This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn . Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 4 ). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A14
- 2021 Kristopher Lee Roybal, petitioner,

Appellant,

vs. Tom Roy, Commissioner of Corrections,

Respondent. Filed March 2, 2015 Affirmed ; motion denied Ross , Judge Rice County District Court File No. 66

- CV

- 14

- 1880 Kristopher Lee Roybal , Faribault, Minnesota (pro se appellant) Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Kelly S. Kemp, Assistant Attorney General , St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Kirk , Presiding Judge; Ross , Judge; and Reilly , Judge

.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N ROSS , Judge Kristopher Roybal refuse s to complete a chemical

- dependency treatment program while he is in prison for his fourth impaired

- driving conviction . The department of corrections determined that Roybal’s refusal is a disciplin able violation and extended his scheduled supervised

- release date by 45 days. Roybal seeks to restore his original release2

date and appeals the district court’s denial of his pe titions for a writ of habeas corpus.
Because the state afforded Roybal the process he is due and because his discipline does not violate his claimed Fifth Amendment rights, we affirm. FACTS The district court convicted Kristopher Roybal in 2012 of his fou rth impaired

driving offense and sentenced him to 50 month s in prison. Roybal’s chemical

dependency assessment indicated that he needs alcohol

- dependency treatment . He began

a treatment program but failed because he drank alcohol while on supervised release

. Roybal then refused to enter another program despite the assessment and a directive to comply with assessment recommendations

. T he department of corrections cited hi m administratively for refus ing t o undergo mandated chemical

- dependency
treatment . A hearing officer found that Roybal ’s refusal constituted a disciplin able violation, and she extended his incarceration by 45 days. The warden at Roybal’s prison
affirmed th at decision. Roybal filed petitions with the district co urt seeking a writ of ha beas corpus. The district court denied the petitions, and Roybal appeals. D E C I S I O N Roybal appeals the district court’s decision den ying his habeas petitions , argu ing that imposing 45 days of extended incarceration violates his constitutional rights . Roybal bears the burden of proving that his detention is illegal. See Breeding v. Swenson , 240 Minn. 93, 97, 60 N.W.2d 4, 7 (1953). We rely on the district court’s fact findings if they3

are supported by the evidence, and we review legal questions de novo. Aziz v. Fabian , 791 N.W.2d 567, 569 (Minn. App. 2010). The commissioner rightly acknowledges that the departm ent of corrections must afford due process before extending Roybal ’s supervi sed release date

. See Carrillo v. Fabian , 701 N.W.2d 763, 773 (Minn. 2005) . Roybal argues that he did not receive due process because the evidence does not show that he violated any prison rule

. The hearing officer found that he violated rule 511. An inmat e violates this rule by refusing chemical

dependency treatment after being directed to participate by a program review team. Minn. Dep’t of Corr., Offender Discipline Rules (2013). T he record demonstrates that a program review team direct ed Roybal to follow the recommendations of a chemical

- dependency
assessment , his 2012 assessment indicated his “hi gh need ” for treatment , and he refused
to return to treatment after failing to complete it

. S ufficient evidence therefore supports the finding that Roy bal r efus ed treatment directed by his program review team. Roybal makes other unconvincing argu ments

. He argues that the 2012 assessment

no longer provide d an “active” recommendation because a department policy govern ing community

- based treatment programs indicates that assessment s should be update d every six month s . See Minn. Dep’t of Corr., Division Directive 203.0152 (201 3 ) ; see also Minn. R. 9530.6615 , subp. 1(E) ( 2013 )

. The policy does not indicate that it applies to a secured

- facility program , like the one offered to and refused by Roybal, so the argument fails. We also reject Roybal ’s argument that prison staff improperly failed to share current information about his diagnosis ; Roybal offers no legal or logical support suggesting how the alleged fai lure w ould in validate his 2012 assessment

. He also4

unpersuasively contends that prison therapist Jason Starkson violated a law requiring an adequate basis for assessments , citing Minnesota Stat utes section 148F.18, subd ivision 1 (2014) . B ut there is no evidence that Starkson played a ny role in the 2012 assess ment

. Roybal argues that he was denied due process because he was not permitted to call two witnesses at his hearing or read his prepared collection of legal authorities. Framing an inma te’s due process challenge requires us to balance his interest s against the prison’s

n eeds , taking into consideration the risk of error. Wolff v. McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539, 566

– 67, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2979

– 80 (1974)

. An inmate has no general right to confront wi tnesses in a prison disciplinary case , and we will not reverse based on that claimed right as long as procedure s provide adequate bases for the decision. Id. at 567

– 68, 94 S. Ct. at 2 980. Roybal wanted to ask Starkson about the validity of the 2012 assessm ent. Prison officials have broad discretion to exclude irrelevant or unnecessary testimony. Id. at 566, 94 S. Ct. at 2980. The hearing officer rejected Roy bal’s request, determin ing that Starkson’s testimony was irrelevant. Roybal makes no convincing chall enge to this determination. He made no record of what he intended to ask the other witness, and so we cannot consider the argument any further.
We also have no ground to reverse on Roybal’s complaint that the hearing officer refused to allow him to complete his recital of a list of legal authorities. After listening to Roybal begin, t he hearing officer found that Roybal was off track and that the referenced authorit ies were irrelevant. Roybal give s us no reason to reach a different conclusion

. Royba l also asserts that he should have been allowed to ask witnesses whether he would have been required to make incriminating statements about his conviction during5

the treatment program

. But he did not suggest this line of inquiry until months after the hear ing. T he contention therefore fails . He similarly argues that extend ing his prison term for his refus ing to enter the treatment program violated his privilege against self

incrimination because , he alleges, the program would have required him to discuss hi s 2012 conviction, which was still on appeal when he r efus ed treatment

. His legal premise has some merit. See U.S. Const. amend. V; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7; Johnson v. Fabian , 735 N.W.2d 295, 309

– 10 (Minn. 2007). But Roybal identified no evidence that the
treatment program he declined would have require d any offending self

- incriminat ing
statements. Roybal has moved us to expedite our decision because he will soon reach his new supervised

- release date. We may expedite a decision on a showing of good cause. Minn. App. Spec. R. Pract. 1. Roybal shows no good cause. He prolong ed the proceedings b y making redundant habeas petitions

— three in total with his last one being filed more than two months after his first. At the time of our decision, the app eal is not moot. We deny the motion to expedite our decision. Affirmed.