### In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ No. 14

- 2846
T EMPEST H ORSLEY , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. J ESSICA T RAME , in her official capacity as Chief of the Illinois State Police Firearms Service s Bureau, Defendan t

- Appellee

.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. No. 13 CV 00321

— Nancy J. Rosenstengel , Judge

.

____________________ A RGUED A PRIL 17 , 2015

— D ECIDED D ECEMBER 14 , 2015

____________________
Before P OSNER and W ILLIAMS , Circuit Judges, and W OOD , District Judge

. 1
W ILLIAMS , Circuit Judge

. Tempest Horsley’s application to pos sess an Illinois Firearm Owner’s Identification Card , com-

1 The Honorable Andrea R. Wood of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.2 No. 14

- 2846
monly known as a “FOID card,” was returned to her as incomplete because she was over 18 but not yet 21 and her application did not contain a parent or guardian signature. Al

t hough she could have under Illinois law , s he did not seek further review from the Director of the Illinois State Police

. We disagree with Horsley that the Illinois statutory scheme violates her rights under the Second Amendment. Illinois does not impose a categorical ban on firea rm possession fo r 18

- to

20

- year

- olds whose parents do not consent

. Rather, w hen an applicant cannot obtain a parent or guardian signa ture, he or she may appeal to the Director for a FOID card , and the Director will make a determination

. We conclude that this process for 1 8

- to

- 20

- year

- olds is not unconstitutional, so w e affirm the decision of the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
A few months after Tempest Horsley turned 18 , she mailed in an application for an Illinois FOID card along with the requisite check for $10. Hors ley’s application was returned to her. The accompanying cover letter informed her that the application was incomplete because she was not yet 21 years old and her application did not contain the signature of a parent or guardian. Horsley did not appeal or seek further review from the Director of the Illinois State Police. Instead, Horsley filed this lawsuit against Jessica Trame, the Chief of the Illinois State Police Firearms Services Bureau, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

. Horsley asserted in her complaint that she seeks to possess a double

- barrel shotgun or other firearm for self

- defense inside her home and that her parents will not sign her application for a FOID card

. Horsley contends that the Illinois parent or guardian signatu re provision for FOID card applicant s who are at least 18 but less than 21 years oldNo. 14

- 2846 3

violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. Her complaint sought an order directing that her application be processed without a parent or guardian sig nature and an injunction preventing the Illinois State Police from rejecting an application for a FOID card to a person at least 18years of age on the basis of a lack of parent or guardian signature. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment , and th ey stipulated that the legal issue to be resolved by the court was whether the age provision in Illinois’s F OID Card Act is constitutional. After a hearing, the district court granted Trame’s motion for summary judgment and de nied Horsley’s motion. Horsley appeals.
II. ANALYSIS In Illinois, m ost person s may not lawfully possess or acquire a firearm without a FOID card issued by the Illinois Department of State Police. 430 ILCS 65/2(a) (1)

. An applicant for a FOID card must complete a form prepared by that department . 430 ILCS 65/4(a)(1). The applicant must submit evidence that, among other things, the applicant has not been convicted of a felony, has not been adjudicated as a person with a mental disability , and is not addicted to narcotics. 430 ILCS 65/4 (a )(2)(ii), (iii), (xv) . Anoth er provision in the Illinois FOID Card Act

— the one relevant here

— states that if under 21 years of age, the applicant must submit evidence that he or she has the written consent of his or her parent or legal guardian to possess and acquire firearms and firearm ammunition ... provided, however, that such parent or guardian is not an individual prohibited from having a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card

... .4 No. 14

- 2846

430 ILCS 65/4 (a)(2)(i)

. The Department of State Police must approve or deny a n application within 30 days o f receipt. 430 ILCS 65/5. Horsley’s application was rejected because she was under 21 years old and her application did not contain the written consent of a parent or guardian. See 430 ILCS 65/8 (b)

. W ith exceptions not releva nt here, w hen an application for a FOID card is denied, the aggrieved party may appeal to the Director of State Police for a hearing. 430 ILCS 65/10(a). T he Director may grant relief to a perso n who lacks a parent or guardian signature if the applicant est ablishes to the Director’s satisfaction that the applicant has not been convicted of a forcible felony within a certain number of years , the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner danger ous to public safety, and granting relief would not be contrary to the public interest or to federal law. 430 ILCS 65/10(c); O’Neill v. Director of Ill. Dep’t of State Police , 28 N.E.3d 1020, 1024 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). A decision from the Director denying an appeal is subject to j udicial review under Illinois’s Administrative Review Law, 735 ILCS 5/3

- 101 et seq . 430 ILCS 65/11(a). Horsley did not seek any relief from the Director.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment in Trame’s favor de novo. Spierer v. Rossman , 798 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2015). In doing so, we use the familiar standard that summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any ma terial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). There are no disputes of material fact in this case, and the only questions are ones of law.No. 14

- 2846 5
Trame first argues that Horsley’s case is not ripe for our review because Horsley d id not ask the Dir ector of State Police to grant her a FOID card after her application was returned to her

. “Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed‘to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in a bstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect theagencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties. ’ ” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior , 538 U.S. 803, 806 (2003) (citation omitted)

. Although she did not appeal to the Director, i t is clear thatthe Department of State Police will not process Horsley’s application in the same way that it will process applications that contain parent or guardian signatures. Applications with such signatures can only be denied by the Department of St ate Police on certain statutorily enumerated grounds. 430 ILCS 65/8. Someone in Horsley’s position, however, must pursue a different procedure of review from the Director. See 430 ILCS 65/10(a), (c). In addition, t o the extent that Trame is arguing that we should not review this case on the basis that Horsley failed to exhaust her administrative remedies , we disagree . An “exhaustion requirement generally refers to administrative andjudicial procedures by which an injured party may seek review of an adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the decision is found to be unlawful or otherwise inappropriate.” William son Cnty. Reg ’ l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank , 473 U.S. 172, 193 (1985). There is no general duty to exhaust state judicial or administrative remed ies before pursu ing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , however

. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of State o f6 No. 14

- 2846

Fl a

. , 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982 ) ( “ exhaustion of state administrative remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to § 198 3 ”) ; see also Felder v. Casey , 487 U.S. 131, 146

- 47 (1988)

. Trame argues that the rule the Supreme Court pronounced in Patsy does not con trol here, and she points to our decision in Daniels v. Area Plan Commission of Allen County , 306 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2002) for the proposition that exhaustion of state court remedies is sometimes a prerequisite to a § 1983 claim. But Daniels is a Takings Clause case. Id. at 454. Suits alleging Takings Clause claims are one of the few exceptions t he Supreme Court has recognized to the general rule it announced in Patsy that § 1983 suits do not require exhaustion of remedies . See Peters v. Village of Clifton , 498 F.3d 727, 730 n.4 (7th Cir. 2007). The exhaustion requirement in Takings Clause cases “ stems from the Fifth Amendment’s proviso that onlytakings without ‘just compensation’ infringe that Amendment.” Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency , 520 U.S. 725, 734 (1997 ); see also William son Cnty. , 473 U.S. at 186

- 87

. And the exhaustion requirement in the other exception, prisoner suits alleging constitutional deprivations while incarcerated, comes straight from a statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. See Patsy , 457 U.S. at 508. Neither exception is present here.
We now turn to the merits. The Second Amendmen t of the Unit ed States Constitution provides: “ A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. The Supreme Court has ruled that the Second Amendment include s an individ ual right to keep and bear arm s in the home for the purpose of self

- defense. District of Columbia v. Heller , 554 U.S. 570 , 635 (2008). This SecondNo. 14

- 2846 7
Amendment right applies to the states through its incorporation in the Du e Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald v. City of Chicago , 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010). The Supreme Court has made clear that “[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.” Heller , 554 U.S. at 626. The questi on in our case is whether the Illinois statutory scheme that promulgates a different procedure for 18

- to

- 20

- year

- olds to possess a firearm, but does not ban them from doing so, violates the Second Amendment.
Our court’s review of a Second Amendment claim t ypically begins with the threshold question of whether “the restricted activity [is] protected by the Second Amendment in the first place.” United States v. Ezell , 651 F.3d 684, 701 (7th Cir. 2011). If the challenged law regulates activity that falls outsi dethe scope of the Second Amendment at the historically relevant time, then the regulated activity is not protected, and the analysis stops there. Id. at 702

- 03.
Trame argues that the challenged statute does not regulate activity protected by the Second Amendment because, she contends, a right to firearm possession by a person under 21 is not within the amendment’s scope

. Heller tells us that the Second Amendment codified a “ pre

- existing right , ” and it analyzed the amendment ’s historical bac kground and understanding at the time of the founding. See 554 U.S. at 592 (emphasis in original) ; id. at e.g. , 592

- 94

. Trame argues that the Second Amendment was not originally understood to include minors , and that minors during the founding era were und erstood to be persons under the ag e of 21 . From there she reasons that persons who are presently under the age of 21 do not have a Second Amendment right to pos sess a firearm

.8 No. 14

- 2846
The Constitution does not set forth an age of majority

. During the founding era, persons under 21 were considered minors or “infants

. ” See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives , 700 F.3d 185, 202 (5th Cir. 2012)

. According to Blackstone , for example, “full age in male or female is twenty

- one years,” and “till that time is an infant, and so stiled in law.” 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 463 (St. George Tucker ed. 1803) ; see Heller , 554 U.S. at 593

- 94 (stating that Blackstone “’cons tituted the preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation’”) (citation omitted)

. The age of majority was 21 until the 1970s

. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n , 700 F.3d at 202. S o most right

- to

- bear

- arms laws were passed while 18

- to

- 20

- year

- olds were min ors. And Trame points to authority for the proposition that states could bar the sale of firearms to minors, such as Thomas Cooley ’s treatise that Heller called “massively popular” in which Cooley writes that the states “may prohibit the sale of arms to minors” pursuant to their police power. Thomas M. Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 740 n.4 (5th ed. 1883) ; Heller , 554 U.S. at 616

. The Fifth Circuit considered historical and other evidence and concluded that a prohibition on carrying a handg un in public by 18

- to

- 20

- year

- olds likely falls outside the Second Amendment’s protection. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n , 700 F.3d at 20 4 (“Modern restrictions on the ability of person s under 21 to purchase handguns

— and the ability of person s under 18 to possess handg uns

— seem, to us, to be firmly historically rooted”)

. The Supreme Court of Illinois made that conclusion even more definitively in two recent decisions challenging convictions for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUU W) by defendants under 21

. See People v. Mosley , 33No. 14

- 2846 9
N.E.3d 137 (Ill. 2015) (concluding that Illinois A U UW convictions for carrying a handgun while under 21 years old outsidethe home did not violate Second Amendment because challenged provisions did not regulate conduct within scope of Second Amendment); In re the Interest of Jordan G. , 33 N.E.3d 162, 168

- 69 (Ill. 2015). And the First Circuit suggested that the right to keep arms in the founding period did not extend to juveniles , though that court was up holding the constitutionality of 18 U.S .C. § 922(x), which prohibits juveniles

— persons under 18, not 18

- to

- 20

- year

- olds as here

— from possessing handguns (with certain exceptions). United States v. Rene E. , 583 F.3d 8, 16 (1st Cir. 2009). Horsley, on the other hand , maintains that firearm possession by 18

- to

- 20

- year

- olds falls within the scope of the Second Amendment

. She emphasizes that persons over 18 can vote and serve in the military , get married without parental consent, and own land. E ven though the age of majority was for

man y years 21, it is now 18 , and so she argues that present

day 18

- year

- olds cannot be restricted from possessing firearms based on age alone

. She points to historical evidence that she contend s favors her position as well. The First Militia Act enacted by the United States Congress in 1792 , for example, included 18

- year

- old men in the scope of those eligible for the militia

. Because a minor could be a member of the militia and be armed, she reasons that the Second Amendment gives these persons a right to bear arms. We need not decide today whether 18

- , 19

- , and 20

- year

olds are within the scope of the Second Amendment. Cf. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n , 700 F.3d 185 at 204

- 05 (also declining to resolve issue)

. E ven if they are , our next step would be to tu rn to
means

- ends scrutiny of the regulation. Ezell , 651 F.3d at 703.10 No. 14

- 2846

I n this analysis we “evaluate the regulatory means the government has chosen and the public

- benefits end it seeks to achieve.” Id. The level of scrutiny we apply “will depend on how close the law comes to the core of the Second Amendment right and the severity of the law’s burden on the right.” Id. “[L]aws restricting activity lying close r to the margins ofthe Second Amendment right, laws that merely regulate rather than restrict, and mod est burdens on the rig ht may be more easily justified .” Id. at 708. The Supreme Court has said that the “need for defense of self, family , and property is most acute” in the home. Heller , 554 U.S. at 628. As Horsley emphasizes, t he Illinois statute here implicates self

- defense in the home. It also implicates self

- defense in the home using handguns, the weapon at issue in Heller. That said, t he Supreme Court explained in Heller that not all regulations of firearm possession , even of handguns in the home, a re invalid

. The Court made clear , for example, that nothing in its opinion “should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill

. ” Id. at 626

- 27; s ee also Moore v. Madigan , 702 F.3d 933, 94 0

- 41 (7th Cir. 2012) (listing “the usualprohibitions of gun ownership by children, felons, illegal aliens, lunatics, and in sensitive places like public schools, the propriety of which was not questioned in Heller ”). Significantly, although Horsley’s argu ments treat the challenged statute as a categorical ban on firearm possession, t he FOID Card Act does not in fact ban persons un der 21 from having firearms without parent or guardian consent. 2 Having

2 We have affirmed categorical bans on firearm possession in other instances. See United States v. Williams , 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming categorical ban on possession of firearms by felons); UnitedNo. 14

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a parent or guardian signa ture may speed up the process, but it is not a prerequisite to obtaining a FOID card in Illinois

. Rather, a person for whom a parent’s signature is not available

can appeal to the Director of the Illinois State Police. Upon a sufficient showing regarding the applicant’s criminal record, lack of dangerousness, and the public interest, the Director may issue a card. 430 ILCS 65/10(c). And if the Director were to deny the application, the denial is subject to judicial review. 430 ILCS 65/11(a).
So t he lack of a parent signature does not bar Horsley from possessing a firearm , despite her arguments to the contrary

. 3 Nor does it impose a bar o n gun possession on an 18

- to

- 20

- year

- old whose parents have passed away or are disqualified from owning guns. The absence of a blanket ban makes t he Illinois FOID Card Act much different from the blanket ban on firearm possession present in Heller

. That there is not a categorical ban here also distinguishes th is case from Planned Parenthood v. Danforth , 428 U.S. 52 (1976), to which Horsley points. T here the Supreme Court struck down a “blanket provision” requiring the consent of a parent or person in loco parentis before an unmarried minor could have an abortion during her first 12 weeks of pregnancy unless necessary to preserve the mother’s life

. Id

. at 74.

States v. Yancey , 621 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming ban on possession of firearms by unlawful users of controlled substances); United States

v. Skoien , 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (affirming categorical ban on possession of firearms by domestic violence misdemeanants).

3 Horsley did not address in her brief the opportunity for appeal to the Director, despite the district court’s emphasis on the statutory provision providing the ability to do so , and she did not file a reply brief on appeal.12 No. 14

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The absence of a parent or guardian signature is not a “veto” on the ability of a person between 18 and 21 to get a FOID card in Illinois. And t he Illinois scheme is not a regulatory means that imposes “ ’ severe burdens ’ ” because it “ ’ [does not] leave open ample alternative channels ’ ”; rather it is a restriction that “ ’ impose[s] only modest burdens (because [it does] leave open ample alternative channels ’ .” Heller v. District of Columbia , 670 F.3d 1244, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Vo lokh , Imple menting the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self

Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda , 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1443 (2009) )

. In addition to reviewing Illinois’s chosen regulatory means, we also consider the public

- benefits end it seeks to achiev e. Ezell , 651 F.3d at 703. It is clear that Illinois has an important and compelling interest in its citizens’ safety. See Schall v. Martin , 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984) (“The ‘legitimate and compelling state interest’ in protecting the community from crime ca nnot be doubted.” ). Illinois’s interest in protecting the public from firearm s violence underlies the challenged statute

. The Illinois FOID Card Act also reflects an interest in ensuring sufficient compensation for injuries caused by an applicant’s firearm s use , as parents o r guardians who give consent on a FOID card application can be civilly liable for damages resulting from the applicant’s firearms use

. See 430 ILCS 65/4.
The Illinois statute is substantially related to the achievement of the state ’s interest s . The goal of protecting public safety is supported by studies and data regarding persons under 21 and violent and gun crimes. For example, b efore federal legislation targeting youth firearm possession and purchase was passed , t he United States D epartments of JusticeNo. 14

- 2846 13
and Treasury analyzed gun crime by persons over 18 and under 21

. It reported that i n 1997, 18

- , 19

- , and 20

- year

- oldsranked first, second, and third in the number of gun homicides committed in the United States . U.S. Dep’t of the Tre asury & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Gun Crime in the Age Group 18

- 20 , at 2 (June 1999). In all gun homicides w h ere an offender was identified, 24 % were committed by person s in t hat age group

. Id. The report also found that among murderers, 18

- to

- 20

- year

- olds we re more likely to use firearms than persons 21 and over. Id.
More recent data reflects similar trends

. An FBI analysis of crime in 2014 reflects that 18

- to

- 20

- year

- olds were responsible for more than 15.8% of all charges issued for murder and nonnegligent manslaughter. When forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault are added, 18

- to

- 20

- year

- olds account for about 11% of charges brought for violent crime . U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States 201 4 , Table 38: Ar rests by Age, https://www.fbi.gov/about

- us/cjis/ucr/crime

- in

- the

- u.s./2014/ crime

- in

- the

- u.s.

- 2014/tables/table

- 38. That is true even though that age group represented only about 4.1% of the country’s total population and 5.4% of the population over the ag e of 14. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n , 700 F.3d at 210 & n.20

. Congressional investigations around the time that Illinois passed the challenged statute in 1967 reflect similar patterns. Those inves tigations concluded that minors under the age of 21 accounted for 64 % of arrests for “ serious crimes” in the United States, S. Rep. 90

- 1097, at 77 (1968), including 21 % of the arrests for murder, 114 Cong. Rec. 12279, 12309 (1968) ( statement of Sen. Thomas J. Dodd). These crime figures reflect im-14 No. 14

- 2846
portant benefits to the p ublic interest in limiting firearm possession by persons in the age group that is the subject of the challenged statute.
Trame also points to scholarly research on development through early adulthood that supports a conclusion that the Illinois FOID card application procedure for persons under 21 fits the state’s compelling interest in public safety . Dr. RubenC. Gur, a neuropsychologist and Director of the Brain Behavior Laboratory at the University of Pen nsy l vania , for example, explains: “The evidence now is strong that the brain does not cease to mature until the early 20s in those relevant parts thatgovern impulsivity, judgment, planning for the future, foresight of consequences, and other characteristi cs that make people morally culpable.” Decl aration of Ruben C. Gur, Ph.D., http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/crimi nal_justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_juvjus

_ Gur_affidavit.authcheckdam.pdf ; see also, e.g., Adam Ortiz, Adolescence, Brain Development and Legal Culpability , American Bar Association , Juvenile Justice Center ( 2004 ) (collecting studies)

. We also note th at Illinois is not alone in directing additional measures for persons under 21. Federal law prohibits federally licensed dealers from selling handguns to persons under 21. 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1), (c)(1). Twelve other states in addition to Illinois have age

- based restrictions on firearm possession or purchase by those under 21. 4

4 See Cal. Penal Code § 27505(a); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29

- 36f; Del. Code. Ann. tit. 24, § 903; D.C. Code Ann. § 7

- 2502.03; Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 134

- 2; Iowa Code § 724.22; Md. Code. Ann., Pub. Safety § 5

- 133(d); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 131; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2 C:58

- 6.1; N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.21; R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11

- 47

- 30, 11

- 47

- 35.No. 14

- 2846 15

We conclude that Illinois has shown a sufficient means

end relationship between the challenged statute and an important government interest. Illinois’s decision to use parents as a f irst check on firearm possession by persons under 21 is reasonable. The parent or guardian signature provision provides for an individualized assessment of the applicant’s fitness for possession of a firearm by a person likely to be in the best position to make such an evaluation. T hat signature also subjects the parent to liability f or harm caused by firearm

owner ship. The legislature could reasonably conclude that many persons under 21 would not have the financial ability to compensate a person injured in a firearms incident, and the signature provision in the Illinois statute provides a means for an additional source of income in that event. I f no parent or guardian is willing or able to sign the application, the Illinois statute provides that another per son can make the individualized assessment

— the Director of State Police. The challenged provisions in the FOID Card Act are substantially related to the state’s important interests , and we do not find the law unconstitutional

. See United States v. Decastro , 682 F.3d 160, 168 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating that a “law that regulates the availability of firearms is not a substantial burden on the right to keep and bear arms if adequate alternatives remain for law

abiding citizens to acquire a firearm for self

- defens e.”). III. CONCLUSION The judgment of the district court is A FFIRMED

.