alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Edward P. Hatch, Respondent, *v.*Adolph Gluck, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term,

April, 1905.)

Statute of Frauds — Sale of goods — Acceptance necessary.

An oral contract for the sale by sample of goods more than fifty dollars in value, which the buyer after inspection and return refuses to accept, is not taken out of the Statute of Frauds though the goods were as represented by the seller and he had fully performed the contract on his part.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff in the Municipal Court of the city of New York, tenth district, borough of Manhattan.

I. B. Ripin, for appellant.

Henry Smith, for respondent.

Scott, J.

The action is to recover for a bill of goods sold to defendant. The defendant claimed that the goods delivered were not the same goods-which he bought. On this issue the justice found, upon satisfactory evidence, in plaintiff’s favor. The sale was, however, for more than fifty dollars, and the defendant also defends upon the ground that the sale was void under the Statute of Frauds. There was no written memorandum of the sale, and the plaintiff’s reliance to avoid the statute is solely upon delivery and acceptance of the goods. The sale was, in effect, one by sample. The defendant visited plaintiff’s place of business and selected certain goods. After fixing upon a price, he agreed to take all the goods of the. particular kind which plaintiff had. He did not see all the goods which he agreed to- purchase as a part was in the stock-room. The goods were delivered at defendant’s place of business and he at once opened the cases and examined the goods therein. The defendant, claiming that the colors were not those which he bought, promptly returned them. It is well settled that in *123order to take a sale of goods out of the statute, there must be not only a delivery, but an acceptance, and that to constitute an acceptance sufficient to validate a contract, it must be made to appear that the buyer has dealt with the goods or done some unequivocal act evincing his intent to accept them unequivocally as his own. Nor does it affect the question that, as it appears in this case, the goods are as represented by the vendor and that the contract on his part has been fully performed, for, although the refusal to accept be unreasonable, the contract is not validated without an acceptance. It is precisely to the risk of an unreasonable refusal to accept that the vendor exposes himself when ha relies upon a void contract. Stone v. Browning, 68 N. Y. 598.

Upon the evidence in the case, the plaintiff did not successfully meet the defense founded upon the Statute of Frauds, and the judgment must consequently be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide the event ,

Leventritt and Greenbaum, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed and new trial granted, with costa to appellant to abide event.
Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 29, 2011.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

____________

NO. 14-10-00668-CR

NO. 14-10-00669-CR

____________

WILLIAM DAVID GOLDEN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 176th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. 1165978 & 1165979

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

After a bench trial, appellant was convicted of the offenses of possession of cocaine, 

and possession of heroin, and sentenced to 25 years’ confinement in the Institutional 

Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant appealed to this court.
2

On July 7, 2011, this court ordered a hearing to determine why appellant had not 

filed a brief in these appeals. On August 2, 2011, the trial court conducted the hearing. 

The record of the hearing was filed in this court on August 19, 2011.

The trial court found appellant is indigent and wants to represent himself. The trial 

court warned appellant of the dangers of representing himself, but appellant declined 

appointed counsel. Appellant requested, and this court granted, extensions of time for 

appellant to file his brief. Still, appellant failed to file a brief in this court. On the basis of 

the trial court’s findings, this court has considered the appeals without briefs. See Tex. 

R. App. P. 38.8(b).

We find no fundamental error.

Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Frost, Seymore, and Jamison.

Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 95-CT-01038-SCT

FREDERICK JONES A/K/A Appellant FRED ARTHUR JONES

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI Appellee
ORDER This matter is before the Court on the Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by David L. Walker on behalf of Frederick Jones. The Court finds that M.R.A.P. 17(b) states in pertinent part: The petition for writ of certiorari . . . must briefly and succinctly state the precise basis on which the party seeks review by the Supreme Court . . . . No citation to authority or argument may be incorporated into the petition by reference to another document. In reviewing the petition sub judice , the Court finds that it is unable to determine what issues are presented for certiorari review. The petition filed in this matter presents no issues and does not comply with Rule 17(b) and should be denied. The Court further finds that a regular practice has grown up among some counsel to file pro forma petitions for certiorari on a routine basis. These petitions generally assert no issues, but make general statements, as does the petition sub judice , that the petition involves issues of general interest to the criminal defense bar and the state prosecutors. The practice of filing a meaningless petition which expends the time and opportunity allowed for the client to seek second tier review cannot be reconciled with the rights of the petitioner nor the integrity of the judicial system. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari be, and hereby is, denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that petitions for writ of certiorari filed by the Hon. David L. Walker following entry of this order conform to M.R.A.P. 17(b). SO ORDERED, this, the day of October, 1997.DAN LEE, CHIEF JUSTICE FOR THE COURT

TO DENY CERTIORARI: ALL JUSTICES
CONCURRING IN THIS ORDER: LEE, C.J., PRATHER AND SULLIVAN, P.JJ., PITTMAN, BANKS, ROBERTS, SMITH AND MILLS, JJ. NOT CONCURRING IN THIS ORDER: McRAE, J.
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 995

To amend title 37, United States Code, to provide a dislocation allowance 

under section 407 of such title to retired members of the uniformed 

services, including members placed on the temporary disability retired 

list, moving from their last duty station to their designated home. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 27, 2003

Mr. JONES of North Carolina introduced the following bill; which was referred 

to the Committee on Armed Services 

A BILL

To amend title 37, United States Code, to provide a dislocation allowance under section 407 of such title to retired 

members of the uniformed services, including members 

placed on the temporary disability retired list, moving 

from their last duty station to their designated home.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Military Retiree Dis5 location Assistance Act’’. 
2

•HR 995 IH 

1 SEC. 2. ELIGIBILITY OF RETIRED MEMBERS FOR DISLOCA2 TION ALLOWANCE WHEN ORDERED FROM 

3 LAST DUTY STATION TO MEMBER’S HOME. 

4 (a) ELIGIBILITY FOR PRIMARY DISLOCATION AL5 LOWANCE.—Subsection (a)(2) of section 407 of title 37, 

6 United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 

7 following new subparagraph: 

8 ‘‘(H) A member who is retired under any provi9 sion of law or placed on the temporary disability re10 tired list under chapter 61 of title 10 and who actu11 ally moves to a home selected by the member in ac12 cordance with section 404(c) of this title.’’. 

13 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Subsection (e) of 

14 such section is amended by inserting ‘‘(except as provided 

15 in subsection (a)(2)(H))’’ before the period at the end. 

16 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

17 this section shall apply with respect to a member of the 

18 uniformed services who is retired, or placed on the tem19 porary disability retired list under chapter 61 of title 10, 

20 United States Code, on or after the date of the enactment 

21 of this Act.

Æ
Exhibit 23.1

INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No. 333-52408 and No. 333-66244 of WJ
Communications, Inc. on Form S-8 of our report dated January 23, 2003 (March 27, 2003 as to the last paragraph of Note 8), relating to the consolidated
financial statements of WJ Communications, Inc. as of and for the year ended December 31, 2002 appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of WJ
Communications, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2002.

|                                    |  | DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP |  | 
|----------------------------------- |  | --------------------- |  | 
|San Jose, California
March 27, 2003 |  |                       |  | 

---

QuickLinks
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A16D0328. JEAN B. ST. FELIX v. BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC.

This case began as a dispossessory proceeding in magistrate court. After an

adverse ruling, defendant Jean B. St. Felix appealed the magistrate court’s decision

to the superior court. On March 9, 2016, St. Felix filed a voluntary dismissal without

prejudice. The superior court entered an order on March 10, 2016, in which it

dismissed St. Felix’s appeal, stated that the magistrate court’s writ of possession

remained in full force and effect, and ordered the disbursement of funds paid into

court registry to Bayview. On March 14, 2016, St. Felix filed a document entitled

“Objection to Order and Memorandum of Law,” in which he challenged the trial

court’s order of dismissal on the ground that it should have had the effect of vacating

the magistrate court’s writ of possession. The trial court construed St. Felix’s

pleading as a motion for reconsideration and denied it on March 28, 2016. St. Felix

filed his application for discretionary appeal on April 4, 2016, seeking review of the

trial court’s order. 

Although an application for discretionary appeal generally may be filed within

30 days of entry of the order sought to be appealed, the underlying subject matter of

an appeal controls over the relief sought when determining the proper appellate

procedure. See Rebich v. Miles, 264 Ga. 467, 467-468 (448 SE2d 192) (1994). The

underlying subject matter of this case is a dispossessory proceeding. And, pursuant

to OCGA § 44-7-56, an appeal in such a case must be filed within seven days of entry

of the judgment. Here, the superior court’s order of dismissal was entered on March

10, 2016, and St. Felix filed his application 25 days later, on April 4, 2016, rendering

it untimely. 

May 04, 2016
The trial court properly construed St. Felix’s objection to its order as a motion

for reconsideration. “[P]leadings, motions, and orders are construed according to their

substance and function and not merely by nomenclature.” See Dept. of Transp. v.

Camvic Corp., 284 Ga. App. 321, 323 (2) (a), (644 SE2d 171) (2007). In its order,

the trial court reconsidered its prior ruling dismissing the case and denied the motion. 

St. Felix’s application was filed within seven days of the order of March 28, but the

denial of a motion for reconsideration is not directly appealable nor doesit extend the

deadline for appealing the underlying order, which in this case was the prior order

dismissing the case. See Bell v. Cohran, 244 Ga. App. 510, 511 (536 SE2d 187)

(2000).

 Under these circumstances, we lack jurisdiction to review St. Felix’s

application, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

05/04/2016
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION

906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002.

The undersigned, Jerry Fowden, Chief Executive Officer of Cott Corporation (the Company), has executed this certification in
connection with the filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission of this Amendment No. 1 to Form 10-Q for the quarter ended July 4, 2015 (the Report).

The undersigned hereby certifies that to the best of his knowledge:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this certification as of the 23rd day of
November, 2015.



/s/ Jerry FowdenJerry FowdenChief Executive Officer
No. 1189.

#### Toucey *v.*New York Life Insurance Co.

June 10, 1946.
Exhibit 23.1

NOTICE REGARDING CONSENT OF ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP

Section 11(a)
of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "Securities Act"), provides that if any part of a registration statement at the time such part becomes effective contains an untrue
statement of a material fact or an omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring a security pursuant
to such registration statement (unless it is proved that at the time of such acquisition such person knew of such untruth or omission) may sue, among others, every accountant who has consented to be
named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, or as having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used in connection with the registration statement,
with respect to the statement in such registration statement, report or valuation which purports to have been prepared or certified by the accountant.

This
Form 10-K is incorporated by reference into the Registration Statement (No. 333-52880) on Form S-8 (the "Registration Statement") of
CareScience, Inc. ("CareScience") and, for purposes of determining any liability under the Securities Act, is deemed to be a new registration statement for the Registration Statement into which
it is incorporated by reference.

On
July 16, 2002 the Board of Directors decided to no longer engage Arthur Andersen LLP as its independent public accountants and appointed KPMG LLP to replace Arthur Andersen LLP. Since
CareScience's former engagement partner and audit manager have left Arthur Andersen LLP and in light of the cessation of Arthur Andersen LLP's SEC practice, CareScience has been unable to obtain
Arthur Andersen LLP's written consent to the incorporation by reference into the Registration Statement of its audit report with respect to CareScience's financial statements as of December 31,
2000 and 2001 for the years then ended. Under these circumstances, Rule 437a under the Securities Act permits CareScience to file this Form 10-K without a written consent
from Arthur Andersen LLP. (As a result, however, Arthur Andersen LLP may not have any liability under Section 11(a) of the Securities Act for any untrue statements of a material fact contained
in the financial statements audited by Arthur Andersen LLP or any omissions of a material fact required to be stated therein. Accordingly, you may not be able to assert a claim against Arthur Andersen
LLP under Section 11(a) of the Securities Act for any purchases of securities under the Registration Statement made on or after the date of this Form 10-K.) To the extent
provided in Section 11(b)(3)(C) of the Securities Act, however, other persons who are liable under Section 11(a) of the Securities Act, including CareScience's officers and directors,
should still be able to rely on Arthur Andersen LLP's original audit reports as being
made by an expert for purposes of establishing a due diligence defense under Section 11(b) of the Securities Act.

---
NOTE: Shaded area represents recession. Data are seasonally adjusted. 

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Employment in thousands

104,000

105,000

106,000

107,000

108,000

109,000

110,000

111,000

112,000

113,000

114,000

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Chart 1-8. Private payroll employment began increasing in 

August 2003

Chart 1-8. Private payroll employment began increasing in 

August 2003

• Private nonfarm employment fell sharply during 2001. The pace of 

employment declines slowed markedly in 2002. 

• Private payroll employment began to increase in August 2003, and by 

December 2005, about 4.3 million private sector jobs had been added.
Exhibit 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statements No. 333-151183,
No. 333-138124, No. 333-126586 and No. 333-122676 on Form S-8 our reports dated March 3, 2009, relating to the
consolidated financial statements of iPCS, Inc., and the effectiveness of iPCS, Inc.'s internal control over financial reporting, appearing in this Annual Report on
Form 10-K of iPCS, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2008.

/s/
DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP

Chicago,
Illinois
March 3, 2009

---



QuickLinks
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William Mitchell, Appellant.

[853 NYS2d 893]

The appellant has failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel *(see Jones v Barnes,*463 US 745 [1983]; *People v Stultz,*2 NY3d 277 [2004]). Rivera, J.P., Skelos, Fisher and Santucci, JJ., concur.
Exhibit
32.1




CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO




18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO




SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection
with the Quarterly Report of Nyer Medical .Group, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form
10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2008, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Mark Dumouchel, President and Chief
Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer) and acting Chief Financial
Officer (Principal Financial Officer) of the Company, hereby certify as of the
date hereof, solely for the purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of
the United States Code, that to the best of my knowledge:




(1)           The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d), as
applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)           The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the dates
and for the periods indicated.




/s/ Mark
Dumouchel


Name: Mark
Dumouchel


Title:   President
and Chief Executive Officer (Principal
Executive Officer and acting Principal
Financial Officer)







November 14,
2008
EXHIBIT 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

The Board of Directors

Watsco, Inc.:

We consent to the
incorporation by reference in the registration statements listed below of Watsco, Inc. of our reports dated February 28, 2013, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of Watsco, Inc. and its subsidiaries as of December 31, 2012 and
2011, and the related consolidated statements of income, comprehensive income, shareholders equity, and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2012, and the effectiveness of internal control over
financial reporting as of December 31, 2012, which reports appear in the December 31, 2012 annual report on Form 10-K of Watsco, Inc.



| |  | Form S-3 (Registration No. 333-185347)
|- |  | --------------------------------------



| |  | Form S-8 (Registration Nos. 333-185345, 333-159776, 333-149467, 333-126824, 333-86006, 333-39380, 333-82011, 333-80341, 333-10363, 33-51934, and
33-72798)
|- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

/s/ KPMG LLP

February 28, 2013

Miami, Florida

Certified Public Accountants
Exhibit 10.6 


Base Salaries for Named Executive Officers


 


As of January 1, 2013 the following are the base salaries (on
an annual basis) of the named executive officers (as defined in Item 402(a)(3) of Regulation S-K) of Access National Corporation:


 


	Michael W. Clarke	 	$	370,000	 
	President and Chief Executive Officer	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	Dean Hackemer	 	$	350,000	 
	President, Mortgage Division	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	Robert C. Shoemaker	 	$	296,800	 
	Executive Vice President and Chief Lending Officer	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	Margaret M. Taylor	 	$	225,000	 
	Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
#### Ovington Brothers Company, Plaintiff, *v.*Cornelia M. Henshaw, individually and as executor of Sara Gracie, deceased, Defendant.

(Supreme Court, Kings Special Term for Trials,

May, 1905.)

¡Lease — Buildings to be erected — Lessor’s covenant to pay for.

A covenant of a lessor that at the end of the term he would pay for buildings to be erected by the lessee does not run with the land and, therefore, the heirs, assigns, or devisees of the lessor are not bound thereby unless by express words.

Tbial of an issue of law raised by a demurrer to the complaint by the defendant in her individual capacity that it *168does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against her individually.

Action by tenant against landlord to recover the value of buildings erected on the demised preanises by the tenant during the lease.

The lease contained a provision that if the lessees should rebuild the buildings, which had been destroyed by fire, *“*The party of the first part (landlord) hereby agrees to pay for the buildings remaining on the premises at the expiration of the term hereby created ”; the amount to be fixed by arbitration, each side appointing an arbitrator and they two a third.

The plaintiff is assignee of the lease and the defendant is devisee and executor of the lessor.

George S. Ingraham for plaintiff.

Henry C. M. Ingraham for defendant.

Gaynor, J.:

The lease was assigned to the plaintiff during the term, and the defendant became the owner of the demised premises during the term, as devisee under the will of the lessor, and collected the rent. As the words of the agreement that the lessor shall pay at the end of the term for the buildings to be erected by the lessees during the term do not name the heirs and assigns of the covenantor, it is not a covenant running with the land, and therefore binding on the defendant as devisee. When the covenant is of a thing not *in esse,*as is the case here, i. e., to erect buildings on the demised premises, there is nothing for It to become appurtenant to, and heirs or assigns are not bound unless by express words. The covenant here was only the personal covenant of the lessor, and binds her executor only (Thompson v. Rose, 8 Cow. 266; Tallman v. Coffin, 4 N. Y. 134; Coffin v. Talman, 8 N. Y. 465 Countrymen v. Deck, 13 Abb. N. C. 105*note;*N. Y. Dyeing & Printing Est. v. De Westenberg, 46 Hun, 281). The case of *Schoellkopf v. Coatsworth*(166 N. Y. 77)"isnot in point. There the agreement was such that the tenancy could only be terminated *169by the lessors giving a notice of six months to the tenant and becoming thereby bound1 to pay for the buildings, and their heirs or grantees were of course in the same position. The giving of the notice made them liable for the buildings, for that was the alternative of the contract.

The demurrer is sustained.