IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Elmer Charles Sutton :

 :

v. : No. 614 C.D. 2016

 : Submitted: August 19, 2016

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Driver Licensing, :

Appellant :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE JOSEPH M. COSGROVE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER1FILED: June 27, 2017

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth), Department of 

Transportation (Department), Bureau of Driver Licensing (Bureau), appeals from 

the March 17, 2016 Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County (trial 

court), which sustained the statutory appeal of Elmer Charles Sutton (Sutton) from 

a three-month suspension of his operating privilege imposed by the Bureau 

pursuant to Section 1786(d)(1) of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law 

(MVFRL), 75 Pa. C.S. § 1786(d)(1).

2

 

1

This opinion was reassigned to the author on February 6, 2017.

2

Section 1786(d)(1) provides, in pertinent part:

(Footnote continued on next page...)
2

On September 5, 2015, Pennsylvania State Police stopped Sutton in North 

Union Township, Fayette County, and issued a traffic citation for operating a 

motor vehicle without the required financial responsibility in violation of 75 Pa. 

C.S. § 1786(f).3 (R.R. at 35a.) On November 18, 2015, a magisterial district judge 

(MDJ) found Sutton guilty of the summary offense of operating a motor vehicle 

without the required financial responsibility. (Id. at 37a.) On December 17, 2015, 

Sutton appealed that conviction. (Id.)

In the interim, the Department was notified of the conviction and issued a 

notice to Sutton on November 26, 2015, advising him that his driving privilege 

would be suspended effective December 31, 2015, because he failed to produce 

proof of financial responsibility on the date of the traffic stop. (Id. at 32a.) On 

_____________________________

(continued...)

The [Department] shall suspend the registration of a vehicle for a period of three 

months if it determines the required financial responsibility was not secured as 

required by this chapter and shall suspend the operating privilege of the owner or 

registrant for a period of three months if the [D]epartment determines that the 

owner or registrant has operated or permitted the operation of the vehicle without 

the required financial responsibility.

75 Pa. C.S. § 1786(d)(1).

3

Section 1786(f) provides:

Any owner of a motor vehicle for which the existence of financial responsibility 

is a requirement for its legal operation shall not operate the motor vehicle or 

permit it to be operated upon a highway of this Commonwealth without the 

financial responsibility required by this chapter. In addition to the penalties 

provided by subsection (d), any person who fails to comply with this subsection 

commits a summary offense and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine 

of $300.

75 Pa. C.S. § 1786(f). 
3

December 16, 2015, Sutton filed a statutory appeal of the suspension of his 

operating privilege. (Id. at 4a.) 

A hearing on the suspension was held on February 17, 2016, at which time 

counsel for the Department proffered as evidence certified records of the 

suspension notice to Sutton, the traffic citation, and the MDJ conviction. (Id. at 

16a.) Sutton’s counsel objected to the admission of the documents on the grounds 

that the underlying conviction had been appealed, and said appeal was still 

pending,4therefore rendering the documents irrelevant. (Id. at 17a.) The trial 

court took the matter of the admissibility of the certified documents under 

advisement to consider the parties’ arguments. (Id. at 28a.) No other evidence was 

offered. (Id.) 

On March 17, 2016, the trial court issued an Order granting Sutton’s appeal, 

vacating the Department’s suspension of operating privileges and ordering same be 

restored and reinstated. (3/17/16 Trial Ct. Order, R.R. at 70a.) In an 

accompanying opinion, the trial court stated that Sutton’s objection to the 

admissibility of the certified records foreclosed the Department from relying solely 

on the certified records to establish its prima facie case. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2-3, R.R. 

at 68a-69a.) The trial court distinguished Capone v. Department of Transportation, 

Bureau of Driver Licensing, 875 A.2d 1228 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005), and Wible v. 

Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 670 A.2d 744 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1996), stating that “there exists a reasonable inference that [the 

Department] only satisfied its burden in those cases due to the failure to object to 

the admission of the [certified documents.]” (Trial Ct. Op. at 3, R.R. at 69a.) 

 

4 A hearing on the appeal of the underlying conviction was scheduled for February 24, 

2016. (R.R. at 18a.)
4

On April 15, 2016, the Department filed a timely appeal to this Court.5 

(R.R. at 72a.) It argues the trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of 

law in sustaining Sutton’s objection to the admission of the certified documents 

showing his conviction.6 Specifically, it contends that certified records reflecting a 

conviction serve as prima facie evidence of its case, and Sutton’s appeal of that 

conviction, which was still pending at the time of the suspension hearing, had no 

effect on the validity of that conviction. 

In order to sustain a suspension of a licensee’s operating privilege under 

Section 1786(d) of the MVFRL, the Department must prove: (1) the vehicle was 

required to be registered in the Commonwealth; (2) financial responsibility 

coverage for the vehicle was not secured or maintained; and (3) the licensee 

operated or permitted the operation of the vehicle while it was not covered by 

financial responsibility. Cangemi v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 

8 A.3d 393, 397 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). Submission of a certified packet, which 

includes the licensee’s conviction of the summary offense, satisfies the 

Department’s prima facie burden. Id.; see also Parnell v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau 

of Driver Licensing, 90 A.3d 840, 844 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). 

In sustaining Sutton’s appeal, the trial court cites to Capone for support that 

an objection to the admission of certified documents is sufficient to preclude the 

Department from relying upon same to satisfy its burden. In Capone, the 

Department suspended the operating privilege of the licensee after she pled guilty 

 

5 Our review of a trial court’s order sustaining a licensee’s statutory appeal from an 

operating privilege suspension is limited to determining whether the trial court committed an 

error of law or abused its discretion. Capone, 875 A.2d at 1230 n.1. 

6

Sutton did not file a brief as directed by this Court’s July 5, 2016 Order, and pursuant to 

this Court’s Order dated August 12, 2016, is precluded from doing so. 
5

to allowing her son to operate her uninsured vehicle, which was involved in an 

accident. 875 A.2d at 1229-30. At the suspension hearing, the Department 

introduced, without objection, a packet of certified documents, which included 

copies of the notice of suspension, conviction detail report documenting the guilty 

plea, and licensee’s driving history. Id. at 1230. In opposition, the licensee and 

her husband testified that they were unaware that their insurance policy had lapsed 

after payment of the premium was returned for insufficient funds, and introduced a 

copy of an insurance card and policy. Id. The trial court noted that the 

Department’s packet did not include a notice from the insurance company 

evidencing a lapse in coverage and credited the testimony of licensee and her 

husband. Id. It also determined the insurance card and policy demonstrated the 

vehicle was insured. Id. It concluded that the Department did not meet its burden 

or, alternatively, that licensee rebutted the presumption she was uninsured. Id. 

The Department appealed arguing the trial court erred in determining it did 

not establish a prima facie case because it introduced the certified records. Our 

Court agreed and reversed the trial court. In doing so, we stated: “Where a 

licensee pleads guilty to the summary offense and does not object to the admission 

of the guilty plea at the suspension hearing, [the Department] satisfies its burden of 

proof . . . .” Id. at 1231 (citing Fine v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver 

Licensing, 694 A.2d 364 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) and Wible, 670 A.2d at 746). We 

further concluded the trial court erred in relying on the insurance card and policy, 

as neither was clear and convincing evidence that the coverage was in effect on the 

date of the accident. Id. at 1232. Therefore, the licensee did not sufficiently rebut 

the evidence. Id.
6

Capone cited Wible and Fine for the proposition that an objection bars the 

Department from satisfying its prima facie case with the mere introduction of 

certified documents. In Wible, the licensee was cited for operating a vehicle 

without financial responsibility, and the Department suspended his operating 

privilege. 670 A.2d at 745. On appeal to the trial court, the licensee did not 

dispute he was operating without the requisite financial responsibility but argued 

he was being punished twice for the same offense because both his vehicle 

registration and operating privilege were suspended. Id. at 745-46. The trial court 

agreed and rescinded the suspension. Id. at 746. The Department appealed,

arguing that it sustained its burden of proof and the trial court erred in finding the 

suspensions should have run concurrently. Id. As to the first issue, we stated, 

“[b]ased on [l]icensee’s plea of guilty and [the Department’s] unobjected to 

admission of the record of [his] plea of guilty to this offense, we conclude that [the 

Department] sustained its burden.” Id. at 746. The remainder of the opinion is 

devoted to addressing the concurrence issue. Id. at 746-47.

In Fine, the licensee’s operating privilege was suspended after he was 

convicted of operating a vehicle without the required financial responsibility. 694 

A.2d at 366. At his suspension hearing, the Department offered a certified copy of 

the conviction record from the district justice, and licensee objected, offering a 

copy of a court of common pleas order adjudging him not guilty of the offense 

after a de novo hearing. Id. The trial court found the Department met its prima 

facie case, which licensee appealed. Id. On appeal, we stated:

Although [the Department’s] initial submission of its records may 

have met its burden to establish a conviction, it is a rebuttable 

presumption; [l]icensee’s submission of a certified copy of the appeal 

is sufficiently clear and convincing to rebut the presumption of a 

conviction. Unlike in Wible, in this case, the plea before the district 
7

justice was overturned on appeal, and the record of the plea was 

objected to by the [l]icensee. Accordingly, [the Department] did not 

meet its ultimate burden of proof because the presumption of a 

conviction was sufficiently rebutted by the record of the not guilty 

judgment in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County.

Id. at 367 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). We explained that “like a 

licensee attempting to argue that he was not properly convicted of an underlying 

offense as the basis of a suspension, [the Department] cannot collaterally attack the 

Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County’s judgment of not guilty.” Id.

Here, the trial court singles out statements made in Capone and Wible to 

conclude that the certified records are only admissible if no objection is lodged. 

(Trial Ct. Op. at 3, R.R. at 69a.) However, Fine demonstrates that an objection to 

such evidence does not prevent the Department from satisfying its prima facie

case. We found the certified records were sufficient to meet its initial burden, even 

over licensee’s objection. Fine, 694 A.2d at 367. The objection simply preserved 

licensee’s right to challenge this evidence by presenting rebuttal evidence showing 

the conviction had already been overturned. Once successfully rebutted, the 

Department could no longer rely on the certified documents and had to produce 

independent evidence to support its suspension. Without such evidence, the 

Department did not satisfy its ultimate burden of proof.

In addition, various sections of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §§ 101-9805, 

specifically endorse the use of certified records, serving as further evidence that 

lack of an objection is not a prerequisite to admissibility. For instance, Section 

1516(b) provides, in pertinent part:

Court abstracts and certifications of conviction and accident reports 

submitted to the [D]epartment under the laws of this Commonwealth 

shall be considered as records of the [D]epartment . . . . Such copies 

shall be admissible into evidence to support the [D]epartment’s case 

in an appeal of a [D]epartment action taken under Chapter . . . 15 
8

(relating to licensing of drivers) . . . , and the certification shall 

constitute prima facie proof of the facts and information contained in 

the court abstract or certification of conviction . . . .

75 Pa. C.S. § 1516(b). In addition, Section 1550(d)(2) provides, in pertinent part:

In any proceeding under this section, documents received by the 

[D]epartment from any other court . . . shall be admissible into 

evidence to support the [D]epartment’s case. In addition, if the 

[D]epartment receives information from a court by means of 

electronic transmission . . . , it may certify that it has received the 

information by means of electronic transmission, and that certification 

shall be prima facie proof of the adjudication and facts contained in 

such an electronic transmission.

75 Pa. C.S. § 1550(d)(2). 

Here, at the time of his suspension hearing, Sutton’s appeal of the summary 

offense was still pending. The underlying conviction was valid and binding and 

remains so until it is overturned. See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver 

Licensing v. Zavodsky, 637 A.2d 673, 676 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (finding licensee’s 

pending criminal appeal was irrelevant to the matter of imposing civil penalties); 

Budjnoski v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety, 566 A.2d 936, 937 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1989) (holding the Department may impose administrative penalties 

despite the fact that an appeal from the underlying criminal conviction is pending). 

This result is not altered by the fact that this case involved an appeal from an MDJ 

subject to de novo review. See Zavodsky, 637 A.2d at 676 (“The fact that the 

driver here appealed from a conviction by a district justice, which allows the trial 

court to conduct a full de novo review, does not distinguish this case from 

[Commonwealth v.] Wolf [632 A.2d 864 (Pa. 1993)] and Budjnoski. A conviction 

is a conviction no matter from which court it issues.”). 

Here, the Department satisfied its prima facie case upon introduction of the 

certified records. This does not mean the records are conclusive evidence that 
9

Sutton violated the MVFRL. Their introduction into evidence merely created a 

rebuttable presumption, and Sutton was free to introduce clear and convincing 

evidence to the contrary. Fine, 694 A.2d at 367. Sutton presented no evidence. 

Based upon the foregoing, we must conclude that the trial court abused its 

discretion and erred as a matter of law in sustaining Sutton’s objection to the 

admission of the certified documents showing his conviction. Accordingly, we 

must reverse the Order of the trial court.

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

Judge Cosgrove dissents.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Elmer Charles Sutton :

 :

v. : No. 614 C.D. 2016

 :

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Driver Licensing, :

Appellant :

O R D E R

NOW, June 27, 2017, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of 

Fayette County, in the above-captioned matter, is REVERSED. 

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge