SUMMARY

January 23, 2020

2020COA11

No. 18CA2342, Marriage of Wright — Family Law —

Dissolution — Spousal Maintenance

A division of the court of appeals discusses the specific 

findings a district court must make when determining a 

maintenance award and concludes that a district court errs by 

failing to follow the detailed procedure set forth in section 14-10-

114, C.R.S. 2019.

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2020COA11

Court of Appeals No. 18CA2342

El Paso County District Court No. 18DR2009

Honorable Theresa M. Cisneros, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Wayne Marcus Wright, Jr., 

Appellant,

and

Karen Cadine Wright,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, 

AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII

Opinion by JUDGE TOW

J. Jones and Fox, JJ., concur

Announced January 23, 2020

Gwendolyn M. Lawson, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant

McKinney & Associates P.C., Nathan D. McKinney, Erin Gardner, Amanda C. 

Musselwhite, Austin G. Jackson, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
1

¶ 1 Wayne Marcus Wright, Jr. (husband), appeals from the 

property division, maintenance award, and an attorney fees 

sanction entered in connection with the dissolution of his marriage 

to Karen Cadine Wright (wife). We affirm in part, reverse in part, 

and remand for further proceedings. In doing so, we hold that a 

district court errs when it fails to make specific findings to support 

its maintenance award, and we set forth in detail the step-by-step 

procedure the district court must follow when determining 

maintenance. 

I. Property Division

¶ 2 Husband contends that the property division is inequitable, 

arguing that the court (1) failed to value the personal property; (2) 

failed to include wife’s Jamaican property as part of the marital 

estate; and (3) ordered him to pay more of the marital debts. We 

perceive no abuse of discretion in the property division. See In re 

Marriage of Powell, 220 P.3d 952, 954 (Colo. App. 2009). 

A. Applicable Law

¶ 3 The district court shall divide the marital property in such 

proportions as it deems just. § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2019. The 

property division must be equitable, but not necessarily equal. In re 
2

Marriage of Antuna, 8 P.3d 589, 594 (Colo. App. 2000). And an 

equitable division depends on the facts and circumstances of each 

case. In re Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 35 (Colo. 2001). “The 

key to an equitable distribution is fairness, not mathematical 

precision.” In re Marriage of Gallo, 752 P.2d 47, 55 (Colo. 1988).

B. Analysis

1. Valuation

¶ 4 A district court is required to find the approximate current 

value of all property owned by the parties. In re Marriage of 

Zappanti, 80 P.3d 889, 892 (Colo. App. 2003). But specific findings 

as to the value of each asset are not always required. See In re 

Marriage of Page, 70 P.3d 579, 582 (Colo. App. 2003). For example, 

if the parties’ valuations of an asset conflict, the court may order 

that each party should retain the property in his or her possession 

without attributing a value. See Antuna, 8 P.3d at 595. 

¶ 5 Wife valued the personal property at $2900, and husband 

initially said it was worth $500. But at the hearing, husband 

offered unsubstantiated “estimates” of value for particular items, 

such as $500 for the bedroom furniture, “somewhere in the range of 
3

$600, $700” for lamps, and “several hundred [dollars]” for paintings 

and mirrors. 

¶ 6 On this conflicting and imprecise evidence, we do not find an 

abuse of discretion in the court’s conclusion that it was “almost an 

impossibility” to value the personal property and its finding that it 

was equitable for each party to retain the property in his or her

possession. See id. 

2. Jamaican Home

¶ 7 Husband believed that wife and her mother owned a home in 

Jamaica. Wife testified that she no longer owned the home after her 

mother refinanced it but acknowledged that it was worth $3600. 

Even if we assume that wife still owns the home, husband testified 

without contradiction that the home was wife’s premarital property. 

¶ 8 Marital property does not include property acquired by one 

party before the marriage. See § 14-10-113(4); see also § 14-10-

113(1) (court must set separate property aside to each spouse 

before dividing marital property). Save for exceptions not relevant 

here, only the increase in value of separate property is marital

property subject to division. See § 14-10-113(1)(d), (4). Yet there 

was no evidence at the hearing to show any increase in value for the 
4

property in Jamaica and, thus, no marital value for the court to 

attribute as part of the property division. See Zappanti, 80 P.3d at

892 (parties must provide evidence sufficient to support their 

claims); see also In re Marriage of Krejci, 2013 COA 6, ¶ 23 (a 

party’s failure to give the court sufficient information to rule on an 

issue does not provide grounds for reversal). We thus perceive no 

error in the omission of this property from the property division.

3. Marital Debt

¶ 9 The court should not assign marital liabilities 

disproportionately to one spouse. In re Marriage of Speirs, 956 P.2d 

622, 623 (Colo. App. 1997) (citing In re Marriage of Kiefer, 738 P.2d 

54 (Colo. App. 1987)). However, Speirs cannot be read to require a 

mathematically equal division of marital debt. For one thing, such 

a requirement would be inconsistent with the “equitable, but not 

necessarily equal” principle reiterated in Antuna. Moreover, in

Kiefer, on which the Speirs division relied, a division of this court 

reversed a property division that had divided a portion of the value 

of the marital home between the spouses but had allocated all of 

the encumbrance on the home to only one spouse. The division 

specifically disavowed any requirement that the court deduct the 
5

amount of the encumbrances before dividing the net value of the 

home. 738 P.2d at 56. Moreover, it noted that under the 

circumstances of that case — where the court had found that the 

parties’ contributions to the marriage and the marital estate were 

roughly equal — “equity requires that wife share a part of the debt 

incurred on the home during the marriage as well as a part of the 

increase in the home’s value.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, Kiefer

and, by extension, Speirs merely stand for the general proposition 

acknowledged in Antuna — that the property and debt division 

must be equitable. 

¶ 10 The court here found that all the parties’ debt was marital, 

which husband does not appear to dispute on appeal. Given the 

disparity in the parties’ income, the court deemed it fair to divide 

the marital debt proportionately to the parties’ incomes, so it 

required husband to pay $29,486.90 of the marital debt while wife 

would pay the remaining $12,886.47. As the record shows that 

husband’s income is more than four times wife’s, the court could 

reasonably conclude that husband had the financial means with 

which to pay more of the debts. See § 14-10-113(1)(c) (requiring the 

court to consider the economic circumstances of each spouse when 
6

dividing property); see also In re Marriage of Faulkner, 652 P.2d 

572, 574 (Colo. 1982) (“It should appear obvious that a spouse’s 

earning capabilities are properly part of the ‘economic 

circumstances’ the court must consider in compliance with [the 

maintenance statute].”). We thus see no abuse of discretion in the 

unequal, but equitable, division of debts.1

4. The Overall Property Division

¶ 11 The parties’ marital estate included their marital debt, the 

personal property, and husband’s $4000 401(k). As mentioned, the 

court ordered that the parties would keep the personal property in 

their possession, and it divided the marital debt in proportion to 

income. The court also allocated the 401(k) equally between the 

parties. In light of the limited estate, and recognizing that husband 

was earning $9583 per month while wife was “living at poverty 

level,” this property division is fair and equitable. See § 14-10-

 1 In allocating the debts “in proportion to income,” the court used a 

“40/60” split, reflecting the relative income figures after adjusting 

for the maintenance award. Because property division is supposed 

to be completed before maintenance is determined, see In re 

Marriage of de Koning, 2016 CO 2, ¶ 21, this procedure may have 

been erroneous. However, because neither party challenges this 

aspect of the order, we will not disturb the order on that basis.
7

113(1)(c) (property division requires the court to consider the 

parties’ economic circumstances).2

II. Maintenance Award

¶ 12 Husband contends that the district court abused its discretion 

by awarding wife spousal maintenance without applying the 

required statutory factors. We agree, and therefore reverse and 

remand the maintenance award for reconsideration.

¶ 13 Section 14-10-114(3), C.R.S. 2019, details a specific process a 

district court must follow when considering a maintenance request. 

In re Marriage of Vittetoe, 2016 COA 71, ¶¶ 8-9. 

¶ 14 First, a court considering a maintenance request 

shall make initial written or oral findings 

concerning:

(A) The amount of each party’s gross income;

(B) The marital property apportioned to each 

party;

(C) The financial resources of each party, 

including but not limited to the actual or 

 2 We have not considered husband’s new assertion that wife failed 

to disclose her current finances and provide mandatory disclosures 

before the hearing, as he did not raise such challenges in the 

district court. See In re Marriage of Wells, 252 P.3d 1212, 1215 

(Colo. App. 2011) (reviewing court will not address issues not 

presented in the district court).
8

potential income from separate or marital

property;

(D) Reasonable financial need as established 

during the marriage; and

(E) Whether maintenance awarded pursuant to 

this section would be deductible for federal 

income tax purposes by the payor and taxable 

income to the recipient.

§ 14-10-114(3)(a)(I); see also People in Interest of C.N., 2018 COA 

165, ¶ 35 (the word “shall” in a statute has a mandatory 

connotation).

¶ 15 Next, the court 

shall determine the amount and term of the 

maintenance award, if any, that is fair and 

equitable to both parties after considering:

(A) The guideline amount and term of 

maintenance set forth in paragraph (b) of 

subsection (3), if applicable, based upon the 

duration of the marriage and the combined 

gross incomes of the parties;

(B) The factors relating to the amount and 

term of maintenance set forth in paragraph (c) 

of this subsection (3); and

(C) Whether the party seeking maintenance 

has met the requirement for a maintenance 

award pursuant to paragraph (d) of this 

subsection (3).
9

§ 14-10-114(3)(a)(II). The section 14-10-114(3)(b) guidelines do not 

create a presumptive amount or term of maintenance. § 14-10-

114(3)(e). Moreover, the factors set forth in section 14-10-114(3)(c) 

are not exclusive, as the final factor is “[a]ny other factor that the 

court deems relevant.” § 14-10-114(3)(c)(XIII). Thus, “[t]he court 

has discretion to determine the award of maintenance that is fair 

and equitable to both parties based upon the totality of the 

circumstances.” § 14-10-114(3)(e). 

¶ 16 Finally, the court must consider whether the party seeking 

maintenance has met the requirement for a maintenance award 

under section 14-10-114(3)(d). § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(C). The statute 

makes clear, however, that the court is to consider this issue only 

“[a]fter considering the provisions of this section and making the 

required findings of fact.” § 14-10-114(3)(d). Under this section,

the court shall award maintenance 

only if it finds that the spouse seeking 

maintenance lacks sufficient property, 

including marital property apportioned to him 

or her, to provide for his or her reasonable 

needs and is unable to support himself or 

herself through appropriate employment or is 

the custodian of a child whose condition or 

circumstances make it inappropriate for the 
10

spouse to be required to seek employment 

outside the home.

In other words, although the legislature has instructed the trial 

court to consider this arguably threshold inquiry last, it is 

nevertheless an essential finding before maintenance may be 

awarded. 

¶ 17 Whether the court grants or denies a maintenance request, it 

“shall make specific written or oral findings in support of” its 

decision. § 14-10-114(3)(e).

¶ 18 The following is the court’s maintenance order:

3. The Court Orders that Mr. Wright pay 

spousal maintenance to Mrs. Wright.

a. The Court finds that Mrs. Wright has a need 

for spousal maintenance and that Mr. Wright 

has the ability to pay.

b. The Court Orders that Mr. Wright pay 

$2,585 per month in spousal maintenance for 

6 years and 4 months. The Court calculates 

that amount based on a finding that the 

parties were married for 12 years and 8 

months, that Mrs. Wright earns $2,080 per 

month and Mr. Wright earns $9,583 per 

month. The Court finds that under C.R.S. § 

14-10-114, the Court is able to find that the 

guideline amount is the proper amount.

c. The Court generated a Spousal Maintenance 

and [a] Child Support worksheet to reflect 

these calculations which have been filed 
11

contemporaneously with this Order and are

hereby incorporated as a part of the Order. 

¶ 19 These findings are insufficient under the statute, since they 

lack most of the required findings under subsections (3)(a)(I) and 

(3)(d) and do not demonstrate consideration of any of the thirteen 

factors within subsection (3)(c). The first step requires specific 

findings, either written or oral. The district court did not make any 

findings regarding the parties’ reasonable needs as established 

during the marriage, or whether the maintenance would be 

deductible for federal income tax purposes. 

¶ 20 The second step does not require explicit findings. However, 

while a district court has no obligation to make specific factual 

findings on every factor listed in section 14-10-114(3)(c), it must 

“make sufficiently explicit findings of fact to give the appellate court 

a clear understanding of the basis of its order.” In re Marriage of 

Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9. We are not convinced by wife’s 

argument that it is enough for the court to have made a 

“generalized statement” that it looked at the statutory factors. See 

id. Although the district court alluded to “the additional criteria set 
12

out in [section] 14-10-114,” there is no other indication in the 

court’s findings that those criteria were meaningfully considered. 

¶ 21 For example, the district court made no mention of husband’s 

claim that wife was underemployed.3 Moreover, the district court 

did not mention, and it is unclear whether it considered, the impact 

of the disproportionate allocation of marital debts on either wife’s 

needs or husband’s ability to pay. 

¶ 22 Here, the district court first considered whether wife qualified 

for maintenance, which pursuant to statute is supposed to be the 

last thing considered. Next, the district court calculated the 

amount and term pursuant to the statutory guideline, incorporating 

the first of the required written findings under section 14-10-

 3 Husband’s opening brief includes a variety of factual assertions 

regarding the income potential of someone who holds a 

phlebotomist license. We cannot consider those assertions, as they 

rely on factual material not provided to the district court. Nor do 

we express any opinion as to whether wife is voluntarily 

underemployed. That decision is for the district court to make after 

considering the relevant evidence and case law. See, e.g., People v. 

Martinez, 70 P.3d 474, 475 (Colo. 2003) (“The income imputation 

inquiry must start with whether the parent is shirking a child 

support obligation.”). Though Martinez was a child support case, 

the analysis of voluntary underemployment is the same in a 

maintenance case. See In re Marriage of Tooker, 2019 COA 83, 

¶¶ 25-27. 
13

114(3)(a)(I). Finally, the court observed in its oral order that the 

evidence “as well as the additional criteria set out in [section] 14-

10-114 cause the court to be able to find that the guideline amount 

is the proper amount for spousal maintenance.” In other words, it 

appears that the court gave the guideline amount presumptive 

effect, then looked for but did not find any reason to deviate from 

that amount. This is not the process required by statute. 

¶ 23 Accordingly, we reverse the maintenance award and remand 

for the district court to follow the procedure specified by section 14-

10-114(3), making findings where required and addressing the 

factors relevant to its maintenance determination. The findings 

entered on remand must be sufficient for us to determine the basis 

for the maintenance award. See Gibbs, ¶ 9.

¶ 24 Because maintenance is based on the parties’ financial 

circumstances at the time the order is entered, the district court 

should consider the parties’ current circumstances on remand. See 

In re Marriage of Kann, 2017 COA 94, ¶ 79. For that reason, we 

need not consider husband’s argument that the court improperly 

calculated wife’s income. 
14

III. Attorney Fees Sanction

¶ 25 Wife moved to compel husband’s disclosure of bank 

statements, credit card statements, and additional income 

documentation. Her motion sought sanctions under C.R.C.P. 

16.2(e) and attorney fees under C.R.C.P. 37. A few days after filing 

her motion, wife submitted a trial management certificate on her 

own behalf. Wife later submitted an attorney fee affidavit showing 

that “[t]o date,” she had incurred $6681.47 in attorney fees. 

¶ 26 After the permanent orders hearing, the court ordered 

husband to pay wife $2500 of attorney fees “for causing [wife] to 

have to file a [m]otion to [c]ompel by providing incomplete 

disclosures and for his failure to participate in the drafting of the 

[t]rial [m]anagement [c]ertificate.” Husband contends that this 

order is an abuse of discretion. We disagree.

¶ 27 Under C.R.C.P. 16.2(e), parties must disclose all information 

material to the resolution of the case, including mandatory 

disclosures such as sworn financial affidavits, personal bank 

statements, and income documentation. Under C.R.C.P. 16.2(h)(2), 

if at least one party is represented by counsel the parties shall 

prepare and file a joint trial management certificate (TMC). The 
15

district court has considerable discretion to impose appropriate 

sanctions if a party fails to comply with the provisions of C.R.C.P.

16.2. See C.R.C.P. 16.2(e), (j); In re Marriage of Cardona, 321 P.3d 

518, 527 (Colo. App. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 2014 CO 3. 

¶ 28 Under C.R.C.P. 37, a party may move for an order compelling 

disclosure and imposing sanctions. C.R.C.P. 37(a)(4)(A) allows the 

district court to require the party whose conduct necessitated the 

motion to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred 

in making the motion, including attorney fees.

¶ 29 We will not disturb the district court’s imposition of sanctions

absent an abuse of discretion. See Cardona, 321 P.3d at 527

(C.R.C.P. 16.2); Antolovich v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d 582, 

598 (Colo. App. 2007) (C.R.C.P. 37).

¶ 30 Despite husband’s cursory statement that he complied with 

disclosures, the record shows that he provided wife with limited 

financial information, which prompted wife’s motion to compel. In 

addition, husband did not cooperate in drafting the TMC, which the 

court concluded resulted in needlessly incurred expenses. Based 

on this record, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its 

discretion by imposing a sanction. 
16

¶ 31 Nor did husband ever challenge the reasonableness of the fee 

award or request a hearing in the district court to test that 

reasonableness. In fact, when submitting his objections to the form 

of the written order, he challenged only the decision to order fees, 

not the amount ordered.4 Thus, any challenge to the 

reasonableness of the fees ordered is not before us. See Metro Nat’l 

Bank v. Roe, 675 P.2d 331, 333 (Colo. App. 1983) (where the 

question of reasonableness of the attorney fees was not raised at 

the trial or hearing, it was not properly an issue on appeal). 

¶ 32 Similarly, because it was first raised in the reply brief, we do 

not consider husband’s argument that section 13-17-102(6), C.R.S. 

2019, prohibited the court from entering the sanction because he 

was pro se at the hearing. See In re Marriage of Drexler, 2013 COA 

43, ¶ 24 (reviewing court will not consider issues not raised until 

the reply brief).

 4 Husband’s version of the written order asserted that he had to pay 

his own attorney fees and that both parties should be responsible 

for their own fees. Husband’s argument appears to misunderstand 

the nature of the fee order. Fees were not ordered pursuant to 

section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2019, which provides for a balancing of 

the parties’ respective financial resources; rather, the fee award was 

a sanction for husband’s misconduct in pretrial disclosures. 
17

¶ 33 In any event, husband’s pro se status does not excuse his 

noncompliance with C.R.C.P. 16.2. See Prefer v. PharmNetRx, LLC, 

18 P.3d 844, 850 (Colo. App. 2000) (acting pro se does not excuse a 

party’s noncompliance with discovery rules); see also Rosenberg v. 

Grady, 843 P.2d 25, 26 (Colo. App. 1992) (“A pro se litigant who 

chooses to rely upon his own understanding of legal principles and 

procedures is required to follow the same procedural rules as those 

who are qualified to practice law and must be prepared to accept 

the consequences of his mistakes and errors.”). To be sure, 

C.R.C.P. 16.2 is drafted in a way that requires the parties, not just 

parties with counsel, to comply with its provisions. See, e.g., 

C.R.C.P. 16.2(b) (requiring the parties, counsel, and the court to 

evaluate the case at all stages); C.R.C.P. 16.2(c)(1)(B) (parties and 

counsel, if any, shall attend the initial status conference); C.R.C.P.

16.2(h)(1) (unrepresented parties shall file a brief statement 

identifying the disputed issues, witnesses, and exhibits).

IV. Bias or Prejudice

¶ 34 Husband contends that the permanent orders must be 

reversed because the district court’s bias and prejudice against men 

and his religion are evident in its rulings. While we disapprove of 
18

some of the court’s commentary, we disagree that it requires 

reversal.

¶ 35 At the hearing, wife testified that she volunteered at the 

parties’ church during the marriage. However, when wife accepted

a job offer that would prevent her from continuing to volunteer with 

the church, husband told her not to come back to the church. A 

few days later, husband packed up his belongings from the parties’ 

shared apartment and sent a text to wife saying that she had to 

move out by the end of the week. Thereafter, wife testified that

husband stopped giving her financial assistance, which required 

her to obtain food stamps, stay with friends until she could obtain 

Section 8 housing, and rely on state-paid day care facilities. Wife 

also testified that husband changed his phone number and 

cancelled their child’s health insurance without telling her. Finally, 

wife testified that husband stopped asking about the parties’ child. 

¶ 36 Peppered in among the court’s factual findings and legal 

conclusions were the following comments:

• “The Court is disappointed with Mr. Wright. And quite 

frankly, I’m glad I don’t attend the church that he goes 

to.”
19

• “Mr. Wright caused his child to be without a home 

when he was upset at Ms. Wright, when he took steps 

to have the home given back to whoever owned the 

home. That caused Ms. Wright and that child to have 

to go – I think the kids call it couch surfing. And I just 

think that’s unconscionable. I just think that’s 

unconscionable. I’m disappointed that Mr. Wright, as 

a churchgoing man, would do that to his little girl.”

• “The Court’s position is is [sic] that dads who are 

putting their children’s needs first make sure that the 

other parent has accurate health insurance 

information. And the fact that Mr. Wright chose to 

withhold that is very offensive to the Court, especially 

when he comes in and he’s shedding some tears, 

wanting me to believe that he’s putting his child first, 

when that fact – that’s the second fact that shows that 

he didn’t put the child’s needs first.” 

• “You’re not so different from a lot of other dads I’ve 

seen that come into court and claim that they love 

their child and, ‘Oh, the child is the end all and the be 
20

all and I would do anything for the child.’ I don’t 

believe them any more than I believe you. Because 

good dads don’t do to their child what you did to your 

child.”

• “I don’t know what to make of this church. I’m just 

glad I don’t go there. Most churches I know support 

family units and support kids and support dads 

involved in kids. And what has been described to me 

today just makes me glad I don’t go to your church. 

And I’d be willing to bet God is disappointed with you, 

too.” 

• “Mr. Wright, I am disappointed in you. I’m 

disappointed in you. Your child will not be well served 

by your behavior. And truthfully, I would expect better 

of a churchgoing man.” 

• “Mr. Wright, I am so disappointed in you. I’m just 

disappointed. I just hope you don’t continue to behave 

like this. That would not be good for your daughter, 

honestly. And I happen to believe everything you said 

about the importance of dads in kids[’] lives. I know 
21

that’s a fact. But not when you’re behaving like a 

knucklehead.” 

¶ 37 A judge must be free of all taint of bias and partiality. Watson 

v. Cal-Three, LLC, 254 P.3d 1189, 1192 (Colo. App. 2011); see also 

C.J.C. 2.3(B) (a judge shall not manifest bias or prejudice). But 

prejudice is distinguishable from the sort of personal opinions that 

as a matter of course arise during a judge’s hearing of a cause. See 

Smith v. Dist. Court, 629 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Colo. 1981). Thus, 

“judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or 

disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their 

cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.” 

Liteky v. Unites States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994); see also People 

v. Roehrs, 2019 COA 31, ¶ 33 (a judge ordinarily cannot be 

disqualified on the basis of opinions, attitudes, and knowledge 

gained during her participation in judicial proceedings). 

¶ 38 We disapprove of the court’s comments about husband’s 

church. However, when read in context with the evidence

presented at the hearing, the comments do not reflect a bias or 

prejudice about husband’s gender or religion. Instead, the 

comments reflect the court’s opinion, based on the evidence, that 
22

husband made poor decisions to withhold money, parenting time, 

and proper living quarters from the child “[a]ll because he’s upset 

with the mom.” While the tone of these comments and the 

expression of the court’s opinion about husband’s church were ill 

advised, they were based on the evidence the court heard in the 

course of the proceedings and thus do not show an unreasonable or 

unfair bias against husband.

V. Appellate Attorney Fees Request

¶ 39 We deny husband’s request for appellate attorney fees because 

he has failed to cite any legal authority for the request. See C.A.R. 

39.1 (party claiming attorney fees must explain the legal and factual 

basis for an award). Citing the appellate fee rule as the sole legal 

basis for an attorney fees request is not sufficient. See In re 

Marriage of Roddy, 2014 COA 96, ¶ 32. (“A request which merely 

identifies the statute under which fees are requested, without 

stating specific grounds that justify an award of fees, does not 

adequately comply with [Rule 39.1].”).

¶ 40 Husband does not assert that wife’s defense of the appeal 

lacked substantial justification, see section 13-17-102, or that the 

parties’ respective financial resources warrant an award of fees, see 
23

section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2019. He merely contends that he is 

entitled to fees due to his “having to file an appeal to address the 

abuse of discretion and reversal of spousal support decision, for fair 

and equitable property divisions, debts and bias.” Rule 39.1 

provides the procedural mechanism for this court to award fees “[i]f 

attorney fees are recoverable for the appeal.” The rule does not, by 

itself, provide a substantive entitlement to fees.

¶ 41 We also deny wife’s request for appellate attorney fees under 

C.A.R. 39.1 and section 13-17-102, for what she calls an appeal 

filed without “any good faith legal basis.” Given our disposition, we 

disagree that the appeal is frivolous, groundless, or vexatious.

VI. Conclusion

¶ 42 The portion of the judgment regarding maintenance is 

reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment is 

affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE FOX concur.