J-S42010-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MICHAEL O. ANDREWS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 519 EDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 8, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-1006871-1995

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED DECEMBER 29, 2023

Michael O. Andrews appeals pro se from the order dismissing his serial 

PCRA petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). We 

affirm. 

Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment following his convictions 

for second-degree murder, robbery, and possession of an instrument of crime 

in connection with the 1995 shooting death of Jamal Pettus. Appellant’s 

judgment of sentence became final in 2004 when his direct appeal was 

unsuccessful and he did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with our 

High Court. See Commonwealth v. Andrews, 2019 WL 1223100, at *1

(Pa.Super. 2019) (unpublished memorandum). 

Appellant filed his first counseled PCRA petition in 2005 and numerous 

more in the ensuing years, none of which merited him relief. In the case at 

bar, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition in March 2021 and then a 
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subsequent petition in July 2022. The PCRA court considered both, treating 

the latter as a “supplemental petition” added to the 2021 petition.1 PCRA 

Court Opinion, 2/8/23, at 2. It ultimately found that the petition was untimely

and that Appellant did not assert a valid timeliness exception. Id. at 2-3. 

Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition. 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court, and both he and 

the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Although Appellant presents 

five questions for our consideration, our review of the following query is 

dispositive: “Was Appellant’s PCRA petition timely filed?” Appellant’s brief at 

iv. 

We begin with an evaluation of this issue, mindful of the following legal 

principles. Initially, we observe that “our standard of review permits us to 

consider only whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the 

evidence of record and whether it is free from legal error.” Commonwealth 

v. Conway, 14 A.3d 101, 108 (Pa.Super. 2011). It is well-settled that the 

timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. See Commonwealth 

v. Lewis, 63 A.3d 1274, 1280-81 (Pa.Super. 2013). “Without jurisdiction, [a 

court] simply do[es] not have the legal authority to address the substantive 

claims.” Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124, 1143 (Pa. 2020) (cleaned 

up). A petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or subsequent 

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1 This Court has held that “nothing bars a PCRA court from considering a 

subsequent petition, even if a prior petition is pending, so long as the prior 

petition is not under appellate review.” Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 

181 A.3d 359, 364-65 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc). 
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petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence 

is final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an exception 

to timeliness is satisfied. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b). Those exceptions relate 

to governmental interference with the presentation of the claim; newlydiscovered facts; and a newly-recognized, retroactively applicable 

constitutional right. See id.

As discussed, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final in 2004, 

whereas his petition was filed in 2021. Hence, it is facially untimely and 

cannot be considered unless he pled and offered to prove one of the 

enumerated exceptions. Appellant first invoked the newly-discovered facts 

exception, contending that he discovered that Attorney James Bruno, counsel 

who represented Appellant regarding his first PCRA petition in 2005, was 

suspended from the practice of law in 2014 because of a mental illness and,

therefore, abandoned him. See PCRA Petition, 3/16/21, at 3-4. 

To establish the newly-discovered facts exception, “two components . . . 

must be alleged and proved. Namely, the petitioner must establish that (1) 

the facts upon which the claim was predicated were unknown and (2) could 

not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth 

v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 628 (Pa. 2017) (cleaned up). “If the petitioner 

alleges and proves these two components, then the PCRA court has 

jurisdiction over the claim.” Id. (cleaned up). Further, we have held that

“[a]n allegation of abandonment by counsel falls within the ambit of [this] 
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exception.” Commonwealth v. Chester, 163 A.3d 470, 473 (Pa.Super. 

2017). 

Our examination of the certified record reveals that Appellant knew of 

Attorney Bruno’s suspension years before the filing of the instant PCRA 

petition. In a pro se PCRA petition filed in March 2015, Appellant attached as 

an exhibit a letter from the Pennsylvania Disciplinary Board detailing the 

reasons for Attorney Bruno’s suspension. See PCRA Petition, 3/11/15, at 3, 

Exhibit A. Moreover, Appellant acknowledged receiving the letter about 

Attorney Bruno’s suspension. Id. at 3. Hence, the facts upon which the claim 

was predicated were not unknown to Appellant at the time of filing the instant 

petition, and he has not demonstrated that this exception applies. 

Next, Appellant invoked the newly-recognized constitutional right 

exception by relying on our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. 

Yale, 249 A.3d 1001 (Pa. 2021). See Supplemental PCRA Petition, 7/25/22, 

at 3. Appellant averred that Yale created a right to present new evidence 

that someone else committed the crimes for which he is incarcerated. Id. In 

Yale, the High Court held that the admissibility of evidence concerning third 

person guilt is not analyzed pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b). See Yale, supra at 

1021. Our Supreme Court’s determination in Yale, however, cannot serve as 

a basis for jurisdiction over Appellant’s PCRA claim pursuant to the newlyrecognized constitutional right exception. As the High Court summarized:

Subsection (iii) of Section 9545 has two requirements. First, it 

provides that the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or [the 
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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania] after the time provided in this 

section. Second, it provides that the right “has been held” by 

“that court” to apply retroactively. Thus, a petitioner must prove 

that there is a “new” constitutional right and that the right “has 

been held” by that court to apply retroactively. 

Reid, supra at 1154 (cleaned up). 

Since neither Court has held that the right of a criminal defendant to 

present third person guilt evidence as recognized in Yale is both new and 

retroactively applicable, the decision does not provide a foundation for the 

newly-recognized constitutional right exception. Therefore, we conclude that 

Appellant has failed to plead and prove that he is entitled to the benefit of this 

exception. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 283 A.3d 178, 188 (Pa. 2022) 

(“In the absence of such a preexisting holding, [petitioner] has failed to 

establish the applicability of the newly[-]recognized constitutional right 

exception[.]”). 

The PCRA court properly dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely, 

since “no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition.” 

Commonwealth v. Ballance, 203 A.3d 1027, 1031 (Pa.Super. 2019). 

Accordingly, we do not reach the remainder of Appellant’s claims and affirm 

the order dismissing his PCRA petition. 

Order affirmed.
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Date: 12/29/2023