NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

SHARIRA RAINERI,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

NORTH AMERICAN VAN LINES, INC.,

 Defendant.

 CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-4235 (MLC)

 MEMORANDUM OPINION

COOPER, Di s t r i c t J udge

The plaintiff, Sharira Raineri, originally brought this 

action in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Monmouth County. 

(Dkt. entry no. 1, Rmv. Not., Ex. A, Compl.) The defendants

properly removed the action to this Court. (Rmv. Not.)1

Raineri thereafter filed the Amended Complaint, raising two 

counts against NAVL that generally relate to services that NAVL

provided to Raineri. (Dkt. entry no. 15, Am. Compl.) Raineri

brings the first count of the Amended Complaint (“First Count”)

under New Jersey law, alleging that NAVL caused damage to her 

Freehold, New Jersey property and, further, caused Raineri to

delay the sale of and “make financial concessions” to the 

purchasers of that property. (See id. at ¶ 19.) She brings the 

 

 1 Raineri originally brought the action against both Apollo 

Moving & Storage (“Apollo”) and North American Van Lines, Inc. 

(“NAVL”). The action was terminated insofar as it was brought 

against Apollo on December 1, 2011. (See dkt. entry no. 14, 

12-1-11 Consent Order.)

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second count of the Amended Complaint (“Second Count”) under the

Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 

14706, et seq. (“the Carmack Amendment”), alleging that NAVL

lost and damaged several household goods when moving Raineri’s 

belongings from her Freehold, New Jersey and Forked River, New 

Jersey properties to her new residence in California. (See id.

at ¶¶ 4, 13.)

NAVL now moves for summary judgment in its favor and 

against Raineri on all claims asserted against it, arguing that: 

(1) the First Count is preempted by the Carmack Amendment; and

(2) Raineri is precluded from raising the Second Count because

she has failed to satisfy conditions precedent to recovery, 

pursuant to either her contract with NAVL or the federal 

regulations under the Carmack Amendment. (See dkt. entry no. 

16, Mot.; see also dkt. entry no. 16-5, NAVL Br.)2

 2 NAVL styled the Motion as a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). 

The parties have, however, asked the Court to consider matters 

beyond the pleadings and treat the Motion as a motion for 

summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(d). (See 12-1-11 Consent Order at ¶ 2(b).) See also

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).

 Raineri

opposes the Motion, arguing that: (1) the First Count is not

subject to preemption; and (2) she may seek relief in the Second 

Count because her e-mails satisfied the conditions cited by 

NAVL. (See generally dkt. entry no. 17, Raineri Opp’n Br.)

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The Court will resolve the Motion without oral argument 

pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). We will, for the reasons 

that follow, grant the Motion.

I. BACKGROUND3

A. NAVL Failed to Timely Pack and Load Raineri’s 

Belongings in New Jersey

Raineri contracted with NAVL and Apollo to move her 

belongings from her two New Jersey properties to San Clemente, 

California. (See dkt. entry no. 16-3, Marlowe Aff., Ex. D, Order 

for Service; see also id., Ex. F, Cost Estimate.) The Order for 

Service provided that NAVL’s agents (“the movers”) would pack

Raineri’s belongings on June 21 and 22, 2010, load them into 

moving trucks on June 23, 2010, and deliver them in California 

in early July. (See Cost Estimate at 1-4.) The movers began 

loading Raineri’s belongings on June 23, 2010, but did not

complete loading until June 27, 2010. (See dkt. entry no. 16-4, 

 3 Raineri agrees with each of NAVL’s statements of material 

fact. (Compare dkt. entry no. 16-1, NAVL’s Statement of Material 

Facts (“NAVL SOF”), with dkt. entry no. 17, Raineri Resp. to 

NAVL SOF.) NAVL did not respond to Raineri’s supplemental 

statement of material facts and is thus deemed to agree with 

each of those statements. (See dkt. entry no. 17, Raineri Supp. 

SOF.) See also L.Civ.R. 56.1(a) (“any material fact not 

disputed shall be deemed undisputed for purposes of the summary 

judgment motion”); Smith v. Addy, 343 Fed.Appx. 806, 808 (3d 

Cir. 2009). We thus, after ensuring that the parties’ 

respective statements of fact accurately summarize the evidence 

of record, provide citation to those statements.

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Daler Aff., Ex. O, 6-28-10 E-mail from Raineri to Pease; see 

also Daler Aff., Ex. S, 6-30-10 E-mail from Raineri to Pease.)

Raineri now seeks both direct and consequential damages as 

a result of the movers’ actions. Some of those damages relate 

to alleged losses of and damage to her belongings. (See Am. 

Compl. at ¶¶ 7, 10, 20-34.) Others relate to financial 

concessions that Raineri made as a result of the movers’ 

conduct. (See id. at ¶¶ 4-5, 17-19.) Those concessions 

included $200 given to a cleaning service to remove “half-eaten 

sandwiches . . . water bottles, and used tape rolls . . . left 

all over the house” by the movers, and $6,000 given to the 

purchasers of Raineri’s Freehold, New Jersey property as a 

result of the damages that the movers allegedly caused to and 

the delay of the sale of that property. (See 6-30-10 E-mail 

from Raineri to Pease.)

Raineri signed a bill of lading after the movers loaded a 

portion of her belongings on June 24, 2010. (NAVL SOF at 

¶¶ 8-9; Raineri Resp. to NAVL SOF at ¶¶ 8-9; see also Marlowe 

Aff., Ex. H, Bill of Lading.)4

 The Bill of Lading, inter alia, 

sets forth the procedures for filing claims for loss and damage. 

 4 A bill of lading is “a transportation contract between a 

shipper . . . and a carrier.” Paper Magic Grp., Inc. v. J.B. 

Hunt Transp. Inc., 318 F.3d 458, 461 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation 

omitted). 

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It states:

As a condition precedent to recovery, a claim for any 

loss or damage, injury or delay must be filed in 

writing with carrier within nine (9) months after 

delivery to consignee as shown on face hereof, or in 

case of failure to make delivery, then within nine (9) 

months after a reasonable time for delivery has 

elapsed; and suit must be instituted against carrier 

within two (2) years and one (1) day from the date 

when notice in writing is given by carrier to the 

claimant that carrier has disallowed the claim or any 

parts of parts thereof specified in the notice. Where 

a claim is not filed or suit is not instituted thereon 

in accordance with the foregoing provisions, carrier 

shall not be liable and such claim will not be paid.

(Bill of Lading at Section 6 (emphasis added).)

The Bill of Lading incorporates by reference the terms of

NAVL’s Professional Relocation Tariff (“Tariff”). (NAVL SOF at

¶ 11; Raineri Resp. to NAVL SOF at ¶ 11.) The Tariff contains 

substantially the same language as that found in Section 6 of 

the Bill of Lading, quoted above. (Marlowe Aff., Ex. C, Tariff 

at Item 104, Section 6.)5

1. Notice of Claims Required — A claim for loss, 

damage, injury, or delay shall not be 

voluntarily paid by [NAVL] unless filed 

electronically via [NAVL]’s website, or in 

writing as provided in paragraph 2 below, 

within the specified time limits applicable 

thereto and as otherwise may be required by 

 The Tariff also provides, in relevant 

part:

 5 The relevant portions of the Tariff differ from Section 6 

of the Bill of Lading only insofar as it refers to “the carrier” 

as “North American”, i.e., NAVL. (See Tariff at Item 104, 

Section 6, Item 302, ¶ 11.)

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law, by the terms of the bill of lading and/or 

other contract of carriage, and by all tariff 

provisions applicable thereto.

2. Minimum Filing Requirements — A communication

[filed] electronically via [NAVL]’s website, or 

in writing from a claimant filed with [NAVL]

within the time limits specified in the bill of 

lading or contract of carriage or 

transportation, and 

(a) containing facts sufficient to identify the 

shipment(s) of property involved;

(b) asserting liability for alleged loss, 

damage, injury; and 

(c) making claim for the payment of a specified 

or determinable amount of money, 

shall be considered as sufficient compliance 

with the provisions for filing claims embraced 

in the bill of lading or other contract of 

carriage.

(Id. at Item 302, ¶¶ 1-2 (emphasized headings in original).)

B. The Movers Failed to Timely Deliver Raineri’s 

Belongings to Raineri’s Residence in California

Raineri flew to California on June 26, 2010. (See 6-30-10 

E-mail from Raineri to Pease.) She thereafter e-mailed Vicki 

Pease, an NAVL customer service representative, informing Pease 

of the earlier service issues and urging Pease to ensure that

her belongings timely arrived in California by July 3, 2010. 

(See 6-28-10 E-mail from Raineri to Pease.) Pease responded to 

Raineri’s e-mail and explained that Raineri, if seeking damages

related to delays, would have to formally submit an NAVL claim 

form and receipts to support her claims. (See Daler Aff., Ex. 

R, 6-29-10 E-mail from Pease to Raineri.)

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Raineri sent Pease another e-mail on June 30, 2010,

complaining again of the movers’ earlier service failures, and

alleging that she was informed she would not timely receive her 

belongings in California. (See 6-30-10 E-mail from Raineri to 

Pease.) Raineri asked Pease to address the situation and ensure 

timely delivery. (See id.) Raineri now acknowledges that this 

e-mail did not contain the NAVL claim form or the receipts that 

Pease earlier requested. (NAVL SOF at ¶ 20; Raineri Resp. to 

NAVL SOF at ¶ 20.)

The movers did not complete delivery of Raineri’s 

belongings until July 18, 2010. (See Bill of Lading.) Raineri

acknowledged final delivery by again signing the Bill of Lading. 

(See id.; see also NAVL SOF at ¶ 15; Raineri Resp. to NAVL SOF 

at ¶ 15.)

C. Raineri Contacted NAVL and Attempted to Seek 

Reimbursement for Items Damaged During the Move

Raineri, on July 22, 2010, sent an e-mail to Ruth Daler, a 

customer service representative for NAVL, informing Daler that 

she wished to suspend payment for the NAVL’s services because 

the shipments to California were late, incomplete, and, to the 

extent that they were delivered, damaged. (Daler Aff., Ex. T, 

7—22-10 E-mail from Raineri to Daler.) Raineri, inter alia, 

explained that many of her belongings were missing; that she, as 

a result of the missing belongings, had purchased replacement 

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“essential ‘need to live’ items”; and that the movers “smashed a 

medicine cabinet”. (Id.) Raineri also requested that Daler 

provide “instructions for . . . getting reimbursed for 

essentials, and for filing a claim for lost and damaged items.”

(Id.) 

Daler responded by e-mail on July 26, 2010, providing

instructions on submitting claims arising from late delivery and 

advising Raineri that another NAVL representative would provide

instructions on submitting claims for loss and damage. (Daler 

Aff., Ex. U, 7-26-10 E-mail from Daler to Raineri.) Sandy 

Marlowe, NAVL’s Lead Claim Services Representative, thereafter

sent Raineri an e-mail with instructions for filing claims for 

loss and damage. (Marlowe Aff. at ¶ 25; see also id., Ex. I, 7-

26-10 E-mail from Marlowe to Raineri.)

Nearly six weeks lapsed before Raineri next contacted NAVL

when, on September 9, 2010, she sent Daler another e-mail. 

(Daler Aff., Ex. V, 9-9-10 E-mail from Raineri to Daler.) 

Raineri stated in that e-mail that her “king size bed headboard 

was cracked in half, the washer was broken (and had to be 

trashed) and [her] grill was in three pieces.” (Id.) She also 

stated that some of her belongings, following the move, had “an 

odor . . . that [she] can’t get rid of” and that she had not yet 

received most of her kitchen items, her ladder, and most of her 

tools. (Id.)

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Raineri, in that e-mail, also declared that she found it

too cumbersome to comply with the formal claims process because 

it “would be [her] full time job to itemize and document the 

inordinately long list of damaged and missing items”. (Id.) 

Raineri thus proposed, as an alternative to NAVL’s formal claims 

process, to reduce her payment to NAVL for its services and

“consider the matter resolved.” (Id.) Daler replied that she 

could not agree to reduce NAVL’s fees. (Daler Aff., Ex. W, 9-9-

10 E-mail from Daler to Raineri.) She instead stated -- as she 

and other NAVL representatives had stated before -- that Raineri 

should file a formal claim for any damages sustained as a result 

of the movers’ actions. (Id.) Daler again provided Raineri

instructions, directing her to claims forms on NAVL’s website 

and informing her that she had nine months from the date of 

delivery to file a claim. (Id.) 

Raineri, despite NAVL’s repeated instruction regarding the 

claims process, failed to complete that process. She instead 

sent several additional e-mails to Daler and Marlowe, further

detailing her frustrations and her reluctance to follow formal 

claims procedures. (See, e.g., Daler Aff., Ex. Y, 9-12-10 EMail from Raineri to Daler (“There is ample evidence to suggest 

that although I may waste my time and fill out all the arduous 

paperwork necessary to file claims for all that has been lost 

and damaged, that your company will not reimburse me.”).) 

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Raineri also further detailed her alleged losses and damages. 

(See Daler Aff., Ex. Z, Second 9-12-10 E-mail from Raineri to

Daler.) She specifically alleged that the movers stole her 

daughter’s iPod and that they “smashed” her grill onto her car. 

(Id.) It appears that Raineri attached photographs to these 

e-mails as proof of her alleged damages, though it is unclear 

(1) what Raineri photographed, or (2) when the photographs were 

taken. (See Daler Aff. at ¶ 24.)6

NAVL continued to attempt to assist Raineri. Marlowe

explained in a reply e-mail that NAVL, after receiving “an 

actual claim form”, would assign a claims adjuster who would 

address Raineri’s complaints. (Marlowe Aff., Ex. M, 9-13-10 

E-mail from Marlowe to Raineri.) Daler similarly responded, 

explaining that Raineri’s photographs, though “helpful”, did not

“constitute a filed claim” and therefore did not waive Raineri’s 

duty to follow NAVL’s formal claims process. (Daler Aff., Ex. 

AA, 9-13-10 E-mail from Daler to Raineri; see also id. at ¶ 26.) 

The parties now agree that Raineri did not complete the 

NAVL claim process, and similarly failed to submit receipts for 

the items for which she sought reimbursement, as requested on 

several occasions by NAVL’s customer service representatives. 

(NAVL SOF at ¶¶ 35-37; Raineri Resp. to NAVL SOF at ¶¶ 35-37.) 

 6 Neither NAVL nor Raineri submitted these photographs for 

the Court’s consideration.

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II. DISCUSSION

NAVL contends that the First Count is preempted by the 

Carmack Amendment. (See NAVL Br. at 11-13.) NAVL also contends 

that it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor and against 

Raineri on the Second Count because: (1) Raineri, by failing to 

adhere to NAVL’s formal claims process, allegedly failed to 

satisfy either the provisions of the parties’ contract or the 

regulations enacted pursuant to the Carmack Amendment pertaining 

to notice of claims; and (2) Raineri’s e-mails, even if accepted 

as notice of a claim, were allegedly deficient as a matter of 

law. (See id. at 13-27.) 

Raineri opposes the Motion. (See generally Raineri Opp’n 

Br.) She argues that the First Count is not preempted by the 

Carmack Amendment because she is not, in that count, claiming 

that NAVL lost or damaged goods in transit. (Id. at 32-33.) 

She also argues, with respect to the Second Count, that she 

satisfied all conditions set by her contract with NAVL and the 

pertinent regulations. (Id. at 14-31.)

A. Summary Judgment Standard

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows 

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant has the initial burden of 

proving the absence of a genuinely disputed material fact 

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relative to the claims in question. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986). Material facts are those “that could 

affect the outcome” of the proceeding, and “a dispute about a 

material fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is sufficient to 

permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving 

party.” Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 2011) 

(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986)). The burden on the movant may be discharged by pointing 

out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence 

supporting the non-movant’s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

The burden then shifts to the non-movant to demonstrate the 

existence of a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. 

Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986); 

Williams v. Bor. of W. Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 460–61 (3d 

Cir. 1989). A non-movant asserting that a fact is genuinely 

disputed must support such an assertion by: “(A) citing to 

particular parts of materials in the record, including 

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, 

affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . ., admissions, 

interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B) showing that 

the materials cited [by the opposing party] do not establish the 

absence . . . of a genuine dispute[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).

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When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact 

exists, the court must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the non-movant and draw all reasonable inferences 

in that party’s favor. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 

(2007); Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007). If 

the non-movant fails to make a sufficient showing on an 

essential element of its case with respect to which it has the 

burden of proof, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

B. The First Count

The Carmack Amendment governs interstate carriers’ 

liability for “damages and losses to goods caused by the carrier 

in interstate shipment.” S & H Hardware & Supply Co. v. Yellow 

Transp., Inc., 432 F.3d 550, 551 (3d Cir. 2005). Congress, in

enacting the Carmack Amendment, intended to “take possession of 

the subject [of interstate carriers’ liability], and supersede 

all state regulation with reference to it” in order to establish

“uniformity . . . of liability”. Adams Express Co. v. 

Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 505-06 (1913); NII Brokerage, L.L.C., 

v. Roadway Exp., Inc., No. 07-5125, 2008 WL 2810160, at *2 

(D.N.J. July 18, 2008). The Carmack Amendment thus covers “all 

losses resulting from any failure to discharge a carrier’s duty 

as to any part of the agreed transportation” and preempts all 

state law claims for the same. See Ga., Fla. & Atl. Ry. Co. v. 

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Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190, 196 (1916); see also Lewis v. 

Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 542 F.3d 403, 407-08 (3d Cir. 2008) 

(stating that state law claims against carrier, based on 

carrier’s interstate transportation services, were preempted by 

the Carmack Amendment); La. Transp. v. Cowan Sys., LLC, No. 

11-3435, 2012 WL 1664120, at *3 (D.N.J. May 10, 2012) (“[C]ourts 

in this Circuit have found that the Carmack Amendment broadly 

preempts claims other than those that relate to lost or damaged 

goods.”) 

The Court has closely considered both the claims for relief 

set forth in the First Count and the full scope of the Carmack 

Amendment. We now conclude that the First Count is preempted by 

the Carmack Amendment.

Raineri acknowledges the full scope of the Carmack 

Amendment, as set forth in Blish Milling and Lewis. (See 

Raineri Opp’n Br. at 32 (citing Lewis, 542 F.3d at 407-08 

(stating that Carmack Amendment covers “all losses resulting 

from any failure to discharge a carrier’s duty as to any part of 

the agreed transportation” and quoting Blish Milling, 241 U.S. 

at 196).) She also acknowledges that the Carmack Amendment 

“preempts state law under almost all circumstances.” (See

Raineri Opp’n Br. at 32 (citing Orlick v. J.D. Carton & Son, 

Inc., 144 F.Supp.2d 337, 345 (D.N.J. 2001).) She nonetheless 

argues that the First Count, which appears to sound in either 

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negligence or breach of contract, is not preempted by the 

Carmack Amendment because it does not concern damage to or loss 

of her household goods. (See Raineri Opp’n Br. at 32-33.) 

Raineri’s argument lacks merit. The First Count concerns 

(1) damages that NAVL’s agents allegedly caused to her Freehold, 

New Jersey residence and (2) costs incurred as a result of 

NAVL’s agents failure to properly discharge their duties. (See

2d Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 16-19.) Because the First Count relates to 

losses resulting from NAVL’s failure to properly discharge its 

duties under some part -- any part -- of the parties’ contract, 

the First Count is preempted by the Carmack Amendment. See

Blish Milling, 241 U.S. at 196; Lewis, 542 F.3d at 407-08.7

 7 The Court notes that the First Count, insofar as it 

concerns NAVL’s failure to properly discharge duties concerning 

packaging and loading Raineri’s belongings into a trailer, fall 

squarely within the scope of the Carmack Amendment. The Carmack 

Amendment provides that a household goods motor carrier, “in the 

ordinary course of its business of providing transportation of 

household goods”, provides services such as “[p]rotective 

packing and unpacking of individual items at personal 

residences” and “[l]oading . . . at personal residences.” 49 

U.S.C. § 13102(12)(A)(iii)-(iv). Because such services fall 

within the definition of duties held by household goods motor 

carriers, state law claims for failure to properly discharge 

such duties are preempted by the Carmack Amendment.

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C. The Second Count

1. Form of Notice

Federal regulations promulgated pursuant to the Carmack 

Amendment govern, inter alia, “the processing of claims for 

loss, damage, injury, or delay to property transported or 

accepted for transportation, in interstate . . . commerce, by” 

motor carriers. 49 C.F.R. § 370.1. These regulations provide

that a claim must take the form of either a written 

communication or, when in a form agreed to by both the carrier 

and shipper, an electronic communication. 49 C.F.R. § 370.3(b).8

NAVL argues that Raineri’s several e-mails to NAVL customer 

service representatives fail to conform to the standard set by 

the federal regulations, insofar as those e-mails are neither 

written (i.e., non-electronic) communications nor electronic 

communications in a form agreed-upon by both parties. (See NAVL 

Br. at 13-22.) It argues that Raineri should have but failed to 

conform to NAVL’s formal claims process, as indicated in the 

several responsive e-mails that Raineri received from Daler, 

Marlowe, and Pease. (See id. at 18-20.) NAVL thus argues that 

 8 The Tariff provisions quoted in Section I.A of this 

Memorandum Opinion, concerning the claims procedure required 

before recovery of damages, are virtually identical to the 

regulations that govern liability of interstate carriers. (See

Tariff.) Cf. 49 C.F.R. § 370.3(b). The Tariff’s provision on 

claims processing differs only insofar as it provides that a 

claim must be filed in writing or “electronically via North 

American’s website”. (Tariff at Item 302, ¶ 1.) 

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Raineri cannot, as a matter of law, proceed with this action. 

(See id. at 13-22.)

Raineri, in opposing the Motion, asserts that her e-mails,

taken together, constitute formal written claims. (See, e.g.,

Raineri Resp. to NAVL SOF at ¶ 21.) She argues that she was not 

required to use NAVL’s formal electronic claims process because

she “substantially complied” with the requirements for 

presenting a written claim for damages set forth in the

regulations related to the Carmack Amendment, Order for Service,

and Tariff. (Id. at 30.)

The Court acknowledges that the written claim requirement 

exists “to insure that carriers may promptly investigate claims, 

and not to permit the carrier to escape liability.” Lewis, 542 

F.3d at 411 (quoting S & H Hardware & Supply, 432 F.3d at 554). 

Courts in this circuit construe the written claim requirement 

liberally, and require substantial performance rather than 

strict compliance with that requirement. See S & H Hardware & 

Supply, 432 F.3d at 554. “The crux of the notice is whether it 

apprises the carrier of the basis of the claim and that 

reimbursement will be sought.” Id.

The Court has scrutinized the series of e-mails that passed 

between Raineri and NAVL’s customer service representatives, 

i.e., Pease, Daler, Marlowe. Upon completion of that review, 

the Court is constrained to find that Raineri’s e-mails do not 

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satisfy either the regulations promulgated pursuant to the 

Carmack Amendment or the contract between the parties.9

2. Raineri’s E-mails Do Not Meet the Formal Claim 

Requirements Because They Constitute Neither 

“Written Communications” Nor “Electronic 

Communications . . . Agreed to By the Carrier and 

Shipper . . . Involved”

The regulation that controls this aspect of the Motion, 49 

C.F.R. § 370.3, defines minimum filing requirements for claims. 

It states that a claim must take the form of a “written or 

electronic communication (when agreed to by the carrier and 

shipper . . . involved) from a claimant.” The Court interprets 

this passage as indicating that a claimant may file a formal 

claim either by submitting written communications (i.e., 

communications in a non-electronic form) or, when agreed to by 

the carrier and the shipper, by submitting electronic 

communications.

The Court reaches this conclusion in consideration of 

Lewis. There, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 

Circuit (“Third Circuit”) explained that “basic tenets of 

statutory construction apply to construction of regulations”. 

 9 “The bill of lading operates as both the receipt and the 

basic transportation contract between the shipper and the 

carrier, and its terms and conditions are binding.” E.F. 

Operating Corp. v. Am. Bldgs., 993 F.2d 1046, 1050 (3d Cir. 

1993); see also Moffitt v. Bekins Van Lines Co., 6 F.3d 305, 306 

(5th Cir. 1993) (recognizing an order for service and bill of 

lading as “governing the move”).

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Lewis, 542 F.3d at 409 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Pursuant to such tenets, “terms connected by a disjunctive

[must] be given separate meanings unless the context dictates 

otherwise”. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979);

United States v. Parcel of Real Prop. Known as 6109 Grubb Rd.,

886 F.2d 618, 626 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Grubb Rd.”). The portion of 

§ 370.3 quoted above -- the section mirrored in the Bill of 

Lading and Tariff -- states that claims for damages must be 

filed in either a written communication or an electronic 

communication in a format agreed upon by the parties. See 49 

C.F.R. § 370.3(b) (providing that a claim for damages must be 

either “[a] written or electronic communication (when agreed to 

by the carrier and the shipper or receiver involved) from a 

claimant.”) Because the terms “written communication” and 

“electronic communication” are separated by the word “or”, they 

must therefore be given separate meanings. See Reiter, 442 U.S. 

330 at 339; Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 626. 

The Court, in the absence of explicit legislative 

definitions, interprets the terms “written” and “electronic” 

according to their ordinary meanings. See Perrin v. United 

States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (“[a] fundamental canon of 

statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words 

will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, 

common meaning”); see also Lewis, 542 F.3d at 409. In 

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determining the ordinary meaning of words, the Court relies on 

“general dictionaries”. See Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 647 F.3d 506, 511 (3d Cir. 

2011); see also Lewis, 542 F.3d at 409 (using general 

dictionaries to determine ordinary meaning of the words 

“specified” and “determinable”). The word “electronic” is 

defined as, inter alia, “implemented on or by means of a 

computer: involving a computer”. Webster’s Third New Int’l 

Dictionary, 733 (Philip Babcock Gove, ed. 1961) (1986). The

word “e-mail” is defined as, inter alia, “a means or system for 

transmitting messages electronically (as between computers on a 

network)”. Id. at 738 (emphasis added). 

The Court thus concludes that, for purposes of applying the 

federal regulations related to the Carmack Amendment, an e-mail 

is not a “written communication”. It is, instead, an 

“electronic communication”.10

 10 Raineri, in her opposition to the Motion, argues that her 

e-mails are “written communications” under 49 C.F.R. § 370.3(b). 

The Court is familiar with a single case where a federal 

district court accepted an e-mail as a “written claim”. See

Valerus Compression Servs. L.P. v. Lone Star Transp., LLC, No. 

10-C-517, 2011 WL 3566865 (E.D. Wisc. Aug. 15, 2011). The court 

in that case, however, did not engage in the analysis that this 

Court has undertaken, above. This Court therefore finds Valerus

unpersuasive.

 The next question, then, is 

We note that Valerus found support in Hopper Paper Co. v. 

Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 178 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1949), where the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded 

that a carrier’s actual knowledge of a claim relieved a shipper 

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whether the parties agreed to accept electronic communications 

in the form of e-mails. See 49 C.F.R. § 370.3(b) (noting that a 

claim may take the form of an “electronic communication (when 

agreed to by the carrier and shipper . . . involved)”).

The evidence of record demonstrates that the parties did 

not anticipate that Raineri, if filing a claim, could do so by 

sending one or more e-mails that simply alleged damage or 

otherwise described her claim. The Tariff, part of the contract 

between the parties, provided that Raineri was, if filing a 

claim, required to complete claim forms available on NAVL’s 

website. (Tariff at Item 302, ¶ 1.) Those forms, once 

completed, could be submitted to NAVL through the website, by 

mail, by e-mail, or by facsimile. (See id.; see also Daler Aff. 

at ¶ 7; 7-26-10 E-mail from Marlowe to Raineri.)

Raineri admits that she failed to complete the formal NAVL 

claims process, despite repeated opportunity and instruction 

from NAVL customer service representatives. (See Raineri Resp. 

to NAVL SOF at ¶¶ 35, 37.) Indeed, as noted above, Raineri 

expressed the belief that completing the formal claims process 

would be “arduous”, become her “full time job”, and would “waste 

 

of its burden to file a proper claim. The Third Circuit has 

explicitly rejected Hopper Paper, calling it a “maverick 

decision”. See Perini-North River Assocs. v. Chesapeake & O. 

Ry. Co., 562 F.2d 269, 273-74 (3d Cir. 1977). The Third 

Circuit’s rejection of Hopper Paper further supports this 

Court’s decision not to rely on Valerus.

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[her] time”. (9-9-10 E-Mail from Raineri to Daler; 9-12-10 

E-mail from Raineri to Daler). The Court is thus constrained to 

conclude, pursuant to both the regulations promulgated under the 

Carmack Amendment and the contract between the parties, that 

Raineri failed to submit a proper notice of claim and, 

accordingly, failed to meet a condition precedent to the 

recovery she now seeks.

3. Raineri’s E-mails, Even When Considered in Light 

of a “Substantial Compliance” Standard, Failed to 

Provide NAVL an Adequate Opportunity to 

Investigate Raineri’s Claim

The purpose of the written claim requirement, as noted 

above, is to afford the carrier an opportunity to investigate 

claims. See Lewis, 542 F.3d at 411; S & H Hardware & Supply, 

432 F.3d at 554. The Court has thus considered whether 

Raineri’s e-mails, though not technically compliant with either 

the regulations promulgated under the Carmack Amendment or the 

parties’ contract, afforded NAVL a meaningful opportunity to 

investigate Raineri’s allegations of loss and damage. 

Raineri, through her several e-mails with NAVL customer 

service representatives, raises allegations about damaged, lost 

or stolen items including “a medicine cabinet”, a “king size bed 

headboard”, “the washer”, a “grill”, her daughter’s iPod, and 

“most of [her] kitchen items . . . [her] ladder and most of 

[her] tools.” (7-26-10 E-mail from Raineri to Daler; 9-9-10 

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E-mail from Raineri to Daler; Second 9-12-10 E-Mail from Raineri 

to Daler.) She alleges that “many of [her] clothes and all of 

[her] mattresses”, following transport, had an odor that could 

not be eliminated. (9-9-10 E-mail from Raineri to Daler.) She 

also offers vague and conclusory comments about the NAVL’s 

alleged service failures. (See, e.g., 9-12-10 E-Mail from 

Raineri to Daler (“many of my items are missing and broken”).)

NAVL, without further information, could not meaningfully 

investigate Raineri’s claims. NAVL was handcuffed by the 

information (or lack of information) provided by Raineri. Her 

failure to adequately describe the items allegedly lost, 

damaged, or stolen by the movers deprived NAVL of the 

opportunity to search its warehouses, interview its employees 

and agents, or otherwise investigate her claims. Put simply, 

Raineri’s failure to provide more detailed information -- e.g., 

the kind of information that one might expect to enter into a 

traditional claims form -- deprived NAVL of “[t]he crux of the 

notice”, an appraisal “of the basis of the claim.”11 

 11 The Court notes, for example, that Raineri alleged that 

the movers damaged “a medicine cabinet” and a “grill”. These 

allegations, however, fail to provide NAVL adequate notice of 

the basis of her claim, as she fails to distinguish the 

allegedly damaged items from other, similar items -- i.e., from 

other medicine cabinets or grills -- that NAVL may have 

transported.

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III. CONCLUSION

The Court recognizes that the entry of judgment in NAVL’s 

favor and against Raineri appears, at first blush, to be a harsh 

result. Raineri alleges that she sustained over $24,000 in loss 

and damage as a result of NAVL’s actions. The Court is 

sympathetic to her situation.

The Court must, however, base its resolution of the Motion 

in law rather than emotion. To that end, we finds persuasive 

the reasoning of the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of New York. That court held that “ideally, 

whoever is responsible for the damage should pay, yet he who 

seeks compensation must . . . comply with the agreed upon 

procedure to recovery.” R.T.A. Corp. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 594 

F.Supp. 205, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). That court further explained:

“To the extent that carriers may escape liability, such 

‘windfalls’ may be properly traced, not to the existence of the 

regulations, but to shippers’ unexcused failure to comply with a 

reasonable condition contained in bills of lading.” Id.

(citation omitted).

Raineri agreed to abide by NAVL’s formal claims process by 

entering into the contract comprised in pertinent part by the 

Bill of Lading and the Tariff. Thereafter, however, she failed 

to abide by that process, despite the repeated reminders and 

explanations of the claims process provided by NAVL’s customer 

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service representatives. (See 6-29-10 E-mail from Pease to 

Raineri; 7-26-10 E-mail from Daler to Raineri; 9-9-12 E-mail 

from Daler to Raineri; 9-13-10 E-mail from Daler to Raineri; 

Marlowe Aff., Ex. K, 9-13-10 E-mail from Marlowe to Raineri; 

Marlowe Aff., Ex. M, 9-13-10 E-mail from Marlowe to Raineri; see 

also Daler Aff. at ¶ 27 (explaining that Raineri was “repeatedly 

informed that her e-mails did not constitute a written claim for 

damages”).) Raineri ignored that process, disregarded NAVL’s 

instructions, and, instead, relied on a series of e-mails, fully 

aware that NAVL would not accept them as notice of her claim. 

(See Daler Aff., Ex. Y, 9-12-10 E-mail from Raineri to Daler 

(Raineri explaining that it would be a waste of her time to 

“fill out all the arduous paperwork necessary to file claims for 

all that has been lost and damaged”).) 

The claims process, as set forth in the NAVL customer 

service representatives’ replies to Raineri’s e-mails, does not 

appear to be particularly unreasonable or arduous. The entry of 

summary judgment in favor of NAVL and against Raineri with 

respect to the Second Count of the Amended Complaint is 

therefore not unreasonably severe. See Calpro Co. v. Consol. 

Eng’g Co. of Ga., Inc., 502 F.Supp. 707, 715 (N.D. Ga. 1980) 

(finding that, despite evidence that the defendant carrier 

knowingly damaged the plaintiff’s oven while in transit, “the 

law require[d]” granting judgment in the carrier’s favor and 

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against the shipper where the shipper failed to properly file a

written claim). 

The Court will thus grant the Motion and enter judgment in 

NAVL’s favor and against Raineri on both the First Count and the 

Second Count. For good cause appearing, the Court will enter an 

appropriate Order and Judgment. 

 s/ Mary L. Cooper .

MARY L. COOPER

United States District Judge

Date: August 28, 2012

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