DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

JUNO OCEAN WALK CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Appellant,

v.

THE NORTH COUNTY COMPANY, INC.,

a Florida Corporation,

MARIAN BOLOGNA, GILLES SOUCY and PATRICIA HARGREAVES, 

Appellees.

No. 4D12-4090

[February 4, 2015]

Appeal and cross-appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth 

Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Lucy Chernow Brown, Judge; L.T. 

Case No. 501996CA002577.

Alan R. Raines and Jay Steven Levine of Jay Steven Levine Law Group, 

Boca Raton, for appellant.

Bard D. Rockenbach of Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm 

Beach, for appellee Patricia Hargreaves.

CONNER, J.

Juno Ocean Walk Condominium Association, Inc. (“Juno Condo”) 

appeals the trial court’s order granting Patricia Hargreaves’s (“Hargreaves”) 

motion to amend a final judgment approving a settlement. Juno Condo 

argues that the trial court did not have legal authority to amend the final 

order that was entered ten years before the motion to amend was filed. We

agree and reverse.

This case was initially filed in 1996 and became a class action lawsuit 

by condominium lot owners against the developer, North County 

Company, Inc. (“North County”). The suit was based on paragraph 11.2 

of the Declaration of Condominium, which states:

11.2 RENTAL OF CONDOMINIUM UNITS. The Developer shall 

have for a period of ninety-nine (99) years from the date of this 

Declaration the exclusive right in the absence of use by the 
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Owner or his registered and approved guests, to rent Units 

which are a part of the Declaration at scheduled rates 

promulgated from time to time by the Developer. The 

Developer shall retain for its services fifty percent (50%) of the 

gross amount of rental collected on any unit with the 

remaining fifty percent (50%) reserved for the benefit of the 

Unit Owner.

The members of the class sought to transfer from the developer to the 

condominium association the right to collect rents when units were not 

occupied by the unit owner or approved guests. During the lawsuit, 

Hargreaves filed a notice to “opt-out” of the class for all of the lots that she 

owned. After the trial court found “[t]hat [North County through its 

president made] oral and written statements [that] interfered with, tainted, 

and prejudiced the class notification and ‘opt-out’ process,” it struck the 

opt-out notice responses, including Hargreaves’s. However, after the trial 

court struck Hargreaves’s first notice to opt-out, she filed a second notice 

to opt-out.

Eventually the class action proceeding resulted in a settlement, and the 

settlement agreement was approved by the trial court in an order entered 

in this case on July 19, 2002 (“the 2002 Order”). The 2002 Order resolved 

the issues as to “the class of lot owners who remained in the class and

who did not opt out and who are listed on the attached exhibit ‘1’ 

incorporated herein.” (emphasis added). Attached to the 2002 Order was 

Exhibit 1, which listed the names of the lot owners, and their lots, to which 

the 2002 Order applied. Hargreaves was not on the list. The 2002 Order 

also stated that:

A) Paragraph 11.2 of the Yogi by the Sea Declaration of 

Condominium recorded in Official Records Book 4693, 

page 1853 as amended in Official Records Book 6509, page 

1193, in the Official Records of Palm Beach County, Florida 

is unenforceable effective as of April 3, 2002, against the 

class of Unit Owners who did not opt out identified on 

attached exhibit “1”, [sic] their heirs, assigns, grantees, 

beneficiaries and transferees (the “Class”). The North 

County Company, Inc., its successors, assigns, transferees 

and principals, now and forever, are enjoined and 

prohibited from enforcing the provisions of Paragraph 11.2 

of the Yogi by the Sea Declaration of Condominium 

recorded in Official Records Book 4693, page 1853 as 

amended in Official Records Book 6509, page 1193, in the 

Official Records of Palm Beach County, Florida against the 
3

class of Unit Owners who did not opt out and their heirs, 

beneficiaries, assigns, grantees and transferees; 

B) On or before April 3, 2005, the North County Company, 

Inc., its successors, assigns, transferees and principals, 

shall turn over and assign[1] to the Juno Ocean Walk 

Condominium Association, Inc., (successor to Yogi by the 

Sea Condominium Association, Inc. to all rights, title and 

interest (including the right to enforce) Paragraph 11.2 of the 

Yogi by the Sea Declaration of Condominium recorded in 

Official Records Book 4693, page 1853 as amended in 

Official Records Book 6509, page 1193, in the Official 

Records of Palm Beach County, Florida as to the class of 

Unit Owners who did opt out and their heirs, assigns, 

grantees, beneficiaries and transferees[.]

(emphasis added). The 2002 Order also contained a “Reservation of 

Jurisdiction” section, which stated that “[t]he Court reserves jurisdiction 

to enforce the provisions of this order and settlement.” In 2002, the class 

action proceeding ended.

Subsequent to the entry of the 2002 Order, two separate lawsuits were 

filed against Hargreaves to collect rents owed pursuant to paragraph 11.2. 

North County sued for rents owed before to April 3, 2005; Juno Condo 

sued for rents owed after April 3, 2005. 

In October, 2012, the class representative in this suit, “joined by” 

Hargreaves, filed an “unopposed” motion for amendment to the 2002 Order 

(“the motion to amend”). The motion to amend stated that the “Developer 

does not object to this Motion and does not oppose the relief sought in this 

Motion,” and later defined the “Developer” as North County. The motion 

to amend also stated: “In pending litigation between North County . . .

[and] Hargreaves, . . [Hargreaves] has pled and asserted that [she] was 

negligently or intentionally threatened, intimidated, misrepresented to and 

fraudulently induced to ‘opt out’ of the class action and was not included 

nor listed in Exhibit ‘1.’” On October 11, 2012, without a hearing on the 

motion to amend, the trial court entered an order granting the motion, 

“there being no opposition or objection to the Motion and to the relief 

sought therein.” The trial court ordered the amendment to apply nunc pro

tunc to July 19, 2002. 

1 The record also contains the executed assignment from North County to Juno 

Condo in accordance with the 2002 Order, filed as supplemental record by 

Hargreaves. 
4

After learning of the motion to amend the 2002 Order and the order 

granting it, Juno Condo filed a motion to intervene in the court below, 

which was denied. This appeal follows.

Both parties agree that the general rule regarding amendment to a final 

judgment is that a trial court loses authority over the case, except as 

dictated by rule 1.540, see generally, Bank One, N.A. v. Batronie, 884 So. 

2d 346, 348 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Thus, “[o]ur standard of review of an 

order ruling on a motion for relief from judgment filed under Florida Rule 

of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) is whether there has been an abuse of the trial 

court’s discretion.” J.J.K. Int’l, Inc. v. Shivbaran, 985 So. 2d 66, 68 (Fla. 

4th DCA 2008) (quoting Snipes v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 885 So. 

2d 899, 900 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Hargreaves argues on appeal that the trial court properly granted the 

motion to amend under the fraud exception contained in rule 1.540(b).2 

However, rule 1.540(b) specifically states that there is a one-year time limit 

for filing a motion to vacate based on fraud. Therefore, since Hargreaves’s 

motion was filed in excess of one year after the 2002 Order was entered, it 

was untimely under rule 1.540(b). Because the motion to amend was 

untimely under rule 1.540(b), the trial court did not have authority to 

modify the 2002 Order in this case. Batronie, 884 So. 2d at 348.

Although it was asserted on appeal that the unopposed motion to 

modify the 2002 Order was intended to be a settlement of the suit brought 

by North County against Hargreaves after the class action proceeding 

ended, there is nothing in the record showing an independent action was 

filed for modification of the 2002 Order.

Hargreaves alternatively argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to 

amend the 2002 Order since, within the 2002 Order, the trial court 

specifically “reserve[d] jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of this order 

and settlement.” Hargreaves argues that “[b]roadly speaking, [the order 

on Hargreaves’s motion to vacate] is an order enforcing the agreement” and 

that it “enforces the agreement as to [her].” We disagree, and find that the 

trial court’s order granting the motion to amend was not an order enforcing

the 2002 Order, but instead, modifying it. 

2 Although rule 1.540(b) couches its language in terms of “vacating” a judgment, 

it also applies to amending a judgment, which was the relief requested in the 

motion to amend. See Dep’t of Banking & Fin. v. Edwards, 695 So. 2d 939, 940 

(Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (“[T]he trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to rule 1.540(b) 

to consider her motion to amend the final judgment.”).
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The trial court did not have any legal authority to enter its order 

amending the 2002 Order. We therefore reverse and remand the case to 

the trial court with instructions to vacate the order entered on October 11, 

2012, amending the 2002 Order.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

DAMOORGIAN, C.J. and TAYLOR, J., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.