alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 10.84


AMENDMENT


TO THE


EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN



STAR SCIENTIFIC,
INC. AND 


JONNIE R. WILLIAMS, SR.


 


This Amendment (“Amendment”)
to that certain Executive Employment Agreement between Star Scientific, Inc., a Delaware corporation
(the “Company”) and Jonnie R. Williams, Sr. (“Executive”) dated as of March 14, 2011 (the “Executive
Employment Agreement”) is made as of this 28th day of December, 2012 (the “Amendment Date”), by and among the
Company and the Executive. Except as set forth in this Amendment, capitalized terms used herein but
not defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Executive Employment Agreement.


 


WITNESSETH


 


WHEREAS, the Company and the Executive desire
to amend the terms of the Executive Employment Agreement to reflect the agreement to continue Executive’s employment on a
further month-to-month basis;


 


NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration,
the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the Executive and the Company (collectively the “Parties”)
hereby agree as of the Amendment Date to the following:


 


1.            Amendments
to the Employment Agreement. Effective as of the Amendment Date, the Executive Employment Agreement is hereby amended in its
entirety as follows:


 


Section “1.7” of the Executive
Employment Agreement is amended to read as follows:


 


Term.
Unless sooner terminated as provided in Section 4 hereof, the term of this Agreement shall
commence on January 1, 2011 and shall continue through December 31, 2012 and then on a month-to-month basis until either Party
notifies the other of the intent not to continue the Agreement on a month-to-month basis. Notice of an intent not to continue the
Agreement on a month-to-month basis shall be effective if provided at least (15) days prior to completion of the monthly term.


 


2.     No Other
Amendment. Except as expressly set forth in this Amendment, the Executive Employment Agreement shall remain unchanged and shall
continue in full force and effect according to its terms.


 


3.     Acknowledgement.
The Executive acknowledges and agrees that the Executive has carefully read this Amendment in its entirety fully understands and
agrees to its terms and provisions and intends and agrees that it be final and legally binding on the Executive and the Company.


 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Executive has hereunto
set the Executive's hand and the Company has caused this Amendment to be executed in its name on its behalf, all as of the day
and year first above written.


 


	 	STAR SCIENTIFIC, INC.
	 	 
	 	/s/ Paul L. Perito
	 	By:  Paul L. Perito
	 	Title:  Chairman, President & COO
	 	 
	 	JONNIE R. WILLIAMS
	 	 
	 	/s/ Jonnie R. Williams
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 01-6171
In Re: GREGORY MILANOVICH, Petitioner.
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (CA-00-234-MU) Submitted: April 20, 2001 Decided: July 5, 2001 Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Gregory Milanovich, Petitioner Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Gregory Milanovich petitions this court for a writ of mandamus compelling Chief District Judge Graham C. Mullen to reverse his order transferring Milanovich’s civil action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. Milanovich has failed to demonstrate he has no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires or that his right to mandamus relief is clear and indisputable. See Allied Chem. Corp. v. Diaflon , 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980). Accordingly, we grant Milanovich’s motion for relief from the provisions of Fed. R. App. P. 21, but we deny mandamus relief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
Exhibit 31**Certification**     I, Michael Coco, certify that:     1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K, and all reports on Form 10-D required tobe filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of Advanta Business CardMaster Trust (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”);     2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not containany untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;     3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required tobe provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Actperiodic reports;     4. Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statement(s) required in this reportunder Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, theservicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing agreement in all material respects; and     5. Allof the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteriafor asset-backed securities and theirrelated attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backedsecurities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB andExchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15-d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except asotherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in suchreports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.     In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me bythe following unaffiliated parties: Deutsche Bank National Trust Company and Deutsche Bank TrustCompany Americas.       Date: March 29, 2007           By:
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirement of
Section 13(a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934; and2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and
result of operations of the Company as of the dates and
for the periods expressed in the Report.
 Date: May 16, 2011
    By:
    /s/ David R. AllenDavid R. AllenChief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer)
#### Johnathan SIMMONS, a/k/a Jonathan Dale Simmons, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John VICKERS; Michael Najjar; Warden McCall; Officer Smith, et al, Defendants-Appellees. Jonathan Dale Simmons, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SCDC; John Vickers; Michael Najjar; Warden McCall; Officer Smith, Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 12-7846, 12-7848.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Dec. 20, 2012.

Decided: Dec. 27, 2012.

Jonathan Dale Simmons, Appellant Pro Se. James Victor McDade, Doyle, O’Rourke, Tate & McDade, PA, Anderson, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Jonathan Simmons appeals the district court’s order denying as untimely his motion to alter or amend the court’s order awarding the Defendants summary judgment on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Simmons v. Vickers,*No. 1:09-cv00653-TLW; *Simmons v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr.,*No. 1:09-cv-00858-TLW, 2012 WL 4761432 (D.S.C. Oct. 3; Oct. 2 2012). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
Opinion issued February 4, 2014

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-13-00866-CV

———————————

IN RE TEXAS WINDSTORM INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, Relator

Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On October 11, 2013, Relator, Texas Windstorm Insurance Association, 

filed a petition for writ of mandamus with this Court requesting relief from two 

orders of the district court compelling discovery.* On January 16, 2014, Relator 

notified this Court that the matter has been resolved and requested that we dismiss 

 

*

The underlying case is League City v. Texas Windstorm Insurance Association, cause 

number 12-CV-0053, pending in the 212th Judicial District Court of Galveston 

County, Texas, the Honorable Susan Criss presiding.
2

the petition for writ of mandamus. No prior opinion has been issued on Relator’s

petition for writ of mandamus.

We grant the motion and dismiss the petition for writ of mandamus.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Massengale and Huddle.
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 980 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 980

  To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to expand Medicare 
             coverage of certain self-injected biologicals.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 27, 2003

 Ms. Dunn (for herself, Mr. McDermott, Mr. Pickering, Mrs. Capps, Mr. 
     Inslee, Mr. Crane, Mr. Greenwood, Mr. Dicks, Mr. Hastings of 
 Washington, Mr. Abercrombie, Mr. McNulty, Mr. Kleczka, Mr. Paul, and 
  Mr. Frost) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
 Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on 
   Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
  Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to expand Medicare 
             coverage of certain self-injected biologicals.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Access to Innovation for Medicare 
Patients Act of 2003''.

SEC. 2. MEDICARE COVERAGE OF SELF-INJECTED BIOLOGICALS.

    (a) Coverage.--Section 1861(s)(2) of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 1395x(s)(2)) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (U);
            (2) by inserting ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (V); 
        and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
            ``(W) a self-injected biological (which is approved by the 
        Food and Drug Administration) that is prescribed as a complete 
        replacement for a drug or biological that would otherwise be 
        described in subparagraph (A) or (B);''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall 
apply to biologicals furnished on or after January 1, 2004.
                                 <all>
```
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2007-3124 

WILLIAM A. COOK, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, 

Respondent. 

William A. Cook, of Ogden, Utah, pro se. 

Joyce G. Friedman, Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, United States Merit 

Systems Protection Board, of Washington, DC, for respondent. With her on the brief 

were B. Chad Bungard, General Counsel, Rosa M. Koppel, Deputy General Counsel, 

and Sara B. Rearden, Acting Associate General Counsel. 

Appealed from: United States Merit Systems Protection Board 
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

 

2007-3124 

WILLIAM A. COOK, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, 

 Respondent. 

 __________________________ 

DECIDED: July 12, 2007 

 __________________________ 

Before MAYER and LOURIE, Circuit Judges and LINARES, District Judge.

∗

PER CURIAM. 

William A. Cook appeals the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, 

dismissing his appeal as untimely filed. Cook v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., DE-844E-06-0449-

I-1 (MSPB Nov. 7, 2006). Because Cook failed to file his appeal within 30 days of 

receiving the Office of Personnel Management’s (“OPM”) final decision and he has not 

demonstrated good cause for his delay, we affirm. 

 Under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.22(b), an applicant for disability retirement benefits must 

file his appeal with the board within 30 days after the effective date of the decision being 

appealed or within 30 days after the applicant receives the board’s decision, whichever 

 

∗

 Honorable Jose L. Linares, District Judge, United States District Court for the 

District of New Jersey, sitting by designation. 
2007-3124 2

is later. Cook does not dispute that he received OPM’s decision no later than March 

2006. Because he did not file his appeal with the board until August 26, 2006, about 

four months late, he may proceed only if he can establish good cause for the delay. 

However, we find no error in the board’s conclusion that Cook failed to establish good 

cause or exercise sufficient diligence in pursuing his appeal. The board properly found 

that his medical conditions did not impair his ability to timely file. Even if his May 5, 

2006, submission to OPM were deemed an improperly-filed board appeal, it was still 

untimely by about one month, and therefore cannot establish good cause for the delay. 

Moreover, even if OPM lost his claim file for some period of time and several employees 

he was in contact with at the agency stopped working there while his claim was 

pending, Cook does not explain how these facts excuse his failure to timely pursue his 

appeal with the board, and we cannot infer good cause from them.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellant,

v.

JULIAN ANDREW LUNA,

Appellee. §

§

§

§

§

§ No. 08

- 16

- 00273

- CR

Appeal from

83rd District Court

of Pecos County, Texas

(TC # P

- 3208

- 83

- CR )

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes there was error in the

judgment. We therefore reverse the order of the trial court and remand the cause for further

proceedings , in accordance with the opinion of this Court, and that this de cision be certified below

for observation.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 30 TH DAY OF APRIL, 2019.

ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Chief Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.

Palafox, J. ( Dissenting)
Ex 10.54 Form of Notice of Grant of RSU Under 2012 Stock Plan






Exhibit 10.54


ZELTIQ AESTHETICS, INC.
NOTICE OF GRANT OF RESTRICTED STOCK UNITS




ZELTIQ Aesthetics, Inc. (the “Company”) has granted to the Participant an award (the “Award”) of certain units pursuant to the ZELTIQ Aesthetics, Inc. 2012 Stock Plan (the “Plan”), each of which represents the right to receive on the applicable Settlement Date one (1) share of Stock, as follows:


	
					
	Participant:
	 
	Employee ID:
	 

	Date of Grant:
	 
	 
	 
	 

	Total Number of Units:
	 
	, subject to adjustment as provided by the Restricted Stock Units Agreement.

	Initial Vesting Date:
	 
	 
	 
	 

	Vested Units:
	Except as provided in the Restricted Stock Units Agreement and provided that the Participant's Service has not terminated prior to the applicable date, the number of Vested Units (disregarding any resulting fractional Unit) as of any date is determined by multiplying the Total Number of Units by the “Vested Ratio” determined as of such date, as follows:

	 
	 
	Vested Ratio

	 
	Prior to Initial Vesting Date
	 

	 
	On  the Initial Vesting Date  Month XX, 20XX
	 

	 
	Plus
	 

	 
	For each additional full month of the Participant's Service from the Initial Vesting Date until the Vested Ratio equals 1/1, an additional
	




	Superseding Agreement:
	NONE

	 
	The terms and conditions of the Superseding Agreement shall, notwithstanding any provision of the Restricted Stock Units Agreement to the contrary, supersede any inconsistent term or condition set forth in the Restricted Stock Units Agreement to the extent intended by such Superseding Agreement.




By their signatures below or by electronic acceptance or authentication in a form authorized by the Company, the Company and the Participant agree that the Award is governed by this Grant Notice and by the provisions of the Plan and the Restricted Stock Units Agreement, both of which are made a part of this document.  The Participant represents that the Participant has read and is familiar with the provisions of the Plan and Restricted Stock Units Agreement, and hereby accepts the Award subject to all of their terms and conditions.


	
				
	ZELTIQ AESTHETICS, INC.
	 
	PARTICIPANT

	 
	 
	 

	By:
	 
	 
	 

	Mark J. Foley
	 
	Signature

	President and Chief Executive Officer
	 
	 

	 
	 
	Date

	 
	 
	 
	 

	By:
	 
	 
	Address

	Sergio Garcia
	 
	 

	SVP, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary
EX-10.20



 EXHIBIT 10.20 
 FIRST AMENDMENT TO 
 SEVERANCE AND CHANGE IN CONTROL AGREEMENT

 (as Amended and Restated as of March 14, 2011) 

THIS FIRST AMENDMENT TO SEVERANCE AND CHANGE IN CONTROL AGREEMENT (this “First Amendment”), is made as of
November 29, 2012, by and between STEC, Inc. (the “Company”), and Manouch Moshayedi (the “Executive”). Capitalized terms used and not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in
the Severance and Change in Control Agreement (as defined below). 
 RECITALS 

 

	A.	The Company and the Executive have entered into a Severance and Change In Control Agreement dated February 22, 2010, amended and restated as of November 18,
2010, and amended and restated further as of March 14, 2011 (the “Severance and Change in Control Agreement”). 

  

	B.	The parties hereto wish to amend certain terms of the Severance and Change in Control Agreement. 


AMENDMENT 
 The parties
hereto hereby amend the Severance and Change in Control Agreement as follows, effective as of December 1, 2012. 

1.        The first paragraph of the Recitals to the Agreement shall be deleted and replaced in its entirety with
the following: 
 “WHEREAS, the Executive currently serves as Founder of the Company;” 

2.        Section 1.13(f). Section 1.13(f) of the Severance and Change in Control Agreement is
hereby deleted and replaced in its entirety with the following: 
 “a material reduction in the Executive’s base
salary following December 1, 2012.” 
 3.        Section 1.13. The final paragraph
of Section 1.13 of the Severance and Change in Control Agreement is hereby amended by adding the following to the end of such paragraph: 
 “In addition, Executive acknowledges and agrees that the reduction in the Executive’s base salary on December 1, 2012 shall not constitute “Good Reason” for purposes of the
Severance and Change in Control Agreement or this First Amendment.” 







 4.        Section 1.14. Section 1.14 of the Severance and
Change in Control Agreement is hereby deleted and replaced in its entirety with the following: 
 “Monthly Base
Salary” means the greater of Executive’s (a) annual base salary in effect as of November 30, 2012 or (b) Executive’s Annual Base Salary, in each case divided by twelve (12).” 

5.        This First Amendment shall be and, as of its effectiveness, is hereby incorporated in and forms a part
of, the Severance and Change in Control Agreement. 
 6.        Except as expressly provided herein, all
terms and conditions of the Severance and Change in Control Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. 
 IN WITNESS
WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this First Amendment as of the date first written above. 
  

			
	STEC, INC.
		
	By:	 	/s/ Raymond D. Cook        
		 	Raymond D. Cook
		 	Chief Financial Officer


  

			
	EXECUTIVE
		
		 	/s/ Manouch Moshayedi        
		 	Manouch Moshayedi
Exhibit 23.1

Consent of Independent Registered Pubic Accounting Firm

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No.333-43618 on Form S-8 of our report dated
April 15, 2005, which report expresses an unqualified opinion and includes an explanatory paragraph relating to the uncertainty of Large Scale Biology Corporation's ability to continue as a
going concern, relating to the financial statements of Large Scale Biology Corporation, appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Large Scale Biology Corporation for the year
ended December 31, 2004.

/s/
DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP

Sacramento,
California
April 15, 2005

---



QuickLinks
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Phillip HENRIQUES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-7662.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Dec. 13, 2012.

Decided: Dec. 19, 2012.

Phillip Henriques, Appellant Pro Se. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*225PER CURIAM:

Phillip Henriques seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Henriques has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
# cpsaat09
Economics Made Easy

What is unemployment?

Every month the Bureau of Labor 

Statistics (BLS) asks roughly 60,000 

households to complete a survey on what 

they did the past week for work. To be 

unemployed, a person must be age 16 or 

older. They must be noninstitutionalized

and not have a job. They also must 

currently be available to work and have

actively looked for work in the prior 4 

weeks to be classified as unemployed.

Actively looking for work

These are examples of specific activities that count as actively looking for work.

Some activities, such as reading about a job opening in the newspaper or 

on the internet but not actually applying for open jobs, are not counted 

as actively looking for work.

DIY data

With BLS data, you can

explore unemployment by 

state and county at 

bls.gov/lau/.

Glossary

Survey — asking questions and 

collecting data using a sample.

Noninstitutionalized — not an 

inmate of an institution such as 

a prison or mental facility, and 

anyone who is not an Active

Duty member of the Armed 

Forces.

Contacting an employer 

or employment agency.

Submitting resumes 

or applications.

Asking for 

recommendations from 

friends and family.

Did you know?

The sample survey system of counting the 

unemployed in the United States is also 

used by many foreign countries, including 

Canada, Mexico, Australia, and Japan.