IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

February 21, 2013 Session

GREGORY ANDERSON d/b/a ABC PAINTING COMPANY v. 

THE METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING AGENCY

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 111093II Carol L. McCoy, Chancellor

No. M2012-01789-COA-R3-CV - Filed July 26, 2013

A painting contractor filed a complaint against Nashville’s Metropolitan Housing and

Development Agency (MDHA) alleging that the agency had violated its own rules by failing

to choose him as the lowest bidder on a painting contract. The trial court dismissed the

complaint, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because an administrative

decision, such as the award of a painting contract, can only be challenged through a petition

for writ of certiorari, and the contractor had filed his complaint after the sixty day time limit

for filing the writ had passed. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ANDY D.

BENNETT and RICHARD H. DINKINS, JJ., joined.

Phillip Leon Davidson, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Gregory Anderson d/b/a

ABC Painting Company.

Harold Frederick Humbracht, Jr., Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, The Metropolitan

Development and Housing Agency.

OPINION

I. PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT

Gregory Anderson is a contractor who has done work for the Metropolitan

Development and Housing Agency (MDHA) under the name ABC Painting Company.

MDHA issued requests for bids in 2008, 2009 and 2010. Anderson bid on contracts in 2008

and 2010, and was awarded contracts during those years. MDHA cancelled the 2010
contract because Anderson failed to provide adequate evidence of insurance as required by

the bid specifications. MDHA did not solicit bids for painting contracts in 2011.

On August 10, 2011, about one year after the last solicitation of bids that he

participated in, Anderson filed a complaint against MDHA in the Chancery Court of

Davidson County. He alleged that the agency had awarded numerous painting contracts for

work in MDHA housing to higher bidders who were less qualified than he was, in violation

of law and policy directing the agency to award contracts to the lowest qualified bidders. He

claimed that he had lost profits as a result of the MDHA’s actions, and he asked the court to

award him his lost income and to order the agency to follow its own bidding procedures and

the applicable laws.

Anderson based his claim on MDHA’s procurement policies, which are found in

Section II of the agency’s nineteen page handbook. The handbook states that for contracts

valued at less $100,000 but more than $2,000, the agency is required to solicit price

quotations from three offerors. After receiving the quotations, “[a]ward shall be made to the

offeror providing the lowest acceptable quotation unless justified in writing.” Anderson

claims that he made the lowest offer for several contracts, but that his offers were not

accepted and that the agency did not justify its decisions in writing.

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On May 24, 2012, MDHA filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the trial court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Anderson’s claim. The agency argued that the only

appropriate way to contest its award of a contract is by way of a common law writ of

certiorari, which must be filed within 60 days of the award being contested. Anderson filed

a response to the motion in which he argued to the contrary that chancery court had subject

matter jurisdiction because the common law writ of certiorari was not the sole remedy

available to a party suing a municipal body for failing to comply with bidding requirements.

The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to dismiss and agreed with MDHA.

The court filed an order on July 27, 2012 dismissing Anderson’s complaint. The order stated

that “. . . while Plaintiff has standing to bring this claim protesting the award of contracts

issued by MDHA, the proper procedure for doing so is by common law writ of certiorari.”

This appeal followed.

We note that Section XII of the handbook also allowsthe agency to use an “Alternative Procurement 1

Process” when it contracts with “businesses owned in substantial part by MDHA residents,” because “[t]his

has been a proven strategy for moving low-income persons out of poverty and dependency.”

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II. ANALYSIS

A. The Standard of Review

Courts derive their subject matter jurisdiction from the Constitution of Tennessee or

from legislative acts. Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co., 924 S.W.2d 632, 639

(Tenn. 1996); Kane v. Kane, 547 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tenn. 1977); Suntrust Bank v. Johnson,

46 S.W.3d 216, 221 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). They cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction

unless it has been conferred on them explicitly or by necessary implication. Dishmon v.

Shelby State Community College, 15 S.W.3d 477, 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). The presence

or absence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Accordingly, we review that

question on appeal de novo without a presumption of correctness. Northland Insurance Co.

v. State, 33 S.W.3d 727, 729 (Tenn. 2000); Nelson v. Wal-Mart Stores, 8 S.W.3d 625, 628

(Tenn. 1999); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993).

B. The Remedy of Certiorari

Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-9-101 et seq is the portion of the Tennessee Code

that governs judicial review of the acts of public bodies such as boards and commissions.

Its provisions have been applied to a wide variety of such bodies. See Watts v. Civil Service

Bd. for Columbia, 606 S.W.2d 274, 284 (Tenn. 1980); Wheeler v. City of Memphis, 685

S.W.2d 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) Walker v. Metro. Bd. Of Parks And Recreation, M2007-

01701-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 5178435 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2009)(rule 11 perm. app.

denied June 30, 2010). The statute declares that “[a]nyone who may be aggrieved by any

final order or judgment of any board or commission functioning under the laws of this state

may have the order or judgment reviewed by the courts, where not otherwise specifically

provided, in the manner provided by this chapter.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102 describes the avenue an aggrieved party is permitted to

follow to obtain judicial review of the actions of a public body like the MDHA.

Such party shall, within sixty (60) days of the order or judgment, file a petition

of certiorari in the chancery court of any county in which any one (1) or more

of the petitioners or any one (1) or more of the material defendants reside or

have their principal office, stating briefly the issues involved in the cause, the

substance of the order or judgment complained of, the respects in which the

petitioner claims the order of judgment is erroneous, and praying for the

accordant review.

Our courts have held many times that the time limit for filing is jurisdictional, and

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they have dismissed petitions for the writ for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because they

were untimely filed. See, Thandiwe v. Traughber, 909 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1994); Wheeler v. City of Memphis, 685 S.W.2d at 6; Fairhaven Corporation v. Tennessee

Health Facilities Commission, 566 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).

We note that the above statutes refer to court review of an order or judgment, thus

implying the existence of some sort of quasi-judicial procedure at the administrative level

that the aggrieved party has recourse to before having to turn to the courts. Such a procedure

makes it possible for the grievance to be resolved at a level closer to the events that gave rise

to it, which is the preferable result, because

Courts are wary of unwarranted judicial intrusions into the performance of

ordinary governmental activities. . . Since procuring goods and services is a

type of routine activity that is best left to governmental officials, most courts

have recognized that public procurement authorities have wide discretion with

regard to accepting bids or any of the other details of entering into a contract.

Metro. Gov. of Nashville, 842 S.W.2d 611, 619 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

The procedure for review in this case is found in Section VII of the MDHA handbook,

which is titled “Appeals and Remedies. It declares among other things, that “. . . any protest

against an award of a solicitation must be received from an offeror within fifteen (15)

calendar days of award (Board approval, execution of contract or Purchase Agreement), or

the protest will not be considered.” The handbook also describes a series of graduated steps

the agency is required to follow to resolve such a protest once it is received, including the

participation of the MDHA Executive Director.

Anderson did not file a protest with the MDHA related to any of the awards he

objected to. Consequently, he did not pursue available administrative remedies. Additionally,

he did not comply with the sixty day requirement for the filing of a petition for writ of

certiorari. This court previously reached the same conclusion in the case of Herbert v. Bd.

of Educ. of Memphis City Schools, W2008-02383-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 4878586 (Tenn.

Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2009) (no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed). In that case, a public

school teacher filed a breach of contract complaint to challenge a Board of Education

decision regarding disability leave. We held that the trial court properly dismissed her

complaint because her failure to file a petition for writ of certiorari deprived it of subject

matter jurisdiction. The reasoning we used in Herbert applies to this case as well.

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C. Anderson’s Arguments on Appeal

Anderson bases his arguments on appeal on a strained reading of the meaning of

Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101 as well as on an earlier decision of this court in a case which

involved a municipal bidding process, but which did not touch on the primary issue in the

case before us. Anderson’s statutory argument focuses on the single word “may” in Tenn.

Code Ann. § 27-9-101, which declares that parties aggrieved by the actions of such bodies

“may have the order or judgment reviewed by the court . . . in the manner provided by this

chapter.” (emphasis added).

The only manner of review provided by “this chapter” is the writ of certiorari.

Anderson contends, however, that the use of the permissive word “may” in the above

sentence, rather than a directive word like “shall” or “must,” implies that there are other

avenues of relief open to an aggrieved party. In the context of the statute, however, “shall”

or “must” would make no sense, for no obligation to seek judicial relief is imposed on an

individual who disagrees with the decision of an administrative body.

Anderson insists that “there is nothing ambiguous about the word ‘may.’ It is

permissive, not exclusionary.” We agree that the use of the word “may” in the statute is

permissive, but only because it indicates that an option for judicial review exists, which the

aggrieved party may or may not choose to take advantage of. See In re Estate of Austin, 920

S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tenn. 1996) (holding that a change of wording from “shall” to “may” in

a statute regarding the administration of estates affected only the manner in which a

decedent’s property may be sold, rather than the obligation to sell).

Anderson also relies on the case of Browning-Ferris Industries v. Oak Ridge, 644

S.W.2d 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982), which he points out has never been overruled and has

been cited approvingly by the courts on numerous occasions. In that case, this court was

asked to decide whether a low bidder had standing to sue the city for its alleged violation of

provisions in the city’s charter and of its ordinances regarding bidding procedures. We

determined that the low bidder did indeed have standing. Anderson insists that there is no

meaningful distinction between the question of standing as discussed in Browning-Ferris and

the question of subject matter jurisdiction in this case.

While lack of standing, like lack of subject jurisdiction, can result in dismissal of a

claim at a very early stage of litigation, they are, in fact, two separate and distinct doctrines.

Standing is a court-made doctrine that is used to determine whether a particular plaintiff has

alleged a sufficiently personal stake in the outcome of the litigation to warrant a judicial

resolution of the dispute. Knierim v. Leatherwood, 542 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tenn. 1976);

Garrison v. Stamps, 109 S.W.3d 374, 377 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Thus, the primary focus

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of a standing inquiry is on the party, not on the merits of the claim. City of Brentwood v.

Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 149 S.W.3d 49, 56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

In Browning-Ferris, the question before the court was whether the unsuccessful low

bidder had standing to sue the governmental authority for its failure to comply with

competitive bidding requirements. We noted that there was a split of authority on the

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question, but we concluded that the better reasoned view was that the economic injury

suffered by the low bidder amounted to a sufficient personal stake in the litigation to give

him standing to sue. Browning-Ferris, 644 S.W.2d at 402. In the case before us, the trial

court held that Anderson had standing to seek judicial review of the MDHA’s action, which

is consistent with our conclusion in Browning-Ferris.

But the trial court also found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Anderson’s

complaint because he had failed to file a petition for writ of certiorari within the statutory

time limit. The focus of a jurisdictional inquiry is neither on the party nor on the merits of

the claim, but solely on the extent of the power that has been conferred on the court by the

Constitution or by the legislature. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102 sets out the jurisdictional

parameters of the court’s power to adjudicate claims brought by parties aggrieved by the

orders or judgments of public bodies. Anderson’s complaint falls outside those parameters.

We therefore affirm the trial court’s dismissal of that complaint.

III.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Remand this case to the Chancery Court

of Davidson County for any further proceeding necessary. Tax the costs on appeal to the

appellant, Gregory Anderson d/b/a ABC Painting Company.

____________________________

PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE

Our opinion in Browning-Ferris contains no indication that the question of jurisdiction was ever 2

raised at any point in the course of that litigation.

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