J-S78022-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JAYRON RAYMOND DUDLEY

Appellant No. 197 WDA 2016 

Appeal from the PCRA Order January 7, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0012381-2013

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OTT, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JANUARY 03, 2017

Jayron Raymond Dudley appeals from the order entered January 7, 

2016, in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, denying his petition 

for collateral relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 

Dudley seeks relief from the judgment of sentence of an aggregate term of 

three to six years’ imprisonment followed by two years’ probation, imposed 

after he entered a guilty plea to charges of possession of firearm with 

altered manufacturer’s number,2tampering with physical evidence,3and 

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*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 6110.2(a). 

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 4910.
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related charges. On appeal, Dudley argues the PCRA court abused its 

discretion in denying his claim that plea counsel’s ineffectiveness caused him 

to enter an involuntary guilty plea. For the reasons below, we affirm.

The facts and procedural history underlying this appeal are as follows. 

On August 31, 2013, Dudley was arrested in the present case, following 

reports of a shooting in the 1300 block of Patterson Avenue in McKeesport, 

Pennsylvania. At Docket No. 12381-2013, he was charged with possession 

of firearm with altered manufacturer’s number, receiving stolen property, 

carrying a firearm without a license, persons not to possess firearms, 

tampering with physical evidence, false identification to law enforcement, 

and criminal mischief.4 Subsequently, on October 8, 2013, Dudley was 

arrested again, after he was found to be in the possession of a firearm 

during a car stop. In that case, which is not on appeal, he was charged at 

Docket No. 14998-2013, with various firearm offenses, as well as escape.5 

Both cases were scheduled for a non-jury trial on March 27, 2014. 

The case at Docket No. 14998-2013 proceeded to trial first, and 

following the testimony, the court took the matter under advisement.6 See

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4 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6110.2, 3925, 6106, 6105(c), 4910, 4914, and 

3304(a)(1), respectively.

5 18 Pa.C.S. § 5121.

6 Dudley was represented by different attorneys from the public defender’s 

office in both cases. 
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N.T., 3/14/2014, at 37. After a short recess, Dudley decided to enter an 

open guilty plea at Docket No. 12381-2013, in exchange for which the 

Commonwealth withdrew the charge of receiving stolen property. Dudley 

completed both a written and oral colloquy, and affirmatively stated he was 

guilty of the crimes charged. The trial court then entered a verdict at 

Docket No. 14998-2013, finding Dudley guilty of only disorderly conduct, 

resisting arrest, and criminal mischief, and acquitting him of the more 

serious firearms and escape offenses. See N.T., 3/27/2014, at 43. 

The trial court proceeded to sentence Dudley in both cases that same 

day. In the present case, at Docket No. 12381-2013, the trial court imposed 

a mitigated range sentence of three to six years’ imprisonment for the 

charge of possession of firearm with altered manufacturer’s number, a 

consecutive term of two years’ probation for tampering with physical 

evidence, and a concurrent term of two years’ probation for providing false 

identification. At Docket No. 14998-2013, the court imposed two concurrent 

terms of two years’ probation on the charges of resisting arrest and false 

identification, and ordered them to run consecutively to the probationary 

term in the present case.7 No further punishment was imposed on the 

remaining charges at either docket. 

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7 As noted above, Dudley’s conviction and sentence at Docket No. 14998-

2013 are not the subject of this appeal.
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On April 3, 2014, Dudley filed a timely, counseled post-sentence 

motion seeking to withdraw his guilty plea.8 After the trial court denied the 

motion, Dudley filed a direct appeal, challenging the court’s failure to 

conduct a hearing on his post-sentence motion, as well as the court’s 

imposition of an illegal sentence on the charge of false identification. In an 

unpublished decision, a panel of this Court affirmed his convictions, but 

vacated the probationary sentence imposed for false identification. See 

Commonwealth v. Dudley, 120 A.3d 391 [700 WDA 2014] (Pa. Super. 

2015) (unpublished memorandum).9 

On March 19, 2015, Dudley filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition, 

challenging plea counsel’s ineffectiveness. PCRA counsel was promptly 

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8 Dudley also filed a pro se post-sentence motion seeking modification of his 

sentence. It does not appear the trial court addressed the pro se filing, 

presumably because he was represented by counsel at that time. See 

Commonwealth v. Williams, ___ A.3d ___, ___, 2016 PA Super 262, *2 

(Pa. Nov. 23, 2016) (stating “hybrid representation is not permitted” and 

court “will not accept a pro se motion while an appellant is represented by 

counsel”).

9 Specifically, the panel concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in determining Dudley’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea was meritless on 

its face. See Commonwealth v. Dudley, 120 A.3d 391 [700 WDA 2014] 

(Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished memorandum at 4-6). However, the panel 

agreed Dudley’s two-year probationary term for false identification was 

illegal since the crime is graded as a third-degree misdemeanor, punishable 

only up to one-year imprisonment. See id. (unpublished memorandum at 

6). Because the sentence was imposed concurrently to the probationary 

term for resisting arrest, the panel concluded that a remand for resentencing 

was unnecessary. See id. 
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appointed, and filed an amended petition on August 28, 2015. Following an 

evidentiary hearing on October 26, 2015, the PCRA court issued notice of its 

intent to dismiss the petition, accompanied by findings of fact and 

conclusions of law. Thereafter, on January 7, 2016, the PCRA court entered 

an order denying Dudley’s petition for relief. This timely appeal followed.10

On appeal, Dudley argues the PCRA court abused its discretion in 

denying him collateral relief. Specifically, Dudley asserts his guilty plea was 

entered unknowingly and involuntarily because plea counsel threatened 

Dudley that if he did not plead guilty to the present charges, the trial court 

would find him guilty of the crimes at Docket No. 14998-2013, and impose a 

harsher sentence. See Dudley’s Brief at 12. He explains: 

With this atmosphere of hostility from his own attorney, [] 

Dudley’s plea was not a voluntary act. His ability to consider his 

option to proceed with a nonjury or jury trial had been replaced 

by his fear of being found guilty of additional felony offenses, 

and facing a longer term of imprisonment.

Id. at 15-16. Furthermore, although Dudley acknowledges he averred in his 

written colloquy that he was not threatened or coerced into entering the 

plea, he contends the “colloquy answers were themselves motivated by his 

being afraid that his plea would not be accepted such that he would be 

convicted of more offenses and given more time.” Id. at 16. Lastly, he 

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10 Although the PCRA court did not direct Dudley to file a concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), Dudley, 

nevertheless, filed a concise statement on March 1, 2016.
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argues counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to protect his right to trial, 

and he suffered prejudice “because his waiver of his constitutional right to a 

trial was involuntary.” Id. at 18.

When reviewing an order dismissing a PCRA petition, we must 

determine whether the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the 

record, and whether its legal conclusions are free from error. 

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014). “Great deference 

is granted to the findings of the PCRA court, and these findings will not be 

disturbed unless they have no support in the certified record.” 

Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 A.3d 680, 682 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation 

omitted). Moreover, “[t]he PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when 

supported by the record, are binding on this Court.” Commonwealth v. 

Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 259 (Pa. 2011).

Where, as here, the petitioner alleges the ineffectiveness of prior 

counsel in conjunction with a guilty plea, our review is as follows: 

To prevail on a claim alleging counsel’s ineffectiveness under the 

PCRA, Appellant must demonstrate (1) that the underlying claim 

is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel’s course of conduct was 

without a reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s 

interest; and (3) that he was prejudiced by counsel’s 

ineffectiveness, i.e. there is a reasonable probability that but for 

the act or omission in question the outcome of the proceedings 

would have been different. 

It is clear that a criminal defendant’s right to effective counsel 

extends to the plea process, as well as during trial. However, 

[a]llegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a 

guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the 

ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or 

unknowing plea. Where the defendant enters his plea on the 
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advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on 

whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence 

demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.

Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 997, 1001-1002 (Pa. Super. 2013), 

quoting Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 338 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(citations, quotation, and quotation marks omitted). 

The PCRA court addressed Dudley’s claim, as follows, in its notice of 

intent to dismiss the petition:

[Dudley’s] sole claim is that his guilty plea at [Docket No. 

12381-2013] was unlawfully induced by the ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel Adam Bishop[, Esq.,] based on the 

allegation that Attorney Bishop threatened [Dudley] that if he 

did not plead guilty [to the present charges], the Trial Court 

would find him guilty of all charges at [Docket No. 14998-2013]. 

This claim fails because [Dudley] has failed to establish that his 

plea of guilty was unlawfully induced by the ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Specifically, the Trial Court finds that 

Attorney Bishop did not threaten or unlawfully induce [Dudley] 

to plead guilty. At [Dudley’s] evidentiary hearing, Attorney 

Bishop testified that he told [Dudley] that his sentence would be 

closer to the mitigated range if [Dudley] pled guilty [at Docket 

No. 12381-2013], and that proceeding to trial at [Docket No. 

12381-2013] would not help his prospects, sentence-wise, at 

[Docket No. 14998-2013]. The Trial Court finds this testimony 

of Adam Bishop credible, and finds that he did not tell [Dudley] 

that if he did not plead he would be found guilty on the other 

case, but rather that if he pled guilty it would likely lessen his 

sentence on the instant case and the nonjury case.

Notice of Intention to Dismiss, 12/9/2015, at 3 (capitalization in original).

Our review reveals the PCRA court’s findings and credibility 

determinations are supported by the record. During the PCRA hearing, 

Dudley testified he wanted to go to trial on the charges sub judice. N.T., 

10/26/2015, at 12. He claimed, however, counsel told him, “if [he] didn’t 
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take a plea, [he] was going to be found guilty on both of [his] cases.” Id. 

Dudley stated:

[Counsel] said I’m not allowed to say this for real. The Judge 

basically implied to him that if I don’t plead guilty on this case 

there’s a high possibility I’m going to be found guilty on both my 

gun cases I had.

Id. at 18. 

Plea counsel testified he told Dudley that if Dudley proceeded to trial 

on the second case, counsel “didn’t think it would help his prospects of being 

found not guilty in the first case.” Id. at 8. However, on cross-examination, 

counsel elaborated:

Well, I said that I believed that with respect to the sentencing 

aspect that he would receive a mitigated range sentence on my 

case if he pled guilty. And if he pled guilty that I believed that 

he would receive favorable treatment, maybe not with respect to 

the charges, but with respect to the sentence on the second 

case.

Id. at 8-9.

The PCRA court found counsel’s testimony credible, and we will not 

disturb the court’s credibility determination. Spotz, supra, 18 A.3d at 259. 

Furthermore, Dudley has failed to establish he was prejudiced by counsel’s 

actions. Although we agree he waived his right to a trial via his guilty plea, 

he did receive a mitigated range sentence, as counsel predicted, and the 

trial court acquitted him of the more serious gun and escape charges at 

Docket No. 14998-2013. Dudley does not explain how “but for [counsel’s] 

act ... the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.” Willis, 
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supra, 68 A.3d at 1001 (quotation omitted). Accordingly, we find no relief 

is warranted on his claim.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/3/2017