SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0191-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KEVIN BOONE,

a/k/a KEVIN N. BOONE,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Submitted September 16, 2021 – Decided September 29, 2021

Before Judges Mawla and Mitterhoff.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 13-04-0518.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Karen A. Lodeserto, Designated Counsel, on 

the brief).

Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney 

for respondent (Patrick L. Harty, Assistant Prosecutor, 

of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant Kevin Boone appeals from a July 26, 2019 order denying his 

petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We 

affirm. 

Defendant was indicted on first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a), 

second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

4(a), and second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b),

in connection with the 2012 shooting death of David Lewis. In 2015, defendant 

pled guilty, under a separate indictment, to a violation of probation relating to a 

prior two-year probationary sentence he received for a guilty plea to third-degree 

eluding. On the same date, he also pled guilty to third-degree aggravated 

manslaughter under the first indictment. In September 2015, defendant was 

terminated from probation, and sentenced on both indictments to an aggregate 

term of twenty years in state prison, subject to the No Early Release Act, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

By way of background, Lewis was gambling in an alleyway near a 

residence on East Paul Avenue in Trenton when he was shot and killed. The 

investigation was led by Trenton Police Detective Brian Jones. Jones received 

information from Detective Ryan Woodhead that a confidential informant 
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identified the shooter as "Quay". Defendant's mother also identified Quay as 

defendant's best friend. 

An eyewitness identified the individuals gambling in the alley as Quay, 

defendant, and another male. The witness heard Quay tell defendant to "get a

gun" and later discovered Lewis shot. A second witness, who was playing dice 

with Quay, heard him arguing with someone and heard shots, ran out of the 

alley, and got into a car Quay was driving. A third witness also heard the shots 

and saw people running from the alley, including defendant. 

Jones interviewed another witness, David Wesley. Prior to doing so, 

Jones read Wesley his Miranda1rights and explained the definition of coercion 

to confirm Wesley understood his rights. Wesley confirmed he understood his 

rights and signed the Miranda waiver form. Wesley then stated he saw defendant 

shoot Lewis several times. Wesley and defendant got into Quay's car and 

Wesley heard defendant confess to shooting Lewis. 

Before entering his plea, defendant filed a motion to suppress his 

statement to police relating to the Lewis shooting. The following facts were 

adduced at the suppression hearing at which Jones testified. The same day 

detectives interviewed Wesley, they located defendant and brought him to the 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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police department for an interview. Prior to the interview, Jones inquired about 

defendant's level of education. Defendant stated he had a ninth-grade education, 

was "in special education" and could read "a little bit." Jones then read the 

Trenton Police Department Miranda Rights Form to defendant. Defendant 

confirmed he understood his rights, and Jones then read the waiver of rights 

portion of the form and explained the meaning of coercion. Defendant stated he 

understood the definition and his rights and signed the waiver form. 

Detectives did not inform defendant he was a suspect in the homicide. 

During the interview, defendant denied shooting Lewis but placed himself at the 

scene of the shooting. He then asked for an attorney and the interview ended. 

The motion judge issued a thirteen-page written opinion denying the 

motion. The judge found Jones credible. The judge determined defendant 

received a proper Miranda warning because he asked Jones to read it to him, 

confirmed he understood his rights and the waiver form, and signed the waiver. 

The judge distinguished defendant's case from State v. A.G.D., 178 N.J. 56 

(2003) and State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383 (2009), noting "no criminal 

complaint or arrest warrant was issued against [d]efendant" at the time of his 

interview. The judge concluded because "[d]efendant was merely a suspect . . . 

detectives were not required to reveal to him their suspicions . . . ." 
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Applying the factors set forth in State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000), 

the trial judge concluded defendant's Miranda waiver was voluntary and 

uncoerced. The judge found as follows:

At the time of his interview on July 24, 2012[,] 

[d]efendant was [nineteen] and a half years old since he 

was born on January 7, 1992. Defendant informed the 

detectives he had a ninth-grade education and had 

attended "special education" classes, offering he had 

trouble reading. However, in spite of any educational 

limitations [d]efendant may have, he was able to have 

a responsive and intelligent conversation with the 

detectives. Defendant's answers to the detectives' 

questions shows he has the intellectual capacity to 

understand his rights, and make a waiver. In addition 

to his involvement with this current matter, [d]efendant 

had extensive experience with the criminal justice 

system for someone of his age. Defendant had one prior 

juvenile arrest, and had been arrested twice as an adult 

prior to this interview. Defendant was no neophyte to 

the criminal justice system leading this court to find 

[d]efendant understood the detectives wanted to take 

statements to be used against him at trial. 

The court finds the detectives' questioning of 

[d]efendant at the police station for approximately one 

hour and [thirty-five] minutes from approximately 2:48 

p.m. to 4:33 p.m. was not prolonged in nature and 

certainly did not involve any "physical punishment or 

mental exhaustion." Defendant was allowed to have a 

beverage, provided cigarettes, allowed to make a 

telephone call to his mother and girlfriend . . . .

. . . . 
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Examining the remainder of the [Presha] factors, 

and reviewing . . . the DVD of [d]efendant's interview, 

and considering [d]efendant's ability to have an 

intelligent and responsive conversation with the 

detectives, this court does not find [d]efendant was so 

mentally limited to prevent him from making a valid 

waiver.

. . . .

This court does not find any coercive techniques 

were used, and does not believe the [d]efendant's 

waiver was the product of coercion. All three 

detectives who questioned [d]efendant were polite and 

accommodating to [d]efendant. Defendant was 

provided a beverage and cigarettes, and his request to 

speak with his mother and girlfriend was honored.

In 2018, defendant filed a PCR petition and certification alleging trial 

counsel was ineffective 

for failing to investigate and confirm that the State's 

main witness . . . Wesley was willing to state that he 

was coerced by the police into saying that [defendant] 

was the shooter. [Defendant] gave this information to 

his trial attorney and she failed to investigate and obtain 

a statement from . . . Wesley. Had trial counsel 

obtained that information, [defendant] certified that he 

would not have entered a guilty plea but would have 

proceeded to trial or obtained a more favorable plea 

bargain from the State.

. . . Additionally, trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to distinguish . . . Nyhammer in the motion to 

suppress [defendant]'s statement to the police. Had trial 

counsel done so, [defendant]'s statement would have 

been suppressed. Had the statement been suppressed, 
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[defendant] certified that he would not have entered a 

guilty plea but would have proceeded to trial or 

obtained a more favorable plea bargain from the State. 

Following oral argument, Judge Robert Bingham, II issued a 

comprehensive twenty-page written decision denying the PCR petition. He

found defendant failed to overcome the presumption trial counsel's decision not 

to call Wesley was sound trial strategy and lacked a certification from Wesley

stating he was coerced. The judge found the assertions in defendant's 

certification were disproved by the evidence in the record. He stated:

Even if trial counsel had, in fact, obtained a statement 

from Wesley, defendant's assertion that he would not 

have entered a guilty plea would still rely on the 

assumption that (l) Wesley was in fact coerced and (2) 

would have given a statement to that effect. . . . But 

during his interview with . . . Jones, Wesley seemed to 

understand the meaning of coercion after Jones 

explained the term to him. He then signed the waiver 

and gave a statement, which undermine defendant's 

assertion that Wesley would have stated he was 

coerced. Furthermore, defendant's argument relies on 

mere speculation that the investigation of Wesley's 

statement to police would have resulted in a more 

favorable plea bargain from the State. This theory 

appears to disregard other witness statements and 

defendant's own statement to police.

The judge concluded defendant's contentions were conjectural, "bald 

assertions", and failed to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984); see State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 

42 (1987).

The judge also rejected defendant's argument his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to distinguish Nyhammer because defendant was not 

subject to a criminal complaint or arrest warrant and therefore police were not 

required to advise him that he was a suspect. The judge noted when detectives 

were interviewing defendant "[t]he State was still in the investigatory stage, as 

the evidence shows several witnesses had identified several individuals at the 

crime scene. Also, defendant having been read and having waived his Miranda

rights, was aware what he said could be used against him." He concluded 

defendant did not show that if counsel had distinguished Nyhammer it would 

have led to suppression of his statement, a more favorable plea bargain, "or that 

[he would have] proceed[ed] to trial rather than entering a guilty plea." 

Citing the motion judge's findings, Judge Bingham rejected defendant's 

argument that his level of education rendered the Miranda waiver invalid. He 

added the following: 

Defendant's limited education does not prevent his 

ability to give a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 

waiver of his Miranda rights. A defendant's education 

level or intelligence is only one factor in determining 

whether there was a valid waiver of Miranda rights. 

Nor does involvement in special education or even mild 
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"[cognitively disabled]" automatically render a waiver 

invalid. State v. Carpenter, 268 N.J. Super. 378, 385 

(App. Div. 1993). In Carpenter, the defendant had the 

mental capacity of a ten-year old child and a forensic 

psychiatrist testified that he was competent to stand

trial but did not have the mental sophistication to 

understand Miranda warnings unless explained to him 

and broken down. Id. at 381-82. Nonetheless, the trial 

court properly found when looking at . . . all of the 

factors, that defendant knowingly and intelligently 

waived his Miranda rights. Id. at 386.

Defendant raises the following arguments on appeal:

POINT ONE — THE PCR COURT ERRED IN 

DENYING [DEFENDANT'S] PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING AS TESTIMONY IS 

NEEDED FROM PRIOR COUNSEL EXPLAINING 

WHY SHE FAILED TO CONTACT AND 

INTERVIEW DAVID WESLEY, AS HE WOULD 

HAVE ADMITTED HE WAS COERCED BY POLICE 

TO SAY [DEFENDANT] WAS THE SHOOTER.

POINT TWO — THE PCR COURT ERRED IN 

DENYING [DEFENDANT'S] PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF AS TESTIMONY IS 

NEEDED FROM PRIOR COUNSEL TO EXPLAIN 

WHY SHE FAILED TO DISTINGUISH . . . 

NYHAMMER, . . . IN ARGUING FOR THE 

SUPPRESSION OF [DEFENDANT'S] STATEMENT 

TO POLICE. 

We review a judge's denial of PCR without an evidentiary hearing de 

novo. State v. Jackson, 454 N.J. Super. 284, 291 (App. Div. 2018) (citing State 

v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 421 (2004)). To reverse a conviction based on 
10 A-0191-19

ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate both: (1) 

"counsel's performance was deficient" and (2) counsel's "errors were so serious 

as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial . . . ." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see

Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58 (adopting the Strickland two-part test). Under the first 

prong, counsel's representation must be objectively unreasonable. State v. 

Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 578 (2015). Under the second prong, a "reasonable 

probability [must exist] that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 

of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 583 (quoting Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 694).

The PCR court has discretion to determine whether a hearing is necessary 

to aid in its analysis. State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 157-58 (1997). If the court 

decides a defendant's allegations "are too vague, conclusory, or speculative to 

warrant an evidentiary hearing . . . then an evidentiary hearing need not be 

granted." Ibid. (citing State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462-64 (1992)). "[A] 

petitioner must do more than make bald assertions that he was denied the 

effective assistance of counsel. He must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate 

counsel's alleged substandard performance . . . [and] assert the facts that an 

investigation would have revealed . . . ." State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 

154, 170 (App. Div. 1999).
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Prejudice is not presumed. Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52. This is because there is 

a strong presumption trial counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made all 

significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 

Having thoroughly reviewed the record pursuant to these principles, we 

affirm for the reasons set forth in Judge Bingham's opinion. The record does 

not establish a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel to grant 

either an evidentiary hearing or post-conviction relief. 

Affirmed.