In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 22-3283 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

JOSHUA R. CAMPBELL, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 3:21-cr-00089-DRL-MGG-1 — Damon R. Leichty, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED JANUARY 9, 2024 — DECIDED AUGUST 5, 2024 

____________________ 

Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit 

Judges. 

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Joshua Campbell seeks to suppress 

evidence of child pornography found by his parole officers 

during an unannounced parole check. He argues that the incriminating statements that led to the evidence cannot be 

used against him, as both his parole agreement, on the one 

hand, and the officers’ failure to issue Miranda warnings on 

the other, led to violations of his Fifth Amendment rights. The 
2 No. 22-3283 

agreement did not threaten to penalize him for invoking his 

Fifth Amendment rights, however. Nor was he in custody at 

the time he revealed the incriminating information. Consequently, Campbell was required to affirmatively assert his 

rights pursuant to the Fifth Amendment to invoke the benefits of its protection. Because he did not, we must affirm the 

decision of the district court denying his motion to suppress 

the evidence. 

I.

In 2011, an Indiana court sentenced Campbell to a 10-year 

prison term for child molestation. He was released on parole 

in 2015, after signing a “Conditional Parole Release Agreement.” Among other requirements in that agreement, Campbell had to make every effort to remain employed. He was required to allow announced and unannounced home visits

which could include searches of his residence and property if 

there was “reasonable cause to believe [he was] violating or 

[was] in imminent danger of violating a condition,” of his parole agreement, and periodic unannounced examination of 

his computer equipment. R. 10-1 at 1, 10-2 at 2. The agreement 

prohibited his possession of “sexual devices or aids,” or any 

computer or electronic device without his parole officer’s permission. R. 10-2 at 2. The record is unclear as to whether his 

first parole officer permitted him to have a cellphone with internet access, but for purposes of this appeal, we adopt the 

district court’s assumption that possession of his cellphone 

was not, in and of itself, a parole violation.

On April 24, 2019, Campbell’s then-current parole officer, 

Ryan Wheeler, and his former parole officer, Craig Smith, accompanied by two other officers, conducted an unannounced 

home visit to check on Campbell’s employment status. While 
No. 22-3283 3

the other two officers remained downstairs with Campbell’s 

roommate (also a parolee), Smith and Wheeler went upstairs 

and found Campbell asleep and naked under a blanket. While 

he was still in bed, Wheeler asked Campbell if he had anything that would constitute a parole violation. Campbell confessed that he had a collection of sex toys in his nightstand. In 

response to the officers’ inquiry as to whether he had anything else that violated the conditions of his parole, Campbell 

lifted the covers to reveal a computer. At some point during 

those early exchanges, the officers patted down Campbell’s 

clothes, handed them to him, and asked him to get dressed. 

When Campbell unlocked his cellphone at Wheeler’s request, 

Wheeler saw sexually explicit images of people he suspected 

were minors.

Campbell initially refused to allow the officers to access 

his locked computer, but he admitted that the computer contained pornography, qualifying that he was not sure of the 

ages of the subjects of the pornography. Smith informed

Campbell that if Campbell did not reveal the password to the 

computer, Smith would obtain access by way of a warrant, 

and a few minutes later, Smith left the room to go to his patrol 

car to do just that. At that point, about 15-20 minutes had 

elapsed since the officers arrived. 

With Smith gone, Wheeler placed Campbell in handcuffs 

to conduct a search of the room. In response to Wheeler’s repeated requests for the computer password, Campbell eventually divulged it, and Wheeler found a folder containing explicit images of minors. Campbell was eventually arrested for 

possession of child pornography. Indiana law enforcement 

officers subsequently obtained search warrants for his electronic devices and accessed them without needing a 
4 No. 22-3283 

password. At no point did the parole officers inform Campbell of his Miranda rights.

Campbell entered into a conditional guilty plea that preserved his ability to challenge the district court’s decision to 

allow in the evidence obtained from the search of his room. 

The district court later sentenced him to the mandatory minimum—10 years’ imprisonment. In this appeal, Campbell asserts that the State violated his Fifth Amendment rights in two 

ways: first, by way of a parole agreement that compelled his 

responses under threat of penalty, and second, when the officers failed to warn him of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent in the face of their custodial interrogation. We explore each of these arguments in turn, after first setting out 

the parameters of Campbell’s Fifth Amendment rights as a 

parolee. 

II. 

Despite significant restrictions on their liberty, those who 

are incarcerated, on parole, or on probation do not relinquish 

all constitutional liberties, and retain, in most instances, their 

Fifth Amendment protection from being compelled to give incriminating statements. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 

(1984). See U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”). 

The Fifth Amendment “not only protects the individual 

against being involuntarily called as a witness against himself 

in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, 

civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might 

incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.” Lefkowitz v. 

Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973). Our cases speak of the right as 

being one that is not “self-executing.” That is, a person who 
No. 22-3283 5

wishes to be cloaked with the protections of the Fifth Amendment ordinarily must assert the privilege. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 

429. And if the questionee opts to answer without asserting 

rights under the Fifth Amendment, a court will consider those 

answers to have been freely and voluntarily given. Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). Our cases recognize that this 

assumption must give way, however, in situations in which 

the subject of an interrogation will feel so compelled to answer that we assume she has lost the “‘free choice to admit, to 

deny, or to refuse to answer.’” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429 (quoting 

Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 657 (1976)). One of those 

self-executing situations occurs when the government imposes penalties on the questionee for electing to exercise her 

Fifth Amendment rights. The second occurs when a suspect 

is subject to questioning while in police custody. 

Campbell claims both circumstances existed at the time he 

revealed incriminating information to the parole officers. If he 

is correct, then any statements he made were inadmissible in 

the subsequent criminal proceedings that the state initiated 

against him for possession of the child pornography the officers found during the parole check. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 426. 

And the discovered pornography would be excludable as derivative of the unconstitutionally obtained incriminating 

statements. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536–37 

(1988). The district court concluded otherwise, however, and 

denied Campbell’s motion to suppress the statements he 

made to the officers. We review de novo the district court’s 

legal conclusions—such as whether the parole agreement 

threatened to penalize Campbell for asserting his rights and 

whether Campbell was in custody—and its factual findings 

for clear error. United States v. Cox, 54 F.4th 502, 511 (7th Cir. 

2022). 
6 No. 22-3283 

A. Threats of a penalty 

Campbell never affirmatively asserted his Fifth Amendment right to refuse to answer questions. The right against 

self-incrimination becomes self-executing, however—that is, 

it need not be affirmatively asserted—when the government 

threatens to penalize a questionee for asserting the right. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434; see also Lefkowitz, 431 U.S. at 805 (“[A] State 

may not impose substantial penalties because a witness elects 

to exercise his Fifth Amendment right not to give incriminating testimony against himself.”).

Campbell points to two provisions in the parole 

agreement that he says underlie the Fifth Amendment 

violation. First, under the terms of the parole agreement, 

Campbell “agreed to report to [his] supervising officer as 

instructed and to respond to any and all communications

from any authorized employee of the Department of 

Correction.” R. 10-1 (emphasis ours). Second, he 

acknowledged “that any acts of omissions in violation of the 

terms of parole [would] subject [him] to being taken into 

immediate custody ... and initiation of proceedings for 

revocation of [his] parole.” R. 10-1.1 That language, he argues, 

threatens a penalty—revocation of his parole—for refusing to 

respond to questions. The Supreme Court, however, has 

distinguished between threatening a penalty for refusing to 

respond, and threatening a penalty for invoking Fifth 

Amendment protections. Requiring a parolee to appear and 

report to a parole officer and “answer truthfully the questions 

1 We assume that the text of the sentence should have said “that any 

acts or omissions” and not “any acts of omissions,” but the difference does 

not affect the outcome in any way.
No. 22-3283 7

of a probation officer” does not, in and of itself, give rise to a 

self-executing privilege. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435, 437. The 

threat of punishment, such as the revocation of probation, for 

invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, however, does. Id. at 435–37. Mere fear of 

revocation, however, “is not a ground for ruling that a 

probationer’s confession deprived him of his Fifth 

Amendment privilege.” United States v. Cranley, 350 F.3d 617, 

622 (7th Cir. 2003). 

At the end of the day, Murphy and Cranley control the outcome here. In Murphy, the defendant’s probation officer asked 

Murphy to meet to discuss his probation. She knew when she 

made the request that she would be asking him about matters 

that might incriminate him in a murder investigation. His 

probation agreement required him to “report to his probation 

officer as directed, and be truthful with the probation officer 

in all matters.” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 422. The agreement also 

informed Murphy that “[f]ailure to comply with these conditions ... could result in his return to the sentencing court for a 

probation revocation hearing.” Id. Despite this language, the 

Court held that there was “no reasonable basis for concluding 

that Minnesota attempted to attach an impermissible penalty 

to the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination.” 

Murphy, 465 U.S. at 437. According to the Court’s reasoning, 

“Murphy’s probation condition proscribed only false statements; it said nothing about his freedom to decline to answer 

particular questions and certainly contained no suggestion 

that his probation was conditional on his waiving his Fifth 

Amendment privilege with respect to further criminal prosecution.” Id. A probation officer, the Supreme Court reasoned, 

can require a probationer to appear and give truthful testimony about matters relevant to his probationary status, 
8 No. 22-3283 

provided the officer does not make the probationer choose between “making incriminating statements and jeopardizing 

his conditional liberty by remaining silent.” Id. at 436. 

There is no material difference between Campbell’s command to “report to [the] supervising officer as instructed and 

respond to any and all communications” and Murphy’s command to “report to his probation officer as directed, and be 

truthful with the probation officer ‘in all matters.’” Id. at 422.2

In both cases, the “legal compulsion to attend the meeting and 

to answer truthfully the questions of a probation officer” was 

distinguishable from a threat to impose a penalty for a valid 

exercise of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 437. And both Murphy 

and Campbell retained the “freedom to decline to answer particular questions.” Id.3 Assertion of the Fifth Amendment is, 

2 Murphy was on probation rather than parole. In the context of the 

Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has noted that parolees have 

fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, as parole is just a variation on imprisonment while probation is meted out in addition to imprisonment, not in lieu of it. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006). It is 

not clear whether this logic extends to the Fifth Amendment right against 

self-incrimination, but in any event, Campbell certainly would have no 

lesser claim to the right to assert the protections of the Fifth Amendment 

than Murphy had. 

3 Campbell points out that, in his testimony, Smith admitted to “violating” another parolee who refused to answer questions, several years 

after the events in this case. R. 25 at 75–76. The record does not reveal 

whether that parolee ultimately was subject to a parole revocation. More 

importantly, because Campbell could not have known about Smith’s actions, and because, under our case law, Campbell was not, himself, threatened with revocation for asserting his Fifth Amendment rights, Smith’s 

report of “violating” another parolee for refusing to answer questions is 

simply not relevant.
No. 22-3283 9

after all, one way to “respond” to the inquiries of a parole officer.

This court, in Cranley, following Murphy, came to the same 

conclusion—determining that a defendant had not been 

threatened with parole revocation for invoking his Fifth 

Amendment rights even where his probation agreement required both “that he report to his probation officer ‘as directed for scheduled or unscheduled meetings,’ and that he

‘provide true and correct information verbally and in writing, 

in response to inquiries by the [probation] agent.’” Cranley, 

350 F.3d at 618. The agreements in Murphy, Cranley, and in 

this case allow for the possibility that the defendants could 

respond by invoking their Fifth Amendment right to refuse to 

answer. See id. at 622.4 

4 Campbell points to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. 

Saechao, 418 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2005), as an example of a case in which a 

court found that the probation agreement imposed a penalty for assertion 

of Fifth Amendment rights when it required a probationer to “promptly 

and truthfully answer all reasonable inquiries” from the probation officer. 

The Ninth Circuit determined 

there is a significant difference between being 

required to be “truthful with ... probation officer 

in all matters,” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 422 (internal 

quotation marks omitted), and being required 

to “promptly and truthfully answer all reasonable inquiries.” Whereas the former “sa[ys] nothing about [a probationer’s] freedom to decline 

to answer particular questions” and “proscribe[s] only false statements,” the latter specifically penalizes a refusal to “answer particular 

(continued)
10 No. 22-3283 

One might question whether it is a realistic assumption 

that parolees will be aware of their right to claim a Fifth 

Amendment privilege, having signed a parole or probation 

agreement with language that, on its face, may appear to require a substantive “response.” This court, in Cranley, certainly questioned that assumption. Id. at 621–23. But despite 

its skepticism, the Cranley panel gave due allegiance to Murphy. Id. at 622. Likewise, the dissent in Murphy explored 

whether the defendant could have known that he had a constitutional right to refuse to answer his probation officer’s 

questions. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 457 (Marshall, J. dissenting). 

But despite the full airing of doubt in both courts, the assumption prevails. There is no room, therefore, for this panel to find 

otherwise.

The Murphy dissenters noted that “responsible criminal 

defense attorneys whose clients are given probation will 

questions.” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 437. In contrast 

to Murphy, who the Supreme Court found was 

free to remain silent as long as he was truthful 

when he spoke, Saechao did not have the luxury 

of remaining silent without violating the conditions of his probation. Failure to answer a relevant inquiry regarding the conditions of probation would have justified the revocation of his 

probation.

Id. at 1078. We are not bound by the Ninth Circuit’s determination of the 

distinction. But in any event, Campbell was required only to “respond,” 

not to “answer all inquiries.” And as Murphy and Cranley both concluded, 

invoking the Fifth Amendment is one possible response for a parolee or 

probationer in these circumstances. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 437; Cranley, 

350 F. 3d at 622.
No. 22-3283 11

inform those clients, in their final interviews, that they may 

disregard probation conditions insofar as those conditions are 

inconsistent with probationers’ Fifth-Amendment rights.” Id.

at 462 (Marshall, J. dissenting). The better practice would be 

for the parole agreements themselves to advise parolees of 

their Fifth Amendment rights explicitly. In contrast to the 

original underlying parole agreement that is at issue in this 

case, Campbell’s conditions of supervised release pursuant to 

his judgment in the current matter does just that:

You must truthfully answer any inquiry by the 

probation officer ... . This condition does not 

prevent you from invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 

R. 49 at 3. If his original parole agreement had provided the 

same notice, we could have avoided the conflict before us. Of 

course, he would still have his argument that he was in custody at the time of questioning, but this, as we will see in the 

subsection below, was a weaker claim. 

B. Custodial interrogation

The Fifth Amendment privilege also becomes selfexecuting for those in police custody. Given the inherently 

isolating and compelling nature of a custodial interrogation, 

“the Miranda Court required the exclusion of incriminating 

statements obtained during custodial interrogation unless the 

suspect fails to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege after 

being suitably warned of his right to remain silent and of the 

consequences of his failure to assert it.” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 

430. 

It is true that for some purposes, a parolee is in custody. 

“The essence of parole is release from prison, before the 
12 No. 22-3283 

completion of sentence, on the condition that the prisoner 

abide by certain rules during the balance of the sentence.” 

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972). Campbell’s Conditional Parole Release Agreement stated, “I understand that 

I am legally in the custody of the Department of Correction ... 

.” R. 10-1. But “[n]ot all restraints on freedom of movement 

amount to custody for purposes of Miranda.” Howes v. Fields, 

565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012). For example, the definition of “custody” for Miranda purposes is narrower than it is for habeas 

corpus purposes. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 430. Even “imprisonment alone is not enough to create a custodial situation within 

the meaning of Miranda.” Howes, 565 U.S. at 511. We have previously compiled a long list of cases holding that probationers 

or parolees were not in police custody for Miranda purposes. 

Cranley, 350 F.3d at 620 (collecting cases). To that earlier list 

we can add many more. See State v. Brandon, 287 A.3d 71, 95–

96 (Conn. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2669 (2023) (collecting 

cases). In short, the fact of parole or probation alone does not 

indicate whether a particular person is in custody for Miranda

purposes. Rather, a court must make an individualized determination about custody as it would in any other circumstance.

We employ an objective test to determine whether a 

person is in custody, looking at the circumstances 

surrounding the interrogation and asking whether “’a 

reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at 

liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’” Howes, 565 

U.S. 509 (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)). 

To make that assessment, a court must look at the totality of 

the surrounding circumstances including factors such as “the 

location of the questioning, its duration, statements made 

during the interview, the presence or absence of physical 
No. 22-3283 13

restraints during the questioning, and the release of the 

interviewee at the end of the questioning.” Id. (internal 

citations omitted); see also Cox, 54 F.4th at 511. We have recited 

lists of examples of other factors we might consider, but 

always with the caveat that the driving determination is the 

totality of the circumstances. For example, in United States v. 

Patterson, 826 F.3d 450, 455 (7th Cir. 2016) we noted that “[w]e 

have provided a non-exhaustive list of example factors, which 

includes: ‘whether the encounter occurred in a public place; 

whether the suspect consented to speak with the officers; 

whether the officers informed the individual that he was not 

under arrest and was free to leave; whether the individual 

was moved to another area; whether there was a threatening 

presence of several officers and a display of weapons or 

physical force; and whether the officers’ tone of voice was 

such that their requests were likely to be obeyed.’” Id. (quoting 

United States v. Littledale, 652 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2011)). In 

the end, we look to see whether “the relevant environment 

presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of 

station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” Howes, 565 

U.S. at 509. 

Campbell’s claim that he was in custody emphasizes the 

fact that the officers were very large men, and that their mere 

presence in a small room (one stood inside the room, and the 

other in the doorway) would have blocked Campbell’s egress. 

Moreover, they wore “battle dress uniform”—tactical pants, 

a t-shirt or polo, a utility belt with a firearm, taser, mace, ammunition, and handcuffs, and entered unannounced, while 

Campbell was in a vulnerable position—naked and sleeping. 

According to Campbell, the armed, commanding officers 

were firmly in control of the environment.
14 No. 22-3283 

But questioning by a parole officer presents a somewhat 

unique set of circumstances. For the average citizen, “’[a]ny 

interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will 

have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the 

police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may 

ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime.’” Patterson, 826 F.3d at 459 (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 

492, 495 (1977)). 

In the paradigmatic Miranda situation—a 

person is arrested in his home or on the street 

and whisked to a police station for 

questioning—detention represents a sharp and 

ominous change, and the shock may give rise to 

coercive pressures. A person who is “cut off 

from his normal life and companions,”

Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 106 (2010), and 

abruptly transported from the street into a 

“police-dominated atmosphere,” Miranda, 384 

U.S. at 456, may feel coerced into answering 

questions.

Howes, 565 U.S. at 511. But meetings with parole officers are 

inherently different. Parolees sign agreements giving fair 

warning that they will be subject to both scheduled and unscheduled visits. They likewise understand that their parole 

officers will ask questions about parole compliance, including 

whether the parolee has engaged in criminal conduct. See

Murphy, 465 U.S. at 432 (“[T]he nature of probation is such 

that probationers should expect to be questioned on a wide 

range of topics relating to their past criminality.”). “Many of 

the psychological ploys discussed in Miranda capitalize on the 

suspect’s unfamiliarity with the officers and the 
No. 22-3283 15

environment.” Murphy, id. at 433. Of course, a parole interview might become custodial for Miranda purposes (e.g.

United States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 409 (1st Cir. 1998)), but 

the factors that cause a court to presume compulsion in a custodial arrest do not necessarily exist during regular parole visits. Once again, the determination depends on the totality of 

the circumstances. 

In this case, Campbell encountered a regular, unannounced parole check with officers with whom Campbell was 

very familiar. Smith supervised Campbell from his 2015 release until early 2019 (excluding some period during which 

Campbell was in prison for an earlier parole violation). 

Campbell saw Smith every Friday at group meetings, and 

Smith had visited his home ten times before. Wheeler had 

only supervised Campbell for about four months, but they too 

met at weekly group meetings and Wheeler had visited 

Campbell at home three to five times previously. A parolee’s 

“regular meetings with his probation officer should have 

served to familiarize him with her and her office and to insulate him from psychological intimidation that might overbear 

his desire to claim the privilege.” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 433.

Those officers were wearing what Campbell was accustomed 

to seeing them wearing. Campbell was not handcuffed or 

physically restrained. See id. at 432. He was in the familiar environment of his home. See Howes, 565 U.S. at 511. The officers 

did not display firearms or threaten to use force, and no one 

told Campbell that he was under arrest or that he was not free 

to leave. See United States v. Leal, 1 F.4th 545, 552 (7th Cir. 

2021). The officers were courteous. See United States v. Ambrose, 668 F.3d 943, 958 (7th Cir. 2012). And although there 

were actually four officers at the house, two remained downstairs and there is no evidence that Campbell was aware of 
16 No. 22-3283 

their presence. Campbell had consented to these visits by 

signing his parole agreement, which significantly reduced 

any expectation of privacy. See United States v. Beechler, 68 

F.4th 358, 365 (7th Cir. 2023) (“When assessing the privacy expectations of a person subject to a correctional system, salient 

factors include ... whether the individual has agreed to waive 

some or all Fourth Amendment rights in exchange for more 

freedom within the correctional system.”). It was also common and expected that officers would question him about parole violations. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 432 . Nothing about the 

initial part of this visit was any different than any of the dozen 

or more parole visits which Campbell had experienced before. Campbell made the incriminating statements about the 

sex toys, computer, and pornography after only 15-20 

minutes of questioning, and before Wheeler handcuffed him.

Murphy and Cranley also control our analysis of the custodial nature of the interrogation. The Supreme Court held that 

Murphy was not in custody requiring Miranda warnings despite the fact that the probation officer compelled Murphy’s 

attendance and truthful answers, she sought incriminating 

evidence, Murphy was not expecting the types of questions 

the officer asked, and there were no observers to guard 

against abuse or trickery. Id. at 431–32. The court concluded 

that Murphy was in a familiar environment—the probation 

office—with familiar officers, he was not physically restrained, and could have left at any time. Id. at 432. 

Similarly, this court in Cranley, relying on Murphy, came to 

the same conclusion, although “[w]ith reluctance, given the 

coercive atmosphere and the pressure on Cranley to talk in 

order to avoid jeopardizing his probation.” Cranley, 350 F.3d 

at 619. This court concluded that Cranley met with the 
No. 22-3283 17

probation officer in a building otherwise unrelated to law enforcement, there were no usual indicia of police custody, and 

Cranley could have asked officers if he was free to leave. Id.

at 620. 

In any event, almost immediately after the officers’ arrival, 

Campbell confessed to having sex toys in his nightstand—a 

violation of parole which would have given the officers reasonable cause to look further for other violations, which, in 

turn, would have led to the discovery of the child pornography. After discovering the illegal photos on his phone, and 

the computer under the blanket, the officers eventually handcuffed Campbell. But even if Campbell was in custody when 

he gave officers further information, he was not in custody 

when he made his first admissions which would have inevitably and lawfully led to the rest.

Murphy and Cranley dictate that Campbell’s parole agreement did not threaten a penalty for exercise of his Fifth 

Amendment protections, and he was not in custody when he 

made the relevant incriminating statements. Because Campbell did not invoke his Fifth Amendment right, and it was not 

otherwise self-executing, the district court properly denied 

his motion to suppress the evidence, and its opinion is therefore AFFIRMED.