IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

August 22, 2017 Session

BOBBIE HARJO CAUDILL, ET AL. v. CLARKSVILLE HEALTH 

SYSTEM, GP

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County

No. CC-15-CV-1578 Ross H. Hicks, Judge

___________________________________

No. M2016-02532-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant medical provider based upon 

the expiration of the statute of limitations. On appeal, the appellant asserts that the statute 

of limitations was tolled because at the time the cause of action accrued, the decedent had 

been “adjudicated incompetent,” as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-

106. We conclude that the appellant failed to meet her burden to show that the decedent 

was adjudicated incompetent at the time required to toll the statute of limitations. The 

trial court’s ruling is therefore affirmed. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J.,W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDY D.

BENNETT and W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JJ., joined.

Christopher Kim Thompson, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Bobbie Harjo 

Caudill, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Austin Amos Harjo.

Thomas A. Wiseman, III and Margaret Moore, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, 

Clarksville Health System, GP.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

 

1

Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee provides:

This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, 

reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal 

opinion would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum 

opinion it shall be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION”, shall not be published, and 

shall not be cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.

10/05/2017
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Background

The facts in this case are undisputed for purposes of this appeal. On August 27, 

2013, Plaintiff/Appellant Bobbie Harjo Caudill (“Appellant”) and her sister filed an 

emergency petition for the appointment of a general guardian for their father, Austin 

Harjo (“Decedent”), in the District Court of Muskogee County, Oklahoma (“Oklahoma 

court”). The petition alleged that Decedent had dementia and mental illness and was 

incapable physically and mentally of caring for his own needs. Appellant and her sister 

appeared ex parte before the Oklahoma court. The Oklahoma court entered the 

emergency order on the same day that the petition was filed based on the finding that 

“irreparable harm [would] be done to” Decedent if the petition were not granted. The 

Oklahoma court also ordered a “[thirty] day review hearing,” set for September 25, 2013. 

Appellant, her sister, and Decedent’s wife appeared before the Oklahoma court on 

October 2, 2013. The minutes of the October 2, 2013 hearing in the record state that “the 

emergency g[uardianship] will remain in full force and effect until further orders of [the] 

[c]ourt . . .[with a further hearing] to be set ASAP/the end of October if possible.” It is 

undisputed that no order was ever entered from the October 2, 2013 hearing. 

Decedent eventually moved to Clarksville, Tennessee, in order to live with 

Appellant. Following a fall, Decedent was admitted to Clarksville Health System GP 

d/b/a/ Gateway Medical Center (“Gateway”) on March 19, 2014. On March 24, 2014, 

Decedent was discharged from Gateway. Decedent’s condition worsened, and he

ultimately died on May 24, 2014.

On May 15, 2015 and May 19, 2015, Appellant sent Gateway a letter notifying the 

hospital of a potential health care liability action against it. On August 7, 2015, 

Appellant, individually and as personal representative of Decedent, filed a health care 

liability action against Gateway.2 Appellant alleged that Decedent developed pressure 

sores and ulcers during his stay at Gateway that became infected, causing injury that 

resulted in Decedent’s death. On October 13, 2015, Gateway filed an answer generally 

denying that Gateway’s negligence caused or contributed to Decedent’s injuries and 

raising the expiration of the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. 

On July 19, 2016, Gateway filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that 

because Appellant knew of Decedent’s injuries as early as March 24, 2014, the notice 

 

2 The complaint also contained allegations against GHS Holdings, LLC (“GHS”), Clarksville 

Holdings, LLC d/b/a Clarksville Health System, G.P. (“Clarksville”), and LP Clarksville, LLC d/b/a 

Signature HealthCARE of Clarksville (“Signature HealthCARE”). Appellant’s claims against GHS and 

Clarksville were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice on September 9, 2015. Appellant’s claims

against Signature HealthCARE were submitted to arbitration by agreed order of December 17, 2015 and 

later voluntarily dismissed with prejudice by agreed order on October 18, 2016. Accordingly, Gateway is 

the only defendant at issue in this appeal. 
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letter sent on May 15, 2015, was untimely, and therefore did not have the effect of 

extending the statute of limitations. As such, Gateway argued that Appellant’s complaint 

was untimely. In response to the motion for summary judgment, Appellant contended that 

Decedent had been adjudicated incompetent at the time of the accrual of this health care 

liability action and therefore the statute of limitations was tolled until his death on May 

24, 2015, when “his incapacity was removed.” According to Appellant, the statute of 

limitations therefore began to run on the date of Decedent’s death; accordingly, the notice 

letter sent on May 15, 2015, was timely and extended the statute of limitations for 

another 120 days. In support, Appellant included a copy of the August 27, 2013 

emergency order of guardianship entered by the Oklahoma court. 

On September 12, 2016, the trial court entered an order granting Gateway’s 

motion for summary judgment. Therein, the trial court noted that, although it examined 

the Oklahoma order in search of any language that would constitute an adjudication of 

incompetency, the Oklahoma order contains no provision adjudicating Decedent 

incompetent. The trial court further found that the Oklahoma order was a temporary 

order; however, the trial court found nothing in the record indicating what action, if any, 

the Oklahoma court took at the thirty day review hearing. 

On October 7, 2016, Appellant subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend the 

trial court’s ruling, attaching to the motion the minutes from the October 2, 2013 hearing 

in Oklahoma. The trial court entered an order denying Appellant’s motion to alter or 

amend on November 15, 2016. The trial court first noted that Appellant failed to show 

why this document had not been presented in response to Gateway’s motion for summary 

judgment. The trial court, however, went on to consider the merits of Appellant’s 

argument. The trial court nevertheless concluded that the language of the minutes from 

the Oklahoma court merely constituted the entry of another temporary order because 

nothing in the record established that the Oklahoma court ever made a determination on 

the merits adjudicating Decedent as incompetent.

Issues Presented

Appellant presented the following issues for our review, which are taken from her 

brief:

1. Whether the trial court was in error in failing to interpret the Oklahoma 

statute about guardianship and the Oklahoma court’s ruling regarding the 

guardianship order in a liberally construed manner and in a light most 

favorable to the non-moving party.

2. Whether the trial court was in error in finding the statute of limitations 

had expired when Austin Amos Harjo had been previously adjudged to be 

incompetent or to have lost his legal rights in the state of Oklahoma.
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Standard of Review

The trial court in this case granted summary judgment in favor of Gateway.

Summary judgment is appropriate where: (1) there is no genuine issue with regard to the 

material facts relevant to the claim or defense contained in the motion; and (2) the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed facts. Tenn. R. 

Civ. P. 56.04. On appeal, this Court reviews a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de 

novo with no presumption of correctness. Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, 

MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 

(Tenn. 1997)), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2452, 195 L.Ed. 2d 265 (2016). In reviewing the 

trial court’s decision, we must view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party and resolve all factual inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor. 

Luther v. Compton, 5 S.W.3d 635, 639 (Tenn. 1999); Muhlheim v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of 

Educ., 2 S.W.3d 927, 929 (Tenn. 1999). If the undisputed facts support only one 

conclusion, then the court’s summary judgment will be upheld because the moving party 

was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See White v. Lawrence, 975 S.W.2d 525, 

529 (Tenn. 1998); McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995). When a moving 

party has filed a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party 

must respond by pointing to evidence that shows summary judgment is inappropriate. 

Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 264–65.

Analysis

Because this is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we must first 

determine the undisputed facts relevant to our analysis. In this case, Appellant concedes 

that her health care liability claim accrued on or about March 24, 2014, the date that 

Decedent was discharged from Gateway. Likewise, there is no dispute that this health 

care liability action is governed by a one-year statute of limitations, which limitations 

period may be extended by one-hundred twenty days when proper pre-suit notice is 

provided to the defendant health care provider. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-26-116 

(providing that the statute of limitations in a health care liability action is one year from 

discovery of the alleged injury); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 (“When notice is given to 

a provider as provided in this section, the applicable statutes of limitations and repose 

shall be extended for a period of one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of 

expiration of the statute of limitations and statute of repose applicable to that provider.”). 

Such pre-suit notice, however, must be sent “within the statutes of limitations and statutes 

of repose applicable to the provider[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(3). Based upon 

an accrual date of March 24, 2014, pre-suit notice was therefore required to be sent on or 

before March 24, 2015, notwithstanding some form of tolling of the statute of limitations. 

Because Appellant sent her pre-suit notice on May 15, 2015, more than one-year from the 

accrual of this cause of action, her notice was untimely and did not serve to extend the 

applicable statute of limitations, unless some other law serves to toll the statute of 
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limitations. As such, in the absence of some form of tolling, the trial court correctly 

concluded that Appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. 

Appellant argues, however, that tolling under Tennessee Code Annotated section 

28-1-106 is present in this case to extend the statute of limitations. Gateway apparently 

concedes that if tolling under section 28-1-106 is present, Appellant’s claim was timely. 

Gateway argues, however, that Appellant failed to meet her burden to establish the 

applicability of section 28-1-106. We therefore proceed to address that question. 

For purposes of this appeal, section 28-1-106 provides: 

If the person entitled to commence an action is, at the time the cause of 

action accrued, either under eighteen (18) years of age, or adjudicated 

incompetent, such person, or such person’s representatives and privies, as 

the case may be, may commence the action, after legal rights are restored, 

within the time of limitation for the particular cause of action, unless it 

exceeds three (3) years, and in that case within three (3) years from 

restoration of legal rights.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106 (2015).3 Appellant argues that this provision applies 

because Decedent was “adjudicated incompetent” by the Oklahoma order of 

 

3

Section 28-1-106 was amended in 2016 to clarify the circumstances under which tolling may 

apply for an adult who lacks capacity. The current version of the statute provides the following additional 

language:

(b) Persons over the age of eighteen (18) years of age are presumed competent.

(c)(1) If the person entitled to commence an action, at the time the cause of action 

accrued, lacks capacity, such person or such person’s representatives and privies, as the 

case may be, may commence the action, after removal of such incapacity, within the time 

of limitation for the particular cause of action, unless it exceeds three (3) years, and in 

that case within three (3) years from removal of such incapacity, except as provided for in 

subdivision (c)(2).

(2) Any individual with court-ordered fiduciary responsibility towards a person who 

lacks capacity, or any individual who possesses the legal right to bring suit on behalf of a 

person who lacks capacity, shall commence the action on behalf of that person within the 

applicable statute of limitations and may not rely on any tolling of the statute of 

limitations, unless that individual can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the 

individual did not and could not reasonably have known of the accrued cause of action.

(3) Any person asserting lack of capacity and the lack of a fiduciary or other

representative who knew or reasonably should have known of the accrued cause of action 

shall have the burden of proving the existence of such facts.

(4) Nothing in this subsection (c) shall affect or toll any statute of repose within this code.

(d) For purposes of this section, the term “person who lacks capacity” means and shall be 

interpreted consistently with the term “person of unsound mind” as found in this section 

prior to its amendment by Chapter 47 of the Public Acts of 2011.
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guardianship, which Appellant asserts remained in effect until Decedent’s death. In 

contrast, Gateway argues that the order of guardianship is insufficient to constitute an 

adjudication of incompetency as required by section 28-1-106. 

Few cases have construed the “adjudicated incompetent” language included in 

section 28-1-106. One such case, Johnson v. UHS of Lakeside, LLC, No. W2015-01022-

COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 9426034 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2015), perm. app. denied

(Tenn. May 6, 2016), serves as the cornerstone of both the parties’ arguments and the 

trial court’s decision. In Johnson, a patient was injured while being treated at a mental 

health facility. Prior to the injury, a physician had executed a Certificate of Need 

indicating that the patient was confused, disoriented, and unable to take care of his basic 

needs, which certificate allowed the patient to be held pending a court order. Following 

the patient’s injury, the Shelby County General Sessions Court entered an order admitting 

the patient for “[e]mergency [d]iagnosis and [t]reatment,” based upon probable cause that 

the patient was subject to involuntary admission pursuant to state law. Id. at *1. In 

addition to this order, the record also contained an undated Admission Summary signed 

by the general sessions court purporting to provide approval for the admission of the 

patient to the mental health facility. 

Months after the patient’s initial injury, his wife, the plaintiff, filed a petition to be 

appointed the patient’s conservator. The probate court granted the petition and therefore 

entered an order removing the patient’s legal rights. Id. at *2. The patient thereafter died,

and the plaintiff filed a suit against the mental health facility for the injuries sustained by 

the patient while there. Although the plaintiff attempted to comply with the pre-suit 

notice requirements, the plaintiff’s complaint was filed beyond one-year and 120 days 

from the date of the patient’s injury. As such, the mental health facility filed a motion to 

dismiss on the basis of the expiration of the statute of limitations. The plaintiff responded 

that the statute of limitations was tolled by operation of section 28-1-106. The trial court 

eventually granted the mental health facility’s motion to dismiss. 

This Court agreed that the statute was inapplicable because, at the time the cause 

of action accrued, the patient had not been “adjudicated incompetent,” as required by 

section 28-1-106. In reaching this result, we considered the plain language of the statute 

as a whole:

[O]ur review of the statute at issue demonstrates that the meaning of the 

phrase “adjudicated incompetent” is clarified by the surrounding language 

in the statute. Specifically, the statute provides that the plaintiff may 

 

2016 Tennessee Laws Pub. Ch. 932 (S.B. 1597), eff. April 27, 2016. The amended statute only applies, 

however, to “to causes of action filed on or after” the effective date of the statute. Because this case was 

filed on August 7, 2015, the amended statute does not apply. Accordingly, all citations to section 28-1-

106 in this case are to the pre-2016 version of the statute. 
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commence the action “after legal rights are restored” within the applicable 

statute of limitations unless that time exceeds three years and, in that case, 

within three years “from restoration of legal rights.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-

1-106. Pursuant to [the accepted rules of statutory construction], the term 

“adjudicated incompetent” must be read in conjunction with the other parts 

of the statute that clearly contemplate a loss and restoration of “legal 

rights.” Undoubtedly, it is the courts, rather than physicians, who can 

adjudicate an individual’s legal rights. Furthermore, our holding is 

supported by this Court’s Opinion in Foster v. Allbright, 631 S.W.2d 147, 

150 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982), which previously used the term “adjudication of 

incompetency” to refer to an order appointing a conservatorship, implying 

that this term denotes judicial action. Based on the foregoing, we conclude 

that the statutory language clearly contemplates that judicial intervention is 

necessary in order for an individual to be “adjudicated incompetent.”

Johnson, 2015 WL 9426034, at *6. Based upon this language and other law concerning 

disabilities for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations, we concluded that to establish 

tolling pursuant to section 28-1-106, “a plaintiff’s mental incompetency must have been 

judicially adjudicated at the time his cause of action accrued.” Id. (citing McMillan v. 

Tennessee Board of Probation & Parole, No. M2001-01843-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 

31109735 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2002), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 16, 2002); 

Foster v. Allbright, 631 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982)). Based upon this 

interpretation, we concluded that section 28-1-106 was inapplicable because the plaintiff 

failed to prove that any “orders of the court had been entered on th[e] issue” of the 

patient’s competency at the time his cause of action accrued, i.e. at the time he sustained 

his injury. Id. at *7. Since the Opinion in Johnson, other decisions have likewise 

required a judicial order regarding the injured party’s competence prior to the accrual of 

the patient’s claim. See Jones v. City of Franklin, 677 F. App’x 279, 280–81 (6th Cir. 

2017) (“[T]he term ‘adjudicated incompetent,’ by any reasonable interpretation, means 

that the person must have been the subject of judicial declaration that he was incompetent 

to handle his own affairs as a matter of law.”); Woodruff by & through Cockrell v. 

Walker, No. W2016-01895-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 2304306, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 

26, 2017) (declining to apply section 28-1-106 where there was no court order concerning 

incompetence until after the accrual of the cause of action).

Here, Appellant does not dispute that section 28-1-106 requires a judicial 

determination in order for Decedent to have been adjudicated incompetent. Rather, 

Appellant asserts that prior to the accrual of Decedent’s cause of action on March 24, 

2014, an order had been entered by the Oklahoma court effectively adjudicating 

Decedent as incompetent for purposes of section 28-1-106, which order remained in 

effect until Decedent’s death. In response to Gateway’s motion for summary judgment, 

Appellant submitted an August 27, 2013 Emergency Order Appointing a Guardian for 

Decedent based upon allegations that “irreparable harm [would] be done” if a guardian 
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was not appointed. As such, Appellant and her sister were appointed as guardians for 

Decedent. The order, however, was entered ex parte and was temporary, with a review 

hearing set to occur on September 25, 2013. Because of the temporary nature of this 

order, the trial court ruled that it was insufficient to show that Decedent was adjudicated 

incompetent at the time Decedent’s cause of action accrued. 

We agree. It is well-settled that it is the plaintiff’s burden to establish that the 

injured party was incompetent “during the entire time necessary to toll the statute.” 

McMillan, 2002 WL 3110973, at *3; see also Johnson, 2015 WL 9426034, at *7 (“A 

plaintiff seeking an exception to the statute of limitations carries the burden of 

demonstrating its applicability.”). In addition, under our summary judgment standard, 

when a defendant files a motion for summary judgment that shifts the burden to the 

plaintiff, the plaintiff “‘must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical 

doubt as to the material facts’” but must come forward with specific evidence showing 

that summary judgment is inappropriate. Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 265 (quoting Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.

Ed. 2d 538 (1986)). Even assuming that an ex parte order of guardianship could serve as 

an adjudication of incompetence, the subject order by its very terms is emergency in 

nature and extends only until the September 25, 2013 review hearing date. Indeed, under 

Oklahoma statutory law, the guardianship court has jurisdiction to appoint a permanent 

guardian only “[a]fter the service of notice in a proceeding seeking the appointment of a 

guardian[.]” Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 30, § 1-113. Before this notice, it appears that Oklahoma 

law only allows the guardianship court to enter a “temporary order of guardianship 

during the progress of the proceedings that would be in the best interest of the ward.” 

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 30, § 1-114. Such an emergency temporary order, however, must be 

reviewed “not more than twenty (20) days from the time of making such order, to show 

cause why the order should not be granted for temporary guardianship.” Id. Here, it is 

undisputed that the emergency guardianship order entered on August 27, 2013 was 

entered ex parte, without notice to all parties entitled to such notice. Consequently, it 

appears that this order was merely temporary in nature and required further judicial 

review after notice to remain in effect. As such, this order, standing alone, is insufficient 

to show that that Decedent was adjudicated incompetent at the time of the accrual of his 

cause of action on or around March 24, 2014, or thereafter, for purposes of tolling the 

applicable statute of limitations. 

Appellant asserts, however, that additional information in the record supports the 

conclusion that the August 27, 2013 temporary order of guardianship had been extended 

and was in effect at the time of the accrual of Decedent’s action until his death. 

Specifically, Appellant cites the minutes from an October 2, 2013 hearing before the 

Oklahoma court in which the court orally ruled that the emergency guardianship would 

“remain in full force and effect until further orders of [c]ourt.” As such, Appellant asserts 

that at the time of the accrual of Decedent’s action, he was under a court order of 
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guardianship that removed his legal rights, sufficient to meet the standard set forth in 

Johnson as to an adjudication of incompetency. 

From our review of the record, the minute entry relied upon by Appellant was only 

presented to the trial court in conjunction with Appellant’s motion to alter or amend the 

trial court’s judgment. In her brief, however, Appellant does not raise the denial of her 

motion to alter or amend as an issue presented for review. Generally, only those issues 

that are specifically presented for review and included in a statement of the issues section 

of the appellant’s brief will be considered by this Court. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b) (“Review 

generally will extend only to those issues presented for review.”); Champion v. CLC of 

Dyersburg, LLC, 359 S.W.3d 161, 163 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (“An issue not raised in an 

appellant’s statement of the issues may be considered waived.”). This Court has 

previously held that consideration of the denial of a motion to alter or amend may be 

waived by failure to comply with the Rules of this Court. See Progeny Mktg. v. Farmers 

& Merchants Bank, No. M2003-02011-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 819732, at *11 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2005). 

Even if we were to consider Appellant’s motion to alter or amend notwithstanding 

Appellant’s failure to raise the denial of that motion as an issue, we note that Appellant 

has failed to show that the minutes from the October 2, 2013 hearing are a proper matter 

to be considered in a motion to alter or amend. As we explained in In re M.L.D., 182 

S.W.3d 890 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005):

The purpose of a Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend a judgment is 

to provide the trial court with an opportunity to correct errors before the 

judgment becomes final. Bradley v. McLeod, 984 S.W.2d 929, 933 

(Tenn.Ct.App.1998) (overruled in part on other grounds by Harris v. 

Chern, 33 S.W.3d 741 (Tenn. 2000)). The motion should be granted when 

the controlling law changes before the judgment becomes final; when 

previously unavailable evidence becomes available; or to correct a clear 

error of law or to prevent injustice. Id. A Rule 59 motion should not be 

used to raise or present new, previously untried or unasserted theories or 

legal arguments. Local Union 760 of Intern. Broth. of Elec. Workers v. 

City of Harriman, No. E2000-00367-COA-R3[-]CV, 2000 WL 1801856, at 

*4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2000) perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 14, 2001), 

see Bradley, 984 S.W.2d at 933 (holding: a Rule 59 motion should not be 

used to raise new legal theories where motion for summary judgment is 

pending).

Id. at 895. Thus,

In order to sustain a motion to alter or amend under Rule 59.04 based on 

newly discovered evidence, “it must be shown that the new evidence was 
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not known to the moving party prior to or during trial and that it could not 

have been known to him through exercise of reasonable diligence.”

Kirk v. Kirk, 447 S.W.3d 861, 869 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Seay v. City of 

Knoxville, 654 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (citations omitted)). Moreover, as 

our Supreme Court explained:

When additional evidence is presented in support of such a motion, the trial 

court should consider the factors applicable to a motion to revise a partial 

summary judgment pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil 

Procedure: the moving party’s effort to obtain the evidence in responding to 

the summary judgment; the importance of the new evidence to the moving 

party’s case; the moving party’s explanation for failing to offer the 

evidence in responding to the summary judgment; the unfair prejudice to 

the non-moving party; and any other relevant consideration. Harris v. 

Chern, 33 S.W.3d 741, 744 (Tenn. 2000) (“Cases analyzing Rule 59.04 

motions to alter or amend . . . offer some guidance in determining the 

standard for revising non-final orders.”).

Stovall v. Clarke, 113 S.W.3d 715, 721 (Tenn.2003). The trial court’s decision on 

whether to grant a Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend a judgment is reviewed under an 

abuse of discretion standard. Id. (citing Harris, 33 S.W.3d at 746).

We cannot conclude that the factors outlined above favor consideration of the 

October 2, 2013 minutes in this case. First, we note that nothing in Appellant’s motion to 

alter or amend indicates Appellant’s efforts to locate the minutes at issue. Rather, 

Appellant’s motion merely states that in light of the trial court’s previous ruling, 

Appellant “was able to obtain the minutes from the October 2, 2013 hearing.” Even more 

egregious, Appellant does not explain the reason that Appellant was unable to obtain 

copies of the minutes from the October 2, 2013 hearing prior to the hearing on Gateway’s 

summary judgment motion. Indeed, the Oklahoma hearing took place nearly three years 

prior to the hearing on Gateway’s motion for summary judgment. There is also no dispute 

that Appellant was present at the October 2, 2013 hearing and therefore was aware of the 

Oklahoma court’s ruling. 

We also conclude that to allow Appellant to rely on the October 2, 2013 minutes 

would result in unfair prejudice to Gateway. This Court has previously held that where 

information was “clearly available” to a litigant prior to the judgment, allowing a litigant 

to rely on that evidence in a motion to alter or amend “would result in unfair prejudice to 

the [party opposing the motion to alter or amend].” Haynes v. Lunsford, No. E2015-

01686-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 446987, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2017) (citing Kirk, 

447 S.W.3d at 869). Because the minutes from the Oklahoma hearing were likewise 

“clearly available” to Appellant prior to the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in 
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this case, we must conclude that it would be unfair to allow Appellant to rely on this 

document. Although Appellant undoubtedly believes that the October 2, 2013 minutes 

are important to the analysis of this case, given that the other factors at issue clearly 

militate against consideration and Appellant failed to raise the denial of her motion to 

alter or amend as an issue in her brief, we decline to consider the late-filed evidence in 

this case. 

Based upon the only evidence properly before the trial court, we therefore 

conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding that the undisputed facts established 

that Appellant failed to meet her burden to show that Decedent was “adjudicated 

incompetent” at the time of the accrual of this cause of action and thereafter. Thus, 

regardless of whether Decedent in fact lacked capacity at this time, Appellant failed to 

show that the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-106 were met in 

order to toll the statute of limitations. See Johnson, 2015 WL 9426034, at *6 (citing 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106 (2015) (requiring a court order adjudicating the injured 

person as incompetent for tolling under section 28-1-106 to apply). In the absence of 

tolling, the undisputed facts establish that Appellant’s notice was untimely, see Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(3), and that the statute of limitations was not thereby 

extended. As such, Appellant’s complaint was filed outside the applicable statute of 

limitations. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c). The trial court therefore did not err in 

granting summary judgment in favor of Gateway based upon the expiration of the 

applicable statute of limitations. 

Conclusion

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County is affirmed, and this 

cause is remanded to the trial court for all further proceedings as are necessary and may 

be consistent with this Opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed to Appellant, Bobbie Harjo 

Caudill, and her surety. 

_________________________________

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE