COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Annunziata and 

 Bumgardner 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

DOUGLAS S. JORDAN 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1533-97-4 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 JANUARY 27, 1998 

MARY ELMORE JORDAN 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

M. Langhorne Keith, Judge 

 Robert L. Vaughn, Jr. (Glennon, Goodman, 

Lubeley, Vaughn & Walker, L.L.P., on briefs), 

for appellant. 

 Carolyn T. Hogans (Dennis M. Hottell; John E. 

Byrnes; Dennis M. Hottell & Associates, P.C., 

on brief), for appellee. 

 On appeal from the trial court's decision awarding Mary 

Elmore Jordan (wife) spousal support, Douglas S. Jordan (husband) 

contends that the court erred in its determination of the proper 

amount. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial 

court. 

 I. Background 

 The parties were married December 19, 1965, early in 

husband's naval career. During the marriage, the parties 

relocated at least five times, and wife performed all household 

duties. Husband obtained his master's degree during the 

marriage. Wife, who had two years of college and a secretarial 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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degree, was employed full-time throughout the marriage except for 

approximately five years after the parties' daughter, Lynn, was 

born in 1970. Lynn suffers some degree of mental illness and has 

never lived independently. Wife continued to provide Lynn a home 

and financial support. 

 The parties' lifestyle during the marriage included owning a 

townhome in Virginia, driving late model cars, taking vacations 

regularly, sending their daughter to one year of college, and 

eating out regularly. Husband retired from the Navy with the 

rank of Commander and secured an additional job in McLean, 

Virginia, which ultimately led to a transfer to California. Wife 

gave up her job, and the parties moved to California in 1990 and 

purchased a home. Husband was laid off in 1992, and the mortgage 

was foreclosed. 

 When the parties returned from California, husband secured 

employment at a salary of $64,000 per year and lived first with 

friends and eventually in a two-bedroom apartment in Reston, 

Virginia. Wife and the parties' adult child lived in wife's 

sister's home in South Carolina, which was temporarily vacant, 

and wife was employed at a wage of $8.94 per hour. After the 

parties decided to terminate the marriage, wife told husband she 

wanted to use some of the money in the parties' joint account for 

a down payment to buy a home in South Carolina. Husband, without 

consulting wife, transferred all of the parties' joint money into 

an account in his name alone. He also ceased sending wife money, 
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as he had been doing during the separation. Wife was later 

awarded court-ordered pendente lite support. 

 When wife's sister returned to her home in South Carolina, 

wife and Lynn moved to a small, run-down rental property in a 

depressed neighborhood. There were only two or three rental 

properties available when she began her search. The rented home 

is "nothing like what [wife was] used to living in." Wife 

considered the area unsafe and was required to call the police 

for aid during at least four neighborhood disturbances. During 

the pendency of this case, wife has been "scared to spend money" 

and has saved as much as possible. 

 On April 15, 1997, a final hearing was scheduled on the 

issues of equitable distribution and spousal support. The 

parties resolved the equitable distribution issue by agreeing to 

an approximately equal division of assets. At the hearing on 

spousal support, the court heard the testimony of the parties and 

received exhibits. By letter opinion issued April 22, 1997, wife 

was awarded support of $1,200 per month. Husband filed a motion 

seeking enforcement of a settlement he contended the parties had 

reached prior to the hearing and a motion to reconsider the 

spousal support award. Both motions were denied, and a final 

divorce decree was entered May 9, 1997. 

 II. 

 We will not reverse a trial court's determination of spousal 

support unless it is "plainly wrong or without evidence to 
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support it." Moreno v. Moreno, 24 Va. App. 190, 195, 480 S.E.2d 

792, 794 (1997) (citations omitted). Moreover, on appeal, we 

view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the 

light most favorable to the party prevailing below. See Gottlieb 

v. Gottlieb, 19 Va. App. 77, 81, 448 S.E.2d 666, 668 (1994). 

 Code § 20-107.1 sets out the factors to be considered in 

setting spousal support. A court is not required to "quantify or 

elaborate exactly what weight or consideration it has given to 

each of the statutory factors," as long as the court's ruling has 

"some foundation based on the evidence presented." Woolley v. 

Woolley, 3 Va. App. 337, 345, 349 S.E.2d 422, 426 (1986). "'When 

a trial court awards spousal support based upon due consideration 

of the factors enumerated in Code § 20-107.1, as shown by the 

evidence, its determination will not be disturbed except for a 

clear abuse of discretion.'" Huger v. Huger, 16 Va. App. 785, 

791, 433 S.E.2d 255, 259 (1993) (citation omitted). 

 Husband contends that the trial court erroneously considered 

evidence of speculative future expenditures for maintenance and 

repairs to wife's rental property, new household furnishings, a 

new vehicle, and legal fees. "[I]n setting support awards, a 

court 'must look to current circumstances and what the 

circumstances will be within the immediate or reasonably 

foreseeable future.'" Furr v. Furr, 13 Va. App. 479, 482, 413 

S.E.2d 72, 74 (1992) (citing Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 10 Va. 

App. 728, 735, 396 S.E.2d 675, 679 (1990)) (other citations 
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omitted). See Code § 20-107.1. "What is 'reasonably 

foreseeable' depends on the circumstances of the particular 

case." Furr, 13 Va. App. at 482, 413 S.E.2d at 74. In the 

instant case, the trial court found that wife was living in a 

"dilapidated house in a rundown neighborhood" and that she "has 

not had a vacation in four years, is living in a marginal 

neighborhood, and is driving a seven year old automobile." The 

court considered these circumstances when it determined wife's 

expenses, and we cannot hold that its conclusion was either 

unsupported by the evidence or an abuse of discretion. 

 Husband next contends that the trial court erred in 

considering wife's expenses on behalf of the parties' adult 

daughter in fashioning the spousal support award. This argument 

lacks merit. While the evidence established that the parties 

assisted their adult child during the marriage and wife continued 

to do so after the separation, the trial court explicitly stated 

in its letter opinion that "the expense Ms. Jordan is spending on 

Lynn was not a determinative factor and the Court's award would 

not be different if Lynn were self-sufficient," in effect giving 

no weight to wife's support of Lynn. 

 Husband next argues that the record fails to support the 

trial court's finding that the parties' multiple relocations 

throughout the marriage "precluded any opportunity to further 

[wife's] education." Husband claims that he encouraged wife to 

return to school and that "[s]he could easily have availed 
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herself of the opportunity to improve her education" during the 

ten-year period she was employed at George Mason University. 

Wife was employed full-time during the marriage except when Lynn 

was quite young, and she testified that continuing her education 

would have been difficult because of the parties' frequent 

relocations. Credible evidence exists to support the trial 

court's finding. 

 Lastly, husband argues that the amount of spousal support 

determined by the court is excessive in light of wife's 

"conscious choice" to live in her present circumstances and her 

ability to save 85% of her pendente lite payments. He further 

claims that "[t]here was absolutely no testimony that the house 

occupied by Ms. Jordan was in a state of disrepair, much less 

dilapidated." Contrary to husband's assertions, the record is 

replete with evidence establishing a markedly lower standard of 

living. Due to husband's seizure of the parties' joint assets, 

wife was unable to buy a home, and her choice of rental 

properties was quite limited. From photographic evidence 

reflected in the record, the trial court found her rented home to 

be "a hovel." Furthermore, wife testified that she no longer 

goes out to eat or takes vacations and that she is afraid to 

spend money for fear that she could not meet her expenses. Wife 

"should not be penalized . . . for her frugality in establishing 

a savings account as a shield against emergencies." Moon v. 

Moon, 210 Va. 575, 577, 172 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1970). See Via v. 
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Via, 14 Va. App. 868, 419 S.E.2d 431 (1992). The trial court 

duly considered the relevant factors and concluded that wife 

"certainly is living . . . in conditions that are not up to the 

conditions that she lived in while she was married." We hold 

that the award of spousal support was not an abuse of 

discretion.1

 Wife has requested an award of attorney's fees for matters 

relating to this appeal. Accordingly, we remand this case to the 

trial court for the sole purpose of entering an appropriate award 

of attorney's fees for services rendered to wife on appeal. See

O'Loughlin v. O'Loughlin, 23 Va. App. 690, 479 S.E.2d 98 (1996). 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 

trial court and remand the case to the trial court for 

determination of the attorney's fees incurred in this appeal. 

 Affirmed and remanded.

 

 1Husband also contends that the trial court's award is 

excessive and that there is "no other rational way to explain the 

court's findings and ultimate ruling" other than that it serves 

to penalize him and reward wife for their respective 

relationships with their daughter. Having determined that the 

award is not excessive, we need not consider this argument.