(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2004 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

GONZALEZ v. CROSBY, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 04–6432. Argued April 25, 2005—Decided June 23, 2005 

Petitioner’s federal habeas corpus petition was dismissed as time 

barred when the District Court concluded that the federal limitations 

period was not tolled while petitioner’s motion for postconviction relief was pending in state court. After petitioner abandoned his attempt to seek review of the District Court’s decision, this Court decided that a state postconviction relief petition can toll the federal 

statute of limitations even if, like petitioner’s, the petition is ultimately dismissed as procedurally barred. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 

4. Petitioner filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) motion 

for relief from the judgment, which the District Court denied. The 

Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that the Rule 60(b) motion was in substance a second or successive habeas petition, which 

under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(AEDPA), 28 U. S. C. §2244(b), cannot be filed without precertification by the court of appeals. 

Held: 

1. Because petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion challenged only the District Court’s previous ruling on AEDPA’s statute of limitations, it is 

not the equivalent of a successive habeas petition and can be ruled 

upon by the District Court without precertification by the Eleventh 

Circuit. Pp. 3–11.

(a) Rule 60(b) applies in §2254 habeas proceedings only “to the 

extent that [it is] not inconsistent with” applicable federal statutes 

and rules. §2254 Rule 11. Because §2244(b) applies only where a 

court acts pursuant to a prisoner’s “habeas corpus application,” the 

question here is whether a Rule 60(b) motion is such an application. 

The text of §2244(b) shows that, for these purposes, a habeas applica-
2 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY 

Syllabus 

tion is a filing containing one or more “claims.” Other federal habeas 

statutes and this Court’s decisions also make clear that a “claim” is 

an asserted federal basis for relief from a state-court conviction. If a 

Rule 60(b) motion contains one or more “claims,” the motion is, if not 

in substance a “habeas corpus application,” at least similar enough 

that failing to subject it to AEDPA’s restrictions on successive habeas 

petitions would be “inconsistent with” the statute. A Rule 60(b) motion can be said to bring a “claim” if it seeks to add a new ground for 

relief from the state conviction or attacks the federal court’s previous 

resolution of a claim on the merits, though not if it merely attacks a 

defect in the federal habeas proceedings’ integrity. Pp. 3–8. 

(b) When no “claim” is presented, there is no basis for contending 

that a Rule 60(b) motion should be treated like a habeas petition. If 

neither the motion itself nor the federal judgment from which it seeks 

relief substantively addresses federal grounds for setting aside the 

movant’s state conviction, allowing the motion to proceed on its own 

terms creates no inconsistency with the habeas statute or rules. Petitioner’s motion, which alleges that the federal courts misapplied 

§2244(d)’s statute of limitations, fits this description. Nothing in 

Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 538, suggests that entertaining a 

filing confined to a nonmerits aspect of the first federal habeas proceeding is “inconsistent with” AEDPA. Pp. 8–11.

2. Under the proper Rule 60(b) standards, the District Court was 

correct to deny relief. The change in the law worked by Artuz is not 

an “extraordinary circumstance” justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6), 

and it is made all the less extraordinary by the lack of diligence that 

petitioner showed in seeking direct appellate review of the statute-oflimitations issue. Pp. 11–13. 

366 F. 3d 1253, affirmed. 

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, 

C. J., and O’CONNOR, KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., 

joined. BREYER, J., filed a concurring opinion. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER, J., joined. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order 

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 04–6432 

AURELIO O. GONZALEZ, PETITIONER v. JAMES V. 

CROSBY, JR., SECRETARY, FLORIDA 

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

[June 23, 2005] 

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. 

After the federal courts denied petitioner habeas corpus 

relief from his state conviction, he filed a motion for relief 

from that judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60(b). The question presented is whether, in a 

habeas case, such motions are subject to the additional 

restrictions that apply to “second or successive” habeas 

corpus petitions under the provisions of the Antiterrorism 

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) codified 

at 28 U. S. C. §2244(b). 

I 

Petitioner Aurelio Gonzalez pleaded guilty in Florida 

Circuit Court to one count of robbery with a firearm. He 

filed no appeal and began serving his 99-year sentence in 

1982. Some 12 years later, petitioner began to seek relief 

from his conviction. He filed two motions for state postconviction relief, which the Florida courts denied. Thereafter, in June 1997, petitioner filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of Florida, alleging that his guilty plea had not 
2 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY 

Opinion of the Court 

been entered knowingly and voluntarily. 

Upon the State’s motion, the District Court dismissed 

petitioner’s habeas petition as barred by AEDPA’s statute 

of limitations, 28 U. S. C. §2244(d). Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, petitioner’s filing deadline, absent tolling, 

was April 23, 1997, one year after AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations took effect. Wilcox v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 158 F. 3d 1209, 1211 (CA11 1998) (per curiam). 

Adopting a Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, the District Court concluded that the limitations period was not 

tolled during the 163-day period while petitioner’s second 

motion for state postconviction relief was pending. Section 

2244(d)(2) tolls the statute of limitations during the pendency of “properly filed” applications only, and the District

Court thought petitioner’s motion was not “properly filed” 

because it was both untimely and successive. Without 

tolling, petitioner’s federal habeas petition was two

months late, so the District Court dismissed it as time 

barred. A judge of the Eleventh Circuit denied a certificate of appealability (COA) on April 6, 2000, and petitioner did not file for rehearing or review of that decision. 

On November 7, 2000, we held in Artuz v. Bennett, 531 

U. S. 4, that an application for state postconviction relief 

can be “properly filed” even if the state courts dismiss it as 

procedurally barred. See id., at 8–9. Almost nine months 

later, petitioner filed in the District Court a pro se “Motion 

to Amend or Alter Judgment,” contending that the District 

Court’s time-bar ruling was incorrect under Artuz’s construction of §2244(d), and invoking Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(b)(6), which permits a court to relieve a

party from the effect of a final judgment.1 The District 

—————— 

1Although the title “Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment” suggests 

that petitioner was relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), the 

substance of the motion made clear that petitioner sought relief under 

Rule 60(b)(6). 
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

Court denied the motion, and petitioner appealed. 

A judge of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 

granted petitioner a COA, but a panel quashed the certificate as improvidently granted. 317 F. 3d 1308, 1310, 1314 

(2003). The full court vacated that order and reheard the 

case en banc. It granted petitioner a COA but held, by a 

vote of 7 to 4, that the District Court was correct to deny 

his Rule 60(b) motion. The en banc majority determined

that petitioner’s motion—indeed, any postjudgment motion under Rule 60(b) save one alleging fraud on the court 

under Rule 60(b)(3)—was in substance a second or successive habeas corpus petition. 366 F. 3d 1253, 1278, 1281– 

1282 (2004). A state prisoner may not file such a petition 

without precertification by the court of appeals that the 

petition meets certain stringent criteria. §2244(b). Because petitioner’s motion did not satisfy these requirements, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed its denial. Id., at 

1282. 

We granted certiorari. 543 U. S. __ (2005). 

II 

Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from a final 

judgment, and request reopening of his case, under a 

limited set of circumstances including fraud, mistake, and 

newly discovered evidence.2 Rule 60(b)(6), the particular 

—————— 

2Rule 60(b) provides in relevant part: 

“On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a 

party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 

reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)

newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 

discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud 

. . . , misrepresentation, or misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 

judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 

discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason 

justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall 
4 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY 

Opinion of the Court 

provision under which petitioner brought his motion,

permits reopening when the movant shows “any . . . reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment” 

other than the more specific circumstances set out in 

Rules 60(b)(1)–(5). See Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U. S. 847, 863, n. 11 (1988); Klapprott v. 

United States, 335 U. S. 601, 613 (1949) (opinion of Black, 

J.). The mere recitation of these provisions shows why we 

give little weight to respondent’s appeal to the virtues of 

finality. That policy consideration, standing alone, is unpersuasive in the interpretation of a provision whose

whole purpose is to make an exception to finality. The 

issue here is whether the text of Rule 60(b) itself, or of 

some other provision of law, limits its application in a 

manner relevant to the case before us. 

AEDPA did not expressly circumscribe the operation of 

Rule 60(b). (By contrast, AEDPA directly amended other 

provisions of the Federal Rules. See, e.g., AEDPA, §103,

110 Stat. 1218 (amending Fed. Rule App. Proc. 22).) The 

new habeas restrictions introduced by AEDPA are made 

indirectly relevant, however, by the fact that Rule 60(b),

like the rest of the Rules of Civil Procedure, applies in 

habeas corpus proceedings under 28 U. S. C. §22543 only

“to the extent that [it is] not inconsistent with” applicable 

federal statutory provisions and rules. 28 U. S. C. §2254 

Rule 11; see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 81(a)(2). The relevant 

—————— 

be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not 

more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was 

entered or taken.” 3 In this case we consider only the extent to which Rule 60(b) applies 

to habeas proceedings under 28 U. S. C. §2254, which governs federal 

habeas relief for prisoners convicted in state court. Federal prisoners 

generally seek postconviction relief under §2255, which contains its 

own provision governing second or successive applications. Although 

that portion of §2255 is similar to, and refers to, the statutory subsection applicable to second or successive §2254 petitions, it is not identical. Accordingly, we limit our consideration to §2254 cases. 
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

provisions of the AEDPA-amended habeas statutes, 28 

U. S. C. §§2244(b)(1)–(3), impose three requirements on 

second or successive habeas petitions: First, any claim 

that has already been adjudicated in a previous petition 

must be dismissed. §2244(b)(1). Second, any claim that 

has not already been adjudicated must be dismissed 

unless it relies on either a new and retroactive rule of 

constitutional law or new facts showing a high probability

of actual innocence. §2244(b)(2). Third, before the district 

court may accept a successive petition for filing, the court 

of appeals must determine that it presents a claim not 

previously raised that is sufficient to meet §2244(b)(2)’s 

new-rule or actual-innocence provisions. §2244(b)(3). We 

proceed to consider whether these provisions limit the 

application of Rule 60(b) to the present case. 

A 

“As a textual matter, §2244(b) applies only where the 

court acts pursuant to a prisoner’s ‘application’ ” for a writ 

of habeas corpus. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 538, 

554 (1998). We therefore must decide whether a Rule 60(b)

motion filed by a habeas petitioner is a “habeas corpus 

application” as the statute uses that term. 

Under §2244(b), the first step of analysis is to determine

whether a “claim presented in a second or successive 

habeas corpus application” was also “presented in a prior 

application.” If so, the claim must be dismissed; if not, the 

analysis proceeds to whether the claim satisfies one of two 

narrow exceptions. In either event, it is clear that for 

purposes of §2244(b) an “application” for habeas relief is a 

filing that contains one or more “claims.” That definition 

is consistent with the use of the term “application” in the 

other habeas statutes in chapter 153 of title 28. See, e.g., 

Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U. S. 202, 207 (2003) (for purposes of §2254(d), an application for habeas corpus relief is 

a filing that seeks “an adjudication on the merits of the 
6 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY 

Opinion of the Court 

petitioner’s claims”). These statutes, and our own decisions, make clear that a “claim” as used in §2244(b) is an 

asserted federal basis for relief from a state court’s judgment of conviction. 

In some instances, a Rule 60(b) motion will contain one 

or more “claims.” For example, it might straightforwardly 

assert that owing to “excusable neglect,” Fed. Rule Civ. 

Proc. 60(b)(1), the movant’s habeas petition had omitted a 

claim of constitutional error, and seek leave to present 

that claim. Cf. Harris v. United States, 367 F. 3d 74, 80– 

81 (CA2 2004) (petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion sought relief 

from judgment because habeas counsel had failed to raise 

a Sixth Amendment claim). Similarly, a motion might

seek leave to present “newly discovered evidence,” Fed. 

Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(2), in support of a claim previously

denied. E.g., Rodwell v. Pepe, 324 F. 3d 66, 69 (CA1 2003). 

Or a motion might contend that a subsequent change in 

substantive law is a “reason justifying relief,” Fed. Rule 

Civ. Proc. 60(b)(6), from the previous denial of a claim. 

E.g., Dunlap v. Litscher, 301 F. 3d 873, 876 (CA7 2002). 

Virtually every Court of Appeals to consider the question 

has held that such a pleading, although labeled a Rule 

60(b) motion, is in substance a successive habeas petition 

and should be treated accordingly. E.g., Rodwell, supra, 

at 71–72; Dunlap, supra, at 876. 

We think those holdings are correct. A habeas petitioner’s filing that seeks vindication of such a claim is, if 

not in substance a “habeas corpus application,” at least 

similar enough that failing to subject it to the same requirements would be “inconsistent with” the statute. 28 

U. S. C. §2254 Rule 11. Using Rule 60(b) to present new 

claims for relief from a state court’s judgment of conviction—even claims couched in the language of a true Rule 

60(b) motion—circumvents AEDPA’s requirement that a

new claim be dismissed unless it relies on either a new 

rule of constitutional law or newly discovered facts. 
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

§2244(b)(2). The same is true of a Rule 60(b)(2) motion

presenting new evidence in support of a claim already 

litigated: even assuming that reliance on a new factual 

predicate causes that motion to escape §2244(b)(1)’s prohibition of claims “presented in a prior application,” 

§2244(b)(2)(B) requires a more convincing factual showing 

than does Rule 60(b). Likewise, a Rule 60(b) motion based 

on a purported change in the substantive law governing 

the claim could be used to circumvent §2244(b)(2)(A)’s 

dictate that the only new law on which a successive petition may rely is “a new rule of constitutional law, made 

retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme 

Court, that was previously unavailable.” In addition to 

the substantive conflict with AEDPA standards, in each of 

these three examples use of Rule 60(b) would impermissibly circumvent the requirement that a successive habeas 

petition be precertified by the court of appeals as falling 

within an exception to the successive-petition bar. 

§2244(b)(3).

In most cases, determining whether a Rule 60(b) motion 

advances one or more “claims” will be relatively simple. A 

motion that seeks to add a new ground for relief, as in 

Harris, supra, will of course qualify. A motion can also be 

said to bring a “claim” if it attacks the federal court’s 

previous resolution of a claim on the merits,4 since alleging 

that the court erred in denying habeas relief on the merits 

is effectively indistinguishable from alleging that the 

—————— 

4The term “on the merits” has multiple usages. See, e.g., Semtek Int’l 

Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U. S. 497, 501–503 (2001). We refer 

here to a determination that there exist or do not exist grounds entitling a petitioner to habeas corpus relief under 28 U. S. C. §§2254(a) 

and (d). When a movant asserts one of those grounds (or asserts that a 

previous ruling regarding one of those grounds was in error) he is 

making a habeas corpus claim. He is not doing so when he merely 

asserts that a previous ruling which precluded a merits determination 

was in error—for example, a denial for such reasons as failure to 

exhaust, procedural default, or statute-of-limitations bar. 
8 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY 

Opinion of the Court 

movant is, under the substantive provisions of the statutes, entitled to habeas relief. That is not the case, however, when a Rule 60(b) motion attacks, not the substance 

of the federal court’s resolution of a claim on the merits, 

but some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas 

proceedings.5 

B 

When no “claim” is presented, there is no basis for contending that the Rule 60(b) motion should be treated like a

habeas corpus application. If neither the motion itself nor 

the federal judgment from which it seeks relief substantively addresses federal grounds for setting aside the 

movant’s state conviction, allowing the motion to proceed 

as denominated creates no inconsistency with the habeas 

statute or rules. Petitioner’s motion in the present case, 

which alleges that the federal courts misapplied the federal statute of limitations set out in §2244(d), fits this

description.6 

—————— 

5Fraud on the federal habeas court is one example of such a defect. 

See generally Rodriguez v. Mitchell, 252 F. 3d 191, 199 (CA2 2001) (a 

witness’s allegedly fraudulent basis for refusing to appear at a federal 

habeas hearing “relate[d] to the integrity of the federal habeas proceeding, not to the integrity of the state criminal trial”). We note that an 

attack based on the movant’s own conduct, or his habeas counsel’s 

omissions, see, e.g., supra, at 6, ordinarily does not go to the integrity of 

the proceedings, but in effect asks for a second chance to have the 

merits determined favorably. 6Petitioner notes that we held in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473 

(2000), that when a petition is dismissed without prejudice as unexhausted, the refiled petition is not “successive.” He argues that, by 

parity of reasoning, his Rule 60(b) motion challenging the District 

Court dismissal of his petition on statute-of-limitations grounds is not 

“successive.” If this argument is correct, petitioner would be able to file 

not just a Rule 60(b) motion, but a full-blown habeas petition, without 

running afoul of §2244(b). But see, e.g., Murray v. Greiner, 394 F. 3d 

78, 81 (CA2 2005). We need not consider this contention, however, 

because we conclude that petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion is not subject to 

the limitations applicable to habeas petitions. 
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

Like the Court of Appeals, respondent relies heavily on 

our decision in Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 538 

(1998). In that case we reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision to recall its mandate and reconsider the denial of 

Thompson’s first federal habeas petition; the recall was, 

we held, an abuse of discretion because of its inconsistency 

with the policies embodied in AEDPA. Id., at 554–559. 

Analogizing an appellate court’s recall of its mandate to a 

district court’s grant of relief from judgment, the Eleventh 

Circuit thought that Calderon’s disposition applied to Rule 

60(b). 366 F. 3d, at 1272–1277. We think otherwise. To 

begin with, as the opinion said, compliance with the actual

text of AEDPA’s successive-petition provision was not at 

issue in Calderon—because the Court of Appeals considered only the claims and evidence presented in Thompson’s first federal habeas petition. 523 U. S., at 554. 

Calderon did state, however, that “a prisoner’s motion to 

recall the mandate on the basis of the merits of the underlying decision can be regarded as a second or successive 

application.” Id., at 553 (emphasis added). But that is 

entirely consonant with the proposition that a Rule 60(b)

motion that seeks to revisit the federal court’s denial on 

the merits of a claim for relief should be treated as a successive habeas petition. The problem for respondent is

that this case does not present a revisitation of the merits. 

The motion here, like some other Rule 60(b) motions in 

§2254 cases, confines itself not only to the first federal 

habeas petition, but to a nonmerits aspect of the first 

federal habeas proceeding. Nothing in Calderon suggests

that entertaining such a filing is “inconsistent with” 

AEDPA. 

Rule 60(b) has an unquestionably valid role to play in 

habeas cases. The Rule is often used to relieve parties 

from the effect of a default judgment mistakenly entered 

against them, e.g., Klapprott, 335 U. S., at 615 (opinion of 

Black, J.), a function as legitimate in habeas cases as in 
10 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY 

Opinion of the Court 

run-of-the-mine civil cases. The Rule also preserves parties’ opportunity to obtain vacatur of a judgment that is 

void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction—a consideration just as valid in habeas cases as in any other, since 

absence of jurisdiction altogether deprives a federal court 

of the power to adjudicate the rights of the parties. Steel 

Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 94, 101 

(1998). In some instances, we may note, it is the State, not 

the habeas petitioner, that seeks to use Rule 60(b), to 

reopen a habeas judgment granting the writ. See, e.g., 

Ritter v. Smith, 811 F. 2d 1398, 1400 (CA11 1987).

Moreover, several characteristics of a Rule 60(b) motion

limit the friction between the Rule and the successivepetition prohibitions of AEDPA, ensuring that our harmonization of the two will not expose federal courts to an 

avalanche of frivolous postjudgment motions. First, Rule 

60(b) contains its own limitations, such as the requirement that the motion “be made within a reasonable time” 

and the more specific 1-year deadline for asserting three of 

the most open-ended grounds of relief (excusable neglect, 

newly discovered evidence, and fraud). Second, our cases 

have required a movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) 

to show “extraordinary circumstances” justifying the 

reopening of a final judgment. Ackermann v. United 

States, 340 U. S. 193, 199 (1950); accord, id., at 202; Liljeberg, 486 U. S., at 864; id., at 873 (REHNQUIST, C. J., dissenting) (“This very strict interpretation of Rule 60(b) is 

essential if the finality of judgments is to be preserved”). 

Such circumstances will rarely occur in the habeas context. 

Third, Rule 60(b) proceedings are subject to only limited and 

deferential appellate review. Browder v. Director, Dept. of 

Corrections of Ill., 434 U. S. 257, 263, n. 7 (1978). Many 

Courts of Appeals have construed 28 U. S. C. §2253 to 

impose an additional limitation on appellate review by 

requiring a habeas petitioner to obtain a COA as a pre-
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

requisite to appealing the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion.7 

Because petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion challenges only

the District Court’s previous ruling on the AEDPA statute 

of limitations, it is not the equivalent of a successive habeas petition. The Eleventh Circuit therefore erred in 

holding that petitioner did not qualify even to seek Rule 

60(b) relief. 

III 

Although the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning is inconsistent with our holding today, we nonetheless affirm its 

denial of petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion.

Petitioner’s only ground for reopening the judgment 

denying his first federal habeas petition is that our decision in Artuz showed the error of the District Court’s 

statute-of-limitations ruling. We assume for present 

purposes that the District Court’s ruling was incorrect.8 

As we noted above, however, relief under Rule 60(b)(6)—

the only subsection petitioner invokes—requires a showing of “extraordinary circumstances.” Petitioner contends 

that Artuz’s change in the interpretation of the AEDPA 

—————— 

7See Reid v. Angelone, 369 F. 3d 363, 369, n. 2 (CA4 2004) (citing 

cases); 366 F. 3d 1253, 1263 (CA11 2004) (case below); cf. Langford v. 

Day, 134 F. 3d 1381, 1382 (CA9 1998) (before AEDPA, a certificate of 

probable cause was a prerequisite to appealing the denial of a 60(b)

motion in a habeas case); Reid, supra, at 368 (same). But see Dunn v. 

Cockrell, 302 F. 3d 491, 492 (CA5 2002); 366 F. 3d, at 1298–1300 

(Tjoflat, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although we do not decide in this case whether this construction of §2253 

is correct (the Eleventh Circuit granted petitioner a COA), the COA 

requirement appears to be a more plausible and effective screening 

requirement, with sounder basis in the statute, than the near-absolute 

bar imposed here by the Court of Appeals. 8Although respondent contends that petitioner’s motion for state 

postconviction relief was untimely, and that the District Court’s denial 

of statutory tolling was therefore correct under Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 

544 U. S. __ (2005), the Florida courts made no reference to untimeliness in dismissing petitioner’s motion. 
12 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY 

Opinion of the Court 

statute of limitations meets this description. We do not 

agree. The District Court’s interpretation was by all 

appearances correct under the Eleventh Circuit’s thenprevailing interpretation of 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2). It is 

hardly extraordinary that subsequently, after petitioner’s 

case was no longer pending, this Court arrived at a different interpretation. Although our constructions of federal 

statutes customarily apply to all cases then pending on 

direct review, see, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U. S. 86, 97 (1993), not every interpretation of the 

federal statutes setting forth the requirements for habeas 

provides cause for reopening cases long since final.9 If 

Artuz justified reopening long-ago dismissals based on a 

lower court’s unduly parsimonious interpretation of 

§2244(d)(2), then Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U. S. __ (2005), 

would justify reopening long-ago grants of habeas relief 

based on a lower court’s unduly generous interpretation of

the same tolling provision.

The change in the law worked by Artuz is all the less 

extraordinary in petitioner’s case, because of his lack of

diligence in pursuing review of the statute-of-limitations 

issue. At the time Artuz was decided, petitioner had 

abandoned any attempt to seek review of the District 

Court’s decision on this statute-of-limitations issue. Although the District Court relied on Eleventh Circuit 

precedent holding that a state postconviction application 

is not “properly filed” if it is procedurally defaulted, and 

although that precedent was at odds with the rule in 

several other Circuits, petitioner neither raised that issue 

in his application for a COA, nor filed a petition for rehearing of the Eleventh Circuit’s denial of a COA, nor 

—————— 

9A change in the interpretation of a substantive statute may have 

consequences for cases that have already reached final judgment, 

particularly in the criminal context. See Bousley v. United States, 523 

U. S. 614, 619–621 (1998); cf. Fiore v. White, 531 U. S. 225, 228–229 

(2001) (per curiam). 
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

sought certiorari review of that denial.10

diligence confirms that Artuz is not an 

This lack of 

extraordinary 

circumstance justifying relief from the judgment in petitioner’s case. Indeed, in one of the cases in which we 

explained Rule 60(b)(6)’s extraordinary-circumstances 

requirement, the movant had failed to appeal an adverse 

ruling by the District Court, whereas another party to the 

same judgment had appealed and won reversal. Ackermann, 340 U. S., at 195. Some years later, the petitioner

sought Rule 60(b) relief, which the District Court denied. 

We affirmed the denial of Rule 60(b) relief, noting that the 

movant’s decision not to appeal had been free and voluntary, although the favorable ruling in the companion case 

made it appear mistaken in hindsight. See id., at 198. 

Under the Rule 60(b) standards that properly govern 

petitioner’s motion, the District Court was correct to deny 

relief. 

* * * 

We hold that a Rule 60(b)(6) motion in a §2254 case is 

not to be treated as a successive habeas petition if it does 

not assert, or reassert, claims of error in the movant’s 

state conviction. A motion that, like petitioner’s, challenges only the District Court’s failure to reach the merits 

does not warrant such treatment, and can therefore be 

—————— 

10We granted review to resolve the conflict over the interpretation of 

“properly filed” on April 17, 2000, only eight days after the Eleventh 

Circuit denied petitioner a COA and well within the 90-day period in 

which petitioner could have sought certiorari. Artuz v. Bennett, 529 

U. S. 1065. Whether or not petitioner was aware that the issue was 

pending before us, see post, at 7, n. 7 (STEVENS, J., dissenting), it is 

indisputable that had he but filed a petition raising the statute-oflimitations argument he now advances, we would surely have granted 

him the reconsideration in light of Artuz that he later sought in his Rule 

60(b) motion. See, e.g., Brown v. Moore, 532 U. S. 968 (2001) (granting a 

pro se petition for certiorari, vacating the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment 

denying a COA, and remanding for reconsideration in light of Artuz). 
14 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY 

Opinion of the Court 

ruled upon by the District Court without precertification 

by the Court of Appeals pursuant to §2244(b)(3). In this 

case, however, petitioner’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion fails to set 

forth an “extraordinary circumstance” justifying relief. 

For that reason, we affirm the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals. 

It is so ordered. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1 

BREYER, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 04–6432 

AURELIO O. GONZALEZ, PETITIONER v. JAMES V. 

CROSBY, JR., SECRETARY, FLORIDA 

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

[June 23, 2005] 

JUSTICE BREYER, concurring. 

The majority explains that a proper Rule 60(b) motion 

“attacks, not the substance of the federal court’s resolution 

of a claim on the merits, but some defect in the integrity of 

the federal habeas proceedings.” Ante, at 8. This is consistent with Judge Tjoflat’s description of the standard in

his opinion below, see 366 F. 3d 1253, 1297 (CA11 2004)

(specially concurring in part and dissenting in part), and I 

agree with it. I fear that other language in the majority’s 

opinion, especially its discussion of the significance of the 

word “claim,” could be taken to imply a different standard, 

with which I would disagree. With that qualification, I 

join the majority’s opinion. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 04–6432 

AURELIO O. GONZALEZ, PETITIONER v. JAMES V. 

CROSBY, JR., SECRETARY, FLORIDA 

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

[June 23, 2005] 

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER joins,

dissenting. 

The most significant aspect of today’s decision is the 

Court’s unanimous rejection of the view that all postjudgment motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)

except those alleging fraud under Rule 60(b)(3) should be 

treated as second or successive habeas corpus petitions. 

Not only do I agree with that holding, I believe that we 

should have more promptly made clear that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)

and Rule 60(b) can coexist in harmony. See Abdur’Rahman v. Bell, 537 U. S. 88, 90 (2002) (STEVENS, J., 

dissenting from dismissal of certiorari as improvidently 

granted).

As the Court recognizes, whether a Rule 60(b) motion 

may proceed in the habeas context depends on the nature 

of the relief the motion seeks. See ante, at 8.1 Given the 

—————— 

1Under the First Circuit’s useful formulation, which was invoked by 

Judge Tjoflat’s dissenting opinion below, “[w]hen the motions’ factual 

predicate deals primarily with the constitutionality of the underlying 

state conviction or sentence, then the motion should be treated as a 

second or successive habeas petition. This situation should be distinguished from one in which the motion’s factual predicate deals primarily with some irregularity or procedural defect in the procurement of 
2 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

substance of petitioner’s motion, I agree with the Court

that this was a “true” Rule 60(b) motion and that the 

District Court and the Court of Appeals therefore erred in 

treating it as a successive habeas petition. And while I 

also agree with much of the Court’s reasoning in Parts I 

and II of its opinion, I believe the Court goes too far in 

commenting on issues that are not directly before us and 

that have not been fully briefed. See, e.g., ante, at 6–7 

(discussing various court of appeals cases). My main 

disagreement, however, pertains to Part III of the Court’s 

opinion.

The Court reaches beyond the question on which we 

granted certiorari (whether petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion 

should be treated as a successive habeas petition) and 

adjudicates the merits of that motion. In my judgment, 

however, “correct procedure requires that the merits of the 

Rule 60(b) motion be addressed in the first instance by the 

District Court.” Abdur’Rahman, 537 U. S., at 97 

(STEVENS, J., dissenting). A district court considering a 

Rule 60(b) motion will often take into account a variety of 

factors in addition to the specific ground given for reopening the judgment. These factors include the diligence of 

the movant, the probable merit of the movant’s underlying 

claims, the opposing party’s reliance interests in the finality of the judgment, and other equitable considerations. 

See 11 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice 

and Procedure §2857 (2d ed. 1995 and Supp. 2004) see 

ibid. (noting that appellate courts will reverse a district

court’s decision only for an abuse of discretion); Plaut v. 

Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211, 233–234 (1995) 

(Rule 60(b) “reflects and confirms the courts’ own inherent 

—————— 

the judgment denying relief. That is the classic function of a Rule 60(b)

motion, and such a motion should be treated within the usual confines 

of Rule 60(b).” Rodwell v. Pepe, 324 F. 3d 66, 70 (2003) (citation omitted); see also 366 F. 3d 1253, 1297 (CA 11 2004) (Tjoflat, J., opinion 

concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

and discretionary power, ‘firmly established in English 

practice long before the foundation of our Republic,’ to set 

aside a judgment whose enforcement would work inequity” 

(citation omitted)). In light of the equitable, often factintensive nature of the Rule 60(b) inquiry, it is inappropriate for an appellate court to undertake it in the first 

instance. This is especially so in this case, in which both 

the briefing and the record before us are insufficient with

regard to the merits issue. 

Orderly procedure aside, the Court’s truncated analysis 

is unsatisfactory. At least in some circumstances, a supervening change in AEDPA procedural law can be the 

kind of “extraordinary circumstanc[e],” Ackermann v. 

United States, 340 U. S. 193, 199 (1950), that constitutes a 

“reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment” within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(6). In this case, 

the District Court dismissed petitioner’s habeas petition 

as time barred after concluding that his second motion for 

state postconviction relief did not toll AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations. See 28 U. S. C. §2244(d). After that judgment 

became final, however, we decided Artuz v. Bennett, 531 

U. S. 4 (2000), which made clear that the District Court’s 

ruling on tolling was erroneous and that the habeas petition should therefore not have been dismissed.2 

Unfortunately, the Court underestimates the significance of the fact that petitioner was effectively shut out of 

federal court—without any adjudication of the merits of 

his claims—because of a procedural ruling that was later 

shown to be flatly mistaken. As we have stressed, 

“[d]ismissal of a first federal habeas petition is a particularly serious matter, for that dismissal denies the peti-

—————— 

2Although the State contests this point in a footnote, see Brief for 

Respondent 40–41, n. 33, the Court rightly assumes that the District 

Court’s decision was incorrect. See ante, at 11, and n. 8. If any doubt 

remains, it should be resolved by the District Court in the first 

instance. 
4 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

tioner the protections of the Great Writ entirely, risking 

injury to an important interest in human liberty.” Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U. S. 314, 324 (1996); see also Slack 

v. McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473, 483 (2000) (“The writ of habeas corpus plays a vital role in protecting constitutional 

rights”). When a habeas petition has been dismissed on a 

clearly defective procedural ground, the State can hardly 

claim a legitimate interest in the finality of that judgment. 

Indeed, the State has experienced a windfall, while the

state prisoner has been deprived—contrary to congressional intent—of his valuable right to one full round of 

federal habeas review. 

While this type of supervening change in procedural law 

may not alone warrant the reopening of a habeas judgment, there may be special factors that allow a prisoner to 

satisfy the high standard of Rule 60(b)(6). For instance, 

when a prisoner has shown reasonable diligence in seeking relief based on a change in procedural law, and when 

that prisoner can show that there is probable merit to his 

underlying claims, it would be well in keeping with a

district court’s discretion under Rule 60(b)(6) for that court 

to reopen the habeas judgment and give the prisoner the 

one fair shot at habeas review that Congress intended that 

he have. After all, we have consistently recognized that

Rule 60(b)(6) “provides courts with authority ‘adequate to 

enable them to vacate judgments whenever such action is 

appropriate to accomplish justice.’ ” Liljeberg v. Health 

Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U. S. 847, 864 (1988) (quoting Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601, 614–615 

(1949)). Here, petitioner, who is serving a 99-year term in 

Florida prison, filed his Rule 60(b) motion approximately

eight months after this Court’s decision in Artuz. A district court could reasonably conclude that this period 

reveals no lack of diligence on the part of an incarcerated 
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 5 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

pro se litigant.3 And while we have received scant briefing 

on the probable merit of his petition, his allegation—that 

his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because it 

was based on grossly inaccurate advice about the actual 

time he would serve in prison—at least states a colorable 

claim of a constitutional violation. See Finch v. Vaughn, 

67 F. 3d 909 (CA11 1995); see also Mabry v. Johnson, 467 

U. S. 504 (1984).4 

The Court relies on petitioner’s supposed lack of diligence in pursuing review of the District Court’s initial 

statute-of-limitations ruling. See ante, at 12. In fact, 

petitioner did appeal the District Court’s ruling, which the 

Court of Appeals correctly interpreted as a request for a 

certificate of appealability (COA).5 As for petitioner’s 

—————— 

3While Rule 60(b)(6) contains no specific time limitation on filing, it 

is worth noting that petitioner filed his motion within the strict 1-year 

limitation that applies to motions under Rules 60(b)(1)–(3). 4 It is also worth noting that Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4 (2000), was 

decided only seven months after petitioner’s habeas judgment became 

final. In cases where significant time has elapsed between a habeas 

judgment and the relevant change in procedural law, it would be within 

a district court’s discretion to leave such a judgment in repose. 5See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 22(b)(2) (“If no express request for a certificate is filed, the notice of [appeal shall be deemed to constitute] a 

request addressed to the judges of the court of appeals”). The procedural route that petitioner navigated was actually more complicated. 

After the Magistrate Judge initially recommended dismissal of the 

petition as time barred, petitioner filed an objection that raised a Third 

Circuit case, Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F. 3d 146 (1998), which was among 

the circuit cases that was later endorsed by Artuz, 531 U. S., at 8. The 

Magistrate’s final report noted that the Eleventh Circuit had not 

addressed the relevant issue of tolling, and then proceeded to rely 

(oddly) on Lovasz to deny petitioner’s claim. In my view, the citation to 

Lovasz and the Magistrate’s acknowledgment that there was no Eleventh Circuit precedent on point provided a reasonable basis for the 

granting of a COA. 

In fact, on September 23, 1998, petitioner filed an application for a 

COA, and this application was granted by the District Court. The 

Court of Appeals, however, dismissed petitioner’s appeal on October 28, 
6 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

failure to seek rehearing or certiorari, he alleged in his 

Rule 60(b) motion, App. 16, and again in his reply brief, 

that he filed a timely petition for rehearing on April 18, 

2000, but that the clerk of the Court of Appeals returned 

the motion unfiled, “explaining, erroneously, that his

appeal was dismissed and closed on October 28, 1999.” 

Reply Brief for Petitioner 13 (emphasis deleted). According to petitioner, “[t]his official misinformation carried 

the weight of a court decision and was enough to convince 

a pro se litigant (and some lawyers) that the 90-day window for filing a certiorari petition expired, as well.” Ibid. 

The State, however, represents that petitioner erroneously 

filed the petition for rehearing under the case number of 

an earlier, dismissed appeal. Brief for Respondent 4. I do 

not know how to resolve these allegations, but this only

highlights the propriety of a remand. Even on the State’s 

version of events, petitioner’s attempt at filing for rehearing is proof of diligence on his part. 

Putting these allegations aside, the Court’s reasoning is 

too parsimonious. While petitioner could have shown even 

greater diligence by seeking rehearing for a second time 

and then filing for certiorari, we have never held pro se 

prisoners to the standards of counseled litigants. See, e.g., 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 (1972) (per curiam). Indeed, petitioner’s situation contrasts dramatically with 

that of the movant in the case the Court relies on, Ackermann v. United States, 340 U. S. 193 (1950). See ante, at 

13. In upholding the denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief in 

Ackermann, the Court put great emphasis on the fact that 

—————— 

1999, and remanded the COA for a determination of which specific 

issues merited permission to appeal. On remand, petitioner filed a new 

application for a COA, but this time the District Court denied the 

request. Petitioner then filed a timely appeal, and the District Court 

granted his motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. The Court 

of Appeals then declined to issue a COA and dismissed the appeal on 

April 6, 2000. 
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 7 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

the movant had the benefit of paid counsel and that, for

much of the relevant period, he was not detained, but 

rather enjoyed “freedom of movement and action,” 340 

U. S., at 201.6 In any event, I believe that our rules governing prisoner litigation should favor a policy of repose 

rather than a policy that encourages multiple filings with 

a low probability of success.7 

Accordingly, I agree with the Court’s conclusion that 

petitioner filed a “true” Rule 60(b) motion. I respectfully 

dissent, however, because of the Court’s decision to rule on 

the merits of the motion in the first instance. 

—————— 

6 Ackermann is further distinguishable in that it did not involve the 

sort of plain error of law that has been identified in this case. But even 

if Ackermann were not distinguishable, I would find the views expressed by Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas in dissent, see 340 

U. S. at 202 (opinion of Black, J.), more persuasive than those expressed by Justice Minton. 7A petition for certiorari seeking review of a denial of a COA has an 

objectively low chance of being granted. Such a decision is not thought 

to present a good vehicle for resolving legal issues, and error-correction 

is a disfavored basis for granting review, particularly in noncapital 

cases. See generally this Court’s Rule 10. As for the fact that this 

Court granted certiorari in Artuz eight days after the Eleventh Circuit 

denied petitioner a COA, it would be unrealistic to fault petitioner for 

failing to capitalize on this fortuity. In my experience, even lower

courts and counseled litigants are often not aware of our grants of 

certiorari on issues that may be relevant to their current business. It 

would be particularly inappropriate to impose such a strict expectation 

on a pro se prisoner, particularly in the absence of any indication of 

when, given his circumstances in prison, he could have reasonably been 

expected to learn of our grant in Artuz.