ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

GREG ABBOTT 

The Honorable R. Kelton Conner 

Hood County Attorney 

1200 West Pearl Street 

Granbnry, Texas 76048 

Dear Mr. Conner: 

September 22, 20 I 0 

Opinion No. GA-0799 

Re: Compensation of judges serving on a juvenile 

board (RQ-0861-GA) 

You ask, on behalf of the Hood County Commissioners Court ("Commissioners Court"), 

'" [w ]ho has the authority and responsibility to establish, increase, decrease or eliminate the amount 

of compensation to be paid to the judges serving on the Juvenile Board of Hood County[.]'''' 

A brief attached to your request explains that the Hood County Juvenile Board ("Board") 

"was created under [c ]hapter 152, Human Resources Code [s ]ubchapters A and B.,,2 Subchapters 

A and B both contain provisions related to the compensation of the Board. Subchapter A provides 

that "[ t]he compensation authorized under this chapter for a judge serving on a juvenile board is in 

addition to all other compensation provided or allowed by law for a judge." TEx. HUM. REs. CODE 

ANN. § 152.0003 (West Supp. 2010). Subchapter B provides that "[s]ervice on ajuvenile board by 

a judge is an additional duty of office" and that "[t]he commissioners court may reasonably 

compensate each member of the juvenile board for the member's additional duties." Id. § 152.0034 

(a)-(b) (West 2001) (emphasis added). 

In construing section 152.0034, we "ascertain and give effect to the Legislature'S intent as 

expressed by the statute's language" and "we give meaning to the language consistent with other 

provisions in the statnte." Presidio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Scott, 309 S.W.3d 927, 930 (Tex. 2010). We 

consider first the meaning of the term "may" as used in section 152.0034(b). As previous attorney 

lRequest Letter (available at http://www.texasattomeygeneral.gov). 

'Briefat I (available athttp://www.texasattomeygeneral.gov). In addition, you clarifY that "Hood County does 

not have a Family District Coutt and no provisions for Hood County are set forth in" subchapter D of chapter 152. 

Request Letter; see also TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 152.0051-.0055 (West 2001) ("Subchapter C: County Juvenile 

Board in Counties with a Family District Court"). It is, therefore, our understanding that neither subchapter C nor D of 

chapter 152 are applicable to the Board. We also note that certain sections of subchapter A do not apply to the Board. 

See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 152.0040 (West2001) (providingthat"[s]ections 152.0002, 152.0004, 152.0005, and 

152.0009 do not apply to ajuvenile board operating under" subchapter B). 
The Honorable R. Kelton Conner - Page 2 (GA-0799) 

general opinions explain, in construing a statute, "the use of the word 'may' as opposed to 'shall' 

generally indicates discretion or choice between two or more alternatives, but the context in which 

the word appears must be the controlling factor." Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JC-0517 (2002) at 4 

(quoting Tex. Att'y Gen. LO-93-60, at 1-2); see also Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0622 (2008) 

at 3 ("The word 'may' denotes discretion not to do something.") (citing Texas Government Code 

section 311.016(1)). Nothing in the language of section 152.0034 indicates that the Legislature 

intended to use the tenn "may" in anything but its usual sense. Moreover, the term "may" in section 

152.0034(b) is qualified by the term "reasonably." TEx. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 152.0034(b) (West 

2001). It would have been unnecessary to qualifY the authority by inserting the word "reasonably" 

if the Legislature had not intended to grant a commissioners court discretionary authority over the 

amount of compensation ofa board. Cf Old Am. Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 149 S.W.3d 

111, 115 (Tex. 2004) (presuming that every word of a statute is included or excluded for a reason). 

Considering section 152.0034 in the context of subchapter B also indicates the 

commissioners court has the discretion, but not the duty, to compensate a juvenile board. The very 

next section of subchapter B uses the term "shall" in referring to the commissioners court's duty to 

reimburse juvenile board members for their actual and necessary expenses. See TEX. HUM. REs. 

CODE ANN. § 152.0035 (West 2001) ("The county shall reimburse ajuvenile board member for the 

member's actual and necessary expenses incurred in performing official duties on the board.") 

(emphasis added); see also TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.016(2) (West 2005) (explaining that the 

term "shall" imposes a duty unless the statute expressly provides otherwise or the context necessarily 

requires a different construction). Had the Legislature intended to impose a duty on the 

commissioners court to compensate a juvenile board under section 152.0034(b), it would have 

similarly used the word shall.3 Cf Old Am. Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 149 S.W.3d at 115 (presuming 

that every word of a statute is included or excluded for a reason). 

Finally, we note that prior attorney general opinions have construed other provisions of 

chapter 152 to authorize a commissioners court to set the amount of compensation of a juvenile 

board: See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. GA-0715 (2009) at 2 (construing Human Resources Code 

section 152.0971), DM-103 (1992) at 2 (construing Human Resources Code section 152.0411(c)). 

Thus, our conclusion here is consistent with other provisions in chapter 152 in regard to the 

relationship between a commissioners court and a juvenile board as to the compensation of the board 

members. 

'In addition, as evidenced by certain statutes pertaining to specific juvenile boards, the Legislature does not 

believe it imperative to compensate those serving on a juvenile board. See, e.g., TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 

152.0791(e) (West 2001) (providing that public members of the Falls County Juvenile Board serve without 

compensation); 152.0901(c) ("The juvenile board members [of Galveston County] do not receive compensation for 

serving on the juvenile board" but shall be paid $75 per month for performing certain duties). 

'The exact scope of that authority may, of course, differ depending upon the statute at issue. For example, the 

Legislature sometimes establishes a statutory minimmn and maximmn amount of compensation for a juvenile board 

within which a commissioners court must act. See Tex. All'y Gen. Op. No. DM-103 (1992) (construing Hmnan 

Resources Code section 152.0411(c)). 
The Honorable R. Kelton Conner - Page 3 (GA-0799) 

Having examined section 152.0034(b)'s express terms in the context of subchapter B, we 

conclude that section 152.0034(b) grants a commissioners court discretionary authority over the 

compensation of a juvenile board member. See Tex. Att'y Gen. LO-94-055, at 3 ("The 

commissioners court also has a role in determining the district judge's compensation. It may ... 

compensate the district judge for serving on the juvenile board [under section 152.0034]."). It is our 

opinion that the Commissioners Court has authority under section 152.0034(b) to establish, increase, 

decrease, or eliminate the amount of compensation to be paid to the judges serving on the Board.5 

'One briefreceived by our office suggests that this conclusion conflicts with state law and prior attorney general 

opinions that address the general fInancial independence of a juvenile board. See Brief from Honorable Vincent J. 

Messina, Hood County Court at Law Judge, to Nancy Fuller, at 2-3 (Mar. 26, 2010) (citing, for example, Local 

Government Code section 140.003, which provides that a juvenile board is a specialized local entity and thatthe county 

disburses and cares for its funds as the entity directs). We disagree. A juvenile board has general fInancial independence 

only to the extent that a statutory provision does not explicitly provide otherwise. Here we have a statute that expressly 

provides that the commiSsioners court has discretionary authority to compensate the members of the juvenile board. 

Moreover, none of the opinions cited in the brief construe section I 52.0034(b ) of the Human Resources Code. See 

generally, e.g., Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. JC-0209 (2000) (regarding ajuvenile board's authority to contract with an 

attorney to represent it in litigation); JC-0085 (1999) (regarding the authority of commissioners court to set salaries for 

employees of a juvenile probation department); DM-460 (1997) (regarding a juvenile board's authority to enter into 

contracts or authorize expenditures for the juvenile probation department). 
The Honorable R. Kelton Conner - Page 4 (GA-0799) 

SUMMARY 

Pursuant to section lS2.0034(b) of the Human Resources 

Code, the Hood County Commissioners Court has the authority to 

establish, increase, decrease, or eliminate the compensation paid to 

the judges serving on the Hood County Juvenile Board. 

DANIEL T. HODGE 

First Assistant Attorney General 

DAVID J. SCHENCK 

Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel 

NANCY S. FULLER 

Chair, Opinion Committee 

Christy Drake-Adams 

Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee