SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

PARSHOTAM CHAHIL , Plaintiff,

v. EPISCOPAL CHURCH HOME FRIENDSHIP, INC. t/a FRIENDSHIP TERRACE RETIREMENT HOME, Defendant. Civil Action No. 10-cv-418 (RLW)

MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 This matter is before the Court on Defendant Episcopal Church Home Friendship, Inc. t/a Friendship Terrace Retirement Ho me’s (“FTR”) Motion for Summar y Judgment. (Dkt. No. 17). Plaintiff Parshotam Chahil (“Chahil ”), a tenant of FTR, is a bli nd man of Indian descent and the Sikh faith. Chahil asserts six counts against FTR:

 Count I: That FTR discriminated against Chahil based on his b lindness and failed to accommodate him under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”) with rega rd to his evening meal program;

 Count II: That FTR discriminated agains t Chahil based on his ra ce, national origin and religion under the FHA and DCHRA by fa iling to accommodate his dietary needs and exempt him from the evening meal program;

1 This unpublished memorandum opinion is intend ed solely to inform the parties and any reviewing court of the basis for th e instant ruling, or alternatively, to assist in any potential future analysis of the res judicata , law of the case, or preclusive e ffect of the ruling. The Court has designated this opinion as “not intended for publication,” but this Court cannot prevent or prohibit the publication of this opinion in the various and sundry electronic and legal databases (as it is a public document), and this Court cannot preven t or prohibit the cita tion of this opinion by counsel. Cf. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1. Nonethel ess, as stated in the operational handbook adopted by our Court of Appeal s, “counsel are reminded that th e Court's decision to issue an unpublished disposition means that the Court sees no precedential value in that disposition.” D.C. Circuit Handbook of Practice a nd Internal Procedures 43 (2011).SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION

2  Count III: That FTR discri minated against Chahil based on his blindness in violation of the FHA and DCHRA with regard to informational notices;

 Count IV: That FTR breached its lease with Chahil by failing to modify his rental rates in accordance with HUD regulations;

 Count V: That FTR breached the anti-discri mination clause of its lease with Chahil; and

 Count VI: That FTR is liable to Chahil for common law defamation/libel. For the following reasons, FTR’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART . For purposes of this ruling, the Court will assume the reader is familiar with the factual assertions and arguments that the parties have made, and will not recite those again here. 2
ANALYSIS A. Standard of Review Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matte r of law. See Moore v. Hartman, 571 F.3d 62, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing F ED
. R. C IV
. P. 56(c) and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986)). The “function of the court on a summary judgment motion is limited to ascertaining whether any factual issue pertinent to the controversy exists; it does not extend to resolution of any such issue.” Weiss v. Ka y Jewelry Stores, Inc., 470 F.2d 1259, 1261-62 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). A genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence “is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A party, howev er, must provide more than “a scintilla of evidence” in support of its position; the quantum of evidence must be such that a jury could

2 Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(h), in “determining a motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume that facts identified by the movi ng party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion.” Accordingly, unless otherwise no ted, the Court states only uncontroverted facts.SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION

3 reasonably find for the moving party. Id. at 252. In considering a motion for summary judgment, the “evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255.
B. Count One: Discrimination and Failu re to Accommodate Under the FHA And DCHRA Based On Disability (Blindness) With Regard To Mandatory Meal Program. Chahil alleges that FTR unlawfully discriminated against him and failed to accommodate his blindness with regard to the mandatory even ing meal program. (Com pl. at ¶¶ 22-25). Chahil contends that FTR: 1) refused to read him the menu; 2) refused to provi de appropriate utensils; 3) failed to inform him how to file a complain t about the food; 4) failed to accommodate his request to be exempted from the food program; and 5) failed to accommodate his dietary needs. (Id.). Because there is a genuin e dispute of material fact, summary judgment is denied as to
Count I. 1. FHA and DCHRA Under the FHA, it is unlawful “[t]o discri minate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the pr ovision of servic es or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of [t he person’s] handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2); Geter v. Horning Bros. Mgmt, 537 F. S upp. 2d 206, 209 (D.D.C. 2008). “Discrimination includes ‘a refusal to make reasonable accommodati ons in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such pe rson equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.’” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B)). To succeed on a failure to accommodate claim under the FHA, a plaintiff must show: 1) He suffers from a handicap as defined by the [FHA]; 2) defendants knew or reasonabl y should have known of the plaintiff’s handicap; 3) accommodation of the handicap ‘may be necessary’ to afford plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoySUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION

4 the dwelling; and 4) defendants refused to make such accommodation. Id. (citing Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2003)). According to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, a landlord may only be held liable for a failure to accommodate if the landlord knew or should have known the tenant suffered from a handicap, as recognized by the FHA. Douglas v. Kriegsfe ld Corp., 849 A.2d 951, 992 (D.C. 2004) (opinion superseded on other grounds by Douglas v. Krie gsfeld Corp., 884 A.2d 1109 (D.C. 2005)). Once a landlord is made aware of a needed accommoda tion, both parties must participate in an interactive process of good faith communications to identify the limitation resulting from the disability and a reasonable ac commodation. Bartee v. Michelin North America, Inc., 374 F.3d 906, 916 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Smith v. Mi dland Brake Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 1999)). It is not, however, sufficien t for the tenant to show that the landlord failed to engage in an interactive process or that it caused the in teractive process to br eak down. See Pantazes v. Jackson, 366 F. Supp. 2d 57, 70 (D.D.C. 2005) (inter nal citations omitted). The tenant must show that the result of the inadequate process was the failure of the landlord to fulfill its role in determining a reasonable accommodation. Id. Once the process has begun, both the employer and employee have a duty to act in good fait h, “and the absence of good faith, including unreasonable delays caused by an employer, can serve as evidence” of a violation. Id. (emphasis added); see also Douglas, 884 A.2d at 1122- 23 & n.23 (stating that any undue delay in responding to a tenant’s request for a reasonable accommodation may itself constitute a failure to accommodate). For purposes of this analysis, the relevant provisions of the FHA and the DCHRA will be construed under the same standard s as the Americans with Disabili ties Act (ADA) with regard to comparable sections of these statutes. The Di strict of Columbia Cour t of Appeals has held:SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION

5 When courts apply the reasonable accommodation provision of the Fair Housing Act, it is their established practice to rely on the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12102, and the Rehabilitation Act (RA) , 29 U.S.C. § 794, both of which mandate an interactive proce ss through which employers and employees explore what accommoda tions are reasonable. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (1995); 29 C.F. R. pt. 1630 Appendix (1996); 29 U.S.C. § 794(d); Giebeler [v. M& B Assocs.], 343 F.3d [1143] at 1156-57 [9th Cir. 2003] (stating that court ordinarily applies RA case law in applying reasonable accommodation provisions of Fair Housing Act and also generally applies RA and ADA case law “interchangeably”; Good Shephe rd Manor Found., Inc. v. City of Momence, 323 F.3d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 2003). Douglas, 884 A.2d at 1122, n.22. Moreover, discrimination claims under th e FHA and DCHRA are assessed pursuant to the familiar three-step framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. See 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Gaujacq v. EDF, Inc., 601 F.3d 565, 576 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Neithamer v. Brenneman Property Services, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D .D.C. 1999). As this Circuit has held, In Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2008), we made it clear that when ‘an employer has asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory re ason’ for an alleged adverse action, the District Court need onl y ‘resolve one central question’ when considering a motion for summary judgment: ‘Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted nondiscriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin?’ Gaujacq, 601 F.3d at 576 (quoting Brady, 520 F.3d at 494). 2. Summary Judgment is Not Proper on Count I Chahil lodges numerous complaints in support of his claim that FTR failed to accommodate his blindness as to the mandatory meal program. The Court will not address and resolve each and every allegation here. It is e nough, however, that there are genuine disputes of material fact as to whether an exemption from the meal program was necessary to afford ChahilSUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION

6 equal opportunity to use and enjoy his residen ce and whether FTR engaged in an interactive process to determine a reasonable accommodation. Moreover, as set forth in the discussion regarding Count II, there is a genuine disput e regarding whether FTR discriminated against Chahil by its failure to follow its own process for resolving requests for exemptions from the mandatory meal program. Accordingly, FT R’s Motion is denied as to Count I. Chahil claims that, after a series of stressful events in the FTR dining room, he decided to stop participating in the mandatory meal program in March of 2007. (Dkt. No. 17-2 at ¶ 38-41). On April 8, 2007, Chahil wrote to FTR’s Admini strator Dawn Quattlebaum explaining his reasons: “[d]innertime was often a nightmare ma de worse by my blindness. For independent living, self-service eliminates th e need for menu, table service, room service, etc. Removing a constant and unnecessary source of stress, thank you.” (Dkt. No. 17-2 at ¶ 44). On July 6, 2007, Chahil submitted a letter from his physician Dr . Dennis Murphy. (Id. at ¶ 45). Dr. Murphy requested that FTR exempt Chahil from the meal program, “and that he be allowed to choose to eat either communally or on his own. His bli ndness makes it much more difficult for him to keep the dining schedules, etc.” (Id. at ¶ 45). It appears that the only step s FTR took regarding Chahil’s request was to have Joseph Brady, the General Manager of FTR’s food service provider Sodexho, reach out to Chahil to offer in-room tray service to reduce the anxiety Chahil had experienced in the cafeteria. (Id. at ¶¶ 50-54). Chahil refused the tray service (id. at ¶ 55), stating late r that it would neither resolve his concern that the Food Servi ce could not meet his dietary n eeds nor save him the stress of dealing with the staff from th e food service. (Id. at ¶ 55). k.FTR argues that it is enti tled to summary judgment on C ount I because Chahil cannot show that he was required an exemption from th e program based specifically on his blindness.SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION

7 Against its own procedure, however, FTR failed to contact Dr. Murphy to discuss whether inroom tray service would be an acceptable alte rnative to an exemption. Moreover, Chahil testified that in-room service would not be a reasonable accommodation for his blindness because the stress of dealing with FTR staff, including the invasion of privacy, would not be alleviated by in-room service. (Dkt. No. 18- 7 at 190:11-16; 93:12-94:4 ; 98:8-20; Dkt. No. 18-8 at 190:11-16). Specifically, Chah il required a staff member to re ad the dinner menu to him, and Chahil testified that he had had issues with FTR staff in the past. (Dkt . No. 18-7 at 92:21-93:1; Dkt. No. 18-8 at 160:22-161:4; 164:1-166:16). Relying on Dr. Murphy’s testimony, FTR argues that the exemption was not a necess ary accommodation for Chahil’s blindness: Q. Are you aware of any reas on Dr. Chahil’s blindness would prohibit him from participating in the evening meal program if he chose to, if he wanted to? A. I don’t know what – I don’t know what ex actly what it entails in terms of as long as he was able to know what the menu entailed every day and had a pretty good u nderstanding of everything and the options and help if he needed it then I think he would be on board with that and would be able to participate. (Dkt. No. 17-2 at ¶ 46). Dr. Murphy’s testimony, however, is not nearly as conclusive as FTR characterizes it. Dr. Murphy did not testify that the accommodation that FTR offered—in-room tray service—would be reasonable for Chahil. Moreover, Dr. Murphy stated that (at least with regard to Chahil’s blindness), th e meal program might be appropria te only if the staff informed Chahil “what the menu entailed every day an d [Chahil] had a pretty good understanding of everything” and Chahil got “help if he needed it.” (I d.). As stated above, there is a dispute as to whether FTR’s staff could provide Chahil the help he needed, especially with regard to reading the menu.SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION

8 It is true that a tenant is not entitled to each and every acc ommodation that he prefers, and the evidence for Chahil on Count I is somewhat weak. Although it is a close call whether Chahil required an exemption from the in-room tray service as a reasonabl e accommodation for his blindness, however, this is not a question th e Court can resolve on summary judgment. Accordingly, FTR’s Motion is denied as to Count I. C. Count II: Race, National Origin and Re ligious Discrimination Under FHA and DCHRA With Regard To Mandatory Meal Program. Chahil next claims that FTR discriminated ag ainst and failed to accommodate him with regard to the meal program based on his race, nati onal origin and religion. (Compl. at ¶¶ 30-38). Chahil claims that, because he is an Indian man of the Sikh faith, he was denied an exemption from the Mandatory Meal Program and that FTR fa iled to accommodate Chahil’s dietary needs. (Id. at ¶¶ 31-34). FTR contends that it undertook an interactive process to determine whether it could accommodate Chahil’s dietary needs and th at denied his exemption request because it could accommodate his needs. FTR has failed to show that it is entitled to summary judgment on this count. Since Chahil moved into FTR in 2006, he has b een one of only three blind residents and the only resident of Indian descent or of the Si kh faith. (Dkt. No. 17-2 at ¶¶ 19, 20). Because he is Sikh, Chahil maintains a beard and wears a turban. (Dkt. No. 18-8 at 276:7-10). HUD regulations require that FTR resi dents participate in an evening meal plan, but that a resident may be exempted “if the resident’s dietary ne eds cannot be accommodated by Food Services . . . .” (Dkt. No. 17-2 at ¶¶ 3, 13). Quattlebaum tes tified that FTR required any resident requesting an exemption from the meal plan for medical or dietary needs to provide a physician’s letter. (Id. at ¶ 14). After receiving su ch a letter, Quattlebaum would nor mally have the staff nurse andSUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION

9 Sodexho review the physician’s letter to determine whether or not the diet could be accommodated. (Dkt. No. 18-5 at 28:9-14). Joseph Brady also testified regarding this process: Dawn would make the decision, sh e would get my opinion on if I could supply the foods that the pe rson needed, and she would also consult the nurse practitioner on th e medical end of the situation. Then she would make the decision on whether they got excused from the meal plan or not. (Dkt. No. 18-16 at 30:16-21). It is undisputed that Chahil participated in th e meal plan for the firs t ten months that he lived at FTR. (Dkt. Nos. 17-2 and 21 at ¶ 24). As part of his request for an exemption from the meal plan, Chahil submitted the letter from Dr. Murphy on or around July 6, 2007. (Dkt. No. 17- 2 at ¶ 45). That letter stated, among other things, that Chahil requi red a “fairly rigid low-fat diet, consisting largely of fruits and vegetables. Unfo rtunately, in his eating arrangement at [FTR] it has been almost impossible for him to adhere to this diet, which is a concern for me.” (Id.) (emphasis added). Quattlebaum did not acknowledge receipt of Chahil’s physician’s letter until approximately a month later on August 6, 2007. (Dkt. No. 17-2 at ¶ 48). In that letter, Quattlebaum told Chahil that the process for re solving his request could take “more than one week.” (Id. at ¶ 49). Qu attlebaum also wrote: I wanted to inform you of our pro cess for these types of requests. Our Nurse Practitioner, Gail Bashore, will receive a copy of this request this Thursday, August 9, 2007. She will contact you to discuss this matter, contact your phy sician, and discuss this request with our Food Service Director, Jo e Brady. Ms. Bashore will then make a determination as to whether or not your medical conditions can be accommodated by our foodservice program and submit that information to me. (Dkt. No. 18-12).SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION

10 Quattlebaum did not notify Brady about Chahil’ s request until the e nd of September. (Dkt. No. 17-2 at ¶ 50). Brady informed Quattleba um that he had spoken to Chahil, that Chahil required a vegetarian diet, and that Food Servic es could accommodate Chahil’s dietary needs. (Id. at ¶¶ 56-57). Based solely on Brady’s opinion, Quattlebaum denied Chahil’s request for an exemption. (Id. at ¶ 58; Dkt. No. 17-3 at 42:2-5; Dkt. No. 18-5 at 36:14-37:11). Despite testifying that her procedure was to have the nurse and Food Services review any physician’s letter, Quattlebaum testified that she never discussed Chahil’s request with Sodexho’s nutritionist and could not recall whether she ever di scussed the requ est with FTR’s Nurse Practitioner, Gail Bashore. (Dkt. No. 18 -5 at 35:18-37:11). Moreover, Quattlebaum did not know what steps, if any, Bashore took with resp ect to Chahil’s request. (Id.). Brady himself testified that he neither consulted with the FTR nurse nor with the nutritionist regarding Chahil’s request. (Id. at 18-16 at 30:7-10; 75:6-10). Despite Dr. Murphy’ s letter that Chahil required a “fairly rigid low-fat diet,” Brady also failed to look into the calorie or fat content of the meals that were being served before giving Quattl ebaum his recommendation. (Dkt. No. 18-16 at 45:13-46:6). It was not until approximately a year later on August 28, 2008, that Quattlebaum notified Chahil that “she had denied his ex emption request after Br ady told her Chahil’s diet of fruits and vegetables could be accommodated by Food Servi ces.” (Dkt. No. 17-2 at ¶¶ 60-61). Although Quattlebaum was FTR’s Administrator and was res ponsible for deciding whether or not to grant resident requests for exemptions, she did not contact Chahil prior to August 2008 because she believed that Brady had already communicated to Chahil that Chahil would not be receiving an exemption. (Dkt. No. 17-2 at ¶¶ 11-12; 59).SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION

11 In July 2009, FTR changed management, at which time Jennifer Easter (“Easter”) acquired many of Quattlebaum’s responsibilities. (Dkt. No. 17-1 at 12). In November 2009, Easter was made aware of Chahil’s request fo r an exemption by way of his Charge of Discrimination from the D.C. Office of Huma n Rights. (Id.). Ea ster approved Chahil’s exemption request on January 27, 2010 pursu ant to a HUD regulation that permits a discretionary exemption from the Mandatory Meal Program for good cause. (Id.). Given this record, the Court cannot grant su mmary judgment in FTR’s favor on Count II. It appears undisputed that Quattlebaum faile d to follow FTR’s own process for determining whether Chahil should be exempt for medical reas ons. Neither she nor Br ady (or anyone else at FTR it seems) consulted with Dr. Murphy or a nother medical professional to determine what specific diet Chahil required. Although Brady supposedly spoke to Chahil and determined that Food Services could accommodate his diet mere ly because Food Services served fruits and vegetables, Dr. Murphy had alrea dy rejected FTR’s menu as inappr opriate for Chahil’s diet. See Dkt. No. 17-2 at ¶ 45 (“Unfortunately, in [Chah il’s] eating arrangement at [FTR] it has been almost impossible for him to adhere to this diet, which is a concern for me.”). There is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether FTR co uld accommodate Chahil’s diet at the time that Quattlebaum denied Chahil an exemption. Although there is no direct evid ence of discrimination and th e circumstantial evidence is somewhat weak, given FTR’s near 14-month de lay alone in acting upon Chahil’s request and Quattlebaum’s apparent disregard for her own process when it came to Chahil’s request, the Court cannot say that FTR is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law on Chahil’s claim of discrimination. Finally, FTR’s claim that Quattleba um also denied exemption requests made by other similarly-situated tenants outside Chahil’s protect ed class is not enough to warrantSUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION

12 summary judgment in FTR’s favor. Quattlebaum’s testimony as to other tenants for whom she either granted or denied exemptions is neutral at best, given that Quattlebaum could not recall details of most or all of the circumstances su rrounding such requests. (Dkt. No. 17-3 at 50:2- 61:17). Accordingly, FTR’s motion as to Count II is denied.
D. Count III: Disability Discrimination under FHA and DCHRA Act with Regard to Informational Notices. Chahil alleges that FTR discriminated against him with regard to informational notices posted throughout the apartment bui lding. (Dkt. No. 18-2 at 18-19). Chahil claims that, because he is blind, he was unable to se e the notices and FTR failed to pr ovide “effective notifications of meetings, notices and the like.” (C ompl. at ¶ 41). Based on the facts set forth in Paragraphs 71- 79 of FTR’s Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Summary Judgment, Chahil has failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to the informational notices. (Dkt. No. 17-2 at ¶¶ 71-79; Dkt. No. 21 at ¶¶ 71-79). FTR has shown th at Chahil never requested a different accommodation than the pr ocedure FTR had in place. Ther efore, FTR did not refuse to make a requested accommodation. Even as suming FTR had refused Chahil’s requested accommodation, FTR has shown that it provided a reasonable alternative to accommodate Chahil’s needs. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted on Count III.
E. Count IV: Breach of Contract With Regard to Rental Rates. Although the basis for and legal th eory as to Count IV is unclea r, it appears that Chahil is alleging that FTR breached its lease with him by fa iling to reduce his rental rates in “accordance with HUD regulations.” (Dkt. No. 18-2 at 20). In his Complaint, Chahil alleges that FTR “modified plaintiff’s rental in March 2009 in accordance with HUD regulations. However, the defendant breached the express provisions of the l ease and is in breach of contract because (on information and belief) the rent should have been modified earlier in the least [sic] term.”SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION

13 (Compl. at ¶ 47). In his O pposition to FTR’s Motion for Su mmary Judgment, Chahil argues that, although FTR offered him a lease with a reduced rental rate, Chahil “refused to execute the new rental contract with the re duced rental rate because FTR c ontinued to wrongfully charge him the $260 fee for the evening meal program.” (Dkt. No. 18-2 at 19). Chahil offers no support for his claim that he can recover on a breach of contract action for the reduced rental rates when he refused to si gn a lease with those rates. See Tsintolas Realty Co. v. Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 187 (D.C. 2009) (stating that, to prevail on a breach of contract claim under District of Columbia law, a plaint iff must prove the defe ndant breached a duty arising out of a valid contract be tween the parties). Nor does Chahil cite to any legal authority or specific HUD regulation for the proposition that he was entitled to such a lease modification. Accordingly, given that there is no genuine disp ute and FTR is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, FTR’s motion is gr anted as to Count IV.
F. Count V: Breach of Lease With Re gard To Anti-Discrimination Clause. Chahil asserts that FTR breached its original lease between the partie s, specifically clause seventeen: “The Landlord agrees not to discriminate based on race, color, religion, creed, national origin, sex, age, handicap, membership in a class, or recipients of public assistance,” when FTR failed to provide Chahil with a suitabl e apartment with all the amenities afforded to other residents. (Compl. at ¶52; Dkt. 18-6 at ¶ 17). The Complaint is unclear what specific fact s Chahil relies on to assert a breach of the anti-discrimination clause of the lease. FTR argues that, because Chahil could not show discrimination as to Counts I, II, and III, Chahil cannot show that FTR breached its duty arising out of paragraph 17 of the lease. Because th ere is a genuine dispute as to whether FTRSUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION

14 discriminated against Chahil w ith respect to Counts I and II, however, FTR is not entitled to summary judgment on Count V and its Moti on is denied as to this count. G. Count VI: Common law Defamation/Libel. FTR’s Motion will, however, be granted respect to Chahil’s common law defamation/libel claim in Count VI. To prev ail on a defamation claim under District of Columbia law, a plaintiff must show: 1) that the defendant made a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; 2) th at the defendant published the statement without privilege to a third party; 3) that the defendant’s fault in publishing the statement am ounted to at least negligence; and 4) either that the statement was actionable as a matter of law irrespective of special harm or that its publication caused the plai ntiff special harm. Mastro v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 447 F.3d 843, 858 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In a defamation claim, “the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the challenged statements are both false and defamatory.” Kendrick v. Fox Television, 659 A.2d 814, 819 (D.C. 1995) . Further, “[a] defamatory statement is one that ‘tends to in jure the plaintiff in his trade, profession or community standing, or lower him in the estima tion of the community.’” Id. (quoting Moss v. Stockard, 580 A.2d 1011, 1023 (D.C. 1993)). The to rt of defamation requires publication to a third party; no actionable claim wo uld arise from a statement publis hed only to the plaintiff, the object of the allegedly defamatory statement. Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63, 73 (D.C. 2005). In a defamation case, “the plaintiff has the burde n of proving that the challenged statements are both false and defamatory.” Kendrick, 659 A.2d at 819. Chahil claims that Quattlebaum made a false and defamatory statement in her August 28, 2008 letter when she wrote that th e process of resolving Chahil’s complaints “was delayed a bit because Mr. Brady had difficulty getting in contact with [Chahil].” (Compl. at ¶ 56). ChahilSUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION

15 claims that this particular statement was “clearly false” and that he was “compromised” “personally, professionally and as a resident.” (Id. at ¶ 60). Chahil does not dispute, however, that Brady tr ied to call him “three or four times” on three different days to talk to him about his diet ary needs. (Dkt. Nos. 17-2 and 21 at ¶ 52). Nor does Chahil dispute that it “took Brady somewhere from a week to a ‘month or two’ to reach Chahil by phone.” (Dkt. Nos. 17-2 and 21 at ¶ 53). It is further undisputed that the letter from Quattlebaum to Chahil was: 1) placed in Chahil’s tenant file in a locked cabinet; 2) that Chahil does not know who received the letter; and 3) that Quattlebaum is not aware that anyone besides Chahil and herself has seen the letter. (Dkt. No s. 17-2 and 21 at ¶¶ 62-64). Finally, there is no genuine dispute that Chahil lacks evidence of any damage flowing from the alleged defamatory statement. (Compare Dkt. No. 17-2 at ¶ 65 w ith Dkt. No. 21 at ¶ 65). Because there is no genuine dispute as to the veracity of the alle ged defamatory statement, no evidence that the statement was published to a third party, and no evidence that Chahil suffered actionable damages, summary judgment is granted to FTR on Count VI. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, FTR’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART . An Order accompanies this Memorandum.

Date: September 7, 2012 ROBERT L. WILKINS United States District Judge