alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Imman H., a Child Alleged to be Neglected. Administration for Children’s Services, Respondent; Diane H.-A., Appellant, et al., Respondent.

[854 NYS2d 517]

*880On July 7, 2005 a petition was filed alleging that the subject child was emotionally neglected by her parents, in that they made her witness the abuse of her uncle and participate in the disposal of the uncle’s dismembered corpse. At the fact-finding hearing, the petitioner’s evidence included the child’s out-of-court statements to a detective, the detective’s testimony that the uncle’s remains were found at the location identified by the child, and a psychologist’s testimony that the child exhibited symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. The court found that the child was emotionally neglected and, inter alia, placed her in the care and custody of the Commissioner of the Kings County Department of Social Services. On appeal, the mother argues that the court erred in granting the motion of the attorney for the child to quash her subpoena to have the child testify at the fact-finding hearing and in denying her motions to have the child’s mental health records entered into evidence.

Family Court Act § 1046 (a) (vi) specifically provides that “[t]he testimony of the child shall not be necessary to make a fact-finding of abuse or neglect.” A child’s out-of-court statements relating to an allegation of neglect may, if adequately corroborated by evidence tending to establish their reliability, support a finding of neglect (see Family Ct Act § 1046 [a] [vi]; *Matter of Christopher L.,*19 AD3d 597 [2005]; *Matter of Khadryah H.,*295 AD2d 607, 608 [2002]). “Family Court Judges . . . have considerable discretion to decide whether the child’s out-of-court statements describing incidents of abuse or neglect have, in fact, been reliably corroborated and whether the record as a whole supports a finding of [neglect]” *(Matter of Nicole V.,*71 NY2d 112, 119 [1987]; *see Matter of Candace S.,*38 AD3d 786, 787 [2007]; *Matter of Khadryah H.,*295 AD2d at 608).

Here, the child’s out-of-court statements were corroborated by the testimony of a detective and the testimony and report of the child’s treating psychologist. That evidence, together with a negative inference drawn from the appellant’s failure to testify, was sufficient to support the court’s finding of neglect. Under *881the circumstances, and based on the evidence of the potential psychological harm that testifying would cause to the child, the court providently exercised its discretion in granting the motion of the attorney for the child to quash the mother’s subpoena to compel the child to testify *(see Matter of Christopher L.,*19 AD3d 597 [2005]; *see also Matter of Karen Patricia G.,*44 AD3d 658 [2007]).

After an in camera inspection, the court providently exercised its discretion in denying the mother’s motions for production of the child’s psychiatric and social work treatment records from various institutions because the mother failed to demonstrate that the records were needed for the preparation of her case *(see*Family Ct Act § 1038 [d]). Mastro, J.P., Covello, Dickerson and Eng, JJ., concur.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ELMER RAMIREZ

- GUZMAN, AKA Elmer Ramirez,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 16

- 72431

Agency No. A205

- 716

- 738

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

S ubmitted September 12 , 2018 **

Before: LEAVY, HAWKINS, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges

.

Elmer Ramirez

- Guzman, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to

reconsider the dismissal of his appe al from an immigration judge’s decision

denying cancellation of removal

. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

SEP 18 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 16

- 72431

We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reconsider

. Mohammed

v. Gonzales , 4 00 F.3d 785

, 791 (9th Cir. 200 5). We deny in part and dismiss in part

the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ramirez

- Guzman’s mot ion

to reconsider for failure to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order

.

See 8 C.F.R. § 1003. 2 (b)( 1 )

. Ramirez

- Guzman has not shown error in the BIA ’s

prior determin ation that he f ailed to meet his burden of establishing good moral

character for cancellation of removal and voluntary departure , where record

evidence did not rule out the possibility that he actually served an aggregate period

of 180 days or more for his criminal conviction sentences. See 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1101(f)(7)

, 1229b( b)(1)(B)

, 1229 c(b)(1)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (“If the

evidence indicates that one or more of the grounds for mandatory denial of the

application for relief may apply, the alien shall have the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that such grounds do not apply.”).

To the extent Ramirez

- Guzman contends the BIA was required to determine

whether his criminal convictions rendered him ineligible for cancellation of

removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C)

, or that there was ineffective assistanc e

of counsel in his underlying proceedings, w e lack jurisdiction to consider th ese

unexhausted contention s

. See Tijani v. Holder , 628 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir.3 16

- 72431

2010) (this court lacks jurisdiction to review contentions not raised before the

agency).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
****
 **Exhibit
31.1**
  
 I,
      Andrew D. Hyder, certify that:
  1.        
      I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB for the year ended
      December 31, 2004 of Subjex
Corporation.
  2.        
      Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue
      statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to
      make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
      statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
      this annual report;
  3.        
      Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
      information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material
      respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of
      the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual
      report;
  4.        
      The registrant’s other certifying officers, and I, are responsible for
      establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
      defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant
      and have:
  a)        
      Designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material
      information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
      subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
      particularly during the period in which this annual report is being
      prepared;
  b)        
      Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and
      procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
      effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of
      the period covered by this report based on such evaluations;
      and
  c)        
      Presented in this annual report our conclusions about the effectiveness of
      the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the
      Evaluation Date;
  5.        
      The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on
      our most recent evaluation, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit
      committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the
      equivalent functions):
  a)        
      All significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal
      controls which could adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record,
      process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the
      registrant’s auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls;
      and
  b)        
      Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
      employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal
      controls over financial reporting.
 
 
 Date: March
      22, 2005
    By:
    /s/ Andrew
      D. HyderChairman,
      President
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 12

- 00226

- CR

Donny Ray Scott

v.

The State of Texas §

§

§

§

§ From the 271st District Court

o f Wise County (CR16270 )

October 1 7 , 2013

Opinion by Judge Campbell

(nfp)



### JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By

________________________ _________ Judge Charles F. Campbell
IC 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1328 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 4, 2019 

Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

AN ACT 

To designate foreign persons who improperly interfere in 

United States elections as inadmissible aliens, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
2 

S 1328 RFH

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Defending Elections 

3 against Trolls from Enemy Regimes Act’’ or ‘‘DETER 

4 Act’’. 

5 SEC. 2. DEFINED TERM. 

6 Section 101(a) of the Immigration and Nationality 

7 Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)) is amended by adding at the end 

8 the following: 

9 ‘‘(53) The term ‘improper interference in a 

10 United States election’ means conduct by an alien 

11 that— 

12 ‘‘(A)(i) violates Federal criminal, voting 

13 rights, or campaign finance law; or 

14 ‘‘(ii) is under the direction of a foreign 

15 government; and 

16 ‘‘(B) interferes with a general or primary 

17 Federal, State, or local election or caucus, in18 cluding— 

19 ‘‘(i) the campaign of a candidate; and 

20 ‘‘(ii) a ballot measure, including— 

21 ‘‘(I) an amendment; 

22 ‘‘(II) a bond issue; 

23 ‘‘(III) an initiative; 

24 ‘‘(IV) a recall; 

25 ‘‘(V) a referral; and 

26 ‘‘(VI) a referendum.’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
3 

S 1328 RFH

1 SEC. 3. IMPROPER INTERFERENCE IN UNITED STATES 

2 ELECTIONS. 

3 (a) INADMISSIBILITY.—Section 212(a)(3) of the Im4 migration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)) is 

5 amended by adding at the end the following: 

6 ‘‘(H) IMPROPER INTERFERENCE IN A

7 UNITED STATES ELECTION.—Any alien who a 

8 consular officer, the Secretary of Homeland Se9 curity, the Secretary of State, or the Attorney 

10 General knows, or has reasonable grounds to 

11 believe, is seeking admission to the United 

12 States to engage in improper interference in a 

13 United States election, or who has engaged in 

14 improper interference in a United States elec15 tion, is inadmissible.’’. 

16 (b) DEPORTABILITY.—Section 237(a) of the Immi17 gration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)) is amend18 ed by adding at the end the following: 

19 ‘‘(8) IMPROPER INTERFERENCE IN A UNITED

20 STATES ELECTION.—Any alien who has engaged, is 

21 engaged, or at any time after admission engages in 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
4 

S 1328 RFH

1 improper interference in a United States election is 

2 deportable.’’. 

Passed the Senate June 3, 2019. 

Attest: JULIE E. ADAMS, 

Secretary. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
THEAITORNEYGIE=NERAL 

OF TEXAS 

AURTIN. TEXAS 78711 

May 20, 1977 

Honorable Oscar H. Mauzy 

Chairman 

Senate Education Committee 

Senate of the State of Texas 

Austin, Texas 

Opinion No. H-997 

Re: Whether MH/MR state 

schools are entitled to a 

distribution from the 

Available School Fund. 

Dear Senator Mauzy: 

You have requested our opinion regarding whether state 

schools of the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation are entitled to a distribution of the state available 

school fund. 

The Available School Fund is created by article 7, section 5 of the Texas Constitution, and the composition of the 

state available school fund is described in section 15.01(b) 

of the Education Code. 

In our opinion, state schools of the Department of Mental 

Health and Mental Retardation, even though created as separate 

school "districts," are not eligible to receive a portion of 

the state available school fund. The Education Code, which 

provides for the distribution of the available fund, is not 

applicable to the institutions of the Department of Mental 

Health and Mental Retardation: 

This code shall not apply to those eleemosynary institutions under the control 

and direction of the Department of Mental 

Health and Mental Retardation or to the 

institutions and activities of the Texas 

Youth Council. 

Education Code § 1.04(b). Although it might be argued that 

the Education Code, by excepting from its application "the 

eleemosynary institutions under the control and direction Of 

the Department" does not thereby except the school districts 

of the various institutions, it is clear that the districts 

p. 4135 
Honorable Oscar H. Mauzy - page 2 (H-997) 

are creatures of the Department. In every case, the territorial limits of the district are coextensive with the boundaries,of the institution. Furthermore, members of the Board 

of Mental Health and Mental Retardation serve as ex-officio 

trustees for each district. See, -1, V.T.C.S. arts. 2668a; 

266813; 2668~; 2668d; 2668e; 3263e. 

Since the Education Code provides for the distribution 

of the state available school fund, and since the Code is inapplicable to institutions under the control of the Department 

of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, it is our opinion 

that the state schools of the Department are not entitled to 

a distribution of the state available school fund under current 

provisions of the Education Code. 

SUMMARY 

State schools of the Department of Mental 

Health and Mental Retardation are not entitled to share in the distribution of the 

state available school fund under current 

provisions of the Education Code. 

Very truly yours, 

JOHN L. HILL 

Attorney General of Texas 

APPROVED: 

Opinion Committee 

km1 

p. 4136
Table 24. Contribution of wives' earnings to 

family income, 1970–2008

1970............................... 26.6

1971............................... 27.5

1972................................. 26.7

1973............................... 26.0

1974............................... 25.4

1975............................... 26.3

1976............................... 26.4

1977............................... 26.1

1978................................. 26.1

1979................................. 26.0

1980............................... 26.7

1981................................. 27.3

1982................................. 28.4

1983............................... 28.8

1984............................... 28.4

1985............................... 28.3

1986................................. 29.0

1987................................. 29.5

1988................................. 29.6

1989............................... 29.9

1990............................... 30.7

Year

Contribution to 

family income 

(median percent)

1991............................... 31.3

1992............................... 32.4

1993............................... 32.2

1994............................... 31.9

1995............................... 31.9

1996............................... 32.6

1997............................... 32.7

1998............................... 32.8

1999............................... 32.8

2000............................... 33.5

2001............................... 34.4

2002............................... 34.8

2003............................... 35.2

2004................................. 34.9

2005................................. 35.1

2006................................. 35.6

2007................................. 36.0

2008................................. 36.0

NOTE: These data, collected in the Annual Social

and Economic Supplement, reflect the earnings and

work experience of the entire year.

SOURCE: Annual Social and Economic

Supplements, 1971–2009, Current Population Survey,

U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Bureau of Labor

Statistics.

77
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Central A. GODBOLT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-7379.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Dec. 13, 2012.

Decided: Dec. 18, 2012.

Central A. Godbolt, Appellant Pro Se. James Andrew Crowell, IV, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*230PER CURIAM:

Central A. Godbolt seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certifícate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Godbolt has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
**EXHIBIT 10.11****LEASE COMMENCEMENT AGREEMENT**     Pursuant to the 5th Amendment to the Lease dated the 31st day of August2005, entered into by and between **1899 L Street Tower LLC**, as Landlord, and **Blackboard, Inc.**, asTenant.     Landlord and Tenant do hereby agree that the tenant previously occupying the **“Additional ThirdFloor Premises”**vacated as of **December 16, 2005**. Per the 5th Amendment to the Leasedated the 31st day of August 2005, the lease commencement date of the **“Additional ThirdFloor Premises”**shall be the date that is fifteen (15) days after the tenant previously occupyingthe **“Additional Third Floor Premises”**vacates. Therefore, Landlord and Tenant do hereby declarethat The Lease for the **“Additional Third Floor Premises”**is in full force and effect and commencesas of the **1****st** day of **January, 2006**; Landlord has fulfilled all of its obligations underthe Lease required to be fulfilled by Landlord on or prior to such date; and Tenant has no right orset-off against any rentals. The Rent Commencement Date is hereby established to be **January 1,2006.**                 **WITNESS:** **LANDLORD:**      **1899 L Street Tower LLC**                 By /s/ Mellonie Sanborn By /s/ John F. Loehr                                    Name:   Mellonie Sanborn Name:   John F. Loehr                                        **WITNESS:** **TENANT:**      **Blackboard, Inc.**                 By /s/ Chelisse Dunn By /s/ Matthew Small                                    Name:   Chelisse Dunn Name:   Matthew Small
HOUSEHOLD DATA

ANNUAL AVERAGES

19. Persons at work in agriculture and nonagricultural industries by hours of work

[Numbers in thousands]

Hours of work

2020

Persons at work Percent distribution

All

industries

Agriculture

and related

industries

Nonagricultural

industries

All

industries

Agriculture

and related

industries

Nonagricultural

industries

Total, persons at work. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141,061 2,263 138,798 100.0 100.0 100.0

1 to 34 hours. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34,585 587 33,997 24.5 26.0 24.5

1 to 4 hours. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,663 44 1,619 1.2 1.9 1.2

5 to 14 hours. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,289 132 5,157 3.7 5.8 3.7

15 to 29 hours. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16,358 258 16,101 11.6 11.4 11.6

30 to 34 hours. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,274 154 11,120 8.0 6.8 8.0

35 hours and over. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106,476 1,675 104,801 75.5 74.0 75.5

35 to 39 hours. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,511 90 8,420 6.0 4.0 6.1

40 hours. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65,897 720 65,176 46.7 31.8 47.0

41 hours and over. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32,069 864 31,204 22.7 38.2 22.5

41 to 48 hours. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,120 140 10,981 7.9 6.2 7.9

49 to 59 hours. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,616 294 12,322 8.9 13.0 8.9

60 hours and over. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,333 431 7,902 5.9 19.1 5.7

Average hours, total at work. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38.3 42.0 38.2 – – –

Average hours, persons who usually work full time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.6 47.5 41.5 – – –

NOTE: Updated population controls are introduced annually with the release of January data. Dash indicates no data or data that do not meet publication criteria (values

not shown where base is less than 35,000).

1
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