United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-40359

Priscilla Villarreal, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

The City of Laredo, Texas; Webb County, Texas; Isidro 

R. Alaniz; Marisela Jacaman; Claudio Trevino, Jr.; Juan 

L. Ruiz; Deyanria Villarreal; Enedina Martinez; 

Alfredo Guerrero; Laura Montemayor; Does 1-2, 

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:19-CV-48

Before Owen, Chief Judge, and Graves and Ho, Circuit Judges.*

James C. Ho, Circuit Judge:

If the First Amendment means anything, it surely means that a citizen 

journalist has the right to ask a public official a question, without fear of being 

* Chief Judge Owen dissents and will file a forthcoming dissenting opinion.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 1, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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imprisoned. Yet that is exactly what happened here: Priscilla Villarreal was 

put in jail for asking a police officer a question.

If that is not an obvious violation of the Constitution, it’s hard to 

imagine what would be. And as the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, 

public officials are not entitled to qualified immunity for obvious violations 

of the Constitution.

The district court accordingly erred in dismissing Villarreal’s First

and Fourth Amendment claims on qualified immunity grounds. The district 

court also erred in dismissing her Fourteenth Amendment claim for failure 

to state a claim. We reverse in part and affirm in part and remand for further 

proceedings.

I.

For purposes of this appeal, we accept the factual allegations stated in 

Villarreal’s complaint as true. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009).

A.

Priscilla Villarreal is a journalist in Laredo, Texas. She regularly 

reports on local crime, missing persons, community events, traffic, and local 

government. But Villarreal is not a traditional journalist. Instead of 

publishing her stories in the newspaper, she posts them on her Facebook 

page. Instead of using a tape recorder to conduct interviews, she uses her cell 

phone to live-stream video footage of crime scenes and traffic accidents. Her

reporting frequently includes colorful—and often unfiltered—commentary. 

Perhaps because of this, she is one of Laredo’s most popular news sources, 

with more than 120,000 Facebook followers. See, e.g., Simon Romero, La 

Gordiloca: The Swearing Muckraker Upending Border Journalism, N.Y. 

Times (Mar. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/10/us

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/gordiloca-laredo-priscilla-villarreal.html (“[Villarreal] is arguably the most 

influential journalist in Laredo, a border city of 260,000.”).

Villarreal is not shy about criticizing law enforcement. For example, 

in 2015, law enforcement uncovered evidence of animal abuse on the 

property of a relative of Marisela Jacaman, Webb County’s Chief Assistant 

District Attorney. Villarreal vocally denounced the district attorney’s 

decision to recall the arrest warrant for Jacaman’s relative on animal cruelty 

charges and instead pursue a civil settlement. On another occasion, Villarreal 

live-streamed Laredo Police Department (LPD) officers choking an arrestee 

during a traffic stop. 

Not surprisingly, local law enforcement officials were less than 

enthused with Villarreal’s reporting. During a meeting with Villarreal, Webb 

County District Attorney Isidro Alaniz told her that he did not appreciate her 

criticism of the decision to withdraw the arrest warrant for Chief Assistant 

District Attorney Jacaman’s relative. On another occasion, an officer 

threatened to take Villarreal’s cell phone when she was recording a crime 

scene from behind a barricade—while saying nothing to the other members 

of the media standing next to her. 

B.

In April 2017, Villarreal published a story about a man who committed 

suicide. The story identified the man by name and revealed that he was an 

agent with the U.S. Border Patrol. Villarreal first uncovered this information 

from talking to a janitor who worked near the scene of the suicide. She then

contacted LPD Officer Barbara Goodman, who confirmed the man’s 

identity.

The following month, Villarreal published the last name of a family 

involved in a fatal car accident in Laredo. She first learned the family’s

identity from a relative of the family who saw a video that Villarreal had 

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posted. Again, Villarreal contacted Officer Goodman, and again, the officer 

verified this information. 

Six months later, two arrest warrants were issued for Villarreal for 

violating Texas Penal Code § 39.06(c). According to Villarreal, local officials 

have never brought a prosecution under § 39.06(c) in the 27-year history of 

that provision—and Defendants do not contend otherwise.

Section 39.06(c) states that “[a] person commits an offense if, with 

intent to obtain a benefit . . . , he solicits or receives from a public servant 

information that: (1) the public servant has access to by means of his office or 

employment; and (2) has not been made public.” Tex. Penal Code 

§ 39.06(c). According to the affidavit in support of the arrest warrants, 

Villarreal solicited or received the names of the suicide victim and the traffic 

accident victims (which, according to the affidavit, was “nonpublic” 

information). The affidavit further alleged that Villarreal benefitted from 

publishing this information before other news outlets, by gaining additional 

followers on her Facebook page. Chief Assistant District Attorney Jacaman 

approved the arrest warrant application. 

After learning about the warrant, Villarreal turned herself in. During 

the booking process, Villarreal saw LPD officers taking pictures of her in 

handcuffs with their cell phones. The officers mocked and laughed at her. 

Villarreal was then detained at the Webb County Jail. 

Villarreal filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Webb 

County district court. In March 2018, a judge granted her petition and held 

that § 39.06(c) was unconstitutionally vague. The government did not 

appeal. 

She subsequently brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various 

LPD officers, Webb County prosecutors, Webb County, and the City of 

Laredo. The suit alleged a pattern of harassment and retaliation by various 

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local officials, culminating in her arrest, in violation of her First, Fourth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights. She sought damages as well as injunctive and 

declaratory relief. 

Defendants moved to dismiss all of her claims under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The officials sought dismissal on grounds of 

qualified immunity and failure to state a claim, and the county and city sought 

dismissal under Monell. The district court granted the motion and dismissed 

all claims accordingly. 

Villarreal appeals the dismissal of her claims against the officials under 

the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. She also appeals the 

dismissal of her municipal liability claims against the City of Laredo, but not 

her claims against Webb County.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Sw. Bell Tel., LP v. City of Houston, 529 F.3d 257, 

260 (5th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Villarreal 

must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). With respect to 

the defense of qualified immunity, Villarreal must plead specific facts that 

defeat that defense with equal specificity. Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 

(5th Cir. 2012).

II.

Villarreal alleges that Defendants violated her First Amendment 

rights in two ways—first, by infringing on her constitutional right to ask 

questions of public officials, and second, by arresting her in retaliation for her 

exercise of First Amendment rights. We address each in turn.

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A.

The district court dismissed her First Amendment infringement claim 

against various officials on qualified immunity grounds, finding that any 

violation was not clearly established at the time. We disagree.

To defeat qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage, Villarreal 

must allege, first, that the officials violated her First Amendment rights, and 

second, that their actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly 

established law. See, e.g., Powers v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 951 F.3d 298, 

305–06 (5th Cir. 2020). The crucial question in this inquiry is whether “a 

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates [a

constitutional] right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 

“The central concept is that of ‘fair warning.’” Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 

337, 350 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740 

(2002)).

Ordinarily, a plaintiff defeats qualified immunity by citing governing 

case law finding a violation under factually similar circumstances. But that is 

not the only way to defeat qualified immunity. “Although earlier cases 

involving ‘fundamentally similar’ facts can provide especially strong support 

for a conclusion that the law is clearly established, they are not necessary to 

such a finding.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 741.

“[O]fficials can still be on notice that their conduct violates 

established law even in novel factual circumstances.” Id. “‘[A] general 

constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with 

obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though the very 

action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful.’” Id. (second 

alteration in original) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640).

In Hope, prison guards handcuffed a prisoner to a hitching post for 

seven hours in the sun with little water. Id. at 734–35. They taunted him 

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about his thirst, giving water to some dogs, before bringing the water cooler 

closer to the prisoner and kicking the cooler over, spilling the water onto the 

ground. Id. at 735. The guards also refused to allow him to use a restroom. 

Id.

The Court acknowledged that there was no “materially similar” case

finding an Eighth Amendment violation under those particular 

circumstances. Id. at 739–41. But the Court denied qualified immunity 

anyway, based on “[t]he obvious cruelty inherent” in the guards’ conduct. 

Id. at 745.

Similarly, in Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52 (2020) (per curiam), two 

prison cells contained massive amounts of feces over a period of six days. Id.

at 53. Again, there was no binding case on point involving those particular 

factual circumstances. But the Court nevertheless denied qualified 

immunity, reasoning that “no reasonable correctional officer could have 

concluded that, under the extreme circumstances of this case, it was 

constitutionally permissible to house Taylor in such deplorably unsanitary 

conditions for such an extended period of time.” Id.

Perhaps the decision most analogous to this appeal is Sause v. Bauer, 

138 S. Ct. 2561 (2018) (per curiam). There, police officers entered a 

woman’s living room in response to a noise complaint. When she knelt down 

to pray, they ordered her to stop, despite the lack of any apparent law 

enforcement need. Id. at 2562. She brought suit against the officers alleging, 

inter alia, a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Id. The Tenth Circuit 

granted qualified immunity, reasoning that any violation was not clearly 

established because “Sause d[id]n’t identify a single case in which this court, 

or any other court for that matter, has found a First Amendment violation 

based on a factual scenario even remotely resembling the one we encounter 

here.” Sause v. Bauer, 859 F.3d 1270, 1275 (10th Cir. 2017).

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The Court reversed the Tenth Circuit’s grant of qualified immunity 

and remanded for further proceedings, holding that “[t]here can be no doubt 

that the First Amendment protects the right to pray,” and that “[p]rayer

unquestionably constitutes the ‘exercise’ of religion.” Sause, 138 S. Ct. at 

2562.

The point is this: The doctrine of qualified immunity does not always 

require the plaintiff to cite binding case law involving identical facts. An 

official who commits a patently “obvious” violation of the Constitution is 

not entitled to qualified immunity. Hope, 536 U.S. at 745.

That principle should have precluded dismissal of the various 

constitutional claims presented here. Just as it is obvious that Mary Anne

Sause has a constitutional right to pray, it is likewise obvious that Priscilla 

Villarreal has a constitutional right to ask questions of public officials. Yet 

according to her complaint, Defendants arrested and sought to prosecute 

Villarreal for doing precisely that—asking questions of public officials.

This is not just an obvious constitutional infringement—it’s hard to 

imagine a more textbook violation of the First Amendment. 

If the freedom of speech secured by the First Amendment includes 

the right to curse at a public official, then it surely includes the right to 

politely ask that official a few questions as well. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New 

Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942) (“‘You are a God damned racketeer’

and ‘a damned Fascist’”); Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250, 1255 (6th Cir. 

1997) (“In 1990 when [the defendant] was arrested for his use of the ‘fword,’ it was clearly established that speech is entitled to First Amendment 

protection.”); Buffkins v. City of Omaha, 922 F.2d 465, 467 (8th Cir. 1990) 

(“I will have a nice day, asshole.”).

If freedom of the press guarantees the right to publish information 

from the government, then it surely guarantees the right to ask the 

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government for that information in the first place. See,e.g., In re Express-News 

Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 808 (5th Cir. 1982) (“news-gathering is entitled to 

[F]irst [A]mendment protection, for ‘without some protection for seeking 

out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated’”) (quoting 

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)); The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 

U.S. 524, 538 (1989) (“That appellant gained access to the information in 

question through a government news release makes it especially likely that, if 

liability were to be imposed, self-censorship would result.”).

Put simply: If the government cannot punish someone for publishing

the Pentagon Papers, how can it punish someone for simply asking for them? 

See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).

Finally, if the First Amendment safeguards the right to petition the 

government for a redress of grievances, then it surely safeguards the right to 

petition the government for information. As one of our colleagues once 

noted, “[t]he original design of the First Amendment petition clause . . . 

included a governmental duty to consider petitioners’ grievances”—not the 

right to detain the petitioner. Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History 

of the Right to Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 Yale L.J.

142, 142–43 (1986).

So it should be patently obvious to any reasonable police officer that 

the conduct alleged in the complaint constitutes a blatant violation of 

Villarreal’s constitutional rights. And that should be enough to defeat 

qualified immunity. The Institute for Justice, a respected national public 

interest law firm, puts the point well in its amicus brief: There is a big 

difference between “split-second decisions” by police officers and 

“premeditated plans to arrest a person for her journalism, especially by local 

officials who have a history of targeting her because of her journalism.” We 

agree that the facts alleged here present an especially weak basis for invoking 

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qualified immunity. For “[w]hen it comes to the First Amendment, . . . we 

are concerned about government chilling the citizen—not the other way 

around.” Horvath v. City of Leander, 946 F.3d 787, 802 (5th Cir. 2020) (Ho, 

J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Cf. Hoggard v. 

Rhodes, 141 S. Ct. 2421, 2422 (2021) (Thomas, J., respecting denial of cert.) 

(“But why should university officers, who have time to make calculated 

choices about enacting or enforcing unconstitutional policies, receive the 

same protection as a police officer who makes a split-second decision to use 

force in a dangerous setting?”). 

Defendants respond that the officials were simply enforcing a statute. 

But “some statutes are so obviously unconstitutional that we will require 

officials to second-guess the legislature and refuse to enforce an 

unconstitutional statute—or face a suit for damages if they don’t.” Lawrence 

v. Reed, 406 F.3d 1224, 1233 (10th Cir. 2005). We agree with Judge 

McConnell and our other sister circuits that police officers can invoke 

qualified immunity by “rely[ing] on statutes that authorize their conduct—

but not if the statute is obviously unconstitutional.” Id. at 1232. We do not 

grant qualified immunity where the official attempts to hide behind a statute 

that is “‘so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of 

reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws.’” Carey v. Nevada 

Gaming Control Bd., 279 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Michigan v. 

DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 (1979)). See also, e.g., Guillemard-Ginorio v. 

Contreras-Gómez, 490 F.3d 31, 40–41 (1st Cir. 2007) (denying qualified 

immunity where statute allowed officials to suspend a professional license 

without a hearing in violation of the Due Process Clause); Leonard v. 

Robinson, 477 F.3d 347, 359, 361 (6th Cir. 2007) (denying qualified immunity 

where statute criminalized cursing by the name of God and indecent language 

in front of women or children); Lawrence, 406 F.3d at 1233 (denying qualified 

immunity where derelict vehicle ordinance provided “no hearing 

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whatsoever” because that was a “sufficiently obvious” violation of due 

process); Vives v. City of New York, 405 F.3d 115, 118 (2nd Cir. 2005) (no 

qualified immunity where official relies on a law “so grossly and flagrantly 

unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to 

see its flaws”) (quoting Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Crotty, 346 F.3d 84, 

103 (2nd Cir. 2003)); Lederman v. United States, 291 F.3d 36, 47 (D.C. Cir. 

2002) (similar); Aubin v. Columbia Cas. Co., 272 F. Supp. 3d 828, 839 (M.D. 

La. 2017) (“[N]o reasonable officer could rely on Louisiana’s public 

intimidation statute to arrest a person who threatens to have them fired.”).

Texas Penal Code § 39.06(c) is one of those statutes. Accordingly, we 

join our sister circuits in holding that the doctrine of qualified immunity does 

not permit government officials to invoke patently unconstitutional statutes 

like § 39.06(c) to avoid liability for their actions.

* * *

It should be obvious to any reasonable police officer that locking up a 

journalist for asking a question violates the First Amendment. Indeed, even 

Captain Lorenzo, the stubborn police chief in Die Hard 2, acknowledged: 

“Now personally, I’d like to lock every [expletive] reporter out of the airport. 

But then they’d just pull that ‘freedom of speech’ [expletive] on us and the 

ACLU would be all over us.” Die Hard 2 (1990).

Captain Lorenzo understood this. The officers in Laredo should have, 

too. Cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (“Miranda has 

become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings 

have become part of our national culture.”). The complaint here alleges an 

obvious violation of the First Amendment. The district court erred in 

holding otherwise.

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B.

Turning to Villarreal’s First Amendment retaliation theory: To 

establish such a claim, she “must show that (1) [she] w[as] engaged in 

constitutionally protected activity, (2) the defendants’ actions caused [her]

to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from 

continuing to engage in that activity, and (3) the defendants’ adverse actions 

were substantially motivated against [her] exercise of constitutionally 

protected conduct.” Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 2002)

(citations omitted).

Notwithstanding that the second element turns on “a person of 

ordinary firmness,” this court has held that “a retaliation claim requires 

some showing that the plaintiffs’ exercise of free speech has been curtailed.” 

Id. at 259 (emphasis added) (citing cases). The court found that the plaintiffs 

there demonstrated curtailment when they asserted that they “backed off 

from direct involvement in helping expose unlawful practices in the 

constable’s office.” Id. at 260. See also McLin v. Ard, 866 F.3d 682, 697 (5th 

Cir. 2017) (holding that plaintiff’s “allegation of ‘great personal damage[]’

. . . d[id] not demonstrate that he reduced or changed his exercise of free 

speech in any way.”).

Villarreal fails to allege that her own “exercise of free speech has been 

curtailed.” Keenan, 290 F.3d at 259. She alleges that she lost sleep, suffered 

reputational damage, became physically ill, was detained, and feared future 

interference from officials. But these allegations do not show that Villarreal 

curtailed herspeech. To the contrary, as Defendants point out, Villarreal has 

continued reporting since her arrest—consistent with the highest traditions 

of fearless journalism.

In response, Villarreal contends that “a chilling injury does not 

require the injured party to stop exercising her First Amendment rights.” 

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That is the law in other circuits—and perhaps for good reason—but it is not 

the law of this circuit. Compare Keenan, 290 F.3d at 259 (“[A] retaliation 

claim requires some showing that the plaintiffs’ exercise of free speech has 

been curtailed.”), with Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1177 (10th Cir. 2001) 

(“The focus . . . is upon whether a person of ordinary firmness would be chilled, 

rather than whether the particular plaintiff is chilled.”), and Mendocino Env’t 

Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t would be 

unjust to allow a defendant to escape liability for a First Amendment violation 

merely because an unusually determined plaintiff persists in his protected 

activity.”).

We are duty-bound to follow our circuit precedent. Accordingly, we 

must hold that Villarreal has failed to sufficiently plead a First Amendment 

retaliation claim.

1

* * *

Although Villarreal has not pleaded an actionable First Amendment 

retaliation claim under the standards set forth in our circuit precedent, she 

has articulated a viable First Amendment theory based on the officers’ 

infringement of her constitutional right to ask questions of public officials. 

The district court accordingly erred in dismissing her First Amendment 

claim.

Villarreal seeks not only damages but also injunctive and declaratory 

relief for her First Amendment claim. We agree with the district court that 

she fails to allege a risk of future injury as required to establish standing for 

1

 Villarreal also brings a retaliatory investigation claim. But this circuit does not 

recognize such a claim. See Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 512 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[The 

plaintiff] has alleged only that she was the victim of criticism, an investigation (or an attempt 

to start one), and false accusations: all harms that, while they may chill speech, are not 

actionable under our First Amendment retaliation jurisprudence.”) (emphasis added).

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injunctive and declaratory relief. To the contrary, Defendants have not 

appealed the grant of Villarreal’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the 

Webb County district court. Nor have they sought to arrest or investigate 

her in the two years since that ruling.

III.

We turn to Villarreal’s Fourth Amendment wrongful arrest claim. To 

prevail on this claim, Villarreal must show that she was seized and that the 

seizure was unreasonable because it lacked probable cause. See, e.g., Brown 

v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The ‘constitutional tort[ ]’ of 

false arrest . . . require[s] a showing of no probable cause.”). Defendants do 

not dispute that Villarreal’s surrender in response to the arrest warrants was

a seizure. See McLin, 866 F.3d at 694 (“McLin’s seizure occurred when he 

surrendered to the arrest warrants and [the sheriff’s office] exercised 

authority consistent with the warrants.”). 

“Probable cause exists when all of the facts known by a police officer 

‘are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had 

committed, or was in the process of committing, an offense.’” Texas v. 

Kleinert, 855 F.3d 305, 316 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Castro, 

166 F.3d 728, 733 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc)). Defendants argue they are 

entitled to qualified immunity because their arrest warrant sufficiently alleges 

a violation of § 39.06(c), which they obtained from a magistrate judge. 

But “the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant 

authorizing the allegedly unconstitutional search or seizure does not end the 

inquiry into objective reasonableness.” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 

535, 547 (2012). Even when officers obtain an arrest warrant from a 

magistrate, we ask “whether a reasonably well-trained officer in [the 

defendants’] position would have known that his affidavit failed to establish 

probable cause and that he should not have applied for a warrant.” Jennings 

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v. Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Malley 

v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986)). “Defendants will not be immune if, on 

an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would 

have concluded that a warrant should issue.” Malley, 475 U.S. at 341. 

As explained above, a reasonably well-trained officer would have 

understood that arresting a journalist for merely asking a question clearly 

violates the First Amendment. “A government official may not base her 

probable cause determination on an ‘unjustifiable standard,’ such as speech 

protected by the First Amendment.” Mink v. Knox, 613 F.3d 995, 1003–04 

(10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)). 

See also Swiecicki v. Delgado, 463 F.3d 489, 498 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n officer 

may not base his probable-cause determination on speech protected by the 

First Amendment.”).

Just as the First Amendment violation alleged in the complaint was 

obvious for purposes of qualified immunity, so too the Fourth Amendment 

violation alleged here. The district court therefore erred in dismissing

Villarreal’s Fourth Amendment claim.

IV.

Next, we address Villarreal’s selective enforcement claim under the 

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. “[T]o successfully 

bring a selective . . . enforcement claim, a plaintiff must prove that the 

government official’s acts were motivated by improper considerations, such 

as race, religion, or the desire to prevent the exercise of a constitutional 

right.” Bryan v. City of Madison, 213 F.3d 267, 277 (5th Cir. 2000). 

“[R]etaliation for an attempt to exercise one’s religion or right to free speech 

would be expected to qualify.” Id. at 277 n.5.

“As a prerequisite to such a claim, the plaintiff must prove that 

similarly situated individuals were treated differently.” Id. at 276 (citing

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Wheeler v. Miller, 168 F.3d 241, 252 (5th Cir. 1999)). The district court here 

dismissed Villarreal’s selective enforcement claim for failure to identify 

similarly situated individuals that could have been arrested, but were not. So 

we begin our analysis there.

Defining the universe of similarly situated individuals is a “case 

specific” inquiry—one that “requires us to consider ‘the full variety of 

factors that an objectively reasonable . . . decisionmaker would have found 

relevant in making the challenged decision.’” Lindquist v. City of Pasadena, 

669 F.3d 225, 234 (5th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Griffin 

Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1203 (11th Cir. 2007)). In Lindquist, we 

explained that, when a case “involves the application of an ordinance or 

statute, the plaintiff’s and comparators’ relationships with the ordinance at 

issue will generally be a relevant characteristic for purposes of the similarlysituated analysis.” 669 F.3d at 234. So, for example, in Beeler v. Rounsavall, 

328 F.3d 813 (5th Cir. 2003), a store alleged that it was treated differently 

than another store located nearby. Id. at 816. The court held that “the 

relevant question [was] whether the two stores were similarly situated under 

[the relevant provision of] the Code,” not whether they were geographically 

proximate. Id. at 817.

Under Defendants’ interpretation of § 39.06(c), any journalist who 

asks a public official a question regarding nonpublic information commits a 

crime. Villarreal’s complaint sufficiently alleges that countless journalists 

have asked LPD officers all kinds of questions about nonpublic information. 

Yet they were never arrested.

Specifically, she alleges a similarly situated group that includes: “(a) 

those who had asked for or received information from local law enforcement 

officials, and (b) persons who published truthful and publicly-accessible 

information on a newsworthy matter.” She points to “local professional 

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newspaper journalists, local professional broadcast journalists, and citizens 

who published on matters of local public concern.” She further alleges that 

Defendants “also knew that members of the local media regularly asked for 

and received information from LPD officials relating to crime scenes and 

investigations, traffic accidents, and other LPD matters.” Finally, Villarreal 

alleges, and Defendants concede, that LPD had never before arrested any 

person under § 39.06(c). 

It is true that Villarreal did not name a specific journalist who solicited 

or received nonpublic information from the LPD in her complaint. When 

evaluating whether Villarreal survives a motion to dismiss under Rule 

12(b)(6), however, we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of

Villarreal. See, e.g., Woodard v. Andrus, 419 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2005)

(“The complaint must be liberally construed, with all reasonable inferences 

drawn in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”).

We have no difficulty observing that journalists commonly ask for 

nonpublic information from public officials, and that Villarreal was therefore 

entitled to make that same reasonable inference. Yet Defendants chose to 

arrest Villarreal—and only Villarreal—for violating § 39.06(c). We 

accordingly conclude that Villarreal has sufficiently pled the existence of 

similarly situated journalists who were not arrested for violating § 39.06(c).

The district court reached the opposite conclusion, holding that 

Villarreal “fail[ed] to allege any facts indicating that Defendants failed to 

enforce § 39.06(c) against any other person where a similar situation 

existed.” The court offered various rationales to justify its conclusion. None 

of them are plausible.

First, the district court reiterated that the officers had “probable cause 

to arrest [her],” because they had “objectively reasonable grounds to find 

probable cause that [Villarreal] violated § 39.06(c).” But probable cause is 

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not a bar to a selective enforcement claim. “The courts have long held that 

a selective enforcement claim may be available even where there is probable 

cause for prosecution.” Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 872 (6th 

Cir. 1997) (citing Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 455–

56 (1962)). See also Bradley v. United States, 299 F.3d 197, 205 (3rd Cir. 2002) 

(“The fact that there was no Fourth Amendment violation does not mean 

that one was not discriminatorily selected for a search.”).

Second, the district court found that local journalists were not 

similarly situated to Villarreal because she was arrested for communicating 

with Officer Goodman—and not with Jose Beza, LPD’s official spokesman. 

The district court reasoned that local journalists are similarly situated to 

Villarreal only if they too “solicited or received information from 

Goodman”—or at least from “some other unofficial or unsanctioned source 

of information within the police department”—but not if they solicited 

information from LPD’s designated spokesman. But of course, LPD has 

never claimed that it has a policy of arresting every journalist who asks 

questions about nonpublic information from LPD officials other than the 

department’s designated spokesmen. Nor is there anything in § 39.06(c) to 

justify such a distinction.

Finally, the district court found that Villarreal’s allegations could not 

establish a discriminatory effect because “it would be equally plausible to 

infer that Defendants had never before encountered circumstances giving 

rise to potential prosecution under the statute.” That is implausible on its 

face. Defendants’ interpretation of § 39.06(c) criminalizes routine reporting. 

It is not “equally plausible” that the only journalist to ever ask questions of

Laredo public officials was Villarreal.

The district court accordingly erred in dismissing Villarreal’s 

selective enforcement claim for failure to identify similarly situated 

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individuals. We of course make no comment on whether Villarreal will 

ultimately prevail on her selective enforcement claim—that is for the district 

court to decide in the first instance on remand.

V.

As for Villarreal’s remaining claims: She also brings a claim for 

conspiracy to violate her constitutional rights under § 1983. Given our 

conclusion that the district court erred in dismissing her First, Fourth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment claims, we remand her conspiracy claim as well.

Finally, we address Villarreal’s municipal liability claim against the 

City of Laredo. “[M]unicipal liability under section 1983 requires proof of 

three elements: a policymaker; an official policy [or custom]; and a violation 

of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is th[at] policy or custom.” 

Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting 

Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). The district court 

held that Villarreal failed to identify an official policy or custom made by a 

final policymaker. We agree. Although Villarreal repeatedly refers to an 

“official city policy or custom” of retaliating against her for her reporting, 

she fails to sufficiently allege either. Villarreal does not point to any 

ordinance, statute, statement, or regulation directing city employees to 

retaliate against her. See Doe v. United States, 831 F.3d 309, 318 (5th Cir. 

2016) (noting that “[a]n official policy is usually evidenced by ‘duly 

promulgated policy statements, ordinances or regulations’”) (quoting 

Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579). Nor does Villarreal sufficiently allege a 

“custom.” Although she alleges “a persistent and widespread practice of 

City officials and employees engaging in retaliatory acts against [her],” such 

a “persistent, widespread practice” must be “so common and well settled as 

to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.” Webster v. 

City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc). Villarreal does 

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not allege that city employees retaliated against, investigated, or arrested

anyone else because of their speech. See Culbertson v. Lykos, 790 F.3d 608, 

628 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that the plaintiffs failed to allege a “widespread 

practice” of retaliation because they “offered no evidence that similar 

retaliation had victimized others.”). We affirm the district court’s judgment 

dismissing Villarreal’s municipal liability claim against the City of Laredo.2

* * *

It is not a crime to be a journalist. As the Institute for Justice rightly 

observes, the position urged by the City of Laredo in this case is “dangerous 

to a free society,” for “[i]t assumes that the government can choose proper 

and improper channels for newsgathering—indeed, that the government can 

decide what is and is not newsworthy.” See also Jobe v. Nat’l Transp. Safety 

Bd., 1 F.4th 396, 410 (5th Cir. 2021) (Ho, J., dissenting) (“Open government 

is a founding principle of our country.”).

We reverse the judgment of the district court dismissing Villarreal’s 

First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments claims, as well as her civil 

conspiracy claims. We affirm the district court’s judgment dismissing 

Villarreal’s municipal liability claims against the City of Laredo. We remand 

the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In issuing this decision, we acknowledge that the constitutionality of 

Texas Penal Code § 39.06(c) has been called into question in this case, but it 

does not appear that either the Plaintiff or the district court has so notified 

the Attorney General of Texas. See 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b); Fed. R. App. 

Proc. 44(b). Accordingly, it is ordered that the Clerk of this Court shall 

2

 Villarreal also appeals the district court’s denial of her request for a declaratory 

judgment on her claim against the City of Laredo. Because she fails to establish municipal 

liability, she is not entitled to a declaratory judgment. 

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promptly file with the Attorney General of Texas a certificate in conformity 

with 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b), and that the entry of judgment and the mandate of 

this court be withheld for a period of sixty days from the date of this opinion 

in order to afford the Attorney General an opportunity to take such steps as 

he may deem advisable. See, e.g., Thatcher v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 

180 F.2d 644, 648 n.7 (5th Cir. 1950); Bridges v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 733 

F.2d 1153, 1156 n.7 (5th Cir. 1984); Jones v. City of Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364, 372 

(5th Cir. 1984).

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