If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

November 22, 2022

v No. 360386

Livingston Circuit Court

JONATHAN DAVID TRUAX, LC No. 21-026819-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and SHAPIRO and PATEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant is charged with seven counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I), 

MCL 750.520b(1)(a), (2)(b) (sexual penetration of victim under 13 years of age by defendant 17 

years of age or older), and two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-II), MCL 

750.520c(1)(a), (2)(b) (sexual contact with victim under 13 years of age by defendant 17 years of 

age or older). He appeals as on leave granted1the circuit court’s order denying his motion to 

disqualify the Livingston County Prosecutor’s Office (LCPO) from prosecuting his case. We 

affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant was initially represented by attorney Rolland Sizemore. But Sizemore withdrew 

from defendant’s representation after he accepted a position as an assistant prosecuting attorney 

(APA) with the LCPO. Defendant’s new attorney promptly filed a motion to disqualify the LCPO, 

arguing that Sizemore’s conflict of interest should be imputed to the entire office. The circuit court 

conducted an evidentiary hearing. 

 

1 This Court denied defendant’s initial application for leave to appeal. People v Truax, unpublished 

order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 9, 2022 (Docket No. 360386). However, the Supreme 

Court remanded the case to this Court for consideration as on leave granted. People v Truax, ___ 

Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 164431).
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Carolyn Henry, the LCPO’s chief APA, testified the LCPO has a written conflict policy to 

ensure that a wall is implemented to screen staff members from cases where a conflict exists. 

When a conflict is identified, all LCPO staff members receive notice that a conflict wall has been 

established. The LCPO staff are directed to:

1. Exclude the screened staff member from any participation in the screened matter.

2. Refrain from discussing the matter in the presence of the screened staff member.

3. Prevent the screened staff member from viewing any documents or material 

relating to the screened matter. 

4. Refuse to receive any confidential information from the screened staff member 

concerning the screened staff member. 

When Sizemore was hired by the LCPO, he provided a list of cases that presented potential 

conflicts. Before Sizemore’s first day of employment, all staff members received notice that there 

were conflicts on particular matters, and were instructed not to discuss the cases around him, work 

on the cases with him, or consult with him regarding the cases. The staff was warned that 

violations would result in strict and severe punishment. Sizemore received the same instructions 

and warnings. The conflicted cases were also omitted from staff roundtable discussions. Because 

all of the LCPO’s files are stored electronically,

2

electronic alerts were placed in each conflicted 

matter to notify users that Sizemore was screened from the file. Approximately one year after 

Sizemore began his employment with the LCPO, additional protections were implemented that 

blocked conflicted attorneys from accessing the electronic files on screened matters.

3

 Sizemore 

testified he had not communicated with anyone at the LCPO about any of his conflict cases, had 

not accessed any of the physical files from his former office, had not accessed any of the electronic 

files for the screened matters, and had no intentions of sharing any details of the screened cases. 

The circuit court denied defendant’s motion, and this appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant argues the trial court clearly erred by finding that there was not a conflict 

requiring disqualification of the LCPO. We disagree.

 

2

 The LCPO stores its files on a Laserfiche system. The LCPO also has access to a separate system 

maintained by the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan (PAAM) referred to as “adult 

case tracking” (ACT). 

3

 Henry testified that she was initially informed by the county’s information technology (IT) 

department that access to Laserfiche files could not be prevented. She continued to work with the 

IT department to be able to implement that additional protection. But PAAM was unable to 

implement similar measures within ACT. Accordingly, the LCPO created red color-coded notes 

in each of the screened files in ACT stating that a conflict exists, and identifying Sizemore as the 

conflicted attorney. 
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“[W]hether a conflict of interest exists sufficient to require disqualification of the 

prosecuting attorney is a question of fact that is reviewed on appeal for clear error. Clear error 

exists if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

made.” People v Harris, 261 Mich App 44, 51; 680 NW2d 17 (2004) (citation omitted).

“The trial court should be promptly informed of a defense attorney’s move to the 

prosecutor’s office, and it should inquire into the matter and order an appropriate safeguard, such 

as disqualifying the individual attorney affected by the conflict of interest, or the entire 

prosecutor’s office, if necessary.” People v Davenport, 280 Mich App 464, 470; 760 NW2d 743 

(2008) (Davenport I). “A presumption of prejudice exists when a defendant’s former defense 

counsel joins the prosecutor’s office that is pursuing the case against the defendant.” People v 

Davenport, 483 Mich 906, 906; 762 NW2d 163 (2009) (Davenport II). But this presumption can 

be overcome “if the prosecutor shows that the attorney who has a conflict of interest was properly 

screened out from ‘any participation in the matter.’ ” Id., quoting MRPC 1.10(b)(1). If the 

attorney in question “has supervisory authority over other attorneys in the office, or has policymaking authority, then recusal of the entire office is likely to be necessary.” People v Mayhew, 

236 Mich App 112, 127; 600 NW2d 370 (1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Other 

factors to consider “include the extent to which knowledge has been shared by the disqualified 

lawyer and the disqualified lawyer’s role within the prosecutor’s office.” In re Osborne, 459 Mich 

360, 369-370; 589 NW2d 763 (1999).

Before joining the LCPO, Sizemore provided the LCPO with a list of cases that presented 

potential conflicts. The case list was distributed to the LCPO’s support staff and assistant 

prosecutors. Henry testified that the LCPO’s staff was instructed “there was to be absolutely no 

discussion whatsoever of these cases within any earshot of Mr. Sizemore” and no one was to work 

on or consult with Sizemore regarding the cases. Pursuant to the LCPO’s written conflict policy, 

alert notices were placed in the Laserfiche files to indicated that the files were conflict wall files,

and identified Sizemore as screened from the file. Later, the LCPO implemented additional 

measures to block Sizemore’s access to the electronic files. Sizemore testified that he did not 

access the files for his conflicted cases since joining the LCPO, he did not discuss those cases with 

any staff at the LCPO, and he has no intention of sharing any knowledge or confidence about those

cases. There was no evidence in the record that the LCPO’s conflict policy was not followed. 

Defendant argues that the LCPO cannot overcome the presumption of prejudice because 

for approximately one year after Sizemore was hired, LCPO did not have a system blocking a 

conflicted attorney from accessing an electronic file. Defendant has failed to cite any authority 

mandating that access to electronic files be physically blocked, or that the LCPO’s conflict 

procedures were inadequate.

4

 Sizemore testified that he had not accessed Truax’s electronic file, 

and defendant has failed to present evidence to refute his testimony. 

 

4

“It is not sufficient for a party simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it 

up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for 

him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.” Wilson v 

Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Accordingly, we need not address this issue and decline to do so.
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We also are not persuaded by defendant’s other arguments. He maintains that the LCPO 

should be disqualified because Sizemore might be promoted to a supervisory role before the 

conclusion of this matter. This argument is speculative, and it is not supported by the record. We 

further reject defendant’s speculative assertion that Sizemore might have to testify at a hearing on 

a potential motion to quash his information. Finally, defendant complains that the prosecution did 

not send defendant notice of the conflict until a little over a month after Sizemore began his 

employment with LCPO. But defendant has not demonstrated any harm from the alleged delay. 

Clearly, defendant was aware of the conflict before he received the LCPO’s notice because his 

motion to disqualify was filed two days after Sizemore began employment with the LCPO. 

We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the LCPO implemented

adequate safeguards to screen Sizemore from any participation in this matter. 

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael J. Kelly 

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro 

/s/ Sima G. Patel