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SCWC-18-0000704

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I

________________________________________________________________

DL,

Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

CL,

Respondent/Defendant-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

(CAAP-18-0000704; FC-D NO. 16-1-1014)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(By: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Wilson, and Eddins, JJ.)

I. INTRODUCTION

This case arises from the Family Court of the First 

Circuit’s determination of child custody, child support, and 

alimony in a divorce proceeding between DL (Father) and CL 

(Mother).

Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant Father appeals from the 

Intermediate Court of Appeals’ (ICA) July 29, 2021 Judgment on 

Appeal pursuant to its Memorandum Opinion vacating in part the 

family court’s June 5, 2018 Order Re: Motion and Declaration for 

Pre-Decree Relief and the July 16, 2018 Order Re: Plaintiff’s 

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCWC-18-0000704

28-JAN-2022

07:47 AM

Dkt. 9 MO
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Motion for Reconsideration of Order Re: Motion and Declaration 

for Pre-Decree Relief, with regard to alimony; vacating the 

August 13, 2018 Order Granting Defendant’s Attorneys’ Fees and 

Costs; and remanding for proceedings consistent with the 

opinion. More specifically, the ICA remanded to the family

court to recalculate the amount of delinquent pre-decree 

temporary child support, and to determine whether good cause 

existed to bifurcate with regard to past alimony.

In his current application for certiorari1, Father 

presents two questions:

[1] Did the ICA gravely err by finding bifurcation by 

the family court and remanding this case to the family 

court to determine whether good cause existed for the 

family court, post-trial and sua sponte, to “bifurcate” the 

issue of pre-decree spousal support requested by CL?

[2] Did the ICA gravely err in affirming the family 

court’s decision, made after entry of the divorce decree, 

to award past child support applicable to the time before 

the decree?

For the following reasons, we vacate the ICA’s 

judgment on appeal to the extent it holds that the “Mother’s 

April 18, 2018 Motion and Declaration for Pre-Decree Relief was 

in the nature of an enforcement action to collect delinquent 

pre-decree temporary child support.” DL v. CL, 149 Hawai‘i 206, 

485 P.3d 1118, 2021 WL 1614343 at *7 (App. Apr. 26, 2021)

 1 For a summary of the prior appeals in this matter, see DL v. CL, 149 

Hawai‘i 206, 485 P.3d 1118, 2021 WL 1614343 at *1-3 (App. Apr. 26, 2021) (DL 

IV).
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(DL IV) (emphasis omitted). In all other respects, the ICA’s 

judgment is affirmed. 

II. BACKGROUND

Father and Mother married in 2008 and have two 

children, both of whom were minors at the time of the divorce 

proceedings. In 2015, Father, Mother, and children moved from 

Sacramento, California, to Honolulu to live in a cottage located 

on Father’s parents’ property. 

On July 9, 2016, Mother took both children with her to 

Arizona due to alleged abuse by Father. Father then filed a 

Motion and Declaration for Pre-Decree Relief on August 12, 2016. 

The family court2 heard Father’s motion on September 19, 2016, 

and awarded Mother temporary physical custody of the children in 

Arizona, pending further proceedings. Three months later, on 

December 16, 2016, the family court ordered Father to pay child 

support in the amount of $1,381 per child for a total of $2,762 

per month commencing November 1, 2016. The family court order 

did not mention alimony. 

Mother and Father stipulated to, inter alia, the 

appointment of a custody evaluator on January 19, 2017. 

Following the custody evaluation, Father filed a Motion for the 

Immediate Return of the Children to the State of Hawai‘i. On 

 2 The Honorable Gale L.F. Ching presided over all proceedings.
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May 12, 2017, the family court granted in part and denied in 

part Father’s motion, and in particular, granted Father and 

Mother joint legal and physical custody. The court’s order, 

however, specified that “[p]ending the Trial, [Father] shall 

have physical custody of the Minors” in Hawai‘i, and “[a]ll prior 

orders not inconsistent with this Order shall remain in full 

force and effect.” The order did not specifically address child 

support or alimony. 

Mother returned to Hawai‘i with the children in May 

2017, and Father stopped making child support payments after 

July. Mother then filed a motion seeking, inter alia, that 

Father not have sole physical custody, that custody should 

instead follow a timesharing plan, and that Father should be 

required to pay Mother $2,762 per month for child support and 

$4,500 per month for alimony. On June 21, 2017, the family 

court ordered Mother and Father to mediation to resolve issues, 

including physical custody, child support, and alimony.3 On July 

26, 2017, following mediation, Mother and Father filed a 

stipulation agreeing to share physical custody equally pending 

trial, and to address the issues of temporary child support and 

temporary alimony “at trial together.” Eight days later, on 

August 3, 2017, the family court ordered that Mother’s request 

 3 The Honorable Michael A. Town conducted the mediation.
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for temporary alimony from June 1, 2017 and Father’s request to 

modify or terminate temporary child support “[would] be added to 

the issues to resolve at trial.” 

The trial lasted twelve days over a six-month period. 

After the trial ended on January 8, 2018, the family court 

issued its First Amended Order Re: Evidentiary Hearing on March 

16, 2018, which in relevant part, provides:

3. Re: Child Support.

As to any past unpaid child support amount that is 

allegedly outstanding, the Parties are ordered to “meet and 

confer” on this matter within fourteen (14) days after 

receipt of this order to discuss this matter. In the event 

that the Parties are unable to reach an amicable 

resolution, then either Party may file a motion with the 

Court.

. . .

5. Re: Alimony.

As to any past alimony amount that is allegedly 

outstanding, the Parties are ordered to “meet and confer”

on this matter within fourteen (14) days after receipt of 

this order to discuss this matter. In the event that the 

Parties are unable to reach an amicable resolution, then 

either Party may file a motion with the Court.

As part of its First Amended Order Re: Evidentiary 

Hearing, the family court also ordered Mother and Father to 

“meet and confer” regarding the Divorce Decree. Additionally, 

in the event the Parties did not reach a resolution, each party 

was instructed to submit a draft Divorce Decree within seven

days of the “meet and confer” conference. 

On March 29, 2018, Mother submitted a Notice of 

Submission, stating that “both parties met and conferred . . . 

but no agreement on the language of the Decree was reached,” and 
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filed her proposed Divorce Decree with the court. Father filed 

a similar notice on April 3, 2018. According to Father’s 

proposed Divorce Decree, “Neither party owes the other back 

child support for any period of time . . . [and] [t]he Court, 

having found both Parties to be able to obtain gainful 

employment and presently employed, therefore denies any award of 

alimony.” 

On April 9, 2018, Father filed his objections to 

Mother’s proposed Divorce Decree. Among his objections were the 

following: 

9. [The family court’s First Amended Order Re: 

Evidentiary Hearing] ordered Plaintiff to pay child support 

of $2,873 per month retroactive to February 1, 2018. 

Paragraph 9 of Defendant’s proposed decree presents 

Defendant’s desired version of child support on terms that 

have not been agreed or ordered by the Court. After trial 

ended Defendant left the children under the sole physical 

care of Plaintiff. If anyone should pay child support 

retroactive to February 1, 2018, it should be Defendant. 

Plaintiff objects to the retroactivity of an award of child 

support and objects to the amount of child support as 

unsubstantiated by the record or any identified rationale. 

As to the form of proposed decree, Plaintiff objects to the 

inclusion of anything more than is stated in the Order.

10. Plaintiff objects to paragraph 10 of Defendant’s 

proposed decree. The issue of Past Child Support was 

specifically reserved and identified as an issue to be 

decided at trial. Trial concluded and the Court did not 

award past child support. In any event, Past Child Support 

is inappropriate, as the parties shared equal physical 

custody of the Children until Defendant left, and at all 

times have had effectively identical earning capacities, 

thereby rendering an award of child support improper during 

that time.

Prior to the family court issuing its Divorce Decree, 

Mother filed a Motion and Declaration for Pre-Decree Relief on 

April 18, 2018, requesting, among other things, that Father be 
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ordered to pay $16,572 in child support and $5,501.68 in alimony 

($22,073.68 total) for the period June 2017 to January 2018 

(which was when the evidentiary portion of the trial concluded). 

According to Mother, she presented evidence during trial to 

support her request for temporary alimony and child support. 

On April 26, 2018, the family court granted Mother’s 

proposed Divorce Decree. The decree states in relevant part:

10. PAST CHILD SUPPORT. Pursuant to the First 

Amended Order Re: Evidentiary Hearing, filed March 16, 2018 

counsel for the parties met and conferred on March 27, 2018 

regarding the issue of past temporary child support. 

However, no agreement was reached. Pursuant to the First 

Amended Order Re: Evidentiary Hearing, either party can 

file a motion with the Court to address this issue.

. . . 

13. ALIMONY/PAST TEMPORARY ALIMONY. Pursuant to 

the First Amended Order Re: Evidentiary Hearing, filed on 

March 16, 2018, counsel for the parties met and conferred 

on March 27, 2018 regarding the issue of past temporary 

alimony. However, no agreement was reached. Pursuant to 

the First Amended Order Re: Evidentiary Hearing, either 

party can file a motion with the Court to address this

issue.

. . . 

21. PRESENT AND FUTURE CLAIMS WAIVED. The parties 

shall release each other and relinquish all claims they 

have, or may have had with each other, whether growing out 

of their relationship as Husband and Wife or otherwise, 

from the beginning of time, either known or unknown, 

discovered or undiscovered, until the present. This means 

that the parties cannot (because they have voluntarily 

given up their rights to do so) sue or make any legal 

claims against each other based on any relationship they 

have had from the beginning of time to the present, whether 

they are aware of these claims or not, or even if they 

discover these claims in the future.

. . .

23. RETENTION OF COURT’S JURISDICTION. Unless 

otherwise provided by statute, court rule or case law, the 

parties shall agree and by the Court’s approval of this 

Decree, the Court shall so order that until there has been 
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a final division and distribution of property in accordance 

with the terms of this Decree, and payment of all 

obligations required under this Decree, the Court shall 

retain jurisdiction over the parties and all properties 

mentioned herein, and retains the authority to issue any 

and all orders respecting the parties or properties in 

order to effect the intent of the parties herein and/or to 

facilitate the division and distribution of the various 

property interests, and payment of all obligations herein.

A week after the Divorce Decree was entered, the 

family court heard Mother’s April 18, 2018 Motion for Pre-Decree 

Relief. On June 5, 2018, the court entered its order, granting 

in part and denying in part Mother’s April 18, 2018 motion. The 

order, in relevant part, granted “monthly child support for the 

period from August 2017 through January 2018 in the amount of 

$5,232.00 . . . [and] alimony for the period of June 2017 to 

July 2017 and from August 2017 through January 2018 in the 

amount of $16,694.00.” The family court also granted Mother’s 

request for reimbursement relating to spring break travel in the 

amount of $913.94. In total, Mother was awarded $22,839.94. 

The family court, however, did not explain its rationale for the 

award. The court also granted Mother’s request for attorneys’ 

fees and costs associated with bringing the motion, and required 

Mother to submit a declaration “itemizing the requested 

attorney[s’] fees and costs.” Mother submitted a declaration 

requesting $7,066.86 for fees and costs, which the family court 

awarded on August 13, 2018. 

On appeal, the ICA vacated the June 5, 2018 Order Re: 

Motion and Declaration for Pre-Decree Relief with regard to 
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alimony; the July 16, 2018 Order Re: Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Reconsideration with regard to alimony; and the August 13, 2018 

Order Granting Defendant’s Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. 

Additionally, the ICA remanded to family court to recalculate 

the amount of delinquent pre-decree temporary child support and 

a determination of whether good cause existed for bifurcation of 

the issue of pre-decree temporary alimony and, if so, an entry 

of findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine such a 

determination. As to pre-decree temporary child support, the 

ICA concluded that child support becomes a liquidated sum and is 

therefore enforceable once it becomes due and payment is not 

made. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, the 

family court’s decision will not be disturbed unless the family 

court disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the 

substantial detriment of a party litigant . . . [and its] 

decision clearly exceed[ed] the bounds of reason.” In Interest

of Doe, 77 Hawaiʻi 109, 115, 883 P.2d 30, 36 (1994) (alterations

in original) (quoting Bennett v. Bennett, 8 Haw. App. 415, 416, 

807 P.2d 597, 599 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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IV. DISCUSSION

A. The ICA Did Not Gravely Err When It Concluded That the 

Family Court Bifurcated, and Remanded Back to Family 

Court to Determine Good Cause as to Alimony

Father asks this court to provide “further guidance” 

to ensure that the family court makes a proper determination of 

whether bifurcation is warranted and to “promote finality and 

avoid protracted, piecemeal litigation.” In other words, 

according to Father, family court should be required “to enter 

its financial orders at the same time it enters a divorce 

decree.” We disagree. The language of HRS § 580-47(a) (Supp. 

2011) clearly and unambiguously provides two conditions for a 

family court to exercise its authority to bifurcate: either “by 

agreement of both parties or by order of court after finding 

that good cause exists.” 

In support of his argument, Father cites to Gordon v. 

Gordon, 135 Hawai‘i 340, 350 P.3d 1008 (2015) for the proposition 

that while the family court has wide discretion pursuant to HRS 

§ 580-47, the family court “strives for a certain degree of 

uniformity, stability, clarity or predictability in its 

decision-making and thus are compelled to apply the appropriate 

law to the facts of each case and be guided by reason and 

conscience to attain a just result.” Id. at 352, 350 P.3d at 

1020 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tougas v. 

Tougas, 76 Hawai‘i 19, 28, 868 P.2d 437, 446 (1994)). Father 
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argues that bifurcating proceedings would “result[] in piecemeal 

litigation,” and so should be avoided. While Father correctly 

cites to our opinion in Gordon, uniformity and predictability 

are not mandates, but important considerations. Indeed, this 

court has concluded that the family court “must exercise its 

discretion within the framework provided by our law.” Id. at 

352, 350 P.3d at 1020. And under HRS § 580-47(a), the framework 

that the family court must consider when making further orders, 

either after agreement by both parties or a finding of good 

cause, includes: 

[T]he respective merits of the parties, the relative 

abilities of the parties, the condition in which each party 

will be left by the divorce, the burdens imposed upon 

either party for the benefit of the children of the 

parties, the concealment of or failure to disclose income 

or an asset, or violation of a restraining order issued 

under section 580-10(a)[.]

HRS § 580-47(a); see Gordon, 135 Hawai‘i at 352-53, 350 P.3d at 

1020-21.

Remand may be proper where the family court, like 

here, fails to make adequate findings under HRS § 580-47. In 

Gordon, this court concluded that the ICA erred when it affirmed 

the family court’s award for marital assets “absent a finding . 

. . regarding the date the divorce commenced[,]” because doing 

so made it “unclear” as to what qualified as a chargeable 

reduction in marital assets. Gordon, 135 Hawai‘i at 355, 350 

P.3d at 1023. Unlike in Gordon, here, the ICA correctly ruled 
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that the family court did not “make a specific finding of good 

cause” to bifurcate. DL IV, 2021 WL 1614343 at *7. We disagree 

with Father that it was improper to remand in these 

circumstances. The family court clearly exercised its 

discretion to reserve a decision on past alimony and child 

support, since it explicitly omitted those issues from the 

matters resolved in its March 16, 2018 First Amended Order. 

However, the family court failed to adequately explain its 

reasons for doing so. It was, therefore, appropriate for the 

ICA to remand to family court to determine if good cause existed 

to bifurcate. 

1. A mandate that “intertwined issues [be] decided 

together” would be improper

It is unclear whether Father seeks (1) a holding that 

the family court erred in considering alimony and child support 

separately from the divorce proceeding, or (2) a holding that

more generally mandates that any time the family court is faced 

with “intertwined issues” such as “various financial aspects 

(property division, child support and spousal support),” the 

issues must be decided together. In our view, neither is 

warranted.

This court has consistently held that the family court 

has “wide discretion.” For example, we have held that HRS 

§ 580-47 precludes our appellate courts “from narrowing the 
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discretion available to the various family courts by 

establishing and mandating adherence to uniform categories, 

[uniform starting points], uniform limits on the range of 

choice, and uniform procedures.” Gussin v. Gussin, 73 Haw. 470, 

478, 836 P.2d 484, 489 (1992) (quoting Bennett, 8 Haw. App. at 

422, 807 P.2d at 601-02). Moreover, in Gussin, we concluded 

that:

When the directive to the court is to do what is just and 

equitable in the circumstances, of course, each case must 

be decided upon its own facts and circumstances. . . . 

[D]iscretion denotes the absence of a hard and fast rule. 

When involved as a guide to judicial action it means a 

sound discretion, that is to say, a discretion exercised 

not arbitrarily or wilfully, but with regard to what is 

right and equitable under the circumstances and the law, 

and directed by the reason and conscience of the judge to a 

just result. This court has avoided, where possible, the 

adoption of general rules governing the division of marital 

assets, because such general rules create rebuttable 

presumptions, which narrow the discretion of family court 

judges, and are thus repugnant to HRS § 580-47.

Id. at 479-80, 836 P.2d at 489 (citations omitted) (quoting 

Myers v. Myers, 70 Haw. 143, 764 P.2d 1237 (1988) and Booker v. 

MidPac Lumber Co., 65 Haw. 166, 172, 649 P.2d 376, 382 (1982)) 

(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

Our decision in Kakinami v. Kakinami, 125 Hawai‘i 308, 

260 P.3d 1126 (2011), is instructive. There, the Respondent 

filed a motion to bifurcate the divorce proceeding and the 

division of property and debts. The question on appeal was 

which standard should apply for bifurcation in divorce cases. 

Id. at 309-12, 260 P.3d at 1127-30. The petitioner in Kakinami, 
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similar to Father in this case, argued that “[s]trong policy 

reasons support requiring family courts to decide all four parts 

[of a divorce case] at the same time [ ] absent exceptional 

circumstances. Such reasons include avoiding piecemeal divorce 

trials, which could result in multiple appeals, clogging both 

trial calendars and appellate dockets.” Id. at 314, 260 P.3d at 

1132 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). This court concluded that while “there may be valid 

policy reasons for imposing a stricter standard for bifurcation 

in divorce proceedings, HRS § 570-47(a) states that the 

appropriate standard to be applied is good cause.” Id. 

Additionally, “it is not the role of this court to alter a 

statutory requirement in order to effect policy considerations 

that are vested in the legislature.” Id. at 315, 260 P.3d at 

1133. Our rationale in Kakinami applies here. If the 

legislature wanted to provide a stricter standard for 

bifurcation in divorce proceedings, it could have done so. It 

is not our place to read into the statute what is not there.

2. “Good cause” should not be limited

Father argues that “[a]ny suggestion that Hawai‘i’s 

family court has broad discretion to delay ruling on issues that 

have already been tried, particularly absent a request from a 

party and without a substantial basis rooted in avoiding 

meaningful prejudice to a party, is simply untenable.” 
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(Emphasis added.) Father also argues that the “good cause”

standard, according to our case law, has only been applied to 

“requests made by a party that a divorce be granted prior to 

trial on the remaining issues.” 

Father misreads the statute. According to HRS § 580-

47(a), “jurisdiction of those matters is reserved under the 

decree by agreement of both parties or by order of court after 

finding that good cause exists.” (Emphasis added.) Here, while 

the parties stipulated to have all the issues be tried together 

at once, that does not end the analysis as the court may 

bifurcate sua sponte upon finding good cause. As our decision 

in Kakinami notes, the statute is clear that the standard for 

bifurcation is good cause, and that any alteration to that 

standard is “vested in the legislature.” 125 Hawai‘i at 314-15, 

260 P.3d 1132-33. There is nothing in the statute that 

precludes the family court from ordering bifurcation despite the 

parties’ stipulation to the contrary. 

Furthermore, Father asserts that if the family court 

had intended to sua sponte bifurcate, “any such determination 

must be the product of the court’s own thinking and based on the 

record that existed at the time.” We agree; the same point was 

addressed by the ICA when it remanded back to the family court 

“to determine whether good cause existed for bifurcation[.]” DL 

IV, 2021 WL 1614343 at *7. Remanding allows the family court to 
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develop the record as to whether there was good cause to 

bifurcate.

3. The Divorce Decree did not divest the family court

of jurisdiction as to issues regarding past alimony 

and past child support

Father argues that once the Divorce Decree was 

entered, the family court lost jurisdiction over the remaining 

issues. Father points to Paragraph 21 of the Divorce Decree, 

which states in relevant part:

21. PRESENT AND FUTURE CLAIMS WAIVED. The parties shall 

release each other and relinquish all claims they have, or may 

have had with each other, whether growing out of their 

relationship as Husband and Wife or otherwise, from the beginning 

of time, either known or unknown, discovered or undiscovered, 

until the present. This means that the parties cannot (because 

they have voluntarily given up their rights to do so) sue or make 

any legal claims against each other based on any relationship 

they have had from the beginning of time to the present, whether 

they are aware of these claims or not, or even if they discover 

these claims in the future.

But Father disregards the other clauses in the Divorce 

Decree that explicitly carve out two issues to be addressed 

post-decree. As Mother and the ICA pointed out, the other parts 

of the Divorce Decree4 provide in relevant part:

 4 The Divorce Decree also provides that: 

Both the Plaintiff and Defendant acknowledge that they have 

carefully read this Divorce Decree and all the other 

supporting financial and other supporting financial and 

other documentation pertinent to this matter. . . . This 

document is the complete and final expression of all 

agreements made by the parties to this divorce. There are 

no other express or implied promises, or agreements, which 

are not set forth herein. Each party acknowledges that he 

or she has knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily 

executed this Decree with sufficient knowledge of the 

facts, the respective finances and the applicable law, and 

this Decree is fair and reasonable. 

 (continued...)
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10. PAST CHILD SUPPORT. Pursuant to the First 

Amended Order Re: Evidentiary Hearing, filed March 16, 2018 

counsel for the parties met and conferred on March 27, 2018 

regarding the issue of past temporary child support. 

However, no agreement was reached. Pursuant to the First 

Amended Order Re: Evidentiary Hearing, either party can 

file a motion with the Court to address this issue.

. . . 

13. ALIMONY/PAST TEMPORARY ALIMONY. Pursuant to 

the First Amended Order Re: Evidentiary Hearing, filed on 

March 16, 2018, counsel for the parties met and conferred 

on March 27, 2018 regarding the issue of past temporary 

alimony. However, no agreement was reached. Pursuant to 

the First Amended Order Re: Evidentiary Hearing, either 

party can file a motion with the Court to address this

issue.

As noted above, the Divorce Decree explicitly 

contemplated that these two issues would be addressed postdecree by filing a motion with the family court. The past child 

support and past alimony carve-outs and the waiver clause can 

thus be read in harmony, with the carve-outs not subject to the 

waiver.

Moreover, Paragraph 23 provides:

23. RETENTION OF COURT’S JURISDICTION. Unless 

otherwise provided by statute, court rule or case law, the 

parties shall agree and by the Court’s approval of this 

Decree, the Court shall so order that until there has been 

a final division and distribution of property in accordance 

with the terms of this Decree, and payment of all 

obligations required under this Decree, the Court shall 

retain jurisdiction over the parties and all properties 

mentioned herein, and retains the authority to issue any 

and all orders respecting the parties or properties in 

order to effect the intent of the parties herein and/or to 

facilitate the division and distribution of the various 

property interests, and payment of all obligations herein.

 

(continued...)

On appeal, Father contends that he never agreed to the form 

of the Divorce Decree, which was drafted by counsel for Mother.
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(Emphasis added.)

Although this provision focuses on property, 

nevertheless, it sweeps more broadly such that the family court

retained jurisdiction over allegedly unpaid alimony and child 

support.

B. The ICA Erred in Concluding That Past Child Support Was 

in the Nature of an Enforcement Action

The ICA read two paragraphs in the Divorce Decree -

that Father characterizes as “essentially-identical” -

differently. On the one hand, the ICA concluded that as to 

alimony, the family court erred when it did not make a finding 

of good cause when it bifurcated. On the other hand, the ICA 

concluded that the motion for past child support, pursuant to 

Mother’s April 18, 2018 Motion for Pre-Decree Relief, “was in 

the nature of an enforcement action.” Accordingly, the ICA 

ruled that “the family court had jurisdiction to decide that 

issue.” DL IV, 2021 WL 1614343. 

As discussed above, the ICA did not err when it 

vacated and remanded to the family court to determine whether 

good cause existed for bifurcation of the issue of pre-decree 

temporary alimony. While the Divorce Decree does include a 

waiver clause, it does not extinguish the family court’s 

discretion to address past alimony because of the paragraph 

carving out that specific issue, as well as the paragraph that 
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maintains the family court’s jurisdiction until all obligations 

are paid. However, with respect to child support, we disagree 

with the ICA and therefore remand to family court to also make a 

finding of good cause as to bifurcation as to child support. In 

other words, the ICA erred by treating the family court’s 

disposition of child support differently from its disposition of 

alimony. The family court retained jurisdiction over both 

issues, subject only to a finding of good cause for bifurcating 

them from the Divorce Decree.

Father argues that the ICA misapplied Lindsey v. 

Lindsey, 6 Haw. App. 201, 716 P.2d 496 (1986), when it 

“incorrectly concluded that CL’s claims survived the waiver 

within the divorce decree.” We agree with Father that the ICA 

misapplied Lindsey, but for other reasons. 

In Lindsey, the family court issued an Interlocutory 

Decree of Divorce that required the ex-husband to pay child 

support in the amount of $70 per month. 6 Haw. App. at 202-03, 

716 P.2d at 498. The family court reaffirmed the child support 

amount in the Final Decree of Divorce. Id. The ex-husband 

appealed and raised multiple questions to the ICA, including 

“[w]hen does a court-ordered child support payment become an 

enforceable decree?” Id. The ICA concluded once child support 

“becomes due and payment is not made,” that amount becomes a 
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“liquidated sum.” Id. at 204, 716 P.2d at 499 (quoting Smith v. 

Smith, 643 S.W.2d 523, 524 (Tex. 1982)). 

Lindsey is not applicable here. While in Lindsey, the 

ex-husband was ordered to pay child support as a result of both 

the Interlocutory Degree of Divorce and the Final Decree of 

Divorce, here, Father did not have a similar mandate. When the 

family court granted Mother’s proposed Divorce Decree, it 

adopted the specific carve-outs regarding past alimony and past 

child support. Stated differently, orders regarding Father’s 

past child support obligations did not become “due” when the 

family court declined to address the issue. Therefore, Mother’s 

“right to collect past-due court-ordered child support payments 

from the payor” did not arise since the family court did not 

rule on the issue. Id. at 202, 716 P.2d at 497.

Based on the explicit language excluding past child 

support post-Divorce Decree, and the ICA’s rationale in Lindsey, 

we find that the ICA incorrectly affirmed the family court’s 

decision to consider Mother’s request for enforcement of 

Father’s delinquent pre-decree temporary child support 

obligations. Similar to alimony, the issue of child support is 

remanded to the family court to make specific findings regarding 

the basis for bifurcation. 

 
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V. CONCLUSION

The ICA correctly remanded to the family court to 

determine whether good cause existed to bifurcate as to past 

alimony, but erred in not similarly remanding with regard to 

past child support. Accordingly, we vacate in part and affirm 

in part the ICA’s July 29, 2021 judgment on appeal and remand to 

the family court. On remand, the family court must make 

findings regarding whether good cause existed to bifurcate as to 

past child support and enter findings of fact and conclusions of 

law with respect to any award of past child support. The ICA’s 

judgment, in all other respects, is affirmed.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai‘i, January 28, 2022.

Philip J. Leas

and DL /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald

for petitioner

/s/ Paula A. Nakayama

CL

Self-represented respondent /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna

/s/ Michael D. Wilson

/s/ Todd W. Eddins