alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Troy Saunders, Petitioner, v Glenn S. Goord, as Commissioner of Correctional Services, Respondent.

[853 NYS2d 418]

Petitioner was charged in two misbehavior reports with lewd conduct, smuggling, providing false statements, refusing a direct order, damaging state property and providing unauthorized legal assistance. The charges stemmed from petitioner exposing himself to a facility nurse during a sick call and the statements made by and items confiscated from petitioner during the cell search that ensued. Following a tier III disciplinary hearing, petitioner was found guilty of all charges and a penalty of 120 days in the special housing unit with a corresponding loss of privileges was imposed. Petitioner’s administrative appeal proved unsuccessful, prompting him to commence this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, subsequently transferred to this Court, to challenge respondent’s determination.

Preliminarily, respondent concedes and the record reveals that there is insufficient evidence to support the charges of smuggling and providing unauthorized legal assistance and, accordingly, the determination is modified to that extent. Inasmuch as the administrative penalty has been served and there was no recommended loss of good time, there is no need to remit this matter for a redetermination of the penalty (see *Matter of Wan Zhang v Murphy,*1 AD3d 784 [2003]).

Turning to the charge of lewd conduct, the misbehavior report, authored by the nurse who witnessed the incident, is sufficient to support the finding of guilt (see *Matter of Foster v Coughlin,*76 NY2d 964, 966 [1990]), and petitioner’s denial of the underlying conduct presented a credibility issue for the Hearing Officer to resolve (see *Matter of Callender v Selsky,*9 AD3d 703 [2004]). Further, the misbehavior report charging petitioner with damaging state property, providing false statements and refusing a direct order, authored by the correction officer who issued the direct order and thereafter searched petitioner’s cell, contained sufficient detail to both apprise petitioner of the charges against him and sustain respondent’s determination.

*1001Petitioner’s remaining contentions, including his assertions that he was denied the opportunity to call relevant witnesses and that the Hearing Officer was biased, have been examined and found to be lacking in merit.

Cardona, P.J., Peters, Lahtinen, Kane and Malone Jr., JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is modified, without costs, by annulling so much thereof as found petitioner guilty of smuggling and providing unauthorized legal assistance; petition granted to that extent and respondent is directed to expunge all references thereto from petitioner’s institutional record; and, as so modified, confirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 01-4780

KEITH DEMOND INGRAM,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Rock Hill.

Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Chief District Judge.

(CR-00-783)

Submitted: August 15, 2002

Decided: August 30, 2002

Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Russell D. Ghent, LEATHERWOOD, WALKER, TODD & MANN,

P.C., Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. J. Preston Strom, Jr.,

United States Attorney, Marshall Prince, Assistant United States

Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Keith Demond Ingram appeals his convictions for armed robbery

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2000); using, carrying, brandishing, and possessing a firearm during a crime of violence in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2000); and unlawful possession of a firearm

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000). Ingram was sentenced as

an armed career criminal. He received a 240 month sentence for

armed robbery, an 84 month sentence for possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, and an 18 month sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm. The sentences were imposed consecutively and

totaled a 342 month term of imprisonment. 

Prior to trial, Ingram filed a suppression motion, claiming the

police officer who stopped the car in which he was an occupant had

no reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop the vehicle. The

district court denied the motion. After careful review of the record,

we agree with the district court’s decision. Under the facts of this

case, the officer possessed reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle

that quickly developed into probable cause. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985); United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d

1105, 1107 (4th Cir. 1987). 

Ingram also claims the prosecutor’s comment during trial concerning his post-arrest silence warranted a mistrial. We find that the

court’s curative instruction provided a sufficient remedy for the prosecutor’s isolated remark. See Williams v. Zahradnick, 632 F.2d 353,

361-62 (4th Cir. 1980). 

Ingram also claims the district court should have considered South

Carolina’s constitutional provisions in ruling on his suppression

motion, attacks the sufficiency of the evidence used to prove he possessed a firearm, and argues he should have been subject to state pros2 UNITED STATES v. INGRAM
ecution only. We reject these claims as meritless. We grant Ingram’s

motion to file a supplemental pro se brief but reject the arguments

raised therein. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument, because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

UNITED STATES v. INGRAM 3
EXHIBIT
32.1





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the amended quarterly report of ThermoEnergy Corporation (the "Company")
on Form 10-Q/A for the period ended September 30, 2009, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report"), I,
Dennis C. Cossey, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify
to the best of my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date:  December
22, 2009




By:
              /s/ Dennis C. CosseyName:
      Dennis C. CosseyTitle:
      Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer
----

Exhibit 32.1

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

            In  connection with the Annual Report of Bellacasa Productions, Inc. (the  "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the year ending December 31, 2005 as  filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"), I, Edwin A. Reilly,  President, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section  1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of  2002, that:

             (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or  15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

             (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all  material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the  Company.

Date: March 31, 2006

| /s/ Edwin A. Reilly                                                                                                                                                                         |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| Edwin A. Reilly, President and Chief Executive Officer (Principal      Executive Officer) and Acting Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial      Officer and Principal Accounting Officer) |
##### 



EXHIBIT 99.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL
OFFICER

PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002


(18 U.S.C. §§1350)


Pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. §§1350),
the undersigned, James Stewart, Chief Financial Officer of
Capital Group One, Inc., a Florida corporation (the
Company), does hereby certify, to his knowledge,
that:

The Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the
quarter ended February 28, 2002 of the Company (the
Report) fully complies with the requirements of
section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and the information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.

|                       |  |                                                               
|---------------------- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: February 4, 2003 |  | By: /s/ James StewartJames Stewart
    Chief Financial Officer
**EXHIBIT
      32.2**


**CERTIFICATION
      OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO**


**RULE
      13a-14(b)/15d-14(b) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
      AND**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350**





In
      connection with Amendment No. 2 to the Annual Report of Eugene Science, Inc.
      (the “Company”) on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2006 as
      filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”), I, Jae Hong Yoo, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
      pursuant to Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
      of
      1934 and 18 U.S.C. 1350, that to the best of my knowledge:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date:
                October 26, 2007
            
            /s/
                Jae Hong YooJae
                Hong YooChief
                Financial Officer(Principal
                Financial Officer)




This
      certification accompanies this Report pursuant to Rule 13a-14(b) or 15d-14(b)
      under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 and shall
      not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934.
The Attorney General of Texas 

September 13, 1978 

JOHN L. HILL 

Attorney General 

Honorable Joe Resweb-er 

Harris County Attorney 

Harris County Courthouse 

Houston, Texas 77002 

Dear Mr. Resweber: 

You ask: 

Opinion No. H- 1242 

Re: Control of the preparation 

of county warrants. 

Can the Harris County Commissioners Court assign the 

preparation of Harris County Flood Control warrants, 

prior .to auditing and final disposition, to either the 

County Clerk or the Harris County Data Processing 

Department? 

Control of the preparation and processing of county warrants is vested 

by statute in the County Auditor of Harris County. V.T.C.S. art. 1656a. In 

counties having a population of 190,000 or more the auditor is to “prescribe 

the system of accounting for the county and the forms to be used by the 

District Clerk,~ the District Attorney and all county and precinct officers. . . 

in the collection and disbursement of county revenues.” He is given power to 

“adopt and enforce such regulations . . , as he may deem essential to the 

speedy end proper collection and checking of, and accounting for, the 

revenues and other funds and fees belonging to the county. . . .” See Attorney 

General Opinion C-218 (1964). 

- 

The Harris County Commissioners Court has no authority to assign the 

preparation of Harris County warrants to any officer or department, since the 

county auditor has responsibility for the preparation of the warrants. See 

V.T.C.S. art. 1650. The rule is the same for the preparation of warrants for 

the Harris County Flood Control District. Article 8280-120, section 8 makes 

applicable to the district “all existing [sItate fllaws . . . applicable to . . . the 

receipt and disbursement of, and accounting for, public funds in Harris 

County.” 

SUMMARY 

The Commissioners Court of Harris County has no 

authority to assign the preparation of Harris County or 

p. 4944 
Honorable Joe Resweber - Page 2 Cl-1242) 

Harris County Flood Control Iktrict warrants to any officer 

or department, since the co&y auditor has responsibility 

for preparation of the warrank 

Very truly yours, 

APPROVED: 

Attorney General of Texas 

C. ROBERT HEATH, Chairman 

Opinion Committee 

p. 498
Exhibit 32.1



Certification Required by 18 U.S.C. sec. 1350

(Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)



In connection with the filing by ADE Corporation (the Company) of the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the
fiscal quarter ended October 31, 2003 (the Report), the undersigned, as the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that, to my knowledge:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/    CHRIS L. KOLIOPOULOSChris L. Koliopoulos, Ph.D. President and Chief Executive Officer
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 22-0658

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

v. 

COLTER HELTON HENRY,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including July 14, 2023, within which to prepare, file, 

and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

June 7 2023

06/07/2023

Case Number: DA 22-0658
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-11-00150-CV

RECYCLED MATERIALS, INC. AND 

MATBON, INC.

APPELLANTS

V.

ALMA J. TAYLOR AND BILL 

JOSSERAND AS TRUSTEE FOR 

ALMA J. TAYLOR TRUST

APPELLEES

------------

FROM THE 271ST DISTRICT COURT OF WISE COUNTY

------------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 AND JUDGMENT

------------

On June 2, 2011 and October 12, 2011, we notified appellants that the trial 

court clerk responsible for preparing the record in this appeal informed the court 

that payment arrangements had not been made to pay for the clerk’s record as 

required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 35.3(a)(2). See Tex. R. App. P. 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

35.3(a)(2). We stated that we would dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution 

unless appellants, within fifteen days, made arrangements to pay for the clerk’s 

record and provided this court with proof of payment.

Because appellants have not made payment arrangements for the clerk’s 

record, it is the opinion of the court that the appeal should be dismissed for want 

of prosecution. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 

37.3(b), 42.3(b).

Appellants shall pay all costs of the appeal, for which let execution issue.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.

DELIVERED: December 8, 2011
#### Frank DELGADO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 11-16301.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 7, 2012.*

Dec. 11, 2012.

Sengthiene Bosavanh, Esquire, Law Offices of Jeffrey Milam, Modesto, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Benjamin Eli Hall, Esquire, Assistant U.S., USF-Office of the U.S. Attorney, Fresno, CA, Theophous H. Reagans, II, Esquire, Special Assistant U.S., SSA-Social Security Administration Office of the General Counsel, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: SILVERMAN, GOULD, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Frank Delgado appeals the district court’s decision affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Delgado alleged disability from post-traumatic stress disorder. At Step 2, the ALJ determined that Delgado’s medically determinable impairments were not severe. Delgado challenges this finding and the ALJ’s treatment of evidence. We conclude that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s determination that Delgado’s impairments were not severe and his case could be resolved at Step 2, and instead conclude that the evidence established that Delgado has a severe mental impairment. We reverse and remand the case for the requisite Step-3 analysis.

“[T]he step-two inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims.” *Smolen v. Chater,*80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir.1996). An impairment or combination of impairments can be found “not severe” only if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has “no more than a minimal effect on an individuals [sic] ability to work.” *Id.*at 1290.

In his findings of fact, the ALJ discussed the opinion of Dr Manzano, Delgado’s treating physician, that Delgado’s “ability to make occupational, performance, and personal/social adjustments are fair to poor.” Also, Dr. Manzano noted that Delgado “can maintain concentration and attention for at least two hour increments except during times of stress.” Based on this evidence accepted by the ALJ in his findings of fact, we conclude that Delgado has met his burden of showing severe impairment under Step 2’s de minimis standard. *See Smolen,*80 F.3d at 1290. After finding the impairment “severe,” the ALJ should have moved to the next step in the five-step process. *See Edlund v. Massanari,*253 F.3d 1152, 1160 *571(9th Cir.2001) (citing SSR 96-3, 1996 WL 374181 (July 2, 1996)).

We reverse and remand and instruct the ALJ to continue to Step 3. Because the ALJ will have the opportunity to further develop the record on remand, we do not address Delgado’s other evidentiary arguments. We also express no view on whether Delgado will be able to meet his burden at Steps 3, 4, and 5. *See Webb v. Barnhart,*433 F.3d 683, 688 (9th Cir.2005).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit 10.1
 Portions of this exhibit were omitted and filed separately with the Secretary of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the Commission) pursuant to an application for confidential treatment filed
with the Commission pursuant to Rule 24b-2 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Such
portions are marked by a series of asterisks.
 AMENDMENT No. 1
TO
SALES AND SERVICES AGREEMENT
  BACKGROUND
    1.
    
    Capitalized terms not otherwise defined in this Amendment shall have the
meanings given to them in the Agreement.2.
    
    The following Section 2.5 shall be added to the Agreement as if originally set
forth therein:
 Assignment to MedQuist of CBay-Client Agreements Requiring Domestic
Services




---



##### 



provided, however
    3.
    
    The following Section 2.6 shall be added to the Agreement as if originally set
forth therein:
 DEP Usage by CBay Clients
  Type of Service
    
    Service Description
    
    RateA
    
    Standard DEP usage
without DocQspeech
    
    *******B
    
    Standard DEP usage with
DocQspeech
    
    *******C
    
    Professional services
including Implementation,
Training, Maintenance &
Support, and
Customization
    
    MedQuists cost plus 15%
  2




---



##### 



4.
    
    The following Section 10.6 shall be added to the Agreement as if originally set
forth therein:
 Standard Inter-Company Pricing for Non-Core Services
   st
   5.
    
    Except as modified by this Amendment, the Agreement shall remain in full force
and effect unmodified. To the extent the terms of the Agreement are inconsistent with
the terms of this Amendment, the terms of this Amendment shall control.
  CBAY SYSTEMS & SERVICES, INC.
    
    
    
    MEDQUIST TRANSCRIPTIONS, LTD.BY:
    
    /s/ Clyde Swager
    
    
    
    BY:
    
    /s/ Peter MasanottiNAME:
    
    Clyde Swager
    
    
    
    NAME:
    
    Peter MasanottiTITLE:
    
    CFO
    
    
    
    TITLE:
    
    President & CEODATE:
    
    7/26/2010
    
    
    
    DATE:
    
    7/26/2010
 3
NUMBER 13

- 19

- 00 576

- C V 

### COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

PATRICIA GONZALEZ GO NZALEZ , A pp ellant , V.
JAIME RUIZ PEREZ , A ppellee

.

On Appeal from the 92nd District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas.



### ORDER ABATING APPEAL
Before Chief Justice Contreras and J ustices Longoria and Perkes Order Per Curiam
This cause is before the Court on the agreed, joint motion to abate appeal pending settlement negotiations and further action by trial cou rt to allow the parties the opportunity to engage in settlement negotiations , via mediation, and a follow

- up hearing at the trial
court

.2

The Court, having examined and fully considered the documents on file and the agreed, joint motion to abat e, is of the opinion that the agreed, joint motion to abate the appeal pending settlement should be granted. The joint motion to abate the appeal pending settlement is GRANTED and this appeal is ordered ABATED. The Court directs appellants to file, on or before Fe bruary 10, 2020 , either (1) a motion to reinstate the appeal, or (2) a motion to dismiss the appeal pursuant to
settlement. IT IS SO ORDERED. PER CURIAM
Delivered and filed this the 29 th day of Ja nuary , 2 020.
Exhibit 32.2
 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2010
(the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial
condition and results of operation of the Company.
 By:
    /s/  Bryan McGuireName:
    Bryan McGuireTitle:
    Chief Financial OfficerDate:
   August 13, 2010