J-A26026-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

NICHOLAS TIMM GINGRICH 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 451 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 13, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-67-CR-0000912-2016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and RANSOM, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MARCH 20, 2018

Appellant, Nicholas Timm Gingrich, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered on February 13, 2017. We vacate and remand for 

resentencing.

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with one count of theft by 

unlawful taking and one count of receiving stolen property.1 Both charges 

arose from Appellant’s theft of $1,590.00 from Planet RYO from August 4, 

2015 through November 13, 2015. See Commonwealth’s Information, 

3/7/16, at 1. As the trial court thoroughly explained:

On February 10, 2016, [Appellant] filed an application with 

the district attorney’s office for admission to the Accelerated 

Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program. On March 16, 

2016, [Appellant] received written notice from the district 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3921(a) and 3925(a), respectively.
J-A26026-17

- 2 -

attorney that he was determined eligible for the ARD 

program. The letter also outlined the conditions [Appellant] 

would need to complete and directed [Appellant] to appear 

on April 26, 2016, before [the trial court,] for admission into 

the ARD program. [Appellant’s] special conditions included 

completing 35 hours of community service within four 

months, complet[ing] a mental health evaluation and 

recommended treatment within six months, and pay[ing]

restitution in the amount of [$590.00] by April 26, 2016.

On April 26, 2016, [Appellant] failed to appear before the 

[trial] court. On April 28, 2016, notice was sent to 

[Appellant] that his application for admission into ARD was 

denied by the district attorney for failure to appear on April 

26, 2016 and for failure to make the required restitution 

payment. . . .

On May 3, 2016, counsel for [Appellant] submitted to the 

district attorney a request for reconsideration of his 

application into ARD. Counsel indicated that the public 

defender’s office routinely advises any inquiring defendant 

that if he/she cannot make the restitution payment 

required, the inquiring defendant need not appear before 

the [trial] court and the ARD application will be rejected. 

Further, defense counsel asserted that the district attorney’s 

rejection of [Appellant] for failure to pay restitution was 

unconstitutional and cited to [Commonwealth v. Melnyk, 

548 A.2d 266 (Pa. Super. 1988) for support].

On May 4, 2016, the district attorney’s office sent 

notification to [Appellant,] advising that he was being given 

reconsideration for ARD. The special conditions were 

slightly amended to increase his community service hours to 

[40; however, Appellant was still required to pay $590.00 

as a condition precedent to being placed into ARD. See

Amended ARD Conditions, dated 5/4/16, at 2. Appellant] 

was directed to appear before the [trial court] on May 31, 

2016 [for his ARD admission hearing]. . . .

On May 13, 2016, [Appellant’s] counsel filed a Motion for 

Payment Determination with the [trial court] and requested 

a continuance of the [May 31, 2016] ARD admission 

hearing. [The trial court did not grant Appellant’s requested 

continuance. Moreover, Appellant] did not appear [for the 
J-A26026-17

- 3 -

scheduled, May 31, 2016] ARD admission hearing. . . . On 

June 2, 2016, [Appellant] was notified by the district

attorney’s office that his ARD application was denied as a 

result of his failure to appear in court on May 31, 2016.

A hearing on [Appellant’s] Motion for Payment 

Determination was held on June 27, 2016. At the hearing 

[Appellant’s] counsel indicated that the relief sought by the 

motion was a determination by the [trial] court as to 

whether [Appellant] could pay the required restitution 

within the ARD time period of [12] months. The 

Commonwealth asserted that [Appellant] had been given 

two opportunities to come before the [trial] court at the 

previously scheduled ARD hearing[s] held on April 26, 2016 

and May 31, 2016. 

[During the June 27, 2016 hearing,] testimony was offered 

by [Appellant] as to his expenses, however, it was woefully 

inadequate. [Appellant] testified to rent expense of 

$542.00 per month, electric bill of $75.50 per month (with a 

past due balance of $1376), cell phone bill of $217.90 per 

month (with an installation balance of $268.88), car 

payment of $281.67 per month, and car insurance of 

$74.00 per month. No testimony was offered as to living 

expenses such as food, gasoline, clothing, toiletries, etc. 

The total of the expenses presented by [Appellant] was 

$1191.27 per month against a monthly income of 

$1148.37.

[Appellant] asserted that his rent expense would decrease 

in the near future when he moved to another location and 

that he would begin to earn commissions at his 

employment[; however,] no verifiable evidence was 

presented regarding these possible future events. [Further, 

Appellant] acknowledged on cross-examination that 

between the time he was charged [with committing the 

offenses] and the June 27, 2016 hearing, he had put aside 

no funds to be paid towards restitution. . . .

Based upon the testimony offered, the [trial] court directed 

[Appellant] to provide to the district attorney’s office within 

ten days a complete budget, including what ability to pay 

restitution was currently in existence. The Commonwealth 

was directed to review the information and provide any 
J-A26026-17

- 4 -

possible alternatives to admitting [Appellant] into the ARD 

program.

[Appellant] timely submitted a budget to the district 

attorney’s office, with no supporting documentation as to 

how it was calculated that his income had increased by 

[$150.00] per month in less than ten days. No lease 

agreement was included that would support [Appellant’s] 

claim that his rent obligation would decrease from 

[$542.00] per month to [$125.00] per month. Additionally, 

calculations were not accurately made to account for the 

fact that there are more than four weeks in [11] out of the 

[12] months of the calendar year. . . . 

Accepting the information provided on its face with only 

adjustments of the information contained within the budget 

to reality, [the trial court] calculate[d] the budgeted income 

as [$1300.00] per month versus expenses of [$1031.00 per 

month] (not including any payment towards ARD costs or 

restitution). No explanation was offered as to how 

[Appellant’s] financial condition improved within a week to 

provide him with disposable income of [$269.00,] with more 

expenses[,] than the earlier evidence of [$43.00] of 

disposable income (with less expenses) at the time of the 

[June] 27, 2016 hearing.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/12/17, at 1-7 (internal footnote and some internal 

capitalization omitted).

On July 18, 2016, Appellant filed a “Motion to Compel Admission into 

the ARD Program” (hereinafter “Motion to Compel ARD”). Within the 

motion, Appellant asserted his indigency and claimed that the district 

attorney had rejected him from ARD simply because he was unable to pay 

the required restitution. Appellant’s Motion to Compel ARD, 7/18/16, at 1. 

In particular, Appellant claimed that the district attorney rejected him from 

ARD because he could not pay the requisite, “up front” $590.00 portion of 
J-A26026-17

- 5 -

his mandatory restitution, as specified in the “ARD Conditions” and 

“Amended ARD Conditions.” Id. at 4. Appellant claimed that the district 

attorney’s action violated his rights under the due process and equal 

protection clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Id.

The Commonwealth responded to Appellant’s Motion to Compel ARD 

and noted that the district attorney did not deny Appellant admission into 

the ARD program because of his indigency. Rather, Appellant was rejected 

from the program because he failed to appear for his scheduled, May 31, 

2016 ARD hearing. Commonwealth’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to 

Appellant’s Motion, 8/22/16, at 6 (“[i]n the instant matter, . . . [Appellant] 

had been accepted into the ARD program but was subsequently denied for 

failing to appear in court”); see also ARD Denial Notice, 6/2/16, at 1 

(“[y]our application for [ARD] has been denied due to the following 

reason(s): failure to appear at ARD court on 5/31/2016”) (some internal 

capitalization omitted). In the alternative, the Commonwealth claimed that, 

if it wished, it was permitted to reject Appellant from ARD because Appellant 

was unable to pay the restitution. See Commonwealth’s Memorandum of 

Law in Opposition to Appellant’s Motion, 8/22/16, at 6-7. 

On October 13, 2016, the trial court entered an order denying 

Appellant’s Motion to Compel ARD. 

Following a stipulated bench trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty 

of theft by unlawful taking and receiving stolen property. On February 13, 
J-A26026-17

- 6 -

2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve 12 months of probation on 

both counts. N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 2/13/17, at 6.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. In response, the trial court 

issued an opinion, in which it explained that it denied Appellant’s Motion to 

Compel ARD because: 1) “[o]n two separate occasions, [Appellant] failed to 

appear for his ARD admission hearing, which in and of itself would provide

the district attorney with a legitimate basis to deny admission into ARD” and

2) during the June 27, 2016 hearing, Appellant did not demonstrate that he 

was willing to make a bona fide effort to pay his restitution. Trial Court 

Opinion, 4/12/17, at 7-12. With respect to the latter reason, the trial court 

noted that Appellant continued to spend large amounts of money on

discretionary goods and services, refused to budget for his restitution 

payments, and, during the hearing, merely speculated as to his income 

sources and expenses. Id. at 10-11.

Appellant now raises two claims to this Court:

[1.] Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s] 

Motion to Compel Admission into the ARD Program where, 

despite being unable to pay a portion of restitution before 

entry into the program, he showed a willingness to make a 

bona fide effort to pay his restitution and there was good 

cause for his failure to appear at his placements due to his 

inability to pay beforehand and the fact that his motion 

regarding same was unresolved[?]

[2.] Whether the trial court erred in failing to merge 

[Appellant’s] conviction for receiving stolen property into his 

theft by unlawful taking conviction[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 4.
J-A26026-17

- 7 -

Appellant first claims that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to 

Compel ARD, as the district attorney denied his ARD application on the 

impermissible basis that he was indigent and unable to pay his mandatory 

restitution. We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying 

Appellant’s motion, as the district attorney did not deny Appellant’s 

application because Appellant was indigent or because Appellant was unable 

to pay the restitution – but rather because Appellant “fail[ed] to appear at 

ARD court on 5/31/2016.” ARD Denial Notice, 6/2/16, at 1.

We have explained:

ARD is a privilege, not a right, and the decision to submit a 

matter for ARD is in the sole discretion of the district 

attorney. While the district attorney’s discretion is broad, 

and appellate review of such decisions is narrow, the district 

attorney’s power is not completely unfettered and is subject 

to the following judicially imposed restrictions: 1) an open, 

on-the-record specification of reasons which are 2) related 

to society's protection or the defendant's rehabilitation. 

Where, however, the decision to reject an ARD candidate is 

wholly, patently and without doubt unrelated to the 

protection of society and/or the likelihood of the candidate’s 

success in rehabilitation, the district attorney has abused his 

discretion.

An abuse of discretion is established where the decision to 

reject a person for ARD is based, for example, on race or 

religion. However, any policy rationally related to society’s 

protection or an individual’s ability to succeed under the 

program is acceptable and is not considered an abuse of 

discretion.

Commonwealth v. Morrow, 650 A.2d 907, 910-911 (Pa. Super. 1994)

(internal quotations and citations omitted). Moreover, and importantly,

“[t]he Commonwealth does not have the burden of proving the absence of 
J-A26026-17

- 8 -

abuse of discretion; rather, the petitioner has the burden of proving the 

Commonwealth's denial of his request was based on prohibited reasons.” 

Commonwealth v. Sohnleitner, 884 A.2d 307, 314 (Pa. Super. 2005). If 

the petitioner fails to disprove that “the district attorney based his decision 

upon criteria related to the protection of society or the likelihood of a 

person's success in rehabilitation, then the district attorney's decision will 

stand.” Id.

On appeal, Appellant claims that the district attorney denied his ARD 

application on the impermissible basis that he was indigent and unable to 

pay his restitution. Appellant claims that the district attorney’s actions 

violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States 

Constitution and this Court’s pronouncement in Melnyk, 548 A.2d at 266. 

Appellant’s claim is based upon a distorted reading of the record and thus 

fails.

In Melnyk, this Court held:

[I]n ARD determinations, the district attorney and the court 

must inquire into the reasons for the petitioner's inability to 

pay restitution. If the petitioner shows a willingness to 

make a bona fide effort to pay whole or partial restitution, 

the State may not deny entrance to the ARD program. If 

the petitioner has no ability to make restitution despite 

sufficient bona fide efforts to do so, the State must consider 

alternative conditions for admittance to and completion of 

the ARD program. To do otherwise would deprive the 

petitioner [his] interest in repaying [his] debt to society 

without receiving a criminal record simply because, through 

no fault of [his] own, [he] could not pay restitution. Such a 

deprivation would be contrary to the fundamental fairness 

required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
J-A26026-17

- 9 -

Melnyk, 548 A.2d at 272.

Contrary to Appellant’s claims, Melnyk is not applicable to the case at 

bar. Indeed, as the trial court found, the district attorney did not reject 

Appellant from the ARD program because of indigency. Rather, as the trial 

court held, the district attorney rejected Appellant because he failed to 

appear for the May 31, 2016 hearing.2 The evidence supports this factual 

finding. 

As noted, on March 16, 2016, the district attorney conditionally 

approved Appellant for entry into the ARD program. The March 16, 2016 

letter from the district attorney to Appellant directed Appellant to appear for 

an April 26, 2016 ARD admission hearing and to pay $590.00 in restitution 

by the hearing date. Appellant, however, did not pay the restitution and did 

not appear for the April 26, 2016 hearing. As a result, the district attorney 

sent Appellant notice that his application for ARD had been rejected for the 

____________________________________________

2 The trial court also held that, during the June 27, 2016 hearing, Appellant 

failed to demonstrate that he would make a bona fide effort to pay his 

restitution. Trial Court Opinion, 4/12/17, at 10-11. However, as this Court 

held in Sohnleitner, “[i]f the decision of the district attorney is related to 

the protection of society or the likelihood of a person’s success in 

rehabilitation, the trial court is no longer in a position to continue inquiry.” 

Sohnleitner, 884 A.2d at 314. Therefore, once the trial court concluded 

that the district attorney denied Appellant’s ARD application because 

Appellant failed to appear for the May 31, 2016 hearing – and not because of 

a genuine inability to pay restitution – the trial court was “no longer in a 

position to continue inquiry” into whether the district attorney abused its 

discretion in denying Appellant’s ARD application. Id.
J-A26026-17

- 10 -

following reasons: 1) “failure to appear at ARD court on 4/26/16” and 2) 

“failure to pay restitution due at ARD court.” ARD Denial Notice, 4/28/16, at 

1.

On May 3, 2016, Appellant’s attorney wrote a letter, requesting that 

the district attorney reconsider Appellant’s application into the ARD program. 

As a result, the district attorney again conditionally accepted Appellant into 

the ARD program. The district attorney’s conditional acceptance notice

directed Appellant to appear for a May 31, 2016 ARD admission hearing and 

specifically informed Appellant: “[f]ailure to appear [for the scheduled May 

31, 2016 hearing] will result in your case being rejected from the ARD 

program and scheduled for trial.” Amended ARD Conditions, dated 5/4/16, 

at 1. 

Appellant simply did not appear for the May 31, 2016 ARD admission 

hearing – and, during the May 31, 2016 hearing, Appellant’s counsel had no 

explanation for Appellant’s failure to appear. See N.T. ARD Admission 

Hearing, 5/31/16, at 10 (when asked why Appellant failed to appear at the 

hearing, Appellant’s counsel informed the trial court: “Your Honor, I believe 

he’s working today. I would be lying if I said I’ve spoken to him. I have not 

since I filed the motion”). Because of Appellant’s failure to appear, the 

district attorney then declared: “[t]he standard thing we do at this point is 

to remove him from the list. If there’s no rationale for it, that’s what we 

would do.” Id.
J-A26026-17

- 11 -

Thus, on June 2, 2016, the district attorney sent Appellant notice that 

his ARD application had been denied for one reason: “failure to appear at 

ARD court on 5/31/2016.” ARD Denial Notice, 6/2/16, at 1.

Further, during the June 27, 2016 hearing, the Commonwealth 

acknowledged that it was not permitted to reject Appellant from the ARD 

program if Appellant were indigent and genuinely unable to make the 

restitution payments. See N.T. Hearing, 6/27/16, at 4 (the Commonwealth

acknowledged that, after it received notice that Appellant claimed indigency,

there was a need to “examine [Appellant] as to his ability to make the ARD 

payments that were requested as required by Commonwealth [v.] 

Melnyk”). N.T. Hearing, 6/27/16, at 4. However, as the Commonwealth

declared during the June 27, 2016 hearing, Appellant failed to appear for the 

May 31, 2016 hearing and, as a result of this failure to appear, the district 

attorney rejected Appellant from the program. Id. Indeed, during the June 

27, 2016 hearing, the district attorney repeatedly declared that Appellant 

had been rejected from the ARD program for one reason: because he failed 

to appear for the scheduled, May 31, 2016 hearing. The district attorney 

informed the trial court:

When the [initial ARD admission hearing] was scheduled for 

April [26, 2016,] when [Appellant] failed to appear, 

[Appellant] was rejected.

Defense counsel at that point presented to the 

Commonwealth, I guess a letter [] referencing this Melnyk

case, indicating that [Appellant] should have an opportunity 
J-A26026-17

- 12 -

to explain, and the reason that he didn’t appear was he was 

instructed by the Public Defender’s Office not to appear.

It was on that basis, out of a sense of fairness that we 

wanted to give [Appellant] an opportunity to explain why he 

could not make his payments, and the matter was then 

rescheduled for May 31[, 2016].

After [Appellant] did not appear on May 31, he was again 

rejected.

. . .

The first hearing I understand. The . . . [public defender’s]

office had a light fumble. Okay. Well, so in fairness

requires him back. But, when you don’t show up a 

second time, and made no effort to do that, and 

inquiry was made at that time before [the trial court 

judge], both counsel and I were [] present, and I 

asked, why has he not appeared? And there was no 

answer from defense counsel and we still haven’t 

heard one today.

This does not – is not a demonstration that he’s going 

to comply with the rehabilitation that ARD is 

supposed to provide.

Id. at 34-35 and 38-39 (emphasis added).

The trial court viewed the evidence of record and concluded that the 

district attorney did not reject Appellant because of indigency – but, rather, 

because he failed to appear for his scheduled, May 31, 2016 hearing. Trial 

Court Opinion, 4/12/17, at 9-10. Moreover, the trial court also heard 

Appellant’s testimony at the June 27, 2016 hearing and concluded that 

Appellant did not demonstrate that he was willing to make a bona fide effort 

to pay his restitution. Id. at 10-11. Indeed, the trial court concluded that 

Appellant continued to have substantial discretionary expenses, refused to 
J-A26026-17

- 13 -

budget for his restitution payments, and, during the hearing, merely 

speculated as to his income sources and expenses. Id. at 10-11.

The trial court’s factual findings in this case are supported by the 

record and demonstrate that the district attorney did not deny Appellant’s 

ARD application because of Appellant’s indigency, but rather because 

Appellant failed to appear for the May 31, 2016 hearing.3 As such, 

____________________________________________

3 Within the Commonwealth’s brief, the Commonwealth notes that it denied 

Appellant’s ARD application because Appellant “fail[ed] to appear in court”

for the May 31, 2016 hearing. Commonwealth’s Brief at 21. Nevertheless, 

the Commonwealth also argues in its brief that it could have denied 

Appellant’s application based upon Appellant’s indigency and inability to pay 

the mandatory restitution. See id. In particular, the Commonwealth argues 

that, since “[t]he restitution owed by [Appellant] is a mandatory obligation 

pursuant to 18 [Pa.C.S.A. §] 1106 . . . [Appellant’s] ability to pay . . . [is] of 

no concern or import to the case at hand.” Id. at 21-22. We are disturbed 

by the Commonwealth’s insistence that it could deny Appellant’s application 

based upon a genuine inability to pay restitution. Regardless of whether 

restitution is mandatory or discretionary at sentencing, a petitioner’s bona 

fide inability to pay the restitution obligation is a factor that is “wholly, 

patently and without doubt unrelated to the protection of society and/or the 

likelihood of the candidate’s success in rehabilitation.” Morrow, 650 A.2d at 

910-911. Further, as this Court has recognized, such discrimination violates 

the due process clause of the United States Constitution. Melnyk, 548 A.2d 

at 270-272.

Nevertheless, since the district attorney did not deny Appellant’s ARD 

application upon the impermissible reason that, “through no fault of [his]

own, [Appellant] could not pay restitution,” we conclude that the 

Commonwealth’s erroneous argument does not require reversal. See id.
J-A26026-17

- 14 -

Appellant’s claim that the district attorney denied his application upon an 

impermissible basis fails.4

For Appellant’s second claim on appeal, Appellant contends that the 

trial court “erred in failing to merge [his] conviction for receiving stolen 

property into his conviction for theft by unlawful taking.” Appellant’s Brief at 

39. The Commonwealth agrees that Appellant is entitled to relief on this 

claim. Commonwealth’s Brief at 34. 

We agree with Appellant and the Commonwealth and conclude that

Appellant is indeed entitled to relief on this claim, as both convictions arose 

from the same criminal act and “all of the statutory elements of [theft by 

unlawful taking] are included in the statutory elements of [receiving stolen 

____________________________________________

4 Within his brief, Appellant also claims that his failure to attend the May 31, 

2016 hearing should be excused because the Amended ARD Conditions 

declared that he was required to pay $590.00 as a condition precedent to 

being placed into ARD. See Amended ARD Conditions, dated 5/4/16, at 2. 

According to Appellant, he had good cause to simply skip his mandatory 

hearing because he was indigent and could not pay the $590.00. Appellant’s 

Brief at 31-38.

As Appellant himself acknowledges, his unexplained failure to appear for his 

May 31, 2016 hearing “suggest[s] disregard for his obligations [and] an 

inability to take the [rehabilitation] program seriously.” Id. at 31. Further, 

even if Appellant were unable to pay the $590.00 at the time of the hearing, 

Appellant had an obligation to comply with the notice and appear at the 

hearing. Certainly, the hearing was Appellant’s only opportunity to explain 

why he could not pay the restitution and establish a good faith plan to 

satisfy his obligations. Appellant’s failure to comply with the notice indeed 

“suggest[s] disregard for his obligations [and] an inability to take the 

[rehabilitation] program seriously.” Id.
J-A26026-17

- 15 -

property].” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9765 (merger of sentences); Commonwealth v. 

Young, 35 A.3d 54 (Pa. Super. 2011); see also Commonwealth v. 

Wilson, 458 A.2d 244, 245-246 (Pa. Super. 1983) (“[f]or purposes of 

sentencing, [] the crime of theft by receiving stolen property merged into 

the crime of theft by unlawful taking”). Further, since the trial court 

sentenced Appellant at both counts and never specified, at sentencing, 

whether Appellant’s sentences were to run consecutively or concurrently, we 

vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.5 See

N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 2/13/17, at 6 (“We sentence [Appellant] on each 

count to 12 months’ probation, plus the cost of prosecution, and direct that 

he make restitution to Planet RYO in the amount of $1,590”); see also 

Sentencing Order, 2/13/17, at 1-2 (does not specify whether the sentences

are consecutive or concurrent).

Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing. 

Jurisdiction relinquished.

____________________________________________

5 Appellant and the Commonwealth claim that the trial court sentenced 

Appellant to serve concurrent terms of probation. Appellant’s Brief at 39; 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 12. Thus, Appellant asserts that this Court does 

not need to remand for resentencing and that we may simply vacate the 

merged sentence. See Appellant’s Brief at 39-40; see also 

Commonwealth v. Owens, 649 A.2d 129, 139 (Pa. Super. 1994) (“Where 

a correction of sentence is needed, this Court has the option of amending 

the sentence directly or remanding to the lower court for resentencing. We 

will not remand for resentencing since the sentences in this case are to run 

concurrently”). As noted, we do not see where the trial court specified that 

the sentences were to run consecutively or concurrently; therefore, we must 

vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.
J-A26026-17

- 16 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/20/2018