NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

____________________________________

:

TAREK EL HADIDI, :

:

Plaintiff, : Civil Action No. 11-3658 (JAP)

v. :

:

INTRACOASTAL LAND SALES, INC., : OPINION

et al., :

:

Defendants. :

___________________________________ :

PISANO, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Intracoastal Land Sales, Inc.’s 

(“Defendant”) motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to transfer this matter pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1404(a). Plaintiff Tarek El Hadidi (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion. For the reasons set 

forth below, the Court will dismiss Count Five of Plaintiff’s complaint for failing to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted, and will transfer the remaining claims to the United States 

District Court for the District of South Carolina. 

I. BACKGROUND1

In February 2005, Plaintiff received an invitation to attend a presentation on the 

Waterway Palms Plantation (“the Plantation”), a subdivision of single family building lots near 

Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. As the broker responsible for the marketing and selling of lots at 

 

1

In addressing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true the allegations contained in a complaint. See Toys 

"R" US, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 457 (3d Cir. 2003); Dayhoff, Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287, 

1301 (3d Cir. 1996). Accordingly, the facts recited herein are taken from Plaintiff’s complaint unless otherwise 

indicated; they do not represent this Court’s factual findings.

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the Plantation, Defendant organized and ran the presentation, which was held on February 15, 

2005 at the Bridgewater Marriot Hotel in Bridgewater, New Jersey.2

After attending the presentation in February, Plaintiff travelled from Newark, New Jersey 

to Myrtle Beach on a flight Defendant chartered for prospective purchasers in March 2005. 

Upon arriving at the Plantation, he was given a tour of the planned development and a 

presentation on the properties available for purchase. Defendant also offered Plaintiff special 

incentives in an effort to facilitate a quick sale and closing. After receiving and reviewing 

various documents concerning the properties, including reports relating to the construction 

schedule at the Plantation, Plaintiff purchased two undeveloped lots. 

In September 2005, Plaintiff returned to South Carolina and retained a private builder to 

develop his lots. When he arrived at the Plantation, however, he alleges that he observed that 

construction had not proceeded as he expected, and that several of the elements contained in the 

property reports he received prior to purchase were not being completed per the estimates. As a 

result, he asserts that the value of his properties decreased and that he was denied the opportunity 

to realize the benefit of his investments. 

On June 24, 2011, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant and several fictitious 

entities and individuals. Therein, he asserts numerous causes of action, including allegations of: 

(1) violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act; (2) negligent misrepresentation; (3) fraud 

and intentional misrepresentation; (4) unjust enrichment; (5) violation of the New Jersey 

Deceptive Business Practices Act; and (6) outrage or negligent infliction of mental distress. 

Plaintiff’s allegations are based primarily on alleged misrepresentations by Defendant contained 

in property reports it furnished to Plaintiff in March 2005. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that 

 

2 The preview was also held at a number of other sites, including hotels located in Eatontown, New Jersey, Cherry 

Hill, New Jersey, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 

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Defendant misrepresented the projected completion dates and construction status of the sewer 

system and various community facilities at the Plantation, including the clubhouse, swimming 

pool, and tennis courts. He alleges that those misrepresentations influenced his decision to 

purchase two lots at the Plantation. On July 15, 2011, Defendant filed the instant motion to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the 

alternative, to transfer this action or any remaining claims to the United States District Court for 

the District of South Carolina.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may grant a motion to dismiss if 

the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court set 

forth the standard for addressing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) in Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). The Twombly Court stated that, “[w]hile a complaint attacked 

by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s 

obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 

555 (internal citations omitted). Therefore, for a complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss 

under Rule 12(b)(6), the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if 

doubtful in fact).” Id. (internal citations and footnote omitted).

More recently, the Supreme Court emphasized that, when assessing the sufficiency of a 

civil complaint, a court must distinguish factual contentions and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 

S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). A complaint will be dismissed unless it “contain[s] sufficient factual 

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matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Count Five: New Jersey Deceptive Business Practices Act

As an initial matter, Plaintiff asserts a claim under the Deceptive Business Practices Act, 

N.J.S.A. § 2C:21-7, a New Jersey criminal statute, in Count Five of his complaint. The Act 

criminalizes a variety of conduct relating to fraudulent and deceptive practices, including false or 

misleading statements made for the purpose of promoting the sale of property. See generally

N.J.S.A. § 2C:21-7. However, as Defendant argues in support of its motion to dismiss, there is 

nothing in the Act or its legislative history that provides for a private cause of action. See, e.g.,

Matter of State Comm'n of Investigation, 108 N.J. 35, 41 (1987). Thus, because the Court cannot 

discern a basis for Plaintiff’s claim under the Act, and because Plaintiff does not address this 

point in his opposition brief or otherwise set forth facts sufficient to state a claim under N.J.S.A. 

§ 2C:21-7, Count Five of his Complaint must be dismissed at this time pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 

B. Remaining Counts

The remaining claims set forth in Plaintiff’s complaint are based primarily on alleged 

conduct and misrepresentations made in connection with his purchase of two undeveloped lots at 

the Plantation. In order to determine whether those claims are subject to dismissal, a choice of 

law analysis is necessary. However, because the Court concludes that the United States District 

Court for the District of South Carolina is the more appropriate venue for this action, it will grant 

Defendant’s motion to transfer.

Defendant’s motion to transfer is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which provides: 

“[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may 

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transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” The 

determination whether to transfer a case is in the discretion of the district court. See Jumara v. 

State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 878 (3d Cir. 1995). A plaintiff’s choice of venue is not to be 

“lightly disturbed,” and the moving party has the burden of establishing both that the proposed 

transferee forum is proper and that a balancing of the relevant interests weighs in favor of 

transfer. See id. at 879. 

As a threshold matter, the Court must determine whether the District of South Carolina is 

a “district in which this action might have been brought” pursuant to § 1404(a). A district is one 

in which an action “might have been brought” if: (1) it has subject matter jurisdiction over the 

claims; (3) personal jurisdiction over the parties; and (3) is a proper venue. See Shutte v. Armco 

Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 24 (3d Cir. 1970)(“venue must have been proper in the transferee 

district and the transferee court must have had power to command jurisdiction over all of the 

defendants”).

Here, the Court concludes that the District of South Carolina is a “district in which this 

action might have been brought.” Indeed, it has (1) subject matter jurisdiction over the claims

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the parties are citizens of different states and the amount in 

controversy exceeds $75,000; (2) personal jurisdiction over the parties because Defendant is

headquartered in South Carolina, incorporated under its laws, and conducts the majority of its 

business there; and (3) venue is proper because the majority of the alleged activities and events 

giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in South Carolina, and South Carolina is the situs of the 

property at issue in this case. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the District of South 

Carolina is a district where this action might have been brought.

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The Court must next determine whether the District of South Carolina is the more 

appropriate and convenient forum to hear this matter. Although the Third Circuit has

emphasized that there “is no definitive formula or list of the factors to consider” when deciding a 

motion to transfer, it has set forth a variety of relevant private and public interests to consider in 

addition to those explicitly listed in § 1404(a). See Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. The relevant private 

interests include: (1) plaintiff’s forum preference; (2) defendant’s forum preference; (3) whether 

the claim arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the convenience of witnesses; 

and (6) the location of sources of proof. See id. The relevant public interests include: (1) the 

enforceability of the judgment; (2) practical considerations that could make the trial easy, 

expeditious, or inexpensive; (3) the relative administrative difficulty in the two fora resulting 

from court congestion; (4) the local interest in deciding local disputes at home; (5) the public 

policies of the fora; and (6) the familiarity of the trial judge with the applicable state law in 

diversity cases. See id. 

Having considered the above factors, the Court concludes that the relevant interests 

weigh in favor of transferring this case to the District of South Carolina. With regard to the 

private interests, the Court recognizes that a plaintiff’s choice of forum is normally accorded

great weight when deciding a motion to transfer. See, e.g., id. However, the degree of deference 

afforded that choice is reduced when, as here, the chosen forum has little connection with the 

dispute and the relevant acts giving rise to the claims occurred elsewhere. See, e.g., Santi v. 

Nat’l Bus. Records Mgmt, LLC, 722 F. Supp. 2d 602, 606 (D.N.J. 2010); Yang v. Odom, 409 F. 

Supp. 2d 599, 606 (D.N.J. 2006); Ramada Worldwide v. Bellmark Sarasota Airport, LLC, 2006 

WL 1675067, at *3 (D.N.J. June 15, 2006)(plaintiff’s choice of venue given less weight where 

New Jersey had little connection with the dispute and “[s]ubstantially all of the relevant acts 

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giving rise to [the] action occurred in Florida and the real property subject to the dispute, as well 

as most of both parties’ material witnesses, are located there”). Indeed, in the instant case, the 

properties at issue were purchased and are located in South Carolina, presentations concerning 

those properties and containing alleged misrepresentations that form the basis of Plaintiff’s 

claims took place in South Carolina, pertinent documents were exchanged and executed in South 

Carolina, and the construction and development of the sewer system and recreational facilities 

that Plaintiff alleges was delayed occurred in South Carolina and was observed by Plaintiff while 

he was there.3 

Moreover, the vast majority of the potential witnesses to this dispute are located in South 

Carolina. In support of its motion, Defendant asserts that, although it is the only named 

defendant in the action, the issues relating to the alleged construction delays that are the 

foundation of Plaintiff’s claims may involve information needed from numerous other parties, all 

of whom are located in South Carolina. Specifically, in addition to its own representatives,

Defendant identifies the developer, general contractor, engineers, and planners for the Plantation, 

the subcontractor and utility authority responsible for the sewer improvements, the law firm at 

which the transaction for the sale of Plaintiff’s lots took place, and the builder Plaintiff retained 

to develop and build on his lots. See Def.’s Br. at 3, 21-22. Plaintiff, on the other hand, 

identifies as potential witnesses only unnamed individuals from New Jersey with little apparent 

connection to the proofs of his case, including employees and patrons at the Bridgewater Marriot 

Hotel who attended the presentation in February 2005, employees and individuals on his flight 

 

3

In his opposition brief, Plaintiff asserts that “Defendant clearly should have expected that they might have to 

litigate in New Jersey” because they solicited Plaintiff in New Jersey, organized a presentation on the Plantation at 

a hotel in New Jersey, and included New Jersey regulations in some of the documents that Plaintiff received and 

allegedly signed in New Jersey. Pl.’s Br. at 16-17. However, as detailed above, the vast majority of the events, 

alleged misrepresentations, and potential evidence took place or is located in South Carolina. Moreover, the transfer 

determination under § 1404(a) does not turn on whether Defendant had sufficient contacts with New Jersey so as to 

establish personal jurisdiction; instead, as outlined above, it involves a weighing of the relevant private and public 

interests. 

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from Newark to Myrtle Beach, and the notary who witnessed him sign certain documents in New 

Jersey. See Pl.’s Br. at 2. Accordingly, the relevant private interests in this case weigh strongly 

in favor of transfer to the District of South Carolina.

On balance, the public interests also weigh in favor of transfer. Although New Jersey has 

an interest in protecting its citizens from alleged misrepresentations in connection with the sale 

of property, South Carolina likewise has a significant interest in this action insofar as many of 

those alleged misrepresentations took place in South Carolina and the property at issue was 

purchased and is located there. Similarly, although the Court acknowledges Plaintiff’s concern 

that litigating in South Carolina as opposed to New Jersey may be more costly and burdensome 

for him, the practical considerations relevant to the transfer determination provide more support 

for Defendant’s position. Indeed, as detailed above, nearly all of the potential witnesses4and 

evidence are located in South Carolina, and the vast majority of the alleged events and conduct 

that form the basis of Plaintiff’s claims occurred there. Accordingly, having considered the 

relevant private and public interests, the Court concludes that transfer of this matter to the 

District of South Carolina is appropriate and in the interest of justice. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court dismisses Count Five of Plaintiff’s Complaint and 

transfers the remaining claims to the United States District Court for the District of South 

Carolina. An appropriate Order will follow. 

/s/ JOEL A. PISANO 

United States District Judge

Dated: February 24, 2012 

 

4

In that regard, the Court notes that Defendant cannot compel the majority of the potential witnesses it identifies to 

travel to New Jersey to testify, and that requiring them to do so would be extremely costly and burdensome. 

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