[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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Nos. 14-10826; 14-11149

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 8:13-cv-02197-JDW,

Bkcy No. 8:12-bk-00562-MGW

IN RE: RONALD BIFANI,

 Debtor.

________________________________________________________

ARLENE M. LAMARCA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee

 Cross Appellant,

 versus

SHARI STREIT JANSEN, 

Chapter 7 Trustee,

 Defendant-Appellant

 Cross Appellee.

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Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(September 11, 2014)

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Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Chapter 7 Trustee Shari Streit Jansen appeals the district court’s reversal of 

the bankruptcy court’s imposition of an equitable lien against property the 

bankruptcy court concluded was fraudulently transferred from debtor Ronald 

Bifani to defendant Arlene LaMarca. LaMarca cross-appeals the bankruptcy and

district courts’ conclusions that Bifani fraudulently transferred the property to her

under the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (FUFTA), Fla. Stat. § 726.101 

et seq. After a thorough review, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

I.

Ronald Bifani owed several properties in the Breckenridge, Colorado area. 

In 2000, Bifani met LaMarca and, within a few years, LaMarca moved into a home 

Bifani owned. In 2006, Bifani transferred this property at 207 North Ridge Street 

to LaMarca. In 2009, LaMarca sold the property, paid off the outstanding 

mortgage, and gave half the $341,297 profit to Bifani.

Shortly thereafter, in June 2009, Bifani transferred additional properties at 

1400 Golden Eagle Road and 988 Bald Eagle Road to LaMarca. It is these 

transfers that form the basis of the Trustee’s action. LaMarca sold the Golden 

Eagle Road property, paid off the mortgage, and in September 2009, used the 

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$669,233 proceeds to purchase a home in Sarasota, Florida where she and Bifani 

currently reside.1

Between 2001 and the time of these transfers, Bifani was involved in a statecourt lawsuit brought against him by a former business partner. After the case had 

been dismissed and reinstated several times, in June 2009, the state court scheduled

a status conference. In December 2012, the state court ruled against Bifani and 

ordered him to pay judgment in excess of $166,000. The following month, Bifani 

filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.

In the bankruptcy proceeding, LaMarca filed claims as a creditor based on 

promissory notes Bifani signed in connection with a line of credit and various 

loans LaMarca made to him. Specifically, LaMarca indicated that Bifani owed her 

over $171,000 for a loan she made after the sale of the North Ridge Street 

property; over $450,000 for a line of credit she gave Bifani; and in excess of 

$131,000 in personal loans. Bifani also owed her over $242,000 for mortgages on 

the Bald Eagle and Golden Eagle properties. Jansen, as the Chapter 7 Trustee,

filed a second amended complaint in the bankruptcy proceeding, seeking to recoup 

the money received from the transfers of the Bald Eagle and Golden Eagle 

properties and the sale of the Golden Eagle property. Jansen alleged that the 

transfers were fraudulent because they were made with the actual intent to hinder, 

 1

 LaMarca admitted that she used the proceeds from the Golden Eagle sale to purchase the 

Sarasota property.

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delay, or defraud creditors under FUFTA, Fla. Stat. §§ 726.105(1)(a) and 

726.106(1). Jansen also sought an equitable lien against the Sarasota property 

because the funds obtained as a result of the fraudulent transfer of Golden Eagle 

were used to purchase the Sarasota property.

The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in Jansen’s favor, finding 

that Bifani made the transfers with actual intent to delay or hinder. In reaching this 

conclusion, the bankruptcy court focused on the following facts: the relationship 

between Bifani and LaMarca, Bifani’s continued possession of the property, the 

pending lawsuit, and the lack of any reasonably equitable value for the transfers. 

The bankruptcy court noted that there was no evidence to show that LaMarca 

credited Bifani’s outstanding loans with the value of the properties. As to the 

equitable lien, the bankruptcy court found that a lien was proper when the property 

was obtained through ill-gotten proceeds, even if the property was subject to a 

homestead exemption. In an amended judgment, the bankruptcy court imposed the 

equitable lien on the Sarasota property and awarded Jansen $661,000.

LaMarca appealed to the district court, arguing that summary judgment was 

improper on factual questions such as actual fraud, and that the imposition of an 

equitable lien against a homestead was not permitted by the Florida Constitution

Article X, section 4. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s conclusions 

as to actual fraud, but reversed the equitable lien as unconstitutional. Jansen now 

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appeals the denial of the equitable lien. LaMarca cross-appeals the determination 

that the transfers were fraudulent.

 II.

We have jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). “As the 

second court of review of a bankruptcy court’s judgment, we independently 

examine the factual and legal determinations of the bankruptcy court and employ 

the same standards of review as the district court.” In re Int’l Admin. Servs., Inc., 

408 F.3d 689, 698 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Because the district court made no factual findings in its function as an appellate 

court, our review is de novo. Id. We review the findings of fact made by the 

bankruptcy court for clear error. Id. A factual finding is not clearly erroneous 

unless “this court, after reviewing all of the evidence, [is] left with the definite and 

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (internal citation omitted). 

We review de novo “determinations of law, whether from the bankruptcy court or 

the district court.” Id. Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no 

genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was any actual intent to hinder, 

delay, or defraud the creditors. See, e.g., In re XYZ Options, Inc., 154 F.3d 1262, 

1272 (11th Cir. 1998) (reversing summary judgment where there were genuine 

issues of fact).

 III.

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Under FUFTA’s actual fraud provision, a 

transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a 

creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose before or after the transfer 

was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the 

transfer or incurred the obligation: (a) [w]ith actual intent to hinder, 

delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor . . . .

Fla. Stat. § 726.105(1)(a). In determining whether a transfer was made with an 

actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud, courts look to the statutory “badges of 

fraud.” See Fla. Stat. § 726.105(2). These include, relevant to this appeal,

whether: the transfer was to an insider, the debtor retained control of the property 

after the transfer, before the transfer occurred the debtor had been sued, and the 

value of consideration was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset or the 

amount of the obligation incurred. Fla. Stat. § 726.105(2)(a)-(k); see also Wiand v. 

Lee, 753 F.3d 1194, 1200 (11th Cir. 2014).

“The existence of badges of fraud creates a prima facie case and raises a 

rebuttable presumption that the transaction is void.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Chuly Int’l, 

LLC, 118 So.3d 325, 327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (citation and internal quotation 

omitted). Once there has been a showing of a prima facie case under FUFTA, the 

burden shifts to the debtor to show the transfer was not made to hinder or delay or 

defraud creditors. Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So.2d 1109, 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).

Although “[a] single badge of fraud may only create a suspicious 

circumstance and may not constitute the requisite fraud to set aside a conveyance 

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[,] several of them when considered together may afford a basis to infer fraud.” 

Wiand, 753 F.3d at 1200 (citation omitted). And although FUFTA lists a number 

of badges of fraud, “[i]t is clear from the language of the statute that in determining 

intent, consideration may be given to factors other than those listed.” Id. (citation 

and internal quotation omitted). Thus, “[c]ourts may take into account the 

circumstances surrounding the conveyance.” Gen. Elec. Co., 118 So.3d at 327 

(citation omitted). Nevertheless, “in fraud cases, summary judgment is available 

only in extraordinary circumstances.” Nationsbank, N.A. v. Coastal Utils., Inc., 

814 So.2d 1227, 1231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). 

LaMarca challenges the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that the transfers of 

the Golden Eagle and Bald Eagle properties were fraudulent. She contends that 

questions of fraud are fact-specific and thus the court erred by granting summary 

judgment. LaMarca asserts that she has a good faith defense—Bifani’s repayment 

of a debt to her—to rebut the badges of fraud.

Here, the bankruptcy court found four badges of fraud present, satisfying the 

prima facie showing of actual fraud. The court then found that LaMarca had 

offered no evidence to rebut this presumption and, because the evidence was one 

sided, granted summary judgment. We will address each finding in turn.

First, the bankruptcy court found that LaMarca was the functional equivalent 

of an “insider” based on her long-term relationship and cohabitation with Bifani. 

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The FUFTA defines an “insider” to include relatives of the debtor or the debtor’s 

general partner. Fla. Stat. § 726.102(8)(a). But nothing in the statute limits the 

definition to exclude close personal friends. See id. (using the language 

“includes”); see also United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1348 (11th Cir. 

2014) (“The items that follow each use of the word ‘includes’ in the statute are 

non-exhaustive examples . . . .” (internal citation omitted)). 

Even if the definition of “insider” did not include LaMarca, the courts 

were permitted to consider LaMarca’s relationship and cohabitation with 

Bifani along with the other badges of fraud. See Gen. Elec. Co., 118 So.3d 

at 327 (“Courts may take into account the circumstances surrounding the 

conveyance.”). Moreover, “[a] close relationship between a transferor 

debtor and a transferee is a factor equivalent to a badge of fraud which 

should be considered in determining fraudulent intent.” Gen. Trading Inc. v. 

Yale Materials Handling Corp., 119 F.3d 1485, 1499 (11th Cir. 1997)

(noting that a close relationship, whether personal or business, can equate to 

a badge of fraud). Thus, the bankruptcy court did not err in considering the 

relationship between Bifani and LaMarca as the equivalent of a badge of 

fraud.

The court next considered whether Bifani retained control of the 

property after the transfer. The record in this case shows that, even after 

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Bifani deeded the North Ridge property to LaMarca, he continued to reside 

there, and he received half the profit once LaMarca sold the property. 

Neither Bifani nor LaMarca offered an explanation as to why the property 

was transferred in this manner. Moreover, LaMarca used the proceeds from 

the sale of Golden Eagle to purchase the Sarasota property in which she and 

Bifani currently live, giving Bifani at least some control over the various 

properties after the transfers. Thus, the bankruptcy court did not err when it 

concluded that Bifani retained some control over property he transferred to 

LaMarca. 

Additionally, the court looked at the timing of the transfer in relation 

to the lawsuit filed against Bifani. Bifani does not dispute that he was being 

sued by his former business partner at the time of the transfers, but he noted 

that the case had been pending since 2001. But, the week before Bifani 

transferred the properties to LaMarca, the state court had scheduled a status

conference in that case. This timing, as the bankruptcy court found, calls 

into question Bifani’s motive for transferring property, and thus was 

properly considered as a badge of fraud.

Finally, the court evaluated whether the value of consideration was 

reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset or the amount of the 

obligation incurred. In his deposition, Bifani admitted that LaMarca 

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provided no consideration in exchange for the deeds to the properties and 

that he transferred the properties to calm her insecurities about money she 

had lent him.2

 Both Bifani and LaMarca claimed in their depositions that 

the amount LaMarca loaned Bifani exceeded one million dollars, but the

properties Bifani transferred to LaMarca only covered part of that amount.

They asserted that the remaining sum of about $130,000 was not paid and 

thus was listed as debt in Bifani’s bankruptcy proceeding. These statements 

were not supported by the record, which showed that LaMarca never 

credited Bifani for payment on the debt. In light of this evidence, the 

bankruptcy court properly concluded that the transfers lacked any reasonably 

equivalent consideration.

We cannot conclude that the bankruptcy court erred when it found

that the badges of fraud established a prima facie case that the transfers were 

fraudulent. The presence of these badges of fraud and the attendant 

circumstances were sufficient to meet the trustee’s burden.

 2

 There are discrepancies in the record between Bifani’s and LaMarca’s account of the transfers, 

the reasons for them, and the basis of their relationship. For example, Bifani stated in his 

deposition that the two lived together to share expenses because they were both on social 

security. But LaMarca stated that the two were good friends and traveled together, and she 

described herself as a “spoiled little rich kid.” Additionally, LaMarca seemed to have endless 

funds with which to bankroll Bifani, an unlikely scenario if the two lived together simply to 

share expenses. Moreover, once they moved to the Sarasota property, Bifani paid only the phone 

and internet; LaMarca paid the rest of the expenses. Bifani also stated that he paid LaMarca a 

commission to sell the North Ridge property, but LaMarca denied this. Finally, Bifani testified 

that LaMarca gave him half the proceeds of the North Ridge sale, but LaMarca characterized this 

as yet another loan.

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Thus, the burden shifted to LaMarca to show the transfers were not 

fraudulent. LaMarca argued that the transfers were made in good faith to 

pay off debts and lines of credit Bifani owed her. But, as the bankruptcy 

court found, there was no evidence in the record to support her claim. 

Rather, the evidence showed that Bifani rarely made payments on the loans 

he owed LaMarca, neither Bifani nor LaMarca kept track of the payments 

made, and LaMarca never demanded payment or put the loans into default. 

Moreover, even after the transfers of property, LaMarca still considered the 

loan outstanding, and she filed a claim for the loan amount in Bifani’s 

bankruptcy proceeding. In light of the one-sided evidence, we conclude that 

the material facts were not genuinely in dispute and thus the bankruptcy 

court properly granted summary judgment on the issue of actual fraud.

 IV.

Having concluded that the bankruptcy court properly granted summary 

judgment in favor of the Chapter 7 Trustee, we turn to the Trustee’s request for an 

equitable lien, which the bankruptcy court granted and the district court reversed.

Under Florida law, 

[t]here shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, 

and no judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, except 

for the payment of taxes and assessments thereon, obligations 

contracted for the purchase, improvement or repair thereof, or 

obligations contracted for house . . . the following property owned by 

a natural person: (1) a homestead . . . .

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Fla. Const. Art. X, § 4. This homestead exemption is liberally construed, but not 

so liberally construed “so as to make it an instrument of fraud or imposition on 

creditors.” Town of Lake Park v. Grimes, 963 So.2d 940, 942 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 

2007). Thus, Florida law is well-settled: A homestead “cannot be employed as a 

shield and defense after fraudulently imposing on others.” Jones v. Carpenter, 106 

So. 127, 130 (Fla. 1925); Palm Beach Savs. & Loan Ass’n, F.S.A. v. Fishbein, 619 

So.2d 267, 270 (Fla. 1993); cf. Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hill, 790 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 

2001) (holding the equitable lien is still a viable remedy for creditors in cases 

where funds obtained fraudulently were used directly to purchase a homestead, but 

the homestead exemption will apply to property purchased using funds legitimately 

obtained even if the property is used to shield funds from creditors). 

Although the state constitution lists only three specific exemptions, Florida 

courts have “invoked equitable principles to reach beyond the literal language of 

the excepts” where “funds obtained through fraud or egregious conduct were used 

to invest in, purchase, or improve the homestead.” Havoco, 790 So.2d at 1028; see 

also Zureikat v. Shaibani, 944 So.2d 1019, 1024 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) 

(affirming an equitable lien placed on a homestead where proceeds obtained from 

fraudulent conduct were used to invest in, purchase, or improve the homestead). 

Jansen argues that the bankruptcy court properly applied the lien and the 

district court erred by reversing it because this case falls outside of Havoco. 

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LaMarca argues that the district court properly denied the equitable lien because in 

cases in which an equitable lien on the homestead was permitted, the homeowner 

engaged in some type of criminal conduct.

We agree with the bankruptcy court’s analysis and conclude that the 

equitable lien on the Sarasota property was proper. Under Florida law, homestead 

property purchased with funds obtained by fraud is not exempted from equitable 

liens. See Havoco, 790 So.2d at 1028. The facts of this case do not fall within 

Havoco’s exception because the funds used to purchase the Sarasota property were 

obtained through Bifani’s fraudulent transfers. See id.; cf. In re Chauncey, 454 

F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting the Havoco rule and concluding that an

equitable lien was improper because the debtor had obtained the funds used to 

purchase the homestead legitimately and not by fraud).

LaMarca and Jansen argue whether an equitable lien is only available in 

cases of equitable subrogation. Although several cases discuss liens in the context 

of subrogation, none of the cases limits the availability of an equitable lien to cases 

of subrogation. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 761 So.2d 370, 373 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

2000) (“[T]he supreme court has limited the exception allowing an equitable lien 

on homestead to those cases where the owner of the property has used the proceeds 

from fraud or reprehensible conduct to either invest in, purchase, or improve the 

homestead.”). We reiterate, under well-settled Florida law, an equitable lien is 

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available where the property owner seeks a homestead exception for property 

purchased with funds obtained by fraud. 

That the fraud occurred in a bankruptcy proceeding rather than a criminal 

offense is irrelevant. The purpose of the lien is to prevent unjust enrichment. 

Allowing Bifani to fraudulently transfer property to LaMarca to avoid his 

creditors, allowing LaMarca to use the proceeds from the properties to purchase a 

home, and then allowing Bifani to live in that home with LaMarca rent free with 

no remedy for the bankruptcy trustee is entirely unjust. Accordingly, we conclude 

that the bankruptcy court properly imposed an equitable lien on the Sarasota 

property, and the district court erred by reversing. The district court’s order is 

affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the district court to impose the 

equitable lien.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part.

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