FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  No. 05-10375

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.

v.  CR-03-00105-ARM

ERNEST G.M. ROWLAND, ORDER AND

Defendant-Appellant. OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Guam

Alex R. Munson, Chief Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 13, 2006—Honolulu, Hawaii

Filed September 13, 2006

Before: Betty B. Fletcher, Harry Pregerson, and

William C. Canby, Jr., Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Pregerson

11289
COUNSEL

John T. Gorman, Federal Public Defender, Mongmong,

Guam, for the defendant-appellant. 

11292 UNITED STATES v. ROWLAND
Karon V. Johnson, Assistant United States Attorney, Hagatna,

Guam, for the plaintiff-appellee. 

ORDER

The panel has unanimously voted to grant the petition for

panel rehearing. The petition for rehearing en banc is denied

as moot. The unpublished memorandum disposition of July 3,

2006, is hereby withdrawn. An opinion shall be filed concurrently with this order.

OPINION

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge: 

Defendant-Appellant Ernest G.M. Rowland appeals the

denial of his motion to suppress evidence and his motion for

pretrial discovery related to his conviction for possession of

methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii). We have jurisdiction over

this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm. We hold

that Guam Customs officers are statutorily authorized to stop

any passenger arriving in Guam if the officer has reasonable

suspicion to believe that the passenger is violating Guam’s

drug laws. We also conclude, that the totality of the circumstances in this case gave rise to reasonable suspicion of such

a violation, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Rowland’s motion for pretrial discovery.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In October 2003, Drug Enforcement Administration

(“DEA”) agents in Guam received a telephone tip that Rowland was planning to smuggle methamphetamine hydrochloride to Guam from Hawaii. The informant identified himself1

1Although the gender of the informant is unknown, we refer to the

informant as a male. 

UNITED STATES v. ROWLAND 11293
to the officers, provided Rowland’s name and his approximate

height and weight, and remarked that Rowland was from

Hawaii and was on probation. The informant told DEA Agent

Jonathan Anderson that he had contacted the DEA to “bare

his soul;” it is undisputed that the informant contacted the

DEA voluntarily and was not motivated by a plea offer or

other favorable treatment from authorities. After receiving the

tip, Agent Anderson and Agent David Taitano contacted the

Hawaii Probation Department. The Probation Department

confirmed that Rowland was on probation in Hawaii, provided Rowland’s date of birth and his physical location, and

informed the agents of Rowland’s criminal history that

included prior drug convictions. 

About one week after receiving the tip, Agents Anderson

and Taitano met with the informant for about ten minutes to

discuss Rowland. In addition to that meeting, the agents spoke

with the informant on the telephone about two or three other

times. The informant could not tell the agents the specific date

that Rowland would travel from Hawaii to Guam. The informant had no known track record of reliability on this or any

other case. Agents Anderson and Taitano informed Guam

Customs and Quarantine (“Guam Customs”) that they were

interested in Rowland; Guam Customs placed Rowland’s

name on a computer “watch list” at A.B. Won Pat International Airport in Guam. 

On December 15, 2003, Rowland arrived at the Guam airport on a domestic flight from Honolulu, Hawaii. Although

Rowland and the other passengers were not required to pass

through federal immigration or customs checkpoints, they

were required to execute a Guam Customs Agriculture Declaration Form. Rowland presented his form to a Guam Customs

Officer, and stated that he would spend roughly one week in

Guam and that he did not possess prohibited items or controlled substances. 

Because Rowland’s name was in the computer watch system, the Guam Customs officer referred Rowland to second11294 UNITED STATES v. ROWLAND
ary inspection. At secondary inspection, Guam Customs

Officer F.J. Quinata asked Rowland if he was carrying any

prohibited items. Rowland responded that he was not. Officer

Quinata searched Rowland’s bag and found nothing. Officer

Quinata observed, however, that Rowland “was nervous and

sweating mildly during the inspection.” Quinata then asked

Rowland if he had any weapons or narcotics on his person.

Rowland replied, “Yes, I have dope on me.” Quinata conducted a strip-search and found 464 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride in packets strapped around Rowland’s

waist. 

On December 17, 2003, Rowland was indicted for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine hydrochloride

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii). Rowland

filed a motion to suppress evidence on March 1, 2004, alleging, inter alia, that the Guam Customs officers lacked both

probable cause and reasonable suspicion to believe that Rowland was engaged in criminal activity. He simultaneously

filed a motion for pretrial discovery of information related to

the confidential informant. In its opposition to the motions,

the government argued, inter alia, that the search was a “border search” that did not require reasonable suspicion or probable cause. In his reply, Rowland contested the assertion that

the customs search qualified as a border search. After a brief

initial hearing on April 28, 2004, the district court ordered

supplemental briefing on the border search issue. On October

5, 2004, the district court conducted a second hearing on the

motions and heard testimony from DEA Agent Anderson

about his contact with the confidential informant. 

On November 3, 2004, the district court denied the motion

to suppress. The district court did not reach the question

whether the search was a “border search” that did not require

reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Instead, the district

court held that “the information supplied by the [informant]

demonstrated sufficient indicia of reliability so as to provide

the DEA with reasonable articulable suspicion justifying the

UNITED STATES v. ROWLAND 11295
issuance of the intelligence report and the custom[s] officer’s

subsequent stop of defendant.” The court further concluded

that Rowland’s statement that he had dope on his body created probable cause that justified the search of his person. 

On December 29, 2004, the U.S. magistrate judge in Guam

denied Rowland’s motion for discovery related to the confidential informant. The magistrate judge concluded that Rowland had not made “a sufficient showing to demonstrate that

he is entitled to the information concerning the informant.”

The magistrate judge found relevant the fact that the government did not intend to use the informant or the information

that he provided at trial. 

Following the denial of his motions, Rowland entered into

a conditional guilty plea with no written plea agreement. On

May 6, 2005, he was sentenced to 292 months incarceration

and 10 years of supervised release. Rowland filed this timely

appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress and his motion

for pretrial discovery. 

II. Standard of Review

We review the denial of a motion to suppress de novo. See

United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir.

2004) (en banc). Whether an official acted within his statutory

authority is a question of law that we review de novo. See,

e.g., United States v. Miller, 205 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir.

2000). We also review de novo whether reasonable suspicion

justified a stop. See United States v. Miguel, 368 F.3d 1150,

1153 (9th Cir. 2004). The trial court’s factual findings are

reviewed for clear error. See United States v. Bynum, 362 F.3d

574, 578 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The decision whether to disclose the identity of a confidential informant is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See

United States v. Henderson, 241 F.3d 638, 646 (9th Cir.

2000). Nondisclosure is an abuse of discretion only if disclo11296 UNITED STATES v. ROWLAND
sure is relevant and helpful to the defense of the accused, or

essential to a fair determination of the defendant’s cause. See

Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957). 

III. Statutory Authority to Make Stop

At the outset, we must determine whether Guam Customs

officers have the statutory authority to stop an individual that

they believe is violating Guam’s drug laws. If the officers

lack the statutory authority to make such a stop, our cases

suggest that the evidence obtained as a result of the stop

might be suppressed. See, e.g., United States v. Juda, 46 F.3d

961, 968 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that dismissal of indictment

or suppression of evidence might be appropriate remedy for

statutorily unauthorized search, but declining to reach the

issue); United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 492-93 (9th

Cir. 1987) (noting that suppression might be proper remedy

for statutorily unauthorized search, but declining to reach the

issue). 

[1] “Any [Guam] Customs Officer may: (1) arrest persons

who violate a prohibition contained in Article 6 of Title 9

[Guam Code Annotated] Chapter 67; [and] (2) make seizures

of any controlled substance imported into Guam in violation

of Article 6 of Title 9 [Guam Code Annotated] Chapter 67

. . . .” 5 Guam Code Ann. § 73102(1), (2). Article 6, Chapter

67 is codified at section 67.600-.608 of title 9 of the Guam

Code, and pertains to “Importation and Exportation” of controlled substances. Specifically, section 67.601 of title 9

makes it unlawful “to import into Guam any controlled substance in Schedule I or II of this Act,” subject to exceptions

for approved medical and scientific imports. 9 Guam Code

Ann. § 67.601(a). Methamphetamine is a Schedule II substance. See 9 Guam Code Ann. § 67.205 (defining Schedule

II drugs as those listed in Appendix B); 9 Guam Code Ann.

App. B(C)(2) (“methamphetamine”). It thus appears that

Guam Customs officers are statutorily authorized to arrest

persons and seize methamphetamine “imported into Guam.”

UNITED STATES v. ROWLAND 11297
The question then becomes whether methamphetamine arriving in Guam on a flight originating in Hawaii is “imported

into Guam” within the meaning of the statutory scheme. This

is a question of first impression.2

Rowland argues that drugs “imported into Guam” must

arrive in Guam from a foreign country. Because his flight was

a nonstop, domestic flight from Hawaii, Rowland argues that

the Guam Customs officers lacked statutory authority to stop

and question him about suspected violations of Guam’s drug

laws. In support of this interpretation, Rowland offers four

arguments: (1) that the plain meaning of “imported” does not

include the authority to stop “domestic” trafficking of controlled substances; (2) that our decision in United States v.

Cabaccang, 332 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), compels

the conclusion that Rowland did not import drugs into Guam;

(3) that our decision in United States v. Mendoza-Ortiz, 262

F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2001), requires that the evidence be suppressed in the instant case; and (4) that other sections of the

Guam Code support his interpretation of the statute. We find

these arguments unpersuasive. 

[2] It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that,

“unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking

their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” United

States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting

Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). Rowland

thus argues that “domestic,” as set forth in section 67.601 of

title 9 of the Guam Code, should be defined as “of or relating

to a country’s internal affairs,” and that importation must

therefore implicate non-domestic activities. The problem with

Rowland’s argument is that he resorts to a common dictionary

2We also observe that at least one of our decisions has assumed that

produce sent from Hawaii to Guam is “imported” pursuant to Guam’s

laws concerning agricultural pests, plant disease, and quarantine. See

Guam Fresh, Inc. v. Ada, 849 F.2d 436, 436 (9th Cir. 1988). That decision

did not address the “importation” question in any detail. 

11298 UNITED STATES v. ROWLAND
meaning before determining whether the term is “otherwise

defined” in the statute. When a word is defined in a statute,

“courts are not at liberty to look beyond the statutory definition.” Smith, 155 F.3d at 1057 (citation omitted). 

[3] In this case, the customs title of the Guam Code states

that, “[f]or the purpose of this Article, the term import means,

with respect to any article, any bringing in or introduction of

any such article into any area on Guam.” 9 Guam Code Ann.

§ 67.600. Thus, when the next subsection prohibits “import[-

ing] into Guam any controlled substance,” see 9 Guam Code

Ann. § 67.601, it prohibits bringing any controlled substances

into Guam, regardless of whether the substance comes from

a foreign country or from the United States. Any article

brought into Guam from outside of Guam is therefore “imported” within the meaning of Guam’s drug laws. Because

Guam Customs officers are statutorily empowered to arrest

individuals who “import” drugs into Guam, see 5 Guam Code

Ann. § 73102(a), and because it is an act of importation to

bring drugs to Guam from the United States, we hold that

Guam Customs officers are statutorily authorized to stop and

seize individuals they suspect of bringing drugs to Guam,

even if the person arrived on a flight originating in the United

States. 

[4] Even if we were not convinced by the plain language

of the statute, we would reach the same conclusion based on

the structure of Guam customs law. Guam is not part of the

United States customs territory, and has its own customs

zone. See 19 U.S.C. § 1401(h) (defining “United States” in

the Tariff Act of 1930 as “all Territories and possessions of

the United States except . . . Guam”); 19 C.F.R. § 7.2(a) (noting that Guam is “outside the customs territory of the United

States”). Imports into Guam are not governed by the Tariff

Act of 1930, and Guam has its own customs administration.

See 19 C.F.R. § 7.2(b) (“The customs administration of Guam

is under the Government of Guam.”). Thus, although Guam

is geopolitically part of the United States, an item passing

UNITED STATES v. ROWLAND 11299
from the United States into Guam leaves one customs territory, and its administration, and enters another. See id. It

therefore makes sense that, for purposes of Guam customs

law, any item arriving in Guam from outside of Guam —

even if coming from the United States — is subject to customs inspection.3

Rowland’s additional arguments in support of his interpretation cannot compete with the clarity of the statutory scheme.

His reliance on our en banc decision in United States v.

Cabaccang, 332 F.3d 622, is misplaced. In Cabaccang, we

reversed a conviction for importation of controlled substances

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a). The Cabaccang brothers

caused large amounts of methamphetamine to be shipped on

nonstop commercial airline flights from California to Guam.

See Cabaccang, 332 F.3d at 623-24. Federal law makes it

unlawful “to import into the United States from any place outside thereof, any controlled substance,” see 21 U.S.C.

§ 952(a), and the Cabaccangs were convicted of violating that

section, see Cabaccang, 332 F.3d at 624. Our prior decisions

had held that transporting drugs from one point in the United

States to another through international airspace constituted

importation. See Guam v. Sugiyama, 846 F.2d 570, 572 (9th

Cir. 1988), overruled by Cabaccang, 332 F.3d at 634-35;

United States v. Perez, 776 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1985),

overruled by Cabaccang, 332 F.3d at 634-35. In Cabaccang,

we sat en banc and overruled those cases, holding that drugs

that pass through international airspace on a nonstop flight

from one U.S. location to another are not from “outside” the

United States for purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a). See Cabaccang, 332 F.3d at 635. 

3Other sections of the customs title of the Guam Code support our conclusion. Within the customs title of the Guam Code, one section refers to

“exportation to the United States” of animal products. See 5 Guam Code

Ann. § 73106. If sending something to the United States is “exportation,”

then receiving something from the United States is likely “importation.”

11300 UNITED STATES v. ROWLAND
[5] The statute in Cabaccang prohibited transportation of

drugs into the United States, and the critical question was

whether passage through international airspace rendered drugs

“imported.” Here, there has been no suggestion that the drugs

were imported due to passage through international airspace;

instead, we know that the drugs were “imported” because they

were introduced “into any area on Guam” from outside of

Guam. See 9 Guam Code Ann. § 67.600. Because Guam has

its own customs zone and a different definition of “imported,”

importation into the United States under 21 U.S.C. § 952 and

importation into Guam under Guam’s customs laws are not

analogous. Guam is part of the United States for purposes of

federal drug law, see 21 U.S.C. § 802(26), (28), but not for

customs purposes. Cabaccang is inapposite to the case at bar.

Rowland also argues that we must suppress the evidence in

this case because of our prior decision in United States v.

Mendoza-Ortiz, 262 F.3d 882. In that case, United States Customs officers inspected a truck entering the United States at

Nogales, Arizona, and learned that it contained marijuana. See

Mendoza-Ortiz, 262 F.3d at 884. Instead of seizing the drugs,

the officers followed the truck to its point of delivery in

Compton, California to arrest potential co-conspirators. See

id. The officers surveilled the suspected contraband for four

days, and watched as it was moved into a building. See id.

The customs officers then entered the building without a warrant and arrested Mendoza-Ortiz. See id. We held that the

motion to suppress should have been granted because the officers were required by statute to obtain a warrant. See id. at

885. Specifically, if a U.S. Customs officer believes that

goods that violate customs laws are in a “dwelling house,

store, or other building or place,” he is “required to seek a

warrant” to enter such building. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C.

§ 1595(a)). It was due to the statutory violation that the evidence was suppressed in that case. 

The instant case is distinct from Mendoza-Ortiz because the

Guam Customs officer did not violate a statutory command.

UNITED STATES v. ROWLAND 11301
Indeed, it appears that the officer was statutorily authorized

to make the stop, as set forth above. We do not agree with

Rowland that Mendoza-Ortiz compels us to order suppression

in this case. 

Finally, Rowland argues that section 67.601 of title 9 of the

Guam Code and section 73126 of title 5 of the Guam Code

support his position. First, he argues that section 67.601 indicates that an item must come from a foreign country to be

imported. That argument is squarely rejected by the broad

definition of “import” in the preceding subsection, a subsection that Rowland does not address. See 9 Guam Code Ann.

§ 67.600 (defining “import” as “any bringing in or introduction of any such article into any area on Guam”). Turning to

his second argument, section 73126 empowers Guam Customs officers to conduct suspicionless searches of baggage

arriving on flights originating outside of the United States.

Rowland asserts that the corollary is that Guam Customs officers lack the statutory authority to conduct searches and seizures of passengers arriving on flights from the United States.

We are not persuaded. That Guam’s legislature has empowered its customs authorities to inspect baggage arriving on

international flights is irrelevant to the question whether customs authorities may stop persons they reasonably suspect of

violating Guam’s drug laws. 

In conclusion, we think it is clear that Guam Customs officers have the statutory authority to stop and question an individual suspected of smuggling drugs into Guam, so long as

the person is arriving from outside of Guam. It is immaterial

whether the flight originated within the United States or in

some other country: the statute prohibits “any bringing in” of

drugs “into any area on Guam.” 9 Guam Code Ann. § 67.600.

Because we conclude that the Guam Customs officer in this

case was statutorily authorized to stop Rowland if he reasonably suspected that Rowland was trafficking in a controlled

substance, we must next determine whether the officer had

reasonable suspicion to stop Rowland. 

11302 UNITED STATES v. ROWLAND
IV. Reasonable Suspicion

[6] An officer may stop and question an individual suspected of wrongdoing if the officer can point to “specific and

articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences

from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (footnote omitted). When a court

is considering whether an informant’s tip is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the

court must employ a “totality-of-the-circumstances approach”

that takes into consideration the informant’s “veracity” or “reliability” and his “basis of knowledge.” Illinois v. Gates, 462

U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 

While the probable cause requirement for a warrant

requires a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a

crime will be found,” reasonable suspicion is less demanding

and “can arise from information that is less reliable than that

required to show probable cause.” Alabama v. White, 496

U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (citations omitted). “Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the content

of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. Both factors — quantity and quality — are considered in

the totality of the circumstances . . . .” Id. (internal citation

omitted). “Thus, if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip

were more reliable.” Id.

[7] Courts look to several factors to determine the reliability of an informant’s tip. First, a known informant’s tip is

thought to be more reliable than an anonymous informant’s

tip. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000); Adams v.

Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1972). That is because an

anonymous informant typically cannot be questioned about

the basis for knowing the information or motive for providing

the tip, nor can the anonymous informant be held accountable

for providing false information in violation of the law. See

UNITED STATES v. ROWLAND 11303
J.L., 529 U.S. at 271; Adams, 407 U.S. at 146-47. Second, an

informant with a proven track record of reliability is considered more reliable than an unproven informant. See Adams,

407 U.S. at 146-47. Third, the informant’s tip is considered

more reliable if the informant reveals the basis of knowledge

of the tip — how the informant came to know the information. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969),

abrogated on other grounds by Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.

Finally, a tip that provides detailed predictive information

about future events that is corroborated by police observation

may be considered reliable, even if the tip comes from an

anonymous source. See White, 496 U.S. at 329-30; Gates, 462

U.S. at 243-45; Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313

(1959). Predictive information that reveals a detailed knowledge of an individual’s intimate affairs is more reliable than

predictive information that could be observed by the general

public, see White, 496 U.S. at 332; J.L., 529 U.S. at 272, and

such self-verifying detail is considerably more valuable if it

relates to suspicious activities than if it relates to innocent

activities, see Gates, 462 U.S. at 245 n.13. 

[8] Here, several indicia of reliability were present that support the informant’s tip. The informant in this case made himself known to the DEA agents, and the agents met with the

informant personally. See generally United States v. Romain,

393 F.3d 63, 73 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that face-to-face

encounter with informant significantly bolsters reliability

because officers may “perceive and evaluate personally an

informant’s mannerisms, expressions, and tone of voice” and

because informant knows that he may be tracked down and

held accountable for false assertions). Further, the informant

did not have any apparent motive to fabricate the tip, and

could presumably have been held accountable if his information proved to be false. See United States v. Terry-Crespo,

356 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2004) (observing that exposure

to legal sanction for providing false information increases

reliablility of tip). Regarding the basis of the informant’s

knowledge, the informant stated that he had personal knowl11304 UNITED STATES v. ROWLAND
edge of Rowland’s activities because he had “dealt with him

in the past.” 

[9] The informant, although not of proven reliability, gave

a general description of Rowland, predicted Rowland’s future

travel from Hawaii to Guam, and accurately stated that Rowland was on probation in Hawaii. The DEA agents corroborated the informant’s tip when they contacted the probation

office in Hawaii and confirmed that Rowland lived in Hawaii

and was on probation there. Rowland’s criminal background,

provided by the probation office, revealed past drug convictions. The informant in this case provided sufficient detail to

dispel concerns that the tip was a hoax. See White, 496 U.S.

at 333 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that if a

generalized tip is sufficient to create reasonable suspicion,

“[a]nybody with enough knowledge about a given person to

make her the target of a prank, or to harbor a grudge against

her, will certainly be able to formulate a tip about her”). 

[10] Although the totality of the circumstances in this case

might not be enough to establish probable cause, here we deal

instead with the less demanding reasonable suspicion standard. See White, 496 U.S. at 330. We hold that the totality of

the circumstances in this case provided “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from

those facts, reasonably warrant[ed]” the stop at Guam Customs.4

Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. 

V. Disclosure of the Informant’s Identity

[11] Finally, Rowland asserts that the district court abused

its discretion when it denied his motion for pretrial discovery

of information related to the confidential informant. In Rov4Because we conclude that the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion, we express no opinion on whether Rowland’s stop at Guam Customs

was a “border search” within the meaning of United States v. Montoya de

Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985). 

UNITED STATES v. ROWLAND 11305
iaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, the Supreme Court held

that an informant’s identity must be revealed whenever it “is

relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause.” Id. at 60-61. But the

right is not absolute. “[N]o fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing

the public interest in protecting the flow of information

against the individual’s right to prepare his defense.” Id. at 62.

The court must examine “the particular circumstances of each

case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible

defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and other relevant factors.” Id. The defendant’s need

for information must be balanced against the value of ensuring the safety of informants. See United States v. Napier, 436

F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Roviaro, 353 U.S. at

60-64). 

[12] We have held that a defendant is sometimes entitled to

disclosure of the informant’s identity, but only after “mak[-

ing] specific allegations that indicate the portions of the warrant claimed to be false” and making “a contention of

deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth.” See

United States v. Kiser, 716 F.2d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 1983).

Here, everything the informant reported turned out to be accurate. Where a defendant “has failed to articulate any substantial reason” why he should be entitled to the confidential

information, disclosure is not appropriate. Napier, 436 F.3d at

1139. 

[13] Rowland claims that he needs the information to

investigate the informant’s credibility and background, but he

has not articulated any specific reasons to disbelieve the informant’s testimony. Our cases do not permit Rowland to go on

a fishing expedition into the informant’s background because

“a mere suspicion that the information will prove helpful will

not suffice” to demonstrate a need for disclosure. United

States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir. 1990). 

11306 UNITED STATES v. ROWLAND
[14] We have little doubt that the district court did not

abuse its discretion when it denied Rowland’s motion. A court

abuses its discretion if its decision “lies beyond the pale of

reasonable justification under the circumstances.” Harman v.

Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, it appears

that the district court correctly and scrupulously followed the

balancing procedures set forth in Roviaro and by this court,

and that Rowland did not carry his burden. We hold that the

district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Rowland’s motion for pretrial discovery. 

VI. Conclusion

We hold that under Guam law, Guam Customs officers are

statutorily authorized to stop and question individuals that

they reasonably suspect are violating Guam’s drug importation laws, without regard for whether the flight originated in

the United States or in a foreign country. In this case, the

totality of the circumstances gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that Rowland was violating Guam’s drug importation

laws. Accordingly, the district court properly denied Rowland’s motion to suppress. Finally, we hold that the district

court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Rowland’s

motion for pretrial discovery. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

UNITED STATES v. ROWLAND 11307