alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Orme, agent, *v.*Burney.

There being ample evidence to show that during the progress of the trial before the arbitrators one of them was guilty of conduct manifesting that he was not impartial, but was on the contrary a partisan of one of the parties and prejudiced in his favor, the jury were warranted in setting aside the award; and the sole issue being whether or not the arbitrator whose conduct was excepted to was fair and impartial, it was not material or necessary to have before the jury the evidence introduced before the arbitrators. There was no error in denying a new trial.

February 27,1895.

Exceptions to award. Before Judge Griggs. Bibb superior court. November term, 1893.

L. D. Moore, by brief, for plaintiff' in error.

J. L. Anderson and Harris & Harris, *contra.*

Lumpkin, Justice.

This case can be disposed of upon one controlling question, without noticing specially the various points raised by the motion for a new trial.

The evidence shows unquestionably that one of the arbitrators was not impartial. His conduct throughout the entire investigation shows that he was a partisan of one of the parties and prejudiced in his favor. This, without more, was sufficient to render the award illegal and of no binding effect against the party against whom *419it was rendered. We quite agree with Chief Justice Bleckley in saying: “It is a misconception of the relation of arbitrators to consider one of them as being the arbitrator of one party, and the other the arbitrator of the other party. Courts have often held that a feeling of partisanship among arbitrators is incompatible with the impartial state of mind in which they ought to enter upon and discharge their duties. *Wilkins et al.*v. *Van Winkle & Co.,*78 *Ga.*568.

It was not necessary to have before the jury the evidence introduced before the arbitrators. The case of *Akridge et al.*v. *Patillo,*44 *Ga.*585, is not in conflict with the assertion just made. There it was held that all the exceptions to the award were, in effect, merely objections to it as being contrary to the evidence or the weight of the evidence; and this being so, it was, of course, necessary that the testimony submitted to the arbitrators should be before the court in order to enable it to pass intelligently upon the objections made. In *Jackson*v. *Roane,*90 *Ga.*669, it was held that where improper conduct on the part of the arbitrators was shown, it was not incumbent upon the complaining party to show that such conduct actually operated to his injury.

The verdict to set aside the award was right, and there was no error in denying a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                          20,830
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    3,996
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,448
<INVENTORY>                                      1,484
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                39,826
<PP&E>                                          46,372
<DEPRECIATION>                                  39,269
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  39,826
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           26,031
<BONDS>                                         45,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            20
<OTHER-SE>                                    (67,038)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  (67,018)
<SALES>                                          4,223
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 8,849
<CGS>                                            3,337
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   12,229
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                25,710
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,814
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (31,575)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (31,575)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (31,575)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (1.65)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.65)


</TABLE>
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-12-00159-CR

Daniel Glenn Ostrander

v.

The State of Texas

§

§

§

§

§

From Criminal District Court No. 2

of Tarrant County (1250966R)

June 20, 2013

Opinion by Justice Gabriel

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that 

there was error in the trial court’s judgment. The judgment is modified to reflect 

that Ostrander pleaded not true to the habitual-offender notice. It is ordered that 

the judgment of the trial court is affirmed as modified.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

By _________________________________

 Justice Lee Gabriel
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 21, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-31176

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

TROY WATTS, also known as T-Dove,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 97-CR-145-16-L

--------------------

Before JOLLY, JONES, and WIENER, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Troy Watts appeals his 48-month sentence following the

revocation of his supervised release term relating to Watts’s

1997 guilty-plea conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. 

Citing United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 164-65 (5th Cir.

2000), and for the first time on appeal, Watts contends that his

revocation sentence was unlawfully imposed. Specifically, Watts

asserts that, because his superseding indictment failed to allege

a specific drug quantity, his underlying drug conspiracy
No. 03-31176

-2-

conviction carried a 20-year maximum sentence pursuant to 21

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), thereby rendering it a Class C felony

under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(3). Watts maintains that his

revocation sentence could not exceed two years pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Watts secondarily argues that, assuming his

case is remanded for resentencing, any additionally imposed

supervised release term would result in an ex post facto

violation. 

Watts neither directly appealed from, nor sought collateral

review of, his underlying conviction and sentence. He may not do

so on appeal from the revocation of supervised release. See

United States v. Moody, 277 F.3d 719, 720-21 (5th Cir. 2001). 

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Form 10-K/A of Microtune, Inc. (the Company) for the year ended December 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Jeffrey A. Kupp, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                                                                      
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ JEFFREY A. KUPP                                                                                   
|Jeffrey A. Kupp Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer)

Date: January 22, 2007
Output is the amount of goods or 

services created or produced, such as the 

number of shirts made or number of meals 

served. The change in the number of shirts 

made one year compared with the number 

made the previous year is called the 

growth in output. 

The value of output is measured as 

the revenue or income a producer receives 

from selling their goods or services. This 

revenue approach lets us combine different 

goods and services—such cars and car 

repairs—into a single measure. 

BLS tracks the growth in output over 

time to determine how effectively 

businesses are using inputs. If the growth in 

output is greater than the growth in inputs, 

then productivity increases. 

Calculate the output!

Beth owns and runs her own business making birdhouses she sells for $22 each. At the 

end of the year, her total sales were $20,020. How many birdhouses did she sell? 

Number of birdhouses =

$ଶ଴,଴ଶ଴ ୲୭୲ୟ୪ ୠ୧୰ୢ୦୭୳ୱୣ ୱୟ୪ୣୱ

$ଶଶ ୮ୣ୰ ୦୭୳ୱୣ = 910 birdhouses

BLS takes total revenue reported by businesses with available 

price data to calculate output. It’s important to use the latest 

data as prices change over time. 

 

Glossary

Output — the amount of 

goods or services made. Productivity — measure of 

how efficiently inputs are 

converted into output.

Prices — the dollar amount at 

which goods or services are 

purchased. 

 In the news 

Many news articles cover 

issues with supply and 

demand of goods or services. 

Those stories provide insight 

into why output data are 

changing.
S07Y1224.

#### IN THE MATTER OF RICHARD O. SMITH.

(652 SE2d 545)

Decided October 29, 2007.

*William P. Smith III, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittelman, Assistant General Counsel State Bar,*for State Bar of Georgia.

Per curiam.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court pursuant to Respondent Richard 0. Smith’s petition for voluntary surrender of license in which Smith admits that on March 21, 2007, he entered a guilty plea in the Superior Court of Harris County to five counts of felony child molestation (Criminal Action No. 06-CR-248), and that by virtue of this conviction he has violated Rule 8.4 (a) (2) of Bar Rule 4-102 (d), the maximum penalty for which is disbarment. Smith requests that he be allowed to voluntarily surrender his license to practice law and asserts that he understands that a voluntary surrender is tantamount to disbarment. The State Bar responded to Smith’s petition recommending that the Court accept it.

We have reviewed the record and agree to accept Smith’s voluntary surrender of his license. Accordingly, the name of Richard O. Smith hereby is removed from the rolls of persons entitled to practice law in the State of Georgia. Smith is reminded of his duties under Bar Rule 4-219 (c).

*Voluntary surrender of license accepted.*

*All the Justices concur.*
AMENDMENT 1 TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT


 


THIS
FIRST AMENDMENT to Employment Agreement (this “Amendment”) is entered into as of February
28, 2013, by and between ADVANCED PHOTONIX, INC., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), and
JEFFREY ANDERSON (“Employee”).


 


Recitals


 


A.Company and Employee are parties
to that certain Employment Agreement dated as of August 19, 2011 (the “Employment Agreement”).


 


B.Company has requested that
Employee amend the Employment Agreement and Employee has consented to the Amendment in accordance with the terms and subject to
the conditions set forth herein.


 


Agreement


 


Now,
Therefore, in consideration of the foregoing recitals and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy
of which is hereby acknowledged, and intending to be legally bound, the parties hereto agree as follows:


 


1.                  
Definitions.
Capitalized terms used but not defined in this Amendment shall have the meanings given to them in the Employment Agreement.


 


2.                  
Amendments to Employment Agreement. Section
3.1 of the Employment Agreement is amended and restated in its entirety to read as follows: 


 


“3.1.Base Salary.
In consideration of the services to be performed by Employee during the Employment Period, the Company agrees to pay Employee a
base salary (“Base Salary”) at the rate of $200,000 per year payable in accordance with the Company’s
customary payroll practices as in effect from time to time. Base Salary will be reviewed no less frequently than annually, and
may be increased (but not decreased) in the sole discretion of the independent directors of the Board or the Compensation Committee
of the Board (the “Committee”). Notwithstanding the preceding, from the period commencing March 1, 2013 and
ending July 31, 2013, the Base Salary payable pursuant to this Section 3.1 shall be reduced by twenty percent (20%).”


 


3.                  
Limitation of Amendment.
Except as expressly provided herein, the terms, covenants and conditions of the Employment Agreement shall remain unamended and
shall continue to be and shall remain in full force and effect in accordance with their respective terms. The terms set forth herein
shall be limited precisely as provided for herein to the provisions expressly referred to herein and shall not be deemed an amendment
or modification of or consent to any other term or provision of the Employment Agreement, or otherwise prejudice any right or remedy
which either party may now have or may have in the future under or in connection with the Employment Agreement.


 


4.                  
Counterparts.
This Amendment may be executed in any number of counterparts and all of such counterparts taken together shall be deemed to constitute
one and the same instrument.


 


In
Witness Whereof, the parties hereto have caused this Amendment to be duly executed and delivered as of the date first
written above.


 


 





	COMPANY	 	 	EMPLOYEE
	 	 	 	 
	ADVANCED PHOTONIX, INC.	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 
	By:
    /s/ Richard Kurtz	 	 	/s/
    Jeffrey Anderson
	Name: Richard Kurtz	 	 	Jeffrey Anderson
	Title: Chief Executive
    Officer
*This matter is being decided by a quorum. 28 U.S.C. §

46(d).

 

** Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 98-40375

Conference Calendar

__________________

JOE HENRY MACK,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

GARY MOHR, Building Major, DAVID

DOUGHTY; HARRIS, Officer; NEWCOST,

Officer, BENNETT, Officer, MACK, 

Officer,

 Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. G-95-CV-393

- - - - - - - - - -

February 9, 1999

Before BARKSDALE and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.*

PER CURIAM:**

 Joe Henry Mack, Texas prisoner # 671331, appeals the

district court's dismissal of his civil rights suit as frivolous. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). He argues that the dismissal of

his suit under § 1915(e)(2)(b)(i) was premature, that he suffered

from denial of library access in violation of the Eighth 
No. 98-40375

-2-

Amendment, and that the Defendants were deliberately indifference

to his serious medical needs in delivering medical care and in

making job assignments. The district court did not abuse its

discretion in dismissing Mack's suit as frivolous. Mack’s appeal

is without arguable merit and is therefore frivolous. See Howard

v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983). It is DISMISSED. 

See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

APPEAL DISMISSED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                         853,279
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                2,828,709
<ALLOWANCES>                                 (249,970)
<INVENTORY>                                  3,794,079
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             8,754,375
<PP&E>                                       1,743,857
<DEPRECIATION>                               (836,991)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              13,037,638
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        4,052,572
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       248,992
<OTHER-SE>                                   8,434,964
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                13,037,638
<SALES>                                      3,614,271
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             3,614,271
<CGS>                                        2,329,632
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,850,643
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              (10,400)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              19,766
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,575,370)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     4,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,579,370)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,579,370)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.06)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.06)


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 10.3 - Schedule of Director Compensation


 


Compensation of Directors. Each director
of the Corporation is also a director of First Financial Bank (“FFB”), the lead subsidiary bank of the Corporation,
and receives directors’ fees from each organization. For 2013 a director of the Corporation and FFB will receive a fee of
$750 for each board meeting attended.


 


Non-employee directors also receive a fee
for meetings attended of the Audit Committee of $1,000, the Compensation Committee of $1,000, the Governance/Nominating Committee
of $500, and the Loan Discount Committee of $300. Each director also will receive from a quarterly director’s fee of $11,250.
No non-employee director served as a director of any other subsidiary of the Corporation.


 


Directors of the Corporation and FFB who
are not yet 70 years of age may participate in a deferred director’s fee program at each institution. Under this program,
a director may defer $6,000 of his or her director’s fees each year over a five-year period. When the director reaches the
age of 65 or age 70, the director may elect to receive payments over a ten-year period. The amount of the deferred fees is used
to purchase an insurance product which funds these payments. Each year from the initial date of deferral until payments begin
at age 65 or 70, the Corporation accrues a non-cash expense which will equal in the aggregate the amount of the payments to be
made to the director over the ten-year period. The Corporation expects that the cash surrender value of the insurance policy will
offset the amount of expenses accrued. If a director fails for any reason other than death to serve as a director during the entire
five-year period, or the director fails to attend at least 60 regular or special meetings, the amount to be received at age 65
or 70, as applicable, will be pro-rated appropriately.


 


Directors also may receive compensation previously
accrued under the Corporation’s 2005 Long-Term Incentive Plan, no other benefits may be accrued under this plan. Under this
plan, directors received 90, 100 or 110 percent of the director’s “award amount” if the Corporation and FFB
attained certain goals established by the Corporation’s Compensation Committee. See Exhibit 10.3 to this Form 10-K for a
description of this plan.
# Male Fatalities, 2017

Males - continued		

Males		

Males - continued		

Males		

Page &P
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Exhibit 10.20



 Exhibit 10.20 
 AMENDMENT NO. 1 
 TO 

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
 THIS AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (“Amendment No. 1”) dated as of December 20, 2012 is made between ASSET ACCEPTANCE LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (the
“Company”), a wholly owned subsidiary of Asset Acceptance Capital Corp., a Delaware corporation (“AACC”) and Rion B. Needs (the “Executive”). 
 Recitals 
 1. Prior to the date hereof, the parties hereto entered
into that certain Employment Agreement, effective as of January 1, 2009 (the “Employment Agreement”). Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the respective meanings set forth in the Employment Agreement. 

2. The Internal Revenue Service has issued guidance under Internal Revenue Code Section 409A that requires AACC and the Executive to
amend the release provision in the Employment Agreement. 
 3. Pursuant to Section 13 of the Employment Agreement, the
Executive and AACC agree to modify the Employment Agreement as set forth below. 
 Agreement 

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and subject to the terms and conditions contained herein and for other consideration
provided herein, the parties agree as follows: 
 8. SEVERANCE BENEFITS. The third sentence in Section 8(a) is hereby
amended and restated to read as follows: 
 As a condition of receiving the Severance Benefits, Executive agrees
to sign an effective legal release (in any form the Board of Directors may require), waiving any and all claims Executive has or may have against the Company, AACC and their agents, employees, directors, subsidiaries, attorneys, successors, assigns,
and affiliates, as of the date of Executive’s termination (the “Release”), including a statutory period during which Executive is entitled to revoke the Release, and Severance Benefits hereunder shall commence to be paid or made, as
applicable, within 60 days following Executive’s termination of employment; provided, however, that the revocation period has first expired and provided further, that if such 60-day revocation period begins in one taxable year of the Executive
and ends in the second calendar year, the payments and benefits shall commence to be paid or made in the second taxable year. 







 The undersigned parties do hereby execute this Amendment No.1 on December 20, 2012.
Effective as of January 1, 2009. 
  

			
	ASSET ACCEPTANCE CAPITAL CORP.
		
	By:	 	 /s/ E.L. Herbert

	Its:	 	 VP – General Counsel and Secretary

	
	 /s/ Rion B. Needs

	Rion B. Needs, Executive



  
 2