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NOT FOR PUBLICATION [Dkt. Ent. 17] 

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

CAMDEN VICINAGE 

KENNETH SHAW, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CAMDEN, et 

al., 

 Defendants. 

Civil No. 11-4291 (RMB/AMD) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 

 

Appearances: 

George R. Szymanski 

Law Office of George R. Szymanski 

1370 Chews landing Road 

Laurel Springs, NJ 08021 

Attorney for Plaintiff 

Christine P. O’Hearn 

Brown & Connery, LLP 

360 Haddon Avenue 

P.O. Box 539 

Westmont, NJ 08108 

 Attorney for Defendants 

BUMB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

Plaintiff Kenneth Shaw (“Plaintiff”) asks the Court to 

reconsider its February 2, 2012 order granting dismissal of Count 

Seven (Defamation) of his First Amended Complaint, (“Complaint”). 

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In the alternative, Plaintiff asks the Court for leave to file a late 

notice of tort claim. For the reasons that follow, the Motion for 

Reconsideration and the Motion to file late notice of claim are 

DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Kenneth Shaw was employed for four years by American 

Water Works Service Company as a contract compliance project manager 

when he began interviewing with Defendant Camden Housing Authority, 

(“CHA”) for a position as a purchasing manager. [First Amended 

Complaint, “FAC”, ¶6]. Defendant Gloria Jackson-Wright, CHA’s 

General Counsel, was one of Plaintiff’s interviewers. Plaintiff 

informed Defendants that he was not a New Jersey Qualified Purchasing 

Agent. Plaintiff further alleges that CHA nonetheless promised to 

employ Plaintiff while he pursued the necessary coursework to garner 

certified status and that it would pay for the costs associated with 

achieving the certification. [FAC ¶¶8-9]. Plaintiff was offered a 

job, and according to Plaintiff, was required to begin work 

immediately on December 20, 2010, allowing him to provide only two 

days notice to American Water Works. [FAC ¶10]. As a consequence 

of giving inadequate notice, Plaintiff avers that he forfeited a “15% 

bonus and tuition reimbursements” owed to him by his previous 

employer and was barred from any future employment with it. [FAC ¶12]. 

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Plaintiff’s employment with CHA was short-lived. He began work 

on December 20, 2010 and was terminated on February 25, 2011. [FAC 

¶14]. Plaintiff believes he was terminated because CHA could not wait 

for him to become a certified purchasing agent. [FAC ¶14]. Plaintiff 

alleges that CHA and Jackson-Wright defamed him by communicating to 

the New Jersey Department of Labor’s Unemployment Insurance Office, 

three days after his termination, that he had been terminated because 

of willful misconduct. 

Plaintiff filed his complaint in this Court on July 26, 2011. 

Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on September 29, 2011. On 

October 12, 2011, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss several counts 

of the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff filed his opposition to the 

motion nearly three months late. Despite Plaintiff’s dilatory 

pleadings, this Court accepted Plaintiff’s submission and heard oral 

argument on February 2, 2012. The Court granted Defendants’ motion, 

without prejudice, on Count 1 (Breach of Contract), Count 3 (with 

respect to §§1985 and 1986), and Count 7 (Defamation). The Court 

granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint with respect 

to Counts 1 and 3; this leave did not extend to the defamation count. 

[Dkt. Ent. 16] 

Relevant to the present motion, when considering Plaintiff’s 

defamation claim, the Court observed that the Plaintiff had failed 

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to show that he followed the notice requirement of the New Jersey 

Tort Claims Act, (“the Act”). See N.J.S.A. 59:8-9. The Act requires 

that when suing a public entity in tort, notice of claims against 

the entity must be served within ninety-days of their accrual. Id. 

Although Plaintiff did file a notice of tort claims within 

ninety-days as required, the notice did not include a claim of 

defamation. 

Plaintiff, in his original papers, argued because he had 

properly served notice upon Defendants for other tort claims arising 

out of his termination from CHA, his claim “related back” to the 

timely notice and was therefore proper. Plaintiff, however, offered 

no authority for this proposition and, when specifically questioned 

by the Court as to his legal authority for this rule, acknowledged 

that there was none.1

 

 On February 22, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion for 

Reconsideration of the Court’s February 2, 2012 order. 

Specifically, Plaintiff seeks reinstatement of the defamation claim. 

He argues that he has found support for his relation back argument. 

In the alternative, he seeks leave from the Court to file a late notice 

of claim. 

 

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 Incredulously, Plaintiff’s counsel claims that he was reluctant to argue 

any such “law” at oral argument out of concern that he might be further 

“mocked” by the Court for failing to cite to supporting law. It is 

unfortunate that counsel misperceived this Court’s display of leniency in 

the face of his inexcusable conduct. 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

 Motions for reconsideration are not expressly recognized in the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. United States v. Compaction Sys. 

Corp., 88 F.Supp.2d 339, 345 (D.N.J. 1999). Generally, a motion for 

reconsideration is treated as a motion to alter or amend judgment 

under Federal Rule of Civ.P. 59(e), or as a motion for relief from 

judgment or order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Id.

In the District of New Jersey, Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) governs 

motions for reconsideration. Agostino v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 

2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135310, at *14-15 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2010)(citing 

Bryan v. Shah, 351 F.Supp.2d 295, 297 (D.N.J.2005)). Local Rule 

7.1(i) creates a procedure by which a court may reconsider its 

decision upon a showing that dispositive factual matters or 

controlling decisions of law were overlooked by the court in reaching 

its prior decision.” Id. (citing Bryan, 351 F.Supp.2d at 297). 

 The “purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct 

manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered 

evidence.” Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 

1985) (internal citation omitted). Reconsideration is to be granted 

only sparingly. United States v. Jones, 158 F.R.D. 309, 314 (D.N.J. 

1994). Such motions “may not be used to relitigate old matters, or 

to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised 

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prior to the entry of judgment.” NL Indus., Inc. v. Commercial Union 

Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 513, 515-16 (D.N.J. 1996) (internal citation 

omitted). Third Circuit jurisprudence dictates that a Rule 7.1(i) 

motion may be granted only if: (1) there has been an intervening 

change in the controlling law; (2) evidence not available when the 

Court issued the subject order has become available; or (3) it is 

necessary to correct a clear error of law or fact to prevent manifest 

injustice. Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d 

Cir. 1999) (citing North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 

52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)); Agostino, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

135310, at *15-16. 

Notably, “any evidence not supported with citation to the record 

and overlooked by the Court will not be grounds for a motion for 

reconsideration.” Gilbert v. Camden City, Civ. No. 04-3268, 2007 

WL 1040978, *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2007) (citing Clawans v. United States, 

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18808, *39 (D.N.J. Dec. 26, 2000) (“To the 

extent that the lack of a Statement of Undisputed Facts has hampered 

this process [of reviewing the record and materials submitted], any 

complaint that some piece of evidence was overlooked, for example 

in a motion for reconsideration, is correspondingly attenuated.”)). 

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff makes two arguments. First, Plaintiff argues that 

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reconsideration is warranted with respect to the Court’s ruling on 

the defamation claim because he has identified two cases that support 

his prior relation back argument. Second, Plaintiff argues that even 

if reconsideration is unwarranted the Court should afford him leave 

to file a late notice of claim. 

A. Motion for Reconsideration: 

Plaintiff offers two New Jersey cases in support of his argument 

that the defamation claim relates back to his original notice of tort 

claims: Russo Farms, Inc. v. Vineland Bd. Of Educ., 144 N.J. 84 (N.J. 

1996); and Kolczycki v. City of East Orange, 317 N.J. Super. 505(N.J. 

1999). Neither case supports that argument, however. 

Instead, both cases stand for the narrow proposition that when 

a municipality is properly notified of a claim based on a particular 

tort, the Plaintiff need not serve additional notices of new injuries 

resulting from that same tort. See Russo Farms, Inc.v. Vineland Bd. 

Of Educ., 144 N.J. at 101-104; and Kolczycki v. City of East Orange

317 N.J. Super. at 519-520. As Defendants correctly argue, neither 

case stands for the proposition, claimed by Plaintiff, that filing 

a proper notice of some tort claims relieves the Plaintiff of 

responsibility to notify the Defendant of other claims that have 

accrued. Id. Such holding, urged by Plaintiff, would run contrary 

to the fundamental purpose of the Tort Claims Act - to afford notice 

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to a public entity to investigate and potentially settle claims. See

Holman v. Hilton, 542 F.Supp. 913 (D.N.J. 1982). 

Therefore, this Court can find no legal error in its prior ruling 

and Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 

B. Leave to File a Late Notice of Claim

Plaintiff asks, in the alternative, that the Court grant him 

leave to file a late notice of tort claim. A court may2

, in its 

discretion, allow a plaintiff to file a late notice of claim if it 

“finds that the public entity or public employee has not been 

substantially prejudiced by the delay and that there were 

extraordinary circumstances that led to the failure to file within 

the period of time prescribed.” Brown v. City of Essex County New 

Jersey, 2010 WL 5139880 (D.N.J. 2010)(emphasis added).3 The 

 

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 Defendants argue that this Court may lack jurisdiction to permit the 

filing of a late notice of claim because the statue explicitly refers to 

“the discretion of a judge of the Superior Court.” See infra. Because this 

matter included federal claims, this Court retains jurisdiction over the 

pendent state tort claims and as such assumes jurisdiction. See generally

Cliett v. Cityof Ocean City, 2007 WL 2459446 (D.N.J. August 24, 2007), 

Forcella v. City of Ocean City, 70 F.Supp.2d 512 (D.N.J. 1999), Tripo v. 

Robert Wood Johnson Medical Center, 2012 WL 113609 (D.N.J. January 12, 

2012), and Blow v. Patterson Police Dept., 2012 WL 386206 (D.N.J. February 

3, 2012). 

3 The statute reads in relevant part: 

A claimant who fails to provide notice 

of his claim within 90 days as provided in 

section 59:8-8 of this act, may, in the 

discretion of a judge of the Superior Court, 

be permitted to file such notice at any time 

within one year after the accrual of his claim 

provided that the public entity or public 

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“extraordinary circumstances” exception is intended to be a limited 

exception to the statue. See Escalante v. Township of Cinnaminson, 

Cinnaminson Memorial Park, 283 N.J. Super. 244, 250 (App. Div. 1995). 

Plaintiff claims that his failure to file a timely notice of 

his defamation claim was the result of his failure to consult with 

his attorney, who had been retained to advise him as to possible 

claims arising out of his termination, on CHA’s reporting to the 

Unemployment Office that his termination had resulted from willful 

misconduct. But a Plaintiff’s mere failure to consult with an 

attorney about a possible claim, absent other facts, does not 

constitute an extraordinary circumstance. O’Neill v. City of Newark, 

304 N.J. Super. 543, 554 (App. Div. 1997). In O’Neill v. City of 

Newark, a transit police officer was injured in a city-owned building 

when a staircase collapsed on him while his weapon was drawn, causing 

his gun to discharge into his leg. Id. at 546. The O’Neill

plaintiff failed to seek legal counsel during the ninety-day notice 

period and as such failed to file a proper notice of tort claim against 

 

employee has not been substantially prejudiced 

thereby. Application to the court for permission 

to file a late notice of claim shall be made 

upon motion supported by affidavits based upon 

personal knowledge of the affiant showing sufficient 

reasons constituting extraordinary circumstances 

for his failure to file notice of claim within 

the period of time prescribed by section 59:8-8 

of this act or to file a motion seeking leave to file 

a late notice of claim within a reasonable time 

thereafter;... (N.J. Stat. Ann §59:8-9.) 

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the City of Newark. Id. at 548. The O’Neill court held that, given 

plaintiff’s ability to seek out medical treatment and leave his 

apartment as needed, and amid his full knowledge of the injury and 

the identity of the owner of the building, extraordinary 

circumstances did not exist to warrant leave to file a late notice. 

Compare O’Neil with R.L. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist., 387 N.J. 

Super. 331, 336 (App. Div. 1996) (finding extraordinary 

circumstances when the under-age plaintiff was infected with HIV by 

a school district employee and promptly notified police and school 

officials within days of learning of his infection, spent the time 

following emotionally distraught, rarely leaving his home, crying 

and preoccupied with fear of his death and the consequences of 

revealing his HIV infection to others). 

Here, Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to an “extraordinary 

circumstances” exception to the statute because he failed to consult 

his attorney on matters related to his employment benefit 

compensation proceedings, thus failing to recognize a potentially 

cognizable defamation claim. The fact that Plaintiff, who was 

represented by counsel at the time, “did not appreciate the 

significance” [Dkt. Ent. 17-1, at 4] of any statements made by CHA 

to the Unemployment Office, does not rise to the “extraordinary” 

level required of the demanding standard. Therefore, Plaintiff’s 

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motion to file a late notice of claim is DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

 

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Reconsideration and Motion to file a late notice of Tort Claim are 

DENIED. 

 

Dated: August 10, 2012 s/Renée Marie Bumb 

 RENÉE MARIE BUMB 

 United States District Judge 

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