UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JOHN MELLEADY, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

v.

ALLISON BLAKE, et al.,

 

 Defendants.

Civil No. 11-1807 (NLH/KMW)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

John Melleady

Virginia Keefer

101 Idle Lake Road

Franklinville, New Jersey 08322

Pro Se

Karen Lee Jordan, Esquire

Office of New Jersey Attorney General

Department of Law and Public Safety, Division of Law

Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex

25 Market Street

P.O. Box 116

Trenton, New Jersey 08625

Attorney for Defendants Allison Blake, Christine NorbutMoses, Kathryn J. Way, Anne Milgram, Jamie Millard-Tindall,

Gregory Rappaport, Larry Moon, Marcella Haddon, Brian

Jakubowski, Taiwo Williams, Tiffany Jubb, Regina FloydJones, Terry McNellis, Deserre Whiteside, Gina Tracy, Janet

Boyle, Deborah Parker, Crystal Bates, Janet Foley, and San

Payne

Brian C. Darreff, Esquire

Earp Cohn P.C.

20 Brace Road

Fourth Floor

Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08034

Attorney for Defendants Frank Borelli, Helen Divens, Joseph

Sottosanti, and Delsea Regional School District

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Steven D. Wallach, Esquire

5 Mapleton Road

First Floor

Princeton, New Jersey 08540

Attorney for Defendant Brent Brendle

Kelly A. Samuels, Esquire

Office of New Jersey Attorney General

Department of Law and Public Safety, Division of Law

Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex

25 Market Street

P.O. Box 112

Trenton, New Jersey 08625

Attorney for Defendant Judge Mary K. White

Rahat N. Babar, Esquire

Office of New Jersey Attorney General

Department of Law and Public Safety, Division of Law

Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex

25 Market Street

P.O. Box 116

Trenton, New Jersey 08625

Attorney for Defendant David Garnes, Esquire

HILLMAN, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court by way of five separate

motions [Doc. Nos. 11, 12, 15, 26, 32] to dismiss Plaintiffs’

complaint filed by various Defendants in this action. Also

before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion [Doc. No. 18] for the

Court to address policies and practices of the New Jersey

Division of Youth and Family Services. The Court has considered

the parties’ motions and the oppositions thereto, and decides

this matter pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. 

For the reasons expressed below, Defendants’ motions are

granted, and Plaintiffs’ motion is dismissed as moot.

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I. JURISDICTION

Plaintiffs, John Melleady and Virginia Keefer, bring this

civil rights complaint against multiple defendants pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’

federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and may exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1367.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Removal of Children from Plaintiffs’ Home

Plaintiffs, John Melleady and Virginia Keefer, a married

couple, filed the complaint in this action pro se on March 30,

2011 against thirty-three defendants. (See generally Pls.’

Compl. [Doc. No. 1].) According to the complaint, Plaintiffs

commenced this action “because children were illegally, forcibly

– kidnapped [sic] [from their home] on known erroneous,

fabricated, and unsubstantiated allegations.” (Pls.’ Compl. ¶

15.) As demonstrated by several exhibits attached to the

complaint, Plaintiffs’ claims arise from the removal of both

their adopted son, (“S.K”), and their foster son, (“D.L.”), from

their home in November of 2008 and subsequent proceedings in the

Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division - Family Part for

Gloucester County, (“Family Court”). 

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The Division of Youth and Family Services (“DYFS” ), a 1

branch of New Jersey’s Department of Children and Families, has

been involved with Plaintiffs’ family since approximately 2004

when S.K. began living with Plaintiffs. (DYFS Contact Sheet, Ex.

4 to Pls.’ Compl. [Doc. No. 1-2] 1.) Plaintiffs formally adopted

S.K. in 2007, but as noted by DYFS, “[s]ince the adoption with

the [Plaintiffs], [S.K.’s] adoptive home has not been ideal” and

there were several referrals to DYFS regarding S.K. not “getting

along” with his adoptive mother, Plaintiff Keefer. (Id.) In

August of 2008, after a referral was made, DYFS substantiated a

claim for child neglect against Plaintiffs for locking S.K., then

fifteen (15) years old, out of the family home. (Id.) After

this claim was substantiated, DYFS placed S.K. in a shelter for a

two-week “cooling off period,” and S.K. was later returned to

Plaintiffs’ home. (Id. at 2.) 

Several months later, in October of 2008, S.K. informed a

DYFS employee that Plaintiff Keefer had become “increasingly

controlling and verbally abusive” to S.K., and S.K. reported that

he did not feel he could remain in Plaintiffs’ home as a result. 

(Id.) On November 7, 2008, while waiting for a court date with

regard to S.K.’s October 2008 allegations, the DYFS employee

working on S.K.’s case received a call from another DYFS employee

1. Although multiple DYFS employees are named as Defendants in

this action, Plaintiffs did not name DYFS as a defendant. 

4

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who served as the permanency supervisor for Plaintiffs’ foster

child, D.L. (Id.) D.L.’s permanency supervisor noted that DYFS

was recommending that D.L. be placed with a new foster family in

light of the difficulties Plaintiff Keefer was having with her

adopted son, S.K. –- specifically, the substantiated claim for

child neglect when S.K. was locked out of the family home. (Id.;

see also Verified Am. Compl. for Custody, Care and Supervision,

Ex. 39 to Pls.’ Compl. [Doc. No. 1-6] ¶¶ 9a-9c.) D.L.’s

permanency supervisor further indicated that DYFS planned to go

to Plaintiffs’ home that same evening to remove D.L. from

Plaintiffs’ care and place D.L. with a new foster family. (DYFS

Contact Sheet, Ex. 4 to Pls.’ Compl. [Doc. No. 1-2] 2-3; see also

Verified Am. Compl. for Custody, Care and Supervision, Ex. 39 to

Pls.’ Compl. [Doc. No. 1-6] ¶¶ 9a-9c.) 

Upon learning of the plans to remove D.L. from Plaintiffs’

home, the DYFS employees assigned to S.K.’s case determined that

S.K. “was now at imminent risk of harm” as a result of DYFS

removing D.L. from Plaintiffs’ care and placing D.L. with a new

foster family since Plaintiffs were trying to adopt D.L. (DYFS

Contact Sheet, Ex. 4 to Pls.’ Compl. [Doc. No. 1-2] 3.) 

Specifically, DYFS employees were concerned that Plaintiffs would

“act out in anger toward” S.K. because D.L. was removed from the

5

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home. (Id.; see also Screening Summary dated November 7, 2008, 2

Ex. 6 to Pls.’ Compl. [1-2] 1.) However, even prior to November

7, 2008, DYFS was preparing to obtain custody, care, and

supervision of S.K. because there “were serious concerns about

[S.K.] being neglected and emotionally abused in [Plaintiffs’]

home.” (DYFS Contact Sheet, Ex. 4 to Pls.’ Compl. [Doc. No. 1-2]

3; see also Investigation Summary, Ex. 14 to Pls.’ Compl. [Doc.

No. 1-3] 12) (“Neglect substantiated according to Allegations

Based System for Lock-out as the parent or caregiver denied the

child access to the home and refused or failed to make provisions

for another arrangement for the child. [Plaintiff] Keefer and

[Plaintiff] Melleady both stated that they intentionally locked

[S.K.] out of their home for at least a half an hour. [S.K.] did

not have access to the home and had to climb in the basement

window.”)

Accordingly, on November 7, 2008, Plaintiffs signed the

necessary paperwork, and S.K. was removed from Plaintiffs’ home 3

2. Furthermore, the record reflects that Plaintiff Keefer was

previously informed that if she or Defendant Melleady were “ever

substantiated for a child abuse or neglect incident in which an

out of home placement of [S.K.] was required, the resource unit

may close her foster home ... [which meant] baby D.L. would be

placed in a different foster home.” (DYFS Contact Sheet, Ex. 13

to Pls.’ Compl. [Doc. No. 1-3] 3.) 

3. It appears that Plaintiffs’ foster child, D.L., was removed

earlier on the evening of November 7, 2008, prior to the time

S.K. was removed. (Verified Am. Compl. for Custody, Care and

Supervision, Ex. 39 to Pls.’ Compl. [Doc. No. 1-6] ¶¶ 9a, 9c.) 

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on an emergent basis. (Notice of Emergency Removal, Ex. 22 to

Pls.’ Compl. [Doc. No. 1-4] 1-2.) A hearing was then held on

November 12, 2008 in the Family Court, and DYFS was granted

custody, care, and supervision of S.K. (DYFS Contact Sheet, Ex.

4 to Pls.’ Compl. [Doc. No. 1-2] 3.) Following subsequent

proceedings, the Family Court entered a Permanency Order on

August 18, 2010 in which the Family Court found that “[i]t is not

and will not be safe to return the child(ren) home in the

foreseeable future because defendants refuse psychological

evaluation and child is 1[7] and refuses counseling and refuses

to return home.” (August 18, 2010 Permanency Order, Ex. 41 to

Pls.’ Compl. [Doc. No. 1-6] ¶ I(b).) The Family Court further

determined that “[t]he minor [S.K.] is unable to thrive in a

family setting and will do well in an independent living program

because: defendants refuse psychological evaluation and child is

17 and refuses counseling and refuses to return home.” (Id. ¶

IV(b).) 

B. Defendants in this Action

In the complaint, Plaintiffs named the following thirtythree Defendants: (1) Allison Blake, Commissioner of the

Department of Children and Families; (2) Kathryn Way, DYFS Area

Director; (3) Deborah Watt, DYFS Regional Director; (4) Deborah 4

Parker, DYFS Manager; (5) Crystal Bates, DYFS Caseworker; (6)

4. No appearance has been entered on behalf of this Defendant.

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Tiffany Jubb, DYFS Caseworker; (7) Gina Tracy, DYFS Caseworker

Supervisor; (8) Janet Foley, DYFS Supervisor; (9) Taiwo Williams,

DYFS Caseworker; (10) Jan Fisher, DYFS Supervisor; (11) Terry 5

McNellis, Litigation Specialist; (12) Deserre Whiteside,6

Resource Specialist; (13) Regina Floyd-Jones, DYFS Supervisor;

(15) Janet Boyle, Resource Specialist; (15) Brian Jakubowski,

DYFS Caseworker; (16) Larry Moon, DYFS Supervisor; (17) Marcella

Haddon, DYFS Supervisor; (18) Gregory Rappaport, DYFS Supervisor;

(19) San Payne, DYFS Manager; (20) Frank Borelli, Superintendent

of the Delsea Regional School District; (21) Joseph Sottosanti of

the Delsea Regional High School; (22) Helen Divens, Vice

Principal at Delsea Regional High School; (23) Delsea Regional

High School; (24) Christine Norbut-Moses, Assistant Commissioner 7

of the Department of Children and Families; (25) Judge Mary K.

White, J.S.C.; (26) Jaime Millard-Tindall, Deputy Attorney 8

General; (27) Brent Brendle, therapist with Family Services of 9

5. No appearance has been entered on behalf of this Defendant

6. Plaintiffs originally improperly identified this Defendant as

“Desiree Whitehall.” (Pls.’ Compl. 3.) 

7. Plaintiffs originally improperly identified this Defendant as

“Christine Moses.” (Pls.’ Compl. 4.)

8. Plaintiffs originally improperly identified this Defendant as

“Jaime Millard-Tindell.” (Pls.’ Compl. 4.)

9. Plaintiffs originally improperly identified this Defendant as

“Brent Brindle.” (Pls.’ Compl. 4.)

8

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Burlington, Inc.; (28) Debra Bowen; (29) Noeline Lewis; (30) 10 11

Joseph Lewis; (31) David Garnes, Esquire, Law Guardian to S.K.; 12

(32) Anne Milgram, former Attorney General; and (33) Peter

Fiorentino, Esquire, Plaintiffs’ attorney. (Pls.’ Compl. 1-5.) 13

C. Allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint

As a result of the removal of S.K. and D.L. and the related

Family Court proceedings, Plaintiffs brought this action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional

rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as

well as a number of state law claims, including defamation,

libel, slander, abuse of process, and negligent and intentional

infliction of emotional distress. (Pls.’ Compl. ¶¶ 14, 22, 28,

39-41, 43, 50-51, 62, 64, 86, 91.)

Initially, the Court notes that Plaintiffs’ complaint is

10. No appearance has been entered on behalf of this Defendant. 

It is unclear if this Defendant was served with Plaintiffs’

complaint. This Defendant has not moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’

complaint. 

11. No appearance has been entered on behalf of this Defendant. 

It is unclear if this Defendant was served with Plaintiffs’

complaint. This Defendant has not moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’

complaint.

12. No appearance has been entered on behalf of this Defendant. 

It is unclear if this Defendant was served with Plaintiffs’

complaint. This Defendant has not moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’

complaint.

13. No appearance has been entered on behalf of this Defendant. 

It is unclear if this Defendant was served with Plaintiffs’

complaint. This Defendant has not moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’

complaint.

9

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nearly one hundred (100) pages in length and contains

approximately one hundred-twenty seven (127) numbered

paragraphs. Moreover, Plaintiffs set forth in the body of 14

their complaint the complete text of the following documents: (1)

a three page singled-spaced letter addressed to Judge White and

sent to the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct outlining

Plaintiffs’ complaints against Judge White, (see id. ¶ 93); (2) a

nearly four page single-spaced letter to a Patrolman Jones15

describing Plaintiffs’ involvement with DYFS and the underlying

Family Court action and requesting criminal charges be brought

against several individuals named as Defendants in this suit,

(see id. ¶ 95); (3) an eight page single-spaced motion that was

originally filed in the state court action, (see id. ¶ 101); (4)

another nearly five page single-spaced letter to the Advisory

Committee on Judicial Conduct outlining complaints against Judge

White and DAG Jamie Millard-Tindall, and issues Plaintiffs had

with the underlying Family Court action, (see id. ¶ 102); and (5)

the Verified Complaint for Custody, Care, and Supervision, filed

14. The Court notes that several of Plaintiffs paragraphs are

misnumbered, as some numbers are used multiple times to identify

different paragraphs. For example, on page 17 of Plaintiffs’

complaint, there are two paragraphs numbered as paragraph 39. 

However, in citing to Plaintiffs’ complaint in this opinion, the

Court has not renumbered the paragraphs and cites to these

paragraphs as referenced by Plaintiffs. 

15. The identity of Patrolman Jones is not clear from the face of

the complaint, but the Court notes that this individual was not

named as a defendant in this action. 

10

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by DYFS in the Family Court action, (see id. ¶ 120). 

Plaintiffs allegedly bring the present suit to exercise

their right as American citizens “to sue all who [are]

responsible for such significant damages resulting in the

permanent removal of [their] child(ren) unconstitutionally.” 

(Id. ¶ 86.) Generally, Plaintiffs allege that their adopted son,

S.K., “the boy who cried wolf[,]” made false allegations of child

abuse and neglect against them, which prompted an investigation

by DYFS. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 19, 23, 67.) Plaintiffs assert that the

“so-called investigation” by DYFS “was botched, and run amuck[.]” 

(Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiffs allege that the investigation was

conducted by “unsupervised ... bias State Workers” and ultimately

led to “trumped-up charges” being brought against Plaintiffs

which ruined their reputations and resulted in the “kidnapping

[sic] [of] their entire family.” (Id.) 

Plaintiffs assert that they suffered multiple violations as

a result, including: violation of “a family’s constitutional

right of privacy while residing in their home[;]” discriminative

action with regard to their children; false accusations made

without probable cause; intentional withholding of evidence;

illegal removal of the children; failure to use reasonable

efforts to reunite the family; false imprisonment of their

children; continued detention of the children without due

process; unreasonable seizure of the children under the Fourth

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Amendment; and unwarranted removal of the children where no

imminent or exigent circumstances existed. (Id. ¶¶ 26, 62.) 

Throughout the complaint, Plaintiffs set forth essentially a

laundry list of alleged improprieties and issues which relate to

the underlying DYFS investigation and the Family Court

proceedings. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 107, 109) (detailing multiple

problems Plaintiffs allege related to the DYFS investigation, the

“pre-trial” hearing, the “trial”, and “post-trial” events). More

specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants at DYFS failed to

follow appropriate protocols and procedures by not returning S.K.

and D.L. to Plaintiffs’ home. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27.) Plaintiffs

contend that Defendants at DYFS also failed to make reasonable

efforts to investigate the allegations against them prior to

removing the children from Plaintiffs’ home, thus making the

removal “criminal and unconstitutional[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 30-31.) 

According to Plaintiffs, Defendant Judge White “turned [the

Family Court] case into chaos[,]” “went beyond her authority to

protect DYFS, and acted as [DYFS’s] advocate[,]” and violated

Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by allowing other Defendants to

engage in “wrongdoing and misconduct[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 32-33.) 

Plaintiffs further assert that Defendants at DYFS acted with

reckless disregard by failing to properly analyze and collect

data that would have demonstrated that no abuse or neglect

occurred and would have lead to the return of the children to

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Plaintiffs’ home and the reunification of the family. (Id. ¶¶

40-41, 47, 60.) Plaintiffs represent that they “were cleared by

the State of New Jersey” of any allegations of abuse or neglect

and contend that this fact substantiates their claim that the

children were “apprehended ILLEGALLY.” (Id. ¶¶ 69-70.) 

According to Plaintiffs, the Family Court “made an error” and

engaged in “illegal maneuvers” which denied Plaintiffs’ their

rights and essentially “black listed” Plaintiffs from adopting

other children. (Id. ¶ 106.) 

As a result of the alleged illegal removal of S.K. and D.L

and the failure by DYFS to reunite the family, Plaintiffs now

seek: (1) removal of Judge White as a Judge in the Superior Court

of New Jersey; (2) “Plaintiffs[’] right of elocution without

disruption[;]” (3) the return of both S.K. and D.L. to

Plaintiffs; and (4) fourteen (14) million dollars in damages 16

consisting of one million dollars for each of the children

involved, one million for each Plaintiff, five million for pain

and suffering, and five million in punitive damages. (Id. at 73-

74.) Plaintiffs also seek legal fees, court costs, travel

expenses, and costs for time lost from work. (Id.) 

16. In opposing one of the pending motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs

represent that they “are no longer seeking the return of DL, as

... he has been adopted and ... it is [not] in the child’s best

interest to be taken again from a bonded family.” (Pls.’ Opp’n

[Doc. No. 27] 1.) Plaintiffs further represent that they no

longer seek the return of S.K. because he is now a legal adult. 

(Id.) 

13

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III. PENDING MOTIONS

In response to Plaintiffs’ complaint, Defendants have filed

five separate motions to dismiss. (See generally [Doc. Nos. 11,

12, 15, 26, 32].) Plaintiffs filed opposition to each of these

motions. (See generally [Doc. Nos. 14, 17, 27, 28, 33].) 17

(1) Motion to Dismiss by S.K.’s Law Guardian

The first of these motions was filed by Defendant David T.

Garnes, Esquire, a “pool attorney with the [New Jersey] Office of

the Public Defender,” who “represented S.K. during the child

abuse and neglect proceedings as S.K.’s Law Guardian.” (Br. in

Supp. of Def. David Garnes’s Mot. to Dismiss in Lieu of Answer

[Doc. No. 11-3] (hereinafter, “Law Guardian’s Mot.”), 4.) 

Defendant Garnes,(“Law Guardian Defendant”), moves to dismiss

Plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiffs fail to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted because the Law Guardian

Defendant did not act under color of state law. (Id. at 6-10.) 

17. The Court has reviewed the oppositions Plaintiffs submitted

to the current motions to dismiss. However, the Court does not

reproduce in this opinion the content of these submissions. As a

general matter, the opposition papers consist of multiple

paragraphs which are irrelevant to the Court’s determination of

the motions to dismiss, and to the extent Plaintiffs raise any

substantive arguments in opposition, these arguments have been

fully considered. The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ opposition

papers set forth more detailed allegations of how various

Defendants violated their Constitutional rights than are set

forth in the complaint. However, these more detailed allegations

are still insufficient to defeat Defendants’ legal arguments for

dismissal. 

14

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The Law Guardian Defendant further argues that he is entitled to

absolute immunity from Plaintiffs’ suit, or alternatively, is

entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. 10-16.) 

(2) Motion to Dismiss by School Defendants

The second of these motions was filed by Defendants Delsea

Regional School District, Frank D. Borelli, Helen Divens, and

Joseph Sottosanti, (“School Defendants”), and also moves to

dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice pursuant to Federal

Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. (Delsea Regional High School Defendants’ Br. in

Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) [Doc. No. 12-1], (hereinafter, “School Defs.’

Mot.”), 1-6.) The School Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’

complaint against them should be dismissed because under New

Jersey law, the School Defendants were required to report

allegations of child abuse to DYFS and thus are entitled to

statutory immunity from any civil or criminal liability for

making a report to DYFS or testifying before the Family Court. 

(Id. at 4-5.) Alternatively, the School Defendants move pursuant

to Federal Rule 12(e) for an order requiring Plaintiffs to make a

more definite statement of their claims against the School

Defendants. (Id. at 5.) 

(3) Motion to Dismiss by State Defendants

The third motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint with

15

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prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6) was filed by

Defendants Allison Blake, Commissioner of the Department of

Children and Families; Christine Norbut-Moses, Assistant

Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families; Kathryn

Way, DYFS Area Director; Anne Milgram, former Attorney General;

Jaime Millard-Tindall, Deputy Attorney General; Gregory

Rappaport, DYFS Supervisor; Larry Moon, DYFS Supervisor; Marcella

Haddon, DYFS Supervisor; Brian Jakubowski, DYFS Caseworker; 

Taiwo Williams, DYFS Caseworker; Tiffany Jubb, DYFS Caseworker;

Regina Floyd-Jones, DYFS Supervisor; Terry McNellis, Litigation

Specialist; Deserre Whiteside, Resource Specialist; Gina Tracy,

DYFS Caseworker Supervisor; Janet Boyle, Resource Specialist;

Deborah Parker, DYFS Manager; Crystal Bates, DYFS Caseworker;

Janet Foley, DYFS Supervisor; and San Payne, DYFS Manager,

(hereinafter, “State Defendants”). (See generally Not. of Mot.

to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

[Doc. No. 15] 1-2.) 

The State Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint

on several grounds. Initially, the State Defendants argue that

Plaintiffs’ claims against them should be dismissed because these

claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and thus this

Court lacks jurisdiction because Plaintiffs’ claims are

“inextricably intertwined” to the adjudication by the Family

Court. (Br. by State Defs. in Supp. of Their Mot. to Dismiss in

16

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Lieu of Answer Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) [Doc. No. 15-1], (hereinafter, “State Defs.’ Mot.”), 5-

7.) The State Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs’ claims

against Defendants Blake, Norbut-Moses, and Milgram should be

dismissed because, under the Eleventh Amendment, these Defendants

acting in their official capacities are immune from suit and

cannot be considered “persons” for purposes of liability under

Section 1983. (Id. at 7-8, 10.) To the extent these Defendants

are being sued in their individual capacities, the State

Defendants argue that the complaint contains “no facts [which]

support their personal involvement in the events alleged.” (Id.

at 9.) 

The State Defendants also argue that they are entitled to

absolute immunity and quasi-judicial immunity because Plaintiffs’

“allegations challenge Defendants’ action in the course of

prosecuting the underlying Family Part case,” and thus

Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed. (Id. at 11-13.) 

Finally, the State Defendants contend that to the extent they are

not otherwise entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, the State

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiffs’

complaint is “insufficient to show either a depravation of a

constitutionally protected right, or that such a right was

clearly established at the time of the depravation[.]” (Id. at

13-14.) 

17

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(4) Motion to Dismiss by Counselor Defendant

Defendant Brent Brendle, a counselor who provided services

to S.K. and Plaintiffs through Family Services of Burlington

County, Inc., also moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint, or

alternatively, for summary judgment. (Def. Brendle’s Letter Br.

in Supp. of his Mot. to Dismiss and/or for Summ. J. [Doc. No. 26-

1] (hereinafter, “Counselor Def.’s Mot.”), 1.) The Counselor

Defendant argues that he is entitled to immunity under the

litigation privilege for his testimony in the underlying action

in the Family Court. (Id. at 2-3.) Moreover, the Counselor

Defendant contends that he is entitled to immunity under New

Jersey law for complying with statutory requirements to report

possible child abuse to DYFS and for testifying regarding that

report in the Family Court proceeding. (Id. at 2-3.) Finally,

the Counselor Defendant argues that he cannot be held liable

under Section 1983 because he did not act under color of state

law either as an employee of Family Services of Burlington

County, a private non-profit agency in New Jersey, or as a

witness in the underlying Family Court proceedings. (Id. at 3.) 

(5) Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Judge White

The fifth motion to dismiss pending before the Court was

filed by Defendant Judge Mary K. White, J.S.C., (“Judge White”). 

Judge White moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and

18

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12(b)(6). (Br. on Behalf of Judge Mary K. White in Supp. of Her

Mot. to Dismiss Compl. Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6) [Doc. No. 32-2] (hereinafter, “Judge

White’s Mot.”), 1.) Initially, Judge White argues that to the

extent Plaintiffs bring claims against Judge White in her

official capacity, these claims are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment, and thus the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

and must dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). (Id.

at 7, 17-18.) Judge White also argues that Plaintiffs’ complaint

should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a

claim because, Judge White, when sued in her official capacity,

is not a “person” subject to liability under Section 1983. (Id.

at 9, 19, 22.) 

Further, Judge White contends that even to the extent this

Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims, the complaint

should still be dismissed because Judge White is entitled to

absolute judicial immunity, regardless of whether Plaintiffs seek

to impose liability against her in her individual or official

capacity, because Plaintiffs’ allegations arise from rulings

Judge White made in the child abuse and neglect proceedings in

Family Court. (Id. at 22, 24, 26-27.) Additionally, Judge White

argues that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for conspiracy under

42 U.S.C. § 1985, that Plaintiffs claims are barred by the

Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine, and that Plaintiffs are

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collaterally estopped from relitigating issues previously

determined by Judge White. (Id. at 28-35.) Finally, Judge White

contends that any claims by Plaintiffs for violations of state

common law are barred because Plaintiffs did not demonstrate in

the complaint that they filed the requisite notice of claim under

the New Jersey Tort Claims Act and because the Tort Claims Act

immunizes actions of judicial officers from suit. (Id. at 36- 18

39.) 

(6) Motion for Review of DYFS Policies and Procedures

Plaintiffs have also filed a motion seeking to “change

current bad DYFS policies, procedures, and practices.” (Pls.’

Motion [Doc. No. 18] 1.) Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that

DYFS employees “are not properly trained in recognizing and

investigating” cases of Reactive Attachment Disorder which leads

to the unnecessary removal of children. (Id.) Plaintiffs also

allege that they were not notified of meetings and conversations

which occurred between DYFS employees and school officials, nor

were they informed of reports made against them to the Child

Abuse Hotline, prior to the time S.K. and D.L. were removed from

their home. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiffs object to the use of

statements by DYFS where there is no affidavit attesting to which

18. Judge White also argues that to the extent Plaintiffs raise

claims under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, those claims must

also be dismissed because Judge White, in her official capacity,

is not a person subject to suit under that Act. (Id. at 39-40.) 

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individual supported the statements made in the Verified

Complaint for removal. (Id.) Plaintiffs do not request any

specific relief regarding these issues except to note that

Plaintiffs “cannot change what was done to [them], but

[Plaintiffs] can change what is done for others.” (Id.) The

State Defendants oppose this motion by Plaintiffs. (See

generally Response in Opp’n [Doc. No. 24].) 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Standard for 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges the existence of a federal court’s

subject matter jurisdiction. “When subject matter jurisdiction

is challenged under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff must bear the

burden of persuasion.” Symczyk v. Genesis HealthCare Corp., 656

F.3d 189, 191 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v.

Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)). In

considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, “the district court may not

presume the truthfulness of plaintiff’s allegations, but rather

must ‘evaluat[e] for itself the merits of [the] jurisdictional

claims.’” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir.

2005) (citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d

884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)).

B. Standard for Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

In this case, several Defendants seek dismissal of

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Plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court

must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true

and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 

Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005). It is well

settled that a pleading is sufficient if it contains “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).

A district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks

“‘not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the

claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims[.]’” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007) (quoting

Scheuer v. Rhoades, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (“Our decision in Twombly

expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions[.]’”)

(citation omitted). First, under the Twombly/Iqbal standard, a

district court “must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded

facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions.” Fowler

v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949). 

Second, a district court “must then determine whether the

facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the

22

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plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Fowler, 578 F.3d

at 211 (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950). “[A] complaint must

do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.” 

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211; see also Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny,

515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court’s Twombly

formulation of the pleading standard can be summed up thus:

‘stating ... a claim requires a complaint with enough factual

matter (taken as true) to suggest’ the required element. This

‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading

stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’

the necessary element.”) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The

defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been

presented.” Hedges, 404 F.3d at 750.

However, “if a complaint is subject to a Rule 12(b)(6)

dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment

unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” 

Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245; see also Ray v. First Nat’l Bank of

Omaha, 413 F. App’x 427, 430 (3d Cir. 2011) (“A district court

should not dismiss a pro se complaint without allowing the

plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint unless an

amendment would be inequitable or futile.”); Burrell v. DFS

Servs., LLC, 753 F. Supp. 2d 438, 444 (D.N.J. 2010) (“When a

claim is dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

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12(b)(6), leave to amend and reassert that claim is ordinarily

granted. ... A claim may be dismissed with prejudice, however, if

amending the complaint would be futile.”) (citation omitted). 

Furthermore, in ruling on the present motion, the Court “must

construe [Plaintiffs’] complaint liberally because [they are]

proceeding pro se.” Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28,

32 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007)).

V. ANALYSIS

A. Requirements Under Rule 8(a)

Initially, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ complaint is in

violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief[,]” as well as a “short and plain

statement of the grounds for the Court’s jurisdiction. FED. R.

CIV. P. 8(a)(1)-(2). For example, Plaintiffs’ jurisdictional

statement alone consists of fourteen (14) paragraphs which

represents nearly four (4) pages of the complaint. (See Pls.’

Compl. ¶¶ 1-14.) However, only the last of these paragraphs

formally asserts that Plaintiffs’ claims are brought pursuant to

Section 1983, thus purporting to raise a federal question in this

action. (Id. ¶ 14.) 

Moreover, Plaintiffs’ complaint, even when construed

liberally, clearly fails to set forth a short and plain statement

of Plaintiffs’ claims. As noted supra, the complaint is nearly

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one hundred (100) pages in length, contains approximately one

hundred twenty-seven (127) numbered paragraphs, and includes the

full text of five separate documents. Also, Plaintiffs attached

approximately three hundred thirty-three (333) pages worth of

exhibits. (See Exs. 1-41 to Pls.’ Compl. [Doc. Nos. 1-1, 1-2, 1-

3, 1-4, 1-5, 1-6].) Furthermore, a thorough review of the

complaint demonstrates that the majority of the paragraphs

present rambling statements and assert multiple allegations 19

against unspecified Defendants which generally profess that

Plaintiffs are loving parents who provided a good home, are

“innocent” of any child abuse or neglect, were falsely accused of

such acts, and that all Defendants conspired against them in

removing S.K. and D.L. from their home, and failing to reunite

the family. (See, e.g., Pls. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 18, 23, 26, 32, 36,

37, 38, 39, 42, 68, 71, 77, 84, 107, 109.) 

It is clear from the complaint that Plaintiffs named nearly

every person even remotely connected with the DYFS investigation

and the New Jersey Family Court proceedings as Defendants in this

action. However, Plaintiffs fail to make any specific

19. For example, while Plaintiffs contend that S.K. is like the

“boy who cried wolf” because he purportedly made false

allegations against them, Plaintiffs’ complaint sets forth the

entire text of Aesop’s fable, despite the fact that the fable

itself is irrelevant to Plaintiffs constitutional claims. (See

Pls.’ Compl. ¶ 24.)

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allegations against the majority of these Defendants.20

Moreover, while Plaintiffs repeatedly assert that Defendants

acted in bad faith, were in “cahoots” with one another, were

biased, made false allegations against Plaintiffs, engaged in

continued misconduct, altered documents, intentionally withheld

and concealed evidence, conspired and acted in collusion to keep

the children from Plaintiffs, obstructed justice, acted outside

“the scope of their aptitude/training and job duties[,]”

testified falsely in the Family Court proceedings, and Plaintiffs

offer absolutely no factual support for these generalized legal

conclusions. (See, e.g., Pls. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 18, 23, 26, 32, 36,

37, 38, 39, 42, 68, 71, 77, 84, 107, 109.) Accordingly,

Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to comply with the requirements of

Rule 8(a). Cf. Venezia v. Union Cnty. Prosecutor’s Office, No. 21

10-6692, 2011 WL 2148818, at *1 (D.N.J. May 31, 2011) (dismissing

pro se plaintiff’s amended complaint without prejudice for

failure to comply with Rules 8(a), 8(d), and 10(b) because the

allegations of the complaint were not short, plain, concise, and

direct since: (1) most of the paragraphs of the amended complaint

20. However, Plaintiffs’ opposition papers [Doc. Nos. 14, 17, 27,

28, 33] set forth more detailed allegations against specific

Defendants and delineate more clearly the manner in which

Plaintiffs contend Defendants violated their Constitutional

rights. 

21. Despite Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with Rule 8, the Court

does not dismiss their claims on that basis. 

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were misnumbered, contained multiple allegations, and

unnecessarily underlined or italicized phrases; and (2) the

amended complaint “present[ed] a dense rambling thicket of

statements over the course of fifty-five pages, as well as 200

pages of exhibits[.]”) 

B. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The State Defendants and Judge White contend that

Plaintiffs’ complaint challenges DYFS’s removal of S.K. and D.L.

from Plaintiffs’ home and the underlying adjudication of claims

for child abuse and neglect in the New Jersey Family Court. 

(State Defs.’ Mot. 7; Judge White’s Mot. 34.) Thus, the State

Defendants and Judge White argue that the Court lacks

jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims filed in this

action based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (State Defs.’ Mot.

6-7; Judge White’s Mot. 34.) 

“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars lower federal courts from

exercising jurisdiction over a case that is the functional

equivalent of an appeal from a state court judgment.” Marran v.

Marran, 376 F.3d 143, 149 (3d Cir. 2004). As the Supreme Court

has held, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “is confined to cases of

the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought

by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by

state-court judgments rendered before the district court

proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and

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rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi 22

Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Specifically, the

“Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal district courts

lack subject matter jurisdiction to review final adjudications of

a state's highest court or to evaluate constitutional claims that

are inextricably intertwined with the state court's [decision] in

a judicial proceeding.” FOCUS v. Allegheny Cnty. Ct. of Common

Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotations and

citations omitted). 

As recognized by the Third Circuit, a “case is the

functional equivalent of an appeal from a state court judgment in

two instances: (1) when the claim was actually litigated before

the state court; or (2) when the claim is inextricably

intertwined with the state adjudication.” Marran, 376 F.3d at

149. “A claim is inextricably intertwined with the state court

adjudication when ‘federal relief can only be predicated upon a

conviction that the state court was wrong.’” Id. at 150 (citing

Parkview Assoc. v. City of Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 325 (3d Cir.

22. In Exxon Mobil, the Supreme Court explained that the

plaintiffs in both the Rooker and Feldman cases alleged federalquestion jurisdiction and called upon the district court to

overturn an injurious state-court judgment. 544 U.S. 280, 291-92

(2005) (citing Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416

(1923); District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.

462, 476 (1983)). However, the Supreme Court went on to note

that because Section 1257 vests authority to review a state

court’s judgment solely in the Supreme Court, the district courts

in Rooker and Feldman lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Exxon

Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292. 

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2000)); see also FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 840 (“A claim is inextricably

intertwined if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that

the state court wrongly decided the issues before it. In other

words, Rooker-Feldman precludes a federal action if the relief

requested in the federal action would effectively reverse the

state decision or void its ruling. Accordingly, to determine

whether Rooker-Feldman bars [plaintiff's] federal suit requires

determining exactly what the state court held[.]”) (citing

Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir.

1995)). 

The Third Circuit has consistently affirmed district court

determinations that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits suits

brought in federal court pursuant to Section 1983 where

plaintiffs challenge the decisions, orders, or judgments of state

family courts. See, e.g., Gass v. DYFS Workers, 371 F. App’x

315, 315-16 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming district court dismissal

under Rooker-Feldman of Section 1983 claims asserted against

state court judge, DYFS, DYFS officials, deputy attorneys

general, and public defender attorney in underlying termination

of parental rights action to the extent plaintiff challenged

family court orders regarding custody of two minors); Johnson v.

City of New York, 347 F. App’x 850, 851-52 (3d Cir. 2009)

(affirming district court determination that Section 1983 claims

were prohibited by Rooker-Feldman to the extent plaintiff sought

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review of family court decisions regarding emergency removal of

children from his home); McKnight v. Baker, 244 F. App’x 442,

444-45 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming district court finding that the

court lacked jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman to review Section

1983 claims where crux of plaintiff’s complaint was that

defendants conspired to have the family court suspend his

visitation rights with his daughter); McAllister v. Allegheny 23

Cnty. Family Div., 128 F. App’x 901, 902 (3d Cir. 2005)

(affirming district court dismissal of federal constitutional

claims where plaintiff “plainly [sought] to void or overturn

adverse rulings entered in the child-custody litigation” by state

family court because such relief required “a finding that the

state court ... made incorrect factual or legal determinations”). 

Similarly, courts within this District have repeatedly

recognized that they lack subject matter jurisdiction to

entertain Section 1983 claims which challenge adjudications made

by state family courts. See, e.g., Severino v. Div. of Youth &

Family Servs., No. 11–3767, 2011 WL 5526116, *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 14,

2011) (dismissing sua sponte pro se plaintiff’s Section 1983

23. The Third Circuit further noted that based on the nature of

plaintiff’s claims, it was “hard to imagine a case which more

directly asks a district court to review the actions of a state

court” because plaintiff could only prevail if the district court

concluded that the family court erred in suspending plaintiff’s

visitation rights or that defendants violated plaintiff’s

constitutional rights by adhering to the family court orders. 

McKnight, 244 F. App’x at 444-45. 

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claims against defendants, including DYFS, DYFS caseworker, New

Jersey State Court Judges, and a deputy attorney general, under

Rooker-Feldman which challenged a state court proceeding

terminating plaintiff’s parental rights wherein plaintiff was

investigated and prosecuted for neglecting his child); Wilson v.

Atl. Cnty. DYFS, No. 10-202, 2010 WL 2178926, at *5-6 (D.N.J. May

25, 2010) (dismissing plaintiff’s complaint against local DYFS

agency and state court judge and finding that Rooker-Feldman

barred Section 1983 claims relating to the family court’s

issuance of a restraining order which effectively barred

plaintiff from seeing his son because the claims were

“inextricably intertwined” with the restraining order and

amounted to a “prohibited appeal” from the family court

adjudication); Kwiatkowski v. De Francesco, No. 01-6145, 2006 WL

2347831, *4-5 (D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2006) (concluding that even if

Section 1983 and 1988 claims were not barred by the statute of

limitations, claims were barred under Rooker-Feldman because the

constitutional claims were “a direct result of the actions taken

by DYFS and the state courts” and were “so inextricably

intertwined with the state court proceedings that federal review

[was] precluded as it would be tantamount to appellate review of

state court determinations.”) 

In this instance, Plaintiffs couch their claims as alleged

violations of their constitutional rights, but upon examination

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of the relief Plaintiffs seek, the Court notes that Plaintiffs

specifically request the return of S.K. and D.L. to Plaintiffs,24

four million dollars in damages for Plaintiffs and the children

involved, five million dollars in punitive damages, five million

dollars for pain and suffering, legal fees they incurred in

defending against the action in the Family Court, and the removal

of Judge White as a Superior Court Judge. (Pls.’ Compl. 73- 25

74.) With regard to the removal and return of the children, the

State Defendants accurately point out, “the removal and placement

of the children was the subject of the Family Court

proceedings[.]” (State Defs.’ Mot. 7). Moreover, the Family

Court previously determined in the August 18, 2010 Permanency

Order that it was not safe for S.K. to return to Plaintiffs’ home

and that he was “unable to thrive in a family setting and [would]

do well in an independent living program” based on his age and

Plaintiffs’ refusal to undergo psychological evaluations. 

24. The Court again notes that Plaintiffs apparently no longer

seek the return of S.K. or D.L. to their care. (Pls.’ Opp’n [Doc.

No. 27] 1.) Plaintiffs argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is

not relevant here because Plaintiffs “are not asking for a

reversal of the judicial decisions made.” (Id.) Plaintiffs

contend that they are “asking that those responsible be held

accountable for their illegal, unethical, and immoral acts that

led to the removal of [the] children and the destruction of

[their] family. [Plaintiffs] are not asking for a reversal of

Judge White’s decision [they] are asking the court to rule on the

constitutionality of the decisions.” (Id.) 

25. To the extent Plaintiffs seek monetary damages, those damages

appear to be sought as a direct result of the removal and

placement of S.K. and D.L. 

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(August 18, 2010 Permanency Order, Ex. 41 to Pls.’ Compl. [Doc.

No. 1-6] ¶¶ I(b), IV(b).) 

In order for this Court to grant any of the relief

Plaintiffs seek, the Court would be required to review the

decision of the New Jersey Family Court. Such a review would

necessitate this Court passing judgment on the soundness and

validity of the Family Court’s actions, reasoning, and resolution

of the underlying child abuse and neglect proceedings. For

example, only by drawing its own legal and factual conclusions as

to the legitimacy of the Family Court’s actions could this Court

determine whether the removal and placement of S.K. and D.L. was,

as Plaintiffs contend, illegal, unwarranted, unreasonable, and

unconstitutional. Plaintiffs specifically argue that the Family

Court “made an error” and engaged in “illegal maneuvers” that

denied Plaintiffs’ their rights and “black listed” Plaintiffs

from adopting other children. (Pls.’ Compl. ¶ 106.) 

To determine whether the Family Court “made an error” or

engaged in “illegal maneuvers” in granting custody, care, and

supervision of S.K. to DYFS, allowing the children to be removed

from the home, and determining that S.K. should be placed in an

independent living program would clearly require this Court to

opine on issues that were previously adjudicated by the Family

Court and to conclude that the Family Court’s adjudication was

erroneous. Such review is intended for the appellate process. 

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Moreover, although Plaintiffs’ complaint names numerous

Defendants including school officials, it is clear that the

essence of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims is the direct result

of the actions taken by DYFS officials and the Family Court. 

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claims are inextricably

intertwined with the New Jersey Family Court adjudication because

the federal relief sought by Plaintiffs “can only be predicated

upon a conviction that the state court was wrong.” See Marran,

376 F.3d at 150. Accordingly, to the extent any of Plaintiffs’

constitutional claims pursuant to Section 1983 require a review

of the Family Court adjudication, Plaintiffs have failed to meet

their burden to demonstrate that the Court has subject matter

jurisdiction over these claims and the claims are barred under

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine against all Defendants and must be

dismissed with prejudice. See, e.g., Gass, 371 F. App’x at 315-

16; Wilson, 2010 WL 2178926, at *5-6; Kwiatkowski, 2006 WL

2347831, *4-5. 

C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Judge White and State Defendants Blake, Norbut-Moses, and

Milgram also argue that even if Plaintiffs’ claims are not barred

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Plaintiffs’ claims must be

dismissed because these Defendants, sued in their official

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capacities, are entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity. 26

(Judge White’s Mot. 7-8, 11, 17-18; State Defs.’ Mot. 7-10.) The

Court agrees. Moreover, because Plaintiffs bring their claims

against all of the DYFS Defendants in their official capacities,

those claims must almost be dismissed pursuant to Eleventh

Amendment Immunity. 

The Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear for over a

century “that the Constitution does not provide for federal

jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting States.” Kimel v.

Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000). Unless sovereign

immunity is waived by the state or by a federal statute, private

parties who seek to impose liability which must be paid from

public funds in the state treasury are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment from bringing suit in federal court. Quren v. Jordan,

440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979). Importantly, both the Supreme Court

and the Third Circuit have recognized that suits for money

damages against state employees in their official capacities are

also barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (“Official-capacity suits ...

‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action

against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’ ... [A]n

official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be

26. Plaintiffs’ complaint indicates that all Defendants are being

sued in both their individual and official capacities. (Pls.’

Compl. 2.) 

35

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treated as a suit against the entity.”) (citation omitted); Pa.

Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d

Cir. 2002) (“the Eleventh Amendment ... has been interpreted to

render states –- and, by extension, state agencies and

departments and officials when the state is the real party in

interest –- generally immune from suits by private parties in

federal court.”).

The Third Circuit and multiple courts in this District have

consistently found that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity

bars claims for money damages against DYFS and DYFS employees

sued in their official capacities. See, e.g., Howard v. New

Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs., 398 F. App’x 807, 811-12

(3d Cir. 2010) (affirming district court dismissal of claims for

damages and attorneys fees against DYFS and two DYFS officers

sued in their official capacities based on Eleventh Amendment

immunity); Love v. New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs., No.

07-3661, 2010 WL 2950019, at *2 (D.N.J. July 22, 2010) (granting

summary judgment to DYFS and DYFS supervisor and director sued in

their official capacities finding that such claims were barred by

Eleventh Amendment Immunity); Garlic v. New Jersey Div. of Youth

& Family Servs., No. 09-1550, 2009 WL 2634665, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug.

24, 2009) (“plaintiff’s claims for money damages against DYFS and

[DYFS caseworker], who has been sued in her official capacity,

are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity”); Metz v. New

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Jersey Dep’t of Human Servs., No. 06-5010, 2007 WL 2416435, at *2

(D.N.J. Aug. 21, 2007) (concluding that where plaintiffs sought

money damages which would be paid from public funds, DYFS

defendants were entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity thus

warranting dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims). 

Accordingly, to the extent any of Plaintiffs’ claims are not

barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Plaintiffs’ claims against

Defendants Blake, Norbut-Moses, and Milgram in their official

capacities are barred by Eleventh Amendment Immunity and

therefore must be dismissed with prejudice. Further, Plaintiffs’

claims against all Defendants who are DYFS officials or employees

sued in their official capacities are similarly precluded by the

Eleventh Amendment and are therefore dismissed with prejudice. 

Moreover, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claims against Judge

White in her official capacity are also barred by Eleventh

Amendment Immunity and must be dismissed with prejudice. See

Dongon v. Banar, 363 F. App’x 153, 156 (3d Cir. 2010)

(recognizing that “the state courts, its employees, and the

judges are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment

because they are part of the judicial branch of the state of New

Jersey, and therefore considered ‘arms’ of the state.”) (citing

Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 869 F. Supp 289, 296-98 (D.N.J.

1994)); see also Hunter v. Supreme Ct. of New Jersey, 951 F.

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Supp. 1161, 1177-78 (D.N.J. 1996).27

D. Absolute Immunity

The State Defendants, Judge White, and the Law Guardian

Defendant also argue that they are entitled to absolute immunity

from Plaintiffs’ claims brought against them in their individual

capacities. (See State Defs.’ Mot. 10-13; Judge White’s Mot. 22-

27; Law Guardian’s Mot. 10-12.)

(1) Absolute Immunity - Judge White

It is well established that “[a] judicial officer in the

performance of his [or her] duties has absolute immunity from

suit and will not be liable for his [or her] judicial acts.” 

Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991)); see also Gallas v.

Supreme Ct. of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000)

(“The Supreme Court long has recognized that judges are immune

27. Additionally, the Court also finds that neither the State

Defendants nor Judge White, sued in their official capacities,

qualify as “persons” under Section 1983, a requirement for

establishing liability, and therefore, Plaintiffs’ claims must be

dismissed with prejudice on that basis as well. See, e.g., Will

v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66, 71 (1989)

(recognizing that a state is not a “person” within the meaning of

Section 1983, and concluding that “a suit against a state

official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against

the official but rather is a suit against the official’s

office[,]” and “[a]s such, it is no different from a suit against

the State itself”); Metz, 2007 WL 2416435, at *3 (acknowledging

that “[a]rms of the state that have traditionally enjoyed

sovereign immunity, as well as officials acting in their official

capacities, are also not considered ‘persons’ under § 1983" and

dismissing claims against DYFS, as an arm of the state, on the

basis it was not a “person” under Section 1983). 

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from suit under section 1983 for monetary damages arising from

their judicial acts.”) Accordingly, “‘[a] judge will not be

deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was

done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he

will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the “clear

absence of all jurisdiction.”’” Azubuko, 443 F.3d at 303 (citing

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)). Judicial

immunity serves an important function in that it furthers the

public interest in judges who are “at liberty to exercise their

functions with independence and without fear of consequences.” 

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (internal quotations and

citation omitted). 

 Courts have repeatedly emphasized the extensive scope of

judicial immunity, holding that immunity applies “‘however

injurious in its consequences [the judge's action] may have

proved to the plaintiff[.]’” Gallas, 211 F.3d at 769 (citing

Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199-200 (1985)). 

“Disagreement with the action taken by the judge ... does not

justify depriving that judge of his immunity. ... The fact that

the issue before the judge is a controversial one is all the more

reason that he should be able to act without fear of suit.” 

Stump, 435 U.S. at 363-64. Further, highlighting its expansive

breadth, it is recognized in this District that “the public

policy favoring the judicial immunity doctrine outweighs any

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consideration given to the fact that a judge's errors caused the

deprivation of an individual's basic due process rights afforded

to him under the law.” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 39 F. Supp. 2d

479, 495 (D.N.J. 1999). Thus, allegations that actions were

undertaken with an improper motive diminishes neither their

character as judicial actions nor the judge's immunity. See

Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988).

There are however, two exceptions to the doctrine of

judicial immunity. These exceptions are narrow in scope and are

infrequently applied to deny immunity. The first exception is

where a judge engages in nonjudicial acts, i.e., actions not

taken in the judge's judicial capacity. Gallas, 211 F.3d at 768. 

The second exception involves actions that, though judicial in

nature, are taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.

Id. Neither exception is applicable in the present case as

Plaintiffs’ only allegations against Judge White are directly

related to her duties as a judge presiding over a child abuse and

neglect proceeding properly before her in New Jersey Family

Court. Therefore, it is clear in this instance that all of Judge

White’s actions qualify as judicial acts which were taken in the

proper exercise of jurisdiction in the Family Court. 

Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiffs’ claims are not otherwise

barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and by Eleventh Amendment

Immunity, Plaintiffs’ claims against Judge White in her

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individual capacity must be dismissed with prejudice because

Judge White is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from

Plaintiffs’ suit.28

(2) Absolute Immunity - The Law Guardian

Similarly, the Court finds that the Law Guardian Defendant

is also entitled to absolute immunity from Plaintiffs’ claims in

this action. In New Jersey, the “Law Guardian Program [of the

Office of the Public Defender] is charged with the responsibility

of acting as law guardian to children in child abuse or neglect

proceedings.” Delbridge v. Office of Pub. Defender, 569 A.2d

854, 857 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989), aff’d sub nom. A.D. v.

Franco, 687 A.2d 748, 750 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993),

certif. denied, 640 A.2d 849 (N.J. 1994), cert. denied sub nom.

Delbridge v. Franco, 513 U.S. 832 (1994). In abuse and neglect

proceedings, a law guardian is appointed by the court to act on

behalf of the child pursuant to New Jersey Statue § 9:6-8.43, and

accordingly, a law guardian is “cloaked with the long-standing

immunity afforded judges by state and federal law.” Id. at 860. 

Such absolute immunity is necessary because law guardians “in

representing the best interests of the ... children [involved in

abuse and neglect proceedings], [are] acting as an integral part

28. In light of the Court’s determinations that Plaintiffs’

claims against Judge White are barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, Eleventh Amendment Immunity, and absolute immunity, the

Court does not address Judge White’s additional argument

regarding collateral estoppel. 

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of the judicial process, and public policy dictates that they be

free to act independently and vigorously without fear of reprisal

at the hands of aggrieved parents.” Id. at 861. Therefore, to 29

the extent Plaintiffs bring claims against the Law Guardian

Defendant for his actions in the underlying Family Court

proceeding, those claims must be dismissed with prejudice as the

Law Guardian Defendant is entitled to absolute immunity because

he was acting on behalf of the child, S.K., in the Family Court

proceedings before Judge White.30

29. Although not deciding the precise issue, the Third Circuit

has similarly recognized that “a guardian ad litem would be

absolutely immune in exercising functions such as testifying in

court, prosecuting custody or neglect petitions, and making

reports and recommendations to the court in which the guardian

acts as an actual functionary or arm of the court, not only in

status or denomination but in reality.” Gardner by Gardner v.

Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 146 (3d Cir. 1989). Other courts have also

found that attorneys acting as guardians ad litem on behalf of

children in dependency proceedings for abuse and neglect are

entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. See, e.g.,

Harrison v. Gilbert, 148 F. App’x 718, 719-721 (10th Cir. 2005)

(affirming district court order which dismissed claims against

guardians ad litem who represented plaintiffs’ children in state

court dependency proceedings on the basis of quasi-judicial

immunity); Goodson v. Maggi, --- F. Supp. 2d ---, No. 08-44, 2011

WL 2533286, at *12 (W.D. Pa. June 23, 2011) (dismissing with

prejudice plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims concerning defendant’s

role as a guardian ad litem on behalf of plaintiff’s child in

termination of parental rights proceeding in state family court

because guardian ad litem was protected by absolute immunity). 

30. Having determined that the Law Guardian Defendant is entitled

to absolute immunity and thus the claims against him must be

dismissed, the Court need not address the Law Guardian’s

arguments that the claims against him should be dismissed on the

basis that he was not acting under color of state law for

purposes of Section 1983 liability or that he is entitled to

qualified immunity. 

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(3) Absolute Immunity - State Defendants

Finally, the State Defendants contend that they are immune

from suit based on the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. The

Third Circuit has previously held that caseworkers employed by a

state child services agency “are entitled to absolute immunity

for their actions on behalf of the state in preparing for,

initiating, and prosecuting dependency proceedings. Their

immunity is broad enough to include the formulation and

presentation of recommendations to the court in the course of

such proceedings.” Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester

Cnty., 108 F.3d 486, 495 (3d Cir. 1997). Moreover, the Third

Circuit has further held that attorneys representing a state

child services agency such as DYFS are also “entitled to absolute

immunity for all of [the attorney’s] quasi-prosecutorial

activities while representing [the agency] in connection with [a

child’s] dependency proceedings[.]” Id. at 504; see also Brown

v. Daniels, 290 F. App’x 467, 474-75 (3d Cir. 2008) (affirming

denial of motion to amend to add as defendants solicitor who

acted on behalf of child services agency and guardian ad litem

appointed by court to represent child on the basis that these

proposed defendants “would have been entitled to absolute

immunity for their roles in [the] dependency proceedings” and

thus amendment would have been futile) (citing Ernst, 108 F.3d at

495). New Jersey courts have also recognized that DYFS

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caseworkers, employees, supervisors, and directors, as well as

New Jersey Deputies Attorney General and the Attorney General are

entitled to absolute immunity where these individuals are

“performing judicial acts within the jurisdiction of the Superior

Court, Family Part[.]” Delbridge v. Schaeffer, 569 A.2d 872,

881-82 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989), aff’d sub nom. A.D. v.

Franco, 687 A.2d 748, 750 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993),

certif. denied, 640 A.2d 849 (N.J. 1994), cert. denied sub nom.

Delbridge v. Franco, 513 U.S. 832 (1994).

Based on the foregoing, to the extent Plaintiffs’ claims

against the State Defendants are not barred under the RookerFeldman doctrine or prohibited by Eleventh Amendment Immunity,

the Court agrees that the State Defendants are entitled to

absolute immunity in this action. Plaintiffs’ complaint sets

forth no credible factual allegations against the State

Defendants outside of each State Defendant’s role (or limited

role as the case may be) in preparing for, initiating, and

prosecuting the dependency proceedings before Judge White in the

Family Court. Accordingly, the State Defendants are entitled 31 32

31. Even the more detailed factual allegations set forth in

Plaintiffs’ opposition papers on the motions to dismiss fail in

this regard. 

32. Although no appearance has been entered on behalf of either

Deborah Watt, a DYFS Regional Director, or Jan Fisher, a DYFS

Supervisor, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims against these

Defendants with prejudice. To the extent Plaintiffs’ claims

against these Defendants are not barred by the Rooker-Feldman

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to absolute immunity against Plaintiffs’ claims based on those

proceedings. 

33

E. Statutory Immunity Under New Jersey Law

Both the School Defendants and the Counselor Defendant argue

that Plaintiffs’ claims against them fail because they are

entitled to statutory immunity under New Jersey law. (School

Defs.’ Mot. 4-5; Counsel Def.’s Mot. 2-3.) Specifically, the

School Defendants and the Counselor Defendant contend that

Plaintiffs’ claims against them arise out of reports certain of

these Defendants made to DYFS concerning allegations that S.K.

was being abused or neglected by Plaintiffs and their subsequent

testimony in the Family Court proceedings. (School Defs.’ Mot.

4; Counsel Def.’s Mot. 2-3.) Based on Plaintiffs’ claims, these

Defendants argue that New Jersey Statute § 9:6-8.10 required them

to report allegations of child abuse to DYFS and that Section

9:6-8.13 immunizes them from liability for such mandatory reports

and any related testimony in judicial proceedings. (School

Defs.’ Mot. 4-5; Counsel Def.’s Mot. 2-3.)

Under New Jersey Law, “a duty falls on all citizens to

doctrine or Eleventh Amendment Immunity, these Defendants are

DYFS employees, and like the represented State Defendants, they

are entitled to absolute immunity from Plaintiffs’ claims.

33. In light of the Court’s rulings regarding the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, Eleventh Amendment Immunity, and absolute immunity, the

Court does not address the State Defendants’ argument regarding

qualified immunity and Plaintiffs’ failure to plead a deprivation

of a constitutionally protected right. 

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report possible child abuse.” Carter v. Estate of Lewis, No.

08–1301, 2011 WL 1885953, at *2 (D.N.J. May 18, 2011) (citing

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10). New Jersey’s mandatory child abuse

reporting statute provides: 

Any person having reasonable cause to believe that

a child has been subjected to child abuse or acts

of child abuse shall report the same immediately

to the Division of Youth and Family Services by

telephone or otherwise. Such reports, where

possible, shall contain the names and addresses of

the child and his parent, guardian, or other

person having custody and control of the child

and, if known, the child's age, the nature and

possible extent of the child's injuries, abuse or

maltreatment, including any evidence of previous

injuries, abuse or maltreatment, and any other

information that the person believes may be

helpful with respect to the child abuse and the

identity of the perpetrator.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 2011). The statute further

provides that “[a]nyone acting pursuant to this act in the making

of a report ... shall have immunity from any liability, civil or

criminal, that might otherwise be incurred or imposed. Any such

person shall have the same immunity with respect to testimony

given in any judicial proceeding resulting from such report.” 

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.13 (West 2011) (emphasis added).

The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court has

noted that this statutory provision does not go so far as to

provide reporters of suspected child abuse with absolute immunity

from suit. F.A. by P.A. v. W.J.F., 656 A.2d 43, 48 (N.J. Super.

Ct. App. Div. 1995). However, the Appellate Division recognized

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that the New Jersey “Legislature has clearly expressed its

resolve to firmly address this terrible problem by encouraging

the reporting of suspected child abuse. The Legislature ...

sought to accomplish this by requiring every person to report

suspected child abuse, by providing that failure to report is a

disorderly persons offense and by affording immunity from

liability for the reporters.” Id. at 47. Moreover, “[t]hat

legislative resolve can easily be frustrated if complying with

the duty to report can subject the reporter to costly and

protracted civil litigation[.]” Id. Accordingly, the Appellate

Division instructed that courts must “liberally construe the

statutory grant of immunity[,]” and set forth the following

paradigm for examining whether immunity attaches for reporters of

child abuse:

(1) An objective test will be used to determine

whether a report of suspected child abuse is

made pursuant to the statute. The test will be

whether a reasonable person would have

reasonable cause to believe that a child has

been abused[;] (2) Immunity will attach if an

investigation by DYFS shows that there was a

reasonable basis to suspect child abuse and the

report was made immediately[;] (3) Immunity will

not be withheld merely because the reporter did

not act “immediately.” The requirement of

reporting “immediately” was intended to protect

children from the potentially serious

consequences of delay. We glean no legislative

intent that the failure to act immediately will

necessarily strip immunity from the reporter[;]

(4) A trial court should not hesitate to place

appropriate restrictions on discovery. Trial

courts are also encouraged to use summary

judgment procedures. Thus, immunity issues will

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be addressed and determined speedily without

extensive and burdensome discovery and trial

preparation.

Id.

The issue of reporter immunity was resolved at the summary

judgment stage of the proceedings in F.A. by P.A.. Id. at 48-49. 

There, the Appellate Division determined that immunity attached

based on (1) defendants’ deposition testimony regarding

observations that the child in question was playing in the street

unsupervised and that plaintiff was yelling and screaming at the

child; and (2) a DYFS report which contained some indications of

child abuse. Id. at 49. The court found that the DYFS report

and the defendants’ deposition testimony were “more than

sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that defendants

had reasonable cause to believe that child abuse had taken

place.” Id. By contrast, the Court is being asked in this

instance to examine whether immunity for the School Defendants

and the Counselor Defendant has attached at the motion to dismiss

stage. In deciding this issue, the Court notes that Plaintiffs

attached to their complaint over three hundred pages worth of

exhibits. These exhibits include multiple documents from DYFS 34

34. As these documents are relied upon by Plaintiffs in the

complaint and are attached as exhibits directly thereto, the

Court may properly consider these documents in the context of a

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) without converting the

motion to one for summary judgment. D.G. v. Somerset Hills

School Dist., 559 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (D.N.J. 2008) (“[T]he

Court may consider (1) exhibits attached to the complaint, (2)

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including but not limited to: screening summaries, contact

sheets, investigation summaries, and assessment summaries. 

As they relate to the issue of reporter immunity, Exhibit 12

is a Screening Summary dated August 15, 2008 which relates to the

report made by the Counselor Defendant. (Screening Summary, Ex.

12 to Pls.’ Compl. [Doc. No. 1-3] 1-5.) As set forth in the

August 15, 2008 Screening Summary, the Counselor Defendant

contacted DYFS to report that S.K. was “hiding” at school

because, according to S.K., his adoptive father, Plaintiff

Melleady, threatened to kill him. (Id. at 1.) The Counselor

Defendant further reported to DYFS that S.K. made allegations

that his adoptive mother, Plaintiff Keefer, slapped him in the

head regarding an incident with a can opener. (Id.) The

Screening Summary further indicates that the DYFS screening

worker who took the report from the Counselor Defendant reached

out to S.K. directly, and that S.K. reported that he was “scared

to go home, and said that [his] dad grabbed the collar of his

shirt and threatened to kill him.” (Id. at 2.) Subsequently, it

appears that the screening worker learned that S.K. would be

matters of public record, and (3) all documents that are integral

to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint without converting

the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.); see also M

& M Stone Co. v. Pennsylvania, 288 F. App’x 156, 162 (3d Cir.

2010) (“In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it is

well-established that a court should ‘consider only the

allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint,

matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a

claim.’”) 

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transported from his school to the local police department. 

(Id.) 

To determine whether the Counselor Defendant is entitled to

statutory immunity for making this report to DYFS, the Court must

determine whether a reasonable person would have had reasonable

cause to believe that a child had been abused and whether an

investigation by DYFS demonstrated any reasonable basis to

suspect child abuse. F.A. by P.A., 656 A.2d at 47. Having

reviewed the Screening Summary dated August 15, 2008, it is clear

that the Counselor Defendant contacted DYFS to report suspected

child abuse based on a direct communication the Counselor

Defendant had with S.K. regarding the specific incidents alleged–

i.e., that S.K.’s adoptive father threatened to kill him and that

his mother had slapped him in the head. An objective review of

the facts demonstrates that a reasonable person who learned

directly from the child involved in the incidents that the

child’s father threatened to kill the child causing the child to

hide at school and that his mother slapped him in the head would

have reasonable cause to believe that the child had been abused. 

Thus, the Counselor Defendant, by reporting this information to

DYFS, acted as any reasonable person would have in the same

circumstances. 

Moreover, once this report was made to DYFS by the Counselor

Defendant, the DYFS screening worker independently verified the

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allegations with S.K. Accordingly, the Court finds that immunity

based on Section 9:6-8.13 attached on behalf of the Counselor

Defendant in these circumstances, and that the Counselor

Defendant is entitled to statutory immunity not only for his

initial report to DYFS but also for his testimony as a witness in

the Family Court proceedings. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 9:6-8.13

(providing the immunity from civil or criminal liability for

making a report also applies “with respect to testimony given in

any judicial proceeding resulting from such report.”) Therefore,

Plaintiffs’ claims against the Counselor Defendant are dismissed

with prejudice. 

35

With respect to the School Defendants’ attempt to assert 36

statutory immunity, a similar Screening Summary dated October 14,

35. In light of the Court’s determination that the Counselor

Defendant is entitled to statutory immunity from liability for

reporting suspected child abuse and testifying in the Family

Court proceedings, the Court does not address the Counselor

Defendant’s additional arguments that he is entitled to absolute

immunity as a witness under New Jersey’s litigation privilege and

that he did not act under color of state law for purposes of

Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim. 

36. The Court notes that the only School Defendant against whom

any specific factual allegations are made in the complaint is

Vice Principal Helen Divens. Accordingly, although Plaintiffs

named Defendants Borelli, Sottosanti, and the Delsea Regional

School District in the complaint, Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently

state any claims against these Defendants upon which relief can

be granted. To the extent Plaintiffs seek to impose liability on

these Defendants based on the actions of Defendant Divens, these

claims also fail and are dismissed with prejudice because, as set

forth herein, Defendant Divens is entitled to statutory immunity

from liability in this case. 

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2008 is also attached to the complaint as Exhibit 19. (Screening

Summary, Ex. 19 to Pls.’ Compl. [Doc. No. 1-4] 1-5.) In the

October 14, 2008 Screening Summary, one of the School Defendants,

Vice Principal Helen Divens, contacted DYFS to report that S.K.

had come to school that day claiming that he ran away from home

and had not been home for three days. (Id. at 1.) After

informing the DYFS screening worker about the facts Defendant

Divens learned directly from S.K., Defendant Divens then put S.K.

on the telephone call with the DYFS screening worker. (Id.) 

S.K. then verified for the screening worker that he had run away

from home because he did not like how he was being treated by his

mother. (Id.) Specifically, S.K. identified that his mother was

very controlling and that she had hit him in the past, kicked him

in the legs and shins, grabbed him by the neck, and punched him

in the head. (Id.) After S.K. spoke with the screening worker,

Defendant Divens informed the screening worker that S.K.’s

adoptive father, Plaintiff Melleady, had called the school to see

if S.K. had been located as he had been missing for several days. 

(Id.) The screening worker then noted that the abuse reported by

S.K. was previously reported to DYFS in September of 2008. (Id.

at 2.) 

As the Court similarly found with respect to the Counselor

Defendant, an objective review of the October 14, 2008 Screening

Summary demonstrates that the School Defendants are also entitled

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to statutory immunity for reporting suspected child abuse to DYFS

and testifying in the Family Court proceedings. The October 14,

2008 Screening Summary clearly demonstrates that the School

Defendants, specifically Defendant Divens, contacted DYFS to

report suspected child abuse based on a information that S.K. had

run away from home for several days. A reasonable person who

learned that a child ran away from home and had not been home for

several days would have reasonable cause to believe that the

child had suffered some form of abuse or neglect which prompted

him to run away. Thus, the School Defendants, and specifically

Defendant Divens, by reporting this information to DYFS, acted as

any reasonable person would have in the same circumstances.

Moreover, as before, once this report was made to DYFS, the

DYFS screening worker spoke with S.K. during the same telephone

call and independently verified the allegations with S.K. that he

had run away. The screening worker also learned of additional

allegations of abuse which had previously been reported to DYFS. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that immunity based on Section 9:6-

8.13 attached on behalf of the School Defendants in these

circumstances, and that the School Defendants are entitled to

statutory immunity not only for the report to DYFS but also for

the testimony of Defendant Divens in the Family Court

proceedings. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 9:6-8.13. Accordingly,

Plaintiffs’ claims against the School Defendants are dismissed

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with prejudice. 

37

F. Additional Issues

In the complaint, Plaintiffs repeatedly allege that

Defendants conspired against them to deprive Plaintiffs of their

constitutional rights. However, Plaintiffs do not provide a

sufficient factual basis for these claims. It appears to the

Court that these claims are based merely on Plaintiffs’ own

suspicions and speculations. Therefore, to the extent Plaintiffs

allege a claim for conspiracy to deprive them of their

constitutional rights, the Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted and this claim is

dismissed with prejudice. See, e.g., Gera v. Pennsylvania, 256

F. App’x 563, 565-66 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming district court

dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims that attorney general and

district attorney conspired against the plaintiff to deprive him

of his constitutional rights where it appears the claims were not

based in fact but upon the plaintiff’s own suspicion and

speculation); Severino, 2011 WL 5526116, at *3 (“To the extent

that the plaintiff asserts any discernible allegations concerning

a conspiracy on the part of the defendants to deprive him of

federal rights, such allegations appear to be based on mere

37. Having determined that the School Defendants are entitled to

statutory immunity and that they claims against them are

dismissed, the Court does not address the School Defendants’

alternative request to require Plaintiffs to provide a more

definite statement under Rule 12(e). 

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speculation and thus are without merit.”) (citing Gera, 256 F.

App’x at 565-66.) 

In light of the Court’s ruling which grants all five pending

motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint and dismisses

Plaintiffs’ underlying federal claims with prejudice, Plaintiffs

no longer maintain a cause of action which independently

establishes federal subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court, sua sponte,

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law

claims to the extent they are raised in Plaintiffs’ complaint. 

Under Section 1367(c)(3), “[a] district court may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if ‘the district

court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction[.]’” Oras v. City of Jersey City, 328 F. App’x 772,

775 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). 

Moreover, as recognized by the Third Circuit, “[w]here the

claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction is

dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to decide

the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial

economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an

affirmative justification for doing so.” Oras, 328 F. App’x at

775 (citing Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000))

(internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). In this

case, the Court finds that considerations of judicial economy,

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convenience, and fairness do not affirmatively justify the

exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Having declined to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the Court dismisses any

pending state law claims without prejudice. Finally, in light

of the dismissal of all of Plaintiffs’ claims, Plaintiffs’ motion

[Doc. No. 18] seeking review of DYFS policies and procedures is

dismissed as moot. 

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions [Doc. Nos.

11, 12, 15, 26, 32] to dismiss are granted. Plaintiffs’ motion

[Doc. No. 18] to address DYFS policies and procedures is

dismissed as moot. An Order consistent with this Opinion will be

entered.

Dated: December 15, 2011 /s/ Noel L. Hillman 

At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

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