PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

Nos. 17-2228, 17-2229

COREY BLAND; VIRGINIA BLAND

v.

CITY OF NEWARK; CITY OF NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT; NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF STATE POLICE; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; SERGEANT JAMES THOMPSON; SERGEANT BRIAN MURPHY; TROOPER II THOMAS ESPINOZA; TROOPER II WILLIAM LEGG; TROOPER MIGUEL HOLGUIN; TROOPER ANTHONY SARDANOPOLI; TROOPER JOHN OLIVEIRA; TROOPER STEPHEN RIEFLER; DETECTIVE THOMAS DEL MAURO; DETECTIVE BRIAN COSTA; DETECTIVE DAVID MARTINEZ; SERGEANT THOMAS ROE; OFFICER DANNY COSTA; JOHN DOES (1–100); ABC ENTITIES (1 –100), A Series of Fictitious Names,

New Jersey State Police, State of New Jersey, Anthony Sardanopoli, James Thompson, Brian Murphy, Thomas Espinoza, William Legg, Miguel Holguin, John Oliveira and Stephen Riefler Appellant s in No. 17 -22282 Thomas Delmauro, David Martinez and Ruben Torres Appellants in No. 17 -2229

__________

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 2-13- cv -02985) District Judge: Honorable Katharine S. Hayden

Argued March 22, 2018 Before: SMITH, Chief Judge , HARDIMAN, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges

.

(Filed: August 15, 2018)

Pamela L. Brause Peter Ventrice [Argued]
Brause Brause & Ventrice 276 Main Street, P.O. Box 232 Metuchen, NJ 08840

Lucas E. Phillips, Jr. [Argued] 134 Evergreen Place, Suite 301
P.O. Box 2487 East Orange, NJ 07019 Attorneys for Appellees3 Michael C. Walters [ Argued ] Office of Attorney General of New Jersey
Division of Law Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex 25 Market Street, P.O. Box 112 Trenton, NJ 08625 Attorney for All Appellants

Gary S. Lipshutz [ Argued ] City of Newark Department of Law 920 Broad Street, Room 316 Newark, NJ 07102 Attorney for Appellant s Thomas Del M auro, David
Martinez

, and Ruben Torres

Michael H. Freeman Greenberg Dauber Epstein & Tucker One Gateway Center, Suite 600 Newark, NJ 07102

Matthew J. Lynch Office of Attorney General of New Jersey
Division of Law Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex
25 Market Street Trenton, NJ 08625 Attorneys for Appellants State of New Jersey, New Jersey State Police, James Thompson, Brian Murphy, Thomas Espin oza, William Legg , Miguel Holguin, Anthony Sardanopoli, John Oliveira and Stephen Riefler4 ____________

OPINION OF THE COURT

____________

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge

.
This interlocutory appeal was filed by several law
enforcement officers who were involved to varying degrees in a prolonged pursuit of a fleeing motorist, Corey Bland. The pursuit involved the use of lethal force against Bland, who sustained severe injuries after he was shot between 16 and 18
times. The question presented is whether the Distric t Court committed legal error when it denied the officers summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Because the
officers’ conduct was within the bounds of the Supreme
Court’s relevant decisions regarding the use of lethal force, we
will reverse.

I

A . Initial Pursuit

In the early evening of December 26, 2011, Newark Police received a report that a black Audi bearing Pennsylvania license plate number PZK821C had been carjacked at gunpoint. Approximately three hours later, New Jersey State Troopers Jam es Thompson and Brian Murphy spotted the carjacked vehicle in Newark. Appellee Corey Bland was behind the wheel. The troopers activated their police lights

, but Bland failed to stop. Instead, he accelerated and began to drive recklessly, running red lights and shutting off his headlights as
he went . Th e troopers lost sight of the Audi, but an officer from the Summit Police Department began following it shortly5 thereafter

. Bland nearl y struck that officer’s vehicle and
collided with an embankment, but he continued driving. He
reached speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour, weaving in and
out of light traffic.

State Trooper John Oliveir a joined the chase in his marked police car after receiving reports that units from the State Police and Summit Police Departments were pursuing a carjacked vehicle. State Trooper Miguel Holguin, 1 driving an unmarked Chrysler 300 accompanied by State Troopers Anthony Sardanopoli and Stephen Riefler, got involved after hearing a radio broadcast by Thompson and Murphy containing details about the carjacked vehicle

. Bland continued to drive recklessly, frequently changing lanes , disregarding traffic lights, turning his lights off, accelerating to more than
80 miles an hour in an ar ea with a 25

- mile

- per

- hour speed limit, and driving over a curb in an empty parking lot

, which caused the Audi to begin to smoke

. Despite all this, the Audi was not
disabled

, and Bland continued to evade police.

B. Lincoln Park Events

Eventually, Bland began driving the wrong way down
Lincoln Park, a one

- way street. While doing so, h e collided
both wit h Thompson and Murphy in their marked state p olice

car a nd a n occupied Newark Police vehicle

. When Bland hit the Newark police car , he was travelling appro ximately 25 to 35 miles per hour, and the impact caused the police car to strike an unoccupied parked car . As a result, the Audi, the police car

, and th e unoccupied car became entangled

. State Trooper

1 Discrepancies exist about the spelling of this trooper’s name. We adopt the spelling provided by the trooper in his deposition.6 Thomas Espinoza, who had received a radio transmission about an ongoing pursuit involving a vehicle carjacked at gunpoint , arrived on the scene shortly after these collisions.

N umerous officers surrounded the Audi, including Murphy, Thompson, Oliveira, Sardanopoli, Espinoza, and State Trooper William Legg. 2 Many of the officers ordered
Bland to surrender, and one officer attempted to break the Audi’s window by striking it

. During this encounter, t he six state troopers fired a total of 28 shots , none of which hit Bland

. Newark Police Officer Thomas Del Mauro was present at Lincoln Park, but h e did not discharge his weapon.

There is no evidence in the record that Bland attempte d
to surrender at this time. I nstead , he revved the Audi’s engine

, spun its tires, and tried to get the vehicle to accelerate. Bland
ul timately freed the Audi from the Newark police car by reversing and stri king the now

- unoccupied state p olice car a second time. 3 He then drove over a curb and through a public park.

Upon exiting the park, Bland continued to speed through Newark with his lights off

, at times on roads populated
with vehic ular and pedestrian traffic

. Officers and state

2 Bland does not identify any actions taken by Riefler or Holguin at Lincoln Park.

3 Both the Newark officers and the state troopers contend that Bland drove aggressively at the officers as he attempted to flee, but Bland disputes this characterization. That dispute is immaterial , however, because all parties agree that officers were standing less than 10 feet from the Audi as Bland
extricated it from the two vehicles.7 troopers continued to pursue Bland, but Thompson and Murphy were no longer involved because their vehicle was
disabled when it was struck by the Audi at Linc oln Park

. During this portion of the chase , a state police car struck an occupied civilian vehicle. Bland eventually drove to the
intersection of 18 th Avenue and Livingston Street, where the

most vigorously disputed series of events took place.

C. The Term inus of the Chas e

At the intersection of 18 th and Livingston, the unmarked Chrysler 300 driven by Holguin allegedly rammed
the Audi , sending the Audi into scaffolding that surrounded a school. State Troopers Holguin, Sardanopoli, and Riefler
exited the Chrysler 300 and moved toward the Audi , which remained entangled in the scaffolding

. Holguin approached the driver’s side with Riefler standing behind him, while Sardanopoli moved to the Audi’s passenger side.

All three troopers began firing their weapon s at the
Audi. Holguin and Riefler testified that they initially discharged their weapons because Bland refused to comply
with their orders to show his hands and to stop moving and
because he repeatedly threatened to kill the officers

. Sardanopoli stated t hat he fired his weapon after he saw Holguin firing. Legg

— also on the scene

— assert ed that he fired
because he could see Bland moving around in the Audi as Holguin and Riefler discharged their weapons

. Bland, for h is part, denied that the trooper s shouted a ny verbal commands or that he made evasive movements , but he conceded that nothing in the record contradicts the officers’ allegations that he
threatened to kill them

.8 After the first volley of shots, Riefler approached the
driver’s side of the Audi

, whe reupon Riefler testified that Bland attempted to climb through the wi ndow while again threatening to kill him

. In response, Riefler fired his weapon again. Es pinoza also discharged his weapon

, as did Newark
Officer s Del Mauro, Reuben Torres, and David Martinez , who
had heard about the carjacking at roll call earlier that evening

. T he Newark officers stated that they fired their weapons
because they saw the Audi moving or heard it revving, indicating that it was still capable of flight. Bland disputed this assertion, arguing instead that the Audi became inoperable once it crashed into the scaffolding. Oliveira, though present,
d id not discharge his weapon at the terminus

.
The shooting finally ceased once Riefler obse rved Bland slumped over, and a Newark sergeant called for the
offic ers to hold their fire. Bland was shot between 16 and 18 times, including in the face, chest, and abdomen. H e suffered

numerous injuries, including a traumatic brain injury, respiratory failure, vision loss , and multiple facial fractures. No gun was recovered from the scene , and no officer observed Bland with a weapon during the course of the pursuit.

II

Bland and his wife Virginia filed a complaint in the Superior C ourt of New Jersey Law Division alleging (among other things) that Defendants violated Bland’s Fourth Amendment rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; N.J. St at . Ann. § 10:6

- 2(c) . Defendants removed the case to federal court and sought su mmary judgment , claiming qualified immunity.

After oral argument, t he District Court concluded that it was “not in a position to grant or deny qualified immunity.”9 App. 78. Instead, i t held that a jury must first decide two issues of material fact: (1) wh ether the Audi’s engine was revving (and thus whether the car was capable of moving) after it crashed into the scaffolding; and (2) whether the officers could
see Bland’s movements inside the vehicle. T he District Court opined that the Supreme Court’s deci sion in Plumhoff v.
Rickard , 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014)

, issued three years after the car chase, may decide the “central ” question of “ whether or not Corey Bland was an active threat to the officers at the terminus so as to justify their actions in using deadly force to end that
risk.” App. 73

. Accordingly, it denied Defendants’ motion, including with respect to the three officers who were n eit her
present n or discharge d their weapons at the terminus of the
chase

. Defendants moved for a stay of trial, whic h the District
Court denied. We entered an order st a ying the district court proceedings pending the resolution of this timely interlocutory appeal.

III

A

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § § 1331 and 1367

. We have jurisdiction under 28 U .S.C. § 1291 pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. , 772 F.3d 979, 986 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Our jurisdiction lies “only to the extent that the order
turns on an issue of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). We “possess jurisdiction to review whether the set of facts identified by the district court is sufficient to establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right,” but “we lack jurisdiction to consider whether the district court correctly identified the set of facts10 that the summary judgment record is sufficient to prove.” 4 Id. ( quoting Ziccardi v. City of Phila delphia , 288 F.3d 57, 61 (3d
Cir. 2002) ). “To the extent we have juri sdiction, this Court exercises plenary review.” Id.

S ummary judgment is proper only when the record

“ shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact i s material if it “affect [s] the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, we view the underlying facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Dougherty

, 772 F.3d at 986.

B

“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional right s of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Mullenix v. Luna , 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Pearson v.
Callahan , 555 U.S. 223 , 231 (2009)). In resolving questions of qualified immunity, “ courts engag e in a two

- pronged inquiry:

4 The Newark officers argue that the District Court erred by considering Bland’s expert testimony, which purported to establish that the Audi was incapable of moving once it crashed
into th e scaffolding. We do not have jurisdiction to review this ruling. See Blaylock v. City of Philadelphia , 504 F.3d 405, 409 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that, in appeals from denials of qualified immunity, “we lack jurisdiction to review questions of ‘evidence sufficiency’” and must instead confine ourselves to

“ pure questions of law”).11 (1) whether the plaintiff sufficiently alleged the violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether t he right was ‘clearly
established’ at the time of the official ’ s conduct. ” L.R. v. Sch.

Dist. o f Phila. , 836 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 201 6 ). We may
tackle these steps “in the order we deem most appropriate fo r the particular case before us. ” Santini v. Fuentes , 795 F.3d 410, 418 (3d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).

Just two terms ago , t he Supreme Court reiterated th e “longstanding principle that clearly estab lished law should not be defined at a high level of gen erality,” but must instead “be particularized to the facts of the case

. ” White v. Pauly , 137 S.
Ct. 548 , 552 (2017) (per curiam) ( internal quotation marks omitted) ; s ee also L.R. , 836 F.3d at 248

. More over , at the time the action is taken, the “legal principle [must] clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances before
him. The rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is clear
to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation he confronted .” District of Columbia v. Wesby , 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, “qualified immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’”
Mullenix , 136 S. Ct. at 308 (quoting Malley v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

C

T he District Court focused its analysis on the events that

occurr ed at the terminus of the reckless flight that ensued after Bland failed to comply with the traffic stop initiated by the New Jersey State Pol ice . W e begin by discussing the d eadly force used by six of the s ta te t roopers at Lincoln Park , and we conclude that they are all entitled to qualified immunity

.12 The Supreme Court has consistently held that officers
either did not violate the Fourth Amend ment or were entitled to qualified immunity when they used deadly force during car chase s similar to the one at issue here . In Brosseau v. Haugen

, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (per curiam)

, the Court held that an officer was entitled to qualified immunity after she shot “a disturbed felon, set on avoiding capture through vehicular flight, when persons in the immediate area [were] at risk from that flight.”
Id. at 200. In Scott v. Harris

, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), the Court
concluded that an officer did not violate the Fo urth Amendment when he “terminate[d] the car chase by ramming his bumper” into the car of a fugitive whose reckless driving “posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any pedestrians who might have been present, to other civilian motorists, and t o the officers involved in the chase.” Id. at 381,
384

. This was so even though the officer ran the motorist off
the road instea d of employing the standard “PIT maneuver” 5 to get the fleeing vehicle to stop, and this decision caused the vehicle to run down an embankment and overturn, rendering the plaintiff a quadriplegic. Id. at 375

.

In Plumhoff v. Rickard

, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014)

, decided
after the events giving rise to this suit

, the Court held that
officer s di d not violate the Fourth Amendment and alternatively were entitled to qualified immunity when they fatally shot a fugitive who m the officers reasonably believed was “intent on resuming” a chase that “pose[d] a deadly threat
for others on the road.” Id. at 2022 . A year later , in Mullenix v.

5 In a Pursuit Intervention Technique maneuver, the pursuing vehicle applies pressure to the rear of the fleeing vehicle, causing the fleeing vehicle to turn abruptly and come
to a stop.13 Luna

, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015)

, the Court concluded that an
officer who shot and killed a motorist during a high

- speed pursuit in which the fugitive threatened to kill police officers was entitled to qualified immunity , even though the officer’s
decision to shoot defied his supervisor’s orders. Id. at 306

– 07

, 312

.
Like the cases just mentioned , Bland’s behavior threatened the safety of the officers, as well as the public at large. B efore shots were fired at Lincoln Park

, Bland drove at high speeds, disregarded traffic signals, drove the w rong way down a one

- way street, collided wi th two occupied police vehicles, and failed to comply with orders to surrender

. As the gunfire erupted, he repeatedly attempted to flee from poli ce and state troopers , including by trying to drive with officers standing in clo se proximity to the Audi . And he engaged in all
of this behavior in a vehicle that had been reportedly taken at gunpoint a few hours earlier

. Bland does not direct us to any

c aselaw indicating that , especially in light of the precedent just discussed, “only someone plainly incompetent or who knowingly violates the law would have perceived a sufficient
threat and ac ted as [the state troopers] did ” in this situation.
Mullenix , 13 6 S. Ct. at 310 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted) ; see also Fields v. City of Philadelphia , 862 F.3d 353, 361 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that clearly established rights are derived either from binding Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent o r from a “robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority in the Courts of Appeals” (citation omitted))

. G iven the troopers’ reasonable belief that Bland was
armed

, and the mortal threat that his conduct posed to t h os e around him, the troopers who discharged their weapons at Lincoln Park did not violate Bland’s clearly established constitutional rights. And because Tho mpson, Murphy, and14 Oliveira fired their weapons only at this location

, they are plainly entitled to qualified immunity.

D

The events at the terminus of the car chase present a more complicated picture, but we reach the same conclusion
because Bland identifies no caselaw indicating tha t the officers violated clearly established law extant in 2011. See Anderson v. Creighton

, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987)

. He instead states in conclusory fashion that “every

. . . reasonable member of law enforcement should be aware that [the officers’] conduct
would constitute excessive fo rce.” Bland Br. 36. In support,
Bland argues that the officers were not in a position to see
whether he made threatenin g movements inside the vehicle,
and that the Audi’s impact with the scaffolding rendered it inoperable, b ringing the car chase to an end

. 6 As a result, Bland
contends that Brosseau and Scott no longer control , and we
should instead look to Tennessee v. Garner for guidance. In

6 After the parties submitted their summary judgment papers, Bland received a report from an automotive expert concerning whether the Audi could have moved after it collided with the scaffolding. The report contained pictures taken after the incident, inclu ding one that purportedly showed the driver’s side tinted window in one piece on the ground. At oral argument, Bland contended that this photograph demonstrated that the window was up during the final moments of the chase, meaning that the officers could n either have seen what Bland was doing inside the Audi nor heard his death
threats. We need not decide whether the District C ourt properly considered this evidence because, even assuming that it s decision to do so was correct, Bland has failed to show that the officers violated clearly established law.15 Garner

, the Supreme Court held that “if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given.” Tennessee v. Garner

, 471 U.S. 1 , 11

– 12 (1985). Applying that standard, the Court

co ncluded that an officer violated the Fourth Amendment by shooting an “unarmed, nondangerous” suspect in the back of the head as he attempted to flee the scene of a burglary. Id. at
11.

Bland ’s reliance on Garner is misplaced. T he Supreme
Court has noted t hat Garner “lay[s] out excessive

- force principles at only a general level” and “do[es] not by [itself] create clearly established law outside an obvious case.” White

, 137 S. Ct. at 552 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Scott , 550 U.S. at 38 2 ( not ing that “ Garner did not establish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer’s actions constitute ‘deadly force’” ).

T he officers here confronted a scenario quite different
from the one present ed in Garner , where the officer pursued
and shot a nondangerous suspect in the back of the head, even though the officer was “reasonably sure” the suspect was
unarmed. 471 U.S. at 3

– 4 ; see also Brosseau , 543 U.S. at 201 (noting that analysis of qualified immunity “ depends very

mu ch on the facts of each case ”)

. This becomes especially clear once we consider the officers’ actions “in light of t he specific context of the case, ” as we are required to do. Fields , 862 F.3d
at 361. T he s tate troopers and Officer Del Mauro

— all of whom

wer e present at Lincoln Park

— continued to pursue a fugitive
who once again disobey ed traffic lights, dro ve at excessive speed s , and put pedestrians and motorists at great risk. U nder16 Bland’s version of events, at least one innocent civilian
suffered harm by his flight when a state police car struck an occupied vehicle during the final leg of the pursuit. See Scott

, 550 U.S. at 379

– 80 (noting that the police were “forced to engage in the same hazardous maneuvers just to keep up” with the plaintiff). After t he crash, Bland threatened to kill the officers, and the record provides no evidence that he attempted
to surrender at any time

. Though the Audi remained pinned against the scaffolding, the officers had previously seen Bland successfully free the car and c ontinue to flee after the crash at
Lincoln Park

. And although the officers did not see a weapon, the police reports of an armed carjacking gave them reason to believe Bland was armed. See Pearson , 555 U.S. at 244 (noting that qualified immunity “turns on t he objective leg al reasonableness of the action” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). This was the situation the officers
confronted at the terminus of the chase when they discharge d their weapons. Bland identifies no cases with similar facts that

, in 2011, would have “put every reasonable offic[er] on notice” that using deadly force in such a situation violated clearly established constitutional rights. Fields , 862 F.3d at 361 ( internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, accepting (as we

mus t) the truth of Bland’s assertion s regarding the Audi’s immobility and the officers’ ability to see Bland’s hands

, our conclusion remains the same: the actions taken by the State Troopers and Officer Del Mauro are protect ed by qualified immunity.

But what about Newark Officers Torres and Martinez

, who, according to Bland, “arrived on the scene[ and] joined in the shooting without knowing whether Mr. Bland was firing at them, and without ever first observing Mr. Bland to be in possession of any firearm ” ? Bl and Br. 5. The Newark officers17 contend that video footage re futes this allegation, but we need not resolve that dispute

. 7 Here again, Bland has presented no caselaw demonstrating that the officers , who reasonably believed that Bland was armed, violated a c learly established right by joining in the chaotic scene and discharging their

weapons.

A r ecent Supreme Court decision demonstrates that Torres’s and Martinez’s actions did not violate clearly established rights

. In White v. Pauly , the Court granted qualified immunity to an officer who arrived late to an armed confrontation between multiple officers and individuals. 137 S.
Ct. at 549 , 551 . After seeing one of the civilians fire shots, the
defendant officer , without giving a warning, shot and killed

an other individual who pointed a weapon at the officers surrounding the house

. Id. at 550. The plaintiff s argued that the other officers had not adequately alerted the occupants to the

7 Though we need not look to the video for guidance, we take this opportunity to remind district courts of their obligation to do so when necessary to identify disputed issues
of material fact. At ora l argumen t, the Newark officer s requested that the District Co urt consider video footage they proffered to counter Bland’s version of events. The Court declined this invitation, st ating that it did not think it was “particularly smart” to “hav[e] judges review indi vidual tapes and say, hey, I’m satisfied.” App. 27. Notwithstanding the District Court’s independent assessment of the wisdom of this approach, the Supreme Court has instructed courts to consider
video evidence in the record and to “view[] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape,” especially when it “blatantly contradict[s]” the nonmovant’s narrative. Scott , 550 U.S. at
380

– 81.18 fact that they were officers, and that White, although late to the

scene, should have been aware that “corrective action was necessary.” Id. at 552. In reversing the denial of qualified immunity, the Court stated that “[c]learly established federal law does not prohibit a reasonable officer who arrives late to an ongoing police action in circumstances like this from assuming that proper procedures

. . . have already been
followed ,” and that “[n] o settled Fourth Amendment principle requires that officer to second

- guess the earlier steps already taken by his or her fellow officers .” Id. So too here. In the absence of any controlling law to the contrary , Newark
Officers Martinez and Torres likewise are entitled to qualified immunity. 8

I V

Because Defendants did not violate any of Bland’s clearly established constitutional rights

, w e will reverse the
order of the Dist rict Court so summary judgment may be
entered for Defendants.

8 Because Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, we need not reach the underlying Fourth

Am endment questions

. Pea rson , 555 U.S. at 236. Nothing in this opinion should be read to suggest that law enforcement officers violate the Fourth Amendment where, as here, they employ lethal force to neutralize a carjacking suspect reasonably perceived to be armed, dangerous, and unwilling to peacefully surrender.