alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 10.31




 



SIXTH AMENDMENT TO DEPOSIT PROCESSING SERVICES AGREEMENT







This SIXTH AMENDMENT TO DEPOSIT PROCESSING SERVICES AGREEMENT (this "Amendment") is entered into as of February 8, 2013 by and between Higher One, Inc. ("Higher One") and Cole Taylor Bank ("Bank").







WHEREAS, Higher One and Bank are parties to that certain Deposit Processing Services Agreement dated as of March 29, 2012 (as previously amended, the "Agreement"); and







WHEREAS, the parties hereto mutually desire to terminate the Agreement in accordance with the terms of this Amendment; and







NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows:







1.  Unless otherwise defined in this Amendment, all capitalized terms used herein shall have the definitions indicated in the Agreement.







2.  The Parties agree to the termination of the Agreement pursuant to Section 7.2(a) of the Agreement, with a mutually agreed termination date of August 30, 2013.







3.  This Amendment may not be amended, waived or modified in any manner without the prior written consent of each party hereto.







4.  Except as specifically amended and modified hereby, all of the terms and conditions of the Agreement shall remain unchanged and in full force and effect. Higher One and Bank each reserve any and all of their respective rights under the Agreement, as amended and modified hereby.







5.  This Amendment shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware without regard to its conflicts of laws rules.







6.  This Amendment may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, but all of which together shall constitute one and the same instrument.







[SIGNATURE PAGE FOLLOWS]








IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Amendment as of the date first written above.












COLE TAYLOR BANK












By: /s/ Randall T. Conte


Its: CFO












HIGHER ONE, INC.












By: Miles Lasater


Its: President







Amendment to Deposit Processing Services Agreement
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jose Fiol, Appellant.

[854 NYS2d 219]

A departure from the presumptive risk level, as determined by the defendant’s total risk factor score on the risk assessment instrument submitted by the New York State Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders (hereinafter the Board), is warranted where “there exists an aggravating or mitigating factor of a kind, or to a degree, not otherwise adequately taken into account by the guidelines. The court’s finding in this regard must be supported by clear and convincing evidence” *(People v Hands,*37 AD3d 441 [2007] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Board’s case summary, together with the information in the probation report, provided clear and convincing evidence that aggravating factors existed which were not fully taken into account by the guidelines, and which supported the Board’s strong recommendation that an upward departure to a level three designation was warranted. Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in making an upward departure from the presumptive level one designation, as determined by the defendant’s score, to a level three designation *(see People v Mudd,*43 AD3d 1128, 1129 [2007]; *People v Hands,*37 AD3d 441 [2007]; *cf. People v Burgos,*39 AD3d 520 [2007]).

There is no merit to the defendant’s contention that, in mak*835ing an upward departure as to the defendant’s risk level determination, the Supreme Court was restricted to a one-level upward departure *(see*Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, at 4-5 [2006 ed]; *see also People v Thornton,*34 AD3d 1026 [2006]; *People v Kwiatkowski,*24 AD3d 878 [2005]). Rivera, J.P., Lifson, Florio and Chambers, JJ., concur.
EX-10.5



 Exhibit 10.5 
 [Quiksilver, Inc. Letterhead] 
 January 22, 2013 

Mr. Robert B. McKnight, Jr. 

Quiksilver, Inc. 
 15202 Graham Street

 Huntington Beach, CA 92649 
 Dear
Bob: 
  

	 	Re:	Surrender, Cancellation and Amendment of Quiksilver, Inc. Restricted Stock Unit Award 


On November 13, 2012, you were granted a restricted stock unit award (the “November 2012 Grant”) with respect to 1,200,000
shares of common stock of Quiksilver, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), pursuant to the terms of the Company’s 2000 Stock Incentive Plan, as amended and restated (the “Plan”). The purpose of this letter is to set
forth our agreement as to the surrender and cancellation of a portion of the November 2012 Grant, and the corresponding amendment of the related award agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A (the “November 2012 RSU
Agreement”). 
 As you know, the Board of Directors of the Company (the “Board”) previously amended the Plan in
February 2012 to clarify that the individual share limit under the Plan, which provides that no one person participating in the Plan may receive awards under the Plan for more than 800,000 shares of the Company’s common stock in the aggregate
during any one calendar year period (this annual limit is referred the “162(m) Limit”), does not apply to awards that are intended to be exempt from Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. As we have discussed, the
November 2012 Grant was not intended to be exempt from Section 162(m) and accordingly, the 162(m) Limit does not apply to the grant. However, to remove any doubt raised by purported stockholder derivative actions that, among other matters, have
challenged the validity of the November 2012 Grant, you have agreed to surrender to the Company for cancellation 400,000 restricted stock units representing the portion of the November 2012 Grant which exceeded the 162(m) Limit (the
“Surrendered RSUs”). Each of the Surrendered RSUs is hereby voluntarily surrendered by you and cancelled by the Company. 
 This letter agreement also serves to amend your November 2012 RSU Agreement, effective immediately, to reduce the number of restricted stock units under the November 2012 RSU Agreement from 1,200,000 to
800,000. You agree that you have no further rights with respect to the Surrendered RSUs. 

  
 1 








 Please acknowledge your agreement with the foregoing by signing the enclosed copy of this
letter agreement where indicated below and returning the signed copy to me. 
  

	
	Sincerely,
	
	  
 [Name]

	[Title]


  
  

			
	Acknowledged and Agreed:
		
	By:	 	  

		 	Robert B. McKnight, Jr.


  
 2 








 EXHIBIT A 
 NOVEMBER 2012 RSU AGREEMENT 
 (See attached)
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5287

To suspend temporarily the duty on Acid yellow 235. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

OCTOBER 7, 2004

Mr. WILSON of South Carolina introduced the following bill; which was 

referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL

To suspend temporarily the duty on Acid yellow 235.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SUSPENSION OF DUTY ON ACID YELLOW 235. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

5 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

6 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following 

7 new heading:

‘‘ 9902.32.06 Acid yellow 235 (CAS Nos. 

73018–84–5, 71562–83–9, 

125408–78–8, 125352–02–

5, and 125352–03–6) (provided for in subheading 

3204.12.45) ......................... Free No Change No Change On or before 

12/31/2007 ’’. 
2

•HR 5287 IH 

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 

3 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

4 the date of the enactment of this Act.

Æ
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-1688

REMI CHIDE NJOKU, 

 Petitioner, 

 v. 

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., United States Attorney General; MICHAEL 

CHERTOFF, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; 

EMILIO GONZALEZ, Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Services; GREGORY L. COLLETT, District Director, Baltimore 

District Office, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; 

CALVIN MCCORMICK, Field Office Director, Office of Detention 

and Removal Operations, Department of Homeland Security 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement; GEORGE WILLIAM MAUGANS, 

III, Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

 Respondents. 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals.

Submitted: March 23, 2009 Decided: April 6, 2009 

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. 

Petition denied in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per 

curiam opinion. 

Remi Chide Njoku, Petitioner Pro Se. Carol Federighi, Senior 

Litigation Counsel, Tyrone Sojourner, Jem Colleen Sponzo, M. 

Jocelyn Lopez Wright, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Washington, D.C.; George William Maugans, III, Special Assistant 

United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Respondents.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 

2 
3 

PER CURIAM: 

 Remi Chide Njoku, a native and citizen of Nigeria, 

petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals (“Board”) denying his motion to reopen removal 

proceedings. We have reviewed the administrative record and the 

Board’s order and find no abuse of discretion in the Board’s 

decision declining to grant reopening. See 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.2(a), (c) (2008). We therefore deny the petition for 

review in part for the reasons stated by the Board. See In re: 

Njoku (B.I.A. May 20, 2008). With regard to Njoku’s challenge 

to the Board’s refusal to exercise its sua sponte authority, we 

find that we are without jurisdiction to review that aspect of 

the Board’s decision, and thus dismiss the petition for review 

with respect to that claim. See Mosere v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 

397, 400-01 (4th Cir. 2009). 

 Accordingly, we deny in part and dismiss in part the 

petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

PETITION DENIED IN PART

AND DISMISSED IN PART
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

   Schedule of Year-To-Date Principal and Interest Distributions
                           to
                  Certificateholders
                                                                              Ending
Class                   Interest             Principal      Losses           Balance
<S>                     <C>                  <C>            <C>              <C>
B1                       357,675.04          57,024.18         0.00          5,690,975.82
B2                       191,158.26          30,476.39         0.00          3,041,523.61
B3                       147,973.41          23,591.43         0.00          2,354,408.58
B4                        73,986.72          11,795.71         0.00          1,177,204.29
B5                        30,801.88           4,910.74         0.00            490,089.25
B6                        61,815.88           9,468.30       387.01            983,553.76
IA1                    5,525,814.54      14,090,496.50         0.00         81,159,403.52
IA10                     598,886.47        (598,886.47)        0.00         10,598,886.48
1A2                      825,963.53         598,886.47         0.00         13,827,113.52
IA3                      423,333.30               0.00         0.00          6,350,000.00
IA4                    1,093,750.00               0.00         0.00         17,500,000.00
IA5                      280,000.00               0.00         0.00          4,200,000.00
IA6                      260,600.00               0.00         0.00          3,909,000.00
IA7                      338,666.70               0.00         0.00          5,080,000.00
IA8                      205,266.70               0.00         0.00          3,079,000.00
IA9                      120,533.30               0.00         0.00          1,808,000.00
IAP                            0.00          64,297.16         0.00          1,208,631.78
IAR                           71.38             100.00         0.00                  0.00
IIA1                   1,224,280.56       2,346,568.02         0.00         18,310,432.00
IIAP                           0.00          80,810.25         0.00            721,543.55

</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 10.7






Fee Settlement Agreement




Recitals




AGREEMENT entered into this 15th day of March, 2013, by and between Seafarer Exploration Corp (the "Company"), and ClearTrust, LLC ("Transfer Agent").




WHEREAS, the Transfer Agent has incurred various reimbursable expenses resulting directly from acting as transfer agent for the Company, and the Company is obligated to reimburse the Transfer Agent for said expenses.




NOW. THEREFORE, the Company and Transfer Agent hereby agree to settle the amount owed to the Transfer Agent with shares of restricted stock. The parties hereto agree as follows:




1.  Legal Expenses Owed




The transfer agent has incurred reimbursable expenses and invoiced the Company as detailed in the table below:




Date of Invoice to Company
Invoice Number
Amount
Reason for Invoice07/31/12
1511
$1,571.55
Legal expenses related to "Eldred vs.

Seafarer" case8/8/12
1517
$421.22
Legal expenses related to -Eldred vs.

Seafarer" case10/31/12
1814
$210.00
Legal expenses related  to "Eldred vs.

Seafarer" case12/06/12
1849
$105.00
Legal  expenses related  to "Eldred vs.

Seafarer" caseTOTAL
$2307.77







2.       Issuance of Stock




The Company shall reimburse the Transfer Agent cashless with a non-refundable payment of 461,554 shares of restricted common stock of the Company. The Transfer Agent may sell the shares in the public marketplace in reliance on Rule 144 ornegotiate the sale of the shares in a privately negotiated transaction. Regardless the manner of sale, the Transfer Agent must apply all proceeds gained by the sale of the shares to the open invoices listed in the table above.




Should the Transfer Agent realize fess proceeds than the total due in the table above, the Transfer Agent may request up to 1,000,000 additional shares of stock or a cash payment to cover the difference  in the amount owed.





1


5. Severability




In the event that any one or more provisions herein shall for any reason be held to be invalid, illegal or unenforceable in any respect, such invalidity, illegality or unenforceability shall not affect any other provision hereof.




6. Miscellaneous




This Agreement (I)constitutes the entire agreement between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof and shall supersede all prior understandings and agreements as to such subject matter; (ii) may be amended or modified only by a writing executed by the party against whom enforcement is sought; (iii) shall inure to the benefit of and be binding upon the respective heirs, administrators, personal representatives, successors and assigns of the parties hereto; and (iv) shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of Florida.




IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Fee Settlement Agreement as of the date and year first above written.




CLEARTRUST, LLC:







Kara Kennedy, Director




SEAFARER EXPLORATION CORP.











Kyle Kennedy, Director








2
EXHIBIT 10.65.1


 


FIRST
amendment to the


DUKe
energy Corporation


Executive
cash Balance Plan


(As Amended and
Restated Effective July 2, 2012)


 


The
Duke Energy Corporation Executive Cash Balance Plan, as amended and restated
effective July 2, 2012, (the “Plan”), is hereby amended effective as of January
1, 2013.


(1)            Explanation of Amendment


The Plan is amended to use a 4% interest
crediting rate for benefits accrued on or after January 1, 2013.


(2)            Amendment 


Section 2.12 of the Plan is amended in its
entirety to read as follows:


“2.12        “Interest
Factor” means the rate determined by the formula (1+i), raised to the
one-twelfth (1/12th) power, minus one (1), where “i” equals the
following:


(a)            For
benefits accrued on or after January 1, 2013, four percent (4%).


(b)            For
benefits accrued prior to January 1, 2013, the yield on 30-year Treasury Bonds
as published in the Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15 for the end of the
third full business week of the month prior to the beginning of the calendar
quarter for which the monthly accrual is being applied, but not more than an
annual percentage rate of nine percent (9%) and not less than an annual
percentage rate of four percent (4%).”


IN WITNESS WHEREOF,
Duke Energy Corporation has caused this Amendment to be executed effective as
of the date specified below.


DUKE
ENERGY CORPORATION


 


By:                
/s/ JENNIFER L. WEBER_______________


Title: Executive Vice President and Chief


Human
Resources Officer


Date:  December 26, 2012
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEFFINANCIAL OFFICER**PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I,James T. Demetriades, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, asadopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that the Annual Report of SeeBeyond Technology Corporation on Form 10-Kfor the annual period ended December 31, 2004 fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Form 10-Kfairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results ofoperations of SeeBeyond Technology Corporation. This written statement is beingfurnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission as an exhibit accompanyingsuch Annual Report and shall not be deemed filed pursuant to the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934.
| By:    | /s/ *JAMES  T. DEMETRIADES* |   |
|--------|-----------------------------|--------|
| Name:  | James T. Demetriades        |
| Title: | *Chief Executive Officer*   |

 

I,Barry J. Plaga, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adoptedpursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that theAnnual Report of SeeBeyond Technology Corporation on Form 10-K forthe annual period ended December 31, 2004 fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Form 10-Kfairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results ofoperations of SeeBeyond Technology Corporation. This written statement is beingfurnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission as an exhibit accompanyingsuch Annual Report and shall not be deemed filed pursuant to the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934.
| By:    | /s/ *BARRY J. PLAGA* |   |
|--------|---------------------------|--------|
| Name:  | Barry J. Plaga            |
| Title: | *Chief Financial Officer* |

 

1

----
J-S41 033

- 14 2014 PA Super 182

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellee : : v. : : BYSHERE LAWRENCE, : : Appellant : No. 2684 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 24, 2013, Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Criminal Division at No. CP- 51

- CR -0010239-2011 BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE and MUNDY, JJ. CONCURRING OPINION BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED AUGUST 27, 2014 I agree with the learned Majority that section 1102. 1(a)(1) of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code neither violates the Eighth A mendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment nor of fends the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Miller v. Alabama , __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012). I also agree that the remaining two i ssues raised by Appellant

– that section 1102.1 is unconstitutional as it violates th e Equal Protection and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States Constitu tion

– are not reviewab le based upon Appellant’s failure to raise these claims before the trial court. I reach this conclusion, however, solely b ased upon this Court’s 2001 decision in Commonwealth v. Williams , 787 A.2d 1085 (Pa. Super. 2001).J-S41033- 14

- 2 -

Like Appellant, the appellant in Williams challenged the applicability of a mandatory minimum sentence 1 for the first time on appeal. Williams , 787 A.2d at 1087. Williams asserted that his sentence w as illegal because the statute pursuant to which he was sentenced was unconst itutional. Id. This Court found that Williams’ claim did not implicate the legality of his sentence; rather, “a claim that a court relied on an un constitutional statute when it sentenced a defendant is a challenge to the discr etionary aspects of sentencing.” Id. ; see also Commonwealth v. Robinson , 931 A.2d 15, 21 (Pa. Super. 2007) ( en banc ) (stating that most sentencing claims involving a legal question “or an issue of constitutional dimension” i mplicate the discretionary aspects of the sentence). It is well-settled law that issues not raised below, ev en those of a constitutional dimension, are waived. See Commonwealth v. Miller , 80 A.3d 806, 811 (Pa. Super. 2013) (finding the appell ant’s argument that Megan’s Law IV violates the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Unite d States and Pennsylvania Constitutions waived based upon his failu re to raise them before the trial court); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first tim e on appeal.”). Because Appellant raises his final two issues for the first time on appeal, I

1 In Williams , the appellant was given a mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712(a) and (b), relating to sentences for offenses committed with firearms. Williams , 787 A.2d at 1087.J-S41033- 14

- 3 -

agree with the learned Majority that they are waive d and not subject to
review.
68

Table 25. Wives who earn more than their husbands, 1987-2005

(Numbers in thousands)

Married-couple

families in which 

wife (but not 

necessarily

husband) had 

earnings from 

work

Wives who earn

more than

their

husbands 1

Percent of wives

who earn more 

than their 

husbands 1

Married-couple

families in which 

both wife and 

husband had 

earnings from 

work

Wives who earn

more than

their

husbands 2

Percent of wives

who earn more 

than their 

husbands 2

1987.................. 32,025 7,581 23.7 29,755 5,311 17.8

1988.................. 32,810 7,827 23.9 30,503 5,520 18.1

1989.................. 33,119 8,068 24.4 30,848 5,796 18.8

1990.................. 33,093 8,221 24.8 30,794 5,923 19.2

1991.................. 33,516 8,983 26.8 30,998 6,465 20.9

1992.................. 33,987 9,715 28.6 31,221 6,948 22.3

1993.................. 34,286 10,000 29.2 31,264 6,978 22.3

1994.................. 35,066 10,184 29.0 32,091 7,209 22.5

1995.................. 34,819 9,822 28.2 32,030 7,033 22.0

1996.................. 35,120 10,070 28.7 32,389 7,340 22.7

1997.................. 35,613 10,309 28.9 32,745 7,441 22.7

1998.................. 35,806 10,467 29.2 32,782 7,443 22.7

1999.................. 36,454 10,548 28.9 33,340 7,434 22.3

2000.................. 37,037 11,070 29.9 33,873 7,906 23.3

2001.................. 36,864 11,329 30.7 33,665 8,130 24.1

2002.................. 36,905 11,765 31.9 33,531 8,391 25.0

2003.................. 36,761 11,923 32.4 33,189 8,351 25.2

2004.................. 36,710 11,985 32.6 33,110 8,386 25.3

2005.................. 37,055 12,215 33.0 33,364 8,524 25.5

Year

Families in which wives have earnings

but husbands may not

Families in which both wives and husbands

have earnings

1 Includes families in which husband had no earnings

from work. 2 Excludes families in which husband had no earnings

from work.

NOTE: These data, collected in the Annual Social

and Economic Supplement, reflect the earnings and work 

experience of the entire year. Data for 2004 were

revised to reflect corrections to survey sample weights. 

SOURCE: 1988-2006 Annual Social and Economic

Supplements, Current Population Survey, U.S.

Department of Labor, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

68