*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

 

 :

ELIJAH CLARK, :

 :

Plaintiff, :

 :

v. :

 :

JOHN DOES 1-25, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

 :

Civil No. 11-1395 (SDW)

OPINION 

 

APPEARANCES:

ELIJAH CLARK, Plaintiff pro se 

4971210 

Albert C. Wagner Youth Correctional Facility 

P.O. Box 500 Ward Avenue 

Bordentown, N.J. 08505 

WIGENTON, District Judge

Plaintiff Elijah Clark (“Plaintiff”) seeks to bring this

action in forma pauperis. Based on his affidavit of indigence, the

Court will grant Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma

pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and order the Clerk of the

Court to file the complaint.

At this time, the Court must review the complaint, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A, to determine whether it should

be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the

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complaint should be dismissed without prejudice at this time.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, incarcerated at the Hudson County Correctional

Facility at the time of filing, brings this civil rights action,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants John Does 1-25 and

the Jersey City Police Department. The following factual

allegations are taken from the complaint, and are accepted for

purposes of this screening only. The Court has made no findings as

to the veracity of Plaintiff’s allegations.

On April 10, 2009, Plaintiff was falsely arrested and

maliciously prosecuted by members of the Jersey City Police

Department. He was arrested and charged with robbery. He was

thereafter arraigned on the charges. “CJP Court” set bail at

$150,000. After 145 days of incarceration, the case was dismissed

on a “no bill” from the Hudson County Grand Jury. 

Plaintiff seeks “compensation for false arrest, unlawful

imprisonment and malicious prosecution by the Jersey City Police

Department and its police officers.” He seeks compensatory damages

in the amount of $250,000 and punitive damages in the amount of

$150,000. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 104-134, §§

801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a

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district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a

prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress against

a governmental employee or entity. The Court is required to

identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that

is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This

action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A because Plaintiff is proceeding

as an indigent and is a prisoner.

In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the

Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the

plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007)

(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see also

United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). 

The Supreme Court refined the standard for summary dismissal

of a complaint that fails to state a claim in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009). The Court examined Rule 8(a)(2) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a complaint

must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2). Citing

its opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)

for the proposition that “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and

conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

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of action will not do,’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court held that, to prevent

a summary dismissal, a civil complaint must now allege “sufficient

factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. This

then “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fowler v. UPMC

Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009)(citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at

1948). The Supreme Court's ruling in Iqbal emphasizes that a

plaintiff must demonstrate that the allegations of his complaint

are plausible. See id. at 1949-50; see also Twombly, 505 U.S. at

555, & n. 3; Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d

Cir. 2011). “A complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's

entitlement to relief. A complaint has to ‘show’ such an

entitlement with its facts.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (citing

Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234-35 (3d Cir.

2008). 

B. Analysis

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983

provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory

... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....

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Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff

must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the

alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting

under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108

S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36

F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560,

563 (3d Cir. 2011). 

1. Claims Against Jersey City Police Department

Plaintiff asserts claims against the Jersey City Police

Department based upon the actions of individuals and an untenable

theory of vicarious liability.

Local government units and supervisors are not liable under §

1983 solely on a theory of respondeat superior. See City of

Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 n. 8, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85

L.Ed.2d 791 (1985); Monell v. New York City Department of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690–91, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611

(1978) (municipal liability attaches only “when execution of a

government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by

those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official

policy, inflicts the injury” complained of); Natale v. Camden

County Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583–84 (3d Cir. 2003).

“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal

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involvement in the alleged wrongs, liability cannot be predicated

solely on the operation of respondeat superior. Personal

involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction

or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Rode v. Dellarciprete,

845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); Argueta v. U.S. Immigration and

Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 72 (3d Cir. 2011).

To establish municipal liability under § 1983, “a plaintiff

must show that an official who has the power to make policy is

responsible for either the affirmative proclamation of a policy or

acquiescence in a well-settled custom.” Watson v. Abington Tp.,

478 F.3d 144, 156 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915

F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990). A plaintiff must demonstrate that,

through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the moving

force behind the plaintiff's injury. Monell, 436 U.S. at 689.

“A government policy or custom can be established in two ways.

Policy is made when a ‘decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority

to establish a municipal policy with respect to the action’ issues

an official proclamation, policy, or edict. A course of conduct is

considered to be a ‘custom’ when, though not authorized by law,

‘such practices of state officials [are] so permanently and

well-settled’ as to virtually constitute law.” McTernan v. City of

York, PA, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Andrews v. City

of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)

Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that would

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suggest a basis for imposing liability upon the Jersey City Police

Department or the city of Jersey City. He has failed to allege any

facts that would suggest that any constitutional violations he

suffered were the result of an official policy or custom.

Accordingly, all claims against the named governmental entities

will be dismissed.

2. Claims Against John Doe Defendants

Plaintiff alleges claims of false arrest, unlawful

imprisonment and malicious prosecution against the John Doe

defendants. 

An arrest without probable cause is a Fourth Amendment

violation actionable under § 1983. See Walmsley v. Philadelphia,

872 F.2d 546 (3d Cir.1989) (citing cases); see also, Albright v.

Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274 (1994) (section 1983 claim for false

arrest may be based upon an individual's Fourth Amendment right to

be free from unreasonable seizures). To state a Fourth Amendment

claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) there was

an arrest; and (2) the arrest was made without probable cause.

Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988).

To prove the absence of probable cause, a plaintiff must show “that

at the time when the defendant put the proceedings in motion the

circumstances were such as not to warrant an ordinary prudent

individual in believing that an offense had been committed.” Hare

v. Woodhead, No. 08–5894, 2011 WL 1748469, at *4 (D.N.J. May 6,

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2011) (quoting Lind v. Schmid, 67 N.J. 255, 262, 337 A.2d 365 (N.J.

1975)).

Moreover “where the police lack probable cause to make an

arrest, the arrestee has a claim under § 1983 for false

imprisonment based on a detention pursuant to that arrest.” Groman

v. Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995); Palma v. Atlantic

County, 53 F.Supp.2d 743, 755 (D.N.J. 1999) (citing Groman); see

also Anela v. City of Wildwood, 595 F.Supp. 511, 512 (D.N.J. 1984).

Here, Plaintiff seems to base his claim for false arrest and

false imprisonment solely upon the fact that the case was later

dismissed on a “no bill” from the grand jury. However, Plaintiff

fails to provide any details regarding the facts known to the

police at the time of his arrest or even any details about the

circumstances of his arrest. As such, Plaintiff has failed to

allege sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially

plausible, and therefore, the claims against John Does 1-25 must be

dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the complaint will be dismissed

in its entirety for failure to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1). However, because it is conceivable that Plaintiff

may be able to supplement his pleading with facts sufficient to

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overcome the deficiencies noted herein, the Court will grant

Plaintiff leave to move to re-open this case and to file an amended

complaint.1

Dated: January 18, 2012

Susan D. Wigenton 

__________________________

SUSAN D. WIGENTON

United States District Judge

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint is filed, the

1

original complaint no longer performs any function in the case and “cannot be

utilized to cure defects in the amended [complaint], unless the relevant

portion is specifically incorporated in the new [complaint].” 6 Wright,

Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1476 (2d ed.1990) (footnotes

omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the allegations in

the original complaint, but the identification of the particular allegations

to be adopted must be clear and explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer

course is to file an amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id.

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