J -A10023-19 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

WELLS FARGO BANK N.A. 

v. 

KENNETH TAGGART, 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant : No. 1384 EDA 2018 

Appeal from the Order Dated March 27, 2018 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at 

No(s): No. 2010-08638 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED AUGUST 1, 2019 

Kenneth Taggart appeals the order entered on March 27, 2018, in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County. The court granted Wells Fargo 

Bank N.A.'s ("Wells Fargo") motion for summary judgment against Taggart in 

a mortgage foreclosure action. On appeal, Taggart argues the trial court erred 

in granting summary judgment because (1) Wells Fargo did not provide proper 

notice of default and intent to file the complaint; (2) the mortgage note was 

not legally perfected; (3) the mortgage did not name the correct lender; and 

(4) Wells Fargo lacked standing.' On June 14, 2019, Taggart filed a motion 

' Taggart's first issue in both his Rule 1925(b) statement and in his brief is 

that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. See Concise 

Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, 5/21/2018, at unnumbered 

page 1; Taggart's Brief, at 2. In it, Taggart baldy alleges that the trial court 
J -A10023-19 

to take judicial notice. Based upon the following, we affirm the decision of the 

trial court and deny Taggart's application for relief in the form of a motion to 

take judicial notice. 

The trial court set out the relevant facts and procedural history as 

follows: 

This action in mortgage foreclosure came before the [the trial 

c]ourt on cross -motions of the parties for summary judgment. 

The record as developed in those motions discloses the following 

undisputed facts: 

On December 16, 2008, [Taggart] executed a [m]ortgage on 

property located at 709 Schwab Road, Hatfield, Montgomery 

County, Pennsylvania. The instrument identifies the lender and 

mortgagee as "American Partners Bank." [a] It provides that before 

erred in granting Wells Fargo's motion for summary judgment and denying his 

motion for summary judgment. Id. However, under this heading in the body 

of the brief, Taggart argues a variety of issues, including, that there are errors 

in the description of the property, various deficiencies in the complaint, 

alleged errors in evidentiary rulings, and duplications of arguments made later 

in the brief. Taggart's Brief, at 7-24. We note that, "[a] concise statement of 

[errors] complained of on appeal must be specific enough to identify and 

address each issue the appellant wishes to raise on appeal. Mazurek v. 

Russell, 96 A.3d 372, 377 (Pa. Super. 2014). An overly vague or broad 

statement of matters complained of on appeal may result in waiver. 

Majorsky v. Douglas, 58 A.3d 1250, 1258 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 

70 A.3d 811 (Pa. 2013). "When a court has to guess what issues an appellant 

is appealing, that is not enough for meaningful review." Commonwealth v. 

McCree, 857 A.2d 188, 192 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted), affirmed, 

924 A.2d 621 (Pa. 2007). Here, the trial court in its Rule 1925(a) opinion 

addressed Taggart's first issue as follows, "[Issue 1] is generic and need not 

be addressed beyond the discussion below of the other items." Trial Court 

Opinion, 7/02/2018, at n. 5. Thus, the trial court was unable to discern from 

Taggart's vague claim, the issues he now argues in his brief. Accordingly, we 

find that Taggart's first issue is both waived and duplicative; we will not further 

discuss it. See Mazurek, supra at 377; Majorsky, supra at 1258. 

- 2 - 
J -A10023-19 

exercising its remedies in the event of default by [Taggart], the 

lender must send him written notice of the default and an 

opportunity to cure it. [Taggart] failed to make the monthly 

payment due on December 1, 2009, and the payments due 

thereafter. [Taggart] does not dispute his failure to make such 

payments, although he contends that such failure does not 

constitute a default under the [m]ortgage, for reasons discussed 

below. 

[a] Technically speaking, the [m]ortgage identifies 

"American Partners Bank" as the "Lender," and it 

identifies as the mortgagee "Mortgage Electronic 

Registration Systems, Inc. . . . solely as nominee for 

Lender and Lender's successors and assigns." For 

purposes of [Taggart's] challenge to the validity of the 

[m]ortgage, the parties have treated "American 

Partners Bank" as the mortgagee, and this [o]pinion 

does the same. 

A copy of an Act 91 Notice sent to [Taggart] is attached to [Wells 

Fargo's] [m]otion for [s]ummary [j]udgment as Exhibit D. A copy 

of the envelope, included in the exhibit, shows that it was sent by 

certified mail to [Taggart] at the address of the mortgaged 

property, with a postage meter date of February 10, 2010. 

Notations by the postal authorities show a "first notice" of the 

certified mailing on "2/13" and a "second notice" on "2-18"; the 

envelope is stamped as "unclaimed" and shows a "returned" date 

of "3-2" (capitalization omitted). The Act 91 Notice states that 

[Taggart] is in default, that he may cure the default by paying 

specified amounts within thirty days, and that if he fails to cure, 

the entire balance of the debt will be due and owing. 

[Wells Fargo] filed its [c]omplaint in [m]ortgage [f]oreclosure on 

April 1, 2010. The [c]omplaint alleged that "[t]he Plaintiff is now 

the legal owner of the mortgage and is in the process of 

formalizing an assignment of same." On January 7, 2016, [Wells 

Fargo] recorded an instrument entitled Corrective Assignment of 

Mortgage, reflecting an assignment of the [m]ortgage from 

"Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for 

American Partners Bank, its successors and assigns" to Wells 

Fargo Bank N.A.[b] 

-3 
J -A10023-19 

[b] The [c]orrective [a]ssignment recites that a 

previous [a]ssignment had been recorded on May 18, 

2010, but was being corrected because "that 

Assignment incorrectly shows the Assignor to be 

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 

whereas it should show Mortgage Electronic 

Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American 

Partners Bank, its successors and assigns." 

[Taggart] created an extensive record on the relevant history of 

American Partners Bank. Specifically, Exhibit F to [Taggart's] 

[m]otion for [s]ummary [j]udgment is an [a]udit [r]eport issued 

by the Office of Inspector General of the Treasury Department, 

entitled "Safety and Soundness: In -Depth Review of Waterfield 

Bank," dated July 14, 2011 (hereinafter, "Audit Report"). The 

Audit Report recites the following history: 

Waterfield Bank's History 

Since the institution's inception in 2000, Waterfield 

Bank has changed ownership three times. Initially, it 

opened on June 12, 2000, as Assurance Partners 

Bank, a federal chartered de novo thrift in Carmel, 

Indiana. . . . On April 8, 2005, Federal City Bancorp, Inc. acquired 

a controlling interest in the institution via a private 

placement. The headquarters were relocated to 

Bethesda, Maryland, and the name was changed to 

American Partners Bank. . . . On January 16, 2008, Affinity [Financial Corporation, 

Inc.] acquired Federal City Bancorp, Inc. and infused 

$20 million in American Partners Bank. The 

institution's name was changed to Waterfield Bank 

and a new board of directors and management team 

were installed.[] 

[Taggart] filed his [m]otion for [s]ummary [j]udgment on May 12, 

2017. [Wells Fargo] filed its own [m]otion for [s]ummary 

- 4 - 
J -A10023-19 

[j]udgment on November 7, 2017. The [m]otions were fully 

briefed, and oral argument was held on March 26, 2018. On March 

27, 2018, [o]rders were issued denying [Taggart's] [m]otion and 

granting [Wells Fargo's] [m]otion; the latter [o]rder entered an in 

rem judgment against [Taggart] for foreclosure and sale of the 

mortgaged property. On April 23, 2018, [Taggart] filed a [m]otion 

for [r]econsideration of the [o]rder granting summary judgment 

in favor of [Wells Fargo]. That [m]otion was denied by [o]rder 

dated April 24,2018.[d] 

[C] A [c]ertification from the Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corporation, also submitted by [Taggart], is to the 

same effect: "[EJffective February 1, 2006, Assurance 

Partners Bank changed title to American Partners 

Bank . . .[;] effective January 21, 2008, American 

Partners Bank changed title to Waterfield Bank." 

[Taggart] acknowledges that Waterfield Bank had the 

same FDIC number as American Partners Bank. 

[d] Several other filings deserve brief mention. On 

December 18, 2017, [Taggart] (acting pro se, 

although represented by counsel) filed a document 

entitled Notice of Fraud, attaching a letter addressed 

to several government officials complaining of [Wells 

Fargo's] alleged fraud in relying on a [m]ortgage that 

[Taggart] claimed to be invalid. On January 22, 2018, 

[Wells Fargo] filed a [m]otion to [s]trike the [n]otice 

of [f]raud. In addition, on March 23 and 26, 2018, 

[Taggart] (again acting pro se) filed seven [m]otions 

to [t]ake [j]udicial [n]otice of documents described as 

follows: public records of the Federal Deposit 

Insurance Corporation, public records of the Federal 

Reserve Board, a certification of the Federal Deposit 

Insurance Corporation, a certificate of the Office of the 

Comptroller of Currency, the Audit Report referred to 

above, a [p]etition for [w]rit of [m]andamus filed by 

[Taggart] in federal court, and a [c]omplaint filed by 

[Taggart] in federal court against [the trial c]ourt and 

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. On March 27, 

2018, the same day that the [m]otions for [s]ummary 

[j]udgment were decided, [the trial c]ourt dismissed 

[Taggart's] [m]otion to [s]trike as moot. Also on that 

- 5 - 
J -A10023-19 

date, the [trial c]ourt denied [Taggart's] [m]otions to 

[t]ake [j]udicial [n]otice. The [o]rder noted that the 

[m]otions to [t]ake [j]udicial [n]otice were improperly 

filed by [Taggart] pro se, even though he was 

represented by counsel. Further, the Order explained: 

To the extent that the documents that are 

the subjects of the seven [m]otions are 

attached as exhibits to [Taggrt's] 

[m]otion for [s]ummary [j]udgment or his 

opposition to [Wells Fargo's] [m]otion for 

[s]ummary [j]udgment, a separate 

request to take judicial notice of such 

documents is unnecessary, as the exhibits 

are already part of the record. To the 

extent that such documents, issued by 

government agencies, are not already 

exhibits, they are redundant and 

cumulative, as the fact of the name 

change of the bank is already established. 

To the extent that [Taggart] requests 

judicial notice of filings made by him in 

Federal Court, they are irrelevant to the 

proceedings before this Court. 

[Taggart's] subsequently filed [n]otice of [a]ppeal 

states that he is appealing "from the order(s) signed 

on March 27, 2018 and April 24, 2018," which might 

be construed to include the two [o]rders referred to in 

this footnote. The [o]rders are not mentioned, 

however, in his [c]oncise [s]tatement of [errors] 

[c]omplained of on [a]ppeal, and therefore they are 

not addressed further in this [o]pinion. 

[Taggart] filed a [timely] [n]otice of [a]ppeal on April 26, 2018,[2] 

and subsequently filed a timely [c]oncise [s]tatement of [errors] 

2 On June 19, 2018, this Court issued a rule to show cause as to why we 

should not quash the appeal as untimely. Taggart filed a response on June 

28, 2018. On July 5, 2018, this Court discharged the rule to show cause. Our 

-6 
J -A10023-19 

[c]omplained of on [a]ppeal. On July 2, 2018, the trial court 

issued an opinion.] 

Trial Court Opinion, 7/02/2018, at 1-5 (record citations omitted, emphasis in 

original). 

Initially, we note that, on June 14, 2019, more than one month after 

oral argument and submission of this case to the merits panel, Taggart filed 

an application for relief in the form of a motion to take judicial notice. The 

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provide: 

(a) General rule. After the argument of a case has been 

concluded or the case has been submitted, no brief, memorandum 

or letter relating to the case shall be presented or submitted, 

either directly or indirectly, to the court or any judge thereof, 

except upon application or when expressly allowed at bar at the 

time of the argument. 

(b) Change in status of authorities. If any case or other 

authority relied upon in the brief of a party is expressly reversed, 

modified, overruled or otherwise affected so as to materially affect 

its status as an authoritative statement of the law for which 

originally cited in the jurisdiction in which it was decided, enacted 

or promulgated, any counsel having knowledge thereof shall file a 

letter, which shall not contain any argument, transmitting a copy 

of the slip opinion or other document wherein the authority relied 

upon was affected. 

Pa.R.A.P. 2501(a) and (b). Here, Taggart's application does not allege any 

change in the status of authorities and is merely a reiteration and expansion 

of the arguments made in both his brief and his reply brief. Moreover, his 

review of the record demonstrates that Taggart timely filed his notice of 

appeal. 

-7 
J -A10023-19 

application does not comply with Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 201, which 

sets forth the criteria for taking judicial notice. Accordingly, we deny the 

application. 

On appeal, Taggart raises five issues in support of his contention that 

the trial court erred in granting Wells Fargo's motion for summary judgment. 

See Taggart's Brief at 2. We have disposed of the first issue; we summarize 

his arguments on the remaining issues as follows. The trial court erred in 

granting summary judgment because Wells Fargo did not properly serve the 

Act 91 Notice. See id. At 24-33. The trial court erred in granting summary 

judgment because the mortgage and note were not perfected because 

"American Partners Bank F.S.B." did not legally exist after January 16, 2008. 

See id. at 33-37. The trial court should not have granted summary judgment 

because Waterfield Bank was not the original lender. See id. at 37-38. Lastly, 

Taggart's claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment 

because Wells Fargo lacked standing as a real party in interest because it was 

not the holder in due course and not a party entitled to enforce the mortgage. 

See id. at 38-46. 

Our standard of review is well settled: 

[o]ur scope of review of a trial court's order granting or denying 

summary judgment is plenary, and our standard of review is clear: 

the trial court's order will be reversed only where it is established 

that the court committed an error of law or abused its discretion. 

-8 
J -A10023-19 

Summary judgment is appropriate only when the record clearly 

shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The 

reviewing court must view the record in the light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party and resolve all doubts as to the existence 

of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party. Only 

when the facts are so clear that reasonable minds could not differ 

can a trial court properly enter summary judgment. 

Bayview Loan Servicing LLC v. Wicker, 163 A.3d 1039, 1043-44 (Pa. 

Super. 2017) (citation omitted), affirmed, 206 A.3d 474 (Pa. 2019). 

Moreover, "[i]n response to a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving 

party cannot rest upon the pleadings, but rather must set forth specific facts 

demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact." Bank of Am., N.A. v. 

Gibson, 102 A.3d 462, 464 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted), appeal 

denied, 112 A.3d 648 (Pa. 2015). We have also stated, "[t]he holder of a 

mortgage has the right, upon default, to bring a foreclosure action. The holder 

of a mortgage is entitled to summary judgment if the mortgagor admits that 

the mortgage is in default, the mortgagor has failed to pay on the obligation, 

and the recorded mortgage is in the specified amount." Id. at 464-465 

(citation omitted). "This is so even if the mortgagors have not admitted the 

total amount of the indebtedness in their pleadings." Cunningham v. 

McWilliams, 714 A.2d 1054, 1057 (Pa. Super. 1998), appeal denied, 734 

A.2d 861 (Pa. 1999). 

-9 
J -A10023-19 

Here, the trial court in its Rule 1925(a) opinion provided a thorough and 

well -reasoned discussion of Taggart's second3 through fifth arguments on 

appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/02/2018, at 1-10 (finding (1) the use of an 

old version of the bank's name on the mortgage did not render it void;4 (2) 

3 We briefly note that, to the extent that Taggart is contending that Wells 

Fargo did not serve the Act 91 Notice at his last known address rather than 

that they did not serve at the mortgaged property, he has waived the claim. 

As Wells Fargo correctly notes, and as our review of the certified record 

demonstrates, Taggart did not raise this argument in either his motion for 

summary judgment or in his response to Wells Fargo's motion for summary 

judgment, instead he raised it for the first time in his motion for 

reconsideration. See Wells Fargo's Brief, at 25-27 (citing to certified record). 

We have held both that a party cannot raise arguments not raised in 

opposition for summary judgment to challenge the grant of summary 

judgment for the first time on appeal and that a party cannot raise an 

argument for the first time in a motion for reconsideration. Krentz v. Consol. 

Rail Corp., 910 A.2d 20, 37 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted)("arguments not 

raised initially before the trial court in opposition to summary judgment cannot 

be raised for the first time on appeal."); Kelly v. Siuma, 34 A.3d 86, 94 n. 8 

(Pa. Super. 2011) (holding trial court properly refused to consider issue raised 

for first time in motion for reconsideration), appeal denied, 42 A.3d 294 (Pa. 

2012). 

4 In its discussion of Taggart's related third and fourth contentions, the trial 

court relies upon a Court of Common Pleas case, Mercer v. Santa Lucia of 

Hillsville, 82 Pa. D. & C. 233 (Lawrence, 1952), as well as several out-ofstate cases. We have stated that, "court of common pleas decisions provide, 

at most, persuasive but not binding authority." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 

69th St. Retail Mall, L.P., 126 A.3d 959, 972 (Pa. Super. 2015). Moreover, 

"[t]he decisions of courts of other states are persuasive, but not binding, 

authority." Huber v. Etkin, 58 A.3d 772, 780 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation 

omitted), appeal denied, 68 A.3d 909 (Pa. 2012). We have been unable to 

discover any pertinent decisions by this Court or the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court on the related issues and find the law cited by the trial court to be 

persuasive. Moreover, in his underdeveloped argument, Taggart has failed to 

- 10 - 
J -A10023-19 

American Partners Bank is an older name for Waterfield Bank and they used 

the same FDIC number; (3) Wells Fargo properly served the notice of default; 

and (4) Wells Fargo had standing.) 

Our review of the record reveals ample support for the trial court's 

conclusions. Accordingly, we adopt the reasoning of the trial court and affirm 

its order in favor of Wells Fargo. 

Order affirmed. Application for relief in the form of a motion to take 

judicial notice denied. 

Judgment Entered. 

Jseph D. Seletyn, 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/1/19 

cite to any legal authority in support of his contentions and has completely 

failed to address the law cited by the trial court in support of its decision. The 

burden is on Taggart to demonstrate that the trial court either abused its 

discretion or committed an error of law. It is also his burden, not this Court's, 

to support that argument with relevant authority. See Hackett v. Indian 

King Residents Assoc., 195 A.3d 248, 254-255 (Pa. Super. 2018) (holding 

it is appellant's responsibility to develop argument with citation to relevant 

supporting authority).