[ DO NOT PUBLISH] 

## In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________ No. 22

- 12119
Non

- Argument Calendar

____________________
HAYWOOD JACKSON MIZELL,
Plaintiff

- Appellant,

versus WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION,

Defendants

- Appellees.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 1:21

- cv

- 00569

- ECM

- SMD USCA11 Case: 22-12119 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2023 Page: 1 of 52 Opinion of the Court 22

- 12119

____________________ Before N EWSOM , G RANT , and L UCK , Circuit Judges.

P ER C URIAM : Haywood Mizell appeals the district court’s order grantingWells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s and PHH Mortgage Corporation’s motions to dismiss his pro se complaint alleging wrongful foreclosure of two properties. We reverse

. Mizell’s claims appear to revolve around two foreclosure sales

— one by each defendant

. Wells Fargo foreclosed on a loan obtained by Mizell’s wife. PHH foreclosed on a loan obtained by Mizell’s daughter and son

- in

- law. Both loans were secure d by properties located in Ozark, Alabama
, and each property was sold

at a foreclosure sale

. In his complaint, Mizell allege d that Wells Fargo and PHH weren ’ t entitled to the proceeds of these sales

. Both defendants moved to dismiss , arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction because Mizell’s claims were barred by the Rooker

–

Feldman 1 doctrine and that Mizell failed to state a claim

. A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation

. Upon f inding that Mizell’s claims w ere inextricably intertwined with final judgments from state court involving the same parties and

1 Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co. , 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462 (1983). USCA11 Case: 22-12119 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2023 Page: 2 of 522

- 12119 Opinion of the Court 3 properties, the magistrate judge recommended that the district court dismiss Mizell’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rooker

–

Feldman

. Mi zell objected to the report and recommendation but raised no arguments about the Rooker

–

Feldman doctrine

. The district court adopted the report and recommendation and dismissed Mizell’s claims with prejudice on the sole basis that Rooker

–

Feldman stripped the district court of its subject matter jurisdiction

. Mizell timely appealed.On appeal, Mizell reiterates the arguments from his complaint but doesn ’ t challenge the district court’s dismissal of his complaint for lack of jurisdiction under R ooker

–

Feldman

. The defendants argue primarily that

— as a result of Mizell’s failure to address the district court’s sole rea son for dismissing his complaint, coupled with his failure to object to the report and recommendation on

- Rooker

–

Feldman grounds

— Miz ell has waived any challenge to the district court’s dismissal. Indeed
, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant ordinarily are deemed abandoned. Timson v. Sampson , 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). And
, under the rules of this court, a party who fail s to object to a magistrate judge ’ s findings contained in a report and recommendation generally “ waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court ’ s order based on unobjected

- to factual and legal con clusions .” 11th Cir. R. 3

- 1. But “[t] he Rooker

–

Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional. ” Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
, 611 F.3d 1324 , 1330 (11th Cir. 2010). And “ arguments regarding subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. ” First Union Nat’l Bank of Fla. v. Hall
, 123 F.3d USCA11 Case: 22-12119 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2023 Page: 3 of 54 Opinion of the Court 22

- 12119

1374 , 1378 n.7 ( 11th Cir. 1997). So, notwithstanding the deficiencies of Mizell’s briefs, we’re compelled to review de novo the district court ’ s determination that it lack ed subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker

–

Feldman doctrine

. Behr v. Campbell , 8 F.4th 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 2021)

. T he Rooker

–

Feldman doctrine bars district courts from review ing or reject ing state court judgments rendered before the district court litigation began. Id. at 1210. The scope of the doctrine is narrow, confined to “cases brought by state

- court losers complaining of injuries caused by state

- court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those jud gments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Rooker

–

Feldman “does not prioritize form over substance,” meaning that it bars all appeals of state court judgments in district courts whether the plaintiff admits to filin g a direct appeal or tries to call the appeal something else. Behr , 8 F.4th at 1211. The injury to the plaintiff must be caused by the judgment itself. Id. The question isn ’ t whether the whole complaint seems to challenge a previous state court judgment, but whether the resolution of each individual claim requires review and rejection of a state court judgment. Id.
at 1213. In Behr , we warned that “district courts should ke ep one thing in mind when Rooker

–

Feldman is raised: it will almost never apply.” Id. at 1212. As the district court itself acknowledged, “[t]he injuries about which [Mizell] complains were caused by the underlying USCA11 Case: 22-12119 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2023 Page: 4 of 522

- 12119 Opinion of the Court 5

foreclosure actions”

— not by the state c ourt judgments that upheld those actions

. We also note that Mizell didn ’ t invite the d istrict

c ourt to review and reject those judgments in his complaint

. Instead, he challenged the defendants’ power to conduct the nonjudicial foreclosure sales and their entitlement to the proceeds

. Therefore, the d istrict c ourt had jurisdiction over Mizell’s claim s and erred in applying Rooker

–

Feldman

. The defendants ask us to affirm the district court’s order ona number of alternative grounds, which were raised in their motion s to dismiss. But because the district court gave only one reason for dismissing Mizell’s complaint

— the Rooker

–

Feldman doctrine

— we defer to t he district court to decide in the first instance whether any or all of these grounds merit dismissal. See Behr , 8 F.4th at 1214.
REVERSED AND REMANDED

. USCA11 Case: 22-12119 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2023 Page: 5 of 5