2023 IL App (4th) 230351-U 

NO. 4-23-0351 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

TARA S.,

 Petitioner-Appellee,

 v. 

CHRISTINA COX, 

 Respondent-Appellant. 

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

)

Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Adams County 

No. 22OP407 

Honorable 

John C. Wooleyhan, 

Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court.

 Justices Zenoff and Doherty concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court reversed, concluding a plenary stalking no contact order should 

not have been issued where the evidence failed to show respondent knew or should 

have known her course of conduct would cause a person in petitioner’s 

circumstances with petitioner’s knowledge of respondent and respondent’s prior 

acts to fear for her safety or the safety of her child or suffer significant mental 

suffering, anxiety, or alarm.

¶ 2 Pursuant to the Stalking No Contact Order Act (Act) (740 ILCS 21/1 to 135 (West 

2022)), petitioner, Tara S., filed a petition for a stalking no contact order against respondent, 

Christina Cox. The circuit court entered the requested order on an emergency basis and then, 

following a hearing, entered the order on a plenary basis to expire one year from the date of entry 

of the emergency order. Respondent appeals, arguing the plenary order should not have been 

issued based upon the evidence presented. For the reasons that follow, we agree and reverse the 

court’s judgment.

FILED

December 28, 2023

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
- 2 - 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 A. Petition for a Stalking No Contact Order

¶ 5 In October 2022, petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a verified petition for a 

stalking no contact order against respondent. In the petition, petitioner alleged respondent, the 

former foster mother of one of petitioner’s children, K.S., continued to contact her and K.S. after 

she “regained custody” of K.S. in July 2022. Specifically, petitioner alleged respondent

(1) repeatedly contacted her via “[p]hone” and “text message” and (2) sent K.S. a letter at her 

school requesting continued communication. With respect to the contact via text message, 

petitioner alleged she received messages on July 5, 14, 22, 27, and 29; August 3; and September 

18 and 24. Petitioner further alleged the contact occurred despite representatives from involved 

agencies addressing the issue with respondent and the existence of a “fostering contract” stating 

respondent was to have no contact with petitioner or K.S. after K.S. was returned to petitioner’s 

care. Petitioner requested the stalking no contact order be entered in favor of herself and K.S.

¶ 6 B. Issuance of an Emergency Order

¶ 7 Also in October 2022, the circuit court, Judge Amy C. Lannerd presiding, 

conducted a hearing on the petition for a stalking no contact order. Petitioner appeared pro se, 

while respondent, who had not been served with the petition, did not appear. A representative from 

the Quincy Area Network Against Domestic Abuse (Quanada) was also present at the hearing. On 

inquiry of the court, petitioner testified the allegations in her petition were true, correct, and 

accurate. When asked for a brief explanation why she was requesting a stalking no contact order, 

petitioner testified:

“[K.S.] did really good [when temporarily placed with respondent]. [K.S.] was to 

be returned to me July 4th of this year and she was. Prior from July 4th, [respondent] 
- 3 - 

was given notice from four agencies that, for the best interest of [K.S.], that she 

would leave me and [K.S.] alone. It was verbal. She won’t do it. She is now in the 

public school system and this lady has—she’s a principal in a different school 

district. They are now sending letters through third parties to [K.S.] in a different 

school district. We can’t get any authority to get her to understand it.” 

The court, based upon the evidence presented, entered the requested stalking no contact order on 

an emergency basis. Thereafter, respondent was served with the petition and emergency order and 

obtained representation by counsel. The matter was then continued until March 2023.

¶ 8 C. Issuance of a Plenary Order

¶ 9 In March 2023, the circuit court, Judge John C. Wooleyhan presiding, conducted a 

hearing on the petition for a stalking no contact order. Petitioner appeared pro se, while respondent

appeared with counsel.

¶ 10 1. Petitioner’s Case

¶ 11 Petitioner presented testimony from multiple witnesses, including herself, her 

therapist, and involved caseworkers. The following is gleaned from the testimony presented.

¶ 12 In early 2022, K.S. was in the temporary care of respondent, her foster mother. 

Petitioner was unaware of how long K.S. had been in respondent’s care. Around July 2022, K.S. 

was returned to the care of petitioner. The court case which brought K.S. into temporary care was 

closed on October 5, 2022, the same day petitioner sought a stalking no contact order against 

respondent. 

¶ 13 With respect to the verified petition filed in this case, petitioner testified she relied 

upon the assistance of a representative from Quanada to complete the petition. As for the allegation 

about a “fostering contract” in the petition, petitioner asserted she knew “nothing about that.” As 
- 4 - 

for the allegation about respondent sending a letter to K.S., petitioner asserted “someone 

misinterpreted what was said.” Petitioner acknowledged the letter, which was the subject of the 

allegation, was not, in fact, sent to K.S. by respondent. 

¶ 14 Petitioner testified respondent continued to contact her after K.S. was returned to 

her care. Specifically, petitioner asserted she “kept getting phone calls and text messages from 

[respondent].” Petitioner indicated she received “five to eight of them all pertaining to [K.S.].” The 

text messages, she explained, concerned “asking about seeing [K.S.], how they miss [K.S.], how 

they want to be involved with her.” Petitioner acknowledged the text messages never contained 

any “threats.” She asserted the continued contact from respondent “was making [her] mental

[health] bad” and “stressed [her].”

¶ 15 Petitioner testified she had wanted “no communication whatsoever” from 

respondent after K.S. was returned to her care and was “under the understanding that there would 

be no [such] communication.” She acknowledged she never directly conveyed to respondent that 

the contact should be halted. Petitioner testified she never responded to respondent’s phone calls 

or text messages; however, she also acknowledged communicating with respondent about a 

bracelet K.S. had left in respondent’s home, as well as K.S. being involved in a dance program. 

Petitioner asserted she spoke with the involved caseworkers and her therapist about her desire for 

the contact by respondent to be halted and then relied upon those individuals to convey her desire 

to respondent.

¶ 16 Petitioner’s therapist testified she contacted involved caseworkers about 

respondent’s continued contact with petitioner. One of the caseworkers, according to petitioner’s 

therapist and over no objection, indicated in response, “[T]hey had conversations before and that 

she would take care of it again.” The caseworker also reportedly indicated respondent would not 
- 5 - 

be “reaching out” to the petitioner further. Petitioner’s therapist did not recall when the caseworker 

had given these responses.

¶ 17 The caseworker whom petitioner’s therapist spoke with testified she spoke with 

respondent and conveyed “that it would not be in the best interest of [K.S.] specifically to have 

in-person visitation.” The caseworker indicated respondent was upset but agreed she would not 

reach out for in-person contact. The caseworker acknowledged petitioner had conveyed to her 

instances where respondent “reach[ed] out” and made “inquiries” about K.S.’s well-being. The 

caseworker was not aware of any “threats or nasty messages” from respondent. The caseworker 

testified she and respondent did not discuss “texting and calling.” The caseworker acknowledged 

the parties had difficulties “get[ting] along” while the case which brought K.S. into care was 

ongoing. 

¶ 18 Another caseworker recalled a conversation with petitioner around August or 

September 2022 about petitioner wanting contact by respondent to halt. The caseworker observed 

text messages on petitioner’s phone. The caseworker indicated the text messages were primarily 

“just concerns about [K.S.],” such as asking “how [K.S.] was” and if there was “anything they 

needed.” The caseworker did not see any threatening messages. The caseworker advised petitioner 

he would talk to his supervisor about the unwanted contact, which he then did. The caseworker 

testified he also advised petitioner to tell respondent to stop contacting her. The caseworker never 

spoke with respondent about the unwanted contact. Later, in October 2022, the caseworker advised 

petitioner to seek a no contact order if the contact was still occurring.

¶ 19 2. Motion for a Directed Finding

¶ 20 At the close of petitioner’s case, respondent moved for a directed finding. The 

circuit court denied respondent’s motion.
- 6 - 

¶ 21 3. Respondent’s Case

¶ 22 Respondent presented testimony from multiple witnesses, including herself, her 

sister, a former teacher of K.S., the director of an involved agency, a caseworker, and a teacher at 

K.S.’s current school. Respondent also presented the letter sent to K.S. which was the subject of 

the allegation in the petition, as well as screenshots of multiple text messages sent between the 

parties. The following is gleaned from the evidence presented. 

¶ 23 Respondent, a school principal and an experienced foster parent, testified K.S. came 

into her temporary care on June 6, 2021, and then lived with her through July 13, 2022. 

¶ 24 With respect to the allegations in the verified petition, respondent testified she never 

sent a letter to K.S. after K.S. was returned to the care of petitioner. She also testified she was not 

aware of any fostering contract indicating she was to have no contact with petitioner or K.S. after 

K.S.’s return. The contents of the letter sent to K.S., as well as the testimony from other witnesses, 

confirmed respondent had no involvement in its drafting or transfer. Testimony from the director 

of an involved agency confirmed the absence of any fostering contract indicating respondent was 

to have no contact with petitioner or K.S. after K.S.’s return to the care of petitioner.

¶ 25 Respondent acknowledged continued contact with petitioner after K.S. was 

returned to petitioner’s care. Respondent asserted said contact was encouraged by a caseworker 

to provide additional support for K.S. That caseworker testified and indicated she told petitioner 

during the summer of 2022 “that communication between [K.S.] and the foster parents would be 

beneficial to [K.S.] [as well as ] the rest of the family as *** extra support.” The caseworker further 

indicated petitioner did not express any opposition to this suggestion at the time. The caseworker 

also testified about an instance where she, in response to an inquiry from petitioner’s therapist, 

informed petitioner’s therapist “[t]hat it would be beneficial for [K.S.] to still have that 
- 7 - 

communication” with respondent. The caseworker testified she never told respondent that her 

contact with petitioner should be halted.

¶ 26 Respondent testified about text messages she sent to petitioner between July and 

September 2022. Respondent took screenshots of the text messages sent and received on or about 

the dates listed in the verified petition. On July 5, respondent sent petitioner a message about an 

appointment for K.S., to which petitioner responded. On July 14, petitioner sent respondent a 

message about a missing bracelet, to which respondent responded and a lengthy discussion 

occurred. On July 22, 27, and 29, respondent sent petitioner messages, to which petitioner did not 

respond. The first two messages concerned respondent “checking in” on K.S. The last message 

concerned respondent sharing information about a dance class for K.S. and offering to provide 

both funds and transportation for the class. 

¶ 27 In late August or early September 2022, respondent contacted a caseworker about 

the absence of any recent communication from petitioner. Respondent testified the caseworker 

advised against in-person contact with K.S. due to an incident which occurred during the last 

overnight visit K.S. had with respondent. Respondent further testified the caseworker stated she 

hoped they could have in-person contact in the future. On September 18 and 24, respondent sent 

petitioner text messages, to which petitioner did not respond. In the first message, respondent 

conveyed a desire to be involved in K.S.’s life and again made the offer concerning the dance 

class. In the second message, respondent conveyed that a picture K.S. had drawn was in the news. 

Respondent testified she was never told to have no further contact with petitioner following K.S.’s 

return to petitioner’s care.

¶ 28 4. Circuit Court’s Decision and Order

¶ 29 Following arguments, the circuit ruled as follows:
- 8 - 

“The record in this case shows that the petition was filed by [petitioner] on 

behalf of herself and also showed [K.S.] as another protected person because [K.S.] 

is a part of the household of [petitioner]. The—based on the evidence, the Court 

can find it does have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. The Court 

has been able to review the exhibits that have been brought into court today and 

also observe all the witnesses who testified and to determine the weight and 

credibility to be assigned to each of them.

There are some statements, parts of the statement in the petition have been 

proven. Others have not. It doesn’t really revolve around the—whether the child 

was in foster care or not. That really doesn’t help determine the issues. That was 

part of what the circumstances were but the way that stalking is defined under the 

statute is it refers to a course of conduct, not one single thing. Not one single act. 

Stalking does include certain things which are listed in the statute such as following 

someone from place to place or keeping someone under surveillance, going to a 

person’s home or place of work. It also includes stalking behavior does include 

making unwanted telephone calls, sending unwanted emails, or text messages along 

with other behavior.

In this situation, it has been proven that [the petitioner] did receive text 

messages from the respondent on several occasions that she had not solicited. They 

came from the respondent to the petitioner regarding the minor child that’s been 

referred to in this case and some of those text messages came after the child was 

back living with the petitioner, the mother.

Under the statute, there is—there is no requirement listed in the statute that 
- 9 - 

someone has to inform another party to say that they don’t want to be contacted by 

that person. Those contacts don’t—do not have to contain threats of any kind to be 

considered stalking if the communication is something that’s unwanted or 

unsolicited and that’s really as far as we have to look here. The petitioner received 

unwanted communications from the respondent and based on that and the exhibits 

and all the information that it would constitute a course of conduct or a series of 

events that would constitute stalking so there’s been a sufficient amount of proof

offered on some of these allegations in the petition to say that or find that the 

petition has been proven by the evidence and would be a basis for continuing the 

stalking no-contact order in place.” 

The court entered a plenary stalking no contact order. The order was set to expire on October 6, 

2023. 

¶ 30 This appeal followed. 

¶ 31 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 32 On appeal, respondent argues the plenary stalking no contact order should not have 

been issued based upon the evidence presented. Specifically, respondent argues the circuit court’s

failure to properly apply the requirements of the Act resulted in it erroneously denying her motion 

for a directed finding at the close of petitioner’s case and issuing the plenary order.

¶ 33 A. Lack of an Appellee Brief

¶ 34 Petitioner has not filed an appellee brief. Nevertheless, the record on appeal is 

simple and the claimed error is such that this court can easily decide it without the aid of an 

appellee’s brief. Accordingly, we will proceed to the merits of this appeal. See First Capitol 

Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133, 345 N.E.2d 493, 495 (1976).
- 10 - 

¶ 35 B. Mootness

¶ 36 Before reaching the merits of this appeal, we must consider the matter of mootness, 

a matter which we note was not addressed by respondent despite the likelihood the plenary order 

would expire before this appeal could be resolved. “An appeal is moot when the issues involved 

in the [circuit] court no longer exist because intervening events have made it impossible for the 

reviewing court to grant the complaining party effectual relief.” In re Benny M., 2017 IL 120133, 

¶ 17, 104 N.E.3d 313. Even assuming the expiration of the plenary order rendered this appeal 

formally moot, we find the issue presented is reviewable under the public interest exception to the 

mootness doctrine. “The public interest exception applies when (1) the question presented is of a 

public nature, (2) there is a need for an authoritative determination for the future guidance of public 

officers, and (3) there is a likelihood of future recurrence of the question.” In re Lance H., 2014 

IL 114899, ¶ 13, 25 N.E.3d 511. Here, it is of public interest that the underlying purpose of the 

Act, which is to address the societal problem of stalking (740 ILCS 21/5 (West 2022)), be 

achieved. This can only be done by courts properly applying the requirements of the Act. See 

Whitten v. Whitten, 292 Ill. App. 3d 780, 784, 686 N.E.2d 19, 22 (1997). Guidance on this issue 

would, furthermore, be beneficial for future litigation under the Act.

¶ 37 C. The Circuit Court’s Judgment 

¶ 38 On the merits, respondent argues the circuit court’s failure to properly apply the 

requirements of the Act resulted in it erroneously denying her motion for a directed finding at the 

close of petitioner’s case and issuing the plenary order.

¶ 39 We initially decline to consider petitioner’s argument to the extent it attacks the 

circuit court’s ruling on her motion for a directed finding. As respondent acknowledges on appeal, 

she moved a directed finding at the close of petitioner’s case pursuant to section 2-1110 of the 
- 11 - 

Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1110 (West 2022)). Section 2-1110 states: “If the ruling 

on the motion is adverse to the defendant, the defendant may proceed to adduce evidence in support 

of his or her defense, in which event the motion is waived.” Id. Because respondent adduced 

evidence in support of her defense following the denial of her motion, she has “waived” any issue 

with the court’s ruling on the motion. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Love, 346 Ill. App. 3d 734, 737-38, 805 

N.E.2d 719, 722-23 (2004) (applying section 2-1110’s waiver provision).

¶ 40 We will, however, consider respondent’s argument to the extent it attacks the 

ultimate issuance of the plenary order. Among other things, respondent argues the circuit court 

failed to properly consider the requisite mental state set forth in the Act before finding she had 

committed an act of stalking. 

¶ 41 Under the Act, a victim of stalking may commence a civil proceeding seeking an 

order barring the stalker from making any further contact. 740 ILCS 21/5, 15 (West 2022). A 

circuit court must issue a stalking no contact order where the petitioner proves by a preponderance 

of the evidence the respondent engaged in an act of stalking. Id. §§ 30, 80. The decision to issue a 

stalking no contact order will generally not be reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. Piester v. Escobar, 2015 IL App (3d) 140457, ¶ 12, 36 N.E.3d 344. 

¶ 42 The Act defines “ ‘Stalking’ ” as “[(1)] engaging in a course of conduct directed at 

a specific person, and [(2)] he or she knows or should know that this course of conduct would 

cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety, the safety of a workplace, school, or place

of worship, or the safety of a third person or suffer emotional distress.” 740 ILCS 21/10 (West 

2022). With respect to the latter, the Act further defines “ ‘[r]easonable person,’ ” as “a person in 

the petitioner’s circumstances with the petitioner’s knowledge of the respondent and the 
- 12 - 

respondent’s prior acts.” Id. The Act also defines “ ‘[e]motional distress’ ” as “significant mental 

suffering, anxiety or alarm.” Id. 

¶ 43 After reviewing the circuit court’s ruling, the pertinent definitions provided in the 

Act, and the evidence presented, we are left with the conclusion the court failed to properly 

consider the requisite mental state before finding respondent had committed an act of stalking. In 

its ruling, the court did not address the pertinent definitions. As they apply here, petitioner had to 

prove by a preponderance of the evidence respondent knew or should have known her continued 

contact would cause a person in petitioner’s circumstances with petitioner’s knowledge of 

respondent and respondent’s prior acts to fear for her safety or the safety of K.S. or suffer 

significant mental suffering, anxiety, or alarm.

¶ 44 We find the evidence presented could not have satisfied petitioner’s burden, and 

any finding to the contrary would be against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence 

showed, shortly before K.S. was returned to petitioner’s care, the parties were encouraged to 

maintain contact with each other. Respondent testified she was, with the exception of in-person 

contact, never told otherwise. The initial complained-of contact was reciprocated by petitioner. 

The continued complained-of contact, although not reciprocated, concerned K.S.’s well-being. It 

was neither threatening, intimidating, harassing, nor incessant.

¶ 45 While petitioner presented testimony over no objection suggesting respondent 

continued to contact her despite having knowledge of petitioner’s desire for the contact to halt, 

that testimony was ambiguous and hearsay. Petitioner also presented testimony indicating the 

parties had difficulty getting along while the case involving K.S. was ongoing. This testimony, by 

itself, is insufficient to show respondent knew or should have known her continued contact about 

K.S.’s well-being would cause a person in petitioner’s circumstances with petitioner’s knowledge 
- 13 - 

of respondent and respondent’s prior acts to fear for her safety or the safety of K.S. or suffer 

significant mental suffering, anxiety, or alarm.

¶ 46 Upon properly considering the requisite mental state, it is evident petitioner has 

failed to show respondent committed an act of stalking as it is defined by the Act. Accordingly, 

the plenary stalking no contact order should not have been issued, and the circuit court’s judgment 

must be reversed.

¶ 47 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 48 We reverse the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 49 Reversed.