UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

FRANKELY R. PAREDES,

 Plaintiff,

v.

SALLIE MAE,

 Defendant.

Civil No. 11-2470 (NLH/KMW)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

Frankely R. Paredes

2700 Atlantic Avenue

Wildwood, NJ 08260

Pro Se

Thomas C. Regan, Esquire

LeClairRyan, a Virginia professional corporation

One Riverfront Plaza

1037 Raymond Boulevard

Sixteenth Floor

Newark, NJ 07102

Attorney for Defendant

HILLMAN, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court by way of an unopposed

motion [Doc. No. 4] by Defendant Sallie Mae, Inc., (hereinafter, 1

“Sallie Mae” or “Defendant”) to dismiss Plaintiff Frankely Paredes’

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

The Court notes that Plaintiff failed to file an opposition to

Defendant’s motion and the time for filing opposition has expired. 

1. Defendant was incorrectly named in Plaintiff’s complaint as,

Sallie Mae, rather than Sallie Mae, Inc. (Notice of Removal [Doc.

No. 1] 1; see also Mot. to Dismiss [Doc. No. 4] 1.) 

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The Court has considered Defendant’s motion and decides this matter

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. 

For the reasons expressed below, Defendant’s motion is granted

in part and denied in part. 

I. JURISDICTION

In this action, Plaintiff alleges claims under the Fair Credit

Reporting Act, (hereinafter, “FCRA”). See generally 15 U.S.C. §

1681 et seq. The Court exercises jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

federal law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this action in the Superior Court of New

Jersey, Law Division, Special Civil Part for Cape May County on

approximately April 4, 2011. (Def.’s Notice of Removal [Doc. No.

1] ¶ 1; see also Ex. A to Notice of Removal, Special Civil Part

Compl. [Doc. No. 1-1] (hereinafter, “Pl.’s Compl.”) (stamped

“Received” on April 4, 2011).) Defendant Sallie Mae filed a timely

Notice of Removal on April 29, 2011 and removed Plaintiff’s action

to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367, 1441, and 1446,

asserting that Plaintiff’s complaint alleged causes of action

arising under federal law, i.e., the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 

(Def.’s Notice of Removal [Doc. No. 1] 1, ¶¶ 4-5.)

In the complaint, Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of

$10,000 and asserts that Plaintiff sustained actual damages,

including “loss of opportunity” as a result of “multiple violations

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of the Fair Credit Reporting Act” by Defendant. (Pl.’s Compl. ¶

2.) Plaintiff asserts that at some time prior to April 5, 2010, “an

unknown account ... listed by the Defendant” appeared on his credit

report. (Id. ¶ 3.) As a result of this unknown account, Plaintiff

alleges that he sent to “Experian, a Credit Reporting [A]gency[,]

a request to investigate and the disputed [sic] of the alleged

debt[.]” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that he received correspondence

from Experian on May 12, 2010 “stating that the matter was

completed and verified by the Defendant [and] thus,” the account

would “remain[] in [Plaintiff’s] credit report as an accurate

account.” (Id. ¶ 4.) 

After receiving a response from Experian, Plaintiff asserts

that he “sent Defendant a dispute letter” via certified mail,

return receipt requested on September 28, 2010, requesting Sallie

Mae “to investigate the matter.” (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff alleges

that Sallie Mae received his dispute letter on September 30, 2010,

but that Plaintiff never received a response from Sallie Mae. (Id.

¶¶ 6, 8.) Plaintiff asserts that he then sent Sallie Mae a second

dispute letter via certified mail, return receipt requested on

December 1, 2010 “in a good faith effort to allow Defendant ample

opportunity to investigate[] the alleged debt[.]” (Id. ¶ 13.) 

Plaintiff contends that this second dispute letter “stated that the

Plaintiff was in full dispute of the account and requested that the

matter be investigated.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Sallie Mae

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received the second dispute letter requesting an investigation on

December 6, 2010. Plaintiff further asserts that on January 10,

2011, Plaintiff sent Sallie Mae “a ‘NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE

LAWSUIT’ letter” via certified mail, return receipt requested

informing Defendant of the alleged violations of the FCRA and

Defendant’s liability. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff contends that the

January 10, 2011 letter “requested immediate deletion of accounts

within 72 hours as a last chance to avoid a lawsuit[.]” (Id.) 

Plaintiff asserts that Sallie Mae “again failed to respond.” (Id.)

Throughout the complaint, Plaintiff cites to the following

sections of the FCRA: Sections 1681s-2(a)(3), 1681n, and 1681o. 

(Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 9-10, 12.) In citing Section 1681s-2(a)(3),

Plaintiff notes that any furnisher of information to a consumer

reporting agency is under a duty to provide the consumer reporting

agency with notice that a consumer disputes the completeness or

accuracy of the information provided to that consumer reporting

agency. (Id. ¶ 9.) Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges that Sallie Mae

“failed to note the account as being disputed with the National

Credit Reporting Agencies as required” under the FCRA. (Id. ¶ 17.)

In citing to Sections 1681n and 1681o, Plaintiff also notes that

willful or negligent noncompliance with the FCRA’s provisions can

result in civil liability. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 12.) Plaintiff thus

alleges that he has a “negative Experian credit score ... and has

been denied credit at reasonable rates because of the negligent

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noncompliance [sic] actions and/or inactions of” Sallie Mae. (Id.

¶¶ 11, 16.) Plaintiff also asserts that he “applied for a credit

card and was denied because of the actions and/or inactions of”

Sallie Mae. (Id. ¶ 16.)

Plaintiff contends that the actions of Sallie Mae “demonstrate

a willful disregard for federal law and constitute a blatant

attempt to injure or ruin the credit rating of Plaintiff[.]” (Id.

¶ 19.) Plaintiff thus asserts that Sallie Mae “has demonstrated an

inability to conduct a fair investigation [of] the alleged debt and

... attempted to coerce payment by placing this alleged debt” on

Plaintiff’s credit report and refusing to remove it. (Id.) 

Accordingly, Plaintiff demands judgment in the amount of $10,000

plus court costs, and seeks the “permanent removal of ... [the]

account from Plaintiff’s files with all three national credit

reporting agencies (Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union).” (Id.) 

In the present motion, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Mot.

to Dismiss [Doc. No. 4] 1.) Specifically, Defendant argues that

Plaintiff cannot recover under Section 1681s-2(a)(3) of the FCRA

because “no private right of action exists to enforce the

provisions of” Section 1681s-2(a). (Mem. of Points and Authorities

in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss [Doc. No. 4] (hereinafter,

“Def.’s Mem.”), 3) (citing Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d

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28, 34 (3d Cir. 2011)). While Defendant acknowledges that a

private right of action does exist under Section 1681s-2(b) of the

FCRA, Defendant asserts that “Plaintiff does not seek to recover

for any alleged violation of Section 1681s-2(b)[.]” (Def’s Mem.

4.) Defendant further contends that even if Plaintiff sought to

recover under Section 1681s-2(b), Plaintiff’s complaint still fails

to state a claim for relief because Plaintiff “does not even allege

that Sallie Mae failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of his

dispute.” (Id.) Accordingly, Defendant seeks to dismiss

Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice. (Proposed Order [Doc. No. 4]

1.) 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard for Motion to Dismiss

In this case, Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court must accept all wellpleaded allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d

347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005). It is well settled that a pleading is

sufficient if it contains “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P.

8(a)(2).

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A district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks “‘not

whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the

claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims[.]’” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007) (quoting

Scheuer v. Rhoades, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (“Our decision in Twombly

expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions[.]’”)

(citation omitted). First, under the Twombly/Iqbal standard, a

district court “must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded

facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions.” Fowler v.

UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. at 1949). 

Second, a district court “must then determine whether the

facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the

plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Fowler, 578 F.3d at

211 (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950). “[A] complaint must do

more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.” Fowler,

578 F.3d at 211; see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d

224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court’s Twombly formulation

of the pleading standard can be summed up thus: ‘stating ... a

claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as

true) to suggest’ the required element. This ‘does not impose a

probability requirement at the pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply

calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that

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discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary element.” (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556)). “The defendant bears the burden of

showing that no claim has been presented.” Hedges v. U.S., 404

F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005).

However, “if a complaint is subject to a Rule 12(b)(6)

dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless

such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips, 515

F.3d at 245; see also Ray v. First Nat’l Bank of Omaha, 413 F.

App’x 427, 430 (3d Cir. 2011) (“A district court should not dismiss

a pro se complaint without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to

amend his complaint unless an amendment would be inequitable or

futile.”); Burrell v. DFS Servs., LLC, 753 F. Supp. 2d 438, 444

(D.N.J. 2010) (“When a claim is dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), leave to amend and reassert that claim

is ordinarily granted. ... A claim may be dismissed with prejudice,

however, if amending the complaint would be futile.”) (citation

omitted). Furthermore, in ruling on the present motion, the Court

“must construe [Plaintiff’s] complaint liberally because he is

proceeding pro se.” Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 32

(3d Cir. 2011) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).

B. Fair Credit Reporting Act

Section 1681s-2 of the FRCA sets forth the general

responsibilities of entities that furnish information, (“furnishers

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of information”), to consumer reporting agencies, (“CRAs”). See 2

generally 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2; see also Burrell, 753 F. Supp. 2d at

446. The term “furnishers of information” is not specifically

defined within the FCRA but generally includes any entity that

reports information to a CRA which is relevant to a consumer’s

credit rating. Burrell, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 446. Under subsection 3

1681s-2(a), furnishers of information have a duty to provide CRAs

with accurate information relating to consumers. Specifically,

furnishers of information are prohibited from providing CRAs with

information relating to a consumer which the furnisher “knows or

has reasonable cause to believe ... is inaccurate.” 15 U.S.C. §

1681s-2(a)(1)(A). Moreover, where a consumer disputes the

completeness or accuracy of any information provided by a furnisher

to a CRA, the furnisher is prohibited from providing “the

information to any consumer reporting agency without notice that

2. Under the FCRA, the term “consumer reporting agency” is

generally defined as an entity which “regularly engages ... in the

practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or

other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing

consumer reports to third parties[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). As

explained by another court in this District, “the function of such

entities is more accurately described by the common term, ‘credit

rating agencies.’” Burrell, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 441 n.2. 

Accordingly, the Court notes that the terms “credit rating agency”

and “consumer reporting agency” refer to companies such as Equifax,

Experian, and TransUnion, the three major United States companies

which track consumer credit ratings. Id. 

3. The parties do not appear to dispute that Sallie Mae is

considered a furnisher of information under the FCRA. (See, e.g.,

Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 9; Def.’s Mem. 3-4.)

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such information is disputed by the consumer.” Id. § 1681s2(a)(3).

Subsection 1681s-2(b) sets forth the duties of furnishers of

information once the furnisher receives notice from a CRA that the

completeness or accuracy of the information provided to the CRA is

disputed by the consumer. Id. § 1681s-2(b)(1). “[S]ubsection (b)

relates to the furnisher’s obligations after learning of

inaccuracies from the [CRAs]. Thus, whereas § 1681s-2(a) purports

to require furnishers of information to ensure the accuracy of that

information before transmitting it to a [CRA], § 1681s-2(b)

requires that furnishers take certain steps to investigate and

correct inaccurate information they [may] have already relayed to

the [CRAs].” Burrell, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 447. “Any person who

willfully or negligently violates the [FCRA] is liable to a

consumer thereby injured.” Armour v. Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 10-

3740, 2010 WL 3724524, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2010) (citing 15

U.S.C. §§ 1681o; 1681n)). Accordingly, a consumer may sue a

furnisher of information for a violation of Section 1681s-2(b) that

causes him injury. Armour, 2010 WL 3724524, at *2.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. FCRA Claims under Section 1681s-2(a)

In the complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant committed

“multiple violations of the” FCRA. (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff

cites to Section 1681s-2(a)(3) and Defendant’s alleged violation

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thereof, as a basis for the current suit. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 9, 11, 16.) 

However, as the Third Circuit has previously held, no private right

of action exists under the provisions of Section 1681s-2(a).4

Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 34 (3d Cir. 2011)

(concluding that plaintiff “cannot base his claim on 15 U.S.C. § 

1681s-2(a)(1)(A), because no private right of action exists under

that provision.”) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681s-2(c), (d); Nelson v.

Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 282 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2002));

see also Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1162

(9th Cir. 2009) (finding specifically that plaintiff had “no

private right of action under § 1681s-2(a)(3) to proceed against [a

4. This holding by the Third Circuit is consistent with the

interpretation of Section 1681s-2(a) by many of its sister Courts

of Appeals. See, e.g., Purcell v. Bank of Am., -—- F.3d -—-, No.

10-3975, 2011 WL 4634216, at *1 (7th Cir. Oct. 3, 2011) (finding

“that section [1681s-2(a)] does not create a private right of

action.”); Chiang v. Verizon New England Inc., 595 F.3d 26, 35 (1st

Cir. 2010) (“Congress expressly limited furnishers' liability under

§ 1681s-2(a) by prohibiting private suits for violations of that

portion of the statute.); Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584

F.3d 1147, 1162 (9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that plaintiff had “no

private right of action under § 1681s-2(a)(3) to proceed against [a

furnisher of information] for its initial failure to notify the

CRAs that he disputed the ... charges.”); Saunders v. Branch

Banking & Trust Co. of Virginia, 526 F.3d 142, 149 (4th Cir. 2008)

(“FCRA explicitly bars private suits for violations of § 1681s2(a)[.]”); Bach v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 149 F. App’x 354, 358-59

(6th Cir. 2005) (“[A] consumer cannot bring a private cause of

action for a violation of a furnisher’s duty to report truthful

information” under Section 1681s-2(a)); Young v. Equifax Credit

Info. Servs., Inc., 294 F.3d 631, 639 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that

“Section 1681s-2(c) ... provide[s] an exception to civil liability

for failure to comply with Section 1681s-2(a) (prohibiting

reporting of inaccurate information), ... and Section 1681s-2(d)

provides that enforcement of Section 1681s-2(a) shall be by

government officials[.]”).

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furnisher of information] for its initial failure to notify the

CRAs that he disputed the ... charges.”); Martinez v. Granite State

Mgmt. & Resources, No. 08-2769, 2008 WL 5046792, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov.

20, 2008) (finding that “[t]here is, ... no private right of action

under § 1681s-2(a)(3) for violations of § 1681n or § 1681o.”).

Even prior to the Third Circuit’s explicit ruling on this

issue, several courts in this District recognized that no private

right of action exists under Section 1681s-2(a). See, e.g.,

Burrell, 753 F. Supp 2d at 447 (finding that plaintiff’s “claims

under subsection (a) of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2 fail because that

portion of the FCRA does not provide a private right of action.”);

DiMedio v. HSBC Bank, No. 08-5521, 2009 WL 1796072, at *3 (D.N.J.

June 22, 2009) , 2009 WL 1796072, at *2 (concluding that plaintiff

“may not bring suit under Section [1681s-2](a) because there is no

private right of action through Section [1681n] for violations of

Section [1681s-2](a).”); Martinez, 2008 WL 5046792, at *2. As

explained by the court in Burrell, subsections (c) and (d) of

Section 1681s-2 “combine to form an explicit bar” to private rights

of action under subsection (a). 753 F. Supp. 2d at 447.

“[S]ubsection (d) of § 1681s-2 prohibits private enforcement of any

of the portions of the FCRA described in paragraphs one and three

of subsection (c). Paragraph one of subsection (c) refers to

‘subsection (a) of this section, including any regulations issued

thereunder.’” Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(c)(1)). 

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Thus, even accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true and

viewing them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s

allegations against Sallie Mae under Section 1681s-2(a) fail to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the “bar on

private enforcement actions applies to the duties imposed on

furnishers of credit information by [Section] 1681s-2(a)[.]” 

Burrell, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 448; see also Ventura v. Collectcorp

Corp., No. 11-4576, 2011 WL 4625365, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2011)

(dismissing plaintiff’s claims under Section 1681s-2(a) with

prejudice, on defendant’s unopposed motion to dismiss pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6), “because subsection (a) of the FCRA does not provide

a private right of action.”) Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is

granted in part with respect to Plaintiff’s Section 1681s-2(a)

claims, and those claims are dismissed with prejudice, as granting

leave to amend would be futile in the absence of a private right of

action under that subsection. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245; Ray,

413 F. App’x at 430 (dismissal of pro se complaint without leave to

amend is appropriate where amendment would be futile). 

B. FCRA Claims under Section 1681s-2(b) 

Unlike subsection (a), subsection (b) of Section 1681s-2 may

serve as the basis for a private suit where a furnisher of

information receives notice from a CRA that the consumer disputes

the information. See, e.g., Cosmas v. Am. Express Centurion Bank,

No. 07-6099, 2010 WL 2516468, at *7 (D.N.J. June 14, 2010)

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(“Private rights of action are permitted for claims brought under

section 1681s-2(b) where the furnisher has received notice of a

dispute from a credit collection agency.”); DiMedio, 2009 WL

1796072, at *3 (recognizing that Section 1681s-2(b) “may be the

basis of a private suit” where the “furnisher of information

receives notice” of the disputed information from the CRA) (citing

Young v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., 294 F.3d 631, 639 (5th

Cir. 2002)). Although Plaintiff only cites specifically to Section

1681s-2(a)(3) of the FCRA, the Court must construe Plaintiff’s

complaint liberally because he is proceeding pro se. Huertas, 641

F.3d at 32. Accordingly, the Court will consider whether

Plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently sets forth a claim under

subsection (b) regarding the duty of a furnisher of information to

investigate the completeness and accuracy of that information upon

receiving notice of a consumer’s dispute from the CRA. 

In the District of New Jersey, courts have repeatedly found

that to state a claim under Section 1681s-2(b), a plaintiff must

demonstrate three specific elements: “(1)‘[the consumer] sent

notice of disputed information to a consumer reporting agency, (2)

the consumer reporting agency then notified the defendant furnisher

of the dispute, and (3) the furnisher failed to investigate and

modify the inaccurate information.’” Cosmas, 2010 WL 2516468, at

*8 (citing DiMedio, 2009 WL 1796072, at *3); see also Armour, 2010

WL 3724524, at *2; Martinez, 2008 WL 5046792, at *3. In the

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complaint, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged all three required

elements under Section 1681s-2(b).

As to the first required element -- that Plaintiff, as the

consumer, sent notice of the disputed information to a consumer

reporting agency –- Plaintiff specifically alleges that on April 5,

2010, he “sent a request to Experian, a Credit Reporting [A]gency

... to investigate and the disputed [sic] of the alleged debt[.]” 

(Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 3.) Although Plaintiff’s language is not a model

of clarity, construing the complaint liberally, the Court finds

that the complaint sufficiently alleges that Plaintiff sent the

required notice of disputed information to a CRA, namely, Experian,

by sending the April 5, 2010 letter. With regard to the second

element of a claim under Section 1681s-2(b) -- that the CRA

notified the furnisher of information of the consumer’s dispute --

the Court finds Plaintiff’s complaint also adequately alleges this

element because the complaint sets forth that after Plaintiff sent

notice to Experian, Plaintiff “received correspondence from

Experian stating that the matter was completed and verified by the

Defendant” and thus would remain on Plaintiff’s credit report. 

(Id. ¶ 4.) Liberally construing Plaintiff’s complaint, the

allegation that Defendant verified the account to Experian

sufficiently demonstrates that Experian, a CRA, notified Defendant,

a furnisher of information, that Plaintiff disputed the information

reported by Defendant. Finally, the third element of a claim under

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Section 1681s-2(b) requires Plaintiff to plead that the furnisher

of information failed to investigate the matter and modify the

inaccurate information. Despite Defendant’s attempt to argue

otherwise, Plaintiff’s complaint specifically alleges that 5

“Defendant has demonstrated an inability to conduct a fair

investigation [of] the alleged debt[.]” (Id. ¶ 19.) The Court,

recognizing Plaintiff’s status as a pro se litigant, concludes that

this assertion sufficiently alleges the third required element of

a claim under Section 1681s-2(b). 

However inartfully plead, Plaintiff’s complaint, construed

liberally, sufficiently alleges all three required elements of a

claim under Section 1681s-2(b) of the FCRA. See Martinez, 2008 WL

5046792, at *3 (concluding that plaintiff’s complaint set forth

sufficient allegations under Section 1681s-2(b) to survive

defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion even though plaintiff only alleged one

required element –- that “she had contact with the credit reporting

agencies” –- but failed to allege whether those agencies contacted

defendant to verify the debt or that defendant’s investigation was

deficient). Accordingly, accepting all of the complaint’s wellpleaded facts as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s factual

allegations are sufficient to show that Plaintiff has a plausible

claim for relief under Section 1681s-2(b). See Fowler, 578 F.3d at

5. Defendant asserts that “Plaintiff does not even allege that

Sallie Mae failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of his

dispute.” (Def.’s Mem. 4.) 

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210-211. Plaintiff has alleged facts adequate to raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence

necessary to support his claims. Thus, Defendant has not meet its

burden to demonstrate that Plaintiff failed to set forth a claim

under Section 1681s-2(b), and therefore Defendant’s motion is

denied in part with respect to those claims.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Sallie Mae’s motion to

dismiss [Doc. No. 4] is granted in part and denied in part. An

appropriate Order will be entered. 

Dated: November 16, 2011 /s/ Noel L. Hillman 

At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

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