alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 32.2**

**Certification ofExecutive Vice President and Chief Financial OfficerPursuant to 18 U.S.C. of Section 1350, as Created by Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

The undersignedofficer of Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (the “Company”), hereby certifies, tosuch officer’s knowledge, that:

(i)                theQuarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended June 30, 2006(the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(ii)             theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date:    August9, 2006                                                        
|        | By:    | **/s/  Charles P. Slacik**                               |
|--------|--------|----------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   | Charles P.  Slacik                                       |
|   |   | Executive Vice  President — Chief Financial Officer |
|   |   | (Principal  Financial Officer)                           |

 

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely toaccompany the Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, and is not being filed forpurposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, andis not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whethermade before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporationlanguage in such filing.

 

----
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of PRIMEDIA Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2007 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Kim R. Payne, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



|/s/KIM R. PAYNEKim R. Payne Senior Vice President and Chief Financial
Officer |  | 
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | 

November 9,
2007

This
certification accompanies each Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---
Consent of Independent Registered Public
Accounting Firm


 


 


 


We consent to the incorporation by reference
in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-177834) pertaining to the 2011 Share Incentive Plan of Sapiens International Corporation
N.V., of our report dated March 11, 2013, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Sapiens International Corporation
N.V. included in this Annual Report (Form 20-F) for the year ended December 31, 2012.


 


 


	 	Yours Truly,
	 	 
	 	/s/ KOST
    FORER GABBAY & KASIERER
	 	 
	March 11, 2013	KOST FORER GABBAY & KASIERER
	Tel-Aviv, Israel	A Member of Ernst & Young Global
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Gilberto Lujan MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-50232

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 19, 2012.

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Gregory L. Ahlgren, Esq., Ahlgren Law Firm, Laredo, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, OWEN, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Gilberto Lujan Martinez appeals from the judgment revoking his term of probation, which was imposed for his conviction of aiding and abetting the distribution of hydrocodone, and sentencing him to 12 months of imprisonment and 24 months of supervised release. He contends solely that his 12-month term of imprisonment was substantively unreasonable.

Because Martinez did not object in the district court, his sentence should be reviewed under the plain error standard. *See United States v. Whitelaw,*580 F.3d 256, 259 (5th Cir.2009). Martinez’s 12-month sentence was within the guidelines policy statement sentencing range for his probation violation. *See United States v. Campos-Maldonado,*531 F.3d 337, 338 (5th Cir.2008). Martinez can rebut the presumption “only upon a showing that the sentence does not account for a factor that should receive significant weight, [] gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or [] represents a clear error of judgment in balancing sentencing factors.” *United States v. Cooks,*589 F.3d 173, 186 (5th Cir.2009).

Martinez has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness. He violated the terms of his probation by distributing hydrocodone. Revocation of probation was required. *See*18 U.S.C. § 3565(b)(1). Moreover, distribution of hydrocodone was the offense that resulted in Martinez being sentenced to probation in the first place, and Martinez received the lowest sentence in the policy statement’s sentencing range. *See*U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a), p.s. Martinez seeks for this court to reweigh the sentencing factors and substitute its judgment for that of the district court. This would be improper. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 700

To amend the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to require written 

opinions in certain cases, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 11, 2003

Mr. PAUL introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on the Judiciary 

A BILL

To amend the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to require written opinions in certain cases, and for other 

purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Openness in Justice 

5 Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. WRITTEN OPINIONS IN APPELLATE CASES. 

7 The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are 

8 amended by inserting after Rule 48 the following new rule: 
2

•HR 700 IH 

1 ‘‘Rule 49. Written opinions 

2 ‘‘(a) WHEN REQUIRED.—A written opinion that ex3 pounds on the law as applied to the facts of the case, and 

4 explains the judicial reasons upon which the judgment is 

5 based, shall be issued in connection with a judgment en6 tered in each of the following cases: 

7 ‘‘(1) A civil action removed from State court. 

8 ‘‘(2) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is found9 ed solely upon diversity of citizenship, in which the 

10 matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 

11 $100,000. 

12 ‘‘(3) Any appeal regarding the use of a court’s 

13 inherent powers. 

14 ‘‘(b) PARTIES’ RIGHT TO REQUEST.—Each party on 

15 direct appeal may request a written opinion referred to 

16 in subsection (a).’’.

Æ
H. R.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on

A BILL

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
# The Attorney General ofTexas September 13, 1978 JOHN L. HILL Attorney General Honorable Joe Resweb-er Harris County Attorney Harris County Courthouse Houston, Texas 77002 Dear Mr.Resweber: Youask: Opinion No. H- 1242 Re: Control of the preparation ofcounty warrants.

Can the Harris County Commissioners Court assign the preparation of Harris County Flood Control warrants, prior .to auditing and final disposition, to either the County Clerk or the Harris County Data Processing Department? Control of the preparation and processing of county warrants isvested by statute in the County Auditor of Harris County. V.T.C.S. art. 1656a. In counties having a population of 190,000or more the auditor is to “prescribe the system of accounting for the county and the forms to be used by the District Clerk,~the District Attorney and all county and precinct officers. .. inthe collection and disbursement of county revenues.” Heisgiven power to “adopt and enforce such regulations .., as he may deem essential to the speedy end proper collection and checking of, and accounting for, the revenues and other funds and fees belonging to the county. . ..” See Attorney General Opinion C-218(1964). - The Harris County Commissioners Court has no authority to assign the preparation of Harris County warrants to any officer or department, since the county auditor has responsibility for the preparation of the warrants. See V.T.C.S. art. 1650. The rule is the same for the preparation of warrants for the Harris County Flood Control District. Article 8280-120, section 8makes applicable to the district “all existing [sItate fllaws ...applicable to ...the receipt and disbursement of, and accounting for, public funds in Harris County.” SUMMARY

The Commissioners Court of Harris County has no authority to assign the preparation of Harris County or

p. 4944Honorable Joe Resweber - Page 2 Cl-1242)
Harris County Flood Control Iktrict warrants to any officer or department, since the co&y auditor has responsibility for preparation ofthe warrankVery truly yours,

APPROVED: Attorney General ofTexas

C. ROBERT HEATH, Chairman Opinion Committee

p. 498
#### Infusacare Medical Services, P.C., Appellant-Respondent, v Syracuse Home Association, Respondent-Appellant, et al., Defendant.

[853 NYS2d 785]

*1177Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking to recover damages allegedly owed by Syracuse Home Association (defendant) for medical treatment and medication provided by plaintiff to one of defendant’s residents. Supreme Court properly granted those parts of the motion of defendant for summary judgment dismissing the breach of contract and account stated causes of action against it inasmuch as the record establishes that there was no contract or account stated between plaintiff and defendant. The court also properly granted that part of plaintiffs motion for summary judgment dismissing defendant’s counterclaims, pursuant to which defendant seeks to recover the amount of $11,721.32 allegedly paid in error to plaintiff from Medicare payments received by defendant. “[T]he evidence supports the conclusion that [defendant] was not operating under an actual mistake of law but, instead, made the . . . payment[ ] voluntarily, as a matter of convenience, without having made any effort to learn what its legal obligations were . . . , and [it] is therefore not entitled to the equitable relief of restitution” *(Gimbel Bros. v Brook Shopping Ctrs.,*118 AD2d 532, 535-536 [1986]).

We agree with defendant, however, that the court erred in denying that part of its motion for summary judgment dismissing the quantum meruit cause of action against it and in granting that part of plaintiffs motion for summary judgment with respect to that cause of action. We therefore modify the order accordingly. To recover in quantum meruit, a plaintiff must establish that the services were performed for the defendant or at its behest (see *Heller v Kurz,*228 AD2d 263, 264 [1996]) and, here, the record establishes that no benefit was conferred on the resident at the behest of defendant. A plaintiff must also establish, inter alia, that it had “an expectation of compensation therefor” *(Moors v Hall,*143 AD2d 336, 337 [1988]). Because the record establishes that plaintiff submitted bills to Medicare for the resident’s treatments, it cannot be said that plaintiff expected to be paid for its services by defendant. Present— Hurlbutt, J.P., Centra, Fahey, Peradotto and Pine, JJ.
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

mntteb ~tate1l ~ourt of ~peaI1l

for tbe jfeberaI ~trtutt

EDERICK D. TAYLOR,

Petitioner,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,

Respondent.

2013-3001

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection

Board in case no. AT0752110754-I-1.

ON MOTION

ORDER

Ederick D. Taylor moves for leave to proceed in forma

pauperIs.

Upon consideration thereof,

IT Is ORDERED THAT:

The motion is denied. The docketing fee must be paid

within 14 days from the filing ofthis order.

Case: 13-3001 Document: 6 Page: 1 Filed: 11/05/2012
EDERICK TAYLOR V. AIR FORCE

s24

FOR THE COURT

/s/ Jan Horbaly

Jan Horbaly

Clerk

2

Case: 13-3001 Document: 6 Page: 2 Filed: 11/05/2012
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Ex parte Alan Nelson Crotts

Appellate case number: 01-18-00666-CR

Trial court case number: 13-CCR-165781

Trial court: County Court at Law No. 3 of Fort Bend County

We abated this appeal and remanded the case to the trial court for appellant to 

obtain a signed order on his application for a writ of habeas corpus, and for the trial court 

to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law and execute a certification of appellant’s 

right to appeal. The trial court clerk has filed supplemental clerk’s records containing the 

trial court’s order denying appellant’s application for a writ of habeas corpus, the trial 

court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, and a certification of appellant’s right to 

appeal stating that appellant “has the right to appeal.” Accordingly, we reinstate the case 

on the Court’s active docket.

Appellant’s brief will be due within 30 days of the date of this order. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 31.1(a), 38.6(a). Appellee’s brief will be due within 20 days of the date the 

appellant’s brief is filed. See id. TEX. R. APP. P. 31.1(a), 38.6(b).

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Julie Countiss

  Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: __April 11, 2019__
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Geovanny HERNANDEZ-GARCIA, also known as Byron Geovanny Revolorio Monjaras, also known as Rojelio De la Rosa, Appellant.

No. 12-3657.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: April 8, 2013.

Filed: April 16, 2013.

Teresa Baumann, Richard L. Murphy, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Appellee.

Geovanny Hernandez-Garcia, Youngstown, OH, pro se.

Brian Dean Johnson, Jacobsen & Johnson, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Appellant.

BYE, ARNOLD, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Geovanny Hernandez-Garcia appeals from the sentence that the district court1*621imposed on him after he pleaded guilty to being an alien who re-entered the United States after having been removed following a felony conviction. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1826(a)(1), (a)(2) & 1326(b)(1). We affirm.

The district court determined that Mr. Hernandez-Garcia had an offense level of 14 and a criminal history category of III, which produced a corresponding guideline range of 21 to 27 months’ imprisonment. But, on the government’s motion, the court departed upward to a criminal history category of VI, producing a guideline range of 87 to 46 months’ imprisonment, and then imposed a sentence of 46 months. The district court also made it clear that even without the upward departure, it would have sentenced Mr. Hernandez-Garcia to the same term of imprisonment under the general provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

On appeal, Mr. Hernandez-Garcia, relying on *United States v. Azure,*536 F.3d 922, 930-32 (8th Cir.2008), maintains that the district court gave an insufficient reason for believing that a category VI criminal history more accurately described his criminal history than category III did. But because the district court indicated an alternative basis for the sentence it imposed, we need only ask whether a 46-month term of imprisonment was unreasonable in the circumstances. *See United States v. Ortiz,*636 F.3d 389, 394-95 (8th Cir.2011). The district court, noting the applicable guideline range, found on a sufficient record that Mr. Hernandez-Garcia had willfully inflicted a serious injury on a person by stabbing him with a knife and had attempted to stab another person, offenses for which he had been charged but not convicted. The court also found on a sufficient record that Mr. Hernandez-Garcia had habitually falsified his identity throughout his life and continued to do so after his arrest for the present offense, even to the point of lying to the district court, all of which was evidence of a substantial tendency on the defendant’s part to recidivate. Considering the admitted offense conduct, and the additional findings of the court, we cannot say that the court’s sentence of 46 months is unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which enumerates the matters that a district court should weigh in fixing a sentence.

Affirmed.

1

. The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern District *621of Iowa.
# Ableu tize Pickering ' J.



### tunic J. J. statement and the record on appeal, we conclude that, regardless of any conflicting evidence, the district court did not clearly err in finding that probable cause existed to grant the petition based on respondent's declaration stating under penalty of perjury that he had wrapped his arm around appellant's face and later noticed a bite mark and bleeding immediately after appellant was subdued. 

### See Han,nam v. Brown, 114 Nev. 350, 358, 956 P.2d 794, 799 (1998) (reviewing the district court's finding of probable cause in a will contest action under a clearly erroneous standard); 

### cf. Sheriff, Clark Cnty. v. Badillo, 95 Nev. 593, 595-95, 600 P.2d 221, 222 (1979) (recognizing, in the context of whether there was sufficient probable cause to find that an individual had committed a criminal offense, that a finding of probable cause "may be based on slight evidence," and that conflicting testimony will not undermine a finding of probable cause). Based on the above discussion, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.'

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 'Because respondent's declaration was sufficient to support the

finding of probable cause, we conclude that our review of the transcript requested by appellant is unnecessary. Further, we have considered appellant's July 18, 2013, letter regarding the appeal statement, August 30, 2013, filing, September 3 and 23, 2013, memoranda to the court, March 10, 2014, communication regarding a petition for a writ of mandamus, and May 29, 2014, communication to this court, and we deny the relief sought by these documents.

( 0 ) I-947Acc: Hon. Elissa F. Cadish, District Judge Jerry Doran Pough, Sr. Eglet Wall Christiansen Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

(0) I947A
NO. OI-l'J-ft#)-f,ft

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF TEXAS

ROMELLE HAWKINS, Appellant

VS.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

PETITIONER'S MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE

PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW ROMELLE HAWKINS, Petioner, and files this motion for an extension

of time in which to file his petition for discretionary review. In support of this motion,

Petitioner shows the court the following:

I

This appeal lies from the Petitioner's conviction in The State of Texas v. Komelle

Hawkins which was affirmed by the First Court of Appeals in Cause No. 01-14-00145-

CR on December 4, 2014. This is Petitioner's first request for an extension to file the

petition for discretionary review.

II

REClfWflfr is Presently incarcerated in TDCJ and receivedrteRQ?¥M 3URT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS I/HIMINAL APPE

jan 2i 2o,5 JAN2320,S

Abel Acosta, Clerk

Abel Acosta, Clerk
••*•• !

opinion on the 2R. day of lyW.f.iTlbf >f» 2014. Petitioner needs additional time to

review the Court of Appeals opinion and prepare his petition for discretionary

review.

This request is not made for delay but so justice may be done

WHEREFORE, Appellant prays the court grant this motion and extend the

deadline for filing the petition for discretionary review.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

/^>l\^4i/n/S)

Romelle Hawkins

TDCJ# 1911528

Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing

instrument has been delivered to the Harris County District Attorney by epositing

same in the U.S. Mail on the 2Jj- day of 1)p/Afl\LY)^ .20 lLI hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing

instrument has been delivered to the State Prosecuting Attorney, P.O. Box 12405,

Austin, Texas 78711 by U.S. mail this the 2l day of Qf-CrMnhfi& .20 W.

Romelle Hawkins
# Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect To the Former Liberian Regime of Charles Taylor 

On July 22, 2004, by Executive Order 13348, the President declared a national emergency and ordered related measures, including the blocking of the property of certain persons connected to the former Liberian regime of Charles Taylor, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706). The President took this action to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy of the United States constituted by the actions and policies of former Liberian President Charles Taylor and other persons, in particular their unlawful depletion of Liberian resources and their removal from Liberia and secreting of Liberian funds and property, which have undermined Liberia's transition to democracy and the orderly development of its political, administrative, and economic institutions and resources. The President further noted that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed on August 18, 2003, and the related cease-fire had not yet been universally implemented throughout Liberia, and that the illicit trade in round logs and timber products was linked to the proliferation of and trafficking in illegal arms, which perpetuated the Liberian conflict and fueled and exacerbated other conflicts throughout West Africa.

The actions and policies of Charles Taylor and others have left a legacy of destruction that continues to undermine Liberia's transformation and recovery. Because the actions and policies of these persons continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy of the United States, the national emergency declared on July 22, 2004, and the measures adopted on that date to deal with that emergency, must continue in effect beyond July 22, 2009. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13348.

                    This notice shall be published in the                     *Federal Register*                    and transmitted to the Congress.                

[FR Doc. E9-17373

Billing code 3195-W9-P