No. 87-442 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1988 

INRE: THE MARRIAGE OF 

GERALD E. SESSIONS, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

DORA F. SESSIONS, 

Respondent and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Fergus, 

The Honorable Peter L. Rapkoch, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Timothy J. O'Hare, Lewistown, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Craig R. Buehler, Lewistown, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: March 24, 1988 

Decided: April 26, 1988 

APR 2 6 1988 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. , delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

Petitioner appeals from a judgment of the District 

Court, Tenth Judicial District, County of Fergus, dissolving 

the marriage between the parties and distributing the marital 

property. 

The issues are: 

1. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in 

dividing the marital property where it adopted verbatim 

wife's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law? 

2. Whether the District Court's order of contempt and 

order to purge contempt was proper? 

3. Whether the District Court's subsequent order of 

contempt is void as a matter of law because it was entered 

after notice of appeal was filed? 

The parties were married on November 8, 1965. Their 

marriage was dissolved by judgment of the District Court 

dated July 31, 1987. At the time of dissolution the couple 

had one minor child left at home. The wife was 41 years of 

age and the husband 44 years of age when the marriage was 

dissolved. 

The husband has held several jobs, including that of 

computer terminal technician, throughout the marriage. At 

the time of trial he was unemployed and living outside 

Montana. The wife has no formal training but worked in the 

couple's various business endeavors throughout the marriage. 

She was a cocktail waitress at the time of trial and living 

in the marital home. 

The major marital assets were awarded to the parties as 

follows: 
Wife Value 

Family home $ -0- plus $16,000 mortgage 

Jensen contract $12,944 discounted value plus 

(sale of catalog store) $23,366 owing on the 

underlying debt 

Vacant lot in Idaho $ 4,000 plus $950.00 tax lien 

Car $ 500 

Husband Value 

Hackamore Supper Club $24,325 

Truck $ 2,500 

Life insurance policy [value not provided] 

Family checking account $ 255 

The rest of the assets were divided according to wife's 

proposed findings and conclusions. Appellant husband 

initially argues that the court abused its discretion by 

dividing the property as it did because it adopted verbatim 

the wife's proposed findings and conclusions. This 

contention lacks merit. 

As has been reiterated by this Court several times, the 

standard of review for adopted findings of fact and 

conclusions of law is the same as for court-prepared 

findings. In Re Marriage of LeProwse (1982), 198 Mont. 357, 

362, 646 P.2d 526, 528-29; Goodmundson v. Goodmundson (1982), 

201 Mont. 535, 538, 655 P.2d 509, 511. Although we recognize 

the possible ethical considerations present in verbatim 

adoption of one party's proposed findings the Court has 

consistently held that no legal error occurs where the 

District Court's decision is supported by law and evidence. 

In re Marriage of Watson (Mont. 1987), 739 P.2d 951, 954, 44 
St.Rep. 1167, 1170; Parenteau v. Parenteau (1983), 204 Mont. 

239, 244, 664 P.2d 900, 903; - Le Prowse, 646 P.2d at 529. 

A review of the record shows that there was conflicting 

evidence given as to the value of most of the marital assets. 

Both parties had experts give an estimate of the value of the 

family home based on appraisals. Wife's expert testified 

that, after making a visual inspection, the home was worth 

$19,000. She further testified that there was no equity 

position on the property. It's not disputed that the 

remaining liability on the home was approximately $16,000. 

Husband's expert gave an appraisal of $22,000 but did not do 

a visual inspection of the home because he had sold it to the 

Sessions some months before. When conflicting expert 

testimony is given the trier of fact has full discretion to 

give weight to the testimony as he sees fit. In re Marriage 

of McCormack (Mont. 1986), 726 P.2d 319, 321, 43 St.Rep. 

1833, 1835; In re Marriage of ~illiams (Mont. 1986), 714 P.2d 

548, 552, 43 St.Rep. 319, 325. The court chose to rely on 

the wife's expert and substantial evidence supports the 

court's finding here. 

The husband also contends that contradictory testimony 

about the value of the Jensen contract shows an abuse of 

discretion. In 1986, the parties sold a Sears catalog store 

they had owned for which the balance owed to them at trial 

was $41,049.90 subject to an underlying mortgage of 

$22,366.59. The husband testified the fair market value of 

this contract was $18,683.31. The wife introduced a 

statement from a prospective purchaser that it would buy the 

contract for $12,944. At the same time, the wife testified 

that the figure given on the document was $27,944. This was 

apparently a misstatement which the court recognized when it 

adopted the $12,944 figure listed in the wife's proposed 
findings . There is substantial evidence to support this 

value also. 

The last major asset we will discuss is the parties' 

interest in the Hackamore Supper Club bought by the husband 

and his brother in 1986. The husband disputes the value 

placed on his interest because he testified that, as it was a 

losing concern, he felt it had no value. The District Court 

valued the husband's interest at $24,325 consisting of a 

$20,000 initial contribution and $4,325 of later 

contributions. The record shows that the Club was run by the 

parties as partners. After filing the petition for 

dissolution but before the trial was held, the husband 

transferred his interest to his brother without his wife's 

approval. It was not improper for the District Court to 

include it as a marital asset and award it to the husband at 

the value stated under these circumstances. 

The husband disputes the values of several other 

household items and vehicles. We hold that the District 

Court's findings as to these items are also fully supported 

by substantial credible evidence and decline to discuss them 

further. We affirm the District Court's property 

distribution. 

Appellant's second issue disputes the propriety of the 

~istrict Court's order of contempt and order requiring the 

husband to purge the contempt. Although contempt of court 

orders by the District Court are final and usually 

unreviewable by this Court in any manner except by writ of 

certiorari, 3-1-523, MCA, an exception is made in 

dissolution of marriage proceedings. In re Marriage of Smith 

(Mont. 1984), 686 P.2d 912, 914, 41 St.Rep. 1695, 1697. We 

must limit our review to see whether the District Court was 

within its jurisdiction and whether the evidence supports the 

finding of the court. Smith, 686 P.2d at 912; Schneider v. 
Ostwald (Mont. 1980), 617 P.2d 1293, 1295, 37 St.Rep. 1728, 

1730. 

By order dated March 9, 1987, the husband was required 

to pay respondent $300.00 per month for support and 

maintenance. Respondent also asserts that at a hearing the 

husband agreed to pay approximately $2,000 in household bills 

and appellant's counsel was asked to draft an order to that 

effect. There is no record of this hearing but apparently 

this order was never drafted. The husband does not dispute 

this contention but argues the bills were already paid by the 

time of trial. The District Court ordered the husband to pay 

$2,900 for support, maintenance and bills. Testimony by the 

husband reveals that the support and maintenance payments and 

the bill payments had not been made by the time of trial. 

Appellant points to no contradictory evidence. We therefore 

affirm this order of the District Court. 

L,astly, appellant asks us to void the District Court 

November 25, 1987 order again finding the husband in contempt 

for not paying the sum of $2,300. He argues that the notice 

of appeal dated August 31, 1987 stripped the District Court 

of its jurisdiction and therefore the order is void. We 

disagree. 

Although the record is silent on this point, the 

respondent admits that support in the sum of $600 was paid 

April 27, 1987. Apparently the District Court was aware of 

this payment and subtracted it from its previous order to pay 

$2,900. There is no evidence as to any other payments. 

This Court has held that a contempt proceeding is 

separate and independent of the civil action from which it 

arose. Myhre v. Myhre (19761, 168 Mont. 521, 522, 548 P.2d 

1395, 1396 (per curiam). The District Court therefore is not 

divested of jurisdiction over a contempt matter by the filing 
of an appeal of the underlying civil matter. Accordingly, we 

affirm the decree and orders of the District Court. 

Affirmed. 

< 4 AzLL) / / ,/ Justices 

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