SHARON CALMON-HESS,

Individually and as Heir to

the Estate of Christopher L.

Calmon, 

Plaintiff,

v.

ROBIN HARMER and THE

PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY

OF AMERICA, 

Defendants.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

HONORABLE JOSEPH E. IRENAS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-03899

(JEI/KMW)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

DESIMONE LAW OFFICES

JOHN G. DESIMONE, LLC

John G. DeSimone

22 Euclid Street P.O. Box 237

Woodbury, NJ 08096

Counsel for Plaintiff

HOFFMAN DIMUZIO

Dante B. Parenti, Esq.

John P. Ciocco, Esq.

1739-1753 Delsea Drive

Franklinville, NJ 08322

Counsel for Defendant Robin Harmer

IRENAS, Senior District Judge:

This action arises from a dispute over the distribution of

proceeds from a life insurance policy under the Servicemembers’

Group Life Insurance Act (SGLIA), 38 U.S.C. §§ 1965-80A, held by

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decedent, Christopher Calmon. Plaintiff Sharon Calmon-Hess, the 1

decedent’s mother, and Defendant Robin Harmer, the decedent’s exwife, both claim to be the rightful beneficiary of the life

insurance policy. Both parties have moved for summary judgment. 

For the reasons stated herein Defendant Harmer’s motion will be

granted; Plaintiff Calmon-Hess’s cross-motion will be denied.

I.

Christopher Calmon joined the United States Marines Corps on

February 11, 2008. (Ex. A to Def.’s Br. 14:16-19 (“Calmon-Hess

Dep.”)). Prior to that, Calmon was in high school in New Jersey. 

For a large part of his life, Calmon suffered from bipolar

disorder. Between the ages of four to twelve, he was

hospitalized ten times for psychiatric treatment. (Id. 8:11-16). 

He was on various medications for treatment of his mental illness

until the age of fourteen. (Id. 10:1-6, 13:15-16). After he

stopped taking medication, he continued to receive treatment once

every three months until he enlisted with the Marines. (Id.

13:17-14:2). Calmon did not start therapy again until October

2009. (Id. 16:5-16; Ex. D to Def.’s Br. 80:11-12 (“Harmer

Dep.”)).

 Because federal law governs this dispute, this Court has 1

subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Rice v.

Office of Servicemembers’ Grp. Life Ins., 260 F.3d 1240, 1245-46

(10th Cir. 2001).

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When he joined the Marines, Calmon enrolled in a life

insurance policy under the SGLIA and designated his mother,

Plaintiff Calmon-Hess, as his principal beneficiary. (Ex. B to

Def.’s Br.). At that time, Calmon told her that he wanted her to

have the proceeds if anything happened to him. (Calmon-Hess Dep.

26:21-23). She remained the principal beneficiary until July

2009.

After completing basic training, Calmon was stationed at

Camp LeJeune, North Carolina. (Calmon-Hess Dep. 17:11-15; Harmer

Dep. 17:14-16). While on leave in May 2009, Calmon came to New

Jersey to visit family and began dating Defendant Harmer. 

(Harmer Dep. 13:21-22, 16:15-20). The day after their first

date, Calmon asked Harmer to go back to Calmon-Hess’s house to

help him balance his checkbook. (Id. 24:8-20). After

approximately one month of dating, Calmon proposed to Harmer,

(id. 19:3-6), and she moved to North Carolina shortly thereafter. 

(Id. 31:5-9). They were married there on July 21, 2009. (Ex. E

to Def.’s Br.). At the time, Calmon did not tell his mother that

he had married Harmer. When Calmon-Hess found out, she

threatened to disown him. (Calmon-Hess Dep. 38:24-39:17).

Three days after Calmon married Harmer, Calmon executed a

new Servicemembers’ Group Insurance Election and Certificate in

which he named Harmer as the principal beneficiary and his

natural father and Calmon-Hess as contingent beneficiaries. (Ex.

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F to Def.’s Br.). That same day, he completed a dependency

application, listing Harmer as his sole beneficiary. (Ex. G to

Def.’s Br.).

While Calmon and Harmer lived together, Calmon was the sole

wage earner. However, Harmer was instrumental in managing their

finances and set a budget for them. (Harmer Dep. 59:22-60:4). 

In early October 2009, Calmon took out a loan to buy a car for

Harmer to use. (Id. 57:24-58:4). While Harmer was there, Calmon

spent less time with his friends, Ryan Dotson and Brandi

Castleberry. (Ex. K to Def.’s Br. 26:23-27:6 (“Castleberry

Dep.”)). Castleberry and Dotson observed that Harmer would

become upset when Calmon discussed certain subjects with

Castleberry or Dotson, and, at least one time, they saw Harmer

smack Calmon. (Id. 18:12-18, 23:20-25; Ex. I to Def.’s Br.

19:18-20 (“Dotson Dep.”)). Castleberry and Dotson also commented

that Calmon seemed stressed and depressed on occasion. 

(Castleberry Dep. 36:20-37:8; Dotson Dep. 24:7-8). Calmon

continued to perform the duties that the Marines assigned to him

during this time. (Castleberry Dep. 56:12-14; Calmon-Hess Dep.

30:24-31:4).

Harmer left North Carolina for New Jersey in mid-October

2009 when Harmer and Calmon were evicted from their apartment. 

(Harmer Dep. 14-17). She returned to North Carolina on October

31, 2009, and stayed for a few days before returning to New

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Jersey permanently. (Harmer 62:8-20). While Harmer was in North

Carolina in October, Calmon attempted suicide. (Calmon-Hess Dep.

29:13-16; Harmer Dep. 64:10-20; Castleberry Dep. 40:19-41:1). 

Calmon was hospitalized for one or two weeks following that

incident. (Calmon-Hess Dep. 29:1-6; Castleberry Dep. 41:15-16). 

Within a few days of his suicide attempt, Calmon executed

another change of beneficiary form, this time naming Harmer as

the principal beneficiary with no contingent beneficiaries. (Ex.

H to Def.’s Br.). He did not make any further changes to his

life insurance beneficiary. Although Dotson told Calmon to

remove Harmer as his beneficiary in December 2009 (Dotson Dep.

16:2-14), Calmon took no action to change his policy.

Calmon and Harmer continued to talk after Harmer left North

Carolina, although they saw each other only once more in January,

2010. (Id. 67:11-21). During the course of these conversations,

Calmon threatened to take away Harmer’s insurance. (Id. 46:1-

48:48:2). He also asked Harmer to come back to North Carolina. 

Later, when he found out that Harmer was pregnant, Calmon

threatened to seek custody of Harmer’s child, even though he was

not the father, if she did not come back to him. (Id. 72:23-

73:22). After Calmon said that he would seek custody of the

child, Harmer filed for divorce. (Id. 72:19-73:22). The divorce

was finalized in March 2011. Calmon committed suicide on April

3, 2011. (Ex. L to Def.’s Br.).

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In June 2011, Calmon-Hess filed suit against Harmer and the

Prudential Insurance Company of America, the insurer, in the

Superior Court of New Jersey, Gloucester County asserting two

counts: (1) Calmon’s designation of Harmer was invalid because

Calmon was of unsound mind and lacked the capacity to effect a

valid designation, and (2) Calmon and Harmer’s divorce revoked

the designation under New Jersey law, making Calmon-Hess the

beneficiary. Following Harmer’s removal of the claim to this

Court, Prudential Insurance deposited life insurance proceeds of

$400,000 with the Court and was dismissed as a defendant. (Dkt.

No. 8).

Harmer has moved for summary judgment on both counts. She

first argues that there is no evidence that Calmon was lacked the

mental capacity to change his insurance policy beneficiary

designation. On the second claim, Harmer argues that the SGLIA

preempts New Jersey law. Calmon-Hess has filed a cross-motion

for summary judgment. She counters that Harmer exerted an undue

influence over Calmon and that Calmon-Hess should be granted

summary judgment based on Calmon’s intent to change his

beneficiary. 

II.

“[S]ummary judgment is proper ‘if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

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together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court

must construe the facts and inferences in a light most favorable

to the non-moving party. Pollock v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Long Lines,

794 F.2d 860, 864 (3d Cir. 1986). The role of the Court is not

“to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but

to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

The summary judgment standard is not affected when the

parties file cross-motions for summary judgment. See Appelmans

v. City of Phila., 826 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1987). Such

motions “‘are no more than a claim by each side that it alone is

entitled to summary judgment, and the making of such inherently

contradictory claims does not constitute an agreement that if one

is rejected the other is necessarily justified or that the losing

party waives judicial consideration and determination whether

genuine issues of material fact exist.’” Transportes Ferreos de

Venez. II CA v. NKK Corp., 239 F.3d 555, 560 (3d Cir. 2001)

(quoting Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc., 402 F.2d 241, 245 (3d

Cir. 1968)). If after review of cross-motions for summary

judgment the record reveals no genuine issues of material fact,

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then judgment will be entered in favor of the deserving party in

light of the law and undisputed facts. Iberia Foods Corp. v.

Romeo, 150 F.3d 298, 302 (3d Cir. 1998).

III.

A.

The SGLIA is one of a line of statutes, including the

National Service Life Insurance Act (NSLIA) of 1958, 38 U.S.C. §§

1901-29, that Congress has enacted to provide life insurance to

members of the armed forces serving on active duty. See Ridgway

v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 50 (1981). Because the NSLIA was

allowed to lapse after the Korean War, active duty service

members in 1965 could not obtain coverage under it. Id. at 50-

51. To correct this problem, Congress enacted the SGLIA, which

in large part resembles the NSLIA. Id. at 51.

The SGLIA provides specific guidance on how the proceeds

from a policy should be paid. 38 U.S.C. § 1970(a) provides that

the proceeds are paid “[f]irst . . . to the beneficiary or

beneficiaries as the member . . . may have designated by a

writing received prior to death.” If there is no designated

beneficiary, the proceeds are paid to the widow or widower, then

to the child or children of the service member and to descendants

of deceased children. If none of these are available, then the

proceeds are paid to parents and then to the representative of

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the insured’s estate. Id. “A change of beneficiary may be made

at any time and without the knowledge or consent of the previous

beneficiary.” 38 C.F.R. § 9.4(b) (2012).

In this case, there is no dispute that Calmon’s designated

beneficiary at the time of his death was his ex-wife, Harmer. 

Rather, the issues presented are whether Calmon lacked the mental

capacity to change his designated beneficiary and whether Harmer

exercised undue influence over Calmon’s decision to do so.

The SGLIA is silent on the issue of mental capacity and

undue influence. “[W]hen a question relating to the

interpretation and administration of an insurance policy issued

under the authority of the servicemen’s insurance statute arises

that is not answered by the statute itself . . . , the answer is

to be supplied by federal common law.” Prudential Ins. Co. of

Am. v. Athmer, 178 F.3d 473, 475 (7th Cir. 1999) (citations

omitted). In particular, federal law governs the questions of

mental capacity and undue influence. Rice v. Office of

Servicemembers’ Grp. Life Ins., 260 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir.

2001); see also Prudential Ins. Co. Of Am. V. Mehlbrech, 878 F.

Supp. 1382, 1386 (D.Or. 1999) (applying federal law to determine

whether a decedent lacked the mental capacity to effect a valid

change of his SGLIA policy beneficiary); cf. Athmer, 178 F.3d at

475 (noting that “the case for using federal law to answer the

question of who is to receive the proceeds of the [SGLIA]

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insurance policy is compelling”). Where “there is no established

federal common law on a given issue, the Court may consult state

law, including the law of the forum state, as a guide to

fashioning a rule that is consistent with the policies underlying

the federal statute in question.” Koenig v. Automatic Data

Processing, 156 F. App’x 461, 468 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Heasley

v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 1257 n.9 (3d Cir. 1993)).

1. Lack of Mental Capacity

The Third Circuit has not articulated a federal law standard

for determining mental capacity in the insurance context, nor

does it appear that there is any widely adopted standard among

the federal courts. At least two district courts have held that

under federal law, a person changing his beneficiary must have

clearness of mind and memory sufficient to know the nature

of the property for which he is about to name a beneficiary,

the nature of the act he is about to perform, the names and

identities of those who are the natural objects of his

bounty; his relationship towards them, and the consequences

of his act, uninfluenced by any material delusions.

Taylor v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 143, 148 (W.D. Ark. 1953);

see also Mehlbrech, 878 F. Supp. at 1386 (adopting the Taylor

test). However, given the sparsity of federal law in this area,

it is helpful to examine New Jersey’s standard for mental

capacity. 

In New Jersey, “[t]he test of capacity to make an agreement

. . . is, that a man shall have the ability to understand the

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nature and effect of the act in which he is engaged, and the

business he is transacting.” Wolkoff v. Villane, 672 A.2d 242,

245 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (second alteration in

original) (quoting Matthiessen & Weichers Refining Co. v.

McMahon’s Adm’r, 38 N.J.L. 536, 546 (N.J. 1876)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). A decedent’s capacity to designate a

beneficiary is presumed. Rice, 260 F.3d at 1247-48.

In this case, Calmon first changed his beneficiary

designation on July 24, 2009. At that time, he made Harmer the

principal beneficiary and designated his mother, Calmon-Hess, and

his natural father as contingent beneficiaries, with each

receiving fifty percent of the proceeds. (Ex. F to Def.’s Br). 

Calmon again changed his designated beneficiaries on October 26,

2009, making Harmer the sole beneficiary of the life insurance

policy. (Ex. H to Def.’s Br). 

While there is evidence that Calmon was suffering from a

mental illness from February to December 2009, it is not

sufficient to overcome the presumption of mental capacity. 

Calmon had a history of mental illness, including bipoloar

disorder. (Calmon-Hess Dep. 8:6–23, 15:3-8). Calmon-Hess noted

that Calmon sounded groggy, tired, and incoherent over the phone

on several occasions between February and October 2009 and that

on some occasions Calmon did not remember those phone calls. 

(Calmon-Hess Dep. 27:22-28:14). Castleberry also stated that

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Calmon seemed depressed in July and that she thought “his

emotions clouded his judgment.” (Castleberry Dep. 36:20-37:8). 

These statements alone do not demonstrate that Calmon did not

understand that he was making a change to his life insurance

beneficiary.

Indeed, there is ample evidence that shows that Calmon had

full knowledge of the nature of his acts. According to Dotson,

Calmon “seemed coherent,” although “he was under a lot of

stress.” (Dotson Dep. 24:7-8). Calmon was able to fulfill the

duties that the Marines assigned to him during this time period. 

(Castleberry Dep. 56:12-14; Calmon-Hess Dep. 30:24-31:4). Calmon

also told Dotson that he made Harmer his principal beneficiary

because “it was just one of the things that you do when you got

married,” (Dotson Dep. 17:23-24), and told Harmer that he changed

the designation “because [she] was his wife.” (Harmer Dep.

45:1). Further, Calmon named Harmer as his beneficiary three

days after they were married. On the same day, he filed a

dependency application listing Harmer as his sole dependent. 

(Exs. E-G to Def.’s Br). These facts demonstrate that Calmon was

aware that he was changing his insurance beneficiary from his

mother, Calmon-Hess, to his wife, Harmer. 

Calmon’s mental health appears to have been more precarious

when he made his second beneficiary change. Although the

specific date is unclear, it is undisputed that Calmon was

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hospitalized after attempting suicide in mid-October. On October

26, 2009, he once again changed his life insurance designation,

this time with Harmer as the sole beneficiary. (Ex. H to Def.’s

Br). But apart from the proximity to Calmon’s suicide attempt,

no evidence suggests that Calmon did not understand the nature of

his actions. Further, even if there were sufficient evidence to

invalidate the October 26 beneficiary designation, that document

is not dispositive.

Because Calmon had the requisite mental capacity when he

executed the July 24, 2009 change of beneficiary, the proceeds

would still go to Harmer. The SGLIA is clear that proceeds from

SGLIA policies will be paid “[f]irst . . . to the beneficiary or

beneficiaries as the member . . . may have designated.” 38

U.S.C. § 1970(a). The insurance election form states that

contingent beneficiaries receive the policy proceeds only “[i]f

all principal beneficiaries predecease” the insured. (Ex. G to

Def.’s Br). As Harmer is listed as the principal beneficiary on

the July 24, 2009 form and is still alive, she should receive the

proceeds under the policy’s terms.

2. Undue Influence

As with mental capacity, there is no uniform federal

standard for evaluating undue influence in the insurance

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context. Thus, New Jersey law again supplies the definition. 2

Under New Jersey law, undue influence exists where there has been

“‘mental, moral or physical’ exertion which has destroyed the

[individual’s] ‘free agency’” such that he is prevented “from

following the dictates of his own mind and will and accept[s]

instead the domination and influence of another.” In re Niles,

823 A.2d 1, 10 (N.J. 2003) (quoting Haynes v. First Nat’l State

Bank of N.J., 432 A.2d 890, 897 (N.J. 1981)). 

New Jersey places the burden of proving undue influence on

 The Tenth Circuit has adopted the following standard, 2

taken from a Sixth Circuit ERISA decision:

[U]ndue influence is generally defined as influence that is

sufficient to overpower volition, destroy free agency, and

impel the grantor to act against the grantor’s inclination

and free will. A showing of mere motive or opportunity to

exert excessive control over another is not enough to make

out a claim of undue influence; rather, the influence must

actually be exerted, either prior to or at the time of the

execution of the relevant document. Courts have looked at a

number of factors to determine whether undue influence has

been exerted in a given case, including the physical and

mental condition of the benefactor; whether the benefactor

was given any disinterested advice with respect to the

disputed transaction; the “unnaturalness” of the gift; the

beneficiary’s role in procuring the benefit and the

beneficiary’s possession of the document conferring the

benefit; coercive or threatening acts on the part of the

beneficiary, including efforts to restrict contact between

the benefactor and his relatives; control of the

benefactor’s financial affairs by the beneficiary; and the

nature and length of the relationship between the

beneficiary and the benefactor.

Rice, 260 F.3d at 1250 (quoting Tinsley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 227

F.3d 700, 704 (6th Cir. 2000)). This standard conforms with New

Jersey’s definition.

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the individual contesting the designation. But the burden shifts

if that individual raises a presumption of undue influence by

showing that (1) there was a confidential relationship between

the insured and the beneficiary, and (2) there were suspicious

circumstances that require explanation. Haynes, 432 A.2d at 897. 

A confidential relationship may be found where “confidence

is naturally inspired, or, in fact, reasonably exists.” Pascale

v. Pascale, 549 A.2d 782, 789 (N.J. 1988). Key factors in this

inquiry are whether the parties dealt with each other as equals,

id., and whether the decedent “was in ‘a state of dependency and

reliance,’ such as receiving assistance with important life and

financial decisions.” Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Giacobbe,

2009 WL 3644121, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2009) (quoting In re

Weeks’ Estate, 103 A.2d 43, 45 (N.J. Super. 1954)). 

Where there is a confidential relationship, only “slight”

suspicious circumstances are necessary to shift the burden of

proof. Haynes, 432 A.2d at 897. But when the confidential

relationship in question is between a husband and wife and the

challenged policy designates the spouse as beneficiary, no

presumption of undue influence will arise even where slight

suspicious circumstances exist. Gellert v. Livingston, 73 A.2d

916, 920 (N.J. 1950).

In this case, a reasonable jury could find that there was a

confidential relationship between Calmon and Harmer. First,

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Calmon and Harmer were married, which suggests a confidential

relationship. See, e.g., Gellert, 73 A.2d at 70; In re Raynolds’

Estate, 27 A.2d 226, 231 (N.J. Super. 1942). Second, Harmer

appears to have had some control over Calmon’s finances, even

though Calmon was the sole wage earner. Before they were

married, Calmon asked Harmer to help him balance his checkbook

and manage his bank accounts. (Harmer Dep. 24:15-20, 25:9-10,

26:12-16). Castleberry and Dotson both testified that Harmer

managed Harmer and Calmon’s finances and that Calmon had to check

with Harmer before spending money on lunch or at stores. 

(Castleberry Dep. 27:25-29:25; Dotson Dep. 12:18-13:2, 15:10-16,

19:4-7, 21:17-24, 27:12-15). Harmer herself testified that she

set a budget for Calmon, although the extent to which Calmon

actually followed Harmer’s financial advice is unclear. (Harmer

Dep. 59:22-60:4, 60:18-20). 

Third, Castleberry and Dotson both testified that Calmon

deferred to Harmer’s wishes, stating that Calmon would not

socialize as much because Harmer did not want to spend time with

other people and that Harmer would reprimand Calmon for

discussing certain subjects with Castleberry and Dotson. 

(Castleberry Dep. 18:12-18, 23:20-25; Dotson Dep. 12:5-10). 

Castleberry and Dotson also stated that Harmer smacked Calmon for

speaking out of turn. (Castleberry Dep. 48:1-5; Dotson Dep.

19:18-22). Based on these statements, a reasonable jury could

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find that Calmon and Harmer were in a confidential relationship.

Once a confidential relationship has been established, the

person challenging the designation must show that there were

suspicious circumstances. Such circumstances are absent here. 

Calmon-Hess asserts that there were suspicious circumstances

based on the following: Calmon and Harmer married; their

marriage occurred after only knowing each other for a few months;

Harmer was in charge of Calmon’s finances; and Calmon changed his

policy beneficiary from Calmon-Hess to Harmer. (Pl.’s Br. 11-

12). These assertions are not sufficient to create suspicious

circumstances, nor do they address the question of suspicious

circumstances surrounding the actual change of beneficiary. 

Even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to

Calmon-Hess, there is no indication that Harmer pressured Calmon

into naming her as the designated beneficiary. Harmer stated

that Calmon initiated the change of beneficiary of his own

accord. (Harmer Dep. 37:11-38:15, 43:6-8). Calmon also told

Dotson that he had made Harmer the beneficiary because it was the

natural thing to do after getting married. (Dotson Dep. 17:21-

24). Although Calmon-Hess testified that Calmon wanted her to

receive the life insurance proceeds, that conversation took place

in 2008 when Calmon joined the Marines and first had to designate

a beneficiary. (Calmon-Hess Dep. 26:21-23). She had no other

conversations with Calmon about his life insurance policy after

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that. (Id. 27:4-12). These statements are the only evidence of

Calmon’s intent and motivation in choosing his designated

beneficiary. Without more, there is nothing to show any

suspicious circumstances here.

Furthermore, even if these circumstances were suspicious,

the marital relationship between Calmon and Harmer negates any

presumption of undue influence. Gellert, 73 A.2d at 920. Naming

one’s wife as beneficiary of a life insurance policy is far from

being an unnatural action. As noted above, Calmon stated that

“it was just one of the things that you do when you got married.” 

(Dotson Dep. 17:23-24). Thus, no presumption of undue influence

arises. 

Finally, the fact that Calmon had ample time and opportunity

to remove Harmer as his designated beneficiary after she had

returned to New Jersey cuts against Calmon-Hess’s allegation of

undue influence. See 4 Couch on Insurance § 60:73 (“[F]or undue

influence to operate to invalidate a change of beneficiary, it is

necessary that the undue influence continue during the remainder

of the insured’s life on the theory that the acquiescence by the

insured in the change of beneficiary after the improper influence

had been removed constitutes a ratification of the change.”).

Harmer left Calmon in North Carolina in November 2009 and saw him

only once after that in January 2010. (Harmer Dep. 67:11-68:2). 

Despite Harmer leaving, Calmon never removed Harmer as from his

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life insurance policy. After Harmer had returned to New Jersey,

Calmon discussed the insurance policy with Dotson, who

recommended that Calmon remove Harmer as a designated

beneficiary. Calmon stated that “he probably should” but did not

want to at the time because “he wasn’t sure how he felt about the

whole situation.” (Dotson Dep. 16:2-14). Looking at the

available facts, no reasonable jury could find that Harmer

exerted undue influence over Calmon or that any such influence

caused him to designate Harmer as his life insurance beneficiary. 

Thus, Harmer’s motion for summary judgment on this count will be

granted.

B.

Calmon-Hess argues that this Court should declare that she

is the rightful beneficiary based on Calmon’s alleged intent to

change his designated beneficiary. She relies on several cases

that arose under the NSLIA, which held that proof of the

insured’s intent to change his beneficiary along with an action

toward making that change was sufficient to effect the change. 

(Pl.’s Br. 12-14 (citing Stone v. United States, 272 F.2d 746,

747-48 (5th Cir. 1959); United States v Pahmer, 238 F.2d 431, 433

(2d Cir. 1956); Roberts v. United States, 157 F.2d 906, 909 (4th

Cir. 1946))). In response, Harmer argues that the SGLIA and its

related case law preempt those cases and that, even if the cases

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apply, there is no evidence demonstrating any intent or action on

Calmon’s part.

The Court agrees that the SGLIA and its related cases

supersede the cases upon which Calmon-Hess relies. Several

circuits have held that Congress, in enacting the SGLIA, clearly

intended to prevent courts from allowing donative intent to

determine the beneficiary. Rather, Congress expected courts to

construe the beneficiary provision strictly. See, e.g., Coomer

v. United States, 471 F.2d 1, 4-5 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that a

beneficiary change can be effected only through the SGLIA’s

required procedures to avoid an inquiry into donative intent);

Stribling v. United States, 419 F.2d 1350, 1352-55 (8th Cir.

1969) (rejecting the contention that Congress intended the “the

liberal policy favoring beneficiary changes” under the NSLIA to

survive under the SGLIA). Thus, the NSLIA policy does not apply

to beneficiary disputes arising under the SGLIA. See Coomer, 471

F.2d at 6; Stribling, 419 F.2d at 1352-55 . 

Several circuits have also held that the SGLIA’s beneficiary

provisions must be strictly construed because of the difficulty

in determining donative intent. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co.

v. Perez, 51 F.3d 197, 198-99 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that the

insured’s intent was irrelevant to determining the rightful

beneficiary); Lanier v. Traub, 934 F.2d 267, 289 (11th Cir. 1991)

(holding that the SGLIA beneficiary provisions must be strictly

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construed due to “the difficulty involved in reconstructing a

serviceman’s donative intentions after his death”); Prudential

Ins. Co. of Am. v. Parker, 840 F.2d 6, 7 (7th Cir. 1988) (“It is

so difficult to reconstruct a person’s donative intentions after

his death that rules relating to bequests have often been

strictly construed, and apparently section [1970] is in this

tradition.”); Coomer, 471 F.2d at 6 (same); cf. Metropolitan Life

Ins. Co. v. Manning, 568 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir. 1977) (relying on

SGLIA case law to construe nearly identical language in the

Federal Employees’ Group Insurance Act and holding that donative

intent is irrelevant). In light of this clear authority, even if

there were sufficient evidence to show that Calmon intended to

change his beneficiary and that he had taken a positive step to

do so, this Court could not overrule Calmon’s properly executed 3

beneficiary designation. Because Calmon did not execute a valid

change of beneficiary under the statute, his designation of

Harmer stands. Accordingly, Calmon-Hess’s crossmotion for

summary judgment will be denied.

C.

In her second claim, Calmon-Hess seeks a declaratory

judgment that Harmer’s designation is invalid and that Calmon-

 In fact, there is little evidence in the record that 3

Calmon intended to change his beneficiary and no evidence at all

that he took any step toward doing so.

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Hess is the rightful beneficiary. She brings this claim under

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3B:3-14 and the New Jersey Declaratory

Judgments Act, id. §§ 2A:16-50 to -62. Harmer moves for summary

judgment on the ground that the SGLIA preempts New Jersey law.

In her complaint, Calmon-Hess indicates that she seeks

relief under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3B:3-14, which addresses the

revocation of any revocable “dispositions or appointment of

property made by a divorced individual to his former spouse in a

governing instrument.” Id. § 3B:3-14(1)(a). However, she has

provided no briefing on the merits of this claim, nor has she

provided any opposition to Harmer’s contention that the SGLIA

preempts this provision.

The law is clear that the SGLIA preempts conflicting state

law with respect to the beneficiary provision. In Ridgway v.

Ridgway, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether an

order issued in a state divorce proceeding could override a

beneficiary designation under the SGLIA. 454 U.S. at 48-50. The

Court held that it could not, explaining that there was a strong

federal interest in regulating “payments of the proceeds of SGLIA

policies.” Id. at 57. Thus, “the controlling provisions of the

SGLIA prevail over and displace inconsistent state law.” Id. at

60.

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3B:3-14 revokes a beneficiary designation

to a spouse in the case of divorce and, if applied here, would

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revoke Harmer’s designation as beneficiary. This law is in

direct conflict with the SGLIA’s directive to pay the proceeds to

the designated beneficiary, no matter who that beneficiary may

be. The SGLIA delineates a preferred beneficiary order in which

to pay out policy proceeds, starting with the insured’s

designated beneficiary. 38 U.S.C. § 1970(a). Further, the

Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs regulations provide that

“[a]ny designation of beneficiary . . . will remain in effect

until properly changed by the member.” 38 C.F.R. § 9.4(a). As

the Supreme Court noted, the SGLIA gives servicemembers wide

latitude in choosing their beneficiaries, no matter what the

relationship may be. Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 56. Applying the New

Jersey law here would work directly against the SGLIA’s purpose

of allowing servicemembers to designate their insurance proceeds

freely. Because the SGLIA controls where there is a conflict

with state law, the life insurance proceeds should be paid to

Calmon’s designated beneficiary, Harmer. Accordingly, summary

judgment will be granted to Harmer.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment will be granted

to Defendant Robin Harmer with respect to both of Plaintiff

Sharon Calmon-Hess’s claims. Accordingly, Defendant Harmer is

entitled to the $400,000 life insurance policy currently held in

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escrow. An appropriate order accompanies this opinion.

Date: October 15, 2012

 S/ Joseph E. Irenas 

Joseph E. Irenas, S.U.S.D.J.

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