c ir-641.—if 

DA 20-0343

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2022 MT 61

STATE OF MONTANA,

 Plaintiff and Appellee,

 v.

WILLIAM JAMES HARNING,

 Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,

In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DC 18-1356

Honorable Colette B. Davies, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Jeavon Lang, Assistant Appellate 

Defender, Helena, Montana

For Appellee:

Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Bree Gee, Assistant Attorney 

General, Helena, Montana

Scott D. Twito, Yellowstone County Attorney, Sarah L. Hyde, Deputy 

County Attorney, Billings, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: January 19, 2022

 Decided: March 29, 2022

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

03/29/2022

Case Number: DA 20-0343
2

Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 William James Harning (“Harning”) appeals from a May 4, 2020, order in the 

Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, affirming the Yellowstone County 

Justice Court’s denial of his motion to suppress. We reverse and restate the issue on appeal 

as follows:

Whether particularized suspicion existed to support extending Harning’s traffic 

stop into a drug investigation.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Harning was transporting a truck full of ceramics to an art show in Colorado on 

March 1, 2018, when Montana Highway Patrol (“MHP”) Trooper Tyler DiGiovanna

(“Trooper DiGiovanna”) pulled him over for going 74 miles per hour in a 65 mile per hour

zone near Billings at approximately 10:18 in the morning. On his approach to Harning’s 

vehicle, Trooper DiGiovanna noticed several sealed cardboard boxes in the bed of the 

truck. 

¶3 As Trooper DiGiovanna approached, Harning rolled his window down 

approximately three or four inches. Trooper DiGiovanna asked Harning to roll the window 

down farther. Harning said he did not feel comfortable doing so and declined. 

Trooper DiGiovanna later testified that he immediately noticed the odor of marijuana when 

Harning rolled his window down. Trooper DiGiovanna testified that Harning “hemmed 

and hawed” when asked why he felt uncomfortable and that Harning’s refusal to roll the 

window down first led Trooper DiGiovanna to believe Harning was hiding something. He 

testified that he preferred a rolled-down window for better communication and that he 
3

“immediately” deemed Harning’s behavior “evasive” because not rolling the window 

down was atypical of most traffic stops. Trooper DiGiovanna did not testify to any 

communication issues related to the distance Harning’s window was rolled down.1

¶4 On cross-examination, Trooper DiGiovanna conceded people might sometimes be 

nervous during traffic stops, but that he had “pulled people over that are nervous, and they 

don’t act like that.” Harning’s behavior struck him as different and “not nervous.” 

Trooper DiGiovanna defined his meaning of “evasive” as “when asked a question, 

[Harning] would not answer it immediately. He hesitated, appeared nervous. He appeared 

as though he was trying to pick his words carefully, which is not normal of someone being 

honest.” On redirect, Trooper DiGiovanna explained the difference between nervous and 

evasive behavior was “just subtle kind of things.” When asked whether he had experience 

differentiating the two, Trooper DiGiovanna responded, without elaboration, that he did.

¶5 Harning provided his license, registration, and insurance upon 

Trooper DiGiovanna’s request. Due to the smell of marijuana, Trooper DiGiovanna asked 

Harning whether he had a medical marijuana card. Harning did not have a medical 

marijuana card, but admitted to smoking marijuana in Big Timber, approximately 80 miles

from where Harning was stopped. Trooper DiGiovanna testified that he asked Harning 

whether there was marijuana in the vehicle and that Harning briefly hesitated and

answered, “I have no marijuana on me,” furthering Trooper DiGiovanna’s determination 

 

1 The only apparent issue, captured on Trooper DiGiovanna’s dashcam, arose from a plastic bag 

in plain view in Harning’s vehicle, the contents of which Trooper DiGiovanna said he could not 

make out through the window. Harning informed Trooper DiGiovanna the bag contained beef 

jerky.
4

that Harning was hiding something. Trooper DiGiovanna later testified that, at this point,

he suspected drugs were in Harning’s vehicle. He cited “the odor, [Harning’s] behavior, 

and just [Harning’s] interactions” as the basis for his suspicion. He did not testify that 

Harning’s travel plans factored into his determination. 

¶6 Trooper DiGiovanna returned to his vehicle with Harning’s documents, verified 

Harning had no outstanding warrants, and called for backup, a standard procedure for 

investigations involving field sobriety tests to determine whether an individual is driving 

under the influence (“DUI”). The record additionally indicates Harning had no prior drug 

charges. Trooper DiGiovanna returned to Harning’s vehicle and gave Harning a warning 

for speeding. He testified that, upon his return to Harning’s vehicle, he made the decision 

to conduct a drug investigation upon completion of the DUI field sobriety tests. He again 

cited Harning’s behavior and noted the “new” smell of marijuana “wafting” from 

Harning’s vehicle as contributing to this decision. Trooper DiGiovanna initiated the 

DUI investigation first to mitigate the possibility of waning impairment.

¶7 Trooper DiGiovanna asked Harning to exit the vehicle and, pursuant to the 

DUI investigation, patted down Harning. The patdown revealed no drugs on Harning’s 

person. During the DUI investigation, Harning informed Trooper DiGiovanna that the 

boxes in his truck bed contained pottery. Trooper DiGiovanna later testified that he 

misheard Harning and believed Harning said the boxes contained “pot.” Another MHP 

trooper clarified the misunderstanding. Nonetheless, after completing all the field sobriety 

tests pursuant to the DUI investigation, Trooper DiGiovanna determined Harning was not 

impaired.
5

¶8 Although Harning had received his traffic warning and was cleared of any impaired 

driving, Trooper DiGiovanna again asked Harning about the marijuana smell. Harning 

responded that there was no marijuana in the car, denied Trooper DiGiovanna’s request for 

consent to search his vehicle, and asked whether he could leave. Trooper DiGiovanna told 

Harning he was not free to leave, but neither was he under arrest. Trooper DiGiovanna did 

not ask Harning any additional questions regarding the drug investigation and testified that 

the denial of consent did not factor into his preexisting suspicion of Harning. 

¶9 At that point, Trooper DiGiovanna informed Harning he was beginning the drug 

investigation and “would be requesting a canine come and not search the vehicle, but be 

deployed.” He informed Harning that he could either get a ride elsewhere or stay and wait 

for the results of the canine sniff; Harning elected to wait. After approximately 17 minutes,

the canine arrived and signaled for drugs in Harning’s vehicle. The total time between the 

initiation of the stop and the conclusion of the canine search was approximately 43 minutes. 

As a result of the canine search, Trooper DiGiovanna obtained a search warrant and located 

a glass marijuana pipe and grinder in Harning’s vehicle. Harning was charged in 

Yellowstone County Justice Court with criminal possession of drug paraphernalia, in 

violation of § 45-10-103, MCA, and criminal possession of marijuana, in violation of 

§ 45-9-102(2), MCA.2 

¶10 Harning moved to suppress the State’s evidence as the product of an illegal 

extension of the stop. After holding a hearing, the Justice Court denied Harning’s motion 

 

2 The Yellowstone County Justice Court is a court of record authorized by § 3-10-101(5), MCA. 
6

to suppress. In addition to the above testimony, Trooper DiGiovanna explained his training 

specifically related to drug interdiction, which included two eight-hour days of drug 

training during the MHP academy. Trooper DiGiovanna estimated he had been involved 

in approximately 50 cases involving drugs during his time with MHP. At the time he pulled 

Harning over, Trooper DiGiovanna had been an MHP Trooper for approximately one year.

¶11 The Justice Court concluded Harning had not been seized within the meaning of the 

Fourth Amendment and deemed the following facts sufficient to create a particularized 

suspicion: Harning’s out-of-state license plates3and speeding, Harning’s evasive answers, 

Harning’s failure to roll down his window more than a few inches, the odor of marijuana, 

Harning’s admission to smoking marijuana in Big Timber, and Harning’s denial of having 

marijuana on his “person” when asked if there was marijuana in the vehicle. The 

Justice Court further concluded that Trooper DiGiovanna’s initial stop was justified by 

Harning speeding, and Trooper DiGiovanna “learned that [Harning] had smoked marijuana 

while on his route to Colorado thereby justifying the DUI investigation. This information, 

coupled with the fact that the Trooper could smell marijuana emanating from inside the 

vehicle, justified the canine search.”

¶12 Harning pleaded guilty to both counts and reserved his right to appeal to the 

District Court. On appeal to the District Court, the District Court found the Justice Court 

erred in determining Harning had not been seized within the meaning of the 

 

3 Trooper DiGiovanna neither testified that Harning’s out-of-state license plates contributed to his 

suspicion nor relied upon the license plates to demonstrate probable cause in his search warrant 

application. 
7

Fourth Amendment, but concluded the seizure was constitutionally sound. The 

District Court affirmed the denial of Harning’s motion to suppress. Harning appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶13 On appeal from a district court’s review of a lower court ruling, we review the lower 

court ruling as if appealed directly to this Court without district court review. State v. 

Hoover, 2017 MT 236, ¶ 12, 388 Mont. 533, 402 P.3d 1224. Our review of a lower court’s 

denial of a motion to suppress is whether the lower court’s findings of fact are clearly 

erroneous and whether it correctly applied the controlling law to those facts. Hoover, ¶ 12. 

A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial evidence, if the 

trial court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if this Court has a firm or definite 

conviction that the trial court committed a mistake. State v. Maile, 2017 MT 154, ¶ 8, 

388 Mont. 33, 396 P.3d 1270. We review the lower court’s conclusions of law and 

application of legal standards de novo. Hoover, ¶ 12. 

DISCUSSION

¶14 Whether particularized suspicion existed to support extending Harning’s traffic 

stop into a drug investigation. 

¶15 Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, 

Section 11, of the Montana Constitution protect persons from unreasonable searches and 

seizures, including brief investigatory stops such as traffic stops. State v. Wilson, 

2018 MT 268, ¶ 25, 393 Mont. 238, 430 P.3d 77. The fundamental purposes of the 

Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 11, are “to protect the privacy and security of 

individuals” from unreasonable government intrusion or interference. Hoover, ¶ 14 (citing 
8

State v. Clayton, 2002 MT 67, ¶ 11, 309 Mont. 215, 45 P.3d 30). To initiate a traffic stop, 

a law enforcement officer must have particularized suspicion that the occupant of the 

vehicle is or has been engaged in unlawful behavior. Section 46-5-401(1), MCA. A traffic 

stop may not last longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. 

Section 46-5-403, MCA. However, investigative stops may be prolonged, and the scope 

of the investigation enlarged, provided the scope of the investigation remains within the 

limits created by the facts and suspicions from which they arose. State v. Estes, 

2017 MT 226, ¶ 15, 388 Mont. 491, 403 P.3d 1249. 

¶16 Harning contends Trooper DiGiovanna lacked particularized suspicion to justify 

extending the traffic stop and ordering a canine sniff search. Harning does not contest the 

validity of the DUI investigation. The State counters that the canine sniff was lawful 

because Trooper DiGiovanna had specific, articulable facts supporting a particularized 

suspicion that Harning was engaged in drug activity. The State contends that 

Trooper DiGiovanna had particularized suspicion to make the initial traffic stop when he 

observed Harning speeding. Thereafter, the odor of marijuana and Harning’s admission to 

using marijuana provided particularized suspicion for a DUI investigation. Finally, the 

State argues that, under the totality of circumstances, particularized suspicion existed to 

support a canine search. 

¶17 A canine sniff of a vehicle constitutes a search under Article II, Sections 10 and 11, 

of the Montana Constitution. State v. Tackitt, 2003 MT 81, ¶ 22, 315 Mont. 59, 

67 P.3d 295. Accordingly, law enforcement must have a particularized suspicion of 

wrongdoing before conducting a canine search of an individual’s vehicle. Tackitt, ¶ 31. 
9

Particularized suspicion requires objective data from which an experienced officer can 

make certain inferences and a resulting suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle is or has 

been engaged in wrongdoing. Estes, ¶ 17. Relevant considerations include the quantity, 

substance, quality, and degree of reliability of information known to the officer. 

Hoover, ¶ 17. Whether an officer possessed particularized suspicion of criminal activity is 

a question of fact assessed under the totality of circumstances, but the related question of 

whether the circumstances indicated illegal activity is a question of law. State v. Kaufman, 

2002 MT 294, ¶ 11, 313 Mont. 1, 59 P.3d 1166. 

¶18 An officer need not be certain, or even correct, that a person is engaged in criminal 

activity. Wilson, ¶ 28. However, particularized suspicion requires more than mere 

generalized suspicion or an undeveloped hunch of criminal activity. Wilson, ¶ 28. 

“Where the only basis for suspecting a specific person of wrongdoing is inferences that 

could be drawn from the conduct of virtually any law-abiding person, the resulting 

suspicion cannot, by definition, be particularized.” State v. Reeves, 2019 MT 151, ¶ 13, 

396 Mont. 230, 444 P.3d 394. If the officer lacks particularized suspicion, and no other 

exceptions to the search warrant requirement apply, the search and seizure is 

unconstitutional and all evidence emanating from the illegal testing must be suppressed. 

State v. Zimmerman, 2018 MT 94, ¶ 17, 391 Mont. 210, 417 P.3d 289. 

¶19 We conclude the record does not support that Trooper DiGiovanna had 

particularized suspicion to extend Harning’s traffic and DUI stop into a drug investigation

of the contents of Harning’s vehicle. Trooper DiGiovanna’s testimony that he determined 

to conduct a drug investigation of Harning’s vehicle after citing Harning for speeding
10

guides our analysis. Up to that point, Trooper DiGiovanna validly pulled Harning over for 

speeding. Aside from declining to roll his window down more than three or four inches

and “hemm[ing] and haw[ing]” in response to Trooper DiGiovanna’s questions,

“immediately” raising the trooper’s suspicions, Trooper DiGiovanna did not articulate 

objective data indicating Harning’s vehicle likely contained drugs. Trooper DiGiovanna 

smelled marijuana, and Harning truthfully admitted to smoking earlier, justifying the DUI 

investigation. See State v. Allen, 1998 MT 293, ¶ 12, 292 Mont. 1, 970 P.2d 81 (concluding 

the smell of alcohol and admission of alcohol use was sufficient to justify the 

administration of field sobriety tests). However, Harning did not admit to smoking 

marijuana in his truck, but rather, 80 miles away in Big Timber. Harning fully cooperated

with Trooper DiGiovanna, providing his license, registration, and insurance upon request. 

Harning also complied with all directives during the DUI investigation. 

Trooper DiGiovanna never testified to any facts that were specific and particularized to 

Harning’s vehicle which would support a suspicion the vehicle itself contained illegal 

drugs. Importantly, although Harning was subjected to a traffic stop and DUI investigation, 

he retained a right of privacy in his vehicle which, absent particularized and articulable 

facts relating to his vehicle, could not be violated. “[O]fficers may rely on a distinctive 

odor as a physical fact indicative of a possible crime; but its presence alone does not strip 

[an individual] of constitutional guarantees against unreasonable search.” Taylor v. 

United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6, 52 S. Ct. 466, 467 (1932) (finding the odor of whiskey during 

the Prohibition Era insufficient to justify a warrantless search).
11

¶20 At the moment Trooper DiGiovanna determined to initiate a drug investigation of 

Harning’s vehicle, which we note was prior to commencing his DUI investigation, he was 

aware of the following facts: (1) Harning’s “evasive” behavior, including his refusal to roll 

the window down, (2) the odor of marijuana and admission of smoking earlier in 

Big Timber, (3) Harning’s response to Trooper DiGiovanna that he did not have marijuana 

on him, and (4) Harning had no prior drug charges. Trooper DiGiovanna failed to 

articulate, beyond a circular definition of “just subtle kind of things” about Harning’s 

“evasive” behavior, how he came to suspect Harning had drugs in his vehicle. 

Trooper DiGiovanna did not specify how the “subtle kind of things” were consistent with 

criminal behavior, nor did his testimony that he had “pulled people over that are nervous, 

and they don’t act like that” provide sufficient objective data that drugs would be found in 

Harning’s vehicle. A stop may not last longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of 

the stop and the scope of the investigation must remain within the limits created by the 

particularized suspicion. Particularized suspicion for the traffic stop was based on 

speeding, which developed more facts and thereby ripened into a DUI investigation based 

on the odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle whose only occupant was the driver. 

Once any suspicion of DUI was dispelled and no facts warranted additional investigation, 

Harning should have been released. Here, there were no additional facts suggesting, for 

example, that Harning’s vehicle in particular contained drugs, that Harning was using his 

vehicle to transport drugs, or that Harning’s vehicle had been used to facilitate drug 

activity. Thus, there was no basis to extend the search to Harning’s vehicle once Harning 

was determined not to be impaired.
12

¶21 The State argues, even if the facts here prove distinguishable from other cases, those 

distinctions are mitigated by assessing the facts under the totality of the circumstances. 

While facts giving rise to a particularized suspicion will, naturally, vary from case to case,

the facts of Wilson prove analogous here. In Wilson, an MHP trooper pulled a vehicle over 

for an expired registration. Wilson, ¶ 3. During the traffic stop, the trooper observed a lack 

of eye contact and nervous behavior by the vehicle’s passenger, Wilson, as well as the 

vehicle’s lived-in appearance. Wilson, ¶ 4. The trooper testified the driver’s “nerves were 

at a different level” than a typical traffic stop and cited heavy breathing and the lack of eye 

contact. Wilson, ¶ 32 (internal quotations removed). The trooper learned the vehicle was 

borrowed and that the driver, a newlywed, was traveling home from his wedding without 

his wife. Wilson, ¶¶ 5-6. The trooper ordered a canine search, which resulted in a positive 

hit for drugs in the vehicle. Wilson, ¶ 15. On appeal, we reversed Wilson’s conviction and 

concluded that while “a driver’s post-stop behavior may, in combination with more 

objectively incriminating behavior, amount to particularized suspicion, [Wilson’s] conduct 

alone did not meet the minimum threshold.” Wilson, ¶¶ 34, 39. We rejected the State’s 

argument that “[a] messy vehicle, a nervous driver with an unlit cigarette, daylight use of 

a Montana highway, using a borrowed vehicle, and the fact that newlyweds aren’t traveling 

together following their wedding” amounted to a particularized suspicion and concluded,

instead, the indicators revealed only a generalized hunch. Wilson, ¶ 34. 

¶22 While there were certain indicators present here that were not present in Wilson, the 

converse is also true. Harning’s vehicle was not messy or lived-in. Trooper DiGiovanna 

did not testify that he found Harning’s travel plans suspicious. Trooper DiGiovanna 
13

testified to his perception of atypical behavior during the stop. We rejected similar 

testimony concerning the trooper’s observations in Wilson, and Trooper DiGiovanna 

provided even less information than the trooper in Wilson to support his observation that 

Harning’s behavior was atypical. Moreover, unlike Wilson, Harning had no issue 

producing either his proof of insurance or his driver’s license, had not borrowed the vehicle 

from an acquaintance, and had no prior drug charges. 

¶23 Trooper DiGiovanna’s relative lack of experience at the time he pulled over Harning 

further distinguishes the facts here. See, e.g., Wilson, ¶ 42 (Rice, J., dissenting) (noting the 

trooper’s training included Basic and Advanced Highway Patrol and three subsequent 

schools focused specifically on vehicle-related drug interdiction); Estes, ¶¶ 18, 27 (finding 

a particularized suspicion and noting the trooper’s “eleven years of experience as an officer 

of [MHP and] over seven hundred hours of drug and K-9 handling training”); State v. 

Marino, 2016 MT 220, ¶¶ 7, 20, 384 Mont. 490, 380 P.3d 763 (finding a particularized 

suspicion and noting the officer’s “significant prior experience with narcotics 

investigations”); State v. Roy, 2013 MT 51, ¶¶ 17-18, 369 Mont. 173, 296 P.3d 1169 

(finding particularized suspicion and noting the officer’s “roughly 20 years of 

law enforcement experience[,] training in drug interdiction and [involvement in] over 

100 stops in which [the officer] investigated the presence of illegal drugs”). The record 

indicates Trooper DiGiovanna, with approximately 16 hours of training, had even less 

experience than the trooper in Wilson.

¶24 While the State contends Harning’s hesitant answers and failure to roll his window 

down more than a few inches aroused Trooper DiGiovanna’s suspicion, this, even 
14

combined with the odor of marijuana and Harning’s admission of smoking in Big Timber,

does not amount to objective data that Harning’s vehicle might contain drugs.

Trooper DiGiovanna testified that Harning’s behavior, and not the smell of marijuana, was 

what first raised his suspicion that Harning was hiding something. The dissent downplays 

the “annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating” experience of an investigatory stop, 

see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1882 (1968), ascribing a nefarious motive 

to Harning’s statement that he “was not expecting this” and Harning’s “hesitant” behavior. 

It is tempting to forgive an officer’s illegal extension of a stop when the officer’s conduct 

uncovers evidence of illegal conduct by a civilian, no matter how minimal; here, possession 

of a marijuana pipe. However, this belies the basic principle at the heart of search and 

seizure jurisprudence: Two wrongs do not make a right. See Weeks v. United States, 

232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341 (1914). An officer who impermissibly extends a detention just 

to fish for further evidence of wrongdoing breaches the protections afforded by the 

Fourth Amendment. Nervous behavior during a traffic stop is not uncommon and does not 

establish particularized suspicion to extend a traffic stop into a drug investigation of 

Harning’s vehicle.

¶25 The dissent agrees with the Justice Court’s determination that the canine search 

failed to “prolong the traffic stop past the stop’s mission given that the Trooper’s mission 

was to investigate” Harning for DUI and drug possession. But “the tolerable duration of 

police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to 

address the traffic violation that warranted the stop . . . and attend to related safety 

concerns.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) 
15

(internal citations omitted). The stop’s “mission” was to address Harning’s speeding, and 

Trooper DiGiovanna’s “[o]n-scene investigation into other crimes . . . detour[ed] from that 

mission.” See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356, 135 S. Ct. at 1616. 

¶26 Notwithstanding Trooper DiGiovanna’s testimony that he determined to complete 

a drug investigation into the contents of Harning’s vehicle at the same time he decided to 

pursue the DUI investigation, Harning never said he had smoked in his vehicle and

admitted only to smoking marijuana in Big Timber, approximately 80 miles before he was 

stopped. The result of Trooper DiGiovanna’s DUI investigation indicated he was not 

impaired. If Trooper DiGiovanna believed Harning was impaired and smoking marijuana 

in his vehicle, the results of the DUI investigation should have dispelled that belief. 

¶27 The dissent points to State v. Pierce, 2005 MT 182, 328 Mont. 33, 116 P.3d 917, 

wherein the Court found probable cause to seize Pierce’s vehicle based on the odor of 

marijuana and an admission that someone else smoked marijuana in the vehicle earlier that 

day. Pierce, ¶ 21. Pierce proves distinguishable on several fronts. First, as the dissent 

notes, Pierce involved the admission of smoking inside the vehicle by a third party. Pierce, 

¶ 21. Harning admitted to smoking 80 miles away in Big Timber—not his vehicle.

4

 

Moreover, assuming Harning had admitted to smoking inside the vehicle, we have 

previously recognized “the mere odor of marijuana might linger in an automobile for more 

 

4 The dissent notes as “objective data” that Harning “did not live in Big Timber but had stopped 

there and smoked with a friend on his trip.” Dissent, ¶ 32. Trooper DiGiovanna neither included 

this information in his search warrant application nor testified that it factored into his suspicion. 

Likewise, the Justice Court did not rely upon Harning’s residence in concluding 

Trooper DiGiovanna had particularized suspicion.
16

than a day[,]” see State v. Schoendaller, 176 Mont. 376, 382, 578 P.2d 730, 734 (1978), 

minimizing the import the dissent and Justice Court incorrectly place on the distance 

between Big Timber and Harning’s stop. Finally, as the Court noted in Pierce, “the issue 

here involves a seizure of a truck based upon the owner’s admission that an offense had 

taken place inside it and not whether the required particularized suspicion existed, based 

on stale information, to conduct a dog sniff.” Pierce, ¶ 20. Indeed, the Pierce Court 

“set aside the questionable K-9 search” based on the odor of marijuana and admission of 

smoking to address the issues before it. Pierce, ¶ 30. Conversely, the facts here implicate 

precisely the “questionable K-9 search” Pierce set aside.

¶28 We have long recognized that the State bears the burden of demonstrating an 

officer’s particularized suspicion. State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 15, 302 Mont. 228, 

14 P.3d 456. In meeting this burden, the “demand for specificity in the information upon 

which police action is predicated is the central teaching” of search and seizure 

jurisprudence. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, n. 18, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. In other words, the State 

must demonstrate more than “just subtle kind of things.” The State failed to do so here, 

and Trooper DiGiovanna unlawfully extended the traffic stop.

CONCLUSION

¶29 The purpose of the initial stop was to warn Harning for speeding. 

Trooper DiGiovanna learned information permitting the extension of the stop into a 

DUI investigation. However, upon determining Harning was not impaired, the stop should 

have terminated. After conducting the DUI investigation, Trooper DiGiovanna possessed 
17

only an undeveloped, generalized suspicion, based off the smell of marijuana, that 

Harning’s vehicle may have contained drugs. 

¶30 The Justice Court erred in denying Harning’s motion to suppress. Harning’s 

conviction is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

/S/ LAURIE McKINNON

We concur: 

/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON

/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR

/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA

Justice Jim Rice, dissenting. 

¶31 I would affirm the Justice Court’s denial of Harning’s motion to suppress. In my 

view, Trooper DiGiovanna lawfully extended the traffic stop into both a DUI investigation 

and a drug investigation with a canine sniff, because the evidence supported either or both. 

For purposes of the issue challenged on appeal, the totality of the circumstances supported 

particularized suspicion that Harning possessed marijuana in his vehicle.

¶32 For a general suspicion of criminal activity to become particularized, an officer 

needs “additional ‘specific and articulable facts’ indicating that the occupants of the vehicle 

had committed, were committing, or were about to commit a specific criminal offense.” 

Hoover, ¶ 19 (citing § 46-5-401(1), MCA) (additional citations omitted). Trooper 

DiGiovanna observed and testified to the following specific and articulable facts, which 

were included in the Justice Court’s Findings of Fact (FOF) and Conclusions of Law 
18

(COL). When Trooper DiGiovanna approached Harning’s truck to investigate the 

speeding violation, Harning only rolled down his window three to four inches. The 

following can be heard from the audio of the dash cam:

Trooper DiGiovanna: Does your window roll down any more?

Harning: Uh, I don’t feel comfortable [inaudible].

TDG: Ok, do you feel uncomfortable about something?

H: No, I just uh was not expecting this [inaudible].

Trooper DiGiovanna could immediately smell marijuana “wafting” from the window of 

the truck, even though rolled down only three to four inches. At the suppression hearing 

he described the odor as “new” and “not aired out.” Harning said he did not have a medical 

marijuana card, and admitted to smoking marijuana in Big Timber, only 80 miles from the 

stop. He did not live in Big Timber but had stopped there and smoked with a friend on his 

trip.1 Critically, when Trooper DiGiovanna asked Harning if he had any marijuana in the 

vehicle, Harning hesitated and then responded with the qualified answer that he did not 

have marijuana on him. “He evaded the question, didn’t acknowledge the fact of the 

vehicle,” Trooper DiGiovanna testified. “If someone is being honest they immediately say 

yes or no, as opposed to hesitating before responding.”

 

1 While the Court takes issue with my referencing the fact that Harning admitted to smoking when 

passing through Big Timber on his way to deliver the pottery, Opinion, ¶ 27 n.4, the Justice Court 

referenced this detail multiple times in its Order. The Justice Court concluded: “The Trooper then 

learned that the Defendant had smoked marijuana while on his route to Colorado thereby justifying 

the DUI investigation. This information, coupled with the fact that the Trooper could smell 

marijuana emanating from inside the vehicle, justified the canine search,” COL, ¶ 27; and “The 

Trooper had distinct and articulable facts that the Defendant was engaged in drug activity based 

upon his behavior and the admission of smoking marijuana while on his route to Colorado.” COL,

¶ 28. See also FOF, ¶ 4; COL, ¶ 30 (additional references to Harning admitting to smoking while 

traveling through Big Timber).
19

¶33 From this objective data, Trooper DiGiovanna made the inference, based on his 

training and experience,

2

that Harning was likely engaged in wrongdoing involving 

marijuana.3 “Based on additional information developed during the initial lawful duration 

and scope of an initial investigative stop, an officer may develop new or broader 

particularized suspicion of criminal activity justifying expansion of the scope or duration 

of the stop beyond that justified by the officer’s initial observations.” City of Missoula v. 

Kroschel, 2018 MT 142, ¶ 19, 391 Mont. 457, 419 P.3d 1208 (citations omitted). Specially, 

“an officer may prolong a traffic stop to conduct a canine search where the officer has a 

particularized suspicion of narcotics activity.” Estes, ¶ 16. 

¶34 Trooper DiGiovanna’s initial particularized suspicion to stop Harning for speeding

grew into particularized suspicion for the offenses of Driving Under the Influence of 

Alcohol or Drugs, in violation of § 61-8-401, MCA (2017), Criminal Possession of Drug 

Paraphernalia, in violation of § 45-10-103, MCA (2017), Criminal Possession of 

Dangerous Drugs, in violation of § 45-9-102(2), MCA (2017), or any combination thereof. 

I would hold Trooper DiGiovanna had particularized suspicion to conduct both a DUI 

 

2 Harning’s briefing emphasizes Trooper DiGiovanna’s relative inexperience, and the Court 

appears to adopt this characterization. See Opinion, ¶ 23. But the level of experience required 

varies with the nature of the inferences made by the officer to reach particularized suspicion, and 

is rarely determinative. In this case, I would conclude that Trooper DiGiovanna’s experience—

two full days of drug detection training at the law enforcement academy, combined with working 

on approximately fifty cases involving drugs—was sufficient to accurately detect the odor of 

marijuana and observe evasive or abnormal responses to straightforward questions such as, “Do

you have marijuana in the vehicle?” 

3

In addition, Harning’s admission that he recently smoked marijuana unequivocally confirmed 

Trooper DiGiovanna’s particularized suspicion that Harning “had committed . . . a specific 

criminal offense” involving marijuana prior to the stop. Hoover, ¶ 19; see also § 46-5-401, MCA. 
20

investigation and a drug investigation with a canine sniff of Harning’s truck, as the 

overlapping evidence supported either or both. In fact, he testified that after his initial 

conversation with Harning, in which he learned the aforementioned facts, he suspected 

there was marijuana in the truck and contemporaneously decided to conduct both 

investigations. This testimony is supported by the dash cam footage and noted by the 

Court. Opinion, ¶¶ 6, 19, 26. I agree with the Justice Court’s determination that, “[t]he 

canine search did not prolong the traffic stop past the stop’s mission given that the 

Trooper’s mission was to investigate [Harning] for driving under the influence and 

investigate [him] for drug possession.” Because the purpose of the stop evolved as Trooper 

DiGiovanna gained new information and developed particularized suspicion of drug 

activity, the stop did “not last longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” 

Section 46-5-403, MCA. 

¶35 The Court holds that, “[a]side from declining to roll his window down more than 

three or four inches and ‘hemm[ing] and haw[ing]’ in response to Trooper DiGiovanna’s 

questions . . . Trooper DiGiovanna did not articulate objective data indicating Harning’s 

vehicle likely contained drugs.” The Court further reasons that Trooper DiGiovanna’s 

smelling of marijuana and Harning’s admission to smoking earlier justified the DUI 

investigation. Opinion, ¶ 19. While these are certainly indicators supporting particularized 

suspicion of DUI, they are also “objective data indicating Harning’s vehicle contained 

drugs.” Trooper DiGiovanna testified that he “fully intended before [asking Harning] to 

get out the vehicle to perform both [the DUI and canine sniff investigations].” 
21

¶36 The Court cites Wilson to support its conclusion that Trooper DiGiovanna lacked 

particularized suspicion. Opinion, ¶¶ 21-22. In Wilson, we reversed because the officer 

“failed to identify details that were objectively indicative of illegal drug activity,” and 

instead only testified about generally suspicious behavior. Wilson, ¶ 35. While the Court 

focuses its comparison solely on Trooper DiGiovanna’s observations of Harning’s evasive 

behavior, clearly the signature odor of marijuana and admission of recently smoking are 

details objectively indicative of, what was at the time, illegal drug activity.4 I believe the 

Court downplays the “substance, quality, and degree of reliability” of these 

marijuana-specific, crime-specific, indicators. Hoover, ¶ 17. Inferences of wrongdoing 

based on these facts could not be “drawn from the conduct of virtually any law-abiding 

person,” because possession and use of marijuana without a valid medical marijuana card 

was illegal in Montana at the time Trooper DiGiovanna stopped Harning. Reeves, ¶ 13. 

¶37 Further, unlike in Wilson, even the evasive behavior noted by Trooper DiGiovanna 

was specifically connected to illegal marijuana activity. It is a reasonable inference that 

Harning did not “feel comfortable” further rolling down his window, as he stated, because 

he was attempting to obscure the fact that his truck smelled of marijuana. He gave no 

competing justification for his discomfort other than he “was not expecting this.”

5

 We

 

4

It is ultimately irrelevant if “Trooper DiGiovanna testified that Harning’s behavior, and not the 

smell of marijuana, was what first raised his suspicion that Harning was hiding something,” 

Opinion, ¶ 24. He immediately smelled the marijuana odor when interacting with Harning and 

observing his behavior and answers to questions. Particularized suspicion is based on the totality 

of the circumstances and, as testified to by Trooper DiGiovanna, both behavioral indicators and 

the smell and admission to smoking all factored into his decision to request a canine search. 

5 The Court claims that I downplay the stressful experience of an investigatory stop by “ascribing 

a nefarious motive” to Harning’s behavior and statements. Opinion, ¶ 25. To the contrary, I simply 
22

have held in previous cases that excessive air fresheners or deodorizers in a stopped vehicle 

was one indicator contributing to particularized suspicion of marijuana activity because it 

is a known method of masking the drug’s odor. Estes, ¶ 18; Roy, ¶ 17. I would observe 

that Harning also displayed behavior that could reasonably be interpreted as attempting to 

mask the odor of marijuana in his truck. In addition, the qualified answer Harning gave to 

Trooper DiGiovanna was in direct response to him specifically asking Harning if he 

possessed marijuana in his truck. Harning’s unusually phrased response was that he did 

not have any marijuana on him. Even a relatively inexperienced officer could recognize 

that answer as conspicuously not matching the question asked. This answer was highly 

suspicious and directly related to marijuana possession in Harning’s truck. When Trooper 

DiGiovanna conducted the DUI investigation, he first patted down Harning, finding no 

drugs on his person, just as Harning had said. The results of the DUI investigation dispelled 

Trooper DiGiovanna’s particularized suspicion that Harning was driving impaired, but it 

did not dispel his particularized suspicion that Harning possessed marijuana in his truck. 

 

include the statements and behaviors that Trooper DiGiovanna testified were suspicious or evasive, 

and conclude they were appropriate indicators contributing to particularized suspicion. This is our 

Court’s approach to particularized suspicion issues and is fully consistent with our precedent. In 

Wilson, we reviewed the officer’s testimony about the defendant’s behavior and held: “Although a 

driver’s post-stop behavior may, in combination with more objectively incriminating behavior, 

amount to particularized suspicion, this conduct alone did not meet the minimum threshold.” 

Wilson, ¶ 34. But we have also held that an officer’s observations of a defendant’s behavior, in 

combination with other indicators connected to drug trafficking, did meet the threshold to support 

particularized suspicion. Estes, ¶¶ 18, 20. Harning’s situation is more analogous to Estes than 

Wilson. As noted, his post-stop behavior was combined with “more objectively incriminating 

behavior.” I believe the Court is choosing to excuse Harning’s unusual statements and behaviors 

by subjectively characterizing them as common “nervous behavior during a traffic stop,” rather 

than fully engaging with their implications. Opinion, ¶ 25. Some of Harning’s actions have never 

before been noted in our opinions, and must be included in the totality of circumstances. 
23

See Kroschel, ¶ 13 (“Law enforcement officers must act with reasonable diligence to 

quickly confirm or dispel the predicate suspicion for the stop.” (Citation omitted.)).

¶38 While Harning’s evasiveness could potentially have innocent explanations, we have 

often cited non-illegal activities as supportive indicators of criminal behavior, such as 

utilizing multiple air fresheners, consuming energy drinks in a messy car, travelling to 

Oregon or North Dakota, Estes, ¶¶ 3, 18, or “‘bobbing up and down’ in the bushes across 

from a courthouse at six a.m.” State v. Stevens, 2019 MT 36, ¶ 14, 394 Mont. 278, 

434 P.3d 904. Here, all the objective indicators relied upon by Trooper DiGiovanna were 

specific to marijuana impairment, possession, or both, not simply a generalized suspicion 

of criminal activity. See Wilson, ¶ 34 (holding that a variety of suspicious indicators 

observed by the officer revealed “only a generalized hunch and not an articulation of 

specific facts demonstrating criminal behavior”); Hoover, ¶ 22 (“though [the officer]

articulated circumstances generally conducive to the commission of a break-in or illegal 

drug use, [he] did not further articulate any specific conduct or circumstance which, in 

context of his articulated generalized suspicion, was particularly indicative of an imminent 

break-in or illegal drug use” (emphasis original)). 

¶39 In Pierce, we held that the smell of burnt marijuana in the defendant’s truck, in 

combination with his admission that someone else had smoked marijuana in the truck 

earlier that day, was enough for the officer to conclude that the contents of the truck 

“‘offended the law.’” Pierce, ¶ 21. We found these facts sufficient for the officer to have 

probable cause to seize, impound, and deploy a canine sniff on the truck before receiving 

a search warrant. Pierce, ¶¶ 8, 22. While Pierce is distinguishable because there we 
24

considered whether the facts met the probable cause standard rather than particularized 

suspicion, particularized suspicion is a less stringent standard. State v. Brander, 

2004 MT 150, ¶ 8, 321 Mont. 484, 92 P.3d 1173. It makes sense that similar facts of a 

slightly lower level of certainty than in Pierce would be sufficient for particularized 

suspicion.6 Here, Trooper DiGiovanna’s particularized suspicion was similarly supported 

by the smell of marijuana and an admission that Harning had recently smoked, albeit not 

in his truck, but on a recent stop on his road trip. 

¶40 Harning argues that “[j]ust because [he] uses marijuana does not mean that his 

vehicle will contain evidence of a drug offense,” and cites State v. Griffin, 2004 MT 331, 

¶ 6, 324 Mont. 143, 102 P.3d 1206. This is true, but based on the totality of the 

circumstances observed by Trooper DiGiovanna from his interaction with Harning, it is a 

reasonable inference from these facts, based on his experience, that Harning may have had 

marijuana or paraphernalia in the vehicle with him, especially given the strength and 

persistence of the odor. Particularized suspicion “does not require that an officer be certain, 

or even correct, that a person is engaged in criminal activity.” Wilson, ¶ 28 (citing Hoover, 

¶ 18). 

 

6 Even if we were not able to point to a case with similar facts, this Court looks at whether the 

“totality of the circumstances” supports particularized suspicion. Wilson, ¶ 28. Harning criticizes 

the Justice Court’s reliance on our precedent finding particularized suspicion, arguing that “[t]he 

[J]ustice [C]ourt’s reliance on Marino, Roy and Estes was misplaced. The facts in those cases are 

not present here.” But I agree with the principle the State notes in its briefing: “The totality of the 

circumstances analysis is not a checklist that can be mechanically applied to each case.” The Court 

also acknowledges that, “facts giving rise to particularized suspicion will, naturally, vary from 

case to case.” Opinion, ¶ 21. 
25

¶41 The Court has debated detailed issues of facts and law herein, but in the final 

analysis, this case should be determined by the requisite focus upon the record as 

established by the fact finder: Trooper DiGiovanna 1) stopped a vehicle for speeding; 

2) immediately smelled the “new” smell of marijuana “wafting” from the driver’s slightly 

opened window; 3) encountered the driver’s unusual behavior of not rolling his window 

down further to talk to the officer, even upon the officer’s request and a discussion about 

it; 4) learned that the driver had used marijuana recently on his road trip; and 5) received 

answers from the driver that clearly inferred marijuana was presently in the vehicle. Under 

any view of our precedent, these facts clearly supported a particularized suspicion of 

marijuana possession and justified a canine sniff. 

¶42 I would affirm. 

/S/ JIM RICE

Chief Justice Mike McGrath and Justice Beth Baker join in the dissenting Opinion of 

Justice Rice. 

/S/ MIKE McGRATH

/S/ BETH BAKER