[Cite as State v. Bohanon, 2011-Ohio-4108.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 95907

 STATE OF OHIO 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

TAMEKA BOHANON 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

DISMISSED 

Criminal Appeal from the 

 Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court 

Case No. CR-535173 

BEFORE: E. Gallagher, J., Blackmon, P.J., and Keough, J. 

 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 18, 2011 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
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Kevin M. Cafferkey 

2000 Standard Building 

1370 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

William D. Mason 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Robert Botnick 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

The Justice Center, 9th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.: 

{¶ 1} Tameka Bohanon appeals her sentence from the Cuyahoga County Court 

of Common Pleas. Bohanon argues the trial court erred in imposing a term of 

incarceration that was not proportionate to similarly situated offenders and that her trial 

counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to raise this argument at sentencing. 

For the reasons that follow, we dismiss for lack of a final appealable order. 

{¶ 2} On March 16, 2010, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Bohanon 

with two counts of aggravated burglary with forfeiture and one- and three-year firearm 
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specifications, two counts of aggravated robbery with forfeiture and one- and three-year 

firearm specifications, two counts of felonious assault, failure to comply, improperly 

handling firearms in a motor vehicle, and having weapons while under disability and 

theft. 

{¶ 3} On August 16, 2010, Bohanon retracted her plea of not guilty and pleaded 

guilty to an amended count of burglary with the firearm specifications deleted, one count 

of felonious assault, and one count of improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle. 

As a condition of her plea, Bohanon forfeited two handguns. The remaining charges 

against Bohanon were nolled. 

{¶ 4} On September 22, 2010, Bohanon was sentenced to seven years for 

burglary, nine years for felonious assault, and eleven months for improperly handling 

firearms in a motor vehicle. The transcript of the sentencing hearing reveals that the 

trial court ordered the nine and seven years to be served consecutively with the eleven 

months to be served concurrently, for a total prison term of sixteen years. Nonetheless, 

the trial court’s journal entries of September 28, 2010 and May 25, 2011, reflect that the 

trial court ordered all three prison terms to run consecutively for a total prison sentence 

of sixteen years, eleven months. The parties to this appeal both state that Bohanon’s 

total prison term is sixteen years.1

 

 1

It is a fundamental principle of appellate review that the court speaks only 

through its journal. Kaine v. Marion Prison Warden (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 454, 727 

N.E.2d 907; State v. Ahmed, Cuyahoga App. No. 88315, 2007-Ohio-2639. As such, 
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{¶ 5} Bohanon appeals, raising the two assignments of error contained in the 

appendix to this opinion. 

{¶ 6} Similar to this Court’s holding in State v. Jones, Cuyahoga App. No. 

95961, 2011-Ohio-3984, we find that the judgment from which Bohanon appeals is not a 

final appealable order. Ohio law provides that appellate courts have jurisdiction to 

review only final orders or judgments. Section III(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio Constitution; 

R.C. 2505.02. If an order is not final and appealable, an appellate court has no 

jurisdiction to review the matter. 

{¶ 7} On April 27, 2011, this court, sua sponte, remanded the record in this 

appeal to the trial court pursuant to App.R. 9(E) for correction of the trial court’s 

judgment of conviction. We stated, in pertinent part, “[t]he trial court’s judgment of 

conviction journalized on September 28, 2010 does not indicate the disposition of the 

two forfeiture specifications attached to count 1. Crim.R. 32(C) imposes a mandatory 

duty upon the trial court to set forth the plea, the verdict or findings, and the sentence for 

each and every criminal charge and specification prosecuted. With respect to forfeiture 

specifications, the judgment must describe the forfeited property and order the specific 

property to be forfeited. State v. Byrd, Cuyahoga App. No. 91090, 2009-Ohio-1876.” 

{¶ 8} In Byrd, this court in dismissing an appeal for lack of a final appealable 

order regarding forfeiture specifications held, “the order Byrd seeks to appeal fails to 

 

we shall note Bohanon’s sentence as sixteen years, eleven months. 
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address the forfeiture specifications — it does not describe the forfeited property and it 

does not order the specific property to be forfeited.” Id. at ¶8. Because the order did 

not address the forfeiture specifications, this court found that it did not comply with 

Crim.R. 32(C) and State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 

163, and thus was not a final appealable order. A judgment of conviction is a final 

appealable order * * * “when it sets forth (1) the guilty plea, the jury verdict, or the 

finding of the court upon which the conviction is based; (2) the sentence; (3) the 

signature of the judge; and (4) entry on the journal by the clerk of court.” Byrd at 5, 

quoting Baker at the syllabus. 

{¶ 9} Reviewing the trial court’s corrected judgment of conviction filed in the 

instant matter, we find that it still does not comply with Byrd, Baker, and Crim.R. 32(C). 

 The pertinent part of the trial court’s corrected judgment entry provides: “Defendant 

forfeits both of the guns.” We find that this vague and general statement does not 

describe with specificity the forfeited property as required by Byrd. See, also, Jones, 

supra. 

{¶ 10} Moreover, we cannot ascertain from the record what weapons Bohanon 

was alleged to have owned or possessed in connection with the charged offenses and 

what weapons are to be forfeited. Neither the indictment, bill of particulars, or the 

State’s response to discovery identifies “both of the guns.” 

{¶ 11} Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal. 
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Appeal dismissed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCURS; 

PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, P.J., DISSENTS 

WITH SEPARATE OPINION ATTACHED 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J., DISSENTING: 

{¶ 12} I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I believe the trial court’s 

judgment entry ordering “Defendant forfeits both of the guns” is specific enough to 

constitute a valid forfeiture order. It clearly details that the weapons to be forfeited are 

“guns” and that there were “two” of them involved in the case. I find this language is 

more specific than in Bohanon’s co-defendant’s case, which we dismissed. State v. 

Jones, Cuyahoga App. No. 95961. In Jones’s case the court ordered the defendant to 

forfeit “all weapons,” which is a much more vague order. Therefore, I conclude the 

judgment entry is a final, appealable order and would address the merits of the appeal. 
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Appendix 

Assignments of Error: 

“I. The trial court erred in imposing a term of incarceration that is not 

proportionate to similarly situated defendants.” 

“II. Defendant-appellant was denied the effective assistance of counsel.”