alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

October 29, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

134616 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 134616 

 COA: 277906 

Wayne CC: 03-008913-01

STEPHAN DANIEL CLARK, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 14, 2007 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded 

that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

p1022 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

October 29, 2007 

 Clerk
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###### Department of Health and Human Services

###### National Institutes of Health 

      ( print page 34361)    
Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App.), notice is hereby given of the following meeting. 

The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 

*Name of Committee:*                         National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases Special Emphasis Panel. Type 1 Diabetes TrialNet: Clinical Centers.                     

*Date:*                         August 3, 2009.                     

*Time:*                         8 a.m. to 5 p.m.                     

*Agenda:*                         To review and evaluate grant applications.                     

*Place:*                         Bethesda Marriott Suites, 6711 Democracy Blvd, Bethesda, MD 20817.                     

*Contact Person:*                         Carol J. Goter-Robinson, PhD, Scientific Review Officer, Review Branch, DEA, NIDDK,  National Institutes of Health,  Room 748, 6707 Democracy Boulevard,  Bethesda, MD 20892-5452.  (301) 594-7791.                         *goterrobinsonc@extra.niddk.nih.gov*.                     

This notice is being published less than 15 days prior to the meeting due to the timing limitations imposed by the review and funding cycle. 

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.847, Diabetes, Endocrinology and Metabolic Research; 93.848, Digestive Diseases and Nutrition Research; 93.849, Kidney Diseases, Urology and Hematology Research, National Institutes of Health, HHS)

Dated: July 8, 2009. 

Jennifer Spaeth, 

Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy. 

 [FR Doc. E9-16694 Filed 7-14-09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4140-01-P
EX-4.67



 Exhibit 4.67 
 English Translation 
 Power of Attorney 

I,                     , citizen of the
People’s Republic of China (the “PRC”) with ID No.                     , is the shareholder of Shenzhen 7Road Technology Co.,
Ltd. (“7Road Technology”) holding              equity interest in 7Road Technology, hereby irrevocably authorize the person (“Attorney-in-fact”) designated from time to
time by written resolution of the Board of Directors of Shenzhen 7Road Network Technologies Co., Ltd. (“7Road Network”) with the following powers and rights during the term of this Power of Attorney: 

I hereby appoint the Attorney-in-fact as my exclusive and sole agent to exercise, on my behalf, all shareholder’s rights in accordance with PRC laws
and 7Road Technology’s Articles of Association (as amended from time to time), including but not limited to the right to convene the shareholder’s meeting, accept the notice regarding the shareholder’s meeting and its agenda,
participate in the shareholder’s meeting and exercise the voting right (including matters such as nominate, elect, or appoint the director, general manager, principal financial officer or other senior management personnel, determine
distribution of dividend), to sell or transfer any or all of equity interests held by me in 7 Road Technology. 
 Such authorization and
appointment are based upon the precondition that the Attorney-in-fact is still serving in 7Road Network or its affiliates. Once the Attorney-in-fact loses his title or position in 7Road Network or its affiliates or the Board of Directors of 7Road
Network terminate such authorization and appointment by written resolution and written notice, the authorization and appointment made by me hereby shall be no longer in force immediately and the other individual nominated by written resolution of
the Board of Directors of 7Road Network shall be authorized to exercise the full aforesaid rights on behalf of myself. 
 The term of this Power
of Attorney is equal to the term of the Business Operation Agreement jointly executed by 7Road Technology, 7Road Network and other parties on June 26, 2012. If the term of Business Operation Agreement terminates early or renews, the term of
this Power of Attorney will terminate simultaneously or renew to the same term with the Business Operating Agreement. Within the term of this Power of Attorney, this Power of Attorney shall not be revised or terminated without the written consent of
7Road Network. 
  

			
	  
	 	(Signature)
	
	June 26, 2012
Exhibit 32.2




CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,




AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002






In connection with the Quarterly Report of Helix Wind, Corp. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:




1.           The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




2.           The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date: November 5, 2010
/s/ Kevin ClaudioKevin Claudio, Chief Financial Officer(Principal Accounting Officer)
\

---

EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
PURSUANT TO 
  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Hassan Hans Bedreddine, hereby certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

|(1) | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Bioshaft Water
      Technology, Inc. for the period ended July 31, 2011 (the "Report") fully
      complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
|(2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents,
      in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
      operations of Bioshaft Water Technology, Inc..                                                               

Dated: September 19, 2011



| | Hassan Hans Badreddine                       
| | -----------------------------------------------
| | Hassan Hans Bedreddine                         
| | President, Chief Executive Officer and Director
| | (Principal Executive Officer)                  
| | Bioshaft Water Technology, Inc.                



A signed original of this written statement required by Section
906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the
signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this
written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Bioshaft Water
Technology, Inc. and will be retained by Bioshaft Water Technology, Inc. and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.

---
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

October 27, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

136922 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION Stephen J. Markman, 

SYSTEMS, INC., as nominee for QUICKEN Justices 

LOANS, INC.,

Plaintiff-CounterDefendant-Appellant, 

v SC: 136922 

 COA: 277343 

Oakland CC: 2005-067556-CH 

MAJIC FUNDING, L.L.C.,

Defendant-Appellee, 

and 

DOUGLAS & DAUGHTERS CORPORATION, 

FRANK SHUSHTARI, and GABRIEL LIMA, 

Defendants/Counter- Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

and 

MELISSA J. WHITSETT and MARK A. 

WHITSETT, 

 Defendants. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 10, 2008 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

p1020 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

October 27, 2008 

 Clerk
II 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5147 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2004 

Received 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 23055 Sherman Way in West Hills, California, 

as the ‘‘Evan Asa Ashcraft Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

HR 5147 RDS 

1 SECTION 1. DESIGNATION. 

2 The facility of the United States Postal Service lo3 cated at 23055 Sherman Way in West Hills, California, 

4 shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Evan Asa Ashcraft 

5 Post Office Building’’. 

6 SEC. 2. REFERENCES. 

7 Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 

8 paper, or other record of the United States to the facility 

9 referred to in section 1 shall be deemed to be a reference 

10 to the ‘‘Evan Asa Ashcraft Post Office Building’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives September 28, 

2004. 

Attest: JEFF TRANDAHL, 

Clerk.
#### Ward *et al. v.*The Frick Company.

It being, under the pleading act of 189S, the duty of the judge of the superior court at each regular term, to call all cases on the appearance docket, and hear and determine all objections made to the *805sufficiency of petitions and pleas, it is incumbent upon plaintiffs to make at that term their exceptions to pleas filed. Consequently, where to an action upon an unconditional contract in writing a plea was filed at the first term, which set forth a good defense, but was notswoi’n to by the defendants, and no objection was then made to it because of this defect, the plaintiff will be held to have waived the same so far as that term is concerned ; and if at a subsequent term he moves to strike the plea because of such defect, the court should then allow the defendants to complete the plea by a proper verification.

June 10,1895.

Complaint on note. Before Judge Sweat. Coffee superior court. October term, 1894.

Ward & Dart, for plaintiffs in error.

G. J. Holton & Son, *contra.*

Atkinson, Justice.

The pleading act of 1893 (Acts 1893, p. 56) is highly remedial in its purposes. It was not designed to advance the interests of plaintiff's alone, but its purpose, while simplifying procedure, was to make more speedy the trial of civil cases by rendering more certain the issues to be tried. It therefore requires that all exceptions to declarations and pleas shall be heard and determined .at the first term; and before they can be heard, they must at that term first be taken. If the declaration of the plaintiff is insufficient in law, or if for any reason the same be not sufficiently full to enable the defendant to plead thereto, he shall make exception at the first term, and, failing in this, will be held to have waived any objection to the declaration curable by amendment. Inasmuch as all exceptions to pleas are likewise required to be heard and determined at the first term, it is the duty of the defendant at that term to make his appearance and file such pleas as he may deem proper to his defense. If the plaintiff does not at that term except to the sufficiency of such pleas, he will be held to have waived any objection thereto which may be cured by subsequent amendment. . For this reason, when a *806defendant was sued upon a promissory note unconditional in its terms, appeared and at the first term filed a substantial defense to the merits of the plain tiff’s cause of action, but omitted to swear to the same, no objection having béeil filed to this plea at the first term,'the plaintiff will be held to have waived this defect; and at a subsequent .term .of the court, when the cause .was called in its order; it was proper that the- court should allow the defendant then to make oath thereto. The present case illustrates the wisdom of the principle upon which the statute under review is predicated. It prevents either party being taken by surprise, and places the responsibility upon the respective parties of taking at the first term such éxceptions to the pleadings of the other as will entitle them to the complete remedial operation of this statute.

Let the judgment of the court below be *Reversed.*
Case 1:11-cv-02658-JBS-KMW Document 11 Filed 09/15/11 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 91
Case 1:11-cv-02658-JBS-KMW Document 11 Filed 09/15/11 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 92
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Rashaan Brown, Appellant.

[822 NYS2d 718]

*1017Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hall, J.), rendered August 6, 2004, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that the Supreme Court erred in failing to charge the jury on the defense of justification. This claim is unpreserved for appellate review *(see*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Edwards,*28 AD3d 491, 492 [2006]; *People v Seeley,*13 AD3d 562 [2004]; *People v Barrett,*11 AD3d 551, 552 [2004]; *People v Bolton,*213 AD2d 660 [1995]). In any event, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s request for a justification charge since no reasonable view of the evidence supported such a charge. The defendant stabbed the victim through the chest and heart, when the victim was unarmed, and the defendant had no reason to believe that the victim was carrying a weapon or was about to use deadly physical force against him *(see*Penal Law § 35.15 [2] [a]; *People v Krebs,*11 AD3d 713 [2004]; *People v Porter,*161 AD2d 811 [1990]; *People v Harris,*134 AD2d 369, 369-370 [1987]). Crane, J.P, Krausman, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 20

- 1851

_____________________________ A LICIA N ICOLE B RYANT , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Suwannee County

. Mark E. Feagle , Judge

. September 3, 2021

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.
B.L. T HOMAS , R OBERTS , and L ONG , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Kathryn Lane, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee; and Ralph R. Deas of The Law Office of Ralph Deas, Lake City, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Robert Quentin Humphrey, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee
, for Appellee.
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of EGPI Firecreek, Inc. (the "Registrant") on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Dennis R. Alexander, President and Chief Financial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of

our knowledge and belief:



(1)   The Annual Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)   The information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Registrant.



| |     |                                                          
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------
| |     |                                                          
| | By: | /s/ Dennis R. Alexander                                  
| |     | Dennis R. Alexander
President and Chief Financial Officer

Date: April 15, 2008





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Registrant and will be retained by the Registrant and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



*****
EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of DoMar Exotic Furnishings, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended August 31, 2006 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the
undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby
certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:

     1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.

Date: October 18, 2006


/s/ Scott Sieck
----------------------------------------
Scott Sieck, Principal Financial Officer
#### Baptist, Adm’r, etc., *v.*Farwell Transp. Co.

*(Circuit Court, N. D. Ohio, E. D.*

October Term, 1886.)

Courts—United States Circuit Court—Judgment—Power to Set Aside at Subsequent Term.

The United States circuit court has no power, at a subsequent term, to set aside a judgment, in due form, unconditionally entered at a former term, and which has become a final judgment.

At Law. Motion for a rehearing refused and dismissed.

*Judge Cadwell, Hoyt & Munsell,*and *A. M. Cox,*for plaintiff.

*H. D. Goulder*and *Estep, Dickey & Squire,*for defendants.

Welker, J.

The action was one for a personal injury, and the case was tried to a jury at the April term, 1886, and a verdict for the plaintiff for $3,250. A motion was filed at said term for a new trial, and was heard by the court, and .overruled, and judgment entered upon the verdict, and execution issued upon the judgment. During said term, on the seventh day of September, 1886, a-motion was filed by the defendant asking for a rehearing and reargument of the motion for a new trial, and stating that motion for a new trial should have been granted, which motion was not heard or disposed of at said term, and at its close a general order was entered “that all the cases on the docket of this court not otherwise disposed of be continued until the next term of this court.”

The defendant at this (October) term asks that said motion be reheard, and that the motion for new trial so overruled at the April term be now heard, and said judgment be set aside, and a new trial ordered. This raises the question whether the court, after the term at which a judgment is rendered, has power to set it aside at such subsequent term in this summary way. The motion filed at last term for a rehearing, and which, by the general order, may be continued to this term, was one not known in proceedings at law. It amounted to the same as an oral motion for a rehearing at the term, and nothing more. If such rehearing was'not had at the term, and judgment set aside, it could not in any way affect the judgment so entered, or in any manner suspend it. It has been clearly settled that the court has no power, at a subsequent term, to set aside a judgment, in due form, unconditionally entered at a former term, and which had become a final judgment. Although the court may, at this term, rehear the motion for new trial, still on such rehearing, without power to set aside the judgment, such rehearing would avail nothing to the defendant. The motion for a rehearing is therefore refused and dismissed.

Jaokson, J., concurs.