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NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY,

CAMDEN VICINAGE

___________________________________

:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel. :

LAURA LAPORTE, et al., : Civil No. 11–3523 (RBK/AMD)

: OPINION

Relators, : 

:

v. :

:

PREMIERE EDUCATION GROUP, L.P., :

et al., :

:

Defendants. :

___________________________________ :

KUGLER, United States District Judge:

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants’ August 21, 2017 Motion for 

Reconsideration and to Certify an Interlocutory Appeal and to Stay the Proceedings (Doc. No. 

170), and Response (Doc. No. 178) and Reply (Doc. No. 181) thereto. Defendants move for 

reconsideration of this Court’s August 11, 2017 Opinion. (Doc. No. 167). That decision declined 

to reconsider this Court’s May 11, 2016 Opinion (Doc. No. 119), granting in part and denying in 

part Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint. 

Defendants also seek an order certifying the August 11, 2017 Opinion for interlocutory 

appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). In addition, they seek a stay of proceedings pending a 

decision by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals if an appeal is certified. For the reasons that follow, 

Defendants’ motion is DENIED.
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I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This Court laid out the facts of this case in great detail in our previous opinion addressing 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint. See May 11, 2016 Opinion at 1-8 

(Doc. No. 111). We dismissed a number of counts, but found that Plaintiffs had stated False Claim 

Act (“FCA”) claims under the implied false certification theory for Defendants’ allegedly 

misleading career placement performance numbers, violations of the Incentive Compensation Ban 

related to providing bonuses based on enrollments, and altering students’ grades and attendance 

records. Shortly after that decision, Defendants filed a Motion for Certificate of Appealability on 

May 23, 2016, asking the Court to certify a question to the Third Circuit on whether “[Program 

Participation Agreements] and [Higher Education Act] Title IV statutes and regulations are 

conditions of participation rather than conditions of payment such that [FCA] Remaining claims 

asserted by Plaintiffs should have been dismissed.” They also sought a stay pending that request’s 

resolution. On June 16, 2016, this Court denied this certification request and the stay. On the 

prompting of the parties (Doc. Nos. 162, 163), we directed them to file briefs addressing the 

impact, if any, of Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 

(2016), on the Court’s May 2016 decision regarding Defendants’ motion to dismiss. After briefing, 

the Court issued its August 11, 2017 Opinion and Order, declining to reconsider its May 2016

decision. Defendants then timely filed the instant set of motions.

II. DISCUSSION

Motion for Reconsideration of the August 11, 2017 Decision

In the District of New Jersey, Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) governs motions for reconsideration,

which allow a party to seek reconsideration of matters that the party believes the judge has 

overlooked. See Carney v. Pennsauken Twp. Police Dep't, 2013 WL 4501454, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug.

21, 2013). “The standard for reargument is high and reconsideration is to be granted only 
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sparingly.” Yarrell v. Bartkowski, 2012 WL 1600316, at *3 (D.N.J. May 7, 2012) (citing United 

States v. Jones, 158 F.R.D. 309, 314 (D.N.J. 1994)). The standard is high because in most 

circumstances, a party should use the appellate process when it disagrees with a court's decision.

See Soboleski v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2015 WL 6175904, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2015). To be 

successful on a motion for reconsideration, a petitioner has the burden to demonstrate: “(1) an 

intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not 

available when the court [issued its order]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or 

to prevent manifest injustice.” Max's Seafood Café ex rel. Lou–Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 

669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). A court may reconsider its own decisions, with or 

without a motion by the parties, pursuant to L. Civ. R. 7.1(i). See, e.g., F.D. v. Holland Twp. Bd. 

of Educ., 2007 WL 2021782, at *1 (D.N.J. July 9, 2007). 

On August 11, 2017, this Court, after briefing by the parties on whether Escobar materially 

affected its prior decision, declined to reconsider its May 2016 decision. Defendants argue the 

Court overlooked factual or legal issues in this August 2017 decision that may alter the ultimate

disposition of the case. Yet the parties already had occasion to present arguments on whether the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Escobar required reconsideration of this Court’s May 2016 decision. 

We decided it did not; now Defendants ask for another reconsideration. The Court declines, 

however, to follow Defendants’ “Matryoshka Doll” approach to motions for reconsideration, in 

which each decision contains within it the miniaturized makings of a subsequent motion for 

re-reconsideration. See Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 2006 WL 2990371, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 

18, 2006) (denying “a motion for re-reconsideration” of issues already reconsidered), aff'd, 210 F. 

App'x 991 (Fed. Cir. 2006); United States v. DeLaurentis, 83 F. Supp. 2d 455, 474 (D.N.J. 2000)

(Reconsideration is not appropriate “as a means of having a second bite at the proverbial 
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apple . . . there must be some end to the litigation of every conceivable issue and [] it may be the 

better part of valor to recognize when that time has come”), vacated on other grounds, 230 F.3d 

659 (3d Cir. 2000). The Court has already considered the impact of Escobar, and decided it did 

not warrant reconsideration of its past opinion. We decline to do so again. We note further that no 

question of new law, new facts, or clear error presents itself on this motion, as is necessary under 

Local Civil Rule 7.1(i). As such, Defendants’ motion for (re-)reconsideration is denied.

Motion for Certification of the August 11, 2017 Opinion for Interlocutory Appeal

In the alternative, Defendants ask the Court to certify its August 11, 2017 Opinion for 

interlocutory appeal. A litigant may apply for interlocutory review of an otherwise non-appealable 

district court order by petitioning the district court to certify its order to the appropriate appellate 

court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). To obtain certification, a movant bears the burden of 

showing there is (1) a controlling question of law (2) as to which there is a substantial ground for 

difference of opinion and (3) where an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate 

termination of the litigation. See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 754 (3d Cir. 1974). 

Interlocutory appeal is used sparingly and only in exceptional cases where the interests cutting in 

favor of immediate appeal overcome the presumption against piecemeal litigation. S.E.C. v. Lucent 

Techs., Inc., 2009 WL 4508583, at *8 (D.N.J. Nov.16, 2009). Merely questioning a court's ruling 

is insufficient. Kapossy v. McGraw–Hill, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 996, 1001 (D.N.J. 1996). A district 

court may exercise considerable discretion in determining whether a particular order is appropriate 

for interlocutory review. See Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 1976); Katz, 496 

F.2d at 754.

Certifying our August 2017 opinion for interlocutory appeal is inappropriate given the 

importance of procedure and economy to the § 1292(b) inquiry. See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 

496 F.2d 747, 764 (3d Cir. 1974) (Seitz, J., dissenting) (observing that § 1292(b) was drafted with 
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an eye toward the “need to avoid piecemeal review and its attendant delays and waste of time”). 

The Court does not see how an interlocutory appeal of the August 2017 opinion would materially 

advance the litigation’s outcome in a manner different than it would have the first time we denied 

such certification in this litigation. Indeed, given the narrower scope of the August 2017 opinion,

which evaluated whether the prior May 2016 opinion should be reconsidered, certification would 

likely advance the outcome even less. This is the sort of delay and waste of time § 1292(b) was 

intended to avoid. Interlocutory appeal is the exception, not the rule, and certification will not tend 

to advance materially the outcome of litigation already six years old and not yet in discovery. As

such, the motion for certification of the August 11, 2017 Opinion for an interlocutory appeal is 

denied.

The Motion to Stay

As the predicate motions for the requested stay are denied, this request is moot. The request 

for a stay is denied. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed above, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED. An order will follow.

Dated: 09/19/2017 s/ Robert B. Kugler

ROBERT B. KUGLER

United States District Judge