UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

PRICASPIAN DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION et al.,

:

:

:

 Plaintiffs, :

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Civil Action No. 11-1459 (SRC)

v.

WILLIAM C. MARTUCCI et al., 

:

:

:

: 

:

OPINION & ORDER

Defendants. :

CHESLER, U.S.D.J.

This matter comes before this Court on four motions for reconsideration of this Court’s

Opinion (the “Opinion”) and Order entered on January 9, 2014 by: 1) Plaintiffs Pricaspian

Development Corporation, Jack Grynberg and Grynberg Petroleum Company; 2) Defendant

Richard Schaefer; 3) Defendant Barbara Queen; and 4) Defendant William Martucci. For the

reasons stated below, the motions will be denied.

“A court may grant a motion for reconsideration if the moving party shows one of the

following: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence

that was not available when the court issued its order; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of

law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” See Banda v. Burlington County, 263 Fed. Appx.

182, 183 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir.

1999)); L. CIV. R. 7.1(i). 

Plaintiffs move for reconsideration on the issue of the RICO distinctiveness requirement. 

In the Opinion, this Court granted Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, and

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explained the decision as follows:

While Plaintiffs argue in their Motion for Summary Judgment that Individual

Defendants and Company Defendants participated in a money laundering scheme

in order to prevent Plaintiffs from collecting on the Colorado judgment, Richard

Schaefer, Joseph Schaefer, and Anthony Sterbens correctly argue that Plaintiffs

have not distinguished between the RICO person and the RICO enterprise.

(Opinion at 11.) Plaintiffs argue for reconsideration as follows. Plaintiffs argue that they stated

in their summary judgment brief that “the Schaefer Defendants operated legitimate ATM

businesses and utilized the legitimate ATM businesses to camouflage their illicit money

laundering activity.” (Pls.’ Br. 2.) Plaintiffs then contend that they pointed to evidence

supporting their contention that ATMMI and ATMPR had legitimate business purposes. (Pls.’

Br. 3-4.) Plaintiffs conclude by arguing that the Court “did not fully consider the legitimate

aspects of ATMMI and ATMPR when the court determined Plaintiffs’ [sic] did not identify the

RICO enterprise.” (Pls.’ Br. 5.)

Plaintiffs appear to be confused about what is admittedly a challenging area of the law. 

As this Court explained in the Opinion, the RICO distinctiveness requirement originates in the

language of the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). (Opinion at 10.) The Supreme Court has

held that “to establish liability under § 1962(c) one must allege and prove the existence of two

distinct entities: (1) a ‘person’; and (2) an ‘enterprise’ that is not simply the same ‘person’

referred to by a different name.” Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 161

(2001). Thus, as this Court explained, at issue was whether Plaintiffs have adequately alleged

and proven the existence of two distinct entities, a RICO person and a RICO enterprise. 

Plaintiffs, however, seek reconsideration with the argument that this Court overlooked the

legitimate purposes of ATMMI and ATMPR. This Court does not see how this is material or

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even relevant to the distinctiveness requirement. In moving for reconsideration, Plaintiffs do not

explain what bearing facts about the legitimate purposes of ATMMI and ATMPR have on the

distinctiveness requirement. How do facts which show that ATMMI and ATMPR have

legitimate purposes support an inference that there is a RICO person who is distinct from a

RICO enterprise? Plaintiffs’ reconsideration brief fails to articulate the basis for a conclusion

that Plaintiffs have offered evidence sufficient to prove the existence of two distinct RICO

entities. 

The fact is that it is Plaintiffs that overlooked the RICO distinctiveness requirement. 

Their moving brief for summary judgment makes no mention of the requirement, nor does it

define the RICO person or the RICO enterprise. Nor does Plaintiffs’ reply brief address this

issue. The reply brief incorporates by reference two previously filed briefs, Docket Entry Nos.

221 and 230. (Pls.’ Reply Br. 3.) Of these previously filed briefs, only the brief at Docket Entry

No. 221 addresses the RICO distinctiveness requirement – but it is an opposition brief to a

motion to dismiss. The upshot is that, as to the motion for summary judgment and the crossmotion for summary judgment now at issue, Plaintiffs neither filed nor incorporated any brief

which addressed the RICO distinctiveness requirement in the context of a motion for summary

judgment. 

The incorporated opposition brief, Docket Entry No. 221, does address Defendant’s

argument that the RICO claims should be dismissed because the Complaint fails to satisfy the 

RICO distinctiveness requirement. At no point in this brief do Plaintiffs even define the RICO

person or the RICO enterprise. Plaintiffs have not given this Court any basis to conclude that the

RICO distinctiveness requirement has been adequately alleged and supported by evidence. 

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There is no basis for reconsideration.

Defendant Richard Schaefer moves for reconsideration of this Court’s denial of his crossmotions to dismiss and for summary judgment on the third through fifth counts in the Complaint. 

Schaefer contends that the Court overlooked his argument that the third through fifth counts

against him should be dismissed because no further relief against him under the UFTA is

available. It is true that the Opinion does not expressly address this argument, but it is more

likely that it was rejected as meritless rather than overlooked. The issues here are quite

straightforward. The Complaint alleges an existing judgment debt, and fraudulent transfers to

frustrate the judgment levy. While it is true that Plaintiffs may not obtain a double recovery, the

fraudulent transfer to escape payment of the debt is legally distinct from the judgment debt itself. 

Schaefer has not persuaded this Court that he is entitled to dismissal of the UFTA claims on the

ground that they are legally redundant. His motion for reconsideration will be denied.

Defendant Barbara Queen moves for reconsideration in a moving brief that contains two

pages of text. It appears that Queen seeks reconsideration on the ground that Plaintiffs failed to

offer evidence sufficient to prove fraud. This does not appear to be a proper ground to seek

reconsideration. Queen’s original moving brief (Docket Entry No. 219) did not make this

argument. A party cannot obtain reconsideration based on a new argument, and Queen’s motion

for reconsideration will be denied.

Defendant William Martucci moves for reconsideration in a moving brief that contains

one-half page of argument which appears substantially identical to that submitted by Queen. As

with Queen, Martucci’s original moving brief (Docket Entry No. 225) did not make this

argument. A party cannot obtain reconsideration based on a new argument, and Martucci’s

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motion for reconsideration will be denied.

For these reasons,

IT IS on this 9th day of September, 2014

ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration by Plaintiffs Pricaspian Development

Corporation, Jack Grynberg and Grynberg Petroleum Company (Docket Entry No. 297) is

DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration by Defendant Richard Schaefer (Docket

Entry No. 298) is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration by Defendant Barbara Queen (Docket

Entry No. 306) is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration by Defendant William Martucci (Docket

Entry No. 307) is DENIED.

 /s Stanley R. Chesler 

STANLEY R. CHESLER

United States District Judge

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