#24460-rev & rem-DG 

2007 SD 115

IN THE SUPREME COURT 

OF THE 

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA 

* * * * 

JEFFREY STONE, Plaintiff and Appellant, 

v. 

VON EYE FARMS, DANIEL VON EYE, SR., 

INDIVIDUALLY, AND JAMIE VON EYE, 

INDIVIDUALLY, Defendants and Appellees, 

DANIEL VON EYE, JR., INDIVIDUALLY, Defendant. 

* * * * 

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 

THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 

MINER COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 

* * * * 

HONORABLE DAVID R. GIENAPP 

Judge 

* * * * 

LAURA KOOB 

BRIAN L. RADKE of 

Radke Law Offices, PC 

Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff 

and appellant. 

TIMOTHY A. CLAUSEN of 

Klass Law Firm 

Sioux City, Iowa Attorneys for defendants 

and appellees. 

 

* * * * 

CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS 

ON AUGUST 27, 2007 

 OPINION FILED 11/07/07
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GILBERTSON, Chief Justice 

[¶1.] On July 19, 2006, in the South Dakota Third Judicial Circuit, Jeffrey 

Stone (Stone) filed a complaint against Von Eye Farms, Daniel Von Eye, Sr., Daniel 

Von Eye, Jr., and Jamie Von Eye (collectively “Von Eyes”) arising from personal 

injuries that he received in a farm accident. On September 1, 2006, Von Eyes filed 

a motion for summary judgment. Stone amended his complaint on November 15, 

2006. On December 18, 2006, the circuit court heard the motion. On January 18, 

2007, the circuit court issued its letter opinion granting Von Eyes’ motion for 

summary judgment. Judgment for Von Eyes was entered on January 25, 2007. We 

reverse and remand. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURE 

[¶2.] Von Eyes are engaged in family farming operations in eastern South 

Dakota. At the time of the incident giving rise to this claim, Stone had been 

employed by Von Eyes as a farm hand for no less than one year. On November 25, 

2005, Stone began work at round 9:30 a.m. At around 12:00 a.m. on November 26, 

2005, Stone was returning from the fields and planning to go home after the day’s 

harvesting activities. Stone caught a ride in from the field with Jim Carroll 

(Carroll). Carroll was operating a Case-IH 7140 tractor and pulling a grain wagon 

loaded with corn. Carroll was heading to a site where the harvested corn was being 

transferred from grain wagons to semi-tractor-trailers. 

[¶3.] When Carroll arrived at the transfer site around midnight, he pulled 

along side a semi-tractor-trailer in preparation to begin offloading corn. Stone 

climbed down off the tractor and spoke to Casey Kneebone (Kneebone), who was 

driving a semi-tractor-trailer rig. After briefly speaking to Stone, Kneebone 
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climbed up the steps of the tractor to talk to Carroll. Unbeknownst to Carroll, 

Stone remained on the ground standing behind the left, front tire of the Case-IH 

tractor. Carroll looked behind the tractor and then began to back up, knocking 

Stone to the ground and driving over his ankle and leg.1 Carroll had moved the 

tractor about three feet when he heard Stone yell, but by that time Stone had 

suffered severe physical injury. 

[¶4.] Stone’s July 19, 2006 complaint alleged that Carroll was negligent in 

the operation of the Case-IH tractor; that said negligence was proximate cause of 

Stone’s injury; and that Von Eyes were liable on a theory of respondeat superior. 

After Von Eyes moved for summary judgment, Stone amended his complaint on 

November 15, 2006, alleging that Von Eyes were negligent by not providing a safe 

work place. Stone’s allegation was based on claims that Von Eyes’ employees had 

not received proper training, were not properly supervised, and were required to 

work under unreasonable working conditions. 

[¶5.] On December 18, 2006, the circuit court heard Von Eyes’ motion and 

thereafter supplemental materials were filed by the parties. On January 18, 2007, 

the circuit court issued its letter opinion granting summary judgment for Von Eyes. 

[¶6.] Stone raises three issues on appeal: 

1. Whether the circuit court erred by not submitting to the jury the 

question of whether Von Eyes were negligent in the nature of 

the workplace they provided for their employees. 

1. Carroll claims that he also hollered twice that he was going to back up. 

However, Stone denies hearing Carroll’s alleged warning. 
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2. Whether the circuit court erred by granting summary judgment 

based on assumption of the risk, barring recovery for Stone as a 

matter of law. 

3. Whether the circuit court erred by granting summary judgment 

based on contributory negligence, barring recovery for Stone as 

a matter of law. 

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Summary judgment is properly granted when the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is 

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

We will affirm the trial court’s grant or denial of a motion 

for summary judgment when no genuine issues of material 

fact exist, and the legal questions have been correctly 

decided. We review the circuit court’s conclusions of law 

under the de novo standard. However, we view all evidence 

and favorable inferences from that evidence in a light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. 

A-G-E Corp. v. State, 2006 SD 66, ¶13, 719 NW2d 780, 785 (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). “Summary judgment is proper in negligence cases if no duty 

exists as a matter of law.” Bordeaux v. Shannon County Schools, 2005 SD 117, ¶11, 

707 NW2d 123, 126 (citation omitted). 

 Negligence is the breach of a duty owed to another, the 

 proximate cause of which results in an injury. This Court 

 has repeatedly stated that questions of negligence, 

 contributory negligence and assumption of the risk are 

 for the jury in all but the rarest of cases so long as there 

 is evidence to support the issues. It is only when 

 reasonable men can draw but one conclusion from facts 

 and inferences that they become a matter of law and this 

 rarely occurs. 

Pierce v. City of Belle Fourche, 2001 SD 41, ¶22, 624 NW2d 353, 356-57 (alteration 

and internal citations and quotations omitted). 
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ANALYSIS AND DECISION 

[¶7.] 1. Whether the circuit court erred by not submitting 

 to the jury the question of whether Von Eyes 

 were negligent in the nature of the workplace 

 they provided for their employees. 

[¶8.] Stone alleged that Von Eyes had a duty to provide a reasonably safe 

place to work and that they breached this duty by not providing adequate training 

and supervision for their employees. Stone further alleged that Von Eyes 

maintained an unsafe working environment by overworking their employees. Von 

Eyes deny Stone’s allegations. The basis underlying their respective positions is 

contained within the pleadings, answers, admissions, affidavits and discovery 

contained in the record. 

[¶9.] Employers have a nondelegable duty to provide their employees with 

reasonably safe places to work. Smith v. Community Co-op. Ass’n of Murdo, 87 SD 

440, 444, 209 NW2d 891, 893 (1973) (citing Stoner v. Eggers, 77 SD 395, 92 NW2d 

528 (1958)). Inherent to this duty is an obligation that employers provide 

employees with proper training and supervision. Id. at 444-45, 209 NW2d at 893 

(citing Restatement, Second, § 492 et seq.; 56 CJS Master and Servant § 186). 

[¶10.] Von Eyes submitted that they were not unlike other family farming 

operations in South Dakota with respect to the amount and kind of training they 

provided for their employees. According to Von Eyes, on-the-job training was 

provided; the extent of which was determined by the complexity of the tasks and or 

the equipment used therein. Von Eyes further contended that Carroll was an 

experienced farm laborer accustomed to operating many different types of farm 

machinery including various kinds of tractors, and specifically the Case-IH 7140. 
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[¶11.] Von Eyes stated that like other farming operations, they did not 

supervise their employees at all times. Rather, they stated that they had 

customarily hired competent employees, who after training, were expected to 

operate equipment in a safe manner without the need for immediate supervision. 

Nevertheless, they indicated that employees were closely scrutinized when the task 

required immediate supervision. 

[¶12.] Stone alleged that on-the-job training and the supervision provided by 

Von Eyes was less than adequate. He also alleged that no safety training had been 

provided and that he was given minimal training in the tasks to which he was 

assigned and for the equipment employed in carrying out the tasks. In addition, he 

averred that for post-training, Van Eyes provided virtually no supervision, 

including on the day that he was injured. 

[¶13.] Stone argues that the inadequacy of the training and supervision that 

Von Eyes provided their employees was evident in the manner in which Carroll 

operated the Case-IH tractor at the time of Stone’s injury. Stone avers that the fact 

Carroll claims to have hollered a warning prior to backing up the tractor is an 

acknowledgment that Carroll was aware that Stone was near the tractor when he 

began to back up. Stone argues the fact Carroll then only looked rearward before 

backing up and moved the tractor while Kneebone was still standing on its steps 

belies the notion that Carroll was properly trained to operate the tractor. Stone 

contends that had Carroll received proper training he would have looked in all 

directions before backing up and that he never would have moved the tractor while 

another person stood on its steps, allegedly obscuring Carroll’s view. 
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[¶14.] Stone also alleged that Von Eyes maintained an unsafe work 

environment by overworking their employees. Stone contends that he had worked a 

15-hour day just prior to the accident and that that was consistent with the amount 

of time he had put in seven days per week during the two months preceding the 

accident and was further consistent with the amount of time that other employees, 

including Carroll were working. However, Von Eyes countered these allegations by 

submitting that while it is customary to work long hours during harvest, no 

employee was required to work such long hours as to become a safety risk. Further, 

Von Eyes also stated that employees were advised to take breaks or go home if they 

became overly tired and that time off to rest was allowed as requested or necessary. 

In any case, Von Eyes contended that the long hours worked by their employees was 

not a contributing factor to the accident since Carroll stated that he neither fell 

asleep at that time nor was inattentive. 

[¶15.] Von Eyes, as a matter of law, had a duty to Stone to provide a 

reasonably safe workplace with adequate training and supervision. We conclude 

that the evidence that was submitted to the circuit court and the inferences drawn 

therefrom, when viewed in a light most favorable to Stone, reveal genuine issues of 

material fact as to whether Von Eyes breached this duty. Accordingly, evidence and 

testimony relevant to that question should have been held over for trial and 

submitted to a jury for determination. 

[¶16.] 2. Whether the circuit court erred by granting 

 summary judgment based on assumption of the 

 risk, barring recovery for Stone as a matter of law. 

[¶17.] In their answer filed August 21, 2006, Von Eyes alternatively 

interposed the affirmative defense of assumption of the risk. In granting Von Eyes’ 
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motion for summary judgment, the circuit court concluded that Stone’s conduct 

constituted assumption of the risk as a matter of law. The circuit court cited our 

rationale in Goepfert v. Filler, 1997 SD 56, 563 NW2d 140 as applicable to the 

instant case. 

[¶18.] The facts of Goepfert, are distinguishable from the instant case in that 

they involved a wrongful death case that arose when a passenger in a moving car, of 

his own accord, stepped out of the vehicle while it was in motion, thereafter striking 

his head on the pavement, which ultimately led to his demise. 1997 SD 56, ¶¶2-3, 

563 NW2d at 141. Defendant moved for summary judgment, which the circuit court 

granted concluding that the decedent had assumed the risk as a matter of law 

therein negating any duty owed him by the defendant operator of the car. Id. ¶3, 

563 NW2d at 141. 

[¶19.] A defendant asserting assumption of the risk must establish three 

elements: 1) that the plaintiff had actual or constructive knowledge of the risk; 2) 

that the plaintiff appreciated the character of the risk; and 3) that the plaintiff 

voluntarily accepted the risk, given the time knowledge, and experience to make an 

intelligent choice. Id. ¶6, 563 NW2d at 142. The failure to establish any one of the 

three elements negates the defense. Id. (citing Westover v. East River Elec. Power 

Co-op., Inc., 488 NW2d 892, 901 (SD 1992)). 

Actual or Constructive Knowledge of the Risk

[¶20.] Given the facts in Goepfert, we held that “exercising ordinary common 

sense, reasonable minds [could not] differ on the jeopardy involved in stepping from 

a moving vehicle.” Id. ¶8, 563 NW2d at 143 (citations omitted). A similar 
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determination cannot be arrived at so intuitively from the facts of the instant case. 

Weighing the circumstances of this case and inferences drawn therefrom in a light 

most favorable to Stone, it is reasonable to conclude that if he did not hear Carroll’s 

warning, he may never have considered the possibility that the tractor would move 

while Kneebone remained hanging on outside the cab. Consequently, an issue of 

material fact remains as to Stone’s knowledge, or lack thereof, of the tractor’s 

imminent movement. 

Appreciated the Character of the Risk

[¶21.] We need not consider this element as Von Eye has failed in their 

burden on the first element. However, we note that the same requirement of a 

showing of the specificity of the appreciation of the nature of the risk that applies to 

the first element also applies to the risk’s character. Westover, 488 NW2d at 901. 

Voluntary Acceptance of the Risk

[¶22.] Once again, there is no necessity that we consider this element. 

Nevertheless, when it can be shown that the plaintiff had reasonable alternatives to 

the injury causing conduct, but subjected himself to the risk of harm 

notwithstanding, this element is established. Goepfert, 1997 SD 56, ¶12, 563 NW2d 

at 144 (citations omitted). Acceptance is not voluntary if another’s tortious conduct 

leaves no reasonable alternative to avert harm or to exercise or protect a right or 

privilege, which another has no right to deny. Id. (citation omitted). 

[¶23.] In Goepfert, we concluded that neither the driver’s conduct nor that of 

any of the other passengers was negligent and therefore played no role in the 

decedent’s decision to exit a moving car. Id. Since, the decedent had a reasonable 
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alternative in that he could have stayed seated in the car until it came to a halt, we 

held that he voluntarily accepted the risk. 

[¶24.] In the instant case, the alternative to Stone remaining in the path of 

the moving tractor tire was to have stepped out of the way. However, given the 

suddenness in which the tractor began to move, a fact question remains with 

respect to Stone’s ability to consider that alternative prior to being run over. 

[¶25.] We find that there were questions of material fact that properly should 

have been considered by a jury, with respect to the issues of Von Eyes’ negligence 

and the affirmative defense of assumption of the risk.2 Therefore, we conclude that 

the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment. 

 (continued . . .) 

2. Since there are issues of material fact for determination on remand, 

regarding whether Von Eyes were negligent, we do not reach on appeal Issue 

3—whether Stone’s claim is barred by contributory negligence as a matter of 

law. However, we think it is again noteworthy to point out the distinction 

between assumption of the risk and contributory negligence is often confused. 

Reflecting on this distinction in Ray v. Downes: 

“Risk is intrinsic to some acts.” Goepfert, 1997 SD 56, ¶8, 563 

NW2d at 143. However this intrinsic risk is not unlimited. 

Certainly, Ray put himself in harm’s way by standing in a 

position to be run over. He frankly admitted as much. 

Nonetheless, he did not consent to relieve the driver of his 

subsequent duty to act with reasonable care. In the words of 

Prosser, “This is a distinction which has baffled a great many 

law students, some judges, and unhappily a few very learned 

legal writers.” Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts § 68, 485. 

 It is here that there is the greatest misapprehension 

 and confusion as to assumption of risk, and its most 

 frequent misapplication. It is not true that in any case 

 where the plaintiff voluntarily encounters a known 

 danger he necessarily consents to any future negligence 

 of the defendant. A pedestrian who walks across the 

 street in the middle of a block, through a stream of 
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________________________ 

(. . . continued) 

[¶26.] We hereby reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

[¶27.] SABERS, KONENKAMP, ZINTER and MEIERHENRY, Justices, 

concur. 

 traffic traveling at excessive speed, cannot by any stretch 

 of the imagination be found to consent that the drivers 

 shall not use care to watch for him and avoid running 

 him down. On the contrary, he is insisting that they 

 shall. This is contributory negligence pure and simple; 

 it is not assumption of the risk. And if A leaves an 

 automobile stopped at night on the traveled portion 

 of the highway, and his passenger remains sitting in 

 it, it can readily be found that there is consent to the 

 prior negligence of A, whose control over the risk has 

 terminated, but not to the subsequent negligence of 

 B, who thereafter runs into the car from the rear. 

 1998 SD 40, ¶13, 576 NW2d 896, 899-900.