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1930 East Marlton Pike, Suite Q29 

Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08003 

Telephone: 856-429-8334 

Attorney of Record: Amy Bennecoff (AB0891) 

Attorney for Plaintiff 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

ELENA MONTANEZ, 

 Plaintiff 

v 

ACADEMY COLLECTION SERVICES, 

INC. f/k/a MONARCH RECOVERY 

MANAGEMENT, INC. 

 Defendant 

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Case No.: 

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR 

JURY TRIAL 

(Unlawful Debt Collection Practices)

COMPLAINT

ELENA MONTANEZ (“Plaintiff”), by her attorney, AMY L. BENNECOFF, ESQUIRE, 

alleges the following against ACADEMY COLLECTION SERVICES, INC. f/k/a MONARCH 

RECOVERY MANAGEMENT, INC. (“Defendant”): 

INTRODUCTION 

1. Plaintiff’s Complaint is based on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 

U.S.C. §1692, et seq. (“FDCPA”). 

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1 JURISDICTION AND VENUE 

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2. Jurisdiction of this court arises pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d), which states 

that such actions may be brought and heard before “any appropriate United States District Court 

without regard to the amount in controversy,” and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 grants this court original 

jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the laws of the United States. 

3. Defendant conducts business within the State of New Jersey and therefore, 

personal jurisdiction is established. 

4. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). 

5. Declaratory relief is available pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. 

PARTIES 

6. Plaintiff is a natural person residing in Palisades Park, New Jersey, 07650. 

 7. Plaintiff is a person granted a cause of action under the FDCPA. See 15 

U.S.C. §1692k(a), and Wenrich v. Cole, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18687 (E.D. Pa. Dec 22, 2000). 

8. Defendant is a national debt collection company with corporate headquarters 

located at 10965 Decatur Road, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19154. 

 9. Defendant is a “debt collector” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. 

§1692a(6), and repeatedly contacted Plaintiff in an attempt to collect a debt. 

 10. Defendant acted through their agents, employees, officers, members, 

directors, heirs, successors, assigns, principals, trustees, sureties, subrogees, representatives, and 

insurers. 

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1 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 

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11. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) is a comprehensive statute 

which prohibits a catalog of activities in connection with the collection of debts by third parties. 

See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. The FDCPA imposes civil liability on any person or entity that 

violates its provisions, and establishes general standards of debt collector conduct, defines abuse, 

and provides for specific consumer rights. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. The operative provisions of the 

FDCPA declare certain rights to be provided to or claimed by debtors, forbid deceitful and 

misleading practices, prohibit harassing and abusive tactics, and proscribe unfair or 

unconscionable conduct, both generally and in a specific list of disapproved practices. 

12. In particular, the FDCPA broadly enumerates several practices considered 

contrary to its stated purpose, and forbids debt collectors from taking such action. The 

substantive heart of the FDCPA lies in three broad prohibitions. First, a “debt collector may not 

engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any 

person in connection with the collection of a debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. Second, a “debt 

collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection 

with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. And third, a “debt collector may not use 

unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 

The FDCPA is designed to protect consumers from unscrupulous collectors, whether or not there 

exists a valid debt, broadly prohibits unfair or unconscionable collection methods, conduct which 

harasses, oppresses or abuses any debtor, and any false, deceptive or misleading statements in 

connection with the collection of a debt. 

13. In enacting the FDCPA, the United States Congress found that “[t]here is 

abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many 

debt collectors,” which “contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, 

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to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a. Congress 

additionally found existing laws and procedures for redressing debt collection injuries to be 

inadequate to protect consumers. 15 U.S.C. § 1692b. 

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14. Congress enacted the FDCPA to regulate the collection of consumer debts by 

debt collectors. The express purposes of the FDCPA are to “eliminate abusive debt collection 

practices by debt collectors, to insure that debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt 

collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action 

to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 

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15. Defendant and others it retained began in or around August 1, 2010 constantly 

and continuously placing harassing and abusive collection calls to Plaintiff seeking and 

demanding payment for an alleged consumer debt. 

16. The alleged debt arose out of a payday loan. 

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17. Upon information and belief, the alleged debt Defendant was seeking to collect 

arose out of transactions, which were primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 

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18. Defendant, through its employee identified as “David” harassed Plaintiff by 

making continuous calls to her place of employment. 

19. At times, Defendant would contact Plaintiff one (1) to two (2) times a day. 

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20. During its first communication with Plaintiff, Defendant failed to advise Plaintiff 

that it was a debt collector attempting to collect a debt and any information obtained will be 

used for that purpose. 

21. On or about September 9, 2010, after the Plaintiff instructed “David” to stop 

contacting her at work, “David” advised Plaintiff he was going to continue to call her at work 

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and contact her boss until she lost her job; that she would be arrested for not paying the alleged 

debt; that he would fax her job information about her debt unless she paid; called her a “bitch”; 

told her she was being sued; and humiliated her by making fun of her accent. 

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22. During a conversation on September 16, 2010, Defendant told Plaintiff’s boss 

that he was an attorney attempting to sue the Plaintiff for money she owed; Defendant’s contact 

with Plaintiff’s boss was embarrassing to her. 

 23. Following the September 9, 2010 and September 16, 2010 telephone calls, 

Plaintiff believed that an attorney was involved in the collection of the alleged debt and that an 

attorney could and would take legal action against her; however, to date, Defendant has not 

taken legal action against Plaintiff. 

 24. Based on information and belief, Defendant misrepresented that it had taken legal 

action, never took any legal action against Plaintiff, and never intended to take legal action 

against her despite its threats to do so. 

 25. Defendant contacted Plaintiff at times and places that were inconvenient to 

Plaintiff and were made known to Defendant as being inconvenient. 

 26. Despite Plaintiff’s instructions not to contact her, Defendant and others it 

retained still continued to contact Plaintiff at work, in an attempt to collect a debt. 

 27. The repetitive calls to Plaintiff were disturbing, harassing, and an invasion of 

privacy; further, these repeated harassing calls left Plaintiff feeling nervous, sick to her stomach, 

worried about possibly losing her job, and have kept her from sleeping at night.. 

28. Defendant and others it retained repeatedly contacted Plaintiff for at least eight 

(8) weeks in its attempts to collect this alleged debt. 

29. Plaintiff at all times has disputed owing this debt; however, despite Plaintiff’s 

repeated dispute, Defendant persisted in its efforts to collect this alleged debt, contacting both 

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1 Plaintiff and her boss regarding this alleged debt. 

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 30. Defendant’s employees and agents discussed the alleged debt with various third 

parties, including but not limited Plaintiff’s boss on September 9, 2010 and September 16, 2010. 

 31. Defendant also failed to send Plaintiff written notification of her rights to dispute 

the debt and/or seek verification of the debt within five (5) days of its initial communication 

with Plaintiff in August 2010. 

 32. Defendant’s actions in attempting to collect the alleged debt were harassing, 

abusive and highly deceptive. 

CONSTRUCTION OF APPLICABLE LAW 

33. The FDCPA is a strict liability statute. Taylor v. Perrin, Landry, deLaunay & 

Durand, 103 F.3d 1232 (5th Cir. 1997). “Because the Act imposes strict liability, a consumer 

need not show intentional conduct by the debt collector to be entitled to damages.” Russell v. 

Equifax A.R.S., 74 F. 3d 30 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Gearing v. Check Brokerage Corp., 233 

F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding unintentional misrepresentation of debt collector’s legal status 

violated FDCPA); Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F. 2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993). 

34. The FDCPA is a remedial statute, and therefore must be construed liberally in favor 

of the debtor. Sprinkle v. SB&C Ltd., 472 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (W.D. Wash. 2006). The remedial 

nature of the FDCPA requires that courts interpret it liberally. Clark v. Capital Credit & 

Collection Services, Inc., 460 F. 3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2006). “Because the FDCPA, like the Truth 

in Lending Act (TILA) 15 U.S.C § 1601 et seq., is a remedial statute, it should be construed 

liberally in favor of the consumer.” Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F. 3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2002). 

35. The FDCPA is to be interpreted in accordance with the “least sophisticated” 

consumer standard. See Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168 (11th Cir. 1985); Graziano v. 

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Harrison, 950 F. 2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991); Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit Service, Inc., 869 

F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1988). The FDCPA was not “made for the protection of experts, but for the 

public - that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking, and the credulous, and 

the fact that a false statement may be obviously false to those who are trained and experienced 

does not change its character, nor take away its power to deceive others less experienced.” Id. 

The least sophisticated consumer standard serves a dual purpose in that it ensures protection of 

all consumers, even naive and trusting, against deceptive collection practices, and protects 

collectors against liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices. 

Clomon, 988 F. 2d at 1318. 

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COUNT I 

DEFENDANT VIOLATED THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

36. In their actions to collect a disputed debt, Defendant violated the FDCPA in one or 

more of the following ways: 

a. When it contacted third parties for purposes other than obtaining location 

information for Plaintiff, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692b; 

b. When it disclosed the existence of a debt owed by Plaintiff to third parties, in 

violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692b(2); 

c. When it communicated with a third party, specifically Plaintiff’s boss, more 

than once, about an alleged debt owed by Plaintiff, in violation of 15 U.S.C. 

§1692b(3); 

d. When it communicated with the Plaintiff at any unusual; time or place known 

or which should be known to be inconvenient to the Plaintiff, in violation of 

15 U.S.C. §1692c(a)(1); 

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e. When it communicated with the Plaintiff at her place of employment and 

knew or had reason to know that the Plaintiff’s employer prohibits the 

Plaintiff from receiving such communication, in violation of 15 U.S.C. 

§1692c(a)(3); 

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f. When it communicated with someone other than the Plaintiff in connection 

with the collection of the alleged debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692c(b); 

g. Harassing, oppressing or abusing Plaintiff in connection with the collection of 

a debt in violation of 15 U.S.C.§1692d; 

h. When it used or threatened to use violence or other criminal means to harm 

the physical person, reputation or property of the Plaintiff, in violation of 15 

U.S.C.§1692d(1); 

i. When it used obscene or profane language or language the natural 

consequence of which is to abuse the hearer or reader, in violation of 15 

U.S.C.§1692d(2); 

j. When it caused the Plaintiff’s telephone to ring repeatedly or continuously 

with the intent to harass, annoy or abuse Plaintiff, in violation of 15 U.S.C. 

§1692d(5); 

k. When it used false, misleading and deceptive means to collect a debt in 

violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e; 

l. When it falsely represented the character, amount or legal status of the alleged 

debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(2); 

m. When it implied that any individual is an attorney or that any communication 

is from an attorney, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(3); 

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n. When it implied that the nonpayment of any debt will result in the arrest or 

imprisonment of any person, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(4); 

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o. When it made threats to take legal action that cannot legally be taken or not 

intended to be taken, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(5); 

p. When it made a false representation that the Plaintiff committed any crime or 

other conduct in order to disgrace the Plaintiff in violation of 15 U.S.C. 

§1692e(7); 

q. When it used false representations or deceptive means to collect the debt, in 

violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10); 

r. When it failed to disclose that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt 

and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose, in violation of 

15 U.S.C. §1692e(11); 

s. Using unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any 

debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692f; 

t. When it failed to validate the debt within 5 days after communicating with 

Plaintiff by sending written notice containing the amount of debt, name of 

creditor, etc., in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a); and 

u. By acting in an otherwise deceptive, unfair and unconscionable manner and 

failing to comply with the FDCPA. 

 PRAYER FOR RELIEF 

 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, ELENA MONTANEZ, respectfully pray for a judgment as 

follows: 

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a. All actual compensatory damages suffered pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 

1692k(a)(1); 

b. Statutory damages of $1,000.00 for the violation of the FDCPA pursuant to 

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A); 

c. All reasonable attorneys’ fees, witness fees, court costs and other litigation 

costs incurred by Plaintiff pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1693k(a)(3); and 

d. Any other relief deemed appropriate by this Honorable Court. 

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff, ELENA MONTANEZ, demands a jury trial in 

this case. 

 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO L. CIV. R. 11.2 

I hereby certify pursuant to Local Civil Rule 11.2 that this matter in controversy is not the 

subject of any other action pending in any court, arbitration or administrative proceeding. 

Respectfully submitted, 

KIMMEL & SILVERMAN, P.C. 

 By: /s/ Amy L. Bennecoff 

Amy L. Bennecoff 

Attorney ID # AB 0891 

Kimmel & Silverman, P.C 

1930 E. Martlon Pike, Suite Q29 

Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08003 

Phone: (856)429-8334 

Facsimile (856) 216-7344 

Email: abennecoff@creditlaw.com

Dated: June 24, 2011 

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