Filed 3/26/13 In re Hartenstein Family Trust CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re the POLA HARTENSTEIN FAMILY TRUST B240493 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BP125686)
CHARLENE HARTENSTEIN et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.
FELICE HARTENSTEIN,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Supe rior Court of Los Angeles County. Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Revers ed and remanded with directions. Mansell & Mansell and Cheryl B. Mansell; Law Offices of Philip R. Homsey II and Philip R. Homsey II for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Law Offices of Tracey P. Hom and Tracey P. Hom for Defendant and Respondent.2 In the underlying action regarding the enforcement of a trust instrument, the
trial court found that the instrument a llocated the interests in a house in equal shares to two trusts. Appellants contend that the instrument requires the house to be allocated entirely to one of the trusts. We conclude that they are correct, and
therefore reverse.

RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PR OCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. 1998 Trust Instrument
Uri and Pola Hartenstein were married for more than 50 years. They had three children, respondent Felice Hartenstei n, and appellants Ch arlene Hartenstein
and Annette Hartenstein-Schultz. 1 In December 1998, Uri and Pola executed a trust instrument prepared by attorney Phillip Tangalakis. The instrume nt established a simple trust for their assets, and designated them as co-trustees while they both remained alive. Upon Uri’s or Pola’s death, the instrument provi ded for the allocation of the trust’s assets into two subtrusts, an exemption trust a nd a survivor’s trust, with the goal of “eliminat[ing] or . . . reduc [ing]” federal estate taxe s without “impair[ing]” the
federal marital deduction. Th e survivor, as sole trustee, was authorized to amend, revoke, or terminate only the survivor’s trust; the exemption trust became irrevocable. Upon the survivor’s death, a ppellants and respondent were to receive equal shares of the assets in the exempti on trust, as well as equal shares of the assets in survivor’s trust, unless it had be en amended or revoked. Uri died in November 2000, rendering Pola the surviving spouse and sole trustee. When Uri died, the trust’s only asset was Uri and Pola’s house.

1 Because the parties and their parents share their surname, we refer to them by their first names.3 B. Attempted Revocation of Exemption Trust In March 2004, Pola executed a trus t modification, providing that the exemption trust would not be funded, a nd that only the survivor’s trust would remain in existence. Later, in Ap ril 2004, she executed other documents purporting to revoke the exemption and surv ivor’s trusts, create a new trust, and disinherit appellants; in addition, she exec uted a grant deed transferring the house to the new trust. Under the documents, Po la and Felice were to be co-trustees of Pola’s 2004 trust, and Felice was to be its sole benefi ciary upon Pola’s death. Attorney Tangalakis prepared the trus t modification and the other documents establishing the 2004 trust.

C. Underlying Action Pola died in July 2010. On Nove mber 22, 2010, appellants filed a petition challenging the 2004 trust and the purported revocation of the 1998 exemption trust. They contended that under the 1998 trust instrument, the exemption trust became irrevocable upon Uri’ s death, and that Pola wa s required to fund it to the full extent of $675,000 federal estate tax credit effective when Uri died. 2 In opposing the petition, respondent maintained that the instrument did not require Pola to allocate any assets to the exemption trust, and that its funding was left to
her discretion. A bench trial on the petition occurred in January 2012. During the trial, the parties stipulated that at the time of Uri’s death, the house was worth less than $675,000. Although the parties also stipul ated that the terms of the 1998 trust instrument were “clear and unambiguous,” Tangalakis testified regarding Uri’s and

2 Appellants’ petition alleged that when Uri died, the value of the house was $900,000.4 Pola’s intent in executing the instru ment, and appellants submitted expert testimony bearing on its meaning. Appe llants argued that under the 1998 trust instrument, the house was an asset of the exemption trust because its value when
Uri died was less than the estate tax credit at that time. In contrast, respondent asserted that the house had been consigne d to the survivor’s trust, which was subject to amendment and revocation by Pola. Following the presentation of eviden ce, the trial court issued a ruling expressly predicated on the parties’ sti pulation that the 1998 trust instrument was clear and unambiguous. The court concl uded that the instrument required equal
interests in the house to be allocated to th e exemption trust and the survivor’s trust; in addition, the court determined that th e provisions of Pola’s 2004 trust purporting to revoke the exemption trust were void. The court further found that respondent, as trustee of the 2004 trust, was the constr uctive trustee of a 50 percent interest in the house and 50 percent of the income from the house arising after Pola’s death. The court ordered respondent to execute a grant deed conveying a 50 interest in the house to the trustees of the exemption trust, and to deliver to them 50 percent of the house’s income arising after Pola’s deat h. The court also confirmed appellants and respondent as the successor co-tru stees of the exemption trust.

DISCUSSION Appellants contend the trial court e rred in determining that the 1998 trust instrument requires the allocation of equal interests in the house to the exemption and survivor’s trusts. They argue that the instrument mandates that the house be allocated entirely to the exemption trust. As explained below, we agree.5 A. Governing Principles Appellant’s contention requires us to interpret the 1998 trust instrument. Generally, “‘“[i]n construing trust inst ruments, as in the construction and interpretation of all documents, the duty of the court is to first ascertain and then, if possible, give effect to the intent of the maker.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘[Probate Code s]ection 21102 provi des, “[T]he intention of the transferor as expressed in the instrument controls the lega l effect of the dispositions made in the instrument.”’ [Citations.] ‘“In construing a trust instrume nt, the intent of the trustor prevails and
it must be ascertained from the whole of the trust instrument, not just separate parts of it.” [Citations.] ’ [Citation.]” ( Estate of Cairns (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 937, 944.) Ordinarily, “[t]he interpretation of a will or trust instrument presents a question of law unless interpretation turn s on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or a conflict therein.” ( Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246, 254.) Here, the trial court heard testimony regarding the instrume nt, but its analysis of the instrument begins by referring to the stipulation, cont ains no discussion of the trial testimony, and focuses exclusively on the language of the instrument. Because the court found no ambiguity in the instrument, we al so construe the instrument in light of its language. ( McAllister v. Metzger (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 692, 702-703.) Our review is thus de novo. ( Ibid .) Under the circumstances, our task is to determine the trustors’ intent at the time the instrument was executed ( Brown v. Labow (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 795, 812), as shown by the face of the document ( Mummert v. Security-First Nat. Bank (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 195, 199 ( Mummert )). Generally, we will give the words of the instrument “their ordinary a nd grammatical meaning.” (Prob. Code, § 21122.) However, as the parties stipul ated that an atto rney prepared the6 instrument, we may infer that legal terms in it are used in their technical sense. ( Estate of McKenzie (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 740, 744.) Our inquiry requires us to construe provisions involving the federal estate
tax credit and marital deduction. Generally, federal law es tablishes a credit that is applied against the value of a decedent’s gross estate, for purposes of determining federal estate tax. (26 U.S.C. §§ 2001, 2010(a); see Ike v. Doolittle (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 51, 60 ( Ike ).) At trial, the parties sti pulated that the value of this credit when Uri died was $675,000. For purposes of determini ng federal estate ta x, federal law also establishes a marital deduction “consisting of a deduction from a decedent’s gross estate of the value of property interests passing from th e decedent to his surviving spouse.” ( Estate of Libeu (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1436, 1445; 26 U.S.C. § 2056.) Under the marital deduction, certain property belongi ng to the decedent “is excluded from the decedent’s gross estate for purposes of fe deral estate taxes; however, the property
so excluded must then be included in the surviving spouse’s estate for federal tax purposes when he or she dies. ( 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a), (b)(7)(A)(i).)” ( McIndoe v.
Olivos (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 483, 489 ( McIndoe ).) At trial, the parties stipulated
that the value of this deduction wh en Uri died was unlimited.

B. 1998 Trust Instrument We turn to the main provi sions of the 1998 trust instrument. Article I, which establishes the original trust, identifies the property that Uri and Pola agreed to assign to the trust. Paragraph G of that article further states: “[The] Trustors declare that all property that may be in cluded in this Trust Estate as their community property and all property transfe rred into this Trust shall retain its character as such regardless of the transfer [,] and in the event that this Trust[] in any way fails, and said community property is returned to the Trustors, it shall be7 returned as their community property and not as the separate property of either or
both Trustors.” The provisions governing the subtrusts are found in Articles II, III, and IV. Paragraph B of Article II provides that upon the death of the first trustor, the original trust was to be split into two dist inct trusts, the survivor’s trust and the exemption trust. Paragraph C of Article III further states: “Upon the Deceased Spouse’s death the Surviving Spouse ma y amend, revoke[,] or terminate the Survivor’s Trust; but the Exemption Tr ust may not be ame nded, revoke[d] or terminated.” Paragraph A of Article IV further specified that after the surviving spouse died, appellants and respondent were to receive equal shares of the assets in the exemption trust, as well as equal shares of the assets in the survivor’s trust,
unless it had been revoked or terminated. Article II contains the key provisions governing the allocation of assets to
the two trusts. Pertinent here are the firs t and third subparagra phs of Paragraph C,
each of which concerns the survivor’s trus t. The first subparagraph states: “The
Survivor’s Trust shall consist of Trust assets equal in value to the minimum pecuniary amount necessary to entirely e liminate, or to reduce to the maximum extent possible, any federa l estate tax at Trustor’s death. In making this determination, the Trustee shall take in to consideration all Federal Estate Tax
deductions and all Federal Es tate Tax credits other than those for State Death Taxes.” The third subparagraph states: “The Trustee shall not allocate to [the] Survivor’s Trust assets having an aggreg ate fair market value at the date of
allocation that is less than the marital deduction amount as finally determined for Federal Estate Tax purposes.” 3

3 The second subparagraph of paragraph C, which also conc erns the survivor’s trust, provides: “This allocation to [t he] Survivor’s Trust shall be satisfied in cash or in kind, (Fn. continued on next page.)8 Paragraph D, which concerns the exempti on trust, provides in pertinent part: “The Exemption Trust shall consist of th e balance of the Trust Estate plus any
amount disclaimed on behalf of th e surviving spouse . . . .” Article II also describes the purpose unde rlying the creation of the survivor’s trust. Paragraph J states: “It is the Tr ustor[s’] intention to have the Survivor’s Trust qualify for the marital deduction un der the Internal Re venue Code Section 2056 [(26 U.S.C. § 2056)] and regulations pertai ning thereto . . . . In no event shall the Trustee take action or have any power that will impair the marital deduction, and all provisions regarding the Survivor’s Trust shall be interpreted to this primary objective.” The issues in the underlying action c oncerned Uri’s and Pola’s intent in adopting this type of trust structure. Viewed as a totality, the trust instrument reveals Uri’s and Pola’s intent to pair an irrevocable subtrust that potentially took advantage of the estate tax credit (the exem ption trust) with a subtrust that made
similar use of the marital de duction (the survivor’s trust) . Typically, this type of trust structure is employed by married trus tors to control the disposition of their property after their death while maki ng some provision for the living spouse through the marital deduction. (See McIndoe
, supra , 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 488- 489; Ike
, supra , 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 61-62.) The structure permits a trustor to ensure that after his or her death, desi gnated children will inherit the assets placed in the irrevocable trust designed to draw on the estate tax credit. ( McIndoe
, supra , at pp. 488-489; Ike
, supra , at p. 61.) However, as explained below, during the underlying proceedings, respondent deni ed that Uri and Pola intended the 1998

or partly in each, only with asse ts eligible for the marital dedu ction. Assets allocated in kind shall be deemed to satisfy this amount on the basis of their values as finally determined for Federal Estate Tax purposes.”9 trust instrument to assure their childre n’s equal inheritance through the exemption

trust.

C. Underlying Proceedings At trial, appellants cont ended that Pola was required to allocate the house in its entirety to the exemption trust. They identified the controlling provision as the first subparagraph of paragra ph C in Article II, which st ates in pertinent part: “[The] Survivor’s Trust shall consist of Trust assets equal in value to the minimum pecuniary amount necessary to entirely e liminate, or to reduce to the maximum extent possible, any federal estate tax at the Trustor’s death. ” (Italics added.) As appellants noted, because the value of th e house at Uri’s death was less than the $675,000 federal estate tax cr edit, no federal estate tax was owed when he died. Pointing to the italicized portion of paragr aph C, they argued that the survivor’s trust was to receive no assets, as it was unnecessary to allocate any assets to it in
order to eliminate the federal estate ta x because “the minimum pecuniary amount necessary” to eliminate the tax was $0. In contrast, respondent contended that a ll the assets in the original trust were to be allocated to the survivor’s trust up on Uri’s death, with the exception of any assets Pola elected to place in the exem ption trust. Respondent relied on the third subparagraph of paragraph C in Article II, which states: “The Trustee shall not allocate to [the] Survivor’s Trust assets having an aggregate fair market value at the date of allocation that is less than the marital deduction amount as finally
determined for Federal Esta te Tax purposes.” (Italics added.) In addition, she pointed to paragraph D in that article, wh ich provides that the exemption trust shall receive the balance of the estate “plus any amount disclaimed on behalf of the surviving spouse.” (Italics added.) Respondent argued that because the marital deduction was unlimited when Uri died, the italicized portion of paragraph C10 required all the trust assets to be alloca ted initially to the survivor’s trust; in addition, she argued that under paragraph D, the exemption trust was to receive only those assets that Pola a ffirmatively disclaimed. The trial court rejected respondent’s interpretation of the trust instrument, insofar as respondent maintained that the house was to be allocated in its entirety
to the survivor’s trust. Th e court also agreed with appe llants’ interpretation in part, stating: “As there was no es tate tax due at Uri’s death, . . . the minimum pecuniary amount necessary to eliminate the tax cons idering the Federal Estate tax credit was zero. Thus, pursuant to the first [subpara graph of paragraph C], no assets were required to be allocated to the Survivor’s Trust . . . .” Nonetheless, the trial court concl uded that appellants’ interpretation improperly disregarded the third subparagraph of paragraph C. In ruling that equal
interests in the house were to be allocated to the subtrusts, the court stated that the portion of the third subpara graph italicized above “sets a minimum value” on the
assets to be allocated to the survivor’s tr ust. The court further reasoned: “[E]ven though the minimum pecuniary amount necessa ry to avoid [the] federal estate tax was zero, . . . the trustee mu st allocate assets valued at the marital deduction to the Survivor’s Trust. [¶] Here, . . . the marital deduc tion was unlimited. The only property held by Uri at the time of his death was his one-half community property interest in the . . . home. As only a deceased spouse’s prope rty qualifies for the marital deduction, the marita l deduction amount would be Uri’s one-half interest in the . . . home. [¶] Ac cordingly, . . . the Survivor’s Trust was required to be funded with a value equal to one-half of the comm unity property or a 50 percent interest in
the . . . home.”11 D. Analysis For the reasons explained below, we ag ree with appellants that the 1998 trust instrument required the house to be allocated entirely to the exemption trust. In interpreting the instrument, we seek a cons truction that respects the language used ( Huscher v. Wells Fargo Bank (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 956, 972), and avoids rendering key phrases as surplusage ( Comstock v. Corwin (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 770, 772-773). Although the trust instrument provided that Uri’s and Pola’s community property retained that character in the tr ust, Pola was obliged to transfer her community property interest in the house fro m the original trust to the exemption trust if required to do so under the instrument. ( Aguilar v. Aguilar (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 35, 38-39; Prob. Code, § 104.) We therefore focus our inquiry on the instrument’s terms regarding the alloca tion of assets. Here, the controlling provisions are paragraphs C and D of Articl e II, as each attends to a particular subtrust and begins by stating that the subt rust “shall consist” of specified assets from the original trust. Of the two provisions, paragraph C mu st be viewed as preeminent because paragraph D, which addresses the exemption trus t, refers to “the balance” of assets
not allotted to the survivor’s trust unde r paragraph C. The initial sentence of paragraph C, by its plain language, identifi es the exact amount of assets to be placed in the survivor’s trust: it states th at the survivor’s trust shall consist of
assets “ equal in value to the minimum pecuniar y amount necessary” to eliminate the federal estate tax. (It alics added.) As no federal estate tax was due upon Uri’s death, the “minimum pecuniary amount necessa ry” to be allocated to the survivor’s
trust in order to eliminate such estate tax was zero. Accordingly, the effect of the12 initial sentence was to dictate that the su rvivor’s trust receive no assets from the original trust. 4 Viewed in context, the third subpara graph of paragraph C does not modify the allocation specified in the first senten ce of paragraph C. The third paragraph
states: “The Trustee shall not allocate to [the] Survivor’s Trust assets having an aggregate fair market value at the date of allocation that is less than the marital deduction amount as finally determined for Federal Estate Tax purposes .” As the italicized terms indicate, the third su bparagraph prohibits the trustee from allocating to the survivor’s trust any asse ts whose total value on the date of the
allocation is less than the amount of the marital deduction “as finally determined,” for purposes of the fede ral estate tax. In light of the phrase “as finally de termined,” the latter amount must be regarded as Uri’s actual marital deduction. Neither the unlimited marital deduction specified in fede ral law (as proposed by respondent) nor the one-half community property interest in the house th at Uri theoretically could have claimed (as proposed by the trial court) satisfy the terms of the third subparagraph, as those sums are not the product of a “final[]” dete rmination. Here, Uri’ s federal estate tax credit shielded his one-half community pr operty interest in the house from federal estate tax, leaving no assets subject to the marital deduction. Because Uri’s actual

4 We note that this conclusion comports w ith paragraph D, whic h provides in full: “The Exemption Trust shall consist of the ba lance of the Trust Estate plus any amount disclaimed on behalf of the surviving spouse, in the amount equal to the maximum sum that can be allocated to a Trust that does not qualify for the Federal Estate Marital deduction to any extent without producing any Federal Es tate Tax, after taking into account, all Federal Estate Tax deductions and all Federal Estate Tax credits, to which the Trust may be entitled to .” (Italics added.) In view of the italicized terms, paragraph D appears to require that th e exemption trust be funded w ith assets up to a defined maximum, namely, the point at which the tota l value of its assets equaled the federal estate tax credit.13 marital deduction was $0, the third subpa ragraph imposes no requirement on the trustee regarding the allocation of assets to the survivor’s trust. Accordingly, it did not oblige the trustee to allot any assets to that trust. We find additional support for our conclusion regarding the third subparagraph from Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Revenue Procedure 64-19, 1964-1 C.B. 682 (Revenue Procedure 64-19). 5 This procedure states requirements for the availability of the marital de duction when “the governing instrument” requires a trustee to select assets to be distributed. ( Id . at §§ .01 - .02.) As explained below, the third paragraph is r easonably viewed as intended to ensure
that the survivor’s trust satisfied th e procedure’s requirements regarding the
marital deduction. Under Revenue Procedure 64-19, the marital deduction will be allowed when the trust instrument obliges the trust ee to transfer a decedent’s assets “having an aggregate fair market value at the date . . . . of distribution amounting to no less than the amount of the pecuniary [amount of] . . .[the] transfer, as finally
determined for Federal es tate tax purposes.” ( Id . at §§ .01 - .02.) The procedure
thus makes the marital deduction available when the trustee must allocate assets
whose value when allocated is not less than their value for purposes of the marital

5 Although appellants argued before the tria l court that Revenue Procedure 64-19 supported their interpretation of the trust inst rument, they never asked the trial court to take judicial notice of it, and no copy of it is found in the record . Instead, appellants attached a copy of Revenue Procedure 64-19 as an exhibit to their opening brief, but did not request that we take judicial notice of it. We proposed to take judicial notice of it on our motion, and invited res pondent to submit an oppositio n. Respondent’s letter contained no argument that judicial notice is inappropriate, but instead challenged appellants’ interpretation of the trust inst rument. As our review is de novo and respondent has had a full opportunity to disc uss the relevance of Revenue Procedure 64- 19, we conclude that we may properly ta ke judicial notice of it, and do so. ( Shamsian v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4t h 967, 975, fn. 5; Freis v. Soboroff (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1104; Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (b), 459, subd. (d).)14 deduction, as finally determined for Federa l estate tax purposes. Because the third subparagraph in paragraph C reflects this requirement, the subparagraph is nothing more than an attempt to ensure that th e survivor’s trust qualifies for the marital deduction. Accordingly, the third para graph merely implements the trustors’ intention stated in paragraph J of Article II, namely, “to have the Survivor’s Trust qualify for the marital deduction.” Respondent contends that we must acce pt the trial court’s interpretation of the instrument because that interpretati on was supported by the evidence presented at trial. However, as e xplained above (see pt. B., ante ), after hearing the evidence at trial, the court referred solely to the parties’ stipulation that the instrument contained no ambiguity. This was entirely proper. Generally, the decision whether to admit extrinsic evidence to interpret a trust instrument involves a two-step process: the court provisionally receive s the evidence to determine whether the instrument is “‘reasonably susceptible’” to the interpretation urged by a party; if it is, the evidence is admitted for purpo ses of construing the instrument. ( Estate of
Kaila (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1130-1133.)
Our focus is on the trial court’s conclusi on at the first step, which presents a question of law, and is reviewed de novo. ( Estate of Kaila, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1130-1133.) At trial, the court he ard testimony bearing on the instrument’s meaning only from attorney Tangalakis and appellant’s expert, attorney Margaret
Lodise. 6 Tangalakis testified in support of respondent’s interpretation, namely, that the third subparagraph of paragraph C required the survivor’s trust to receive all of the original trust’s assets upon Uris ’ death. According to Tangalakis, he

6 Although Charlene testified that she wa s present when Uri and Pola met with Tangalakis to discuss the trust instrument , she provided no testimony regarding the provisions of the instrument at issue here.15 prepared the instrument to reflect Uri’s and Pola’s intent, which was “to provide the surviving spouse full discretion” over the trust estate. In contrast, Lodise testified in support of a ppellants’ interpretation.
We conclude that the trial court properly declined to credit Tangalakis’s and Lodise’s testimony, for pur poses of setting aside the parties’ stipulation. As explained above, respondent’s interpretation of the instru ment cannot be reconciled with its structure and plain language. Furthermore, Lodise ’s testimony was not cognizable for a different reason, albeit one that is consistent with our conclusion regarding the instrument’s proper interpre tation: a lawyer’s opinion regarding the meaning of a writing that she had no role in creating does not constitute substantial evidence regarding its interpretation. ( Devin v. United Services Auto. Assn. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1157-1158, fn. 5; see Downer v. Bramet (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 837, 841 ; Elder v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 650, 664.) Respondent also contends that appe llants’ interpretation of the trust instrument must be rejected because it compels the allo cation of Pola’s one-half community property interest in the house to the irrevocable exemption trust. She argues that Pola would not have agreed to that allocation, as it required her to give up her rights over the house and potentia lly constituted a taxable event (see 26 C.F.R. § 25.2511-2(b) [for purposes of federa l gift tax, gift is complete when “ the donor has so parted with dominion and c ontrol as to leave in him no power to change its disposition”]). This contentions fails in light of the terms of the instrument, which allocate the house to the exemption trust, and are sile nt regarding the fede ral gift tax. As explained above (see pt. B, ante ), our task is limited to discerning Pola’s intent
from the trust instrument itself. Because the instrument is unambiguous, we will
not insert new terms or alter it to reflect an intent not mani fested in it, or to address16 new desires or goals that arise only after its execution. ( Mummert , supra , 183 Cal.App.2d at p. 199.) In su m, we conclude that the 1998 trust instrument required
the allocation of the house in its en tirely to the exemption trust.

DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed, and the matte r is remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate the judgment and ente r a new judgment in favor of appellants, in accordance with this opinion. Appellants are awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MANELLA, J.

We concur:

EPSTEIN, P. J.

WILLHITE, J.