F ILED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS EL EV EN TH C IRC UIT March 13 , 2 007 T HOMA S K. KA HN CLERK

The Honor able C. Rog er V inson, United States District J udg e of the Norther n District * of F lorida, sitting by

desig nation. [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 05- 1309 3

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 00-00099 -CR- T- N UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Plaintiff-Appellee, ve rs us ANTHONYJOHNSON, d.b.a . Jiff y Produce, D ef en dant- Appe llant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court f o r th e M i d d l e D i s t r i c to f

A l ab a ma

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (M ar ch 13, 200 7) Before AN DE RSO N and DU BIN A, Circuit Judges, and VINS ON , District Judge. * PE R CU RIA M:We rejec t J ohnson’s argument that the district court de nied him cre dit for ac cepta nce of 1 responsibility

without discussion. S imilarly , we r ejec t his argument reg ardingthe district court’s de te rm inatio n o f t

he amou nt o f l os s a s who lly

wi tho ut m e ri t. 2 Anthony Johns on appeals his 51-m onth sentence im posed after he w as convicted of m aking a false statem ent on a food stam p program

(“ FSP” ) application, in vio lation of 18 U.S. C. § 100 1. Johnson argues that the district court erre d by (1) adm itting com

puter printou ts to establis h his prio r convictions that we re not properly

certified recor ds of convictio n when the originals wer e de st ro y ed , and (2) fin di ng th athi s o ffen se in vo lv ed“ m or e th an m in im al pl an ni ng ,” unde r U . S. S. G . § 2F 1. 1 ( b) (2 )( A ) (1 994) , be ca use his c ondu ct

– i m pr ope rl y ch ec kin g “ no” on the F SP appl ic at ion– di d no t i nvol ve c onc ea lm en t or e xte nsi ve plannin g and there w as no proof the receipt of f ood st am ps was anything other than

“ op po rtu ne .” 1 Af ter the Suprem e Court’ s decision in United State s v. Booker, 543 U.S . 220, 125 S . Ct . 738 ( 2005 ), w e re vie wthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s a ppl ic at ionof

the Gu i d el i n es u n d erth e s ame s t an d ar d s as we d i dp re -B o o k er : th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s interpretation of the Guidelines is reviewe d de novo and factual f indin gs are re vie w ed f or c le ar e rr or . U nit ed

S ta te s v. Cr aw fo rd , 407 F . 3d 1 174, 117 7- 78 ( 11th Cir. 2005 ). T he district court m ust, using pre-B ooker precedent, corre ctly interpret an d a ppl y the G uid el ine s w he n c al cu la tin g th e ap pr opr ia te a dvi sor y G uid el ine3

range. Id. at 1178-79 ; United States v. W ining ear, 422 F.3d 1241 , 1246 (11th Cir. 2005 ). John son’ s f

ir st arg um en t, that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed w he n it inc lud ed c er ta in m isd em eanor

c onvi ct ion s inhis se nte nc ing c al cu la tio ns b ec au se c om put er pr int out s we re a dm itted to establis h the convictio ns, fa ils. T his court has heldthat a cer tified copy of a c onvi ction is no t necessary to supp ort a finding of a conviction . United States v. W ilson , 183 F. 3d 12 91, 1301 (11t h Cir. 1999 ). In W ilson , w e held that althoug h a cer

tified copy

wa s best, a P SI in com

binatio n with the on-the-recor d statem ents of a probation officer and the notes of another probation o ffice r w ere sufficiently

reliable to support th e finding of a conviction . Id. Sim ilarly , in U nited States v. Ac osta, 287 F.3d 1034, 1036 (11th Cir. 2002), we held that an uncertified co py of aj uve nil e ad

j udi catio n, w he re the or igi na l w as se al ed a nd una va ila

ble in its or igi na l f orm , pr ove d be y ond a doub t tha t the de fe ndant h ad apr ior dr ug co nvi ct ion . H er e, the dis tr ic t c ourt ha d su ff ic ie nt, r el ia

ble e vid en ce that Jo hnso n ha d m isd em eanor

c onvi ct ion s. T he or igi na l r ec or ds h ad be en de str oy ed

but the co urt ha d ( 1) ac opy

of the c om put er sc re enthat di spl ay ed

the f ac ts o f the c as e an d ha d Jo hnso n’ s c or

re ct S oc ia l S ec ur ity

num be r an d date of

bir th; ( 2) aw ai ve r of ar ra ign m en t si gne d by

Joh nson ; and ( 3) age ne ra l l ette r an d te sti m ony statin g th e reason why

the originals coul d not b e provided. T his satisfies the rules of evidenceTo the extent that J ohnson challeng es the district cour t’s admission of the exhibi ts that 2 it found inadmissibl e, the district cour t merely misspoke when it said the exhibit s were ina dmi ssi ble and

late r c or re c te d it se lf

. B e c a us e he make s th e argume nt f or the fi rs t ti me in h is reply brief, w e dec line to addre ss J ohnson’s cha lleng e, base d on Shepard v. United States, 544 U. S. 1 3, 12 5 S. Ct. 12 54 (2 00 5) , to his pr ior c onvic tio ns and

the us e of

c omp ute r p ri nto uts . In h is initial brief, J ohnson failed to pre sent such a Shepa rd cha lleng e; indeed, he failed to pre sent any Booke r-c halleng e to his prior convic tions, li miting his argument in this reg ard to his other c ha lle ng e s. In a

ny e ve nt, the ins tant s e nte nc ingoc c ur re d a ft e r Unit e d St ate s v . B oo ke r, 54 3 U .S. 220, 125 S.Ct . 738 (2005); the district cour t clear ly understood the a dvisory

nature of the guidelines and the instant sente nce did not implicate a ny statutory minimum . Thus, the conc erns of Almenda

rez-Torr es v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219 (1998), and Appre ndi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.C t. 2348 (2000), ar e not implicated. 4 and the district court did not err. 2 N ex t, Joh nsonarg ue s th at the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

w he n it f ound that hi s of fe nse inv olv ed

m or e than m ini m al planni ng b ec au se his c ondu ct did not inv olv e co nc ea lm en t or

e xte nsi ve planni ng and the re w as no p ro of that the r ec ei pt o f fo od stam ps w as anythi ng o the r than op portun e. W e co nc lud e that Jo hnso n’ s arg um en t is w ith out m er it. Inli ght of Joh nson ’ s r ep eate d r ed em pti ons of f ood stam ps m ad e poss ibl e by his false statem ent (that he had no prior convictio ns), and in li ght of the dis trict co urt’ s f ind ing that Jo hnso n’ s r ed em pti ons w er e “ pur e fr au d” ( i. e. so num er ous an d th e am ou nt so lar ge th atitwas i nc red ib le th atth ey rep res en te d l eg it im at e sa le s) , we re ad ily c onc lud e that the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t e rr in re j ec tin g Jo hnso n’ s arg um en t that hi s a ct ion s w er e m er el y opp ortun e. A lth oughJoh nson ’ s br ie fs on a ppe al do not a rg ue that the f

ood stam p r ed em pti ons w er e not

part of the a ppr opr ia te r el ev an tTh e min ima l pl ann inge nh anc e me nt w a s e lim inate d in 20 01 . H ow e ve r, be c a

us e 3 J ohnson committed the conduct in 1995, whe n the 1994 guidelines wer e in ef fec t, the district c ourt us e d th os e guid e lin e s. 5 co nd uc t, we wo ul d i n a ny even t h av e reject edsu ch an arg um en t. Se ct ion2F 1. 1( b) (2 )( A ) of the 199 4 S en te nc ing G uid el ine s m an da te s atw olevel increase in the offense level for a defendant who has engaged in “ m ore than m inim al planning ” for the c omm issio n of “ the offense. ” T his Court has heldthat 3

“ [t] he inqui ry

for m ore than m inim al planning is not lim ited to the elem ents of a part ic ular of

fe nse or the c om ple tio n of the of fe nse it se lf

. ” U nit ed S ta te s v. Craw ford, 407 F.3d 117 4, 1179 (11th Cir. 2005 ). If the governm ent proves that an of fe nse inv olv ed

r ep eate d a ct s ov er

ape ri od o f tim e, m or e than m ini m al planni ng i s deem ed present unless it is clear that each instance w as “purely oppo rtune.” Id. at 1180 . H ow ev er , the pur el y opp ortun e ex ce pti on i s narr ow , onl y appl ie s to “ spur

of the m om en t c ondu ct , ” an d “ re qui re s ac los e te m por al r el at ionbe tw ee n af ortui tou s oppo rt uni ty and an a ct

that t ak es a dvanta ge of

the opp ortun ity . ” Cr aw fo rd , 407 F. 3d at 11 80. H er e, und er

U . S. S. G . § 1B 1. 3( a) (1 )( B) a nd 1 B1 . 3( a) (3 ), Joh nson ’ s a ct s of re de em ing the f

ood stam ps w er e part

of the r el ev an t c ondu ct

a nd thus shou ld b e considered in the m inim al planning calculus. S ection 1B1.3(a)( 1)(B) defines as relevant conduct all foreseea ble acts of others involv ed in the jointly undertaken6

cr im ina l a ct ivi ty , e ve n if

it is not c harg ed a s su ch , that are m ad e in f urthe ranc e of the c ri m ina l a ct ivi ty . T he re w as sub stanti al e vid en ce that Jo hnso n’ s r ed em pti on o f the f ood stam ps w as f ra udul en t and w as the r ea son fo r his f ra udul en t a ppl ic at ionto the F SP . A ddi tio na lly , und er § 1B 1. 3( a) (3 ), r el ev an t c ondu ct sha ll be de te rm ine d, in p ar t, ba se d on“ al l harm

that w as the obj ec t of

” al l a ct s un de rt ak ento furthe r the cr im ina l a ct ivi ty . T he obj ec t of f ill ing out the f al se a ppl ic at ionw as to de fr au d th e fo od s tam p pr ogr am . Jo hnso n a lso r ed ee m ed the f ood stam ps t o f urthe r that go al . T he re fo re , be ca

use that a ct ivi ty

w as part of the r el ev an t c ondu ct , it

c oul d pr ope rl y be considered in the dis trict court’ s determ ination of w hether or not there had been m or e than m ini m al planni ng. U nde r Cr aw fo rd , Joh nson ’ s r ed em pti ons w er e not pu rel y op po rtu ne an d, h en ce, t he sch em e in vo lv edm or e th an m in im al pl an ni ng . T he re fo re , the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t e rr a nd J ohns on’ s se nte nc e is AFFIR MED.