NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SCOTT DEAN MARTIN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-35769 

D.C. No. 3:13-cv-05787-KLS 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Karen L. Strombom, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 18, 2018**

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and TROTT and SILVERMAN, Circuit 

Judges

Scott Martin appeals the district court’s decision affirming the 

Commissioner of social Security’s denial of Martin’s application for disability 

insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JAN 22 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 14-35769 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 

1110 (9th Cir. 2012), and we affirm.

In determining that Martin retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to 

perform less than the full range of light work, the administrative law judge (ALJ) 

properly accounted for all limitations supported by substantial evidence. See 

Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008).

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusions regarding limitations 

resulting from obesity and pain. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 

F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that this Court will defer to the ALJ’s 

RFC determination when the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one 

rational interpretation). The ALJ properly rejected medical opinion evidence 

regarding crouching and lifting by discussing other evidence in the record that 

contradicted those limitations. See Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 

F.3d 685, 692-93 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding that the ALJ provided specific and 

legitimate reasons to reject a treating physician’s opinion by discussing other 

evidence in the record that contradicted the opinion); Batson, 359 F.3d at 1198 

(resolving conflicting evidence regarding functional limitations is ALJ’s duty).

Because substantial evidence did not show that obesity or pain disorder had more 

than a minimal effect on Martin’s ability to work prior to his date last insured, the 

ALJ did not err by finding that obesity was not a severe impairment and not 
3 14-35769 

considering whether pain disorder was a severe impairment. See Webb v. Barnhart, 

433 F.3d 683, 686-87 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that an ALJ properly finds an 

impairment is not severe when the medical evidence establishes that it has no more 

than a minimal effect on the claimant’s ability to work). No substantial evidence 

includes additional non-exertional limitations arising from obesity, pain, or carpal 

tunnel syndrome that the ALJ failed to include in the RFC. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 

1198. Any error in failing to include additional limitations is harmless. See StubbsDanielson, 539 F.3d at 1174 (holding that failure to include limitations in the RFC 

is harmless when the ALJ identified jobs that accommodate those limitations).

The ALJ provided several clear and convincing reasons supported by 

substantial evidence to find Martin’s testimony not credible regarding the severity 

of his symptoms. First, objective medical evidence was inconsistent with the 

alleged limitations. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113. Second, no physician opinions 

corroborated the alleged severity of Martin’s limitations. See Burch v. Barnhart, 

400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (including lack of supporting medical evidence 

as one factor that an ALJ can rely on in discrediting claimant testimony). Third, the 

ALJ relied on internal inconsistencies in Martin’s statements throughout the record 

to discredit his testimony. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 

2001). Fourth, failure to comply with treatment recommendations was inconsistent 

with the alleged severity of Martin’s symptoms. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113-14 
4 14-35769 

(concluding that an ALJ may discredit claimant testimony based on an unexplained 

or inadequately explained failure to complete a course of treatment).

The ALJ properly rejected Ms. Venable’s testimony because it largely 

reiterated Martin’s own testimony and was inconsistent with the objective medical 

evidence. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1122 (holding that any error in rejecting lay 

testimony is harmless when the lay testimony is discredited by the same evidence 

used to discredit the claimant’s testimony); Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211,

1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (inconsistency with medical evidence is a germane reason to 

reject lay testimony).

The hypothetical posed to the VE by the ALJ properly incorporated the 

limitations that the ALJ identified in Martin’s RFC. See Stubbs-Danielson, 539 

F.3d at 1175-76 (explaining that the appellant’s contention of error at step five fails 

to raise a fresh issue when it restates the appellant’s arguments of error in assessing 

the RFC).

AFFIRMED.