SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1039 

CA 13-00609 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, CARNI, LINDLEY, AND SCONIERS, JJ. 

 

THEODORE F. BARNES, JR., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LISA A. DELLAPENTA, D.W. DELLAPENTA, JR., AND 

ANNE THOMPSON, AS VOLUNTARY ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 

ESTATE OF J. ANDREW THOMPSON, DECEASED, 

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS. 

 

CELLINO & BARNES, P.C., BUFFALO (GREGORY V. PAJAK OF COUNSEL), FOR

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT. 

KENNEY SHELTON LIPTAK NOWAK LLP, BUFFALO (NANCY A. LONG OF COUNSEL),

FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS LISA A. DELLAPENTA AND D.W. DELLAPENTA, JR. 

LAW OFFICES OF LAURIE G. OGDEN, BUFFALO (TARA E. WATERMAN OF COUNSEL),

FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT ANNE THOMPSON, AS VOLUNTARY ADMINISTRATOR OF

THE ESTATE OF J. ANDREW THOMPSON, DECEASED. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Erie County (John F.

O’Donnell, J.), entered August 2, 2012 in a personal injury action. 

The judgment dismissed the complaint upon a verdict of no cause of

action. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages

for injuries he allegedly sustained when the vehicle he was driving

was rear-ended in a chain-reaction motor vehicle accident involving a

vehicle driven by defendant D.W. Dellapenta, Jr. and a vehicle driven

by J. Andrew Thompson (decedent), whose estate was substituted as a

defendant. The accident occurred on a cold, clear and sunny winter

day, when strong winds caused a sudden and temporary whiteout as snow

was blown across an inclined off-ramp connecting the eastbound New

York State Thruway to Interstate 290 in the Town of Amherst. 

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment dismissing his complaint entered

upon a jury verdict of no cause of action. 

Supreme Court gave the jury a sudden stopping charge (see PJI

2:83) as made applicable to defendants and plaintiff, and plaintiff

contends that the court erred in including him in that charge. We

reject that contention. While plaintiff claimed that he was forced to

stop due to the actions of the vehicle ahead of him (see generally
-2- 1039 

CA 13-00609 

Carhuayano v J&R Hacking, 28 AD3d 413, 414), Dellapenta testified that

plaintiff did not slow down before the whiteout, he did not see any

vehicles ahead of plaintiff, plaintiff’s vehicle was completely

stopped in the whiteout, he never saw plaintiff’s brake or hazard

lights, and plaintiff told Dellapenta after the accident that he

stopped because he could not see. Thus, the issue whether plaintiff

“stopped suddenly, without an apparent reason to do so,” was properly

submitted to the jury (Stalikas v United Materials, 306 AD2d 810, 811,

affd 100 NY2d 626; see Niemiec v Jones, 237 AD2d 267, 268).

We reject plaintiff’s further contention that the court erred in

instructing the jury on the emergency doctrine (see PJI 2:14) inasmuch

as, evaluating the evidence in the light most favorable to defendants,

a reasonable view of the evidence supported the conclusion that a

sudden and temporary whiteout constituted a qualifying emergency (see

Lifson v City of Syracuse, 17 NY3d 492, 497; Sossin v Lewis, 9 AD3d

849, 850-851, amended on rearg 11 AD3d 1045; Barber v Young, 238 AD2d

822, 823-824, lv denied 90 NY2d 808). Although Dellapenta had

previously experienced whiteouts at that location and decedent had

experienced blowing snow at that location, such experience does not

negate the applicability of the emergency doctrine “as to the events

in issue in this case” (Kuci v Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating

Auth., 88 NY2d 923, 924). 

Plaintiff failed to preserve for our review his contention that

the verdict was against the weight of the evidence because there is no

indication in the record that he made a posttrial motion to set aside

the verdict (see Homan v Herzig [appeal No. 2], 55 AD3d 1413, 1413-

1414). In any event, “the preponderance of the evidence in favor of

the plaintiff[] [was not] so great that the verdict could not have

been reached upon any fair interpretation of the evidence” (Wilson v

Mary Imogene Bassett Hosp., 307 AD2d 748, 748; see Stalikas, 306 AD2d

at 810-811).

Entered: November 8, 2013 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court