alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

August 29, 2001 Session

GEORGE MICHAEL TIPTON, ET AL. v. AXIS FABRICATION &

MACHINE COMPANY, ET AL.

 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Blount County

No. L-11629 W. Dale Young, Judge

FILED NOVEMBER 29, 2001

No. E2001-00258-COA-R3-CV

HOUSTON M. GODDARD, P.J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part

I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it vacates the directed verdict in favor of the

Defendant Thomas. I would, however, affirm the directed verdict as to the Defendant Axis.

The majority opinion predicates its determination as to Axis on the ground that "a reasonable

jury could conclude that Axis was vicariously liable for Thomas’ culpable conduct and/or that it

breached its duty of reasonable care by allowing someone to utilize a machine without appropriate

warning and/or by failing to replace the missing guard on the machine.”

As to the first point, I find nothing in the record which would support a finding of vicarious

liability. While it is true Mr. Thomas is an employee of Axis and is a supervisor of Mr. Tipton, on

the occasion of the accident he was not acting as Mr. Tipton’s supervisor and, as pointed out in the

majority opinion, was not in the course of his employment with Axis.

With regard to appropriate warning, I believe that the notice on the machine “Do not place

hand near moving parts” was a sufficient warning to the Plaintiff. I think this particularly true where

the warning uses the word “near,” and the proof shows that the Plaintiff’s fingers were within one

or two inches of the moving parts when he was injured.

As to the failure to replace the guard on the machine, the unrefuted proof shows that other

and newer shears are not even equipped with the guard that was missing.
-2-

For the foregoing reasons I would vacate the judgment as to Mr. Tipton and affirm it as to

Axis.

_________________________________________

HOUSTON M. GODDARD, PRESIDING JUDGE
#### Steven Donnelle CODY, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Ms. Jacueline NEWBURN, Jail Administrator, Clark County Detention Center; Tim Patterson, Chief Deputy, Clark County Detention Center; Rick Loy, Interim Jail Administrator, Clark County Detention Center; David Turner, Sheriff, Clark County; Raymond Moore, Jailer, Defendants-Appellees. Steven D. Cody, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Jacueline Newborn, Jail Administrator, Clark County Detention Center; Tim Patterson, Chief Deputy, Clark County Detention Center; Rick Loy, Jail Administrator, Clark County Detention Center; David Turner, Sheriff, Clark County; Officer Moore, Defendants-Appellees. Steven Cody, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Rick Loy, Jail Administrator; Ray Winsfield, Chief Deputy, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-2764.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: April 11, 2013.

Filed: April 16, 2013.

Steven D. Cody, Newport, AR, pro se.

Clyde Burt Newell, Nicholas Rudolph Windle, Bachelor & Newell, Ralph Charles Ohm, Hot Springs, AR, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before WOLLMAN, BOWMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Inmate Steven Donnelle Cody appeals from the order of the District Court,1 en*609tered after an evidentiary hearing, dismissing his consolidated 42 U.S.C. § 1988 actions. Upon careful consideration of Cody’s arguments for reversal, we conclude that the District Court properly entered judgment for the defendants based on the hearing evidence. *See Holden v. Hirner,*663 F.3d 336, 340-42 (8th Cir.2011) (discussing a pretrial detainee’s failure-to-protect claim); *Story v. Norwood,*659 F.3d 680, 684-85 (8th Cir.2011) (reviewing for clear error a district court’s findings of fact made following an eviden-tiary hearing, which is the equivalent of a bench trial, and noting that credibility findings are virtually unreviewable on appeal); *Crow v. Montgomery,*403 F.3d 598, 601-02 (8th Cir.2005) (explaining that a pretrial detainee’s conditions-of-confinement claims are analyzed under the same deliberate-indifference standard as those brought by convicted prisoners: the detainee must show that conditions posed a substantial risk of serious harm to his health or safety and that defendants knew of but were deliberately indifferent to this risk).

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed, and Cody’s pending motion is denied.

1

. The Honorable Robert T. Dawson, United States District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendation of the Honorable Barry A. Bryant, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-1066

JENNIFER C. LAWRENCE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

WAL-MART STORES EAST, LP,

Defendant - Appellee,

and

FAIRFAX WALMART SUPERCENTER #2015; WAL-MART ASSOCIATES, 

INC.; WALMART INC.; WAL-MART REAL ESTATE BUSINESS TRUST; 

WAL-MART STORES, INC.,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:20-cv-00130-LMB-MSN)

Submitted: March 24, 2022 Decided: March 31, 2022

Before NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: D. Cory Bilton, BILTON LAW FIRM, PLLC, Washington, D.C., for 

Appellant. John M. Murdock, POTTER & MURDOCK, PC, Falls Church, Virginia, for 
2

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

Jennifer C. Lawrence appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment 

to Wal-Mart in Lawrence’s tort action arising out of a fall in the store. We have reviewed 

the parties’ briefs and the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for 

the reasons stated by the district court at the December 15, 2020, hearing on the motion for 

summary judgment. Lawrence v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., No. 1:20-cv-00130-LMBMSN (E.D. Va. filed Dec. 15, 2020 & entered Dec. 16, 2020). We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                          54,941
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   68,603
<ALLOWANCES>                                     4,885
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               126,193
<PP&E>                                          60,930
<DEPRECIATION>                                  32,366
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 267,500
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           46,209
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     219,916
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   267,500
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               155,641
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  115,641
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                13,681
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               (450)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 27,034
<INCOME-TAX>                                    11,102
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             15,932
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    15,932
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.46
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.44


</TABLE>
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics www.bl

Fastest Growing Protective Service Occupations:

Occupations Projected Job Growth 

Rate 2022-2032

Median Annual Wage 

Lifeguards, ski patrol, and other 

recreational protective service workers

15% $48,110

First-line supervisors of firefighting 

and prevention workers

6%

52,120

Forest fire inspectors and prevention 

specialists

6%

27,270

Fire inspectors and investigators

Crossing guards and flaggers 4% 33,380

4% 39,320

Private detectives and investigators

4% 69,450

Most New Jobs Among Protective Service Occupations:

Occupations Projected Job Growth 2022-2032 Median Annual Wage 

Police and sheriff's patrol officers 22,500 $65,790

Security guards

Firefighters 12,000 51,680

7,000 27,270 Lifeguards, ski patrol, and other 

recreational protective service workers

4,300 96,290 First-line supervisors of police and 

detectives

3,800

80,150

Crossing guards and flaggers

3,100

33,380

Additional Protective Service Occupations:

Occupations Typical Entry-Level Education Median Annual Wage 

Fish and game wardens Bachelor’s degree $59,500

Detectives and criminal investigators High school diploma or equivalent 86,280

Animal control workers

High school diploma or equivalent 34,750

Correctional officers and jailers High school diploma or equivalent 49,610

Transportation security screeners High school diploma or equivalent 47,710

Parking enforcement workers High school diploma or equivalent 41,570

35,970

Transit and railroad police High school diploma or equivalent 69,150

Bailiffs High school diploma or equivalent 49,100

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Projections program.

Protective Service

Occupations

Gambling surveillance officers and gambling investigators High school diploma or equivalent
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-40512 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus ERNESTO ORLANDO LANZA-CHAN, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. B-01-CR-562-1

-------------------- February 20, 2003 Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Ernesto Orlando Lanza-Chan appeals the 60-month sentence imposed following his plea of guilty to a charge of being found in the United States after deportation, a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Lanza-Chan argues for the first time on appeal that the magistrate judge did not have the jurisdiction or authority to accept his guilty plea because the district court had not referred the case to the magistrate judge. In United StatesNo. 02-40512 -2- v. Bolivar-Munoz , 313 F.3d 253, 256-57 (5th Cir. 2002), this court concluded that the district court must enter a proper referral order, but found that a failure to do so causes a procedural error, which can be waived, rather than a jurisdictional defect. As in Bolivar-Munoz , Lanza-Chan consented to proceedings before the magistrate judge and lodged no objection to the absence of a referral order. Lanza-Chan waived the procedural error. Lanza-Chan argues that the felony conviction that resulted in his increased sentence under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) was an element of the offense that should have been charged in the indictment. He acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224 (1998), but he seeks to preserve the issue for Supreme Court review in light of the decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres
. Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 489-90, 496; United States v. Dabeit , 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied , 531 U.S. 1202 (2001)
. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Peninsula Holdings Group, Ltd. (the Company) on Form 10-KSB for the three year period ending December 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Celso B. Suarez, Jr., Secretary and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



1.

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2.

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material aspects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date:  November 5, 2004





/s/ Celso B. Suarez, Jr.



Celso B. Suarez, Jr., Secretary,

Chief Financial Officer









{A0023805.DOC}
#### Sandra Elena Hatem, Respondent, v Albert Anthony Hatem, Appellant.

[853 NYS2d 904]

*813The Supreme Court properly determined that the parties’ circumstances had changed in the time between the entry of a prior pendente lite order and the entry of the order appealed from, and properly granted the plaintiffs request, inter alia, for an increase in the defendant’s child support obligation.

Modifications of pendente lite awards should rarely be made by an appellate court, and then only under exigent circumstances, which do not exist here *(see Swickle v*Swickle, 47 AD3d 704 [2008]; *DeVerna v DeVerna,*4 AD3d 323 [2004]). Fisher, J.P., Angiolillo, Balkin and Leventhal, JJ., concur.
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

T he pa ne l una ni m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on ** w ith o u t o r a l a r g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp . P . 34 (a )( 2). NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T D A N I EL J . CA RPEN TER, P la in tif

f - A p p e lla n t, v. S T A T E O F C A L I F O RN I A ; e t a l., D efen d an t s - A p p el l ees. N o. 11- 16635 D. C . No . 2 : 0 6 - c v - 0 0 9 2 9 - OD W ME MOR AN DU M *

A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f o rth e E a s te rn D is tr ic t o f C a lif o rn ia O t i s D . W r i ght , D i s tr i c tJ udge , P r e s i di ng S ubm i tt e d A pr i l 16, 2013 ** B efo re: C A N B Y , IK U T A , an d W A T F O R D , C i rcu i tJu d g es. C al i forni a s t at e pri soner D ani el J. C arpent erappeal s pro se fr om the di stri ct court ’ s j ud gm entdi sm i ss i ng hi s 42 U . S . C . § 1 98 3 act i on for f ai l ure t o fi l e an am ended com pl ai nt . W e have j uri sdi ct i on un der U . S . C . § 1 29 1. W e r evi ew for an 

# FI LED APR23 2 013 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS11- 16635 2 ab u s e o f d is c r e tio n , P a g ta lu n a n v. G a la za , 291 F . 3d 639, 640 ( 9th C i r . 2002) , a nd w e a f f irm . T h e d istrict co u rt d idn o t ab u se it s d iscr etio n b y d ism issin g C arp en ter’s a c tio n a f te rit p r o v id e d n o tic e o f th e in a d e q u a c ie s o f

C a rp e n te r ’s c o m p la in t, w a rne d hi m tha tf

a i l ur e t o f

i l e a n a m e nde d c om pl a i ntw oul d r e s ul ti n di s m i s s a l , a nd g a v e h im a m p le tim e to a m e n d . Se e i d. a t642 ( l i s t i ng the r e l e va ntf a c t or s t o be consi dere d b ef

ore di sm i ss al un der F ed. R . C i v. P . 41 (b)) ; se e al so E dw ards v. M ari n P ark, Inc. , 35 6 F . 3d 10 58 , 10 65 (9th C i r. 20 04 ) ( “ T he fa i l ure of the pl ai nt i ff e ve ntua l l yt o r e s pond t o the c ourt ’ s ul t i m a tum - e i the rbya m e ndi ng the c om pl a i ntor byi ndi c a t i ng t o the c ourttha ti tw i l l notdo s o- i s pr ope r l ym e tw i th the s a nc t i on of aR u le 4 1 ( b ) d is m is s a l.” ) . B e c aus e w e a f

f i rm the di s tr i c tc ourt ’ s di s m i s s a l unde rR ul e 41( b) , w e do not c o n s id e rC a rp e n te r ’s c h a lle n g e s to a n yin te r lo c u to ryo r d e r s . See A l-T orkiv. Kaem pen , 7 8 F . 3 d 1 3 8 1 , 1 3 8 6 (9 th C i r. 1 9 9 6 ) (n o t i n g th at“ i n t erl o cu t o ry o rd ers, ge ne r a l l yappe a l abl e a f

t e rf i na l j udgm e nt , a r e notappe a l abl e a f t e radi s m i s s a l f

or f a ilu r e to p r o s e c u te ” ) . W e d o n o t c o n s id e ra r g u m e n ts r a is e d f o rth e f ir s t tim e o n ap p e a l. Se e Sm ith v. M a rsh , 19 4 F . 3d 10 45 , 10 52 (9th C i r. 19 99 ). AF F I RME D.
Exhibit 8

INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES AG

Significant Subsidiaries and Associated Companies
As of September 30, 2003

|Name and Location of Company                                                            |  | Share in
capital |  
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | ---------------- | -
|EUPEC Europäische Gesellschaft für Leistungshalbleiter mbH, Warstein-Belecke, Germany   |  | 100              | %
|Infineon Technologies Dresden GmbH & Co. OHG, Dresden, Germany                          |  | 100              | %
|Infineon Technologies SC 300 GmbH & Co. KG, Dresden, Germany                            |  | 87               | %
|Infineon Technologies Austria AG, Villach, Austria                                      |  | 100              | %
|Infineon Technologies-Fabrico de Semicondutores, Portugal S.A., Vila do Conde, Portugal |  | 100              | %
|Infineon Technologies France S.A.S., Saint Denis, France                                |  | 100              | %
|Infineon Technologies Holding B.V. Rotterdam, Netherlands                               |  | 100              | %
|Infineon Technologies Catamaran, Inc., Wilmington Delaware, USA                         |  | 100              | %
|Infineon Technologies Holding North America Inc., Wilmington Delaware, USA              |  | 100              | %
|Infineon Technologies North America Corp., Wilmington Delaware, USA                     |  | 100              | %
|Infineon Technologies Richmond LP, Wilmington Delaware, USA                             |  | 100              | %
|Infineon Technologies (Advanced Logic) Sdn. Bhd., Malacca, Malaysia                     |  | 100              | %
|Infineon Technologies Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd., Singapore                                 |  | 100              | %
|Infineon Technologies (Integrated Circuit) Sdn. Bhd., Malacca, Malaysia                 |  | 100              | %
|Infineon Technologies (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd., Malacca, Malaysia                           |  | 100              | %
|Infineon Technologies Japan K.K., Tokio, Japan                                          |  | 100              | %
|ALTIS Semiconductor S.N.C, Essonnes, France                                             |  | 50               | %

---

QuickLinks
Opinion filed August 20, 2009

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals

____________

No. 11-09-00119-CV

__________

 JAMES WILLIAM HORNSBY, Appellant

V.

 TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ET AL, Appellees

On Appeal from the 259th District Court

 Jones County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 021871

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

James William Hornsby sued the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Executive Director

Brad Livingston, Correctional Officer Frances Odom, and Lieutenant Santos J. Garcia, Jr. for over

$9,000 in damages resulting from the alleged seizure of his personal items. The trial court dismissed

Hornsby’s action for failure to comply with TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.001-.014

(Vernon 2002). We affirm.

On appeal, Hornsby briefs three issues. In his first issue, Hornsby argues that the trial court

abused its discretion because his claims are not frivolous. Next, he argues that the district clerk
2

violated his rights to access the courts. Finally, Hornsby contends that his claim is “almost entirely

identical” to the case of Minix v. Gonzales, 162 S.W.3d 635 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005,

no pet.).

Hornsby does not address the trial court’s determination that he failed to comply with the

mandatory elements in Chapter 14. The record does not support Hornsby’s claims concerning the

actions of the clerk of the trial court. We find the Minix case to be distinguishable. In Minix, both

the trial court and the appellate court addressed the merits of the claims advanced. In the present

case, the trial court was unable to consider the merits of Hornsby’s claims. All of Hornsby’s

contentions have been considered. Each is overruled.

The order of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM

August 20, 2009

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

McCall, J., and Strange, J.
Exhibit
32.2





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the quarterly report of Infinite Group, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, James Witzel, Chief Financial Officer of
the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
              The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
  and




(2)
              The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
      Company.





Dated:
      May 12, 2010/s/ James WitzelJames
      WitzelChief
      Financial Officer(Principal
      Financial and Accounting Officer)





A signed
original of this certification has been provided to the Company and will be
retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.