1

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

___________________________________

:

MANUEL EGAS and KEVIN EGAS, :

:

Plaintiffs, :

: Civil Action No: 11-2340 (ES)

v. :

: OPINION 

FIT RITE BODY PARTS, INC., et al., :

:

Defendants. :

___________________________________ :

SALAS, DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before this Court is Defendants’ Borough of Totowa,1 Patrolman DeCeglie, and 

Passaic County Prosecutor’s Office (“PCPO”) (collectively, “Defendants”) motion for summary 

judgment. (D.E. No. 90). Pro se Plaintiffs Manuel Egas and Kevin Vargas (collectively, 

“Plaintiffs”) did not oppose the motion. The Court has considered the Defendants’ submissions 

and decides the motion without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). Based on the 

following reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND 

Because the parties are familiar with the undisputed facts in this case, the Court provides 

the background of this action in summary fashion. See Egas v. Fit Rite Body Parts, Inc., No. 11-

2340, 2011 WL 6935314 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2011); (D.E. Nos. 49, 51, Opinion and Order, Mar. 27, 

2012; D.E. Nos. 68, 69, Opinion and Order, Apr. 9, 2013). Briefly, the instant matter stems from 

 

1 On July 6, 2011, the Court corrected the docket to reflect that Defendant Borough of Totowa was improperly plead 

as the Totowa Police Department. (See D.E. No. 26, Pretrial Scheduling Order). 

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the arrest, detention and prosecution of Plaintiffs on charges that they stole money from their 

employer Fit Rite Body Parts, Inc. (D.E. No. 90-1, Statement of Undisputed Material Facts In 

Support of Defendants’ Borough of Totowa, Patrolman DeCeglie, and Passaic County 

Prosecutor’s Office’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“SUMF”)). Plaintiffs were found not guilty 

and this litigation ensued. (Id. ¶ 7). 

On March 8, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in state court, which was removed to this 

Court on April 26, 2011. (D.E. No. 1). On May 17, 2011, Defendants Fit Rite Body Parts, Inc., 

Keystone Automotive Industries, Inc. and Thomas Holmes (“Fit Rite Defendants”) moved to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. (D.E. No. 8). On July 8, 2011, Defendants Local 223 

Amalgamated Industrial and Toys & Novelty Workers of America, AFL-CIO (“Local 223 

Defendants”) joined the Fit Rite Defendants’ motion. (D.E. No. 28). On December 30, 2011, this 

Court granted the motions and permitted Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint within 30 days. 

(D.E. No. 38). 

On January 13, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint. (D.E. No. 40). The Fit 

Rite Defendants and Local 223 Defendants moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. (D.E. 

Nos. 41, 42). On March 27, 2012, the Court dismissed the claims with prejudice against the Fit 

Rite Defendants and Local 223 Defendants.2 (D.E. No. 51). 

On May 23, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint against the Borough of 

Totowa and Sgt. Macaluso for false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts One and Two) and 

against the PCPO for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment (Counts Three and Four). 

(D.E. No. 56). The Second Amended Complaint did not name Patrolman DeCeglie as a defendant. 

 

2 The Court also dismissed the claims against Patrolman DeCeglie, Sergeant Joseph Macaluso (“Sgt. Macaluso”), the 

Totowa Police Department i.e. the Borough of Totowa, and the PCPO with leave to amend. (Id.). 

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(See D.E. No. 56). Sgt. Macaluso moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. (D.E. No. 

58). On April 9, 2013, this Court granted the motion in favor of Sgt. Macaluso, dismissing Count 

Two against him with prejudice. (D.E. Nos. 68-69). Therefore, the Court will limit its analysis in 

this opinion to claims against the remaining Defendants—Borough of Totowa and the PCPO. 

On May 23, 2013, Defendants, the Borough of Totowa (improperly plead as Totowa Police 

Department), Patrolman DeCeglie, and the PCPO filed a motion for summary judgment. (D.E. 

No. 73). On December 16, 2013, this Court administratively terminated the motion for summary 

judgment “to provide the Plaintiffs time to find replacement counsel and submit opposition 

papers.” (D.E. No. 89 at 3). The Court cautioned Plaintiffs that “[t]here [would] be no further 

extensions of that deadline unless Plaintiffs demonstrate[d] extraordinary circumstances.” (Id.). 

On December 19, 2013, Defendants, the Borough of Totowa, Patrolman DeCeglie, and the PCPO

re-filed their motion for summary judgment. (D.E. No. 90). Plaintiffs did not oppose the instant 

motion. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard3

A court shall grant summary judgment under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show 

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). On a summary judgment motion, the moving party must 

show, first, that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

 

3 The Court observes that: “Rule 56(b) authorizes a defending party to move ‘at any time’ for a summary judgment 

in his favor. Such a motion may be made before the pleading to the complaint . . . .” Hubicki v. ACF Indus., Inc., 484 

F.2d 519, 522 (3d Cir. 1973). Accordingly, the Court properly considers Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, 

which was filed before any responsive pleading to the Second Amended Complaint. 

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323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to present evidence that a genuine 

issue of material fact compels a trial. Id. at 324. In so presenting, the non-moving party must offer 

specific facts that establish a genuine issue of material fact, not just “some metaphysical doubt as 

to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-

87 (1986). Thus, the non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in its 

pleadings. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Further, the non-moving party cannot rely on 

unsupported assertions, bare allegations, or speculation to defeat summary judgment. See 

Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1999). The Court must, 

however, consider all facts and their reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Pa. Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995).

B. Analysis

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims based upon false arrest and imprisonment must be 

dismissed because they are barred by the statute of limitations. (D.E. No. 90-2, Brief in Support 

of Defendants’ Borough of Totowa Police Department, Patrolman DeCeglie and Passaic County 

Prosecutor’s Office’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defs. Br.”) 8-10). Defendants further 

contend that Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Id. at 

10-14). Additionally, Defendants claim that PCPO is immune from this lawsuit under the Eleventh 

Amendment and that the employees of the PCPO were acting in their official capacities and are 

not “persons” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 14-19). And finally, Defendants 

argue the PCPO is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. (Id. at 20-26). 

This Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claim for false arrest against the Borough of Totowa is 

barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations for the same reason it dismissed Sgt. 

Macaluso in its earlier opinion. (See D.E. No. 68 at 5-6). “The statute of limitations for any 

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Section 1983 claim is the state statute which limits actions for personal injuries.” Cito v. 

Bridgewater Twp. Police Dep’t, 892 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). “In New Jersey 

that statute is N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, which provides that an action for an injury to the person caused

by a wrongful act, neglect, or default, must be convened within two years of accrual of the cause 

of action.” Id. (quotation omitted). “A [S]ection 1983 cause of action accrues when the plaintiff 

knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action is based.” Sameric Corp. of Del., 

Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).

Plaintiffs’ claim for false arrest accrued when they were arrested on November 10, 2008.

Plaintiffs first asserted that claim against Sgt. Macaluso on March 8, 2011, after the expiration of 

the two-year statute of limitations. Consequently, this claim in Count One is dismissed with 

prejudice.

Regarding Counts Three and Four against the PCPO, this Court finds that Plaintiffs may 

not sue the PCPO in its official capacity for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.4 Section 1983 

provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to 

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable 

 

4 Plaintiff asserts Counts Three and Four against the PCPO. (D.E. No. 56 ¶¶ 28-44). Count Three alleges that 

“Defendants [sic] Passaic County Prosecutors Violated Plaintiff’s Civil Rights due to Malicious Prosecution.” (Id. ¶¶ 

28-35). Count Four alleges that “Defendants [sic] Passaic County Prosecutors Violated Plaintiff’s Civil Rights due to 

False Imprisonment.” (Id. ¶¶ 35-44). Neither count explicitly asserts whether these claims are brought under Section 

1983 or state law, and Plaintiffs do not otherwise specify. This Court will, therefore, construe Counts Three and Four 

as federal claims. To be sure, even if Counts Three and Four were state law claims, this Court declines to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction since the Court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under 

subsection (a) if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction . . . .”); see also

Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Where the claim over which the district court has original 

jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent state claims unless 

considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification or 

doing so.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

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to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 

proceeding for redress . . . . 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the 

violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the 

alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a “person” acting under color of state law. See 

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). A 

prosecutors office, however, is not a person amenable to suit under § 1983. Sutton v. Gloucester 

Cnty. Prosecutors Office, No. 13-6132, 2014 WL 2155349, at *4 (D.N.J. May 22, 2014). 

Plaintiffs’ claims against the PCPO are therefore dismissed. 

Additionally, even if the Plaintiffs’ claims were alleged against any prosecutors in their 

individual capacities, “[p]rosecutors have absolute immunity from suit under § 1983 when carrying 

out prosecutorial functions.” Hyatt, 390 F. App’x at 837 (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 

409, 427-31 (1976)). Such absolute immunity extends to misdeeds that a prosecutor is alleged to 

have committed in his prosecutorial capacity, including the decision to initiate a prosecution and 

obtaining and evaluating evidence in a case. Hyatt v. Cnty. of Passaic, No. 04-1545, 2008 WL 

839556, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2008) (citations omitted), aff’d 340 F. App’x 833 (3d Cir. 2009). 

Accordingly, absolute immunity also shields the PCPO in this matter. 

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III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons mentioned above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment and dismisses all remaining claims.

5

 An appropriate order shall accompany this 

opinion.

s/Esther Salas

Esther Salas, U.S.D.J.

 

5

 Having dismissed the remaining counts against the Borough of Totowa and the PCPO in Counts 1, 3 and 4, this 

Court need not address Defendants’ remaining arguments. Additionally, because Defendants have not filed any 

counterclaims or crossclaims in response to the Second Amended Complaint, this matter is closed. 

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