DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

STATE FARM FLORIDA INSURANCE COMPANY,

Appellant,

v.

RICHARD MOODY, ROBERTA MOODY and ROBERT DENNEY,

Appellees.

Nos. 4D13-3377, 4D14-273 and 4D14-274

[December 9, 2015]

Consolidated appeals from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial 

Circuit, Palm Beach County; Janis Brustares Keyser, Judge; L.T. Case 

Nos. 502006CA014072XX and 502007CC002907XX.

Elizabeth K. Russo of Russo Appellate Firm, P.A., Miami, and 

Bernstein, Chackman, Liss & Rose, Hollywood, for appellant.

Bard D. Rockenbach of Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm 

Beach, and Louis M. Silber and Allison J. Davis of Silber & Davis, P.A., 

West Palm Beach, for appellees.

MAY, J.

Aristotle once said: “The whole is greater than the sum of all its parts.” 

This appeal gives us an opportunity to reflect on this statement as an 

insurer appeals a final judgment for “Additional Living Expenses” that 

were incurred as a result of Hurricane Jeanne. The insurer argues that 

two separate trial courts erred in entering summary judgment for the 

insureds in these consolidated cases.1 We agree with the insurer and 

reverse.

In 2004, the National Hurricane Center issued a Tropical Cyclone 

Report naming an upcoming storm Hurricane Jeanne. On September 24, 

25, and 26, the National Hurricane Center issued hurricane warnings for 

Hurricane Jeanne for South Florida. On the night of September 25 and 

the morning of September 26, Hurricane Jeanne hit South Florida. During 

1 Judge Keyser and Judge Damico ruled on separate motions for summary 

judgment, but the cases were consolidated before Judge Keyser for the trial.
2

Hurricane Jeanne, the insureds’ condominiums were severely damaged 

and became uninhabitable.

The insureds held separate condominium policies with the same 

insurer, including building property, personal property, and additional 

living expense coverages. Before section one in both policies, a notice read 

“Hurricane Notice–You may have no coverage or you may have limited 

coverage for damage caused by hurricane.” Section one listed the 

protection for the dwelling (Coverage A), personal property (Coverage B), 

loss of use (Coverage C), and loss assessment (Coverage D). “Section 1 . . 

. Losses Insured,” listed familiar perils the policy protected against, but 

had a section stating, “Windstorm, hail–See special hurricane coverage 

that follows.”

The policies also contained a Hurricane Coverage Endorsement, which 

stated:

There is no coverage for loss caused by a hurricane under 

Section I of the policy to which this endorsement is attached. 

No coverage is provided for accidental direct physical loss to 

the property described in the policy caused by a hurricane 

other than that which is provided in this endorsement. The 

provisions of this endorsement apply only in respect to loss 

caused by hurricane.

The Hurricane Coverage Endorsement contained “Section I – Coverages,” 

which replaced Coverages A, B, C, and D. “Coverage C – Loss of Use,” 

read, in part:

1. Additional Living Expense. When a hurricane causes the 

covered dwelling to become uninhabitable, we will cover the 

necessary increase in cost you incur to maintain your 

standard of living for up to 12 months. Our payment is limited 

to incurred costs for the shortest of: (a) the time required to 

repair or replace the covered dwelling; (b) the time required for 

your household to settle elsewhere; or (c) 12 months.

. . . .

Our payment will not exceed an amount equal to 10% of the 

Coverage B limit applicable at the time of loss.

The Hurricane Coverage Endorsement also contained the definition of 

“hurricane.”

When used in this endorsement:
3

“hurricane” means a storm system that has been declared to 

be a hurricane by the National Hurricane Center of the 

National Weather Service. The duration of the hurricane 

includes the time period, in Florida:

a. beginning at the time a hurricane watch or hurricane 

warning is issued for any part of Florida by the National 

Hurricane Center of the National Weather Service;

b. continuing for the time period during which the hurricane 

conditions exist anywhere in Florida; and

c. ending 72 hours following the termination of the last 

hurricane watch or hurricane warning for any part of Florida 

by the National Hurricane Center of the National Weather 

Service.

The insurer paid the insureds their full coverage amounts on the 

building property and personal property coverages. Based on the 

Hurricane Coverage Endorsement, the insurer paid the insureds their 

additional living expenses, which were limited to 10% of the Coverage B 

(personal property coverage) limit. 

In June 2006, the insureds, Richard and Roberta Moody, filed a twocount complaint against the insurer; and in March 2007, another insured, 

Robert Denney, filed suit. The insureds alleged in count one that the 

insurer breached its contract with them by providing additional living 

expenses coverage under the Hurricane Coverage Endorsement rather 

than under the general policy provisions because “the loss of use was 

caused by a peril other than a hurricane.” 

They alleged their loss was caused by a tornado or microburst, not a 

hurricane. They alleged their policies’ Hurricane Coverage Endorsement 

was ambiguous and coverage should not be limited to 10% of the Coverage 

B (personal property coverage) limit. The Moodys requested $11,245.00

and Denney requested $10,059.10 in additional living expenses.

The insurer answered both complaints and asserted affirmative 

defenses. In its first affirmative defense, the insurer asserted that “[t]he 

[insureds’] actions [were] barred or limited by the Hurricane Coverage 

Endorsement of the policy.” In its third affirmative defense, the insurer

asserted that “[t]he [insureds] [were] barred from recovery because the 

tornado which allegedly caused [the] loss occurred during and was 
4

therefore part of Hurricane Jeanne which affected [the] property on or 

about September 26, 2004.”

The insureds and insurer all moved for summary judgment. Denney

argued a tornado, not a hurricane, caused damage to his condominium so 

the ten percent additional living expenses limitation under Coverage C of 

the Hurricane Coverage Endorsement should not apply. He also argued 

the definition of hurricane in the Hurricane Coverage Endorsement “is 

limited to a hurricane, and does not include other meteorological events, 

such as a tornado.” If the insurer “wanted to exclude tornado as part of 

its hurricane exclusion, it could and should have said so,” and that “a 

hurricane can occur without a tornado, and a tornado can occur without 

a hurricane.” He asserted that hurricanes and tornados are not 

synonymous as understood by an everyday person. 

The Moodys made similar arguments. They also argued the insurer 

used only the definition of hurricane found in section 627.4025(2)(c), 

Florida Statutes, and not the definitions of hurricane coverage and 

windstorm in sections (2)(a) and (2)(b). They asserted that if the insurer

used all three statutory sections in the policy, the Hurricane Coverage 

Endorsement would have included tornados. The Moodys attached a 

Citizens windstorm policy, which included all three statutory sections. 

They argued the insurer’s choice to include only one section should be 

construed against it. They filed an affidavit from their daughter attesting 

that the attached Citizens policy was hers.

The insurer argued that its policy was unambiguous and should be 

given its plain and ordinary meaning. It argued the definition of hurricane 

was clear and damage resulting from the storm system was covered under 

the Hurricane Coverage Endorsement. To the insurer, the real issue was 

whether the tornado occurred during the storm system. No one disputed

that the National Hurricane Center declared the storm system Hurricane 

Jeanne; the hurricane hit the insureds’ condominiums on September 26, 

which was a day the hurricane warning occurred; and the insureds 

incurred losses on that day.

Separate trial judges granted summary judgment for the insureds, and 

denied the insurer’s motion for summary judgment. Both courts found:

If [the insurer] had included in its policy the definition of 

“hurricane” sections 2(a) and 2(b) in addition to Section 2(c) of 

section 627.4025, Florida Statutes, there would be no 

question that the policy’s hurricane definition included 

tornados. If [the insurer] had intended to include tornados in 
5

its Hurricane Coverage Endorsement, it should have used 

language clearly stating this purpose.

. . . .

The Court finds that the fact that [the insurer] had available 

language such as that contained in Section 627.4025, Florida 

Statutes and chose not to insert that language in their policy 

should be construed against [the insurer] and in favor of a 

finding of coverage. Based on [the insurer]’s failure to include 

the language set [forth] in Sections 2(a) and 2(b) of Section 

627.4025 in its definition of “hurricane,” the Court finds that 

the Hurricane Endorsement does not apply to losses caused 

by tornados.2

2 (2) As used in policies providing residential coverage:

(a) “Hurricane coverage” is coverage for loss or damage caused by 

the peril of windstorm during a hurricane. The term includes 

ensuing damage to the interior of a building, or to property inside a 

building, caused by rain, snow, sleet, hail, sand, or dust if the direct 

force of the windstorm first damages the building, causing an 

opening through which rain, snow, sleet, hail, sand, or dust enters 

and causes damage.

(b) “Windstorm” for purposes of paragraph (a) means wind, wind 

gusts, hail, rain, tornados, or cyclones caused by or resulting from 

a hurricane which results in direct physical loss or damage to 

property.

(c) “Hurricane” for purposes of paragraphs (a) and (b) means a 

storm system that has been declared to be a hurricane by the 

National Hurricane Center of the National Weather Service. The 

duration of the hurricane includes the time period, in Florida:

1. Beginning at the time a hurricane watch or hurricane warning 

is issued for any part of Florida by the National Hurricane Center 

of the National Weather Service;

2. Continuing for the time period during which the hurricane 

conditions exist anywhere in Florida; and

3. Ending 72 hours following the termination of the last hurricane 

watch or hurricane warning issued for any part of Florida by the 

National Hurricane Center of the National Weather Service.

§ 627.4025(2), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).
6

The consolidated cases proceeded to a jury trial on whether a hurricane 

or a tornado caused the losses. Prior to trial, the insureds moved to 

determine the burden of proof. The parties disagreed on which party bore 

the initial burden of proof. The trial judge found that “[the insureds] ha[ve]

the initial burden to prove that the loss is covered under the applicable 

policy of insurance. The burden shall then shift to [the insurer] to prove 

that the loss falls within the Hurricane Endorsement of the policy.” 

The trial focused on facts largely irrelevant to the legal issue in this 

appeal. The insurer’s expert testified that tornados and hurricanes were 

“separate meteorological phenomena.” The insureds’ expert testified to 

reasons tornados and hurricanes were different. But, he also testified that 

“a tornado is an element of a hurricane.” He noted that there have been 

hurricanes, including Hurricane Jeanne, where tornados developed in the 

hurricane eye wall. He also distinguished between tornados in the 

Midwest and tornados that may occur within a hurricane.

The evidence showed that the insureds’ building sustained heavy 

damage, while the surrounding buildings sustained minor damage. The 

insureds’ expert opined that the damage to the insureds’ building was 

caused by a tornado. The insurer’s expert opined that the damage was 

caused by hurricane-force winds that hit the insureds’ building, which was 

unprotected because it was across from a golf course. 

The jury found the insurer did not prove by the greater weight of the 

evidence that the damage was caused by a hurricane and not by a tornado 

that developed during the hurricane. The trial court entered final 

judgment in favor of the insureds. The insureds moved for attorney’s fees 

pursuant to section 627.428, Florida Statutes, and the trial court later 

entered final judgment for attorney’s fees in their favor for $755,465.00 in 

fees and $3,600.00 in expert witness fees. 

The insurer moved for entry of judgment in accordance with its motion 

for directed verdict and renewed motion for summary judgment. It also 

moved for a new trial, arguing the trial court erred in its burden of proof 

ruling, and in giving incorrect jury instructions and an incorrect verdict 

form. The trial court denied the insurer’s motions. The insurer now 

appeals.

The insurer continues to argue that the policy is unambiguous and

property damage caused by a storm system declared a hurricane by the 

National Hurricane Center is covered under the Hurricane Coverage 

Endorsement. It argues that the court erred in considering extrinsic 

evidence in the form of the Citizens policy to interpret the policy. It asserts 
7

the ten percent coverage limitation on additional living expenses applied

because the insureds’ condominium losses were caused by Hurricane 

Jeanne. 

The insureds respond that their policies provide general coverage for 

residential losses and a specific exclusion/limitation for hurricanes. They 

argue the trial court did not err in deciding the general loss provisions 

applied to their claims for additional living expenses. They argue the 

Hurricane Coverage Endorsement defines “hurricane,” in part, as a “storm 

system,” but there is nothing in the policy that defines the components of 

the system. They argue their loss must be caused “by” a hurricane and 

not just caused “during” a hurricane. If the insurer intended for the 

Hurricane Coverage Endorsement to apply to tornados, it could have 

included section 627.4025(2)(b), which defined “windstorm” as part of a 

hurricane including tornados.

We have de novo review. Rodrigo v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 144 So. 3d 

690, 692 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (citation omitted). We also have de novo 

review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion for directed verdict. Gyongyosi 

v. Miller, 80 So. 3d 1070, 1074 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citation omitted).

“An insurance contract must be construed in accordance with the plain 

language of the policy.” Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Pin-Pon Corp., 155 So. 

3d 432, 437 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (citation omitted). 

If the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, the 

court is bound by the plain meaning of those terms. Thus, 

where a contract is unambiguous, the parties’ intent must be 

gleaned from “the four corners of the document.” “In the 

absence of ambiguity, the language itself is the best evidence 

of the parties’ intent and the plain meaning controls.”

Id. (internal citations omitted).

With these clear rules of construction in place, we begin our review.

The Hurricane Coverage Endorsement defines hurricane as, “a storm 

system that has been declared to be a hurricane by the National Hurricane 

Center of the National Weather Service.” (Emphasis added). There is only 

one reasonable interpretation of this definition. If the National Hurricane 

Center names a storm system a hurricane, the entire named storm 

system, including the elements of the storm, constitutes the hurricane. 

Under the loss of use provision in the Hurricane Coverage 
8

Endorsement, “[w]hen a hurricane causes the covered dwelling to become 

uninhabitable, [the insurer] will cover the necessary increase in cost [the 

insureds] incur to maintain [their] standard of living for up to 12 months,” 

subject to the ten percent limitation. Here, the National Hurricane Center 

named the storm system “Hurricane Jeanne” and issued the policyrequired hurricane warnings and watches. On September 26, Hurricane 

Jeanne passed over the insureds’ condominiums and the storm system

caused their condominiums to become uninhabitable. Therefore, the 

Hurricane Coverage Endorsement unambiguously applied.

The insureds argue the definition of hurricane is ambiguous by 

reference to the Citizens insurance policy, coupled with the insurer’s 

failure to include subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b) of section 627.4025, Florida 

Statutes, in its policy. But, when a policy is unambiguous, there is no 

need to, and courts should not, consider extrinsic evidence. Bombardier 

Capital Inc. v. Progressive Mktg. Grp., Inc., 801 So. 2d 131, 134 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 2001); see Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So. 2d 29, 34 (Fla. 

2000). Here, the court’s interpretation of the policy effectively rendered 

the entire Hurricane Coverage Endorsement meaningless. See Ergas v. 

Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 114 So. 3d 286, 289 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2013) (“A term of an insurance policy should not be construed to reach an 

absurd result.”). 

Both trial courts erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the 

insureds and finding the policy’s definition of hurricane did not include 

tornados spawned during a named hurricane storm system. The policy 

was not ambiguous. The trial courts should have applied the policy’s 

plain, unambiguous language. The Hurricane Coverage Endorsement

applied to the insureds’ losses.

We therefore reverse and remand for entry of judgment for the insurer. 

The insurer has also appealed the attorney’s fees and costs judgments. 

The insureds agree that if the judgment is reversed, the attorney’s fees and 

costs judgments should also be reversed. We therefore reverse the 

attorney’s fees and costs judgments.

Reversed.

GROSS and CONNER, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.