[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Disciplinary Counsel v. Brockler, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-657.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-657

DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. BROCKLER.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Brockler, Slip Opinion No. 

2016-Ohio-657.] 

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Oneyear suspension, stayed on conditions. 

(No. 2015-0280—Submitted May 6, 2015—Decided February 25, 2015.) 

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 

Court, No. 2014-030. 

_______________________ 

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Aaron James Brockler of Lakewood, Ohio, Attorney 

Registration No. 0078205, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2004. In 

an April 7, 2014 complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Brockler with 

engaging in professional misconduct while he served as the assistant Cuyahoga 

County prosecutor assigned to a murder case. Specifically, relator alleged that 
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2

while investigating the shooting death of Kenneth “Blue” Adams, Brockler created 

a fictitious Facebook account and used it to contact the alibi witnesses of Damon 

Dunn, who had been indicted for the murder. 

{¶ 2} The parties entered into stipulations of fact and submitted 15 

stipulated exhibits. After a two-day hearing, a panel of the Board of Professional 

Conduct issued a report finding that Brockler’s use of the fictitious Facebook 

account to contact the alibi witnesses involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 

misrepresentation, and that it prejudiced the administration of justice. It 

recommended, however, that we dismiss an alleged violation arising from certain 

statements that Brockler made to the media. 

{¶ 3} Citing substantial mitigating evidence and finding that Brockler’s 

misconduct was an isolated incident in an otherwise notable legal career, the panel 

recommended that he be suspended for one year, fully stayed on conditions. The 

board adopted the panel’s report in its entirety, and neither party has filed 

objections. We adopt the board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and 

suspend Brockler from the practice of law in Ohio for one year, fully stayed on 

conditions. 

Misconduct 

{¶ 4} Before he was indicted, Dunn denied any involvement in Adams’s 

death and told Cleveland police that at the time of the murder, he was with his 

girlfriend, Sarah Mossor, and her friend Marquita Lewis. Brockler did not believe 

Dunn’s alibi was true, but Mossor and Lewis refused to talk with him on numerous 

occasions when he identified himself as the assistant prosecutor assigned to the 

case. 

{¶ 5} As part of his investigation, Brockler listened to recordings of 

telephone calls that Dunn had made from the Cuyahoga County Jail. On the 

morning of December 14, 2012, he listened to a recording of a heated conversation 

in which Dunn and Mossor argued over Dunn’s fear that Mossor would not be a 
January Term, 2016 

3

reliable witness and Mossor’s belief that Dunn had not been faithful to her. Mossor 

suspected that Dunn had had a romantic relationship with a woman named “Taisha” 

and indicated that if her suspicion was true, she would end her relationship with 

Dunn. Believing that Mossor’s relationship with Dunn was near a breaking point, 

Brockler saw an opportunity to exploit her feelings of distrust and get her to recant 

her support for Dunn. 

{¶ 6} Recalling a Facebook ruse he had used in a prior case, Brockler 

planned to create a fictitious Facebook identity to contact Mossor. He attempted to 

obtain assistance from several Cleveland police detectives and the chief 

investigator in the prosecutor’s office, but they were not available. Believing that 

time was of the essence, Brockler decided to proceed with the Facebook ruse on his 

own approximately one hour after he heard the recording of Mossor and Dunn’s 

conversation. He created a Facebook account using the pseudonym “Taisha Little,” 

a photograph of an African-American female that he downloaded from the Internet, 

and information that he gleaned from Dunn’s jailhouse telephone calls. He also 

added pictures, group affiliations, and “friends” he selected based on Dunn’s 

telephone calls and Facebook page. 

{¶ 7} Posing as Little, Brockler simultaneously contacted Mossor and 

Lewis in separate Facebook chats. He falsely represented that Little had been 

involved with Dunn, that she had an 18-month-old child with him, and that she 

needed him to be released from jail so that he could provide child support. He also 

discussed Dunn’s alibi as though it were false in an attempt to get Mossor and Lewis 

to admit that they were lying for Dunn (or would lie for him in the future) and to 

convince them to speak with the prosecutor. 

{¶ 8} After chatting for several hours, Brockler sensed that Mossor and 

Lewis were suspicious, so he shut down the chat and deleted the fictitious account. 

He testified that he printed copies of the chats and placed them in a file—with the 

intent to provide copies to defense counsel—before he deleted the account, but 
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4

those copies were never found. He attended five pretrial conferences from January 

through April 2013 but did not disclose the circumstances or content of his 

conversations with Mossor or Lewis. 

{¶ 9} Brockler was scheduled to take an extended medical leave beginning 

April 16, 2013, and assistant prosecutor Kevin Filiatraut was assigned to handle the 

Dunn case in his absence. Brockler gave his file to Filiatraut, reviewed the case 

with him, and attended a pretrial conference with him. Brockler also disclosed that 

he might need to be a witness at trial because both Mossor and Lewis had told him 

they would not support Dunn’s alibi, although they were afraid to say so in court. 

Brockler did not disclose how he obtained that information. 

{¶ 10} On the second day of Brockler’s leave and less than one week before 

Dunn’s trial, a police detective gave Filiatraut several documents, including a 

transcript of Lewis’s chat with “Taisha Little” (obtained from Lewis) and Lewis’s 

written statement about the chat. Filiatraut immediately made the documents 

available to defense counsel and began to investigate Little. 

{¶ 11} Although Filiatraut quickly informed Brockler about this new 

information, Brockler waited nearly three weeks to disclose that he was “Taisha 

Little.” Upon learning of Brockler’s ruse, Filiatraut reported this information to his 

superiors. The prosecutor’s office withdrew from the case and the court appointed 

the attorney general to serve as a special prosecutor. Shortly after Brockler returned 

from his medical leave in June 2013, his employment was terminated. 

{¶ 12} Soon thereafter, Brockler spoke with reporters from the Cleveland 

Plain Dealer and a local television affiliate in response to Cuyahoga County 

Prosecuting Attorney Timothy McGinty’s statements that Brockler was fired for 

his unethical conduct in creating false evidence, lying to witnesses and another 

prosecutor, and damaging the prosecution’s chances in a murder case in which an 

innocent man was killed at work. 
January Term, 2016 

5

{¶ 13} The subsequently published article and broadcasted interview 

included statements by Brockler—which he does not dispute—to the effect that (1) 

prosecutors have long engaged in ruses to obtain the truth, (2) his firing was an 

overreaction because he only did what the police should have done, (3) he engaged 

in an investigative ruse to uncover the truth and keep a murderer behind bars, (4) 

the public was better off because of his actions, (5) if he had not taken these actions, 

a murderer might be walking the streets, (6) he promised the victim’s mother that 

he would not let a horrible killer walk out of the courthouse to kill someone else, 

and (7) McGinty chose to follow the technical rules of ethics, while he chose to 

protect the public. 

{¶ 14} Approximately one year after Brockler’s termination, Dunn was 

convicted of aggravated murder, murder, felonious assault, and having weapons 

while under disability. The parties stipulated in January 2015 that his conviction 

was on appeal, but it has since been affirmed, see State v. Dunn, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. CR-12-568849-A, 2015-Ohio-3138. 

{¶ 15} Brockler admitted that the Facebook ruse violated the plain language 

of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving 

dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), but he urged the board to carve out 

an exception for “prosecutorial investigation deception.” 

{¶ 16} Noting that a comment to Prof.Cond.R. 8.4 already recognizes an 

exception for lawyers who supervise or advise nonlawyers about lawful covert 

investigative activities, and that this court has found in two cases that lawyers in 

private practice violated the analogous provisions of DR 1-102(A)(4) by personally 

engaging in investigatory deceptions, the board refused to carve out a broader 

exception to the rule. See Prof.Cond.R. 8.4, Comment 2A; Columbus Bar Assn. v. 

King, 84 Ohio St.3d 174, 702 N.E.2d 862 (1998) (finding that two attorneys 

engaged in dishonest conduct by conspiring for one of them to place a phone call 

while posing as someone else in order to generate evidence in furtherance of a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6

client’s case); Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Statzer, 101 Ohio St.3d 14, 2003-Ohio-6649, 

800 N.E.2d 1117, ¶ 17 (finding that an attorney engaged in dishonesty, fraud, 

deceit, or misrepresentation when she intimidated a deposition witness by creating 

the false impression that she possessed compromising personal information that 

could be offered as evidence). 

{¶ 17} Instead, the board found that Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) requires an 

assistant prosecutor to refrain from dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation 

when personally engaging in investigatory activity and that Brockler’s Facebook 

ruse therefore violated the rule. 

{¶ 18} Brockler argued that his conduct did not violate Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) 

(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the 

administration of justice) as charged in the complaint because it encouraged 

witnesses to come forward and tell the truth. But the board found that his subterfuge 

prejudiced the administration of justice because it had the potential to induce false 

testimony, injected significant new issues into the case shortly before trial, and 

materially delayed the resolution of the case by requiring further investigation and 

the appointment of a special prosecutor. 

{¶ 19} Relator’s complaint also alleged that Brockler’s statements to the 

media violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.6(a) (prohibiting a lawyer who has participated in 

the investigation or litigation of a matter from making extrajudicial statements that 

he knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public 

communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an 

adjudicative proceeding in the matter). While the board did not condone Brockler’s 

statements, it found that relator failed to carry his burden of proving not only that 

the statements were made but that Brockler knew or reasonably should have known 

that his statements would have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing 

Dunn’s trial. Therefore, the board recommended that we dismiss the alleged 

violation of Prof.Cond.R. 3.6(a). 
January Term, 2016 

7

Sanction 

{¶ 20} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 

relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 

sanctions imposed in similar cases. Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 

St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16. In making a final determination, 

we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar 

R. V(13). 

{¶ 21} As an aggravating factor, the board found that Brockler’s deceptions 

and misrepresentations in his contacts with Mossor and Lewis resulted in multiple 

violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) and (d), though it treated them as a single instance 

of misconduct. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(4). The board also found that his 

extrajudicial statements to the media, deflecting blame for his own misconduct to 

the police department and the prosecutor’s office, undermined the public’s 

confidence in the criminal-justice process. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(A) (requiring the 

board to consider all relevant factors in determining the appropriate sanction for a 

lawyer’s misconduct). 

{¶ 22} In mitigation, the board found that Brockler did not have a prior 

disciplinary record, made a full and free disclosure and cooperated in the 

disciplinary process, submitted numerous letters attesting to his good character and 

reputation for honesty, and acknowledged that the loss of his “dream job” was a 

form of penalty. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (4), (5), (6). Although Brockler’s 

use of deception violated core ethical values, the board also found he was not 

motivated by self-interest, because he honestly—albeit erroneously—believed that 

his covert use of Facebook was an effective and acceptable tactic akin to more 

traditional investigative tactics such as staged drug buys and the use of undercover 

informants. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(2). 

{¶ 23} Despite advocating for a public-policy exception for deceptive 

prosecutorial investigation tactics, Brockler admitted that his conduct violated the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

plain language of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) and argued for no more than a stayed sixmonth suspension. Relator, in contrast, argued that Brockler should serve an actual 

suspension from the practice of law, though he did not suggest any specific 

duration. 

{¶ 24} The board acknowledged that misconduct involving dishonesty, 

fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation generally warrants an actual suspension from the 

practice of law. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Karris, 129 Ohio St.3d 499, 

2011-Ohio-4243, 954 N.E.2d 118, ¶ 16; Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 74 

Ohio St.3d 187, 658 N.E.2d 237 (1995), syllabus. 

{¶ 25} But the board also recognized that we may deviate from that rule in 

the presence of significant mitigating evidence. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Potter, 

126 Ohio St.3d 50, 2010-Ohio-2521, 930 N.E.2d 307 (absence of a prior 

disciplinary record, efforts to rectify the consequences of the misconduct, full 

cooperation in the investigation, self-reporting, and evidence of good character and 

reputation apart from the charged misconduct sufficient to stay 12-month 

suspension for violating fiduciary duty as the executor of an estate); Disciplinary 

Counsel v. Niermeyer, 119 Ohio St.3d 99, 2008-Ohio-3824, 892 N.E.2d 434, 

¶ 12-13 (absence of prior misconduct, self-reporting, cooperation in the disciplinary 

process, acceptance of responsibility for misconduct, and evidence of good 

character and reputation sufficient to stay 12-month suspension for altering a 

document to make it appear that it had been timely filed). See also King, 84 Ohio 

St.3d 174, 702 N.E.2d 862 (imposing a fully stayed one-year suspension based 

upon the presence of significant mitigating evidence); Statzer, 101 Ohio St.3d 14, 

2003-Ohio-6649, 800 N.E.2d 1117 (imposing a fully stayed six-month suspension 

based upon the presence of significant mitigating evidence). 

{¶ 26} Noting the substantial mitigating factors present in this case—

including the board’s finding that the misconduct was an isolated incident in an 

otherwise notable legal career—the board recommends that we suspend Brockler 
January Term, 2016 

9

for one year, fully stayed on the conditions that he engage in no further misconduct 

and that he pay the costs of this action. 

{¶ 27} Having determined that the board’s findings of fact and conclusions 

of law are supported by the record and the law, we adopt the board’s report, find 

that Brockler’s use of a deceptive investigative technique to contact Dunn’s alibi 

witnesses violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) and (d), and dismiss the alleged violation of 

Prof.Cond.R. 3.6(a). We also find that a one-year suspension, fully stayed on the 

conditions recommended by the board, is the appropriate sanction for Brockler’s 

misconduct. 

{¶ 28} Accordingly, Aaron James Brockler is suspended from the practice 

of law in Ohio for one year, fully stayed on the conditions that he engage in no 

further misconduct and pay the costs of this proceeding. If he fails to comply with 

the conditions of the stay, the stay will be lifted, and he shall serve the full one-year 

suspension. Costs are taxed to Brockler. 

Judgment accordingly. 

PFEIFER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., dissents with an opinion in which LANZINGER, J., joins. 

O’DONNELL, J., dissents, with opinion. 

_________________ 

O’CONNOR, C.J., dissenting.

{¶ 29} The preamble to the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, entitled “A 

Lawyer’s Responsibilities,” lays out broad obligations, recognizing that “a lawyer 

not only represents clients but has a special responsibility for the quality of justice” 

and that that responsibility extends “to practicing lawyers even when they are acting 

in a nonprofessional capacity.” Prof.Cond.R., Preamble [1], [3]. By imposing a 

marginal sanction—a fully stayed one-year suspension—on respondent, Aaron 

Brockler, the majority minimizes his significant ethical violations and does so 

based upon a myopic view of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The men and 
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10 

women who serve as prosecutors in this state are authorized to enforce the law and 

administer justice, one of the noblest pursuits an attorney can enjoy. Accordingly, 

they must meet or exceed the highest ethical standards imposed on our profession. 

Given the significant ethical violations Brockler committed, I cannot implicitly 

condone the imposition of a negligible sanction for his egregious misconduct. 

{¶ 30} The substantial evidence of wrongdoing and the aggravating factors 

in this case prove that Brockler committed significant violations of the Ohio Rules 

of Professional Conduct. Yet faced with Brockler’s glaring disdain for the ethical 

responsibilities this court imposes on all attorneys in this state, a majority of this 

court imposes only a one-year suspension, fully stayed. 

{¶ 31} In the past, our punishment for lawyers’ conduct involving 

dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation has been significantly harsher. We 

indefinitely suspended an attorney who had lied to the disciplinary counsel’s 

investigator. Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Gruttadaurio, 136 Ohio St.3d 283, 

2013-Ohio-3662, 995 N.E.2d 190, ¶ 2-4. We imposed a one-year suspension, with 

six months stayed on conditions, on an attorney who had falsely advised that her 

client’s case was being settled. Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnson, 122 Ohio St.3d 

293, 2009-Ohio-3501, 910 N.E.2d 1034, ¶ 7, 14. We suspended a lawyer for six 

months for attempting to advance his client’s interests with evidence that the lawyer 

knowingly fabricated. Cleveland Bar Assn. v. McMahon, 114 Ohio St.3d 331, 

2007-Ohio-3673, 872 N.E.2d 261, ¶ 25, 30. 

{¶ 32} The disciplined attorneys in those cases were ordered to serve actual 

suspensions, and none of them was a prosecutor. Instead, those cases all involved 

civil matters, in which the worst outcome risked by the lawyer’s deception was the 

loss of money by a party. 

{¶ 33} In contrast, the stakes in this case involved imprisonment for up to a 

life term. Brockler actively hindered the pursuit of justice in a criminal proceeding 

on multiple occasions, by lying to alibi witnesses in an effort to make them change 
January Term, 2016 

11 

their statements. He made every effort to hide his deceptive activities until they 

were uncovered, and then he refused to admit that his actions were wrong. 

{¶ 34} Failing to require Brockler to serve even a single day of his 

suspension does little to establish that this court will ensure the integrity of 

prosecutors and the ethical administration of justice. Indeed, none of the cases upon 

which the majority opinion relies to support a fully stayed sentence involves a 

lawyer lying in a criminal case to the detriment of a criminal defendant and, 

ultimately, to the detriment of the public’s faith in our courts and in justice.1

{¶ 35} The stakes in this case are significantly higher than those in the cases 

cited in the majority opinion. The courts are the bulwark of justice, and we must 

prove that government is trustworthy and working tirelessly but fairly, ethically, 

and honestly in support of justice. To do that, we must require the offices of Ohio’s 

prosecuting attorneys to strive for flawless obedience to the ethical rules governing 

all lawyers practicing in the state. 

{¶ 36} Despite Brockler’s claims about his training in the prosecutor’s 

office, Brockler admits that his actions at issue in this case were not directed by a 

supervisor and that whatever a supervisor may have told him in the past does not 

 

1

 In Columbus Bar Assn. v. King, the attorney lied to a landlord in a slip-and-fall case in order to 

add a slander claim to the complaint of his client, the landlord’s former tenant. 84 Ohio St.3d 174, 

175-177, 702 N.E.2d 862. The opinion does not disclose if the landlord ever had to defend the false 

slander claim in court or if the deception came out prior to trial. In Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Statzer, 

this court found that a lawyer engaged in subterfuge that intimidated a witness during a deposition 

related to a disciplinary investigation for failing to provide a file to a former client. 101 Ohio St.3d 

14, 2003-Ohio-6649, 800 N.E.2d 1117, ¶ 2, 16. Disciplinary Counsel v. Niermeyer concerned an 

attorney who lied when he backdated a workers’ compensation claim in order to cover up the fact 

that he missed a filing deadline. 119 Ohio St.3d 99, 2008-Ohio-3824, 892 N.E.2d 434, ¶ 4. In that 

case, the attorney was “almost immediately * * * struck with regret and overwhelmed with guilt” 

over his deception. Id. at ¶ 5. In contrast, Brockler steadfastly denied that his actions were unethical. 

The deceit in Disciplinary Counsel v. Potter, 126 Ohio St.3d 50, 2010-Ohio-2521, 930 N.E.2d 307, 

bears even less resemblance to Brockler’s case. There, Potter’s deception involved giving money 

to a friend to purchase, at the fairly appraised value, property from an estate of which Potter was the 

executor, with the plan calling for Potter to ultimately become owner of the land. Id. at ¶ 6. While 

recognizing that each of these cases involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that 

was wholly inappropriate for a lawyer and was a discredit to our honorable profession, the stakes at 

issue in these cases were, at most, monetary and wholly inapposite to the circumstances here. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12 

excuse his conduct. It is the responsibility of every Ohio lawyer to know and follow 

the Rules of Professional Conduct. There is no separate code of conduct that 

prosecutors alone get to play by. 

{¶ 37} I am cognizant of Brockler’s desire to serve the public and to do what 

is “right” by protecting society from dangerous criminal defendants, just as I am 

aware of the intensely difficult nature of such work, which often involves tragic 

circumstances, elicits visceral reactions, and presents great risks for both the 

accuser and the accused. See Disciplinary Counsel v. LoDico, 106 Ohio St.3d 229, 

2005-Ohio-4630, 833 N.E.2d 1235, ¶ 30. Although criminal cases “bring the 

responsibility and necessity” of zealous representation, a prosecuting attorney “is 

not endowed with a concomitant right to denigrate the court in discharging that 

responsibility.” Id.

{¶ 38} In light of the series of lies and misrepresentations here and the 

impact they have on the profession and our communities, I would indefinitely 

suspend Brockler’s license to practice law in this state. 

CONCLUSION

{¶ 39} Because I believe that the court’s sanction in this case is entirely 

incongruous with Brockler’s behavior, I cannot subscribe to it. For his ethical 

misdeeds, I would indefinitely suspend Brockler’s license to practice law in the 

state of Ohio. Accordingly, I dissent. 

LANZINGER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

_________________ 

O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 40} Respectfully, I dissent. 

{¶ 41} Respondent engaged in unacceptable dishonest conduct that 

materially affected the administration of justice, and I would impose an indefinite 

suspension. 

_________________ 
January Term, 2016 

13 

Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Donald M. Scheetz, Assistant 

Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 

Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson, George D. Jonson, and Kimberly Vanover 

Riley, for respondent. 

_________________