NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

AMY V. HINES,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER 

OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION,

 Defendant.

 CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-1318 (MLC)

 MEMORANDUM OPINION

COOPER, District Judge

The plaintiff, Amy V. Hines (“Plaintiff”), applies for 

judicial review of the final decision of the defendant, the 

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

(“Commissioner”), denying her claim for Disability Insurance 

Benefits (“DIB”). (Dkt. entry no. 1, Compl.) The Court has 

jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § (“Section”) 405(g). The 

Court, for the reasons stated herein, will affirm the 

Commissioner’s decision.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a claim for DIB on July 27, 2007, alleging 

that she became unable to work on June 14, 2006. (Administrative 

Record (“A.R.”) at 140-46.) The Commissioner denied the claim

on January 3, 2008. (Id. at 80-82.) Plaintiff sought

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reconsideration of the decision, which the Commissioner denied

on April 23, 2008. (Id. at 85-87.) On June 3, 2008, Plaintiff

timely requested a hearing before an administrative law judge. 

(Id. at 88-89.) Administrative Law Judge Mark G. Barrett 

(“ALJ”) conducted a hearing on January 19, 2010, in which 

Plaintiff was represented by counsel. (Id. at 12.)

The ALJ issued a decision on May 7, 2010, finding, inter

alia, that Plaintiff: (1) “meets the insured status requirements 

of the Act through December 31, 2011”; (2) “has not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since June 14, 2006”; (3) “has the 

following severe impairment: labyrinthitis (20 C.F.R.

404.1520(c))”; (4) “does not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed 

impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1”; (5) 

“has the residual functional capacity to lift and/or carry at 

least 20 pounds; to stand and/or walk for 2 hours and sit for 6 

hours in an 8-hour workday; and to occasionally climb ramps and 

stairs, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl,” but because “she finds 

it difficult to balance [she] should avoid exposure to workplace 

hazards including unprotected heights and moving machinery”; (6)

“is capable of performing past relevant work as a computer 

programmer” because such work “does not require the performance 

of work-related activities precluded by the claimant’s residual 

functional capacity”; and (7) “has not been under a disability, 

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as defined in the Social Security Act, from June 14, 2006, 

through the date of this decision (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f)).”

(Id. at 17-23.)

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to DIB. 

(Id. at 24.) Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s decision 

by the Appeals Council on May 21, 2010. (Id. at 10-11.) The 

Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on January 

4, 2011. (Id. at 1-5.) Plaintiff applied for review here on 

March 8, 2011. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard Of Review

The Court may review a final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security in a disability proceeding. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

The Court may affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner’s 

decision with or without remanding the case for a rehearing. 

Id. This judicial review, however, is limited. The Court must 

affirm the Commissioner’s decision regarding disability benefits 

if an examination of the record reveals that the findings of 

fact are supported by substantial evidence. Id.; Reefer v. 

Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003). “Substantial 

evidence” in the context of a Social Security matter is defined 

as less than a preponderance of the evidence but “more than a 

mere scintilla,” i.e., such evidence “as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. 

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Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quotation and citations 

omitted). This standard “is deferential and includes deference 

to inferences drawn from the facts if they, in turn, are 

supported by substantial evidence.” Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999).

Despite the deference given to administrative decisions 

under this standard, the Court “retain[s] a responsibility to 

scrutinize the entire record and to reverse or remand if the . . 

. decision is not supported by substantial evidence.” Smith v. 

Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1981). Furthermore,

[a] single piece of evidence will not satisfy the 

substantiality test if the [Commissioner] ignores, or 

fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing 

evidence. Nor is evidence substantial if it is 

overwhelmed by other evidence - particularly certain 

types of evidence (e.g., that offered by treating 

physicians) - or if it really constitutes not evidence 

but mere conclusion.

Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983). “That the 

record contains evidence which could have supported a different 

conclusion does not undermine” the Commissioner’s decision 

provided that the record contains substantial evidence 

supporting that decision. Rivera v. Shalala, No. 94-2740, 1995 

WL 495944, at *3 (D.N.J. July 26, 1995). The Commissioner is 

required, however, to address and reconcile medical evidence 

that would support a contrary conclusion. Schaudeck, 181 F.3d

at 435.

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II. Eligibility For Disability Insurance Benefits

The term “disability” is defined as the “inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can 

be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). An individual is determined 

to be disabled if the individual’s “physical or mental 

impairment or impairments are of such severity that [the 

individual] is not only unable to do his [or her] previous work 

but cannot, considering his [or her] age, education, and work 

experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work 

which exists in the national economy.” Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).

An ALJ employs a five-step process in determining whether a 

person is “disabled.” In the first step, the ALJ determines 

whether the claimant is currently engaged in “substantial gainful 

activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is 

so engaged, the ALJ will find that the claimant is not disabled 

and deny the application for disability benefits. Id. § 

404.1520(b). If the claimant is not employed, the ALJ will 

consider the medical severity and duration of the claimant’s 

impairment or combination of impairments in the second step. 

Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). A “severe impairment” is one that 

significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability 

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to do basic work activities, including, inter alia, (1) sitting, 

lifting, and speaking, (2) responding appropriately to 

supervision and co-workers, and (3) understanding, carrying out, 

and remembering instructions. Id. § 404.1521(a)-(b). A 

claimant not meeting this requirement is not disabled. Id. § 

404.1520(c). Thus, the second step requires a threshold-level 

demonstration of severe impairment without consideration of the 

claimant’s age, education, and work experience. Bowen v. 

Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 153 (1987).

If the claimant shows a severe impairment, the ALJ then 

moves to the third step to determine whether the impairment is 

listed in section 20, part 404, subpart P, appendix 1 of the 

C.F.R. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment 

meets or equals a listed impairment, then the claimant is 

presumed to be disabled, and the evaluation ends at this stage. 

Id. § 404.1520(d). If the impairment does not meet or equal a 

listed impairment, then the ALJ proceeds to step four. Id. § 

404.1520(a)(4).

The ALJ must determine at step four whether the impairment 

prevents the claimant from returning to the work that the 

claimant performed in the past. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). The 

claimant, if able to resume the previous work, will not be 

considered disabled. Id. If the claimant cannot resume 

previous work, the ALJ then moves to step five and considers the 

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claimant’s ability to perform other work that is available in 

the national economy. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(e). 

This inquiry requires the ALJ to consider the claimant’s 

residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work 

experience. Id. A claimant will be found disabled if the 

claimant is unable to adjust to any other work in the national 

economy. Id. § 404.1520(g).

The claimant has the initial burden of production for the 

first four steps of the evaluation process. Plummer v. Apfel, 

186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 1999). Once a claimant meets this 

burden, the burden shifts to the Commissioner in step five to 

show that the claimant has the transferable skills that would 

allow him or her to engage in alternative substantial gainful 

employment. Id.

III. Analysis of Plaintiff’s Claim

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s findings are not supported 

by substantial evidence. (Dkt. entry no. 12, Pl. Br. at 1.) 

Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by (1) assigning

inadequate weight to Dr. Abrams’s opinion on Plaintiff’s workrelated limitations, (2) failing to properly include Plaintiff’s 

symptom of dizziness in determining that she is capable of 

returning to her past relevant work, and (3) improperly 

discrediting Plaintiff’s statements regarding her condition. 

(Id. at 10-16.) The Commissioner argues, in contrast, that

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substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff 

was not disabled. (Dkt. entry no. 13, Def. Br. at 13.)

In determining whether a claimant is entitled to DIB, the 

ALJ “must consider all the evidence and give some reason for 

discounting the evidence [the ALJ] rejects.” Plummer, 186 F.3d 

at 429. The ALJ need not engage in a comprehensive analysis 

when explaining why probative evidence is being rejected. 

Cotter v. Harris, 650 F.2d 481, 482 (3d Cir. 1981). Rather, a 

short sentence or paragraph explaining the basis upon which the 

ALJ is rejecting evidence will suffice. Id. The ALJ is not 

required to reference each and every treatment notation with 

particularity in the analysis, but must “consider and evaluate 

the medical evidence in the record consistent with [the] 

responsibilities under the regulations and case law.” Fargnoli 

v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 42 (3d Cir. 2001). 

An ALJ “may choose whom to credit” when a conflict in the 

evidence exists, but may not “reject evidence for no reason or 

for the wrong reason.” Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429 (quotation and 

citation omitted). “When the medical testimony or conclusions 

are conflicting, the ALJ is not only entitled but required to 

choose between them.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d 

Cir. 1981). While treating physicians’ opinions are “accorded 

great weight,” an ALJ “may afford a treating physician’s opinion 

more or less weight depending upon the extent to which 

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supporting explanations are provided.” Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429 

(citation omitted). 

The Court need not examine the ALJ’s step one determination 

that Plaintiff has engaged in “substantial gainful activity”

after her alleged disability onset date. (A.R. at 17.) 

Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s finding at step two that 

she suffered from the severe impairment of labyrinthitis. (See

id.) Plaintiff also does not challenge the ALJ’s finding at

step three that she did not automatically qualify as disabled 

under any listed impairment. Further, the Court need not 

consider step five because the Court finds that the ALJ’s step 

four determination that Plaintiff could perform past relevant 

work is supported by substantial evidence. (See id. at 39-42.) 

Therefore, the Court will address the ALJ’s determinations at 

step four.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred at step four of the 

sequential analysis because his decision that Plaintiff’s 

residual functional capacity allowed her to perform sustained, 

full-time work was not based on substantial evidence. Before 

proceeding to step four and step five in the sequential analysis, 

the ALJ must determine whether Plaintiff’s impairment prevents 

her from returning to the work that she performed in the past. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). This requires a determination 

of Plaintiff’s residual functioning capacity (“RFC”), which is 

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defined as “the most you can still do despite your limitations.” 

Id. § 404.1545(a)(1). To properly assess an individual’s RFC, 

the ALJ must consider all the relevant evidence in the record. 

Id. In addition to considering an individual’s ability to 

perform specific work activities, a determination of an

individual’s RFC necessarily involves consideration of whether 

that individual is capable of performing the relevant work 

activities on a “regular and continuing basis.” See id. §

404.1545(b); SSR 96-8P, “Assessing Residual Functional Capacity 

in Initial Claims,” 1996 WL 374184 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996) (stating

that “RFC is an assessment of an individual’s ability to do 

sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work 

setting on a regular and continuing basis”).

A. ALJ’s Consideration of the Opinion of Dr. Abrams in 

Formulating RFC

Plaintiff asserts that in determining that her RFC allowed 

her to work on a regular and continuing basis and to return to 

her past relevant work, the ALJ failed to give adequate weight 

to the opinion of Dr. Abrams in deciding that Plaintiff was not 

capable of performing sustained, full-time work. (Pl. Br. at 

9.) The Court finds that the ALJ’s decision to assign minimal 

weight to the Medical Source Statement (“MSS”) of Dr. Abrams was 

supported by substantial evidence. “A cardinal principle guiding 

disability eligibility determinations is that the ALJ accord 

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treating physicians’ reports great weight, especially ‘when 

their opinions reflect expert judgment based on a continuing 

observation of the patient’s condition over a prolonged period of

time.’” Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429 (internal citations omitted).1

Plaintiff argues that Dr. Abrams was Plaintiff’s only 

treating physician and therefore his opinion should be given 

great if not controlling weight. (See Pl. Br. at 12.) Plaintiff 

consulted with Dr. Abrams at the request of her attorney. (A.R.

at 68-69.) Therefore, Dr. Abrams should not be considered a 

treating doctor. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 (explaining that a 

medical source will not be considered a treating source when 

Plaintiff’s relationship with the doctor does not arise out of a 

medical need for treatment or evaluation but rather arises from

a need to obtain a report in support of a disability claim).

 

Additionally, “[i]n considering a claim for disability benefits, 

greater weight should be given to the findings of a treating 

physician than to a physician who has examined the claimant as a 

consultant.” Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 47 (3d Cir. 1994).

 1

 A treating source is a “physician, psychologist, or other 

acceptable medical source” who provides a patient with “medical 

treatment or evaluation,” and has an “ongoing treatment 

relationship” with the patient. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502. A 

medical source may be considered a treating source where the 

claimant sees the source “with a frequency consistent with 

accepted medical practice for the type of treatment . . . 

required for [the claimant’s] condition(s).” Id.

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Dr. Abrams opined in his MSS that Plaintiff’s impairments 

“do prevent her from working in her usual capacity” and that she 

could not engage in “gainful employment . . . given these 

ongoing symptoms.” (A.R. at 358.) Thus, not only was Dr. Abrams 

not a treating physician, but his MSS was an opinion on an issue 

reserved to the Commissioner because it addresses whether 

Plaintiff is disabled as defined by the Act. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527; SSR 96-5P, “Medical Source Opinions on Issues Reserved 

to the Commissioner,” 1996 WL 374183 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). 

Opinions that are either from a non-treating source and/or on an 

issue reserved to the Commissioner are never entitled to 

controlling weight, and therefore must be weighed against all of 

the other evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; SSR 

96-5P. In determining the weight of a doctor’s opinion, the ALJ 

is required to consider, inter alia, the length, nature, and 

extent of the treatment relationship, the medical evidence 

presented in support of the opinion, and the consistency of the 

opinion with the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ gave greater weight to the 

opinions of Dr. Pasupuleti and Dr. Alexeeva over Dr. Abrams 

solely because Dr. Abrams saw Plaintiff on only one occasion. 

(Pl. Br. at 12.) However, this contention is inaccurate, 

because the ALJ also pointed out that Dr. Abrams’s opinion is

unsupported by his own findings and inconsistent with the rest 

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of the record, including Plaintiff’s own statements, other 

objective medical evidence, and the opinions of Dr. Pasupuleti 

and Dr. Alexeeva. (A.R. at 22-23.)

The only objective explanation for Dr. Abrams’s opinion was 

his finding of nystagmus, which does not necessarily support the 

dramatic limitations that Dr. Abrams asserts. (Id. at 358.)2

 2 “Nystagmus is a term to describe fast, uncontrollable movements 

of the eyes.” Medline Plus, Nystagmus, U.S. Nat’l Library of 

Med., http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/003037.htm.

 

Dr. Abrams did not provide any objective evidence of the 

frequency, persistence, and intensity of Plaintiff’s symptoms to 

support his opinion. Dr. Abrams’s opinion that Plaintiff 

required 1-2 hours of supine rest on a daily basis is 

inconsistent with Plaintiff’s statements that her dizzy spells 

are “erratic” and “unpredictable.” (A.R. at 55 (Plaintiff’s 

testimony about the frequency of her dizzy spells); id. at 169

(function report by Plaintiff); id. at 361 (Dr. Abrams’s MSS

describing how Plaintiff’s symptoms limit her ability to work).) 

In fact, Plaintiff asserts in her brief that her “unpredictable 

dizziness . . . requires supine rest on an unpredictable basis.” 

(Pl. Br. at 10.) Dr. Abrams’s MSS also asserts that side effects

from Plaintiff’s Xanax would affect Plaintiff’s functioning at 

work. (A.R. at 361.) However, Plaintiff testified that she 

does not experience any side effects from her medication. (Id.

at 61.) Further, Dr. Abrams’s opinion is inconsistent with 

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Plaintiff’s normal results on physical tests performed by other 

doctors. (See id. at 259-73, 351-56, 367-70.)

As the ALJ properly noted, Dr. Pasupuleti and Dr. Alexeeva 

are treating physicians because they have seen Plaintiff on more 

than one occasion, have given her physical examinations, and 

have made treatment recommendations to her. (See id. at 23 (ALJ 

hearing decision); id. at 259-73 (office treatment records from 

Dr. Pasupuleti); id. at 350-56 (office treatment records from 

Dr. Alexeeva)). Dr. Pasupuleti suggested that Plaintiff was able

to return to work about a month after she first experienced her 

symptoms. (Id. at 272-73.) Dr. Alexeeva opined that Plaintiff 

was “really not disabled.” (Id. at 356.) Thus, the opinions of 

Dr. Pasupuleti and Dr. Alexeeva were on issues reserved to the 

Commissioner, but Plaintiff is incorrect in asserting that 

opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner “are not subject 

to evaluation pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.” (Pl. Br. at

11.) Although opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner 

are never automatically entitled to controlling weight, the ALJ 

is required to evaluate such opinions according to the factors 

set out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527, and may not ignore them. See

SSR 96-5P.

The ALJ was entitled to give greater weight to the opinions

of Dr. Pasupuleti and Dr. Alexeeva as long as he provided 

reasons for doing so, which he did. See Plummer, 186 F.3d at 

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429; Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705. Several pages of medical records

accompanied the opinions of Dr. Pasupuleti and Dr. Alexeeva, 

while Dr. Abrams’s opinion was accompanied only by his finding 

of nystagmus. (A.R. at 259-73 (office treatment records from 

Dr. Pasupuleti); id. at 351-56 (office treatment records from 

Dr. Alexeeva); id. at 357-66 (medical report from Dr. Abrams).)

See Chanbunmy v. Astrue, 560 F.Supp.2d 371, 387 (E.D. Pa. 2008)

(finding it acceptable for the ALJ to give greater weight to the 

opinion of a doctor who provided a detailed report with specific 

findings, than that of a doctor who provided “very few words of 

explanation” with his opinion). The opinions of Dr. Pasupuleti 

and Dr. Alexeeva were consistent with Plaintiff’s previous 

reports that her dizzy spells had improved and she was not 

currently being treated for the same. Further, two state 

medical examiners opined that the Plaintiff was capable of 

returning to her past work. (A.R. at 307-14, 339-48.) The ALJ 

was not required to accept Dr. Abrams’s opinion that Plaintiff’s 

impairments rendered her unable to work or to accord it 

controlling weight. Rather, there was substantial evidence in 

the record for the ALJ to conclude that Dr. Abrams’s opinion 

should be given minimal weight. The Court will defer to the 

Commissioner’s decision insofar as it adopted the ALJ’s findings 

with respect to Dr. Abrams.

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B. ALJ’s Rejection of Plaintiff’s Dizziness in 

Formulating RFC 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not include “any 

limitation related to the Plaintiff’s dizziness in the

formulation of RFC.” (Pl. Br. 10.) The Court finds that,

contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the ALJ did not “essentially 

reject” Plaintiff’s dizziness in formulating her RFC. (Id.) 

The ALJ, in assessing RFC, must consider limitations caused 

not only by the claimant’s impairment alone, but also the 

limiting effects of any related symptoms, even those that are 

“not severe.” SSR 96-8P. The ALJ uses a two-step process in 

evaluating symptoms. When evaluating a claimant’s symptoms in 

formulating the RFC, the ALJ must first determine whether there 

is a “medically determinable impairment” that could “reasonably 

be expected” to produce the symptom complained of. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1529. Then the ALJ must evaluate “the intensity, persistence, 

and functionally limiting effects of the symptoms to determine 

the extent to which the symptoms affect the individual’s ability 

to do basic work activities,” which “requires the adjudicator to 

make a finding about the credibility of the individual’s 

statements.” SSR 96-7P, “Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability 

Claims: Assessing the Credibility of an Individual’s Statements,” 

1996 WL 374186 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). See also Hartranft v. 

Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d. Cir. 1999).

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The ALJ, while not fully crediting Plaintiff’s statements 

for reasons discussed below, explicitly took her statements 

about her dizziness into account when deciding to reject the RFC 

suggested by two state agency medical reviewers. (A.R. at 22.) 

Therefore, the ALJ did not ignore Plaintiff’s symptoms in

formulating her RFC. Instead, the ALJ expressly accepted that 

dizziness resulted from Plaintiff’s impairment, and only 

somewhat discredited Plaintiff’s statements about the frequency, 

intensity, and limiting effects of the dizziness. The Court 

finds no basis for remand in Plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ 

failed to consider her dizziness in formulating the RFC.

C. ALJ’s Determination of Plaintiff’s Credibility 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s credibility determination 

is not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, 

Plaintiff argues that her own testimony is not inconsistent with 

the other statements in the record, her daily activities do not 

suggest she is capable of working, and her non-compliance with 

treatment recommendations is due to lack of health insurance and 

not improvement of symptoms. (Pl. Br. at 13-17.) The Court 

finds that the ALJ’s credibility determination, which resulted 

in a finding that Plaintiff was capable of performing past 

relevant work, was based on substantial evidence. 

The ALJ must give “serious consideration to the plaintiff’s 

subjective complaints of pain, even when those assertions are 

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not fully confirmed by objective medical evidence.” Mason v. 

Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1067 (3d. Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). 

As long as the ALJ gives reasons other than a lack of objective 

evidence supporting the subjective complaints, the reviewing 

court should accept the ALJ’s credibility determination. See

Reyes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 07-3884, 2008 WL 1995144, at *6

(D.N.J. May 5, 2008) (“[I]t is well within the discretion of the 

Commissioner to evaluate the credibility of Plaintiff’s 

complaints and render an independent judgment in light of the 

medical findings and other evidence regarding the true extent 

of. . . symptoms”) (citation omitted). See also SSR 96-7P

(stating that an adjudicator cannot reject an individual’s 

subjective complaints “solely because they are not substantiated 

by objective medical evidence,” but must give other reasons for 

the credibility determination).

The ALJ correctly concluded that Plaintiff’s testimony at 

the hearing was inconsistent with other evidence in the record. 

See id. (“One strong indication of the credibility of an 

individual’s statements is their consistency, both internally 

and with other information in the case record.”) Plaintiff 

testified at the hearing that her dizzy spells occur on average 

once a week, but that she can go 2-3 weeks without having a 

dizzy spell. (A.R. at 55.) However, during her visit with Dr. 

Alexeeva, she failed to mention that her dizzy spells happen once

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a week and only reported that she could go 2-3 weeks without a 

dizzy spell. (Id. at 351.) Plaintiff also testified that her 

life has “become” that of a hermit since her impairments began. 

(Id. at 72.) In her initial application paperwork for DIB, 

however, Plaintiff reported that she avoided social activities 

even before her impairments began. (Id. at 173.)

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that her 

daily activities suggest an ability to maintain consistent work 

activity, because she only engages in those daily activities 

when she is not having a dizzy spell. The ALJ acknowledged, 

however, that Plaintiff reported that she can watch movies or 

read unless she is having a “particularly bad spell.” (Id. at

213.) Even if Plaintiff does experience dizzy spells once a 

week as she asserts, there is nothing to suggest that each

weekly spell is “particularly bad” such that she is completely 

debilitated. In fact, Plaintiff testified that her spells vary 

in intensity. (Id. at 72.) 

Plaintiff also argues that because the ALJ conceded that 

driving was a trigger to her dizzy spells, he should have 

concluded that she was unable to commute to a job. (Pl. Br. at 

15.) However, the ALJ was not required to determine that she 

could not return to her past work simply because her ability to 

commute to work was limited. See SSR 82-61P, “Past Relevant 

Work--The Particular Job or the Occupation as Generally 

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Performed,” 1982 WL 31387 (S.S.A. Aug. 20, 1982) (listing factors 

that an ALJ should consider to determine whether an individual 

can return to past relevant work without mentioning ability to 

commute); cf. Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1204 (4th Cir. 1995) 

(explaining that a determination that an individual can return 

to past relevant work involves only an assessment of that 

individual’s capacity to perform the tasks involved in the job).

The ALJ also properly rejected Plaintiff’s statements about 

the intensity, frequency, and limiting effects of her symptoms 

based on Plaintiff’s treatment history and failure to follow 

treatment recommendations. See SSR 96-7P (stating that a 

plaintiff’s statements about symptoms “may be less credible if 

the level or frequency of treatment is inconsistent with the 

level of complaints, or if the medical reports or records show 

that the individual is not following the treatment as prescribed 

and there are no good reasons for this failure.”) There was 

substantial evidence in the record for the ALJ to infer that 

Plaintiff’s symptoms had improved and were no longer as limiting 

as she claimed them to be. Plaintiff did not seek treatment for 

her dizzy spells since her last visit with Dr. Pasupuleti, 

during which she reported that her spells had improved. (A.R.

at 269.) She made no mention of her dizzy spells until her 

third visit with Dr. Alexeeva. (Id. at 351.) Plaintiff was no 

longer on any prescription medication for her dizziness except 

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for Xanax, which she only used occasionally. (Id. at 58-59.)

Further, Plaintiff was never hospitalized for her condition. 

(Id. at 61.) See Reyes, 2008 WL 1995144, at *7 (finding that 

plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain and disabling 

limitations were not supported where plaintiff was never 

hospitalized for her condition and did not take any medication 

for her alleged pain).

Contrary to Plaintiff’s testimony that her doctors “threw 

up their hands” and told her there was nothing more they could 

do, Plaintiff’s medical records show otherwise. Dr. Alexeeva 

recommended that Plaintiff should have additional testing; 

specifically, a carotid Doppler and transcranial Doppler. (A.R.

at 61, 352.) Dr. Pasupuleti suggested that Plaintiff receive 

treatment at The Balance Center. (Id. at 269.) The ALJ thus

had substantial evidence in the record to reject Plaintiff’s 

contention that her doctors failed to offer her any solutions to 

her impairments. The Court therefore finds that the ALJ’s 

finding that Plaintiff’s statements regarding the intensity, 

persistence, and functionally limiting effects of her symptoms 

were not entirely credible, was based on substantial evidence.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed supra, the Court will affirm the 

Commissioner’s decision denying Plaintiff’s claim. The Court 

will issue an appropriate Order.

 s/ Mary L. Cooper .

MARY L. COOPER

United States District Judge

Dated: July 6, 2012

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