PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

Nos. 17-2228, 17-2229 

COREY BLAND; VIRGINIA BLAND 

 v. 

CITY OF NEWARK; CITY OF NEWARK POLICE 

DEPARTMENT; NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF STATE 

POLICE; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; SERGEANT JAMES 

THOMPSON; SERGEANT BRIAN MURPHY; TROOPER 

II THOMAS ESPINOZA; TROOPER II WILLIAM LEGG; 

TROOPER MIGUEL HOLGUIN; TROOPER ANTHONY 

SARDANOPOLI; TROOPER JOHN OLIVEIRA; 

TROOPER STEPHEN RIEFLER; DETECTIVE THOMAS 

DEL MAURO; DETECTIVE BRIAN COSTA; DETECTIVE 

DAVID MARTINEZ; SERGEANT THOMAS ROE; 

OFFICER DANNY COSTA; JOHN DOES (1–100); ABC 

ENTITIES (1–100), A Series of Fictitious Names, 

New Jersey State Police, State of New Jersey, Anthony 

Sardanopoli, James Thompson, Brian Murphy, Thomas 

Espinoza, William Legg, Miguel Holguin, 

John Oliveira and Stephen Riefler 

Appellants in No. 17-2228 
2 

Thomas Delmauro, David Martinez and Ruben Torres 

Appellants in No. 17-2229 

__________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 2-13-cv-02985) 

District Judge: Honorable Katharine S. Hayden 

Argued March 22, 2018 

Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, and BIBAS, 

Circuit Judges. 

(Filed: August 15, 2018) 

Pamela L. Brause 

Peter Ventrice [Argued] 

Brause Brause & Ventrice 

276 Main Street, P.O. Box 232

Metuchen, NJ 08840 

Lucas E. Phillips, Jr. [Argued] 

134 Evergreen Place, Suite 301 

P.O. Box 2487 

East Orange, NJ 07019 

Attorneys for Appellees
3

Michael C. Walters [Argued]

Office of Attorney General of New Jersey

Division of Law

Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex

25 Market Street, P.O. Box 112

Trenton, NJ 08625

Attorney for All Appellants

Gary S. Lipshutz [Argued]

City of Newark Department of Law

920 Broad Street, Room 316

Newark, NJ 07102

Attorney for Appellants Thomas Del Mauro, David 

Martinez, and Ruben Torres

Michael H. Freeman

Greenberg Dauber Epstein & Tucker

One Gateway Center, Suite 600

Newark, NJ 07102

Matthew J. Lynch

Office of Attorney General of New Jersey

Division of Law

Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex

25 Market Street

Trenton, NJ 08625

Attorneys for Appellants State of New Jersey, New 

Jersey State Police, James Thompson, Brian Murphy, 

Thomas Espinoza, William Legg, Miguel Holguin, 

Anthony Sardanopoli, John Oliveira and Stephen 

Riefler
4

____________

OPINION OF THE COURT

____________

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

This interlocutory appeal was filed by several law 

enforcement officers who were involved to varying degrees in 

a prolonged pursuit of a fleeing motorist, Corey Bland. The 

pursuit involved the use of lethal force against Bland, who 

sustained severe injuries after he was shot between 16 and 18 

times. The question presented is whether the District Court 

committed legal error when it denied the officers summary 

judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Because the 

officers’ conduct was within the bounds of the Supreme 

Court’s relevant decisions regarding the use of lethal force, we 

will reverse.

I

A. Initial Pursuit

In the early evening of December 26, 2011, Newark 

Police received a report that a black Audi bearing Pennsylvania 

license plate number PZK821C had been carjacked at 

gunpoint. Approximately three hours later, New Jersey State 

Troopers James Thompson and Brian Murphy spotted the 

carjacked vehicle in Newark. Appellee Corey Bland was 

behind the wheel. The troopers activated their police lights, but

Bland failed to stop. Instead, he accelerated and began to drive 

recklessly, running red lights and shutting off his headlights as 

he went. The troopers lost sight of the Audi, but an officer from 

the Summit Police Department began following it shortly 
5

thereafter. Bland nearly struck that officer’s vehicle and

collided with an embankment, but he continued driving. He

reached speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour, weaving in and 

out of light traffic.

State Trooper John Oliveira joined the chase in his 

marked police car after receiving reports that units from the 

State Police and Summit Police Departments were pursuing a 

carjacked vehicle. State Trooper Miguel Holguin,1 driving an 

unmarked Chrysler 300 accompanied by State Troopers 

Anthony Sardanopoli and Stephen Riefler, got involved after 

hearing a radio broadcast by Thompson and Murphy 

containing details about the carjacked vehicle. Bland continued 

to drive recklessly, frequently changing lanes, disregarding 

traffic lights, turning his lights off, accelerating to more than

80 miles an hour in an area with a 25-mile-per-hour speed limit, 

and driving over a curb in an empty parking lot, which caused

the Audi to begin to smoke. Despite all this, the Audi was not 

disabled, and Bland continued to evade police.

B. Lincoln Park Events

Eventually, Bland began driving the wrong way down 

Lincoln Park, a one-way street. While doing so, he collided 

both with Thompson and Murphy in their marked state police 

car and an occupied Newark Police vehicle. When Bland hit 

the Newark police car, he was travelling approximately 25 to 

35 miles per hour, and the impact caused the police car to strike 

an unoccupied parked car. As a result, the Audi, the police car, 

and the unoccupied car became entangled. State Trooper 

 1 Discrepancies exist about the spelling of this trooper’s 

name. We adopt the spelling provided by the trooper in his 

deposition. 
6

Thomas Espinoza, who had received a radio transmission 

about an ongoing pursuit involving a vehicle carjacked at 

gunpoint, arrived on the scene shortly after these collisions. 

Numerous officers surrounded the Audi, including 

Murphy, Thompson, Oliveira, Sardanopoli, Espinoza, and 

State Trooper William Legg.2 Many of the officers ordered 

Bland to surrender, and one officer attempted to break the 

Audi’s window by striking it. During this encounter, the six 

state troopers fired a total of 28 shots, none of which hit Bland.

Newark Police Officer Thomas Del Mauro was present at 

Lincoln Park, but he did not discharge his weapon.

There is no evidence in the record that Bland attempted 

to surrender at this time. Instead, he revved the Audi’s engine, 

spun its tires, and tried to get the vehicle to accelerate. Bland 

ultimately freed the Audi from the Newark police car by 

reversing and striking the now-unoccupied state police car a 

second time.3 He then drove over a curb and through a public 

park. 

Upon exiting the park, Bland continued to speed

through Newark with his lights off, at times on roads populated 

with vehicular and pedestrian traffic. Officers and state 

 2 Bland does not identify any actions taken by Riefler or 

Holguin at Lincoln Park. 

3 Both the Newark officers and the state troopers 

contend that Bland drove aggressively at the officers as he 

attempted to flee, but Bland disputes this characterization. That 

dispute is immaterial, however, because all parties agree that 

officers were standing less than 10 feet from the Audi as Bland

extricated it from the two vehicles. 
7

troopers continued to pursue Bland, but Thompson and 

Murphy were no longer involved because their vehicle was 

disabled when it was struck by the Audi at Lincoln Park. 

During this portion of the chase, a state police car struck an 

occupied civilian vehicle. Bland eventually drove to the 

intersection of 18th Avenue and Livingston Street, where the 

most vigorously disputed series of events took place.

C. The Terminus of the Chase

At the intersection of 18th and Livingston, the

unmarked Chrysler 300 driven by Holguin allegedly rammed 

the Audi, sending the Audi into scaffolding that surrounded a 

school. State Troopers Holguin, Sardanopoli, and Riefler

exited the Chrysler 300 and moved toward the Audi, which 

remained entangled in the scaffolding. Holguin approached the 

driver’s side with Riefler standing behind him, while 

Sardanopoli moved to the Audi’s passenger side. 

All three troopers began firing their weapons at the 

Audi. Holguin and Riefler testified that they initially 

discharged their weapons because Bland refused to comply

with their orders to show his hands and to stop moving and 

because he repeatedly threatened to kill the officers. 

Sardanopoli stated that he fired his weapon after he saw 

Holguin firing. Legg—also on the scene—asserted that he fired

because he could see Bland moving around in the Audi as 

Holguin and Riefler discharged their weapons. Bland, for his 

part, denied that the troopers shouted any verbal commands or 

that he made evasive movements, but he conceded that nothing 

in the record contradicts the officers’ allegations that he 

threatened to kill them. 
8

After the first volley of shots, Riefler approached the 

driver’s side of the Audi, whereupon Riefler testified that 

Bland attempted to climb through the window while again 

threatening to kill him. In response, Riefler fired his weapon 

again. Espinoza also discharged his weapon, as did Newark 

Officers Del Mauro, Reuben Torres, and David Martinez, who 

had heard about the carjacking at roll call earlier that evening.

The Newark officers stated that they fired their weapons 

because they saw the Audi moving or heard it revving, 

indicating that it was still capable of flight. Bland disputed this 

assertion, arguing instead that the Audi became inoperable 

once it crashed into the scaffolding. Oliveira, though present, 

did not discharge his weapon at the terminus. 

The shooting finally ceased once Riefler observed 

Bland slumped over, and a Newark sergeant called for the 

officers to hold their fire. Bland was shot between 16 and 18 

times, including in the face, chest, and abdomen. He suffered 

numerous injuries, including a traumatic brain injury, 

respiratory failure, vision loss, and multiple facial fractures. No 

gun was recovered from the scene, and no officer observed 

Bland with a weapon during the course of the pursuit.

II

Bland and his wife Virginia filed a complaint in the 

Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division alleging (among 

other things) that Defendants violated Bland’s Fourth 

Amendment rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; N.J. Stat. Ann. 

§ 10:6-2(c). Defendants removed the case to federal court and 

sought summary judgment, claiming qualified immunity.

After oral argument, the District Court concluded that it 

was “not in a position to grant or deny qualified immunity.” 
9

App. 78. Instead, it held that a jury must first decide two issues 

of material fact: (1) whether the Audi’s engine was revving 

(and thus whether the car was capable of moving) after it 

crashed into the scaffolding; and (2) whether the officers could 

see Bland’s movements inside the vehicle. The District Court 

opined that the Supreme Court’s decision in Plumhoff v. 

Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014), issued three years after the 

car chase, may decide the “central” question of “whether or not 

Corey Bland was an active threat to the officers at the terminus 

so as to justify their actions in using deadly force to end that 

risk.” App. 73. Accordingly, it denied Defendants’ motion, 

including with respect to the three officers who were neither 

present nor discharged their weapons at the terminus of the 

chase. Defendants moved for a stay of trial, which the District 

Court denied. We entered an order staying the district court 

proceedings pending the resolution of this timely interlocutory 

appeal.

III

A

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1331 and 1367. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. Dougherty v. 

Sch. Dist. of Phila., 772 F.3d 979, 986 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation 

omitted). Our jurisdiction lies “only to the extent that the order 

turns on an issue of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks, 

citation, and alteration omitted). We “possess jurisdiction to 

review whether the set of facts identified by the district court 

is sufficient to establish a violation of a clearly established 

constitutional right,” but “we lack jurisdiction to consider 

whether the district court correctly identified the set of facts 
10

that the summary judgment record is sufficient to prove.”4 Id.

(quoting Ziccardi v. City of Philadelphia, 288 F.3d 57, 61 (3d 

Cir. 2002)). “To the extent we have jurisdiction, this Court 

exercises plenary review.” Id.

Summary judgment is proper only when the record 

“shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “affect[s] the outcome 

of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In determining whether 

a genuine dispute of material fact exists, we view the 

underlying facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 

the party opposing the motion. Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 986.

B

“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials 

from civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate 

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 

S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). In resolving questions of 

qualified immunity, “courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry: 

 4 The Newark officers argue that the District Court erred 

by considering Bland’s expert testimony, which purported to 

establish that the Audi was incapable of moving once it crashed 

into the scaffolding. We do not have jurisdiction to review this 

ruling. See Blaylock v. City of Philadelphia, 504 F.3d 405, 409 

(3d Cir. 2007) (noting that, in appeals from denials of qualified 

immunity, “we lack jurisdiction to review questions of 

‘evidence sufficiency’” and must instead confine ourselves to 

“pure questions of law”).
11

(1) whether the plaintiff sufficiently alleged the violation of a 

constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was ‘clearly 

established’ at the time of the official’s conduct.” L.R. v. Sch. 

Dist. of Phila., 836 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2016). We may 

tackle these steps “in the order we deem most appropriate for 

the particular case before us.” Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 

418 (3d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).

Just two terms ago, the Supreme Court reiterated the 

“longstanding principle that clearly established law should not 

be defined at a high level of generality,” but must instead “be 

particularized to the facts of the case.” White v. Pauly, 137 S. 

Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also L.R., 836 F.3d at 248. Moreover, at the time 

the action is taken, the “legal principle [must] clearly prohibit 

the officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances before 

him. The rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is clear 

to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the 

situation he confronted.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. 

Ct. 577, 590 (2018) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Thus, “qualified immunity protects ‘all but the 

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” 

Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 

335, 341 (1986)).

C

The District Court focused its analysis on the events that 

occurred at the terminus of the reckless flight that ensued after 

Bland failed to comply with the traffic stop initiated by the 

New Jersey State Police. We begin by discussing the deadly 

force used by six of the state troopers at Lincoln Park, and we 

conclude that they are all entitled to qualified immunity.
12

The Supreme Court has consistently held that officers 

either did not violate the Fourth Amendment or were entitled 

to qualified immunity when they used deadly force during car 

chases similar to the one at issue here. In Brosseau v. Haugen, 

543 U.S. 194 (2004) (per curiam), the Court held that an officer 

was entitled to qualified immunity after she shot “a disturbed 

felon, set on avoiding capture through vehicular flight, when 

persons in the immediate area [were] at risk from that flight.” 

Id. at 200. In Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), the Court 

concluded that an officer did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment when he “terminate[d] the car chase by ramming 

his bumper” into the car of a fugitive whose reckless driving 

“posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any 

pedestrians who might have been present, to other civilian 

motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase.” Id. at 381, 

384. This was so even though the officer ran the motorist off 

the road instead of employing the standard “PIT maneuver”5 to 

get the fleeing vehicle to stop, and this decision caused the 

vehicle to run down an embankment and overturn, rendering 

the plaintiff a quadriplegic. Id. at 375.

In Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014), decided 

after the events giving rise to this suit, the Court held that 

officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment and 

alternatively were entitled to qualified immunity when they

fatally shot a fugitive whom the officers reasonably believed 

was “intent on resuming” a chase that “pose[d] a deadly threat 

for others on the road.” Id. at 2022. A year later, in Mullenix v. 

 5 In a Pursuit Intervention Technique maneuver, the 

pursuing vehicle applies pressure to the rear of the fleeing 

vehicle, causing the fleeing vehicle to turn abruptly and come 

to a stop.
13

Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015), the Court concluded that an 

officer who shot and killed a motorist during a high-speed 

pursuit in which the fugitive threatened to kill police officers

was entitled to qualified immunity, even though the officer’s 

decision to shoot defied his supervisor’s orders. Id. at 306–07, 

312.

Like the cases just mentioned, Bland’s behavior 

threatened the safety of the officers, as well as the public at 

large. Before shots were fired at Lincoln Park, Bland drove at 

high speeds, disregarded traffic signals, drove the wrong way 

down a one-way street, collided with two occupied police 

vehicles, and failed to comply with orders to surrender. As the 

gunfire erupted, he repeatedly attempted to flee from police

and state troopers, including by trying to drive with officers 

standing in close proximity to the Audi. And he engaged in all 

of this behavior in a vehicle that had been reportedly taken at 

gunpoint a few hours earlier. Bland does not direct us to any 

caselaw indicating that, especially in light of the precedent just 

discussed, “only someone plainly incompetent or who 

knowingly violates the law would have perceived a sufficient 

threat and acted as [the state troopers] did” in this situation.

Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 310 (internal quotation marks and

alteration omitted); see also Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 

F.3d 353, 361 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that clearly established 

rights are derived either from binding Supreme Court and 

Third Circuit precedent or from a “robust consensus of cases 

of persuasive authority in the Courts of Appeals” (citation 

omitted)). Given the troopers’ reasonable belief that Bland was 

armed, and the mortal threat that his conduct posed to those 

around him, the troopers who discharged their weapons at

Lincoln Park did not violate Bland’s clearly established 

constitutional rights. And because Thompson, Murphy, and 
14

Oliveira fired their weapons only at this location, they are 

plainly entitled to qualified immunity.

D

The events at the terminus of the car chase present a 

more complicated picture, but we reach the same conclusion 

because Bland identifies no caselaw indicating that the officers 

violated clearly established law extant in 2011. See Anderson

v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). He instead states in 

conclusory fashion that “every . . . reasonable member of law 

enforcement should be aware that [the officers’] conduct 

would constitute excessive force.” Bland Br. 36. In support, 

Bland argues that the officers were not in a position to see 

whether he made threatening movements inside the vehicle,

and that the Audi’s impact with the scaffolding rendered it 

inoperable, bringing the car chase to an end.

6 As a result, Bland

contends that Brosseau and Scott no longer control, and we 

should instead look to Tennessee v. Garner for guidance. In 

 6 After the parties submitted their summary judgment 

papers, Bland received a report from an automotive expert 

concerning whether the Audi could have moved after it 

collided with the scaffolding. The report contained pictures 

taken after the incident, including one that purportedly showed 

the driver’s side tinted window in one piece on the ground. At 

oral argument, Bland contended that this photograph 

demonstrated that the window was up during the final moments 

of the chase, meaning that the officers could neither have seen 

what Bland was doing inside the Audi nor heard his death 

threats. We need not decide whether the District Court properly 

considered this evidence because, even assuming that its

decision to do so was correct, Bland has failed to show that the 

officers violated clearly established law.
15

Garner, the Supreme Court held that “if the suspect threatens 

the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe 

that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or 

threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force 

may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where 

feasible, some warning has been given.” Tennessee v. Garner, 

471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985). Applying that standard, the Court 

concluded that an officer violated the Fourth Amendment by 

shooting an “unarmed, nondangerous” suspect in the back of 

the head as he attempted to flee the scene of a burglary. Id. at 

11.

Bland’s reliance on Garner is misplaced. The Supreme 

Court has noted that Garner “lay[s] out excessive-force 

principles at only a general level” and “do[es] not by [itself] 

create clearly established law outside an obvious case.” White, 

137 S. Ct. at 552 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 

Scott, 550 U.S. at 382 (noting that “Garner did not establish a 

magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions 

whenever an officer’s actions constitute ‘deadly force’”).

The officers here confronted a scenario quite different 

from the one presented in Garner, where the officer pursued 

and shot a nondangerous suspect in the back of the head, even 

though the officer was “reasonably sure” the suspect was 

unarmed. 471 U.S. at 3–4; see also Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 201 

(noting that analysis of qualified immunity “depends very 

much on the facts of each case”). This becomes especially clear 

once we consider the officers’ actions “in light of the specific 

context of the case,” as we are required to do. Fields, 862 F.3d 

at 361. The state troopers and Officer Del Mauro—all of whom 

were present at Lincoln Park—continued to pursue a fugitive 

who once again disobeyed traffic lights, drove at excessive

speeds, and put pedestrians and motorists at great risk. Under 
16

Bland’s version of events, at least one innocent civilian

suffered harm by his flight when a state police car struck an

occupied vehicle during the final leg of the pursuit. See Scott, 

550 U.S. at 379–80 (noting that the police were “forced to 

engage in the same hazardous maneuvers just to keep up” with 

the plaintiff). After the crash, Bland threatened to kill the 

officers, and the record provides no evidence that he attempted 

to surrender at any time. Though the Audi remained pinned 

against the scaffolding, the officers had previously seen Bland 

successfully free the car and continue to flee after the crash at 

Lincoln Park. And although the officers did not see a weapon, 

the police reports of an armed carjacking gave them reason to 

believe Bland was armed. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244 (noting 

that qualified immunity “turns on the objective legal 

reasonableness of the action” (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted)). This was the situation the officers 

confronted at the terminus of the chase when they discharged

their weapons. Bland identifies no cases with similar facts that, 

in 2011, would have “put every reasonable offic[er] on notice” 

that using deadly force in such a situation violated clearly 

established constitutional rights. Fields, 862 F.3d at 361

(internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, accepting (as we 

must) the truth of Bland’s assertions regarding the Audi’s

immobility and the officers’ ability to see Bland’s hands, our 

conclusion remains the same: the actions taken by the State 

Troopers and Officer Del Mauro are protected by qualified 

immunity.

But what about Newark Officers Torres and Martinez,

who, according to Bland, “arrived on the scene[ and] joined in 

the shooting without knowing whether Mr. Bland was firing at 

them, and without ever first observing Mr. Bland to be in 

possession of any firearm”? Bland Br. 5. The Newark officers 
17

contend that video footage refutes this allegation, but we need 

not resolve that dispute.

7 Here again, Bland has presented no 

caselaw demonstrating that the officers, who reasonably 

believed that Bland was armed, violated a clearly established 

right by joining in the chaotic scene and discharging their 

weapons.

A recent Supreme Court decision demonstrates that 

Torres’s and Martinez’s actions did not violate clearly 

established rights. In White v. Pauly, the Court granted 

qualified immunity to an officer who arrived late to an armed 

confrontation between multiple officers and individuals. 137 S. 

Ct. at 549, 551. After seeing one of the civilians fire shots, the 

defendant officer, without giving a warning, shot and killed 

another individual who pointed a weapon at the officers 

surrounding the house. Id. at 550. The plaintiffs argued that the 

other officers had not adequately alerted the occupants to the 

 7 Though we need not look to the video for guidance, 

we take this opportunity to remind district courts of their 

obligation to do so when necessary to identify disputed issues 

of material fact. At oral argument, the Newark officers 

requested that the District Court consider video footage they 

proffered to counter Bland’s version of events. The Court 

declined this invitation, stating that it did not think it was 

“particularly smart” to “hav[e] judges review individual tapes 

and say, hey, I’m satisfied.” App. 27. Notwithstanding the 

District Court’s independent assessment of the wisdom of this 

approach, the Supreme Court has instructed courts to consider 

video evidence in the record and to “view[] the facts in the light 

depicted by the videotape,” especially when it “blatantly 

contradict[s]” the nonmovant’s narrative. Scott, 550 U.S. at 

380–81.
18

fact that they were officers, and that White, although late to the 

scene, should have been aware that “corrective action was 

necessary.” Id. at 552. In reversing the denial of qualified 

immunity, the Court stated that “[c]learly established federal 

law does not prohibit a reasonable officer who arrives late to 

an ongoing police action in circumstances like this from 

assuming that proper procedures . . . have already been 

followed,” and that “[n]o settled Fourth Amendment principle 

requires that officer to second-guess the earlier steps already 

taken by his or her fellow officers.” Id. So too here. In the 

absence of any controlling law to the contrary, Newark 

Officers Martinez and Torres likewise are entitled to qualified 

immunity.8

IV

Because Defendants did not violate any of Bland’s 

clearly established constitutional rights, we will reverse the 

order of the District Court so summary judgment may be 

entered for Defendants.

 8 Because Defendants are entitled to qualified 

immunity, we need not reach the underlying Fourth 

Amendment questions. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. Nothing in 

this opinion should be read to suggest that law enforcement 

officers violate the Fourth Amendment where, as here, they 

employ lethal force to neutralize a carjacking suspect 

reasonably perceived to be armed, dangerous, and unwilling to 

peacefully surrender.