### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 ON MOTION F OR REHEARING

444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 NO. 03- 08 -00 582 -CV
Bas tr op C ount y, Te xa s , A ppe lla nt

v. De nve r Sam ple s; One M ar ti n’ s M e ado w, Lt d.; M ain St r e e t, Lt d.; Ja m e s E. G ar on; and

Jam es E. Gar on & Associates, Inc. , Appellees
F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF B ASTROP COUNTY , 335TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 26,5 67 , HO NORAB LE CHARLO TTE HINDS , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

NO. 03-08-00648- CV In re Bastrop County, Texas ORI GINAL PRO CEEDING FRO M B ASTROP COUNTY

O P I N I O N
Ba strop County , Texas, appellant and relator in these proce eding s, has filed a motion fo r r e he ari ng . We wi thd ra w o ur op ini on and jud g me nt o f M arc h 2 0, 20 09 , a nd su bs tit ute thi s
o p i n i o n . W e o v erru l e B as t ro p C o u n t y ’s m o t i o nfo r r eh ea ri n g.

Ba s t ro p C ounty

filed an inter locutory

appea l, see Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014 (a )( 8 ) (W es t 2008), and pe tition for writ of mandamus, see Tex. R. App. P . 52.3, complaining of the trial c ourt’s re fusal to rule on the County ’s pl ea to the j urisdiction and abatementThe County and Samples ag ree that we have jurisdiction over the in t er l o cu t o ry appea l 1 beca use the trial court’ s order

can be interpre ted as implicitly or expressly

denying the County ’s plea to the jurisdiction. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a )(8) (West 2008). 2 of the un de rl y ingpr oc e e din gto a llo w a pp e lle e and re a l pa

rt y in i nte re st D e nv e r S a mpl e s to e xha us t
a d m i n i s tr a tiv e re me die s. We r e ve rs e the tr ia l c ourt ’s a bate me nt o rd e r a

nd a ff ir m th e c ourt ’s imp lic it 1 de nia l of the ple a to t he jur isd ic tio n. We d ism iss the County ’s pe tit ion fo r w ri t of

mand a mus . The unde rly ing la

wsuit was broug ht by

Samples aga i n s t t he County , One Ma rtin’s Me a do w, L td. , M a in S tr e e t, Ltd. , Jam e s Garo n, and Jame s E . G aro n & As so c ia te s, I nc . In th a t su it, Sa mpl e s a lle g e d that

in 1 96 0 h e bo ug ht n ine te e n a c re s a lon g State Hi g hw ay 21 . So me tim e afte r 1960, J ames and Roz elle Martin boug ht about 145 acr es east of Samples’s prope rty . Samples g ave the Martins verba l permission to use a 62-foot stretch of Samples’s proper ty to ga in acc ess from the Martin prope rty

to SH21. The throug hway was not pave d, but over time, it beca me “impre ssed with tire ruts while the native shrubs and g rasse s continued to g row be tween the ruts.” In 2002, afte r J ames Mar

tin died, Roz elle Mar

tin sold the proper

ty to One Mar

tin’s Meadow, w hich subdivided the pr op e rt

y fo r a ho us ingde ve lop me nt
. The de e d to On e Ma rt in’ s Me a do w d id n ot p ur po rt to include any

interest in t he throughwa

y acr oss Samples’s proper ty
. Howeve r, One Martin’s Mea dow, relying on a survey perf

ormed by J ames Gar on and Gar on’s survey ing firm and on a county

roadma p prepa red by the County , paved the throug hway acr oss Samples’s proper

ty to SH21. Samples was
never contac ted for pe rmission to use his property for hig hway

acc ess. Samples s u e d

O n e M a r tin’s Meadow a

nd Main Street, L td., which construc ted homes in the subdivision, for trespass to try title. Main St ree t fi l ed a cross-claim ag ainst One Mar tin’s Meadow , asser

ting that One Martin’s Mea dow had repre sented to Main Street t hat the subdivision3

ha d a c c e ss r ig hts a cros s Sa mpl e s’ s p ro pe rt y to t he hig hw ay . Sampl e s late r d ism iss e d h is c la ims
a g a ins t Ma in S tr e e t. O ne Mart in’ s Me a do w f ile d a thi rd -p art

y pe tit ion a g a ins t G aro n a

nd his fi rm , a lle g ingtha

t th e y we re ne g lig e nt in the ir surv e y of the pr op e rt y and ha d c e rt if

ie d th a t th e pr op e rt

y had ac cess to and from SH21 acr oss the throug hway , which One Martin’s Mea dow believe d was
name d M art in’ s Cr os sin g Dr ive
. I n M arc h 2 00 8, Sa mpl e s ame nd e d h is p e tit ion to a dd the County as a de fenda

nt, alleg ing that in J une 2007, the County , throug h its commiss io n ers court, cre ated a roadma p that improperly desig nated Martin’s Crossing Drive as a road in which the County had a pu bli c int e re st. Sa mpl e s so ug ht t o c on te st the Cou nty ’s de sig natio n o f t

he thr ou g hw ay

a s a c ounty
ro a d and a sk e d th e tr ia l c ourt to s e t a sid e the Cou

nty ’s de sig natio n in

the Cou nty ’s ro a dma

p a nd to require the County

to redra w the map. The C o u n t y fi l ed a ple a to the jurisdiction, asser ting that under c hapter

258 of the tra

nsportation code, Samples w as re quired to conte st the roadmap at the
co m m i ssioners-c ourt level be fore he could sue in the trial court to have the map re draw n. S ee Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 258.001-.007 (West Supp. 2008). Following a hea ring on the County ’s ple a , th e tr ia l c ourt

sig ne d a n o rd e r a batin g the pro c e e din g to a llo w Sa mpl e s “ the op po rt

un ity to pursue the a dminist rative r emedies a vailable unde r Chapter

258.” I n its int erloc utory

appea l, the C ounty

argues that the trial c ourt should have g rante d the ple a and dis mis se d th e su it r a the r t ha n a batin g it b e c a

us e Sa mpl e s d id n ot e xha us t hi s administrative re medies bef ore suingthe County . I n its mandamus petit ion, the County argues that the trial cour

t abused its discretion in re fusing to rule on the County ’s plea to the jur isdiction. A county ’s commissioners cour t may propose a roadma p showing all roads in which th e c o un ty “ c la im s th e e xis te n c e o f a p u b li c in te r e s t.” Id
. § 2 58.002(a) . A commissioners cour t4

pr op os inga

c ounty ro a dma p mu st ho ld a pu

bli c me e tin g , duri ng wh ic h a pe rs on a sse rt inga

pr ivate interest in a road may protest t he road’s i nclusion on the map. Id
. § 258.002(b). A pe rson asser ting a private intere st may

also file a written protest at any time before the public hea ring
. Id. I f a

pr ote st is made or f

iled, the commissioners cour t shall appoint a jury to deter mine whether

the public has an intere st in the contested roa d. Id. The commiss ioners court is require d to publish not ice of the hear ing in at least one ne wspape r of g ener al circ ulation in the county
. Id . § 258.002(c)
. A per son claiming a private intere st in a road in which the county asse rt s a p u blic interest “ma y contest the inclusion of the roa d in the county road ma p by filing a suit in a district court in the county in which the roa d is located not later tha n the sec ond anniver sary

of the date on which the c ounty road ma p including the road was adopted.” Id. § 258.004(a)
. “The county has the burden of proving that the county has continuously

maintained . . . the r oad in question.” Id. § 258.004(b). The County

argues that bec ause Samples did not appe ar at the hear ing on the map or file a written protest befor e the hear ing, he has not exhausted the ava ilable administrative re medies and ther efor e may

not sue under se ction 258.004. The County contends that sec tion 258.002(b), which stat e s th a t a p e r s o n a s s e rti n g a p r iv a te in te r e s t in a r o a d c la im e d to b e p u b li c “ ma y ” f ile a
wr it ten prot e st o r a

pp e ar at th e ro a dma

p h e ari ng , s ho uld

be re a d a s requiring the land ow ne r t o pr ote st at or be fo re the he ari ng be fo re he may su e un de r se c tio n 258 .0 04
. As su pp or t, t he County points to other statutes in w hich “may” has been interpre ted as setting out a mandatory

prec ondition to suit. However, those statutory fra meworks a

re ve ry differ ent than the one at issue her e. I n Schroede r v. Texas I

ron W orks, Inc

. , the supreme court c oncluded that by stating that an ag g rieve d person “ may file” a complaint with the Texas Comm ission on Human R ights, theTh e c ur re nt v e rs ion

of the wh ist le blo we r a c t pr ov ide s th a t an e mpl oy e e “ mus t in iti a te 2 a c tio n und e r t

he g ri e va nc e or a pp e a l pr oc e dure s o f t

he e mpl oyingstate or

loc a l g ov e rnme nta l e nti ty . . . befor e suing under this cha pter.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.006 (West 2004).

5 Commi ssion on Human Rights Act mea nt that the person must have exhausted his adm i nistrative
reme dies befor e filing suit. 813 S.W .2d 483, 487-88 (Tex. 1991). I t rea ched this conc lusion after conside r in g th a t t

h e A c t w a s in te n d e d

to a d v an c e p o li c ie s s e t o u t i nf e d e r a l a n ti

- d is c r im in a tion statutes, which re quire “ exhaustion of administ rative r emedies pr ior to liti g ation”; established “ a compre hensive a dminist rative r eview sy stem”; and used the date a co m p laint was filed with the
co m m i s sion to determine the de adline for filing suit in a trial c ourt. See id. at 4 8 5
- 8 7
. In Gregg County v. F

arrar , we noted that the Texas Whis tleblower A ct re quired a n ag g rieve d person t o “e x h au s tan y ap p l i cab l e gri ev an ce o r ap p ea l p ro ce d u re s ” be fo re fi l i n g s u i t , re gar d l es s o f l an gu age in an employ ee manual that a g rieva nce c ommitt ee de cision “may be appe aled.” 933 S.W .2d 769, 774-76 (Te x . App.—Austin 1996, writ denied)
. Simi larly , the educ ation code a nd the local 2 g ov e rnm ent c od e ’s pr ov isi on s r e la te d to zon ingde c isi on s, wh ic h u se “ may ” in d isc us sin g c e rt a in
a dmi nis tr a tiv e pr oc e dure s o r t he fi lin g of

an a pp e a l, b oth

re qu ir e a c omp la ina

nt t o f ir st e xha us t
a v a il a b le a d mi n is tr a ti v e r e me d ie s b e f o r e f il in g s u it
. S

ee Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 7.057, 21.209, .301, .307 (West 2006) (provisions related to appea ls available at various levels g ener ally say that ag g rieve d person “ may

appea l” to next l evel in proc ess); Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. §§ 211.010(a) , .011(a) (West 2008) (per son ag g rieve d by zoning decision may appea l to board of a djustment, and,
a ft e r d e c isi on by bo ard, “ may ” se e k ju dic ia l r e vie w) ; J on es v . Cl

ar k sv ill e In de

p. Sc h. Di

st. , 46 S.W .3d 467, 470-71 (Te x . App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.) (interpreting “may” in sec tion 7.0576

of education c ode to me an that “ag g rieve d person may appea l, and if an a

pp e a l is take n, it mu st be to the commissioner if the matter is one within the scope of the ag ency ’s re view powe rs”)
. The statutes to which the County cites diffe r i n signific ant way s from cha pter 258 of the t ra n s p o rt ati on code. T he other statutory provisions set out fairly

compre hensive sche mes for f i l i n g an d p u r s u i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o mp l a i n t s t h r o u g h a w e l l d e f i n e d p r o c e s s . M o r e i mp o rt a n t l y, those statutes addre ss complaints filed by an individual in response to a specific adver se ac tion, and the time in which a complainant may pursue a dminist rative r emedies g ener ally beg ins to run when he lea rns he ha s a g rieva

nce. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 554.002-.006 (West 2004); Tex. L ab. C o de Ann. §§ 21.201- .262 (West 2006); Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. §§ 211.010(a) , .011(a) , (b); Tex. Educ
. Code Ann. § 7.057, 21.209, .301, .307. But see Te x. Ed uc . Code Ann. § 7.0 57 (s ta tut e does not specif

y time to file appe al); Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 211.010(b) ( appea l to board of
a dju stm e nt “ mus t be fi le d w ith in a re a so na ble tim e ” ); W

esth e im e r I

nd e p. Sc h. Di

st. v . B rock

e tte , 56 7 S. W.2 d 7 80 , 7 89 (T e x. 19 78 ) ( “ Te xas l aw i s f ir mly e sta bli sh e d th a t, w he n th e statut e fai ls t o presc ribe such a

time limi t, an appe al must be taken w ithin a reasonable time.”). For instance, unde r the whistleblower act, an individual may file a c omplaint alleg ing g overnme ntal reta liat i on for a g ood-fa ith report of a

violation of law within ninety day s after

the reta liation occurr ed or w as discovered throug h rea sonable dilig ence , Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.006, and under

the commission on human rig hts act, an indivi d u al m ay fi le a c omplaint alleg ing illeg al employ

ment prac tices wit hin 180 day s of the a lleg ed illeg al pra ctice, T ex. L ab. Code Ann. §§ 21.201, .202. Under the local g overnme nt c ode, municipalities must both post notice in the local new spaper and send notice of a proposed zoning chang e to ea ch prope rty owner who might be7

aff ecte d, and a pe rso n aggr i ev ed of a board de cision may then appe al throug h the administrative proce ss. Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. §§ 211.007, .010, .011 (West 2008).

Chapter 258 of

the transpor

tation code, on t h e o t h er hand, which implicates constituti o n a ll y p r o te c te d p r o p e rty in te r e s ts , d o e s n o t e n s u r e th a t an in d iv id u a l w h o s ta

n d s to be
a dv e rs e ly a ff e c te d b y an a sse rt ion

of a pu bl ic int e re st i n a

ro a d w ill re c e ive no tic e c omm e ns ur a te with the proper

ty interest at stake befor e the time to re g ister a pr otest expi res. I t require s that notice of a he aringon a propose d map be r un in the local newspaper s in advanc e of the hear ing; the ma p is not included in the notice but is made available for study at a public location. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 258.002(c) , (d). I t a lso r equire s that the commissioners court include “a notice of its intention to consider a doption of the county road ma p with the ad valor em tax st atements for the y ear befor e” the map’s a doption, including “a list of all roads in which the county will claim t he ex istence of a public in t ere st,” the date of the public he aringon the map’s a doption, and a stateme nt that the proper ty owner may protest under

section 258.002 (b). Id. § 258.005(a) (West Supp. 2008). The same g ener al notice is sent to all prope rty owner s in the county , howeve r, and the statute does not require specific , individual notice be provide d to owners who will be individually aff ecte d. See id. The County ’s interpre tation would in this ins t an ce v iolate state a nd fede ral
c on sti tut ion a l pr ote c tio ns on pr op e rty ri ghts . The fe de ra l c on sti tut ion “ pr ov ide s th a t ‘ pr ivate proper ty [shall not ] be taken for

public use, without just compensation,’” and “article I , section 17 of the Te x as Constitut ion provides, in pertinent pa rt, that no ‘pers o n ’s p roper ty shall be take n, damag ed or de stroy ed for or applied to public use w ithout adequate c om pensation beingmade.’ ” Ma y he w v . To wn o

f Su nn y v ale , 964 S.W .2d 922, 933 (Tex. 1998) (quoting U.S
. Const. amend. V;8

Te x. Con st. a rt . I , § 17 ). Al tho ug h the re are se ve ra l me tho ds fo r a c qu ir ingpr ivate land fo r p ub lic roads, they

have in c ommo n at least two re quirements—spec ific notice must be pr ovided to the aff ecte d proper

ty owner s and compe nsation must be paid to proper ty owner s whose land is used f or public purposes. See id. at 939 (to deprive individual of proper ty rig ht, gove rnment must give notice
and me anin g fu l oppo rt

un ity to b e he ard ); Koch v. Texas G en. Land Office , 273 S.W .3d 451, 457-60 (T ex . Ap p . —

Au s t i n 2 0 0 8 , p et
. fi l ed ) ( qu o t i n g Porretto v. Patterson , 251 S.W .3d 701, 708 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1st Dis t.] 200 7, no pe t.) ) ( no tin g that if g ov e rnme nt c ou ld c la im i mmunit y by mere ly claiming title in indi vidual’s land, conde mnati o n would be unnec essar y and individual would not rec eive c ompensation unless leg islature g rante d permission to sue).

Th e tr a n s p o r ta ti o n c o d e s e ts out severa l provisions related to a c ounty ’s establishment of and a cquisition of private prope rty for public r oads. Residents may apply with their local
c omm iss ion e rs c ourt

fo r a ne w r oa d. Te x. Tr ans p. Cod e Ann. § 2 51 .0 52 (a ) ( Wes t 19 99 ); se e als o id. § 251.053 (West 1999) (per son without public road to pr operty may apply for neig hborhood roa d; application must name “ persons that would be aff ected by the establishment of the r oad”; e ach aff ecte d proper

ty owner must be given notice of proposed road and informed of rig ht to appear and protest; if neig hborhood roa d is es t ablished, prope rty owner s must be paid damag es). I f a
c omm iss ion e rs c ourt de c ide s to or de r a ne w ro a d, it mus t a pp oin t a “ jur y of vie w” of loc a l pr op e rt

y
owner s, which must issue written notice of the time “it will lay out the road or

assess dama g es incidental to the openingof t h e ro ad , ” gi ving notice to eac h proper ty owner “throug h whose re al proper ty the roa d may

pass”; the pr operty

owner may prese nt a written statement of the damag es he will incur and, if dissatisfied with the jury ’s dec ision and the commissioners court’ s awa rd, appe alThe “ jury of view” method seems lar g ely to have f allen by the way side, with condemnation 3 being used m ore f

reque ntly
. See David B . Br ooks, 36 Texas Practice 2d County & Special District Law, Roads & Bridges § 40. 25 (2 00 2) (“ Th e c ounty may pr oc e e d und e r i ts g e ne ra l e min e nt d oma in statutory authority or under the Tra nsportation Code, which include s the use of a jury of view.
. . . [A] s it now stands, with the availability of the g ener al condemnation statutes, there is no rea son for a county to open a r oad under

the old jury

of view me thod.” (footnotes omitted))
. The tra nsportati o n code a lso provides that a c ounty of fe wer than 50,000 people “ may 4 acquir e a public inter est in a private road only by : (1) pur chase ; (2) conde mnation; (3) dedication; o r ( 4 )
. . . a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n . ” T e x . T r an s p . C o d e A n n . § 2 8 1
. 0 0 2 ( W e s t1 9 9 9 )
. In s u c h a c o u n t y, the commissioners court “may not a ssert a public interest in a pr ivate roa d” without g iving wr itten notice to the roa d’s owner in person o r b y reg istered mail. Id . § 281.006 (West 1999). A per son a sse rt ingan in te rest in th a t r oa d ma y su e in d istri c t c ourt

wi thi n tw o y e ars a ft e r ( 1) a c ounty resolution decla

ringa public intere st in the road or ( 2) t h e p ro p er t y owner is give n notice of the county ’s intention, whicheve r is later. Id
. § 281.007 (West 1999)
. We re co gn i z e that section 258.001 of the tr ansportation code states that “[n] otwithstanding chapte r 281, a county may clar ify the ex i s t en ce o f a public inter est in a roa d as provided by this chapter,” id. § 258.001 (We st Supp . 200 8) , but we do no t bel ie ve that the le g isl a tur e int e nd e d to allo w a co un ty su bje c t to chapte r 281 to avoid notice a nd compensation provisions by availing itse lf of the r oadmap a do pti on pr oc e ss. 9 the damag es dete rmination. Id. § 251.054(a) , (e) , (f) , (g ) (West 1999). I n a mun ic ipa lity , a

c ounty 3

may , w iththe mun ic ipa lity ’s c on se nt, c on de mn p ro pe rt y f o r c o u nt y r o a d s t hr o u gh an e min e nt d oma in proce eding
. Id
. § 251.101 (West 1999). Fina lly , the prope rty code se ts out specific proc edure s and require ments for condemning land t hroug h eminent domain. See Tex. P rop. Code Ann. §§ 21.001- .102 (West 2000 & 2004 & Supp. 2008) (statutes g overningeminent domain in g ener al). 4

Thus , und e r any oth e r p ro vis ion re la te d to pu

bli c us e of

pr ivate land , s pe c if

ic a lly us e for public r oads, bef

ore a county may acqui re a public intere st in a private r oad, esta blish a new county road, or acc ess roa d acr oss private land, the aff ecte d land owner

must be g iven per sonal notice of the proposed a cquisition and the opportunity to protest and/or pre sent evidenc e o f the
owner ’s damag es. See Tex. Transp. Code A nn. §§ 251.053, .054, .101, 281.006 (West 1999). More imp or tantl y , a c ounty is c on sti tut ion a lly

and statut or ily

ba rr e d f ro m takin g pr ivate land

fo r a pu bli c road w ithout pay ing the landowner for the pr ivilege
. See id. §§ 251.053(e) , .054(e) , (f) , (g ), .101,10

28 1. 00 2; se e als o Tex. P rop. Code Ann. §§ 21.014- .016, .018 (West 2004) (spec ial commissioners must be appointed to a ssess proper ty owner ’s damag es; eac h party “is entitled to written notice” of damag es hea

ring ; party to condemnation proce eding may appea l special c ommissi oners’ finding s), 21.041 (West 2000) (spec ial commissioners must hear e vidence related to value of land being
c on de mne d a

nd i n j u ry to l and ow ne r) , 2 1. 04 2 ( Wes t Su pp . 2 00 8) (s pe c ia l c omm iss ion e rs mus t a sse ss dama g e s su ff

e re d b y land ow ne r) ; Mayhe w , 964 S.W .2d at 933. Sa mpl e s w a s n ot s e rv e d w ith sp e c if ic no tic e of

the County ’s int e nt t o ta

ke a pu bli c interest in his private throug hway , as require d by the var ious condemnation statutes. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 251.053, .054, .101, 281.006. H e wa s p ro vided a notice in his ad valore m tax statement, as required by section 258.005(b) , that stated that B astrop County intended to claim a public intere st in the roads lis ted. Howeve r, t he noti ce was a g ener al announc ement sent to all taxpay e r s in

th e c o u n ty

an d d id n o t s p e c if

y th a t o n e o f

th e r o a d s r

u n s a c r o s s Samp le s ’s proper ty . Fur ther, the list included more than 1,000 roads, and Samples had no re ason to know he should look for Martin’s Crossing Drive or seek out the ma

p to see whether the portion of the r oad that runs acr oss his proper ty was shown as public. Fur ther, section 258.005, which require s t hat
no tic e of a c ounty ’s int e nti on

to a do pt a

ro ad map be in clud e d in pr op e rt y ta x sta te me nts , a lso require s that in the y ear

following the map’s a doption, the commissioners court must include in tax statements a se cond notice inf orming proper

ty owner s of the map’ s adoption and (1) listi ng all the
ro a ds in w hic h th e c ounty c la ime d a pu

bli c int e re st an d (2) inf

or min g the pr op e rt

y ow ne r o f t

he date of the map’ s adoption and “the date on whic h the statute of limitations will bar a landowner

from filing a suit in di strict court to dispute the county ’s claim.” Id . § 25 8. 00 5( b) . I t make s li ttl e se ns eOur c onclusion is supporte d by the bill analy sis of H.B. 1117, w hich was e nacte d in 2003 5 as cha pter 258 of the transportation c ode. See House Tr ansp. Comm., Bill Analy sis, Tex . H.B . 1117, 78 th L e g ., R.S. (2 00 3) . In th a t ana ly sis , th e c omm itt e e no te d th a t be fo re c ha pte r 2 58 ’s e na c tme nt, there was no statute of limit ations on when a landowner could challeng e the public or private status of a r oad. Id. H. B . 1 11 7 w a s in te nd e d to a id count ies , whi ch o the rw ise “ wi ll m os t li ke ly los e in c o u rt” in th e f

u tu r e , w h e n th e y w il l li k e ly b e “ u n a b le to p r o v id e ‘ li v e b o d ie s ’ w it h firsthand knowledg e” of

a roa d’s g enesis, re sulting in counties losing the rig ht to maintain what they consider to b e pu bli c ro a ds , “ e nd ang e r[i ng ] the ri g hts of tho se int e ri or lan do wne rs who u se the ro a d[s] to acc ess their prope rt[ies] .” Id. B e c a us e it i s d if

fi c ult and pr oh ib it iv ely

e xpe ns ive fo r c ounti e s to deter mine owner ship of all proper ties that adjoin all county roads, H.B
. 1117 was intende d to allow a c ounty to ad op t a pro po se d roa dma p, pla c ing no tic e of a he ari ngon the ma p in loc a l ne ws pa

pe rs . Id. “L andowne rs could protest i n a publi c hearing or by mail.
. . . After two y ear s, if the landowne r does not protest, the roa d become s the responsibility of the c ounty . I f, af

ter that two y ear

period, the landowner

decide s to protest, the burden is on the la ndowner , not the county , to prove their c ase.” Id. The c ommitt ee stated that sec tion 258.004
11 to r e qu ir e a

se c on d n oti c e if the fi rs t is su ff ic ie nt to p ut o wn e rs on

no tic e of the po ssi ble los s o f t

he ir proper ty and their r ight to conte st the claim of a public inter est. I f we wer e to ag ree wi t h the County ’s ar g ument, the County would essentially

be allowed to take Samples’s private road without satisfying the statutory require ments for a taking , and chapte r 258’s roa dmap pr o v i s i ons would trump the constitutionally mandated pr ocedur es for a g overnme ntal tak i n g. See M organ v. Olive r , 82 S.W . 1028, 1030 (Tex. 1904) (“A t common law
ever y proprietor

holds his property

subject to the rig ht of t he sover eig n to take it for public use . That rig ht, under the Constitution of this state, is subject to t h e co n d i tion that compensation for the pr op e rt y and fo r a ll dama g e s in c ide nt t o it s ta kin g mus t be a sse sse d, and , e xce pt i n c a se of the state itself, must be paid for or secur ed.”) I nstead, we conclude that, unlike the compre hensive statutory frameworks c ited by the County , the permissi ve langua g e in chapte r 258 of the tra nsportation code is indee d permissive. 5[a] uthor i z es a p erson asserting a private rig ht, titl e, or inter est in a roa d in which a

public interest is asser

ted under this chapter to c ontest the inclusion of the roa d in the County ro a d ma p b y fi lin g a su it i n a dis tr ic t c ourt

in t he c ounty in w hic h th e ro a d is located n o t l at er t h an the se cond annive rsar y of the date on which the c ounty road map including the roa d was a dopted. Id. Th e ana ly sis do e s n ot su g g e st that a land ow ne r mus t pr ote st at or be fo re the he ari ngin o rd e r t o avail himself of the contest provision in section 258.004 and, indee d, states that a landow n er has two y ear s from the date the map is adopte d to file suit protesting the inc lusion of a roa d. See id. 12 A prope rty

owner may file a protest at or befor e the he aringon a propose d map, which r esults in a jury consideringthe matter a

nd making a dec ision that is bi nding on the commissioners court. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 258.002(b) . Howeve r, in the sec tion titled, “Contest,” the code provides that a prope rty

owner has two y ear s after

the adoption of a map to file suit to amend the map, making no ref ere nce to the pr otest option provided in section 258.002. See id. § 258.004(a)
. We concl u d e that section 258.004 allows Samples to pursue his suit, which was timely filed within two y ear s of the County ’s adoption of the roadmap, without first having filed a protest pursuant to sec tion 258.002. W e ther efor e re verse the trial cour t’s order abating the pr oc e e din g and

a ff ir m th e c ourt ’s imp lic it de nia l of the Cou nty ’s ple a to t he jur isd ic tio n. We d ism iss the County ’s petition for wr it of mandamus.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pury ear and He nson Affir med in part; Rever sed in part on Motion for Rehe aring Filed: May

8, 2009