IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE In the Matter of Confidential Consumer Protection Investigation.

KING FUJI RANCH, INC., KING FUJI RANCH, MT TRAGGARES, INC. DBA ARETE VINYARDS, BENCH ONE, INC., KING ORGANICS, INC.

Appellant s ,

v. WASHINGTON STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. 37662

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UNPUBLISHED OPINION

S IDDOWAY , J.

— After King Fuji Ranch, Inc. and related entities (King Fuji) were served with a civil investigative demand by the Washington State Attorney General ’s Office (AG O ) , King Fuji petitioned the Grant County Superior Court to vacate the 

### FILED DECEMBER 7 , 2021 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division IIINos. 37662

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2 demand. 1 It was unsuccessful and now appeals trial court orders denying its request to vacate the demand and granting the AGO’s motion to enforce it. The subject matter of the AGO’s investigation falls within the scope of activity prohibited by the Cons umer Protection Act, chapter 19.86 RCW (CPA) , which the AG O is au thorized to enforce. Conduct by King Fuji that may have violated the federal Immigration and Nat ionality Act (INA) 2 might be evidence that helps demonstrate a CPA violation , but contrary to King Fuji’s arguments, that alone does not give rise to federal
p reemption. For that reason, and because the civil investigative demand was not an unreasonable search and did not invade King Fuji’s private affairs without authority of
law as alleged by King Fuji, w e affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND King Fuji is an agric ultural business that grows apples and wine grapes. It recruits some of i ts workers from other countries using the H

- 2A visa process provided by federal law

. Eligibility for the visas requ ires demonstrating that the job openings cannot be filled with United States ( U.S. ) workers. As part of making that demonstration, King Fuji is require d by federal law to submit a job order for approval by the state workforce agency designated by the state

— in Washington, the Employment Security Department (ESD)

.

1 The demand was addressed to King Fu ji Ranch, Inc., King Fuji Ranch, ML Taggares, Inc. dba Arete Vineyards, Bench One, Inc., and King Organics, Inc. We use “King Fuji” to refer to King Fuji Ranch, Inc. and to the related entities collectively.

2 8 U.S.C. ch. 12 ( as amen ded)

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3 The job order must identify the positions available and their hours, pay, and qualifications

. Once the ESD approves a job order submitted by King Fuji , it begins recruiting U.S. workers an d re fers each U.S. worker who applies for the job opportunity. 20 C.F.R. § 655.121(c), (d). In 2019 , the AG O receive d information that King Fuji might have provided misleading information in the process of hiring H

- 2A workers the year before. It learned that the president of King Fuji had submitted a job order to t he ESD in May 2018 for 101 farmworker/laborer positions stating , as job requirements, that previous w ork experience was preferred and specifying “[t]hree (3) months tree fruit experience.” C lerk’s Papers (C P(A) ) at 402, 404. 3 It learned that on the same day, King Fuji’s operations m anager had e - mailed CSI Visa Processing, S.C., a farm labor contractor in Mexico, about its need to hire 101 workers for the season , but had provided different job requirement information . In his e

- mail to CSI, the operations manager explained that King Fuji’s only recruiting criteria for this “next group of guys,” based on its experience with workers in prior seasons, was

 Age

– 35 and under

 Married

 Experience

– Must be new to H2A program

3 The orders ch allenged on appeal were entered in two Grant County actions that we consolidated . Clerk’s p apers designated in the “anchor” case on appeal ( In re Confidential Consumer Protection Investigation , No. 37662

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4  Desired States/

Regions: o 1/3 of group fr om State of Jalisco o 1/3 of group from State of Nayarit o 1/3 of group from So uth regions of Mexico (Oaxoca/ Veracruz) CP(A) at 411 (boldface omitted) . King Fuji eventually received federal certification that there were not sufficient U.S. workers available for the 101 positions it had available in
2018 and that its employment of H

- 2A workers would not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers. The foregoing information led the AGO to serve a civil investigative demand on King Fuji o n September 23, 2019

. A civil investigative demand, or CID, is an investigati ve t ool authorized by the CPA

. The CID stated , The Demand is made pursuant to RCW 19.86.110. The Attorney General believes you have knowledge relevant to the subject matter of an investigation now in progress. Said investigation involves possible past or current violations of RCW 19.86.020 (unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce), including but not limited to representations or omissions t o obtain certification that there are insufficient U.S. workers for particular crop production and harvest in the area and permission to hire foreign guest workers. CP(A) at 207. The CID included 16 interrogatories and 15 requests for production and
requ ired a response within 30 days

. It was accompanied by orders the Attorney General had obtained several days earlier , ex parte, in a Thurston County S uperior C ourt action entitled In re Confidential Consumer Protection Investigation . The orders prohibited King Fuji from disclosing the existence or contents of the CID to anyone but its counsel, retained jurisdiction over subsequent proceedings, and sealed the case file.Nos. 37662

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5 King Fuji responded by filing a n action in Grant C ounty Superior Court prior to the CID’ s return date. It requested a declaratory judgment that the AG O lacked authority for its investigation since the regulation of immigration is exclusively vested in the federal government. It sought an extensio n of the return date for the CID until the
AG O ’s authority to issue it could be resolved

. On the same day, King Fuji filed a motion in the Thurston County action seeking an order changing venue of that action to Grant County. Both parties filed motions in the Thurston County action thereafter, and in mid

December 2019 , the Thurston County Super ior Court entered an order trans fer ring the case to Grant County. It provided that its earlier orders prohibiting disclosure and sealing the file “shall remain in force and effect for 45 day s or until furthe r order of Grant County Superior Court or this court

. ” CP(A) at 332. The Grant County court later denied the AG’s motion to maintain and enforce the nondisclosure order and order sealing the file.
I n February 2020 , the AGO filed a petition in the trans ferred action for enforcement of its CID. King Fuji responded by filing a motion to vacate the CID in the
action it had commenced

. King Fuji argued that the INA “permits employers to hire temporary non

- immigrant agricultural workers (H

- 2A workers) and pr ovides the exclusive process by which the services of these workers may be obtained and utilized.” CP(S) at 75 (footnote omitted)

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6 argued that the CID was an unlawful search and invasion of its pr ivate affairs un der the federal and Washington C onstitutions. In responding to the motion to vacate the CID, t he AG O denied King Fuji’s allegation s that the “ ‘ real focus ’ ” of its investigation was “ ‘alleged false statements to the federal gov ernment in t he H

- 2A application ’” and that its investigation was a

“ ‘ disguised attem pt to bring a lawsuit to claim that fraud was perpetrated on the federal government. ’” CP(S) at 102 , 113 (quotin g King Fuji’s motion to vacate)

. Rather, the AGO argued, “the CID is f ocused on investigating King Fuji’s possible false and misleading statements and omissions to U.S. workers , not the federal government. ” CP(S) at 102. It explained , “T he CID only seeks information about King Fuji’ s

co mmunications and representations to [ the U.S. Department of Labor] so the State may
compare the represen t ations made to U.S. workers and determine whether those representations were false or omitted material information about the job opportunities.”
Id. The AGO argued that its CID met a th ree - part test for reasonableness under the United States Constitution’s Fourth Amendment, which the Washington Supreme Court applied to CIDs in Steele v. State , 85 Wn.2d 585, 594, 537 P.2d 782 (1975): its inquiry was within the AGO’s authority, the demand was not too indefinite, and the information sought was reasonably relevant. O n the issue of its authority, the AGO argued thatNos. 37662

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7 actions of an employer that have the capacity to deceive the general labor pool, such as misleadin g job postings, violate the CP A. In King Fuji’s reply in support of its motion to vacate, it led by insisting that the superior court must “determine the purpose of the AG’ s investigation. ” CP(S) at 1 18 . It argued that “[a] lthough the AG shifts the focus, the stated purpose remain [ s ] constant,” emphasizing the language of the CID that the violations of RCW 19.86.020 under investigation include representations or omissions “ to obtain certification that there are insufficient U.S. workers for particular crop production and harvest in the area and permission to hire foreign guest workers. ” CP(S) at 118 (boldface omitted)

. After hearing argument of the cross motions, the trial court denied the motion to vacate and g ranted t he State’s motion to enforce the CID. Its order enforcing the CID required the AGO and King Fuji to meet and confer in good faith on the scope of documents and information to be produced by King Fuji and provided that if agreement could not be reached, the court would resolve whatever issues remained. King Fuji
app eals both orders.
ANALYSIS Among conduct that the CPA declares unlawful are “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” RCW 19.86.020. “Trade” and “commerce” are defined by the act to include “any commerce directly o r indirectly affecting the people of the state of Washington.” RCW 19.86.010(2). The act includes aNos. 37662

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8 mandate that it be liberally construed to serve its beneficial purposes. RCW 19.86.920. The AGO “may bring an action in the name of the state, or as par ens patriae on behalf of persons residing in the state, against any person to restrain and prevent the doing of any
act

. . . declared to be unlawful.” RCW 19.86.080(1). By statute, when the AGO believes a person has documentary materials or kno wledge o f any information the AGO believes is relevant to the subject matter of an investigation of a possible violation of the CPA , it may serve that person with a CID requiring the person to produce the documentary materials, answer written interrogatories, or g ive oral testimony. RCW 19.86.110(1). In serving a CID, the only identification of the AGO’s investigation and purpose that is required is that the demand “[s]tate the statute and section or sections thereof, the alleged violation of which is under inves tigation” and that it “ [ s ] tate . . . the general subject matter of the investi gation.” RCW 19.86.110(2)(a). The demand served on King Fuji identified the violations under investigation as “possible past or current violations of RCW 19.86.020 (unfair or
d eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce).” CP(A) at 16

. It identified the general subject matter as being such possible past or future violations “including but not limited to representations or omissions to obtain certificatio n that there are insufficient U.S. workers for particular crop production and harvest in the area and permission to hire foreign guest workers.” Id.Nos. 37662

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9 King Fuji challenges the CID on the basis that the INA preempts the st ate law on which the AGO relies an d as an unconstitutional search and invasion of its private affairs.
We turn to those arguments after first addressing King Fuji’s contention that we must regard the AGO as engaged in an improper investigation into its compliance with the federal H

- 2A pro gram. I. T HE CID WAS ISSUED IN CONNEC TION WITH THE INVEST IGATION OF POSSIBLE MISREPRESENTATIONS T O U.S. FARMWORKERS REGARDIN G AGRICULTURAL JOB OPPORTUNITIES In applying to the Thurston C ounty Superior C ourt for an order prohibiting disclosure of its invest igation, the AGO disclosed the information it had receiv ed suggesting that King Fuji might be abusing the H

- 2A program

. I t broadly identified representations as to which it sought information , including representations King Fuji had made to federal and st ate agencies

. It attached newspaper articles reporting on strikes by King Fuji’s H

- 2A workers complaining of untenable working conditions and retaliation. Seizing on the AGO’s statements about suspected abuse of the H

- 2A program, King Fuji has emphasized below and on appeal that we should view the AGO as making an argument it has never made: that the target of its investigation is suspected violations by King Fuji of federal law and regulations. See, e.g. , Appellant ’s Opening Br. at 15 (“The Purpose of t he Civil Investigative Demand is to Improperly Investigate Statements Made to the Federal Gov ernment to obtain H

- 2A Workers.” (boldface omitted))

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10 In reviewing the AGO’s presentation to the Thurston County court, we bear in mind the purpose of that present ation. The AGO did not need and was not seeking authorization for its CID. What it felt it did need , and was seeking , was court

- order ed confidentiality for the CID , which it is entitled to request under RCW 19.86.110(6)

. The AGO evidently believed that demonstrating that its investigation might reveal violations of federal immigration law by King Fuji and its farm labor contractor in Mexico could help it persuade the court that disclosure w ould jeopardize its investigation.
T he AGO has consistently cla imed that it is interest ed in misrepresentation s made to U.S. farmworkers regarding agricultural job opportunities , misrepresentations it contends violate the CPA and “have the potential to harm Washington farmworkers and

t he state labor market.” Resp’t ’s Br. at 1. 4 Even if we were to accept King Fuji’s characterization of the original submissions to the Thurston County court as “overzealous,” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 13, the AGO has since made it clear in the trial court and on appeal that it is only m isreprese ntations made to U.S. farmworkers that it is investigating as violations of the CPA

.

4 For example, a declaration in support of the AGO’s request for court

- ordered confidentiality stated that its CID sought informa tion about “representations made in, and concerning, advertisement and recruitment efforts that are supposed to be designed to fill agricultural labor needs with U.S. workers,” and information about “whether interested U.S. workers were turned away by King Fuji Ranch and Affiliated Companies unfairly and/or deceptively.” CP(A) at 9.Nos. 37662

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11 This is consistent with its investigation as described in the CID. King Fuji a rgues otherwise, emphasizing that the CID states the AGO is investigating “repres entations and omissions to obtain certification that there are insufficient workers.” CP(A) at 16. W hile King Fuji’s direct representations to obtain certification would be to the Department of Labor, “obtain[ing] certification” arguably depended in the first instance on representations and omissions to U.S. farmworkers , that would deter them from applying. 5 CP(A) at 16. In evaluating a party’s positions in an appeal, we consider that party’s good faith argument, not a “straw man” argument foisted on the party by its adversary. We proceed on the basis of what we are satisfied is the AGO’s good faith characterization of its investigation. 6
II. P REEMPTION Under the supremacy clause to the United States Constitution, United State law is the supreme law of the land, notwithstanding state law to the contrary. U.S. C ONST ., a rt. VI, cl. 2. “Accordingly, state law that conflicts with federal law is ‘without effect. ’”

5 The CID also states that its investigation concerns misrepresentations “including but not limited to” representations and omissions to o btain certification. CP(A) at 16

.

6 Since the AGO is not engaged in an investigation of violations of the INA, we need not address King Fuji’s discussion of case law holding that there is no private right to enforce the INA

— a proposition with which the AGO agrees. We also ne ed not address King Fuji’s argument, citing RCW 19.86.170, that the CPA does not apply to “transactions permitted by any other regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States.”Nos. 37662

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12 Hue v. Farmboy Spray Co. , 127 Wn.2d 67, 78, 896 P.2d 682 (1995) (quoting Maryland v.
Louisian a , 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S. Ct. 2114 , 68 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1981)). Courts “do not presume that Congress reli shes abrogating state authority,” however. Id. at 78

.

“ Congress is presumed to respect our system of ‘dual governance.’ Accordingly, any
considera tion of preemption issues ‘ start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by . . . Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. ’” Id. (alterations in original) (footnote om itted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc. , 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 120 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1992)). Congress may preempt state law in three ways: through express preemption, field preemption, and conflict pree mption. Estate of Becker v. Avco Corp. , 187 Wn.2d 615, 622, 387 P.3d 1066 (2017) (citing Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’ y v. Univ. of Wash. , 125 Wn.2d 243, 265, 884 P.2d 592 (1994) (plurality opinion)). King Fuji advances argument in support of each. 7
Ex press preemption. The INA contains express preemption language

. 8 U.S.C. § 1188 deals with the admission of temporary H

- 2A workers , and its subsection (h)(2) provides that “[t] he provisions of subsections (a) and (c) of section 1184 of this title and

7 King Fuji also mentions San Diego Buuilding Trades Council v. Garmon , 359 U.S. 236, 79 S. Ct. 773, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1959) , as the source of a preemption doctrine. The Garmon doctrine is a special type of conflict preemption that only applies when a state law regulates issues covered by the Nationa l Labor Relations Act (NLRA) . This case has nothing to do with the NLRA.Nos. 37662

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13 th e provisions of this section preempt any State or local law regulating admissibility of nonimmigrant workers .” (Emphasis added.) RCW 19.86.110 is t he only state law being applied in this case and it does not regulate the admissibi lity of nonimmigrant wor kers. Plainly, 8 U.S.C. § § 1184(a), (c) and 1188(h)(2) d o not preempt it. King Fuji also cites a federal regulation , 20 CFR § 655.185, that it argues expressly preempts state regulation. The regulation appears in a s ubpart of fe deral labor regulations dealing with the labor certification process for H

- 2A workers. The language on whi ch King Fuji relies provides that “[c]omplaints arising under this subpart” that involve fraud or misrepresentation “ must be referred by the [ state workforce agency ] to the [ certifying o fficer] for appropriate handling and resolution ” and complaints alleging that an employer discouraged an eligible U.S. worker from applying, “ will be referred to the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Office of Special Counsel for Unfair Immigration Related Employment Practices .” 20 CFR § 655.185 (a), (b)

. T he regulation makes no reference to preemption , but King Fuji argues that it necessarily preempts state regulation because it “dictate[s] the exclusive method to address [s uch] allegations. ” Appellant ’s Opening Br. at 25. We disagree; the regulation makes the complaint process mandatory, but it includes no language making it exclusive . King Fuji has identified no court that has ever construed the regulatory complaint proc ess as exclusive.Nos. 37662

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14 When federal law expressly p reempts some state legislation but not the state law at issue, an inference can be drawn that implied preemption is foreclosed. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick , 514 U.S. 280, 289, 115 S. Ct. 1483, 131 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1995). From the

narrow express preemption provided by 8 U.S.C. § 1188 (h)(2), one might infer that Congress did not intend any broader preemption. King Fuji nonetheless advances

a lternative arguments for field and conflict preemption. Field preempti on. To effectuate field preemption, Congress must “occup[y] an entire field of regulation to the exclusion of any state laws.” Becker , 187 Wn.2d at 622 (alteration in original) (citing Resident Action Council v. Seattle Hous. Auth. , 177 Wn.2d 417, 444, 3 27 P.3d 600 (2013)). King Fuji’s argument for f ield preemption relies on its characterization of the AGO’s investigation as an investigation of fraud on the federa l government, which i t likens to state “f r aud

- on - the

- FDA” 8 claims that the United States Sup reme Court found to be preempted by federal law in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs ’ Legal
Committee , 531 U.S. 341, 348, 121 S. Ct. 1012, 148 L. Ed. 2d 854 (2001).
In Buckman , plaintiffs who suffered injuries from the implantation of FDA

approved orthopedic bone screws sued parties who allegedly misled the FDA in obtaining the screws’ a pproval. The screws were given market clearance under a simplified approval process for a limited use that the plaintiffs claimed was bogus, and was not their intended use. Id. at 346

- 47. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’

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15 m isrepresentations were at least a “ ‘ but for ’ ” cause of their injuries: had the representations not been made, the FDA wou ld not have approved the bone screws , and the plaintiffs would not have been inj ured. Id. at 343. The Supreme Court found implied preemption because the federal statutory scheme amply empowers the FDA to punish and deter fraud agai nst the Administration, and . . . this authority is used by the Administration to achieve a somewhat de licate balance of statutory objectives. The balance sought by the Administration can be skewed by allowing fraud

- on - the

- FDA claims under state tort law. Id. at 348. The “delicate balance” was between safety, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the ab ility for devices to enter the market in a relatively short period of tim e and the accepted view that FDA regulations sh ould not interfere with off

- label use prescribed by health care professionals. See i d. at 349

- 50. Congressional intent that the FDA p rovisions in Buckman preempt ed state law was found in 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) , which the Supreme Court stated provided “clear evidence
that C ongress intended that the [medical device amendments] be enforced exclusively by the Federal Government.” Id. at 352. 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) provides that subject to exceptions not relevant in Buckman , “all . . . proceedings for the enforcement, or to restrain violations, of this chapter shall be by and in the name of the United States.” The Supreme Court in Buckman also dis tinguishe d the plaintiffs’ fraud

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16 device approval provisions were a “critical element” of Buckman’s and the other plaintiffs’ cases. Id . at 353.
Her e, by contrast, the A GO is investigating possible representations to U.S. farmworkers that job qualifications and requ irements existed for positions when those qualifications and requirements were not, in fact, being applied. N o provision of federal law a kin to the provision in Buckman states that this sort of claim must be brought by and in the name of the United States. If the AGO’s concerns are borne out by its investigation, its enforcement action will rely on state law

— no violation of federal law

ser ves as an element of those claim s , let alone as a critical element. Conduct by King Fuji that may have violated the INA might be relevant to proving that job qualifications and requirements were misrepresented to U.S. farmworkers, but it is the conduct th at will be relevant, not whether or not it violated the INA. Field preemption is not shown. Conflict p reemption

. Finally, conflict preemption occurs when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law. Satomi Owners Ass’n v. Satomi, LLC , 167 Wn.2d 781, 800, 225 P.3d 213 (2009). It can also occur when state law “ ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. ’”
McKee v. AT& T Corp. , 164 Wn.2d 372, 387, 191 P.3d 845 (2008) (quoting Silkwood v.
Kerr

- McGee Corp. , 464 U.S. 238, 248, 104 S. Ct. 615, 78 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1984)). “ ‘[ T]he conflict must be an actual conflict, not merely a hypothetical or potential conflict. ’”Nos. 37662

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17 Satomi , 167 Wn.2d at 800 (alteration in original) (quoting Chicanos Por La Causa, I nc. v. Napolitano , 558 F.3d 856, 863 (9th Cir. 2009)). King Fuji relies on the fact that federal regulations establish remedies for employer misrepresentations in an H

- 2A application to the federal government that are different from remedies the AGO is abl e to seek in an action to enforce the CPA. But the AGO is not investigating fraud on the federal government, so there is no conflict. King Fuji does not demonstrate any respect in which a Washington employer is unable to provide accurate information abou t agricultural job opportunities to U.S. farmworkers at the same time it complies with federal law. The AGO’s authority to issue the CID is not preempted by federal law.
II I

. T HE CID IS NOT AN UNCONSTITU TIONAL SEARCH OR INV ASION OF PRIVATE AFFAIRS King F uji’s remaining challenge to the CID is that it is an unreasonable and
therefore unconstitutional search under the federal co nstitution or an invasion of King Fuji’s private affairs without authori ty of law under the Washington C onstitution. Controlling c ase law defeats its arguments.
A. Fourth Amendment It is well settled that where “ ‘(1) the inq uiry is within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information sought is reasonably relevant, ’” a CID issued by the AGO does not violate the Fourth Amendment.Nos. 37662

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18 Ameri quest Mortg. Co. v. Off. of Att’ y Gen. , 177 Wn.2d 467, 498, 300 P.3d 799 (2013) (quoting Steele , 85 Wn.2d at 594 ). King F uji contends that inquiring into false statements made to the federal government in an H

- 2 A application is not within the scope of the AGO’s authority, but that is not the focus of the AGO’s inquiry. T he AGO’s inquiry is into misrepresentations to workers about agricultural employment opportunities. Steele itself involved the AGO’s investigat ion of an employment agency, and the Supreme Court found “it is clear” that an inquiry into possible unfa ir or deceptive practices by an agency involved in employment was within the authority of the AGO. 85 Wn.2d at 594

. King Fuji does not contend that th e CID is not reasonably clear. See Appellant ’s
O pening Br. at 43

- 44. Steele held that a CID was not impermissibly indefinite where there was “no general or undiscriminating r equest for all business records ” and the types of records sought were “explained with reasonable clarity, ” which is the case with the CID served on King Fuji

. Steele , 85 Wn.2d at 594

. King Fuji does contend that the CID seeks information that is not reasonably relevant, but the only examples of insufficiently relevant information i t cites are “information ranging from the identity of every worker hired since 2015 . . . , every advertisement placed . . . , steps to contact U.S . workers . . . , selection criteria . . . ,
persons who prepared the H

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19 appear reasonably calculated to identify what U.S. workers were told about job openings , whether it was accurate , and the employees and applicants wh o would have relevant information. If there is some information requested that King Fuji can demonstrate cannot conceivably lead to relevant information, the superior court’ s order provides for a meet and confer process and that it will resolve disputes c onsistent with its “discovery” related authority under RCW 19.86.110(8) and (9). No Fourth Amendment violation is shown.
B. Article I, section 7 Under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” The provision protects “ ‘those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, sa fe from governmental trespass. ’ ” State v. Reeder , 184 Wn.2d 805, 814, 365 P.3d 124 3 (2015) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Maxfield , 133 Wn.2d 332, 339, 945 P.2d 196 (1997)). If a private affair is not disturbed, there is no violation of article I, section 7. Reeder , 184 Wn.2d at 814. The burden of proving that a private affair has been disturbed is borne by the person asserting the intrusion. State v. Cheatam , 112 Wn. App. 778, 7 87, 51 P.3d 138 (2002) , aff’d , 150 Wn.2d 626, 81 P.3d 830 (2003)

.

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20 citizens have held or privacy rights that they are entitled to hold.” State v. Miles , 160 Wn.2d 236, 244, 156 P.3d 864 (2007). Instead, courts look at “ ‘the nature a nd extent of the information which may be obtained as a result of the government conduct’ and at the
historical treatment of the interest asserted. ” State v. Hinton , 179 Wn.2d 862, 869, 319 P.3d 9 (2014) (quoting Miles , 160 Wn.2d at 244 )

. Division Two of t his court held in State v. Brelvis Consulting LLC that in determining whether information is a private affair under article I, section 7, “[a] corporation’s business records . . . are distinct from personal records” and information that may be “the sort o f thing that would be sensitive personal information for a natural person” is not sensitive information “for a legal abstraction like a corporation or LLC.” 7 Wn. App. 2d 207, 229, 436 P.3d 818 (2018 ) (citing State v. Chase , 1 Wn. App. 2d 799 , 804

- 05, 407 P.3d 1178 ( 2017 ) ) . In this respect, article I, section 7 is like the Fourth Amendment, under which it is a “well

- established proposition that although corporations and business are protected by the Fourth A mendment, the privacy of their books and records is not as stringently protected as is that of the privacy of individuals.” Steele , 85 Wn.2d at 592

- 93 (citations omitted). King Fuji tries to distinguish Brelvis by arguing that the CID served on it will require it to reveal “ ‘ potentially sensitive perso nal information ’ ” of individuals, such as their immigration status. Appellant ’s Opening Br. at 42. B ut the assertedly privateNos. 37662

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21 nature of that information is belied by the fact that it is information employers and state workforce agen cies are required to c ollect, report, retain, and make available for audit. Employers are required to keep a recruitment report identifying its recruitment sources, the name and contact information of all U.S. workers who apply or are referred, confirm that the U.S. worker was contacted and specify by what means, and if not hired, explain the lawful reasons for not hiring the U.S. worker. 20 CFR § 655.156. Employers must certify that they have and will continue to retain records of all hires and rejections.
20 CF R § 655.135 (a). Information received during the application process and during program integrity measures such as audits may be forwarded to the Office of Fore ign Labor Certification to the Wage and Hour Division for enforcement purposes. 20 CFR § 655.130(e). Thi s is manifestly not informat ion King Fuji has held and should be entitled to hold “ safe from government trespass. ” State v. Myrick , 102 Wn.2d 506, 511, 688 P.2d 151 (1984). Moreover, the required authority of law can exist in the form of “a valid ( i.e. ,

c onstitutional ) statute. ” Reeder , 184 Wn.2d at 817. King Fuji identifies no constitutional infirmity with RCW 19.86.110, which has authorized CIDs since 1961. L AWS OF 1961, ch. 216 § 11. King Fuji points out that a statutorily

- authorized administrative subpoena was found unconstitutional in Miles because it was not judicially authorized. B ut that was because of several concerns not present here: the agency was seeking personal (not business) banking records, from a third party, without notice to the aff ected individual.Nos. 37662

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22 The Supreme C ourt observed that had it not been for those circumstances, the same
agency could have obtained business information and documents: it “could have requested Miles to submit to an audit of his business records, could have iss ued the subpoena to Miles to deliver his business records, [and could have] required Miles to submit to a deposition.” 160 Wn.2d at 249. Authority of law existed for this CID , which was issued to King Fuji and which King Fuji had the statutory right to c hallenge before responding. No violation of article I, section 7 is shown.
IV

. A TTORNEY FEES The AG O requests an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs under R AP 18.1(b) and RCW 19.86.080(1), and cites Brelvis , in which Division Two awarded it fees
in a CID enforcement action. RAP 18.1 allows for attorney fees on appeal if provided for by applicable l aw. RCW 19.86.080(1) provides that the AGO may bring an action “to restrain and prevent the doing of any act herein prohi bited or declared to be unlawful ; and the prevailing party may, in the discretion of the court, recover the costs of said action including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” After giving respectful consideration to Division Two’s award of fees
and costs in Brelvis , we find that these consoli dated actions are governed by RCW 19.86.110(8) and (9) , not RCW 19.86.080(1) . We deny the request for an award of fees and costs.Nos. 37662

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23 Affirmed. A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.

_____________________________ Siddoway, J. WE CONCUR:

__________ ___________________ Pennell, C. J.

__________ ___________________ Staab, J.