Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2624 | May 5, 2020 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kay A. Beehler

Terre Haute, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Matthew B. MacKenzie

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Robert J. Baldwin,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 5, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-2624

Appeal from the Knox Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Sherry B. Gregg 

Gilmore, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

42C01-1704-MR-1

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2624 | May 5, 2020 Page 2 of 9

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Robert J. Baldwin (Baldwin), appeals the trial court’s 

sentence following his guilty plea to murder, a felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.

[2] We affirm.

ISSUES

[3] Baldwin presents two issues on appeal, which we restate as:

(1) Whether the trial court properly took into account his guilty-butmentally-ill plea; and 

(2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in its identification of the 

aggravators to impose an aggravated sentence. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On April 4, 2017, Baldwin collected his five-year-old son from school early and 

took him home. At home, Baldwin smothered his son with a pillow, wrapped a 

USB cord around his neck, and sat on him until he thought the child had died. 

Baldwin called 911 and informed dispatch that he had killed his son. When law 

enforcement officers arrived at the residence, Baldwin directed them to the back 

bedroom where the officers found the child lying on the bed, blue-faced, and 

without a pulse. The child was airlifted to Riley Children’s Hospital, where he 

died two days later. When interviewed by the officers, Baldwin confessed to 

the murder of his son. He explained that he had been planning to kill his son 

for some time. He described that he first attempted to kill the child with a 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2624 | May 5, 2020 Page 3 of 9

pillow, and when he did not succeed, he strangled his son with a USB cord and 

sat on him until he stopped breathing. 

[5] On April 6, 2017, the State filed an Information, charging Baldwin with 

murder, a felony; strangulation, a Level 6 felony; and domestic battery on a 

person less than fourteen years old, a Level 6 felony. On May 30, 2017, 

Baldwin filed a notice of mental disease or defect. On May 3 and October 3, 

2018, Baldwin was evaluated by three court-appointed psychologists. During 

these evaluations, Baldwin explained that he had been planning to kill one of 

his children for some time because his wife was leaving him, and he thought 

that if he killed one of his children he would go to jail where “at least he would 

be warm.” (Defendant’s Exh. 1). Baldwin specifically selected his five-year-old 

son because the other children were older and strong enough to run away from 

him.

[6] On April 9, 2019, Baldwin entered into a plea agreement with the State in 

which he agreed to enter a plea of guilty but mentally ill to murder in exchange 

for the State’s dismissal of the remaining charges. On August 23, 2019, the trial 

court conducted a sentencing hearing. In sentencing Baldwin, the trial court 

found as mitigating circumstances: 1) the lack of criminal history; 2) the 

presence of mental health issues; and 3) his guilty plea. As aggravating factors, 

the trial court listed: 1) the victim’s young age; 2) the abuse of Baldwin’s 

position of trust; 3) the premeditation and pre-planning of the murder; and 4) 

the lack of remorse. Concluding that the aggravators significantly outweighed 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2624 | May 5, 2020 Page 4 of 9

the mitigating factors, the trial court sentenced Baldwin to an aggravated 

sentence of sixty-five years in the Department of Correction.

[7] Baldwin now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Mental Illness

[8] Baldwin contends the trial court failed to advise him that his “mental illness 

would essentially be of no consequence in his sentencing.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 

7). He maintains that although he had a longstanding and well-documented 

mental illness, he was never “advised of the relative impact such a plea would 

have on sentencing.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 8). 

[9] It is well recognized that a defendant who enters a plea of guilty but mentally ill 

is to be sentenced in the same manner as a defendant who is found guilty of the 

offense. See I.C. § 35-36-2-5; see also Georgopulos v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1138, 1141 

(Ind. 2000). Thus Baldwin, and other defendants who plead or are found guilty

but mentally ill, are not automatically entitled to any particular credit or 

deduction from their otherwise aggravated sentence because they are guilty but 

mentally ill. Archer v. State, 689 N.E. 2d 678, 684 (Ind. 1997). Nonetheless, our 

supreme court has directed trial courts to, at a minimum, carefully consider on 

the record what mitigating weight, if any, to allocate any evidence of mental 

illness, even though the court is not obligated to give the evidence the same 

weight as does the defendant. Weeks v. State, 697 N.E. 2d 28, 30 (Ind. 1998). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2624 | May 5, 2020 Page 5 of 9

[10] In its written sentencing statement, the trial court found as follows:

The [c]ourt also considers, as the Defense has requested, that 

[Baldwin] has been diagnosed with and treated with mental 

illness for the majority of his life, and has suffered from such to 

the extent that he was awarded and received social security 

disability benefits. The [c]ourt appointed mental health 

evaluators all concluded that [Baldwin] suffers from mental 

illness. However, they also concluded that [Baldwin] knew what 

he was doing when he committed this crime and that he was 

competent to stand trial if a trial was to be held. The [c]ourt has 

considered this factor in mitigation of his sentence. 

[11] (Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 25). Accordingly, the trial court considered 

Baldwin’s mental illness during sentencing. However, as a trial court is not 

obligated to “credit or weigh a possible mitigating circumstance as defendant 

suggests it should be credited or weighed” and because Baldwin was found to 

be cognizant of his actions at the time of the murder, the trial court awarded his 

mental illness only minimal mitigation. Archer, 689 N.E.2d at 684. 

II. Aggravating Circumstances

[12] Baldwin next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it found as 

aggravating circumstances that the killing of his son was premeditated and that 

he had committed the murder knowingly, because he claims both aggravators 

to also be elements of the crime of murder. 

[13] So long as a sentence imposed by a trial court is within the statutory range for 

the offense, it is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. 

State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2624 | May 5, 2020 Page 6 of 9

2007). An abuse of the trial court’s sentencing discretion occurs if its decision is 

clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the 

court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn 

therefrom. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to enter a 

sentencing statement at all, its stated reasons for imposing sentence are not 

supported by the record, its sentencing statement omits reasons that are clearly 

supported by the record and advanced for consideration, or its reasons for 

imposing sentence are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91. 

[14] Turning to the trial court’s identification of aggravators, Baldwin challenges the 

trial court’s finding that the killing of his son was premeditated as the element 

of premeditation is also an element of the crime of murder. In its written 

sentencing statement, the trial court observed with respect to this aggravator as 

follows:

The [c]ourt also finds as an aggravating factor that this crime was 

pre-planned and pre-meditated. [Baldwin] told the police that he 

planned to kill three (3) of his children and that he killed [his son] 

first because the opportunity was there. He knew when he 

picked that child up that day what he was going to do and he 

went through with it. That child could not have had any idea 

when he went home with his own father, what his father had 

planned for him and at five (5) years old, he was defenseless, an 

innocent child. Further, [Baldwin] showed absolutely no 

remorse for his actions. He just wanted to commit a crime so 

bad he would go to prison. He saw no other way out of a bad 

situation, so he killed his child instead of protecting him, in order 

to take care of himself.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2624 | May 5, 2020 Page 7 of 9

(Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 24). Murder is defined as the knowing or 

intentional killing of another human being. See I.C. § 35-42-1-1. As such, the 

element of pre-meditation is not specifically included as an element of the 

crime. Rather, here, the trial court used the premeditated nature of the killing—

as confessed by Baldwin—as a description of the nature and circumstances of 

the offense. See McCann v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (Ind. 2001) (Generally, 

the nature and circumstances of a crime is a proper aggravating circumstance); 

Concepcion v. State, 567 N.E.2d 784, 791 (Ind. 1991) (holding that the manner in 

which a crime is committed can be considered as an aggravating circumstance.)

[15] Baldwin also asserts that the trial court aggravated his sentence because he 

committed the murder “knowingly” and attributes this “knowing” aggravator 

to the trial court’s comment that when law enforcement officers arrived at 

Baldwin’s house, his responses to their questions were “clear, logical, 

understandable.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 8). However, in the trial court’s written 

sentencing statement, the court only listed four aggravators: 1) the victim’s 

young age; 2) Baldwin’s abuse of position of trust; 3) the premeditation and preplanning of the murder; and 4) his lack of remorse. Thus, even though the trial 

court might have described Baldwin as knowingly killing his son, the trial court 

did not count it as a specific aggravator for sentencing. 

[16] Nevertheless, even if “knowing” could be considered an improper aggravator, 

we may affirm the sentence if we can “say with confidence that the trial court 

would have imposed the same sentence.” Webb v. State, 941 N.E. 2d 1082, 1090 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Here, under the particularly heinous circumstances of his 
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crime, we are very confident that the trial court would not have wavered by 

imposing a lesser sentence. The gruesome killing of a five-year-old child at the 

hands of his own father merely for the father’s own interest because he wanted 

someplace “warm” to go to is particularly monstrous. (Defendant’s Exh. 1). 

The callous character of this crime is exacerbated by the fact that Baldwin failed 

to succeed the first time and the child had to endure suffocation, strangulation, 

and suffocation again, followed by a two-day unsuccessful fight for his life at 

Riley’s Children’s Hospital. Baldwin never showed any remorse. We affirm 

the trial court’s sentence. 

CONCLUSION

[17] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court properly took into account 

Baldwin’s guilty-but-mentally-ill plea, and appropriately identified the 

aggravating circumstances in pronouncing Baldwin’s sentence.

[18] Affirmed.

[19] Tavitas, J. concurs

[20] Mathias, J. concurs with separate opinion
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2624 | May 5, 2020 Page 9 of 9

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Robert J. Baldwin,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-2624

Mathias, Judge concurring

[21] I concur in full with my colleagues. I write only to reiterate that competency 

evaluations immediately upon arrest are the best way for our criminal justice 

system to fairly treat those defendants who are mentally ill or deficient. At some 

point, such immediate competency evaluations will be recognized as an integral 

part of due process. See Wampler v. State, 67 N.E.3d 633 (Ind. 2017).

[22] In this case, Baldwin’s first mental health evaluation was approximately 30 

days after his arrest. His matter-of-fact responses to the doctors in the face of his 

monstrous acts lead me to believe that an earlier examination would not have 

mattered.