IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1144

Filed August 30, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

AMY LOIS RASMUSSEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County, Stephen A. Owen, 

District Associate Judge.

Amy Rasmussen challenges the sentences imposed following her Alford

plea. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Maria Ruhtenberg, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, Nick Siefert and Kyle Hanson, Assistant 

Attorneys General, and Kelly Lynch, Law Student, for appellee.

Considered by Schumacher, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Gamble, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 

(2023).
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GAMBLE, Senior Judge.

Amy Rasmussen pleaded guilty to two counts of assault causing bodily 

injury via an Alford plea1in exchange for the dismissal of a related simple 

misdemeanor charge. Rasmussen stipulated the minutes of testimony contained 

strong evidence that could establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and a jury 

could find her guilty. The minutes established that Rasmussen confronted three 

women outside city hall following a city council meeting. Rasmussen pushed L.H. 

over a wall resulting in injuries. She attacked A.B. causing her to fall to the ground. 

Once she was down, Rasmussen struck A.B. multiple times and kicked her 

causing injuries. Rasmussen admitted to police, “I kicked her ass” referring to A.B. 

H.S. was elbowed in the head and witnessed the assault on the other women. 

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss a separate 

charge of simple misdemeanor assault involving H.S. and Rasmussen agreed to 

the entry of a no contact order for H.S. in the case of the other two victims. The 

plea agreement provided the parties were free to argue at sentencing. The 

prosecutor recommended one year incarceration on each count with all but seven 

days suspended to be served concurrently followed by two years of probation. 

Rasmussen requested a deferred judgment and probation. The district court 

sentenced Rasmussen to one year on each serious misdemeanor count of assault 

causing bodily injury to be served consecutively for a term of two years in prison

and entered no contact orders for all three women. 

1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1970) (permitting a criminal 

defendant to enter a guilty plea without admitting guilt by acknowledging strong 

evidence of guilt and voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly agreeing to allow 

the court to consider such strong evidence of guilt in accepting the guilty plea).
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Rasmussen now appeals claiming the district court considered improper 

factors at sentencing and otherwise abused its discretion when imposing 

sentencing. Rasmussen also challenges the district court’s ability to impose a no 

contact order related to the dismissed simple misdemeanor charge.

“‘Our review of a sentence imposed in a criminal case is for correction of 

errors at law.’ We will not reverse a sentence unless there is ‘an abuse of 

discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure.’” State v. Damme, 944 

N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 2020) (internal citations omitted). “An abuse of discretion 

will only be found when a court acts on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent 

clearly unreasonable.” State v. Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Iowa 2015) 

(citation omitted). Because we presume a sentence is valid, “[a] defendant must 

affirmatively show that the sentencing court relied on improper evidence to 

overcome this presumption of validity.” State v. Wickes, 910 N.W.2d 554, 572 

(Iowa 2018).

First, we address good cause. Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2022) 

requires defendants appealing from a guilty plea to any offense other than a class 

“A” felony establish good cause. Good cause is established when a defendant 

appeals the sentence imposed and that sentence is “neither mandatory nor agreed 

to in the plea bargain.” State v. Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Iowa 2022) (quoting 

Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 100). And when a defendant brings multiple claims 

following a guilty plea, once one claim satisfies this requirement all of the

defendant’s claims are properly before this court for review. Id. That is because 

“[a]n appellate court either has jurisdiction over a criminal appeal or it does not. 

Once a defendant crosses the good-cause threshold as to one ground for appeal, 
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the court has jurisdiction over the appeal.” Id. As Rasmussen contends the district 

court considered improper factors when reaching a sentencing determination, and 

the imposed sentence was not mandatory nor agreed to by the parties, she has 

crossed the good-cause threshold, and we consider all of her claims on appeal.

Moving on to the merits of Rasmussen’s appeal, we address her first claim, 

that the district court abused its discretion in imposing sentencing. Rasmussen 

contends the district court improperly considered a victim impact statement from 

the would-be victim associated with the dismissed simple misdemeanor 

charge, H.S. See Iowa Code § 915.10(3) (limiting who qualifies as a “victim” for 

purposes of victim impact statements). While we agree that H.S. did not qualify as 

a victim for the purposes of providing a victim impact statement, we generally “trust 

that our district court, when weighing [victim impact] statements as part of the 

sentencing determination, will filter out improper or irrelevant evidence.” State v. 

Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 764 (Iowa 1998). However, when there is evidence the 

district court actually considered the statement for the purposes of sentencing, 

then we must vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. See State v. 

Matheson, 684 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Iowa 2004) (determining the district court 

considered an impermissible victim impact statement because the court overruled 

an objection to its admission and nothing in the record suggested the court later 

concluded the statement could not be considered). Here, H.S. presented a victim 

impact statement over Rasmussen’s objection, but the court explicitly stated it 

would “consider it only as it concerns the case regarding [H.S.] I do understand 

that there’s going to be some ongoing matter, in terms of a no contact order.” This 

demonstrated the court understood it could not consider H.S.’s statements for 
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purposes of sentencing Rasmussen on the two counts of assault causing bodily 

injury. Given this acknowledgment by the district court, we do not assume the 

court improperly considered the statement when reaching a sentencing 

determination.

Rasmussen also takes issue with the district court relying on her making 

“statements in the community, . . . taking pride in that consequence” and her 

“apparent pride in the offense and her lack of remorse” when reaching its 

sentencing determination. She contends this was based on unproven portions of 

the two victim impact statements given by A.B. and L.H. However, L.H. provided 

a screen shot of Rasmussen’s social media post in which Rasmussen stated, “You 

run pretty well for a gimp!” and included an address and time that corresponded 

with L.H.’s location where L.H. had been walking with a cane as a result of her 

injuries from Rasmussen. We think it was permissible for the district court to 

consider the social media post to conclude Rasmussen lacked remorse and took 

pride in her assault of others. As to Rasmussen’s claim that the district court relied 

on unproven allegations of harassment and domestic abuse contained in A.B. and 

L.H.’s statements, she has shown nothing to suggest the district court relied on 

those allegations and did not filter them out when making a sentencing 

determination, as we presume the district court does. See Sailer, 587 N.W.2d at 

764; State v. Olsen, No. 19-1960, 2020 WL 5650580, at *4–5 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 

23, 2020).

Rasmussen complains the district court did not consider the many letters 

written in support of her, the fact this was a first offense, or any other mitigating 

factor. Indeed, “[a] sentencing court is to consider any mitigating circumstance 
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relating to the defendant.” State v. Crooks, 911 N.W.2d 153, 173 (Iowa 2018) 

(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Witham, 583 N.W.2d 677, 678 (Iowa 1998)).

But Rasmussen’s complaints about the weight the district court placed on certain 

factors, whether complaining the court weighed certain factors too heavily or not 

enough, do not establish the district court abused its discretion. See State v. 

Wright, 340 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Iowa 1983) (“The right of an individual judge to 

balance the relevant factors in determining an appropriate sentence inheres in the 

discretionary standard.”). Likewise, to the extent Rasmussen complains that the 

district court did not adopt either party’s sentencing recommendation and instead 

fashioned an independent sentence within the statutory limits, she cannot show 

the district court abused its discretion. See State v. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d 223, 225 

(Iowa 1996) (“The sentencing court, however, is generally not required to give its 

reasons for rejecting particular sentencing options.”).

The district court provided a thorough explanation of its reasons for rejecting 

the recommendations of counsel and for imposing the maximum sentence 

provided by law. The court considered all of the factors set forth in Iowa Code 

section 907.5 including the mitigating factors. We are satisfied the record supports 

the sentence. See State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 553 (Iowa 2015) (“[A] district

court did not abuse its discretion if the evidence supports the sentence.”). The 

sentencing court did not abuse its discretion. See State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 

720, 724 (Iowa 2002) (“[T]he decision of the district court to impose a particular 

sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, 

and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of 

inappropriate matters.”).
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Next, we address Rasmussen’s claim that the district court could not impose 

the no contact order with respect to H.S. As a result, she argues imposition of the 

no contact order amounted to an illegal sentence. She contends the court could 

not impose the no contact order because the court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction even though she consented to the imposition of the no contact order. 

See State v. Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d 481, 482 (Iowa 1993) (recognizing subject 

matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by consent). In making such contention, she 

notes there was no adjudication of the simple misdemeanor charge related to H.S

because it was dismissed as part of the plea agreement.

But Rasmussen conflates the concepts of subject matter jurisdiction and 

judicial authority. “A constitution or a legislative enactment confers subject matter 

jurisdiction on the courts.” State v. Weiderien, 709 N.W.2d 538, 540 (Iowa 2006) 

(quoting In re Est. of Falck, 672 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Iowa 2003)). Iowa Code 

chapter 664A provides the district court subject matter jurisdiction to enter no 

contact orders against those guilty of a public offense referred to in 

section 664A.2(1). So the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter a 

no contact order. 

The real crux of Rasmussen’s claim is that the district court lacked authority

to enter the no contact order on the dismissed charge. See id. But a party can 

consent to the court’s authority. Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d at 483. Here, Rasmussen 

consented to the no contact order at sentencing and acknowledged that consent 

in her appellate brief. In exchange for the dismissal of the simple misdemeanor 

assault charge involving H.S., Rasmussen agreed the district court would enter a 

no contact order for H.S. in this case. This consent granted the district court 
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authority to issue the no contact order as part of the plea agreement. The State 

likens her consent to the no contact order to instances where a defendant consents 

to the payment of costs and fees associated with dismissed charges as part of a 

plea agreement. See State v. Petrie, 478 N.W.2d 620, 622 (Iowa 1991) (permitting 

parties to consent to payment of costs and fees for dismissed criminal charges as 

part of a plea agreement). We find the two instances to be similar, and the 

comparison reenforces our conclusion that Rasmussen was able to consent to the 

district court’s authority to enter the no contact order even though it related to the 

dismissed charge. As a result, imposition of the no contact order did not result in 

an illegal sentence.

Because Rasmussen cannot demonstrate the district court abused its 

discretion in imposing sentencing or that her sentence was illegal, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.