UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4961

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ERIC LAVELL SKIPWITH,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District 

Judge. (1:14-cr-00092-JFM-2)

Submitted: June 16, 2015 Decided: July 2, 2015

Before DIAZ, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Nancy S. Forster, KADISH FORSTER AND FASTOVSKY, Baltimore, 

Maryland, for Appellant. Christopher John Romano, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Eric Lavell Skipwith appeals the district court’s judgment 

sentencing him to 72 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to 

possess with the intent to distribute 500 grams or more of 

cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). In accordance 

with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Skipwith’s 

counsel filed a brief certifying that there are no meritorious 

grounds for appeal but questioning whether the district court 

imposed an unreasonable sentence in light of the lesser sentence 

imposed on Skipwith’s codefendant. Skipwith filed a pro se 

supplemental brief, alleging that the district court erred in 

sentencing him above the mandatory minimum because his criminal 

history score overstated his criminal history, and that the 

district court engaged in impermissible judicial fact-finding in 

violation of Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). 

We affirm.

We review a defendant’s sentence for reasonableness using 

an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 

U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We must first review for “significant 

procedural error,” which includes improperly calculating the 

Sentencing Guidelines range, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) factors, sentencing based on clearly erroneous facts, 

or failing to adequately explain the sentence. Id.
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If we find no significant procedural error, we examine the 

substantive reasonableness of the sentence under “the totality 

of the circumstances.” Id. The sentence imposed must be 

“sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to satisfy the 

goals of sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). We 

presume on appeal that a sentence within a properly calculated 

Guidelines range is reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756 

F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014). 

The appellant bears the burden to rebut the presumption by 

showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against 

the § 3553(a) factors. Id.

Skipwith argues that his sentence runs afoul of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(6) because his codefendant was sentenced to only 15 

months’ imprisonment. Section 3553(a)(6) is aimed at 

eliminating national sentencing disparities, not sentencing 

disparities among codefendants. United States v. Quinn, 359 

F.3d 666, 682 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Withers, 100 

F.3d 1142, 1149 (4th Cir. 1996). The district court did, 

however, consider the potential sentence of Skipwith’s 

codefendant, but found that in light of the § 3553(a) factors as 

a whole, a 72-month sentence was appropriate for Skipwith.

Moreover, the district court did not err in declining to 

depart downward on the basis that Skipwith’s criminal history 

score overstated his criminal history. Because no motion for a 
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downward departure was made below, we review for plain error. 

United States v. Slade, 631 F.3d 185, 189 (4th Cir. 2011). A 

downward departure is warranted “when a defendant’s criminal 

history category exaggerates the seriousness of his past 

criminal conduct or the likelihood that he will commit further 

crimes.” United States v. Stockton, 349 F.3d 755, 764 (4th Cir. 

2003). Here, the district court considered the fact that many 

of Skipwith’s past convictions were for alcohol-related offenses 

and not controlled substance offenses; however, the court found 

Skipwith’s criminal history sufficiently serious to justify the 

sentence imposed. Thus, the district court did not err in 

declining to sua sponte depart downward, and when measured 

against the § 3553(a) factors as a whole, Skipwith’s withinGuidelines sentence is reasonable.

Finally, Skipwith’s pro se claim that his sentence runs 

contrary to Alleyne is without merit. Alleyne applies to 

statutory mandatory minimums, not Guidelines sentences. See

Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2163. Moreover, the court used the exact 

quantity of cocaine charged in the indictment and to which 

Skipwith stipulated, and by pleading guilty Skipwith waived his 

right to have the jury decide if those facts were proven. Id.

at 2160.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in 

this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We 
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therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Skipwith, in writing, of the right 

to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Skipwith requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Skipwith.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED