PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT 

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Kimmel & Silverman, P.C. 

1930 East Marlton Pike, Suite Q29 

Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08003 

Telephone: 856-429-8334 

Attorney of Record: Amy Bennecoff (AB0891) 

Attorney for Plaintiff 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

CYNTHIA BERRIGAN, 

 Plaintiff 

 v. 

PRESSLER & PRESSLER, LLP 

 Defendant 

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Case No.: 

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR 

JURY TRIAL 

(Unlawful Debt Collection Practices)

COMPLAINT

 CYNTHIA BERRIGAN (“Plaintiff”), by her attorneys, KIMMEL & 

SILVERMAN, P.C., alleges the following against PRESSLER & PRESSLER, 

LLP (“Defendant”): 

INTRODUCTION 

1. Plaintiff’s Complaint is based on the Fair Debt Collection Practices 

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (“FDCPA”). 

 

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PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT 

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2. Jurisdiction of this court arises pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d), 

which states that such actions may be brought and heard before “any appropriate 

United States district court without regard to the amount in controversy,” and 28 

U.S.C. § 1331 grants this court original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising 

under the laws of the United States. 

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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 

3. Defendant conducts business and has an office in the State of New 

Jersey and therefore, personal jurisdiction is established. 

4. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). 

5. Declaratory relief is available pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 

2202. 

PARTIES 

6. Plaintiff is a natural person residing in Bayou, New Jersey. 

7. Plaintiff is a “consumer” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 

1692a(3). 

8. Defendant is a national debt collection company with corporate 

headquarters located at 7 Entin Road in Parsippany, New Jersey, 07054. 

9. Defendant is a “debt collector” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 

1692a(6), and repeatedly contacted Plaintiff in an attempt to collect a debt. 

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10. Defendant acted through its agents, employees, officers, members, 

directors, heirs, successors, assigns, principals, trustees, sureties, subrogees, 

representatives, and insurers. 

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 

11. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) is a 

comprehensive statute, which prohibits a catalog of activities in connection with 

the collection of debts by third parties. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. The FDCPA 

imposes civil liability on any person or entity that violates its provisions, and 

establishes general standards of debt collector conduct, defines abuse, and provides 

for specific consumer rights. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. The operative provisions of the 

FDCPA declare certain rights to be provided to or claimed by debtors, forbid 

deceitful and misleading practices, prohibit harassing and abusive tactics, and 

proscribe unfair or unconscionable conduct, both generally and in a specific list of 

disapproved practices. 

12. In particular, the FDCPA broadly enumerates several practices 

considered contrary to its stated purpose, and forbids debt collectors from taking

such action. The substantive heart of the FDCPA lies in three broad prohibitions. 

First, a “debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of 

which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection 

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of a debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. Second, a “debt collector may not use any false, 

deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection 

of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. And third, a “debt collector may not use unfair 

or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 

1692f. The FDCPA is designed to protect consumers from unscrupulous 

collectors, whether or not there exists a valid debt, broadly prohibits unfair or 

unconscionable collection methods, conduct which harasses, oppresses or abuses 

any debtor, and any false, deceptive or misleading statements in connection with 

the collection of a debt. 

13. In enacting the FDCPA, the United States Congress found that 

“[t]here is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt 

collection practices by many debt collectors,” which “contribute to the number of 

personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of 

individual privacy.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a. Congress additionally found existing 

laws and procedures for redressing debt collection injuries to be inadequate to 

protect consumers. 15 U.S.C. § 1692b. 

14. Congress enacted the FDCPA to regulate the collection of consumer 

debts by debt collectors. The express purposes of the FDCPA are to “eliminate 

abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that debt collectors 

who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively 

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20. On July 30, 2010 upon finding out that her checking account had been 

levied Plaintiff called Defendant and spoke with its agent “John”. Plaintiff 

explained to “John” that the Pamrapo checking account was a child support and 

unemployment fund account in which the funds were direct deposited. 

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disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against 

debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 

. At all relevant times, Defendant was attempting to collect two (2) 

alleged consumer debts from Plaintiff. 

6. The alleged debts at issue arose out of transactions, which were 

primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 

17. On July 6, 2010 Defendant placed a levy on Plaintiff’s Pamrapo 

checking account in the amount of $5,299.01. 

8. On July 29, 2010 Defendant removed $875.00 plus an added $75.00 

levy fee from Plaintiff’s Pamrapo checking account. 

9. At the time the Plaintiff had in total $989.70 in her Pamrapo checking 

account. 

1. Plaintiff informed Defendant that the amount of money they took 

from her was the money directly deposited from her latest unemployment check 

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1 and the balance of her child support. 

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24. “John” stated that Plaintiff would need to prove that the money in her 

checking account was from child support payments and unemployment checks. 

Plaintiff was to provide three (3) months worth of bank statements. 

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26. Plaintiff told “John” that her child support and unemployment check 

total $2,900.00 a month, but that the account can overlap if she waits till the 

fifteenth of the month to pay the rent instead of on the first, that is why her 

account could look like it has more deposits in it then it really does. 

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. Plaintiff requested that Defendant remove the levy and return the 

funds so that she could pay her rent for the upcoming month. 

3. Plaintiff also told “John” that since it was a Friday and the bank 

would be closed for the weekend Defendant was leaving her with no money and 

no recourse at all until Monday. 

5. “John” also informed Plaintiff that if there were any other deposits 

into the account then the Defendant was entitled to take them. 

7. Plaintiff told “John” that her rent and living expenses far outreached 

the amount she received from child support and unemployment. 

28. “John” once again stated that Plaintiff would need to prove this. 

9. On July 30, 2010 Plaintiff called up Defendant again to ask for the 

name of the original creditor and the original amount of the debt, she spoke with 

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1 “Brittney”. 

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34. Plaintiff once again requested Defendant to remove the levy because 

the bank account in question was for child support and unemployment check 

deposits only. 

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. “Brittney” informed the Plaintiff that she had forfeited all of her rights 

to any information regarding to the judgment issued against her. 

1. The Plaintiff informed “Brittney” that she was neither confirming nor 

denying the debt at this time, she merely wanted to know where the debt 

originated. 

32. “Brittney” again refused to provide the requested information. 

3. On Friday, July 30, 2010, Plaintiff drafted a letter to Defendant and 

faxed it on Monday, August 2, 2010. True and correct copies of the relevant 

portions of the July 30, 2010 letter are attached hereto as Exhibit “A”. 

See Exhibit A. 

35. Plaintiff included copies of her checking account deposits made from 

the months of April 2010 to June 2010. The only deposits into Plaintiffs checking 

account were for child support and unemployment. See Exhibit A. 

36. After Plaintiff faxed Defendant the above letter she called Defendant 

to ensure her documents had been received. 

37. Plaintiff was informed that she would need to resend her documents. 

38. On August 3, 2010 Plaintiff once again called Defendant to see if her 

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documents had been reviewed; Defendant informed Plaintiff they had not yet 

retrieved and/or reviewed her documents. 

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43. Plaintiff was frustrated by Defendant’s lack of attention to this matter 

as she was unable to provide food and pay for living expenses for her and her 

children. 

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45. At no time prior to the levy was Plaintiff ever informed that a 

judgment had been issued against her and that Defendant would be levying her 

bank account. 

. In response to this, Plaintiff re-faxed the documents to ensure 

Defendant’s receipt of the same. 

0. On August 4, 2010, Plaintiff still without access to her checking 

account, called Defendant to see if her documents had been reviewed; Defendant 

informed Plaintiff they still had not yet retrieved and/or reviewed her documents. 

41. In response to this, Plaintiff re-faxed the documents again. 

2. On August 6, 2010 Plaintiff once again called Defendant to check on 

whether her documents had been reviewed; Defendant informed her that it still had 

not yet retrieved and/or reviewed her documents. 

4. Almost a month went by until the levy was removed and Plaintiff 

could once again access her unemployment and child support funds. 

46. Defendant also made repeated harassing telephone calls to Plaintiff at 

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her home telephone number in an effort to collect this alleged debt; the most 

recent telephone call to Plaintiff was made on April 18, 2011. 

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49. The FDCPA is a strict liability statute. 

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47. These contacts are despite knowledge that Plaintiff is represented by 

counsel and correspondence Plaintiff’s counsel sent to Defendant on August 24, 

2010 indicating to cease and desist any further contact with Plaintiff. A true and 

correct copy of the August 24, 2010 letter is attached hereto as Exhibit “B”. 

8. Defendant’s actions in attempting to collect the alleged debt were 

harassing, abusive and highly deceptive. 

 

CONSTRUCTION OF APPLICABLE LAW 

Taylor v. Perrin, Landry, 

deLaunay & Durand, 103 F.3d 1232 (5th Cir. 1997). “Because the Act imposes 

strict liability, a consumer need not show intentional conduct by the debt collector 

to be entitled to damages.” Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F. 3d 30 (2d Cir. 1996);

see also Gearing v. Check Brokerage Corp., 233 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding 

unintentional misrepresentation of debt collector’s legal status violated FDCPA); 

Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F. 2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993). 

50. The FDCPA is a remedial statute, and therefore must be construed 

liberally in favor of the debtor. Sprinkle v. SB&C Ltd., 472 F. Supp. 2d 1235 

(W.D. Wash. 2006). The remedial nature of the FDCPA requires that courts 

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interpret it liberally. 

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Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Services, Inc., 460 F. 3d 

1162 (9th Cir. 2006). “Because the FDCPA, like the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) 

15 U.S.C §1601 et seq., is a remedial statute, it should be construed liberally in 

favor of the consumer.” Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F. 3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2002). 

51. The FDCPA is to be interpreted in accordance with the “least 

sophisticated” consumer standard. See Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168 

(11th Cir. 1985); Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F. 2d 107 (3rd Cir. 1991); Swanson v. 

Southern Oregon Credit Service, Inc., 869 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1988). The FDCPA 

was not “made for the protection of experts, but for the public - that vast multitude 

which includes the ignorant, the unthinking, and the credulous, and the fact that a 

false statement may be obviously false to those who are trained and experienced 

does not change its character, nor take away its power to deceive others less 

experienced.” Id. The least sophisticated consumer standard serves a dual 

purpose in that it ensures protection of all consumers, even naive and trusting, 

against deceptive collection practices, and protects collectors against liability for 

bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices. Clomon, 988 F. 2d at 

1318. 

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COUNT I 

DEFENDANT VIOLATED 

THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

52. In its actions to collect a disputed debt, Defendant violated the 

FDCPA in one or more of the following ways: 

a. Defendant violated of the FDCPA generally; 

b. Defendant violated § 1692c(a) of the FDCPA when it 

communicated with Plaintiff after it had knowledge that Plaintiff 

was represented by counsel; 

c. Defendant violated § 1692c(c) of the FDCPA when it 

communicated with Plaintiff after being advised to cease further 

communication; 

d. Defendant violated § 1692d of the FDCPA by harassing Plaintiff 

in connection with the collection of an alleged debt; 

e. Defendant violated § 1692d(5) of the FDCPA by causing 

Plaintiff’s telephone to ring repeatedly or continuously with the 

intent to annoy, abuse or harass Plaintiff; 

f. Defendant violated § 1692e of the FDCPA by using false, 

deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection 

with the collection of a debt; 

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g. Defendant violated § 1692e(10) of the FDCPA by using false 

representations or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect 

a debt; 

h. Defendant violated § 1692f of the FDCPA by using unfair and 

unconscionable means with Plaintiff to collect or attempt to collect 

a debt; 

i. Defendant violated § 1692g of the FDCPA by failing to send 

written notification, within five (5) days after its initial 

communication with Plaintiff, advising Plaintiff of her rights to 

dispute the debt or request verification of the debt; 

j. Defendant acted in an otherwise deceptive, unfair and 

unconscionable manner and failed to comply with the FDCPA. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, CYNTHIA BERRIGAN, respectfully pray for a 

judgment as follows: 

a. All actual compensatory damages suffered pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 

1692k(a)(1); 

b. Statutory damages of $1,000.00 for each violation of the FDCPA 

pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A); 

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c. All reasonable attorneys’ fees, witness fees, court costs and other 

litigation costs incurred by Plaintiff pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 

1693k(a)(3); and 

d. Any other relief deemed appropriate by this Honorable Court. 

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff, CYNTHIA BERRIGAN, demands 

a jury trial in this case. 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO L.CIV.R.11.2

 I hereby certify pursuant to Local Civil Rule 11.2 that this matter in 

controversy is not subject to any other action pending in any court, arbitration or 

administrative proceeding. 

 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 

DATED: April 22 2010 KIMMEL & SILVERMAN, P.C.. 

By: /s/ Amy L. Bennecoff 

Amy L. Bennecoff 

Attorney ID # AB 0891 

Kimmel & Silverman, P.C 

1930 E. Marlton Pike, Suite Q29 

Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08003 

Phone: (856) 429-8334 

Facsimile (856) 216-7344 

Email: abennecoff@creditlaw.com 

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