[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-11932

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

VINODH RAGHUBIR, 

ALL U.S. CITIZENS WITHIN 11TH CIRCUIT BOUNDARIES, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

BONNIE JEAN PARRISH, 

Florida Attorney General’s Office, 

ORANGE COUNTY CLERK, 

5TH DCA, 

WENDY BERGER, 

USDC Orlando, 

G. KENDALL SHARP, 

USDC Orlando, et al.,

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-11932

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:20-cv-01883-GKS-GJK

____________________

Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Vinodh Raghubir appeals pro se the district court’s sua 

sponte dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint, as 

well as the court’s subsequent orders denying his first Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion to vacate that dismissal, and denying his second motion to vacate, which had challenged the denial 

of his first motion to vacate. After careful review, we affirm.

Raghubir argues that the district judge assigned to 

Raghubir’s case erred in failing to recuse because the district judge 

was a named defendant in the complaint. Raghubir also argues that 

the district court erred in determining that absolute immunity protected the other named defendants, who were (1) an employee at 

the Florida Attorney General’s Office; (2) the Orange County, Florida, Clerk of Court; (3) the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal; 

and (4) other federal judges. Raghubir contends that he should 

have been released from prison and should have received 

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21-11932 Opinion of the Court 3

$65 million in damages. He also argues that all of the federal judges 

within this Circuit should recuse themselves from his case. 

First, we address whether all the federal judges in this Circuit 

should recuse themselves from this case. Second, we discuss 

whether the district judge should have recused himself. Third, we 

discuss whether the district court erred in dismissing Raghubir’s 

complaint and denying his motions for reconsideration.

I.

First, Raghubir argues that all the judges within this Circuit 

should recuse themselves from his case. Under the “rule of necessity,” we have held that a judge need not recuse himself or herself, 

even if he or she is a named defendant, if all but one of the judges 

on the court are also named defendants, such that the case cannot 

be heard by a panel of judges who are not named defendants. Bolin 

v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1238–39 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). In 

Bolin, we noted that the rule of necessity “is generally invoked in 

cases in which no judge in the country is capable of hearing the 

case.” Id. at 1238. But because the plaintiffs in Bolin indiscriminately named as parties all but one of the then-current judges on 

our Court, regardless of whether any particular judge participated 

in the plaintiffs’ prior appeals, we could not convene a panel in 

which none of the judges had a personal interest in the case. Id. at 

1239. Thus, we determined that the rule of necessity allowed at 

least a panel of judges who had not been involved in the plaintiffs’ 

prior appeals to hear the case. Id.

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Here, the rule of necessity permits us to rule on Raghubir’s 

case, as he has attempted to name every federal judge within this 

Circuit as a defendant. We accordingly find that all of the federal 

judges of this Circuit need not recuse themselves from Raghubir’s 

case simply because he has named them as defendants. 

II.

Second, Raghubir argues that the district court judge assigned to Raghubir’s case erred in failing to recuse because the district judge was a named defendant. We review for an abuse of discretion a judge’s decision whether to recuse himself. Thomas v. 

Tenneco Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306, 1319–20 (11th Cir. 2002)

(per curiam).

We have held that “a district judge must recuse himself ‘in 

any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” Thomas, 293 F.3d at 1329 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)). A 

district judge’s impartiality may reasonably be questioned when 

“an objective, fully informed lay observer would entertain significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.” Id. (quotation marks 

omitted). A judge must also recuse himself when, among other 

circumstances, he “[i]s a party to the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 455(b)(5)(i). Thus, § 455(b) “sets forth specific circumstances requiring recusal, which establish the fact of partiality.” United States 

v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003).

We may review violations of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b), governing disqualification of federal judges, for harmless error. Parker 

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v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1527–28 (11th Cir. 1988). But

harmless-error review “is neither categorically available nor categorically unavailable for all § 455(a) violations.” Murray v. Scott, 

253 F.3d 1308, 1313 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks 

omitted, alterations adopted). 

The district judge should have recused from this matter because he was a named defendant. But this error is harmless because, as discussed below, Raghubir’s complaint failed to state a 

claim upon which relief could be granted.1

III.

Last, Raghubir argues that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint by finding that absolute immunity protected the 

other named defendants. 

We liberally construe pro se filings. Sconiers v. Lockhart, 

946 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2020). Section 1915A of the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that the district court shall 

pre-screen “a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Then, the district court 

must identify any cognizable claims, or dismiss the complaint—or 

1 Further, in his second motion to vacate (reconsider), Raghubir lists all the 

judges in the district court to try to conflict out all the judges. Just as the rule 

of necessity permits a panel of this Circuit to hear Raghubir’s appeal, despite 

his efforts to conflict out all of the judges, the rule of necessity also allowed 

the district judge to rule on his motion to vacate. See Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239. 

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any part of it—if it, among other things, fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from defendants who are immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). A

dismissal for failure to state a claim under the PLRA may be with 

or without prejudice. See Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 

1721, 1725 (2020). We review de novo a district court’s dismissal 

of a complaint for failure to state a claim, “accept[ing] the allegations in the complaint as true and constru[ing] them in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff.” Chua v. Ekonomou, 1 F.4th 948, 

952 (11th Cir. 2021). 

A district court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a 

claim based on the affirmative defense of judicial immunity “when 

the defense is an obvious bar given the allegations.” Sibley v. 

Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005). We review de 

novo the grant of absolute judicial immunity. Smith v. Shook, 

237 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 2001). 

A judge acting within his judicial capacity2 is entitled to absolute judicial immunity, and is not subject to civil suits for damages, unless he acted “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Bolin, 

225 F.3d at 1239 (internal quotation marks omitted). Absolute judicial immunity applies “regardless of whether [the judge] made a 

2 A judge’s actions were made within his judicial capacity if: “(1) the act complained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the 

judge’s chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy involved a case pending 

before the judge; and (4) the confrontation arose immediately out of a visit to 

the judge in his judicial capacity.” Sibley, 437 F.3d at 1070. 

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mistake, acted maliciously, or exceeded his authority.” 

McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2018). Court 

clerks “have absolute immunity from actions for damages arising 

from acts they are specifically required to do under court order or 

at a judge’s direction.” Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th 

Cir. Unit A 1981).3 Similarly, a “prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from allegations stemming from the prosecutor’s function 

as advocate.” Hart v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2009) 

(per curiam).

In Raghubir’s complaint he names the following as defendants: (1) an employee at the Florida Attorney General’s Office; 

(2) the Orange County, Florida, Clerk of Court; (3) the Florida 

Fifth District Court of Appeal; and (4) three federal judges. 

Raghubir largely complains about the outcome of his prior cases in 

the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal and the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, claiming that the associated judges harmed him while acting in their judicial capacities. 

Thus, because Raghubir complains about actions that were taken 

when they were acting in their judicial capacity, the defendantjudges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. See Bolin, 

225 F.3d at 1239.

3 We are bound by decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before 

October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 

1981) (en banc).

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Because the Orange County Clerk of Court’s actions arise 

from duties that were given by judge’s orders, the Clerk is entitled 

to absolute immunity. See Tarter, 646 F.2d at 1013. Because the 

actions taken by Bonnie Jean Parrish from the Florida Attorney 

General’s Office were prosecutorial actions, she enjoys similar 

prosecutorial absolute immunity. See Hart, 587 F.3d at 1295.

Also, Raghubir’s primary claim for release from detention 

cannot be brought in a Section 1983 claim. See Boyd v. Warden, 

Holman Corr. Facility, 856 F.3d 853, 865 (11th Cir. 2017) (A plaintiff seeking to invalidate “his conviction or sentence or change the 

nature or duration of his sentence” must bring any such claims in a 

habeas corpus action, not under § 1983.). 

Raghubir also argues that the district court erred in denying 

his motions to vacate its dismissal, which the district court construed as motions for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60(b). A district court may relieve a party from a final 

judgment, order, or proceeding for reasons including “fraud . . . 

misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;” “the 

judgment is void”; or “any other reason that justifies relief.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), (4), (6). We generally review the district 

court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. Griffin v. Swim-Tech Corp., 722 F.2d 677, 680 (11th Cir. 1984). 

In his motions, Raghubir restates his original claims or raises 

unsupported allegations. None of those allegations meet any reason under Rule 60 for the district court to relieve Raghubir from 

the prior dismissal of his complaint.

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Thus, Raghubir’s complaint failed to state a claim upon 

which relief could be granted because all of the defendants were 

protected by absolute immunity, and his primary claim was for release, which is unavailable under § 1983. Further, the district court

did not abuse its discretion in denying Raghubir’s two motions to 

vacate under Rule 60(b) because he did not show fraud, misconduct, a judicial mistake, or any compelling justification under Rule 

60(b) for the requested action. 

AFFIRMED.4

4 We also deny Raghubir’s pending motions to take judicial notice. 

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