J-S71037-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MARK BROWN

 Appellant No. 2095 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 7, 2011

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division

at No(s): CP-51-CR-0400851-2002

BEFORE: BOWES, PANELLA, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED MARCH 15, 2017

Appellant, Mark Brown, appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment of 

sentence entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, 

following revocation of his probation. Appellant challenges the discretionary 

aspects and legality of his revocation sentence. We affirm. 

We adopt the facts and procedural history set forth by the trial court’s 

opinion. See Trial Ct. Op., 3/17/16, at 1-3. Appellant raises the following 

issues on appeal:

I. Was the sentence imposed by the trial court, which was 

5 to 10 years in state prison followed by 10 years[’] 

probation, unjust, improper, manifestly unreasonable, and 

an abuse of discretion because the sentence imposed of 

total incarceration plus 10 years[’] probation was contrary 

to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing 

process?

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S71037-16

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II. Was the sentence imposed by the trial court illegal 

because including the initial sentence of the court on the 

robbery offense of 11 1⁄2 to 23 [months’ imprisonment], 

the entire sentence imposed was longer than the 

maximum authorized allowable sentence of 20 years?

Appellant’s Brief at 2. 

In his first issue, Appellant’s challenges the discretionary aspects of his 

revocation sentence.1 Appellant argues his revocation sentence of five to 

ten years’ imprisonment, followed by ten years’ probation, is manifestly 

excessive. Appellant further alleges the court failed to consider mitigating 

factors, including Appellant’s age, rehabilitative needs, family history, that 

he was gainfully employed while on probation, and that he remained crimefree for the majority of his probation. Appellant concludes this Court should 

vacate his judgment of sentence. We conclude Appellant is not entitled to 

relief. 

After careful consideration of Appellant’s brief, the record, and the 

decision of the trial court, we affirm Appellant’s discretionary aspects issue

on the basis of the trial court’s opinion. See Trial Ct. Op. at 4-11 (finding: 

(1) Appellant demonstrated that he was not amenable to probation when he 

committed new offenses; (2) Appellant originally pleaded guilty to firstdegree robbery, first-degree aggravated assault, and criminal conspiracy, 

 

1 Appellant preserved his discretionary aspects of sentencing issue by filing a 

post-sentence motion and notice of appeal nunc pro tunc, including a 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his brief, and alleging that his discretionary 

aspects claims raised a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. 

Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2006). 
J-S71037-16

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which each carried a maximum sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment; (3) 

at the time of his original guilty plea, the plea/sentencing court had the 

statutory authority to sentence Appellant to a total of forty years’ 

imprisonment; (4) the trial court imposed a reasonable sentence of five to 

ten years’ imprisonment, followed by ten years’ probation for all offenses; 

(5) before imposing Appellant’s revocation sentence, the court considered all 

relevant factors, including the number of victims harmed by Appellant’s 

criminal conduct, the manner in which he committed the crimes, the 

protection of society, Appellant’s mental aptitude, employment history, prior 

criminal record, the sentencing guidelines, statutory maximums, and the 

factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), such as Appellant’s age, 

rehabilitative needs, and family history; (6) the court also balanced the 

interests of both society and Appellant in determining that his conduct 

indicated that probation was not an effective means by which to accomplish 

rehabilitation and deter future criminal conduct; (7) the court was not 

required to order a pre-sentence investigative report and a mental health 

evaluation; (8) the court had the opportunity to review Appellant’s probation 

history, as well as his demeanor during several court proceedings; (9) the 

court properly revoked Appellant’s sentence; (10) Appellant’s claim lacks 

merit because the court had sufficient information to determine a reasonable 

sentence after revoking Appellant’s probation). 
J-S71037-16

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In his second issue, Appellant argues his revocation sentence for 

robbery is illegal because his revocation sentence of five to ten years’ 

imprisonment followed by ten years’ probation combined with his original 

sentence of confinement, eleven-and-one-half to twenty-three months, 

exceeds the statutory maximum of twenty years for a first-degree felony.2 

Appellant concludes this Court should vacate his judgment of sentence. We 

conclude Appellant is not entitled to relief. 

“The issue of whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law and our 

scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 

1283 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). 

Our statutory and case law are clear. Subsequent to 

revocation of probation, the sentencing court has available 

to it all the options permissible at the time of initial 

sentencing, giving due consideration to the time spent 

serving the order of probation. As long as the new 

sentence imposed does not exceed the statutory maximum 

when factoring in the incarcerated time already served, the 

sentence is not illegal. Additionally, the sentencing court 

cannot give a new split sentence where the period of 

incarceration and period of probation exceed the statutory 

maximum. 

Id. at 1285 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “a

defendant who had previously served time on a split sentence and was 

subsequently sentenced to the maximum term after revocation of his 

probation was entitled to credit for time served for his original period of 

 

2 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(1). 
J-S71037-16

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incarceration.” Id. at 1284-85 (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 662 

A.2d 658, 659 (Pa. Super. 1995)). 

Here, Appellant was originally sentenced to eleven-and-one-half to 

twenty-three months’ imprisonment for robbery. Upon revocation, the court 

resentenced Appellant on the robbery offense to five to ten years’ 

imprisonment, followed by ten years’ probation. Although combining these 

sentences would subject Appellant to a sentence beyond the twenty-year

statutory maximum for a first-degree felony, the court granted Appellant 

credit for all time served upon imposing his revocation sentence. See N.T., 

6/7/11, at 22. Therefore, Appellant’s revocation sentence for robbery is not 

illegal, as it does not exceed the statutory maximum. See Crump, 995 

A.2d at 1284-85. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/15/2017
Commw. v. Mark Brown Page 1 of 11 

Court of Common Pleas to driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance: 

2010, defendant pled guilty before the Honorable Steven T. O'Neill in the Montgomery County 

(14) days to twenty (23) months incarceration followed by one (1) year probation. On June 15, 

retail theft - taking merchandise, at CP-15-CR-0002424-2008. He was sentenced to fourteen 

Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas to the charge of criminal conspiracy to engage in 

On May 21, 2010, defendant pied guilty before the Honorable Anthony Sarcione in the 

incarceration followed by eight (8) years consecutive probation. 

sentence and re-sentenced defendant to eleven and one-half (11 Yi) to twenty-three (23) months 

six (6) years consecutive probation. However, on August 11, 2003, this court vacated that 

(20) months) to forty-eight (48) months state incarceration with immediate parole, followed by 

evaluation were ordered. On August 5, 2003, defendant was sentenced to time served (twenty 

sentencing hearing was deferred, and both a pre-sentence investigation and mental health 

degree robbery, first-degree aggravated assault, and criminal conspiracy. Defendant's 

On May 21, 2003, defendant entered into a non-negotiated guilty plea to charges of firstByrd, J. March 17, 2016 

OPINION 

MAR 17 2016 

Criminal Appeals Unit 

First Judicipl District of PA 

MARK BROWN 2095 EDA 2015 

v. SUPERIOR COURT FILED 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA CP-5 l-CR-0400851-2002 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPIDA COUNTY 

CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION 

Circulated 02/22/2017 05:17 PM 
Commw. v. Mark Brown Page 2 of 11 

general impairment (first offense), at CP-46-CR-0005097-2008, and was sentenced to six (6) 

months probation. On July 30, 2010, defendant pied guilty before the Honorable Steven T. 

O'Neill in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas to receiving stolen property, at CP46-CR-0002534-2008. He was sentenced to one hundred and eight (108) days to twenty-three 

(23) months incarceration to be followed by two (2) years probation. In addition to these 

convictions, defendant absconded from the Philadelphia Probation Department on September 8, 

2008, and missed a scheduled meeting with his probation officer on May 17, 2011. 

In light of the above, a violation of probation hearing was held on June 7, 2011, and 

defendant was found to be in technical and direct violation of the probationary terms imposed by 

this court, Consequently, this court revoked defendant's probation and re-sentenced him to an 

aggregate imprisonment term of five (5) to ten (10) years followed by ten (10) years probation. 

Defendant did not file a post-sentence motion or an appeal of his new sentence. 

On September 27, 2011, defendant filed a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(PCRA). Norman Orville Scott, Esquire, was appointed as counsel, and filed an amended PCRA 

petition on July 29, 2014. On April 24, 2015, Mr. Scott was removed and John P. Cotter, 

Esquire, was appointed as counsel. On June 19, 2015, counsel filed a second amended PCRA 

petition wherein he sought the reinstatement of defendant's right to file a post-sentence motion 

and an appeal, nunc pro tune. The Commonwealth did not oppose this petition. On June 26, 

2015, this court granted defendant PCRA relief, permitting him to file a post-sentence motion 

and an appeal from the judgment of sentence imposed after the revocation of his probation on 

June 7, 2011. Defendant filed a motion requesting modification of his sentence on June 29, 

2015, and a notice of appeal on July 10, 2015. This court ordered defendant to file a statement of 
Commw. v. Mark Brown Page 3 of 11 

3 This court relied upon the facts stated in its October 27, 2004 1925(a) opinion in Commonwealth v. Wykiem 

Nelson, 3753 EDA 2003, and in its July 3, 2003 response to the Superior Court's request for a statement of reasons 

for revoking and denying bail for co-defendant Wykiem Nelson, at 56 EDM 2003. 

1 Co-defendant Wykiem Nelson was convicted by a jury of first-degree robbery and criminal conspiracy, on May 27, 

2003. 

2 See Commonwealth v. Wykiem Nelson, N.T. 05/23/03, p. 6. 

crime until November 19, 2001, when he was apprehended on a warrant.' 

daughters has a child by co-conspirator Reginald Lynch. Defendant was not arrested for this 

Lam's daughters has a child by defendant's brother, Joseph Sill. Another of Ms. Lam's 

Defendant and his co-conspirators knew Ms. Lam from the neighborhood. One of Ms. 

July 25, 2001.2 

a zygomatic fracture and an occipital lobe contusion. Ms. Lam was released from the hospital on 

the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, where she was treated for head trauma including 

body and took $700 and a bag of change from the store before fleeing. Ms. Lam was admitted to 

causing her to fall. Defendant and his co-conspirators then repeatedly struck her in the head and 

was making the pretzel, defendant and his co-conspirators grabbed Ms. Lam from the back, 

co-conspirator Reginald Lynch, and asked for another pretzel. While complainant Phoung Lam 

pretzel. Wykiem Nelson then returned to the store a third time, with defendant Mark Brown and 

exited without making a purchase.1 A few minutes later he returned to the store and purchased a 

Phoung Lam's corner grocery store located at 2838 Wharton Street, looked around the store and 

On July 23, 2001, at approximately 8 :00 a.m., co-conspirator Wykiem Nelson entered 

STATEMENT OF FACTS 

2015. 

matters complained of on appeal on July 15, 2015. Defendant filed his statement on July 23, 
Commw. v. Mark Brown Page 4 of 11 

4 The following is a verbatim account of defendant's Statement. 

Commonwealth v. Simmons, 56 A.3d 1280, 1283-1284 (Pa. Super. 2012)). An abuse of 

appeal." Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2014) ( quoting 

discretion of the trial court, which, absent an abuse of that discretion, will not be disturbed on 

"[t]he imposition of sentence following the revocation of probation is vested within the sound 

sentence imposed." Commonwealth v. Wright, 116 A.3d 133, 136 (Pa. Super. 2015). Indeed, 

sentence imposed following revocation, and any challenge to the discretionary aspects of the 

our Superior Court reviews "the validity of the revocation proceedings, the legality of the 

court after revocation of his probation. In an appeal from the revocation of a probation sentence, 

All of the issues raised in defendant's statement relate to the sentence imposed by this 

DISCUSSION 

1. The sentence imposed did not take into consideration the 

requirements of 42 Pa CSA sec. 9721 (b ). 

2. The sentence imposed did not take into consideration the 

defendant's age, family history and rehabilitative needs. 

3. The sentence imposed of 5 to 10 years in prison was an abuse 

of discretion and unreasonable because the trial court only 

considered the defendant's criminal history in imposing 

punishment. 

4. The imposition of a consecutive 10 years of probation to the 5 

to 10 year prison sentence was an abuse of discretion and 

unreasonable. 

5. The trial court imposed the sentence without a presentence 

report or mental health evaluation. 

6. The defendant reserves the right to modify, amend, and/or 

supplement this statement. 

Appeal, in accordance with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure l 925(b ):4 

Defendant raised the following issues in his Statement of Matters Complained of on 

STATEMENT OF MATTERS COMPLAINED OF ON APPEAL 
Commw. v. Mark Brown Page 5 of 11 

discretion is more than just an error in judgment. It is "synonymous with a failure to exercise a 

sound, reasonable, and legal discretion." Commonwealth v. Myers, 554 Pa. 569, 574, 722 A.2d 

649, 651 (1998) (quoting Commonwealth v. Powell, 527 Pa. 288, 298, 590 A.2d 1240, 1245 n.8 

(1991 )). The appellate court will not conclude that the trial court has abused its discretion unless 

the record discloses that the trial court's judgment was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of 

partiality, bias or ill-will. See McNabb. See also Commonwealth v. Gould, 912 A.2d 869 (Pa. 

Super. 2006) (holding that the standard of review is very narrow for a challenge to the 

discretionary aspects of a defendant's sentence). A sentence must either exceed the statutory 

limit or be manifestly excessive to constitute an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. 

White, 491 A.2d 252 (Pa. Super. 1985). 

Defendant alleges that his sentence was unreasonable and an abuse of this court's 

discretion. In Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 338 (Pa. Super. 2015), the court noted 

that "[ujpon revoking probation, a sentencing court may choose from any of the sentencing 

options that existed at the time of the original sentencing, including incarceration." By 

participating in additional criminal activity, defendant demonstrated that he was not amenable to 

probation and that he was a menace to society, thereby subjecting himself to the statutory 

maximum sentence for his original offense. Accordingly, this court did not abuse its discretion 

because defendant's sentence was not excessive and did not exceed the statutory limits for each 

offense. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 611 A.2d 731, 737 (Pa. Super. 1992) (holding that "a 

claim of excessiveness . . . does not constitute a substantial question when the sentence in 

question is within the statutory limits"). Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery, firstdegree aggravated assault, and criminal conspiracy. A defendant convicted of robbery, where 

the victim suffered serious bodily injury, has committed a first-degree felony. See 18 Pa. C.S. 
Commw. v. Mark Brown Page 6 of 11 

§3701(a)(l)(ii), (b), A first-degree felony carries a maximum term of twenty (20) years 

imprisonment. See 18 Pa. C.S. §1103(1). The offense of aggravated assault is a first-degree 

felony when defendant has caused serious bodily injury to the victim. See 18 Pa. C.S. 

§2702(a)(l), (b). As mentioned above, the court may sentence an individual convicted of a firstdegree felony to a maximum confinement term of twenty (20) years. See 18 Pa. C.S. 

§2702(a)(l), (b); 18 Pa. C.S. §1103(1). For his criminal conspiracy conviction, defendant was 

subject to the same sentence as the most serious crime for which he was convicted. See 18 Pa. 

C.S. §905(a). Accordingly, defendant could have been sentenced to an additional twenty (20) 

years in prison for criminal conspiracy. In total, it would have been within this court's statutory 

authority to sentence defendant to a maximum period of confinement of forty (40) years on these 

two offenses alone. See Coommonwealth v. Booze, 953 A.2d 1263 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting that 

42 Pa. C.S. §9721 gives sentencing court discretion to impose consecutive or concurrent 

sentences); Commonwealth v. Yuhasz, 592 Pa. 120, 133, 923 A.2d 1111, 1119 (2007) (holding 

that "[tjhe only line that a sentence may not cross is the statutory maximum sentence"), Instead, 

defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of five (5) to ten (10) years in a state correctional 

institution followed by ten (10) years probation. 

Contrary to defendant's argument, his sentence was reasonable. See Commonwealth v. 

Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 190 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting that "[w]hen reviewing a sentence outside 

of the guideline range, the essential question is whether the sentence imposed was reasonable"); 

Commonwealth v. Daniel, 30 A.3d 494, 497 (Pa. Super. 2011) (recognizing that "the term 

'unreasonable' generally means a decision that is either irrational or not guided by sound 

judgment"). In determining whether a sentence was reasonable, the appellate court reviews: (1) 

the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; 
Commw. v. Mark Brown Page 7 of 11 

(b) General standards.--ln selecting from the alternatives set forth in 

subsection (a), the court shall follow the general principle that the sentence 

imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection of the 

public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the 

victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. The 

court shall also consider any guidelines for sentencing and resentencing adopted 

by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing and taking effect under section 

2155 (relating to publication of guidelines for sentencing, resentencing and 

parole and recommitment ranges following revocation). i In every case in which 

the court imposes a sentence for a felony or misdemeanor, modifies a sentence, 

rcsentences an offender following revocation of probation, county intermediate 

punishment or State intermediate punishment or resentences following remand, 

the co1111 shall make as a part of the record, and disclose in open court at the 

time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence 

imposed. In every case where the court imposes a sentence or resentence outside 

the guidelines adopted by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing 

under sections 2154 (relating to adoption of guidelines for sentencing), 2154. l 

(relating to adoption of guidelines for county intermediate punishment), 2154.2 

(relating to adoption of guidelines for State intermediate punishment), 2154.3 

(relating to adoption of guidelines for fines), 2154.4 (relating to adoption of 

guidelines for reseuteucing) and 2154.5 (relating to adoption of guidelines for 

parole) and made effective under section 2155, the court shall provide a 

contemporaneous written statement of the reason or reasons for the deviation 

from the guidelines to the commission, as established under section 

2153(a)(14) (relating to powers and duties). Failure to comply shall be grounds 

for vacating the sentence or resentence and resentencing the defendant. 

5 Section 9721 (b) states: 

committed these crimes, the protection of society, the sentencing guidelines, as well as his age, 

number of victims harmed by defendant's criminal conduct, the manner in which defendant 

the sentence. The record reflects that this court considered all relevant factors, including the 

for defendant's contention that this court considered only his criminal history when fashioning 

consideration of his age, family history and rehabilitative needs. Moreover, there is no support 

Section 9721(b) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §9721(b),5 and that there was no 

Defendant incorrectly asserts that this court did not consider the factors set forth in 

court considered the above-listed factors before imposing a reasonable sentence on defendant. 

promulgated by the commission. Id. (citing 42 Pa. C.S. §9781(d)). The record shows that this 

investigation; (3) the findings upon which the sentence was based; and (4) the guidelines 

(2) the sentencing court's opportunity to observe the defendant, including any presentence 
Commw. v. Mark Brown Page 8 of 11 

Mr. Brown, you will recall that I initially sentenced you to a period of 

state incarceration and both the assistant district attorney and the defense 

attorney sought reconsideration of the sentence because at that time you had no 

prior conviction as a juvenile or an adult. I relented and sentenced you to a 

period of county incarceration, time served to 48 months, paroled you 

immediately. l11at was followed by a period of probation and 1 directed that you 

be employed, that you enroll in and complete drug therapy, that you pay $700 in 

restitution and $277.50 in court costs. 

I also told you the following: Sir, if you have any thoughts of returning 

to a life of crime, you should appreciate that there are consequences and one of 

those consequences is that, and this was in reference if you were convicted of a 

crime of violence, the first conviction having constituted a first strike, you 

cannot come before that judge as you did before me and plead for leniency. 

Well, you can do it but the judge could have no authority to do it. Do you 

understand? You said yes. 

I would hope that you will continue to be the person that the record 

suggests you were before you ran into Mr. Nelson, your co-defendant or 

whomever it was that you allied yourself with when you decided to take from 

someone who works 12 hours a day, seven days a week. People like that are 

appreciated in our society. Do you understand? You told me yes. You told me 

you would not engage in any misconduct. 

6 Before imposing sentence, this court stated the following: 

Furthermore, there were no impermissible factors considered by this court. 

and the circumstances surrounding the various crimes he committed before imposing sentence.6 

and nature of the crime." Indeed, this court carefully assessed defendant's individual situation 

the [individual's] character, displays of remorse, defiance or indifference, and the overall effect 

1990)), the sentencing court must be accorded great weight "as it is in the best position to view 

354 (Pa. Super. 1992) (quoting Commonwealth v. Clever, 576 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Pa. Super. 

his sentence was unreasonable. As the court held in Commonwealth v. Eicher, 605 A.2d 337, 

all other legally permissible and pertinent factors, there is no support for defendant's claim that 

each conviction, the facts of this case, defendant's individual circumstances and background, and 

22. Because this court carefully reviewed the sentencing guidelines, the statutory maximum for 

record, and rehabilitative needs before imposing defendant's sentence. See N.T. 06/07/11, pp. 3- 

mental aptitude, educational attainment, family history, employment history, prior criminal 
Commw. v. Mark Brown Page 9 of 11 

THE COURT: I think you just thumb your nose at me and 

at this system and I think that you've engaged in criminal misconduct and 

you've gotten away with it. I do not intend to permit you to continue to violate 

others. When you were here the last time, you had a prior record score of zero. 

The offense gravity score was 12. The guidelines were 48 to 66, plus or minus 

12, and you got a county sentence. 

I have determined that you are not amenable to probation and that a 

period of state incarceration is required to protect other members of our society 

from you. 

Mr. Marcus, Mr. Powers, neither of you was involved in this case but 

the defendant and his co-defendant took it upon themselves to rob a merchant, 

one of the local restaurants. They went into the store and beat this woman about 

her face, fractured her orbital bone and they stole $700 from her. The defendant 

set this up because his brother had fathered a child by the shopkeeper's 

daughter. I thought it was a fairly heinous crime at the time but the parties 

thought that because of his outstanding record, he should be given a break. I 

vacated the stated sentence and gave him a county sentence. This is what I have 

to - this is what the defendant has done in response to that. 

N.T. 06/07/11, pp. 18-21. 

[Probation Officer}: Fifty-five dollars, Your Honor. 

Now, I can appreciate that you've had only eight years to pay off the 

$700. But it seems to me you could have exhausted that sum by paying about 

$100 a year. 

How much has he paid? 

(Pa. Super. 2007), the court explained that "it is only when 'it becomes apparent that the 

Conte, 419 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. Super. 1980). In Commonwealth v. Carver, 923 A.2d 495, 499 

against the possibility of rehabilitating the defendant outside of prison." Commonwealth v. Del 

"the court balances the interests of society in preventing future criminal conduct by the defendant 

revocation of probation, this purpose should not be frustrated"). In making such a determination, 

A.2d 82, 86 (2007) (ruling that "[e]ven where the VOP hearing record is insufficient to sustain 

114-115, 305 A.2d 701, 708 (1973). See also Commonwealth v. Mullins, 591 Pa. 341, 349, 918 

sufficient deterrent against future antisocial conduct." Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 

that the probation has proven to be an effective vehicle to accomplish rehabilitation and a 

incarceration, this court carefully considered "whether the conduct of the probationer indicates 

Before revoking defendant's probation and re-sentencing him to the above-stated term of 
Commw. v. Mark Brown Page 10 of 11 

court for sentencing purposes. Prior to imposing defendant's original sentence in August 2003, 

2000)). It is important to note that this was not the first time defendant had been before this 

Id. at 725 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748 A.2d 721, 728 (Pa. Super. 

The first responsibility of the sentencing judge [is] to be sure that 

he ha] s] before him sufficient information to enable him to make a 

determination of the circumstances of the offense and the character 

of the defendant. Thus, a sentencing judge must either order a PSI 

report or conduct sufficient presentence inquiry such that, at a 

minimum, the court is apprised of the particular circumstances of 

the offense, not limited to those of record, as well as the 

defendant's personal history and background .... The court must 

exercise 'the utmost care in sentence determination' if the 

defendant is subject to a term of incarceration of one year or 

more[.] 

Carrillo-Diaz, 64 A.3d 722 (Pa. Super. 2013): 

information to make the determination of sentence"). As the court stated in Commonwealth v. 

Super. 1980) (stating that "[b ]road discretion is reposed in the judge to receive relevant 

this case. See Pa. R. Crim. P. 702(A)(l ), (B); Commonwealth v. Vernille, 418 A.2d 713, 719 (Pa. 

to order a pre-sentence investigation and a mental health evaluation, but such was not required in 

investigation or mental health evaluation. Certainly, it is within the sentencing court's discretion 

Defendant further claims that his new sentence was imposed without a pre-sentence 

Thus, there is no merit to defendant's claim that this court imposed an unreasonable sentence. 

revoked, and his new sentence was not illegal nor was it an abuse of this court's discretion. 

rehabilitation and deterring future criminal conduct. Thus, defendant's probation was properly 

not err in determining that probation was an ineffective vehicle in accomplishing defendant's 

115, 305 A.2d at 708). In balancing the interests of society and those of defendant, this court did 

impose a more appropriate sanction should not be fettered." Id. at 499 (quoting Kates, 452 Pa. at 

probationary order is not serving this desired end (of rehabilitation) the court's discretion to 
Commw. v. Mark Brown Page 11 of 11 

i THECOUR, 

( ~·· 

! San 

Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, the judgment of sentence should be AFFIRMED. 

revoked. 

enable this comt to formulate a careful and reasonable sentence after defendant's probation was 

proceedings. Indeed, the record shows that more than sufficient information was available to 

note that this court had the opportunity to observe defendant's demeanor during several court 

particular circumstances surrounding defendant's probation violations. It is further important to 

addition, a Gagnon II hearing summary was submitted which apprised this court with the 

this court had the benefit of both a pre-sentence investigation and a mental health evaluation. In