Filed 2/1/24 P. v. Reynolds CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DARIOUS REYNOLDS,

Defendant and Appellant.

B331433

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. VA139152-02)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Joseph R. Porras, Judge. Affirmed.

Richard B. Lennon, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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2

Pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216

(Delgadillo), we review this appeal of an order denying an 

evidentiary hearing to preserve evidence for a youth offender 

parole hearing pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1203.01, People v. 

Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 and In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 

439. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 2014, appellant Darious Reynolds entered pleas of no 

contest to charges of robbery and rape, violations of sections 211 

and 261, subdivision (a)(2). He also admitted he personally used 

a firearm in the commission of the rape within the meaning of 

section 12022.53, subd. (b). The trial court sentenced Reynolds to 

14 years in state prison. Reynolds was 17 years old at the time of 

the offense.

In 2023, Reynolds filed a post-judgment motion for an 

evidentiary proceeding to preserve evidence to be used at a youth 

offender parole hearing. The trial court denied the motion 

because Reynolds was ineligible for a youth offender parole 

hearing under section 3051. Reynolds timely appealed.

On October 26, 2023, we appointed counsel to represent 

Reynolds on appeal. On November 30, 2023, counsel filed a noissue brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo. Counsel advised us 

he had told Reynolds he may file his own supplemental brief 

within 30 days. Counsel sent Reynolds transcripts of the record 

on appeal as well as a copy of the brief.

On December 1, 2023, this court sent Reynolds notice that 

a brief raising no issues had been filed on his behalf. We advised 

him he had 30 days within which to submit a supplemental brief 

1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

or letter stating any issues he believes we should consider. We 

also advised him that if he did not file a supplemental brief, the

appeal may be dismissed as abandoned.

On December 29, 2023, Reynolds filed a supplemental brief, 

in which he contends: 1) trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance in failing to inform him about his eligibility for a youth 

offender parole hearing; 2) he wants to withdraw his no contest 

plea because he was ill informed about his rights; 3) he suffered

from mental duress, incompetency and derangement at the time 

of his sentencing; 4) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 

in failing to present his mental duress to the sentencing judge as 

mitigation of punishment; 5) he was never identified in a lineup 

or in the surveillance video from the business at the time of the 

incident; and 6) there was no evidence against him except his 

own statement which he gave without the benefit of a Miranda2

warning.

DISCUSSION

Reynolds raises what he perceives to be weaknesses in the 

evidence at trial and errors made by his trial counsel. An appeal 

from a post-judgment motion for a youth offender parole hearing 

is not a vehicle to raise unrelated claims of error allegedly 

committed by the trial court or trial counsel or to attack the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support a plea. We decline to 

address these issues.

We note Reynolds is not entitled to a youth offender parole 

hearing under section 3051. Section 3051 entitles certain 

prisoners who committed “controlling offenses” under the age of 

26 to youth offender parole hearings and to a “meaningful 

2 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
4

opportunity for release.” (§ 3051, subds. (a)(1) & (e).) The statute 

provides for a youth offender parole hearing after a fixed period 

of years. (In re Jenson (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 266, 273, 277.) 

A youth offender is entitled to such a parole hearing during the 

15th year of incarceration on a determinate sentence; during the 

20th year of incarceration on a life term of less than 25 years to 

life; and during the 25th year of incarceration on a term of 

25 years to life, or life without the possibility of parole if under 

the age of 18 when the crime was committed. (§ 3051, subd.

(b)(1)–(4).) Here appellant was sentenced to a 14-year term. He 

will be released before the mandated youth offender parole 

hearing timeframes are activated.

We are not required to independently review the record and 

we decline to do so. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 226.)

DISPOSITION

The order denying the motion for a youth offender parole 

hearing is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

GRIMES, J. WILEY, J.