1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

DEBORAH EHLING, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

MONMOUTH-OCEAN HOSPITAL 

SERVICE CORP., et al.,

 Defendants.

Civ. No. 2:11-cv-03305 (WJM) 

OPINION

 

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.: 

Plaintiff Deborah Ehling brings this action against Monmouth-Ocean Hospital 

Service Corp. (“MONOC”), Vincent Robbins, and Stacy Quagliana (collectively 

“Defendants”), alleging violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the 

Family Medical Leave Act, and various state laws. This matter comes before the Court 

on Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 

for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. There was no oral 

argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Rule 

12(b)(6) motion is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part. 

I. BACKGROUND 

The following facts are drawn from the Amended Complaint and the documents 

that form the basis of Plaintiff’s claims. 

 Plaintiff Deborah Ehling is a registered nurse and paramedic. Defendant 

Monmouth-Ocean Hospital Service Corporation (“MONOC”) is a non-profit hospital 

service corporation dedicated to providing emergency medical services to the citizens of 

the State of New Jersey. Defendant Vincent Robbins is the President and CEO of 

MONOC. Defendant Stacy Quagliana is the Executive Director of Administration at 

MONOC. 

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Plaintiff was hired by MONOC in 2004 as a registered nurse and paramedic. In 

July of 2008, Plaintiff took over as the Acting President of the local union for 

Professional Emergency Medical Services Association – New Jersey (the “Union”). As 

President, Plaintiff was “very proactive in attempting to protect the rights and safety of 

her union members” and filed numerous complaints and charges against MONOC to that 

end. Am. Compl. 8. Plaintiff alleges that, as soon as she became President of the Union, 

Defendants began engaging in a pattern of retaliatory conduct against her, eventually 

culminating in her termination in July 2011. Although the Amended Complaint contains 

allegations regarding a wide range of conduct, the Court will discuss only those 

allegations that are relevant to the motion to dismiss. 

During the 2008-2009 timeframe, Plaintiff maintained an account on Facebook, a 

social networking website. According to Plaintiff, if someone was not invited to be her 

Facebook “friend,” he or she could not access and view postings on Plaintiff’s Facebook 

“wall.” Many of Plaintiff’s coworkers were invited to be Plaintiff’s Facebook friends. 

Plaintiff did not invite any members of MONOC management as friends. 

Plaintiff alleges that MONOC “[s]ubsequently . . . gained access to Ms. Ehling’s 

Facebook account by having a supervisor(s) summon a MONOC employee, who was 

also one of Ms. Ehling’s Facebook friends, into an office” and “coerc[ing], strongarrn[ing], and/or threaten[ing] the employee into accessing his Facebook account on the 

work computer in the supervisor’s presence.” Am. Compl. 20. Plaintiff claims that the 

supervisor viewed and copied Plaintiff’s Facebook postings. One such posting was a 

comment that Plaintiff made regarding a shooting that took place at the Holocaust 

Museum in Washington, DC, stating: 

An 88 yr old sociopath white supremacist opened fire in the Wash 

D.C. Holocaust Museum this morning and killed an innocent guard 

(leaving children). Other guards opened fire. The 88 yr old was 

shot. He survived. I blame the DC paramedics. I want to say 2 

things to the DC medics. 1. WHAT WERE YOU THINKING? 

and 2. This was your opportunity to really make a difference! 

WTF!!!! And to the other guards....go to target practice. 

Certification of Elizabeth Duffy (“Duffy Cert.”) Ex. C, ECF No. 11.1

 On June 17, 2009, 

MONOC sent letters regarding Plaintiff’s Facebook posting to the New Jersey Board of 

 

1

 The Court relies on the screenshot of Plaintiff’s Facebook page attached to the motion to 

dismiss, as Plaintiff’s Facebook posting is integral to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. See Am. 

Compl. ¶¶ 11-13, 18, 20-23; see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 

1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (“a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be 

considered without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment”) (internal 

citations omitted); Pryor v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002) 

(“documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party 

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Nursing and the New Jersey Department of Health, Office of Emergency Medical 

Services. The letters state that MONOC was concerned that Plaintiff’s Facebook posting 

showed a disregard for patient safety. See Duffy Cert. Ex. A, ECF No. 11. Plaintiff 

alleges that these letters were sent in a “malicious” attempt to attack Plaintiff, damage her 

reputation and employment opportunities, and potentially risk losing her nursing license 

and paramedic certification status. Am. Compl. 21-22. 

 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, 

in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

The moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated. Hedges v. 

United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). In deciding a motion to dismiss under 

Rule 12(b)(6), a court must take all allegations in the complaint as true and view them in 

the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); 

Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 

1998). 

Although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, “a plaintiff’s 

obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels 

and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, the factual allegations 

must be sufficient to raise a plaintiff’s right to relief above a speculative level, such that it 

is “plausible on its face.” See id. at 570; see also Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Serv., Inc., 

542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008). A claim has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 

at 1949 (2009).

III. DISCUSSION 

Defendants move to dismiss two of the nine counts in the Amended Complaint: 

(1) Count II, alleging a violation of the New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic 

Surveillance Control Act; and (2) Count IV, alleging common law invasion of privacy. 

Each issue will be addressed in turn. 

 

questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered” on a motion 

to dismiss). 

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a. N.J. WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 

CONTROL ACT (COUNT II) 

In Count II of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated 

the a. New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (“NJ Wiretap 

Act”), N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-27, “by accessing without permission and improperly 

monitoring the electronic communications being stored on the plaintiffs Facebook 

account.” Am. Compl. 59. Defendants move to dismiss Count II on the ground that the 

communication was not accessed in the course of transmission. The Court finds that 

Count II should be dismissed. 

The NJ Wiretap Act provides that: “A person is guilty of a crime of the fourth 

degree if he (1) knowingly accesses without authorization a facility through which an 

electronic communication service is provided or exceeds an authorization to access that 

facility, and (2) thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or 

electronic communication while that communication is in electronic storage.” N.J.S.A. 

2A:156A-27(a). “Electronic storage,” as used in the NJ Wiretap Act, is defined as: “(1) 

Any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to 

the electronic transmission thereof; and (2) Any storage of such communication by an 

electronic communication service for purpose of backup protection of the 

communication.” N.J.S.A. 2A:l56A-2(q). 

Based on the definition of “electronic storage,” New Jersey courts have held that 

the NJ Wiretap Act “protects only those electronic communications, which are in the 

course of transmission or are backup to that course of transmission.” White v. White, 344 

N.J. Super. 211, 220 (Ch. Div. 2001). Thus, in White, the court concluded that the NJ 

Wiretap Act “does not apply to electronic communications received by the recipient, 

placed in post-transmission storage, and then accessed by another without 

authorization[,]” because “the ‘strong expectation of privacy with respect to 

communication in the course of transmission significantly diminishes once transmission 

is complete.’” Id. at 220. This is consistent with federal courts’ interpretation of similar 

provisions of the federal Wiretap Act (18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.). See Fraser v. 

Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Every circuit court to 

have considered the matter has held that an ‘intercept’ under the ECPA must occur 

contemporaneously with transmission.”); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 

868, 878 (9th Cir. 2002) (dismissing claim for violation of the Wiretap Act in a case 

where employer gained access to restricted employee website because the electronic 

communication was not acquired “during transmission”). 

In this case, Plaintiff clearly failed to state a claim under the NJ Wiretap Act. The 

Amended Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff’s Facebook posting was in the course 

of transmission when Defendants viewed it. To the contrary, the Amended Complaint 

clearly states that the posting was live on the Facebook website for all of Plaintiff’s 

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Facebook friends to “access and view.” Am. Compl. 11. Because the posting was in 

post-transmission storage when Defendants accessed it, this communication does not fall 

under the purview of the NJ Wiretap Act. 

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Count II of the Amended Complaint is 

granted. 

b. COMMON LAW INVASION OF PRIVACY (COUNT VI) 

In Count VI of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a claim for common law 

invasion of privacy. Plaintiff’s claim is premised on Defendants’ alleged unauthorized 

“accessing of her private Facebook postings” regarding the Holocaust Museum shooter. 

Am. Compl. 78; Duffy Cert. Ex. C. Defendants move to dismiss Count VI, arguing that 

Plaintiff did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in her Facebook posting. The 

Court finds that the motion to dismiss Count VI should be denied. 

Under New Jersey law, to state a claim for intrusion upon one’s seclusion or 

private affairs, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that (1) her solitude, 

seclusion, or private affairs were intentionally infringed upon, and that (2) this 

infringement would highly offend a reasonable person. See Bisbee v. John C. Conover 

Agency Inc., 186 N.J. Super. 335, 339 (App. Div. 1982). “[E]xpectations of privacy are 

established by general social norms” and must be objectively reasonable – a plaintiff’s 

subjective belief that something is private is irrelevant. White, 344 N.J. Super. 211, 223 

(Ch. Div. 2001). 

Privacy in social networking is an emerging, but underdeveloped, area of case law. 

See Robert Sprague, Invasion of the Social Networks: Blurring the Line between 

Personal Life and the Employment Relationship, 50 U. Louisville L. Rev. 1, 13 (2011) 

(discussing the undefined legal boundary between public and private communications on 

social networking websites). There appears to be some consistency in the case law on the 

two ends of the privacy spectrum. On one end of the spectrum, there are cases holding 

that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for material posted to an unprotected 

website that anyone can view. See, e.g., United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F.Supp.2d 

205, 225 (D.P.R. 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 90 F. App’x 3 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[I]t it 

strikes the Court as obvious that a claim to privacy is unavailable to someone who places 

information on an indisputably, public medium, such as the Internet, without taking any 

measures to protect the information”); Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N.P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 44 

(Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that privacy was lost when private information was 

posted on a publicly accessible Internet website and “[a]ccess to the publication was not 

restricted”). On the other end of the spectrum, there are cases holding that there is a 

reasonable expectation of privacy for individual, password-protected online 

communications. See, e.g., Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 201 N.J. 300 (N.J. 

2010) (employee could have reasonably expected that e-mail communications with her 

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lawyer through her personal, password-protected, web-based e-mail account would 

remain private); Pure Power Boot Camp, Inc. v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, LLC, 587 F. 

Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 

personal, password-protected e-mail messages stored on a third party’s server, although 

the employee had accessed that outside server while at work). 

Courts, however, have not yet developed a coherent approach to communications 

falling between these two extremes. Although most courts hold that a communication is 

not necessarily public just because it is accessible to a number of people, courts differ 

dramatically in how far they think this theory extends. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A 

Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 919, 939, 973 (2005) (explaining 

that most courts have adopted the concept of “limited privacy,” which is “the idea that 

when an individual reveals private information about herself to one or more persons, she 

may retain a reasonable expectation that the recipients of the information will not 

disseminate it further.”); compare Multimedia Wmaz v. Kubach, 212 Ga. App. 707, 709 

& n.1 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (plaintiff’s disclosure of facts to sixty people did not render 

them public) with Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871, 878 

(8th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff’s disclosure of facts to two coworkers deprived her of a 

reasonable expectation of privacy). What is clear is that privacy determinations are made 

on a case-by-case basis, in light of all the facts presented. See Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. 

Group, No. 06-5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108834, at *20 (D.N.J. July 24, 2008). 

In this case, Plaintiff argues that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her 

Facebook posting because her comment was disclosed to a limited number of people who 

she had individually invited to view a restricted access webpage. Defendants argue that 

Plaintiff cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy because the comment was 

disclosed to dozens, if not hundreds, of people.2

 The Amended Complaint and 

underlying documents do not indicate how many Facebook friends Plaintiff had at the 

time the comment was made; thus, there is no indication of how many people could 

permissibly view Plaintiff’s posting. 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for invasion of privacy, 

especially given the open-ended nature of the case law. Plaintiff may have had a 

reasonable expectation that her Facebook posting would remain private, considering that 

she actively took steps to protect her Facebook page from public viewing. More 

importantly, however, reasonableness (and offensiveness) are highly fact-sensitive 

inquiries. As such, these issues are not properly resolved on a motion to dismiss. See 

2

 The parties did not cite any relevant case law in support of their arguments. Instead, they each 

cited to a single, non-analogous case. Plaintiff cited a case in which the Court held that there 

was no reasonable expectation of privacy in communications sent over the company e-mail 

system. See Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Defendants cited a case in 

which the person accused of invading the plaintiff’s privacy had direct, authorized access to the 

communications at issue. See White, 344 N.J. Super. at 223. 

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Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Group, No. 06-5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108834, at *20 

(D.N.J. July 24, 2008) (“[T]he question of the reasonableness of the Plaintiffs’ 

expectations of privacy is a question of fact for the jury to decide.”). 

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Count VI of the Amended Complaint is 

denied. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in 

part, and DENIED in part. Specifically, the motion to dismiss Count II of the 

Amended Complaint is granted, and Count II is dismissed with prejudice. The motion to 

dismiss Count VI is denied. An appropriate order follows. 

 

 /s/ William J. Martini 

 WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J. 

Date: May 30, 2012.

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