United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued January 24, 2006

Decided February 27, 2006

Before

Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 04-4080

NAJAH MOHAMMAD, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Northern District 

of Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 04 C 4403 

 

Suzanne B. Conlon,

Judge.

O R D E R

 Najah Mohammad appeals the dismissal of her suit to recover money and

jewelry that the Drug Enforcement Administration seized before, but did not

declare administratively forfeited until after, the suit was commenced. The district

court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Mohammad’s suit because

she received written notices of the administrative forfeiture proceedings but failed

to file a claim with the DEA asserting an interest in the property. Mohammad

argues, however, that the notices were inadequate, in part because an assistant

United States attorney left her believing that the filing of her lawsuit in district

court was adequate to challenge the seizures. Because we conclude that

Mohammad’s suit should not have been dismissed without exploring her factual

allegations, we vacate the decision and remand for further proceedings.

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 04-4080 Page 2

I.

On April 14, 2004, a magistrate judge issued three seizure warrants for,

respectively, a savings account, checking account, and safety deposit box in

Mohammad’s name located in a bank in Palos Hills, Illinois. The basis for each

warrant was a separate affidavit sworn to by a member of a DEA task force who

detailed various crimes, including drug trafficking, committed by Mohammad’s

husband, Fadel Mohammad. When the warrants were issued, Fadel Mohammad

was jailed in Cook County awaiting trial on a state drug charge; he already had

pleaded guilty to federal drug charges. The affidavits detail information from a

confidential informant that Fadel Mohammad garnered between $3 and $4 million

in proceeds from illegal activities and laundered the money through several bank

accounts, including the accounts at the bank in Palos Hills. The affidavits relate

that Fadel Mohammad commonly put his accounts in nominee names, including his

wife’s. On April 15, 2004, task force agents executed the three warrants and,

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 881, seized $170,450 in cash plus 112 pieces of jewelry

valued at $143,635.

In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 981(d) and 19 U.S.C. § 1607(a), the DEA on

June 3, 2004, mailed Mrs. Mohammad written notice regarding the funds seized

from the savings account, and on June 14, 2004, two more written notices regarding

the funds seized from the checking account and the jewelry seized from the safety

deposit box. The three notices, all using a DEA standard form, informed her that

procedures to administratively forfeit the money and jewelry had been initiated:

Pursuant to Title 18, U.S.C., Section 983 and Title 19, U.S.C., Sections

1602-1619, procedures to administratively forfeit this property are

underway. You may petition the DEA for return of the property or

your interest in the property (remission or mitigation), and/or you may

contest the seizure and forfeiture of the property in Federal court.

The notices further explained the procedures for requesting remission or mitigation

of forfeiture and for contesting the forfeiture. To request remission or mitigation,

Mohammad was to file a petition with DEA Forfeiture Counsel within 30 days of

receiving notice. If she wanted to contest the forfeiture in district court, she had to

file a claim of ownership with DEA Forfeiture Counsel by July 8, 2004, with respect

to the funds from the checking account, and by July 19, 2004, with respect to the

funds in the savings account and the contents of the safety deposit box. The specific

language of the notices reads: [Y]ou may contest the forfeiture of the seized

property in UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT. To do so, you must file a claim

with the Forfeiture Counsel of the DEA by July 8, 2004 [for the checking account]

and by July 19, 2004 [for the savings account and safety deposit box]. The notices

direct that claims be delivered to DEA Forfeiture Counsel at one of two addresses in
No. 04-4080 Page 3

Virginia depending on whether the submission was being sent via private courier or

regular mail.

Mohammad, though, did not submit a claim to DEA Forfeiture Counsel in

Virginia. Instead, on July 1, 2004, she filed in the district court what Charles

Murphy, her retained lawyer at that time, labeled as “Plaintiff’s Claim for Return of

Property Under 18 U.S.C. § 983, et seq., Which Was Seized by the United States

Government and is Presently Subject to Forfeiture Proceedings.” Section 983, in

relevant part, provides that “[a]ny person claiming property seized in a nonjudicial

civil forfeiture proceeding under a civil forfeiture statute may file a claim with the

appropriate official after the seizure.” 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(2)(A). That statute

further requires that a claim “(i) identify the specific property being claimed;

(ii) state the claimant’s interest in such property; and (iii) be made under oath,

subject to penalty of perjury.” Id. § 983(a)(2)(C). Although § 983 defines the steps

to follow in making a claim with the agency that seized and holds the property, it is

apparent from her submission to the district court that Mohammad thought she

was complying with that provision. Her “claim” identifies the seized assets—the

funds from the two accounts and the contents of the safety deposit box—and both

articulates her alleged interest in those assets and argues that they are not

proceeds of her husband’s illegal activities. At this point, Mohammad still had

seven days before the first deadline to submit a claim to DEA Forfeiture Counsel

would expire.

Assistant United States Attorney Lisa Noller entered an appearance for the

government on July 13, and the district court ordered that a response to

Mohammad’s suit be filed by September 3, 2004. On that date the government,

through Noller, moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

asserting that Mohammad’s failure to file a claim and post bond with DEA

Forfeiture Counsel prevented the court from considering her claim. The

government also noted that because Mohammad had not submitted claims to the

agency by July 8 for the funds in the savings account, and by July 19 for the funds

in the checking account and the contents of the safety deposit box, the DEA had

issued Declarations of Forfeiture for all of the seized assets in mid-August.

Mohammad, still represented by attorney Murphy, responded with three

arguments. First, she contended that the district court should exercise “equitable

jurisdiction” over her demand for return of the seized assets because she was misled

by AUSA Noller, which deprived her of an adequate remedy at law. Specifically,

Mohammad alleged that attorney Murphy contacted the United States Attorney’s

Office before her deadlines for submitting claims to the DEA expired and was

directed to AUSA Noller when he asked to speak with someone about the seizures. 

Over the course of several telephone conversations (Murphy indicated he could not

recall whether the conversations continued after Mohammad’s “claim” was filed in
No. 04-4080 Page 4

the district court), Murphy and Noller discussed the merits of Mohammad’s

contention that the DEA had seized assets belonging to her and derived from

sources untainted by her husband’s criminal activities. At no time, Mohammad

insisted, did Noller inform Murphy that he should be speaking instead to DEA

Forfeiture Counsel. The only time Noller told Murphy to speak to someone else was

when she suggested that he might wish to speak with “an administrative assistant

in the forfeiture unit” concerning the translation of Arabic-language documents that

Mohammad said would support her contention that the seized assets were not

criminally derived. Mohammad explained that “[i]n discussing the merits of

Plaintiff’s claim—at the very least—AUSA Noller implied that counsel was

communicating with the appropriate individual in the Department of Justice.”

Mohammad also found it noteworthy that it was Noller, not someone at DEA, who

faxed Murphy copies of the DEA seizure notices. Because Noller’s involvement led

her to believe she was adequately contesting the seizures by filing her “claim” in the

district court, Mohammad continued, she did not file timely claims with DEA

Forfeiture Counsel. Mohammad suggested that Noller stalled her until the time for

submitting her DEA claims lapsed by allowing attorney Murphy to believe that she

was taking adequate steps to challenge the seizures. Thus, Mohammad reasoned

(in a bit of hyperbole), she was deprived of an adequate remedy at law “due to the

scheming of the United States Attorney’s Office.”

Second, Mohammad argued that, because the DEA and the United States

Attorney’s Office are components of the Department of Justice, the DEA in effect

had knowledge of her claim when she made it clear to AUSA Noller that she

intended to contest the seizures. Mohammad cited Santobello v. New York, 404

U.S. 257, 262 (1971), for the proposition that prosecutors are responsible for “letting

the left hand know what the right hand is doing.”

Last, Mohammad argued that requiring her to file claims with DEA

Forfeiture Counsel as a prelude to challenging the seizures in district court served

no meaningful purpose because the very effect of submitting a claim to the agency is

to compel the government to proceed with a judicial forfeiture unless the assets are

returned or a settlement is reached with the agency. See 18 U.S.C. 983(a)(3).

On September 27, 2004, the district court sided with the government and

dismissed Mohammad’s lawsuit. The court reasoned that it was divested of

jurisdiction over the assets even before Mohammad filed her suit because the DEA’s

administrative forfeiture proceedings were underway. And, the court continued,

the only way it could have regained jurisdiction was for Mohammad to submit

timely claims with DEA Forfeiture Counsel, which she did not do. Finally, the

court held that it could not exercise “equitable jurisdiction” because Mohammad

bypassed an adequate remedy at law—the DEA administrative procedures.
No. 04-4080 Page 5

Mohammad then moved for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 59(e), reasserting the arguments she made in her response to the

government’s motion to dismiss. This motion gave AUSA Noller her first

opportunity to respond to Mohammad’s allegations about the telephone

conversations between the two lawyers. Noller did not deny that she was in contact

with Murphy regarding the merits of the proposed forfeitures or that she faxed

Murphy documents concerning the seizures. Instead, she argued that she had no

responsibility to tell Murphy that the seizures could be contested only by filing a

claim with the DEA. The government, she said, “never misled him or told him not

to file a claim.” Noller further stated that “she suggested that [Murphy] call a

forfeiture paralegal,” and that “on one occasion, the government suggested to

plaintiff’s attorney that he should file an administrative claim.” After receiving

Noller’s response, the district court refused to set aside its dismissal order. The

court explained that it already had considered Mohamad’s arguments, adding that

because Mohammad received notice of the administrative procedures her “attempt

to blame the United States Attorney’s Office for her failure to follow administrative

procedures is baseless.”

II.

On appeal Mohammad does not brief, and thus abandons, two of the three

arguments she made in the district court. See, e.g., Ricci v. Arlington Heights, Ill.,

116 F.3d 288, 292 (7th Cir. 1997). Through new counsel, she no longer contends

that she effectively notified DEA Forfeiture Counsel of her intention to challenge

the seizures when she conveyed that position to AUSA Noller. Nor does she

contend here that it would have served no purpose to submit claims to DEA

Forfeiture Counsel after she already had put the matter before the district court by

filing her “claim.” Mohammad, though, continues to maintain that the district

court should have exercised “equitable jurisdiction” over the case because, she says,

the seized assets were not derived from her husband’s drug dealing, the notices

from the DEA are ambiguous and thus inadequate, and those notices, even if

literally understandable, were rendered inadequate when AUSA Noller allowed

attorney Murphy to believe that Mohammad was dealing with someone authorized

to act in the matter.

We review the district court’s dismissal of Mohammad’s suit de novo. 

Linarez v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 2 F.3d 208, 211 (7th Cir. 1993). Section

881(a)(6) of Title 21 authorizes the civil forfeiture of property derived from the

proceeds of drug transactions. By initiating administrative forfeiture proceedings

pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1607(a)—that is, by sending notice of a seizure and

proposed forfeiture to parties known to be interested in the property and publishing

notice to all others in a newspaper—an agency holding seized property divests the

district court of subject matter jurisdiction to review the forfeiture. Linarez, 2 F.3d
No. 04-4080 Page 6

at 211. The district court remains without jurisdiction unless an interested party

timely submits a claim and posts a bond with the seizing agency. Id. at 211-12;

see 19 U.S.C. § 1608. If no claim is filed, the property is forfeited without judicial

intervention. Lobzun v. United States, 422 F.3d 503, 506-07 (7th Cir. 2005);

Linarez, 2 F.3d at 211-12.

In Linarez, as in this case, the appellant received notice from the DEA telling

him that administrative forfeiture proceedings had commenced, and that he must

submit a claim to the DEA if he wanted to contest the seizure. Linarez, 2 F.3d at

210. The appellant instead sued in the district court to regain the seized assets, but

we held that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case because of

the administrative forfeiture proceedings. Id. at 213. Notwithstanding, we held out

the possibility that a district court might still retain “equitable jurisdiction” even

after the commencement of administrative forfeiture proceedings. Id. at 213. We

explained, though, that a plaintiff seeking equitable relief would have to establish

that she “had an inadequate legal remedy and that irreparable injury will result if

the court does not act.” Id. This notion of “equitable jurisdiction” was

acknowledged again in Williams v. United States Drug Enforcement

Administration, 51 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 1995). In Williams, which came to us as an

appeal from the denial of relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), the

appellant sued in the district court to recover forfeited assets on the theory that he

was denied due process because he did not receive personal notice of the

administrative forfeiture proceedings. We characterized this claim as “essentially a

plea for the court to exercise its equitable jurisdiction” and observed that “the

contours of these sorts of claims are largely undefined.” Id. at 733-35.

After Williams, however, we have moved away from the idea of “equitable

jurisdiction” in cases like this one. In United States v. Duke, 229 F.3d 627, 629 (7th

Cir. 2000), we clarified that jurisdiction to review a claim that notice of an

administrative seizure and proposed forfeiture was constitutionally deficient arises

under the general federal-question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. That point is now

firmly established. See Lobzun, 422 F.3d at 507; Chairez v. United States, 355 F.3d

1099, 1101 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Howell, 354 F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir.

2004); Krecioch v. United States, 221 F.3d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 2000). Morever, the

Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, see 18 U.S.C. § 983(e), made explicit that

an aggrieved party could move to set aside even a completed forfeiture if notice of

the administrative forfeiture proceedings were not received. Accordingly, it would

seem that Mohammad’s invocation of the district court’s “equitable jurisdiction” was

unnecessary. It clouded what is really a straightforward contention: that the

notices of the property seizures and administrative forfeiture proceedings were

inadequate. The district court plainly had jurisdiction to decide this narrow

question.
No. 04-4080 Page 7

Two of the three reasons Mohammad gives for claiming she received

inadequate notice are not persuasive. Her first argument—that the seized assets

are hers alone and derived from a source independent of her husband’s drug

dealing—speaks to the underlying merits of the DEA’s claimed entitlement to the

assets and has nothing to do with whether the agency gave adequate notice of its

administrative proceedings. Challenges to the legality of a proposed civil forfeiture

are made in the district court “after filing a claim of interest and posting a bond

with the DEA.” Linarez, 2 F.3d at 213 (emphasis in original). The very point of

submitting a claim to the agency is to compel the government to proceed with a

judicial forfeiture action in lieu of the administrative route, see United States v.

Commodity Account No. 549 54930, 219 F.3d 595, 597 (7th Cir. 2000); Garcia v.

Meza, 235 F.3d 287, 292 n.5 (7th Cir. 2000), and to prevail in district court the

government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the assets are

subject to forfeiture.

Mohammad’s second argument, that the notices were inadequate because

they are literally confusing, also fails. Due process requires only that notice of a

seizure and impending administrative forfeiture be “‘reasonably calculated, under

all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action

and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” Lobzun, 422 F.3d at

507 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). 

Mohammad concedes that she received the notices but she argues that they are

deficient because they are confusing and contradicted by the underlying forfeiture

statutory scheme. But this is not an argument Mohammad made in the district

court when opposing the government’s motion to dismiss, and that is reason enough

to reject it. See, e.g., Belom v. Nat’l Futures Ass’n, 284 F.3d 795, 799 (7th Cir. 2002).

In any event, the contention lacks merit. The notices state that to contest the

seizures in the district court a claimant must start with the agency: “[Y]ou may

contest the forfeiture of the seized property in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT. To do so, you must file a claim with the Forfeiture Counsel of the DEA.” 

The notices further stipulate that all submissions must be made to DEA Forfeiture

Counsel, and provide the appropriate addresses. Mohammad cannot seriously

contend that, standing alone, the notices are unclear. Moreover, we are not

persuaded by her suggestion that the forfeiture statutory scheme is confusing and

contradictory. The notices set out the steps she had to follow, and until now she has

never contended that a misunderstanding about the underlying forfeiture statutes

is what caused her and her former lawyer to fail to act.

That leaves Mohammad’s final argument, the one she developed most

thoroughly in responding to the government’s motion to dismiss. Mohammad

contends that the DEA notices, even if otherwise sufficient, were rendered

inadequate by the misleading conduct of AUSA Noller. Mohammad argues (and at
No. 04-4080 Page 8

this juncture we accept her factual allegations as true) that Noller, by discussing

the merits of the forfeiture matter with attorney Murphy and not telling him that

he should be talking to DEA Forfeiture Counsel until it was too late, “held herself

out as the appropriate government representative for the resolution of the matter

and potential release of the property.” As a consequence, Mohammad argues, she

was misled into believing that she did not have to file a claim with the DEA.

On the one hand, Mohammad does not allege that AUSA Noller specifically

told Murphy not to contact the DEA, and the government makes a forceful

argument that it should not be blamed for Murphy’s misunderstanding. Moreover,

any discussions Murphy had with Noller spoke to the underlying merits of the

forfeiture, which would be relevant only after she filed her administrative claim

with the DEA. See Linarez, 2 F.3d at 213. Further, Noller maintains that the

government “suggested to plaintiff’s attorney that he should file an administrative

claim.” If that assertion is true, then depending on how and when the message was

delivered, Mohammad has no legitimate cause for complaint.

On the other hand, if AUSA Noller did not tell attorney Murphy that

Mohammad must file an administrative claim with DEA Forfeiture Counsel and

that her district-court “claim” was not a substitute, this conduct could be viewed as

misleading, even without intending to have that effect. Judicial forfeitures are

initiated by the government, not by the party making a claim to seized property, see

Commodity Account No. 549 54930, 219 F.3d at 597; Garcia, 235 F.3d at 292 n.5, so

Mohammad’s filing was easily recognized as a nullity. But Noller (at least

according to Mohammad’s version of events) remained silent until it was too late

rather than informing Mohammad’s lawyer that their conversations did not relieve

him of the imperative of contacting DEA Forfeiture Counsel.

We find support for Mohammad’s position in Muhammad v. DEA, 92 F.3d

648 (8th Cir. 1996). In that case the Eighth Circuit declared an administrative

forfeiture void for lack of proper notice where the claimants filed a civil action

seeking return of seized assets even before the agency commenced administrative

forfeiture proceedings, since the claimants believed that the pendency of their court

action excused them from filing a claim and posting bond with the DEA. Id. at 650,

653. Although, just as in this case, notices were sent by the DEA advising the

claimants that administrative forfeiture proceedings were underway, the

Muhammad court found it significant that the claimants afterwards wrote to the

DEA requesting clarification of the appropriate procedures but were met with

silence from the agency. In thus concluding that the notices from the DEA were

inadequate under the particular circumstances, the court reasoned that “[a]

reasonable person would ordinarily not believe that their government would ignore

their inquiry and proceed as if it had never been sent.” Id. at 653.
No. 04-4080 Page 9

Much the same could be said on these facts if they are as Mohammad

represents. Although she did not file suit in district court before administrative

proceedings were initiated, she did sue before her deadlines to submit claims with

the DEA had expired. And taking her allegations as true, she believed that by filing

a “claim” in the district court she was doing what was required to contest the

administrative forfeiture of the assets, and it seems that a reasonable person could

believe, as Mohammad says she did, that AUSA Noller would have told her attorney

that he was talking to the wrong person and filing in the wrong place. Of course,

the facts may not be as Mohammad and her former counsel allege, but we conclude

that Mohammad, in fairness to her, should have a chance to prove her allegations. 

III.

The judgment of the district court is VACATED and the case REMANDED

for further proceedings.