[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

ex rel. Ellis v. Cleveland Police Forensic Laboratory, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-4487.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-4487

THE STATE EX REL. ELLIS, APPELLANT, v. CLEVELAND POLICE FORENSIC 

LABORATORY, APPELLEE.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. Ellis v. Cleveland Police Forensic Laboratory, Slip 

Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-4487.] 

Public Records Act—Mandamus—Statutory damages—Request for recordsretention policies of public office is not subject to R.C. 149.43(B)(8)’s 

restrictions on requests by incarcerated persons—Denial of relator’s 

request was not reasonable—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and 

statutory damages awarded to relator. 

(No. 2021-0628—Submitted October 5, 2021—Decided December 23, 2021.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 107571. 

________________ 

 Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} Appellant, L’Ddaryl D. Ellis, appeals the judgment of the Eighth 

District Court of Appeals denying his motion for an award of statutory damages 
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under the Ohio Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43. We reverse the judgment of the 

court of appeals and hold that Ellis is entitled to statutory damages. 

Background 

{¶ 2} Ellis is an inmate at the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center. In June 

2018, while confined at the Trumbull Correctional Institution, Ellis sent a request by 

certified mail to the Cleveland Police Forensic Laboratory (“CPFL”) for three 

categories of public records. First, without identifying a specific case or 

investigation, he requested “All Investigative Reports [and] All Laboratory or 

Hospital Reports,” as well as statements of police, victims, and witnesses. Second, 

he requested the results of a ballistics test of a “Skyy 9mm caliber pistol, Model CPX1, with serial #018313.” And third, he requested “Copies of all Records Retention 

Schedule, Records Retention Policy, and Public Records Policy.”

{¶ 3} In August 2018, Ellis filed a mandamus action in the Eighth District 

alleging that the CPFL had not responded to his request. In addition to an order 

compelling the CPFL to provide the requested records, Ellis sought statutory 

damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2). 

{¶ 4} The court of appeals granted CPFL’s motion for summary judgment in 

part, denied the motion in part, and granted a writ of mandamus compelling the 

production of some of the requested records. 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107571, 2019-

Ohio-710, ¶ 13. The court of appeals deemed the first request “overly broad and not 

subject to disclosure,” because Ellis “failed to specify or identify with reasonable 

clarity” which records he sought. Id. at ¶ 2. The court rejected Ellis’s second request 

because he did not obtain approval from the sentencing judge before requesting 

documents relating to a criminal investigation, as inmates are required to do under 

R.C. 149.43(B)(8). Id. at ¶ 5. Further, the court concluded that “the doctrine of res 

judicata also bar[red] Ellis from seeking a writ of mandamus” for the ballistics 

results, because he had previously been denied relief when seeking those records in 

an action before the Court of Claims. Id. at ¶ 8. 
January Term, 2021 

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{¶ 5} However, the court of appeals held that R.C. 149.43(B)(8) was 

inapplicable to Ellis’s third request—for the CPFL’s records-retention schedule and 

policies—because those records do not relate to a criminal investigation or 

prosecution. Id. at ¶ 9. The court granted a writ of mandamus ordering the CPFL to 

provide those records. Id. at ¶ 11. The CPFL subsequently informed the court that 

it had complied with the order by releasing those records to Ellis. 

{¶ 6} Because the CPFL failed to comply with an obligation under R.C.

149.43(B), Ellis filed a motion for an award of statutory damages. He then appealed 

the decision denying the writ as to his first two requests. We affirmed the judgment 

and remanded the case to the court of appeals for consideration of Ellis’s statutorydamages motion. 157 Ohio St.3d 483, 2019-Ohio-4201, 137 N.E.3d 1171, ¶ 12. 

{¶ 7} On remand, the court of appeals denied the request for statutory 

damages. In a one-paragraph journal entry, the court explained: “Although this Court 

ultimately held that the Cleveland Police Forensic Lab is required to release its 

retention schedule, it was reasonable for the Cleveland Police Forensic Lab to 

interpret R.C. § 149.43(B)(8) as requiring it to withhold these documents from Ellis 

because it was part of the larger improper request.” Ellis appealed. 

Legal analysis

{¶ 8} A person requesting public records, provided he has used a qualifying 

method of transmission, “shall be entitled to recover” an award of statutory 

damages “if a court determines that the public office or the person responsible for 

public records failed to comply with an obligation in accordance with [R.C. 

149.43(B)].” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 149.43(C)(2). We have recognized that the 

Public Records Act “provides for an award of statutory damages * * * when a court 

determines that the public office failed to comply with an obligation to provide 

access to the records.” State ex rel. Rogers v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 155 Ohio 

St.3d 545, 2018-Ohio-5111, 122 N.E.3d 1208, ¶ 23. 
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{¶ 9} Statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2) “are mandatory whenever 

a public-records custodian fails to comply with her obligation[s].” State ex rel. 

Ware v. Akron, 164 Ohio St.3d 557, 2021-Ohio-624, 174 N.E.3d 724, ¶ 18. We 

review de novo a court of appeals’ decision to grant or deny statutory damages 

under the Public Records Act. State ex rel. Armatas v. Plain Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 

163 Ohio St.3d 304, 2021-Ohio-1176, 170 N.E.3d 19, ¶ 12. 

{¶ 10} The amount of statutory damages is fixed at $100 for each business 

day during which the public office or official fails to comply with a statutory 

obligation, beginning on the day the requester files a mandamus action, up to a 

maximum of $1,000. R.C. 149.43(C)(2). However, a court may reduce the amount 

or not award statutory damages at all if it makes the following two findings: 

(a) That, based on the ordinary application of statutory law 

and case law as it existed at the time of the conduct * * * of the 

public office * * * that allegedly constitutes a failure to comply with 

an obligation * * *, a well-informed public office * * * reasonably 

would believe that the conduct * * * of the public office * * * did 

not constitute a failure to comply with an obligation in accordance 

with [R.C. 149.43(B)]; 

(b) That a well-informed public office * * * reasonably 

would believe that the conduct * * * of the public office * * * would 

serve the public policy that underlies the authority that is asserted as 

permitting that conduct * * *. 

R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a) and (b). 

{¶ 11} When a court exercises its discretion to reduce an otherwise 

mandatory statutory-damages award, we review that decision for an abuse of 

discretion. State ex rel. DiFranco v. S. Euclid, 138 Ohio St.3d 367, 2014-Ohio-
January Term, 2021 

5

538, 7 N.E.3d 1136, ¶ 14, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State 

ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Cincinnati, 157 Ohio St.3d 290, 2019-Ohio-3876, 

135 N.E.3d 772, ¶ 12. In this case, however, the court of appeals denied Ellis’s 

motion for statutory damages. We therefore review the denial of his statutorydamages request de novo. 

{¶ 12} Although the court of appeals did not indicate that it was reducing

the award, it made one of the findings necessary to support a reduction: that the 

CPFL’s interpretation of R.C. 149.43(B)(8) in support of its denial of the recordsretention documents was reasonable. Without recognizing the distinction between 

a denial and a reduction, the CPFL’s merit brief appears to misconstrue the Eighth 

District’s decision as a reduction of the award to zero and asks this court to review 

that decision for an abuse of discretion. Nonetheless, under either standard of 

review, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and award the maximum 

amount of statutory damages. 

{¶ 13} The Public Records Act imposes restrictions on the ability of an 

inmate to request records. 

A public office or person responsible for public records is not

required to permit a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a 

criminal conviction * * * to inspect or to obtain a copy of any public 

record concerning a criminal investigation or prosecution * * * 

unless the request to inspect or to obtain a copy of the record is for 

the purpose of acquiring information that is subject to release as a 

public record under this section and the judge who imposed the 

sentence * * * finds that the information sought in the public record 

is necessary to support what appears to be a justiciable claim of the 

person. 
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(Emphasis added.) R.C. 149.43(B)(8). In the absence of the necessary finding from 

the sentencing judge, an inmate is not entitled to the requested records. State ex 

rel. Fernbach v. Brush, 133 Ohio St.3d 151, 2012-Ohio-4214, 976 N.E.2d 889, 

¶ 2. 

{¶ 14} By its terms, R.C. 149.43(B)(8) applies only to records “concerning 

a criminal investigation or prosecution.” The court of appeals correctly determined 

that Ellis’s second request, for the results of ballistics tests, was precluded by R.C. 

149.43(B)(8). 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107571, 2019-Ohio-710, at ¶ 5. And in the 

earlier appeal of this case, we held that the statute also applied to Ellis’s overbroad 

request for unidentified investigative materials. 157 Ohio St.3d 483, 2019-Ohio4201, 137 N.E.3d 1171, at ¶ 12. But his third request, for the records-retention 

schedules and policies, did not relate to a criminal investigation or prosecution and 

was therefore not subject to R.C. 149.43(B)(8). The question, then, is whether it 

was reasonable for the CPFL to believe that it could reject the entire request for 

noncompliance with R.C. 149.43(B)(8) without parsing the individual requests to 

see if any fell outside the scope of that provision. 

{¶ 15} The answer to that question may be found in the plain language of 

the statute. R.C. 149.43(B)(8) excuses a public office or official from having to 

provide a record when it relates to a criminal proceeding. This provision does not 

create a blanket rule that an office or official may disregard an entire request when 

a portion thereof is subject to the prerelease approval of the sentencing judge. The 

CPFL suggests that it was reasonable for it to believe that its blanket rejection was 

appropriate but does not cite any court decisions in support of this position. 

{¶ 16} To rule in favor of the CPFL, we would have to first assume that the 

court of appeals intended to award statutory damages and then reduce the award to 

zero pursuant to R.C. 143.49(C)(2), even though that is not what the court said in 

its entry. We would then have to assume that the court of appeals implicitly 

addressed both prongs of the reduction analysis, even though the judgment entry 
January Term, 2021 

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does not mention the second prong, i.e., whether “a well-informed public office” 

would have reasonably believed that its conduct served the public policy underlying 

R.C. 149.43(B)(8). And then we would have to conclude that the court of appeals 

did not abuse its discretion in concluding that it was reasonable for the CPFL to 

have acted in a manner that is not supported by the plain language of the statute or 

any prior court decisions. This exceeds the reasonable bounds of deference inherent 

in an abuse-of-discretion review, and certainly fails under a de novo review. 

{¶ 17} We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and grant Ellis’s 

application for an award of statutory damages. Given the length of time during 

which the CPFL failed to respond, we conclude that Ellis is entitled to the maximum 

amount permitted under the statute, $1,000. 

Conclusion

{¶ 18} We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and award statutory 

damages. 

Judgment reversed. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, 

and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 

_________________ 

L’Ddaryl D. Ellis, pro se. 

Barbara A. Langhenry, Cleveland Director of Law, William M. Menzalora, 

Chief Assistant Director of Law, and Timothy J. Puin, Assistant Director of Law, 

for appellee. 

 _________________