NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

:

TREASA FENNIE, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-753 (MLC)

:

Plaintiff, : O P I N I O N

:

v. :

:

D’ANNE BREVETTI, :

:

Defendant. :

 :

THE PLAINTIFF, who is pro se, applies for in-forma-pauperis

relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (“Application”). (Dkt. entry no.

1, Appl.) The Court will (1) grant the Application, and (2) deem

the Complaint to be filed. The Court may now (1) review the

Complaint, and (2) dismiss it sua sponte if it is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,

or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court will

dismiss the Complaint, as it fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted.

BACKGROUND

I. DEFENDANT

The plaintiff identified the defendant, D’Anne Brevetti, as

the “managing agent” of either “Region Nine - New Brunswick UAW

Housing Corp.” or “Region Nine Housing Corp.” (Dkt. entry no. 1,

Compl.; Appl; dkt. entry no. 1, Civil Cover Sheet.) The Court’s

own research on Westlaw databases, the New Jersey State Business

Case 3:11-cv-00753-MLC-TJB Document 2 Filed 05/10/11 Page 1 of 7 PageID: 8
Gateway Service database, and the website for the Region Nine

Housing Corporation (“RNHC”) reveals that (1) RNHC’s state of

incorporation is unclear, but its principal place of business is

in New Jersey, and (2) New Brunswick U.A.W. Housing Corp.

(“NBUAW”) is a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of

business in New Jersey. See also Jenkins v. Region Nine Hous.

Corp., 306 N.J.Super. 258, 258, 261 (N.J. App. Div. 1997) (noting

RNHC is corporation); Richard Khavkine, A Permanent Remembrance,

Home News Tribune, Mar. 30, 2008 (noting RNHC has its main office

in New Jersey, and NBUAW operates as sole owner of certain

housing project); Nawal Qarooni, Saving A Parking Space For

Seniors, Star-Ledger, Oct. 19, 2006 (noting RNHC and NBUAW are

corporations). The Court’s research also reveals that Brevetti

is a New Jersey citizen.

II. PLAINTIFF

The plaintiff is a New Jersey citizen who is a resident of a

housing project managed by NBUAW. (Compl. at 1.)

III. RELATED ACTION

It appears that NBUAW has brought a landlord-tenant action

(“Landlord-Tenant Action”) in New Jersey state court against the

plaintiff. See New Brunswick UAW v. Fennie, No. LT-3067-11.

IV. 42 U.S.C. § 3535

42 U.S.C. § 3535 concerns administrative provisions relating

to the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development

(“HUD”). The statute provides that the Secretary of HUD is

2

Case 3:11-cv-00753-MLC-TJB Document 2 Filed 05/10/11 Page 2 of 7 PageID: 9
authorized to make rules and regulations to carry out HUD’s

functions, powers, and duties. 42 U.S.C. § 3535(d).

V. 24 C.F.R. § 245.15(a)

24 C.F.R. § 245.15(a) is a regulation concerning the manner

in which tenants of a housing project must be notified concerning

(1) a request for approval of a rent increase, (2) changes in the

manner in which utilities are paid, (3) conversion of residential

units to certain other purposes, (4) transfer of a housing

project to another entity, (5) a partial release of a mortgage

security, and (6) capital additions. The regulation permits such

notices to be posted publicly.

THIS ACTION

The plaintiff alleges that Brevetti “put sensative [sic]

private correspondence on outside of rented unit for all to see”. 

(Compl. at 1.) Apparently, a confrontation ensued, and the

plaintiff was “disciplined unnecessarily” and “management . . .

issued [her] an infraction”. (Id.) As a basis for jurisdiction,

the plaintiff alleges that “[p]ursuant to 24 [C.F.R.] § 245.15(a),

[she] was violated several times”, and cites 42 U.S.C. § 3535. 

(Id.) Thus, jurisdiction is premised upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

THE COMPLAINT WILL BE DISMISSED

42 U.S.C. § 1983 may provide a conduit to tenants of certain

housing projects to bring a private cause of action to address a

violation of federal housing laws by state officials. Shaw v.

3

Case 3:11-cv-00753-MLC-TJB Document 2 Filed 05/10/11 Page 3 of 7 PageID: 10
Phila. Hous. Auth., No. 90-7650, 1991 WL 97681, at *4 (E.D. Pa.

May 28, 1991) (discussing Wright v. Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth.,

479 U.S. 418 (1987)); see Diggs v. Hous Auth., 67 F.Supp.2d 522,

531-32 (D. Md. 1999) (finding private cause of action available

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of HUD regulation 24 C.F.R.

§ 966.4(d)(1)). In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 3535(d) may not embody

a statutory intent to foreclose enforcement under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. See Williams v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. 04-

3488, 2006 WL 2546536, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2006). But the

regulation cited by the plaintiff — 24 C.F.R. § 245.15(a) — (1)

does not concern anything that could be construed as sensitive,

private correspondence that is not proper to publicly post, (2)

cannot be interpreted to limit public postings in a housing

project only to the topics enumerated therein, and (3) in any

event, permits public postings. Thus, there is no basis for a

federal claim here under that regulation.1

Even if there were a basis for a claim here, it would be

dismissible because a claim brought under the auspices of 42

 The HUD regulations appear to generally require notices 1

to be publicly posted. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 247.4 (stating

that when landlord determines to terminate a tenancy, landlord

must (1) specifically state in writing the reasons for the

landlord’s action, and (2) serve notice by, among other means,

affixing notice to the door of the leased dwelling). Indeed, if

the notice affixed to the plaintiff’s dwelling here was a notice

concerning the termination of her tenancy, then the posting of

that notice was proper under the relevant regulations, thereby

making the plaintiff’s claim frivolous. See id.

4

Case 3:11-cv-00753-MLC-TJB Document 2 Filed 05/10/11 Page 4 of 7 PageID: 11
U.S.C. § 1983 is viable only against those acting under color of

state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. NBUAW and RNHC are private

entities, and cannot be deemed to be state actors. See Hussein

v. New Jersey, 403 Fed.Appx. 712, 716 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating

private landlord seeking to evict tenant is not state actor under

42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Although the Complaint cites a federal statute and a federal

regulation, it is actually an action to recover damages for

harassment, infliction of emotional distress, or invasion of

privacy pursuant to state law. Those causes of action do not

arise under federal law, as they “do[] not fit within th[at]

special and small category”, and “it takes more than a federal

element to open the ‘arising under’ door”. Empire Healthchoice

Assur. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699-701 (2006) (quotations and

citations omitted); see Merrell Dow Pharms. v. Thompson, 478 U.S.

804, 813-17 (1986) (affirming remand of removed state negligence

action that was based on theory that defendant violated federal

law); Kalick v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 372 Fed.Appx. 317, 320-21 (3d

Cir. 2010) (stating contract and fraud claims derived from the

interpretation of federal aviation regulation does not give rise

to federal jurisdiction), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 348 (2010);

Jayme v. MCI Corp., 328 Fed.Appx. 768, 770 (3d Cir. 2008)

(stating, in dispute over caller identification service, fact

that contract is subject to federal regulation does not, in

5

Case 3:11-cv-00753-MLC-TJB Document 2 Filed 05/10/11 Page 5 of 7 PageID: 12
itself, demonstrate existence of federal jurisdiction); JVC Ams.

Corp. v. CSX Intermodal, 292 F.Supp.2d 586, 592 (D.N.J. 2003)

(stating removed action should be remanded when federal law is

merely referenced or mentioned in claim). Furthermore, an action

that amounts to nothing more than a landlord-tenant dispute does

not give rise to federal jurisdiction, even if federal statutes

or regulations are cited in a complaint. Groves v. Wilson, 404

Fed.Appx. 705, 707 (3d Cir. 2010).

It is also apparent that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332

is lacking, as the plaintiff, Brevetti, NBUAW, and RNHC are deemed

to be New Jersey citizens. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1), (c)(1).

The Court, if not dismissing the Complaint, would have been

inclined to abstain here due to the related Landlord-Tenant

Action. A federal court must abstain, pursuant to the Younger

abstention doctrine, when (1) a state court action is ongoing,

(2) important state interests are implicated, and (3) there is an

adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in state court. See

Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S.

423, 435 (1982); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971). 

The Court cannot interfere with the ongoing Landlord-Tenant

Action. In addition, the plaintiff can address the violation of

any federal regulation within the Landlord-Tenant Action. See

Edward Gray Apartments - Region Nine Hous. Corp. v. Williams, 352

N.J.Super. 457, 460-66 (N.J. App. Div. 2002) (addressing defenses

6

Case 3:11-cv-00753-MLC-TJB Document 2 Filed 05/10/11 Page 6 of 7 PageID: 13
that were based on federal regulations in landlord-tenant

action); 24 C.F.R. § 247.6 (concerning procedure in eviction

proceedings).2

The Court will dismiss the Complaint for failing to state a

claim on which relief may be granted. But the Court will do so

without prejudice, and grant the plaintiff leave to recommence

the action in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (concerning

state law claims surviving dismissal of federal claims). The

Court will issue an appropriate order and judgment.

 s/ Mary L. Cooper 

MARY L. COOPER

United States District Judge

Dated: May 10, 2011

 The Court also notes that NBUAW and its employees are not 2

converted into state actors for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

by bringing the Landlord-Tenant Action. See Keisling v. Renn,

No. 10–4346, 2011 WL 1632955, at *1 (3d Cir. May 2, 2011)

(stating parties who brought foreclosure action in state court

were not converted to state actors by merely resorting to the

courts).

7

Case 3:11-cv-00753-MLC-TJB Document 2 Filed 05/10/11 Page 7 of 7 PageID: 14