In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 22-1037 

MICHELLE R. GILBANK, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

WOOD COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Wisconsin. 

No. 3:20-cv-00601-jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED FEBRUARY 6, 2024 — DECIDED AUGUST 1, 2024 

____________________ 

Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK, ROVNER,

HAMILTON, BRENNAN, SCUDDER, ST. EVE, KIRSCH, JACKSONAKIWUMI, LEE, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.*

* Circuit Judges Kolar and Maldonado did not participate in consideration of this case. Senior Circuit Judge Hamilton participated in the en 

banc hearing as a member of the panel originally assigned to this case, 

along with Judges Kirsch and Pryor. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c).
2 No. 22-1037 

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. At the center of this federal case 

is a child-protection case in a Wisconsin state court. After losing custody of her daughter in state-court proceedings and 

regaining custody a year later, plaintiff Michelle Gilbank filed 

this lawsuit in federal court. She alleges that many officials 

involved in the state-court proceedings violated her federal 

constitutional rights. The district court granted summary 

judgment for all defendants, finding that some of Gilbank’s

claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that all 

other claims failed on the merits. Gilbank’s appeal was argued to a panel. We then decided under Circuit Rule 40(e) to 

hear the case en banc. The full court heard argument on February 6, 2024.1

We offer this roadmap for the three opinions and shifting 

majorities. First, a majority of the en banc court has voted to 

affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing this action. That will be the mandate of the court. Second, all members of the en banc court agree to affirm summary judgment 

for defendants on the merits of Gilbank’s claims for alleged 

injuries not caused by the state courts’ judgments, as explained in Part VIII. 

The picture on the Rooker-Feldman issue is more complex. 

Five of the eleven judges participating (Judges Rovner, Hamilton, Brennan, Jackson-Akiwumi, and Pryor) join all of this 

opinion. A majority of the en banc court, those five judges 

plus Judge Easterbrook, joins Parts I—III, V, VI, and VIII of 

1 After plaintiff Gilbank briefed her appeal pro se, we recruited counsel for her. Attorneys Joseph S. Diedrich and Kirsten Adrienne Atanasoff

and the firm of Husch Blackwell, LLP have ably represented plaintiff Gilbank before the panel and the en banc court. They have the thanks of the 

court.
No. 22-1037 3

this opinion, so those portions of this opinion are an en banc 

majority opinion. In these sections, we reject Gilbank’s assertion that she lacked a reasonable opportunity to litigate her 

claims in state court, and we eliminate the “fraud exception” 

to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

A different majority of the court, including Judge Easterbrook (with Chief Judge Sykes and Judges Scudder, St. Eve, 

Kirsch, and Lee), joins Part I of Judge Kirsch’s opinion, making that portion also an en banc majority opinion. That section 

holds that jurisdiction over Gilbank’s claims for injuries allegedly inflicted by the state court’s judgments is not barred by 

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because they do not seek a federal 

district court’s review and rejection of the state court’s judgments. Part IV of this opinion dissents from Part I of Judge 

Kirsch’s majority opinion on this issue. Part VII of this opinion, which responds to Judge Easterbrook’s concurring opinion, is also joined by only five judges. 

All judges agree that we should no longer rely on the 

“inextricably intertwined” language that has contributed to 

confusion in applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. All judges 

also agree that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, whatever its 

proper scope, should not recognize what we describe below 

as a “fraud exception.” And all members of the en banc court 

agree that our different understandings of the Rooker-Feldman 

doctrine may help show a need for the Supreme Court to 

clarify application of the doctrine, especially in the types of 

cases where the lower courts often confront it, including 

child-custody and mortgage-foreclosure cases. 
4 No. 22-1037 

I. Factual Background & Procedural History

A. Plaintiff’s Early Encounters with Police and Child Welfare 

Officials

Because we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 

we present the facts in the light most favorable to Gilbank as 

the non-moving party, giving her the benefit of the doubt 

when it comes to conflicting evidence and reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. E.g., Sullivan v. 

Flora, Inc., 63 F.4th 1130, 1141 (7th Cir. 2023). Plaintiff Michelle 

Gilbank had sole custody of her young daughter T.E.H. until 

the girl’s father, Ian Hoyle, was granted supervised visitation 

rights in November 2017. T.E.H. was three years old at the 

time. The relationship between Gilbank and Hoyle was 

fraught. Hoyle had a prior conviction for first-degree sexual 

assault of a six-year-old girl and frequently drank and used 

drugs. Gilbank too had a history of drug use, particularly 

methamphetamine. Nevertheless, in February or March 2018, 

when the home where they lived went into foreclosure, Gilbank and T.E.H. moved into Hoyle’s apartment.

On June 29, 2018, an anonymous caller contacted the 

Wood County Department of Human Services about Gilbank 

and T.E.H. The weather was hot, and they appeared to be living in Hoyle’s garage, which lacked air conditioning. Defendant Marshfield Police Department sent two officers, one of 

whom was defendant Detective Derek Iverson, to respond to 

the call. The officers were joined by a social worker from Human Services, defendant Theresa Heinzen-Janz. The officers 

and social worker spoke with Gilbank and observed that 

T.E.H. appeared well cared for and in good health. Gilbank 

expressed concern about living with Hoyle. Heinzen-Janz 

agreed to help, scheduling an appointment for July 3.
No. 22-1037 5

Before that appointment, Heinzen-Janz reviewed Gilbank’s history with Human Services. She learned that Gilbank 

had a history of drug problems and had a pending charge for 

methamphetamine possession from August 2017. Just before 

the appointment, Heinzen-Janz and Iverson met with Hoyle, 

who told them that he was concerned about Gilbank’s drug 

use and that he wanted her to move out.

At the meeting on July 3, Heinzen-Janz gave Gilbank contact information for local housing resources. Detective Iverson and Heinzen-Janz also pressed Gilbank about her drug 

use. Gilbank acknowledged her history with methamphetamine but denied having used the drug for a few weeks. Iverson asked Gilbank to take a drug test. She agreed to provide 

a urine sample, which came back positive for methamphetamine. When Heinzen-Janz and Iverson shared the results with 

her, Gilbank insisted the test results were wrong. She later admitted to having smoked methamphetamine “residue” just 

two days before the test.

B. Plaintiff is Arrested and Loses Custody

August 21, 2018 was a pivotal day for this case. Hoyle 

asked Gilbank for a ride to work. After Gilbank and T.E.H. 

dropped him off, an officer pulled Gilbank over for driving 

with a suspended license. A drug-sniffing dog alerted to the 

presence of a controlled substance. While officers searched 

the vehicle, Gilbank called Hoyle and asked him to come to 

the scene and care for T.E.H. The search uncovered drug paraphernalia and 0.7 grams of methamphetamine. Gilbank was 

arrested. Her daughter left with Hoyle.

Gilbank was taken to the Marshfield Police Department 

and interviewed by Detective Iverson and Heinzen-Janz.
6 No. 22-1037 

After Iverson gave her Miranda warnings, Gilbank said that 

she did not want to answer questions without a lawyer present. Iverson said that he would not ask Gilbank about the 

drugs and paraphernalia found in her vehicle, but he and 

Heinzen-Janz both told Gilbank that they needed to have a 

frank conversation about her drug use to the extent it affected 

T.E.H. Without an honest dialogue, they said, Heinzen-Janz 

could not create a safety plan to allow T.E.H. to remain with 

her.

Gilbank decided to talk. She said that she never used 

methamphetamine around T.E.H. and that she was making 

progress. After Detective Iverson questioned her truthfulness, 

Gilbank became defiant—claiming she did not have a problem with methamphetamine—and refused to talk any further.

Heinzen-Janz then told Gilbank that the county would be taking temporary physical custody of T.E.H. and placing her 

with Hoyle, that a hearing would be held in a day or two, and 

that Heinzen-Janz would call Gilbank to tell her the date and 

time of the hearing. Gilbank was booked and taken to the 

Wood County Jail.

The next day, August 22, Heinzen-Janz filed two documents in the Wood County Juvenile Court: a request for temporary physical custody of T.E.H. and a “CHIPS” petition 

(“Child in Need of Protective Services”) under Wis. Stat. 

§ 48.13(10) (child’s physical health seriously endangered). 

The request detailed how Gilbank had been taken into custody, refused to acknowledge her addiction, and refused to 

cooperate with safety planning. The request recommended 

that T.E.H. be placed temporarily with Hoyle. The petition 

echoed the request and noted that Gilbank’s association with 

methamphetamine users and dealers, who had “regular 
No. 22-1037 7

access” to T.E.H., put the child “at repeated risk for imminent 

harm”—a danger that Gilbank “failed to recognize.”

The state court scheduled a temporary physical custody 

hearing for the next day, August 23. Heinzen-Janz called the 

jail to give Gilbank the details. Jail staff said they would notify 

Gilbank of the hearing. Gilbank had already been released,

though, so despite Heinzen-Janz’s efforts, Gilbank did not receive notice of the hearing. Gilbank happened to go to the 

courthouse that day to inquire about the 48-hour hearing, 

only to learn that it had already been held earlier that day 

without her.

C. State-Court Proceedings

At the hearing on August 23, 2018, the juvenile court addressed temporary physical custody. The child’s father 

(Hoyle), Heinzen-Janz, an assistant district attorney, and a 

guardian ad litem appointed to represent T.E.H. were present. 

Gilbank was not. The court found that the information in the 

temporary custody request established probable cause to believe that Gilbank was unable to provide adequate care and 

supervision of T.E.H. or was neglecting her, so the court ordered T.E.H. be placed with Hoyle until the next hearing.

The next day, after learning of the order, Gilbank wrote a 

letter to the presiding judge contesting the court’s temporary 

physical custody order. She followed up by filing a motion to 

dismiss. Gilbank objected to the order on several grounds, including that she had not received notice of the hearing. Gilbank also moved to reopen the probable cause hearing. The 

court denied both motions but noted that Gilbank was “welcome” to use the appeals processes of the Wisconsin courts
8 No. 22-1037 

“any time that that’s appropriate.” A CHIPS hearing was 

scheduled for September 25.

Gilbank attended the September 25 CHIPS hearing and 

was represented by an attorney. She did not testify. Detective

Iverson and social worker Heinzen-Janz testified to the events 

leading to Gilbank’s temporary loss of custody, ending with 

her arrest on August 21, 2018. Heinzen-Janz also testified that 

Gilbank had admitted using methamphetamine as recently as 

August 23, the day of the temporary custody hearing. The 

guardian ad litem recommended that T.E.H. stay with Hoyle.

The court found these witnesses credible. The court found 

that Gilbank suffered from “a very serious methamphetamine 

addiction,” that necessary care for T.E.H. would require “sober parenting,” and that clear and convincing evidence 

showed that T.E.H. was a child in need of protection and services. The court ordered supervision for a period not to exceed one year. Pending a follow-up hearing to be held on October 29, the court ordered that T.E.H. remain with Hoyle.

At the October 29 hearing, Heinzen-Janz testified that 

T.E.H. should remain with Hoyle because of Gilbank’s continuing drug use. Until the extent of Gilbank’s methamphetamine use was clear, Heinzen-Janz said, she could not establish 

a plan for safely allowing Gilbank to have custody of T.E.H.

Still represented by counsel, Gilbank testified at that hearing. 

She testified that she had not used methamphetamine for several months. Finding that Gilbank was not forthright about 

her methamphetamine addiction and that T.E.H. could not be 

placed safely with her, the court ordered continued placement with Hoyle.
No. 22-1037 9

Eleven months later, on September 9, 2019, the court held 

a closure hearing on the CHIPS petition. By then, a separate 

case in family court was addressing custody and placement 

of T.E.H., so all parties, including Gilbank, agreed to close the 

CHIPS proceedings. The court agreed. In March 2020, Gilbank 

regained sole custody of T.E.H. in that separate proceeding.

There were no further relevant proceedings in state court.2

D. This Federal Lawsuit

Proceeding without a lawyer, Gilbank filed this federal 

lawsuit in June 2020, naming as defendants nearly everyone 

involved from the first welfare check in June 2018 to the conclusion of the CHIPS proceedings—from state-court judges to 

social workers to police officers. The complaint alleged numerous constitutional claims on behalf of Gilbank and T.E.H., 

primarily under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as conspiracy claims 

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986. In December 2020, the district court dismissed T.E.H. as a plaintiff and dismissed some 

of Gilbank’s claims. Gilbank v. Wood County Dep’t of Human 

Servs., 2020 WL 7364511, at *1, *5–6 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 15, 2020). 

Plaintiff also withdrew several more claims during discovery 

and later briefing.3 

2 Gilbank’s Amended Complaint in federal court alleged that Hoyle 

admitted having touched T.E.H.’s genitals daily and that his admission 

led to the March 2020 decision granting Gilbank sole custody. However,

there was no finding, admission, or even admissible evidence in our record of sexual assault or other wrongdoing. Still, Hoyle’s history of sexual 

abuse of another child and Gilbank’s methamphetamine use show starkly 

how difficult such decisions about child custody can be.

3 The district court dismissed as untimely all Section 1986 conspiracy 

claims against individual social workers. Gilbank, 2020 WL 7364511, at *5–

6. The parties debate whether the district court also dismissed plaintiff’s 
10 No. 22-1037 

By the time the district court ruled on cross-motions for 

summary judgment, the remaining defendants were the 

Marshfield Police Department, Detective Iverson, and four 

Wood County social workers, including Heinzen-Janz. The 

remaining claims were: (1) unreasonable search by compelling plaintiff to provide a urine sample; (2) unreasonable seizure and violations of substantive due process by removing 

T.E.H. from plaintiff’s custody; (3) denial of procedural due 

process by continuing to interrogate plaintiff after she had requested an attorney; (4) unreasonable seizure by evicting 

plaintiff from her home; (5) violations of substantive due process by interfering with family integrity; (6) violations of 42 

U.S.C. § 1985 by conspiring to remove T.E.H. from plaintiff’s 

custody; (7) a Monell claim against the Marshfield Police Department for enforcing policies and practices that led to the 

alleged constitutional violations; (8) denial of procedural due 

process by failing to provide plaintiff with notice prior to the 

temporary physical custody hearing on August 23, 2018; 

(9) denial of procedural due process by making fraudulent 

statements in the CHIPS proceedings; and (10) violations of 

state statutes governing protective custody.

The district court concluded that plaintiff’s principal 

claims were based on injuries caused by the state court’s orders in the CHIPS proceedings and were therefore barred by 

the Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional doctrine. Gilbank v. Marshfield Police Dep’t, 2021 WL 5865453, *5–6 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 10, 

Section 1985 claims as untimely. We do not read the court’s order as dismissing those claims. The dismissal order focused almost entirely on Section 1986. Since the court ultimately found no underlying constitutional 

violations within its jurisdiction, it may have seen no need to address the 

Section 1985 claims. 
No. 22-1037 11

2021). Plaintiff argued, however, that “some of her injuries occurred prior to, and exist independently of, the state court’s 

custody decision.” Id. at *6. Plaintiff contended that three of 

her claims—unreasonable search via urinalysis, interrogation 

without an attorney, and lack of notice—were not subject to 

Rooker-Feldman because they were based on those prior, independent injuries. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on the merits of those three claims. Id. at 

*6–7. The court found that plaintiff had consented to the urinalysis, that her Fifth Amendment claim failed because none 

of her statements were ever used against her in a criminal proceeding, and that her due process claims were barred by issue 

preclusion. The district court also granted summary judgment for defendants on Gilbank’s other due process claim, 

finding that any failures to abide by state statutory requirements were insufficient to state a claim for a federal due process violation. Id. at *7. 

II. Standards of Review

Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine operates as a “jurisdictional bar,” Andrade v. City of Hammond, 9 F.4th 947, 948 

(7th Cir. 2021), we must consider first whether the district 

court had subject-matter jurisdiction before reviewing the 

merits of any claim. Swartz v. Heartland Equine Rescue, 940 F.3d 

387, 390 (7th Cir. 2019); see also Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (“Without 

jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause ....”), 

quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 

83, 94 (1998). We review de novo both a district court’s conclusion that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and its grant of 

summary judgment on the merits of claims within its jurisdiction. Andrade, 9 F.4th at 949 (jurisdiction); Pierner-Lytge v. 
12 No. 22-1037 

Hobbs, 60 F.4th 1039, 1043 (7th Cir. 2023) (summary judgment). Rooker-Feldman is properly applied on a claim-by-claim 

basis. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 

U.S. 462, 486–87 (1983) (concluding that the district court 

lacked jurisdiction over some of plaintiffs’ claims but not others); Crawford v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 647 F.3d 642, 

646–47 (7th Cir. 2011) (same); Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 

1213 (11th Cir. 2021); In re Isaacs, 895 F.3d 904, 912 (6th Cir. 

2018); Henrichs v. Valley View Development, 474 F.3d 609, 613 

(9th Cir. 2007).

III. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

From the earliest days of this federal Republic, the parallel 

federal and state court systems have offered opportunities for 

litigants disappointed in one court system to seek a better result in the other. See VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C., 

951 F.3d 397, 408 (6th Cir. 2020) (Sutton, J., concurring) (“In 

our legal system of overlapping state and federal jurisdiction, 

dueling resolutions of claims and issues are a national litigation reality.”) For just as long, Congress and state and federal 

judges have debated and adjusted the boundaries of appropriate roles for state and federal courts. The Rooker-Feldman

doctrine has emerged from those debates. 

A. Basics of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), only the Supreme Court is 

“vested with appellate authority over state courts.” Sykes v. 

Cook County Circuit Court Probate Div., 837 F.3d 736, 741 (7th 

Cir. 2016). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizes that Congress has not “authorize[d] district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments.” Verizon 
No. 22-1037 13

Maryland, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 

644 n.3 (2002), citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). 

The doctrine takes its name from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust 

Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Our application of RookerFeldman today is guided by the Supreme Court’s authoritative 

restatement of the doctrine in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic 

Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005). 

Exxon Mobil emphasized the “limited circumstances” 

where Rooker-Feldman should apply, cautioning that the 

doctrine has no place “overriding Congress’ conferral of 

federal-court jurisdiction concurrent” with the jurisdiction of 

state courts or “superseding the ordinary application of 

preclusion law ....” 544 U.S. at 283, 291. Our application of 

Rooker-Feldman must neither interfere with our “‘virtually 

unflagging obligation’ to exercise the jurisdiction that 

Congress” has granted, Huon v. Johnson & Bell, Ltd., 657 F.3d 

641, 645 (7th Cir. 2011), quoting Colorado River Water 

Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976), nor 

swallow up issues that are properly resolved under 

abstention or claim- and issue-preclusion doctrines. In short, 

Rooker-Feldman must stay in its lane, allowing comity and 

abstention doctrines to do the work, when necessary, “to stay 

or dismiss the federal action in favor of the state-court 

litigation,” and using preclusion principles to prevent a party 

from relitigating “in federal court a matter previously 

litigated in state court.” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292–93. 

Rooker and Feldman are the only two cases in which the Supreme Court itself has actually applied the doctrine to reject 

federal jurisdiction. Given the tendency of disappointed litigants to seek new forums to vindicate their claims or 
14 No. 22-1037 

defenses, though, the doctrine has been invoked in tens of 

thousands of circuit and district court decisions since Exxon 

Mobil. Along with abstention and jurisdictional doctrines, it is 

part of the arsenal of federalism doctrines that circuit and district judges must consider on a regular basis. 

Exxon Mobil teaches that district courts should disclaim jurisdiction only in “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered 

before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting 

district court review and rejection of those judgments.” 544 

U.S. at 284. Phrased that way, the doctrine blocks federal jurisdiction when four elements are present. First, the federal 

plaintiff must have been a state-court loser. Second, the statecourt judgment must have become final before the federal 

proceedings began. Third, the state-court judgment must have 

caused the alleged injury underlying the federal claim. Fourth, 

the claim must invite the federal district court to review and 

reject the state-court judgment.

Our case law has added to the four elements in Exxon Mobil a fifth that the Supreme Court has not had occasion to address directly. Rooker-Feldman does not apply to bar jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s federal claim if she did not have a reasonable opportunity to raise her federal issues in the state 

courts. Andrade, 9 F.4th at 950, quoting Jakupovic, 850 F.3d at 

902. 

The first two Exxon Mobil elements are satisfied here. 

Plaintiff lost in state court, and the state-court judgments were 

final before she brought this action in federal court. 
No. 22-1037 15

B. The Third Element—Injured by a State-Court Judgment

The third element of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine asks 

whether the state-court judgments caused the alleged injury 

underlying the claim. Our case law has developed useful 

principles for dealing with the injury element. Most basic, as 

Exxon Mobil teaches, Rooker-Feldman bars claims where only 

the state-court judgment itself caused the alleged injury underlying the claim. 544 U.S. at 284. See also Swartz, 940 F.3d at 

392 (Rooker-Feldman barred claims where only “alleged injury,” the seizure of plaintiffs’ livestock, “was directly caused 

by the state court’s orders”); Jakupovic v. Curran, 850 F.3d 898, 

903–04 (7th Cir. 2017) (Rooker-Feldman barred claims where 

defendants simply “executed the state court’s bond condition 

and order”); Kelley v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 605 

(7th Cir. 2008) (Rooker-Feldman barred claims where defendants could have obtained sought-after attorney fees only by 

award of state court).

On the other hand, claims based on injuries that are “independent” of the state-court judgment (i.e., injuries that were 

not caused by that judgment) are not barred. See Exxon Mobil, 

544 U.S. at 293 (“If a federal plaintiff ‘present[s] some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a 

state court has reached in a case to which he was a party ..., 

then there is jurisdiction and state law determines whether 

the defendant prevails under principles of preclusion.’”), 

quoting GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 

(7th Cir. 1993). Where, for example, an injury was complete 

before the state-court judgment was rendered, the judgment 

could not have caused the injury, so a claim based on that injury is independent. See Andrade, 9 F.4th at 948, 950–51 (claims 

not barred where challenged conduct, an adverse 
16 No. 22-1037 

administrative determination regarding rental property, “occurred before any judicial involvement”); Iqbal v. Patel, 780 

F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2015) (claims not barred because challenged racketeering enterprise “predate[d] the state litigation 

and caused injury independently of it”). 

In another common pattern where Rooker-Feldman does 

not apply, the federal plaintiff was also a plaintiff in state 

court, lost in a case seeking relief for injuries inflicted by the 

state-court defendant, and wants to relitigate the dispute in 

federal court. Exxon Mobil said what this circuit has long made 

clear: Rooker-Feldman does not bar federal jurisdiction in such 

a case. Doctrines of claim- and issue-preclusion will often apply to bar relitigation, see 544 U.S. at 293, quoting GASH Assocs., 995 F.2d at 728, but there is no jurisdictional bar.4

In short, Exxon Mobil’s injury element hinges on whether 

the federal claim alleges an injury “caused by the state court 

judgment” or “an independent prior injury that the state court 

failed to remedy.” Sykes, 837 F.3d at 742. We now apply this 

test to plaintiff’s claims in this case.5 

4 For other recent cases in this circuit addressing Rooker-Feldman, see 

Jakupovic, 850 F.3d at 902–04; Sykes, 837 F.3d at 741–43; Kelley, 548 F.3d at 

603–06; Taylor v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 532–35 (7th Cir. 

2004); Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554–59 (7th Cir. 1999); 

Centres, Inc. v. Town of Brookfield, 148 F.3d 699, 701–03 (7th Cir. 1998); Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506, 509–12 (7th Cir. 1996); Young 

v. Murphy, 90 F.3d 1225, 1230–33 (7th Cir. 1996); Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 

1364–70 (7th Cir. 1996) (Rooker-Feldman does not apply where injury exists 

“apart from the loss in state court”); Homola v. McNamara, 59 F.3d 647, 650 

(7th Cir. 1995); GASH Assocs., 995 F.2d at 729.

5 In line with many of our cases, Sykes referred to this analysis as the 

“‘inextricably intertwined’ determination.” 837 F.3d at 742. This “inextricably intertwined” language appeared in Feldman: federal claims are 
No. 22-1037 17

1. Claims Alleging Injuries from State-Court Judgments 

Plaintiff Gilbank’s central claims allege injuries inflicted 

by the state-court judgments taking away custody of T.E.H. 

The only injury plaintiff claims to have suffered after the temporary physical custody hearing held on August 23, 2018 was 

being deprived of custody of T.E.H. pursuant to the state 

court’s orders. We appreciate how serious that injury may 

have been. State courts have in their hands our lives, liberties,

and livelihoods, as well as our property, dignity, and reputations. In cases like this, they have our families in their hands. 

Some of their decisions are incorrect, as are some federalcourt decisions. In a much, much higher proportion of cases, 

inextricably intertwined with the state court’s judgment where the federal 

court “is in essence being called upon to review the state court decision.” 

460 U.S. at 482 n.16 & 486–87. The phrase has been frequently criticized. 

E.g., Andrade, 9 F.4th at 954 (Sykes, C.J., concurring) (suggesting that our 

“continued recitation of the inextricably intertwined test isn’t just harmless gloss” on the post-Exxon Mobil doctrine and arguing that we should 

“avoid the ‘inextricably intertwined’ framing”); Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 

1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2021) (placing the phrase “at the root of the many 

mistaken Rooker-Feldman dismissals”); VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, 

P.C., 951 F.3d 397, 406 (6th Cir. 2020) (Sutton, J., concurring) (calling the 

phrase “a prolific source of controversy”); Milchtein v. Chisholm, 880 F.3d 

895, 898 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he phrase ‘inextricably intertwined’ ... should 

not be used as a ground of decision.”). We agree that it is difficult to discern a “bright line that separates” the “inextricably intertwined” from the 

“not so intertwined,” see Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1993), 

and courts may ponder the imponderable by asking whether a claim is 

intertwined, “‘inextricably’ or extricably,” with a state-court judgment, 

Richardson v. Koch Law Firm, P.C., 768 F.3d 732, 734 (7th Cir. 2014). The 

Supreme Court has never explicitly discarded the phrase, but the Court 

did not use it in Exxon Mobil and has not otherwise explained it. All judges 

agree here that the “inextricably intertwined” language is not useful in 

analyzing questions under Rooker-Feldman. 
18 No. 22-1037 

though, losing parties believethe courts have erred. See Homola 

v. McNamara, 59 F.3d 647, 648 (7th Cir. 1995). 

The high stakes and the possibility of errors, even egregious errors, do not affect application of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. The very starting point for the analysis is the assumption that a state-court judgment was wrong and injured 

the federal plaintiff. See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415–16 (assuming 

state court erred); Lennon v. City of Carmel, 865 F.3d 503, 506 

(7th Cir. 2017) (“There is no exception for egregious error.”

(citing Kelley, 548 F.3d at 603)). 

Because plaintiff’s injury in the loss of custody was “effectuated” only by the state court’s temporary and longer-term 

orders on August 23 and October 29, 2018, respectively, those 

claims based solely on that injury satisfy the third Exxon Mobil

element. See Swartz, 940 F.3d at 391. These claims include the 

alleged violations of: (1) procedural due process for want of 

notice before the August 23 hearing; (2) state statutes governing protective custody; (3) substantive due process by interfering with family integrity after the court’s temporary physical custody order; and (4) procedural due process by making 

fraudulent statements in state courts in the CHIPS petition 

and later proceedings.

Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim, alleging that she 

did not receive notice of the temporary physical custody hearing, satisfies the third element because the failure of notice 

would have been harmless if the August 23 hearing had gone 

her way. Her temporary loss of custody of T.E.H. arose from 

a state-court order. That claimed injury satisfies the third

Exxon Mobil element of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See 544 

U.S. at 284. So too with any alleged violations of state statutes. 

The only injury these claims allege “was effectuated by” the 
No. 22-1037 19

state court’s orders. See Swartz, 940 F.3d at 391. Likewise, 

plaintiff’s substantive due process claim—interference with 

family integrity—alleges injury only by the state-court judgments that deprived her of custody of her daughter. On these 

claims, we move on to the fourth Exxon Mobil element in Part 

IV.

2. Injuries Complete Before State-Court Judgments

Rooker-Feldman does not apply to plaintiff’s other claims 

because they assert injuries that were complete prior to the 

state court’s temporary physical custody order of August 23, 

2018. Those claims do not satisfy the third Exxon Mobil

element. For example, any injury plaintiff suffered when she 

provided a urine sample on July 3 occurred before the statecourt proceedings began. The same is true of any injuries 

plaintiff suffered by being interrogated without an attorney 

and evicted from Hoyle’s apartment on August 21. Likewise, 

to the extent that plaintiff’s substantive due process claim 

alleges interference with family integrity before the state 

court’s temporary physical custody order of August 23, 

Rooker-Feldman does not bar the claim. 

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment and substantive due process claims relating to the removal of T.E.H. on August 21 involve one extra twist. The state court later approved the initial 

removal when it found probable cause on August 23. These 

claims might therefore seem to invite “review and rejection” 

of the state court’s finding. But plaintiff’s injuries flowing 

from T.E.H.’s removal began the moment she no longer had 

custody of her daughter. Any injuries sustained from August 

21 until the court order two days later were not caused by the 

state court’s order. So even if these claims question “a legal 

conclusion” that the state court reached later, the claims are 
20 No. 22-1037 

for Rooker-Feldman purposes still “independent” of the state 

court’s August 23 judgment. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293, 

quoting GASH Assocs., 995 F.2d at 728. As we explain below 

in Part VIII, all judges agree that these claims fail on the merits 

for other reasons. But the fact that the injuries preceded the 

state court’s judgments means that these claims do not satisfy 

the third element under Exxon Mobil, so jurisdiction over 

these claims is not blocked by Rooker-Feldman. See id.

Finally on this topic, because jurisdiction is proper over 

these alleged constitutional violations, plaintiff’s Monell and 

conspiracy claims, which rely on these same alleged violations, are likewise not barred by Rooker-Feldman. 

IV. The Controversial Fourth Element: “Review and Reject” the 

State Court Judgment

The fourth element under Exxon Mobil is that the federal 

claim must invite “review and rejection” of the state court 

judgments in question. 544 U.S. at 284. That element of the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine divides this court. I believe that 

plaintiff’s claims for damages for injuries inflicted by state 

court judgments invite “review and rejection” of those judgments, so that Rooker-Feldman bars jurisdiction here. But a majority of the en banc court disagrees in Judge Kirsch’s opinion, 

as joined in part by Judge Easterbrook. This Part IV should 

thus be read as a dissent from Part I of Judge Kirsch’s opinion. 

Among the three opinions in this case, no one disputes

that plaintiff Gilbank was a state-court loser (Exxon Mobil’s 

first factor), that the state-court judgments were final before 

she filed her federal case (second), and that she claims that the 

state-court judgments injured her (third). The majority takes 

the approach, though, that plaintiff’s claims based on injuries 
No. 22-1037 21

inflicted by the state-court judgments do not invite a federal 

court to “review and reject” those state-court judgments. So 

long as plaintiff is seeking only monetary damages rather 

than a federal-court order directly nullifying the state court’s 

custody orders, the majority reasons, Rooker-Feldman does not 

apply and the federal court is free to decide those damages 

claims on their merits. 

On this issue, this en banc decision marks a dramatic departure from this circuit’s precedents, a departure that I view 

as erroneous and unjustified. I explain next in Part IV-A why 

the new majority is misreading Exxon Mobil. Part IV-B addresses this circuit’s precedents and why a departure from 

stare decisis is not justified here. Part IV-C explains why the 

majority’s new approach to Rooker-Feldman will produce arbitrary, impractical, and troubling results.

A. Exxon Mobil’s Fourth Element

The majority argues that its new bright-line rule—that 

Rooker-Feldman does not apply to a federal claim for damages 

based on an injury inflicted by a state-court judgment—is 

required by Exxon Mobil. Judge Kirsch’s opinion even 

describes Exxon Mobil’s key language as unambiguous. Post

at 72. It is not.

The opinion in Exxon Mobil is not as clear as it could have 

been on the contours of this fourth element—inviting review 

and rejection of state-court judgments. That is not surprising 

because it was not the pivotal issue in that case. The federal 

case in Exxon Mobil did not come close to satisfying the doctrine. The federal case sought coercive relief and was filed just 

a few weeks after a mirror-image state-court action seeking 

declaratory relief was filed. That pattern is familiar when 
22 No. 22-1037 

parties are maneuvering for advantage in different courts, but 

it had nothing to do with Rooker-Feldman. The federal action 

satisfied none of the elements of the doctrine. It was filed before any state-court judgment had become final; the federal 

plaintiff had not lost in the state courts; without any statecourt judgment no injury had been inflicted; and of course 

there was no state-court judgment to review and reject. 

The Exxon Mobil opinion used many verbs to address this 

fourth element: review, reject, overturn, undo, reverse, set 

aside, and alter. 544 U.S. at 283–93. This was not the language 

of legal precision. In referring to the relief being sought in 

cases barred by Rooker-Feldman, the opinion used language 

with a decidedly practical bent. The key phrase, “inviting 

review and rejection,” is not a legal term of art limited to a 

specific technical meaning. It invites a practical approach, one 

that cannot be avoided by artful pleading. Elsewhere the 

opinion said, for example, with emphases added: plaintiffs’ 

complaints “essentially invited federal courts of first instance 

to review and reject unfavorable state-court judgments;” id. at 

283; that the doctrine bars a party “from seeking what in 

substance would be appellate review” in a federal court; id. at 

287; or that a new federal action “in essence, would be an 

attempt to obtain direct review” of state court decision; id. at 

287–88 n.2.6

Until this en banc decision, this circuit has also consistently understood Rooker-Feldman, including this fourth 

6 The latter two of these quotations quoted in turn other Supreme 

Court opinions describing the doctrine. See also Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 

459, 466 (2006) (doctrine applies where “a party in effect seeks to take an 

appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision to a lower federal court” 

(emphasis added)).
No. 22-1037 23

“review and reject” element, in practical terms. On plaintiff’s 

four claims that should be barred by the doctrine, the only alleged injury is the deprivation of custody itself, as ordered by 

the state trial court. So while these claims do not ask the federal district court in so many words “to reverse or modify” 

those judgments, Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416, the claim is barred 

because its premise is that the state-court judgments were 

wrong, and there is “no conceivable way to redress” the alleged interference “without overturning” the state-court 

judgments ordering that interference, Jakupovic, 850 F.3d at 

903, quoting Sykes, 837 F.3d at 743, or, in terms of Exxon Mobil, 

“reviewing and rejecting” those state-court judgments as incorrect.

Several other considerations, apart from adherence to a 

long line of circuit precedent, indicate that a practical application fits the doctrine better than the majority’s approach to 

Exxon Mobil and decisive reliance on the form of relief sought.

First, if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine really embodied the 

majority’s simple, bright-line rule—that a federal claim seeking damages for injuries inflicted by a state-court judgment 

does not invite review and rejection—I would have expected 

Exxon Mobil to have been direct and explicit about it. The short 

opinion could have been even shorter. Exxon Mobil narrowed 

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but nothing in the Court’s opinion signaled that the jurisdictional bar could be avoided by 

the simple device of asking for damages rather than injunctive 

relief. In one of our many cases rejecting the majority’s new 

theory, we wrote that, if plaintiff were correct on this point, 

“federal courts could award damages every time a litigant in 

state court used an improper procedure or considered evidence that a federal judge does not think trustworthy. That 
24 No. 22-1037 

duplication would greatly increase the already high cost of 

civil litigation.” Harold, 773 F.3d at 887. Cf. post at 73 (denying 

Harold’s point).

The focus of Exxon Mobil was more on the source of injuries

than on the form of relief. 544 U.S. at 284 (“complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments”) (emphasis added). 

Our cases before Exxon Mobil had taught that a good way to 

keep Rooker-Feldman and preclusion doctrines in their proper 

lanes was to focus on the cause of the injury. Exxon Mobil took 

the same approach, and the Court quoted one of our precedents to make its point: 

If a federal plaintiff “present[s] some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to 

which he was a party..., then there is jurisdiction 

and state law determines whether the defendant prevails under principles of preclusion.” 

GASH Assocs. v. Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 

(C.A.7 1993); accord Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 

1163–1164 (C.A.9 2003). 

Id. at 293. 

Second, the majority does not offer a reason why the Supreme Court would have drawn the majority’s bright line for 

these purposes between seeking damages and injunctive relief. It is difficult to see such a reason. Federal courts do not 

take such an approach when parties invite state courts to review and reject federal-court judgments, as I explain below in 

Part IV-C. Why would the Supreme Court adopt such an approach when the roles are reversed?
No. 22-1037 25

Where the only injury underlying a claim was caused by 

the state-court judgment, there is simply no sensible way to 

separate the injury from the judgment that caused it. Redressing the injury—regardless of the form of relief requested—

necessarily requires a federal court to review and reject the 

state-court judgment. Whether the claim asks the federal 

court to undo the state-court judgment or to compensate the 

state-court loser for injuries caused by that judgment, the result is the same: the state-court loser is in substance appealing 

her loss to the federal district court, seeking review and rejection of the state-court decision. 

We cannot determine the merits of such a claim “without 

determining that the state court erred by issuing” its judgment. Kelley, 548 F.3d at 605. In those circumstances, we have 

explained, “when ‘the injury is executed through a court order, there is no conceivable way to redress the wrong without 

overturning the order of a state court. Rooker-Feldman does not 

permit such an outcome.’” Jakupovic, 850 F.3d at 903, quoting 

Sykes, 837 F.3d at 743. Both the injury and review-and-reject 

elements are satisfied in such cases. 

B. Circuit Precedents and Stare Decisis

The new majority also does not even acknowledge how 

well-settled our circuit’s law has been in rejecting its new rule. 

After Exxon Mobil, we have, until today, consistently rejected 

the majority’s position. We have repeatedly applied RookerFeldman to claims where federal plaintiffs sought only 

damages rather than a federal judgment literally vacating or 

modifying a state-court judgment. We have done so because 

we have recognized that even when a state-court loser seeks 

only damages, a federal court is still being invited to review 

and reject the state-court decision. For our cases making this 
26 No. 22-1037 

point after Exxon Mobil, see Bauer v. Koester, 951 F.3d 863, 865–

66 (7th Cir. 2020) (Rooker-Feldman barred claim for damages to 

remedy injuries inflicted by state-court foreclosure 

judgment); Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 908 F.3d 1050, 1062 

(7th Cir. 2018) (same: “Mr. Moore insists he can bring these 

claims before us because he seeks damages rather than 

reconsideration of the state court decision, but that assertion 

denies the substance of what he actually seeks in federal 

court.”); Lennon v. City of Carmel, 865 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 

2018) (Rooker-Feldman barred claims for damages from traffic 

fines and points added to driving records imposed in statecourt proceedings); Harold v. Steel, 773 F.3d 884, 885–87 (7th 

Cir. 2014) (Rooker-Feldman barred claim for damages under 

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act where only source of injury 

was state-court judgment); Gilbert v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 

591 F.3d 896, 899–902 (7th Cir. 2010) (Rooker-Feldman barred 

claims for damages and injunction where state-court 

judgment reinstated teacher’s termination; affirming district 

court decision that “Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred Gilbert’s 

claims no matter what form of relief he sought”); Kelley v. 

Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 2008) (RookerFeldman barred claims for damages in amounts attorney fees 

awarded against federal plaintiffs in state-court judgments: 

“Because defendants needed to prevail in state court in order 

to capitalize on the alleged fraud, the FDCPA claims that 

plaintiffs bring ultimately require us to evaluate the state 

court judgments. We could not determine that defendants’ 

representations and requests relating to attorney fees violated 

the law without determining that the state court erred by 

issuing judgments granting the attorney fees.”).

Judge Kirsch’s opinion says nothing directly about this 

consistent line of authority, which has not been even 
No. 22-1037 27

controversial until today’s decision. (All the cited cases were 

unanimous and were joined by, among others, four members 

of the new six-member majority rejecting them on this point.) 

Instead, to overcome both Exxon Mobil and the weight of our 

case law on this issue, the opinion relies on two other decisions of this court, Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 

2002), and Johnson v. Pushpin Holdings, LLC, 748 F.3d 769 (7th 

Cir. 2014). Post at 69–70. We found federal jurisdiction in 

those decisions, but not on the majority’s new theory that the 

plaintiffs had requested only damages. 

In Brokaw, we wrote that claims based on injuries 

sustained “before any court proceedings occurred” could 

proceed because the plaintiffs had no “reasonable 

opportunity” to pursue them in state court and, alternatively, 

the claims were “independent[] of the state court decision.” 

305 F.3d at 664–65, 668. Brokaw also said that even if the 

plaintiffs alleged injuries directly from the state-court 

judgments, Rooker-Feldman did not apply because the 

plaintiffs had no opportunity to raise their federal issues in 

the state courts. The case is thus not on point here. It is 

certainly not a counterweight to the long line of cases rejecting 

the majority’s theory.

Pushpin Holdings offers some rhetorical support for the 

majority in dicta, but a closer look at the facts shows that we 

did not embrace the majority’s theory there. We certainly did 

not engage with or purport to depart from the many cases 

rejecting that theory. Plaintiffs in the case had filed a class 

action in a state court alleging that Pushpin had filed more 

than 1,000 “fraudulent” small-claims suits in state court that 

resulted in default judgments against class members. 748 F.3d 

at 770–71. After Pushpin removed the case to federal court, 
28 No. 22-1037 

the class argued that Rooker-Feldman required remand. Id. at 

773. We rejected application of the doctrine, noting without 

any analysis that Rooker-Feldman “does not bar a federal suit 

that seeks damages for a fraud that resulted in a judgment 

adverse” to the federal plaintiff. Id., citing Nesses v. Shepard, 68 

F.3d 1003, 1004 (7th Cir. 1995), and cases cited in Truong v. 

Bank of America, N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 383–84 (5th Cir. 2013). 

Pushpin’s language, if not its holding, would thus seem to 

support not the majority’s new rule but a “fraud exception” 

to Rooker-Feldman, which does not exist, as explained below in 

Part VI, which is a majority en banc decision. 

Moreover, our later decision in the Pushpin case made this 

limit clear. We affirmed the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim. We made clear then that the alleged fraud 

occurred prior to the state-court proceedings. Johnson v. Pushpin Holdings, LLC, 821 F.3d 871, 873, 875–76 (7th Cir. 2016) 

(plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated the state consumer 

protection law when they failed to register as a debt collection 

agency, sued for an unconscionably high amount, and forged 

plaintiffs’ signatures on guaranties and leases). 

In short, neither Brokaw nor Pushpin was on point. Neither 

adopted the majority’s new rule that a federal plaintiff can 

avoid Rooker-Feldman by asking only for damages for injuries 

inflicted by state-court judgments.7

7 Likewise, the cases that Judge Kirsch’s opinion relies on from other 

circuits are distinguishable or inconsistent with our circuit’s precedents 

from both before and after Exxon Mobil. See Hohenberg v. Shelby County, 68 

F.4th 336 (6th Cir. 2023); Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206 (11th Cir. 2021);

Webb ex rel. K.S. v. Smith, 936 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. 2019); Great Western Mining 

& Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2010); Kovacic v. 

Cuyahoga County Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 606 F.3d 301 (6th Cir. 
No. 22-1037 29

Under these circumstances, I need not say anything original here about the familiar principle of stare decisis:

Overruling precedent is never a small 

matter. Stare decisis—in English, the idea that 

today's Court should stand by yesterday's 

decisions—is “a foundation stone of the rule of 

law.” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 

572 U.S. 782, 798 (2014). Application of that 

doctrine, although “not an inexorable 

command,” is the “preferred course because it 

promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and 

consistent development of legal principles, 

fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and 

contributes to the actual and perceived integrity 

of the judicial process.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 

U.S. 808, 827–828 (1991). It also reduces 

incentives for challenging settled precedents, 

2010); Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 

F.3d 456 (4th Cir. 2006); Mo’s Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 F.3d 1229 (10th 

Cir. 2006); Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Ernst 

v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester County, 108 F.3d 486 (3d Cir. 1997). In all 

but one of these cases, plaintiff argues, damages requests went forward in 

federal court, but not because plaintiffs were seeking only damages. The 

exception is Behr, where a father lost custody of two of his four children in 

state court. Along with his other two children, he sued a host of defendants in federal court for conspiring to deprive him of custody. 8 F.4th at 

1208–09. The Eleventh Circuit reversed dismissal of some claims, adopting 

the majority’s theory here that a request for damages for injuries caused 

by a state court’s unconstitutional judgment does not ask a federal court 

to “review and reject” that judgment. That approach is contrary to our circuit’s long line of precedents before and after Exxon Mobil. 
30 No. 22-1037 

saving parties and courts the expense of endless 

relitigation.

Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 455 (2015). 

Or, as this court put it a few years earlier:

if the fact that a court considers one of its previous decisions to be incorrect is a sufficient 

ground for overruling it, then stare decisis is out 

the window, because no doctrine of deference to 

precedent is needed to induce a court to follow 

the precedents that it agrees with; a court has no 

incentive to overrule them even if it is completely free to do so. The doctrine of stare decisis 

imparts authority to a decision, depending on 

the court that rendered it, merely by virtue of 

the authority of the rendering court and independently of the quality of its reasoning. The essence of stare decisis is that the mere existence 

of certain decisions becomes a reason for adhering to their holdings in subsequent cases.

Tate v. Showboat Marina Casino P’ship, 431 F.3d 580, 582–83 (7th 

Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

I agree that stare decisis is not “an inexorable command,” 

but one can reasonably expect the majority (a) to acknowledge 

what it is doing to circuit precedent and (b) to offer some compelling justification for doing so beyond disagreement with 

those precedents. The majority here does neither. It does not 

rely on any intervening Supreme Court precedent or statutory 

amendment. Nor does it assert that our established RookerFeldman precedents have been causing active mischief and 

harm. To the contrary, Judge Kirsch’s opinion goes out of its 
No. 22-1037 31

way to assert that the majority’s new course under RookerFeldman will have little or no practical impact. The theory (or 

hope) seems to be that all the plaintiffs whose cases will now 

be subject to federal jurisdiction will still lose on the merits 

based on immunity doctrines and claim and issue preclusion. 

Perhaps, but if that’s what the majority expects, what’s the 

point of overruling our post-Exxon Mobil precedents applying 

Rooker-Feldman to damages claims? 

C. Arbitrary, Impractical, and to What End?

None of this adds up to a persuasive case for overruling

well-established circuit precedents. To the contrary, the more 

likely results will be arbitrary, inconsistent, and impractical. 

We will add to the cost and delays of efforts to relitigate child 

custody, mortgage foreclosures, and other disputes that seem 

especially prone to stubborn relitigation.

Rooker-Feldman has arisen most often in child-custody 

cases and mortgage foreclosures. The federal plaintiffs in such 

cases are often pro se, since lawyers are more likely than pro 

se parties to anticipate the obstacles they will face in going to 

federal court to challenge a state-court decision. With or 

without counsel, these state-court losers will now be able to 

establish federal jurisdiction in the district courts to pursue 

their claims. Further, consider how often state courts issue 

temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions 

that cause significant injury to the enjoined party. (Erroneous 

enforcement of unreasonable and oppressive covenants not to 

compete—especially with ex parte injunctions—comes to 

mind.) 

This case is about a family-law matter, child custody. The 

high stakes and strong emotions in such matters are obvious. 
32 No. 22-1037 

They provide powerful motives to treat a state-court loss as 

not final, as reflected in the frequency of such cases on our 

docket, especially with pro se plaintiffs. We also see frequent 

efforts to continue litigating state-court losses in federal challenges to foreclosures on home mortgages. Under the majority’s new rule, federal courts will now have jurisdiction over 

claims for damages based on alleged due process violations 

in state-court foreclosure proceedings. We can expect to see 

even more such challenges. And by categorically excluding 

damages claims from Rooker-Feldman, the majority is also inviting federal challenges to state-court decisions granting 

temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions 

that inflict injury on the enjoined parties. 

It may be that absolute judicial immunity will protect 

some defendants at the motion-to-dismiss stage—most likely 

state-court judges and those carrying out their orders. Other 

defendants will not have that option, particularly in childcustody and mortgage-foreclosure cases. More fundamental, 

the majority is overlooking important practical differences 

between resolving a case based on the Rooker-Feldman

jurisdictional doctrine and relying instead on preclusion and 

immunity doctrines. 

The most important difference is that doctrines of claim 

preclusion and issue preclusion (also known as res judicata 

and collateral estoppel) are equitable doctrines. They are subject to equitable exceptions and significant state-to-state variation. In Illinois, for example, claim preclusion “is an equitable doctrine that is not applied when it is fundamentally unfair to do so.” Parker v. Lyons, 757 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(internal quotation omitted), overruled on other grounds by 

Hadzi-Tanovic v. Johnson, 62 F.4th 394 (7th Cir. 2023). We have 
No. 22-1037 33

said that in Wisconsin, on the other hand, while “the doctrine 

of issue preclusion includes a ‘fairness’ element, claim preclusion does not. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has not adopted 

a general fairness factor as part of its claim-preclusion doctrine.” Adams Outdoor Advert. Ltd. P’ship v. City of Madison, 56 

F.4th 1111, 1118 (7th Cir. 2023), citing Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 

279 Wis. 2d 520, 541–42, 694 N.W.2d 879, 890. But cf. Friends of 

Milwaukee's Rivers v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 382 F.3d 

743, 765 & n. 17 (7th Cir. 2004) (remanding for consideration 

of Wisconsin “fairness” exception to claim preclusion: 

“[c]laim preclusion may be disregarded in appropriate circumstances when the policies favoring preclusion of a second 

action are trumped by other significant policies. Claim preclusion ... is a principle of public policy applied to render justice, 

not to deny it. Any exception to claim preclusion, however, 

must be limited to special circumstances or the exceptions will 

weaken the values of repose and reliance.”), quoting Sopha v. 

Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 230 Wis.2d 212, 236, 601 

N.W.2d 627, 638 (1999).

When it comes to issue preclusion based on Wisconsin 

state court decisions, the “fundamental fairness step” requires 

the court to “determine whether it is fundamentally fair to 

employ issue preclusion given the circumstances of the particular case at hand.” First Weber Grp., Inc. v. Horsfall, 738 F.3d 

767, 773 (7th Cir. 2013), quoting Mrozek v. Intra Fin. Corp., 281 

Wis.2d 448, 464, 699 N.W.2d 54, 61 (2005). Relevant factors include “the availability of review of the first judgment, differences in the quality or extensiveness of the proceedings, shifts 

in the burden of persuasion, and the adequacy of the loser's 

incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication of the issue.” 

Id. And signaling the need for caution here, especially before 

the majority relies too heavily on these doctrines, we said that 
34 No. 22-1037 

Wisconsin’s “fundamental fairness step eschews formalistic 

requirements in favor of ‘a looser, equities-based interpretation of the doctrine.’” Id., quoting Michelle T. by Sumpter v. Crozier, 173 Wis.2d 681, 688, 495 N.W.2d 327, 330 (1993). 

For these reasons, this circuit’s precedents under RookerFeldman offer a much better prospect for preventing unjustified relitigation of state-court judgments than the looser equitable evaluations permitted or required under doctrines of 

claim and issue preclusion, upon which the majority places so 

much reliance.8

As for immunity doctrines, absolute judicial immunity 

should protect judges and those who are carrying out their 

commands. Other federal defendants, including the statecourt plaintiffs and their agents (such as the social workers 

here) will probably have to fend for themselves without absolute immunity. Qualified immunity may help them in some 

cases, but not at the pleading stage if the federal plaintiff accuses them of misleading the state courts. Use of these other 

doctrines seems to me likely to lead to longer and more extensive litigation seeking federal review and rejection of statecourt judgments.

8 Judge Kirsch asserts that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as it existed 

prior to this decision and advocated in this opinion, federalized issue and 

claim preclusion. Post at 79. That description is not accurate. RookerFeldman and preclusion are not jigsaw puzzle pieces, where one cannot sit 

atop the other. The doctrines can and do overlap when a state-court loser 

asks a federal court to review and reject a state-court decision and to decide 

issues or claims that were previously resolved on their merits. In these 

common instances, the jurisdictional nature of Rooker-Feldman simply 

means that it must be decided first.
No. 22-1037 35

Consider what discovery and a trial would look like in this 

case or similar child-custody cases, or in mortgageforeclosure cases. To award the damages this plaintiff seeks 

on these four claims, the federal court (and probably a jury) 

would need to put the Wisconsin trial court’s proceedings 

under a microscope. The federal trial would need to focus on 

the evidence before the state court, its weight and credibility, 

and even which factual and legal arguments were presented 

to the state court. A jury simply could not rule in favor of 

plaintiff on any of these claims without finding that the state 

court’s judgments about custody of T.E.H. were wrong on the 

merits.

The merits of plaintiff’s claims here also pose obvious 

questions of causation, particularly given the evidence of her 

habitual methamphetamine abuse. It is easy to imagine a defendant in this federal case seeking to call as a witness the 

state-court judge to explain whether particular evidence, especially allegedly false evidence, did or did not make a difference in the state-court decisions that injured the plaintiff. Perhaps such questions of materiality could be decided fairly 

without such testimony, but perhaps not. Consider the predicament of a county social worker. Her job is to try to protect 

vulnerable children from neglect and abuse. She faces a federal jury trial where the plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damage sufficient to bankrupt her. She would be entitled to offer evidence showing that, even if she presented an 

incomplete and incorrect picture of the case to the state court, 

the errors would not have made any difference because the 

mother was in denial about a serious methamphetamine addiction. 
36 No. 22-1037 

Trying the four claims presented here would inevitably invite review and rejection of the state court’s judgments. The 

friction between state and federal courts would only increase.

Judge Kirsch dismisses these concerns about federal-state friction as overridden by his view of the scope of our obligatory 

jurisdiction. Post at 75. The same response might be made to 

many fundamental doctrines of federalism, including different varieties of abstention and some applications of ripeness, 

mootness, and standing. All of those doctrines can keep federal courts from ruling on the merits of cases otherwise within 

their jurisdiction. The majority’s dismissal of these concerns

also stands in sharp contrast to federal courts’ reactions to litigants’ attempts to avoid the effects of federal-court judgments 

by seeking relief in state courts. Those reactions have a distinctly practical side to them that is missing in the majority’s 

decisive reliance on the form of relief sought in the second action.

For example, in Matter of VMS Securities Litigation, 103 F.3d 

1317 (7th Cir. 1996), overruled in part on other ground by Envision Healthcare, Inc. v. PreferredOne Ins. Co., 604 F.3d 983 (7th 

Cir. 2010), a federal district court approved a class settlement 

of securities law claims. A group of class members who had 

not opted out were unhappy with the settlement. Rather than 

appeal in the federal courts, they brought a new claim for 

damages in a state court. We affirmed an injunction against 

that state-court litigation, and we held that the All Writs Act, 

28 U.S.C. § 1651, permitted the injunction and that the AntiInjunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, did not apply, because the 

federal court was protecting its jurisdiction. 103 F.3d at 1324–

25 (collecting cases). The state court was not being asked to, 

in the majority’s words here, “reverse” the federal judgment, 

but it was being asked to award damages for injuries inflicted 
No. 22-1037 37

by it. That would have required the state court to “review and 

reject” the federal judgment. Accord, e.g., Wyly v. Weiss, 697 

F.3d 131, 139–45 (2d Cir. 2012) (district court that had approved attorney fees as part of class settlement properly enjoined class members’ state court case seeking damages from 

attorneys based on alleged legal malpractice); Rutledge v. Scott 

Chotin, Inc., 972 F.2d 820, 824–25 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming federal injunction against state court action for damages contrary 

to federal decision on statute of limitations defense). Or consider how the federal courts would react to a state court action 

for damages brought against federal plaintiffs who had obtained a federal injunction against potentially violent interference with the federal plaintiffs’ planned march in favor of 

civil rights (or any other cause, for that matter). 

With this comparison, I am not suggesting that a state 

court would have any business trying to enjoin this federal 

litigation. But the federal courts’ pragmatic applications of 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1651 and 2283 to prevent state courts from “reviewing and rejecting” federal judgments by awarding damages 

for injuries inflicted by them are hard to reconcile with the 

majority’s formalism. The majority’s dismissal of concerns 

about friction between state and federal courts is also difficult 

to reconcile with federal courts’ approaches when the positions are reversed. 

To sum up the grounds for this dissent from the majority’s 

new decision not to apply Rooker-Feldman if the federal plaintiff seeks only damages for injuries inflicted by state-court 

judgments, the majority’s new rule: (A) is not required by the 

Supreme Court’s opinion in Exxon Mobil, which signaled a 

more practical approach; (B) overrules a long and consistent 

line of precedent from this court, and does so without 
38 No. 22-1037 

acknowledging or justifying its action; and (C) is likely to add 

new layers of expense, confusion, and complexity in categories of cases where parties refuse to accept their losses in state 

courts.

Before moving on, I must acknowledge that Judge Kirsch’s 

opinion denies that it is actually adopting the bright-line rule 

that I read in it. The opinion suggests in a curious dictum that 

Rooker-Feldman might bar a federal claim for damages where 

the challenged state-court judgment awarded damages. Post 

at 74. The theory seems to be that a federal damages award 

“would nullify or modify” the state-court judgment. To the 

contrary, such an award on the majority’s theory would not 

“modify” a state-court judgment at all. Such an award would 

“nullify” a state-court judgment awarding damages only under the more practical approach to the “review and reject” element of Exxon Mobil advocated in this opinion. 

In other words, that concession undercuts the foundation 

of the new majority rule. The concession is built on the premise that “review and reject” must mean something broader 

than directly vacating a state-court judgment. Still, apart from 

exposing the contradiction in the majority position, the concession also seems unlikely to have much practical effect. 

Such cases seeking damages in a federal court to undo or offset damages awarded by a state court seem to be rare. Only 

one such actual case is cited, Bauer v. Koester, 951 F.3d 863 (7th 

Cir. 2020), and we affirmed a Rooker-Feldman dismissal there 

under longstanding principles the new majority rejects here.

V. Opportunity to Raise Federal Issues in State Court

This Part V is the opinion of an en banc majority. In opposing application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, plaintiff also 
No. 22-1037 39

argues that she had no reasonable opportunity to raise her 

claims in state court.

Even if a claim otherwise seems barred by Rooker-Feldman, 

this court has recognized a narrow exception to the doctrine: 

“if a plaintiff lacked a reasonable opportunity to litigate” an 

issue in state court, then the claim may proceed in federal 

court. Kelley, 548 F.3d at 605; see also Long v. Shorebank Dev. 

Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 558 (7th Cir. 1999), citing Wood v. Orange 

County, 715 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1983). The “reasonable 

opportunity” exception operates as something of a safety 

valve with respect to the review-and-reject element, allowing 

a claim to go forward where “factors independent of the actions of the opposing parties,” such as state-court procedural 

barriers, prevented the plaintiff from asserting her rights in 

state court. Jakupovic, 850 F.3d at 904, quoting Taylor v. Federal

Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 534–35 (7th Cir. 2004) (cleaned 

up). Essentially, if an issue could not have been raised in the 

state court, the state court’s judgment could not have encompassed that issue, and we could not review and reject that 

judgment by deciding it. 

We have carefully limited the “reasonable opportunity” 

safety valve lest the exception swallow the rule. “Reasonable 

opportunities” are not only those available “in the particular 

state court” that rendered the judgment adverse to the federal 

plaintiff. Kelley, 548 F.3d at 606 (finding a “reasonable opportunity” where plaintiff could have transferred “small claims 

cases to the plenary docket for trial by jury”); see also Beth-El 

All Nations Church v. City of Chicago, 486 F.3d 286, 292–93 (7th 

Cir. 2007) (state-court judgment could have been “attacked at 

any time”). Rather, state law must “have effectively precluded” raising the issue in state court for the federal plaintiff 
40 No. 22-1037 

to succeed on a “no reasonable opportunity” argument. Long, 

182 F.3d at 558–59. 

Only twice have we found the federal plaintiff had no 

“reasonable opportunity” to raise the federal issue in state 

court. One was Long, where the state-court “forcible entry and 

detainer” proceedings were summary in nature, so that 

Long’s federal issues could not be heard. Id. at 559–60. The 

other was Brokaw, where the plaintiff was not “even present” 

at a hearing “and was not represented ... by a guardian ad 

litem or an attorney.” 305 F.3d at 668. 

The situation here was quite different. Brokaw is easily distinguishable because Gilbank was represented in state court 

by an attorney, and T.E.H. was represented by a guardian ad 

litem. Long is distinguishable because Gilbank had ample opportunities to raise her federal issues, and actually did raise 

them.

Gilbank argues that two procedural barriers prevented her 

from asserting her rights in state court. First, she contends that 

her constitutional challenges were simply beyond the scope 

of the custody and placement hearings. She points out that an 

initial custody hearing is held “to determine whether any 

party wishes to contest an allegation that the child ... is in 

need of protection or services.” Wis. Stat. § 48.30(1). Later 

hearings also focus on the allegations in the petition and the 

appropriate placement of the child. See §§ 48.30(7), 48.335 & 

48.345. 

In fact, however, the Wisconsin Children’s Code imposed 

no limits comparable to those in Long. If a party believes that 

an allegation is fraudulent or that relief would violate a constitutional right, Wisconsin state law gives her the right to 
No. 22-1037 41

raise the issue in the CHIPS proceedings. The Children’s Code 

instructs that it “shall be liberally construed” so that “children 

and all other interested parties are assured fair hearings and 

their constitutional and other legal rights are recognized and 

enforced.” Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1), (1)(ad). More specifically, the 

Children’s Code provides that “[d]efenses and objections 

based on defects in the institution of proceedings, lack of 

probable cause on the face of the petition, [or] insufficiency of 

the petition,” as well as motions to suppress evidence and 

challenges to “the lawfulness of the taking into custody,” must

be raised on penalty of waiver. § 48.297(2)–(4). Just because 

the focus of proceedings is on a particular issue does not mean 

that the scope of those proceedings is constrained. 

Second, plaintiff contends that “the strict, mandatory 

timeframes within which various stages of a CHIPS proceeding must take place” precluded her “from effectively raising 

her claims.” The limitations period for her claims under 42 

U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1985 is three years. Wis. Stat. § 893.54(1m)(a).

A CHIPS fact-finding hearing must be held within 30 days of 

the initial hearing. Wis. Stat. § 48.30(7). A date for a dispositional hearing must be set within 30 days of the fact-finding 

hearing. § 48.31(7)(a). While these consecutive 30-day windows are relatively narrow, they afford far more opportunity 

to raise a constitutional issue than did the forcible entry and 

detainer proceeding we considered in Long. See 182 F.3d at 

552–53 (judgment entered against plaintiff in a single ex parte 

proceeding). Here, during September and October 2018, three 

hearings were held, hours of testimony were taken, and plaintiff and her counsel were afforded repeated opportunities to 

raise any challenges or issues they wished. Plaintiff had still 

more opportunities as hearings continued through September 

2019. She also could have appealed and presented her 
42 No. 22-1037 

constitutional challenges as of right following the state court’s 

judgments, or she could have petitioned for permission to appeal during the state-court proceedings. Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1)–

(2).

In fact, plaintiff actually raised these issues in state court. 

Take plaintiff’s substantive due process claim. She did not say 

in so many words that removing her daughter from her custody “is a violation of substantive due process under the 

United States Constitution,” but throughout the proceedings 

she challenged the relevant officials’ alleged interference with 

family integrity. In her September 5, 2018 motion to dismiss, 

plaintiff essentially stated a substantive due process violation, 

asserting “the important and defendable and inalienable 

rights of a parent and child relationship.” That language signaled with sufficient clarity that she was invoking a federal 

substantive due process right to family integrity.

Plaintiff also repeatedly challenged her lack of notice for 

the initial temporary physical custody hearing, first sending a 

letter to the presiding judge, then filing motions to dismiss or 

reopen those hearings for lack of notice, and finally asking 

permission to take the issue “to a higher court.”

So too with plaintiff’s claims that state procedural rules 

were violated and that officials made fraudulent statements 

to the state court. Plaintiff challenged the failure to notify her 

of the initial hearing, in violation of state statutes, in her September 2018 motion to dismiss. And in her February 2019 motion to dismiss, plaintiff raised myriad state-law challenges 

and her claims of fraud. 

We recognize that plaintiff believes the state court decided 

these and many other issues incorrectly. But again, Rooker-
No. 22-1037 43

Feldman is built on the assumption that a state court has erred 

in a way that injured the federal plaintiff. See Rooker, 263 U.S. 

at 415–16 (“If the [state-court] decision was wrong, ... no court 

of the United States other than this court could entertain a 

proceeding to reverse or modify the [state-court] judgment[.]”). And again, there is no Rooker-Feldman exception for 

egregious errors or serious injuries.

If the federal plaintiff actually raised the challenge in state 

court, there can be no recourse to the “reasonable opportunity” safety valve. As the Supreme Court said in Rooker, if 

the constitutional questions presented to the federal court actually arose in the state-court proceedings, “it was the province and duty of the state courts to decide them,” and the injured party’s recourse is to “an appropriate and timely appellate proceeding” in the state courts and, if necessary, in the 

Supreme Court of the United States. 263 U.S. at 415. 

VI. No “Fraud Exception”

This Part VI is also the opinion of an en banc majority. In 

opposing application of Rooker-Feldman, plaintiff argues that 

some of the defendants defrauded the state court, lying to the 

court about her case and thus causing her injuries inflicted by 

the state-court judgments. Put another way, plaintiff tries to 

invoke what has sometimes erroneously been called a “fraud 

exception” to Rooker-Feldman’s jurisdictional bar.9

9 We have often said in non-precedential orders that “the RookerFeldman doctrine does not have a fraud exception.” Podemski v. U.S. Bank 

National Ass’n, 714 F. App’x 580, 581–82 (7th Cir. 2017), citing Mains v. 

Citibank, N.A., 852 F.3d 669, 676 (7th Cir. 2017), and Kelley, 548 F.3d at 605;

see also Keith v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Workforce Dev., No. 21-2398, 2022 WL 

741731, at *2 (7th Cir. Mar. 11, 2022) (“[T]here is no general fraud exception 

to Rooker-Feldman.”), citing Iqbal, 780 F.3d at 729; Bond v. Perley, 705 F. 
44 No. 22-1037 

We recently explained in Hadzi-Tanovic v. Johnson, 62 F.4th 

394, 396 (7th Cir. 2023), that Rooker-Feldman applies even 

where the federal plaintiff alleges that the state courts that injured her were corrupt. We did not address in Hadzi-Tanovic

the related issue whether Rooker-Feldman applies “where 

plaintiffs seek damages for injuries caused ... by the fraudulent conduct of state court opponents.” Id. at 406. That question is before us in this case. Plaintiff argues that two of our 

prior decisions—the same Brokaw case we just discussed, 

Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2002), and Johnson v. 

Pushpin Holdings, LLC, 748 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2014)—recognize 

a “fraud” exception to Rooker-Feldman. The great weight of 

our case law, however, unequivocally holds the opposite, and 

a closer look at Brokaw and Pushpin shows they offer little actual support for such an exception. 

The notion of a “fraud exception” to Rooker-Feldman seems 

to have germinated in Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003 (7th Cir. 

1995), a case that we recently overruled in part in HadziTanovic. In Nesses, the federal plaintiff “alleged ‘a massive, 

tentacular conspiracy’ by the defendants to ‘engineer’ his 

defeat in state court.” Hadzi-Tanovic, 62 F.4th at 402, quoting 

Nesses, 68 F.3d at 1004. We acknowledged that the plaintiff 

could not “show injury from the alleged conspiracy unless” 

the state-court decision “was erroneous,” but we concluded 

that there was jurisdiction so long as the plaintiff claimed that 

“people involved in the [state-court] decision violated some 

App’x 464, 465 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e have rejected the notion of a ‘fraud 

exception’ to Rooker-Feldman.”), citing Iqbal, 780 F.3d at 729; accord Truong 

v. Bank of America, N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 383 n.3 (5th Cir. 2013) (“There is, of 

course, no general rule that any claim that relies on a fraud allegation is an 

‘independent claim’ for Rooker-Feldman purposes.”).
No. 22-1037 45

independent right of his, such as the right (if it is a right) to be 

judged by a tribunal that is uncontaminated by politics.” 

Nesses, 68 F.3d at 1005. If Rooker-Feldman barred the claim, we 

reasoned, “there would be no federal remedy for a violation 

of federal rights whenever the violator so far succeeded in 

corrupting the state judicial process as to obtain a favorable 

judgment.” Id.

We later applied this same reasoning in two other cases 

involving allegations of extensive judicial corruption—

Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 439 (7th Cir. 2006), and Parker v. 

Lyons, 757 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2014). Hadzi-Tanovic overruled 

these cases as well, putting an end to the “corruption exception.” 62 F.4th at 402. But Hadzi-Tanovic expressly left open the 

status of a fraud exception, noting the tension in this circuit’s 

case law on that subject. Id. at 406–07. We noted there that two 

of our opinions have been read to extend Nesses’ reasoning 

from claims of “judicial corruption” to claims of “third-party 

fraud.” We explain here why that reading is mistaken.

In Brokaw v. Weaver, decided before Exxon Mobil, the federal plaintiff brought claims for violations of procedural and 

substantive due process and the Fourth Amendment, alleging 

“that the defendants conspired with state actors to file false 

claims of child neglect so as to cause her and her brother to be 

removed from their parents’ home.” 305 F.3d at 669–70. Without prior judicial authorization, state actors had removed the 

children from the home, so both the conspiracy and the removal were effectuated “prior to any judicial involvement.” 

Id. at 662–63, 665. About a month later, a state judge adjudicated the children wards of the state. Id. at 662–63. We concluded “that the Nesses reasoning” applied because the federal plaintiff was “not merely claiming that the [subsequent] 
46 No. 22-1037 

decision of the state court was incorrect or that the decision 

violated her constitutional rights,” but that “the people involved in the decision to forcibly remove her from her home” 

violated her rights “independently of the state court decision.” Id. at 665. Given that the alleged Fourth Amendment 

and due process violations occurred “before any court proceedings occurred,” id. at 664, Brokaw’s conclusion on that 

point was correct. As explained above, we reach the same conclusion here on Gilbank’s Fourth Amendment and substantive due process claims insofar as they are based on injuries 

allegedly sustained before any action by the state court. 

In discussing Nesses, however, the Brokaw opinion observed that some of Nesses’ language “indicates that, even if 

[plaintiff] would not have suffered any damages absent the 

state order of wardship, her claim is not barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine ....” Id. at 667. This was not Brokaw’s holding 

but merely a response to an argument by the defendants. It 

was not essential to Brokaw’s holding because the federal 

plaintiff had suffered an injury independent of the state-court 

judgment. Indeed, Brokaw went on to observe that this language from Nesses was in direct conflict with language from 

Long: “because ‘[a]bsent the eviction order, [plaintiff] would 

not have suffered the injuries for which she now seeks to be 

compensated,’ her claims appeared to be barred under RookerFeldman.” Id., quoting Long, 182 F.3d at 557. Brokaw found that 

Long’s “reasoning seemingly support[ed] the defendants’ argument that” the Brokaw plaintiff’s claims were barred by 

Rooker-Feldman. Id.

Brokaw therefore did not find jurisdiction solely or even 

partially on a theory that an allegation that the defendants 

had misled or defrauded the state court made the claims 
No. 22-1037 47

“independent” of the state-court judgment. Rather, we took a 

belt-and-suspenders approach to jurisdiction, concluding 

that, “even assuming that [the] constitutional claims [were] 

not independent of the state court proceedings,” they were 

not barred by Rooker-Feldman because plaintiff, who was neither present at the wardship hearing nor represented by a 

guardian ad litem, “lacked a reasonable opportunity to present” her claims in state court. Id. at 668. Thus, although 

Brokaw has been cited as creating a “fraud exception” to 

Rooker-Feldman, the case provides only tenuous support for it. 

Our opinion in Johnson v. Pushpin Holdings, LLC also cited 

Nesses for the proposition that there is a “fraud exception” to 

Rooker-Feldman. In Pushpin, plaintiffs filed a class action in Illinois state court, alleging that Pushpin had filed more than 

1,000 “fraudulent” small-claims suits in state court that resulted in default judgments against class members. 748 F.3d 

at 770–71. After Pushpin removed to federal court, the class 

argued that Rooker-Feldman required remand. Id. at 773. We 

rejected application of the doctrine, noting without any analysis that Rooker-Feldman “does not bar a federal suit that seeks 

damages for a fraud that resulted in a judgment adverse” to 

the federal plaintiff. Id., citing Nesses, 68 F.3d at 1004, and 

cases cited in Truong v. Bank of America, N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 

383–84 (5th Cir. 2013). Pushpin’s language, if not its holding, 

would thus seem to support a “fraud exception” to RookerFeldman. Our later decision in that case affirmed the district 

court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim. We made clear 

then that the alleged fraud occurred prior to the state-court 

proceedings. Pushpin Holdings, 821 F.3d at 873, 875–76 (plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated the Illinois Consumer 

Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act when they failed 

to register as a debt collection agency, sued for an 
48 No. 22-1037 

unconscionably high amount, and forged plaintiffs’ signatures on guaranties and leases). 

While some of Pushpin’s language endorses a “fraud exception,” the case as a whole does not support it. Fraud was 

not committed during the state-court proceedings; rather, alleged fraud external to those proceedings formed the basis of 

the state-court actions. The same was true in Brokaw, where 

the alleged fraud occurred “prior to any judicial involvement.” 305 F.3d at 665. In short, on closer scrutiny, neither 

Brokaw nor Pushpin offers robust support for the “fraud exception” attributed to them.10

10 Judge Kirsch’s opinion mistakes dicta in Brokaw and Pushpin for 

precedential holdings. See post at 69–70. The holdings of both cases remain viable, but their language supporting a fraud exception does not. 

Other circuits have also, at times, excluded fraud claims from Rooker-Feldman. See, e.g., Behr, 8 F.4th at 1213 (claims that defendants had violated 

procedural due process rights by using “falsified and/or coerced information as a basis for the [state-court] proceedings” could proceed because 

the claims did not seek “to undo the state court’s child custody decision”); 

Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir. 2021) (“injury 

based on the alleged misrepresentation by [defendants] that caused the 

juvenile court to issue” its orders meant that claim was “not a de facto 

appeal” of those orders); Truong, 717 F.3d at 383–84 (relying in part on 

Nesses to find allegations that defendants “misled the state court” and 

“misled [the plaintiff] into [forgoing] her opportunity” to raise a dispute 

in state court presented “independent claims”); McCormick v. Braverman, 

451 F.3d 382, 392 (6th Cir. 2006) (plaintiff’s claims that state-court judgments “were procured by certain Defendants through fraud, misrepresentation, or other improper means” did not “assert an injury caused by” 

those judgments). But some of these decisions seem to hinge not on the 

existence of a fraud exception but on the court’s conclusion that either 

Exxon Mobil’s “injury” element or “review and reject” element was not 

met in the first place. E.g., Behr, 8 F.4th at 1213 (plaintiffs “are not raising 

these due process claims so that we can ‘review and reject’ the state court’s 
No. 22-1037 49

To the extent they offer any traction for a “fraud 

exception,” Brokaw and Pushpin are inconsistent with the great 

weight of Seventh Circuit case law, including decisions after 

Exxon Mobil. Just a year after Brokaw, we held that RookerFeldman barred claims where the federal plaintiffs alleged that 

a debt collector had misrepresented the amount of damages 

recoverable in state court. Epps v. Creditnet, Inc., 320 F.3d 756, 

757–60 (7th Cir. 2003). Those claims could not proceed in 

federal court because they asked the federal courts “to review 

the state court judgment,” and the plaintiffs were not injured 

“until the state court entered judgment against them.” Id. at 

759. 

In Kelley, decided after Exxon Mobil, we held that RookerFeldman barred jurisdiction over claims where the “defendants needed to prevail in state court in order to capitalize on 

[their] alleged fraud.” 548 F.3d at 605. Such claims would “ultimately require us to evaluate the state court judgments,” for 

we “could not determine that defendants’ representations 

and requests” in state court were fraudulent “without determining that the state court erred by issuing [its] judgments.” 

Id. 

child custody judgment”); Truong, 717 F.3d at 383 (claims “independent” 

because they sought damages “for injuries caused by the [defendants’] actions, not injuries arising from” the state-court judgment). Other cases on 

which plaintiff relies to support a “fraud exception” are not persuasive 

because allegations of fraud, while involved, were not relevant to the 

court’s reasoning. See, e.g., VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 400–01, 403 (while 

federal defendants had incorrectly, and perhaps fraudulently, calculated 

post-judgment interest owed by state-court losers, that challenged conduct did not lead to, but followed, the state-court judgment).
50 No. 22-1037 

So too in Harold, where the federal plaintiff argued that 

“false statements” made by his state-court opponent, “rather 

than the state court’s decision, inflicted the injury” underlying 

his claims. 773 F.3d at 886. We recognized the possibility of 

“situations in which a violation of federal law” in state court 

“could cause a loss independent of the suit’s outcome.” Id. For 

example, debt collectors could violate the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act by filing suit in a prohibited venue. Cf. Suesz v. 

Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 757 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc). In 

such a case, the violation “inflicts an injury measured by the 

costs of travelling or sending a lawyer to the remote court and 

moving for a change of venue, no matter how the suit comes 

out.” Harold, 773 F.3d at 886. But we concluded in Harold that, 

where the federal plaintiff alleges false “representations that 

concern the merits” of the state-court litigation, no “injury occurred until the state judge ruled against” the federal plaintiff. 

Id. Rooker-Feldman barred the claims.

In Mains v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2017), we 

made this point crystal clear. The federal plaintiff argued that 

a state-court foreclosure judgment was erroneous because it 

rested on a fraud perpetrated by the defendants. We said that 

such a claim presented “precisely what Rooker-Feldman prohibits.” Id. at 676. “If we were to delve into the question 

whether fraud tainted the state court’s judgment, the only relief we could give would be to vacate that judgment. That 

would amount to an exercise of de facto appellate jurisdiction

....” Id. A federal forum would simply be unnecessary because the “state’s courts are quite capable of protecting their 

own integrity.” Id. To avoid Rooker-Feldman, the plaintiff 
No. 22-1037 51

would need to pursue “damages for independently unlawful 

conduct.” Id. at 675.11

More recently in Swartz, we again rejected the theory that 

allegations of “false claims” and “bad faith actions” on the 

part of the state-court opponents take a case outside RookerFeldman. 940 F.3d at 391–92. Relying on Kelley, Harold, and 

Mains, we noted that such claims are “routinely dismissed under Rooker-Feldman.” Id. at 392. “To find that the defendants 

acted wrongfully in seizing the [property at issue] would call 

into question the state court’s judgment,” which had ordered 

the seizure. Id. at 391. 

Most recently, in Bauer, the federal plaintiffs sought damages for the defendants’ alleged “collusion to introduce 

forged evidence” in state-court foreclosure proceedings. 951 

F.3d at 866. We held that Rooker-Feldman barred the suit “because any finding in favor of the [plaintiffs] would require us 

to contradict the state court’s orders.” Id. Pointing to Kelley

and Swartz, we emphasized that, “were it not for the state 

court’s foreclosure order and order awarding additional interest, no injury would have resulted from the allegedly 

forged escrow exhibit or the citations to discover assets. Indeed, the defendants needed to prevail in the state court to 

effectuate their alleged fraud.” Id. 

11 We also pointed out that Indiana courts allow “a party to file for 

relief from judgment based on ... the fraud or misrepresentation of an adverse party.” Mains, 852 F.3d at 676. So too in Wisconsin, where a plaintiff 

like Gilbank may move for relief from a judgment or order based on the 

alleged “[f]raud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse 

party.” Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(c) (“Relief from judgment or order”). See also 

Matter of Lisse, 921 F.3d 629, 641 (7th Cir. 2019). The same is true in Illinois. 

See 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-1401.
52 No. 22-1037 

To be clear, we are not disagreeing with the results in

Brokaw and Pushpin. Brokaw correctly allowed the claims to 

proceed under the “reasonable opportunity” safety valve. The 

alleged injuries in Pushpin occurred before the state-court proceedings began, so those claims also were not barred by 

Rooker-Feldman. The facts of those cases did not call for recognition of a “fraud exception.” But we are disapproving the 

language in Brokaw and Pushpin that endorses an exception to 

Rooker-Feldman based on a federal plaintiff’s allegation that 

her state-court opponents or others misled or defrauded the 

state court into causing her injury.

We said in Hadzi-Tanovic that failing to apply RookerFeldman where claims allege injuries based on state-court 

corruption would “open a large loophole” in the doctrine, one 

that “has not been endorsed by the Supreme Court.” 62 F.4th

at 401–02. The same is true with a so-called “fraud exception.” 

The Supreme Court has never suggested that Rooker-Feldman 

does not apply to claims that sound in fraud. If a state-court 

loser can challenge a state-court judgment in federal court 

merely by alleging fraud, that exception could too easily 

swallow the rule.

As we said in Iqbal, Rooker-Feldman is simply not concerned “with why a state court’s judgment might be mistaken.” 780 F.3d at 729. While “fraud is one such reason[,] 

there are many others.” Id. “The reason a litigant gives for 

contesting the state court’s decision cannot endow a federal 

district court” with jurisdiction that it does not otherwise 

have. Id. In short, “fraud accusations do not change the calculus.” Matter of Lisse, 921 F.3d 629, 641 (7th Cir. 2019). 
No. 22-1037 53

VII. The Effect of Heck v. Humphrey

Judge Easterbrook’s separate opinion argues for a different reason for dismissal of the four claims that the judges joining this opinion find barred by Rooker-Feldman. He treats 

those claims for injuries inflicted by state-court judgments as 

not yet having accrued, applying the principles underlying 

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Perhaps Rooker-Feldman 

and Heck share deep roots that call for further exploration. See 

the academic articles cited in Judge Easterbrook’s opinion, including Stephen I. Vladeck, The Increasingly Unflagging Obligation: Federal Jurisdiction after Saudi Basic and Anna Nicole, 42 

Tulsa L. Rev. 553 (2007). Nevertheless, the proposed approach 

would amount to a dramatic and unprecedented expansion of 

Heck beyond cases complaining about the duration of confinement in criminal cases. I am not prepared to take that step.

The petitioner in Heck was a state prisoner who sued for 

damages, alleging that the defendants had violated his 

constitutional rights and caused his imprisonment. The 

Supreme Court held that his claims were not yet ripe—had 

not yet accrued—because he had not shown that his 

conviction or sentence had been reversed on direct appeal, 

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by an 

authorized state tribunal, or called into question by a federal 

writ of habeas corpus. 512 U.S. at 486–87. The Supreme Court 

later took a modest step expanding Heck to cases seeking 

damages for the use of invalid prison disciplinary procedures 

to deprive a prisoner of good-time credits affecting the length 

of imprisonment. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997). 

Nothing on the surface of Heck or Balisok indicates broader 

extension of their rule to any other categories of federal cases 

seeking damages for injuries inflicted by state-court 
54 No. 22-1037 

judgments. Judge Easterbrook asserts, however, that we must 

now “treat Heck as generally applicable to state-court judgments that have not been set aside,” post at 63, based on this 

court’s decision in Savory v. Cannon, 947 F.3d 409 (7th Cir. 

2020) (en banc). Savory decided a question of accrual for purposes of applying the statute of limitations to civil claims for 

wrongful conviction. We held that the plaintiff’s conviction 

remained intact, and his claims had not accrued, until he was 

pardoned. Id. at 431. We rejected the civil defendants’ and the 

dissenting judge’s arguments that Savory’s civil claims accrued earlier, when he was released from state custody but 

while his convictions remained legally intact. Id. at 418–19. 

The dissent in Savory argued for the rule proposed by Justice 

Souter in his Heck concurrence. See 947 F.3d at 431–34 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting), endorsing Heck, 512 U.S. at 491–503 

(Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). Savory did not endorse, explicitly or implicitly, an extension of Heck to claims 

like this plaintiff’s, which do not have anything to do with a 

criminal conviction or the length of a criminal sentence. Perhaps the Supreme Court might take such a step in the future, 

but I do not see a basis for taking such a broad and consequential step at this point.

Regarding Heck, I should also address Judge Kirsch’s 

reliance upon it and his suggestion that my view of RookerFeldman would leave Heck with no work to do. Post at 76. It’s 

an interesting and creative argument, but it loses sight of 

history. Lower federal courts have long had an express grant 

of jurisdiction to review criminal judgments of state courts, in 

the form of writs of habeas corpus, at least in the wake of 

Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923), Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 

443 (1953), and similar cases, and the enactment of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. Heck was of course a response to civil actions seeking 
No. 22-1037 55

damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for wrongful convictions in 

state court. Heck was tailored to manage the integration of 

habeas relief and § 1983. To my knowledge there was no 

suggestion that Rooker-Feldman should apply in the context of 

challenges to criminal convictions. I do not suggest it should 

be extended there either, given the different heritages of the

relevant statutes and the doctrines that have evolved to 

manage the respective roles of state and federal courts. If the 

question were squarely presented in a future case, we could 

deal with it then.

VIII. Claims Not Subject to Rooker-Feldman

The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on the merits of all claims it found were not barred by 

Rooker-Feldman. All members of the court agree and affirm 

summary judgment for defendants on those claims. This portion of this opinion is for an en banc majority.

A. Hypothetical Jurisdiction

Before addressing the merits of those claims, we consider 

plaintiff’s argument on appeal that the district court erred by 

exercising “hypothetical” jurisdiction over them. The district 

court was a bit ambiguous with respect to the remaining 

claims. At one point, the court wrote: “even if I assumed that 

Gilbank suffered injuries that were not caused by ... the state 

court’s decisions, Gilbank has not presented evidence to support any constitutional violations” with respect to “(1) the 

warrantless urinalysis; (2) the interrogation without an attorney at the police station; and (3) the denial of due process.”

Gilbank, 2021 WL 5865453, at *6. Adding to the room for argument, the final judgment entered under Rule 58 said that the 

case was “dismissed” without specifying whether the 
56 No. 22-1037 

dismissal was entirely for lack of jurisdiction or partially on 

the merits and partially for lack of jurisdiction. 

Plaintiff reads “even if I assumed” to mean the district 

court first concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over all of 

plaintiff’s claims but then proceeded to discuss the merits of 

some of those claims, an exercise of “impermissible hypothetical jurisdiction.” As plaintiff sees it, our only course is to remand any claims that survive Rooker-Feldman to the district 

court.

We are not persuaded there was such an error here. First, 

the district court’s opinion as a whole shows that the court did 

not disclaim jurisdiction over all of plaintiff’s claims. Summarizing its decision in its introduction, the court wrote: 

Gilbank’s primary injury—loss of custody of 

her daughter—was the result of the state juvenile court decision. For reasons explained in this 

opinion, this court does not have authority to review state court decisions. ... The other injuries 

about which Gilbank complains—the warrantless urine test, denial of counsel, and denial of 

due process—were either already addressed by 

the state juvenile court or are not constitutional 

violations.

Gilbank, 2021 WL 5865453, at *1. That is not the language of 

hypothetical jurisdiction; it shows the district judge carefully 

parsed the limits of Rooker-Feldman. That is also how the district judge concluded his opinion:

In sum, most of Gilbank’s claims are based on 

injuries that were either caused by the state juvenile court’s decision [i.e., Rooker-Feldman
No. 22-1037 57

applied] or were considered and rejected already by a state court [i.e., claim and/or issue 

preclusion applied]. This court cannot provide 

Gilbank relief on those claims. Gilbank’s other 

claims lack any evidentiary basis [i.e., plaintiff 

loses on the merits]. Defendants are entitled to 

summary judgment. 

Id. at *7. 

Second, on those claims properly before the district court, 

defendants moved for summary judgment on both the merits 

and jurisdictional grounds, and plaintiff moved for summary 

judgment on the merits. Plaintiff therefore argued or had an 

opportunity to argue the merits of all her claims. Since we 

have determined that jurisdiction is proper over some claims, 

we may affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

with respect to those claims on any ground supported by the 

record so long as plaintiff “had an opportunity to contest the 

issue.” O’Brien v. Caterpillar Inc., 900 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 

2018). All judges of this court agree that we may reach those 

claims for which there is jurisdiction, and as we explain next,

agree to affirm summary judgment on the merits.

B. The Merits of Remaining Claims

1. Unreasonable Search – Urine Sample

Plaintiff’s unreasonable-search claim fails on the merits.

Consent negates any claim to an unreasonable search. United 

States v. Ahmad, 21 F.4th 475, 478 (7th Cir. 2021) (“A search authorized by consent is wholly valid.”), quoting Schneckloth v. 

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). In proposed findings of 

fact for summary judgment, plaintiff did not dispute that she 
58 No. 22-1037 

consented to the urinalysis. Her undisputed consent defeats 

the claim.

2. Unreasonable Seizure & Violation of Substantive Due 

Process – Removal of T.E.H.

Plaintiff’s unreasonable-seizure and substantive-dueprocess claims based on the removal of T.E.H. in the course of 

her traffic stop and arrest on August 21, 2018 also fail on the 

merits. On that day, T.E.H. was not seized by the government 

or by anyone else. Rather, when plaintiff was facing arrest that 

day, she called Hoyle and asked him to come care for T.E.H. 

When plaintiff was arrested, it was Hoyle—and not any 

government actor—who, with plaintiff’s consent, removed 

T.E.H. from the scene. With no seizure or removal by 

government actors, neither claim can prevail.

3. Denial of Due Process – Interrogation Without an Attorney

Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim also fails on the undisputed facts. It is true that, once Miranda warnings have been 

given, if the person under interrogation “states that he wants 

an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is 

present.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966). But it is 

also true that, even if questioning continues, no violation of 

the Fifth Amendment occurs unless and until a statement is 

used in a criminal case against the person interrogated. Chavez 

v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 769 (2003). Plaintiff’s statements to 

Detective Iverson and social worker Heinzen-Janz were never 

introduced against her in a criminal trial. Her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination therefore was not violated. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the 

merits of this claim.
No. 22-1037 59

4. Unreasonable Seizure – Unlawful Eviction

Plaintiff also claims that she was unreasonably seized 

when she was evicted from her home on August 21, 2018. 

Plaintiff waived this argument by failing to develop it beyond 

saying only that she suffered a “warrantless” and “unlawful 

eviction.” See Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th 

Cir. 2012) (“arguments that have been raised may still be 

waived on appeal if they are underdeveloped, conclusory, or 

unsupported by law”).

5. Substantive Due Process Before the Temporary Custody 

Order

We have long recognized a substantive due process “right 

to familial integrity in the context of action by child protective 

services.” Sebesta v. Davis, 878 F.3d 226, 233 (7th Cir. 2017). 

That right is subject to limits. The “interests in familial integrity must be weighed against the state’s interest in protecting 

children from harm.” Id. To interfere lawfully with family integrity, caseworkers must have “‘some definite and articulable evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion’ of past or 

imminent danger of abuse before they ... take a child into protective custody” or otherwise interfere with a family unit. 

Xiong v. Wagner, 700 F.3d 282, 291 (7th Cir. 2012), quoting Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Foster, 657 F.3d 463, 478 (7th Cir. 

2011). “Reasonable suspicion” means that the state actor has 

“more than a hunch but less than probable cause.” Id., quoting 

Hernandez, 657 F.3d at 478. This “reasonable suspicion” standard applies to all of defendants’ actions leading up to plaintiff’s arrest. 

We doubt very much that any of the defendants’ investigative conduct alleged by plaintiff amounted to interference 
60 No. 22-1037 

with family integrity. In any event, the undisputed facts show 

that defendants’ conduct before the state-court proceedings 

began was justified. When Detective Iverson and social 

worker Heinzen-Janz performed a welfare check at Hoyle’s 

apartment on June 29, 2018, they did so based on the report of 

an anonymous caller that Gilbank and T.E.H. appeared to be 

living in Hoyle’s garage during hot summer weather. When 

they returned to Hoyle’s apartment on July 3, it was at plaintiff’s request. When they asked plaintiff to provide a urine 

sample, they knew that she had a pending charge for methamphetamine possession and a history of drug abuse, which 

she acknowledged. And when they encountered plaintiff on 

August 21, she had just been arrested for possession of methamphetamine. Even if these actions could be construed as “interference” with family integrity, defendants never acted 

without consent or reasonable suspicion or both. The substantive due process claim based on defendants’ conduct leading 

up to plaintiff’s arrest therefore fails.

6. Conspiracy Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 

Section 1985(3) of Title 42 of the United States Code “provides no substantive rights itself; it merely provides a remedy 

for violation of the rights it designates.” Great American Fed. 

Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372 (1979). Without 

a viable claim for an underlying constitutional or federal statutory violation, plaintiff’s Section 1985 conspiracy claim fails 

as a matter of law. 

7. Monell Claim Against the Marshfield Police Department

Similarly, to succeed on a Monell claim seeking to hold 

Marshfield liable for constitutional violations by individual 
No. 22-1037 61

officers, the plaintiff must show the deprivation of a federal 

right. Helbachs Café LLC v. City of Madison, 46 F.4th 525, 530 

(7th Cir. 2022), citing Monell v. Department of Social Services, 

436 U.S. 658 (1978). Plaintiff’s Monell claim cannot survive 

summary judgment in the absence of an underlying violation 

of federal law.

Conclusion

Federal jurisdiction is proper over plaintiff’s claims based 

on alleged injuries that were complete before the state-court 

proceedings began, and on those claims we affirm summary 

judgment on the merits for the defendants. On plaintiff’s 

claims alleging injuries inflicted by the state-court judgments, 

dismissal is also affirmed for the reasons set forth in Parts I–

III and V–VIII of this opinion and Judge Easterbrook’s 

opinion.

AFFIRMED. 
62 No. 22-1037 

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. I 

agree with Judge Hamilton that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 

does not have an exception for bad conduct during the state 

suit. The doctrine rests on the Supreme Court’s view that its 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1257 is exclusive, and jurisdictional doctrines do not have equitable exceptions. Bowles v. 

Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 213–14 (2007); Harrow v. Department of 

Defense, 601 U.S. 480, 484 (2024). I join all but Part IV and Part 

VII of Judge Hamilton’s opinion. 

But I agree with Judge Kirsch that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not deprive federal district courts of jurisdiction to 

award damages for injury caused by a state court’s judgment.

This is so because damages do not modify a judgment and are 

not a form of appellate review. I join Part I of Judge Kirsch’s 

opinion.

If this were litigation under state law, in federal court because the parties were of diverse citizenship, I would agree 

with Judge Kirsch that the suit should be remanded for further proceedings, beginning with consideration of issue and 

claim preclusion (collateral estoppel and res judicata). But it 

is not. 

All defendants are state actors, and Gilbank’s claims rest 

on 42 U.S.C. §1983. That makes a difference, given the holding 

of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), that a federal court 

must dismiss any suit that seeks damages under §1983 on a 

theory incompatible with the validity of a state court’s judgment that has not been set aside on appeal or by some other 

means.

The state court’s judgment at issue in Heck had been entered in a criminal prosecution, but the principle is broader.
No. 22-1037 63

Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), holds that the same approach applies when a prisoner contests the outcome of a disciplinary proceeding. And any contention that Heck and Edwards are limited to persons in custody—in order to coordinate §1983 with 28 U.S.C. §2254, the main provision for collateral review of state criminal judgments—would be inconsistent with Savory v. Cannon, 947 F.3d 409 (7th Cir. 2020) (en 

banc). There we held that Heck continues to apply even after 

a prisoner’s release and the end of all options to seek collateral 

review (which is available only to persons in custody). After 

Savory, we must treat Heck as generally applicable to statecourt judgments that have not been set aside. Once a judgment has been annulled, suit for damages under §1983 is possible; until then, not. The judgment that caused Gilbank’s injury has not been vacated. It has been superseded by a later 

reallocation of custody, but this does not imply that any state 

tribunal has found it defective.

It is possible to understand Heck and its successors as designed to reconcile §1983 with the limits on collateral review 

under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255. Indeed, I took that view 

myself in Savory. But I was in dissent. 947 F.3d at 431–34. The 

majority applied Heck to a person who had been released from 

prison years earlier and could not obtain collateral review. It 

treated Heck as instantiating a strong judicial policy against 

using §1983 to create an outcome inconsistent with a state 

court’s decision. 947 F.3d at 414. Heck itself said the same. 512 

U.S. at 484. Having extended Heck to a situation beyond the 

reconciliation of damages (§1983) with collateral review 

(§2254 and §2255), and having treated it as a rule against using §1983 to collect damages on account of a state court’s undisturbed decision, we should accept the implications of that

choice.
64 No. 22-1037 

In litigation under §1983, Heck and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine serve much the same function. Yet the cases that rely on

Heck do not cite Rooker or Feldman, and the reverse. (There are 

a few exceptions, but they say little about how these doctrines 

relate. See, e.g., Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 531–37 (2011); 

Homola v. McNamara, 59 F.3d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 1995); Graff v. 

Aberdeen Enterprizes, II, Inc., 65 F.4th 500 (10th Cir. 2023).) Perhaps this is because Rooker-Feldman nominally is about jurisdiction, while Heck nominally is about ripeness. Yet Rooker itself seems to be Heck’s progenitor. As the Justices remarked: 

“If the decision was wrong, that did not make the judgment 

void, but merely left it open to reversal or modification in an 

appropriate and timely appellate proceeding. Unless and until so reversed or modified, it would be an effective and conclusive adjudication.” Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 

415 (1923). Although these doctrines have different names, 

they lead to the same end: as long as the state court’s judgment stands, a federal district court must not intervene.

To the extent the overlap of these doctrines has attracted 

any academic attention (and it has not received much), authors favor treating them as functionally identical. Stephen I. 

Vladeck, The Increasingly Unflagging Obligation: Federal Jurisdiction after Saudi Basic and Anna Nicole, 42 Tulsa L. Rev. 553, 

563 (2007) (“[T]he analogy [between Rooker-Feldman and] the 

‘favorable termination’ rule of Heck v. Humphrey is inescapable—both doctrines purport to limit lawsuits that would require a subsequent court to collaterally invalidate an earlier 

decision.”); Thomas Stephen Schneidau, Favorable Termination 

After Freedom: Why Heck's Rule Should Reign, Within Reason, 

70 La. L. Rev. 647, 673–74 (2010) (Rooker-Feldman’s bar on appellate review of state court judgments supports applying 
No. 22-1037 65

Heck’s favorable termination rule to “non-habeas-eligible 

plaintiffs”).

I conclude that Heck blocks an award of damages in 

Gilbank’s favor. And Heck is not her only problem. 

Defendants who are, or act for, the State of Wisconsin are not 

“persons” for the purpose of §1983 and cannot be sued for 

damages. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 

58 (1989). The judge who entered the custody order has 

absolute immunity. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Stump 

v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). Private parties who conspire 

with a judge may in principle be liable under 42 U.S.C. §1985, 

see Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980), but people who file 

civil complaints and their witnesses enjoy absolute immunity 

under both §1983, see Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983), and

state law, see Restatement (Second) of Torts §587, for statements 

during the proceedings. Quite apart from either Heck or the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts are not supposed to 

resolve child-custody disputes. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 

U.S. 689 (1992); Ashley W. v. Holcomb, 34 F.4th 588 (7th Cir. 

2022). There is just no point to a remand in this case, so I 

concur in the judgment.
66 No. 22-1037 

KIRSCH, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 

part. Michelle Gilbank lost custody of her four-year-old 

daughter, T.E.H., for more than a year. The state placed T.E.H. 

in the custody of her father, a convicted child predator. Gilbank alleged that the father admitted to touching T.E.H.’s 

genitals daily and that his admission led a state court to reverse the earlier custody decision and return T.E.H to her. 

With the custody battle over, Gilbank then turned to federal 

court and brought this suit for money damages, alleging that 

local officials violated her constitutional rights during the custody dispute. 

A majority of the court agrees that Gilbank’s lawsuit does 

not fall within the narrow parameters of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine because Gilbank’s suit cannot and will not modify

the since resolved custody judgment. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 

Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 293 (2005) (RookerFeldman applies only when a plaintiff asks a federal court to 

overturn or undo a state court judgment). Her damages suit 

does not seek to undo any state court judgment. Nor could it: 

ever since Gilbank regained custody of her daughter, the state 

custody proceedings have been closed. She could not appeal 

an order depriving her of custody after she regained custody. 

The case and the custody issue are over. Gilbank’s federal 

suit, by contrast, can give her meaningful relief. Doing so 

might result in a federal court frowning upon the state court’s 

conclusions. But that is decidedly not a Rooker-Feldman problem.

I 

I will not belabor the points I made in Hadzi-Tanovic v. 

Johnson, 62 F.4th 394, 408–14 (7th Cir. 2023) (Kirsch, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc), but here is the short 
No. 22-1037 67

of it: Congress has authorized only the Supreme Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments. 28 

U.S.C. § 1257(a). The Court has enforced this statutory limit 

on the jurisdiction of lower federal courts just twice, in Rooker 

v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). These cases 

hold that district courts lack power to reverse a state court 

judgment at the request of a disgruntled plaintiff. See Exxon, 

544 U.S. at 283 (noting that the plaintiffs in both Rooker and 

Feldman “essentially invited federal courts of first instance to 

review and reverse unfavorable state-court judgments”). 

Exxon itself was a response to lower courts’ expansive misapplication of Rooker-Feldman. The Court clarified that 

§ 1257(a)’s exception to federal jurisdiction applies only in 

those “limited circumstances,” id. at 291, “where a party in effect seeks to take an appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision to a lower federal court,” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 

466 (2006). Exxon provides the test: Rooker-Feldman “is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its 

name: [1] cases brought by state-court losers [2] complaining 

of injuries caused by state-court judgments [3] rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and [4] inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” 

Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284. “Review and reject[],” the Court made 

clear, means that the plaintiff asks a federal court to “overturn” or “undo” the state court judgment. Id. at 287 n.2, 292–

93. Only when every element is met does Rooker-Feldman enter 

the picture. 

Judge Hamilton’s dissent, however, reads Exxon wrong. 

Ante, at 21–25. Judge Hamilton concludes that, because the 

Supreme Court did not use “the language of legal precision” 
68 No. 22-1037 

in articulating the review and reject element, Exxon endorses 

an endlessly pliable “practical approach” to Rooker-Feldman. 

Id. at 22. The dissent leverages this purported flexibility to 

posit that Exxon requires attention to injuries alone—the relief 

sought in federal court is irrelevant. It follows, says the dissent, that any plaintiff complaining of injuries caused by a 

state court judgment inherently asks the federal court to review and reject that judgment. So understood, it is irrelevant 

whether the relief would or could have any effect on the state 

court judgment. 

But the source of a plaintiff’s injury is one, and only one, 

requirement. The key Rooker-Feldman inquiry is not simply 

whether a plaintiff’s injury can be separated from the state 

court judgment that completed it but also whether the plaintiff asks a federal court to reverse a state court judgment. The 

practical approach of Judge Hamilton’s dissent simply gives

no independent meaning to this distinct requirement. 

Courts in this circuit must, however, give due weight to all 

four elements of Rooker-Feldman. This requires a court to consider the relief requested in determining if the plaintiff has indeed asked the court to reject a state court judgment. Exxon, 

544 U.S. at 291–93. And it is unlikely, though not impossible, 

that a plaintiff seeking damages, like Gilbank, has requested 

a court to do so: awarding damages usually does not affect a 

state court judgment not sounding in monetary terms. 

A 

Exxon’s core focus is on what the plaintiff asks the federal 

court to do. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized 

that Rooker-Feldman is confined to cases where the plaintiff 

asks the federal court to overturn a state court judgment. See 
No. 22-1037 69

Milchtein v. Chisholm, 880 F.3d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The 

vital question” the Court asked in Exxon “is whether the federal plaintiff seeks the alteration of a state court’s judgment.”). 

In explaining the “limited circumstances” in which RookerFeldman applies, for example, Exxon described the only two 

plaintiffs to have ever lost at the Court under the doctrine: 

both “called upon the District Court to overturn an injurious 

state-court judgment.” 544 U.S. at 291–92 (emphasis added). 

The Court later described the typical Rooker-Feldman plaintiff 

as a “loser in state court [who] invites [a] federal district court 

to overturn [a] state-court judgment.” Id. at 287 n.2 (emphasis 

added). And in concluding that Rooker-Feldman did not bar 

Exxon’s suit, the Court held that Exxon “plainly ha[d] not repaired to federal court to undo the [state court] judgment in its 

favor.” Id. at 293 (emphasis added). 

Our own cases—Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 

2002), and Johnson v. Pushpin Holdings, LLC, 748 F.3d 769 (7th 

Cir. 2014)—correctly recognize that identifying what the 

plaintiff has requested is the key Rooker-Feldman inquiry. 

Brokaw recognized that Rooker-Feldman did not bar suits alleging fraud in state custody proceedings when the plaintiff did 

not seek to set aside the custody judgment. 305 F.3d at 663, 

666–68. Similarly, in Pushpin, we said that Rooker-Feldman

“does not bar a federal suit that seeks damages for a fraud that 

resulted in a judgment adverse to the plaintiff” because 

“[s]uch a suit does not seek to disturb the judgment of the 

state court, but to obtain damages for the unlawful conduct 

that misled the court into issuing the judgment.” 748 F.3d at 

773. That is not mere “dicta,” ante, at 27, as we explicitly addressed the damages issue to “end the appeal,” Pushpin, 748 

F.3d at 773. These cases do not stand for a “fraud exception” 

to Rooker-Feldman, ante, at 43–52, as there has never been such 
70 No. 22-1037 

an exception, see Hadzi-Tanovic, 62 F.4th at 412–13 (Kirsch, J., 

dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). Simply, 

Brokaw and Pushpin reflect the limits on Rooker-Feldman and 

make plain, in line with Exxon, that Rooker-Feldman does not 

apply when, given the relief sought, a plaintiff, like Gilbank,

does not seek to reverse a state court judgment. Brokaw, 305 

F.3d at 663, 666–68; Pushpin, 748 F.3d at 773. 

Not only does our precedent support requiring courts to 

focus on the relief sought, but we are also in good company

in doing so: other circuits recognize that the key question 

Exxon asks is whether the relief a plaintiff seeks would reverse 

a state court judgment. See Hohenberg v. Shelby County, 68 

F.4th 336, 341 (6th Cir. 2023) (“[A] complaint demanding 

‘compensatory damages’ does not ‘seek review or reversal’ of 

a court order awarding relief not measured by money.”) (quotation omitted); Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1214 (11th Cir. 

2021) (expressly rejecting the proposition that Rooker-Feldman 

“focus[es] on the federal claim’s relationship to the issues involved in the state court proceeding, instead of on the type of 

relief sought by the plaintiff”) (quotation omitted); Webb ex rel. 

K.S. v. Smith, 936 F.3d 808, 816 (8th Cir. 2019) (“An important 

consideration for a court confronted with the issue of whether

Rooker-Feldman applies is to analyze ‘the effect the requested 

federal relief would have on the state court judgment.’”) (quotation omitted); Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild 

LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 173 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[W]hile [the plaintiff’s] 

claim for damages may require review of state-court judgments and even a conclusion that they were erroneous, those 

judgments would not have to be rejected or overruled for [the 

plaintiff] to prevail. Accordingly, the review and rejection requirement of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not met.”); Green 

v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 2009) (Rooker-Feldman is 
No. 22-1037 71

inapplicable to a damages suit based on custody proceedings 

when a child had been returned to the plaintiff because “the 

question of the validity of the temporary order of removal was 

likely moot and there was no basis for [the] plaintiff to appeal.”); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 464 (4th Cir. 2006) 

(“[T]he test [under Exxon] is not whether the relief sought in 

the federal suit ‘would certainly upset’ the enforcement of a 

state court decree, ... but rather whether the relief would ‘reverse or modify’ the state court decree.”) (quotation omitted). 

The Tenth Circuit perhaps said it best: 

As the Supreme Court emphasized in Exxon Mobil, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply 

simply because a party attempts to litigate in 

federal court a matter previously litigated in 

state court. To the contrary, a party may lose in 

state court and then raise precisely the same legal issues in federal court, so long as the relief 

sought in the federal action would not reverse or 

undo the relief granted by the state court.

Mo’s Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 F.3d 1229, 1237 (10th Cir. 2006) 

(cleaned up). We and our sister circuits understand Exxon’s 

core lesson: Rooker-Feldman applies only when a plaintiff 

seeks relief from a federal court that would reverse a state 

court judgment. And to the extent that some of our cases disregard that lesson and focus on a plaintiff’s injury to the exclusion of the relief sought, they are “both inconsistent with 

Supreme Court precedent and out of step with our sister 
72 No. 22-1037 

circuits” and must not be followed. United States v. Parker, 508 

F.3d 434, 436, 441 (7th Cir. 2007).*

Judge Hamilton concludes that, because Exxon used 

“many verbs” in illustrating the review and reject element, the 

Supreme Court did not mean what it said, and under a “practical approach,” courts can safely ignore the review and reject

element (and the relief a plaintiff has sought). Ante, at 22. For 

the dissent—based solely on an isolated phrase: “complaining 

of injuries caused by state-court judgments,” id. at 24 (quoting 

Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284)—Exxon requires such an approach because its “focus ... was more on the source of injuries than on 

the form of relief,” id. Thus, asserts Judge Hamilton’s dissent, 

once a court knows that the “injury underlying a claim was 

caused by the state-court judgment, ... [r]edressing the injury—regardless of the form of relief requested—necessarily 

requires a federal court to review and reject the state-court 

judgment.” Id. at 25. 

The dissent’s quasi-textual analysis holds no water: in 

both its holding and its explanation of Rooker-Feldman’s

proper scope, Exxon spoke—expressly, repeatedly, and unambiguously—in terms of relief. On the dissent’s read, 

Rooker-Feldman would bar all federal cases (1) brought by 

* Contrary to Judge Hamilton’s argument, the majority is not creating 

a new rule. Ante, at 37. Rather, we are cleaning up our case law and clearly 

articulating how Exxon is to be applied in our circuit. We are here because 

we overruled precedent in Hadzi-Tanovic that properly described RookerFeldman’s bounds (as Brokaw and Pushpin do) and continued the expansion 

of Rooker-Feldman in our circuit. 62 F.4th at 402 (Hamilton, J.). I warned 

then that the sprawl of our Rooker-Feldman doctrine reflected in our recent 

case law was “out of step with Exxon.” Id. at 412 (Kirsch, J., dissenting from 

the denial of rehearing en banc). 
No. 22-1037 73

state court losers (2) complaining of injuries caused by state 

court judgments that were (3) rendered before federal proceedings commenced. But Exxon did not stop there. When the 

Supreme Court tells us that a rule applies only when four elements are met, we do not read one of those requirements as 

superfluous. We must read Exxon’s test as giving some independent meaning to “and inviting district court review and 

rejection of those judgments.” 544 U.S. at 284. The only way 

to do that is to look at the relief a plaintiff seeks—what the 

federal plaintiff “invite[s]” the district court to do. Id. at 283.

If a plaintiff extends the invitation to undo, reverse, or overturn the state court judgment, Rooker-Feldman bars her case. 

Unable to find sufficient support in Exxon, Judge Hamilton’s dissent trots out a parade of horribles to justify its expansive view of Rooker-Feldman. Ante, at 35; see also id. at 31–

36. It warns that the majority view would mean “federal 

courts could award damages every time a litigant in state 

court used an improper procedure or considered evidence 

that a federal judge does not think trustworthy.” Ante, at 23–

24 (quoting Harold v. Steel, 773 F.3d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 2014)). 

No, they couldn’t. A federal court’s jurisdiction to hear a case 

says nothing about its merits. Preclusion, immunity, abstention, and merits-focused defenses all impede a state court 

loser’s path to damages, even if they will not guarantee a loss 

for every plaintiff who seeks to call a state court judgment into 

question. But they have nothing to do with jurisdiction, and 

applying them is the job of federal courts.

The dissent also misapprehends the role that relief plays 

in the application of the review and reject element. There is 

no “bright-line rule,” as the dissent fears, that in all cases, 

“Rooker-Feldman does not apply to a federal claim for damages 
74 No. 22-1037 

based on an injury inflicted by a state-court judgment.” Ante, 

at 21. Rather, a determination of whether a court is being 

called upon to review and reject a state court judgment must 

involve some comparison of the relief requested with the relief granted by the state court. Hohenberg, 68 F.4th at 341; Sopkin, 441 F.3d at 1237. 

By way of example, in a case where the state-court judgment sounded in monetary relief, a plaintiff repairing to federal court pursuing refund or adjustment of the sum assessed 

against her could be seeking review and rejection of that judgment because the relief sought would nullify or modify the 

judgment. Indeed, in Bauer v. Koester, 951 F.3d 863 (7th Cir. 

2020), a state court, in a foreclosure proceeding, issued a monetary judgment against the plaintiffs who then, in federal 

court, sought actual and punitive damages for alleged constitutional violations in that proceeding. Id. at 865–66. Though 

the plaintiffs only sought damages, their claim would be 

barred by Rooker-Feldman because awarding such damages 

would refund the money assessed against them and thereby 

void the judgment. See, e.g., Fliss v. Generation Cap. I, LLC, 87 

F.4th 348, 353 (7th Cir. 2023) (suggesting that Rooker-Feldman

bars actions seeking a refund of the damages assessed by the 

state court); Graff v. Aberdeen Enterprizes, II, Inc., 65 F.4th 500, 

519 n.24 (10th Cir. 2023) (indicating that a claim for money 

damages seeking to recover the amount of debt imposed in 

the judgment of conviction would be barred); cf. Gisslen v. 

City of Crystal, Minn., 345 F.3d 624, 627–28 (8th Cir. 2003) 

(finding that Rooker-Feldman bars a damages claim that challenges a state court’s determination of just compensation for 

a taking). This clarification should mollify the dissent’s fear of 

opening the courts to a flood of cases and “longer and more 

extensive litigation.” Ante, at 34. 
No. 22-1037 75

Even if the dissent’s policy concerns stand, so what if our 

jurisdiction extends to these cases? The specter of federal 

courts exercising jurisdiction in the areas of mortgage foreclosure, family law, and other cases, ante, at 31, does not justify 

shirking the “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise our 

jurisdiction, Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United 

States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). And the dissent’s concern 

about an increase in “friction between state and federal 

courts” cannot displace that obligation, especially when such 

friction is contemplated by our system of concurrent jurisdiction. Ante, at 36. We trust that courts can avoid any “increase” 

in that friction, not by refusing jurisdiction, but through rigorous application of the arsenal of doctrines that will stymy 

state-court losers from proceeding far in their federal suits. Id. 

The Supreme Court shares neither Judge Hamilton’s concerns nor a desire for a broader Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The 

Court has been clear: “Neither Rooker nor Feldman elaborated 

a rationale for a wide-reaching bar on the jurisdiction of lower 

federal courts, and our cases since Feldman have tended to emphasize the narrowness of the Rooker-Feldman rule.” Lance, 546 

U.S. at 464. And in nearly half a century, the Court “has never 

applied Rooker-Feldman to dismiss an action for want of jurisdiction.” Exxon, 544 U.S. at 287; see also, e.g., Reed v. Goertz, 

598 U.S. 230, 235 (2023); Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 532–

33 (2011). 

The breadth of the dissent’s position—and its incongruity 

with the Court’s view—is clear when applied to the overlap 

between Rooker-Feldman’s bar and that of Heck v. Humphrey, 

512 U.S. 477 (1994). See Sanchez v. City of Chicago, 880 F.3d 349, 

356 (7th Cir. 2018) (identifying that both Heck and RookerFeldman can bar a challenge to a state court conviction). 
76 No. 22-1037 

Consider a plaintiff alleging malicious prosecution, a Fourth 

Amendment violation. Heck holds that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does 

not authorize him to sue for that violation until his 

maliciously obtained conviction has been set aside. 512 U.S. at 

486–89. But once that happens, the plaintiff can sue in federal 

court to remedy the violation of his constitutional rights. The

approach in Judge Hamilton’s dissent, however, would 

render Heck’s holding superfluous. If the dissent were correct, 

Roy Heck’s § 1983 suit would have been dismissed at the 

outset on jurisdictional grounds under Rooker-Feldman—he 

was a state court loser complaining of injuries effectuated by 

his conviction. Id. at 478–79. But Heck is not jurisdictional. See, 

e.g., Polzin v. Gage, 636 F.3d 834, 837 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The Heck

doctrine is not a jurisdictional bar.”); Garrett v. Murphy, 17 

F.4th 419, 427 (3d Cir. 2021) (collecting cases). Under the 

dissent’s unyielding rule, district courts no longer need to (or 

even have jurisdiction to) invoke Heck. Instead, they must 

dismiss every suit complaining of injuries that contributed to 

a state court conviction, whether the conviction has been 

vacated or not. That is not the law. 

B 

Duly regarding, rather than brushing off, whether we 

have been asked to “review, reject, overturn, undo, reverse, 

set aside, [or] alter,” ante, at 22, a state court judgment dictates 

the outcome here: given the status of the custody judgment 

and the relief she seeks, Rooker-Feldman does not bar Gilbank’s 

claims. The return of her child resolved the state court judgment that effectuated Gilbank’s alleged constitutional injuries. By giving meaning to each requirement of Exxon, particularly the fourth, our jurisdiction is secure because the state 

court proceedings are “over,” “the state court[‘s] decisions are 
No. 22-1037 77

not subject to review anywhere,” and Gilbank, in requesting 

damages, “did not ask the district judge, and do[es] not ask 

us, to alter or annul any decision by a state judge.” Milchtein, 

880 F.3d at 897. 

The Second and Sixth Circuits have provided the blueprint 

for resolving the very issue before us in accordance with 

Exxon. In Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009), the 

plaintiff sued multiple state officials involved with temporarily removing her daughter from her custody, alleging that 

they had violated her constitutional rights. Id. at 99. The Second Circuit held that, under Exxon, Rooker-Feldman did not apply because the plaintiff’s child had been returned to her: 

“The only conceivable ‘judgment’ against plaintiff—the temporary removal of her child—has already been undone.” Id. 

at 102. In Kovacic v. Cuyahoga County Department of Children and 

Family Services, 606 F.3d 301 (6th Cir. 2010), the Sixth Circuit 

likewise held that Rooker-Feldman did not bar damages claims 

based on the conduct of the social workers that led to a custody judgment which was no longer in effect. Id. at 302–03. 

Because those plaintiffs sought only damages for alleged unconstitutional conduct, “any action concerning [the children’s] return to their mother’s custody became moot when 

they were reunited with their mother.” Id. at 310. So too for 

Gilbank: after she regained full custody of her daughter, the 

custody dispute was over, and there was no state court judgment to appeal. And because there is no judgment upon 

which Gilbank can seek appellate review, § 1257(a)’s limit on 

appellate jurisdiction is irrelevant.

Yet Judge Hamilton’s dissent maintains that its analysis is 

consistent with Exxon because Gilbank’s claims invited the 

federal court to review and reject those since-resolved 
78 No. 22-1037 

custody orders. While paying (what one might generously 

call) lip service to the review and reject element, it finds we 

lack jurisdiction because Gilbank’s “only alleged injury is the 

deprivation of custody itself, as ordered by the state trial 

court,” and the “premise” of her claims is that “the state-court 

judgments were wrong, and there is no conceivable way to 

redress the [injury] without ... reviewing and rejecting those 

state-court judgments as incorrect.” Ante, at 23 (cleaned up). 

But Exxon squarely contradicts this approach: “If a federal 

plaintiff ‘present[s] some independent claim, albeit one that 

denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a 

case to which he was a party ..., then there is jurisdiction and 

state law determines whether the defendant prevails under 

principles of preclusion.’” 544 U.S. at 293 (quoting GASH Assocs. v. Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993)). 

Even if the premise of Gilbank’s claims is that a state court 

judgment is wrong, and thereby she seeks to “put the Wisconsin trial court’s proceedings under a microscope” by relitigating issues she raised or could have raised in that court, that is 

a question of state preclusion law. Ante, at 35. Indeed, preclusion requires a court to put prior proceedings, even statecourt proceedings, “under a microscope,” id., to determine 

the issues that were actually litigated, Waagner v. United States, 

971 F.3d 647, 657 (7th Cir. 2020). Courts can do so without 

calling judges as witnesses. And because Rooker-Feldman “is 

not simply preclusion by another name,” Lance, 546 U.S. at 

466; Hohenberg, 68 F.4th at 339, it does not preclude claims

merely premised on challenges to a state court’s decision. And 

that is true even if Rooker-Feldman might “offer a much better 

prospect” for courts to rid themselves of cases seeking to relitigate state court judgments than equitable doctrines of preclusion. Ante, at 32–34. The dissent’s goal-oriented application
No. 22-1037 79

of Rooker-Feldman to suits premised on the incorrectness of

state court judgments would encourage the federalization of 

state preclusion law, contravening the Court’s admonishments. See Exxon, 544 U.S. at 283 (expressing concern that 

lower courts’ expansive use of Rooker-Feldman was “superseding the ordinary application of preclusion law”). 

A determination that Gilbank’s claims are not barred by 

Rooker-Feldman does not categorically reject its application to 

suits seeking money damages. In contrast to a damages award 

that would neutralize the money judgment issued in state 

court, such as in Bauer, awarding Gilbank damages could do 

nothing to the custody judgment because: (1) the custody dispute is over; and (2) even if it were not, the judgment provided equitable relief that an award of damages would not 

undo. This conclusion shows only that the relief Gilbank 

sought could not undo the custody determination and thus, 

under Exxon, her suit is beyond the reach of Rooker-Feldman. 

II

One final point. I agree with the majority’s dismissal on 

the merits of the warrantless urinalysis claim, the Fifth 

Amendment right to counsel claim, and the due process 

claims, all of which the district court addressed on the merits 

and dismissed with prejudice. However, we cannot reach the 

merits of Gilbank’s remaining claims. While we ordinarily 

may affirm the district court on any ground adequately supported by the record, see Bay v. Cassens Transp. Co., 212 F.3d 

969, 972–73 (7th Cir. 2000), the merits of Gilbank’s remaining 

claims that were solely dismissed under Rooker-Feldman are 

not properly before us. This is because “an appellee who does 

not cross-appeal may not ‘attack the decree with a view either 

to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the 
80 No. 22-1037 

rights of his adversary.’” Jennings v. Stephens, 574 U.S. 271, 276 

(2015) (quotation omitted). And while dismissals based on a 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction are without prejudice, affirmance based on defendants’ alternative merits arguments 

would require dismissal of Gilbank’s claims with prejudice. 

Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190, 224 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The case 

law holds, consistent with Rule 41(b), that a dismissal for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be a dismissal with prejudice.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). To enlarge their relief in this 

way, defendants needed to cross-appeal; they did not, which 

precludes our review. See Bankert, 733 F.3d at 224 (“[A]n appellee who wants, not that the judgment of the district court 

be affirmed on an alternative ground, but that the judgment 

be changed ... from a dismissal without to a dismissal with 

prejudice, ... must file a cross-appeal.”) (cleaned up).

* * * 

The state court took Gilbank’s daughter from her. Gilbank 

has her daughter back. The custody dispute is over, and the 

state court judgment is not in effect. Because Gilbank never 

asked to reverse the state custody judgment, Rooker-Feldman

does not bar her claims, and the district court had jurisdiction. 

Their dismissal on Rooker-Feldman grounds should therefore 

be reversed. This narrower view of Rooker-Feldman is how 

courts in this circuit will apply the doctrine going forward. 

I concur in the dismissal, on the merits, of Gilbank’s urinalysis, Fifth Amendment right to counsel, and due process 

claims. I respectfully dissent from the mandate affirming the 

dismissal of her remaining claims on Heck and Rooker-Feldman

grounds.