J-A28022-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: B.E.A., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.B.A., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 934 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Decree Entered June 10, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Orphans’ Court at 

No(s): 26-ADOPT-2020

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JANUARY 25, 2022

Appellant T.B.A. (Father) appeals from the order granting the petition 

of Appellees T.M.L. (Mother), and B.C.L. (Stepfather) (collectively, Petitioners) 

and involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights to B.E.A. (Child), born 

in February of 2012. We affirm. 

The orphans’ court set forth the following findings of fact:

• [Mother] and [Father] lived together when [Child] was born. 

[Father] participated in [Child’s] care, including providing

physical, emotional, and financial support.

• In 2015, the relationship between [Mother] and [Father]

ended.

• On March 12, 2015, the court entered a Final Protection from 

Abuse Order (PFA) against [Father] on behalf of [Mother].

[Father] violated the PFA by communicating with [Mother] via 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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her cell phone and once serendipitously meeting her at the 

mall.

• The PFA afforded [Father] visitation with [Child] every other

weekend and permitted [Father] to contact [Mother] regarding 

[Child]. [Father] exercised custody of [Child] under the PFA.

• In February 2016, [Father] was incarcerated for non-payment 

of child support. He was released in April 2016.

• [Father]’s first priority after his release from incarceration was

seeking rehab. In April 2016, [Father] entered an in-patient 

rehab program. He was discharged in November or December 

2016.

• On February 11, 2016, the court entered a Custody Order 

(2016 Order). The 2016 Order granted [Mother] and [Father]

shared legal custody. The 2016 Order also granted [Mother]

primary physical custody.

• The 2016 Order granted [Father] partial physical custody on

alternating weekends subject to three preconditions; [Father]

was required to: 1) pass a hair follicle drug test; 2) maintain a 

stable residence for at least four months; and 3) possess a 

reliable and working cell phone. [The 2016 Order also provided 

that Father had the right to supervised partial physical custody 

through the Salvation Army, ABC House, or another mutually 

agreed-upon supervised visitation program.]

• [Father] never fulfilled the preconditions under the 2016 Order 

so he could exercise partial physical custody. Thus, [Father]

never exercised physical custody of [Child] under the 2016 

Order.

• Although [Father] reads and understands the English language,

he claims he did not understand the 2016 Order, including how 

to arrange a drug test. However, [Child’s] paternal 

grandmother spoke to [Father] about the preconditions.

Further, [Father] read the 2016 Order aloud from the witness 

stand without issue.

• [Father] testified he believed the PFA prohibited him from

contacting [Mother] and exercising custody under the 2016 

Order. However, the PFA contained a provision permitting 

[Father] to contact [Mother] regarding [Child].
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• [Father] moved in with his fiancé[e] . . . in March 2017. 

[Father] has lived at his current address since June 2017.

• [Mother] last saw [Father] in-person in 2017. During a

meeting at the Domestic Relations office, [Father] asked 

[Mother] how he could see [Child]. [Mother] referred [Father]

to the 2016 Order and her attorney.

• In 2018, [Father] was incarcerated on a DUI charge for 72 

hours.

• In mid to late 2018, [Father] learned [Mother] and [Child’s] 

address through [Child’s] paternal extended family.

• [Father’s] last physical contact with [Child] occurred on June 

22, 2018. [Father] stopped by [Child’s] paternal 

grandparent[s’] house without knowing [Child] was there.

[Father] and [Child] spent about two hours together.

• [Father] had not fulfilled the preconditions of the 2016 Order 

prior to his contact with [Child] on June 22, 2018.

• [Mother] and Stepfather married on September 15, 2018. 

[Child] has known Stepfather since 2015 and lived with 

Stepfather since 2018. Stepfather and [Child] have formed a 

parent/child bond. They enjoy time together hunting, target 

shooting, working around the house[,] and playing video 

games. Stepfather provides for [Child’s] financial, physical,

and emotional needs.

• [Child] refers to Stepfather [by his first name] except when 

[Child] is in an upset emotional state; during those times 

[Child] refers to Stepfather as “Father” or “Dad.”

• [Child] has expressed his desire to be adopted by Stepfather.

• Stepfather is willing to accept legal and physical custody of 

[Child] and intends to adopt him.

• [Father] reached out to legal aid organizations three or four 

times from June 2019 to November 2020 regarding custody of 

[Child] but did not qualify for services. [Father] testified he 

also reached out to private attorneys but could not afford them.

• [Father] did no research or investigation into representing 

himself in the custody court.
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• [Father] testified he reached out to Alternative Behavior

Consultants (ABC), a supervised parental visitation program, 

for intake in August 2019 and again at the beginning of 2020. 

However, ABC only received one request for visitation from 

[Father] in January 2020.

• In August 2019, [Father] messaged Stepfather twice via 

Facebook regarding ABC. [Mother] filed paperwork at ABC in 

2019.

• In February 2020, [Father] messaged Stepfather via Facebook

requesting [Mother] submit additional paperwork to ABC, but

[Mother] was not required to file additional paperwork by ABC.

• [Father’s] intake at ABC was delayed to July 2020 because of

[Mother’s] limited availability and COVID-19 restrictions. 

[Father] never exercised physical custody of [Child] at ABC.

• In February 2020, [Child] told Stepfather he wanted Stepfather 

to adopt him. Stepfather intends to adopt [Child].

• In June 2020, [Father] messaged Stepfather via Facebook 

stating [Child] is [Father’s] son, not Stepfather’s son.

• As of May 2021, [Father] was $547.92 in arrears on child 

support for [Child]. [Father] is currently unemployed and was 

last employed in January 2021.

• [Mother’s] cell phone number, which [Father] has used to

contact her in the past, has not changed since 2015. [Mother]

and [Child] have lived at the same address since 2018.

• [Father] messaged Stepfather via Facebook from 2015 to 

2020. [Father] never inquired after [Child] in these messages.

• When [Father] requested information from [Mother] in

Facebook messages to Stepfather, [Mother] responded by 

texting her answers to [Child’s] paternal aunts. [Mother] does 

not have a working cell phone number for [Father].

• [Mother] is in contact with several members of [Child’s]

extended paternal family, including paternal grandparents, two 

paternal aunts, and a paternal uncle. [Father] inquires about 

[Child] to [Child’s] paternal aunts and uncle. [Child] is not 

aware of [Father’s] inquires through [Child’s] paternal aunts 

and uncle.
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• [Father] has never attempted to contact [Mother] or [Child] 

through [Child’s] extended paternal family.

• [Child] spends every other weekend with his paternal 

grandparents and takes occasional week-long vacations with 

them. [Mother] intends to maintain [Child’s] relationship with 

his paternal grandparents.

• [Father] is not involved in [Child’s] education or medical care, 

nor has he sent notes, cards, or presents to [Child]. [Father]

posts a birthday message on Facebook every year on [Child’s]

birthday, but no evidence was presented [Child] is aware of 

these messages.

• [Petitioners filed a petition for involuntary termination of 

Father’s parental rights on July 13, 2020.] The legal grounds 

asserted for the termination of the parental rights of [Father]

are: 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) – “The parent by conduct

continuing for a period of at least six months immediately 

preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a 

settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has 

refused or failed to perform parental duties.”

Orphans’ Ct. Decree, 6/10/21, at 2-6 (footnotes omitted and formatting 

altered). 

The orphans’ court held a hearing on the petition to involuntarily 

terminate Father’s parental rights on May 4, 2021.1 Mother, Stepfather, and 

Father all testified at the hearing. The parties also stipulated as to what Child’s 

paternal grandmother and paternal uncle would testify to if they had been 

called as witnesses. 

____________________________________________

1 The orphans’ court appointed Lauren Sulcove, Esq. as Child’s legal counsel 

pursuant to Section 2313(a) on September 3, 2020. See In re Adoption of 

K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1223-24 (Pa. 2020) (stating “[a]s we have previously 

recognized, [23 Pa.C.S. §] 2313(a) requires that the common pleas court 

appoint an attorney to represent the child’s legal interest, i.e. the child’s 

preferred outcome, and the failure to appoint counsel constitutes structural 

error in the termination proceedings” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). 
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On June 10, 2021, the orphans’ court issued a decree involuntarily 

terminating Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1)

and (b). Id. at 11-12. 

On July 9, 2021, Father timely filed a notice of appeal and a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The orphans’ court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion 

adopting the reasons set forth in its June 10, 2021 decree. See Orphans’ Ct. 

Op., 7/15/21, at 3-4. 

On appeal, Father raises a single issue for our review: “Whether the 

[orphans’] court’s decision to terminate [Father’s] parental rights was 

supported by clear and convincing evidence and did not constitute an abuse 

of discretion.” Father’s Brief at 5. 

Our Supreme Court has explained:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard 

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for 

termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if 

they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. As has been often 

stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the 

reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. 

Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion 

only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will.

[T]here are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion 

standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial 

courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific 

determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are 
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observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often 

presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and 

parents. Therefore, even where the facts could support an 

opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and 

termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to 

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record 

and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of 

law or an abuse of discretion.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, [23 Pa.C.S. § 2511,] which requires a bifurcated 

analysis:

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental 

rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the 

termination of parental rights are valid. 

In re M.T., 101 A.3d 1163, 1178-79 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (citations

omitted and formatting altered). 

We have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence 

is defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to 
J-A28022-21

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enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the 

truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1004 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (en banc) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Section 2511(a)(1)

Father argues that the orphans’ court erred in concluding that there was 

clear and convincing evidence that Father had shown a settled purpose of 

relinquishing his parental rights and/or he failed to perform parental duties for 

at least six months prior to the filing of the instant petition. Father’s Brief at 

14. Father acknowledges that he was absent from Child’s life but contends 

that he credibly testified that he was absent because he was focusing on his 

sobriety so that “he could be well for his son.” Id. at 14-15. Father also 

argues that the orphans’ court did not consider the efforts he made to perform 

parental duties in the six months preceding the filing of the petition to 

terminate his parental rights or the obstacles he faced in doing so. Id. at 15-

16. Specifically, Father asserts that he reached out to Stepfather to restore 

contact with Child and that Mother testified that she never responded to 

Father’s attempts at contact. Id. at 15. Father notes that he worked with 

ABC to initiate supervised custodial time with Child, but there were delays in 

setting up supervised visitation resulting from a scheduling conflict and the 

COVID-19 pandemic. Id. at 15-18. Additionally, Father contends that Mother 

was uncooperative with Father’s attempts to initiate supervised custody by 

not communicating with Father and then by filing the instant petition. Id. at 

17-18. Finally, Father claims that the orphans’ court did not give proper 
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weight to the circumstances beyond Father’s control, i.e., the COVID-19 

pandemic and Mother’s unavailability and uncooperativeness, which

prevented him from exercising custody of Child through ABC. Id. at 18. 

Section 2511(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either 

has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim 

to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1). 

“A court may terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1) where 

the parent demonstrates a settled purpose to relinquish parental claim to a 

child or fails to perform parental duties for at least the six months prior to the 

filing of the termination petition.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. 

Super. 2010) (emphasis in original). “Although it is the six months 

immediately preceding the filing of the petition that is most critical in the 

analysis, the trial court must consider the whole history of [the] case and not 

mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision.” In re B., N.M., 856 

A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). 

This Court has explained:

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental 

duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child 

needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These needs, 
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physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive 

interest in the development of the child. Thus, this court has held 

that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires 

affirmative performance.

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial 

obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a 

genuine effort to maintain communication and association with 

the child.

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty 

requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place 

of importance in the child’s life.

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good 

faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order 

to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her 

ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all 

available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and 

must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in 

the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental 

rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while 

others provide the child with his or her physical and emotional 

needs.

Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). In B., N.M., the Court rejected 

the father’s claims that his ignorance of the law and lack of information about 

the mother’s new telephone number prevented him performing his parental 

duties. Id. at 856-57. The B., N.M. Court held that although the “[f]ather 

was not required to perform the impossible, he was obligated to act 

affirmatively to maintain his relationship with [the child], even in difficult 

circumstances” and that the “[f]ather failed to act to the best of his ability to 

meet his obligation despite his incarceration and the obstacles [the m]other 

placed before him.” Id. at 857 (citation omitted). 

Our Supreme Court has held that
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[o]nce the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental 

duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the 

court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s 

explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment 

contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the 

effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to 

Section 2511(b).

Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998) 

(citation omitted); accord In re J.T.M., 193 A.3d 403, 409-11 (Pa. Super. 

2018) (affirming the termination of the incarcerated father’s parental rights 

when the father only sent the child a single letter and had paternal aunt 

engage in limited contact with the child on his behalf). 

This Court has noted that

we may not consider any effort by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described in subsection (a)(1) . . . if that remedy was 

initiated after the parent was given notice that the termination 

petition had been filed. Further, this evidentiary limitation applies 

to the entire termination analysis. The court, however, may 

consider post-petition efforts if the efforts were initiated before 

the filing of the termination petition and continued after the 

petition date.

Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. 

Additionally,

to be legally significant, the post-abandonment contact must be 

steady and consistent over a period of time, contribute to the 

psychological health of the child, and must demonstrate a serious 

intent on the part of the parent to recultivate a parent-child 

relationship and must also demonstrate a willingness and capacity 

to undertake the parental role. The parent wishing to reestablish 

his parental responsibilities bears the burden of proof on this 

question.

Id. at 1119 (citation omitted and formatting altered). 
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Here, in addressing Section 2511(a)(1), the orphans’ court explained:

The facts that support . . . termination [of Father’s parental rights] 

are as follows:

a. [Father’s] last physical contact with [Child] was June 

22, 2018. Prior to this, [Father’s] last physical contact 

with [Child] was in 2015.

b. [Father] has not been involved in [Child’s] education 

or medical care, nor has he sent notes, cards, or 

presents to [Child]. [Father] supports [Child] 

financially only by virtue of a court order compelling 

child support.

c. [Father] never vindicated his parental and custodial 

rights through the 2016 Order or filed for modification 

of that order. 

* * *

[Father] has not played any significant role in [Child’s] life since 

2015. [Father’s] last physical contact with [Child] occurred on 

June 22, 2018, when [Father] stopped by [Child’s] paternal 

grandparent[s’] house. [Father] and [Child] spent about two 

hours together. Notably, this contact was mere happenstance, 

not the result of [Father]’s initiative; [Father] did not know [Child] 

would be present at [Child’s] paternal grandparent[s’] house. 

Further, this contact violated the 2016 Order, as [Father] had not 

completed any of the preconditions under the 2016 Order. 

[Father] has not sent notes, cards, or presents to [Child] since 

2015 or otherwise attempted to communicate with him. [Father]

posts a message on Facebook every year on [Child’s] birthday and 

inquires after [Child] through [Child’s] paternal extended family, 

but there is no evidence [Child] has awareness of this.

[Father] made few efforts to communicate with [Mother] about 

custody. [Father] testified he believed the PFA prohibited him 

from reaching out to [Mother]; however, the PFA explicitly 

permitted [Father] to contact [Mother] regarding [Child]. 

[Mother’s] cell phone number, which [Father] had used to contact 

[Mother] in the past, has not changed. [Father] learned [Mother]

and [Child’s] current address in 2018, but [Father] never sent 

communication to their address. Additionally, both [Father] and 

[Mother] are in contact with [Child’s] extended paternal family, 
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but [Father] never attempted to contact [Mother] or [Child] 

through them. [Father] messaged Stepfather via Facebook on 

multiple occasions from 2015 to 2020 but never inquired about 

[Child’s] well-being or asked to relay messages to [Child].

[Father] testified to three reasons for his lack of contact with 

[Child]: 1) [Father] did not understand the 2016 Order; 2) 

[Father] did not have an attorney; and 3) [Father’s] struggles with 

addiction. We do not find any of these explanations persuasive.

First, [Father] testified he did not understand the terms of the 

2016 Order. However, [Child’s] paternal grandmother spoke to 

[Father] about the 2016 Order, including the preconditions for 

[Father] to exercise[] partial physical custody of [Child]. Further, 

[Father] previously exercised custody under the PFA, and [Father]

read the 2016 Order from the witness stand during the hearing 

without issue.

Second, [Father] testified he did not exercise custody because he 

did not have an attorney. Crucially, [Father] never invoked the 

custody court to vindicate his rights after the 2016 Order went 

into effect. [Father] made some efforts to acquire counsel through 

legal aid organizations and private attorneys, but [Father] never 

researched or attempted to represent himself in the over five 

years since the 2016 Order has been in effect.

Third, [Father] testified about his struggles with addiction, 

including his time in rehab in 2016 and his relapse in 2018 (when 

he was incarcerated for DUI). His efforts in rehab are laudable. 

However, [Father’s] substance abuse issues do not justify his 

almost complete absence from [Child’s] life.

During the hearing, [Father] repeatedly expressed that he 

believes there is room for himself, [Mother], and Stepfather in 

[Child’s] life. However, [Father] has done nothing in the past five 

years demonstrating this is true. [Child] is not required to wait 

for [Father] to assert a place in his life.

The [c]ourt finds by clear and convincing evidence that [Father], 

by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months 

immediately preceding the filing of the petition, refused or failed 

to perform parental duties. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1). 

Orphans’ Ct. Decree at 6, 9-10. 
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Following our review, we find no abuse of discretion or error of law in 

the orphans’ court’s conclusion that there was clear and convincing evidence 

to support termination of Father’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1). 

See S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27; see also M.T., 101 A.3d at 1178-79. 

Instantly, the orphans’ court noted that Father has been absent from 

Child’s life since Father separated from Mother in 2015. Although the orphans’ 

court considered Father’s explanations for his absence, see Charles E.D.M., 

II, 708 A.2d at 91, the court did not find those assertions credible. 

Specifically, the orphans’ court rejected Father’s claim that he did not 

understand the 2016 custody order. See Orphans’ Ct. Decree at 10. The 

orphans’ court also found that Father “never invoked the custody court to 

vindicate his rights after the 2016 Order went into effect” and made no 

attempt to represent himself in the custody action. See id. Finally, the 

orphans’ court acknowledged Father’s struggle with sobriety, but concluded 

that it did not justify Father’s “almost complete absence” from Child’s life. 

See id. 

With respect to Father’s post-abandonment contact with Child, the 

orphans’ court noted that Father had no contact with Child after 2015, except 

for an unplanned visit at paternal grandparents’ home on June 22, 2018.2 

Although the record indicates that Father made some attempts to exercise 

supervised custody of Child at ABC, the orphans’ court explained that he

____________________________________________

2 Father visited paternal grandparents’ home that day without knowing that 

Child would be there. See Orphans’ Ct. Decree at 3. 
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“made few efforts” to communicate with Mother about custody arrangements 

and made no attempt to communicate with Child. See id. at 9.

The record supports the orphans’ court’s findings. See S.P., 47 A.3d at

826-27. Further, we decline to reweigh the evidence or interfere with the 

court’s credibility determinations in that these conclusions are based on clear 

and convincing evidence established in the record. Id. Therefore, we discern 

no abuse of discretion or legal error by the orphans’ court in concluding that

Father failed to perform his parental duties pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a)(1). See Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d at 91; J.T.M., 193 A.3d at 

409-11; see also B., N.M., 856 A.2d at 855. 

Section 2511(b)

Father contends that Petitioners failed to prove the grounds alleged for 

termination of his parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1), such that the 

orphans’ court should not have considered whether the termination served the 

interests of the Child under Section 2511(b). Father’s Brief at 18. 

Father further claims that the orphans’ court

failed to consider all possible options to maintain strong familial 

ties and relationships for [Child]. . . . Child spent . . . his formative 

years, years when significative familial bonds are formed, in the 

care of both Mother and Father. The evidence shows that [Child] 

was happy and excited when he last saw Father, and was 

distressed when Father had to leave. [Child’s] emotional needs 

and welfare are best served by maintaining all familial bonds and 

ties and allowing him to continue to enjoy the relationships with 

Mother, Father, and Stepfather.

Id. at 19. 
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Initially, we note that Father did not preserve his appellate challenge to 

the orphans’ court’s ruling under Section 2511(b) in his Rule 1925(b) 

statement. Additionally, Father failed to cite any relevant legal authority to 

support his Section 2511(b) claim. See Father’s Brief at 19. While we could 

conclude that Father has waived this issue, see Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii), 

2119(a); In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 466 & n.3 (Pa. Super. 2017), we 

will consider the orphans’ court’s ruling under Section 2511(b) in the interest 

of justice. See C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1009 (addressing the trial court’s analysis 

of Section 2511(b) despite the mother’s failure to present a challenge under 

that subsection). 

Once the statutory grounds for termination have been met under 

Section 2511(a), the court must consider whether termination serves the 

needs and welfare of Child, pursuant to Section 2511(b). See M.T., 101 A.3d 

at 1178-79. 

Section 2511(b) provides:

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). 
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“[T]he focus in terminating parental rights is on the parent, under 

Section 2511(a), whereas the focus in Section 2511(b) is on the child.” 

C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1008 (citation omitted). 

The C.L.G. Court further explained that regarding Section 2511(b):

Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are 

involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. 

The court must also discern the nature and status of the parentchild bond, paying close attention to the effect on the child of 

permanently severing the bond.

Moreover, [t]he court should also consider the importance of 

continuity of relationships to the child, because severing close 

parental ties is usually extremely painful. The court must consider 

whether a natural parental bond exists between child and parent, 

and whether termination would destroy an existing, necessary and 

beneficial relationship. Most importantly, adequate consideration 

must be given to the needs and welfare of the child.

Id. at 1010 (citations omitted and formatting altered). 

“[W]hen evaluating a parental bond, the court is not required to use 

expert testimony. . . . Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal 

bonding evaluation.” In re D.L.B., 166 A.3d 322, 328 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted). Further, this Court has explained that 

“the existence of some bond” between a parent and a child “does not 

necessarily defeat termination of . . . parental rights.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 

753, 764 (Pa. Super. 2008). Rather, the question is whether the bond 

between the parent and the child “is the one worth saving or whether it could 

be sacrificed without irreparable harm to” the child. Id. 

Here, the orphans’ court addressed Child’s best interests as follows:
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No evidence was presented that whatever limited bond existed 

between [Father] and [Child] on June 22, 2018, still exists.

[Child] does not look to [Father] for emotional or physical support; 

[Father’s] only support toward [Child] has been financial and only 

then as compelled by the [c]ourt. It is clear [Mother] and 

Stepfather, not [Father], provide [Child] the love, comfort, 

security, and stability he needs. [Child] looks to [Mother] and 

Stepfather as his parental figures, not [Father]. Indeed, [Child] 

himself expressly desires to cement his parent/child bond with 

Stepfather through adoption.

Severing [Child’s] bond with [Father], to the extent it even exists, 

will allow [Child] to move forward in life with little to no long-term 

ill effects. It is in the [C]hild’s best interests that the parental 

rights of [Father] be terminated.

Orphans’ Ct. Decree at 10-11. 

Based on our review of the record, we discern no basis to disturb the 

orphans’ court’s finding that termination of Father’s parental rights would best 

serve Child’s needs and welfare. See K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 764. After hearing

testimony from Father, Mother, and Stepfather during the termination 

hearing, the orphans’ court concluded that there is no significant bond 

between Father and Child. See N.T. Termination Hr’g, 5/4/21, at 21, 29

(Mother testified that Child does not recognize Father in photographs or ask 

about Father), 43 (Stepfather testified that Child does not look at Father as 

his father anymore), 88-89 (the parties stipulated that paternal grandmother 

would testify she does not believe Child has a relationship with Father because 

of lack of contact over an extended period). Further, the court found that 

Stepfather and Mother have consistently provided Child with the “love, 

comfort, security, and stability” that Child needs. See id. at 23-24, 39-41 

(Stepfather performs recreational activities with Child, Stepfather provides 
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emotional support for Child, when Child is emotional, he addresses Stepfather 

as “Dad”, Mother and Stepfather provide for Child’s emotional, psychological, 

and financial needs, and Child asked Stepfather to adopt him), 88-89 (the 

parties stipulated that paternal grandmother would testify about the bond 

between Stepfather and Child). Upon review, the record supports the orphans’ 

court’s findings of fact, including its credibility determinations. See S.P., 47

A.3d at 826-27. 

Under these circumstances, we conclude that the orphans’ court 

appropriately considered the developmental, physical, and emotional needs 

and the welfare of Child and determined that they were best served by the 

termination of Father’s parental rights. See C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1010. The 

record evidence supports the orphans’ court’s finding that there was little to 

no bond between Father and Child, that Stepfather has a parental bond with 

Child, and that severing the bond between Father and Child to allow Stepfather 

to adopt Child is in Child’s best interest. See K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 764. For 

these reasons, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its 

discretion, and that its determinations and findings were supported by clear 

and convincing evidence, free of legal error. Accordingly, we affirm the decree 

involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights. See S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-

27. 
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Decree affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/25/2022