NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

:

STEPHEN T. TAFARO, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-4231 (MLC)

:

Plaintiff, : O P I N I O N

:

v. :

:

MELANIE MILLER, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

 :

THE PLAINTIFF, Stephen T. Tafaro, brings this pro se action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against the defendants —

(1) his former spouse, Melanie Miller, and (2) the State of New

Jersey — concerning determinations made by the New Jersey state

courts regarding his divorce, custody of his children, and child

support payments (“State Court Matter”). (See dkt. entry no. 1,

Compl.) The details of the State Court Matter have been well- 1

documented by the state courts. See Miller v. Tafaro, Nos.

A-3709-09T3, A-5461-09T3, 2011 WL 2321303 (N.J. App. Div. May 27,

2011); Miller v. Tafaro, Nos. A-2120-09T3, A-3039-09T3, 2011 WL

43311 (N.J. App. Div. Jan. 7, 2011), certif. denied, 205 N.J. 519

(2011); Miller v. Tafaro, No. A-4469-07T3, 2009 WL 1286825 (N.J.

App. Div. May 12, 2009); Tafaro v. Tafaro, No. A-1189-05T1, 2006

WL 2355070 (N.J. App. Div. Aug. 16, 2006); Tafaro v. Tafaro, No.

A-4402-04T1, 2006 WL 1911390 (N.J. App. Div. July 13, 2006).

 Tafaro paid the filing fee. (See dkt. entry no. 1 (noting 1

same).)

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THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY now moves to dismiss the claims

against it. (See dkt. entry no. 5, Notice of Mot.) Tafaro

opposes the motion. (See dkt. entry no. 7, Pl. Opp’n.) The

Court will (1) grant the motion, (2) dismiss the claims against

the State of New Jersey, and (3) dismiss, sua sponte, the claims

against Miller.2

THIS ACTION concerns a domestic relations matter involving

divorce, alimony, child custody, and child support over which the

Court lacks jurisdiction. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S.

689, 702-04 (1992); Mayercheck v. Judges of Pa. Sup. Ct., 395

Fed.Appx. 839, 842 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 945

(2011); see also Galtieri v. Kane, No. 03-2994, slip op. at 3 (3d

Cir. Mar. 4, 2004) (stating federal court has no jurisdiction

 The Court may dismiss, sua sponte, the claims asserted 2

against a nonmovant defendant:

when the allegations within the complaint “are so attenuated

and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit, ...

wholly insubstantial, ... obviously frivolous, ... plainly

unsubstantial, ... or no longer open to discussion.”

DeGrazia v. Fed. Bur. of Investigation, 316 Fed.Appx. 172, 173

(3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37

(1974)); see Smith v. Farnan, No. 10–830, 2011 WL 2119340, at *5

(D.Del. May 27, 2011) (granting motion by two defendants to

dismiss claim of fee-paying pro se plaintiff asserted against

them, and dismissing claim asserted against nonmomvant defendant,

sua sponte, in reliance on Hagans and DeGrazia); see 10-28-08

Order, Dubose v. Walsh, No. 07-45 (D. Del. Oct. 28, 2008)

(adopting Report and Recommendation, found at 2008 WL 4426090 (D.

Del. Sept. 29, 2008), which applied Hagans in action brought by

fee-paying pro se plaintiff).

2

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over domestic relations matter even when complaint is drafted in

tort, contract, “or even under the federal constitution”).

TAFARO is also attempting to avoid the determinations issued

in the State Court Matter. The proper way to do so is to seek

review through the state appellate process, and then seek

certiorari directly to the United States Supreme Court. See D.C.

Ct. of Apps. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fid.

Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-16 (1923). The Rooker-Feldman

doctrine prohibits adjudication where the relief requested would

require a federal court to either determine whether a state

court’s decision is wrong or void that decision, and thus would

prevent a state court from enforcing its orders. See McAllister

v. Allegheny Cnty. Fam. Div., 128 Fed.Appx. 901, 902 (3d Cir.

2005). This Court cannot directly or indirectly review, negate,

void, or provide relief that would invalidate decisions in the

State Court Matter. See White v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., 319 Fed.Appx.

171, 173 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming district court’s dismissal of

claim challenging state court decisions in plaintiff’s child

custody case); Kliesh v. Bucks Cnty. Dom. Rel., No. 04-4714, slip

op. at 2 (3d Cir. Oct. 27, 2005) (affirming district court’s

dismissal of complaint, as “Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the

review of a state court child support order”).

THE COURT also must abstain from exercising jurisdiction

pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine. The Court must

3

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abstain because (1) aspects of the State Court Matter can be

viewed as being ongoing, (2) important state interests are

implicated, and (3) Tafaro has an adequate opportunity to raise

the claims in state court. (See dkt. entry no. 9, Pl. Br. at 16-

20 (confirming State Court Matter is ongoing).) See Middlesex

Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 435

(1982); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971); see also

DiPietro v. N.J. Fam. Support Payment Ctr., 375 Fed.Appx. 202,

204-05 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s dismissal of

claim concerning child support, as “New Jersey courts are charged

with monitoring, enforcing, and modifying child support

obligations throughout the duration of a child support order”);

Anthony v. Council, 316 F.3d 412, 418-21 (3d Cir. 2003)

(concerning action brought by persons subject to state child

support orders).

THE SECTION 1983 CLAIMS against the State of New Jersey are

barred, as “the State of New Jersey . . . enjoy[s] sovereign

immunity in federal court” and “the State of New Jersey . . . is

[not] a ‘person’ under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”. Hussein v. New Jersey,

403 Fed.Appx. 712, 715 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s

dismissal of claim seeking damages under Section 1983 against

State of New Jersey); see Thorpe v. New Jersey, 246 Fed.Appx. 86,

86-87 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming district court’s dismissal of

complaint pursuant to Eleventh Amendment immunity, where plaintiff

4

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asserted State of New Jersey violated Section 1983 by depriving

him of custody of children). Any claims under Section 1983 that

may be construed to be against Miller are also barred, as Miller

is not a state actor. See Boyd v. Pearson, 346 Fed.Appx. 814,

816 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming district court’s dismissal of

complaint where defendant was not state actor). Section 1983

does not cover merely private conduct, no matter how wrongful. 

St. Croix v. Etenad, 183 Fed.Appx. 230, 231 (3d Cir. 2006).

TAFARO asserts that the claims against the State of New

Jersey may be construed to be against the judges involved in the

State Court Matter. (Pl. Opp’n at 12.) But such claims would be

barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. Judges cannot be

held civilly liable for their judicial acts, even when those acts

are in excess of their jurisdiction and alleged to have been done

maliciously or corruptly. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,

356-57 (1978); Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir.

2000); see also Dongon v. Banar, 363 Fed.Appx. 153, 155 (3d Cir.

2010) (affirming district court’s dismissal of claim against New

Jersey state judges involved in plaintiff’s child support case);

White, 319 Fed.Appx. at 173 (affirming district court’s dismissal

of claim asserted against New Jersey state judges involved in

plaintiff’s child custody case).

TO THE EXTENT that Tafaro asserts any discernible claims

concerning a conspiracy to deprive him of federal rights, such

5

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allegations appear to be based on mere speculation and thus are

without merit. See Gera v. Pennsylvania, 256 Fed.Appx. 563, 565-

66 (3d Cir. 2007).3

THE COURT thus intends to dismiss the entire Complaint. The

Court will issue an appropriate order and judgment.4

 s/ Mary L. Cooper 

MARY L. COOPER

United States District Judge

Dated: December 6, 2011

 The claims against Miller also may be barred by the 3

doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

 The plaintiff cross-moved for miscellaneous relief. (See 4

dkt. entry no. 9, Notice of Cross Mot., Pl. Br., & Pl. Appendix.) 

As the entire Complaint will be dismissed, the Court will deny

the cross motion as moot.

6

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