FI LED U. S . COURT OF AP PE ALS E L E V E N T H C IR C U IT A ug. 19, 2008 T HOM AS K. KAHN CL E RK [ P UB L I S H] I N THE UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS F O R T H E E L E V E N T H C IR C U IT

________________________ N o. 07- 12141

________________________ D . C. D o c k e tN o . 0 6 - 0 0 0 8 7 - CR- 4 - SPM - W CS U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , P la in tif f - A p p e lle e , v ersu s V I C T O R G O N Z A L O V E G A - C A S T I L L O , D e f e n d a n t- A p p e lla n t.

________________________ A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f orthe N or the r n D i s tr i c tof F l or i da

_________________________ ( A u gu s t 19, 2008) B ef ore D U B IN A and B A R K E T T , C i rc ui tJudg es and S C H L E S IN G E R , * D i stri ct Judg e.

___________________ *Honora ble Har vey E. Schlesing er, United States District Judg e for the Middle District of F lorida, sitting by

designation.Th eGo ve rnme nt a ssert s th at th is a pp e a l is “ moo t”be c a

us eVe g a -C a sti llo ’s ine lig ibi lity 1 for relief “ even in a

fast-track district” mea

ns that we c ould not afford him “meaning ful relief ” e v e ni f h ep r e v a i l s o na

p p e a l . W er e

j e c tth i s argum e nt . T h e rei s ana c t i v ec a s eo r c o ntr o v e r s y, and “me aning ful relief

” is possible. See United States v. Orre ga , 363 F.3d 1093, 1095 ( 11th Cir. 2004) (c iting U.S. Const. art. I I I , § 2) (discussingthat a ca se is moot if there is no ac tive caseor c ontrov e rs y

); Cal de ro n v . M

oo re , 5 18 U. S. 1 49 , 1 50 , 1 16 S. Ct . 2 06 6, 20 67 (1 99 6) (n otingthat a caseis moot where no e ffe ctual re lief whatsoever is possible). 2 P E R C U R I A M: A pp el l antV i ct or G on za l o V ega- C as t i l l o app ea l s hi s 70-m on th sent ence fol l ow i ng a pl ea of gu i l ty t o ree nt er i ng the U ni t ed S t at es i l l egal l y a ft erhavi ng been de por t e d orr e m ove d, i n vi ol a t i on of 8 U . S . C . § 1326( a ) ( 1) , ( b) ( 2) . B e f or e the di stri ctcourti m po se d h i s s ent ence , V ega- C as t i l l o asked t he di stri ctcourtt o v ary dow nw a r d f

r om hi s a ppl i c a bl e s e nt e nc i ng r a nge of 70 t o 87 m onths i m pr i s onm e nt base d o n t he fa ctthatthe di stri cti n w hi ch he w as i nd i ct ed on the pres entchar ge – the N or the r n D i s tr i c tof F l or i da – di d note m pl oy a n e a r l y di s pos i t i on pr ogr a m , a nd thi s r es ul t ed i n an u nw arra nt ed se nt enci ng di spar i ty thatshou l d b e c on si dere d p u r s u a n t to 1 8 U .S .C . § 3 5 5 3 ( a ) ( 6 ) . O n a ppe a l , V e ga - C a s t i l l o r e que s t s tha tthi s c our tr e m a nd hi s c a s e t o the d is tr ic t c o u r t f

o rr e s e n te n c in g a n d o r d e rth e d is tr ic t c o u r t “to c o n s id e rth e d is p a r ity ca used by nat i on al l y di spar at e ‘ fa st -tra ck’ se nt enci ng w hen con si deri ng the fa ct ors in 1 8 U .S .C . § 3 5 5 3 ( a ) .” V e g a - C a s tillo r e c o g n iz e s th a t w e p r e v io u s ly h e ld in 1 U n i t ed S ta t es v. C a stro , 455 F . 3d 1249, 1253 ( 11th C i r . 2006) , tha t“ s e c t i on 3553( a ) ( 6) doe s notr e qui r e the di s tr i c tc our tt o de pa r tba s e d on the a va i l a bi l i ty ofVe g a -C a sti llo a lso argue s th at Cas tro w a s o v e r r u l e d b y Rita v. United States , 5 51 U. S. 2 __, 127 S. Ct . 2456 (2007). This argument is meritless. Ri ta did not expressly overr ule Cas tro or its prog eny , and did not do so impli citly beca use it was fa ctually

distinguishable. See United States v. Chubbuck, 252 F.3d 1300, 1305 n.7 ( 11th Cir. 2001) (noting that the prior pre cedent rule would not apply

if interveningon-point case law from the Supreme Court existed). The dissent re lies on the First Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Rodriguez , 527 F.3d 3 221 (1st Cir. 2008), in which the c ourt dec lined to follow its prior prec edent prohibiting the consideration of fast-tra ck disparities in light of the Supreme Court’ s decision in Kimbrough . It 3 the [f as t -tra ck] departure i n o nl y s om e di stri ct s, ” butar gu es thatthi s dec i si on has b een o v erru l ed b y K i m brou gh v. U ni t ed St at es , 12 8 S . C t . 55 8 (20 07 ). 2 A s a n in itia l m a tte r , w h ile V e g a - C a s tillo ’s a p p e lla te b r ie f o n ly c ite s to C a stro , the es se nce of hi s a rgum enti s thatthe di stri ctcourtshou l d h ave c on si dere d f a s t- tr a c k d is p a r ity a s p a r t o f th e § 3 5 5 3 ( a ) f

a c to r s in im p o s in g h is s e n te n c e . B e c a us e tw o c a s e s f

ol l ow i ng C a stro – U

ni t ed St at es v. A re val o-Juarez , 464 F . 3d 1246, 1251 ( 11th C i r . 2006) , a nd U n i t ed S ta t es v. L la n o s-A g o sta d ero , 486 F . 3d 1194, 1198- 99 ( 11th C i r . 2007) – s ugge s ttha tdi s tr i c tc our t s a r e pr ohi bi t e d f r om c ons i de r i ng thi s di s pa r i ty i n i m pos i ng s e nt e nc e , w e a l s o i nc l ude thos e c a s e s i n our r e v i e w o f

V e g a - Ca s t i l l o ’ s c l a i m. U nde rthe pr i orpr e c e de ntrul e , w e a r e bound t o f ol l ow a pr i orbi ndi ng p r e c e d e n t“ u n l e s s a n d u n t i l i ti s o v e r ru l e d b y th i s c o u r te n b a n c o rb y th e Su p r e me C ou rt . ” U

n i t e d S ta t e s v . Br o wn , 3 4 2 F .3 d 1 2 4 5 , 1 2 4 6 ( 1 1 th C ir . 2 0 0 3 ) . H e r e , it is undi s put e d tha tw e ha ve notove r rul e d C a stro ori t s pr oge ny i n a n e n banc de c i s i on. T hus , the onl y i s s ue i s w he the rthe S upr e m e C our tha s done s o. 3is i mpo rt ant t o n otethat th eF ir st C irc uit e mpl oys a

dif ferent p ri or

pre c e de nt r

ule . Unli kethi s circ uit, whereprior pre cedent must be followed unless the prior prece dent has be en over ruled by thi s c ourt en bancor

by theUnite d St ate s Su

pre meCourt , th eF ir st C irc uit a llo ws a pa ne l to depar t from prior prece dent “in those re latively rare instance s in which authority that postdates the orig inal decision, although not directly controlling , never

theless offers a sound re ason for believingthat the former pane l, in light of fresh deve lopments, would chang e its collective mind.” Id. at 225 (internal quotations and citation omitt ed). Thus, unlike theFirst Circuit, even if the re asoningof Kimbrough is at odds wi th t here a so nin gof

our p ri or ho lding s, wemus t fo llo w o ur

prior pre c e de nts un le ss Kimbrough ov e rr ule d th e m. M ore ov e r, theF if th C irc uit confronted the sameissue and held that “ [fast-trac k] precedents werenot called into question by Rita or Kimbrough .” Un ited S tates v . Gom e

z-Herrera , 523 F.3d 554, 563 ( 5th Cir. 2008). To highlight the na

rrowne ss of this circuit’s prior prece dent rule, c onsider United States 4 v. Cleck ler , 270 F.3d 1331, 1335 &n.4 (11th Cir. 2001), where wedeclined to ignore prior prec edent be cause , amongother re asons, the SupremeCourt caseinvolved the innocent- owner 4 F o rth e S u p r e m e C o u r t to o v e r ru le a c a s e , its d e c is io n m u s t h a v e “a c tu a lly ov errul ed or confl i ct ed w i th [thi s c ou rt ’ s pri or prece dent ] . ” See U ni t ed St at es v . M a r te , 3 5 6 F .3 d 1 3 3 6 , 1 3 4 4 ( 1 1 th C ir . 2 0 0 4 ) ( c ita tio n a n d q u o ta tio n o m itte d ) . T h e r e is a d if

f e r e n c e b e tw e e n th e h o ld in g in a c a s e a n d th e r e a s o n in g th a t s u p p o r ts th a t h o ld in g . A t lant i c Soundi ng C o. , I nc . v . T ow ns e nd , 4 9 6 F .3 d 1 2 8 2 , 1 2 8 4 ( 1 1 th C i r . 2007) . E ve n i f

the r e a s oni ng of

a n i nt e r ve ni ng hi gh c our tde c i s i on i s a todds w ith a p r io ra p p e lla te c o u r t d e c is io n , th a t d o e s n o t p r o v id e th e a p p e lla te c o u r t w ith a b a s is f o rd e p a r tin g f

r o m its p r io rd e c is io n . I d. ; co m p a re U n i t ed S ta t es v. O rt i

zD e l gado , 4 5 1 F .3 d 7 5 2 , 7 5 4 n .1 ( 1 1 th C ir . 2 0 0 6 ) ( a p p ly in g th e p r io rp r e c e d e n t ru le a n d r e f u s in g to r e c o n s id e ra n o th e rp a n e l d e c is io n ) , w ith U n ite d S ta te s v . Sm ith , 934 F . 2d 27 0, 27 4-75 (11t h C i r. 19 91 ) ( re fusi ng t o app l y rul e bec ause pri or ca se had been i m pl i ci t l y overrul ed by subsequentS up re m e C ou rtdeci si on s) . 4de fens ein t hec onte xt of

21 U. S.C. § 8 81 (a)( 6) , whil ethepa ne l’ s c a seinv olv e d th esamede fens e in the context of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), even though “sec tion 881(a)( 6) parallels section 881(a) (7) a

nd contains an ide ntically worde d innocent-owner de fense .”

5 F as t -tra ck prog ra m s ori gi nat ed i n feder al di stri ctcourt s i n t he sout hw es t ern U ni t ed S t at es t o d ea l w i th t he l ar ge nu m ber of i l l egal re -e nt ry and o ther im m ig r a tio n c a s e s p e n d in g in th o s e d is tr ic ts . See U ni t e d Stat e s v . C am

pos - D i az , 4 7 2 F .3 d 1 2 7 8 , 1 2 7 9 n .1 ( 1 1 th C ir . 2 0 0 6 ) , ce rt . deni ed , 1 2 7 S . C t. 2 0 8 5 ( 2 0 0 7 ) . Co n g r e s s e n d o r s e d th e f a s t - tr a c k p r o g r a m i n 2 0 0 3 i n th e PR OTEC T Ac t , Pu b . L. N o. 108- 21, 117 S t a t . 650 ( 2003) , w hi c h “ i ns truc t e d the U ni t e d S t a t e s S e nt e nc i ng C om m i ss i on t o p rom ul gat e a po l i cy st at em entautho ri zi ng a dow nw ar d d epar ture of no tm ore than 4 l evel s i f the G ov ernm entfi l es a m ot i on for s uch d epar ture pur s ua ntt o a n e a r l y di s pos i t i on pr ogr a m a uthor i z e d by the A t t or ne y G e ne r a l a nd the U ni t ed S t at es A t t orney. ” C am pos - D i az , 47 2 F . 3d at12 79 n. 1 (i nt ernal q u o ta tio n m a r k s a n d c ita tio n s o m itte d ) . T he S e nt e nc i ng C om m i s s i on, i n tur n, a dde d U . S . S . G . § 5K 3. 1 t o the S e nt e nc i ng G ui de l i ne s , w hi c h pr ovi de s f orthe dow nw a r d de pa r tur e a uthor i z e d by th e P R O T E C T A c t. I

d. S pe c i f

i c a l l y , § 5K 3. 1 pr ovi de s tha t“ on a m ot i on by the g o v e r n m e n t, a d is tr ic t c o u r t m a y g r a n t a d o w n w a r d d e p a r tu r e o f u p to f o u rle v e ls pur s ua ntt o a n e a r l y di s pos i t i on or‘ f a s t - tr a c k’ pr ogr a m s pe c i f i c a l l y a uthor i z e d by the A t t or ne y G e ne r a l a nd the U ni t e d S t a t e s A t t or ne y i n the di s tr i c thous i ng the6

prog ra m . ” A re val o-Juarez , 4 6 4 F .3 d a t 1 2 4 8 . In Ja nu ary 200 5, the S up re m e C ou rtre nd er ed the S ent enci ng G ui del i nes advi sory i n t he re m edi al op i ni on of U ni t ed St at es v. B oo ke r , 543 U . S . 220, 233- 34, 12 5 S . C t . 73 8, 75 0-51 (200 5), bu tdi d n oti m m edi at el y e xp l ai n h ow an advi sory s y s t e m of

gui de l i ne s s houl d be a ppl i e d. W e i s s ue d C a stro o n J u ly 1 2 , 2 0 0 6 . C a stro , 455 F . 3d a t1249. I n C a stro , w e a dd re ss ed a s i tuat i on w here a def endantw ho w as prosec ut ed i n a no n-fa st -tra ck d is tr ic t m o v e d f

o rth e d is tr ic t c o u r t to u s e its p o s t- B oo ke rd is c r e tio n to r e d u c e h is se nt ence by the equi val entof the four-l evel departure provi ded for by t he fa st -tra ck g u id e lin e , U .S .S .G . § 5 K 3 .1 , b u t th e d is tr ic t c o u r t u ltim a te ly d e n ie d h is m o tio n . I d. at12 51 . O n app ea l , w e hel d t hat“ se ct i on 35 53 (a )( 6) do es no tre qu i re the di stri ct c o u r tt o d e p a r tb a s e d o n th e a v a i l a b i l i ty o f th e [ f a s t - tr a c k ] d e p a r tu r e i n o n l y s o me di stri ct s. ” I

d . a t1253. W e r e a s one d tha t“ [ a ] ny di s pa r i ty c r e a t e d by s e c t i on 5K 3. 1[ , the f

a s t - tr a c k gui de l i ne , ] doe s notf a l l w i thi n the s c ope of

s e c t i on 3 5 5 3 ( a ) ( 6 ) . W h e n C o n g r e s s d ir e c te d th e S e n te n c in g C o m m is s io n to a llo w th e [ f a s ttra ck] departure f

or on l y par t i ci pat i ng di stri ct s, C on gres s i m pl i ci t l y det er m i ned t hat the [s ent enci ng ] di spar i ty w as w arra nt ed. ” I d. a t 1 2 5 2 ( in te r n a l c ita tio n o m itte d ) . F ol l ow i ng C a stro – a nd be f or e the di s tr i c tc our ts e nt e nc e d V e ga - C a s t i l l o – w e de c i de d A re val o-Juarez . In thatca se , the di stri ctcourt , i n i m po si ng se nt ence ,7

i ndi c a t e d tha ti ti m pos e d the de f e nda nt ’ s s e nt e nc e t o e f

f e c t i ve l y “ r e duc [ e ] the gui de l i ne r a nge f

ourof f e ns e l e ve l s ” be c a us e “ w i thoutthi s a dj us t m e ntthe r e w i l l be a di spar i ty i n sent enci ng betw ee n t hi s def endantand l i ke defendant s w ho ar e s e n te n c e d in b o r d e rs ta te s w h e r e th e A tto r n e y G e n e r a l . . . h a s a u th o r iz e d e a r ly di sposi t i on or fa st -tra ck prog ra m s. ” A re val o-Juarez , 4 6 4 F .3 d a t 1 2 4 7 - 4 8 . H ow e ve r , w e va c a t e d the de f e nda nt ’ s s e nt e nc e a nd r e m a nde d f orr e s e nt e nc i ng, e xpl a i ni ng tha t , i n l i ghtof ourhol di ng i n C a stro , “ i tw a s i m pe r m i s s i bl e t o us e the di spar i t i es cr ea t ed by U . S . S . G . § 5 K 3. 1 as the basi s f or i m po si ng a [ do w nw ar d vari ant ] se nt ence of 30 m on ths. ” I d. a t 1 2 5 1 & n .3 . I n L la n o s-A g o sta d ero , d e c i d e d a f t e rVe g a - C a s t i l l o ’ s s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , we re i t er at ed that“ a [ se nt enci ng ] courtm ay no tconsi der s ent enci ng di spar i t i es as soci at ed w i th ear l y di sposi t i on prog ra m s i n i m po si ng se nt ence , ” a nd ci t ed A re val o-Juarezf

o rth is p r o p o s itio n . L la n o s-A g o sta d ero , 4 8 6 F .3 d a t 1 1 9 9 . W e a ls o o b s e r v e d th a t w e c o u ld n o t “s a y th a t th e s e n te n c e s r e c e iv e d b y d e f e n d a n ts in di s tr i c t s w i thoutf

a s t - tr a c k pr ogr a m s a r e ‘ gr e a t e rtha n ne c e s s a r y ’ t o a c hi e ve the pu rposes of § 3 55 3(a) (2) so l el y b eca u se s im ila r ly - s itu a te d d e f e n d a n ts in d is tr ic ts w ith fa st -tra ck prog ra m s a re el i gi bl e t o rec ei ve l es se r s ent ence s. ” I d. F o llo w in g th e p a r tie s s u b m is s io n o f b r ie f s , th e S u p r e m e C o u r t c o n c lu d e d , in K i m brou gh v. U

ni t ed St at es , 128 S . C t . 558 ( 2007) , tha t , be c a us e the S e nt e nc i ng8

G u i d el i n es are ad v i so ry, i n cl u d i n g th e crack /p o w d er co cai n e d i sp ari ty p ro v i si o n s, di stri ctcourt s have the abi l i ty und er18 U . S . C . § 3 55 3(a) (6) t o con si der that d is p a r ity in im p o s in g s e n te n c e s . See K i m br ough , 1 2 8 S . C t. a t 5 6 5 - 6 6 , 5 7 3 - 7 6 . M or e ove r , a s V e ga - C a s t i l l o not e s on a ppe a l , the G ove r nm e ntc onc e de d be f or e the S up re m e C ou rtthat“ [a ] di stri ctcourtm ay there fore se nt ence base d o n p ol i cy c o n s id e r a tio n s th a t d if

f e rf r o m th o s e r e f

le c te d in th e G u id e lin e s ( s u b je c t to re as on abl enes s r evi ew on appeal ). ” See K i m br ough , 2007 W L 2461473 ( N o. 06- 6330) , B r i e f

f orthe U ni t e d S t a t e s , a t29. W e a g r e e w ith th e G o v e r n m e n t th a t K i m br ough di d n otov errul e C a stro or its p r o g e n y , a n d s o w e a r e b o u n d to a p p ly th e p r io rp r e c e d e n t ru le in th is a p p e a l. S p e c if ic a lly , K i m br ough ne ve rdi s c us s e d C a stro orthe c a s e s f ol l ow i ng i t , or othe r w i s e c om m e nt e d on non- c r a c k c oc a i ne di s pa r i t i e s , a nd s o K i m br ough di d not expres sl y overrul e C a stro ori t s pr oge ny . M or e ove r , a s i n C l ec kl er , the hol di ngs of K i m br ough a nd C a stro a r e d is tin g u is h a b le . Ki m br ough d ea ltw ith th e c o u rt’s a b ility , p o s t- B oo ke r , t o t a ke i nt o c ons i de r a t i on the di s pa r i ty c a us e d by the c r a c k /p o w d e rc o c a in e g u id e lin e , U .S .S .G . § 2 D 1 .1 , in im p o s in g s e n te n c e , w h ile C a stro a n d its p r o g e n y d e a lt w ith th e c o u r t’s a b ility to ta k e in to a c c o u n t a s e n te n c in g d is p a r ity r e s u ltin g f r o m a n e n tir e ly d if

f e r e n t g u id e lin e in v o lv in g f a s ttra ck prog ra m s, U . S . S . G . § 5 K 3. 1. T hu s, the m ostthatca n b e s ai d o f V ega-9

C a s t i l l o’ s a r gum e nti s tha ti tpi t s “ r e a s oni ng a ga i ns thol di ng, ” butnot“ hol di ng agai nstho l di ng . ” See A t lan t i c Sou nd i ngC o. , Inc. , 4 9 6 F .3 d a t 1 2 8 7 ( C a r n e s , J ., c o n c u r r in g ) . F in a lly , w e n o te th a t “K i m br ough a ddr e s s e d onl y a di s tr i c tc our t ’ s di s c r e t i on t o va r y f r om the G ui de l i ne s ba s e d on a di s a gr e e m e ntw i th G ui de l i ne , not C on gres si on al , po l i cy . ” G o m ez-H errera , 5 2 3 F .3 d a t 5 6 3 ; s e e K i m br ough , 128 S . C t . a t571 ( not i ng tha tC ongr e s s “ m a nda t e [ d] onl y m a xi m um a nd m i ni m um sen t en ces” an d “ sai [d ] n o th i n g ab o u tth e ap p ro p ri at e sen t en ces w i th i n th ese b r a c k e ts ” ) . M o r e o v e r , K i m br ough d e a lt o n ly w ith c e r ta in G u id e lin e s — th o s e th a t, l i ke the c r a c k c oc a i ne G ui de l i ne s , “ do note xe m pl i f y the C om m i s s i on’ s e xe r c i s e of its c h a r a c te r is tic in s titu tio n a l r o le .” 1 2 8 S . C t. a t 5 7 5 . T h u s , th e m o s t th a t c o u ld p o s s ib ly b e a r g u e d is th a t K i m br ough o v e r ru le d th e f o llo w in g : p r io rp r e c e d e n ts hol di ng tha ta di s tr i c tc our tc a nnotva r y f r om the a dvi s or y G ui de l i ne s ba s e d on a di sa gree m entw i th a G ui del i ne, even w here S ent enci ng C om m i ss i on po l i cy j ud gm ent , no tC on gres si on al di re ct i on , un derl i es the G ui del i ne ati ss ue, and even w h e r e th a t p o lic y ju d g m e n t d id n o t a r is e f r o m th e C o m m is s io n ’s e x e r c is e o f its c h a r a c te r is tic in s titu tio n a l r o le . C a stro , A re val o-Juarez , a nd L la n o s-A g o sta d ero d o n o t f a ll w ith in th a t n a r r o w f

ie ld . W e c o n c lu d e th a t K i m br ough d id n o t o v e r ru le th e m . S ee C a stro , 455 F . 3d a t1252 ( “ C ongr e s s di r e c t e d the S e nt e nc i ng10

C om m i s s i on t o a l l ow the de pa r tur e f oronl y pa r t i c i pa t i ng di s tr i c t s . . . . ” ( c i t i ng P R O T E C T A ct , P ub . L . N o. 10 8-21 § 4 01 (m )( 2)(B ), 11 7 S t at . 65 0, 67 5 (20 03 )) . T hu s, w e a ff

i rm V ega- C as t i l l o’ s 70-m on th sent ence . AF F I RME D.In Arc her, this cour t found that a SupremeCourt case , Be g ay v. United States, 128 1 S . C t . 1 5 8 1 ( 2 0 0 8 ) , d e a l i n gw i thth equ e s t i o no f wh e th e r dr unk dri v i n gi s a

“ v i o l e ntf

e l o ny” under theArmed Career

Criminal Act, had under

mined a prior pa

nel dec ision to the point of abrog ation even though it dealt with a different c rime (unlaw fully car rying a conce aled we apon) and a dif ferent statutory

definition (“c rime of violenc e” under the Sentenc ing Guidelines).

11 B A R K E T T , C i r c ui tJ udge , D i s s e nt i ng: I r e s pe c t f ul l y di s s e ntf

r om the m a

j or i ty ’ s opi ni on be c a us e I be l i e ve the S upr e m e C our t ’ s de c i s i on i n K i m br ough l e a ve s no r oom f oruphol di ng ourpr i or pr e c e de nt s i n C a s tr o, A r e va l o- J ua r e z , a nd L l a nos - A gos t a de r o. U nde rour pr e c e de nt , w he n a n i nt e r ve ni ng S upr e m e C our tde c i s i on ha s “ unde r m i ne d [ a pr i or p an el d ec isio n ] t o th e p o in t o f a b ro g atio n ,” w e m u st ap p ly th e S u p re m e C o u rt’s deci si on . U ni t ed S t at es v. A rc her, N o. 07 -114 88 , 20 08 U . S . A pp . L E X IS 13 46 2, at *1 1– 12 (11t h C i r. June 26 , 20 08 ). 1 I b e lie v e it to b e b e y o n d p e r a d v e n tu r e th a t K im b r o u g h h a s c o m p le te ly unde r m i ne d the r a t i ona l e of ourpr i orc a s e s hol di ng tha ts e nt e nc i ng c our t s c a nnot c o n s id e r“f

a s t- tr a c k ” s e n te n c in g d is p a r itie s a s th e b a s is f o ra G u id e lin e s v a r ia n c e . A s th e A ssi st an tU . S . A t t o rn ey, t o h er cred i t , co n ced ed , “ [t ] h e h o l d i n g s i n L l an o sA go st ader o and A re val o-Juar ez appear t o b e a tod ds w i th K i m brou gh . ” L ett er fr om T erry F l ynn, A ss i st antU . S . A t t orney, t o t he C ou rt , af t eroral ar gu m ent(M ay 22 , 20 08 ) ( i nt ernal ci t at i on s om i t t ed). T he r a t i ona l e unde r l y i ng a nd s uppor t i ng the hol di ngs of C a s tr o, A r e va l o-In deter mining the of

fenselevels for

cra ck and pow der c ocaine , the Sentencing 2 Commi ssion adopted the 100-to-1 ratio in line with the Anti-DrugAbuse Ac t of 1986. This court in United States v. Will iams, 456 F.3d 1353, 1364–69 (11th Cir. 2006), 3 likewise had he ld that courts haveno authority to deviate f

rom the 100-to-1 c rac k/powder cocaine ratio. But see United States v. Wi lliams, 472 F.3d 835, 848–49 (11th Cir. 2006) (denial of rehearing en banc) (B arke tt, J ., dissenting) (statingthat a sente ncingcourt may deviate f rom the 100-to-1 ratio if it properly calculates the Guide lines rang e and sentence s a def endant ba sed on the individual fac ts and circumstances of the ca se). 12 J u a r e z , a n d L la n o s - A g o s ta d e r o w a s th a t b y a u th o r iz in g “f a s t- tr a c k ” p r o g r a m s in s om e di s tr i c t s butnoti n othe r s , C ongr e s s i m pl i c i t l y i nt e nde d the s e nt e nc i ng di s pa r i t i e s tha tm i ghta r i s e be tw e e n “ f a s t - tr a c k” di s tr i c t s a nd non- “ f a s t - tr a c k” di s tr i c t s . S i m i l a r l y , i n K i m br ough, the gove r nm e nta r gue d tha tby pa s s i ng the A nt i - D rug A bus e A c tof 1986, C ongr e s s “ i m pl i c i t l y ” pr ohi bi t e d tr i a l j udge s f r om 2 d e v ia tin g f

r o m a G u id e lin e s s e n te n c e b a s e d u p o n th e G u id e lin e s ’ 1 0 0 - to - 1 r a tio . K im b r o u g h v . U n ite d S ta te s , 1 2 8 S . C t. 5 5 8 , 5 7 1 , 5 7 2

– 7 3 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ( e m p h a s is a d d e d ) ; s e e a ls o U n ite d S ta te s v . E u r a , 4 4 0 F .3 d 6 2 5 ( 4 th C ir . 2 0 0 6 ) ( h o ld in g th a t a s e nt e nc e out s i de the G ui de l i ne s r a nge w a s pe rs e unr e a s ona bl e w he n ba s e d on a di sa gree m entw i th t he se nt enci ng di spar i ty f or cr ac k and po w der c ocai ne offens es ); U ni t e d S t a t e s v. K i m br ough, 174 F . A pp’ x 798 ( 4th C i r . 2006) ( s a m e ) . T he 3 S u p r e m e C o u r t f

la tly r e je c te d th a t p o s itio n , e x p r e s s ly s ta tin g th a t it “d e c lin e [ d ] to r e a d a n y im p lic it d ir e c tiv e in to . . . c o n g r e s s io n a l s ile n c e .” K im b r o u g h , 1 2 8 S . C t. at57 1 (em ph as i s a dd ed). T he S upr e m e C our tc onc l ude d tha ta j udge i s pe r m i t t e d t o “ c ons i de rthe13

d i sp ari ty b etw een th e G u i d el i n es’ treat m en to f crack an d p o w d er co cai n e o ffen ses” i n i m pos i ng a s e nt e nc e . I d. a t564. T he C our the l d tha t“ unde rB ooke r , the c oc a i ne G ui de l i ne s , l i ke a l l othe rG ui de l i ne s , a r e a dvi s or y onl y , a nd tha tthe C our tof A p p e a ls e r r e d in h o ld in g th e c r a c k /p o w d e rd is p a r ity e f f e c tiv e ly m a n d a to r y . A l tho ug h a di stri ctj ud ge m usti ncl ud e the G ui del i nes r ange i n t he ar ra y of f ac t ors w arra nt i ng consi dera t i on , the j ud ge m ay al so det er m i ne that , i n t hatpart i cul arca se , a w i thi n- G ui de l i ne s s e nt e nc e i s ‘ gr e a t e rtha n ne c e s s a r y ’ t o s e r ve the obj e c t i ve s of s e n te n c in g .” I d . S p e a k i n g e v e n m o r e b r o a d l y , a n d q u o t i n g th e g o v e r n m e n t ’ s o wn conces si on ary posi t i on on the i ss ue, the C ou rtno t ed that“ as a genera l m att er , co u rt s m ay v ary [fro m G u i d el i n es ran g es] b ased so l el y o n p o l i cy co n si d erat i o n s, i nc l udi ng di s a gr e e m e nt s w i th the G ui de l i ne s . ” I d. a t570 ( i nt e r na l quot a t i on m a r ks o m itte d ) . T h u s , th e C o u r t m a d e c o n s id e r a tio n o f th e § 3 5 5 3 ( a ) f

a c to r s p a r a m o u n t, i ncl ud i ng a det er m i nat i on thati n a part i cul arca se , a w i thi n-G ui del i nes s ent ence m a y b e “g r e a te rth a n n e c e s s a r y ” to s e r v e th e o b je c tiv e s o f

s e n te n c in g . T he G ui de l i ne s a r e now s i m pl y the “ s t a r t i ng poi nt ” a nd “ i ni t i a l be nc hm a r k” for a se nt enci ng court , G al l v. U ni t ed S t at es , 12 8 S . C t . 58 6, 59 6 (20 07 ), and aft er c o n s id e r in g th e m , a c o u r t “s h o u ld th e n c o n s id e ra ll th e § 3 5 5 3 ( a ) f a c to r s ” in m aki ng an “ i nd i vi du al i ze d ass es sm entbase d o n t he fa ct s pre se nt ed. ” I d. atIre sp e c tf ully dis a gre ewi th a

pa ne l of theF if th C irc uit wh ic h h e ld t

hat Kimb ro ugh did 4 not overruleits prior holdings that a district c ourt may not vary from the Guide lines based on sentenc ing dispa

rities cause d by

“fa st-trac k” programs. See United States v. Gomez-Her rera, 52 3 F .3 d 5 54 (5 th C ir . 2 00 8) . T heF if th C irc uit re a so ne d th at be c a

us eCon gre ss a

uth orize d “ fa sttra c k”progra

ms w ith out r e vis ing§ 3 55 3( a)( 6) , a ny se ntenc ingdis pa

ri tie s re su lti ngfrom “ fa sttrac k” programs are “ne cessa rily” wa rra nted. See id. at 562–63 ( citing a nd quoting United States v. Marc ial-Santiag o, 447 F.3d 715, 718 ( 9th Cir. 2006)). In light of theSupreme Court’s pronounce ment that it refuse d to rea d any “implicit directive . . . into congressional silence ,” Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct . at 571, I cannot read into the PROTECT Act a n implicit di rec tive that restric ts a sentenc ing c ourt’s discre tion to deviate from the Guidelines based on “ fast-track” disparities. Just as the Court in Kimbrough stated that congressional intent could not be inferre d 14 596–97. A s the C our ta dde d, the § 3553( a ) f a c t or s r e qui r e c ons i de r a t i on of “ the need t o avo i d u nw arra nt ed se nt ence di spar i t i es am on g d ef endant s w i th si m i l ar r e c or ds w ho ha ve be e n f ound gui l ty of

s i m i l a rc onduc t , ” w hi c h m a y r e s ul ti n a s e nt e nc e tha tva r i e s f

r om the G ui de l i ne s r a nge . K i m br ough, 128 S . C t . a t570 (i nt ernal qu ot at i on m ar ks om i t t ed). In di re ct i ng di stri ctcourt s t o con si der the need to a v o id u n w a r r a n te d d is p a r itie s w h e n im p o s in g s e n te n c e s , th e C o u r t s p e c if ic a lly not e d tha t§ 3553( a ) ( 6) r e qui r e s tha tdi s tr i c tc our t s t a ke a c c ountof s e nt e nc i ng prac t i ce s i n o ther c ou rt s. Id. at57 4 (em ph as i s a dd ed). T he C ou rtfurther not ed that a d is tr ic t c o u r t m a y c o n s id e ra r g u m e n ts th a t “th e G u id e lin e s s e n te n c e its e lf f a ils pr ope r l y t o r e f

l e c t§ 3553( a ) c ons i de r a t i ons . ” I d. a t570 ( c i t i ng a nd quot i ng R i t a v. U ni t ed S t at es , 12 7 S . C t . 24 56 , 24 65 (200 7)). I a gr e e w i th the F i r s tC i r c ui t , i n w hi c h a pa ne l r e c e nt l y he l d tha tK i m br ough ove r rul e d i t s pr i orpr e c e de ntw hi c h w a s i de nt i c a l t o C a s tr o, A r e va l o- J ua r e z , a nd L l a nos - A gos t a de r o. T he F i r s tC i r c ui tf ound tha ta f

t e rK i m br ough, “ c ons i de r a t i on 4from the manda tory maxi mum-minimum sentence s in the Anti-DrugAbuse Ac t of 1986 or Congress’ inac tion in the faceof the Sentenc ing Commission’s recommenda tions to chang e the 100-to-1 ratio, sentencingcourts should not infer f rom the PROTECT Act that they can never de viatefrom t

heGuide lin e s b a se d o n “ fa st- tra c k”dis pa ri tie s. “ Drawi ngme anin gfrom s ilenc eis particula rly inappropriate . . . for Congress ha s shown that it knows how to direct sente ncing prac tices in express terms.” I d. Congress’ a uthorization of “fast-track” programs does not equateto a congressional de cision that district courts haveno discretion to deviatefrom the Guide lin e s b a se d o n “ fa st- tra c k”dis pa ri tie s so lon ga s th ese ntenc eis w ith in t hemaximum minimumlimit s and the sentencingcourt ha s considere d the § 3553(a) factors. The majority ’s discussion of the F irst Circuit’s prior pre cedent rule is misleadingand 5 fails to g ivea

prop e r re a din gto t

heF ir st C irc uit ’s de c isi on in Rod ri gue z. ( Se eMa

j. O p. at 3 n.3.) The c ourt in Rodrigue z never said it was overrulingits prior prec edent only on the basis of the “sound re ason[ing]” from “ authority that postdates the orig inal decision”—i.e ., Kimbrough. Rather, a ft e r s e tti ngfo rt

h th etw o e xcepti on s to theprior pre c e de nt r

ule(( 1) “ a

pre vio us pa

ne l is c ontra dic te d b y

c ontroll inga

uth ority”and

(2 ) a su bs e qu e nt d e c isi on , whil eno t dire c tly c ontroll ing , n e ve rt

he le ss o ff e rs a so un d re a so n f

or ov e rr ulingtheprior

pa ne l) , th ec ourt

e xplic itly s tate s th at “ [t ]h es it

u ati o nh e r ep o s s e s s e s e lements o f b o th o f th e s ee xc ep ti o n s . ”Se eRo drigu e z, 527 F.3d at 224–25. The F irst Circuit’s decision to overr ule its prior prec edent wa s not based solely on the sec ond exception as stated by the majority

in footnote 3. Fur

thermore , as is evident from this circuit’s recent decision in Archer, our prior prec edent r ule is not very

different from the Fir st Circuit’s rule. 15 of f a s t - tr a c k di s pa r i ty i s notc a t e gor i c a l l y ba r r e d a s a s e nt e nc e - e va l ua t i ng da tum w i thi n the ove r a l l a m bi tof 18 U . S . C . § 3553( a ) . ” U ni t e d S t a t e s v. R odr i gue z , 527 F . 3d 22 1, 22 9 (1stC i r. 20 08 ). T he courtre as on ed that“ K i m brou gh m akes m ani fe stthatse nt enci ng court s posse ss suff i ci entdi sc re t i on un der s ec t i on 35 53 (a ) t o c ons i de rr e que s t s f

orva r i a nts e nt e nc e s pr e m i s e d on di s a gr e e m e nt s w i th the m a n n e rin w h ic h th e s e n te n c in g g u id e lin e s o p e r a te .” I d . a t 2 3 1 . T h e F ir s t C ir c u it 5 i s c orre ctthatK i m brou gh com pl et el y e vi sc er at es any pri or panel deci si on that hol ds tha ta s e nt e nc i ng c our tc a t e gor i c a l l y c a nnotc ons i de r“ f a s t - tr a c k” s e nt e nc i ng d is p a r itie s a s a b a s is f

o ra v a r ia n c e f

r o m a G u id e lin e s s e n te n c e .16

W hen i ti s nec es sa ry t o g i ve “ ful l ef fe ct ” t o an i nt er veni ng S up re m e C ou rt d e c is io n , a p a n e l o f

th is c o u r t m a y d e c lin e to f o llo w a d e c is io n o f

a p r io rp a n e l. L u f k in v . M c C a llu m , 9 5 6 F .2 d 1 1 0 4 , 1 1 0 7 ( 1 1 th C ir . 1 9 9 2 ) . I b e lie v e th e m a jo r ity ha s f a i l e d t o gi ve a ny e f

f e c tt o the S upr e m e C our t ’ s de c i s i on i n K i m br ough, a nd thus , I m us tdi s s e nta nd ur ge thi s c our tt o r e he a rthi s c a s e e n ba nc t o r e c ons i de rour p r io rp r e c e d e n ts in lig h t o f K im b r o u g h .