* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept

under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicat a, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order andjudgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of Tenth Ci r. R. 36.3. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 8/23/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

______ DENNIS O’NEILL, ) ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 96-1214 ) (D.C. No. 95-Z-863) THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ) (Dist. of Color ado) OF THE COUNTY OF LAKE, JANIS A. ) FAIRCHILD, KEN BAKER, KEN BAKER, ) P.C., LLOYD E. SCHOOLEY, REATHA A. ) SCHOOLEY, DALLAS H. FULLERTON, ) LEONARD CAMPBELL, VIRGIL NEAL ) CAMPBELL, and PAUL CAMPBELL, ) ) Defendants-Appellees. )

______ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

______ Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

______ After examining the briefs and the appellate record , this panel has determined unanimously to honor the parti es’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. Se e Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefo re ordered submitted without oral argument. Dennis O’Neill (O’Neill) appeals from the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of his civil rights compla int filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Although O’Neill had retained counsel for this

proceeding, counsel was unable to attend due to a s cheduling conflict and the district court denied O’Neill’s re quest for a continuance on the morning of the hearing. - 2 - O’Neill owned real property in Lake County, Colorad o, which was secured by a Deed of Trust and a Promissory Not e in favor of appellees, Leonard Campbell, Virgil Neal Campbell, Paul Campbell, Lloyd E. Schooley, Reatha A. Schooley, and Dallas H . Fullerton (collectively “the Campbells”). When O’Neill faile d to make certain payments, the Campbells initiated foreclosu re proceedings, through their attorney, appellee Ken Baker (Baker), with the Public Trustee for Lake County, Colorado, appellee Janis A . Fairchild (Fairchild). Fairchild set the foreclosure sale fo r April 1, 1993. O’Neill filed an objection to the sale and on March18, 1993, Fairchild changed the sale date to April 29, 1993. O’Neill claims he did not receive notice of the new date of sale. Pursuant to Colo. R. Civ. P. 120(d), a hearing was held on April 23, 1993, for authorization of the foreclosur e sale. O’Neill attended the hearing without counsel. 1During the hearing, the court inquired as to the date of the foreclosure sa le. Baker replied that it was set for April 28, 1993, or “nex t Friday,” April 30, 1993. After the hearing, the court determined that O’Neill had defaulted on the promissory note and granted the Or der Authorizing
Sale. Pursuant to the order, Fairchild held the foreclosu re sale on- 3 -

April 29, 1993, and the subject property was sold. On July 23, 1993, O’Neill filed a Motion For Reconsideration ofOrder Authorizing Sale and to Void Sale. On September 24 , 1993, O’Neill filed a Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with the Colorado Supreme Court. Both motions were based on O’Neill’ s claim that he was denied procedural due process because the forec losure sale occurred before the statutory seven day period for him file a Notice of Intent to Cure had elapsed. On September28, 1993, the district court denied O’Neill motion for reconsider ation and on September 30, 1993, the Colorado Supreme court deni ed O’Neill’s petition for mandamus. Finally, on October 29, 19 93, the Lake County District Court approved the sale. On April 19, 1995, O’Neill filed this civil rights action in district court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1983 allegin g, interalia , that he was denied procedural due process because t he foreclosure sale occurred before the statutory seven day periodallowed for the filing of a Notice of Intent to Cure after a Rule 1 20 hearing had elapsed. On April 10, 1996, the district court gra nted appellees’ motions to dismiss and dismissed O’Neill’s complain t on the grounds that: (1) the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because O’Neill sought appellate revie w of a state court decision; (2) O’Neill’s claims were barred bythe doctrine of collateral estoppel; and (3) O’Neill failed to stat e a claim upon which relief can be granted.2 Although the district court found alternative groun ds

to dismiss O’Neill’s complaint, we need only addres s the issue of subject matter jurisdiction because without jurisdi ction we are without authority to consider anything else. - 4 - On appeal, O’Neill reiterates his due process claim . He specifically contends that the district court erredin finding that: his claims sought to vacate, reverse or modif y a state court decision, therefore, depriving the district court o f subject matter jurisdiction; his claims were barred by the doctrin e of collateral estoppel; and his complaint failed to sufficiently plead the specifics of conspiracy between public officials an d private litigants. We review the district court dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo . 2Thomas Brooks Chartered v. Burnett , 920 F.2d 634, 641 (10th Cir. 1990). The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdicti on and may only adjudicate cases within their authority, Hackb art v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. , 601 F.2d 516, 521 (10th Cir.), cert

. denied , 444 U.S. 931 (1979), and “[i]t is well settled th at federal district courts are without authority to review sta te court judgments where the relief sought is in the nature of appellate review.” Anderson v. Colorado , 793 F.2d 262, 263 (10th Cir. 1986).
See Facio v. Jones , 929 F.2d 541, 543 (10th Cir. 1991). Where a constitutional claim has, or could have been, revie wed by a state appellate court, a litigant may not use § 1983 as avehicle in a- 5 -

federal district court through which to seek revers al. Anderson , 793 F.2d at 263. “Any such federal review has to b e addressed directly to the United States Supreme Court from th e state’s highest court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257.” Facio , 929 F.2d at 543. The Colorado courts have considered, or had the opp ortunity to consider, O’Neill’s claims of deprivation of due pr ocess and have denied relief. Therefore, we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the district court’s Order of April 10 , 1996. O’Neill’s motion for Correction or Modification of the record is denied. Appellees’, the Board of County Commiss ioners for the- 6 -

County of Lake and Fairchild, request for attorney fees and sanctions is denied.
AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court:

James E. Barrett, Senior United States Circuit Judge