Docket No. 89780–Agenda 22–March 2001.

THE PEOPLE ex rel. JAMES E. RYAN, Attorney General of Illinois, Appellant, v. THE WORLD CHURCH OF THE

								 CREATOR et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed November 21, 2001.

	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

	The issue in this case is whether the Solicitation for Charity

Act (Solicitation Act) (225 ILCS 460/0.01 through 23 (West

1998)) is unconstitutionally vague on its face, as violative of the

first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution

(U.S. Const., amends. I, XIV). The circuit court of Cook County

held the statute unconstitutional and dismissed the Attorney

General’s complaint against defendants for failure to register under

the Solicitation Act. The Attorney General appealed directly to this

court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 603. We now reverse the circuit court’s

judgment.

BACKGROUND

	The Solicitation Act requires every “charitable organization,”

with exceptions not relevant here, that solicits or intends to solicit

contributions from persons within Illinois to file with the Attorney

General a registration statement providing specified information.

225 ILCS 460/2(a) (West 1998). The Solicitation Act defines

“[c]haritable organization” in pertinent part as:

			“[A] benevolent, philanthropic, patriotic, or

eleemosynary person or one purporting to be such which

solicits and collects funds for charitable purposes ***.”

225 ILCS 460/1(a) (West 1998).

	The Solicitation Act defines “[c]haritable purpose” as “[a]ny

charitable, benevolent, philanthropic, patriotic, or eleemosynary

purpose.” 225 ILCS 460/1(f) (West 1998).

	Annual reports must be filed with the Attorney General setting

forth detailed information concerning receipts and expenses. 225

ILCS 460/4 (West 1998). When the Attorney General has reason

to believe that a charitable organization is operating in violation of the Solicitation Act, he may seek an injunction prohibiting the

organization from continuing to solicit or collect funds. 225 ILCS

460/9(c) (West 1998). In addition, any organization that violates

the Solicitation Act shall, at the request of the Attorney General,

forfeit any monies received through solicitation (225 ILCS

460/9(h) (West 1998)) and may be subject to punitive damages

(225 ILCS 460/9(g) (West 1998)). Persons and organizations

failing to register under the Solicitation Act or whose registration

is canceled by the Attorney General for violation of the Solicitation

Act are subject “to injunction, to removal, to account, and to

appropriate other relief before the circuit court exercising chancery

jurisdiction.” 225 ILCS 460/2(i) (West 1998). In addition, the

court “shall” impose a civil penalty of not less than $500 and not

more than $1,000 against such person or organization. 225 ILCS

460/2(i) (West 1998). The Solicitation Act also provides civil and

criminal penalties for professional fund-raisers found to be in

violation of the Solicitation Act. 225 ILCS 460/6(g), (h) (West

1998).

	On July 14, 1999, the Attorney General filed a complaint

against defendants, The World Church of the Creator (World

Church) and Matthew Hale. The World Church is an organization

that exists, according to a copy of its literature attached to the

complaint, to promote the survival, expansion, and advancement

of the white race. Count I sought a declaratory judgment that the

World Church was a charitable organization subject to the

Solicitation Act. It was alleged that the World Church held itself

out to be a religious not-for-profit unincorporated association and

that it was managed and controlled by Hale. The complaint alleged

that defendants sought members and solicited payment of

membership dues and money from the general public through an

Internet website and through flyers offering for sale books,

materials, and merchandise. In these solicitations, defendants

suggested that purchases would benefit the not-for-profit cause of

the World Church, thus giving it the appearance of a charitable

organization as defined in the Solicitation Act and subjecting it to

the statute’s registration requirements. Count I requested that the

World Church be declared to be engaged in charitable solicitation

of the public and, therefore, subject to the Solicitation Act. Count II of the complaint requested a finding that defendants had violated

the Solicitation Act and an injunction prohibiting defendants from

further soliciting of funds and from disbursing or transferring any

assets without court approval. The prayer for relief also requested

that the court freeze the assets of defendants, order them to

account for the funds collected from their solicitation on behalf of

the World Church, and impose a $1,000 fine.

	Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant

to section 2–615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS

5/2–615 (West 1998)), claiming that the Solicitation Act is

unconstitutionally vague on its face, in that it fails to adequately

define the terms “charitable organization” and “charitable

purpose.”

	In a memorandum opinion filed on February 8, 2000, the

circuit court granted defendants’ motion. Relying on federal cases,

the court found that the definition of “charitable organization” in

the Solicitation Act does not guide the Attorney General in

determining which organizations are subject to the provisions of

the Solicitation Act. The court stated that the terms “benevolent,

philanthropic, patriotic, or eleemosynary” used to define

“charitable organization” are themselves undefined and so generic

as to fail to provide adequate notice as to which organizations may

be subject to the Solicitation Act. The court also expressed

concern as to the Attorney General’s unbridled discretion in

determining which organizations are subject to the Solicitation Act

and the potential threat to protected first amendment activity. The

court determined that the Solicitation Act does not meet the

heightened standard of precision required of legislative enactments

that regulate the first amendment right to freedom of speech. The

circuit court denied the Attorney General’s motion to reconsider

and this direct appeal followed.

	ANALYSIS	

	All statutes are presumed to be constitutionally valid. People v. Sanders, 182 Ill. 2d 524, 528 (1998). It is the court’s duty to construe a statute in a manner upholding its constitutionality, if

such a construction is reasonably possible. City of Chicago v. Morales, 177 Ill. 2d 440, 448 (1997). We review de novo the circuit court’s order granting defendants’ section 2–615 motion to

dismiss the Attorney General’s complaint (Neade v. Portes, 193 Ill. 2d 433, 439 (2000)), as well as the court’s determination of the

Act’s unconstitutionality (People v. Maness, 191 Ill. 2d 478, 483 (2000)).

	It is well settled that the first amendment’s guarantee of

freedom of speech encompasses solicitation of funds. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 633, 63 L. Ed. 2d 73, 85, 100 S. Ct. 826, 834 (1980). Defendants

argue that, because the Solicitation Act regulates speech, it must

meet a heightened standard of precision. See National Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432- 33, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405, 417-18, 83 S. Ct. 328, 337-38 (1963); Hynes v. Mayor & Council, 425 U.S. 610, 620, 48 L. Ed. 2d 243, 253, 96 S. Ct. 1755, 1760 (1976) (stricter standards of permissible

statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute that has a

“ ‘potentially inhibiting effect on speech,’ ” quoting Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151, 4 L. Ed. 2d 205, 210, 80 S. Ct. 215, 217-18 (1959)). However, not all laws that regulate speech

are subject to this higher standard. “Content neutral regulation of

protected speech is subject to ‘an intermediate level of scrutiny.’ ”

American Target Advertising, Inc. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 2000), quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 642, 129 L. Ed. 2d 497, 517, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2459 (1994). In determining

whether a regulation is content neutral, the main inquiry is whether

the state has adopted the regulation because of its disagreement

with the content of the message sought to be conveyed. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661, 675, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2754 (1989). Government regulation of

expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is “ ‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’ ”

(Emphasis in original.) City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29, 38, 106 S. Ct. 925, 929 (1986),

quoting Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771, 48 L. Ed. 2d 346, 364, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1830 (1976).

	In American Target, a professional fund-raising corporation sought to have Utah’s Charitable Solicitations Act declared

unconstitutional. Among other requirements, that law required all

professional fund-raising consultants to register with the state and

obtain permits. To obtain such a permit, the consultant must

complete a written application, pay an annual fee and post a bond

or letter of credit. Plaintiff did not comply with the registration

requirements and was consequently barred from assisting Judicial

Watch, a nonprofit organization, with its mailing campaign in Utah.

American Target, 199 F.3d at 1246. The court of appeals found that the law was a content-neutral regulation of protected speech

and was, therefore, subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny. The

law was designed to control the secondary effects of professional

solicitations, i.e., increased fraud and misrepresentation. It simply facilitated oversight of the mailers’ backgrounds and methods. The

court noted that subjecting the law to intermediate scrutiny

required the state to show that the law “(1) serves a substantial

governmental interest and (2) is ‘narrowly drawn’ to serve that

interest ‘without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment

freedoms.’ ” American Target, 199 F.3d at 1247, quoting Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 637, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 87-88, 100 S. Ct. at 836.

	The court of appeals further found that the mandatory

registration and disclosure requirements were narrowly tailored to

serve Utah’s substantial interest in combating fraud, in that the law

allowed Utah citizens to make informed decisions about making

charitable donations, and the requirements directly promoted

Utah’s legitimate interest, while not unnecessarily burdening

speech. American Target, 199 F.3d at 1248.

	Here, the Solicitation Act’s registration provisions apply to all

entities that solicit funds for purposes defined in the Solicitation

Act, except those specifically exempted. They do not in any way

control the content of speech. We, therefore, conclude that the

registration and reporting requirements are content neutral and the

law is therefore subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, rather

than the more exacting standard urged by defendants.

	Intermediate scrutiny first requires that the regulation at issue

serve a substantial governmental interest. A state or municipality undoubtedly has the power to protect its citizens from fraud by

regulating solicitation of funds. Hynes, 425 U.S. at 616-17, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 251, 96 S. Ct. at 1758-59. The Solicitation Act seeks to

prevent frauds on Illinois citizens in the solicitation and use of

charitable funds. People ex rel. Scott v. Gorman, 96 Ill. App. 3d 289, 290 (1981). To that end, violators may be subject to a

prohibition on future solicitation of funds (225 ILCS 460/9(c)

(West 1998)), forfeiture of any monies received through

solicitation (225 ILCS 460/9(h) (West 1998)), civil penalties (225

ILCS 460/2(i) (West 1998)), punitive damages (225 ILCS

460/9(g) (West 1998)) and, in some instances, criminal penalties

(225 ILCS 460/6(g) (West 1998)). The registration and reporting

requirements may serve as a deterrent to fraudulent solicitation of

funds, since those intent on defrauding the public will be less likely

to do so if required to disclose identifying information to the

Attorney General. The additional deterrence provided by the

registration and reporting provisions of the Solicitation Act

promote Illinois’ interest in protecting its citizens from fraud.

Without such provisions, the State’s ability to detect fraudulent

solicitations would be undermined. Thus, we conclude that the

registration and reporting requirements of the Solicitation Act

serve a substantial governmental interest.

	We now turn to the question of whether the challenged

provisions of the Solicitation Act are narrowly tailored to serve this

interest. Defendants claim that the Solicitation Act is not narrowly

drawn and that its definitions of “charitable organization” and

“charitable purpose” are unconstitutionally vague. In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972), the United States Supreme Court explained the dangers

posed by unconstitutionally vague laws:

			“It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment

is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly

defined. Vague laws offend several important values. First,

because we assume that man is free to steer between

lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the

person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to

know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.

Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory

enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit

standards for those who apply them. A vague law

impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen,

judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary

and discriminatory application. Third, but related, where

a vague statute ‘abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First

Amendment freedoms,’ [citation] it ‘operates to inhibit the

exercise of [those] freedoms.’ [Citation.] Uncertain

meanings inevitably lead citizens to ‘ “steer far wider of

the unlawful zone” ... than if the boundaries of the

forbidden areas were clearly marked.’ [Citations.]”

Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 227-28, 92 S. Ct. at 2298-99.

	A law is unconstitutionally vague, and therefore violative of

due process, when it lacks “ ‘terms susceptible of objective

measurement’ ” (Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 604, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629, 641, 87 S. Ct. 675, 684 (1967), quoting Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 286, 7 L. Ed. 2d 285, 291, 82 S. Ct. 275, 280 (1961)) and when persons of “ ‘common intelligence

must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its

application’ ” (Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 604, 17 L. Ed. 2d at 641, 87 S. Ct. at 684, quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367, 12 L. Ed. 2d 377, 382, 84 S. Ct. 1316, 1320 (1964)).

	The Attorney General argues that the Solicitation Act may not

be declared facially invalid because it is capable of at least one valid

application. He notes that during oral argument in the circuit court,

counsel for defendants conceded that the Solicitation Act could

validly be applied to the United Way. However, a party must

establish that a statute is impermissibly vague in all of its

applications only where the statute does not implicate

constitutionally protected conduct. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 369, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (1982); see City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55, 144 L. Ed. 2d 67, 79, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1858 (1999) (noting that where vagueness permeates the text of a law that infringes on constitutionally protected rights, the law is

subject to a facial challenge).

	The circuit court relied on three federal cases in concluding

that the Solicitation Act is unconstitutionally vague. The first case, Ass’nociation of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. Golden, 744 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 1984), involved a city ordinance prohibiting uninvited door-to-door solicitation unless the city

manager granted an exemption. Such an exemption would be

granted only if the city council determined that the solicitation was

for a “charitable, religious, patriotic or philanthropic purpose or

otherwise provides a service or product so necessary for the

general welfare of the residents of the city that such activity does

not constitute a nuisance.” Golden, 744 F.2d at 741. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s judgment in favor of the city,

finding that the ordinance vested unguided discretion in the city

council to grant exemptions. The court noted that the definition of

the types of organizations eligible for an exemption was not

specific. It found the words “charitable, religious, patriotic or

philanthropic purpose” to be vague and indefinite. Such terms did

not provide sufficient guidance to the city council in exercising its

authority under the ordinance. The court also noted that no

regulations or written interpretations of the ordinance existed.

Golden, 744 F.2d at 748.

	In Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. City of Chicago, No. 84–C–10536 (N.D. Ill. February 24, 1986) (unpublished decision), plaintiffs challenged two city ordinances

that regulated solicitation activities through an application process.

The city filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The original

ordinance required that an organization, for a period of one year

prior to application, must have been engaged in charitable and

philanthropic work. Churches were excepted from this

requirement. The grant or denial of an application was left to the

sole discretion of a committee of the city council. Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, slip op. at 6. After suit was filed, the city replaced this ordinance with a new one that

required an organization to obtain a permit prior to engaging in

solicitation activities. Only those organizations that intended to

solicit for “charitable purposes” were required to apply for a permit. The ordinance did not purport to regulate political,

religious, or other activities. Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, slip op. at 8.

	Plaintiffs challenged the facial validity of the ordinance,

arguing that the language was unconstitutionally vague, particularly

with respect to the scope of the ordinance’s application. The

district court noted that the ordinance did not define “charitable

purposes.” The court rejected the city’s argument that the

ordinance’s requirement that an organization applying for a permit

must be a “benevolent, philanthropic, patriotic, or eleemosynary

organization” registered under the Charitable Solicitation Act (Ill.

Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 23, par. 5102), or be exempt from such

registration, served to narrow the scope of the ordinance. The

court noted that this requirement merely compelled organizations

to be in compliance with state law. Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, slip op. at 21-22. The court found that the term “charitable purposes” was unconstitutionally vague

and required police to make decisions on the street as to whether

a particular organization was soliciting for charitable purposes, as

opposed to some other purpose. Thus, the ordinance vested

unbridled discretion in the police to decide what organizations

were violating the ordinance when they solicited without a permit.

The court noted that the term “charitable purposes” is “generic,

malleable, and difficult to apply.” Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, slip op. at 23.

	The third federal decision relied on by the circuit court in this

case is Carolina Action v. Pickard, 465 F. Supp. 576 (W.D.N.C. 1979). There, the district court struck down an ordinance that

imposed a requirement that expenses of soliciting not exceed 25%

of contributions and required a permit for organizations soliciting

for “charitable, patriotic, educational or philanthropic purposes.”

These terms were not defined in the ordinance. Carolina Action, 465 F. Supp at 577. Plaintiff was denied a permit on the ground

that the cost of its fund-raising effort would exceed the 25% ceiling

set forth in the ordinance. Carolina Action, 465 F. Supp. at 578. The district court held the ordinance unconstitutionally vague,

noting the inconsistency with which defendants applied the permit

and expense percentage requirements. Some organizations were allowed to solicit without any investigation into the accuracy of the

statements on their permit applications. Other applications were

approved despite incomplete information. At times, organizations

whose reported costs exceeded the 25% limitation were issued

permits. Carolina Action, 465 F. Supp. at 579-80. The court also noted that while defendants had construed the term “charitable” to

exclude political organizations, it had included as charitable some

organizations that were in fact political. Carolina Action, 465 F. Supp. at 581-82.

	We note that lower federal court decisions are not binding on

Illinois courts, but may be considered persuasive authority. People v. Stansberry, 47 Ill. 2d 541, 545 (1971). However, this court has the final word on interpretation of Illinois statutes.

	We find that the cited cases are distinguishable from the case

before us. In Golden, the phrase “charitable, religious, patriotic or philanthropic purpose or otherwise provides a service or product

so necessary for the general welfare of the residents of the city that

such activity does not constitute a nuisance” was not defined in the

ordinance, nor were there any regulations or directions to guide the

city council’s discretion. The record indicated that the council had

applied the ordinance inconsistently. We disagree with the district

court’s conclusion in Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now that reference in the ordinance to the Solicitation Act did not provide a definition of the term “charitable purposes.” In

Carolina Action, the terms “charitable,” “patriotic,” “educational,” and “philanthropic” were not defined in the ordinance. Although

defendants had interpreted those terms so as not to include political

organizations, the ordinance had been applied inconsistently.

	In all three cases, the regulatory schemes required either a

permit to solicit or the obtaining of an exemption to a general

prohibition on solicitation. In the instant case, the Solicitation Act

merely requires that entities subject to its provisions register and

report certain specified information. In addition, the Solicitation

Act contains definitions of the terms “[c]haritable organization”

and “charitable purpose.” 225 ILCS 460/1(a), (f) (West 1998).

	In fact, the terms “charity” and “charitable” have a settled

meaning in Illinois case law. For example, in Congregational Sunday School & Publishing Society v. Board of Review, 290 Ill. 108 (1919), the appellant’s claimed exemption from personal

property taxation for religious books and Sunday school supplies

was denied. See Congregational Sunday School, 290 Ill. at 109, 113. This court, in construing the statutory term “beneficent and

charitable organizations,” noted that charity is a gift to be applied

for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, by bringing their

“ ‘minds and hearts under the influence of education or religion,

*** by assisting them to establish themselves in life *** or by

otherwise lessening the burdens of government.’ ” Congregational Sunday School, 290 Ill. at 112-13, quoting Crerar v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625, 643 (1893).

	The Solicitation Act was construed in People ex rel. Hartigan v. National Anti-Drug Coalition, 124 Ill. App. 3d 269 (1984). There, the State sought injunctive relief against defendant and an

accounting of donations solicited by it without first registering

under the Solicitation Act as a charitable organization. The circuit

court granted the State’s motion to strike defendant’s affirmative

defenses that the Solicitation Act was unconstitutionally overbroad

and vague and that it violated the first amendment to the United

States Constitution. Hartigan, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 270. The circuit court granted the relief requested on the ground that defendant was

a charitable organization and required to register. Hartigan, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 271.

	On appeal, the appellate court found defendant’s constitutional

claims waived. Hartigan, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 272. In addressing the question of whether defendant was in fact a charitable

organization, the appellate court noted that:

		“The courts in this State are in accord in applying a broad

legal definition of ‘charity’ to include almost anything that

tends to promote the improvement, well[-]doing and

well[-]being of social man. [Citation.] Moreover,

charitable organizations may include organizations whose

primary purpose is not to provide money or services for the poor, the needy or other worthy objects of charity, but

to gather and disseminate information about and to advocate positions on matters of public concern.” (Emphases in original.) Hartigan, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 274.

The court held that, based upon the evidence before the circuit

court, defendant had a charitable purpose. Hartigan, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 274-75.

	Thus, the term “charity” has a broad legal meaning. This court

has stated:

		“ ‘A charity, in a legal sense, may be more fully defined as

a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the

benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by

bringing their hearts under the influence of education or

religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or

constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves for

life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or

works, or otherwise lessening the burthens of

government.’ ” Crerar v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625, 643 (1893), quoting Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 556.

	The Solicitation Act’s definition of “charitable organization”

is so well understood that it has been incorporated into other

Illinois statutes. For example, the statute defining the offense of

international terrorism provides that the terms “[c]haritable

organization,” “professional fund raiser,” and “professional

solicitor” have the meanings ascribed to them by the Solicitation

Act. 720 ILCS 5/29C–5 (West 1998). Likewise, the Good

Samaritan Food Donor Act (745 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 1998)) provides that the term “[c]haritable organization” is to be defined

as set forth in the Solicitation Act. 745 ILCS 50/2.02 (West 1998).

Some Illinois statutes provide even broader definitions of

“charitable organization” than does the Solicitation Act. The

Illinois Pull Tabs and Jar Games Act (230 ILCS 20/1 et seq. (West 1998)) defines “[c]haritable organization” as “an organization or

institution organized and operated to benefit an indefinite number

of the public.” 230 ILCS 20/1.1 (West 1998). The same definition

applies to the Bingo License and Tax Act (230 ILCS 25/1 (West

1998)).

	Other states have rejected vagueness challenges to broad

definitions of “charitable” or similar terms. In State v. Watson, 433 N.W.2d 110 (Minn. App. 1988), defendant was convicted of, inter alia, diversion of charitable gambling funds. He challenged Minnesota’s charitable gambling statute, arguing that it was unconstitutionally vague. Watson, 433 N.W.2d at 111. He claimed that use of the term “lawful purposes” as defined in the statute did

not give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what

conduct was proscribed. Watson, 433 N.W.2d at 112. The statute provided that profits from lawful gambling could be used only for

lawful purposes or expenses related to the gambling operation. In

upholding the statute’s constitutionality, the court of appeals noted

that

			“Statutes regulating charities must be inclusive so as to

cover many varied organizations. The fact that a statute is

inclusive does not make it vague. Definitions of charitable

or lawful purposes, therefore, are by nature general and

more inclusive.” Watson, 433 N.W.2d at 113.

	The court found the definition of “lawful purposes” to be

similar to the generally accepted legal definition of “charitable.”

Watson, 433 N.W.2d at 113-14.

	In Holloway v. Brown, 62 Ohio St. 2d 65, 403 N.E.2d 191 (1980), an ordinance prohibited a person from soliciting for a

charitable organization unless the organization registered with a

commission. Professional promoters and solicitors were required

to obtain a license. “Professional promoter” was defined in the

ordinance as a person who for compensation plans, promotes, or

carries on any drive or campaign for the purpose of soliciting

contributions on behalf of any charitable person or engages in the

business of soliciting contributions for charitable purposes.

Holloway, 62 Ohio St. 2d at 67-68, 403 N.E.2d at 193. The term “charitable” was defined as “meaning and including ‘the words

patriotic, philanthropic, religious, social service, welfare,

benevolent, educational, civic or fraternal, either actual or

purported.’ ” Holloway, 62 Ohio St. 2d at 70, 403 N.E.2d at 195. One of plaintiffs’ arguments was that the definition of “charitable”

was unconstitutionally vague. Holloway, 62 Ohio St. 2d at 70, 403 N.E.2d at 195. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this argument,

finding that the term “charitable” has a meaning that persons of

ordinary intelligence can discern, and that this is especially true

when the ordinance itself defines the term more specifically.

Holloway, 62 Ohio St. 2d at 75, 403 N.E.2d at 198.

	Although the terms at issue in this case are broad in scope, we

fail to see how they could be more precisely defined. Given the

wide variety of organizations subject to the Solicitation Act, an all-

inclusive definition must be used. The terms defendants challenge

have well-settled definitions in Illinois jurisprudence. Judicial

interpretations of the same or similar terms in other states also

support our conclusion that the terms “charitable organization” and

“charitable purpose” are not unconstitutionally vague.

	We conclude that the Solicitation Act’s registration and

reporting requirements are narrowly tailored to serve the state’s

substantial governmental interest in protecting its citizens from

fraud and do not unnecessarily burden first amendment speech.

Therefore, the terms “charitable organization” and “charitable

purpose” are not unconstitutionally vague.

CONCLUSION

	For the reasons stated, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment

and remand to that court for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.