### ORD ERED PU BLISHED

U NIT E D ST A T E S BA NK RU PT CYA PPE L L A T E PA N E L

OF T HE NINT H CIRCU IT In re: DA VID W ILLIA M BA RTEN W ERFER and KA TE M A R IE BA RTEN W ERFER , Deb to rs. DA VID W ILLIA M BA RTEN W ERFER; KA TE M A R IE BA RTEN W ERFER ,

A p pellants,

v. K IERA N BU C KL EY,

A p pellee. BA P N o . N C -19-1178-TaFB Bk. N o . 3:13-b k-30827 A dv. N o . 3:13-ap-03185

O PIN IO N

A rgued and Sub m itted o n March 26, 2020

Filed – A pril 23, 2020 A ppeal fro m the U nited States Bankruptcy C o urt fo r the N o rthern Distric t o f C alifo rnia H o no rab le Hannah L. Blum enstiel, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding 

# FIL ED
APR 23 2020 SUSAN M . SPRAUL, CLERK U. S. BKCY

. APP. PANEL O F T HE N I NT H CI RCUI TA ppearanc es: Iain A . Mac do nald, Reno F.R . Fernandez III, and Matthew J. O lso n o f Mac d o nald Fernandez LLP o n b rief fo r appellants; Janet Marie Brayer argued o n b ehalf o f appellee.
Befo r e: T A Y L O R, F A R IS , and B R A N D , Bankruptcy Judges. T A Y L O R, Bankruptcy Judge: INT ROD U CT I ON In earlier c ro ss-appeals, 1 we reviewed a judgm ent in whic h the b ankruptcy c o urt: (1) determ ined that appellee K ieran Buc kley’s state c o urt judgm ent and atto rneys’ fees award against appellants David and Kate Bartenwerfer (“Deb to r s”) were exc epted fro mDeb to rs’ discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A ); 2 (2) denied Mr. Buc kley atto rneys’ fees inc urred in his
no ndischargeab ility ac tio n; and (3) awarded Mr. Buckley interest at the C alifo rnia judgm ent rate o f 10% . W e affirm ed the b a nkruptcy c o urt in all b ut two respec ts. First, we vac ated its judgm ent as against Mrs. Bartenwerfer and rem anded fo r further findings regarding her intent

1 Bartenwerfer v. Buckley (In re Bartenwerfer) , BAP Nos. NC-16-1277-BJuF, NC-16-1299-BJuF, 2017 WL 6553392 (9th Ci r . BAP Dec. 22, 2017).

2 Unless specifi ed other wi se, chapterand secti on r efer ences ar e to the Bankr uptcy Code, 11 U.S .C. §§ 101–1532. 2to defraud. 3 A nd sec o nd, as relevant to this appeal, we vac ated its

judgm ent and two related o rders to the extent that it determ ined that Mr. Buc kley’s state c o urt atto rneys’ fees were no ndischargeab le. The thenexisting rec o rd was inadequate toassess which fees, if any, flo wed fro m Mr. Bartenwerfer’s no ndischargeab le fraudulent c o nduc t. W e therefo re rem anded the issue fo r further determ inatio n and with instruc t io ns to reo pen the rec o rd. O n rem and, the b ankruptc y c o urt did a searching analysis o f the state
c o u rt rec o rd and fo und that Mr. Buckley’s state c o urt fraud and no n-fraud
c laim s were inextric ab ly intertwined, thus m aking fee appo rtio nm ent im po ssib le. It then entered judgm ent o nc e again determ ining that his fees were who lly no ndischargeab le. Deb to r s appealed. W e determ ine that the judgm ent is well-suppo rted b y the rec o rd develo ped o n rem and, and we A FFIRM. FA CT S A . Prepetition E v ents 1. T he Sale of the Property Prepetitio n, Deb to rs purchased a ho m e in San Franc isc o , C alifo rnia (“Pro perty”), which they rem o deled and so ld to Mr. Buc kley. Befo re the sale, Deb to rs signed a C al. C iv. C o de § 1102 et seq. transfer disc lo s ure

3 On r emand, the bankr uptcy cour t enter ed j u dgment i n Mr s . Bar tenwer fer ’s fav or after finding that she lacked the r equi si te fr audulent intent. The par ti es cr ossappealed the j udgment. See BAP Nos. NC-19-1016-TaFB and NC-19-1025-TaFB. 3statem ent and a supplem ent thereto (c o llec tively, the “TDS”), which

c o ntained false represe ntatio ns regarding, inter a lia , water leaks, defec tive windo w c o nditio ns, o p en perm it issues, and fire esc a pe no n-c o m plianc e (“Defec ts”). 2. T he State Court A c tion Mr. Buc kley disc o vered the Defec t s after the sale and sued the Deb to rs in state c o urt. His c o m plaint inc luded eight c laim s: (1) stric t liab ility; (2) b reach o f express warranty; (3) b reach o f im plied warranty; (4) negligenc e; (5) b reach o f c o ntrac t; (6) negligent m isrepresentatio n; (7) fraud/dec eit; and (8) resc issio n. The c o m p laint also nam ed vario us c o ntrac to rs as defendants in the negligenc e c laim
. A ll o f the c laim s relied o n and inc o rpo rated the c o re fac tu al allegatio ns set fo rth in paragraphs nine thro ugh fo u rteen o f the c o m plaint. These paragraphs alleged that: Deb to rs engaged in the b usiness o f
rem o deling and selling residenc es to the general pub lic(¶9); Deb to rs failed to c o nstruc t the Pro perty in ac c o rdanc e with pro per and appro ved techniques and failed to hire and adequately m anage c apab le c o ntrac to rs, sub c o ntrac to r s, and m a terial suppliers (¶10); Deb to rs failed to perfo rm wo rk at the Pro perty in c o m plianc e with C alifo rnia b uilding c o de standards (¶11); Mr. Buckley disc o vered the Defec ts after the Pro perty was transferred to him(¶12); the Pro perty m ay have additio nal as yet undisc o vered defec ts (¶13); and Deb t o rs’ rem o deling, c o nstruc tio n, and

4sale o f the Pro p erty in a defec tive c o nditio n dam aged Mr. Buc kley (¶14).

Deb to rs answered the c o m plaint and c r o ss-c o m plained against Mr. Buc kley and their c o ntrac to rs. Their answer inc luded a general denial and affirm ative defenses, inc luding fault o f a third party, indemnity b y the
c o ntrac to rs, and dam ages c aused b y ano ther party, wear, o r tear. Their
c ro ss-c o m plaint asserted b reach o f c o ntrac t c laim s against Mr. Buckley and the c o ntrac to rs and im plied indem nity and c o ntrib utio n c laim s against the
c o ntrac to rs. In answering the c o m plaint and c ro s s-c o m plaint, so m e c o ntrac to rs asserted affirm ative defenses o f indem nific atio n and c o ntrib uto ry o r c o m p arative negligenc e o f the o ther parties to the ac tio n. A t least o ne c o ntrac to r also filed its o wn c ro ss-c o m plaint. Extensive disc o very and m o tio n prac t ic e fo llo wed fo r three years. The parties did no t parse disc o very am o ng Mr. Buc kley’s c laim s against Deb to rs and the c o ntrac to rs, and the nature o f the indem nity c laim s resulted in a finger-po inting b lam e gam e relative to Mr. Bartenwerfer’s defense that he lac ked kno wledge o f, and respo nsib ility fo r, the Defec ts. A fter a 19-day trial, the jury fo und in Mr. Buc kley’s favo r o n his b reach o f c o ntrac t, negligenc e, and failure to disc lo se info rm atio n (deno m inated as the “Seller’s N o ndisc lo s ure” c laimin the verdic t fo rm )
c laim s, b ut in Deb to rs’ favo r o n his intentio nal and negligent
m isrepresentatio n c laim s. The jury fo und against Deb to rs o n their b reach o f

5c o ntrac t c laim . A nd the jury awarded Mr. Buckley $444,671 in dam ages,

which the state c o urt reduc ed in an am ended judgm ent (“State C o urt Judgm ent”) to $234,671, plus 10%interest, atto rneys’ fees, and c o sts, pursuant toa no tic ed m o t io n. Mr. Buc kley then filed a m o tio n seeking atto rneys’ fees, b ut the Deb t o rs filed their chapter 7 b ankruptc y b efo re the state c o urt c o uld hear it. B. Pos tpetition E v ents 1. T he Nondis c harg e ability Judg m ent Mr. Buc kley respo nded with an adversary c o m plaint to exc ept the State C o urt Judgm ent and his fees fro m Deb to rs’ discharge. A fter trial, the b ankruptcy c o urt entered judgm ent exc epting the entire State C o urt Judgm ent fro mdischarge pursuant to§ 523(a)(2)(A ). 2. T he Pos t-T rial A ttorneys ’ FeesProc e eding s Mr. Buc kley then m o ved fo r the atto rneys’ fees he inc urred in the State C o urt A c tio n, am o ng o ther relief (“Fee Mo tio n”). Deb to rs o ppo sed. Initially, the b ankruptcy c o urt granted Mr. Buckley $378,491 in state c o urt fees and c o sts, sub

jec t to a reaso nab leness determ inatio n. Mr. Buc kley c o ntended his fees were reaso nab le given the m o dest ho urly rate charged, a 19-day jury trial, and the five-year duration o f the State C o urt A c tio n. Deb to rs c o untered that 521 ho urs ( i .e. , $182,566) o f tim e was exc essive b ec ause such tim e aro se fro mthe allegedly unrelated
c o ntrac to r litigatio n. They further objec t ed to alleged b lo c k-b illing and
6b illing fo r c leric al and travel ac tivities.

Eventually, the b ankruptcy c o urt reduc ed the fees to $348,483.53 to elim inate c leric al and travel fees lum ped in with sub stantive legal wo rk. But it dec lined to further reduc e the fees fo r tim e spent o n allegedly unrelated m atters b ec ause Deb to rs had failed tointro duc e the c o m plaint into evidenc e and explain why such tim e was unrelated tothe c laim s giving rise to the no ndischargeab le deb t. Thus, the b ankruptcy c o urt entered its final o rder o n the Fee Mo tio n and an am ended § 523(a)(2)(A ) judgm ent to award Mr. Buckley $348,483.53
o f no ndischargeab le fees. It later entered a further am ended judgm ent (“523 Judgm ent”) to add relief no t relevant to this appeal. 3. T he Cros s -A ppeals Bo th Mr. Buc kley and Deb to rs appealed the fee award. W e c o nc luded that b ec ause the state c o urt never liquidated Mr. Buckley’s fees o r determ ined their reaso nab leness, the b ankruptc y c o urt must determ ine what po rtio n o f the fees, if any, flo w ed fro mMr. Bartenwerfer’s fraudulent
c o nduc t. W e no t ed that neither we no r the b ankruptc y c o urt c o uld m ake that determ inatio n fro mthe thin rec o rd. A c c o rdingly, we vac ated the b ankruptcy c o urt’s fee o rders and 523 Judgm ent and direc ted it to reo pen the rec o r d to m ake that determ inatio n. 4. T he Rem and Proc eeding s O n rem and, the parties agreed that Mr. Buckley b ears the initial
7b urden o f estab lishing that his fees are trac eab le to his no ndischargeab le

c laim, and thereafter the b urden shifts to Deb to rs to identify o r explain the extent to which tho se fees are no t attrib utab le to Mr. Bartenwerfer’s fraud. To determ ine the fee issue, the b ankruptc y c o urt autho rized the parties to b rief the appo rtio nm ent issue and Deb to rs to depo se and review the tim e sheets o f Mr. Buc kley’s c o unsel, Janet Brayer. C iting Ms. Brayer’s testim o ny and the state c o urt do c ket repo rt, Mr. Buc kley argued that his state c o u rt c laim s were b o th fac tually and legally intertwined, m aking fee appo rtio nm ent im p o ssib le. The b ankruptcy c o u rt fo und that he m et his initial b urden o f trac ing his fees to his
no ndischargeab le c laimand that the b urden shifted to Deb to rs. Deb to rs argued that the b ankruptc y c o urt sho uld deny the fees b ec ause Mr. Buckley failed to trac e the fees to the c laimupo n which his § 523(a)(2)(A ) c laimis prem ised— the no ndisc lo sure c laim . But Deb to rs failed to spec ify any partic ular tim e entry o r c atego ry that was no t trac eab le to Mr. Bartenwerfer’s fraud. And while they annexed c o pies o f the c o m p laint and jury instruc tio ns fo r the b ankruptc y c o urt’s
c o nsideratio n, they failed to analyze such do c um ents. Mr. Buc kley argued that Deb to rs failed to m eet their b urden to pro vide the b a nkruptc y c o urt with spec ificreaso ns fo r disallo wing fees. A nd he again argued that his state c o urt c laim s against Deb to rs were interrelated and prem ised o n the sam e set o f o perative fac ts, po inting to
8spec ificexam ples in the jury instruc tio ns. He argued that tim e spent

litigating with the c o ntrac to rs was alsotrac eab le to his no ndisc lo sure c laim as it related toDeb to rs’ attem pts to shift liab ility fo rthe Defec ts. The b ankruptcy c o urt agreed with Mr. Buckley and entered judgm ent awarding him$348,483.53 o f no ndischargeab le fees, plus interest at a rate
o f 10% fro mentry o f the State C o urt Judgm ent fo rward. Deb to rs tim ely appealed. JU RISD ICT ION The b ankruptcy c o urt had jurisdic tio n under 28 U .S.C . §§ 1334 and 157(b )(2)(I). W e have jurisdic tio n under 28 U .S.C . § 158. ISSU E Did the b ankruptcy c o urt err in determ ining that all o f Mr. Buc kley state c o urt atto rneys’ fees were no ndischargeab le o n rem and? ST A ND A RD S OF RE V IE W W e review the b a nkruptc y c o urt’s award o f atto rneys’ fees fo r an ab use o f disc retio n o r erro neo us applic atio n o f the law. D ina n v. F ry (In re D ina n) , 448 B.R . 775, 783 (9th C ir. BA P 2011). The b ankruptc y c o urt ab uses its disc retio n if it applies the wro ng legal standard o rits fac tual findings are illo gic al, im p lausib le, o r witho ut suppo r t in the rec o rd. Tra fficS cho o l.co m, Inc. v. Edriver Inc. , 653 F.3d 820, 832 (9th Cir. 2011). To the extent the issue is whether C a lifo rnia law allo ws the award o f atto rneys’ fees, o ur review is de no vo . S ee In re D ina n , 448 B.R . at 783.
9W e m a y affirmo n any b asis suppo rted b y the rec o rd. S ha nks v.

D ressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2008). D ISCU SSION A . T he bankruptcy c ourt applied the c orrec t leg al s tandard reg a rding apportionm ent of fees . Deb to rs ac kno wledge that § 523(a)(2)(A ) exc epts fro mdischarge atto rneys’ fees that are trac eab le to fraud. S ee Co hen v. D e La C ruz, 523 U .S. 213, 218-19 &223 (1998). But they c o ntend that the b ankruptc y c o urt erred b y no t requiring Mr. Buc kley to appo rtio n his atto rneys’ fees b etween tho se attrib utab le to his no ndischargeab le fraud c laim and tho se that are no t. While it is true that as the prevailing party Mr. Buckley b o re the b urden o f estab lishing that the fees stem m ed fro mthe no ndischargeab le fraud liab ility, see Plik

aytis v. R o th (In re R o th) , 662 F. A pp’x 540, 544 (9th C ir. 2016), fee appo r tio nm ent is no t required if the issues in the vario us c laim s are “soinextric ab ly intertwined that it wo uld b e im prac tic al o r im po ssib le to separate the atto rney’s tim e into c o m pensab le and
no nc o m pensab le units,” H a rm a n v. C ity &C ty. o

f S .F
. , 158 C al. A p p. 4th 407, 417 (2007) (c itatio n and internal quo tatio n m a rks o m itted). Whether
c o m p ensab le and no nc o m pensab le c laim s are inextric ab ly intertwined to
exc use appo rtio nm ent is a fac tual questio n. S ee id. at 424. Mr. Buc kley argued, and the b ankruptc y c o urt agreed, that his state
c o u rt c laim s were prem ised o n a c o m m o n c o re o f fac ts and, thus, were
10inextric ab ly intertwined, exc using the appo rtio nm ent o f fees. W e find

suffic ient suppo rt in the rec o rd fo r the b ankruptc y c o urt’s finding. Spec ific ally, the State C o urt A c tio n and the adversary pro c eeding fo c used o n the issue o f Deb t o rs’ no ndisc lo sure o f m aterial fac ts relating to the Defec ts to induc e Mr. Buc kley to b uy the Pro p erty. The c o m p laint’s eight c laim s all inc o rpo rated the sam e c o re o perative fac t s . A nd the jury instruc tio ns reflec ted the interrelatedness o f the c laim s. Fo rexam p le, dam ages fo r each c laimrequired sim ilar analyses o f the c o sts torepair the Pro perty and the differential value o f the Pro perty as represented versus its
ac tual c o nditio n. Further, b o th the jury instruc tio ns and verdic t fo rm instruc ted the jury that, if it fo u nd in Mr. Buc kley’s favo r o n m ultiple
c laim s, it c o u ld o nly award dam ages o nc e. This indic a tes that the sam e set o f c o r e fac ts c o nnec ted all c laim s. And reso lutio n o f Deb to rs’ c r o ssc o m p laint and the c o ntrac t o r s’ c ro s s -c laim s sim ilarly c entered o n whether Mr. Bartenwerfer o rthe c o ntrac to rs were respo nsib le fo r, and kno wledgeab le o f, the Defec ts. While the no ndisc lo sure c laimis prem ised o n o nly fo ur o f twelve alleged defec t s in the c o m plaint, Deb to rs were required to disc lo se all twelve defec ts in the TDS, tothe extent the defec ts existed. And while the
c laim s and sc o p e o f dam ages narro wed thro ugh the c o urse o f litigatio n, a signific ant o verlap o f fac ts and issues b etween the c laim s in the State C o urt A c t io n and the adversary pro c eeding existed in all o ther respec ts. The
11b ankruptcy c o urt painstakingly articulated the o verlapping fac tual

predic ates and issues in the claim s asserted b y and am o ng Mr. Buc kley, Deb to rs, and the c o ntrac to rs to c o nc lude that Mr. Buckley need no t appo rtio n his fees. W e disc ern no erro r in its fac tually suppo rted and tho ro ughly reaso ned c o nc lusio n. B. D ebtors failed to m ake s pec ificobjec tions to fees . A s Mr. Buckley estab lished that fee appo rtio nm ent was unnec essary, Deb to rs were required to objec t to spec ifictim e entries to ob tain a reduc tio n o r disallo wanc e o f fees. Co tto n v. C ity o f Eurek a, 889 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1176 (N .D. C al. 2012). This entailed “specific ally identify[ing] defec t s o r defic ienc ies in the ho urs requested. C o nc luso ry and unsub stantiated
objec tio ns are insuffic ient to warrant a reduc tio n in fees.” Id
. ; s e e a lso Mo reno v . C ity o

f S a cra m ento , 534 F.3d 1106, 1116 (9th Cir. 2008) (“If
o ppo sing c o unsel c anno t c o m e up with spec ificreaso ns fo r reduc ing the fee request that the distric t c o urt finds persuasive, it sho uld no rm ally grant the award in full, o r with no m o re than a haircut.”); Prem ier Med. M gm t. S ys., Inc. v. Ca l. Ins. Gua ra ntee Ass’n , 163 C al. A pp. 4th 550, 564 (2008) (ho lding that objec ting party b ears the b urden o f spec ifying item s challenged with suffic ient evidenc e and argum ent and “[g]eneral argum ents that fees
c laim ed are exc essive, duplic ative, o r unrelated do no t suffic e”). They failed to do so . They did no t m ake suffic iently spec ificobjec tio ns to Ms. Brayer’s
12tim e entries. R ather, they o bjec ted to the fee request o n the b asis that the

tim e entries c o ntained b lo c k-b illing. W hile b lo c k-b illing m ay result in reduc tio ns fo r spec ificentries, it do es no t require disallo wanc e o f all fees. S ee Ga rciav. R e surgent Capita l S ervs., L.P. , N o . C -11-1253 EMC, 2012 WL 3778852, at *8 (N .D. C al. A ug. 30, 2012) (citing F ischer v. S JP–P.D . Inc. , 214 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000) and H ensley v. Eck

erha rt, 461 U .S. 424, 433 (1983)) ; S unsto ne Beha vio ra l H ea lth, Inc. v. Ala m edaC ty. Med. C tr ., 646 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1216–17 (E.D. Cal. 2009); cf. W elch v. Metro . Life Ins. Co . , 480 F.3d 942, 948 (9th C ir. 2007) (ho lding that the use o f b lo c k-b illing do es no t justify an ac r o ss-the-b o a rd reduc tio n o r rejec t io n o f all ho urs). Aparty objec ting to fees o n the b a s is o f b lo c k-b illing sho u ld spec ific ally identify prob lem aticentries. But here, Deb to r s sim ply requested that the b ankruptcy c o urt exerc ise its general disc retio n to disallo w b ro a d
c atego ries o f b lo c k-b illed tim e. The b ankruptc y c o urt appro priately denied the request. It likewise appro priately o verruled Deb to rs’ objec tio n to b r o ad
c atego ries o f fees that were allegedly extraneo us to the no ndisc lo sure c laim b ec ause Deb to r s failed to pro vide spec ificreaso ns why these c atego ries
were objec tio nab le. They dec lined to m eaningfully analyze the state c o urt pleadings and jury instruc t io ns to aid the b ankruptc y c o urt in determ ining what po rtio n o f the fees, if any, flo w ed fro mMr. Bartenwerfer’s fraudulent
c o nduc t. W itho ut their input, the b ankruptc y c o urt determ ined that the
13pleadings and instruc tio ns revealed that the c laim s, c ro ss-c laim s, and

affirm ative defenses b etween the parties— inc luding c laim s b y and against the c o ntrac to rs— were who lly intertwined. This was no t an ab use o f disc retio n. A m o ng o ther generalized c o m plaints, Deb to rs to o k issue with fees inc urred to address an interpleader ac t io n. But these fees suffic iently related to Mr. Buc kley’s no ndisc lo sure c laimgiven that they were inc urred to c o mb at Deb to rs’ assertion that Mr. Buc kley had waived and released his
c laim s b y ac c epting interpled funds. Deb t o rs alsoasserted a b lanket
objec tio n to a ho dgepo dge o f tim e related to m ediatio n, experts, and
research o n c laim s witho u thighlighting spec ific entries and witho ut pro viding c lear argum ent fo r disallo wing such fees. A gain, the b ankruptcy c o u rt did no t ab use its disc retio n in awarding these fees in light o f Deb to rs’ failure to m eet their b urden to sho w that any particular c atego ry o f fees sho uld b e reduc ed o rdisallo wed. S ee Rya n v. Editio ns Ltd. W ., Inc. , 786 F.3d 754, 764-65 (9th C ir. 2015). N either did it ab use its disc retio n in allo w ing fees inc u rred in respo nding to a m o tio n in lim ine b ro ught b y o ne o f Deb t o rs’ sub c o ntrac to rs c o nc erning prio r litigatio n. While Deb to rs c ited to spec ificobjec tio nab le tim e entries in that regard, the b ankruptc y c o urt fo und that the tim e related to Mr. Bartenwerfer’s po t ential liab ility fo r negligently hiring and supervising c o ntrac to rs, so m e o f who mwere allegedly invo lved in the
14undisc lo sed perm itting issues.

Deb to rs alsourge that fees inc urred in disc o very relating to defec ts no t spec ific ally inc luded in the no ndisc lo sure c laimsho uld b e disallo wed. But the c o m p laint indic ated that Mr. Buckley’s c laim s c o ver undisc o vered defec ts. Any defec ts unkno wn to Mr. Buc kley sho u ld have b een disc lo sed b y Deb to rs in the TDS. A c c o rdingly, fees inc urred in such disc o very related to Mr. Buc kley’s fraud c laim . A gain, the b ankruptc y c o u rt appro priately
o verruled Deb to rs’ objec tio n to such fees. It alsodid no t ab use its disc retio n b y o verruling Deb t o rs’ objec tio ns to fees inc urred regarding: (1) the explo ratio n o f Mr. Bartenwerfer’s status
as a c o ntrac to r; and (2) lay o pinio n c o nc erning c o ntrac t interpretatio n. Such fees related to Mr. Bartenwerfer’s kno wledge and awareness o f the
c o nditio n o f the Pro perty and his understanding o f his ob ligatio ns under the sale c o ntrac t, which inc o rpo rated the TDS. CONCL U SION The b ankruptcy c o urt pro perly exc used fee appo rtio nm ent and fo und that Deb to rs failed to identify o r explain why Mr. Buc kley’s fees were unrelated to his no ndischargeab le fraud c laim . It alsopro perly o verruled
o ther inadequately o rwho lly unsuppo rted objec t io ns to the fee request. W e A FFIRM.

15