Filed 3/26/13 In re Hartenstein Family Trust CA2/4 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION FOUR 

In re the POLA HARTENSTEIN 

FAMILY TRUST 

 B240493 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. BP125686) 

CHARLENE HARTENSTEIN et al., 

 Plaintiffs and Appellants, 

 v. 

FELICE HARTENSTEIN, 

 Defendant and Respondent. 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. 

Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions. 

 Mansell & Mansell and Cheryl B. Mansell; Law Offices of Philip R. 

Homsey II and Philip R. Homsey II for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 

 Law Offices of Tracey P. Hom and Tracey P. Hom for Defendant and 

Respondent. 
2 

 In the underlying action regarding the enforcement of a trust instrument, the 

trial court found that the instrument allocated the interests in a house in equal 

shares to two trusts. Appellants contend that the instrument requires the house to 

be allocated entirely to one of the trusts. We conclude that they are correct, and 

therefore reverse. 

RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

A. 1998 Trust Instrument 

 Uri and Pola Hartenstein were married for more than 50 years. They had 

three children, respondent Felice Hartenstein, and appellants Charlene Hartenstein 

and Annette Hartenstein-Schultz.1 

 In December 1998, Uri and Pola executed a trust instrument prepared by 

attorney Phillip Tangalakis. The instrument established a simple trust for their 

assets, and designated them as co-trustees while they both remained alive. Upon 

Uri’s or Pola’s death, the instrument provided for the allocation of the trust’s assets 

into two subtrusts, an exemption trust and a survivor’s trust, with the goal of 

“eliminat[ing] or . . . reduc[ing]” federal estate taxes without “impair[ing]” the 

federal marital deduction. The survivor, as sole trustee, was authorized to amend, 

revoke, or terminate only the survivor’s trust; the exemption trust became 

irrevocable. Upon the survivor’s death, appellants and respondent were to receive 

equal shares of the assets in the exemption trust, as well as equal shares of the 

assets in survivor’s trust, unless it had been amended or revoked. 

 Uri died in November 2000, rendering Pola the surviving spouse and sole 

trustee. When Uri died, the trust’s only asset was Uri and Pola’s house. 

 1

 Because the parties and their parents share their surname, we refer to them by their 

first names.
3 

B. Attempted Revocation of Exemption Trust 

 In March 2004, Pola executed a trust modification, providing that the 

exemption trust would not be funded, and that only the survivor’s trust would 

remain in existence. Later, in April 2004, she executed other documents 

purporting to revoke the exemption and survivor’s trusts, create a new trust, and 

disinherit appellants; in addition, she executed a grant deed transferring the house 

to the new trust. Under the documents, Pola and Felice were to be co-trustees of 

Pola’s 2004 trust, and Felice was to be its sole beneficiary upon Pola’s death. 

Attorney Tangalakis prepared the trust modification and the other documents 

establishing the 2004 trust. 

C. Underlying Action 

 Pola died in July 2010. On November 22, 2010, appellants filed a petition 

challenging the 2004 trust and the purported revocation of the 1998 exemption 

trust. They contended that under the 1998 trust instrument, the exemption trust 

became irrevocable upon Uri’s death, and that Pola was required to fund it to the 

full extent of $675,000 federal estate tax credit effective when Uri died.2

 In 

opposing the petition, respondent maintained that the instrument did not require 

Pola to allocate any assets to the exemption trust, and that its funding was left to 

her discretion. 

 A bench trial on the petition occurred in January 2012. During the trial, the 

parties stipulated that at the time of Uri’s death, the house was worth less than 

$675,000. Although the parties also stipulated that the terms of the 1998 trust 

instrument were “clear and unambiguous,” Tangalakis testified regarding Uri’s and 

 2

 Appellants’ petition alleged that when Uri died, the value of the house was 

$900,000. 
4 

Pola’s intent in executing the instrument, and appellants submitted expert 

testimony bearing on its meaning. Appellants argued that under the 1998 trust 

instrument, the house was an asset of the exemption trust because its value when 

Uri died was less than the estate tax credit at that time. In contrast, respondent 

asserted that the house had been consigned to the survivor’s trust, which was 

subject to amendment and revocation by Pola. 

 Following the presentation of evidence, the trial court issued a ruling 

expressly predicated on the parties’ stipulation that the 1998 trust instrument was 

clear and unambiguous. The court concluded that the instrument required equal 

interests in the house to be allocated to the exemption trust and the survivor’s trust; 

in addition, the court determined that the provisions of Pola’s 2004 trust purporting 

to revoke the exemption trust were void. The court further found that respondent, 

as trustee of the 2004 trust, was the constructive trustee of a 50 percent interest in 

the house and 50 percent of the income from the house arising after Pola’s death. 

The court ordered respondent to execute a grant deed conveying a 50 interest in the 

house to the trustees of the exemption trust, and to deliver to them 50 percent of 

the house’s income arising after Pola’s death. The court also confirmed appellants 

and respondent as the successor co-trustees of the exemption trust. 

DISCUSSION 

 Appellants contend the trial court erred in determining that the 1998 trust 

instrument requires the allocation of equal interests in the house to the exemption 

and survivor’s trusts. They argue that the instrument mandates that the house be 

allocated entirely to the exemption trust. As explained below, we agree. 
5 

A. Governing Principles 

Appellant’s contention requires us to interpret the 1998 trust instrument. 

Generally, “‘“[i]n construing trust instruments, as in the construction and 

interpretation of all documents, the duty of the court is to first ascertain and then, if 

possible, give effect to the intent of the maker.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘[Probate 

Code s]ection 21102 provides, “[T]he intention of the transferor as expressed in the 

instrument controls the legal effect of the dispositions made in the instrument.”’ 

[Citations.] ‘“In construing a trust instrument, the intent of the trustor prevails and 

it must be ascertained from the whole of the trust instrument, not just separate parts 

of it.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Estate of Cairns (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 937, 

944.) 

 Ordinarily, “[t]he interpretation of a will or trust instrument presents a 

question of law unless interpretation turns on the credibility of extrinsic evidence 

or a conflict therein.” (Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246, 254.) Here, the trial 

court heard testimony regarding the instrument, but its analysis of the instrument 

begins by referring to the stipulation, contains no discussion of the trial testimony, 

and focuses exclusively on the language of the instrument. Because the court 

found no ambiguity in the instrument, we also construe the instrument in light of 

its language. (McAllister v. Metzger (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 692, 702-703.) Our 

review is thus de novo. (Ibid.) 

 Under the circumstances, our task is to determine the trustors’ intent at the 

time the instrument was executed (Brown v. Labow (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 795, 

812), as shown by the face of the document (Mummert v. Security-First Nat. Bank 

(1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 195, 199 (Mummert)). Generally, we will give the words 

of the instrument “their ordinary and grammatical meaning.” (Prob. Code, 

§ 21122.) However, as the parties stipulated that an attorney prepared the 
6 

instrument, we may infer that legal terms in it are used in their technical sense. 

(Estate of McKenzie (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 740, 744.) 

 Our inquiry requires us to construe provisions involving the federal estate 

tax credit and marital deduction. Generally, federal law establishes a credit that is 

applied against the value of a decedent’s gross estate, for purposes of determining 

federal estate tax. (26 U.S.C. §§ 2001, 2010(a); see Ike v. Doolittle (1998) 61 

Cal.App.4th 51, 60 (Ike).) At trial, the parties stipulated that the value of this 

credit when Uri died was $675,000. 

 For purposes of determining federal estate tax, federal law also establishes a 

marital deduction “consisting of a deduction from a decedent’s gross estate of the 

value of property interests passing from the decedent to his surviving spouse.” 

(Estate of Libeu (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1436, 1445; 26 U.S.C. § 2056.) Under the 

marital deduction, certain property belonging to the decedent “is excluded from the 

decedent’s gross estate for purposes of federal estate taxes; however, the property 

so excluded must then be included in the surviving spouse’s estate for federal tax 

purposes when he or she dies. (26 U.S.C. § 2056(a), (b)(7)(A)(i).)” (McIndoe v. 

Olivos (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 483, 489 (McIndoe).) At trial, the parties stipulated 

that the value of this deduction when Uri died was unlimited. 

B. 1998 Trust Instrument 

 We turn to the main provisions of the 1998 trust instrument. Article I, which 

establishes the original trust, identifies the property that Uri and Pola agreed to 

assign to the trust. Paragraph G of that article further states: “[The] Trustors 

declare that all property that may be included in this Trust Estate as their 

community property and all property transferred into this Trust shall retain its 

character as such regardless of the transfer[,] and in the event that this Trust[] in 

any way fails, and said community property is returned to the Trustors, it shall be 
7 

returned as their community property and not as the separate property of either or 

both Trustors.” 

 The provisions governing the subtrusts are found in Articles II, III, and IV. 

Paragraph B of Article II provides that upon the death of the first trustor, the 

original trust was to be split into two distinct trusts, the survivor’s trust and the 

exemption trust. Paragraph C of Article III further states: “Upon the Deceased 

Spouse’s death the Surviving Spouse may amend, revoke[,] or terminate the 

Survivor’s Trust; but the Exemption Trust may not be amended, revoke[d] or 

terminated.” Paragraph A of Article IV further specified that after the surviving 

spouse died, appellants and respondent were to receive equal shares of the assets in 

the exemption trust, as well as equal shares of the assets in the survivor’s trust, 

unless it had been revoked or terminated. 

 Article II contains the key provisions governing the allocation of assets to 

the two trusts. Pertinent here are the first and third subparagraphs of Paragraph C, 

each of which concerns the survivor’s trust. The first subparagraph states: “The 

Survivor’s Trust shall consist of Trust assets equal in value to the minimum 

pecuniary amount necessary to entirely eliminate, or to reduce to the maximum 

extent possible, any federal estate tax at Trustor’s death. In making this 

determination, the Trustee shall take into consideration all Federal Estate Tax 

deductions and all Federal Estate Tax credits other than those for State Death 

Taxes.” The third subparagraph states: “The Trustee shall not allocate to [the] 

Survivor’s Trust assets having an aggregate fair market value at the date of 

allocation that is less than the marital deduction amount as finally determined for 

Federal Estate Tax purposes.”3

 

 3

 The second subparagraph of paragraph C, which also concerns the survivor’s trust, 

provides: “This allocation to [the] Survivor’s Trust shall be satisfied in cash or in kind, 

(Fn. continued on next page.) 
8 

 Paragraph D, which concerns the exemption trust, provides in pertinent part: 

“The Exemption Trust shall consist of the balance of the Trust Estate plus any 

amount disclaimed on behalf of the surviving spouse . . . .” 

 Article II also describes the purpose underlying the creation of the survivor’s 

trust. Paragraph J states: “It is the Trustor[s’] intention to have the Survivor’s 

Trust qualify for the marital deduction under the Internal Revenue Code Section 

2056 [(26 U.S.C. § 2056)] and regulations pertaining thereto . . . . In no event shall 

the Trustee take action or have any power that will impair the marital deduction, 

and all provisions regarding the Survivor’s Trust shall be interpreted to this 

primary objective.” 

 The issues in the underlying action concerned Uri’s and Pola’s intent in 

adopting this type of trust structure. Viewed as a totality, the trust instrument 

reveals Uri’s and Pola’s intent to pair an irrevocable subtrust that potentially took 

advantage of the estate tax credit (the exemption trust) with a subtrust that made 

similar use of the marital deduction (the survivor’s trust). Typically, this type of 

trust structure is employed by married trustors to control the disposition of their 

property after their death while making some provision for the living spouse 

through the marital deduction. (See McIndoe, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 488-

489; Ike, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 61-62.) The structure permits a trustor to 

ensure that after his or her death, designated children will inherit the assets placed 

in the irrevocable trust designed to draw on the estate tax credit. (McIndoe, supra, 

at pp. 488-489; Ike, supra, at p. 61.) However, as explained below, during the 

underlying proceedings, respondent denied that Uri and Pola intended the 1998 

 

or partly in each, only with assets eligible for the marital deduction. Assets allocated in 

kind shall be deemed to satisfy this amount on the basis of their values as finally 

determined for Federal Estate Tax purposes.” 
9 

trust instrument to assure their children’s equal inheritance through the exemption 

trust. 

C. Underlying Proceedings 

 At trial, appellants contended that Pola was required to allocate the house in 

its entirety to the exemption trust. They identified the controlling provision as the 

first subparagraph of paragraph C in Article II, which states in pertinent part: 

“[The] Survivor’s Trust shall consist of Trust assets equal in value to the minimum 

pecuniary amount necessary to entirely eliminate, or to reduce to the maximum 

extent possible, any federal estate tax at the Trustor’s death.” (Italics added.) As 

appellants noted, because the value of the house at Uri’s death was less than the 

$675,000 federal estate tax credit, no federal estate tax was owed when he died. 

Pointing to the italicized portion of paragraph C, they argued that the survivor’s 

trust was to receive no assets, as it was unnecessary to allocate any assets to it in 

order to eliminate the federal estate tax because “the minimum pecuniary amount 

necessary” to eliminate the tax was $0. 

 In contrast, respondent contended that all the assets in the original trust were 

to be allocated to the survivor’s trust upon Uri’s death, with the exception of any 

assets Pola elected to place in the exemption trust. Respondent relied on the third 

subparagraph of paragraph C in Article II, which states: “The Trustee shall not

allocate to [the] Survivor’s Trust assets having an aggregate fair market value at 

the date of allocation that is less than the marital deduction amount as finally 

determined for Federal Estate Tax purposes.” (Italics added.) In addition, she 

pointed to paragraph D in that article, which provides that the exemption trust shall 

receive the balance of the estate “plus any amount disclaimed on behalf of the 

surviving spouse.” (Italics added.) Respondent argued that because the marital 

deduction was unlimited when Uri died, the italicized portion of paragraph C 
10 

required all the trust assets to be allocated initially to the survivor’s trust; in 

addition, she argued that under paragraph D, the exemption trust was to receive 

only those assets that Pola affirmatively disclaimed. 

 The trial court rejected respondent’s interpretation of the trust instrument, 

insofar as respondent maintained that the house was to be allocated in its entirety 

to the survivor’s trust. The court also agreed with appellants’ interpretation in part, 

stating: “As there was no estate tax due at Uri’s death, . . . the minimum pecuniary 

amount necessary to eliminate the tax considering the Federal Estate tax credit was 

zero. Thus, pursuant to the first [subparagraph of paragraph C], no assets were 

required to be allocated to the Survivor’s Trust . . . .” 

 Nonetheless, the trial court concluded that appellants’ interpretation 

improperly disregarded the third subparagraph of paragraph C. In ruling that equal 

interests in the house were to be allocated to the subtrusts, the court stated that the 

portion of the third subparagraph italicized above “sets a minimum value” on the 

assets to be allocated to the survivor’s trust. The court further reasoned: “[E]ven 

though the minimum pecuniary amount necessary to avoid [the] federal estate tax 

was zero, . . . the trustee must allocate assets valued at the marital deduction to the 

Survivor’s Trust. [¶] Here, . . . the marital deduction was unlimited. The only 

property held by Uri at the time of his death was his one-half community property 

interest in the . . . home. As only a deceased spouse’s property qualifies for the 

marital deduction, the marital deduction amount would be Uri’s one-half interest in 

the . . . home. [¶] Accordingly, . . . the Survivor’s Trust was required to be funded 

with a value equal to one-half of the community property or a 50 percent interest in 

the . . . home.” 
11 

D. Analysis 

 For the reasons explained below, we agree with appellants that the 1998 trust 

instrument required the house to be allocated entirely to the exemption trust. In 

interpreting the instrument, we seek a construction that respects the language used 

(Huscher v. Wells Fargo Bank (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 956, 972), and avoids 

rendering key phrases as surplusage (Comstock v. Corwin (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 

770, 772-773). 

 Although the trust instrument provided that Uri’s and Pola’s community 

property retained that character in the trust, Pola was obliged to transfer her 

community property interest in the house from the original trust to the exemption 

trust if required to do so under the instrument. (Aguilar v. Aguilar (2008) 168 

Cal.App.4th 35, 38-39; Prob. Code, § 104.) We therefore focus our inquiry on the 

instrument’s terms regarding the allocation of assets. Here, the controlling 

provisions are paragraphs C and D of Article II, as each attends to a particular 

subtrust and begins by stating that the subtrust “shall consist” of specified assets 

from the original trust. 

 Of the two provisions, paragraph C must be viewed as preeminent because 

paragraph D, which addresses the exemption trust, refers to “the balance” of assets 

not allotted to the survivor’s trust under paragraph C. The initial sentence of 

paragraph C, by its plain language, identifies the exact amount of assets to be 

placed in the survivor’s trust: it states that the survivor’s trust shall consist of 

assets “equal in value to the minimum pecuniary amount necessary” to eliminate 

the federal estate tax. (Italics added.) As no federal estate tax was due upon Uri’s 

death, the “minimum pecuniary amount necessary” to be allocated to the survivor’s 

trust in order to eliminate such estate tax was zero. Accordingly, the effect of the 
12 

initial sentence was to dictate that the survivor’s trust receive no assets from the 

original trust.4

 

 Viewed in context, the third subparagraph of paragraph C does not modify 

the allocation specified in the first sentence of paragraph C. The third paragraph 

states: “The Trustee shall not allocate to [the] Survivor’s Trust assets having an

aggregate fair market value at the date of allocation that is less than the marital 

deduction amount as finally determined for Federal Estate Tax purposes.” As the 

italicized terms indicate, the third subparagraph prohibits the trustee from 

allocating to the survivor’s trust any assets whose total value on the date of the 

allocation is less than the amount of the marital deduction “as finally determined,” 

for purposes of the federal estate tax. 

 In light of the phrase “as finally determined,” the latter amount must be 

regarded as Uri’s actual marital deduction. Neither the unlimited marital 

deduction specified in federal law (as proposed by respondent) nor the one-half 

community property interest in the house that Uri theoretically could have claimed 

(as proposed by the trial court) satisfy the terms of the third subparagraph, as those 

sums are not the product of a “final[]” determination. Here, Uri’s federal estate tax 

credit shielded his one-half community property interest in the house from federal 

estate tax, leaving no assets subject to the marital deduction. Because Uri’s actual 

 4

 We note that this conclusion comports with paragraph D, which provides in full: 

“The Exemption Trust shall consist of the balance of the Trust Estate plus any amount 

disclaimed on behalf of the surviving spouse, in the amount equal to the maximum sum 

that can be allocated to a Trust that does not qualify for the Federal Estate Marital 

deduction to any extent without producing any Federal Estate Tax, after taking into 

account, all Federal Estate Tax deductions and all Federal Estate Tax credits, to which 

the Trust may be entitled to.” (Italics added.) In view of the italicized terms, paragraph 

D appears to require that the exemption trust be funded with assets up to a defined 

maximum, namely, the point at which the total value of its assets equaled the federal 

estate tax credit.
13 

marital deduction was $0, the third subparagraph imposes no requirement on the 

trustee regarding the allocation of assets to the survivor’s trust. Accordingly, it 

did not oblige the trustee to allot any assets to that trust. 

 We find additional support for our conclusion regarding the third 

subparagraph from Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Revenue Procedure 64-19, 

1964-1 C.B. 682 (Revenue Procedure 64-19).5 This procedure states requirements 

for the availability of the marital deduction when “the governing instrument” 

requires a trustee to select assets to be distributed. (Id. at §§ .01 - .02.) As 

explained below, the third paragraph is reasonably viewed as intended to ensure 

that the survivor’s trust satisfied the procedure’s requirements regarding the 

marital deduction. 

 Under Revenue Procedure 64-19, the marital deduction will be allowed 

when the trust instrument obliges the trustee to transfer a decedent’s assets “having 

an aggregate fair market value at the date . . . . of distribution amounting to no less 

than the amount of the pecuniary [amount of] . . .[the] transfer, as finally 

determined for Federal estate tax purposes.” (Id. at §§ .01 - .02.) The procedure 

thus makes the marital deduction available when the trustee must allocate assets 

whose value when allocated is not less than their value for purposes of the marital 

 5

 Although appellants argued before the trial court that Revenue Procedure 64-19 

supported their interpretation of the trust instrument, they never asked the trial court to 

take judicial notice of it, and no copy of it is found in the record. Instead, appellants 

attached a copy of Revenue Procedure 64-19 as an exhibit to their opening brief, but did 

not request that we take judicial notice of it. We proposed to take judicial notice of it on 

our motion, and invited respondent to submit an opposition. Respondent’s letter 

contained no argument that judicial notice is inappropriate, but instead challenged 

appellants’ interpretation of the trust instrument. As our review is de novo and 

respondent has had a full opportunity to discuss the relevance of Revenue Procedure 64-

19, we conclude that we may properly take judicial notice of it, and do so. (Shamsian v. 

Atlantic Richfield Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 967, 975, fn. 5; Freis v. Soboroff (2000) 

81 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1104; Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (b), 459, subd. (d).)
14 

deduction, as finally determined for Federal estate tax purposes. Because the third 

subparagraph in paragraph C reflects this requirement, the subparagraph is nothing 

more than an attempt to ensure that the survivor’s trust qualifies for the marital 

deduction. Accordingly, the third paragraph merely implements the trustors’ 

intention stated in paragraph J of Article II, namely, “to have the Survivor’s Trust 

qualify for the marital deduction.” 

 Respondent contends that we must accept the trial court’s interpretation of 

the instrument because that interpretation was supported by the evidence presented 

at trial. However, as explained above (see pt. B., ante), after hearing the evidence 

at trial, the court referred solely to the parties’ stipulation that the instrument 

contained no ambiguity. This was entirely proper. Generally, the decision whether 

to admit extrinsic evidence to interpret a trust instrument involves a two-step 

process: the court provisionally receives the evidence to determine whether the 

instrument is “‘reasonably susceptible’” to the interpretation urged by a party; if it 

is, the evidence is admitted for purposes of construing the instrument. (Estate of 

Kaila (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1130-1133.) 

 Our focus is on the trial court’s conclusion at the first step, which presents a 

question of law, and is reviewed de novo. (Estate of Kaila, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 1130-1133.) At trial, the court heard testimony bearing on the instrument’s 

meaning only from attorney Tangalakis and appellant’s expert, attorney Margaret 

Lodise.6

 Tangalakis testified in support of respondent’s interpretation, namely, 

that the third subparagraph of paragraph C required the survivor’s trust to receive 

all of the original trust’s assets upon Uris’ death. According to Tangalakis, he 

 6

 Although Charlene testified that she was present when Uri and Pola met with 

Tangalakis to discuss the trust instrument, she provided no testimony regarding the 

provisions of the instrument at issue here. 
15 

prepared the instrument to reflect Uri’s and Pola’s intent, which was “to provide 

the surviving spouse full discretion” over the trust estate. In contrast, Lodise 

testified in support of appellants’ interpretation. 

 We conclude that the trial court properly declined to credit Tangalakis’s and 

Lodise’s testimony, for purposes of setting aside the parties’ stipulation. As 

explained above, respondent’s interpretation of the instrument cannot be reconciled 

with its structure and plain language. Furthermore, Lodise’s testimony was not 

cognizable for a different reason, albeit one that is consistent with our conclusion 

regarding the instrument’s proper interpretation: a lawyer’s opinion regarding the 

meaning of a writing that she had no role in creating does not constitute substantial 

evidence regarding its interpretation. (Devin v. United Services Auto. Assn. (1992) 

6 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1157-1158, fn. 5; see Downer v. Bramet (1984) 152 

Cal.App.3d 837, 841; Elder v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 650, 

664.) 

 Respondent also contends that appellants’ interpretation of the trust 

instrument must be rejected because it compels the allocation of Pola’s one-half 

community property interest in the house to the irrevocable exemption trust. She 

argues that Pola would not have agreed to that allocation, as it required her to give 

up her rights over the house and potentially constituted a taxable event (see 26 

C.F.R. § 25.2511-2(b) [for purposes of federal gift tax, gift is complete when “ the 

donor has so parted with dominion and control as to leave in him no power to 

change its disposition”]). 

 This contentions fails in light of the terms of the instrument, which allocate 

the house to the exemption trust, and are silent regarding the federal gift tax. As 

explained above (see pt. B, ante), our task is limited to discerning Pola’s intent 

from the trust instrument itself. Because the instrument is unambiguous, we will 

not insert new terms or alter it to reflect an intent not manifested in it, or to address 
16 

new desires or goals that arise only after its execution. (Mummert, supra, 183 

Cal.App.2d at p. 199.) In sum, we conclude that the 1998 trust instrument required 

the allocation of the house in its entirely to the exemption trust. 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court with 

directions to vacate the judgment and enter a new judgment in favor of appellants, 

in accordance with this opinion. Appellants are awarded their costs on appeal. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

 MANELLA, J. 

We concur: 

EPSTEIN, P. J. 

WILLHITE, J.