alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
s

Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

December 10, 2014

No. 04-14-00785-CV

Mary Ann CASTRO,

Appellant

v.

Manuel CASTRO,

Appellee

From the 45th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2011-CI-15957

Honorable Janet P. Littlejohn, Judge Presiding

ORDER

 Appellant’s counsel filed a motion for leave to file a motion to withdraw as counsel. A

motion for leave is unnecessary if counsel wishes to withdraw. Counsel should simply file an 

actual motion to withdraw in accordance with the rules. We have contacted counsel’s office by 

telephone on numerous occasions since the motion was filed, explaining to counsel that she 

should move to withdraw the motion for leave and simply file a motion to withdraw. Despite 

assurances that this would be done, there have been no subsequent filings. Accordingly, we 

DENY counsel’s motion of leave to file a motion to withdraw as counsel.

 Moreover, a filing fee of $195.00 was due when this appeal was filed but it was 

not paid. See TEXAS SUPREME COURT ORDER REGARDING FEES CHARGED IN THE SUPREME 

COURT, IN CIVIL CASES IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS, AND BEFORE THE JUDICIAL PANEL ON 

MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION (Misc. Docket No. 13-9127, Aug. 16, 2013). The clerk of the court 

notified appellant of this deficiency in a letter dated November 12, 2014. Appellant was advised 

the fee was due no later than November 24, 2014. The fee remains unpaid. Rule 5 of the Texas 

Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:

A party who is not excused by statute or these rules from paying costs must pay –

at the time an item is presented for filing – whatever fees are required by statute 

or Supreme Court order. The appellate court may enforce this rule by any order 

that is just.

TEX. R. APP. P. 5. 
 We therefore ORDER appellant, not later than December 22, 2014 to either (1) pay the 

applicable filing fee, or (2) provide written proof to this court that she is indigent or otherwise 

excused by statute or the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure from paying the fee. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 20.1 (providing that indigent party who complies with provisions of that rule may 

proceed without advance payment of costs). If appellant fails to respond satisfactorily within the 

time ordered, this appeal will be dismissed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3.

 The clerk is ordered to serve copies of this order on appellant, all counsel, the district 

clerk, and the court reporter.

_________________________________

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 10th day of December, 2014.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
# msd_CD_R1_00_2019
The State s



# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas**

Augus t 5, 2015

N o. 04

- 15

- 00090

- CR

Anthony Alex DELEON

, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

, Appellee

From the 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas Trial Court No. 13

- 1992

- CR

- B The Honorable William Old, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

Court reporter Patricia Wagner has filed a notification of late reporter’s record, requesting an extens ion to August 18, 2015. We GRANT her request and ORDER her to file the reporter’s record on or before August 18, 2015. NO FURTHER EXTENSIONS WILL BE GRANTED.

_________________________________ Karen Angelini, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 5th day of August, 2015

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle Clerk of Court
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**246 KA 11-00967** 
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CARNI, SCONIERS, AND VALENTINO, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DANA M. HOLLEY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (JAMES ECKERT OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (STEPHEN X. O’BRIEN OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (John L. DeMarco, J.), rendered February 9, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts) and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [1] [b]; [3]), and one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (§ 265.02 [1]), defendant contends that County Court erred in refusing to suppress his statements and certain evidence seized from his person when he was stopped and searched by a Rochester police officer. Specifically, defendant contends that the officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing was incredible, and, thus, the court’s determination that the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that he had committed a crime is not supported by the evidence. We reject defendant’s contention.

The officer testified at the suppression hearing that she heard shots fired, then observed defendant fire a handgun at a moving vehicle. She stopped defendant and recovered a semi-automatic handgun from his pocket. It is well settled that a hearing “court’s credibility determination is entitled to great deference” ( People v Coleman , 57 AD3d 1519, 1520, lv denied 12 NY3d 782; see generally People v Prochilo , 41 NY2d 759, 761), and we conclude that “[t]he police officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing does not have all appearances of having been patently tailored to nullify constitutional objections . . . , and was not so inherently incredible**-2- 246 KA 11-00967** 

or improbable as to warrant disturbing the . . . court’s determination of credibility” ( People v Walters , 52 AD3d 1273, 1274, lv denied 11 NY3d 795 [internal quotation marks omitted]). We therefore see no basis in the record for disturbing the court’s finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop and search defendant, or its ultimate suppression ruling.

Entered: March 27, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
# United Stat es Court of Appeals For the First C ircuit
No. 02-1846 ERNESTO CIRILO-MUÑOZ, Petitioner, Appellant,

v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent, Appellee.

ERRATA The opinion of this Court, issued on April 15, 2005, should be amended as follows. On page 12, line 7: change “court” to “case”. On page 13, second-to-last line of page: change “430" to “490“. On page 19, line 4 of first full paragraph: change “n.3“ to “n.2“. On page 21, s econd-to-last line of note 11: change “CiriloMuñoz” to “Cirilo[-Muñoz]”. On page 23, lines 8-11: change “a formal finding that the victim was a police officer when he assisted in the venture. But there is no detaile d discussi on of the evidence on which such a finding might rest.” to “a formal finding that Cirilo knew that the victimwas a police officer when he (Cirilo) assisted in the venture. But there was no detailed discussion by the district judge of the evidence on which such a finding might rest.”
Exhibit 4.3




 





Consent of Independent Registered
Public Accounting Firm


We consent to the reference made to our firm under the caption “Independent Registered Public Accounting
Firm” in Part B of the Prospectus and to the use of our report dated March 21, 2013, in this Registration Statement (Form
S-6 No. 333-186258) of Smart Trust, Morningstar Dividend Yield Focus Trust, Series 1.


 


/s/ Grant
Thornton LLP


Grant
Thornton LLP


Chicago, Illinois


March 21, 2013
#### BAUM v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.

Civ. A. No. 13395.

United States District Court E. D. New York.

June 19, 1953.

*399Grabow & Katz, New York City, Sidney Braverman, New York City, of counsel, for' plaintiff.

Conboy, Hewitt, O’Brien & Boardman, by Louis Carruthers, New York City, Donald H. Balleisen, New York City, of counsel, for defendant.

BRUCHHAUSEN, District Judge.

The defendant moves for an order directing the plaintiff to answer.questions in connection with the taking of a deposition.

The plaintiff declined to answer some of the questions upon the ground that they were privileged communications between himself, a patient, and his physician. Section 352 of the New York Civil Practice Act sets forth the rule on that subject. It has been held that the privilege extends to both patient and physician, Galligano v. Galligano, 245 App.Div. 743, 280 N.Y.S. 419. The case of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 396, 91 L.Ed. 451, cited by the defendant, is not in point. It is true that the doctrine of privilege between an attorney and client, which is similar to the privilege attaching to patient and physician, was alluded to by the Court, but it is likewise true that the Court did not intend to weaken or destroy the privilege. In this connection, Mr. Justice Jackson, in the concurring opinion, said:

> “It seems equally clear that discovery should not nullify the privilege of confidential communication between attorney and client. But those principles give us no real assistance here because what is being sought is neither evidence nor is it a privileged communication between attorney and client.”

While the plaintiff may not be compelled to divulge the information received - from his physician, he is obliged to disclose whether he was treated professionally and the names of his physicians and’ the dates of-his visits. Lorde v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., 252 App.Div. 646, 300 N.Y.S. 721.

Inasmuch as plaintiff seeks damages for' loss of earnings, profits and commission (paragraph Nineteenth of the Complaint) and failed on examination to satisfactorily answer questions as to his earnings, the question relating to the amount received for his share of the business is relevant. ‘

Submit order.
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In  connection  with the  Quarterly  Report of  Infinite  Group Inc.  (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Michael
S. Smith, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
ss.  1350,  aS adopted  pursuant to ss. 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,
that:

      (1) The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2) The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.

      A signed  original  of this  written  statement  has been  provided to the
Company and will be retained  by the  Company  and  furnished  to the SEC or its
staff upon request.


/s/  MICHAEL S. SMITH
---------------------
     Michael S. Smith
     Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer

July 26, 2005


                                       21
**Exhibit 23.1**

**Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**

To theBoard of Directors of SMTC Corporation: 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statement (No. 333-44250) on FormS-8, the registration statement (No. 333-116986) on Form S-3, and the registration statement (No. 333-115400) on Form S-1 of SMTC Corporation of our report dated March 19, 2010, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of SMTCCorporation as of January 4, 2009 and January 3, 2010, and the related consolidated statements of operations and comprehensive income, changes in shareholders’ equity and cash flows for the year ended December 31, 2007 and theperiods from January 1, 2008 to January 4, 2009 and January 5, 2009 to January 3, 2010, and the related financial statement schedule, which report appears in the January 3, 2010 annual report on Form 10-K of SMTCCorporation. 

/s/ KPMG LLP 

Chartered Accountants, Licensed Public Accountants 

Toronto, Canada 

March 19, 2010
# 2018-hospital-event-nature-part

&8page &P of &N
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-7055

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

ALBERT WILLIAM LACY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Charles H. Haden II, Chief

District Judge. (CR-88-35, CA-94-845-2)

Submitted: December 14, 1995 Decided: January 4, 1996

Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, and WIDENER and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Albert William Lacy, Appellant Pro Se. Rebecca A. Betts, United

States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying his

28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988) motion. We have reviewed the record and the

district court's opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no reversible error. Although the lower court

erroneously stated that Appellant pled guilty to count 7 of the

indictment, this error was harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. Accordingly, we deny Appellant's motion for transcripts at government

expense, see 28 U.S.C. § 753(f) (1988), and affirm on the reasoning

of the district court. United States v. Lacy, Nos. CR-88-35; CA-94-

845-2 (S.D.W. Va. June 7, 1995). We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
# Occupational Employment and Wages in Green Goods and Services

The Green Goods and Services Occupations (GGS-OCC) estimates present occupational employment and wage information for businesses that produce green goods and services. The GGS-OCC data provide occupational employment, staffing patterns, and occupational wages for establishments that receive none of their revenue from green goods and services, all of their revenue from green goods and services, and revenue from a mix of green and nongreen goods and services.

- Transportation, production, and office are the top occupation groups in green businesses
#### In the Matter of Gregory Mingo, Appellant, v Anthony Annucci, as Deputy Commissioner of Correctional Services, Respondent.

[853 NYS2d 739]

In 1983, petitioner was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison on each of four counts of murder in the second degree, I2V2 to 25 years for robbery in the first degree, I2V2 to 25 years for burglary in the first degree and *21k*to 7 years for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. Two of the sentences for the murder convictions were set to run consecutively, with all other sentences running concurrently, for an aggregate prison term of 50 years to life. After exhausting his administrative remedies, petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging his sentence, arguing that, since a person has only one life, consecutive life sentences can be served only concurrently and, as such, the minimum period should be recalculated to run concurrently as well. Supreme Court dismissed the petition, prompting this appeal.

Contrary to petitioner’s contentions, there is no provision of the Penal Law that prohibits the imposition of consecutive life sentences (see *e.g. Matter of Roballo v Smith,*63 NY2d 485 [1984]). The Department of Correctional Services properly calculated petitioner’s sentence pursuant to Penal Law former § 70.30, as it read at the time of petitioner’s sentencing. Pursuant to that provision, when sentences are set to run consecutively, the minimum periods are added to arrive at the aggregate minimum—which, here, is 50 years—and the maximum *1107periods are added to arrive at the aggregate maximum—which, here, is life *(see*Penal Law former § 70.30 [1] [b]).*

Petitioner’s remaining contentions regarding the constitutionality of the statute were not raised in the petition and, thus, have not been preserved for this Court’s review *(see Matter of Killeen v Travis,*291 AD2d 600, 601 [2002]; *Matter of White v Goord,*278 AD2d 694, 694 [2000]).

Cardona, P.J., Peters, Rose, Kane and Malone Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

*

 Petitioner concedes that the sentence limitations enumerated in Penal Law former § 70.30 (1) (c) and (d) are inapplicable to him.
#### COHEN et al. v. AVCO CORP. et al.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

June 6, 1953.

See also, 113 F.Supp. 244.

Arnold G. Malkan, New York City, for plaintiff.

Hawkins, Delafield & Wood, New York City, for defendants.

WEINFELD, District Judge.

The plaintiffs in this action are entitled to an examination of the defendant Telecoin Corporation. The fact that the examination is sought on the same matters as in the Raybin case, Raybin v. Avco Mfg. Corp., D.C., 12 F.R.D. 321, where plaintiffs are represented by the same attorney who appears for plaintiffs here, is not sufficient to defeat a litigant’s right to avail himself of the deposition-discovery procedure. Plaintiffs’ claim here is independent of those asserted in the other suit.

*471The Court regrets that counsel for the respective parties were unable to work out a modus operand! so as to avoid duplication of effort and unnecessary loss of time, of counsel and litigants, especially so since it appears that substantially the same issues are involved in the pending actions.

The motion is denied. Settle order on notice.
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
                                      2000
                          CHANGE IN CONTROL AGREEMENTS

DIRECTORS

Philip J. Dion
D. Kent Anderson
LeRoy C. Hanneman, Jr.
Michael O. Maffie
Dr. J. Russell Nelson
Peter A. Nelson
Michael E. Rossi
Glenn W. Schaeffer
C. Anthony Wainwright
Sam Yellen

OFFICERS

Mary S. Alexander
Kimball Bannister, III
Larry W. Beckner
John H. Gleason
LeRoy C. Hanneman Jr.
Robertson C. Jones
Anne L. Mariucci
Helen M. McEnerney
Donald V. Mickus
Gary L. Newman
Frank D. Pankratz
Scott J. Peterson
David E. Rau
Charles T. Roach
David G. Schreiner
M. Lynn Schuttenberg
John A. Spencer
Robert R. Wagoner
Scott C. Widener
[No. 55417-4-I.

Division One.

October 31, 2005.]

#### Connie Ann Bernard et al., *Appellants,*v. Bert Henderson et al., *Respondents.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for San Juan County, No. 04-2-05051-1, Vickie I. Churchill, J., entered November 15, 2004. *Affirmed in part*and *reversed in part*by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Exhibit
      15.1














August
      8,
      2007





Securities
      and Exchange Commission


100
      F
      Street, N.E.


Washington,
      D.C. 20549





Commissioners:





We
      are
      aware that our report dated August 8, 2007 on our review of interim financial
      information of Stratus Properties Inc. for the three and six month periods
      ended
      June 30, 2007 and 2006 and included in the Company's quarterly report on Form
      10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2007 is incorporated by reference in its
      Registration Statements on Form S-8 (File Nos. 33-78798, 333-31059, 333-52995
      and 333-104288).







Very
      truly yours,




/s/
      PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
#### HOFFMAN et al. v. PERRUCCI (HOFFMAN, third-party defendant).

No. 13172.

United States District Court E. D. Pennsylvania.

May 14, 1953.

*475Freedman, Landy & Lorry, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Todd Daniel, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

Freedman, Landy & Lorry, Philadelphia, Pa., for third party defendant.

GANEY, District Judge.

This is a motion to quash notices of oral examination and subpoena.

Notices of oral examination and subpoena were issued to officers of the American Automobile Insurance Company, Associated Indemnity Corporation and American Associated Insurance Companies to appear before this court on Tuesday, April 28, 1953 at 10 o’clock a. m. and to show cause why relief should not be granted. The persons to whom the motion is directed are not parties to the suit, but it is alleged that since a jury trial has been demanded, certain advertisements appearing in Life Magazine and the Saturday Evening Post, inserted therein by the officers of the above mentioned companies, are prejudicial to the plaintiff’s right to a fair trial in the instant case, inasmuch as they attack the unreasonable amounts of jury awards. Objection has been made on the part of the defendant in the motion to quash that the matter set forth is one concerning itself with criminal contempt and, therefore, not cognizable under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Without passing on the question of contempt, whether any exists, or whether, if it so does, it is civil or criminal, the motions to quash are denied, as the relief prayed for is injunctive in nature and sufficient to support an ordinary application for oral examination without, as having indicated above, passing on any question of contempt.
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<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
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<RECEIVABLES>                                      300
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,370,780
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<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          346,231
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