alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
---

|Exhibit 32.1                               
|-------------------------------------------
|                                           
|CERTIFICATION                              
|PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350         
|AND RULE 13a-14(b) OR RULE 15d-14(b)       
|OF THE U.S. SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

I, Jagjit Jay Sidhu, the Chief Executive Officer and Chief
Financial Officer of Spring Creek Capital Corporation (the "Company"), certify,
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, that to the best of my knowledge:

|(1) | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB/A of the Company for
      the fiscal period ended March 31, 2007 (the "Report") fully complies with
      the requirements of Section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange
      Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and
|--- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
|(2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents,
      in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
      operations of the Company.                                                                                                       

A signed original of this written statement required by Section
906 has been provided to Spring Creek Capital Corporation and will be retained
by Spring Creek Capital Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.

By: /s/ Jagjit Jay SidhuJagjit Jay Sidhu


Date: October 17, 2007

---
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 132 (Monday, July 13, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 33468-33469]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-16481]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Bureau of Indian Affairs


Restoration of Wilton Rancheria

AGENCY: Bureau of Indian Affairs, Interior.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice is published pursuant to a court order and relates 
to restoration of the Wilton Miwok Rancheria, its members, and Dorothy 
Andrews, and the Me-Wuk Indian Community of the Wilton Rancheria. See 
the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this notice for details.

DATES: The restoration is effective as of June 8, 2009.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jane Smith, Office of the Solicitor--
Division of Indian Affairs, 1849 C Street, NW., MS-6456, Washington, DC 
20240. Telephone: (202) 208-6526.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This notice is published pursuant to the 
Order issued June 8, 2009, in Wilton Miwok Rancheria and Dorothy 
Andrews v. Salazar, Civil No. C-07-02681 (JF) (PVT), and Me-Wuk Indian 
Community of the Wilton Rancheria v. Salazar, Civil No. C 07-05706 
(JF), United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California.
    Plaintiffs, Wilton Miwok Rancheria, its members, and Dorothy 
Andrews, and the Me-Wuk Indian Community of the Wilton Rancheria, 
hereinafter the Wilton Rancheria, are relieved from the application of 
section 10(b) of the Act of August 18, 1958, 72 Stat. 619, as amended 
by the Act of August 11, 1964, 78 Stat. 390, and shall be deemed 
entitled to any of the benefits or services provided or performed by 
the United States for Indians because of the status as Indian, if 
otherwise qualified under applicable laws and regulations.
    The Wilton Rancheria is an Indian entity with the same status as it 
possessed prior to distribution of the assets of the Rancheria and 
shall be deemed entitled to any of the benefits or services provided or 
performed by the United States for Indian Tribes, bands, communities or 
groups because of its status as an Indian Tribe.
    The Distribution Plan for the Wilton Rancheria is of no further 
force and effect and shall not be further

[[Page 33469]]

implemented, provided, however, that this provision shall not affect 
any vested rights created under the Distribution Plan.

    Dated: July 1, 2009.
Paul Tsosie,
Acting Assistant Secretary--Indian Affairs.
[FR Doc. E9-16481 Filed 7-10-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-4J-P
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Omar Fabara, Appellant.

[852 NYS2d 781]

Although departures from the presumptive risk level determined by the risk assessment instrument are the exception rather than the rule, a departure is warranted where clear and convincing evidence demonstrates the existence of an aggravating or mitigating factor that in kind or degree is not otherwise taken into account by the risk assessment guidelines *(see People v Thompson,*31 AD3d 409 [2006]; *People v Forney,*28 AD3d 446, 447 [2006]; *People v White,*25 AD3d 677 [2006]). Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court’s determination to depart from the presumptive risk level and designate him a level three sex offender was supported by clear and convincing evidence based, inter alia, on the case summary prepared by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders, the defendant’s statements to the police, and the victims’ statements *(see People v Leibach,*39 AD3d 1093, 1093-1094 [2007]; *People v Allen,*24 AD3d 979, 980 [2005]). Skelos, J.P., Fisher, Covello and Eng, JJ., concur.
#### Price *v.*Robinson.

Atkinson, J. — The issues presented by the bill of exceptions in this case involve only questions of fact; no error of law is alleged to have been committed; and the verdict is supported by the evidence. This court, therefore, will not control the discretion of the trial judge in refusing a new trial.

December 21,1894.

Levy and claim. Before Judge Gamble. Johnson superior court. March term, 1894.

An execution in favor of Robinson, founded upon a judgment dated in September, 1892, was levied on a house and lot in Wrightsville, to which a claim was interposed by a daughter of Linder, the defendant in execution. It appears that he conveyed the property to his wife by deed dated December 3, 1891, and recorded in the same month; that he and his wife conveyed to Mrs. E. H. Price by deed dated April 4, 1892, and recorded in the same month; and that Mrs. Price con*562veyed to the claimant, her daughter-in-law, by deed dated October 16,1892, and recorded in the same month. The issue in the case was, whether the deeds to Mrs. Linder and Mrs. Price were based on valuable considerations and made in good faith, or were made to hinder, delay or defraud Linder’s creditors, of which purpose his wife and Mrs. Price had notice or grounds for reasonable suspicion. The evidence was conflicting. The jury found the property subject to the execution. Claimant moved for a new trial on the grounds, that the verdict was contrary to law, evidence, and the charge of the court; and the motion was overruled.

*561*Judgment affirmed.*

*562A. P. Daley, W. R. Daley and Harris & Rawlings, for plaintiff in error.

V. B. Robinson and Evans & Evans, *contra.*
#### Bearden *v.*The State.

Bleckley, O. J. — Where the house broken and entered was not a dwelling nor within the curtilage, and was neither alleged nor proved to be a place of business, but was in fact a corn-crib or barn in which corn was stored, there was no burglary. The offense proved was larceny from the house only.

October 8, 1895.

Indictment for burglary. Before Judge Roney. Richmond superior court. April term, 1894.

D. L. Pendleton and J. H. Poster, for plaintiff in error.

W. H. Davis, solicitor-general, by R. O. Lovett, *contra.*

*Judgment reversed.*
**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS**

No. 04-1040

IN RE  KAREN MAYS-HOOPER

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus

**ORDERED:**

1.Relator’s emergency motion for emergency relief, filed November 18, 2004, is granted.  The order dated September 21, 2004, in Cause No. 322-299612-00, styled *In The Interest of Joe Edward Hooper, a child*, in the 322nd District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, is stayed pending further order of this Court.

2.The real parties in interest are requested to respond to relator’s petition for writ of mandamus no later than 3:00 p.m., November 29, 2004.

Done at the City of Austin, this 19th day November 19, 2004.

Andrew Weber, Clerk

Supreme Court of Texas

By Nancy J. Vega, Chief Deputy Clerk
EXHIBIT IX SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF THE 2013 DIRECTORS COMPENSATION PROGRAM






Exhibit 10b(ix)


Summary Description of the 2013 Directors Compensation Program


Effective April 24, 2013, members of the Company’s Board of Directors who are not Company employees receive an annual retainer of $85,000, which is intended to cover all regularly scheduled meetings of the Board and its committees.  If additional meetings are held, a per-meeting fee of $1,500 will be paid to each attending director.


The Chairs of Board committees receive additional annual retainers.  For the Chair of the Audit Committee, the retainer is $20,000; for the Chair of the Board Affairs and Nominating Committee, the retainer is $10,000; and for the Chair of the Compensation Committee, the retainer is $15,000.  The retainer for the Lead Director is $20,000.


All independent directors also receive an annual deferred stock unit grant.  The number of shares covered by each grant is equal to $125,000 (based on the 200-day average stock price as of January 31, in the year of the grant, a methodology consistent with the calculation for other executive equity awards), rounded up to the next ten-share increment.  The deferred stock units are settled upon termination of service as a director.  Directors may also defer their annual retainers, committee chair retainers, and meeting fees in a deferred stock unit account.


A director who is an employee of Grainger or any Grainger subsidiary does not receive any retainer fees for Board or Board committee service, Board or Board committee meeting attendance fees, or stock options or stock units under the Director Stock Plan.


Stock ownership guidelines applicable to non-employees directors were established in 1998.  These guidelines provide that within five years after election, a director must own Grainger common stock and common stock equivalents having a value of at least five times the annual retainer fee for serving on the Board.
Exhibit 10.31

AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO

CHANGE OF CONTROL SEVERANCE AGREEMENT

This Amendment No. 1 (this "Amendment") to the Change of Control Severance Agreement (the "Agreement") entered into as of December 14, 2001, between Faraj Aalaei (the "Employee") and Centillium Communications, Inc., a Delaware Corporation (the "Company"), is entered into effective as of November 19, 2002 (the "Effective Date").

WHEREAS, the Company and the Employee wish to amend the Agreement as set forth in this Amendment;

NOW THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration the sufficiency of which hereby is acknowledged, the parties hereby amend the Agreement as follows:

Amendment to Section 3(a)(i)
.  Section 3(a)(i) of the Agreement is hereby amended and restated in its entirety as follows:

"(i)	Severance Payment.  The Employee shall be entitled to receive a lump-sum severance payment (less applicable withholding taxes) equal to (x) 200% of the Employee's Annual Base Salary (as defined herein ) plus (y) 200% of the Employee's Annual Target Bonus (as defined herein)."
Amendment to Section 3(a)(ii)
.  Section 3(a)(ii) of the Agreement is hereby amended by adding the following sentence at the end of Section 3(a)(ii):

Employee shall have a period of five (5) years following a Change of Control to exercise options vested at the time of, or which vest as a result of, a Change of Control.
Amendments to Section 6
.  The following new paragraphs (e) and (f) are hereby added to Section 6 of the Agreement:

"(e)	Annual Base Salary.  "Annual Base Salary" shall mean an amount equal to $375,000, regardless of the actual base salary that the Company may from time to time pay to the Employee."

"(f)	Annual Target Bonus.  "Annual Target Bonus" shall mean an amount equal to the Annual Base Salary."
Modification
.  No provision of this Amendment shall be modified, waived or discharged unless the modification, waiver or discharge is agreed to in writing and signed by the Employee and by an authorized officer of the Company (other than the Employee).
Entire Agreement
.  This Amendment constitutes the entire agreement of the parties hereto and supersedes in their entirety all prior representations, understandings, undertakings or agreements (whether oral or written and whether expressed or implied) of the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof.  In all other respects, the Agreement shall continue in force without amendment.
Choice of Law
.  The validity, interpretation, construction and performance of this Amendment shall be governed by the laws of the State of California.
Severability
.  The invalidity or unenforceability of any provision or provisions of this Amendment shall not effect the validity or enforceability of any other provision hereof, which shall remain in full force and effect.
Counterparts
.  This Amendment may be executed in counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but all of which together will constitute one and the same instrument.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the parties has executed this Amendment, in the case of the Company by its duly authorized officer, as of the day and year set forth above.

COMPANY
S05A2050.

#### HUDSON v. THE STATE.

(623 SE2d 497)

SEARS, Chief Justice.

The appellant, Otis Hudson, appeals from his conviction for the felony murder of Chris Clark.1 On appeal, Hudson contends that the *124trial court erred in failing to charge on mutual combat. Finding no merit to this contention, we affirm Hudson’s conviction.

Decided December 1, 2005

Reconsideration denied January 17, 2006.

*Samuel G. Merritt,*for appellant.

*Cecilia M. Cooper, District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Laurie M. Hughes, Assistant Attorney General,*for appellee.

1. The evidence shows that, on March 21,1992, Hudson and the victim had an altercation that culminated in a fight between, on the one hand, the victim, the victim’s brother, and the victim’s cousin, and, on the other hand, Hudson and several of his friends. The evidence would have authorized the jury to conclude that the victim was not armed during this fight; that, during the fight, Hudson had a gun; and that, at one point during the fight, Hudson, who was standing, shot the victim who was kneeling on the ground in front of him. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Hudson guilty of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt.2

2. Hudson contends that the trial court erred by failing to charge on mutual combat. A charge on mutual combat, however, is warranted only when the combatants are armed with deadly weapons and mutually agree to fight.3 Because there was no evidence that the victim in this case was armed with a deadly weapon, a charge on mutual combat was not warranted by the evidence.4

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*

1

 The crime occurred on March 21,1992. A jury found Hudson not guilty of malice murder, *124but guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault on March 3,1993. The aggravated assault conviction merged with the conviction for felony murder, and the trial court sentenced Hudson to life in prison for felony murder. Hudson did not file a timely appeal, but in 2003, he filed a motion for out-of-time appeal. The trial court denied the motion, but this Court reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded for a determination whether Hudson lost his right to a direct appeal due to the ineffectiveness of trial counsel. *Hudson v. State,*278 Ga. 409 (603 SE2d 242) (2004). On June 21,2005, the trial court granted Hudson an out-of-time appeal, and on July 21, 2005, Hudson filed a notice of appeal. On August 22, 2005, the appeal was docketed in this Court, and on October 11, 2005, the case was submitted for decision on the briefs.

2

*Jackson v. Virginia,*443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

3

*Demons v. State,*277 Ga. 724, 726 (595 SE2d 76) (2004); *Holcomb v. State,*268 Ga. 100, 105 (485 SE2d 192) (1997); *Martin v. State,*258 Ga. 300, 301 (368 SE2d 515) (1988).

4

Id.
#### Ashworth *v.*Harper.

The principal debt stated as such in a promissory note, and the amount of attorney’s fees agreed thereby to be paid, both constitute an aggregate principal debt, and where both are sued for and the gross sum exceeds one hundred dollars, a judgment for any portion thereof in a justice’s court is void for want of jurisdiction.

March 18, 1895.

Brought forward from the last term. Code, §4271(a-c).

Affidavit of illegality. Before Judge McWhorter. Hart superior court. March term, 1894.

Suit was brought in a justice’s court on a note attached to the summons, for $93.57 principal, with interest from maturity, and “all cost of collection, including ten per cent, attorney’s fees.” Judgment was rendered for $93.57 principal, and $1.70 costs; and execution issued accordingly. It yras levied, and defendant interposed an affidavit of illegality on the ground that the judgment was void for want of jui'isdiction in the justice’s court. This was overruled, and defendant excepted.

James II. Skelton, for plaintiff in error.

W. L. Hodges, *contra.*

Atkinson, Justice.

The jurisdiction of a justice’s court is fixed by the principal sum claimed in the summons ; and where the summons claims upon a promissory note a principal debt therein stated, and in addition thereto ten per *661cent, for attorney’s fees, both sums constitute a part of a principal debt; and if the amount of the principal debt stated as such in a promissory note be such as that, with the amount of attorney’s fees stipulated and sued for added thereto, the aggregate would exceed one hundred dollars, the justice’s court would be without jurisdiction to render a judgment in the case. The fact that after suit was brought for the principal debt and the attorney’s fees as stipulated in the note, the claim for the latter was abandoned and judgment rendered only for the amount of the principal debt, with intei’est thereon, without attorney’s fees, would not cure the defect resulting from the infirmity in the original suit. The jurisdiction of the court being dependent upon the amount of principal *claimed*in thé original suit, and not upon the sum for which plaintiff finally obtained a judgment, the recovery of a less sum as expressed in the judgment leaves that judgment nevertheless void. See *Almand*v. *Almand &*George, 95 *Ga.*204; see also 73 *Ga.*240. *Judgment reversed.*
Exhibit 31.2
 CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 17 CFR 240.13a-14
PROMULGATED UNDER
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
      (a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made
known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which
this report is being prepared;(b)
    
    Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal
control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide
reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the
preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles;(c)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report
based on such evaluation; and(d)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter
(the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants
internal control over financial reporting; and
  (a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation
of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely
affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; and(b)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees
who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting.
 /s/ Roger MoodyRoger MoodyChief Financial Officer and Treasurer
##### 



Exhibit 32.1
 EXTERRAN PARTNERS, L.P.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 *
 (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 /s/ STEPHEN A. SNIDER

Stephen A. SniderChief Executive Officer, UCO GP, LLCAs General Partner of UCO General Partner, LPAs General Partner of Exterran Partners, L.P.
  
 *
    
    This report presents the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of
the registrant and the results of operations and cash flow of the registrants predecessor,
the natural gas contract operations business that was provided in the United States of America
by Universal Compression Holdings and its subsidiaries.
Case 3:09-cr-00695-PGS Document 37 Filed 01/20/11 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 76
#### Jerry D. BRUMBAUGH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Chief Justice John G. ROBERTS; Justice Stephen G. Breyer; Justice Samuel Alito; Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg; Justice Anthony Kennedy; Justice Clarence Thomas; Justice John Paul Stevens; Justice David H. Souter; Justice Antonin Scalia, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-1126.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: March 12, 2013.

Filed: April 1, 2013.

Jerry D. Brumbaugh, Hartville, MO, pro se.

Before MURPHY, SMITH, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Robert Brumbaugh appeals after the district court1 dismissed his pro se complaint and denied his motions for reconsideration. Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that Brumbaugh’s notice of appeal (NOA) was timely only as to the district court’s January 2013 orders denying two of his motions for reconsideration, see *United States v. Watson,*623 F.3d 542, 545 (8th Cir.2010) (NOA time limits are jurisdictional); *Dieser v. Cont’l Cas. Co.,*440 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir.2006) (court can raise jurisdiction sua sponte when there is indication jurisdiction is lacking), and we further conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying those motions, *see In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prod. Liab. Litig.,*496 F.3d 863, 866 (8th Cir.2007) (abuse-of-discretion standard of review).

Accordingly, we affirm. *See*8th Cir. R. 47B. We also deny Brumbaugh’s motion for appointment of counsel.

1

. The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.