NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, 

v.

CAMERON LEEZELL TAYLOR, Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CR 16-0600 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2014-000910-001 

The Honorable Michael W. Kemp, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Michael O’Toole

Counsel for Appellee 

Bain & Lauritano, PLC, Glendale

By Sheri M. Lauritano

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 8-29-2017
STATE v. TAYLOR

Decision of the Court

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Cameron Leezell Taylor appeals his convictions and 

sentences for drive-by shooting, aggravated assault, assisting a criminal 

street gang, second-degree murder, and endangerment. For the following 

reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

¶2 Shortly before noon on March 23, 2009, J.M., Antwone C., 

Arkeem C., and Taylor were driving through a south Phoenix

neighborhood in J.M.’s Honda Accord. At some point, the men, all 

documented gang members, began following a Chevrolet Caprice occupied 

by two rival gang members, T.C. and E.M., and two women, S.M. and A.B. 

As J.M. drove, Taylor, the front-seat passenger, withdrew a handgun from 

his waistband. When the Accord pulled within two or three car lengths 

behind the Caprice, Taylor extended his arm outside the front-passenger 

window and began shooting. At the same time, backseat passenger Arkeem 

C. stood upright through the Honda’s sunroof and began firing a rifle at the 

Caprice. Initially, the handgun bullets ricocheted off the road, but Taylor 

quickly adjusted his aim upward and he and Arkeem C. shot at their rivals’

vehicle for approximately twenty seconds before the Caprice’s driver, A.B.,

maneuvered through traffic and sped away.

¶3 Notwithstanding A.B.’s evasive actions, a bullet hit E.M. in 

the back. Another bullet pierced the rear window of an unrelated vehicle, 

striking and killing G.L. A third bullet hit the tire of another unrelated 

vehicle, but that driver, N.M., was not injured. 

¶4 Following these events, Taylor was the target of an extensive,

multi-agency law enforcement investigation, but he eluded capture until 

November 21, 2013. Once he was apprehended, the State charged Taylor

 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

verdicts. State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 509, ¶ 93 (2013). 
STATE v. TAYLOR

Decision of the Court

3 

with one count of drive-by shooting (Count 1), four counts of aggravated 

assault (Count 2 – victim E.M.; Count 3 – victim T.C.; Count 4 – victim S.M.; 

and Count 5 – victim A.B); one count of assisting a criminal street gang 

(Count 6); one count of first-degree, premeditated murder (Count 7 – victim 

G.L.); and one count of endangerment (Count 8 – victim N.M.). The State 

also alleged numerous aggravating factors. 

¶5 Eight days into the first trial, the court granted Taylor’s 

motion for a mistrial. After the State’s presentation of evidence at the 

second trial, Taylor moved for a judgment of acquittal on Counts 3 and 4,

which the trial court granted. The jury then found Taylor not guilty of 

first-degree murder, guilty of the lesser-included offense of second-degree 

murder, and guilty of the remaining charges. The jury also found multiple 

aggravating factors for each count. The superior court sentenced Taylor to 

an aggravated term of 12 years’ imprisonment on Count 1, a concurrent, 

aggravated term of 3.5 years’ imprisonment on Count 6, a concurrent, 

aggravated term of 22 years’ imprisonment on Count 7, a consecutive (as to 

Counts 1, 6, and 7), aggravated term of 12 years’ imprisonment on Count 2, 

a consecutive (as to Count 2), aggravated term of 12 years’ imprisonment 

on Count 5, and a consecutive (as to Count 5), aggravated term of 3 years’ 

imprisonment on Count 8. Taylor timely appealed and we have jurisdiction 

pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 

13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).2

DISCUSSION

A. Alleged Double Jeopardy Bar to Second Trial. 

¶6 Taylor argues the trial court should have barred retrial 

pursuant to the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Arizona 

Constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend. V; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 10. 

¶7 Before his first trial, Taylor moved in limine to preclude any 

evidence that he fled or concealed his whereabouts after the shooting. The 

State opposed the motion, explaining the search for Taylor “became local 

and national news” and included multiple profiles on the television 

program America’s Most Wanted. At a hearing on the motion, defense 

counsel argued any evidence regarding the manhunt to find Taylor was 

inadmissible hearsay. In response, the prosecutor acknowledged the U.S. 

Marshal who led the manhunt was not available to testify, but argued a 

 

2 Absent material revision after the date of an alleged offense, we cite 

to the current version of applicable statutes and rules.
STATE v. TAYLOR

Decision of the Court

4 

local detective who assisted the U.S. Marshal should be permitted to testify 

regarding events he witnessed firsthand. After hearing from the parties, the 

trial court precluded as unfairly prejudicial any evidence regarding 

Taylor’s profiles on America’s Most Wanted. The court further held, 

however, other non-hearsay evidence regarding Taylor’s capture was 

admissible.

¶8 Notwithstanding the evidentiary ruling, during the first trial, 

the prosecutor asked a local police detective whether he “personally 

contact[ed] America’s Most Wanted regarding [Taylor].” The detective 

responded in the affirmative, and defense counsel objected and asked to 

approach the bench. During the ensuing bench conference, defense counsel 

argued the prosecutor violated the court’s pretrial order. The prosecutor 

denied violating the order, maintaining the court’s evidentiary ruling

precluded only evidence regarding the U.S. Marshal who led the manhunt. 

At that point, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. To allow the court 

reporter time to prepare a transcript of the motion in limine hearing, the trial 

court delayed ruling on the motion for mistrial. 

¶9 The following morning, after reviewing the transcripts of 

both the motion in limine hearing and the relevant testimony from the 

previous day, the trial court asked the prosecutor to explain why he asked 

“that question” in contravention of the court’s order. The prosecutor stated 

he erroneously believed the trial court’s evidentiary ruling excluded only 

hearsay evidence. Having just reviewed the motion in limine transcript, the 

prosecutor avowed he “never would have asked the question” had he 

realized the trial court’s ruling, with respect to America’s Most Wanted

evidence, was predicated on unfair prejudice rather than hearsay. After the 

prosecutor acknowledged that nothing could ameliorate the resulting 

prejudice, the court declared a mistrial. In doing so, the court found the 

prosecutor’s violation was negligent, not intentional. The matter then 

proceeded to a second trial.

¶10 Taylor argues the trial court’s remedy of mistrial was 

insufficient. Indeed, asserting the prosecutor intentionally “crafted” 

questions “to elicit the exact information” precluded by court order, Taylor 

contends the court should have “barred a retrial.” 

¶11 “Whether double jeopardy bars retrial is a question of law, 

which we review de novo.” State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 437, ¶ 18 (2004). 

Although a defendant “ordinarily waives” his “right to be free from 

multiple trials” when he “seeks a new trial because of error in the original 

trial,” there is no such waiver “when the need for a second trial is brought 
STATE v. TAYLOR

Decision of the Court

5 

about by the state’s egregiously intentional, improper conduct.” State v. 

Jorgenson, 198 Ariz. 390, 391, ¶ 6 (2000). Stated differently, when the 

prosecutor’s intentional misconduct is the reason the defendant seeks a new 

trial, “the State has intentionally exposed the defendant to multiple trials 

for the same crime,” the precise harm the Double Jeopardy Clauses were 

“intended to prevent.” Id. at 392, ¶ 6. Accordingly, jeopardy attaches when 

a mistrial is granted on a defendant’s motion if: (1) the motion is predicated 

on the prosecutor’s improper conduct; (2) “such conduct is not merely the 

result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, 

taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor 

knows to be improper and prejudicial”; and (3) the conduct causes 

prejudice that cannot be cured by means short of a mistrial. Pool v. Superior 

Court (State), 139 Ariz. 98, 108–09 (1984). 

¶12 In this case, the prosecutor admitted he violated the trial 

court’s evidentiary ruling and acknowledged it was impossible to “unring 

[the] bell.” Therefore, the only question remaining is whether the 

prosecutor’s conduct was intentional. We review a trial court’s finding 

regarding a prosecutor’s intent for clear error. See State v. Lamar, 205 Ariz. 

431, 440, ¶ 45 (2003) (the trial court’s finding that the prosecutor did not 

engage in intentional misconduct was not “clearly erroneous”); see also State 

v. Cuffle, 171 Ariz. 49, 51 (1992) (“Appellate review of a trial court’s findings 

of fact is limited to a determination whether those findings are clearly 

erroneous.”); State v. Korovkin, 202 Ariz. 493, 495, ¶ 8 (App. 2002) (“We defer 

to the trial court’s finding that the prosecutor’s comment here, if improper, 

was not intentionally so.”). 

¶13 On this record, we cannot say the trial court’s finding that the 

prosecutor negligently, rather than intentionally, violated the evidentiary 

order was clearly erroneous. The prosecutor avowed that he 

misunderstood the legal basis for the trail court’s ruling, and thereby 

mistakenly believed he was foreclosed only from introducing hearsay 

evidence regarding the U.S. Marshal’s investigation. Although the 

evidentiary ruling was clearly broader in scope, and precluded any 

reference to Taylor’s profiles on America’s Most Wanted, the trial court had 

the opportunity to assess the prosecutor’s credibility firsthand, and nothing 

in the record suggests that the prosecutor was less than forthcoming when 

he explained he had simply misunderstood the nature of the evidentiary 

ruling. See State v. Garcia, 224 Ariz. 1, 10, ¶ 22 (2010) (a reviewing court 

defers to the trial court’s assessment of a prosecutor’s credibility). 

Accordingly, jeopardy did not attach when the trial court granted the 

mistrial, and Taylor’s double jeopardy rights were not violated by a second 

trial. 
STATE v. TAYLOR

Decision of the Court

6 

B. Alleged Jury Panel Taint. 

¶14 Taylor contends the trial court should have stricken the entire 

jury panel after a prospective juror intimated that he knew either defense 

counsel or Taylor through his ministry outreach program at a local jail.

¶15 While conducting voir dire on the first day of the second trial, 

the court introduced Taylor and defense counsel to the venire panel and 

inquired whether any prospective jurors knew either man. In response, two

jurors raised their hands. The first juror (“Juror No. 18”) explained defense 

counsel had previously represented him in a criminal matter, and the men 

had subsequently become friends. At that point, the court explained the 

jury would be required to assess Taylor’s culpability solely based on the 

evidence presented in court, and Juror No. 18 stated he could follow that 

instruction. Turning to the second juror (“Juror No. 54”), the court asked, 

“[W]ho do you know?” Without directly answering the question posed, 

Juror No. 54 stated, “I’m a lay minister. I’ve just come off a ministry in 

Sheriff Joe’s 4th Avenue Jail where I was privileged to preach the gospel.” 

Without asking any follow-up questions, the court stated that the parties 

would speak with Juror No. 54 privately.

¶16 Later, after excusing the other prospective jurors from the 

courtroom, the court and parties met privately with Juror No. 54. When 

asked whether he knew Taylor, Juror No. 54 stated, “I don’t recognize him.” 

The court then excused Juror No. 54 from the courtroom and expressed 

concern that the other prospective jurors may nonetheless believe Juror No. 

54 recognized Taylor from his jail ministry. Defense counsel discounted any 

possible prejudice, and suggested Juror No. 54 may have recognized him 

rather than Taylor. But Taylor, through counsel, expressed a residual 

concern that Juror No. 54’s remarks may have improperly influenced the 

other jurors. Given this concern, defense counsel suggested the court excuse 

Juror No. 54 as a precautionary measure. Noting the prosecutor did not 

object, the trial court struck Juror No. 54 accordingly. 

¶17 Although Taylor claims he urged the trial court to strike the 

entire jury panel, the record reflects that he moved to strike only Juror No. 

54. We therefore review his challenge to the impartiality of the entire panel

only for fundamental, prejudicial error. State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 

567, ¶ 20 (2005); see also State v. Garza, 216 Ariz. 56, 63, ¶ 20 (2007) (reviewing 

a defendant’s challenges to the voir dire process, raised for the first time on 

appeal, for fundamental error). 
STATE v. TAYLOR

Decision of the Court

7 

¶18 A defendant has a constitutional right to a fair and impartial 

jury, but he is not entitled to a “particular jury.” State v. Greenawalt, 128 Ariz. 

150, 167 (1981). As the party challenging the impartiality of a jury panel, a 

defendant bears the burden of showing that a juror’s voir dire statements

prejudiced empaneled jurors. See State v. Doerr, 193 Ariz. 56, 61, ¶ 18 (1998). 

To meet this burden, the defendant must present “objective indications of 

jurors’ prejudice.” State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 526, 535 (1981). In reviewing such 

a claim, an appellate court does not presume prejudice because the trial 

court is in the “best position” to assess a remark’s “impact on the jurors.” 

Doerr, 193 Ariz. at 62, ¶ 23. 

¶19 Applying these principles here, Taylor has failed to 

demonstrate that he was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury. He 

does not identify anything in the record that suggests an empaneled juror

was prejudiced by Juror No. 54’s ambiguous, isolated, and fleeting remark. 

Relying primarily on Mach v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 630, 632–33 (9th Cir. 1997), 

Taylor speculates that Juror No. 54’s comments may have improperly 

influenced one or more jurors. However, speculation is insufficient to 

demonstrate prejudice for purposes of fundamental error review. See State 

v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 13–14 (1997). Moreover, unlike the circumstances in 

Mach, in which a juror had repeatedly made “expert-like” statements 

regarding “material issues” related to “the defendant’s guilt and the 

victim’s truthfulness,” Doerr, 193 Ariz. at 62, ¶ 19 (quoting Mach, 137 F.3d 

at 633), here, Juror No. 54 did not state he recognized Taylor from jail, much 

less profess expert knowledge or comment on Taylor’s guilt or innocence. 

Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jurors to evaluate Taylor’s 

culpability solely based on the evidence presented at trial and not speculate 

or “guess about any fact.” We presume jurors follow the trial court’s 

instructions, and Taylor has not provided any evidence to rebut this 

presumption. See State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 403, ¶ 68 (2006). Therefore, 

Taylor has failed to present the requisite objective evidence of juror

prejudice, and the trial court did not err, much less commit fundamental 

error, by failing to sua sponte strike the entire jury panel.3

 

3 In his reply brief, Taylor argues for the first time that the empaneled 

jurors may have also been improperly influenced by Juror No. 43’s voir dire

remarks. Because arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are 

waived, we do not address this claim. State v. Brown, 233 Ariz. 153, 163, ¶ 28 

(App. 2013). 
STATE v. TAYLOR

Decision of the Court

8 

C. Inclusion of Lesser-Included Offense Instruction. 

¶20 Taylor contends the trial court improperly instructed the jury, 

over objection, on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. He 

asserts no evidence supported the instruction. 

¶21 During the settling of final jury instructions, the prosecutor 

requested lesser-included offense instructions for second-degree murder 

and manslaughter explaining, “the facts in this case suggest that the 

shooting . . . could have happened all of a sudden.” Defense counsel 

objected to either lesser-included offense instruction, arguing the projectile 

evidence showed Arkeem C., not Taylor, caused G.L.’s death. Overruling 

the objection, the trial court found evidence supported both instructions, 

and explained the jury could reasonably find Taylor “was the shooter” but

“did not premeditate,” or that he acted sufficiently reckless to satisfy the 

mens rea component of either lesser-included offense. 

¶22 We review a trial court’s decision “to give a particular 

instruction” for an abuse of discretion. State v. Sprang, 227 Ariz. 10, 12, ¶ 5 

(App. 2011). A trial court may instruct the jury on any lesser-included 

offense that is supported by the evidence. State v. Gipson, 229 Ariz. 484, 487, 

¶ 17 (2012). A lesser-included offense instruction is warranted when a

reasonable jury could find: (1) the State failed to prove an element of the 

greater offense, and (2) the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction on 

the lesser offense. State v. Wall, 212 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 18 (2006). 

¶23 To convict Taylor of second-degree murder in this case, the 

State was required to prove that, acting without premeditation: (1) Taylor

intentionally or knowingly caused G.L.’s death, or (2) under circumstances 

manifesting extreme indifference to human life, he recklessly engaged in 

conduct that created a grave risk of death and thereby caused G.L.’s death. 

See A.R.S. § 13-1104. Taylor does not dispute that the jury could reasonably 

find the State failed to prove premeditation, the distinguishing element 

between first-degree and second-degree murder. See Sprang, 227 Ariz. at 12, 

¶ 6 (“Second-degree murder is a lesser-included offense of premediated 

first-degree murder, the difference between the two being premeditation.”). 

Instead, he argues no reasonable jury could find he caused the victim’s 

death or acted recklessly, and therefore no evidence supported an 

instruction on second-degree murder. 

¶24 While it is true that a detective testified G.L. was shot in the 

head by a “rifle round,” and J.M. testified Arkeem C., not Taylor, fired a 

rifle on the day in question, the detective explained that his testimony was 
STATE v. TAYLOR

Decision of the Court

9 

based on the autopsy and lab reports, not a firsthand analysis. Contrary to 

this detective’s testimony, the medical examiner who conducted the

autopsy of G.L. testified the projectile recovered from the body was too 

“fragmented” to determine the caliber of the firing weapon. Likewise, 

another detective, who processed the fragmented projectiles retrieved from 

G.L.’s vehicle, testified he was unable to discern the weapon used.

Therefore, as noted by the State, the evidence did not rule out the possibility 

that Taylor fired the fatal shot. 

¶25 More importantly, the evidence reflects that Taylor and 

Arkeem C. acted in concert to shoot at the Caprice. Immediately before the

shooting commenced, J.M. heard one of the men say, “Are you ready?” 

Because their conduct was coordinated, and the trial court provided an

accomplice liability instruction, the jurors could reasonably find Taylor was 

culpable for Arkeem C.’s actions during the drive-by shooting. See A.R.S. 

§ 13-301 (defining “accomplice” as a person, acting “with the intent to 

promote or facilitate the commission of an offense,” who solicits, 

commands, aids, or counsels another person to commit an offense). In other 

words, under a theory of accomplice liability, Taylor “caused” G.L.’s death 

even if Arkeem C. fired the fatal shot. See State v. Baldenegro, 188 Ariz. 10, 13 

(App. 1996) (jurors can find the defendant “guilty as an accomplice” even 

if they “believed that [the defendant] drove the car and [a passenger] fired 

the shots”). 

¶26 Moreover, contrary to Taylor’s additional claims, substantial 

evidence supports a finding that either he or Arkeem C. fired the fatal 

bullet. Without equivocation, J.M. testified that: (1) Taylor directed him to 

follow the Caprice, withdrew a handgun, leaned out the passenger 

window, and repeatedly shot at the Caprice, and (2) Arkeem C. stood 

upright through the sunroof and repeatedly fired a rifle at the Caprice. 

Given this testimony and the uncontroverted evidence that G.L. sustained 

his fatal head injury during the brief period that Arkeem C. and Taylor fired 

their weapons, a reasonable jury could find that either Arkeem C. or Taylor 

fired the fatal shot, and that both men were culpable. 

¶27 With respect to the mens rea element, Taylor’s challenge is 

likewise without merit. The location of the shooting was a “busy,” 

high-traffic area. Shooting into a crowd, or in this case numerous occupied 

vehicles, is quintessential recklessness. State v. Garnica, 209 Ariz. 96, 102, 

¶ 24 (App. 2004) (the discharge of a weapon into a group was, “at the least, 

reckless”). Although the record reflects that Taylor targeted only the 

occupants of the Caprice, his reckless conduct endangered the lives of every 
STATE v. TAYLOR

Decision of the Court

10 

person in the vicinity, and took G.L.’s life. Therefore, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion by giving the second-degree murder instruction.

CONCLUSION

¶28 We affirm Taylor’s convictions and sentences.