UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

BUENAVENTURA DIAZ-VALLE,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

SHARMALIE PERERA, et al.,

 Defendants.

Civil No. 11-2443

 

OPINION

This action comes before the Court on Defendants’ motion for: (1) an order 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for dismissal of Plaintiff’s 

complaint; or in the alternative (2) an order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 56(c) for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 

will GRANT summary judgment for Defendants.

I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Buenaventura Diaz-Valle brings this action against Defendants 

Sharmalie Perera, Yana Jeffers, Denise Johnson, Francis Meo, and Jane and John 

Does 1 through 20 (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff is currently an inmate in 

Northern State Prison (“NSP”), a state prison in New Jersey. Plaintiff is a native 

Spanish speaker and does not understand English. Defendants are several medical 

doctors, physician’s assistants, and nurses employed by NSP, and, with respect to 

the Doe Defendants, medical staff at South Woods State Prison (“SWSP”). 

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff was diagnosed with a hiatal hernia

over sixteen years ago. Plaintiff alleges from April 2009 through October 29, 

2010, while he was an inmate at SWSP, his condition caused chronic pain, 

vomiting, loss of appetite, and weight loss of over thirty pounds. He further 

alleges that he submitted multiple medical service requests to the SWSP medical 

department, but several members of the medical staff refused to treat him or allow 

him access to a Spanish-speaking interpreter. On October 30, 2012, Plaintiff was 

transferred to NSP, and the staff at NSP similarly ignored or denied his requests for 

medical attention. In response to the medical staff’s alleged lack of action, 

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Plaintiff claims to have filed a series of administrative relief forms, known as

Inmate Remedy System Forms (“IRSFs”), in order to compel Defendants to treat 

him. He maintains that his IRSFs were ignored, as well.

Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants on April 27, 2011, bringing 

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights by 

deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Defendants filed the pending motion 

in March of 2012. Plaintiff has not responded to the motion, and the time for any 

response has passed. The Court has federal question jurisdiction based on 28 

U.S.C. § 1331. 

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard1

A party seeking summary judgment must “show that there is no genuine 

issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 

(1986); Hersh v. Allen Prod. Co., 789 F.2d 230, 232 (3d Cir. 1986). The threshold 

inquiry is whether there are “any genuine factual issues that properly can be 

resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor 

of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (noting 

that no triable issue exists unless there is sufficient evidence favoring nonmoving 

party for jury to return verdict in its favor). In deciding whether triable issues of 

fact exist, this Court must view the underlying facts and draw all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Pa. Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 

236 (3d Cir. 1995). However, the non-moving party “may not rest upon the mere 

allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as

otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if

appropriate, shall be entered against him.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586; see also 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3). “Where the plaintiff is a pro se litigant, the court has an 

obligation to construe the complaint liberally.” Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 

322 (3d Cir. 2009). But a plaintiff’s pro se status does not excuse him from the 

 1 In order to resolve the pending motion, the Court must consider evidence outside of the 

pleadings, which would be inappropriate under Rule 12(b)(6). Thus, the Court will analyze the 

motion solely through the lens of summary judgment under Rule 56. To the extent Defendants 

sought to move separately to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court’s decision on summary 

judgment renders any such motion moot. 

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obligations of Rule 56. See Tillman v. Lebanon Cty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 

420 n. 10 (3d Cir. 2000).

B. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative 

remedies, as required by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e(a), which would bar this Court from undertaking further review of 

Plaintiff’s claims. Defendants are correct.

The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison 

conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “[T]he PLRA 

exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 

81, 93 (2006); Drippe v. Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 781 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 

Woodford). That means a prisoner must show compliance with his prison’s 

specific grievance procedures prior to filing suit. Drippe, 604 F.3d at 781. This 

stricture applies to claims of deliberate indifference to medical needs, such as the 

claims Plaintiff raises here. See, e.g., Watts v. Herbik, 364 F. App’x 723, 724 (3d 

Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of deliberate indifference claim where plaintiff 

failed to exhaust administrative remedies). “The availability of administrative 

remedies to a prisoner is a question of law.” Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 

(3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 2002)).

In support of their motion, Defendants have submitted the declarations of:

Frank Pellegrino, the Inmate Request Coordinator at NSP; Peter Ramos, the 

Supervisor of Claims for the Division of Risk Management for the State of New 

Jersey Department of the Treasury; Ralph Woodward, the Director of the Health 

Services Unit at the New Jersey Department of Corrections office in Trenton; and 

Linda Linen, a Program Development Specialist at SWSP. Defendants have also 

submitted various administrative and medical records pertaining to Plaintiff. This 

evidence, in sum, establishes some basic facts regarding both prisons, their 

administrative grievance procedures, and Plaintiff’s treatment and conduct during 

his incarceration.

Both SWSP and NSP have grievance systems for prisoners requesting 

administrative remedies pertaining to the conditions of incarceration. Inmates are 

provided with IRSFs that allow them to address any concerns, problems, and 

complaints. Once an inmate completes the form and submits it to the Office of the 

Executive Assistant in Charge of Remedy Forms, the IRSF is then given to the 

appropriate supervisor for a response. After a thirty-day processing period, the 

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inmate receives a response to his IRSF. The inmate may appeal the response. 

After a response is provided to the inmate’s appeal, his remedies are exhausted.

Although Plaintiff alleged that he exhausted his administrative remedies by 

attempting to use the IRSFs, Defendants uncontroverted evidence shows otherwise. 

Plaintiff submitted ten IRSFs while incarcerated at SWSP, but none concerning the 

claims raised in his complaint. During his incarceration at NSP, Plaintiff only 

submitted one IRSF, and that, too, did not concern his medical condition. These 

records indicate that not only did Plaintiff fail to exhaust his remedies, he did not 

use the process at all to attempt to remedy the issues that form the basis of his 

Section 1983 claims.

Because Plaintiff fails to proffer any evidence to the contrary, the Court 

finds that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff has 

exhausted his administrative remedies. Thus, summary judgment in Defendants’ 

favor is appropriate.

C. Deliberate Indifference Claims

Even had Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies, his claims for 

deliberate indifference could not survive a motion for summary judgment because 

he has failed to put forth evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue of 

material fact that might foreclose judgment against him.

To establish a claim under the Eighth Amendment for denial of medical 

care, an inmate-plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant was deliberately 

indifferent to his medical needs; and (2) those needs were serious. Rouse v. 

Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 

103 (1976)). Deliberate indifference occurs when “[an] official knows of and 

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 

U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Mere negligence is not sufficient. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 

106. Rather, deliberate indifference comprises a conscious disregard of a serious 

risk. Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197. A medical need is serious if it “has been diagnosed 

by a physician as requiring treatment,” or if it “is so obvious that a lay person 

would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Atkinson v. Taylor, 

316 F.3d 257, 272–73 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates 

v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). “A medical need is also serious 

where denial of treatment would result in the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

pain . . . or a life-long handicap or permanent loss.” Atkinson, 316 F.3d at 273 

(internal quotations and citations omitted).

Defendants have proffered sufficient evidence to indicate that they did not 

disregard an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health or safety. Plaintiff’s medical 

records from his incarceration indicate that he received extensive medical care for 

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a variety of issues, including the medical issues that are the basis for his present 

claims. Defendants also produced evidence that between April 8, 2009 and 

December 19, 2011, Plaintiff refused prescription pain medication and did not 

show for over fifty medical appointments. Plaintiff’s medical records clearly 

indicate that not only were Defendants making at least adequate attempts to treat 

Plaintiff, his intractable attitude made their job harder and possibly worsened his 

condition. The Court does not see how Defendants’ conduct even approaches the 

level of disregard required for a deliberate indifference claim. See Mosley v. 

Snider, 10 F. App’x 663, 664 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming summary judgment for 

medical staff-defendants where inmate refused to accept prescribed medication and 

missed three medical appointments); Gadson v. Goord, No. 96 Civ. 7544, 2000 

WL 328879, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2000) (granting summary judgment for 

defendants where inmate with severe back problems was offered medically 

adequate chair but inmate refused to accept it). On this record, the Court would 

have to find for Defendants. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed, the Court grants summary judgment for 

Defendants on the entirety of Plaintiff’s complaint. The Court also denies 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss as moot. An appropriate order follows. 

 /s/ William J. Martini 

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.

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