Stephen N. Dratch, Esq.

Franzblau Dratch, PC

Plaza One

354 Eisenhower Parkway

P.O. Box 472

Livingston, New Jersey 07039-0472

Counsel for Defendant 

George Brandley, Esq.

Office of the United States Attorney

970 Broad Street

Newark, NJ 07102

Counsel for the Government

LETTER OPINION FILED WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT 

Re: United States v. Marcus Williams

Criminal Action No. 11-00421-SDW-1

Counsel: 

Before this Court is Defendant Marcus Williams’ (“Defendant”) Motion for 

Compassionate Release under the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (D.E. 34.) This 

Court having considered the parties’ submissions, and for the reasons stated below, denies

Defendant’s motion.

DISCUSSION

A.

Although a district court generally has limited authority to modify a federally-imposed 

sentence once it commences, see Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 825 (2010); United States 

v. Epstein, Crim. No. 14-287, 2020 WL 1808616, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 9, 2020), the First Step Act

(“FSA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), permits district courts to grant compassionate release 

where there exist “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to reduce a sentence. The statute 

provides, in relevant part, that:

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CHAMBERS OF

SUSAN D. WIGENTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

March 29, 2022

MARTIN LUTHER KING COURTHOUSE

50 WALNUT ST.

NEWARK, NJ 07101

973-645-5903

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(A) [T]he court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of 

Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has 

fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the 

Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the 

lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of 

the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of 

imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised 

release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved 

portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the 

factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are 

applicable, if it finds that—

(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction . 

. . and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy 

statements issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). Accordingly, under the FSA, “a defendant seeking a reduction in his term 

of imprisonment bears the burden of establishing both that he has satisfied (1) the procedural 

prerequisites for judicial review, and (2) that compelling and extraordinary reasons exist to justify 

compassionate release.” Epstein, 2020 WL 1808616, at *2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)).

First, “a defendant seeking a reduced sentence must ask the [Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)] to do so 

on his or her behalf and either . . . wait thirty days for the BOP to respond or . . . exhaust all 

available administrative appeals after receiving an adverse decision.” United States v. McDonald, 

Crim. No. 09-556, 2020 WL 3638280, at *3 (D.N.J. July 2, 2020) (citing United States v. Raia, 

954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020)). Then, a court may reduce a defendant’s sentence pursuant to 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) “if the court finds that (1) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant 

a reduction, (2) the reduction would be consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the 

Sentencing Commission,1 and (3) the applicable sentencing factors under § 3553(a) warrant a 

reduction.” United States v. Sparrow, Crim. No. 18-653, 2020 WL 4364328, at *2 (D.N.J. July 

30, 2020) (quoting United States v. Pabon, Crim. No. 17-165-1, 2020 WL 2112265, at *2 (E.D. 

Pa. May 4, 2020)).

B.

On June 22, 2011, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to 

distribute crack-cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. (D.E. 

29 at 1.) On December 22, 2011, this Court sentenced Defendant to 188 months of imprisonment 

and 5 years of supervised release. (Id. at 2–3.) While incarcerated in the Federal Correctional 

Institute in Allenwood, Pennsylvania (“FCI Allenwood”), on February 3, 2022 Defendant moved

pro se in this Court for compassionate release under the FSA. (D.E. 34.) The Government filed 

its opposition brief on February 18, 2022. (D.E. 37.)

1 The Sentencing Commission’s relevant policy statement identifies medical conditions that meet the “extraordinary 

and compelling” requirement as those where the defendant is (i) suffering from a terminal illness, or (ii) suffering 

from a serious physical or medical condition, serious functional or cognitive impairment, or deteriorating physical or 

mental health because of the aging process “that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide selfcare within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover.” U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A).

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C.

Defendant moves for compassionate release on the bases of (1) susceptibility to COVID19 because he suffers from hypercoagulation, and (2) he has completed rehabilitative programs 

while incarcerated. (See D.E. 34.) For the reasons discussed below, this Court does not find that 

Defendant has met the procedural requirement for judicial review and, even if Defendant had met 

the procedural requirement, he has not established compelling and extraordinary reasons to justify

his release.

First, Defendant has not provided any confirmation that he filed a request with the warden 

of FCI Allenwood and exhausted the available administrative remedies, as required by the FSA.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). It is well settled in this Court that “Congress, in enacting the FSA, 

has statutorily imposed exhaustion requirements before a defendant can petition in court,” and “a 

court may not ignore a statutory command, such as the one imposed in Section 3582(c)(1)(A).” 

Epstein, 2020 WL 1808616, at *2. While the Government did not raise an objection on that basis, 

(D.E. 37), because Defendant did not submit any evidence that he adhered to this important

procedural requirement, this Court must deny Defendant’s Motion.

Second, even if Defendant had complied with the procedural requirement, the Motion still 

would not withstand scrutiny on the merits. Although this Court is sympathetic to Defendant’s 

concerns for his health, his concerns do not amount to “compelling and extraordinary reasons” that 

justify early release. See Epstein, 2020 WL 1808616, at *2. If a defendant is vaccinated, many 

courts have found that there is an insignificant likelihood that the defendant “will contract COVID19 and become seriously ill.” United States v. Pabon, Crim. No. 17-312, 2021 WL 603269, at *4 

(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2021); see also United States v. Donley, 2021 WL 6197633, at *4 (N.J.D. Dec. 

30, 2021) (denying compassionate release to a fully vaccinated defendant with two heath 

conditions, neither of which is recognized by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

(“CDC”) as definitively increasing the risk of COVID-19); United States v. Roper, Crim. No. 16-

335, 2021 WL 963583, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2021) (“The risk posed to an inoculated [defendant] 

is not an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release.”). Further, the CDC does not identify 

hypercoagulation alone as a COVID-19 risk factor.2 The CDC considers blood clots as a COVID19 risk factor only when the patient has a history of serious disorders related to the lungs or brain.3

Here, Defendant’s medical condition is not sufficiently severe to establish a compelling 

basis for his release. Defendant was diagnosed with “primary hypercoagulable state,” but has not 

demonstrated any history of blood clots related to his lungs or brain. (D.E. 35 at 2.) Defendant’s 

medical records indicate that he is provided routine medical check-ups at FCI Allenwood, and the 

anticoagulant medication that the facility provides effectively manages any symptoms. (See 

generally D.E. 35.) While Defendant’s medical records indicate that he has a history of missing 

doses of his prescribed anticoagulant, that fact does not constitute a basis for release since effective 

treatment is available and Defendant can manage his condition. (D.E. 35 at 61.) Importantly, 

Defendant is fully vaccinated and has received two doses of the Moderna vaccine. (D.E. 35 at 

108–09.) Furthermore, Defendant contracted COVID-19 in November 2020 and made a full 

2 People with Certain Medical Conditions, CDC ̧ https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extraprecautions/people-with-medical-conditions.html (last updated Oct. 14, 2021). 3 Cf. id.

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recovery while taking Warfarin to manage his hypercoagulation disorder. (D.E. 35 at 9.) Thus,

Defendant’s request for compassionate release due to concerns about susceptibility to COVID-19

is not supported.

Moreover, while this court applauds Defendant’s efforts to rehabilitate himself during his 

incarceration bey participating in classes and programs, these efforts do not demonstrate 

“compelling and extraordinary reasons” that justify early release. (See D.E. 34.) This Court has 

clearly articulated that rehabilitative efforts alone “cannot demonstrate ‘extraordinary and 

compelling reasons’ to warrant . . . release.” United States v. Brashear, 2021 WL 5239119, at n.5

(D.N.J. Nov. 10, 2021) (quoting United States v. James McNair, 481 F. Supp. 3d 362, 370 (D.N.J. 

Aug. 2020)). Because Defendant’s medical concerns and rehabilitative efforts do not demonstrate 

“extraordinary and compelling reasons” to warrant his release, his request for compassionate 

release is not supported.

Consequently, even if Defendant presented extraordinary and compelling reasons for 

release, this Court would still deny his motion because the applicable sentencing factors under 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) weigh against his release. See United States v. Horvath, Crim. No. 15-400, 2020 

WL 7074379, at *1, *3–4 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2020) (concluding that, while defendant’s hypertension 

and other health issues constituted an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for release, the 

sentencing factors weighed against compassionate release). Defendant is serving a 188-month 

term for possession with intent to distribute crack-cocaine. Moreover, Defendant was sentenced as 

a “career offender” (Criminal History Category VI). (See D.E. 29 at 1–3.) A reduced sentence 

would not “reflect the seriousness of the offense,” “promote respect for the law,” or “provide just 

punishment for the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). It would also create an “unwarranted 

sentence disparit[y] among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar 

conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6); see Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 107 (2007) 

(noting that “uniformity remains an important goal of sentencing”). The supportive reasons set 

forth on the record at the time of sentencing are still applicable. Thus, even if Defendant’s Motion

had survived the procedural inadequacy, this Court would deny release.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Compassionate Release is DENIED. 

An appropriate order follows.

___/s/ Susan D. Wigenton_____

SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.

Orig: Clerk

cc: Parties

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