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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

DEMEKO BRAZILLE HOLLAND a/k/a

DEMEKO BRAZILE HOLLAND,

Appellant.

No. 84260-9-I

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SMITH, C.J. — In 2008, a jury convicted Demeko Holland of second degree 

murder with a firearm enhancement. Thirteen years later, in 2022, Holland filed a 

motion for postconviction DNA testing of the murder weapon, claiming that new 

techniques in rust removal warranted additional testing. The trial court denied 

the motion. Because Holland does not explain how the rust removal process 

would provide significantly more accurate DNA information than was obtained 

prior to trial nor explain how a favorable DNA test result would prove his 

innocence on a more probable than not basis, we affirm.

FACTS

On August 18, 2003, fourteen-year-old D.C. was riding his bike in West 

Seattle when he was shot and killed. Witnesses reported to police that the 

shooter was running through the residential area west of the shooting. Several 

individuals testified they had witnessed a “dark skinned” individual fleeing with 

varying physical descriptions. Seattle Police Officer Richard Heideman stopped 
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Demeko Holland about 10 blocks northwest of the shooting. Heideman reported 

that when stopped, Holland said, “Why did you stop me? I’m just out jogging.” 

Officer Chris Hairston then arrived and asked Holland if he knew why he was 

being stopped. Hairston reported that Holland responded, “Is this about the 

shooting?” and then asked, “Is the kid all right?” One witness, Michael Anderson, 

saw the final shots fired and pursued the shooter who began to flee the scene. 

Officers brought Anderson to identify Holland, who was being detained and 

handcuffed. Anderson identified Holland as the shooter with 70 percent 

certainty.

After Holland was detained, Seattle Police Department Detectives Donna 

O’Neal and Rob Blanco questioned Holland, who admitted to being out late the 

night before with friends and smoking 9 to 12 sticks of “sherm.”

1

 When asked 

about the side effects of sherm, Holland explained that when his smoking was 

excessive, he suffered blackouts. He described it as being in a state of 

consciousness in which he was unable to account for any of his actions. When 

asked about the gun, Holland told Detective Blanco that it was possible his friend 

gave him a gun and that he did the shooting, but he could not remember.

Detective Blanco described Holland as being “very moody” during questioning

and recalled Holland telling him that he had “slipped up and that something 

happened and he felt bad for it.” After Holland started crying during questioning,

Detective O’Neal asked if Holland wanted to write a letter to the victim’s family to 

 

1

“Sherm” is marijuana that has been dipped in either embalming fluid or 

PCP and dried.
No. 84260-9-I/3

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express his remorse. Detective O’Neal said that Holland responded, “That’s a 

good idea. Maybe I’ll do it later.”

Evidence found and collected along Holland’s flight path included a jacket, 

pen, T-shirt, and bandana. DNA testing implicated Holland as a possible 

contributor to the DNA found on all four items. When asked about the jacket, 

Holland told the detectives that his brother had a similar jacket and that he might 

have taken it with him that morning. And when asked about the recovered Tshirt, Holland gave the same response. 

Nearly two years after the shooting, a gun was discovered in a bush along 

Holland’s flight path. The gun was severely rusted and corroded from having 

been outside and exposed to the elements for 20 months. The gun, magazine, 

and bullets were submitted to a fingerprint examiner, who did not find any

evidence of fingerprints. The items were then delivered to forensic scientist, Amy 

Jagmin, who conducted a cursory visual examination and determined the gun 

was not suitable for DNA testing. Jagmin testified that DNA testing the gun 

would likely be unsuccessful due to environmental exposure, which “break[s]

down DNA and cause[s] the outer surface of . . . hard metal pieces to rust and 

cause[s] inhibition to anything that may have been present.” For this reason, the 

gun, magazine, and bullets were not examined further for DNA. The pieces were 

then sent to a ballistics expert, who compared the gun with casings found at the 

crime scene and determined the gun was the murder weapon. 

The case proceeded to trial and a jury convicted Holland of second degree

murder with a firearm enhancement and first degree unlawful possession of a 
No. 84260-9-I/4

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firearm. Holland’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. In 2022, thirteen 

years after his conviction, Holland filed a motion requesting postconviction DNA 

testing of the gun. The trial court denied the motion and Holland appeals.

ANALYSIS

Holland contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for 

postconviction DNA testing of the gun. Because Holland fails to satisfy the 

statutory requirements for postconviction DNA testing, we disagree.

Under RCW 10.73.170, a person convicted of a felony currently serving a 

prison sentence may file a motion requesting DNA testing. The person 

requesting testing must then satisfy the statute’s procedural and substantive 

requirements. RCW 10.73.170(2)-(3). The procedural requirement is “lenient.”

State v. Riofta, 166 Wn.2d 358, 367, 209 P.3d 467 (2009). The motion must (a) 

“state the basis for the request,” (b) “explain the relevance of the DNA evidence 

sought,” and (c) “comply with applicable court rules.” Riofta, 166 Wn.2d at 364

(citing RCW 10.73.170(2)(a)-(c)). Postconviction DNA testing is allowed when:

“(i) the court previously denied admission of DNA testing; (ii) the DNA evidence 

was unavailable due to inferior technology; and (iii) current technology will yield 

more accurate results than those previously obtained or, . . . will provide 

significant new information.” Riofta, 166 Wn.2d at 366 (emphasis omitted) (citing

RCW 10.73.170(2)(a)(i)-(iii)). After stating the basis of the request, the statute 

requires a defendant to explain “why DNA evidence is material to the identity of 

the perpetrator of, or accomplice to, the crime, or to sentence enhancement.”

RCW 10.73.170(2)(b).
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Unlike the lenient procedural standard, the substantive standard is 

“onerous.” Riofta, 166 Wn.2d at 367. The substantive standard requires a 

defendant to show a “likelihood that the DNA evidence would demonstrate 

innocence on a more probable than not basis.” RCW 10.73.170(3). The court 

evaluates the likelihood of innocence based on a presumption of favorable test 

results. State v. Crumpton, 181 Wn.2d 252, 262, 332 P.3d 448, 452 (2014). But

the defendant is not “entitled to additional inferences in [their] favor beyond the 

assumption of favorable DNA test results.” State v. Braa, 2 Wn. App. 2d 510, 

521, 410 P.3d 1176 (2018). Rather, the “ ‘court must look to whether, viewed in 

light of all of the evidence presented at trial or newly discovered, favorable DNA 

test results would raise the likelihood that the person is innocent on a more 

probable than not basis.’ ” State v. Thompson, 173 Wn.2d 865, 872, 271 P.3d 

204, (2012) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Riofta, 166 Wn.2d at 367 (citing RCW 

10.73.170(3))). If the favorable results, in combination with other evidence, raise 

a reasonable probability the defendant was not the perpetrator, the court must

grant the motion. Riofta, 166 Wn.2d at 367-68. 

Finally, “[t]esting should be limited to situations where there is a credible 

showing that it could benefit a possibly innocent individual, not only because that 

is the goal of the statute but also to avoid overburdening labs or wasting state 

resources.” Crumpton, 181 Wn.2d at 261 (internal citations omitted). We review 

a trial court’s decision on a motion for postconviction DNA testing for abuse of 

discretion. Crumpton, 181 Wn.2d at 257 (citing Riofta, 166 Wn.2d at 370). 
No. 84260-9-I/6

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1. Procedural Standard

As a preliminary matter, the State contends that Holland waived his 

reliance on Section 1.29 of the Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory 

Division, Firearms/Tool Marks Technical Procedures Manual (Firearms Manual)

because he did not cite to it in his motion before the trial court. We disagree.

The statute does not require the defendant to state what the technology is, only 

that technology exists that will produce more accurate DNA testing results.

2

 

RCW 10.73.170.

We now turn to whether Holland satisfied the procedural requirements of 

the statute. Holland alleges “current technology will yield more accurate results”

because the Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory (WSPCL) has “amended 

its procedure in DNA collection of rusty firearms.” Holland further asserts testing

the rusted gun is relevant “because there [was] no evidence adduced during trial 

that linked him to the murder weapon.” We disagree and conclude that Holland 

did not satisfy the statute’s procedural requirements because he did not explain 

the materiality of the DNA evidence to his case. 

Holland’s motion easily clears the first procedural hurdle—he plainly 

identifies the basis of his request as “technology [that] will yield more accurate 

results then those previously obtained.” But his motion fails to meet the second 

procedural requirement—explaining the relevance of additional DNA testing. To 

 

2

In his opening brief, Holland cites to “WSPCL 1, 28” and proceeds to talk 

about rusted firearms. However, language about rusted firearms is found in 

section 1.29 of the Firearms Manual, not section 1.28. This is a nonissue. The 

State’s briefing demonstrates that the State understood Holland was trying to cite 

to section 1.29 and Holland correctly refers to section 1.29 in his reply brief.
No. 84260-9-I/7

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meet the relevance prong, Holland must “[e]xplain why DNA evidence is material 

to the identity of the perpetrator of . . . the crime.” State v. Gray, 151 Wn. App. 

762, 768, 215 P.3d 961 (2009) (citing RCW 10.73.170(2)(b)).

Gray is instructive here. In Gray, the court determined that the defendant 

met the relevance requirement because they explained the relevance of the new 

DNA testing in detail, noting that the new method made it possible to test “small 

amounts of previously untestable biological material contained in rape kits.” 151 

Wn. App. at 769. Unlike the defendant in Gray, Holland did not explain how the 

updated Firearms Manual would be relevant to DNA analysis of the gun.

Instead, Holland contends that because the procedural component of the 

statute does not “require[] a petitioner to divulge ‘why and how’ a test is relevant 

nor to ‘grapple’ with specific evidence,” he has satisfied the requirement by citing 

to the Firearms Manual. We disagree. Though the procedural requirement is 

lenient, the defendant still has the burden of showing materiality. RCW 

10.73.170(2)(b). And here, the section of the Firearms Manual that Holland 

relies on does not mention DNA at all; rather, it details the procedure for 

removing rust from firearms in order to restore the firearm. The section provides 

that the purpose of restoration is for test firing and recovering manufacturer 

information such as serial numbers—not DNA recovery. Firearms Manual § 

1.29. 

Moreover, the Manual instructs that the firearm should be thoroughly 

sprayed with a water-displacing product like WD-40®, soaked in penetrating oil

and other de-rusting solvents, cleaned with a soda blaster, washed with gun 
No. 84260-9-I/8

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cleaning solvent, and so forth. Firearms Manual § 1.29. It is difficult to 

understand how any DNA would remain on the gun after following such a 

rigorous cleaning procedure, let alone yield more accurate DNA results than 

testing methods that were previously available. Without further explanation of 

why rust removal will allow detection of new DNA evidence, Holland has not 

demonstrated why these updated procedures are material to identifying the 

perpetrator. We conclude that he fails to satisfy the relevance prong of the 

statute. 

2. Substantive Standard

Holland contends that exculpatory DNA results would exclude him as the 

perpetrator, and, in light of weak evidence presented at trial, this would prove his 

innocence on a more probable than not basis. We disagree. Even if there were 

a possibility the firearm would yield DNA and produce favorable results, it would 

not establish Holland’s innocence. 

Holland alleges that the cross-racial identification evidence of this case is 

weak. We acknowledge that the problematic nature of eyewitness testimony can 

lead to misidentification, and that misidentification increases substantially when 

the identification is cross-racial. However, there is other independent evidence in 

support of Holland’s conviction. In addition to the eyewitness testimony, 

Holland’s conviction was based on flight path evidence, Holland’s proximity to the 

shooting, DNA found on clothing items discarded along the flight path, and 

inculpatory statements he made to police officers.
No. 84260-9-I/9

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Officers found Holland at the end of that flight path,3 and when they asked 

Holland if he knew why he was stopped, he asked if it was about the shooting 

and if the kid was all right. When talking to the police, he began crying and said

he had slipped up and that something happened and he felt bad for it. According 

to Detective O’Neal, after she asked if Holland would feel better if he wrote a 

letter to the victim’s family, he replied, “That’s a good idea. Maybe I’ll do it later.”

Holland later refused to tell officers where the gun was, stating, “I could 

get charged with a weapon enhancement.” Moreover, Holland was a possible 

contributor to DNA found on items discarded along the flight path—including a 

jacket, T-shirt, bandana, and pen. When asked about the jacket, Holland said his 

brother had a similar jacket and said that it was possible he took it with him that 

morning. And when asked about the recovered T-shirt, Holland said the same 

thing. Additionally, Detective Blanco said that during questioning Holland 

admitted “it was possible he was the person that [] did the shooting, but he 

couldn’t remember.” He also told the detectives that he was out late with friends 

the night before using sherm and that he might have received a gun from his 

friend but could not remember his actions while under the influence. 

Holland relies on Thompson and Gray—both of which are rape cases—to 

contend that “[a]n exculpatory DNA test result [is] pertinent to show innocence on 

 

3 We recognize that a black person running from the police is not 

incriminating evidence in and of itself. And there is a long history in American 

society of attributing such behavior by black people as evidence of guilt due to 

stereotyping members of the black community as criminals. Here, the evidence 

is significant not because Holland was running, but because he was found at the 

end of the flight path seen by several witnesses. 
No. 84260-9-I/10

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a more probable than not basis when the identity of a lone perpetrator is in 

question.” But these cases are not persuasive because both involved only one 

possible source of DNA. Thompson, 173 Wn.2d at 870; Gray, 151 Wn. App. 

at 775. 

The present case is more analogous to Riofta. 166 Wn.2d at 358. In 

Riofta, the court held that exculpatory test results would not show innocence on a 

more probable than not basis when the limited probative value of the evidence 

sought was outweighed by other substantial evidence. 166 Wn.2d at 373. The 

court determined that the hat had low probative value, because it could have 

been worn by several individuals during and after the time of the incident. 166 

Wn.2d at 370. Much like the hat in Riofta, here, the gun could have been 

handled by anyone when it was left outside in a bush for 20 months. 

Indeed, the gun has likely been handled by several individuals before and 

after its discovery in 2005. Holland told police it was possible he got the gun 

from his friend; it was in the bushes for 20 months; it was handled by DNA 

scientists and taken apart and reassembled at a ballistics lab; it was handled and 

transported by the police; and it was also admitted at trial. And even if the gun 

was not compromised by the DNA of others, the absence of Holland’s DNA and 

the presence of someone else’s does not outweigh the substantial evidence 

incriminating Holland. Because Holland failed to show the likelihood that the 

DNA evidence would demonstrate innocence on a more probable than not basis, 

we conclude that he fails to satisfy the substantive requirement. 
No. 84260-9-I/11

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Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion 

for postconviction DNA testing, we affirm.

WE CONCUR: