2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
1-9-2004 

# Li ve r mor e v . C omm S o c i al S ec ur it y P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 03-1769

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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/11011 NOT PRE CEDENT IAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

___________ No. 03-1769

___________ LOUISE A. LI VERMOR E, Ap pellan t

v. JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMM ISSI ONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

On A ppeal from the Un ited States District Co urt for the We stern D istrict of P enns ylvania Distri ct Court J udge: The H onorable Donetta W. A mbrose (D.C. No. 02-1222)

___________ Submitte d Under Third Circ uit L. A.R. 34.1( a)

October 23, 2003 Bef ore: AL ITO , FU EN TE S an d B EC KE R, Circuit Judges
. (Fil ed January9, 2004)

________________________ OPINI ON OF THE COURT

________________________2

FUEN TES, Circuit

Judge : Livermore appea ls fr om the decis ion of the United States District Court for the Western Dist

rict of Pennsy lvania , affi rming the Commissi oner of Socia l Securi ty ’s deni al of Livermore’ s clai m for disabi lit y i nsurance bene fits (“DIB”) under Ti tle I I of the Soci al Security Act ( the “Act”) , 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Our review is limi ted to de termini ng wh ethe r the Co mm issio ner ’s fin al de cisio n w as su ppo rted by sub stan tial ev iden ce. Hartranft v. Apfel , 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 199 9). We n ow a ffirm the D istrict Court’s decisi on. I. Livermore, a regis tered nur se, s uffers fr om persistent ast hma and related sympt oms, including fatigue, coughing, and shortness of bre ath. On Novem ber 20, 2000, Livermore fi led an appl ication for DIB, al leging t hat she had be en disabl ed since September 4, 1990. After he r appli cati on was denied, Li vermore reque sted a hea ring before an ALJ. The ALJ found that although Li vermore suffered from an impairment as of December 31, 1994, her condit ion did not

consti tute a

disabi lit y of s uch severi ty that she was enti tled to recei ve benefit s. The ALJ concluded t hat as of he r date l ast i nsured, Live rmo re cou ld perf orm her p reviou s relev ant w ork a s a reg istered n urse, at a ll exerti onal le vels, with the s ole li mitation that she could not

be exposed to c leani ng sup plies (w hich trigg ered her asth ma ). Livermore’ s request

for revi ew by the Soci al Securi ty Appeals Council was denied, m aking the A LJ’s opinio n the final dec ision of the C omm issioner. Liverm ore3

then filed an action in t

he District Court. Livermore and the Com missioner filed cross

motions for

summary j udgment. On February 18, 2003, the Distri ct Court gr anted the Com missioner’s m otion for sum mary judgm ent, affirming th e Com missioner’s determi nation t

hat Livermore was not dis abled pri or to t he expiration of he r insured statu s. Li ver mo re n ow app eals this d ecis ion
. II. Livermore ar gues that

the Dist rict Court erred in fi nding that she did not

suffer from a severe impairment . However, we agree wit h the Dist

rict Court’s c onclusi on that substant ial e vidence suppor

ts the ALJ’s findi ng that Li vermore was capabl e of performing he r past

work as a regi ster ed nurse before the expi rati on of her DIB. App. 16, 17. Under the Act, a clai mant for DIB must show that he has a phy sicalor mental impairment of such
seve rity that: he is not only unable t o do his pre vious work but c annot, considering his age, educati on, and work experi ence, engage in anyother ki nd of substantialgainful wo rk w hich exis ts in th e na tion al ec ono my . . . . 42 U .S .C . § 4 23 (D )(2 )(A ). A cc or di ng to th e D ist ric t C ou rt, L iv er m or e a pp ar en tly concedes that her a sthma does not meet the def

inition of a “se vere impai rment” under the Social Sec urity r egulations. Dist. Ct. Op. 8. Alternat ively , an i mpairment i s conside red
seve re if it is “o f ma gnitud e suf ficien t to limit signi ficantly the indi vidual’ s abil ity to do basic work act

ivities. ” Santis e v. Schweiker , 677 F .2d 92 5, 927 (3d C ir. 1982 ); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404. 1521(a), 416.921(a) . In addi tion, because Livermore’s i nsurance4

coverag e for disability benefits expired on D ecemb er 31, 199 4, she mu st establish her disa bility on or b efo re th at da te. See Esposit o v. Apfel , CA 99- 771 , 200 0 U .S. D ist. LEXIS 1720, *30 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2000) ( “The last insure d date i s a statutory cut -off wh ich pre clude s con sidera tion of any new impa irmen ts wh ich de velop therea fter”); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404. 101 and 404.132. None of the medicalevidence Li vermore offer s support s her cl aim that she was disabl ed or incapable of performing her pa st work duri ng the rel evant period. The evidence , in the form o f med ical opinions, largely pertains to Live rmore’s co ndition mo re than si x year s after

her ins ured st atus expi red. App. 202, 230. These opi nions (whic h may reflect a worsening of Livermore’s condition after expir ation of her DIB) suggest that L iverm ore’s a bility to wo rk co uld b e limited by “sign ifican t expo sure” to certa in environment al occurrences, such as dust mites, pollens , ani mals, and strong odor s or exp osu re to “un usu al” f um es, d ust, o r po llens
. Id. However, Livermore’ s medical
re cor ds f ro m bef or e the e xpi ra ti on o f he r i nsu re d st atus i ndi cate on lytwo acu te as th ma atta cks, bot

h tri ggered byprolonged expos ure to cl eaning sol utions , and both control led with treatm ent. T heref ore, the Distric t Cou rt foun d that “ signif icant e xpo sure” to cleani ng suppli es was the onl y cons ist ent trigger of Li vermore’s asthma attacks during the releva nt perio d. D ist. Ct. O p. 18; A pp. 16 . Furth er, Liv ermo re off ers no evide nce to sug ges t that her pas t job as a nur se w oul d su bjec t her to su ch e xpo sure . Because nothing in the record supported a finding that Livermore’s asthma was
so severe as to pr event her from working, t

he District Court

held that subst antia l evide nce5

supp orted th e A LJ’s c onclu sion a s to the m inima l sever ity of Liv ermo re’s im pairm ents before expi rati on of her DIB. Dist . Ct. Op. 10; App. 14-15. We agree, and affirm the dec ision of th e D istrict Co urt. III. Livermore al so argues t hat the ALJ reached an err oneous conclus ion based on t he response of a vocati onal expert (“VE”) t o a hypot hetic al question concerning whether e mployment exists in the national ec onom y that could accom mod ate some one w ith Livermo re’s impairment s. The ALJ posed a hy potheti cal quest ion to t he VE that included a li mitation from expo sure to clean ing ag ents. In r espo nse, the VE testified that this lim itation w ould not prevent

Livermore fr om performing her past work. App. 254-55. Li vermore argue s that t he hypot hetic al was inade quate becaus e it di d not include the addi tionallimi tati ons on her ab ilityto work that were ide ntified by the Social Se curity Administration’s med ical co nsultan t ( i.e
. , li mitations fr om “concentrated exposure” to various environmental conditions, such as extreme temperatures, wetness, humidity , odors dusts, and gases) . App. 195, 198. Because we found, above, that s ubstantial e vidence suppor ts the ALJ’s conclus ion that Li vermore was not di sabled bef ore the e xpiration of her DIB, we need not consider this is sue . See 20 C.F.R. § 404. 1520 (“If we can fi nd that y ou are dis abled or not disabl ed at a step, we make our dete rminati on or decis ion and we do not go on t o the next step. ”). However, we affirm the Dis tri ct Court’ s conclus ion that the hy potheti cal was pr ope r b ecause it

“t ookin to acc oun t t

he o nl y con si st ent

trig ger of [ Liv er mor e’ s] as th ma6

atta cks” that

was identi fied i n the rec ord during t he rele vant peri od ( i.e
. , exposur e to the odo rs of clea nin g su ppl ies). D ist. C t. Op . 13; Ap p. 25 4-5 5. IV. Finall y, Livermore ar gues that the Dist rict Court erred in not e mployi ng a medical expe rt to seek furthe r con sultation due to an inc om plete re cord that co uld h ave re sulted in prejudi ce to Livermore. The Dist rict Court st ated: “An ALJ has a duty t o seek furt her
cons ultation if an in com plete re cord revea ls evide ntiary gap s wh ich res ult in pre judice to the cl aimant or

if medicalrecords contai n a confli ct of ambigui ty that must be resol ved.” Dist. Ct. Op. 16, citi ng Bell v. Ba rnhart , 218 F. Supp. 2d 583, 593 (D. Del. 2002) (i nternal quotati ons omitted). We have car efull y r eviewed the r ecord, and agree with the Dist rict Co urt th at ne ither of th ese situa tion s aro se d urin g th e ad min istrati ve h earin g. In the D istrict Co urt, Liv ermo re requ ested th e assista nce o f a m edica l expe rt to determi ne if various t

rigger s, other than c leani ng suppli es, l imit ed her activities t o the extent that s he clai med. However, the Dis tri ct Court f ound, based l argely

on the longterm tre atme nt repo rts of a spec ialist in allerg ies and asthm a, that the record failed to support t hese subj ecti ve complaint s by Li vermore. Dist. Ct. Op. 15-16. The objecti ve medical evi dence on recor d contai ned neither evide ntiar y gaps resul ting i n prejudi ce nor confli cts of ambi guity . Therefore, the ALJ was not requir ed to seek a ssis tance fr om an add ition al m edic al ex per t. Di st. C t. Op . 16. On appeal, Live rmore als o argues that addi tionalconsult ation wit h a medical expert was nec essary

because the record was mis sing certain reports from four of her7

physi cians, making the r ecord inc omplete. Although the Soci al Securi ty Administr ation sought i nformati on from three of these s ources, the medicalreport s dated bac k several years a nd h ad b een disc ard ed o r de stroye d by th e ph ysician s. A pp. 7 9-8 0, 17 5-7 6. Live rmo re fur ther co ntend s that the Ad minis tration f ailed to seek record s from the fo urth physi cian that s he id entif ied. However, although Livermore as sert ed in her Dis tri ct Court brief that the testimony of a

medical expe rt was warra nted, she fail ed to argue that t he record was otherwise incomplete because it was missing reports from these four sources. I t was also not unti l thi s appeal t

hat Livermore firs t rai sed the i ssue of the Administr ation not seeking certain of these medical records. Because Livermo re failed to properl y rai se these arg um ents bef ore the D istrict Co urt, sh e w aive d he r righ t to d o so on a ppe al. Accordingly , for t

he reasons stated above, we affi rm the judgment of the Dist

rict Court holdi ng that t

he Commissioner’ s finaldecisi on was supported by substant ial evid enc e.8

___________________ TO THE CLERK OF THE CO URT: Kindly file the fore going Opinion.

/s/ Jul io M. Fuentes Circuit Judge