### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs N ove m be r 16, 200 4

DA RR ELL JON ES, JR. v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Ham ilton Coun ty No. 244008 Stephen M. Bevil, Jud ge

No. E2004-00835-CC A-R3- P C - F iled Fe bruary 10, 2005

Th e Ap pe lla nt, Da

rr e ll Jon e s, Jr., app e a ls the Hamil tonCou nty Cr imi na l Co urt’ s d ism iss a l of his petition for post-conviction relief. Jones was indicted f or first deg ree murder; howe ver, the plea ag ree ment permitted J ones t o enter a guilty plea to the reduced charg e of second de g ree murder. A s pa rt of the a g re e me nt, he a c c e pte d a fo rty -f ive y e a r s e nte nc e a s a

Ra ng e I I I

of fender despit e on ly meeting the statutory

criteria for a

Rang e I offe nder. On appea l, J ones raises the issue of whe ther tr ia l c ou ns e l w a s in e ff

e c tiv e fo r faili ng to inf

orm Jone s o f the ramif

ic a tio ns of

ple a din g ou tsi de his rang e. F ollowing r eview of the re cord, w e af

firm the dismissal of the petition.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opi n i o n o f t h e court, in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.

Hallie H. Mc Fa dden, Chattanoog a, Te nnessee , for the A ppellant, Dar rell Jones, J r.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Mic hae l Mo or e , So lic ito r G e ne ra l; Se th P

. Kestner , Assistant Attorney Gene ral; Will iam H. Cox I I I , District Attorney Gene ral; Jason Thomas and Ne al Pinkston, Assi stant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

The fa ctual basis for

the Appellant’ s plea, a s s ummarized by the State at the g uiltyplea he ari ng , e sta

bli sh e d th a t:-2-

. . . on Aug ust 18 of the y ear 2000, here in Hamilton Count y , the [Appellant] knew th victim, J ohn Palchak , an d he, along with the co-de fendant, Sarah B ry ant, wer e in v o lv e d inth e mu r d e r

o f [th e v ic ti m]

.

. . . [ T ] h e victim was taken to a n are a in the Woodlawns are a her e in Hamilton County , and while at that are a, he w as beate n. And there is a witness who saw the [Ap pe lla nt] w itha , a n it e m in his ha nd raise d u p in to the a ir . [T he vic tim ] ha d a skull fra cture as a r esult of being beate n about the hea d. I n addition to that, Mr. P alcha k was shot once in the fac e and onc e behind the
ear , that being the fatal wound causing his death. . . . Th e fa c ts wo uld be that th e rewe rewi tne sse s th a t w ou ld s a y that th is c ri me was, in fa ct, pre meditated; that there had bee n planning that had g one into it in the day s prec eding the murder

. Th e re wo ulda lso be fa c ts that a ft e r the mur de r, bo th o f the de fe nd a nts le ft in the victim’s car

and then a

bandoned it a short distance from wher e he w as murder ed. They took a cab. [The A ppellant] we nt ba ck to - - w ent – not back, but we nt to his place of employ ment and there gave the gun t o another individual, indicating that basica lly

he, in f act, ha d killed the victim and had bee n involved in his murder.

. . .
I n Fe bruary 2001, a Hamilton County g rand jury returne d a thre e-c ount indictment charg ing the Appe l l an t , as a Rang e I offe nder, w ith first deg ree preme ditated murder , first deg ree felony murder, and espec ially

ag g ravated robbe ry . On J uly 11, 2002, the Appellant waived his rig ht to a j u r y tr i a l a n d e n t e r e d a g u i l t y p l e a t o t h e r e d u c e d c h ar g e o f s e c o n d d e g r e e m u r d e r

a s a R a n g e III of fe nd e r. As pa

rt of the a g re e me nt, the Ap pe llant a g re e d to the se nte nc e, whi ch was ou tsi de his rang e, and was sentenc ed to f orty -five y ear s in the Depa rtment of Corre ction as a violent off ender

. No direc t appea l was take n.

I n April 2003, the Appe llant filed a pro s e petition for post-conviction re lief alleg ing that he was de nied t he ef

fec tive assistance of counse l because trial counse l failed to explain the ramifications of pleading outside his statutory sentenc ing rang e. Counsel was late r appointed, but no amende d petition was filed. On Septemb er 8, 2003, a post-conviction hea ring was he ld. The post-conviction court dismi ssed the Appe llant’s petition, and this appeal followe d.

Ana lys is

I n o rd ert o s u cc ee d o n a p o s t -c o n v i ct i o n cl ai m , t h e Ap p el l an t b ea rs t h e b u rd en o f s h o wi n g, by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e, the a lleg ations set forth in his petition. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 11 0( f) (2 00 3) . T o s uc c e e d in a c ha lle ng e fo r ine ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of c ou ns e l, the Ap pe llant mus t d e m o n s tr a t e t h a t c o u n s e l ’ s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f e l l b e l o w t h e r a n g e o f

c o m p e t e n c e d e m a n d e d o f a t t o r n e ys in criminal ca ses. Ba

x te r v . R os e , 523 S.W .2d 9 30, 936 (Tenn. 1975) . Under Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. C t. 2052, 2064 (1984), the Ap p el l an t must establish (1) de fi c ie nt r e pr e se ntatio n a nd(2 ) p re jud ic e re su lti ng fr om the de fi c ie nc y

. I n th e c on te xt of a g uil ty plea, to satisfy

the sec ond prong of Strickland , the Ap pe llant mus t sh ow tha t “ the reis a

re a so na bleW e a r e s om ewh at puzzl ed by t he ar gu ment t hat t r i al couns el ’ s r epre s ent at i on was def i ci ent becau s e c ouns el 1
“fai l ed t o ad vi se” on a m at t er t hat “ d i d n’ t m at t er. ” W e b el i eve t hi s wo ul d f al l und er t he head i ng o f a nonm at eri al m at t er, thu s n o n -p reju d ic ia l. N o n e the le ss, w e e le c t re v ie w o f t h e issu e

.

A t t he heari ng, t he A p p el l ant t est i f i ed that he want ed t o ass ert t he d ef ense of s el f

- d efense, al t ho ugh he 2

a c k n o w le d g e d tha t he h a d m a d e c e rta in ad m issio n s to the p o lice a n d tha t the v ic tim h a d “se v e n b lun t tra u m a inj u rie s to the he a d ” in a d d iti o n to “tw o gu n sh o t wo u n d s to the he a d .”

T he p l ea agreem ent , whi ch was s i gned by t he A p p el l ant , exp res sl y p rovided t hat t he A p p el l ant wo ul d recei ve 3

a sent ence o f

“ 4 5 y ears at 10 0 % ” fo r s eco nd de gree murd er.
-3- probability

that, but for counse l’s err ors, he would not ha ve pleade d g uiltyand would have insisted on g oing to tria l.” Hi ll v . Lo c k ha rt , 4 74 U. S. at 59 , 1 06 S. Ct . at 37 0; se e als o W alton v . S tate , 966 S.W .2d 54, 55 (Tenn

. Crim. App. 1997). The issues of de ficient pe rformance by counsel a nd possible prejudice to the defe nse ar e mix ed questions of law and fa ct. State v. Burns , 6 S.W .3d 453, 46 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) . “ A t

ri a l c ou rt ’s findings of

fact underlying a

cl ai m of ineff

ective a ssistance of counsel a re r eviewe d on appea l under a de n o vo s t an d ard, acc ompanied with a pr esumption that those finding s are corr ect unless the preponde ranc e of the e vidence is otherwise.” Fi e lds v . S tate , 40 S.W. 3d45 0, 45 8 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) (c iti ng Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ); He nle y v . S tate , 960 S.W .2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997) . Howeve r, conclusions of law , ar e r e v i e w e d u n d e r a p u r e l y de novo stand ard , w ith no presumption of cor

rec tness. Fields , 40 S.W .3d at 458.
First, on appe al, the Appe llant contends that t ri al counsel wa s ineffe ctive bec ause c ounsel “failed to advise [the Appellant] that the Range to which he pled g uiltydidn’t matter bec ause he
wo uldse rv e 10 0% of the tim e on a ple a to S e c on d D e g re e Mu rd e r r e g ard le ss o f h is r a ng e .” Th is 1 alleg ation is directly

contra dicted by

the proof at the post-conviction hea ring . Trial counse l testified that th e pr oo f a g a ins t th e Ap pe lla nt wa s ve ry c omp e lli ng , a nd the State sh ow e d li ttl e wi lli ng ne ss t o neg otiate for le ss than a first de g ree murder c onvict i on. Counsel further testified that he a dvised 2 the Appellant that a

person convicted of first deg ree murder w ould be elig ible for pa role a fter se rvice of fifty -one y ear s. After discussions with the St ate, tria l counsel wa s able to neg otiate a plea
a g re e me nt fo r a te rm of fo rty -f ive y e ars a s a

Ra ng e I I I of fe nd e r. Tria l c ou ns e l f

urthe r e xpla ine d to the Appellant that it was not the r ang e which c ontrolle d his parole date, rather, it was the violent offe nder statute w hich re quired service of 85%, at a minimum , of the sente nce. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501( i)(1),( 2) (2003) . “So for pur poses of the r ang e, it doesn’t matter , the 30, 35 or 45 perc ent.”

Moreove r, at the he aring , the Appellant a dmitted that trial counsel explained the terms and conseq u e n c e s o f

th e St a te ’ s p r o p o s e d p le a o f f e r to h im a n d th e f a c t th a t th e “ r a n g e d id n ’ t m a tte r e ith e r wh ic h wa y .” Th e Ap pe lla nt al so a c kn ow le dg e d tha t tria l cou ns e l adv ise d him that, s ho uld 3 he be c on vic te d o f f

ir st de g re e mur de r, he wo uldbe e lig ibl e fo r p aro le a ft e r s e rv ic e of fi fty -o ne y e ars

.Al t h ou g h n ot r ai s ed as a n i s s u e, t h e Appel l an t a ppea r s t o a l l eg e t h at h i s g u i l t y pl ea was ne i t h er v ol u n t ar i l y n or 4
kn owi ng l y en t er ed. Fi r s t , we woul d not e t hat t he A p p ell an t d oes not r ai s e t hi s proposi t i on i n t he form of an i s s ue as
r equi r ed by T enn

. R. Ap p. P

. 27(a) ( 4). M ore i mp ort ant l y , t he po s t

- convi ct i on cour t found t he A pp el l ant ’ s gu i l t y pl ea
w a s k n o w ing ly an d vo lun ta rily en te re d , an d the p ro o f d o e s n o t p re p o n d e ra te a g a ins t t h is fi n d ing

.

B ot h f i r s t de g r ee mu r der a n d s ec on d deg r ee mu r der a r e cl as s i f i ed as v i ol en t of

fen s es

. T en n

. Code An n

. § 40- 5
35- 501( i ) ( 2)

. T h e Appel l an t w as s en t en ce d a s a v i ol en t of fen der u n der t h e pr ov i s i on s of T en n

. C o d e Ann

. § 40- 35- 5 0 1 (i)( 1 ). T h u s, a ssu m ing the A p p e llan t ea rn s a n d re ta ins se n te n c e c re d its o f f ift e e n p e r c e n t, h is e a rlie st p a ro le el i gi bi l i t y dat e woul d occur af t er s er vi ce of

38. 25 y ear s

. I f

t he A pp el l ant ha d re cei ved a l i fe s ent enc e f or f i r s t degr ee
m urd er, assum i ng he ea rne d senten ce cre d i t s o f f i f t ee n p erc en t , he wo uld b e e l i gib l e fo r p aro l e aft er service o f 5 1 years. T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 4 0 -3 5 -5 0 1 (h )( 1 ), (i)( 1 ).
-4- S ec o n d , t h e A p p el l an tco n t en d s t h attri al co u n s el al l o we d t h e Ap p el l an t t o p l ea d as a R an ge I I I offe nder w hen he w as subject only to a Rang e I

sent en ce

. Offe nder c lassification is a “non-

4 jurisdictional and leg itimate barg aining tool[ ] i n plea ne g otiations. . . .” Bland v. Dukes , 97 S.W .3d 1 3 3 , 1 3 4 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g Mc Con ne ll v . S tate , 12 S.W

. 3 d 7 9 5 , 7 9 8 (Tenn. 2000) ; Hi c k s v . S tate , 945 S.W .2d 706, 709 (Tenn. 1997)). The sentence imposed upon the Appellant is not an illeg al sentenc e, as the Appellant appe ars to asse rts, despite the fac t that he statutorily qualifies only as a Rang e I

offe nder ba sed upon his l ack of criminal history . A def

endant c an ag ree as part of a ple a ag ree ment to be sentenc ed as a Rang e I I I offe nder, a lthough only meeting the criteria for Rang e I , as long as the sente nce imposed is within the s tatutory limit s fix ed for the offense. Sta te v. Mahle r , 7 35 S.W. 2d22 6, 22 8 ( Te nn . 1 98 7) ; se e als o M c Con ne ll , 12 S.W. 3d a t 79 8. Th e po ssi ble rang e of punishment for

second de g ree murder is fif teen to six ty y ear s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 210 (2003); Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 112 (2003). Trial co u n s el t est ified that he informed the Appellant that he w ould have to ac cept the highe r rang e in order to g et the forty -five- y ear sentenc e of fe re d b y the State , w hic h th e Ap pe llant a c kn ow le dg e d w as in hi s be st i nte re sts . Cl e arl y , inthi s case , no prejudice has bee n shown as the Appellant’s plea ag ree ment permitted him to be sentenc ed to forty -five y ear s as a violent off ender as opposed to life imprisonment as a violent offende r. 5

At the c on c lus ionof

the he ari ng , th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt fo un d:

that the [Appellant] has failed to show that he was denied ineffe ctive [si c] assistance of counsel or t hat hi s plea was not knowing ly and voluntarily

enter ed. The testimony of [trial counsel] as well as t he P etition to Enter Plea of Guilty , and the transcript of the g uiltyplea he aring show that [the Appellant] was fully advised of his rig hts and that he u n d e r s to o d th o s e r ig h ts

. H e w a s f u ll y e xp lain e d th e p le a a n d th a t he
un ders to od that

ple a , a ndthat hee nte re d th e ple a that w a s o ff

e re d inhis be st int e re sts

. Ac c or din g to [tr ia l c ou ns e l’ s] te sti mon y the fa c ts in the c a se w ere really ba d a ndthe de fe ns e wa s r e a lly ble ak. Th e pr oo f i n th e c a se a g a ins t the [Ap pe llant]
was ove rwhe lming[.]

. . . The proof does not preponde rate ag ainst these findings. At the post-conviction hea ring , trial counsel testified that he t horoug hly explained the ramifications of acce pting a sentenc e outside the
app ro pri ate st atu tory

rang e a ndthat he re vie we d th e ple a a g re e me nt i n d e ta il w iththe Ap pe lla nt. Moreove r, the re cord establishes that the trial court, befor e ac cepting the plea, r eviewe d the sentenc e-5-

in painstaking detail with the Appellant. The post-convictio n co u rt obviouslyacc redited tria l
c ou ns e l’ s te sti mon y that he fu lly a dv ise d th e Ap pe llant w ithre g ardto the c on se qu e nc e s o f h is g uil ty plea, and we will not rew eig h or ree valuate the evidenc e or substitut e our infere nces f or those dra wn by the trial court. Henley , 96 0 S.W. 2d a t 57 8- 79

. Qu e sti on s c on c e rn ing the c re dib ili ty of wi tne sse s, the weig ht and value g iven to the ir testimony , and the fac tual issues raised by the evidenc e ar e to be resolved by

the trial court. Id. at 579.

Acc ording ly , we conclude that the Appellant has not pr oven by clea r and c o n v i ncing evidenc e that trial counsel’s per formanc e wa s outside the rang e of c ompetencedemande d of attorney s in criminal case s. Moreove r, af ter c onside ri n g t h e t o tality of the c ircumstance s, the Appellant ce rtainly has failed to show evidenc e that but for counsel’s er rors, he would not have pled g uilty . A letter w ritten by the Appellant to trial c ounsel perha ps best establishes the Appellant’s motive for this collatera l attack:

I want to l et y ou know t hat I thank y ou for all the t hings y ou did for me! . . . I was blessed to g et y ou when I did!

. . . I also wante d to ask y ou how do I g o about coming back to the c ourt to g et some of this time off of me! I alre ady have the appea l form and the only way I can see to c ome back is to say ineffe ctive assistanc e in counse ling but in all honesty

I rea lly don’t want to do that! . . . I don’t want to combat the conviction just the amount of time hopefully we ca n find a hole in the D A’s we b about my rang e wa iver. . . .

CO NC LU SION

B a s e d u p o n th e f

o r e g o in g , w e a f

f irm th e d is mi s s a l o f th e p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n p e ti tion by the Hamilton CountyCriminal Court.

___________________________________ DAVID G. HAY ES, J UDGE