Filed 2/1/24 P. v. Reynolds CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DARIOUS REYN OLDS

,

Defendant and Appellant. B 3 3 1433

( Los Angeles County Sup er . Ct. No. VA139152

- 02 )

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles Count y , Joseph R. Porras, J udge. Affirmed

.

Richard B. Lennon

, under appointment by the Court of
A ppeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

——————————2 Pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5 th 216 ( Delgadillo ) , w e review this appeal of an order denying a n evidentiary hearing to preserve evidence for a yo u th o ffender

p arole h earing pursuant to Penal Code 1 section 1203. 0 1, People v.
Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 and In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th

439

. We affirm

. BACKGROUND
In 2014, appellant Darious Rey n olds entered pleas of no contest to charges of robbery and rape, violations of sections 211 and 261, subdivision (a)(2). He also admitted he personally used a firearm in the commission of the rape within the meaning of section 12022.53, subd. (b). The trial court sentenced Reynolds to 14 years in state priso n. Reynolds was 17 years old at the time of
the offense. In 2023, Reynolds filed a post

- judgment motion for a n evidentiary proceeding to preserve evidence to be used at a y outh

o ffender p arole h earing

. The trial court denied the motion because Reynolds w as ineligible for a youth offender parole
h earing under section 3051. Reynolds timely appealed. On October 26, 2023, w e appointed counsel to represent Reynolds on appeal. On November 3 0 , 2023, counsel filed a no

issue brief purs uant to People v. Delgadil lo

. Counsel advised us
he had told Reynolds he may file his own supplemental brief within 30 days. Counsel sent Reynolds transcripts of the record on appeal as well as a copy of the brief.
On December 1, 2023 , thi s court sent Reynolds notice that
a brief raising no issues had been filed on h is behalf. We advised
him he had 30 days within which to submit a supplemental brief

1 Further statuto ry references are to the Penal Code.3

or letter stating any issues he believes we should consider. We
also advised him that if he did not file a supplemental brief

, the appeal may be dismissed as abandoned.
On December 29

, 2023, Reynolds filed a supplemental brief

, in which he contends : 1) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to inform him about his eligibility for a y outh

o ffender p arole h earing; 2) h e wants to withdraw his no contest plea because he was ill informed about his rights ; 3) he suffer ed from mental duress, incompetency and derangement at the time of his sentencing; 4 ) trial cou nsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to present his mental duress to the sentencing judge as mitigation of punishment; 5 ) he was never identified in a lineup
or in the surveillance video from the business at the time of the incident; and 6 ) there was no evidence against him except his

own statement which he gave without the benefit of a Miranda 2 warning.

DISCUSSION
Reynolds raises what he perceives to be weaknesses in the
evidence at trial and errors made by his trial counsel

. A n appeal
from a post

- judgment motion for a y outh o ffender p arole h earing
is not a vehicle to raise unrelated cla i ms of error allegedly
committed by the trial court or trial counsel or to attack the sufficiency of the evidence to support a plea

. We decline to
address these issues. We note Reynolds is not entitled to a youth offender p arole hearing under section 3051. Section 3051 entitles certain prisoners who committed “controlling offenses” under the age of

26 to youth offender parole hearings and to a “meaningful

2 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.4

opportunity for release.” (§ 3051, subds. (a)(1) & (e).) The statut e provides for a youth offender parole hearing after a fixed period of years. ( In re Jenson (2018) 24 Cal.App

. 5th 266, 273 , 277 .)
A youth o ffender is en titled to such a parole hearing during the

15 th year of incarceration on a determinate sentence; durin g the

20 th year of incar ceration on a life term of less than 25 years to life; and during the 25 th year of incarceration on a term of

25 years to life

, or life without the possibility of parole if under the age of 18 when the crime was committed

. ( § 3051

, subd

. (b)(1 )

– ( 4 ).) H ere appellant was sentenced to a 14

- year term. He will be released before the mandated youth offender parole hearing timeframes are activated.
W e are not required to independently review the record and

we decline to do so . ( Delgadill o , supra , 14 Cal.5th at p. 226.)

DISPOSIT I ON

The order denying the motion for a youth offender parole hearing is affirmed

.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

GRIMES , J. WILEY, J.