COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-11-00105-CV

KATHRYN AND JEREMY MEDLEN APPELLANTS

V.

CARLA STRICKLAND APPELLEE

----------

FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY

----------

OPINION

----------

Appellants Kathryn and Jeremy Medlen appeal the dismissal of their suit 

against Appellee Carla Strickland for the death of their dog. We will reverse and 

remand the case to the trial court.

Background Facts

On or about June 2, 2009, the Medlens‘ dog, Avery, escaped from their

backyard and was picked up by animal control. Jeremy went to the animal 

shelter to retrieve Avery but did not have enough money with him to pay the fees. 

He was told that he could return for the dog on June 10, and a ―hold for owner‖ 
2

tag was placed on Avery‘s cage, notifying employees that the dog was not to be 

euthanized. On June 6, Strickland, a shelter employee, made a list of animals 

that would be euthanized the following day. She put Avery on the list, contrary to 

the ―hold for owner‖ tag. Avery was put down the next day. When the Medlens 

returned for the dog a few days later, they learned of his fate.

The Medlens sued Strickland, alleging that her negligence proximately 

caused Avery‘s death.1 They sued for Avery‘s ―sentimental or intrinsic value‖ 

because he had little or no market value and was irreplaceable. Strickland 

specially excepted to the Medlens‘ claim for intrinsic value damages on the 

grounds that such damages are not recoverable for the death of a dog. The trial 

judge granted the special exception and ordered the Medlens to amend their 

pleadings to ―state a claim for damages recognized at law.‖ The Medlens filed an 

amended petition but reasserted that they were seeking damages for Avery‘s 

―intrinsic value‖ only. Strickland specially excepted again, and the trial judge 

dismissed the lawsuit. The Medlens appealed.

Discussion

The Medlens‘ sole issue on appeal is whether a party can recover intrinsic 

or sentimental damages for the loss of a dog. In issues that turn on a pure 

question of law, we do not defer to the legal determinations of the trial court but

instead apply a de novo standard of review. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Minco 

 

1

The Medlens also sued another employee of animal control, whom they later 

nonsuited. He is not a party to this appeal.
3

Oil & Gas, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 309, 312 (Tex. 1999).

The Medlens argue that the Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 

where personal property has little or no market value, damages can be awarded 

based on the intrinsic or sentimental value of the personal property. City of Tyler 

v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 497 (Tex. 1997); Porras v. Craig, 675 S.W.2d 503, 506 

(Tex. 1984); Brown v. Frontier Theatres, Inc., 369 S.W.2d 299, 304–05 (Tex. 

1963). Dogs are personal property under Texas law. Arrington v. Arrington, 613 

S.W.2d 565, 569 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1981, no writ). Therefore, the 

Medlens argue that they should be able to recover the intrinsic value of their dog. 

Strickland contends that under an 1891 supreme court case, dogs are treated 

differently under the law than other personal property. See Heiligmann v. Rose, 

81 Tex. 222, 16 S.W. 931 (Tex. 1891). For dogs, a party can only recover the 

market value, if there is any, or a special or pecuniary value determined by the 

usefulness or services of the dog. Id. at 932. Strickland argues that Heiligmann

prohibits consideration of the sentimental value of the animal in determining its 

―usefulness‖ to the owner.

In Heiligmann, the trial court awarded damages to the appellees after three 

of their dogs were maliciously poisoned by Heiligmann. Id. at 931. The dogs 

―were of a fine breed, and well trained‖; one of the dogs used different barks to 

signal to appellees whether an approaching person was a man, woman, or child. 

Id. at 932. One of the appellees testified that the dogs could have been sold for 

$5 each, but that she would not have been willing to part with them for $50 
4

apiece. Id. Heiligmann argued that there was no evidence presented supporting 

a market or pecuniary value of the dogs or that their use or service was valuable 

to their owner. Id. The court upheld the damages award, holding that the value 

of a dog may be determined by ―either a market value, if the dog has any, or 

some special or pecuniary value to the owner, that may be ascertained by 

reference to the usefulness and services of the dog.‖ Id. In that case, ―the 

evidence [was] ample showing the usefulness and services of the dogs, and that 

they were of special value to the owner.‖ Id. The court reasoned that the jury 

could infer the value of the dogs ―when the owner, by evidence, fixes some 

amount upon which they could form a basis.‖ Id.

The Texas Supreme Court has not dealt directly with the value of a lost pet 

in the 120 years since Heiligmann, but in more recent cases, it has explicitly held 

that where personal property has little or no market value, and its main value is in 

sentiment, damages may be awarded based on this intrinsic or sentimental 

value. See Likes, 962 S.W.2d at 497 (reaffirming recovery of sentimental value 

for items that have little or no market value, such as family correspondence, 

family photographs, and keepsakes); Porras, 675 S.W.2d at 506 (adopting 

―intrinsic value rule‖ and awarding intrinsic value for the loss of shade or 

ornamental trees); Brown, 369 S.W.2d at 304–05 (awarding sentimental 

damages for loss of items such as wedding veil, shoes, point lace collar, watch,

and slumber spreads). The Medlens contend that the notion that the Texas 

Supreme Court intended to exclude dogs from the intrinsic value rule appears 
5

nowhere in these subsequent opinions. They argue that to treat a dog differently 

than all other personal property would be irrational.

Strickland points out that several courts of appeals‘ decisions have 

reaffirmed Heiligmann by holding that damages for the loss of a dog can only be 

based on market value or a value ascertained from its usefulness or services, not 

companionship or sentimental value. See Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. 

Schuster, 144 S.W.3d 554 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (interpreting 

Heiligmann to mean that special or pecuniary value can only be derived solely 

from the dog‘s usefulness or services, not from companionship or other 

sentimental considerations); Zeid v. Pearce, 953 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. App.—El Paso 

1997, no writ) (denying damages for pain and suffering or mental anguish for the 

loss of a pet); Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (using expected stud fees to determine pecuniary value); 

Young’s Bus Lines, Inc. v. Redmon, 43 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 

1931, no writ) (stating that peculiar or sentimental value of a dog or what it was 

worth to its owner is not admissible).

Redmon was decided more than thirty years before the Texas Supreme 

Court held in Brown that sentimental damages could be awarded for personal 

property. We disagree with Redmon regarding the sentimental value of a dog to 

its owner based on later supreme court decisions.

We also disagree with Strickland‘s position that Bueckner supports the idea 

that sentimental value is not recoverable. In that case, the plaintiff sued the 
6

defendant for shooting two of his dogs. Bueckner, 886 S.W.2d at 370. The trial 

court determined that the dogs had a market value, pecuniary value, intrinsic 

value as companions, and special value as loved pets, and it awarded the 

plaintiff $1,825 in ―actual damages.‖ Id. The defendant appealed, arguing that 

the court had erred by basing the award on the value of the puppies that the 

dogs would have produced in the future. Id. The appeals court agreed that the 

value of the dogs themselves, not the value of their unborn puppies, must be 

determined, but held that the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to 

support the trial court‘s finding of actual damages ―based on the pecuniary value 

of the dogs to the [plaintiff].‖ Id. at 371–72. In doing so, the court considered the 

breed of the dogs and their owner‘s plan to use them for breeding in the future. 

Id. As the concurrence in Bueckner points out, the defendant did not challenge 

the trial court‘s findings of fact that addressed the intrinsic value of the pets. Id.

at 373 (Andell, J., concurring). The majority thus did not address that issue. 

Justice Andell wrote separately only to address an alternative basis for the award 

on which he had strong feelings. See id. at 377 (―I consider [pets] to belong to a 

unique category of  ̳property‘ that neither statutory law nor caselaw has yet 

recognized.‖).

Zeid also does not support Strickland‘s argument that sentimental value is 

not recoverable. In Zeid, plaintiffs sought to recover pain and suffering and 

mental anguish damages for the loss of their dog. 953 S.W.2d at 369. The court 

of appeals affirmed the trial court‘s ruling that pain and suffering and mental 
7

anguish cannot be recovered for the loss of a pet. Id. The court restated the rule 

from Heiligmann, allowing for either market value or special value based on the 

dog‘s usefulness or services. Id. The court discussed Porras, awarding intrinsic 

value for shade trees, and Bueckner, but it found these cases unhelpful because 

the plaintiff never pleaded special or intrinsic value. Id. at 369–70. As with 

Bueckner, the court in Zeid was silent on the issue of companionship and 

sentimental value.

In Petco, the plaintiff was awarded damages, including lost wages, mental 

anguish, emotional distress, and intrinsic value, for loss of companionship after 

her dog escaped from a groomer and was run over. 144 S.W.3d at 557. Petco 

appealed, asserting that as a matter of law the trial court could not award lost 

wages, mental anguish, counseling costs, and loss of companionship damages 

for the loss of a dog. Id. at 560. The court of appeals agreed, citing Heiligmann‘s 

rule of either market value or some special or pecuniary value based on 

usefulness or services of the dog. Id. at 561. The court went on to state, 

―Heiligmann makes clear that the  ̳special or pecuniary value‘ of a dog to its 

owner refers solely to economic value derived from the dog‘s usefulness and 

services, not value attributed to companionship or other sentimental 

considerations.‖ Id. Intrinsic value for loss of companionship was among the 

damages that were reversed. Id. at 565.
8

We respectfully disagree with our sister court‘s interpretation of Heiligmann

and its holding in Petco regarding intrinsic value for loss of companionship. 

Heiligmann does not say that special value is derived ―solely‖ from usefulness or 

services and that it does not include companionship or sentimental value.

Heiligmann says that the value of a dog ―may be‖ ascertained from usefulness or 

services. 16 S.W. at 932. And nowhere does Heiligmann state what should be 

considered in assessing the usefulness or services of a dog. It certainly did not 

rule out companionship or sentimental value. The Heiligmann opinion never 

uses the term ―intrinsic value‖ or ―sentimental value‖; therefore, the opinion

cannot preclude an award of damages never specifically discussed. The 

Heiligmann court reasoned,

The law recognizes a property in dogs, and for a trespass and 

infraction of this right the law gives the owner his remedy. The 

wrong-doer cannot escape the consequences of his acts by saying, 

 ̳You have suffered no damages,‘ for the law implies that some 

damages result from every illegal trespass or invasion of another‘s 

rights.

Id. at 225–26.

Strickland argues that the Medlens ―are asking this Court of 

Appeals to overturn one hundred and twenty years of law‖ and that we are ―not 

empowered to make such a ruling.‖ First of all, there is a difference between 

overruling one hundred and twenty years of law and overruling one one-hundredand-twenty-year-old case. Second, we are doing neither of those things. We are 

duty-bound to interpret Heiligmann in light of subsequent supreme court 
9

decisions which have developed and refined the law concerning intrinsic value 

damages.

The Heiligmann court still stated that the dogs ―were of a special value to 

the owner.‖ Id. at 226. That special value must be more than the market value of 

a well-trained dog. A dog‘s ability to use certain barks to alert its owner to the 

gender and general age of an approaching visitor would surely be included in its 

price if it were sold. We believe that the special value alluded to by the 

Heiligmann court may be derived from the attachment that an owner feels for his 

pet.

Strickland attempts to distinguish this case from the supreme court 

decisions allowing sentimental damages for personal property by arguing that 

sentimental value is only recoverable for heirlooms or property that takes a long 

time to replace, such as trees. According to Strickland‘s position, intrinsic 

damages could be awarded for a sentimental photograph of a family and its dog, 

but not for the dog itself. Strickland‘s position might also allow intrinsic damages 

for a pet that had been inherited from a loved one, but not a pet that had been 

purchased. We find little reason in this argument and do not believe that it 

reflects the attachment owners have to their beloved family pets.

Finally, as Strickland has admitted, Texas law has changed greatly since 

1891. Heiligmann was decided at a time when Texas law did not allow recovery 

for the sentimental value of any personal property. See, e.g., Mo., Kan. & Tex. 

Ry. Co. of Tex. v. Dement, 115 S.W. 635, 637 (Tex. Civ. App.––Dallas 1909, no 
10

writ) (―It seems to be well settled in this state that the measure of damages for 

the loss of articles which have no market value, and which cannot be replaced or 

reproduced, is the actual loss in money sustained by the owner by reason of his 

being deprived of such articles, and not any fanciful price that he might, for 

special reasons, place upon them.‖). In that way, Heiligmann was ahead of its 

time by noting that the dogs ―were of special value to the owner.‖ 16 S.W. at 932. 

As we noted above, sentimental damages may now be recovered for the loss or 

destruction of all types of personal property. See Likes, 962 S.W.2d at 497; 

Porras, 675 S.W.2d at 506; Brown, 369 S.W.2d at 304–05. Because of the 

special position pets hold in their family, we see no reason why existing law 

should not be interpreted to allow recovery in the loss of a pet at least to the 

same extent as any other personal property. Cf. Bueckner, 886 S.W.2d at 377–

78 (Andell, J., concurring) (―Society has long since moved beyond the untenable 

Cartesian view that animals are unfeeling automatons and, hence, mere

property. The law should reflect society‘s recognition that animals are sentient 

and emotive beings that are capable of providing companionship to the humans 

with whom they live.‖). Dogs are unconditionally devoted to their owners. Today, 

we interpret timeworn supreme court law in light of subsequent supreme court 

law to acknowledge that the special value of ―man‘s best friend‖ should be 

protected.

Because an owner may be awarded damages based on the sentimental 

value of lost personal property, and because dogs are personal property, the trial 
11

court erred in dismissing the Medlens‘ action against Strickland. We sustain the 

Medlens‘ sole issue on appeal.

Strickland raises a cross-point, asking that the case be remanded if

reversed, so that she may file a motion to dismiss on grounds of governmental 

immunity. Because we have sustained the Medlens‘ sole issue and are 

remanding the case to the trial court on that basis, we do not need to reach 

Strickland‘s cross-point seeking the same relief of remand. See Tex. R. App. P. 

38.2(b)(2).

Conclusion

Having sustained the Medlens‘ sole issue on appeal, and because we do 

not need to reach Strickland‘s cross-point, we reverse the judgment of the trial 

court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

LEE GABRIEL

JUSTICE

PANEL: WALKER, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.

DELIVERED: November 3, 2011