UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

 :

ANNA MARIE DAVIS, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-3036 (MLC)

 :

Plaintiff, : MEMORANDUM OPINION

 :

v. :

 :

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, :

 :

Defendant. :

 :

COOPER, District Judge

The plaintiff, Anna Marie Davis, applies for judicial review of 

the final decision of the defendant, Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”), denying her claims for Disability Insurance 

Benefits (“DIB”). (Dkt. entry no. 1, Compl.) The Court has 

jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court, for the 

reasons stated herein, will affirm the Commissioner’s decision.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff filed a claim for DIB on July 27, 2006, alleging 

that she became unable to work on March 31, 2004. (Administrative 

Record (“A.R.”) at 138.) The Commissioner denied the claim on 

October 10, 2006. (Id. at 88-89.) The plaintiff filed a request for 

a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Id. at 110.) 

An ALJ conducted a hearing on June 25, 2008, in which the plaintiff 

was represented by counsel. (Id. at 60-87.

The ALJ issued a decision on July 17, 2008, finding, inter alia, 

that (1) the plaintiff “meets the insured status requirements of the 

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Social Security Act through December 31, 2009”; (2) the plaintiff “has 

not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 31, 2004, the 

alleged onset date of disability”; (3) the plaintiff “has the 

following severe impairments: fractured arm, back pain, and 

headaches (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c))”; (4) the plaintiff “does not have 

an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically 

equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart 

P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526)”; (5) 

the plaintiff “has the residual functional capacity to perform light

work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b), except she can: use the 

right (dominant) upper extremity for gross but no fine manipulation; 

do simple and repetitive tasks due to loss of concentration because 

of pain from headaches and effects of pain medication; and, alternate 

sitting and standing at her election due to back problems”; (6) the 

plaintiff “is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 C.F.R.

404.1565)” as a clerical worker because it “involved fine 

manipulations”; (7) the plaintiff “was thirty-six years old, which 

is defined as a younger individual age 18-44, on the alleged 

disability onset date (20 C.F.R. 404.1563)”; (8) the plaintiff “has 

at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English 

(20 C.F.R. 404.1564)”; (9) “transferability of job skills is not 

material to the determination of disability . . . (See SSR 82-41 and 

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2)”; (10) there are “jobs that 

exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the 

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[plaintiff] can perform (20 C.F.R. 404.1560(c) and 404.1566)”; and 

(11) the plaintiff “has not been under a disability, as defined in 

the Social Security Act, from March 21, 2004 through the date of this 

decision (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)).” (Id. at 90-101.) 

The ALJ concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to DIB 

payments. (Id. at 90-92.) The plaintiff requested review of the 

ALJ’s decision by the Social Security Administration Appeals Council 

(“Appeals Council”) on September 6, 2008. (Id. at 133-34.) The 

Appeals Council remanded the plaintiff’s case to the ALJ for, inter

alia, further consideration of evidence and clarification of 

plaintiff’s subjective complaints, mental impairments, and residual 

functional capacity. (Id. at 104.) 

The ALJ held a supplemental hearing on March 25, 2009. (Id. at 

26-51.) The ALJ then issued a decision on June 2, 2009, finding, 

inter alia, that (1) the plaintiff “meets the insured status 

requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2009”;

(2) the plaintiff “has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since March 31, 2004, the alleged onset date”; (3) the plaintiff “has 

the following severe impairments: lumbosacral disc bulge with pain 

syndrome and status-post right arm fracture with residual pain 

syndrome (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c))”; (4) the plaintiff “does not have 

an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically 

equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart 

P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. 404.1525 and 404.1526)”; (5) the plaintiff 

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“has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as 

defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(a) except no continual and repetitive 

head movements; no continual and repetitive fine fingering 

manipulations; must alternate sit/stand election; and is limited, due 

to pain/medication, to simple, unskilled work which entails 

understanding, carrying out and remembering simple instructions; 

responding appropriately to supervision, coworkers; and usual work 

situations; and dealing with changes in a routine work setting”; (6)

the plaintiff “is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 C.F.R. 

404.1565)” including “clerical and other secretarial jobs”; (7) the 

plaintiff “was 36 years old, which is defined as a younger individual 

age 18-44, on the alleged disability onset date (20 C.F.R. 404.1563)”; 

(8) the plaintiff “has at least a high school education and is able 

to communicate in English”; (9) “transferability of job skills is not 

material to the determination of disability . . . (See SSR 82-41 and 

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2)”; (10) “considering the 

[plaintiff’s] age, education, work experience, and residual 

functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers 

in the national economy that the [plaintiff] can perform (20 C.F.R. 

404.1560(c) and 404.1566)”; and (11) the plaintiff “has not been under 

a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from March 21, 

2004 through the date of this decision (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(g)).” 

(Id. at 16-21.) 

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The ALJ concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to DIB. 

(Id. at 11-22.) The plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s June 2, 

2009 decision by the Appeals Council on July 30, 2009. (Id. at 8.) 

The Appeals Council acknowledged receipt of additional evidence, 

found no reason to review the ALJ’s decision, and denied plaintiff’s 

request for review on April 19, 2011. (Id. at 1-5.) 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

The Court may review a “final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security” in a disability proceeding. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

The Court may affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner’s decision 

with or without remanding the case for a rehearing. Id. However, 

this judicial review is limited. The Court must affirm the 

Commissioner’s decision regarding disability benefits if an 

examination of the record reveals that the findings of fact are 

supported by substantial evidence. Id.; Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 

376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003). “Substantial evidence” in the context of 

a social security matter is defined as less than a preponderance of 

the evidence but “more than a mere scintilla,” i.e., such evidence 

“as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) 

(quotation and citations omitted). This standard “is deferential 

and includes deference to inferences drawn from the facts if they, 

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in turn, are supported by substantial evidence.” Schaudeck v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999).

Despite the deference given to administrative decisions under 

this standard, the Court “retain[s] a responsibility to scrutinize 

the entire record and to reverse or remand if the . . . decision is 

not supported by substantial evidence.” Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 

968, 970 (3d Cir. 1981). Furthermore,

[a] single piece of evidence will not satisfy the 

substantiality test if the [Commissioner] ignores, or 

fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing 

evidence. Nor is evidence substantial if it is 

overwhelmed by other evidence - particularly certain types 

of evidence (e.g., that offered by treating physicians) -

or if it really constitutes not evidence but mere 

conclusion.

Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983). “That the record 

contains evidence which could have supported a different conclusion 

does not undermine” the Commissioner’s decision provided that the 

record contains substantial evidence supporting that decision. 

Rivera v. Shalala, No. 94-2740, 1995 WL 495944, at *3 (D.N.J. July 

26, 1995). The Commissioner is required, however, to address and 

reconcile medical evidence that would support a contrary conclusion. 

Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 435.

II. Determining Eligibility for Disability Benefits

The term “disability” is defined as the “inability to engage in 

any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for 

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a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 

423(d)(1)(A). An individual is determined to be disabled if the 

individual’s “physical or mental impairment or impairments are of 

such severity that [the individual] is not only unable to do his [or 

her] previous work but cannot, considering his [or her] age, 

education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of 

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Id.

§ 423(d)(2)(A).

An ALJ employs a five-step process in determining whether a 

person is “disabled.” In the first step, the ALJ determines whether 

the claimant is currently engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is so engaged, the 

ALJ will find that the claimant is not disabled and deny the 

application for disability benefits. Id. § 404.1520(b). If the 

claimant is not employed, the ALJ will consider the medical severity 

and duration of the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments in the second step. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). A 

“severe impairment” is one that significantly limits the claimant’s 

physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, including, 

inter alia, (1) sitting, lifting, and speaking, (2) responding 

appropriately to supervision and co-workers, and (3) understanding, 

carrying out, and remembering instructions. Id. § 404.1521(a)-(b). 

A claimant not meeting this requirement is not disabled. Id. §

404.1520(c). Thus, the second step requires a threshold-level 

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demonstration of severe impairment without consideration of the 

claimant’s age, education, and work experience. Bowen v. Yuckert, 

482 U.S. 137, 153 (1987).

If the claimant shows a severe impairment, the ALJ then moves 

to the third step to determine whether the impairment is listed in 

section 20, part 404, subpart P, appendix 1 of the C.F.R. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment meets or equals a listed 

impairment, then the claimant is presumed to be disabled, and the 

evaluation ends at this stage. Id. § 404.1520(d). If the impairment 

does not meet or equal a listed impairment, then the ALJ proceeds to 

step four. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4).

The ALJ must determine at step four whether the impairment 

prevents the claimant from returning to the work that the claimant 

performed in the past. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). The claimant, if 

able to resume the previous work, will not be considered disabled. 

Id. If the claimant cannot resume previous work, the ALJ then moves 

to step five and considers the claimant’s ability to perform other 

work that is available in the national economy. Id. §

404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(e). This inquiry requires the ALJ to 

consider the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), age, 

education, and past work experience. Id. A claimant will be found 

disabled if the claimant is unable to adjust to any other work in the 

national economy. Id. § 404.1520(g).

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The claimant has the initial burden of production for the first 

four steps of the evaluation process. Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 

428 (3d Cir. 1999). Once a claimant meets this burden, the burden 

shifts to the Commissioner in step five to show that the claimant has 

the transferable skills that would allow him or her to engage in 

alternative substantial gainful employment. Id.

III. Analysis of the Plaintiff’s Claim

The plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s findings are not supported 

by substantial evidence. (Dkt. entry no. 14, Pl. Br. at 15.) 

Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the ALJ (1) failed to consider 

Dr. Williamson’s consultative examination report stating that she

suffered from major depression and anxiety; (2) failed to consider 

the effects of medication on the plaintiff’s ability to work as 

required by SSR 95-5p; (3) improperly concluded that the plaintiff 

was not disabled “based upon the ALJ’s own medical opinion”; (4) gave 

no reason why he “gave little or no weight” to the plaintiff’s treating 

physician’s opinions; (5) made “conclusory” findings “not supported 

by the medical evidence” in determining the plaintiff’s RFC; (6) 

“ignore[d] the severity of and the significant impact [that] the

plaintiff’s mental impairments would have on her ability to work”;

and (7) “failed to construct hypotheticals ‘which accurately 

portray[ed] the [plaintiff’s] individual physical and mental 

limitations.’” (Id. at 19-24). The Commissioner argues, in

contrast, that the “decision that [the] plaintiff was not disabled 

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is supported by substantial evidence” provided by the reports of Drs. 

Christopher Williamson (upon whom the plaintiff contends the ALJ 

failed to rely), Michael Britton, and Deogracias Bustos. (Dkt. entry 

no. 15, Def. Br. at 2.)

In determining whether a claimant is entitled to disability 

benefits, the ALJ “must consider all evidence and give some reason 

for discounting the evidence [the ALJ] rejects.” Plummer, 186 F.3d 

at 429. The ALJ need not engage in a comprehensive analysis when 

explaining why probative evidence is being rejected. Cotter v. 

Harris, 650 F.2d 481, 482 (3d Cir. 1981). Rather, a short sentence 

or paragraph explaining the basis upon which the ALJ is rejecting 

evidence will suffice. Id. 

The ALJ is not required to reference each and every treatment 

notation with particularity in the analysis, but must “consider and 

evaluate the medical evidence in the record consistent with [the] 

responsibilities under the regulations and case law.” Fargnoli v. 

Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 42 (3d Cir. 2001). An ALJ “may choose whom 

to credit” when a conflict in the evidence exists, but may not “reject 

evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Plummer, 186 F.3d 

at 429 (quotation and citation omitted). This policy allows the 

Court to properly review the ALJ’s decision pursuant to Section 405(g) 

to determine whether the decision is supported by substantial 

evidence. Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981). The 

Court, without an indication as to what evidence the ALJ considered 

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or rejected, “cannot tell if significant probative evidence was 

credited or simply ignored.” Id. Although the ALJ is not required 

“to use particular language or adhere to a particular format in 

conducting his analysis,” the ALJ’s findings must provide “sufficient 

development of the record and explanation of findings to permit 

meaningful review.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 

2004). 

The Court need not examine the ALJ’s step one determination that 

the plaintiff has not engaged in work activity after her alleged 

disability onset date. (A.R. at 16.) The plaintiff does not 

challenge the ALJ’s finding at step two that the plaintiff suffered 

from two severe impairments, lumbosacral disc bulge with pain 

syndrome and status-post right arm fracture with residual pain 

syndrome. (Id.) The plaintiff also does not challenge the ALJ’s 

finding at step three that the plaintiff did not automatically qualify 

as disabled under any “listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (Id. at 17.)1

 

1 “The plaintiff is not arguing that her mental impairments are of 

Listing severity but rather they are significant enough to [a]ffect 

her ability to perform basic work related functions.” (Dkt. entry 

no. 16, Pl. Reply Br. at 2.)

 

Step four is not in dispute to the extent that the ALJ found that 

the plaintiff could not perform any past relevant work. (See A.R. 

at 20.) However, the plaintiff objects to the ALJ’s RFC 

determination as well as the ALJ’s construction of the hypothetical

questions posed to the vocational expert (“VE”). (Pl. Br. at 22-24.) 

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Therefore, the Court will address the ALJ’s determinations at step 

four and step five of the sequential analysis.

The plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s determination of her RFC

was “merely conclusory” and “not supported by the medical evidence.” 

(Id.) The ALJ found that the plaintiff has the RFC to perform 

sedentary work, but cannot make continual and repetitive head 

movements or fine fingering manipulations, and “must alternate 

sit/stand election.” (A.R. at 18.) The ALJ further found that the 

plaintiff is “limited to simple, unskilled work which entails 

understanding, carrying out and remembering simple instructions,” 

yet can respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers, usual work 

situations, and “changes in a routine work setting.” (Id.) The 

plaintiff raises several objections to the ALJ’s RFC determination, 

which the Court addresses below.

A. ALJ’s Consideration of the Plaintiff’s Mental Impairments

The plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in (1) determining that 

the plaintiff’s mental impairments were not severe, and (2) using 20 

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“Listing”) to determine the 

severity of the plaintiff’s mental impairments. (Pl. Br. at 16.) 

The Court disagrees on both counts. Substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ’s finding that the plaintiff’s mental impairments 

were not severe. Additionally, the ALJ correctly considered the 

functional limitations of the plaintiff’s mental impairments in 

determining her ability to perform substantial gainful activity. 

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The ALJ must “first assess the nature and extent of [the 

plaintiff’s] mental limitations and restrictions and then determine 

[her] residual functional capacity for work activity on a regular and 

continuing basis.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(c). If the plaintiff’s 

mental impairments do not meet or sufficiently equal the criteria of 

any Listing, then the ALJ determines the plaintiff’s RFC in light of 

a functional evaluation based on the plaintiff’s (1) “activities of 

daily living; (2) social functioning; (3) concentration, 

persistence, or pace; and (4) episodes of decompensation.” 20 C.F.R. 

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 § 12.00(A). 

The plaintiff does not argue that her mental impairments meet 

or equal a specified listing. (Pl. Reply Br. at 2.) Therefore, the 

ALJ correctly relied on the evaluation of the areas of functional 

limitation in determining that the plaintiff was capable of 

performing “unskilled, repetitive work,” and “responding 

appropriately” to supervision, coworkers, usual work situations, and 

changes in a routine work setting. (A.R. at 18, 20.) 

The plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider Dr. 

Williamson’s consultative examination report in determining that the 

plaintiff’s mental impairments were not severe. The plaintiff 

further argues that her mental impairments are “significant enough 

to [a]ffect her ability to perform basic work related functions.” 

(Pl. Reply Br. at 2.)

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The record shows that the ALJ considered Dr. Williamson’s 

consultative examination report in determining that the plaintiff’s 

mental impairments were not severe. (A.R. at 17 (discussing 

plaintiff’s mental impairments as stated in Exhibit 6F, Dr. 

Williamson’s consultative examination report).) While Dr. 

Williamson diagnosed the plaintiff with major depressive disorder and 

generalized anxiety disorder, Dr. Williamson found no evidence of a 

“formal thought disorder,” “compulsions in thinking, and/or 

behavior,” or “issues of suicidal ideation.” (Id. at 295.) Dr. 

Williamson further found that the plaintiff’s “verbalizations were 

clear, coherent and goal-directed.” (Id.) The plaintiff 

complained of “attention, concentration, and short-term memory 

difficulties,” but “she could repeat up to 5 digits forward and 4 

digits backward,” and “recall 3 out of 3 common objects at 5 to 10 

minute intervals.” (Id.) However, the plaintiff was unable to 

“state serial 7’s subtracting 7 from 100 in reverse order.” (Id.) 

The ALJ considered Dr. Williamson’s findings in the context of 

additional objective evidence in the record. Specifically, the ALJ 

reviewed the plaintiff’s limitations based on the “four broad 

functional areas” and concluded that the plaintiff had mild 

functional limitations in the areas of (1) activities of daily living; 

(2) social function; and (3) concentration, persistence or pace. 

(Id. at 17.) See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(3). Further, the 

plaintiff did not experience any episodes of decompensation. (Id.) 

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If a plaintiff’s degree of functional limitation in the first three 

areas is “mild” and “none” in the fourth area, then the ALJ will 

“generally conclude that [the plaintiff’s] impairment(s) is not 

severe.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(3)(1). The ALJ properly applied 

the functional limitation criteria in assessing the severity of the 

plaintiff’s mental impairments. The ALJ’s determination that the 

plaintiff’s mental impairments were not severe is supported by both 

Dr. Britton’s psychiatric review of the plaintiff’s functional 

limitations and Dr. Williamson’s consultative examination report. 

(See A.R. at 294-96, 307 (failing to identify symptoms or effects 

beyond “feeling . . . jumpy and nervous”).) 

The plaintiff contends that the Commissioner’s references to Dr. 

Britton and Dr. Bustos as “highly qualified psychiatrist[s]” are not 

supported by the record. (Pl. Reply Br. at 3-4.)2

 

2 Dr. Britton is a practicing psychologist licensed by the New Jersey 

State Board of Psychological Examiners. See New Jersey Division of 

Consumer Affairs,

https://newjersey.mylicense.com/verification/Details.aspx?agency_

id=1&license_id=6188& (last visited July 3, 2012). Dr. Bustos is a 

medical doctor licensed by the New Jersey State Board of Medical 

Examiners. See New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs, 

https://newjersey.mylicense.com/verification/Details.aspx?agency_

id=1&license_id=646770& (last visited July 3, 2012).

 However, the ALJ 

must “consider findings and other opinions of . . . psychological 

consultants . . . and other medical specialists as opinion evidence.” 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2)(i). When conflicting objective evidence 

in the record exists, the ALJ must decide which evidence is more 

persuasive. In making this determination, the ALJ may not make 

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speculative inferences from medical reports and may not interject his 

own medical analysis. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Schweiker, 765 F.2d 31, 

37 (3d Cir. 1985); Califano, 637 F.2d at 972. The ALJ may, however, 

consider all of the relevant medical evidence, decide which evidence 

to credit, and explain why he chose to favor one medical opinion over 

another. See Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 505-06 (3d 

Cir. 2009). The ALJ’s conclusion that the plaintiff is not 

“psychiatrically impaired” to the extent that she is prevented from 

performing “even low stress work” is supported by Dr. Britton’s 

psychological evaluation of the plaintiff. (A.R. at 20.) Even if 

Dr. Britton’s evaluation failed to support Dr. Williamson’s 

consultative examination report, the ALJ was entitled to favor the 

opinion which he found more persuasive provided that he explained his 

decision. (See A.R. at 17-19.) 

“A cardinal principle guiding disability eligibility 

determinations is that the ALJ accord treating physicians’ reports 

great weight, especially ‘when their opinions reflect expert judgment 

based on a continuing observation of the patient’s condition over a 

prolonged period of time.’” Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429 (internal 

citations omitted). Additionally, “[i]n considering a claim for 

disability benefits, greater weight should be given to the findings 

of a treating physician than to a physician who has examined the 

claimant as a consultant.” Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 47 (3d Cir. 

1994). However, when a conflict in the evidence exists, the ALJ may 

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choose whom to credit but “cannot reject evidence for no reason or 

for the wrong reason.” Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1066 (3d Cir. 

1993). 

The ALJ considered the plaintiff’s own testimony regarding her 

functional limitations and determined that she performs activities 

of daily living, such as driving a car, personal care, and light 

cooking without difficulty, “handles routine changes fairly well,” 

and “pay[s] attention ‘as long as [she] has to.’” (A.R. at 19, 195.) 

The plaintiff’s testimony further demonstrates that she handles 

stress “fairly well” and gets along with authority figures “fairly 

well.” (Id. at 195.) Additionally, the ALJ found that the 

plaintiff’s anxiety and depression are controlled with medication. 

(Id. at 19, 40-41.) The ALJ rejected the plaintiff’s treating 

physician Dr. Golding-Granado’s assessment that plaintiff was 

incapable of low stress work because that “assessment [was] 

inconsistent with objective evidence and even the claimant’s own 

allegations.” (Id. at 20.) The ALJ determined that the plaintiff 

was not “psychiatrically impaired”; thus, the ALJ found no evidence 

that the plaintiff was “incapable of even low stress work.” (Id.) 

We find that the ALJ provided adequate reasons for rejecting Dr. 

Golding-Granado’s opinion. 

B. ALJ’s Determination of the Plaintiff’s RFC

The plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s determination of her RFC was 

not based on objective medical evidence. First, the plaintiff argues 

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that the ALJ failed to include the plaintiff’s mental impairments in 

her RFC assessment. (Pl. Br. at 18.) Second, the plaintiff argues 

that the ALJ failed to consider the side effects of the plaintiff’s 

medications. (Id. at 19.) Third, the plaintiff argues that the ALJ 

failed to give controlling weight to the plaintiff’s treating 

physicians’ opinions. (Id. at 22.) Fourth, the plaintiff argues 

that the assessment of her RFC was not based on objective medical 

evidence. (Id. at 21.) 

The Court disagrees. At step four and step five, the ALJ “must 

determine whether the claimant retains the ability to perform either 

his [or her] former work or some less demanding employment.” Pearson 

v. Barnhart, 380 F.Supp.2d 496, 504 (D.N.J. 2005) (quotation and 

citation omitted). An RFC is defined as what an individual “can still 

do despite [his or her] limitations. . . . If [the plaintiff] can meet 

his or her past work demands, then he or she is not disabled within 

the meaning of the Act.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). 

Here, the ALJ adequately explained the basis for the RFC to perform 

sedentary work limited by the inability to perform continual and 

repetitive head movements or fine fingering manipulations. (See

A.R. at 18, 49.) The ALJ further determined that the plaintiff must 

have the ability to sit and stand at her election, and be restricted 

to simple and repetitive tasks. (Id.) The Court will address each 

of the plaintiff’s claims in turn. 

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The plaintiff first claims that the ALJ failed to include her 

mental impairments in her RFC. (Id. at 18.) The RFC must “identify 

the individual’s functional limitations and restrictions and assess 

his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis, 

including the functions in paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of 20 C.F.R.

404.1545.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996). The ALJ is not 

required to “use particular language or adhere to a particular format 

in conducting his analysis.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505. Here, the ALJ 

did perform the required analysis and detailed his findings in his 

decision. (A.R. at 18-20.) The ALJ properly took into account the 

plaintiff’s mental impairments, “assess[ing] the nature and extent 

of [the plaintiff’s] mental limitations and restrictions.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1545(c)-(d). Based on a full review of the record, the 

ALJ concluded that the plaintiff’s “complaints of depression and 

anxiety . . . [do] not cause more than minimal limitation in the 

[plaintiff’s] ability to perform basic mental work activities.” 

(A.R. at 17.) The ALJ considered the plaintiff’s subjective 

complaints of depression and anxiety, but found that these “feelings 

. . . are abated with anti-depressant medication.” (Id. at 19; see 

also id. at 40-41.) Moreover, the ALJ did list certain nonexertional 

limitations in the plaintiff’s RFC, which take into account the 

plaintiff’s mental limitations: “[the plaintiff] is limited to 

“simple, unskilled work which entails understanding, carrying out and 

remembering simple instructions.” (Id. at 18.) The ALJ concluded 

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that, based upon the plaintiff’s “mild” limitation in the functional 

areas of activities of daily living; social functioning; and 

concentration, persistence, and pace, the plaintiff was able to 

respond appropriately to supervisors, coworkers, usual work 

situations, and changes in a routine work setting. (Id.)

The plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider the effect 

of plaintiff’s medications on her ability to perform substantial 

gainful activity. The ALJ questioned the plaintiff regarding any 

side effects caused by her medications. The plaintiff responded that 

her medication “makes [her] very sleepy” and nauseated “some of the 

time.” (Id. at 39-40.) The record indicates that the plaintiff 

stated in her disability report dated December 1, 2006, that she 

experiences drowsiness and nausea, but the record fails to suggest 

that the plaintiff reported these side effects to her treating 

physicians or that her medications were adjusted for poor toleration. 

See Grandillo v. Barnhart, 105 Fed.Appx. 415, 419 (3d Cir. 2004) 

(holding that plaintiff’s “own conclusory statements” did not 

“establish a sufficient on-going struggle with any side effects”). 

In fact, Dr. Golding-Granado’s records indicate that the plaintiff’s 

dosage of Inderal, which the plaintiff stated causes her to feel 

“tired” and “nauseous,” was increased on October 10, 2008. (A.R. at

218, 344.) However, in determining the plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ took 

into account the plaintiff’s complaints of her “pain/medication”

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effects to the extent that such effects limited her RFC to “simple, 

unskilled work.” (Id. at 18.)

The plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed “to explain why he 

[gave] little weight or no weight” to the plaintiff’s treating 

physicians’ opinions in accordance with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).3

The Court disagrees. The ALJ performed an exhaustive review of 

the plaintiff’s medical records. (See A.R. at 16-21 (discussing 

plaintiff’s medical records).) The ALJ considered those records in

the context of testimony from the plaintiff. (Id. at 20-21.) The 

record shows that the ALJ considered the opinions offered by the 

plaintiff’s treating physicians, Drs. Golding-Granado and Lopez.

(Id. at 18-20.) The record includes several reports by Dr. 

Golding-Granado, the plaintiff’s treating physician, which the ALJ 

considered, but ultimately gave little weight to in determining the 

plaintiff’s RFC because the ALJ found that these opinions were not 

 

(Pl. Br. at 22.) The plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to 

cite to “a single piece of contradictory evidence.” (Id.)

 

3 “Generally, we give more weight to opinions from your treating 

sources, since these sources are likely to be the medical 

professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture 

of your medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to 

the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective 

medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations. 

. . . If we find that a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of 

the nature and severity of your impairment(s) is well-supported by 

medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques 

and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in your 

case record, we will give it controlling weight.” 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(d)(2).

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“consistent with objective and other evidence.” (Id. at 325-29, 

343-68.) 

The plaintiff argues that the ALJ rejected her treating 

physicians’ opinions without stating a reason for his rejection. 

(Pl. Br. at 19.) The ALJ’s decision indicates, however, that the ALJ 

considered but ultimately “[did] not give any weight” to Dr. 

Golding-Granado’s conclusion that the plaintiff was unable to work, 

because “[Dr. Golding-Granado] assessed that [the plaintiff] was 

unable to perform any sitting, standing, walking, lifting or carrying 

in an 8 hour workday.” (A.R. at 19.) The ALJ found that Dr. 

Golding-Granado’s assessment was “inconsistent with the objective 

evidence and even the [plaintiff’s] own allegations that she lives 

alone and cooks, food shops, does laundry, etc.” (Id.) 

The Court finds that the ALJ relied on objective evidence in the 

record that contradicts Dr. Golding-Granado’s assessment. First, 

Dr. Rosario’s report dated June 27, 2006, states that the plaintiff’s 

neck, back, and spine demonstrate a “full range of motion.” (Id. at 

279.) Dr. Rosario further noted that plaintiff’s grips and foot 

pushes were “strong and equal.” (Id. at 278.) Dr. Rosario 

determined that the plaintiff suffered from migraines which were 

worse because the plaintiff had “been off of Lexapro,” her medication 

for migraines. (Id. at 279.) 

Ani Ortho Group’s report dated August 2, 2006, indicates that 

the plaintiff’s joints have “full passive range of motion.” (Id. at 

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280.)4

Dr. Bustos’s physical RFC assessment stated that the plaintiff’s 

primary diagnosis was “migraine headaches” and found that during an 

eight-hour work day, the plaintiff could: occasionally lift and/or 

carry twenty pounds; frequently lift and/or carry ten pounds; stand 

and/or walk for a total of six hours; sit for a total of six hours; 

push and/or pull; and never balance or crawl. In Dr. Bustos’s

judgment, the “degree of [the plaintiff’s] alleged difficulties [was] 

not fully supported by objective findings.” (Id. at 316.) 

 The Ani Ortho Group report also indicates that the 

plaintiff’s “gait and station is normal,” although she suffers from 

migraines. (Id. at 289.) Ani Ortho Group’s report additionally 

found that the plaintiff’s pain was “qualitatively” rated as severe. 

(Id. at 292.) 

Dr. Lopez, the plaintiff’s treating orthopedist, indicated in 

a RFC questionnaire completed on November 11, 2007, that during an 

eight-hour work day, the plaintiff could sit, stand, walk less than 

two hours, and should break to walk for five minutes at twenty minute 

intervals. (A.R. at 334.) A second medical report by Dr. Lopez, 

dated June 28, 2007, indicated that the plaintiff could stand and/or

walk up to two hours per eight-hour work day and sit less than six 

hours per eight-hour work day. Dr. Lopez’s MRI examination of the 

plaintiff indicated “mild disc bulging,” and “slight disc 

 

4 The plaintiff was treated for a right wrist contusion in November 

2005, which the ALJ properly found “did not result in any 

abnormalities.” (A.R. at 19, 292.)

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desiccation,” but “no focal disc herniation or significant spinal 

stenosis.” (Id. at 340.) Dr. Lopez stated that the plaintiff “is 

able to actively move her upper and lower extremities,” as well as 

“flex and extend with good strength at the elbow, wrists and fingers.” 

(Id. at 339.) 

The ALJ, in assessing the plaintiff’s RFC, stated that he

“accorded great weight” to Dr. Lopez’s assessment dated June 28, 2007,

but he rejected Dr. Lopez’s finding that the plaintiff was only 

capable of sitting less than six hours in an eight-hour workday. (Id.

at 20.) Given that Dr. Lopez’s own assessments are inconsistent, and 

based on the physical examinations conducted by other medical 

specialists in the record, the ALJ was not required to give 

controlling weight to Dr. Lopez’s opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(c)(2)(ii) (explaining that inconsistency and lack of 

supportability are factors to consider when determining the weight 

given to opinions); see also id. § 404.1527(e) (reserving the question 

of whether a person is disabled and unable to work to Commissioner 

as opposed to opinion of a medical source); SSR 96-5p, “Medical Source 

Opinions on Issues Reserved to the Commissioner,” 1996 WL 374183 

(S.S.A. July 2, 1996) (distinguishing between treating source 

opinions and Commissioner’s administrative ruling on RFC and noting 

that a treating source’s opinion on issue of whether an individual 

is disabled is “reserved to the Commissioner . . . . [E]ven when 

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offered by a treating source, they can never be entitled to 

controlling weight or given special significance.”). 

The ALJ’s determination of the plaintiff’s RFC took into account

the exertional limitations expressed by Dr. Lopez, as well as the 

other medical opinions in the record, and thus is supported by 

substantial evidence. Additionally, Dr. Golding-Granado’s reports 

appear internally inconsistent, insofar as some of Dr. 

Golding-Granado’s conclusions were based on the plaintiff’s 

complaints rather than objective measures or personal observation. 

(See A.R. at 336-37 (noting that plaintiff’s “chronic physical pain” 

and “neuropathic pain” render her “unable to work”).) The ALJ may 

exclude the plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain when there is 

little evidence to support such claims, and there is evidence that 

medication relieves the pain. Cruz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 244 

Fed.Appx. 475, 481 (3d Cir. 2007). When the ALJ asked the plaintiff 

whether Roxicodone alleviates her pain, the plaintiff responded,

“Yes.” (A.R. at 40.) 

The ALJ properly considered the plaintiff’s own testimony that 

she lives alone, prepares small meals, drives a car, reads, writes 

poetry, cares for a cat, and performs household chores. See Cerrato 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 386 Fed.Appx. 283, 286 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding 

that plaintiff’s inability to perform low stress work was 

unsubstantiated by objective medical evidence and inconsistent with 

her reports of her ability to perform household chores, use public 

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transportation, and occasionally assist at her sister’s convenience 

store). The ALJ concluded that the plaintiff’s testimony undermines 

Dr. Golding-Granado’s findings that the plaintiff is incapable of 

sitting, standing, or walking for any amount of time during an 

eight-hour workday. (A.R. at 19, 327.) The ALJ was therefore not 

required to accept Dr. Golding-Granado’s conclusion that the 

plaintiff’s symptoms render the plaintiff unable to work. The ALJ 

was also not required to accept Dr. Lopez’s finding that the plaintiff 

was limited to sitting less than six hours in an eight-hour workday.

C. Sufficiency of the ALJ’s Explanation at Step Five

The plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to include “the 

plaintiff’s mental limitations” in the hypothetical questions posed 

to the VE. (Pl. Br. at 24.) Specifically, the plaintiff argues that 

the hypotheticals excluded the limitations caused by her depression, 

anxiety, and difficulties with attention, concentration, and 

short-term memory. (Id.) The ALJ found that the plaintiff was 

capable of performing “unskilled, repetitive work.” (A.R. at 17-18.) 

When an ALJ poses a hypothetical to a VE, that hypothetical must 

include all of the plaintiff’s impairments that are supported by the 

record. Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1276 (3d Cir. 1987). 

If the hypothetical does not include all of the plaintiff’s 

impairments, then it is deficient. Id.

This Court finds no merit to the plaintiff’s contention that the 

ALJ’s hypothetical posed to the VE did not accurately portray the 

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plaintiff’s physical and mental impairments. Such a hypothetical 

need only “fairly set forth every credible limitation established by 

the physical evidence.” Plummer, 186 F.3d at 431. The ALJ need not 

“submit to the vocational expert every impairment alleged by a 

claimant.” Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005). 

The ALJ’s hypotheticals, which reduced the plaintiff’s RFC to the 

ability to perform sedentary work, included impairments which were 

not credibly established on the record. (A.R. at 18.) The ALJ took 

into account all of the evidence set forth in the record, including 

“many of the [plaintiff’s] alleged limitations,” and reduced the 

plaintiff’s RFC from the ability to perform light work, determined 

during the first hearing, to the ability to perform sedentary work, 

determined during the second hearing. (Id. at 20, 96.) The ALJ 

further determined that the plaintiff’s RFC was restricted to 

unskilled and repetitive work. (Id. at 18.) 

Only those impairments that are medically undisputed need to be 

included in the hypotheticals posed to the VE. Podedworny v. Harris, 

745 F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984). No basis therefore existed for the 

ALJ to include the plaintiff’s mental impairments insofar as they 

would limit the plaintiff’s ability to perform less than unskilled 

and repetitive work. Cf. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 122-24 (3d 

Cir. 2002) (holding that a hypothetical restricting plaintiff to 

“simple, routine, repetitive work” could not account for plaintiff’s 

borderline intellectual functioning). Here, the plaintiff’s 

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functional limitations were mild, and the plaintiff’s depression and 

anxiety were controlled with medication. (A.R. at 41, 279, 294-96, 

307.) The ALJ considered the plaintiff’s mental impairments and 

determined that she was able to respond appropriately to supervisors, 

coworkers, usual work situations, and changes in a routine work 

setting. (Id. at 18.) Given that the ALJ’s hypotheticals took into 

account the scope of the plaintiff’s established impairments, 

including her (1) lumbrosacral disc bulge with pain syndrome and 

status-post right arm fracture with residual pain syndrome 

(restricting hypotheticals to jobs that do not require continual and 

repetitive head movements or fine fingering manipulations); (2) her 

inability to sit and/or stand for a required amount of time 

(restricting hypotheticals to a “job that required alternate 

sit/stand at [the plaintiff’s] election”); and (3) her inability to 

perform repetitive work that requires more than “understanding, 

carrying out, and remembering simple instructions” (restricting 

hypotheticals to “simple, unskilled work”), the ALJ’s hypotheticals

posed to the VE, and the ALJ’s reliance on the VE’s answers, were

supported by substantial evidence. (A.R. at 47-50.)

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed supra, the Court will affirm the 

Commissioner’s decision denying the plaintiff’s claim. The Court 

will issue an appropriate Order.

 s/ Mary L. Cooper 

MARY L. COOPER

United States District Judge

Dated: July 5, 2012

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