NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

 

:

ISABELL HAAGEN RAIA, :

:

Petitioner, :

:

v. :

:

OSCAR AVILES et al., :

:

Respondents. :

 :

Civil Action No. 11-3374 (WJM) 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Martini, District Judge:

On March 2, 2011, a counseled § 2241 Petition for a Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) was filed on behalf of Petitioner. 

See Docket Entry No. 1. The Petition was filed in the United

States District Court for the Southern District of New York

("SDNY"), even though Petitioner was and still is confined in New

Jersey; moreover, the Petition opened with an assertion that

Petitioner suffered a "severe restraint on [her] individual

liberty"; that assertion was coupled with a cursory reference to

Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the case focusing on

detention of pre-removal-order alien detainees. See id. at 1-4. 

While this Court is not in the position to guess, with any

degree of certainty, all aspects that were considered by the SDNY

upon its receipt and screening of the Petition, it appears that: 

a. the SDNY presumed that the Petition was challenging a preremoval-order detention of the type examined in Demore and,

correspondingly, the SDNY held a pre-trial conference;

Case 2:11-cv-03374-WJM Document 9 Filed 07/06/11 Page 1 of 18 PageID: 43
b. during the aforesaid pre-trial conference, the SDNY took

notice of the fact that, while Petitioner was confined in

New Jersey, the Petition was improperly venued with the

SDNY. 

Acting on this latter determination, the SDNY directed

transfer of the Petition to this District, where Petitioner's

action should have been brought in the first place.1

The SDNY's transfer order was received by the Clerk of this

District on June 10, 2011, thus giving rise to the matter at bar;

the resulting action was assigned to the undersigned on June 13,

2011. See Docket Entry No. 7 and Docket Text of June 13, 2011. 

In light of the SDNY's decision to hold a pre-trial conference

(indicative of the SDNY's determination that the Petition, as

drafted, could survive sua sponte dismissal), this Court issued a

form order directing Respondents to answer Petitioner's

challenges. See Docket Entry No. 8.

However, having conducted a closer review of Petitioner's

allegations, the Court finds it warranted to: 

a. vacate the order to answer; 

 It appears that Petitioner's counsel ("MA Counsel") who 1

filed the Petition with the SDNY: (a) is admitted in

Massachusetts but not admitted to practice in this District; and

(b) obtained a liaison counsel admitted to practice before the

SDNY but, thus far, has not obtained a liaison counsel admitted

to practice before in this District. Therefore, for the purposes

of the instant action, Petitioner is presumed proceeding pro se.

2

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b. dismiss Petitioner's allegations asserting civil rights

challenges without prejudice to Petitioner's filing a civil

complaint; 

c. dismiss Petitioner's challenges to her order of removal for

lack of jurisdiction, pursuant to the REAL ID Act, construe

this aspect of the Petition as Petitioner's application to

the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

("Court of Appeals") and forward the Petition accordingly; 

d. dismiss Petitioner's § 2241 challenges to the fact of her

current confinement without prejudice, as premature and/or

not warranting habeas relief on the basis of Petitioner's

claims as these claims are currently asserted; 

e. initiate a new § 2241 action for Petitioner and allow her an

opportunity to file, in that new action, an amended petition

stating Petitioner's ripened and potentially meritorious

claims, if any; and 

f. detail to Petitioner the relevant legal regime in order to

provide her with guidance for the purposes of her future

actions, if any.

I. CIVIL RIGHTS CHALLENGES

A substantial portion of the Petition is dedicated to

discussions of Petitioner's conditions of confinement and the

emotional distress Petitioner allegedly suffered as a result of

her contacts with the immigration authorities; these allegations

3

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are, seemingly, included in the Petition with an aim to assert

that Petitioner should be released from confinement because her

conditions of confinement are harsh and she feels emotionally

unstable. However, the harshness of an inmate's conditions of

confinement or the inmate's emotional state cannot operate as a

valid basis for the inmate's release obtained by means of habeas

review; rather, these allegations should be raised by means of a

civil complaint seeking injunctive and/or monetary relief. 

Federal law provides two avenues of relief to inmates: a

petition for habeas corpus and a civil rights complaint. See

Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004). "Challenges to the

validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its

duration are the province of habeas corpus . . . [while] requests

for relief turning on circumstances of confinement [fall within

the realm of] a § 1983 action." Id. As § 1983 action applies 2

only to state actions, it is not available to federal inmates;

 In a series of cases beginning with Preiser v. Rodriguez, 2

411 U.S. 475 (1973), the Supreme Court analyzed the intersection

of civil rights and habeas corpus. In Preiser, state prisoners

who had been deprived of good-conduct-time credits by the New

York State Department of Correctional Services as a result of

disciplinary proceedings brought a § 1983 action seeking

injunctive relief to compel restoration of the credits, which

would have resulted in their immediate or speedier release. See

id. at 476. The prisoners did not seek compensatory damages for

the loss of their credits. See id. at 494. Assessing the

prisoners' challenge, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner must

bring a suit for equitable relief that, effectively, challenges

"the fact or duration of confinement" as a habeas corpus

petition. See id. at 500.

4

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the federal counterpart is an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown

Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging

deprivation of a constitutional right. See Brown v. Philip

Morris, Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 801 (3d Cir. 2001) ("A Bivens action

. . . is the federal equivalent of the § 1983 cause of action

against state actors, [it] will lie where the defendant has

violated the plaintiff's rights under color of federal law").

The Court of Appeals explained the distinction between the

availability of civil rights relief and the availability of

habeas relief as follows:

[W]henever the challenge ultimately attacks the "core

of habeas" - the validity of the continued conviction

or the fact or length of the sentence - a challenge,

however denominated and regardless of the relief

sought, must be brought by way of a habeas corpus

petition. Conversely, when the challenge is to a

condition of confinement such that a finding in

plaintiff's favor would not alter his sentence or undo

his conviction, an action under § 1983 is appropriate.

Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002).3

 Unlike habeas actions, civil rights cases always require 3

a filing fee, either as a prepayment or a series of installment

payments. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915. While the filing fee for a

habeas petition is $ 5.00, and inmates filing a habeas petition

who are granted in forma pauperis status do not have to pay the

filing fee. See Santana v. United States, 98 F. 3d 752 (3d Cir.

1996) (filing fee payment requirements of PLRA do not apply to in

forma pauperis habeas corpus petitions and appeals). In

contrast, the filing fee of a civil rights complaint is $ 350.00.

Inmates filing a civil rights complaint who proceed in forma

pauperis are required to pay the entire filing fee in monthly

installments which are deducted from the prison account. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b). In addition, if a prisoner has, on three or

more occasions while incarcerated, brought an action or appeal in

a federal court that was dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for

5

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Therefore, in the event Petitioner holds a bona fide belief

that the conditions of her confinement or the actions of

immigration officers, which allegedly caused Petitioner emotional

distress, violated her constitutional rights, her remedy is to

submit a civil complaint and accompany that complaint with

Petitioner's application to prosecute her challenges in forma

pauperis (or with Petitioner's filing fee of $350). In 4

contrast, for the purposes of this Court's review of the habeas

Petition at bar, Petitioner's civil rights challenges are subject

to dismissal for this Court's lack of habeas jurisdiction over

this line of claims.

II. CLAIMS BARRED BY THE REAL ID ACT

In addition to asserting Petitioner's civil rights claims,

the Petition also challenges, to a great extent, the final order

of removal entered against Petitioner. 

5

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

because it seeks monetary relief from immune defendants, then the

prisoner may not bring another action in forma pauperis unless

he or she is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Thus, courts generally do not sua sponte

re-characterize habeas pleadings into civil rights complaints.

 No statement made in this Memorandum Opinion shall be 4

construed as expressing this Court's opinion as to substantive or

procedural validity or invalidity of Petitioner's civil rights

claims.

 The Petition elaborates on the positive developments 5

that, allegedly, have taken place in Petitioner's marital

relationship, on her husband's alleged need for Petitioner's

assistance and companionship, on her in-laws willingness to

provide the supplemental income she and her husband require in

6

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However, on May 11, 2005, President George W. Bush signed

into law the REAL ID Act of 2005. See Pub. L. 109-13, Div. B,

119 Stat. 231 (May 11, 2005). 

Section 106(a)(5) of the REAL ID Act of 2005 amends 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252 to provide that, “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of

law (statutory or non[-]statutory), including section 2241 of

title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus

provision . . . . a petition for review filed with an appropriate

court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the

sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of

removal entered or issued under any provision of this Act, except

as provided in subsection (e)." See REAL ID Act of 2005, §

106(a)(5), to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). 

Therefore, Petitioner’s challenges to her removal order

should have been brought, at the first instance, to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In contrast, for

the purposes of the instant matter, Petitioner's challenges to

her order of removal are subject to dismissal for lack of

jurisdiction. 

order not to fall in public care, etc. However, all these

matters have no relevance to the scope of review this Court can

conduct pursuant to its Section 2241 mandate. If Petitioner

finds these aspects relevant to her immigration claims, she may

bring them to the attention of the Court of Appeals and/or

immigration authorities. However, no statement made by the Court

in this Memorandum Opinion or in the accompanying Order shall be

construed as expressing this Court's opinion as to validity or

invalidity of Petitioner's immigration challenges. 

7

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However, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631,

[w]henever a civil action is filed in a court . . . and

that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction,

the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice,

transfer such action or appeal to any other such court

in which the action or appeal could have been brought

at the time it was filed or noticed, and the action or

appeal shall proceed as if it had been filed in or

noticed for the court to which it is transferred on the

date upon which it was actually filed in or noticed for

the court from which it is transferred.

Correspondingly, this Court -- out of abundance of caution

and taking notice of substantial confusion plaguing the Petition

-- finds it warranted to construe the aspect of the Petition

challenging her removal order as her application to the Court of

Appeals; this Court, therefore, will direct the Clerk to forward

Petitioner's instant Petition accordingly. 

III. CHALLENGES TO THE FACT OF PETITIONER'S DETENTION

Finally, the Court takes notice of those allegations that

suggest Petitioner's intent to challenge the fact of her current

detention.

A. Jurisdiction

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), habeas jurisdiction “shall not

extend to a prisoner unless . . . he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A federal court has subject matter

jurisdiction under § 2241(c)(3) if two requirements are

satisfied: (1) the petitioner is “in custody,”; and (2) the

custody could be “in violation of the Constitution or laws or

8

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treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see also

Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989). To the extent

Petitioner's challenges the fact of her current confinement, this

Court has § 2241 subject matter jurisdiction because Petitioner

is detained within its jurisdiction and some of her claims seem

to assert that her detention is not statutorily authorized and

violates her constitutional rights. 

B. Petitioner's Claims Are, At This Point, Without Merit

1. Statutory Removal Period

Section 1231(a)(1)(A) provides that the government has a

90-day “removal period” to remove an alien ordered removed from

the United States. Detention during the removal period under

Section 1231(a)(1)(A) is mandatory.6

2. Zadvydas Period

While, during the 90-day “removal period,” the alien must be

detained, after the 90-day removal period, the government may

further detain the alien or release him/her subject to conditions

of release. See U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). However, in Zadvydas v.

Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001), the Supreme Court held that

aliens may be detained beyond the 90-day statutory period under §

1231(a)(6), although only for “a period reasonably necessary to

 In addition, § 1231(a)(1)(C) provides that the removal 6

period shall be extended, and the alien may remain in detention

during such extended period, if the alien “acts to prevent the

alien's removal subject to an order of removal.” 

9

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bring about that alien's removal from the United States.” 533

U.S. at 689 (holding that “the statute, read in light of the

Constitution's demands, limits an alien's post-removal-period

detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that

alien's removal from the United States [and] does not permit

indefinite detention”). 

Recognizing that its holding would lead to difficult

judgment calls in the courts, the Supreme Court, “for the sake of

uniform administration in the federal courts” recognized a

six-month “presumptively reasonable period of detention.” Id. at

700-01. However, coining this “presumptively reasonable period

of detention,” the Supreme Court stressed that,

[a]fter this 6-month period, [if] the alien provides

good reason to believe that there is no significant

likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable

future, the Government must respond with evidence

sufficient to rebut that showing. And for detention to

remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval

confinement grows, what counts as the “reasonably

foreseeable future” conversely would have to shrink. 

This 6-month presumption, of course, does not mean that

every alien not removed must be released after six

months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in

confinement until it has been determined that there is

no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future.

Id. at 701 (emphasis supplied). 

3. Zadvydas Considerations Not Triggered Thus Far

Here, the Petition indicates that Petitioner is a German

national who entered the United States in 1991 on a visitor's

visa. See Docket Entry No. 1, at 4. The Petition does not

10

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enlighten this Court as to the legal basis for Petitioner's

presence in the United States for the following twelve years

(i.e., between 1991 and 2003), but it informs the Court that, in

2003, Petitioner married a certain individual who was, seemingly,

a United States citizen and who, apparently, proved to be a

systemically imprisoned/re-imprisoned career criminal. See id. 7

at 4 and 5. The Petition also asserts that, right after the

marriage, Petitioner swiftly became estranged from her husband

but, many years later, re-established her relationship with him

when she decided to visit her husband during one of his many

incarcerations; the Petition states that Petitioner and her

husband began living together in 2010 (when, apparently, her

husband was released from his latest prison term), and her

husband, eventually, developed a need in Petitioner's care and

companionship. See id. at 5. 8

Petitioner was taken in custody of immigration authorities

on January 7, 2001, and -- five days later -- had her MA Counsel

 The Petition indicates that Petitioner caught the eye of 7

the immigration authorities when she processed the official

paperwork associated with her marriage. This statement strongly

suggests that Petitioner was in the United States illegally for

the period of twelve years preceding her marriage, that is, minus

those initial few post-arrival months when Petitioner was in the

United States on her visitor's visa. 

 According to the Petition, Petitioner's removal order 8

became final in the meantime, specifically, it occurred on March

26, 2007: upon dismissal of her appeal by the Board of

Immigration Appeals.

11

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file an administrative application for release on bond. The

instant Petition was filed with the SDNY less than two months

later, i.e., on March 7, 2011. 

However, the government's efforts to remove Petitioner were

triggered only on January 7, 2001: in that sense, Petitioner's 9

 

9

[Indeed, there cannot] be [“]only one[”] removal

period[:] . . . that is the only rational reading of

the statute. . . . [T]he statute provides that the

removal period begins on the latest of several dates. 

The passing of one date does not stop the operation of

the statute. In a sense, the only way to apply the

statute to a given situation is retrospectively. That

is, the [first] removal period begins when the removal

order becomes final. . . . If there is another

[triggering] event, there is another potential

beginning date for the removal period. The only

sensible reading of this provision is that [DHS] is

required to effectuate the removal within 90 days of

certain events, but [DHS] will have another 90 days if

another one of the designated events occurs at a later

date. 

Michel v. INS, 119 F. Supp. 2d 485, 498 (M.D. Pa. 2000); accord

Morena v. Gonzales, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37989, at *18 (M.D. Pa.

Oct. 4, 2005); Atkinson v. INS, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11335, at

*5 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 2002); Marcelus v. INS, 2002 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 795, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2002); Dunbar v. Holmes, 2000

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17048, at *6-7 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 2000). Here,

it would be anomalous to presume that Petitioner's 90-day

statutory removal period and 6-month Zadvydas-based presumptive

period of removal expired within 90 days (or within 6 months)

from the date when the order of removal became final, since

Petitioner was not in custody of immigration authorities (and,

hence, could not have been realistically removed) during those

periods. The government is not expected to forfeit enforcement

of a valid orders of removal in the event it cannot "catch" an

alien and remove aliens adjudicated removed within 90 days (or 6

months) after adjudication completes. Finding otherwise would

not only create an undue incentive for aliens adjudicated removed

to hide from authorities for six months after the date when their

removal orders become final, it would also reward those aliens

12

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placement in custody operated as the superceding event from which

both the 90-day period of removal and the 6-month Zadvydas-based

presumptive period of removal began to run. 

Therefore, it is hardly surprising that Petitioner's

administrative application for release on bond (filed just five

days after Petitioner was taken into custody) was left

unanswered: during the first 90 days from the date of Petitioner

being taken in custody, Petitioner's detention was mandatory

under the statute.10

 To add, at the time when Petitioner filed her instant

Petition with the SDNY, her Zadvydas-based challenges were

facially premature: simply because the government's presumptive

six-month period to remove Petitioner had not expired since, at

the time of Petitioner's filing of her Petition, the government

used less than two months of its Zadvydas-based six-month period.

Moreover, even as of now, i.e., when the Court is issuing this

Memorandum Opinion and accompanying Order, the § 2241 aspect of

the Petition is still facially premature because Petitioner's

Zadvydas-based 6-month presumptive period of removal still had

who succeed at escaping the authorities for these six months with

a de facto vacatur of wholly valid removal orders.

 Analogously, even at the point in time when Petitioner 10

filed her instant Petition with the SDNY and asserted that she

should not have been detained, Petitioner was still under the

same mandatory 90-day detention mandated by the statute: this is

so because Petitioner filed her instant Petition just within two

months from the date of her being taken into custody.

13

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not expired: such expiration date would take place only on July

7, 2011, hence ripening Petitioner's Zadvydas-based habeas

challenges. 

Furthermore, even on and after July 7, 2011, it would not be

enough for Petitioner to merely assert that she has been held in

confinement for six months or longer: Petitioner would have to

assert facts giving this Court a good reason to believe that

there is no significant likelihood of her removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.

at 701. Here, the Petition does not assert any such reason.11

The Court, however, cannot rule out the possibility that

Petitioner might be able to state facts so indicating. 

Therefore, to the extent Petitioner is challenging her

current confinement, this Court will dismiss the Petition as

premature or, in alternative, for failure to state a claim

warranting habeas relief. Correspondingly, the Court will vacate

its order directing Respondents' answer.

However, taking notice of the fact that Petitioner's

Zadvydas-based six-month presumptive period of removal is to

expire, literally, tomorrow, this Court finds it prudent to: (a)

 Indeed, Germany is not a country tormented by such 11

plagues as civil war, lawlessness of the state, etc. Germany has

been a cooperative partner of the United States in a multitude of

matters, including immigration affairs. Therefore, this Court,

on its own, fails to fancy any reason why there could be no

significant likelihood of Petitioner's removal to Germany in the

reasonably foreseeable future.

14

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direct the Clerk to initiate a new and separate § 2241 habeas

matter for Petitioner; (b) allow Petitioner an opportunity to 12

seek in forma pauperis status for the purposes of that new § 2241

matter; and (c) provide Petitioner with an opportunity to file, 13

in that new § 2241 matter, Petitioner's amended petition stating

her facts, if any, that might indicate to the Court that there is

no significant likelihood of Petitioner's removal to her country

of origin, i.e., Germany, in the reasonably foreseeable future.14

 Such new § 2241 matter will be administratively 12

terminated. The Court, however, stresses that administrative

termination is not a dismissal on merits and, in the event

Petitioner elects to file her amended petition and does so

timely, this Court will direct the Clerk to reopen Petitioner's

new § 2241 matter and will examine the amended petition on

merits.

 Section 1914, the filing fee statute, provides in 13

relevant part that “[t]he clerk of each district court shall

require the parties instituting any civil action, suit or

proceeding in such court . . . to pay a filing fee of $350 except

that on application for a writ of habeas corpus the filing fee

shall be $5.” The Supreme Court, however, observed that, “while

[$5] is . . . an 'extremely nominal' sum, if one does not have it

and is unable to get it[,] the fee might as well be [$500].” 

Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712 (1961). The Court,

therefore, will direct the Clerk to serve Petitioner with a blank

in forma pauperis form. (The in forma pauperis form for inmates

seeking to file a habeas pleading is different from the in forma

pauperis form for inmates seeking to file a civil complaint,

since the former need not be accompanied by the inmate's prison

account statement for the six months preceding filing. Rather,

the in forma pauperis form for inmates seeking to file a habeas

petition shall indicate the average amount on the inmate's prison

account over the six months preceding filing.) 

 In other words, in the event Petitioner was cooperating 14

with the United States immigration authorities in their efforts

to remove her to Germany but, Petitioner's cooperation

regardless, the United States immigration authorities face

15

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In connection with the foregoing, the Court stresses that

Petitioner may file a counseled amended petition or submit such

petition pro se: the choice is entirely Petitioner's, and no

statement made in this Memorandum Opinion shall be construed as

expressing this Court's preference for receiving counseled or pro

se future submissions from Petitioner.15

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition will be dismissed. 

The Court's prior order directing Respondents to answer the

Petition will be vacated. 

Petitioner's civil rights challenges will be dismissed

without prejudice to Petitioner's filing a civil complaint

asserting such challenges. 

16

certain obstacles that render her removal to Germany in the

reasonably foreseeable future significantly unlikely, Petitioner

must detail these obstacles to the Court in her amended petition. 

All other aspects of Petitioner's position, e.g., her alleged

developed affection for her husband, her husband's alleged need

for her care and companionship, her allegedly harsh conditions of

confinement, etc. have no place in Petitioner's amended petition:

they should be omitted or saved for Petitioner's other actions. 

 In the event Petitioner files a counseled petition, her 15

counsel shall be admitted to practice in this District (or, in

alternative, Petitioner's current MA Counsel may obtain a liaison

counsel admitted to practice in this District and then move this

Court for allowing Petitioner's MA Counsel to appear pro hac vice

in Petitioner's new § 2241 matter, jointly with the local liaison

counsel).

 The Court will direct the Clerk to serve Petitioner with 16

a blank civil complaint form and a blank in forma pauperis form

for incarcerated individuals seeking to file a civil complaint. 

In the event Petitioner elects to file such complaint and, in

16

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Petitioner's challenges to her order of removal will be

construed as Petitioner's application to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Third Circuit and forwarded accordingly. 

Petitioner's habeas challenges to the fact of her current

confinement will be dismissed, without prejudice, as premature

and/or for failure to assert a claim warranting habeas relief. 

The Clerk will be directed to open a new and separate § 2241

habeas action for Petitioner. That new and separate action will

be administratively terminated subject to reopening in the event

Petitioner decided to prosecute that new matter and timely files

her amended petition detailing the facts in support of her

position that there is no significant likelihood of her removal

to Germany in the reasonably foreseeable future. In the event

Petitioner timely files such amended petition in her new § 2241

action (and submits, in conjunction with her filing of that

amended petition, either her filing fee of $5.00 or her in forma

conjunction with that filing, seek in forma pauperis status,

Petitioner must complete the in forma pauperis application and

include, in addition, Petitioner's prison account statement for

the six months preceding filing. The Court stresses that, in the

event Petitioner is granted in forma pauperis status in

connection with her filing of civil complaint, then the Court

would be required to assess the $350.00 filing fee against

Petitioner and collect the fee by directing the agency having

custody of her to deduct installment payments from her prison

account equal to 20% of the preceding month's income credited to

the account for each month that the balance of the account

exceeds $10.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). Such collection will

be conducted regardless of the outcome of Petitioner's civil

rights action. 

17

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pauperis application), the Court will direct reopening of this

new § 2241 matter and will address the merits of Petitioner's

amended petition. 

Petitioner will be allowed ample time to prepare such

amended petition on her own or, in the event Petitioner elects to

submit a counseled amended petition, Petitioner will be allowed

ample time to select counsel admitted in this District or to have

her MA Counsel: (a) find a suitable liaison counsel admitted in

this District; and (b) move this Court for pro hac vice

appearance.17

An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

 s/William J. Martini

 

WILLIAM J. MARTINI

United States District Judge

Dated: July 6, 2011

 While the courts construe pro se pleadings liberally and 17

with a measure of tolerance, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520 (1972), counseled pleadings are held to higher standards. 

This Court, therefore, stresses that -- in the event Petitioner

files a counseled amended petition -- this Court expects such

amended petition to be a document carefully drafted, wellthought-through and free of factual allegations and legal

arguments having no relevance to this Court's § 2241 mandate.

18

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