alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of the Arbitration between Erie Insurance Company, Respondent, and Traci A. Calandra, Appellant.

[856 NYS2d 325]

*1238Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this proceeding seeking a permanent stay of arbitration and a determination that it does not owe any uninsured motorist benefits to respondent, a patrol officer who was injured while responding to a call with the lights and sirens on her patrol vehicle activated. Respondent lost control of her patrol vehicle on the expressway while attempting to avoid a collision with an unidentified vehicle that had entered the expressway in front of her patrol vehicle, but it is undisputed that the unidentified vehicle did not make contact with respondent’s patrol vehicle. Petitioner denied coverage based on the lack of physical contact with the unidentified vehicle, whereupon respondent sought arbitration on the issue of her entitlement to uninsured motorist benefits.

Supreme Court properly granted the petition. Although respondent concedes that the insurance policy requires physical contact *(see*Insurance Law § 5217), she nevertheless seeks to expand the meaning of that term to include circumstances such as those presented in this case. Respondent contends that there should be coverage even in the absence of actual physical contact because she is able to establish through the affidavits of two disinterested eyewitnesses that an unidentified vehicle forced her to take evasive action to avoid the collision, thereby causing her to sustain injuries. We reject respondent’s contention. “ ‘[P]hysical contact’ occurs within the meaning of [Insurance Law § 5217] when the accident originates in collision with an unidentified vehicle, or an integral part of an unidentified vehicle” *(Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Killakey,*78 NY2d 325, 329 [1991]), and the Court of Appeals has consistently held that there must be some physical contact with the unidentified vehicle *(see id.*at 327-329; *Matter of Smith [Great Am. Ins. Co.],*29 NY2d 116, 118-121 [1971]; *Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Eisenberg,*18 NY2d 1, 4-5 [1966]). “The goal is to accord every *1239liberal extension to the remedial statute but not to the point of judicially removing the meaning and frustrating the purpose of limiting language deliberately inserted into the statute” *(Smith,*29 NY2d at 121-122).

We reject the further contention of respondent that petitioner waived its right to deny coverage based on its delay in doing so. “[P]hysical contact goes to coverage, rather than exclusion, . . . [and n]o coverage exists in the absence of the required contact” *(Matter of Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v Hobson,*67 NY2d 19, 21 [1986]; *see generally Matter of Worcester Ins. Co. v Bettenhauser,*95 NY2d 185, 188-190 [2000]). Inasmuch as there is no coverage here, it cannot be said that petitioner waived the right to deny coverage *(see generally Albert J. Schiff Assoc. v Flack,*51 NY2d 692, 698-699 [1980]). Present—Scudder, P.J., Hurlbutt, Lunn, Pine and Gorski, JJ.
<PAGE>




                                                                           99.2

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Amended Annual Report of Impreso, Inc. (the "Company"),
on Form 10-K /A for the period ending August 31, 2002, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Susan
Atkins, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date:   April 2, 2003                  Signature: /s/ Susan M. Atkins
        -------------                             --------------------------
                                                  Susan M. Atkins
                                                  Chief Financial Officer
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 939

To amend title 18, United States Code, to punish persons who use false 

or misleading domain names to attract children to Internet sites not 

appropriate for children. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 26, 2003

Mr. PENCE introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on the Judiciary 

A BILL

To amend title 18, United States Code, to punish persons 

who use false or misleading domain names to attract 

children to Internet sites not appropriate for children.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Truth in Domain 

5 Names Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. MISLEADING DOMAIN NAMES ON THE INTERNET. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 110 of title 18, United 

8 States Code, is amended by inserting after section 2252A 

9 the following: 
2

•HR 939 IH 

1 ‘‘§ 2252B. Misleading domain names on the Internet 

2 ‘‘Whoever knowingly uses a misleading domain name 

3 with the intent to attract a minor into viewing a visual 

4 depiction of sexually explicit conduct on the Internet shall 

5 be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 2 

6 years, or both. For the purposes of this section, a domain 

7 name that includes the word ‘sex’ is not misleading.’’. 

8 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections 

9 at the beginning of chapter 110 of title 18, United States 

10 Code, is amended by inserting after the time relating to 

11 section 2252A the following new item:

‘‘2252B. False or misleading domain names on the Internet.’’.

Æ
#### Kenn GOLDBLATT, Pro Se and as ADAAA Advocate for Barbara J. Baillie, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James DOERTY, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Assistant Presiding Judge of the King County Superior Court, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 11-35720.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 19, 2012.*

Filed Jan. 3, 2013.

Kenn Goldblatt, Fort Worth, TX, pro se.

Janine Elizabeth Joly, Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Kenn Goldblatt appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims for violations of his due process and equal protection rights, and for failure to accommodate under the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp.,*358 F.3d 616, 619 (9th Cir.2004), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Goldblatt’s claims regarding defendant’s alleged denial of ADA accommodations because they arose out of defendant’s rulings in his capacity as a judge presiding over a state court family law proceeding, and, therefore, were barred by absolute judicial immunity. *See Duvall v. County of Kitsap,*260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir.2001) (listing factors for determining whether an act is judicial in nature and explaining that a judge in marital dissolution proceedings was absolutely immune from claims related to orders denying a litigant ADA accommodations); *see also Stump v. Sparkman,*435 U.S. 349, 356-58, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (judges are immune *538from suit for actions within their jurisdiction even if proceedings are marred by grave errors or lack of due process).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Goldblatt’s motion for a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment because Goldblatt failed to establish grounds for such relief. *See Sch. Dist. No. U, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc.,*5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir.1993) (setting forth standard of review and discussing factors for reconsideration or relief from judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) and 60(b)).

Goldblatt’s contentions concerning the merits of his claims are rejected.

We do not address issues that are raised for the first time on appeal. *See Brown v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Cal.,*108 F.3d 208, 210, n. 1 (9th Cir.1997). Goldblatt’s motion to supplement the record is granted.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 614 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 614

 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow a credit against 
      income tax to professional school personnel in grades K-12.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 5, 2003

 Mr. Paul (for himself and Mr. Bachus) introduced the following bill; 
         which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow a credit against 
      income tax to professional school personnel in grades K-12.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Professional Educators Tax Relief 
Act of 2003''.

SEC. 2. TAX CREDIT FOR PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL PERSONNEL IN GRADES K-12.

    (a) In General.--Subpart A of part IV of subchapter A of chapter 1 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to nonrefundable 
personal credits) is amended by inserting after section 25B the 
following new section:

``SEC. 25C. PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL PERSONNEL IN GRADES K-12.

    ``(a) Allowance of Credit.--In the case of an eligible individual, 
there shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed by this 
chapter for the taxable year the amount of $1,000.
    ``(b) Eligible Individual.--For purposes of this section, the term 
`eligible individual' means any individual--
            ``(1) who is employed--
                    ``(A) on a full-time basis or in another capacity 
                (including librarians) in any of the grades 
                kindergarten through grade 12, or
                    ``(B) in a position which involves regular contact 
                with students in any of such grades, and
            ``(2) whose position involves the formulation or 
        implementation of the academic program for any of the grades 
        kindergarten through 12.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for such subpart A 
is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 25B the 
following new item:

                              ``Sec. 25C. Professional school personnel 
                                        in grades K-12.''.
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to taxable years beginning after the date of the enactment of 
this Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### In the Matter of Shawn Carter, Appellant, v Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, Respondent.

[852 NYS2d 915]

*1170Memorandum: Petitioner, allegedly the victim of a hit-and-run accident, appeals from an order denying his application for an order permitting him to commence an action against respondent pursuant to Insurance Law § 5218. We agree with petitioner that, by the affidavit of his attorney, he established the applicability of the presumption that he delivered the requisite notice of claim to respondent by mail *(see Nassau Ins. Co. v Murray,*46 NY2d 828, 829 [1978]; *see generally*Insurance Law §§ 5208, 5218 [b] [1]), and that respondent failed to rebut that presumption *(see Nassau Ins. Co.,*46 NY2d at 829-830). We further agree with petitioner that, on the record before us, Supreme Court erred in denying his application without conducting a hearing pursuant to Insurance Law § 5218 (b) to enable him to establish that he made “all reasonable efforts ... to ascertain the identity of the motor vehicle and of the owner and operator” (§ 5218 [b] [5]; *see Matter of O’Rourke v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp.,*29 AD2d 938 [1968]; *Matter of Malitz v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp.,*17 AD2d 108 [1962]). We therefore reverse the order and remit the matter to Supreme Court for a hearing pursuant to Insurance Law § 5218 (b) (5). Present—Smith, J.P., Lunn, Peradotto, Green and Pine, JJ.
#### Jose Alfredo JIMENEZ-CHIRINOS, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 11-72872.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 19, 2012.*

Filed Dec. 21, 2012.

Maziar Razi, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner.

Thomas Fatouros, Esquire, Senior Litigation Counsel, OIL, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jose Alfredo Jimenez-Chirinos, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, *Avagyan v. Holder,*646 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir.2011), and we deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Jimenez-Chirinos’ motion to reopen as untimely where he filed the motion eleven years after his final order of removal, *see 8*C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of final order), and failed to show the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, *see Avagyan,*646 F.3d at 679 (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud or error, and exercised due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
/Securities and Exchange Commission
Washington, D.C.
Statement of registered  closed-end investment company with respect to purchases
of its own securities pursuant to Rule N-23(c)-1 during the last calendar month.

Report for the calendar month ending November 30, 1998

MFS Government Markets Income Trust
Date        Identification   Shares RepurchaseRepurchase       NAV       Broker
            of Security                       Price
11/11/98    Shares of        29,500           6.625            7.45      Merrill
            Beneficial                                                   Lynch
            Interest
11/12/98    Shares of        50,000           6.625            7.42      Merrill
            Beneficial                                                   Lynch
            Interest


Total Shares Repurchased:   79,500
Remarks: None.

MFS Government Markets Income Trust
by:  W. Thomas London
         W. Thomas London
         Treasurer
Exhibit 32.1



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Soyo Group, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-K for the period  ended  December 31, 2004 as filed with the  Securities  and
Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  the  undersigned,  Ming
Tung Chok,  Chief  Executive  Officer of the Company  certifies,  pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section  13a-14(b) or
15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



 /s/ Ming Tung Chok
-----------------------
Ming Tung Chok
Chief Executive Officer
March 31, 2005
EX-4.68



 Exhibit 4.68 
 English Translation 
 Spousal Consent Letter 

I, the undersigned (ID No:                     ), as
the legal spouse of                      (ID No:
                    ), hereby unconditionally agree that the equity interests of Shenzhen 7 Road Technology Co., Ltd., owned by and registered under
name of my spouse, is disposed in accordance with the arrangements under Equity Interest Purchase Right Agreement, Equity Interest Pledge Agreement, Business Operation Agreement dated as of 26 June, 2012 and other supplementary agreements to be
signed from time to time. 
 I further guarantee not to take any action at any time with an intention conflicting against the above-identified
arrangements, including making a claim to court or other competent authorities that such equity interests constitute the property or community property between my spouse and me. I, unconditionally and irrevocably, hereby waive any and all rights or
benefits and my share of any community property between my spouse and me with relation to such equity interests under applicable laws. 
  

			
	Name of the Spouse:	 	  

		
	 ID No:
	 	
	 Date:
#### In the Matter of Roland Smith, Petitioner, v Brian Fischer, as Commissioner of New York State Department of Correctional Services, Respondent.

[852 NYS2d 912]

Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 seeking to annul the determination that he violated various inmate rules. The misbehavior report, authored by the laundry supervisor, established that petitioner gesticulated wildly and shouted profanities at her when she accused him of stealing and, contrary to petitioner’s contention, the misbehavior report constitutes substantial evidence supporting the determination finding that he created a disturbance in violation of inmate rule 104.13 (7 NYCRR 270.2 [B] [5] [iv]; *see generally People ex rel. Vega v*Smith, 66 NY2d 130, 140 [1985]).

As respondent correctly concedes, however, the determination finding that petitioner violated the remaining inmate rules set forth in the misbehavior report is not supported by substantial evidence. We therefore modify the determination and grant the petition in part by annulling those parts of the determination finding that petitioner violated those inmate rules, and respondent is directed to expunge from petitioner’s institutional record all references to the violations of those rules.

*1174Because we are annulling that part of the determination finding that petitioner stole property in violation of inmate rule 116.10 (7 NYCRR 270.2 [B] [17] [i]), we further modify the determination by vacating that part of the penalty imposing restitution for the stolen property in the amount of $96, and respondent is further directed to refund to petitioner’s inmate account any restitution paid. In view of the fact that petitioner has served the remainder of the penalty imposed and no loss of good time was imposed, there is no need to remit the matter to respondent for reconsideration of the remainder of the penalty imposed *(see Matter of Maybanks v Goord,*306 AD2d 839, 840 [2003]). Present—Hurlbutt, J.P., Centra, Fahey, Peradotto and Pine, JJ.
EXHIBIT 31.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, R. B.Harris, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Sales Strategies, Inc.;

2.  Based on my  knowledge,  this  annual  report  does not  contain  any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact  necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the  circumstances  under which such statements
were made,  not  misleading  with  respect to the period  covered by this annual
report;

3.  Based  on my  knowledge,  the  financial  statements,  and  other  financial
information  included  in this annual  report,  fairly  present in all  material
respects the financial  condition,  results of operations  and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

4.  The  registrant's  other  certifying  officers  and  I are  responsible  for
establishing and maintaining  disclosure  controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and we have:

a) designed  such  disclosure  controls and  procedures  to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries,
is made known to us by others  within those  entities,  particularly  during the
period in which this annual report is being prepared;

b) evaluated  the  effectiveness  of the  registrant's  disclosure  controls and
procedures  as of a date  within 90 days prior to the filing date of this annual
report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

c) presented in this annual report our conclusions  about the  effectiveness  of
the  disclosure  controls  and  procedures  based  on our  evaluation  as of the
Evaluation Date;

5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation,  to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of
registrant's board of directors:

a) all significant  deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls
which  could  adversely  affect the  registrant's  ability  to record,  process,
summarize and report  financial data and have  identified  for the  registrant's
auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

b) any  fraud,  whether  or not  material,  that  involves  management  or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls; and

6. The  registrant's  other  certifying  officers  and I have  indicated in this
annual report whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls
or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent
to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with
regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.

Date: September 22, 2003                 /s/ R. B. Harris
                                         ------------------------
                                         R. B. Harris
                                         President/ CEO/Director