Filed 1/28/22 Certified for Publication 2/24/22 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JUSTIN ASHLEY FLINT,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B310238

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. NA071779)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Gary J. Ferrari, Judge. Reversed.

Emry J. Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant. 

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Michael J. Wise, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________________
2

In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437

(2017−2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437), which, among other 

changes, restricted the application of the felony murder doctrine. 

Prior to the enactment of the law, if a defendant committed one of 

certain serious felonies in which an accomplice killed someone, the 

defendant was liable for first degree murder even if the killing was

inadvertent and unforeseeable. (1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal 

Law (4th ed. 2021) Crimes Against the Person, § 163; People v. 

Stamp (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 203, 210.) Under the new law, this is 

no longer the case. To obtain a conviction for felony murder, the 

prosecution must prove the defendant was the actual killer, acted 

with the intent to kill in aiding, abetting, counseling, or soliciting 

the killing, or was “a major participant in the underlying felony 

and acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, 

ch. 2015, § 3, p. 6675, enacting Pen. Code,1 § 189, subd. (e)(3).) The 

statute created a single exception to these requirements, for cases 

where “the victim is a peace officer who was killed while in the 

course of his or her duties, where the defendant knew or reasonably 

should have known that the victim was a peace officer engaged in 

the performance of his or her duties.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 2015, § 3, 

p. 6675, enacting § 189, subd. (f).) In such a case, the felony murder 

doctrine applies as it did before the enactment of Senate Bill 

No. 1437, with no requirement to show that the defendant was a 

major participant in the felony or acted with reckless indifference 

to human life. (People v. Hernandez (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 94, 

105-109 (Hernandez).)

Senate Bill No. 1437 also created a mechanism for defendants 

previously convicted of felony murder who “could not be convicted 

of first or second degree murder because of changes” in the law to

1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

petition to vacate their convictions and be resentenced. (Stats. 

2018, ch. 2015, § 4, p. 6676, enacting § 1170.95, subd. (a)(3).)2 

The Legislature included a provision to “streamline the process”

(People v. Ramirez (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 923, 932 (Ramirez)) for 

petitioners who are clearly eligible for resentencing. “If there was 

a prior finding by a court or jury that the petitioner did not act with 

reckless indifference to human life or was not a major participant 

in the felony, the court shall vacate the petitioner’s conviction and 

resentence the petitioner.” (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(2).) This provision

in section 1170.95 makes no reference to the peace officer exception.

Defendant and appellant Justin Ashley Flint was convicted 

of murder for his role in an attempted robbery in which his 

codefendant shot and killed Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 

Department Deputy Maria Cecilia Rosa. Flint and the Attorney 

General agree, as do we, that the trial court erred by denying Flint’s 

petition for resentencing under section 1170.95 at the first stage of

review, where a petitioner is required to make only a prima facie 

case of eligibility. Flint argues further that he is entitled to 

immediate resentencing under section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(2)

because the jury at his trial rejected a felony-murder special 

circumstance allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). According to 

Flint, by finding the allegation untrue, the jury implicitly found 

that he was not a major participant in the robbery who acted 

with reckless indifference to human life. We disagree that Flint 

is entitled to immediate resentencing. Although section 1170.95, 

subdivision (d)(2) does not refer to the peace officer exemption, it 

2 The Legislature has subsequently amended this portion 

of the law in ways not relevant to this opinion. (See Sen. Bill 

No. 775 (2021−2022 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2, italics 

added.)
4

would be absurd to infer that the Legislature intended to guarantee 

resentencing for defendants who could still be convicted of murder 

under current law.3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

In 2006, Flint and his codefendant, Frank Gonzalez, 

attempted to rob Maria Cecilia Rosa outside Rosa’s home in

Long Beach. Rosa, a deputy in the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 

Department, drew her service weapon. Gonzalez, who was armed 

with a revolver, shot Rosa twice, killing her. Because neither we 

nor the trial court may engage in factfinding at this stage of the 

proceedings (see People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972 (Lewis)), 

it is not necessary to describe the facts of the case in detail.

4 We 

note, however, that there was at least some evidence that Flint 

knew or should have known Rosa was a peace officer: At the trial,

a police officer testified that Flint told him that he saw Rosa’s 

badge.

A jury convicted Flint of one count of first degree murder 

(§ 187, subd. (a)) and one count of attempted robbery (§§ 211, 

664), and found that a principal was armed with a firearm in 

the commission of both counts. The prosecution alleged that a 

felony-murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) applied 

3 On February 4, 2021, Flint filed a petition for writ of 

mandate. On March 26, 2021, his petition was deemed to be a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus and was ordered to be considered 

concurrently with this appeal (In re Justin Ashley Flint, case 

No. B3102). Flint’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied by

separate order filed concurrently herewith.

4 Our opinion in Flint’s direct appeal (People v. Flint (July 30, 

2010, B205374) [nonpub. opn.]) describes the evidence in more 

detail.
5

to the murder, but the jury found this allegation “not true.” The 

trial court sentenced Flint to 29 years to life in prison. We affirmed 

the conviction but stayed the sentence on the attempted robbery 

conviction, reducing the sentence to 26 years to life. (See People v. 

Flint, supra, B205374).) 

Flint filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95 

on January 4, 2019, shortly after Senate Bill No. 1437 became 

effective. The trial court appointed counsel to represent him

and obtained briefing from both sides. The court found that 

Flint had failed to make a prima facie case that he was entitled 

to resentencing and denied the petition. The court reasoned that

Flint was a direct aider and abettor to the murder, and that he 

knew or should have known that Rosa was a peace officer engaged 

in the performance of her duties.

DISCUSSION

A. Flint Made a Prima Facie Case That He Is 

Eligible for Resentencing

Flint contends that he made a prima facie case that he 

is eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95, and that the 

trial court erred by finding to the contrary. The Attorney General

agrees, as do we.

When a defendant files a facially sufficient petition for 

resentencing under section 1170.95, the trial court must first 

determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing 

for relief. (§ 1170.95, subd. (c).) At the time of Flint’s hearing, the 

standards for determining whether a petitioner has made a prima 

facie case for resentencing under section 1170.95, subdivision (c) 

were unsettled. Recently, however, the Supreme Court in Lewis

clarified this issue. The court explained that “the prima facie 

inquiry under [section 1170.95,] subdivision (c) is limited. Like 
6

the analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, 

‘ “the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes 

a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would 

be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. 

If so, the court must issue an order to show cause.” ’ ([People v.] 

Drayton [(2020)] 47 Cal.App.5th [965,] 978, quoting Cal. Rules 

of Court, rule 4.551(c)(1).) ‘[A] court should not reject the 

petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without first 

conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ (Drayton, at p. 978, fn. omitted, 

citing In re Serrano (1995) 10 Cal.4th 447, 456 . . . .) ‘However, if

the record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts

refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court

is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the

petitioner.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) The court

cautioned further that, at this stage, “a trial court should not

engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the

exercise of discretion.’ ” (Id. at p. 972, quoting Drayton, supra, 

47 Cal.App.5th at p. 980.)

As both parties agree, the trial court exceeded the bounds

established in Lewis for prima facie review. The statement of 

decision shows that the court reviewed “the trial transcript, the 

court file, the Court of Appeal opinion, and the moving papers 

filed by the parties” and determined that Flint was ineligible 

for resentencing because he was a direct aider and abettor in the 

murder and that he knew or should have known that Rosa was a 

peace officer engaged in the performance of her duties. To reach 

this conclusion the court weighed the evidence and exercised its 

discretion in a manner forbidden by Lewis.

Nor may we affirm the trial court’s decision as harmless 

error. In Lewis, the Supreme Court held that, in order to 

demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner need not show that he is likely 
7

to succeed in having his conviction vacated in the end; instead, 

“a petitioner ‘whose petition is denied before an order to show 

cause issues has the burden of showing “it is reasonably probable 

that if [not for the error] . . . his [or her] petition would not have 

been summarily denied without an evidentiary hearing.” ’ ” (Lewis, 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 974.) Flint has done this much—we have 

seen nothing in the record of conviction refuting his claim of 

eligibility as a matter of law. We must therefore reverse the denial 

of his petition.

B. Flint Is Not Entitled to Automatic Relief under 

Section 1170.95, Subdivision (d)(2)

In most cases where the petitioner has made a prima facie 

case for relief, the trial court must issue an order to show cause 

and hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner is entitled 

to resentencing. (See § 1170.95, subd. (d)(3).) Subdivision (d)(2) of 

section 1170.95 provides a mechanism for avoiding such a hearing

in cases where both sides waive the hearing and stipulate that 

the petitioner is eligible, or “[i]f there was a prior finding by a court 

or jury that the petitioner did not act with reckless indifference 

to human life or was not a major participant in the felony.” In the 

latter instance, “the court shall vacate the petitioner’s conviction 

and resentence the petitioner.” (Ibid.) When this provision 

applies, it “impos[es] a mandatory duty on the court to vacate [the

petitioner’s] sentence and resentence him.” (Ramirez, supra, 41 

Cal.App.5th at p. 932.)

Flint contends that he is entitled to immediate resentencing 

under section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(2) because the jury at his 

trial rejected the prosecution’s allegation of a felony murder special 

circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), which required proof that 

Flint at a minimum was a major participant in the robbery and 

acted with reckless indifference to human life. (See § 190.2, 
8

subd. (d).) The Attorney General makes two arguments to the 

contrary. First, the Attorney General contends that the jury’s 

verdict does not constitute “a prior finding . . . that the petitioner 

did not act with reckless indifference to human life or was not a 

major participant in the felony.” (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(2).) Second, 

the Attorney General argues that even if the jury’s verdict meets 

the literal requirements of section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(2), the 

prosecutor must have an opportunity to show Flint is not eligible 

for resentencing because he knew or should have known that Rosa

was a peace officer acting within the course of her duties. We 

disagree with the Attorney General’s first argument but agree with 

the second and therefore do not order the trial court to resentence 

Flint under subdivision (d)(2).

1. The jury’s verdict on the special 

circumstance is a “finding” as described 

in section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(2)

To prove a felony-murder special circumstance, the 

prosecution must show that the defendant “actually killed the 

victim (. . . [§] 190.2, subd. (b)); acted with the intent to kill in 

aiding, abetting, counseling, commanding, inducing, soliciting, 

requesting, or assisting in the killing (. . . [§] 190.2, subd. (c)); 

or [was] a major participant in the underlying felony and acted 

with reckless indifference to human life (. . . [§] 190.2, subd. (d)).” 

(People v. Galvan (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1141, review granted 

Oct. 14, 2020, S264284; accord, In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 

384, 393.) Flint argues that, by finding the special circumstance 

allegation not true, the jury necessarily made a “finding . . . that 

[he] did not act with reckless indifference to human life or was not 

a major participant in the felony.” (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(2).)

The Attorney General disagrees, arguing that the jury’s 

“not true” verdict shows only that the jury had a reasonable doubt 
9

as to the requirements for the special circumstance. In general, 

“a jury verdict acquitting a defendant of a charged offense does not

constitute a finding that the defendant is factually innocent of the 

offense or establish that any or all of the specific elements of the 

offense are not true.” (In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 554.) 

According to the Attorney General, if the Legislature had meant 

for a jury verdict like the one in this case to be sufficient for

resentencing under section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(2), it would

have used the term “acquittal” in the statute, rather than “finding.”

Two published cases have considered this question: People v. 

Clayton (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 145 and People v. Harrison (Dec. 30, 

2021, A159115) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ [2021 WL 6144005] (Harrison). 

Both agreed with Flint’s position, as do we. The Attorney General 

is correct that the jury’s verdict is an expression of reasonable doubt 

as to the prosecution’s allegation, and falls short of a finding of 

actual innocence. But as the majority in Clayton noted, at the final 

eligibility hearing under section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(3), the 

prosecution bears the burden to prove the defendant’s ineligibility 

for resentencing beyond a reasonable doubt. (Clayton, supra,

66 Cal.App.5th at p. 155.) By finding the special circumstance 

allegation not true, the jury necessarily “found the evidence 

insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner 

was an aider and abettor with the intent to kill or a major 

participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to 

human life. In that case, the prosecution cannot sustain its burden 

of proving ineligibility under subdivision (d)(3) without invalidating 

the jury’s finding.” (Ibid.)

As we have explained previously, the purpose of proceedings 

under section 1170.95 is to decide “issues not previously 

determined, not to [retry] . . . disputes that have already been 

resolved.” (People v. Allison (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 449, 461.) 
10

Subdivision (d)(2) serves to “streamline the process” (Ramirez, 

supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 932) in instances where the record 

clearly demonstrates the defendant’s eligibility. The prosecution 

had an opportunity at the original trial to prove that Flint 

was a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless

indifference to human life. In enacting section 1170.95, 

subdivision (d)(2), the Legislature has determined that it 

should not have a second bite at the apple.

Finally, although “courts may be called upon to establish 

factual innocence[ ] (e.g., § 851.8, subd. (e)), juries do so rarely, 

if ever.” (Harrison, supra, ___ Cal.App.5th at p. ___ [2021 

WL 6144005, at p. *17].) If a jury’s “not true” verdict on a special 

circumstance allegation did not constitute “a prior finding by 

a . . . jury that the petitioner did not act with reckless indifference 

to human life or was not a major participant in the felony”

(§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(2)), it is difficult to conceive of a scenario in 

which a jury in a criminal trial could make such a finding. We 

must avoid statutory interpretations “ ‘that lead to absurd results

or render words surplusage.’ ” (People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 

1, 9 (Loeun).)

The Attorney General argues that its interpretation of 

the law does not in fact render the language of section 1170.95, 

subdivision (d)(2) surplusage. According to the Attorney General, 

the jury’s verdict in this case was simply too ambiguous to allow for 

a specific conclusion on the jury’s findings. The Attorney General is 

correct that a jury’s general verdict does not always imply specific 

factual findings about the case. (See People v. Towne (2008) 44 

Cal.4th 63, 86.) For example, a jury may convict a defendant of 

murder even if the jurors do not unanimously agree as to whether 

the defendant was the actual perpetrator or an aider and abettor. 

(People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903, 918.) In this case, the 
11

jury could have found the felony-murder special circumstance 

true even if some jurors believed that Flint acted with the intent 

to kill in aiding and abetting Gonzalez in the murder (see § 190.2, 

subd. (c)), while other jurors believed Flint was a major participant 

in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life

(see § 190.2, subd. (d)). As long as each juror found at least one 

of the requirements true beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury could

correctly find the allegation true. (See People v. Grimes (2016) 

1 Cal.5th 698, 726–727.)

It does not follow, however, that the jury’s rejection of the 

felony murder special circumstance is equally ambiguous. The 

jury instructions told the jurors to find the special circumstance 

allegation true if they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 

that either of two possibilities was true: Flint “with the intent 

to kill [aided,] [abetted,] [counseled,] [commanded,] [induced,] 

[solicited,] [requested,] [or] [assisted] any actor in the commission 

of the murder in the first degree . . . or with reckless indifference 

to human life and as a major participant, [aided,] [abetted,] 

[counseled,] [commanded,] [induced,] [solicited,] [requested,] [or] 

[assisted] in the commission of the crime of attempted robbery . . .

which resulted in the death of a human being.” (Italics added.) If 

either theory alone was sufficient to prove the special circumstance, 

then in order to find the allegation not true, the jurors must have 

had a reasonable doubt as to both theories. The Attorney General 

contends that the jury could have voted the special circumstance 

not true even “if some jurors believed that the victim was killed 

unintentionally, while others believed [Flint] was a major 

participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” 

But the jury instructions stated that, “[i]n order to find the special 

circumstance alleged in this case to be true or untrue, you must 

agree unanimously.” The jury’s “not true” verdict thus signifies 
12

that the jurors unanimously believed the prosecution had failed to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Flint was a major participant 

who acted with reckless indifference to human life.

2. Nevertheless, Flint is not entitled to 

resentencing under section 1170.95, 

subdivision (d)(2) because the peace 

officer exception may apply

The Attorney General argues that Flint is not entitled to 

immediate relief under section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(2) because 

the prosecution must have an opportunity to show that Flint knew 

or should have known that Rosa was a peace officer engaged in 

the performance of her duties at the time of the murder. Flint 

disagrees, arguing that no such exception applies. We agree with 

the Attorney General.

In enacting Senate Bill No. 1437, the Legislature created 

an exception to the new requirements for felony murder, providing 

that they do “not apply to a defendant when the victim is a peace 

officer who was killed while in the course of the peace officer’s 

duties, where the defendant knew or reasonably should have known 

that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance of 

the peace officer’s duties.” (§ 189, subd. (f).) When this exception 

applies, a defendant may be convicted of felony murder even if he 

was not a major participant in the felony who acted with reckless 

indifference to human life. (See Hernandez, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 108.) But section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(2) makes no 

provision for the peace officer exemption.

Flint argues that the absence of any reference to the peace 

officer exception in section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(2) is decisive. 

“ ‘If the statutory language is unambiguous, then its plain 

meaning controls’ ” (People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100, 1106), 

and the only requirement for relief in the text of section 1170.95, 
13

subdivision (d)(2) is that “there was a prior finding by a court or

jury that [he] did not act with reckless indifference to human life 

or was not a major participant in the felony.” Flint has done so, 

and he contends that the trial court must therefore “vacate [his]

conviction and resentence” him.

We disagree. Although we must defer to the plain language 

of a statute, “the language of a statute should not be given a 

literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences 

that the Legislature did not intend. To this extent, therefore, 

intent prevails over the letter of the law and the letter will be read 

in accordance with the spirit of the enactment.” (In re Michele D.

(2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 606; see also Loeun, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 9

[“ ‘[i]nterpretations that lead to absurd results or render words 

surplusage are to be avoided’ ”].) 

The legislative history shows that the Legislature intended 

to maintain broader liability for felony murder in cases where the 

victim was a peace officer. A report of the Senate Rules Committee5

explained that, although the new law restricted the application of 

the felony-murder doctrine, “the provisions of the bill do not apply 

when the decedent is a peace officer” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of 

Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017−2018 

Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 20, 2018, p. 2). Moreover, the 

committee explained that the bill “[a]llows a defendant to be 

convicted of first degree murder if the victim is a peace officer 

who was killed in the course of duty, where the defendant was a 

participant in certain specified felonies and the defendant knew, 

or reasonably should have known, that the victim was a peace 

5 “ ‘[R]eports of legislative committees and commissions are 

part of a statute’s legislative history and may be considered when 

the meaning of a statute is uncertain.’ ” (People v. Cruz (1996) 13 

Cal.4th 764, 773, fn. 5.)
14

officer engaged in the performance of duty, regardless of the 

defendant’s state of mind.” (Id. at p. 4, italics added.)

The Legislature’s purpose in enacting section 1170.95 as 

the retroactive component of Senate Bill No. 1437 is also clear, and 

is stated in the preamble to the bill itself: to “provide a means of 

vacating the conviction and resentencing a defendant” convicted 

of murder where “the defendant could not be charged with murder 

after the enactment of this bill.” Indeed, one of the criteria for 

resentencing is that the petitioner “could not presently be convicted 

of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 

or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(3).) 

Under section 189, subdivision (f), a defendant convicted of felony 

murder who knew or should have known that the victim was a 

peace officer engaged in the performance of her duties fails to meet 

this requirement regardless of whether or not he was a major 

participant in the felony who acted with reckless indifference to 

human life. (Hernandez, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 105–109.) 

Flint’s interpretation of the statute would make subdivision (d)(2) 

into a backdoor to guarantee resentencing for certain defendants 

who are not eligible, rather than a mechanism to “streamline the 

process” of resentencing (Ramirez, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 932)

in cases where it is clear that the defendant is eligible. This is an 

absurd result, which we will not infer the Legislature intended.

C. Section 1170.95 Does Not Implicate Double 

Jeopardy Concerns

Finally, Flint contends that the double jeopardy clauses of 

the federal and state constitutions preclude the prosecution from 

introducing new theories of his guilt that it did not raise at trial. 

We disagree.

“An evidentiary hearing under section 1170.95 . . . does not 

implicate double jeopardy because section 1170.95 ‘involves a 
15

resentencing procedure, not a new prosecution.’ [Citation.] 

The retroactive relief provided by section 1170.95 is a legislative 

‘act of lenity’ intended to give defendants serving otherwise final 

sentences the benefit of ameliorative changes to applicable criminal 

laws and does not result in a new trial or increased punishment 

that could implicate the double jeopardy clause.” (Hernandez, 

supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 111.)

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order denying Flint’s petition for 

resentencing is reversed. On remand, the court shall issue an 

order to show cause pursuant to section 1170.95 and hold further 

proceedings in conformance with this opinion.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

CRANDALL, J.*

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo Superior Court, assigned by 

the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.
Filed 2/24/22

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JUSTIN ASHLEY FLINT,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B310238

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. NA071779)

 CERTIFICATION AND

 ORDER FOR PUBLICATION

THE COURT:

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on January 28, 

2022 was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For 

good cause, it now appears that the opinion should be published in 

the Official Reports and it is so ordered.

_______________________________________________________________

 ROTHSCHILD, P. J. CHANEY, J. CRANDALL, J.*

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo Superior Court, assigned by 

the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.