23-54-cv

Spottswood v. Kijakazi

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED 

BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY 

MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE 

NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A 

COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the 

City of New York, on the 9th day of January, two thousand twenty-four.

PRESENT:

BARRINGTON D. PARKER,

ALISON J. NATHAN,

SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________

Melissa Spottswood,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 23-54-cv

Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.*

* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption accordingly. 
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_____________________________________

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:

PETER A. GORTON, Lachman & 

Gorton, Endicott, NY.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE:

MOLLY E. CARTER (Ellen E. Sovern, on 

the brief), for Carla B. Freedman, 

United States Attorney for the 

Northern District of New York, 

Syracuse, NY.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern

District of New York (Dancks, M.J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff-Appellant Melissa Spottswood appeals from a December 7, 2022

judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York 

(Dancks, M.J.) affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her 

applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income 

under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The administrative law 

judge (ALJ) who evaluated her claims determined that although she suffered from 
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severe impairments, she retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform 

light work with the limitation that she could only stand or walk for four hours and 

sit for six hours. The ALJ also found additional environmental and postural 

limitations. The ALJ concluded that this RFC allowed Spottswood to return to 

her past work as a small products assembler. We assume the parties’ familiarity 

with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we 

refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm the district court’s

judgment.

Determinations of disability under Title II and Title XVI of the Social 

Security Act are governed by parallel regulations that are, as relevant here, 

equivalent. See Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2019). Those 

determinations follow a five-step process, by which the Commissioner decides:

(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful 

activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical or mental 

impairment, or combination of severe impairments; (3) whether the 

impairment (or combination) meets or equals the severity of one of 

the impairments specified in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 

1 (“Listing of Impairments”); (4) whether, based on an assessment of 

the claimant’s residual functional capacity, the claimant can perform 

any of her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant can make 

an adjustment to other work given the claimant’s residual functional

capacity, age, education, and work experience.
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Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64, 70 (2d Cir. 2022); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v). 

The process stops if at any of these sequential steps the Commissioner can make a 

finding of disability or nondisability. See Schillo, 31 F.4th at 70; 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proof for the first four steps; at 

the fifth step, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Schillo, 31 F.4th at 70.

Under the regulations applicable to Spottswood’s claims, the Commissioner 

owes no special deference to any particular medical opinion in the record. See id. 

at 71 & n.1; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. Rather, the Commissioner must evaluate the 

persuasiveness of medical opinions in light of several factors, the most important 

of which are “supportability” (how well supported an opinion is by medical 

evidence and the explanations given in the opinion) and “consistency” (how 

consistent an opinion is with other evidence in the record). See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520c(a), (c).

“On an appeal from the denial of disability benefits, we focus on the 

administrative ruling rather than the district court’s opinion.” Estrella v. Berryhill, 

925 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). We employ a 

highly deferential standard of review, under which the findings of the agency are 

conclusive if supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error. Schillo, 
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31 F.4th at 74. That standard means that “once an ALJ finds facts, we can reject 

those facts only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.” Id. 

(cleaned up). We are not to reweigh evidence and must uphold a determination 

when “evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Id. 

(quotation marks omitted); see also Cage v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 692 F.3d 118, 122 (2d 

Cir. 2012) (“In our review, we defer to the Commissioner’s resolution of conflicting 

evidence.”).

Here, our analysis focuses on step four of the process. An ALJ determined 

that Spottswood suffered from severe impairments—type two diabetes with 

neuropathy, chronic kidney disease, gastroparesis, chronic obstructive pulmonary 

disease, anemia, and chronic renal insufficiency—but also determined that she had 

the RFC to perform light work requiring no more than four hours per day of 

standing or walking, which allowed her to return to her previous work. A 

claimant’s RFC is defined as “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [his or her] 

limitations,” and is assessed by the ALJ based on all of the relevant evidence in the 

record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1), (3); id. § 404.1546(c). Spottswood argues that 

she proved a more restrictive RFC and does not, in fact, have the residual

functional capacity to return to her prior work. Applying the appropriate, 
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deferential standard of review, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the 

ALJ’s determination.

In determining Spottswood’s RFC, the ALJ relied on evidence sufficient for 

a reasonable factfinder to reach the same conclusion: medical opinion evidence, 

voluminous records of Spottswood’s physical examinations and medical history, 

and Spottswood’s own statements about her symptoms and activities. 

The ALJ found somewhat persuasive the opinion of Dr. Gilbert Jenouri, who 

performed a consultative examination of Spottswood before her revised disability 

onset date.1 Dr. Jenouri found limitations in Spottswood’s ability to squat, but 

the examination was otherwise largely normal. Spottswood was able to walk on 

her heels and toes, albeit with noted difficulty, and showed normal stance and gait. 

Dr. Jenouri, thus, concluded that Spottswood had only “[m]ild restrictions 

walking and standing long periods, bending, stair climbing, lifting, and carrying.” 

App’x 84. The ALJ found this opinion somewhat persuasive because it was 

supported by Dr. Jenouri’s examination and consistent with Spottswood’s ability 

to work at the time; however, the ALJ recognized that evidence postdating the 

1 Spottswood had originally alleged a disability onset date that was prior to this examination, 

but then amended it to a later date.
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examination suggested greater limitations. App’x 39.

The ALJ also relied partially on the opinion of a state agency consultant, Dr. 

S. Putcha, who reviewed Spottswood’s medical records available at the time 

including Dr. Jenouri’s report, and ultimately concluded that Spottswood retained 

the capacity to stand or walk (with normal breaks) for about six hours out of a 

normal eight-hour workday. As with Dr. Jenouri, the ALJ found Dr. Putcha’s 

opinion persuasive at the time it was given, but again noted that subsequent 

evidence suggested greater limitations.

In particular, the ALJ found that Spottswood’s treatment history and 

varying control of her symptoms supported some limitation on her ability to work. 

However, the ALJ highlighted that Spottswood’s physical examinations remained 

largely normal and showed “no loss of strength or motion in the lower extremities, 

[and] no instability . . . .” App’x 40. The ALJ further noted that Spottswood had 

recently reported that her blood sugar readings were satisfactory and she was no 

longer experiencing frequent hypoglycemia, that she was walking every day, and 

that she hoped to move out of her current living situation with her niece in order 

to live on her own. Id. Evaluating all of this evidence, the ALJ assessed an RFC 

slightly more restrictive than that suggested by Dr. Jenouri and Dr. Putcha, 
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concluding that Spottswood was limited to standing or walking for four hours per 

workday, with additional restrictions on other activities. Id. at 38.

In reaching this determination, the ALJ reasonably declined to rely on two 

medical opinions she found unpersuasive. First, in response to a questionnaire, 

nurse-practitioner Jennifer LaVare opined that Spottswood “may experience 

pain,” that her conditions would cause diminished concentration and diminished 

work pace, that her conditions would be expected to produce “good days and bad 

days,” and that she might need to rest at work depending on the day. App’x 99. 

LaVare declined to opine on how much time Spottswood could be expected to 

miss work and how long she could be expected to stand or walk during an eighthour workday. In finding this opinion unpersuasive, the ALJ observed that 

LaVare gave “little more than speculative support” to answers on the 

questionnaire and offered only vague opinions as to Spottswood’s capabilities. 

App’x 41. The ALJ also noted that LaVare’s findings did not reflect consistency 

with other evidence. Id. Indeed, LaVare linked Spottswood’s potentially 

diminished concentration to severe hypoglycemia, but the record reflected that 

Spottswood was no longer experiencing frequent hypoglycemia by that time. Id. 

at 88-89.
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Second, nurse-practitioner Elizabeth Romeo, Spottswood’s primary care 

provider, filled out the same questionnaire and opined that Spottswood would 

need to be off-task more than 33% of the workday, would need to miss more than 

four workdays per month, and would be able to stand or walk for less than one 

hour per workday. The ALJ found Romeo’s opinion “wholly unpersuasive,” 

because the responses to the questionnaire lacked any supporting analysis and 

were contrary to both Spottswood’s generally normal physical examinations and 

her own statements about her capabilities and activities. App’x 41. The record 

contains evidence to support this conclusion. Spottswood stated that she 

performed housework and shopped for groceries, her anemia was improving such 

that she experienced diminished fatigue, and she had difficulty standing or 

walking “[s]ometimes, not much.” Administrative Record (A.R.) 39-40, 43, 45-47. 

Her medical records indicated normal gait, no muscle or joint pain, and full 

strength and a full range of motion in her extremities. Id. at 440, 448, 500, 502, 

504.

Examining the full record, “we cannot say that no reasonable factfinder 

could have reached the same conclusion.” Schillo, 31 F.4th at 78. Spottswood 

argues for evaluating specific evidence differently and finds fault with specific 
10

aspects of the ALJ’s reasoning, but she does not demonstrate any legal error or 

meet the demanding standard for showing that substantial evidence does not 

support the ALJ’s conclusion.

Contrary to Spottswood’s arguments on appeal, the ALJ’s reasoning was 

not merely conclusory. The ALJ appropriately explained why she was relying (in 

a qualified way) on the opinions of Dr. Jenouri and Dr. Putcha and why she was 

not relying on the opinions of nurse-practitioners LaVare and Romeo. And the 

ALJ had before her sufficient evidence to contextualize Dr. Jenouri’s arguably 

vague language regarding “mild” restrictions. Cf. Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 

421 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding a “remarkably vague” medical opinion insufficient by 

itself to support RFC). Spottswood highlights specific findings in Dr. Jenouri’s 

examination, identifies a handful of apparent errors in Dr. Putcha’s 

summarization of Dr. Jenouri’s findings, and argues for evaluating LaVare’s and 

Romeo’s opinions differently—but she fails to show that the record would require 

a reasonable factfinder to reach a different result.

Finally, Spottswood argues that the ALJ impermissibly substituted her lay 

opinion for medical judgment and insufficiently explained how she arrived at her 

specific four-hour standing or walking limitation in the RFC. This argument is 
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without merit. It was the ALJ’s responsibility to assess Spottswood’s RFC, and 

the RFC “need not perfectly match any single medical opinion in the record, so 

long as it is supported by substantial evidence.” Schillo, 31 F.4th at 78. Here, the 

four-hour figure simply reflects a slight downward departure from Dr. Putcha’s 

opinion in light of other record evidence, though not as extreme of a departure as 

suggested by nurse-practitioner Romeo—a determination that a reasonable 

factfinder could make based on the totality of evidence in this record. Once again, 

Spottswood fails to demonstrate that the ALJ’s finding rested on legal error or was 

not supported by substantial record evidence.

* * *

We have considered the remaining arguments advanced by Spottswood and 

find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the 

district court.

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court