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[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1285 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1285

To require certifications and reporting in an unclassified form related 
   to the national security implications of the New START Treaty, to 
provide for arms limitations in the event of the treaty's non-renewal, 
                        and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 2, 2019

 Mr. Markey (for himself, Mrs. Gillibrand, Ms. Warren, Mr. Leahy, and 
  Mr. Brown) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
             referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To require certifications and reporting in an unclassified form related 
   to the national security implications of the New START Treaty, to 
provide for arms limitations in the event of the treaty's non-renewal, 
                        and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Save Arms control and Verification 
Efforts Act of 2019'' or ``SAVE Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Every United States president since John F. Kennedy has 
        successfully concluded at least one agreement with Russia to 
        reduce nuclear dangers.
            (2) If the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty is 
        terminated, and the New START Treaty is not extended, or a new 
        treaty is not negotiated and ratified before 2021, there would 
        be no legally binding, verifiable limits on the United States 
        or Russian nuclear arsenals for the first time since 1972.
            (3) For both the United States and the Russian Federation, 
        the New START Treaty's transparency and verification measures 
        provide invaluable insight into the size, capabilities, and 
        operations of both countries' nuclear forces beyond that 
        provided by more traditional intelligence collection and 
        assessment methods, helping create a mutually beneficial 
        environment of stability and predictability.
            (4) Former Republican and Democratic national security 
        leaders, including George Shultz, William Perry, Richard Burt, 
        Sam Nunn, Richard Lugar, and others, have expressed support for 
        a prompt decision to extend the New START Treaty.
            (5) United States military leaders continue to see value in 
        the New START Treaty, including Gen. John Hyten, Commander of 
        United States Strategic Command, who told Congress in March 
        2018 that ``bilateral, verifiable arms control agreements are 
        essential to our ability to provide an effective deterrent,'' 
        and testified before Congress in February 2019 that the New 
        START Treaty is important because it provides to the United 
        States ``a cap on [Russia's] strategic baseline nuclear 
        weapons, and their ballistic missiles, both submarine and ICBM, 
        as well as their bombers'' and ``just as important it gives me 
        insight through the verification regime to their Russia's real 
        capabilities''.
            (6) The United States NATO allies have consistently 
        expressed support for a decision by the United States and the 
        Russian Federation to extend New START before the scheduled 
        expiration date in 2021.
            (7) Russian President Vladimir Putin said in July 2018 that 
        ``I reassured President Trump that Russia stands ready to 
        extend this treaty, to prolong it, but we have to agree on the 
        specifics . . .''.
            (8) The Department of Defense Report on the Strategic 
        Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation submitted pursuant to 
        section 1240 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
        Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81; 125 Stat. 1643) determined 
        that Russia ``would not be able to achieve a militarily 
        significant advantage by any plausible expansion of its 
        strategic nuclear forces, even in a cheating or breakout 
        scenario under the New START Treaty, primarily because of the 
        inherent survivability of the planned United States strategic 
        force structure, particularly the Ohio-class ballistic missile 
        submarines, a number of which are at sea at any given time''.
            (9) For as long as it must exist, the United States nuclear 
        arsenal must be maintained and modernized in a cost-effective 
        manner to ensure it remains a safe, secure, and reliable 
        effective nuclear force that can continue to deter nuclear 
        attack on the United States and its allies, and so that the 
        United States can continue to pursue further verifiable 
        reduction in global nuclear stockpiles consistent with its 
        obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
            (10) The New START Treaty created a Bilateral Consultative 
        Commission to resolve issues related to implementation of the 
        New START Treaty, and Article II of the New START Treaty 
        states, ``When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic 
        offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to 
        raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for 
        consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Commission.''

SEC. 3. SENSE OF THE SENATE.

    It is the sense of the Senate that--
            (1) extending the New START Treaty by a period of five 
        years is in the national security interest of the United 
        States, so long as the Russian Federation continues to meet the 
        central limits of the treaty;
            (2) the United States should immediately seek to begin 
        discussions with the Russian Federation on agreeing to a 5-year 
        extension of the New START Treaty;
            (3) the United States should use the Bilateral Consultative 
        Commission mechanism within the New START Treaty to address 
        issues related to new Russian strategic nuclear weapons it 
        believes may fall under New START treaty limits;
            (4) extending the New START Treaty would facilitate efforts 
        by the United States to pursue additional arms control efforts 
        with the Russian Federation, including efforts to address the 
        Russian Federation's nonstrategic nuclear weapons and emerging 
        technologies such as hypersonic weapons;
            (5) the United States should resume more regular talks on 
        strategic stability with Russia, as well as additional 
        bilateral and multilateral arms control efforts worldwide to 
        address a changing global security environment; and
            (6) extending the New START Treaty would facilitate efforts 
        by the United States to engage with the People's Republic of 
        China to reduce dangers associated with its nuclear arsenal, 
        which is fundamentally different than the Russian Federation's 
        and requires a separate, focused arms control effort.

SEC. 4. CERTIFICATIONS IN EVENT NEW START TREATY IS NOT EXTENDED.

    Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
and every 180 days thereafter, if the parties to the New START Treaty 
have not completed the procedures outlined in the treaty and its 
related protocols and annexes to extend the treaty's effective date by 
up to five years beyond February 5, 2021--
            (1) the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the 
        Secretary of State shall separately submit to the appropriate 
        congressional committees a justification for why New START has 
        not been extended and a certification that the absence of an 
        extension of the treaty is in the national security interest of 
        the United States; and
            (2) the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to 
        the appropriate congressional committees--
                    (A) an intelligence community-coordinated 
                assessment of why the New START Treaty has not been 
                extended;
                    (B) a certification that the absence of an 
                extension of the treaty is in the national security 
                interest of the United States; and
                    (C)(i) a certification that the United States is 
                not losing intelligence insight into the Russian 
                Federation's strategic nuclear program; or
                    (ii) a report detailing how the Director of 
                National Intelligence and the intelligence community 
                will account for any lost intelligence capabilities.

SEC. 5. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a National 
Intelligence Estimate, consisting of an unclassified executive summary 
and judgments and a more detailed, classified report on the Russian 
Federation's compliance with the New START Treaty and the impact to the 
intelligence collection capabilities of the United States if the New 
START Treaty and its related information exchanges and associated 
inspections regimes were to lapse. The report shall include the 
following elements:
            (1) A description of the Russian Federation's compliance 
        with the New START Treaty.
            (2) An assessment of the Russian Federation's intentions 
        with regard to extending the New START Treaty.
            (3) A description of the intelligence collection benefits 
        gained as a result of the ratification and implementation of 
        the New START Treaty.
            (4) An assessment of what specific capabilities the United 
        States intelligence community would have to develop and deploy 
        to ensure that no loss of collection capability would occur in 
        the event of the lapse of the New START Treaty.
            (5) A cost estimate and estimated timeline for developing 
        these new or additional capabilities, and a description of how 
        new intelligence gathering requirements related to the Russian 
        Federation's nuclear forces may affect other United States 
        intelligence gathering needs.
            (6) An assessment of projections for Russian Federation 
        nuclear and non-nuclear force size, structure, and composition 
        with the New START Treaty limitations in place and without the 
        limitations in place.
            (7) An assessment of Russian Federation actions, 
        intentions, and likely responses to the United States 
        withdrawing from, suspending its obligations under, or allowing 
        to lapse the New START Treaty and subsequently developing 
        platforms and weapons beyond the New START Treaty's 
        limitations.
    (b) Briefings.--The Director of National Intelligence shall brief 
the appropriate congressional committees on the elements set forth in 
subsection (a) when the National Intelligence Estimate is submitted 
under such subsection and every 120 days thereafter.

SEC. 6. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

    (a) Department of Defense.--
            (1) Report on expected force structure changes in event of 
        treaty lapse.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, and not later than February 5, 2021, if 
        the New START Treaty is allowed to lapse, the Secretary of 
        Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
        committees a report discussing changes to the expected force 
        structure of the United States Armed Forces if the New START 
        Treaty is no longer in place and estimating the expected costs 
        necessary to make such changes.
            (2) Report on impacts to modernization plan.--Not later 
        than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
        not later than February 5, 2021, if the New START Treaty is 
        allowed to lapse, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of 
        Energy shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional 
        committees a report on how the current program of record to 
        replace and upgrade United States nuclear weapons delivery 
        systems and warheads, which anticipates the continued existence 
        of the New START Treaty, would be modified without the 
        existence of the New START Treaty. The report shall include the 
        information required to be submitted in the report required by 
        section 1043 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
        Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81; 125 Stat. 1576) and shall 
        include--
                    (A) a separate 10-year cost estimate from the 
                Department of Defense to implement a nuclear 
                sustainment plan that does and does not anticipate the 
                continued existence of the New START Treaty, including 
                possible costs associated with conversion or uploading 
                of strategic delivery vehicles and warheads;
                    (B) a separate 10-year cost estimate from the 
                Department of Energy to implement a nuclear sustainment 
                and modernization plan that does and does not 
                anticipate the continued existence of the New START 
                Treaty, including uploading warheads previously 
                withdrawn from service;
                    (C) a description of how the absence of the New 
                START Treaty limits would impact the schedule and cost 
                of Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship 
                management plan; and
                    (D) an assessment of the potential impacts on how 
                these changes will impact the Department of Energy's 
                nuclear weapons complex.
    (b) Department of State.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, and not later than February 5, 2021, if the 
New START Treaty is allowed to lapse, the Secretary of State shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the 
likely foreign policy implications of and potential impacts to United 
States diplomatic relations if the New START Treaty lapses. The report 
shall include the following elements:
            (1) An assessment of the likely reactions of the North 
        Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and NATO member countries, 
        United States allies, Asia, and each permanent member of the 
        United Nations Security Council.
            (2) A description of the expected impacts on the Nuclear 
        Nonproliferation Treaty and the ability of the United States to 
        key nonproliferation objectives.
            (3) A description of the risks posed to the long-term 
        health of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in the absence of 
        United States-Russia bilateral nuclear arms control agreements 
        and dialogue.
    (c) Presidential Report on Strategic Arms Control Strategy.--Not 
later than February 5, 2020, the President shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report including--
            (1) a 5-year strategy for future strategic arms control 
        agreements with the Russian Federation;
            (2) an update on the status of any current discussions that 
        may be in progress at time of report; and
            (3) a description of other United States bilateral and 
        multilateral arms control efforts globally.

SEC. 7. PROHIBITION ON INCREASES IN CERTAIN WARHEADS, MISSILES, AND 
              LAUNCHERS.

    (a) Prohibition.--
            (1) In general.--If either of the conditions in paragraph 
        (2) occurs, the United States Government may not, except as 
        provided under subsection (b), obligate or expend any funds 
        to--
                    (A) increase above 1,550 the number of United 
                States warheads operationally deployed on launchers for 
                ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers;
                    (B) increase above 700 the number of deployed 
                Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine-
                Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers; 
                or
                    (C) increase above 800 the number of deployed and 
                non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy 
                bombers,
        as such terms are defined and such systems are counted in the 
        New START Treaty.
            (2) Conditions.--The conditions referred to in paragraph 
        (1) are as follows:
                    (A) The President initiates United States 
                withdrawal from the New START Treaty in accordance with 
                the procedures outlined in the New START Treaty and its 
                related protocols and annexes.
                    (B) As of February 5, 2021, the parties to the New 
                START Treaty have not completed the procedures outlined 
                in the New START Treaty and its related protocols and 
                annexes to extend the Treaty's effective date to 
                February 5, 2026.
                    (C) The President takes one or more actions to 
                suspend United States obligations outlined in the New 
                START Treaty and its related protocols and annexes.
    (b) Exceptions.--The prohibition under subsection (a) shall not be 
in effect if all of the following conditions are met:
            (1) The President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
        Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of National 
        Intelligence jointly certify that the Russian Federation is, in 
        a way that is militarily significant--
                    (A) increasing above 1,550 the number of the 
                Russian Federation's strategic warheads operationally 
                deployed on launchers for Intercontinental Ballistic 
                Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles 
                (SLBMs), and heavy bombers;
                    (B) increasing above 700 the number of deployed 
                ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers; or
                    (C) increasing above 800 the number of deployed and 
                non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy 
                bombers,
        as such terms are defined and such systems are counted in the 
        New START Treaty and its related protocols and annexes.
            (2) The President, the Director of National Intelligence, 
        the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy, and the 
        Secretary of Defense certify that it is in the national 
        security interest of the United States to exceed prohibition 
        limits.
            (3) The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy 
        submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
        with 10-year cost projections related to increasing the number 
        of United States nuclear warheads, delivery vehicles, and 
        systems as covered by the New START Treaty and its related 
        protocols and annexes.
            (4) The Director of National Intelligence submits to the 
        appropriate congressional committees a National Intelligence 
        Estimate of Russian actions, intentions, and likely responses 
        to the United States exceeding these specified caps.
            (5) The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the 
        Secretary of Energy, and the Director of National Intelligence 
        provide briefings to the appropriate congressional committees 
        about the certifications and reports submitted under paragraphs 
        (1) though (4).
            (6) There is not enacted, within 60 days after each of the 
        conditions in paragraphs (1) through (5) having been met, a 
        joint resolution of disapproval that continues the prohibition 
        on funding levels under subsection (a).
    (c) Sunset.--The prohibition under subsection (a) shall expire on 
February 5, 2026.

SEC. 8. FORM OF REPORTS AND CERTIFICATIONS.

    If any report or certification required under this Act is submitted 
in classified form, an unclassified version shall also be submitted at 
the same time.

SEC. 9. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means all members of--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
                Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee on 
                Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of 
                the Senate; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
                on Armed Services, the Permanent Select Committee on 
                Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of 
                the House of Representatives.
            (2) Intermediate range nuclear forces treaty.--The term 
        ``Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty'' means the Treaty 
        between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
        Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-
        Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, together with the Memorandum 
        of Understanding and Two Protocols, signed at Washington 
        December 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988.
            (3) New start treaty.--The term ``New START Treaty'' means 
        the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian 
        Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation 
        of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed April 8, 2010, and entered 
        into force February 5, 2011.
            (4) Nuclear nonproliferation treaty.--The term ``Nuclear 
        Nonproliferation Treaty'' means the Treaty on the Non-
        Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington July 1, 
        1968 (commonly known as the ``NPT'').
                                 <all>
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