United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 94-3407.

Sylvia HILL, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Wayland Clifton, individually and as the Chief of Police and agent

for the city of Gainesville, City of Gainesville, Defendants,

Gainesville, City of, a municipal corporation of the State of

Florida, Defendant-Appellee.

Feb. 14, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Florida. (No. 91-10118-MMP), Maurice Mitchell Paul,

Chief Judge.

Before ANDERSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges, and FAY, Senior Circuit

Judge.

FAY, Senior Circuit Judge:

Sylvia Hill, a Police Officer, brought suit against the City

of Gainesville, alleging gender discrimination, equal protection

violations, and retaliation for the exercise of her First Amendment

rights. The District Court granted summary judgment to the City on

all counts. Because the Police Chief was not the final

policymaking authority, and because there is no evidence that the

City Manager approved of any illegal or improper motive the Police

Chief may have had, we affirm the District Court's decision.

I. BACKGROUND

Sylvia Hill became the first female Master Sergeant at the

Gainesville Police Department in 1986, the first female Lieutenant

in 1987, the first female Executive Lieutenant in 1988, and the

first female in Internal Affairs in 1990. She applied for a

promotion to Captain when positions opened up in 1987 and again in
1988, but each time she was passed over. In 1990, an experienced

male homicide detective was promoted to Acting Captain and

appointed to an inter-agency task force investigating the serial

murders known as the Gainesville Student Homicides. Hill filed an

employee grievance alleging gender discrimination, even though she

conceded that she had no homicide experience and was not qualified

to lead the task force. This grievance was denied by the City

Manager, Paul White.

In early 1991, Hill joined in initiating an internal affairs

investigation of the Police Chief, Wayland Clifton, Jr., regarding

his possible involvement in alleged misconduct by a group of police

officers and employees calling themselves "Hallucinations 2000".

City Manager White ordered an independent investigation by Lt. Roy

Dickey of the Tallahassee Police Department. His investigation

revealed that: 1) Clifton was not aware of the existence of the

group, 2) the group was innocuous and well-intentioned, and 3) it

had no effect on promotions.

Meanwhile, Hill had been transferred from Internal Affairs to

Patrol division, with no loss of rank, pay, or benefits. The City

alleges that Lt. Sherry Scott, after assuming command of Internal

Affairs, discovered that several investigations had not been

completed and that other files were in disarray. Clifton, in

consultation with City Manager White, ordered a performance audit

of Internal Affairs. According to the City, this audit uncovered

serious flaws: investigative files were missing, some cases were

never completed, some investigations were untimely or unauthorized,

certain findings were inconsistent with the evidence, and in some
 1

The grand jury subsequently rejected all of Hill's

accusations against Clifton. 

cases Clifton's direct orders had been ignored.

By early June, both the audit and Lt. Dickey's investigation

into Hallucinations 2000 were complete. Hill alleges that at this

point Clifton was willing to transfer her to a more desirable

position within the police department, so long as she agreed not to

testify before a grand jury investigating Clifton and

Hallucinations 2000. In any event, in July, Hill and the two other

transferred Internal Affairs officers testified before the grand

jury.1 Soon after, in August of 1991, Clifton brought employee

misconduct charges against Hill. Hill claims these charges were in

retaliation for her gender discrimination claim and her testimony

before the grand jury. After investigation, almost all of those

charges were sustained, including numerous incidents of willful

neglect of duty, numerous incidents of incompetence, and one

incident of insubordination. Clifton demoted Hill and placed her

on probation. She appealed her demotion through the City's

administrative grievance procedures, but the City Manager

ultimately denied her relief.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, and

affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548,

2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The evidence must be viewed in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party. Augusta Iron and
 2

The District Court held that the City Commission, not the

City Manager, had final policymaking authority in Gainesville. 

For the purposes of this opinion, we assume without deciding that

the City Manager has ultimate authority. 

Steel Works, Inc. v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, 835 F.2d 855,

856 (11th Cir.1988).

III. ANALYSIS

 Municipalities may be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if an

official policy or custom of the municipality violates

constitutional requirements. Monell v. New York City Department of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037-38, 56

L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Only those officials who have final

policymaking authority may render the municipality liable under §

1983. Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89

L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). Hill concedes that Clifton was not the final

policymaking authority in regard to the actions taken against Hill.

Thus the actions of Clifton cannot impose liability on the city.

 Hill argues that White, the City Manager, was the final

policymaker2

 as to such personnel matters and that White ratified

the actions of Clifton. A city may be held responsible where the

authorized policymakers "approve a subordinate's decision and the

basis for it." City of St. Louis v. Prapotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127,

108 S.Ct. 915, 926, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (emphasis added). Even

though White approved of Clifton's actions, and even assuming that

Clifton's actions were illegal because they were based on improper

motives, the city would not be liable because Hill has simply

presented no evidence that White approved of the basis for

Clifton's actions: the improper motives.
IV. CONCLUSION

Because Clifton, the police chief, was not the final

policymaking authority, and because there is no evidence that

White, the City Manager, approved of any illegal or improper motive

Clifton may have had, we AFFIRM the District Court's decision.