J-A22024-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

PATRICIA HECK IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

DAVID P. VALENTIN

Appellant No. 796 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered January 30, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County

Domestic Relations at No(s): 2012-05269-DI

**************

PATRICIA HECK IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

DAVID P. VALENTIN

Appellee No. 874 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered January 30, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County

Domestic Relations at No(s): 2012-05269-DI

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 24, 2017

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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These are cross appeals from the Final Decree of divorce and equitable 

distribution entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County. Patricia 

Heck (“Wife”) is the designated appellant and David P. Valentin (“Husband”) 

the designated appellee. Upon careful review, we affirm the trial court’s order.

The trial court set forth the facts of this matter as follows:

[Husband and Wife] entered into a common law marriage in 

1997.1 The parties have one child, Veronica Valentin, who is 

emancipated. Husband and Wife separated on April 23, 2012. On 

May 24, 2012, Wife filed a Complaint in Divorce.

1 On November 2, 2012, [the trial court] found that the 

parties entered into a common law marriage on February 

11, 1997.

Husband, 49, is a Pennsylvania State Trooper. He is an 

investigator in the Vehicle Fraud Unit. His base salary is [$]97,477 

per year. Husband lives alone in the marital residence.

Wife, 56, suffers from rheumatoid arthritis. She receives Social 

Security disability income and disability insurance. She worked 

for the Oxford Area School District as a custodian and for 

Longwood Gardens as a custodian. Wife receives $1459 per 

month in income from her pension from the Oxford Area School 

District, disability insurance payments from Longwood Gardens 

and Social Security disability payments. Wife lives in an 

apartment.

The equitable distribution matter was heard before Special Master 

Caren E. Morrissey on June 8, 2016. Special Master Morrissey 

issued her [r]eport and [r]ecommendation based upon the record 

and hearings before her. She found that the marital estate 

consists of $428,034 in assets and recommended that the marital 

assets be divided 60% ($256,820) to Wife and 40% ($171,214) 

to Husband. She recommended that Husband receive 42% of his 

SERS Pension and Wife receive 58% “in consideration of Wife 

retaining 100% of her Longwood Gardens and Oxford Area School 

District pensions.”

. . .
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To effectuate the recommended 60%/40% distribution [of marital 

assets], Special Master Morrissey recommended that Husband pay 

Wife $231,813.[1]

The Special Master recommended that Husband have ninety (90) 

days from the entry of the Divorce Decree to obtain the funds 

necessary to pay Wife $231,813. She recommended that if 

Husband is unable to obtain the funds within ninety days, Husband 

should incur interest on the outstanding balance at the rate of 6% 

per annum until said funds are paid to Wife. 

. . . 

The Special Master recommended that Husband pay Wife $1094 

per month in alimony for three (3) years from the date of the entry 

of the Final Decree in Divorce, and that alimony shall terminate 

upon the death of either party or Wife’s remarriage or 

cohabitation. [Husband has already paid spousal support to Wife 

for a period of over four years prior to the entry of the Final 

Decree.]

Trial Court Opinion, 1/30/17, at 1-5 (internal citations to the record omitted).

Both Husband and Wife filed exceptions to the report of the special 

master. Husband’s exceptions were granted in part and denied in part; all of 

Wife’s objections were denied. The court entered a final decree on January 

30, 2017. This timely cross appeal follows. 

Wife raises the following issue for our review:

Did the trial court err in limiting Wife’s alimony to three years from 

the entry of the divorce decree?

Brief of Designated Appellant, at 6.

Our standard of review regarding questions pertaining to the 

award of alimony is whether the trial court abused its discretion. 

We previously have explained that the purpose of alimony is not 

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1 This sum consists of 60% of the marital assets, plus $3,095 in counsel fees, 

minus $28,102, the value of the marital assets being distributed to Wife. 
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to reward one party and to punish the other, but rather to ensure 

that the reasonable needs of the person who is unable to support 

himself or herself through appropriate employment, are met.

Alimony is based upon reasonable needs in accordance with the 

lifestyle and standard of living established by the parties during 

the marriage, as well as the payor’s ability to pay. Moreover, 

alimony following a divorce is a secondary remedy and is available 

only where economic justice and the reasonable needs of the 

parties cannot be achieved by way of an equitable distribution 

award and development of an appropriate employable skill.

Teodorski v. Teodorski, 857 A.2d 194, 200 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). 

In determining whether alimony is necessary, and in determining 

the nature, amount, duration and manner of payment of alimony, 

the court must consider numerous factors including the parties' 

earnings and earning capacities, income sources, mental and 

physical conditions, contributions to the earning power of the 

other, educations, standard of living during the marriage, the 

contribution of a spouse as homemaker and the duration of the 

marriage.

Id., quoting Anderson v. Anderson, 822 A.2d 824, 830-31 (Pa. Super.

2003) (citations omitted). See also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701.2 

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2 Pursuant to section 3701, the factors to be considered in determining an 

award of alimony are as follows:

(b) Factors relevant.--In determining whether alimony is 

necessary and in determining the nature, amount, duration and 

manner of payment of alimony, the court shall consider all 

relevant factors, including:

(1) The relative earnings and earning capacities of the 

parties.

(2) The ages and the physical, mental and emotional 

conditions of the parties.
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____________________________________________

(3) The sources of income of both parties, including, but not 

limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits.

(4) The expectancies and inheritances of the parties.

(5) The duration of the marriage.

(6) The contribution by one party to the education, training 

or increased earning power of the other party.

(7) The extent to which the earning power, expenses or 

financial obligations of a party will be affected by reason of 

serving as the custodian of a minor child.

(8) The standard of living of the parties established during 

the marriage.

(9) The relative education of the parties and the time 

necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to 

enable the party seeking alimony to find appropriate 

employment.

(10) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties.

(11) The property brought to the marriage by either party.

(12) The contribution of a spouse as homemaker.

(13) The relative needs of the parties.

(14) The marital misconduct of either of the parties during 

the marriage. The marital misconduct of either of the parties 

from the date of final separation shall not be considered by 

the court in its determinations relative to alimony, except 

that the court shall consider the abuse of one party by the 

other party. As used in this paragraph, “abuse” shall have 

the meaning given to it under section 6102 (relating to 

definitions).

(15) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications of the 

alimony award.

(16) Whether the party seeking alimony lacks sufficient 

property, including, but not limited to, property distributed 
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Here, Wife argues that the court’s award of three years of additional 

alimony is insufficient, as she is disabled and will likely never work again. Wife 

asserts that, after the expiration of three years, she will be unable to provide 

for her basic needs “unless she receives the funds from her share of Husband’s 

SERS pension or Husband has paid to her the amount due for her share of 

equitable distribution.” Brief of Designated Appellant, at 9-10. Wife claims 

that the court should have awarded her alimony indefinitely until such time as 

she receives either the pension payments or the equitable distribution sums 

due her by Husband. Wife notes that this approach has previously been 

approved by our Court in Williams v. Williams, 540 A.2d 563 (Pa. Super. 

1988), in which the trial court awarded alimony to wife, aged 60, whose sole 

income was temporary unemployment benefits, until such time as she 

received proceeds from the sale of the marital real estate or until she received 

social security, whichever came first. 

In approving the master’s recommendation as to alimony, the trial court 

found as follows:

The Special Master considered Wife’s economic circumstances and 

recommended that Wife receive 60% of the assets in a lump sum 

payment of $231,813. In addition to her disability payments, Wife 

____________________________________________

under Chapter 35 (relating to property rights), to provide 

for the party's reasonable needs.

(17) Whether the party seeking alimony is incapable of selfsupport through appropriate employment.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(b).
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will have three years of alimony to help her meet her reasonable 

needs. Wife will have funds from equitable distribution to support 

her during any gap before she receives her share of the marital 

pension. If Husband fails to pay Wife the lump sum within 90 

days, she can pursue the usual enforcement remedies and 

sanctions.

As noted above, Husband has paid spousal support for over four 

years. The Special Master recommended that he pay alimony for 

three years from the date of the Divorce Decree. The parties were 

married and living together for fifteen years. Husband will have 

paid support to Wife for over seven years. Given the length of the 

marriage and the years spent paying Wife support, the Special 

Master’s recommendation was reasonable. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/30/17, at 26. 

Based on the circumstances present in this case, we conclude that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Wife alimony for a period of 

three years. First, Wife’s claim for additional alimony is premised solely on 

her belief that Husband may not pay her lump sum equitable distribution share 

in a timely manner. However, this assertion is entirely speculative and, as 

the trial court aptly notes, in the event Husband does not pay within 90 days 

as required by the final decree, Wife has at her disposal “the usual 

enforcement remedies and sanctions” to compel compliance. The trial court 

was well within its discretion to decline to award indefinite alimony based only 

on the possibility that Husband may not comply with the court’s equitable 

distribution order, an eventuality that may never come to pass and for which 

Wife has ample remedies available. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(b) (in enforcing

rights of any party to final divorce decree, the court shall have all necessary 

powers, including, but not limited to, power of contempt and the power to 

attach wages).
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Second, Husband and Wife were married for fifteen years. Husband has 

already paid Wife support for over four years. By the time Husband has 

completed his alimony obligation, he will have paid to support Wife for over 

seven years. Moreover, Wife is to receive a disproportionate share of the 

marital estate through equitable distribution. In light of this fact, and the 

duration of the parties’ marriage, the total award of more than seven years’ 

support was not unreasonable or an abuse of discretion. 

Husband raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as a 

matter of law by denying Husband’s exception asserting that 

the Special Master erred and/or abused her discretion in 

placing values on Husband’s 1967 Z-28 Camaro and 1969 Pace 

Car Camaro?

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as a 

matter of law by denying Husband’s exception asserting that 

the Special Master’s equitable distribution recommendation, 

that Husband pay Wife $231,813.00 in cash in ninety days, 

constituted a punitive award and an abuse of discretion?

Brief of Designated Appellee, at 8.

Husband first claims that the trial court erred in accepting the special 

master’s valuation of two of his classic cars. Husband argues that the values

attributed by the special master to his 1967 Camaro and 1969 Pace Car 

Camaro, which the trial court accepted, were: (1) inconsistent with valuations 

given to two other Camaros; (2) unsupportable under NADA3 definitions, even

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3 National Automobile Dealers Association. An entity called National Appraisal 

Guides, Inc., licensing the name “NADA,” publishes vehicle pricing information 
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though based on NADA reports; and (3) not a reflection of the true value of 

the cars given that Husband has spent far more on individual parts than he 

could ever resell the restored cars for. Husband argues that the Camaros are 

“totally disassembled vehicle[s] accompanied by an incomplete collection of 

assorted parts” and, thus, cannot be valued based on NADA reports, which 

apply to functional cars. Moreover, whereas the master valued two other

disassembled Camaros owned by Husband at $15,000 based upon Husband’s 

valuations, the master chose to value the 1967 and Pace Car Camaros based 

on an average between the high and low values set forth in the NADA reports. 

In sum, Husband asserts that the valuations on the Camaros are unsupported 

by the record and should be reduced to $15,000 each. 

In response, Wife argues that the special master properly found 

Husband’s opinions as to the value of the 1967 and Pace Car Camaros not 

credible, based on his testimony that he spent over $70,000 on parts for and 

improvements to the 1967 Camaro and offered it for sale in 2007 for $65,000 

or best offer. Wife also points to Husband’s testimony before the master that, 

upon selling the vehicle, he “would like to get what I pretty much got in it.” 

N.T. Master’s Hearing, 6/8/16, at 142. Similarly, with respect to the 1969 

Pace Car Camaro, Wife argues that the master’s determination that Husband’s 

valuation estimate of $15,000 was not credible was supported by evidence 

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and tools for new, used, and classic cars, for use by consumers, dealers and 

other entities. http://www.nadaguides.com/Company-Overview (visited on 

10/5/17).
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that Husband purchased the car for $10,000 and spent an additional $59,000 

in parts and improvements to the car. 

We begin by noting:

[a] trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an award of 

equitable distribution. Our standard of review when assessing the 

propriety of an order effectuating the equitable distribution of 

marital property is whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

a misapplication of the law or failure to follow proper legal 

procedure. We do not lightly find an abuse of discretion, which 

requires a showing of clear and convincing evidence. This Court 

will not find an “abuse of discretion” unless the law has been 

overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised was 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence in the certified record. 

In determining the propriety of an equitable distribution award, 

courts must consider the distribution scheme as a whole. We 

measure the circumstances of the case against the objective of 

effectuating economic justice between the parties and achieving a 

just determination of their property rights.

Moreover, it is within the province of the trial court to weigh the 

evidence and decide credibility and this Court will not reverse 

those determinations so long as they are supported by the

evidence. We are also aware that a master’s report and 

recommendation, although only advisory, is to be given the fullest 

consideration, particularly on the question of credibility of 

witnesses, because the master has the opportunity to observe and 

assess the behavior and demeanor of the parties.

Carney v. Carney, 167 A.3d 127, 131 (Pa. Super. 2017), reargument denied 

(Aug. 25, 2017), quoting Morgante v. Morgante, 119 A.3d 382, 386–87 (Pa. 

Super. 2015). 

We begin by emphasizing that “[t]he Divorce Code does not set 

forth a specific method for valuing assets, and consistent with our 

standard of review, the trial court is afforded great discretion in 

fashioning an equitable distribution order which achieves 

economic justice.” Mundy v. Mundy, 151 A.3d 230, 236 (Pa. 

Super. 2016) (citation omitted). In valuing marital assets, “[t]he 
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trial court must exercise discretion and rely on the estimates, 

inventories, records of purchase prices, and appraisals submitted 

by both parties.” Smith v. Smith, 904 A.2d 15, 21–22 (Pa. 

Super. 2006). However, this Court has consistently held that, 

“[i]n determining the value of marital property, the court is free 

to accept all, part or none of the evidence as to the true and 

correct value of the property.” Mundy, 151 A.3d at 236 (quoting 

Smith, 904 A.2d at 22).

Carney, 167 A.3d at 131–32. 

Here, it was reasonable for the master to conclude, and for the trial 

court to agree, that the valuation of Husband’s car collection should account 

for the value of the parts Husband purchased to restore them, even though 

many of the parts have not yet been installed and the cars are not currently 

in running condition. Husband purchased the parts, using marital funds, with 

the goal of using them to ultimately restore the automobiles to the condition 

they were when “they came out of the factory.” N.T. Master’s Hearing, 6/8/16, 

at 129. The master concluded that Husband’s $15,000 estimate as to the 

value of the 1967 Camaro was unreasonable in light of his expenditures 

towards improvements to the vehicle, as well as the fact that he had 

previously offered it for sale for $65,000. We do not find the trial court’s 

adoption of this finding to be an abuse of discretion. Similarly, the master’s 

valuation of the 1969 Pace Car was reasonable in light of the fact that Husband 

paid $10,000 for it and spent an additional $59,000 for parts and 

improvements to the vehicle. Neither party presented professional appraisals 

as to the value of the vehicles, and the master was left to arrive at an equitable 

valuation based on the evidence before her. Given the information made 
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available by the parties, the master evaluated the credibility of the evidence 

and arrived at valuations that were reasonable under the circumstances, and 

the trial court did not err in adopting her conclusions. 

Finally, Husband claims that the trial court abused its discretion in 

adopting the master’s recommendation that he pay Wife the sum of $231,813, 

in cash, within 90 days of the date of the final decree. Husband asserts that 

the court’s order was punitive because he lacks sufficient liquidity and his 

income and other financial obligations make it virtually impossible for him to 

access the necessary funds. We can discern no abuse of discretion. 

In its opinion disposing of the parties’ exceptions, the trial court noted 

the master’s finding that Husband has a substantial income and the ability to 

acquire future income and assets. The court also focused on Husband’s 

expenditure of significant sums of money on his car restoration hobby, noting 

the following: (1) Husband spent over $70,000 on the 1967 Camaro, including 

on the car itself and parts; (2) Husband spent nearly $1,000 to sandblast one 

of his cars; (3) Husband paid $14,500 to have the 1969 Pace Car painted; (4) 

Husband paid $16,800 to install sheet metal on the 1969 Pace Car; and (5) 

Husband spent $108 on screws for one of his cars, even though he 

acknowledged that he could have gone to a hardware store and purchased 

screws for just six cents apiece. Trial Court Opinion, 1/30/17, at 7. In light 

of Husband’s income, substantial expenditures on his car collection, and his 

ability to sell all or parts of that collection to fund his financial obligation to 

Wife, the trial court was within its discretion to conclude that it was reasonable 
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to require him to pay Wife her share of equitable distribution – interest free –

within 90 days. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/24/2017