2020 IL App (4th) 180333-U 

NO. 4-18-0333 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

OLIVER J. HUTT, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

 Circuit Court of 

Adams County 

No. 16CF752 

 Honorable 

 Robert K. Adrian, 

 Judge Presiding. 

PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices DeArmond and Holder White concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment because a reasonable trier

 of fact could have found that defendant’s actions proximately caused the officer’s 

 injury. 

¶ 2 In December 2016, the State charged defendssant, Oliver J. Hutt, with one count of 

felony resisting a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a-7) (West 2014)), one count of misdemeanor 

resisting a peace officer (id. § 31-1(a)), and two counts of criminal damage to property (id. § 21-

1(a)(1)). The State alleged that in December 2016, defendant damaged the property of Sierra 

Parrish (now known as Sierra Parrish-Hutt) and then resisted the arrest of a peace officer, Terry 

Hagan, causing Hagan to break his hand. 

¶ 3 In February 2018, the trial court conducted defendant’s bench trial at which the 

court found him guilty of both counts of resisting a peace officer and not guilty of both counts of 

criminal damage to property. The court sentenced defendant to 30 months of probation. 

FILED

June 1, 2020

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme 

Court Rule 23 and may not be cited 

as precedent by any party except in 

the limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
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¶ 4 Defendant appeals, alleging no reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that 

(1) defendant resisted arrest or (2) defendant’s actions were the proximate cause of Hagan’s injury.

¶ 5 We disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 6 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 7 A. Procedural History 

¶ 8 In December 2016, the State charged defendant with one count of felony resisting 

a peace officer (id. § 31-1(a-7)), one count of misdemeanor resisting a peace officer (id. § 31-1(a)), 

and two counts of criminal damage to property (id. § 21-1(a)(1)). In total, the counts alleged that 

defendant damaged Sierra Parrish’s property and then resisted the arrest of a peace officer, Terry 

Hagan, causing Hagan to break his hand. 

¶ 9 B. The Bench Trial

¶ 10 In February 2018, the trial court conducted defendant’s bench trial. 

¶ 11 1. Sierra Parrish-Hutt

¶ 12 The State first called Sierra Parrish-Hutt who testified that in December 2016, she 

called the police to remove defendant from their home. Sierra explained that at the time she called 

the police, she and defendant were in a dating relationship and lived together and that they had 

since married. She testified that defendant had consumed alcohol and she wanted him removed 

from their home because he was causing a disturbance. Sierra said she had an argument with 

defendant and defendant had tossed around a Christmas tree and two tables.

¶ 13 Sierra explained that when an officer arrived at her residence, she informed him 

that defendant had been drinking and she wanted him removed from the residence. The officer

then approached defendant to get his version of events and to obtain defendant’s name and date of 

birth, but defendant refused to comply. Sierra testified that defendant asked the officer, “ ‘I’m not 
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under arrest. Do I need to speak with you?’ ” Sierra said the officer responded, “ ‘No, you’re 

not.’ ” Defendant then said, “ ‘I don’t have to talk to y’all,’ ” and walked down a hallway towards 

the bedroom. The officer followed. 

¶ 14 Sierra testified that when she next saw defendant and the officer, she observed the 

officer on top of defendant as defendant was facedown and “squirming.” She testified that she 

reviewed a video recorded by her sister and she heard her sister say, “ ‘Stop resisting, Fred,’ ” on 

the recording. Sierra explained that “Fred” is a nickname for defendant.

¶ 15 On cross-examination, Sierra testified that the police officer did not ask whether 

defendant had a weapon. However, defendant told the police officer he did not have a weapon. 

¶ 16 2. Officer Terry Hagan

¶ 17 Quincy police officer Terry Hagan testified that on December 25, 2016, he was 

dispatched to 1505 North Sixth Street to remove someone from the residence. At about the same 

time, Hagan received another call indicating a male had possibly attacked a female with a knife at

“almost the same exact location.” 

¶ 18 Hagan testified that when he arrived at the residence, he went inside the house and 

Sierra told him that defendant was “drunk and tearing up the house.” Hagan then asked defendant 

to exit the house so Hagan could obtain defendant’s side of the story. Hagan testified that defendant 

responded, “F*** you. Get out of my house. How’d you get in my house?” Hagan then asked 

defendant for identification, and defendant told Hagan that he would not comply with his request. 

¶ 19 Hagan explained that he did not know where defendant was going when he went 

down the hallway and was not familiar with the layout of the residence. Hagan told defendant to 

stop and place his hands behind his back, but defendant continued down the hallway. Hagan 

testified that he then he grabbed defendant’s arm but defendant stiffened his arm. When Hagan 
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attempted to grab both of defendant’s arms, their momentum took them into a wall. Hagan then 

took defendant to the ground. 

¶ 20 Hagan testified that he told defendant multiple times to place his arms behind his 

back. Hagan said that defendant tried to “squirm” and “crawl out from underneath [him],” and that 

defendant “eventually [did] get on his back.” Hagan said that defendant “got his hands towards 

my gear and up almost at my face. I punched him once in the face. That stopped him from touching 

me anymore.” Hagan was asked why he punched defendant, and Hagan replied, “[H]e’s got his 

hands up towards my face. He could access my gun belt. I didn’t feel comfortable with that. And 

he was—he could choke me. He could do anything with his hands up here. So that’s why I punched 

him, to make him stop doing that.” Hagan said that after punching defendant, his hand was “not 

working right.” With the help of another officer, Hagan went to a local hospital and learned that 

he broke his hand. He required a cast for several weeks.

¶ 21 On cross-examination, Hagan testified that he did not ask defendant if he had a 

weapon. He also said he told defendant that he was under arrest and to put his hands behind his 

back. When defense counsel confronted Hagan with his written report of the incident, Hagan 

acknowledged he did not say in his report that he told defendant that he was under arrest.

¶ 22 On redirect examination, Hagan confirmed he wrote in his report that he told 

defendant to “stop and put his hands behind his back for not giving me his information.” 

¶ 23 3. The Remainder of the Trial

¶ 24 Officers Taylor Dralle and Kevin Patton also testified for the State. Dralle testified 

that when she arrived, she saw that Hagan was on top of defendant and assisted Hagan with 

defendant’s arrest. Officer Patton testified that defendant was intoxicated.

¶ 25 The State rested, and defendant moved for a directed verdict on all counts. The trial 
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court granted the motion in relation to the criminal-damage-to-property counts but denied the 

motion in relation to the resisting-a-peace-officer counts. Defendant did not testify or present 

evidence. 

¶ 26 Following arguments from both parties, the trial court found beyond a reasonable 

doubt that defendant resisted arrest and that his actions were the proximate cause of Hagan’s injury. 

In May 2018, the trial court sentenced defendant to 30 months of probation. 

¶ 27 This appeal followed. 

¶ 28 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 29 Defendant appeals, alleging that no reasonable trier of fact could have concluded 

that (1) defendant resisted arrest or (2) defendant’s actions were the proximate cause of Hagan’s 

injury. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 30 A. Resisting Arrest

¶ 31 In the heading of defendant’s argument section, he states, “No reasonable trier of 

fact could have found that [defendant’s] act of walking away from an interview and stiffening his 

arm when grabbed constituted resisting ***.” However, defendant does little to develop this 

argument and does not cite authority to suggest that the State failed to prove that defendant resisted 

an authorized act. See id. § 31-1(a).

¶ 32 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018) requires that an 

appellant’s brief “shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with 

citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Country Preferred Insurance Co. v. Groen, 2017 IL App (4th) 160028, ¶ 12, 69 N.E.3d 911. “A 

contention that is supported by some argument but no authority does not meet the requirements of 

Rule 341 and is considered forfeited.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
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¶ 33 For these reasons, we conclude that defendant has forfeited this argument. 

¶ 34 B. Proximate Cause

¶ 35 1. The Law

¶ 36 The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that the State prove 

every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 

(1970); U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2. On appeal, the question is whether, 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have 

found all of the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 64.

¶ 37 A reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for the fact finder on questions 

involving the weight of evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, 

¶ 64. On appeal from a criminal conviction, the appellate court will not reverse the trial court’s 

judgment unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies a 

reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. Id.

¶ 38 A person who commits misdemeanor resisting arrest when that violation “was the 

proximate cause of an injury to a peace officer,” is guilty of a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a7) (West 2014). Proximate cause requires (1) cause in fact and (2) legal cause. People v. Hudson, 

222 Ill. 2d 392, 401, 856 N.E.2d 1078, 1084 (2006). “Legal cause is essentially a question of 

foreseeability; the relevant inquiry is whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would 

see as a likely result of his or her conduct.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

¶ 39 2. This Case

¶ 40 In this case, defendant does not challenge that the State established that defendant’s 

actions were the cause in fact of Hagan’s injury. Therefore, the question is whether defendant’s 
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resisting arrest was the legal cause of Hagan’s injury. We conclude that it was. 

¶ 41 Hagan ordered defendant to stop, but defendant did not. Hagan ordered defendant 

to put his hands behind his back, but defendant did not. Hagan grabbed ahold of defendant, and 

defendant stiffened his arm. Defendant ended up on his back, and his hands got near Hagan’s gear 

and face. Hagan testified that defendant was in a position where he could (1) grab Hagan’s gun 

belt or (2) choke Hagan. In response, Hagan punched defendant in the face and shortly thereafter 

discovered his hand was injured. 

¶ 42 Defendant contends that “[n]o reasonable person could predict that Hagan[,]

punching [defendant] in the face was a likely consequence of [defendant’s] turning from Hagan 

and walking away, or even a likely consequence of rolling onto his back after being taken facefirst to the floor.” In support of this contention, defendant cites section 7-5 of the Criminal Code 

of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/7-5 (West 2014)), which is the statute for a police officer’s justifiable use of 

force. 

¶ 43 As an initial matter, we note that this statute is of no value for determining 

proximate cause. Although considerable overlap exists between justified police actions and those 

that are foreseeable, not every justified action is foreseeable, and not every foreseeable action is 

justified. The proximate cause analysis in this case requires only that Hagan’s punch be 

foreseeable, not that it be justified; accordingly, that is the sole question we address. 

¶ 44 This is not a close case. Defendant first walked away, ignoring the order to stop. 

Defendant then stiffened his arm, resisting both the verbal instruction to put his hands behind his 

back and Hagan’s grabbing his arm. Defendant then placed his hands near Hagan’s gear and face.

Hagan specifically testified that defendant could access his gun belt and could choke him.

Reasonable people understand that when a police officer is dealing with a person who is actively 
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resisting arrest and escalating resistance, an officer may respond with physical force—in this case 

a punch. Hagan was not required to wait for defendant to punch first or to get ahold of Hagan’s 

gear before taking action. Physical injury to an arresting officer is unquestionably a foreseeable 

result when defendant’s resisting requires the officer to use force. This court is singularly 

unsympathetic to defendants who choose to resist arrest and then complain of the direct 

consequences of that resistance.

¶ 45 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a 

reasonable trier of fact could have found that the State proved proximate cause beyond a reasonable 

doubt. 

¶ 46 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 47 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 48 Affirmed.