NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ECC SYSTEMS, LLC, :

:

:

 

Petitioner, :

:

Civil Action No. 11-1437 (SRC)

v.

NEW JERSEY REGIONAL COUNCIL

OF CARPENTERS, 

:

:

:

:

: 

:

OPINION

Respondent. :

CHESLER, U.S.D.J.

This matter comes before the Court on two motions: 1) the motion to confirm the

arbitration award by Respondent New Jersey Regional Council of Carpenters (the “Union”); and

2) the motion to vacate the arbitration award by Petitioner ECC Systems, LLC (“Systems”). For

the reasons that follow, the motion to confirm the arbitration award will be denied, and the

motion to vacate the arbitration award will be granted.

This case concerns a labor dispute that was heard by arbitrator J.J. Pierson (the

“Arbitrator”). On January 10, 2011, the Arbitrator issued a final decision. In brief, the Union

had entered into a collective bargaining agreement with East Coast Conveyors, LLC. The labor

agreement contains an arbitration provision. Systems opposed the arbitration but participated in

it, maintaining that it was not a signatory to the labor agreement. The Arbitrator found that

Systems was a double-breasted form of East Coast Conveyors, LLC, and found that Systems was

liable to the Union under the labor agreement.

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Systems moves to vacate the arbitration award on the ground that the Arbitrator “usurped

the court’s exclusive role.” (Systems’ Br. 6.) This is clearly true. It is well-settled that

“arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any

dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior &

Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960). This fundamental principle alone mandates that

the award be vacated. It is undisputed that Systems was not a signatory to the labor agreement

with the Union. The Arbitrator had no authority to arbitrate the dispute between Systems and the

Union – absent a determination by the Court that Systems was contractually bound to arbitrate.

Moreover:

[T]he question of arbitrability – whether a collective-bargaining agreement creates

a duty for the parties to arbitrate the particular grievance – is undeniably an issue

for judicial determination. Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide

otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided

by the court, not the arbitrator. 

AT&T Techs. v. Communs. Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986). There is no claim in

this case that the parties – meaning Systems and the Union – clearly and unmistakably agreed to

arbitrate. To the contrary, Systems made its disagreement with arbitration known at every step. 

As such, under AT&T, the question of whether the labor agreement created a duty for Systems to

arbitrate a dispute is a question for a court to decide, and not for the arbitrator.

The Union argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v.

Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 547 (1964) supports its position that Systems, though not a signatory

to the labor agreement, was obligated to arbitrate. This is simply not so. Instead, Wiley stands 1

for the proposition that a court may determine that a non-signatory is obligated to arbitrate a

 The Union also cites other cases in support, but none is controlling authority. 

1

2

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dispute. The point is that it is the court that makes this threshold determination, not the

arbitrator, and Wiley is crystal clear on this point:

The threshold question in this controversy is who shall decide whether the

arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement survived the

Wiley-Interscience merger, so as to be operative against Wiley. Both parties urge

that this question is for the courts. Past cases leave no doubt that this is correct. 

Under our decisions, whether or not the company was bound to arbitrate, as well

as what issues it must arbitrate, is a matter to be determined by the Court on the

basis of the contract entered into by the parties. . . . Here, the question is whether

Wiley, which did not itself sign the collective bargaining agreement on which the

Union’s claim to arbitration depends, is bound at all by the agreement’s arbitration

provision. The reason requiring the courts to determine the issue is the same in

both situations. The duty to arbitrate being of contractual origin, a compulsory

submission to arbitration cannot precede judicial determination that the collective

bargaining agreement does in fact create such a duty. Thus, just as an employer

has no obligation to arbitrate issues which it has not agreed to arbitrate, so a

fortiori, it cannot be compelled to arbitrate if an arbitration clause does not bind it

at all.

Id. at 546-547 (citations omitted). Wiley makes clear that, when the Arbitrator decided the

question of whether Systems, a non-signatory to the labor agreement, was bound to arbitrate, he

usurped the role of the court and exceeded his powers.

Moreover, the Third Circuit’s decision in Laborers’ Int’l Union v. Foster Wheeler Corp.

controls this Court’s decision on this issue. The Third Circuit held as follows:

This Court vacated the arbitration order because the district court, not the

arbitrator, was to decide whether FWC was bound by the Agreement, since if it

were not bound, it could not be commanded to submit to arbitration. The reason

is straightforward: a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate the arbitrability issue. 

As a signatory to the Agreement, FWEC was unquestionably obligated to arbitrate

the dispute. FWC, on the other hand, was not a signatory thereto, and hence the

court could direct it to arbitration only if the court first determined that somehow

FWC had become bound by the Agreement.

Laborers’ Int’l Union v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 399 n.27 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations

omitted). The analogy is so clear that no further explanation is needed.

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This Court finds that, pursuant to AT&T, the Arbitrator lacked the authority to determine

that Systems was bound by the labor agreement. The Arbitrator thus lacked the authority to

conduct the arbitration. The motion to confirm the arbitration award will be denied, the motion

to vacate the arbitration award will be granted, and the Arbitrator’s award will be vacated. 

 /s Stanley R. Chesler 

STANLEY R. CHESLER

Dated: September 9, 2011 United States District Judge

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