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NOT FOR PUBLICATION [Docket No. 16] 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

CAMDEN VICINAGE

RAYNE CROVETTI, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

WASHINGTON TOWNSHIP, KENNETH 

CONDIT, RAFAEL MUNIZ, STEVEN 

ROLANDO, 

 Defendants. 

 

 Civil Action No. 

 11-cv-1834 RMB/JS 

 OPINION

Appearances: 

Jacqueline M. Vigilante 

The Vigilante Law Firm 

99 N. Main Street 

Mullica Hill, NJ 08062 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

Patrick J. Madden 

Madden & Madden, P.A. 

108 Kings Highway East – Suite 200, PO Box 210 

Haddonfield, New Jersey 08033 

 Attorneys for Defendants 

BUMB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Defendants Washington Township, Kenneth Condit (“Condit”), 

Raphael Muniz (“Muniz”), and Stephen Rolando (“Rolando”) 

(collectively, the “Defendants”) have moved for summary judgment. 

For the reasons that follow, that motion is GRANTED. 
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I. Background1

Since 1998, Plaintiff Rayne Crovetti (the “Plaintiff”), a 

woman, has been employed as a police officer with the Washington 

Township Police Department (the “Department”). (Docket No. 16 

at Ex. 8, Deposition Transcript of Rayne Crovetti (“Crovetti 

Tr.”) at 31:6-11). In 2004, Plaintiff entered the Detective 

Division of the Department. (Id. at 31:21-25). In 2007, 

Plaintiff was promoted to the position of Corporal. (Id. at 

32:1-9). In 2009, Plaintiff requested, and was granted, a 

transfer to a squad in the Patrol Division. (Id. at 36:18-

37:16). 

Typically, squads are led by a lieutenant, with a sergeant 

beneath the lieutenant, a corporal beneath the lieutenant, and 

line officers beneath the corporal. (Compl. ¶ 18). In 

Plaintiff’s case, Plaintiff’s new squad lacked a lieutenant. 

(Id.). The squad was instead led by Sergeant Christopher Pelosi 

(“Pelosi”), with Plaintiff his direct subordinate as a corporal. 

(Id. at ¶ 15). Condit, a Captain, had supervisory 

responsibility for the entire Patrol Division. (Id. at ¶ 17). 

 

1

 All background facts are drawn from the affidavits 

and depositions submitted by the parties, as well as 

their Statements of Material Fact under Local Rule 56.1, with the facts 

construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the nonmoving 

party. See Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. 

den'd, 543 U.S. 956 (2004). 
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On November 22, 2009, Plaintiff responded to a call from 

the Iron Moto restaurant that an intoxicated female had placed 

her child on top of the bar in a car seat, but the child had 

fallen out of the car seat. [Docket No. 24, Plaintiff’s 

Supplemental Statement of Facts ¶ 227]. On the scene, Plaintiff 

told the female at issue that she was a “stellar mother.” (Id.). 

While on the scene, Pelosi chastised Plaintiff for her remark 

and, without prompting, provided the intoxicated individual a 

complaint form. (Id. ¶¶ 228-229). The female at issue 

subsequently filed a complaint with the Department. [Docket No. 

16, Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts ¶ 40]. An internal 

affairs investigation subsequently concluded that Plaintiff had 

violated the Township’s Rules and Regulations and Plaintiff was 

given an oral reprimand by Condit. (Id. ¶¶ 41-42). 

Subsequent to this episode, Plaintiff complains that, 

during her January 2010 annual performance evaluation, Condit 

indicated that it had been a “hard transition” for her and 

criticized her performance. [Docket No. 24, Plaintiff’s 

Supplemental Statement of Facts ¶ 273]. 

Later, in August 2010, the Department experienced problems 

with handheld radio equipment. In response, Pelosi directed the 

officers to use their cell phones when conducting self-initiated 

activity (i.e. activity that is on the officer’s own initiative, 

as opposed to in response to a dispatch). 
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On August 16, 2010, Plaintiff met with Lieutenant Robert 

Borkowski to complain that relying on cell phones during selfinitiated activity presented a serious safety concerns. 

(Crovetti Tr. at 96:23-97:11; Borkowski agreed with 

Plaintiff’s assessment and suggested that Plaintiff hold a 

meeting to discuss this issue. 

On August 19, 2010, Plaintiff met with her squad for their 

morning squad briefing. The meeting began, as customary, at 

6:45 a.m. Following a review of their log book, Plaintiff 

opened the floor to address issues the squad had with Pelosi. 

The issues included: (1) Pelosi’s instruction to officers, when 

radios were not functioning, to use cell phones to contact one 

another while outside their vehicles; (2) Pelosi’s instruction 

that officers receive approval for arrests from a municipal 

court judge on domestic violence call – a purported violation of 

mandatory arrest protocol on domestic violence calls; and (3) 

Pelosi’s general lack of leadership and decision-making skills. 

During the meeting Officer Volpe informed Plaintiff that he had 

a detainee in custody that he would be handing off to Plaintiff. 

The meeting concluded at 7:23 a.m. Following the meeting, 

Plaintiff met with Defendant Condit and reported the detainee 

issue as well as the group’s discussion of issues with Pelosi. 

On August 23, 2010, Muniz, the Chief of the Department, met 

with Condit and watched video of the August 19, 2010 squad 
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briefing. Later that morning, Condit questioned Plaintiff over 

the radio several times whether she had “something.” Plaintiff 

did not “copy” and asked to give Condit a call. On the call, 

Condit clarified that he had observed her speeding and was 

questioning whether she was responding to a call. Plaintiff 

indicated that she did not realize she was speeding and 

apologized if she had. Plaintiff reported that another officer 

laughed over the radio questioning what Plaintiff had done to 

warrant Condit’s radio communication. No discipline was 

initiated against Plaintiff in relation to this incident. 

(Plaintiff’s Supplemental Statement of Facts ¶ 137). On one 

other occasion, Condit had pulled over another officer for 

speeding. (Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts ¶ 132). 

The following day, on August 24, 2010, Plaintiff and Pelosi 

were directed to report to a meeting with Condit. (Plaintiff’s 

Supplemental Statement of Facts ¶¶ 41, 43). At the meeting, 

Condit asked Plaintiff to address the issues she had with Pelosi. 

(Id. ¶ 276). He also suggested that she had transferred to the 

patrol division to be popular and questioned her as to whether 

she had made a driving while intoxicated arrest. (Id. at ¶ 273; 

Crovetti Tr. at 146:10-147:1). Plaintiff and Pelosi subsequently 

had an argument. (Crovetti Tr. at 147:4-6). At the end of the 

meeting, Plaintiff was issued a performance notice. (Defendants’ 

Statement of Material Facts ¶ 156). The performance notice 
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indicates that it is based on the fact that Plaintiff and her 

fellow officers were loafing following the August 19, 2010 

meeting. (Plaintiff’s Supplemental Statement of Facts ¶ 110; 

Docket No. 16 at Ex. 16). It also suggested that Officer Volpe 

was acting as a lookout for the meeting to ensure that it 

concluded upon Condit’s arrival. (Id. ¶ 144; Docket No. 16 at 

Ex. 16). No other officers were disciplined in relation to the 

meeting. (Id. ¶ 49). However, on two other prior occasions, 

Condit had disciplined male supervisors based on the same 

articulated loafing rationale. In one case, a sergeant was 

issued a performance notice on the same grounds for idling 

following the completion of briefing for a 7 a.m. meeting. 

[Docket No. 16 at Ex. 17]. In another, a corporal was issued an 

oral reprimand for general idling by officers during the day 

shift. [Docket No. 16 at Ex. 18]. 

On September 3, 2010, Plaintiff filed a grievance that 

Condit’s conduct violated the Department’s harassment policy. 

(Plaintiff’s Supplemental Statement of Facts ¶ 53; Crovetti Tr. 

at 195:18-21). In two prior complaints of harassment at the 

Department, the alleged harasser was suspended pending the 

investigation. (Plaintiff’s Supplemental Statement of Facts ¶¶ 

72-76). In this case, however, Condit was not suspended. (Id. 

¶ 59). However, on September 9, 2010, Muniz did issue an order 

to Condit prohibiting Condit from contacting Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 
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61). Plaintiff was notified about the order on October 6, 2010 

and received a copy of it on October 29, 2010. (Crovetti Tr. at 

237:16-239:8; Docket No. 24 at Ex. 17 at p. 24). On September 

14, 2010, Plaintiff’s grievance was denied. From September 9, 

2010 until October 6, 2010, Plaintiff used accrued vacation time 

to avoid having to work in the same building as Condit. 

(Plaintiff’s Supplemental State of Fact ¶ 171). 

Rolando, a Sergeant, conducted an investigation into 

Plaintiff’s claims. (Id. ¶ 141). His investigation determined 

that Condit did not violate Department workplace harassment 

policy, but did find that the performance notice did not conform 

to departmental policy. [Docket No. 16 at Ex. 22 at p. 14]. 

Consequently, the performance notice was reissued. (Plaintiff’s 

Supplemental State of Fact ¶ 144). Rolando’s investigation 

report is dated September 21, 2010. (Docket No. 16 at Ex. 22 at 

p. 15). 

On October 6, 2010, Muniz received a letter from 

Plaintiff’s psychologist indicating that Plaintiff was 

“complaining of symptoms of stress and anxiety” from “a 

combination of personal and work-related factors” and supporting 

a request for a leave of absence by Plaintiff, who had by then 

exhausted her vacation and personal hours. (Defendants’ 

Statement of Facts ¶ 231; Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts ¶¶ 204-

217). In response, Muniz placed Plaintiff on administrative 
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leave, pending a positive result on a fitness for duty 

examination. (Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts ¶¶ 217, 210). 

While on leave, Plaintiff’s badge, gun, car, and identification 

were collected from her. (Id. ¶ 217). Plaintiff was 

subsequently evaluated by Dr. Jennifer Kelly, a licensed 

psychologist, who, on November 19, 2010, pronounced Plaintiff 

fit for duty. (Defendants’ Statement of Facts ¶¶ 237, 239). 

Plaintiff returned to work on December 3, 2010 for a 

different squad. (Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts ¶ 317). She 

continued to use paid time off to avoid being present when 

Condit was in the building and did so until Condit retired in 

May 2011. (Id. ¶ 321). 

Plaintiff subsequently filed suit in this Court based on 

federal question jurisdiction. Complaint ¶ 7). Plaintiff’s 

Complaint makes six claims – one federal constitutional claim 

and five claims under New Jersey law: 

(1) that Defendants discriminated against her on the basis 

of gender in violation of New Jersey’s Law Against 

Discrimination (“LAD”); 

(2) that Defendants created a hostile work environment in 

violation of LAD; 

(3) that Defendant Washington Township violated the 

Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”); 

(4) that Defendants violated LAD by retaliating against 

her in response to complaints of gender discrimination 

and safety violations; 
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(5) that Defendants Muniz, Condit, and Rolando violated 

Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by retaliating 

against her and are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. and 

(6) that Defendant Condit intentionally inflicted 

emotional distress on Plaintiff. 

[Docket No. 1]. 

 

II. Standard 

 Summary judgment shall be granted if “the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it will affect the outcome of 

the suit under the governing law . . . .” Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” 

if it could lead a “reasonable jury [to] return a verdict for 

the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248. 

 When deciding the existence of a genuine dispute of 

material fact, a court’s role is not to weigh the evidence: all 

reasonable “inferences, doubts, and issues of credibility should 

be resolved against the moving party.” Meyer v. Riegel Prods. 

Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 307 n.2 (3d Cir. 1983). However, a mere 

“scintilla of evidence,” without more, will not give rise to a 

genuine dispute for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Further, 

a court does not have to adopt the version of facts asserted by 

the nonmoving party if those facts are “utterly discredited by 

the record [so] that no reasonable jury” could believe them. 
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Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 373, 380 (2007). In the face of such 

evidence, summary judgment is still appropriate “where the 

record . . . could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for 

the nonmoving party . . . .” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “Summary judgment 

motions thus require judges to ‘assess how one-sided evidence is, 

or what a ‘fair-minded’ jury could ‘reasonably’ decide.’” 

Williams v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d 

Cir. 1989)(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 265). 

 The movant “always bears the initial responsibility of 

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and 

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 

with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the 

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 

Then, “when a properly supported motion for summary judgment 

[has been] made, the adverse party ‘must set forth specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The 

non-movant’s burden is rigorous: it “must point to concrete 

evidence in the record”; mere allegations, conclusions, 

conjecture, and speculation will not defeat summary judgment. 

Orsatte v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995); 
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Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 228 

(3d Cir. 2009)(“[S]peculation and conjecture may not defeat 

summary judgment.”). 

III. Analysis 

 The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s First Amendment Claim. 

 A. First Amendment Claim 

 For a public employee to succeed on a First Amendment 

retaliation claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) it 

engaged in speech about a matter of public concern; (2) 

plaintiff’s interest in speech outweighs any countervailing 

governmental interest in promoting the efficiency of the public 

service it provides through its employees; and (3) that the 

plaintiff’s speech was a substantial or motivating favor in the 

alleged retaliatory action. Baldassare v. New Jersey, 250 F.3d 

188, 195 (3d Cir. 2001). With respect to the first prong, in 

evaluating whether a matter is of public concern, courts 

consider whether the speech “is important to the process of 

self-governance that communications on this topic, in this form 

and in this context, take place.” Zelinski v. Penn. State 

Police, 108 F. App’x 700, 707 (3d Cir. 2004). A public 

employee’s speech is not protected, however, even if it touches 

on a matter of public concern, if it was made pursuant to the 

employee’s official duties. Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 185 

(3d Cir. 2009). “Factors considered [in this analysis] include 
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whether the speech fell within the individual's job duties, 

whether it related to special knowledge or experience acquired 

on the job, whether it was made inside or outside the work place, 

and whether it concerned the job's subject matter.” Houston v. 

Twp. of Randolph, No. 11-4810, 2013 WL 1192579, at *11 (D.N.J. 

Mar. 21, 2013). With respect to the third prong, a defendant 

can defeat this prong by demonstrating that it would have taken 

the same action, absent the protected activity. Gorum, 561 F.3d 

at 184. 

 Plaintiff claims that she engaged in protected speech 

concerning the cell phone issue and her own discrimination. 

Defendants argue, and this Court agrees, that this speech does 

not qualify as protected speech. With respect to the cell phone 

issue, that speech was made pursuant to Plaintiff’s official job 

duties and not as a public citizen because it was made at the 

police station to fellow officers concerning the safe 

performance of their job duties. Morris v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 

487 F. App’x 37, 39 (3d Cir. 2012)(“We have consistently held 

that complaints up the chain of command about issues related to 

an employee's workplace duties—for example, possible safety 

issues or misconduct by other employees—are within an employee's 

official duties.”); Houston, 2013 WL 1192578, at *13 (finding 

firefighter’s speech concerning safety issues with official 

procedure was speech as employee and not as citizen). 
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With respect to the discrimination claim, because that 

claim related solely to her own claims of discrimination, was 

not made in public, and did not involve either a broader, 

systemic practice of discriminatory treatment or conduct 

implicating an elected official, it did not relate to a matter 

of public concern. Bell v. City of Philadelphia, 275 F. App’x 

157, 159 (3d Cir. 2008)(finding no public concern at issue when 

complaining solely about “own abuse” and not systemic issue); 

Feldman v. Comm. College of Allegheny, 85 F. App’x 821, 825 (3d 

Cir. 2004)(finding discrete complaint of racial and religious 

animus was private matter and not one of public concern); 

Zelinski, 108 F. App’x at 708 (finding complaint of sexual 

harassment was not public concern but was instead private matter 

where it was not raised to the public and did not concern an 

elected public official); Torres v. City of Philadelphia, 907 F. 

Supp. 2d 681, 687 (E.D. Pa. 2012)(finding same when complaint 

was about one incident and distinguishing between incidents 

involving elected officials); Middleton v. Deblasis, 844 F. Supp. 

2d 556, 565 (E.D. Pa. 2011)(“Instead, plaintiff ‘complain[s] 

solely about [her] own ‘abuse’ and mistreatment by superiors,’ 

which is not a matter of public concern.”). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim is DISMISSED. 
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B. Plaintiff’s Remaining State Law Claims 

Having dismissed Plaintiff's lone federal claim, and with 

this Court's subject matter jurisdiction premised on federal 

question jurisdiction, this Court must determine whether it will 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining 

state law claims. Flemming v. Nettleton, No. 10–cv1958, 2012 WL 

5943644, at *4 (D.N.J. November 26, 2012) (citing Kalick v. 

Northwest Airlines Corp., 372 F. App'x 317, 322 (3d Cir. 2010)). 

Absent extraordinary circumstances, district courts should not 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. Id. 

(citing Shaffer v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Albert Gallatin Area Sch. 

Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir.1984)). Because no 

extraordinary circumstances are evident here, this Court 

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's 

state law claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state law claims are 

DISMISSED, without prejudice.2 See Gibson v. Weber, 433 F.3d 642, 

647 (8th Cir. 2006) (where district court had granted summary 

judgment to defendants on inmate’s § 1983 claim that medical 

officials were deliberately indifferent to his diabetic foot 

wound, court did not abuse discretion by declining to exercise 

 

2 Since the statute of limitations on Plaintiff’s state claims is 

“tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days 

after it is dismissed,” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), this Court discerns 

no unfairness in declining to decide the state claims. See 

Munoz v. City of Union City, 481 F. App’x 754, 761 n.8 (3d Cir. 

2012). 
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jurisdiction over the remaining state malpractice claim); King v. 

County of Gloucester, 302 F. App’x 92, 99 (3d Cir. 2008) 

(finding no abuse of discretion where court declined to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after dismissal of 

federal claims). 

IV. Conclusion 

 For all these reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment is GRANTED. 

 s/Renée Marie Bumb 

RENÉE MARIE BUMB 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: July 31, 2013