If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

October 29, 2020

v No. 348475

Wayne Circuit Court

NATHANIEL WARD, LC No. 18-005445-01-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and MARKEY and FORT HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals by right his jury trial convictions of third-degree criminal sexual 

conduct (CSC-III), MCL 750.520d(1)(c) (penetration of a physically helpless person), and 

resisting or obstructing an officer, MCL 750.81d(1). The circuit court sentenced defendant as a 

fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 25 to 50 years’ imprisonment for his CSC-III 

conviction and 10 to 15 years for his resisting or obstructing an officer conviction. We affirm.

I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

While visiting her sister in River Rouge, JH, the victim in this case, came into contact with 

three male friends of her sister whom she did not know. One of them was defendant. JH testified 

at trial that she fell asleep on her sister’s couch, and awoke during the early morning hours of 

May 30, 2018, to defendant inserting his fingers into her vagina. JH pushed defendant off of her, 

a brief physical altercation occurred, and defendant was eventually ushered out of the house by 

JH’s sister and another friend. Defendant left behind his cell phone; JH testified that she looked 

in his phone to find his name. JH then searched Michigan’s Offender Tracking Information System 

(OTIS) for defendant’s name, and because defendant was on parole at the time, found information 

about defendant and a photograph of him. JH reported the assault and defendant’s identity to the

police and defendant’s parole officer, and a warrant was issued for defendant’s arrest.

Later that day, Investigator John Hugle of the Absconder Recovery Unit (ARU), which is 

a branch of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), responded to the arrest warrant for 

defendant. Investigator Hugle began to surveil defendant’s home in River Rouge; two hours later, 

defendant arrived on a bicycle and entered the residence. Investigator Hugle approached the front 
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door and knocked. Defendant opened the front door slightly and Investigator Hugle, who was 

wearing clothing and body armor that clearly identified him as an officer with MDOC, announced 

that he had a warrant for defendant’s arrest and asked him to come outside. Defendant said “no,”

attempted to push the door closed, and began backpedaling. Investigator Hugle stopped the door 

with his foot, then saw defendant begin to turn and reach toward his pockets. Fearing for his 

safety, Investigator Hugle deployed his taser, incapacitating defendant, who was then arrested. 

Two folding knives were found in defendant’s pockets.1

Prior to trial, the prosecution moved the circuit court under MRE 404(b) to admit JH’s 

testimony concerning her use of OTIS to identify defendant and her call to his parole officer, as 

well as testimony from an MDOC employee concerning the nature of OTIS, which would have 

the effect of revealing defendant’s status as a parolee, although his specific prior crimes would not 

be disclosed. The prosecution argued that the evidence was admissible for the purpose of showing 

the identify of the defendant and explaining how JH, who had just met defendant that day, was 

able to identify him by name and photograph. Defendant argued that the evidence was 

impermissible propensity evidence and was unfairly prejudicial. The circuit court allowed the 

testimony, but gave a limiting instruction to the jury before its deliberations, as discussed later in 

this opinion.

Defendant was convicted and sentenced as described. This appeal followed. After filing 

his claim of appeal, defendant filed a motion in propria persona with this Court, seeking to remand 

for a Ginther2hearing on the issue of his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, which this Court denied.3

II. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S PAROLEE STATUS

Defendant argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by granting the prosecution’s 

MRE 404(b) motion and admitting evidence related to OTIS and his status as a parolee. We 

disagree.

“[W]e review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion, but 

review de novo preliminary questions of law, such as whether a rule of evidence precludes 

admissibility.” People v Chelmicki, 305 Mich App 58, 62; 850 NW2d 612 (2014). “An abuse of 

discretion occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome falling outside the range of principled 

outcomes.” People v Buie, 491 Mich 294, 320; 817 NW2d 33 (2012). “[I]t is an abuse of discretion 

to admit evidence that is inadmissible as a matter of law.” People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 

596 NW2d 607 (1999).

 

1 Defendant was originally charged with two counts of carrying a concealed weapon (CCW), but 

those charges were dismissed by the circuit court because the knives were of a type that were not 

prohibited by the relevant statute.

2 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).

3 See People v Ward, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 17, 2020 (Docket 

No. 348475).
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MRE 404(b) regulates the admissibility of evidence of “[o]ther crimes, wrongs, or 

acts . . . .” MRE 404(b)(1) states that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible 

to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” The Michigan 

Supreme Court has explained that “MRE 404(b) ‘is a rule of legal relevance’ that ‘limits only one 

category of logically relevant evidence’: ‘[i]f the proponent’s only theory of relevance is that the 

other act shows defendant’s inclination to wrongdoing in general to prove that the defendant 

committed the conduct in question, the evidence is not admissible.’ ” People v Jackson, 498 Mich 

246, 258; 869 NW2d 253 (2015), quoting People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 61-63; 508 NW2d 

114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994). “Underlying the rule is the fear that a jury will 

convict the defendant inferentially on the basis of his bad character rather than because he is guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime charged.” People v Watkins, 491 Mich 450, 468; 818 

NW2d 296 (2012), quoting People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 384; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). 

MRE 404(b), however, “is not exclusionary, but is inclusionary, because it provides a 

nonexhaustive list of reasons to properly admit evidence that may nonetheless also give rise to an 

inference about the defendant’s character.” People v Mardlin, 487 Mich 609, 616; 790 NW2d 607 

(2010). That “nonexhaustive list of reasons” includes “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake 

or accident when the same is material, whether such other crimes, wrongs, or acts are 

contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the conduct at issue in the case.” MRE 404(b)(1).

Even where evidence is considered to be relevant under MRE 401 and admissible for a 

proper purpose under MRE 404(b), the evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” See MRE 403. Notably, MRE 403 

does not regulate all evidence that is “prejudicial” because “[r]elevant evidence is inherently 

prejudicial.” People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 75; 537 NW2d 909 (1995) (citation omitted), mod 450 

Mich 1212 (1995). Rather, “[i]t is only when the probative value is substantially outweighed by 

the danger of unfair prejudice that evidence is excluded.” Id; see also People v Cameron, 291 

Mich App 599, 611; 806 NW2d 371 (2011).

Before trial, the prosecution provided notice to defendant that it would be seeking the 

admission of other-acts evidence under MRE 404(b). Specifically, the prosecution identified 

testimony regarding JH’s discovery of defendant’s identity via her use of OTIS. The prosecution 

asserted that such testimony would involve a discussion of the OTIS website, which contained 

defendant’s photograph because he was on parole. Thus, the jury would be exposed to defendant’s 

parolee status, although the information regarding the actual crimes of which defendant was 

convicted would be redacted. The prosecution argued that this evidence was relevant to and 

probative of the issue of defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the sexual assault of JH. 

Defendant argued the evidence was not relevant to his identity, but instead was being used solely 

as a way to inflame the passions of the jurors and to convince them that defendant had committed 

the charged crimes because he was a criminal. Further, defendant insisted that any marginal 

probative value of the OTIS evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice, and thus that the evidence should be excluded under MRE 403. The circuit court agreed 

with the prosecution, reasoning that the evidence was relevant to and probative of defendant’s 

identity, admissible, and not excludable under MRE 403. The circuit court noted that the evidence 

that defendant was on parole at the time he committed the sexual assault would have been 

presented to the jury even without JH’s testimony about OTIS because Investigator Hugle was part 
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of the ARU, a branch of MDOC that finds and arrests individuals who have violated their parole. 

In any event, to limit any unfair prejudice, the circuit court agreed to and did give a limiting 

instruction to the jury.

Defendant now reiterates his argument that the evidence was inadmissible under 

MRE 404(b). Our Supreme Court has directed that the first step in analyzing admissibility of 

other-acts evidence under the rules of evidence requires consideration of whether “the evidence 

[was] offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b) . . . .” VanderVliet, 444 Mich at 55. One of 

the proper purposes for the introduction of other-acts evidence specifically considered by 

MRE 404(b) is to prove “identity.” MRE 404(b)(1). Here, the prosecution asserted that it was 

introducing the evidence to prove defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the sexual assault of 

JH. Indeed, JH’s testimony established that she used OTIS to obtain a photograph of her attacker 

and information about him, which she reported to the police and his parole officer, leading to 

defendant’s arrest as the alleged perpetrator of the assault against her. The prosecution’s use of 

this evidence to prove identity was a proper purpose under MRE 404(b)(1). VanderVliet, 444 

Mich at 55.

The second step in analyzing other-acts evidence requires consideration of “the legal 

relevance of the evidence in light of” the stated purpose for its admission. People v Kelly, 317 

Mich App 637, 644; 895 NW2d 230 (2016). “Under the second prong of the VanderVliet test, 

logical relevance is determined by the application of MRE 401 and MRE 402.” People v Denson, 

500 Mich 385, 400; 902 NW2d 306 (2017). “We have emphasized the importance of logical 

relevance, calling it the ‘touchstone’ of the admissibility of other-acts evidence.” Id. “Relevance 

is a relationship between the evidence and a material fact at issue that must be demonstrated by 

reasonable inferences that make a material fact at issue more probable or less probable than it 

would be without the evidence.” Crawford, 458 Mich at 387. “Other-acts evidence is logically 

relevant if two components are present: materiality and probative value.” Denson, 500 Mich at 

401.

JH’s use of OTIS was probative of a material fact at issue in the trial—defendant’s identity 

as the person who sexually assaulted her. Id. It is clear from the record that defendant’s identity 

was a material fact at issue during the trial. JH testified that the afternoon preceding the sexual 

assault was the first time that she met the person who assaulted her. She also testified that she had

not been provided with that person’s name during their interactions. Therefore, the jury was 

required to consider whether she actually identified the correct person as the one who had assaulted 

her, making that issue a material fact for the jury to decide. Crawford, 458 Mich at 387.

JH testified that her attacker had left his cell phone at her sister’s house when he left on the 

morning of the assault. She used that cell phone to access its owner’s e-mail account, and 

discovered defendant’s name, “Nathaniel Ward.” JH then searched for Nathaniel Ward on OTIS. 

When she found the listing for defendant and saw the photograph, she immediately identified him 

as the man who assaulted her on May 30, 2018.

JH’s use of OTIS to find defendant was probative of her ability to identify him. Denson, 

500 Mich at 401. Without this evidence, the jury would have been left to speculate about how JH 

was able to identify defendant as her attacker despite having only met him once and not having 

been introduced to him by name.
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Defendant argues that the only evidence that actually was probative of defendant’s identity 

was that JH looked up his name online and discovered his photograph. In other words, the fact 

that JH found defendant on OTIS specifically was not probative of his identity as the perpetrator. 

We disagree. The jury was entitled to consider the reliability of the source of the photograph that 

JH used to identify defendant as her perpetrator. Stated differently, evidence that JH consulted a 

governmental database to identify the photograph of defendant was probative of the weight the 

jury might give her identification. Moreover, an MDOC employee testified that defendant’s 

photograph on OTIS was last updated when he was paroled in August 2017, less than one year 

before the assault occurred. That testimony had significant probative value because it showed that 

JH had viewed a recent photograph of defendant when she identified him as the perpetrator. We 

conclude that the circuit court properly determined that JH’s and the MDOC employee’s testimony 

regarding OTIS was probative of defendant’s identity, which was a material fact at issue during 

the trial. Denson, 500 Mich at 401; Crawford, 458 Mich at 387.

The third prong of the test for admissibility of other-acts evidence under VanderVliet, 444 

Mich at 55, questions whether, although relevant, the evidence should be still be excluded under 

MRE 403 because the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger 

of unfair prejudice. “Unfair prejudice may exist where there is a danger that the evidence will be 

given undue or preemptive weight by the jury or where it would be inequitable to allow use of the 

evidence.” People v Gipson, 287 Mich App 261, 263; 787 NW2d 126 (2010), quoting People v 

Blackston, 481 Mich 451, 462; 751 NW2d 408 (2008). Stated differently, the “major function [of 

MRE 403] is limited to excluding matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the 

heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.” Mills, 450 Mich at 75 (citation omitted). Such concerns 

arise where “the tendency of the proposed evidence [is] to adversely affect the objecting party’s 

position by injecting considerations extraneous to the merits of the lawsuit, e.g., the jury’s bias, 

sympathy, anger, or shock.” Cameron, 291 Mich App at 611 (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Additional concerns include “the danger of confusion of the issues, or misleading the 

jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 

evidence.” Watkins, 491 Mich at 489 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Defendant argues that the evidence that he was a parolee (and therefore had previously 

been convicted of a crime) was unfairly prejudicial in light of the minimally probative nature of 

the evidence. We disagree. As discussed, the evidence involving OTIS was highly probative of 

defendant’s identity, which was a material fact at issue during the trial. JH did not know defendant 

or his name when the assault occurred; therefore, the methods she used to identify him (and their 

reliability) was important for the jury to consider. Moreover, although the fact that defendant had 

been recently paroled was revealed, the jury was not made aware of the actual crimes of which 

defendant had been convicted. The fact that the jury was made generally aware that defendant had 

been convicted of a crime in the past, without more, does not suggest that the jury would have 

turned to passion or bias in deciding to convict defendant of the charged crimes. Cameron, 291 

Mich App at 611. Furthermore, because the specific crimes were not mentioned, there was little 

possibility that the jurors would confuse the issues and convict defendant on the basis of a crime 

not charged in the present case. Watkins, 491 Mich at 489. In light of the relatively minor 

prejudice, if any, and the significant probative value of the evidence, the circuit court did not err 

by deciding that the evidence need not be excluded under MRE 403. VanderVliet, 444 Mich at 

55.
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Even if the circuit court did improperly admit the evidence, defendant would still have been 

required to show that he was prejudiced by the admission of the evidence. See Lukity, 460 Mich 

at 496 (“[A] preserved, nonconstitutional error is not a ground for reversal unless ‘after an 

examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear’ that it is more probable than not that 

the error was outcome determinative.”), quoting MCL 769.26. A trial court may often prevent 

prejudice through a limiting instruction. Kelly, 317 Mich App at 644; see also People v Mullins, 

322 Mich App 151, 173; 911 NW2d 201 (2017).

The circuit court gave the following limiting instruction before the jurors began 

deliberations:

5.11. You have heard evidence that was introduced to show that the 

Defendant was on parole at the time of the alleged offenses. If you believe this 

evidence you must be very careful only to consider it for certain purposes.

You may only think about whether this evidence tends to show how [the 

victim] identified Nathaniel Ward as the person who sexually assaulted her. You 

must not consider this evidence for any other purpose.

For example, you must not decide that it shows that the Defendant is a bad 

person or that he’s likely to commit crimes. You must not convict the Defendant 

here because you think he is guilty of other bad conduct. All the evidence must 

convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the alleged 

crime or you must find him not guilty.

“Jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions, and instructions are presumed to 

cure most errors.” People v Mullins, 322 Mich App 151, 173; 911 NW2d 201 (2017). In light of 

the circuit court’s instruction, we conclude that defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice. Lukity, 

460 Mich at 496. This is especially true because, as the circuit court noted, the jury would likely 

have inferred defendant’s parolee status from his apprehension by an ARU officer in any event.

Additionally, our conclusion is supported by the strong independent evidence presented at 

trial. JH gave specific, detailed testimony about her recollection of events that night, which were 

largely corroborated by her sister. Even if admitted in error, the challenged evidence was not 

outcome-determinative, because the jury would have been exposed to defendant’s parolee status

anyway, any unfair prejudice was limited by a jury instruction, and there was strong independent 

evidence of defendant’s guilt. Id.

III. DEFENDANT’S STANDARD 4 BRIEF

Defendant, in his Standard 4 brief,4alleges a wide array of errors to have occurred in this 

case. We find all of defendant’s allegations to be without merit.

 

4 A supplemental appellate brief filed in propria persona by a criminal defendant under Michigan 

Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 2004-6, Standard 4.
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A. ALLEGED CONSTITUTIONAL AND JURISDICTIONAL ERRORS—DISTRICT 

COURT

Defendant contends that the district court made a number of errors, that resulted both in 

constitutional violations and a loss of jurisdiction. We disagree.

1. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Generally, “[f]or an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must be raised, addressed, 

and decided by the lower court.” People v Zitka, 325 Mich App 38, 48; 922 NW2d 696 (2018) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendant first challenges alleged errors with the felony 

warrant, felony complaint, and his arraignment on those documents. Because defendant did not 

raise those issues with the district or circuit courts, they are not preserved for appellate review. Id. 

Defendant’s second and third challenges are constitutional arguments regarding Magistrate Vesta 

Svenson’s age and requirement to uphold the United States Constitution. Once again, a review of 

the record shows that defendant did not raise these issues in the lower courts, and they thus are not 

preserved for review. Id. Lastly, defendant argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction 

because the case actually involved a contract and a trust, over which the district court never 

established jurisdiction. In three separate motions that defendant filed in propria persona with the 

circuit court, defendant made similar allegations regarding contracts, corporations, trusts, 

executors, and trustees that he now raises in this appeal. The circuit court denied defendant’s 

motions to dismiss the charges against him on those grounds. Therefore, these arguments by 

defendant are preserved for appeal. Zitka, 325 Mich App at 48. Additionally, defendant’s 

challenges to jurisdiction generally are also preserved, because “[j]urisdictional defects may be 

raised at any time.” People v Martinez, 211 Mich App 147, 149; 535 NW2d 236 (1995).

Defendant’s arguments require consideration of certain court rules, statutes, and 

constitutional provisions, and also challenge the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction. “To the 

extent our analysis involves the interpretation of court rules or questions of subject-matter 

jurisdiction . . . our review is de novo.” People v Clement, 254 Mich App 387, 389-390; 657 

NW2d 172 (2002). For preserved issues, “[w]e review de novo constitutional challenges and 

questions of statutory interpretation . . . .” People v Hrlic, 277 Mich App 260, 262; 744 NW2d 

221 (2007) (citations omitted). However, because certain issues were not raised, addressed, and 

decided, we review the “unpreserved claim[s] for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial 

rights.” People v Roscoe, 303 Mich App 633, 648; 846 NW2d 402 (2014). In order to show that 

a defendant’s substantial rights were affected, there must be “a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the 

error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 

597 NW2d 130 (1999). “Reversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the 

conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error seriously affected the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s innocence.” 

People v Randolph, 502 Mich 1, 10; 917 NW2d 249 (2018) (citation omitted).

2. ANALYSIS

Defendant’s allegations of errors committed by the district court are without merit.
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Defendant argues that the felony complaint filed in this case lacked sufficient factual detail 

and was not properly authorized by a prosecutor. We disagree. “A complaint is a written 

accusation that a named or described person has committed a specified criminal offense.” 

MCR 6.101(A). “The primary function of a complaint is to move the magistrate to determine 

whether a warrant shall issue.” People v Higuera, 244 Mich App 429, 443; 625 NW2d 444 (2001) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). “A complaint shall recite the substance of the accusation 

against the accused. The complaint may contain factual allegations establishing reasonable cause.” 

MCL 764.1d. “The complaint must include the substance of the accusation against the accused 

and the name and statutory citation of the offense.” MCR 6.101(A); see also People v Glass, 464 

Mich 266, 277; 627 NW2d 261 (2001). “The factual allegations contained in the complaint . . . 

may be based upon personal knowledge, information and belief, or both.” MCL 764.1a(3).

The complaint in this case, which was sworn to by Detective Danny Dotson, the officerin-charge of the case, stated that there was probable cause to believe that defendant committed 

CSC-III and resisting or obstructing an officer on May 30, 2018, at JH’s sister’s house in River 

Rouge. The complaint contained specific allegations that defendant “did engage in sexual 

penetration to wit finger into genital opening with [the victim], said defendant knowing or having 

reason to know that the victim was physically helpless, contrary to MCL 750.520d(1)(c).” As to 

the second charge, the complaint stated that defendant “did assault, batter, wound, resist, obstruct, 

oppose, or endanger John Hugle, a police officer of Absconder Recovery Unit, Michigan 

Department of Corrections that the defendant knew or had reason to know was performing his or 

her duties, contrary to MCL 750.81d(1).”

Detective Dotson, therefore, swore that defendant had digitally penetrated JH’s vagina 

while he knew she was physically helpless, and then resisted or obstructed Investigator Hugle, an 

officer with the ARU of the MDOC, in River Rouge on May 30, 2018. The complaint also 

contained the relevant statutory sections that were allegedly violated. This was enough factual 

information to satisfy the relatively limited standard required of a felony complaint, which by court 

rule “must include the substance of the accusation against the accused and the name and statutory 

citation of the offense.” MCR 6.101(A). This Court has held, although relating to different 

charges, that a similar, brief factual summary was sufficient. People v Cain, 299 Mich App 27, 

52; 829 NW2d 37 (2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds 495 Mich 874 (2013).

Defendant also contends that the felony complaint was insufficient because it was not 

properly authorized by a prosecutor. A review of the felony complaint filed on June 2, 2018, 

shows that it was authorized by a prosecutor, Jacqueline Nicholas, on the day it was filed and 

signed by Magistrate Svenson. Therefore, despite allegations to the contrary by defendant, the 

district court record in this case clearly establishes that the prosecution complied with 

MCR 6.101(C).

In sum, defendant’s allegations regarding errors with the complaint lack merit. Moreover, 

our Supreme Court has held that “inadequacies of the complaint” do not “affect the jurisdiction of 

the court . . . .” People v Burrill, 391 Mich 124, 132; 214 NW2d 823 (1974). See also People v 

Mayberry, 52 Mich App 450, 450-451; 217 NW2d 420 (1974) (concluding that “a conclusory 

complaint . . . does not oust jurisdiction”). Therefore, even if defendant had proven that there were 

inadequacies with the felony complaint, he would not have been entitled to reversal because of a 
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resultant lack of jurisdiction. Burrill, 391 Mich App at 132. Consequently, defendant’s arguments 

regarding the felony complaint lack merit.

Next, defendant argues that the district court made procedural errors during his 

arraignment, which resulted in a loss of jurisdiction. Primarily, defendant argues that his 

arraignment was unnecessarily delayed and was held in the wrong district court. Both arguments 

lack merit. “Unless released beforehand, an arrested person must be taken without unnecessary 

delay before a court for arraignment in accordance with the provisions of this rule . . . .” 

MCR 6.104(A). The United States Supreme Court has held that “a jurisdiction that provides 

judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply 

with the promptness requirement . . . .” Riverside Co v McLaughlin, 500 US 44, 56; 111 S Ct 

1661; 114 L Ed 2d 49 (1991). The Court clarified, though, that a violation of the 48-hour rule does 

not automatically require a finding that a delay was unreasonable, but only that, “[i]n such a case, 

the arrested individual does not bear the burden of proving an unreasonable delay.” Id. at 57. 

Instead, “the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide 

emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.” Id.

Defendant’s arraignment occurred on June 2, 2018, following his arrest on May 30, 2018. 

Therefore, more than the 48-hour period discussed in Riverside Co, 500 US at 56-57, had elapsed. 

Defendant contends that this was a jurisdictional error requiring the reversal of his convictions and 

the dismissal of the charges against him. But this Court has held that, “ ‘[w]hile an improper delay 

in arraignment may necessitate the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of that delay, the 

delay does not entitle a defendant to dismissal of the prosecution.’ ” Cain, 299 Mich App at 49, 

quoting People v Harrison, 163 Mich App 409, 421; 413 NW2d 813 (1987). Our Supreme Court 

has held similarly, reasoning that application of the exclusionary rule—not a loss of jurisdiction 

and dismissal—is the remedy for an improperly delayed arraignment. People v Mallory, 421 Mich 

229, 240-241; 365 NW2d 673 (1984). Defendant has not alleged that evidence was obtained as a 

result of an unnecessary delay and should have been excluded. Defendant has not provided any 

grounds for this Court to provide him relief for the delayed arraignment, even assuming the delay 

was unreasonable. Id.; Cain, 299 Mich App at 49; Harrison, 163 Mich App at 421.

In regards to the place of the arraignment, the court rules provide that “[a]n accused arrested 

pursuant to a warrant must be taken to a court specified in the warrant.” MCR 6.104(B). 

Defendant argues that this rule was violated, because the felony warrant in this case specified the 

25th District Court, and Magistrate Svenson, who signed the warrant, was not a judge in that 

district. Defendant is correct that the felony warrant in this case appears on a form containing the 

address of the 25th District Court. The record shows that defendant was arraigned and bound over 

at the 25th District Court, and that the arraignment was conducted by Magistrate Svenson and

Judge David Zelenak. Defendant has presented no evidence to establish the factual basis for his 

claim.

Defendant also argues that the district court erred by failing to make “[a] verbatim 

record . . . of the arraignment,” and that the district court violated MCR 6.104(F). “As the 

appellant,” defendant “bore the burden of furnishing the reviewing court with a record to verify 

the factual basis of any argument upon which reversal was predicated.” People v Elston, 462 Mich 

751, 762; 614 NW2d 595 (2000). The record as provided to this Court does not contain a transcript 

of the district court’s arraignment on the felony complaint and warrant. However, the record also 
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shows that defendant never requested production of the transcript of his arraignment. Therefore, 

defendant has failed to bear his burden to “verify the factual basis” of his contention that such a 

record does not exist. Id.

Defendant further argues that his convictions must be reversed because Magistrate Svenson 

was over the age of 70 years during the district court proceedings. Defendant is in error, because

Const 1963, art 6, § 19(3), applies to state court judges, but does not, by its language, apply to 

magistrates. Under that provision of the Michigan Constitution, individuals cannot be appointed 

or elected as state court judges when they are over the age of 70 years on the date of the election 

or appointment. O’Connell v Dir of Elections, 317 Mich App 82, 86; 894 NW2d 113 (2016). But 

the requirements and duties of a district court magistrate are established by statute. In re James, 

492 Mich 553, 566 n 21; 821 NW2d 144 (2012). These statutory qualifications, notably, do not 

contain an age limitation. See MCL 600.8501 and MCL 600.8507. Defendant has failed to 

support his argument with applicable law (and has further failed to demonstrate, that even if the 

Michigan Constitution were applicable, Magistrate Svenson was appointed or elected when she 

was over the age of 70). Moreover, defendant has failed to cite any authority for the proposition 

that the remedy for a violation of an age limitation on magistrates would be the reversal of his 

convictions.

Defendant makes a lengthy and largely incoherent argument regarding alleged mass fraud 

by the criminal justice system in the United States. The crux of his argument appears to be that 

district and circuit courts in Michigan are only able to render decisions in criminal cases by 

considering people as personal property and with the consent of the accused. He claims that by 

withdrawing his consent and asserting that he is representing a trust, the district and circuit courts 

were divested of their jurisdiction. Defendant also makes an array of allegations that, because the 

courts are actually dealing with property and not people, they have to prove there was a valid debt 

or valid contract before they can proceed. Because there was no evidence of a debt or a contract, 

defendant contends that his convictions must be reversed and all “criminal” charges against him 

dismissed. In support of that argument, defendant cites sources including Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure; Title 5 of the United States Code; Title 27 of the Code of Federal Regulations; and 

various treatises, cases, and canons. We decline to respond at length to these sweeping allegations, 

but only note that under MCL 600.8311(c) and(d), “the district court has jurisdiction of . . . 

[a]rraignments, the fixing of bail and the accepting of bonds, [and] . . . [p]reliminary examinations 

in all felony cases . . . .” A district court obtains jurisdiction over a specific defendant to perform 

the arraignment and preliminary examination when it issues a warrant on the basis of a probablecause finding after reviewing a sworn complaint. People v Mosley, 338 Mich 559, 564; 61 NW2d 

785 (1953). Defendant has not successfully challenged the district court’s jurisdiction in this case.

Defendant’s final constitutional/jurisdictional argument is that the district court lost 

jurisdiction over him when it failed to ensure that his due-process rights were not violated by the 

other errors he has alleged. Defendant goes so far as to suggest that the district court has committed 

treason, see 18 USC 2381,5by failing to ensure his constitutional right to due process. As 

 

5

“Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their 

enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason 
-11-

discussed, we find no merit to his claims of error; we also decline to find the district court to have 

lost jurisdiction over defendant, through treason or otherwise.

B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Defendant also argues that he was not provided effective assistance of counsel during the 

district-court proceedings. We disagree.

1. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because defendant did not move the circuit court for a new trial or a Ginther hearing on his 

counsel’s ineffectiveness, and this Court denied his motion to remand for a Ginther hearing, our 

review is limited to the existing record. People v Jackson (On Reconsideration), 313 Mich App 

409, 431; 884 NW2d 297 (2015); see also People v Johnson, 315 Mich App 163, 174; 889 NW2d 

513 (2016). “The denial of effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and 

constitutional law, which are reviewed, respectively, for clear error and de novo.” People v 

Schrauben, 314 Mich App 181, 189; 886 NW2d 173 (2016), quoting People v Brown, 279 Mich 

App 116, 140; 755 NW2d 664 (2008).

2. ANALYSIS

“Criminal defendants have a right to the effective assistance of counsel under the United 

States and Michigan Constitutions.” Schrauben, 314 Mich App at 189-190, citing US Const, Am 

VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. “However, effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the 

defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise.” Schrauben, 314 Mich App at 190. The 

United States Supreme Court has held that “in order to receive a new trial on the basis of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish that ‘counsel’s representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness’ and that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” People 

v Vaughn, 491 Mich 642, 669; 821 NW2d 288 (2012), quoting Strickland v Washington, 466 US 

668, 688, 694; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). “When reviewing defense counsel’s 

performance, the reviewing court must first objectively ‘determine whether, in light of all the 

circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally 

competent assistance.’ ” Jackson, 313 Mich App at 431, quoting Strickland, 466 US at 690. 

“Next, the defendant must show that trial counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense—

in other words, that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” Jackson, 313 Mich App at 431, quoting 

Vaughn, 491 Mich at 669.

We will not find trial counsel to be ineffective when an objection would have been futile; 

nor will we second-guess matters of trial strategy. People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 457; 678 

NW2d 631 (2004); People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76-77; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). “The 

 

and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title but 

not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States.” 18 

USC 2381.
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defendant ‘bears the burden of demonstrating both deficient performance and prejudice[;] the 

defendant [also] necessarily bears the burden of establishing the factual predicate for his claim.’ ” 

People v Cooper, 309 Mich App 74, 80; 867 NW2d 452 (2015), quoting People v Carbin, 463 

Mich 590, 600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001) (alteration in Cooper).

Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective during the district-court proceedings for 

failing to object to the issues with the felony complaint, felony warrant, and jurisdiction identified 

in his Standard 4 brief. As discussed earlier in this opinion, we find no error requiring reversal in 

any of these allegations. Thus, any objection or motion to dismiss filed by defendant’s counsel 

would have been futile. “Failing to advance a meritless argument or raise a futile objection does 

not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v Savage, 327 Mich App 604, 617; 935 

NW2d 69 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Defendant also argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately crossexamine the prosecution’s witnesses during the preliminary examination. Generally, counsel’s 

decision regarding whether or how to cross-examine witnesses is a matter of trial strategy, “which 

we will not second-guess with the benefit of hindsight.” People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 398; 

688 NW2d 308 (2004). During the preliminary examination, the prosecution called Investigator 

Hugle as the first witness. After Investigator Hugle provided testimony about his altercation with 

defendant during his arrest, defendant’s district court counsel engaged in the following brief crossexamination:

Q. Did you have a bodycam on?

A. No, sir.

Q. Okay. Is it a policy . . .

A. No, sir.

Q. . . . if you wear a bodycam or not?

A. No, sir. No, sir.

Q. Okay.

JH also testified at the preliminary examination, and the prosecution elicited testimony that 

substantively matched her testimony during trial. Defense counsel only asked JH one question on

cross-examination:

Q. Uh, I just want to clarify ma’am, when—when, um, [defendant], um, 

had his fingers in your vagina, was anybody else present, anybody else see this to 

your knowledge?

A. No.
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On the second day of the preliminary examination, the prosecution called Lieutenant Vanderaa to 

testify regarding the two knives found in defendant’s possession after his arrest. Defense counsel 

did not ask any questions on cross-examination.

Defense counsel’s strategy during cross-examination was clear—to ensure that the district 

court judge was aware that there were no other witnesses to defendant’s alleged sexual assault of 

JH and that there was no bodycam footage of defendant’s arrest. Although the cross-examination 

was brief, defense counsel elicited these weaknesses in the prosecution’s case from the testifying 

witnesses. Defendant has failed to overcome the presumption that defense counsel’s conduct was 

the product of sound trial strategy. Johnson, 315 Mich App at 174; Schrauben, 314 Mich App at 

190; Dixon, 263 Mich App at 398.

Further, even if his counsel’s cross-examination of witnesses during the preliminary 

examination was objectively unreasonable, defendant would still be unable to prove prejudice. 

Cooper, 309 Mich App at 80; see also Strickland, 466 US at 694. Defendant was not prejudiced 

by counsel’s decision not to cross-examine Lieutenant Vanderaa about his finding knives in 

defendant’s pockets, because the CCW charges were dismissed before the case went to trial. 

Further, defendant has not explained how additional cross-examination of Investigator Hugle or 

JH would have changed the outcome of the proceedings. Both Investigator Hugle and JH presented 

specific testimony that defendant had digitally penetrated JH while she was asleep, and then

resisted or obstructed Investigator Hugle during his arrest. There is nothing apparent on the record 

that suggests that further cross-examination during the preliminary examination would have 

resulted in defendant not being bound over to the circuit court. Defendant has not demonstrated a 

reasonable probability that, but for any errors by his counsel, the proceedings against him would 

have had different results. Strickland, 466 US at 694.

Defendant also argues that his counsel’s cross-examination of JH was ineffective for an 

additional reason, i.e., that his counsel’s only question implied that defendant had committed the 

digital penetration. However, as noted, JH had already testified that defendant digitally penetrated 

her vagina while she was sleeping. Defense counsel’s question about whether anyone saw this 

event occur, while perhaps not perfectly crafted, certainly did not cause defendant prejudice. Id.

Lastly, defendant argues that his counsel failed to properly investigate the case, that proper 

investigation would have led to additional witnesses testifying at the preliminary examination, and 

that his counsel failed to meet with defendant before the preliminary examination. “The failure to 

reasonably investigate a case can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v Anderson, 

322 Mich App 622, 630; 912 NW2d 607 (2018). The defendant bears the burden of establishing 

the factual predicate for his claim of inadequate investigation. Anderson, 322 Mich App at 628.

Defendant has failed to establish the factual predicate for his claim. Although he claims a 

more thorough investigation by his counsel would have uncovered additional witnesses, he fails

to identify any such witnesses or describe what their testimony would have been and how that 

would have benefited his case. Id. Regarding defendant’s claim that his attorney failed to meet 

with him prior to the preliminary examination, defendant has not established the factual basis for 

this claim; further, defendant has not specified how he was prejudiced by his attorney’s alleged 

failure to meet with him. As we have discussed, defendant’s attorney was clearly versed in the 

facts of the case at the time of the preliminary examination, and employed a reasonable strategy 
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of pointing out a lack of corroborating evidence. We find defendant’s argument to be without 

merit. Id.; Anderson, 322 Mich App at 628.

C. ALLEGED CONSTITUTIONAL AND JURISDICTIONAL ERRORS—CIRCUIT COURT

Defendant, in his Standard 4 brief, also asserts that there were a number of errors, 

constitutional and otherwise, that resulted in the circuit court’s loss of jurisdiction. We disagree.

1. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Generally, as noted, “[f]or an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must be raised, 

addressed, and decided by the lower court.” Zitka, 325 Mich App at 48 (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Defendant challenges the circuit court’s jurisdiction on two grounds—first, that 

the circuit court improperly tried him as a criminal when it was actually civil court by virtue of 

defendant’s supposed status as a trust and contract, and second, that the circuit court improperly 

acted under maritime jurisdiction. As discussed earlier, defendant raised the issue of jurisdiction 

related to allegations that the circuit court was a civil court masquerading as a criminal court, along 

with the various associated arguments about contract and commercial law, with the circuit court, 

which motion was denied. Thus, that issue is preserved. Id. Defendant’s argument regarding 

maritime jurisdiction, however, was not raised. However, “[j]urisdictional defects may be raised 

at any time.” Martinez, 211 Mich App at 149. Consequently, we will still consider the issue, 

despite the lack of preservation. Next, defendant makes a constitutional argument regarding 

education and licensing of lawyers and judges, which was not raised with the lower court and 

therefore is not preserved for this Court’s review. Zitka, 325 Mich App at 48.

See Section III.A.1. of this opinion for the applicable standards of review for preserved and 

unpreserved issues.

2. ANALYSIS

Defendant’s arguments regarding the circuit court’s jurisdiction and alleged constitutional 

violations are without merit and do not require reversal.

Defendant first argues that we must not hold him, as a pro se appellant, to the same standard 

to which we hold licensed attorneys. It is true that this Court has held that “because of the 

constitutional issues involved, a prisoner’s pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent 

standard . . . .” People v Herrera (On Remand), 204 Mich App 333, 339; 514 NW2d 543 (1994). 

Even so, this less-stringent standard does not change the requirement that defendant present some

legally or factually meritorious grounds for reversal. See Estelle v Gamble, 429 US 97, 106-108; 

97 S Ct 285; 50 L Ed 2d 251 (1976).

Next, defendant makes two separate arguments regarding the circuit court’s jurisdiction 

over him. Defendant first reiterates his argument (which we have already addressed and rejected 

in this opinion)—that the entire criminal justice system in Michigan state courts is a fraudulent 

scheme involving civil courts, administrative tribunals, contracts, the consent of the accused, 

trusts, and unproven debts. Second, defendant adds that the circuit court operated under maritime 

jurisdiction, which was not permitted because defendant was on land when the alleged crimes 
-15-

occurred. We need not address either of these issues at length, as defendant has failed to provide 

binding legal authority in support of either of these propositions.

Our Supreme Court in People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 458-459; 579 NW2d 868 (1998), 

held that circuit courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over felony criminal cases, in general. Id. 

at 458. Further, “[i]n personam jurisdiction is vested in the circuit court upon the filing of a return 

of the magistrate . . . before whom the defendant had been examined.” Id. (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). A review of the record in this case shows clearly that defendant underwent a 

preliminary examination in the district court, after which the district court found probable cause to 

believe that defendant had committed the charged crimes. Having so decided, the district court 

then bound defendant over to circuit court for trial on those charges. The prosecution subsequently 

filed a felony information, and the circuit court conducted an arraignment on the information. 

Considering those facts, it is clear that the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this 

case. Id. See also People v Lown, 488 Mich 242, 268; 794 NW2d 9 (2011) (“Michigan circuit 

courts are courts of general jurisdiction and unquestionably have jurisdiction over felony cases.”).

Further, the circuit court also had personal jurisdiction over defendant because the district 

court conducted a preliminary examination and filed a return, binding over defendant’s case for 

trial. Goecke, 457 Mich at 458. There is nothing in the record to suggest that any court involved 

in this case was relying on maritime jurisdiction. Rather, the facts as just discussed establish that 

the circuit court had both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction to consider defendant’s case. Id.

D. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM AS A WHOLE

Defendant argues that the system for accreditation of lawyers and judges is unconstitutional 

because it provides for titles of nobility and creates a ruling class. For that argument, defendant 

first relies on the following pertinent language: “No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United 

States.” US Const, art I, § 9, cl 8. However, while creative, defendant has not supported with any 

legal authority his argument that an attorney, as a result of being licensed or becoming qualified 

to be a judge, becomes invested with a title of nobility. Indeed, in Jackson v Florida, opinion of 

the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, issued December 19, 2018 (Case 

No. 18-cv-259-FtM-29MRM), p 2, the court held that a lawyer’s “ ‘title’ as ‘Esquire’ does not 

implicate” US Const, art I, § 9, cl 8. Similarly, in McIndoo v Broward Co, 750 Fed Appx 816, 

819 (CA 11, 2018), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a suit 

against a state judge “involves no title of nobility . . . that would implicate” the cited clause of the 

United States Constitution. Although those decisions are not binding, we consider them 

persuasive. Consequently, because the titles given to attorneys and judges are not titles of nobility, 

US Const, art I, § 9, cl 8, is not implicated, and thus, defendant’s argument lacks merit.

Defendant also argues that the existence of licensure for attorneys and judges violates the 

following relevant portion of the United States Constitution: “The United States shall guarantee to 

every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .” US Const, art IV, § 4. When 

describing this “Republican Form of Government” guaranteed to Michigan’s citizens, our 

Supreme Court explained that Michigan is “a constitutional republic in which we, as Michigan 

citizens, elect our representatives to local and state legislative bodies to enact our laws.” Stand Up 

for Democracy v Secretary of State, 492 Mich 588, 599; 822 NW2d 159 (2012) (opinion by MARY 

BETH KELLY, J.). In a similar vein, our Supreme Court has also stated that, “[o]f primary 
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importance to the viability of our republican system of government is the ability of elected 

representatives to act on behalf of the people through the exercise of their power to enact, amend, 

or repeal legislation.” Studier v Mich Pub Sch Employees’ Retirement Bd, 472 Mich 642, 660; 

698 NW2d 350 (2005). From these cases, it is clear that the constitutional right to a “Republican 

Form of Government” is related to the legislative branch of the government. US Const, art IV, § 

4; Stand up for Democracy, 492 Mich at 599; Studier, 472 Mich at 660. Defendant’s analysis of 

the issue makes no allegation that the licensing procedures for attorneys and judges somehow 

violates a Michigan citizen’s right to elect a representative to the Legislature. Consequently, 

contrary to defendant’s argument, the existence of attorneys and judges in Michigan does not 

implicate US Const, art IV, § 4.

E. JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT

Lastly, defendant, in his Standard 4 brief, argues that we are required to determine whether 

we have been divested of jurisdiction by failing to ensure that defendant was not denied his right 

to due process. Because we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal, we disagree.

“Under MCR 7.203(A)(1), this Court has jurisdiction over ‘[a] final judgment or final order

of the circuit court . . . .’ ” People v Wiley, 324 Mich App 130, 146; 919 NW2d 802 (2018). In 

criminal cases, a “final judgment” or “final order” includes “the original sentence imposed 

following conviction.” MCR 7.202(6)(b)(ii).

Having already addressed defendant’s previous arguments regarding jurisdiction and 

finding them to be without merit, we are left with a direct appeal by a defendant of the circuit 

court’s judgment of sentence following his criminal convictions. Under the applicable court rules, 

MCR 7.203(A)(1) and 7.202(6)(b)(ii), and caselaw, Wiley, 324 Mich App at 146, this Court has 

jurisdiction over such an appeal. Defendant has not cited any authority that a denial of due process 

by a circuit court or district court, even if it actually existed, would deprive an appellate court of 

jurisdiction to hear his appeal. Indeed, if it did, defendant would be left without an avenue to 

challenge his convictions and assert his right to due process.

Moreover, to the extent that defendant argues that this Court has already denied him due 

process, defendant has failed to allege exactly what actions by this Court have deprived him of his 

constitutional rights, and has failed to provide authority that such a deprivation would divest this 

Court of jurisdiction. Defendant is not permitted “to announce a position or assert an error and 

then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and 

elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his 

position.” People v Bass, 317 Mich App 241, 276; 893 NW2d 140 (2016) (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Defendant’s argument is without merit.

Affirmed.

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra

/s/ Jane E. Markey

/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood