IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Borough of Coraopolis, :

Officer Robert Litterini :

and Officer Nicholas DeRusso, :

Appellants :

:

v. : No. 233 C.D. 2022

:

Amanda Papa : Submitted: November 4, 2022

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

PER CURIAM FILED: March 3, 2023

The Borough of Coraopolis, Officer Robert Litterini, and Officer Nicholas

DeRusso (collectively, the Borough) appeal from a December 30, 2021 order of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (Trial Court) denying the Borough’s

Motion for Summary Judgment. Upon review, we reverse and remand to the Trial 

Court for the entry of judgment in favor of the Borough. 

I. Background 

On the evening of May 30, 2018, Coraopolis Police Officers Litterini and 

DeRusso responded to a domestic violence call at the residence of Amanda Papa and 

her husband, Garrett Wasserman. See Commonwealth v. Amanda Lynn Wasserman, 

a.k.a. Papa (C.C.P. Allegheny Cnty., No. CP-02-CR-0008418-2018, filed July 20, 

2020) (Criminal Trial Opinion), at 9. The call had been placed by Ms. Papa’s father, 

who was concerned after finding his daughter intoxicated and agitated following a 

fight with her husband. Id. After the officers arrived, Mr. Wasserman, visibly 

injured, granted the officers access to the home. Id. at 9-10. Inside, the officers 

observed a broken television, broken computers, upturned houseplants and lamps, 
2

and shattered glass strewn across the floors. Id. at 10. Ms. Papa emerged from an 

upstairs bedroom door, announced that she did not wish to see her husband, and 

returned to the bedroom to lock herself inside it. Id. Due to the information received 

from Ms. Papa’s father and the condition of her home and her husband, the officers 

forced the bedroom door open. Id. They informed Ms. Papa that she was under 

arrest for the assault of her husband. Id. When the officers attempted to handcuff 

her, Ms. Papa attempted to fight them off. Id. 

Upon her arrest, Ms. Papa was taken to a holding cell at the police station. Id. 

Immediately after the officers left her alone, Ms. Papa attempted to flood the cell by 

stuffing a blanket into a toilet and repeatedly flushing it. Id. at 10-11. The officers 

moved Ms. Papa to an interview room, where they handcuffed each of her hands to 

the arms of a chair. Id. at 11. Immediately after they left the room, Ms. Papa began 

kicking a nearby table, which the officers (who had been watching via surveillance 

camera) returned to remove. Id. Minutes after they left, Ms. Papa proceeded to kick

the chair across the room, jump up and down, kick the wall repeatedly, bite her wrists 

causing blood and bite marks, remove her clothing, urinate on the floor and chair, 

and hit her head repeatedly on the chair. Id. The officers called a team of medics to 

evaluate and treat Ms. Papa’s self-inflicted injuries. Id. 

Following the events of May 30, 2018, Ms. Papa was charged with resisting 

arrest and institutional vandalism.1 Id. at 2. Following a bench trial, the court 

1 At the time, Ms. Papa was already facing several criminal charges as the result of an 

incident on April 22, 2018. The charges were consolidated with those in the instant matter for 

trial, conviction, and sentencing. Criminal Trial Op. at 1. The May 30, 2018 events, and the 

convictions that followed, form the factual basis of a separate civil action and appeal to this Court. 

See Moon Twp. v. Papa (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 234 C.D. 2022, filed March 3, 2023). 
3

convicted Ms. Papa of both counts and, on March 27, 2019, sentenced her to 

concurrent one-year terms of probation.2 Id. at 3. 

On September 23, 2020, Ms. Papa filed a pro se3 Complaint alleging that

Officers Litterini and DeRusso were liable for false arrest, negligence, defamation,

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious prosecution. Original 

Record (O.R.), Item No. 10. Ms. Papa further alleged that the Borough was liable 

for the officers’ conduct as their employer, and was liable in its own right for an 

additional count of negligence. See generally id. ¶¶ 56-70. As a proposed remedy, 

Ms. Papa requested an award of money damages in an unspecified amount, plus legal 

costs. Id. ¶ 70. 

The Borough filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on September 29, 2021.4 

O.R., Item No. 17. Therein, the Borough arguesthat Coraopolis was governmentally 

immune from Ms. Papa’s claims under what is commonly known as the Political 

2 Ms. Papa appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the convictions. See 

Commonwealth v. Amanda Lynn Wasserman (Pa. Super., No. 1407 WDA 2019, filed Nov. 12, 

2021), appeal denied, 275 A.3d 487 (Pa. 2022). 

3 While examining Ms. Papa’s claims, we are mindful of the rule that “allegations of a pro 

se complainant are held to a less stringent standard than that applied to pleadings filed by 

attorneys.” Rosario v. Beard, 920 A.2d 931, 934 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (quoting Danysh v. Dep’t of 

Corr., 845 A.2d 260, 262-63 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), aff’d, 881 A.2d 1263 (Pa. 2005)). Where a pro 

se complainant’s allegations are adequately set forth, they will not be dismissed just because they 

are not artfully drafted. Hill v. Thorne, 635 A.2d 186, 189 (Pa. Super. 1993).

4 Previously, the Borough removed the case to the United States Court for the Western 

District of Pennsylvania on October 21, 2020. O.R., Item No. 11. In a January 8, 2021 order, the 

district court remanded the case to state court. Id., Item No. 12. 
4

Subdivision Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-8542.5 Id.

¶¶ 24-25. The Borough further asserts that Officers Litterini and DeRusso are

protected by official immunity pursuant to Section 8545 of the Tort Claims Act.6 Id. 

¶¶ 26-28. Finally, the Borough claims that each of Ms. Papa’s claims fail on their 

merits because Ms. Papa has not, and cannot, allege facts necessary to establish the 

elements of each claim. See generally id. ¶¶ 35-64. 

On December 30, 2021, the Trial Court issued an order denying the Borough’s 

summary judgment motion. O.R., Item No. 22. The order consisted simply of a 

printout of the Borough’s proposed order granting summary judgment, with the text 

crossed out and the single word “denied” written in the margin. Id. 

The Borough subsequently petitioned this Court for permission to appeal. In 

a May 19, 2022 per curiam order, this Court granted its petition. Our order directed 

the parties to submit briefs on whether the Borough and its employees are immune 

from suit, and on whether Ms. Papa’s suit constituted a collateral attack on her 

convictions.7

5 Section 8541 provides that, except as otherwise specified in the Tort Claims Act, “no 

local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property 

caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.” 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 8541. Section 8542 provides certain exceptions, all of which involve negligence claims and 

which are not applicable to the instant matter. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542. 

6 Section 8545 provides that an “employee of a local agency is liable for civil damages on 

account of any injury to a person or property caused by acts of the employee which are within the 

scope of his office or duties only to the same extent as his employing local agency and subject to 

the limitations imposed by [the Tort Claims Act].” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8545. 

7 The order also directed the parties to submit briefs on the question of whether “the 

Pennsylvania Constitution provides a private right of action to” Ms. Papa. This is a reference to 

one of Ms. Papa’s claims in her related suit against Moon Township. 
5

II. Issues

The Borough argues that summary judgment was improperly denied because 

the Borough and its employees are immune from suit as a matter of law, and because 

Ms. Papa’s claims constitute an improper collateral attack on her criminal 

conviction.8 

III. Discussion 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2 provides: 

After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to 

unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for summary judgment 

in whole or in part as a matter of law

(1) whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a 

necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could be 

established by additional discovery or expert report, or

(2) if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion, 

including the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will 

bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts 

essential to the cause of action or defense which in a jury trial would 

require the issues to be submitted to a jury.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.2. A party seeking to avoid summary judgment must show by 

specific facts in the depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits 

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Moon v. Dauphin Cnty., 129 A.3d 16, 28 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2015). 

Here, the Borough moved for summary judgment on the basis that Ms. Papa’s 

claims suffer from legal defects that “could not be cured through any further 

discovery in this case.” O.R., Item No. 17, Motion ¶ 7. Ms. Papa countered that 

summary judgment would be inappropriate because she did not have an opportunity 

8 Our standard of review on appeal from the grant or denial of summary judgment is de 

novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Clean Air Council v. Sunoco Pipeline L.P., 185 A.3d 

478, 485 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). Our review is limited to determining whether the trial court 

committed an error of law or abuse of discretion. Id.
6

to substantiate her allegations of abusive treatment at the hands of the Borough and 

its employees. O.R., Item No. 20, Response ¶¶ 11-12. 

Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a),9the Trial Court submitted a single sentence 

statement explaining its denial of summary judgment, which reads as follows: 

“When [the Borough] filed [its] [M]otion for [S]ummary [J]udgment, discovery was 

not closed and it was therefore not free and clear from all doubt that [the Township 

or its employees] were entitled to summary judgment.” The memorandum cites a 

single case, Brown v. Tunkhannock Township, 665 A.2d 1318 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995), 

which is inapposite to the issues at hand.10 

It is important to note that the Trial Court did not address any of the issues set 

forth in this Court’s order granting the interlocutory appeal such as immunity and 

collateral attack defenses. Furthermore, the Trial Court offers an incomplete 

statement of when summary judgment is appropriate. The close of discovery is not 

the only condition allowing summary judgment to be considered. Pursuant to Rule 

of Civil Procedure 1035.2(1), summary judgment is equally appropriate when “there 

is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of 

action or defense which could be established by additional discovery.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 

9 Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) provides that, upon the receipt of a notice of appeal, “the judge who 

entered the order giving rise to the notice of appeal, if the reasons for the order do not already 

appear of record, shall . . . file of record at least a brief opinion of the reasons for the order.” 

10 The Trial Court’s reliance on Brown in this matter is perplexing as Brown does not 

discuss the status of discovery or its impact on summary judgment. Brown involved a plaintiff 

who sustained injuries at a softball game on township-owned land and brought an action in 

negligence against the township. 665 A.2d at 1319. After the close of pleadings and a single 

deposition, the township moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity pursuant to the 

Recreational Use of Land and Water Act (RULWA), Act of February 2, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1860, 

as amended, 68 P.S. §§ 477-1–477-8. 665 A.2d at 1319. The trial court granted the township’s 

motion. Id. at 1319-20. This Court reversed, holding that the ballpark was “improved land” and 

therefore outside the scope of the RULWA. Id. at 1322. 
7

1035.2(1). The Trial Court’s statement fails to provide any insight or explanation as 

to why Rule 1035.2(1) is inapplicable in this instance. For the reasons set forth 

below, we have determined that the Borough and officers are immune from suit, that

Ms. Papa’s claims fail as a matter of law, and that further discovery would serve no 

purpose. 

A. Governmental Immunity

Section 8541 of the Tort Claims Act provides the general rule of government 

liability: “Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no local agency shall be 

liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by 

any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.” 42 Pa. C.S. 

§ 8541. The following section provides eight exceptions, all of which involve acts 

of negligence.11 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542. The clear legislative intent to insulate local 

agencies and their employees from tort claims mandates that courts construe those 

exceptions narrowly. Cornelius v. Roberts, 71 A.3d 345, 350 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). 

Instantly, Ms. Papa alleges that the Borough is liable for the torts committed 

by Officers Litterini and DeRusso in its capacity as their employer. Ms. Papa also 

alleges that the Borough is liable in its own right for negligence due to its failure to 

heed her calls to investigate the officers’ alleged wrongdoing. Not one of the 

11 The exceptions include: (i) the operation of motor vehicles; (ii) the care, custody, or 

control of personal property; (iii) the care, custody or control of real property; (iv) a dangerous 

condition of trees, traffic controls and street lighting; (v) a dangerous condition of steam, sewer, 

water, gas or electric systems; (vi) a dangerous condition of streets; (vii) a dangerous condition of 

sidewalks; and (viii) the care, custody or control of animals. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b).
8

allegations falls under Section 8542’s exceptions to governmental immunity.

12

 The 

Borough is therefore immune from all of Ms. Papa’s claims.

13

 

B. Official Immunity 

The general rule of official immunity is stated in Section 8545 of the Tort 

Claims Act: “An employee of a local agency is liable for civil damages on account 

12 Ms. Papa’s negligence claim against the Borough itself would be unavailing even if 

immunity did not apply. Specifically, Ms. Papa alleges that the Borough is in breach of a duty “to 

oversee its employees including investigating complaints of misconduct by its employees and take 

appropriate action.” O.R., Item No. 10, Complaint ¶ 67. In support, Ms. Papa cites Section 1123.1 

of the Borough Code, which provides that “[t]he mayor shall have full charge and control of the 

chief of police and the police force,” and that the mayor “may delegate to the chief of police or 

other officer supervision over and instruction to subordinate officers in the manner of performing 

their duties.” 8 Pa.C.S. § 1123.1(a)-(c). There is nothing in that provision, or elsewhere in the 

Borough Code, that imposes an affirmative duty on municipal authorities to take disciplinary 

action anytime that someone alleges misconduct. A borough’s power to investigate or discipline 

a police officer is governed by Section 1124(a) of the Borough Code, which provides that a 

borough mayor “may, for cause and without pay, suspend any police officers until the succeeding 

regular meeting of the council at which time or later the council may . . . suspend, discharge, reduce 

in rank or reinstate with pay the police officers.” 8 Pa.C.S. § 1124(a) (emphases added). As made 

clear by the operative verb “may,” the Borough Code authorizes, but does not require, a borough 

government to take such action. 

13 In opposition to the Borough’s assertion of immunity, Ms. Papa also argues that under 

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), local governments “may be sued 

in certain limited circumstances.” O.R., Item No. 20, Response ¶ 13. While that is true, Monell

concerned civil actions for loss of federal constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ms. 

Papa is not pursuing federal claims, which is why this case was remanded to state court. 

Ms. Papa also opposes immunity on the basis of two new allegations against the Borough: 

that it had failed to place her under a female police officer’s supervision, and that one of the police 

officers at the station on the evening of Ms. Papa’s arrest was the subject of a sexual misconduct 

complaint. O.R., Item No. 20, Response ¶¶ 15, 16. It is unclear how these allegations relate to the 

question of whether the Borough is immune from her suit. If Ms. Papa wished to argue that the 

alleged conduct constituted additional torts, then the allegations should be included in an amended 

complaint. Even if the Trial Court were to grant Ms. Papa leave to amend, however, the averments 

would fail to support the argument; Ms. Papa does not allege that she was harmed by the absence 

of a female officer, or that she had any interactions with the officer accused of sexual misconduct. 

The new allegations are therefore irrelevant to the question of whether the Borough is immune. 
9

of any injury to a person or property caused by acts of the employee which are within 

the scope of his office or duties only to the same extent as his employing local 

agency.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8545. That limitation is waived if an injury was caused by 

an act that is judicially determined to have “constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual 

malice or willful misconduct.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8550. For purposes of Section 8550, 

“willful misconduct” is synonymous with “intentional tort”; that is, the actor 

“desired to bring about the result that followed, or at least that he was aware that it 

was substantially certain to ensue.” Balletta v. Spadoni, 47 A.3d 183, 196 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2012). If the claim does not rise to the level of willful misconduct, but, 

instead, is based on negligence, then the employee enjoys governmental immunity 

to the same extent as a local agency, and the negligence claim must meet one of the 

eight enumerated exceptions in Section 8542(b). Orange Stones Co. v. City of 

Reading, 87 A.3d 1014, 1023 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). 

Instantly, Ms. Papa alleges that Officers Litterini and DeRusso are personally 

liable for false arrest, negligence, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional 

distress, and malicious prosecution. The negligence count against the officers, like 

the one against the Borough itself, does not fall under any of the Section 8542(b) 

exceptions. Officers Litterini and DeRusso are therefore immune from that claim.14 

14 Like the negligence claim against the Borough itself, the claim against the officers would 

be unavailing even if immunity did not apply. In her Complaint, Ms. Papa alleges that the officers 

are liable for negligence through a variety of bad acts. First, the Complaint states that the officers 

violated Section 302(a)(2) of the Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 817, as amended, which provides that 

a peace officer who personally observes someone in apparent need of immediate mental health 

treatment “may take such person to an approved facility for an emergency examination.” 50 P.S. 

§ 7302(a)(2). As made clear by the operative verb “may,” Section 302(a)(2) grants officers the 

discretion to take a person to an approved facility for an emergency examination; it does not 

require them to do so. 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
10

As the remaining counts all involve allegations of intentional acts, they may 

only survive if it is judicially determined that the officers’ actions constituted willful 

misconduct; that is, intentional torts. For the following reasons, we conclude that 

the averments in Ms. Papa’s Complaint fail as a matter of law to support any such

determination. 

1. False Arrest 

The necessary elements of a cause of action for false arrest are: (1) the 

detention of another person, and (2) the unlawfulness of such detention. Renk v. City 

of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994). An arrest that is based upon probable 

cause is legally justified, regardless of whether the individual arrested was 

eventually found guilty. Id. 

Ms. Papa also alleges that Officers Litterini and DeRusso “left [a] urine-soaked towel 

around the head of [Ms. Papa],” and that they later pushed the towel into her face. O.R., Item No. 

10, Complaint ¶¶ 35-36. Ms. Papa later alleged that their actions constitute attempted 

“strangulation.” O.R., Item No. 20, Response ¶ 12. In support, Ms. Papa refers to images from 

the surveillance footage of the interview room during her detention. That footage does not support 

Ms. Papa’s version of events. At 8:18 p.m. on the evening of her arrest, one of the emergency 

medical technicians who were called to evaluate Ms. Papa is seen placing a towel on the floor, 

presumably to clean up the puddle of urine. O.R., Item No. 21, Reply Brief, Exhibit B. At 8:51 

p.m., Ms. Papa is seen placing the towel around her own neck and shoulders. Id. At 9:33 p.m., 

Ms. Papa is seen kicking Officer DeRusso while he appears to be attempting to remove Ms. Papa’s 

right handcuff; seconds later, he is seen lifting one end of the towel and holding it in front of Ms. 

Papa’s face, but not pushing it into her face. Id. 

While we and the Trial Court are required to view the record in the light most favorable to 

Ms. Papa, we are under no obligation to adopt a version of events that is blatantly contradicted by 

video evidence. See Sellers v. Twp. of Abington, 106 A.3d 679, 690 (Pa. 2014) (finding no genuine 

issue of material fact where an in-car camera recording “blatantly contradicts” the nonmoving 

party’s version of events) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). Consequently, the

evidence referred to by Ms. Papa does not establish any element of a negligence claim. 
11

Ms. Papa argues that Officers Litterini and DeRusso are liable for false arrest 

because, inter alia, her assault charge was eventually withdrawn.

15

 O.R., Item No. 

10, Complaint ¶ 20. As stated, however, a charge need not result in a conviction for 

probable cause to have existed. When the officers arrived at Ms. Papa’s home, they 

observed scratches on Mr. Wasserman’s skin, which Mr. Wasserman attributed to 

Ms. Papa’s assault. Those signs of injury and the coinciding evidence of the broken 

objects strewn across Ms. Papa’s and Mr. Wasserman’s home were more than 

enough to establish a probable cause to arrest for domestic violence. For this reason, 

Ms. Papa’s allegations cannot support an inference that the officers are liable for 

false arrest. 

2. Defamation 

In a defamation action, the plaintiff carries the burden of showing that an 

allegedly defamatory statement was false. Am. Future Sys., Inc. v. Better Bus. 

Bureau of Pa., 923 A.2d 389, 396 n.8 (Pa. 2007) (citing Phila. Newspapers v. Hepps, 

475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986)). Ms. Papa alleges that a Coraopolis police officer 

informed her employer that Ms. Papa was facing criminal charges, which is a true 

statement.16 The allegations therefore cannot support an inference that the officers 

are liable for defamation. 

15 Ms. Papa’s husband did not pursue the domestic violence charge. As for Ms. Papa’s 

charges for resisting arrest and institutional vandalism, a cause of action for false arrest obviously 

cannot be made because she was convicted of those charges. See McGriff v. Vidovich, 699 A.2d 

797, 800 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (explaining that “[p]robable cause to arrest is conclusively 

established to have existed at time that arrest was made, which thus precludes action for false 

arrest, if there is guilty plea or conviction”).

16 Specifically, the Complaint avers that Ms. Papa’s husband was told that a Coraopolis 

police officer, “possibly” Sergeant DeRusso, “had informed [Ms. Papa’s] employer of the pending 

criminal action.” O.R., Item No. 10 ¶ 41. 
12

3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

A person is liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress if, by extreme 

and outrageous conduct, that person intentionally or recklessly causes severe or 

emotional distress to another. Carson v. City of Phila., 574 A.2d 1184, 1187 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1990). Conduct or statements are “outrageous” if they “go beyond all 

bounds of decency and are regarded as utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” 

Id. Before the question reaches a jury, it is for the court to determine whether the 

defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded so extreme and outrageous as to 

permit recovery. Swisher v. Pitz, 868 A.2d 1228, 1231 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

Ms. Papa alleges that Officers Litterini and DeRusso engaged in “outrageous 

conduct” when they arrested and detained her. O.R., Item No. 10, Complaint ¶ 46. 

Because the officers had probable cause to arrest her, the conduct was entirely 

consistent with their duties as law enforcement officers. No reasonable inference 

can be made that the performance of official duties constitutes extreme or outrageous 

conduct. 

4. Malicious Prosecution 

To succeed in an action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that 

the defendant instituted proceedings against the plaintiff (1) without probable cause, 

(2) with malice, and that (3) the proceedings terminated in favor of the plaintiff. 

Kelley v. General Teamsters, Chauffeurs, & Helpers, Local Union 249, 544 A.2d 

940, 941 (Pa. 1988). 

Instantly, Ms. Papa alleges that Officers Litterini and DeRusso are liable for 

malicious prosecution because they “initiated criminal proceedings” against her, and 

that she “expects” a ruling by the Superior Court in her favor on the appeal from

those charges. O.R., Item No. 10, Complaint ¶¶ 51, 54. The Superior Court affirmed 
13

the convictions; thus, the proceedings did not terminate in her favor, and no 

reasonable inference can be made that the officers are liable for malicious 

prosecution. 

For the foregoing reasons, all of Ms. Papa’s claims fail as a matter of law; 

consequently, there is nothing in the record to justify a judicial determination that 

Officers Litterini or DeRusso engaged in a crime, actual fraud, actual malice, or 

willful misconduct. Pursuant to Section 8545 of the Tort Claims Act, they are 

officially immune from Ms. Papa’s claims. 

C. Collateral Estoppel 

Finally, the Borough argues that Ms. Papa’s claims constitute an improper 

collateral attack on her criminal conviction. As authority for this assertion, the 

Borough cites Weaver v. Franklin County, 918 A.2d 194, 196 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). 

In that case, a prison inmate sued a county government for conspiracy, negligence, 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and libel following his conviction and 

imprisonment for sexual assault. In rejecting his claims, this Court concluded that 

the plaintiff’s “inability to aver that the underlying conviction was invalidated” was 

an absolute bar to recovery. Id. at 203. The principle underlying that conclusion, 

commonly referred to as collateral estoppel, is that a party may not relitigate an issue 

that has already been resolved in another proceeding. See Shaffer v. Smith, 673 A.2d 

872, 874 (Pa. 1996) (noting “that a criminal conviction collaterally estops a 

defendant from denying his acts in a subsequent civil trial”). 

Since it has already been demonstrated that Ms. Papa’s claims fail as a matter 

of law, it is not necessary to engage in a separate collateral estoppel analysis of those 

claims. However, for the sake of thoroughness, we note that underlying every one 

of Ms. Papa’s claims is an effort to negate the legality and propriety of her arrest and 
14

conviction, and the later determination that she violated the terms of her probation. 

This Court is powerless to undo the outcome of valid criminal proceedings. The 

purpose of civil actions such as the one brought by Ms. Papa is not to provide second 

or third opportunities to relitigate criminal convictions after the proper avenues of 

appeal have been exhausted. 

IV. Conclusion 

The Borough and its employees are governmentally and officially immune 

from suit pursuant to the Tort Claims Act. Ms. Papa’s claims also fail as they 

constitute a collateral attack on the outcome of valid criminal proceedings. Finally, 

as the allegations fail as a matter of law, any further discovery would only delay the 

inevitable dismissal of this case. Accordingly, we reverse the Trial Court’s order

and remand for entry of judgment in favor of the Borough. 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Borough of Coraopolis, :

Officer Robert Litterini :

and Officer Nicholas DeRusso, :

Appellants :

:

v. : No. 233 C.D. 2022

:

Amanda Papa :

PER CURIAM

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 3

rd day of March, 2023, the order of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Allegheny County (Trial Court) in the above-captioned matter, dated 

December 30, 2021, is hereby REVERSED. The case is remanded to the Trial Court 

for the entry of judgment in favor of Appellants. 

Jurisdiction relinquished.