J-S29019-18

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: A H. A/K/A 

A.D.H., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.H., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 85 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree December 13, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000910-2017, 

CP-51-DP-0003127-2015, FID: 51-FN-002636-2015

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED JUNE 13, 2018

A.H. (Mother) appeals from the decree that involuntarily terminated her 

parental rights to her minor son, A.D.H. (Child), born in November 2008.1 

Additionally, Mother’s counsel filed a petition to withdraw and brief pursuant 

to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. 

Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). After careful review, we grant counsel’s 

petition to withdraw and affirm.

The Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) opened a case 

file for Child in October 2015 due to substance abuse and housing concerns 

with Mother. Trial Court Opinion, 1/19/18, at 1. On January 13, 2016, the 

trial court adjudicated Child dependent and identified Child’s permanency goal 

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1 E.D.B. (Father) voluntarily relinquished his parental rights to Child and is not 

a party to this appeal.
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as reunification. Child was placed with, and continues to reside with, Maternal 

Aunt and Uncle. Mother was granted supervised vitiation with Child at the 

agency. 

On September 15, 2017, DHS filed a petition to change Child’s 

permanency goal from reunification to adoption and to involuntarily terminate 

Mother’s parental rights to Child. On December 13, 2017, the trial court held 

a joint hearing on the petitions.2 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial 

court orally delivered its decree terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child 

and changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption. The trial court entered its 

decree that same day. Mother timely filed a notice of appeal on December 

18, 2017, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. 

On February 15, 2018, Mother’s counsel filed an Anders brief, in which

counsel argued that Mother’s appeal was frivolous and requested permission 

from this Court to withdraw as counsel.3

Before reaching the merits of Mother’s appeal, we must first address 

counsel’s petition to withdraw. See Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 

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2 At the hearing, Child was represented by guardian ad litem, Andre Martino, 

Esquire, and by legal counsel, Daniel Silver, Esquire. Mr. Martino and Mr. 

Silver both advocated in favor of terminating Mother’s parental rights.

3 Counsel did not file a separate petition to withdraw, but rather set forth his 

withdrawal request in his Anders brief. While this is satisfactory, we note our 

preference that counsel file a separate petition to withdraw. See 

Commonwealth v. Fischetti, 669 A.2d 399, 400 (Pa. Super. 1995) 

(“Although we believe the more desirable practice would be to submit a 

separate withdrawal request to the court, we . . . treat counsel’s [request] in 

the brief as such a request.”); see also Commonwealth v. Green, 513 A.2d

1008, 1010 (Pa. Super. 1986).
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638, 639 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“When faced with a purported Anders brief, this 

Court may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first passing 

on the request to withdraw.”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 700 A.2d 

1301, 1303 (Pa. Super. 1997)). This Court extended the Anders procedure 

to appeals from decrees involuntarily terminating parental rights in In re V.E., 

611 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Super. 1992). To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel 

must:

1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after 

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has 

determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy 

of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the 

[appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel 

or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy 

of the court’s attention.

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en 

banc) (citing Commonwealth v. Lilley, 978 A.2d 995, 997 (Pa. Super. 

2009)). With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel inform 

the appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal, this Court 

has held that counsel must “attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of the 

letter sent to their client advising him or her of their rights.” Commonwealth 

v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Additionally, an Anders brief must comply with the following 

requirements:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes 

arguably supports the appeal;
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(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; 

and

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of 

record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that 

have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. 

In the instant matter, Mother’s counsel filed a petition to withdraw, 

certifying that he reviewed the record and determined that Mother’s appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel also filed a brief, which includes a summary of the history 

and facts of the case, potential issues that could be raised by Mother, and 

counsel’s assessment of why those issues are frivolous, with citations to 

relevant legal authority. Counsel provided Mother with a copy of the brief and 

a letter advising her that she may obtain new counsel or raise additional issues 

pro se. Accordingly, counsel complied substantially with the requirements of 

Anders and Santiago. Therefore, we may proceed to review the issues 

outlined in the Anders brief. We must also “conduct an independent review 

of the record to discern if there are any additional, non-frivolous issues 

overlooked by counsel.” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1250 

(Pa. Super. 2015) (footnote omitted). 

Counsel’s Anders brief raises the following issues for our review.

1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error, when it 

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights and changed 

the goal from reunification to adoption where such 

determination was not supported by clear and convincing 
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evidence under the [A]doption [A]ct, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8)[?]

2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it 

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights without giving 

primary consideration to the effect that the termination would 

have on the developmental, physical and emotional needs of 

the child as required by the [A]doption [A]ct, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(b)[?]

3. Whether[ ] the trial court erred because the evidence was 

overwhelming and undisputed that Mother demonstrated a 

genuine interest and sincere, persistent, and unrelenting effort 

to maintain a parent-child relationship with her child[?]

Anders Brief at 6 (unpaginated).

We review these claims mindful of our well-settled standard of review:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 
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that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

In this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant 

to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). We need only agree with the 

court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), 

in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, we analyze the court’s 

decision to terminate under Section 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provides as 

follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

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(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 
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medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 

are first initiated subsequent to the giving notice of the filing 

of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b). 

As it relates to Section 2511(a)(1), we note the pertinent inquiry for our 

review: 

To satisfy Section 2511(a)(1), the moving party must 

produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct sustained 

for at least the six months prior to the filing of the 

termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to 

relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to 

perform parental duties. . . . Section 2511 does not require 

that the parent demonstrate both a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child and refusal or failure 

to perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights may 

be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if the parent 

either demonstrates a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child or fails to perform parental duties.

In re D.J.S., 737 A.2d 283, 285 (Pa. Super. 1999) (quoting In re Adoption 

of Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)) (internal citations omitted). 

Although the six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition are 

the most critical to the analysis, “the trial court must consider the whole 

history of a given case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory 

provision.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847 (Pa. Super. 2004). Additionally, to 

the extent that the trial court based its decision to terminate parental rights 

pursuant to subsection (a)(1), “the court shall not consider any efforts by the 

parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated 
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subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(b). In In re C.M.S., we explained, “[a] parent is required to exert a 

sincere and genuine effort to maintain a parent-child relationship; the parent 

must use all available resources to preserve the parental relationship and must 

exercise ‘reasonable firmness’ in resisting obstacles placed in the path of 

maintaining the parent-child relationship.” 832 A.2d 457, 462 (Pa. Super. 

2003).

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties or a 

settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the trial court must then 

engage in three additional lines of inquiry: “(1) the parent’s explanation for 

his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between parent and 

child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights on 

the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (quoting In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d at 91).

In granting DHS’s petition for involuntary termination, the trial court 

made the following determination:

Under these specific facts and circumstances, this [c]ourt found 

clear and convincing evidence that Mother demonstrated a settled 

purpose of relinquishing parental claim to the Child and failed to 

perform any parental duties. The Child was removed from 

Mother’s home approximately twenty months ago. Mother’s 

refusal to parent since that time was demonstrated by her failure 

to comply with her single case plan objectives. Mother has never 

completed a drug a program and has not attended random drug 

screens [] as ordered by this [c]ourt. Most importantly, Mother 

has never attended parenting classes and has demonstrated an 

inability to properly parent the Child. According to the testimony 

of the [] social worker, Mother’s visits with the Child w[ere]
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suspended for a short period as a result of Mother’s inappropriate 

behavior during visits. Mother’s phone contact with the Child was 

also discontinued due to the inappropriate conversations Mother 

had with the Child about his body parts. Mother’s actions 

demonstrate a need for parenting classes; however, Mother has 

never completed a parenting program. These minimal objectives 

would have demonstrated Mother’s interest in caring for her child; 

however, Mother made little efforts to fulfill these objectives. 

Accordingly, this [c]ourt found termination of Mother’s parental 

rights warranted pursuant to [Section] 2511(a)(1).

Trial Court Opinion, 1/19/18, at 6.

Mother argues that she has complied with the objectives put in place by 

DHS. Namely, Mother asserts that she completed her drug and alcohol 

objective and was consistent with her visits with Child. Anders Brief at 13. 

Moreover, Mother contends that “she is currently capable of providing her child 

with the essential parental care, control and subsistence necessary for 

[Child’s] physical and mental wellbeing and that the conditions and causes 

that led to her incapacity were remedied within the time allotted by the 

Adoption Act.” Id. at 15. 

After careful review of the record, we find there is ample, competent 

evidence to support the trial court’s factual findings, and the court’s 

conclusions are not a result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. Child 

was initially removed from Mother’s care because of concerns regarding 

Mother’s drug and alcohol use and housing. Dependency Petition – Statement 

of Facts, 12/2/15, at ¶ b. During the termination hearing, DHS presented the 

testimony of Tenicha Wright, the case manager assigned to Mother’s case. 

Ms. Wright testified that DHS established the following objectives for Mother: 
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complete a Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU) assessment and comply with any 

recommendations, complete random drug screens, attend outpatient 

treatment at Wedge and comply with any recommendations, attend Achieving 

Reunification Center (ARC) for parenting classes, and attend visits with Child. 

N.T., 12/13/17, at 23, 25, 28-29. 

Contrary to Mother’s claims, Mother’s substance abuse issues persist. 

Ms. Wright testified that she has not received any documentation from Mother 

regarding her completion of drug and alcohol treatment. N.T., 12/13/17, at 

25, 43. Although Mother completed a CEU assessment, Mother failed to follow 

through with the recommended outpatient treatment at Wedge. Id. at 25. 

Mother tested positive for cocaine and marijuana in a drug screen taken in 

December 2015, and failed to submit to any subsequent drug screens, despite 

the courts requests for her to do so. Id. at 24, 43. Moreover, Ms. Wright 

testified that Mother never attended any parenting classes and currently lacks 

appropriate housing. Id. at 26, 43-44. 

With regard to visitation, Ms. Wright testified that Mother was consistent 

with her visits with Child, but expressed concern regarding the 

appropriateness of Mother’s behavior at the visits. Specifically, Ms. Wright 

testified that during a visit, Mother attempted “to pull the child’s pants down 

to view his butt hole. . . .” N.T., 12/13/17, at 31. As a result of Mother’s 

behavior, visits were suspended, but were subsequently reinstated. Id. 

Likewise, Ms. Wright testified that Mother engaged in inappropriate behavior 
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during her phone contact with Child. Id. at 34. Ms. Wright indicated that 

Mother would attempt to talk to Child about his body parts. As a result of 

Mother’s behavior during visits, Child required behavioral health services and 

underwent a psycho-sexual evaluation. Id. at 33-34. 

Thus, the record confirms that Mother refused or failed to perform 

parental duties for the six months immediately preceding the filing of DHS’s 

termination petition on September 15, 2017. The record establishes that due 

to Mother’s inappropriate behavior, Mother’s visits with Child were temporarily 

suspended and phone contact with Child was eliminated. N.T., 12/13/17, at 

34. Although Mother made an effort to attend visits with Child, Mother failed 

to address the concerns expressed by the court, which ultimately led to Child’s 

removal. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1).

We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b).

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights 

would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has explained, 

Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and 

the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, 

however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any, 

between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of 

our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child 

is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, 

it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
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[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have 

with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated 

that the trial court should consider the importance of 

continuity of relationships and whether any existing 

parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental 

effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

Here, the trial court concluded that DHS presented clear and convincing 

evidence that terminating Mother’s parental rights would best serve Child’s 

needs and welfare pursuant to Section 2511(b). Trial Court Opinion, 1/19/18, 

at 10. In particular, the trial court noted there was ample testimony presented 

to establish that Child is not bonded with Mother. Id. at 11. Likewise, the 

trial court noted that, at the time of the termination hearing, Child had been 

in care for over twenty months and Mother was nowhere closer to reunification 

than when Child first came into care in January 2016.

Our review of the record again supports the findings of the trial court. 

Mr. Wright testified that no parental-child bond exists between Mother and 

Child. N.T., 12/13/17, at 33, 46. Rather, Ms. Wright testified that Mother 

and Child have “more of a friend relationship.” Id. at 33. Ms. Wright stated 

that Child has developed a bond with Maternal Aunt and Uncle, and that they 

desire to adopt him. Id. at 36. She noted that Child looks to Maternal Aunt 

and Uncle for security and comfort, and that they meet all of Child’s physical 
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and emotional needs. Id. at 37-38. Moreover, Ms. Wright opined that, based 

on her observations, she did not believe terminating Mother’s parental rights 

would be detrimental to Child. Id. at 40-41. 

Although Mother’s love for Child is not in question, along with her desire

for the opportunity to parent Child, a parent’s own feelings of love and

affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights. 

See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010). A child's life “simply 

cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to

handle the responsibilities of parenting.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d at 732. 

Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his

or her child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, 

to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her 

potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 

A.2d at 856.

Accordingly, our independent review of Mother’s claims demonstrates 

that they do not entitle her to relief. Moreover, our review of the record does 

not reveal any non-frivolous claims overlooked by counsel. See Flowers, 113 

A.3d at 1250. We therefore grant counsel’s petition to withdraw, and we 

affirm the decree.

Petition to withdraw granted. Decree affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/13/18