NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPI RES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT RICKY HIXON, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D15-5122 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ___________________________________) Opinion filed November 18, 2016. Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Lee County; Joseph C. Fuller, Judge. Ricky Hixon, pro se. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Lisa Martin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.
Ricky Hixon appeals the order summarily denying his motion fi led under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(b)(2) (providing an ex ception to the two-year time limit for newly-established constitutional rights that hav e been held to apply retroactively). We reverse and remand for resentencing.2 In his rule 3.850(b)(2) motion, Hixon argued that his life se ntence with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years for a first-degre e murder committed when he was a juvenile was unconstitutional under the United States Sup reme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), and Florida cases interpreting Miller. See Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954 (Fla. 2015); Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 2015). He asserted that he was entitled to a new sentencing he aring that would address his individualized sentenci ng considerations in conform ance with chapter 2014- 220, Laws of Florida. See §§ 921.1401, .1402, Fla. Stat. (2014 ) (creating a scheme in which a juvenile receives individualized considerations at the time of sentencing that can be reviewed later by the trial court). The postconviction court summarily denied Hixon's motion beca use thenexisting case law held that juveniles who were sentenced to lif e imprisonment with the possibility of parole were actually provided with a meaningful opportunity for release. See McPherson v. State, 138 So. 3d 1201, 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014 ) (citing Atwell v. State, 128 So. 3d 167, 169 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), for the proposi tion that Miller does not apply to life sentences with parole eligibility)). The Florida Supreme Court recently addressed this issue when it quashed the Fourth District's Atwell decision. See Atwell v. State, 19 7 So. 3d 1040, 1040 (Fla. 2016). The supreme court concluded that "Florida's existing pa role system, as set forth by statute, does not provide for individualized consideration o f Atwell's juvenile status at the time of the murder, as requi red by Miller, and that his sen tence, which is virtually indistinguishable from a sentence of life without parole, is th erefore unconstitutional." Id. at 1041. Ultimately, the court held that juveniles sentenc ed to life with the possibility3 of parole are entitled to resentencing pursuant to sections 921 .1401 and 921.1402. Id. at 1050 (citing Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 399). In accordance with the supreme court's Atwell decision, Hixon is entitled to resentencing in conformance with chapter 2014-220, Laws of Flor ida, even though he was originally sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. Accordingly, we reverse the order denying Hixon's postconviction motion and rem and for resentencing. Reversed and remanded.

SILBERMAN, MORRIS, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.