alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5424

To repeal a provision relating to privacy officers in the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2005. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 6, 2004

Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia introduced the following bill; which was referred 

to the Committee on Government Reform 

A BILL

To repeal a provision relating to privacy officers in the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. REPEAL OF PRIVACY OFFICER PROVISION. 

4 Section 522 of the Transportation, Treasury, Inde5 pendent Agencies, and General Government Appropria6 tions Act, 2005 (division H of the Consolidated Appropria7 tions Act, 2005), is hereby repealed.

Æ
Exhibit 32(i)

Certification of the Principal Executive Officer

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

The undersigned hereby certifies that, to his knowledge, (i) the Form 10-K filed by American Community Bancshares, Inc. (the
Issuer) for the year ended December 31, 2006, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and (ii) the information contained in that report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Issuer on the dates and for the periods presented therein.



|                        |  |     |  |                                    
|----------------------- |  | --- |  | -----------------------------------
|Date: November 16, 2007 |  | By: |  | /s/ Randy P. Helton                
|                        |  |     |  | Randy P. Helton                    
|                        |  |     |  | President & Chief Executive Officer
NAICS 

code Industry Industry GTP 

employment1

Industry GTP 

employment 

as a percent 

of total GTP 

employment 

Industry GTP 

employment 

as a percent of 

total industry 

employment

Total GTP employment, all industries2 ............ 854,700 100.0 0.7

11 Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting ...... 18,900 2.2 1.5

21 Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction ... 3,100 0.4 0.4

22 Utilities ............................................. 16,800 2.0 2.1

23 Construction .......................................... 134,100 15.7 2.3

31-33 Manufacturing ....................................... 57,600 6.7 0.5

42 Wholesale trade .................................... 22,900 2.7 0.4

44-45 Retail trade .......................................... 39,700 4.6 0.3

48-49 Transportation and warehousing .................. 35,100 4.1 0.7

51 Information .......................................... 3,600 0.4 0.1

52 Finance and insurance .............................. 4,700 0.6 0.1

53 Real estate and rental and leasing ............... 10,500 1.2 0.5

54 Professional, scientific, and technical services 99,800 11.7 1.3

55 Management of companies and enterprises ...... 3,900 0.5 0.2

56 Administrative and waste services ............... 151,900 17.8 2.0

61 Educational services .............................. 30,800 3.6 0.3

62 Health care and social assistance .................. 63,900 7.5 0.4

71 Arts, entertainment, and recreation ............... 12,900 1.5 0.5

72 Accommodation and food services ............... 58,800 6.9 0.5

81 Other services (except public administration) ... 27,800 3.2 0.7

92 Public administration .............................. 57,800 6.8 0.8

2

Detail may not sum to total due to rounding.

Table 5. Employment for workers spending more than half of their time involved in green technologies and 

practices (GTP employment) by industry, August 2011

1

Defined as employees who spend more than half of their time involved in green technologies and practices. 

June 18, 2012
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

STATE OF ARIZONA , Respondent ,

v.

ANTHONY GREG LAPOINTE , Petitioner

. No. 1 CA

- CR 23

- 0108 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR 2009

- 048332

- 001 The Honorable Ronee Korbin Steiner , Judge
REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL Maricopa County Attorney ’ s Office , Phoenix By Krista Wood Counsel for Respondent Anthony Greg LaPointe , Buckeye Petitioner FILED 6-29-2023STATE v. LAPOINTE Decision of the Court

2 MEMORANDUM DECISION Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey , Judge Jennifer B. Campbell , and Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court.

PER CURIAM : ¶1 Petitioner Anthony Greg LaPointe seeks review of the superior court’s order denying his petition for post

- conviction relief

. This is petitioner’s fifth successive petition. ¶2 Absent an abuse of discretion or error of law, this court will not disturb a superior court’s ruling on a petition for post

- conviction relief. State v. Gutierrez , 229 Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19, 278 P.3d 1276, 1280 (2012). It is petitioner’s burden to show that the superior court abused its discretion by denying the petition for post

- conviction relief. See State v. Poblete , 227 Ariz. 537, ¶ 1, 260 P.3d 1102, 1103 (App. 2011) (petitioner has burden of establishing abuse of discretion on review). ¶3 We have reviewed the record in this matter, the superior court’s order denying the petition for post

- conviction relief, and the petition for review. We find that petitioner has n ot established an abuse of discretion. ¶4 We grant review and deny relief.
#### FLEMING v. MANTE et al.

Civ. No. 23869.

United States District Court N. D. Ohio, E. D.

May 23, 1950.

*392Walter J. Heddesheimer, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff.

Stanley Denlinger, William Creme, Akron, Ohio, A. R. Fiorette, Qeveland, Ohio, for defendants.

JONES, Chief Judge.

This is a motion to vacate judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) (6), Fed.Rules Civ. Proc. 28 U.S.C.A.

The action, one seeking treble damages for violation of the rent control act, was originally filed March 22, 1946. On January 16, 1947 a default judgment was entered in the sum of $1,608.00 and costs. On March 26, 1949, plaintiff made the judgment a lien upon the real property of the defendants.

At the time the action was filed Tony Mante was a patient in a tuberculosis sanatorium and he was not released until October, 1946. His wife was for part of this time supported by relief. However, the defendants did retain an attorney who filed an answer for them. In October, 1946, plaintiff’s attorney sent the defendants’ attorney a card with reference to setting this case for trial. In answer the defendants’ attorney said that he was. no longer retained by defendants and “if you wish to take a default judgment on the matter there is nothing that I can do about it. These people are penniless and unable to pay any attorney fee.” The record does not show that the request for trial card was subsequently sent to the defendants or that they had knowledge of the date of trial, and under this court’s rules the action should not have been placed on the trial calendar. The defendants’ failure to appear and the consequent default judgment were undoubtedly the result of the letter of an attorney who did not represent the defendants, and perhaps the Government’s too eager acquiescence in the suggestion of this attorney.

It is true that three years have passed since the judgme'nt was entered. However, the notice of judgment which defendants received probably meant nothing to them, and the Government’s failure to take any steps to enforce the judgment quite likely led defendants to believe that they were not liable in any way. It is also likely that this motion was filed soon after defendants learned of the judgment lien on their land. In any event, it is never too late to set aside an unjust judgment.

Defendants have offered to pay the amount of single damages, and the Court is willing to accept such compromise. If, however, plaintiff refuses this offer, the judgment of January 16, 1947 will be set aside.

Enter order accordingly.
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

Alpha Pro Tech, Ltd.

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

 

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

 

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

 

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with the quarterly report of Alpha Pro Tech, Ltd. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Lloyd Hoffman, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| DATE:  | **May 6,   2011** | ** ** | BY:    | /s/Lloyd Hoffman          |
|--------|------------------------|------------|--------|---------------------------|
|   |                   |       |   |                      |
|   |                   |       |   | Lloyd   Hoffman           |
|   |                   |       |   | Chief   Financial Officer |

 

1

----
Exhibit 32.3

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of PRIMEDIA Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2004 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Robert J. Sforzo, Senior Vice President, Chief Accounting Officer and Controller of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



|/s/ROBERT J. SFORZORobert J. Sforzo                                        |  |  |  | 
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  |  |  | 
|Senior Vice President, Chief Accounting Officer and ControllerMay 10, 2004

This
certification accompanies each Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---



QuickLinks
Exhibit 32.1



Certification Required by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350

(Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)



In connection with the filing by ADE Corporation (the Company) of the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended January 31,
2005 (the Report), the undersigned, as the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                     |  |                                      
|-------------------- |  | -------------------------------------
|Date: March 14, 2005 |  | /s/ Chris L. Koliopoulos             
|                     |  | Chris L. Koliopoulos, Ph.D.          
|                     |  | President and Chief Executive Officer
Case 2:11-cr-00470-SDW Document 33 Filed 01/10/12 Page 1 of 3 PageID: 101
Case 2:11-cr-00470-SDW Document 33 Filed 01/10/12 Page 2 of 3 PageID: 102
Case 2:11-cr-00470-SDW Document 33 Filed 01/10/12 Page 3 of 3 PageID: 103
#### David KING and Julie King, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 10-36174.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Dec. 4, 2012.

Filed Dec. 17, 2012.

*700Lonnie James Dale, Esquire, Cory R. Gangle, Esquire, Milodragovich Dale & Dye, PC, Missoula, MT, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Martha Sheehy, Sheehy Law Firm, Billings, MT, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: SCHROEDER, McKEOWN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

David and Julie King (“the Kings”), residents of Montana and assignees of rights under a comprehensive general liability (“CGL”) policy in favor of their judgment debtor, brought suit against State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (“State Farm”) for satisfaction of a $600,048.47 judgment entered in their favor after a special verdict award by a Montana state court jury in a breach of contract case. The Kings sought three forms of relief: (1) a declaratory judgment that the defendants’ CGL policy in the underlying case covered the damages incurred, (2) estoppel to prevent State Farm from denying coverage, and (8) attorneys’ fees related to the underlying lawsuit. The United States district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm on all three claims.

The Kings are not entitled to a declaratory judgment because the facts of the underlying case do not constitute an “occurrence” as defined in the State Farm policy. Where the defendants in the underlying case deliberately refused to remedy the breach of a contract to deliver a log home package and the Kings deliberately chose to use the known non-conforming product in constructing their residence, any unintended results stemming from their intentional actions are not caused by an occurrence under Montana state law. *See Blair v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co.,*339 Mont. 8, 167 P.3d 888, 891-92 (2007). Without an occurrence no coverage, exists and there is no resulting duty to defend or to indemnify. *See Daly Ditches Irr. Dist. v. Nat’l Sur. Corp.,*234 Mont. 537, 764 P.2d 1276, 1279 (1988).

*701Neither are the elements of estoppel met. The Kings failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that in reliance on an act of State Farm, they, or the defendants in the underlying case, changed their position for the worse. *See Avanta Fed. Credit Union v. Shupak,*354 Mont. 372, 223 P.3d 863, 872 (2009); *St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Am. Bank,*33 F.3d 1159, 1161 (9th Cir.1994). We have examined the Kings’ remaining claims for coverage, but none have merit. The district court properly denied attorneys’ fees because it denied the Kings’ claim for declaratory judgment. *See*Mont.Code Ann. § 27-8-313.

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
[903 NYS2d 872]

#### Firooz Ghassabian, Petitioner, v Fatollah Hematian, Respondent.

Supreme Court, New York County,

June 3, 2010

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Neil J. Saltzman,*New York City, for petitioner. *Weber & Pullin LLP,*Woodbury *(.Allan L. Pullin*of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Michael D. Stallman, J.

It is adjudged that this petition for a confidentiality order in accordance with the terms of a stipulation among the parties is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed.

The CPLR does not provide for issuance of confidentiality orders in aid of arbitration. CPLR 7502 (c) specifically provides that the court may entertain an application for provisional rem*958edies, i.e., for an order of attachment or for a preliminary injunction. The confidentiality order is not in the nature of a provisional remedy. For instance, paragraph 4 of the stipulation provides that the confidentiality obligations shall remain in effect even after the termination of the arbitration.

Petitioner’s reliance upon CPLR 7601 as a possible ground for the protective order is unavailing. Article 76 concérns special proceedings to enforce agreements raising a question of valuation, appraisal, or similar issues, which does not appear to be the case here. In any event, CPLR 7601 provides that an agreement raising such questions may be enforced as if it were an arbitration agreement, and is thus governed under article 75. CPLR 3103, 6001 and 6301 are inapplicable, for there is no action or special proceeding involving the actual controversy itself before the court.

It cannot be said here that the parties are seeking discovery in aid of arbitration *(see*CPLR 3102 [c]), because the parties are not seeking any court-ordered discovery from each other. To the extent -that CPLR 3102 (c) might be liberally construed to include the power to issue a confidentiality order, the burden for such relief under CPLR 3102 (c) is. high. “Generally, courts may not order discovery in aid of arbitration unless the movant has demonstrated ‘extraordinary circumstances.’ It has been stated that ‘[t]he test is necessity rather than convenience.’ ” *(Hendler & Murray v Lambert,*127 AD2d 820, 820-821 [2d Dept 1987] [citation omitted].) Here, the parties want the court to grant the confidentiality order simply because they agreed to the terms. Petitioner claims that there are “sensitive issues of intellectual property and other matters,” but such concerns are inherent in any intellectual property dispute, and thus do not constitute extraordinary circumstances.

Moreover, where the parties previously agreed to arbitrate their disputes, it is inappropriate for them to place the court in the role of enforcer of their proposed confidentiality order for an indefinite period of time after the conclusion of the arbitration.

Accordingly, the court declines to “so order” the parties’ proposed stipulation, notwithstanding the approval of the arbitrators. This is without prejudice to the parties agreeing to a new or amended arbitration agreement that would include a confidentiality agreement enforceable via arbitration.
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5362 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5362

 To ensure that a former Federal building in Shreveport, Louisiana, is 
       no longer known as the ``Joe Waggoner Federal Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 16, 2004

 Mr. McCrery introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To ensure that a former Federal building in Shreveport, Louisiana, is 
       no longer known as the ``Joe Waggoner Federal Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DEDESIGNATION.

    The former Federal Building located at 500 Fannin Street in 
Shreveport, Louisiana, designated on October 28, 1978, by Public Law 
95-545, as the ``Joe Waggoner Federal Building'' shall no longer be 
known as the ``Joe Waggoner Federal Building''.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States to the former Federal Building referred to 
in section 1 shall not be deemed to be a reference to a Federal 
building.
                                 <all>
```
Q412 Exhibit 10.64






Exhibit 10.64


Letter Agreement, dated January 17, 2013, between Orbitz Worldwide, Inc. and David Belmont




January 17, 2013


David Belmont
Orbitz Worldwide
500 W. Madison St., #1000
Chicago, IL 60661


Dear David:


On behalf of Orbitz Worldwide, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, (“Company”), I am pleased to confirm the terms of your appointment as Interim Chief Financial Officer, reporting to me.  The effective date of your appointment was January 8, 2013, and it is our expectation that you will serve as Interim CFO until the Company appoints a new Chief Financial Officer on an interim or permanent basis.


The Compensation Committee has approved the following additional compensation, to apply for the duration of your service as Interim CFO: 


		
	(i)
	a $5,000 per month increase in base salary for each month that you perform the role of Interim Chief Financial Officer, 




		
	(ii)
	an additional special payment of $5,000 for each month that you perform the role of Interim Chief Financial Officer to be paid in a lump sum on the first pay date following the start date of a new Chief Financial Officer (whether interim or permanent) and 




		
	(iii)
	a performance bonus lump sum payment of $50,000 which will be paid three months after the start date of the new Chief Financial Officer (whether interim or permanent). 




All payments are contingent on your continued employment on the date of payment, and the additional base salary, special payment and lump sum bonus payment will not be considered part of eligible earnings for purposes of the 2013 Annual Incentive Plan.


Per Orbitz Worldwide standard policy, this letter is not intended nor should it be considered as an employment contract for a definite or indefinite period of time.  Employment with Orbitz Worldwide is at will, and either you or the Company may terminate employment at any time, with or without cause.


If these terms are acceptable to you, please sign on the line indicated below and return this letter to me.


We really appreciate your willingness to take on these responsibilities during an important time for the Company.


Regards,


/s/ Barney Harford
Barney Harford
CEO
Orbitz Worldwide, Inc.


Understood and accepted:


	
			
	/s/ David Belmont
	 
	1/25/13

	David Belmont


	 
	Date
NC EXH 10.84 2012 10K








AMENDMENT NO. 1
TO THE
HAMILTON BEACH BRANDS, INC.
LONG-TERM INCENTIVE COMPENSATION PLAN
 (EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 2010)
    
Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. (the “Company”), hereby adopts this Amendment No. 1 to the Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. Long-Term Incentive Compensation Plan (Effective January 1, 2010) (the “Plan”), effective January 1, 2013.  Words and phrases used herein with initial capital letters that are defined in the Plan are used herein as so defined.


Section 1
The first sentence of Section 6 of the Plan is hereby amended by deleting the phrase “Hay Salary Grade of 16 or above” and replacing it with the phrase “Hay Salary Grade of 17 or above” therein.




EXECUTED this 13th day of November, 2012.




HAMILTON BEACH BRANDS, INC.


    
	
					
	 
	 
	 
	/s/ Kathleen L. Diller
	 

	 
	 
	 
	Kathleen L. Diller
	 

	 
	 
	 
	Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary