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OPINION V.

JONATHAN POAG, et al.,

Defendants.

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:

This matter comes before the Court on the motion (ECF No. 32) of all

defendants to dismiss the amended complaint (ECF No. 18) of the plaintiff,

Jhon Sanchez, for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Reviewing the complaint, I find that it does not set forth facts sufficient to

make out a plausible claim for relief against the defendants. Accordingly, the

motion to dismiss the complaint is GRANTED, albeit without prejudice to thefiling of a second amended complaint within 45 days.

I. BACKGROUND 1

Mr. Sanchez is a civilly committed detainee of East Jersey State Prison’s

Special Treatment Unit (“STU”). (Am. Compl. 2—3) The defendants are New

Jersey state officials from the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) or

employees at the STU. (Am. Compi. 4a-4d)

1 The facts that follow are taken from the complaint. They are assumed to be

true solely for the purposes of the motion to dismiss.

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complaint in October 2014. The defendants have moved to dismiss it for failure

to state a claim. (ECF No. 32)

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To state a valid claim for relief under Rule

12(b)(6), the complaint must contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the

grounds for the court’s jurisdiction; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief

sought. Fed R. Civ. P. 8(a).

For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in the

complaint are accepted as true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor

of the plaintiff. N.J. Carpenters & the Trs. Thereof v. Tishman Const. Corp. of

N.J., 760 F.3d 297, 302 (3d Cir. 2014). Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) does not require that

a complaint contain detailed factual allegations. Nevertheless, “a plaintiff’s

obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do.” Bell Ati. Corp. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127

S. Ct. 1955, 1964—65 (2007). Thus, the complaint’s factual allegations must be

sufficient to raise a plaintiff’s right to relief above a speculative level, so that a

claim is “plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570; see also W. Run Student Hous.

Assocs., LLC u. Huntington Nat. Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 169 (3d Cir. 2013).

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ate a claim for relief. See [Iqbal, 556

U.S.] at 675; Argueta, 643 F.3d at 73. Next, we peel away those

allegations that are no more than conclusions and thus not

entitled to the assumption of truth. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679;

Argueta, 643 F.3d at 73. Finally, we look for well-pled factual

allegations, assume their veracity, and then “determine whether

they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 679; Argueta, 643 F.3d at 73. This last step is “a context-specific

task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012).

In a case brought pro se such as this one, the Court must construe the

complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94,

127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.

Ct. 594, 596—97 (1972). Liberal construction does not, however, require the

Court to credit a pro se plaintiff’s “bald assertions” or “legal conclusions.”

Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Even apro

se complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if the allegations set

forth by the plaintiff cannot be construed as supplying facts to support a claim

entitling the plaintiff to relief. See Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d

239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (An example of the limits of courts’ procedural

flexibility regarding pro se litigants is that “pro se litigants still must allege

sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.”).

B. Analysis

I find that the complaint fails to state a claim against the defendants.

Even under the most liberal construction of the complaint, Mr. Sanchez has

failed to allege facts sufficient to support a cognizable claim. See generally

Haines, 404 U.S. at 520—2 1, 594 S. Ct. at 596—97. In his amended complaint,

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1. Jonathan Poag

Mr. Poag was the Director of the DHS Division of Mental Health Services.

As to him, the complaint alleges only this: that Poag was “[fjailing to oversee

the interferences that DOC is doing to therapy. And the using of psychiatricbeing used as a form of prison punishment.” (Am. Compl. 4a)

In conclusory fashion, this allegation simply states that an unsavory

practice is underway. Sanchez does not state any facts as to when, where, and

how, and against whom psychiatric treatment has been used as a form ofprison punishment. It does not so much as give an example. Nor does the

complaint allege that Sanchez personally has been subject to that practice or

has been injured as a result of it. This conclusory allegation is insufficient to

state a claim for relief.

2. Menu Main

Merill Main was the clinical director of STU. As to him, the complaint

alleges only this: that Merill Main was “[ajuthorizing and giving Corrections theauthority of placing us (residents) under the prison policy. Knowing that we are

civilly committed residents.” (Am. Compl. 4a) Again, Sanchez fails to provide

any facts. The complaint does not state what “prison policy” is referred to; how,

when, or to whom it was applied; or any other facts. Again, no example or

examples are given. Nor does the complaint state that Sanchez himself has

been subjected to such policies or injured as a result. This conclusory

allegation is insufficient to state a claim for relief.

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again, is wholly conclusory and contains no facts. It does not state what the“abuse” might consist of, when it occurred, or by whom it was perpetrated. It

does not give an example of what is meant. This conclusory allegation is

insufficient to state a claim for relief.

4. Jacelyn Ottino

Ms. Ottino was a program director at STU. As to her, the complaint

alleges only this: that Ottino was “[o]verlooking the abuse of Corrections filing

False Reports on me. Causing serious interference with my treatment.” (Am.

Compl. 4b) This allegation, like the others, is devoid of facts. It does not state

what reports are referred to, or in what way they were false. The interference

with treatment is not described, even generally, nor are examples given. This

conclusory allegation is insufficient to state a claim for relief.

5. Brian Friedman

Dr. Friedman was a psychologist at STU. As to him, the complaint alleges

only this: that Friedman was “[djisregarding my grievances and verbalcomplaints of being discriminated against towards my treatment byCorrections.” (Am. Compl. 4c) This allegation is insufficient to state a claim for

relief. Sanchez fails to provide examples of grievances and complaints that weredisregarded, to describe them in any way, or to state when and to whom they

were made. This conclusory allegation is insufficient to state a claim for relief.

6. Jennifer Velez

Commissioner Velez was the commissioner of DHS. As to her, the

complaint alleges only this: that Velez was “[fjailing to answered my complaints

of being mental and physically abused by Corrections. And for failing to send

someone to this Facility to oversee the DOC and their corruptive ways of

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John Main was the CEO of DHS Hospitals. As to him, the complaint

alleges only this: that John Main was “[ajllowing Corrections to apply the 10:ACode (prison rules) for us. Knowing that we are civilly committed residents.”

(Am. Compl. 4d) Sanchez fails to provide examples of how prison rules were

applied, state how they were applied, or describe how he was harmed as a

result. It does not state how Sanchez was harmed personally; it merely states

generally that civilly committed prisoners are treated as if they were prisoners.

This conclusory allegation is insufficient to state a claim for relief.

In sum, Mr. Sanchez has failed to provide “more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct.

at 1964—65). The complaint thus fails to state a claim for relief that is

“plausible on its face,” and it will be dismissed for failure to comply with the

pleading standards of Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is

GRANTED and Mr. Sanchez’s amended complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE to the submission within 45 days of a Second Amended

Complaint containing the necessary factual allegations. If he wishes, Mr.

Sanchez may use extra sheets and file his Second Amended Complaint as asupplement to the current version on file

Dated: March 22, 2016

Hon. evin McN ty

United States Di t Judge

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