### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-17-00707- CV

Core ALM, LLC, Appellan t

v. Ke en F usion , Inc., Appellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 200 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 -GN-1 5-0 0088 3, H ONO RAB LE TIM SULAK , JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

CoreAL M, L L C, appea ls the trial court’s judgme nt rende red on a ju ry verdic t

awa rding Kee n Fu s ion, I nc., $116,509 in damag es for tortious interfe renc e with contra ct and business disparag ement. On ap p eal, CoreAL M contends that the economic loss rule barr ed an

awa rd of damag es based on tort claims and that the evidenc e was leg ally insufficient to support the jury finding s that CoreAL M tortiously interfe red with a contra ct an d disparag ed the business of Kee n Fusion. We will affirm.

BACK GR OUND

CoreAL M is a company that provides consulting service s relate d to SAP s oftwar e, specia liz ing in application lifecy cle manag ement. Kee n Fusion, a company owned solely by Nathan 1

SAP softwar e is enter

prise resour ce planning softwar e used by larg e companies to manag e 1 their businesses. Application lifecy cle m anag ement is the supervision of a softwar e application fr om its initial planning throug h retire ment and also ref ers to how chang es to an application ar e documented a

nd trac ked.Wil liams, also specia liz es in a cer tain product wi t h i n SAP. I n J une 2013, Wil liams contac ted CoreAL M throug h L inkedI n and informed it that he would soon b e av ai l ab l e as an independe nt

co n s u l t ant and would be interested in any potential opportunities to “par tner in the AL M space . ” Wil liams informed CoreAL M that he was only interested in “a straigh t rate non-exclusive

arr ang ement.” I n April 2014, CoreAL M and Wil liams beg an discussing a potential place ment with Wa r n e r B r o th e r s . Wi ll ia

ms te s ti f ie d th a t Co r e A L M a s k e d K e e n F u s io n to s ig n a B il a te r a l Su b c o n tr a c t Ag ree ment (B SA) and a No n -D i s cl o s ure Ag ree ment (NDA ) in anticipation of working on the Wa r n e r B r o th e r s p r o

je c t. T h e B SA s ta

te s th a t it s o b je c t is to p r o v id e a

n a g r e e me n t b e tw e e n Co r e A L M and Kee n Fusion for marke ting, projec t delivery , and other activities rela

ted to the two companie s worki n g toge ther on consulting tasks and opportunities. The BSA includes the following provisions:

P rim e Role. Ty

pically , the party which first identifies the prospec t shall serve as prime contra ctor and the other party shall serve as the subcontrac tor, howeve r, when the interests of the client or other circ umstances so indicate, the parties may ag ree that the party which first identifies the p ro s p ect may serve as the subcontrac tor with the other party serving as the prime c ontrac tor. For eac h projec t on which the parties ag ree to team toge ther pursuant to this ag ree ment, the parties shall execute a schedule to this ag ree ment which shall set forth the name of the client or prospect, a descr iption of the projec t, a descr iption of the tasks to be perf ormed b y t he subcontrac tor and a ll other rele vant matters, including billing ra tes. Client Non-Com petition. Eac h party ag ree s that it will respe ct the other party ’s priority rig ht of rela

tionship with customers introduced by the o t her party

. To the extent that one party introduces a new customer to the other party , the other party will not, during the term o f t h i s agr ee ment and for a period of one (1) y ear afte rwa rd, solicit business from such customer in the other party ’s field of expertise, except in connec tion with the introducing party

. This is limit ed to clients introduced direc tly by the partne r and does not aff ect b u s i ness derive d from marke ting perf ormed independe ntly

.

2The BSA also made clea r that eac h p ar t y re mained an independe nt contra ctor and that nothing in the BSA could be construed to bind either party to an exclusive working rela tionship. The Warner Br others projec t w as not a war ded to Core AL M or Kee n Fusion and ne ither par ty did a ny work for Warner B rothers.

I n J uly 2014, Wil liams was contac ted by Maria Upt on, an employ ee of a staffing company called eCommQuest, reg arding an opportunity to provide SAP-related consulting service s. The a rra ng ement that wa s proposed was that Ke en F usion would become a subcontrac tor of Ernst & Y o u n g , w h ic h w a s w o r

k in g o n a n e n g a g e me n t f

o r Jo h n s o n Co n tr o ls , I

n c . , in M il w a

u k e e , Wi s c o n s in

. Upton arr ang ed for Wil liams to have a teleph o n e i n t er v i ew with repr esenta tives of both Ernst & Young and J ohnson Controls to discuss a five-month consulting projec t. After the interview, Ernst & Young confirme d that it would reta in Kee n Fusion for the J ohnson Controls projec t. Kee n Fusion and eComm Qu es t t h en executed a contra ct wher eby Kee n Fusion reta ined the service s of eCommQuest to act as a broker ing ag ent for Kee n Fusion to provide service s to Ernst & Young and J ohnson Controls for five months. Wil liams testified that Kee n Fusion was to be paid an hourly rate of $165 and tha t he was sc heduled to start the f ive-month projec t on Aug ust 25, 2014. During this time period, CoreAL M was also providing application lifecy cle

m an age m en t service s to J ohnson Controls as a subcontrac tor for I MPRI VA, a J ohnson Controls
contra ctor. I n mid-Aug ust 2014, L abinot By ty qi, Core AL M’s president, lear ned of Kee n Fusion’s eng ag ement with E rnst & Young and J ohnson Controls. By ty qi sent Wil liams an email informing him that J ohnson Controls was a C o re ALM account and that CoreAL M had “asked many time[ s]
to bring y ou here .” Wil lia m s responde d that the Warner Br others projec t was the only projec t

3CoreAL M had asked him to join. Wil liams also stated: “We’ve been try ing to f ind a n opportunity
to collabora te for over a y ear so I can assure y ou that I was unawa re of the landsca

pe at [J ohnson Controls] or y our intentions to bring me on. Also, the specific details of the role wer e not reve aled

u n til afte r I was submi tted throug h a recruiter

. Please know that my intentions would never be t o take wor k awa y from a Core AL M acc ount.” By ty qi testified that, afte r lear ning of Kee n Fusion’s ag ree ment to provide consulting service s to J ohnson Controls through a subcontrac t w ith Er nst & Young , he contac ted Akita Chen
at Ernst & Young and told her that Kee n Fusion had a contra ct with Core AL M and that CoreAL M had p re v i o u s ly “submitted Wil liams” for the position he was now taking throug h eCommQuest. Acc ording to By

ty qi, he tol d Chen that Kee n Fusion had a contract with C oreA L M and that Chen understood him to mean that the contra ct prohibited Kee n Fusion from doing work for J ohnson Controls throug h any avenue other than CoreAL M. By ty qi testified that he offe red Ernst & Young th e o p p o rt u n i t y to reta in Kee n Fusion’s services through CoreAL M. By ty qi also sent an email to Chen attac hing a

copy of the B SA and the NDA

. By ty qi te stified that he talked to either Upton or L isa Wil cox at eCommQuest about the Kee n Fusion situation and that eCommQuest offe red to split the fee s g ener ated by Kee n Fusion’s work for J ohnson Con t ro l s , b u t t hat he ref used that offe r beca use he w anted to “f

ollow the [BSA] .” On Aug ust 12, 2014, Chen sent an ema il to W ilcox at eCommQuest stating :

Unfortuna tely , the client [J ohnson Controls] has decide d to not move forw ard w ith N a te Wi ll ia ms . T im E a

r h a r t [I M PR IV A ’ s p r e s id e n t] h a s c le a r ly s ta te d th a t Co r e A L M believes that Nate would be in violatio n o f t h e contract and they will pursue leg al action if Nate takes the position via [Ernst & Young ]. The team dy namics would not be conduc ive to collabora tion under those cir cumstance s.
4The next day Upton at eCommQuest informed Wil liams that he would not be reta ined for the fivemonth consulting projec t at J ohnson Controls.

Kee n Fusion then filed suit ag ainst CoreAL M alleg ing that CoreAL M’s actions constituted a brea ch of the BSA’s Client Non-Competition provision. Ke en Fusion also alleg ed that CoreAL M tortiously interfe red with Kee n Fusion’s business rela tionships with eCommQuest, Ernst & Young , and J ohnson Controls. Kee n Fusion also asser ted a defa mation ca u s e of action, alleg ing that CoreAL M made untrue statements to eCommQuest, Ernst & Youn g, and J ohnson Controls that caused Ke en F usion to suffer da mag es. After a two-day j u ry t ri al, C oreA L M moved for a directed verdict arg uing, in part, that Kee n Fusion’s tort claims wer e barr ed by the economic loss rule. The trial court denied the

mo ti o n . T h e c o u

r t th e n s u b mi tt e d to th e ju

r y a c h a r g e c o n s is ti n g o f e ig

h t q u e s ti o n s . Q u e s ti o n 1 a s k e d the jury , “Did CoreAL M intentionally interfe re with Kee n Fusion’s contra ct with eCommQuest, I nc. to become a subcontrac tor for Ernst & Young L .L .P. on an eng ag ement for J ohnson Controls, I nc.? ” The jury answe red “Ye s” to this question. Question 2 asked the jury , “Did CoreAL M fail to comply with the Bil ater al Subcontrac t Ag ree ment it enter ed into with Kee n Fusion? ” The jury answe red “No” to this question. Question 3 asked the jury , “Did C oreAL M disparag e the business of Keen Fusion [by stating that] Kee n Fusion was prec luded fr o m wo rki ng on the J ohnson Controls eng ag ement pursuant to its ag ree ment with CoreAL M? ” The jury answe red “Ye s” to this question. Question 4, which was predic ated on an aff irmative answe r to Question 1, Question 2, or Question 3, asked the jury what sum of m oney would fairly

and re asonably

compensa te Kee n Fusion for its damag es, measure d by the amount Kee n Fusion would have received for the J ohnson Controls eng ag ement. The jury

answe red “ $116,509.” 5The trial court rende red judgme nt on the jury ’s verdic t, deny ing CoreAL M’s motion

f o r ju d g me n t n o tw it

h s ta n d in g th e v e r d ic t. Co r e A L M ’ s s u b s e q u e n t mo ti o n f o r n e w tr ia l w a s o v e r

r u le d by opera tion of l aw. On a ppeal, Core AL M reur g es its contention that the economic loss rule bars Kee n Fusion’s re cover

y on its tort claims and challeng es the fac tual sufficie ncy of the e vidence to support the ju ry ’s fi n d ings that CoreAL M tortiously interfe red with Kee n Fusion’s contra ct with eCommQuest and that CoreA L M disparag ed Ke en F usion’s business.

DISCUSSIO N We first consider whether the economic loss r ule barr ed Kee n Fusion’s rec overy of damag es under its tort theories. The “ec onomic loss rul e” i s a d octrine that consists of sever al limit ed rules that g overn rec overy of economic losses under cer tain circ umstances. See Sharyland W ater Supply Corp. v

. City of Alton , 354 S.W .3d 407, 415 (Tex. 2011)

. The rule “is not g ener ally ap plicable in ever

y situation; it allows rec overy of economic damag es i n tort, or not , acc ording to its underly ing principles.” LAN/ST V v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. , 435 S.W .3d 234, 235-36 (Tex. 2014). I n broad terms, the doctrine addre sses eff orts to use neg lige nce and product liability claims

as vehicles for rec overy of econ o m i c l o s s es . See Sharyland , 354 S.W .3d at 414-18. Sharyland emphasizes that shorthand ref ere nces to “the” economic loss rule in the singula r can be “something of a m i s n o mer” beca

use the term actua lly encompa sses multipl e conce pts addre ssing eff orts to

rec over pa

rticular e conomic losses in particula r situations. Id . at 414-15. Her e, CoreAL M relies on a particula r rule included within the “ec onomic loss rule” doctrine—spe cifica lly , that when a party seeks damag es for brea ch of a duty cre ated under contra ct,

as opposed to a duty imposed by law, tort damag es are unavailable

. See Jim W alter Homes, Inc. v. 6Ree d , 711 S.W .2d 617, 617-18 (Tex. 1986) (whe n plaintiff asser ts tort claim arising from contra ct, we must look to substance of c ause of action, not ma nner in w hich it wa s plead, to dete rmine ty pe

o f a c ti o n b r o u g h t) ; s e e a ls o S o u th we s te r n B e ll Te l. Co

. v . D e

La n n e y , 8 0 9 S. W. 2 d 4 9 3 , 4 9 4 ( T e x. 1 9 9 1 ) (“ W h en t h e only loss or damag e is to the subject matter of the contra ct, the plaintiff’s action i s

o r d in a r il y o n th e c o n tr a c t. ” )

. Co r e A L M a r g u e s th a t K e e n F u s io n c a

nn o t r e c o v e r it s e c o n o mi c d a ma g e s throug h a tort claim beca

use those damag es arise out of the alleg ed brea ch of the BSA. I mplicit in CoreAL M’s arg ument is the assumption that the duty not to interfer e with Kee n Fusion’s c ontrac t with eCommQuest arose solely out of the BSA, and was not a duty imposed by law. We disa g ree .

The economic loss rule does not bar all tort claims arising out of a contra ctual setting. Chapman Custom Homes, Inc. v. Dallas Plumbing Co. , 445 S.W .3d 716, 718 (Tex. 2014). A party states a tort claim when the dut y alleg edly brea ched is indepe ndent of the contractual undertaking and the harm suffe red is not mere ly the economic loss of a benefi t u n d er that contra ct. Id. The Tex as S u p reme Court has rec og nized the rig ht of a party to an exis ting contra ct to rec over from

a third party who tortiously interfe res with the contra ct since 1903. See Raymond v. Y arrington , 73 S.W

. 800, 804 (Tex. 1903) (upholding rig ht of purcha ser of business to rec over from third party for inducing seller of business to brea ch noncompetition provision of contra ct of sale). The duty not to interfe re with anot h er’s contra ctual relationship arises out of t he law and is independe nt of any
contra ctual rela tionship betwe en the interfe ring party and the pa

rty whose c ontrac tual rela tionship with a third party has been interfe red wi t h

. See id. (“I f it be actionable for one to intermeddle in another ’s aff

airs, and there by preve nt him from making contra cts, to the damag e of his business, for

a s tr o n g e r r e a s o n it is a c ti o n a b le to in d u c e th e b r e a c h o f a c o n tr a c t a lr e a d y ma d e . ” )

. T h

u s , Co r e A L M ’ s

7duty n o t t o i nterfe re with Kee n Fusion’s contra ct with eCommQuest did not arise out of the

BSA, but out of common law. Additionally , the damag es Ke en F usion sought we re the economic losses he suffe red from not be ing able to pe rfor m the J ohnson Controls e ng ag ement as anticipated by his contra ct wit h eCommQuest, not the economic loss of a benef it under the BSA. The recor d demonstrates that the damag es awa rded, $116,509, was an amount equal to the sum of the amount Wil liams testified Kee n Fusion would make working for J ohnson Controls ($116,160) and the
amount Kee n Fusion paid to purcha se a worke rs compensa tion policy require d by J ohnson Controls ($349). Although CoreAL M arg ues that those damag es are equivalent to the damag es Kee n Fusion would have r ecove red under his claim t hat C oreA L M brea ched the BSA, the f act r emains that the tortious interfe renc e claim arose out of C oreA L M’s separ ate lega l duty not to interfe re with Kee n Fusion’s contra ct with eCommQuest

. See, e.g. , American Nat’l Petroleum Co. v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. , 798 S.W .2d 274, 278 (Tex. 1990) (“I n a commerc ial rela tions tort, the fac t that the damag es are ‘ec onomic’ does not mean that they may not be damag es for the tort. The basic measure of actua l damag es for tortious interfe renc e with contra ct is the same as the measure of damag es for brea ch of the contract i nterfe red with, to put the plaintiff in the same economic positi on he would have be en in had the c ontrac t interfer ed with bee n actua lly perf ormed.” ). CoreAL M also asser

ts that the damag es Kee n Fusion soug ht wer e available throug h

a cl ai m t hat CoreAL M brea ched the BSA and thus could not be rec overe d throug h a tort clai m . See W ansey v . Hole , 379 S.W .3d 246, 248 (Tex. 2012) (economic los s rule precludes recove ry on neg lige nce claim when the loss is also subject of contra ct betwee n parties)

. Specifica lly , CoreAL M arg ues that an indemnification provision in the BSA was desig ned to cover the economic damag es

8Ke en Fusion soug ht to rec over throug h its tort claims. As an initial matter, Kee n Fusio n d i d n o t

contend that Core AL M brea ched the indemnification provisi on of t he BSA. Rather, Ke en F usion alleg ed that CoreAL M brea ched the Client Non-Competition provision by failing to “re spect [Keen Fusion’s] priority rig ht of rela tionship with customers introduced by [Keen Fusion].” The jury did not f ind in Kee n Fusion’s favor on the brea ch of contra ct claim. Moreove r, even had Kee n Fusion soug ht to rec over damag es for brea ch of the indemnification provision, those damag es would not compensa te Keen Fus i o n fo r t h e loss of i ncome it suffe red as a result of l osing the opportunity to perf orm the J ohnson Controls eng ag ement. The indemnification provision provides that eac h party shall indemnify the other the “fe es pay able to the indemnify ing party in connec tion with Subcontrac t under which the obliga tions arose . . . .” Thus, the indemnification provisi o n ap p l i es solely to “Subcontra cts” enter ed into pursuant to the BSA, which is a “tea ming ag reem en t ” desig ned to provide an ag ree ment for “mar keting , p rojec t delivery and other applicable activate s [si c], sp ec i f i ca l l y involving t he tw o companies working together .” (Emphasis added). The evidence at trial es t ab l i s h ed that CoreAL M and Kee n Fusion never enter ed into any “Subcontra ct” g overne d by the B SA and no work was ever perf ormed by either party under the BSA. The indemnification provision was inapplicable to the subject matter of Kee n Fusion’s suit, wh i ch was CoreAL M’s interfe renc e with its rela tionship with eCommQuest and the opportunity to perf orm service s for J ohnson Controls. We hold that the economic loss rule did not prec lude Kee n Fusion’s rec overy of damag es pursua

nt to its tort claims and over rule Core AL M’s first issue. I n its second issue, CoreAL M asser ts that there was fa ctually insufficient evidence to support the jury ’s finding that CoreAL M tortiously interfe red w ith Keen F usion’s contrac t with

9eCommQuest. I n revie wing a fac tual-suffic iency challeng e, we examine the entire re co rd and

consider and weig h all the evidenc e, both in support of and contra ry to the challeng ed finding

. Ortiz

v. Jones , 917 S.W .2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996). We view the e vidence in a neutra l light. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis , 46 S.W .3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001). We defe r to the jury ’s implicit deter minations of

cre dibilit y and we i gh t t o b e g iven to the evidenc e. See Golden Eagle Archery , Inc. v. Jack

son , 1 1 6 S

. W

. 3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003). When, as here , a party attacks the fac tual sufficie ncy o f an adver se finding as to an issue on which it did not have the burden of proof, we set aside the finding only if the evidenc e is so wea k as to make the finding clea rly err oneous and manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain , 709 S.W .2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pitts & Collard, L.L.P. v. Schechter , 369 S.W .3d 301, 312 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

“A party alleg ing tortious interfe renc e must prove four elements to sustain its claim: (1) that a contra ct subject to interfe renc e exit s; (2) that the alleg ed act of interfe renc e was willful and intentional; (3) that the wil lful and int entional act proxi mately cause d damag e; and (4) that actua l damag e or loss occ urre d.” ACS Inv’rs, I nc. v. M cLaughlin , 943 S.W .2d 426, 430 (Tex. 1997). T h e p a rties do not dispute that Kee n Fusion and eCommQuest had a contra ct p u r s u a n t to which Kee n Fusion was to provide co n s u l t ing service s for a five-month period to J ohnson Controls and would be compensa ted at the rate of $165 per hour. By ty q i t es tified that, afte r he 2 lear ned that Ke en F usion would be working on a proje ct for Johnson Controls, he contac ted Chen
at Ernst & Young and stated that CoreAL M had a contra ct with Kee n Fusion and that CoreAL M had

The jury char g e did not include any questions or instructions reg arding the exis tence of the 2 contra ct as would be require d if the issue wa s in dispute. 10alre ady submitt ed Wil liams’s resume for considerat i o n fo r a J ohnson Controls projec t. By ty qi ag ree d that Chen would have inferr ed from that statement that CoreAL M’s position was that Kee n Fusion should not do work for J ohnson Controls throug h a differ ent avenue than CoreAL M. By ty qi testified that he offe red to have Kee n Fusion g o throug h CoreAL M for the J ohnson Controls projec t based on CoreAL M’s status as “prime contra ctor” under the BSA. There was evidenc e that By ty qi had sever al contac ts with Ernst & Young and J ohnson Controls in which he stated his obje ction to Kee n Fusion’s working on a J ohnson Controls projec t throug h a contra ct with any entity other than Cor eA L M

. I t i s undisputed that By ty qi emailed Chen a copy of the BSA and the NDA, and that Tim Ea rhar t w ith I MPRI VA was copied on the email. After those events, Chen at Ernst & Young informed eC o m m Qu est that J ohnson Controls had decide d not to move forwa rd with using Kee n Fusion o n t h e projec t beca use of its conce rn that cer tain threa tened leg al action by CoreAL M to

en force the BSA would cre ate “tea m dy namics” that “would not be conducive to collabora t i o n . ” This evidenc e supports the jury ’s finding that C o reAL M willfully interfe red with Kee n Fusion’s
contra ct with eCommQuest to perfor m a five- month project for J ohnson Controls. O n a p p e a l, h o w e v e r , Co r e A L M p o in ts to e v id e n c e th a

t it s u b mi tt e d Wi ll ia

ms ’ s r e s u me to J ohnson Controls first, “entitling i t t o ce rt ai n rig hts under the BSA.” Acc ording to CoreAL M, this evidence demonstrates tha t CoreAL M was the “ prime contra ctor” under the BSA a nd that the non-compe tition provision of the BSA prohibited Kee n Fusion from competing with it with respe ct to the J ohnson Controls eng ag ement. CoreAL M does n o t explain, howeve r, nor can we discern, how this evidenc e tends to show that CoreAL M did not interfe re with Kee n Fusion’s contra ct with eCommQuest. I nstead, it seems to be an attempt to show that CoreAL M’s actions with reg ard to the

11J ohnson Controls eng ag ement wer e justified. J ustification is an af fi rm ati ve defe nse to tortious in te r f e r e n c e w it h c o n tr a c t. Pr

u d e n ti a l I n s . Co

. o f A m . v . F in a n c ia l R e v ie w S

e r v s . , I n c . , 2 9 S. W. 3 d 7 4 , 7 7 (T ex . 2 0 0 0). A defendant may justify its actions “based on the ex erc ise of either (1) [ its] o wn leg al rig hts or (2 ) a go o d -faith claim to a colora ble leg al rig ht, even though that claim ultimately proves to be mistaken.” Id. at 80. CoreAL M did not, howeve r, reque st a jury question on the defe nse of leg al justification a nd, conseque ntly , has waived any claim that its interf ere nce was not actionable beca

use it wa s leg ally justified. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 279 (“U pon appea l a ll indepe ndent g rounds of re cover

y or of de fense not c onclusively established under the evidenc e and no ele ment of which is submitted or re quested a re w aived.” ). CoreAL M also arg

ues that evidenc e that J ohnson Contro l s i n fo rmed By ty qi in September 2014 that it wa s, at that time, se eking to hir e only perma nent employ ees to pe rfor

m the servi ce s that Kee n Fusion was planning to perf orm on a five-month contra ct basis conclusively neg ates the element of proxi mate cause . Howeve r, as noted above, there was evidenc e that during the rele vant time fra

me J ohnson Controls decide d not to pursue the five-month eng ag ement with Kee n Fusion d u e t o conce rns about the “tea m dy namics” g iven the controve rsy around Kee n Fusion’s eng ag ement with J ohnson Controls cre ated by CoreAL M. Moreove r, J ohnson Controls’s decision to use a subcontrac tor to perf orm service s for a five-month period is not inconsistent with

a subsequent plan to make that position a p erma nent hire. On this rec ord we cannot say that the evidenc e supporting the jury ’s finding that CoreAL M interfe red w ith Keen F usion’s contrac t with eCommQuest was so we ak as to make that finding clea rly err oneous and ma

nifestly unjust. I n its second issue, CoreAL M also asser ts that the finding t h at i t d isparag ed Kee n Fusion’s business is not supported by fac tually sufficie nt evidenc e. The judgme nt in this case was 12not g rante d on a specific g round. Rather, the trial court rende red judgme nt on the jury ’s aff irmative finding s of both tortious interfe renc e with contra ct and business disparag ement. When the judgme nt rests on multipl e theories of rec overy , we need not addre ss a ll c auses of action if any one theory is valid. See EMC Mortg. Corp. v. Jones , 2 5 2 S

. W

. 3d 857, 870 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). Having conclude d that the evidenc e was fac tually sufficie nt to sustain the trial court’s judgme nt in favor of Kee n Fusion’s tortious inter fer ence with c ontrac t c laim, w e need not addre ss CoreAL M’s challeng e to the business disparag ement cl ai m . See Barbarawi v. Ahmad , No. 14-07-00790- CV, 2008 WL 2261433, at *4 & n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] May 27, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (h aving conclude d that tortious interfe renc e with contra ct claim supported trial court’s judgme nt,

a p p e l l a t e c o u r t n e e d n o t a d d

r e s s c h a ll e n g e to b u s in e s s d is p a r a g e me n t c la im )

. We o v e r

r u le Co r e A L M ’ s second issue. CONCLUSION

Having overr

uled CoreAL M’s two appellate issues, we aff irm the trial court’s judgme nt.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Goodwin, and B ourland Affir med Filed: Nove mber 21, 2018

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