C O U R T O F A P P E A LS EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEXAS ELPASO, TEXAS

MA RTI N L EE CH AV I S, Ap pe lla nt,
v. TH E ST AT E O F TE XA S, Appellee
. § § § § § § No . 0 8- 10 -0 00 26 -C R

Appea l from the Criminal District Court of Jef fe rs on County , T e xas (TC# 09-05356)

O P I N I O N In separ ate c ases, Ma

rtin L ee Chavis was convicte d of deliver y of a c ontrolled substance and possession of c hild pornog raphy . He wa s ultim ately sentenc ed to serve concur rent five -y ear terms for the offe nses. On appe al, he c halleng es the de nial of a motion to suppress, the
su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e , a

nd the vo luntari ne ss o f h is p le a s. We a ff ir m. In Dec ember

2004, Chavis was indicted for delivery of a c ontrolled substance . He pled g u i l ty , an d

th e tr i a l c o urtp l a c e d

h i mo nd e f

e r r e d a d j u d i c at i o np r o b at i o nf

o r f o ur y e ar s . In J anuar y 2009, Chavis was indicted for possession of child pornog raphy . Specifica lly , he wa s
acc used of usingL imeWire, a pee r-to-pe er f ile-shar ing pr og ram, to download movies de picting
c h i l d p o r n o g r a p h y. At a hea ringon Chavis’s motion to s uppress, De tective Curl of the Be aumont Police Depa rtment explained how his investigation led him to C havis. Curl testified that prog rams such as L imeWire allow users to ac cess the G nutella file-sha ringnetwork. Pee r-to-pe er ne tworks ar e

“ de signe d a

nd ins ta lle d to
. . . inte nti on a lly sh are inf or matio n f ro m a pe rs on ’s c omp ute r t o“An I P address is a unique 32- bit-long c o d e number that eac h computer a cquire s 1 automatically

throug h its I nterne t acc ess provider for c onnectingto the Interne t.” W e nge r v . S tate , 292 S.W .3d 191, 194 n.2 (Tex.App.--F ort Worth 2009, no pet.). -2- anyone any

wher e in the wor ld that’s using sof tware that operates on that same ne twork so that people c an shar e music, shar e movies, shar e softwa re, sha re pic tures openly

acr oss the entire world.” Curl stated that when a use r runs L imeWire it communicates with a “supe rnode,” by “send[ing] a file up to the supe rnode a utomatically

that say s, ‘Hey , Ihave the following files available for sha

re; a nd they ’re on my

computer.’ ” A use r ca

n also send a r equest to the supernode for pa

rticular f iles by title or topic. For e x ample, a use r could re quest a spec ific song or a ty pe of music. The supernode sear ches the network to see if any users have the r equeste d file on their c omputer. Onc e the f ile is found, the two computer s–“the one who has the f ile for share and the one that wants the file f or shar e”–c ommunicate dire ctly to acc omplish t he download. L imeWire also allows users to sea rch on the basis of an I P address. The user c an the n b ro ws e a ll o f t

he ite ms a

va ila ble fo r s ha

re at th at pa

rt ic ula r a dd re ss. 1 In h is w or

k inve sti g atin gc hil d p or

no g ra phy , Curl us e s a

pr og ra m c a lle d “ Phe x,” wh ic h is compar able to L imeWire. L ike L imeWire, it is available for a ny one to download f

rom the Interne t and it allows users to ac cess the G nutella networ k. Cur l te sti fi e d th at he re c e ive d a n I P a dd re ss f ro m a se rv e r u se d b y

law e nf or c e me nt t o identify computers that ha

ve downloade d movies depictingchild pornog raphy . Using Phex , he br ow se d th e ite ms a

va ila ble fo r s ha

re at th e I P a dd

re ss a nd ide nti fi e d a

fi le that a

pp e are d to
c on ta in c hil d p or

no g ra phy . H e wa s uns uc c e ssf

ul at do wn loa din gthe fi le fr om t hat I P a dd

re ss, so he downloade d it from another computer. Curl then ve rified that the “ SHA1 hash value ” of the fi le he do wn loa de d w a s th e same a s th at f or the fi le at th e targ e t I P a dd re ss. Th e SHA 1 h a sh-3-

va lue is a un iqu e ide nti fi e r. Cur l vi e we d th e vid e o a nd de te rm ine d th at it

c on ta ine d c hil d p o r n o g r a p h y. Curl enlisted the district attorney ’s offic e to help him find the per son associate d with the targ et I P address. An a ssistant dist rict attorne y signe d a g rand jury

subpoena duc es tec um direc ting Time Warne r Cable to provide the subscribe r’s name and a ddress. In response to the subpoena, Time War

ner pr ovided Chavis’s name a nd addre ss. Wi th this i nformation, Curl ob ta ine d a

se arc h w arr ant f

or Cha vis ’s ho us e . T we nty -s e ve n mo vie s c on ta ini ngc hil d pornog raphy

wer e found on Chavis’s c omputer. After the trial cour

t denied Chavis’s motion to suppress, Chavis entere d an open ple a of g uilty to possession of child pornog raphy . He a lso pled true to violating his probation by committing the off

ense of possession of child pornog raphy . When court conve ned for sentenc ing, Chavis’s attorney argued that althoug h Chavis was “te chnica lly ” guilty of possessing child pornog raphy , he dele ted the files c ontaining c hild pornog raphy once he rea liz ed what they
wer e. Chavis told the court that he set up his computer to download por nog raphy while he wa s not present. He would later look to see what had be en downloade d and would dele te any movies involving childre n. The trial c ourt announc ed that he w ould conduct an e videntiary hear ing on Chavis’s claims and would “ make a punishment decision based on that.” At the commenc ement of the evidentiar y hear ing, the judge stated that he w as intere sted in “the degree of [Chavis’s] offe nse.” Curl testified that the vast majority of the pornography

on Cha vis ’s c omp ute r w a s “ a du lt p or n. ” Th e mov ie s c on ta ini ngc hil d p or no g ra phy we re fo un d in the re cycle bin of the computer a nd thus had bee n deleted. Items in the rec y cle bin could, howeve r, be “ restore d” so they could be view ed ag ain. Curl claimed that Chavis told him that he-4-

ini tia lly us e d “ a du lt s e arc h te rm s, ” but he g ot t ir e d o f t he re su lts he wa s g e tti ngwi th t ho se te rm s
and sta rt e d u sin goth e r t e rm s, su c h a s “ pe do .” Cha vis tol d Curl that he un de rs too d “ pe do ” to mean “ pedophile.” Curl a lso testified that, based on his examination of Chavis’s computer, Chavis had pre viewed twe lve of the movies c ontaining c hild pornog raphy duringthe downloadingproce ss, but neverthe less allowed them to continue downloadingand then view ed the m at le a st o ne mor e tim e . Curl c ou ld n ot d e te rm ine ho w l on ge a c h p re vie w l a ste d; t he y c ou ld have be e n f

ive se c on ds or

te n mi nute s. Chavis denied tellingCurl that he used “ pedo” a s a sea rch te rm. He a lso testified that sometimes the previe ws failed to r evea l that children we re involved. Mor eover , his cousin was often at his house and thus could have previe wed the f iles while Chavis was at wor k. In his first issue, Chavis challeng es the de nial of his motion to s uppress. He argues that Curl violated Article 18.20 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e and Sec tion 16.02 of the Texas Penal Code by

browsingthe files on his computer. H e also a rgues that the g rand jury subpoena w as not proper . In revie winga trial c ourt’s rulingon a motion to suppress, we g ive almost total defer ence to t he tr ia l c ourt ’s de te rm ina tio ns of his tor ic a l f

a c t, b ut w e e xami ne le g a l c on c lus ion s de novo
. Se e Car mo uc hev . S

tate , 10 S.W .3d 323, 327 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). When, as in this case, the tr ia l c ourt did no t ma ke e xpre ss f

ind ing s o f f

a c t, w e vie w the e vid e nc e in t he light m os t f

avo ra ble t o th e t ri al co urt ’s ru l i n g an d as s u m e t h atth e c o urtm ad e i mp l i ci tfi n d i n gs i ns u p p o rto f i t s ru l i n g, as longas the implicit findings a re suppor ted by the re cord. Se e Cra in v . S tate , 315 S.W .3d 43, 48 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010). We will uphol d the trial cour t’s ruling if it is correc t under a ny theory of law a pplicable to the c ase. Id
.-5-

Pursuant to Article 18.20 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure , an interc epted communication and e vidence derive d there from ar e inadmissible as evide nce if the communication was inter cepte d in violation of Section 16.02 of the Texas Penal Code. T EX .C ODE C R IM .P R OC .ANN . art. 18.20, § 2(a )(1) (West 2010). Section 16.02 of the Pena l Code makes it a c rime to “intentionally interce pt[ ] . . . a[ n] . . . electronic c ommunication.” T EX .P EN .C ODE ANN . § 16.02(b)( 1)(West 2011). Chavis asserts that Curl intentionally interce pted his elec tronic communications when Curl browsed his computer files. He r elies on the statutory definitions of the terms in Section 1 6
. 0 2
. T h e t erm“e l ec tro n i c c o m mun i ca t i o n ” r ef er s t o “atra n s fe r o f s i gn s , s i gn al s , wr i t i n g, imag es, sounds, data, or

intelligenc e of a

ny nature transmitted in whole or in par t by a wire , radio, e lectroma g netic, photoelec tronic, or photo-optica l sy stem.” T EX .C ODE C R IM .P R OC .ANN . art. 18.20, § 1(15) . The wor d “interc ept” mea ns “the a ural or othe r ac quisiti on of the c ontents of a wire , oral, or e lectronic communication throug h the use of a n elec tronic, mec hanica l, or other device .” Id . at § 1 (3 ); se e als o T EX .P EN .C ODE A NN . § 16.02(a) (incorpor atingthe def initions of “ele ctronic c ommunication” and “ interce pt” from Ar ticle 18.20). The State a

rgues that Curl did not intercept a ny elec tronic communications. I t relies on
case s that hold that making c hild pornog raphy available for other s to acc ess and downloa d throug h peer -to-pee r file- sharingsoftwar e qualifie s as “dissemination” or “distribution” of the pornog raphy
. See, e .g. , W e nge r v . S tate , 292 S.W .3d 191, 198-99 (Te x .App.--F ort Worth 2009, no pet.). The se ca ses do not addre ss the issue of whe ther a law enf orce ment office r interc epts an
e le c tr on ic c omm

un ic atio n b y

br ow sin ga

pe rs on ’s sh are d f

ile s. The pa rties have not cited, and we have not f ound, any case s interpre ting the T exas-6-

statutes in a fa ctual sce nario like the one we e ncounter here . Neve rtheless, we are not without g uid anc e . T he F e de ra l Wir e ta p A c t’ s d e fi nit ion s o f “ e le c tr on ic c omm un ic atio n” and

“ int e rc e pt”
are virtually

identical to the Te x as statutes’ de finitions of those terms. See18 U.S.C.A. at § 2510(4)( West S upp. 2010)(de fining “interc ept” a s “the a ural or othe r ac quisiti on of the contents of a

ny wire, e lectronic , or ora l communication throug h the use of a ny elec tronic,
me c ha nic a l, o r o the r d e vic e ” ); id . at § 2 51 0( 12 )( Wes t 20 00 )( de fi nin g“ e le c tr on ic communication” a s “any

transfe r of sig ns, signa ls, writing, imag es, sounds, data, or intelligenc e of any nature transmitted in whole or in par t by a wire , radio, e lectroma g netic, photoelec tronic or ph oto op tic a l sy ste m th at a ff e c ts i nte rs tate or

fo re ig n c omm e rc e ” ). Ac c or din g ly , w e may tur n to
case s interpre ting the F eder al Wiretap Ac t for dire ction. Se e Cas til lo v . S tate , 810 S.W .2d 180, 18 3 ( Te x.Cr im. Ap p. 19 90 ); Me y e r v . S tate , 7 8 S. W.3 d 5 05 , 5 08 -0 9 ( Te x.Ap p. -- Au sti n 2 00 2, pe t. ref ’d). “The fede ral c ourts have c onsistently held that elec tronic communications, in order to be int e rc e pte d, mus t be a c qu ir e d c on te mpo ra ne ou sly wi th t ra ns mis sio n a

nd that e le c tr on ic communications are not interce pted within the meaningof the F eder al Wiretap Ac t if they are retrie ved fr om storag e.” O’Brien v . O’Brien , 8 99 So. 2d 11 33 , 1 13 6 ( F la .D ist .Ct .App . 2 00 5) ; see also Fraser v. Nationwi de Mut. Ins. Co. , 3 52 F .3 d 1 07 , 1 13 (3 rd Cir . 2 00 3) ; United States v. Steiger , 3 18 F .3 d 1 03 9, 10 46 -4 9 ( 11 th C ir . 2 00 3) ; Konop v. Hawaiian Airli nes, Inc
. , 302 F.3d 86 8, 87 8 ( 9th

Cir . 2 00 2) ; Ste v e J

ac k so n G am es, In c . v . U

.S . S e c re t Se rv ., 36 F.3d 457, 461- 62 (5 th C ir . 1 99 4) ; Pure Power Boot Camp v. W arrior Fitness Boot C

amp , 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 556-58 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
. Contra United States v. Szymuszkiewicz , 6 22 F .3 d 7 01 , 7 05 -0 6 ( 7th Cir. 2010)(indicatingthat the Fe dera l Wi reta p Act does not have a timingrequire ment).-7-

The Steiger

case has a f

actua l scena

rio somewhat similar to this case. T here , an anony mous hacke r e- mailed the Montg omery , Alabama Police Depa

rtment, stating that he had identified the De fenda

nt Steiger as a c hild molester. Steiger , 318 F.3d at 1041-42. The ha cker had tricke d Steige r into downloadinga “tr ojan horse” prog ram, whic h allowed the ha cker to enter into St eig er’ s computer through the Interne t. Id . at 1044. The ha cker sent the police se vera l emails containing information he ha d obtained, includingSteige r’s name and I P address, picture s depictingchild pornog raphy , and the identities of f olders on Steig er’ s computer whe re pornog raphic pictures we re store d. Id . at 1042. The Ele venth Circuit deter mined that the hac ker did not intercept a

ny elec tronic communication in viol ation of the F eder al Wiretap Ac t beca use a “conte mporane ous interce ption– i.e ., an ac quisiti on during‘flig ht’–is require d to impli cate the Wiretap Act with re spect to ele ctronic c ommunications.” Id . at 1048-49. The c ourt noted that its holding compor ted with the ordinar

y meaningof “inter cept,” which connote s interruptinga communication in progr ess or be fore arr ival. Id . at 1048. The court a lso relied on a dif

fer ence in the statutory

definitions of “wire communication” a nd

“ e le c tr on ic c omm

un ic atio n. ” B e fo re the F e de ra l Wir e ta p A c t w a s ame nd e d to a dd re ss e le c tr on ic communications, fede ral c ourts had interpr eted “ interce pt” “to mea n the ac quisiti on of a communication contempor aneous w ith transmission.” Id . at 1047. When Congr ess amende d the Ac t, i t r e de fi ne d th e te rm “ wi re c omm

un ic atio n” to i nc lud e sto ra g e , b ut d id n ot i nc lud e sto ra g e in the def inition of “elec tronic communication.” Id . at 1048. Thus, a wir e communication could be interce pted while in storag e, but an e lectronic communication could not. Steiger , 318 F.2d at 10 48 ; accord Ste ve J

ackson G ames , 3 6 F .3 d at 46 1- 62 (“ Con g re ss’ us e of the wo rd ‘t ra ns fe r’ in the de fi nit ion

of ‘e le c tr on ic c omm

un ic atio n, ’ a

nd its omi ssi on

in t hat de fi nit ion

of the phra se-8-

‘any elec tronic storag e of suc h communication’ . . . re flec ts that Congre ss did not int end for ‘i nte rc e pt’ to a

pp ly to ‘ e le c tr on ic c omm

un ic atio ns ’ whe n th os e c omm un ic atio ns are in ‘ e le c tr on ic storag e.’” ). When Congr ess later deleted the ref

ere nce to store d communications from the definition of “wir e communication,” courts pre sumed that it intended to require contempora

neous ac quisiti on for the inter ception of both wire and ele ctronic c ommunications. See Ste iger , 318 F.3d at 1048. L ike the F e de ra l Wir e ta

p A c t, S e c tio n 1 8. 20 pr e vio us ly de fi ne d “ wi re c omm

un ic atio n” to include communications “in electronic storag e.” SeeAct of June 19, 2009, 81st L eg ., R.S., ch. 1237, § 1, 2009 T EX .G EN .L AWS 3952 (dele ting “ elec tronic storag e of a wire c ommunication” from the de finition of “wire communication”) . The similarities in the leg islative histories of the fe de ra l and

state statut e s su g g e st that th e te rm s “ e le c tr on ic c omm un ic atio n” and

“ int e rc e pt” in Section 18.20 should be interpre ted as those ter ms have be en interpr eted by the fe dera l courts. Under that interpre tation, Curl did not i nterc ept Chavis’s elec tronic communications when he browsed the share d files re siding on Chavis’s c omputer, bec ause the files wer e not “in flig ht” at the time. I t makes par

ticular sense to use the fe dera l courts’ interpr etation in this case. B ased on Cur l’ s te sti mony , th e tr ia l c ourt c ou ld h ave fo un d th at by pla c ingfi le s in

the sh are d f

old e r o f h is computer, Chavis wa s eff ectively saying “ to anyone any

wher e in the wor ld” with the nec essar y softwar e, “H ey , Ihave [these] files ava ilable for sha re.” I t would seem strang e to interpre t the statutes to prohibit law enfor ceme nt from using publicly available softwar e to view f iles that
wer e made available for view ing to e veryone else in the world. Chavis also argues that his motion to s uppress should have been grante d beca use the-9-

g rand jury

subpoena duc es tec um was improper . Acc ordingto Chavis, a g rand jury does not have the power

to issue a subpoena

duces te cum and, e ven if it had such pow er, it did not follow the prope r proc edure to subpoena Time Warne r Cable. The State counter s that the subpoena w as lawful a nd that Chavis does not have standingto challeng e the subpoe na. Agree ing w ith the State’s sec ond argument, we f ind it unnecessar

y to consider Chavis’s c omplaints about the subpoena. In Tap p v . S tate , th e a pp e lla nt r a ise d a

rgume nts sim ila

r t o th os e ra ise d b y

Cha vis reg ardinga g rand jury

subpoena duc es tec um. See108 S.W .3d 459, 461 (Tex.App.--Houston [14t h Dist.] 2003, pet. re f’d) . A law e nforc ement off icer procur ed a grand jury

subpoena f

or the appellant’ s blood test results, which then for med the basis for

char g ing the appellant with driving while intox icated. Id . at 460. The F ourtee nth Court of Appea ls held that the appe llant did not have sta nding to c omplain of any defe cts in the g rand jury

subpoena pr ocess be cause he did not have a ny constitutional or statutory rea sonable e x pectation of privacy in the blood test results. Id . at 46 1; ac c or

d G arc ia v . S

tate , 95 S.W .3d 522, 526-27 (Te x .App.--H ouston [ 1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Her e, the grand jury

subpoena duc es tec um was used to discove r the subscr iber information for the I P address whe re Curl ha d found the file c ontaining c hild pornog raphy
. Chavis did not have a r easona ble expectation of priva cy in this i nformation. See U nited States v. Bynum , 604 F.3d 161, 164 ( 4th Cir.)(noting that ever y fede ral c ourt that has addr essed the issue has held that ther e is no rea sonable e x pectation of privacy in subscriber inf

ormation), c e rt. denied, 1 30 S. Ct . 3 44 2, 17 7 L .E d. 2d 34 7 ( 20 10 ); Ru sso v . S

tate , 228 S.W .3d 779, 802 (T e x.Ap p. -- Au sti n 2 00 7, pe t. r e f’ d) (s tatin gthat th e re is n o F ourt h A me ndme nt p ro te c tio n a g a ins t-10-

the disclosure of

subscriber

information). Ac cording ly , he does not have standingto complain of defe cts in the proce ss used to obtain the information. Chavis’s first issue is overr uled. In his second issue, Chavis ar g ues that the e vidence was fa ctually insufficient to support his conviction for possession of c hild pornog raphy . He c ontends that his statements at the sentenc ing he aring s demonstrate that his possession of child pornog raphy was not intentional. The State a

rgues that the e vidence was fa ctually sufficie nt. The Texas Court of Criminal Appea ls rece ntly

overr uled its decisions providing f or fa ctual suff

iciency revie w and he ld that the leg al suffic iency

standard is the only

standard that a re viewingcourt should apply in determining the suffic iency

of the e vidence
. Se e Broo k s v . S tate , 323 S.W .3d 893 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010). Since Brooks was de cided a fter the prepa ration of the pa

rties’ brie fs, we c ould construe Chavis’s second issue a s a cha lleng e to the leg al suffic iency of the e vidence
. Se e, e .g., Ma uld in v . S tate , No . 0 8- 09 -0 00 28 -C R, 2 01 0 WL 45 23 76 1, at *1 (T e x.Ap p. -- El Pa so No v. 10 , 2 01 0, pe t. ref ’d)( not desig nated f

or publication). How ever , neither the leg al nor the f actua l sufficienc y standard a

pplies when a

defe ndant knowing ly

and voluntarily

pleads guilty

to a fe lony
. Keller v. Sta te , 125 S.W .3d 600, 604 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2003), pe t. d ism ’d , im pr ov ide ntl

y granted , 146 S.W .3d 677 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). Al tho ug h Ch avis ’s c onvic tio n c ann ot b e re vie we d f or le g a l or fa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y , A rt ic le 1.15 of the Te x as Code of Criminal Proce dure r equire s that a guilty plea be supported by evidenc e. Se e Me ne

fe e v . S tate , 287 S.W .3d 9, 13 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009). A sworn wr itten statement that spec ifically admits culpability

or that g ener ally

acknow ledg es that the a lleg ations
are true will suffice to support a guilty plea. Mene

fee , 287 S.W .3d at 13. Her e, Chavis sig ned a state me nt t

hat pr ov ide d, “ Ihave re a d th e c ha rg ingins tr

ume nt a nd my atto rn e y ha s e xpla ine d it

to-11-

me and I committed eac h and eve ry element a lleg ed. . . . I

am guilty

of the off ense . . . . I

swea r that all of the for eg oing . . . is the truth, so he lp me God.” The statement wa s sworn bef ore a deputy district clerk. This stateme nt amounts to a judicial confe ssion and is sufficient to support the guilty plea. Se e Sta

gg s v . S tate , 314 S.W .3d 155, 159-60 (Te x .App.--H ouston [ 1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.)(holdingthat a judicial conf ession in which the def

endant a dmitted that he

“ c omm itt e d e a c h a

nd e ve ry e le me nt” wa s su ff

ic ie nt t o s atis fy

Ar tic le 1. 15 ); Ho us ton v . S

tate , 286 S.W .3d 604, 614 (Tex.App.--B eaumont 2009, pet. r ef’ d)(holdingthat a stateme nt composed of virtually identical languag e wa s a judicial conf ession, which pre cluded a challeng e to the State’s proof) , cert. de nied , 1 30 S. Ct . 1 08 2, 17 5 L .E d. 2d 90 6 ( 20 10 ). Cha

vis ’s se c on d is su e is
overr uled. In his third issue, Chavis attacks his plea of guilty to possession of child pornog raphy and his ple a of tr ue to v iol atin ghis pr ob atio n. Re lyingon his state me nts at th e se nte nc inghe ari ng s, Chavis argues that he did not under stand the mens rea element of the child pornog raphy

char g e. Sin c e his g uil ty

ple a wa s n ot k

no wi ng ly ma de , Ch avis argue s th at hi s p le a of tr ue wa s a lso unknowingbeca

use it was base d on his mist aken be lief that he violate d his probation by committing the child pornography offe nse. We rec ently

addre ssed a similar cla im. Se e Ha ll v . S tate , N o . 0 8
- 0 8
- 0 0 1 1 1
- CR , 2 0 1 0 WL 65 41 57 (T e x.Ap p. -- El Pa so F e b. 24 , 2 01 0, no pe t.) (n ot d e signate d f or pu bli c atio n) . L ike Cha

vis , Hall re lied on testimony

from a punishment he aringto establish that she did not know that she must have committed the off ense intentionally

or knowing ly
. Ha ll , 2 0 1 0 WL 6 5 4 1 5 7 , at * 3
. We conclude d that Hall forf

eited her rig ht to raise the voluntar iness of her plea on a ppeal be cause she did not ask the trial cour

t to withdraw the plea
. Id . at *3 -4 ; ac c or d D ou gla s v . S tate , No.-12-

08-09-00027- CR, 2010 W L2196082, at *3 (Te x .App.--E l Paso May 28, 2010, pet. re f’d) (not de signate d f

or pu bli c atio n) ; se e als o S

e rn a v . S tate , N os . 0 5- 08 -0 17 09 -C R & 05 -0 8- 01 71 0- CR, 2010 WL188574, at *2 (Te x .App.--D allas Jan. 21, 2010, no pet.)(not desig nated f or publication)(holdingthat appellant f orfe ited the rig ht to raise the voluntar iness of his pleas of true be cause he did not raise voluntar iness at the re vocation hea ring ). Our c onclusion was base d on the re asoningof Me nd e z v . S tate , 138 S.W .3d 334 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). In Mende z , the appe llant argued that the tria l court should have sua sp on tewithdrawn his guilty plea be cause his testimony raised a question as to his guilt. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the a ppellant fa iled to preser

ve this issue beca

use he did not seek to withdra

w his plea in the trial c ourt. Mende z , 138 S.W .3d at 339, 350. Ther e wa s no sug g estion in Mende

z of any err or in the proc eeding s leadingup to the g uilty plea. Id . at 350. Be fore Chavis pled g uilty , he and his attorney signe d a docume nt entitled, “Written Pl ea Admonishments.” This document includes the a dmonishments required by Article 26.13 of

the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure . Chavis stated in the document that he understood the admonishments and was a war e of the conseque nces of his plea. As in Mende

z , there is no sug g estion of any

err or in the proc eeding s leadingup to the g uilty plea or the true ple a. F rom the statements made by

counsel a nd the judg e, it is clear

that the purpose of

the testimony

taken at the sentenc ing he aring s was to allow the judg e to deter mine the seve rity

of Chavis’s off

ense f or purposes of punishment. Chavis neve r re quested to withdraw the pleas, e ven af

ter his testimony at the sente ncinghear ings. A ccor dingly , based on the authorities cited a bove, Chavis forf

eited his ri g ht t o r a ise the vo luntari ne ss o f h is p le a s. One f inal issue not raised by

the par ties must be addre ssed. In both case s, the trial cour t-13-

signe d a c e rt if ic atio n o f C havis ’s ri g ht t o a pp e a l. H ow e ve r, the c e rt if ic atio ns do no t a

pp e ar t o contain Chavis’s sig nature . SeeT EX .R.A PP .P. 25.2(d). Instead, it appe ars that a court c lerk simply wrote Chavis’s na

me and a ddress onto the c ertification. W e ther efor e ORDER Chavis’s
atto rn e y to s e nd him a c op y of thi s o pin ion

and our j ud g me nt, to n oti fy

Cha vis of his ri g ht t o f

ile
a pro se petition for discre tionary revie w, and to inform him of the pe rtinent dea dlines. See T EX .R.A PP .P. 48.4, 68. Counsel is further ORDERED to comply

with the additional require ments of Rule 48.4. The judg ments of the trial c ourt are aff irmed.
August 26, 2011 DAVI D WEL L I NGTONCHEW, C hief Just ice B e f o r e C h e w , C
. J. , M c C l ur e , a n d R i v e r a , JJ. (Do Not Publish)