NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPI RES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

ABEL ALONSO HUERTA, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D16-3946 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ) Opinion filed October 4, 2017.

A ppeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Manatee County; Deno Economou, Judge. Jorge Leon Chalela, Tampa, for Appellant.

SLEET, Judge. Abel Alonso Huerta appeals the summary denial of his timely ame nded Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for postconvict ion relief as facially insufficient. We reverse the postconviction court's order and remand for consideration

of the motion on its merits because Huerta’s motion stated a fa cially sufficient claim for relief under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). To state a facially sufficient claim for postconviction relief, a movant must allege "that counsel's performance was deficient [and] . . . th at the deficient- 2 - performance prejudiced the def ense." Blackwood v. State, 217 S o. 3d 1146 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (alterations in original) (quoting Hernandez v. State , 124 So. 3d 757, 762 (Fla. 2013)). In his amended motion, Huerta alleged that his t rial counsel failed to warn him that he would be subject to presumptively mandatory deporta tion as a result of entering a plea to felony possession of a controlled substance and felony battery. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2013) ("Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of . . . any law . . . relating to a c ontrolled substance . . . is deportable."); § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) ("Any alien who is convicte d of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable."); § 1101(a)(43)(F) (de fining an aggravated felony as "a crime of violence . . . for which the term of impr isonment [is] at least one year" (footnote omitted)); 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2013) (defining a crime of violence as "an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threa tened use of physical force against the person or pr operty of another"). Huerta cont ended that had he known the deportation consequences of entering the plea, he would hav e instead proceeded to

trial. The postconviction court denied Huerta's amended motion as faci ally insufficient, citing Agent v. State, 19 So. 3d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), and Ramirez v. State, 124 So. 3d 967, 968 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), in s upport. In Agent, this court explained that the defenda nt's postconviction motion was facially insufficient because the defendant failed to allege that he would not have e ntered his plea but for counsel's error. 19 So. 3d at 1115. Because Huerta alleged th at he would not have pleaded but for counsel's failure to adequately advise him of t he deportation consequences, his motion sufficiently alleged prejudice. See D eck v. State, 985 So. 2d- 3 - 1234, 1238 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ("[I]n order to satisfy the 'prej udice' requirement of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in a case involv ing a plea, the defendant must allege and prove only that 'there is a reasonable probabil ity that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insiste d on going to trial." (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985))). In Ramirez, the Fourth District affirmed the summary denial of a postconviction motion but did so without prejudice to the defen dant's right to file a facially sufficient motion consistent with Cano v. State, 112 S o. 3d 646, 648 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). 124 So. 3d at 968. As we recently explained in Bla ckwood, "Cano is limited to its facts and should not be read to impose an additi onal evidentiary burden on all defendants asserting ineffective assistance of counsel clai ms under Padilla." 217 So. 3d at 1146. Huerta alleged that his counsel failed to prop erly advise him of the presumptively mandatory deporta tion consequences of his guilty plea under the federal immigration statutes and that but for his counsel's insufficien t advice, he would not have entered the plea. Therefore, Huerta's motion for postconvictio n relief was facially sufficient. See Hernandez, 124 So. 3d at 762. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for

the trial court to consider the motion on its merits.

Reversed and remanded.

NORTHCUTT and SILBERMAN, JJ., Concur.