1 RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Six

th Circuit Rul e 206

ELECTRO NIC CIT

ATION: 2003 FED App . 0338P (6th C ir.) File Name: 03a03 38p.06



### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXT H CIR CUIT

_________________
M ARK V ROMAN , Petitione r-Appell ant,

v.

ANTHONY B RIGA

NO , Warden, Respondent-Appellee. X

- - - -
> , - - N No. 02-3258

Appeal from the United States District Court for the So uthern D istrict of

Ohio at Col

umbus. No. 99-01277—Algenon L. Ma rbley, District Judge.
Argued: August 1, 2003
Decided and Filed: September 22, 2003

Befor e: KENNEDY, GI

LMAN , and GI

BBONS, Circuit Judges.

_________________ COUNSEL

AR GUED: William R. Gallagher, ARENSTEIN & GALL AGH ER, C incinnat

i, Ohio, for Appella

nt. Stepha

nie L. Watson, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENE RAL, CORRE CTIONS LITIGATI ON SE CT IO N, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee

. ON BRIE F: William R. Gallagher, ARE NS TEIN & GAL

LAGH ER, Cincin

n ati, Ohio, for 2 Vroman v. Brigano No. 02-3258

Appellant

. Ste phanie L. Watson, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, C ORRECTIONS LI TIGATI ON SECTION, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.

_________________ OPINION

_________________ JU LIA SMITH GI

BBONS , C ircuit Judge. Petitionerappellant Mark Vroman was convicted on one cou nt of
mu rder with a firearm specification in Ohio state cou rt

. Vroman appeals the distri ct court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as time-barred under the applicable one-yea

r statute of limitations set forth in the Antiterr orism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2 244(d). F or the fo llowing r easons, we affi rm the judg

ment of the

district c ourt.

I.

OnJuly 28, 1995, an Ohio jury convicted Vroman of murder w ith a fire arm spec ificatio n. He wa s sentenc ed to a termof fifte en y

ears to li fe in pris o n for the murder convictionand

a term of three ye ars for the use of the firearm to be ser ved consecutively with and prior to the murder sentence. Vroman a

ppealed his convicti on to the O hio Court of Appeals, and on June 24, 1 996, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. On December 18, 1996, t

he Ohio Supreme Court denied Vroman’s request for leave to appeal and dismissed t

he appe al as not involving any substantial constitutional question.

OnAugust 1 1, 19 97, Vroman filed a delay ed application for reopeni ng his ap peal pur suant to Oh

io Appell ate Ru le 26(B), and the application was denied as un ti me ly. Vroman then filed a pro se

appeal of the Ohio Court of Appea ls’ s decisionwith

the Ohio Su

preme Court on October 31, 1997. The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed Vroman’s appeal.No. 02-3258 Vroman v. Brigano 3

Prior to the above proceedings, on or about September 24, 1996, Vroman f

iled a de layed petition to vaca te or set a si d e his sentence. The trial co u rt denied this post-conviction actionas untimel

y on November 15, 1996. Vroman appealed and on April 15 , 1997, th e Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial c ourt’s judgmen

t. On Septe

mber 2, 19 97, the Oh

io Supreme Court dismis sed Vroma n’s subse quen t appeal

. Fi na ll y, on November 12, 1997, Vroman filed a motion for relief from judg

ment req uesting that the tr

ial cour t vacate its November

15, 1996, decision

dismissing

his post-conviction actionas untimel

y f ile d. On D ecember 31, 1997, the trial court denied Vroman’s motion. On December 10, 1998, the Ohio Court of A

ppeals af firmed the judgment of the trial court. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to hear the case a nd dismissed Vroman’s appeal on April 21, 1999.

OnNovember 2 3, 1999, Vroma n, act ing pro se , filed a petition for writ

of habea s corpus p

ursuant t o 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the U ni ted States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. In his habeas petition, Vroman alleg ed sixteen grounds for relief. The Warden, Anthony Brigano, moved to dismiss the petition for failing to comply with the one-yea r statute of

limitations

imposed by

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). On March 19, 2001, the district court denied the Warden’s motion to dismiss, concluding tha t Vroman’s untimely Ohio post-conviction petition tolled the running of the sta tute of limitations under § 2244(d)(2). The Warden moved for rec onsidera

tion and th e distr

ict court denied the motion. Thereafter, t

he Warden filed a Return of Writ, and
on Decemb er 17, 20 01, the dis tr ict court dismissed the petition a s time-ba

rred due to the Sixth

Circuit’s decision in Raglin v. Randle , No. 00-3322, 2001 WL 523530 ( 6th Cir. May 8, 2001). Vroman moved for reconsideration, and on January 30, 2002, the district court denied his motion.

OnFebruary

26, 2002, Vroman

filed a notice of appeal and

anapplica

tion for a certifi cateof app ealability. The district court granted a certificate of

appealability on the issues of whether the stat ute of limitations expired prior to filing the 4 Vroman v. Brigano No. 02-3258

instantpetition and whether Vroman is entitled to an evidentiary

hearing to prese

nt eviden

ce that h

is postconvicti on action

was timely

filed in st

ate cour t.

II.

The dismissal of a habeas pe tit ion by the district court as barred by 2 8 U.S.C. § 2 244’s sta tute of lim

itations is reviewed de novo

. Cook v. Ste gall , 295 F.3d

517, 519 ( 6th Cir.), cert. denied , 123 S.Ct. 699 (2002). Where the facts of the case are undisputed

or the district

court rules as a matter of law that e quitable

tolling is unavailable, this court reviews the decision de novo

. Dunlap v. United States , 250 F.3 d 1001, 1007 (6th Cir. 2001).

Under AEDPA, a pri soner has one y ear from the
co mp letion of the direct review of his case to commence a collateral attack on his conviction. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). This one year

limitation period runs from the latest of: (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusionof direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an appl icati on created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United State s is remove d, if the applica

nt was pre

vented f rom fil ing by

such State action; (C) the date on which the constitutional ri ght ass erted
was initially recog

ni zed b y the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by

the Supreme Court and ma de re tr oa ct iv el y a

p plicable to cases on collateral review; or (D) the date

on which t

h e fac tual pre dicate o f the cla im
or claim s pres ented could have b een di scove red th rough the exercise of due diligence.

Id. Vroman’s conviction became final on March 18, 1997, ninety days afte r the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed his directNo. 02-3258 Vroman v. Brigano 5

1 Oh io Rev ised C ode § 29 53.2 3 pe rmits the u nti mel y filing of a peti ti on f

or p ost-co nviction relief if (1) the petition er was unavo idab ly prevente d from dis co ve ring the f actual predicate of hi s claim, or (2) t he United Sta tes Supreme Co urt recognized a new federal or st ate right that applies retr oactiv ely t o persons i n the peti ti on er’s si tuation and the appea l. See Bron augh v. Oh io , 235 F.3d 280, 283 ( 6th Cir

. 2000). Theref

ore, i n the a bsenc e of any tol ling, Vroman had until March 18, 1998, to file his habeas petition.

The AEDPA limitations period ma y b e tolled for that period of time “during which a properly filed application for State post-c o nviction r

elief or other co llatera

l review with respect to the per

tinent judg ment or claim is pending.” 28 U .S.C. § 2244( d)(2) (emphasis added). “The tolling provision does not, however, ‘revive’ the limitations period (i.e., restart the clock at zero) ; it can on ly serve to pause a clock

that has notyet fully

ru n . Once the limitations period is expired, coll ateral petitions can no longer serve to avoid a statute of li mitations.” Rashid v. Khulmann , 991 F. Supp. 254, 25 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).

OnAugust 11 , 1997 , during the relevant one-y ear period, Vroman filed a d elay ed Ohio Ap

pellate R ule 26(B) action

and

a post-con viction pe

tition. The

petition w as ultimately dismissedby the Ohio Supreme Court o n January 21, 1998. Becau se Vroman filed the Rule 26 (B) action 146 day s after his conviction became final, Vroman had 219 day s remaining of his AEDPA one-y ear sta tute of limitations as of January 2 1, 1998. Therefore, Vroman must also receive tolling during t

he ti m e his post-conviction action remained pending inthe state courts to prevent his habeas petition, filed on November 23, 1999, from being time barred.

Effective Sept ember 21 , 1995, Oh io amende d its postconvictionstatute to

inclu de a time limitation period of 180 d ays from the d

ate the c riminal tr ial trans cript is f

il ed in th e appella te court for direct review, subject to severa l exception s. 1 Ohi o Revised Co de § 2953. 23(A). Ca ses in 6 Vroman v. Brigano No. 02-3258

petit ioner shows by clear and convinc ing evi dence that no reasonabl e fact fin der would have fo und h im guilty. V rom an did not arg ue that h is postconvi cti on petiti on fell wi thin eit her of these excepti ons in stat e court and doe s not ar gue tha t either ex cep tion ap plies o n app eal to this c ourt. which a sentence was imposed prior to September 21, 1995,
were given a

one-yea r grace period, and, there fore, Vroman’s deadline for filing any

petition seeking post-conviction relief
was September 21, 1996. O hio Re vised Cod e § 2953.21(A)(2). Because that par ticular date fe ll on a Sa tu rd ay, the act

ual deadline was Monday , September 23, 1996. Ohio Criminal Rule 45(A). According

to the Ohio tri al court , Vroman ’s postconvictionpetition was filed on September 24, 1996, one day late. The Ohio t

rial cou rt concl uded that Vroman’ s peti ti on was nott imely filed acc ording to Ohio law. Vroman appealed, arguing that

his petition was timely filed beca use he delivered the petiti on to prison auth or ities for mailing on September

19, 1996, within the applicable time limit (the “mailbox rule”). The appellate court rejec ted Vroman’s argume nt, holding t

hat “[a] fi ling is tim e ly

only if it is filed

w ith the court within the appropriate time limits; the jailer does not represent the court for filing purpose s.”

Vroman then move d for re lief fro m ju dgme nt pursua nt to Ohio Civil Rule 60(B), arguing that the clerk of court actually

r eceived his petition on September 23, 1996, and, therefor e , his petition was timely. In su pport of h is argu ment, Vroman submittedtwo letter s he wrote to t he postma ster of the post office that deliv ers mail t o the Ross Co

unty Clerk of C ourts. The postmaster made handwritten notes on the letters stating that mail is delivered to the courthouse at 12:30 p.m. on a daily basis, an d that mail

is never deliver ed prior to 9:00 a.m. V roman’s petition was stamped received on September 24, 1996, at 9:04 a.m. The refore , Vroman claimed t

hat his petition was received by

the clerk on September

23, but wasNo. 02-3258 Vroman v. Brigano 7

notstamped until September 2 4. The Ohio state courts rejecte d Vroman ’s arg

ument.

Inrespon se to the Warden’s argument that Vroman’s habeas petition should be dismissed as time-barred, Vroman claimed the state courts had erroneously determined

that his post-convictionpetition was untimely. The district court defer red to the stat

e courts ’ deter

mination that the pos t

convictionpetition w as untime ly, and, therefore, the district court concluded that Vrom an’s h abeas petition was timebarred.

Onappeal, Vro m an arg

ues that the distric t court e rred in determining that the stat ute of limitations imposed by § 2244(d) was not tolled by his state post-conviction filing because his post-conviction petition was timely filed with the Ohio tria l court. The Unite d States Supreme Court has held that an application fo r p ost-conv iction re lief is “properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2) “when its delivery and accept ance ar e in compl iance with

the applicable laws and rules governing filing s. T hese usually pre scribe, for example, . . . th e time limits upon its delivery.” Artuz v. Bennett , 531 U.S. 4 , 8 (2000) . Similarly , this court

has held that an application for post-conviction reli ef is “‘p

roperly filed’ when its delivery a nd accept ance are in compliance with the appli cable

laws and rules governing filings, e .g., . . . applica ble time limits upon its delivery.” Isra fil v. Russ ell
, 276 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 2001), ce r t. denied , 122 S.Ct. 1985 (2002).

The ti meliness of an Ohio prisoner’s post-conviction petition is governed by

state statute. O hio Rev ised Code §§ 2953.21(

A)(2) & 2953.23(

A). Acc ording t

o the Ohio Supreme Court, apleading is considered filed on theday it is filed with the c ourt. State ex rel. Tyler v. Alexander , 52 Ohio St.3d84 (Ohio 1990). The Ohio courts concluded that Vroman’s post-conviction petition was not timely filed under Ohio law. “[F]ederal courts . . . defer to a state cour t’s judgment on issues of state law and , m ore particularly , on 8 Vroman v. Brigano No. 02-3258

issues of state procedural law.” Israfil , 276 F.3d at 7 71; see also Godfrey v. Beightler , No. 02-3499, 2002 WL 31805606, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 2002) (stating that “f ederal courts defer to the state court’s inter pret ation of state filing requirements”). In Israfil , the Sixth Circuit he ld that “[b]ecau se state cou

rts are the final authority on state law, federal courts mu st

accept a state court’s interpretation of its statutes and its rules of practice.” 276 F.3d at 771 (citations omitted). Therefore, the Israfil court conclud ed th at the districtcourt properly

deferred to the Ohio state court’s finding as to whether the petitioner’s post-conviction motion had been sub mitted ac cording to Ohio’s t

im eli ness require ments. Id. at 771-72 ; see also R aglin , 2001 WL 523530, at *1 (holding that “unt imely state collateral attacks
are notproperl

y filed and do not toll

the statut e of limita tions” and therefore concluding

that the petitioner’s post-conviction petition did not toll the statute of limitations because it was dismissedas untimely under Ohio law) . Here, as in Is r afil
, the district c ourt properly c oncluded thatOhio’s determination

of whether Vroman’s post-conviction petition
was properly filed governs whether such a c tion tolls the statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(2).

Vroman contends that the Ohio state courts’ conclus ion that his post-conviction petition was untimely is incorrec tand an
unreasonabledetermination based on the fac ts presented, and argues that this court should apply the fe deral mailbox rule to his post-conviction filing. This court, howev er, does not functionas an additional state appellate court reviewingstatecou rt decisions on state law or procedure. Allen v. Mo rris , 845 F.2d 610, 614 (6th Cir. 1988). Federal courts are obligated t o accept as valid a state court’s interpreta tion of state law and rules of

practice of that state. Duffell v. Dutton , 785 F.2d 131, 133 (6th Cir. 1986). In Houston v. L ack , 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988), the United States Sup reme C ourt adopted the mailb o x rule in hold ing that when a pr

isoner is acting pro se , his notice of appeal is considered “filed” under federal law when

he turns t

he petit ion o ver to the prison authorities for ma ilin g. The Ohio Supreme Court hasNo. 02-3258 Vroman v. Brigano 9

expressly rejected this rule. Tyler , 5 2 Ohi o St.3d at 85 ; see also State v. H

ansbro , No. 2001-CA-88, 2002 WL 1332297, at *4 (Ohio Ct . App. June 1 4, 2002) ( noting that Ohio courts have “rejected a ‘pr

ison mail rule’” ). In

addition, the major

ity of federa l circuit s to consid

er the iss ue have decline d to extendthe mailbo x rule to the determinati on of f

iling dates for stat e po st-conviction applications. See Coleman v. Johnson
, 184 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1564 (200 0); Adams v. LeMaster , 223 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2000); Web

ster v. M oore , 199 F.3d

1256, 1258-59 (11th Cir. 2000). But see Anthonyv. Cambra , 236 F.3d 568, 575 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that the Ninth Circuit holds that the federal “mailbox rule applies with equal force to thefiling of state as well as federal petitions”). Accordingly , this court will notrecon sider the Ohio state courts’ determination that Vroman’s post-convictionpetition was untimely or apply the federal mailbox rule to the present case.

I n the alternative, Vroman argues tha t the doctrine of equitabl e tolling sh

ould apply

to his case. Vroman

bears the burden of demons trating

that he is

entit led to equ

itable toll ing. Griffin v. Rogers , 308 F.3d 647, 653 (6th Cir. 2002). The doctrine o f equitable tolling is applied sparingly by federal co urts. Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc. , 209 F.3d 552, 560 (6th Cir. 2000). “T ypi ca ll y, e quitable tolling applies only when a litigant’s failure to meet a legally

-mandated deadline unavoi dably aros e fromcircumstances bey

ond that litigant ’ s control.” Id. at 560-61 (citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court has explained tha t “ [w]e have a llowed eq uitable to lling in situations where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by f

ilin g a de fective pleading during the statutory period, or where the complainant has been induced or tric ked by his ad versary ’s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass.” Irwin v. D ep’t of Veterans Affairs , 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990). However, the Court has “generally

been much less forg

iving . . . where the claima nt failed to exercis e due diligence in preser

vi ng his legal rights.” Id. “Absent compelling equitable considerations, a cou rt should not 10 Vroman v. Brigano No. 02-3258

2 W ith rega rd to dili gen ce i n fi li ng hi s st ate court post -con viction petiti on, as the dist

rict court not ed, three months prior to t he September 23, 199 6, de adline , an O hio ap pellate court ex pressl y advis ed Vroman to present his c laim of inef fect ive as sis tance of trial counsel in a peti ti on for post

convict ion rel ief. The record does no t contain any evidence providin g an expl anati on for Vroman’s decisi on to delay three months in presenti ng this cl aim to the Ohio state court s. Therefore, the fact that Vroman waited t o petit ion for post convi ction reli ef

three months extendlimitation s by even a single day .” GrahamHumphreys , 209 F.3d at 561.

This court determines whether to equitably toll AEDPA’s statute of l imita tions using

the five -facto r test set

forth in Andrew s v. Orr , 851 F.2d 146, 151 (6th Cir. 1988). See Dunlap v. United

States , 250 F.3d 1001, 1010 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying the five-factor

test set forth in Andrews ). Pursuant to Andrews , a court

should consider: (1) the petitioner’s lack of notice of the filing requirement; (2) the petitioner’s lac k of constructive knowledge o f th e filing requirement ; (3) diligence in pursuing one’s rights; (4) absence of prejudice to the resp ondent; a

nd (5) the petitione r’s r eason ablenes s in remainingignora

nt of the legal r

equirem ent for f

iling his cla im

. Id. at 1008. T

his list of f

actors is not nece ssarily comprehensive, and not al l factors are re le van t in all ca ses. Miller v. Collins , 305 F.3d 491, 495 (6th Cir. 2002).

Inthe present case, Vroman does not claim that he lacked either actual or constr

uctive no tice of the filing require ment. Where the litigant does not claim lack of knowledge or notice of the filing require ment, th is court ’s inquiry is focused on examining his diligenc e i n pursuing his rights and the
reasona blenessof his ignorance of theeffect of his delay

. See Andrews
, 851 F. 2d at 151. Vroman contends that he was diligent inpursuing

his righ ts because he claims that his po stconvictionpetition was act ua ll y filed on or before the September

23, 1996, deadline. This argum ent, however, focuses on Vroma

n’s dilig ence in p

ursuing his righ ts inOhio state pos t-conviction proc eeding s. 2 Vroman f ails to addressNo. 02-3258 Vroman v. Brigano 11

afte r being a dvised to do so demonstrates a lack of dil igence in pursuing his rights.

3 In support of

his c laim t

hat he i s enti tled t o equitabl e to lling, Vroman relies on t

his court’ s unpub lis hed Rule 34(j) order in White v. Cu rtis , No. 01-1493, 2002 WL 1752272 ( 6th Cir. July 26, 2002 ). In Wh ite , thi s cour

t he ld t hat equi table to lling app lied to th e petitio ner’s fe deral habe as pe tition whe re the p etitioner ’s direc t app eal to th e Michigan Supreme Court woul d have been t imely under th e federal mail box rule. Id. Apart from the question of whet her White was co rrectly decide d, applicat ion of t he Andre ws fact ors requi res an indi vidual ized exami nati on of each pet iti oner’s showing with respect to his dil igence and knowledge. W hit e, whose habeas peti tion wa s fi led eig hteen day s lat e, displayed far more dili gence than Vroman, who filed his habeas peti ti on over one yea r aft er the applicabl e deadlin e. his lack of d

ilig ence in timely filing a petition for habe as relief. While Vroman concentrates his argument on the fact that at most his state filing was one day late, this court mus t determine whether

to equita bly toll Vroma

n’s AEDPA

statute of limitations for more than one ye ar.
The Ohio trial court informed Vroman on Nove mb er 15, 1996, that his September 24, 199 6, p et it io n w as un ti me ly. Therefore, when Vroman’s one-y ear federal habeas

statute of limitations began to run on March 17, 1997, Vroman knew that he would n

ot be enti tled to toll

the time pe

riod for his September

24, 19 9 6, petition

unless he prevail ed on app eal. Vroman’s a

ppe al was denied by

an Ohio appellate court on April15, 1997, thereby

informing Vroman more than eleven months prior to his habeas filingdeadline that the O hio court s did not consider his September 24, 1996, petition pro perl y filed. Vroman’ s decision to proce ed solely to the Ohio Supreme Court, rather than filing h is federal habeas petition and protecting his federal

constitutional rights, demonstrates a lack of diligence. 3

The fourth factor , whe ther respondent was prejudiced by the delay infiling, is irrelevant here. Absence of preju dice is

a factor to be considered only

after a factor that might

justify 12 Vroman v. Brigano No. 02-3258

tol li ng is identified. Andrews , 851 F.2d at 151. The final factor is petitioner’s reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the legal requirement for filing his cl aim. Vro man does not argue that he was ignorant of the legal require ment for filing h is c laim. Acc ordingl

y, a pplication of the f

ive-fa ctor test indicates that equi

table toll ing is not

appropr iate in this case.

The district c ourt denie d Vroman’s request for an evidentiary

hearing without

discussion. This court reviews a districtcourt’s decision whether to ho ld an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion. See Lott v . Coyle
, 2 61 F.3d 594, 602 (6th Cir. 2001). Under AEDPA, evidentiary he arings are not mandatory . Instead, AEDPA contai n s express limitations on a federal court’s discretion to grant an evidenti ary

hearing . The stat

ute provi des: (e)(2) If the applica

nt ha s failed to develop the factual basis of a cla

imin State c ourt proc eeding s, the cour t shall nothold an ev

identi a ry hear

ing on the claim, unless the applicant shows that – (A) the claim relies on: (i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, tha

t was pre viously unavailable; or (ii) a factu

al predi cate tha

t could not ha ve been previous ly

discover ed th rough the exercise of due diligence; and (B) the facts un d erlying the claim would be sufficient to est abli sh by clear

and convincing evidence tha t but for constitutional error, no
reasona ble fact-finder woul d have found the applicant guilty of

the underlying

offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). If the peti tioner ha s not faile d to develop the factual basis of a claim in state court, the feder alNo. 02-3258 Vroman v. Brigano 13

court may hold a hearing if thepetitione

r’s factual alle gations
, if proved, would entitle him to relief. See Byrd v. Collins
, 209 F.3d 486, 550 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing McMill an v. Barksdale
, 823 F.2d 981, 983-84 (6th Cir. 198 7)); Rector v. Johnson
, 120 F.3d 551, 562-63 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[A] federal habeas court mus tallow discovery a nd anevidentiary he aring only where a factual dispute, if resolve d in the pe tit i oner’s favor
, would entitle him to relief and the state has not afforded the petitioner a full and fair evide ntiary hear

ing.”).

AEDPA address es st ate prisoners’ federal constitutional claims. See Austi

n v. Mitchell , 200 F.3d 391, 393 (6th Cir. 1999). Therefore, any

refer ence to a “claim” in AEDPA

is to

a federa l constitut

i onal claim. AE

DPA thus pe

rmits evidentiary

hearing s rega

rding f ederal constituti onal cla

ims under limitedcircumst

ances a s set fort

h in the statut e. While Vroman’s habeas petition sets forth fe d eral constitutional claims, he seeks an evidentiary hearing on a

state procedural law issue. Specifically, he r eques ts th at the district court allow him to submit evidence to conclu sively prove the state court ruling that his post-conviction pe ti tion was un timely
was unreasonable in light of the facts presented to it. Vroman does not reque st a

n evid entiary

hearing to allow hi

m to present evidence regarding

a federal constitution al claim. Inst ead, Vroman se eks to re visit the O hio state c ourts’ determination

th at he fa il ed to co mp ly with Ohio law regarding time limi ts for fili ng a post-conviction petition. As previous ly

discussed, state c ourts are the final authority on st ate la w and federal courts must accept a state court’s interpretation

of its rules of practice. Israfil , 276 F.3d at 771. Accord ingly , the distr

ict cour t did not ab

use its disc

retion in denying Vroman’s request for an evidentiary hearing.

III.

For all of the f

orego ing reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the petition.