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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED

In re BOEHRINGER, Minors. December 29, 2015

Nos. 326892; 326893 Wayne Circuit Court Family Division

LC No. 13-513954-NA

Before: R ONAYNE K RAUSE , P.J., and M ARKEY and M. J. K ELLY , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

In these consolidated appeals, 1 respondent-mother (docket no. 326892) and respondentfather (docket no. 326893) each ap peal by right the trial court ’s order terminating their parental rights to the four minor children, JMB, BLB, HRB, and BNB. On appeal, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err when it found that the Departme nt of Health and Human Services established grounds for terminating respondent-father’s parenta l rights by clear and convincing evidence and did not clearly err when it found that termination of both respondents’ parental rights was in the children’s be st interests. Consequently, we affirm.

I. BASIC FACTS

In August 2013, the Department petitioned for the removal of t he three older children from their parents’ care. The Dep artment alleged that the chil dren witnessed an incident of domestic violence between their parents, which resulted in thei r father’s arrest. The Department also alleged that respondent-mother was unable to care for the children as a result of her drug abuse and that the home was unsuitable. The Department related that it had offered services to the parents in 2011 and 2012 in an attempt to rectify problems related to improper supervision, drug abuse, and domestic violence, and maintained that the curr ent problems were indicative that the parents had not benefited from those services. The Departm ent also noted that HRB tested positive for THC and opiates at her birth in 2012.

1 See In re Boehringer Minors , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 22, 2015(Docket Nos. 326892 and 326893).-2- Respondent-mother testified at a hearing later that same month and admitted that the children had witnessed an incident of domestic violence, which resulted in her husband’s arrest, that the home was “disorganized,” that HRB had tested positive for THC and opiates at her birth, and that she had tested positive for marijuana, hydrocodone, an d hydromorphone in July 2013. Respondent-father pleaded no-contest to the allegation that the children had witnessed domestic violence at the same hearing. On the basis of the admissions a nd plea, the trial court found that there were statutory grounds to take jurisdiction over the chil dren and entered an order to that effect on August 29, 2013. The order further provided for supe rvised parenting time for both parents and required the Departme nt to establish a parent-agenc y agreement and service plan for both parents.

The Department established a plan for respondent-father that c entered on helping him obtain skills for emotional stability, positive communication, and proper parenting. It also required him to find suitable housing and to understand the imp ortance of not allowing others— including his wife—to abuse drugs in front of the children. Th e Department required respondent-mother to obtain similar skills and suitable housing , but also required her to demonstrate clean and sober living and find employment. At a h earing held in September 2013, the Department’s case worker, Je ssica Rush, testified that the children had been placed with their maternal grandmother and described the plans and the services that the Department would provide.

Rush testified about the parents compliance with the plans at a hearing held in November 2013. She stated that respondent-mother had not submitted any drug screens, had twice missed her psychological intake, had not regularly visited with the ch ildren, and had missed her initial therapy session. As for respondent-father, Rush said he too mi ssed his psychological intake, but had attended individual therapy. He also had only sporadic vis its with the children and appeared to be living at a friend’s home. The trial court found that bo th parents were not complying with their plans.

At a hearing held in February 2014, Rush testified that respon dent-mother was still not in compliance with the requirements of her plan; Rush agreed that respondent-mother had been early terminated from every service provided by the Department. She left the rehab facility before she completed the program and tested positive for THC onone screen. Rush also
described an incident where res pondent-mother obtained Vicodin from her mother on Christmas day. Rush stated that respondent -father was in c ompliance withhis parenting classes, but did not have regular visits with the children.

In May 2014, the trial court held another hearing. Rush testi fied that respondent-mother was pregnant by respondent-father and continued to be completel y non-compliant with her plan. Rush stated that both respondents had stated that they were not planning together, but that she believed they were planning together on the basis of the eviden ce. 2 Rush stated that respondent-

2 Rush used the phrase “planning together” in the lower court pr oceedings to refer to the parties’ intent either to separate and planfor the children’s future se parately, or to remain together and jointly plan for the children’s future.-3- father was mostly compliant with his plan; he completed his psy chological and psychiatric evaluations and parenting classe s. He was also participating i n his individual therapy. However, he continued to have issues with codependency and anger and was still living at a friend’s home.
At the conclusion of the heari ng, the trial court found that re spondent-mother was not in compliance with her plan and found t hat respondent-father was i n compliance.

At an August 2014 hearing, Rush testified that she wanted to c hange the goal of the plan to adoption rather than reunification. She stated that respond ents continued to have extensive contact—including two incidents where respondent-father drove h is wife to the hospital because
she stated she wanted to commit suicide—and both have issues wi th compliance. Respondentfather was partially compliant. He had moved from his friend’s home, but was now living with his mother, which is also where his ex-wife lives with their tw o children. Although he had been visiting the children more, Rush s tated that the children’s bon d with him was not strong. She was also concerned about his employment and felt that his codep endency and anger issues made it unsafe for him to have unsupervised visits with the children . Finally, she stated that respondent-mother was not at all compliant with her plan. The trial court agreed that the plan should now be concurrent plans fo r adoption and reunification.

Respondent-mother gave birth to BNB in September 2014. The De partment petitioned
for the removal of BNB from bot h respondents’ care in October 2 014. It alleged that respondent-mother tested positive for opiates, THC, and Tricycl ics at the child’s birth. It also alleged that respondent-father re ported that he knew respondent -mother was taking Vicodin during her pregnancy.

The trial court held a hearing later in October 2014. Respond ent-father testified that he
did not have suitable housing for the chil d—he was moving from place to place—and that he had
three other children under the De partment’s care. Respondent-m other similarly conceded that she did not have proper housing and was not complying with the plan put in place by the Department with regard to her other children. On the basis of this testimony, the trial court found that there were grounds for exercising jurisdiction over BNB and placed the child with the Department. It also ordered the Department to establish a plan , which it stated “should probably just mirror” the existing service plans.

After the trial court took jur isdiction, it heard testimony by the parents’ new case worker, Amy Miller. Miller testified that respondent-mother was still not in compliance with her plan. She testified that respondent-father was in partial compliance; he was attending some of his individual therapy sessions, but still did not have suitable ho using. She further stated that neither parent was visiting regul arly with the children.

In December 2014, Rush signed a supplemental petition on behal f of the Department asking the trial court to termina te both respondents’ parental rights to the children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ), (c)( ii ), (g), and (j). In the petiti on, the Department alleged, in r elevant part, that respondent-mother had missed 77 of 77 random drug screens, had never provided the Department with proof of employment, did not have suitable hous ing, and had never had a permanent address. It alleged that respondent-father had not a dequately established his income and did not have adequate housing.-4- At a hearing held in January 2015, Rush testified that respond ents were living together in a hotel, but she had had no contact with them. Miller also tes tified and stated that respondentmother had been arrested in December; she was arrested for poss ession of heroin and driving on a suspended license. She was in respondent-father’s car at the time of her arrest. The trial court authorized the supplemental peti tion at that time and ordered that the respondents be given notice of a dispositional hearing by publication.

In February 2015, the tr ial court held a dis positional hearing on the supplemental petition. The respondents did not appear f or the hearing, but their lawye rs were present. Rush testified that she handled respondents’ case from August 2013 to August 2 014. During that time, respondent-mother never complied with her service plan; she nev er had housing—she “househopped or went to hotels”, never had employment, did not consis tently visit with the children, did not complete her psychologica l evaluation, and did not subm it any random drug screens. Respondent-mother did take a drug screen at the court and teste d positive for marijuana. Rush stated that respondent-mother ne ver “addressed her substance ab use issues” and would blame her behavior on “her past history of when she was a child.” She al so “[p]retty much” relied on respondent-father for her income.

Rush stated that respondent-fath er did complete some of the se rvices provided to him, but he was early terminated from therapy because his work schedule interfered with his ability to participate. Respondent-father sa id he worked as an independen t contractor doing sound engineering or lighting engineer ing, but Rush never received ad equate proof of his employment. Rush testified that respondent-father did not have adequate hou sing; he was living with his mother, which arrangeme nt Rush felt was not appropriate, but wa s now living in a hotel. He also
was not consistent with his visitation.

Rush testified that she felt that the court should terminate r espondent-father’s parental rights even though he made some progress. One serious concern with respondent-father was that, because of his work, he would leave the children in his w ife’s care while she was abusing substances. He also had a significant problem with codependenc y involving his wife: he is
“obsessed with his wife. He follows her around. He needs to know her every move where she goes. Just everything pertains t o his wife. His whole life [r evolves] around his wife.” She felt
that the children would be at-risk if returned to his care beca use he had not benefited from the services provided to him and, specifically, because he continue d to put his desire to be with his
wife before his children’s needs.

Miller similarly testified that respondent-mother had not comp lied with the service plan since Miller took over the case in August 2014. Miller stated that respondent-mother told her that she was not going to do the drug screens because she knew she would test positive. Miller also stated that respondent-father had not complied with the pl an and that the children had no bonds to either parent. She also did not believe that it was i n the children’s best interests to continue services, even though the children were currently in f amily placement. She agreed that the children needed permanency and stability, which their paren ts could not provide. She noted that JMB had had some significant behavioral issues, but that h is issues had stabilized while in his grandparents’ care. The other children were also doing wel l in their placements.-5- In reviewing the evidence, the trial court first noted that th e “parents gave up trying long before permanent custody was e ven discussed as an option.” Forthat reason, the court rejected respondent-mother’s lawyer’s argument that the parents should b e given more time. It also felt that the fact that the children had been placed with a relative did not weigh in favor of giving respondents more time. Had they admitted earlier that they wer e incapable of caring for the children and suggested a guardianship, the court might have ent ertained that idea: “But what they
have done is receded further and further from the children’s li ves rather than try to get closer and make some sort of legitimate arrangements for the children to r emain in care.” The trial court then found, on the basis of the record evidence, that the Department had established by clear and convincing evidence grounds for terminating both respondents’ p arental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ), (g), and (j), and that termi nation was in the children’s
best interests. The trial court entered an order to that effec t in March 2015.

Respondents now appeal in this Court.

II. STATUTORY GROUNDS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal, respondent-father argues that the trial court clear ly erred when it found that the Department established a gr ound for terminating his parenta l rights to the minor children. A trial court may terminate a parent’s parental rights, if it fin ds that the petitioner established a statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing eviden ce. MCL 712A.19b(3). This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s finding that the petitioner established a ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence. In re Mason , 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). A trial court’s finding is clearly erroneous when, aft er reviewing the entire record, this
Court is left with the definite and firm conviction that the tr ial court has made a mistake. Id.

B. ANALYSIS

The trial court, in relevant part, found that the Department h ad established grounds for terminating respondent-father’s parental rights to the childrenunder MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). A trial court may terminate a parent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) when the parent, “without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or cust ody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the p arent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.”

Although housing and income were issues for respondent-father, the most serious concerns with his parenting invol ved his relationship with his wife. There was evidence that respondent-father had a volatile relationship with his wife; in deed, the incident that (again) brought the children to the Department’s attention involved dom estic violence. In addition to that, Rush stated that the Department was concerned that respon dent-father would leave the children in his wife’s care, even though he knew she was abusin g drugs. There was evidence that he also enabled her drug use. In order to rectify the pro blems stemming from his relationship with his wife, the Department provided respondent- father with services fashioned to help him develop skills to address his codependency, and to hel p him with emotional stability, good communication, and anger management. Nevertheless, after more than a year of services,-6- there was no indication that respondent-father had been able to overcome the issues arising from his relationship with his wife.

Respondent-father fought with his wife in front of the childre n and police officers
became involved on at least two occasions. There was evidence too that he would travel as part
of his work and leave the children in his wife’s care with full knowledge that she had a serious drug problem that prevented her from safely caring for the chil dren. Respondent-father understood that he needed to separate himself from his wife whi le she remained addicted to drugs, but was unable or unwilli ng to do so. He repeatedly rep resented to the Department that he was planning for the children’s care on his own, but—despite hi s representations—continued to have contact with his wife; in fact, he impregnated his wife an d, by the time of the dispositional hearing, was living in a hotel w ith her. He also apparently pr ovided her with the car involved in her arrest for driving on a suspended license and possession of heroin. As Rush testified at the dispositional hearing, respondent -father was obsessed with his wife—and the evidence amply
demonstrated that he continued to be obsessed with her. His co dependency led to his problems with anger and domestic violence, and also contributed to his i nability to provide proper care and custody. On the basis of this evidence, the trial court could find that, as a result of his dysfunctional relationship with h is wife, responde nt-father was unable to provide proper care and custody to his children and would continue to be unable to prov ide proper care and custody to them for the foreseeable future. The totality of this evidence , especially when considered along with the evidence that respondent -father had been unable to sec ure proper housing in over a year, sufficiently supported the trial court’s finding that the Depar tment had established grounds for terminating respondent-father’s parental rights under MCL 712A. 19b(3)(g) by clear and convincing evidence.

This same evidence also supported a finding that, based on res pondent-father’s “conduct or capacity” there was a “reason able likelihood . . . that the child[ren] will be harmed if [they are] returned to the home of the parent.” MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). The evidence demonstrated that respondent-father placed his need to be with his wife, even tho ugh she posed a danger to his children, before his children’s need for a safe and stable home environment. Under different circumstances, respondent-mother might very well have been arre sted after getting high and crashing respondent-father’s car w ith the children inside, rath er than merely for possession of heroin or driving on a suspended license. The trial court was not required to wait for such an
incident before it could find th at respondent-father’s codepend ency placed the children in harm’s way. Because the evidence showed that respondent-father had no t demonstrated progress with regard to his codependency and th at his wife had not made any p rogress with her addiction, the trial court could reasonably f ind that respondent-father would continue to be involved with his wife and that his continued involvement with her would likely r esult in harm to the children, if they were returned to his car e. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).

On appeal, respondent-father makes much of the fact that he wa s partially compliant with his service plan; he maintains t hat his partial compliance was “indicative” of his intent to “eventually be reunified with the Children” and “shows that the re was a reasonable [likelihood] that the conditions that brought the Children into care would b e rectified.” However, on this record, we cannot agree that there was evidence that he would r ectify the behaviors that prevented him from properly cari ng for his children and protect ing them from possible harm. It is not sufficient to be partially compliant with the case servi ce plan; a parent must not only-7- participate in, but also benefit from, the services provided. In re Frey , 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). We also do not accept respondent-father’s argument that his noncompliance should be excused because he was merely the “vict im of an unpredictable and onerous work schedule.” The primary impediment to reunificatio n was and remained respondent-father’s inability to rectify the problems arising f rom his relationship with his wife. And it remained his obligation to demonstrate that he sufficien tly benefited from the services provided to him, notwithstanding his work schedule. Id. Here, the evidence strongly suggested that respondent-father had not benefited from the services prov ided to him and would likely continue to engage in the same kind of behaviors that had histo rically prevented him from providing proper care and custody for his children, and that pl aced his children in danger of
harm.

The trial court did not clearlyerr when it found that the Dep artment had established by clear and convincing evidence gr ounds for terminating responden t-father’s parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j). In re Mason , 486 Mich at 152. Because the trial court only needed to find one statutory ground in order t o terminate respondent-father’s parental rights, we need not address the remaining ground for t erminating his parental rights. In re Frey , 297 Mich App at 244.

III. BEST INTERESTS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal, respondent-mother doe s not challenge the trial cour t’s finding that the Department established a ground for terminating her parental ri ghts by clear and convincing evidence; rather, she argues that the trial court erred when itfound that the termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests. This Cou rt reviews for clear error the trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best int erests. In re White , 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014).

B. RESPONDENT-MOTHER

Even when a trial court finds t hat the petitioner established a statutory ground for terminating a parent’s parental rights, it cannot terminate the parent’s parental rights unless it also finds by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests. In re Gonzales/Martinez Minors , 310 Mich App 426, 434; ___ NW2d ___ (2015). “The children’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, and the chi ldren’s need for permanency, stability, and finality are all factors for the court to consid er in deciding whether termination is in
the best interests of the children.” Id. In addition, a child’s placement with relatives is a factor that the trial court is require d to consider and which generall y weighs against termination. Id.

There was overwhelming evidence that respondent-mother had a s erious drug addiction that prevented her from caring for her children and placed them at risk of harm while in her care. Respondent-mother made no effort to comply with her service pla n and, in fact, made it abundantly clear that she had no intention of doing so. As the trial court aptly noted, respondentmother had not done anything to f oster her relationship to the children, but instead had “receded
further and further from the children’s lives.” Her children s imply did not take priority over her-8- addiction. The record evidence also demonstrated that responde nt-mother’s continued participation in her children’ s lives—however minimal—placed th e children at risk. She could not even behave appropriately ar ound her children on Christmas day. The children needed permanency and stability and respondent-mother’s continued part icipation in their lives served only to disrupt and disorder the stability that they had found with their grandparents. Consequently, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred when it found that it was in all of
the children’s best interests to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights. In re White , 303 Mich App at 713.

Respondent-mother also argues th at the trial court erred when it failed to individually
consider the best interests of the children. Specifically, she argues that the Department never gave her an opportunity to show that she could properly parent BNB, who was born in September 2014, and the infant’s best interests clearly differe d from those of the older children. The primary barrier to respondent -mother’s reunification with h er children was her drug abuse. And the evidence established that respondent-mother had done no thing to address that problem. The evidence that respondent-mother’s drug abuse prevented her from properly caring for her older children and exposed them to harm was also probative of h ow she would treat BNB. See

In re Hudson , 294 Mich App 261, 266; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). BNB also tested positive for drugs at birth and respondent-mother remained unwilling to do a nything to address her addiction
after the child’s birth.

Moreover, while the trial court had an obligation “to view eac h child individually when determining whether termination of parental rights is in that c hild’s best interests,” In re
Olive/Metts Minors , 297 Mich App 35, 42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012), it was not requiredto separately address the best interests of each child; rather, a trial court’s findings are sufficient if
it is evident that the trial court considered the children’s in dividual situation. See In re White

, 303 Mich App at 715-716 (rejectin g the contention that the deci sion in In re Olive/Metts Minors requires “redundant factual findi ngs concerning each child’s be st interests” and holding that the trial court need only make indivi dual findings when the best in terests of the ch ildren significantly differ). Here, the children’s be st interests were essentially the same. The trial court specifically noted that respondent-mother had no bond with any of the childr en and had effectively abandoned each of them. It also recognized that respondent-mother’s continued participation in their lives was disruptive and c ontrary to their best interests

.

The trial court did not clearly err when it found that termina tion of respondent-mother’s parental rights to the childre n was in their best interests. In re White , 303 Mich App at 713.

C. RESPONDENT-FATHER

On appeal, respondent-father also argues in a one-paragraph ar gument under a separate heading that the trial court erred when it determined that term ination was “warranted.” The heading refers to the trial court’s exercise of discretion in t erminating respondent-father’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ), (g), and (j). It is unclear what respondent-father
means when he refers to the trial court’s exercise of discretio n; once the trial court found that a statutory ground had been estab lished by clear and convincing e vidence and found that termination was in the children’s best interests, it had to ent er an order terminating respondentfather’s parental rights. See MCL 712A.19b(5). To the extent that respondent-father appears to-9- be challenging the trial court’ s best interests determination, we conclude that he has abandoned that claim of error by failing to properly address it on appeal . See Berger v Berger , 277 Mich App 700, 712; 747 NW2d 336 (2008). In any event, there was sub stantial evidence that respondent-father was unable to address his dysfunctional relat ionship with his wife and that his continued exercise of parental r ights would, for that reason, l ikely continue to disrupt the stability and permanence the children needed. Therefore, we cannot state that the trial court clearly erred when it found that termination of respondent-fath er’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interests. In re White , 303 Mich App at 713.

IV. CONCLUSION

The trial court did not clearly err when it found that the Dep artment had established at least two statutory grounds for t erminating respondent-father’s parental rights to the children. It also did not clearly err when it found that termination of bothrespondents’ parental rights was in
the children’s best interests . Accordingly, we affirm in both dockets.

Affirmed.

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause /s/ Jane E. Markey /s/ Michael J. Kelly