NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

:

T. GLENNON, INC., : CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-4155 (MLC)

:

Plaintiff, : O P I N I O N

:

v. :

:

THE HARTFORD CASUALTY :

INSURANCE COMPANY, :

:

Defendant. :

 :

CHARLES JOHNSON brought an action against T. Glennon, Inc.

(“Insured”) in New Jersey state court to recover damages for

personal injuries (“Tort Action”). (Dkt. entry no. 1, Rmv. Not.,

Ex. A, Compl. at 1-3.) The Hartford Casualty Insurance Company

(“Insurer”) allegedly provided coverage to the Insured. (Id. at

2-6.) The Tort Action remains pending. (Dkt. entry no. 11,

Insurer Br. at 2.) Indeed, Charles Johnson has added the Insurer

as a defendant in the Tort Action. (Id.)

THE INSURED then brought this separate action against the

Insurer in the same state court for, inter alia, a judgment

declaring that the Insurer is obligated to defend and indemnify

the Insured in the Tort Action (“Declaratory Judgment Action”). 

(See Compl.) The Insured listed, among others, Charles Johnson

as an interested party. (Id.) The Insurer removed the

Declaratory Judgment Action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1332(a). (Rmv. Not.)

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THE INSURED now moves to remand the Declaratory Judgment

Action and to recover an award of costs. (Dkt. entry no. 4,

Notice of Mot.) For the following reasons, the Court will (1)

grant the part of the motion seeking remand, and (2) deny the

part of the motion seeking to recover an award of costs. Oral

argument is not necessary. See L.Civ.R. 78.1(b).

THE INSURER has been added as a defendant in the Tort

Action. The Insurer also could be named as a third-party

defendant, a cross-claim defendant, or in some other capacity. 

Furthermore, a determination as to any claim in the Declaratory

Judgment Action would necessarily affect — and thus interfere

with — the Tort Action. As a result, this Court must abstain

from adjudicating the Declaratory Judgment Action. See Wilton v.

Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 280-90 (1995) (upholding Brillhart

v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491 (1942)).

THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION (1) is, as the Court’s

shorthand reference suggests, a declaratory-judgment action

involving insurance-coverage issues, (2) concerns issues that

will be raised in the Tort Action, and (3) as the Insured

correctly points out, could be adjudicated by the same judge

overseeing the Tort Action, as both actions were initiated in the

same court. (See dkt. entry no. 5, Insured Br. at 1-2.) As a

result, the Declaratory Judgment Action should be remanded. See

Del Suppo, Inc. v. Nautilus Ins. Co., No. 07-952, 2007 WL

2

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2345287, at *2-3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2007) (declining jurisdiction

and remanding action where insurer removed insured’s action

seeking indemnification in underlying state court action); see

also Williams v. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 08-4983,

2009 WL 1119502, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2009) (remanding

action concerning insurance coverage, and noting “the possibility

of interfering with the state court cases regarding the same

matter is substantial” because the conduct of certain parties

would need to be addressed in both the underlying state action

and the removed declaratory-judgment action).

THE COURT, in view of the pending Tort Action, must “promote

judicial economy by avoiding duplicative and piecemeal

litigation”. State Auto Ins. Cos. v. Summy, 234 F.3d 131, 135

(3d Cir. 2001). It appears that the Insurer’s desire to proceed

in federal court “has no special call on the federal forum”. Id.

at 136. Therefore, the Court will grant the part of the motion

seeking remand.

THE COURT, however, will deny the part of the motion seeking

to recover an award of costs. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (stating

“order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and

any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a

result of the removal”). The Court has broad discretion over

whether to require the payment of costs. See Mints v. Educ.

Testing Serv., 99 F.3d 1253, 1260 (3d Cir. 1996). The issue of

3

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the propriety of the removal was not entirely straightforward,

and there was an objectively reasonable basis for the removal.

FOR GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, the Court will issue an appropriate

order and judgment.

 s/ Mary L. Cooper 

MARY L. COOPER

United States District Judge

Dated: November 28, 2011

4

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