SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

350 

CA 11-01573 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., FAHEY, LINDLEY, SCONIERS, AND MARTOCHE, JJ. 

 

M&T REAL ESTATE TRUST, SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO 

M&T REAL ESTATE, INC., PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JAMES J. DOYLE, II, AND JIM DOYLE FORD, INC., 

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. 

(APPEAL NO. 2.) 

 

GROSS, SHUMAN, BRIZDLE & GILFILLAN, P.C., BUFFALO (JOHN K. ROTTARIS OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. 

JAECKLE FLEISCHMANN & MUGEL, LLP, BUFFALO (HOWARD S. ROSENHOCH OF

COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme

Court, Erie County (Michael L. D’Amico, A.J.), entered July 20, 2011

in a proceeding pursuant to RPAPL article 13. The order and judgment,

insofar as appealed from, granted plaintiff a deficiency judgment

against defendants. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order and judgment insofar as

appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs and

that part of the motion for leave to enter a deficiency judgment is

denied. 

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking, inter alia,

to foreclose certain commercial mortgages and obtain a judgment of

foreclosure and sale. Plaintiff was the successful bidder when the

property in question was sold at public auction, and it thereafter

assigned its successful bid. According to the report of sale dated

May 11, 2010, the Referee appointed to conduct the sale executed a

deed prepared by counsel for plaintiff naming plaintiff’s assignee as

the grantee. The Referee mailed the deed to plaintiff’s counsel, who

also represented the assignee. After the deed was mailed but before

it was received, plaintiff’s counsel telephoned the Referee and

advised him that the assignee was negotiating with a prospective

purchaser and would not accept the deed at that time. Plaintiff’s

counsel subsequently returned the deed with a cover letter dated May

17, 2010, directing the Referee to hold the deed in his file until

further notice. By letter dated July 26, 2010, plaintiff’s counsel

requested that the Referee send him the deed and other closing

documents. After receiving the deed, plaintiff’s counsel further

requested that the Referee “re-execute the . . . deed” so that it
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CA 11-01573 

would be “dated concurrently with its delivery.” The Referee’s deed

indicates that it was executed August 9, 2010.

On September 3, 2010 plaintiff moved, inter alia, to confirm the

Referee’s report of sale and for leave to enter a deficiency judgment

against defendants pursuant to RPAPL 1371 (2). Supreme Court erred in

granting that part of the motion seeking leave to enter a deficiency

judgment inasmuch as the motion was not “made within [90] days after

the date of the consummation of the [foreclosure] sale by the delivery

of the proper deed of conveyance to the purchaser” (RPAPL 1371 [2]). 

That 90-day period is a statute of limitations that was timely raised

by defendants in opposition to the motion (see Mortgagee Affiliates

Corp. v Jerder Realty Servs., 62 AD2d 591, 593, affd 47 NY2d 796; Voss

v Multifilm Corp. of Am., 112 AD2d 216, 217). 

We agree with defendants that the foreclosure sale was

consummated and the 90-day period commenced in May 2010 upon the

delivery of the Referee’s deed. Such delivery occurred within the

meaning of the statute at that time inasmuch as the Referee, acting as

grantor on behalf of the court (see Lennar Northeast Partners Ltd.

Partnership v Gifaldi, 258 AD2d 240, 243, lv denied 94 NY2d 754),

executed and parted with control of the deed prepared by plaintiff’s

counsel with the intention to pass title (see National Bank of Sussex

County v Betar, 207 AD2d 610, 611-612). “When the Referee[] signed

the deed[] presented by [plaintiff’s] counsel, [he was] left with no

title to convey to any other party,” and thus the sale was consummated

upon the delivery of that deed in May 2010, notwithstanding the

refusal of plaintiff’s counsel to accept and retain physical

possession of the deed at that time (Lennar Northeast Partners Ltd.

Partnership, 258 AD2d at 243; see Cicero v Aspen Hills II, LLC, 85

AD3d 1411, 1412). Thus, plaintiff’s motion was untimely.

Entered: March 23, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court