NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

 :

MARY ALICE GOLDEN-KOETHER, :

et al., :

 : CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-3586 (MLC)

Plaintiffs, :

 : MEMORANDUM OPINION

v. :

 :

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., :

 :

Defendant. :

 :

COOPER, District Judge

Plaintiffs, Mary Alice Golden-Koether and Caitlin C. Koether

(“Plaintiffs”), proceeding pro se, commenced this action in New

Jersey state court against defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

(“Chase”), alleging “fraud” on the basis that Chase had not

provided “a copy of the original ‘Wire Transfer Receipts’”

requested by Golden-Koether with respect to withdrawals of

approximately $452,000 between September 2006 and October 2006,

from a bank account of which she contends she was a 50% owner. 

(Dkt. entry no. 1, Rmv. Not., Ex. 1, Compl. at 1-2.) Chase

removed the action on the basis that federal subject matter

jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. 

(Rmv. Not. at 2.) Chase contends that although Plaintiffs’ claim

does not cite to a federal statute, it arises under the

Electronic Fund Transfer Act (“EFTA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq. 

(Id.)

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Chase now moves to dismiss the Complaint for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). (Dkt. entry

no. 13, Mot. Dismiss.) Chase contends the Complaint must be

dismissed because it is barred by the EFTA’s statute of

limitations. (Dkt. entry no. 14, Def. Br. at 2.) Plaintiffs

have responded to this argument in their opposition papers. 

(Dkt. entry no. 16, Pl. Opp’n at 9.) The Court decides the

motion on the submissions of the parties, without oral argument,

pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons stated

herein, the motion will be granted. 

I. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Standard

In addressing a motion to dismiss a complaint under Rule

12(b)(6), the Court must “accept all factual allegations as true,

construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, and determine, whether under any reasonable reading of

the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” 

Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). 

At this stage, a “complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct.

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1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 556 (2007)). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit

the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,

the complaint has alleged--but it has not ‘show[n]’--that the

‘pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950

(quoting Rule 8(a)(2)).

The Court, in evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim, may consider the complaint,

exhibits attached thereto, matters of public record, and

undisputedly authentic documents if the plaintiff’s claims are

based upon those documents. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.

White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).

II. Electronic Fund Transfer Act

The EFTA was enacted “to provide a basic framework

establishing the rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of

participants in electronic fund and remittance transfer systems,”

particularly with regard to individual consumer rights. 15

U.S.C. § 1693(b). It provides a private cause of action for a 

consumer to seek damages for financial institutions’ unauthorized

electronic transfer of funds from the consumer’s account. See 15

U.S.C. §§ 1693a, 1693m; Raine v. Reed, 14 F.3d 280, 283 (5th Cir.

1994).1

 The New Jersey Uniform Commercial Code expressly states that it 1

does not apply to claims governed by the EFTA, insofar as the

EFTA is the exclusive remedy for consumers seeking documentation

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“The EFTA governs wire transfers to and from bank accounts

‘established primarily for personal, family, or household

purposes.’” Regatos v. N. Fork Bank, 257 F.Supp.2d 632, 638 n.10

(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(2)). The Court finds

that the EFTA applies to Plaintiffs’ claim that Chase failed to

provide supporting documentation regarding what the Complaint

appears to suggest may have been unauthorized wire transfers from

a consumer account jointly owned by Golden-Koether and her exhusband.

III. EFTA Statute of Limitations

The EFTA requires that when a consumer believes an

unauthorized electronic fund transfer or other error has

occurred, the consumer must provide, within sixty days of

receiving documentation such as an account statement, oral or

written notice to a financial institution setting forth the

identifying account information and the basis for the consumer’s

belief that the account contains an error. 15 U.S.C. § 1693f(a). 

The financial institution is obliged to investigate and respond

to such notice within ten business days. Id. Any action brought

under the EFTA must be brought “within one year from the date of

the occurrence of the violation.” 15 U.S.C. § 1693m(g). “In

light of the ten-day statutory period within which a financial

pertaining to fund transfers, disputing the validity of a

transfer, and asserting claims against financial institutions. 

N.J.S.A. §§ 12A:4A-104, 12A:4A-108. 

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institution must provide a written response,” the statute of

limitations begins to run ten days after the consumer provides

the oral or written notice of the alleged error to the financial

institution. Berenson v. Nat’l Fin. Servs., LLC, 403 F.Supp.2d

133, 145 (D. Mass. 2005). 

The wire transfer transactions at issue occurred in

September and October 2006. (Compl. at 2.) The Complaint

alleges that on some unspecified date, Golden-Koether had a

telephone conversation with an Executive Assistant at Chase, “was

told that the bank statement” for the period in question “was a

true statement,” but Chase failed to “give [her] further

information on [her] account for the past 31⁄2 years.” (Id. at 4

(emphasis added).) It is thus evident from the face of the

Complaint that any claim arising under the EFTA is barred by the

one year statute of limitations. Even presuming that Plaintiffs

satisfied the prerequisite of providing notice within sixty days

of receiving the bank statement showing the September and October

2006 account withdrawals, three and a half years passed between

Golden-Koether’s providing notice to Chase and the filing of the

Complaint on December 6, 2010. 15 U.S.C. § 1693m(g); see Houck

v. Local Fed. Sav. & Loan, Inc., No. 93-6046, 1993 WL 191818, at

*3 (10th Cir. June 1, 1993 (Table Decision at 996 F.2d 311));

Springer v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 09-628, 2010 WL 427417, at

*2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2010).

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IV. Common Law Fraud

The Complaint also must be dismissed insofar as it purports

to assert a claim for common law fraud. (See Pl. Opp’n at 8

(“Actually, what I am suing for is fraud on Chase Bank. . . .

[for] not giving me documents of a joint account of mine.”).)2

To state a claim for fraud, Plaintiffs must allege “(1) a

material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact;

(2) knowledge or belief by the defendant of its falsity; (3) an

intention that the other person rely on it; (4) reasonable

reliance thereon by the other person; and (5) resulting damages.” 

Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 148 N.J. 582, 610 (1997).

Plaintiffs have not alleged that they relied upon the bank

statement showing withdrawal of funds by wire transfer for the

September to October 2006 period. Rather, the Complaint alleges

that Golden-Koether notified Chase that she wished to receive

further documentation regarding these withdrawals, and has been

damaged as a result of retaining attorneys to obtain such

documents since Chase responded to her notification in a way that

was unsatisfactory to her. (Pl. Opp’n at 7 (“I have spent all

money on attorneys attempting to gain the wire transfer

 The Court lacks jurisdiction to review proceedings that 2

occurred in state court, referred to in the Plaintiffs’

opposition papers. (Pl. Opp’n at 5, 8.) See, e.g., Dunleavy v.

Gannon, No. 11-361, 2011 WL 5321004, at *2-3 (D.N.J. Nov. 1,

2011) (observing that the “District Court lacks the entitlement

of appellate jurisdiction required to review a state court

judgment” and discussing Rooker-Feldman doctrine).

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documents. . . .” and referring to the “account withdrawal

summary . . . I had received originally in October of 2006”).) 

As Chase points out, the Complaint cannot be read as suggesting

that Plaintiffs relied on the account statement, because GoldenKoether alleges that she has been trying to obtain the “wire

transfer receipts” for years. (Dkt. entry no. 17, Def. Reply Br.

at 3; Compl. at 4.) See Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Mills, 567

F.Supp.2d 719, 727-28 (D.N.J. 2008) (dismissing fraud claim for

failure to plead reasonable reliance where plaintiff indicated

that it thought the representation in question was false from the

time it was communicated). Because no reasonable reliance has

been alleged, Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for common law

fraud.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed supra, the Court will grant the

motion to dismiss. The Court will issue an appropriate Order and

Judgment.

 s/ Mary L. Cooper 

MARY L. COOPER

United States District Judge

Dated: November 29, 2011

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