IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-20-00084-CR

MARCUS DEMOND PARRISH,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 54th District Court

McLennan County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019-872-C2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In two issues, appellant, Marcus Demond Parrish, challenges his conviction for 

assault family violence with a prior conviction for a continuous violence against the 

family and a habitual allegation referencing his prior conviction for unlawful possession 

of a firearm by a felon. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01. Specifically, appellant 

contends that the trial court erred: (1) by allowing a family-violence expert to observe 

appellant’s testimony over appellant’s invocation of “the Rule,” see TEX. R. EVID. 614; and 
Parrish v. State Page 2

(2) by submitting certain testimony to the jury that was requested during deliberations. 

Because we overrule both of appellant’s issues, we affirm.

I. “THE RULE”

In his first issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred by excusing a State’s 

witness from “the Rule” because the State did not establish that the witness’s presence 

was essential. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law

Texas Rule of Evidence 614, otherwise referred to as “the Rule,” provides for the 

exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom during trial. See id. The purpose of Rule 614 

is to prevent the testimony of one witness from influencing the testimony of another. 

Russell v. State, 155 S.W.3d 176, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Once Rule 614 is invoked, 

witnesses are instructed by the trial court that they cannot converse with one another or 

with any other person about the case, except with permission from the trial court, and 

the trial court must exclude witnesses from the courtroom during the testimony of other 

witnesses. TEX. R. EVID. 614; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.06. 

However, Rule 614 does not authorize the exclusion of certain witnesses. See TEX.

R. EVID. 614. In criminal cases, those witnesses are,

(1) a defendant who is a natural person, the representative of a defendant who 

is not a natural person, (2) a person whose presence a party shows to be 

essential to the presentation of the party’s case, and (3) a victim if the court 

does not determine that the victim’s testimony would be materially affected 

by hearing other testimony. 
Parrish v. State Page 3

Russell, 155 S.W.3d at 180 (citing TEX. R. EVID. 614). In particular, the Court of Criminal 

Appeals has held that a trial court is vested with discretion and may permit expert 

witnesses to be exempt from “the Rule,” so they may hear other witnesses testify and 

then base their opinions on such testimony. Lewis v. State, 486 S.W.2d 104, 106 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1972); see Martinez v. State, 867 S.W.2d 30, 40 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Caron v. State, 

162 S.W.3d 614, 618 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). “Under Rule 614, a 

party has the burden to show that its witness is one of those whose exclusion from the 

courtroom is not authorized by that Rule.” Russell, 155 S.W.3d at 180 (citing Moore v. 

State, 882 S.W.2d 844, 848 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)).

B. Discussion

Prior to appellant’s testimony during the guilt-innocence phase of trial, appellant 

objected to the presence of Detective Michelle Starr of the Waco Police Department in the 

courtroom during his testimony, arguing that she is a fact witness in the case because she 

was the detective on the case, and because she drafted and signed the arrest-warrant 

affidavit. The State responded that Detective Starr had been designated as an expert in 

Assault Family Violence and that her presence was necessary to “observe the way 

[appellant] answers the questions and—and the way he behaves in the courtroom to be 

able to testify to that,” especially with regard to relationships between “assault family 

violence victims and perpetrators.” 
Parrish v. State Page 4

As noted above, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the trial court is 

vested with discretion and may permit expert witnesses to be exempt from “the Rule” so 

they may hear other witnesses testify and then base their opinions on such testimony. See

Martinez, 867 S.W.2d at 40; Lewis, 486 S.W.2d at 106; see also Caron, 162 S.W.3d at 618. 

Therefore, in line with these cases, we find no abuse of discretion.1 The purpose 

articulated by the State regarding Detective Starr’s testimony—allowing a domestic 

violence expert to take appellant’s testimony into account when offering her opinion—

falls within the exemptions provided for in the rule. See TEX.R.EVID. 614; see also Martinez, 

867 S.W.2d at 39-40; Lewis, 486 S.W.2d at 106; Caron, 162 S.W.3d at 618; see also Garcia v. 

State, No. 01-17-00171-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1184, at **15-16 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] Feb. 13, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)2; Gonzales v. 

1 We also note that appellant seeks to reverse his conviction based on this issue; however, the record 

reflects that the State never called Detective Starr as a rebuttal witness. Rather, Detective Starr was called 

to testify at punishment. Therefore, even if the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Detective Starr 

to remain in the courtroom over appellant’s invocation of “the Rule,” the relief sought could not be granted 

based on this record. 

2

In fact, the fact scenario in this case is substantially similar to that in Garcia v. State, No. 01-17-

00171-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1184, at **15-16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 13, 2018, pet. ref’d) 

(mem. op., not designated for publication), where the First Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion 

where the State argued the following regarding appellant’s attempt to exclude a State’s witness from the 

courtroom under Rule 614:

Your Honor, the State’s here to put on the record that we would like to have our expert 

witness, Kapriva Hutchinson, present during the complainant’s testimony. She is 

testifying as an expert in domestic violence, and we just ask that she be able to be present 

to listen to the testimony so that it can—she can take that into consideration when she puts 

forth her expert testimony.

In her testimony, Hutchinson explained that she had met with the complainant three weeks after the 

incident and observed the complainant’s trial testimony. Id. at **5-6. Hutchinson then described how 
Parrish v. State Page 5

State, Nos. 03-13-00333-CR & 03-13-00334-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 5869, at *6 (Tex. 

App.—Austin June 11, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“We 

believe the purpose articulated by the State—providing expert testimony based upon 

observations of the children’s testimony to explain exhibited behaviors not readily 

understood by those not familiar with the dynamics of child sexual abuse—is consistent 

with the exception provided for in the Rule.”). As such, we overrule appellant’s first 

issue.

II. THE JURY’S REQUESTS FOR TESTIMONY

In his second issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred by providing the 

jury with a partial transcript of testimony where the jury did not specifically state they 

had a disagreement about the testimony. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.28.

A. Applicable Law

Article 36.28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, in relevant part, that:

In the trial of a criminal case in a court of record, if the jury disagrees as to 

the statement of any witness they may, upon applying to the court, have 

read to them from the court reporter’s notes that part of such witness 

testimony or the particular point in dispute. . . .

Id. If the trial court determines that the jury’s request is proper under article 36.28, the 

trial court must then interpret the request and decide which portions of the testimony 

will best answer the request. Brown v. State, 870 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). 

victims of domestic violence may minimize, normalize, or deny the violence to cope with it, which may 

serve as an explanation for why the complainant recanted. Id. at *6.
Parrish v. State Page 6

We will not disturb a trial judge’s decision under article 36.28 unless a clear abuse of 

discretion and harm are shown. Id.

B. Discussion

In the instant case, the jury sent multiple notes to the trial judge. In one note, the 

forewoman of the jury requested, “Transcripts of Susie [the complainant] on the stand.” 

Thereafter, the trial judge sent the following instruction:

Ladies and Gentleman of the Jury:

. . .

With reference to your request, you are instructed that the law does 

not permit a general re-reading of the testimony of any witness or 

witnesses, and in this connection you are instructed that the law in this 

regard provides as follows:

In the Trial of any criminal case in any District Court of this State if 

the jury disagrees as to the statement of any witness, they may, upon 

applying to the Court, have read to them from the court reporter’s notes 

that part of such witness’ testimony on the particular point in dispute, and 

no other.

Unless the jury has disagreed upon some part of the testimony under 

the above law, you are not entitled to have any of the testimony re-read, but 

if you have disagreed upon any point or points in the testimony, you will 

so state to the Court in writing, and point out in writing the point or points 

upon which you have disagreed, then the Court will have the court reporter 

read back to you only the testimony on the point or points in dispute, and 

no other, as best such testimony can be selected from the recorded 

testimony.

In the event you should state to the Court that you have disagreed 

as to the testimony of the witness or witnesses referred to above on any 

point or points, and request that the testimony be read back on any point 
Parrish v. State Page 7

or points, you are instructed that the court reporter will need sufficient time 

to examine all of the testimony of the witness or witnesses in order to get 

all of the testimony on the point or points concerning your inquiry and it 

will take the court report as long to read the testimony back as it did to put 

it on, and in the event you ask for such testimony the Court will request 

you to be patient, and allow sufficient time for this to be done in order for 

you to get the matters you have requested.

In response to the trial court’s instruction, the forewoman of the jury sent another note 

requesting: “Transcript from when Suzie [sic] says she was hurt or felt pain.”

As shown above, the jury initially made a general request for the complainant’s 

testimony, which, by itself, was insufficient to reflect a dispute. See TEX. CODE CRIM.PROC.

ANN. art. 36.28; see also Moore v. State, 874 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (“A 

simple request for testimony does not, by itself, reflect disagreement, implicit or express, 

and is not a proper request under Art. 36.28.” (internal citations omitted)). However, 

after the trial judge instructed the jury that the testimony would be read back only in the 

event of a dispute, the jury provided a more specific request. Similar to Robison v. State, 

when the jury’s notes are read together with the corresponding instructions from the trial 

court, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by inferring a dispute as to 

the complainant’s testimony, as this dispute has a basis other than mere speculation. See 

Robison v. State, 888 S.W.2d 473, 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (holding that the trial court 

was “properly cautious in observing the competing concerns of article 36.28 of the Texas 

Code of Criminal Procedure” where “there were three separate requests made by the jury 

in determining whether a dispute existed, each becoming increasingly narrow in scope” 
Parrish v. State Page 8

and the trial court “clearly informed the jury that testimony would be read back only in 

the event of a dispute after each request for information”); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

ANN. art. 36.28; Howell v. State, 175 S.W.3d 786, 792 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Although a 

simple request for testimony is insufficient to reflect a dispute, a trial judge may, in its 

discretion, infer a dispute in a given case. The judge’s inference of dispute need only 

have some basis other than mere speculation.”). We therefore overrule appellant’s 

second issue.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

JOHN E. NEILL

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Neill, 

and Senior Justice Scoggins3

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed February 17, 2021

Do not publish

[CRPM]

3 The Honorable Al Scoggins, Senior Justice of the Tenth Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment 

of the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 74.003, 75.002, 75.003.