UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

ANDREW REDICK, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

KVC BEHAVIORAL HEALTHCARE, 

INC., corporate entity for the State of 

Kansas; JASON R. HOOPER, President 

and Chief Officer, KVC Behavioral 

Healthcare, Inc., in his official and 

individual capacity; ALICIA BROWN, 

Case Coordinator, KVC Behavioral 

Healthcare, Inc., in her official and 

individual capacity; SHARON PERKINS, 

Case Coordinator, KVC Behavioral 

Healthcare, Inc., in her official and 

individual capacity; SAMANTHA 

ZELLER, Case Coordinator, KVC 

Behavioral Healthcare, Inc., in her official 

and individual capacity, 

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 21-3023

(D.C. No. 5:19-CV-03129-SAC)

(D. Kan.)

_________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________

Before MORITZ, BALDOCK, and EID, Circuit Judges.**

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. ** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument.

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

July 14, 2021

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court
2

_________________________________

Pro se inmate Andrew Redick appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 claims. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we dismiss 

this appeal as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

I.

Redick is a Kansas state prisoner with two minor children. A few years into 

Redick’s term of incarceration, his wife lost custody of them. KVC Behavioral 

Healthcare, Inc. stepped in to manage the children’s placement, reintegration, and 

eventual adoption. KVC is a private child placement agency licensed by the Kansas 

Department of Children and Families.

Redick filed a § 1983 complaint in the district court seeking declaratory relief 

and damages against KVC, its president, and three case coordinators. The crux of 

Redick’s complaint, which contained several claims falling under a variety of 

constitutional amendments, is that the defendants in this case violated his

constitutional rights by failing to provide him with custodial status updates about his 

children.

In screening, the district court ordered Redick to show cause for why his 

complaint should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court noted multiple 

legal issues with Redick’s complaint, including that the domestic-relations exception 

to federal jurisdiction bars Redick’s custodial-status claims and that Redick failed to 

prove any of the named defendants in this case can be treated as state actors for 

§ 1983 purposes.
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Redick’s response repeated the facts from his initial complaint and ignored the 

legal issues raised by the court. It also disclosed that Redick had previously 

presented his custodial-status claims in state court. ROA at 31 (“This issue was 

addressed by the plaintiff, Mr. Redick, Wayne French attorney at law, plaintiff 

attorney, and by the presiding Judge on several occasions at court.”). Redick 

confirmed that in subsequent filings, as well. See id. at 36 (“The courts have this on 

record that the plaintiff emotionally addressed the court, the attorneys addressed the 

defendants and even the judge addressed the problem . . .”); id. at 46 (attaching

correspondence with a Kansas district court implying the court previously ordered 

KVC to provide Redick with status updates about his children).

Accordingly, the district court dismissed Redick’s complaint for the reasons 

given in its order to show cause and added that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine1 bars 

his action since it appears to challenge a state-court decision. Redick filed a “motion 

to object [to] dismissal and request to add additional jurisdictional statutes,” id. at 52, 

which the court construed as a Rule 59(e) motion and denied. This appeal followed. 

II.

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. Full Life Hospice, LLC v. Sebelius, 709 F.3d 1012, 1016 

(10th Cir. 2013). Although we liberally construe Redick’s pleadings because he 

1 See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. 

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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appears pro se, we will not assume the role of his advocate. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 

F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).

On appeal, Redick contends that the district court erred in dismissing his 

claims, but he offers no legal argument to explain why he believes the court should 

have found jurisdiction. In fact, his brief again confirms that a state court has already 

considered the custody issue. Aplt. Br. at 2 (stating the defendants violated his rights 

“[e]ven after the judge told them to stop”). His only argument before us is that the 

district court should have found “the state must follow . . . procedures when it comes 

to informing the child[’]s parents of their wellbeing and when they fail [to] do this 

they violate a liberty and due process clause.” Id. at 4. 

We find no error in the district court’s dismissal of Redick’s claims. Under 

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal “courts do not have jurisdiction over 

challenges to state-court decisions” or over claims that are “inextricably intertwined 

with the state court decision.” Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1436 (10th 

Cir. 1986) (quotations omitted). Since the record showed Redick’s claims pertaining 

to the custodial status of his children had already been litigated, the district court 

lacked jurisdiction over them. We need not address whether the domestic-relations 

exception also barred jurisdiction. To the extent additional claims remained, we 

agree with the district court that Redick failed to demonstrate the named defendants 

are state actors for purposes of a § 1983 claim. See Schwab v. Kan. Dep’t of 

Children & Families, No. 20-3099, 2021 WL 982246, at *17 (10th Cir. Mar. 16, 
5

2021) (unpublished) (explaining that adoption services, including KVC, are not state 

actors). 

Redick’s appeal is “without merit in that it lacks an arguable basis in either 

law or fact.” Thompson v. Gibson, 289 F.3d 1218, 1222 (10th Cir. 2002). We 

therefore deny Redick’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, which requires a 

litigant to show a “reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support 

of the issues raised in the action.” Lister v. Dept. of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 

(10th Cir. 2005). We also dismiss this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

Redick will receive a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Redick’s request for IFP status, 

DISMISS his appeal, and assess a strike against him.

Entered for the Court

Allison H. Eid

Circuit Judge