In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 12-645C

(Filed: October 29, 2013)

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PRAIRIE COUNTY, MONTANA and *

GREENLEE COUNTY, ARIZONA, *

*

Plaintiffs, *

*

v. *

*

THE UNITED STATES, *

*

Defendant. *

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Alan I. Saltman, Washington, DC, for plaintiffs.

Sharon A. Snyder, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

SWEENEY, Judge.

Plaintiffs Prairie County, Montana and Greenlee County, Arizona seek to recover monies 

that they claim are due to them under the Payment in Lieu of Taxes Act (“PILT”), 31 U.S.C. 

§§ 6901-6907 (2000). Greenlee County previously was unsuccessful in seeking payments under 

the statute before the United States Court of Federal Claims (“Court of Federal Claims”) and the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”). Defendant moves to 

dismiss this action based on the earlier decision of the Federal Circuit. In this action, plaintiffs 

argue that a recent United States Supreme Court (“Supreme Court”) decision changed the law 

such that the previous decision of the Federal Circuit no longer remains controlling precedent. 

Because the court rejects plaintiffs’ argument, defendant’s motion is granted, and accordingly 

plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Payment in Lieu of Taxes Act

In 1964, Congress established the Public Land Law Review Commission (“commission”)

to “conduct a comprehensive review of the policies applicable to the use, management, and 

disposition of the Federal lands.” S. Rep. No. 94-1262, at 5 (1976). The commission returned 

its report four years later, recommending that the federal government no longer continue the 

“historic policy of disposal” of public lands but should instead keep federal ownership of the 

Payment in Lieu of Taxes Act, 31 

U.S.C. §§ 6901-6907; Accrual 

Suspension; Contract Programs 

Versus Benefits Programs; RCFC 

12(b)(6)
lands then held. Id. at 6 (citing Public Land Law Review Commission, One Third of the 

Nationʼs Land: A Report to the President and the Congress by the Public Land Law Review 

Commission (1970) 1). The commission also suggested that, if its recommendation of 

maintaining the lands owned by the federal government was followed, then it was “the obligation 

of the United States to make certain that the burden of that policy is spread among all the people 

of the United States and is not borne only by those states and governments in whose area the 

lands are located.” Id.

Agreeing with this recommendation, Congress enacted the PILT in 1976 “to compensate 

local governments for the loss of tax revenues resulting from the tax-immune status of federal 

lands located in their jurisdictions, and for the cost of providing services related to those lands.” 

Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 258 (1985). The

Supreme Court explained that the PILT was intended to address a deficiency in the way that 

public lands were provided with governmental services:

Where these lands consisted of wilderness or park areas, they 

attracted thousands of visitors each year. State governments might 

benefit from this federally inspired tourism through the collection 

of income or sales taxes, but these revenues would not accrue to 

local governments, who were often restricted to raising revenue 

from property taxes. Yet it was the local governments that bore 

the brunt of the expenses associated with federal lands, such as law 

enforcement, road maintenance, and the provision of public health 

services.

Id. at 262-63 (citing S. Rep. No. 94-1262 at 8-9). 

Pursuant to the PILT, the United States Department of the Interior (“Interior” or 

“agency”) “shall make a payment for each fiscal year to each unit of general local government in 

which entitlement land is located as set forth in this chapter.” 31 U.S.C. §6902(a)(1). A “unit of 

general local government” includes counties and other municipalities that the Secretary of the 

Interior “determines to be the principal provider or providors of governmental services within the 

state[.]” Id. § 6901(2)(A). “Entitlement land” includes land owned by the United States in the 

National Park System and the National Forest System. Id. § 6901(1). 

To determine the amount of a payment directed by § 6902(a)(1), the agency computes 

payment amounts for each unit of general local government under two alternative formulas set 

forth in the PILT, and then distributes the higher of the two amounts calculated. Id. 

§ 6903(b)(1). The agency receives funding to make the payments directed by § 6902(a)(1) 

through congressional appropriations. During all times relevant to this litigation, the PILT 

provided: “Necessary amounts may be appropriated to the Secretary of the Interior to carry out 

this chapter. Amounts are available only as provided in appropriation laws.” 1

 Id. § 6906. In 

1 In 2008 and 2012, the PILT’s funding provision was amended to read:

For each of the fiscal years 2008 through 2013 –

2

 
2006 and 2007, Congress appropriated less than the amount necessary to pay the full authorized 

payment amounts to every qualified unit of general local government. Consistent with the 

regulations, Interior proportionally reduced the authorized payment amounts to conform to the 

amount of funds actually appropriated. 

B. Plaintiffs’ Allegations

Plaintiffs are political subdivisions of their respective states that qualify as units of 

general local government as defined by the PILT and in which entitlement land is located. 

Prairie County alleges that it was entitled to receive a payment of $261,987 for fiscal years 2006 

and 2007 under the PILT formulas, but that it only received a $173,061 payment, a difference of 

$81,500. Greenlee County alleges that it was entitled to receive a payment of $981,310 under 

the PILT formulas for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, but that it only received a $645,927 payment, 

a difference of $335,383. Plaintiffs allege, in Count II of their complaint, that they remain 

entitled to the difference between what was due to them pursuant to the statutory formulas and 

the amount actually paid. Plaintiffs also seek, in Count I of the complaint, to certify a class of 

similarly situated units of general local governments that, like the two named plaintiffs, allegedly 

did not receive all of the monies that were due to them under the PILT. 

C. Procedural Background

Plaintiffs filed their complaint on September 27, 2012. Defendant subsequently moved to 

dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”). 

In its motion, defendant relies primarily on the decision in Greenlee County v. United 

States, 487 F.3d 871 (Fed. Cir. 2007), in which the Federal Circuit rejected Greenlee County’s 

prior suit for the recovery of the PILT shortfalls. Defendant argues that Greenlee County and the 

principle of issue preclusion prevent plaintiffs in this action from stating a cause of action that 

would allow the court to rule in plaintiffs’ favor. Oral argument is unnecessary.

II. DISCUSSION

A. RCFC 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

“A complaint must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts asserted do not give 

rise to a legal remedy.” Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. United States, 704 F.3d 949, 954 (Fed. Cir. 

(1) each county or other eligible unit of local government shall be 

entitled to payment under this chapter; and 

(2) sums shall be made available to the Secretary of the Interior for 

obligation or expenditure in accordance with this chapter.

31 U.S.C. § 6906 (2006), amended by Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. 

L. No. 112-141, § 100111, 126 Stat. 405, 906 (2012); Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 

2008, Pub. L. 110-343, § 601(c)(1), 122 Stat. 3765, 3911 (2008). 

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2013) (citing Lindsay v. United States, 295 F.3d 1252, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). “When 

considering an RCFC 12(b)(6) motion, the court “must determine ‘whether the claimant is 

entitled to offer evidence to support the claims,’ not whether the claimant will ultimately 

prevail.” Chapman Law Firm Co. v. Greenleaf Constr. Co., 490 F.3d 934, 938 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 

(quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Harlow v 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814-19 (1982)). “[T]he consequence of a ruling by the court . . . that 

plaintiff’s case does not fit within the scope of the [money-mandating] source . . . is simply this: 

plaintiff loses on the merits for failing to state a claim on which relief can be granted.” Jan’s 

Helicopter Serv. v. United States, 525 F.3d 1299, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (alteration in original);

see also RhinoCorps Co. v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 481, 492 (2009) (“A motion made under 

Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal theory of the complaint, not the sufficiency of any evidence 

that might be adduced.”).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2006)). 

“Deciding whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific 

task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Neither allegations “that are 

‘merely consistent with’ a defendants liability,” nor “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are sufficient. Id.

“The court assumes all well-pled factual allegations are true and indulges in all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant.” Terry v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 645, 652 

(2012) (citing United Pac. Ins. Co. v. United States, 464 F.3d 1325, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 

The court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

B. Greenlee County Remains Controlling Precedent 

Defendant relies upon Greenlee County to argue that plaintiff cannot state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted. Because the court agrees that Greenlee County is controlling, a 

fuller discussion of the Federal Circuit’s decision is warranted.

In 2004, Greenlee County filed suit alleging that it did not receive the full amount of the 

PILT monies to which the statutory formulas entitled it because Congress had not appropriated 

enough money to fully fund the program. Greenlee County, 487 F.3d at 874-75. The Court of 

Federal Claims granted the government’s motion to dismiss, and Greenlee County appealed. Id. 

The Federal Circuit affirmed. It first noted that a line of cases going back as far as 1886 

established that Congress’s failure to appropriate funds did not defeat a suit to enforce an 

obligation set by statute. Id. at 877. The Federal Circuit explained that this proposition had been 

expressed at least as early as 1886, when the Supreme Court held that the United States

Ambassador to Haiti could sue the government to recover his full $7,500 annual salary set by 

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statute despite the fact that Congress had only appropriated $5,000 that year. Id. (citing United 

States v. Langston, 118 U.S. 389, 390 (1886)). In its Greenlee County decision, the Federal 

Circuit also found persuasive the reasoning expressed in a United States Court of Claims’

decision: “ʻIt has long been established that the mere failure of Congress to appropriate funds, 

without further words modifying or repealing, expressly or by clear implication, the substantive 

law, does not in and of itself defeat a Government obligation created by statute.’” Id. (quoting

N.Y. Airways, Inc. v. United States, 369 F.2d 743, 748 (Ct. Cl. 1966)). According to the Federal 

Circuit, in some instances a “failure [of Congress] to appropriate funds to meet statutory 

obligations prevents the account officers of the Government from making disbursements, but 

such rights [remain] enforceable in the Court of Claims.” Id. (quoting N.Y. Airways, 369 F.2d at 

748) (alterations in original).

The Federal Circuit then turned its inquiry to whether the PILT fit into this template 

because “in some instances, the statute creating the right to compensation (or authorizing the 

government to contract) may restrict the government’s liability or limit its contractual authority 

to the amount appropriated by Congress.” Id. at 878. It concluded that the PILT was so limited, 

focusing on the language of § 6906 that “[a]mounts are available only as provided in 

appropriation laws.” Id. The court first noted that “the language ‘subject to the availability of 

appropriations’ is commonly used to restrict the government’s liability to the amounts 

appropriated by Congress for the purpose.” Id. It continued:

[W]e have stated that “[a]lthough [a plaintiff] may have expected 

to receive full funding . . . based on past experiences, the subjectto-availability-of-appropriations language . . . prevents [the 

plaintiff] from asserting that it was entitled to full funding as a 

matter of right.” Thus it is undisputed that if PILT used the phrase 

“subject to the availability of appropriations,” Greenlee County’s 

right to recover would be limited to the amount appropriated. 

Id. (citation omitted). The court concluded: “We see little functional difference between saying 

that amounts are ‘subject to the availability of appropriations’ and saying that amounts are 

‘available only as provided in appropriations laws,’ and we conclude that the language of § 6906 

limits the government’s liability under PILT to the amount appropriated by Congress.” Id. 

Importantly, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Greenlee County also characterized the 

program authorized by the PILT as a benefits program and not as establishing a contract between 

units of general local government and the United States. “PILT . . . involves a benefit program 

not a contract, and ‘there is great room’ in benefits programs to find the government’s liability 

limited to the amount appropriated.” Id. at 879 (citing Star-Glo Assocs., LP v. United States, 

414 F.3d 1349, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). Therefore, the court concluded “that the government’s 

liability for PILT payments was limited to the amounts appropriated by Congress.” Id. at 880.

Plaintiffs recognize this precedent. Nonetheless, they argue that the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181 (2012), changed the law 

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sufficiently such that the Federal Circuit’s prior Greenlee County decision is no longer 

controlling.2 Plaintiffs contend:

Ramah holds that once Congress has appropriated sufficient legally 

unrestricted funds to pay an obligation to the plaintiff out of an 

appropriation account from which others are to be paid, the 

government cannot back out of its promise to pay the plaintiff

upon the exhaustion of funds in that account. This is true even if 

the government’s obligation to pay is subject to the availability of 

appropriations. 

Pls.’ Resp. 5 (footnotes and citations omitted). Under Ramah, plaintiffs argue, the PILT must be 

read as an obligation to pay the full amount set by the statutory formulas, even if the amount 

appropriated has been exhausted. 

Plaintiffs misread Ramah, a decision which involved breach of contract, not a benefits 

program. The decision in Ramah, concerned a suit by Indian tribes arising under the Indian SelfDetermination Act (“ISDA”), 25 U.S.C. §§ 450f-450n (1988 & Supp. II). 132 S. Ct. at 2186. 

Specifically, the issue before the Supreme Court in Ramah was whether the ISDA requires the 

Secretary of the Interior to contract to pay the “contract support costs” related to each selfdetermination contract. Id. The ISDA “directs the Secretary of the Interior, ‘upon the request of 

any Indian tribe . . . to enter into a self-determination contract . . . to plan, conduct, and 

administer’ health, education, economic, and social programs that the Secretary otherwise would 

had administered.” Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(1)) (emphasis added). “Congress included a 

model contract in ISDA and directed that each tribal self-determination contract ‘shall . . . 

contain or incorporate it by reference.’” Id. at 2187 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 450l) (emphasis 

added). The model contract provided for by the ISDA specifies that “ʻ[s]ubject to the 

availability of appropriations, the Secretary shall make available to the Contractor the total 

amount specified in the annual funding agreement’ between the Secretary and the tribe.” Id.

(quoting 25 U.S.C. § 450l(c)) (emphasis added). 

In Ramah, the Supreme Court explained that between fiscal years 1994 and 2001, 

“appropriations covered only between 77% and 92% of tribes’ aggregate contract support costs. 

. . . Lacking funds to pay each contractor in full, the Secretary paid tribes’ contract support costs 

on a uniform, pro rata basis.” Id. Several Indian tribes sued for breach of contract for the unpaid 

sums. Id. at 2188. Relying on its earlier decision in Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Leavitt, 

543 U.S. 631 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the tribes could recover despite the language 

in the contract making payment “[s]ubject to the availability of appropriations” because the 

“Government cannot back out of its contractual promise to pay each Tribe’s full contract support 

2

 Plaintiffs also rely on the Supreme Court’s decision in Arctic Slope Native Ass’n v. 

Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 22 (2012), for the same proposition. The Supreme Court’s decision in 

Arctic Slope was a memorandum opinion that vacated the judgment of the Federal Circuit 

dismissing an Indian tribe’s suit for contract support costs under the ISDA in light of Ramah, and 

remanded for further proceedings. Id. Arctic Slope provides no independent change in the law.

6

 
costs.” Ramah, 132 S. Ct. at 2191. The Supreme Court’s decision in Ramah turned on the 

contractual relationship between the parties:

Our conclusion in Cherokee Nation followed directly from wellestablished principles of Government contracting law. When a 

Government contractor is one of several persons to be paid out of a 

larger appropriation sufficient in itself to pay the contractor, it has 

long been the rule that the Government is responsible to the 

contractor for the full amount due under the contract, even if the 

agency exhausts the appropriation in service of other permissible 

ends. That is so “even if an agency’s total lump-sum appropriation 

is insufficient to a pay all the contracts the agency has made.” In 

such cases, “[t]he United States are as much bound by their 

contracts as are individuals.” 

Id. at 2189 (citations omitted). Indeed, it repeatedly emphasized that its decision was 

“[c]consistent with longstanding principles of Government contracting law . . . .” Id. at 2186; 

see also id. at 2189 (“This principle safeguards both the expectations of Government contractors 

and the long-term fiscal interests of the United States.”); id. at 2192 (rejecting the dissent’s 

argument as “inconsistent with ordinary principles of Government contracting law”). 

Plaintiffs, in contrast, rely not on an explicit contract between themselves and defendant, 

but instead seek payments under the PILT, a program the Federal Circuit has determined is a 

benefits program. See Greenlee County, 487 F.3d at 879. Thus, Ramah is inapposite. 

Plaintiffs attempt to minimize the differences between a contractually based program and 

a benefits program by arguing that the predictability of payment under the PILT is “critical.” 

Pls.’ Resp. 6. The Federal Circuit did not find the “predictability of payment” a reason to depart 

from the distinction between a contract and a benefits program and neither will this court. 

Indeed, the difference between a benefits program and a contractually based program is 

significant, if not determinative, a point plaintiffs recognize:

It would be equally wrong to do as defendant suggests and apply 

one rule where an obligation is created “subject to the availability 

of appropriations” by contract (particularly one to perform work 

done formerly by the federal government) as in Ramah and Arctic 

Slope and another rule where, as here, an obligation is created 

“subject to the availability of appropriations” by statute intended to 

provide local governments an adequate and predictable level of 

payment for services that they (not the federal government) 

provide with respect to federal lands located within their borders.

Id. at 8. This is the precise distinction made by the Federal Circuit in Greenlee County and StarGlo Associates. Unquestionably, the Court of Federal Claims “is bound to follow Federal 

Circuit precedent unless ‘the circuit’s precedent is expressly overruled by statute or by a 

subsequent Supreme Court decision.’” Red River Coal Co. v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 602, 

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610 (2012) (quoting Strickland v. United States, 423 F.3d 1335, 1338 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); see 

also Coltec Indus, Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“There can be no 

question that the Court of Federal Claims is required to follow the precedent of the Supreme 

Court, our court, and our predecessor court, the Court of Claims”). A “trial judge, believing that 

[prior precedents of a circuit court] contravene a Supreme Court precedent . . . may do no more 

than criticize those opinions, urging en banc review.” Strickland, 423 F.3d at 1338 n.3. The 

court sees no basis to criticize Greenlee County and thus follows that decision. Additionally, the

court sees no reason why making a distinction between a contractually based remedy and a 

benefit program would be, as plaintiffs argue, a “wrong” distinction. Binding precedent holds 

the distinction between a contractually based program and qualifying for participation in a 

benefits program as not equivalent. Greenlee County, 487 F.3d at 879 (citing Star-Glo Assocs., 

414 F.3d at 1355). Consequently, the “distinction” which defines the parties’ relationship to the 

government is not merely a distinction of form. Rather, the distinction is determinative of the 

claims a party may bring against the government for money damages. 

Plaintiffs additionally argue that units of general local government are not receiving 

“gratuitous benefits,” but are providing public health, safety, and infrastructure services with 

respect to federal lands. However, they do not assert that any program or contract, explicit or 

implicit, other than the program created by the PILT, entitles them to these funds. At most,

plaintiffs hint that these services constitute an implied-in-fact contract. To establish the 

existence of an implied-in-fact contract, plaintiffs must demonstrate the same elements required 

to establish the existence of an express contract: mutuality of intent, consideration, unambiguous 

offer and acceptance, and authority on the part of the government’s representative to bind the 

government. Hanlin v. United States, 316 F.3d 1325, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003). However, plaintiffs 

failed to allege any of these requirements, except perhaps consideration, have been met in this 

case. Consequently, because plaintiffs have not alleged the existence of an implied-in-fact 

contract in their complaint, the court need not decide whether the provision of services to federal 

lands has created one.

Plaintiffs finally argue that in Bristol Bay Area Health Corp. v. United States, 110 Fed. 

Cl. 251 (2013), the Court of Federal Claims rejected the argument that the holding of Ramah

applies only to the United States’ contractual obligations. Plaintiffs are mistaken. Indeed, 

plaintiffs’ selectively quote from that decision to support their argument: “[T]he Supreme Court 

in its decision in [Ramah] confirmed the full funding mandate, opining that the [ISDA] 

‘mandates that the Secretary shall pay the full amount of contract support costs incurred by tribes 

in performing their contracts.’” Id. at 264 (quoting Ramah, 132 S. Ct. at 2186). But, plaintiffs 

disregard the language immediately following that which they quote:

The Supreme Court recognized the model contract and its 

reference to the [annual funding agreements] as a basis for the full 

amount of [contract support costs], and found that, “the 

Government’s contractual promise to pay each tribal contractor the 

‘full amount of funds to which the contractor [was] entitled,’ was 

therefore binding.” 

Id. (citations omitted). Thus, it is plain that the Bristol Bay court acknowledged that the 

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contractual relationship between the tribes and the United States in Ramah was fundamental to 

the Supreme Court’s decision. The court’s conclusion here – that plaintiffs participate in a 

benefits program and are not in privity with the United States – is not therefore inconsistent with 

the court’s reasoning in Bristol Bay. Thus, plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state a claim for relief.

Accordingly, the court dismisses Count II of plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to RCFC 

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

C. Plaintiff Greenlee County Is Precluded From Relitigating the PILT Payment 

Deficiencies

“A fundamental precept of common-law adjudication . . . is that a ‘right, question or fact 

distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . cannot be 

disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies.’” Montana v. United 

States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). The doctrines of res judicata and issue preclusion, also called 

collateral estoppel, are “central to the purpose for which civil courts have been established, the 

conclusive resolution of disputes within their jurisdictions.” Id. “Under res judicata, a final 

judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of 

action.” Id. The doctrine of issue preclusion “serves, in certain circumstances, ‘to bar the 

revisiting of “issues” that have already been fully litigated.’” Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie 

& Fitch Trading Co., 719 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration 

Sys., 223 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). A party asserting issue preclusion must establish 

four elements: “(1) identity of the issues in a prior proceeding; (2) the issues were actually 

litigated; (3) the determination of the issues was necessary to the resulting judgment; and (4) the 

party defending against preclusion had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues.” Id.

(citing Jet, Inc., 223 F.3d at 1366).

Plaintiffs contend that issue preclusion “does not apply because . . . there has been a 

significant change in the law” and they seek recovery for different years than were litigated in 

the prior case. Pls.’ Resp. 8. To the contrary, all four factors are met in this proceeding for 

plaintiff Greenlee County. The issues are the same as the issues in Greenlee County because 

both suits were filed by units of general local government seeking payment for the difference 

between the amounts they should have received under PILT and what they were actually paid. 

Compare Greenlee County, 487 F.3d at 874, with Compl. ¶¶ 48-56. In addition, the issue in this 

case was actually litigated in and the determination was necessary to the Federal Circuit’s 

decision in Greenlee County. Indeed, the issue of whether defendant was liable for any PILT 

shortfall was the only issue presented and decided in Greenlee County. Finally, one of the 

plaintiffs in this case, Greenlee County, was the same plaintiff in the Greenlee County case and 

therefore had the opportunity to litigate this issue.

Plaintiffs are correct that issue preclusion “is subject to exceptions when the 

circumstances dictate.” Bingaman v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 127 F.3d 1431, 1437 (Fed. Cir. 

1997) (citing Montana, 440 U.S. at 162). In particular, “[c]ourts have crafted an exception to the 

collateral estoppel principle when there has been a change in the applicable law between the time 

of the original decision and the subsequent litigation in which collateral estoppel is invoked.” Id. 

Plaintiffs argue that this exception applies here because Ramah worked a change in the 

9
applicable law. However, as explained above, the court concludes that there has been no change 

to the precedential force of Greenlee County, and accordingly this exception does not apply. 

Plaintiffs also contend that issue preclusion does not apply because the controversy now before 

the court concerns different payment years. Plaintiffs argument lacks merit. Issue preclusion 

applies because the factual and legal underpinnings are identical. As the Supreme Court 

explained in Montana v. United States: “Because the factual and legal context in which the 

issues of this case arise has not materially altered since [the prior decision], normal rules of 

preclusion should operate to relieve the parties of “redundant litigation [over] the identical 

question of the statute’s application . . . .” 440 U.S. at 162; see also Jet, Inc., 223 F.3d at 1366 

(“[T]he ‘identity of issues’ analysis requires inquiry into the actual facts found and presented in 

the earlier litigation.”).

Because all four factors are met with respect to plaintiff Greenlee County and because the 

court has found that Ramah has not worked a change in the law such that this action falls within 

an exception to the doctrine of issue preclusion, plaintiff Greenlee County must be dismissed 

from this case. Moreover, the court need not consider whether plaintiff Prairie County and the 

rest of the purported class of units of general local government are barred by issue preclusion 

stemming from the Greenlee County decision. Such an analysis would focus on whether the 

non-parties to the prior decision were nonetheless privy to or represented in the prior proceeding. 

See generally Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892-895 (2008) (discussing when a non-party to a 

prior judgment may still be bound by res judicata or issue preclusion). The parties have provided 

no background or argument speaking to this point and thus the court need not decide if issue 

preclusion applies to any party other than Greenlee County. However, even if Prairie County 

and the members of the purported class were not privy to or represented in Greenlee County, 

their claims must still be dismissed for failure to state a claim based on the controlling precedent 

of that decision. 

D. Plaintiffs’ Request for Class Action Certification Is Dismissed as Moot

In Greenlee County, the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Court of Federal 

Claims finding the issue of class certification moot because the cause of action under PILT had 

been dismissed. 487 F.3d at 880-81. The Federal Circuit noted that it had “repeatedly found on 

appeal that issues related to class certification were moot in light of [its] resolution against the 

plaintiff of a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment” and saw “no reason to apply a 

different rule when it is the Court of Federal Claims that finds the issue moot.” Id. at 880. 

Count I of the complaint seeks only to certify a class of similarly situated units of general 

local government. Having dismissed Count II of the complaint, the only claim upon which relief 

could be granted for any individual plaintiff, the court also dismisses Count I, plaintiffs’ request 

to certify a class, as moot. 

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III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the court GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss and

DISMISSES plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

The clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly. No costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Margaret M. Sweeney______________

MARGARET M. SWEENEY 

Judge

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