alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 12.1

                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

           We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements on Form S-8 (Registration No. 333-12586, 333-13786, 333-14142,
333-83914 and 333-104070), of our report dated February, 4 2003, with respect to
the consolidated financial statement of Alvarion Ltd. included in this Amendment
No.1 to the Annual Report on Form 20-F/A of Alvarion Ltd. for year ended
December 31, 2002.



                                             /s/ KOST, FORER and GABBAY
Tel-Aviv, Israel                            A Member of Ernst & Young Global


March 18, 2004
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATIONS OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
AND THE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT
TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of iPCS, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended
December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), each of the undersigned certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|                                                                                                            |  | 
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | 
|/s/ TIMOTHY M. YAGER Timothy M. Yager, President and Chief Executive Officer                                |  | 
|/s/ STEBBINS B. CHANDOR, JR. Stebbins B. Chandor, Jr., Executive Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer |  | 

---
Exhibit 32.2

Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,  As Adopted Pursuant To  Section 906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

April 15,
2005

In
connection with the Large Scale Biology Corporation Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Ronald J. Artale, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that, to my knowledge:



| |  | By: | /s/RONALD J. ARTALERonald J. Artale Senior Vice President, Chief Operating
Officer and Chief Financial Officer
Large Scale Biology Corporation
| |  | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

---



QuickLinks
[No. 55669-0-I.

Division One.

October 31, 2005.]

#### Raymond T. O’Leary et al., *Respondents,*v. Mary J. Mitchell, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 01-2-00451-4, William L. Downing, J., entered January 3, 2005. *Affirmed*by unpublished per curiam opinion.
#### Nathan B. Tefft, Plaintiff, *v.*The Greenwich & Johnsonville Railway Co., Defendant.

(Supreme Court, Saratoga Special Term,

April, 1905.)

Trial — Action in equity — Motion for judgment.

A motion for judgment in an equity action constitutes a part of the trial, and may not be made except at a term of court in the county of the venue.

*27Motion by plaintiff for judgment upon the verdict of a jury answering certain questions to them submitted.

Ostrander & Salisbury, for motion.

Patterson, Bulkeley & Van Kirk (Kobert O. Bascom, of counsel), opposed.

Spencer, J.

This is an action in equity brought in the county of Washington to reform a certain deed executed by the plaintiff to the defendant for a conveyance of real property. On the 2d day of March, 1904, the court at Special Term on the application of the plaintiff made an order that certain specific questions of fact be submitted to the jury for their determination. The issues raised thereby Avere brought on for trial at a Trial Term in the county of Washington, and a verdict rendered by the jury ansAvering each of the questions submitted to them for decision. There Avas no general A'erdict. On the coming in of the ATerdict, no motion A\-as made by either party for judgment. The plaintiff noAv moA’es, at a Special Term of this court held in Saratoga county, for judgment and asks that the court frame its decision upon the issues, and for such other and further relief as may be proper. The defendant interposes the objection that the trial has not been concluded and that the court may proceed only in the county of the venue.

I think the contention of the defendant must prevail. The action was in equity and triable by the court without a jury. The verdict of the jury upon the questions submitted to them Avas simply an incident in the trial, and the trial was not terminated upon the rendering' of the verdict. The trial may not be regarded as concluded until the justice presiding has made his findings of fact and conclusions of laAv. If the findings of the jury and the facts submitted by the pleadings coA'er the entire case, a motion for judgment thereon Avould be proper; but such a motion constitutes a part of the trial of the action and may not be made except at a term of the court in the county of the venue.

It is not necessary on this motion to determine whether *28further issues remain to he tried, inasmuch as this motion is not at a term of the court in the county where the venue is laid. The provisions of the Code, which require that actions of this character be tried in the county of the venue, apply to all parts of the trial. This motion constitutes, in my opinion, a part of the trial.

The motion, therefore, is denied, with costs.

Motion denied, with costs.
108TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 917

AN ACT

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 1830 South Lake Drive in

Lexington, South Carolina, as the ‘‘Floyd SpencePost Office Building’’.

108TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 917

AN ACT

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service

located at 1830 South Lake Drive in Lexington, South

Carolina, as the ‘‘Floyd Spence Post Office Building’’.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

•HR 917 EH

1 SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

2 The facility of the United States Postal Service lo3 cated at 1830 South Lake Drive in Lexington, South

4 Carolina, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Floyd

5 Spence Post Office Building’’.

6 SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

7 Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document,

8 paper, or other record of the United States to the facility

9 referred to in section 1 shall be deemed to be a reference

10 to the ‘‘Floyd Spence Post Office Building’’.

Passed the House of Representatives March 26,

2003.

Attest:

Clerk.
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 95-5769 VINCENT B. BEST, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert D. Potter, Senior District Judge. (CR-93-216-P) Submitted: June 19, 1997 Decided: July 3, 1997 Before WILKINS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________ Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________ COUNSEL G. Alan DuBois, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Mark T. Calloway, United States Attorney, Gretchen C. F. Shappert, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________ OPINION
PER CURIAM: Appellant filed an untimely notice of appeal. Counsel has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Appellant has filed a pro se supplemental brief. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The time periods for filing notices ofappeal are governed by Fed. R. App. P. 4. These periods are "mandatory and jurisdictional." Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections , 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson , 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). A criminal defendant has ten days within which to file in the district court a notice of appeal from entryof judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b). The only exception to the appeal period is when the district court extends the time to appeal for a showing of excusable neglect for a period not to exceed thirty days from theexpiration of the time otherwise prescribed by the rule. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b).The district court entered its judgment on October 3, 1994; Appellant's notice of appeal was filed on September 14, 1995, which is beyond the ten-day appeal period. Appell ant's failure to note a timely appeal or obtain an extension of the appeal period leaves this court without jurisdiction to consider the merits of Appellant's appeal. We therefore dismiss the appeal and deny Best's motions to file an amendment to the supplemental brief and for leave to proceed and amend the supplemental brief. This Court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel maymove in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state a copy thereof was served on the client.
2We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED 3
[No. 54458-6-I.

Division One.

November 7, 2005.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Yusef Jihad, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Snohomish County, No. 02-1-02367-8, James H. Allendoerfer, J., entered June 1, 2004. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Becker, J., concurred in by Grosse and Agid, JJ.
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

**Certificationof the Chief Executive Officer**

(Pursuant to Rule 13a-14(a))

 

I, Brett Moyer, certify that:

 

1.               I have reviewedthis Form 10-Q of Focus Enhancements, Inc.;

2.               Based on myknowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.               Based on myknowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;

4.               The registrant’sother certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controlsand procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to bedesigned under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating tothe registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this reportour conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any changein the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurredduring the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourthfiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected,or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting; and

5.               The registrant’sother certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’sauditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (orpersons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies andmaterial weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control overfinancial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect theregistrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material,that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

 

Date: November 14, 2005

 
|  /s/ | Brett Moyer       |   |
|-----------|-------------------|--------|
|      | Brett Moyer       |
|      | President and CEO |

 

----
# 2015

# 2016

# 2017
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

TORMAX USA, LLC,

Appellant,

v.

KENNEDY CONTRACTORS, INC.,

Appellee.

No. 4D2023-1867

[July 24, 2024]

Appeal from the County Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm 

Beach County; Debra Moses Stephens, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

502022CC014719XXXXNB.

Lauren Marcil of Gunster, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Stephen M. Cohen of Law Offices of Stephen M. Cohen, P.A., Palm 

Beach Gardens, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellee Kennedy Contractors, Inc. (“Kennedy”) filed a breach of 

contract action against Appellant Tormax USA, LLC (“Tormax”) in the 

county court. A clerk’s default was subsequently entered against Tormax 

for failure to serve or file any document in the action. Tormax moved to 

set aside the default based on excusable neglect. The county court denied 

the motion, as well as Tormax’s motion for reconsideration. 

Kennedy moved for summary judgment, which the county court 

granted. The court entered final summary judgment in favor of Kennedy 

for the $16,782.20 Kennedy claimed in damages, plus attorney’s fees, 

costs, and prejudgment interest.

As there was no abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s decision 

not to set aside the default. However, we reverse and remand for a trial 

on damages because there are issues of fact regarding damages awardable 

under the contract.

Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.
2

GROSS, FORST and ARTAU, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
# 17SNR09_00

# image1.png
CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO

SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

  In connection with theReport on Form 10-Q of TMP Inland Empire VI, (the “Company”) forthe period ended September 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Form 10-Q”), I, John Fonseca,certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

```

           1.    The Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of  Section
                 13(a)  or 15(d) of the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934; and
```

```

           2.    The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in
                 all material respects,  the financial condition and results of
                 operations of the Company Intentionally omitted;
```

                                            Date: November 21, 2005                         By:
Exhibit 23.1



CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS



We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Forms S-8 (File Nos. 333-42598,
333-42596, and 333-42594), on Form S-4 (File No. 333-32446) and on Forms S-3 (File Nos. 333-108570 and 333-111525) of Curis, Inc., of our report dated February 4, 2004 relating to the financial statements, which appears in this Form 10-K.



|                              
|------------------------------
|/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
|Boston, Massachusetts         
|February 27, 2003
Exhibit 99.1
                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                               18 U.S.C. ss. 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of RDC International,  Inc. (the "Company")
on Form  10-KSB for the period  ending  September  30,  2002,  as filed with the
Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I, John
Harkola, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,  certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002,
that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

(1)  the Report fully complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  the information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
     respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



/s/ John Harkola
----------------------------
John Harkola
Chief Executive Officer
Februar 24, 2003
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

October 31, 2005 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice
128989 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Plaintiff-Appellee, Stephen J. Markman, Justices v SC: 128989 COA: 253443 Wayne CC: 03-009818-01 TAWANDA SWAIZER, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 16, 2005 judgment of the Court of Appeals is cons idered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

K ELLY
, J., would hold this case in abeyance for People v Drohan , lv gtd 472 Mich 881 (2005).

p1024 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

October 31, 2005

Clerk
TRICCAR, Inc. 10-K

**Exhibit31.1**

 

CERTIFICATION

 

I,William Townsend, certify that:

 

1.          Ihave reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Frontier Oilfield Services, Inc.;

 

2.          Basedon my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material factnecessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading withrespect to the period covered by this annual report;

 

3.          Basedon my knowledge, the consolidated financial statements, and other financial information included in this annual report, fairlypresent in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for,the periods presented in this annual report;

 

4.          Iam responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rule 13a-15eand 15d-15e) for the registrant and have:

 

a.          designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under my supervision,to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its subsidiaries, is made known to us by others withinthose entities, particularly during the period in which this annual report is being prepared;

 

b.          designedsuch internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed undermy supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of consolidatedfinancial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;

 

c.          evaluatedthe effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report my conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;and

 

d.          disclosedin this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant'smost recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, oris reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5.          I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's boardof directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):

 

a.          allsignificant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the registrant's abilityto record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrant's auditors any material weaknessesin internal controls; and

 

b.          anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internalcontrols.

 

 

21
#### In the Matter of Anthony Mack, Appellant, v Glenn S. Goord, as Commissioner of Correctional Services, et al., Respondents.

[853 NYS2d 704]

Petitioner, a prison inmate, was charged in a misbehavior report with assaulting staff, engaging in violent conduct, disobeying a direct order and being out of place. The charges stemmed from an incident wherein petitioner, who was noted to be out of place, refused a correction officer’s order to stop and, ultimately, struck the correction officer on the face with a closed fist. Following a tier III disciplinary hearing, petitioner was found guilty as charged and a penalty of 180 days in the special housing unit and a corresponding loss of privileges and good time was imposed. Petitioner thereafter commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 raising, among other things, various procedural defects.* Supreme Court dismissed the petition, prompting this appeal.

*1046We affirm. Petitioner initially contends that the underlying disciplinary hearing was both commenced and completed in an untimely manner. Simply put, the time limits imposed by the relevant regulations are directory, not mandatory *(see Matter of Chaney v Selsky,*37 AD3d 983, 984 [2007]; *Matter of Konigsberg v Selsky,*255 AD2d 702, 703 [1998]), and absent a showing of prejudice, which did not occur here, annulment is not warranted *(see Matter of Bilbrew v Goord,*33 AD3d 1107, 1108 [2006]). Moreover, our review of the record reveals valid reasons for each of the extensions granted.

As to petitioner’s claim that he was denied the right to present relevant documentaiy evidence, we agree that in the absence of some indication that disclosing the injured correction officer’s medical records would jeopardize institutional safety, the Hearing Officer’s failure to provide petitioner with such documents was error *(see Matter of Cody v Goord,*17 AD3d 943, 944 [2005]; *Matter of Moore v Goord,*255 AD2d 640, 641 [1998], *lv denied*93 NY2d 802 [1999]). This error, however, is harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of petitioner’s guilt and the fact that these records were not relied upon by the Hearing Officer in rendering his determination *(see Matter of Abdul-Khaliq v Goord,*34 AD3d 872, 872-873 [2006]). Finally, we have reviewed petitioner’s challenge to the Hearing Officer’s designation and find it to be lacking in merit.

Peters, J.P., Spain, Rose, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

*

 Although petitioner initially raised a substantial evidence issue, Supreme Court granted petitioner’s subsequent request to withdraw that portion of the petition.