IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-50373

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JUAN JOSE GARCIA,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:18-CR-3208-1

Before WIENER, HAYNES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Juan Jose Garcia appeals from his jury trial conviction for importing 50 

kilograms or more of marijuana for which he received an 18-month sentence. 

Garcia argues that the district court abused its discretion in giving the jury an 

instruction on deliberate ignorance.

We review the district court’s decision to give a deliberate ignorance jury 

instruction for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Ricard, 922 F.3d 639, 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 23, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 19-50373

2

654-55 (5th Cir. 2019). “[A] deliberate ignorance instruction should only be 

given when a defendant claims a lack of guilty knowledge and the proof at trial 

supports an inference of deliberate ignorance.” Id. at 655-56 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). “An inference of deliberate ignorance 

exists if there is evidence showing (1) subjective awareness of a high 

probability of the existence of illegal conduct, and (2) purposeful contrivance to 

avoid learning of the illegal conduct.” Id. at 656 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

Garcia denied having any knowledge that there were drugs in the 

suitcase found in the trunk of his car. Yet there was substantial evidence that 

Garcia was aware of a high likelihood that he was participating in criminal 

activity. In a post-arrest interview, Garcia admitted to agents that he felt 

something was wrong soon after his arrival in Juarez when his car was taken 

for two hours by the people paying him to supposedly bring money from Mexico 

into the United States. After the car was returned to Garcia, he noticed that 

“it felt heavy, for some reason.” He also told agents he did not know the amount 

of money he was supposedly bringing across the border, but knew his job 

involved “something bad.” One of the people giving him instructions in Juarez 

had a pistol in his waistband. The men in Juarez also placed a GPS tracker on 

Garcia’s car, which would be removed after he met someone in a parking lot 

after crossing the border. In addition, Garcia engaged in nervous and unusual 

behavior when agents started asking him about the suitcase at the El Paso 

border crossing. There is even more evidence showing Garcia’s subjective 

awareness of a high probability he was engaged in criminal conduct, but what 

we have already described is more than enough to support that requirement 

for the deliberate ignorance instruction. See United States v. Farfan-Carreon, 

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935 F.2d 678, 681 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 

946, 952 (5th Cir. 1990). 

Despite the highly suspicious circumstances, Garcia did not attempt to 

determine the source of the heaviness of his vehicle or otherwise inquire about 

what was put into his car during the two hours it was taken from him before 

he crossed the border. “[W]e have previously recognized that where the 

likelihood of criminal wrongdoing is so high, and the circumstances 

surrounding a defendant’s activities are extremely suspicious, a failure to 

conduct further inquiry” supports a finding of deliberate ignorance. See United 

States v. Freeman, 434 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. 

Brown, 871 F.3d 352, 356 (5th Cir. 2017). 

We reject Garcia’s argument that the deliberate ignorance instruction 

was improperly used by the Government as a failsafe mechanism to relieve 

itself of proving a mens rea. “[T]he same evidence that will raise an inference 

that the defendant had actual knowledge of the illegal conduct ordinarily will 

also raise the inference that the defendant was subjectively aware of a high 

probability of the existence of illegal conduct.” Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d at

952. So the government’s argument that Garcia had actual knowledge did not 

preclude the deliberate ignorance instruction. See United States v. OrjiNwosu, 549 F.3d 1005, 1009 (5th Cir. 2008). Nor did the instruction otherwise 

relieve the government of its burden. 

The judgment is AFFIRMED.

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