[Cite as State v. Meyers, 2024-Ohio-4533.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

WARREN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

Appellee,

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ALLEN ROBERT MEYERS,

Appellant.

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CASE NO. CA2023-12-112

O P I N I O N

9/16/2024

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Case No. 20CR36941

David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kirsten A. Brandt, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

James F. Maus, for appellant.

HENDRICKSON, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Allen Robert Meyers, appeals from a sentence imposed by the 

Warren County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} On July 27, 2020, the Warren County Grand Jury returned an indictment 

against Meyers charging him with failure to comply with an order or signal of a police 
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officer, a felony of the third degree; operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, a 

drug of abuse, or a combination of them, a misdemeanor of the first degree; OVI (refusal 

with a prior OVI conviction), a misdemeanor of the first degree; and failure to stop after 

an accident, a misdemeanor of the first degree. From October 2020 to May 24, 2023, 

Meyers was at large in the community, could not be located, and was unavailable for trial.

{¶ 3} On November 1, 2023, Meyers entered into a plea agreement in which he 

would plead guilty to failure to comply, OVI (refusal with prior OVI conviction), and failure 

to stop. In exchange, the state would dismiss the remaining OVI charge. Because the 

failure to comply charge was a third-degree felony offense of violence, the change of plea 

form advised Meyers that he was subject to mandatory postrelease control after his 

release from prison for up to three years. However, at the plea hearing, Meyers' counsel 

objected to the imposition of mandatory postrelease control, arguing that failure to comply 

is not an offense of violence. In discussing postrelease control with Meyers, the trial court 

advised him that mandatory postrelease control was applicable. Meyers then entered his 

pleas of guilty.

{¶ 4} On December 13, 2023, a sentencing hearing was held. The prosecutor 

gave a summary of the facts for the court's consideration:

This is a failure to comply from 2020 that occurred in the early 

morning hours in South Lebanon. It ended—he was OVI. He 

struck a parked car. Then there was a pursuit kind of in a 

circle around the streets of South Lebanon . . . he failed to 

stop at multiple different stop signs. Traveled up the center. 

Drove the wrong way down a one way before ultimately kind 

of pulling into a private driveway. Did not put the car in . . . 

park as he got out of the vehicle and troopers had to jump in 

and stop the vehicle before it ran into a structure.

The trial court then sentenced Meyers to one year of incarceration to be followed by 

mandatory postrelease control of up to three years, but not less than one year.

{¶ 5} Meyers now appeals, raising one assignment of error for our review.
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II. Legal Analysis

{¶ 6} Assignment of Error:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY SENTENCING 

APPELLANT-DEFENDANT TO A TERM OF MANDATORY 

POST-RELEASE CONTROL IN THE ABSENCE OF A 

FELONY CONVICTION FOR AN "OFFENSE OF 

VIOLENCE."

{¶ 7} In his sole assignment of error, Meyers asserts that failure to comply is not 

an offense of violence, and therefore the court erred in imposing a mandatory term of 

postrelease control. In support, Meyers argues that failure to comply is not specifically 

listed as an offense of violence under R.C. 2901.01(A)(9)(a), and the elements of failure 

to comply under R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii) are broader than the 2901.01(A)(9)(c) 

definition of an offense of violence.

{¶ 8} The crux of Meyers' argument is that his plea of guilty to R.C. 

2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii) does not clarify if his conduct created a risk of serious physical harm 

to property only, persons only, or both—therefore it does not qualify as an offense of 

violence which requires a risk of serious physical harm to persons specifically. We 

disagree.

{¶ 9} R.C. 2967.28(B) states that "[e]ach sentence to a prison term . . . for a felony 

of the third degree that is an offense of violence and is not a felony sex offense shall 

include a requirement that the offender be subject to a period of post-release control 

imposed by the parole board after the offender's release from imprisonment." R.C. 

2967.28(B)(4) specifies the required period of postrelease control is up to three years, but 

not less than one year.

{¶ 10} R.C. 2901.01(A)(9) defines an "offense of violence." R.C. 2901.01(A)(9)(a) 

provides an enumerated list of offenses that qualify as offenses of violence. Failure to 

comply is not specifically enumerated, however R.C. 2901.01(A)(9)(c) provides that "An 
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offense, other than a traffic offense, under an existing or former municipal ordinance or 

law of this or any other state or the United States, committed purposely or knowingly, and 

involving physical harm to persons or a risk of serious physical harm to persons" is an 

offense of violence. 

{¶ 11} The offense of failure to comply is described in R.C. 2921.331(B) as follows: 

"No person shall operate a motor vehicle so as willfully to elude or flee a police officer 

after receiving a visible or audible signal from a police officer to bring the person's motor 

vehicle to a stop." Meyers was specifically indicted under R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a), which 

provides that "[a] violation of (B) of this section is a felony of the third degree if the jury or 

judge as trier of fact finds any of the following by proof beyond a reasonable doubt . . . (ii) 

[t]he operation of the motor vehicle by the offender caused a substantial risk of serious 

physical harm to persons or property." (Emphasis added.)

{¶ 12} We do not agree with Meyer's contention that his guilty plea to failure to 

comply did not include the "physical harm to a person" requirement necessary to impose 

mandatory postrelease control. A guilty plea acts as a complete admission of factual guilt 

and embraces "'not only the discreet acts alleged, but the totality of the substantive 

conduct involved in committing the crime.' Therefore, the guilty plea subsumes any right 

related to the state's ability to prove factual guilt." (Citation omitted.) State v. Dabney, 

2023-Ohio-28, ¶ 25 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Brimacombe, 2011-Ohio-5032, ¶ 16 (6th 

Dist.). "A [guilty] plea 'provides the necessary proof of the elements of the crime and 

sufficient evidence to support the conviction.'" State v. Taylor, 2011-Ohio-6797, ¶ 9 (12th 

Dist.), quoting State v. Isbell, 2004-Ohio-2300, ¶16 (12th Dist.). By pleading guilty, "the 

accused acknowledges full responsibility for all legal consequences of guilt and consents 

to whatever judgment and sentence the court may legally impose." State v. Fore, 18 Ohio 

App.2d 264, 267 (1969). Thus, by pleading guilty to failure to comply, appellant was 
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admitting that his operation of the vehicle "caused a substantial risk of serious physical 

harm to persons or property." Taylor at ¶ 9. The totality of the substantive conduct in 

R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii) involves a "risk of serious physical harm to persons" and thus 

qualifies as an offense of violence pursuant to R.C. 2901.01(A)(9)(c). Therefore, the 

imposition of mandatory postrelease control for up to three years, but not less than one 

year, pursuant to R.C. 2967.28(B)(4), was proper. Id.

{¶ 13} Further, although Meyers' plea rendered a review of the facts unnecessary, 

his conduct clearly satisfied the R.C. 2967.28 "risk of serious physical harm to persons"

requirement. Meyers led police on a vehicle chase around the streets of South Lebanon, 

struck a parked car, failed to stop at multiple stop signs, drove up the center line of the 

road, and drove the wrong way on a one-way street. When Meyers abandoned his 

vehicle, police had to jump in to stop the vehicle from colliding with a structure.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 14} For the reasons outlined above Meyers' sole assignment of error is 

overruled.

{¶ 15} Judgment affirmed.

S. POWELL, P.J., and PIPER, J., concur.