J-S01044-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

BRIAN THOMAS ANTONOVICH 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 179 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 5, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0000508-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: APRIL 11, 2023

Appellant, Brian Thomas Antonovich, appeals the judgments of sentence 

imposed after he was convicted of stalking, terroristic threats, and 

harassment.1 He challenges the discretionary aspects of his aggregate 

sentence: two to four years’ imprisonment, to be followed by six years’ 

probation. Upon review, we affirm. 

On October 7, 2021, Appellant waived a jury and proceeded to trial. 

N.T. 10/7/21, 5-7. The trial court offers us the following summary of the 

facts:

At trial[,] the Commonwealth presented the testimony of the 

victim who testified that between April and May of 2020 she first 

encountered [Appellant] when she was walking near a grocery 

store in the Greenfield area of Pittsburgh. As she walked past 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2709.1(a)(2), 2706(a)(1), and 2709(a)(4), respectively. 
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[Appellant], who sitting at a bus stop, he said to her, “I like your 

ass in your pants[,]” and as she ignored him and continued 

walking[,] he screamed at her, “I will F--- you up your ass.” The 

victim then ran across the street and [Appellant] screamed at 

her[,] “I am going to beat you the F--- up.” The victim testified 

that she had eight to ten similar encounters with [Appellant] in 

the Greenfield area over the ensuing months. The victim also 

testified that on the night of January 7, 2021[,] she was in her 

fenced[-]in front yard with her dog when [Appellant] approached 

the fence, leaned over and began throwing punches at her dog. 

When the victim pleaded for him to stop, [Appellant] stated: “I 

am going to kill your dog[,]” and told the victim[,] “I am going to 

get you[,]” and “I am going to beat you the F--- up.” The victim 

did not know [Appellant’s] name at that point but subsequently 

videoed him on other encounters and[,] after showing the video 

to others in the neighborhood[,] was able to identify [Appellant]. 

After identifying [Appellant,] she was able to video him again 

approaching her and yelling[,] “I will slam your door shut for real.” 

The victim testified that[,] during the repeated encounters with 

[Appellant,] he threatened to sexually assault her, beat her up[,]

and kill her and her dog. The victim testified that she not only 

feared for herself but others in the neighborhood and posted 

information regarding the threats by [Appellant] online. On cross

examination[,] defense counsel elicited testimony that the victim 

only identified [Appellant] by name after showing the video she 

made to others in the neighborhood and it was those other 

individuals who provided [Appellant’s] name to the victim. 

Further, [the cross-examination testimony included] that the 

victim subsequently researched [Appellant’s] name on the 

internet and found that [Appellant] had similar criminal offenses 

and she then contacted the police. The Commonwealth also 

presented evidence from the investigating officers that the victim 

clearly identified [Appellant] from a photo array as the person 

repeatedly threatening her. 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/6/22, 2-3 (trial record citations omitted).

On October 14, 2021, the court found Appellant guilty of stalking by 

repeatedly committing acts to cause fear, terroristic threats, and harassment 

through the communication of lewd, lascivious, threatening, or obscene 
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language. N.T. 10/7/21, 5; N.T. 10/14/21, 3; Bill of Information, 3/8/21. 

Sentencing was deferred for the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation 

report and a mental health evaluation. N.T. 10/14/21, 3; Mental Health 

Evaluation Order, 7/12/21, 1. On January 5, 2022, the court imposed 

consecutive terms of one to two years’ imprisonment and three years’ 

probation for stalking and terroristic threats, and no further penalty for 

harassment.2 N.T. 1/5/22, 14; Sentencing Order, 1/5/22, 1. Prior to 

announcing the terms of the sentence, the court told Appellant, “I find you to 

be a clear and present danger to society and the victim here. You don’t seem 

to take any remorse and responsibility. I feel that you’re definitely a threat 

to her as well as the general public.” N.T. 1/5/22, 14.

Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion seeking modification of his 

sentence in which he claimed, among other things, that his sentence was 

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2 Both imprisonment terms were within the standard range recommended by 

the Sentencing Guidelines. The guidelines assigned offense gravity scores of 

four for stalking and three for terroristic threats. 204 Pa.Code § 303.15 

(offense listing; 7th ed., amend. 5). Appellant had a prior record score of five. 

N.T. 1/5/22, 6-7. Accordingly, the guidelines recommended minimum 

imprisonment terms of nine to sixteen months, plus or minus three months 

for aggravating or mitigating circumstances, for stalking, and six to sixteen 

months, plus or minus three months for aggravating or mitigating 

circumstances, for terroristic threats. 204 Pa. Code § 303.16(a) (basic 

sentencing matrix; 7th ed., amend 5). 

Appellant was charged for acts committed on or about April 1, 2020, through 

January 14, 2021, a period of time that spanned the effective date of the sixth 

amendment of the seventh edition of the Sentencing Guidelines. For our 

purposes that amendment is not material because the fifth and sixth 

amendments both recommended same minimum imprisonment terms.
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unreasonable, manifestly excessive, and contrary to the factors set forth 

under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), and that the sentencing court failed to consider 

his rehabilitative needs contrary to Section 9721. Post-Sentence Motion, 

1/12/22, ¶¶ 6-7. After the court denied the motion, Appellant timely filed a 

notice of appeal and a court-ordered concise statement of matters complained 

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Order Denying Post-Sentence 

Motion, 1/12/22, 1; Notice of Appeal, 2/7/22, 1; Rule 1925 Order, 2/24/22, 

1; Rule 1925(b) Statement, 3/17/22, 1-3. 

Appellant presents the following question for our review: “Did the Trial 

Court abuse its sentencing discretion by focusing entirely on the gravity of the 

offenses and the impact on the victim in imposing [his] sentence?” Appellant’s 

Brief at 5.

Appellant asserts that the sentencing court abused its discretion by 

focusing entirely on the gravity of his offenses and their impact on the victim 

and not giving any consideration to his mitigation evidence, including his 

rehabilitative needs, his alcoholism and mental health diagnoses, and the fact 

that he had a comprehensive treatment plan in place for rehabilitation. 

Appellant’s Brief at 11. He alleges that this claim raises a substantial question 

for our review because he states in his separate statement in his brief pursuant

to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) that the claim highlights the fact that the court abused 

its discretion “by disregarding the mandates of Section 9721(b).” Appellant’s 

Brief at 13. He also points out that combined claims of excessive sentences 

and the failure to consider mitigating sentencing factors raises a substantial 
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question for our review. Appellant’s Brief at 14, citing Commonwealth v. 

Miller, 275 A.3d 530 (Pa. Super. 2022). 

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing, such as the claim 

presented here, “do not entitle an appellant to an appeal as of right.” 

Commonwealth v. Perzel, --- A.3d ----, 2023 WL 2252159, *5 (Pa. Super., 

filed Feb. 28, 2023). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing 

issue:

[W]e conduct a four[-]part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal[;] (2) whether the 

issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to 

reconsider and modify sentence[;] (3) whether appellant’s brief 

has a fatal defect[, see Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f);] and (4) whether there 

is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code[.]

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2006). An 

appellant must satisfy this four-part test to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction 

when challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence. Commonwealth 

v. Salter, --- A.3d ----, 2023 WL 2053193, *4 (Pa. Super., filed Feb. 17, 

2023), citing Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa. Super. 

2014). As to the last part of the test,

A substantial question will be found where an appeal advances a 

colorable argument that the sentence imposed is either 

inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or is 

contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing 

process. At a minimum, the Rule 2119(f) statement must 

articulate what particular provision of the code is violated, what 

fundamental norms the sentence violates, and the manner in 

which it violates that norm.
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Zirkle, 107 A.3d at 132 (citation omitted).

The Commonwealth raises no argument as to the timeliness of 

Appellant’s notice of appeal and concedes that Appellant preserved his claim 

before the sentencing court and included a required statement in his brief 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Appellee’s Brief at 9-10 & n.9. The 

Commonwealth, while describing the nature of the Rule 2119(f) statement as 

“anemic,” ultimately states that “it is likely appellant will be deemed to have 

raised the requisite substantial question.” Appellee’s Brief at 10, citing 

Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 242 A.3d 667, 680 (Pa. Super. 2020) 

(acknowledging that claims that a sentencing court sentenced based solely on 

the seriousness of the offense and failed to consider all relevant factors or 

failed to consider relevant sentencing criteria, including the protection of the 

public, the gravity of the underlying offense, and the rehabilitative needs of 

an appellant, as required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), present a substantial 

question). 

We do not find any impediment to us reaching the merits of Appellant’s 

claim. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, preserved his instant claim by 

raising a combined excessive-sentence and failure-to-consider-Section 

9721(b)-sentencing-factors claim in his post-sentence motion, and 

demonstrated that his instant claim raised a substantial question for purposes 

of Rule 2119. See Commonwealth v. Snyder, --- A.3d ----, 2023 WL 

1793573, *3 (Pa. Super., filed Feb. 7, 2023) (noting that a claim that a 

sentencing court disregarded a defendant’s rehabilitative potential and 
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sentenced her to a manifestly excessive sentence presented a substantial 

question); Miller, 275 A.3d at 534 (concluding that a defendant raised a 

substantial question where he contended that a sentencing court “focused 

solely on the nature of the crimes,” “paid no more tha[n] lip service to [his] 

strides toward rehabilitation and reform,” and imposed a “manifestly 

excessive sentence”).

We apply the following standard of review when reviewing discretionary 

sentencing claims:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the 

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Bankes, 286 A.3d 1302, 1307 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation 

omitted). “[W]hen imposing sentence, the trial court is granted broad 

discretion, as it is in the best position to determine the proper penalty for a 

particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances 

before it.” Commonwealth v. Mulkin, 228 A.3d 913, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020). 

This deferential standard is based on the recognition that “the nuances of 

sentencing decisions are difficult to gauge from the cold transcript used upon 

appellate review.” Commonwealth v. Perry, 32 A.3d 232, 236 (Pa. 2011), 

quoting Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961-62 (Pa. 2007).
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42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) offers the following guidance to the trial court’s 

sentencing determination:

[T]he sentence imposed should call for total confinement that is 

consistent with section 9725 (relating to total confinement) and

the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates 

to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and 

the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).

Moreover,

[42 Pa.C.S. §] 9781(c) specifically defines three instances in which 

appellate courts should vacate a sentence and remand: (1) the 

sentencing court applied the guidelines erroneously; (2) the 

sentence falls within the guidelines, but is “clearly unreasonable” 

based on the circumstances of the case; and (3) the sentence falls 

outside the guidelines and is “unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9781(c). Under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d), the appellate courts must 

review the record and consider the nature and circumstances of 

the offense, the sentencing court’s observations of the defendant, 

the findings that formed the basis of the sentence, and the 

sentencing guidelines. The ... weighing of factors under 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9721(b) [is] exclusively for the sentencing court, and an 

appellate court could not substitute its own weighing of those 

factors. The primary consideration, therefore, is whether the 

court imposed an individualized sentence, and whether the 

sentence was nonetheless unreasonable for sentencing falling 

outside the guidelines, or clearly unreasonable for sentences 

falling within the guidelines, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c).

Commonwealth v. Bricker, 41 A.3d 872, 875-76 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation 

omitted).

When imposing sentence, a court is required to consider the 

particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the 

defendant. In considering these factors the court should refer to 

the defendant’s prior criminal record, age, personal characteristics 
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and potential for rehabilitation. Where pre-sentence reports exist, 

we shall...presume that the sentencing judge was aware of the 

relevant information regarding defendant’s character and 

weighted those considerations along with mitigating statutory

factors. 

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 277 A.3d 577, 593 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation 

omitted).

Additionally, we note the “imposition of consecutive rather than 

concurrent sentences lies within the sound discretion of the sentencing court.” 

Commonwealth v. Redmond, 273 A.3d 1247, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2022), 

citing Zirkle, 107 A.3d at 133 (citation omitted). It is well-accepted that

“[i]n imposing a sentence, the trial [court] may determine whether, given the 

facts of a particular case, a sentence should run consecutive to or concurrent 

with another sentence being imposed.” Commonwealth v. Wright, 832 

A.2d 1104, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted); see also

Commonwealth v. Marts, 889 A.2d 608, 612 (Pa. Super. 2005) (42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9721 “affords the sentencing court discretion to impose its sentence 

concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being imposed at the same 

time or to sentences already imposed.”) (citations omitted).

Here, Appellant asserts in the heading of his argument that the 

sentencing court abused its discretion “by focusing entirely on the gravity of 

the offense and the impact of the victim in imposing [his] sentence.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 16. Based on his tailored citation to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c), 

he intimates that this Court should vacate his sentence and remand because 

the sentencing court imposed a sentence within the recommendations of the 
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Sentencing Guidelines but the application of the guidelines would be “clearly 

unreasonable” given the circumstances involved in this matter. Appellant’s 

Brief at 16-17. As for those circumstances, he refers us to his counsel’s 

arguments from the sentencing hearing about the role of his alcohol use and 

mental health issues throughout his criminal history, his prior lack of any inpatient or rehabilitation treatment, and his support for a Justice Related 

Services (“JRS”) treatment plan to address these underlying causes of his 

crimes. Appellant’s Brief at 19, citing N.T. 1/5/22, 3-5. After these 

arguments which appeared to be in the same vein as the claim preserved in 

his post-sentence motion, Appellant proceeds to segue into a separate claim 

that the sentencing court erred by not offering an adequate explanation of the 

reasons for its sentence at the sentencing hearing. Appellant’s Brief at 20. 

He then restates the court’s remarks that prefaced the imposition of his 

sentence, calling them “exceptionally minimal,” and argues that the limited 

remarks demonstrated that the trial court “gave no consideration to [his] 

mitigating evidence as required by Section 9721(b).” Appellant’s Brief at 20. 

We do not discern an abuse of discretion upon reviewing these arguments. 

To the extent that Appellant presents for the first time on appeal an

argument that the trial court abused its discretion by not offering an adequate 

statement of reasons for the sentence pursuant to Section 9721(b), that part 

of his argument is waived as it was never preserved below either in an 

objection at the sentencing hearing following the imposition of his sentence or 

in his post-sentence motion. See Commonwealth v. Hartman, 908 A.2d 
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316, 319 (Pa. Super. 2006) (appellant waived a discretion sentencing claim 

by not preserving it at sentencing or in a timely post-sentence motion); 

Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(discretionary sentencing claim waived where, although appellant filed a postsentence motion for reconsideration of sentence, the motion did not include 

the specific claim raised on appeal); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in 

the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). 

The claims preserved below were that the sentencing court failed to consider

Appellant’s rehabilitative needs and imposed an excessive sentence – not that 

the court failed to offer an adequate statement of reasons pursuant to 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). See Post-Sentence Motion, 1/12/22, ¶¶ 6-7 (“At 

sentencing, this Honorable Court failed to consider [Appellant’s] rehabilitative 

needs, in violation of 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9721(a) and (b). ... Based on the foregoing, 

[Appellant] submits that his sentence is unreasonable, manifestly excessive, 

and contrary to factors set forth under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9725, and the Sentencing Code generally.”).

In any event, the court offered a statement of reasons for the sentence 

but Appellant suggests that it was inadequate because it failed to address the 

court’s consideration of his mitigation evidence. In support of that argument, 

he relies solely upon this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 

34 A.3d 135 (Pa. Super. 2011). Appellant’s Brief at 17-20. He argues that 

because the sentencing court’s statement was “exceptionally minimal,” “as in 

Coulverson,” the record fails to “evince that the [sentencing] court ... 
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considered anything other the severity of [the] offenses and their impact on 

the victim.” Appellant’s Brief at 20. 

Coulverson, a well-reasoned opinion by an esteemed member of this

panel, does not support a finding of an abuse of discretion here. In that case, 

the defendant pleaded guilty to rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, 

sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault, robbery, unlawful restraint, 

terroristic threats, and two counts of indecent assault that he committed when 

he was 19 years old. Coulverson, 34 A.3d at 138-39. The sentencing court 

imposed an 18-to-90-year aggregate term of imprisonment, which included 

the imposition of multiple consecutive statutory maximum sentences to 

accomplish the upper end of the sentence. Id. at 139. On appeal, we found 

that the imposition of a 90-year maximum sentence on a 19-year-old 

defendant was “clearly unreasonable” as the trial court imposed a virtual life 

sentence, failing to give any consideration to the defendant’s characteristics 

and improperly basing its sentencing on its determination that defendant 

should “spend as much of his life in prison as the court could order[.]” Id. at 

148.

In the instant case, Appellant does not develop an argument that his 

sentence was “clearly unreasonable” for purposes of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c). 

Instead, he is only arguing that the sentencing court’s statement of reasons 

showed a disregard for mitigating evidence and that was an abuse of 

discretion based on Coulverson. But the result in Coulverson did not hinge 

on an improper or inadequate statement of reasons. See id. at 146 
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(“Although we do not dispose of this appeal on that basis, we are troubled by 

the court’s cursory treatment of so weighty a matter, as the 90-year 

aggregate maximum potentially consigns a 19-year old defendant with mental 

health problems to life in prison without even a nod to relevant sentencing 

factors.”) (emphasis added). This Court vacated the sentence and remanded 

because the maximum aggregate sentence was “clearly unreasonable” and 

the court’s stated reasons appeared to “ignore the continuum of circumstances 

underlying a defendant’s criminal conduct, society’s need for rehabilitation, or 

the statutory factors enunciated in our Sentencing Code on the way to 

imposing a maximum sentence.” Id. at 150.

In the present case, as opposed to Coulverson, the trial court imposed 

two imprisonment terms within the standard range recommended by the 

Sentencing Guidelines that did not extend to the statutory maximum. Also, 

the court’s statement of reasons for the sentence did not demonstrate a 

fixation to keep Appellant “in jail for life,” id. at 149 n.3, to the total disregard 

of the relevant sentencing factors under Section 9721(b). Here, the trial 

court’s statement – while short and certainly not to Appellant’s liking –

reflected consideration of the mandatory sentencing factors under Section 

9721(b). The court’s findings as to Appellant being “a clear and present 

danger to society and the victim” and a “threat to [the victim] as well as the 

general public” reflected consideration of the factors concerning the need to 

protect the public and the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on 

the life of the victim and on the community. N.T. 1/5/22, 14. At the same 
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time, the court’s statement to Appellant, “You don’t seem to take any remorse 

and responsibility,” N.T. 1/5/22, 14, appeared to reflect consideration of his

need for rehabilitation, the remaining mandatory factor for imposing an

imprisonment term under Section 9721(b). 

The trial court could have elaborated on its remarks prior to the 

imposition of the sentence but we cannot characterize the offered statement 

of reasons as evincing a disregard for the mandatory statutory sentencing

factors as in Coulverson. To the extent that Appellant suggests that the trial 

court had to address the points and statements made by his counsel to reflect 

its consideration of the mitigation evidence, Appellant does not cite any 

caselaw to that effect. Indeed, “a lengthy discourse on the trial court’s 

sentencing philosophy is not required. Rather, the record as a whole must 

reflect the court’s reasons and its meaningful consideration of the facts of the 

crime and the character of the offender.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 

A.2d 1247, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations omitted); see also

Coulverson, 34 A.3d at 145 (“The court is not required to parrot the words 

of the Sentencing Code, stating every factor that must be considered under 

Section 9721(b).”) (citation omitted). 

In this instance, we can presume that the sentencing court was 

aware of the statutory sentencing factors and considerations about Appellant’s 

character and properly weighed them because the record reflects the court’s 

possession of a pre-sentence investigation report. N.T. 1/5/22, 2 (the court 

asked Appellant’s counsel about whether he had a chance to review the report 
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and whether there were any additions or corrections to it); see 

Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988) (“Where presentence reports exist, we shall continue to presume that the sentencing judge 

was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and 

weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.); 

accord Commonwealth v. Rosario, 248 A.3d 599, 614 (Pa. Super. 2021); 

Commonwealth v. Wallace, 244 A.3d 1261, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2021).

Furthermore, Appellant’s reliance on Coulverson is misplaced because 

he fails to demonstrate that his sentence is “clearly unreasonable” such that 

the trial court committed a manifest abuse of discretion when it sentenced 

him. The trial court only imposed two consecutive standard-guideline-range 

sentences resulting in a four-year maximum possible imprisonment term and 

six years of probation. This is a reasonable sentence where Appellant 

reoffended after serving a prior lengthy imprisonment term for prior sex 

offenses and the instant charges involved him threatening additional sex acts 

and violence against the victim in this case. N.T. 10/7/21, 18-19; N.T. 1/5/22, 

4, 7. Moreover, the court acted within its discretion by opting for consecutive 

sentences where the underlying charges involved eight to ten encounters that 

Appellant had with the victim. N.T. 10/7/21, 19. Appellant was not entitled 
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to a volume discount for his crimes.3 Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 

333, 341 (Pa. Super. 2015). 

We find that the aggregate sentence is not grossly disparate to 

Appellant’s conduct and does not appear “clearly unreasonable” for purposes 

of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c). Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant is entitled 

to no relief on the grounds raised before us. 

Judgments of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/11/2023 

____________________________________________

3 We also note that the fact that victim’s testimony addressed that Appellant 

“started throwing physical punches” at her dog and made threats to kill the 

animal during one of the encounters is particularly troubling and additionally 

speaks to the rehabilitative needs of Appellant that might be addressed by the 

sentence imposed. N.T. 10/7/21, 20.