NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

U1’IITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Civil Action No. 07-01 (JLL)

Plaintiff,

v. OPINION AND ORDER

BAYER CORPORATION,

Defendant.

IN RE: BAYER PHILLIPS COLON HEALTH

PROBIOTIC SALES PRACTICES Civil Action No. l1-3017(JLL)

LITIGATION

OPINION AND ORDER

LINARES, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Dino Rikos and Troy Yuncker’s (“Plaintiffs”)

appeal of Magistrate Judge Dickson’s May 7, 2015 Letter Order denying Plaintiffs’ motion to

modify the Discovery Confidentiality Orders in the above-referenced matters. The Court has

considered the submissions ofthe parties and for good cause shown, Plaintiffs’ appeal is denied.

A United States Magistrate Judge may hear and determine any [non-dispositive] pretrial

matter pending before the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(A). The district court will

only reverse a magistrate judge’s decision on these matters ifit is “clearly erroneous or contrary

to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); L. Civ. R. 72.I(c)(1)(A). Therefore,

“this Court will review a magistrate judge’s findings of fact for clear error.” Lithuanian

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Commerce Corp., Ltd. v. Sara Lee Hosiery, 177 F.R.D. 205, 213 (D.N.J.1997) (citing Lo Bosco

v. Kure Engg Ltd., 891 F.Supp. 1035, 1037 (D.N.J. 1995)). Under this standard, a finding is

clearly erroneous when “although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the

entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”

Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (citing United States v. US. Gypsum Co.,

333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). The district court will not reverse the magistrate judge’s

determination, even in circumstances where the court might have decided the matter differently.

Bowen v. Parking Auth. ofCity ofCamden, 2002 WL 1754493, at *3 (D.N.J. July 30, 2002). “A

district judge’s simple disagreement with the magistrate judge’s findings is insufficient to meet

the clearly erroneous standard ofreview.” Andrews v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 191

F.R.D, 59, 68 (D.N.J.2000).

In matters where the magistrate judge is authorized to exercise his or her discretion, the

decision will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Kresejky v. Panasonic

Commc’ns & Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996) (“Where, as here, the magistrate has ruled

on a non-dispositive matter such as a discovery motion, his or her ruling is entitled to great

deference and is reversible only for abuse of discretion”). “This deferential standard is

‘especially appropriate where the Magistrate Judge has managed this case from the outset and

developed a thorough knowledge ofthe proceedings.” Lithuanian Commerce Corp., 177 F.R.D.

at 214 (quoting Pub. Interest Research Group v. Hercules, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1525, 1547

(D.N.J.1993), affdon other grounds and rev’d on other grounds, 50 F.3d 1239 (3d Cir.1995)).

However, a magistrate judge’s legal conclusions on a non-dispositive motion will be reviewed de

novo. See Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81,91 (3d Cir.1992); Lo Bosco, 891 F.Supp.

at 1037. A ruling is “contrary to law” when the magistrate judge has misinterpreted or

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misapplied the applicable law. Pharm. Sales & Consulting Corp. v. J WS. Delavau Co., Inc.,

106 F.Supp.2d 761, 764 (D.NJ.2000).

In his May 7, 2015 Letter Order, Magistrate Judge Dickson denied Plaintiffs’ request to

modify the Discovery Confidentiality Orders in the instant cases. Rather, Magistrate Judge

Dickson determined that there was “no basis to compel Bayer to modify the Discovery

Confidentiality Order nor to produce documents [to the Plaintiffs], regardless of relevance,

privilege or other considerations, which it has produced to the Government,” acknowledging that

while “[t]he cases apparently overlap. . . [,] [they] are litigated under somewhat different legal

standards.” Judge Dickson further concluded that the requested modification “would effectively

force Bayer to produce confidential or irrelevant information in this action merely because it has

been produced in the Government’s suit.” Finally, Judge Dickson ordered the parties to meet

and confer and “ifthe parties’ meet and confer fails, Plaintiffs may seek an order compelling

production of documents [to Plaintiffs] that they deem relevant in the instant matter.” Plaintiffs

claim that Judge Dickson decided a dispute that was not before him and did not decide the issue

which was before him.

Judge Dickson’s May 7, 2015 Letter Order appropriately required Plaintiffs to follow the

normal discovery process of meeting and conferring before seeking relief from the Court. If

there are outstanding discovery matters in this case, Plaintiffs are directed to meet and confer

with Bayer before seeking relief from the Court. Judge Dickson also was correct in finding that

granting the request to modify the Discovery Confidentiality Orders would “effectively force

Bayer to produce confidential or irrelevant information” even ifit was technically Plaintiff

turning over the information because, as Judge Dickson so aptly pointed out, these are separate

cases, filed at different times, involving different claims, different legal standards and different

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discovery requests. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that

Magistrate Judge Dickson committed a clear error or reached a decision contrary to law, and his

May 7, 2015 Letter Order will be affirmed.

Accordingly, IT IS on this

_____

day ofJune, 2015,

ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ appeal of Magistrate Judge Dickson’s May 7, 2015 Letter

Order is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

JQSL.1Th4ARES

DISTRICT JUDGE

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