COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-13-00555-CR

RAMIEN JORDAN HENRY APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 3 OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 1312412D

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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A jury convicted Appellant Ramien Jordan Henry of two counts of 

aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon and one count of burglary of a 

habitation, all charged in a single indictment. The jury assessed Appellant’s

punishment at five years’ confinement on each count. The trial court sentenced 

him accordingly and ordered the three sentences to be served concurrently. In 

 1

See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

three issues, Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the 

aggravated robbery conviction of Count Three, the State withheld Brady

material,2 and trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Because the 

evidence is sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction and because the record is 

insufficient to support Appellant’s complaints in the remaining two issues, we 

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Brief Facts

Ross Pardue, Riley Goff, Emily Gates, and Lauryn Fanning were in Ross’s

apartment in Grapevine, Tarrant County, Texas, watching TV and socializing

when Ross answered the front door intending to make a marijuana sale. Instead,

several men entered with handguns, ransacked the apartment looking for

marijuana and money, and left after about fifteen minutes, taking various

electronic and personal items with them. The testimony varied on the number of

assailants and guns involved. Ross maintained that five individuals had entered

the apartment, each with a gun. Emily “vividly” remembered three individuals

entering the apartment and described at least one of them holding a gun. She

also described one man standing over her with a gun, but it is not clear if she

was referring to a second gunman. She said that she was focused on the man

standing over her with a gun and not focused on counting people.

 2

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963).
3

Ross insisted that he recognized Appellant as one of the men who came

inside the apartment and ransacked it and that Appellant was holding a firearm

and pointing it at Emily when she photographed him on her cell phone. The

assailants took that cell phone. But at trial, Emily could not identify Appellant as

one of the assailants.

After Appellant’s arrest in Denton County, Detective Pedro Soltero of the

Grapevine Police Department interviewed him, making a video and audio

recording of the interview. In the interview, Appellant took some but not all

responsibility for the crimes of that night.

Ross admitted on the stand that he was actively engaged in buying and 

selling marijuana, although he described it as more of a sideline venture to help 

his “close friends.” He testified that he had only been involved in selling it for a 

few months.

Sufficient Evidence of Aggravated Robbery of Emily with a Deadly Weapon

In his first issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support his conviction on Count Three, the aggravated robbery allegation naming 

Emily as the complainant. In our due-process review of the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support a conviction, we view all of the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have 
4

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.3

 This 

standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts 

in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from 

basic facts to ultimate facts.4

The trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the 

evidence.5

 Thus, when performing an evidentiary sufficiency review, we may not 

re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence and substitute our judgment 

for that of the factfinder.6

 Instead, we determine whether the necessary 

inferences are reasonable based upon the cumulative force of the evidence 

when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.7

 We must presume that 

the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict and defer 

to that resolution.8

 3

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979);

Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

4

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Dobbs, 434 S.W.3d at 170.

5

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (West 1979); Dobbs, 434 

S.W.3d at 170.

6

Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

7

Sorrells v. State, 343 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see 

Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

8

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at 2793; Dobbs, 434 S.W.3d at 170.
5

Appellant’s trial counsel conceded in his opening statement that Appellant 

got into a bad situation with some older boys on the night of the robbery. He 

admitted that Appellant was present but stated that Appellant did not have a gun 

and did not enter the apartment. But in his testimony, Ross identified Appellant 

as one of the assailants. Although the evidence showed that when they called 

about buying marijuana from him, Ross had given the people who turned out to 

be the assailants instructions for finding his apartment, the witnesses described 

the assailants as pushing their way into the apartment at gunpoint.

A person commits robbery if he intentionally or knowingly threatens or 

places another in fear of serious bodily injury or death while in the course of 

committing theft.9

 The robbery is aggravated if he uses or exhibits a deadly 

weapon.10 Although Emily could not identify Appellant as one of the men who 

entered and ransacked the apartment or who pointed a firearm at her head, Ross 

recognized Appellant and testified that Appellant had pointed the gun at Emily. 

That is sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s conviction as a principal for the 

aggravated robbery of Emily. We therefore do not need to address whether the 

evidence supported his conviction as a party.11 We overrule Appellant’s first 

issue.

 9

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02(a)(2) (West 2011).

10Id. § 29.03(a)(2).

11See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
6

Brady Complaint Not Supported by the Record

In his second issue, Appellant argues that the State failed to disclose 

exculpatory evidence as mandated by Brady v. Maryland.

12 To support his 

argument, Appellant refers us to a record found on publicdata.com. As Appellant 

concedes, this information does not appear in the appellate record. 

Consequently, it is not evidence properly before this court, and we may not 

consider it.13 We therefore overrule Appellant’s second issue.

Failure to Prove Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his third issue, Appellant argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must show 

by a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel’s representation was 

deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.14 An ineffectiveassistance claim must be “firmly founded in the record,” and “the record must 

affirmatively demonstrate” the meritorious nature of the claim.15 Direct appeal is 

 12Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S. Ct. at 1196.

13See Leza v. State, 351 S.W.3d 344, 362 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

14Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 

(1984); Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

15Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
7

usually an inadequate vehicle for raising an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 

claim because the record is generally undeveloped.16

It is not appropriate for an appellate court to simply infer ineffective 

assistance based upon unclear portions of the record or when counsel’s reasons 

for failing to do something do not appear in the record.17 Trial counsel “should 

ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to explain his actions before being 

denounced as ineffective.”18 If trial counsel is not given that opportunity, we 

should not conclude that counsel’s performance was deficient unless the 

challenged conduct was “so outrageous that no competent attorney would have 

engaged in it.”19

In the case now before this court, the evidence is inadequate to allow us to 

review Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We therefore 

overrule Appellant’s third issue.

Conclusion

Having overruled Appellant’s three issues, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment as to each count.

 16Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 592–93; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 

813–14.

17Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 593; Mata v. State, 226 S.W.3d 425, 432 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2007).

18Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 593.

19Nava, 415 S.W.3d at 308.
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/s/ Lee Ann Dauphinot

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT

JUSTICE

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: March 26, 2015