United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 15, 2006

Decided December 15, 2006

Before

Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

 Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

 Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 06-1774

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CHARLES V. DAVIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Central District of Illinois

No. 05-10068-001

Michael M. Mihm, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Charles Davis pleaded guilty without a plea agreement to possessing a gun

as a felon, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment. 

Davis filed a timely notice of appeal, but his appointed counsel now seeks to

withdraw because he cannot discern a nonfrivolous basis for the appeal. See Anders

v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Because Davis has not accepted our invitation to

comment on counsel’s motion, see Cir. R. 51(b), our review is limited to the potential

issues identified in counsel’s facially adequate brief. See United States v. Schuh,

289 F.3d 968, 973-74 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel first considers whether there are any nonfrivolous issues to be raised

regarding Davis’s conviction. Counsel correctly notes that an “unconditional guilty

plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects occurring prior to the plea.” United States

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 06-1774 Page 2

v. Elizalde-Adame, 262 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the only

potential issue Davis could raise on appeal about his conviction is whether he

knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea. But counsel consulted with

Davis, who advised that he does not want his guilty plea set aside; thus, counsel

appropriately avoids any discussion about the adequacy of the guilty plea colloquy

or the voluntariness of Davis’s plea. See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671

(7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel next considers whether Davis could challenge the reasonableness of

his prison sentence. Counsel cites two factors that at sentencing Davis argued

would justify a term below the guidelines range: first, that Davis showed

extraordinary acceptance of responsibility by pleading guilty knowing he might be

sentenced to the statutory maximum and, second, that Davis was already serving a

prison sentence for a state parole revocation based on the offense conduct 

underlying the instant offense. But the district court considered both points along

with the factors specifically enumerated in 18 U.S.C § 3553(a) before ultimately

sentencing Davis to the statutory maximum, which was at the lowest end of the

applicable guidelines range. We ordinarily presume that any sentence within the

advisory guidelines range is reasonable. See United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d

606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005). But whether or not we applied the presumption here, we

would conclude, as does counsel, that it would be frivolous for Davis to argue that

his prison term is unreasonable. See United States v. Rita, No. 05-4674, 2006 WL

1144508 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 75 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2006) (No.

06-5754) (granting writ of certiorari to decide whether it is consistent with Booker

to accord a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within the guidelines

range). Counsel can identify no error in the district court's calculation of the

guidelines range and correctly notes that the district court gave detailed and

meaningful consideration to the relevant factors under § 3553(a), which is all it was

required to do. See United States v. Laufle, 433 F.3d 981, 987 (7th Cir. 2006). 

Accordingly, counsel's motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is

DISMISSED.