* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, this Court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-51552

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

RICARDO RENEE SANCHEZ-GONZALEZ

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 2:05-CR-869-2

Before KING, DAVIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Ricardo Sanchez-Gonzalez (“Sanchez”) appeals the district court’s denial

of his motion to suppress evidence obtained after his arrest. Sanchez was

convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and § 846, conspiracy to import cocaine, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) and § 960(a)(1), (b)(1), possession of cocaine with

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

February 12, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 06-51552

2

intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and

importation of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a), § 960(a)(1), (b)(1). 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents arrested Sanchez because

they believed he was acting as a “scout”for a car they had previously determined

to be transporting drugs across the U.S.-Mexico border. For the reasons stated

below, we affirm the district court’s rulings and sustain Sanchez’s convictions.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

On August 26, 2005 immigration inspectors at the Eagle Pass, Texas port

of entry into the United States determined that a Mercury Cougar driven by

Alonso Mercado-Espino (“Mercado”) contained cocaine. ICE agents decided to

place the Cougar under surveillance without alerting Mercado to the fact that

they had discovered the drugs in his car, an operation which is known as a “tailout.” 

After crossing the border into Texas, Mercado parked and entered a Dairy

Queen where he ordered food and sat for about twenty minutes. An undercover

ICE agent entered the store and overheard Mercado speaking in Spanish on a

cell phone. The ICE agent heard Mercado say “there’s no problem,” “where are

you?” and “what are you driving?” After this conversation, Mercado grabbed his

food, threw it away, and quickly left the Dairy Queen. 

Outside of the Dairy Queen, ICE agents observed the driver of a gold Ford

Taurus parked two spaces away from the Cougar wave to Mercado, and they

observed Mercado waving back. The Taurus driver was Sanchez. Mercado got

into the Cougar and pulled out of his parking space. Mercado then waited for

Sanchez to pull out of his parking spot and exit the Dairy Queen parking lot in

front of him. At this point, agents ran a check to verify the registration

information on Sanchez’s car. They discovered that Sanchez had crossed the

U.S.-Mexico border at Eagle Pass that afternoon at 12:36 p.m., five minutes

before Mercado arrived at the same port of entry. 
No. 06-51552

1

ICE officers testified that they planned to arrest Sanchez at the checkpoint to protect

the child traveling with him from the danger of a high-speed chase.

3

With Sanchez in the lead, the two cars proceeded to an Exxon station.

Although there was other traffic on the road and at times the two cars were

separated by other vehicles, Mercado continued to follow Sanchez, mimicking

lane changes and slowing down atthe same time. At the Exxon station, Mercado

waited in line for a gas pump while Sanchez parked in front of the convenience

store. Sanchez looked under the hood of his car and then entered the store with

his young son, who traveled with him, to purchase a snack. Sanchez and

Mercado left the Exxon convenience store at the same time but did not

acknowledge each other’s presence. Mercado and Sanchez drove out of the

Exxon station within moments of each other and proceeded to Highway 57

toward San Antonio, Texas. At this point, Sanchez followed Mercado. 

At the suppression hearing, ICE agents testified that drug traffickers

frequently use a “load car-scout car” arrangement in which the load car carries

the drugs and the scout car travels behind it to inform the owners of the drugs

if anything happens to the load car, and to distract the police if the need arises.

Based on their observations of the interaction between Sanchez and Mercado at

the Dairy Queen and the way that the two cars traveled together to the Exxon

and left the gas station in tandem, coupled with their knowledge that Mercado

carried cocaine in a hidden compartment in the Cougar, ICE agents believed

that Sanchez was acting as a scout for Mercado.

Once it became clear that Sanchez and Mercado were leaving Eagle Pass,

an ICE agent in an unmarked vehicle sped ahead of them to alert officers at the

Highway 57 Border Patrol checkpoint.1 Shortly thereafter, another ICE agent

pulled Mercado over and arrest him. Sanchez, who was traveling behind

Mercado at the time of the stop, proceeded to the Border Patrol checkpoint,

where he was arrested by ICE agents. ICE agents testified that they did not see
No. 06-51552

2 Mercado was charged as a codefendant in the same indictment, but he plead guilty.

4

Sanchez make any phone calls between the time Mercado was pulled over and

the time he arrived at the checkpoint. Sanchez and his son were transported to

the Eagle Pass ICE station. ICE agents sought basic biographical information

from Sanchez, but they did not question him extensively until after Sanchez’s

wife arrived to pick up his son. 

Sanchez was informed of his rights, but waived them orally and in writing,

and eventually wrote out a confession in which he admitted that he had been

promised $500 to escort a car to San Antonio, and that he was aware that he was

agreeing to be involved in something illegal. He was charged with conspiracy to

possess with intent to distribute cocaine, conspiracy to import cocaine,

possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and importation of cocaine.2 He

moved to suppress his confession and all the evidence produced after his arrest

as the fruit of an unlawful seizure. The district court denied his motion after a

hearing, and the jury convicted Sanchez of all four counts against him. He was

sentenced to four 120-month terms of imprisonment and five years of supervised

release. Sanchez now appeals the denial of his motion to suppress and the jury

verdict against him. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, [this Court] reviews

questions of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error.” United States v.

Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 2001). This Court “view[s] the evidence in

the light most favorable to the party that prevailed in the district court.” Id.

This Court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States

v. Burns, 162 F.3d 840, 847 (5th Cir. 1998). 

In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence we must affirm the

verdict“if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude from the evidence

that the elements of the offense were established beyond a
No. 06-51552

5

reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the verdict and drawing all reasonable inferences from the

evidence to support the verdict.”

Id. (quoting United States v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 78 (5th Cir. 1997)).

III. DISCUSSION

Sanchez argues that the evidence obtained after his arrest, including his

confession, should be suppressed because ICE agents lacked probable cause to

arrest him. Sanchez also argues that without the evidence obtained after his

arrest, the remaining evidence against him is not sufficient to sustain his

conviction.

A. Motion To Suppress 

Sanchez argues on appeal that any probable cause which ICE agents had

to arrest him for being a scout driver dissipated when he failed to call the drug

owners and alert them of Mercado’s arrest, as a scout driver would be expected

to do. He argues that the evidence gathered following his arrest must therefore

be suppressed as the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Wong Sun v. United States,

371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). 

“‘[P]robable cause’ to justify an arrest means facts and circumstances

within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person,

or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the

suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.”

Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). In evaluating whether probable

cause exists, we consider the “collective knowledge” of the ICE agents involved

in the tail-out operation which led to Sanchez’s arrest. United States v. Clark,

559 F.2d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 1977). Agents evaluating whether probable cause

exists are permitted to rely on their specialized training and experience. Id.

This Court recognizes the load car-scout car pattern of travel, “whereby

two cars travel together during a smuggling venture with the first car operating

primarily as a scout car.” United States v. Barnard, 553 F.2d 389, 392 (5th Cir.
No. 06-51552

3 Sanchez correctly points out that Mercado’s cell phone records revealed that Sanchez

was not the person on the other end of the line during this conversation. This does not change

the relevance of the overheard conversation to our present analysis, however. There was no

way for the agents who overheard the suspicious conversation to know who Mercado was

speaking to, and it was reasonable for them to conclude based on the part of the conversation

they overheard that Mercado was speaking to the driver of a car he planned to travel with. 

6

1977) (quoting United States v. Vital-Padilla, 500 F.2d 641, 643 (9th Cir. 1974));

see also United States v. Lopez, 911 F.2d 1006, 1009 (5th Cir. 1990) (recognizing

that “vehicles . . . traveling in tandem, lead car-load car arrangement, is a

circumstance that ‘may understandably raise the officer’s suspicions’”) (quoting

Barnard, 553 F.2d at 392). This Court has also stated that when contraband is

discovered in the load car, officers have reasonable cause to believe that the

scout car was involved in a criminal activity. Barnard, 553 F.2d at 392. 

We note at the outset that this is not a case in which the load car-scout car

driving pattern created reasonable suspicion of smuggling activity. Cf. Lopez,

911 F.2d at 1009. When Sanchez was arrested, ICE agents already knew that

Mercado’s car was carrying cocaine in a hidden compartment. Agents relied on

their knowledge of the load car-scout car pattern to conclude that Sanchez was

participating in Mercado’s drug-smuggling activity, which gave them probable

cause to arrest him. 

At the time of Sanchez’s arrest, agents had been observing Sanchez and

Mercado for several miles. They knew that Mercado had a cell phone

conversation in the Dairy Queen in which he asked whatthe person on the other

end of the line was driving, and that immediately after this conversation,

Mercado left the restaurant.3In the parking lot, agents observed Sanchez wave

at Mercado, and they saw Mercado return the wave. They also ran a

registration check and discovered thatthe two cars had entered the same border

crossing within five minutes of one another that afternoon. 

Agents observed the two cars proceed together to the same gas station, and

they saw that Mercado and Sanchez did not speak to each other or otherwise
No. 06-51552

7

acknowledge each others’ presence while they were both in the gas station

convenience store. As the district court noted, this absence of communication

was in itself suspicious: 

If [Mercado and Sanchez] were simply friends, waiving to one

another across a parking lot, as [Sanchez] would have this Court

believe, then surely the two friendly men would have struck up a

conversation inside the Exxon station when distance was not a

factor as it was in the parking lot.

After acknowledging one another in the Dairy Queen parking lot and driving to

the same gas station, Mercado and Sanchez then ignored one another at the

Exxon— yet still leftthe crowded gas station atthe same time and took the same

highway to San Antonio. The facts known to the agents at the time of Sanchez’s

arrest were more than sufficient to cause a reasonable person to believe that a

crime was being committed. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 37. 

Once on the highway, Sanchez drove some distance behind Mercado, a

circumstance which this Court has noted cuts against the load car-scout car

inference. Barnard, 553 F.2d at 392 n.5 (discussing the scout car’s role in

alerting the load car to upcoming checkpoints and stating that “it would be

improper to infer that the lead car-load car scheme was being used when the

purported scout car was actually following, rather than preceding,the load car”).

At the suppression hearing, ICE agents testified that scout cars can serve

“multiple functions” and that sometimes a scout car “follows the narcotics . . .

just to make sure nothing happens to [them].” Under the totality of the

circumstances known to the agents at the time of Sanchez’s arrest, particularly

the pattern oftandem driving between Sanchez and Mercado prior to their entry

on the highway, it was not unreasonable for the agents to believe that Sanchez

was acting as a scout for Mercado in spite of the fact that Mercado pulled ahead

on the highway. Clark, 559 F.2d at 424 (“In determining whether there was

reasonable cause . . . we look to the totality of the circumstances and the
No. 06-51552

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inferences that flow therefrom. . . . We weigh not individual layers [of evidence]

but the laminated total.”(internal quotations and citations omitted)).

Sanchez argues that the probable cause to believe that he was acting as

a scout for Mercado dissipated when officers did not observe Sanchez making a

phone call after Mercado’s arrest. This argument is without merit. Sanchez

points to no case from this or any other circuit which required a scout car to

make contact with the owners of the contraband in order to establish a load carscout car relationship. The agents rightly focused on the factors which

established a connection between the load car and the suspected scout car, not

any communication between the suspected scout and third parties. See Barnard,

553 F.2d at 392 (noting CB radio equipment and traffic pattern between two

vehicles on sparsely traveled road known for smuggling activity); Lopez, 911

F.2d at 1009 (noting CB communications and observation of driving pattern of

three trucks traveling in tandem and stopping at the same gas station led

officers to infer illegal activity). Sanchez’s behavior, combined with the bordercrossing records, gave agents probable cause to believe that he was cooperating

with Mercado’s drug-smuggling activity. Nothing that happened on Highway 57

dissipated that probable cause, and Sanchez’s arrest at the border patrol

checkpoint was lawful. The evidence lawfully obtained after Sanchez’s arrest is

admissible.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Sanchez also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him. He

argues thatthe evidence obtained after his arrest should be suppressed and that

the remaining evidence against him is circumstantial and insufficientto sustain

his convictions. We reject this argument because we find that his arrest was

lawful and that the evidence lawfully obtained after Sanchez’s arrest is

admissible. 
No. 06-51552

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We also note that the evidence obtained from Sanchez following his arrest

was more than sufficient to sustain his convictions for possession and

importation of a controlled substance and conspiracy to do the same. After

initially lying to agents about whether he had gone to Mexico that morning,

Sanchez agreed to “tell the truth” and wrote out a confession in which he

admitted that a man named Juan Gonzalez had offered him $500 to follow a car

to San Antonio. He told agents that he had met Juan (whom he referred to as

“Juanillo”) in Mexico and that Juan’s boss, who was known as “Chuy,” was going

to pay him for his work. Sanchez wrote in his confession thatit was “logical” that

what he was doing was illegal. 

Sanchez’s confession was corroborated by his phone records. Sanchez’s

phone book contained phone numbers for “Juanio” and “Chuy, patron Juanio.”

Sanchez had two cell phones with him at the time of his arrest. One of the

phones, which was registered in the name of “Juanillo Gonzalez,” recorded calls

from the numbers for “Juanio” and “Chuy” on the date of his arrest. Mercado’s

cell phone received calls from the same two numbers that day. This evidence,

combined with the evidence which led the agents to arrest him, was more than

sufficient to permit a rational jury to conclude that Sanchez knowingly

participated in a conspiracy to possess, import, and distribute a controlled

substance in the United States. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.