GLD-119 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 12-3766

____________

SHANE CHRISTOPHER BUCZEK,

Appellant

v.

R. WERLINGER; T. MONTGOMERY

__________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 3-12-cv-00112)

District Judge: Kim R. Gibson

__________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

February 7, 2013

Before: FUENTES, FISHER and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 13, 2013)

____________

OPINION

____________

PER CURIAM

Appellant Shane C. Buczek, formerly a federal prisoner, appeals an order of the 

District Court denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. For the following reasons, 

we will dismiss the appeal as moot.
2

Buczek was serving a term of imprisonment of 33 months imposed on 

November 5, 2010, by the United States District Court for the Western District of New 

York when, on July 29, 2011, a Bureau of Prisons staff member received information 

from the U.S. Marshal service that Buczek had attempted to extort or blackmail his 

sentencing judge. Specifically, Buczek sent a Form 1099-A, Acquisition of 

Abandonment of Secured Property, to the Internal Revenue Service, listing the 

sentencing judge as a debtor and Buczek as the lender. In using the Form 1099-A, 

Buczek was attempting to set-off the restitution order imposed as part of his sentence (of 

$8,882.39) under a theory of redemption, but the use of Form 1099-A under these 

circumstances is regarded by the IRS as frivolous. Buczek was adjudicated guilty 

following a disciplinary hearing of violating Offense Code 299, most like 217; that is, 

conduct disruptive to security or orderly running of a BOP facility, most like attempting 

to give money to or receive money from any person for the purpose of introducing 

contraband, or for any other illegal or prohibited act. See 28 C.F.R. § 541.3, Table 1. 

The Disciplinary Hearing Officer imposed a sanction of disallowance of 27 days of Good 

Conduct Time, among other sanctions not relevant here. Buczek appealed through 

administrative channels but the sanction was upheld on the grounds that he had 

improperly attempted to use his criminal case to place a financial liability on the 

sentencing judge and to have the United States Treasury pay his restitution.

On June 6, 2012, Buczek filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, 
3

seeking restoration of his Good Conduct Time.1 The Magistrate Judge filed a Report and 

Recommendation, in which he determined that Buczek’s due process rights had not been 

violated, and he recommended that the habeas corpus petition be denied. After Buczek 

filed meritless objections, the District Court, in an order entered on July 20, 2012, 

adopted the Report and Recommendation and denied the habeas corpus petition. 

Thereafter, the District Court denied Buczek’s motion for reconsideration in an order 

entered on September 7, 2012.

Buczek appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291; United States v. 

Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 264-65 (3d Cir.2000) (certificate of appealability not required to 

appeal from denial of section 2241 petition). Our Clerk granted Buczek leave to appeal 

in forma pauperis and advised him that the appeal was subject to summary dismissal 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or summary affirmance under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and 

I.O.P. 10.6. The parties were invited to submit argument in writing. Buczek has 

submitted a response in support of his appeal, and the federal appellees have moved for 

dismissal of the appeal on the ground that it is now moot.

We will dismiss the appeal as moot. Insofar as Buczek was in BOP custody when 

he filed his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, he satisfied the “in custody” 

jurisdictional requirement, Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). However, in 

 

1 A challenge to the Bureau of Prison’s execution of a sentence is properly brought 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Woodall v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d at 235, 241-43 

(3d Cir. 2005); Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001).
4

their summary action motion/response, the federal appellees have established that Buczek 

was released from custody on December 6, 2012, to serve his term of supervised release. 

Buczek sought in his habeas corpus petition only to have his Good Conduct Time 

restored. This is all the relief he requested. The federal courts may adjudicate “only 

actual, ongoing cases or controversies.” Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir.

2009) (quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). This “case 

or controversy” requirement continues at the appellate stage and requires that a party like 

Buczek have a personal stake in the outcome. See id. That personal stake in the 

restoration of his Good Conduct Time is now absent from his case because of his release

from prison. We are unable to fashion any form of meaningful relief and thus, whether or 

not his due process rights were violated (and we do not suggest that they were), the 

appeal is moot. See Artway v. Att’y Gen. of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235, 1246 (3d Cir. 

1996).

For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal as moot. The appellees’ 

motions for summary action and for a stay of the briefing schedule are denied as moot.