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 [Dkt. No. 35] 

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

 CAMDEN VICINAGE 

AARON R. JOHNSON, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

LOUIS KING, 

 Defendant. 

 

 Civil No. 11-3836 RMB/JS 

 MEMORANDUM ORDER 

Aaron R. Johnson 

546546C 

S.W.S.P.215 Burlington Road 

Brudgeton, NJ 08302 

Pro se Plaintiff 

James T. Dugan 

Atlantic County Department of Law 

1333 Atlantic Avenue, 8th Floor 

Atlantic City, New Jersey 08401 

Attorneys for Defendant 

Pro se Plaintiff Aaron Johnson (“Plaintiff”) claims, 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that Defendant Louis King 

(“Defendant”) violated Plaintiff’s constitutional right to be 

free from excessive force. Defendant has moved for summary 

judgment. For the reasons that follow, that motion is DENIED. 

I. Background 

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 Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee incarcerated in the 

Atlantic County Justice Facility. Plaintiff claims that 

Defendant, a corrections officer at the facility, kicked 

Plaintiff down a set of stairs while Defendant was escorting 

Plaintiff from the showers. Plaintiff’s principal evidence in 

support of this claim is the eyewitness account of a fellow 

inmate - Michael Williams. 

Defendant disputes Plaintiff’s version of events and claims 

that Plaintiff simply fell down the stairs. 

II. Standard 

 Summary judgment should only be granted if “there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). 

“An issue is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary 

basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving 

party, and a factual dispute is material only if it might affect 

the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Kaucher v. County 

of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). 

 In opposing a motion for summary judgment, a litigant may 

not stand on his pleadings alone, but must instead cite to 

particular parts of materials in the record, including 

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depositions, documents, electronically stored information, 

affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made 

for purposes of the motion only) or other materials in support of 

their claim. Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c). 

III. Analysis 

 Plaintiff has asserted excessive force claims against 

Defendant in both his official and individual capacities. 

Defendants have moved for summary judgment as to each. For the 

reasons set out below, Defendant’s motion is granted with respect 

to the claim against Defendant in his official capacity and 

denied with respect to Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant 

individually. 

 A. Plaintiff’s Official Capacity Claim 

 Defendant is entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff’s official 

capacity claim for two reasons: (1) because as a state employee, 

he is not a “person” amenable to suit under Section 1983; and (2) 

because the claim against him officially is barred by the 

Eleventh Amendment. Clayton v. Clement, No. 06-5426, 2007 WL 

4260002, at *4-5 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2007) (holding that state 

officers sued in their official capacities are immune from suit 

under the Eleventh Amendment and are not considered “persons 

within the meaning of Section 1983”); Afdahl v. Cancellieri, No. 

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09-1332, 2009 WL 5213992, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2009) 

(dismissing suit against prison official sued in his official 

capacity on same grounds); Rodriguez v. Hayman, No. 08-4239, 2009 

WL 4122251, at *4-5 (D.N.J. Nov. 23, 2009) (dismissing suit 

against state prison guards in their official capacities on same 

grounds). 

 B. Plaintiff’s Individual Capacity Claim 

 Defendant argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity 

on Plaintiff’s individual capacity claim. To determine whether 

an officer is entitled to qualified immunity from suit, courts 

ask two questions: “(1) whether the officer violated a 

constitutional right,” and “(2) whether the right was clearly 

established, such that it would have been clear to a reasonable 

officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he 

confronted.” Lamont v. N.J., 637 F.3d 177, 182 (3d Cir.2011) 

(quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2001) (internal 

quotations and brackets omitted)). The officer seeking to invoke 

qualified immunity has the burden of proving its applicability. 

See Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 223 (3d Cir. 2010). The 

Court addresses each question in turn. 

1. Did Defendant Violate A Constitutional Right? 

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In determining whether there was a violation of a 

constitutional right, the Court must first determine what 

standard applies. While it is clear that pre-trial detainee 

excessive force claims are analyzed under the Fourteenth 

Amendment, it is unclear what standard applies here. Johnson v. 

Bondiskey, No. 11-3836, 2011 WL 3236519, at *4 (D.N.J. July 27, 

2011)(holding that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to pre-trial 

detainee excessive force claims); see Carson v. Mulvihill, 488 F. 

App’x 554, 562 (3d Cir. 2012)(declining to decide what more 

particular standard applies in circumstances like here). 

The Third Circuit has made plain that, in the context of a 

prison disturbance, the standard applied to pre-trial detainees 

is the same as that applied in Eighth Amendment prisoner 

excessive force cases. Carson, 488 F. App’x at 562. Under that 

standard, courts look to both subjective and objective elements. 

Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1992). Subjectively, courts 

assess whether prison officials applied force “in a good faith 

effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and 

sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Johnson, 

2011 WL 3236519, at *3 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6.). 

Objectively, courts consider whether officials’ conduct was 

“objectively harmful enough” that it offends “contemporary 

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standards of decency.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8. In weighing these 

issues, the courts look to the following factors: 

 (1) the need for the application of force; 

(2) the relationship between the need and the amount of 

force used; 

(3) the extent of the injury inflicted; 

(4) the extent of the threat to the safety of prison staff 

and inmates, as reasonably perceived by prison 

officials on the facts known to them; and 

(5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful 

response. 

Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000). 

Outside of the context of a prison disturbance, however, the 

Third Circuit has not yet specifically addressed the contours of 

an excessive force claim by a pre-trial detainee. Carson, 488 F. 

App’x at 562.1 Generally, courts assessing the treatment of pretrial detainees look to whether the treatment of the prisoner is: 

(1) rationally related to a legitimate non-punitive governmental 

purpose; and (2) whether the treatment of the prisoner appears 

excessive in relation to that purpose. Id. at 560 (3d Cir. 

2012)(citing to Bell v Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)). 

 

1

 Other Circuit Courts have not distinguished pre-trial detainee excessive 

force claims on this basis and instead held that Eighth Amendment 

excessive force principles are applicable to all pre-trial detainee 

claims. DeBoe v. Du Bois, No. 12-53, 2012 WL 5908447, at *2 (2d Cir. 

Nov. 27, 2012); Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 11590, 1166 (4th Cir. 1997). 

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 Here, because the alleged incident did not occur in the 

context of a prison disturbance, it is unclear what standard 

applies. However, applying either standard articulated above, 

Plaintiff has presented a genuine issue of material fact as to 

whether Defendant violated Plaintiff’s right to be free from 

excessive force by kicking him down a flight of stairs without 

provocation. Under the standard this Circuit has applied in the 

context of a prison disturbance, an unprovoked kick down a set of 

stairs, would represent force used maliciously and sadistically 

to cause harm and not a good faith effort to maintain or restore 

discipline. Under the general standard applicable to pre-trial 

detainees, an unprovoked kick down a set of stairs would lack any 

rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.2 

 2. Was That Right Clearly Established? 

 Because the “[m]alicious and sadistic use of force is always 

in violation of clearly established law,” “qualified immunity 

affords no protections to defendants in” excessive force cases, 

whether analyzed under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. 

Fennell v. Gilstrap, 559 F.3d 1212, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009)(holding 

 

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 Defendant argues that, even crediting Plaintiff’s version of events, the 

use of force was de minimis and, therefore, not actionable. 

(Defendant’s Brief in Support of Summary Judgment at 16). This Court 

disagrees. Kicking someone down a set of stairs is not a de minimis use 

of force. 

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that where excessive force is established under either Eighth or 

Fourteenth Amendment, defendants have no entitlement to qualified 

immunity); Thomas v. Ferguson, 361 F. Supp. 2d 435 (D.N.J. 

2004)(Eighth Amendment); Athill v. Speziale, No. 06-4941, 2009 WL 

1874194, at *9 (Fourteenth Amendment); Shaffer v. Balicki, No. 

07-0031, 2010 WL 891336, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2010)(Eighth 

Amendment); Small v. Whittick, No. 06-1363, 2010 WL 3881303, at 

*4 (D.N.J. Sep. 27, 2010)(Eighth Amendment). 

Here, having found that Plaintiff presented a genuine issue 

of material fact as to whether Defendant violated his 

constitutional right to be free from excessive force, Defendant 

cannot claim that that right was not clearly established. 

IV. Conclusion 

 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment is DENIED, in part, and GRANTED, in part. It is DENIED 

with respect to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against 

Defendant in his individual capacity. This claim must be 

presented to a jury. It is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s 

excessive force claim against Defendant in his official capacity. 

That claim is dismissed with prejudice. 

 

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/s/Renée Marie Bumb 

 RENÉE MARIE BUMB 

 United States District Judge 

Dated: May 7, 2013 

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