J-A23017-17

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RAHEEM WILLIAMS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1249 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 20, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0015842-2013, 

 CP-51-CR-0015843-2013, 

 CP-51-CR-0015844-2013

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., DUBOW, J., and FITZGERALD*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED DECEMBER 22, 2017

Appellant, Raheem Williams, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

following his convictions on multiple counts of attempted murder and other 

related charges. We affirm.

For a recitation of the complete factual background and procedural 

history of this case, we direct the interested reader to the trial court’s 

comprehensive opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/22/16, at 1-11. 

Briefly, in August 2013, a fistfight between two groups of men escalated 

into a shootout, with two men firing weapons into the crowd. One person was 

wounded. The next day, two other people connected with the fight were 

wounded in another shooting outside of one of the victims’ homes. Police 

questioned a witness, Rakeem Hall, who identified Appellant in a photo array 
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as one of the men who began firing into the crowd. Hall also stated that 

Appellant shot Hall’s brother and a neighbor outside of Hall’s residence. 

Kaleem Shelton, who separately pled guilty to charges in connection with the 

first shootout, likewise identified Appellant as the other gunman firing into the 

crowd, and as the person who shot Hall’s brother and neighbor. 

Following his arrest, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the photo 

identification made by Hall. The court denied the motion, and Appellant 

proceeded to a jury trial. At trial, both Hall and Shelton refused to testify, and 

their prior signed statements were admitted into evidence.1 The jury convicted 

Appellant of three counts each of attempted murder and aggravated assault, 

and one count each of firearms not to be carried without a license, carrying 

firearms on a public street in Philadelphia, and possession of an instrument of 

crime. The court imposed an aggregate sentence of 25-50 years’ 

incarceration. This timely appeal follows.

On appeal, Appellant challenges five issues. He first contends the trial 

court improperly denied his motion to suppress Hall’s photo identification. The 

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1 The trial transcript is not in the certified record. Appellant requested a copy 

of the transcript in the trial court. For whatever reason, the trial court did not 

forward the transcript along with the certified record. A copy of the transcript 

is in Appellant’s reproduced record, and the Commonwealth has not objected 

to that copy. In the interest of judicial economy, we have not requested the 

trial court to locate and forward the official transcript, see Commmonwealth 

v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 7 (Pa. Super.2006) (en banc), but have elected to 

use the one provided in the reproduced record. Accord Commonwealth v. 

Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 959 n.1 (Pa. 2007) (relying on pre-sentence 

investigation report that appeared only in reproduced record where neither 

party challenged the validity of the report).
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police, Appellant argues, were unnecessarily suggestive in presenting Hall with 

the photo array by implying that he had to choose one of the images before 

him, rather than giving Hall the option not to select a photo if he did not 

recognize the gunman. We disagree. 

When reviewing a denial of a suppression motion, “we must consider 

only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence of the 

defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as 

a whole.” Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 915 A.2d 1122, 1134 (Pa. 2007). 

We are not bound by the suppression court’s legal conclusions and review the 

suppression court’s application of the law to the facts de novo. See 

Commonwealth v. Myers, 118 A.3d 1122, 1125 (Pa. Super. 2015). 

In contrast, we defer to the suppression court’s findings of fact as it is 

in the bailiwick of the suppression court to assess the credibility of witnesses 

and the weight to be given to their testimony. See id. “It is within the 

suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of 

witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. The suppression court 

is free to believe all, some or none of the evidence presented at the 

suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v. Elmobdy, 823 A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. 

Super. 2003) (citations omitted).

“Whether an out of court identification is to be suppressed as unreliable, 

and therefore violative of due process, is determined from the totality of the 

circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Fulmore, 25 A.3d 340, 346 (Pa. Super. 

2011) (citation omitted). Identification evidence will not be suppressed, 
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except in cases where “the identification procedure used was so impermissibly 

suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 

misidentification.” Commonwealth v. Stiles, 143 A.3d 968, 978 (Pa. Super. 

2016) (citation omitted). “Suggestiveness in the identification process is a 

factor to be considered in determining the admissibility of such evidence, but 

suggestiveness alone does not warrant exclusion.” Fulmore, 25 A.3d at 346. 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Suggestiveness occurs in an 

identification procedure where the police emphasize or otherwise isolate a 

suspect. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 17 A.3d 390, 394 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Appellant’s argument is misleading at best. Hall told police officers that 

he knew “Bam” (Appellant’s nickname) was the shooter. Hall’s decision not to 

cooperate at trial notwithstanding, Appellant cannot fairly maintain that the 

police procedures used here created a “substantial likelihood of 

misidentification.” The police culled a list from their database, using Hall’s 

description of Appellant, a person Hall knew. They produced pictures of seven 

other people in conjunction with Appellant’s picture—all men in their 20s with 

close-cropped dreadlocks and similar skin tones and features. Appellant does 

not suggest, nor does the record show, that the police asked Appellant to do 

anything more than “identify the shooter.” N.T. Suppression Hearing, 10/5/15, 

at 9. 

Again, Appellant was someone Hall knew as “Bam” prior to the both 

shootings. We find nothing in the record to support Appellant’s assertions that 
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the trial court erred by not suppressing the photo identification, and we decline 

to reverse on those grounds.

In Appellant’s second issue, he challenges the trial court’s conduct 

during the voir dire jury selection process. Specifically, Appellant contends the 

court erred by not allowing him to conduct individual questioning of jurors to 

elicit evidence of potential racial bias. 

“[T]he purpose of voir dire is to ensure the empaneling of a fair and 

impartial jury capable of following the instructions on the law as provided by 

the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Paolello, 665 A.2d 439, 450 (Pa. 1995) 

(citation omitted). “[T]he test of disqualification is the juror’s ability and 

willingness to eliminate the influence of his scruples and render a verdict 

according to the evidence. This determination is to be made by the trial judge 

based on the juror’s answers and demeanor and will not be reversed absent 

a palpable abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Penn, 132 A.3d 498, 502 

(Pa. Super. 2016). 

“Voir dire is not to be utilized as a tool for the attorneys to ascertain the 

effectiveness of potential trial strategies.” Paolello, 665 A.2d at 451 (holding 

that counsel was not permitted to question jurors during voir dire about their 

attitudes toward alcohol in case where victim’s death involved alcohol 

consumption). The trial court has discretion in determining whether counsel 

may pose separate questions to potential jurors during voir dire. See 

Commonwealth v. Mattison, 82 A.3d 386, 397 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted) 

(holding trial court did not abuse its discretion when it precluded defense 
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counsel’s proposed questions to jury venire about defendant’s prior murder 

conviction). Indeed, despite counsel’s request, the court may decline to ask 

voir dire questions on race where particularly sensitive racial issues are not 

present, and raising such issues risks unnecessarily injecting race into the 

proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Richardson, 473 A.2d 1361, 1363 (Pa. 

1984). See also Commonwealth v. Glaspy, 616 A.2d 1359, 1362 (Pa. 

1992) (describing point at which racial considerations were introduced into 

the case and it became appropriate for the trial court to individually question 

potential jurors on prejudices they may have held).

The trial court here did not allow Appellant to ask additional questions 

about jurors’ possible bias regarding statements made by police officers. 

However, this was after the court had asked jurors whether they could be fair 

and open-minded, and after it already informed jurors they may not give a 

police officer’s testimony any additional weight simply because of the officer’s 

status as a law enforcement agent. Any jurors who indicated on their 

individual questionnaire that they would give an officer’s testimony more 

weight were individually questioned in order for the court to ascertain whether 

they could follow the court’s instructions with respect to law enforcement 

testimony. Each juror answered in the affirmative. To the extent Appellant 

challenges these questions as “cursory, superficial, [and] leading,” we decline 

to find that the court erred in this line of questioning. 

Counsel also avers the trial court erred by not permitting trial counsel 

to question potential jurors during voir dire about their views on guns and gun 
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violence, or on their racial attitudes. Counsel’s own explanation as to why he 

wanted to ask those questions demonstrates his intent to use this line of 

reasoning as a framing device for Appellant’s case. 

Counsel advanced no reason as to why the case might be racially 

sensitive, but instead baldly stated: “[T]here’s nothing [in the questionnaire] 

about the current situation that young African American men are constantly 

in the media talking about guns in – particular guns and shootings and could 

that possibly impact the prejudice in any way that this case involves a young 

African American male accused of shooting and having a gun.” N.T. Jury 

Selection, 10/7/15, at 43-44. 

Voir dire is not an appropriate opportunity for counsel to assess the 

value of particular trial strategies. See Paolello, 665 A.2d at 451. The trial 

court acted well within its discretion in not permitting counsel to individually 

question jurors about their racial attitudes or views on firearms. Thus, we find 

the court did not err when it refused to permit defense counsel’s proposed line 

of questioning. 

In Appellant’s third issue, he claims the Commonwealth improperly 

bolstered Kaleem Shelton’s testimony by noting the Commonwealth 

prosecuted Shelton for his role in the crimes, and the same court presided 

over Shelton’s guilty plea hearing. We disagree.

The trial court has discretion over the admissibility of evidence, and its 

decision will not be disturbed unless it abuses that discretion. 

Commonwealth v. Lam, 684 A.2d 153, 158 (Pa. Super. 1996). “Improper 
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bolstering of a witness occurs when the Commonwealth places the prestige of 

the government behind the witness through personal assurances of his or her 

veracity, or the Commonwealth indicates that information which is not before 

the jury supports the witness’ testimony.” Id. (citations omitted). The 

Commonwealth may introduce evidence of a witness’ plea agreement in 

testimony at trial. See Commonwealth v. Bricker, 581 A.2d 147, 155 (Pa. 

1990). 

There is no merit in Appellant’s third issue. The Commonwealth noted 

while reading the transcript of Shelton’s prior police statement that it had 

charged Shelton for his participation in the crimes at issue in this case, and 

Shelton pled guilty. The Commonwealth indicated that the same court 

presiding over Appellant’s case accepted Shelton’s plea. At no point did the 

Commonwealth place its authority behind Shelton’s statement, or otherwise 

bolster Shelton’s credibility. Counsel for the Commonwealth did not personally 

assure jurors that Shelton was a truthful witness, nor did counsel imply the 

court was convinced of Shelton’s truthfulness. Indeed, the Commonwealth 

clearly and carefully emphasized that Shelton was also a participant in the 

crimes, and that he had been sentenced to time in prison for his role. 

Introducing evidence of Shelton’s own criminal responsibility for actions in this 

case does not constitute improper bolstering. Appellant is due no relief on this 

issue.

In Appellant’s fourth issue, he claims the trial court erred by admitting 

hearsay when it permitted the Commonwealth to read into evidence Raquane 
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Hall’s out-of-court statement to his brother, Rakeem Hall. We find this issue 

waived.

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 103(a) provides that a party may claim 

error in the admission of evidence only if he makes a timely objection on the 

record and states the specific ground for the objection, unless it was apparent 

from the context. See Pa.R.E. 103(a)(1)(A)-(B). “We have long held that 

‘[f]ailure to raise a contemporaneous objection to the evidence at trial waives 

that claim on appeal.’” Commonwealth v. Tha, 64 A.3d 704, 713 (Pa. Super. 

2013) (citing, among others, Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

At trial, the Commonwealth read portions of Rakeem Hall’s prior police 

statement into evidence after he refused to cooperate. See N.T. Trial, 

10/8/15, at 25-61. The Commonwealth also introduced sections of the 

statement where Rakeem Hall recounted a conversation with his girlfriend’s 

uncle, as well as text messages between Hall and his girlfriend. See id., at 

32, 36. Rakeem Hall’s statement included an allegation from his brother 

Raquane, in which Raquane described who shot him and Rakeem concluded 

that the person described was Appellant. See id., at 59-60. While Appellant’s 

counsel specifically objected to the introduction of the statement between 

Rakeem Hall and his girlfriend’s uncle, and to the text messages, he failed to 

object to the declaration Raquane allegedly relayed to Rakeem over the 

phone, which Rakeem memorialized in his police statement. 

The court gave Appellant’s counsel an opportunity to clarify his 

objections before cross-examination, and counsel again stated his belief that 
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the text messages and the conversation between Rakeem and his girlfriend’s 

uncle was inadmissible. See id., at 66-69. The court denied this objection, 

and Appellant specifically does not raise this issue on appeal. See Appellant’s 

Brief, at 42. Appellant did not raise a specific and timely objection to the 

introduction of the testimony regarding what Raquane Hall said to Rakeem 

about the person who shot him. As Appellant failed to specifically object to 

this testimony, the issue is not preserved for appellate review. 

Appellant’s final issue challenges the trial court’s alleged limitations on 

his cross-examination of Commonwealth witnesses, and the admission of 

Kaleem Shelton’s written statement to police. 

The trial court has broad discretion in determining the scope and limits 

of cross-examination, and the court’s decision will not be reversed unless it 

clearly abused that discretion. See Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 

335 (Pa. 2011). “Although the right of cross-examination is a fundamental 

right, it is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. Rosser, 135 A.3d 1077, 1088 

(Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). The right of confrontation does not 

permit fishing expeditions. See id. “On cross-examination, counsel may 

question the witness concerning subjects raised during direct examination, 

may refute inferences raised during direct testimony, and may attempt to 

discredit a witness through questions about acts or omissions inconsistent with 

his testimony.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 877 A.2d 433, 449 (Pa. 2005) 

(citation omitted). 
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“[T]he admission of a prior inconsistent statement of a non-party 

witness shall be used as substantive evidence only when: (1) the statement 

was given under oath at a formal legal proceeding; or (2) the statement is 

reduced to a writing signed and adopted by the declarant; or (3) the statement 

is recorded verbatim contemporaneously with the making of the statement.” 

Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 445 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted) 

(holding witness’ adoption of statement at trial unnecessary to prove that 

witness previously signed and adopted statement when made).

During cross-examination of Rakeem Hall, Appellant’s counsel asked 

him about statements Hall’s brother Raquane made to police. See N.T. Trial, 

10/8/15, at 97. Appellant avers this testimony was properly within the scope 

of cross-examination, as the Commonwealth had previously elicited testimony 

that Raquane told Rakeem Appellant had shot him. However, Rakeem’s 

statement to police, which the Commonwealth partially read into the record 

on direct, concerned what Raquane directly related to Rakeem, not what 

Raquane told the police. Neither the Commonwealth nor Appellant presented 

any evidence that Rakeem was present during, or had direct knowledge of, 

Raquane’s interview with police. Thus, the court properly sustained the 

Commonwealth’s objection to Appellant’s counsel’s question.

Appellant also objects to the court’s limitation of his cross-examination 

of Kaleem Shelton. Appellant contends that this limitation restricted him from 

eliciting information that could have allowed the jury to more fully evaluate 

Shelton’s credibility.
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Appellant’s counsel questioned Shelton at length about Shelton’s 

purported reading comprehension issues, in order to undermine the veracity 

of Shelton’s signed statement, which a police officer transcribed by hand. See

N.T. Trial, 10/9/15, at 60-66. Counsel then asked Detective Wolkowicz, who 

had taken Shelton’s statement, about Shelton’s ability to understand him. 

Notably, counsel did not ask the detective if he believed Shelton understood 

him; instead, counsel asked Detective Wolkowicz how Shelton “would know 

the difference between what you’re reading to him and what you’re saying to 

him[.]” Id., at 102. This question called for the detective to speculate as to 

what Shelton may have understood, which not a fact the detective could 

properly testify to. The trial court did not err in sustaining the 

Commonwealth’s objection. 

To the extent Appellant asserts that Shelton’s statement should have 

been excluded from evidence because of Shelton’s purported lack of ability to 

understand it, this argument is also baseless. Shelton testified he signed the 

document. See id., at 43. On direct examination, Detective Wolkowicz 

testified he read the statement to Shelton line-by-line, and that Shelton 

agreed with each line before signing the statement at the end of the 

document. Id at 78. Appellant’s argument that Shelton did not understand 

what the detective wrote was thus properly submitted as argument for the 

fact-finder to consider, rather than as a reason to preclude Shelton’s prior 

inconsistent statement from evidence altogether.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judge Dubow joins the memorandum.

Justice Fitzgerald concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/22/2017