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SUSAN L. CARLSON SUPREME COURTCLERK

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
THE OLYMPIC PENINSULA NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT TEAM; BILL BENEDICT,

CLALLAM COUNTY SHERIFF; CLALLAM COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE;and CLALLAM COUNTY,

Respondents,

REAL PROPERTY KNOWN AS (1)JUNCTION CITY LOTS 1 THROUGH 12 INCLUSIVE,BLOCK 35, (2)LOT 2 OF THE NELSON SHORT PLAT LOCATED IN JEFFERSON COUNTY,AND ALL APPURTENANCES AND IMPROVEMENTS THEREON,OR PROCEEDS THEREFROM,

Defendant, STEVEN L.FAGER;DBVWC,INC.,a Washington corporation; and the LUCILLE M.BROWN LIVING TRUST,

Petitioners. No. 95013-0

EN BANC
Filed: SEP 0 6OlympicPeninsula Narcotics Enf't Team v. Junction City Lots 1 through 12Inclusive,

No. 95013-0 YU,J.— This case involves Washington's civil forfeiture statute and the 

### scope ofthe attorney fees provision where the claimant is the substantially prevailing party. The forfeiture statute allows law enforcement agencies to seize and take ownership ofproperty that has a sufficient factual nexus to certain controlled substance violations. RCW 69.50.505. However,ifsomeone claims the 

### property and law enforcement cannot prove that forfeiture is authorized,then the claimant is entitled to have the property returned and to receive "reasonable 

### attorneys' fees reasonably incurred by the claimant." Id. at (6). We are presented with two issues offirst impression regarding this attorney fees provision. First, we are asked who qualifies as a "claimant" when the property at issue is owned by a corporation. We hold that in such a case,a corporate shareholder who did not file any claim in the forfeiture case is not a claimant and therefore cannot recover attorney fees pursuant to the statute's plain language. We thus affirm the Court ofAppeals in part. Second,we must decide whether a substantially prevailing claimant's fee award is strictly limited to fees incurred in the forfeiture proceeding itself. The
answer is no. The plain language ofRCW 69.50.505(6)gives courts discretion to award the claimant attorney fees from a related criminal case ifthe fees were reasonably incurred for the primary purpose ofresisting civil forfeiture. WeOlympic Peninsula NarcoticsEnf't Team v. Junction City Lots 1 through 12Inclusive,

No. 95013-0 therefore reverse the Court ofAppeals in part and remand to the trial court to enter
a corrected fee award consistent with this opinion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Beginning in 2007,the Olympic Peninsula Narcotics Enforcement Team 

### (OPNET)became suspicious that brothers Steven and Timothy Eager'were growing and distributing marijuana from a commercial building at 115 Freeman Lane in Port Townsend. OPNET officers conducted surveillance and,in 2009, obtained a warrant for a thermal image search,based on allegations that they could smell marijuana from the street and that the smell was coming from the 115 Freeman Lane building. Based on the results ofthe thermal image search, OPNET obtained a search warrant for the 115 Freeman Lane building and "discovered a large, sophisticated, indoor marijuana growing operation." Clerk's Papers (CP)at 19. The next day, the Pagers were each charged with one count ofmanufacturing marijuana and one count ofpossession with intent to deliver marijuana. The criminal cases against the Pagers were consolidated. On the same day that the criminal charges were filed, OPNET,the Clallam 

### County sheriff, and Clallam County brought this civil forfeiture case against the

' For clarity, we refer to the brothers collectively as "the Fagers"and individually as "Steven" and "Timothy."OlympicPeninsula NarcoticsEnf't Team v. Junction CityLots 1 through 12Inclusive,

No. 95013-0 

### two parcels ofreal property on which the 115 Freeman Lane building is loeated. One parcel belongs to Steven and the other belongs to a corporation,Discovery 

### Bay Village Wellness Collective (DBVWC).^ Steven is the president and registered agent for DBVWC,and the Pagers are both shareholders. Jeffrey Steinbom timely entered a notice ofappearance in the forfeiture case as "Attorney for Claimant Steven Fager." Id. at 31. In January 2010,the parties entered an agreed order staying the forfeiture case pending the outcome ofthe consolidated criminal cases,which took several more years to resolve. In their criminal cases,the Pagers moved to suppress the evidence OPNET obtained from searching the 115 Freeman Lane building. After a lengthy hearing, the trial court granted the motion,crediting unrebutted expert testimony "that it would have been impossible for the officers to smell the marijuana" from the distance at which they claimed to smell it. Id. at 80. The court also determined that the officers' statements "demonstrate[d] a reckless disregard for the truth" and must be suppressed. Id. at 81. Without those statements,there was no probable cause for the search warrant,and the court therefore suppressed "[a] 11 evidence procured as a result." Id. at 84. The trial court then dismissed the criminal cases with prejudice,and the

^ The "WC"in DBVWC is variously referred to as standing for "Water Company"and "Wellness Collective." E.g.,CP at 19,52. We defer to the trial court's findings offact,which use "Wellness Collective." Id. at 546.Olympic Peninsula Narcotics Enft Team v. Junction City Lots 1 through 12Inclusive,

No. 95013-0 

### Court ofAppeals affirmed. State v. Eager,No.44454-2-II (Wash.Ct.App.Feb. 10,2015)(unpublished),bttp://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2044454-2- 

### II%20%20Unpublisbed%200pinion.pdf. The State did not seek further review, and the mandate issued on April 8,2015. Two and a halfweeks later, James R.Dixon entered a notice ofappearance 

### in the forfeiture proceeding as "Substitution Counsel for Steve Fager." CP at 46. That same day,"Steven Fager and the Discovery Bay Village Wellness Collective" moved for summary judgment. M at 52. OPNET did notrespond. Instead, OPNET released its lis pendens and filed a motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant 

### to CR 41(a)(1)(B). The parties agreed that voluntary dismissal should be granted and that the summary judgmentmotion was moot. However,OPNET would not 

### stipulate to a dismissal that included any attorney fee award,so Steven filed a separate motion for attorney fees. The trial court dismissed the forfeiture case and awarded the Fagers the 

### attorney fees incurred in the forfeiture case,as well as some ofthe fees incurred in the Fagers' criminal cases. The Fagers did not request,and the court did not award,all oftheir criminal defense fees,however. Instead,the court awarded fees 

### only "where the primary purpose behind the incurred fees was to prevent the forfeiture." Id. at 540. On OPNET's request for clarification,the court confirmed that it was awarding fees to both Steven and Timothy because Timothy is "a part

### OlympicPeninsula NarcoticsEnf't Team v. Junction City Lots 1 through 12Inclusive,

No. 95013-0 

### owner ofDBVWC,Inc." Excerpt ofProceedings ofAudio Verbatim Tr.(Aug. 5, 2015)(RP)at 67. 

### OPNET appealed. In an unpublished decision,the Court ofAppeals, Division One,held that RCW 69.50.505(6)did not authorize the trial court to consider "factors unrelated to the civil forfeiture proceeding," such as '"the way in 

### which the State approached the criminal case,'" in awarding attorney fees. 

### Olympic Peninsula Narcotics Enf't Team v. Junction CityLots 1 through 12 Inclusive,No.75635-4-1,slip op. at 14-15 (Wash.Ct. App.May 22,2017) 

### (unpublished)(OPNET)

(underlining omitted),http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/ pdf/756354.pdf. It also held that Steven appeared in the forfeiture proceeding only in his individual capacity and thatDBVWC and Timothy never appeared at all, so Timothy could not be a claimant entitled to attorney fees. The Court ofAppeals therefore affirmed in part,reversed in part, and remanded for the trial court to enter
a corrected fee award as to Steven. We granted the Pagers'petition for review.
ISSUES 

### A. Is Timothy a substantially prevailing claimant entitled to attorney fees in the forfeiture case? B. Does RCW 69.50.505(6)give courts discretion to award attorney fees 

### that a substantially prevailing claimant incurred in a related criminal proceeding for the purpose ofresisting forfeiture?OlympicPeninsula Narcotics Enf't Team v. Junction City Lots 1 through 12Inclusive,

No. 95013-0 C. Are the Fagers entitled to attorney fees incurred on review in this
court? ANALYSIS In Washington,"a court may award [attorney] fees only when doing so is authorized by a contract provision,a statute, or a recognized ground in equity." King County v. Vinci Constr. GrandsProjets/Parsons RCI/Frontier-Kemper, JV, 188 Wn.2d 618,625,398 P.3d 1093 (2017). The only basis asserted for attorney fees in this case is a statute,RCW 69.50.505(6). Attorney fee awards are reviewed for abuse ofdiscretion. Guillen v. Contreras, 169 Wn.2d 769,774,238 P.3d 1168 (2010). However,the underlying question ofwhich fees may be awarded pursuant to the statute is a question oflaw reviewed de novo. Id. In this case, OPNET did not waive or forfeit its argument that Timothy is not a claimant,and the record clearly shows that he is not. His status as a shareholder in DBVWC,a distinct corporate entity,does not make him a claimant. We therefore affirm the Court ofAppeals in part and remand to the trial court to exclude from its fee award the fees that Timothy incurred in his criminal case. We further hold that RCW 69.50.505(6)gives courts discretion to award attorney fees that a substantially prevailing claimantreasonably incurred in a related criminal case for the primary purpose ofavoiding civil forfeiture. Here,the trial court properly exercised its discretion to award some ofSteven's criminalOlympicPeninsula NarcoticsEnf't Team v. Junction CityLots 1 through 12Inclusive,

No. 95013-0 defense fees when he prevailed in the civil forfeiture case. We therefore reverse 

### the Court ofAppeals on this issue.^ Finally,we award Steven the attorney fees he incurred on review in this court as to the second issue,on which he substantially prevails. A. Timothy's criminal defense fees cannot be awarded because he is not a claimant As discussed further below,the trial court properly awarded some of Steven's criminal defense fees in this case. However,we affirm the Court of 

### Appeals'holding that Timothy's criminal defense fees must be excluded from the
fee award. 

### The Fagers initially contend that OPNET forfeited or waived this issue by failing to raise it in a timely manner. However,OPNET did raise concerns about Timothy's status as a claimant before the trial court entered its findings offact, conclusions oflaw,and order,both at oral argument and in its written briefing. RP at 43,67; CP at 522-24. The Fagers responded on the merits,and the trial court

^ The parties read the Court ofAppeals' opinion as agreeing with OPNET that trial courts do not have any discretion to award related criminal defense fees in a civil forfeiture case. See OPNET,No.75635-4-1,slip op. at 14-15. Amicus,however,contends that the Court ofAppeals held just the opposite. Amicus Curiae Br. ofWash.Ass'n ofCriminal Defense Lawyers at 2-7. We agree with the parties' reading hecause the Court ofAppeals denied the Fagers'motion for reconsideration or clarification on that very issue and only the Fagers sought this court's review as aggrieved parties. See RAP 3.1.

8OlympicPeninsula NarcoticsEnf't Team v. Junction City Lots 1 through 12Inclusive,

No. 95013-0 decided the issue in their favor. RP at 43-44,67; CP at 527,529-30. We likewise address the merits ofthis issue on review. RCW 69.50.505(6)explicitly allows courts to award fees "reasonably incurred by the claimant." A "claimant" in a civil forfeiture case is "any person 

### [who]notifies the seizing law enforcement agency in writing ofthe person's claim 

### ofownership or right to possession of the property within the statutory time limit. RCW 69.50.505(5). Timothy did not do that in this case. Timothy argues that his duty to notify OPNET in writing was never triggered because OPNET never served him with notice ofthe intended forfeiture. OPNET contends it had no duty to serve Timothy because its "title search did not identify Timothy Eager as having a known interest in the real property." Suppl. 

### Briefing under RAP 13.7(d)at 15-16. We decline to resolve this dispute because it is unnecessary. Timothy cannot be a claimant in this case as a matter oflaw. Steven owns one parcel ofthe real property at issue and DBVWC,a 

### corporation,owns the other."^ "[A]corporation's shareholders have no property interest in that corporation's physical assets because corporations are separate

OPNET conceded at oral argument that Steven "was acting as the representative for" DBVWC in the forfeiture case,so DBVWC and Steven are both prevailing claimants. Wash. Supreme Court oral argument,Olympic Peninsula Narcotics Enf't Team v. Junction City Lots 1 through 12Inclusive,No.95013-0 (June 1.2, 2018),at 18 min., 16 sec.,video recording by TVW,Washington State's Public Affairs Network,http://www.tvw.org. Contra OPNET,No. 75635-4-1,slip op. at 11-12. In light ofOPNET's concession,this opinion does not distinguish between Steven's and DBVWC's entitlement to attorney fees.Olvmpic Peninsula Narcotics Enf't Team v. Junction City Lots 1 through 12Inclusive,

No. 95013-0 

### organizations with different privileges and liabilities from shareholders." Nw. Cascade,Inc. v. Unique Constr.,Inc., 187 Wn.App.685,702,351 P.3d 172 

### (2015)(citing Christensen v. Skagit County,66 Wn.2d 95,97,401 P.2d 335 

### (1965)). We do not doubt that as a shareholder in DBVWC, Timothy is financially interested in the outcome ofthe forfeiture case. But a claim offinancial interest in the outcome is not a "claim ofownership or right to possession of the real 

### property. RCW 69.50.505(5). Timothy is therefore not a claimant. RCW 69.50.505(6)explicitly limits the attorney fees that may be awarded to 

### fees "incurred by the claimant." Steven and DBVWC are the only claimants in this forfeiture case,and there is no suggestion that they incurred Timothy's criminal defense attorney fees. Therefore,those fees may not be awarded. B. RCW 69.50.505(6)gives courts discretion to award attorney fees that a claimant reasonably incurs in a criminal case for the purpose ofprevailing in a related civil forfeiture case Washington is one ofthe few jurisdictions that provides for mandatory attorney fee awards to prevailing claimants in civil forfeiture cases: "In any 

### proceeding to forfeit property under this title, where the claimant substantially prevails,the claimant is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees reasonably incurred by the claimant."^ RCW 69.50.505(6). The parties dispute whether,and to what

^ See also 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1); lowA Code § 809A.12(7); Or.Rev. Stat. § 131A.310(1);Utah Code § 24-4-110(l)(b);Va.Code § 19.2-386.12(6); Wyo.Stat. § 35-7- 1049(p)(i).

10Olympic Peninsula NarcoticsEnf't Team v. Junction City Lots 1 through 12Inclusive,

No. 95013-0 

### extent,there are limitations on the fees that may be awarded pursuant to this 

### provision. OPNET contends that claimants may recover attorney fees incurred only in the civil forfeiture case itself,under that specific cause number,while the Pagers contend that courts have discretion to award claimants fees reasonably incurred in a related criminal case for the primary purpose ofensuring the claimant's success in the forfeiture case. We agree with the Pagers. 

### When interpreting statutes,our task is always to give effect to the 

### legislature's intent. Dep'tofEcology v. Campbell & Gwinn,LLC,146 Wn.2d 1,9, 43 P.3d 4(2002). The legislature's intent in enacting RCW 69.50.505(6)was "to protect individuals against having their property wrongfully taken by the State." Guillen, 169 Wn.2d at 776. To effect this intent, courts should look at the purpose 

### ofthe work underlying the fees incurred and ask whether the attorney's work was directly related to the forfeiture proceedings even ifit was notthe same cause number. The trial court in this case thus properly exercised its discretion when it awarded Steven some ofthe attorney fees he incurred in his criminal case because it found those fees were factually connected and reasonably incurred for the primary purpose ofprevailing in the forfeiture case. We have already once interpreted RCW 69.50.505(6)as requiring courts to 

### take a purpose-based approach to fees in civil forfeiture cases. In Guillen,we held that a partially prevailing claimant is entitled only to partial attorney fees,

11Olympic Peninsula Narcotics Enf't Team v. Junction City Lots 1 through 12Inclusive,

No. 95013-0 reasoning thatthe legislature did not "intend for claimants to recover fees and costs incurred solely for unsuccessful claims." Id. at 780. This reasoning directs courts to award fees based not on cause number but on whether the fees were reasonably incurred for the purpose ofensuring the success that the claimant actually achieved. We decline to confine Guillen's,reasoning to cases where it works to the claimant's detriment. Just as a partially prevailing claimant is entitled to only partial attorney fees, we hold that a fully prevailing claimant is entitled to the full amount ofattorney fees reasonably incurred for the claimant to succeed. This is the only approach that accounts for all ofthe statutory language,gives that language the liberal interpretation required, and reflects the realities presented in
the context ofcivil forfeiture. When interpreting statutes, we have a duty '"to give effect to all language,
so as to render no portion meaningless or superfluous.'" State v. Ervin, 169 Wn.2d 815, 823,239 P.3d 354 (2010){cyaoCmg Rivard v. State, 168 Wn.2d 775,783,231 P.3d 186 (2010)). Iffee awards pursuant to RCW 69.50.505(6)were limited based strictly on the cause number,as OPNET contends they should be,then the statute could just as easily read,"In any proceeding to forfeit property under this title, where the claimant substantially prevails,the claimant is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees." We cannot ignore the legislature's decision to specifically

12OlympicPeninsula NarcoticsEnf't Team v. Junction City Lots 1 through 12Inclusive,

No. 95013-0 include additional language without limitation that allows for the award offees "reasonably incurred by the elaimant." RCW 69.50.505(6). OPNET suggests that its interpretation would not render "reasonably incurred by the claimant"meaningless because that phrase should be interpreted as
an additional limit on a claimant's right to recover fees: [T]he legislature was setting out two separate reasonable standards. The first one ["reasonable attorneys' fees"]is whether the attorney was charging a reasonable rate,whether it was a reasonable fee for that attorney's work in the civil forfeiture proceeding. And then the "reasonably incurred"language is for the actual work within the civil forfeiture proceeding that was—led to a successful [claim]under that statute. Wash.Supreme Court oral argument, OlympicPeninsula Narcotics Enf't Team v. Junction City Lots 1 through 12Inclusive,No.95013-0 (June 12,2018),at 27 min., 31 sec., video recording by TVW,Washington State's Public Affairs Network,http://www.tvw.org. This is a dubious proposition because work that did not lead to a successful claim is already excluded by the statute's reference to "reasonable attorneys' fees." RCW 69.50.505(6);see Guillen, 169 Wn.2d at 780. More troublingly,this interpretation relies on federal case law that "'strictly'" interprets the attorney fees provision in a federal civil forfeiture statute. United States V. 317NickFitchardRd.Nw.,579 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2009) Ruckelshaus V. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680,685, 103 S. Ct. 3274,77 L.Ed. 2d938 (1983)).

13Olympic Peninsula Narcotics Enf't Team v. Junction City Lots 1 through 12Inclusive,

No. 95013-0 Our precedent precludes such a strict interpretation, directing us instead to interpret ROW 69.50.505(6)liberally in favor ofthe claimant's right to recover fees. Guillen, 169 Wn.2d at 777-78. Liberally reading the phrase "reasonably incurred by the claimant" leads us to conclude that the legislature intended to make it clear that a court's guiding inquiry in awarding attorney fees incurred by a prevailing claimant is the fees' purpose and reasonableness. RCW 69.50.505(6). In the context ofcivil forfeiture,neither purpose nor reasonableness can be determined by cause number alone. Courts must instead account for the "pragmatic" considerations presented by such cases. Guillen, 169 Wn.2d at 778; of. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens'Council for Clean Air,478 U.S. 546,558, 106 S. Ct. 3088,92 L.Ed. 2d 439 (1986)(awarding fees that were "necessary to the attainment ofadequate relief," even though the fees were incurred before the • litigation officially began). It is certainly true that civil forfeiture and criminal cases are separate proceedings and that civil forfeiture is not technically a criminal penalty. United States V. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267,292, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed. 2d 549 (1996). But forfeiture as a civil matter derives from a "'legal fiction'" that "'[i]t is the property which is proceeded against, and . . .held guilty and condenmed as though it were conscious instead ofinanimate and insentient.'" Id. at 275 (emphasis added)(quoting Various Items ofPers. Prop. v. United States, 282 U.S. 577,581,

14

### OlympicPeninsulaNarcoticsEnf't Team v. Junction City Lots 1 through 12Inclusive,

No. 95013-0 

### 51 S. Ct. 282,75 L.Ed.558 (1931)). This legal fiction prevents courts from 

### applying constitutional rules that "are expressly limited to criminal cases"in civil forfeiture cases. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602,607, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 125 

### L.Ed.2d 488 (1993). But it does notrequire courts to ignore the fact that with the enactment ofRCW 69.50.505,the legislature "has chosen to tie forfeiture directly to the commission ofdrug offenses." Id. at 620. The connection between criminal and civil forfeiture cases is most clearly 

### pronounced in situations like this one,where both cases are based on the same underlying offense,allegedly committed by the property's owner and claimant. In each case,the government mustprove the same offense was committed,and the same person will be defending against the same charges based on the same evidence. It is therefore entirely unsurprising that much ofthe legal work done in 

### one case will directly benefit the other. Performing such legal work under the

cause number for the criminal case will sometimes be the most reasonable course 

### ofaction in order to prevail in the forfeiture case. Fees for that work may be 

### awarded pursuant to RCW 69.50.505(6),which clearly does notrequire courts to diminish a prevailing claimant's entitlement to attorney feesjustbecause the claimant acted reasonably. 

### The facts presented here well illustrate the reasonableness ofperforming 

### legal work in a criminal case to benefit a forfeiture claimant. Steven was charged

- 15OlympicPeninsula NarcoticsEnf't Team v. Junction City Lots 1 through 12Inclusive,

No. 95013-0 in his criminal case on the same day that OPNET filed its civil forfeiture 

### eomplaint. He was thus left with three options: stay the forfeiture case pending the criminal case,stay the criminal case pending the forfeiture case,or litigate both
eases at the same time. Steven chose the first strategy, and OPNET agreed to stay the forfeiture case. The trial court found that Steven pursued this strategy for the 

### primary,subjective purpose ofprevailing in the forfeiture case,noting the high value ofthe real property at issue in eomparison to the relatively small impactthat

a criminal conviction would have on Steven's interests. The eourt further found that Steven's strategy was objectively reasonable 

### based on the circumstances presented. Indeed,in many circumstanees,staying the 

### forfeiture case pending the criminal case may be the most(and possibly only) 

### reasonable option. Any other strategy (staying the criminal case pending the civil forfeiture or litigating both eases at the same time)may require a person to forfeit 

### important constitutional rights that he or she is entitled to as a criminal defendant, including the right to a speedy trial and the right against self-incrimination. Const,art. I, §§ 22,9;Austin,509 U.S. at 607 (constitutional rules that "are 

### expressly limited to criminal cases" do not apply in civil forfeiture cases). It would also be an extremely inefficient use ofresources for all parties involved. By 

### litigating the criminal case first,however,Steven was able to pursue a successful suppression motion with preclusive effeet in the forfeiture ease,leading direetly to

16Olvmpic Peninsula NarcoticsEnf't Team v. Junction City Lots 1 through 12Inclusive,

No. 95013-0 

### the dismissal ofboth cases without duplicative litigation or forfeiture ofSteven's constitutional rights. 

### Steven thusreasonably incurred some attorney fees in his criminal case for 

### the primary purpose ofprevailing in the forfeiture case. Denying his right to recover those fees based solely on cause number would elevate form over substance and would fail to make Steven whole,even though he wholly prevailed. We therefore hold that the trial court properly exercised its discretion to award Steven some ofhis criminal defense attorney fees in accordance with RCW 69.50.505(6). C. Steven is entitled to partial attorney fees on review 

### The Pagers requested attorney fees on review in their Court ofAppeals brief, and "[rjequests made at the Court ofAppeals will be considered as continuing requests at the Supreme Court." RAP 18.1(b). As discussed above,Steven 

### prevails on the second issue presented,butnot the first. He is therefore entitled to the attorney fees he reasonably incurred on this court's review ofthe second issue. RCW 69.50.505(6);RAP 18.1(a); Guillen, 169 Wn.2d at 780.
CONCLUSION RCW 69.50.505(6)requires courts to award attorney fees to substantially 

### prevailing claimants and gives them discretion to determine which fees were "reasonably incurred." The statute's plain language does not indicate that courts

17Olympic Peninsula NarcoticsEnf't Team v. Junction City Lots 1 through 12Inclusive,

No. 95013-0 

### should limit their inquiry into reasonableness based on cause number. The trial court here properly considered all the fees reasonably incurred by Steven Fager 

### when be prevailed as a claimant in the civil forfeiture case. However,because 

### Timothy Fager is not a claimant,the attorney fees be incurred in bis criminal case were not incurred "by a claimant" and cannotbe awarded in accordance with the 

### statute's plain language. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in partthe Court ofAppeals and remand for the trial courtto enter a corrected fee award consistent with this opinion.

18OPNET,etal. v. RealProp.,No.95013-0

WE CONCUR:

19Opnet, et al. v. RealProp.

No. 95013-0

GonzAlez,J. (dissenting)—^The civil forfeiture statute does not authorize attorney fees incurred in a criminal case to be awarded in a forfeiture proceeding. To the extent the majority holds otherwise,I respectfully dissent. The legislature made its intent plain. "In any proceeding to forfeit property under this title, where the claimant substantially prevails,the claimant is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees reasonably incurred by the claimant." RCW 69.50.505(6). This statute explicitly limits attorney fees to "any proceeding to forfeit property under this title." Attorney fees were meant to be limited to civil forfeiture proceedings under Title 69 RCW. See State v. Catlett, 133 Wn.2d 355, 366-67,945 P.2d 700 (1997)("Seizure and forfeiture are civil processes and are independent ofthe outcome ofany criminal charges that mightbe brought against the owner ofthe property."(quoting FinalLegislativeReport,51st Leg.,at 119 (Wash. 1989))). I recognize that in Guillen v. Contreras,we read this statute liberally. 169 Wn.2d 769,778,238 P.3d 1168 (2010). But liberal interpretationOpnet, et al. v. RealProp.,No. 95013-0 (Gonzalez,J., dissenting)

does not,and cannot, override the explicit limitation ofattorney fee recovery to "any proceeding to forfeit property." The issue before us is a matter ofform,not substance. majority at 17. The civil forfeiture and criminal case are factually and legally two separate proceedings. They involve different parties and different interests. The legislature limited attorney fees to the civil forfeiture case. Contrary to the majority's assertion,RCW 69.50.505(6)'s "reasonably incurred" does not change the meaning of"any proceeding to forfeit property" to "any proceeding to forfeit property and any connected proceedings." In each proceeding, Steven Fager faced different adversaries: the Olympic Peninsula Narcotics Enforcement Team in the forfeiture proceeding and the State ofWashington in the criminal case. See Clerk's Papers at 305-06. He is entitled to
an award of"reasonable attorneys' fees reasonably incurred" in the civil forfeiture proceeding only. RCW 69.50.505(6). I respectfully dissent.Opnet, et al. v. RealProp.,No.95013-0 (Gonzalez,J., dissenting)



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