IN THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS

WESTERN DISTRICT

ANTONIO M. MORRISON,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF MISSOURI,

Respondent.

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WD83887

OPINION FILED:

March 30, 2021

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Buchanan County, Missouri

The Honorable Patrick K. Robb, Judge

Before Division Four: Cynthia L. Martin, Chief Judge, and

Thomas H. Newton and Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judges

Mr. Antonio M. Morrison (“Morrison”) appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court of 

Buchanan County, Missouri (“motion court”), denying, without an evidentiary hearing, his 

Rule 29.15 amended motion for post-conviction relief, based on ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background1

On November 26, 2015, at approximately 3:45 a.m., a St. Joseph, Missouri police officer 

received a call over dispatch advising him of a white-colored vehicle in the parking lot of the 

 

1 On appeal from the motion court’s denial of a Rule 29.15 motion, we view the facts in the light most 

favorable to the underlying criminal conviction as those facts bear upon the motion court’s judgment. McFadden v. 

State, 553 S.W.3d 289, 296 n.2 (Mo. banc 2018).
2

Hampton Inn hotel in St. Joseph engaged in suspicious activity.

2

 A white-colored car was lingering 

in the parking lot and switching parking stalls, though no one exited the car (i.e., to enter a guest 

room as a hotel customer or guest of a hotel customer). This continued for over twenty minutes.

Shortly after the officer arrived and patrolled the hotel parking lot area, the officer observed 

a vehicle matching the dispatch description (i.e., white Toyota Solara). Indeed, the white Toyota’s 

engine was running and no one exited the vehicle, though the vehicle was parked in a hotel parking 

stall. Instead, as the officer’s vehicle became visible to the occupants of the white Toyota, the 

vehicle began backing out of the parking stall and proceeded to exit the hotel parking lot. The 

white Toyota drove directly in front of the officer’s patrol vehicle, and the driver looked straight 

ahead so as to avoid eye contact with the officer. However, because the officer’s headlights were 

illuminated and the parking lot was well lit, the officer was able to clearly see the driver, later 

identified as Morrison. Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the officer decided to initiate 

a Terry stop3of the white Toyota.

As the white Toyota left the hotel parking lot, the officer followed the vehicle and activated 

the emergency lights on his squad car in an effort to stop the white Toyota. Instead of stopping, 

the white Toyota fled, prompting the officer to activate his siren. Again, the white Toyota refused 

to stop and instead turned onto the nearest highway. The officer estimated the white Toyota’s 

speed to be 100 miles per hour, prompting the officer to discontinue his pursuit per department 

policy to prevent unreasonable harm to the community.

Although the officer discontinued his pursuit, he was able to observe the white Toyota 

swerve across lanes and speed between traffic. Soon after the officer discontinued his pursuit, he 

 

2 Many of the underlying facts are taken directly from the memorandum of law issued to Morrison in his

direct appeal, State v. Morrison, 581 S.W.3d 161 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019), without further attribution.

3 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
3

received a report that the white Toyota was involved in an accident. When the officer and other

law enforcement officers arrived at the scene, Morrison had already fled on foot. Morrison was 

apprehended near the scene of the crash approximately one hour later.

Morrison was charged in the Circuit Court of Buchanan County with one count of felony 

resisting arrest in violation of section 575.150.1(1).

4

 Following a bench trial, Morrison was 

convicted of resisting arrest and sentenced to two years in the Department of Corrections. 

Morrison appealed his conviction, alleging that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he

had driven at a speed of 100 miles per hour so as to create a substantial risk of serious physical 

injury or death. This Court, in an unpublished per curiam order, affirmed his conviction. State v. 

Morrison, 581 S.W.3d 161 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019).

Thereafter, Morrison filed a Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief in which he 

claimed that his appellate counsel on direct appeal provided constitutionally ineffective assistance

of counsel. The motion court denied his claim for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary

hearing. Morrison now appeals.

Standard of Review

“Appellate review of the [motion] court’s action on the motion filed under . . . Rule 29.15 

shall be limited to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the [motion] court 

are clearly erroneous.” Rule 29.15(k). “A judgment is clearly erroneous when, in light of the 

entire record, the court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made.” 

Shockley v. State, 579 S.W.3d 881, 892 (Mo. banc 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Our 

 

4 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory citations refer to the 2000 edition of the REVISED STATUTES OF 

MISSOURI, updated through the 2015 supplement, which is the version of the statute that was in effect at the time of 

Morrison’s commission of the crime and, hence, the version of the statute we apply to our review of Morrison’s appeal.

See State v. Hagan, 79 S.W.3d 447, 452 (Mo. App. S.D. 2002); State v. Cruz-Basurto, 581 S.W.3d 51, 60 (Mo. App. 

W.D. 2019). We note that the legislature made additional (and unrelated) amendments to section 575.150 in 2014, 

but those amendments did not take effect until January 1, 2017.
4

review of a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is governed by the same standard 

as that employed regarding claims concerning ineffective assistance of trial counsel.” Sykes v. 

State, 372 S.W.3d 33, 40 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012). Regardless of the motion court’s findings and 

conclusions in denying the motion, we will affirm the motion court’s decision if sustainable for 

any reason. Dorsey v. State, 448 S.W.3d 276, 282 (Mo. banc 2014).

Analysis

Morrison asserts one point on appeal. He contends in his appellate briefing to this Court

that the motion court erred in denying his post-conviction relief motion without an evidentiary 

hearing because appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise in his direct appeal the claim 

that there was insufficient evidence that the officer was attempting to stop his vehicle for

committing any “crime, infraction, or ordinance violation.”

An evidentiary hearing is not required where “the motion and the files and records of the 

case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.” Rule 29.15(h). “As distinguished 

from other civil pleadings, courts will not draw factual inferences or implications in a Rule 29.15 

motion from bare conclusions or from a prayer for relief.” Morrow v. State, 21 S.W.3d 819, 822 

(Mo. banc 2000) (citing White v. State, 939 S.W.2d 887, 893 (Mo. banc 1997)). Because his claim 

for post-conviction relief alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, Morrison was entitled to an 

evidentiary hearing only if his motion “allege[d] facts, not refuted by the record, showing that 

counsel’s performance did not conform to the degree of skill, care, and diligence of a reasonably 

competent attorney and that [he] was thereby prejudiced.” Id. at 823.

“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the movant must 

establish that counsel failed to raise a claim of error that was so obvious that a competent and 

effective lawyer would have recognized and asserted it.” Anderson v. State, 564 S.W.3d 592, 617 
5

(Mo. banc 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “There is no duty to raise every possible 

issue asserted in the motion for new trial on appeal, and no duty to present non-frivolous issues 

where appellate counsel strategically decides to winnow out arguments in favor of other 

arguments.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Morrison must overcome the strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct was within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). Morrison must also show that 

“if counsel had raised the claims, there is a reasonable probability the outcome of the appeal would 

have been different.” Anderson, 564 S.W.3d at 617 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Morrison was convicted of resisting arrest under section 575.150 which provides that:

1. A person commits the crime of resisting or interfering with arrest, detention, or 

stop if, knowing that a law enforcement officer is making an arrest, or attempting 

to lawfully detain or stop an individual or vehicle, or the person reasonably should 

know that a law enforcement officer is making an arrest or attempting to lawfully 

detain or lawfully stop an individual or vehicle, for the purpose of preventing the 

officer from effecting the arrest, stop or detention, the person:

(1) Resists the arrest, stop or detention of such person by using or 

threatening the use of violence or physical force or by fleeing from such 

officer; . . .

2. This section applies to:

(1) Arrests, stops, or detentions, with or without warrants;

(2) Arrests, stops, or detentions, for any crime, infraction, or ordinance

violation; and

(3) Arrests for warrants issued by a court or a probation and parole officer.

The State is required to prove the following elements to support a conviction for resisting 

a lawful stop under section 575.150.1(1): “(1) defendant knew or reasonably should have known 

that a law enforcement officer was making a lawful stop; (2) defendant resisted that stop by fleeing 

from the officer, or by threatening to use violence or physical force; and (3) defendant did so for 
6

the purpose of preventing the officer from completing the stop.” State v. Nelson, 505 S.W.3d 437, 

445 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (citing State v. Jones, 479 S.W.3d 100, 109 (Mo. banc 2016)).

The flaw in Morrison’s argument is that he focuses on sub-section 575.150.2(2) and 

attempts to create a fourth element—that the reason for the officer’s attempted stop must be “for 

any crime, infraction, or ordinance violation.” However, as we have stated before, “[t]he specific 

reason for the stop is neither an element of the offense, nor a method of committing this offense. 

The method of committing the offense is by fleeing, or by threatening to use violence or physical 

force.” Nelson, 505 S.W.3d at 445.5

More importantly, Morrison ignores sub-section 575.150.2(1), which contemplates that the 

resisting arrest statute “applies to . . . stops, or detentions, with or without warrants.” Clearly, then, 

the statute applies to the type of stops or detentions contemplated by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 

(1968).

The “reasonable suspicion” standard contemplated in a Terry stop is a less stringent 

standard than “probable cause.” State v. Pike, 162 S.W.3d 464, 473 (Mo. banc 2005). Thus, the 

State may establish that the police officer had reasonable suspicion even though the officer had 

information that was less reliable than the evidence that would be required to establish probable 

cause. Id. “The [reasonable suspicion] that will justify the minimally intrusive Terry stop is 

present when a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude 

in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” State v. Waldrup, 331 S.W.3d 668, 

673 (Mo. banc 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

 

5 Morrison refers us to State v. Redifer, 215 S.W.3d 725 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006), a case that interpreted a 

prior version of section 575.150. At that time, sub-section 575.150.2 was written as one sentence, and we concluded 

that the phrase “for any crime, infraction or ordinance violation” was applicable to any arrest, stop or detention. Id.

at 732. However, in response to Redifer, the legislature amended sub-section 575.150.2 to include three distinct 

categories, eliminating the distorting effect of meshing separate categories into one sentence. In the version of the 

resisting arrest statute applicable at the time of Morrison’s arrest, section 575.150.2(1) did not include the “crime, 

infraction, or ordinance violation” descriptive language. Accordingly, Morrison’s reliance upon Redifer is misplaced.
7

While no exact formula exists defining reasonable suspicion, it is clear that the Fourth 

Amendment requires only “some minimal level of objective justification” for a Terry stop. 

Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984); see also State v. Williams, 

334 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011). Furthermore, the facts and inferences on which the 

officer acts need not exclude every possible interpretation other than criminal activity. State v. 

Lanear, 805 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991); see also State v. Pike, 162 S.W.3d at 473 

(stating traffic violation not required to create reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop); State 

v. Crabtree, 398 S.W.3d 57, 60 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) (holding that nervous, evasive behavior is 

a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop); State v. Kelly, 119 

S.W.3d 587, 595 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003) (explaining that even where conduct justifying a Terry 

stop is ambiguous and reasonably susceptible of innocent explanation, if it also suggests criminal 

activity may be afoot, then detention to resolve the ambiguity does not violate the Fourth 

Amendment).

In the instant appeal, Morrison does not even mention Terry v. Ohio, nor does he discuss 

or argue that the officer’s actions are violative of the “reasonable suspicion” standard for initiating 

a Terry stop.

Hence, the record reflects that Morrison has failed to challenge that: (1) he knew or 

reasonably should have known that a law enforcement officer was attempting to make a lawful 

Terry stop; (2) he resisted that attempted Terry stop by fleeing; and (3) he did so for the purpose 

of preventing the officer from completing the stop. Simply put, the claim Morrison asserts 

appellate counsel should have asserted on his direct appeal would have been futile. And, we will 

not convict appellate counsel of ineffective assistance for failing to raise a claim that would have 

been futile. See Vogel v. State, 31 S.W.3d 130, 146 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000).
8

The motion court’s ruling denying Morrison’s motion for post-conviction relief without an 

evidentiary hearing was not clearly erroneous.6

Conclusion

Because we have concluded that the motion court’s post-conviction relief ruling is not 

clearly erroneous, we affirm.

/s/ Mark D. Pfeiffer

Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge

Cynthia L. Martin, Chief Judge, and Thomas H. Newton, Judge, concur.

 

6 Having concluded that Morrison failed to make the required showing of constitutionally deficient 

performance of appellate counsel, we need not consider the Strickland prejudice prong. Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 700 (1984).