*Pursuant to5 T H C IR . R. 47.5, the court h as de termin ed th at this opinionsho uld not

be publishe d an d is not precede nt except und er the limit ed circu mstance s set forth in 5 T H C IR . R. 47.5 .4. 

### INTHE UNI TED S TATESCOU RT OFAPPEALS

FORTHE FIFTH CIRCU IT

N o. 08- 30908

L IN D YIN V E S T M E N T S III , a L ou i sian a L i m i ted P a rtn ersh i p ; M A G N O L IA C R E E KA P A R T M E N T S , a L o u is ia n a P a r tn e r s h ip P l a i n ti ffs - A p p ell a n t s v. S HAKERTOW N 1 9 9 2 I NC; COM M ERCE AND I NDU S TR Y I NSURANCE CO OF C ANADA D efen da n t s - A pp el l ee s

A p p ea l s f

rom the U n i ted S tates D i stri ct C ou rt f o r t he Eas t e r n Di s t r i c t o f Lo ui s i ana U SD C N o. 2: 94- C V

- 4112

B ef ore B A R K S D A L E , SO U T H W IC K , an d H AY N E S , C i rcui t Ju dg es . P E R C U R I A M: * Li ndy I nves t m ent s I I I and M agnol i a C r ee k A p ar t m ent s ( c ol l ec t i vel y, L in d y ) c o n te s t t h e a w a r d o f r e lie f fr o m ju d g m e n t, u n d e r F e d e r a l R u le o f C iv il P r o c e d u r e 6 0 (b ), to S h a k e r to w n 1 9 9 2 , I n c . In t h e lig h t o f L in d y ’ s u n r e a s o n a b le del ayi n c o m pl yi ng w i t h t he c o ndi t i o n pr e c e de ntf o r e xe c ut i o n o f

t he j udg m e nt United States Court of App eals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D Janua ry 4, 2010 Cha rl es R. F ulb ru g e II I ClerkN o. 08- 30908

2 en t ered i n 199 8, t h e di st ri ct court di d not abu se i t s di scr et i on i n gran t i n g such
r e l i e f t o S h a k e r t o wn . A F F I RMED. I. I n 1 9 9 2 , Sh a k e r t o wn s o l d L i n d y s h i n g l e s f o r u s e a s s i d i n go n t wo ap art m en tcom pl exes i n L ou i si an a. Soon af t er i n st al l ati on , the shi n gl es s h ow ed si gn s of deteri orat i on . In 199 4, L i n dy f i l ed a redh i bi t i on a ctio n a gainst S h a k ertow n i n L ou i sian a state cou r t. S ee L A
. C IV
. C ODE A NN
. ar t
. 2520 (d e fin in gre d h ib iti o n a s a n a ctio n for re sc iss ion o f a sa le of a d e fec tiv e p ro d u ct). S h a k e r to w n re m o v e d th e a c tio n to fe d e r a l co u r t. In 199 8, a j u ry f

ou n d: al t h ou gh L i n dy received $6, 845 of value f rom i t s use of t h e shi n gl es, i t al so suff ered da m ages i n t h e am ou n t of $13 6,9 0 5 for “rescissi on of sa l e/red u cti on of p u rch a se p ri ce”; $ 3 , 0 0 0 for “ d i m i n u ti on of va l u e”;
a n d $1 4 , 0 6 3 i n “reas on a b l e ex p en ses ”. L i n d y d i d n ot, h ow ev er, p rev a i lon i ts
c la im fo r $ 1 .8 m illio n to re m o v e a n d re p la c e th e s h in g le s . The di s t r i c tc o ur te nt e r e d j udg m e nto n 3 0 Se pt e m be r 1 99 8, r e f l e c t i ng t he
ve r di c t , b ut al s o r e qui r i ng Li ndy t o “ r e t ur n t o Shak e r t o w n . . . t he s hi ngl e s m ad e t h e subj ectof

t h e res ci ssi on of sal e a s a cond i t i on p recedent to the executi on of
a n y m on ey j u d gm en t”. N o t i m e l i m i t w as s peci f i ed f or t h e ret u rn. O u r c ou rt af f i rm ed, hol di n g ret u rn of t h e defec t i ve produ ctw as necessary f or r esci ssi on of
s a le

. Li ndy I

nv s . , L. P. v . Shak e r t o w n Cor p. , 2 0 9 F .3d 8 0 2 , 8 0 7 (5t h C ir. 2 0 0 0 ). In stea d of retu rn i n g th e sh i n gles a n d oth erw i se ex ecu ti n g th e j u d gm en t, L i n dy conti n u ed to u se t h em . N otun t i lA u gu st200 7 d id L in d y fi rstadv i se S h a k ertow n i t w a s rea d y to re tu rn the m an d coll ect th e 1 9 9 8 m on ey j u d gm en t. As d i s c us s e d i nf

ra , Sh ak ert ow n ref

u sed t o accepta shi pm en t of shi n gl es o r p a y th e j u d g m e n t. In ste a d , it m o v e d th e d istr ict co u rt fo r R u le 6 0 (b ) re li e f,N o. 08- 30908

3 cl ai m i n g L i n dy ha d n u l l i f i ed the j u dg m en t by conti n u i n g t o use t h e sh i n gl es f or e i ghty e ar s a f

t e r ourco ur taf

f i r m e d Li ndy ’ s be i ng r e qui r e d t o re t ur n t he m . The di st ri ctcou rtg ran t ed the m ot i on , concl u di n g: “ t h e conti n u ed u se by [ L i n dy ] of th e p u rp orted l y d efecti ve pr od u ct an d t h e u n rea son a b l e d elay i n ten d erin g it s
r e tu r n ” w a r r a n te d r e lie f u n d e r e ith e r R u le 6 0 (b )(5 ) o r (b )(6 ). L indy In vs., III , L. P. v . Shak e r t o w n Cor p. , 6 3 1 F

. S u p p . 2 d 8 1 5 , 8 2 2 & n .14 (E .D

. L a . 2 0 0 8 ).

II. A. L i n dy rai ses t w o procedu rali ssues; each fai l s. I t contends: t h e di st ri ct
c our t l ac ked s ubj ec t

- m at t erj uri sdi c t i on t o a m end t he j u d gm en t af t eri t w as af f i r m ed o n appeal ; and Shakert ow n’ s R ul e 6 0(b) m ot i on w as unt i m el y. 1. The di s t r i c t c o ur t ’ s s ubj e c t

- m at t e r j ur i s di c t i o n i s r e vi e w e d de no vo . E

. g. , I n reG r and Jury Pro c e e di ngs , 1 15 F. 3d 1 240, 1 243 ( 5t h Ci r . 1 99 7)

. Li ndy contend s t h e di st ri ctcourtl acked subj ect

- m att er j u ri sdi ct i on becau se i t di d n ot fir s t o b ta in o u r p e r m is s io n to re v is it th e ju d g m e n t. N e e d le s s to s a y , R u le 6 0 is th e v eh i cl e b y w h i ch reli ef f rom a jud gm en t can be ob tain ed i n distri ct cou rt. In t h e lig h t o f th e ch a n g e d cir c u m s ta n c e s , i.e ., L in d y ’ s g r e a t d e la y in
r e t ur ni ng t he s hi ngl e s , t he di s t r i c t co ur t di d not“ ‘ f l o ut [] t he m and at e b y ac t i ng o n th e m o tio n ’ ”, Li ndy , 6 3 1 F

. S u p p . 2 d a t 8 1 9 n .6 ; see S t an d ardO i lCo. of C alif ornia v. Un i t ed S ta tes , 429 U

. S. 17, 18 ( 1976) (hol di ng appel l at e l eave
u n n ece ssa ry f

or a distri ct cou rt t o con sider a 6 0 (b) m oti on be ca u se “th e a p p ell a te
m an da t e rel ates t o t h e rec o rd a n d i ssues t h en bef ore t h e court , an d d oes not p u rp o rt to d e a l w ith p o ss ib le la te r e v e n ts” ).N o. 08- 30908

4 2. F ederal R u l e of

C i vi lP rocedure 60(c ) ( 1) requi res th at a R u l e 60(b) ( 5) or (b) ( 6) m ot i on be m ad e i n a reasonab l e t i m e. O u r c ou rtrevi ew s t h e di st ri ct
c o u r t’s ru lin go n w h e th e r s u c h a m o tio n is tim e ly fo r a b u s e o f d i s c r e t io n . S ee Mat t e rof

AlCop e l and Ent e r

pr i s e s , I

nc ., 1 5 3 F .3 d 2 6 8 , 2 7 1 -7 2 (5 th C ir . 1 9 9 8 ). T h r o u g h o u t t h e F a ll o f 2 0 0 7 , L in d y a n d S h a k e r t o w n e n g a g e d in
n egoti ati on s on w h et h er t h e shi n gl es w ou ld be ret u rned ; t h at N ovem ber, S h ak e rto w n i n f

orm ed L i n dy of

i t s i n t erpret ati on of t h e j u dg m en t as no l on ger vali d; an d, on 20 M ay 20 08, Sh ak ertow n m oved f or r el i ef

ei gh t day s af

t er
r e c e i vi ng a l e t t e r f

r o m Li ndy s t at i ng Li ndy had t e nde r e d pa r t o f t he s i di ng and
w ou l d soo n ex ecu te o n t h e j u d gm en t. T h e d i stri ct cou rt did n ot ab u se it s di sc r et i on i n hol di ng Shak er t ow n’ s m ot i on w as t i m el y. B.

“ [ T] he de c i s i o n t o gr anto r de ny r e l i e f und e r Rul e 6 0(b) l i e s w i t hi n t he
so und di sc r et i on o f

t he di st r i c t c our t and w i l l be r eve r se d onl y f or abuse of

t hat d i s c r e t i o n. A d i s t r i c t c o ur t a b us e s i t s d i s c r e t i o n i f i t b a s e s i t s d e c i si on o n an e r r o n e o u s v ie w o f th e la w o r o n a c le a r ly e r r o n e o u s a s s e s s m e n t o f th e e v id e n c e .” He s lingv . C SX

Tr a n s p ., In c ., 3 9 6 F .3 d 6 3 2 , 6 3 8 (5 th C ir

. 2 0 0 5 ) (a lte r a t i o n in ori gi n al ) (i n t erna l q u ot ati on s and ci t ati on s om i t t ed). “ T h e di scr et i on un der 6 0 (b ) ( 6) i s s ai d to be e s pe c i al l y b r o ad b eca u se rel i ef m a y be gr a n ted u n d e r it
w h en ap p rop ri a te to acco m p l i sh j u sti ce.” Har r e l lv . D CSEqui pm e ntLe as i ng Cor p. , 9 5 1 F .2 d 1 4 5 3 , 1 4 5 8 (5 th C ir . 1 9 9 2 ) (e m p h a s is a d d e d ). A t is s u e , th e n , is
w he t he r , w he n i tr ul e d t hat ext r ao r di nar y c i r c um s t anc e s j us t i f i e d r e l i e f, t he d is tr ic t co u r t’s d e c is io n r e s te d u p o n a n e r r o n e o u s v ie w o f th e la w o r a c le a r ly
e r r o ne o us a s s e s s m e nto f t he e vi de nc e . The ul t i m at e q ue s t i o n, ho w e ve r , r e m ai nsN o. 08- 30908

5 w he t he r t he di s t r i c tc o ur ta bus e d i t s d i scr et i on (“in d iv id u a l ju d g m e n t” ) in g r a n tin gre lie f fr o m th e ju d g m e n t. S ee In re G ri m l an d , I n c. , 243 F. 3d 228, 233 ( 5th C i r . 2 00 1) ( “ G r ant i ng o r de nyi ng a m o t i o n und e r Rul e 6 0(b) i s w i t hi n t he di scr et i on of the d i st ri ctcou rt , an d w e revi ew t h at deci si on onl y f or an ab u se of di scr et i on . ” ) C on t rary t o t h e D isse n t at 2, t h i s deci si on m u st be accor ded
a p p e lla te d e fe r e n c e . Se e Pe as e v . Pakho e d Cor p. , 980 F

. 2d 995 , 998 ( 5th C i r. 19 93 ) ( “ [ T] he de c i s i o n t o g r anto r de ny a Rul e 6 0(b) m o t i o n i s co m m i t t e d t o t he
s o und di s c r e t i o n o f

t he di s t r i c t c o ur ta nd i s a cc ordeddef ere n t i al revi ew ”. (e m p h a s is a d d e d )). O th e r w is e , v e s tin gth e d is tr ic t c o u r t w ith d is c r e tio n is
m ean i n gl ess. A s n ot ed, t h e di st ri ct court based i t s deci si on up on t w o al t erna t e groun ds: R u le 6 0 (b )(5 ), w h ic h a llo w s r e lie f w h e n p r o s p e c tiv e a p p lic a tio n o f a ju d g m e n t “ is
n o longer eq u i t able” ; an d R u l e 60(b) ( 6) , w h i ch al l ow s r el i ef “ f or any ot h er r eason th a t ju s tifie s ” it

. Li ndy , 63 1 F. Supp

. 2d at 82 2 & n. 14
. W e ne e d no t r e ac h t he Ru l e 6 0 (b ) ( 5 ) g r o u n d s ; i n s t e a d , o n t h i s r e c o r d a n d f o r t h e r e a s o n s t h a t f o l l o w, Rul e 6 0(b) ( 6) r e l i e f

di d n otc o ns t i t ut e a n a bus e o f di s c r e t i o n. N o ne t he l e s s , t o t he
ex ten t t h e d i stri ct cou rt’ s rea son i n g u n d e r R u le 60 (b)( 5 ) i s ap p l i ca b l e to i ts deci si on , i n t h e al t erna t i ve, t o gran t rel i ef u n der R u l e 6 0(b) ( 6) , w e consi der such
r e a s o n in g . R el i ef under R ul e 6 0(b) ( 6) m ay o nl y be gr ant ed i n exc ept i onal
c ir c u m s ta n c e s . Hes s v . C o ck re ll , 281 F

. 3d 2 12, 2 16 ( 5th C i r. 2 002 )

. Th e di st ri ct
c o u r t im p lic itly co n c lu d e d s u c h c ir c u m s ta n c e s w e r e p r e s e n t b e c a u s e , in tera lia , i t c o nc l ude d i tw as “ pa t e nt l y unfai r t o t he de fe nda nt s ” f o r Li ndy“ [ t ] o c o nt i nue t o use t h e al l eged l y defec t i ve produ ctf or ei gh t m ore years an d then expect
r e s to r a tio n o f th e p u r c h a s e p r ic e ”. Li ndy , 6 3 1 F

. S u p p . 2 d a t 8 2 0 . G iv e n L in d y ’sN o. 08- 30908

6 e xt e nde d d e l ayi n co m pl yi ng w i t h t he co ndi t i o n pr e c e de nto f t he j udg m e nt , t he di s t r i c t c o ur tg r ant e d r e l i e f f r o m t he j udg m e ntt o Sha ke rt o w n. ( The di s s e nt
m a k e s re p eated m en t i on of t h e j u ry ve rdic t , e .g ., D isse n t at2 , 3 ; t he r e l i ef gran t ed, how ever, w as f rom t h e j udg m e nt , w h i ch i n cl u ded t h e condit i on p r e c e d e n t a d d e d b y th e d is tr ic t c o u r t a n d u p h e ld b y o u r co u r t, Li ndy , 209 F. 3d
a t 8 0 7 .) 1. C o n c e r n in gw h e th e r th e d is tr ic t c o u r t’s v ie w o f th e e v id e n c e w a s cle a r ly
e r r o n e o u s , t h e d i s tr ic t ju d g e w h o g r a n te d th e R u le 6 0 (b ) r e lie f a ls o tr ie d th is
ac t i on and w as , t her ef or e, fam i l i arw i t h al lasp ects, incl udi ng t he e vi denc e a t t ri al

. Th at j u dg e i m posed t h e condit i on preceden t i n t h e 199 8 j u dg m en t , w h i ch
w a s a c o n te s te d co n d itio n u p h e ld b y o u rco u r t. Li ndy , 2 09 F. 3d a t 8 07
. Al o ng t hi s l i ne , i n g r ant i ng Rul e 6 0(b) r e l i e f, t he di s t r i c t c o ur t no t e d: T h e C ou rti s m i n dfult h at Sh ak ert ow n . . . al so prevai l ed on i m porta n t is sue s att r i al

. There w as no e vi denc e i nt r oduc ed t hat anyde fe c t i n t he s i di ng ad ve r s e l y af fe c t e d t he i nt e gr i t y o f a ny bu i l di n g u pon w h i ch i t h a d b een pl aced. Th e m overs anti ci pa t ed t hatt he pl ai nt i f

fs w e r e s e e ki ng t w o s e t s o f f unc t i o nal s i di ng f

o r t he pr i c e o f o ne , a nd t he a r gum entr e ga r di ng r e t ur n s po t l i ght e d t he i s s ue . The r e qui r e m e nto f r e t ur n was r e c o gni z e d by [ t hi s c o ur t a nd t he Fi f t h Ci r c ui t ] a s pa r t a nd p ar c e lo f t he c l ai m o f

r e dhibi t i o n. Li ndy , 63 1 F

. S u p p . 2d at 82 2
. A l th ou gh the cou rt m a d e th i s ob serv a ti on i n i ts R u le 6 0 (b )(5 ) a n a ly s is , th e s ta te m e n t o b v io u s ly a p p lie s to a n a ly s is u n d e r R u le 6 0 (b )(6 ) a s w e ll. N o fu r th e r e v id e n c e is r e q u ir e d to s h o w a n inju s tic e to S h a k e r to w n . It is f und am ent al l y unj ust f or Li ndy t o v i gor ous l y c ont end ( and co nvi nce a j ury) t hat t h e shi n gl es w ere w ort h l ess an d c o m pl et el y defec t i ve, t o conti n u e t o use t h emN o. 08- 30908

7 for ei gh t yea rs, a n d th en to se ek reco ve ry by off erin g fi n a l l y to re tu rn the m . In t hatr e ga r d, Li ndy , i n ourco ur t , st r o ngl y c o nt e s t e d t he co ndi t i o n of re t ur n of

t he g o o d s . Li ndy , 209 F

. 3d at 807
. L i n dy can n ot l ose t h at i ssue on ap pea l bu t t h en ci rcum ven tour m an da t e. 2. N o t i m e l i m i thavi ng be e n i m po s e d byt he j udg m e ntf o r t he r e t ur n o f

t he shi n gl es, t h e f

i n alqu est i on i s w h et h er t h e di st ri ctcourt ’ s deci si on res t ed u pon an err on eou s vi ew of t h e l aw . L ou i si an a courts ha ve requ i red i n redhibi t i on a c tio n s th a t t h e te n d e r o f g o o d s b e m a d e w ith in a re a s o n a b le tim e . S e e e.g ., B e n ef i c i a lFi n . Co . of

Ne w O r l e a n s v . B i e n e my , 2 44 So

. 2 d 27 5, 28 1 ( La. Ct

. App. 1 9 7 1 ), ov e r r ul e d on ot hergr ounds by Travel ers Ins. C o. v. S on n i er , 344 So. 2d 73, 7 4 -7 5 (L a . C t. A p p . 1 9 7 7 ); B r e a u xv . Win n e b ag o In d u s ., In c ., 282 So. 2d 763 , 769 (L a . C t. A p p . 1 9 7 3 ); S t arw oodv. T aylor, 4 34 So

. 2 d 1 23 6, 1 23 8 ( La. Ct

. App. 19 83 )

. Adm i t t e dl y, t ho s e Lo ui s i ana c as e s addr e s s how, i n cl ai m i ng r e dhibi t i o n, an of fer of t en der of

t h e defect i ve good s m u stbe m ad e bef ore p u r s u i n gt h e c l a i m; t h eref ore, t h ey do not st an d prec i sel y f or t h e poi n t f

or w h i ch t h e di st ri ct co u rt ci t ed them

. N evert h el ess, t h ose c ases do em ph asi ze t h at Lou i si an a l aw does not
c o nt e m pl at e r e t e nt i o n o f t he def e c t i ve go o ds fo r an ex t e nde d pe r i o d of t i m e . A nd, al t h ou gh t h e D i s s e nt at 5 i s corre ct th a t t h e con stru cti on of fede ra lj u d gm en ts i s a m att er of

federallaw , itw as not an a bu se of di scr et i on f

or t h e di st ri ctcourt to co n s id e r L o u is ia n a re d h ib itio n la w p e r s u a s iv e . T h e d is tr ic t c o u r t fu r th e rre lie d u p o n , in tera lia , I n r e Rai ns , 338 B. R

. 99 ( Bankr

. E. D

. Cal

. 2 00 6)

. I n Rai ns , a b a n k r u p tc y p e tit io n e r re fu s e d to co m p ly
w ith t h e b a n k r u p tc y p la n ’ s d ir e c tiv e th a t h e re q u e s t a w ith d r a w a l fr o m h is
r e tir e m e n t p la n . Id

. at 10 2. Si m i l ar t o t he j udg m e nt at i s s u e here, t heN o. 08- 30908

8 ban k ru ptcy pl an ( w h i ch h as t h e sam e bi n di n g ef fectas a j u dg m en t ) di d n ot
s pe c i f y a t i m e f

o r pe r f o r m anc e , butt h e R ains court h el d that Fed eralR u l e of C iv il P r o c e d u r e 7 0 , w h ic h g o v e r n s th e p e r fo r m a n c e o f ju d g m e n ts , lo g ic a lly
c o n ta in s a r e a s o n a b le t im e r e q u ir e m e n t. Idat103
. T h e court t h eref ore gave a t r ust ee t he pow ert o w i t hdraw t he f und s und erR ul e 7 0. Id

. Al t ho ugh w e a r e c o ns i deri n g a Rul e 6 0(b) ( 6) , no t a Rul e 7 0, m o t i o n, t he
re a so n in g i s t h e sam e. B ot h rul es c on cern t h e const ructi on an d ef fectof j udg m e nt s . I tw as e nt i r e l y pr o pe r f o r t he di st ri ct cou r t t o ha ve i m po s e d a
reasona bl e- t i m e requi rem en ton a j u dg m en t f or t h e equ i t able rem edy of
r e s c i s s i o n i n whi c h Li ndyw as r e qui r e d t o pe r f o r m t he s pe c i f

i c a c t o f r e t ur ni ng t h e shi n gl es. ( C on t rary t o t h e D isse n t at 7, t h at “ [ t ] h e j u dg m en t di d n ot , t o use th e lan gu a ge of R u l e 7 0 , ‘ req u i re[] [ L i n d y]

. . . to p erform a n y . . . sp ecif i c act’ ”, t he j udg m e ntdi d r e qui r e Li ndyt o pe r f o r m t he s pe c i f

i c a c t o f

t e nde r i ng t he si di n g shou l d i tw i sh to col l ectt h e m on ey j u dg m en t .) N e e d l ess t o say, un der R u le 6 0 (b )( 6 ), th e d is t r ic tc o u r th a s b r o a d e q u it a b le p o w e r s to a d d r e s s L in d y ’s
u n r e a s o n a b le d e la y . S e e Ha r r e ll , 951 F

. 2d at 145 8 ( n ot i n g R u l e 60(b) ( 6) “ i s a g r a n d re s e r v o ir o f e q u ita b le p o w e r to d o ju s tic e ”). III. F o r th e fo r e g o in gre a s o n s , th e ju d g m e n t is A F F IR M E D

.No. 08-30908

The district c ourt re sted its decision on R ule 6 0(b)(5),thusrelegatingR ule 6 0(b)(6) to a 1 footnote. The two sentencesare as follows: “The C ourt finds that the movers are alternatively entitled to relief under R

ule 6 0(b)(6),which is a catch- all provision that gives thecourt discretion to afford a party from anorder

for ‘any other

re a s onthatj us ti f

i e sre l i e f ,’ butisextraordinary re l i e f re quiring a showingof exceptional c ircumstances. ‘The broad language of Fed. R . C iv . P . 6 0(b)(6) provides the court am pl e power

tovac ate judgmentswhenever such acti on

isa ppropriatetoacc om

plish justic e. ’” LindyInvs. , III, L. P. v. Shak ertown C orp. , 6 31 F. Supp. 2d 815,82 2 n .14(E. D. La . 2 008) (citations omitte d). Itsdis cus si on of Rule 60 (b) (5) was quitethorough, and Iwilladdressthatbelow. Shakertown’s motion attached only Lindy ’s attorney ’s letter attem ptingto return the siding

. 2 Lind y ’s resp onse attached

more c ouns el letters and the Affidavit of David S anderson opiningthat the shingles as removed have novalue. Shakertown’s rep ly did not c ontest this evidence and,again, attached only attorney letters regardingthe disputeover whether Lind y could still enforce the judgment by returningthe shingles. 9 H AY N E S, C i r c ui tJudge, di ss ent i ng: Th i s c as e i s a qu i nt es se nt i alexam pl e o f t he m axi m “ B ad fac t s m ake ba d l aw. ” The di s t r i c tc o ur tw as pr e s e nt e d w i t h t he une nvi ab l e t as k o f a ddr e s s i ng per c ei ved w r ongdoi ng by bot h si des : one w hi c h m anufac t ure d an d s ol d def ec t i ve sh i n gles a n d on e w h i ch w a i ted m a n y y ea rs to eff ectu a te the rem ed y g i ve n i t. C o n c lu d in gth a t t w o w r o n g s h a v e n o t b e e n m a d e rig h t h e r e , I r e s p e c tfu lly d i sse n t. R ul e 60(

b) (6) T h e m aj o r ity u p h o ld s th e d is tr ic t c o u r t’s ru lin go n th e g r o u n d s o f R u le 6 0 (b)( 6 ), n oti n g th e defere n ti a l rev i ew stan d a rd of “ab u se o f d i scre ti on . ” Y et a
r e vi e w o f

t h e di st ri ctcourt ’ s opi n i on regardi n g R u l e 60(b) ( 6) l eaves l i t t l e t o w h i ch to give su ch de feren ce. In d ee d , the distri ct cou rt de vo tes on l y tw o sen ten ces to t hi s poi nt
. N o fac t s w er e f ound t o w hi c h w e w ou l d a p pl y t he def er ent i al 1 “c le a r ly e r r o n e o u s ” s ta n d a r d

. In d e e d , n o e v id e n c e o f a n y s o r t w a s p r e s e n te d in
s upp ort of t he m o t i o n. The o nl y “ fac t ” upo n whi c h t he di s t r i c t c o ur t ’ s r ul i ng 2
r e s t s i s t he pa s s ag e o f t i m e . I t he n t ur n t o t he he ar t o f t he m at t e r : whet he rt heNo. 08-30908

H arrell is actually

almost the opposite of thesituation here. While the facts are somewhat 3 com plex,sim ply stated, in H

arrell,variousp lainti ff

s sued Tru pin,an individ

ual,and s everalc or

porate de fendants
. The corp orate de fendantsdef aulted,whileTru

pin liti gated

through a jury

verdi ct
. The jury ab so lved Tru pin of any wrongdo ingbut

f ound that he wasthe alter ego of

the de faultingc or

porate 10 d i stri ct cou rt correctly ap p l i ed the l a w — a qu estion on w h ic h n o a p p ell a te defer en ce i s du e. R u l e 60(b) ( 6) i s a “ cat cha l l ” provi si on , “ ‘ a resi du alcl au se used to cover
u n fo r e s e e n co n tin g e n c ie s ; th a t i s , i t is a m e a n s fo r a c c o m p lis h in gju s tic e in
ex cep ti on a lci rcu m stan ces.’” St e v e r s o n v . G l o ba l Sant aFe Cor p. , 508 F

. 3d 300, 303 ( 5t h C i r . 2007) ( quot i ng S t i pel covi ch v. S an dD ol l ar Mari n e, I n c. , 805 F. 2d 5 9 9 , 6 0 4 -0 5 (5 th C ir

. 1 9 8 6 )). It is w e ll-s e tt le d th a t R u le 6 0 (b ), a n d p a r tic u la r ly
s u b s e c tio n (6 ) , m a y b e a p p lie d o n ly in e x tr a o r d in a r y ca s e s . See , e . g. , G on zal ez v. C r os by , 54 5 U

. S

. 52 4 , 53 6 -37 ( 2 0 0 5 ); A ck erm an n v. Un i t ed S t ate s , 3 40 U

. S. 1 9 3 , 1 9 9 (1 9 5 0 ). S u c h e x tr e m e cir c u m s ta n c e s s o m e tim e s h a v e b e e n fo u n d in d e fa u lt ju d g m e n t c a s e s a n d th e lik e . S ee S even E l ves, I n c. v. E skena zi , 635 F. 2d 3 9 6 , 4 0 2 -0 3 (5t h C ir. U n it A1 9 8 1 ). Tu r ni ng t o t he cas e i n ques t i on, the di st r i c t cour t ’ s br i ef ci t at i on o f

l egal
au t h ori t i es w as cor rectas far as i t w en t
. I t qu ot ed t h e f ol l ow i n g sentence f

rom o uro pi ni o n i n Mad d ox v. R u nyon , 139 F

. 3d 101 7, 1 02 0 ( 5t h Ci r . 1 99 8) ( quo t i ng Har r e l lv . D CSEqui

p. Le as i ng Cor

p. , 9 51 F. 2d 1 45 3, 14 58 ( 5t h Ci r . 19 92 ) ) : “ ‘ The b roa d l a n gu a ge of F ed

. R

. C i v. P

. 6 0 (b)( 6 ) p rov i d es t h e cou rt a m p l e po w e r to
v a c a t e ju d g m e n t s w h e n e v e r s u c h a c t io n is a p p r o p r ia t e t o a c c o m p li s h ju s t ic e .’” Mad d ox , w h il e c o n t a in in g t h is b r o a d q u o t e , d id n o t a u t h o r iz e a d is t r ic t c o u r t ’s
w hol es al e di sr egar d of a j ury ver di c t u pon w hi c h j udgm entw as ente r ed. T hat
case act u al l y dea l tw i t h a m ot i on f or r econsi derati on of an i n t erl ocutory or der par t i al l y de nyi ng a m ot i on t o di sm i ss f orfai l ure t o s t at e a c l ai m . 139 F. 3d at 1 0 1 9

– 2 0
. Ha rr ell , u p o n wh i c h Ma d d oxreli ed , w a s a ca se w h ere the pa rty
a ga i n st w h om a d efau l t j u d gm en t w a s req u ested to b e en forced w a s a l l ow ed to
s e t a s i de t he de faul t
. 9 51 F

. 2d a t 1 45 9. I n L. M

. Le at he r s ’ So ns v . G o l dm an , 3No. 08-30908

defendants. The plaintiffs then sought to enforce the default judgments against Trupin as alter ego. He, in turn, moved toset aside the default judgments under Rule60 (b), and the district court granted the motion. Thus, in addition to beinga default j udgment case, H arrell is one in which theeffect of granting the motion wastof

ollowthe jury ’sverdi ct

as tothe answeringdef

endant,not

def eat it. “ Thetrial c ourt wa sobvious ly di sturbe d by theprospe ctof having toaf

f ord [pl ainti f

f s ] th eab i l ity toac c ompl i sh through de f aultwhatth ey coul d notachi eve through atri alby j ury.”95 1 F .2 d at14 59 (internalquotati onmarks and citati on

omitte d)

. It then conc lude d that there “wasno abus e of

dis cretion ins ettingasi dethe de fault j udgments s o that thos e claims could b e tried. ” Id. 11 252 F

. 2d 188 ( 6th C i r. 195 8) , up on w h i ch S h ak ert ow n rel i es, the court af f i rm ed a dis t ri ctcourt ’ s set t i n g asi de of a consen t j u dg m en t an d set t i n g t h e m att er f or tr ia l. N e i t h e r t h e s e a s o n e d d i s t r i c t j u d g e , t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e i r b r i e fs , n o rmy e s t e e m e d c o l l e ag ue s c i t e o r po i ntt o any aut ho r i t y f o r t he c o m pl e t e s e t t i ng as i de of a j udgm entbas ed upon a fu l l y- l i t i gat ed j ury ver di c t ei ght ye ar s af t eri tw as af f i rm ed w i t h no p ossibi li t y of al t erna t i ve rel i ef

an d u pon no su bm i ssi on of
e vi de nc e . N o ne o f

t he c as e s upo n whi c h Sha ke r t o w n, t he di s t r i c t c o ur t a nd t he
m aj ori t y rel y i n vol ved j u dg m en t s u pon a j u ry verdi ctw h ere t h e j u ry w i n n er bec om es t he R ul e 6 0 l os erw i t hout hope o f an y fut ure r ec ove r y. Court s have
u sed R u l e 60(b) ( 6) t o m odi f y j u dg m en t s to ref

orm un l aw f

u lor i n consi st en tj u ry
v e r d ic ts , s e e , e . g. , A cz el v . L a b o n ia , 5 8 4 F .3d 5 2 , 6 1

– 6 2 (2d C ir. 2 0 0 9 ), to c la rify d is p u te d ju d g m e n ts , s e e , e . g. , Kram er v. G ate s , 4 8 1 F

. 3d 788 , 793 ( D

. C

. C i r. 2 0 0 7 ), to re m e d y v io la tio n s o f 2 8 U .S .C . § 4 5 5 , L i l j eberg v. Heal t h S ervs . Acq ui s i t i o n Cor

p. , 486 U

. S

. 847 , 8 64– 65 (1988), an d to vacate defau l t j u dg m en t s, Ha rr ell , 951 F

. 2d at 145 9, bu t n ever t o si m pl y vacate a m on ey j u dg m en t based
on a j ur y ve r di c tw he r e t he r e s ul t i s no t a ne w t r i al

. Rul e 6 0(b) ( 6) i s a ppl i ed
m o r e lib e r a lly in th e co n te x ts p r e v io u s ly a p p lie d p r e c is e ly b e c a u s e th e re s u lt is t o allow a tr ia l to o c c u r . Se e i d. (“ T h i s cou rt a p p l i es R u l e 6 0 (b) ‘ m ost l i b era l l y to j u dg m en t s i n defau l t
. . . [becau se]

. . . t run cat ed p roceedi n gs of t h i s s ortare not favor ed. ’ ” ) ( quot i ng S even E l ves , 6 3 5 F .3 d a t 4 0 3 ); s e e als o Ac ke r m an , 3 40 U

. S. at202. I t f

ol l ow s t hat the gr eat es t deg r ee of c aut i on i n appl yi ng R ul e 6 0(b) ( 6)No. 08-30908

12 i s c al l e d f

o r w he r e t he c o ns e que nc e , as he r e , i s t o d ep riv e t he pa r t i e s o f t he
r e s u lts o f a n a c tiv e ly -litig a t e d ju r y tr ia l. S u c h ca u tio n w a s in s u ffic ie n tly
e xe r c i s e d he r e : t he di s t r i c t c o ur t he ar d no e vi de nc e be f o r e r e nde r i ng i t s de c i s i o n. In short, I h ave been un able t o l ocat e an y case al l ow i n g t h e rel i ef provi ded here i n a s i m i l ars i t uat i o n t o t hi s c as e . The r e s ul t r e ac he d b y t he m aj o r i t y, us i ng t he la n g u a g e o f th e m ajo r ity , is c e r ta in ly “fu n d a m e n ta lly u nju s t.” In d e e d , g ive n th a t th e re is n o p re ce d e n t for th is a ctio n u n d e r R u le 6 0 (b)(6 ), I lo o k e d a ta n a lo g o u s “d e la y -b a s e d ” th e o r ie s to s e e i f t h e y s u p p o r t t h e m ajo r it y ’s
c o n c l u s i o n . S t a t u t e o f l i mi t a t i o n s i s o f

n o h e l p t o S h a k e r t o wn , a s L o u i s i a n a l a w, l i k e m a n y oth er st a tes, pr ov i d es ten ye a rs to coll ect a m on ey j u d gm en t. L A
. C IV
. C ODE A NN
. a r t. 3 5 0 1 (1 9 9 4 ); seeal so A n d rew s v. R oad w ay Express I n c. , 473 F. 3d 5 6 5 , 56 8 ( 5 th C i r. 20 0 6 ) (ho l d i n g th a t, pu rsu a n t t o F ed era lR u l e of C iv il Proc edur e 6 9( a) , s t at e l aw go ver ns t he per i od of t i m e f orw hi c h a f

ede r al j udg m e nti s e nf

o r c e ab l e unl e s s a s pe c i f i c f e de r als t at ut e a ppl i e s )

. La c he s — t he
e qui t ab l e a nal o g t o t he s t at ut e of l i m i t at i o ns — s e e m s t he m o s t a nal o go us doctr i n e t o tha ta pp l i ed by t h e d i st ri ctcou rtan d the m aj ori t y opi n i on . La ches
r e qui r e s de l aya nd u n d u e p re ju d ice to th e o

pp o s in gp a rty
. Jo h n s o n v . C r o wn E n t ers . , 3 9 8 F .3 d 3 3 9 , 3 4 4 (5 th C ir . 2 0 0 5 ) (“T o e s ta b lis h th a t a ca u s e o f a c tio n is barred by l ach es, the defenda n tm u stsh ow (1) a d el ay i n asser t i n g t h e ri gh tor c l ai m ; ( 2) t hat th e de l ayw as no t e xc us ab l e ; a nd ( 3) t hatt he r e w as und ue prej udi c e t o t he def

endant

. ” ( quot at i on om i t t ed) )

. W hi l e w e c er t ai nl y have del ay h ere, w e are s orel y l acking i n evi den ce of prej u di ce t o Sh ak ert ow n , m u ch l ess
u n d u e p r eju d ic e . Cf. id

. (“A l l th a t [t h e ap p ell ee s] a rg u e is th a t [ th e a p p ell a n t]
w a ited too lon g[to fil e ]. T h is a rg u m e n t d o e s n o t sa tisfy th e ir b u rd e n .”)

. C ruci al l y, Sh ak ert ow n of fered n ota sh red of

proof t h at t h e val u e of

t h e shi n gl es, i f pro m pt l y r em ove d i n 2000 i m m edi at el y f ol l ow i ng our or i gi nalaf f i r m ance , w asNo. 08-30908

The maj ority

suggests that Lindy

derived s ome value—the amount of which we k nownot from 4 this record—by

continuingto have the shingles on its buildings. But value toLindy is not harm

or detriment toShakertown. B y way of analogy, I

may derive some benefit from havingpaint—even de f e ctivep aint

—onmy hous e ,butiti so f littl eus etoanyonee l s ei f Is crap eito f

f and s end ittothem. That i s tr uewhether

Is crap e ito ff

im mediate ly or many yearslater. In addition,the district court conclude d that a “reasona ble time” for returnof the shingles 5 would b e one year,again without c itingtoor cons ideringany evidenceo f what may

b e a “reasona

bl e time” in the context of this particular product and this particular situation. LindyInvs. , 6 31 F. Supp. 2d at 82 0 n .10

. Given that thereis a ten-year time period for enforcement o f judgments, that se ems like a more appropri ate “reasona bl e time”here than

that f ound by the di stri ct

c ourt
. 13 greatert h an t h e val u e of t h e shi n gles w h e n r em oved i n 200 8; t h at i s, 4 S h ak ert ow n of

fered no evidence that i t act u ally suff ered an y h arm or l oss of val ue f r om t he del ay. 5 T h e m aj ori t y opi n i on su ggests tha t R u l e 60(b) ( 6) rel i ef can be ba sed u pon t he a l l e ge d i ne qui t y i n Li ndy ’ s r e t ai ni ng o f t he “be ne f i t ” o f t he s hi ngl e s f

o r e i ght year s af

t erouror i gi nalaf

f i r m ance . Even th ere , how eve r , no e vi denc e w as pr e s e nt e d t hats uc h a “be ne f i t ” w as t he s am e o r m o r e t han t he a m o unto f t he j udgm enti n ques t i on; norw as t her e a ny c ons i der at i on o f t he c os t s expe nded by L in d y o v e r t h e y e a r s t o r e p a ir t h e s h in g le s in o r d e r t o g a in a n y s u c h “b e n e fit.” Th us, t he di st r i c t c our t , w i t hout any evi denc e or hear i ng, es se nt i al l y appl i ed an
o f fs e t t o t h e j u r y v e r d i c t t e n y e a r s a f t e r i t wa s a n n o u n c e d

. Th e a m o u nt o f t he ef fect i ve of

fset , m oreover, i s i n t h e en tire a m o u n t of t he ve r di c t , a c onc l usi on t hat is s im p ly w ith o u t a n y e v id e n tia r y s u p p o r t in th e re c o r d

. T h e j udgm ent i n ques t i on i s si l ent as t o any t i m e per i od f or r et urn. In d i scu ssing the j u d gm en t, the distri ct cou rt refere n ced L ou i sian a l a w of con tracts
n o t fe d e r a l ( o r s t a t e ) la w o f ju d g m e n ts
. C o n s tr u c tio n o f a fe d e r a l ju d g m e n t is go ve rn ed b y f

ed era l l a w of j u d gm en ts, ev en i f th e un d erlying ca se inv olved state la w a s th e ru l e o f

d e c is io n . See , e . g. , 11 C H ARLES A LAN W RIGHT & A RT HUR R. M I L L ER , F EDERAL P RA CT I CE AND P ROC EDUR E § 2 85 3 ( 2d e d. 1 99 5) ( “ The gr o unds
an d the procedu re f

or set t i n g asi de a federal j u dg m en t are enti rel y a m att er of fede r all aw , on w hi c h st at e l aw m ay be di sr egar ded. ” )

. N o evi denc e w asNo. 08-30908

14 pre se nt ed t hat a t i m e pe r i od c oul d nothave bee n i ncl uded i n t he o r i gi nal ju d g m e n t. F e d e r a l la w re q u ir e s ju d g m e n ts to b e in te r p r e te d a s w r itt e n . S ee, e . g. , Chi c k K

am Choo v . Exx o n Cor p. , 486 U

. S. 140, 148 ( 1988) (i nt erpr et i ng a di st ri ctcourt ’ s i nj u n ct i on order by con si deri n g “ w h at t h e earl i er f ederal order act u all y sa i d” rat herthan “pe r m i t [ t i ng] the D i st r i c t C our t to rendera post hoc j u dg m en t as t o w h at t h e order w as i n t end edt o say”)

. If a t erm i s not contai n ed i n a j udg m e nt , i ts ho ul d no tb e l i ght l y ad de d s o m e e i ghty e ar s lat er t o t he detri m en t of the p art y t h at w on a h ard-f ou gh t j u ry v erdi ct
. R u l e 60(b) ( 6) i s n ot t he a ppr o pr i at e m e c hani s m f o rc o r r e c t i n g “ a poi nto bv i o us o n t he fac e o f t he j u dg m en t [ t h at] w as [ n ei t h er] rai sed by m ot i on t o am en d un der R u l e 59(e) , nor
r a is e d o n ap p ea l , ” S col a v. B oat Fran ces , R

. , I n c. , 618 F

. 2d 147 , 155 ( 1st C i r. 198 0) , even i f

one p art y ap pa rentl y fai l ed to ap preci ate t h e l egal consequ en ces o f t h e j u d g m e n t a t t h e tim e , PR CHarri s, I n c. v. B oei ng C o. , 700 F. 2d 894, 8 9 7

– 9 8 (2d C ir. 1 9 8 3 ). T h e d is tr ic t c o u r t’s a n d th e m ajo r ity ’ s re lia n c e o n F e d e r a l R u le o f C iv il Pr o c e dur e 7 0 and Fl i n n v. R ains ( In reR ains) , 3 3 8 B .R . 9 9 , 1 0 3 (B a n k r . E .D . C a l. 2006) , t o c onc l u d e t hat a r eas onabl e t i m e f or“ c om pl i ance ” has pass ed and c an b e a d d e d to th e ju d g m e n t a fte rth e ti m e h a s p a s s e d is m is p la c e d

. R u le 7 0 in ge ne r ala nd R ai ns i n pa rti cu l a r con cern the cou rt’ s p ow er to en force j u d gm en ts
r equi r i ng a par t y t o do s om et hi ng by i nst ead r equi r i ng anot hert o pe r f or m t hat act
. R u l e 70 provides: “I f a j u dg m en t requ i res a pa rt y . . . t o perf orm an y ot h er spe c i f i c actan d the par t y fai l s t o co m pl y w i t hi n t he ti m e s pec i f i ed, t he c our t m ay ord er th e a ct to b e d on e . . . by an oth er p erso n ap p oin ted by the cou rt. ” F ED
. R. C IV
. P. 7 0( a)

. I n R ai ns , t he ba nkr upt c y c o ur t o r de r e d Rai ns t o t ak e m o ne y o ut
o f hi s pe ns i o n f

und t o pa y Fl i nn “ f

o r t hw i t h” af

t e r Rai ns fai l e d t o c o m pl y w i t h a
se t t l em entagr ee m ents et t i ng a dat e c er t ai n f ors uch paym ent
. 338 B

. R

. at101. W h e n h e d id n o t c o m p ly , th e b a n k r u p tc y co u r t c o n c lu d e d th a t a “r e a s o n a b le t i m e ” h a d p a s s e d a n d a p p o i n t e d t h e t r u s t e e t o t a k e t h e mo n e y o u t o f t h e f u ndNo. 08-30908

Thedi stri ctcourt ’ sconc lus i onthat“[ t] hepl ainti f f s ’ de l iberatede l ay unti l20 08 coul d nothave 6 be en antic ip ated

at thetime the amende d judgment wasis sued” isc ontradicte d by the numerous state statutes that p ermit a prevailingparty to delay many years b efore c ollectinga money judgment. See, e. g. , LA . C IV . C OD E ANN . art. 3 501 (1994) (providinga period of ten years b efore a

money judgment b ecomes unenforc ea

bl e)

. 15 a n d p a y F lin n . I

d. at103. I n shar p c ont r as t t o t he si t uat i on c ont em pl at ed byR ul e 7 0 and t he ac t ual fa cts of R ai ns , t he j udgm ent by i t s t er m s di d not r equi r e Li ndy t o do anyt hi ng. T h e j u d gm en t did n ot, to u se th e lan gu a ge of R u l e 7 0 , “requ i re[] [ L i n d y] .

. . to perf orm an y . . . speci f

i c act
. ” Inst ead , t h e j u dg m en t i m posed an obl i ga tion on L i n dy t o t u rn over t h e shi n gl es i n ord er to tr i gger i t s ab i l i t y t o col l ectredhibi t i on dam ages f

rom S h a k er t ow n. Even i f, as t he m aj or i t y c ont ends, Li ndy w as req u i red to do a s pec i f i c ac t , R ul e 7 0' s r em edy, af t era “ r eas onabl e t i m e” has pa ss e d , is t o order another t o do t h at w h i ch L i n dy fai l ed to do. H ere, af t er a “re a so n able t i m e” ha d p assed, i n t h e di st ri ctcourt ’ s vi ew , i t di d n otorder
som eon e el se t o t ak e th e s h in gl es dow n an d sen d them t o Sh ak ert ow n , w h i ch
w o ul d hav e be e n t he r e s ul t unde r Rul e 70 and R ai ns . I nst ead, i t or der ed t hat L i n d y w a s too late an d “ou t of l u ck

. ” T h e conti n u ati on of

t h e st atus qu o— L i n dy ’ s conti n u ed use of t h e shi n gl es year s a ft er obt ai ni ng a favor abl e j ury ver di c t

— doe s notr eac h t he l eve lof an e x c e p t io n a l c ir c u m s t a n c e ju s t if y in gth e w h o le s a le a b a n d o n m e n t o f t h e ju r y ’s verdi ctor t h e val i d f

i n alj u dg m en t w i t h ou t an y h ope of rec om pen se t o L i n dy f or S h a k e r to w n ’ s o r ig in a l s a le o f d e fe c tiv e g o o d s . T h e r ig h t to tr ia l b y ju r y s h o u ld 6
n o t d r o w n in th e “g r a n d re s e r v o ir ” o f R u le 6 0 (b )(6 ). R ul e 60(

b) ( 5) Bec aus e I c o nc l ude t hat Rul e 60 (b) ( 6) do e s no t j us t i f y t he r e l i e f

gran t e d, I t ur n t o t he o r i gi nalg r o und f o r t he di s t r i c t c o ur t ’ s r ul i ng no t r e ac he d b y t he
m aj ori t y— R u l e 60(b) ( 5)

. R u l e 60(b) ( 5) st ates t h at, “ [ o] n m ot i on an d j u stt erm s, t h e cou rtm ayr e l i e ve a pa r t y . . . f r o m a f i nalj udg m e nt[ o r ] o r de r . . . [ w he n]No. 08-30908

16 a p p l yin g itpr osp ectively i s n o lon ge r eq u i tab l e.” F ED
. R. C IV
. P

. 6 0( b) ( 5)

. The
a p p lic a tio n o f R u le 6 0 (b )(5 ) h e r e tu r n s in p a r t o n th e m e a n in go f “p r o s p e c tiv e .” Thi s Cour tha s e xp l ai ne d: Li ke t he t r adi t i onaleq ui t y r ul e o n w hi ch it i s bas ed, r ul e 6 0(b) ( 5) ap pl i es onl y t o j u dg m en t s t hatha ve pr o s pe c t i ve ef fect“ as contr asted w i t h t hos e t hat of

fera pr es entr em edy f ora pas t w r ong. ” 11 [C H ARLES A LAN] W RIGHT & [A RT HUR R .] M I L L ER , F EDERAL P RA CT I CE AND P ROC EDUR E § 2 8 6 3 [ , ] a t 2 0 5 [ ( 1 9 7 3 ) ] (f o o t no t e om i t t e d )

. As Jus t i c e Car do z o po i nt e d o uti n S w ift , “ T h e di st i n ct i on i s bet w een rest rai n t s t h at gi ve protec t i on t o ri gh t s f u l l y accrued up on fact s s o ne ar l y pe r m ane nta s t o b e s ubs t ant i al l y i m pe r vi o us t o c hang e , a nd t ho s e t hati nvo l ve t he sup e r vi s i o n o f c hang i ng c o nduc t o r c o ndi t i o ns a n d a r e th u s p r o v is io n a l a n d te n ta tiv e .” Co o k v . B i r mi ng h a m Ne ws , 618 F. 2d 1149, 1152 ( 5t h C i r . 1980) ( quot i ng Un i t ed S t ate s v. S w if

t& Co. , 2 8 6 U .S

. 1 0 6 , 1 1 4 ( 1 9 3 2 )); seeal so Ki rksey v. C i ty of Jackson , 714 F

. 2d 42, 43 ( 5th C i r. 198 3) (af f i rm i n g den i alof

rel i ef sough t un der R ul e 6 0(b) ( 5) be c ause t he j udgm enthad no pr os pec t i ve ef fec t )

. O t herc i rcu i ts h ave observed t h at “ [ t ] h e m ere possibi l i t y t h at a j u dg m en t ha s s om e f u t u re ef fect does n ot m ean tha ti ti s ‘ prospective’becau se ‘vi rt u al l y every court order c au ses at l eas t so m e r eve r ber at i ons i nt o t he f ut ure , and has

. . . so m e pro spe c t i ve effect. ’ ” K

al am az o o R i v e r St udy G r o up v . R o c kwel lI nt ’lCor p. , 355 F. 3d 574, 587 ( 6t h C i r . 2004) ( quot i ng Tw elv e Jo h n D o es v. D istric t of C o lu m b ia , 841 F. 2d 1133, 1 1 3 8 (D .C . C ir . 1 9 8 8 )) (s e c o n d a lte r a tio n in o r ig in a l). R u l e 6 0 (b)( 5 ), by i ts plain term s, do es n ot p erm i t t h e d i stri ct cou rt t o vacate t h e j u ry’ s m on ey aw ard i n t h i s m att er. Th at s ection al l ow s a di st ri ct court w i t h a conti n u i n g sup ervi sory r ol e t o m odi f y or vacat e an order w h en c o n d i t i o n s h a v e ch a n g e d s u c h th a t c o n tin u e d e n fo r c e m e n t o f th e o r d e ris i ne qui t ab l e . H o w e ve r , Sha ke r t o w n c i t e s no pr e c e de nt i alca s e s t hatpe r m i tt he ap pl i cat i on of

R u l e 60(b) ( 5) t o j u dg m en t s ot h er t h an consent decree s , de c l ar at ory ju d g m e n ts , a n d inju n c tio n s , a ll o f w h ic h te n d to b e “p r o s p e c tiv e ” in n a tu r e . S ee id

. at588 ( i nt er pre t i ng R u fo v . In m a tes of S u ffolk Co u n ty Ja il , 502 U

. S. 367, 384No. 08-30908

As discussed in thecontext o f R ule 6 0(b)(6),in this way, this caseis q uite different from

many 7 of thecase s cited

by the parties in

which the effe ct of grantingthe Rule60 (b) motion is to allow a trial on the merits. Here,the effect is to deprive the winningparty of the results o f a trial on the merits without further recourse . 17 ( 1992) )

. The l i m i t ed r eac h of R u l e 6 0 (b)( 5) i s c ons i st entw i t h t he t r adi t i onal
r e lu c ta n c e o f c o u r ts to d is tu r b fin a l ju d g m e n ts
. S e e G o l d s t e i n v . MCI Wo r l d C o m, 34 0 F. 3d 238 , 258 ( 5t h Ci r . 2 00 3) ( c i t i ngPe as e v . Pak ho e d Cor p. , 980 F. 2d 995, 99 8 ( 5t h Ci r . 1 99 3) a nd Long de n v . Sunde r m an , 979 F

. 2d 109 5, 110 2 ( 5th C i r. 199 2) )

. Th i s di si n cl i n ati on w ou l d s eem especi al l y ap propri ate t o observe w h ere Rul e 6 0(b) ( 5) , as di s c us s e d ab o ve , w o ul d e f fe c t i ve l y o ve r t ur n a j ur y ve r di c ta nd hand a w i ndfal lt o t he l o s i ng pa r t y. Al t ho ugh t he j udg m e nt he r e c o ndi t i o ns t he 7 pa ym e ntof

t he j ur y’ s a w ar d up o n pr o pe r r e s c i s s i o n o f t he c o nt r ac t

— t hati s , t he
r e t ur n o f

t he faul t y pr o duc tt o Sha ke r t o w n— t he j udg m e nti t s e l f ha s no pro spe c t i ve ef

fec t
. W het herornott he c ondi t i on s h a ve ch anged s uch t hat
e n fo r c e m e n t o f th e ju d g m e n t is in e q u ita b le , th e d is tr ic t c o u r t’s s u p e r v is o r y ro le
c onc l uded w hen i tent er ed t he j udgm enton Sept em ber25, 19 98. Acc or di ngl y, I d o n o t c o n s id e r R u le 6 0 (b )( 5 ) t o b e th e p r o p e r a v e n u e fo r d is t u r b in gth e ju r y ’s fi n d i n g o f l i a b i l i ty a n d the distri ct cou rt’ s resu l ti n g fi n a lj u d gm en t. Ev e n i f Ru l e 6 0 (b ) ( 5 ) a p p l i e d h e r e , a s d i s c u s s e d a b o v e , S h a k e r t o wn p r e s e n t e d n o e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t i t s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e p a s s a g e o f t i me
m a te r ia lly a lte r e d th e b e n e fits it w a s to re c e iv e fr o m th e re s c i s s i o n . R u le 60(b) ( 5) r el i ef

i s “ onl y c aut i ous l y t o b e g r ant ed .

. . . [ C ] aut i on, s ubst ant i al
c hang e , unf

o r e s e e nne s s , o ppr e s si ve ha r ds hi p, a nd a c l e ars ho w i ng ar e t he req u i rem en ts. ” Val e nt i ne Suga r s , I nc . v . Sudan , 34 F. 3d 320, 322 ( 5t h C i r . 1994) ( i n t erna lci t ati on s an d quotati on m arks om i t t ed). N o evi den ce w as presented of t he d i f fe r e nc e i n v a l ue b e t wee n t he s i d i nga t t he t i m e o f t hi s c o ur t ’ s or i gi nal af f i r m anc e a nd t he t i m e o f Li ndy ’ s r ej e c t e d e f f o r t t o r e t ur n. I ns t e ad , t he evi den ce f

rom t h e t ri al sug gest ed t h at, on ce rem oved , t h e shi n gl es had no va l u e. T h u s, I concl u de th a t S h a kertow n fai l ed to m eeti t s burd en t o prove “ cha n gedN o. 08- 30908

18 ci rcu m stan ces” th a t l ed to som e u n forese en “op p ress i ve h a rd sh i p ” ag a i n st i t. C on cl u si on L i n dy ’ s del ay i n f

u l f i l l i n g t h e cond i t i on preceden t t o obtai n its m o n ey j udg m e ntdo e s no t p re s e nta n e xt r e m e s i t uat i o n s uf f i c i e ntt o j us t i f

y t he
e x c e p t io n a l r e m e d y i m p o s e d b y t h e d is t r ic t c o u r t

— t h e a n n u lm e n t o f t h e ju r y ’s verdi ctb y set t i n g asi de t h e j u dg m en t en t ered on tha t verdi ct
. I w ou l d reverse t h e di st ri ctcourt ’ s R u l e 60(b) order.