[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 138 (Tuesday, July 21, 2009)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 35789-35792]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-17118]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2007-28988; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-047-AD; 
Amendment 39-15975; AD 2009-15-12]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 747-400 and -400D Series 
Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 
Boeing Model 747-400 and -400D series airplanes. This AD requires 
installing new relays to allow the flightcrew to turn off electrical 
power to the in-flight entertainment (IFE) system and other non-
essential passenger cabin systems through the left and right utility 
bus switches, and other specified actions. This AD results from an IFE 
systems review. We are issuing this AD to ensure that the flightcrew is 
able to turn off electrical power to the IFE system and other non-
essential passenger cabin systems through utility bus switches in the 
flight compartment, in the event of smoke or fumes. The flightcrew's 
inability to turn off electrical power to the IFE system and other non-
essential passenger cabin systems could result in the inability to 
control smoke or fumes in the airplane flight deck or passenger cabin 
during a non-normal or emergency situation.

DATES: This AD is effective August 25, 2009.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by 
reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of August 25, 
2009.

ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this AD, contact 
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, 
P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; telephone 206-
544-5000, extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; e-mail <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#fd9098d39f92989e9290bd9f929894939ad39e9290"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="f29f97dc909d97919d9fb2909d979b9c95dc919d9f">[email protected]</span></a>; 
Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.

[[Page 35790]]

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, 
any comments received, and other information. The address for the 
Docket Office (telephone 800-647-5527) is the Document Management 
Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, 
West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 
Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joe Salameh, Aerospace Engineer, 
Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft 
Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-
3356; telephone 425-917-6454; fax 425-917-6590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion

    We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 
part 39 to include an airworthiness directive (AD) that would apply to 
certain Boeing Model 747-400 and -400D series airplanes. That NPRM was 
published in the Federal Register on August 16, 2007 (72 FR 45968). 
That NPRM proposed to require installing new relays to allow the 
flightcrew to turn off electrical power to the in-flight entertainment 
(IFE) system and other non-essential passenger cabin systems through 
the left and right utility bus switches, and other specified actions.

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing 
this AD. We considered the comments received from the three commenters.

Support for the NPRM

    Inflight Canada (IFC) strongly supports the intent of the NPRM.

Request To Clarify Service Bulletin Instructions

    Boeing requests that we clarify, in the ``Relevant Service 
Information'' section of the NPRM, that Boeing Service Bulletin 747-24-
2246, dated October 6, 2005, provides procedures for turning off 28 VDC 
power to the IFE system. Boeing states that all Model 747-400 series 
airplanes have 115 VAC control, and that representing the proposed 
actions as addressing electrical power, in general, might be misleading 
to operators regarding the scope of the action.
    We agree to provide clarification. We understand that operators are 
able to turn off 115 VAC power under the existing configuration for 
Model 747 series airplanes, and that Boeing Service Bulletin 747-24-
2246, dated October 6, 2005, provides changes to also allow for turning 
off 28 VDC power. Therefore, the wording of the NPRM is appropriate and 
not misleading, since the intent of this AD is to ensure that all 
electrical power is removed from the affected systems through the use 
of the right and left utility bus switches. No change to the AD is 
necessary in this regard.

Request To Clarify Instructions for Airplanes Modified After Delivery

    Boeing requests that we clarify, in the ``Relevant Service 
Information'' section of the NPRM, that instructions in Boeing service 
bulletins are based upon the delivered product configuration. Boeing 
states that it is not obvious to operators that post-production 
modifications to the IFE system might require an alternative method of 
compliance (AMOC) to comply with the requirements of the AD.
    We agree that operators might not be able to accomplish the 
requirements of this AD on airplanes that have been modified or altered 
after airplane delivery. Section 39.17 of the Federal Aviation 
Regulations (14 CFR 39.17) specifically addresses this situation. If a 
change in a product affects one's ability to accomplish the actions 
required by an AD, then a request for FAA approval of an AMOC 
addressing that configuration must be submitted in accordance with the 
procedures specified in paragraph (g) of this AD. According to 14 CFR 
39.17, the request should include the specific actions that are 
proposed to address the unsafe condition, unless one can show that the 
change eliminated the unsafe condition. No change to the AD is 
necessary in this regard.

Request To Remove Certain Airplanes From the Applicability

    Lufthansa states that it has installed two additional Heath Techna 
power distribution panels (P94 and P9100) on all of its affected 
airplanes, in accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) 
ST01507SE, issued February 11, 2005, amended September 7, 2006. 
Lufthansa states that, on these modified airplanes, power can be turned 
off by right and left utility bus switches located in the cockpit. 
Lufthansa also states that, additionally, the cabin crew is able to 
turn off power to the IFE and passenger seats using a master switch 
located in the purser station of the cabin. Since the modification 
addresses the intent of the NPRM, Lufthansa has asked Boeing to remove 
all of Lufthansa's airplanes from the effectivity of Boeing Service 
Bulletin 747-24-2246, dated October 6, 2005. We refer to that service 
bulletin for the applicability of this AD.
    We infer that Lufthansa requests that we remove airplanes modified 
in accordance with STC ST01507SE from the applicability of this AD. We 
disagree with revising the applicability of this AD because we have 
determined that, based upon the delivered airplane configuration, the 
unsafe condition of this AD applies to the airplanes identified in the 
effectivity of Boeing Service Bulletin 747-24-2246, dated October 6, 
2005. STC ST01507SE, at the time of its issuance, was not evaluated as 
an AMOC to the requirements of this AD. The design and installation 
aspects of the STC must be reviewed under an AMOC request submitted by 
either the STC applicant or the operator. Under the provisions of 
paragraph (g) of this AD, we will consider requests for approval of an 
AMOC if sufficient data are submitted to substantiate that the design 
change would provide an acceptable level of safety. We have not changed 
the AD in this regard.

Recommendation To Consider This AD an Interim Action

    IFC recommends that we consider the requirements of this AD an 
interim action. IFC states the final action for eliminating the unsafe 
condition should be to move the components and wire bundles from the 
cabin area to areas where they will not be subjected to damage and 
abuse. IFC states that the cabin sidewalls and the area under the cabin 
floor offer much safer environments for these items.
    We disagree with considering this AD an interim action. The intent 
of the AD is to address the unsafe condition, not to provide design 
guidelines for installation of the IFE system. We have determined that 
the requirements of this AD adequately address the unsafe condition. 
Should new reports or data arise that show that the unsafe condition 
has not been adequately addressed by the requirements of this AD, we 
could consider further rulemaking. No change to the AD is necessary in 
this regard.

Recommendation To Remove Power From All Components in the Cabin

    IFC recommends that the requirement to be able to remove power from 
the IFE system be expanded to include all components using power in the 
passenger cabin. IFC states that, in most cases, the In Seat Power 
Systems (ISPS) and seat adjustment systems carry much

[[Page 35791]]

higher power loads than do the IFE components.
    We disagree that the scope of the AD needs to be expanded because 
the ISPS and seat adjustment systems are addressed already as other 
non-essential cabin systems in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-24-2246, 
dated October 6, 2005. No change to the AD is necessary in this regard.

Recommendation To Locate Primary Switch in the Passenger Cabin

    IFC recommends that the primary switch to isolate the IFE system 
and other non-essential cabin systems be located in the cabin, rather 
than in the cockpit. IFC states that, in most cases, the cabin crew 
will be the first to notice a problem, and that the additional time 
needed to notify the flightcrew will allow the problem to worsen if not 
immediately addressed by the trained cabin crew. IFC states that, if 
desired, a secondary switch could also be located in the cockpit.
    We disagree because Boeing's design approach adequately addresses 
the unsafe condition; the flightcrew can shut off power to any non-
essential system in the event of smoke or fire in the flight deck or 
passenger cabin. However, under the provisions of paragraph (g) of this 
AD, we will consider requests for approval of an AMOC if sufficient 
data are submitted to substantiate that the design change would provide 
an acceptable level of safety. We have not changed the AD in this 
regard.

Recommendation to Automatically Turn Off Power in an Emergency

    IFC recommends that the system, which will provide the IFE shut-off 
capability, also be required to automatically turn off power in the 
event of certain emergencies, such as deployment of oxygen masks or 
loss of a generator. IFC states that this capability would allow the 
flightcrew and cabin crew to perform more important tasks without 
having to be concerned with turning off power to the IFE system.
    We disagree with requiring the system to automatically turn off 
power to the IFE system and other non-essential cabin systems in the 
event of certain emergencies because, currently, there is no regulatory 
requirement to have power turned off automatically. We are issuing this 
AD to address a specific unsafe condition, and the areas discussed by 
IFC fall outside the requirements of this AD. We have not changed the 
AD in this regard.

Recommendation To Allow Operators To Develop Other Solutions

    IFC states that Boeing Service Bulletin 747-24-2246, dated October 
6, 2005, which is referenced as the only acceptable means of complying 
with the intent of the NPRM, provides only limited protection from the 
myriad of electrical hazards in the cabin. IFC recommends that we 
establish the desired functionality of a system for dealing with the 
electrical hazards, and then allow operators to develop workable 
solutions using these in combination with other designs to meet the 
requirements.
    We disagree because we are issuing this AD to address a specific 
unsafe condition, and we have determined that the service information 
that is currently available adequately addresses that unsafe condition. 
However, under the provisions of paragraph (g) of this AD, we will 
consider requests for approval of an AMOC if sufficient data are 
submitted to substantiate that the design change would provide an 
acceptable level of safety. We have not changed the AD in this regard.

Conclusion

    We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, 
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting 
the AD as proposed.

Costs of Compliance

    There are about 490 airplanes of the affected design in the 
worldwide fleet. This AD affects about 62 airplanes of U.S. registry. 
The required actions take about 123 work hours per airplane, at an 
average labor rate of $80 per work hour. Required parts cost between 
$9,412 and $11,936 per airplane. Based on these figures, the estimated 
cost of the AD for U.S. operators is up to $1,350,112, or up to $21,776 
per airplane.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation 
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's 
authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, 
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866,
    (2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and
    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    You can find our regulatory evaluation and the estimated costs of 
compliance in the AD Docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, 
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new AD:

2009-15-12 Boeing: Amendment 39-15975. Docket No. FAA-2007-28988; 
Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-047-AD.

Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective August 25, 
2009.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to Boeing Model 747-400 and -400D series 
airplanes, certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing 
Service Bulletin 747-24-2246, dated October 6, 2005.

[[Page 35792]]

Unsafe Condition

    (d) This AD results from an in-flight entertainment (IFE) 
systems review. We are issuing this AD to ensure that the flightcrew 
is able to turn off electrical power to the IFE system and other 
non-essential passenger cabin systems through utility bus switches 
in the flight compartment, in the event of smoke or fumes. The 
flightcrew's inability to turn off electrical power to the IFE 
system and other non-essential passenger cabin systems could result 
in the inability to control smoke or fumes in the airplane flight 
deck or passenger cabin during a non-normal or emergency situation.

Compliance

    (e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this 
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the 
actions have already been done.

Install New Relays

    (f) Within 60 months after the effective date of this AD, 
install new relays to allow the flightcrew to turn off electrical 
power to the IFE system and other non-essential passenger cabin 
systems through the left and right utility bus switches and do all 
other specified actions as applicable, by accomplishing all the 
applicable actions specified in the Accomplishment Instructions of 
Boeing Service Bulletin 747-24-2246, dated October 6, 2005. The 
other specified actions must be done before further flight after 
installing the new relays.

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (g)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 
FAA, ATTN: Joe Salameh, Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment 
Branch, ANM-130S, FAA, Seattle ACO, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 
Washington 98057-3356; telephone 425-917-6454; fax 425-917-6590; has 
the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the 
procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
    (2) To request a different method of compliance or a different 
compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. 
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC 
applies, notify your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or 
principal avionics inspector (PAI), as appropriate, or lacking a 
principal inspector, your local Flight Standards District Office. 
The AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this AD.

Material Incorporated by Reference

    (h) You must use Boeing Service Bulletin 747-24-2246, dated 
October 6, 2005, to do the actions required by this AD, unless the 
AD specifies otherwise.
    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the 
incorporation by reference of this service information under 5 
U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) For service information identified in this AD, contact 
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, 
P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; telephone 
206-544-5000, extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; e-mail 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#1c7179327e73797f73715c7e737975727b327f7371"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="036e662d616c66606c6e43616c666a6d642d606c6e">[email protected]</span></a>; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.
    (3) You may review copies of the service information at the FAA, 
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 
Washington. For information on the availability of this material at 
the FAA, call 425-227-1221 or 425-227-1152.
    (4) You may also review copies of the service information that 
is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this 
material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on July 6, 2009.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. E9-17118 Filed 7-20-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


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