ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS GREG ABBOTT

The Honorable R. Kelton Conner Hood County Attorney 1200 West Pearl Street Granbnry, Texas 76048
Dear Mr. Conner: September 22, 20I0

Opinion No. GA-0799
Re: Compensation ofjudges serving on a juvenile board (RQ-0861-GA)

You ask, on behalfofthe Hood County Commissioners Court ("Commissioners Court"), '" [w ]ho has the authority and responsibility to establish, increase, decrease oreliminate the amount ofcompensation to be paid to thejudges serving on the Juvenile Board ofHood County[.]''''
A brief attached to your request explains that the Hood County Juvenile Board ("Board") "was created under [c]hapter 152, Human Resources Code [s]ubchapters A and 

### B.,,2 Subchapters A and B both contain provisions related to the compensation ofthe Board. Subchapter A provides that "[ t]he compensation authorized under this chapter for ajudge serving on ajuvenile board is in addition to all other compensation provided or allowed by lawfor ajudge." TEx. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 152.0003 (West Supp. 2010). Subchapter B provides that "[s]ervice on ajuvenile board by a judge is an additional duty of office" and that "[t]he 

### commissioners court may reasonably compensate each member of the juvenile boardfor the member's additional duties." 

### Id. § 152.0034 (a)-(b) (West 2001) (emphasis added).
In construing section 152.0034, we "ascertain and give effect to the Legislature'S intent as expressed by the statute's language" and "we give meaning to the language consistent with other provisions inthe statnte." 

### Presidio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 

### Scott, 309 S.W.3d 927, 930 (Tex. 2010). We consider first the meaning ofthe term "may" as used in section 152.0034(b). As previous attorney

lRequest Letter (available athttp://www.texasattomeygeneral.gov).
'Briefat I (available athttp://www.texasattomeygeneral.gov). In addition, youclarifYthat "HoodCountydoes not have a Family District Coutt and no provisions for Hood County are set forth in" subchapter D ofchapter 152. RequestLetter; see also TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 152.0051-.0055 (West2001) ("Subchapter C: County Juvenile Board in Counties with a Family District Court"). It is, therefore, our understanding that neither subchapter C nor D of chapter 152 are applicable to the Board. We also note that certain sections ofsubchapter A do not apply to the Board. SeeTEX. HUM. RES. CODEANN. § 152.0040 (West2001) (providingthat"[s]ections 152.0002, 152.0004, 152.0005, and 152.0009 do not apply to ajuvenile board operating under" subchapter B).

### The Honorable R. Kelton Conner

- Page 2 (GA-0799)

general opinions explain, in construing a statute, "the use ofthe word 'may' as opposed to 'shall' generally indicates discretion or choice between two or more alternatives, but the context in which the word appears must be the controlling factor." Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JC-0517 (2002) at 4 (quoting Tex. Att'y Gen. LO-93-60, at 1-2); see also 

### Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0622 (2008) at 3 ("The word 'may' denotes discretion not to do something.") (citing Texas Government Code section 311.016(1)). Nothing in the language of section 152.0034 indicates that the Legislature intendedto use the tenn "may" in anythingbutits usual sense. Moreover, the term "may"in section 152.0034(b)is qualifiedbythe term "reasonably." TEx. HUM. REs. CODEANN. 

### § 152.0034(b) (West 2001). It 

### would have been unnecessary to qualifY the authority by inserting the word "reasonably" ifthe Legislature had not intended to grant a commissioners court discretionary authority over the amount ofcompensation ofaboard. Cf OldAm. Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 

### 149 S.W.3d 111, 115 (Tex. 2004) (presuming that every word ofa statute is included or excluded for a reason). Considering section 152.0034 in the context of subchapter B also indicates the commissioners court has the discretion, butnot the duty, to compensate ajuvenile board. The very next section ofsubchapter 

### Buses the term "shall" in referring to the commissioners court's duty to reimbursejuvenile board members for their actual and necessary expenses. See 

### TEX. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. 

### § 152.0035 (West 2001) ("The county shall

### reimburse ajuvenileboard member for the member's actual and necessary expenses incurred in performing official duties on the board.") (emphasis added); see also 

### TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. 

### § 311.016(2) (West 2005) (explaining that the term "shall"imposes adutyunlessthe statuteexpresslyprovides otherwiseorthe contextnecessarily requires a different construction). Had the Legislature intended to impose a duty on the commissioners court to compensate a juvenile board under section 152.0034(b), it would have similarly usedthe word shall. 3 Cf Old Am. Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 

### 149 S.W.3d at 115 (presuming that every word ofa statute is included or excluded for a reason). Finally, we note that prior attorney general opinions have construed other provisions of chapter 152 to authorize a commissioners court to set the amount ofcompensation ofajuvenile board: See 

### Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. GA-0715 (2009) at 2 (construing Human Resources Code section 152.0971), DM-103 (1992) at 2 (construing Human Resources Code section 152.0411(c)). Thus, our conclusion here is consistent with other provisions in chapter 152 in regard to the relationshipbetween acommissioners courtand ajuvenileboard astothecompensationof theboard members.

'In addition, as evidenced by certain statutes pertaining to specificjuvenile boards, the Legislature does not believe it imperative to compensate those serving on a juvenile board. See, e.g., TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 152.0791(e) (West 2001) (providing that public members of the Falls County Juvenile Board serve without compensation); 152.0901(c) ("Thejuvenile board members [of Galveston County] do not receive compensation for serving on thejuvenile board" but shall be paid $75 permonth for performing certain duties).
'The exact scope ofthat authority may, ofcourse, differ depending upon the statute at issue. For example, the Legislature sometimes establishes a statutory minimmn and maximmn amount ofcompensation for ajuvenile board within which a commissioners court must act. See Tex. All'y Gen. Op. No. 

### DM-103 (1992) (construing Hmnan Resources Code section 152.0411(c)).The Honorable R. Kelton Conner

- Page 3 (GA-0799)

Having examined section 152.0034(b)'s express terms in the context of subchapter B, we conclude that section 152.0034(b) grants a commissioners court discretionary authority over the compensation of a juvenile board member. See Tex. Att'y Gen. LO-94-055, at 3 ("The commissioners court also has a role in determining the districtjudge's compensation. It may ... compensatethe district judge for serving on thejuvenileboard [under section 152.0034]."). Itis our opinionthattheCommissioners Courthas authorityunder section 152.0034(b)to establish, increase, decrease, or eliminate the amount ofcompensation to be paid to thejudges serving on the Board. 5

'Onebriefreceivedby our office suggeststhatthis conclusion conflicts with state law andpriorattorney general opinions that address the general fInancial independence of a juvenile board. See Brieffrom Honorable Vincent J. Messina, Hood County Court at Law Judge, to Nancy Fuller, at 2-3 (Mar. 26, 2010) (citing, for example, Local Government Code section 140.003, whichprovides that ajuvenileboard is a specialized local entity andthatthe county disburses andcares for its funds as the entity directs). We disagree. Ajuvenileboardhas general fInancial independence only to the extentthat a statutory provision does not explicitly provide otherwise. Here we have a statute that expressly provides that the commiSsioners court has discretionary authority to compensate the members ofthejuvenile board. Moreover, none ofthe opinions cited in the briefconstrue section I52.0034(b) ofthe Human Resources Code. See generally, e.g., Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. JC-0209 (2000) (regarding ajuvenile board's authority to contract with an attorney torepresent it in litigation); JC-0085 (1999) (regarding the authority ofcommissioners court to set salaries for employees ofajuvenile probation department); DM-460 (1997) (regarding ajuvenile board's authority to enter into contracts or authorize expenditures for thejuvenile probation department).The Honorable R. Kelton Conner

- Page 4 (GA-0799)



### SUMMARY
Pursuant to section lS2.0034(b) of the Human Resources Code, the Hood County Commissioners Court has the authority to establish, increase, decrease, or eliminate the compensation paid to thejudges serving on the Hood CountyJuvenile Board.

DANIEL T. HODGE First Assistant Attorney General
DAVID J. SCHENCK Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel
NANCY S. FULLER Chair, Opinion Committee Christy Drake-Adams Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee