RENDERED: AUGUST 30, 2024; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2023-CA-0755-ME

C.M.I. APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM LIVINGSTON CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE JAMES R. REDD, III, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 21-AD-00002

R.D.H., JR.; N.N.H.;

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, 

CABINET FOR HEALTH AND 

FAMILY SERVICES; D.I.; AND P.S.I., 

A MINOR CHILD APPELLEES 

AND

NO. 2023-CA-0756-ME

C.M.I. APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM LIVINGSTON CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE JAMES R. REDD, III, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 21-AD-00003

R.D.H., JR.; N.N.H.;

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, 

CABINET FOR HEALTH AND 
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FAMILY SERVICES; D.I.; AND 

C.L.I., A MINOR CHILD APPELLEES 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: ACREE, CETRULO, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: C.M.I. (Mother) brings this consolidated appeal from orders

of the Livingston Circuit Court entered on March 15, 2023, terminating her 

parental rights as to P.S.I. and C.L.I. and granting the adoption petitions filed by 

appellees, R.D.H., Jr., and N.N.H. We affirm. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

P.S.I., a minor child, was born on August 12, 2016. C.L.I., a minor 

child, was born on August 14, 2018. Mother and D.I. (Father) struggled with 

substance abuse which led to the Cabinet for Health and Family Services (Cabinet) 

filing a Dependency, Neglect, or Abuse (DNA) petition on June 8, 2018. Therein, 

the Cabinet alleged that P.S.I. was observed with an untreated facial wound; that

the parents were suspected of illegal drug use; and that the living environment for 

P.S.I. was unsafe. A similar DNA petition pertaining to C.L.I. was filed in August 

of 2018. R.D.H., Jr. and N.N.H.

1 were granted permanent custody of both children 

1 Petitioners are the children’s biological maternal grandfather and his wife. 
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on August 22, 2019, after having been P.S.I.’s primary caretaker since June of 

2018, and C.L.I.’s caretaker since birth.

2

 On October 1, 2021, R.D.H., Jr. and 

N.N.H. (collectively, Petitioners) filed a “Petition for Adoption by Relatives 

Without the Consent of the Child’s Biological Living Parents” pursuant to 

Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 199.470 et seq. in the Livingston Circuit Court.3 

Separate actions were filed for each child. Subsequently, on March 30, 2022, the 

circuit court held a hearing regarding the termination of both Mother and Father’s 

parental rights in both cases; neither parent attended. The circuit court entered an 

Order on May 4, 2022, terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father. 

On June 15, 2022, Mother filed a Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate, 

arguing she did not receive notice of the final hearing. Mother had filed a notice 

with the court on January 24, 2022, stating that she was in a recovery facility in 

Mayfield, Kentucky, and none of the pleadings or notices regarding the matter 

were sent to her at that facility. The court granted Mother’s Motion to Alter, 

Amend, or Vacate on June 29, 2022. Mother was appointed counsel on August 23, 

2022, and a bench trial was set for October 26, 2022. At the October 26, 2022, 

2 C.L.I.’s dependency, neglect, and abuse (DNA) case was filed on August 14, 2018, his date of 

birth. Both DNA cases originated in Livingston County and were transferred to McCracken 

County in December of 2018 because R.D.H., Jr., and N.N.H. moved to McCracken County. 

See Action Nos. 18-J-00452-001 and 18-J-00453-001. 

3 Livingston County does not have a family court judge. All proceedings were conducted in the 

circuit court.
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bench trial, Mother asked for a continuance and requested that petitioner’s counsel 

be removed due to a possible conflict. The continuance was granted and the circuit

court set a pretrial conference for December 21, 2022. At the December 21, 2022, 

pretrial conference, petitioner’s attorney reported there was no conflict found by 

the Kentucky Bar Association ethics hotline, and the circuit court set the matter for 

a bench trial on February 22, 2023. 

The bench trial was conducted on February 22, 2023. The circuit

court heard testimony from Mother, Father, both Petitioners, and a social worker 

previously involved in the case. Mother testified about the actions she had taken to 

better her life in the preceding fourteen months, such as maintaining sobriety, 

stable housing, and a job.4 Petitioners testified about their lives with both children, 

and how they are the only parents both children have truly known due to the tender 

age of both children when they were removed from Mother’s care and placed with 

Petitioners. Petitioners further testified that Mother had not seen the children since 

2021, although she had attempted to send letters and Christmas gifts to them. 

Petitioners testified that they had denied Mother’s efforts to contact the children,

which Mother commenced in 2021, after the adoption petitions were filed. 

4 Mother testified that she completed a recovery program in Mayfield, Kentucky, in February of 

2022 and proceeded to another program in Lexington, Kentucky. Upon graduating from that

program in October of 2022, she moved into a trailer in Versailles, Kentucky, where she 

presently resides.
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Petitioners testified they did not believe it was in the best interest of the children to 

have contact with C.M.I. 

On March 15, 2023, the circuit court entered its Findings of Fact, 

Conclusions of Law and Order Terminating Parental Rights in both cases based on 

the evidence heard at the February 22, 2023, hearing.5 Mother then filed a Motion 

to Alter, Amend, or Vacate on March 27, 2023. The motion was denied by the 

circuit court by Orders entered on May 19, 2023. An appeal was filed by C.M.I. in 

both cases, which were consolidated for review by Order entered by this Court on 

August 17, 2023.6 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

To begin, an adoption without the consent of a living parent under 

KRS 199.502 is still effectively a proceeding to terminate parental rights. C.J. v. 

M.S., 572 S.W.3d 492, 496 (Ky. App. 2019); see also M.S.S. v. J.E.B., 638 S.W.3d 

354, 359 (Ky. 2022). Thus, in adoption without parental consent cases, our 

standard of review is the same as in termination cases as follows: 

The standard of review in a termination of parental rights 

action is confined to the clearly erroneous standard in CR

52.01 based upon clear and convincing evidence. The 

findings of the trial court will not be disturbed unless 

there exists no substantial evidence in the record to 

5 The Order Terminating Parental Rights in each case also granted the adoptions sought by 

Petitioners. 

6 Father did not file an appeal.
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support its findings. Clear and convincing proof does not 

necessarily mean uncontradicted proof. It is sufficient if 

there is proof of a probative and substantial nature 

carrying the weight of evidence sufficient to convince 

ordinarily prudent-minded people. M.P.S. v. Cabinet for

Human Resources, 979 S.W.2d 114, 116-17 (Ky. App.

1998). Additionally, since adoption is a statutory right 

which severs forever the parental relationship, Kentucky 

courts have required strict compliance with the 

procedures provided in order to protect the rights of the 

natural parents. See Day v. Day, 937 S.W.2d 717 (Ky.

1997). 

B.L. v. J.S., 434 S.W.3d 61, 65 (Ky. App. 2014).

This standard of review reflects the law’s protection of the parentalchild relationship. While termination proceedings are not criminal matters, they 

encroach “on the parent’s constitutional right to parent his or her child, and 

therefore, is a procedure that should only be employed when the statutory 

mandates are clearly met.” M.E.C. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Cabinet for 

Health and Fam. Servs., 254 S.W.3d 846, 850 (Ky. App. 2008). In this regard, we 

note that parental rights are a “fundamental liberty interest protected by the 

Fourteenth Amendment” of the United States Constitution. Santosky v. Kramer, 

455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); see also M.S.S., 638 S.W.3d at 359. When the 

government acts to terminate a parent’s rights, it is not merely infringing on those 

rights; it is ending them. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of Durham County, 

N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981). The protection of these rights is not reduced or 

altered where termination of parental rights occurs in an adoption proceeding. 
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Regardless of how achieved, termination of parental rights is a serious action 

which the courts must conduct with the “utmost caution.” M.E.C., 254 S.W.3d at 

850. Therefore, in order to pass Constitutional muster, the evidence supporting 

termination must be clear and convincing. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769-70; F.V. v. 

Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health Fam. Servs., 567 S.W.3d 597, 606 (Ky. App. 

2018) (citation omitted).

Notwithstanding this standard of review, we acknowledge the legal 

conundrum created by the distinction in the statutory framework set out in KRS 

199.502 versus KRS 625.090, regarding the termination of parental rights of 

nonconsenting parents. Clearly, there is a lesser threshold for terminating parental 

rights in the adoption statute (KRS 199.502) as compared to the tripartite test set 

out in KRS 625.090 in regard to terminations sought by the Cabinet. See Cabinet

for Health and Family Services v. K.H., 423 S.W.3d 204, 209 (Ky. 2014).7 

Arguably, the protections afforded to nonconsenting parents whose parental rights 

are terminated in an adoption under KRS 199.502 are significantly less than those 

afforded to parents in termination proceedings set out in KRS 625.090.8 However, 

the Kentucky Supreme Court has clearly stated that the adoption proceeding 

7 By contrast, in an adoption proceeding that seeks to terminate parental rights under Kentucky 

Revised Statutes (KRS) 199.502, a party need only prove by clear and convincing evidence one 

of the conditions set out in KRS 199.502(1)(a)-(j) to successfully terminate parental rights.

8 For a thorough discussion of this statutory conundrum, see the dissent of Justice Lambert in 

M.S.S. v. J.E.B., 638 S.W.3d 354, 371-79 (Ky. 2022).
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supersedes the termination and KRS Chapter 199 governs over the entire 

proceeding, including the termination of parental rights. M.S.S., 638 S.W.3d at 

361. This Court is duty bound to follow Supreme Court precedent. Supreme 

Court Rule 1.030(8)(a). Our review proceeds accordingly.

ANALYSIS

Under KRS 199.502(1), “an adoption may be granted without the 

consent of the biological living parents of a child if it is pleaded and proved as part 

of the adoption proceeding that any of the [nine] following conditions exist with 

respect to the child[.]” KRS 199.502(1); R.P., Jr. v. T.A.C., 469 S.W.3d 425, 427

(Ky. App. 2015). In this case, the circuit court based its decision primarily on 

subsections (e) and (g) of the statute which read as follows:

(e) That the parent, for a period of not less than six (6) 

months, has continuously or repeatedly failed or refused 

to provide or has been substantially incapable of 

providing essential parental care and protection for the 

child, and that there is no reasonable expectation of 

improvement in parental care and protection, considering 

the age of the child;

. . . . 

(g) That the parent, for reasons other than poverty alone, 

has continuously or repeatedly failed to provide or is 

incapable of providing essential food, clothing, shelter, 

medical care, or education reasonably necessary and 

available for the child’s well-being and that there is no

reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the 

parent’s conduct in the immediately foreseeable future, 

considering the age of the child[.]
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KRS 199.502(1)(e) and (g). Mother argues that the circuit court erred in finding 

there was no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the immediately 

foreseeable future because she has made several changes to her life such as

maintaining sobriety, housing, and a job. She asserts her recent actions 

demonstrate a reasonable expectation of improvement in her conduct, contrary to 

the circuit court’s determination. In support thereof, Mother cites M.E.C., 254 

S.W.3d at 851-52. 

In M.E.C., 254 S.W.3d 846, the Court held that the circuit court’s 

termination of M.E.C.’s parental rights was not supported by substantial evidence 

where the Cabinet had not shown that the children were abused or neglected under 

KRS 600.020(1); where the Cabinet failed to offer reasonable services to M.E.C.; 

and where M.E.C. had timely made significant strides in her case plan such that the 

Cabinet had not proven there was “no reasonable expectation of improvement in 

M.E.C.’s situation.” M.E.C., 254 S.W.3d at 854. M.E.C. had made timely 

improvements to her life, and “[a]t the conclusion of the trial, M.E.C. was in a 

substance abuse treatment center, had a full-time job, acquired parenting classes 

for herself, and had resolved most of her legal issues.” Id. at 854. 

Moreover, in M.E.C., 254 S.W.3d 846, the family court’s finding that 

the children in question had been abused or neglected was not supported by 

substantial evidence. Id. There was no evidence demonstrating physical or 
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emotional injury of the children while in M.E.C.’s care; on the contrary, both 

children were in good health at the time of their removal from her custody. Id. 

Finally, testimony from social workers described M.E.C. as a “nurturing and 

loving parent[.]” Id. at 851.

Unlike what occurred in M.E.C., in this case, Mother and Father 

conceded to neglect in a DNA proceeding in 2018. Mother failed to engage in 

lifestyle improvements or seek any treatment until the adoption petition was filed

in late 2021. This case is more factually similar to A.F. v. L.B., 572 S.W.3d 64

(Ky. App. 2019). In A.F., this Court held that the parents’ history of drug use, 

failure to maintain permanent sobriety, and limited amount of time the parents 

spent with the child were grounds for termination of their parental rights. A.F., 

572 S.W.3d at 74-75. The Court in A.F. emphasized that it was only after the 

termination petition was filed that the parents started to work toward control of 

their lives and started to show interest in reuniting with their child. Id. Appellant

in A.F. argued that her efforts showed a reasonable expectation of parental 

improvement. Id. In determining “whether a parent has a reasonable expectation 

for improvement” the court may examine that party’s current and past parenting 

ability. A.F., 572 S.W.3d at 76. Under that standard, the Court held appellant’s 

actions to be “too little and too late to reclaim a relationship with Child which, for 
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Child’s tenderest years, Mother voluntarily subordinated to pursue an illicit life of 

drugs and company with those who do worse.” Id. at 75. 

In our case, both C.M.I and D.I. were abusing drugs while their 

children were living with them and at the time of the children’s removal from their 

custody. Both admitted to having an unsuitable housing condition for their 

children including the oldest child receiving a dog bite to the face in 2018 which 

became infected due to lack of medical treatment. Mother continued to abuse 

methamphetamine while pregnant with the youngest child, C.L.I. The DNA 

petition was first filed in June 2018, as concerns P.S.I., and Petitioners received 

permanent custody of both children in August 2019; it was not until after the filing 

of the adoption petition in 2021, that Mother sought to attain sobriety.9 

Furthermore, neither parent has seen their children in over two years. Unlike in

M.E.C., here, Mother’s absence in her children’s lives was a result of her poor 

choices rather than mere incarceration or hospitalization. Like in A.F., Mother’s

recent progress, although commendable, was “too little too late.” A.F., 572 

S.W.3d at 75. 

9 Appellant, C.M.I., testified that she had been sober for fourteen and one half months at the time 

of the February 22, 2023, hearing. Video Record at 11:23:25. The children’s Father, D.I., also 

testified at the hearing, describing how he and C.M.I. had been doing better, but described how 

he had relapsed beginning in 2019. 
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The record reflects that the circuit court took Mother’s recent steps for 

improvement into consideration when determining whether to grant the adoption 

petition. The court had the sole responsibility to weigh the evidence to reach its 

decision in concluding that the conditions set forth in KRS 199.502(e) and (g) were 

established by clear and convincing evidence. We agree and otherwise cannot 

substitute our judgment for the court below in so finding. The circuit court’s 

findings were not clearly erroneous. 

We would be remiss if we did not note that while not a party to this 

action, the Cabinet has a role in adoptions. Under KRS 199.510, the Cabinet must 

investigate the adoption petitions and the adoptive parents. Thereafter, the Cabinet 

must file a confidential report with the court before the evidentiary hearing can be 

conducted. This report includes whether the adoption is in the best interest of the 

children and if the children are suitable for adoption. KRS 199.510(1)(c). In both 

cases on appeal, the Cabinet conducted an investigation and filed a report on 

December 10, 2021, prior to the hearing on February 22, 2023. In both cases, the 

Cabinet recommended that the adoption petitions be granted. Additionally, the 

guardian ad litem for the children in both cases also recommended the granting of 

the adoption petitions.
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Livingston Circuit Court’s March 15, 

2023, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order terminating the parental 

rights of Mother and granting Petitioners’ adoption petitions as to both children are

AFFIRMED.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Gini G. Grace

Symsonia, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Jennifer Peek

Paducah, Kentucky