IN THE COURT OFAPPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

HUGH F. BANGASSER, an individual; 

### ) No. 78595-8-I and ELIZABETH B. HALL, an individual,) (Consolidated with No. 78670-9-I)

Respondents, 

### ) DIVISION ONE
v. 

### ) THOMAS F. BANGASSER, an 

### ) individual; BANGASSER & 

### ) ASSOCIATES, INC., a Washington 

### ) corporation, 

### ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellants, and VISION VASHON, ostensibly a 

### ) Washington non-profit corporation, 

### )

Defendant. 

### ) FILED: October 14, 2019 SCHINDLER, J.

—The Uniform Limited Partnership Act, chapter25.10 RCW, gives the superior courtthe discretion to issue a lien againstthe transferable interest ofthe judgment debtor in a limited partnership. Siblings Thomas Bangasser, Elizabeth Hall, and Hugh Bangasserare limited partners ofthe MidTown Limited Partnership.1 In these consolidated appeals, Thomas challenges the charging and disbursement orders

1 We referto siblings Elizabeth Hall, Hugh Bangasser, and Thomas Bangasser by theirfirst names forclarity and mean no disrespect by doing so.No. 78595-8-I (Consol. with No. 78670-9-1)/2

entered against his interest in the limited partnership to payjudgment creditors Elizabeth and Hugh the award for attorney fees incurred postjudgment. We affirm. This is the third appeal in this case. The facts are setforth in Hall v. Bangasser, No. 76077-7-I (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2018), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/ 760777.pdf, and Banqasserv. Banqasser, No. 77398-4-I (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2019), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pcif/773984.pdf, and will be repeated only as necessary. MidTown Limited Partnership MidTown is a Washington limited partnership. The primary asset ofthe partnership is several parcels ofcommercial real estate in Seattle. The limited partners
are siblings or entities owned by siblings. Thomas Bangasserwas the general partner of MidTown until 2015. Loans to Thomas Bangasser In October2003, Elizabeth Hall loaned her brotherThomas $75,000. Thomas signed a promissory note as the secretary/treasurerofVision Vashon, a now-defunct nonprofit corporation. Thomas guaranteed payment ofthe promissory note personally and as the president of Bangasser &Associates Inc. The promissory note provides that payment on the note with interest is due October2004. In October2003, Hugh Bangasser loaned Thomas $70,000. Thomas signed a promissory note on behalf ofVision Vashon. Thomas guaranteed payment ofthe promissory note personally and as the president of his company Bangasser & Associates. The promissory note provides that payment on the note with interest is due October 2004.

2No. 78595-8-I (Consol. with No. 78670-9-1)/3

Thomas never made any payments on the principal or interest due on the promissory notes to either Elizabeth or Hugh. Both ofthe promissory notes include a provision forthe award of reasonable attorneyfees and costs in a lawsuitto enforce the notes to the prevailing party. Breach of Partnership Agreement Lawsuit On June 22, 2015, the limited-partner siblings voted to remove Thomas as the general partner of MidTown. In September 2015, Thomas filed a lawsuit against MidTown and the limited partners (collectively, MidTown) for breach ofthe partnership agreement and claimed he was entitled to compensation. Thomas also sought a security interest in property owned by MidTown and appointment ofa receiverto sell the property owned by MidTown. Thomas filed a is pendens againstthe property. The court granted MidTown’s motion to strike the is pendens because the lawsuitThomas filed did not involve a dispute overthe title to real property. MidTown filed a motion for partial summaryjudgment on two issues: (1) Thomas
was validly removed as the general partner and (2) Thomas had no right offirst refusal regarding the property orthe interests ofthe limited partners in the partnership. In response to the motion, Thomas conceded both these issues. The court granted the motion for partial summaryjudgment, entered a finaljudgment under CR 54(b), and awarded attorneyfees to MidTown. On appeal, Thomas challenged the decision to strike the us pendens he filed on the property and the order on summaryjudgment. We affirmed. Bangasserv. MidTown

3No. 78595-8-I (Consol. with No. 78670-9-1)/4

Ltd. P’ship, No. 75226-0-I (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2017), http://www.courts.wa.gov/ opinions/pdf/752260

.pdf.~ Lawsuits To Enforce the Promissory Notes In December2015, Thomas sent an e-mail to Elizabeth and Hugh stating, “[W]e
were finally able to refinance/sell ourVashon Island real estate and would like to now address the outstanding Promissory Notes payable to you.” On July 14, 2016, Elizabeth filed a lawsuit against Thomas, Vision Vashon, and Bangasser &Associates (collectively, Thomas) to enforce the October 2003 promissory note for$75,000 plus prejudgment and postjudgment interest and attorney fees and costs. On September 13, 2016, Elizabeth filed a motion forsummaryjudgment. Elizabeth argued Thomas never made any payments and acknowledged his obligation to paythe 2003 promissory note. The court granted the motion forsummaryjudgment. On October 14, 2016, the court entered ajudgment in favor of Elizabeth forthe principal amount owed, prejudgment interest, and attorneyfees and costs for a total of $194,737.63. The court ordered postjudgment interest of$24.66 perday. Thomas filed
an appeal. We affirmed and awarded Elizabeth attorneyfees and costs on appeal. HaN, No. 76077-7-I, slip op. at 1. On November22, 2016, Hugh filed a lawsuit against Thomas, Vision Vashon, and Bangasser & Associates (collectively, Thomas) to enforce the October2003 promissory note and entry ofajudgmentforthe principal amount owed plus prejudgment and postjudgment interest and an award ofattorneyfees and costs.

2 Thomas latervoluntarily dismissed the lawsuit.
4No. 78595-8-I (Consol. with No. 78670-9-1)15

Hugh filed a motion for summaryjudgment. The court granted the motion for summaryjudgment. On August 18, 2017, the court entered ajudgment against Thomas forthe principal amount owed and prejudgment interest in the amount of$184,681.09. The court ordered postjudgment interest of$72.86 perday. The court reserved ruling
on the requestforan award ofattorney fees. On September 8, 2017, the court awarded Hugh reasonable attorney fees in the amount of$39,831 .00. Thomas filed an appeal. We affirmed and awarded Hugh attorneyfees and costs on appeal. Bangasser, No. 77398-4-I, slip op. at 1. Sale ofthe MidTown Progerty and Entry of Charging Orders In May 2017, MidTown sold the property it owned for $23,300,000. A letterdated June 22, 2017 addressed partial distribution from the sale ofthe ‘23rd & Union Property.” The letter states the sale proceeds of$14,041,347 “will be distributed next week to the five limited partnership groupings in five equal shares of$2,808,269.” The letteralso states, “Our hope is thatthe funds will be transferred to your respective banks by Friday, June 30th.” On July 7, Elizabeth filed a motion for an orderto show cause whythe court should not entera charging order againstthe interest ofThomas in the limited partnership forthe amountThomas owed on the October 14, 2016judgment plus postjudgment interest. On July 10, the court entered a charging order. The charging order directed MidTown to “set aside $201 099.91 plus interestfrom its declared distributions to Thomas F. Bangasser and hold that amountforthe benefit ofJudgment Creditor Elizabeth B. Hall pursuantto RCW 25.10.556.” On August 22, Elizabeth obtained an orderto disburse proceeds and release the July 10, 2017 charging order.

5No. 78595-8-I (Consol. with No. 78670-9-1)16

On August 30, the court granted Hugh’s motion for a charging order against Thomas’ partnership interestforthe August 18, 2017judgment of$185,950.36 plus postjudgment interest. On August 31, 2017, MidTown deposited approximately $1.4 million ofThomas’ share ofthe proceeds from the sale ofthe MidTown property in the King County Superior Court Clerk’s Office Registry ofthe Court pending resolution ofthe remaining disputes in the Midtown Ltd. Partnership v. Thomas F. Banqasser lawsuit. One ofthe disputes in the MidTown lawsuitwas whetherThomas “transferred one-halfof his interest in MidTown, as he previously claimed, and hence one-halfof his distributable proceeds, to a community group Africatown Community Land Trust.” The August 31, 2017 letterfrom the attorney representing MidTown states, in pertinent part:In accordance with our previous correspondence, today MidTown is tendering one-half ofthe Distributable Proceeds, slightly more than $1 .4 million, to the King County Superior Court Clerk’s office for deposit in the court registry. It is doing so without in anyway conceding thatthe Africatown Community Land Trust is entitled to that money, orthat any purported transferof MidTown units from Tom to the Africatown Trustwas authorized; itwas not. Further, one or more plaintiffs may have claims on those funds. We are nonetheless tendering to the Court so that all claims to those funds can be properly adjudicated. As I have previously mentioned, onlythe Court can authoritatively decide whetherTom actually and validlytransferred one-halfof his interest in MidTown to the Africatown Trust. On those and related issues, my clients reserve all rights. The letter also states, “MidTown today is distributing moneyto Elizabeth in accordance with her charging order and order authorizing distribution. In accordance with the charging order obtained by Hugh, MidTown is holding backfunds.”

6No. 78595-8-I (Consol. with No. 78670-9-1)/7

On September 15, 2017, Hugh filed a motion for an orderto disburse proceeds and release the August 30, 2017 charging order. Hugh also filed a motion to issue a substitute and corrected charging orderto include the $39,831 in attorneyfees and postjudgment interest as of September25, 2017. On September25, 2017, the court entered an order granting Hugh’s motion to issue a substitute and corrected charging order. The order states, in pertinent part: MidTown shall therefore set aside $225,781 .36 (consisting ofthe sum of the $185,950.36 Judgment amount and the $39,831.00 Attorney Fee Judgment), plus interest.

. . from any distribution to Thomas F. Bangasser and hold that amountforthe benefit ofJudgment Creditor Hugh Bangasser pursuant to RCW25.10.556. On October9, 2017, the court entered an orderto correctthe charging order and disburse proceeds to Hugh. On November 13, 2017, the trial court entered ajudgment in favor of Elizabeth and againstThomas for $6,838.97 in postjudgment attorneyfees and costs. On November22, 2017, the court awarded postjudgment attorneyfees and costs to Hugh in the amount of$9,566.97. On April 12, 2018, Thomas paid the August 18, 2017judgment amount owed to Hugh on the promissory note and the September8, 2017 award of attorneyfees but not the November 22, 2017 award of postjudgment attorneyfees. On April 13, 2018, the court entered a partial satisfaction ofthe October 14, 2016judgment owed to Elizabeth
on the promissory note and the award ofattorneyfees. The order states the payment did not satisfythe November 13, 2017 award of postjudgment attorney fees owed to Elizabeth.

7No. 78595-8-I (Consol. with No. 78670-9-1)18

Charging and Disbursement of Proceeds Orders for PostjudgmentAward ofAttorney Fees On May 31, 2018, Elizabeth and Hugh each filed a motion for entry ofa charging and disbursement of proceeds order against Thomas’ partnership interestforthe award ofattorneyfees incurred postjudgment. Thomas filed a brief in opposition to the motions to issue a charging order and disburse proceeds. The court granted Elizabeth’s motion fora charging and disbursement orderfor the postjudgment award of attorneyfees in the amount of $6,838.97 plus interest. On June 19, 2018, the court entered an “Order Granting Motion for Charging Order and Disbursement of Proceeds to Judgment Creditor.” Thomas filed a notice ofappeal of the order. The court granted Hugh’s motion for a charging and disbursement orderforthe award of postjudgment attorneyfees in the amount of$9,556.97 plus interest. On June 20, 2018, the court entered an “Order Granting Motion for Charging Order and Disbursement of Proceeds to Judgment Creditor.” Thomas filed a notice ofappeal of the June 20 order. This court consolidated the two appeals. Appeal of Charging and Disbursement Orders for PostiudgmentAward ofAttorney Fees In this appeal, Thomas contends the court did not have authorityto enterthe charging and disbursement orders under RCW25.10.556; MidTown did not have the authorityto deposit his partnership distribution in the court registry; and the attorney representing Hugh, Elizabeth, and MidTown has a conflict of interest. Thomas also

8No. 78595-8-I (Consol. with No. 78670-9-1)19

argues we should review entry ofthe previous charging orders thatwere not designated in the notice ofappeal. Authority To Enter Charging and Disbursement Orders Thomas contends the court did not have the authority under RCW25.10.556 to enterthe charging and disbursement orders against his limited partnership interestfor the award of attorneyfees and costs Elizabeth and Hugh incurred postjudgment. Thomas cites language in ROW25.10.556 and supplemental proceedings statute ROW 6.32.085 to argue the court has authorityto entera charging order on onlyfuture partnership distributions. The plain and unambiguous language of ROW25.1 0.556 and RCW 6.32.085 does not support his argument. The meaning ofa statute is a question of lawwe review de novo. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). Ourobjective is to ascertain and give effectto legislative intent. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 9. We lookfirst to the text ofa statute to determine its meaning. Griffin v. Thurston County Bd. of Health, 165 Wn.2d 50, 55, 196 P.3d 141 (2008). Statutory interpretation begins with the plain meaning ofthe statute. Lake v. Woodcreek HomeownersAss’n, 169 Wn.2d 516, 526, 243 P.3d 1283 (2010). Plain meaning “is discerned from all thatthe Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question.” Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 11. When the meaning ofthe statute is plain on its face, the court must give effectto that plain meaning as the expression ofthe legislature’s intent. Bostain v. Food Express, Inc., 159 Wn.2d 700, 708, 153 P.3d 846 (2007); City of Spokane v. Spokane County, 158 Wn.2d 661, 673, 146 P.3d 893 (2006). Statutes are to be read together, whenever

9No. 78595-8-I (Consol. with No. 78670-9-1)/10

possible, to achieve a” harmonious total statutory scheme

. . . which maintains the integrity ofthe respective statutes.’

“ Employco Pers. Servs., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 117 Wn.2d 606, 614, 817 P.2d 1373 (1991)~ (quoting State v. O’Neill, 103 Wn.2d 853, 862, 700 P.2d 711 (1985)). An interpretation that reads language in isolation is too limited and fails to applythis rule. Jonqeward v. BNSF Ry., 174 Wn.2d 586, 595, 278 P.3d 157 (2012); see Davis v. Mich. Dept ofTreasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809, 109 S. Ct. 1500, 103 L. Ed. 2d 891 (1989) (‘It is a fundamental canon ofstatutory construction thatthe words of
a statute must be read in their context and with a viewto their place in the overall statutoryscheme.”). The construction oftwo statutes shall be made with the assumption thatthe legislature does not intend to create an inconsistency. State v. Bash, 130 Wn.2d 594, 602, 925 P.2d 978 (1996). In 2009, the Washington legislature enacted the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, chapter25.10 RCW. LAWS OF 2009, ch. 188. RCW25.10.556 addresses the “[r}ights of creditor of partner ortransferee.” RCW25.10.556 provides: (1) On application to a court of competentjurisdiction by anyjudgment creditorofa partner ortransferee, the court may charge the transferable interest ofthejudgment debtorwith payment ofthe unsatisfied amount of thejudgmentwith interest. To the extent so charged, thejudgment creditor has onlythe rights ofa transferee. The court may appoint a receiver ofthe share ofthe distributions due orto become due to the judgment debtor in respect ofthe partnership and make all other orders, directions, accounts, and inquiries thejudgment debtor might have made orthatthe circumstances ofthe case may require to give effectto the charging order. (2) A charging order constitutes a lien on thejudgment debtor’s transferable interest. The court may order a foreclosure upon the interest subjectto the charging order at anytime. The purchaser at the foreclosure sale has the rights of a transferee. (3) At anytime before foreclosure, an interest charged may be redeemed: (a) Bythejudgment debtor;

~ Alteration in original.
10No. 78595-8-I (Consol. with No. 78670-9-1)111 (b) With property otherthan limited partnership property, by one or more ofthe other partners; or (c) With limited partnership property, bythe limited partnership with the consent ofall partners whose interests are not so charged. (4) This chapterdoes not deprive any partner ortransferee ofthe benefit of any exemption laws applicable to the partner’s ortransferee’s transferable interest. (5) This section provides the exclusive remedy bywhich a judgment creditorofa partnerortransferee may satisfy ajudgment out of thejudgment debtor’s transferable interest. Chapter6.32 RCW governs supplemental proceedings to enforce ajudgment. ROW 6.32.085 provides: Order charging partnership interest ordirecting sale. If it appears from the examination ortestimonytaken in the special proceedings authorized by this chapterthatthejudgment debtorowns an interest in a partnership, the judge who granted the order orwarrant orto whom it is returnable may in his or herdiscretion, upon such notice to other partners as thejudge deemsjust, and to the extent permitted byTitle 25 ROW, (1) enteran order charging the partnership interestwith payment ofthejudgment, directing that all or any part ofdistributions or other amounts becoming due to thejudgment debtor, otherthan earnings as defined in ROW 6.27.010, be paid to a receiver ifone has been appointed, otherwise to the clerk ofthe court that entered thejudgment, for application to payment of thejudgment in the same manner as proceeds from sale on execution and, in aid ofthe charging order, the court may make such other orders as a case requires, or (2) enteran order directing sale ofthe partnership interest in the same manner as personal property is sold on execution. The plain and unambiguous language of ROW25.10.556 and the statutory definitions establish that a charging order under ROW 25.10.556 is not limited to future distributions. The statute expressly states the court has the authorityto entera charging order against “the transferable interest” ofthe limited partnerjudgment debtor. ROW 25.10.556(1). ROW 25.10.011(5) defines “distributions” as “a transfer of money or other propertyfrom a limited partnership to a partner in the partner’s capacity as a partner.” ROW 25.10.011(22) defines a “transferable interest” as “a partner’s right to receive distributions.” ROW 25.10.011(23) defines a “transferee” as “a person to which

11No. 78595-8-I (Consol. with No. 78670-9-1)112

all or part ofa transferable interest has been transferred, whether or notthe transferor is
a partner.” Thomas cites language in ROW25.10.556(1) and ROW 6.32.085(1) to argue the court can issue a charging order only on partnership distributions “to become due” or “becoming due.” The plain and unambiguous language in ROW25.10.556(1) that ‘{t]he court may appoint a receiver ofthe share ofthe distributions due orto become due to the judgment debtor in respect ofthe partnership” means the court has the “discretion” to appoint a receiverfordistributions “due orto become due.” Strenqe v. Clarke, 89 Wn.2d 23, 28, 569 P.2d 60 (1977). The plain and unambiguous language of ROW 25.10.556(1) also states the court has the discretion to “make all other orders, directions, accounts, and inquiries thejudgment debtor might have made orthatthe circumstances ofthe case may require to give effectto the charging order.” Here, the undisputed record shows that as a limited partner, Thomas was entitled to a distribution from the proceeds from the sale ofthe MidTown property and the court did not appoint a receiver. ROW 6.32.085 expressly states that issuing a charging order underthat statute is authorized only “to the extent permitted byTitle 25 ROW.” ROW 25.10.556(5) states, “This section provides the exclusive remedy bywhich ajudgment creditor ofa partner or transferee may satisfy ajudgment out ofthejudgment debtor’s transferable interest.” Therefore, the court may enteran order charging partnership interest and directing payment ofjudgment on “all or any part ofdistributions or other amounts becoming due” onlyto the extent permitted by ROW 25.10.556(5). ROW 6.32.085(1).

12No. 78595-8-I (Consol. with No. 78670-9-1)113

Construing the language ofthe two statutes together, we conclude the court has the authorityto issue a charging order againstthe partnership interest ofajudgment debtorto paythejudgment creditor. RCW 25.10.556 is the exclusive remedyto “charge the transferable interest ofthejudgment debtorwith payment ofthe unsatisfied amount” due to thejudgment creditor. The statute also gives the courtthe discretion to appoint a receiverfor “the share ofthe distributions due orto become due to thejudgment debtor” and to enter orders “thatthe circumstances ofthe case may require to give effect to the charging order.” RCW25.10.556(1). Forthe first time on appeal at oral argument, Thomas argued the court did not have authorityto simultaneouslyentera charging and disbursement of proceeds order. We do not consider arguments raised forthe firsttime at oral argument. Maziarv. Dept of Corr., 180 Wn. App. 209, 227 n.1 1, 327 P.3d 1251 (2014) (legal theories raised for the firsttime at oral argument are too late for consideration), rev’d on other grounds by 183 Wn.2d 84, 349 P.3d 826 (2015). Nonetheless, as noted, ROW25.10.556(1) gives the courtthe discretion to enter orders that “the circumstances ofthe case may require to give effectto the charging order.” Depositing Proceeds in Court Registry Without citation to authority, Thomas claims MidTown did not have the authority to deposit partnership distributions in the court registry. We do not consider issues not supported by argument and citation to authority on appeal. RAP I 0.3(a)(6); Darkenwald
v. Emp’t Sec. Dept, 183 Wn.2d 237, 248, 350 P.3d 647 (2015); Mairs v. Dep’t of Licensing, 70 Wn. App. 541, 544-45, 854 P.2d 665 (1993).

13No. 78595-8-I (Consol. with No. 78670-9-1)114

Nonetheless, the record supports the decision of MidTown to depositthe proceeds in the court registry pending resolution ofthe remaining disputes in the Midtown lawsuit. The declaration Hugh filed as the general partner of MidTown addresses the decision to depositthe proceeds in the court registry:

3. Disbursement ofthe roughly $2.8 million otherwise available to Tom Bangasser has been held up because ofconfusion overwho owns Tom’s ownership units in the MidTown Partnership. Tom claims that he sold half ofthe 12 units he claims he owns to the Africatown Trust

. The MidTown Partnership Agreement, however, forbids assignment of ownership interests without consent ofthe limited partners, which Tom never obtained.

. . . He also claimed that as ofyear-end 2016, he had transferred 4 ofthe 12 units he claims to own to his daughter Lauren. MidTown’s limited partners did not consent to thattransfer. 4. Given MidTown’s knowledge ofTom’s position that he transferred halfof his ownership interestto Africatown, MidTown simply cannot put itselfat risk by not accepting Tom’s “instruction” to send aM of the sale proceeds associated with his ownership units to Tom’s daughter Lauren.[41 Article 5.3 ofthe MidTown Partnership Agreement, Distributive Shares and Other Distribution,” also specifically provides: The net profits ofthe partnership available for distribution after payment of partnership liabilities then due, less reserves forthe reasonable needs of the business ofthe partnership, ~j~y be distributed at such times as the General Partner may determine.15~ Conflict of Interest In his opening brief, Thomas asserts the attorney who represents Hugh, Elizabeth, and MidTown has a conflict of interest. ButThomas does not present argument or explain why “there is a significant risk thatthe representation” is a conflict
orwhythe representation is “directly adverse” under RPC 1 .7(a). State v. Living Essentials, LLC, 8Wn. App.2d 1, 14, 436 P.3d 857 (2019) (mere assertions oferror are

~ Emphasis in original.

~ Emphasis added.
14No. 78595-8-I (Consol. with No. 78670-9-1)115

not enough to prevail on appeal). An appellant must include all theories upon which he seeks reversal, accompanied by argument and citation to authority in his opening brief, otherwise an appellate courtwill not considerthe issue. Jackson v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 186 Wn. App. 838, 845, 347 P.3d 487 (2015); Maziar, 180 Wn. App. at 227 n.1 1;
see also RAP 10.3(a); Univ. ofWash. v. Govt Emps. Ins. Co., 200 Wn. App. 455, 465 n.3, 404 P.3d 559 (2017) (‘An issue raised in a party’s opening brief but unsupported by legal authority is waived.”). In his reply brief, Thomas cites the RPCs but does not explain whythese RPCs support his conflict of interest argument. Charging Orders Not Designated on Appeal Thomas argues this court should review charging orders the court entered on July 10, 2017; August 30, 2017; and September25, 2017. Thomas did not designate these orders on appeal. We will review an undesignated order only if“the order or ruling prejudicially affects the decision designated in the notice” ofappeal. RAP 2.4(b)(1). Our Supreme Court has interpreted the term “prejudicially affects” to turn on whetherthe orderdesignated in the notice of appeal would have occurred absentthe otherorder. Adkins v. Alum. Co. ofAm., 110 Wn.2d 128, 134-35, 750 P.2d 1257, 756 P.2d 142 (1988); Right-Price Recreation, LLC v. Connells Prairie Cmty. Council, 146 Wn.2d 370, 380, 46 P.3d 789 (2002). The issues in the orders

“ ‘must be so entwined thatto resolve the order appealed, the court must considerthe order not appealed.’

“ In
re Estate of Foster, 165 Wn. App. 33, 45, 268 P.3d 945 (2011) (quoting Right-Price Recreation, LLC v. Connells Prairie Cmty. Council, 105 Wn. App. 813, 819, 21 P.3d 1157 (2001)). Here, the priorcharging orders are not so entwined with the charging orders on appeal thatwe must considered those orders to resolve this appeal.

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Attorney Fees When a contract provides for an attorneyfee award, the party prevailing before this court may seek reasonable attorneyfees incurred on appeal. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Harrison, 181 Wn. App. 595, 607, 326 P.3d 808 (2014); see also RAP 18.1. The promissory notes state that “[ijfsuit should be brought to collect any ofthe principal
or interest ofthis Note, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” We affirm the charging and disbursement orders. Subject to compliancewith RAP 18.1, we award Elizabeth and Hugh reasonable attorneyfees and costs on appeal.

WE CONCUR:

___________________ ~

16