alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO****18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,****AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE****SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

            In connection with the Quarterly Report of Jake’s Trucking International, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended December 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), the undersigned certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of the undersigned’s knowledge, that:				            (1)        The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and				            (2)        The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.				Dated:   February 14, 2007                                                       By: /s/ Michael Quesnel                                                                                                 Michael Quesnel, Chief Executive Officer				                                                                                                 (Principal Executive Officer) Chief Financial				                                                                                                 Officer, Chief Accounting Officer and Principal				                                                                                                 Financial Officer)

----
Case 1:11-cv-02658-JBS-KMW Document 33 Filed 03/29/12 Page 1 of 3 PageID: 1093
Case 1:11-cv-02658-JBS-KMW Document 33 Filed 03/29/12 Page 2 of 3 PageID: 1094
Case 1:11-cv-02658-JBS-KMW Document 33 Filed 03/29/12 Page 3 of 3 PageID: 1095
#### SEKELY v. SALKIND et al.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

Nov. 6, 1950.

Walter & Walter, Brooklyn, N. Y., for plaintiff.

Stillman & Stillman, New York City, for defendants.

McGOHEY, District Judge.

 The plaintiff having brought suit here cannot now complain that he is required to be examined here. But the time of his examination should be fixed so as not to require him to break existing commitments in Mexico. Accordingly, the motion to set aside the notice for his examination here is denied. But the examination will not be held until the second week of December, 1950. Furthermore, it will be held at the United States Court House in this district unless the parties agree on some other place. The motion to require defendants to defray plaintiff’s expenses is denied.

The notice calls for production of documents containing and relating to the contract alleged to have been breached by the *504defendants. Plaintiff urges that production cannot be required by notice under the rules, but only by order on a motion under Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 34, 28 U.S. C.A.

The notice is sufficient to require production. Smith v. Bentley, D.C.S.D. N.Y., 9 F.R.D. 489, 490. The documents are clearly relevant and material, and- there is obviously good cause for their inspection and discovery. Accordingly, as Judge Koscinski did in Society of Independent Motion Picture Producers v. United Detroit Theatres Corporation, D.C.E.D. Mich., 8 F.R.D. 453. I will consider the notice as a motion under Rule 34 and order the production, examination and inspection of the documents specified in the notice.

Submit order.
* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secretary of Health and

Human Services in social security cases were transferred to the Commissioner of

Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c), Shirley S.

Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for Donna E. Shalala,

Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defendant in this action. 

Although we have substituted the Commissioner for the Secretary in the caption,

in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary because she was the appropriate

party at the time of the underlying decision.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

*** Honorable Myron H. Bright, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of

Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 8/14/96

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

CLARENCE M. KING, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner

of Social Security,*

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 95-5282

(D.C. No. 94-C-586-J)

(N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT**

Before PORFILIO, BRIGHT,*** and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
-2-

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

We affirm for substantially the reasons given by the district court.

The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District

of Oklahoma is affirmed.

Entered for the Court

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. 

Circuit Judge
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

(ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002)

In connection with the report of Dynegy Holdings Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ended
December 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Holli C. Nichols, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify as of the date hereof,
solely for the purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code, that to the best of my knowledge:



|(1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
|--- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the dates and for the periods
indicated.
|--- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                     |  |     |  |                                                                      
|-------------------- |  | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: March 16, 2007 |  | By: |  | /s/ HOLLI C. NICHOLS                                                 
|                     |  |     |  | Holli C. Nichols Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
Case 2:11-cr-00310-JLL Document 10 Filed 06/08/11 Page 1 of 5 PageID: 13
Case 2:11-cr-00310-JLL Document 10 Filed 06/08/11 Page 2 of 5 PageID: 14
Case 2:11-cr-00310-JLL Document 10 Filed 06/08/11 Page 3 of 5 PageID: 15
Case 2:11-cr-00310-JLL Document 10 Filed 06/08/11 Page 4 of 5 PageID: 16
Case 2:11-cr-00310-JLL Document 10 Filed 06/08/11 Page 5 of 5 PageID: 17
**Exhibit32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Inconnection with this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Homeland EnergySolutions, LLC (the “Company”) for the quarter ended June 30, 2010, as filedwith the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),I, Jeffrey S. Grober, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuantto 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, that:

 

1.               The Report fully complieswith the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Actof 1934, as amended; and

 

2.               The information contained inthe Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial conditionand results of operations of the Company.

 
|   |               /s/  Jeffrey S. Grober |
|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   | Jeffrey  S. Grober,                                                                                        |
|   | Chief  Financial Officer                                                                                   |
|   | Dated:                                                                                                     |                 August  13, 2010 |

 

----
#### Isa Cekic, Appellant, et al., Plaintiff, v Royal-Pak Systems, Inc., Respondents.

[854 NYS2d 204]

*796The plaintiff Isa Cekic (hereinafter the plaintiff) allegedly was injured while attempting to remove a bag of garbage that had become lodged near the bottom opening of a trash compacter manufactured and installed by the defendant Royal-Pak Systems, Inc. At the trial, the plaintiff testified that although the compactor was set to its automatic mode, she believed she had deactivated it by opening the hopper door, triggering the interlock switch. Additionally, the plaintiff produced evidence that there were no warning signs on the compactor, that the interlock switch was negligently designed, as it failed to function properly and allowed the compactor to activate with the hopper door partially open, and that the compactor did not conform to generally accepted industry standards. The court declined to charge on negligent design, failure to warn, and breach of implied warranty. It charged the jury only on a design defect under a strict products liability theory.

Under these circumstances, the evidence was sufficient to raise questions for the jury as to whether the trash compactor was reasonably safe, whether the allegedly defective design was a substantial factor in the plaintiffs accident, and whether the plaintiff was aware of the potential hazard *(see Guaman v Industry City Mgt.,*40 AD3d 698, 699 [2007]; *Nagel v Brothers Intl. Food, Inc.,*34 AD3d 545, 547 [2006]; *Giunta v Delta Intl. Mach.,*300 AD2d 350, 352 [2002]). The court’s failure to charge on negligent design, failure to warn, and breach of implied warranty was erroneous and prejudicial. Accordingly, a new trial is required *(see Slatsky v Great Neck Plumbing Supply, Inc.,*29 AD3d 776, 777 [2006]; *Maloney Carpentry, Inc. v Budnick,*19 AD3d 378, 378-379 [2005]).

In light of this determination, the plaintiff’s remaining contentions have been rendered academic. Rivera, J.P., Skelos, Santucci and Leventhal, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jose Santiago, Appellant.

[823 NYS2d 16]

*449Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Michael J. Obus, J.), rendered February 20, 2004, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the second degree and assault in the second degree, and sentencing him to concurrent terms of 20 years to life and seven years, respectively, unanimously affirmed.

The court properly excluded hearsay evidence offered by defendant. The evidence consisted of a 911 tape in which an identified caller who was not a witness to the incident provided a description of the assailant that was at variance with the description given by an eyewitness. This eyewitness testified that he never gave the caller any description. We reject defendant’s argument that the description on the 911 tape was admissible as a prior inconsistent statement by the eyewitness. The evidence fails to support the inference that the eyewitness was the source of the description on the tape. Moreover, at a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the 911 caller testified that he was certain that the eyewitness never gave him a description of the assailant.

Because the statement by the 911 caller lacked sufficient indicia of reliability, the court properly rejected defendant’s alternate argument that his constitutional right to present a defense required its admission *(see Chambers v Mississippi,*410 US 284 [1973]; *People v Robinson,*89 NY2d 648, 654 [1997]; *People v Burns,*18 AD3d 397 [2005], *affd*6 NY3d 793 [2006]). Finally, even if we were to find the court should have admitted the tape, we would find the error to be harmless under the standards for both constitutional and nonconstitutional error in view of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt, which included, among other things, the testimony of multiple eyewitnesses *(see People v Crimmins,*36 NY2d 230 [1975]). Concur— Mazzarelli, J.E, Andrias, Sullivan, McGuire and Malone, JJ.
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4999 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4999

To repeal the provisions of law making reemployed annuitants ineligible 
 for physicians comparability allowances under title 5, United States 
   Code, and special pay for physicians and dentists under title 38, 
                          United States Code.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 22, 2004

Mr. Van Hollen introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
  Committee on Government Reform, and in addition to the Committee on 
 Veterans' Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
  Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To repeal the provisions of law making reemployed annuitants ineligible 
 for physicians comparability allowances under title 5, United States 
   Code, and special pay for physicians and dentists under title 38, 
                          United States Code.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PROVISIONS REPEALED.

    (a) Physicians Comparability Allowances.--Section 5948(b) of title 
5, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (2), by adding ``or'' at the end;
            (2) by striking paragraph (3); and
            (3) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (3).
    (b) Special Pay.--Section 7431(f) of title 38, United States Code, 
is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (1), by adding ``or'' at the end;
            (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``; or'' and inserting a 
        period; and
            (3) by striking paragraph (3).
                                 <all>
```
ARMANDO C. IBARRA
                          Certified Public Accountants
                           A Professional Corporation


Armando C. Ibarra, C.P.A.
Armando Ibarra, Jr., C.P.A., JD
with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board



March 28, 2006


To Whom It May Concern:

The firm of Armando C. Ibarra, Certified Public Accountants, APC consents to the
inclusion of our report of March 1, 2006, on the audited financial statements of
Quantum Companies, Inc., (A Development Stage Company) as of December 31, 2005,
in any filings that are necessary now or in the near future with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.



Very truly yours,


/s/ Armando C. Ibarra_________
------------------------------
ARMANDO C. IBARRA, C.P.A.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gabriel Blair STITT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-12173

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Dec. 6, 2012.

*835Karin Bethany Hoppmann, Kelley Clement Howard-Alien, Robert E. O’Neill, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Kenneth S. Siegel, Kenneth S. Siegel, PA, Tampa, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The District Court revoked Gabriel Stitt’s supervised release on the ground that he had engaged in conduct that constituted a felony battery under Florida law, a “Grade A” violation under the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a), notwithstanding that the State did not charge and convict Stitt of the felony. In determining the sentence to be imposed, the District Court calculated Stitt’s guidelines sentence range as calling for incarceration for a term of 33 to 41 months. The statutory maximum term the court could impose was 26 months, *see*18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), and the court sentenced Stitt to that maximum term. Stitt now appeals the revocation of supervised release on the ground that the District Court lacked constitutional authority to revoke his supervision because he had not been convicted of the felony battery. Put in his words, “the Federal Government had no power to enforce a State criminal law against [him] after the State Attorney of Hillsborough County had determined not to prosecute [him] for felony battery.” Appellant’s br. at 12.

Stitt’s problem is that he did not present this argument to the District Court. Hence, we consider it under the plain error doctrine. *See United States v. Nash,*438 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir.2006). Under plain error review, we have discretion to correct an error where it: (1) occurred, (2) was plain, (3) affects substantial rights, and (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. *United States v. Turner,*474 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir.2007). An error is not plain when no decision from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolves the issue in favor of the defendant. *United States v. Humphrey,*164 F.3d 585, 588 (11th Cir.1999). That is the case here; Stitt cites no decision holding that supervised release cannot be revoked for criminal conduct that, in fact, occurred but did not result in a criminal conviction because it was not charged. In short, there was no error here, much less plain error. To the extent that Stitt argues that the District Court clearly erred in finding that he engaged in the conduct cited in the petition to revoke supervised release, his argument is frivolous; the evidence fully supports the court’s finding.

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 32.1

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Coastal Media Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-QSB for the period ending September 30, 2006 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jan
Aaron Sigurgeirson, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
          the Company.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this certification as of the
7th day of November, 2006.


/s/  Jan Aaron Sigurgeirson
---------------------------------
Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit 10.10

 

NINTH AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

 

THIS NINTH AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (this “Amendment”) is dated as of January 28, 2013, by and between BRAM GOLDSMITH (“Goldsmith”), on the one hand, and CITY NATIONAL CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation (“CNC”) and CITY NATIONAL BANK, a national banking association (“CNB”), on the other hand.

 

WHEREAS, the parties have entered into that certain Employment Agreement, dated as of May 15, 2003, as amended (as amended, the “Agreement”);

 

WHEREAS, the initial term of the Agreement was two years from May 15, 2003 to May 15, 2005, as amended to extend the term for an additional two years to May 15, 2007, further amended to extend the term for an additional year to May 14, 2008, further amended to extend the term for an additional year until May 14, 2009, further amended December 22, 2008 in recognition of the requirements of Internal Revenue Code § 409A, further amended to extend the term for an additional year to May 14, 2010, further amended to extend for the term for an additional year until May 14, 2011, further amended to extend for the term for an additional year until May 14, 2012, further amended to extend for the term for an additional year until May 14, 2013; and

 

WHEREAS, the parties wish to amend the Agreement to further extend the term for an additional one year until May 14, 2014, and the Board of Directors of CNB and CNC have approved the extension of the term of the Agreement for an additional one year on the same terms and conditions as in effect currently;

 

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and the mutual covenants and promises contained herein, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto hereby agree as follows:

 

1.                                      All capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings set forth in the Agreement.

 

2.                                      Except as amended hereby, the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.

 

3.                                      This Amendment shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the State of California.

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Amendment to Employment Agreement as of the date first written above.

 

	
/s/ Bram Goldsmith
    	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
Bram Goldsmith
    	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
CITY NATIONAL CORPORATION
    	
 
    	
 
    	
CITY   NATIONAL BANK
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
By:
    	
  /s/ Michael B. Cahill
    	
 
    	
 
    	
By:  
    	
/s/   Michael B. Cahill
    
	
Name:
    	
Michael   B. Cahill
    	
 
    	
 
    	
Name:
    	
Michael   B. Cahill
    
	
Title:
    	
EVP,   Secretary & General Counsel
    	
 
    	
 
    	
Title:
    	
EVP,   Secretary & General Counsel