### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE O ct obe r 7, 200 3 S es sio n
LYNN ASTON BL EVI NS v. LE STER ST EVE BL EVI NS
Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Sumner County No. 2001D-303 TomE. Gr ay, Jr., Chancellor

No. M2002- 02583-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Dece m ber 30, 2003

This appea l arises fr om Wi fe’ s complaint for divorc e. B ased on H usband’s fa ilure to file an a nswer, W i fe fi l ed a m o t i o n fo r d ef au l t an d n o t i ce o f h ea ri n g. Hu s b an d at t en d ed t h e h ea ri n g pro s e and wa s aff orded the opportunity

to continue the hea

ring to retain lega l counsel but declined to do so. After
rec eiving testimony , the trial court awa rded W ife a divorce , divided marital property and aw arde d Wife reha bilitative alimonyfor 60 months. Husband appea ls, a sserting that the trial court's division of mari ta l pr op e rty was no t fai r a nde qu ita ble a ndtha

t Wif e didno t pr ov ide pr oo f s uf fi c ie nt t o establish a prope r basis for an aw ard of

reha bilitative alimony . We r ever se and modify in part the division of marital property and indebtedne ss and re classify the alimony

from re hab i l i tative to in solido . In a ll o the r r e sp e c ts, we a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of right; Judgm ent of the Chancery Court Re ve r se d and M odi fie d in pa r t, Affir m e d in pa r t a nd R e m ande d.

F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., and W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., joined.

Cha rl e s H ill B e a ty , G a lla tin , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, L e ste r S te ve B le vin s.

Br uce N . Oldham and Sue Hynds Dunning , Gallatin, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, L y nn Aston B le vin s.
OP IN ION

L ester Steve Ble vins (Husband) a nd L y nne Aston Ble vins ( Wife) marrie d on J une 19, 1976. Two childre n, both of whom are now adults, wer e born to the marria g e. On June 8, 2001, Wi fe f iled for divorc e base d on irrec oncilable diff eren ce s an d inappropria te marital c onduct. Husband w as proper ly serve d with the Complaint for Divorce on J une 11, 2001 but failed to file a n answe r. On M ay 30, 2002, Wife filed a Motion for D efault and Notice of Hea ring for June 28, 2002.H u s ban d di d n ot r et ai n an at t or n ey f or t h i s h ea r i n g , s t at i n g t h at h e t ol d h i s ch i l dr en h e wou l d mak e i t e as y for 1
hi s wi fe t o get a d i vo rce. H usband f urt her s t at ed t hat he did no t unde rs t and t hat m ari t al pro p ert y wo ul d be divi d ed and al i m o n y a w a rd e d a t t he heari ng; how ever, W i fe' s C o m p l ai nt fo r D i vo rce s p eci f i cal l y asked t hat m ari t al pro p ert y and

m a rita l d e b ts b e d ivid e d a n d tha t she b e a w a rd e d a lim o n y.

T he Stat emen t of t h e Evi den ce i n di ca t es t h at H u s ban d “ di d n ot g i v e h i s opi n i on of t h e v al u es of an y o f t he 2

m ari t al ass et s, nor d i d he dis p ut e any of t he val ues as t est i f i ed t o by t he W i fe o t her t han t o que st i o n t he val ue set by t he W i fe a s t o cer t ai n s i l ver or gol d i t ems. ”

T hese percentages ap p arent l y t ake i nt o co nsi d erat i o n t he $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 off set award ed t o W i fe b ut f ai l t o acco unt 3
f or H us band’ s as s umpt i on of t he $1 73 , 10 0 i ndebt ednes s on t he C amp bel l R oad p r op er t y , W i fe’ s ne w r es i dence wh i ch was award ed t o her.
-2- There is no tra nscript of the June 28, 2002 hearing. We do ha ve, howe ver, a Statement of the Evi dence which wa s adopted by the trial court that shows Husband appe are d pro s e at the J une 28, 2002 hearing, that he was g iven t he opportunit y to continue the he aring to obtain leg al counse l but chose not to do so, and that Wife, who wa s repr esente d by counsel, testified r eg arding the value 1 of marital pr operty

and the division of marital a ssets and debts.

Wif e ’s te sti mon y

pr ov ide d th e on ly

e vid e nc e c on c e rn ing the va lue of th e c ou ple ’s a sse ts, inc lud ing the ir

re a l pr op e rt y , g old , s ilv e r a ndc oinc oll e c tio ns , f ina nc ia l a c c ou nts , f

un ds on de po sit , a n d t h e v a l u e o f H u s b a n d ’ s b u s i n e s s , V i l l a g e D ru g s , a p h ar m a c y. H u s b a n d d i d n o tt e s t i f y. Moreove r, Husband did not object to the evidenc e offe red by Wife, he did not cross-e x amine Wife

2 to c ha lle ng e the va lue s sh e pr ov ide d, a ndhe did no t of fe r pr oo f of the va lue of

the c ou ple ’s a sse ts.

Hu sb a ndis a

ph arm a c ist . H e ow ns a ndop erat es th e bu sin e ss kno wn a s V ill a g e Dr ug s in Portland, Tennesse e. Wife was a pharmacist but she has not worke d for many y ear s and there fore would require additional education before returning to wor k in the pharma ceutica l field. Furthermore , she has no income and rece ntly underw ent bac k surg ery . Wife testified that she had linge ring disabiliti es that would preve nt her from working as a pha rmac ist for she could not stand on her f eet f or long periods of time, a s is required of a pharmacist.
Following the heari ng , the trial court divided marital assets and de bts and awa rded Wife $50,000 to equalize the divis i o n o f m ar i t al prope rty . The trial c ourt also awa rded r ehabilitative alimony to Wi fe f or a pe riod of six ty

months at $3,500 pe r month. The Statement of the Evidenc e su g g e sts t h a t t h e t o t a l m ar i t a l e s t a t e i s w o r t h $ 2 , 9 2 8 , 4 3 1

. T h e S t a t e m e n t o f t h e E v i d e n c e a lso sug g ests that 46.93% of the marital estate was awarde d to Wi fe a nd 53.07% to Husband. Husband 3 disputes both the siz e of the estate a nd the proportionate division of the assets.
On Aug ust 16, 2002, Husband, now repr esente d by counsel, filed a Mot ion for a New T rial or, Alternatively , M o t i o n to Set Aside Defa ult J udg ment. The motion was denie d. This appea l followed.

Husband ra ises two issues on appea l. First, Husband arg ues that the trial court' s division of marital asse t s an d debts was not fa ir and e quitable. Second, Husba nd arg ues that Wife did not-3-

provide proof

nece ssar y

to establish a prope r basis for an aw ard of

reha bilitative alimony . Wife
ra ise s n o is su e s on app e a l how e ve r she re qu e sts that she be a wa rd e d att or ne y

fe e s a sso c ia te d w ith this appeal.

Standard of Re view

An app e lla te c ou rt ’s re vie w o f a tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t is de novo upon the re cord of the trial court acc ompanied b y a presumption of the corr ectne ss of the finding s, unless the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e is otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P

. 13(d). Unless t here is an error of law, we must aff

irm the trial court’s decision as long as the evidenc e does not pre ponderate ag ainst the finding s. Umstot v. Umstot , 968 S.W .2d 819, 821 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Where the trial c ourt does not ma ke finding s of fa ct, we “ must conduct our own indepe ndent re view of the rec ord to determine wher e the pr eponder ance of the e vidence lie s

. ” Brooks v. Brook s , 992 S.W .2d 403, 405 (Tenn. 1999). Que stions of law are revie wed de novo with no presumption of cor rec tness. Ne lso n v . W

alMart Stores, Inc. , 8 S.W .3d 625, 628 (Tenn. 1999)

. Trial courts are aff

orded wide discre tion in divi ding the interests of pa rties in jointlyowned property

. Fo rd

v . F or d , 9 5 2 S

. W

. 2 d 8 2 4 , 8 2 5 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 6 ). Ac co rd i n gl y , t h e t ri al co u rt 's distribution wil l be g iven g reat weig ht on appea l, and will be pre sumed to be cor rec t unless we find the pre pondera nce of

the evidenc e is otherwise

. Ba rn hil l v . B ar nh ill , 826 S.W .2d 443, 449 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). The appellate courts of this state are inclined not to disturb a trial court' s division of mari ta l pr op e rt y

un le ss the y

fi ndthat the dis tr ibu tio n la c ke d pr op e r e vid e nti ary su pp ort or

re su lts from either

an er ror of law or a misapplication of the statutory require ments. Thompson v. Th ompson, 797 S.W .2d 599, 604 (Tenn. Ct. App.1990).

Di vis ion of

Ma ri ta l Pr op e rt y
Husband ha s three spe cific a rg uments conce rning the trial cour t’s division of marital property . First, Husba nd arg ues that t he divi sion of property was not fa ir and e quitable as re quired b y T en n

. C o d e An n

. § 3 6 -4 -1 2 1

. S p ec i fi ca l l y , Hu s b an d cl ai m s t h att h e t ri al co u rt fa i l ed t o as s i gn values to ce rtain asse ts and that t h e court mer ely adopted the va lues proposed by Wife. Second, Hu s b an d ar gu es t h at t h e t ri al co u rt er re d wh en i tas s i gn ed t o h i m t h e e n t i re i n d eb t ed n es s o n W i fe 's
new residenc e at 4881 Campbell Road, Cross Plains, Tenne ssee. Third, Husband a rg ues that the trial court fa iled to consider the tax conse quence s of a future sale of V illage Drug s, and asse rts that such
a s a l e s u b s t a n t i a l l y a l t e r s t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e e s t a t e a w ar d e d e a c h p ar t y.
Husband asserts tha t the trial court failed to va lue much of the marital estate in the divorce decr ee a nd that such renders the division of mar ital property inequitable. Husba nd corr ectly notes that the divorce decr ee a ssigns va lues to the real property but assig ns no values to the other ma rital assets. B ut for the Nic holas Fund, the Statement of Evidence adopted by the t rial court reve als that the trial court rec eived testimony from Wife reg arding the value of all marital property , as we ll as he r p ro po se d d ivi sio n th e re of . The Sta te me nt of Ev ide nc e a lso re ve a ls tha t Wife is the on ly pa rt yW e f i nd t hat i t was r eas onabl e f or t he t r i al co ur t t o acce pt W i fe’ s va l uat i ons of t he mari t al proper t y as r ef l ect ed 4
in the S ta te m e n t o f th e E v id e n c e , in c lud ing W ife’s v a lua tio n o f t h e p a rtie s’ 1 9 9 6 J e e p , w h ic h H u sb a n d ’s b rie f co rr e c tly p o ints o u t wa s o m itt e d fro m the F ina l D e c re e o f D ivo rc e

. -4- who proposed va lues for ma rital property

. Husband did not introduce e vidence of value s and did not dispute the values pr esente d by Wife.

The c ourt is to, "e quitably divide, distribute or assig n the marital prope rty betwee n the parties without reg ard to marital fault in proportions as the c ourt d ee m s j u s t

. " Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 4- 121(a) (1). F urthermor e, whe n fashioning an equitable division, the trial court must consider va rious rele vant fa ctors, including the leng th of t he mar riag e; the ag e, hea lth, employ ability , and ea rning capa city of ea ch of the parties; the pa rt i es ' ability

for f uture a cquisitions of capital and inc ome; eco n omic circ umstances of the parties at the time the division is t o come into ef fec t; the tax conseque nces a nd costs related to the rea sonably fore seea ble sale of

an asse t as well as other
rea sonably

fore seea ble expenses; and such othe r fa ctors nee ded to eva luate the e quities betwee n the parties. Te nn. Code Ann.§ 36-4- 121(c)



### . The pa rties, not the court, are responsible for proposing values to m arital prope rty

. W allace v. W allace , 733 S.W .2d 102, 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

The va lue of a

marital asse t is determined by considering all re levant evide nce reg arding value (citation omitt ed). The burden is on the pa rties to produce competent evidenc e of va lue, and t h e parties are bound by the evidenc e they

prese nt (citation omi t t ed). Thus the trial court, in its discretion, is fre e to place a value on a mar ital asset that is within the rang e of e vidence submitt ed (c itation omit ted).

Koch v. Koch , 8 7 4 S

. W

. 2 d 5 7 1 , 5 7 7 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 3 ) ( q u o t i n g W allace , 733 S.W .2d at 107).
Ap plying the log ic g le a ne d f ro m W allace and Koch to the situation before us, Husband and Wife both had the burde n of bring ing forth evidence reg arding the value of marital asse ts, and they
are bound by

the evidenc e they

prese nt, or in this case, did not prese nt. I n addition, the trial court is f ree to a ssign the marital prope rty a value that is “within the rang e of e vidence submitt ed.” Koch , 874 S.W .2d at 577. Moreove r, a tria l court has an enormous amount of discr etion in its di vision of marital prope rty

and its division is g iven g reat weig ht on appea l. Dellinger v. D ellinger , 958 S.W .2d 778, 780 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) ( citing W ade v. W ade , 897 S.W .2d 702, 715 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); W a ll a c e v. W

allace , 733 S.W .2d 102, 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987)) . We are also cog nizant that the d iv is io n o f ma

r it a l p r o p e r ty n e e d n o t b e e q u a l in o r d e r to b e e q uitable. W atters v. W

atter s, 959 S.W .2d 585, 591 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

Wif e ’s va lue s we re the on ly

on e s su bmi tte d, the re fo re it w a s r e a so na ble fo r the tr ia l c ou rt

to
a c c e pt Wif

e ' s va luatio ns of the mari ta l pr op e rt y a s re fl e c te d in the Sta te me nt of the Ev ide nc e

. Th is 4 is certa inly

within the range of evide nce pr esente d to the court. How ever , since ne ither the Statement of the Evidence nor the Final Dec ree of Divorc e applies a value to the Nic holas Fund, w eB y m a k ing W ife re sp o n sib le fo r th is d e b t, the trial c o u r t’ s c a lc u la tio n o f p e rc e n ta g e s o f t h e m a rita l es ta te 5

awar ded t o each par t y as r ef l ect ed i n t he St at ement of t he E vi dence i s now more acc ur at e.
-5- are un able to de te rm ine if that va lue is or is no t of su c h a n e xten t that it ma y a ffect th e eq uit able division of the marital assets. Ac cording ly , we must vac ate the a war d of the Nic ho l as Fu n d and
rema nd this li mited issue to the trial court for valuation and e quitable division. See Langschm idt v. Langschmidt , 8 1 S. W.3 d 7 41 , 7 50 (T e nn . 200 2) (v a c a tin g a nd re ma nd ing du e to fa c t tha t c ou rt c ou ld not determine if division of mar ital property was e quitable).

Husband’s second arg ument with the trial court’ s division of marital property perta ins to the $173,100 indebtedness on Wife' s new re sidence at 4881 Campbell Road, Cross Plains, Tennessee

. The re sidence was a war ded to Wife but the indebtedness was char g ed to H usband. The re sidence , valued a t $200,000, was ac qui re d s h o rt l y prior to the divorc e and is re fer red to in the re cord a s “Wife’s ne w re sidence .” Specif ically , the re sidence was de ed ed t o Wife three months af ter the Complaint for Divorce was fil ed . Husband c ontends that the debt should be a ssigne d to Wi fe, the party who incurr ed the de bt and who re ceive d the ass et

. W i fe arg ues that the a ssignment of the indebtedness to Husba nd was prope r, in light of he r lac k of income, me dical p roblems, financ ial needs a nd Husband' s income.

This Court considere d the s ame issue in Dellinger v. D ellinger , 958 S.W .2d 778, 782 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 19 97 ), wh e re in the hu sb a ndarg ue d that the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in or de ri ng him to p a y the c re dit
car d debts incurr ed by

his wife af

ter the pa rties' separation. Dellinger re c ite d f a c tor s se t f

orth i n Houghland v. Houghland fo r the app ortio nin g of

ma ri ta l de bts , w hic h a

re : (1 ) w hic h p art y

inc ur re d th e de bt a ndthe re a so n f or the de bt; (2) whic h party

benef itted from the loan; and (3) whic h party

is better able to assume the debt.
Houghland v. Houghland, 884 S.W .2d 619, 624 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

I n Dellinger , t h e cr edit car d debts wer e incur red by the wife , they

wer e incur

red w hile the parties we re living apart, and the husband did not benefit from them. Althoug h the debts incurr ed by the wife wer e subst antially less than here, the De lli ng e r court found e rror in the trial court' s order
re qu ir ing the hu sb a ndto p a y the wi fe ' s c re dit

c ardde bts inc ur

re d w hil e the pa

rt ie s w e re liv ing apa

rt

. Her e, the indebte dness is substantial, $173,100, and Wife rec eived the encumber ed asset which has a value g reater than the debt. Apply ing the fac tors in Houghland and the r ational in Dellinger , we fi ndthe tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d in a sse ssi ng the $1 73 ,1 00 mortg a g e on the re c e ntl y a c qu ir e d r e sid e nc e to Hu sb a ndins te a d o f Wi fe . A c c or din g ly , w e re ve rs e the tr ia l cou rt ’s a llo c a tio n o f this de bt a nda sse ss the $173,000 mortg ag e to Wife instead of H usband. 5

Husband’s third a

rg ument with the trial court’s divisi on of m arital property perta ins to the tax i mplications of a future sale of V illage Drug s, arg uing tha t Tenn. Code Ann. 36- 4-121(c )( 9) compelled the tr ial court to consider the tax im plications

. The only evidenc e presented to the tria l-6-

court pe rtaining to the value of Villag e Drug s was $1,450,000. The trial court a war ded Wife a one

ha lf int e re st i n V ill a g e Dr

ug s a ndre qu ir e d th a t H us ba ndpu rc ha se Wife’s $7 25 ,0 00 ha lf int e re st. Specifica lly , the trial court g ave Husband a period of time to purcha se Wife’s interest and a war ded Wife a lien ag ainst the business to secure Wife’s interest.
Husband insists that the property awa rded Wife is excessive due to the trial court’s a lleg ed fa ilu re to c on sid e r tha t he wi ll be ar the ta x liabil ity if a ndwh e n h e se lls the bu sin e ss. Wif e a sse rt s that Husband did not offe r proof at trial re g arding the sale of the bus iness, that nothing in the r ecor d indicates t h at h e i n t ends to liquidate the business, and that until any such sale is c onsummated, Husband stands to bene fit from monthly income g ener ated f

rom the busi n es s as we l l as any appre ciation in value.
Fulbright v. Fulbright , 64 S.W .3d 359 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) addressed such tax
c on sid e ratio ns a ndhe ld tha t, “ Whil e the ta x co ns e qu e nc e s c e rt a inl y are a fa c tor to be c on sid e re d in making an equitable distribution of property , i t i s b u t o n e factor .” Id. at 366. In Fulbright , the hus b a n d ar g u e d th a t th e tria l c o u r t’ s d iv is io n w a s in e q u it ab le f o r th e c o u r t h a d n o t c o n s id e r e d the tax consequence s. This Court aff irmed the trial court’ s division of marital property in Fulbright

and dismiss ed the husba nd’s ar g ument that the trial court’s division was in e q u it a b le , holding, “ There was no pr oo f at tr ia l th a t H us ba ndint e nd e d to liq uid a te a ny of the se a sse ts in the ne ar fu tur e . Thu s, wh ile
e ve ntu a lly th ey wi ll be su bje c t to inc ome ta x, thi s may no t oc c ur

fo r m a ny y e ars . I n th e int e ri m, Husband will rec eive income , and any appre ciation on the cur

rently untaxed assets.” Id . at 366-367.

Wif e te sti fi e d th a t he r v a luat ion of Vi lla g e Dr

ug s w a s b a se d o n H us ba nd ’s state me nt. Hu sb a nd did n o t r a i s e t h e t a x c o n s e q u e n c e o f a s a l e a s a n i s s u e a t t r i a l

. T h e r e i s n o e vid e nc e to sug g est a sale of Villag e Drug s is in the fore seea ble future, and the trial court did not or der H usband to sell Village Drug s. Furthe r, the unc ontrave rted testimony contained in the r ecor d ref lects that the business will ge nerate income f rom which o n l y Hu sband will benef it. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4- 121(c) provides that the tria l court is to consider a ll "re levant" fa ct o rs when dividing marital property . Ba sed upon the for eg oing, w e find that the evidenc e does not pr eponder ate a g ainst the trial court’s a war d of Villag e Dr ug s to Husband and the g ranting of a lien of $725,000 to Wi fe.
Rehabilitative Alimony

Husband' s second issue on appea l is that the t rial court's a war d of re habilitative alimony was improper. Specifica lly , Husband asserts that the record lacks any evidenc e jus tify ing an award of spousal support, or in the alternative, the lower court' s awa rd wa s excessive and should be r educe d to r e fl e c t th e true pu rp os e of a n a wa rdof re ha bil ita tive ali mo ny . Hus ba ndc ite s th e c ou ple s' educational backg rounds, ea rning capa cities and fina ncial re source s as re asons why alimony is not appropriate. The trial court he ld:

The Wife is in need of

alimony for he r own support a nd maintenanc e. I nasmuch a s the statutory

pref ere nce is for

reha b i l i t ati ve alimony , the Wife is here by awa rded reha bilitative a limony for a period of six ty months in the amount of $3 , 5 0 0 each,T h e v er s i on of T en n

. Code An n § 36- 5- 101( d) ( 1) a ppl i ed an d c i t ed abov e h as s i n ce be en a men ded. 6

-7- with th e Co u r t t o r e ta in ju r is d ic ti o n to mo d if y o r e xte n d th is a w ar d if

ap p r o p r iate

. The Court finds that the Husband has the ability to pay this amount based upon the div isi on of

a sse ts p ro po se d h e re in a ndthe inc ome a nti c ipate d th e re fr om. Wife reque sted perma nent alim ony of $4,500 per month and arg ues t hat t he re cord c ontains substantial evidence to support an awa rd of r ehabilitative alimony , in c lu d in g h e r testimonyreg arding he r l a c k o f i nc ome , me dic a l pr ob le ms a ndre ma ini ng dis abil iti e s a ndHu sb and 's mon thl y inc ome resulting from prope rty

division which was esti mated to be be tween $13,000 a nd $15,000 per month.
When deciding whether

an awa rd of support and maintena nce is a ppropriate , the trial court
mus t c on sid e r the fo llo wi ng re le va nt f a c tor s: (A) T he relative earning capa city , obliga tions, needs and financ ial resour ces of eac h party including inc ome from pe nsion, profit sharing or retirement plans and a ll other
so ur c e s; (B ) The r elative e ducation and training of eac h party , the ability and opportunity of each party

to s e c ur e su c h e du c a tio n a ndtr a ini ng , a ndthe ne c e ssi ty of a pa rt y to
secur e further e ducation and tr ai n i n g t o improve such pa rty ' s earning c apac ity

to a
re a so na ble le ve l; (C) The dur ation of the mar riag e; ( D ) T h e a g e a n d m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n o f e a c h p ar t y; (E) The phy sical conditi o n o f ea ch party , including, but not limited to, phy sical disabilityor inca

pacity due to a c hronic de bilitating disease ; (F ) The e x tent to w h i ch i t would be undesira ble for a party to seek e mploy ment outside the home bec ause suc h party wi l l be custodian of

a minor child of the marria g e; (G) T he sepa

rate assets of e ach pa

rty , both rea l a nd persona l, ta ng ible and intang ible; (H) T h e provisions made with reg ard to the ma rital property

as def ined in § 36-4- 121; (I ) The sta ndard of

living of the parties e stablished during the marriag e; (J) Th e e xten t to wh ic h each party ha s ma de su c h ta ng ibl e a ndint a ng ibl e c on tr ibu tio ns to the mar

ri a g e a s m o n e t a

r y an d h o m e m a ke r c on tr ibu tio ns ; a ndta ng ibl e and intang ible contributions by a party to the education, training or incre ased e arning p o w e r o f t h e o t h e r p ar t y; (K ) T he re la tiv e fa

ult of the pa

rt ie s in ca se s whe re the c ou rt , in its dis c re tio n, de e ms it appropriate to do so; and (L ) Such other f

actor s, including the tax conse quence s to e ach party , as ar e nec essary to c on sid e r the e qu iti e s b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s.
Tenn. Co de Ann. § 36- 5-101(d) (1). Furthermore , while a tria l court must consider a ll releva nt 6 statut ory fa c tor s to de te rm ine if a n ec on omi c a lly dis a dv a nta g e d spo us e c a n b e re ha bil ita te d, the mos t-8-

i m p o r t a n ts t a t u t o r y f

a c t o r s ar e t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e d s p o u s e ' s n e e d a n d t h e o t h e r s p o u s e ' s ab i l i t y t o p a y. Burlew v. Burlew , 40 S.W .3d 465, 470 (Tenn. 2001) ; Robertson v. Robe rtson , 76 S.W .3d 337, 342 (Tenn. 2002)

. Husband a nd Wife were mar ri ed fo r almost 25 y ear s. Wi fe is 51 y ear s old and has no income. She has not wor

ked outside of the home for se vera l y ear s and would nee d to take additional
c la sse s to be able to wo rk in the fi e ld in wh ic h sh e ob ta ine d h e r d e g re e . Wif e te sti fi e d th a t sh e did not anticipate be ing ab l e t o co n t ri b u te to her ow n support in the near future. In addition, she has
re c e ntl y un de rg on e ba c k s ur g e ry , whi ch pr e ve nts he r f ro m sp e nd ing e xten de d ti me on he r f e e t. Moreove r, she does not e x pect her medical problems to improve signific antly . I n contra st, the rec ord shows that Husband is g ainfully employ ed and ha s a steady monthlyincome.

The trial court is g iven broad discretion in awa rding spousal support. W

att e rs , 959 S.W .2d at 5 9 3 (c i t i n g Br

own v . B ro wn, 913 S.W. 2 d 1 6 3 , 1 6 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994)) . “The amount of
a lim on y a wa rd e d is larg e ly

a ma tte r le ft to the dis c re tio n o f the tr ia l c ou rt , a ndthe app e lla te c ou rt s will not int erf

ere except in the case of an a buse of discr etion.” Burlew v. Burlew , 40 S.W .3d 465, 470 (Tenn. 2001) . “A tria l court ac ts within i ts discretion when it applies the c orre ct leg al standar d and re ache s a dec ision that is not clea rly unre asonable.” Bogan v. Bogan , 60 S.W .3d 721, 733 (T e nn . 2 00 1) . U po n a

tho ro ug h r e vie w o f the re c or d, we fi ndthe e vid e nc e do e s n ot p re po nd e rate ag ainst the amount of the trial court' s awa rd of spousal support. Thus, the trial court's a war d to Wi fe of spousal support of $3,500 pe r month for a p er i o d of 60 months is affirmed. H oweve r, we take issue with the trial court' s ref ere nce to this awa

rd as r ehabilitative.

Rehabil i t at i v e s u p p o rt an d m ai n t en an ce i s a s ep ar at e c l as s o f s p o u s al s u p p o rt as di stinguished from alimony

in solido and periodic alimony . Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-101(d) (1). " [T] he adve nt of
re h ab i l i t at i v e s u p p o rt d i d n o t t o t al l y d i s p l ac e p er m an en t al i m o n y ; t h e co u rt s m ay s t i l l aw ar d l o n gterm support an d m ai n t en ance until remarriag e or de ath of the r ecipient in situations where reha bilitation i s simplynot fea sible.” Is be ll v . I sb e ll , 816 S.W. 2d 73 5, 73 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 1) . T he fa c ts befor e us establish that it will be most difficult to rehabilitate Wife g iven Wife’s ag e and he alth. Admittedly , Wife possesses t he same educational backg round as Husba nd, howeve r, due to he r lac k of work e x perie nce a nd medical pr oblems, it is unlikely that the trial court's a war d will enable he r to be re habilitated. Acc ording ly , we f ind tha t the awa

rd of reha bilitative a limony is not supported by the fa cts of thi s case

. Neve rtheless, we ag ree that Wife is deserving of alimony ; theref ore, the trial
c o u r t ’ s a w ar d o f $ 3 , 5 0 0 p e r m o n t h f o r 6 0 m o n t h s i s m o d i f

i e d t o a l i m o n y in solido rathe r than reha bilitative.
Attorney Fe es Finally , Wife is seeking to be re imbursed the attorney fee s associate d with this appeal. She relies on Lancaster v. Lancaster and ar gu es that she should not have to use assets re ceive d in the divorce to defe nd the claims Husband r aises on appe al. 671 S.W.2d 501, 504 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984)

. Given the f

act that both parties were succe ssful on appea l, we dec line to awar d attorney fee s. See-9-

Sm ith v . S

mi th , 984 S.W .2d 606, 610 (Tenn. Ct. App

. 1 9 99). Ac cording ly , both parties ar e responsible for

their re spective attorney

fee s associate d with this appeal.

Acc ording ly , the t rial court's decision is reve rsed in part, modi fied in part, affir med in part and re manded. Costs are taxed to Husband.



### __________________________________ FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., JUDGE