### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d O n B ri ef

, Ja nua ry 15, 200 4

DOROTH Y SUE BRYANT v. DAMON EUG ENE BRYANT
Appeal f rom the Chancer y Court for Obion County No. 23405 W. Michael M aloan, Chan cellor

No. W2003-01906-C OA-R3-C V - F iled April 28, 2004

This case involves an antenuptial ag ree ment. Prior to their marr iag e, the husba nd and wife enter ed int o a n a nte nu pti a l a g re e me nt whic h s ta te d th a t e a c h p art y wa ive d h is o r he r int e re st i n a ny pr op e rt y acquir ed af

ter the ma rriag e in the individual spouse’s name . After a nearly twenty -y ear

marria g e, the wife filed for

divorce . During t h e divorce proce eding s, the wife a rg ued that the a

ntenuptial ag ree ment should not affe ct t he trial court’s divisi on of property acquir ed duringthe marr iag e. The tr ia l c ourt e nf or c e d the ante nu

pti a l ag re e me nt, awa

rd ing a ll pr op e rt

y he ld in the hu sb and ’s name to the husband, re g ardle ss of whethe r it would otherwise ha ve bee n classified as marital prope rty . The wife a ppeals. We af

firm, finding that the wife waived he r intere st in the property under the
ante nu pti a l a g re e me nt and that the e vid e nc e do e s n ot p re po nd e ra te a g a ins t e ith e r t

he e nf or c e a bil ity
o f t h e a g r e e m e n to r

t h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s d i v i s i o no f p r o p e rt y. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court is Aff irm ed

H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u rt, in

w h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., joined.

Jame s H . B ra db e rr

y , D re ds e n, fo r t

he a pp e lla nt D or othy

Sue B ryant.

Da mon E. Campb e ll, Un ion

City , f or the a pp e lle e Da

mon Eu g e ne B ryant.

OP IN ION Plaintiff/Appellant Dorothy Su e B ry ant (“ Wife”) a

nd Def endant/Appe llee Damon Eug ene Br y ant (“ Husband” ) we re ma rried on Aug ust 28, 1982. The day befor e their w edding , Wife and Husband e x ecute d a Prema rital Ag ree m en t (“Ag ree ment”). The Ag ree ment contained a ty pical provision stating that sepa rate proper

ty own ed b y ea ch par

ty prior to the mar

riag e re mained the separ ate pr operty

of that par

ty . I n addition, the Ag ree ment included a provision stating: “[Wife] understands that she is waiving all interest in any here inafter

acquir ed prope rty

of [Husband] which is a c qu i r e d b y an y m e an s i n h i s i n d i v i d u a l n a m e

. ” T h e A g r e e m e n t h a d a s i m i l ar p r o v isi on a s to Husband, in which he waive d any interest in prope rty

acquir ed by

Wife in her name . There fore ,T h i s a mou n t doe s n ot i n cl u de t h e v al u e H u s ban d pl ac ed i n h i s g u n c ol l ec t i on

. H i s a f f i dav i t c i t es t o a 1

s epar at e a pp r ai s al f

or t he val ue of

t he col l ect i on, but t he apprai s al i s not i n t he r ecor d. W i f e v al ued t he col l ect i on at $ 1 5 ,0 0 0 . T h e a sse t’s va lue is no t ne c e ssa ry fo r th e d isp o sitio n o f t h is a p p e a l.
-2- un de r t he Ag re e me nt, pe rs on a l pr op e rt y a c qu ir e d in

the name of

e ith e r H usban d or W if

e , e ve n if acquir ed with marital funds, w as the separ ate proper ty of the party in w hose name it was ac quired. The pa rties re mained mar

ried ne arly

twenty y ears

. During the cour se of the ma rriag e, the p art i e s h a d

t w o s o n s , b o r

ni n1 9 8 3 an d

1 9 8 4

. T h e y a c qu i r e d

b o t h r e a l an d

p e r s o n a l p r o p e rt y. Numerous items purc hased w ith marital funds wer e put in Husband’s na me, with some put in W ife’s
name.
Wife filed for divor ce on F ebr u ar y 4, 2002. Her

complaint and ame nded complaint ea ch inc lud e d a

re qu e st f or an e qu ita ble dis tr ibutio n of the mari ta l pr op e rt y . In Wif e ’s a ff ida vit of a sse ts and liabilities, she valued the ma rital assets at $ 2 2 9,238. Husband’s A nswer ma intained that the division of property

should be g overne d by

the Ag ree ment, and par

ticularly the provisions reg arding the par ties’ post-marr iag e ac quisiti on of prope rty . I n his affidavit of assets and liabilities, Husband separ ated a ll of the proper ty acquir ed a fter ma

rriag e into either se parate prope rty under the Ag ree ment or marital assets. He cate g orized all proper ty in his name as his separ ate pr operty , and pr op e rt y in Wi fe ’s name a s he r se pa rate pr op e rt

y

. He the n va lue d the pr op e rt y ow ne d in

his name at $109,500, and he valued Wife’s a ssets at $9,300. Husband c ateg orized the rema ining items as

1 marital prope rty , and value d the marital estate at $83,850. Thus, there was a differ ence of $145,388 in the value the pa

rties place d on the marital e state.

T h e trial was held on April 30, 2003. The pr imary issue at trial wa s the eff ect of the Ag re e me nt o n th e pr op e rt y div isi on

. Wif

e argue d th a t th e pr ov isi on re g ard ingthe wa ive r o f r ig hts in after -acq u i re d p ro p er t y had no ef

fec t, even on pr operty

taken in the name of one spouse or the other, be cause the prope rty was acquir ed throug h the parties’ joint ef forts and should be c onsidered mari ta l p r o p e rty

. H u s b an d r e s p o n d e d

th a t b o th p arti e s h a d

f r e e ly e n te r e d in to th e A g r e e me n t a

nd should be bound by

its terms, reg ardle ss of whethe r their pr operty would otherwise be classified as separ ate or marital property

. I n an oral ruling , the t rial cour t held that the provision was e nforc eable : [T] hese pa

rties enter ed int o a premarital agr eeme nt in 1982, and it’s very clea r t hat t hey

settled their prope rty

rig hts and that para g raph 5 states that [W ife] understands that she is wai ving a ll interest in any here inafter

acquir ed prope rty

of [Husband] which is acquir ed by any means in his individual name.

The trial c ourt ac knowledg ed that this result of the de cision might be ine quitable: “[Husband] has
a ver y substantial individual separ ate estate and [W ife] has vi rtually littl e, and I

understand it may
no t be fa ir , b ut i t’ s a

c on tr a c t, a

nd it’ s b in di ng on

the pa rt ie s, and the Cou rt ha s to g ive it f

ull
me an in g an d e f

f e c t. ” T h e tr ia l c o u rt o b s e r v e d th a t “ [t ]h e ma

r it a l e s tate , a f

te r c o n s id e r in g the prema rital a g r e e me n t, is r e lati v e ly s ma ll in li g h t o f th e s e p ar a te h o ld in g s o f th e p r o p e rty

. ” The-3-

m ar i t a l e s t a t e w a s d i v i d e d an d W i f e w a s aw ar d e d $ 3 0 0 p e r m o n t h i na l i m o n y in f utu ro . Fr om that
or de r, Wif

e no w a pp e a ls. The only issue on appea l is whether the t rial court err ed in g iving effe ct t o the Agre ement and classifying a ll after- acquir ed persona l pr operty in one party ’s name as the sepa rate proper

ty of that party , even if

it was acquir ed with ma

rital funds or by the parties’ joint ef forts. I n a divorce , the trial court is cha

rg ed with equitably

dividing the mar ital property . Tenn. Code Ann. § 36 -4 -1 2 1 (a )(1) (2001 & Supp. 2002). I n order to do this, t he trial court must c lassify the parties’ proper ty as either marital or se parate, as sepa rate proper

ty is not subject to divis ion. Dunlap v. Dun lap , 996 S.W .2d 80 3, 81 4 ( Te nn . Ct . App

. 19 98 ). Th e tr ia l c ourt ’s c la ssi fi c a tio n and div isi on of the pa rt ie s’ pr op e rt

y is reviewe d de novo with a pre sumption o f correc tness, and will be re verse d only if the p re p o n d er an ce of the evide nce is other wise. Id. L ikewise, we revie w the trial c ourt’s dec ision
re g ard ingthe e nf

or c e a bil ity of an a nte nu pti a l a g re e me nt de novo wi th a pr e su mpt ion

of c or re c tne ss under Rule 13(d) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Appellate Procedur e. See In re Estate of Belew , No. 03A01-9807-CH- 00206, 1998 WL 881863, at *4 (Te nn. Ct. App. D ec. 17, 1998) (citations omitted) (“ Th e Te nn e sse e c ourt s w hic h h a ve c on sid e re d th e fa ir and ful l di sc los ur e iss ue have un if or mly deter mined it to be fac tually

driven.” ) Howe ver, be cause antenuptial agr eeme nts are treated as a ny other c ontrac t, Minor v. Min or , 8 63 S .W .2 d 51 , 5 4 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 1 99 3) , th e ir int e rp re ta tio n is considere d a matter of law, subject to de novo revie w with no presumption of cor rec tness. Se eCla rk v. Rhea , No. M2002-02717-COA- R3-CV, 2004 WL 63476, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. J an. 13, 2004).

I n th e statut e s g ov e rn ing the dis tr ibutio n o f m ari ta l pr op e rt y , ma ri ta l pr op e rt

y is d e fi ne d in pa rt a s “ a ll real and

pe rs on a l pr op e rt

y , b oth tang ibl e and

int ang ibl e , a c qu ir e d b y

e ith e r o r b oth spouses during the cour se of the ma rriag e up to the date of the final divorce hear ing a nd owned by either or both spouses as of the date of filing of a complaint for divorc e.” T enn. Code Ann. § 36- 4- 12 1( b) (1 )( A) . Se pa

rate pr op e rt

y is d e fi ne d a s: (A) A ll real a

nd persona l property

owned by

a spouse be fore marria g e . . . ; (B ) Proper

ty acquir ed in exchang e for

proper ty acquir ed bef

ore the marr iag e; (C) Income f

rom and a

pprec i ation of prope rty

owned by

a spouse be fore marria g e except whe n char acte rized as marital prope rty under subdivision (b)(1) ; (D) Prope rty

acquir ed by

a spouse at any

time by g ift, bequest, d evise or de sc e nt; (E) Pain a nd suffe ring awa

rds, victim of crime compensation awar ds, future medical e x penses, a

nd future lost wa g es; and (F ) Proper

ty acquir ed by a spouse af

ter a n order of leg al sepa

ration whe re the
c o u rth a s m a d e a

f i n a l d i s p o s i t i o no f

p r o p e rt y.
Id. § 36-4-121( b)(2) (Supp. 2002). Thus, in g ener al, persona l pr operty acquir ed by a spouse dur ing
marr ia g e is c on sid e re d mari ta l pr op e rt y , un le ss it fi ts the de fi nit ion of se pa ra te pr op e rt y se t f or th i n subparts (B ) throug h (F ) above , reg ardle ss of the name listed on the titl e to the prope rty

.-4-

The statute g overningthe distribution of marital proper ty also contains a pr ovision which states, “Nothingin this section shall be construed to pre vent the affi rm ation, ratification and incorpora tion in a decr ee of an agr eeme nt betwee n the parties reg arding the di vision of property .” Id. § 3 6- 4- 12 1( g )(1 ) (20 01 & Su pp . 2 00 2) . T he statut e c on tin ue s: “ No thi ngin t

his se c tio n s ha ll aff ect va lidity

of an a ntenuptial ag reem en t which is enfor cea ble under § 36-3-501.” Id. § 36-4- 121(g )(2)

. Section 36-3-501 a ddresse s the enforce ment of antenuptial ag ree ments. I t provides: “[A]ny antenuptial or pr enuptial ag ree ment enter ed into by sp o u s es conce rning proper ty owned by

either spouse bef

ore the marria g e which is the subject of such a g ree ment shall be binding upon any court having jurisdiction over such spouses a nd/or such ag ree ment . . . .” Id. § 36-3-501. Such an antenuptial ag ree ment may be enf orce d only

“if such a g ree ment is determined, in the discr etion of such cour t, to have bee n enter ed into by [t he] spouse s fre ely , knowledg eably and in g ood faith and without ex ertion of dur ess or undue influence upon either spouse .” Id. So long as this re quirement is met, its enforce ability

is not a ff ec t ed b y the fa ct that the re sulting distribution of assets to eac h p arty is disproportionate. Se eKahn v . Ka hn , 7 5 6 S

. W

. 2 d

6 8 5 , 6 9 2 (T en n

. 1 9 8 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Baker v. Baker , 142 S.W .2d 737, 746 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940))

. Al tho ug h th e statut e sp e c if ie s p ro pe rt

y ow ne d pri or to marr ia g e , Te nn e sse e c ourt s h a ve he ld “that the subjec t matter of pr enuptial ag ree ments is not li mited to the disposition of property owned by the par ties befor e their ma

rriag e.” Solom an v. Murrey , 103 S.W .3d 431, 434 (Tenn

. C t

. Ap p. 2002) (enf

orcingprovision of antenuptial ag ree ment which resulted in the husba nd reimbursing the wi fe fo r h is sh are of the liv ing e xpe ns e s that aro se duri ng the marr ia g e ); se eals o Ca ry v . Ca ry , 937 S.W .2d 777 , 7 8 1 (T enn. 1996) (“Althoug h this statute does not specifica lly g overn a ntenuptial provisions waiving or limiti ng alimony , it is persuasi v e ev i d ence that antenuptial a g ree ments are favor ed and not r epug nant to the public policy of this State.”).

On ap p ea l , W i fe ar gu es t h at , d es p i t e th e Agr ee m en t , p ro p er t y o b t ai n edd

u ri n g t h e m arri age i nt h e n a m e o f

ani n d i v i d

u a l s p o u s e s h o u l d

b e c o n s i d e r e d

m ar i t a l p r o p e rt y an d

d i s t r i b u t e d

e qu i t a b l y. She argues that bec ause she contributed to the a cquisition, p re s ervation and appre ciation of many of the items titled se parately in H usband’s name, this prope rty did not f it the statutory

definition of separ ate pr operty

and thus should have been considered marital proper ty

. I n addition, she contends that she could not ha

ve enter ed into the Ag ree ment “knowledg eably” bec ause the Ag ree ment applied to a sse ts t o b e a c qu ir e d in the futur e , thu s re nd e ri ng imp os sib le fu ll dis c los ur e of the a ff e c te d a sse ts at the time the par

ties executed the Ag ree ment, and fur ther be cause Wife was not re p re s ented by counsel at the time it was ex ecute d. Moreove r, W ife maintains that ante nuptial ag ree ments do not apply to property

fitting the “ classica l definition of marital prope rty .”

We f ir st a dd re ss Wi fe ’s c on te nti on

that sh e did no t kn ow le dg e a bly e nte r i nto the Ag re e me nt, beca use sh e d i d n o t k n o w what a ssets Husband would own in the f uture a nd beca use she wa s not repr esente d by

counsel at the time the Ag ree ment was e x ecute d. By enfor cing the Ag ree ment, the trial court implicitly

found that the pa

rties enter ed the Ag ree ment fre ely , knowledg eably and in g ood faith, without duress or undue influence

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-501. A lthough r epre sentation-5-

b y i n d e p e n d e n tc o u n s e l i s e v i d e n c e t h a tt h e p art i e s e n t e r e d t h e A g r e e m e n tf

r e e l y an d k n o w l e d g e a

b l y, it is not a prerequisite to such a finding

. Randol ph v . Randoph , 937 S.W .2d 815, 822 (Tenn. 1996)

. The Ag ree ment in this case is shor t a nd straig htforwa

rd and cle arly

applies to proper

ty acquir ed by the par ties i n t h e future . Under these c ircumstance s, we c annot conc lude that the evide nce preponde rate s ag ainst the trial cour t’s implicit findi ng that Wife fre ely and knowledg eably

enter ed int o th e Ag re e me nt.

Wif e a lso argue s th a t th e Ag re e me nt s ho uld no t be a pp lie d to the pr op e rt

y a t is su e be c a

us e it does not fit the statutory d ef i n i t i o n of sepa

rate proper

ty and bec ause she contributed to the
a c qu isi tio n, pr e se rv a tio n and a pp re c ia tio n of the pr op e rt

y

. Un de r t

he te rm s o f t

he Ag re e me nt i n th is
ca s e, i t d oes not matter whe ther the pr operty fits the statutory

definition of sepa

rate proper

ty or marital prope rty , or whether Wife contributed to the acquisition, prese rvation or a pprec iation of the proper ty . Unde r t he explicit terms of the Ag ree ment, reg ardle ss of how the prope rty would be classified, Wife wa ives all interest in any proper ty acquir ed “by

any means ” i n Hu s b and’s name. Although it lea ds to a harsh result in this case , under the circ umstances, we cannot conclude that the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in fo llo wi ngthe Ag re e me nt’ s p la in t e rm s.
Th e de c isi on

of the tr ia l cou rt is a ff

ir me d. Cos ts o f t

his a pp e a l are ta xed

a g a ins t P l a i n t i f f / A p p e l l an tD o r o t h y S u e B r yan tan d h e r s u r e t y, f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m ay i s s u e i f n e c e s s a r y.

___________________________________ HOL L Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE