2015 UT App 43

_________________________________________________________

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KIA LYN FADEL HODGSON, KRISTIN LOUISE FADEL, DOUGLAS

KELLY FADEL, AND KARA FADEL BURNETT,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

FARMINGTON CITY, ERIC MILLER, AND FARMINGTON CITY

BOARD OF APPEALS,

Defendants and Appellees.

Per Curiam Decision

No. 20141125-CA

Filed February 26, 2015

Second District Court, Farmington Department

The Honorable Thomas L. Kay

No. 120701027

George K. Fadel, Attorney for Appellants

Jody K. Burnett and Robert C. Keller, Attorneys

for Appellees

Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME, J. FREDERIC VOROS JR.,

 and JOHN A. PEARCE.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 This is the second appeal by members of the Fadel family

(the Fadels) arising from Farmington City’s (the City)

determination that the Fadels’ barn (the Barn), which is used only

as a sign, violated a number of provisions of the Uniform Code for

the Abatement of Dangerous Buildings (the UCADB), available at

https://law.resource.org/pub/us/code/ibr/icc.ucadb.1997.pdf, and

that an abatement action was required. See generally Hodgson v.

Farmington City, 2014 UT App 188, 334 P.3d 484. The district court

agreed with the City. We affirm.
Hodgson v. Farmington City

¶2 In the first appeal, the Fadels argued that the Barn is a sign

and not a building subject to the UCADB. See id. ¶ 8 (citing the

Uniform Code for the Abatement of Dangerous Buildings § 302

(1997) (providing that “any building or structure” that exhibits

“any or all of the conditions or defects” described by the UCADB

“shall be deemed to be a dangerous building”)). The Fadels argued

that in Rock Manor Trust v. State Road Commission, 550 P.2d 205

(Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court “conclusively determined

that the Barn is a sign and that its holding makes the issue of

whether the Barn is a sign or a structure res judicata.” Hodgson,

2014 UT App 188, ¶ 9. We rejected that argument, stating that the

supreme court “determined only that the Fadels’ nonconforming

use of the Barn as a sign was not extinguished by the fire and

continued to be permitted pursuant to the Outdoor Advertising

Act’s grandfather clause.” Id. We stated that the Fadels did not

present any argument “explaining why the Barn could not be

classified as both a structure and a sign.” Id. Accordingly, we

rejected the assertion that the Barn was not subject to the UCADB.

Id.

¶3 In their first appeal, the Fadels also challenged the Notice

and Order issued by the Farmington City Board of Appeals,

claiming that it was insufficient because it gave them only the

options to repair the Barn or demolish it and did not give them the

third option under the UCADB, i.e., to vacate and secure the

building against entry “‘[i]f the building does not constitute an

immediate danger to the life, limb, property, or safety of the

public.’” See id. ¶ 10 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted)

(quoting the Uniform Code for the Abatement of Dangerous

Buildings § 403). We concluded that the Fadels “ha[d] failed to

explain how the potential remedy of vacating and securing the

Barn was even a viable option under the circumstances, let alone a

necessary one,” and we held that the Notice and Order was

sufficient. Id. We also rejected a challenge to the adequacy of the

Board’s factual findings regarding the dangerous conditions of the

Barn. Id. ¶¶ 11–12. After determining that the findings were

adequate, we concluded that the Fadels failed to satisfy their

20141125-CA 2 2015 UT App 43
Hodgson v. Farmington City

burden to demonstrate that the findings were not supported by

substantial evidence in the record. Id. ¶ 13. Considering the Fadels’

final argument that the Board’s decision did not adequately

describe “the requirements to be complied with,” we concluded

that “the Board implicitly indicated its intent that the Fadels

comply with the remedies outlined in the Notice [and Order].” Id.

¶ 14. We declined to disturb the decision of the Board, previously

affirmed by the district court. 

¶4 After their first appeal, the Fadels failed to comply with the

Notice and Order and stated that they would not do so absent a

further court order. The City filed a Motion to Allow Demolition of

a Dangerous Structure. On November 24, 2014, the district court

entered its Order on Farmington City’s Motion to Allow

Demolition of a Dangerous Structure (the Demolition Order), and

the Fadels filed this second appeal. Despitehaving prosecuted their

first appeal through the district court and this court, the Fadels

claim that the Demolition Order is “the only final appealable order

or judgment that is appealable as a matter of right” and further

claim that the appeal raises new issues not previously considered.

We disagree with both assertions. The Final Summary Judgment

and Order of Dismissal appealed by the Fadels in their first appeal

was a final appealable order. The Demolition Order enforced

compliance with the Notice and Order after the Fadels’

unsuccessful first appeal. This second appeal is therefore limited to

a review of the Demolition Order. 

¶5 The City moves for summary disposition, arguing that this

appeal seeks to reargue issues determined in the first appeal. The

Fadels again argue that the Rock Manor Trust case “confirms that

the sign is a nonconforming use which survives governmental

interference” and that the City cannot take action under the

UCADB to require that it be repaired or removed. We rejected this

argument in the first appeal. Hodgson v. Farmington City, 2014 UT

App 188, ¶ 9, 334 P.3d 484. At the hearing on the motion to

demolish the Barn, the district court clarified that issues regarding

the Fadels’ alleged right to relocate or replace the sign were not

20141125-CA 3 2015 UT App 43
Hodgson v. Farmington City

before the district court and were separate from issues related to

whether the Barn could be demolished as an unsafe structure. 

¶6 The Fadels next argue that the “proceeding to demolish a

sign structure requires substantial due process.” In the first appeal,

we rejected arguments challenging the due process afforded to the

Fadels in the administrative and district court proceedings. Id.

¶¶ 5–6. Furthermore, the Fadels were afforded due process

through the proceeding that resulted in the Notice and Order

specifically requiring repair or demolition of the Barn within

specified time frames and an appeal to the Board that included a

hearing where the Fadels had an opportunity to call and cross

examine witnesses. The Fadels then obtained judicial review by

both the district court and this court. After the first appeal, the

district court held an additional hearing on the City’s motion to

allow demolition of the Barn. The argument that the Fadels were

not afforded substantial due process lacks merit.

¶7 In this appeal, the Fadels again argue that the district court

erred in entering an order allowing demolition of the Barn rather

than allowing them to vacate and secure the Barn, which they use

only as a sign. In our earlier decision, we considered ”whether the

condition of the Barn makes it so dangerous that vacating and

securing it is an inadequate remedy.” Id. ¶ 9. We concluded that the

Fadels had failed to explain how vacating and securing the Barn

was “a viable option.” Id.In addition, we rejected an argument that

there was insufficient evidence to support the determination that

the Barn was an unsafe structure. Id. ¶ 10. 

¶8 The Fadels’ argument in this second appeal that there were

genuine issues of material fact related to the dangerous condition

of the Barn is tied to a mischaracterization of the proceedings on

the motion to demolish as a summary judgment proceeding rather

than an enforcement proceeding. The district court’sonly summary

judgment was affirmed in our 2014 decision in the Fadels’ first

appeal. Finally, the Fadels argue that the November 24, 2014 Order

failed to satisfy rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by

20141125-CA 4 2015 UT App 43
Hodgson v. Farmington City

failing to include findings of fact. Any factual issues regarding the

City’s right to proceed to abate the dangerous condition of the

building were resolved in the original proceedings that culminated

with our decision in the first appeal. In addition, the Fadels failed

to object to the form of the order. The proceedings on the motion

to demolish were limited to a determination of whether an order

was necessary to complete the proceedings. 

¶9 The Fadels cannot reargue in this appeal issues that were

determined in Hodgson v. Farmington City, 2014 UT App 188, 334

P.3d 484. We conclude that the district court did not err in entering

the Order on Farmington City’s Motion to Allow Demolition of a

Dangerous Structure. Accordingly, we affirm.

20141125-CA 5 2015 UT App 43