IB 

Union Calendar No. 36

108TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 760

[Report No. 108–58] 

To prohibit the procedure commonly known as partial-birth abortion. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 13, 2003

Mr. CHABOT (for himself, Mr. SENSENBRENNER, Mr. KING of Iowa, Mr. KENNEDY of Minnesota, Mr. BACHUS, Mr. BRADY of Texas, Mr. CANNON, 

Mr. CANTOR, Mr. CUNNINGHAM, Mr. ENGLISH, Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin, 

Ms. HART, Mr. HAYES, Mr. HEFLEY, Mr. HOEKSTRA, Mr. HUNTER, Mr. 

JENKINS, Mr. KINGSTON, Mr. MILLER of Florida, Mrs. MYRICK, Mr. 

NEY, Mr. PENCE, Mr. PETERSON of Pennsylvania, Mr. PITTS, Mr. 

TOOMEY, Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania, Mr. PICKERING, Mr. OXLEY, 

Mr. CRANE, Mr. DEMINT, Mr. SCHROCK, Mr. TANCREDO, Mr. 

ADERHOLT, Mr. TIAHRT, Mr. NORWOOD, Mr. SHADEGG, Mr. BURTON of 

Indiana, Mr. DOOLITTLE, Mr. EHLERS, Mr. ROGERS of Michigan, Mr. 

BAKER, Mr. MOLLOHAN, Mr. BALLENGER, Mr. MCCRERY, Mr. RENZI, 

Mr. FLETCHER, Mr. TIBERI, Mr. AKIN, Mr. COLLINS, Mr. JOHN, Mr. 

RYUN of Kansas, Mr. HOSTETTLER, Mr. VITTER, Mr. MCCOTTER, Mr. 

PORTMAN, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. SOUDER, Mr. SHUSTER, Mr. WOLF, Mr. 

POMBO, Mr. DELAY, Mr. CAMP, Mr. BARTON of Texas, Mr. COSTELLO, 

Mr. BISHOP of Utah, Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi, Mr. EVERETT, Mr. 

BLUNT, Mr. TERRY, Mrs. CUBIN, Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. GRAVES, Mr. 

WHITFIELD, Mr. ISSA, Mr. FEENEY, Mr. STENHOLM, Mr. GOSS, Mr. 

SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. HYDE, Mr. WILSON of South Carolina, Mr. 

GUTKNECHT, Mr. PETRI, Mr. LINDER, Mr. COBLE, Mr. HAYWORTH, Mr. 

FRANKS of Arizona, Mr. BURGESS, Mr. STEARNS, Mr. BEAUPREZ, Mr. 

HULSHOF, Mr. ROGERS of Alabama, Mr. BURNS, Mr. PLATTS, Mr. 

BROWN of South Carolina, Mr. REHBERG, Mrs. EMERSON, Mr. KLINE, 

Mr. LAHOOD, Mr. MORAN of Kansas, Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia, Mr. 

BOOZMAN, Mr. OSBORNE, Mr. LEWIS of Kentucky, Mr. MURPHY, Mr. 

SIMPSON, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. TAYLOR of North Carolina, Mrs. JO ANN

DAVIS of Virginia, Mr. WAMP, Mr. GOODE, Mr. CHOCOLA, Mrs. 

NORTHUP, Mr. FORBES, Mr. SULLIVAN, Mr. GOODLATTE, Mr. PUTNAM, 

Mrs. BLACKBURN, Mr. TURNER of Ohio, Mr. PEARCE, Mrs. MILLER of 
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Michigan, Ms. GRANGER, Mr. GINGREY, Mr. MANZULLO, Mr. COLE, Mr. 

FERGUSON, Mr. CALVERT, Mr. SMITH of Texas, Mr. GARRETT of New 

Jersey, Mr. STUPAK, Mr. BURR, Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin, Mr. JONES of 

North Carolina, Mrs. MUSGRAVE, Mr. CULBERSON, Mr. LATOURETTE, 

Mr. BOEHNER, Mr. BARRETT of South Carolina, and Mr. HENSARLING) 

introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the 

Judiciary 

APRIL 3, 2003

Additional sponsors: Mr. SHIMKUS, Mr. TAUZIN, Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland, 

Mr. KING of New York, Mr. WELLER, Mr. ALEXANDER, Mr. SKELTON, 

Mr. BUYER, Mr. NUSSLE, Mr. FLAKE, Mr. PETERSON of Minnesota, Mr. 

JOHNSON of Illinois, Mr. MICA, Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, Mr. LUCAS of Oklahoma, Mr. JANKLOW, Mr. LUCAS of Kentucky, Mr. DOYLE, Mr. ROGERS

of Kentucky, Mr. FOLEY, Mr. OTTER, Mr. BONILLA, Mr. CARTER, and 

Mr. KELLER

APRIL 3, 2003

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union 

and ordered to be printed 

A BILL

To prohibit the procedure commonly known as partial-birth 

abortion.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Partial-Birth Abortion 

5 Ban Act of 2003’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 The Congress finds and declares the following: 

8 (1) A moral, medical, and ethical consensus ex9 ists that the practice of performing a partial-birth 

10 abortion—an abortion in which a physician delivers 
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1 an unborn child’s body until only the head remains 

2 inside the womb, punctures the back of the child’s 

3 skull with a sharp instrument, and sucks the child’s 

4 brains out before completing delivery of the dead in5 fant—is a gruesome and inhumane procedure that is 

6 never medically necessary and should be prohibited. 

7 (2) Rather than being an abortion procedure 

8 that is embraced by the medical community, particu9 larly among physicians who routinely perform other 

10 abortion procedures, partial-birth abortion remains a 

11 disfavored procedure that is not only unnecessary to 

12 preserve the health of the mother, but in fact poses 

13 serious risks to the long-term health of women and 

14 in some circumstances, their lives. As a result, at 

15 least 27 States banned the procedure as did the 

16 United States Congress which voted to ban the pro17 cedure during the 104th, 105th, and 106th Con18 gresses. 

19 (3) In Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 932 

20 (2000), the United States Supreme Court opined 

21 ‘‘that significant medical authority supports the 

22 proposition that in some circumstances, [partial 

23 birth abortion] would be the safest procedure’’ for 

24 pregnant women who wish to undergo an abortion. 

25 Thus, the Court struck down the State of Nebras-
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1 ka’s ban on partial-birth abortion procedures, con2 cluding that it placed an ‘‘undue burden’’ on women 

3 seeking abortions because it failed to include an ex4 ception for partial-birth abortions deemed necessary 

5 to preserve the ‘‘health’’ of the mother. 

6 (4) In reaching this conclusion, the Court de7 ferred to the Federal district court’s factual findings 

8 that the partial-birth abortion procedure was statis9 tically and medically as safe as, and in many cir10 cumstances safer than, alternative abortion proce11 dures. 

12 (5) However, the great weight of evidence pre13 sented at the Stenberg trial and other trials chal14 lenging partial-birth abortion bans, as well as at ex15 tensive Congressional hearings, demonstrates that a 

16 partial-birth abortion is never necessary to preserve 

17 the health of a woman, poses significant health risks 

18 to a woman upon whom the procedure is performed, 

19 and is outside of the standard of medical care. 

20 (6) Despite the dearth of evidence in the 

21 Stenberg trial court record supporting the district 

22 court’s findings, the United States Court of Appeals 

23 for the Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court re24 fused to set aside the district court’s factual findings 

25 because, under the applicable standard of appellate 
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1 review, they were not ‘‘clearly erroneous’’. A finding 

2 of fact is clearly erroneous ‘‘when although there is 

3 evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the en4 tire evidence is left with the definite and firm convic5 tion that a mistake has been committed’’. Anderson 

6 v. City of Bessemer City, North Carolina, 470 U.S. 

7 564, 573 (1985). Under this standard, ‘‘if the dis8 trict court’s account of the evidence is plausible in 

9 light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court 

10 of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced 

11 that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would 

12 have weighed the evidence differently’’. Id. at 574. 

13 (7) Thus, in Stenberg, the United States Su14 preme Court was required to accept the very ques15 tionable findings issued by the district court judge—

16 the effect of which was to render null and void the 

17 reasoned factual findings and policy determinations 

18 of the United States Congress and at least 27 State 

19 legislatures. 

20 (8) However, under well-settled Supreme Court 

21 jurisprudence, the United States Congress is not

22 bound to accept the same factual findings that the 

23 Supreme Court was bound to accept in Stenberg 

24 under the ‘‘clearly erroneous’’ standard. Rather, the 

25 United States Congress is entitled to reach its own 
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1 factual findings—findings that the Supreme Court 

2 accords great deference—and to enact legislation 

3 based upon these findings so long as it seeks to pur4 sue a legitimate interest that is within the scope of 

5 the Constitution, and draws reasonable inferences 

6 based upon substantial evidence. 

7 (9) In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 

8 (1966), the Supreme Court articulated its highly 

9 deferential review of Congressional factual findings 

10 when it addressed the constitutionality of section 

11 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Regarding 

12 Congress’ factual determination that section 4(e) 

13 would assist the Puerto Rican community in ‘‘gain14 ing nondiscriminatory treatment in public services,’’ 

15 the Court stated that ‘‘[i]t was for Congress, as the 

16 branch that made this judgment, to assess and 

17 weigh the various conflicting considerations. . . . It 

18 is not for us to review the congressional resolution 

19 of these factors. It is enough that we be able to per20 ceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve 

21 the conflict as it did. There plainly was such a basis

22 to support section 4(e) in the application in question 

23 in this case.’’. Id. at 653. 

24 (10) Katzenbach’s highly deferential review of 

25 Congress’s factual conclusions was relied upon by 
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1 the United States District Court for the District of 

2 Columbia when it upheld the ‘‘bail-out’’ provisions of 

3 the Voting Rights Act of 1965, (42 U.S.C. 1973c), 

4 stating that ‘‘congressional fact finding, to which we 

5 are inclined to pay great deference, strengthens the 

6 inference that, in those jurisdictions covered by the 

7 Act, state actions discriminatory in effect are dis8 criminatory in purpose’’. City of Rome, Georgia v. 

9 U.S., 472 F. Supp. 221 (D. D. Col. 1979) aff’d City 

10 of Rome, Georgia v. U.S., 446 U.S. 156 (1980). 

11 (11) The Court continued its practice of defer12 ring to congressional factual findings in reviewing 

13 the constitutionality of the must-carry provisions of 

14 the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Com15 petition Act of 1992. See Turner Broadcasting Sys16 tem, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 

17 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (Turner I) and Turner Broad18 casting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications 

19 Commission, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (Turner II). At 

20 issue in the Turner cases was Congress’ legislative 

21 finding that, absent mandatory carriage rules, the 

22 continued viability of local broadcast television would 

23 be ‘‘seriously jeopardized’’. The Turner I Court rec24 ognized that as an institution, ‘‘Congress is far bet25 ter equipped than the judiciary to ‘amass and evalu-
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1 ate the vast amounts of data’ bearing upon an issue 

2 as complex and dynamic as that presented here’’. 

3 512 U.S. at 665–66. Although the Court recognized 

4 that ‘‘the deference afforded to legislative findings 

5 does ‘not foreclose our independent judgment of the 

6 facts bearing on an issue of constitutional law,’ ’’ its 

7 ‘‘obligation to exercise independent judgment when 

8 First Amendment rights are implicated is not a li9 cense to reweigh the evidence de novo, or to replace 

10 Congress’ factual predictions with our own. Rather, 

11 it is to assure that, in formulating its judgments, 

12 Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on 

13 substantial evidence.’’ Id. at 666. 

14 (12) Three years later in Turner II, the Court 

15 upheld the ‘‘must-carry’’ provisions based upon Con16 gress’ findings, stating the Court’s ‘‘sole obligation 

17 is ‘to assure that, in formulating its judgments, Con18 gress has drawn reasonable inferences based on sub19 stantial evidence.’ ’’ 520 U.S. at 195. Citing its rul20 ing in Turner I, the Court reiterated that ‘‘[w]e owe 

21 Congress’ findings deference in part because the in22 stitution ‘is far better equipped than the judiciary to 

23 ‘‘amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data’’ 

24 bearing upon’ legislative questions,’’ id. at 195, and 

25 added that it ‘‘owe[d] Congress’ findings an addi-
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1 tional measure of deference out of respect for its au2 thority to exercise the legislative power.’’ Id. at 196. 

3 (13) There exists substantial record evidence 

4 upon which Congress has reached its conclusion that 

5 a ban on partial-birth abortion is not required to 

6 contain a ‘‘health’’ exception, because the facts indi7 cate that a partial-birth abortion is never necessary 

8 to preserve the health of a woman, poses serious 

9 risks to a woman’s health, and lies outside the 

10 standard of medical care. Congress was informed by 

11 extensive hearings held during the 104th, 105th, 

12 and 107th Congresses and passed a ban on partial13 birth abortion in the 104th, 105th, and 106th Con14 gresses. These findings reflect the very informed 

15 judgment of the Congress that a partial-birth abor16 tion is never necessary to preserve the health of a 

17 woman, poses serious risks to a woman’s health, and 

18 lies outside the standard of medical care, and 

19 should, therefore, be banned. 

20 (14) Pursuant to the testimony received during 

21 extensive legislative hearings during the 104th, 

22 105th, and 107th Congresses, Congress finds and 

23 declares that: 

24 (A) Partial-birth abortion poses serious 

25 risks to the health of a woman undergoing the 
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1 procedure. Those risks include, among other 

2 things: an increase in a woman’s risk of suf3 fering from cervical incompetence, a result of 

4 cervical dilation making it difficult or impos5 sible for a woman to successfully carry a subse6 quent pregnancy to term; an increased risk of 

7 uterine rupture, abruption, amniotic fluid embo8 lus, and trauma to the uterus as a result of 

9 converting the child to a footling breech posi10 tion, a procedure which, according to a leading 

11 obstetrics textbook, ‘‘there are very few, if any, 

12 indications for . . . other than for delivery of 

13 a second twin’’; and a risk of lacerations and 

14 secondary hemorrhaging due to the doctor 

15 blindly forcing a sharp instrument into the base 

16 of the unborn child’s skull while he or she is 

17 lodged in the birth canal, an act which could re18 sult in severe bleeding, brings with it the threat 

19 of shock, and could ultimately result in mater20 nal death.

21 (B) There is no credible medical evidence 

22 that partial-birth abortions are safe or are safer 

23 than other abortion procedures. No controlled 

24 studies of partial-birth abortions have been con25 ducted nor have any comparative studies been 
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1 conducted to demonstrate its safety and efficacy 

2 compared to other abortion methods. Further3 more, there have been no articles published in 

4 peer-reviewed journals that establish that par5 tial-birth abortions are superior in any way to 

6 established abortion procedures. Indeed, unlike 

7 other more commonly used abortion procedures, 

8 there are currently no medical schools that pro9 vide instruction on abortions that include the 

10 instruction in partial-birth abortions in their 

11 curriculum. 

12 (C) A prominent medical association has 

13 concluded that partial-birth abortion is ‘‘not an 

14 accepted medical practice,’’ that it has ‘‘never 

15 been subject to even a minimal amount of the 

16 normal medical practice development,’’ that 

17 ‘‘the relative advantages and disadvantages of 

18 the procedure in specific circumstances remain 

19 unknown,’’ and that ‘‘there is no consensus 

20 among obstetricians about its use’’. The asso21 ciation has further noted that partial-birth 

22 abortion is broadly disfavored by both medical 

23 experts and the public, is ‘‘ethically wrong,’’ 

24 and ‘‘is never the only appropriate procedure’’. 
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1 (D) Neither the plaintiff in Stenberg v. 

2 Carhart, nor the experts who testified on his 

3 behalf, have identified a single circumstance

4 during which a partial-birth abortion was nec5 essary to preserve the health of a woman. 

6 (E) The physician credited with developing 

7 the partial-birth abortion procedure has testi8 fied that he has never encountered a situation 

9 where a partial-birth abortion was medically 

10 necessary to achieve the desired outcome and, 

11 thus, is never medically necessary to preserve 

12 the health of a woman. 

13 (F) A ban on the partial-birth abortion 

14 procedure will therefore advance the health in15 terests of pregnant women seeking to terminate 

16 a pregnancy. 

17 (G) In light of this overwhelming evidence, 

18 Congress and the States have a compelling in19 terest in prohibiting partial-birth abortions. In 

20 addition to promoting maternal health, such a 

21 prohibition will draw a bright line that clearly 

22 distinguishes abortion and infanticide, that pre23 serves the integrity of the medical profession, 

24 and promotes respect for human life. 
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1 (H) Based upon Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 

2 113 (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 

3 505 U.S. 833 (1992), a governmental interest 

4 in protecting the life of a child during the deliv5 ery process arises by virtue of the fact that dur6 ing a partial-birth abortion, labor is induced 

7 and the birth process has begun. This distinc8 tion was recognized in Roe when the Court 

9 noted, without comment, that the Texas partu10 rition statute, which prohibited one from killing 

11 a child ‘‘in a state of being born and before ac12 tual birth,’’ was not under attack. This interest 

13 becomes compelling as the child emerges from 

14 the maternal body. A child that is completely 

15 born is a full, legal person entitled to constitu16 tional protections afforded a ‘‘person’’ under 

17 the United States Constitution. Partial-birth 

18 abortions involve the killing of a child that is in 

19 the process, in fact mere inches away from, be20 coming a ‘‘person’’. Thus, the government has 

21 a heightened interest in protecting the life of 

22 the partially-born child. 

23 (I) This, too, has not gone unnoticed in 

24 the medical community, where a prominent 

25 medical association has recognized that partial-
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1 birth abortions are ‘‘ethically different from 

2 other destructive abortion techniques because 

3 the fetus, normally twenty weeks or longer in 

4 gestation, is killed outside of the womb’’. Ac5 cording to this medical association, the ‘‘ ‘par6 tial birth’ gives the fetus an autonomy which 

7 separates it from the right of the woman to 

8 choose treatments for her own body’’. 

9 (J) Partial-birth abortion also confuses the 

10 medical, legal, and ethical duties of physicians 

11 to preserve and promote life, as the physician 

12 acts directly against the physical life of a child, 

13 whom he or she had just delivered, all but the 

14 head, out of the womb, in order to end that life. 

15 Partial-birth abortion thus appropriates the ter16 minology and techniques used by obstetricians 

17 in the delivery of living children—obstetricians 

18 who preserve and protect the life of the mother 

19 and the child—and instead uses those tech20 niques to end the life of the partially-born child. 

21 (K) Thus, by aborting a child in the man22 ner that purposefully seeks to kill the child 

23 after he or she has begun the process of birth, 

24 partial-birth abortion undermines the public’s 

25 perception of the appropriate role of a physician 
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1 during the delivery process, and perverts a 

2 process during which life is brought into the 

3 world, in order to destroy a partially-born child. 

4 (L) The gruesome and inhumane nature of 

5 the partial-birth abortion procedure and its dis6 turbing similarity to the killing of a newborn in7 fant promotes a complete disregard for infant 

8 human life that can only be countered by a pro9 hibition of the procedure. 

10 (M) The vast majority of babies killed dur11 ing partial-birth abortions are alive until the 

12 end of the procedure. It is a medical fact, how13 ever, that unborn infants at this stage can feel 

14 pain when subjected to painful stimuli and that 

15 their perception of this pain is even more in16 tense than that of newborn infants and older 

17 children when subjected to the same stimuli. 

18 Thus, during a partial-birth abortion procedure, 

19 the child will fully experience the pain associ20 ated with piercing his or her skull and sucking 

21 out his or her brain.

22 (N) Implicitly approving such a brutal and 

23 inhumane procedure by choosing not to prohibit 

24 it will further coarsen society to the humanity 

25 of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and in-
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1 nocent human life, making it increasingly dif2 ficult to protect such life. Thus, Congress has 

3 a compelling interest in acting—indeed it must 

4 act—to prohibit this inhumane procedure.

5 (O) For these reasons, Congress finds that 

6 partial-birth abortion is never medically indi7 cated to preserve the health of the mother; is in 

8 fact unrecognized as a valid abortion procedure 

9 by the mainstream medical community; poses 

10 additional health risks to the mother; blurs the 

11 line between abortion and infanticide in the kill12 ing of a partially-born child just inches from 

13 birth; and confuses the role of the physician in 

14 childbirth and should, therefore, be banned. 

15 SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTIONS. 

16 (a) IN GENERAL.—Title 18, United States Code, is 

17 amended by inserting after chapter 73 the following: 

18 ‘‘CHAPTER 74—PARTIAL-BIRTH 

19 ABORTIONS

‘‘Sec. 

‘‘1531. Partial-birth abortions prohibited.

20 ‘‘§ 1531. Partial-birth abortions prohibited 

21 ‘‘(a) Any physician who, in or affecting interstate or 

22 foreign commerce, knowingly performs a partial-birth 

23 abortion and thereby kills a human fetus shall be fined 

24 under this title or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or 
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1 both. This subsection does not apply to a partial-birth 

2 abortion that is necessary to save the life of a mother 

3 whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical 

4 illness, or physical injury, including a life-endangering 

5 physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy 

6 itself. This subsection takes effect 1 day after the enact7 ment. 

8 ‘‘(b) As used in this section—

9 ‘‘(1) the term ‘partial-birth abortion’ means an 

10 abortion in which—

11 ‘‘(A) the person performing the abortion 

12 deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers 

13 a living fetus until, in the case of a head-first 

14 presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the 

15 body of the mother, or, in the case of breech 

16 presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past 

17 the navel is outside the body of the mother for 

18 the purpose of performing an overt act that the 

19 person knows will kill the partially delivered liv20 ing fetus; and 

21 ‘‘(B) performs the overt act, other than 

22 completion of delivery, that kills the partially 

23 delivered living fetus; and 

24 ‘‘(2) the term ‘physician’ means a doctor of 

25 medicine or osteopathy legally authorized to practice 
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1 medicine and surgery by the State in which the doc2 tor performs such activity, or any other individual 

3 legally authorized by the State to perform abortions: 

4 Provided, however, That any individual who is not a 

5 physician or not otherwise legally authorized by the 

6 State to perform abortions, but who nevertheless di7 rectly performs a partial-birth abortion, shall be sub8 ject to the provisions of this section. 

9 ‘‘(c)(1) The father, if married to the mother at the 

10 time she receives a partial-birth abortion procedure, and 

11 if the mother has not attained the age of 18 years at the 

12 time of the abortion, the maternal grandparents of the 

13 fetus, may in a civil action obtain appropriate relief, unless 

14 the pregnancy resulted from the plaintiff’s criminal con15 duct or the plaintiff consented to the abortion. 

16 ‘‘(2) Such relief shall include—

17 ‘‘(A) money damages for all injuries, psycho18 logical and physical, occasioned by the violation of 

19 this section; and 

20 ‘‘(B) statutory damages equal to three times 

21 the cost of the partial-birth abortion. 

22 ‘‘(d)(1) A defendant accused of an offense under this 

23 section may seek a hearing before the State Medical Board 

24 on whether the physician’s conduct was necessary to save 

25 the life of the mother whose life was endangered by a 
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1 physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, in2 cluding a life-endangering physical condition caused by or 

3 arising from the pregnancy itself. 

4 ‘‘(2) The findings on that issue are admissible on that 

5 issue at the trial of the defendant. Upon a motion of the 

6 defendant, the court shall delay the beginning of the trial 

7 for not more than 30 days to permit such a hearing to 

8 take place. 

9 ‘‘(e) A woman upon whom a partial-birth abortion is 

10 performed may not be prosecuted under this section, for 

11 a conspiracy to violate this section, or for an offense under 

12 section 2, 3, or 4 of this title based on a violation of this 

13 section.’’. 

14 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of chapters 

15 for part I of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 

16 inserting after the item relating to chapter 73 the fol17 lowing new item:

‘‘74. Partial-birth abortions ........................................................... 1531’’.
Union Calendar No. 36

108TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 760

[Report No. 108–58] 

A BILL

To prohibit the procedure commonly known as 

partial-birth abortion. 

APRIL 3, 2003

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 

State of the Union and ordered to be printed