alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                           AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report On Form 10-QSB of Grace 7,
Inc. (the "Company") for the quarter ending August 31, 2006, I, Virginia K.
Sourlis, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company
hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge and
belief, that:

      1. Such Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ending August 31,
2006, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      2. The information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for
the quarter ending August 31, 2006, fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated:  October 12, 2006

Grace 7, Inc.

By: /s/ Virginia K. Sourlis
    -----------------------
Chief Executive Officer and
Chief Financial Officer
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-79,644-01

EX PARTE JOSE LUIS PINEDA, AKA JOSE LUIS PINEDA-HERNANDEZ, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 5141-A IN THE 109TH DISTRICT COURT

FROM WINKLER COUNTY

Per curiam.

O P I N I O N

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of aggravated

assault and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. He did not appeal his conviction.

Applicant contends, among other things, that trial counsel failed to advise him of the

deportation consequences of his guilty plea. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). The trial

court made findings of fact and conclusions of law. Based on its findings and conclusions, we

conclude that counsel’s advice was deficient and that but for this advice, Applicant would have
2

insisted on a trial. 

Relief is granted. The judgment in cause number 5141 in the 109th District Court of Winkler

County is set aside. If Applicant is in custody, he is remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of

Winkler County to answer the charges as set out in the indictment. The trial court shall issue any

necessary bench warrant within 10 days after the mandate of this Court issues.

Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional

Institutions Division and Pardons and Paroles Division.

Delivered: June 4, 2014

Do not publish
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 134 (Wednesday, July 15, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 34320]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-16720]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Project No. 13473-000]


FFP Project 60, LLC; Notice of Preliminary Permit Application 
Accepted for Filing and Soliciting Comments, Motions To Intervene, and 
Competing Applications

July 8, 2009.
    On May 22, 2009, FFP Project 60, LLC filed an application for a 
preliminary permit, pursuant to section 4(f) of the Federal Power Act, 
proposing to study the feasibility of the Springfield Bend Hydrokinetic 
Project, to be located on the Mississippi River, in West Baton Rouge 
Parish, Louisiana and East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana.
    The sole purpose of a preliminary permit, if issued, is to grant 
the permit holder priority to file a license application during the 
permit term. A preliminary permit does not authorize the permit holder 
to perform any land disturbing activities or otherwise enter upon lands 
or waters owned by others without the owners' express permission.
    The proposed Springfield Bend Hydrokinetic Project consists of: (1) 
2,090 proposed 40 kilowatt Free Flow generating units having a total 
installed capacity of 83.6 megawatts; (2) a 2.3-mile-long, 69 kilovolt 
transmission line; and (3) appurtenant facilities. The proposed 
Springfield Bend Hydrokinetic Project would have an average annual 
generation of 366 gigawatt-hours.
    Applicant Contact: Ramya Swaminathan, Vice President of 
Development, Free Flow Power Corporation, 33 Commercial Street, 
Gloucester, MA 01930; phone: (978) 226-1531.
    FERC Contact: Kim Carter, 202-502-6486.
    Deadline for filing comments, motions to intervene, competing 
applications (without notices of intent), or notices of intent to file 
competing applications: 60 days from the issuance of this notice. 
Comments, motions to intervene, notices of intent, and competing 
applications may be filed electronically via the Internet. See 18 CFR 
385.2001(a)(1)(iii) and the instructions on the Commission's Web site 
under the ``e-Filing'' link. If unable to be filed electronically, 
documents may be paper-filed. To paper-file, an original and eight 
copies should be mailed to: Kimberly D. Bose, Secretary, Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426. For 
more information on how to submit these types of filings, please go to 
the Commission's Web site located at http://www.ferc.gov/filing-comments.asp. More information about this project, including a copy of 
the application, can be viewed or printed on the ``eLibrary'' link of 
Commission's Web site at http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/elibrary.asp. 
Enter the docket number (P-13473) in the docket number field to access 
the document. For assistance, call toll-free 1-866-208-3372.

Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
 [FR Doc. E9-16720 Filed 7-14-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
EXHIBIT 10.5




Fee Settlement Agreement




Recitals




AGREEMENT entered into this 10th day of July, 2012, by and between Seafarer Exploration Corp (the "Company"), and ClearTrust, LLC ("Transfer Agent").


WHEREAS, the Transfer Agent has incurred various reimbursable expenses resulting directly from acting as transfer agent for the Company, and the Company is obligated to reimburse the Transfer Agent for said expenses.
  NOW, THEREFORE, the Company and Transfer Agent hereby agree to settle the amount owed to the Transfer Agent with shares of restricted stock. The parties hereto agree as follows:




1.       Legal Expenses Owed




The transfer agent has incurred reimbursable expenses and invoiced the Company as detailed in the table below:




Date of Invoice to Company
Invoice Number
Amount
Reason for Invoice4/20/12
1262
$783.88
Legal expenses related to "Eldred vs.Seafarer" case5/31112
1346
$105.00
Legal expenses related to "Eldred vs.Seafarer" case7/6/12
1479
$4787.83
Legal expenses related to "Eldred vs.Seafarer" caseTOTAL
$5,676.71




2.       Issuance of Stock


The Company shall reimburse the Transfer Agent cashless with a non-refundable payment of 1,530,111 shares of restricted common stock of the Company. The Transfer Agent may sell the shares in the public marketplace in reliance on Rule 144 ornegotiate the sale of the shares in a privately negotiated transaction. Regardless the manner of sale, the Transfer Agent must apply all proceeds gained by the sale of the shares to the open invoices listed in the table above.




Should the Transfer Agent realize less proceeds than the total due in the table above, the Transfer Agent may request up to 1,000,000 additional shares of stock or a cash payment to cover the difference in the amount owed.




5.       Severability


Inthe event that any one or more provisions herein shall for any reason be held to be invalid, illegal or unenforceable in any respect, such invalidity, illegality or unenforceability shall not affect any other provision hereof.







Page 1 of 2









6.       Miscellaneous


This Agreement (i) constitutes the entire agreement between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof and shall supersede all prior understandings and agreements as to such subject matter; (ii) may be amended or modified only by a writing executed by the party against whom enforcement is sought; (iii) shall inure to the benefit of and be binding upon the respective heirs, administrators, personal representatives, successors and assigns of the parties hereto; and (iv) shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of Florida.




IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Fee Settlement Agreement as of the date and year first above written.




CLEARTRUST, LLC:

























/s/ Kyle Kennedy




























Page 2 of 2
1

Worthy v. Widnall, 900 F.Supp. 475 (M.D.Ga.1995), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1171 (11th

Cir.1996)(unpublished table decision); Worthy v. Widnall, No. 5:95-CV-76-1

(DF)(M.D.Ga.1996), aff'd, 108 F.3d 344 (11th Cir.1997)(unpublished table decision); Worthy v.

Widnall, No. 5:95-CV-412-4(WDO)(M.D.Ga.1996), aff'd, 134 F.3d 386 (11th

Cir.1997)(unpublished table decision). 

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 97-8581

Non-Argument Calendar.

Roosevelt WORTHY, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Sheila E. WIDNALL, Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Defendant-Appellee.

April 7, 1998.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. (No. 5:96-CV-418-

1(HL), Hugh Lawson, District Judge.

Before EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge, and RONEY and HILL, Senior Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This appeal arises out of the fourth Title VII action filed by Appellant Roosevelt Worthy

against his employer, the Secretary of the Air Force, in the space of two years. All four of these

actions were found by the district court to be meritless and dismissed on motion for summary

judgment. This court affirmed the first three appeals summarily without publication.1

 This fourth

time we publish our opinion.

Two orders are involved here: first, the district court order dismissing Worthy's action on

summary judgment, and, second, the district court order imposing sanctions upon Worthy's lawyer

in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500.00) under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(2). We affirm the
summary judgment order without discussion. See 11th Cir. R. 36-1. We discuss only the order

imposing sanctions.

The same lawyer brought all four of Worthy's meritless actions. In the third suit, at the

conclusion of his order granting summary judgment against Worthy's claims, the district judge

issued the following warning:

The complaint presently before the court is sufficiently without merit and potentially

frivolous as to subject both plaintiff and his counsel to the imposition of sanctions. FRCP

11(b). In declining to impose sanctions at this time, the court gives plaintiff's counsel the

benefit of the doubt by assuming that the present claims arise out of a profound and

fundamental misunderstanding of the scope and purpose of Title VII, rather than from a total

lack of respect for this court and for his role as an officer of it.

Worthy v. Widnall, No. 5:95-cv-412-4 (WDO)(M.D.Ga., Oct. 15, 1996).

Three weeks after receiving this stern admonition from the court, Worthy's lawyer filed the

present lawsuit and the court's sanction warning became reality. Instead of imposing the $500.00

sanction against Worthy's lawyer, the district judge in this case might have ordered him to reimburse

the Air Force for all attorneys fees required for defense. There is no question that this relatively

mild sanction was reasonable and adequately supported by the record.

AFFIRMED.
#### Hawkins *v.*The State.

Bleckley, C. J. — A conviction for the offense of larceny from the house cannot be sustained without proof of the ownership of the property alleged to have been stolen and that the same was of some value. In the present case there was no legal proof of ownership, the only evidence on this point being hearsay, which was illegally admitted; and there was no proof at all as to value.

October 8,1894.

*Judgment reversed.*

Indictment for burglary. Before Judge Clark. Fulton superior court. March term, 1894.

Hawkins was charged with breaking and entering the Houston street school-house and stealing therefrom a clock, the property of the City of Atlanta. He was found guilty of larceny from the house, of goods of the value of less than $50; and his motion for a new trial was overruled. The motion contained the general grounds, and alleged that the court erred in overruling defendant’s objection to the testimony of Matthews, the principal of the Houston street school, who on direct •examination testified that the clock was the property of the City of Atlanta. On cross-examination he was asked how he knew this, and answered, because Major Slaton (the superintendent of the schools) told him so, that the clock had been in the school-house for four years, and the school-house and property therein belonged to the City of Atlanta, — he knew that because Major Slaton told him so. The objection was on the ground, that there was better evidence of the ownership of the property, the testimony of Matthews being hearsay merely. The ownership of the property did not otherwise appear; nor does the brief of evidence contain any evidence as to its value.

*459J. E. Robinson, for plaintiff in error.

C. D. Hill, solicitor-general, *contra.*
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.



## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2007-5164

BRIAN ALAN BLAKLEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee.

Robert G. Nath , Robert G. Nath, PLLC, of McLean, Virginia, argued for plaintiffappellant.

Teresa T. Milton , Attorney, Appellate Section, Tax Division, United States

Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for def endant-appellee. With her on

the brief were Nathan J. Hochman , Assistant Attorney General; and Thomas J. Clark

, Attorney.

Appealed from: United States Court of Federal Claims

Judge Susan G. BradenNOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.



## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2007-5164

BRIAN ALAN BLAKLEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee.



# Judgment

ON APPEAL from the UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS

In CASE NO(S). 06-CV-749.

This CAUSE having been hear d and considered, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED:

Per Curiam: (MAYER, Circuit Judge , PLAGER, Senior Circuit Judge and DYK, Circuit

Judge ):

AFFIRMED

. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

DATE: June 5, 008 /s/ Jan Horbaly

Jan Horbaly, Clerk
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of PRIMEDIA Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2005 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Kelly P. Conlin, Chief Executive Officer and President of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



|/s/KELLY P. CONLINKelly P. Conlin
Chief Executive Officer and President
August 9, 2005 |  | 
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | 

This
certification accompanies each Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

64

---



QuickLinks
#### Briscoe and Mathis *v.*The State.

Simmons, J. — Newly discovered evidence that another person has admitted that he and certain others committed the offense, is no cause for a new trial, inasmuch as the admissions would not be competent evidence in behalf of the accused were a new trial ordered. *Kelly*v. *The State,*82 *Ga.*441, and cases cited. The evidence warranted the verdict, and there was no error in denying a new trial.

October 8, 1894.

Indictment for assault with intent to rob. Before Judge Henry. Bloyd superior court. March term, 1894.

G. A. H. Harris and J. B. P. Lumpkin, for plaintiff in error. *W.*J. Nunnally, solicitor-general, *contra.*

*Judgment affirmed.*
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 136 (Friday, July 17, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 34749-34750]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-16985]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Project No. 13492-000]


FFP Project 82, LLC; Notice of Preliminary Permit Application 
Accepted for Filing and Soliciting Comments, Motions To Intervene, and 
Competing Applications

July 10, 2009.
    On May 22, 2009, FFP Project 82, LLC filed an application for a 
preliminary permit, pursuant to section 4(f) of the Federal Power Act, 
proposing to study the feasibility of the Little Cypress Bend 
Hydrokinetic Project, to be located on the Mississippi River, in 
Pemiscot County, Missouri and Lake County, Tennessee.
    The sole purpose of a preliminary permit, if issued, is to grant 
the permit holder priority to file a license application during the 
permit term. A preliminary permit does not authorize the permit holder 
to perform any land disturbing activities or otherwise enter upon lands 
or waters owned by others without the owners' express permission.
    The proposed Little Cypress Bend Hydrokinetic Project consists of: 
(1) 3,168 proposed 40-kilowatt Free Flow generating units having a 
total installed capacity of 126.72 megawatts; (2) a 4-mile-long, 69-
kilovolt transmission line; and (3) appurtenant facilities. The 
proposed Little Cypress Bend Hydrokinetic Project would have an average 
annual generation of 555 gigawatt-hours.
    Applicant Contact: Ramya Swaminathan, Vice President of 
Development, Free Flow Power Corporation, 33 Commercial Street, 
Gloucester, MA 01930; phone: 978-226-1531.
    FERC Contact: Kim Carter, 202-502-6486.

[[Page 34750]]

    Deadline for filing comments, motions to intervene, competing 
applications (without notices of intent), or notices of intent to file 
competing applications: 60 days from the issuance of this notice. 
Comments, motions to intervene, notices of intent, and competing 
applications may be filed electronically via the Internet. See 18 CFR 
385.2001(a)(1)(iii) and the instructions on the Commission's Web site 
under the ``e-Filing'' link. If unable to be filed electronically, 
documents may be paper-filed. To paper-file, an original and eight 
copies should be mailed to: Kimberly D. Bose, Secretary, Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426. For 
more information on how to submit these types of filings please go to 
the Commission's Web site located at http://www.ferc.gov/filing-comments.asp. More information about this project, including a copy of 
the application, can be viewed or printed on the ``eLibrary'' link of 
Commission's Web site at http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/elibrary.asp. 
Enter the docket number (P-13492) in the docket number field to access 
the document. For assistance, call toll-free 1-866-208-3372.

Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. E9-16985 Filed 7-16-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
- 1 - 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

___________________________________________ 

SANTOMENNO, et al. : 

 : Civil Action No. 11-0736 (ES) 

 Plaintiffs, : 

 v. : 

 : 

TRANSAMERICA LIFE INSURANCE CO., et al. : ORDER 

 : 

 : 

 Defendants. : 

_________________________________________ : 

SALAS, District Judge 

For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed herewith, 

 IT IS on this 30th Day of March 2012, 

 ORDERED that Transamerica Life Insurance Company, Transamerica Investment 

Management, LLC, and Transamerica Asset Management’s motion for transfer of venue to the 

Central District of California—(D.E. 33)—is hereby GRANTED; and it is further 

ORDERED that, in light of the Court’s determination that transfer is proper, the Court 

will not address the motions to dismiss—(D.E.s 34 and 35); and it is further 

 ORDERED that the clerk of Court shall terminate D.E.s. 33, 34, and 35. 

s/Esther Salas 

 Esther Salas, U.S.D.J.

Case 2:11-cv-00736-ES -CLW Document 57 Filed 03/30/12 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 3105
#### In the Matter of Michael Tersigni, Appellant, v Village of Lynbrook Board of Zoning Appeals, Respondent.

[821 NYS2d 919]

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Village of Lynbrook Board of Zoning Appeals dated January 29, 2004, which, after a hearing, denied the petitioner’s application for certain area variances, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Peck, J), entered October 26, 2004, which denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

Local zoning boards have broad discretion in considering applications for area variances and judicial review is limited to determining whether the action taken by the board was illegal, arbitrary, or an abuse of discretion *(see Matter of Pecoraro v Board of Appeals of Town of Hempstead,*2 NY3d 608, 613 [2004]; *Matter of Ifrah v Utschig,*98 NY2d 304, 308 [2002]). Therefore, the determination of a zoning board should be sustained if it has a rational basis and is not illegal or an abuse of discretion *(see Matter of Pecoraro v Board of Appeals of Town of Hempstead, supra; Matter of Sasso v Osgood,*86 NY2d 374, 385 [1995]; *Matter of Zupa v Zoning Board of Appeals of Town of Southold,*31 AD3d 570 [2006]; *Matter of Halperin v City of New Rochelle,*24 AD3d 768, 770 [2005]).

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the Village of Lynbrook Board of Zoning Appeals (hereinafter the Board) engaged in the required balancing test and considered the rele*714vant statutory factors *(see Matter of Sasso v Osgood, supra*at 384; Village Law § 7-712-b [3] [b]). The record indicates that the Board’s determination had a rational basis and was not illegal, arbitrary, or an abuse of discretion *(see Matter of Pecoraro v Board of Appeals of Town of Hempstead, supra*at 614-615; *Matter of Sasso v Osgood, supra; Matter of Martino v Board of Zoning Appeals of Inc. Vil. of Great Neck Plaza,*26 AD3d 382, 383 [2006]; *Matter ofHalperin v City of New Rochelle, supra*at 770-773).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the petition. Florio, J.E, Krausman, Luciano and Skelos, JJ., concur.