Plaintiffs, OPINION

V.

FUSION MANUFACTURING and : Civ. No. 11-3671 (WHW)(CLW)MICHAEL FERCHAK,

Defendants.

Walls, Senior District Judge

Plaintiff Codrut Radu Radulescu appeals Magistrate Judge Cathy L. Waldor’s order of

February 3, 2016, ECF No. 177, denying his motion for leave to file a second amendedcomplaint. ECF No. 175. Defendants move for sanctions under fed. R. Civ. P. 11, ECF No. 179,

and Plaintiff seeks leave to file his own motion for sanctions. ECF No. 184. The Court decides

these motions without oral argument under fed. R. Civ. P. 78. Magistrate Judge Waldor’s order

is affirmed, Defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions is denied, and Plaintiffs request for leaveto file a Rule 11 motion is denied as moot.

BACKGROUND

This case, which has been before this Court for nearly five years, concerns a business

partnership gone awry. Plaintiff Codrut Radu Radulescu, a citizen of New Jersey, began

operating the dismissed Plaintiff Sync Labs LLC as a single-owner New Jersey limited liability

company in 2007. First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 9 ¶J 1-2, 10. Defendant Michael Ferchak

is the founder and managing director of Defendant fusion Manufacturing. Ferchak Email,

August 9, 2010, ECF No. 93-12 at 2. The Court has recounted the factual history of this case in

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ECF No. 9 ¶4, Defendant Ferchak became involved in Sync Labs by contributing services andcapital. In 2008, Ferchak entered into an oral agreement, later memorialized in writing, to work

part-time for Sync Labs in exchange for profit interest in the company. Id. ¶4; Work for HireAgreement, ECF 93-6. In 2009, the parties entered into a “Funding Agreement,” under whichFerchak agreed to provide $250,000 in “matching funds” to help Sync Labs qualify for an

“Edison grant” from the New Jersey Commission on Science and Technology (“NJCST”).

Ferchak Letter, Jan. 2, 2009, ECF No. 84-5; Funding Agreement, July 2, 2009, ECF No. 84-15.

Ferchak transferred $20,000 to Sync Labs in August 2009, P1.’s Decl., ECF No. 84-2 ¶ 10, butthe parties soon had a falling-out. In 2010, Ferchak withdrew his $250,000 pledge ofsupport,

resigned from Sync Labs, and demanded that Radulescu refund the $20,000 he had provided in2009. Radulescu refused. Declaration Christopher W. Hager, Esq., ECF No. 93-1 ¶J 25-29.

II. The amended complaint, counterclaims, and initial dispositive motions

In an amended complaint filed in this Court on September 28, 2011, Radulescu and Sync

Labs brought the following ten causes of action against Ferchak and Fusion Manufacturing:

breach of contract, ECF No. 9 ¶J 96-97; violation ofNew Jersey’s LLC Act, Id. ¶f 98-100;

fraud, id. ¶J 101-04; theft, Id. ¶J 105-06; breach of implied duties and covenants, ¶J 107-09;

tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage, Id. ¶J 110-12; breach of warranties,

Id. ¶J 113-15; promissory estoppel, Id. ¶J 116-21; conversion, id. ¶J 122-27; and defamation, Id.

¶J 128-33.

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PlaintiffRadulescu, a licensed attorney, initially represented both himself and Plaintiff

Sync Labs. On June 7, 2012, Magistrate Judge Madeline C. Arleo disqualified Radulescu as

counsel for Sync Labs and ordered Sync Labs to obtain independent counsel by July 6, 2012.

ECF No. 37. Plaintiff Radulescu filed a motion for reconsideration, which Magistrate Judge

Arleo denied. ECF No. 49. Radulescu then appealed the order to this Court. The Court denied the

appeal, ECF No. 60, as well as Radulescu’s subsequent motion for reconsideration of the Court’sdenial. ECF No. 82.

On September 4, 2013, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff

Radulescu with respect to his breach of contract claim and Defendants’ breach of contract and

NJWPL counterclaims. The Court also denied Radulescu’s motion for summary judgment withrespect to Defendants’ NJUSL counterclaim. ECF No. 102.

PlaintiffRadulescu moved for reconsideration of the summary judgment decision on

September 18, 2013, ECF No. 104, and Defendants filed a cross-motion to dismiss the claims of

Plaintiff Sync Labs for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with Magistrate Judge Arleo’sorder to obtain counsel. ECF No. 107. The Court denied both motions in one opinion on January6, 2014, holding in part that Defendants’ motion was not “related to the subject matter” of

Radulescu’s motion, as required by L. Civ. R. 7.1(h). ECF No. 115 at 8.

Defendants then filed a renewed motion for dismissal of Plaintiff Sync Labs under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 41. ECF No. 120. PlaintiffRadulescu filed a cross-motion for default judgment,

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III. The discovery disputes

What followed were nearly 18 months of discovery disputes overseen by Magistrate

Judge Waldor, to whom the case was reassigned at the end of 2012. On December 10, 2014,

Magistrate Judge Waldor issued an amended scheduling order that required PlaintiffRadulescu

to file any motion to amend or correct his first amended complaint by April 30, 2015 and setMay 1, 2015 as the final date of factual discovery. ECF No. 132. The parties continued to request

relief on various discovery issues. On August 5, 2015, Magistrate Judge Waldor held a

conference between the parties to discuss several disputes, including (1) whether Radulescu

could subpoena internet service providers (“ISPs”) for allegedly unproduced communications

involving Ferchak he claimed were stored on their servers, see Def. Mot. Relief, ECF No. 141,and (2) whether Radulescu could block the New Jersey Department ofthe Treasury’s (“Treasury

Department”) release ofmaterials related to Sync Labs’ Edison grant application sought by

Defendants under New Jersey’s Open Public Records Act (“OPRA”). See Radulescu Mot. Seal,

ECF No. 145. Magistrate Judge Waldor (1) quashed Radulescu’s subpoena to the ISPs, (2)

ordered Defendants to file a certification stating whether the ISPs had any relevant, discoverablecommunications stored on their servers, (3) ordered Radulescu to provide evidence

demonstrating that the Edison grant materials were non-public under OPRA, and (4) granted

Radulescu permission to file a motion for leave to amend his complaint. ECF No. 154; ECF No.

158 (clarifying ECF No. 154). Magistrate Judge Waldor instructed PlaintiffRadulescu to file the

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Edison grant documents, ECF No. 160, but the parties continued to dispute whether the

documents were properly discoverable. See Radulescu Letter, ECF No. 16$ (Arguing, on

November 30, 2015, that the Treasury Department had mistakenly released the documents, that

Magistrate Judge Waldor’s September 28 order was incorrectly decided, and that Defendants had

ignored requests from the Treasury Department to destroy their copies ofthe documents).

IV. The motions for leave to file a second amended complaint

On December 11, 2015, Plaintiff Radulescu filed a motion for leave to file a second

amended complaint. ECF No. 169. Radulescu withdrew the motion on December 29 after

receiving a notice of intent to file Rule 11 sanctions from Defendants’ counsel. See Motion to

Withdraw Remark, ECF No. 171; Christopher W. Hager, Esq. letter regarding Rule 11 sanctions,

ECF No. 171-1. On January 23, 2016, Plaintiff Radulescu filed a second motion for leave to file

a second amended complaint. ECF No. 175. The proposed second amended complaint brings

twenty-two causes of action against the existing Defendants and several new Defendants and

three causes of action against the Treasury Department. In the first ten counts, Plaintiff

Radulescu reasserts, on behalf of himself only, the same ten causes of action brought in the first

amended complaint. Proposed Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. 175-5 ¶J 1-250. In the

eleventh through nineteenth counts, Plaintiff Radulescu reasserts, on behalf of the dismissed

Plaintiff Sync Labs as its “assignee of choses [sic] in action and property,” all of the causes of

action brought in the first amended complaint other than the defamation claim. Id. ¶J 251-294.

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25, alleging that Ferchak and Dunning secretly transferred the assets of Defendant Fusion

Manufacturing to another company under their control, new Defendant Fusion Glassworks LLC,

after the Court granted summary judgment on Radulescu’s breach of contract claim. Id. ¶JJ 295-

299. In Count Twenty-One, PlaintiffRadulescu charges Defendants with tortious concealment

and spoliation of evidence, claiming that Ferchak intentionally erased or discarded the electronic

communications Radulescu sought from the ISPs. Id. ¶J 300-308. In Count Twenty-Two,

Radulescu charges Defendants with accessing, tampering with, and altering or copying data on

his computer networks, in violation ofN.J.S.A. § 2A:38A-3. Id. ¶ 309-3 14. Finally, in Counts

Twenty-Three, Twenty-Four, and Twenty-Five, respectively, Radulescu brings claims against

the Treasury Department under Title 47 ofthe New Jersey Statutes, which governs control of

public records, Title 59, which governs claims against public entities, and for violating his

“statutory and constitutional rights for right compensation” by releasing the allegedly

confidential Edison grant documents to Defendants. Id. ¶J 315-338.

After hearing oral argument on February 2, 2016, Magistrate Judge Waldor denied

PlaintiffRadulescu’s motion for leave to file the second amended complaint. ECF No. 177. At

oral argument, Magistrate Judge Waldor indicated that Radulescu had failed to demonstrate good

cause to justify the late filing of Counts One through Nineteen, Twenty-One, and Twenty-Two,

Hearing Transcript, Feb. 2, 2016, ECF No. 178 at 39:23-40:1, 41:24-42:1, that Count Twenty is

untimely and inadequately pled, Id. at 41:8-11, and that an amendment to assert the three claims

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for monetary sanctions against Plaintiff Radulescu under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 on February 10,

2016. ECF No. 179. Defendants argue that Radulescu’s second motion for leave to file a second

amended complaint was “frivolous and harassing.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff Radulescu filed a brief in

opposition on February 22, 2016, requesting leave to file his own motion for Rule 11 sanctionsagainst Defendants’ counsel for making a “bad faith” request for sanctions. ECF No. 184 at 4.

Finally, on March 1, 2016, PlaintiffRadulescu filed an appeal of Magistrate Judge

Waldor’s denial of his second motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. ECF No.

127. Radulescu makes several arguments, including that he demonstrated good cause for the late

filing of his motion, Id. at 7-12, that Magistrate Judge Waldor violated the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure by deciding the motion before the designated motion day, Id. at 13-16, and thatMagistrate Judge Waldor made erroneous findings of fact. Id. at 17-20. Defendants filed a brief

in opposition on March 17, 2016, ECF No. 188, and Radulescu filed a reply brief on March 28,2016. ECF No. 190.

The Court now addresses (a) PlaintiffRadulescu’s appeal, (b) Defendants’ motion for

Rule 11 sanctions, and (c) Radulescu’s request for leave to file a Rule 11 motion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

I. Appeal of a magistrate judge’s non-dispositive ruling

A magistrate judge may hear and determine any non-dispositive pretrial matter pending

before a district court, including motions to amend pleadings. Miller v. Beneficial Management

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72.1(c)(1)(A). A decision is “contrary to law” ifthe magistrate judge has misinterpreted or

misapplied applicable law. Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 32 F. Supp. 2d 162, 164 (D.N.J.

1998). A decision is “clearly erroneous” ifthe reviewing court, when looking at the evidence that

was presented to the magistrate judge, is left with the “definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been committed.” Richardson v. Allied Interstate, Inc., 2010 WL 340497$, at *3 (D.N.J.

Aug. 26, 2010) (quoting Dome Petroleum Ltd. v. Employers Mitt. Liab. Ins. Co., 131 F.R.D. 63,

65 (D.N.J. 1990)). Absent a finding that the decision was clearly erroneous or contrary to law,

the reviewing court may not reverse a magistrate judge’s decision, even ifthe reviewing court

might have decided the matter differently. Cardona v. General Motors Corp., 942 F. Supp. 968,

971 (D.N.J. 1996).

II. Rule 11 sanctions

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, a district court may impose sanctions on

parties or their attorneys ifthey have violated subdivision (b) ofthe Rule. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c).

Under subdivision (b), an attorney must certify that “to the best of [his or her] knowledge

formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:” (1) papers submitted to the courtare not “being presented for an improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or

needlessly increase the cost oflitigation;” (2) “the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions

are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or

reversing existing law or for establishing new law;” (3) “the factual contentions have evidentiary

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The standard for imposing Rule 11 sanctions is one based upon objective reasonableness

under the circumstances. See Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 289

(3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 939 (1991). Sanctions are appropriate only if “the filing [at

issue] constituted abusive litigation or misuse of the courCs process.” Simmerman v. Corino, 27F.3d 58, 62 (3d Cir. 1994). Bad faith on the part ofthe filer is not required, Martin v. Brown, 63

f.3d 1252, 1264 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted), but subjective good faith is insufficient toavoid sanction. See Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 482 (3d Cir. 1987). The court must

examine the objective knowledge ofthe attorney at the time the challenged paper was signed to

determine whether the claim was well grounded in both law and fact. See Cooler & Gell v.

Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 399 (1990); Teamsters Local Union No. 430 v. Cement Express,

Inc., 841 F.2d 66, 68 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848 (1989); Eavenson, Auchmuty &

Greenwatd v. Hottzman, 775 F.2d 535, 540 (3d Cir. 1985). An attorney must “[s]top, [t]hink,[i]nvestigate and [r]esearch before filing papers either to initiate a suit or to conduct the

litigation.” Gaiardo, 835 F.2d at 482. However, sanctions are warranted “only in the ‘exceptional

circumstance’ where a claim or motion is patently unmeritorious or frivolous.” Ford Motor Co.,

930 F 2d at 289 (citingDoeringv. Union County Rd. OfChosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 194

(3d Cir. 1988)).

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Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), a party may amend his pleading “once as a matter of course

within (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) ifthe pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is

required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under

Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Otherwise, “[t]he court shouldfreely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Id.; Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182

(1962). The decision to grant leave to amend a complaint is left within the discretion of the court.

Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. Generally, “absent undue or substantial prejudice,” leave to amend should

generally be granted “unless denial [can] be grounded in bad faith or dilatory motive, truly undue

or unexplained delay, repeated failure to cure deficiency by amendments previously allowed or

futility of amendment.” Long v. Wilson, 393 F.3d 390, 400 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotations and

citations omitted). “Amendment of the complaint is futile if the amendment will not cure the

deficiency in the original complaint or if the amended complaint cannot withstand a renewed

motion to dismiss.” Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 292 (3d Cir. 1988).

For that reason, the court applies the “plausibility” standard which applies to motions to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6), Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Where a party seeks to amend its pleadings after a deadline set by a court order, Rule

16(b) requires that the party first demonstrate “good cause” for its failure to comply with the

scheduling order. Graham v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 112, 118 (E.D. Pa. 2010)

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amendments and it must be satisfied before determining whether an amendment should be

permitted under Rule 15.”). The “good cause” standard “focuses on the moving party’s burden to

show due diligence.” Race Tires America, Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57, 84 (3d

Cir. 2010); see also Price v. Trans Union, LLC, 737 F. Supp. 2d 276, 279 (E.D. Pa. 2010)

(“[T]he court may modify the schedule on a showing of good cause ifit cannot be reasonably

met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16,

Advisory Committee Note (1983)). “The most common basis for finding a lack of good cause is

the party’s knowledge ofthe potential claim before the deadline to amend has passed.” Lucia v.

McCtain & Co, Inc., 2013 WL 4517976, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 23, 2013) (citing cases).

A. Counts One through Nineteen

PlaintiffRadulescu states that he only appeals the denial of leave to assert Counts Twenty

through Twenty-Five, ECF No. 187 at 5, but he makes arguments about all counts ofthe

proposed second amended complaint. To the extent Radulescu also appeals Magistrate Judge

Waldor’s denial of leave to reassert Counts One through Ten on behalf of himself and assert

Counts Eleven through Nineteen as the assignee of Sync Labs’ legal claims, the Court agrees

with Magistrate Judge Waldor’s conclusion that these claims are “regurgitations” ofthe first ten

counts in the first amended complaint, ECF No. 178 at 38:4, and that PlaintiffRadulescu could

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this is true (and even if Radulescu is indeed authorized to bring claims on behalf of Sync Labs),

this argument is irrelevant: Radulescu did not need discovery to assert “new claims” in Counts

Eleven through Nineteen that are the same as the claims in the first amended complaint.

Radulescu provides no other reason for his failure to comply with the scheduling order.

Magistrate Judge Waldor’s denial of leave to amend the first nineteen counts was not contrary to

law or clearly erroneous.

B. Count Twenty

The Court also finds that Magistrate Judge Waldor’s rejection of Count Twenty, which

charges Defendant Ferchak and new Defendant Paul Dunning with fraudulently transferring the

assets of Defendant Fusion Manufacturing into Fusion Glassworks LLC, in violation ofN.J.S.A.

25:2-25, was not contrary to law or clearly erroneous. PlaintiffRadulescu claims Count Twenty

was denied because Magistrate Judge Waldor held him to an unfairly high pleading standard,

requiring him to demonstrate “clear knowledge” ofthe facts alleged in the complaint. ECF No.

187 at 14. The hearing transcript shows otherwise. Magistrate Judge Waldor stated that Count

Twenty is “pled very scantily” and is “incomprehensible,” suggesting that it does not meet the

“short and plain statement ofthe claim” pleading standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), ECF No.

178 at 41:10-11; implied that Radulescu had failed to demonstrate good cause for the late

amendment under Rule 16, noting that Count Twenty was “again filed in 2016” when “[t]his

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did not seek to assert a fraudulent concealment claim until January 2016. Radulescu argued

before Judge Waldor that good cause existed to file the claim two years after it accrued becausehe first learned about Fusion Glassworks in his 2015 deposition of Defendant Ferchak and

discovered Defendant Dunning’s connection to fusion Manufacturing while conducting online

research after the deposition. ECF No. 178 at 5:14-22. Assuming this is true, Radulescu still hasnot demonstrated that he was “diligent” in discovering and bringing the claim. Nor will the Court

disturb Magistrate Judge Waldor’s finding that it would be unduly prejudicial to Defendants — especially Dunning, who is not yet a party in this action — to assert a new claim, based on newly

alleged facts that are only indirectly related to the Sync Labs investment originally at issue in this

case, nearly five years after the filing ofthe first complaint and over two years after the alleged

misconduct at issue. Magistrate Judge Waldor’s denial ofleave to add Count Twenty was not

clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

C. Count Twenty-One

Count Twenty-One is a claim against Defendants for tortious concealment and spoliation

of evidence regarding the email communications that were the subject of PlaintiffRadulescu’sISP subpoenas and Magistrate Judge Waldor’s August 5, 2015 conference. See ECF No. 154.

Magistrate Judge Waldor noted that this claim runs contrary to Defendants’ certification, served

on PlaintiffRadulescu, that the communications he seeks do not exist or are not within

Defendant ferchak’s possession. ECF No. 12$ at 23:3-7; see also ECF No. 162-1 (certification

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under oath that all relevant [communications] he had was destroyed and therefore nothing was

produced through discovery.” ECF No. 187 at 11. In spite ofthis, Radulescu continues to insist

that Defendant Ferchak is lying and that documents were intentionally destroyed. Radulescu

argues that his insistence, without any additional factual allegations, creates a “reasonable

possibility of existence of electronic communications. . . that were concealed by defendants.” Id.

A “reasonable possibility,” though, would not be enough to survive Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.

Allegations that do not “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility ofmisconduct”

fail to state a plausible claim for relief, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, so amendment would be futile

under the 12(b)(6) standard.’ Magistrate Judge Waldor’s decision is affirmed.

D. Count Twenty-Two

Magistrate Judge Waldor dismissed Count Twenty-Two, which charges Defendant

Ferchak with searching Plaintiff Radulescu’s computer in violation ofN.J.S.A. 2A:38A-3,

because Radulescu did not provide good cause under Rule 16 for his failure to include the claim

in the first amended complaint in 2011. ECF No. 178 at 42:24. Plaintiff now states that Count

Twenty-Two actually charges Defendants with unlawfully accessing his computers in 2015. ECF

‘In any event, in conducting a 1 2(b)(6) analysis, the Court is not required to simply “accept facts

as stated,” as Plaintiff Radulescu claims. ECF No. 187 at 15. The Court may also consider

documents attached to or specifically referenced in the complaint. See Sentinel Trust Co. V.

Universal Bonding Ins. Co., 316 F .3 d 213, 216 (3d Cir. 2003); Charles A. Wright, Arthur R.

Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 at 299 (3d ed. 2014). Plaintiff

Radulescu’s proposed second amended complaint specifically references Defendant Ferchak’s

certification that no additional discoverable materials exist. See ECF No. 175-5 ¶J 202-06.

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The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Waldor that Count Twenty-Two is “sparsely

pled,” ECF No. 178 at 3 0:6-7, and finds that amendment would be futile because, again,

Radulescu’s allegations allow the Court to infer only the “mere possibility ofmisconduct.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678-79. In any event, the cause of action arose before Radulescu’s initial filing

deadline of April 30, 2015, and well before his second motion for leave to amend was filed on

January 23, 2016. Plaintiff does not show Rule 16 good cause for his failure to bring the claim in

a timely manner. Magistrate Judge Waldor did not err or make a finding contrary to law.

E. Counts Twenty-Three through Twenty-Five

Finally, Plaintiff challenges Magistrate Judge Waldor’s denial of leave to bring three

causes of action against the Treasury Department for allegedly providing confidential, non

OPRA-discoverable documents to Defendants. Magistrate Judge Waldor held that these claims

are “not related to this suit” and that amendment would be futile. ECF No. 178 at 42:4-9.

Previously, Magistrate Judge Waldor denied PlaintiffRadulescu’s motion to seal the same

documents and ruled that that they are discoverable under OPRA. ECF No. 160. Radulescu

argues, as he has done in the past, see ECF No. 168, that Judge Waldor’s denial ofthe motion to

seal was incorrect. ECF No. 187 at 17. He provides no real basis for this conclusion, and his

attempt to bring claims against the Treasury Department on a decided issue would be futile. The

Court also observes that Counts Twenty-Three and Twenty-Four, which refer to the general

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procedural due process of law” because she denied his motion to amend on February 2, 2016,

two weeks before the motion day provided by L. Civ. R. 78.1(a). As a result, Radulescu says he

had insufficient time to prepare for oral argument. ECF No. 187 at 13-14. Putting aside that

Plaintiff Radulescu had months, if not years, to prepare arguments on most of the proposed

amended claims, any harm caused by the timing of Magistrate Judge Waldor’s ruling has been

made harmless by the nearly four weeks Radulescu was given to file this appeal. Even with the

benefit of this additional time, PlaintiffRadulescu fails to demonstrate that he should be

permitted to file a second amended complaint.

II. Defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions

Defendants seek an order sanctioning PlaintiffRadulescu under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and

directing him to pay $14,347.50 in monetary sanctions, which Defendants claim represent

reasonable attorneys’ fees for Defendants’ counsel’s work opposing Radulescu’s motions for

leave to amend between October 2015 and February 2016. ECF No. 179 ¶J 3 1-14. Defendants

do not specify which section of Rule 11(b) Radulescu allegedly violated, but state that Counts

One through Nineteen of the proposed second amended complaint are “copy and paste

reiterations” of Plaintiff Radulescu’s original causes of action asserted on behalf of a dismissed

party, id. ¶J 17, 27-28, and describe the previously-discussed discovery disputes that are the

subjects of the Counts Twenty through Twenty-Five. See id. ¶ 3-4 (describing dispute over

allegedly unproduced Ferchak electronic communications) 11-12, 27 (describing dispute over

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because Defendants did not file a briefin support ofthe motion, made legal arguments in the

declaration of counsel Christopher Hager, failed to give Plaintiff advance notice ofthe motion in

violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 l(c)(l), and failed to serve Plaintiff with the motion in violation of

fed. R. Civ. P. ll(c)(2). ECF No. 184 at 1-2. As discussed, though, Defendants did provide

PlaintiffRadulescu with a Rule 11 notice in response to his first motion for leave to file a second

amended complaint, describing the nature oftheir Rule 11 claim. See ECF No. 171-1. Radulescu

withdrew the motion but filed a nearly identical one the next month, inserting Rule 16 arguments

and bringing additional causes of action against the Treasury Department. ECF No. 175.

In any event, sanctions are not warranted here. As an initial matter, “mere failure to

prevail does not trigger a Rule 11 sanction order.” Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d

90, 99 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). And although the Court agrees that PlaintiffRadulescu

failed to show Rule 16 good cause for the late filing of his motion to amend, he did attempt to

justify the filing by describing, in detail, the contentious nature of discovery. See ECF No. 175 at

4-8. Without accepting Plaintiffs account of events, the Court agrees that discovery was

contentious and that both parties continued to raise new issues of fact throughout 2015. With

respect to PlaintiffRadulescu’s proposed claims against the Treasury Department in particular,

although the Court repeats that Magistrate Judge Waldor had already ruled that the Edison grant

documents in question were not confidential, see ECF No. 160, both parties’ continued

communications with the Treasury Department raised additional factual issues regarding the

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III. Plaintiffs request to move for sanctions

In his opposition to Defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions, Plaintiff seeks leave to file

his own motion for Rule 11 sanctions against Defendants’ counsel Hager. ECF No. 184 at 4. As

a matter oflaw, although parties are directed to file a Rule 11 motion “as soon as practicable

after discovery ofthe Rule 11 violation,” Pensiero, 847 F.2d at 100, Plaintiffmay move for

sanctions any time before the challenged filing is withdrawn, Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (c)(2), or final

judgment is entered in the case. Pensiero, $47 F.2d at 100; L. Civ. R. 11.3. It follows that

Plaintiff Radulescu may file a motion with or without the permission ofthe Court, though he is

cautioned against exposing himself to sanctions again by causing “unnecessary delay” and

“needlessly increas{ing] the cost of litigation” in this five-year-old case by filing a “frivolous

argument” without “evidentiary support” in order to “harass” Defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).

Continued squabbling from both sides will only prevent this matter from being resolved. It is

time to move forward.

2 Some courts have held the filings of attorneys who represent themselves, as PlaintiffRadulescu

does here, to the “less stringent standard” applied to ordinarypro se plaintiffs. See, e.g., Cooper

v. farmers New Century Ins. Co., 607 F. Supp. 2d 175, 179 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)); see also Stoltz v. Macurdy, 2009 WL 1120034, at *1 n.1

(D. Col. Apr. 27, 2009); but see Tracy v. freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 2010); Goodbye

v. Bamberger, Foreman, Oswald, and Hahn, 903 F.2d 1145, 1148 (7th Cir. 1990); Capogross v.

State Farm Ins. Co., 2010 WL 3404974, at *19 (D.N.J. Aug. 26, 2010) (declining to give special

consideration to briefs ofpro se lawyers). Plaintiff avoids sanctions under either standard.

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right. An appropriate order follows.DATE: t

William H. Walls

Senior United States District Court Judge

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