COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
T AMIKA R. M ONTGOMERY - R EEVES

V ICE C HANCELLOR New Castle County Courthouse 500 N. King Street, Suite 11400 Wilmington, Delaware 19801

- 3734 May 9 , 2016

Mr. Michael Vernon Critchfield P.O. Box 11 Mondovi, WI 54755 David C. Hutt, Esquire R. Eric Hacker, Esquire Morris James Wilson Halbrook & Bayard LLP 107 West Market Street P.O. Box 690 Georgetown, DE 19947
RE: Michael Vernon Critchfield v. Rosie Rios, U.S. Treasurer, et al. Civil Action No. 11717

- VCMR
Dear Mr. Critchfield and Counsel: I have considered the filings in this case , the exhibits attached thereto, and the applicable laws . For the following reasons , Mr. Critchfield’s c omplaint is
dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On November 18, 2015, Plaintiff Michael Vernon Critchfield filed the complaint in this action ( the “Complaint”)

. Mr. Critchfield was born in Illinois

. Mr. Critchfield ’s wife and their three children were born in Wisconsin. Mr.
Critchfield ’s Complaint alleges that when each of Mr. Critchfield and his family
members was born, a Certificate of Live Birth was created, but “ was incomplete ”
because “ articles of incorporation and Federal Reserve Banking information ”Critchfield v. Rios

C.A. No. 11717

- VCMR May 9 , 2016 Page 2 of 9 “[ making ] each family member a surety ( bondservant ) to that corporation” was concealed from them. 1 According to Mr. Critchfield , “proof of that incorporation is evident by the all capital letters name on the birth certificates . . . and social security cards . . . .” 2 Further, bonds were issued for each family member based on the Certificates of Live Birth resulting in unjust enrichment of others based on the
future labors of Mr. Critchfield , his wife, and his children. 3 The Complaint alleges that “[e]ach family member’s rights to constitutional protections were swept away as a result of this heinous fraud on [ Mr. Critchfield ] and his family members as they were all infants at the time of the fraud.” 4 Mr. Crit chfield pleads that, t o regain his equitable rights, he established a trust in Wisconsin for himself and a trust in Illinois for his family members. 5 Purportedly in accordance with provisions of the Trading with the Enemy
Act of 1917 (“TWEA”) , 6 Mr. Critchf ield names Rosie Rios, the current U.S.

1 Compl. at 2.

2 Id. (citing exhibits).

3 Id. at 3.

4 Id. at 2.

5 Id. at 3.

6 Trading With The Enemy Act of 1917 § 9, 50 U.S.C.A. § 4309 (West 2016) [ h ereinafter TWEA]

.Critchfield v. Rios

C.A. No. 11717

- VCMR May 9 , 2016 Page 3 of 9 Treasurer, and Richard H. Bell, agent of the Delaware corporation U.S. TREASURY, as defendants (“Defendants”) in this civil action in equity, 7 and prays for twenty

- two forms of relief. 8
Mr. Critchfield also filed num erous moti ons with the Court. On December 1, 2015, Mr. Critchfield filed a motion to replace his supplemental information sheet, a motion to expedite proceedings, and a motion to remove summonses for
Ms. Rios and Mr. Bell from the record because Mr. Critc hfield seeks a declaratory judgment

. On December 15, 2015, Mr. Critchfield filed a motion to amend supplemental information sheet, a statement of good cause for suit to not be assigned to a Master in the first instance, and a motion for a de novo review of this
suit in equity. On February 15, 2016 , Mr. Critchfield filed several individual

7 Id.

8 Examples include: (1) deliver Mr. Critchfield’s and his family’s Certificates of Live Birth from Illinois and Wisconsin, respectively; (2) declare Mr. Critchfield and his family members are nationals of Illinois and Wisconsin, respectively; (3) compel issuance of U.S. Passports and Passport cards for family members reflecting national status and diplomatic immunity; (4) elim inate credit history/credit reports; (5) enter restraining orders against the National Security Agency (“NSA”), the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) Secretary, the Transportation Safety Administration (“TSA”), and the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS” ) Secretary, among others; and (6) compel a complete accounting of all U.S. Department of the Treasury accounts created by the artifice and fraud via the family’s certificates of live birth. See Compl. at 4

- 6.Critchfield v. Rios

C.A. No. 11717

- VCMR May 9 , 2016 Page 4 of 9 motions for various declarations. 9 Also on February 15, 2015, Mr. Critchfield moved for a special proceeding in chambers, in camera, for a declaratory judgment on the pleadings. On April 20, 2016, Mr. Bell filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)( 6) (the “Motion to Dismiss”) on the grounds that the Complaint does not contain any allegations against Mr. Bell and does not suggest that Mr. Bell can provide any of the relief Mr. Critchfield seeks.
T he Motion to Dismiss also questions this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over
Mr. Critchfield ’s claims. Further , Mr. Bell points out that Mr. Critchfield ’s “straw man” or “redemption” theory, which often arises in fraud, debt avoidance, and tax
evasio n cases , is well known to and uniformly rejected by federal courts. 10

9 The motions seek declarations ordering the above

- cited relief, supra note 8 , and ordering the release of their natural persons from office of trustee; moving Mr. Critchfield’s natural person from the office of trustee to the office of cestui que trust; and ordering U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch, State of Wisconsin Attorney General Brad Schimel, and Buffalo County District Attorney Thomas Clark to update their respective databases to reflect that Mr. Critchfield and his family members have diplomatic immunity from at

- law courts, among other things. Docket Item Nos. 19

- 26, 29

- 30, 37.

10 See, e.g. , United States v. Provost , 2012 WL 1158801, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2012) (collecting cases chara cterizing straw man and redemption theories as patently frivolous, “implausible,” “clearly nonsense,” “convoluted,” and “peculiar,” “nonsensical and soundly rejected in this and all other jurisdictions,” and itself finding the theories unintelligible, with out merit, and wholly frivolous); United States v. Waalee , 133 Fed. Appx. 819, 822 n.2 (3d Cir. 2005); Bryant v. Washington Mut. Bank , 524 F. Supp. 2d 753, 758

- 59 (W.D. Va. 2007), aff’d , 282Critchfield v. Rios

C.A. No. 11717

- VCMR May 9 , 2016 Page 5 of 9 On May 3, 2016, Mr. Critchfield filed additi onal pleadings with the Court, including (1) Complainant’s Exception To Defendant Bell’s Answer; Motion To Strike Defendant Bell’s Motion To Dismiss; Declaration Of Trust ( the “Exception”) ; and (2) Motion To Strike Defendant Richard Bell’s Motion To
Dismiss ( the “Motion to Strike”)

. In the Exception, Mr. Critchfield argues that Mr. Bell’s Motion to Dismiss “is incomprehensible and irrelevant i n exclusive equity” because it “makes an at

- law argument in an attempt to dismiss the complaint’s private trust suit and the implied fiduciary relations when the suit is being adjudicated in exclusive equity.” 11 Further, Mr. Critchfield argues the Motion t o Dismiss “misconstrued the basis for the complaint, and, therefore, has not answered it.” 12 Mr. Critchfield also refutes the characterization of “straw man” theory in the Motion to Dismiss , clarifies that “[o]nly the State of Delaware recognizes natural p ersons” and that, “[f]or all practical purposes, Wilmington, Delaware is the de jure capitol of th e United States,” and concludes that “[t]he Fed. Appx. 260 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Rev. Rul. 2005

- 21, 2005

- 14 I.R.B. 822 ; OCC Alert 2007

- 55, Sept. 5, 20007, http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/alert/2007

- 55.html (describing “[t]he use of a nonexistent ‘trust account’ supposedly held in a person’s name at the United States Department of the Treasury or some other part of the federal government” as one of the “fraudulent processes u sed to . . . ‘eliminate’ debt”)

. 11 Docket Item No. (“D.I. No.”) 52 at 1 (“Exception”)

. 12 Id.Critchfield v. Rios

C.A. No. 11717

- VCMR May 9 , 2016 Page 6 of 9 ‘answer’ is full of sophistry and obfuscation, which is completely inappropriate with respect to a suit in exclusi ve equity governed by the maxims of equity.” 13 Finally, Mr. Critchfield purportedly makes a declaration of trust appointing Mr. Bell, Mr. Bell’s counsel, and Ms. Rios as trustees of the Critchfield Pecuniary Relief Trust, a Wisconsin trust that consists o f all financ ial accounts in the all capital letter names of Mr. Critchfield, his wife, and their three children.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction This is the third action of its nature dismissed by this Court in four months.
In Bechard v. Rios , Master Ayvazian detailed allegations and theories nearly
identical to those raised here before recommending , on February 2, 2016, that the
Court sua sponte dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, that
related motions be dismissed as moot, and that Bechard refer to Court of Chancery Rule 144 for the process of taking exception to a Master’s Final Report. 14 On February 18, 2016, Chancellor Bouchard approved the Master’s final report and

13 Id. at 4.

14 2016 WL 402471, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 2, 2016) (Master’s Final Report) (“ Bechard I ”).Critchfield v. Rios

C.A. No. 11717

- VCMR May 9 , 2016 Page 7 of 9 adopted the findings of fact made therein. 15 None theless, Bechard filed a purported notice of voluntary dismissal on or about March 8, 2016 and re

- filed the same complaint on or about March 9, 2016. 16 Echoing Master Ayvazian’s findings, Vice Chancellor Glasscock concluded that “[Bechard’s] Complaint is
i ncomprehensible and [Bechard] manifestly lack[s] jurisdiction to bring this matter before a Court in Delaware.” 17 Similar to Bechard I , “[Bechard’s second ] action [was] dismissed sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and [his] related
motions [were] dismissed as moot.” 18
In his Exceptions, Mr. Critchfield attempts to distinguish Bechard I and
Bechard II from this action based on Mr. Bechard’s failure to show in his paperwork that his trust was verified and recorded . Mr. Critchfield argues this is
the reason both the Complaint “made it past the de facto Reg ister of Chancery’s
office ” and Vice Chancellor Glass c ock “chastised [Mr. Bechard’s] efforts to gain
access to the d e jure Chancellor’s office

. ” 19 I do not read Bechard I or Bechard II

15 Bechard I , C.A. No. 11657

- MA (De l. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016) (ORDER).

16 Bechard v. Rios , 2016 WL 1169097, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 17, 2016) (hereinafter Bechard II

).

17 Id.

18 Id.

19 Exception at 1

- 2.Critchfield v. Rios

C.A. No. 11717

- VCMR May 9 , 2016 Page 8 of 9 th at way . First, Mr. Critchfield’s Complaint “made it past the de facto Register of Chancery’s office” because he filed the Complaint in accordance with the Court of Chancery Rules and paid the required fees, not because Mr. Critchfield showed
trusts on the face o f the Complaint . Second, b oth of Mr. Bechard’s actions were
dismissed because Mr. Bechard ’s complaints manifestly failed to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court: Mr. Bechard sought relief that this Court is not authorized to grant, asserted legal theories that no court in this State has
recog nized , and pled facts taking place entirely outside of Delaware. Following the reasoning of Bechard I and Bechard II , which are based on the same theories as this action, this Court dismisses Mr. Critchfield’s Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismisses all related motions as moot.
B. Alternative Grounds Mr. Critchfield’s Complaint is also dismissed for the independent reason that

t he statute on which Mr. Critchfield’s claims rely do es not permit this Court to grant the relief Mr. Critchfield seeks. W ithout suggesting that Mr. Critchfield’s theories have any basis in reality, the Complaint and several of Mr. Critchfield’s
motions appear to seek relief based on theories rooted in TWEA

. 20 Acc ording to TWEA Section 4309(a) , however, Mr. Critchfield must bring his claims in the

20 TWEA § 4309.Critchfield v. Rios

C.A. No. 11717

- VCMR May 9 , 2016 Page 9 of 9 United States District Court for the District of Columbia or in the United States
District Court for the district in which he resides

. 21 Therefore, this Court may not
determine any questi on of construction or validity arising under TWEA. Contrary to Mr. Critchfield’s suggestions, t his Court ’s authority under the Delaware Declaratory Judgment Act 22 does not extend to construing TWEA or determining Mr. Critchfield’s rights, status, or legal relations, if any, thereunder.
III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice , and all of Mr. Critchfield’s motions are denied as moot

. IT IS SO ORDERED. Sincerely, /s/ Tamika Montgome ry - Reeves
Vice Chancellor
TMR/jp

21 Id. § 4309(a) (“[C]laimant may institu te a suit in equity in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or in the district court of the United States for the district in which such claimant resides . . . to establish the interest, r ight, title, or debt so claimed . . . .”).

22 10 Del. C. ch. 65.