[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 18-13600

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 2:17-cv-00468-ACA

KHALIL WILLIAMS, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES FOR PERSONS WITH EXCEPTIONALITIES, 

 Defendant - Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

________________________

(July 15, 2019)

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JILL PRYOR and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Khalil Williams appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to 

his former employer, Housing for Persons with Exceptionalities (“HOPE”), on his 

claim that HOPE discriminated against him based on his race when it terminated 

him. The district court ruled that Williams failed to introduce sufficient evidence 

to support a reasonable inference that HOPE’s decision to terminate him was based 

on his race. Williams argues on appeal that the district court erred by failing to 

decide that race was at least a motivating factor in HOPE’s termination decision. 

We disagree. After careful review, we affirm the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

Williams, who is African-American, worked for HOPE as a direct care 

provider.1

 In that position, he was responsible for supervising three group home 

residents with special needs and administering their medication. Williams worked 

each weekend during the night shift, although HOPE also expected him to work 

additional shifts, depending on his availability. While he worked weekend nights 

at HOPE, Williams spent his weekdays studying air conditioning and refrigeration

at a local community college.

The sequence of events leading to Williams’s termination began when 

HOPE’s executive director, Debra Sokol, called Williams to ask whether he could 

 1 Because we are reviewing the district court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment,

we recite the facts in the light most favorable to Williams, the nonmovant. See Hoffman v. Allied 

Corp., 912 F.2d 1379, 1383 (11th Cir. 1990).

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cover another employee’s scheduled shift after that employee had called out. 

Williams responded that he could not cover the shift because that evening he 

planned to celebrate his graduation from the community college program. Sokol 

replied to Williams, “either you come in or don’t come back.” Doc. 18-1 at 10.2

Sokol called Williams the next morning to remind him that he had signed an 

agreement in which he promised as a condition of his employment to cover extra 

shifts when he was available. The two agreed to meet in HOPE’s office later that 

day to review the agreement. As the two conferred and Sokol read the agreement 

aloud to Williams, he interrupted her to say that she should not expect him to cover 

the extra shift at issue based on that provision because he had a legitimate excuse 

as to why he was unavailable.

Sokol responded to Williams with a profanity-laced tirade lasting two or 

three minutes. She first told him: “I can’t stand your black ass.” Id. at 11. 

Williams then asked Sokol for a copy of the agreement but she refused his request. 

She instructed him to instead memorize the document based on her recitation. 

After uttering various profanities, Sokol returned the document to a file cabinet and

directed Williams to leave the premises by saying: “[G]et out of here. Get out of 

this office.” Id. at 14. Sokol ran into her office to hide from him under her desk. 

 2 Citations in the form “Doc #” refer to the numbered entries on the district court’s 

docket.

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He then told her, “you have made your decision,” before he left the office as 

instructed with the belief that Sokol’s instruction amounted to her termination of 

his employment. He accordingly elected not to report for his remaining scheduled 

shifts.

Williams sued HOPE in federal district court alleging a single claim of racial 

discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 arising from his alleged 

termination. The complaint alleged that Williams “may prevail under a mixedmotive theory, as even if [HOPE] had legitimate reasons for terminating him, race 

was at least a motivating factor in the adverse employment actions [it] took against 

him, up to and including termination.” Doc. 1 at ¶ 18. HOPE answered the 

complaint.

After discovery, HOPE filed a motion for summary judgment. HOPE 

argued that Williams voluntarily resigned. It further argued that, assuming it did 

fire Williams, the record lacked evidence from which a reasonable juror could find

that its decision to fire him evinced discriminatory intent. HOPE pointed to 

evidence in the record militating against a finding of discriminatory intent, 

including Williams’s testimony that Sokol’s racial remark was “very much out of 

character,” Doc. 18-1 at 13, and interrogatory answers showing that immediately 

after Williams’s separation, Sokol filled his position with people of the same race 

as his.

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In response, Williams argued that he was terminated when he left the office 

following his confrontation with Sokol. According to Williams, a reasonable jury 

could find that race was at least a motivating factor in HOPE’s decision to fire him 

because Sokol told him, “I can’t stand your black ass,” right before his termination. 

He further argued that his strong work performance, HOPE’s lack of a reason for 

firing him, the falsity of Sokol’s explanation that he stopped showing up for work, 

and her testimony that he was not required to work on the night of his graduation 

all supported an inference of racial discrimination.

The district court granted HOPE’s motion. The court ruled that under Smith 

v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011), Williams failed to 

present a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a 

reasonable jury to infer that HOPE fired him because of his race.

This is Williams’s appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court order granting a motion for summary 

judgment, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in favor 

of the non-moving party. Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1291-92 

(11th Cir. 2012). Summary judgment is appropriate when a movant shows that 

there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact,” such that “the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute 

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of a material fact exists only when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in 

support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on 

which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252.

III. DISCUSSION

Williams argues on appeal that the district court erred in ruling that he failed 

to introduce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that 

HOPE’s decision to terminate him was based on his race. Title VII prohibits 

employers from terminating an employee “because of . . . race.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-2(a)(1). An employer runs afoul of this prohibition whenever race was at 

least “a motivating factor” for the termination decision, “even though other factors 

also motivated” it. Id. § 2000e-2(m). Section 1981 similarly “prohibits intentional 

race discrimination in the making and enforcement of public and private contracts, 

including employment contracts.” Ferrill v. Parker Grp., Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 472 

(11th Cir. 1999). As a general rule, discrimination claims brought pursuant to Title 

VII and § 1981 “are subject to the same standards of proof and employ the same 

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analytical framework.” Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1296 n.20 (11th Cir. 

2009).3

We typically evaluate employment discrimination claims by applying the 

burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 

U.S. 792 (1973). We do not apply that framework here, however, because 

Williams concedes in his brief that he “does not rely on establishing a traditional 

McDonnell Douglas prima facie case.” Appellant’s Br. at 36. But, as we have 

recognized, “establishing the elements of the McDonnell Douglas framework is 

not, and never was intended to be, the sine qua non for a plaintiff to survive a 

summary judgment motion.” Lockheed-Martin, 644 F.3d at 1328. Rather, a

“plaintiff will always survive summary judgment” by “present[ing] circumstantial 

evidence that creates a triable issue concerning the employer’s discriminatory 

intent.” Id. “A triable issue of fact exists if the record, viewed in a light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, presents a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence 

that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.”4

 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

 3 The fit between the standards that apply to claims and defenses arising under the two 

statutes is nevertheless inexact. We have held that “the 1991 mixed-motive amendments to Title 

VII do not apply to § 1981 claims.” Mabra v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local Union 

No. 1996, 176 F.3d 1357, 1358 (11th Cir. 1999). We do not address this issue, however, because 

it does not affect our disposition of this appeal.

4 In his opening brief, Williams consistently conflates the standards that we apply under 

McDonnell Douglas, Lockheed-Martin, and a third case, Quigg v. Thomas Cty. Sch. Dist., 

814 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2016). McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed-Martin set forth alternative 

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Williams argues that a reasonable jury could find that HOPE fired him 

because of his race because Sokol told him, “I can’t stand your black ass,” just 

before she fired him. Appellant’s Br. at 23. Williams also argues that a reasonable 

jury could find intentional discrimination from the falsity of HOPE’s explanation 

of his separation. We address each of these arguments in turn.

A. Williams Has Failed to Present Sufficient Evidence to Show That He 

Was Fired Because of His Race.

Williams argues that he has shown intentional discrimination based on his 

testimony that Sokol told him, “I can’t stand your black ass.” Doc. 18-1 at 11. We 

disagree. Her comment evinces discriminatory animus and is unbefitting of any 

workplace. But a reasonable jury could not find that she fired him because of his 

race based only on that statement because its content bears no relation to the 

termination decision. Cf. Scott v. Suncoast Beverage Sales, Ltd., 295 F.3d 1223, 

 

frameworks for analyzing “single-motive claims[,] . . . also known as ‘pretext’ claims[, which] 

require a showing that bias was the true reason for the adverse action.” Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1235. 

In contrast, we apply the framework described in Quigg to “mixed-motive” employment 

discrimination claims, which require a showing that “illegal bias, such as bias based on [race] or 

gender, ‘was a motivating factor for’ an adverse employment action, ‘even though other factors 

also motivated’ the action.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). The district court analyzed 

Williams’s claim under Lockheed-Martin, and Williams raised no argument in his opening brief

that the district court’s application of Lockheed-Martin was error. He has therefore abandoned 

the argument that the mixed-motive “motivating factor” standard should apply instead. See

Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681-82 (11th Cir. 2014). We accordingly

treat his claim as a “single-motive” claim. 

In his reply brief, Williams argues that we should avoid comparing his evidence to a 

mosaic. We do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. Id. at 682. We 

note nonetheless that the term “‘convincing mosaic’ is not a legal test.” Ortiz v. Werner Enters., 

Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 764-65 (7th Cir. 2016). Rather, the phrase “was designed as a metaphor to 

illustrate why courts should not try to differentiate between direct and indirect evidence.” Id.

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1229 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Although a comment unrelated to a termination decision 

may contribute to a circumstantial case for pretext, it will usually not be sufficient 

absent some additional evidence supporting a finding of pretext.” (citation 

omitted)). Further, other evidence in the record counsels against a finding that 

Sokol fired Williams because of his race. He testified that her comment was “very 

much out of character,” Doc. 18-1 at 13, and after his separation, she filled his 

position with people of the same race. The record evidence is thus insufficient for 

Williams to withstand HOPE’s motion for summary judgment.5

 5 Williams also argues that another encounter between him and Sokol shows her 

discriminatory intent: her refusal of his request to use the restroom inside her home while he 

was there to paint her deck pursuant to an agreement between them that was unrelated to his 

employment at HOPE. In the district court, Williams recounted that incident in the facts section 

of his brief opposing summary judgment but raised no argument that the incident evidenced 

intentional discrimination. The district court nonetheless explained that evidence of that 

encounter failed to show that Williams was fired because of his race:

Sokol did not tell . . . Williams that he could not use the restroom inside her house 

because he is African-American, and . . . Williams has submitted no evidence 

demonstrating that . . . Sokol allowed Caucasian individuals doing work at her 

house to use the restroom inside. Therefore, this evidence does not give rise to an 

inference of intentional race discrimination. In the absence of other evidence 

suggesting that . . . Sokol prohibited . . . Williams from using her restroom 

because he is African-American, a reasonable jury cannot infer discriminatory 

intent from this facially neutral act that is removed in time and place from the 

employment decision.

Doc. 22 at 16. We agree with the district court. On appeal, Williams argues that Sokol’s refusal 

of his request shows discriminatory animus because it exemplifies the historical mistreatment of 

African-American workers in the South. But Williams did not raise that argument in the district 

court, and we therefore decline to address it here. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 

1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (“This Court has repeatedly held that an issue not raised in the 

district court and raised for the first time in an appeal will not be considered by this court.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

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We disagree with Williams’s argument that Damon v. Fleming 

Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1999), requires us to decide 

that his evidence is sufficient to support a finding of intentional discrimination. 

There, two former supermarket employees brought an age-discrimination suit 

against the supermarket, their former employer, after a district manager terminated 

them. Damon, 196 F.3d at 1357-58. Within one year of assuming the district 

manager position, the manager fired or demoted “five older, more experienced 

[workers],” including the plaintiffs, “and replaced them with [employees] who 

were younger and less experienced.” Id. at 1358. One of the younger 

replacements testified that the district manager had told him immediately after 

terminating one of the two plaintiffs (and three months after terminating the other) 

that “what the company needed was aggressive young [people] like [the younger 

replacement] to be promoted.” Id. at 1359, 1363 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). We decided based on this and other evidence in the record that the two

former supermarket employees survived summary judgment. Id. at 1366. 

Williams contends that Damon supports his case because there the district 

manager’s statement was considered as probative circumstantial evidence that the 

manager impermissibly discriminated against the plaintiff whom the manager fired 

three months before making the statement. See id. at 1363. Williams argues that 

the closer temporal proximity between Sokol’s statement and his termination 

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suggests that he too should survive summary judgment. But this argument misses 

the mark because Williams has presented much weaker evidence of intentional 

discrimination than the Damon plaintiffs did. Most significantly, the district 

manager’s statement in Damon was more closely related to the termination 

decision because it implied that the protected characteristic generally affected the 

manager’s personnel decisions. See id. at 1362 (“The comment . . . arguably 

suggests that [the manager] had an ageist preference for young managers. Given 

the substance, context, and timing of [the] comment, if credited, we find it to be a 

significant piece of circumstantial evidence.” (emphasis added)). In contrast, 

Sokol’s statement does not imply that race had any influence on Sokol’s personnel 

decisions, as a general matter or in Williams’s case. Accordingly, temporal 

proximity aside, without additional evidence, we must conclude that Sokol’s 

remark was unconnected to her termination decision. 

For similar reasons, Williams’s reliance on Mora v. Jackson Mem’l Found., 

Inc., 597 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2010), is misplaced. There, a plaintiff sued her 

former employer, alleging that its chief executive fired her because of her age. 

Mora, 597 F.3d at 1202. When the chief executive fired the plaintiff, the executive 

stated, “I need someone younger I can pay less . . . I need an Elena [Quevedo, a 25 

year old employee].” Id. at 1203 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

executive further told the plaintiff, “[Y]ou are very old, you are very inept. What 

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you should be doing is taking care of old people. They really need you. I need 

somebody younger that I can pay less and I can control.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). In speaking about the plaintiff to a different employee, the 

executive also said that the plaintiff “is too old to be working here anyway.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). We concluded that a reasonable jury could 

take these statements “at face value” and find that the chief executive fired the 

plaintiff because of her age. Id. at 1205. But in the instant case, unlike in Mora, 

we cannot conclude that Sokol based her termination decision on Williams’s race

simply by taking Sokol’s statement “at face value.” See id. Mora therefore offers 

Williams little help.

B. A Reasonable Jury Could Not Find Intentional Discrimination Based on 

The Falsity of HOPE’s Explanation of His Separation.

As an alternative to relying solely on Sokol’s remark, Williams argues that 

under Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), we may 

find intentional discrimination from the falsity of HOPE’s explanation that he was 

terminated when he abandoned his job and stopped showing up for work. 

Appellant’s Br. at 32. Even if we were to agree with Williams that HOPE’s 

explanation of his resignation is unworthy of credence, we would still conclude 

that the record lacked sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find 

that he was fired because of his race. 

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The Reeves Court, applying McDonnell Douglas, recognized that “a 

plaintiff’s prima facie case [under McDonnell Douglas], combined with sufficient 

evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the 

trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.” Reeves, 530 

U.S. at 148 (emphasis added). But Williams has presented much weaker evidence 

of intentional discrimination than would a plaintiff who had established a prima 

facie case under McDonnell Douglas. To establish a prima facie case under the 

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that 

she belongs to a protected class, (2) that she was subjected to an adverse 

employment action, (3) that she was qualified to perform the job in question, and 

(4) that her employer treated similarly situated employees outside her class more 

favorably.” Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 2019)

(en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).

6

 Establishing the prima facie case

“raises an inference of discrimination,” but it does so “only because we presume 

these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the 

consideration of impermissible factors.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 

450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). Williams’s evidence 

 6 “If the plaintiff succeeds in making out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the 

defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Finally, should the 

defendant carry its burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered 

reason was merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination, an obligation that merges with the 

[plaintiff’s] ultimate burden of persuading the [factfinder] that she has been the victim of 

intentional discrimination.” Id. at 1221.

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is weaker than that offered by a plaintiff who has established a prima facie case 

under McDonnell Douglas because, as we have explained, the record contains a 

paucity of evidence to prove that Sokol’s decision to fire Williams was based on 

his race. Though we acknowledge the possibility that a plaintiff who makes no 

attempt to establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas may nonetheless 

survive summary judgment based in part on proof that the employer’s proffered 

justification is false, we conclude that such a plaintiff would need stronger 

evidence of intentional discrimination than Williams has offered in the instant 

case. See Flowers v. Troup Cty., Ga., Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 1327, 1337-38 (11th 

Cir. 2015) (concluding that a plaintiff failed to offer sufficient evidence to prove “a 

causal connection between his race and his termination” when the plaintiff showed 

that the defendant’s justification for his termination “may have been pretext of 

something” but did not show that the justification “was pretext of discrimination 

on the basis of his race”).7

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s order granting 

HOPE’s motion for summary judgment.

AFFIRMED.

 7 We make no attempt to demarcate the quantum of evidence necessary in such a case to 

go to trial, we merely decide that Williams’s evidence is insufficient.

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