Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3 

# United Stat es Court of Appeals

For the First C ircuit

No. 04-1058 LINDA L. ELLISON, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v. DAVID BROCK, CHIEF JUSTICE, NEW HAMPSHIRE SUPREME COURT, Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE [Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge ]

Before Boudin, Chief Judge , Selya and Lynch, Circuit Judges .

Linda L. Ellison on brief pro se. Daniel J. Mullen , Associate Attorney General, on brief for appellee.

June 21, 20041 Under that doctrine, articulated by the United States Supreme

Court in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462 (1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413 (1923), federal district courts lack appellat e jurisdiction to review state-court decisions. -2-

Per Curiam . The pro se plaintiff in this case asked the district court to order the defendant Chief Justice of the New Hampshire Supreme Court to vacate orders declini ng pl aintiff's appeal to that court. As grounds for that relief, plaintiff allegedthat one of the other state Supreme Court justices (Justice Broderick) who participated in the decision to decline her appeal formerly represented the defendant University of New Hampshire in other matters. Plaintiff also asked the district court to award dam ages against the Chief Justice because he allegedly "allowe d " Justice Broderick to participate in the case.

The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 1 andby absolute judicial immunity. Having reviewed de novo the district court's allowance of defendant's motion to dismiss, "keeping in m ind th at a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim "'only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the alleg ati ons,'" Pena-Borrero v. Estremeda 365 F.3d 7, 11 (1 st Ci r. 2004) (citations omitted), we affirmthe dismissal on Rooker-Feldman grounds, withou t re aching the judicial immunity ground also relied on by the district court.-3- After judgment, plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the dismissal. As grounds for that motion, in addition to arguing that the court had erred in granting the motion to dismiss, plaintiff claimed, for the first time, that the district court judge, Judge McAuliffe, was disqualified from deciding the case. In support of that claim, plaintiff alleged th at Jud ge McAuliffe had served as a trustee of the University of New Hampshire at the time that the university decided to purchase the land that was the subject of plaintiff's state-court homestead claim. The district court denied that motion. We decline to vacate the district

cour t's ju dgment because any error in declining to recuse was harmless. Motion to Dismiss

As the district court stated, "[T]o the extent plaintiff seeks relief in the nature of a 'reversal' or 'vacation' of orders enteredin her state litigation by the New Hampshire Supreme Court, [the district court was] without jurisdiction to consider her claim." See Hill v. Town of Conway , 193 F.3d 33, 40 (1 st Cir. 1999) (finding Rooker-Feldman doctrine applicable where the relief sought "'would, if granted, effectively void the state court's judgment'" (citation omitted)). Here, the injunctive relief plaintiff sought fromthe district court–"to vaca te all orders in regard to [plaintiff's appeal] and issue new orders with only qualified justices participating in the decision,"–"would, if granted,-4-

effec tively void the state court's judgment." That relief i s therefore clearly barred by Rooker-Feldman .

For the same reasons, plaintiff's clai m for damages is also barred. The premise of plaintiff's damage claim is that the New Hampshire Supreme Co urt was incorrect in denying plaintiff's various motions for relief from judgme nt based on the alleged disqualification of Justice Broderick. Ther e fore, the district court "could not give the [plaintiff] the relief [she] seek[s] without in effect reviewing and reversing the [New Hampshire] court," Newman v. Indiana , 129 F.3d937, 942 (7 th Cir. 1997) , which Rooker-Feldman forbids. Id. ; see also Wilson v. Shumway , 264 F.3d 120, 121, 126 (1 st Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of damages claims under Rooker-Feldman ). Mot io n for Reconsideration Based on Judge McAuliffe's Alleged Disqualification

In support of her recusal request, plaintif f all eged that: (1) in 1993, as a trustee of the University of New Hampshire, Steven McAuliffe "spoke very much in fa vor" o f acquiring certain landknown as Leawood Orchards "and encouraged the other trustee[s] to do so," and (2) Leawood Orchards is the property that was the subject of plaintiff's state-court homestead claim. Some of these allegations are suppor ted] b y minutes of a Board of Trustees' meeting, which indicate that "Trustee McAu liffe asked for reconsiderat ion of the proposal for UNH to acquire the Leawoods Orchards property" and that Trustee M cAu liffe spoke in favor of-5-

acquiring the property. However, the record contains no evidence

as to, among other things, whether plaintiff had c laimed a homestead interest in that property at that time, whether Trustee McAuliffe was aware of any such interest when he spoke in favor of acquiring the property or at any time thereafter, or whether Judge McAuliffe was still a trustee at the time he presided over plaintiff's case.

We need not resolve this issue because, "[a]s in other

areas of the law, there is surely room for harmless error committed by busy judges who inadvertently overlook a disqualifying circumstance." Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp. , 486 U.S. 847, 862 (1987). "Although § 455 defines the circumstances that mandate dis qualification of federal judges, it neither prescribes nor prohibits any particular remedy for a violation of that duty." Id.

Here, even if we were to assume, without deciding, that Judge McAuliffe should have recu sed hi mself, we would not vacate the district court's judgment now. The purely legal questions that Judge McAuliffe decided here called for no exercise of discretion

on his part and are subject to plenary review by this Court. In re Sch. Asbestos Litig. , 977 F.2d 764, 787 (3 rd Cir. 1992) (characterizing failure to recuse as "harmless error when a court of appeals will later review a ruling on a plenary basis"). As-6-

discussedabove, our plenary review of Judge McAuliffe's denial of plaintiff's motion to dismiss revealed no error.

Un der these circumstances, vacating the judg ment an d remanding this case for reconsideration by another district court judge would be unfair to the defendant and unduly burden the district court without any benefit. For those reasons, we decline to vacate the district court judgement basedo n plaintiff's recusal claim.

The grant of plaintiff's motion to dismiss andthe denial of her motion for reconsideration are affirmed .