NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

RAYMOND DANIEL ROBBINS, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0584

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2014-128866-001

The Honorable Annielaurie Van Wie, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Eric Knobloch

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Christopher V. Johns

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. ROBBINS

Decision of the Court

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Donn Kessler delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding 

Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

K E S S L E R, Judge:

¶1 Robbins appeals the superior court’s preclusion of evidence

regarding his possession of a registry identification card (“AMMA Card”) 

pursuant to the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act (“AMMA”). See Ariz. Rev. 

Stat. (“A.R.S”) §§ 36-2801 to -2819 (2014).

1 He argues the court committed 

reversible error by excluding evidence of his AMMA Card because doing 

so precluded an affirmative defense under the AMMA. The State argues 

the court did not err because evidence of Robbins’ AMMA Card was not 

relevant to Robbins’ conviction under § A.R.S. 28-1381(A)(1) (2014) 

(“Subsection (A)(1)”), and that any error regarding his conviction under

A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(3) (“Subsection (A)(3)”) was harmless. For the reasons 

stated below, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In June 2014 at approximately 1:45 a.m., police officers M and 

R observed Robbins’ vehicle veer into the bicycle lane while making a left 

turn. After following Robbins and noticing that he continued to weave in 

and out of his lane, the officers conducted a traffic stop and noted a slight 

odor of marijuana. When the officers asked Robbins for identification, he 

presented his AMMA Card because he could not find his driver’s license.

Robbins stated he had smoked marijuana approximately two hours before

the encounter, but he denied having ingested alcohol and showed officers 

he had an interlock device on his vehicle. An officer trained in DUI 

detection arrived and administered field sobriety tests, noting that Robbins’ 

eyes were bloodshot and watery and that Robbins was unable to 

successfully complete several of the tests. Based on Robbins’ driving, 

physical signs, and poor performance on the tests, the officers arrested him 

and obtained a blood sample. Blood testing revealed methamphetamine, 

amphetamine, marijuana, and marijuana’s metabolites. 

 

1 We cite to the current statutes unless changes material to this 

decision have occurred. 
STATE v. ROBBINS

Decision of the Court

3

¶3 The State indicted Robbins on two counts of aggravated 

driving or actual physical control while under the influence of intoxicating 

liquor or drugs, both class 4 non-dangerous, repetitive felonies. The State 

brought Count 1 pursuant to A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(1), which criminalizes 

driving while under the influence of any drug “if the person is impaired to 

the slightest degree.” The State brought Count 2 pursuant to A.R.S. § 28-

1381(A)(3), which criminalizes driving “[w]hile there is any drug defined 

in § 13-3401[2] or its metabolite in the person’s body.” The State also alleged 

Robbins had nine prior felonies, was on probation at the time of the offense, 

and that eight aggravating factors applied. 

¶4 Before trial, the State sought to preclude testimony that 

Robbins held an AMMA Card as a defense to Count 2, arguing the evidence 

was not relevant to the Subsection (A)(3) charge. Although Robbins 

conceded that the evidence would not affect the jury’s determination as to 

Count 2, he nevertheless argued knowledge of his AMMA Card “would 

take the sting out of the fact that he might be impaired.” The court granted 

the State’s motion, with the caveat that the State could not suggest that 

Robbins possessed marijuana illegally and had to treat marijuana in the 

same manner it would treat any type of prescription drug. 

¶5 The jury found Robbins guilty on both counts. At sentencing, 

the State proved two prior felony convictions and all eight aggravating 

factors. The superior court sentenced Robbins to an aggravated sentence of 

twelve years’ imprisonment and community supervision for both counts, 

the sentences to be served concurrently.

¶6 Robbins timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) (2016), 13-4031 (2010), and 13-4033 (2010).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Robbins argues the superior court erred by precluding 

evidence regarding his AMMA Card. He argues that: (1) he was entitled to 

present evidence that went to an affirmative defense, and (2) the court’s 

error affected the verdict because Robbins was unable to show that his 

metabolite levels were impacted by his regular lawful use of marijuana. 

 

2 Section 13-3401 includes marijuana, amphetamine, and 

methamphetamine. A.R.S. § 13-3401(6), (19) (Supp. 2015). 
STATE v. ROBBINS

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I. Standard of Review

¶8 We review rulings on the admissibility of evidence for an 

abuse of discretion, and we consider only the facts presented at the 

suppression hearing. State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 396, ¶ 22 (2006). We 

view the disputed evidence in the “light most favorable to its proponent, 

maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect.” State 

v. Harrison, 195 Ariz. 28, 33, ¶ 21 (App. 1998) (citation omitted). “When a 

judge commits an error of law . . . in the process of reaching [a] discretionary 

conclusion, he may be regarded as having abused his discretion.” Twin City 

Fire Ins. Co. v. Burke, 204 Ariz. 251, 254, ¶ 10 (2003) (quotations and citations 

omitted). Interpreting rules, statutes, and constitutional provisions raises 

questions of law that we review de novo. E.g. Pima County v. Pima Cty. Law 

Enforcement Merit Sys. Council, 211 Ariz. 224, 227, ¶ 13 (2005) (rule and 

statute); Duncan v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging, Ltd., 205 Ariz. 306, 308, ¶ 2 (2003) 

(statute and constitution).

¶9 Arizona law prohibits driving or being in actual physical 

control of a vehicle while under the influence of certain substances. See 

A.R.S. § 28-1381. The controlling statute, A.R.S. § 28-1381, addresses 

various categories of DUI; Subsection (A)(1) focuses on impairment, 

forbidding driving under the influence of any drug “if the person is 

impaired to the slightest degree,” whereas Subsection (A)(3) focuses on the 

presence of certain drugs or their metabolite in the person’s body. Id.; see 

also Dobson v. McClennan, 238 Ariz. 389, 391, ¶ 10 (2015).

3 

¶10 The AMMA immunizes registered qualifying patients for 

their medical use of marijuana, but it expressly denies immunity for 

“[o]perating, navigating or being in actual physical control of any motor 

vehicle . . . while under the influence of marijuana.” A.R.S. § 36-2802(D); 

see also Dobson, 238 Ariz. at 391, ¶¶ 8-9. The AMMA clarifies that “a 

registered qualifying patient shall not be considered to be under the 

influence of marijuana solely because of the presence of metabolites or 

components of marijuana that appear in insufficient concentration to cause 

impairment.” A.R.S. § 36-2802(D). Thus, the AMMA provides an 

 

3 Robbins’ trial proceeded while a petition for review was pending 

before the Arizona Supreme Court in Dobson. However, the holding from 

Dobson must be applied here because a “new rule for the conduct of 

criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or 

federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for 

cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ from the past.” 

Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987).
STATE v. ROBBINS

Decision of the Court

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affirmative defense to a charge pursuant to Subsection (A)(3). Dobson, 238 

Ariz. at 393, ¶¶ 19-20. This affirmative defense does not apply to Subsection 

(A)(1). Id. at 391, ¶ 11. 

II. Subsection (A)(1)

¶11 Although Robbins concedes the affirmative defense does not 

apply to Subsection (A)(1), he maintains the superior court erred by 

precluding evidence regarding his possession of an AMMA Card. He

argues any evidence that went to his tolerance for drugs was relevant to 

determining “impairment” pursuant to Subsection (A)(1). We disagree.

¶12 Under Subsection (A)(1), the State must only show that the 

defendant took “any drug” that caused impairment. State v. George, 233 

Ariz. 400, 403, ¶ 12 (App. 2013) (citation omitted). “Whether a particular 

drug may cause a driver to be impaired is the driver’s responsibility,” and 

the driver bears personal responsibility for taking a drug and driving. Id.

(citations omitted). Evidence of erratic driving, poor performance on field 

sobriety tests, and physical signs of impairment constitute evidence of 

impairment. See State ex rel. McDougall v. Albrecht, 168 Ariz. 128, 132 (App. 

1991). 

¶13 Here, the State presented evidence that Robbins showed signs 

of impairment and that his blood tested positive for marijuana, marijuana’s 

metabolites, methamphetamine, and amphetamine. Thus, Robbins’ failure 

to successfully complete the field sobriety tests and the presence of 

methamphetamine, amphetamine, and marijuana and its metabolites in his 

blood sufficed to demonstrate Robbins’ guilt under Subsection (A)(1). 

Robbins’ argument that the jury would have thought he was not impaired 

because he had an AMMA Card is simply speculative. Therefore, the court 

did not err by excluding the AMMA Card in regards to the Subsection 

(A)(1) charge.

III. Subsection (A)(3)

A. Whether the Superior Court Erred

¶14 Robbins argues the superior court erred by precluding the 

evidence showing his possession of an AMMA card because he was entitled 

to assert an affirmative defense against the Subsection (A)(3) charge. We 

agree.

¶15 An AMMA patient may establish the affirmative defense to 

Subsection (A)(3) by showing that: (1) the patient’s use was authorized by 
STATE v. ROBBINS

Decision of the Court

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the AMMA, and (2) the marijuana or its metabolite was in a concentration 

insufficient to cause impairment. Dobson, 238 Ariz. at 393, ¶ 20. Possession 

of an AMMA Card creates a presumption that a qualifying patient is 

engaged in the use of marijuana pursuant to the AMMA, so long as the 

patient does not possess more than the permitted quantity of marijuana. Id.

at ¶ 19; A.R.S. § 36–2811(A)(1). Evidence of possession of an AMMA Card

is generally admissible in a Subsection (A)(3) prosecution to invoke this 

presumption. Dobson, 238 Ariz. at 393, ¶ 22.

¶16 When this issue was before the superior court, neither the 

parties nor the court had the benefit of the supreme court’s decision in 

Dobson. However, under Dobson, Robbins was entitled to present an 

affirmative defense to Subsection (A)(3) and to present evidence in support 

of that defense. See A.R.S. § 13-205(A) (2010) (“[A] defendant shall prove 

any affirmative defense raised by a preponderance of the evidence.”). The

court therefore erred by excluding evidence of Robbins’ AMMA Card. See

Twin City Fire, 204 Ariz. at 254, ¶ 10 (stating a court abuses its discretion 

when it commits an error of law in making a discretionary conclusion). 

B. Whether the Error was Harmless

¶17 Because the superior court erred in precluding evidence 

relating to Robbins’ possession of an AMMA Card and Robbins objected to 

such preclusion, we employ harmless error review. Harmless error review 

places the burden on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

error did not contribute to or affect the verdict. State v. Valverde, 220 Ariz. 

582, 585, ¶ 11 (2009). “The inquiry . . . is not whether, in a trial that occurred 

without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but 

whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely 

unattributable to the error.” State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 588 (1993) (citations 

omitted). We consider the error in light of all the evidence. Id. (citation 

omitted).

¶18 The State argues any error regarding the Subsection (A)(3) 

conviction was harmless because substantial other evidence supported

Robbins’ conviction. It asserts the jury would still have concluded Robbins 

had drugs in his system because sufficient evidence showed his blood 

tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. Robbins counters 

that knowledge of his AMMA Card and status may have contributed to or 

affected the jury’s deliberation and the factual allegation of whether traces 

of amphetamine and methamphetamine were true. We agree with the 

State. 
STATE v. ROBBINS

Decision of the Court

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¶19 To convict Robbins under Subsection (A)(3), the State had to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Robbins had methamphetamine, 

amphetamine, marijuana, or marijuana’s metabolites in his body while 

driving. See A.R.S. §§ 28-1381, 13-3401. Subsection (A)(3) prohibits driving 

with any amount of an impairing substance in the body, regardless of 

impairment. State ex rel. Montgomery v. Harris, 234 Ariz. 343, 347, ¶ 24 

(2014).

¶20 We conclude sufficient evidence supported Robbins’ 

conviction under Subsection (A)(3) and, accordingly, that the superior 

court’s error regarding Robbins’ AMMA Card was harmless. In addition 

to a blood test showing Robbins’ blood contained methamphetamine and 

amphetamine, the State presented two expert witnesses who testified 

regarding the methods used to test and confirm the blood results. 

Regardless of the presence of marijuana and its metabolites in Robbins’ 

blood, sufficient evidence of the presence of methamphetamine and 

amphetamine in Robbins’ blood supported the conviction under Subsection 

(A)(3). We therefore conclude the court’s error was harmless.

CONCLUSION

¶21 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Robbins’ convictions and 

sentences.