OPINION

V.

KOLE AKINOLA, a/k/a Kale Akin, a/k/aKalee Akins, a/k/a Black Law, a/k/a Black,

LINARES, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court by way ofthe Government’s motion for reconsideration

of this Court’s January 9, 2017 Opinion (ECF No. 263, “Op.”) and Order (ECF No. 264), which

granted Defendant Akinola’s motion to dismiss the Second Superseding Indictment (“S SI”) in this

matter on the grounds that Akinola’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial right has been violated. (ECf

No. 265, “Gov’t Mov. Br.”). Defendant has opposed this motion (ECF No. 270, “Def.’s Opp.

Br.”), and the Govenunent has replied to same (ECF No. 271, “Gov’t Reply Br.”). for the reasons

stated herein, the Government’s motion for reconsideration is denied.

I. Legal Standard

Motions for reconsideration filed in this district are governed by Local Civil Rule 7.1(i),

which is applicable to criminal actions through Local Criminal Rule 1.1. “[R]econsideration is an

extraordinary remedy[] that is granted ‘very sparingly.” Brackett v. Ashcroft, Civ. No. 03-3988,

2003 WL 22303078, *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 2003) (citations omitted). A motion for reconsideration

“may not be used to re-litigate old matters, nor to raise arguments or present evidence that could

have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” F. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Cendant

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an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence not previously

available; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” N. River

Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance, Co., 52 f.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotations and

alterations omitted). A court commits clear error of law “only if the record cannot support the

findings that led to the ruling.” ABS Brokerage Servs. v. Fenson Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 09—4590,

2010 WL 3257992, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2010) (citing United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d 591,

603—04 (3d Cir. 200$). “Thus, a party must. . . demonstrate that (1) the holdings on which it bases

its request were without support in the record, or (2) would result in ‘manifest injustice’ if not

addressed.” Id. “Mere ‘disagreement with the Court’s decision’ does not suffice.” Id. (quoting

F. Schoenfeld, 161 F.Supp. 2d at 353). Moreover, when the assertion is that the Court overlooked

something, the Court must have “overlooked some dispositive factual or legal matter that was

presented to it.” McGovern v. City ofJersey City, Civ. No. 98—5186, 2008 WL 58820, at *2

(D.N.J. Jan. 2, 2008).

II. Discussion

The Government offers four arguments in its motion for reconsideration. The Court

addresses each argument, in turn.

First, the Government argues that, with respect to the Court’s analysis ofthe second Barker

factor—that is, the reason for the delay— the Court overlooked Supreme Court precedent as well

as this Court’s prior findings which were affirmed on appeal. (Gov’t Mov. Br. at 2). Specifically,

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neutral, or purportedly caused by both parties, this Court sharply deviated from its prior rulings in2014, 2015 and 2016—all affirmed by the Court of Appeals—that Akinola, not the Government,

caused virtually all of the pretrial delay in this case.” (Id. at 3). The Government further argues

that the standard that this Court applied in denying Defendant’s prior arguments that his due

process rights were being violated substantially overlaps with the Sixth Amendment analysis,

thereby implying an inconsistency in the Court’s opinions.

The Court did not overlook Brillon, nor did it overlook its prior opinions with respect to

Defendant’s motions for bail. At the outset, the Court recognized that this Barker factor “givesthe Court the greatest pause.” (Op. at 6). As far as Britton, the Court only notes that it had

reviewed the case as cited by the Govenm-ient and fully understood its application to the case atbar. As to the Court’s prior opinions, the Court specifically referenced same. (Id.). However,the Court recognized that, by granting Defendant’s adjournment and other requests, the Court

“implicitly found these requests to be reasonable.” (Id. at 7). Moreover, the Court noted that caselaw counsels “that the Court should not weigh against Defendant delays caused by his attempts to

vigorously pursue his defense.” (Id.). Accordingly, the Court’s findings with respect to the second

Barker factor are appropriately tethered to the applicable case law. The Court properly considered

all facts and relevant cases before it when it found this second Barker factor to be neutral.

Second, the Government argues that “this Court erred in dismissing all counts of the

Second Superseding Indictment because the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial did not attach

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until April 1, 2014, when the grand jury returned the First Superseding Indictment.

(Id. at 3). At the outset, the Court notes that the Government did not raise this argument in

opposition to Defendant’s Sixth Amendment motion. The Government suggests that because this

argument was raised with respect to Defendant’s motion to dismiss based upon a violation of thestatutory speedy trial clock, this “principle” was before the Court with respect to Defendant’s

motion to dismiss on constitutional (i.e., speedy trial right) grounds. (Gov’t Reply Br. at 2). Yet,

the Government’s opposition to Defendant’s arguments for dismissal on Sixth Amendment

grounds is inconsistent with this inference. Specifically, in its opposition to Defendant’s Sixth

Amendment motion, the Government stated that “[tJhe length of delay is measured ‘from the dateof arrest or indictment, whichever is earlier, until the start of trial.” (ECF No. 250 (quoting

Hakeern v. Bever, 990 F.2d 750, 760 (3d Cir. 1993)). Nowhere in its opposition did the

Government argue that the filing of the SSI in any way affected Defendant’s speedy trial rights.

Because motions for reconsideration are “not for addressing arguments that a party should have

raised earlier,” United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 732 (3d Cir. 2010), the Court is not requiredto addresses this belated argument.

In any event, were the Court to consider this new argument, the Court would be

unpersuaded by same. In support of its argument that the speedy trial act is triggered upon the

filing of subsequent indictments, the Government relies on two cases—one from the Fifth Circuit

and one from the Seventh Circuit. These cases are not binding on this Court. In contrast, binding

precedent from the Third Circuit holds that a defendant’s “speedy trial right [is] not affected by

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his initial arrest.

Third, the Government takes exception with this Court’s finding that Defendant has been

prejudiced by the delay. (Gov.’t Mov. Br. at 4-5). In summary, the Government argues that the

Court erred in crediting Defendant’s argument that the delay has caused a potential defense

witness, Ms. Bailey, to decline to cooperate with Defense counsel. (Id.). The Government states

that to the extent that Ms. Bailey declined to cooperate with Defense counsel, Defendant could

have compelled her to testify. (Id. at 4). Further, the Govenmient argues that, contrary to Mr.Akinola’s representations, Ms. Bailey would not have provided testimony favorable to Defendant.

(Id.). Lastly, the Government states that because Ms. Bailey’s statements have been preserved via

recordings and affidavits, the Court’s concern that the delay will hinder the reliability of this

particular witnesses’ memory is without merit.

In support ofthis argument, the Government refers the Court to various parts of the record

which the Court is alleged to have “overlooked,” but which the Government failed to cite it its

underlying opposition. (Id. at 4-5). For example, for the first time, the Government cites to docket

entries dating back to August 2011. (Id. at 5). The Court was not required to search the entire

record of this case for evidence that could possibly contradict Defendant Akinola’s arguments.

Because the Government failed to raise this evidence below, the Court rejects this argument.

In any event, and as Defendant argues, the evidence relied upon by the Government does

not plainly contradict Mr. Akinola’s argument that Ms. Bailey could have testified as to other users

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she rented the Camaro with the intention that Mr. Akinola would use the vehicle, and that she did,

in fact, allow Mr. Akinola to drive same. (Gov’t Mov. Br. at 4-5). But, as Defendant notes, Ms.

Bailey “admitting that she rented the Camaro with the understanding that Akinola would use it is

not inconsistent with her also wanting to test drive it, or with her allowing others to drive and

occupy it prior to giving it to Akinola, or with her claim that nothing in the vehicle was hers.”

(Def.’s Opp. Br. at 9). Nor, for that matter, does this newly referenced evidence cure the

Defendant’s concern that counsel would not have been able to prep Ms. Bailey as a defense

witness. (Id.).

finally, the Government maintains that the Court failed to consider that the delay in

bringing this matter to trial caused “actual and greater prejudice to the Government” than to

Akinola. (Id. at 5). The Court is and was keenly aware of the fact that delay may hinder both the

Government’s and the Defendant’s case. Specifically, the Court heard from the Government at

oral argument that several of the victims in this case are now deceased. Nonetheless, as the Third

Circuit has recognized, “two wrongs don’t make a right.” Doeblers’ Pennsylvania Hybrids, Inc.

v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, n. 27 (3d Cir. 2006). That is, even if the Court had made an express

finding that the Government was also prejudiced by the delay, that finding would not have

assuaged either this Court’s or Defendant’s concerns that the delay in bringing this case to trial

has: (1) hindered the truth-seeking process or; (2) adversely affected Defendant’s ability to put up

a defense. The Court, therefore, rejects this final argument.

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appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.DATED: March 12017

E L. LINARES, U.S.D.J.

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