COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Petty, Alston and Senior Ju dge Felton Argued by teleconference STEVEN PARASIDIS, I NDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE FOR PARASIDIS FAMILY TRUST NO. 1, PARASIDIS FAMILY TRUST NO. 2, STEVE PARASIDIS REVOCABLE TRUST, PARASIDIS FAMILY I, L.L.C., MEMORANDUM OPINION  BY PARASIDIS FAMILY II, L.L.C. AND JUDGE ROSSIE D. ALSTON, JR. PARASIDIS FAMILY III, L.L.C. DECEMBER 8, 2015

v. Record No. 0714-15-4

MARGARET KARAGEORGE

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF FAIRFAX COUNTY Jane Marum Roush, Judge Joseph Peter Drennan for appellants. Lawrence J. McClaffery (R. Peyt on Mahaffey; Laura Golden Liff; McCandlish & Lillard, P.C., on brief), for appellee.

Steve Parasidis, individually, and as Trustee of Parasidis Fam ily Trust I, Parasidis Family Trust 2, and as Co-Trustee of the Steve Parasidis Revocable Trust, Parasidis Family I, L.L.C., Parasidis Family II, L.L.C., and Parasidis Family III, L.L.C. (collectively, appellant or appellants) appeals the trial court’s finding that he was in civil contempt of court for submitting fraudulent documents during the pendency of this litigation and lying at a deposition. On appeal, appellant presents six assignments of error, wh ich can be summarized as follows: (1) That the trial court erred in considering appellant’s prev ious contempt finding when determining whether he was in contempt in the present proceeding, (2) that the trial court erre d in failing to consider mitigating factors and in taking evidence of alleged misconduct by appellant at a bankruptcy

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - court deposition, and (3) that the trial court erred in its monetary and equitable sanctions against appellant as a result of finding him in contem pt. We find that appellant failed to properly preserve two of his assignments of error, and we find no error in the trial court’s rulings. Therefore, we affirm. I. Background 1 A. The Litigation History The parties have a lengthy and tortured hi story of litigation, which began in 2008 when appellant’s wife, Penelope (“Penny” ) Parasidis and her brother, Pa ul Karageorge, filed a petition for appointment of a guardian and conservato r for their mother, Margaret Karageorge (Mrs. Karageorge or appellee) (the “first litigation”). Th e first litigation was settled upon execution of a written settlement agreement and re lease requiring Mrs. Karageorge to pay more than $9.5 million combined to Paul, Penny, and their children, which included a total of $1.6 million net to be paid to Penny. In exchange, Mrs. Karageorge was to receive a dismissal of the first litigation with prejudice and a comprehensive release of claims (the “release”), which included any allegations related to Mrs. Karageorge’s estate, litigation, capacity, any property matters, and any future claims any party may have relating to or arising di rectly or indirectly from or concerning any of those matters. Despite the release, Penny and her thr ee children filed a complaint against Mrs. Karageorge in December 2009 related to the very matters released at the conclusion of the first litigation (the “second litigation”). In response, Mrs. Karageorge filed a counterclaim seeking rescission of the settlement agreement since she did not receiv e the benefit of the

1 As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this ca se and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, th is opinion recites only those facts and incidents of the proceedings as ar e necessary to the parties’ unders tanding of the disposition of this appeal.- 3 - bargain. Though Penny nonsuited her claims in th e second litigation, the case went to trial on Mrs. Karageorge’s counterclaim and on August 17, 2011, the trial court granted Mrs. Karageorge’s request and entered a judgment order rescindi ng the settlement agreement and requiring Penny and appellant to disgorge all paym ents received from Mrs. Karageorge under the settlement agreement (the “judgment”). 2 The judgment for Mrs. Karageorge totaled $1.6

million.

B. The Fraudulent Documents Several fraudulently executed documents lie at the heart of the pres ent litigation and are the basis for which the trial court found appellant in contempt in this case. Purportedly in January 2010, Penny transferred $1.25 million of the $1.6 million paid to her by Mrs. Karageorge under the settlement agreemen t to Parasidis Family Trust No. 2, of which appellant and Penny are trustees and appellant’s three sisters ar e beneficiaries. Penny and appellant then took out a Lease hold Deed of Trust Bond, which ob ligated the Parasidis Family Trust No. 2 to return the $1.25 million to Penny and appellant, with interest, in monthly installments over ten years. Penny and appellant la ter purported to endorse the leasehold deed of trust over to themselves as tenants by the enti rety (the “leasehold deed”). Penny and Steve then purported to enter into assignment of interest agreements, as trus tees and beneficiaries of the Parasidis Family Trusts 1 and 2, assigning all of thei r right, title, and interest in both trusts from

themselves as “husband and wife” to “Steve Para sidis and Penelope K. Pa rasidis, as tenants by the entirety” (the “assignment of interest tr ansfers”) (collectively, the leasehold deed and assignment of interest transfers will be refe rred to as the “January 2010 documents”).

2 Penny appealed the trial court’s ruling in the second litigation a nd the Supreme Court denied her petition for appeal. See Parasidi s v. Karageorge, Record No. 112032 (Va. Mar. 6, 2012).- 4 - From July 2011 through March 2012, Penny made transfers of assets from bank accounts titled in her name individually or jointly with appellant into new acc ounts titled to her and appellant as tenants by the entire ty (the “bank transfers”). On September 17, 2012, over one year after the judgment was entered, Penny and appella nt created the Steve Parasidis Revocable Trust and the Penelope K. Parasidis Revocable Trust an d appointed themselves as co-trustees (together the “revocable trusts”). C. The Fraudulent Conveyance Action ag ainst Appellants and Penny Parasidis’s Bankruptcy Filing On May 30, 2013, Mrs. Karageorge filed the present case against Penny and appellant, alleging that they created and controlled various entities to transfer and conceal assets in avoidance of the judgment. The complaint request ed that the trial court void the fraudulent conveyances (the leasehold deed, assignment of interest transfers, and the bank account transfers) and award Mrs. Karageorge her $1.6 million plus attorney’s fees. In March 2014, Penny and Steve gave their depositions in the fraudulent conveyance action. In their deposit ions, they both testifie d that the January 2010 documents were in fact

drafted in 2010 and effected the tr ansfer of assets and interest to them as tenants by the entirety long before the judgment was entered in 2011. They did, however, admit that the bank transfers were done to avoid the judgment. On April 10, 2014, the Parasidises’ attorney, Phillip J. Harvey, sent a letter to Mrs. Karageorge’s counsel, indicating that the January 2010 documents were actually created and executed sometime in 2012 and that appell ant’s and Penny’s testimony at their March 2014 depositions was “inaccurate.” As a result of Mr . Harvey’s letter, Mrs. Karageorge filed an- 5 - amended complaint in the fraudulent conveyance ac tion to include allegati ons that the January

2010 documents were fraudulent. 3 On June 17, 2014, Penny filed for Chapter 7 bank ruptcy in the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. On June 18, 2014, an order staying the fraudulent conveyance action was entered by the trial cour t as a result of Penny’s bankruptcy filing (the “stay order”). The stay order provided that the “status quo is maintained” and prohibite d Mrs. Karageorge and appellant from obtaining possession of the prope rty of Penny’s estate and from exercising control over her property “i.e., th e property that is the subject of this fraudulent conveyance

action.” 4 Because the trial court proceedings were stayed, the parties conducted a Rule 2004 examination of Steve on September 10, 2014, in the context of Penny’s bankruptcy proceedings. 5 During this deposition, Steve admitted that he ag reed with Mr. Harvey’s letter, that it was self-explanatory, and that his te stimony at his March 2014 trial c ourt deposition was “inaccurate”

and “untruthful.”

3 This was an appropriate disclosure made by Mr. Harvey, after di scovering appellant’s fraudulent conduct, since Virginia Rules of Profe ssional Conduct 3.3(a)(2) and (4) provide that a lawyer shall not knowingly fail to disclose a materi al fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act of a client, nor offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.

4 Appellant and Penny filed a “Petition for Revi ew of a Preliminary Injunction Pursuant to . . . Code § 8.01-626” purporting to appeal the stay order, arguing that it amounted to a permanent injunction. The Supreme Court issued an order on July 21, 2014, stating that it did not have jurisdiction over an appeal of the stay or der because it “did not grant, refuse, dissolve or enlarge an injunction” but rather was “coextensiv e with the automatic st ay imposed pursuant to federal statute and subject to the authority of th e United States Bankruptcy Court to interpret that statute.” See Parasidis v. Karageorge, Record No. 141035 (Va. July 21, 2014).

5 See U.S.C.S Bankruptcy R. 2004 (“On motion of any party in interest, the court may order the examination of any entity.”).- 6 - D. The Contempt Motions On September 24, 2014, Mrs. Karageorge file d a “Contempt Motion” against appellant and on October 10, 2014, the trial court entered an order finding that appellant “willfully violated” the stay order, and ordering the stay temporarily lifted as to the non-bankrupt defendants, and further ordering that “[o]n or before November 10, 2014, [appellant] . . . shall cause to be paid into the registry of this C ourt the sum of $20,796, which represented one-half of the subject Leasehold Deed of Trust Bond paym ents for the months of July, August, and September, and October 2014.” The trial court further ordered that “on or before the 10 th of each subsequent month during the pendency of thes e proceedings, [appellant] shall pay into the registry of this Court the sum of $5,244, which represents one-half of the subject Leasehold Deed of Trust Bond payments.” 6 On October 24, 2014, Mrs. Karageorge filed a second contempt motion, requesting the trial court hold appellant in contempt for “givin g perjured testimony in proceedings before [the trial court], and otherwise tampering with the administration of justi ce herein” (the “second contempt motion”). The second contempt moti on alleged that Penny and appellant admitted to fabricating the January 2010 documents in 2012 to a void the judgment and failed to disclose this fact until the April 10, 2014 letter from Mr. Ha rvey. The motion noted that these revelations required Mrs. Karageorge to amend her complain t, continue the original trial date, reopen discovery, and re-depose Penny and appellant. The motion also alleged that appellant lied at his Rule 2004 deposition and that once again, Mr. Harv ey was the “bearer of bad news” when he revealed that appellant signed his sisters’ names on the document purporting to assign a portion

6 Appellant appealed the trial court’s first c ontempt order. That appeal was dismissed by order of this Court on March 25, 201 5, due to appellant’s failure to file an opening brief within the limits of Rule 5A:26. See Parasidis v. Karageorge, Record No. 2093-14-4 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2015).- 7 - of the beneficial interests of Trust No. 2 to appe llant’s sisters. Mrs. Ka rageorge requested that

the trial court lift the stay order for the purposes of addr essing the second contempt motion, hold appellant in contempt, award Mrs. Karageorge attorney’s fees incurred in uncovering and addressing the contempt and in bringing and argu ing the second contempt motion, and to strike any of appellants’ defenses to the fraudulent conveyance action. E. The Second Contempt Motion Hearing On December 12, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on the second contempt motion and entered an order providing that “Steve Parasidi s has been cited for contempt” and set the matter for a determination of appropriate sanctions or compensation to Mrs. Karageorge, if any. The trial court held a hearing on the second contem pt motion on February 3, 2015. At the hearing, Mrs. Karageorge’s counsel requ ested that the trial court aw ard Mrs. Karageorge $187,000 in attorney’s fees for prosecuti on of the fraudulent conveyance ac tion for eleven months before being told that the January 2010 documents we re fabricated to avoid the judgment. Mrs. Karageorge argued that she couldn’t go forward to trial the next month because her pleadings had to be amended to include new a llegations and that she essentially spent the previous year prosecuting a lie. Appellant testified at the hearing and ad mitted that he backdated the January 2010 documents, that he testified falsely at his Marc h 2014 deposition, and that he lied at his Rule 2004 deposition regarding his sister s’ signatures. During closing argument, appellant’s counsel stated the following: If it please the Court, Your Honor , there can be no gainsaying here that my client tendered altere d or backdated documents in discovery. There can be no gainsa ying that he testified falsely about them in his deposition in the spring of la st year. And to the extent to which hi s conduct is sanctionable or worthy of civil contempt in respect to this case, that would be it.- 8 - . . . . And the damages and the appropriate sanction to flow from that would -- should be attributable or traceable to those actions. Appellant’s counsel also objected to any consideration of acti ons taken by appellant prior to the filing of the fraudulent conveyance action or at the Rule 2004 deposition that occurred within the context of the bankruptcy case. The trial court noted that TRIAL COURT: I believe the alleged contempt -- and you can correct me if I’m wrong, Counsel -- is submitting the fraudulent documents, the backdated documents, the false documents, to this court in this case as part of di scovery and testifying about them falsely in a deposition in March of 2014 in this case. Is that right? [MRS. KARAGEORGE’S COUNSEL] : That is correct, Your Honor. TRIAL COURT: Okay. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: All ri ght. And I actually agree with that. And the question th en becomes the sanction. Further, the following discussion took place betw een appellant’s counsel and the trial court: TRIAL COURT: Well, having adm itted that he submitted false documents and backdated documents – [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: He did. TRIAL COURT: -- how can he be in a position now to oppose the relief that’s requested in term s of the unlawful and fraudulent conveyance actions?

. . . . [When] the stay is lifted and he f iles his answer what’s he going to do? Is he going to deny that thes e things were false? He can’t possibly. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: No, he can’t. He can’t do that. And so the remedy – the remedy of barring him from raising any defenses which would not transgress the automatic stay, I don’t necessarily oppose that sort of relief.- 9 - At the conclusion of the hearing, the tr ial court found appellant in contempt and specifically noted the following in its ruling: I do think that perjury is punishable as contempt as long as added to it is the additional element of obstruction of the court in the performance of its duties.

. . . . And let me be specific. It is not at all what happened at the 2004 - - Rule 2004 hearing in the ba nkruptcy court. I don’t think that that’s punishable as contempt by me. But it does help fashion the remedies, because even when [appellant] acknowledges his untruth ful testimony under oath he continues to testify untruthfully under oath about something which he thinks is not material.

. . . . But the fact that this went on for such a long time, that there were many, many, many docum ents submitted in discovery in this case which he acknowledges now were false, created out of whole cloth and backdated and his testimony under oath at his deposition in March of 2014 is punishable as civil contempt. The trial court determined that the appropriate sanction was to compensate Mrs. Karageorge in the amount of $187,000 and bar appellant from raising any defenses to the fraudulent conveyance action. This appeal followed. II. Analysis Appellant challenges the trial court’s contem pt finding and sanctions on several grounds. First, appellant argues that th e trial court erred by taking into account th e fact that he was previously found in contempt of court for continui ng to take payments for the leasehold deed of trust after the entry of the stay or der. Appellant further argues that the trial court erred in striking any defenses to the present fraudulent conveyan ce action and in failing to consider mitigating circumstances when determining whether appellant was in contempt and fashioning the remedies- 10 - for contempt. Appellant also takes issue with the allegedly excessive c ounsel fees awarded to Mrs. Karageorge as a result of the trial court’s contempt finding and alleges that the trial court erred in considering actions ta ken by appellant prior to the filing of the present fraudulent conveyance action. Finally, appella nt argues that the trial court erred in considering evidence

that he lied under oath at his Rule 2004 bankruptcy deposition. First, we find that appellant’s second a ssignment of error challe nging the trial court’s decision to strike any defenses he may have rais ed to the fraudulent conveyance action is barred from consideration by Rule 5A:18. We also find that any argument appellant makes challenging the trial court’s authority to find appellant in c ontempt of court is barred from consideration by

Rule 5A:18. Rule 5A:18 provides, in relevant part that “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless an objec tion was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the ends of justice.” “The purpose of the contem poraneous objection rule ‘i s to avoid unnecessary appeals by affording the trial judge an opportunity to rule intelligently on objections.’” Maxwell v. Commonwealth, 287 Va. 258, 264-65, 754 S.E.2d 516, 519 (2014) (quoting State Highway Comm’r v. Easley, 215 Va. 197, 201, 207 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1974)). Appellant spends the majority of his brief a nd argument on the trial court’s alleged lack of authority to find him in contempt of court. However, at the contem pt hearing, appellant not only failed to object to the trial co urt’s authority to find him in cont empt of court but went so far as to concede that a finding of contempt was appropriate and that the only remaining argument centered on appropriate sanctions. To this point, during closing arguments, the following discussion took place:- 11 - [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, there can be no gainsaying here that my client tendered altered or backdated documents in discovery. There can be no gainsaying that he testified falsely about them in hi s deposition in the spring of last year. And to the extent to which hi s conduct is sanctionable or worthy of civil contempt in respect to this case, that would be it.

. . . . And the damages and the appropriate sanction to flow from that would -- should be attributable or traceable to those actions.

. . . . TRIAL COURT: I believe the alleged contempt -- and you can correct me if I’m wrong, Counsel -- is submitting the fraudulent documents, the backdated documents, the false documents, to this court in this case as part of di scovery and testifying about them falsely in a deposition in March of 2014 in this case. Is that right? [MRS. KARAGEORGE’S COUNSEL] : That is correct, Your Honor. TRIAL COURT: Okay. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: All ri ght. And I actually agree with that. And the question th en becomes the sanction. Similarly, appellant failed to object to the trial court’s decision to strike any defenses to the fraudulent conveyance action at the time that the trial court orally ruled. In fact, appellant actually conceded that such punishment was ap propriate. These concessions are fatal to appellant’s position on appeal. During the tria l court’s ruling, the following discussion took place between the trial court and appellant’s attorney: TRIAL COURT: Well, having adm itted that he submitted false documents and backdated documents – [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: He did.- 12 - TRIAL COURT: -- how can he be in a position now to oppose the relief that’s requested in term s of the unlawful and fraudulent conveyance actions? [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Because he’s not - he’s not here for trial on the fraudulent conveyanc e action. He’s here for trial on the - on this contempt matter. And - TRIAL COURT: Well, when he files his - when the stay is lifted and he files his answer what’s he going to do? Is he going to deny that these things were fa lse? He can’t possibly. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: No, he can’t. He can’t do that. And so the remedy – the remedy of barring him from raising any defenses which would not transgress the automatic stay, I don’t necessarily oppose that sort of relief. Because appellant not only failed to timely object to the trial court’s authority to find him in contempt of court or object to the trial court’s decision to strike any defenses to the fraudulent conveyance action, and in fact conceded that a finding of contempt and such punishment was appropriate, we find that consider ation of any challenge to the trial court’s authority to find appellant in contempt of court or to that portion of the trial cour t’s punishment is barred by Rule

5A:18. Next, we find no evidence in the record to support appellant’s allegations with respect to his first, third, fifth, and sixth as signments of error. Specificall y, we find no evidence from the

record that the trial court considered the fact that appellant was prev iously found to be in contempt of court in 2014 in de termining whether he should be he ld in contempt in the present

matter. While the trial cour t received contextual argument and evidence through appellant’s testimony at the hearing regarding his previous contemptuous conduct and punishment, there is absolutely no indication from the trial court’s very specific ruling that it considered those actions when determining whether to find appellant in contempt of court on the present motion or in determining sanctions.- 13 - Further, we find no evidence in the record th at the trial court failed to consider the alleged mitigating circumstances presented by appellant when determining whether to find him in contempt of court and if so, determining what punishments were appropriate. We similarly

find no evidence in the record that the trial court improperly considered actions taken by appellants preceding the filing of the present fra udulent conveyance action or that it considered evidence from appellant’s Rule 2004 bankruptcy de position in its determination of this case. To the contrary, the trial court was quite sp ecific in its ruling and the basis for it. The

trial court noted that “It is not at all what happened at the 2004 – Rule 2004 hearing in the bankruptcy court. I don’t think th at that’s punishable as contempt by me.” The trial court went on to recognize that appellant “acknowledge[d] his untruthful testimony under oath[,]” however, also found that despite that acknowledgement by way of Mr. Harvey’s April 10, 2014 letter, appellant “continue[d] to testify untruthfully under oath.” The trial court clearly stated that the

“extent and duration for which this went on does . . . make this behavior rise to the level of contempt of court[,]” however it noted that the period of time it considered for purposes of the contempt was the period of time since the fili ng of the fraudulent conveyance action. The trial court did not state that it considered the forg ery of the backdated documents in 2012 as the contemptuous behavior; rather, it was the “many, many documents submitted in discovery in this case which [appellant] acknowledges now were fals e, created out of whole cloth and backdated and his testimony under oath at his deposition in March of 2014 [that] is punishable as civil contempt.” From the record, it is clear that the trial co urt considered actions post-dating the filing of the fraudulent conveyance action and unrelated to the Rule 2004 deposition when determining whether appellant was in contempt of court. It also plainly considered the fact that appellant acknowledged that he lied under oath at his March 2014 deposition and corrected that- 14 - information in April 2014. For these reasons, we see no support in the record for appellant’s allegations that the trial court considered any evidence that it should not have in determining whether appellant was in contempt of court and fashioning the remedy for that contemptuous conduct. Therefore, we affirm the trial cour t on appellant’s first, third, fifth, and sixth assignments of error. Appellant’s remaining assignment of error challenges the allegedl y excessive counsel fees awarded to Mrs. Karageorge as compensa tion and punishment for appellant’s misconduct.

A trial court’s exercise of its civil contempt power is review ed under an abuse of discretion standard, Petrosinelli v. People for the Ethica l Treatment of Animals, Inc., 273 Va. 700, 706, 643 S.E.2d 151, 154 (2007), because the “use of contempt powers is clearly subj ect to the discretion of the trial court,” Sapp v. Commonw ealth, 263 Va. 415, 425, 559 S.E.2d 645, 650 (2002). “When dealing with discretionary decisions, only ‘when reasonable juri sts could not differ can we say an abuse of discretion has occurre d.’” Robbins v. Robbins, 48 Va. App. 466, 482, 632 S.E.2d 615, 623 (2006) (quoting Hernandez-Guerrero v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 366, 370, 617 S.E.2d 410, 412 (2005)). Contempt may be either criminal or civil. “[T]hose prosecuted to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties are ci vil, remedial, and coercive.” United Steelworkers of America, Local 8417 v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 220 Va. 547, 549, 260 S.E.2d 222, 224 (1979) (citing Local 333 B, United Mari ne Div. v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 773, 780, 71 S.E.2d 159, 163 (1952)). “‘Civil as distinguished from criminal contempt is a sanction to enforce compliance with an order of the court or to compensate for losses or damages sustained by- 15 - reason of noncompliance.’” Leisge v. Leisge, 224 Va. 303, 309, 296 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1982) (quoting McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949)). 7

The trial court received evidence of Mrs. Ka rageorge’s counsel f ees for prosecuting the fraudulent conveyance action up until appellants di sclosed the fraudulence of various documents and admitted that appellant lied at his March 2014 deposition. The trial court found these compensatory sanctions reasonable and appropria te in light of the appellants’ contemptuous

7 The parties both discuss the circuit cour t case French v. Painter, 86 Va. Cir. 344, 2013 Va. Cir. LEXIS 111 (Martinsville, Mar. 27, 20 13), because it involved factually similar circumstances in that the plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to the inherent power of the court because the defendant pe rpetrated a fraud on the court by lying in discovery, violating federal and state healthcare priv acy laws, and making improper contac t with a material witness. The trial court noted that the Supreme Cour t had not defined a “fraud on the court” and therefore adopted the definition pr omulgated by the federal courts that a “fraud on the court” occurs where it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judi cial system’s ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier of fact or unfairly hampering the presentati on of the opposing party’s claim or defense. Id. at 356-57, 2013 Va. Cir. LEXIS 111, at *23-24 (citing SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. v. AIG United Guaranty Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33118 (E.D. Va. 2011); Holmes v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46020 (E .D. Va. 2011)). Then, citing several circuit and local district court cases, the trial court went on to find that falsel y testifying at a deposition and submitting a false interrogatory answer, even if unrelated to the matters in controversy, could support a finding of contempt and imposition of sanctions. After finding that the defendant “engaged in a pattern of deceptive and abusive conduct” the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, struck the defendant’s answer to the complaint against him, and granted the plaintiff summary judgment on liability in the case. Id. at 361, 2013 Va. Cir. LEXIS 111, at *33-34. Appellant argues that “the scope of wr ongdoing in [French v. Painter] eclipsed the wrongful discovery conduct in which Appellants enga ged in the trial court” and that in Painter, unlike the present case, the defendant never admitted to his misconduct, which should be considered a mitigating factor in this case. While Painter is not binding on this Court, we disagree with appellant that the conduct at issue in Painter was far more egregious than appellant’s behavior in the presen t case. Painter, even if it was binding on this Court, would in fact support the trial court’s finding of contem pt and imposition of sanctions in this case.- 16 - behavior. The trial court’s punishment was r easonable and supported by the evidence provided and therefore, we affirm the mone tary sanctions against appellants.

Affirmed.