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NOT FOR PUBLICATION [Dkt. Ent. 24] 

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

CAMDEN VICINAGE 

KENNETH SHAW, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CAMDEN, 

et al., 

 Defendants. 

Civil No. 11-4291 (RMB/AMD) 

 OPINION and ORDER 

 

 

Appearances: 

George R. Szymanski 

Law Office of George R. Szymanski 

1370 Chews landing Road 

Laurel Springs, NJ 08021 

Attorney for Plaintiff 

Christine P. O’Hearn 

Brown & Connery, LLP 

360 Haddon Avenue 

P.O. Box 539 

Westmont, NJ 08108 

 Attorney for Defendants 

BUMB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 This matter comes before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff Kenneth Shaw’s (“Plaintiff”) Second Amended Complaint, 

(“Complaint”) filed by defendants Housing Authority of the City 

of Camden, Gloria Jackson-Wright, Maria Marquez, Victor Figeroa, 

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Bernardina Plumey, Thomas Kwartnik, Melvin Gibson, and Vincent 

Miluro, (collectively, the “Defendants”). [Dkt. Ent. 24.] In 

the Complaint, Plaintiff Kenneth Shaw alleges six causes of 

action: Promissory Estoppel (Count 1), Federal Civil Rights 

Violations(Count 2), Violation of New Jersey Law Against 

Discrimination (Count 3), Intentional Inflection of Emotional 

Distress (Count 4), Fraud (Count 5)and Defamation (Count 6). 

Defendants, save for Camden Housing Authority and Gloria 

Jackson-Wright, move to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety. 

Defendants Camden Housing Authority and Gloria Jackson-Wright 

move to dismiss Count 2 with respect to 42 U.S.C §§1985 and 1986 

and Count 6.1

 

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND 

A detailed recitation of the underlying facts related to 

all counts before the Court has been set forth in the Court’s 

Opinion dated August 10, 2012 and is incorporated by reference 

herein. 

LEGAL STANDARD

 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Sheridan v. NGK Metals 

Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 263 n. 27 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, –- U.S. --, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)). “A claim 

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

(quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949). 

 

1

 For reasons unclear to this Court, these Defendants did not move to 

dismiss the §1983 allegation. 

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 The Court conducts a three-part analysis when reviewing a 

claim: 

First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a 

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 

at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations 

that, “because they are no more than conclusions are not 

entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 1950. 

Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, 

a court should assume their veracity and then determine 

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for 

relief.” Id.

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010); 

see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 

2009) (“. . . [A] complaint must do more than allege the 

plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” 

such an entitlement with its facts.”). 

LEGAL ANALYSIS

I. Counts Against Newly Named Defendants

 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint includes six 

previously unnamed employees of the Camden Housing Authority as 

defendants. Specifically, Maria Marquez, Victor Figeroa, 

Bernardina Plumey, Thomas Kwartnik, Melvin Gibson and Vincent 

Miluro are named as parties to the action for the first time and 

identified by the Plaintiff as employees of the Camden Housing 

Authority. Defendants now ask the Court to dismiss all claims 

against them because they allege that there are no factual 

averments related to any act or omission attributable to these 

new defendants present in the Complaint. 

 Even under the most liberal notice pleading requirements of 

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Rule 8(a), a plaintiff must differentiate between defendants. 

Pietrangelo v. NUI Corp., 2005 WL 1703200 (D.N.J. 2005). In 

Pietrangelo, the plaintiff’s complaint, though voluminous, 

failed to mention several defendants individually in any of the 

allegations, instead, referring to all of the defendants 

collectively as “Defendants” throughout. The court held that the 

“lumping together” of defendants “fails to put the various 

defendants on notice of the allegations against them.” Id.

(compare H2O Plus, LLC. V. Arch Personal Care Products, L.P, 

2011 WL 2038775 (D.N.J. 2011) distinguishing Pietrangelo amid a 

complaint that differentiated between defendants by utilizing 

headings in its complaint that indicated which counts were 

against which defendant, with only a small number of counts 

against both defendants.) 

 The Complaint at issue here is analogous to the situation 

in Pietrangelo. Though the Complaint lists each new defendant by 

name and title when numerating the parties to the action, none 

are ever mentioned elsewhere in the complaint. As such, the new 

defendants are not on notice of the allegations against them. 

Therefore, the claims against them are dismissed.2 

II. 42 U.S.C. §§1985 and 1986 Claims

 The Court previously dismissed these claim due to the vague 

and conclusory nature of the allegations. [Dkt. Ent. 7]. 

Plaintiff has failed to allege any more facts to render his 

claim plausible under Iqbal/Twombly. In fact, Plaintiff’s 

 

2

 Because the Court is dismissing all counts against the new defendants 

on grounds that the Complaint fails to follow the requirements of 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(b), it is not necessary to reach 

Defendants’ argument that any claims in tort must fail amid a lack of 

proper notice under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. See N.J.S.A. 59:8-

9. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint, he will 

also be required to show that notice was served on these defendants in 

compliance with the Act. 

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Complaint with respect to this count is identical to its earlier 

iteration save for the addition of one sentence stating, “the 

defendants conspired to deprive plaintiff of his job and 

constitutional rights, as there was a meeting of their minds 

with regard to that, and as they acted with the common purpose 

of trying to deprive the plaintiff of his job and constitutional 

rights.” [Complaint ¶24]. Given that this sentence also 

represents a legal conclusion and is absent any fact to render 

the claim plausible, the Court now dismisses this claim for a 

second time on the same grounds. To the extent that the 

Plaintiff seeks to file a Third Amended Complaint, he shall 

follow the Court’s instruction outlined below. 

III. Defamation

 This Court in its Opinion of August 10, 2012 denied 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and his request for Leave 

to File a Late Notice of Claim. As such, Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss this count is moot as this claim was previously 

dismissed with prejudice. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, it is now this 10th day of 

August, 2012 ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is 

GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that although Plaintiff has 

already had two opportunities to amend, in light of the liberal 

amendment standard, Plaintiff will be given “one final 

opportunity” to further amend. Resnik v. Boskin, No. 09–5059, 

2011 WL 689617, at *9 (D.N.J. Feb.17, 2011); Fennell v. Alie, 

2009 WL 2984200, at *2 (D.Del. Sept.16, 2009) (affording 

plaintiff a “final opportunity” to amend where he had already 

amended once and the court could not say that amendment would be 

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futile). To the extent Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint, 

he may do so within 30 days of the entry of this order. 

 

Dated: August 10, 2012 s/Renée Marie Bumb 

 RENÉE MARIE BUMB 

 United States District Judge 

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