Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 55A01-1312-CR-524 | January 28, 2015 Page 1 of 14

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Glen E. Koch II

Boren, Oliver & Coffey, LLP

Martinsville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Eric P. Babbs

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Aaron J. Taylor,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

January 28, 2015

Court of Appeals Cause No.

55A01-1312-CR-524

Appeal from the Morgan Superior 

Court

The Honorable Christopher 

Burnham, Judge

Cause No. 55D02-1109-FB-1157

Robb, Judge.

Case Summary and Issues

[1] Following a jury trial, Aaron Taylor was convicted of two counts of criminal 

confinement, both Class B felonies; two counts of intimidation, both Class C 
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felonies; criminal recklessness, a Class D felony; and pointing a firearm, a Class 

D felony. Taylor raises the following issues for our review: 1) whether the trial 

court abused its discretion in excluding certain evidence offered to establish a 

citizen’s arrest defense; and 2) whether there was sufficient evidence to support 

one of his convictions of intimidation. Concluding the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in excluding evidence and that there was sufficient evidence of 

intimidation, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History1

[2] Taylor hired an attorney and filed bankruptcy in August 2011. Morgan County 

Rural Water (“Water Company”) was named as a creditor. Shortly thereafter, 

Taylor received a letter from Glen Miller, the Water Company’s manager, 

demanding that Taylor make an adequate assurance payment as a condition to 

keeping his water turned on. Taylor contacted his attorney, and he advised 

Taylor that a membership fee, which Taylor had already paid the Water 

Company and which had been applied towards his delinquency, was a 

sufficient adequate assurance payment. Although the Water Company 

disagreed, neither party brought the dispute to the attention of the bankruptcy 

court.

 

1 We held oral argument in this case on October 20, 2014, in Indianapolis, Indiana, and would like to thank 

the attorneys for their excellent arguments.
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[3] The Water Company had an easement and right-of-way that provided the 

Water Company the right to “place, construct, install and lay, and thereafter 

use, operate, inspect, repair, maintain, replace and remove water pipes and 

lines, meters and meter enclosures, valves and related structures in, under, 

through, upon, over and across” the land on which Taylor’s home sits. Exhibit 

1. Pursuant to a water user’s agreement, the Water Company also retained 

ownership of the water meter and had “the exclusive right to use the cut-off 

valve and to turn it on and off.” Exhibit 2. It also stated that “a failure to pay 

water charges shall result in the . . . termination of water services . . . .” Id. 

Users agreed “to maintain free and unobstructed access between the meter pit 

and the road or street.” Id. Taylor signed the water user’s agreement.

[4] Taylor did not make the entire adequate assurance payment demanded by the 

Water Company. Accordingly, Miller and three other Water Company 

employees went to Taylor’s home to disconnect his water meter on September 

8, 2011. The men did not notify Taylor that they were there, but Taylor had 

parked a large trailer over the water meter pit, so the trailer had to be moved in 

order for the men to access it. Without seeking permission, the men moved the 

trailer and removed the water meter. Taylor’s girlfriend, Rachel Garriott, 

noticed the water shut off and yelled for Taylor. Taylor told Garriott to call the 

police. He then grabbed his shotgun, went into the front yard, and yelled 

“stop.” Transcript at 416. The men did not stop, so Taylor fired his shotgun. 

While the direction of the shot was disputed at trial, the fact that Taylor fired 

his shotgun was not. Garriot said Taylor fired the gun “straight down,” id. at 
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416, but Miller said the shot struck the ground “in front of us,” id. at 181. The 

men stopped and Taylor stood between them and their vehicles, pointing his 

loaded shotgun towards them. At that time, Miller called the sheriff and one of 

the men began filming the incident with his cell phone. While standing 

between the men and their vehicles, Taylor told Garriott that she better pay the 

bill “before I end up f****** killing one of these guys, especially someone in the 

green shirt,” referring to Miller. Ex. 4 at 7:25-:35. Taylor then told them that 

everyone but Miller could leave. However, because the men still felt 

threatened, they waited for the police to arrive.

[5] Eventually a police officer arrived and Taylor unloaded and put down his 

shotgun after being ordered twice to do so. Although he did not arrest Taylor 

at the time, the officer wrote a report and reviewed the cell phone video. The 

State charged Taylor with two counts of criminal confinement with a deadly 

weapon, both Class B felonies; criminal recklessness with a deadly weapon, a 

Class D felony; two counts of intimidation-one for threatening Miller with a 

deadly weapon with the intent that Miller engage in conduct against his will 

(Count 4) and one for threatening Miller with a deadly weapon with the intent 

that Miller be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act (Count 5), both 

Class C felonies; and pointing a firearm, a Class D felony.

[6] A jury trial was held in October 2013. Before jury selection began, the trial 

court ruled in response to the State’s motion in limine that Taylor would be 

prohibited from raising a citizen’s arrest defense unless and until the evidence 

showed that the men committed a felony. During trial, Taylor sought to 
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introduce into evidence a section of the Bankruptcy Code and a section of the 

Indiana Administrative Code, which he claimed would support his arguments 

relating to the citizen’s arrest defense. The trial court sustained the State’s 

objections to admission of this evidence, finding it was not relevant. The jury 

was instructed regarding Taylor’s right to use reasonable force in defense of his 

dwelling and curtilage, but it found him guilty on all counts. He now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Exclusion of Evidence

[7] Taylor believes the trial court abused its discretion when it barred him from 

presenting a citizen’s arrest defense. Specifically, Taylor argues that the court 

erred by excluding evidence of 11 U.S.C. section 366 (“Bankruptcy Statute”) 

and 170 Indiana Administrative Code 6-1-1 et seq. (“Utility Regulation”), 

which he argues would have shown that the men committed a felony by 

removing the water meter and moving his trailer. Thus, he argues the excluded 

evidence was relevant to the citizen’s arrest defense. 

[8] We review the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence for an abuse of 

discretion. Barnhart v. State, 15 N.E.3d 138, 143 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “An 

abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s decision is clearly against the 

logic and effect of the facts and circumstances presented.” Id. 

[9] The right to “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense” is 

guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 
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690 (1986). When relevant evidence that is central to the defendant’s case is 

excluded, this right is abridged. Allen v. State, 813 N.E.2d 349, 361 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2004), trans. denied. “Relevant evidence means evidence having any 

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 

without the evidence.” Ind. Evidence Rule 401 (2013). 

[10] The trial court found the Bankruptcy Statute, which governs utility service 

during bankruptcy proceedings,2 and the Utility Regulation, which provides 

procedures and notice requirements for water utility companies,3to be 

irrelevant to Taylor’s citizen’s arrest defense and excluded them. Taylor claims 

he was denied a meaningful opportunity to present his defense. The citizen’s 

arrest defense is authorized by Indiana statute. It states:

A person other than a law enforcement officer is justified in using 

reasonable force against another person to effect an arrest or prevent 

the other person’s escape if:

(1) a felony has been committed; and

(2) there is probable cause to believe the other person committed that 

 

2 A “utility may . . . discontinue service if neither the trustee nor the debtor, within 20 days after the date of 

the order for relief, furnishes adequate assurance of payment, in the form of a deposit or other security, for 

service after such date. On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court may order 

reasonable modification of the amount of the deposit or other security necessary to provide adequate 

assurance of payment.” 11 U.S.C. § 366(b). 

An “assurance of payment” can be a cash deposit, a prepayment of utility consumption, or another form of 

security agreed upon by the parties. 11 U.S.C. § 366(c)(1)(A)(i), (v), (vi).

3

Specifically, “service to any residential customer shall not be disconnected for a violation of any rule or 

regulation of a utility or for the nonpayment of a bill, except after seven (7) days prior written notice to the 

customer” stating in part the date of proposed disconnection. 170 Ind. Admin. Code 6-1-16(e) (2014). 

“Immediately preceding the actual disconnection of service, the employee of the utility” shall identify himself 

and announce the purpose of his presence. 170 I.A.C. 6-1-16(f).
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felony.

However, such a person is not justified in using deadly force unless 

that force is justified under [Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2].[4]

Ind. Code § 35-41-3-3(a) (emphasis added). 

[11] Taylor contends the excluded evidence was relevant for showing the Water 

Company employees committed a felony, entitling him to present the citizen’s 

arrest defense. Specifically, he claims that because the removal of the water 

meter was in contravention of the Bankruptcy Statute and the Utility 

Regulation, the men committed theft and criminal mischief. However, our 

review of the record shows that neither the Bankruptcy Statute nor the Utility 

Regulation established the commission of either felony.

[12] Taylor contends the men committed theft by unlawfully taking Taylor’s access 

to water. Theft occurs when “[a] person . . . knowingly or intentionally exerts 

unauthorized control over property of another person, with intent to deprive the 

other person of any part of its value or use . . . .” Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a) 

(emphasis added). Here, the Water Company had an easement and right-ofway that provided it access to the water meter. Additionally, Taylor signed a 

water user’s agreement which provided that the Water Company retained 

ownership of the water meter and had “the exclusive right to use the cut-off 

 

4

In relevant part, Indiana Code section 35-41-3-2 states, “[a] person: is justified in using reasonable force, 

including deadly force, against any other person . . . [and] does not have a duty to retreat . . . if the person 

reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent or terminate the other person’s unlawful entry of or 

attack on the person’s dwelling, curtilage, or occupied motor vehicle.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(d).
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valve and to turn it on and off.” Exhibit 2. The agreement also stated that “a 

failure to pay water charges shall result in the . . . termination of water services

. . . .” Id. Taylor did not make the entire payment demanded by the Water 

Company—a condition which authorized the Water Company to terminate 

Taylor’s water services under the water user’s agreement. Accordingly, 

whether the termination of his water service was appropriate is a matter of 

contract law, not criminal law. See Jamrosz v. Resource Benefits, Inc., 839 N.E.2d 

746, 759 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that the criminal conversion statute does 

not criminalize bona fide contract disputes), trans. denied. Neither the 

Bankruptcy Statute nor the Utility Regulation prove a theft occurred under 

these circumstances. 

[13] Taylor also argues the men committed criminal mischief by moving the trailer 

that was parked over the water meter pit. Criminal mischief occurs when “[a] 

person . . . recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally damages or defaces property 

of another person without the other person’s consent . . . .” Ind. Code § 35-43-

1-2(a). It is a felony if “the damage causes a substantial interruption or 

impairment of utility service rendered to the public.” Ind. Code § 35-43-1-

2(a)(2)(B). Taylor fails to acknowledge that he agreed “to maintain free and 

unobstructed access between the meter pit and the road or street.” Exhibit 2. 

The men moved the trailer because Taylor did not maintain free and 

unobstructed access to the meter pit. Taylor also has shown no evidence that 

his trailer was damaged in the process or that the alleged damage caused an 

interruption in water service rendered to the public. To the extent that the 
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excluded evidence would have proven a violation under bankruptcy law or 

Indiana administrative law, the violation would have been of a civil, rather than 

criminal, nature. The excluded evidence was irrelevant to proving criminal 

mischief for the purposes of Taylor’s citizen’s arrest defense.

[14] Even if we assumed the men committed a felony, the citizen’s arrest defense 

would still not save Taylor’s actions due to his use of unlawful deadly force.5 

When available, the citizen’s arrest defense justifies a person’s use of reasonable 

force against another person. Ind. Code § 35-41-3-3(a). This statute only 

permits the use of deadly force as provided in Indiana Code section 35-41-3-2. 

Deadly force is “force that creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury.” 

Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-85. Taylor argued the defense of property under Indiana 

Code section 35-41-3-2 at trial, but the jury was not persuaded. 

[15] The record shows that Taylor knew he was delinquent on his water bill. He 

discussed this with his attorney and even tried to prevent the Water Company 

from turning his water off by parking a trailer over the meter pit. When 

Taylor’s water was shut off, he knew why, and he knew who was on his 

property. He could not have reasonably believed deadly force was necessary. 

Despite that knowledge, Taylor grabbed his shotgun and fired off a shot in his 

 

5 The dissent believes Taylor should have been allowed to introduce the Bankruptcy Statute and Utility 

Regulation because he had a right to try to show he was permitted to defend his property by effecting a 

citizen’s arrest at gunpoint. Yet, the dissent also acknowledges that he likely would have been unsuccessful 

given that his self-defense claim was rejected by the jury. We do not discount a person’s right to defend his 

property, but as stated herein, there are limits to that right. A person is not entitled in every circumstance to 

use deadly force in defending himself or another person, let alone his property.
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front yard. Taylor then held the four men at gunpoint with the loaded shotgun 

even though they were leaving his yard. His actions constitute the unlawful use 

of deadly force. See Nantz v. State, 740 N.E.2d 1276, 1280-81 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2001) (pointing a loaded firearm at man’s head created a substantial risk of 

serious bodily injury and was an unreasonable use of force in defense of 

property), trans. denied; see also Upp v. State, 473 N.E.2d 1030, 1032 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1985) (firing gun close to man created a substantial risk of bodily injury 

because bullet could have ricocheted). Because “deadly force may never be 

used by a non-law enforcement officer to effect the arrest or prevent the escape 

of a felon[,]” Rose v. State, 431 N.E.2d 521, 523 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982), the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence pertaining to Taylor’s 

citizen’s arrest defense.6 

II. Sufficiency of Evidence

[16] Taylor also challenges his conviction of Count 4, intimidation.7 He argues that 

there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that he threatened Miller 

 

6 Taylor also claims on appeal that the excluded evidence was relevant to his defense to Count 5, 

intimidation, which requires a person to be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act. See Ind. Code § 

35-45-2-1(a)(2). Although Taylor explained to the trial court that the evidence was relevant for showing that 

the actions of the men were unlawful, our review of the transcript shows that these arguments were made—

and the objections were ruled on—in the context of his claims of self-defense and citizen’s arrest defense. 

Taylor did not specifically argue that the excluded evidence was relevant to his charge of intimidation at trial, 

and therefore, it is forfeited on appeal. See Taylor v. State, 710 N.E.2d 921, 923 (Ind. 1999) (A defendant “is 

limited to the specific grounds argued to the trial court and cannot assert new bases for admissibility for the 

first time on appeal.”).

7 We note that Taylor states there was insufficient evidence for his intimidation conviction under Count 5. 

See Appellant’s Brief at 13. However, the substance of his argument addresses his intimidation conviction 

under Count 4. Thus, we address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction of Count 4.
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with the intent that Miller engage in conduct against his will. See Ind. Code § 

35-45-2-1(a)(1) (2011).

[17] “In reviewing claims of insufficient evidence, we consider only the evidence 

supporting the verdict and any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.” 

VanMatre v. State, 714 N.E.2d 655, 657 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). We will neither 

reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. at 657-58. 

The conviction will be affirmed if there is probative evidence from which a 

reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Hyppolite v. State, 774 N.E.2d 584, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. 

denied.

[18] Under Count 4, the State had to prove that Taylor threatened Miller with the 

intent that Miller engage in conduct against his will. See Ind. Code § 35-45-2-

1(a)(1); Appellant’s Appendix at 23. “Threat means an expression, by words or 

action, of an intention to: (1) unlawfully injure the person threatened or another 

person . . . [or] (2) unlawfully subject a person to physical confinement or 

restraint . . . .” Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(d) (quotation marks omitted).

[19] Our review of the record shows that the men were leaving when Taylor walked 

into the front yard, told the men to stop, and fired his shotgun. The men 

stopped once Taylor fired his shotgun, and Taylor then stood between them 

and their vehicles, holding them at gunpoint with a loaded shotgun. Taylor’s 

actions alone constituted a threat, and the men were prevented from leaving. 

Thus, they were held against their will. Taylor then told Garriott that she better 
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pay the bill “before I end up f****** killing one of these guys, especially 

someone in the green shirt.” Ex. 4 at 7:25-:35. He said this while holding 

Miller—who was wearing a green shirt—at gunpoint. Taylor’s words and 

actions expressed an intention to injure Miller in order to hold him there 

against his will. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find Taylor guilty 

of intimidation beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Conclusion

[20] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of bankruptcy 

law or Indiana administrative law, and there was sufficient evidence for the jury 

to find Taylor guilty of intimidation. Taylor’s convictions are affirmed.

[21] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., concurs.

Baker, J., dissents with separate opinion. 
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I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Aaron J. Taylor,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

January 28, 2015

Court of Appeals Cause No.

55A01-1312-CR-524

Appeal from the Morgan Superior 

Court

The Honorable Christopher 

Burnham, Judge

Cause No. 55D02-1109-FB-1157

Baker, Judge, dissenting.

[22] I respectfully dissent. The constitutional right to have one’s day in court and, in 

a criminal context, to present a complete defense, is sacrosanct. I believe that in 

this case, Taylor was denied that right. He has consistently tried to argue that 

he sincerely believed that he was defending his property. And in this State, 

under certain circumstances, he is permitted to do so—even at gunpoint. In my 

opinion, Taylor has the right to try to show that those circumstances were 

present in this case.

[23] I believe that it is especially absurd that the evidence excluded by the trial court 

in this case consisted of a federal statute and a section of the Indiana 

Administrative Code. To say that a criminal defendant is not permitted to 

introduce the law into evidence as part of his defense goes, in my opinion, 
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several steps too far. Both of these pieces of legislation are relevant to Taylor’s 

defense and to the case as a whole.

[24] We are quick to say—and rightly so—that citizens are charged with the 

knowledge of the law, whether or not they have actual knowledge to that effect. 

See, e.g., Kirk v. State, 256 Ind. 480, 484, 269 N.E.2d 751, 754 (Ind. 1971) 

(affirming conviction in part because defendant “was charged with the 

knowledge of the content of the statute”); Zakrasek v. State, 197 Ind. 249, 249, 50 

N.E. 615, 615 (Ind. 1926) (holding that “[a]ll persons are charged with 

knowledge of the criminal laws which define crimes”). In this case, Taylor both 

knows and seeks to apply the content of potentially relevant statutes. To hold 

that he has no right to do so seems to be particularly unfair given that we would 

pretend he had knowledge of the laws under which he was convicted even if he 

did not.

[25] Whether Taylor’s claims would ultimately succeed is beside the point (and 

indeed, given that the jury was not persuaded by Taylor’s self-defense claim, it 

seems unlikely that the citizen’s arrest defense would have been any more 

successful). Instead, I believe that the focus should be on Taylor’s fundamental 

right to present a full and complete defense. He was denied that right in this 

case. Therefore, I would reverse his convictions and remand the case for a new 

trial, at which Taylor would be afforded the right to present a full defense, to 

include both self-defense and a citizen’s arrest defense.