alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

May 29, 2019

No. 04-19-00328-CR

Betty ROJAS,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 227th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2017CR3790

Honorable Kevin M. O'Connell, Judge Presiding

ORDER

The trial court’s certification in this appeal states “this criminal case is a plea-bargain 

case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” The clerk’s record contains a written plea 

bargain, and the punishment assessed did not exceed the punishment recommended by the 

prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant; Rule 25.2(a)(2) applies. See TEX. R. APP. P. 

25.2(a)(2).

This court must dismiss this appeal “if a certification that shows the defendant has a right 

of appeal has not been made part of the record under these rules.” Id. R. 25.2(d); see Chavez v. 

State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 

We ORDER Appellant to cause an amended trial court certification to be filed in this 

court within TWENTY days of the date of this order showing Appellant has the right of appeal. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d), 37.1; see also Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2005); Daniels v. State, 110 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.). If no 

amended trial court certification is filed as ordered, this appeal will be dismissed. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 25.2(d).

All other appellate deadlines are SUSPENDED pending further order of this court.
_________________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 29th day of May, 2019.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court
IV 

House Calendar No. 41

108TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 180

[Report No. 108–101] 

Supporting the goals and ideals of ‘‘National Correctional Officers and Employees Week’’ and honoring the service of correctional officers and 

employees. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 7, 2003. 

Mr. STRICKLAND (for himself, Mr. HOLDEN, Mr. SWEENEY, and Mr. GREEN

of Wisconsin) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to 

the Committee on the Judiciary 

MAY 15, 2003

Additional sponsors: Mr. SIMMONS, Mr. BROWN of Ohio, Mr. FROST, Mr. 

BOEHLERT, Mr. BALLANCE, Mr. OXLEY, Mr. BISHOP of Georgia, and 

Mr. RANGEL

MAY 15, 2003

Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed 

RESOLUTION

Supporting the goals and ideals of ‘‘National Correctional 

Officers and Employees Week’’ and honoring the service 

of correctional officers and employees.

Whereas the operation of correctional facilities represents a 

crucial component of the criminal justice system of the 

United States; 
2

•HRES 180 RH 

Whereas correctional personnel play a vital role in protecting 

the rights of the public to be safeguarded from criminal 

activity; 

Whereas correctional personnel are responsible for the care, 

custody, and dignity of the human beings charged to 

their care; 

Whereas correctional personnel work under demanding circumstances and face danger in their daily work lives; and 

Whereas S. Res. 24 of the 108th Congress, as agreed to on 

March 12, 2003, designates the week beginning May 4, 

2003, as ‘‘National Correctional Officers and Employees 

Week’’: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved, That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) supports the goals and ideals of ‘‘National 

3 Correctional Officers and Employees Week’’; and 

4 (2) honors all correctional officers and employ5 ees for their service to their communities, States, 

6 and the Nation. 

House Calendar No. 41

108TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 180

[Report No. 108–41] 

RESOLUTION

Supporting the goals and ideals of ‘‘National Correctional Officers and Employees Week’’ and 

honoring the service of correctional officers and employees. 

MAY 15, 2003

Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 

printed
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Rogelio CERVANTES-DEL TORO, also known as Marcelo Miranda-Cantu, also known as Marcelo Aranda-Cantu, also known as Jose Acuna, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-50469

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 17, 2012.

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

James Morris Balagia, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Rogelio Cervantes-Del Toro, Pecos, TX, pro se.

Before DAVIS, OWEN, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Rogelio Cervantes-Del Toro has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.2011). Cervantes-Del Toro has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
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|   | By: | Stratus      Block 21 Investments, L.P., a Texas limited partnership,      Manager |
|--------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | By: | Stratus      Block 21 Investments GP, L.L.C., a Texas limited liability company,      General Partner |
|--------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | By: | Canyon-Johnson      Urban Fund II, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership,  Member |
|--------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | By: | Canyon-Johnson      Realty Advisors II LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, General      Partner |
|--------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | By: | /s/ K. Robert      Turner |
|--------|-----|---------------------------|

|   | K.      Robert Turner, Managing Partner |
|--------|-----------------------------------------|

----
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 964

To amend the Federal Power Act to provide the Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission with authority to order certain refunds of electric rates, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 27, 2003

Mr. OSE (for himself and Mr. HUNTER) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL

To amend the Federal Power Act to provide the Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission with authority to order 

certain refunds of electric rates, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Electric Refund Fair5 ness Act of 2003’’. 

6 SEC. 2. WHOLESALE RATE REFUND AUTHORITY. 

7 Section 206(b) of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 

8 824e(b)) is amended as follows: 
2

•HR 964 IH 

1 (1) In the second sentence, strike ‘‘shall not be 

2 earlier than the date 60 days after the filing of such 

3 complaint nor later than 5 months after the expira4 tion of such 60-day period’’ and insert ‘‘shall be the 

5 date of the filing of such complaint’’. 

6 (2) In the third sentence, strike ‘‘shall not be 

7 earlier than the date 60 days after the publication 

8 by the Commission of notice of its intention to ini9 tiate such proceeding nor later than 5 months after 

10 the expiration of such 60-day period’’ and insert 

11 ‘‘shall be the date of publication by the Commission 

12 of notice of its intention to initiate such proceeding’’. 

13 (3) Beginning in the seventh sentence, strike 

14 ‘‘through a date fifteen months after such refund ef15 fective date’’ and all that follows down through 

16 ‘‘prior to the conclusion of the proceeding’’ and in17 sert ‘‘through the conclusion of the proceeding in ex18 cess of those which would have been paid under the 

19 just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, 

20 regulation, practice or contract which the Commis21 sion orders to be thereafter observed and in force’’. 

22 SEC. 3. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PENALTIES. 

23 (a) CRIMINAL PENALTIES.—(1) Section 316(a) of the 

24 Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 825o(a)) is amended by 
3

•HR 964 IH 

1 striking ‘‘$5,000’’ and inserting ‘‘$1,000,000’’, and by 

2 striking ‘‘two years’’ and inserting ‘‘five years’’; 

3 (2) Section 316(b) of the Federal Power Act (16 

4 U.S.C. 825o(b)) is amended by striking ‘‘$500’’ and in5 serting ‘‘$25,000’’. 

6 (b) CIVIL PENALTIES.—Subsections (a) and (b) of 

7 section 316A of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 825o–

8 1) are amended by striking ‘‘section 211, 212, 213, or 

9 214’’ each place it appears and inserting ‘‘part II’’.

Æ
Exhibit 32 (b)

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Jay W. Rembolt, Vice
President and Chief Financial Officer of WD-40 Company (the Company), have reviewed the Annual Report on Form 10-K and Amendment No. 1 on Form 10-K/A of the Company for the fiscal year ended August 31, 2012 (the Report).
For purposes of Section 1350 of Title 18, United States Code, I certify that to the best of my knowledge:

(1) the Report
fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2)
the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date: October 29, 2012



/s/ JAY W. REMBOLTJay W. RemboltVice President and Chief Financial Officer
[909 NYS2d 861]

#### Ennismore Apartments, Inc., Appellant, v Allan Gruet, Respondent, et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

September 17, 2010

*49APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Thomas S. Fleishell & Associates,*New York City, for appellant. *Penn, Proefriedt Schwarzfeld,*New York City, for Allan Gruet, respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Final judgment, entered on or about April 18, 2008, reversed, with $30 costs, final judgment of possession awarded to petitioner, and matter remanded for determination of petitioner’s claim for use and occupancy. Execution of the warrant of eviction shall be stayed for 30 days after service of a copy of this order with notice of entry.

We agree with petitioner-appellant that respondent Gruet is not entitled to succeed to the subject West 79th Street rent-stabilized apartment. Respondent is judicially estopped from asserting that he primarily resided at the subject unit for the relevant time period — the two-year period immediately prior to the death of the tenant — since, in a prior holdover proceeding, he asserted in a verified answer that he was the tenant of record of and primarily resided in another, rent-controlled apartment on West 88th Street during that same period (see *Gale P. Elston, P.C. v Dubois,*18 AD3d 301 [2005]). Critically, pursuant to a “so-ordered” stipulation settling the prior proceeding, respondent accepted $150,000 to vacate the rent-controlled unit there at issue, and a final judgment was entered in favor of the owner of the West 88th Street building premises.

> “While a settlement does not constitute a judicial endorsement of either party’s claims or theories and thus does not provide the prior success necessary for judicial estoppel . . . here, the stipulation was so-ordered by the court, which thereby inferentially endorsed [respondent’s] then position concerning [his primary residence in the rent-controlled unit], *50satisfying the prior success element necessary for judicial estoppel” *(Manhattan Ave. Dev. Corp. v Meit,*224 AD2d 191, 192 [1996], *lv denied*88 NY2d 803 [1996] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; *see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Chandler,*35 AD3d 588 [2006]).

It need be emphasized that respondent, who had a duty to occupy the rent-controlled apartment as his primary residence *(see Cenpark Realty, LLC v Mesnikoff,*10 Misc 3d 137[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 52159[U] [2005]; *see also Matter of Stahl Assoc. Co. v State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, Off. of Rent Admin.,*148 AD2d 258, 262-263 [1989]), admittedly took occupancy of the rent-controlled apartment in 1964 and utilized it for many years, including the two-year period determinative of his succession claim herein. In this posture, respondent should not be permitted to avail himself of the advantages of the rent laws when it furthers his interests and decline to be bound by them when it proves detrimental to those interests *(see Drucker v Mauro,*30 AD3d 37, 47 [2006], *lv dismissed*7 NY3d 844 [2006]).

McKeon, RJ., Shulman and Hunter, Jr., JJ., concur.
#### FACEN v. ROYAL ROTTERDAM LLOYD S. S. CO. et al. BARTON v. ROYAL ROTTERDAM LLOYD S. S. CO.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

May 12, 1952.

Albert Martin Cohen and Louis I. Rothenberg, Brooklyn, N. Y., for plaintiff Lottie Barton.

Harry H. Lipsig, New York City, for plaintiff Irene Facen.

Thomas F. Keane, Brooklyn, N. Y., for defendants.

WEINFELD, District Judge.

Plaintiff in an action pending in the Eastern District of New York moves in this Court to consolidate her action with one pending in this district. There are different plaintiffs in each action, and while one defendant is common to both, an additional defendant is named only in the Eastern District suit. The basis of the motion is that the claim of each plaintiff arises out of one accident and involves the identical state of facts.

Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C., permits consolidation of actions involving common questions of law or fact only where they “are pending before the court”. But the Court is without authority to consolidate an action pending in another district with one pending here.1 Implicit in the plaintiff’s motion is the removal to this district of her action pending in the Eastern District. A case may be removed from one district to another upon the ground of forum non conveniens. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). But the application must be made in the district in which the case is pending and not in the district to which it is to be removed.

The cases cited by the moving party are inapplicable since in each instance the consolidation was of actions pending in the same district.

Motion denied.

Settle order on notice.

1

. Schwartz v. Kaufman, D.C., 46 F.Supp. 318; 5 Moore’s Federal Practice, Second Edition, ¶42.02, footnote 11.
EX-10.2



 Exhibit 10.2 
 G-III Apparel Group, Ltd. 
 March 13, 2013 

Mr. Morris Goldfarb 
 21 Fairway Drive

 Mamaroneck, New York 10543 
 Dear
Mr. Goldfarb: 
 This letter agreement, when executed by you, shall constitute an amendment to the Employment Agreement
(the “Agreement”), dated February 1, 1994, as amended, between G-III Apparel Group, Ltd. (the “Company”) and you. 
 The Company and you hereby agree that Section 4a of the Agreement shall be amended by the addition of the following language at the end of such section after the Pre-Tax Income table: 

“provided, however, that, with respect to each fiscal year of the Company commencing with the fiscal year ending January 31,
2014, (i) no cash bonus shall be payable hereunder unless the Company’s Pre-Tax Income shall exceed $10,000,000 for such fiscal year and (ii) the maximum annual cash bonus payable with respect to such fiscal year shall be no more than
two times the target annual bonus for such fiscal year based on the budgeted Pre-Tax Income for such fiscal year as determined no later than April 30 of such fiscal year by the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors, and shall be
payable no later than April 15 of the following year.” 
 This Letter Agreement may be executed by the parties hereto
in one or more counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original and all of which when taken together shall constitute one and the same agreement. Any signature delivered by a party by facsimile transmission, or in “PDF” format
circulated by electronic means, shall be deemed to be an original signature hereto. 
 Except as modified herein, all terms and
provisions of the Agreement continue in full force and effect. If the foregoing accurately sets forth our agreement, please execute this letter and return it to the undersigned. 

 

			
	Very truly yours,
	
	G-III APPAREL GROUP, LTD.
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Wayne S. Miller



 Accepted and agreed to: 
 /s/ Morris Goldfarb 
 Morris Goldfarb
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

JUSTIN KENDALL,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D18-439

[January 9, 2019]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Timothy L. Bailey, Judge; L.T. Case Nos. 

15005828CF10A and 16009287CF10A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Paul E. Petillo, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Justin Kendall, Lake City, pro se.

No appearance filed for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), we have reviewed 

the entire record on appeal and brief filed by counsel seeking to withdraw. 

There are no issues of arguable merit in the two appeals before this Court, 

arising from lower court cases numbered 15-5828CF10A and 16-

009287CF10A. We specifically reject appellant’s sentencing challenge in 

the 2015 case, based on the authorities recognizing that a defendant is 

not entitled to retain his youthful offender status after his violation of

probation and adult sentencing. See Eustache v. State, 248 So. 3d 1097, 

1102 (Fla. 2018); Granger v. State, 252 So. 3d 769 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). 

Therefore, we affirm the adjudications and sentences. 

However, the record demonstrates that the trial court did not file a 

written order revoking community control in case number 15-5828CF10A. 

This requires remand to the trial court for entry of a written order revoking 

community control and specifying the conditions violated. Musto v. State, 

174 So. 3d 568, 569-70 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). 
2

Affirmed, but remanded for entry of written revocation order in case 

number 15-5828CF10A, consistent with this opinion. 

GERBER, C.J., TAYLOR and LEVINE, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### Arthur R. Poblocki, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Eileen M. Poblocki, Deceased, Respondent, v Carmen Todoro, M.D., et al., Defendants, and McAuley Seton Home Care, Appellant.

[856 NYS2d 327]

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for the alleged medical malpractice of defendants in their diagnosis and treatment of his wife (decedent), who sustained a cerebral vasospasm following a craniotomy and clipping of a leaking aneurysm, resulting in neurological impairment and, eventually, in death. We conclude that Supreme Court erred in *1240denying those parts of the motion of McAuley Seton Home Care (defendant) for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action, for negligence, the third cause of action, for loss of services and consortium, and the cross claim against it, and we therefore modify the order accordingly. Defendant met its initial burden by demonstrating that its nursing staff complied with orders given by decedent’s physician, including the revised order that home care nursing visits need not be conducted over the weekend, and those orders were not “so clearly contraindicated by normal practice that ordinary prudence require [d] inquiry [by defendant] into the correctness of the orders” *(Toth v Community Hosp. at Glen Cove,*22 NY2d 255, 265 [1968], *rearg denied*22 NY2d 973 [1968]; *see Walter v Betancourt,*283 AD2d 223, 224 [2001]; *Nagengast v Samaritan Hosp.,*211 AD2d 878, 880 [1995]).

Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact sufficient to defeat those parts of defendant’s motion with respect to the first and third causes of action and the cross claim *(see generally Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). We note in particular that the redacted affidavits of plaintiffs experts are both speculative and conclusory inasmuch as they fail to set forth the manner in which the actions of defendant or its nursing staff deviated from the standard of care *(see Selmensberger v Kaleida Health,*45 AD3d 1435, 1436 [2007]; *Moticik v Sisters Healthcare,*19 AD3d 1052, 1053 [2005]). Plaintiff also failed to submit evidence raising a triable issue of fact whether defendant’s actions were a proximate cause of decedent’s injuries and death, i.e., evidence that earlier detection of decedent’s aneurysm and performance of the procedures would have prevented decedent from developing a cerebral vasospasm *(see Rodriguez v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp.,*245 AD2d 174, 175 [1997]; *Bartha v Lombardo & Assoc.,*212 AD2d 494 [1995]; *see also Sawczyn v Red Roof Inns, Inc.,*15 AD3d 851, 852 [2005], *lv denied*5 NY3d 710 [2005]). Present—Scudder, P.J., Hurlbutt, Lunn, Pine and Gorski, JJ.
[No. 54646-5-I.

Division One.

December 12, 2005.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. J.E., *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 04-8-00833-8, Patricia H. Clark, J., entered June 28, 2004. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Cox, C.J., concurred in by Baker and Ellington, JJ.
<PAGE>   1
EXHIBIT 23                                            
                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS


We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in each prospectus
constituting part of the Registration Statements on Form S-3 (Nos. 33- 41417,
33-41475, and 33-51298), and on Form S-8 (Nos. 2-83376, 2-92085, 33-44044,
33-45365, 33-46051, 33-46779, 33-51445, 33-51579, 33-53815, 33-53819, 33-62043,
and 33-62045) of Westinghouse Electric Corporation of our report dated February
12, 1996 appearing on page 30 of this Form 10-K.  We also consent to the
incorporation by reference of our report on the Financial Statement Schedule,
which appears on page 63 of this Form 10-K.


/s/ PRICE WATERHOUSE LLP

Price Waterhouse LLP
600 Grant Street
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219-9954
March 13, 1996