IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

KEVIN A. WALKER,

Defendant Below, 

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF DELAWARE,

Plaintiff Below, 

Appellee.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 183, 2018

Court Below: Superior Court of 

the State of Delaware

I.D. No. 1607007865 (K)

Submitted: December 6, 2018

Decided: February 21, 2019

Before VAUGHN, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices.

Upon appeal from the Superior Court. REVERSED.

Stephanie Blaisdell, Esquire, Assistant Public Defender, Dover, Delaware, for 

Appellant, Kevin A. Walker.

John Williams, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Dover, Delaware, for Appellee, 

State of Delaware.

VAUGHN, Justice:
1

I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant, Kevin A. Walker, appeals from a Superior Court order finding that 

he violated the terms of his probation. The issue we address is whether evidence 

seized as a result of an unlawful administrative search of Walker’s residence should 

have been suppressed from use as evidence at his violation of probation hearing.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Walker began probation on May 10, 2017, as a result of a felony drivingunder-the-influence conviction. On June 1, 2017, the State received a tip from a 

past-proven reliable informant that Walker had heroin in his home that he planned 

to distribute. On June 5, 2017, Delaware probation officers conducted an 

administrative search of Walker’s residence pursuant to an administrative warrant. 

Administrative warrants and searches are authorized by 11 Del. C. § 4321(d), which 

permits the State to conduct administrative searches of probationers that are “in 

accordance with Department [of Correction] procedures.” The Department of 

Correction promulgated Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19 (“Procedure 7.19”), 

which sets out the procedural requirements for conducting administrative searches.1

During the search, probation officers discovered 252 bags of heroin, drug 

paraphernalia, and a locked safe. The officers took the safe to Delaware State 

 

1

See Culver v. State, 956 A.2d 5, 10-11 (Del. 2008) (en banc) (discussing the requirements of 

Procedure 7.19).
2

Police Troop 3. After the officers opened the safe there, they found a loaded 9mm 

handgun, five doses of Suboxone,2and five grams of marijuana. The Delaware 

State Police then arrested Walker and took him to the Sussex Correctional Institution 

(“SCI”). At SCI, correctional officers found 86 bags of heroin and nine grams of 

crack cocaine inside Walker’s rectum.

In the criminal proceeding based on the new charges, Walker filed a motion 

to suppress all the evidence found as a result the administrative search, claiming that 

the search was not conducted in accordance with the provisions of 11 Del. C. § 

4321(d) and Procedure 7.19. At the suppression hearing, the Superior Court, 

guided by our decision in Culver v. State,

3

analyzed the four factors that the 

probation officer and the officer’s supervisor were required to consider under 

Procedure 7.19 before making the decision to conduct the administrative search. In 

Culver, we explained that Procedure 7.19 requires the following:

The officer and supervisor will hold a case conference . . . . 

During the case conference the supervisor will review the 

“Yes” or “No” responses of the officer to the following 

search decision factors:

(1) Sufficient reason to believe the offender 

possesses contraband.

 

2 Suboxone is a prescription medication used to treat opiate and opioid addiction but is also 

frequently itself abused for its narcotic effects.

3

956 A.2d 5.
3

(2) Sufficient reason to believe the offender 

is in violation of probation/parole.

(3) Information from a reliable informant, 

indicating offender possesses contraband or 

is violating the law.

(4) Information from the informant is 

corroborated.4

Where an informant is involved, Procedure 7.19 also requires the officers to consider 

the detail of the information received from the informant, the consistency of the 

information, the reliability of the informant in the past, and any reasons why the 

informant would supply the information.5

After considering these factors, the Superior Court concluded that the 

administrative warrant failed to satisfy Procedure 7.19. In particular, it found there 

was a lack of detail concerning the informant’s tip and that no effort was made at all 

to corroborate the tip or consider the reason why the informant was supplying 

information. The court concluded that “there was no attempt to comply with these 

basic aspects of the probation procedures.” 6 Accordingly, the court held that 

suppression of evidence in the criminal case was an appropriate remedy for the

violation of 11 Del. C. § 4321(d). The State did not appeal the suppression order. 

 

4

Id. at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted).

5

Id.

6 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A33.
4

Instead, the State dismissed the criminal action against Walker but continued to 

pursue a violation of probation (“VOP”).

The Superior Court then held a contested VOP hearing. Applying the 

balancing test from Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott,

7

the court 

held that “the exclusionary rule does not apply in violation of probation proceedings, 

even when the illegal search was a result of an administrative warrant issued and 

executed by probation officials.”8 The court accordingly denied Walker’s motion 

to suppress the evidence from his VOP proceeding. Walker was then found to have 

violated his probation, his probation was revoked, and he was resentenced. This 

appeal followed.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the Superior Court’s revocation of a defendant’s probation for an 

abuse of discretion. 9 We review questions of law and alleged constitutional 

violations de novo.

10

IV. DISCUSSION

Walker contends that the evidence seized as a result of the administrative 

search should have been suppressed under both the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 

 

7

524 U.S. 357 (1998).

8

State v. Walker, 177 A.3d 1235, 1236 (Del. Super. 2018), available at Appellant’s Opening Br. 

Ex. A.

9 Thompson v. State, 192 A.3d 544, 549 (Del. 2018).

10 Zebroski v. State, 12 A.3d 1115, 1119 (Del. 2010) (en banc).
5

Constitution and Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution. Recently, in 

Thompson v. State, we recognized that the overwhelming weight of federal authority 

holds that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment does not apply in VOP

proceedings.11 Our ruling in Thompson disposes of Walker’s federal claim.12

In Culver, this Court was confronted with a statutory violation of 11 Del. C. 

§ 4321(d) in a criminal proceeding.13 We concluded that “[w]ithout reasonable 

suspicion determined in compliance with [the probation officers’] duties under 

Procedure 7.19, the unlawfully seized evidence . . . should have been suppressed.”14 

“To hold otherwise,” we reasoned, “would render 11 Del. C. § 4321 and the 

regulations promulgated under it meaningless.”15 This decision was not based on 

any constitutional basis. As stated in a footnote, “[b]ecause we find that probation 

officers violated their clear statutory mandate, we do not reach any constitutional 

questions.”16 The suppression of evidence based on violation of a statute enforces

the public policy embodied by the statute and promotes the proper and orderly 

administration of justice.17 Culver is consistent with other cases from this Court 

 

11 192 A.3d at 551-552.

12 See id. at 552 (“We have no reason not to follow what appears to be the entirety of the federal 

weight of authority, and hold that the exclusionary rule does not apply to probation revocation 

proceedings under Amendments IV and XIV of the Federal Constitution.”).

13 956 A.2d at 10-11.

14 Id. at 15.

15 Id. at 7.

16 Id. at 7 n.1.

17 See Webster v. State, 213 A.2d 298, 301 (Del. 1965) (“[T]he exclusionary rule with which we 

deal here [for an alleged statutory violation] is a rule of evidence, adopted by the courts as an 
6

where evidence has been suppressed based upon a statutory, rather than a 

constitutional, violation.

18

Here, we are confronted with a statutory violation of 11 Del. C. § 4321(d) in 

a VOP proceeding. We have frequently recognized that the rights of probationers 

are curtailed as compared to the rights of ordinary citizens. 19 We have also 

recognized that probation officers are not required to “satisfy each technical 

requirement of the search and seizure regulations of the Department of Correction” 

for a search to be reasonable.20 In this case, however, the Superior Court found that 

“there was no attempt to comply with . . . basic aspects of the probation 

procedures,”21 a finding we accept and which has not been challenged. Because

there was no attempt to comply with basic aspects of the probation procedure, we 

think that the proper and orderly administration of justice calls for suppression, 

under the statute-based rule enunciated in Culver,

22 of the evidence seized in the 

 

instrument to implement the proper administration of criminal justice; and it does not stand upon

constitutional grounds.”).

18 See Vorhauer v. State, 212 A.2d 886, 892 (Del. 1965) (applying an exclusionary rule based on 

a violation of a statute requiring the defendant to be presented to a magistrate within twenty-four 

hours of detention and finding that incriminating statements made after the expiration of that 

twenty-four-hour period should have been suppressed in a criminal proceeding); see also Wright 

v. State, 633 A.2d 329, 334-35 (Del. 1993) (en banc) (applying the exclusionary rule from 

Vorhauer but finding no statutory violation); Hanna v. State, 591 A.2d 158, 162-64 (Del. 1991) 

(explaining that a failure to comply with 11 Del. C. § 2308, which sets the requirements for a 

nighttime search, is alone sufficient for the evidence to be excluded under the statutory-based 

exclusionary rule even if there was no constitutional violation).

19 E.g., Donald v. State, 903 A.2d 315, 318-19 (Del. 2006) (en banc).

20 Id. at 319.

21 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A33.

22 956 A.2d at 7 n.1, 10-15.
7

unlawful administrative search. We therefore find it unnecessary to consider 

Walker’s claim under Article I, § 6 of the Delaware constitution.23

Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court is reversed.

 

23 Id. at 7 n.1 (“We address any statutory violation before reaching questions under the United 

States and Delaware Constitutions.”).