COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2017COA16 

Court of Appeals No. 16CA0723 

Eagle County District Court No. 15CV30255 

Honorable Russell H. Granger, Judge 

Traer Creek-EXWMT LLC, a Colorado limited liability company, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

Eagle County Board of Equalization, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED 

Division II 

Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES 

Dailey and Berger, JJ., concur 

Announced February 9, 2017 

Otten, Johnson, Robinson, Neff & Ragonetti, P.C., Dimitri Adloff, David P. 

Hutchinson, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant 

Bryan Treu, County Attorney, Christina Hooper, Assistant County Attorney, 

Eagle, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
1 

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Traer Creek-EXWMT LLC (Traer), appeals the district 

court’s judgment dismissing its claims against defendant, Eagle 

County Board of Equalization (the Board), for lack of standing. 

Because we conclude that a mere lessee of property (such as Traer) 

does not have standing to challenge a property tax valuation of 

property that includes the leased property, we affirm.

I. Background 

¶ 2 This appeal concerns the property tax valuation of Chapel 

Square Subdivision Tract B-1 (Tract B) for the tax year 2015. Tract 

B is a parcel of land that has a commercial retail building on it. 

Tract B has been subject to a lease since 1987, and since 2002 

Traer has been the lessee.1 Under a “Declaration of Easements,” 

Traer is contractually obligated to pay the property taxes “directly to 

the appropriate taxing authorities.” But since assuming the lease, 

Traer has not paid the property taxes directly to the taxing 

authority; the owner has made those payments and Traer has 

reimbursed the owner. 

 

1 The parties appear to dispute whether the lease covers all of Tract 

B, but we do not need to resolve that dispute. 
2 

¶ 3 On May 1, 2015, the Eagle County Assessor mailed the owner 

a notice of valuation regarding Tract B. Traer (but not the owner) 

initiated the statutory protest and adjustment process to challenge 

the 2015 valuation of Tract B. The assessor issued a notice of 

determination declining to adjust the valuation. 

¶ 4 Traer appealed the notice of determination to the Board. The 

Board upheld the valuation.

¶ 5 Undaunted, Traer appealed the Board’s decision to district 

court pursuant to section 39-8-108, C.R.S. 2016.2 

¶ 6 The Board moved to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) on the 

theory that a mere lessee does not have standing to challenge a 

property tax valuation of the sort issued by the assessor. The 

district court agreed and dismissed the case. 

II. Discussion 

¶ 7 Traer contends that the district court erred in ruling that it 

does not have statutory or common law standing, and that factual 

 

2 Traer joined CSB Properties Holdings LLC, one of the owners, as a 

defendant because CSB declined to join as a plaintiff. CSB did not 

file an answer or other pleadings, and the district court entered a 

“clerk’s default” against CSB.
3 

determinations underlying the court’s ruling are incorrect. We 

address and reject each contention in turn. 

A. Statutory Standing 

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law 

¶ 8 We review questions of standing and statutory interpretation 

de novo. 1405 Hotel, LLC v. Colo. Econ. Dev. Comm’n, 2015 COA 

127, ¶ 36; Krol v. CF & I Steel, 2013 COA 32, ¶ 15 n.2. 

¶ 9 Our primary goals in interpreting a statute are to discern and 

give effect to the General Assembly’s intent. Krol, ¶ 15. 

We look first to the statutory language, giving 

the words and phrases used therein their plain 

and ordinary meanings. We read the language 

in the dual contexts of the statute as a whole 

and the comprehensive statutory scheme, 

giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible 

effect to all of the statute’s language. 

Id. (citation omitted). 

2. Analysis 

¶ 10 Traer argues that because it “owns” an interest in property — 

albeit a leasehold interest — it has standing under the statutory 

scheme to object to and protest a valuation. To show why Traer is 

wrong, we walk through the objection and protest process laid out 

by the applicable statutes, beginning with the notice of valuation. 
4 

¶ 11 Section 39-5-121(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2016, provides that “the 

assessor shall mail to each person who owns land or improvements 

a notice setting forth the valuation of such land or improvements.” 

When the valuation in question concerns the fee interest in real 

property, the statutory phrase “owns land” is most naturally 

understood as referring to a fee owner, not someone with a mere 

leasehold interest in property. Thus, only the fee owner of real 

property need be notified of a tax valuation of that owner’s real 

property. 

¶ 12 This understanding of owner in this context is confirmed by 

section 39-5-102(1), C.R.S. 2016, which says that “[o]wnership of 

real property shall be ascertained by the assessor from the records 

of the county clerk and recorder.” Such records typically identify 

fee owners, but not necessarily lessees.3 And this understanding 

also makes sense in light of the fact that only fee owners of real 

property are liable to the taxing authority for taxes assessed 

pursuant to a valuation of real property. See Cantina Grill, JV v. 

 

3 Traer notes that the Declaration of Easements describing the 

lessee’s tax obligation was recorded in the county land records. 

However, this document was not recorded to demonstrate 

ownership, and Traer is not mentioned in the document. 
5 

City & Cty. of Denver Cty. Bd. of Equalization, 2015 CO 15, ¶ 20 

(even if there are taxable interests in property that are less than fee 

ownership, the property is taxed to the fee owner). 

¶ 13 Section 39-5-122(1)(a), C.R.S. 2016, outlines the “[t]axpayer’s 

remedies to correct errors” after valuation. It reads in relevant part 

that 

after notices of adjusted valuation are mailed 

to taxpayers, the assessor will sit to hear all 

objections and protests concerning valuations 

of taxable real property determined by the 

assessor for the current year; [and] that, for a 

taxpayer’s objection and protest to be heard, 

notice must be given to the assessor. 

The reference to “notices . . . mailed to taxpayers” clearly refers to 

the notices mailed pursuant to section 39-5-121(1)(a)(I). Since 

those notices are, with respect to real property, mailed to owners, 

and “owners” in this context means fee owners, “taxpayers” as used 

in section 39-5-122(1)(a) means those fee owners to whom the 

assessor sent notices. 

¶ 14 Under subsection (2) of section 39-5-122, “[i]f any person is of 

the opinion that his or her property has been valued too high, . . . 

he or she may appear before the assessor and object.” Considered 

in conjunction with subsection (1), a “person” referred to in 
6 

subsection (2) is a “taxpayer.” And as discussed, a taxpayer to 

whom a notice of valuation of real property has been sent is a fee 

owner. At least this is so when the valuation is of the fee interest in 

the land, as it was in this case, for the objection may be made only 

as to the “property” that “has been valued.” An assessor values real 

property as a whole, regardless of any leasehold interests in the 

property, and the fee owner is responsible for paying the tax. 

Cantina Grill, ¶ 20. 

¶ 15 Thus far, therefore, this much is clear: the fee owner is the 

only party given statutory standing to object to and protest the 

assessor’s valuation of real property in fee. And once the assessor 

decides such an objection and protest, the statutes governing 

further review of that decision make clear that they do not expand 

the class of persons with standing. 

¶ 16 Under section 39-8-106, C.R.S. 2016, the county board of 

equalization must “hear petitions from any person whose objections 

or protests have been refused or denied by the assessor.” The 

“person” referred to in this section is plainly the “person” who had 

standing to first object to and protest the valuation with the 

assessor under section 39-5-122. If “the petitioner’s” petition is 
7 

denied by the board, section 39-8-108 allows “the petitioner” to 

appeal that denial. The “petitioner” is the “person” who filed the 

petition under section 39-8-106; that “person” is the “taxpayer” who 

objected under section 39-5-122; and that “taxpayer” is, in turn, 

the owner who received the notice of valuation pursuant to section 

39-5-121. See Tenney v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 856 P.2d 89, 

91 (Colo. App. 1993) (“[T]he term ‘petitioner,’ as used in these 

statutes, has been interpreted as meaning the taxpayer for the 

property.”). 

¶ 17 In sum, the relevant statutes expressly limit the right of review 

in this context to a property owner to whom a notice of valuation is 

sent as required by statute. “[W]hen a statute creates a cause of 

action and designates those who may sue under it, none except 

those designated may sue,” and “we are without authority to 

expand [that class].” Berry Props. v. City of Commerce City, 667 

P.2d 247, 249 (Colo. App. 1983); see Tenney, 856 P.2d at 90 (“If a 

statute designates those who may bring an action, only those 

parties so designated have standing to do so.”). 

¶ 18 We are not persuaded to the contrary by Traer’s argument that 

because section 39-1-102(16), C.R.S. 2016, defines “taxable 
8 

property” as including “all property, real or personal, not expressly 

exempted from taxation by law,” and since section 39-1-102(14) 

defines “real property” as including “all . . . interests in lands,” it 

may challenge any assessment relating to the underlying property 

under section 39-5-122. Even if Traer is a “person” as that term is 

defined in section 39-1-102(9), it is not a person whose “property 

has been valued too high.” § 39-5-122(2). The assessor did not 

separately value Traer’s alleged “property” — its leasehold interest; 

the assessor valued the fee ownership interest in the property. 

Traer does not have such an interest. 

¶ 19 Traer’s reliance on cases addressing abatement and refund 

proceedings4 is equally misplaced. Traer is not seeking a tax 

abatement and refund — a process that occurs after the property 

tax is paid. Rather, Traer seeks to protest and adjust the property 

valuation, which is a procedure that occurs before the tax is paid. 

 

4 See Hughey v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 921 P.2d 76, 79 

(Colo. App. 1996) (purchaser of a tax lien did not have standing to 

petition for abatement); Wyler/Pebble Creek Ranch v. Colo. Bd. of 

Assessment Appeals, 883 P.2d 597 (Colo. App. 1994) (taxpayer 

sought abatement); Telluride Reg’l Airport Auth. v. Bd. of 

Equalization, 789 P.2d 201 (Colo. App. 1989) (lessee had standing 

to petition for abatement under § 39-9-108); Gunnison Cty. v. Bd. of 

Assessment Appeals, 693 P.2d 400 (Colo. App. 1984) (county 

sought property tax abatement). 
9 

These two procedures are not identical as “[t]he protest and 

adjustment procedures and the abatement and refund procedures 

are separate and independent administrative procedures for the 

adjudication of property tax disputes which are governed by 

different statutes.” Wyler/Pebble Creek Ranch v. Colo. Bd. of 

Assessment Appeals, 883 P.2d 597, 599 (Colo. App. 1994); see 

Huerfano Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Atl. Richfield Co., 976 P.2d 

893, 896 (Colo. App. 1999) (same). 

¶ 20 Therefore, based on the plain language in the statutes 

governing valuation protest and adjustment, we conclude that the 

district court did not err in ruling that Traer lacks standing to 

challenge the valuation of Tract B. 

B. Common Law Standing 

¶ 21 Traer contends that it has standing under common law 

principles because it pays the taxes on Tract B, and because the 

land owner granted it agency authority to challenge the valuation. 

¶ 22 Traer’s contention falters at the outset because when a statute 

limits standing to bring a particular kind of action, a court may not 

effectively disregard that limitation by employing notions of 

common law standing. Tenney, 856 P.2d at 90; Berry Props., 667 
10 

P.2d at 249. As discussed, the relevant statutes deny Traer 

standing.5

C. Factual Findings 

¶ 23 Traer contends that the district court improperly adopted the 

Board’s factual assertions regarding the amount of space Traer 

leases and the amount of tax liability for which Traer is directly 

responsible under the Declaration of Easements. But the amount 

of leased space and Traer’s liability to the owner are irrelevant to 

the question of standing under the governing statutes. So any error 

as to those facts is harmless. See C.R.C.P. 61. 

III. Conclusion 

¶ 24 The judgment is affirmed. 

JUDGE DAILEY and JUDGE BERGER concur. 

 

5 We also observe that the letter allegedly granting Traer agency 

authority is not typed on letterhead, and it is unclear who signed 

the letter as the signature is illegible and there is no printed 

signature. Further, the property was owned by two separate 

entities during tax year 2015, and Traer has never claimed to have 

permission from CSB to appeal the valuation. In fact, CSB has 

been unresponsive through the valuation appeal process. Traer 

joined CSB as a co-defendant in this case. We will not interpret 

CSB’s unresponsiveness as granting Traer authority to act as its 

agent.