UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-4907

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TRAVIS DORAN RAMSEUR, a/k/a 50,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. 

Voorhees, District Judge. (5:05-cr-00009-RLV-DCK-21)

Argued: March 26, 2010 Decided: May 13, 2010

Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Duncan wrote the 

opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge King joined.

ARGUED: Nathan J. Taylor, ANDERSON TERPENING, PLLC, Charlotte, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

ON BRIEF: William R. Terpening, ANDERSON TERPENING, PLLC, 

Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Edward R. Ryan, 

Acting United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Travis Ramseur (“Ramseur”) appeals his conviction 

and sentencing for conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute cocaine, cocaine base, and marijuana in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 846. He challenges the district court’s decision 

not to declare a mistrial after a witness mentioned a murder 

charge during examination, as well as its decision to apply a 

sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(d). Constrained 

by the applicable standards of review, we affirm.

I.

During the course of Ramseur’s four-day trial and four-day 

sentencing hearing, the government presented evidence composed 

largely of witness testimony. We provide a general recitation 

of the relevant facts, but focus on particular testimony as 

needed. We set forth the facts in the light most favorable to 

the government, the prevailing party below. United States v. 

Mehta, 594 F.3d 277, 279 (4th Cir. 2010).

A.

Between 1999 and 2004, Rickie Eckles (“Eckles”) ran a drug 

distribution operation in and around Statesville, North 

Carolina, in Iredell County. The operation involved dozens of 

individuals and large quantities of cocaine, crack, and 
3

marijuana. Sometime in the early 2000s, Eckles formed an 

association with Ramseur, through which Ramseur bought bulk 

quantities of drugs and resold them on the street. 

After Eckles and thirty-five other coconspirators were 

indicted, in their quest for sentence reductions based on 

substantial assistance, he and seven others testified about 

Ramseur’s various roles and extensive involvement in the 

venture.1

 

1 The government produced one additional witness at trial 

who was not indicted as part of the Eckles conspiracy, but who 

had personal knowledge of Ramseur’s activity.

 Also, Detective David Ramsey of the Iredell County 

Sheriff’s Office testified about his in-depth investigation of 

Ramseur. Detective Ramsey conducted surveillance of Ramseur 

while he bought drugs from Eckles, listened to numerous 

wiretapped phone conversations in which Ramseur talked about his 

drug trafficking, and personally interviewed every cooperating 

witness prior to their testifying at Ramseur’s trial. This 

cumulative testimony painted a detailed picture of Ramseur’s 

involvement: it made out the amounts of cocaine, crack, and 

marijuana Ramseur purchased; the individuals in the conspiracy 

whom he worked with to sell drugs; and the time period, 

beginning as early as 1996, during which he trafficked in the 

Statesville area. 
4

During the course of Eckles’s examination, he was asked 

when he began selling drugs to Ramseur. Eckles first said he 

began dealing with Ramseur in 2000 or 2001, but later said it 

was in 2003. He maintained, however, that he stopped selling to 

Ramseur in November 2004. When defense counsel asked if he was 

sure about when he stopped selling to Ramseur, Eckles said, 

“[m]y last time I dealt with him was the time -- if that was the 

time when the murder charge -- that’s the last time.” J.A. 187. 

Defense counsel moved to strike this comment, and the district 

court granted the motion. The district court also instructed 

the jury, “[m]embers of the jury, don’t consider the last 

remark. Strike it.” Id. 

The jury convicted Ramseur of the sole count under 18 

U.S.C. § 846. In special verdicts, it attributed to Ramseur the 

maximum amount of crack and cocaine charged by the government, 

“50 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a 

detectable amount of cocaine base” and “5 kilograms or more of a 

mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of powder 

cocaine.” J.A. 948. However, the jury attributed only the 

minimum amount of marijuana that they had been asked to find, 

“less than 50 kilograms.” J.A. 949. 
5

B.

Prior to Ramseur’s sentencing hearing, the United States 

Probation Office (“Probation”) prepared a presentence report, 

calculating Ramseur’s recommended guidelines sentence under 

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. Based on his involvement in the conspiracy, 

Ramseur’s offense level was 36. Probation determined, however, 

that Ramseur was also directly responsible for three murders and 

so, under § 2D1.1(d), cross-referenced § 2A1.1 and assigned 

Ramseur an offense level of 43.2

Ramseur filed an objection to the application of 

§ 2D1.1(d). In response, the government sought to establish 

that Ramseur was responsible for three murders, “during the 

course of the conspiracy . . . [and] in furtherance of a drug 

conspiracy.” J.A. 963. In so doing, the government again 

relied predominately on the testimony of cooperating witnesses.

The first murder occurred on May 25, 2001, on Wilson Lee 

Boulevard (the “Wilson Lee Boulevard” murder). This murder grew 

out of a theft of drug proceeds by a dealer named Nakia White. 

Demetrius Thompson, another dealer who did not receive a portion 

 

2 Section 2D1.1(d) provides, “[i]f a victim was killed under 

circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1111 . . . [one must] apply § 2A1.1 (First Degree Murder) or 

§ 2A1.2 (Second Degree Murder), as appropriate.” The base 

offense level for § 2A1.1 is 43.
6

of the stolen proceeds to which he felt entitled, prevailed upon 

Ramseur, who was known for possessing a number of firearms and 

for using violence against rival dealers, to assist in 

retaliating for the slight. The two knew that White sold crack 

with Roxanne Eckles out of her apartment, and so went to 

Roxanne’s apartment, along with Eckles-coconspirator O’Kiera 

Myers, and shot into it, killing John Lewis Davis in the 

process. A week later, Ramseur returned and fired into the 

apartment again, but did not manage to harm anyone.

The other murders occurred in November 2004, on Brevard 

Street (the “Brevard Street” murders). At the time, victims 

Angelo Stockton and Timothy Cook, rival dealers in Statesville, 

had been engaged in a longstanding feud with Ramseur and his 

associates. Because of the feud, gunfire had been exchanged on 

several occasions. Ramseur’s associates had shot at Stockton, 

Cook, and their associates, and Ramseur had participated in 

shooting up a house, seeking to kill them. On November 16, 

2004, Stockton and Cook encountered several of Ramseur’s 

associates at a drinking establishment, and a fight ensued. In 

the course of the fight, three of Ramseur’s associates, two of 

whom were named in the Eckles conspiracy, summoned Ramseur 

because they knew he possessed numerous firearms. Ramseur 

collected Al Bellamy, an associate and member of the conspiracy, 

and drove to the drinking establishment, where they encountered
7

Cook and Stockton outside. Ramseur and Bellamy shot and killed 

both.

At the sentencing hearing, the three associates who 

summoned Ramseur to Brevard Street testified about the event. 

Though each had personal knowledge of these murders, two said 

that they did not know the reason for the underlying feud, and 

the third said it was “[j]ust some beef about like neighborhoods 

or something.” J.A. 1277. Other cooperators who testified 

about their knowledge of the murders similarly disclaimed any 

knowledge of the source of the feud. The government was able to 

provide an explanation, however, by calling to the stand Tyrone 

Brandon, who had been convicted of unrelated charges of drug 

distribution in the Statesville area. Brandon had been 

incarcerated with Al Bellamy in county prison after the murders 

occurred, and testified to what Bellamy told him about them:

Q: [D]id [Bellamy] tell you what the argument was 

over?

A: He told me it was over drugs.

Q: Did he also tell you that other people thought it 

was over a girl, but it was really over drugs?

A: Yes ma’am.

Q: Did he describe in what way it was over drugs or 

he just told you it was over drugs?

A: He said that [Stockton] refused to pay [Cary 

Phifer] for the drugs that [Cary] had fronted him 

to sell.
8

J.A. 1413-14. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court 

overruled Ramseur’s objection to the application of § 2D1.1(d), 

finding that Ramseur was “directly accountable” for the Wilson 

Lee Boulevard and Brevard Street murders. J.A. 1783-84. The 

district court adopted Probation’s recommendation, and sentenced 

Ramseur to life imprisonment. He now appeals.

II.

On appeal, Ramseur challenges his conviction and his 

sentencing. Ramseur contends that the district court should 

have declared a mistrial after Rickie Eckles referenced a murder 

charge while testifying about Ramseur’s involvement in the drug 

conspiracy. Ramseur further contends that his sentence should 

be vacated because the district court erred in finding that the 

murders of Davis, Cook, and Stockton were “relevant conduct” 

under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, and thus grounds for applying the 

§ 2D1.1(d) sentencing enhancement.3

 

3 We are aware that the district court is obligated to 

consider evidence of relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, 

United States v. Hayes, 322 F.3d 792, 801 (4th Cir. 2003), and 

that in this case, the district court did not make its 

determinations explicit. Ramseur, however, does not argue that 

 We consider these arguments 

in turn.

(Continued)
9

A.

We first consider Ramseur’s challenge to his conviction. 

Ramseur argues that Eckles’s comment was prejudicial to the 

point that the district court had to dismiss the jury, because 

the comment informed them of highly damaging information about 

Ramseur that did not relate to the drug charge for which he was 

being tried. Because Ramseur did not move for a mistrial below, 

we review the district court’s decision not to declare one sua 

sponte for plain error. See United States v. Castner, 50 F.3d 

1267, 1272 (4th Cir. 1995). 

A criminal defendant suffers sufficient prejudice to 

warrant a new trial if “there is a reasonable possibility that 

the jury’s verdict was influenced by the material that 

improperly came before it.” United States v. Barnes, 747 F.2d 

 

the district court failed to consider § 1B1.3. This is probably 

so because the district court responded to the government’s 

stated intention of proving that the murders were committed 

“during . . . [and] in furtherance of a drug conspiracy,” J.A. 

963, by finding that Ramseur was “directly responsible” for the 

murders, J.A. 1783-84. This finding clearly indicates that the 

district court found the conduct relevant under § 1B1.3. 

Accordingly, although it would have been preferable for the 

district court to make an express finding of relevance, because

the record clearly demonstrates considerations relevant to 

§ 1B1.3, we will not find clear error on these facts based on a 

failure to consider that guideline.
10

246, 250 (4th Cir. 1984) (internal quotations and citation 

omitted). In the context of witness testimony, sufficient 

prejudice does not exist if, despite the testimony, the jury 

“could make individual guilt determinations by following the 

court’s cautionary instructions.” United States v. West, 877 

F.2d 281, 288 (4th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989). 

When considering whether the jury could make individualized 

determinations by following the court’s instructions, several 

factors are relevant: (1) whether the prosecutor sought to bring 

out the comment and, if so, whether that was with an improper 

purpose; (2) whether the district court’s instruction 

sufficiently informed the jury that it could not consider the 

testimony; (3) whether the jury’s verdict fairly implies that it 

was not influenced by the testimony; and (4) the weight of the 

evidence. United States v. Dorsey, 45 F.3d 809, 817-18 (4th 

Cir. 1995). 

As a threshold matter, we are unconvinced that Eckles’s 

comment could be considered prejudicial. Eckles stated, “[m]y 

last time I dealt with him was the time -- if that was the time 

when the murder charge -- that’s the last time.” J.A. 187. 

This comment does not provide any insight into who was charged 

with a murder. Upon hearing it, all the jury could infer is 

that Eckles sold drugs to Ramseur until the time that a “murder 
11

charge” interrupted their association. This inference, standing 

alone, is hardly prejudicial to Ramseur.

Furthermore, even if Eckles’s comment had the power to 

prejudice Ramseur, under the Dorsey factors, Ramseur has failed 

to show that the comment was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant 

a mistrial. First, as Eckles was responding to defense counsel, 

there is no evidence here that the prosecutor sought to bring

out the comment, which means the prosecutor did not attempt to 

mislead the jury. Where the prosecutor cannot be held 

accountable for the comment, we customarily find insufficient 

prejudice to warrant a mistrial. United States v. Johnson, 610 

F.2d 194, 197 (4th Cir. 1979). Second, the district court ably 

addressed Eckles’s comment, giving the jury a firm, immediate 

instruction that they could not consider it. Third, the jury’s 

verdict demonstrates that the jury was not influenced by 

Eckles’s comment. The jury could have attributed the maximum 

amount of marijuana to Ramseur but did not, thereby evidencing 

that it paid attention to the evidence and not the comment. 

Fourth, the weight of the evidence “clearly establishe[d] all 

the facts necessary for proof of the illegal conspiracy.” 

United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 235 

(1940). Notably, Ramseur did not argue that the evidence was 

insufficient to convict him, thereby conceding that the jury had 

enough to rely upon in its deliberation. 
12

Accordingly, we find that the district court committed no 

error when it did not order a mistrial.

B.

We turn now to Ramseur’s challenges to his sentencing. He 

argues that the district court erred when enhancing his offense 

level under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(d) because it based the enhancement 

on murders that were not relevant to his crime of conviction 

under § 1B1.3. We review the district court’s legal conclusions 

de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States 

v. Martinez-Melgar, 591 F.3d 733, 737 (4th Cir. 2010). As 

Ramseur’s arguments concern whether the murders applied under 

§ 2D1.1(d) are relevant conduct within the meaning of § 1B1.3, 

we begin with a brief discussion of these provisions.

If an individual being sentenced under § 2D1.1 has 

committed a crime that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1111 within federal jurisdiction, the district court may 

enhance the offense-level calculation under § 2D1.1(d). In 

order to do so, the district court must determine that the 

murders are relevant within the meaning of § 1B1.3. The 

district court first determines the scope of the underlying 

relevant conduct based on “all acts and omissions committed, 

aided [and] abetted . . . that were part of the same course of 

conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.” 
13

See § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), (2). A murder is then relevant if it 

occurs during and in furtherance of the crime of conviction, or 

conduct that is part of a same course of conduct or common 

scheme or plan as the crime of conviction. See United States v. 

Pauley, 289 F.3d 254, 259 (4th Cir. 2002).

When determining if conduct is part of a “common scheme or 

plan” or of the “same course of conduct,” we apply “a fairly 

straightforward test.” Pauley, 289 F.3d at 259. We consider:

such factors as the nature of the defendant’s acts, 

his role, and the number and frequency of repetitions 

of those acts, in determining whether they indicate a 

behavior pattern. The significant elements to be 

evaluated are similarity, regularity and temporal 

proximity between the offense of conviction and the 

uncharged conduct. Although an appellate court cannot 

formulate precise recipes or ratios in which these 

components must exist in order to find conduct 

relevant, a district court should look for a stronger 

presence of at least one of the components if one of 

the components is not present at all. If the 

uncharged conduct is both solitary and temporally 

remote, then there must be a strong showing of 

substantial similarity.

Id. (quoting United States v. Mullins, 971 F.2d 1138, 1144 (4th 

Cir. 1992). With this framework in mind, we consider Ramseur’s 

arguments. 
14

We limit our consideration to the Brevard Street murders.4

Ramseur’s first argument is a challenge to the district 

court’s credibility determination on Brandon, a kind of 

determination we can scarcely reverse. As we have said, “when a 

 

Ramseur does not contest that he committed these murders during 

his crime of conviction. Rather, he contends only that the 

district court relied on insufficient evidence to find them 

relevant, because it relied on the statements of Tyrone Brandon, 

a witness who testified that the murders occurred because 

Stockton refused to pay Ramseur’s associate, Cary Phifer, for 

drugs Phifer had fronted Stockton. First, Ramseur argues that 

Brandon was not a credible witness because he was “a felon [who 

testified] . . . with an expectation of a reduction in 

sentence,” Appellant’s Br. at 27, and so could not provide a

reliable explanation as to why Ramseur killed Stockton and Cook. 

Second, Ramseur argues that Brandon’s hearsay testimony could 

not be used to find the murders relevant because other witnesses 

testified from personal knowledge that the murders were not 

drug-related. 

 

4 Section 2D1.1(d) requires only a single murder to support 

the cross-reference. Accordingly, because we find that the 

district court did not clearly err in concluding that the 

Brevard Street murders were relevant conduct, we need not 

consider the Wilson Lee Boulevard murder.
15

district court’s factual finding is based upon assessments of 

witness credibility, such finding is deserving of the highest 

degree of appellate deference.” United States v. Thompson, 554 

F.3d 450, 452 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). 

Ramseur provides no compelling reason why we should not apply 

that level of deference here. Not only is it accepted practice 

for the government to produce cooperating witnesses at trial --

so much so that § 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides a 

means to decide how much credit cooperators should receive --

but Ramseur does not even complain about the credibility of the

other cooperating witnesses, who all were in the same position 

as Brandon. Moreover, the district court had the opportunity to 

hear Brandon’s testimony, as well as defense counsel’s effort to 

impeach him on cross-examination. In such circumstances, the 

district court’s credibility determination is not reversible. 

Ramseur also fails to show that the district court erred by 

finding facts based on Brandon’s hearsay instead of those 

witnesses who testified from personal knowledge. At the 

sentencing stage, the district court is entitled to hear any 

relevant information, so long as it bears “sufficient indicia of 

reliability to support its probable accuracy.” United States v. 

Hernandez-Villanueva, 473 F.3d 118, 122 (4th Cir. 2007) 

(internal quotations and citation omitted). The district court

may find hearsay sufficiently reliable, and rely on it to find 
16

facts. See United States v. Carter, 300 F.3d 415, 427 (4th Cir. 

2002). The hearsay can come from any source, even convicted 

felons seeking a sentence reduction. See United States v. 

Johnson, 489 F.3d 794, 797 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he district 

court may credit testimony that is totally uncorroborated and 

comes from an admitted liar, convicted felon, or large scale 

drug-dealing, paid government informant.”) (internal quotations 

and citations omitted). Here, the differing rationales offered 

by the witnesses required the district court to resolve a 

question of fact based on whose testimony ought to be credited, 

and it was not error for the district court to rely on Brandon 

in resolving that issue. See Carter, 300 F.3d at 425. 

In particular, the district court did not err here because, 

as Ramseur effectively concedes, it did not have to resolve any 

real conflicts in the witness testimony. The witnesses who were 

present on Brevard Street had personal knowledge about the 

murders, but not the cause of the feud underlying them. Only 

one actually suggested a rationale different from Brandon’s, 

that the feud was about territory. This explanation, however,

could well be construed as drug-related. The district court 

therefore heard alternative testimony that the source of the 

feud was unknown, or that it was for a reason that could also be 

about drugs. Neither explanation logically precludes the 
17

finding that drugs were, at minimum, a principal reason 

underlying the murders. 

In this case, the record supports a determination that 

these murders were committed in furtherance of Ramseur’s crime 

of conviction, and so were relevant within the meaning of 

§ 1B1.3. The district court therefore did not clearly err by 

enhancing Ramseur’s sentence under § 2D1.1(d) on this basis.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Ramseur’s conviction 

and sentence.

AFFIRMED