COURT OF CHANCERY

OF THE

STATE OF DELAWARE

TAMIKA R. MONTGOMERY-REEVES

VICE CHANCELLOR

New Castle County Courthouse

500 N. King Street, Suite 11400

Wilmington, Delaware 19801-3734

May 9, 2016

Mr. Michael Vernon Critchfield

P.O. Box 11

Mondovi, WI 54755

David C. Hutt, Esquire

R. Eric Hacker, Esquire

Morris James Wilson Halbrook & 

 Bayard LLP

107 West Market Street

P.O. Box 690

Georgetown, DE 19947

RE: Michael Vernon Critchfield v. Rosie Rios, U.S. Treasurer, et al.

Civil Action No. 11717-VCMR

Dear Mr. Critchfield and Counsel:

I have considered the filings in this case, the exhibits attached thereto, and

the applicable laws. For the following reasons, Mr. Critchfield’s complaint is 

dismissed.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 18, 2015, Plaintiff Michael Vernon Critchfield filed the 

complaint in this action (the “Complaint”). Mr. Critchfield was born in Illinois. 

Mr. Critchfield’s wife and their three children were born in Wisconsin. Mr. 

Critchfield’s Complaint alleges that when each of Mr. Critchfield and his family 

members was born, a Certificate of Live Birth was created, but “was incomplete”

because “articles of incorporation and Federal Reserve Banking information”
Critchfield v. Rios

C.A. No. 11717-VCMR

May 9, 2016

Page 2 of 9

“[making] each family member a surety (bondservant) to that corporation” was 

concealed from them.1 According to Mr. Critchfield, “proof of that incorporation 

is evident by the all capital letters name on the birth certificates . . . and social 

security cards . . . .”2 Further, bonds were issued for each family member based on 

the Certificates of Live Birth resulting in unjust enrichment of others based on the 

future labors of Mr. Critchfield, his wife, and his children.3 The Complaint alleges 

that “[e]ach family member’s rights to constitutional protections were swept away 

as a result of this heinous fraud on [Mr. Critchfield] and his family members as 

they were all infants at the time of the fraud.”4 Mr. Critchfield pleads that, to 

regain his equitable rights, he established a trust in Wisconsin for himself and a 

trust in Illinois for his family members.5

Purportedly in accordance with provisions of the Trading with the Enemy 

Act of 1917 (“TWEA”),

6 Mr. Critchfield names Rosie Rios, the current U.S. 

 

1 Compl. at 2. 

2

Id. (citing exhibits). 

3

Id. at 3. 

4

Id. at 2. 

5

Id. at 3.

6

Trading With The Enemy Act of 1917 § 9, 50 U.S.C.A. § 4309 (West 2016) 

[hereinafter TWEA].
Critchfield v. Rios

C.A. No. 11717-VCMR

May 9, 2016

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Treasurer, and Richard H. Bell, agent of the Delaware corporation U.S. 

TREASURY, as defendants (“Defendants”) in this civil action in equity,7and 

prays for twenty-two forms of relief.8

Mr. Critchfield also filed numerous motions with the Court. On December 

1, 2015, Mr. Critchfield filed a motion to replace his supplemental information 

sheet, a motion to expedite proceedings, and a motion to remove summonses for 

Ms. Rios and Mr. Bell from the record because Mr. Critchfield seeks a declaratory 

judgment. On December 15, 2015, Mr. Critchfield filed a motion to amend 

supplemental information sheet, a statement of good cause for suit to not be 

assigned to a Master in the first instance, and a motion for a de novo review of this 

suit in equity. On February 15, 2016, Mr. Critchfield filed several individual 

 

7

Id.

8

Examples include: (1) deliver Mr. Critchfield’s and his family’s Certificates of 

Live Birth from Illinois and Wisconsin, respectively; (2) declare Mr. Critchfield 

and his family members are nationals of Illinois and Wisconsin, respectively; (3) 

compel issuance of U.S. Passports and Passport cards for family members 

reflecting national status and diplomatic immunity; (4) eliminate credit 

history/credit reports; (5) enter restraining orders against the National Security 

Agency (“NSA”), the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) Secretary, the 

Transportation Safety Administration (“TSA”), and the Internal Revenue Service 

(“IRS”) Secretary, among others; and (6) compel a complete accounting of all 

U.S. Department of the Treasury accounts created by the artifice and fraud via the 

family’s certificates of live birth. See Compl. at 4-6.
Critchfield v. Rios

C.A. No. 11717-VCMR

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motions for various declarations.9 Also on February 15, 2015, Mr. Critchfield 

moved for a special proceeding in chambers, in camera, for a declaratory judgment

on the pleadings.

On April 20, 2016, Mr. Bell filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6) (the “Motion to Dismiss”) on the 

grounds that the Complaint does not contain any allegations against Mr. Bell and 

does not suggest that Mr. Bell can provide any of the relief Mr. Critchfield seeks. 

The Motion to Dismiss also questions this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over 

Mr. Critchfield’s claims. Further, Mr. Bell points out that Mr. Critchfield’s “straw 

man” or “redemption” theory, which often arises in fraud, debt avoidance, and tax 

evasion cases, is well known to and uniformly rejected by federal courts.10

 

9

The motions seek declarations ordering the above-cited relief, supra note 8, and 

ordering the release of their natural persons from office of trustee; moving Mr. 

Critchfield’s natural person from the office of trustee to the office of cestui que 

trust; and ordering U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch, State of Wisconsin 

Attorney General Brad Schimel, and Buffalo County District Attorney Thomas 

Clark to update their respective databases to reflect that Mr. Critchfield and his 

family members have diplomatic immunity from at-law courts, among other 

things. Docket Item Nos. 19-26, 29-30, 37.

10 See, e.g., United States v. Provost, 2012 WL 1158801, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 

2012) (collecting cases characterizing straw man and redemption theories as 

patently frivolous, “implausible,” “clearly nonsense,” “convoluted,” and 

“peculiar,” “nonsensical and soundly rejected in this and all other jurisdictions,” 

and itself finding the theories unintelligible, without merit, and wholly frivolous); 

United States v. Waalee, 133 Fed. Appx. 819, 822 n.2 (3d Cir. 2005); Bryant v. 

Washington Mut. Bank, 524 F. Supp. 2d 753, 758-59 (W.D. Va. 2007), aff’d, 282 
Critchfield v. Rios

C.A. No. 11717-VCMR

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On May 3, 2016, Mr. Critchfield filed additional pleadings with the Court, 

including (1) Complainant’s Exception To Defendant Bell’s Answer; Motion To 

Strike Defendant Bell’s Motion To Dismiss; Declaration Of Trust (the 

“Exception”); and (2) Motion To Strike Defendant Richard Bell’s Motion To 

Dismiss (the “Motion to Strike”). In the Exception, Mr. Critchfield argues that Mr. 

Bell’s Motion to Dismiss “is incomprehensible and irrelevant in exclusive equity” 

because it “makes an at-law argument in an attempt to dismiss the complaint’s 

private trust suit and the implied fiduciary relations when the suit is being 

adjudicated in exclusive equity.”11 Further, Mr. Critchfield argues the Motion to 

Dismiss “misconstrued the basis for the complaint, and, therefore, has not 

answered it.”12 Mr. Critchfield also refutes the characterization of “straw man” 

theory in the Motion to Dismiss, clarifies that “[o]nly the State of Delaware 

recognizes natural persons” and that, “[f]or all practical purposes, Wilmington, 

Delaware is the de jure capitol of the United States,” and concludes that “[t]he 

 

Fed. Appx. 260 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Rev. Rul. 2005-21, 2005-14 I.R.B. 822; 

OCC Alert 2007-55, Sept. 5, 20007, http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/alert/2007-

55.html (describing “[t]he use of a nonexistent ‘trust account’ supposedly held in a 

person’s name at the United States Department of the Treasury or some other part 

of the federal government” as one of the “fraudulent processes used to . . . 

‘eliminate’ debt”).

11 Docket Item No. (“D.I. No.”) 52 at 1 (“Exception”).

12 Id.
Critchfield v. Rios

C.A. No. 11717-VCMR

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‘answer’ is full of sophistry and obfuscation, which is completely inappropriate 

with respect to a suit in exclusive equity governed by the maxims of equity.”13 

Finally, Mr. Critchfield purportedly makes a declaration of trust appointing Mr. 

Bell, Mr. Bell’s counsel, and Ms. Rios as trustees of the Critchfield Pecuniary 

Relief Trust, a Wisconsin trust that consists of all financial accounts in the all 

capital letter names of Mr. Critchfield, his wife, and their three children. 

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

This is the third action of its nature dismissed by this Court in four months. 

In Bechard v. Rios, Master Ayvazian detailed allegations and theories nearly 

identical to those raised here before recommending, on February 2, 2016, that the 

Court sua sponte dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, that 

related motions be dismissed as moot, and that Bechard refer to Court of Chancery 

Rule 144 for the process of taking exception to a Master’s Final Report.14 On 

February 18, 2016, Chancellor Bouchard approved the Master’s final report and 

 

13 Id. at 4.

14 2016 WL 402471, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 2, 2016) (Master’s Final Report) (“Bechard 

I”).
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C.A. No. 11717-VCMR

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adopted the findings of fact made therein.15 Nonetheless, Bechard filed a 

purported notice of voluntary dismissal on or about March 8, 2016 and re-filed the 

same complaint on or about March 9, 2016.16 Echoing Master Ayvazian’s 

findings, Vice Chancellor Glasscock concluded that “[Bechard’s] Complaint is 

incomprehensible and [Bechard] manifestly lack[s] jurisdiction to bring this matter 

before a Court in Delaware.”17 Similar to Bechard I, “[Bechard’s second] action 

[was] dismissed sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and [his] related 

motions [were] dismissed as moot.”18 

In his Exceptions, Mr. Critchfield attempts to distinguish Bechard I and 

Bechard II from this action based on Mr. Bechard’s failure to show in his 

paperwork that his trust was verified and recorded. Mr. Critchfield argues this is 

the reason both the Complaint “made it past the de facto Register of Chancery’s 

office ” and Vice Chancellor Glasscock “chastised [Mr. Bechard’s] efforts to gain 

access to the de jure Chancellor’s office.”

19

 I do not read Bechard I or Bechard II

 

15 Bechard I, C.A. No. 11657-MA (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016) (ORDER).

16 Bechard v. Rios, 2016 WL 1169097, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 17, 2016) (hereinafter 

Bechard II).

17 Id.

18 Id.

19 Exception at 1-2.
Critchfield v. Rios

C.A. No. 11717-VCMR

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that way. First, Mr. Critchfield’s Complaint “made it past the de facto Register of 

Chancery’s office” because he filed the Complaint in accordance with the Court of 

Chancery Rules and paid the required fees, not because Mr. Critchfield showed 

trusts on the face of the Complaint. Second, both of Mr. Bechard’s actions were 

dismissed because Mr. Bechard’s complaints manifestly failed to invoke the

jurisdiction of this Court: Mr. Bechard sought relief that this Court is not 

authorized to grant, asserted legal theories that no court in this State has

recognized, and pled facts taking place entirely outside of Delaware. Following 

the reasoning of Bechard I and Bechard II, which are based on the same theories as 

this action, this Court dismisses Mr. Critchfield’s Complaint for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction and dismisses all related motions as moot.

B. Alternative Grounds

Mr. Critchfield’s Complaint is also dismissed for the independent reason that

the statute on which Mr. Critchfield’s claims rely does not permit this Court to 

grant the relief Mr. Critchfield seeks. Without suggesting that Mr. Critchfield’s 

theories have any basis in reality, the Complaint and several of Mr. Critchfield’s 

motions appear to seek relief based on theories rooted in TWEA.

20

 According to 

TWEA Section 4309(a), however, Mr. Critchfield must bring his claims in the 

 

20 TWEA § 4309.
Critchfield v. Rios

C.A. No. 11717-VCMR

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United States District Court for the District of Columbia or in the United States 

District Court for the district in which he resides.

21

 Therefore, this Court may not 

determine any question of construction or validity arising under TWEA. Contrary 

to Mr. Critchfield’s suggestions, this Court’s authority under the Delaware 

Declaratory Judgment Act22 does not extend to construing TWEA or determining 

Mr. Critchfield’s rights, status, or legal relations, if any, thereunder.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice, and all 

of Mr. Critchfield’s motions are denied as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Sincerely,

/s/ Tamika Montgomery-Reeves

Vice Chancellor

TMR/jp

 

21 Id. § 4309(a) (“[C]laimant may institute a suit in equity in the United States 

District Court for the District of Columbia or in the district court of the United 

States for the district in which such claimant resides . . . to establish the interest, 

right, title, or debt so claimed . . . .”).

22 10 Del. C. ch. 65.