alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
COURT OF APPEAL S OF VIRGINIA Present: Judges Elder, Bumgardn er and Lemons

HARVEY SCOTT MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 12 24-99-2 PER CURIAM SEPTEM BER 14, 1999 PENINSULA AIRPORT COMMIS SION AND EMPLOYERS INSU RANCE OF WAUSAU

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION (Harvey Scott, pro se , on brief). (Deborah S. O'Toole; Cowen & Owen, P.C., on brief), for appellees.

Harvey Scott (claimant) contends that the Workers' Compensation Commission (commission) erred in denying him benefits after January 19, 1998 on the grounds that he was released to light-duty work and that he failed to market his remaining work capacity after that date. Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission’s decision. See Rule 5A:27. On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below. See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. Mullins , 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). Unless we can say as a matter of law that claimant’s evidence sustained his burden of proof, the commission’s findings are

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.- 2 - binding and conclusive upon us. See Tomko v. Michael’s Plastering. Co. , 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970). In denying claimant's application for benefits, the commission found as follows: The medical record contains a note dated May 30, 1995, in which Dr. [Charles H.] Bonner opined that [claimant] was not suitable for any work. There are no later work disability slips in the record. Dr. Bonner wrote on January 20, 1998, that the claimant's restrictions were sitting three hours, walking 200 feet, standing one-half hour intermittently, and the "pt states taking bus exceeds his functional capacities." It is immaterial that the restrictions originated from [claimant's] request for documentation of his inability to ride the bus. The restrictions were written on a work disability form and indicated partial, not complete incapacity. . . . The claimant has not looked for any type of light-duty employment. Since he failed to reasonably market his residual work capacity, benefits were correctly denied after January 19, 1998. In light of Dr. Bonner's uncontradicted January 20, 1998 work disability form, which established that claimant was partially but not totally disabled, and the lack of any evidence to indicate that claimant made any effort to market his residual work capacity, we cannot find as a matter of law that claimant's evidence sustained his burden of proof. Accordingly, we affirm the commission's decision. Affirmed.
Amended and Restated Exhibit A to the Investment Management Agreement



 EXHIBIT 10.17 
 EXHIBIT A 
 FEE SCHEDULE 

AMENDED AND RESTATED as of January 1, 2013 
 This Amended and Restated Exhibit A is effective as of January 1, 2013, and is attached to and made a part of the Investment Management Agreement between Stateco Financial Services, Inc.
(“Stateco”) and Meridian Citizens Mutual Insurance Company effective June 1, 2001. 
 Agreement 

Except as amended or modified by mutual agreement of the parties hereto, Stateco shall be paid an investment management
fee every quarter based on a percentage of the average asset value of invested assets which average shall be calculated by adding the market value of invested assets at the beginning of the quarter and at the end of the quarter, dividing that sum by
two. The fee will be paid within forty-five (45) days after the end of each calendar quarter. 
 The annual
fee for fixed instruments including bonds (taxable and tax-free), invested cash and preferred stock is 20 basis points or .002 times the average asset value of that category of invested asset. 

The annual fee for all common stock portfolios is 50 basis points or .005 times the average asset value of that category
of invested assets. 
 In addition, as respects the common stock portfolios, Stateco shall be entitled to a
performance bonus based on the performance of the common stock portfolios determined in the following manner. 

In the event the total return on any common stock portfolio exceeds for a particular quarter the total return for the
S&P 500 for the same quarter, Stateco shall be paid an annual bonus of 10 basis points or .001 times the portion of the average asset value of the particular portfolio which exceeds the asset value of the same portfolio calculated based on the
actual total performance of the S&P 500 for the quarter in question. 
  

			
	 STATECO FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.

		
	By:	 	 /s/ Robert P. Restrepo, Jr.

		 	 President

		 	
	MERIDIAN CITIZENS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Robert P. Restrepo, Jr.

		 	 President
EXHIBIT 23.0

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the  incorporation  by reference in  Registration  Statement  Nos.
333-135229,   333-38152  and  333-61114  of   Harleysville   Savings   Financial
Corporation on Form S-8 and Registration Statement No. 333-38970 of Harleysville
Savings Financial  Corporation on Form S-3 of our report dated December 8, 2006,
incorporated  by  reference in this Annual  Report on Form 10-K of  Harleysville
Savings Financial Corporation for the year ended September 30, 2006.



/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
December 19, 2006
#### Vito Mondelli, Respondent, v County of Nassau et al., Appellants.

[854 NYS2d 224]

*827“[B]y engaging in a sport or recreational activity, a participant consents to those commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from such participation” *(Morgan v State of New York,*90 NY2d 471, 484 [1997]). “It is not necessary to the application of assumption of risk that the injured plaintiff have foreseen the exact manner in which his or her injury occurred, so long as he or she is aware of the potential for injury of the mechanism from which the injury results” *(Maddox v City of New York,*66 NY2d 270, 278 [1985]). The doctrine of assumption of risk “encompasses risks associated with the construction of the playing surface” *(Morlock v Town of N. Hempstead,*12 AD3d 652, 652 [2004] [citations omitted]).

Here, the plaintiff sustained injuries when he fell while attempting to catch a fly ball at the border of the dirt infield and grass outfield of a baseball field in Eisenhower Park, Nassau County. The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the plaintiff was aware of a “lip” of dirt that accumulated at the infield/outfield border and that he assumed the risk of injury when he chose to play on the field *(see Morlock v Town of N. Hempstead,*12 AJD3d 652 [2004]; *see also Casey v Garden City Park-New Hyde Park School Dist.,*40 AD3d 901 [2007]; *Steward v Town of Clarkstown,*224 AD2d 405, 406 [1996]; *cf. Ellis v City of New York,*281 AD2d 177 [2001]; *Schmerz v Salon,*26 AD2d 691 [1966], *affd*19 NY2d 846 [1967]).

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The plaintiff testified at a deposition that he believed that the defendants had dug up the grass on the infield/outfield border and replaced it in loose, sod-like pieces. This speculative testimony, along with the affidavits of his teammates, were insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment *(see generally Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). Rivera, J.P., Skelos, Santucci and Leventhal, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1



Certification Required by 18 U.S.C. sec. 1350

(Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)



In connection with the filing by ADE Corporation (the Company) of the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended January 31,
2004 (the Report), the undersigned, as the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/    Chris L. KoliopoulosChris L. Koliopoulos, Ph.D. President and Chief Executive Officer
<PAGE>
Exhibit 99.2


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of MedQuist Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Brian J. Kearns,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350,
as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
              or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
         (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
              material respects, the financial condition and results of
              operations of the Company.





Brian J. Kearns
-----------------------
Brian J. Kearns
Chief Financial Officer
May 13, 2003
#### CARLO BIANCHI and COMPANY, Inc., Central Construction Co., Lawrence Munroe-Langstroth, Inc., and G. L. Rugo *&*Sons, Inc., as Joint Venturers, Plaintiffs, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

Jan. 2, 1957.

*166Robert L. Graham, Jr. and Robert W. Knox, New York City, for plaintiff.

Peter Campbell Brown, Corporation Counsel, New York City, for defendant.

PALMIERI, District Judge.

This is a motion to strike the complaint on the grounds that it is fraught with immaterial matter and that it fails to state plainly a claim upon which relief can be granted. In the alternative, the defendant moves for a more definite statement of the plaintiffs’ claims. See Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 12(e) and (f), 28 U.S.C.A. The motions are denied.

The litigation involves a dispute over a contract for extensive dam construction work entered into in 1950 between the plaintiffs and the Board of Water Supply of the City of New York (hereinafter called “Board”). The plaintiffs seek compensation for extra work caused by alleged breaches by the Board of its contractual duties to the plaintiffs. After having exhausted their administrative remedies through three years of proceedings, the plaintiffs brought their action in this court, invoking our diversity jurisdiction.

The complaint is a long one and, in parts, inclined to a narrative recital of the events. The artful pleader might regard it as prolix and tautological and perhaps open to an imputation of constructive fraud in paragraph 8. However, the defendant has certainly been given notice of plaintiffs’ claims and should be able to file a responsive pleading. Pre-trial discovery procedures are available to defendant and it should have no difficulty in clarifying and defining the issues and in preparing adequately for trial.

Accordingly, defendant’s motions are denied. Submit order on notice.
#### McDOWELL ASSOCIATES, Inc., Plaintiff, v. The PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD, Defendant.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

Jan. 16, 1957.

See also, D.C., 142 F.Supp. 751.

*220Bigham, Englar, Jones & Houston, New York City, for plaintiff.

Bleakley, Platt, Gilchrist & Walker, New York City, for defendant.

CASHIN, District Judge.

Plaintiff herein seeks by separate motions (a) to quash the service of a subpoena duces tecum, and (b) to compel the production under Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 34, 28 U.S.C.A. of certain designated documents within the possession, custody and control 'of defendant.

Defendant caused to be issued by the clerk a subpoena duces tecum directed to Alexander Smith & Company, by William Kennedy, secretary. The documents subpoenaed were to be used in the taking of an oral deposition of R. P. Ridges, formerly vice-president and comptroller of Alexander Smith & Company. Previously defendant had noticed the taking of the deposition of Alexander Smith & Company as a witness by various of its officers, not including Mr. Kennedy, and had served a subpoena duces tecum pursuant to said notice upon J. M. Elliot, chairman, for the production of certain records not coextensive with the records demanded in the subpoena attacked herein.

Defendant contends that it is entitled to have the documents produced for the purpose of refreshing the recollection of Mr. Ridges on his oral examination. It is apparent that the subpoena was improvidently issued. Rule 45(d) authorizes the issuance of a subpoena directed only to persons named in a notice to take a deposition. Since Mr. Kennedy has not been named in any notice, the subpoena directed to him must be quashed.

 Defendant opposes the motion for production on the ground that good cause has not been shown. His objection, however, has no merit. Plaintiff is suing for damage to 13 carloads of machinery delivered to defendant for shipment from Newark, New Jersey to Greenville, Mississippi. All of the documents demanded are either records of defendant with relation to the shipment, which are kept in the regular course of business, records of investigations of the damage involved in the suit, or records tending to show the condition of the cars used in the shipment or the condition of the area where the cars were loaded. All such records are clearly relevant within the meaning of Rules 26(d) and 34 and thus available to plaintiff. Defendant states that plaintiff has not shown that such documents are in existence. Plaintiff has, however, shown that they are ordinarily maintained by *221a railroad. From this fact, the inference is clear that defendant did maintain such records. Defendant does not deny their existence. On this record, a requisite showing of good cause has been made.

Settle an order on each motion.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________ No. 05-50021

_____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff - Appellee

v. JOSE HUMBERTO CAMPA-FAVELA also known as, Carlos Fabela-DeLeon Defendant - Appellant

--------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Texas, El Paso

3:04-CR-1902-ALL-FM

---------------------
Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

IT IS ORDERED that appellee’s unopposed motion to vacate
sentence is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHE R ORDERED that appellee’s unopposed motion to
remand to district court for resentencing in light of the Supreme

Court’s opinion in USA v. Booker and this cou rt’s opinion in U SA

v. Mares is GRANTED. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## F I L E D July 22, 2005 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that appellee’s alternative u nopposed

motion for extension of time for a period of fourteen (14) days
from the court’s denial of appellee’s motion to vacate and remand

is MOOT.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 13.2

                   CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC FINANCIAL REPORT
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


         In connection with the amendment to the Annual Report of GigaMedia
Limited (the "Company") on Form 20-F/A for the year ended December 31, 2002 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Winston Hsia, the Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge, that:

     1.  The amendment to the Report fully complies with the requirements of
         Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.  The information contained in the amendment to the Report fairly
         presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
         of operations of the Company.

Date: August 14, 2003

                                                     By: /s/ Winston Hsia

                                                     ---------------------------
                                                     Winston Hisa
                                                     Chief Financial Officer

*        A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of
         the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the Company and
         will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and
         Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

                                       88
Document Headings

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                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Broadcasting Board of Governors

# Date and Time: 

Friday, July 24, 2009, 11 a.m.-1 p.m.

# Place:

Cohen Building, Room 3321, 330 Independence Ave., SW., Washington, DC 20237.

# Closed Meeting: 

The members of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) will meet in closed session to review and discuss a number of issues relating to U.S. Government-funded non-military international broadcasting. They will address internal procedural, budgetary, and personnel issues, as well as sensitive foreign policy issues relating to potential options in the U.S. international broadcasting field. This meeting is closed because if open it likely would either disclose matters that would be properly classified to be kept secret in the interest of foreign policy under the appropriate executive order (5 U.S.C. 552b.(c)(1)) or would disclose information the premature disclosure of which would be likely to significantly frustrate implementation of a proposed agency action. (5 U.S.C. 552b.(c)(9)(B)) In addition, part of the discussion will relate solely to the internal personnel and organizational issues of the BBG or the International Broadcasting Bureau. (5 U.S.C. 552b.(c)(2) and (6))

# Contact Person for More Information:

Persons interested in obtaining more information should contact Paul Kollmer-Dorsey at (202) 203-4545.

Paul Kollmer-Dorsey,

Deputy General Counsel.

[FR Doc. E9-17491 Filed 7-20-09; 11:15 am]

BILLING CODE 8610-01-P
Order filed June 4, 2014

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 14

- 00189

- CV

____________ KEN OKORIE AND LINDA OKORIE , Appellant

V.

OCWEN LOAN SERVICING , LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the 157th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2012

- 13966



### O R D E R
Appellant’ s brief was due May 8, 2014

. No brief or motion for extension of
time has been filed.
Unless appellant files a brief with this court on or before July 7, 2014 , the court will dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b).

PER CURIAM
#### Francisco CASIA-MACARIO, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 10-73504.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 19, 2012.*

Filed Dec. 21, 2012.

Francisco Casia-Macario, Las Vegas, NV, pro se.

Oil, Christopher C. Fuller, Esquire, Senior Litigation Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Francisco Casia-Macario, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence factual findings and review de novo questions of law. *Wakkary v. Holder,*558 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir.2009). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Casia-Macario’s experiences in Guatemala do not rise to the level of past persecution. *See Li v. Ashcroft,*356 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc) (“Our caselaw characterizes persecution as an extreme concept, marked by the infliction of suffering or harm ... in a way regarded as offensive.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s finding that Casia-Macario did not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution in Guatemala. *See Nagoulko v. INS,*333 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir.2003) (possibility of future persecution too speculative); *see also Molina-Estrada v. INS,*293 F.3d 1089, 1095-96 (9th Cir.2002). Accordingly, Casia-Macario’s asylum claim fails.

Because Casia-Macario did not establish eligibility for asylum, he necessarily failed to meet the more stringent standard for withholding of removal. *See Zehatye v. Gonzales,*453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir.2006).

Further, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of CAT relief because Casia-Macario did not establish he more likely than not will be tortured if returned to Guatemala. *See Wakkary,*558 F.3d at 1068.

Finally, Casia-Macario’s contention that the IJ made a boilerplate adverse credibility finding lacks merit because the IJ found Casia-Macario credible. We lack jurisdic*647tion to consider Casia-Macano s claim that his case was not fully developed because he did not exhaust it before the agency. *See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358*F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.2004).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.