SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION 

1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

PARSHOTAM CHAHIL, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

EPISCOPAL CHURCH HOME 

FRIENDSHIP, INC. t/a FRIENDSHIP 

TERRACE RETIREMENT HOME, 

 Defendant.

   

Civil Action No. 10-cv-418 (RLW) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

 This matter is before the Court on Defendant Episcopal Church Home Friendship, Inc. t/a 

Friendship Terrace Retirement Home’s (“FTR”) Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 17). 

Plaintiff Parshotam Chahil (“Chahil”), a tenant of FTR, is a blind man of Indian descent and the 

Sikh faith. Chahil asserts six counts against FTR: 

 Count I: That FTR discriminated against Chahil based on his blindness and failed to 

accommodate him under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and the District of Columbia 

Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”) with regard to his evening meal program; 

 Count II: That FTR discriminated against Chahil based on his race, national origin 

and religion under the FHA and DCHRA by failing to accommodate his dietary needs 

and exempt him from the evening meal program; 

                                                            

1

 This unpublished memorandum opinion is intended solely to inform the parties and any 

reviewing court of the basis for the instant ruling, or alternatively, to assist in any potential future 

analysis of the res judicata, law of the case, or preclusive effect of the ruling. The Court has 

designated this opinion as “not intended for publication,” but this Court cannot prevent or 

prohibit the publication of this opinion in the various and sundry electronic and legal databases 

(as it is a public document), and this Court cannot prevent or prohibit the citation of this opinion 

by counsel. Cf. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1. Nonetheless, as stated in the operational handbook 

adopted by our Court of Appeals, “counsel are reminded that the Court's decision to issue an 

unpublished disposition means that the Court sees no precedential value in that disposition.” 

D.C. Circuit Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures 43 (2011). 
SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION 

2 

 Count III: That FTR discriminated against Chahil based on his blindness in violation 

of the FHA and DCHRA with regard to informational notices; 

 Count IV: That FTR breached its lease with Chahil by failing to modify his rental 

rates in accordance with HUD regulations; 

 Count V: That FTR breached the anti-discrimination clause of its lease with Chahil; 

and 

 Count VI: That FTR is liable to Chahil for common law defamation/libel. 

 For the following reasons, FTR’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN 

PART. For purposes of this ruling, the Court will assume the reader is familiar with the factual 

assertions and arguments that the parties have made, and will not recite those again here.2

 

ANALYSIS 

A. Standard of Review 

 Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Moore v. Hartman, 571 F.3d 62, 66 

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

247 (1986)). The “function of the court on a summary judgment motion is limited to 

ascertaining whether any factual issue pertinent to the controversy exists; it does not extend to 

resolution of any such issue.” Weiss v. Kay Jewelry Stores, Inc., 470 F.2d 1259, 1261-62 (D.C. 

Cir. 1972) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). A genuine issue of material fact 

exists if the evidence “is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A party, however, must provide more than “a scintilla of 

evidence” in support of its position; the quantum of evidence must be such that a jury could 

                                                            

2

 Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(h), in “determining a motion for summary judgment, the 

Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are 

admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition 

to the motion.” Accordingly, unless otherwise noted, the Court states only uncontroverted facts. 
SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION 

3 

reasonably find for the moving party. Id. at 252. In considering a motion for summary 

judgment, the “evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to 

be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. 

B. Count One: Discrimination and Failure to Accommodate Under the FHA And 

DCHRA Based On Disability (Blindness) With Regard To Mandatory Meal 

Program. 

 Chahil alleges that FTR unlawfully discriminated against him and failed to accommodate 

his blindness with regard to the mandatory evening meal program. (Compl. at ¶¶ 22-25). Chahil 

contends that FTR: 1) refused to read him the menu; 2) refused to provide appropriate utensils; 

3) failed to inform him how to file a complaint about the food; 4) failed to accommodate his 

request to be exempted from the food program; and 5) failed to accommodate his dietary needs. 

(Id.). Because there is a genuine dispute of material fact, summary judgment is denied as to 

Count I. 

1. FHA and DCHRA 

 Under the FHA, it is unlawful “[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, 

conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities 

in connection with such dwelling, because of [the person’s] handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2); 

Geter v. Horning Bros. Mgmt, 537 F. Supp. 2d 206, 209 (D.D.C. 2008). “Discrimination 

includes ‘a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, 

when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and 

enjoy a dwelling.’” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B)). To succeed on a failure to 

accommodate claim under the FHA, a plaintiff must show: 

1) He suffers from a handicap as defined by the [FHA]; 2) 

defendants knew or reasonably should have known of the 

plaintiff’s handicap; 3) accommodation of the handicap ‘may be 

necessary’ to afford plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy 
SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION 

4 

the dwelling; and 4) defendants refused to make such 

accommodation. 

Id. (citing Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2003)). According to the 

District of Columbia Court of Appeals, a landlord may only be held liable for a failure to 

accommodate if the landlord knew or should have known the tenant suffered from a handicap, as 

recognized by the FHA. Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 849 A.2d 951, 992 (D.C. 2004) (opinion 

superseded on other grounds by Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 884 A.2d 1109 (D.C. 2005)). Once 

a landlord is made aware of a needed accommodation, both parties must participate in an 

interactive process of good faith communications to identify the limitation resulting from the 

disability and a reasonable accommodation. Bartee v. Michelin North America, Inc., 374 F.3d 

906, 916 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Smith v. Midland Brake Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 

1999)). It is not, however, sufficient for the tenant to show that the landlord failed to engage in 

an interactive process or that it caused the interactive process to break down. See Pantazes v. 

Jackson, 366 F. Supp. 2d 57, 70 (D.D.C. 2005) (internal citations omitted). The tenant must 

show that the result of the inadequate process was the failure of the landlord to fulfill its role in 

determining a reasonable accommodation. Id. Once the process has begun, both the employer 

and employee have a duty to act in good faith, “and the absence of good faith, including 

unreasonable delays caused by an employer, can serve as evidence” of a violation. Id. (emphasis 

added); see also Douglas, 884 A.2d at 1122-23 & n.23 (stating that any undue delay in 

responding to a tenant’s request for a reasonable accommodation may itself constitute a failure to 

accommodate).   

 For purposes of this analysis, the relevant provisions of the FHA and the DCHRA will be 

construed under the same standards as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) with regard to 

comparable sections of these statutes. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has held: 
SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION 

5 

When courts apply the reasonable accommodation provision of the 

Fair Housing Act, it is their established practice to rely on the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12102, 

and the Rehabilitation Act (RA), 29 U.S.C. § 794, both of which 

mandate an interactive process through which employers and 

employees explore what accommodations are reasonable. See 29 

C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (1995); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 Appendix (1996); 29 

U.S.C. § 794(d); Giebeler [v. M& B Assocs.], 343 F.3d [1143] at 

1156-57 [9th Cir. 2003] (stating that court ordinarily applies RA case 

law in applying reasonable accommodation provisions of Fair Housing 

Act and also generally applies RA and ADA case law 

“interchangeably”; Good Shepherd Manor Found., Inc. v. City of 

Momence, 323 F.3d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 2003). 

Douglas, 884 A.2d at 1122, n.22. 

Moreover, discrimination claims under the FHA and DCHRA are assessed pursuant to 

the familiar three-step framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. See 411 U.S. 

792 (1973); Gaujacq v. EDF, Inc., 601 F.3d 565, 576 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Neithamer v. Brenneman 

Property Services, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1999). As this Circuit has held, 

In Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 

2008), we made it clear that when ‘an employer has asserted a 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason’ for an alleged adverse 

action, the District Court need only ‘resolve one central question’ 

when considering a motion for summary judgment: ‘Has the 

employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to 

find that the employer’s asserted nondiscriminatory reason was not 

the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated 

against the employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or 

national origin?’ 

Gaujacq, 601 F.3d at 576 (quoting Brady, 520 F.3d at 494). 

2. Summary Judgment is Not Proper on Count I 

Chahil lodges numerous complaints in support of his claim that FTR failed to 

accommodate his blindness as to the mandatory meal program. The Court will not address and 

resolve each and every allegation here. It is enough, however, that there are genuine disputes of 

material fact as to whether an exemption from the meal program was necessary to afford Chahil 
SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION 

6 

equal opportunity to use and enjoy his residence and whether FTR engaged in an interactive 

process to determine a reasonable accommodation. Moreover, as set forth in the discussion 

regarding Count II, there is a genuine dispute regarding whether FTR discriminated against 

Chahil by its failure to follow its own process for resolving requests for exemptions from the 

mandatory meal program. Accordingly, FTR’s Motion is denied as to Count I. 

Chahil claims that, after a series of stressful events in the FTR dining room, he decided to 

stop participating in the mandatory meal program in March of 2007. (Dkt. No. 17-2 at ¶ 38-41). 

On April 8, 2007, Chahil wrote to FTR’s Administrator Dawn Quattlebaum explaining his 

reasons: “[d]innertime was often a nightmare made worse by my blindness. For independent 

living, self-service eliminates the need for menu, table service, room service, etc. Removing a 

constant and unnecessary source of stress, thank you.” (Dkt. No. 17-2 at ¶ 44). On July 6, 2007, 

Chahil submitted a letter from his physician Dr. Dennis Murphy. (Id. at ¶ 45). Dr. Murphy 

requested that FTR exempt Chahil from the meal program, “and that he be allowed to choose to 

eat either communally or on his own. His blindness makes it much more difficult for him to 

keep the dining schedules, etc.” (Id. at ¶ 45). 

It appears that the only steps FTR took regarding Chahil’s request was to have Joseph 

Brady, the General Manager of FTR’s food service provider Sodexho, reach out to Chahil to 

offer in-room tray service to reduce the anxiety Chahil had experienced in the cafeteria. (Id. at 

¶¶ 50-54). Chahil refused the tray service (id. at ¶ 55), stating later that it would neither resolve 

his concern that the Food Service could not meet his dietary needs nor save him the stress of 

dealing with the staff from the food service. (Id. at ¶ 55). 

k.FTR argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Count I because Chahil cannot 

show that he was required an exemption from the program based specifically on his blindness. 
SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION 

7 

Against its own procedure, however, FTR failed to contact Dr. Murphy to discuss whether inroom tray service would be an acceptable alternative to an exemption. Moreover, Chahil 

testified that in-room service would not be a reasonable accommodation for his blindness 

because the stress of dealing with FTR staff, including the invasion of privacy, would not be 

alleviated by in-room service. (Dkt. No. 18-7 at 190:11-16; 93:12-94:4; 98:8-20; Dkt. No. 18-8 

at 190:11-16). Specifically, Chahil required a staff member to read the dinner menu to him, and 

Chahil testified that he had had issues with FTR staff in the past. (Dkt. No. 18-7 at 92:21-93:1; 

Dkt. No. 18-8 at 160:22-161:4; 164:1-166:16). Relying on Dr. Murphy’s testimony, FTR argues 

that the exemption was not a necessary accommodation for Chahil’s blindness: 

Q. Are you aware of any reason Dr. Chahil’s blindness would 

prohibit him from participating in the evening meal program if he 

chose to, if he wanted to? 

A. I don’t know what – I don’t know what exactly what it entails 

in terms of as long as he was able to know what the menu entailed 

every day and had a pretty good understanding of everything and 

the options and help if he needed it then I think he would be on 

board with that and would be able to participate. 

(Dkt. No. 17-2 at ¶ 46). Dr. Murphy’s testimony, however, is not nearly as conclusive as FTR 

characterizes it. Dr. Murphy did not testify that the accommodation that FTR offered—in-room 

tray service—would be reasonable for Chahil. Moreover, Dr. Murphy stated that (at least with 

regard to Chahil’s blindness), the meal program might be appropriate only if the staff informed 

Chahil “what the menu entailed every day and [Chahil] had a pretty good understanding of 

everything” and Chahil got “help if he needed it.” (Id.). As stated above, there is a dispute as to 

whether FTR’s staff could provide Chahil the help he needed, especially with regard to reading 

the menu. 
SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION 

8 

It is true that a tenant is not entitled to each and every accommodation that he prefers, and 

the evidence for Chahil on Count I is somewhat weak. Although it is a close call whether Chahil 

required an exemption from the in-room tray service as a reasonable accommodation for his 

blindness, however, this is not a question the Court can resolve on summary judgment. 

Accordingly, FTR’s Motion is denied as to Count I. 

C. Count II: Race, National Origin and Religious Discrimination Under FHA and 

DCHRA With Regard To Mandatory Meal Program.

Chahil next claims that FTR discriminated against and failed to accommodate him with 

regard to the meal program based on his race, national origin and religion. (Compl. at ¶¶ 30-38). 

Chahil claims that, because he is an Indian man of the Sikh faith, he was denied an exemption 

from the Mandatory Meal Program and that FTR failed to accommodate Chahil’s dietary needs. 

(Id. at ¶¶ 31-34). FTR contends that it undertook an interactive process to determine whether it 

could accommodate Chahil’s dietary needs and that denied his exemption request because it 

could accommodate his needs. FTR has failed to show that it is entitled to summary judgment 

on this count. 

Since Chahil moved into FTR in 2006, he has been one of only three blind residents and 

the only resident of Indian descent or of the Sikh faith. (Dkt. No. 17-2 at ¶¶ 19, 20). Because he 

is Sikh, Chahil maintains a beard and wears a turban. (Dkt. No. 18-8 at 276:7-10). HUD 

regulations require that FTR residents participate in an evening meal plan, but that a resident 

may be exempted “if the resident’s dietary needs cannot be accommodated by Food Services . . . 

.” (Dkt. No. 17-2 at ¶¶ 3, 13). Quattlebaum testified that FTR required any resident requesting 

an exemption from the meal plan for medical or dietary needs to provide a physician’s letter. 

(Id. at ¶ 14). After receiving such a letter, Quattlebaum would normally have the staff nurse and 
SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION 

9 

Sodexho review the physician’s letter to determine whether or not the diet could be 

accommodated. (Dkt. No. 18-5 at 28:9-14). Joseph Brady also testified regarding this process: 

Dawn would make the decision, she would get my opinion on if I 

could supply the foods that the person needed, and she would also 

consult the nurse practitioner on the medical end of the situation. 

Then she would make the decision on whether they got excused 

from the meal plan or not. 

 

(Dkt. No. 18-16 at 30:16-21). 

It is undisputed that Chahil participated in the meal plan for the first ten months that he 

lived at FTR. (Dkt. Nos. 17-2 and 21 at ¶ 24). As part of his request for an exemption from the 

meal plan, Chahil submitted the letter from Dr. Murphy on or around July 6, 2007. (Dkt. No. 17-

2 at ¶ 45). That letter stated, among other things, that Chahil required a “fairly rigid low-fat diet, 

consisting largely of fruits and vegetables. Unfortunately, in his eating arrangement at [FTR] it 

has been almost impossible for him to adhere to this diet, which is a concern for me.” (Id.) 

(emphasis added). 

Quattlebaum did not acknowledge receipt of Chahil’s physician’s letter until 

approximately a month later on August 6, 2007. (Dkt. No. 17-2 at ¶ 48). In that letter, 

Quattlebaum told Chahil that the process for resolving his request could take “more than one 

week.” (Id. at ¶ 49). Quattlebaum also wrote: 

I wanted to inform you of our process for these types of requests. 

Our Nurse Practitioner, Gail Bashore, will receive a copy of this 

request this Thursday, August 9, 2007. She will contact you to 

discuss this matter, contact your physician, and discuss this request 

with our Food Service Director, Joe Brady. Ms. Bashore will then 

make a determination as to whether or not your medical conditions 

can be accommodated by our foodservice program and submit that 

information to me. 

(Dkt. No. 18-12). 
SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION 

10 

Quattlebaum did not notify Brady about Chahil’s request until the end of September. 

(Dkt. No. 17-2 at ¶ 50). Brady informed Quattlebaum that he had spoken to Chahil, that Chahil 

required a vegetarian diet, and that Food Services could accommodate Chahil’s dietary needs. 

(Id. at ¶¶ 56-57). Based solely on Brady’s opinion, Quattlebaum denied Chahil’s request for an 

exemption. (Id. at ¶ 58; Dkt. No. 17-3 at 42:2-5; Dkt. No. 18-5 at 36:14-37:11). 

Despite testifying that her procedure was to have the nurse and Food Services review any 

physician’s letter, Quattlebaum testified that she never discussed Chahil’s request with 

Sodexho’s nutritionist and could not recall whether she ever discussed the request with FTR’s 

Nurse Practitioner, Gail Bashore. (Dkt. No. 18-5 at 35:18-37:11). Moreover, Quattlebaum did 

not know what steps, if any, Bashore took with respect to Chahil’s request. (Id.). Brady himself 

testified that he neither consulted with the FTR nurse nor with the nutritionist regarding Chahil’s 

request. (Id. at 18-16 at 30:7-10; 75:6-10). Despite Dr. Murphy’s letter that Chahil required a 

“fairly rigid low-fat diet,” Brady also failed to look into the calorie or fat content of the meals 

that were being served before giving Quattlebaum his recommendation. (Dkt. No. 18-16 at 

45:13-46:6). 

It was not until approximately a year later on August 28, 2008, that Quattlebaum notified 

Chahil that “she had denied his exemption request after Brady told her Chahil’s diet of fruits and 

vegetables could be accommodated by Food Services.” (Dkt. No. 17-2 at ¶¶ 60-61). Although 

Quattlebaum was FTR’s Administrator and was responsible for deciding whether or not to grant 

resident requests for exemptions, she did not contact Chahil prior to August 2008 because she 

believed that Brady had already communicated to Chahil that Chahil would not be receiving an 

exemption. (Dkt. No. 17-2 at ¶¶ 11-12; 59). 
SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION 

11 

In July 2009, FTR changed management, at which time Jennifer Easter (“Easter”) 

acquired many of Quattlebaum’s responsibilities. (Dkt. No. 17-1 at 12). In November 2009, 

Easter was made aware of Chahil’s request for an exemption by way of his Charge of 

Discrimination from the D.C. Office of Human Rights. (Id.). Easter approved Chahil’s 

exemption request on January 27, 2010 pursuant to a HUD regulation that permits a 

discretionary exemption from the Mandatory Meal Program for good cause. (Id.). 

Given this record, the Court cannot grant summary judgment in FTR’s favor on Count II. 

It appears undisputed that Quattlebaum failed to follow FTR’s own process for determining 

whether Chahil should be exempt for medical reasons. Neither she nor Brady (or anyone else at 

FTR it seems) consulted with Dr. Murphy or another medical professional to determine what 

specific diet Chahil required. Although Brady supposedly spoke to Chahil and determined that 

Food Services could accommodate his diet merely because Food Services served fruits and 

vegetables, Dr. Murphy had already rejected FTR’s menu as inappropriate for Chahil’s diet. See 

Dkt. No. 17-2 at ¶ 45 (“Unfortunately, in [Chahil’s] eating arrangement at [FTR] it has been 

almost impossible for him to adhere to this diet, which is a concern for me.”). There is a genuine 

dispute of material fact as to whether FTR could accommodate Chahil’s diet at the time that 

Quattlebaum denied Chahil an exemption. 

Although there is no direct evidence of discrimination and the circumstantial evidence is 

somewhat weak, given FTR’s near 14-month delay alone in acting upon Chahil’s request and 

Quattlebaum’s apparent disregard for her own process when it came to Chahil’s request, the 

Court cannot say that FTR is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Chahil’s claim of 

discrimination. Finally, FTR’s claim that Quattlebaum also denied exemption requests made by 

other similarly-situated tenants outside Chahil’s protected class is not enough to warrant 
SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION 

12 

summary judgment in FTR’s favor. Quattlebaum’s testimony as to other tenants for whom she 

either granted or denied exemptions is neutral at best, given that Quattlebaum could not recall 

details of most or all of the circumstances surrounding such requests. (Dkt. No. 17-3 at 50:2-

61:17). Accordingly, FTR’s motion as to Count II is denied. 

D. Count III: Disability Discrimination under FHA and DCHRA Act with Regard 

to Informational Notices. 

 Chahil alleges that FTR discriminated against him with regard to informational notices 

posted throughout the apartment building. (Dkt. No. 18-2 at 18-19). Chahil claims that, because 

he is blind, he was unable to see the notices and FTR failed to provide “effective notifications of 

meetings, notices and the like.” (Compl. at ¶ 41). Based on the facts set forth in Paragraphs 71-

79 of FTR’s Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Summary Judgment, Chahil has failed 

to make a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to the informational notices. (Dkt. No. 

17-2 at ¶¶ 71-79; Dkt. No. 21 at ¶¶ 71-79). FTR has shown that Chahil never requested a 

different accommodation than the procedure FTR had in place. Therefore, FTR did not refuse to 

make a requested accommodation. Even assuming FTR had refused Chahil’s requested 

accommodation, FTR has shown that it provided a reasonable alternative to accommodate 

Chahil’s needs. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted on Count III. 

E. Count IV: Breach of Contract With Regard to Rental Rates. 

 Although the basis for and legal theory as to Count IV is unclear, it appears that Chahil is 

alleging that FTR breached its lease with him by failing to reduce his rental rates in “accordance 

with HUD regulations.” (Dkt. No. 18-2 at 20). In his Complaint, Chahil alleges that FTR 

“modified plaintiff’s rental in March 2009 in accordance with HUD regulations. However, the 

defendant breached the express provisions of the lease and is in breach of contract because (on 

information and belief) the rent should have been modified earlier in the least [sic] term.” 
SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION 

13 

(Compl. at ¶ 47). In his Opposition to FTR’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Chahil argues 

that, although FTR offered him a lease with a reduced rental rate, Chahil “refused to execute the 

new rental contract with the reduced rental rate because FTR continued to wrongfully charge him 

the $260 fee for the evening meal program.” (Dkt. No. 18-2 at 19). 

 Chahil offers no support for his claim that he can recover on a breach of contract action 

for the reduced rental rates when he refused to sign a lease with those rates. See Tsintolas Realty 

Co. v. Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 187 (D.C. 2009) (stating that, to prevail on a breach of contract 

claim under District of Columbia law, a plaintiff must prove the defendant breached a duty 

arising out of a valid contract between the parties). Nor does Chahil cite to any legal authority or 

specific HUD regulation for the proposition that he was entitled to such a lease modification. 

Accordingly, given that there is no genuine dispute and FTR is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law, FTR’s motion is granted as to Count IV. 

F. Count V: Breach of Lease With Regard To Anti-Discrimination Clause. 

 Chahil asserts that FTR breached its original lease between the parties, specifically clause 

seventeen: “The Landlord agrees not to discriminate based on race, color, religion, creed, 

national origin, sex, age, handicap, membership in a class, or recipients of public assistance,” 

when FTR failed to provide Chahil with a suitable apartment with all the amenities afforded to 

other residents. (Compl. at ¶52; Dkt. 18-6 at ¶ 17). 

 The Complaint is unclear what specific facts Chahil relies on to assert a breach of the 

anti-discrimination clause of the lease. FTR argues that, because Chahil could not show 

discrimination as to Counts I, II, and III, Chahil cannot show that FTR breached its duty arising 

out of paragraph 17 of the lease. Because there is a genuine dispute as to whether FTR 
SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION 

14 

discriminated against Chahil with respect to Counts I and II, however, FTR is not entitled to 

summary judgment on Count V and its Motion is denied as to this count. 

G. Count VI: Common law Defamation/Libel. 

FTR’s Motion will, however, be granted respect to Chahil’s common law 

defamation/libel claim in Count VI. To prevail on a defamation claim under District of 

Columbia law, a plaintiff must show: 

1) that the defendant made a false and defamatory statement 

concerning the plaintiff; 2) that the defendant published the 

statement without privilege to a third party; 3) that the 

defendant’s fault in publishing the statement amounted to at 

least negligence; and 4) either that the statement was actionable 

as a matter of law irrespective of special harm or that its 

publication caused the plaintiff special harm. 

Mastro v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 447 F.3d 843, 858 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In a defamation claim, 

“the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the challenged statements are both false and 

defamatory.” Kendrick v. Fox Television, 659 A.2d 814, 819 (D.C. 1995). Further, “[a] 

defamatory statement is one that ‘tends to injure the plaintiff in his trade, profession or 

community standing, or lower him in the estimation of the community.’” Id. (quoting Moss v. 

Stockard, 580 A.2d 1011, 1023 (D.C. 1993)). The tort of defamation requires publication to a 

third party; no actionable claim would arise from a statement published only to the plaintiff, the 

object of the allegedly defamatory statement. Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63, 73 (D.C. 2005). 

In a defamation case, “the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the challenged statements are 

both false and defamatory.” Kendrick, 659 A.2d at 819. 

Chahil claims that Quattlebaum made a false and defamatory statement in her August 28, 

2008 letter when she wrote that the process of resolving Chahil’s complaints “was delayed a bit 

because Mr. Brady had difficulty getting in contact with [Chahil].” (Compl. at ¶ 56). Chahil 
SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION 

15 

claims that this particular statement was “clearly false” and that he was “compromised” 

“personally, professionally and as a resident.” (Id. at ¶ 60). 

Chahil does not dispute, however, that Brady tried to call him “three or four times” on 

three different days to talk to him about his dietary needs. (Dkt. Nos. 17-2 and 21 at ¶ 52). Nor 

does Chahil dispute that it “took Brady somewhere from a week to a ‘month or two’ to reach 

Chahil by phone.” (Dkt. Nos. 17-2 and 21 at ¶ 53). It is further undisputed that the letter from 

Quattlebaum to Chahil was: 1) placed in Chahil’s tenant file in a locked cabinet; 2) that Chahil 

does not know who received the letter; and 3) that Quattlebaum is not aware that anyone besides 

Chahil and herself has seen the letter. (Dkt. Nos. 17-2 and 21 at ¶¶ 62-64). Finally, there is no 

genuine dispute that Chahil lacks evidence of any damage flowing from the alleged defamatory 

statement. (Compare Dkt. No. 17-2 at ¶ 65 with Dkt. No. 21 at ¶ 65). Because there is no 

genuine dispute as to the veracity of the alleged defamatory statement, no evidence that the 

statement was published to a third party, and no evidence that Chahil suffered actionable 

damages, summary judgment is granted to FTR on Count VI. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, FTR’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN 

PART. An Order accompanies this Memorandum. 

Date: September 7, 2012 

 ROBERT L. WILKINS 

 United States District Judge