COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Bumgardner and Agee 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

GENEVA MAE HOOKER ABBOTT 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 3076-00-3 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

 FEBRUARY 5, 2002 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE 

James F. Ingram, Judge 

 S. Jane Chittom, Appellate Defender (Public 

Defender Commission, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General 

(Randolph A. Beales, Acting Attorney General; 

Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 This appeal arises from orders revoking the suspension of 

prison sentences previously imposed upon Geneva Mae Hooker 

Abbott and re-suspending those sentences. Abbott contends that 

the trial court lacked authority to condition re-suspension of 

her sentences upon her "good behavior for the rest of her 

natural life" because the prior sentencing order suspended those 

sentences on condition that she remain of good behavior for ten 

years only. She argues that the enlargement of the term of 

suspension amounts to a retroactive increase in sentence and is, 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
therefore, void. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of 

the trial court. 

I. BACKGROUND

 On September 4, 1984, Abbott was convicted of sixteen 

counts each of forgery, uttering, and petit larceny. The trial 

court sentenced her to confinement for thirty-four years and 

1,440 days, but suspended thirty-one years, nineteen months and 

1,440 days conditioned on ten years good behavior following a 

one year period of probation. 

 On July 28, 1989, the trial court held that Abbott had 

violated the terms of her probation and revoked the suspension 

of her sentences. It then re-suspended the sentences on the 

condition that Abbott serve six months in jail and be of good 

behavior for ten years following a two-year period of probation. 

 On August 28, 2000, Abbott was again convicted of forgery 

and uttering, the offenses having been committed on March 24, 

2000. On November 27, 2000, the trial court again revoked the 

suspension of Abbott's sentences. It sentenced her to serve two 

years in prison, but re-suspended the remaining time on the 

condition that she be of "good behavior for the rest of her 

natural life." 

II. ANALYSIS

 Abbott did not assert her position on appeal before the 

trial court. Rule 5A:18 bars its consideration on appeal unless 

the sentence is void. Nesbit v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 391, 

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394, 424 S.E.2d 239, 240 (1992). Abbott concedes that she made 

at trial no objection to the sentence imposed and that she can 

prevail on appeal only if the sentencing order is void. 

 Trial courts are granted broad discretion in matters of 

suspension and probation. See, e.g., Nuckoles v. Commonwealth, 

12 Va. App. 1083, 1085-86, 407 S.E.2d 355, 356 (1991); Grant v. 

Commonwealth, 223 Va. 680, 684, 292 S.E.2d 348, 350 (1982). 

"The only limitation placed upon the discretion of the trial 

court in its determination of what conditions are to be imposed 

is that a condition be 'reasonable.'" Nuckoles, 12 Va. App. at 

1086, 407 S.E.2d at 356 (citing Dyke v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 

478, 484, 69 S.E.2d 483, 486 (1952)). 

 The trial court "may fix the period of suspension for a 

reasonable time, having due regard to the gravity of the 

offense, without regard to the maximum period for which the 

defendant might have been sentenced." Code § 19.2-303.1. "The 

court may, for any cause deemed by it sufficient which occurred 

at any time within the probation period, or if none within the 

period of suspension fixed by the court, or if neither, within 

the maximum period for which the defendant might originally have 

been sentenced to be imprisoned, revoke the suspension of 

sentence and any probation . . . ." Code § 19.2-306. 

 The November 27, 2000 order did not enlarge the sentence 

originally imposed on Abbott. It modified only the conditions 

of suspension, permitting her to avoid serving the sentence. 

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The conditions imposed, i.e. that she be of "good behavior for 

the rest of her natural life," are reasonable and constitute no 

abuse of the trial court's discretion. Thus, the sentencing 

order is not void. 

 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.

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