alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Corey Jampetro, Appellant.

[853 NYS2d 894]

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt of burglary in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the resolution of issues of credibility is primarily a matter to be determined by the trier of fact, which saw and heard the witnesses, and its determination should be accorded great deference on appeal *(see People v Romero,*7 NY3d 633, 644-645 [2006]). Upon the exercise of our factual review power *(see*CPL 470.15 [5]), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Romero,*7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

The sentence imposed was not excessive *(see People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80 [1982]). Mastro, J.P., Covello, Eng and Helen, JJ., concur.
##### 



EXHIBIT 99.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
(18 U.S.C. Section 1350)

Pursuant to the requirements of Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (18 U.S.C. Sections 1350(a) and (b)), the undersigned hereby certifies as
follows:



| | 1.  |  | I, Janet Ching Man Fung, am the Group Director  Finance of SUNDAY
Communications Limited (the Company).                                                                                                                                                  
| | --- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| | 2.  |  | To the best of my knowledge:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
|
| | (A) |  | The Companys Form 20-F accompanying this Certification, in the
form filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report)
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act); and
|
| | (B) |  | The information in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.                                                                                                                  

Dated: June 30, 2003

| |  |                                                                                        
| |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |  | By:  /s/ JANET CHING MAN FUNGName: Janet Ching Man Fung
Title: Group Director - Finance

A SIGNED ORIGINAL OF THIS WRITTEN STATEMENT REQUIRED BY SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO SUNDAY COMMUNICATIONS LIMITED AND WILL
BE RETAINED BY SUNDAY COMMUNICATIONS LIMITED AND FURNISHED TO THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OR ITS STAFF UPON REQUEST.

THE FOREGOING CERTIFICATION IS BEING FURNISHED SOLELY PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION
ISSUED BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON MARCH 21, 2003 IN RELEASE
NO. 33-8212, THIS CERTIFICATION WILL NOT BE DEEMED FILED FOR PURPOSES OF
SECTION 18 OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, OR OTHERWISE SUBJECT TO THE
LIABILITY OF THAT SECTION.

E-3
S05Y1880, S05Y1881, S05Y1882, S05Y1883, S05Y1884, S05Y1885, S05Y1886, S05Y1887.

#### IN THE MATTER OF CHARLES DOUGLAS BEST (eight cases).

(622 SE2d 337)

Per curiam.

These disciplinary matters'are before the Court on the Notices of Discipline filed by the State Bar against Respondent Charles Douglas Best in which it recommends that Best be disbarred for his violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, 8.4 (a) (4), and 9.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The State Bar served Best by publication in accordance with Bar Rule 4-203.1 (b) (3) (ii) but Best failed to reject the notices within 30 days of service, see Bar Rule 4-208.3 (a), and accordingly, he is in default, has no right to an evidentiary hearing and is subject to the discipline of this Court, see Bar Rule 4-208.1 (b).1

In each of the eight cases, Best accepted representation and fees, but took little or no action to pursue his clients’ cases. His telephone numbers were disconnected and he moved from his office with no forwarding address. He did not contact or communicate with his clients, nor did he take any action to protect their rights. Accordingly, we agree with the State Bar that the appropriate discipline in this case is disbarment. We hereby order that the name of Charles *56Douglas Best be removed from the rolls of attorneys authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. He is reminded of his duties under Bar Rule 4-219 (c).

Decided November 21, 2005.

*William P. Smith III, General Counsel State Bar, Paula J. Frederick, Assistant General Counsel State Bar,*for State Bar of Georgia.

*Disbarred.*

*All the Justices concur.*

1

 We note that, for the first time, Best has filed a petition for voluntary surrender of his license with this Court. In general, however, such petitions may be submitted prior to the issuance of a formal complaint for the consideration by the State Bar, not this Court. See Bar Rule 4-227 (b). Therefore, we do not consider Best’s untimely petition, and it does not change the outcome in this case.
Case 3:11-mj-02506-DEA   Document 3   Filed 03/01/11   Page 1 of 1 PageID: 4
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17
- 4390

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. DENNIS MICHAEL GALLIPEAU , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Columbia

. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior District Judge. ( 3:08

- cr
- 00096

- JFA

- 1 )

Submitted : December 19, 2017 Decided: December 21, 2017

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and DIAZ , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Dennis Michael Gallipeau , Appellant Pro Se. Tommie DeWayne Pearson, Assistant U nited S tates Attorney , OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY , Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee

.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in thi s circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Dennis Michael Gallipeau appeals the district court’s order granting the Government’s motion to modify the terms of his supervised release and denying Gallipeau’s request to terminate his supervision . We have reviewed the record and find
no reversible error. The district court acted within its discretion by modifying Gallipeau’s terms of supervised release to include 90 days of home confinement with electronic monitoring and to submit to a search of his home at any time during

su pervision. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2012). Accordingly , we affirm

. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Julius STEVENS, a.k.a. Judog, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-12274

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Dec. 11, 2012.

*901Wifredo A. Ferrer, Armando Rosquete, Kathleen Mary Salyer, Anne Ruth Schultz, Alejandro Oscar Soto, William Carter White, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Julius Stevens, Coleman, FL, pro se.

Before HULL, MARTIN and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Julius Stevens appeals the denial of his *pro se*Rule 36 motion to correct his pre-sentence investigation report (PSI). Stevens argues that because a prior conviction for “Possession of Cannabis” listed in the criminal history section of his PSI was classified as a felony rather than a misdemeanor, he was incorrectly considered a career offender by the district court when it originally sentenced him.

We review legal issues presented in a Rule 36 motion to correct a judgment *de novo. United States v. Portillo,*363 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir.2004). Rule 36 allows a court to correct at any time “a clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of the record, or correct an error in the record arising from oversight or omission.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 36. Rule 36 does not allow for a substantive correction or alteration to a criminal sentence. *Portillo,*363 F.3d at 1164.

The district court correctly denied the Rule 36 motion. Even assuming the district court originally considered the “Possession of Cannabis” charge to be a felony, such a correction would not be clerical in nature. Rather, such a correction would result in a substantive alteration to a criminal sentence, particularly if it would change Stevens’ career offender status. Accordingly, Rule 36 was not the correct basis for Stevens’ requested relief, and we affirm.

AFFIRMED.
Case 2:11-cr-00470-SDW   Document 90   Filed 03/17/13   Page 1 of 17 PageID: 1176

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Case 2:11-cr-00470-SDW   Document 90   Filed 03/17/13   Page 17 of 17 PageID: 1192
**EXHIBIT
        32.1**
  **CERTIFICATION
        PURSUANT TO**
 **18
        U.S.C. SECTION 1350**
 **AS
        ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**
 **SECTION
        906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**
  In
        connection with the Quarterly Report of Piedmont Mining Company,
        Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2007 as
        filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
        “Report”), the undersigned, in the capacities and on the date indicated below,
        hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
        to
        Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his
        knowledge:
  1.           The
        Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
        the
        Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
  2.           The
        information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
        the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.
  Date:
              November
                  13, 2007By:
              /s/
                  Robert M. Shields, Jr.Name:  Robert
                  M. Shields, Jr.Title:  Chief
                  Executive Officer
 
 A
        signed
        original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
        authentications, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
        appears
        in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
        by Section 906, has been provided to Piedmont Mining Company, Inc. and will
        be
        retained by Piedmont Mining Company, Inc. and furnished to the Securities
        and
        Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED OCTOBER 17, 2013

NO. 03-13-00611-CV

United Central Control, Inc., Appellant

v.

Duncan & Boyd Jewelers of Austin, LLC; Valley Forge Ins. Co. as Subrogee of D&B; 

and Hanover Insurance Co., Appellees

APPEAL FROM 345TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, ROSE AND GOODWIN

DISMISSED ON APPELLANT’S MOTION -- OPINION BY JUSTICE PURYEAR

THIS DAY came on to be submitted to this Court appellant’s motion to dismiss the appeal in the 

above cause, and the Court having fully considered said motion, and being of the opinion that 

same should be granted: IT IS THEREFORE considered, adjudged and ordered that said 

motion is granted, and that the appeal is dismissed. It is FURTHER ordered that the appellant

pay all costs relating to this appeal, both in this Court and the court below; and that this decision 

be certified below for observance.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

SHIRLEY HOMLER )

) No. 3‐10‐1154

v. )

)

MERCK SHARP & DOHME CORP. )

O R D E R

On March 25, 2011, the defendantfiled a motion to stay.  No response has been filed,

indicating that there is no opposition to the motion.  See Local Rule 7.01(b).

Therefore, the motion to stay (Docket Entry No. 11) is GRANTED, and all

proceedings in this case are STAYED pending the ruling by the Panel on MultiDistrict

Litigation, exceptthat counselforthe parties shall convene a telephone conference call with

the Court on Friday, April 22, 2011, at 2:00 p.m., to be initiated by defendantʹs counsel, to

address whether any objections have been filed with the MDL to the defendantʹs motion

to establish an MDL proceeding, and the expected time frame within which the MDL is

expected to rule on the defendantʹs motion.

It is so ORDERED.

                                                          

JULIET GRIFFIN

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:11-cv-03162-FLW-LHG Document 13 Filed 04/18/11 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 112
fourthamendment.htm




Exhibit 10.1

 


 


FOURTH AMENDMENT TO


AMENDED AND RESTATED


EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT







THIS FOURTH AMENDMENT to the Amended and Restated Executive Employment Agreement between Daniel A. DeMatteo (“Executive”) and GameStop Corp. (the “Company”) dated December 31, 2008 and amended April 5, 2010, June 2, 2010 and February 9, 2011 (such agreement, as amended, the “Employment Agreement”) is entered into on March 1, 2013.







WHEREAS, the parties desire to modify the Employment Agreement as provided below.







NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereby agree that the Employment Agreement is modified as follows:


 


1.           Term of Employment.  The term of Executive’s employment under the Employment Agreement shall continue through June 2, 2013, unless terminated earlier in accordance with Section 4 of the Employment Agreement.


 


2.           Miscellaneous.  Except as modified by this Fourth Amendment, all terms and conditions set forth in the Employment Agreement shall continue to apply and remain unchanged and in full force and effect, and any reference in the Employment Agreement to “this Agreement” shall mean the Employment Agreement, as modified by this Fourth Amendment.







IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Fourth Amendment on the date indicated above.







EXECUTIVE:








	 /s/ Daniel A. DeMatteo	
 







Daniel A. DeMatteo












THE COMPANY:







GAMESTOP CORP.


 



	By:  	 /s/ Paul Raines	
 







Name: Paul Raines


Title:  Chief Executive Officer
Case 3:11-cr-00393-JAP   Document 11   Filed 03/10/11   Page 1 of 2 PageID: 20

Case 3:11-cr-00393-JAP   Document 11   Filed 03/10/11   Page 2 of 2 PageID: 21
Case 2:11-cr-00470-SDW Document 14 Filed 02/23/11 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 53
NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

STATE OF ARIZONA
, Respondent,

v.

ARVIN PRASAD
, Petitioner

.
N o . 1 CA

- CR 13

- 0 246 PRPC

Petition for Review fro m the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. C R2009

- 141535

- 001 The Honorable Bruce R. Cohen
, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELI EF DENIED

COUNSEL
Maricopa County Attorney’s Attorney Office , Phoenix By Diane Meloche Counsel for Respondent

Arvin Prasad
, Florence PetitionerSTATE v. PRASAD Decision of the Court

2 MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Andrew W. Gould delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Margaret H. Downie and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

G O U L D , Judge:

¶1 Petitioner Arvin Prasad petitions this court for review from the dismissal of his notice of post

- conviction relief. We have considered the petition for review and, for the reasons stated, grant review and deny relief.

¶2 A jury convicted Prasad of contributing to the delinquency of a child, sexual assault, kidnapping, unlawful imprisonment, false reporting to a la w enforcement agency
, and assault. The trial court sentenced Prasad to an aggregate term of fourteen years’ imprisonment followed by seven years’ probation and we affirmed his convictions and sentences on direct appeal. State v. Prasad , 1 CA

- CR 10

- 0186 (Ariz. App. Jul. 31, 2012). Prasad filed a timely notice of post

- conviction relief, but his counsel foun d there were no colorable claims

. The trial court then gave Prasad forty

- five days to file a pro per petition. Rather than file a petition for post

- c onviction relief, Prasad chose to file various motions, including motions to reconstruct the record based on Prasad’s personal belief that unidentified portions of the trial transcript were in correct for unidentified reasons and/or were missing. In the en suing months, Prasad never filed a petition for post

- conviction relief and the trial court eventually dismissed the proceedings. Prasad now seeks review. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.9(c).

¶3 Prasad argues the tri al court should have granted his motions to reconstruct the record. We deny relief because reconstruction of the record is not a cognizable ground for relief pursuant to Rule 32.1 and the denial of a motion to reconstruct is not reviewable pursuant to Rul e 32.9. While the petition for review presents additional issues, Prasad did not raise those issues below. A petition for review may not present issues not first presented to the trial court. State v. Bortz , 169 Ariz. 575, 577 , 821 P.2d 236, 238 (App. 1 991); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(1)(ii).STATE v. PRASAD Decision of the Court

3 ¶4 We grant review and deny relief.
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4956 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4956

    To amend title 18, United States Code, to provide penalties for 
 accessing certain electronic communications in a manner that violates 
               consumer privacy, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 22, 2004

 Mr. Inslee (for himself, Mr. Bartlett of Maryland, Mr. Flake, and Mr. 
  Delahunt) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To amend title 18, United States Code, to provide penalties for 
 accessing certain electronic communications in a manner that violates 
               consumer privacy, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``E-mail Privacy Act of 2004''.

SEC. 2. INTERCEPTIONS.

    Section 2510(4) of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) by striking the period at the end; and
            (2) by inserting ``, and, with respect to an electronic 
        communication, includes the acquisition of the contents of the 
        communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or 
        other device, at any point between the point of origin and the 
        point when it is made available to the recipient '' after 
        ``device''.

SEC. 3. LIMITATION OF SERVICE PROVIDER EXCEPTION.

    Section 2701(c)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
inserting ``to the extent the access is a necessary incident to the 
rendition of the service, the protection of the rights or property of 
the provider of that service, or compliance with section 2702'' after 
``service''.
                                 <all>
```
#### Strong *v.*The State.

Lumpkin, J. — There being no doubt at all that the deceased was murdered, and the only issue at the trial being whether or not the accused was the person who committed the crime, and there being ample evidence to authorize the jury in finding that he was the murderer, a new trial will not be granted on account of slight inaccuracies or errors in the charge of the court, it appearing that, if there were any at all, they were immaterial and could not have affected the result. No cause for a new trial appears.

February 5, 1895.

Indictment for murder. Before Judge Smith. Pulaski superior court. November term, 1894.

Morcock.& Warren and Hardeman, Davis & Turner, for plaintiff in error. J. M. Terrell, attorney-general, and Tom Eason, solicitor-general, *contra.*

*Judgment affirmed.*
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-6629

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

NATHANIEL DUNLAP,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News. Raymond A. Jackson, District

Judge. (CR-95-57-4, CA-98-64-4)

Submitted: July 8, 1999 Decided: July 15, 1999

Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Nathaniel Dunlap, Appellant Pro Se. Janet S. Reincke, OFFICE OF

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Nathaniel Dunlap seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.

1999). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of

the district court. See United States v. Dunlap, Nos. CR-95-57-4;

CA-98-64-4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 20, 1999). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid

the decisional process.

DISMISSED