NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GLENN GALVAN, pro se, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 

REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., AKA 

MERS, AKA MERSCORP Holdings, Inc.; 

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST 

COMPANY, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-16930 

D.C. No. 3:15-cv-00632-MMDVPC 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Miranda M. Du, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 15, 2018**

Before: SILVERMAN, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

Glenn Galvan appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in 

his diversity action arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAY 23 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-16930 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Garity v. APWU Nat’l Labor Org., 

828 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2016) (issue preclusion); Ford v. City of Yakima, 706 

F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2013) (cross-motions for summary judgment). We 

affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants on the 

basis of issue preclusion because the issue of whether the assignment of the loan 

was fraudulent was actually litigated and decided against Galvan in his prior 

action. See Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 194 P.3d 709, 713-14 (Nev. 2008) (en 

banc) (elements of issue preclusion under Nevada law).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Galvan’s requests 

for judicial notice. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689-90 (9th Cir. 

2001) (setting forth standard of review and circumstances under which judicial 

notice is inappropriate).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Galvan’s discovery 

requests because Galvan failed to demonstrate how the denial resulted in actual 

and substantial prejudice to him. See Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 

1080, 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of review and explaining 

that district court’s decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed unless there is 

a clear showing that the denial “results in actual and substantial prejudice” (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted)).
3 17-16930 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Galvan’s motion to 

stay. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706-07 (1997) (setting forth standard of 

review and explaining that district court “has broad discretion to stay proceedings 

as an incident to its power to control its own docket”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Galvan leave to 

amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide 

Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of 

review and stating that leave to amend may be denied where amendment would be 

futile).

To the extent that Galvan seeks review of orders from his state court 

proceedings, we do not consider those orders as they are not properly before this 

court.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.