SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

348 

KA 12-01481 

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, VALENTINO, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CURTIS A. WRIGHT, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

(APPEAL NO. 2.) 

 

LEANNE LAPP, PUBLIC DEFENDER, CANANDAIGUA (BRIAN SHIFFRIN OF COUNSEL),

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

R. MICHAEL TANTILLO, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, CANANDAIGUA (JEFFREY L. TAYLOR

OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Ontario County Court (Frederick G.

Reed, A.J.), rendered July 21, 2010. The judgment convicted

defendant, upon a jury verdict, of criminal possession of a controlled

substance in the fourth degree, assault in the second degree (two

counts), resisting arrest and escape in the third degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that said appeal from the judgment insofar

as it imposed sentence is unanimously dismissed and the judgment is

affirmed.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury

verdict of, inter alia, criminal possession of a controlled substance

in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 220.09 [1]) and two counts of

assault in the second degree (§ 120.05 [3]), defendant contends that

County Court erred in denying his challenge for cause to a prospective

juror who, according to defendant, expressed a bias in favor of police

officers. We reject that contention. “A challenge for cause is an

objection to a prospective juror and may be made only on the ground

that . . . [h]e has a state of mind that is likely to preclude him

from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at

trial” (CPL 270.20 [1] [b]). Only statements that “cast serious doubt

on [a prospective juror’s] ability to render an impartial verdict”

trigger a court’s obligation to obtain an unequivocal assurance from

the prospective juror that he or she can render an impartial verdict

(People v Arnold, 96 NY2d 358, 363). Here, the prospective juror was

an emergency medical technician who dealt with police officers when

responding to service calls. During voir dire, the prospective juror

stated that he “usually go[es] with what the officer said” when trying

to sort out the facts at the scene of an accident or injury. In our

view, that statement did not demonstrate a state of mind “likely” to

preclude impartiality (CPL 270.20 [1] [b]), nor did it cast “serious”
-2- 348 

KA 12-01481 

doubt on the prospective juror’s ability to render an impartial

verdict (Arnold, 96 NY2d at 363). 

In any event, in responding to follow-up questions from the

prosecutor, the prospective juror gave an “unequivocal assurance that

[he could] set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on

the evidence” (People v Johnson, 94 NY2d 600, 614; see People v

Chambers, 97 NY2d 417, 419). The prospective juror stated that he

understood that police officers “are human” and thus “can be mistaken”

or “lie,” and that he could “evaluate the testimony [of police

officers] to determine whether they are mistaken or lying” (see People

v Castrechino, 24 AD3d 1267, 1268, lv denied 6 NY3d 810; People v

Chatman, 281 AD2d 964, 965, lv denied 96 NY2d 899). We thus conclude

that the court properly denied defendant’s challenge for cause to the

prospective juror. 

Defendant further contends that the evidence is legally

insufficient to establish that he assaulted the police officers

because the People failed to establish that the police officers

lawfully stopped his motor vehicle, and thus failed to establish that

they were “performing a lawful duty” when they were injured (Penal Law

§ 120.05 [3]). We reject that contention. When viewed in the light

most favorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621),

we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to establish that

defendant was observed by the police officers making at least one

traffic infraction, which justified the stop (see People v Pealer, 89

AD3d 1504, 1506, affd ___ NY3d ___ [Feb. 19, 2013]; People v Robinson,

97 NY2d 341, 349). The People thus established that the police

officers were performing a lawful duty when they were injured. 

We have reviewed defendant’s remaining contentions and conclude

that they are without merit. 

Entered: March 22, 2013 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court