alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### MATTINGLY v. BOSTON WOVEN HOSE & RUBBER CO., Inc. (Dravo Corp., third-party defendant).

United States District Court S. D. New York.

Jan. 4, 1952.

*267Gair & Gair, New York City, for plaintiff.

Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York City, for defendant.

Alexander & Ash, New York City, for third-party defendant.

EDWARD WEINFELD, District Judge.

The third-party defendant moves to vacate two notices to take depositions served by defendant. The first notice seeks to examine the third-party defendant by its “President, Vice-President and any other officers, agents or employees (including, but not limited to Glen Leeper and Peter Duscha) having knowledge of the facts.” Upon the argument it was conceded that the named individuals need not be produced for examination.

Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 28 U.S.C.A. provides that the notice shall “state a * * * general description sufficient to identify” the person to be examined “or the particular class or group to which he belongs.” Insofar as the notice specifies the “President” and “Vice-President” it is sufficient. But the remaining language—“any other officers, agents or employees having knowledge of the facts”—is an improper designation under Rule 30. Moore v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., D.C., *7*F.R.D. 65; Cohen v. Pennsylvania R. Co., D.C., 30 F.Supp. 419. Defendant may, through proper questioning of the President and Vice-President, discover the names of persons having knowledge of the facts and may examine such persons subject to the Rules.

In the second notice, defendant seeks to examine the third-party defendant by six named “agents or employees,” one of whom is described as “Manager of Shaft Department.”

There is no evidence to show that the persons named in the second notice are “managing agents.” For all that appears, they are merely employees, and, therefore, the third-party defendant may not be examined through them; nor is it under an obligation to produce them for examination. Defendant may take their depositions as witnesses and their presence at the examination may be compelled by the use of subpoenas. Aston v. American Export Lines, Inc., D.C., 11 F.R.D. 442; 4 Moore’s Federal Practice, Second Edition, 1051. Of course, should the examination of the officers permitted under the first order indicate that the employees are in fact “managing agents,” the plaintiff may then proceed to examine the defendant through them upon compliance with the Rules.

Settle order on notice, to also provide, in accordance with defendant’s concession made at the argument, that the depositions shall be taken in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
**Exhibit32.1**

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS CREATED BYSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

The undersigned officerof Stratagene Corporation (“Stratagene” or the “Company”) hereby certifiesthat:

(i) the accompanyingannual report on Form 10-K of the Company for the year ended December 31, 2006(the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d),as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “ExchangeAct”); and

(ii) the informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| Date: April 27, 2007 |   | By:    |   | /s/ Joseph A. Sorge                              |   |
|----------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                 |   |   |   | Joseph A. Sorge, M.D.                            |
|                 |   |   |   | Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and  President |

 

This certification is provided solely pursuant to 18U.S.C. Section 1350 and Item 601(b)(32) of Regulation S-K (“Item 601(b)(32)”)promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”),and the Exchange Act. In accordance with clause (ii) of Item 601(b)(32), thiscertification (A) shall not be deemed “filed” for purposes of Section 18 of theExchange Act or otherwise subject to the liability of that section and (B)shall not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under theSecurities Act or the Exchange Act, except to the extent that the Companyspecifically incorporates it by reference.

A signed original of this written statement requiredby Section 906 has been provided to Stratagene and will be retained byStratagene and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staffupon request.

----
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Gordon J. Quist, Senior District Judge for the U.S. District Court for Western Michigan, sitting by designation. NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. PETER JERALD FROMMER, Defendant - Appellant. No. 11-50146 D.C. No. 2:10-cr-00109-GW-1
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding Submitted October 12, 2012 ** Pasadena, California Before: KLEINFELD and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges, and QUIST, Senior District Judge. *** 

# FILED
OCT 29 2012 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 Peter Frommer appeals his sentence of 108 months. We reject his arguments and affirm. We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
We review whether the district court made sufficient factual findings de novo. U.S. v. Forrester , 616 F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 2010). We review substantive reasonableness of the sentence for abuse of discretion. Gall v. U.S. , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Frommer failed to object to the district judge’s treatment of the sentencing factors below, so we review for plain error. U.S. v. Valencia-Barragan , 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010).

The district court made sufficient findi ngs of fact and resolved the factual disputes by adopting the prosecution’s position. U.S. v. Karterman , 60 F.3d 576 (9th Cir. 1995). Considering the manner in which Frommer committed the crime and the severe victim impact, the distri ct court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing above the guidelines. Finally, the district court did not plainly err in considering the necessary sentencing factors. U.S. v. Daniels , 541 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2008).

AFFIRMED
#### KEN-MAR AIRPARK Inc., v. TOTH AIRCRAFT & ACCESSORIES CO. et al.

No. 7085.

United States District Court W. D. Missouri.

April 23, 1952.

*400Sol M. Yarowsky, Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff.

. Roy L. Vickrey, Kansas City, Mo., for defendant Gilbert H. Clevidence.

REEVES, Chief Judge.

A default judgment was entered in the above cause on March 25th last. It appeared from the pleadings that the suit was filed on August 13, 1951 and in due time the several defendants separately answered. Such answers were filed on August 31, 1951. Subsequently depositions were taken and other proceedings had, all of the parties being represented by counsel. On November 17, 1951 counsel for defendants withdrew “as attorney for the defendants in this cause.” No further appearances were made and the cause was duly set for trial, the same being at issue.

When the case was called the defendants were not represented and counsel for the plaintiff sought judgment by default. The request for judgment by default was granted and as above stated such a default judgment was taken after a brief hearing on March 25th last.

The personal defendant has now moved for a rehearing and for an order setting aside the default judgment. This motion is based upon an affidavit designed to show excusable neglect as contemplated by Rule 60(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.

Another important question, however, obtrudes itself. It does not appear that the defendant or either of them had notice as contemplated by Rule 55(b) (2) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This riile specifically provides:

> “If the party against whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action, he (or, if appearing by representative, his representative) shall be served with written notice of the application for judgment at least 3 days prior to the hearing on such application.”

Neither the judgment nor the files show that such a notice was given in this case and according to- the authorities there was a failure of due process and the judgment is a nullity. See Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. White Line T. & S. Co., 114 F.2d 946, loc. cit. 947, and Bass v. Hoagland, 5 Cir., 172 F.2d 205, loc. cit. 210. Moreover, the personal defendant has appended a doctor’s certificate - in support of his affidavit that he was ill and in bed for several days prior to and at the time the default judgment was entered and that because of such illness he was totally unable to appear in court. This would be excusable negligence perforce the provisions of said Rule 60.

In view of the above the defendant’s motion should be sustained and the default judgment set aside for. failure of due process and for excusable neglect.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Blair B. Chattley, Appellant.

[852 NYS2d 861]

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of reckless endangerment in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.20) and unlawful imprisonment in the second degree (§ 135.05). Contrary to defendant’s contentions, the conviction is supported by legally sufficient evidence and the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence *(see generally People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Although defendant has not preserved his contention that the duration of the order of protection was improper *(see People v Nieves,*2 NY3d 310, 315-317 [2004]; *People v Heise,*41 AD3d 1255 [2007], *lv denied*9 NY3d 1006 [2007]), we nevertheless exercise our power to review it as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice *(see*CPL 470.15 [6] [a]). At the time of defendant’s conviction, an order of protection could not exceed three years from the date of conviction *(see*CPL 530.13 [former (4)]). Supreme Court improperly set the order of protection to expire three years after the date of sentencing, July 20, 2006, rather than three years after the date of the conviction, May 18, 2006. We therefore modify the judgment by providing that the order of protection shall expire on May 18, 2009.

*1308Finally, defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that the verdict is repugnant *(see People v Alfaro,*66 NY2d 985, 987 [1985]), and we decline to exercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice *(see*CPL 470.15 [6] [a]). Present—Hurlbutt, J.P., Martoche, Lunn, Green and Gorski, JJ.
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#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Rodney Pena MENDEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-10993

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 17, 2012.

Nancy E. Larson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

*334Robert C. Heald, Lubbock, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before DAVIS, OWEN, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Rodney Pena Mendez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed briefs in accordance with *Anders v. California,*886 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.2011). Mendez has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s briefs and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DENNIS M. BUCKOVETZ,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

THE NAVY,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 15

- 56376

D.C. No. 3:14

- cv

- 02872

- BEN

MDD

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 18, 2017 **

Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

Dennis M. Buckovetz appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his action under the

Administrative Procedures Act requesting a document be removed from his

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

JAN 30 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 15

- 56376

personnel file. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo

a dismissal on the basis of mootness. White v. Lee , 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir.

2000 ) . We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Buckovetz’s action as moot because

the Department of the Navy removed the document at issue fro m Buckovetz’s

person ne l file and confirmed that there is no reference to it in its human resources

or Equal Employment Opportunity files. See Biodiversity Legal Found. v.

Badgley , 309 F.3d 1166, 1173 (9th Cir. 2002) ( “W hen a controversy no longer

exists, the case is moot

. ” )

. Buckovetz has failed to show that any exception to the

mootness doctrine appl ies to his action. See Pub. Utilities Comm’n of State of Cal.

v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n , 100 F.3d 1451, 1459

- 61 (9th Cir. 1996)

(discussing exceptions to the mootness doctrine).

AFFIRMED.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

AUSTIN 

Aan, a, & Croetkwaft 

ootmtg Jl.g¶itor 

Dallas county 

DBuli8, !ibxatr 

Dear sir: 
Hon. J.L crosthuatt, Junel4, 1%s9,age& 

neosseary in the enrolw or the duties 

or pow'sa oonferred upon them*...* 

On January 15, 1991, thi8 d%parta%nt &id 

in an opinion written by Hon. J. H. GtanforU, Assistant 

.dttornciy General, that the ao9ppi8elon%ra~ court ha8 

ippxed power to aontraot for seniase or experts in 

. v*luation of property. 

cond%meion suits r0r right or way F2ub.m 

road purposoe am alearly *'oomty busine8eR. 

~3learly the duty Or the %~B~I!&~J~IoIA%T&I' 0OUTt toaaks 

propsr preparation ror and defenss 0r cond%mation 6uit6 

lnwhloh the oouaty is imolved. W-the 0OnaiSBi01M~rS 

court 0r Dallas county reeb that it is necei3sar~ ror the 

OOUntJ' t0 %¶IplOJ' %Xl %w%l-t Uftll%%8 t0 t%6tim t8'tO t&l 

~fatt0 or th0 land in gu%%tion in 00admti0n sat6 in 

order-to tmrefgmrd the Interest or Dalla6 County, then 

alearly the oomlsslon%m~* aourt has the pow%r to par 

such exp%rt witn~ess ar%asonabl% 03% r0r his ssnioeu, 

zehed0r%, gouxme mt3p00trulu advfeerl that 

it is the opinion 0r 6lll.B departmallt that ii the QR 

miMfOner8'ooUrt ~,EalklaaCoWlt~! ofth%opSl&o~ 

‘that It is a%oeMary rot the 6ountyto aRp3ey ez~rxporti 

rftn088 t0 tQ8tiry in 00wt4mi0n 8tite r0r rigwi or. 

my ror $ublio road purpoase and agree to paf swh expert wltnsss a r%aacmab~s f%% ~f~r~@u%h &WV~OM aad 

appmve hiaalain, ror such senloes, then you s h oald 

legallyapprove forpaymntsmholalmof auohritneaa 

for expmt testlnony.
Exhibit 23.1





Independent Auditors Consent





The Board of Directors


Orchid BioSciences, Inc.:





We consent to the incorporation by
      reference in the registration statements No. 333-53118 and No. 333-76744
      on
    Form S-8 and No. 333-60582, No. 333-85550 and No. 333-98825 on Form S-3 of
      Orchid BioSciences, Inc. of our report dated February 19, 2003, except
      as
    to note 23 which is as of April 1, 2003, with respect to the consolidated
      balance sheets of Orchid BioSciences, Inc. and subsidiaries as of December
      31, 2002 and 2001, and the related consolidated statements of operations,
      comprehensive loss, stockholders equity (deficit) and cash flows for
    each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2002, and the
    related financial statement schedule, which report appears in the December
    31, 2002 Annual Report on Form 10-K of Orchid BioSciences, Inc.

Our report refers to the Companys
    adoption of the provisions of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
    (SFAS) No. 141, Business Combinations, as of July
    1, 2001 and of certain provisions of SFAS No. 142, Goodwill and Other
    Intangible Assets, as required for goodwill and other intangibles resulting
    from business combinations consummated after June 30, 2001, and to the full
    adoption as of January 1, 2002 of the provisions of SFAS No. 142.




|                         | /s/ KPMG LLP
|------------------------ | ------------
|                         |             
|Princeton,    New Jersey |             
|April 2, 2003            |             




---
American Association of Exporters and Importers 

1717 K Street, NW. Suite 1120 

Washington, DC 20006 

(202) 857-8009 

(202) 857-7843 

Dear AAEI members and Industry Officials: 

 

The American Association of Exporters and Importers (AAEI) supports the work of the International Price 

Program (IPP) of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). AAEI encourages its members and the companies 

they represent to support IPP in its efforts to collect price data that is used to publish timely and 

accurate price indexes. 

 The International Price Program’s Import and Export Price Indexes measure price changes for goods and

selected services exported out of and imported into the United States. The Import and Export Price 

Indexes are used to measure inflation, negotiate trade contracts, and analyze exchange rates. 

Your participation supports the valuable work of the International Price Program as they conduct 

surveys for the American people and companies. Member companies may receive a visit from BLS 

economists to secure cooperation for their participation in these surveys. This participation will ensure 

that BLS can produce and publish robust price indexes. In short, your contribution is vital. 

 We recognize the valuable work BLS conducts on behalf of the American people and support its mission 

to “collect, analyze, and disseminate essential economic information to support public and private 

decision making” and we strongly encourage our members to participate in the data collection efforts of 

the International Price Program. 

 

Sincerely yours, 

Marianne Rowden 

President & CEO 

American Association of Exporters and Importers
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

T he pa ne l una ni m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on ** w ith o u t o r a l ar g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp . P . 34 (a )( 2). H L/I nvent o ry NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON

UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T UN I T E D S T AT E S OF AME R I C A, P l ai nt i ff

- A pp el l ee , v. GU AD E NC I O C AY E T AN O- C AMAC HO , D e f

e n d a n t - A p p e llan t. N o. 09- 50053 D . C . N o. 3: 07 -C R -032 67 -J L S -1 ME MOR AN DU M *

A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f o rth e S o u th e rn D is tr ic t o f C a lif o rn ia J a ni s L . S a m m art i no, D i s tr i c tJudge , P r e s i di ng S ubm i tt e d F e bruary16, 2010 ** B efo re: F E RN A N D E Z , G O U L D an dM . S M IT H , C i rcu i tJu d g es. G uadenci o C ay et ano-C am ac ho appeal s f rom the 51 -m on th sent ence i m po se d fol l ow i ng hi s gui l ty- pl eaconv i ct i on for bei ng a deport ed al i en foun d i n the U ni t ed 

# FI LED MA R 04 2010 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALSH L/I nvent o ry

St a t e s , i n v i o l a t i o n o f

8 U . S. C. § 1 3 2 6 . W e h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n p u r s u an tt o 2 8 U . S. C. § 1 2 9 1 . W e a f

f i rm. C a y e t a no- C a m a c ho c ont e nds the di s tr i c tc ourte rr e d byappl y i ng a“ c r i m e of vi ol ence ” s ent enci ng enhancem ent , pu rs uantt o U . S . S . G . § 2 L 1. 2(b)(1)(A )( i i ), b e c au s e h is p r io rc o n v ic tio n f o rle w da n dla s c iv io u s a c ts o n am in o ru n d e r1 4 , in vi ol at i on of C al i forni a P enalC od e § 28 8(a) , do es no tconst i tut e s exual abuse of a m i n o r. T h i s co n t en t i o n i s fo recl o sedb y U n ite d Sta tes v . Me d in a - V

illa , 567 F . 3d 50 7, 50 9 (9th C i r. 20 09 ). AF F I RME D.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         0001108940
<NAME>                        SoftCare EC.com Inc.
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     Canandian dollars

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAY-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAY-31-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                   1.49
<CASH>                                       4,496,951
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<RECEIVABLES>                                  202,675
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