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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judge Fitzpatrick and 

 Senior Judge Duff 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

COUNTY OF FREDERICK FIRE AND RESCUE AND 

 VIRGINIA MUNICIPAL GROUP SELF-INSURED ASSOCIATION 

v. Record No. 1521-94-4 OPINION BY 

 CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON 

ANNMARIE G. DODSON JUNE 6, 1995 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 Susan A. Evans (Siciliano, Ellis, Dyer & Boccarosse, 

 on brief), for appellants. 

 J. Sloan Kuykendall III (Kuykendall, Johnston, 

 Coleman & Kuykendall, on brief), for appellee. 

 County of Frederick Fire and Rescue and its insurer 

("employer") contend that the Workers' Compensation Commission 

erred in finding (1) that Annmarie G. Dodson's (claimant) two 

employments were substantially similar for the purposes of 

calculating her average weekly wage; and (2) that she was 

entitled to further compensation because she had not been 

released to return to work for employer. We disagree and affirm 

the commission's decision. 

 Claimant was employed part-time as a "fire-medic" for the 

Frederick County Fire and Rescue Department. Concurrently, 

claimant also held a full-time position as a cardiac technician 

and emergency room nurse with the Prince William Hospital. On 

June 23, 1993, claimant sustained a compensable injury to her 
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right knee while fighting a brush fire. She was deemed totally 

disabled from both employments from June 24, 1993, through August 

19, 1993. On August 20, 1993, claimant returned to work at 

Prince William Hospital with a light duty restriction. Her 

doctor gave her a full-duty release to return to the hospital on 

September 17, 1993, but did not give her a full-duty release to 

return to her job at Frederick County Fire and Rescue. 

Claimant's inability to return to her work as a fire-medic formed 

the basis for her claim for temporary partial disability 

benefits. 

 In determining the amount of benefits claimant would be 

awarded, the commission ruled that her two employments were 

substantially similar for the purpose of calculating claimant's 

average weekly wage. The commission based its ruling, in large 

part, on a letter from Thomas W. Owens, Director of Frederick 

County Fire and Rescue, which described the duties of the firemedics who worked for employer. The letter explained that the 

fire-medics are required to perform both firefighting and 

emergency medical duties. The department actively recruits 

cardiac technicians, paramedics, and emergency nurses to serve as 

part-time fire-medics to ensure that it has a consistent advanced 

life support service. Response to medical emergencies accounts 

for seventy-three percent of the department's response activity. 

 The letter concluded that claimant was also required to perform 

firefighting duties, but emergency medical services was her 

primary mission as a part-time fire-medic. 
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I. Average Weekly Wage 

 On appeal, employer first argues that the commission's 

finding that claimant's two employments were substantially 

similar under the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act is not 

supported by the evidence. Essentially, employer would have us 

hold that because some of claimant's duties with the fire and 

rescue department, such as fighting fires and performing 

maintenance on the firefighting equipment, were not required for 

her work with the hospital, her two employments cannot be said to 

be substantially similar. We disagree. 

 Under Virginia law, workers' compensation benefits are 

computed on the basis of the employee's "average weekly wage." 

Code § 65.2-101. Virginia follows the majority rule that when an 

employee is injured on one job while in concurrent employment, 

the average weekly wage compensated is based on the combined 

earnings of both jobs if, but only if, the employments are 

related or similar. See First Virginia Banks, Inc. v McNeil, 8 

Va. App. 342, 343, 381 S.E.2d 357, 358 (1989)(where claimant is 

employed by more than one employer, claimant's combined earnings 

are used to arrive at the average weekly wage only if the 

employments are "substantially similar"). 

 In the past, the commission has held that in applying the 

similar employment rule, it "must . . . recognize that there are 

no two jobs which are exactly alike," but that "the entire 

spectrum of duties should be considered." Hall v. American 
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Janitor Service, 61 OIC 172, 175 (1982). The commission's 

statement in Hall, which is cited by both the employer and 

claimant, is open to conflicting interpretations. The employer 

argues that because some of the claimant's duties as a fireparamedic exceeded the scope of her employment as an emergency 

medical technician, the employments were not substantially 

similar. Claimant argues, on the other hand, that because all of 

her duties and skills as an emergency technician were utilized in 

her job as a firefighter-paramedic, the employments would be 

substantially similar. 

 Other jurisdictions have held that if the employment is of 

the same class or kind, the similar or related employment rule 

may apply to work done during irregular, off hours. See 

generally Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, 

§ 60.31(b) (1994). For example, where a workman was regularly 

employed as an electric welder for one employer and repaired 

gasoline tanks for another employer on Saturday afternoons and 

Sundays as needed, his compensation for injury during the off 

hours job was calculated by including earnings from the full time 

job because both were electric welding jobs. See Sprout & Davis, 

Inc. v. Toren, 118 Ind. App. 384, 78 N.E.2d 437 (1948). In 

another case, a high school dietician, injured while supervising 

a church dinner, was allowed to combine earnings from both 

activities. See McDowell v. Flatbush Congressional Church, 277 

N.Y. 536, 13 N.E.2d 462 (1938). 

 In Smith v. James, 12 A.D.2d 833, 209 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1961), 
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the Appellate Division affirmed an award to an employee who was 

injured during employment as a maid for one day a week and who 

was additionally employed five days a week at a beauty shop. In 

holding the two employments were similar, the Court noted that in 

both employments the claimant testified that she was a maid and 

that she was not employed by the beauty parlor as a beautician. 

Id. at 834, 209 N.Y.S.2d at 624. While the claimant's duties at 

the parlor included waiting on customers, putting customers under 

the dryers, and serving lunches, her principal work was cleaning. 

Id.

 In cases like the present one, we believe that the general 

class of employment analysis in the above-cases is instructive 

and helps to narrow the focus of comparison of the two 

employments. A straight quantitative approach, weighing the like 

duties against the distinct duties of two employments to reach a 

decision, will not always be determinative of the issue. Where, 

in cases like this one, all of a claimant's duties and skills in 

one job are utilized in the other job, which has a wider scope of 

employment, the general class of employment approach, focusing on 

the primary mission of an employee in both jobs, provides a more 

rational analysis for determining whether two employments are so 

related as to conclude they are substantially similar. 

 In this case, Mr. Owens's letter provided the most accurate 

description of the claimant's duties and responsibilities for 

employer and revealed that claimant's primary mission for 

employer, as it was for the hospital, was emergency medical 
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service. Owens's letter established that claimant was recruited 

upon her experience as a cardiac technician/paramedic and as an 

emergency room nurse. Owens stated that claimant's work for the 

hospital was directly comparable to the duties she performed 

while staffing the medic ambulance in Frederick County. While 

claimant was required to perform firefighting duties, Owens 

stated that emergency medical services was the primary mission of 

the employer's fire and rescue personnel. Thus, not only were 

all of the claimant's skills as an emergency medical technician 

utilized in her job as a firefighter-paramedic, but both 

employments were of the same general class, i.e., 

emergency/rescue. The letter provides credible evidence to 

support the commission's decision that claimant's job for 

employer was substantially similar to her job at the hospital. 

 Employer relies upon its written job description for a 

"Firefighter I" to support its argument that the employments were 

not similar. However, Owens specifically stated that this job 

description was outdated and failed to reflect the emergency 

medical services provided by employees, such as claimant. Based 

upon the evidence, the commission, in its role as fact finder, 

was entitled to find that Owens's letter minimized the relevance 

of the written job description. 

II. Return to Work 

 Employer's second argument, which is related to its first, 

is that even if the two employments are substantially similar, 

the commission lacked sufficient evidence and a legal basis to 
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allow the claimant to claim further entitlement to benefits for 

her job as a fire-medic after her full duty release to her job 

with the hospital on September 16, 1993. We hold that the 

evidence supports the commission's determination that claimant is 

entitled to temporary partial benefits after September 16, 1993. 

 On September 16, 1993, Dr. Thomas Schulz, claimant's 

treating physician, released her to return to full duty at the 

hospital. On that same date, he released her to return to full 

duty with employer, except that she was restricted from 

firefighting. Dr. Schulz's records provide credible evidence to 

support the commission's finding that claimant was entitled to 

temporary partial disability commencing September 16, 1993. 

 Employer contends that if, as the commission found, the 

jobs were substantially similar, then a release to return to one 

job should have released claimant to return to the other. We 

find no merit in this argument and no case law to support it. 

The word similar "is generally interpreted to mean that one thing 

has a resemblance in many respects, nearly corresponds, is 

somewhat like, or has a general likeness to some other thing but 

is not identical in form and substance. . . ." Blacks Law 

Dictionary 1383 (6th ed. 1990). By definition, employer's 

argument must fail. Just because claimant can fully perform her 

duties in one job does not mean that she should be able to 

perform all her duties in the other. 

 Dr. Schulz merely restricted claimant from performing one of 

the duties, firefighting, involved in her job with employer. 
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This limitation does not require a finding that the jobs are 

dissimilar, nor does it necessitate a finding that claimant was 

not entitled to temporary partial disability benefits. While it 

is true, as employer contends, that claimant has been able to 

return to her work at the hospital but still cannot fight fires, 

this could be true of any number of jobs that are similar and of 

the same general class but in which one requires extra physical 

qualifications that the other does not. 

 Accordingly, the award is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.