### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 09 -0 00 80 -C V

______________________________ NANCY DIANE B ROOKS, Appellant

V. PRH I NVESTMENTS, I

NC., AND WHATABU RGER OF EAST TEX AS, Appellees
On Appea l from the County Court at L aw No. 2 Gre g g County , Texas T r i a l C o u rtN o . 2 0 0 8

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B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C
. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Opinion by

J ustice Moseley2 O P I N I O N Whil e vis iti ngthe re str oo m of a Wha ta burg e r r e sta

ur a nt, Na nc y Di ane B ro ok s ( B ro ok s) inj ur e d h e rs e lf

wh e n s he sli pp e d o n a

we t f loo r a nd fe ll. B ro ok s’s e xpe ri e nc e pr e c ipi ta te d th is law s u it a g a in s t P RH I n v e s tm e n ts , I n c . , an d Wh a ta b u r g e r o f E a s t T e xa s ( c o ll e c ti v e ly , PR H ) , the
owner s and oper ators of the restaur ant. The moisture on the floor wa s occa sioned by the mopping of the fl o o r b y

a re staurant e mploy ee a fewminutes before Br ooks fell. B rooks’s suit alleg ed neg lige nt activity

and / o r p re m ises liability . After discovery , PRH filed a motion for summary judgme nt on b o t h t raditi onal and no- evidenc e g rounds, and the tr ial court g rante d the summary judgme nt on b o t h grounds, and no- evidenc e summary judgme nt as to both neg lige nt activity and premises liability
. Br ooks argues that the trial court err ed in granting the motion for traditional s u m m ary judgme nt and no-e vidence summary judgme nt beca

use: (1) she adequately

alleg ed and suppor

ted her c laims for neg lige nt activity and that ther e we re material fa cts in dispute as t o t his issue; and (2) she adequately

alleg ed and suppor

ted her claims for pr emises liability and ther e we re material fac ts in disput e. We sustain Brooks’s points of e rror r e g a r d in g th e gr a n ti n g o f n o - e vidence summary

judgme nt
as to the premises liability claim; howeve r, we aff irm the trial court’s judgme nt be cause (1) B rooks’s fa ll w a s n ot c on te mpo ra

ne ou s to the a c tio n of mop pin g the fl oo r; and (2 ) P RH pr ov ide d B ro ok s w ith adequate ca

utionary war nings c oncer

ning the wet floor.3

Fac ts On May

23, 2007, Br ooks was a c ustomer at a W hatabur g er restaura nt owned a

nd operated by PRH. W hile attempting to leave the restroom, she wa s injured when she slipped and fe ll. The floor of the restroom ha d been moppe d only a fe w minutes prior to Br ooks’s fall. J ay ne Summers, the PRH employ ee w ho mopped the floor, te stified that befor e she
commence d mopping the f loor, sh e p u t o u t t he “w et floor” signs in the r estroom and that she had “just about finished” mopping t h e restroom floor when B rooks enter ed the r estroom. Summers testified that she told Br ooks “to be car eful” and “the floor was wet” beca use she had “just mopped in there.” B ro ok s te sti fi e d th a t th e fl oo r w a s d ry wh e n s he e nte re d th e re str oo m and wh ile sh e wa s in the bathroom stall, a lady

“ca me in and mopped.” Br ooks testified that when Summers wa s leaving the re stroom, she told Bro o k s t o “b e care ful, the floor ma y be a little damp.” B rooks was in the restroom stall for thr ee to f ive minutes after

Summers left the re stroom and admits there was a wet fl oo r w arn ingsig n in

the ro om. Whe n B ro ok s att e mpt e d to leave the re str oo m, s he sli pp e d a nd fe ll, causinginjury

to herself

. Stan dard of Revie w When review ing a

summary

judgme nt, we take as true a ll evidence favor able to the nonmovant and indulg e eve ry rea sonable infe renc e and r esolve a ny doubts in the nonmovant’s favor
. Lim esto ne Pr od

s. Di str ib. , I nc . v . M c Nam ara , 71 S.W. 3d 30 8, 31 1 ( Te x. 20 02 ); Rhone-P oulenc, I nc.I n her argument, Br ooks emphasizes that the floor wa s not mopped acc ording to company 1 proce dures. Unde r our analy sis of Br ooks’s neg lige nt a ctivity claim, the product and proc edure used 4 v. Stee l , 997 S.W .2d 217, 223 (Tex. 1999). On appe al, t he movant must show that there is no
m ater ial fac t issue and that the movant is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law. Mc

Nam ara , 71 S.W. 3d a t 31 1; Steel , 997 S.W .2d at 223. A no-e vidence summary

judgme nt is e ssentially a pretria l dir ecte d verdic t. We, ther efor e,
a pp ly the same le g a l su ff

ic ie nc y sta nd ard in r e vie wi nga no -e vid e nc e su mma ry jud g me nt a s w e a

pp ly in review ing a

direc ted ver dict. W

a l- M a r t S to r es , I n c . v . R o d

r igu ez , 92 S.W .3d 5 0 2 , 5 0 6 ( T e x. 20 02 ). I n our re vie w, we c on sid e r a ll the su mma ry jud g me nt e vid e nc e in the lig ht m os t f a vo ra ble to t he pa rt y a g a ins t w ho m th e no -e vid e nc e su mma ry jud g me nt w a s r e nd e re d, disregardi nga ll contra ry evidenc e and infere nces. Merre ll Dow Pharms., Inc. v . Havne r , 9 5 3 S. W. 2 d 7 0 6 , 7 1 1 ( T e x. 19 97 ). We m

us t de te rm ine wh e the r t

he no nmo va

nt p ro du c e d a

ny e vid e nc e of

pr ob a tiv e fo rc e to raise a fac t issue on the materia l questions presented. Rodriguez , 9 2 S
. W
. 3 d a t5 0 6; W

o odruff v. W right , 5 1 S. W.3 d 7 27 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 01 , p e t. d e nie d) . Ano nmo va nt w ill de fe a t a no-evide nce summar

y judgme nt motion if the nonm ovant presents more than a scintilla of probative evidenc e on eac h element of his claim. King Ranch, Inc. v . Chapman , 1 1 8 S. W. 3 d 7 4 2 , 7 5 1 ( T e x. 20 03 ); Jack

son v. Fiesta Mart, Inc

. , 979 S.W .2d 68, 70–71 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.). Brooks’s Fall

Was Not Con tem

poraneous to t

he Mopping Br ooks argues that t he trial court erre d in g ranting PRH summary judgme nt and no-e vidence summary judgme nt on the neg lige nt activity cause of ac tion. We disag ree . 1to mop the floor is irrele vant in this case. 5

A tri al co u rt s h o u l d not submit a neg lige nt activity claim to the trier of

fac t unless the evidenc e shows that the injury was c aused by

or wa s a conte mporane ous result of the ne g lige nt activity itself, rathe r than a

condition cre ated by

the neg lige nt activity
. Keetch v. Kroger Co. , 845 S.W. 2d 26 2, 26 4 ( Te x. 19 92 ); Kroger v. Persley , 2 61 S.W. 3d 31 6, 32 0 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t Di st. ] 200 8, no pe t.) ; Lucas v. Titus County Hosp. Dist./Ti tus County Mem’l Hosp. , 964 S.W .2d 144, 153 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1998), pet. denied , 988 S.W. 2d 74 0 ( Te x. 19 98 ). Th e ne g lig e nt a c tiv ity theory of liability

is only applicable wher e the e vidence shows that the injuries wer e dire ctly related to the activity

itself. Keetch , 845 S.W .2d at 264. I f the injury was cause d by a condition c reated by t h e a c t i v i t y r a t h e r

t h ant h e a c t i v i t y i t s e l f

, a p l a i n t i f f i s l i m i t e d t o a p r e m i s e s d e f

e c tt h e o r y o f l i a b i l i t y. Lucas , 964 S.W .2d at 153. The Te x as Supreme Court’ s decision in Keetch g uid e s u s in de te rm ini ngwh a t e vid e nc e is neede d to establish that an injury wa s the contempor aneous r esult of the neg lige nt activity itself, rathe r than a

condition cre ated by

the neg lige nt activity
. Keetch , 845 S.W .2d at 264. In Keetch , the plaintiff slipped and fe ll about thirty minutes after

a Kr og er e mploy ee ha d s p ra y ed a chemica l subst an ce on plants in the floral sec tion of the store. Id. The Te x as Supreme Court r ejec ted the
c o n t e n t i o nt h a tK

r o g e r ’ s e mp l o ye e s w e r e c o n d u c t i n g a n e g l i g e n ta c t i v i t y b e c a

u s e t h e a c t i v i t y, spray ing plants, was not “ ong oing” at the time of the plaintiff’s injury
. Id. Thus, while the plaintiff

“ may have be e n in

jur e d b y a c on dit ion c re a te d by the sp ra y ing , . . . sh e wa s no t inj ur e d by the a c tiv ity6

of spra y ing.” Id . In h old ingthe c a se to b e a pr e mis e s li a

bil ity c a se rathe r t

ha n a ne g lig e nt a c tiv ity
case , the cour

t noted “[a]t s ome point, almost every artificia l condition can be said to have be en
cre ated by

an ac tivity .” Id. Simi larly , in Stanley Stores v. V eazey , the B eaumont C o u rt of Appe als applied the Keetch analy sis to another slip and fa ll case wher e the plaintiff alleg ed a ne g lige nt activity
. Sta nle ySto re s, Inc. v . Veazey , 838 S.W .2d 884, 885–86 (Tex. A pp.—Be aumont 1992, writ denied) . I n the Stanley Stores case , while shopping, the plaintiff slipped on a c lear liquid and fell to the floor. Id. at 885. The store manag er found “a sma ll puddle of wate r and a paper cup” in the a

rea wher e the plaintiff slipped. Id
. The cup was a small sample-ty pe similar to those being used at that time in promotion of a Pepsi-Cola display
. Id. at 886. The Pepsi-Cola display was located near the front entr ance of the store, awa

y from the are a wher e the plaintiff f ell. Id . Apply ing the holding in Keetch , the cour t held that the fac ts w ere insufficient to suppor t a neg lige nt a ctivity claim. Id. The c ourt explained: L e t’ s a ssume that a ll of

the e vid e nc e wa s p ro of

po sit ive (m a tte r o f l aw) that th e liq uid which ca used Mrs. Ve azey

to slip and f

all did indeed orig inate fr om the Pepsi display a c tiv ity wh ic h w a s o ng oin g a t th e tim e of the fa ll. Thus , we have an o ng oin g a c tiv ity (Pepsi display) in one are a of the store and a slip a nd fall on subst an ce gen er ated from that ac tivity

in another a

rea of the store
. Kee tch say s, “Rec overy on a neg lige nt activity theory require s that a person have been injured by or as a conte mporane ous result of the a ctivity

itself rathe r th an b y a co n d ition created by the ac tivity .” . . . E v en u n d er our proof

positive assumption, Mrs. Veazey slipped on a “c ondition cre ated by

the ac tivity .” Id.7

Simi larly , in Kroger Co. , the cour t of appea ls r ever sed the trial cour t and held that ther e wa s no evidenc e of ne g lige nt activity when the pla intiff s l i p p ed an d fell by stepping in water

that was alleg edly dripped onto the floor

when a store employ ee tr ansported f rozen food from pallets to the frozen food c ases. 261 S.W.3d at 320–21. The court noted t hat t here was no ong oing activity in the
are a whe re the plaintiff fe ll a t t h e t i m e t h e fa ll occurr ed and tha t the plaintiff fe ll at least fiftee n minutes after

the employ ee had left the ar ea, “ [t ]hus t here was no c onnection betwe en the injury and the stocking of the fr ozen foods section that would lea d us to c onclude that [t he plaintiff’ s] i njury
occur red a s a conte mporane ous result of a ne g lige nt activity .” Id. at 320–21. The fa cts of this case are very simil ar to those in Keetch , Stanley Stores , and Kroger Co. in that th e a lle g e d n e g lig e nt a c tiv ity —mo pp ing

—w a s n ot o ng oin g a t th e tim e and pla c e B ro ok s f

e ll. Summers testified that she had f inished mopping the r estroom and ve rbal l y wa rn ed Brooks about the floor a s Br ooks entered t h e re s t room. Br ooks testified that she fe ll severa l minutes after Summers had ce ased mopping, place d a “we t-floor” war ning cone, verba lly war

ned B rooks about the we t f loo r, and lef

t the re str oo m. I

n e ith e r c a se , th e re is n o e vid e nc e that th e ne g lig e nt a c tiv ity i t s el f c au s edBr o o k s ’s i n j u ri es o r t h at h er

fa l l wa s co n t em p o ra n eo u s wi t h S u m m er s ’s m o p p i n g. Rather, just as in Keetch and Kroger Co. , all the evidenc e indicate s that Br ooks slipped on a condition cause d by

the mopping a ctivity . There fore , PRH is entitled to judgment a s a matter of law. We affir m the trial court’ s g ranting of sum mary judgme nt and no-evidence summary judgme nt as8

to Brooks’ s neg lige nt activity cause o f ac t i o n and over rule B rooks’s points of er ror de riving there from. Adequate Warnings Abou t the Fl oor Were Giv en Br ook s a ls o c o n te n d s th a t th e tr ia l c o u rt e r r e d b y g r an ti n g s u mm ar

y ju d g me n t and noevidenc e summary judgme nt a s to he r premises liability claims bec ause she did provide supporting evidenc e and the re w ere materia l fac ts in disput e. We disag ree . Tort liability

depends on both the e x istence of and the violation of a duty
. Le fm ar k Mg mt
. Co. v . O ld , 946 S.W .2d 52, 5 3 (T ex . 1997). An owne r or oc cupier of land ha s a duty

to keep the premises under hi s control i n a saf e condition. Redinger v. Living, Inc. , 6 8 9 S. W. 2 d 4 1 5 , 4 1 7 ( T e x. 1985). This duty is discharg ed by war ning the invitee of unrea sonable risks of harm, either known to the owner or which would be known to him by rea sonable inspec tion or by making the pre mises
rea sonably

safe
. State v. W

illiams , 9 40 S.W. 2d

58 3, 58 4 ( Te x. 19 96 ); se e als o McCaughtry v

. Barwood H

omes Ass’n , 981 S.W .2d 325, 330 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1998, pet. denied)
. I f the e vidence conclusively established that the owne r ade quately war n ed the plaintiff of the condition, the owner

cannot be found neg lige nt as a matter of law. W

illiams , 940 S.W .2d at 584. To succe ed in a

premises liability

suit, an invitee plaintiff must prove (1) that the def endant had ac tual or construc tive knowledg e of some c ondition on the premises, (2) that the condition posed
an unr e a so na

ble ri sk of ha rm , (3) that the de fe nd ant f a ile d to e xer c ise re a so na

ble c are to e lim inate
or re du c e the ri sk

of that ha rm , a nd (4 ) t hat th e de fe nd ant’ s fail ure to us e su c h c are pr oximate ly9

cause d the invitee’s injury
. W al-Mart Stores, Inc. v . Gonzalez , 968 S.W .2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1998); Piercev. Holiday , 155 S.W .3d 676, 679 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.). The c ase of Bill’s Dollar Stor e, Inc . v. Be an is strikingly simil ar t o t h e prese nt case . 77 S.W .3d 367 (Tex. App.––Houston [14t h Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) . A plaintiff slipped and f ell due to a wet spot on the floor cause d by

spilled cola. Id. at 3 7 0
. P ri o r t o t h e plainti ff’ s fall, a store employ ee ve rbally

war ned the plaintiff a

bout the wet spot, the plaintiff stood just a few fe et from the wet spot as it was be ing moppe d, and she c ould see that the floor wa s wet. Id. Th e c ourt of a pp e a ls he ld t h a t u n d e r t h o s e c i r c u m s t an c e s , t h e v e r b a l w ar n i n g g i v e n t o t h e p l a i n t i f f w a s a d e qu a t e a s a matter of la

w. Id. I n this case, th e mater ial fac ts are not in dispute. B rooks slipped and fe ll three to five min ute s a ft e r t

he re str oo m f

loo r w a s mopp e d. Vi e wi ng the e vid e nc e in the lig ht mos t f a vo ra ble to Br ooks, she saw the floor beingmopped, saw the wet floor war ning sig n, and wa s verba lly war ned “to be c are ful” be cause the “f loor may be a little damp.” U nder the se c i rcumstances, whe ther the
wa rn ingwa s g ive n p ri or

to o r a ft e r B ro ok s e nte re d th e re str oo m, t he wa rn ing w as adeq uat e a s a matter of la

w to discharg e the proper

ty owner ’s dut y to war

n Br ooks about t he possi ble dang er pose d by the condition of the floor
. T h e p l ea d i n g s and their attachments and e x hibits present a prima f acia cause of ac tion for premises liability ; theref ore, w e sustain B rooks’s p o i n t s of er ror r eg ardingthe g ranting of noe vid e nc e su mma

ry jud g me nt as to he r pr e mis e s lia bil ity c la im. Ho we ve r, the ma te ri a l f a c ts i n th is10

case are not in dispute and P RH is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law. Ther efor e, we aff irm the tr ia l c ourt ’s g ra

nti ng of su mma ry jud g me nt a s to B ro ok s’ s p re mis e s li a bil ity c la ims and

ov e rr ule Br ooks’s points of err or der iving ther efr om. The traditional summary

judgme nt was prope rly

g rante d, and we aff

irm the judg ment of the trial court.

Ba iley C. Moseley J ustice Date Submitted: Dec ember 15, 2009 Date D ecide d: J anuar y 22, 2010