Filed 3/18/14 

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION SIX 

SANDRA BOWMAN, as Cotrustee, etc., 

et al., 

 Plaintiffs and Appellants, 

v. 

CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, 

 Defendant and Respondent. 

2d Civil No. B243015 

(Super. Ct. No. CV100611) 

(San Luis Obispo County) 

 The California Coastal Commission (Commission) grants a party a 

development permit. After the time for appeal has passed, the party may not collaterally 

attack the permit. A collateral attack is not a substitute for an appeal. (Pub. Resources 

Code, § 30600.) 

 The County of San Luis Obispo (the County) issued a coastal development 

permit on condition the landowner dedicate a lateral public access easement across the 

oceanfront portion of the property. The landowner did not appeal the condition, but later, 

after the permit became final, requested removal of the easement condition in a second 

coastal development permit application to the County. The County allowed the condition 

to be removed. Other parties appealed the removal of the condition to the Commission. 

The Commission refused to remove the easement condition imposed in the first permit. 

The landowner petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate. The trial court gave 

judgment to the Commission. We affirm. 
2 

 Collateral estoppel bars the landowner from attacking in a second permit 

application the validity of a condition that became final in the first permit application. 

FACTS 

 Walton Emmick owned approximately 400 acres in San Luis Obispo 

County. At the time he purchased the property, it contained a single family residence and 

a barn. The residence was uninhabitable and the barn was in disrepair. The property 

includes approximately one mile of shoreline along noncontiguous parcels. The parcels 

are separated by a parcel owned by another property owner. 

 In May 2002, Emmick applied to the County for a coastal development 

permit (CDP) to rehabilitate the residence. The permit application included interior and 

exterior improvements, installation of a new septic system, and a connection of an 

existing water well to the house. 

 While the CDP application was pending, in June 2002, Emmick applied to 

the County for construction permits covering much of the same work as the CDP 

application. The County issued the permits over the counter. 

 Emmick began work on the residence pursuant to the construction permits. 

A county inspector told Emmick he had to stop work until the County issued the CDP. 

Emmick complied. The County did not issue a formal stop-work order. 

 Emmick died in March 2003. SDS Family Trust (SDS) succeeded to the 

property.1

 In March 2004, the County approved the CDP for which Emmick had 

applied. The parties refer to it as "CDP-1." CDP-1 was conditioned upon SDS's offer to 

dedicate a lateral easement for public access along the shorefront portion of the property. 

The County's reason for the easement condition was that the residence had not been 

occupied for several years and its occupation would increase the intensity of the 

property's use. 

 

 1 Plaintiffs and appellants, Cotrustees Sandra Bowman, Denise McLaughlan 

and Sharyn Schrick of the SDS Family Trust, are collectively referred to as SDS.
3 

 The notice of approval informed SDS that it had 14 days to appeal. SDS 

did not appeal. 

 Nine months later, in December 2004, SDS applied to the County for 

another coastal development permit (CDP-2) This application was for the construction of 

a 4,576 square-foot barn to replace the existing barn, which had collapsed. The 

application included remodel of the existing residence, connection to an existing well and 

installation of a new septic system, all of which had been approved under CDP-1. 

Significantly, the application requested the removal of the condition requiring an offer to 

dedicate a lateral coastal access easement imposed by CDP-1. 

 The County approved the CDP-2 application, including the removal of the 

coastal access condition. The County removed the condition in spite of finding that SDS 

is "currently in violation" of the lateral easement condition because the remodeling of the 

residence had begun but SDS has not recorded an offer to dedicate. 

 The Sierra Club, the Surfrider Foundation and two coastal commissioners 

appealed the County's approval of CDP-2 to the Commission. The parties appealing 

were concerned that the County had eliminated a valid existing easement condition 

imposed by CDP-1. The Commission accepted jurisdiction. 

 After hearing, the Commission determined that the easement condition 

contained in CDP-1 is permanent and binding on the landowner, and removal of the 

easement condition would violate the policy favoring public access to coastal resources. 

The Commission conditioned its permit on the implementation of the easement condition 

contained in CDP-1. 

DISCUSSION 

I. 

 In reviewing a judgment from a petition for writ of administrative mandate, 

our function is the same as that of the trial court. (LT-WR, LLC v. Cal. Coastal Com. 

(2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 770, 780.) We must determine whether the Commission's 

decision is supported by substantial evidence. (Paoli v. Cal. Coastal Com. (1986) 178 

Cal.App.3d 544, 551-553.)
4 

 In viewing the evidence, we look only to the evidence supporting the 

prevailing party. (GHK Associates v. Mayer Group, Inc. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 856, 

872.) We discard evidence unfavorable to the prevailing party as not having sufficient 

verity to be accepted by the trier of fact. (Ibid.) Where the trial court or jury has 

drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence, we have no power to draw different 

inferences, even though different inferences may also be reasonable. (9 Witkin, Cal. 

Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 376, p. 434.) The trier of fact is not required to 

believe even uncontradicted testimony. (Sprague v. Equifax, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 

1012, 1028.) 

II. 

 SDS contends the access easement condition constitutes an unlawful 

exaction of its property under Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987) 483 U.S. 

825 and Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374, because the condition is not 

roughly proportional to the burden the project places on the public interest. SDS also 

contends the easement condition violates the local coastal plan. 

 The Commission responds that it did not create the easement condition. 

The condition was created by the County in approving CDP-1. SDS's failure to appeal 

CDP-1 rendered the condition final and binding. The Commission argues it did nothing 

more than refuse to remove a valid and binding condition. 

 Where an administrative tribunal has rendered a quasi-judicial decision that 

could be challenged by administrative mandamus pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 

section 1094.5, a party's failure to pursue that remedy will give rise to collateral estoppel. 

(See Mola Development Corp. v. City of Seal Beach (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 405, 410.) 

The failure to pursue administrative mandamus will preclude the litigation of claims that 

were actually litigated in a prior proceeding or that could have been litigated. (Patrick 

Media Group, Inc. v. Cal. Coastal Com. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 592, 617.) 

 Here when the County granted CDP-1 it made a quasi-judicial 

determination that the lateral easement condition was valid for the proposed development 

because development would lead to an increased use of the property. When SDS failed 
5 

to appeal, that determination became final. SDS may not collaterally attack the 

determination of validity. 

 SDS argues, without citation to authority, that a permit applicant who is 

dissatisfied with a permit condition may simply "walk away" from the permit and apply 

for a new one. SDS may be able to walk away from the permit, but it cannot walk away 

from collateral estoppel. 

 Collateral estoppel does not depend on the permit. It applies even in cases 

where no permit is involved. (See, e.g., Weil v. Barthel (1955) 45 Cal.2d 835, 839 [final 

judgment barring equity of redemption not subject to collateral attack].) The purpose of 

collateral estoppel is to protect the finality of judgments, or in this case, administrative 

decisions. (See 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Judgment, § 334, p. 938.) A 

party dissatisfied with an administrative decision must attack it directly on appeal, or the 

issues decided therein will be deemed conclusively determined against the party. (See 

Weil, supra, at p. 839.) It is the finality of that determination, not the permit, from which 

the collateral estoppel arises. 

 For the same reason, SDS's argument that CDP-1 has expired is unavailing. 

Collateral estoppel does not depend on the permit. 

 Here SDS is attempting to use its application for CDP-2 to collaterally 

attack the easement condition imposed in CDP-1. The lateral access condition was based 

on the projected increase in use generated by the development project. This condition 

had been conclusively determined. SDS is precluded from attacking it in a collateral 

proceeding. Whether the imposition of the access easement condition violates the 

Nollan/Dolan test or the local coastal plan is beside the point. Even an erroneous 

decision is as conclusive as a correct one. (Weil v. Barthel, supra, 45 Cal.2d at p. 839.) 

 SDS points out that a permit condition can be modified. But SDS points to 

nothing that would compel the Commission to modify the access easement condition, a 

condition the validity of which is not subject to attack. 

 SDS claims that the Commission expanded the width of the easement 

beyond that required by CDP-1. But the Commission stated under "Special Conditions": 
6 

"Compliance with CDP-1. PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF THE COASTAL 

DEVELOPMENT PERMIT, the Permittee shall submit to the Executive Director for 

review and approval proof that the offer to dedicate (OTD) a lateral public access trail 

easement along the shoreline portion of the property as required by CDP[-1] has been 

recorded consistent with the terms and conditions verifying its recordation, and shall 

include written evidence of review and approval by San Luis Obispo County." The 

easement condition goes no further than requiring compliance with CDP-1. It does not 

expand the requirement. 

III. 

 SDS contends that it never accepted CDP-1. 

 SDS cites no authority for the proposition that acceptance of the permit by 

the applicant is necessary for collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel is not based on a 

party's acceptance of the result of a judicial or quasi-judicial determination. Instead, it is 

based on the policy insulating final decisions from collateral attack. (See 7 Witkin, 

supra, § 334 at pp. 938-939.) Thus, even if SDS did not accept CDP-1, it would be 

precluded from collaterally attacking the easement condition. 

 In any event, the Commission as the trier of fact could reasonably conclude 

SDS accepted CDP-1 by implication. 

 Here SDS completed the work on the house restoration that CDP-1 

authorized. SDS did not appeal CDP-1. Instead, SDS accepted the benefit of the house 

restoration and improvements, and that benefit continues to this day. A party who fails to 

challenge the validity of a permit condition and accept its benefits has acquiesced in the 

permit and is bound by the conditions. (County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 

Cal.3d 505, 510, 511.) 

 SDS argues that it is not enough to accept the benefit of a permit in order to 

be bound; a party must also accept its burden. That one can accept the benefits of a 

permit and avoid its burdens simply by ignoring or rejecting them is untenable. The 

cases on which SDS relies, involve permit holders who accepted the benefits of the 

permit, but also performed the permit conditions. (Citing County of Imperial v. 
7 

McDougal, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 510; Ojavan Investors, Inc. v. Cal. Coastal Com. 

(1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 516, 527; Rossco Holdings, Inc. v. State of California (1989) 212 

Cal.App.3d 642, 646.) But in none of those cases do the courts consider any requirement 

that a permit holder must accept the burdens of a permit in order to be found to have 

accepted the permit. A case is not authority for matters not considered therein. (Contra 

Costa Water Dist. v. Bar-C Properties (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 652, 660.) Instead, the cases 

all hold that a party is bound by the conditions of a permit when he fails to challenge the 

permit and accepts its benefits. (County of Imperial, supra, at pp. 510-511; Ojavan 

Investors, Inc., supra, at p. 527; Rossco Holdings, Inc., supra, at p. 654.) 

 SDS argues that all the improvements were constructed under the County's 

over-the-counter building permits. It points to evidence that all the improvements to the 

house were completed over a year prior to the issuance of CDP-1, and that no 

improvements have been constructed since. 

 But because SDS's property is in the coastal zone, the County's building 

permits alone are not sufficient. A CDP is also required. (Pub. Resources Code, 

§ 30600, subd. (a).) 

 SDS appears to argue that because Emmick completed the improvements 

prior to the time CDP-1 was issued, it cannot be said that SDS has accepted the benefits 

of CDP-1. But CDP-1 had the potential, at least, to retroactively make the illegally 

constructed improvements legal. That alone is a benefit. SDS did not, after all, withdraw 

its application for CDP-1 once the improvements were completed; nor has it removed the 

illegally constructed improvements. 

 Moreover, SDS's argument amounts to nothing more than that it has gained 

an advantage by illegally constructing the improvements instead of waiting for CDP-1 to 

be issued and complying with its conditions. A party who waits for the proper permit to 

legally construct improvements may be said to have accepted the benefit of the permit. 

But in SDS's view, a party who illegally constructs improvements prior to obtaining a 

permit, may not be said to have accepted the benefit of the permit, and thus, may escape 
8 

its burdens. Suffice it to say, SDS will not be allowed to obtain an advantage from illegal 

activities. 

 The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to respondent Commission. 

 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. 

 GILBERT, P. J. 

We concur: 

 YEGAN, J. 

 PERREN, J. 
Dodie A. Harman, Judge 

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo 

______________________________ 

 Pacific Legal Foundation, Paul J. Beard II, Damien M. Schiff for Plaintiffs 

and Appellants. 

 Richard M. Ross for California Cattlemen's Association as Amicus Curiae 

on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 

 Briscoe Ivester & Bazel, John Briscoe, Peter Prows for Building Industry 

Association of the Bay Area as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, John A. Saurenman, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General, Christina Bull Arndt, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, for 

Defendant and Respondent.