Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 09A02-1510-CR-1653 | May 11, 2016 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Mark Leeman

Cass County Public Defender

Logansport, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Michael Gene Worden

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Travis Scott Cunningham,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 11, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

09A02-1510-CR-1653

Appeal from the Cass Superior 

Court

The Honorable Rick Maughmer, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

09D02-1312-FC-62

Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 09A02-1510-CR-1653 | May 11, 2016 Page 2 of 10

Case Summary and Issue

[1] The State charged Travis Cunningham with burglary, theft, and criminal 

mischief, and alleged he was an habitual offender. Cunningham, who was 

represented by counsel, entered a plea of guilty to burglary, a Class C felony, 

and the State moved to dismiss all remaining counts. Before he was sentenced, 

Cunningham—without counsel’s acquiescence—orally moved to withdraw his 

guilty plea. The trial court explained it would not grant Cunningham’s motion, 

accepted Cunningham’s guilty plea, and sentenced Cunningham to eight years 

imprisonment, with three years suspended to probation, pursuant to the plea 

agreement. Cunningham raises a sole issue for our review: whether the trial 

court abused its discretion in denying Cunningham’s motion to withdraw his 

plea. Concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History1

[2] On the evening of October 26, 2012, an individual smashed the front window of 

the Cole Clothing Museum (“Museum”) in Logansport, Indiana, entered the 

Museum, and disturbed many of the Museum’s possessions. The following 

morning, a Museum employee discovered several blood stains inside the 

Museum. The police collected blood samples from the scene. A DNA analysis 

 

1 We held oral argument in this case on April 18, 2016, at the Hammond Academy of Science & Technology. 

We commend counsel for their advocacy and thank the faculty, staff, and students at the school for their 

hospitality and participation. 
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indicated the DNA profile of the blood discovered in the Museum matched 

Cunningham’s DNA profile.

[3] On December 13, 2013, the State of Indiana charged Cunningham with 

burglary, a Class C felony; theft, a Class D felony; and criminal mischief, a 

Class B misdemeanor. The State also filed an habitual offender enhancement. 

After being charged, Cunningham absconded to Florida. Cunningham was 

then caught and returned to Indiana, and the trial court appointed a public 

defender to represent Cunningham. Thereafter, Cunningham entered into a 

plea agreement with the State. The agreement provided for Cunningham to 

plead guilty to burglary as a Class C felony in exchange for the State dismissing 

the remaining counts.2 In addition, the agreement provided a sentence of eight 

years imprisonment, with three years suspended to probation.

[4] At the guilty plea hearing on August 11, 2015, Cunningham affirmed under 

oath he intended to plead guilty; he had read, understood, and signed the plea 

agreement; he was previously treated for ADHD, but no mental illness affected 

his ability to understand the proceedings; he was not under the influence of 

drugs or alcohol; he understood all of the rights he was waiving by pleading 

guilty; he was satisfied with the services of his attorney; and he had not been 

 

2 Unrelated to the plea agreement, the trial court—at the State’s request—dismissed the habitual offender

enhancement.
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forced or coerced into pleading guilty. Thereafter, the State provided a factual 

basis for the guilty plea and asked Cunningham whether those facts were true:

[Cunningham:] Some of it, yes.

[State:] All right, well let’s cut to the main part of this is that you 

have to admit that the reason that your blood was in [the 

Museum] is that you were the one that broke in, is that true?

[Cunningham:] Yes, I’ll admit that.

[State:] All right and you did that with the intent to find 

something to steal?

[Cunningham:] Yes.

Transcript, Volume I, at 16. The trial court then asked Cunningham why he 

committed the burglary. Cunningham explained he had been drinking alcohol 

and using drugs before breaking into the Museum, and he only entered the 

Museum because he thought he saw his girlfriend enter seconds before him. 

Cunningham further explained he was confused at the time and thought the 

Museum was his personal residence. The following exchange then occurred:

[Trial Court:] You just told the prosecutor that you broke in to 

steal something.

[Cunningham:] Right. Well, I did—I guess my intention was to 

take something from there. I don’t know. I was under—I was, I 

don’t know.

* * *

[Defense Counsel:] Maybe I can help out. Travis, you told me 

at one time in one of the letters that you wrote that you were 

looking—your girlfriend . . . something about a wedding dress 

that you were looking for something maybe to get married with 

or something? 

[Cunningham:] No, I don’t know about all that but I know that I 

went into the museum because I thought, you know, I thought 
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she had went in there. But it wasn’t her. I was seeing things, so. 

Because I was under the influence.

[Defense Counsel:] But you thought also that you could find 

something to steal.

[Cunningham:] See this is what happened. We was in an 

argument and I went to chase after her and I couldn’t find her. I 

thought she had went in that place. But she didn’t.

[Trial Court:] But you went ahead and broke in?

[Cunningham:] Yeah because I thought—

[Trial Court:] Taking the opportunity to find something?

[Cunningham:] Well, I broke in, yeah, to find her—I thought 

she had went in but it—I was seeing things was all because I was 

drinking.

[Trial Court:] So I guess to make sure that I understand that I’m 

doing this right then you did take something from the building? 

Did you steal anything?

[Cunningham:] Yeah, I guess, you can say I did, yes.

[Trial Court:] We don’t deal with guess. Did you or not?

[Cunningham:] Yes, I did.

Id. at 17. Immediately thereafter, the trial court took the matter under 

advisement, ordered a pre-sentence investigation report, and scheduled a 

sentencing hearing for September 14, 2015.

[5] The pre-sentence investigation report recommended the trial court reject the 

plea agreement “because [Cunningham] reported that he is not guilty of the 

crime of Burglary and he would prefer to go to Trial.” Appellant’s Appendix at 

89. At the sentencing hearing, Cunningham orally requested to withdraw his 

guilty plea. Cunningham claimed he provided a written motion to withdraw 

his plea to his counsel and the State, but defense counsel stated he never 

acquiesced to the filing of any motions. Despite this, the trial court explained 
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to Cunningham he had to show withdrawal of his plea was necessary to correct 

a manifest injustice. Thereafter, Cunningham argued the plea agreement was in 

conflict with Evidence Rules 402, 403, and 410; the plea agreement 

contravened the “possession statute” in that he was “never in possession” of the 

property he was accused of stealing and the State was required to prove he was 

in possession of the property; he felt compelled to enter into the plea agreement, 

stating, “[M]y lawyer wasn’t representing me how I was asking his [sic] to 

represent me”; and he never broke into the building. Tr., Vol. II, at 11-12. 

After listening to a recording of the guilty plea hearing, the trial court concluded 

withdrawal of the plea was not necessary to correct a manifest injustice and 

accepted the plea agreement. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[6] Indiana Code section 35-35-1-4(b) governs a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 

that is filed after the defendant pleads guilty but before he is sentenced. “The 

motion to withdraw the plea of guilty . . . shall be in writing and verified.” Ind. 

Code § 35-35-1-4(b). The trial court must allow a defendant to withdraw his 

guilty plea if the defendant proves it is “necessary to correct a manifest 

injustice.” Id.; Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Ind. 2001). The trial court 

must deny the motion if withdrawal of the plea would substantially prejudice 

the State. Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b). In all other cases, the trial court may grant 

the motion for “any fair and just reason.” Id. The defendant has the burden to 
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prove by a preponderance of the evidence and with specific facts that he should 

be permitted to withdraw his plea. Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b), (e); see also Davis v. 

State, 770 N.E.2d 319, 327 (Ind. 2002) (noting the defendant is required to 

demonstrate “(1) a fair and just reason for withdrawal of the guilty plea and (2) 

no reliance by the State that resulted in substantial prejudice”). 

[7] The trial court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea arrives in our 

court with a presumption in favor of the ruling. Johnson v. State, 734 N.E.2d

242, 245 (Ind. 2000). A trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b). “A trial court 

abuses its discretion only when the failure of the trial court to grant the motion 

would result in . . . a manifest injustice.” Davis, 770 N.E.2d at 326 (alteration in 

original) (quotation and citation omitted). In determining whether a trial court 

has abused its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, we 

examine the statements made at the guilty plea hearing to decide whether the 

plea was made “freely and knowingly.” Brightman, 758 N.E.2d at 44 (citation 

omitted).

II. Manifest Injustice

[8] Cunningham contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The State counters Cunningham’s appeal is 

waived because he did not file a verified written motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea. As noted above, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea must be in writing 

and verified. Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b). In Peel v. State, 951 N.E.2d 269 (Ind. Ct. 
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App. 2011), Peel knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty. The trial court took 

the matter under advisement and set a date for sentencing. At the beginning of 

the sentencing hearing, Peel’s counsel orally moved to withdraw the guilty plea, 

which the trial court denied. On appeal, Peel argued the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Because the 

defendant did not file a written and verified motion to the trial court, we 

concluded the issue was waived. Id. at 272.

[9] Similar to Peel, Cunningham knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty. The 

trial court took the matter under advisement and set a date for sentencing. At 

the beginning of the sentencing hearing, Cunningham orally moved to 

withdraw his guilty plea pro se. Cunningham claimed he provided a written 

motion to his counsel and the State, but Cunningham’s counsel did not 

acquiesce to the filing of the motion, Cunningham did not file his written 

motion with the trial court, and at no point did Cunningham, or his counsel, 

file with the trial court a verified written motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 

See Black v. State, 7 N.E.3d 333, 338 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (noting once a 

defendant is represented by counsel, a trial court is not required to respond to a 

defendant’s pro se request). Therefore, the issue is waived. 

[10] Waiver notwithstanding, Cunningham contends withdrawal of his plea was 

necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Specifically, Cunningham argues he 

entered a guilty plea while maintaining his innocence at the same time in that 

he stated at the guilty plea hearing that he entered the Museum with the intent 

to steal something in addition to stating he entered the Museum because he was 
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intoxicated and thought he saw his girlfriend enter the Museum. See Ross v. 

State, 456 N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind. 1983) (noting a trial court may not accept a 

guilty plea when the defendant pleads guilty while maintaining his innocence at 

the same time).3 Cunningham also argues his plea was not voluntary due to 

pressure from his counsel. As noted above, in determining whether a trial court 

has abused its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, we 

examine the statements made at the guilty plea hearing to decide whether the 

plea was made “freely and knowingly.” Brightman, 758 N.E.2d at 44 (citation 

omitted).

[11] Based upon our review of the record, we cannot say the trial court was required 

to grant Cunningham’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. At the guilty plea 

hearing, the trial court properly advised Cunningham of the charges against 

him, the possible penalties that could result from trial, the terms of the plea 

agreement, and the rights he would be giving up by pleading guilty. In each 

case, Cunningham indicated he understood. Cunningham also affirmed under 

oath he intended to enter a plea of guilty, he was satisfied with the services of 

his attorney, he had not been forced or coerced into pleading guilty, and he 

 

3 Cunningham additionally argues the trial court abused its discretion because the pre-sentence investigation 

report recommended the trial court not accept the plea because Cunningham claimed he was innocent during 

the pre-sentence investigative interview. However, a claim of innocence during a pre-sentence investigative 

interview is an unsworn out-of-court statement, and not only has our supreme court specifically declined to 

extend the Ross rule to out-of-courtroom protestations of innocence, “it also explicitly held the acceptance of 

a guilty plea from a defendant who protests his innocence to a probation officer in a presentence interview is 

not a basis for post-conviction relief.” Mayberry v. State, 542 N.E.2d 1359, 1361 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), trans. 

denied.
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broke into the Museum with the intent to steal property. Moreover, at no point 

during the guilty plea hearing did Cunningham claim counsel was ineffective, 

nor did he deny entering the Museum with the intent to commit a felony. See

Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 (1999) (“A person who breaks and enters the building or 

structure of another person, with intent to commit a felony in it, commits 

burglary, a Class C felony.”). Rather, Cunningham protested his innocence 

and claimed counsel pressured him into pleading guilty only after the guilty plea 

hearing. Therefore, Cunningham has failed to prove withdrawal of his guilty 

plea was necessary to correct a manifest injustice. 

Conclusion

[12] We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Cunningham’s pro se oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Accordingly, we 

affirm.

[13] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Barnes, J., concur.