1 

2024 IL App (5th) 220711-U 

NO. 5-22-0711 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the

 ) Circuit Court of

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Jefferson County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 20-CF-117 

 ) 

CODY T. RECTOR, ) Honorable 

 ) Jerry E. Crisel, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE SHOLAR delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Moore and Barberis concurred in the judgment.

 

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Defendant’s conviction is affirmed where the State did not commit plain error

during rebuttal closing argument; the trial court’s restitution order is remanded for

the issuance of an amended restitution order. 

¶ 2 The defendant, Cody T. Rector, appeals his conviction following a jury trial in the circuit 

court of Jefferson County for predatory criminal sexual assault and two counts of child 

pornography. On appeal, defendant argues that the State committed plain error by shifting the 

burden of proof to the defense during rebuttal closing argument. Defendant also contends that the 

trial court’s restitution order fails to comply with the requirements of People v. Auler, 250 Ill. App. 

3d 1095 (5th Dist. 1993). For the following reasons, we affirm defendant’s convictions but remand 

for the issuance of an amended restitution order.

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).

NOTICE

Decision filed 07/19/24. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.
2 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The State charged defendant by information with two counts of predatory criminal sexual 

assault of a child, in violation of section 11-1.40(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 

ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2020)); seven counts of child pornography, in violation of sections 

11-20.1(a)(1), 11-20.1(a)(2), and 11-20.1(a)(6) of the Code (id. § 11-20.1(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(6)); and 

one count of felony possession of a firearm without a FOID card, in violation of section 2(a)(1) of 

the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1) (West 2020)). Count I charged 

defendant with touching the vagina of a minor, E.I., under the age of 13. Count II charged 

defendant with licking the vagina of E.I. Counts III and IV charged defendant with child 

pornography for taking and disseminating photos of E.I. The additional five counts of child 

pornography alleged defendant possessed pornographic photos of unknown females under the age 

of 18 and count X alleges defendant possessed a firearm without a valid FOID card. Count X was 

severed before trial and later dismissed. 

¶ 5 Following a jury trial, on June 23, 2022, defendant was convicted on counts I, III and IV. 

Defendant was found not guilty on counts II, V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX. The trial court sentenced 

defendant to three consecutive terms totaling 75 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections 

(IDOC) with 3 years mandatory supervised release (MSR). 

¶ 6 Relevant to this appeal, the following facts were adduced at trial. On March 4, 2020, a chat 

website called Flingster.com received a report flagging a picture as possible child pornography. 

Flingster forwarded the complaint to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. The 

complaint was forwarded to an area task force, and on April 28, 2020, the case was assigned to 

Captain Detective Bobby Wallace with the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department, who was a 

member of the Illinois Attorney General’s Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force. The 
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flagged photograph depicted a young girl on a bed, with her nightgown pulled up to expose her 

bare buttocks; it appeared that her underwear had been removed. The Internet Protocol address (IP 

address) associated with the file was registered to Spectrum Communications in the Mt. Vernon, 

Illinois, area. Wallace obtained a search warrant to obtain information from Spectrum about the 

holder of the IP address which revealed that at the date and time of the complaint, the IP address 

was assigned to the account of defendant at his home in Mt. Vernon. Based on this information, 

Wallace and other officers obtained and executed a search warrant at defendant’s home for the 

seizure and analysis of electronic devices or electronic storage devices.

¶ 7 Wallace executed the search warrant on May 7, 2020. When Wallace knocked on the door, 

Alyssa Wolf (defendant’s former girlfriend and E.I.’s mother) answered. When asked if defendant 

was home, Alyssa said yes and went inside to get him. Alyssa told defendant that the police were 

at the door, and defendant told Alyssa to say he was not home. Alyssa refused. Defendant went to 

the door, and Wallace informed defendant about the warrant. Defendant, Alyssa, and E.I. gathered 

in the living room while law enforcement executed the warrant. Law enforcement seized 

defendant’s Apple iPhone, defendant’s Apple desktop computer, and other phones and tablets. 

Wallace testified that Alyssa fully cooperated in the investigation. 

¶ 8 Both defendant and Alyssa gave recorded statements at the sheriff’s office later that day. 

In her noncustodial interview, Alyssa stated she had never heard of Flingster and had never been 

on it. When Wallace showed her the picture that someone at her home posted on Flingster, Alyssa 

identified the child in the picture as E.I. Alyssa said she did not take the picture, had never seen it 

before, and that she did not use defendant’s computer. Alyssa further stated that defendant was 

laid off from his job with a school bus company and that he babysat E.I. while she worked. 
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¶ 9 In her interview, Alyssa told Wallace that recently, E.I. said she had a rash. E.I. told Alyssa 

that defendant put cream on her, and that he also put cream on himself. When Alyssa asked E.I. 

where on himself defendant put the cream, E.I. said, “his thingy” and pointed down. Defendant 

was not home at the time E.I. made these statements, so Alyssa called him. Defendant denied 

putting cream on E.I. Defendant told Alyssa that he put Vaseline on himself in the living room due 

to chafing and that E.I. must have seen him. Alyssa examined E.I., but she did not find either cream 

or a rash. Alyssa again asked E.I. if defendant put cream on her. E.I. responded that she was lying 

about defendant putting cream on her, but that he did put it on himself. 

¶ 10 In defendant’s custodial interview, defendant admitted having been on Flingster, but he 

said he could not recall the last time he was on it or whether he accessed it from his phone or his 

computer. Wallace showed defendant the picture from Flingster; defendant said the subject of the 

photograph looked like E.I. Initially, defendant stated the bedroom was E.I.’s, but later stated the 

room was his, but that E.I. never slept on his bed. 

¶ 11 Defendant initially denied taking the photograph. When asked if the picture would be found 

on his phone, defendant said no. When asked if his answer to whether he took the picture was yes, 

no, or that he did not remember, defendant paused, stammered, and then said: “I wanna say I—I—

I didn’t.” Defendant then equivocated on whether that was his “official answer, because, I mean, 

maybe I did and was like, hey, she—why’d she fall asleep like this or what the fuck, but I—I 

highly doubt I was doing anything like that.” Later in the interview, when asked again if he took 

the picture, defendant answered, “To my knowledge, no.” Defendant said that if the picture was 

later found on his phone, it was Alyssa who had taken it and posted it, or alternatively, he 

speculated he was being set up and that he allowed his friends to use his computer and his phone. 

When Wallace told defendant his phone would be examined, defendant stated he did not remember 
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taking the picture, but the only way he would have taken it would be to show it to Alyssa, but that 

he did not remember doing so.

¶ 12 When Wallace asked about the Vaseline incident, defendant stated that E.I. walked into the 

bedroom while he was masturbating, but to his knowledge, she never saw anything. He added that 

he was not very cautious with her being around. He denied putting cream or lotion on E.I., but 

stated he put cream or lotion between his own legs when he was in the living room. 

¶ 13 Two days after his interview, while in custody, defendant exchanged a series of texts with 

Alyssa via the jail’s text messaging service. In the messages, defendant said E.I. fell asleep “in a 

weird way” and that he was going to send Alyssa a picture, but he was “afraid it could be looked 

at in a wrong way.” In the messages, defendant speculated the picture recovered by law 

enforcement could have been that picture. Defendant also theorized that E.I. could have been 

positioned on his bed in that manner while he was starting her bath, and that he had been walking 

around on his phone while livestreaming. 

¶ 14 On May 8, 2020, five-year-old E.I. was interviewed at The Amy Schulz Child Advocacy 

Center in Mt. Vernon, Illinois, by forensic interviewer Wendi Zobrist. Prior to the interview, law 

enforcement gave Zobrist a brief report that stated a picture of E.I. had been put on an adult 

website. The report said nothing about sexual molestation. During the interview, E.I. told Zobrist 

that sometimes defendant watches “bad stuff” on the TV while cleaning his legs. When asked to 

point to where defendant was cleaning, E.I. said, “[h]ere,” and pointed to her crotch. E.I. also told 

Zobrist that defendant sometimes “cleaned his legs” in her room while E.I. was in the room and 

while Alyssa was not home. Zobrist asked E.I. if she ever talked to her mom about defendant 

cleaning his legs, and E.I. answered no because defendant told her it was a secret. Toward the end 
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of the first interview, when Zobrist asked E.I. to confirm that she had touched defendant’s “leg,” 

E.I. said that was a joke. 

¶ 15 Zobrist testified that sometimes after a forensic interview, a child makes additional 

disclosures, and that in such cases, a second interview is conducted. After her initial interview, E.I. 

made additional disclosures to her grandfather, and as such, Zobrist conducted a second interview 

with E.I. on May 22, 2020. In the second interview, E.I. disclosed that defendant touched her 

vaginal area, both inside and outside, while defendant was unclothed and in E.I.’s room. E.I. further 

disclosed that she saw slime come out of defendant’s “leg.” Zobrist reminded E.I. that at the first 

interview, E.I. told Zobrist that she was joking about touching defendant. When asked why it was 

a joke, E.I. said it was funny and that she loves her jokes and wants to keep them. Zobrist testified 

that when E.I. said it was a joke, she interpreted this as E.I. wanting the interviews to end. 

¶ 16 The forensic analysis of the devices seized during the execution of the search warrant did 

not reveal the picture of E.I. on defendant’s bed, but other child pornography images were found 

on his iPhone and desktop computer. Wallace, an expert in computer analysis and forensic 

technology, testified that the image of E.I. could have been deleted from the phone or the computer 

prior to the seizure. 

¶ 17 In August of 2021, more than a year after defendant’s arrest, E.I. made an unprompted 

disclosure to her mother and told her that defendant “licked her hoo-ha.” Alyssa reported this 

statement to Wallace. E.I. was not reinterviewed at the Amy Center after this disclosure, as 

Wallace did not believe this was substantially different from the sexual activity that E.I. had 

already disclosed.

¶ 18 At the jury trial, seven-year-old E.I. testified that an example of a “good touch” is a hug, 

and an example of a “bad touch” is if someone touched your “hoo-ha.” When asked to define that 
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term, she pointed at her private part. She further stated that nobody should touch that part, or a 

girl’s “butt[ ]” or [b]oobs.” When asked if anyone had ever touched those parts of her body, E.I.

named defendant. When asked what he touched her with, E.I. stated “[h]is fingers inside and 

outside, and he licked my hoo-ha.” When asked where she was when this occurred, she stated she 

was in defendant’s bedroom and identified a picture of his room.

¶ 19 Both E.I. and Alyssa testified that E.I. told Alyssa that defendant licked and touched her 

“hoo-ha,” and Alyssa testified that E.I. told her that defendant put cream on her and himself. E.I. 

testified that she told her mother that she lied about this, because defendant denied it on the phone. 

E.I. thought her mother did not believe her. Alyssa testified that E.I. did not tell her she was lying 

about defendant putting his finger inside her vagina and licking her vagina. 

¶ 20 Wallace testified that Flingster is a web-based chat site that allows livestreaming if a 

person’s camera is activated. Defendant’s desktop computer had a built-in web camera, and 

Wallace found evidence that defendant accessed Flingster from that computer. Wallace testified 

that although Flingster does not allow a user to upload pictures, a person could get an image onto 

Flingster using multiple methods—screensharing, screen captures, or holding another device 

displaying the image up to the web camera. Wallace did not know specifically how the image of 

E.I. was transmitted to Flingster.

¶ 21 After the presentation of the evidence, the State’s rebuttal closing argument concluded as 

follows: 

 “Ladies and gentlemen, the totality of everything you’ve seen here, is there 

anything that has convinced you that he has not touched that little girl inappropriately; that 

he has not touched her vagina; that he has not licked her vagina; that he has not jacked off 

in front of her; that he has not had slime coming out of his penis in her presence? Because 

if you think he did that, if you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed that 

material and he touched that little girl, please return a verdict of guilty. Thank you.” 

¶ 22 The jury instructions provided to the jury included, in part: 
8 

 “The defendant is presumed to be innocent of the charges against him. This 

presumption remains with him throughout every stage of the trial and during your 

deliberations on the verdict and is not overcome unless from all evidence in this case you 

are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty. 

The State has the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable 

doubt, and this burden remains on the State through the case. The defendant is not required 

to prove his innocence.” 

¶ 23 After approximately 31⁄2 hours of deliberation, the jury found defendant guilty of predatory 

criminal sexual assault based on touching E.I.’s vagina; not guilty on the count of predatory 

criminal sexual assault based on licking E.I.’s vagina; guilty on the two counts of child 

pornography against E.I.; and not guilty on the five additional counts of child pornography alleging 

possession of lewd pictures. 

¶ 24 Defendant was arrested and first charged in May 2020. He was released in June 2021 prior 

to trial upon payment of $25,000 bond by his family. At sentencing, the State asked for the court 

costs and fees to be satisfied from the bond money and for the remainder of the bond money to be 

held for counseling for E.I. The State explained that E.I. receives weekly counseling sessions at a 

cost of $150 per hour. The State offered that the cost of this counseling was not yet determined, 

but explained its understanding that the bills would be submitted to the circuit clerk’s office for 

payment. Further, the State suggested that this arrangement could continue until five years after 

defendant’s release from prison. On the day after sentencing, a payment status information sheet 

was filed, reflecting that $5064 in fees and costs were paid in full and that defendant had no money 

due. A docket entry for that day showed the remaining posted bond amount was $19,936. The 

docket entry stated that this money was not to be refunded and would be held to pay for the victim’s 

mental health counseling. 

¶ 25 The trial court sentenced defendant to mandatory consecutive terms totaling 75 years in 

IDOC with 3 years’ MSR. The court noted that defendant would serve over 51 years of real time 
9 

with credit for time served. The court did not impose a fine but imposed all mandatory costs and 

assessments. The court also ordered that defendant’s bail bond money be held and used to pay for 

counseling for E.I. “as allowed by statute.” The court’s financial sentencing order provided: 

“Restitution—Mental Health Counseling $TBD.” On July 22, 2022, defendant filed a posttrial 

motion for a new trial arguing (i) the evidence was insufficient to find defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt and (ii) defendant was not afforded a fair trial due to the prosecutor’s statements 

regarding defendant having the ability to access pornographic files that could only be accessed by 

use of specialized software. That motion was denied on August 18, 2022. Also on August 18, 2022, 

defendant filed his motion to reconsider sentence, arguing defendant’s sentence was excessive and 

that the court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant. That motion was denied on October 4, 

2022. This timely appeal followed. 

¶ 26 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 27 On appeal, defendant argues that the State improperly shifted the burden of proof to the 

defense in rebuttal closing argument. Additionally, defendant argues the trial court abused its 

discretion in ordering the balance of defendant’s bond money to be held to pay for the victim’s 

counseling because its restitution order did not set out the required details. Finally, defendant asks 

this court to remand for a new hearing on the issue of restitution. For the reasons that follow, we 

affirm the defendant’s convictions but remand for the issuance of an amended restitution order. 

¶ 28 First, we address defendant’s argument that the State improperly shifted the burden of 

proof to him during rebuttal closing argument. Defendant did not object to the error at trial, nor 

did he raise the error in a posttrial motion. As such, and as he concedes, the issue is forfeited, and 

is only reviewable for plain error. See People v. Williams, 2022 IL 126918. “To preserve a 

purported error for consideration by a reviewing court, a defendant must object to the error at trial 
10 

and raise the error in a posttrial motion.” People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48 (citing People v. 

Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 66); see generally People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176 (1988); People v. 

Ford, 19 Ill. 2d 466 (1960) (“An accused may not sit idly by and allow irregular proceedings to 

occur without objection and afterwards seek to reverse his conviction by reason of those same 

irregularities.”). Failure to do either results in forfeiture of such review, but the forfeiture may be 

excused when the error is “plain.” Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48. 

¶ 29 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967) memorializes the plain-error 

doctrine: 

“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall 

be disregarded. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although 

they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.”

The plain-error doctrine does not create a “general saving clause” to allow defendants to escape 

the consequences of their nonfeasance. People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 177 (2005). Instead, it 

offers a narrow exception to the rule of procedural default for unpreserved errors. People v. 

Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 81. Whether there is plain error is a question of law, which we review 

de novo. People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 485 (2009).

¶ 30 “[T]he defendant cannot obtain relief on an unpreserved error under the plain-error doctrine 

if he would not have been entitled to relief on the same error if preserved.” Williams, 2022 IL 

126918, ¶ 49. The Illinois Supreme Court has identified two instances in which a reviewing court 

can consider a forfeited but still clear and obvious error: (1) when “a clear or obvious error 

occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of 

justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error,” or (2) when “a clear or 

obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s 
11 

trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the 

evidence.” People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007) (citing Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 186-87). 

¶ 31 The initial step under either prong of the plain-error doctrine is to determine whether there 

was a clear or obvious error at trial. Id. Therefore, “the threshold inquiry is whether there was an 

error at all.” Williams, 2022 IL 126918, ¶ 49 (citing Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 81). 

¶ 32 Here, defendant seeks review under the second prong of the plain-error doctrine. Under the 

second prong of the plain-error doctrine, a reviewing court must decide whether the defendant has 

shown that the error was so serious it affected the fairness of the trial and challenged the integrity 

of the judicial process. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187. If the defendant meets that burden, “[p]rejudice 

*** is presumed because of the importance of the right involved.” Id. “[C]omments in 

prosecutorial closing arguments will rarely constitute second-prong plain error because the vast 

majority of such comments generally do not undermine basic protections afforded to criminal 

defendants.” Williams, 2022 IL 126918, ¶ 56.

¶ 33 The prosecution has wide latitude in making closing arguments and is permitted to 

comment on the evidence and any fair, reasonable inference it yields. People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 

2d 173, 204 (2009) (citing People v. Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d 104, 121 (2005)). A closing argument 

must be viewed in its entirety, and challenged remarks must be viewed in the context of the entire 

argument as well as the trial court’s instructions that arguments are not evidence, that the State 

bears the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the defendant 

need not present any evidence. Id. An improper closing comment is reversible error only if it 

substantially prejudiced the defendant’s right to a fair trial. People v. Euell, 2012 IL App (2d) 

101130, ¶ 22. 
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¶ 34 On appeal, defendant characterizes the State’s rebuttal closing argument as burdenshifting. Defendant argues the prosecutor required the defense to convince the jury that he was 

innocent and that he did not commit the crimes. The State disagrees with defendant’s 

characterization of the rebuttal closing argument. The State counters that the prosecutor did not 

allege the defendant had the burden of producing evidence of his innocence and that the prosecutor 

did not argue that defendant failed to produce such evidence. We agree with the State. 

¶ 35 In the case before us, the prosecutor did not state that defendant had the burden of 

producing evidence of his innocence, and the prosecutor did not argue that he failed to produce 

such evidence. A closing argument must be viewed in its entirety. See Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 204. 

Looking at the rebuttal closing argument as a whole, the prosecutor asked the jury whether it was 

convinced of his innocence based on the “totality of everything you’ve seen here,” not based on 

the evidence that defendant did or did not produce. Immediately following the contested comment, 

the prosecutor reminded the jury of the State’s burden of proof by stating that the jury should 

convict defendant if it believed “beyond a reasonable doubt” that he committed the charged crimes. 

¶ 36 Further, the court repeatedly and explicitly instructed the jury that the burden of proving 

defendant’s guilt rested with the State, and that the State had to meet that burden beyond a 

reasonable doubt in order for the jury to convict him. In jury selection, the court ascertained that 

each juror understood and accepted the principles set forth in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) 

(eff. July 1, 2012) and further ascertained that each juror would apply the law provided by the 

court, without regard to personal feelings. Where a jury is repeatedly properly instructed on the 

burden of proof, a contested comment by the State in rebuttal closing argument is not reversible 

error. See People v. Mudd, 2022 IL 126830, ¶¶ 45-46. 
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¶ 37 More importantly, we further find that defendant did not suffer substantial prejudice as a 

result of this challenged comment. First, there was significant, credible evidence at trial that tied 

defendant to these crimes. Second, the court repeatedly and explicitly instructed the jury that the 

burden of proving defendant’s guilt rested with the State, and that the State had to meet that burden 

beyond a reasonable doubt in order for the jury to convict him. Therefore, where there is no error 

and where the court properly instructed the jury, defendant has not met his threshold plain-error 

burden of showing that the State clearly and obviously shifted the burden to him. 

¶ 38 Even if we were to find that defendant met the initial step of the plain-error doctrine, 

defendant has not shown that the error was so serious it affected the fairness of the trial and 

challenged the integrity of the judicial process. Improper burden-shifting comments are not 

necessarily second-prong plain error. See People v. Bell, 2020 IL App (4th) 170804, ¶¶ 137-41. 

The Fourth District found in Bell, similar to the case at hand, that improper burden-shifting 

comments were not second-prong plain error where the prosecution did not directly state that the 

defendant had the burden to introduce evidence of innocence, that the State’s comments primarily 

concerned the credibility of the defendant’s theory in light of the evidence presented, and the jury 

was properly instructed. Id. The Second District has also held that improper burden-shifting 

comments were not second-prong plain error where the prosecution did not directly state that the 

defendant had the burden to support his theory. Euell, 2012 IL App (2d) 101130, ¶¶ 20-23. In the 

case at hand, similar to Bell and Euell, the prosecution did not directly state that the defendant had 

the burden to introduce evidence of his innocence nor did the prosecution state that the defendant 

had the burden to support his theory. For the foregoing reasons, defendant has not met his burden 

of showing that the State’s challenged comment, even if improper, affected the fairness of the trial 

and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, or that it was so inflammatory or flagrant that 
14 

he was denied a fair trial. For these reasons, the State did not commit plain error in his rebuttal 

closing argument. As such, defendant’s convictions are affirmed. 

¶ 39 Next, defendant argues that the trial court’s restitution order is inadequate under the 

restitution statute (730 ILCS 5/5-5-6(e) (West 2020)). Defendant asks this court to remand the 

matter to the trial court to correct the order. Defendant argues the restitution order for future 

counseling expenses is based on speculation and does not comply with the requirements of People 

v. Auler, 250 Ill. App. 3d 1095, 1101 (5th Dist. 1993). 

¶ 40 Defendant was arrested and first charged in May 2020. He was released in June 2021 prior 

to trial upon payment of $25,000 bond by his family. At sentencing, the State asked for the court 

costs and fees to be satisfied from the bond money and for the remainder of the bond money to be 

held for counseling for E.I. The State explained that E.I. receives weekly counseling sessions at a 

cost of $150 per hour. The State offered that the cost of this counseling would be undetermined, 

but explained its understanding that the bills would be submitted to the circuit clerk’s office, which 

would pay them, and further told the court that this arrangement could continue until five years 

after defendant’s release from prison. On the day after sentencing, a payment status information 

sheet was filed, reflecting that $5064 in fees and costs were paid in full and that defendant had no 

money due. A docket entry for that day showed the remaining posted bond amount was $19,936. 

The docket entry stated that this money was not to be refunded and would be held to pay for the 

victim’s mental health counseling. 

¶ 41 A circuit court’s determination on restitution will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse 

of discretion. People v. Cameron, 2012 IL App (3d) 110020, ¶ 35. Where the issue is whether a 

restitution order is authorized by statute, the issue is one of law, subject to a de novo standard of 

review. Id. Defendant concedes that the trial court was authorized to issue a restitution order for 
15 

E.I.’s counseling expenses, and that the trial court was authorized to order the balance of 

defendant’s cash bond be used for that purpose. As such, we review the trial court’s restitution 

order for an abuse of discretion. 

¶ 42 Section 5-5-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections permits an order of restitution for 

prospective counseling expenses in sex abuse cases. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-6 (West 2020). When a court 

orders restitution for future counseling expenses, the order must include a maximum dollar 

amount, the time frame for counseling and proof of expenses, that the court services or probation 

department will administer the restitution payment, that either party may petition the court if a 

dispute arises, and a date when any bond monies held for use for restitution will be remitted to the 

defendant. Auler, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 1101. 

¶ 43 In defendant’s financial sentencing order, entered August 18, 2022, the court entered a 

restitution amount of “TBD.” Defendant does not dispute that the trial court has the discretion to 

order restitution from his cash bond; however, defendant asserts the trial court’s restitution order 

does not adhere to the statutory requirements set forth in section 5-5-6 of the Unified Code of 

Corrections. Specifically, defendant asserts the court based the order for future counseling 

expenses on speculation, did not include a maximum dollar amount, the time frame for counseling 

and proof of expenses, that the court services or probation department will administer the 

restitution payment, that either party may petition the court if a dispute arises, and a date when any 

bond monies held for use for restitution will be remitted to the defendant. In response, the State 

argues that the restitution award had a sufficient factual basis and was sufficiently definite in most 

respects. Additionally, the State argues the trial court’s oral pronouncement controls, and that it 

provided adequate certainty on that issue. We reject the State’s argument and remand to the trial 

court for the issuance of a modified restitution order. 
16 

¶ 44 In the sentencing context, it is well settled that a written order is evidence of the trial court’s 

judgment, but the court’s oral pronouncement is the judgment of the court. People v. Carlisle, 

2015 IL App (1st) 131144, ¶ 87. When the court’s oral pronouncement conflicts with its written 

order, the oral pronouncement controls. Id. We agree with defendant that we cannot read the trial 

court’s written order in conjunction with its oral pronouncement and determine the conditions of 

the restitution order. Additionally, the State makes no argument on appeal regarding the trial 

court’s failure to include a method for resolving disputes in its restitution order, and instead asks 

this court to amend the order to include that provision. We decline to do so. 

¶ 45 Where a restitution order is not sufficiently clear and definite, the proper remedy is for the 

reviewing court to remand the cause for the trial court to provide any missing conditions of the 

restitution award. See Auler, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 1101. We agree with defendant that the trial court 

did not issue a clear and definite restitution order and the matter should be remanded to the trial 

court for the issuance of a modified restitution order. 

¶ 46 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 47 For the reasons stated, defendant’s Jefferson County convictions are affirmed. However, 

we remand this matter for the issuance of a modified restitution order, where the trial court is 

directed to specify the maximum amount, duration, and other conditions of the restitution order.

¶ 48 Affirmed and remanded with directions.