In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 23-2577 

HENRY BEVERLY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

ABBOTT LABORATORIES, an Illinois Corporation, and VICTORIA 

LUO, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:17-cv-05590 — Sarah L. Ellis, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED APRIL 10, 2024 — DECIDED JULY 10, 2024 

____________________ 

Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges. 

BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Henry Beverly worked as a financial analyst for Abbott Laboratories. That company was restructured, and his job duties changed. Beverly sought and 

received a personal leave of absence from Abbott, during 

which he started working for Cook County. Beverly did not 

tell Abbott about his other employment while on leave. That 

leave was extended twice. But when he sought a third 
2 No. 23-2577 

extension, his position at Abbott had been filled, and the company terminated his employment. 

Beverly sued Abbott alleging, among other claims, racial 

discrimination and defamation. The district court granted 

summary judgment on some of his claims, and others went to 

trial before a jury who found for Abbott. Beverly appeals certain pretrial, trial, and posttrial rulings. We affirm the district 

court’s decisions in full.

I 

We begin by examining Beverly’s work history, his extended leave of absence, and his termination. For the district 

court’s rulings on summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, we view that evidence in the light most favorable 

to him and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Navratil v. City of Racine, 101 F.4th 511, 516 (7th Cir. 2024) (for summary judgment); Sun v. Xu, 99 F.4th 1007, 1013 (7th Cir. 2024) 

(for judgment as a matter of law). 

A. Beverly’s Work at Abbott and Change in Job Duties

Beverly, a Black man, worked briefly for Abbott in 2002 

and was later rehired as a senior financial analyst in 2007. In 

2008, he transferred laterally to a new position in which he 

was supervised by Kevin Bowler from 2008 to mid-2012. 

In late 2012, Victoria Luo became Beverly’s direct supervisor. When Luo took over, Beverly assumed some of Bowler’s 

prior duties and handled any work for which Luo did not 

have the certification or training. Luo also enlarged Beverly’s 

role to include more contact with and training of certain managers. In 2012 and 2013, Luo tasked Beverly with preparing 

templates and programs to allow other employees to report 
No. 23-2577 3

on their new sales. Beverly also created new financial models 

and prepared a variety of reports. 

Abbott split into two companies in 2013, Abbott and 

AbbVie. As part of this restructuring, Abbott eliminated the 

team which handled systems work for Luo’s group. Her

group hired new people and shifted duties from 2013 to 2015. 

The new hires in Luo’s group were all Asian men.

After this restructuring, Luo shifted some of Beverly’s duties, including uploading annual forecasts and new sales 

transactions and manipulating data and spreadsheets, to a 

new team member. Beverly trained that team member on how 

to perform those duties. He also retained responsibility for reporting-related training. Later in 2014, Luo reduced Beverly’s 

role and his interaction with affiliates, placing him on a new 

project. 

Beverly had regularly attended different company meetings. But by 2013 Beverly was excluded from certain meetings 

attended by other team members. He no longer had the opportunity to attend desired training sessions, although in 2014 

Luo approved Beverly to attend an annual conference about 

healthcare information systems. Beverly also traveled to receive training in Mexico. Over the same period, other team 

members attended different trainings overseas. Abbott instituted a travel freeze in 2014 on all overseas travel for meetings 

and trainings. 

By 2015, Beverly no longer prepared several reports, further reducing his job duties. He testified that in 2015, all that 

remained for him to do was to prepare part of a PowerPoint

presentation for a meeting and to answer ad hoc requests 
4 No. 23-2577 

from affiliates. This amounted to about one to two hours of 

work per week. 

Abbott never disciplined Beverly or placed him on a performance improvement plan. He received various letters of 

recognition and awards during his employment. In his 2012, 

2013, and 2014 performance reviews, Luo gave Beverly an 

“achieved expectations” rating. Beverly’s base rate of pay in 

April 2012 was $94,820.74. That rate increased to $97,902.41 in 

April 2013 and $100,839.48 in March 2014. 

B. Beverly’s Leave of Absence and Termination

On March 16, 2015, Beverly requested a personal leave of 

absence from Abbott to begin on March 20, with an anticipated return date of May 25. Before his request, and unknown 

to Abbott, Beverly had applied for and obtained a full-time 

position with Cook County. Luo granted Beverly’s requested 

leave on March 20, but she told him that due to its duration, 

Abbott may have to search for a backup to cover his job during his absence. 

Beverly understood Abbott’s leave policy when he made

his request. In relevant part, the policy provides that Abbott 

retains the discretion to grant or deny leave based on operational needs and the employee’s performance. The policy 

does not limit or prohibit Abbott’s ability to terminate the employment of an at-will employee. In fact, Abbott does not 

guarantee reinstatement from a personal leave of absence. 

Notably, the policy also prohibits an employee from obtaining “full-time employment while on a personal leave of 

absence,” and if the employee does so, “the leave will be canceled and termination will be automatic.” 
No. 23-2577 5

While on leave, Beverly reached out to Luo to discuss his 

leave and how things were at Abbott. Luo said everything 

was going well and that Beverly’s work was covered. Soon 

after, Beverly emailed Luo and Abbott’s third-party benefits 

administrator to request an extension of his personal leave of 

absence through June 29. Luo approved the extension the next 

day. A few days later, Luo, with the aid of Abbott’s human 

resources department, posted Beverly’s position on May 22, 

2015. Luo never informed Beverly that she posted his job internally. 

On June 24, Beverly again asked to extend his personal 

leave of absence through July 31. Luo approved his request. 

While Beverly remained out on his extended leave, Abbott offered his position to Bruce Tsai, an Asian American who had 

previously worked at AbbVie. Tsai accepted. 

On July 26, Beverly sought a third leave extension, this 

time through August 22. Luo, rather than responding to Beverly, contacted Abbott’s human resources and spoke with 

Kevin Mason about terminating Beverly’s employment. Mason, the director of business human resources, supported 

Luo’s decision to terminate Beverly’s employment with Abbott. On July 29, Mason and Luo called Beverly and informed 

him that they were denying his request to extend his personal 

leave of absence. This amounted to a termination of employment, effective July 31. 

Luo later called Global Security, the Abbott department 

responsible for investigating safety and security concerns, to 

discuss the deactivation of Beverly’s work badge and his access to the Abbott worksite. Per the Global Security employee

that spoke with Luo, Luo stated that Beverly had a “history of 

lying” and could be a security threat. Luo said she did not 
6 No. 23-2577 

want personal contact with Beverly and that she did not feel 

comfortable with him. Luo did not specify any objectionable 

or untoward statements that Beverly had made, she did not 

report that Beverly lied in any of his performance reviews, 

and she denied during her later deposition that Beverly lied 

to her. Global Security prepared a report of this conversation, 

which other Abbott employees could access. 

II

A. Pretrial Proceedings

Beverly sued Abbott and Luo. In his operative second 

amended complaint, Beverly’s claims included, as relevant on 

appeal, (1) racial discrimination and retaliation, related to reduction of his job duties and his termination, in violation of 

42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”), 

775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-101 et seq.; and (2) defamation against 

Abbott and Luo for the report that said Beverly had a “history 

of lying.” 

After years of discovery and COVID-related delays, defendants moved for summary judgment. In response, defendants raised the affirmative defense that Luo’s statement was a 

non-actionable opinion. The district court granted in part and 

denied in part Abbott’s motion. The court granted summary 

judgment on those portions of Beverly’s racial discrimination 

and retaliation claims connected to the termination of his employment. The court denied summary judgment on those 

same claims as to the reduction of Beverly’s job duties. Defendants’ motion for summary judgement on the defamation 

claim was also denied. 

Shortly after the summary judgment decision, the parties 

filed proposed jury instructions. On the defamation claim, 
No. 23-2577 7

defendants stated that they intended to proceed “upon the 

understanding that their opinion defense to the defamation 

claim will be decided by the court as a matter of law based 

upon the evidence at trial.” 

At the final pretrial conference, Abbott and Luo again 

raised the defense that the statements Beverly challenged as 

defamatory were non-actionable opinions. The district court 

asked if Beverly objected to “that defense being decided by 

the Court rather than the jury as a matter of law?” Beverly’s 

counsel did not, so the district court reserved ruling, stating 

that it planned to wait until the close of Beverly’s case-in-chief 

to rule. 

B. Trial

A four-day jury trial took place in January 2023. The day 

before trial, defendants filed a bench brief arguing their opinion defense to Beverly’s defamation claim. No motion was 

filed, and the brief did not cite any rule of civil procedure. The 

district court said it would not rule until Beverly could be 

heard. Beverly responded on the second day of trial. Later 

that same day, the district court entered an order for defendants on Beverly’s defamation claim. The court reasoned, “the 

opinion defense involves a question of law that [it] must 

decide before the defamation claim may go to the jury and 

Beverly cannot claim surprise.” Illinois law provides that a 

statement a person is a liar—without the context of specific 

facts—is an opinion. Because the court had no specific facts 

against which to test Luo’s statement, it concluded that the 

challenged statement was a non-actionable opinion. 

Some of the district court’s rulings during the jury trial are 

disputed. The initial two concern Beverly’s questioning of 
8 No. 23-2577 

Luo. First, when Beverly’s counsel questioned Luo on the 

topic of Tsai’s hiring, she attempted to impeach her before establishing that a deposition occurred. Eventually, with the 

court’s guidance, Beverly’s counsel completed her impeachment of Luo. Second, after the district court had dismissed the 

defamation claim, Beverly’s counsel attempted to question 

Luo about her conversation with Global Security, which was 

the basis for the now-dismissed defamation claim. Defense 

counsel objected based on relevance. When the court asked 

why Beverly’s counsel was proceeding down this line of questioning, Beverly’s counsel initially said, “I’m not sure what — 

I’m not sure what I can ask her[.]” In a later discussion with 

the court, Beverly’s counsel said the testimony went to Luo’s 

animus towards Beverly. The district court rejected this argument. Beverly’s counsel then offered that it was relevant to 

Luo’s credibility, which the district court rejected. 

Comments by Abbott’s counsel during closing argument

are also contested, though this objection was not raised until 

later in Beverly’s motion for new trial. Those remarks faulted 

Beverly for the absence of a “tear or a whimper” and contended that “[t]his is business for him, nothing but business.” 

After closing arguments, the district court instructed the jury 

that those arguments were not evidence and should not be 

considered if contradicted by the evidence. The jury was specifically instructed not to consider any evidence pertaining to 

the defamation claim during its deliberations. The court also 

instructed, “if I told you to disregard any testimony or exhibits or struck any testimony or exhibits from the record, such 

testimony or exhibits are not evidence and must not be considered.” 
No. 23-2577 9

The jury found for Abbott on all of Beverly’s claims. Beverly moved for a new trial, which the district court denied. 

This appeal followed.

III

This case narrowed during its lengthy journey through 

motion practice and trial. Beverly contends on appeal that the 

district court: (1) erroneously granted Abbott summary judgment on his racial discrimination and retaliation claims related to his termination; (2) incorrectly entered judgment as a 

matter of law for Abbott on his defamation claim; and (3) 

committed numerous errors during the jury trial. 

A. Summary Judgment

Beverly argues the district court erred by finding that a reduction in his job duties did not amount to a constructive discharge and by granting summary judgment on the portions 

of his racial discrimination and retaliation claims related to 

his termination. 

Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits show “that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56. In employment discrimination cases, the question at summary judgment is “whether the evidence would permit a reasonable 

factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s race ... caused the 

discharge or other adverse employment action.” Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016). 
10 No. 23-2577 

1. Constructive discharge and changes in Beverly’s job duties 

Beverly challenges the district court’s finding that his reduction in job duties, while an adverse employment action

that survived summary judgment, did not amount to a constructive discharge. 

This court has said that adverse employment actions generally fall into three categories: (1) termination or reduction in 

compensation, fringe benefits, or other financial terms of employment; (2) transfers or changes in job duties that cause an 

employee’s skills to atrophy and reduce future career prospects; and (3) unbearable changes in job conditions, such as 

a hostile work environment or conditions amounting to constructive discharge. E.g., Barton v. Zimmer, Inc., 662 F.3d 448, 

453–54 (7th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added). 

To prevail on a claim of constructive discharge, Beverly 

must show “that he was forced to resign because his working 

conditions, from the standpoint of the reasonable employee, 

had become unbearable.” Chapin v. Fort-Rohr Motors, Inc., 621 

F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2010). We assess such a claim “from the 

viewpoint of a reasonable employee.” Ziccarelli v. Dart, 35 

F.4th 1079, 1091 (7th Cir. 2022); Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 

10 F.3d 526, 537 (7th Cir. 1993). 

This court recognizes two forms of constructive discharge: 

when an employee resigns due to discriminatory harassment, 

and “[w]hen an employer acts in a manner so as to have communicated to a reasonable employee that she will be terminated ... .” Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Univ. of Chi. 

Hosps., 276 F.3d 326, 332 (7th Cir. 2002). The first requires “a 

discriminatory work environment even more egregious than 
No. 23-2577 11

the high standard for hostile work environment.” Scaife v. U.S.

Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 49 F.4th 1109, 1119 (7th Cir. 2022). The 

second requires the plaintiff to show that “she was forced to 

resign because her working conditions became so intolerable 

that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign.” Id. (cleaned up). 

Conditions amounting to constructive discharge must be

pervasive and extreme. See, e.g., Wince v. CBRE, Inc., 66 F.4th 

1033, 1043 (7th Cir. 2023) (no constructive discharge where 

plaintiff provided information about an isolated “severe” incident of racial discrimination); Porter v. Erie Foods Int’l, Inc., 

576 F.3d 629, 631–33, 641 (7th Cir. 2009) (where employees 

taunted the plaintiff with nooses and threatened him with 

comments about his death because of his race, that conduct 

“clearly qualifies as egregious for purposes of constructive 

discharge”); Patton v. Keystone RV Co., 455 F.3d 812, 818 (7th 

Cir. 2006) (constructive discharge where plaintiff’s boss was 

obsessive and capable of and desirous of physically assaulting her). 

Beverly claims that, beginning sometime in 2013, Luo materially altered his job duties and excluded him from meetings 

and trainings, leaving him with at most one to two hours of 

work per week. This could rise to the level of a constructive 

discharge, Beverly says, because Luo stripped him of all 

meaningful work but still required him to report to work with 

nothing to do.

For working conditions to constitute constructive 

discharge, an employer’s actions must communicate to the 

employee that he “immediately and unavoidably will be terminated.” Wright v. Ill. Dept. of Child. & Fam. Servs., 798 F.3d 

513, 529 (7th Cir. 2015). Beverly continued to work at Abbott 
12 No. 23-2577 

for about two years after his job duties began to change. He 

also felt secure enough in his employment with Abbott to ask 

for a personal leave of absence and repeated extensions. There 

is no indication that Abbott intended to fire Beverly. Although Beverly testified that he feared termination when he 

requested his personal leave of absence, nothing suggests that 

Abbott intended to take such action around that time so as to 

make his termination “an imminent and inevitable event.” 

Chapin, 621 F.3d at 680 (collecting cases). Although Beverly’s 

job duties were reduced, nothing showed that his time at Abbott was coming to an end. He did not receive poor performance reviews, and he continued to receive salary increases. 

While Beverly had fewer job duties due to the reorganization 

of Abbott and hiring of new team members, he does not allege 

he experienced any other changes or bad experiences with his 

coworkers and supervisor.

For these reasons, the district court correctly concluded 

that the reduction in Beverly’s job duties did not amount to a 

constructive discharge. Notwithstanding that finding, the district court considered the reduction to be an adverse employment action and allowed those claims to continue. 

2. Discriminatory animus and Beverly’s termination

Beverly also challenged his termination, saying it was a 

racially discriminatory adverse employment action in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the IHRA. To prove discriminatory animus motivated an adverse employment action under 

those statutes, Beverly must show that his race caused the action. See Lewis v. Ind. Wesleyan Univ., 36 F.4th 755, 759 (7th Cir. 

2022); Zaderaka v. Ill. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, 545 N.E.2d 684, 687 

(Ill. 1989). On Beverly’s § 1981 claim, he was required to establish but-for causation. See Lewis, 36 F.4th at 759. For his 
No. 23-2577 13

IHRA race discrimination claim, the protected category must 

have been a motivating factor in the termination. See Zaderaka, 

545 N.E.2d at 687. 

Beverly contends that he was fired because of his race, and 

that Abbott proffered pretextual reasons for doing so. Specifically, he argues that Abbott did not follow its personal leave 

of absence policy, and that Luo lied when she said that she 

needed someone to perform Beverly’s job duties. Abbott disagrees and submits that Beverly can cite to no evidence of discrimination.

“In determining whether an employer’s stated reason [for 

discharge] is pretextual, the question is not whether the employer’s stated reason was inaccurate or unfair, but whether 

the employer honestly believed the reason it has offered to 

explain the discharge.” Harper v. C.R. Eng., Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 

311 (7th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). “Pretext involves more than 

just faulty reasoning or mistaken judgment on the part of the 

employer; it is [a] lie, specifically a phony reason for some action.” Monroe v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 871 F.3d 495, 505 (7th Cir. 

2017) (alteration in original). Speculation about colleagues’ ill 

motives is too conclusory to create an issue of material fact.

See Johnson v. Advoc. Health & Hosp. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 899 

(7th Cir. 2018); see also Sauzek v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 202 F.3d 

913, 918 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Speculation based on suspicious timing alone ... does not support a reasonable inference of retaliation ... .”). Causation can be shown through evidence of, for 

example, comments or animus toward the protected group, 

suspicious timing, more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees, or pretextual reasons given for the adverse 

employment action. Monroe, 871 F.3d at 504. 
14 No. 23-2577 

Abbott’s proffered reason for terminating Beverly’s employment was that the company needed someone to take on 

those job duties, so it hired a replacement. Abbott did so only 

after repeated extensions of Beverly’s personal leave of absence. 

Abbott’s proffered reason for firing Beverly was consistent 

with the undisputed facts. He understood Abbott’s personal 

leave of absence policy, so he knew that Luo may need help 

and seek to replace him during his leave. Yet, Beverly continued to request extensions, three in total. Because the personal 

leave of absence policy provided for only unprotected leave, 

Beverly cannot complain that Abbott terminated him based 

on its decision to hire someone in his place while he remained 

on a personal leave of absence. Widmar v. Sun Chem. Corp., 772 

F.3d 457, 464 (7th Cir. 2014) (“This court has repeatedly stated 

that it is not a super-personnel department that secondguesses employer policies that are facially legitimate ... .”).

Beverly’s assertion that Abbott lied about its reason for 

terminating his employment similarly fails to support his allegations of pretext. He contends that, had Luo made clear to 

him the need for his help at work, he would have gladly returned to Abbott from his personal leave of absence. But Beverly had already secured a job with Cook County and failed 

to tell Abbott about his new position. Moreover, it was within 

Abbott’s discretion whether to inform Beverly about its 

search for new employees and its decision to terminate his 

employment after his personal leave of absence.

The district court ruled correctly that Abbott did not have 

a pretextual or discriminatory reason for terminating Beverly’s employment. None of his arguments persuade us otherwise.
No. 23-2577 15

B. Defamation Claim

Beverly takes issue with the district court’s mid-trial order 

entering judgment as a matter of law on his Illinois state law 

defamation claim. We first consider the timing of this order, 

then its merits.

1. Timing

Beverly alleges that Abbott and Luo defamed him when 

Luo told Global Security that Beverly had a “history of lying.” 

Defendants raised the affirmative defense that Luo’s statement was a non-actionable opinion. The defendants did not 

move for summary judgment on this defense. Rather, during

trial preparation, they said they would stand on this defense. 

Their proposed jury instructions stated, “Defendants proceed 

here based upon the understanding that their opinion defense 

to the defamation claim will be decided by the court as a matter of law based upon the evidence at trial.” 

A district court has broad discretion in when to enter judgment as a matter of law on a claim. Under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 50(a), “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an 

issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable 

jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to 

find for the party on that issue, the court may ... resolve the 

issue against the party... .” And, importantly for this case, a 

motion is not required. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a). Yet, as this 

court has explained in the analogous context of summary 

judgment, a sua sponte judgment “is a hazardous procedure 

which warrants special caution.” Osler Inst., Inc. v. Forde, 333 

F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 2003). 

We review a district court’s entry of judgment as a matter 

of law under the federal standard, de novo, even where the 
16 No. 23-2577 

district court applies state law to the merits of the motion. See, 

e.g., Hall v. Flannery, 840 F.3d 922, 931 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing 

Sokol Crystal Prods., Inc. v. DSC Commc’ns. Corp., 15 F.3d 1427, 

1432 (7th Cir. 1994); cf. Osler Inst., 333 F.3d at 837. The standard for granting judgment as a matter of law “mirrors” the 

standard for granting summary judgment. Surgery Ctr. at 900 

N. Mich. Ave., LLC v. Am. Physicians Assurance Corp., 922 F.3d 

778, 784 (7th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up); see Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250–51 (1986)).

The opinion defense to defamation is a question of law to 

be addressed by the court, not the jury. See Imperial Apparel, 

Ltd. v. Cosmo’s Designer Direct, Inc., 227 Ill. 2d 381, 398 (2008).1

The viability of the defamation claim and the strength of the 

opinion defense were at issue throughout this litigation. The 

court permitted both sides to brief the claim and the defense 

before it decided the question. The district court’s ruling thus 

should not have caught Beverly off guard.

Still, the district court’s approach—granting judgment as 

a matter of law at trial during the plaintiff’s case—should be 

avoided if possible. Such timing is disruptive and risks making the jury trial unfair. Beverly was prevented from offering 

promised evidence of the defamation, yet Abbott was able to 

present evidence that the alleged defamatory statement was 

true. 

1 Beverly’s counsel conceded at the final pretrial conference that she 

“wouldn’t object if there was ... a basis for the Court to determine as a 

matter of law [the defamation claim].” Transcript of Final Pre-Trial Conf. 

at 20, Beverly v. Abbott Lab’ys, No. 1:17-cv-05590 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2022), 

ECF No. 214.
No. 23-2577 17

Even if the evidence Beverly wished to offer had been admitted, however, he still would have lost on the merits. And 

Beverly has not identified evidence that could have been presented that would have overcome Abbott’s protected opinion 

defense. So any arguable error with the district court’s timing 

was harmless.

Beverly also claims prejudice because the order on the defamation defense was entered after opening statements. The 

defamation claim had already been discussed before the jury, 

but all evidence on that claim had not yet been received. He 

asserts the timing adversely affected his lawyer’s credibility

and confused the jury. 

But the jury was specifically instructed not to consider any 

evidence pertaining to the defamation claim during its deliberations. The court also instructed, “if I told you to disregard 

any testimony or exhibits or struck any testimony or exhibits 

from the record, such testimony or exhibits are not evidence 

and must not be considered.” These instructions addressed

any potential prejudice resulting from the timing of the district court’s judgment. See Stollings v. Ryobi Techs., Inc., 725 

F.3d 753, 769 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Lee, 558 F.3d 

638, 649 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Absent any showing that the jury 

could not follow the court’s limiting instruction, we presume 

that the jury limited its consideration of the testimony in accordance with the court’s instruction.”)). So, again, any error 

is harmless.

2. Merits

To prove defamation under Illinois state law, Beverly 

must show: (1) defendants made a false statement about him; 

(2) defendants made an unprivileged publication of that 
18 No. 23-2577 

statement to a third party; and (3) the publication caused 

damages, or the harm is obvious on its face. See Basile v. Prometheus Glob. Media, 225 F. Supp. 3d 737, 742 (N.D. Ill. 2016)

(applying Illinois law).

Whether a statement is an opinion or assertion of fact is a 

question of law. Moriarty v. Greene, 732 N.E.2d 730, 740 (Ill. 

App. 2000) (citing Owen v. Carr, 497 N.E.2d 1145, 1148 (Ill. 

1986)). To aid in this legal determination, courts ask whether: 

(1) the statement “has a precise and readily understood meaning;” (2) the statement is factually verifiable; and (3) the “literary or social context signals that [the statement] has factual 

content.” Solaia Tech., LLC v. Specialty Pub. Co., 852 N.E.2d 825, 

840 (Ill. 2006). “The test is restrictive: a defamatory statement 

is constitutionally protected only if it cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual fact.” Id. (citing Kolegas v. Heftel 

Broad. Corp., 607 N.E.2d 201, 208 (Ill. 1992)). “[B]ut if it is plain 

that the speaker is expressing a subjective view, an interpretation, a theory, conjecture, or surmise, rather than claiming 

to be in possession of objectively verifiable facts, the statement is not actionable.” Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 

1222, 1227 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 

U.S. 1, 17–21 (1990)). A non-actionable statement of opinion is 

one where the statements are “too broad, conclusory, and 

subjective to be objectively verifiable.” Liu v. Nw. Univ., 78 F. 

Supp. 3d 839, 850 (N.D. Ill. 2015). 

Illinois courts have repeatedly held that general statements about a person’s honesty constitute non-actionable 

statements of opinion. See Quinn v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 658 

N.E.2d 1225, 1229–30 (Ill. App. 1995). “[T]he general statement that someone is a liar, not being put in context of specific 
No. 23-2577 19

facts, is merely opinion.” Piersall v. SportsVision of Chi., 595 

N.E.2d 103, 107 (Ill. App. 1992). 

Beverly argues that because Luo, as Beverly’s supervisor,

made these statements in the employment context, that 

should alter the analysis. But the statement at issue is still too 

broad and generalized to be actionable. See Perfect Choice Exteriors, LLC v. Better Bus. Bureau of Cent. Ill., Inc., 99 N.E.3d 541, 

550–51 (Ill. App. 2018) (holding defendant’s grading of and 

comments about plaintiff’s unsatisfactory performance were

constitutionally protected opinions, not verifiable statements 

of fact that could support a claim for defamation). Luo’s statement that Beverly had a “history of lying” is the type of vague 

and generalized opinion protected under the First Amendment. While the line between non-actionable statements of 

opinion and actionable false factual assertions can be difficult 

to parse, that is not so here. 

For these reasons, the district court properly entered judgment for defendants on Beverly’s defamation claim.

C. Trial Decisions

Beverly’s last contentions concern some of the district 

court’s rulings at trial. He argues the court should have 

granted his motion for a new trial because it: (1) abused its 

discretion in deciding his defamation claim during trial; (2) 

failed to follow Federal Rule of Evidence 613 in its rulings 

concerning his counsel’s impeachment attempts; and (3) 

should have allowed evidence at trial of Luo’s post-termination statements to Global Security.2

2 Beverly offers three additional arguments: (1) evidence regarding 

Abbott’s personal leave of absence policy and his Cook County employment should have been excluded; (2) some pretrial evidentiary rulings 
20 No. 23-2577 

The denial of a motion for new trial is reviewed for abuse 

of discretion. See Ewing v. 1645 W. Farragut LLC, 90 F.4th 876, 

886 (7th Cir. 2024). This court “shall not second-guess the decision of a trial judge that is in conformity with established 

legal principles and, in terms of its application of those principles to the facts of the case, is within the range of options 

from which one would expect a reasonable trial judge to select.” Liu v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 302 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 

2002) (citation omitted). “[W]e reverse only if the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence, the damages are excessive, 

or if for other reasons the trial was not fair to the moving 

party.” Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 610 F.3d 434, 440 

(7th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). 

Just as Beverly’s first argument on his defamation claim 

fell short on de novo review, it fails under the more deferential review for the denial of a motion for new trial.

His second argument—that the court misapplied Rule 613 

in its rulings concerning his counsel’s impeachment attempts—also misses the mark. District courts have wide discretion to control the mode and order of presenting evidence

at trial. See FED. R. EVID. 611(a); Gong v. Hirsch, 913 F.2d 1269, 

were unfair; and (3) certain remarks made by Abbott’s counsel in closing 

argument should not have been allowed.

Although Beverly made numerous objections during trial, he failed to 

object on these three grounds. By knowingly and intentionally deciding 

not to object at trial, Beverly waived these arguments. See United States v. 

Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 448 (7th Cir. 2019); see also Christmas v. City of Chicago, 

682 F.3d 632, 640 (7th Cir. 2012) (“By failing to object, Plaintiffs may not 

raise the issue for the first time in a motion for a new trial or on appeal.”).

Even if these arguments are only forfeited, we see no error here. See 

Flores, 929 F.3d at 448.
No. 23-2577 21

1274 (7th Cir. 1990). When Beverly’s counsel tried to impeach 

Luo by referencing testimony from her deposition, defense 

counsel objected. The court sustained the objection, and Luo

was allowed to read the statement, and then answer whether 

the statement was made during her deposition. The district 

court noted that “the time between that question and counsel’s attempt at impeachment spanned over fifty pages of the 

transcript and a lunch recess.” Beverly’s counsel’s initial attempt at impeachment was thus improper, and she needed to 

re-elicit the in-court testimony she sought for impeachment 

by disclosing the prior statement. See FED. R. EVID. 613(b) 

(“Extrinsic evidence of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement is admissible only if the witness is given an opportunity 

to explain or deny the statement ... .”).

A witness’s prior statement is not hearsay where it “is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony.” FED. R. EVID. 

801(d). The attempt to impeach Luo began on the wrong foot. 

By attempting to introduce an out-of-court statement without 

first properly establishing the recent in-court testimony of 

Luo, the use of her deposition seemed to be framed as an offer 

of inadmissible hearsay.3 The district court then aided Beverly’s counsel in the impeachment process, and the examination of Luo was completed. So, no evidence was excluded 

based on defense counsel’s “improper impeachment” objection.

3 Neither party raised the possibility of treating Luo’s deposition testimony as a party admission under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) 

and (D). Further, Rule 613(b) does not apply to statements by an opposing 

party.
22 No. 23-2577 

Beverly’s counsel next attempted to introduce Luo’s prior 

statement without laying a proper foundation. “Under Rule 

613(b), extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent oral or written statement is not permitted unless the witness is afforded 

an opportunity to explain or deny and the opposite party is 

afforded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon.” 21 AM.

JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 101 § 12. Beverly’s counsel did not first

establish that Luo gave a deposition. The district court noted 

that step should be taken. Though the court assisted Beverly’s 

counsel with impeachment attempts, this did not prejudice 

Beverly. With that help, Beverly’s counsel presented the evidence to the jury, and neither sequence provides grounds for 

a new trial.

Beverly’s third argument—that the court should have allowed evidence at trial of Luo’s post-termination statements 

to Global Security—does not succeed either. “The decision 

whether to admit evidence is a matter peculiarly within the 

competence of the trial court and will not be reversed absent 

a clear abuse of discretion.” Manuel v. City of Chicago, 335 F.3d 

592, 595 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); see Downing v. Abbott Lab’ys, 48 F.4th 793, 813 (7th Cir. 2022); Henderson v. Wilkie, 

966 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 2020). This court “give[s] particularly great deference to the trial court’s decision weighing 

probative value against prejudice.” Cerabio LLC v. Wright Med. 

Tech., Inc., 410 F.3d 981, 994 (7th Cir. 2005).

At trial and now on appeal, Beverly argues that the relevance of these statements to Global Security lies in their alleged contradiction to Luo’s expected testimony. She testified 

Beverly never intimidated her and that she called Global Security “because she ... thinks he wasn’t going to give the laptop back ... And then the jury can decide, ‘Do I believe what 
No. 23-2577 23

she’s saying? ... .’” The district court ruled that this evidence 

was “too attenuated” of an attack on Luo’s credibility. The 

court noted the reason Luo said she had concerns was that 

Beverly did not return Abbott’s property, yet “the jury’s already heard he didn’t, and he didn’t return it until this week. 

So, how that goes to her credibility, I don’t see the link.” That 

reasoning is not an abuse of discretion. 

Given our deference to trial decisions such as these, we 

have not been presented with a convincing reason to overturn 

the jury’s verdict and to grant a new trial.

IV 

Beverly’s numerous challenges to the district court’s decisions at summary judgment, trial, and after trial do not succeed for the reasons explained above. We AFFIRM the district 

court in all respects.