[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 22-12119

Non-Argument Calendar

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HAYWOOD JACKSON MIZELL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., 

PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION, 

Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-00569-ECM-SMD

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12119

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Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Haywood Mizell appeals the district court’s order granting 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s and PHH Mortgage Corporation’s motions to dismiss his pro se complaint alleging wrongful foreclosure 

of two properties. We reverse.

Mizell’s claims appear to revolve around two foreclosure 

sales—one by each defendant. Wells Fargo foreclosed on a loan 

obtained by Mizell’s wife. PHH foreclosed on a loan obtained by 

Mizell’s daughter and son-in-law. Both loans were secured by 

properties located in Ozark, Alabama, and each property was sold 

at a foreclosure sale. In his complaint, Mizell alleged that Wells 

Fargo and PHH weren’t entitled to the proceeds of these sales. 

Both defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the district 

court lacked jurisdiction because Mizell’s claims were barred by the 

Rooker–Feldman1 doctrine and that Mizell failed to state a claim. 

A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation. Upon 

finding that Mizell’s claims were inextricably intertwined with final 

judgments from state court involving the same parties and 

1 Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals 

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

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22-12119 Opinion of the Court 3

properties, the magistrate judge recommended that the district 

court dismiss Mizell’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

under Rooker–Feldman. Mizell objected to the report and recommendation but raised no arguments about the Rooker–Feldman

doctrine. The district court adopted the report and recommendation and dismissed Mizell’s claims with prejudice on the sole basis 

that Rooker–Feldman stripped the district court of its subject matter jurisdiction. Mizell timely appealed. 

On appeal, Mizell reiterates the arguments from his complaint but doesn’t challenge the district court’s dismissal of his complaint for lack of jurisdiction under Rooker–Feldman. The defendants argue primarily that—as a result of Mizell’s failure to address 

the district court’s sole reason for dismissing his complaint, coupled 

with his failure to object to the report and recommendation on -

Rooker–Feldman grounds—Mizell has waived any challenge to the 

district court’s dismissal. Indeed, issues not briefed on appeal by a 

pro se litigant ordinarily are deemed abandoned. Timson v. 

Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). And, under the rules 

of this court, a party who fails to object to a magistrate judge’s findings contained in a report and recommendation generally “waives 

the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on 

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1.

But “[t]he Rooker–Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional.” 

Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 

2010). And “arguments regarding subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived.” First Union Nat’l Bank of Fla. v. Hall, 123 F.3d 

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1374, 1378 n.7 (11th Cir. 1997). So, notwithstanding the deficiencies of Mizell’s briefs, we’re compelled to review de novo the district court’s determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction

under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 

1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 2021). 

The Rooker–Feldman doctrine bars district courts from reviewing or rejecting state court judgments rendered before the district court litigation began. Id. at 1210. The scope of the doctrine 

is narrow, confined to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district 

court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil 

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 

Rooker–Feldman “does not prioritize form over substance,” meaning that it bars all appeals of state court judgments in district courts 

whether the plaintiff admits to filing a direct appeal or tries to call 

the appeal something else. Behr, 8 F.4th at 1211. The injury to the 

plaintiff must be caused by the judgment itself. Id. The question 

isn’t whether the whole complaint seems to challenge a previous 

state court judgment, but whether the resolution of each individual 

claim requires review and rejection of a state court judgment. Id.

at 1213. In Behr, we warned that “district courts should keep one 

thing in mind when Rooker–Feldman is raised: it will almost never 

apply.” Id. at 1212. 

As the district court itself acknowledged, “[t]he injuries 

about which [Mizell] complains were caused by the underlying 

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foreclosure actions”—not by the state court judgments that upheld 

those actions. We also note that Mizell didn’t invite the district 

court to review and reject those judgments in his complaint. Instead, he challenged the defendants’ power to conduct the nonjudicial foreclosure sales and their entitlement to the proceeds. 

Therefore, the district court had jurisdiction over Mizell’s claims

and erred in applying Rooker–Feldman.

The defendants ask us to affirm the district court’s order on 

a number of alternative grounds, which were raised in their motions to dismiss. But because the district court gave only one reason for dismissing Mizell’s complaint—the Rooker–Feldman doctrine—we defer to the district court to decide in the first instance 

whether any or all of these grounds merit dismissal. See Behr, 8 

F.4th at 1214.

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

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