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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

CAMDEN VICINAGE 

JASON COLE, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA,

LLC, 

 Defendant. 

Civil No. 11-4174 (RMB) 

OPINION 

Appearances: 

 Jacqueline C. Herritt 

 Kimmel & Silverman, P.C. 

 Executive Quarters, 

 1930 East Marlton Pike, Suite Q29 

 Cherry, Hill NJ 08003 

 Attorneys for Plaintiff 

 James S. Dobis 

 Dobis, Russell & Peterson P.C. 

 326 South Livingston Avenue 

 Livingston, NJ 07039 

 Attorneys for Defendant 

 

BUMB, United States District Judge: 

 Plaintiff Jason Cole (“Plaintiff” or “Pl.”) filed a 

complaint (the “Complaint” or “Compl.”) in New Jersey Superior 

Court, Camden County, asserting claims under the New Jersey 

Motor Vehicle Warranty Act, Magnuson-Moss Warranty Improvement 

Act (“MMWA”), and the Uniform Commercial Code against Defendant 

Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (“Defendant” or “Def.”). 

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Defendant removed the case to the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey, claiming that this court has 

original jurisdiction under the MMWA and supplemental 

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. Plaintiff moved 

for remand. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion is 

GRANTED. 

I. Background

A. Factual 

On or about January 4, 2010, Plaintiff leased a new 2010 

Jaguar XF from Cherry Hill Classic Cars in Cherry Hill, New 

Jersey. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 4, 17.1 The vehicle was manufactured and 

warranted by Defendant. Compl. ¶ 3. The lease payments totaled 

$30,425 to be paid out over the term of the lease. Compl. Ex. 

B.2 As part of the agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant, 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant issued “several warranties, 

guarantees, affirmations or undertakings with respect to the 

material or workmanship of the vehicle and/or remedial action in 

the event the vehicle fail[ed] to meet the promised 

specifications,” including “an express 4 year/50,000 mile 

warranty.” Compl. ¶¶ 6, 7, 8. 

 

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 The facts recited herein are drawn from Plaintiff’s Complaint, which 

this Court accepts as true for the purposes of this motion. 

2

 The Complaint alleges that the “lease price of the vehicle” was 

“approximately $28,000.” Compl. ¶ 5. While Plaintiff has not 

explained the inconsistency between this figure and the figure quoted 

in the lease, the discrepancy is immaterial for the purposes of 

resolving Plaintiff’s motion. 

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Plaintiff alleges that the vehicle has been rendered 

“substantially impaired, unable to be utilized for its intended 

purposes, and is worthless” due to ineffective attempts to 

repair the vehicle by Defendant through its authorized dealer. 

Compl. ¶ 9. Plaintiff alleges three documented warranty repair 

attempts by defendant: (1) an attempt to repair abnormal noise 

in the brakes, vehicle sluggishness, a defective glove box, and 

problems with the transmission on or before August 24, 2010 

(Compl. ¶ 10); (2) an attempt to repair a “defective air 

conditioner” on or before September 29, 2010 (Compl. ¶ 11); and 

(3) a second attempt to fix the air conditioner, along with an 

attempt to fix the radio, on or before November 1, 2010 (Compl. 

¶ 12). Despite the repair attempts, Plaintiff alleges that 

the vehicle “continues to exhibit defects and nonconformities, 

which substantially impair its use, value, and/or safety.” 

Compl. ¶ 13. 

B. Procedural 

Plaintiff commenced this action against Defendant in the 

Superior Court of New Jersey, Camden County on June 23, 2011, 

asserting claims under the MMWA and under New Jersey state law. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), Defendant filed a notice of 

removal to the United States District Court for the District of 

New Jersey on July 20, 2011. Defendant asserts that removal is 

proper because Plaintiff’s MMWA claim provides for original 

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federal question jurisdiction when the amount in controversy is 

at least $50,000 and Plaintiff’s claim exceeds that amount. 

Defendant further argues that this court has supplemental 

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims because they 

“arise from a common nucleus of operative facts.” Def.’s Notice 

of Removal at 2. 

Plaintiff filed a motion to remand the case to state court, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), on July 27, 2011. Plaintiff 

argues that his cause of action does not meet the requisite 

$50,000 amount in controversy under the MMWA necessary to 

trigger federal jurisdiction. 

II. Standard of Review

A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court 

to federal court if the federal court would have had original 

jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). Pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), the federal court must remand an action 

“[i]f at any time before final judgment, it appears that the 

district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction....” 

On a motion to remand, where jurisdictional facts are in 

dispute, “the party challenging federal jurisdiction bears the 

burden of proving necessary facts by a preponderance of the 

evidence.” Zanger v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 10-2480, 2010 WL 

3910142, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2010). However, if 

jurisdictional facts are not in dispute, the analysis turns on 

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whether Plaintiff has specifically averred in the complaint that 

the amount in controversy is less than the jurisdictional 

minimum. Id. Where the plaintiff has done so, “a defendant 

seeking removal must prove to a legal certainty that plaintiff 

can recover the jurisdictional amount.” Frederico v. Home 

Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 196-97 (3d Cir. 2007). “A plaintiff is 

entitled to this deferential standard only if the complaint 

specifically (and not impliedly) and precisely (and not 

inferentially) state[s] that the amount sought shall not exceed 

the jurisdictional minimum.” Zanger, 2010 WL 3910142, at *2 

(quotation and citation omitted). In contrast, where a 

plaintiff has not specifically and precisely averred in the 

complaint that the amount in controversy is less than the 

jurisdictional minimum, the case may only be remanded if the 

Plaintiff demonstrates, to a legal certainty, that it cannot 

recover the jurisdictional amount. Frederico, 507 F.3d at 195, 

197; Lawton v. Basic Research, L.L.C., No. 10-6341, 2011 WL 

1321567, at *2 (D.N.J. April 4, 2011). 

III. Analysis

This Court’s analysis proceeds in three parts. First, it 

discusses the basis for federal jurisdiction – the MMWA. 

Second, it assesses the appropriate standard of review based on 

whether jurisdictional facts are in dispute and whether 

Plaintiff has specifically averred that its claimed damages are 

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below the jurisdictional minimum. Third, it determines whether, 

under the appropriate standard, remand is warranted. 

A. Federal Jurisdiction Under The MMWA 

Defendant’s removal is predicated on the MMWA. The MMWA 

states that “a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a 

supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any 

obligation under this chapter, or under a written warranty, 

implied warranty, or service contract, may bring suit for 

damages and other equitable relief” in state or federal court. 

15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1). However, the MMWA imposes a limit on 

federal jurisdiction by stating that a federal court may not 

take jurisdiction if “the amount in controversy is less than the 

sum or value of $50,000 (exclusive of interests and costs) 

computed on the basis of all claims to be determined in this 

suit.” Id. § 2310(d)(3)(B). Under the statute, supplemental 

state law claims, court costs, and potential attorney’s fees are 

not taken into consideration when calculating the amount in 

controversy. Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors Am., 357 F.3d 392, 

402-03 (3d Cir. 2004); Suber v. Chrysler Corp., 104 F.3d 578, 

588 n. 12 (3d Cir. 1997); Mele v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., No. 93-

2399, 1993 WL 469124, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 12, 1993). “[T]he 

standard measure of damages [in an MMWA case] is the difference 

between the value of goods as warranted and the value of the 

defective goods.” Pavese v. General Motors Corp., No. Civ. A. 

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97-3688, 1998 WL 57761, at *5 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 11, 1998); Rouse v. 

Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. Civ.A.04-5320, 2005 WL 61449, at *3 

(E.D.Pa. Jan. 10, 2005)(same). 

B. Applicable Standard For Remand 

At issue here is whether there is subject matter 

jurisdiction under the MMWA, or whether remand is appropriate. 

Because there are no jurisdictional facts in dispute, to 

determine the appropriate standard for remand, the Court must 

assess whether the Complaint specifically avers that the amount 

sought for Plaintiff’s MMWA claim, the only pertinent claim for 

jurisdictional purposes, is less than the $50,000 jurisdictional 

minimum under the MMWA. Zanger, 2010 WL 3910142, at *3; Mele, 

1993 WL 469124, at *4 (concluding state law claims were not

included in calculating amount in controversy for MMWA 

jurisdictional purposes). 

The Complaint alleges damages under the MMWA “in an amount 

equal to the price of the subject vehicle, plus all collateral 

charges, incidental and consequential damages, attorney’s fees, 

and all court costs.” Compl. ¶ 46. Because the Court does not 

consider attorney’s fees and court costs in calculating the MMWA 

amount in controversy (Samuel-Bassett, 357 F.3d at 402-03), the 

only relevant claimed MMWA damages for the jurisdictional 

analysis are the “price of the subject vehicle, plus all 

collateral charges, incidental and consequentional damages[.]” 

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The Complaint did not, however, specifically quantify these 

damages or aver that these damages are less than the $50,000 

jurisdictional minimum.3 Therefore, this case may be remanded 

only if Plaintiff demonstrates with legal certainty that it 

cannot recover $50,000 or more. Id. 

C. Remand Is Warranted 

This Court concludes, with legal certainty, that Plaintiff 

cannot recover $50,000 or more in MMWA damages. While Plaintiff 

did not specifically aver that its damages are less than the 

jurisdictional threshold, Plaintiff’s Complaint, as a practical 

matter, impliedly, but necessarily, so limits Plaintiff’s 

 

3

 The Court recognizes that this finding is at odds with Judge Walls’ 

finding in Royster v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC, No. 11-

3599, 2011 WL 4860030, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 12, 2011), although Judge 

Walls reached the same ultimate conclusion as this Court. That case 

dealt with the same counsel, same defendant, and almost identical 

damages claims. Id. (alleging damages “in an amount equal to the price 

of the subject vehicle, plus all collateral charges, incidental and 

consequential damages”). Also like here, plaintiff there did not 

expressly allege that these damages were less than $50,000. Id. Judge 

Walls nonetheless concluded that the plaintiff there had “averred 

damages less than the jurisdictional minimum of $50,000” – entitling 

plaintiff to the more deferential standard of review - because the 

damages there were almost entirely predicated on the lease price, which 

was alleged to be below $50,000 Id. This Court agrees, as discussed 

below, that, as a practical matter, allegations that a claim is based 

on a vehicle lease for an amount under the jurisdictional threshold, 

coupled with an allegation of damages based on the vehicle’s price, 

inexorably lead to the conclusion that the damages at issue are below 

the jurisdictional threshold. However, that conclusion is not drawn 

from a specific and precise statement in the complaint. It instead 

relies on implication and inference. And this Court, though 

recognizing that this places form over substance, is bound by the Third 

Circuit’s admonition that, to obtain the benefit of the more 

deferential standard, the plaintiff’s complaint must “specifically (and 

not impliedly) and precisely (and not inferentially) state that the 

amount sought” is less than the jurisdictional threshold. Frederico, 

507 F.3d at 196. The Court also notes that, though Royster post-dates 

the briefing here, given counsels’ participation in Royster, and that 

it involved a practically identical legal issue, counsel should have 

brought that decision to this Court’s attention. 

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damages. 

As discussed above, Plaintiff’s damages claim has two 

components for MMWA jurisdictional purposes: (1) “the price of 

the subject vehicle”; and (2) “all collateral charges, 

incidental and consequential damages.” Plaintiff argues that its 

claim for damages from the first component is the $30,425 in 

payments due under the lease. Plaintiff asserts that the 

remaining claimed damages are less than the $19,575 necessary, 

when combined with the lease payments, to reach the $50,000 

required by the MMWA for federal jurisdiction. Pl.’s Mot. for 

Remand at 6. 

In contrast, Defendant contends that the amount in 

controversy exceeds $50,000 because the proper price of the 

vehicle is $53,109.19, the gross capitalized cost of the 

vehicle. Def.’s Mem. of Law at 5. Importantly, however, if 

this Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim is instead for the total 

lease payments, Defendant does not contest that the addition of 

the remaining damages would not be sufficient to satisfy the 

$50,000 amount in controversy requirement. Therefore, whether 

the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000 as required turns on 

the proper characterization of Plaintiff’s claim for damages 

based on the price of the vehicle. 

The Court agrees with Plaintiff’s characterization for two 

independent reasons. First, Plaintiff’s characterization is 

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consistent with a plain reading of the Complaint. The Complaint 

does not, directly or indirectly, refer to the gross capitalized 

cost of the vehicle, or any other pricing measure based on the 

sale cost of the vehicle. See generally Complaint. Instead, the 

sole price the Complaint references is the lease payments due. 

Compl. ¶ 5 (listing the “lease price of the vehicle” as 

“approximately $28,000”). Therefore, the reference to damages 

“in an amount equal to the price of the subject vehicle” (Compl. 

¶ 46) can only plausibly refer to the lease payments due, which 

are far below $50,000. See Royster, 2011 WL 4860030, at *3 

(D.N.J. Oct. 12, 2011) (applying similar logic in granting 

motion to remand for lack of jurisdiction where the plaintiff 

claimed damages based on the lease payment and not, as the 

Defendant contended, based on the gross capitalized cost or 

MSRP); Roxbury v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., No. 07-6046, 2008 WL 

4307113 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2008) (remanding for lack of 

jurisdiction where the plaintiff conceded that he did not seek 

damages based on the price of the vehicle and that the claimed 

damages were less than $50,000). Second, even if Plaintiff’s 

Complaint could be read as stating a claim based on the 

vehicle’s gross capitalized cost, as a legal matter, Plaintiff’s 

lease payments represent the outward bound of any potential 

damages, since a plaintiff’s MMWA recovery is generally based on 

the difference between the price paid and the value received. 

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See Rouse, 2005 WL 61449, at *4 (holding that the price paid for 

a defective vehicle represented the maximum recoverable in 

damages). Thus, there is no potential that Plaintiff’s damages 

claims exceed the jurisdictional minimum and remand is 

appropriate. 

IV. Conclusion

 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion to 

remand the matter to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Camden County is GRANTED. An accompanying Order shall 

issue this date. 

 s/Renée Marie Bumb 

RENÉE MARIE BUMB 

United States District Judge 

Dated: March 2, 2012 

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