This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellant, 3

v. NO. 34,894 4 DESIREE TORRES, 5 Defendant-Appellee. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Brett R. Loveless, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 Steven Johnson, Assistant Attorney General 11 Albuquerque, NM 12 for Appellant 13 Bennett J. Baur, Acting Chief Public Defender 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 for Appellee 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 HANISEE, Judge. 182 {1} The State appeals from the di strict court’s order dismissing the charges against 1 Defendant Desiree Torres without prejudice. This Court issued a first calendar notice 2 proposing summary dismissal for lack of a fi nal, appealable order. The State filed a 3 timely first memorandum in opposition to this Court’s notice of proposed disposition. 4 Following this Court’s decision in State v. Angulo , No. 34,714, mem. op. ¶ 1 (N.M. 5 Ct. App. Jan. 5, 2016) (non-precedential), concluding that the State is entitled to an 6 immediate right of appeal from the district court’s order dismissing the case without 7 prejudice, we issued a second notice addressi ng the merits of the appeal and proposing 8 to affirm. In response, the State f iled a timely second me morandum in opposition, 9 which we have duly considered . Unpersuaded, we affirm. 10 Materiality 11
{2} We turn first to the State’s argument th at the State was not required to disclose 12 the second CADS log because there was no s howing of materiality to the defense. [2 13 MIO 3] The State acknowledges that Local Rule 2-400(D)(1) NMRA (2015) “does 14 not contain any language limiting the State’ s duty to provide copies of documentary 15 evidence based on a lack of materiality to the defense[,]” but argues that because Rule 16 5-501(A)(3) NMRA requires a showing of materiality, this Court should interpret LR 17 2-400 to “place[] similar limits on the State’ s duty to provide copies of documentary 183 evidence as those limits placedon the State’s duty to disclose documents under Rule 1 5-501.” [2 MIO 4] 2
{3} We decline to adopt the State’s proposed construction of LR 2-400 because 3 doing so would conflict with th e plain language of the localrule. As our second notice 4 observed, pursuant to LR 2- 400(D)(1), the State is required to make all initial 5 disclosures “described in Rule 5-501(A)(1)-(6 ) . . . at the arraignment or within five 6 (5) days of when a written waiver of arraignment is filed[.]” LR 2-400(D)(1). [2 CN 7 4–5] In addition to those disclosures, howev er, the State is also required to provide, 8 at the same time, “copies of documentary ev idence, and audio, vi deo, and audio-video 9 recordings made by law enforcement officers or otherwise in possession of the state.” 10 [2 CN 5 (quoting LR 2-400(D)(1)] The Ru le provides that “[e]vidence in the 11 possession of a law enforcement agency or other government agency is deemed to be 12 in possession of the state for purposes of this rule.” LR 2-400(D)(3). Therefore, we 13 conclude that the plain language of LR 2-400 is broader than that of Rule 5-501(A)(3), 14 requiring the State to provide to the de fense copies of documentary evidence 15 irrespective of a showing of materiality. Accordingly, we affirm. 16 Lack of Reasonable Opportunity for Disclosure 174 {4} We turn next to the State’s second argument that the State should have received 1 a reasonable opportunity to disclose the CADS evidence after the district court 2 determined that the evidence was subject to disclosure. [2 MIO 7] In support of its 3 contention, the State relies on State v. Harper , 2011-NMSC-044, ¶¶ 16–20, 150 N.M. 4 745, 266 P.3d 25, to argue that the districtcourt’s dismissal without prejudice was an 5 inappropriate sanction because the State asserted in good faith that the CADS log was 6 not subject to disclosure. [2 MIO 7–8] The State argues that this Court should read LR 7 2-400 to allow the State to assert that the evidence is not discoverable, permit the 8 parties to litigate the issue, and then if the district court determines that the evidence 9 is discoverable, to treat the evidence as newly discovered evidence pursuant to Rule 10 5-505(A). [2 MIO 8–9] In short, the Stat e argues that LR 2-400 mandates a different 11 result when read in conjunction with Harper . [2 MIO 7–9] 12
{5} We disagree and conclude that Harper is not analogous to the present situation. 13
InHarper , the district court excluded two key w itnesses on behalf of the State, which 14 precluded the State from making a prim a facie case against the defendant. 2011- 15 NMSC-044, ¶ 1. Our Supreme Court emphasizedthe serious nature of this type of 16 sanction, explaining that the exclusion of these key witnesses was the functional 17 equivalent of a dismissal with prejudice. Id. ¶ 21. Given the extreme effect of this type 185 of sanction and its impact on the fairness of the judicial process, our Supreme Court 1 explained that “like outright dismissal of a case, the exclusion of witnesses should not 2 be imposed except in extreme cases, and only after an adequate hearing to determine 3 the reasons for the violation and the prejudicial effect on the opposing party.” Id. A 4 dismissal without prejudice, however, where nothing appears to bar the State from 5 reindicting a defendant, doe s not fall within the category of extreme sanctions 6 contemplated byHarper , and the State has not pointed us to any authority suggesting 7 otherwise. See Curry v. Great Nw. Ins. Co. , 2014-NMCA-031, ¶ 28, 320 P.3d 482 8 (“Where a party cites no authority to s upport an argument, we may assume no such 9 authority exists.”). 10
{6} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 11
{7} IT IS SO ORDERED. 12

13 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 14 WE CONCUR: 15

16 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 17

186 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 1