This memorandum opinion was not selected for publi cation in the New Mexico Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version file d by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 FAIRY PURIFOY, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3 vs. NO. 31,714 4 GROUP I, 5 FAIRY PURIFOY as Personal Respresentative 6 of the Estate of JOHN FRED CAVENDAR, 7 Deceased, 8 Defendants, 9 DUSTY STONE, 10 Defendant-Appellant. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF QUAY COUNTY 12 David P. Reeb, Jr., District Judge (Sitting by Designation) 13 John R. Hakanson 14 Alamogordo, NM 15 for Appellees 16 Dusty Stone 17 San Jon, NM 18 Pro se Appellant 192 MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 GARCIA, Judge. 2 Defendant appeals from the following orde rs: (1) judgment and final decree of 3 quiet title filed on August 21, 2007 [RP 20]; (2) order granting Plaintiff’s motion for 4 judgment on the pleadings filed on April 14, 2011 [RP 166]; (3) order on hearing of 5 March 28, 2011, filed on April 14, 2011 [RP 169]; and (4) order granting second 6 motion for protective order or permanent injunction against Lee Stone, Dusty Stone, 7 and any, and all siblings, he irs, successors or assigns of Lee Stone or Dusty Stone, 8 filed on October 21, 2011 [RP 381]. We dismiss Defendant’s app eal from the first 9 three orders listed above and affi rm the October 21, 2011 order. 10 DISCUSSION 11 A. The District Court’s August 21, 2007, April 14, 2011, and April 18, 2011 12 Order Were Final and Appealable When filed; Therefore, Defendant’s 13 Appeal From them is Untimely 14 “Whether an order is a ‘final order’ w ithin the meaning of the statute is a 15 jurisdictional question that anappellate court is required to raise on its own motion.” 16 See Khalsa v. Levinson , 1998-NMCA-110, ¶ 12, 125 N.M. 680, 964 P.2d 844. 17 Moreover, “our appellate jurisdiction is limited to revi ew of ‘any final judgment or 183 decision, any interlocutory order or decisi on which practically disposes of the merits 1 of the action, or any final order after entry of judgment which affects substantial 2 rights[.]’” Capco Acquisub, Inc. v. Greka Energy Corp. , 2007-NMCA-011, ¶ 17, 140 3 N.M. 920, 149 P.3d 1017 (citing NMSA 1978, § 39-3-2 (1966). Finally, generally, 4 an order or judgment is considered final wh en all issues of law and fact have been 5 determined and the case disposed of by the di strict court to the fullest extent possible. 6 See Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison , 113 N.M. 231, 236, 824 P.2d 1033, 1038 7 (1992). 8 Final judgment quieting title in Plaintiff to the real property in dispute (the real 9 property) was filed on August 21, 2007. [RP 20] Under the principles of finality and 10 this Court’s jurisdiction set forth above, th is order was final and appealable on August 11 21, 2007. Defendant did not file a notice of appeal with regard to this order until 12 October 13, 2011. [RP 374] 13 On June 3, 2010, Defendant filed post-judgment motion against the August 21, 14 2007 judgment, objecting to it on grounds of fraud and misreprese ntation. [RP 24] 15 Plaintiff responded, pointing out that Defendant had not intervened or timely appealed 16 from the August 21, 2007 final judgment; thatthe requested reopening of this case 17 was for the purpose of perpetuating a fa lsehood on the court on issues that have 18 already been ruled upon; and that res j udicata bars Defendant’s claims. [RP 63] 194 Plaintiff also filed a motion for judgment on th e pleadings. [RP 65] The district court 1 granted judgment on the pleadings to Plaintiff in an order filed, after a hearing, on 2 April 14, 2011. [RP 169] Under the principles of finality and this Court’s jurisdiction 3 as set forth above, this order was final and appealable when entered on April 14, 2011. 4 Defendant did not file a notice of appeal with regard to this order until October 13, 5 2011. [RP 374] 6 On January 18, 2011, Defendant filed a motion for default judgment, continuing 7 to argue that Plaintiff received quiet title to the real property through fraud and 8 misrepresentations and that Plaintiff was in default for not responding to Defendant’s 9 discovery requests regarding title to the realproperty. [RP 94] The district court 10 denied Defendant’s motion fo r default judgment in an order filed on April 18, 2011. 11 [RP 169] 12 Defendant also appears to argue that his two post-judgment motions were filed 13 pursuant to Rule 1-60(B)(1), (2), and (3 ) NMRA (providing that a judgment may be 14 set aside for (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly 15 discovered evidence which by due diligence c ould not have been discovered in time 16 to move for a new trial under Rule 1-059 NMRA; and (3 ) fraud (whether heretofore 17 denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), mi srepresentation or other misconduct of an 18 adverse party). Rule 1-060(B)(6) specifica lly provides, however, that such a motion 195 “shall be made within a reas onable time, and for reasons (1 ), (2) and (3) not more than 1 one-year after the judgment, order or proceed ing was entered or taken.” In this case, 2 Defendant filed both of his motions , on June 3, 2010 and January 18, 2011, 3 respectively, more than one year after th e August 21, 2007 judgment. As such, these 4 motions were untimely filed pursuant to Rule 1-060(B). 5 In addition, a Rule 1-060(B) motion, unlike other post-judgment motions filed 6 pursuant to Rule 12-201(D) NMRA, does not affect the finality of the underlying 7 judgment, nor toll the time for fili ng a notice of appeal from it. SeeRule 1-060(B)(6) 8 (stating that “[a] motion under this paragra ph does not affect the finality of a judgment 9 or suspend its operation”). Thus, Defendant’s motions filed on June 3, 2010, and 10 January 18, 2011, did not affect the finalityof the August 21, 2007 judgment, nor toll 11 the time for filing a notice of appeal withinthirty (30) days of August 21, 2007. See 12 Rule 12-201(A)(2) NMRA. Defendant did not appeal from the August 21, 2007 13 judgment until October 13, 2011. [RP 374] 14 Defendant’s June 3, 2010, and January 18, 2011, moti ons were also untimely 15 filed with regard to the requirements for timely filing motions for reconsideration that 16 would have affected the finality of th e August 21, 2007 judgment, pursuant to Rule 17 1-050A(B) NMRA, Rule 1-059, Rule 1- 052(D) NMRA, and NMSA 1978, § 39-1-1 18 (1953). SeeRule 12-201(D). 196 Thus, we hold that, no matter how Defe ndant’s June 3, 2010, and January 18, 1 2011, motions attacking the August 21, 2007 judgment are considered, Defendant did 2 not file a notice of appeal within thirty ( 30) days from the dates they were entered on 3 April 14, 2011. As such, Defendant’s noti ce of appeal filed on October 13, 2011, was 4 untimely filed with regard to the August 7, 2007, April 14, 2011 orders, and, 5 therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review them on the merits. See Chavez v. 6 U-Haul Co. , 1997-NMSC-051, ¶¶ 19-22, 124 N.M. 165, 947 P.2d 122 (stating that 7 generally, an appellate court will only exercise discretion to hear an untimely appeal 8 if a court has somehow misled the parties or if deviation from mandatory requirements 9 is truly minimal such as where the notice of appeal was filed 58 minutes late); see also 10 Trujillo v. Serrano , 117 N.M. 273, 278, 871 P.2d 369, 374 (1994) (“Only the most 11 unusual circumstances beyond the control of th e parties—such as error on the part of 12 the court—will warrant overlooking procedural defects.”). 13 In the memorandum, Defendant contends that the district court perhaps 14 “unethically” misled him into not filing notices of appeal from the April 2011 orders. 15 [MIO 3-4] Defendant also alleges that hethought the district court would hold him 16 in contempt if he did file a notice of app eal in this Court from these orders. [MIO 3] 17 Defendant continues to argue that the underlying quiet title judgment filed on August 18 21, 2007, and the orders filed on April 14, 2011, were entered due to Plaintiff’s fraud, 197 misrepresentation, and Plaintiff’s failure to give proper notice to Defendant. [MIO 4- 1 21] Defendant further argues that this Cour t is bound by the facts he sets forth in his 2 docketing statement. [MIO 21, v] We are not persuaded. 3 Defendant’s failure to timely appeal from the August 2007 and April 2011 4 orders cannot be attributed to any “unethical” actions or trickery by the district court 5 judge. [MIO 3-4] No district court judge conceives that it can hold a party in 6 contempt for filing a notice of appeal in th is Court in accordance with that party’s 7 reading of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. See also State v. Case, 100 N.M. 714, 8 717, 676 P.2d 241, 244 (1984) (stating personal bias cannot be inferred from an 9 adverse ruling). It is well-established that factual recitations in the docketing 10 statement are accepted as trueunless the record on appeal shows otherwise

. State v. 11 Calanche , 91 N.M. 390, 392, 574 P.2d 1018, 1020 (Ct. App. 1978). In this case, the 12 record proper clearly shows that, upon due c onsideration, the district court rejected 13 Defendant’s claims against the validity of the August 2007 judgment, which 14 Defendant continues to articulate in the docketing statement and his memorandum; the 15 district court filed its rulings against Defendant’s claims; and Defendant did not timely 16 appeal from them. 17 We dismiss Defendant’s appeal with regard to merits of these three orders, 18 because this Court lacks jurisdiction to review them. 198 B. Defendant’s Appeal From the Distri ct Court’s October 21, 2011 Order was 1 Timely Filed 2 On March 28, 2011, Plaintiff filed a mo tion for protective order and permanent 3 injunction against Defendant and his relatives, siblings, he irs, successors, and assigns, 4 for continuing to file motions and pleadings raising the same issues already ruled upon 5 in the August 21, 2007 judgment. [RP 136] On October 21, 2011, the district court 6 granted Plaintiff’s motion. [RP 381] Defe ndant’s appeal from this order was timely 7 filed on October 13, 2011. [RP 374] SeeRule 12-201(A)(3) (stating that “[a] notice 8 of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision, or return of the verdict, but 9 before the judgment or order is filed in the district court clerk's office shall be treated 10 as filed after such filing and on the day thereof”). 11 Defendant contends that the district c ourt erred in enteri ng the October 21, 2011 12 order. We affirm. 13 The district court has broad discretion in determining whether good cause exists 14 to issue a protective order. See, e.g. , Mitchell-Carr v. McLendon , 1999-NMSC-025, 15 ¶ 37, 127 N.M. 282, 980 P.2d 65; see also Estate of Romero v. City of Santa Fe , 16 2006-NMSC-028, ¶ 21, 139 N.M . 671, 137 P.3d 611 (discussing that “we do not tell 17 the [district] court when it is appropriate to issue protective orders under [Rule 1-026] 18 to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue 19 burden or expense”) (internal quot ation marks and citation omitted). 209 As discussed above, the district court entered final and appeal able orders on all 1 of Defendant’s issues on August 21, 2007 and April 14, 2011. Defendant did not 2 timely appeal from these orders. Instead , Defendant continue d to file numerous 3 pleadings against Plaintiff, including a new complaint in the district court [RP 377], 4 raising the same issues and concerns that the district had already ruled upon in these 5 orders. 6 We agree with the district court thatDefendant was estopped by judgment and 7 res judicata from further litigating the issues in this case and from continuing to file 8 pleadings against Plaintiff about them. [RP 381] See e.g. , Belser v. O’Cleireachain, 9 2005-NMCA-073, ¶ 3, 137 N.M. 623, 114 P.3d 303 (stating that a district court has 10 inherent authority to manage the cases before it); Pizza Hut of Santa Fe, Inc. v. 11 Branch, 89 N.M. 325, 327, 552 P.2d 227, 229 (Ct. App. 1976) (stating that district 12 courts have inherent power to manage their dockets so as to achieve the orderly and 13 expeditious disposition of cases). We hold that the district c ourt did not abuse its 14 discretion in granting Plaintiff’s motion for a protective order. See Lepiscopo v. 15 Hopwood, 110 N.M. 30, 32, 791 P.2d 481, 483 (Ct. App. 1990) (stating that when 16 there is a pattern of vexatious filings, courts can constitutionally restrict access to the 17 courts). 18 CONCLUSION 1910 Defendant did not timely appeal from the district court’s final and appealable 1 orders filed on August 21, 2007 and April 14, 2011. Since we do not have jurisdiction 2 to review these orders on the merits, we di smiss Defendant’s appeal relating to them. 3 We affirm the district court’s October 21, 2011 order. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5

_______________________________ 6 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 7 WE CONCUR: 8

9 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 10

11 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 12