alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Criminal Action No. 11-3 10

ORDER

V.

KOLE AKINOLA,

Defendant.

LINARES, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court by way of Defendant Kole Akinola (“Defendant”)’s

motion for reconsideration ofthis Court’s Opinion and Order denying Defendant’s motion to

suppress evidence seized from a rental vehicle on April 27, 2011. For the reasons set forth in

this Court’s corresponding Opinion,

IT IS on this day of December, 2013,

ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for reconsideration (CM/ECF Nos. 90, 103, lii) is

denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

L. LINARES

ES. DISTRICT JUDGE

1
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5206 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exclude from gross income 

certain hazard mitigation assistance. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

OCTOBER 4, 2004 

Mr. FOLEY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exclude 

from gross income certain hazard mitigation assistance. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. EXCLUSION FROM GROSS INCOME FOR CER4 TAIN DISASTER MITIGATION PAYMENTS. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 139 of the Internal Rev6 enue Code of 1986 (relating to disaster relief payments) 

7 is amended by adding at the end the following new sub8 section: 

9 ‘‘(g) CERTAIN DISASTER MITIGATION PAYMENTS.— 

10 Gross income shall not include the value of any amount 
2 

•HR 5206 IH 

1 received directly or indirectly as payment or benefit by the 

2 owner of any property for hazard mitigation with respect 

3 to the property pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Dis4 aster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act or the Na5 tional Flood Insurance Act.’’ 

6 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

7 this section shall apply to taxable years ending on or after 

8 December 31, 2004. 

Æ
a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating
to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others
within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;b)
    
    Designed such internal controls over financial reporting, or caused such internal control
over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance
regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements
for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;c)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls
and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;
andd)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants
fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial
reporting.
  a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal
control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; andb)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a
significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.
 Date: November 16, 2009
    By:
    /s/ David R. AllenDavid R. AllenChief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer)
Certification of the Chief Financial Officer

I, Shmuel Arvatz, certify that:

1.   I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Clicksoftware
     Technologies Ltd. (the "Company");

2.   Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
     of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
     statement made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
     were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
     report;

3.   Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
     information included in this report, fairly present in all material
     respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of
     the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.   The Company's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
     establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
     defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Company and
     have:

     a)   Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
          disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
          supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the
          Company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us
          by others within those entities, particularly during the period in
          which this report is being prepared;

     b)   Evaluated the effectiveness of the Company's disclosure controls and
          procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
          effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the
          end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;
          and

     c)   Disclosed in this report any change in the Company's internal control
          over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by
          the annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably
          likely to materially affect, the Company's internal control over
          financial reporting; and

5.   The Company's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
     most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to
     the Company's auditors and the audit committee of the Company's board of
     directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

     a)   All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
          operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
          reasonably likely to adversely affect the Company's ability to
          record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

     b)   Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
          employees who have a significant role in the Company's internal
          control over financial reporting.

Date:  April 24, 2006



/s/ Shmuel Arvatz
Chief Financial Officer
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

PEPSICO, INC., a North Carolina corporation, 

and THE CONCENTRATE 

MANUFACTURING COMPANY OF 

IRELAND, a corporation governed by the laws 

of the Republic of Ireland, 

          Plaintiffs, 

v. 

R. R. IMPORTACIONES, INC., a New Jersey 

corporation, JAMES MARTINEZ, an 

individual, and JOHN DOES 1-10, 

           Defendants. 

Civil Action No.: 11-2315(PGS)(ES) 

NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY  

DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE 

AS TO DEFENDANT  

JAMES MARTINEZ ONLY 

Please take NOTICE that pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A), Plaintiffs Pepsico, Inc. 

and The Concentrate Manufacturing Company of Ireland hereby voluntarily dismiss this matter 

without prejudice as to Defendant James Martinez ONLY.   

     GENOVA, BURNS & GIANTOMASI 

       s/  John W. Bartlett   

      JOHN W. BARTLETT 

494 Broad Street 

Newark, New Jersey 07102 

(973) 533-0777 

Dated: May 22, 2011 

      and 

PATTISHALL, McAULIFFE, NEWBURY, 

  HILLIARD & GERALDSON LLP 

311 South Wacker Drive, Suite 5000 

Chicago, Illinois 60606 

(312) 554-8000 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs PepsiCo, Inc., 

and The Concentrate Manufacturing Company of Ireland 

Case 2:11-cv-02315-CCC-JAD   Document 8   Filed 05/22/11   Page 1 of 1 PageID: 29
#### Luis Treminio, Respondent, v Manuel Argueta, Appellant.

[854 NYS2d 212]

The plaintiff testified at trial that he fell in a house owned by the defendant as he descended a staircase connecting the first floor to the basement, where his leased room was located. The plaintiff further testified that about six months prior to the accident, he noticed that one of the steps was broken, and mentioned that to the defendant, but the defendant never fixed the problem. The plaintiff stated that there was no lighting for this staircase, and that he had also discussed that issue with the defendant about six months prior to his accident. The plaintiff stated that he fell when he attempted to step on the defective step.

The Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s application pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law. To be entitled to such relief, the movant must demonstrate that “there is no rational process by which the fact finder could base a finding in favor of the nonmoving party” *(Szczerbiak v Pilat,*
      *86390 NY2d 553, 556 [1997]; *see Poulakis v Town of Orangetown,*29 AD3d 882, 883 [2006]). In determining the motion, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party *(see Robinson v 211-11 N., LLC,*46 AD3d 657 [2007]; *Poulakis v Town of Orangetown,*29 AD3d at 883). The evidence in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, was sufficient to make out a prima facie case of negligence against the defendant *(see Robinson v 211-11 N., LLC,*46 AD3d 657 [2007]).

Any error in preventing the defendant from impeaching the credibility of the nonparty witness with a prior inconsistent statement was harmless *(see*CPLR 2002; *Barracato v Camp Bauman Buses,*217 AD2d 677, 678 [1995]; *Walker v State of New York,*111 AD2d 164, 165 [1985]).

The parties’ remaining contentions are without merit. Miller, J.P., Covello, Eng and Chambers, JJ., concur.
CERTIFICATIONS OF CEO PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 Exhibit 31.1 I, Helen Siwak, certify that  1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Cyclon Capital Corporation; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4. The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and 5. The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.  March 23, 20009  /s/ Helen Siwak Helen Siwak Chief Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer
EXHIBIT
      32.1





CERTIFICATION
      OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT
      TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350





In
      connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report On Form 10-QSB of Grace 4,
      Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”) for the quarter ending November 30,
      2007 (the “Report”), I, Virginia K. Sourlis, Chief Executive Officer and Chief
      Financial Officer of the Company hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
      1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
      to
      the best of my knowledge and belief, that:





1.
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Dated:
      January 9, 2008





By:
            /s/
                Virginia K. SourlisVirginia
                K. SourlisChief
                Executive Officer andChief
                Financial Officer ofGrace
                4, Inc.
Exhibit 32(ii)

Certification of the Principal Financial Officer

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

The undersigned hereby certifies that, to his knowledge, (i) the Form 10-K filed by American Community Bancshares, Inc. (the
Issuer) for the year ended December 31, 2006, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and (ii) the information contained in that report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Issuer on the dates and for the periods presented therein.



|                        |  |     |  |                                               
|----------------------- |  | --- |  | ----------------------------------------------
|Date: November 16, 2007 |  | By: |  | /s/ Dan R. Ellis, Jr.                         
|                        |  |     |  | Dan R. Ellis, Jr.                             
|                        |  |     |  | Chief Financial & Principal Accounting Officer
Order filed April 19, 2016 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-15-00952-CV

____________

GIOVANNY LAGUAN, Appellant

V.

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION A/K/A FANNIE 

MAE, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1

Fort Bend County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 15-CCV-055845

O R D E R

Appellant’s brief was due March 28, 2016. No brief or motion for extension 

of time has been filed. 

Unless appellant files a brief with this court on or before May 19, 2016, the 

court will dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b). 

PER CURIAM
CLOSED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

_______________________________________

:

PATRICK COLLINS, INC., : Civil Action No. 11-1513 (FSH)

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : O R D E R

:

JOHN DOES 1-9. :

:

Defendants. :

_______________________________________:

It appearing to the Court that the above case has been pending for more than 120 days

without any proceeding having been taken therein, and the Court having noticed Plaintiff for

dismissal pursuant to Local Civil Rule 41.1, and good cause having not been shown by affidavit as

to why this action should not be dismissed, 

It is on this 25 day of April, 2012, th

ORDERED that the above case be and the same hereby is dismissed in accordance with L.

Civ. R. 41.1 without prejudice and without cost to any party; it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of Court close this case accordingly. 

 s/ Faith S. Hochberg 

United States District Judge

Case 2:11-cv-01513-FSH-PS Document 23 Filed 04/25/12 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 114
AMENDED DLD-095 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 13-4166

___________

IN RE: LEOTIS FOWLER,

Petitioner

____________________________________

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey

(Related to D.C. Civ. No. 13-cv-03137)

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.

December 5, 2013

Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 9, 2014)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

In April 2013, petitioner Leotis Fowler filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in 

the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking a “prompt 

supervise[d] release revocation hearing.” That Court, recognizing that the sentencing court 

retains jurisdiction to modify or revoke supervised release, transferred the petition to the 

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, the jurisdiction in which the 

sentence was imposed. In an order entered May 20, 2013, the matter was administratively 
2

terminated for failure to pay the filing fee or to file a completed in forma pauperis application. 

A review of the docket sheet indicates that the order that was sent to Fowler was returned as 

undeliverable, apparently because it was sent to the wrong address.1 

Fowler, unaware that an order had been entered in the case, filed the instant mandamus 

petition, alleging delay in the adjudication of his habeas petition and seeking an order directing 

the District Court to rule in the matter. Since the filing of this petition, Fowler has received a 

copy of the District Court’s order. Because Fowler has received the relief he requested in his 

mandamus petition, we will deny the mandamus petition as moot. The motion for a refund of 

the filing fee is granted. 

 

 

1

Fowler is incarcerated at FCI-Otisville, in Otisville, New York. His correct address is 

indicated on the docket, as well as in his habeas petition. Inexplicably, however, the District 

Court noted in its order that Fowler was located in FCI-Schuykill in Minersville, Pennsylvania.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v David Garcia, Appellant.

[853 NYS2d 895]

The defendant claims that his conviction of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree was not based on legally sufficient evidence. We disagree. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence of the defendant’s recent and exclusive possession of stolen property was legally sufficient to support the finding that the defendant knowingly possessed such stolen property *(see*Penal Law § 165.40; *People v Zorcik,*67 NY2d 670, 671 [1986]; *People v Douglas,*254 AD2d 367, 368 [1998]).

Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power *(see*CPL 470.15 [5]), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence.

The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit. Fisher, J.P., Angiolillo, Balkin and Leventhal, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Ronald Massey, Appellant.

[856 NYS2d 44]

The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. There is no basis for disturbing the jury’s determinations concerning credibility. The account of the transaction given by the prosecution witnesses was at odds with defendant’s agency defense *(see e.g. People v Lam Lek Chong,*45 NY2d 64, 74-75 [1978], *cert denied*439 US 935 [1978]), and defendant’s present argument rests on his own testimony, which the jury was entitled to reject. Defendant’s arguments concerning the resisting arrest conviction are without merit.

As defendant concedes, the fact that he interposed an agency defense permitted the People to introduce evidence of prior drug sales. We reject defendant’s argument that the court permitted elicitation of excessive and prejudicial details about his prior drug sale conviction. The challenged evidence was highly probative to refute his agency defense, and that probative value outweighed the potential for undue prejudice *(see People v Castaneda,*173 AD2d 349, 350 [1991], *lv denied*78 NY2d 963 [1991]), which the court minimized by means of a limiting instruction. Moreover, defendant specifically opened the door to inquiry into the facts of his prior case when, on cross-examination, he testified that he was innocent of the prior crime notwithstanding his guilty plea in that case.

The court properly denied defendant’s suppression motion. Defendant’s generalized argument that the police lacked probable cause for his arrest failed to preserve his present contentions (s*ee People v Tutt,*38 NY2d 1011 [1976]), and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we also reject them on the merits. The hearing evidence warranted the conclusion that the arresting officer acted lawfully, pursuant to the fellow officer rule *(see People v Ketcham,*93 NY2d 416 [1999]; *People v Green,*2 AD3d 279 [2003], *lv*
      *463
      *denied*2 NY3d 740 [2004]). Concur-Friedman, J.P., Gonzalez, McGuire and Moskowitz, JJ.
#### U.S. Bank National Association TR U/S 6/01/98 (Home Equity Loan Trust 1998-2), Appellant, v Linda Alvarez, Respondent.

[854 NYS2d 171]

In order to establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment in a foreclosure action, a plaintiff must submit the mortgage and unpaid note, along with evidence of default *(see Hoffman v Kraus,*260 AD2d 435, 436 [1999]; *Mahopac Natl. Bank v Baisley,*244 AD2d 466, 467 [1997]). The burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate “the existence of a triable issue of fact as to a bona fide defense to the action, such as waiver, estoppel, bad faith, fraud, or oppressive or unconscionable conduct on the part of the plaintiff” *(id.*at 467; *see Nassau Trust Co. v Montrose Concrete Prods. Corp.,*56 NY2d 175, 183 [1982]).

*712Here, after the plaintiff, the assignee of a note and mortgage executed by the defendant, established, prima facie, its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the defendant raised triable issues of fact concerning the defense of fraud and the counterclaim for rescission, which precluded the granting of summary judgment to the plaintiff *(see Bankers Trust Co. of Cal., N.A. v Sciarpelletti,*28 AD3d 408, 411-412 [2006]; *State St. Bank & Trust Co. v Boayke,*249 AD2d 535 [1998]; *Horowitz v Griggs,*245 AD2d 486 [1997]).

The plaintiffs remaining contentions are without merit. Prudenti, P.J., Miller, Dillon and McCarthy, JJ., concur.