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NOT FOR PUBLICATION [Docket Nos. 484, 496, 497 & 499] 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

CAMDEN VICINAGE

FINANCIAL CASUALTY & SURETY, 

INC., 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

JOHN BONINO and 007 BAIL BONDS, 

INC., 

 Defendants. 

 

Civil No. 11-4316 (RMB/JS)

OPINION 

Appearances: 

Samuel M. Silver 

2050 Route 27, Suite 105 

North Brunswick, NJ 08902 

 Attorneys for Plaintiff 

Joseph Liguori 

Mazraani & Liguori, LLP 

1901 Route 130 

Second Floor 

North Brunswick, NJ 08902 

 

Ksenia Proskurchenko 

Proskurchenko Law Group, LLC 

570 North Broad Street, Suite 13 

Elizabeth, NJ 07208 

 Attorneys for Defendants John Bonino and 007 Bail Bonds 

BUMB, United States District Judge: 

I. Introduction 

 This matter comes before the Court upon the post-trial 

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motion by Defendants John Bonino and 007 Bail Bonds (the 

“Defendants”) [Docket No. 484] and the supplemental briefing of 

the parties, including Plaintiff Financial Casualty & Surety, 

Inc. (“FCS” or the “Plaintiff”), addressing whether the jury’s 

verdict and damage awards may be reconciled or whether a new 

trial is warranted [Docket Nos. 496 & 499], as well as 

Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss its action against 007 Bail Bonds. 

[Docket No. 497]. 

 In its September 3, 2015 Opinion [Docket No. 493], this 

Court requested further briefing, in addition to the submission 

of appropriate record citations where applicable, addressing 

whether the jury’s answers in the verdict are irreconcilable 

such that a new trial is warranted. The parties each submitted 

supplemental briefs in support of their respective positions. 

[Docket Nos. 496 & 499]. FCS also moved to dismiss its action 

against 007 Bail Bonds only. [Docket No. 497]. Based on the 

record now before it, this Court will discuss the resolution of 

these issues below. 

II. Motion to Dismiss Defendant 007 Bail Bonds Only 

 In the face of potentially inconsistent jury verdicts, the 

Plaintiff seeks a Court Order dismissing its action against 

Defendant 007 Bail Bonds only under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 41(a)(2). 

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 Under Rule 41(a)(2), a court may dismiss an action at the 

plaintiff’s request “on terms that the court considers proper.” 

The “decision to allow voluntary dismissal is left to the sound 

discretion of the district court. That said, Rule 41 motions 

should be allowed unless the defendant will suffer some 

prejudice other than the mere prospect of a second lawsuit.” 

Hayden v. Westfield Ins. Co., 586 F. App’x 835, 842 (3d Cir. 

2014) (internal citations, quotations, and modifications 

omitted); see also Baldinger v. Cronin, 535 F. App’x 78, 80 (3d 

Cir. 2013) (“A plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal under Rule 

41(a)(2) requires court approval, though the general rule 

provides that such a motion should be granted liberally.”). 

 Courts in the Third Circuit consider various factors in 

ruling on a Rule 41(a)(2) motion to dismiss, including: 

(1) the plaintiff’s diligence in moving to dismiss; 

(2) any undue vexatiousness on the plaintiff’s part; 

(3) the extent to which the pending litigation has 

progressed; 

(4) the effort and expense incurred by the defendant in 

preparing for trial; 

(5) any excessive and duplicative expense of relitigation; and 

(6) the adequacy of the plaintiff’s explanation for the 

need to dismiss. 

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See, e.g., Hayden v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2013 WL 5781121, at *2 

(W.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2013) aff’d, 586 F. App’x 835 (3d Cir. 2014); 

Lombarski v. Cape May Cnty., 2011 WL 1322910, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 

5, 2011); Pappas v. Twp. of Galloway, 565 F. Supp. 2d 581, 594 

(D.N.J. 2008). 

 “Chief among the factors to consider in determining whether 

a defendant will suffer prejudice are the extent to which 

litigation has progressed and the extent to which the defendant 

will be exposed to new litigation in another forum.” Hayden, 

586 F. App’x at 842 (affirming district court’s denial of Rule 

41(a)(2) motion to dismiss brought “seventeen months after the 

start of litigation and six months after the close of discovery” 

and for the purpose of “litigat[ing] against [defendant] in 

state court”); see also Ferguson v. Eakle, 492 F.2d 26, 29 (3d 

Cir. 1974) (holding that district court abused its discretion in 

granting plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss defendants since the 

motion was filed “[f]ourteen months after they became defendants 

in one case . . . and at least two months after they had 

expected that all discovery had been completed.”). 

 007 Bail Bonds has been a defendant in this litigation 

since it was first initiated, on January 12, 2011, nearly four 

years ago. Defendants 007 Bail Bonds and John Bonino have 

engaged in extensive motion practice over the course of these 

four years, presumably incurring significant effort and expense. 

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The litigation is in its final stages. The jury trial in this 

litigation has long since been completed. In fact, the jury 

verdict that is the subject of the dispute presently before the 

Court was rendered nearly one and a half years ago. Given all 

of this, it cannot be said that the Plaintiff has been diligent 

in moving to dismiss 007 Bail Bonds. 

 Rather, FCS seeks to dismiss its action against 007 Bail 

Bonds specifically to encourage the Court to deny Defendants’ 

motion for a new trial. See Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief 

[Docket No. 499] at ¶ 1 (“FCS has filed a Motion to Dismiss 007 

from this lawsuit (Doc. No. 497) and has elected to proceed to 

judgment against Bonino only. The jury’s verdict with respect 

to Bonino only contains no inconsistencies, thus obviating the 

need for a new trial.”); id. at ¶ 3 (“To the extent the Court 

finds difficulty in rendering judgment based on the verdict as 

to Bonino and 007, that conflict has been mooted given FCS has 

abandoned its claims against 007.”). The Plaintiff only seeks 

dismissal to “kill two birds with one stone.” See Hayden, 586 

F. App’x at 843; Ferguson, 492 F.2d at 29. The Court finds this 

explanation for dismissal inadequate. 

 In light of the above, this Court will deny Plaintiff’s 

motion to dismiss its action against 007 Bail Bonds. 

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III. Inconsistent Verdict and Motion for New Trial 

 “[A] court may order a new trial based on inconsistent 

verdicts only if ‘no rational jury could have brought back the 

verdicts that were returned.’” Monaco v. Camden, 366 F. App’x 

330, 332 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 

732, 739 (7th Cir. 2006)). Establishing this is no easy feat. 

The Third Circuit has made clear that district courts are “under 

a constitutional mandate to search for a view of the case that 

makes the jury’s answers consistent.” Citizens Fin. Grp., Inc. 

v. Citizens Nat. Bank of Evans City, 383 F.3d 110, 124 (3d Cir. 

2004). 

 Accordingly, if there is “any view of the case which 

reconciles the various answers,” this Court must construe the 

jury’s verdict in accordance with that view and deny a new 

trial. Id. at 124 (emphasis in original) (quoting McAdam v. 

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 896 F.2d 750, 763 (3d Cir. 1990)). 

See also Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 119 

(1963) (“Where there is a view of the case that makes the jury’s 

answers to special interrogatories consistent, they must be 

resolved that way.”); Kinnel v. Mid-Atl. Mausoleums, Inc., 850 

F.2d 958, 965 (3d Cir. 1988) (“We, therefore, must attempt to 

reconcile the jury’s findings, by exegesis if necessary, . . . 

before we are free to disregard the jury’s special verdict and 

remand the case for a new trial.”). 

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 Courts across the country routinely reconcile jury verdicts 

and damage awards that appear inconsistent at first glance by 

applying the well-established principle against double 

recoveries. For example, in Associated Business Telephone 

Systems Corp. v. Dalia, 729 F. Supp. 1488, 1507-08 (D.N.J. 

1990), aff’d 919 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1990), the district court 

reconciled a verdict where the jury awarded compensatory damages 

against a corporation, but awarded only punitive damages against 

that corporation’s officers, reasoning that the jury “had an 

obvious desire to prevent a double recovery.” Id. at 1508. 

This Court directed the parties to address whether the logic in 

Dalia should apply in the present case. 

 The Defendants have failed to meaningfully distinguish 

Dalia from the case at bar. The Court is convinced that, as in 

Dalia, the jury only awarded damages against Bonino, despite 

finding both Bonino and 007 Bail Bonds liable, in an effort to 

prevent a double recovery by FCS. In fact, the jury was 

instructed as to the proper measure of compensatory damages for 

breach of contract, which does not allow for double recovery, 

but rather is “designed under the law to place the injured party 

in as good a monetary position as it would have enjoyed if the 

contract had been performed as promised.” Instruction No. 17. 

 Furthermore, the jury verdict form requested that the jury 

determine Bonino’s liability and the amount of damages to be 

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assessed against him first, before addressing the liability of 

and damages against 007 Bail Bonds. [Docket No. 450]. “By the 

time they filled out the first line, [the jury] had accounted 

for all the compensatory damages. The jury was not specifically 

instructed on joint and several liability, but that was their 

intent.” Dalia, 729 F. Supp. at 1508. 

 Several other courts have reconciled jury verdicts using 

the same reasoning. The Fifth Circuit in Holt Oil & Gas Corp. 

v. Harvey, 801 F.2d 773, 781 (5th Cir. 1986) held that it had 

“no difficulty reconciling the jury’s verdict” finding the 

defendant liable under two theories of recovery, but awarding 

damages only under one theory. The Holt court explained, “[t]he 

jury might well have concluded that [the plaintiff] would 

unjustifiably receive a double recovery if damages were awarded 

under both theories of recovery.” Id. See also Cutaia v. 

Radius Eng’g Int’l, Inc., 2014 WL 3359368, at *3 (W.D. Va. July 

9, 2014) (holding that Holt’s “reasoning applies equally to the 

jury’s decision in this case. As such, the court will harmonize 

the jury’s verdict by entering judgment for $1,762,087.40 on the 

breach of contract claim only[, which] will fully compensate 

Cutaia for the damages he sustained.”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. 

Michael Kent Plambeck, D.C., 2014 WL 1303000, at *7 (N.D. Tex. 

Mar. 31, 2014) aff’d sub nom. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Plambeck, 

2015 WL 5472433 (5th Cir. Sept. 17, 2015) (relying on Holt and 

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rule against double recovery to reconcile jury damage award on 

RICO claims, but not on fraud and unjust enrichment claims, 

despite finding liability based on all three theories). 

 In Zwerin v. Maccabees Mutual Life Insurance Co., 111 F.3d 

140 (Table), 1997 WL 191490, at *5 (10th Cir. 1997), the Tenth 

Circuit affirmed a district court’s order reconciling a jury’s 

verdict, which awarded the full amount requested by the 

plaintiffs under one theory of recovery only, despite finding 

the defendant liable under two theories. The district court 

found that “the jury had simply followed its admonition not to 

duplicate damages.” Id. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, noting 

that the district court’s reasoning was “coherent, logical, and 

consistent with the instructions.” Id. Here, too, the jury’s 

verdict suggests that it intended to award compensatory damages 

in accordance with the instructions it received and prevent 

double recovery by FCS, as contemplated by Instruction No. 17. 

 Additionally, the jury was instructed that “[a] 

corporation, like 007 Bail Bonds, is a creature of legal fiction 

which can act only through its officers, directors and other 

agents, and acts of a corporate agent which are performed within 

the scope of his authority are binding upon the corporate 

principal.” Instruction No. 12. Bonino testified at trial that 

he was the “owner of 007 Bail Bonds.” Trial Transcript [Docket 

No. 496-1] at 689:15-17. He also testified that the 

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recognizance documents generally listed Bonino as the agent 

“because I was at that time the only one working for my 

company.” Id. at 729:20-23. Consistent with the instruction 

and Defendant Bonino’s testimony as to his relationship to 007 

Bail Bonds, “the jury acted as if the acts of [Bonino] and the 

acts of the corporation [007 Bail Bonds] were one and the same.” 

Dalia, 729 F. Supp. at 1508. This Court finds that the jury 

“acted under the belief that an award against [Bonino] 

functioned as an award against [007 Bail Bonds]” and, therefore, 

any inconsistency in the jury’s damage awards is “one of form, 

not of substance.” Id. 

IV. Conclusion 

 For the reasons set forth above, the Court holds that the 

jury’s answers are not inconsistent and that a new trial is not 

warranted. Judgment will be entered against both Defendant 

Bonino and Defendant 007 Bail Bonds, but damages will be awarded 

only against Defendant Bonino, consistent with the jury’s 

verdict. An appropriate Order will issue. 

 The Court has scoured the burdensome and protracted record 

and docket and has determined that this Opinion and accompanying 

Order finally resolve all claims with respect to all parties 

presently before the Court. See, e.g., Order dated November 18, 

2014 [Docket No. 478] (granting BGM Defendants’ motion to 

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dismiss all remaining cross-claims and Plaintiff’s motion to 

dismiss counterclaim); Joint Final Pretrial Order [Docket No. 

367] at 36-37 (defining legal issues of the case for trial, 

which do not include any counterclaims or cross-claims); see 

also Barista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 85 (3d Cir. 1965) (“It is, of 

course, established law that a pretrial order when entered 

limits the issues for trial and in substance takes the place of 

the pleadings covered by the pretrial order.”); AstraZeneca LP 

v. Breath Ltd., 2013 WL 2404167, at *6 (D.N.J. May 31, 2013) 

(“The final pretrial order controls the course of the action 

unless the court modifies it . . . ; it effectively supersedes 

the pleadings and defines the issues for trial.”) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). 

 Notwithstanding the foregoing, the parties shall have the 

opportunity to advise the Court within ten days as to whether 

there are any outstanding claims not yet adjudicated by the 

Court. Should no unresolved claims be brought to the Court’s 

attention within ten days, the Court shall issue its final 

judgment and direct the Clerk of the Court to close this matter. 

s/Renée Marie Bumb 

RENÉE MARIE BUMB 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: October 22, 2015 

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