J-S57023-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ERIC GALTON DANIELS

Appellant No. 624 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence imposed April 12, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Criminal Division at No: CP-67-CR-0000618-2018

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J. AND MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 31, 2019

Appellant, Eric Galton Daniels, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed on April 12, 2019 in the Court of Common Pleas of York County 

following his conviction of the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent 

to deliver marijuana (“PWID”) and possession of drug paraphernalia. 

Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress 

because the search warrant was not supported by probable cause. Upon

review, we affirm.

The underlying facts of the case are not in dispute. Briefly, on October 

24, 2017, Trooper Clint Long of the Pennsylvania State Police filed an 

application for a warrant to search Appellant’s residence in Franklin Township. 

On that same day, a magisterial district judge approved the request and 

issued the warrant. Immediately thereafter, Trooper Long executed the 
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warrant. With Appellant’s cooperation, troopers searched his property and 

confiscated approximately 20 pounds of marijuana along with marijuanagrowing equipment. See Notes of Testimony, Suppression Hearing, 4/30/18, 

Exhibit 1 (Application for Search Warrant, Affidavit of Probable Cause, and 

Inventory).

Following his arrest, Appellant filed a motion to suppress, arguing the 

warrant was legally insufficient because, inter alia, it was based on information 

from an anonymous source and no further investigation was conducted to 

corroborate the anonymous source(s). Motion to Suppress, 4/2/18, at 3-4. 

Following a suppression hearing on April 30, 2018, the court denied 

Appellant’s motion. 

Appellant proceeded to a non-jury trial on February 28, 2019 and was 

found guilty of PWID and possession of drug paraphernalia. On April 12, 2019, 

the court imposed a five-year county intermediate punishment sentence for 

PWID and a standard range sentence of twelve months’ probation for 

possession of drug paraphernalia, concurrent with the sentence for PWID. 

This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Appellant asks us to consider one question:

I. Whether the honorable trial court erred in denying 

Appellant’s motion to suppress in that the search warrant 

was legally insufficient and was not supported by the 

required level of probable cause in that the information 

relied upon was provided by an anonymous source and 
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there was no further corroboration or investigation by the 

trooper?

Appellant’s Brief at 4. 

As this Court recently reiterated: 

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of 

a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the 

suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record 

and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are 

correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the 

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as 

a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may 

reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. The 

suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an 

appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression 

court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions 

of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary review.

Moreover, appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the 

evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining a 

ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress.

Commonwealth v. Harlan, 208 A.3d 497, 499 (Pa. Super 2019) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Freeman, 150 A.3d 32, 34–35 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(citation omitted)).

In his brief, Appellant summarizes his argument as follows:

The suppression court erred in not granting Appellant’s motion to 

suppress. Reviewing the four (4) corners of the warrant, the 

warrant as issued was legally deficient. The warrant was issued 

based upon an anonymous tip received by Trooper Long. Trooper 

Long did no further investigation and did not corroborate the 

information provided in the affidavit of probable cause. Since the 

tip was anonymous and there was insufficient corroboration, there 

was no indicia of reliability to support the issuance of the warrant. 
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There was no corroborating evidence set forth in the affidavit of 

probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant. 

Appellant’s Brief, Summary of Argument, at 7. 

In the argument section of his brief, Appellant focuses on the fact 

Trooper Long’s source was anonymous and contends that, looking at the four 

corners of the affidavit of probable cause, an anonymous tip “is not sufficient 

to elevate the anonymous source into a being a confidential informant or a 

named source, or someone providing information with any indicia of 

reliability.” Appellant’s Brief at 9. Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. 

Torres, 764 A.2d 532 (Pa. 2001), in support of his argument.1 However, 

Torres is factually distinguishable from the case before us. 

In Torres, our Supreme Court determined there was “no attempt made 

to establish either the basis of knowledge of the anonymous sources or their 

general veracity, a strong showing of the reliability of the information that 

they have relayed to the police in the specific case is required in order to 

support a finding of probable cause.” Id. at 540. In contrast, at the April 30, 

2018 suppression hearing, Trooper Long testified that on October 22, 2017, 

he received an anonymous tip indicating Appellant was cultivating and growing 

marijuana at his residence. The source provided a phone number and was 

subsequently contacted at that number, validating its reliability. The source 

____________________________________________

1 We note that Torres is the only case cited in the argument section of 

Appellant’s brief.
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also provided photographs depicting several plants hanging inside a shed as 

well as plants on a table, ready to be packaged and processed. The source 

advised that photographs were taken within 72 hours of being provided to 

Trooper Long. This information is documented in the affidavit of probable 

cause. Therefore, unlike in Torres, Trooper Long not only attempted, he also 

succeeded, in establishing the basis of the anonymous source’s knowledge 

and the source’s veracity as well as the reliability of the information provided.

In Harlan, we “emphasize[d] that ‘the totality of the circumstances’ set 

forth in the affidavit must be considered when examining whether probable 

cause supports the issuance of the search warrant.” Harlan, 208 A.3d at 505. 

We noted:

[T]he question of whether probable cause exists for the issuance 

of a search warrant must be answered according to the totality of 

the circumstances test articulated in Commonwealth v. Gray, 

509 Pa. 476, 503 A.2d 921 (1985), and its Pennsylvania progeny, 

which incorporates the reasoning of the United States Supreme 

Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 

L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). . . . The task of the magistrate acting as the 

issuing authority is to make a practical, common sense 

assessment of whether, given all the circumstances set forth in 

the affidavit, a fair probability exists that contraband or evidence 

of a crime will be found in a particular place. A search warrant is 

defective if the issuing authority has not been supplied with the 

necessary information. The chronology established by the 

affidavit of probable cause must be evaluated according to a 

common sense determination.

Further, probable cause is based on a finding of the probability, 

not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity, and deference is to 

be accorded a magistrate's finding of probable cause. We must 

limit our inquiry to the information within the four corners of the 

affidavit submitted in support of probable cause when determining 

whether the warrant was issued upon probable cause.
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Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Arthur, 62 A.3d 424, 432 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(quotation marks and some citations omitted)). 

In his Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant detailed his claims of error 

relating to the denial of the motion to suppress and insufficiency of the warrant 

application. See Rule 1925(b) Statement, 5/3/19, at ¶ 9(A)(1)(a)-(e) and 

(2)(a)-(f). The trial court addressed each claim of error in its Rule 1925(a) 

opinion, rejecting Appellant’s assertions regarding the unreliability of the 

source and the claimed lack of investigation and corroboration. See Rule 

1925(a) Opinion, 6/12/19 at 2-7. After noting the affidavit of probable cause 

included the exact address of the property and a full description of that 

property, along with information regarding Trooper Long’s substantial training 

and drug investigation experience, the court concluded that “considering all of 

the circumstances set forth in the Affidavit of Probable Cause while giving 

deference to the magistrate’s finding of probable cause, the issuing magistrate 

appropriately determined that probable cause existed for the issuance of the 

warrant.” Id. at 7. Based on our review, we find the trial court’s factual 

findings are supported by the record and its legal conclusions are free of error. 

Therefore, we shall not disturb its ruling.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/31/2019