FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T H C IR C U IT May 22, 2008 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [ P U B L I S H ] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ _ N o. 07- 1233 0

____ ____ ____ _ D. C. Docket N o. 02-00947 -CV -T -23TBM MAVERICK M EDIA GROUP, INC., P la int if f- Appe llant, ve rs us HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA, De fendant -Appellee.

____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ (M ay 2 2, 200 8) Be fo re BI RC H , D U BIN A and H IL L , Ci rc uit Jud ge s.2

PE R CU RIA M: M a v e r i c kM e d i aGr o up , I n c . , ( “Ma v e r i c k ” ) , s u e dHi l l s b o r o u g h C o u n t y, Fl or ida , ( the “ Co unty ”) , c la im ing that the Co unty unc onst itu tio na lly

de nie d it pe rm its f or out door sig ns. T he dis tr ic t c ourt e nte re d sum m ar y j udgm en t f

or the Countyand Maverick appealed. Areviewof the rec ord reveals that Maver ick does not have standing to bring th is claim . Ther efore, we shall vacate the district co ur t’s jud gm en t an d re m an d fo r di sm is sa l o f th e cas e. I. A . Inor de r to h av e A rt ic le I II standi ng t o c ha lle nge the Co unty ’ s si gn or din an ce , Mave ri ck

m ust have ac onst itu tio na l i nj ur y that i s r edre ssa

ble by the c ourt. In order to have A rticle II I standing in feder al court, a plaintiff m ust su ffer aninj ur y in fa ct that i s bo th c au sa lly

c onne ct ed

to the c ondu ct

c om pla ine d of

and red res sabl e b y

a fav or ab le de ci si on of t he co ur t. Lu jan v . D ef

en de rs o f W ild lif e , 504 U.S . 555, 560-61 (1992). T hese constitu tional stand ing requirem ents are j urisdictio nal in that they “ invo lve[] the court’ s com petency to consid er a

given ty pe of c as e, ’ ” an d, the re fo re , “ ‘ cannot be w ai ve d or

oth er w ise c onf er re d up on the court by the parties.” Bochese v. Town of Ponce I nlet , 405 F. 3d 96 4, 975 (11 Cir. th 2005 ). S tandi ng “ is the thr es hol d qu es tio n ine ve ry f ed er al c as e, de te rm ini ng the power of the court to entertain the suit.” W arth v
. Se lde n, 422 U . S. 490 , 499The district cour t refe rre d the ca se to the Mag istrate Judge f or a Repor

t and 1 Recommendation on the cross-motions for summary judgme nt. 3 (1975). “ ‘ In the absence of standing, a court is not free to opin e in an advisory ca pa ci ty about the m er its of

apla int if f’ s c la im s, ’ ” an d “ ‘ the c ourt i s po w er le ss t o continu e. ’ ” CA M

P L egal D ef

en se F und, I nc . v . Ci tyofA tla nta , 451 F . 3d 1 257, 1269 (11 Cir. 2006 ) (internal c itations om itted).

th The C ount y

in its Answer

to the Com

plaint deni ed that Maverick had standin g to bring its claim s. T he Magistrate Judge concluded th at Maveric k had standin g. A lthou gh the Coun ty did no t cross-appeal this part of the district 1 court’ s judgm ent, w e m

ust satisfy

ourselves that Maverick has standing before pr oc eed in g t o c on si de r th e m eri ts of t hi s ap pe al . Id
. U nle ss M av er ic k ha s A rt ic le II I standi ng t o br ing it s c la im s, the dis tr ic t c ourt ha d no c onst itu tio na l auth or ity to en te r a jud gm en t i n t he cas e. Id
. B. Mave ri ck ’ s in

j ur y is not r edre ssa ble by the c ourt. W e have re cently

held that a plaintiff whose sign perm it application s wer e de nie d onthe ba sis of

one pr ovi sio n inac ounty ’ s si gn o rd inanc e, but w hic h c oul d have been denied on th e basis of som e alter nate, but un challenged regulation, does no t h av e a red res sabl e in

jury. KH O utd oor, L
. L. C. v . ClayCo unt y , 482 F . 3d 1 299, 1301 ( 11 Ci r. 200 7) . I n th at c as e, KH O utd oor

sou ght to er ec t of

fs ite bil lbo ar ds, thIn KH Outdoor , th e “ oth e r” re gulatio ns we re fo un d in state law that im

po se d c e rt a in 2 application re quirements that had not be en met by the plaintiff. 541 F .3d at 1303-04. Th e Ma g istrate in t

his c a se c on c lud e d th at Ma ve ri c k h a d s tand ingbe c a

us e “ [Mave ri c k’ s] 3 injury likely would be re dresse d by

a fa vorable decision ( e.g ., actua l or nominal damag es).” The district court summarily

adopted the Re port and Rec ommendation. This was er ror. In KH Outdoor , th e p l ai n t i ff

s re qu es t edd am age s . Inco n cl u d i n g th atth e p l ai n t i ff d i d n o th av e s t an d i n g, we ne cessa

rily conclude d that damag es – just as sign pe rmits – are una vailable to the plaintiff whose sig n applications may be denie d under a

n alternative, unchalleng ed provision of a n ordinanc e. See also Ge t Outdoors II , 506 F.3d 894 ( nominal damag es unava ilable to plaintiff whose a pplications deniable unde r alter nate pr ovision of ordinance ) Offsite signs are those that are not located at the site of the business adve rtised. 4 4 prohibi ted by

a provision of the county ’ s sign ordinance. W e held that its injury wa s not redressable because even if the court we re to strike the challenged pr ovi sio n, the re w er e oth er unc ha lle nge d r eg ulatio ns tha t w oul d st ill have pr oh ib it edit s s ig ns . Id

. I n th e ab se nc e of

ar edre ssa

ble inj ur y , KH O utd oor

did 2 no t h av e st an di ng to co nt es t t he ord in an ce. Id
. 3 This approach has been endorsed by several of our sister circuits. I n M idw es t M edia Prop. , LLC

v . Sy m m es T

p. , 503 F . 3d 4 56, 461 ( 6 Ci r. 200 7) , the th pla int if f sig n c om

pany sou ght pe rm its to er ec t of

fs ite bil lbo ar ds, w hic h th e township’s ordinance prohibited. T he Sixth Circuit held that the plain tiff’ s injury 4 wa s n o tre dre s s ab l e b ec au s e “[e ]v en i f p l ai n t i ff s co u l ds h o w t h at th e t o wn s h i p ’s or igi na l [ of

fs ite ] a dve rt isi ng b an. . . vio late d th e Fi rs t A m en dm en t, e ac h of [p la int if f’ s] nin e sig n a

ppl ic at ion s so ught

to post sig ns tha t pl ai nly

vio la te d th e townshi p’ s si ze and h ei ght r eg ulatio ns, ” w hic h pl ai nti ff s c hose not

to ch al le nge in5

th ei r co m pl ai nt . Id
. T he c ourt sa id tha t “ ev en if . . . our c ourt i nva lid at ed

[ the of fs ite sig n ban] , that w oul d no t r edre ss p la int if fs ’ inj ur y be ca use the siz e an d he igh t r es tr ic tio ns s til l w oul d pr ec lud e the townshi p f ro m appr ovi ng the ir

sig n ap pli catio ns and thus sti ll w oul d pr ec lud e pla int if fs f ro m e re ct ing e ac h of

the se signs .” Id
. at

461 -6 2. T he re fo re , the c ourt c onc lud ed , pla int if fs ha d no standi ng. Si m ilarl y , in A dv antage M edia, L
. L. C. v . Ci tyof E

de n Prai rie , 456 F . 3d 793, 801 ( 8 Ci r. 200 6) , the E igh th C ir cu it co nc lud ed that the pla int if

f sig n th co m pany la ck ed standi ng t o c ha lle nge ac ity or din an ce banni ng b ill board s be ca use

“ a favor ab le de ci sio n f

or A dvanta ge , e ve n w ithr es pe ct to tho se sig n c ode pr ovi sio ns whic h w er e fa ct or s inthe de nia l of it s pe rm it ap pli catio ns w oul d no t allow it to build it s propos ed signs , f or these would still vio late other unchallenged pr ovi sio ns o f the sig n c ode li ke the r es tr ic tio ns o n si ze , he igh t, loc at ion , and se tba ck . ” P la int if

f’ s in j ur y w as not r edre ssa ble , the c ourt c onc lud ed , “ fo r ev enin victory it would be ‘ no closer’ to erec ting its billbo ards or obtaining dam ages than when litigation b egan.” Id
. at 802 ( int er

na l c itatio n om itt ed ). W ith out a re dr es sa ble inj ur y , the c ourt he ld tha t the sig n c om pany la ck ed standi ng t o pr oc eed . Id

. T he F ourth C ir cu it re ac he d th e sam e re sul t i n Co ve nant M edia o f So uth Ca rol ina , LLC

v . Ci tyof No rth Ch arl es ton , 493 F. 3d 42 1 (4 Cir. 2007 ). In that th6

ca se the pla int if

f sig n c om

pany ’ s a ppl ic at ion s vi olate d m

ult ipl e se ct ion s of

the city ’ s sign ordinance, not all of which it challenged. T he court said that

“ [b ] ec au se Co ve nant’ s a

ppl ic at ionvio la te d th e spa ci ng r equir em en t, it c oul d no t ha ve be enappr ove d r eg ar dle ss o f w he the r oth er sub stanti ve pr ovi sio ns o f the S ign Regulation are held to be uncon stitut ional.” Id
. at 4 3 0 . Th er ef o re , t h e p l ai n t i ff

’s al le ge d in j ur y w as unr edre ssa

ble and i t ha d no standi ng t o pr oc ee d. The S eventh Circuit has also endorsed th is redressability analy sis as applied to sign com

pany plaintiffs whose applications cou ld have been denied un der al te rn at e, unc ha lle nge d pr ovi sio ns o f a sig n or din an ce , hol din g th at pla int if fs have no stand ing where “ [plaintiff] suffers an injury [it cannot erec t the propos ed bi ll bo ard ], bu t wi nn in g t he cas e wil l n ot alt er t ha t s it ua ti on ”). Har p Ad ver . Ill ., In c., v. Vil la ge of

Ch ic ag o Ri dg e, Il l., 9 F .3d12 90 , 12 92 (7 Cir . 19 93 ). Se e als o th G et O utd oors I I, LLC v . Ci tyof San D ie

go , 506 F . 3d 8 86, 893 ( 9 Ci r. 200 7) th (e ndor sin g our ap pr oa chin KH O utd oor , so l ong as standi ng i s de fe at ed a s ar es ult of an unchallenged second ary restriction, such as one based on height o r size) . Thus, the KH

O utd oor redressability

analy sis is appl icable to the case where a co unty c oul d de ny

apla int if f’ s si gn p er

m it ap pli catio ns unde r ana lte rn at ive pr ovi sio n of

it s or din an ce that the pla int if f’ s c om pla int doe s no t c ha lle nge . T his is suc h ac as e. Jus t a s in KH O utd oor, H ill sbor oughCo unty ’ s or din an ce c ont ai nsTh e or din anc e de fi ne d b ill bo ard s a s a ny a dv e rt isi ngsign me a suri ng72 sq ua re fe e t in 5 ag g reg ate sig n are a or more . [R& R, n. 22]. Both the Ame nded Complaint and Maver ick’s proper ty lease s for its signs c onfirm that all of Mave rick’s a pplications were for sig ns measuring 14 by 48 fee t in siz e, and the Mag istrate spec ifically so found in his R & R. The Mag istrate Judge f

ound that the County

denied Maveric k’s applications on the 6 g ro un d th at th e y

we re fo r p ro hib ite d o ff

-s ite signs or

bil lbo ard signs . 7 he igh t and s iz e lim itatio ns f or pe rm itt ed

sig ns. T he se li m itatio ns w oul d have pr ohi bit ed

the e re ct ionof

Mave ri ck ’ s bi llb oard s independently o f t h e o rd i n an ce ’s categorical billboard prohibi tions , and the Magistrate specifically so found . [R & R at n. 23. ] I n hi s R ep ort and R ec om m en da tio n, the Ma gis tr at e fo und that the ev ide nc e subm itt ed

by Mave ri ck

r ev ea le d th at

it sou ght pe rm its onl y

f or sig ns m ea sur ing 14' x 48 ' , “ the siz e of w hic h c le ar ly

e xc ee ds the siz e lim itatio ns co nta ine d inthe e xc ep te d of f- sit e dir ec tio na l si gns pr ovi sio ns. ” [R & R at n. 23, ci tin g §§ 7. 04. 02( B) (6 ), ( C) (6 ), ( D )( 2) , ( E )( 2) , and ( F) (2 )] . T he re fo re , the Co unty 5 could have deniedMaverick’ s applications under an alternative, unchallenged provisi on of its sig n ordinance. Mave ri ck did not spe ci fi ca lly

c ha lle nge the he igh t and s iz e re str ic tio ns i n the Co unty ’ s or din an ce be ca use it did not appl y f or the ty pe of sig n pe rm itt ed

by the Co unty ’ s or din an ce . T he re fo re , it s a ppl ic at ion s w er e not

de nie d un de r the se provisi ons. Since its applications were for off site billb oards, they

we re denied unde r or din an ce pr ovi sio ns p ro hib iti ng b ill board s and o ff sit e sig ns. 68

Nor m ay Maverick invoke the overbreadth doctrine in an attem pt to get at th es e li m it at io ns . Se e CAMP , 451 F . 3d at 12 70. I n CAMP , w e re j ec te d th e contentio n that a plaintiff who has suffer ed injury under one provis ion of an or di na nc e h as st an di ng to ch al le ng e th e en ti re o rd in an ce. Id
. at1 2 7 0 . We clarifie d that the overbreadth doctrine is an exception only to the prudential standi ng r equir em en t tha t a pla int if f m ust a sse rt his ow n le ga l r igh ts and i nte re sts , an d c an no t re st hi s cl ai m

to rel ie f on th e le ga l ri gh ts or i nt eres ts of t hi rdpa rti es . Id
. at 127 0- 71 ( ci tin g W

arth v. Selden , 422 U . S. 490 , 499 ( 1975 )) . T he doc tr ine m er el y pe rm its the pla int if

f to whom

apr ovi sio n of

astatut e is c onst itu tio na lly ap pli ed to as se rt that the sam e pr ovi sio n m igh t be unc onst itu tio na lly appl ie d to th ird pa rti es no t b efo re t he co ur t. Bro ad ri ck v. Okl ah oma , 413 U . S. 601 , 613 (1 973) . T hus, apla int if

f w ho h as e sta

bli she d c onst itu tio na l i nj ur y a s to him se lf under a pr ov isi on of

astatue m ay

a lso a tta ck tha t pr ov isi on und er the ove rb re adth do ct rin e to vi nd ic at e th e ri gh ts of o th ers no t b efo re t he co urt. Ca mp , 451 F. 3d at 1273 -7 4 ( ci tin g F W

/P B S, I nc . v . Ci tyof D allas , 493 U. S. 215, 233 (199 0)). T he ove rb re adth d oc tr ine doe s no t, how ev er , gr an t a pla int if f cart e blanc he to c ha lle nge an e nti re or din an ce m er el y be ca use som e part

of the or din an ce – t o whi ch th e p la in ti ff i s n ot su bjec t –m ig ht be un co ns ti tu ti on al . Id
. at 1271. It does not , be ca use it m ay not , w ai ve the A rt ic le I II r equir em en t tha t the pla int if f ha ve9

suf fe re d ar ea l inj uryin fac t as to a ch al le ng edpro vi si on of a n o rd in an ce. I d. ; see als o G rani te Sta te O utd

oor A dv er tis ing

, I nc . , v . Ci tyof Cl ea rw ate r, F la. , 351 F . 3d 1112 , 111 6- 17 ( 11 Ci r. 200 3) ( ove rb re adth d oc tr ine doe s no t vi tiate the th req ui rem en t fo r an in

jury in fa ctas t o t he ch al le ng edpro vi si on ). Ther efo re, a pla int if f m ay not a tta ck any pr ovi sio n of

an or din an ce und er

w hic h he ha s no t su ffer eda real in

jury in fa ct . Id
. See also Get O utdo ors II , 506 F . 3d at 89 2 (p la int if f m ay not “ le ve ra ge it s in

j ur ie s un de r ce rt ai n, spe ci fi c pr ovi sio ns t o st at e aninj ur y und er the sig n or din an ce ge ne ra lly ); Prim e M edia, I nc . v . Ci tyof B re ntw ood , 485 F . 3d 3 43, 350 ( 6 Ci r. 200 7) ( “ Pr im e Me dia ’ s st an din g w ith th re gard to the siz e an d he igh t r equir em en ts d oe s no t m ag ic al ly c ar ry ove r to a llo wit to l iti ga te oth er

ind ep en de nt p ro vis ion s of the or din an ce w ith out

ase parate show ing of

an a ct ua l i nj ur y und er tho se pr ovi sio ns” ); Co ve nant M edia , 493 F . 3d at 4 2 1 (“Th at Co v en an th as s t an d i n g t o ch al l en g e t h e t i m el i n es s o f t h e C i t y’ s de ci sio n onthe D ec em

be r 2004 appl ic at iondoe s no t pr ovi de it apa ssp ort t o explore the constitu tionalit y of every provisio n of the Sign Regulation ”). Ther efore, Maverick m ay challenge only

those provi sions of the ordinance under which it suffere d an injury in fact. T he Magistrate deter m ined that Mave ri ck did not suf fe r inj ur y und er the pe rm itt ed

sig n pr ovi sio ns o f the or din an ce be ca

use Mave ri ck

did not appl y f or suc h si gns. A ll of

Mave ri ck ’ s si gn10

ap pli catio ns w er e fo r pr ohi bit ed bil lbo ar ds –

sig ns tha t gr eatly

e xc ee d th e he igh t an d si ze li m itatio ns f

or pe rm itt ed

sig ns. T he Ma gis tr at e spe ci fi ca lly f ound , w ith out obj ec tio n by

Mave ri ck , that i t w as “ not sub j ec t t o th e ex ce pti ons to the prohibi tions on off-site signs foun d in [the old ordi nance] because the evidence subm itt ed by Mave ri ck

r ev ea ls tha t i t so ught

pe rm its f or sig ns m ea sur ing 14' by 48', the size of w hich clearly exceeds the size lim itations contained in th e excepted off-site direc tional sig ns provi sions .” If ther e w ere any

evidence in this record that Maverick sought to display signs that otherwise com

plied with the perm itted sign provisio n, it m ight h ave an inj ur y in fa ct a s to the he igh t and s iz e re str ic tio ns i n th is p ro vis ion . S inc e the re is no s uc h e vid en ce , Mave ri ck suf fe re d no inj ur

y in fa ct und er the pe rm itt ed

sig n pr ovi sio n of

the pr ior or din an ce and i t ha s no standi ng t o c ha lle nge it und er the ov erb read th do ct rin e o r an y ot he r do ct rin e. Se e Prim e M edia, I nc . v . Ci tyof B re ntw ood , 485 F . 3d 3 43, 352 ( 6 Ci r. 200 7) ( re ac hin g sam e co nc lus ionand th obse rv ing that “ [i ] f it ha d a tte m pte d to pr oduc e a bil lbo ar d w hic h c om pli ed w ith the he igh t and s iz e re qui re m en ts, and w as thr eate ne d w ithr ej ec tio n or r eg ulatio n under the other challenged ordin ance provisions , ther e w ouldarguably be a co gni za ble inj ur y in fa ct . . . . H ow ev er , the r ec or d be ar s no e vid en ce of suc h aNo r d o es M av er i ck ’s cl ai mth atth e o ff s i t e s i gnp ro h i b i t i o ni s n o tco n t en t -n eu tra l ch an ge 7 this analy sis in any

way . Maver ick’s off

site sign a pplications, denied unde r the ordina nce’ s prohibition on offsite signs, similarly could have been de nied under the size and heig ht limit ations, beca

use all the a

pplications were for sig ns that exceede d those limit ations.

11 developm ent”). 7 II. Insum , Mave ri ck

doe s no t have sta

ndi ng t o br ing thi s a ct ionc ha lle ngi ng the billb oard and offsite sign proh ibitio ns in th e County ’ s prior sign o rdinance because its injury

in fact under these provisions is unredressable by the court. It m ay not challenge the entire ordinance on its face beca use it has suffered no injury in f ac t a s to any

oth er pr ovi sio ns. T he re fo re , the j udgm en t of the dis tr ic t c ourt i s due to be va cate d, and the c as e w ill be r em an de d to the dis tr ic t c ourt w ith instructio ns to di sm iss the case. VACATED andREMANDED.