NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

No. 22-1397 

___________ 

OLEG ZHUIKO, 

 Petitioner 

v. 

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

____________________________________ 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals 

(Agency No. A087-312-113) 

Immigration Judge: Kuyomars Q. Golparvar 

____________________________________ 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

January 5, 2023 

Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, Jr., and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed: January 17, 2023) 

___________ 

OPINION*

___________ 

PER CURIAM 

 Oleg Zhuiko, a native of Kazakhstan, entered the United States in 2001 and 

overstayed his visa. In November 2018, the Department of Homeland Security charged 

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent. 
2 

him with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) for remaining in the country 

longer than permitted. Zhuiko conceded removability and applied for cancellation of 

removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). Following a hearing, an Immigration Judge (IJ) 

denied his application as a matter of discretion.1

 The Board of Immigration Appeals 

(BIA) dismissed the appeal, and we dismissed Zhuiko’s petition for review. See Zhuiko 

v. Att’y Gen., No. 19-3728, 2022 WL 385521 (3d Cir. Feb. 8, 2022). 

 In February 2022, Zhuiko moved the BIA to reopen his removal proceedings to 

request asylum and withholding of removal. Recognizing that his motion was time- and 

number-barred under the applicable regulations, Zhuiko sought to satisfy the changedcountry-conditions exception by presenting evidence that the Kazakh government had 

“stripped [him] of his Kazakh citizenship due to his non-Kazakh heritage, which 

constitutes persecution.” AR000060. That evidence included: (1) a letter from the 

Consulate General of the Republic of Kazakhstan stating that Zhuiko no longer has 

citizenship, in accordance with Article #21 of that country’s citizenship law,2

 AR000183; 

(2) a letter from the Department of Internal Affairs, City of Almaty, stating that Zhuiko’s 

passport/identification card had been “included in a Category INVALID on December 

1

 In finding that Zhuiko did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion, the IJ took into 

account that, in 2014, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services determined 

that Zhuiko had entered into a fraudulent marriage in an effort to adjust his status. 

2

 According to Zhuiko, Article 21 provides that “[c]itizenship of the Republic of 

Kazakhstan is lost . . . if an individual is permanently residing outside the [country] and 

has not reported to a Kazak mission abroad for five years without a valid reason.” 

AR000214. 
3 

13, 2019, in connection with the ‘Loss of Citizenship of Republic of Kazakhstan,’” 

AR000185; and (3) an affidavit by expert Steve M. Swerdlow opining that Zhuiko will 

likely be persecuted on account of his “nationality and ethnicity (Jewish) and religion 

(Judaism), which is considered both an ethnicity and a religious faith in Kazakhstan,” 

AR000192, and noting that Article 21 “is used disproportionately against Non-Kazakh 

nationals,” AR000211. Zhuiko also provided general country conditions evidence, 

including, for example, the State Department’s 2014 Human Rights Report: Kazakhstan, 

AR000154–168, Bulletins issued by Refugees International in 2007 and 2010, 

AR000142–43 and AR000220, and a 2009 article titled “Refugees still face uncertainty 

in Kazakhstan,” AR000170. The BIA determined that Zhuiko had not satisfied the 

changed-country-conditions exception and denied the motion to reopen.3

 Zhuiko timely 

filed a petition for review. 

 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). We review the BIA’s denial of

a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion. Bamaca-Cifuentes v. Att’y Gen., 870 F.3d 

108, 110 (3d Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted). We review its conclusions of law de 

novo, Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006), and will uphold its factual 

determinations if they are “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence 

on the record considered as a whole.” Id. (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 

481 (1992)). 

3 We do not address the remainder of the BIA’s decision because Zhuiko does not 

challenge it in his brief. See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005). 
4 

Generally, a noncitizen may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, 

and that motion must be filed no later than ninety days after the agency’s final order. 8 

U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time and numerical 

limitations do not apply, however, to motions seeking reopening “based on changed 

circumstances arising in the country of nationality” and supported by material evidence 

that was not available during the previous proceeding. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)); 

see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). “This changed-circumstances regulation effectively 

creates a procedural hurdle that must be overcome before an untimely motion to reopen 

may be considered.” Bamaca-Cifuentes, 870 F.3d at 111. 

 We see no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s determination that Zhuiko’s untimely 

motion failed to satisfy the changed-country-conditions exception. In order to satisfy this 

exception, he was required to present evidence that, inter alia, makes a material 

difference to his proposed asylum and withholding of removal claims. Substantial 

evidence supports the BIA’s finding that this evidence does not sufficiently show that his 

citizenship was revoked on account of his non-Kazakh ethnicity or Jewish religion rather 

than his failure to follow the law for retaining citizenship.4

 And, to the extent that 

Zhuiko seeks asylum on the ground that he fears persecution on account of his “lack of 

4

 We read the BIA’s findings in this regard as supporting its determinations that: (1) any 

change in country conditions was not material; and (2) Zhuiko failed to establish prima 

facie eligibility for relief. To the extent that the BIA may have conflated the analyses of 

these two independently dispositive determinations, any such error is harmless. See

Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 2011). 
5 

citizenship,” AR000248, or “statelessness,” Br. 8, ECF No. 10, lack of citizenship is not a 

protected category under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Therefore, any change supported by 

this evidence was not material to his claims for asylum and withholding of removal. 

 We have considered the remaining arguments that Zhuiko raises in his briefs and 

conclude that they do not warrant relief. First, Zhuiko contends that the BIA “ignored” 

evidence demonstrating that the Kazakh government enforces its immigration laws 

disproportionately against non-ethnic Kazakhs. Notably, however, the BIA explicitly 

recognized in its decision that Zhuiko was relying on “country conditions evidence and 

an expert affidavit to establish that his citizenship was revoked on account of his nonKazakh ethnicity” and referenced the relevant portions of the record. AR000006 (citing 

AR0000182–223). Second, Zhuiko argues that the fact that the Kazakh government did 

not revoke his status until 2019 “should lead one to believe that other factors played a 

part in [his] denaturalization.” Opening Br. 6, ECF No. 10. As the Government correctly 

notes, however, nothing in the record establishes that Zhuiko’s citizenship was revoked in 

2019 as opposed to an earlier date. Br. 6, ECF No. 10.5

 

 Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 

5

 To the extent that Zhuiko challenges the BIA’s alternative determination that he failed 

to make a prima facie showing that he is entitled to asylum or withholding of removal, 

we address only the Board’s independently dispositive determination that his untimely 

motion failed to satisfy the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). See Bamaca-Cifuentes, 

870 F.3d at 111–12 (explaining that the Board was procedurally barred from examining 

the underlying merits of petitioner’s claims because the motion to reopen was untimely).