alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 809

To prohibit certain abortions. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 13, 2003

Mr. HOYER (for himself, Mr. GREENWOOD, Mrs. TAUSCHER, Mrs. JOHNSON

of Connecticut, Mr. MENENDEZ, Mr. BOUCHER, Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts, Mr. HINCHEY, Mr. WYNN, Mr. SMITH of Washington, Ms. 

MCCARTHY of Missouri, Mr. KOLBE, Mr. KIND, Mr. MOORE, and Mr. 

SCOTT of Virginia) introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by 

the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL

To prohibit certain abortions.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Late Term Abortion 

5 Restriction Act’’. 
2

•HR 809 IH 

1 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN ABORTIONS. 

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—It shall be unlawful, in or affect3 ing interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly to perform 

4 an abortion after the fetus has become viable. 

5 (b) EXCEPTION.—This section does not prohibit any 

6 abortion if, in the medical judgment of the attending phy7 sician, the abortion is necessary to preserve the life of the 

8 woman or to avert serious adverse health consequences to 

9 the woman. 

10 (c) CIVIL PENALTY.—A physician who violates this 

11 section shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed 

12 $10,000. The civil penalty provided by this subsection is 

13 the exclusive remedy for a violation of this section.

Æ
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-51314 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus RAUL ALBERTO VALDEZ-CHAVEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. EP-00-CR-954-1-H

- - - - - - - - - - June 15, 2001 Before WIENER, DeMOSS, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Raul Alberto Valdez-Chavez appeals his sentence following his guilty plea conviction for illegal re-entry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Valdez argues that his sentence should not have exceeded the two-year maximum sentence under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Valdez acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224 (1998), but he seeks to preserve the issue for Supreme Court review in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000).No. 00-51314 - 2 - Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres

. See Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit , 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied , 121 S. Ct. 1214 (2001). Valdez’s argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres , 523 U.S. at 235. The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks that the judgment of the district court be affirmed and that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is granted.
AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 00-7140

GEORGE DUNDAS, Petitioner - Appellant, versus RONALD HUTCHINSON; ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF MARYLAND, Respondents - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District ofMaryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, District Judge. (CA99-3612-PJM) Submitted: January 18, 2001 Decided: January 24, 2001 Before WIDENER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. George Dundas, Appellant Pro Se. John Joseph Curran, Jr., AttorneyGeneral, Ann Norman Bosse, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: George Dundas seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. Dundas v. Hutchinson , No. CA-99- 3612-PJM (D. Md. Aug. 3, 2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-53,608-03

EX PARTE WARREN DARRELL RIVERS, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR POST-CONVICTION WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

IN CAUSE NO. 0475122-C IN THE 228 JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

TH

HARRIS COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

In December 1988, a jury found Applicant guilty of the offense of capital murder.

See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03(a). Based on the jury’s answers to the statutory

punishment questions set out in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.071, the

trial court sentenced Applicant to death. We affirmed the 1988 conviction and sentence.

1

Rivers v. State, No. AP-70,776 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 14, 1993) (not designated for

 Unless otherwise indicated, all references in this order to Articles refer to the Texas 1

Code of Criminal Procedure.
Rivers - 2

publication). We also denied relief on Applicant’s initial post-conviction application for

a writ of habeas corpus and his first subsequent writ application. Ex parte Rivers, No.

WR-53,608-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 27, 2002) (not designated for publication), and Ex

parte Rivers, No. WR-53,608-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2007) (not designated for

publication).

Following a grant of federal habeas corpus relief reversing Applicant’s death

sentence, the trial court held a new punishment trial in November 2014. See Rivers v.

Quarterman, 661 F. Supp. 2d 675 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2009). Based on the jury’s

answers to the statutory punishment questions set out in Article 37.0711, the trial court

again sentenced Applicant to death.

On September 2, 2016, the State filed in this Court its brief on Applicant’s direct

appeal of the punishment retrial. Pursuant to Article 11.071 §§ 4(a) and (b), Applicant’s

initial application for a writ of habeas corpus after retrial was due to be filed in the trial

court on or before January 16, 2017, assuming a motion for extension was timely filed

and granted. See Art. 11.071 §§ 4(a) and (b).

It has been four years since the application was due in the trial court. Accordingly,

we order the trial court to resolve any remaining issues in the case within 60 days from

the date of this order. The clerk shall then immediately transmit the complete writ record

to this Court. Any extensions of time shall be requested by the trial judge, or on his or her

behalf, and obtained from this Court.
Rivers - 3

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS THE 13 DAY OF JANUARY, 2021.

TH

Do Not Publish
|                                                                  |                                                          | Page 21            
|----------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------
|                                                                  |                                                          |                    
|NORTHEAST BANCORP                                                
|Exhibit 11. Statement Regarding Computation of Per Share Earnings
|                                                                  |                                                          |                    
|                                                                  | Three Months Ended                                       | Three Months Ended 
|                                                                  | September 30, 2002                                       | September 30, 2001 
|                                                                  | ___________________                                      | ___________________
|EQUIVALENT SHARES:                                                |                                                          |                    
|                                                                  |                                                          |                    
|Weighted Average Shares Outstanding                               | 2,647,924                                                | 2,577,079          
|                                                                  |                                                          |                    
|Total Diluted Shares                                              | 2,686,789                                                | 2,623,909          
|                                                                  |                                                          |                    
|Net Income                                                        | $     906,939                                            | $      942,361     
|                                                                  |                                                          |                    
|Basic Earnings Per Share                                          | $           0.34                                         | $            0.37  
|                                                                  |                                                          |                    
|Diluted Earnings Per Share                                        | $                                                   0.34 | $            0.36
# laucnty94

&8Page &P of &N
# 16SNR02_00

# image1.png
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT DEREK TODD, Plaintiff - Appe lla nt, v. GAR Y IC HIKAWA, Judge , De fe nda

nt - Appe lle e . No. 12-16588 D.C . No. 2:12-c v-01379-M C EGGH M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for theEa ste rn Distric t of C a lifornia M orrison C . Engla

nd, Jr., C hie f Judge , Pre siding Submitte d De c e m

be r 17, 2013 ** B e fore : GOODW IN, WALLAC E, a nd GR AB ER , C irc uit Judge s. De re k Todd a

ppe a ls pro sefrom

the distric t c ourt’ s judgm e nt dismissing his 42 U.S.C . § 1983 a c tion a lle ging tha t JudgeIc hika

wa de nie d Todd visita

tion with his son during Ea ste r in viola tion of Todd’ s c onstitutiona l rights. W e hav e jurisdic tion under 28 U.S.C . § 1291. W e re vie w de novo a dismi ssa l unde r 28 

# FIL ED JAN 02 2014 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S . CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. ** The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without oral a

rgum e nt. Se eFe d. R . App. P. 34(a)(2).U.S.C . § 1915(e )(2)(B )(ii). Barre n v . Harrington , 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th C ir.

1998) (orde r). W e a ffirm . The distric t c ourt prope rly dismisse d Todd’ s a c tion be c a use Judge Ic hika

wa is im m une from lia bility . Se e Mire le

s v . W ac o , 502 U.S. 9, 9, 11-12 (1991) (pe r c uriam ) (judge s a

re a bsolute ly im

m une from suits for da

m a ge s ba se d on the ir judic ia l c onduc t e x c e pt whe n pe rform ing nonjudic ia l func tions or a c ting in the c om ple t e a b se nc e of jurisdic tion). AFFIRM E D.

1 2 - 1 6 5 8 8 2
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 140 (Thursday, July 23, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 36506]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-17573]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Bureau of Land Management

[LLNM920000 L13100000 FI0000; NMNM-119267]


Notice of Proposed Reinstatement of Terminated Oil and Gas Lease 
NMNM 119267

AGENCY: Bureau of Land Management, Interior.

ACTION: Notice of reinstatement of terminated oil and gas lease.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Under the Class II provisions of Title IV, Public Law 97-451, 
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) received a petition for 
reinstatement of oil and gas lease NMNM 119267 from the lessee, J Bar 
Cane Inc., for lands in Chaves County, New Mexico. The petition was 
filed on time and was accompanied by all the rentals due since the date 
the lease terminated under the law.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lourdes B. Ortiz, Bureau of Land 
Management, New Mexico State Office, P.O. Box 27115, Santa Fe, New 
Mexico 87502 or at (505) 438-7586.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: No valid lease has been issued that affects 
the lands. The lessee agrees to new lease terms for rentals and 
royalties of $10.00 per acre or fraction thereof, per year, and 16 \2/
3\ percent, respectively. The lessee paid the required $500.00 
administrative fee for the reinstatement of the lease and $166.00 cost 
for publishing this Notice in the Federal Register. The lessee met all 
the requirements for reinstatement of the lease as set out in Section 
31(d) and (e) of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (30 U.S.C. 188). We 
are proposing to reinstate lease NMNM 119267, effective the date of 
termination, December 1, 2008, under the original terms and conditions 
of the lease and the increased rental and royalty rates cited above.

Lourdes B. Ortiz,
Land Law Examiner, Fluids Adjudication Team.
[FR Doc. E9-17573 Filed 7-22-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-FB-P
Exhibit 31.1

Certification of Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to Rule 13a-14(a) or 15d-14(a)

I, Dawn H. Robertson, certify that:



|1. | I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q/A of Stein Mart, Inc.; and
|-- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                      |  |  |  |  |  |                        
|--------------------- |  |  |  |  |  | -----------------------
|Date: August 23, 2016 |  |  |  |  |  | /s/ Dawn H. Robertson  
|                      |  |  |  |  |  | Dawn H. Robertson      
|                      |  |  |  |  |  | Chief Executive Officer
#### In re: Betty Jean MCCARTHER-MORGAN, Debtor. Betty Jean McCarther-Morgan, Appellant, v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, Appellee.

No. 09-60006.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 6, 2010.*

Filed April 9, 2010.

Michael G. Doan, Doan Law Firm, LLP, Carlsbad, CA, for Appellant.

Dean T. Kirby, Jr., Kirby & McGuinn, A.P.C., San Diego, CA, for Appellee.

Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

*779MEMORANDUM **

Betty Jean McCarther-Morgan appeals the dismissal of her adversary action against Asset Acceptance, LLC. McCarther-Morgan alleges violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and the California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“RFDCPA”). We review de novo. *Price v. U.S. Tr. (In re Price),*353 F.3d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir.2004).

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) properly affirmed the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of McCarther-Morgan’s FDCPA claim because the Bankruptcy Code precludes that claim. *Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,*276 F.3d 502, 510-11 (9th Cir.2002). The BAP also properly affirmed the dismissal of McCarther-Mor-gan’s RFDCPA claim because the Bankruptcy Code preempts that claim. *MSR Exploration, Ltd. v. Meridian Oil, Inc.,*74 F.3d 910, 912-16 (9th Cir.1996).

McCarther-Morgan argues that recent revisions to the Bankruptcy Code undermine the holdings in *Walls*and *MSR Exploration,*but that argument is inapplicable. McCarther-Morgan raises this argument for the first time in her reply brief. Because she failed to raise this argument either below or in her opening brief on appeal, she has waived it. *Butler v. Curry,*528 F.3d 624, 642 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 767, 172 L.Ed.2d 763 (2008).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
EXHIBIT 10.29



 



FOURTH AMENDMENT TO DEPOSIT PROCESSING SERVICES AGREEMENT







This FOURTH AMENDMENT TO DEPOSIT PROCESSING SERVICES AGREEMENT (this "Amendment") is entered into as of August 30, 2012, by and between Higher One, Inc. ("Higher One") and Cole Taylor Bank ("Bank").







WHEREAS, Higher One and Bank are parties to that certain Deposit Processing Services Agreement dated as of March 29, 2012, as amended (the "Deposit Processing Services Agreement"); and







WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire to amend the terms of the Deposit Processing Services Agreement in accordance with the terms of this Amendment; and







NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the Parties hereto agree as follows:







1.  Unless otherwise defined in this Amendment, all capitalized terms used herein shall have the definitions indicated in the Deposit Processing Services Agreement.







2.  The final sentence of Section 2.11 of the Deposit Processing Services Agreement is hereby amended and restated as follows:


"Furthermore, the Parties shall draft, finalize and execute a transition agreement addressing each Party's responsibilities in conjunction with the future termination of this Agreement and Depositor Program on, or prior to, November 30, 2012."







2.  This Amendment may not be amended, waived or modified in any manner without the prior written consent of each party hereto.







3.  Except as specifically amended and modified hereby, all of the terms and conditions of the Deposit Processing Services Agreement shall remain unchanged and in full force and effect. This Amendment shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware without regard to its conflict of laws rules.







4.  This Amendment may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, but all of which together shall constitute one and the same instrument.







[SIGNATURE PAGE FOLLOWS]













IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Amendment as of the date first written above.












COLE TAYLOR BANK







By: /s/ Randall T. Conte


Its: CFO












HIGHER ONE, INC.







By: Miles Lasater


Its: COO
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 139 (Wednesday, July 22, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 36190]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-17344]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission


Notice of Membership of Performance Review Board for Senior 
Executives (PRB)

July 15, 2009.
    The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission hereby provides notice of 
the membership of its Performance Review Board (PRB) for the 
Commission's Senior Executive Service (SES) members. The function of 
this board is to make recommendations relating to the performance of 
senior executives in the Commission. This action is undertaken in 
accordance with Title 5, U.S.C., section 4314(c)(4). The Commission's 
PRB will add the following members:
Norman C. Bay,
Michael C. McLaughlin,
Jamie L. Simler,
Jeff C. Wright.

Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. E9-17344 Filed 7-21-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### F LORIDA



### S ECOND 

### D ISTRICT

GEORGE MILLER,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 2D2023

- 2384

June 5, 2024

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for

Pinellas County ; Philip J. Federico, Judge.

Cydnee Brown of Law Office of Cydnee Brown, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

PER CURIAM

.

Affirmed.

SILBERMAN

, VILLANTI, and BLACK, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
Opinion issued February 11, 2016

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-14-00980-CR

———————————

DAVID JAMES CHAPMAN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 183rd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1421328

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, David James Chapman, was charged with the offense of evading 

arrest. The clerk’s record contains no judgment of conviction because the State 

moved to dismiss this cause and, on November 12, 2014, the trial court granted the 
2

motion and dismissed this cause. Thus, there is no adverse ruling and no judgment 

of conviction from which Chapman may appeal.

Having found the record reveals that Williams received no adverse rulings 

and the charge was dismissed, we hold that we have no jurisdiction over this appeal. 

See Valencia v. State, No. 05–06–01727–CR, 2007 WL 196449, at * 1 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Jan. 26, 2007, no pet.) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction where record 

contained no judgment of conviction and thus, nothing was presented for review). 

We dismiss the appeal. We deny all pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Bland, Brown, and Lloyd.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA
F OURTH D ISTRICT

LIBERTY INTERNATIONAL UNDERWRITERS , Appellant,

v.

FRISKY LADY VENTURES, LLC and DEMPSEY MARINE
ELECTRONICS AND ELECTRICAL , a foreign corporation, Appellee s

.

No. 4D 17

- 3839

[ February 21, 2018 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County ; Jeffrey R. Levenson , Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE 16

- 014957

.

Jerry D. Hamilton, Michael J. Dono and Karina M. Cerda Collazo of Hamilton, Miller & Birthisel, LLP, Miami , for appellant.

Stuart Sobel and John I. Criste, Jr. of Siegfried, Rivera, Hyman, Lerner, De La Torre, Mars & Sobel, P.A., Coral Gables, for appellee, Frisky Lady Ventures, LLC.

P ER C URIAM

.

Liberty International Underwriters appeals a non

- final order d enying a motion to compel arbitration. Appellee, Frisky Lady Ventures, LLC,
concedes error.

Accordingly, we reverse the order denying the motion to compel arbitration and remand for the trial court to submit the action against Liberty International Underwriters to arbitration.

Reversed and remanded

.

G ROSS , F ORST and K UNTZ , JJ., concur

.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.