Filed 4/30/13 Offerman v. McCurtis CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

DONALD OFFERMAN,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL McCURTIS et al., 

 Defendants and Respondents.

2d Civil No. B239370

(Super. Ct. Nos. 56-2011-00408205-

CU-HR-VTA, 56-2011-00408208-

CU-HR-VTA)

(Ventura County)

Plaintiff Donald Offerman appeals judgments denying his applications for 

harassment injunctions (Code Civ. Proc. § 527.6) against defendants Michael McCurtis 

and Billy Hammock.1 We conclude, among other things, that: 1) Offerman has not shown 

that the trial court displayed bias against him during an evidentiary hearing, and 2) the 

court did not abuse its discretion by denying injunctive relief. We affirm.

FACTS

Offerman was "a live-in caretaker" at Pastor McCurtis's church. He decided 

to leave the church because McCurtis gave him "an ultimatum" to "either do as he wanted 

. . . or leave." McCurtis did not give him sufficient time to remove his belongings or to 

"obtain other housing." 

In June 2011, Offerman and a friend returned to the church to pick up 

Offerman's "personal items." McCurtis said he wanted to talk to Offerman "alone." 

 

1 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2.

Offerman testified this request was "very disturbing to [him]." He said, "I immediately 

went into the adjacent fellowship wall." McCurtis followed him. Offerman testified 

McCurtis "got into my face." "[McCurtis] had his chest and his face about three inches 

away from my face, and in a loud, aggressive tone of voice and demeanor, he told me to 

get out of the church."

After leaving the church, Offerman asked McCurtis's father, also a pastor, for 

"a letter of reference." Offerman "didn't want to be around" McCurtis. People associated 

with McCurtis contacted Offerman. Elizabeth, McCurtis's sister, invited him to a wedding. 

Offerman believed this was threatening because, if he went, he might come in contact with 

McCurtis. 

Offerman felt Hammock was a threat to him because he "did not intervene" 

when McCurtis asked Offerman to leave the church and Hammock "was starring at 

[Offerman] with a mean look." He also felt Hammock was a threat to him because he 

recently left a voice message stating he had "a letter from Pastor." 

Offerman filed requests for "Orders to Stop Harassment" against McCurtis 

and Hammock. (§ 527.6.) He appeared in propria persona and was the only witness at the 

hearing. 

The trial court denied the requests for injunctive relief. It found there was no 

evidence to support an injunction against Hammock or McCurtis based on alleged 

harassment. 

DISCUSSION

Denying Injunctive Relief

Offerman contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his 

request for injunctive relief against McCurtis and Hammock. He claims the record shows: 

1) the trial court was "biased" against him during the hearing, and 2) it erred by rejecting 

his evidence of harassment by the defendants, including facts showing "a conspiracy to 

lure [him] to vulnerable locations." We disagree. 

"A person who has suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining 

order and an injunction prohibiting" that conduct. (§ 527.6, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court 
3.

may issue a temporary restraining order where there is "reasonable proof of harassment of 

the petitioner by the respondent, and that great or irreparable harm would result to the 

petitioner." (§ 527.6, subd. (d).)

The granting or denying of injunctive relief "rests within the sound discretion 

of the trial court and may not be disturbed on appeal except for an abuse of discretion." 

(California Assn. of Dispensing Opticians v. Pearle Vision Center, Inc. (1983) 143 

Cal.App.3d 419, 425.) 

We review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment. An 

appellate court "must resolve all evidentiary conflicts in favor of the prevailing party . . . ." 

(Burch v. Premier Homes, LLC (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 730, 744.) "We may not insert 

ourselves as the trier of fact and reweigh the evidence." (Id. at p. 745.) The trial court 

decides the credibility of the witnesses. (Fredrics v. Paige (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1642, 

1647; Church of Merciful Saviour v. Volunteers of America (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 851, 

856.)

Bias

Offerman contends the trial court was biased. He claims it did not permit 

him to make an oral argument. But the court said it did not want him "to read a 

statement." Offerman appeared in propria persona at the hearing on the injunction. The 

court had reviewed his moving papers and it had questions about his allegations. The court 

asked him a series of questions to evaluate the merits of his claims. In so doing, it acted 

within its discretion. The court asked questions about all of his material allegations.

Offerman claims the trial court refused to permit him to file documents at the 

hearing. But the court found his request was untimely. He made the request at the end of 

the hearing after the court had denied the injunctions. He did not explain why he did not 

make the request earlier. Moreover, the court ultimately said, "[Y]ou're welcome to file 

them if you wish to do so." It also told him, "This case is still open. If anything occurs in 

the future, sir, you can refile in the same case." Offerman has not cited to any remarks by 

the court that would support a bias claim. From our review of the record, we conclude this 

claim is without merit.
4.

Abuse of Discretion

In his petitions for orders to stop harassment by McCurtis and Hammock, 

Offerman alleged his "request for orders is based on a credible threat of violence." (Italics 

added.) But the trial court reasonably found Offerman's testimony did not support those 

allegations. When the court asked whether McCurtis "ever threatened [him] in any way," 

Offerman said, "Not verbally, but--yeah. He got in my face." (Italics added.) The court: 

"What does 'got into my face' mean . . . ?" Offerman: "He had his chest and his face about 

three inches away from my face, and in a loud, aggressive tone of voice and demeanor, he 

told me to get out of the church." Offerman said his "last contact" with McCurtis was in 

June 2011, six months before the hearing on injunctive relief. 

The trial court could find the evidence was not sufficient. Offerman may 

have been upset by McCurtis's conduct and did not want to be near him. But the trial court 

must use an objective standard to determine whether injunctive relief is appropriate. A 

"'[c]redible threat of violence' is a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that 

would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety . . . ." (Italics added.) 

(§ 527.6, subd. (b)(2).) "'[I]njunctive relief lies only to prevent threatened injury and has 

no application to wrongs that have been completed.'" (Russell v. Douvan (2003) 112 

Cal.App.4th 399, 401, italics omitted.) 

The trial court could reasonably infer that other than telling Offerman to 

leave in an aggressive manner in one prior incident, there was no evidence that McCurtis 

made a threat of violence or a physical assault. Moreover, Offerman did not show that he 

would suffer future irreparable harm. Relief under the statute may be based on evidence of 

either a credible threat or a pattern of harassment. (§ 527.6.) But "an injunction 

restraining future conduct is authorized by section 527.6 only when it appears from the

evidence that the harassment is likely to recur in the future . . . ." (R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 

Cal.App.4th 181, 189, italics added; Leydon v. Alexander (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1, 3-5 

[single incident of defendant's "deplorable" conduct and abusive language did not 

authorize the court to issue a harassment injunction].) Here there was no evidence that 

within the past six months McCurtis ever personally contacted Offerman. The injunction 
5.

is not to be used "as punishment for past acts." (Russell v. Douvan, supra, 112 

Cal.App.4th at p. 401.) 

Offerman testified McCurtis created an "ugly situation" in June by 

preventing him from getting his belongings and not giving him "ample time to find 

alternative housing." But the trial court could reasonably infer such claims about 

McCurtis's past conduct cannot be decided by a section 527.6 injunction. 

Offerman also alleged McCurtis was currently harassing him by using third 

parties to contact him. But an injunction must be based on evidence, not speculation. 

(FLIR Systems, Inc. v. Parrish (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1277.) Offerman testified 

that McCurtis "has been orchestrating, apparently, efforts to have me contacted. . . . And 

connecting the dots leaves me to believe that there's no other reasonable explanation for

his friends contacting me . . . ." (Italics added.) But the court could find this testimony 

about what McCurtis "apparently" did and "connecting the dots" was speculation. 

Offerman did not show that the people he claimed were currently contacting him had made 

any threats. The court found "no evidence that the subsequent contact by other people 

were in any way shape or form instrumented . . . by [McCurtis] for the purpose of 

harassing [Offerman]." It was not required to accept Offerman's personal view that an 

invitation to a wedding was a threat. Offerman has not shown error. 

Offerman contends the trial court erred by not granting an injunction against 

Hammock. But it could reasonably find he did not prove Hammock made a credible threat 

or had engaged in harassment. Offerman sought an injunction against Hammock citing 

three incidents: 1) that on one occasion six months earlier Hammock "was starring at 

[him] with a mean look"; 2) that Hammock "did not intervene" when McCurtis asked 

Offerman to leave; and 3) Hammock left a voice mail stating he had "a letter from Pastor" 

and he wanted to "talk to [him] about other things." The court found that none of these 

events constituted "the basis for issuing a restraining order." There was no abuse of 

discretion. The court may not grant a harassment injunction where it reasonably finds the 

defendant's conduct is not currently threatening. (Russell v. Douvan, supra, 112 
6.

Cal.App.4th 399, 401-403 [single incident of a battery committed by the defendant against 

plaintiff did not, by itself, justify injunctive relief].)

Offerman apparently claims the trial court had to accept his theory that the 

defendants were "conspiring" to "lure" him to "vulnerable locations" because he was the 

only testifying witness. But "a trial judge is not required to accept as true the sworn 

testimony of a witness, even in the absence of evidence directly contradicting it . . . ." 

(Lohman v. Lohman (1946) 29 Cal.2d 144, 149.) It is apparent from the court's findings 

that it did not view Offerman's claims to be credible. We do not decide credibility and we 

may not reweigh the evidence. (Burch v. Premier Homes, LLC, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 744.) 

Offerman contends that during the hearing the trial court made some remarks 

which he claims were irrelevant, unnecessary or incorrect. But the court's isolated or 

tentative remarks during a hearing will not impeach the judgment where, as here, the 

court's ultimate findings are supported by the record. (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz

(2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 268.) 

We have reviewed Offerman's remaining contentions and we conclude he 

has not shown error.

The judgments are affirmed. Each party is to bear their own costs.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P.J.

We concur:

YEGAN, J.

PERREN, J.
7.

JoAnn Johnson, Commissioner

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Donald Offerman, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

No appearance for Defendants and Respondents.