FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JANE BOYD,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-55585

D.C. No.

2:18-cv-00803-

MWF-JEM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 1, 2020

Pasadena, California

Filed March 24, 2021

Before: Sandra S. Ikuta and Mark J. Bennett, Circuit 

Judges, and Douglas Woodlock,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Bennett;

Dissent by Judge Ikuta

* The Honorable Douglas P. Woodlock, United States District Judge 

for the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
2 UNITED STATES V. BOYD

SUMMARY**

Tax

The panel reversed the district court’s judgment and 

remanded for further proceedings in an action by the United 

States for tax penalties and interest involving a taxpayer’s 

failure to report foreign financial accounts.

Taxpayer had a financial interest in multiple financial 

accounts in the United Kingdom. She received interest and 

dividends from these accounts but did not report the interest 

and dividends on her 2010 federal income tax return, or 

disclose the account to the Internal Revenue Service. In 

2012, taxpayer participated in the Internal Revenue 

Service’s Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program and 

submitted a Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts 

(FBAR) listing her fourteen foreign accounts for 2010, and 

amended that year’s tax return to include the interest and 

dividends from those accounts. The IRS concluded that 

taxpayer had committed thirteen non-willful violations of 

the reporting requirements under 31 U.S.C. § 5314—one for 

each account she failed to timely report for 2010. The United 

States then sued taxpayer for civil penalties under 

§ 5321(a)(5)(A).

Examining the statutory and regulatory scheme for 

reporting a relationship with a foreign financial agency 

under § 5314, the panel held that § 5321(a)(5)(A) authorizes 

the IRS to impose only one non-willful penalty when an 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
UNITED STATES V. BOYD 3

untimely, but accurate, FBAR is filed, no matter the number 

of accounts.

Judge Ikuta dissented because the panel’s interpretation 

of the statutes is contrary to the language of the relevant 

statutes and regulations, and is implausible in context. In 

Judge Ikuta’s view, the majority interprets the statutes and 

regulations in a manner that unfairly favors the tax evader.

COUNSEL

A. Lavar Taylor (argued) and Jonathan T. Amitrano, Law 

Offices of A. Lavar Taylor LLP, Santa Ana, California, for 

Defendant-Appellant.

Francesca Ugolini (argued), Deborah K. Snyder, and 

Kathleen E. Lyon, Attorneys; Richard E. Zuckerman, 

Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Tax Division, 

United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for 

Plaintiff-Appellee.

David Michaels, DTMtax, Placentia, California, for Amici 

Curiae Laxman, Jashu, Hiten, and Anita Patel.

Caroline D. Ciraolo and Caroline Rule, Kostelanetz & Fink 

LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae American 

College of Tax Counsel.
4 UNITED STATES V. BOYD

OPINION

BENNETT, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Jane Boyd did not timely file a Report of 

Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts form (“FBAR”) 

disclosing her foreign financial accounts in the United 

Kingdom.1 The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) found 

that she violated the reporting requirements of 31 U.S.C. 

§ 5314 and imposed multiple penalties under 31 U.S.C. 

§ 5321(a)(5)(A) based on her belated submission of a single 

FBAR. The government sued in the district court seeking to 

obtain a judgment against Boyd in the amount of $47,279, 

plus additional late-payment penalties and interest for nonwillful violations. The parties cross moved for summary 

judgment. The district court granted the government’s 

motion, concluding that § 5321(a)(5)(A) authorized the 

government to impose multiple non-willful penalties—up to 

$10,000 for each foreign bank account that was required to 

be listed on the FBAR. We reverse this judgment and 

conclude that § 5321(a)(5)(A) authorizes the IRS to impose 

only one non-willful penalty when an untimely, but accurate, 

FBAR is filed, no matter the number of accounts.

I.

The relevant facts are undisputed. Jane Boyd, an 

American citizen, had a financial interest in fourteen 

1 The FBAR was due by June 30, 2011. Boyd filed an accurate 

FBAR in October 2012 on the prescribed form, TD F 90-22.1. A blank 

copy of Form TD F 90-22.1 as it appears in the Excerpts of Record, is 

attached as Appendix A to this opinion. The parties do not dispute that 

this was the prescribed form at the time Boyd made her belated FBAR 

filing. Appendix B to this opinion contains certain relevant statutes and 

regulations.
UNITED STATES V. BOYD 5

financial accounts in the United Kingdom with an aggregate 

balance in excess of $10,000. The amounts in these accounts 

significantly increased between 2009 and 2011 after her 

father died in 2009 and she deposited her inheritance. Boyd 

received interest and dividends from these accounts and did 

not report the interest and dividends on her 2010 federal 

income tax return or disclose the accounts to the IRS. In 

2012, Boyd asked to participate in the IRS’s Offshore 

Voluntary Disclosure Program—a program that allows 

taxpayers to voluntarily report undisclosed offshore 

financial accounts in exchange for predictable and uniform 

penalties. After the IRS accepted Boyd into the program, 

she submitted, in October 2012, an FBAR listing her 

fourteen foreign accounts for 2010 and amended her 2010 

tax return to include the interest and dividends from these 

accounts.

Boyd was granted permission by the IRS to opt out of 

the program in 2014. The IRS then examined Boyd’s 

income tax return and concluded that she committed thirteen 

FBAR violationsone violation for each account she failed 

to timely report for calendar year 2010.2 The late-submitted 

FBAR was complete and accurate. The IRS concluded that 

Boyd’s violations were non-willful, and it assessed a total 

penalty of $47,279. In 2018, the government sued Boyd 

seeking to obtain a judgment against her for the $47,279 plus 

additional late-payment penalties and interest.

Boyd argued before the district court that she had 

committed only one non-willful violation, not thirteen, and 

that the maximum penalty allowed by the statute for that 

2 The IRS determined that one of the accounts was used to fund 

several other accounts and therefore did not impose a separate penalty 

on the fourteenth account.
6 UNITED STATES V. BOYD

single non-willful violation was $10,000. The government 

contended that the relevant statutes and regulations 

authorized the IRS to assess one penalty for each nonreported account. The district court agreed with the 

government. Boyd timely appealed.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

This case presents an issue of first impression for this 

court. We must decide whether 31 U.S.C. § 5321 authorizes 

the IRS to impose multiple non-willful penalties for the 

untimely filing of a single accurate FBAR that includes 

multiple foreign accounts.

Boyd argues that the statutory language does not support 

a separate penalty for each account she should have listed on 

the FBAR she failed to timely file. Rather, according to 

Boyd, the statutory and regulatory schemes provide that a 

non-willful, untimely but accurate FBAR filing constitutes a 

single violation subject to a maximum penalty of $10,000. 

Boyd also contends that the rule of lenity applies to statutes 

imposing penalties and, therefore, § 5321 should be 

construed strictly against the government.

The government argues that multiple non-willful 

violations may spring from a single late but accurate FBAR, 

because 31 U.S.C. § 5314 and its implementing regulations 

create reporting requirements that extend to each foreign 

account. In the government’s view, Boyd’s reading of 

§ 5321 is incompatible with the statutory scheme as a whole, 

particularly when viewing the statute’s “reasonable cause” 

exception and willful penalty provisions, both of which, the 

government claims, are directed to accounts and not the 

FBAR form.
UNITED STATES V. BOYD 7

We agree with Boyd. The statute, read with the 

regulations, authorizes a single non-willful penalty for the 

failure to file a timely FBAR. Accordingly, we reverse the 

district court and remand for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

A.

We review de novo both the “district court’s grant of 

summary judgment,” Bradley v. United States, 817 F.2d 

1400, 1402 (9th Cir. 1987), and its interpretation of the 

statute, see United States v. Town of Colo. City, 935 F.3d 

804, 807 (9th Cir. 2019). Summary judgment here is 

appropriate if there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the [government] is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When we interpret a statute, 

our “first step . . . is to determine whether the language at 

issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to 

the particular dispute in the case.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 

519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). If so, the “inquiry must cease,” 

provided “the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.” 

Id. (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 

235, 240 (1989)). We determine “[t]he plainness or 

ambiguity of [the] statutory language . . . by reference to the 

language itself, the specific context in which that language 

is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” 

Id. at 341; see also Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 

302, 320 (2014) (noting that it is a “fundamental canon of 

statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read 

in their context and with a view to their place in the overall 

statutory scheme” (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson 

Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000))). Thus, in 

addition to looking at the statutory text, we analyze the 

statutory and regulatory framework as a whole and examine 

the meaning of the statutory provisions “with a view to their 
8 UNITED STATES V. BOYD

place” in that framework. Util. Air Regul. Grp., 573 U.S. 

at 320.

B.

Section 5321 authorizes the government to “impose a 

civil money penalty on any person who violates, or causes 

any violation of, any provision of section 5314.” 31 U.S.C. 

§ 5321(a)(5)(A). Section 5321 establishes two types of civil 

penalties depending on whether the violation was willful or 

non-willful. See id. § 5321(a)(5). The maximum penalty for 

a non-willful violation “shall not exceed $10,000.” Id. 

§ 5321(a)(5)(B)(i).3

 The maximum penalty for willful 

violations is the greater of $100,000 or “50 percent of the 

amount determined under subparagraph (D).” Id. 

§ 5321(a)(5)(C). Subparagraph (D) provides that for “a 

violation involving a transaction,” the relevant amount is 

“the amount of the transaction,” id. § 5321(a)(5)(D)(i), while 

for “a violation involving a failure to report the existence of 

an account or any identifying information required to be 

provided with respect to an account,” the relevant amount is 

“the balance in the account at the time of the violation,” id. 

§ 5321(a)(5)(D)(ii). The statute thus penalizes willful 

violations involving misreporting or non-reporting of 

account information up to the greater of 50 percent of the 

account balance, or $100,000.4

3 The statute also recognizes a reasonable cause exception for nonwillful violations: “No penalty shall be imposed” if a violation was “due 

to reasonable cause” and “the amount of the transaction or the balance in 

the account at the time of the transaction was properly reported.” 

31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(B)(ii).

4 So, for example, a penalty of up to $500,000 may be imposed for 

a willful failure to report an account with a balance of $1,000,000, and a 
UNITED STATES V. BOYD 9

The salient question is: Did Boyd commit one nonwillful violation for her single failure to timely file the 

FBAR, or did she commit thirteen (or fourteen) non-willful 

violations for her single failure to timely file an FBAR listing 

her fourteen relevant accounts? We turn to the applicable 

statutes and implementing regulations to answer this 

question.

Section 5321(a)(5)(A) provides for imposition of “a 

civil money penalty on any person who violates, or causes 

any violation of, any provision of section 5314.” Congress 

did not define “provision.” We therefore apply the ordinary 

and plain meaning of that word. See Metro One 

Telecomms., Inc. v. Comm’r, 704 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 

2012) (“[I]n the absence of an indication to the contrary, 

words in a statute are assumed to bear their ordinary, 

contemporary, common meaning.” (quoting Walters v. 

Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207 (1997))). A 

provision is “an article or clause (as in a contract) that 

introduces a condition” or “a condition, requirement, or 

item specified in a legal instrument.” Provision, MerriamWebster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictiona

ry/provision (last visited Nov. 9, 2020) (defining provision 

as “proviso” or “stipulation”).5

Section 5314 contains several provisions, including:

(a) Considering the need to avoid impeding 

or controlling the export or import of 

penalty of up to $100,000 may be imposed for a willful failure to report 

an account with a balance of $150,000.

5 To determine “the plain meaning of terms, we may consult the 

definitions of those terms in popular dictionaries.” Metro One 

Telecomms., Inc., 704 F.3d at 1061.
10 UNITED STATES V. BOYD

monetary instruments and the need to avoid 

burdening unreasonably a person making a 

transaction with a foreign financial agency, 

the Secretary of the Treasury shall require a 

resident or citizen of the United States or a 

person in, and doing business in, the United 

States, to keep records, file reports, or keep 

records and file reports, when the resident, 

citizen, or person makes a transaction or 

maintains a relation for any person with a 

foreign financial agency. The records and 

reports shall contain the following 

information in the way and to the extent the 

Secretary prescribes:

(1) the identity and address of participants in 

a transaction or relationship.

(2) the legal capacity in which a participant is 

acting.

(3) the identity of real parties in interest.

(4) a description of the transaction.

31 U.S.C. § 5314(a) (emphases added). As emphasized 

above, § 5314(a) contains two separate and relevant 

provisions: (1) filing a report when maintaining a 

relationship with a foreign financial agency, and (2) ensuring 

the filed report contains specified information as prescribed 

by the Secretary. We next consider the relevant regulations, 

as they prescribe how these provisions may be violated.

The Supreme Court in California Bankers Association v.

Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) explained that “the Act’s civil and 
UNITED STATES V. BOYD 11

criminal penalties attach only upon violation of regulations 

promulgated by the Secretary; if the Secretary were to do 

nothing, the Act itself would impose no penalties on 

anyone.” Id. at 26. Consequently, our focus must be on the 

directives the Secretary had in place at the time of Boyd’s 

reporting of her foreign financial accounts. There are two 

relevant regulations. The first requires a citizen (like Boyd) 

to report financial interests in foreign accounts “for each 

year in which such relationship exists and [to] provide such 

information as shall be specified in a reporting form

prescribed under 31 U.S.C. 5314 . . . . The form prescribed 

under section 5314 is the Report of Foreign Bank and

Financial Accounts [the FBAR] . . . .” 31 C.F.R. 

§ 1010.350(a) (emphases added). The second requires that 

the FBAR “be filed . . . on or before June 30 of each calendar 

year with respect to foreign financial accounts exceeding 

$10,000 maintained during the previous calendar year.” Id. 

§ 1010.306(c).6

 Thus, § 1010.350 (and the FBAR form) 

describes what information must be disclosed in the report 

prescribed by § 5314—the FBAR—while § 1010.306 

imposes a deadline for when the FBAR must be filed.

Because Boyd’s late-filed FBAR was accurate, she could

not have violated § 1010.350—the regulation that delineates 

the content of the report (the FBAR) required by § 5314. 

Boyd violated only § 1010.306. Her FBAR for calendar year 

2010 was due by June 30, 2011, and she did not file it until 

2012. Thus, we hold that, under the statutory and regulatory 

6 The requirement to file an FBAR does not turn on the number of 

accounts, only on the aggregate value in those accounts. And only one 

yearly FBAR is required, whether there are twenty accounts with an 

aggregate value of $10,000, or one account with a value of $10,000,000.
12 UNITED STATES V. BOYD

scheme, Boyd committed a single non-willful violation—the 

failure to timely file the FBAR.7

We are unpersuaded by the government’s arguments that 

Boyd committed multiple violations. First, the 

government’s reliance on § 1010.350(a) to support that 

Boyd committed multiple violations is misplaced because, 

as discussed above, Boyd did not violate § 1010.350(a).8

 To 

the contrary, she disclosed all the information called for by 

Form TD F 90-22.1.

Second, the government argues that the use of the word 

“any” before “violation” in § 5321(a)(5)(A) suggests “that 

more than one violation may occur with respect to a 

particular report (§ 5314(a)) required to be filed.” We 

7 The dissent accuses us of misquoting and misreading § 1010.306. 

Dissent at 25 n.6, 27–28. The dissent is wrong. Subsection (c) of 

§ 1010.306 states that “[r]eports required to be filed by § 1010.350 shall 

be filed . . . on or before June 30 of each calendar year.” The following 

subsection (d) makes clear that such reports must be made using the 

prescribed form. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.306(d) (“Reports required by . . .

§ 1010.350 . . . shall be filed on forms prescribed by the Secretary.” 

(emphasis added)). Because a taxpayer must make the reports on the 

FBAR, it is the FBAR that must be filed by June 30. See United States 

v. Bittner, 469 F. Supp. 3d 709, 718 (E.D. Tex. 2020) (“[I]t is the failure 

to file an annual FBAR that is the violation contemplated and that 

triggers the civil penalty provisions of § 5321.”), appeal docketed, No. 

20-40612 (5th Cir. Sept. 18, 2020); see also United States v. Kaufman, 

No. 3:18-CV-00787 (KAD), 2021 WL 83478, at *9 (D. Conn. Jan. 11, 

2021) (“FBARs must be filed on or before June 30 . . . .” (internal 

quotation mark and citation omitted)).

8 The regulations and FBAR require a person to report much more 

information than the number of accounts. Taken to its “logical” 

conclusion, the government’s argument could permit many more nonwillful violations than those tied just to the number of accounts that 

should have been listed on an FBAR that was not timely filed.
UNITED STATES V. BOYD 13

disagree. The language in § 5321(a)(5)(A) that “any

violation of . . . any provision of section 5314” simply refers 

to the relevant regulations that prescribe how the provisions 

in § 5314 may be violated. As discussed above, under the 

relevant regulations, Boyd committed one violation. And 

even if the language could support separate non-willful 

penalties in a different factual scenario—like if an individual 

first failed to timely file an FBAR, and then filed an 

inaccurate one—we are not presented with those facts. Boyd 

failed to timely file an FBAR and later filed an accurate one.9

In sum, under the statutory and regulatory scheme, 

Boyd’s conduct amounts to one violation, which the IRS 

determined was non-willful. Section 5321(a)(5)(B)(i) 

authorizes one penalty per non-willful violation of § 5314, 

not to exceed $10,000. Because Boyd committed a single 

non-willful violation, the IRS may impose only one penalty 

not to exceed $10,000.

III.

Despite the clear language of § 5321(a)(5)(B)(i), the 

government argues that the amount of the penalty can be 

assessed on a per-account basis based on the statutory 

9 The district court cases that the government cites in support of its 

position, see United States v. Ott, No. 18-cv-12174, 2019 WL 3714491 

(E.D. Mich. Aug. 7, 2019); United States v. Gardner, No. 2:18-cv03536-CAS-E, 2019 WL 1767120 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2019), are 

inapposite because those courts did not directly address the question 

raised here—whether a person commits multiple violations equivalent to 

the number of accounts reported on an untimely but accurate FBAR. We 

further note that two district court cases, relied upon by Boyd, postdating 

the decision we now review, have directly rejected the outcome reached 

below in this case. See Kaufman, 2021 WL 83478, at *8–11; Bittner, 

469 F. Supp. 3d at 718–26.
14 UNITED STATES V. BOYD

scheme as a whole and legislative intent. We are 

unpersuaded.

Before 2004, § 5321 only penalized willful violations. 

See 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5) (2004). Congress amended the 

statute to allow for non-willful penalties and did so by 

establishing a new generally applicable penalty provision, 

31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(B), while placing willful violations 

and the associated penalty provision in different 

subparagraphs, 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(C)–(D). See 

American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 

§ 821(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1586. The new penalty provision 

in § 5321(a)(5)(B)(i) does not expressly authorize (or forbid) 

multiple non-willful penalties on a per account basis for a 

late-filed but accurate FBAR—“[T]he amount of any civil 

penalty imposed [for a non-willful violation of any provision 

of § 5314] . . . shall not exceed $10,000.” 31 U.S.C. 

§ 5321(a)(5)(B)(i). The willful-violation provisions, on the 

other hand, are not silent as to multiple account penalties; 

they state that a penalty amount is determined “in the case of 

a violation involving a transaction, [by] the amount of the 

transaction, or . . . in the case of a violation involving a 

failure to report the existence of an account or any 

identifying information required to be provided with respect 

to an account, [based on] the balance in the account at the 

time of the violation.” 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(D)(i)–(ii).

The government contends that the willful violation 

penalty provision, § 5321(a)(5)(D)(ii)—which explicitly 

bases the penalty amount on the balance of any account 

willfully misreported or non-reported—is evidence that the 

non-willful violation penalty provision also must base the 

penalty amount on the number of accounts misreported or 

non-reported, given that Congress intended to treat the two 

penalty frameworks identically. In the government’s view, 
UNITED STATES V. BOYD 15

the 2004 amendments merely extended the existing penalties 

authorized by § 5321 to non-willful violations. We find the 

text Congress adopted did not do so.

“Congress generally acts intentionally when it uses 

particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 

another.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 574 U.S. 

383, 391 (2015). Thus, we presume that Congress purposely 

excluded the per-account language from the non-willful 

penalty provision in subparagraph (B)(i) because it included 

such language in the willful penalty provision in 

subparagraph (D). See United States v. McDuffy, 890 F.3d 

796, 800 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[W]here Congress includes 

particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 

another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 

Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate 

inclusion or exclusion.” (alteration in original) (quoting 

Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 573 (2009))), cert. 

denied, 139 S. Ct. 845 (2019); see also Fortney v. United 

States, 59 F.3d 117, 120 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying this 

presumption to the Internal Revenue Code). Indeed, 

Congress could very easily have written, using the language 

of the willful violations penalty provision, something like: 

“Except as provided in subparagraph (C) [dealing with 

willful violations], the amount of any civil penalty imposed 

under subparagraph (A) shall not exceed $10,000 for each 

failure to timely report the existence of an account or any 

identifying information required to be provided with respect 

to an account.” Instead, Congress wrote the statute it did: 

“Except as provided in subparagraph (C) [dealing with 

willful violations], the amount of any civil penalty imposed 

under subparagraph (A) shall not exceed $10,000.” 

31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(B)(i). We decline to read into the 

statute language that Congress wrote in the willful penalty 
16 UNITED STATES V. BOYD

provision but omitted from the non-willful penalty 

provision.10

The government also contends that the per-account 

language in the reasonable cause exception to non-willful 

violations (which Congress created with the same set of 

amendments that established non-willful violations) 

supports its interpretation. But contrary to the government’s 

argument, the inclusion of per-account language in the 

reasonable cause exception supports that Congress 

intentionally omitted per-account language from the nonwillful penalty provision. Since we know Congress was 

aware of that language during the amendment process and 

left it out of the non-willful penalty provision, we think the 

better view is that Congress acted intentionally when it 

drafted the non-willful civil penalty with no reference to 

“account” or “balance in the account.” See MacLean, 

574 U.S. at 391; see also Bittner, 469 F. Supp. 3d at 719; 

Kaufman, 2021 WL 83478, at *9 (agreeing with Bittner “that 

Congress intentionally omitted reference to ‘account’ or 

10 The dissent erroneously claims that we “defin[ed] the word 

‘violation’ differently when it is used in” § 5321(a)(5)(B) than when it is 

used in subparagraph (D). Dissent at 28–30. We have not done so. We 

have simply given effect to Congress’s intent to formulate two different 

schemes of punishment for willful and non-willful violations. See

Kaufman, 2021 WL 83478, at *10 (“Concluding that the manner of 

calculating the statutory cap for a willful violation is different than for a 

non-willful violation does not mean that the conduct underlying the 

violation differs. Under both scenarios, the violation flows from the 

failure to file a timely and accurate FBAR. The only difference is that 

the manner for calculating the statutory cap for penalties for willful 

violations involves an analysis that includes consideration of the balance 

in the accounts, while no such analysis is required for non-willful 

violations.”). The dissent on the other hand ignores the import of 

Congress’s explicit choice to omit the per-account language from the 

non-willful penalty provision in subparagraph (B).
UNITED STATES V. BOYD 17

‘balance in the account’ when drafting the penalty provision 

for non-willful violations”).

The government contends that the use of the word “any” 

before “civil penalty” in § 5321(a)(5)(B)(i) suggests that 

“multiple potential items are being referenced.” The “any

civil penalty imposed under subparagraph (A)” language in 

§ 5321(a)(5)(B)(i) simply refers to subsection (a)(5)(A), 

which provides that the Secretary “may impose a civil 

money penalty on any person who violates, or causes any 

violation of, any provision of section 5314.” This does not 

suggest the possibility of multiple non-willful penalties on a 

per-account basis for the single failure to file a timely 

FBAR.11

11 The American College of Tax Counsel, appearing before us as 

amicus curiae, points out that, in 2014, the IRS provided taxpayers its 

view of the difference between willful and non-willful penalties:

Separately, taxpayers with foreign accounts 

whose aggregate value exceeds $10,000 any time 

during the year must file a[n FBAR] . . . . The FBAR 

is not filed with a federal tax return and must be filed 

by June 30 each year.

. . . .

For the FBAR, the penalty may be up to $10,000, 

if the failure to file is non-willful; if willful, however, 

the penalty is up to the greater of $100,000 or 50 

percent of account balances; criminal penalties may 

also apply.

Fact Sheet, Offshore Income and Filing Information for Taxpayers with 

Offshore Accounts, FS-2014-7 (June 2014) (hereinafter, “2014 Fact 

Sheet”) (emphasis added), available at https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/
18 UNITED STATES V. BOYD

The non-willful penalty provision allows the IRS to 

assess one penalty not to exceed $10,000 per violation, and 

nothing in the statute or regulations suggests that the penalty 

may be calculated on a per-account basis for a single failure 

to file a timely FBAR that is otherwise accurate. Thus, the 

IRS may impose only one penalty not to exceed $10,000 for 

Boyd’s single failure to file a timely FBAR.

IV.

Starting with the language of the statute and the 

regulations as a whole, and using normal tools of statutory 

construction, we have no difficulty concluding that the 

government cannot assess multiple penalties for the nonwillful violation here—failing to timely file an FBAR. But 

offshore-income-and-filing-information-for-taxpayers-with-offshoreaccounts (last visited Nov. 9, 2020).

And even here, at the same time the IRS was telling Boyd she was 

subject to multiple non-willful penalties, it sent her a form letter 

(consistent with the 2014 Fact Sheet) appearing to state the opposite. 

The letter explained that the IRS was “proposing a penalty” and included 

two checked boxes. The first box explained that the IRS was “proposing 

the assessment of a penalty under 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5) for failing to 

meet the filing requirements of 31 U.S.C. § 5314. For each calendar 

year, any U.S. person having one or more foreign accounts with 

maximum balances aggregating over $10,000 is required to file [the 

FBAR] with the Internal Revenue Service by June 30th of the following 

year.” The second box explained that “[f]or the failure to file [the 

FBAR] due on or after June 30, 2005, the penalty cannot exceed 

$10,000.” (emphasis added).

No one cited this letter in their briefs, and it does not “estop” the 

government or the IRS. We cite it and the 2014 Fact Sheet for two 

purposes—first for their logical read of the statute and regulations, and 

second for the fact that they come from the IRS, which now urges upon 

us a different and far less logical read.
UNITED STATES V. BOYD 19

even if the statute were ambiguous in its treatment of nonwillful penalties, we must strictly construe a “tax provision 

which imposes a penalty . . . ; [it] cannot be assessed unless 

the words of the provision plainly impose it.” Bradley, 

817 F.2d at 1402–03. While the rule of lenity ordinarily 

applies only to criminal statutes, see Kasten v. Saint-Gobain

Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 16 (2011), our 

circuit strictly construes tax penalty provisions independent 

of the rule of lenity. The statute in Bradley was not a penal 

statute, and we did not discuss the rule of lenity. 

Nevertheless, we still strictly construed the statute, which 

authorized a maximum civil penalty of $500 for the filing of 

frivolous returns. Bradley, 817 F.2d at 1402. We are bound 

by Bradley’s statement of the law.12

Even if the government’s reading of the statutory scheme 

were reasonable (and we think it is not), that reading does 

not arise from the plain words of either the statute or the 

regulations. And Boyd’s reading, even if it is not compelled, 

is reasonable. Thus, the rule we enunciated in Bradley

would come into play, and we would strictly construe the 

statute against the government. The district court found the 

rule inapplicable because “that is not exactly the issue 

herethere’s no question that the civil penalty exists; that’s 

the basis for this dispute.” United States v. Boyd, No. 18-

803-MWF (JEMx), 2019 WL 1976472, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 

23, 2019). We disagree. The precise issue here is not 

whether the statute authorizes a non-willful penalty; it is 

whether the statute plainly authorizes a non-willful penalty

12 We note that though Boyd raised Bradley in her opening brief, the 

government did not discuss the case in its answering brief. We also note 

that the United States Tax Court has held that the rule of lenity applies 

to tax laws that impose a monetary penalty. Mohamed v. Comm’r, T.C. 

Memo. 2013-255, 2013 WL 5988943, at *10–11.
20 UNITED STATES V. BOYD

for each account under the facts here, and it does not.13 

Thus, the government’s position would also be unavailing 

under Bradley.

V.

Boyd was required to file one FBAR for the 2010 

calendar year by June 30, 2011. She failed to do so. 

Accordingly, she committed one violation, and the IRS 

concluded that her violation was non-willful. Thus, the 

maximum penalty for such a violation “shall not exceed 

$10,000.”

REVERSED and REMANDED.

IKUTA, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

When the Bank Secrecy Act1 was enacted by Congress 

in 1970, it was a cutting edge vehicle to combat “a serious 

13 Though the government did not discuss Bradley, it did discuss

Comm’r v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87 (1959), which was also cited by Boyd in 

her opening brief. The government argued: “[T]he Supreme Court noted 

the established principle that ‘one is not to be subjected to a penalty 

unless the words of the statute plainly impose it.’ As the District Court 

held . . . , however, there is no dispute here that § 5321(a)(5) provides 

for a penalty.” (emphasis added). We reject this “out of one, many” 

argument.

1 The Bank Secrecy Act is the popular name for the Bank Records 

and Foreign Transactions Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114. Title 

II of the Act was originally codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1122. In 

1982, these sections were re-enacted without substantive change as 

31 U.S.C. §§ 5311 to 5322, with applicable regulations at 31 C.F.R. 

§ 103.11 et seq.
UNITED STATES V. BOYD 21

and widespread use of foreign financial institutions, located 

in jurisdictions with strict laws of secrecy as to bank activity, 

for the purpose of violating or evading domestic criminal, 

tax, and regulatory enactments.” Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. 

Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 27 (1974). The use of foreign accounts 

led to the loss of “hundreds of millions in tax revenues,” and 

had “debilitating effects” on the American economy. Id.

at 28. Similar issues are facing law enforcement today. In 

recent years, Americans have poured billions of dollars into 

undeclared accounts in jurisdictions like Switzerland and the 

British Virgin Islands. See, e.g., Laura Saunders, The IRS 

Reels in a Whale of an Offshore Tax Cheat – and Goes for 

Another, Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 2020.2

 In many cases, “an 

American puts assets into foreign trusts, companies, and 

other offshore accounts nominally owned by foreigners to 

make it look as though no tax is owed to the IRS.” Id. Such 

“offshore structures are hard for the IRS to investigate if

they’re in countries without treaties or agreements easing the 

exchange of tax information.” Id. The IRS has redoubled 

its efforts “to pierce the veil of bank secrecy.” Id.

The Bank Secrecy Act gives the IRS multiple statutory 

tools for combating these offshore tax evasion techniques. 

See Shultz, 416 U.S. at 27. One tool that has remained 

essentially unchanged since 1970 is the power to impose 

penalties on Americans who fail to keep records and file 

reports on transactions or accounts with foreign financial 

agencies, e.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 5314, 5321. These reporting 

requirements and associated penalties deter taxpayers from 

hiding their offshore accounts and therefore “have a high 

2 Available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-irs-reels-in-awhale-of-an-offshore-tax-cheatand-goes-for-another-11603445399.
22 UNITED STATES V. BOYD

degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory 

investigations or proceedings.” 31 U.S.C. § 5311.

Instead of providing an evenhanded interpretation of 

these statutes, the majority strains to interpret them 

narrowly. The majority rejects the most natural reading of 

the statutory language, which requires Americans to report

each foreign account and imposes a penalty for each failure 

to do so. Rather, the majority focuses on the procedure for 

complying with the law. Because the regulations direct 

taxpayers to aggregate their reports of foreign accounts on a 

single reporting form,3 the majority concludes that it is the 

failure to provide the reporting form (not the failure to report 

the individual foreign financial accounts) that constitutes the 

statutory violation, and that the IRS may impose only single 

penalty for failure to provide the reporting form. Maj. at 11–

12.

Because this interpretation is contrary to the language of 

the relevant statutes and regulations—as well as being 

implausible in context—I dissent.

I

The facts of this case are undisputed. From 2004 to 

2011, Jane Boyd had a financial interest in multiple financial 

accounts in the United Kingdom. Boyd did not report these 

accounts to the IRS as required by law. After a state 

government discovered her foreign accounts, Boyd entered 

into the IRS’s limited-amnesty program, which allowed 

persons to voluntarily report previously undisclosed 

3 Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (Form TD-F 90-

22.1), frequently referred to as the FBAR (revised Jan. 2012), available 

at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f90221.pdf.
UNITED STATES V. BOYD 23

offshore financial accounts to the IRS in exchange for lower 

penalties. As part of her participation in this program, Boyd 

submitted her delinquent reports in October 2012. For 

unknown reasons, Boyd subsequently opted out of the 

amnesty program, and so became subject to full assessment 

of penalties. The IRS ruled that Boyd’s failure to report her 

foreign accounts was not willful, and it assessed a penalty 

for each of thirteen unreported accounts for a total penalty of 

$47,279. The government subsequently brought a civil 

action against her when she failed to pay the penalty amount. 

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 

government, and this appeal followed.

II

On appeal, the only issue is whether the IRS may assess 

a penalty for Boyd’s failure to file a report regarding each of 

the thirteen accounts she maintained in the United Kingdom. 

The language of the relevant statutes and regulations makes 

clear that the IRS can do so.4

The IRS assessed civil penalties against Boyd under 

31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(A) for a violation of 31 U.S.C. 

§ 5314. As relevant here, § 5314(a) has both a substantive 

and procedural element. As to the substantive element, 

§ 5314(a) directs the Secretary of the Treasury to require a 

person to “file reports” when that person “makes a 

transaction with a foreign financial agency” or “maintains a 

relation . . . with a foreign financial agency.” Procedurally, 

the report must contain certain information “in the way and 

4 The text of the relevant statutes and regulations are attached as an 

appendix.
24 UNITED STATES V. BOYD

to the extent the Secretary prescribes.” 31 U.S.C. 

§ 5314(a).5

As required, the Secretary promulgated regulations to 

implement the statute. The relevant regulation, 31 C.F.R. 

§ 1010.350(a), states that “[e]ach United States person 

having a . . . financial account in a foreign country [1] shall 

report such relationship to the Commissioner of Internal 

Revenue for each year in which such relationship exists and 

[2] shall provide such information as shall be specified in a 

reporting form prescribed under 31 U.S.C. 5314 to be filed 

by such persons.” 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(a) (emphasis 

added). As this wording makes clear, the obligation to report 

each account (as set out in the first clause of § 1010.350(a)) 

is independent of the obligation to file a reporting form (as 

set out in the second clause of § 1010.350(a)).

The first clause of § 1010.350(a) sets out the reporting 

obligation: “[e]ach United States person having a financial 

interest in, or signature or other authority over, a bank, 

securities or other financial account in a foreign country” 

must “report such relationship” to the IRS. Id. A person 

must “report” a financial interest in a “financial account” 

“for each year in which such relationship exists.” Id.

The second clause of § 1010.350(a) sets out a procedural 

requirement: that the person having the interest in the 

foreign account must “provide such information as shall be 

specified in a reporting form.” Id.

5 The Secretary has delegated “[t]he authority to enforce the 

provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 5314 and [its implementing regulations] . . . to 

the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.” 31 C.F.R. § 1010.810(g).
UNITED STATES V. BOYD 25

Section 1010.306 confirms that § 1010.350(a) 

implements two independent requirements. Section 

1010.306(d) states that the “reports required to be filed” by 

§ 1010.350 “shall be filed on forms prescribed by the 

Secretary.” The “reports required to be filed” are distinct 

from the form that must be used for filing the reports. This 

interpretation is required by § 1010.306(e), which provides 

that “[f]orms to be used in making the reports required by” 

§ 1010.350 “may be obtained from BSA E-Filing System.” 

Id. § 1010.306(e) (emphasis added). Given that the reports 

are distinct from the applicable reporting forms, the 

requirement in § 1010.306(c) that “[r]eports required to be 

filed by § 1010.350 . . . shall be filed with FinCEN on or 

before June 30 of each calendar year,” requires the specified 

United States person to file a report regarding each foreign 

account before June 30, and (as explained in § 1010.306(d)) 

must do so on the appropriate reporting form.6

Paragraph 5 of § 5321 sets out civil penalties and 

establishes both the mens rea and actus reus for a violation 

of the reporting requirements in § 5314. As to mens rea, a 

6 Thus, the majority is incorrect in stating that § 1010.306(c) 

“requires that the FBAR ‘be filed . . . on or before June 30 of each 

calendar year . . . .” Maj. at 11 (quoting § 1010.306(c)). The majority 

omits the text in § 1010.306(c) immediately preceding its quotation, 

which states that “[r]eports required to be filed by § 1010.350 shall be 

filed . . . on or before June 30.” 31 C.F.R. § 1010.306(c) (emphasis 

added). Contrary to the majority, § 1010.306(c) does not reference the 

FBAR reporting form. The “[r]eports required to be filed by 

§ 1010.350” references § 1010.350(a), which provides that a person with 

“a financial interest in, or signature or other authority over, a bank, 

securities, or other financial account in a foreign country shall report 

such relationship to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for each year 

in which such relationship exists.” (emphasis added). Therefore, the 

“[r]eports required to be filed,” for purposes of § 1010.306(c), refers to 

a report of a “financial account” or other such relationship.
26 UNITED STATES V. BOYD

violation may be either willful or not willful. See 31 U.S.C. 

§ 5321(a)(5)(B), (C). Regardless of the mens rea, the actus 

reus is the same: “any violation of, any provision of section 

5314.” Compare 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(A) (penalty 

authorized for “any violation of, any provision of § 5314” 

that is not willful), with id., § 5321(a)(5)(C) (penalty 

authorized for “any violation of, any provision of § 5314” 

that is willful). Subparagraphs (B)(i), (C) and (D) of 

§ 5321(a)(5) explain the penalties that may be assessed for 

any “violation,” which vary depending on the mens reas 

(willful or not).

For violations that are not committed willfully, 

subparagraph (B)(i) provides that the penalty “shall not 

exceed $10,000.” Subparagraph (B)(ii) includes an 

exception for “any violation” if it was due to “reasonable 

cause” and if “the amount of the transaction or the balance 

in the account at the time of the transaction was properly 

reported.” This language indicates that the failure to report 

a single transaction, or the balance in a single account, 

constitutes a violation.

For violations committed willfully, subparagraph (C)(i) 

provides that the maximum penalty is the greater of 

$100,000 or 50 percent of an amount determined in 

subparagraph (D). Subparagraph (D) sets out two different 

amounts. Subparagraph (D)(i) provides that “in the case of 

a violation involving a transaction” the relevant amount is 

“the amount of the transaction.” Subparagraph (D)(ii) 

provides that “in the case of a violation involving a failure to 

report the existence of an account or any identifying 

information required to be provided with respect to an 

account” the relevant amount is “the balance in the account 

at the time of the violation.” This language makes clear that 
UNITED STATES V. BOYD 27

a violation may involve “a failure to report the existence of 

an account” or may involve a single transaction.

Reading these provisions together in a straightforward 

manner, a “violation” of § 5314 is the same whether the 

mens rea is willful or not willful: the failure to report a single 

account or a single transaction. A person with an interest in 

a financial account in a foreign country must report that 

relationship to the IRS. The person must provide the report 

pursuant to the appropriate procedures, including meeting 

the June 30 deadline, and submitting the report on the 

appropriate reporting form. 31 U.S.C. § 5314(a), 31 C.F.R. 

§§ 1010.350(a), 1010.306(c). The failure to do so is a 

violation subject to a civil penalty. If that same person had 

an interest in a second financial account in a foreign country, 

that person would have the same obligation to report the 

second account to the IRS pursuant to the relevant 

procedures. The failure to do so would be a second violation, 

and that person would be subject to a second civil penalty.

In other words, the applicable statute and regulations 

make clear that any failure to report a foreign account is an 

independent violation, subject to independent penalties. 

Accordingly, the district court did not err in affirming the 

IRS’s imposition of penalties against Boyd for each failure 

to report a foreign account.

III

The majority’s arguments to the contrary do not comport 

with the language of the relevant statutes and regulations.

The majority’s primary argument appears to be as 

follows. A penalty under § 5321(a) is imposed for a 

violation of a provision of § 5314. Section 5314 

incorporates the regulatory requirements in § 1010.350 and 
28 UNITED STATES V. BOYD

§ 1010.306. Section 1010.350 requires a person to report 

foreign accounts in a reporting form. The majority then 

misreads § 1010.306 as requiring the reporting form (rather 

than the reports themselves) to be filed before June 30 of 

each year. According to the majority, Boyd violated only 

the requirement to file the reporting form on time. 31 C.F.R. 

§ 1010.306(c). Because Boyd had only one violation—the 

failure to timely file the reporting form—only one penalty 

can be assessed. Maj. 10–12.

The majority’s analysis is wrong because the majority 

conflates the “report” that a person must make, with the 

“reporting form” required by the regulations. Contrary to 

the majority, there is no language in the relevant statutes or 

regulations providing that it “is the failure to file an annual 

FBAR that is the violation contemplated and that triggers the 

civil penalty provisions of § 5321.” Maj. at 12 n.7 (quoting 

United States v. Bittner, 469 F. Supp. 3d 709, 718 (E.D. Tex. 

2020)). Rather, as indicated above, the statute and 

regulations make clear that the requirement to report an 

account and the requirement to file a reporting form are 

distinct, and the violation of § 5314 described in § 5321 

includes the failure to report the existence of an account 

before June 30, as required by § 1010.306(c).

The majority attempts to explain away the language in 

§ 5321(a)(5)(B) and (D) indicating that a failure to report the 

existence of a single transaction or a single account 

constitutes a violation. The majority acknowledges that 

language in subparagraph (D), § 5321(a)(5)(D), “explicitly 

bases the penalty amount on the balance of any account 

willfully misreported or non-reported.” Maj. at 14

(emphasis added). But the majority argues that Congress 

intended a “violation” of § 5314 that is not willful to include 

only the failure to file a single reporting form, and intended 
UNITED STATES V. BOYD 29

a “violation” of § 5314 that is willful to include the failure 

to report the existence of each foreign account.

This reasoning fails. The “normal rule of statutory 

construction” is that “identical words used in different parts 

of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.” 

Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990) (citation 

omitted). Nothing in the language of § 5321 suggests that 

Congress wanted the word “violation” to have a different 

meaning in different subparagraphs. As mentioned above, 

even though subparagraphs (B) and (D) refer to different 

mens rea, the actus reus (the violation itself) is defined the 

same way—as “any violation of, any provision of section 

5314”—for violations that are both willful and not willful. 

See 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(A) (penalty authorized for “any 

violation of, any provision of § 5314” that is not willful); 

§ 5321(a)(5)(C) (penalty authorized for “any violation of, 

any provision of § 5314” that is willful). Moreover, other 

language in the statute indicates Congress’s understanding 

that a single transaction can constitute a “violation” of a 

provision in § 5314. See 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(B)(ii) 

(providing that a violation is excused if it involved a properly 

reported “transaction”); § 5321 (a)(5)(D)(i) (referring to “a 

violation involving a transaction”). Therefore, there is no 

basis for defining the word “violation” differently when it is 

used in subparagraph (B) than when it is used in 

subparagraph (D). If subparagraph (D) explicitly establishes 

that the word “violation” refers to the failure to report the 

existence of an account, we must use that definition through 

the entire section.

The majority acknowledges that the word “violation” in 

§ 5321(a)(5)(D)(ii) refers to the conduct of failing to report 

the existence of a single account, but claims that the same 

word in § 5321(a)(5)(B)(i) refers to the conduct of failing to 
30 UNITED STATES V. BOYD

file a reporting form. Maj. at 16 n.10. It thus defines 

“violation” differently in the two different contexts. In an 

effort to brush off this interpretive problem, the majority 

claims that it is “simply giv[ing] effect to Congress’s intent 

to formulate two different schemes of punishment for willful 

and non-willful violations.” Maj. at 16 n.10. But this is not 

responsive. While Congress chose to impose different 

punishments for willful and non-willful violations, nothing 

in the statute suggests that the conduct that violates § 5314 

(failing to file a report of an account) changes with the 

violator’s mens rea.

Finally, the majority makes the last-ditch argument that 

we must strictly construe a tax provision that imposes a 

penalty. Maj. at 18–19 (citing Bradley v. United States, 

817 F.2d 1400, 1402–03 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that “a 

penalty cannot be assessed unless the words of the provision 

plainly impose it,” but affirming a penalty assessed against 

an individual who had no legal obligation to pay taxes)). The 

majority’s construction of the relevant statutes and 

regulations is not “strict”; rather, it is strained and 

unpersuasive. Under the most natural reading of the relevant 

statutes and regulations, each failure to report a foreign 

account is a separate violation. “We are not impressed by 

the argument that [any doubtful question] should be resolved 

in favor of the taxpayer.” Fang Lin Ai v. United States, 809 

F.3d 503, 506–07 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). Rather, “where the rights of 

suitors turn on the construction of a [tax] statute . . . it is our 

duty to decide what that construction fairly should be,” and 

“doubts which may arise upon a cursory examination of [tax 

statutes may] disappear when they are read, as they must be, 

with every other material part of the statute, and in the light 

of their legislative history.” Id. at 507. Therefore, “we do 

not mechanically resolve doubts in favor of the taxpayer but 
UNITED STATES V. BOYD 31

instead resort to the ordinary tools of statutory 

interpretation.” Id.

***

Boyd violated § 1010.306(c) for each report of a foreign 

account that she failed to file before June 30. Because she 

failed to file thirteen such reports, she committed thirteen 

violations of a provision in § 5314, and the IRS could have 

assessed penalties of up to $130,000. See 31 U.S.C. 

§ 5321(a)(5)(B). Therefore, it was permissible for the IRS 

to assess penalties in the amount of $47,279, and the district 

court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of 

the government. By holding otherwise, the majority 

misinterprets the relevant statutes and regulations in a 

manner that unfairly favors the tax evader. I therefore 

dissent.
APPENDIX A

32 UNITED STATES V. BOYD
37

Case: 19-55585, 11/08/2019, ID: 11494907, DktEntry: 17, Page 39 of 48

UNITED STATES V. BOYD 33 
38

Case: 19-55585, 11/08/2019, ID: 11494907, DktEntry: 17, Page 40 of 48

34 UNITED STATES V. BOYD
39

Case: 19-55585, 11/08/2019, ID: 11494907, DktEntry: 17, Page 41 of 48

UNITED STATES V. BOYD 35 
40

Case: 19-55585, 11/08/2019, ID: 11494907, DktEntry: 17, Page 42 of 48

36 UNITED STATES V. BOYD
APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES V. BOYD 37 
Appendix B

31 U.S. Code § 5314. Records and reports on foreign financial agency transactions

(a)Considering the need to avoid impeding or controlling the export or import of monetary 

instruments and the need to avoid burdening unreasonably a person making a transaction with a 

foreign financial agency, the Secretary of the Treasury shall require a resident or citizen of the 

United States or a person in, and doing business in, the United States, to keep records, file 

reports, or keep records and file reports, when the resident, citizen, or person makes a transaction 

or maintains a relation for any person with a foreign financial agency. The records and reports 

shall contain the following information in the way and to the extent the Secretary prescribes:

(1)the identity and address of participants in a transaction or relationship.

(2)the legal capacity in which a participant is acting.

(3)the identity of real parties in interest.

(4)a description of the transaction.

(b)The Secretary may prescribe—

(1)a reasonable classification of persons subject to or exempt from a requirement under this 

section or a regulation under this section;

(2)a foreign country to which a requirement or a regulation under this section applies if the 

Secretary decides applying the requirement or regulation to all foreign countries is unnecessary 

or undesirable;

(3)the magnitude of transactions subject to a requirement or a regulation under this section;

(4)the kind of transaction subject to or exempt from a requirement or a regulation under this 

section; and

(5)other matters the Secretary considers necessary to carry out this section or a regulation under 

this section.

(c)A person shall be required to disclose a record required to be kept under this section or under 

a regulation under this section only as required by law.

31 U.S. Code § 5321. Civil penalties

(a)

(5)Foreign financial agency transaction violation.—

(A)Penalty authorized.—

The Secretary of the Treasury may impose a civil money penalty on any person who violates, or 

causes any violation of, any provision of section 5314.

(B)Amount of penalty.—

(i)In general.—

Except as provided in subparagraph (C) [willful violations], the amount of any civil penalty 

imposed under subparagraph (A) shall not exceed $10,000.

38 UNITED STATES V. BOYD
(ii)Reasonable cause exception.—No penalty shall be imposed under subparagraph (A) with 

respect to any violation if—

(I)such violation was due to reasonable cause, and

(II)the amount of the transaction or the balance in the account at the time of the transaction was 

properly reported.

(C)Willful violations.—In the case of any person willfully violating, or willfully causing any 

violation of, any provision of section 5314—

(i)the maximum penalty under subparagraph (B)(i) shall be increased to the greater of—

(I)$100,000, or

(II)50 percent of the amount determined under subparagraph (D), and

(ii)subparagraph (B)(ii) shall not apply.

(D)Amount.—The amount determined under this subparagraph is—

(i)in the case of a violation involving a transaction, the amount of the transaction, or

(ii)in the case of a violation involving a failure to report the existence of an account or any 

identifying information required to be provided with respect to an account, the balance in the 

account at the time of the violation.

31 CFR § 1010.306 - Filing of reports.

(c) Reports required to be filed by § 1010.350 shall be filed with FinCEN on or before June 30 of 

each calendar year with respect to foreign financial accounts exceeding $10,000 maintained 

during the previous calendar year.

(d) Reports required by § 1010.311, § 1010.313, § 1010.340, § 1010.350, § 1020.315, § 

1021.311 or § 1021.313 of this chapter shall be filed on forms prescribed by the Secretary. All 

information called for in such forms shall be furnished.

(e) Forms to be used in making the reports required by § 1010.311, § 1010.313, § 1010.350, § 

1020.315, § 1021.311 or § 1021.313 of this chapter may be obtained from BSA E-Filing System. 

Forms to be used in making the reports required by § 1010.340 may be obtained from the U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection or FinCEN.

31 CFR § 1010.350 - Reports of foreign financial accounts.

(a) In general. Each United States person having a financial interest in, or signature or other 

authority over, a bank, securities, or other financial account in a foreign country shall report such 

relationship to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for each year in which such relationship 

exists and shall provide such information as shall be specified in a reporting form prescribed 

under 31 U.S.C. 5314 to be filed by such persons. The form prescribed under section 5314 is the 

Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (TD-F 90-22.1), or any successor form. See 

paragraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2) of this section for a special rule for persons with a financial interest 

in 25 or more accounts, or signature or other authority over 25 or more accounts.

UNITED STATES V. BOYD 39