COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Annunziata and 

 Bumgardner 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

CHRIS GARY PETERS 

 MEMORANDUM* OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 3060-96-4 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 FEBRUARY 3, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 

Donald H. Kent, Judge 

 Jeffrey T. Barbour, Assistant Public Defender 

(Office of the Public Defender, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General 

(Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Chris Gary Peters (appellant) appeals his conviction for 

distribution of cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-248. He 

contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to 

compel the disclosure of the Commonwealth's surveillance location 

and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. 

 We disagree and affirm. 

 On May 1, 1996, appellant was arrested for distribution of 

cocaine after Officer William Bunney, concealed in an observation 

post, observed appellant hand what he believed to be crack 

cocaine to another man on the 3800 block of Old Dominion 

Boulevard in Alexandria, Virginia. Appellant filed a Motion to 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116 this opinion is not designated 

for publication. 
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Compel Disclosure of Surveillance Location in an attempt to 

discover Bunney's exact location. 

 At a hearing on appellant's motion, Bunney testified that at 

9:05 p.m. on May 1, 1996, he was conducting a surveillance of the 

3800 block of Old Dominion Boulevard from a concealed location 

using a Sorovsky spy scope with a magnification of 20-60 times. 

Streetlights and lights on the fronts of buildings lit the block, 

as the sun had gone down. Bunney testified that his observation 

post was within the 3800 block, elevated between twenty and 

thirty feet, and that there were no obstructions between him and 

the area he was viewing. There was no precipitation, and the 

area Bunney was observing was directly in front of him. Bunney 

stated that, within the previous year, he had told the owner of 

the building in which he was concealed that the location "would 

never be revealed because they were concerned about reprisals 

from individuals on the street." 

 Bunney saw appellant walk past two individuals standing 

outside an apartment building at 3816 Old Dominion Boulevard and 

into the apartment building. Appellant came out of the building 

with his right hand closed, and gave "at least one rock of what 

appeared to be crack cocaine" to one of the individuals standing 

outside of the building, later identified as William Brown. 

Bunney called other members of his unit for the arrest of 

appellant and Brown. 

 On cross-examination, Bunney acknowledged that there are at 
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least four trees on the west side of the 3800 block of Old 

Dominion Boulevard, the side opposite that of his observation 

post. However, they are located south of the doorway where the 

transaction involving appellant occurred. He testified that, 

although one tree at least partially blocked his view of the 

sidewalk south of 3816 Old Dominion Boulevard for twenty to 

thirty feet, and that a building blocked his view of the end of 

the block, his view of the location where the transaction 

occurred was not blocked. 

 The court denied appellant's motion, ruling that the defense 

had not "established that there are no alternative means of 

getting at the same point," given counsel's cross-examination of 

Bunney. The court also ruled that the interests of the 

Commonwealth in protecting the surveillance location outweighed 

appellant's interest in knowing the location. 

 At trial before the court sitting without a jury, Bunney 

testified that he saw appellant "pour[] one rock or at least one 

rock of crack cocaine from his right hand into palm up, left hand 

of Mr. Brown" after leaving the building at 3816 Old Dominion 

Boulevard. Brown put his left hand, containing the cocaine, into 

his left pants pocket. Bunney notified other officers to arrest 

Brown and appellant, and confirmed that they had arrested the 

correct people. Officer Christopher Wimple testified that he 

arrested Brown, and found a rock of an off-white substance in 

Brown's left pants pocket; testing determined the substance to be 
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crack cocaine. 

 Appellant testified in his own defense that he had gone with 

his father-in-law to look at a car on Old Dominion Boulevard. He 

testified that as he walked down Old Dominion Boulevard, he had 

passed some men, the shorter one of whom asked him for a 

cigarette; he gave the man his lit cigarette. 

 The court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to five 

years imprisonment, with four years suspended. 

 I. 

Disclosure of Surveillance Location 

 Appellant first contends that the court erred in denying his 

motion to compel the Commonwealth to reveal the location from 

which Bunney observed him. We review a court's denial of such a 

motion for an abuse of discretion. Hollins v. Commonwealth, 19 

Va. App. 223, 228, 450 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1994). 

 The Commonwealth "has a qualified privilege not to disclose 

the location" of a concealed surveillance post. Hollins, 19 Va. 

App. at 226, 450 S.E.2d at 399. "The Commonwealth's privilege is 

limited, however, by 'the fundamental requirements of fairness,' 

which require consideration of an accused's right to prepare [a] 

defense." Davis v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 588, 593, 491 

S.E.2d 288, 290 (1997) (quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 

U.S. 53, 60, 62 (1957)). In order to overcome the Commonwealth's 

privilege, a defendant 

 must "show that he needs the evidence to 

conduct his defense and that there are no 

other adequate alternative means of getting 
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at the same point." Only then must the court 

balance the public interest in effective law 

enforcement and citizens' safety against the 

defendant's constitutional right to confront 

government witnesses. 

Hollins, 19 Va. App. at 227, 450 S.E.2d at 399 (citation 

omitted). 

 Appellant has not satisfied his burden to "'show that he 

needs the evidence to conduct his defense.'" Hollins, 19 Va. 

App. at 227, 450 S.E.2d at 399 (quoting United States v. Harley, 

682 F.2d 1018, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). While appellant 

established that a number of possible obstructions in the 3800 

block of Old Dominion Boulevard existed, including at least four 

trees, both the testimony of Bunney and the photos make clear 

that Bunney's view of the transaction was unobstructed. 

 Furthermore, the record contains significant evidence 

corroborating the evidence that Bunney's view was not obstructed 

and that the transaction occurred as Bunney reported it. See

Davis, 25 Va. App. at 594, 491 S.E.2d at 291 (considering the 

quality of corroborating evidence as a factor); Hollins, 19 Va. 

App. at 227, 450 S.E.2d at 399 (same). Bunney testified that he 

saw appellant distribute crack cocaine to Brown. While denying 

that he had given crack cocaine to Brown, appellant admitted 

passing a small object which he characterized as "a lit 

cigarette," to a man standing with another on Old Dominion 

Boulevard. The men described by appellant matched the 

description of the men Bunney observed, one of whom took part in 
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the illegal transaction. That appellant denied that the small 

white object in question was cocaine does not materially detract 

from the substance of the corroborating evidence. Appellant's 

testimony further corroborates Bunney's testimony that a 

transaction involving the passing of a small white object to 

another took place and confirms that Bunney was not obstructed 

from observing the transaction. 

 The other factors identified as relevant in Hollins, 19 Va. 

App. at 227-28, 450 S.E.2d at 400, also support a finding that 

appellant failed to show that he had a need for the information. 

 Bunney was elevated and used a vision-enhancing device; these 

factors support the inference that Bunney could clearly see 

appellant and the events in question. Although the sun had gone 

down, Bunney testified that the area was well lit by streetlights 

and lights on the front of the buildings themselves. 

 Looking at the relevant factors as a whole, we find that the 

court did not err in denying appellant's motion to compel the 

disclosure of the exact surveillance location. Cf. Davis, 25 Va. 

App. at 594, 450 S.E.2d at 291. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence 

 Appellant next contends that the evidence was insufficient 

to support his conviction for distribution of cocaine. Where the 

sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, this Court 

must consider all the evidence and any reasonable inferences 

fairly deducible from it in the light most favorable to the 
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Commonwealth. Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 

218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975); Traverso v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 

172, 176, 366 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1988). A trial court's judgment 

will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is plainly wrong or 

without evidence to support it. Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 

Va. 124, 145-46, 314 S.E.2d 371, 385 (1984). 

 Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 

evidence establishes that appellant distributed crack cocaine to 

Brown. Bunney testified that he saw appellant pour a rock of 

crack cocaine into Brown's left hand, and saw Brown put the rock 

into his left pocket. When Brown was arrested, the police found 

a rock of crack cocaine in his left pocket. Even if, as 

appellant contends, Brown threw the cocaine that he acquired from 

appellant away as he saw the police approach, Bunney's testimony 

that he saw appellant hand a rock of cocaine to Brown is 

sufficient to support his conviction. 

 Affirmed.