UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ANTHONY BILAZZO,

 Plaintiff,

v.

PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES,

LLC,

 Defendant.

Civil No. 11-4517 (NLH/KMW)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

Jennifer M. Kurtz, Esquire 

The Law Office of Jennifer M. Kurtz 

540 Old Bridge Turnpike 

South River, New Jersey 08882 

Attorney for Plaintiff

Donald S. Maurice , Jr., Esquire 

Rachel Francesca Marin, Esquire

Maurice & Needleman, PC 

5 Walter E. Foran Boulevard 

Suite 2007 

Flemington, New Jersey 08822-4672 

Joann Needleman, Esquire 

Maurice & Needleman PC 

935 One Penn Center 

1617 JFK Boulevard 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103 

Attorneys for Defendant

HILLMAN, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion

[Doc. No. 10] for attorneys’ fees and costs to Defendant’s offer

of judgment seeking a total award in the amount of $4,669.00

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pursuant to Section 1692k(a)(3) of the Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). Defendant Portfolio

Recovery Associates, LLC, opposes Plaintiff’s motion and requests

that the Court deny the motion in its entirety, or alternatively,

reduce the total award of fees and costs to $698.00. The Court

has considered the parties’ submissions, and decides this matter

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78.

For the reasons expressed below, Plaintiff’s motion is

granted in part, but the total award of attorneys’ fees and costs

is reduced to $1,694.28. 

I. JURISDICTION

Plaintiff Anthony Bilazzo brings this action under the Fair

Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. 

Accordingly, the Court exercises jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action on August 8,

2011 asserting one count against Defendant alleging multiple

violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). 

(Compl. [Doc. No. 1] ¶ 13.) According to the complaint,

Defendant “constantly and continuously placed collection calls to

Plaintiff seeking and demanding payment of an alleged debt

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Plaintiff does not owe.” (Id. ¶ 9.) Apparently as a result of

these calls, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant on May 3, 2011

requesting that Defendant “cease any further communications with

Plaintiff regarding the alleged debt.” (Id. ¶ 10; see also Cease

and Desist Letter, Ex. A to Compl. [Doc. No. 1] 1.).

Plaintiff alleged that despite Defendant’s receipt of the

cease and desist letter on May 3, 2011, (see Compl. [Doc. No. 1]

¶ 11; see also Fax Confirmation, Ex. B. to Compl. [Doc. No. 1]

1), Defendant called Plaintiff on May 7, 2011 at 8:55 a.m. (See

Compl. [Doc. No. 1] ¶ 12; see also Ex. C to Compl. [Doc. No. 1]

1.) In this action, Plaintiff originally sought statutory

damages in the amount of $1,000.00, reasonable attorneys’ fees,

and any other relief deemed appropriated by the Court. (Id. ¶¶

14-16.) Defendant was served with a copy of Plaintiff’s

complaint on August 19, 2011. (Summons [Doc. No. 3] 1.)

Approximately one month later, Defendant served Plaintiff’s

counsel of record, Jennifer Kurtz, Esquire, with an Offer of

Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. (See 1

Offer of J., Ex. A to Pl.’s Notice of Acceptance of Def.’s Offer

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68(a) provides that “[a]t

least 14 days before the date set for trial, a party defending

against a claim may serve on an opposing party an offer to allow

judgment on specified terms, with the costs then accrued. If

within 14 days after being served, the opposing party serves

written notice accepting the offer, either party may then file

the offer and notice of acceptance, plus proof of service. The

clerk must then enter judgment.” FED. R. CIV. P. 68(a). 

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of J. [Doc. No. 8] 1-3.) Shortly thereafter, Defendant filed an

answer to the complaint on October 5, 2011. (See generally

Answer [Doc. No. 5].) Subsequently, on October 7, 2011,

Plaintiff filed a Notice of Acceptance of Defendant’s Offer of

Judgment. Pursuant to the Offer of Judgment, Defendant offered

“to allow judgment to be taken against it in the amount of

$1,001.00 ..., plus 1) ... reasonable attorneys fees and costs,

through the date of this Offer of Judgment, as may be determined

by the Court; 2) [the] actual costs for the filing fee of [the]

complaint in the U.S. District Court; and, 3) [the] actual costs

for service of the summons and complaint upon the Defendant.” 

(Offer of J., Ex. A to Pl.’s Notice of Acceptance of Def.’s Offer

of J. [Doc. No. 8] 1.)

The present motion for attorneys’ fees and costs was filed

on October 27, 2011 after the parties were unable to agree the

amount for such an award, and seeks the Court’s determination as

to the proper amount of attorneys’ fees and costs that should be

awarded pursuant to the Act and in accordance with Defendant’s

Offer of Judgment.

III. DISCUSSION

Under the FDCPA, a “debt collector who fails to comply with

any provision” of the Act with respect to an individual plaintiff

is liable for any actual damages sustained as well as statutory

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damages as awarded by the court, not to exceed $1,000.00. 15

U.S.C. §§ 1692k(a)(1), (a)(2)(A); see also Graziano v. Harrison,

950 F.2d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that two of the “three

standard components of liability for violations of the Act”

include “actual damages, [and] statutory damages as determined by

the court”). “[I]n the case of any successful action to enforce

... liability,” the Act provides for an award of “the costs of

the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as

determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); see also

Graziano, 950 F.2d at 113 (recognizing that Section 1692k(a)(3)

allows a prevailing plaintiff to recover a reasonable attorney’s

fee and costs). 

In the context of awarding attorneys’ fees under Section

1692k(a)(3), a plaintiff may be considered a “prevailing party”

if plaintiff succeeds on any significant issue in litigation

which achieves some of the benefit plaintiff sought by bringing

the suit. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433

(1983); Norton v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 216, 218

(D.N.J. 1999) (citing Hensely, 461 U.S. at 433); Conklin v.

Pressler & Pressler LLP, No. 10-3566, 2012 WL 569384, at *2

(D.N.J. Feb. 21, 2012). As the Third Circuit has recognized,

absent unusual circumstances, an award of attorney's fees to a

prevailing party in an FDCPA action “should not be construed as a

special or discretionary remedy” and is therefore required under

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the Act. Graziano, 950 F.2d at 113 (acknowledging that the FDCPA

“mandates an award of attorney's fees as a means of fulfilling

Congress's intent that the Act should be enforced by debtors

acting as private attorneys general.”).

Section 1692k(a)(3) specifically provides that an attorney’s

fee under the FDCPA must be reasonable. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). 

According to the Third Circuit, generally, “a reasonable fee is

one which is adequate to attract competent counsel, but which

do[es] not produce windfalls to attorneys.” Pub. Interest

Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1185

(3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotations and citation omitted). In

order to determine what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee

under the FDCPA, the Court must employ the well recognized

“lodestar” method applicable under other fee-shifting statutes

which entails multiplying the total number of hours reasonably

expended by a reasonable hourly rate. See Graziano, 950 F.2d at

114 (concluding that a reasonable fee under the FDCPA is

determined in accordance with Supreme Court precedent directing

that the number of hours reasonably expended should be multiplied

by a reasonable hourly rate) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433);

see also Maldonado v. Houstoun, 256 F.3d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 2001)

(recognizing in the context of Section 1983 that the

reasonableness of an attorney’s fee is calculated under the

lodestar formula); Norton, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 218-19 (applying the

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lodestar method to calculate reasonable attorney’s fee award

under Section 1692k(a)(3) of the FDCPA).

 It is the “party seeking attorney fees [that] bears the

ultimate burden of showing that its requested hourly rates and

the hours it claims are reasonable.” Interfaith Cmty. Org. v.

Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 426 F.3d 694, 703 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005)

(citation omitted). In order to meet this burden, the party

seeking fees is initially required to submit evidence supporting

the hours worked and the rates claimed. Id. To the extent the

opposing party seeks to challenge the fees sought, “the opposing

party must ... object ‘with sufficient specificity’ to the

request.” Id. Where the opposing party raises objections, “the

party requesting fees must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the

court that its fee request is reasonable.” Id. 

Additionally, although the lodestar is presumed to yield a

reasonable fee, district courts retain discretion to adjust the

lodestar. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir.

1990). Adjustments to the lodestar may be made based on a

variety of factors, including but not limited to: the time and

labor required; the novelty and difficulty of the legal issue;

the skill required to perform the legal service properly; the

customary fee in the community for similar work; the amount

involved and results obtained; the experience, reputation and

ability of the attorneys; the nature and length of the

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attorney-client relationship; and fee awards in similar cases. 

Pub. Interest Research Group, 51 F.3d at 1185 n.8 (citing Johnson

v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.

1974)).

IV. ANALYSIS

Initially, the Court notes Defendant does not dispute that

the FDCPA provides for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees,

nor does Defendant dispute that Plaintiff is considered the

prevailing party in this matter in light of his recovery of a

judgment for $1,001.00. (See Def.’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to

Pl.’s Mot. for Att’y’s Fees and Costs [Doc. No. 15] (hereinafter,

“Def.’s Opp’n”), 5.) Accordingly, the Court now turns to the

only issue the parties dispute — the reasonableness of the fees

requested.

A. Breakdown of Fee Award Sought by Plaintiff

Plaintiff seeks an award of attorneys’ fees totaling

$4,259.00. (Pl.’s Mot. for Att’y’s Fees and Costs to Def.’s

Offer of J. (hereinafter, “Pl.’s Mot.”) [Doc. No. 10] 9.) The

award requested by Plaintiff seeks fees for three attorneys and

one paralegal for their respective time spent on this matter

billing at the following rates: 

(1) Jennifer Kurtz, Esq. for 2.5 hours at

$350.00 per hour — totaling $875.00; 

(2) John Barker, Esq., for 5.7 hours at $350.00

per hour — totaling $1,995.00; 

(3) Mahadhi Corzano, Esq., for 5.9 hours at

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$210.00 per hour — totaling $1,239.00; and 

(4) Moira Roth, Legal Assistant, for 1.2 hours

at $125.00 per hour — totaling $150.00.

 

(Id.) Plaintiff also seeks to recover $410.00 in litigation

costs which includes the $350.00 filing fee for the complaint,

and $60.00 cost for service of Plaintiff’s complaint. (Id. at

14; see also Absolute Process and Litigation Invoice, Ex. I [Doc.

No. 10-9] 1.) Defendant does not dispute Plaintiff’s ability to

recover $410.00 in litigation costs pursuant to the terms of the

Offer of Judgment. Therefore, $410.00 will be added to lodestar

calculation set forth infra. 

B. Compensable Period

As a threshold matter to the awarding of attorneys’ fees in

this case, Defendant objects to the inclusion in such an award of

any fees incurred after the date of the Offer of Judgment (“the

Offer”) – that being September 23, 2011. (Def.’s Opp’n. 11.) 

Defendant contends that the Offer “was clear on its face:

acceptance of the offer of judgment would entitle the Plaintiff

to the judgment amount plus reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred

through the date of the offer.” (Id.) (citing Offer of J., Ex. A

to Pl.’s Notice of Acceptance of Def.’s Offer of J. [Doc. No. 8]

1) (emphasis in original). Thus, Defendant argues that the Offer

was a contract which Plaintiff accepted, Plaintiff is bound by

the accrual date therein, and under the Offer’s express terms,

Plaintiff cannot recover $1,596.00 worth of fees for 5.6 hours of

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work billed by attorneys Kurtz, Barker, and Corzano after the

date of the September 23, 2011 Offer. (Def.’s Opp’n 11.) 2

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68(a) permits a party to

“offer to allow judgment [against it] on specified terms, with

the costs then accrued.” FED. R. CIV. P. 68(a). Thus, an offer

of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 constitutes a contract which

“should be interpreted like any other contract.” Kyreakakis v.

Paternoster, 732 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 n.3 (D.N.J. 1990); see also

Weed-Schertzer v. Nudelman, Klemm & Golub, No. 10-6402, 2011 WL

4436553, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2011). In drafting the terms of

a Rule 68 offer of judgment “a party may specify within the offer

of judgment a cut-off date for the accrual of fees and costs.” 

Alexander v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., No. 11-401, 2011 WL 2415156, at

*3 (E.D. Pa. June 16, 2011); see also Weed-Schertzer, 2011 WL

4436553, at *5 (recognizing that “‘an [o]ffer of judgment is a

contract, and if a party has agreed to the accrual date therein,

that date will control.’”) (citation omitted). 

Interpreting similar, and in some cases identical, language

in a Rule 68 offer of judgment to that presented here, courts

within this Circuit have routinely found that such language

constitutes “an enforceable temporal limitation on Plaintiff’s

2. If the Court accepts Defendant’s argument, Plaintiff would

necessarily be precluded from recovering the fees incurred in

preparing the present motion because Plaintiff’s attorneys

expended this time on October 24, 2011, approximately one month

after the date of the Offer. 

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potential attorney’s fees” which warrants the exclusion of fees

accrued after the date the offer was served. See Weed-Schertzer,

2011 WL 4436553, at *5-6 (interpreting identical language in Rule

68 offer and excluding 8.3 hours of time where offer “plainly

state[d] that reasonable attorney’s fees may be recovered through

‘the date of the Offer’”) (emphasis in original); see also

Zavodnick v. Gordon & Weisberg, P.C., No. 10-7125, 2012 WL

2036493, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 2012) (holding that offer of

judgment, which specifically included “‘reasonable attorneys fees

and costs, through the date of this Offer of Judgment, as may be

determined by the Court’”, “unambiguously excluded” fees incurred

after the offer was served); Brass v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., No.

11-cv-1611, 2011 WL 3862145, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 2011)

(excluding 7.1 hours accrued after the date offer of judgment was

served where offer explicitly stated that “‘the Judgment entered

shall include an amount for Plaintiff's reasonable costs and

attorney's fees accrued through the date of this Offer of

Judgment.’”); Alexander, 2011 WL 2415156, at *3-4 (finding that

terms of a Rule 68 offer precluded recovery of 5.4 hours billed

after the date of the offer which provided for attorney's fees

“‘accrued through the date of this Offer of Judgment.’”) 

In this instance, the relevant language of Defendant’s Offer

explicitly provides as follows: “Defendant, Portfolio Recovery

Associates, LLC, pursuant to Federal Rule[] of Civil Procedure

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68, hereby offers to allow judgment to be taken against it in the

amount of $1,001.00 ..., plus 1) your reasonable attorneys fees

and costs, through the date of this Offer of Judgment, as may be

determined by the Court[.]” (Offer of J., Ex. A to Pl.’s Notice

of Acceptance of Def.’s Offer of J. [Doc. No. 8] 1) (emphasis

added). Plaintiff does not appear to challenge that Defendant

served the Offer on September 23, 2011. Furthermore, Plaintiff

does not dispute that the Offer contains the specific phrase

“through the date of this Offer of Judgment”, nor does Plaintiff

argue that the language of the Offer is ambiguous in any respect.

Rather, Plaintiff’s sole argument in response is that the

time incurred in preparing the present motion for fees should not

be reduced. (Pl.’s Reply Br. [Doc. No. 18] 7.) Plaintiff 3

relies on case law from multiple district courts and several

Courts of Appeals, including the Third Circuit, to argue that

“[i]t is generally accepted ... that time spent preparing the fee

petition is compensable.” (Id. at 6-7.) Thus, Plaintiff argues

that the time incurred after September 23, 2011 to prepare this

motion should not be reduced.

The Court disagrees with Plaintiff in this particular

3. It is unclear whether, by asserting this argument, Plaintiff

concedes that time incurred after the date of the Offer other

than that expended to prepare the present motion is properly

excluded. The Court need not address this issue based on its

finding infra that all time beyond the date of the Offer is

properly excluded. 

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circumstance because the language of the Offer expressly stated

that it included “reasonable attorneys fees and costs, through

the date of this Offer of Judgment[.]” (Offer of J., Ex. A to

Pl.’s Notice of Acceptance of Def.’s Offer of J. [Doc. No. 8] 1)

(emphasis added). The Court finds that the terms of Defendant’s

Offer were clear and constitute a reasonable temporal limitation

on Plaintiff’s recoverable attorneys’ fees. See Weed-Schertzer,

2011 WL 4436553, at *6. If Plaintiff wanted to ensure recovery

of attorneys’ fees incurred after the date of the Offer,

including those related to preparation of this motion, Plaintiff

was free to reject the Offer outright or negotiate for different

terms. Plaintiff did not do so, and in accepting the Offer,

Plaintiff agreed to limit the recoverable fees to those incurred

only through September 23, 2011. Plaintiff is thus bound to that

accrual date. 

Therefore, consistent with the terms of the Offer, the Court

will exclude 5.6 hours of time billed after September 23, 2011. 

See, e.g., Weed-Schertzer, 2011 WL 4436553, at *5-6; Zavodnick,

2012 WL 2036493, at *2-3; Brass, 2011 WL 3862145, at *3-4;

Alexander, 2011 WL 2415156, at *3-4. After the exclusion of 5.6

hours of time accrued beyond the date of the Offer, the remaining

8.5 attorney hours to be considered on this motion are as

follows: (1) Jennifer Kurtz, Esq. — 1.6 hours; (2) John Barker,

Esq. — 3.6 hours; and (3) Mahadhi Corzano, Esq. — 3.3 hours. 

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C. Compensation to Non-New Jersey “Consulting” Attorneys

 Defendant also objects to the award of any attorneys’ fees

for services rendered by John Barker, Esq. and Mahadhi Corzano,

Esq. on the basis that the services provided by these attorneys, 4

who are not admitted to practice in the state of New Jersey or

before the bar of this Court, are not recoverable. (Def.’s 5

Opp’n 13.) The Court notes that the time incurred by Mr. Barker

and Mr. Corzano constitutes 6.9 hours of the remaining 8.5

attorney hours under consideration here. According to the

Court’s calculations then, over eighty-one percent (81%) of the

total attorney time billed in this case before the date of the

Offer of Judgment was performed by these two attorneys, and if

the Court accepts Defendant’s argument, cannot be recovered. 

Plaintiff indicates that Mr. Barker and Mr. Corzano

“incurred time in this matter as consulting attorneys[] only.” 

(Pl.’s Mem. 9 n.4.) Plaintiff concedes the fact that Mr. Barker

and Mr. Corzano are not admitted to practice in the state of New

Jersey or before the bar of this Court. (See Pl.’s Reply 2-3). 

However, according to Plaintiff, “a reasonable attorney fee

4. Both Mr. Barker and Mr. Corzano are attorneys with the law

firm of Krohn and Moss, Ltd. (Pl.’s Mem. 9.)

5. The parties do not dispute that Jennifer Kurtz, Esq. is a

licensed attorney admitted to practice in the state of New Jersey

and before this Court. (See Def.’s Opp’n 15; Pl.’s Reply Br. 4.) 

Thus, Defendant does not challenge the awarding of fees incurred

by Ms. Kurtz on this basis. 

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includes time spent by individuals that are not members of the

bar, but whose work product contributes to the results obtained

in this case.” (Pl.’s Mem. 9 n.4) (citing Missouri v. Jenkins,

491 U.S. 274 (1989)). 

In this regard, Defendant argues that fees for work by Mr.

Barker and Mr. Corzano should be denied because neither of these

attorneys registered with the New Jersey Lawyers’ Fund for Client

Protection pursuant New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct

5.5(c)(6). (Def.’s Opp’n 14.) Defendant also contends that the

majority of this time includes work which should have been, but

was not, adequately supervised by Ms. Kurtz. (Id. at 15.) 

Specifically, Defendant points to the fact that although

Plaintiff is a citizen of New Jersey, Ms. Kurtz never spoke to

Plaintiff and never sent Plaintiff any correspondence regarding

his complaint or the status of this litigation. (Id.) Defendant

also asserts that Ms. Kurtz was not involved in any of the

initial work in this cause because it was Mr. Barker who handled

Plaintiff’s initial inquiry, handled the initial client consult

with Plaintiff, and conducted Plaintiff’s client interview. (Id.

15-17.) Thereafter, Defendant notes that it was Mr. Corzano,

who, without any supervision from Ms. Kurtz, drafted the

complaint, sent correspondence to Plaintiff, and sent a demand to

Defendant on Plaintiff’s behalf. (Id. at 16-17.) 

Defendant also raises several issues with respect to Krohn

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and Moss, Ltd.’s (“Krohn and Moss”) practices in retaining

clients and engaging local counsel. Defendant points out that

Krohn and Moss’s website “invites individuals, like Plaintiff, to

either call their 1-800 number or submit a ‘free case review.’” 

(Id. at 18; see also Screen shot of Krohn and Moss website, Ex.

B. to Certification of Donald S. Maurice [Doc. No. 15-5] 1.) 

Defendant also alleges that Krohn and Moss “advertises for ‘local

counsel’ and suggests that local counsel will have little or no

involvement in the litigation.” (Def.’s Opp’n 18; see also

Craig’s List Advertisement, Ex. C. to Certification of Donald S.

Maurice [Doc. No. 15-6] 1.) 

The Craig’s List advertisement submitted by Defendant

indicates that Krohn and Moss is seeking “local counsel” for

federal court filings in Iowa and asserts that Krohn and Moss

would “would pay a ‘flat’ $150 per case just for the right to

designate the attorney as ... local counsel ([with] no work

required other than signing off on the complaint)[.]” (See

Craig’s List Advertisement, Ex. C. to Certification of Donald S.

Maurice [Doc. No. 15-6] 1.) The advertisement further sets forth

that Krohn and Moss “would cover any trials or heavy litigation

and will handle all paperwork.” (Id.) Based on all of the

above, Defendant argues that the majority of legal services

provided here were performed by individuals not authorized to

practice law in New Jersey and without attorney supervision thus

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warranting denial of these fees. (Def.’s Opp’n 19.) 

The issue the Court must resolve in this circumstance is

whether the work conducted by Mr. Barker and Mr. Corzano was done

merely in their purported role as “consulting attorneys” or

whether their work was of such a significant nature that it can

fairly be said that these attorneys “appeared” and “participated”

in this case on Plaintiff’s behalf. The precise nature of the

relationship between Ms. Kurtz and the attorneys from Krohn and

Moss, Mr. Barker and Mr. Corzano, is unclear to the Court. What 6

is clear, however, is that neither Mr. Barker, nor Mr. Corzano

are licensed to practice by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. 

(Pl.’s Reply Br. 2-5). Accordingly, these attorneys cannot be

considered for plenary admission to the bar of the District Court

of New Jersey pursuant to Local Civil Rule 101.1(b). 

As the comments to Local Rule 101.1 make clear,

“[m]embership in New Jersey’s federal bar is restricted to

attorneys licensed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, ..., and

patent attorneys, .... All other counsel wishing to appear

before the Court must be admitted pro hac vice under L.Civ.R.

101.1(c) in civil cases[.]” Cmt. 3 to L. CIV. R. 101.1. In this

6. To the extent Defendant contends that Ms. Kurtz and the

attorneys at Krohn and Moss have an undisclosed fee-sharing

arrangement that violates the New Jersey Rules of Professional

Conduct, the record before the Court at this time is insufficient

to make this determination and will therefore not be addressed

herein. 

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District, where an attorney cannot seek plenary admission, the

attorney must seek leave to appear pro hac vice pursuant to Local

Civil Rule 101.1(c) which provides that “[a]ny member in good

standing of the bar of any court of the United States or of the

highest court of any state, who is not under suspension or

disbarment by any court and is ineligible for admission to the

bar of this Court under L.Civ.R. 101.1(b), may in the discretion

of the Court, on motion, be permitted to appear and participate

in a particular case.” L. CIV. R. 101.1(c)(1) (emphasis added). 

Thus, if Mr. Barker and Mr. Corzano’s work can fairly be

considered as “appearing and participating” in this case, then

Mr. Barker and Mr. Corzano were required to seek admission pro

hac vice pursuant to the Local Rules. 

In determining whether these attorneys functioned in a

“consulting” role or in a more qualitatively significant manner

in this case, the Court is guided first by the New Jersey Supreme

Court’s decision in In re Jackman, 761 A.2d 1103 (2000). There,

the New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether Steven Jackman,

an attorney originally licensed to practice in Massachusetts,

engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in New Jersey while

he was employed as an associate in a large law firm but was not

licensed to practice in New Jersey. Initially, the Supreme Court

recognized that protection of the public and assurance of the

proper, orderly, and efficient administration of justice in New

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Jersey constitute fundamental interests that are “implicated

whether an attorney counsels a client through a transaction

culminating in the client’s execution of legally binding

documents, or counsels and represents a client during a litigated

matter.” In re Jackman, 761 A.2d at 1105.

In reviewing Mr. Jackman’s conduct, the Supreme Court noted

that although Mr. Jackman “consulted with other [New Jersey

licensed] lawyers on New Jersey law matters, ... [Mr. Jackman]

otherwise operated as if he were a fully authorized associate at

the firm.” Id. Based on the nature of the work Mr. Jackman

performed, the Supreme Court concluded that his conduct

represented “the unabashed practice of law in New Jersey by one

who lacked a New Jersey license to practice.” Id. at 1106. 

Importantly, the fact that Mr. Jackman “may not have appeared in

court, but [only] worked on transactional matters,” did not

govern the Supreme Court’s conclusion that Mr. Jackman was

practicing law in New Jersey. Id. According to the Supreme

Court “[o]ne is engaged in the practice of law whenever legal

knowledge, training, skill and ability are required.” Id. In

arriving at the conclusion that Mr. Jackman was practicing law

without a license, the Supreme Court found that Mr. Jackman “had

taken on all the duties of a lawyer rending legal services to

clients [because he] ... interviewed and counseled clients,

prepared and signed documents to or on behalf of clients, and

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negotiated with lawyers on the merger and acquisition matters he

handled.” Id. at 1107. 

Although In re Jackman is particularly instructive,

Plaintiff, relying on Winterrowd v. American General Annuity Ins.

Co., 556 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2009), argues that “fees for out-ofstate attorneys providing assistance to lead counsel are

recoverable because such conduct does not rise to the level of

‘appearing’ before the district court.” (Pl.’s Reply Br. 3.) 

While the Court finds Plaintiff’s reliance on Winterrowd

misplaced here, Winterrowd does provide significant guidance on

this issue of a consulting attorney generally. In finding that

plaintiffs could recover attorney’s fees for the work of an outof-state attorney in Winterrowd, the Ninth Circuit concluded that

the out-of-state attorney acted in a “litigation support” or

consultant capacity where he “did not physically appear before

the Central District, did not sign pleadings in the case before

the Central District, had minimal, nonexclusive contacts with the

... plaintiffs, that [lead counsel], who was licensed to practice

law in California, was the person who alone remained responsible

to the plaintiffs, and that [the out-of-state attorney] did not

render legal services directly to the plaintiffs[.]” 556 F.3d at

824-25. 

The Court also finds instructive another FDCPA case

involving different attorneys from the same law firm involved in

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the present case, Krohn and Moss, where the District Court for

the Central District of California faced a similar issue on a

motion for attorneys’ fees. Krapf v. Nationwide Credit Inc., No.

09-00711, 2010 WL 4261444, at *1, 3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2010). 

In Krapf, the defendant objected to fees sought for nonCalifornia counsel arguing that the plaintiff could not recover

fees for the work of unlicensed attorneys. Id. at *2. The court

rejected this argument and permitted plaintiff to recover

attorney’s fees for work performed by the out-of-state attorney

because that attorney: (1) “recorded a modest number of hours” as

compared to associates from Krohn and Moss; (2) acted as a

consultant by only “reviewing motions, preparing memos, and

discussing trial strategy”; (3) did not sign or draft any

pleadings in the case; and (4) did not have any contact with the

plaintiff or opposing counsel. Id. at *3. Thus, the out-ofstate attorney “acted in such a manner that his contribution was

distinguishable from an ‘appearance.’” Id. 

With this guidance in mind, the Court finds while the

particular circumstances may vary from case to case, generally, 

an out-of-state attorney functions as a “consulting” attorney

where that attorney: 

(1) refrains from direct contact with the client

through either client consults, interviews,

telephone calls, in-person meetings, or

correspondence, etc.; 

(2) refrains from any significant contact with

opposing counsel, including but not limited to,

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presenting a settlement demand/offer on behalf of

the client or granting extensions of time to file

court documents;

(3) does not sign pleadings or motions filed with the

court, and does not draft a substantial portion of

the pleadings– specifically the complaint;

(4) engages almost exclusively in activities such as

reviewing motions, preparing memos, editing

documents, discussing litigation strategy with

lead counsel, conducting legal research, and the

like; and 

(5) records only a modest number of hours during the

course of litigation as compared to that of lead

counsel and other attorneys admitted to practice

in the relevant jurisdiction.

In the Court’s view, serving as a “consulting” attorney is

qualitatively different than “appearing and participating” in a

given case, and the issue of whether the attorney ever physically

appears before the court is not particularly instructive to

evaluating an out-of-state attorney’s role in a case. The

determination turns instead on the nature of the work and whether

the out-of-state attorney can fairly be said to have “taken on

all the duties of a lawyer rendering legal services to clients”

such as “interview[ing] and counsel[ing] clients, prepar[ing] and

sign[ing] documents to or on behalf of clients, and negotiat[ing]

with lawyers” representing the client’s adversary. Cf. In re

Jackman, 761 A.2d at 1106-07. 

Here, Plaintiff essentially contends that Mr. Barker’s and

Mr. Corzano’s hours, which were incurred to “provide assistance”

to lead counsel, Ms. Kurtz, are compensable under Winterrowd. 

However, Plaintiff’s reliance on Winterrowd is unwarranted and

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his argument is flawed because it presupposes, without offering

any support, that the nature of the work performed by Mr. Barker

and Mr. Corzano constituted mere “assistance” to Ms. Kurtz and

did not rise to level of “appearing” before this Court. In this

case, the nature of the work performed by Mr. Barker and Mr.

Corzano is fundamentally, qualitatively different than that of

the out-of-state attorneys involved in Winterrowd or Krapf. 

While Plaintiff indicates that Mr. Barker and Mr. Corzano

are merely “consulting” attorneys and that Ms. Kurtz was “lead

counsel” in this case, the Court finds that characterization of

their respective roles to be quite problematic. Initially, as

noted supra, over eighty-one percent (81%) of the remaining 8.5

hours of potentially compensable attorney time was incurred by

the so-called “consulting” attorneys Mr. Barker and Mr. Corzano —

a total of 6.9 hours. Thus, Ms. Kurtz’s efforts in this case

account for a mere nineteen-percent (19%) of the total attorney

fees sought by Plaintiff. The numbers do not lie, and these

percentages alone strongly suggest to the Court that Ms. Kurtz’s

role was secondary to that of Mr. Barker and Mr. Corzano. 

Although Ms. Kurtz is listed as counsel of record in this case,

the delegation of work between these attorneys demonstrates that

Mr. Barker and Mr. Corzano were in fact lead counsel and

fulfilled far more than a mere “consulting attorney” role in this

litigation. 

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Furthermore, the pleadings and motions filed by Plaintiff

lead the Court to the same conclusion that Ms. Kurtz served in

only a minimal capacity in this case. While Ms. Kurtz may have

signed all the pleadings and motions filed on behalf of

Plaintiff, those documents repeatedly indicate that Krohn and

Moss, and not Ms. Kurtz or her law firm, represented Plaintiff in

this case. For example, the first line of the complaint sets

forth that “Plaintiff, Anthony Bilazzo (Plaintiff), through his

attorneys, Krohn & Moss, LTD., alleges the following against

Defendant[.]” (Compl. [Doc. No. 1] 1) (emphasis added). 

Additionally, Krohn and Moss is identified as “Of Counsel” in

Plaintiff’s complaint. (Id. at 4.) Similarly the present motion

for attorneys’ fees reiterates that “Plaintiff, by and through

his attorneys Krohn & Moss, Ltd. (“K&M”), brought suit pursuant

to provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act[.]” 

(Pl.’s Mem. 1.) The motion concludes by explicitly stating that

“Plaintiff was represented by Krohn & Moss, Ltd, a consumer

protection law firm that has represented thousands of consumers

to date and relies solely on the fee-shifting provision of the

FDCPA to be paid.” (Id. at 15.) These repeated representations

that Krohn and Moss represents Plaintiff are another clear

indication to the Court that Mr. Barker and Mr. Corzano were in

fact lead counsel in this case and not merely “consulting” with

Ms. Kurtz. 

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Moreover, the billing records submitted by Plaintiff resolve

any lingering uncertainty regarding which attorneys served as

lead counsel in this case. These records demonstrate that the

nature of the work performed by Mr. Barker and Mr. Corzano went

far beyond “consulting”, and the Court finds that these attorneys

actively “appeared and participated” in this case. For example,

with respect to Mr. Barker, the billing records presented to the

Court specify that the 3.6 hours billed by Mr. Barker included

the following work completed between May 11, 2011 and May 13,

2011:

(1) receiving the initial client inquiry from

Plaintiff;

(2) setting up a client consultation with

Plaintiff;

(3) researching the “viability” of Defendant;7

(4) drafting a factual summary of the case with

instructions on how to proceed with the

litigation;

(5) conducting a client interview of Plaintiff;8

7. Presumably this research was done for the purpose of

determining whether or not Defendant was “judgment proof” and to

permit Mr. Barker to assess whether bringing a suit against

Defendant could potentially result in either a settlement or the

recovery of money damages. 

8. The billing records reflect that this interview conducted by

Mr. Barker was the only interview with Plaintiff during the

entirety of this case by any of the three attorneys involved, and

also indicate that Plaintiff had no further telephone or inperson communications with any of these attorneys from May 13,

2011 to the Offer of Judgment Date – September 23, 2011. 

(Attorney Billing Records, Ex. C to Pl.’s Mot. [Doc. No. 10-3] 3-

5.) The Court declines to comment on the sufficiency of

counsel’s efforts to keep Plaintiff apprised of the status of his

case, and simply observes these facts for purposes of assessing

whether Mr. Barker and Mr. Corzano were merely “consulting”

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(6) preparing a memo regarding which counts to

allege in the complaint; and

(7) researching applicable state and federal

statutes to determine venue, and any additional

state or federal claims to assert.

(Attorney Billing Records, Ex. C to Pl.’s Mot. [Doc. No. 10-3]

5.) These entries further reflect that all of the work performed

by Mr. Barker was done independently of Ms. Kurtz, and that she

did not supervise, review, or otherwise assist Mr. Barker in any

meaningful, substantive manner in this case. 

With respect to Mr. Corzano, the billing records presented

to the Court demonstrate that the 3.3 hours billed by Mr. Corzano

included the following work completed between June 16, 2011 and

September 13, 2011:

(1) composing the initial draft of the complaint;

(2) reviewing information provided by Plaintiff for

the purpose of drafting the complaint;

(3) researching the FDCPA to determine applicable

violations for inclusion in the complaint;

(4) drafting the introduction, jurisdiction, venue,

and identity of the party sections of the

complaint;

(5) drafting the statement of facts and the FDCPA

count of the complaint;

(6) preparing the verification signed by Plaintiff

and attached to the complaint;

(7) editing the complaint and sending it to Ms. Kurtz

for review and approval;

(8) revising the complaint per Ms. Kurtz’s

instructions;

(9) sending correspondence directly to Plaintiff;

(10) preparing and sending a pre-suit settlement

demand to Defendant, and following up with

Defendant several weeks later in an “attempt to

resolve [the] case prior to commencing

attorneys in this matter. 

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litigation”;

(11) preparing and sending correspondence to

Defendant’s counsel agreeing to “an extension to

Answer with demand to settle [the] case”;

(12) reviewing the case to verify and assess

Defendant’s allegations regarding the bona fide

error defense.

(Attorney Billing Records, Ex. C to Pl.’s Mot. [Doc. No. 10-3] 3-

5.) The billing records further establish that Mr. Corzano acted

independently of Ms. Kurtz with respect to several significant

tasks set forth above, including drafting the entirety of the

complaint, determining relevant FDCPA violations for inclusion in

the complaint, preparing Plaintiff’s verification, sending

correspondence directly to Plaintiff, and preparing and sending a

pre-suit demand to Defendant to resolve the case prior to the

complaint being filed.

Between Mr. Barker and Mr. Corzano, these two attorneys had

substantial and direct contact with the client through client

consults, interviews, and correspondence. Mr. Corzano also

engaged in significant contact with opposing counsel and

Defendant by presenting Defendant with a pre-suit demand to

resolve the case on Plaintiff’s behalf, following-up on the

status of that demand, and granting an extension of time to file

an answer. Although neither Mr. Barker nor Mr. Corzano actually

signed the pleadings or motions filed with the Court, Mr. Corzano

drafted the entire complaint independently of Ms. Kurtz and based

largely on information Mr. Barker, not Ms. Kurtz, actually

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obtained from Plaintiff. Additionally, while Ms. Kurtz’s name

follows the “/s/” on these documents, the documents repeatedly

confirm that Plaintiff was represented by Krohn and Moss – i.e.,

through Mr. Barker and Mr. Corzano. 

Taking these circumstances under consideration, the Court

finds that the nature of the work performed by Mr. Barker and Mr.

Corzano went far beyond simply reviewing motions, preparing

memos, editing documents, and conducting legal research. These

attorneys clearly took on the duties of lawyers rendering legal

services to Plaintiff by interviewing and counseling Plaintiff,

drafting the complaint, and negotiating on behalf of Plaintiff to

settle the case. The reality that these attorneys served as lead

counsel and actively participated in litigating this case is

confirmed by the fact they billed over four times as many hours

in this case than Ms. Kurtz. In these circumstances, the Court 9

9. In light of the facts and circumstances outlined herein, the

Court is deeply concerned by the Craig’s List advertisement

Defendant submitted in connection with the present motion. This

internet based advertisement - or classified ad - demonstrates

that Krohn and Moss, at least in other cases, might be seeking

local counsel to appear on behalf of plaintiffs in other district

courts, with the apparent intention that Krohn and Moss will

handle 80-90% of the actual litigation in the case and will

simply pay local counsel to “sign-off” on court filings while

Krohn and Moss covers the “heavy litigation” and handled “all

paperwork”. The role of local counsel, at least in this

District, requires more. 

 Although it appears that Ms. Kurtz’s overall involvement in

this case is generally consistent with that advertised and

marketed for by Krohn and Moss on at least one previous occasion,

there is no direct evidence before the Court to demonstrate that

Krohn and Moss recruited the services of Ms. Kurtz in this

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finds that Mr. Barker and Mr. Corzano “appeared and participated”

in this litigation within the meaning of Local Civil Rule

101.1(c) and thus were required to obtain admission pro hac vice. 

However, the record clearly reflects neither of these attorneys

ever sought, nor were granted, leave to appear pro hac vice at

any time during the pendency of this case.

At least one other federal court has encountered similar

“confusion regarding the status of plaintiff’s counsel” in a

FDCPA case where Krohn and Moss, through Mr. Barker, was involved

in the representation of plaintiff. Carman v. CBE Group, Inc.,

782 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1235 n.58 (D. Kan. 2011). The district

court in Carman noted that Krohn and Moss, and specifically Mr.

Barker, were “apparently lead counsel for plaintiff” but “had not

taken steps to be admitted pro hac vice” pursuant to the district

court’s local rules. Id. The district court further commented

that while attorney, Raymond Probst, Jr. of The Probst Law Firm

in Kansas City, Kansas entered his appearance in the case as

local counsel, Mr. Probst signed his pleadings as both a member

of The Probst Law Firm and as a member of Krohn and Moss, thereby

adding to the uncertainty of plaintiff’s representation. Id. 

The district court addressed this matter by communicating with

particular case by way of a similar Craig’s List advertisement or

other classified posting. The Court merely notes that such a

general practice is questionable under the Local Rules in this

District. 

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Mr. Barker directly wherein the court learned that the “failure

to seek pro hac vice status was [apparently] inadvertent[.]” Id. 

At this time, it is also worth noting that Krohn and Moss is

a consumer protection law firm that purportedly “relies solely on

the fee-shifting provision of the FDCPA to be paid.” (Pl.’s Mem.

15.) Accepting this representation as true, one could reasonably

expect that attorneys relying so heavily on this fee-shifting

provision for compensation would carefully review and familiarize

themselves with the local civil rules for attorney admission in

any district court where those attorneys are not admitted to

practice but seek to initiate litigation so as to ensure their

compliance with the local rules and any other ethical guidelines

governing the practice of law in that district. In this case, as

in Carman v. CBE Group, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1235 n.58 (D.

Kan. 2011), it appears that the attorneys from Krohn and Moss,

particularly Mr. Barker for a second time, failed to engage in

such a reasonable course of professional conduct. On the record

presented here, the Court will assume that this failure was

inadvertent and resulted from counsel’s oversight. There is not

sufficient evidence presented here to warrant a finding by this

Court that counsel purposefully violated the Local Civil Rules of

this District by not seeking admission pro hac vice.

However, this failure, even if inadvertent, cannot be

condoned by the Court. “[I]t is well established that ‘a federal

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court has the power to control admission to its bar and to

discipline attorneys who appear before it.’” Surrick v. Killion,

449 F.3d 520, 531 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,

501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991). Moreover, the Court is “afforded a

‘great deal of discretion’ to adjust the awarded [attorneys’] fee

in light of the opponent’s objections” and finds that such

discretion must be utilized here based on the significant

objections raised by Defendant. See Levy v. Global Credit and

Collection Corp., No. 10-4229, 2011 WL 5117855, at *2 (D.N.J.

Oct. 27, 2011) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). 

The failure of Mr. Barker and Mr. Corzano to properly seek

admission pro hac vice in this case is troublesome to the Court

because it essentially disregards the Court’s well established

power to control admission to its own bar. Therefore, the Court

cannot, in good conscience, permit Plaintiff to recover the

entirety of the fees sought for Mr. Barker and Mr. Corzano. 

However, the Court disagrees with Defendant that no fees should

be awarded for this work based on the mandatory nature of a fee

award under Section 1692k(a)(3) of the FDCPA. Accordingly,

having reconciled these issues, the Court will impose a flat

fifteen percent (15%) reduction of the total fee award with

respect to these two attorneys after the lodestar calculation is

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complete. Additionally, the Court will then subtract another 10

$150.00 from each attorney’s fee award — the payment each

attorney would have been required to pay pursuant to Local Civil

Rule 101.1(c)(3) had they properly sought and been granted pro

hac vice admission. The Court finds this approach reasonable 11

and equitable particularly where case law offers support for the

complete denial of attorneys’ fees where attorneys are not

admitted pro hac vice. See, e.g., Idaho Sporting Congress, Inc.

V. Alexander, 23 F. App’x 713, 714 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Failure of

... counsel to properly and timely secure pro hac vice admission

before the district court was a sufficient reason to deny [their]

application for attorneys’ fees[.]”); Martz v. PNC Bank, N.A.,

No. 06-1075, 2008 WL 1994858, at *4 n.19 (W.D. Pa. May 5, 2008)

10. The decision to permit these non-admitted attorneys to

recover the remaining eighty-five percent (85%) of their fees as

determined by the lodestar calculation should not be construed to

mean that in any case and in all circumstances, non-admitted

attorneys will recover such a large portion of their fees. These

particular attorneys are now on notice of their obligation to

abide by the local rules governing attorney admission. Any

future violation of the local rules will likely be willful rather

than inadvertent or otherwise excusable. Furthermore, the

percentage awarded in this case shall not be construed as

precedent with regard to future fee applications before this

Court made by other attorneys who are not in compliance with the

local rules. At all times, the Court retains its discretion to

fashion an appropriate award in future matters depending on the

facts and circumstances of each case. 

11. Local Civil Rule 101.1(c)(3) provides that “[t]he order of

the Court granting a motion to appear pro hac vice shall require

the out-of-state attorney to make a payment of $150.00 on each

admission payable to the Clerk, USDC.” L. CIV. R. 101.1(c)(3). 

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(excluding from fee award hours bill by law firm in part because

“no counsel from that firm was admitted pro hac vice to this

district”). 

D. Reasonable Hourly Rates

With respect to the hourly rates sought for Attorneys Kurtz,

Barker, and Corzano ($350.00 and $210.00, respectively),

Plaintiff contends that these rates “are commensurate with the

experience and training of each employee at Krohn & Moss, Ltd.” 

(Pl.’s Mot. 9.) Plaintiff offers the following in support of the

reasonableness of these hourly rates: (1) attorney biographies;

(2) the 2010 Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey; (2) the 2004

National Law Journal Survey; (3) the Laffey Matrix; and (4) the 12

affidavit of Steven Solomon, Esquire, a consumer protection

attorney licensed to practice in California, not New Jersey. 

(Id. at 9-13; see also Exs. D, F-H [Doc. Nos. 10-4, 10-6, 10-7,

10-8].) 

Defendant argues that the attorney biographies are

inadequate to support the rates requested, and further contends

that Plaintiff’s other supporting materials have all been

repeatedly rejected by courts in this District and by the Third

Circuit. (Def.’s Opp’n 7-9.) As an alternative, Defendant urges

the Court to adopt the 2006 fee schedule established by Community

12. Although Plaintiff represents in the motion that the

National Law Journal Survey is from 2007, the exhibit attached to

the motion appears to be from 2004. 

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Legal Services of Philadelphia (“the CLS fee schedule”) which has

been accepted by the Third Circuit and other courts in this

District to calculate the prevailing market rates in this region. 

(Id. at 9-10.) Plaintiff objects to the application of the CLS

fee schedule because the fee schedule from 2006 is outdated and

“applies only to the community of Philadelphia and not to the

community of New Jersey.” (Pl.’s Reply Br. 6.) 

The relevant inquiry in evaluating the reasonableness of

attorneys’ hourly rates is the prevailing rate for comparable

legal services in the forum of litigation. See Interfaith Cmty.

Org., 426 F.3d at 705. Plaintiff bears the burden “of producing

sufficient evidence of what constitutes a reasonable market rate

for the essential character and complexity of the legal services

rendered in order to make out a prima facie case.” Smith v.

Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 107 F.3d 223, 225 (3d Cir. 1997). In

arguing that the requested rates of $350.00 and $210.00 per hour

are reasonable, Plaintiff relies entirely on his supporting

materials alone, and fails to cite a single case within this

District or this Circuit where any of those materials were

accepted as indicative of the prevailing market rate in the

District of New Jersey. Plaintiff has not satisfied his burden

on this issue simply by presenting the Court with the 2010

Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey, the 2004 National Law Journal

Survey, the Laffey Matrix, and the affidavit of Steven Solomon,

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Esquire, an out-of-state attorney who does not practice in New

Jersey. 

A simple search reveals that courts in this District have

repeatedly reject these same materials in determining the

reasonableness of hourly rates when fashioning FDCPA fee awards. 

See, e.g., Freid v. Nat’l Action Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 10-2870,

2011 WL 6934845, at *6-7 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2011) (refusing to

consider the 2007 Consumer Law Survey, the Laffey Matrix, an

affidavit from a non-New Jersey consumer protection attorney, or

the National Law Journal Survey to assess reasonable rates in New

Jersey for purposes of FDCPA fee award); Cassagne v. Law Offices

of Weltman, Weinberg and Reis Co., No. 11-2791, 2011 WL 5878379,

at *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 23, 2011) (reaching the same conclusion

regarding the Consumer Law Survey, the Laffey Matrix, and

affidavits of non-New Jersey licensed attorneys); Levy, 2011 WL

5117855, at *3-4 (declining to adopt the Consumer Law Attorney

Fee Survey, the Laffey Matrix, and the affidavit of a consumer

protection attorney who was not admitted in New Jersey and did

not represent clients in New Jersey, in ruling on fee petition

under FDCPA); Weed-Schertzer, 2011 WL 4436553, at *4 (same); see

also Conklin v. Pressler and Pressler LLP, No. 10-3566, 2012 WL

569384, at *4-5 (reducing attorneys’ hourly rates in fee petition

under FDCPA despite plaintiff’s presentation of nearly identical

sources in support of requested rates).

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This Court similarly declines to consider Plaintiff’s

supporting materials as indicative of the prevailing market rate

in this District for the same reasons previously articulated by

other courts in this District. The Court agrees with Defendant

and the court in Levy that the CLS fee schedule has been cited

with approval by the Third Circuit and includes hourly rates

“comparable to the fee schedules used to calculate attorneys’

fees in other FDCPA cases in this district.” 2011 WL 5117855, at

*4. However, Plaintiff’s point that the 2006 CLS fee schedule is

outdated is well taken. Accordingly, the Court will employ the

most recent CLS fee schedule effective June 23, 2011. CLS Fee

Schedule, http://www.clsphila.org/Content.aspx?id=206 (last

visited June 22, 2012). The 2011 CLS fee schedule establishes

the following rates relevant on this motion: for attorneys with

2-5 years experience – an hourly rate between $180.00 and

$225.00; for attorneys with 6-10 years experience – an hourly

rate between $225.00 and $255.00; for paralegals – an hourly rate

from $80.00 to $100.00; and for senior and supervisory paralegals

– an hourly rate from $100.00 to $135.00. Id.

Here, Plaintiff represents that Ms. Kurtz has been licensed

in New Jersey for over seven years, that Mr. Barker has been

licensed in Indiana and Illinois for over ten years, and that Mr.

Corzano has been licensed in California for over three years. 

(Pl.’s Reply Br. 5.) Therefore the Court finds the following

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hourly rates reasonable for these attorneys: Ms. Kurtz – $235.00

per hour; Mr. Barker - $255.00 per hour; and Mr. Corzano –

$190.00 per hour. 

Plaintiff also seeks to recover time incurred by Moira Roth

at a rate of $125.00 per hour. The billing records identify Ms.

Roth as a “legal assistant”. (Attorney Billing Records, Ex. C to

Pl.’s Mot. [Doc. No. 10-3] 4.) However, the time Ms. Roth billed

is categorized as “paralegal” time on Plaintiff’s summary chart

of fees and costs. (Id. at 1.) As Defendant accurately points

out, Plaintiff does not provide sufficient information regarding

Ms. Roth’s training, skill, or level of experience. Plaintiff

does argue though that Ms. Roth is more than just “an untrained

secretary[.]” (Pl.’s Reply Br. 8.) In these circumstances, the

Court cannot assume without adequate factual support that Ms.

Roth would qualify as a senior or supervisory paralegal under the

CLS fee schedule. Moreover, the Court finds insufficient support

for the reasonableness of Ms. Roth’s proposed $125.00 per hour

rate. Therefore, the Court finds that a reasonable hourly rate

for Ms. Roth is $80.00 per hour.

E. Reasonable Hours Expended

In fashioning an award of attorneys’ fees, the “prevailing

party is not automatically entitled to compensation for all the

time its attorneys spent working on the case[.]” Interfaith

Cmty. Org., 426 F.3d at 711. “Hours that would not generally be

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billed to one's own client are not properly billed to an

adversary.” Pub. Interest Research Group, 51 F.3d at 1188. As a

result, the Court must determine “whether the hours set out were

reasonably expended for each of the particular purposes described

and then exclude those that are excessive, redundant, or

otherwise unnecessary.” Interfaith Cmty. Org., 426 F.3d at 711

(internal quotations and citation omitted). In conducting a

“thorough and searching analysis” of such charges, the Court

cannot reduce an award sua sponte but “only in response to

specific objections made by the opposing party.” Id. 

Here, Defendant objects to 1.2 hours of timed billed by a

paralegal, Moira Roth, on the basis that all of the work

performed by Ms. Roth consisted of “purely administrative tasks

which are simply not recoverable and must be excluded here.” 

(Def.’s Opp’n 13.) Defendant objects to five specific time

entries for Ms. Roth:

(1) June 28, 2011 – “Received documents from

client (.1)”;

(2) August 18, 2011 – “Served complaint by process

server (.5)”;

(3) August 26, 2011 - “Received email from process

server stating that due to hurricane

everything is down for business until Monday

(.1); Noted to file (.1)”;

(4) September 8, 2011 – “Called process server

regarding status of service and stated that it

was filed (.2)”;

(5) September 8, 2011 – “Emailed Defendant

attorney contact information (.2)”.

(Attorney Billing Records, Ex. C to Pl.’s Mot. [Doc. No. 10-3] 4;

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see also Def.’s Opp’n 12-13.)

“As a general rule, time that would not be billed to a

client cannot be imposed on an adversary.... Thus, administrative

tasks, which are not the type normally billed to a paying client,

may not be recovered by a party through a fee petition.” Levy,

2011 WL 5117855, at *6. Administrative tasks generally include,

but are not limited to, opening a file in a database, entering

case updates in a management system, mailing letters, copying

documents, calendaring deadlines, confirming contact information,

and talking with a process server or court clerk. See, e.g.,

Levy, 2011 WL 5117855, at *6; Brass, 2011 WL 3862145, at *5. 

Here, the Court will exclude all of the challenged entries except

for .5 hours incurred on August 18, 2011 for serving the

complaint by process server. The four other entries – totaling

.7 hours of time - clearly represent the performance of

administrative tasks like receiving client documents, receiving

email updates from a process server, speaking with a process

server to confirm the status of service, and emailing contact

information, and therefore are excluded. Although the August 18,

2011 time entry for serving the complaint via a process server

appears on its face to be more than a purely administrative task,

the absence of specific details on how Ms. Roth “served the

complaint by a process server” and what that entails warrants an

additional reduction of .1 hours. Therefore, the Court will only

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award fees for a total of .4 hours of Ms. Roth’s time. 

To the extent that Defendant objects to the award of any

fees to Ms. Kurtz, Mr. Barker, and Mr. Corzano on several grounds

as detailed above, the Court construes these objections broadly

and similarly finds that the following time entries for these

attorneys must be excluded as administrative in nature:

(1) May 12, 2011 – Mr. Barker: “Open file in

database (.2)”;

(2) May 12, 2011 - Mr. Barker: “Prepared Amicus

Precedent to track case (.1)”;

(3) July 13, 2011 - Mr. Corzano: “Reviewed case to

see if Defendant responded to pre-suit demand

(.1)”;

(4) July 25, 2011 - Mr. Corzano: “Reviewed case to

see if Defendant responded to pre-suit demand

(.1)”;

(5) September 8, 2011 - Ms. Kurtz: “Received email

from Defendant’s counsel requesting an

extension to answer and demand (.1)”; and

(6) September 9, 2011 - Mr. Corzano: “Reviewed

case and instructions from Jennifer (.1)”.

(Attorney Billing Records, Ex. C to Pl.’s Mot. [Doc. No. 10-3] 4-

5.) 

Plaintiff originally sought fees for 5.7 hours of time

billed by Mr. Barker. The Court will reduce this number by 2.1

hours for time billed after the date of the Offer of Judgment as

set forth supra, and by .3 hours billed for administrative tasks. 

Therefore, Plaintiff can recover fees for 3.3 hours of time

billed by Mr. Barker. With respect to Mr. Corzano, Plaintiff

originally sought fees for 5.9 hours of time. The Court will

reduce this number by 2.6 hours for time billed after the date of

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the Offer of Judgment as set forth supra, and by .3 hours billed

for administrative tasks. Accordingly, Plaintiff can recover

fees for 3.0 hours of time billed by Mr. Corzano. Similarly,

Plaintiff initially sought fees for 2.5 hours of time billed by

Ms. Kurtz. The Court will reduce this number by .9 hours for

time billed after the date of the Offer of Judgment, and by .1

hours billed for an administrative task. Thus, Plaintiff can

recover fees for 1.5 hours of time billed by Ms. Kurtz.

F. Lodestar Calculation

For the reasons set forth above, the lodestar in this case

is as follows:

Legal Professional

Reasonable

Hourly Rate

Reasonable

Hours Expended

Subtotal of

Recoverable Fees

Jennifer Kurtz, Esquire $235.00 1.5 $352.50

John Barker, Esquire $255.00 3.3 $841.50

Mahadhi Corzano, Esquire $190.00 3.0 $570.00

Moira Roth,

Paralegal/Legal Assistant

$80.00 0.4 $32.00

Having now employed the lodestar calculation, the Court will

reduce the subtotal of the recoverable fees for Mr. Barker and

Mr. Corzano by fifteen percent (15%) each and then again by

another $150.00 for each attorney for their failure to properly

seek pro hac vice admission in this case. Thus, Plaintiff can

recover reduced fees for Mr. Barker in the total amount of

$565.28 and for Mr. Corzano in the total amount of $334.50. In

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conclusion, Plaintiff is entitled to recover the following

attorneys’ fees and costs in this action: $352.50 regarding Ms.

Kurtz, $565.28 regarding Mr. Barker, $334.50 regarding Mr.

Corzano, $32.00 regarding Ms. Roth, and $410.00 in litigation

costs for a total award in the amount of $1,694.28. 

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion [Doc. No.

10] for attorneys’ fees and costs in part but reduces the total

award as set forth herein. Defendant shall reimburse

Plaintiff’s counsel $1,694.28. An Order consistent with this

Opinion will be entered. 

Dated: June 25, 2012 /s/ Noel L. Hillman 

At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

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