NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

:

KENDRA BROWN, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-3124 (MLC)

:

Plaintiff, : O P I N I O N

:

v. :

:

LAURA BRYANT, :

:

Defendant. :

 :

THE PLAINTIFF, who is pro se, applies for in-forma-pauperis

relief under 28 U.S.C. § (“Section”) 1915 (“Application”). (Dkt.

entry no. 1, Appl.) This Court, based upon the plaintiff’s

financial situation, will (1) grant the Application, and (2) deem

the Complaint to be filed. The Court may now (1) review the

Complaint, and (2) dismiss it sua sponte if it is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,

or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court will

dismiss the Complaint, as it (1) fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted, and (2) seeks monetary relief against a

defendant who is immune from such relief.

THE DEFENDANT is an attorney with the New Jersey Office of

Parental Representation (“NJOPR”), which is a unit of the New

Jersey Office of the Public Defender (“NJOPD”). The plaintiff

brings this action (“Federal Action”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging that the defendant violated her rights while representing

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her in a state proceeding (“State Proceeding”) brought by the New

Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (“NJDYFS”). (See

dkt. entry no. 1, Compl.) The Court is able to discern that (1)

the plaintiff was found in the State Proceeding to have neglected

her children, and (2) a judgment was entered therein. (See id.

at 3 (arguing plaintiff “did not commit neglect and abuse or

imminent danger [sic]”); see also id. at 1 (stating “outcome” was

“decision of ‘Guilty’ by Judge Cantor”); id. at 2 (stating there

was “trial”, and “Plaintiff was found unfortunately ‘guilty’”); 

id. at 3 (referring to “Guilty verdict” in State Proceeding).) 

The plaintiff alleges that the negative outcome in the State

Proceeding resulted from the defendant’s conduct.1

THE PLAINTIFF is attempting to avoid an order in the State

Proceeding. The proper way to do so is to seek review through

the state appellate process, and then seek certiorari directly to

the United States Supreme Court. See D.C. Ct. of Apps. v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263

U.S. 413, 414-16 (1923).

THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE prohibits adjudication of an

action where the relief requested would require a federal court

to either determine whether a state court’s decision is wrong or

 The plaintiff also has brought an action to recover 1

damages for violations of her constitutional rights against the

NJDYFS employees involved with the State Proceeding. See Brown

v. Meskin, No. 11-3125 (D.N.J.).

2

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void that decision, and thus would prevent a state court from

enforcing its orders. See McAllister v. Allegheny Cnty. Fam.

Div., 128 Fed.Appx. 901, 902 (3d Cir. 2005). This Court cannot

directly or indirectly review, negate, void, or provide relief

that would invalidate a decision in the State Proceeding. See

Gass v. DYFS Workers, 371 Fed.Appx. 315, 315-16 (3d Cir. 2010)

(affirming judgment dismissing claim asserted against, among

others, public defender representing plaintiff in parentalrights-termination proceeding brought by NJDYFS, as barred by

Rooker-Feldman doctrine).

THIS COURT also must abstain from exercising jurisdiction,

pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine, when (1) a state

court action is ongoing, (2) important state interests are

implicated, and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise

federal claims in state court. See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm.

v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982); Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971). This Federal Action is thus

barred because the State Proceeding can be viewed as being

“ongoing for purposes of Younger Abstention”, as (1) Brown “could

have appealed the termination of [her] parental rights first to

the Appellate Division and then to the New Jersey Supreme Court”,

but “elected to forgo these appeals and instead file the instant

federal claim”, (2) the state has a substantial interest in

parental rights proceedings, and (3) Brown had an opportunity to

3

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raise constitutional claims in the State Proceeding. McDaniels

v. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs., 144 Fed.Appx. 213, 214-16

(3d Cir. 2005) (affirming judgment dismissing claim of

constitutional violations committed in parental-rightstermination proceeding).

THE DEFENDANT, who represented the Plaintiff in the State

Proceeding in her capacity as an attorney with the NJOPR, which

is a unit of the NJOPD, is also immune from liability. See Polk

County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (stating public

defender is not state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and

thus is immune from liability); Santos v. New Jersey, 393

Fed.Appx. 893, 895 (3d Cir. 2010) (same).

THE COURT will dismiss the Complaint for the aforementioned

reasons. The Court will issue an appropriate order and judgment.

 s/ Mary L. Cooper 

MARY L. COOPER

United States District Judge

Dated: November 14, 2011

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