NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

PETER JOSEPH DANIELS, III, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 18-0306

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County

No. P1300CR201700779

The Honorable Tina R. Ainley, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Law Offices of Stephen L. Duncan, PLC, Scottsdale

By Stephen L. Duncan

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 4-23-2019
STATE v. DANIELS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the decision of the court, in which Presiding 

Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined.

S W A N N, Judge:

¶1 This is an appeal under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), from Peter Joseph Daniels III’s 

convictions and sentences for two counts of aggravated assault and one 

count of criminal damage. Neither Daniels nor his counsel identify any 

issues for appeal.1 We have reviewed the record for fundamental error. See 

Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000); Anders, 386 U.S. 738; State v. Clark, 196 

Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30 (App. 1999). We find none.

¶2 Daniels was indicted for two counts of aggravated assault

(class three felonies), two counts of aggravated assault against persons

under 15 years of age (class two felonies), and one count of criminal damage 

in an amount totaling between $1,000 and $2,000 (class six felony). He

pleaded not guilty, and the matter proceeded to a jury trial.

¶3 At trial, the state presented evidence of the following facts, 

which we view in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdicts. 

See State v. Gunches, 225 Ariz. 22, 25, ¶ 14 (2010). T.M., C.W., and T.M.’s two 

young daughters were driving home to Phoenix from Prescott in T.M.’s 

small four-door hatchback, when T.M. noticed a SUV weaving through 

traffic behind him. T.M. was driving, with C.W. in the passenger seat and 

his daughters in the backseat, while Daniels was driving alone in the 

approaching SUV. It was midday and T.M.’s car windows were down.

 

1 Daniels filed a motion with this court in propria persona in February

2019, in which he argues that his “appointed assistance of counsel has not 

been adequate,” and requests additional time to file a supplemental brief. 

First, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may only be raised in 

petitions for post-conviction relief, not in direct appeals. See State v. Spreitz, 

202 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 9 (2002). Second, by the time Daniels requested an 

extension, the deadline to file a supplemental brief had already passed. We 

deny his request for an extension to file a supplemental brief.
STATE v. DANIELS

Decision of the Court

3

¶4 Daniels started to drive close to T.M.’s rear. T.M. could not 

change lanes because of the traffic, so Daniels drove into the median to pass 

him, kicking up dirt and debris onto his car. T.M. stuck up his middle finger 

toward Daniels, who reciprocated the gesture, laughed, and started braking 

in front of T.M. At a bend in the road, Daniels swerved his SUV attempting 

to force T.M. and his passengers off the road, but T.M. maneuvered sharply 

to avoid Daniels. C.W. fumbled with her phone to call the police while 

trying to comfort the worried children. T.M. then sped up to approximately 

90 miles per hour to get ahead of and away from Daniels, but Daniels was 

able to get back behind T.M.’s car and rammed it several times with his 

front bumper while both vehicles were still traveling at high speeds. 

Daniels then pulled his SUV up to the side of T.M.’s car, and began laughing

and “egging [T.M.] on.” T.M. warned his passengers to hold on and 

“mashed” on the brakes so to fall behind Daniels, and then took several 

pictures of Daniels’s license plate. T.M. abruptly pulled off the highway 

into a store parking lot and Daniels drove away. The altercation caused 

approximately $4,200 of damage to T.M.’s car.

¶5 The court denied Daniels’s motion for a judgment of acquittal 

under Ariz. R. Crim. P. (“Rule”) 20. The jury found Daniels guilty of two 

counts of aggravated assault (as to T.M. and C.W., but not to T.M.’s two 

minor children) and one count of criminal damage in an amount of over 

$1,000, and the court sentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment, with credit 

for 315 days of presentence incarceration.

¶6 We detect no fundamental error. Daniels was present and 

represented at all critical stages. The jury was properly comprised under 

A.R.S. § 21-102 and was properly instructed. The jury’s verdict was 

supported by sufficient evidence.

¶7 A person commits assault by “intentionally placing another

person in reasonable apprehension of immediate physical injury.” A.R.S. 

§ 13-1203(A)(2). Basic assault becomes aggravated assault if the person 

commits the assault by using a “dangerous instrument,” such as a vehicle.

A.R.S. §§ 13-105(12), -1204(A)(2). Here, the state’s evidence established that, 

while driving at high speeds, Daniels drove close on T.M.’s rear, swerved 

his SUV toward T.M.’s car at a bend in the road, and then rammed T.M.’s 

car from the rear several times. Daniels’ physical gestures toward T.M.’s 

car further indicate that his aggressive driving was intentional, and support 

finding that T.M. and C.W. feared for their safety. Daniels was aware that 

C.W. was a passenger in the car. A person commits criminal damage by 

“recklessly defacing or damaging the property of another person.” A.R.S. 

§ 13-1602(A)(1); see A.R.S. § 13-1701(1) (“‘Damage’ means any physical or 
STATE v. DANIELS

Decision of the Court

4

visual impairment of any surface.”). Here, the state established that T.M.’s 

vehicle sustained over $4,000 in damage from the altercation with Daniels—

significantly more than the $1,000 to $2,000 in damage required under § 13-

1602(B)(4), with which Daniels was charged and convicted. The court 

imposed a lawful prison term for Daniels’s convictions under A.R.S. §§ 13-

703(J), -1204(E), and -1602(B)(4).

¶8 We affirm. Defense counsel’s obligations pertaining to this 

appeal have come to an end. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85 

(1984). Unless, upon review, counsel discovers an issue appropriate for 

petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court, counsel must only 

inform Daniels of the status of this appeal and his future options. Id.

Daniels has 30 days from the date of this decision to file a petition for review 

in propria persona. See Rule 31.21(b)(2)(A). Upon the court’s own motion, 

Daniels has 30 days from the date of this decision in which to file a motion 

for reconsideration. See Rule 31.20(c).