COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judge Elder and Senior Judge Cole 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

ANDREW LEWIS ADAMS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1884-95-2 CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON 

 AUGUST 27, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

James B. Wilkinson, Judge 

 Patricia P. Nagel, Assistant Public Defender 

(David J. Johnson, Public Defender; Office of 

the Public Defender, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 John K. Byrum, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Andrew Lewis Adams appeals from his conviction of conspiracy 

to distribute cocaine in violation of Virginia Code § 18.2-256. 

He argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove the 

existence of an agreement to distribute cocaine between him and 

codefendant. We disagree and affirm the conviction. 

 On March 30, 1995, Officers Eric S. Lee and Leigh Ashtiani 

were assigned to an undercover controlled-buy operation in the 

City of Richmond. While driving down Southlawn Boulevard in an 

unmarked police vehicle they encountered appellant and 

codefendant, a female later identified as Yvette Liles. As the 

officers drove by, appellant motioned for the officers to pull 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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over. After the officers stopped, appellant approached the 

vehicle and engaged in a conversation with Lee, the driver, 

through the open passenger side window. At trial, Lee related 

the conversation as follows: 

 The first thing I said once he [appellant] 

got to the vehicle was, yo, what's up. At 

that point, he [appellant] came over and said 

what's up man? I said I am looking. He 

[appellant] then said, in a rather distinct 

voice, what are you looking for? I said I 

need something to set me off. He [appellant] 

said what? I then said a rock. He 

[appellant] said how much man? And I told 

him all I can do is a twenty. 

At that point, appellant turned to codefendant who was standing 

on the sidewalk and told codefendant to come over to the car. 

Codefendant did so, at which point the appellant asked if he and 

the codefendant could get into the car. Officer Lee declined and 

told appellant that he had the money "right here." Officer Lee 

then handed the money to Officer Ashtiani who then passed the 

money to codefendant. Codefendant then reached into her pocket 

and passed drugs to Ashtiani. Appellant and codefendant then 

walked away together and were arrested together shortly 

thereafter. 

 On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Higginbotham v. 

Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). 

The judgment of the trial court is presumed correct, Daley v. 

Commonwealth, 132 Va. 621, 111 S.E. 111 (1922), and in a 
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circumstantial case, the inferences drawn by the fact finder will 

not be disturbed on appeal as long as they are reasonable and 

justified. O'Brien v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1045, 1049, 243 

S.E.2d 231, 233 (1978). 

 "Conspiracy is defined as `an agreement between two or more 

persons by some concerted action to commit an offense.'" Feigley 

v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 717, 722, 432 S.E.2d 520, 524 (1993) 

(quoting Wright v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 502, 505, 297 S.E.2d 

711, 713 (1992)). "There can be no conspiracy without an 

agreement, and the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that an agreement existed." Id. (quoting Floyd v. 

Commonwealth, 219 Va. 575, 580, 249 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1978)). 

However, "[p]roof of an explicit agreement is not required and 

oftentimes the prosecution must rely only on circumstantial 

evidence to establish the conspiracy." Stevens v. Commonwealth, 

14 Va. App. 238, 241, 415 S.E.2d 881, 883 (1992). 

 In Feigley, we addressed the question of when a multi-party 

drug sale would give rise to an agreement to distribute, and 

therein held that 

 the agreement must be that two or more 

persons will act in concert to commit a crime 

. . . if two or more people agree in advance 

to act in concert to sell drugs, where one 

serves as the "supplier" and the other as the 

"runner," an agreement to distribute drugs 

exists and a conspiracy has been proven. It 

is proof of the second element, the agreement 

to distribute, that "establishes the 

necessary preconcert and connivance" 

necessary to prove a conspiracy. 

16 Va. App. at 722-23, 432 S.E.2d at 524 (quoting Zuniga v. 
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Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 523, 529, 375 S.E.2d 381, 385 (1988)). 

 Here, the record indicates that appellant and codefendant 

had reached an agreement and conspired to distribute drugs. 

Trial testimony creates an inference that appellant and 

codefendant operated as a team, wherein the appellant flagged 

down the vehicle, made inquiries, and having determined the kind 

and quantity of drug desired, motioned codefendant to approach 

and complete the transaction. The evidence presented at trial 

makes certain that appellant realized the nature of the activity. 

 It was appellant, not codefendant, that solicited the sale and 

inquired as to what substance was sought. Likewise, appellant 

ascertained the amount to be spent. Codefendant then, on cue, 

completed the transaction in progress. Such activity is 

sufficient to demonstrate the preconcert and connivance necessary 

to prove a conspiracy. 

 The facts here are distinguishable from those in Feigley, 16 

Va. App. 717, 432 S.E.2d 520, upon which appellant relies, where 

we considered a multi-party drug deal involving an undercover 

police officer, defendant and three other individuals. We found 

that there was no evidence to prove Feigley and another had 

prearranged that they would distribute drugs or that another 

would run drugs for Feigley. 

 Unlike Feigley, the record in this case contains facts 

sufficient to justify the trial court's decision that an 

agreement existed. Here, unlike in Feigley, the appellant was 

not contacted after the sale was initiated and then asked to 
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supply the drugs, thereby leaving it undecided on the record as 

to whether there had been a prior agreement to distribute drugs. 

Instead, here the evidence presented establishes concerted 

actions of appellant and codefendant sufficient to prove an 

agreement. Appellant initiated and established the terms of the 

deal while codefendant awaited her cue to enter and complete the 

sale. When appellant made the initial contact he asked if he and

codefendant could get into the car to complete the transaction. 

Both were present for the duration of the transaction and each 

performed in accordance with a reasonably inferred plan or system 

of operation. 

 Finding sufficient evidence of an agreement between 

appellant and codefendant to distribute cocaine, we affirm. 

 Affirmed.