UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Ermen-Rene BARNETT, Senior Airman 

U.S. Air Force, Appellant 

No. 12-0251 

Crim. App. No. 37578 

United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 

Argued May 15, 2012 

Decided July 16, 2012 

ERDMANN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which STUCKY 

and RYAN, JJ., and COX, S.J., joined. ERDMANN, J., filed a 

separate special concurring opinion. BAKER, C.J., filed a 

separate opinion concurring in part and in the result. 

Counsel 

For Appellant: Major Michael S. Kerr (argued). 

For Appellee: Captain Brian C. Mason (argued); Colonel Don M. 

Christensen, Lieutenant Colonel Linell A. Letendre, and Gerald 

R. Bruce, Esq. (on brief). 

Military Judge: Joseph S. Kiefer 

This opinion is subject to editorial correction before final publication. 
United States v. Barnett, No. 12-0251/AF 

2

Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the court. 

 Senior Airman Ermen-Rene Barnett was a United States Air 

Force recruiter who engaged in misconduct involving several 

female recruits. He entered mixed pleas before a general courtmartial to eight specifications of violating Article 92 

(recruiter misconduct and dereliction of duty), one 

specification of using marijuana on divers occasions in 

violation of Article 112a, and three specifications of witness 

tampering in violation of Article 134. Articles 92, 112a, and 

134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 892, 

912a, 934 (2006). Barnett was found guilty of the Article 92 

and Article 112a offenses and not guilty of two of the three 

Article 134 offenses (the other Article 134 offense was 

withdrawn and dismissed after arraignment). The convening 

authority approved the panel’s adjudged sentence of reduction to 

E-1, confinement for eight months, and a bad-conduct discharge. 

The United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) 

affirmed the findings and the sentence. United States v. 

Barnett, No. ACM 37578, slip op. at 8 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 

14, 2011). 

 We granted review in this case to determine if the military 

judge properly instructed the members concerning credit ordered 

under the provisions of Article 13, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 813 
United States v. Barnett, No. 12-0251/AF 

3

(2006).1 “The military judge has an independent duty to 

determine and deliver appropriate instructions.” United States 

v. Ober, 66 M.J. 393, 405 (C.A.A.F. 2008). “We review issues 

concerning non-mandatory instructions for an abuse of 

discretion.” United States v. Forbes, 61 M.J. 354, 358 

(C.A.A.F. 2005) (citing United States v. Damatta-Olivera, 37 

M.J. 474, 478 (C.M.A. 1993)). Under the circumstances of this 

case, we hold that the military judge did not abuse his 

discretion when instructing the members on the Article 13 

confinement credit. We also hold that the military judge was 

within his discretion to deny Barnett’s requested instruction 

informing the members that they were not permitted to nullify 

some or all of the credit by increasing the sentence. Therefore 

the decision by the CCA is affirmed. 

Background

The specific factual basis for the charges is not relevant 

to the issue before the court. At some point prior to trial 

Barnett was removed from his recruiter duties and assigned to 

 

1

 We granted review of the following issue: 

Whether the military judge abused his discretion when 

he informed the members of Appellant’s illegal 

pretrial punishment credit and then failed to instruct 

the members based on a submitted question that they 

were not allowed to nullify some or all of that credit 

by increasing the sentence. 

United States v. Barnett, No. 12-0251/AF, 2012 CAAF LEXIS 

176 (C.A.A.F. Feb. 12, 2012) (order granting review). 
United States v. Barnett, No. 12-0251/AF 

4

perform duties with the “Thunder Pride” team at Luke Air Force 

Base, Arizona. The “Thunder Pride” team is a holding unit for 

Airmen who are under investigation, facing potential 

disciplinary action, or awaiting separation. Based on his 

assignment to the “Thunder Pride” team, Barnett moved for 

sentence credit under Article 13, UCMJ, alleging illegal 

pretrial punishment. While the military judge did not find an 

intent to punish, based on the sixteen-month duration of 

Barnett’s duties with the “Thunder Pride” team (a base 

regulation limits assignment to the “Thunder Pride” team to 

sixty days unless the legal office is consulted) and the 

circumstances of those duties, he ordered 100 days confinement 

credit pursuant to Article 13.2

At an Article 39(a) session the military judge informed 

counsel that he had reviewed the sentencing instructions and 

while it was clear that members should be instructed about 

pretrial confinement credit, it was “a little more confusing 

when you’re dealing with credit for pretrial punishment under 

Article 13.” Following a discussion of the issue with counsel, 

Barnett’s attorney informed the military judge that they did not 

want the members instructed about the Article 13 credit in any 

 

2

 The appropriateness of the military judge’s award of 100 days 

confinement credit has not been appealed by either party and 

that issue is not before the court. 
United States v. Barnett, No. 12-0251/AF 

5

manner. The military judge concluded the session by asking the 

parties to look for legal authority on this issue. 

After findings were announced, the defense offered several 

sentencing exhibits that included information concerning the 

circumstances and duties of individuals on the “Thunder Pride” 

team. The Government did not object to the exhibits referencing 

“Thunder Pride,” but argued that if the exhibits were admitted 

the court should instruct the members on the award of Article 13 

confinement credit. The military judge asked both counsel if 

either of them had found any applicable law as to how to 

instruct members of Article 13 credit and both counsel responded 

in the negative. The military judge indicated at that point 

that he intended to give an instruction similar to the Pretrial 

Confinement Credit instruction in the Military Judges’ 

Benchbook.3

 He noted that he was not aware of anything that 

would make that instruction applicable only to pretrial 

confinement and not Article 13 credit. Neither party objected 

at that time and the defense exhibits, including those that 

referenced the circumstances and duties of the “Thunder Pride” 

team, were admitted into evidence and published to the members. 

The military judge then discussed his proposed instructions 

with counsel. After acknowledging the defense’s earlier 

 

3

 Dep’t of the Army, Pam. 27-9, Legal Services, Military Judges’ 

Benchbook ch. 2, § V, para. 2-5-22 (2010). 
United States v. Barnett, No. 12-0251/AF 

6

objection to any instruction on Article 13 credit, the military 

judge informed counsel that he intended to give the following 

instruction: 

In determining an appropriate sentence in this case, 

you should consider that the accused has been 

granted 100 days of confinement credit. If you 

adjudge confinement as part of your sentence, those 

days will be credited against any sentence to 

confinement you may adjudge. This credit will be 

given by the authorities at the correctional 

facility where the accused is sent to serve his 

confinement and will be given on a day-for-day 

basis. 

There were no further objections to the instruction. The 

military judge subsequently provided that instruction to the 

members and also instructed them: 

 In selecting a sentence, you should consider 

all matters in extenuation and mitigation as well as 

those in aggravation, whether introduced before or 

after your findings. Thus, all of the evidence you 

have heard in this case is relevant on the subject 

of sentencing. 

 During argument on sentence the Government noted that the 

court had already taken the conditions of “Thunder Pride” into 

account when it awarded Barnett 100 days of confinement credit 

for the time he was in “Thunder Pride.” Barnett’s counsel also 

referenced “Thunder Pride” and argued that the Government asked 

for twenty-four months of confinement “as if they didn’t punish 

Airman Barnett already,” and “[t]he government got their ton of 

flesh already and now they want it again.” 
United States v. Barnett, No. 12-0251/AF 

7

 Deliberation on sentencing was interrupted when the members 

brought a question to the military judge. The following 

discussion took place between the military judge (MJ) and the 

President of the panel (PRES): 

PRES: In your instructions that you gave us, you 

talked about a hundred days confinement credit. The 

question is, and we can expound if we need to, can 

we, as the members, differentiate between a hundred 

days of confinement for Thunder Pride versus a 

hundred days of confinement? 

MJ: Okay. I guess I’m not exactly clear on what 

your question is. 

PRES: The question is, understanding based on the 

defense exhibits that we were provided and knowing 

what Thunder Pride is and knowing that it’s not 

actual confinement, is it okay for us to 

differentiate from the hundred days or do we have to 

consider that as confinement? 

MJ: Okay. There had been a motion for some credit 

that I had to take up related to the circumstances 

of Thunder Pride. 

MJ: And after reviewing the evidence and the issues 

involved in that, I determined that the accused was 

to be granted 100 days of credit toward any 

confinement that the court may adjudge. So as I 

instructed earlier, if the court adjudges 

confinement, then the 100 days credit that I granted 

already will be applied toward that to be applied by 

the correctional facility wherever the accused would 

go for any period of confinement. 

PRES: So legally, is it okay for us to consider 

that hundred days of credit less than what we would 

consider actual confinement? That’s the question 

that’s come up in our discussions. And maybe for 

ease of understanding and, please, this is just for 

the example, if we consider 300 days as appropriate 

confinement but we know the hundred days credit is 

there but we think that the 300 days confinement 

should be actual confinement so we bump it up to 400 
United States v. Barnett, No. 12-0251/AF 

8

days because we know we’re going to subtract a 

hundred days; is that legal for us to do that? 

MJ: What I can instruct you in this regard is that 

you should determine a sentence that you believe is 

appropriate for this accused for the offenses that 

he’s been found guilty of, considering all of the 

evidence that you’ve been presented in the case. 

You’ve been provided the fact or circumstance that, 

if you adjudge confinement, then he will have 100 

days of credit toward any period of confinement that 

is adjudged by the court. 

 Following this exchange the military judge held an Article 

39(a) session where the defense specifically requested that the 

military judge instruct the members that it was their duty to 

adjudge an appropriate sentence “without any consideration about 

how many days of pretrial confinement [sic] credit he received” 

and that the members were not allowed to increase the amount of 

confinement to essentially offset the confinement credit. The 

Government opposed the specific instruction requested and 

ultimately the military judge provided the following additional 

instruction to the members: 

 Your duty is to adjudge an appropriate sentence 

for this accused that you regard as fair and just when 

it is imposed and not one whose fairness depends upon 

actions that others may or may not take in this case. 

These instructions must not be interpreted as 

indicating an opinion as to the sentence which should 

be adjudged for you alone are responsible for 

determining an appropriate sentence in this case. In 

arriving at your determination, you should select the 

sentence which will best serve the ends of good order 

and discipline, the needs of the accused, and the 

welfare of society. 
United States v. Barnett, No. 12-0251/AF 

9

 On appeal to the CCA, that court analogized Article 13 

confinement credit with Pierce4 credit (credit for punishment 

imposed pursuant to Article 15, UCMJ, for the same act or 

omission for which an accused faces court-martial) and held 

that: 

Where the appellant chose to introduce evidence of the 

16 months he spent assigned to the “Thunder Pride” 

team as evidence in mitigation, we find the military 

judge had a duty to instruct the members on the 

administrative credit awarded so they may consider 

that information during their deliberation on 

sentence. 

Barnett, No. ACM 37578, slip op. at 7. The CCA went on to hold 

that “[a]s in Balboa, the instruction given did not expressly or 

by inference invite the members to award extra confinement to 

compensate for the administrative confinement credit awarded . . 

. .” and found no error in the sentencing instructions given. 

Id. 

Discussion

Before this court Barnett argues that the military judge 

abused his discretion when he failed to properly tailor his 

instructions to inform the members that they could not negate or 

nullify the Article 13 credit that Barnett had been awarded. 

Barnett goes on to argue that once the military judge had 

 

4

 United States v. Pierce, 27 M.J. 367 (C.M.A. 1989). 
United States v. Barnett, No. 12-0251/AF 

10

instructed the members as to the Article 13 credit, he was 

required to answer their question as to how they should treat 

that credit in their determination of an appropriate sentence. 

The Government responds that the military judge did not abuse 

his discretion in declining to provide the defense requested 

instruction and that he properly instructed the members on how 

they should treat the Article 13 credit. Even if the military 

judge did not properly instruct the members, the Government 

argues that Barnett did not suffer material prejudice to a 

substantial right. 

Whether the Military Judge Abused His Discretion in 

Initially Instructing the Members on the Award of 

Article 13 Credit. 

After the defense evidence of pretrial punishment was 

admitted, the military judge gave the members an instruction 

informing them that Barnett had already received confinement 

credit for pretrial punishment. Rule for Courts-Martial 

(R.C.M.) 1005 addresses required instructions on sentencing. 

Subparagraph (a) of the rule provides that “[t]he military judge 

shall give the members appropriate instructions on sentence.” 

See also Ober, 66 M.J. at 405 (“[t]he military judge has an 

independent duty to determine and deliver appropriate 

instructions”). Although an instruction on Article 13 credit is 

not specifically listed among the required instructions within 
United States v. Barnett, No. 12-0251/AF 

11

R.C.M. 1005(e), the rule does provide that instructions on 

sentence shall include: 

(4) A statement informing the members that they are 

solely responsible for selecting an appropriate 

sentence and may not rely on the possibility of any 

mitigating action by the convening or higher 

authority; and 

(5) A statement that the members should consider all 

matters in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation, 

whether introduced before or after findings . . . . 

 

The Discussion to R.C.M. 1005(a) goes on to provide that the 

“[i]nstructions should be tailored to the facts and 

circumstances of the individual case.” See also United States 

v. Wheeler, 17 C.M.A. 274, 277, 38 C.M.R. 72, 75 (1967). 

Once evidence of pretrial punishment was introduced during 

sentencing by Barnett, “in the interests of reliable and 

truthful sentencing,”5 it was within the military judge’s 

discretion to initially instruct the members of the Article 13 

credit and how it would be credited. 

Whether the Military Judge Failed to Answer the 

Members’ Question Concerning Treatment of the 

Confinement Credit. 

Barnett does not assert that the instruction provided by 

the military judge in response to the members’ question was 

incorrect, but he does argue that the instruction provided did 

not answer the question. In United States v. Greaves, 46 M.J. 

133, 134 (C.A.A.F. 1997), this court held that the military 

 

5

 United States v. Balboa, 33 M.J. 304, 306 (C.M.A. 1991). 
United States v. Barnett, No. 12-0251/AF 

12

judged erred by “failing to correctly answer two relevant and 

proper questions asked by the members concerning the impact of a 

bad-conduct discharge on appellant’s impending eligibility to 

retire.” 

Neither side is arguing that the question posed by the 

members was not relevant. The members’ question specifically 

asked whether the panel could increase the sentence to offset 

the 100 days of credit Barnett received. The second instruction 

provided to the members did, in fact, address this question, 

although not as specifically as Barnett would have wished: 

Your duty is to adjudge an appropriate sentence 

for this accused that you regard as fair and just when 

it is imposed and not one whose fairness depends upon 

actions that others may or may not take in this case. 

Emphasis added. 

Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that the 

instruction correctly responded to the members’ question. 

Further, nothing in the instruction invited the members, either 

expressly or by inference, to either impose extra confinement to 

offset the Article 13 credit or impose less confinement in 

consideration for the pretrial punishment. See Balboa, 33 M.J. 

at 307. 

Whether the Military Judge Abused His Discretion When He 

Declined to Give the Defense Requested Instruction. 

Barnett requested that the military judge specifically 

instruct the members that they could not increase the amount of 
United States v. Barnett, No. 12-0251/AF 

13

confinement to offset the confinement credit. This court has 

said that “[w]hile counsel may request specific instructions, 

the military judge has substantial discretion in deciding on the 

instructions to give and whether the requested instruction is 

appropriate. This discretion must be exercised in light of 

correct principles of law as applied to the facts and 

circumstances of the case.” United States v. Miller, 58 M.J. 

266, 270 (C.A.A.F. 2003). 

Denial of a requested instruction is error if: (1) the 

requested instruction is correct; (2) “it is not 

substantially covered in the main charge”; and (3) “it 

is on such a vital point in the case that the failure 

to give it deprived [the] defendant of a defense or 

seriously impaired its effective presentation.” 

Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). For the 

military judge’s refusal to instruct the members as requested to 

be error, all three prongs of the test in Miller must be 

satisfied. 

 We believe that the issue as to how the members should 

consider the Article 13 credit was substantially covered in the 

instructions provided and therefore the military judge did not 

abuse his discretion in declining to give the requested 

instruction. We also note, however, the difficulty inherent in 

the requested instruction and its potential for confusing the 

members. If the military judge had instructed the members that 

they could not consider the Article 13 confinement credit in 

determining an appropriate sentence, that instruction would have 
United States v. Barnett, No. 12-0251/AF 

14

been in conflict with the standard instruction properly 

informing the members that they should consider all matters in 

extenuation and mitigation as well as those in aggravation in 

determining an appropriate sentence. 

Decision

 The decision of the United States Air Force Court of 

Criminal Appeals is affirmed. 
United States v. Barnett, No. 12-0251/AF 

ERDMANN, Judge (special concurrence): 

I write separately solely to note an issue that was not 

raised in this case but which may have an impact on this area of 

the law absent legislative or administrative clarification. 

This court has held that “[t]he proper applications of credit 

for illegal pretrial punishment and lawful pretrial confinement 

are questions of law, reviewed de novo.” United States v. 

Spaustat, 57 M.J. 256, 260 (C.A.A.F. 2002). As a question of 

law, therefore, whether an accused has been subject to illegal 

pretrial punishment and, if so, the appropriate credit for such 

illegal pretrial punishment, could be viewed as issues solely 

for the military judge. 

On the other hand, this court has recognized that an 

accused seeking relief from alleging pretrial punishment has a 

tactical decision to make -- presenting the evidence of illegal 

pretrial punishment to the members or asking the military judge 

for specific relief under Article 13. United States v. 

Southwick, 53 M.J. 412, 416 (C.A.A.F 2000); United States v. 

Tanksley, 54 M.J. 169, 177 (C.A.A.F. 2000).1 In Inong, we 

addressed a situation where the appellant did not seek Article 

13 relief from the military judge but raised the issue of 

 

1 To the extent that Southwick and Tanksley established a 

“tantamount to affirmative waiver” rule for asserted violations 

of Article 13 raised for the first time on appeal, they were 

overruled by United States v. Inong, 58 M.J. 460, 464 (C.A.A.F. 

2003). 
United States v. Barnett, No. 12-0251/AF 

2

illegal pretrial punishment to the members during his sentencing 

case. 58 M.J. at 462-63. The appellant then requested Article 

13 sentencing credit from the CCA on appeal. In holding that 

Inong was not entitled to Article 13 relief we noted: 

[A]n appellant is not entitled to sentence credit on 

appeal for what is alleged to have been illegal 

pretrial punishment or confinement if such relief was 

not sought at trial, but instead, a tactical decision 

was made to use the complained of condition as a means 

of obtaining a lesser adjudged sentence. Southwick, 

53 M.J. at 416; Tanskley, 54 M.J. at 177. 

Id. at 463. 

The “tactical decision” discussed in these cases appears to 

be whether to request specific Article 13 relief from the 

military judge or to present the underlying facts of the illegal 

pretrial punishment to the members for consideration in 

determining an appropriate sentence. If, however, an accused 

were free to pursue both forums, there would be no tactical 

decision to make. While not specifically discussed in these 

cases, the underlying rationale for such a rule may be that if 

an accused opts to pursue an Article 13 motion before the 

military judge, the matter has been properly litigated. If the 

accused is then permitted to present the same evidence in his 

sentencing case he is re-litigating the legal issue already 

decided by the military judge and creating the potential for 

being credited twice for the same government conduct. 
United States v. Barnett, No. 12-0251/AF 

3

I take no position on this matter as it is unnecessary for 

resolution of the case before us, but in the absence of 

legislative or administrative clarification, I merely note the 

issue until it is properly presented to the court. 

 

 
United States v. Barnett, No. 12-0251/AF 

BAKER, Chief Judge (concurring in part and in the result): 

I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the military judge 

did not abuse his discretion when he initially instructed the 

members regarding the Article 13, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 813 (2006), 

credit. However, I believe that there was instructional error 

in this case, given the unusual questions from the members and 

the military judge’s failure to provide a tailored instruction 

in response. 

DISCUSSION 

Where, as in this case, the military judge has awarded 

credit for government conduct that has already occurred and the 

accused chooses to argue pretrial punishment during sentencing, 

the military judge should instruct the members that the accused 

will already be credited for the Article 13, UCMJ, violation, 

thus negating any concern of a double benefit to the accused. 

The military judge should then instruct the members that their 

duty is to assess a sentence appropriately based on the 

accused’s conduct and all other relevant matters independent of 

any credit the accused might be entitled to under Article 13, 

UCMJ, based on the government’s conduct. The military judge 

properly instructed on both matters in this case. 

However, the problem arose in this case when the members 

asked multiple questions suggesting the possibility that they 
United States v. Barnett, No. 12-0251/AF 

2

might nullify the military judge’s previous award of credit. 

The president of the panel asked: 

In your instructions that you gave us, you talked to 

us about a hundred days confinement credit. The 

question is, and we can expound if we need to, can we, 

as the members, differentiate between a hundred days 

of confinement credit for Thunder Pride versus a 

hundred days of confinement? 

The military judge asked for clarification, and the member 

clarified: 

The question is, understanding based on the defense 

exhibits that we were provided and knowing what 

Thunder Pride is and knowing that it’s not actual 

confinement, is it okay for us to differentiate from 

the hundred days or do we have to consider that as 

confinement? 

The military judge reiterated part of his previous instruction, 

prompting the member to again clarify the question: 

So legally, is it okay for us to consider that hundred 

days of credit less than what we would consider actual 

confinement? That’s the question that’s come up in 

our discussions. And maybe for ease of understand 

and, please, this is just for the example, if we 

consider 300 days as the appropriate confinement but 

we know the hundred days credit is there but we think 

that the 300 days confinement should be actual 

confinement so we bump it up to 400 days because we 

know we’re going to subtract a hundred days; is that 

legal for us to do that? 

These questions required a tailored response rather than a 

repeat of the standard instruction. First, the questions 

suggested, without confirming, that a member or members might be 

inclined to nullify or negate the military judge’s award of 

Article 13, UCMJ, credit. However, the question of whether an 
United States v. Barnett, No. 12-0251/AF 

3

accused was subject to pretrial punishment and entitled to 

credit is a question of law for the military judge to decide. 

“The proper applications of credit for illegal pretrial 

punishment and lawful pretrial confinement are questions of law, 

reviewed de novo.” United States v. Spaustat, 57 M.J. 256, 260 

(C.A.A.F. 2002). 

Second, Article 13, UCMJ, credit is provided for conduct in 

which the government has already engaged. In other words, it is 

relief for the government’s conduct, not a sentencing factor 

related to the accused’s offenses. In this sense, pretrial 

punishment is different than pretrial confinement, which is 

offset against adjudged confinement and thus is appropriately 

part of the members’ calculus of confinement earned by an 

accused based on his rather than the government’s conduct. 

Finally, even if the members were permitted to consider 

whether to nullify an accused’s Article 13, UCMJ, credit because 

they did not agree with the amount of credit or the military 

judge’s determination that credit was due, they could not do so 

without additional appropriate instructions on what legally 

qualifies as pretrial punishment under Article 13, UCMJ. 

Thus, although the military judge was not obliged to give 

the specific defense requested instruction, in my view the 

military judge erred by not providing a more tailored 

instruction in response to the members’ questions suggesting the 
United States v. Barnett, No. 12-0251/AF 

4

possibility of credit nullification. Nevertheless, I would 

affirm this case on the ground that Appellant has not shown 

prejudice. For sure, it is difficult to show prejudice given 

United States v. Balboa, 33 M.J. 304 (C.M.A. 1991), where the 

members appeared to have added an additional sixty-eight days of 

confinement -- the exact amount of automatic administrative 

credit for the accused’s pretrial confinement. Nonetheless, 

Balboa received no relief on appeal. 

However, even if one treats the members’ deliberations as 

immutable, much like a convening authority’s discretionary 

judgment on clemency, and applies a “colorable showing of 

possible prejudice” as the standard, Appellant falls short. See

United States v. Rodriguez-Rivera, 63 M.J. 372, 384 (C.A.A.F. 

2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Appellant only 

received eight months when he could have received fifteen and a 

half years of confinement. Manual for Courts-Martial, United 

States pt. IV, paras. 16.e.(1),(3)(B); 37.e.(1)(b) (2006). 

Thus, Appellant’s sentence was only a fraction of what it could 

have been. Moreover, there is nothing about the sentence in 

this case that suggests the members in fact negated the credit 

awarded by the military judge.