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Filed 3/8/16 P. v. Brown CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LERON BROWN,

Defendant and Appellant.

C078943

(Super. Ct. No. 14F04720)

The crux of this case turns on the definitions of burglary and larceny. So, we 

begin with these. Burglary is committed when a person “enters any house, room, [or] 

apartment . . . with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony.” (Pen. Code, § 

459, italics added.) Larceny is committed when a person “steal[s] or take[s] . . . the 

personal property of another.” (Pen. Code, § 484, subd. (a), italics added.) Here, a jury 

found defendant Leron Brown guilty of second degree burglary based on his entering an 

apartment unit that had been vacated by its tenants, who had left inside an office chair 

and television. The office chair and television had not been removed by apartment 
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management yet because there was still time for the tenants to retrieve their property. On 

appeal, defendant raises contentions challenging the sufficiency of evidence and jury 

instructions. Disagreeing with these contentions, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant was walking around an apartment complex in the early morning 

knocking on apartment doors until he found one (unit 60) where nobody answered. 

Inside unit 60 were an office chair and a television that were part of a pile that included a 

mattress and kids’ toys. The tenants in unit 60 had moved out recently. The property 

manager had not yet hauled away these items because the tenants still had time to come 

back to the apartment and retrieve their property. The property manager was alerted to 

defendant’s presence at the complex when the tenant from unit 59 (which was next door 

to 60) told the manager he had heard noises that sounded like somebody was walking 

inside unit 60 and moving stuff. The property manager saw defendant coming out of an 

elevator in the complex (with nothing in his hands), and he told defendant he needed to 

leave. Defendant asked if he could quickly grab his bike, and the property manager said, 

“yes.” Defendant got his bike, went around the corner, and left. Five minutes later, 

though, the apartment manager saw defendant in the apartment complex pushing the 

office chair and television. Police found defendant a short time later at a nearby gas 

station, where he had just been hit by a car while riding his bike. In defendant’s pant 

pockets were a flathead screwdriver, a pair of wire cutters, and a shaved key. Police 

found the office chair and television in one of the apartment parking stalls. A jury found 

defendant guilty of second degree burglary and possessing burglary tools. 

I

There Was Sufficient Evidence Of Burglary,

And No Instructions On Mistake Of Fact Or Claim Of Right Were Warranted

Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence he committed burglary

because there was no evidence the property was owned by someone else, as the tenants 
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abandoned the office chair and television. Related to this contention is another that 

defendant raises -- the court should have instructed on (or defense counsel was 

ineffective in not requesting instruction on) mistake of fact (namely, defendant’s 

mistaken belief that the property was abandoned or discarded) and defendant’s claim of 

right (namely, defendant believed in good faith he had a right to the property and he 

openly took it). 

There are two reasons these contentions are nonstarters. One, as to the sufficiency 

of evidence, burglary requires only entry with the required intent; this entry constitutes 

the completed crime of burglary regardless of whether any felony or theft is actually 

committed. (People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846, 863, fn. 18.) Thus, the perpetrator of 

the burglary does not have to know exactly what is inside when he or she enters -- he or 

she only has to have the unlawful intent when entering. Here, defendant was knocking 

on apartment doors until he found a unit where nobody answered. Once he entered that 

unit with the intent to take whatever personal property of another was inside, he 

committed the crime of burglary. Moreover, there was evidence that this property had 

not yet been abandoned by the tenants of unit 60, because they still had time to retrieve

the office chair and television before the property manager was going to haul them away. 

Two, as to the instructional arguments, the only defense defendant offered at trial 

was the People could not prove that he even entered unit 60. There was no evidence and 

thus no argument to be made that defendant believed he had a right to the office chair or 

television or evidence that defendant believed the property inside belonged to nobody, 

i.e., was not “the personal property of another.” (Pen. Code, § 484, subd. (a).)

II

The Flight Instruction Was Warranted

Defendant contends the court erred in instructing on the inference of guilt

following his flight after the burglary (CALCRIM No. 372) because the property 

manager told him to leave. He argues “[t]here was no circumstantial evidence that 
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[defendant]’s departure was motivated by a consciousness of guilt, or the purpose of 

avoiding detection.” The problem with defendant’s contention is that it does not take into 

account all the facts of defendant’s departure from the apartment complex. Namely, 

although the property manager initially did tell defendant to leave and it appeared that 

defendant did so, defendant returned to the complex shortly thereafter and was seen with 

the stolen property. Then, the office chair and the television were discovered in an 

apartment parking stall, supporting a reasonable inference that defendant feigned (initial) 

departure from the apartment complex, only to return to get the office chair and 

television, but abandoned the property and fled on his bike when seen again by the 

property manager. Thus, there was this additional evidence that defendant did in fact flee 

the apartment complex when he left the second time, after being seen pushing around the 

stolen property.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

/s/ 

Robie, J.

We concur:

/s/ 

Nicholson, Acting P. J.

/s/ 

Renner, J.