UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

ex rel. WENDY A. BAHNSEN et al. 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

BOSTON SCIENTIFIC 

NEUROMODULATION 

CORPORATION, 

Defendant. 

Honorable Susan D. Wigenton 

Civil Action No. 11-cv-1210 

RELATORS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN 

OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 

Nicholas C. Harbist 

Blank Rome LLP 

301 Carnegie Center, 3rd Floor 

Princeton, NJ 08540 

Telephone: 609-750-2991 

Facsimile: 609-897-7442 

Attorneys for Relators 

Thomas J. Poulin 

W. Scott Simmer 

Blank Rome LLP 

Watergate 

600 New Hampshire Ave., NW 

Washington DC 20037 

Telephone: 202-772-5986 

Facsimile: 202-572-8432 

Of Counsel

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND .......................................................................... 3 

III. RELATORS HAVE STATED A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN 

BE GRANTED AS TO THEIR FALSE BILLING ALLEGATIONS ........... 6 

A. Relators Have Sufficiently Alleged that Defendant Did Not Have Physician 

Orders Prior to Submitting the CMS-1500 Claim Form to Support Medical 

Necessity .......................................................................................................... 7 

B. Relators Have Sufficiently Alleged that Defendant Falsified Diagnosis 

Codes on CMS-1500 Forms Submitted to the Government ......................... 11 

C. Relators Have Sufficiently Alleged That the Defendant’s Pattern and 

Practice of Falsifying Claim Forms Supports Relators’ False Certification 

Claims ............................................................................................................ 14 

IV. RELATORS HAVE SUFFICIENTLY PLED FALSE CLAIMS RELATED 

TO DEFECTIVE EQUIPMENT ................................................................... 16 

V. RELATORS’ ADVERSE EVENT CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE 

PUBLIC DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE .......................................................... 19 

A. Relators’ Allegations Are Not Barred By the Public Disclosure Doctrine ... 20 

B. Relators Are Original Sources ....................................................................... 24 

VI. RELATORS HAVE SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED A KICKBACK 

SCHEME THAT RESULTED IN DEFENDANT’S FALSE 

CERTIFICATIONS OF COMPLIANCE ...................................................... 26 

VII. RELATORS HAVE SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED RETALIATION 

CLAIMS ........................................................................................................ 31 

VIII. RELATORS ALLEGE VIABLE STATE LAW CLAIMS .......................... 35 

IX. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 35 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

 Page(s) 

CASES

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662 (2009) ........................................................................................ 6, 35 

Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544 (2007) .......................................................................................... 6, 7 

Charleston v. Salon Secrets Day Spa, Inc., 

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45638 (E.D. Pa. June 1, 2009) ........................................ 6 

Childree v. UAP/AGGA CHEN Inc. 

92 F.3d 140 (11th Cir. 1996) .............................................................................. 33 

United States ex rel. Cooper v. Gentiva Health Services, Inc. 

2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20690 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2003) .................................... 33 

Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 

130 S. Ct. 1396 (2010) ........................................................................................ 21 

Hutchins v.Wilentz, 

253F.3d 176, 187 (3rd Cir. 2001) ....................................................................... 33 

In re U.S. Bioscience Sec. Litig., 

806 F. Supp. 1197 (E.D. Pa. 1992) ..................................................................... 17 

Knight v. Rourke, 

1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2919 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 1995) ....................................... 17 

Landau v. Lucasti, 

680 F. Supp. 2d 659 (D.N.J. 2010) ....................................................................... 1 

United States ex. rel. Landsberg v. Levinson, 

2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66689 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2006) ............................. 17, 19 

Mann v. Heckler and Koch Defense, Inc., 

2008 WL 4551104 (E.D. Va. Nov. 7, 2008) ...................................................... 34 

Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 

521 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2008) ............................................................................. 35 

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iv 

Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 

515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008) ................................................................................. 6 

Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 

292 F.3d 361 (3d Cir. 2002) ................................................................................. 6 

Schahardt v. Washington Univ., 

390 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 2004) ............................................................................... 33 

U.S. ex rel. Atkinson v. PA Shipbuilding Co., 

473 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. 2007) ............................................................................... 21 

U.S. ex rel. Barth v. Ridgedale Elec., 

44 F.3d 699 (8th Cir. 1995) ................................................................................ 24 

United States ex real Eberhardt v. Integrated Design and Construction, Inc., 

167 F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 1999) .............................................................................. 34 

United States ex. real. Marlar DBWXTY-12, LLC, 

525 F.3d 439 (6th Cir. 2008) .............................................................................. 33 

U.S. ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Auth. of the City of Pittsburgh, 

186 F.3d 376 (3d Cir. 1999) ............................................................................... 23 

U.S. ex rel. Monahan v. Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp., 

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38898 (D.N.J. May 7, 2009) ......................................... 17 

U.S. ex rel. Paranich v. Sorgnard, 

396 F.3d 326 (3d Cir. 2005) ............................................................. 21, 22, 25, 26 

U.S. ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 

507 F.3d 720 (1st Cir. 2007) ............................................................................... 22 

U.S. ex rel. Singh v. Bradford Regional Med. Ctr., 

2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65268 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2006) .................................. 19 

U.S. ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. 

Co., 

944 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1991) ............................................................................. 25 

U.S. v. Torkelson, 

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88955 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2007) ........................................ 7 

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United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Group, Inc., 

659 F.3d 295 (3rd Cir, 2011) ............................................................................... 16 

Yesudian v. Howard University, 

153 F.3d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ............................................................................ 33 

Kennard v. Comstock Res. Inc., 

363 F.3d 1039 (10th Cir. 2004) .......................................................................... 22 

United States ex rel. Meyer v. Horizon Health Corp.,

565 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2009) ............................................................................ 22 

United States ex rel. Whitten v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 

575 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (S.D. Ga. 2008) ............................................................... 23 

United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 

931 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1991) .......................................................................... 23 

STATUTES

31 U.S.C. § 3729 ........................................................................................................ 1 

31 U.S.C. § 3730(3)(4)(B) ....................................................................................... 25 

31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) ....................................................................................... 24 

42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) ....................................................................................... 7 

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) ......................................................................................... 6, 17, 35 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) .............................................................................................. 6 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) .............................................................................................. 6, 17 

42 C.F.R. pt. 424, § 424.57(c).............................................................15 

Medicare Program Integrity Manual, Pub. 100-08, Ch. 5 § 5.2.4......................9 

Medicare Benefit Policy Manual, Pub. 100-02, Ch. 15 § 110.........................10 

Medicare Benefit Policy Manual, Pub. 100-02, Ch. 15 § 120.........................10 

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I. INTRODUCTION 

The False Claims Act (“FCA”) allows private persons to file suit for 

violations of the FCA on behalf of the government (qui tam “Relators”). The FCA 

establishes a civil cause of action for the recovery of damages, and penalties, from 

those who submit false or fraudulent claims to the United States. To establish a 

prima facie case under the false claims prong of the FCA, the relator must prove: 

(1) the defendant presented or caused to be presented to an agent of the United 

States a claim for payment; (2) the claim was false or fraudulent; and (3) the 

defendant knew the claim was false or fraudulent. 31 U.S.C. § 3729; Landau v. 

Lucasti, 680 F. Supp. 2d 659, 665 (D.N.J. 2010). 

This False Claims Act action was brought by Wendy Bahnsen (“Bahnsen”) 

and Carolina Fuentes (“Fuentes”) (collectively, the “Relators”), who, while 

employed by Defendant Boston Scientific Neuromodulation Corporation (“Boston 

Scientific,” the “Company” or “Defendant”), witnessed acts of Medicare and 

Medicaid fraud being committed by the Company. Relators complained about the 

fraudulent conduct in an effort to alert the Company’s management to stop its 

unlawful conduct. Instead of acting to address the Relators’ complaints of fraud, 

Boston Scientific unlawfully retaliated against the Relators. 

The Relators allege the Defendant violated the False Claims Act to 

maximize reimbursement from Medicare and Medicaid by: (1) submitting claims 

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misrepresenting that the Defendant was in possession of a physician’s order 

required for payment of such claims; (2) making up or changing diagnosis codes 

on Medicare claim forms; (3) submitting Medicare claims without knowing 

whether supplies were medically necessary; (4) concealing patient harm from the 

government that involved defective equipment, then improperly submitting claims 

to Medicare; (5) paying kickbacks to artificially increase sales of its expensive 

medical devices; and (6) falsely certifying its compliance with laws that go to the 

heart of Defendant’s role as a medical equipment supplier to Medicare patients. 

(See First Amended Complaint, or “FAC” ¶¶ 23, 58-61). 

After trying to stop the Company’s unlawful practices, Relators were 

disciplined. (FAC ¶144.). When Relators refused to be silenced, Bahnsen was 

summarily and unlawfully terminated from her employment and Fuentes was 

subjected to a hostile work place. (FAC ¶¶144, 154, 161 and 163). In its Motion 

to Dismiss, Boston Scientific employs a “kitchen sink” approach to Relators’ fraud 

claims, premised upon its selective reading of the FAC as well as its misreading of 

the applicable law and the FCA. 

Together with Defendant’s other Motions, the Motion to Dismiss should be 

denied. 

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Relator Wendy Bahnsen possesses specialized background and knowledge 

of Medicare compliance requirements. She is an experienced medical biller, who 

was employed first in the Company’s Customer Service Department, until she was 

promoted to the Billing and Collections Department. (FAC ¶ 8). In Customer 

Service, her primary task was to coordinate and resolve adverse issues patients 

were experiencing with Boston Scientific’s Precision PlusTM spinal cord 

stimulation system, such as technical or device problems, lead migration, skin 

irritation, burns and infection. Id. 

Then from January 2009 through her date of termination, Bahnsen was 

employed in Boston Scientific’s Billing and Collections Department as a 

Reimbursement and Claims Management Specialist. (FAC ¶ 9). Her primary task 

was to submit claims for payment to Medicare, Medicaid and private insurance 

companies to obtain payment for Boston Scientific’s medical equipment supplies 

associated with Boston Scientific’s spinal cord stimulation medical devices. Id. 

Relator Fuentes was employed by the Defendant from May 2005 through 

June 2010. She was first employed as the Administrative Assistant to the Vice 

President of Health Economics and Reimbursement, John Hernandez, from May 

2005 through March 2008. (FAC ¶ 13). Relator Fuentes was then transferred to 

the Billing and Collections Department in February 2009, until June 2010. Id. 

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The Relators are classic insiders with personal knowledge of Boston 

Scientific’s fraudulent conduct. 

The Defendant is a government contractor – an approved supplier of medical 

devices and replacement supplies -- which includes the Precision PlusTM Spinal 

Cord Stimulation (“SCS”) system, approved by the FDA in 2004 for use in the 

treatment of intractable back pain. (FAC ¶ 17). The Precision PlusTM SCS System 

consists of both the implanted device and external equipment. Id. The external 

equipment includes (1) a wireless remote control, (the Precision SCS Remote, also 

known as the Programmer); (2) a cordless battery charger, (the Precision Charger); 

and (3) the Precision Adhesive Kit (26 double-sided adhesive patches used to 

attach the cordless charger to the patient’s implant site). Id. 

The remote control, known as the PrecisionTM SCS Remote Model SC-5210, 

allows the patient to turn stimulation on and off, increase and decrease the level of 

stimulation, and target different pain areas using programs that are customized for 

use in different situations. (FAC ¶ 18).

The charger, known as the PrecisionTM SCS Charger 2.0 Model SC-5312 is a 

follow-on charger that replaced the Precision Charger 1.0, which was recalled due 

to defects which caused burns. (FAC ¶ 19). The Precision Charger is a cordless 

(i.e., wireless) lightweight charger which allows the patient to subcutaneously 

recharge his/her IPG battery while he/she continues to receive therapy. Id. A 

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patient needs only to place the charger on top of the implant site using an adhesive 

patch or charging belt provided with the SCS system. Id. Since April 2004, 

numerous patients reported receiving severe burns in the area of charging while 

using the Precision Charger 1.0. Id. Boston Scientific issued a recall of its 

Precision Charger 1.0 in September of 2008. Id. 

The adhesive kits, known as the PrecisionTM Adhesive Kit Model SC-6350, 

consists of 26 double-sided adhesive patches used to attach a cordless charger to 

the patient’s implant site while their Implantable Pulse Generator (“IPG”) battery 

is being recharged. (FAC ¶ 20). 

In 2009, Boston Scientific’s Neuromodulation products earned U.S. net sales 

of $271 million, as compared to $234 million in 2008, which includes amounts 

paid or reimbursed by federal and state funded Government Programs, including 

Medicare and Medicaid. (FAC ¶¶ 21-22). As a government contractor providing 

medical equipment and supplies to Medicare patients, Medicare billing and 

compliance requirements are binding on the Company, as Defendant readily 

acknowledges. (See Def. Br. at 6-7). 

Relators have alleged that Defendant knowingly1

 submitted or caused to be 

submitted false claims in the marketing of its SCS System, fraudulent billing to 

 

1

 To violate the FCA, a person or entity must have submitted, or caused the 

submission of, the false claim (or made a false statement or record) with 

knowledge of the falsity. “Knowledge” is defined as (1) actual knowledge, (2) 

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obtain government reimbursement for the SCS System’s replacement supplies, and 

false certifications of the Company’s compliance with applicable law, which 

compliance was a condition of payment. (FAC ¶¶ 23-162).

III. RELATORS HAVE STATED A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN 

BE GRANTED AS TO THEIR FALSE BILLING ALLEGATIONS2

In considering a Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court 

must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of 

the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 

515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 

361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)). 

Though the recent Supreme Court pleading cases, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), have caused much 

debate and discussion, “[n]otwithstanding Twombly [and Iqbal], the basic tenants 

of the Rule 12(b)(6) have not changed.” Charleston v. Salon Secrets Day Spa, 

Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45638, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. June 1, 2009). Under the 

Third Circuit’s reading of Twombly, “the notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) 

remains intact” and although mere “labels and conclusions” will not suffice, 

 

deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information, or (3) reckless 

disregard of the truth or falsity of the information. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b). 

2

 Defendants concede that Relators have sufficiently alleged Defendant’s billing 

fraud as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). (See Def. Motion to Dismiss at 15, n. 

4). 

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Twombly “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations.’” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 

231, 233; see also U.S. v. Torkelson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88955, at *16 n.2 

(E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2007) (“The Supreme Court in Twombly explicitly did not alter or 

broaden the scope of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 

A. Relators Have Sufficiently Alleged that Defendant Did Not Have 

Physician Orders Prior to Submitting the CMS-1500 Claim Form 

to Support Medical Necessity 

Defendant misconstrues Relators’ allegations in the FAC. Relators simply 

allege that Medicare claims were submitted to Medicare without a physician’s 

order, i.e. without any evidence of medical necessity. Relators do not allege that 

any initial order was available. To the contrary, Relators have alleged that no

physician orders were available, that the Company instead directed its billing and 

collection employees to avoid wasting time trying to locate any physician order. 

(FAC ¶¶ 148-149). Although Defendant agrees with Relators that evidence of 

medical necessity in the form of a physician order is required as a condition of 

Medicare reimbursement3

 (See Def. Motion to Dismiss at 8), Defendant asserts 

misplaced arguments as to the need for physican orders to support replacement 

supplies and inapplicable Medicare guidance, premised on a fundamental 

 

3

 Relators allege that the Medicare statute and regulations specify items or services 

are only reimbursable when “medically indicated and necessary.” See, e.g., 42 

U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (“nonpayment may be made [under the Medicare statute] 

for any expenses incurred for items or services which . . . are not reasonable and 

necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury”). (FAC ¶¶ 43, 48 and 

77). 

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misreading of Relators’ allegations. Relators allege that Defendant knowingly 

submitted claims without any physician orders.4

 (See e.g. FAC ¶¶ 23, 31, 34, and 

148-149). 

These physicians’ orders provide the documentation requirements to 

substantiate that the physician has reviewed the patient’s condition and has 

determined that certain equipment and supplies are medically necessary before a 

medical supplier like Boston Scientific submits a claim to Medicare. These 

allegations must be accepted “as true” at this stage of the case. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662. 

As to applicable Medicare guidance, Defendants wrongly assert that, once 

the patient has received the implantable SCS device, follow-up physician orders 

for replacement supplies are never required.5

 Relators allege that physician orders 

for replacement supplies are required, and that, the Company acknowledged as 

much by providing blank order supply forms to physicians to complete. (FAC ¶ ¶ 

108, 109). 

 

4

 The Medicare Program Integrity Manual, Pub. 100-08, Ch. 5, § 5.8 on “Supplier 

Documentation” states in relevant part: “Before submitting a claim...the supplier 

must have on file a dispensing order [and] information from the treating physician 

concerning the patient’s diagnosis...” In addition, this documentation must be 

maintained in the supplier’s files for seven (7) years. 

5

 Unless a physician has specified on the initial order for the implanted device, the 

supplies and frequency with which the patient may obtain the supplies, and the 

Defendant supplier is in possession of this order, a new physician’s order may not 

be needed. See Medicare Program Integrity Manual, Pub. 100-08, Ch. 5, §§ 5.2.4. 

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The Medicare Program Integrity Manual, Pub. 100-08, Ch. 5, § 5.2.46

supports Relators’ allegations: 

5.2.4 – Requirement of New Orders 

A new order is required in the following situations: 

 There is a change in the order for the accessory, supply, drug, etc.; 

 On a regular basis (even if there is no change in the order) only if it is 

so specified in the documentation section of a particular medical 

policy; 

 When an item is replaced; and 

 When there is a change in supplier. (emphasis added) 

The replacement supplies at issue here – remotes, chargers, and adhesive kits – all 

require a new order, since these items are being “replaced.” Defendant was aware 

of this requirement, as Relators allege, as it was discussed in meetings and when 

Defendant provided its own physician order forms for these supplies. 

The Medicare manual that Defendant cites mischaracterizes the applicable 

requirements for Medicare suppliers. For example, the Medicare Benefit Policy 

Manual, Pub. 100-02, Ch. 15 §§ 120(D) and 110.27

 on which Defendants rely, 

 

6

 Available at: 

http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/pim83c05.pdf 

7

 Available at: 

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refers to conditions of coverage, including evidence of medical necessity. Neither 

section negates a supplier’s requirement to obtain physician order for supplies. 

Quite the contrary. See Section 110.2: “A physician’s order and/or new 

Certificate of Medical Necessity (CMN), when required, is needed to reaffirm the 

medical necessity of the item.” Suppliers are directed to follow the Durable 

Medical Equipment (“DME”) provisions in the Medicare Program Integrity 

Manual, which as Relators allege and set forth above, requires an order for 

replacement supplies. 

The Medicare program requirement of a new order is logical considering 

that equipment suppliers like Defendant typically do not have possession of 

physician orders for related surgically-implanted devices. As Defendant explains, 

hospitals and physicians submit their own claims, supported by physician orders, to 

Medicare for the initial implants, in accordance with the Medicare Claims 

Processing Manual, Pub. 100-04, Ch. 14 § 10.2. (See Def. Motion to Dismiss at 6, 

n. 2). Medicare’s regulatory framework therefore recognizes that the supplier of 

replacement supplies may not know if and when patients need replacement 

supplies, and thus in order to ensure medical necessity, a new physician order is 

required to bill Medicare. This is what Relators allege. (FAC ¶ 108). 

 

http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/bp102c15.pdf 

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Relators have also alleged that a supplier’s possession of a physician’s order 

is a condition of payment (FAC ¶ 108); that Defendant itself provided physicians 

with its own order form entitled “Healthcare Provider’s Order For Precision SCS 

Supplies (FAC ¶ 109); that the need for a physician’s order was discussed and 

acknowledged by Senior Company management; (FAC ¶ 110); and that Defendant 

nonetheless ignored this requirement in order to unlawfully bill and be reimbursed 

by Medicare. (FAC ¶¶ 29, 31). 

Given that Relators’ detailed factual allegations as to these factually and 

legally false claims must be taken as true, and construed in their most favorable 

light, Defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion as to physician orders must be denied. 

B. Relators Have Sufficiently Alleged that Defendant Falsified 

Diagnosis Codes on CMS-1500 Forms Submitted to the 

Government 

As Defendants acknowledge, Medicare deems valid diagnosis codes 

material, and requires valid codes for the claims submitted by Defendant. The 

systematic practice of making up codes renders each of these claims factually 

false.8

 Relators have alleged that Defendants made up codes without any physician 

documentation or physician input, in essence, self-diagnosing patients. (FAC ¶¶ 

28-35, 38-42, 148-151). The made-up codes were usually several favorite codes, 

 

8

 Valid, accurate diagnosis codes are required. See Medicare 100-04, Ch. 23 § 10. 

See also the Medicare Program Integrity Manual, Pub. 100-08, Ch. 5, § 5.8 on 

“Supplier Documentation” which required Defendant, prior to submitting a claim, 

to have information from the treating physician concerning the patient’s diagnosis. 

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such as code 724.2 (“lumbago” or back pain), which assured prompt Medicare 

reimbursement, and was a financial advantage to Defendants. (FAC ¶ 33, 38, 39, 

41 and 148-149). Using 724.2, for example, was financially advantageous because 

of the prevalence of off-label uses (such as phantom leg pain), which would 

generate a diagnosis code not related to the FDA-approved use associated with 

back pain. Using back pain-related codes avoided any red flags that could result in 

denials, questions or audits by Medicare.9

 

In only certain limited circumstances not present here, Medicare allowed 

Boston Scientific to insert a diagnosis code on the CMS-1500, for example if the 

physician provided a medical record or a verbal description to the Defendant. 

However, Relators have alleged that those circumstances were not present. (See 

e.g. FAC ¶¶ 120-124). Here, Relators have amply alleged that Defendant 

knowingly submitted CMS-1500 claim forms that were materially false. (FAC ¶¶ 

28-35, 38-42, 148-151). 

 

9

 Defendant argues that, since these supplies are reimbursed under a Medicare fee 

schedule, it should benefit from the “no-harm no-foul” defense. However, 

Defendants ignore circumstances when, for example, the item was not medically 

necessary, or when Medicare should not have made payment based on Defendant’s 

false claims, or Defendant’s violations of conditions of payment. 

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Moreover, Relators have amply alleged that Defendant made up diagnosis 

codes, and even in circumstances when it did possess a physician order, changed 

codes.10 (FAC ¶¶ 28-35, 38-42, 142, 148-151). 

Finally, Defendant’s selective reading of Relators’ allegations leads it to 

argue that “[a]t most Relators have alleged that it is conceivable that an error could 

have been made in the selection of diagnostic codes by [Boston Scientific]....” 

(See Def. Motion to Dismiss at 17). Yet, Relators are not alleging an 

“inadvertence” scheme. Rather, Relators allege they were trained and directed to 

make-up codes without consulting any physician or medical record; that when they 

complained, the Company ignored their concerns; and when the Relators persisted 

in complaining, the Defendant retaliated against them. (See FAC ¶¶ 59, 143, 144, 

146, 155, 158, 161, 162 and 163). These allegations do not describe Boston 

Scientific’s commission of an “error,” but rather Boston Scientific’s knowing and 

systematic practice of violating the FCA. 

 

10 Defendants also raise a disputed factual issue not ripe for resolution at this stage 

of the litigation -- e.g., that Medicare might have paid one or more of the alleged 

false claims even in the face of Defendant’s fraud and violation of Medicare 

program requirements. Relators have, however, sufficiently alleged that 

Defendant’s submission of its false billing claims was material to the government’s 

decision to pay. (FAC ¶ 47, 51 and 53). Defendant itself acknowledges that 

“valid” (i.e. true and accurate) diagnosis codes are required for Medicare claims. 

(Def. Motion to Dismiss at 11). 

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Given that Relators’ detailed factual allegations must be taken as true, and 

construed in their most favorable light, Defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion as to falsified 

diagnosis codes must be denied. 

C. Relators Have Sufficiently Alleged That the Defendant’s Pattern 

and Practice of Falsifying Claim Forms Supports Relators’ False 

Certification Claims 

Relators have alleged that, as a Medicare supplier, Defendant was obligated 

to comply with laws material to its role as a supplier of medical equipment to 

Medicare patients, and that compliance with these laws was a condition of 

Medicare payment. (FAC ¶ 100). Relators allege in paragraph 100 that Defendant 

entered into agreements with the government that required compliance with law as 

a condition of payment, and quoted the applicable Medicare form: 

“100. To participate in the Medicare program, DME suppliers enter into 

agreements with CMS in which the supplier agrees to conform to all 

applicable statutory and regulatory requirements for reimbursement from 

Medicare. For DME suppliers like [Boston Scientific], a CMS Form 855S 

(or equivalent) is completed. At all relevant times, [Boston Scientific] was a 

certified supplier which applied for Medicare enrollment by completing a 

Form CMS-855. The CMS-855 contains a certification of compliance with 

law, which further notified [Boston Scientific] that lawful compliance is a 

condition of payment by Medicare: 

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15 

I agree to abide by the Medicare laws, regulations and program instructions 

that apply to this provider. The Medicare laws, regulations, and program 

instructions are available through the Medicare contractor. I understand that 

payment of a claim by Medicare is conditioned upon the claim and the 

underlying transaction complying with such laws, regulations, and program 

instructions (including, but not limited to, the Federal anti-kickback statute 

and the Stark law), and on the provider’s compliance with all applicable 

conditions of participation in Medicare.” (emphasis added) 

Relators alleged in great factual detail in the First Amended Complaint how 

Defendant systematically failed to abide by “Medicare laws, regulations and 

program instructions”.11 Defendant falsely certified its compliance with the law, 

and at that time and continuing into the future, committed the fraudulent acts, 

including payment of kickbacks, alleged herein. As such, all payments made from 

Medicare were wrongly paid.12 

In addition, Relators have alleged that Defendant falsified numerous CMS1500 claim forms, and as a result, falsely certified compliance with its legal billing 

 

11 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (e.g., at 17) recites factual scenarios and factbased arguments, such as characterizing the alleged flagrant billing fraud as 

“acceptable billing practices for suppliers...” These factual arguments are not 

appropriately considered at the motion to dismiss stage. 

12 42 C.F.R. pt. 424 “Conditions of Medicare Payment” addresses, inter alia, 

Medicare DME Supplier Standards. These standards include “compliance with all 

applicable federal and state licensure and regulatory requirements.” CMS as well 

as its Medicare carriers, such as Palmetto GBA, which handled the processing of 

Defendant’s claims (FAC ¶ 118) enforce these standards, which are listed in 42 

C.F.R. pt. 424, § 424.57(c). Suppliers must be in compliance with these Supplier 

Standards in order to obtain and retain their billing privileges. The Palmetto GBA 

Supplier Standards are located at 

http://www.palmettogba.com/palmetto/providers.nsf/DocsCat/Providers~National

%20Supplier%20Clearinghouse~Supplier%20Enrollment~Standards%20Complian

ce~DMEPOS%20Supplier%20Standards~7GLS7Z1267?open&navmenu=|| 

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16 

obligations by signing each of the false CMS-1500 forms submitted to Medicare. 

(FAC ¶¶ 47, 142). 

These allegations are sufficient that, if true, to establish Defendant’s liability 

on a false certification theory, which has been endorsed by the Third Circuit and 

every other Circuit to have the issue considered. The Third Circuit takes an 

expansive view of the remedial purposes of the False Claims Act. United States ex 

rel. Wilkins v. United Health Group, Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 306 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[A] 

false claim may take many forms, the most common being a claim for goods or 

services not provided, or provided in violation of contract terms, specification, 

statute, or regulation . . . . [Claims made to Medicare or Medicaid programs] may 

be false even though the services are provided as claimed if, for example, the 

claimant is ineligible to participate in the program. . . .”). 

Taken as a whole and construed in the light most favorable to Relators, 

Relators’ detailed factual allegations in the First Amended Complaint, Relators’ 

false certification claims are more than adequate to survive Defendant’s 12(b)(6) 

motion. 

IV. RELATORS HAVE SUFFICIENTLY PLED FALSE CLAIMS 

RELATED TO DEFECTIVE EQUIPMENT 

Relators have more than adequately alleged facts that place the Defendant on 

notice of the claims against it. Indeed, detailed allegations of the submission of a 

false claim are not required at the motion to dismiss stage of the proceeding. 

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17 

Relators have sufficiently pled that Defendant submitted false claims by 

covering up patient harm, and then submitting claims to Medicare for expensive 

defective equipment and related surgeries.13 

Relators have alleged Defendant provides patients with replacement 

equipment, such as the battery charging system it markets and sells as the Precision 

SCS Implantable Pulse Generator (“IPG”). (See eg. FAC ¶¶ 17, 27). Relators have 

further alleged that Defendant concealed and/or sought to minimize reports of 

patient harm, and failed to reimburse Government Programs for defective devices 

and equipment. (FAC ¶¶ 83-87). 

 

13 Relators have met the Third Circuit’s flexible Rule 9(b) pleading standards. 

Under Third Circuit precedent, Rule 9(b) is to be read in tandem with Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(a)(2), which only requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This Court (and other Third Circuit courts) 

has explicitly stated that the “particularity requirement [of 9(b)] must be read in 

conjunction with the liberal pleading rule of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).” Knight v. 

Rourke, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2919, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 1995); United 

States ex. rel. Landsberg v. Levinson, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66689, at *10 (W.D. 

Pa. Feb. 13, 2006) (denying motion to dismiss because complaint was “[c]onsistent 

with the requirements of Rule 9(b) and with Rule 8’s requirement of a short, plain 

statement of entitlement to relief”). Moreover, the requirements of 9(b) are relaxed 

under the circumstances presented in this case. The requirements of 9(b) are not 

applied in circumstances when the defendants have control of the factual 

information. See, e.g., In re U.S. Bioscience Sec. Litig., 806 F. Supp. 1197, 1201 

(E.D. Pa. 1992) (“[C]ourts have ‘relaxed the [particularity] rule when factual 

information is peculiarly within the defendant’s knowledge or control.’” (citation 

omitted and alteration in original)). That is because “courts should be ‘sensitive’ 

to situations in which ‘sophisticated defrauders’ may ‘successfully conceal the 

details of their fraud.’” United States ex rel. Monahan v. Robert Wood Johnson 

Univ. Hosp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38898, at *14 (D.N.J. May 7, 2009). 

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18 

Relators have provided detailed allegations as to the manner in which the 

Company tracked patient complaints. See FAC ¶ 56: “[Boston Scientific] tracked 

these patient issues by entering Customer Service call notes with sales 

representatives and patients into [Boston Scientific]’s ‘Net Regulus’ computer 

program. These calls are recorded by [Boston Scientific].” Relators allege the 

range of patient complaints experienced with the implantable device, as well as 

certain external supplies. (FAC ¶ 57). Relators allege that the time frame involved 

was at least March 31, 2008 to January 2009. (FAC ¶ 56). Relators identified as 

an example an “Issue Detail Report” dated September 29, 2009 involving a patient 

who was burned by a defective charger. (FAC ¶ 70). The patient’s complaint was 

entered into the Defendant’s Net Regulus system as “Record No. 369,126.” (FAC 

¶ 82). Relators further allege that, since the defective charger was out of warranty, 

a manager pushed replacement off on to the patient’s insurance company. (FAC ¶ 

71). The insurance company was likely Medicare. (FAC ¶ 72). The defect was 

either in the implanted device, or the charger, and as a result, the device needed to 

be surgically “explanted.” (FAC ¶ 72). 

Relators have alleged Defendant’s obligations under federal law related to 

adverse event reporting for medical devices. (FAC¶ 62-64). In order to avoid 

legally required reporting of certain adverse events, Defendant’s Customer Service 

Employees were required to manipulate how patient complaints were recorded. 

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19 

(FAC ¶¶ 73-76). The known defects associated with certain of Defendant’s 

devices and equipment rendered them not reasonable and necessary and thus 

ineligible for reimbursement. (FAC ¶ 85). Finally, Relators allege the submission 

of false claims to Medicare. (FAC ¶ 87). 

As to Relators’ allegations that Defendant ignored its responsibility to report 

patient adverse events to proper government authorities, and to shoulder the 

financial burden for defective equipment (and associated surgeries), Relators have 

met the generous pleading standards in the Third Circuit. See United States ex rel. 

Singh v. Bradford Regional Med. Ctr., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65268, at *12 (W.D. 

Pa. Sept. 13, 2006) (holding that pleading fraudulent scheme can survive 9(b) 

“without requiring specific identification of claims”); Landsberg, 2006 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 66689, at *8-10 (holding that “Relators have sufficiently identified the 

scheme of fraudulent behavior” and that Third Circuit approach does not “requir[e] 

the plaintiff to plead the facts of each individual claim, particularly where the 

claims are numerous and extend over the course of several years”) 

Under Third Circuit precedent, consistent with its generous approach to the 

pleading requirements of 9(b), to survive a motion to dismiss a plaintiff/relator 

only needs to detail the general fraudulent scheme that led to the submission of 

false claims, which Relators have done here. 

V. RELATORS’ ADVERSE EVENT CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY 

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20 

THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE 

A. Relators’ Allegations Are Not Barred By the Public Disclosure 

Doctrine 

Defendant makes a cursory argument that Relators’ allegations of fraudulent 

underreporting of adverse event reports (“AERs”) are barred pursuant to the public 

disclosure doctrine. This argument has no merit. Relators’ allegations of the 

systematic underreporting of AERs are not based upon the alleged public 

disclosures that Defendant attached to its Motion. To hold otherwise – where 

Defendant has attached only two “confidential” letters it submitted to the FDA 

containing sparse and vague references to review criteria for the Precision Plus 

SCS System – would be an inappropriate expansion of the public disclosure bar. 

(See Def. Mem. of Law Ex. 1-2). There is no justification to find these two letters 

publicly disclosed the systematic fraud concerning the intentional underreporting 

of AERs for the Precision Plus SCS System. 

The public disclosure bar is designed as a “balance between encouraging 

private persons to root out fraud and stifling parasitic lawsuits.” Graham County 

Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, ___ U.S. ___, 130 

S. Ct. 1396, 1407 (2010). To trigger the bar, a relator’s allegations need to be 

“based upon” public disclosures stemming from one of the enumerated sources 

contained in § 3730(e)(4)(A)(i)-(iii). Allegations are considered “based upon” a 

qualifying public disclosure only if they are “supported by or substantially similar 

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21 

to the [publicly] disclosed allegations and transactions.” United States ex rel. 

Atkinson v. PA Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 519 (3d Cir. 2007). 

Here, it is clear that Defendant’s two letters do not trigger the public 

disclosure bar. The contents of the letters are not a public disclosure for a simple 

reason: they were not publicly disclosed. See United States ex rel. Paranich v. 

Sorgnard, 396 F.3d 326, 332-33 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that “to qualify as a public 

disclosure under the FCA, a disclosure must (1) issue from a source or occur in a 

context specifically recognized by the Act, and (2) be sufficient to support the 

conclusion that the information contained therein is now public within the meaning 

of the Act”). 

The two letters that Defendant voluntarily submitted to the FDA were not 

publicly disclosed. The headers on each letter are denoted in bold print that they 

are “confidential.” (See Def. Mem. of Law Ex. 1-2). Moreover, because each 

letter contained confidential information and trade secrets, Defendant requested 

from the FDA that the letters “not be publicly disclosed prior to thorough redaction 

of such information.” See id. Nowhere in its motion does Defendant claim that 

these letters were subsequently disclosed to the public. At most, these letters 

represent direct communications between Defendant and the FDA regarding the 

Defendant’s general handling of complaints and MDR systems, with a brief 

mention of reporting complaints related to the Precision Plus SCS System. 

Case 2:11-cv-01210-SDW-MCA Document 33 Filed 11/30/12 Page 26 of 41 PageID: 544
22 

However, a confidential communication with the FDA does not amount to a public 

disclosure. See United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 507 F.3d 720, 728 (1st 

Cir. 2007) (holding that “self–disclosure made by private party only to government 

agencies, without further disclosure . . . does not itself constitute public 

disclosure”). Instead, to qualify as a public disclosure, “there [must] be some act 

of disclosure to the public outside of the government.” Id.14 

Defendant attempts to bootstrap its position because the supplemental AERs 

that Defendant submitted to the FDA are available to the public through a FOIA 

request. (See Def. Mem. of Law at 24 n.7). This in and of itself, however, does 

not amount to a public disclosure. Nor does Defendant argue that Relators 

submitted a FOIA request. See United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Auth. 

of the City of Pittsburgh, 186 F.3d 376, 383 n.3 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that 

 

14 The Rost Court also observed that “[i]f providing information to the government 

were enough to trigger the bar, the phrase ‘public disclosure’ would be 

superfluous.” 507 F.3d at 729. The same conclusion has likewise been reached in: 

United States ex rel. Meyer v. Horizon Health Corp., 565 F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 

2009) (“Thus, even when the government has the information, it is not publicly 

disclosed under the Act until it is actually disclosed to the public.”); Kennard v. 

Comstock Res. Inc., 363 F.3d 1039, 1043 (10th Cir. 2004) (concluding that “the 

Government is not the equivalent of the public domain”); United States ex rel. 

Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1496 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Even if a 

government investigation was pending at the time [relator] filed his qui tam

complaint, such fact would not jurisdictionally bar [relator] from initiating suit 

under the FCA.”); United States ex rel. Whitten v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 575 F. 

Supp. 2d 1367, 1381 (S.D. Ga. 2008) (holding that the jurisdictional bar did not 

apply where there was “no evidence that any information about the 

[Government’s] investigation was ever revealed to the public.”). 

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23 

“information may be easily accessible to the public – it may be available under 

FOIA to anyone who simply files a request – but unless there is a request and the 

information is actually produced, it is not publicly disclosed”). Moreover, the 

availability of AERs themselves on the FDA website or through a FOIA request 

would not in any way reveal Defendant’s intentional fraudulent scheme to 

systematically underreport AERs. Thus, the mere public availability of AERs 

would not publicly disclose anything that would allow a third-party to conclude 

that a fraud has been committed. In other words, the allegations in the FAC are not 

“based upon” the alleged public disclosures contained in the AERs.15

 

15 Furthermore, even assuming that the letters themselves (as opposed to just the 

AERs) were disclosed to others outside the Government, they would still not be 

qualifying public disclosures, because they too fail the Third Circuit’s “based 

upon” formulation. It strains credulity to believe that Relators’ allegations in the 

Complaint are based on (i.e.,, supported by or substantially similar to) the two 

letters from Defendant to the FDA. These letters contain nothing more than a few 

stray general statements related to its intake procedure for complaints about the 

Precision Plus SCS System. And one of the letters states that, based on its own 

internal review, Defendant would submit approximately 500 additional AERs. 

(See Def. Mem. of Law Ex. 1-2). Nowhere are there any statements that would 

lead a stranger to read these letters and be able to infer a systematic fraud has been 

committed, nor are there statements that would put the DOJ squarely on the trail of 

fraud. In fact, it is quite the opposite. These letters contain carefully crafted 

statements from Defendant to downplay any potential wrongdoing. Thus, the plain 

fact is that these letters do not qualify as public disclosures sufficient to implicate 

the jurisdictional bar. 

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B. Relators Are Original Sources 

Defendant’s public disclosure arguments fail. Regardless, whether there was 

a qualifying public disclosure is irrelevant. That is because Relators qualify as 

original sources. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (noting that relator is not barred 

from bringing suit even if based on public disclosures if relator is “an original 

source of the information”). This doctrine is only “intended to avoid parasitic 

lawsuits by ‘disinterested outsiders’ who ‘simply stumble across an interesting 

court file.’” United States ex rel. Barth v. Ridgedale Elec., 44 F.3d 699, 703 (8th 

Cir. 1995). It is not meant to prohibit legitimate insiders who have useful 

information about fraud being committed against the Government from bringing 

False Claim Act cases. Indeed, the Third Circuit has recognized that “[t]he 

paradigmatic ‘original source’ is a whistleblowing insider.” United States ex rel. 

Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 

1160 (3d Cir. 1991). And that is exactly the scenario that is presented here. 

Under the new version of the rule, a relator is an original source if he or she: 

“(i) prior to a public disclosure . . . has voluntarily disclosed to the Government the 

information on which allegations or transactions in a claim are based, or (ii) who 

has knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed 

allegations or transaction, and who has voluntarily provided the information to the 

Government before filing an action under this section.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(3)(4)(B) 

Case 2:11-cv-01210-SDW-MCA Document 33 Filed 11/30/12 Page 29 of 41 PageID: 547
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(emphasis added). Here, Relators’ independent knowledge of material facts more 

than passes this threshold. 

To have independent knowledge “mean[s] that knowledge of the fraud 

cannot be merely dependent on a public disclosure.” Paranich, 396 F.3d at 336. 

From March 2008 through January 2009, Relator Bahnsen was employed in 

Defendant’s Customer Service Department. (See FAC ¶ 56). In this position, she 

dealt directly with customers alleging defects with Defendant’s products, including 

the Precision SCS System. In addition, she was directly trained by her supervisors 

to “avoid documenting patient adverse events or device problems.” (FAC ¶ 59). 

Thus, there is no question that Relator Bahnsen’s knowledge came from her own 

exposure to Defendant’s systematic underreporting of AERs and not from the 

alleged public disclosures contained in Defendant’s two letters to the FDA. See 

Paranich, 396 F.3d at 337 (finding relator had independent knowledge because 

“his initial knowledge was, from his own experience, independent of such [public] 

disclosures”). 

Defendant’s alleged public disclosures contained in two letters to the FDA 

make no mention of a systematic fraudulent scheme to underreport AERs. It is 

Relators’ allegations that shed the true light on the AERs in relation to Defendant’s 

fraud, and explain that there had been concerted effort placed on staff to 

inaccurately report patient complaints to avoid reporting those to the FDA. 

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26 

And Defendant’s cursory argument that Relators’ FAC does not detail this 

material information with adequate specificity cannot be credited. (See Def. Mem. 

of Law at 25). On the contrary, Relators’ FAC contains over 30 paragraphs 

detailing the scheme with specificity. (See FAC ¶¶ 55-87). Relators detail how 

Relator Bahnsen was directed to conceal any references to burns in her calls with 

complaining patients in order to avoid FDA reporting. (See FAC ¶¶ 59, 68 and 

75-76). 

Relators have also sufficiently alleged that they provided the Government 

with information prior to filing the First Amended Complaint. (See FAC ¶¶ 11-12, 

14-15). Thus, Relators satisfy the original source exception and have standing to 

bring this FCA claim. 

VI. RELATORS HAVE SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED A KICKBACK 

SCHEME THAT RESULTED IN DEFENDANT’S FALSE 

CERTIFICATIONS OF COMPLIANCE 

Relators have sufficiently alleged under applicable Third Circuit standards 

that Defendant engaged in an unlawful kickback scheme involving on-label, as 

well as off-label, conduct to increase utilization of its SCS system.16 

 

16 Defendant devotes a significant amount of time defending their practice of 

promoting the SCS System for non-FDA approved uses. (See Def. Motion to 

Dismiss at 26-30). Relators’ have alleged illegal off-label promotion in 

conjunction with Defendant’s illegal kickbacks in a scheme to artificially increase 

utilization of its SCS System, both as to on-label and off-label uses. (FAC ¶ 98). 

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27 

Relators allege that Defendant promoted the Precision PlusTM System 

beyond FDA-approved indications, and the provision of free services and other 

inducements to physicians. (FAC ¶ 88). Relators allege the Defendant had 

mandatory meetings at Boston Scientific’s Valencia, California headquarters where 

annual off-label presentations were given. These presentations began at least as 

early as 2005, and annually through at least 2008. These mandatory meetings for 

Boston Scientific employees were attended by Boston Scientific’s senior 

management, including Michael Onuscheck, Boston Scientific’s Vice President of 

Sales and Marketing for Boston Scientific’s Pain Management business (who led 

the commercial launch of the PrecisionTM Spinal Cord Stimulation System), John 

Hernandez, Wendy Chan, Richard Garcia, Boston Scientific staff, patient speakers, 

physician speakers, sales representatives as well as reimbursement specialists. 

(FAC ¶ 33). 

Relators also allege that the Company paid speakers to promote the 

Precision PlusTM system for off-label uses, and provide the example of Michael 

Roman (“Roman”) a paid spokesperson for the Precision PlusTM System, who 

spoke nationally on the use of the Precision PlusTM System for his phantom leg 

pain. Roman is a partial amputee, and experienced pain associated with phantom 

limb pain, a use of the Precision PlusTM not approved by the FDA. (FAC ¶ 94). 

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Defendant provided free services to prescribing physicians to induce use of 

the SCS. (FAC ¶ 98). Moreover, Relators link the kickbacks to the false 

certification of compliance with the Anti-Kickback Act (“AKA”).17 (FAC ¶ 99). 

Compliance with the AKA is a pre-condition of payment by the government, based 

on Defendant’s execution of Form 855, the DME supplier form (described, supra). 

Relators allege that to participate in the Medicare program, DME suppliers 

enter into agreements with CMS in which the supplier agrees to conform to all 

applicable statutory and regulatory requirements for reimbursement from 

Medicare. For DME suppliers like Boston Scientific, a CMS Form 855 (or 

equivalent) is completed. At all relevant times, Boston Scientific was a certified 

supplier which applied for Medicare enrollment by completing a Form CMS-855. 

The CMS-855 contains a certification of compliance with law, which further 

notified Boston Scientific that lawful compliance is a condition of payment by 

Medicare. (FAC ¶ 100). 

Relators further allege, as noted above, that the Form 855 requires suppliers 

like Defendant to abide by applicable Medicare laws, regulations and program 

instructions and that the payment of a claim by Medicare is conditioned upon the 

claim and the underlying transaction complying with such laws, regulations, and 

program instructions (including, but not limited to, the Federal AKA and the Stark 

 

17 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b. 

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29 

law), and on the provider’s compliance with all applicable conditions of 

participation in Medicare. (FAC ¶ 100). 

Finally, as a result of Defendant’s kickbacks, false claims were submitted to 

the government for claims tainted by illegal kickbacks, rendering these tainted 

claims ineligible for reimbursement. 

The Court of Appeals has stated that compliance with the AKA is material to 

the Government’s decision to make payment under the Medicare and Medicaid 

programs. United States ex. rel, Kosenke v. Carlisle HMA, Inc., 544 F.3d 88, 94 

(3rd Cir. 2009)(“falsely certifying compliance with . . . Anti-Kickback Act[] in 

connection with a claim submitted to a federally funded insurance program is 

actionable under the FCA”). Moreover, United States ex. rel. Quinn v. Omni Care, 

382 F.3d 432, 438 (3d Cir. 2004) makes clear that a claim for payment may be 

“false or fraudulent” under § 3729(a)(1) whether or not it is “factually false” and 

whether or not it falls within the § 3729(a)(2) certification-related provision. Thus, 

defendant who employs deceit, concealment or intentional nondisclosure for the 

purpose of extracting funds that it would otherwise not have been able to obtain 

cannot escape liability under the FCA because the claim was technically true. See, 

United States ex. rel. Monahan v. Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital, 2009 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38898 (D.N.J. 2009)(the defendants claims could be fraudulent 

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30 

because the Government had “pled facts which demonstrate non-disclosure and 

intentional misrepresentation, which are the hallmarks of ‘fraud’”). 

In United States ex. rel. Zimmer, 386 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2004) the Court held 

that a medical device company which marketed orthopedic implants, which 

knowingly caused a hospital to submit a false certification of compliance in 

Medicare form HCFA-2552 by payment of kickbacks, can be held liable under the 

FCA. Here, Relators allege that Defendant itself falsely certified compliance on 

Medicare Supplier Form 855, and on each and every falsified CMS-1500 form it 

submitted. (See FAC ¶¶ 100-101). 

Under the “express false certification” theory, an entity is liable under the 

FCA for falsely certifying, as Relators allege, that it is in compliance with 

regulations which are prerequisites to Government payment in connection with the 

claim for payment of federal funds. See United States ex rel. Kosenske v. Carlisle 

HMA, Inc., 554 F.3d 88, 94 (3d Cir. 2009). 

Accordingly, here, where claims were submitted to the government tainted 

by illegal kickbacks, they were ineligible for payment due to lack of compliance 

with the AKA. Consistent with the case law as described above, the FAC 

adequately alleges that Defendant provided illegal kickbacks to physicians as part 

of its marketing scheme for the SCS system, but also that compliance with the 

Anti-Kickback statute is a condition of payment. 

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VII. RELATORS HAVE SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED RETALIATION 

CLAIMS 

Defendant argues that Relators do not allege a viable retaliation claim 

because they merely complained to their supervisors about Boston Scientific’s 

billing practices. (Def. Br. 32-33). Like Boston Scientific’s other arguments, this 

assertion ignores Relators’ detailed allegations that describe their efforts to put 

Boston Scientific on notice about their investigation of fraudulent claims. Read in 

its entirety, the complaint more than sufficiently states that the Relators were 

engaged in protected activity under § 3730(h). 

Relators allege that they were trained and directed by Boston Scientific to 

assist in its fraudulent billing scheme and that after continually complaining about 

Boston Scientifics’ “unlawful billing practices to their supervisors”, Relators were 

disciplined for continually pointing out the Medicare billing fraud that Relators 

were forced to engage in as a condition of their employment. (FAC ¶¶ 143-44). 

Relators allege that they made “multiple complaints “about the “fraudulent billing 

conduct.” (FAC ¶¶ 146-147). In particular, Relator Bahnsen questioned the use of 

code 724.2 in absence of any diagnosis, and told her trainer that such conduct was 

“illegal.” (FAC ¶ 148). The response Bahnsen received was that she should “get 

used to it,” as this was the best way to ensure prompt Medicare payment to deal 

with the thousands of backlogged invoices. (FAC ¶ 149). The Relators were also 

trained to forget contacting doctors to obtain orders and diagnosis code, and 

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32 

routinely used code 724.2, which a trainer wrote on a pink post-it note and stuck it 

on Relator Bahnsen’s computer screen. (FAC ¶ 150-151). 

In mid-June 2009, Relator Bahnsen became increasingly troubled by the 

fraudulent billing practices and brought her collections manager copies of the 

Medicare billing guidelines and examples of “falsified claims.” (FAC ¶ 154). At a 

meeting, she complained that the policy of falsifying CMS-1500 forms was 

“illegal,” which was met by a supervisor taking the unsigned 1500 claims forms 

and returning them that Relator Bahnsen “signed.” (FAC ¶¶ 155-156). Thereafter, 

both Relators were banned from group meetings. 

Based upon the Relators’ internal complaints about the billing fraud, Boston 

Scientific conducted its own internal investigation by its Compliance Officer. This 

investigation also included interviews by outside counsel hired by Boston 

Scientific. (FAC ¶ 145). Boston Scientific was informed that Relator Bahnsen 

intended to file a “whistleblower case,” and shortly thereafter was terminated. 

(FAC ¶ 161). 

Boston Scientific’s characterization of these allegations as mere complaints 

about “billing practices” is disingenuous. In this circuit and others, protected 

activity under § 3730(h) can include “internal reporting and investigation of an 

employer’s false or fraudulent claims.” Hutchins v. Wilentz, 253 F.3d 176, 187 

(3rd Cir. 2001); See also United States ex rel. Marlar DBWXTY-12, LLC, 525 F.3d 

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33 

439, 451 (6th Cir. 2008) (complaint about fraud perpetrated on a government 

sufficient to constitute protected conduct); Schuhardt v. Washington Univ., 390 

F.3d 563, 568-69 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding employee’s complaint that billing 

practice was “fraudulent” and “illegal” provided sufficient notice of protected 

activity); Yesudian v. Howard University, 153 F.3d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Childree 

v. UAP/AGGA CHEN Inc., 92 F.3d 140, 1145 (11th Cir. 1996); United States ex 

rel. Cooper v. Gentiva Health Services, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20690, at *17 

(W.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2003) (concluding direct call to corporation’s compliance 

hotline was protected activity); Mann v. Heckler and Koch Defense, Inc., 2008 WL 

4551104 (E.D. Va. Nov. 7, 2008) (Plaintiff’s informing employer of his belief that 

late delivery of rifle parts after bid submission deadline was fraudulent was 

protected conduct).18

 

18 Boston Scientific asserts that Relator Fuentes fails to provide sufficient detail 

about her whistleblowing complaints to put it on notice of her protected activity. 

Def. Br. at 33. But, as noted above, Relators, including Fuentes, made multiple 

complaints about Defendant’s “fraudulent billing.” (FAC ¶¶ 146-147). Rather than 

modify its fraudulent billing practices, Relators were trained to forget about 

contacting doctors to obtain orders and diagnosis codes, and just routinely used 

code 724.2. (FAC ¶ 151). Like Relator Bahnsen, Fuentes was disciplined for 

continually pointing out the Medicare billing fraud and after their complaints 

escalated, was interviewed by Defendant’s Compliance Officer and outside 

counsel. (FAC ¶¶ 144-145). Eventually Fuentes was cut off from computer access 

and was forced to work in an oppressive work-place. (FAC ¶ 162). Contrary to 

Boston Scientific’s suggestion, these allegations amount to more than “mere 

dissatisfaction with ones treatment on the job” and at the very least, constitute 

internal complaints about fraudulent billing practices, which, under the law, put 

Boston Scientific on notice of her protected conduct. 

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As the Court in the United States ex rel. Eberhardt v. Integrated Design and 

Construction, Inc., 167 F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 1999) stated: 

Such notice can be accomplished by expressly stating an 

attention to bring a qui tam suit, but it may also be 

accomplished by any action which a fact finder reasonably 

could conclude would put the employer on notice that litigation 

is a reasonable possibility. Such actions would include, but are 

not limited to, characterizing the employers conduct as illegal 

or fraudulent, or recommending that legal counsel become 

involved. These types of actions are sufficient because they let 

the employer know, regardless of whether the employee’s job 

duties include investigating potential fraud, that litigation is a 

reasonable possibility. 

Here, not only did the Relators complain to their supervisors about 

“fraudulent billing,” they went so far as to state that the use of Code 724.2 was 

“illegal.” The Relators refused to participate in the policy of falsifying the 

CMS-1500 forms and in response to the Relators continuing complaints, Boston 

Scientific conducted an internal investigation, which included interviews of 

Relators by outside counsel hired by Boston Scientific. 19 These facts are more 

than sufficient to establish that the Relators engaged in protected activity. 

 

19 Divorcing itself from the allegations of the complaint, Boston Scientific claims 

that the factual allegation that Boston Scientific was informed that Bahnsen 

intended to file a whistleblower case, and shortly thereafter was terminated (FAC 

at ¶ 161) is “vague and conclusory.” (Def. Br. at 35). This allegation establishes 

not only that Boston Scientific was put on notice of Relator Bahnsen’s protected 

activity, but establishes the plausible connection between her protected activity and 

eventual termination. Boston Scientific’s assertion that this allegation is 

insufficiently pled is baseless, as the allegations must only meet the Iqbal test of 

plausibility; not Rule 9(b)’s specificity requirement. Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. 

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35 

VIII. RELATORS ALLEGE VIABLE STATE LAW CLAIMS 

Defendant again misreads Relators’ allegations by blithely asserting that 

Relators have not provided the factual basis for their State law claims. The 

Relators allege that the false and fraudulent claims alleged in the FAC similarly 

violate the corresponding State qui tam statutes (See e.g. FAC ¶ 2, Counts IVXXIX), which are modeled on the Federal FCA. Given the substantive similarities 

between the Federal FCA and the State FCA’s, State FCA’s are construed 

consistently with the Federal FCA. See e.g. New York v. Amgen, Inc., 652 F.3d 

103, 109 (1st Cir. 2011) (New York FCA may be construed consistently with the 

Federal Act.); United States ex rel. Humphrey v. Franklin-Williamson Human 

Services, Inc., 189 F.Supp.2d 862, 867 (S.D.Ill. 2002) (Illinois’ version of the FCA 

should be interpreted consistently with the FCA). Relators’ allegations and claims 

in the FAC apply with equal force to each State FCA, and should not be dismissed. 

IX. CONCLUSION 

Boston Scientific’s Motion to Dismiss is premised on a fundamental 

misreading of Relators’ detailed factual allegations, a mischaracterization of 

Medicare’s medical necessity requirements, while ignoring the stringent legal and 

regulatory requirements Medicare imposes on medical equipment suppliers as a 

condition of Medicare payment. When Relators brought the unlawful conduct to 

 

Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008)(applying Rule 8 lower pleading 

standard to FCA retaliation claim). 

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36 

Boston Scientific’s attention in an effort to stop False Claims Act violations, 

instead of correcting, or even addressing Relators’ complaints, Boston Scientific 

chose to silence the whistleblowers. Boston Scientific’s motion should be denied 

in its entirety. 

 /s/ Nicholas C. Harbist 

Dated: November 30, 2012 Nicholas C. Harbist 

Blank Rome LLP 

301 Carnegie Center, 3rd Floor 

Princeton, NJ 08540 

Telephone: 609-750-2991 

Facsimile: 609-897-7442 

Attorneys for Relators 

Thomas J. Poulin 

W. Scott Simmer 

Blank Rome LLP 

Watergate 

600 New Hampshire Ave., NW 

Washington DC 20037 

Telephone: 202-772-5986 

Facsimile: 202-572-8432 

Of Counsel 

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