Filed 2/2/21 P. v. Gibson CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CODELL GIBSON III,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B301074

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. NA110504)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County. Judith Levey Meyer, Judge. Affirmed and 

remanded with directions.

Jeanine Grimmond Strong, under appointment by the 

Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and Charles J. Sarosy, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________
2

In a three-count information filed by the Los Angeles 

County District Attorney’s Office, defendant and appellant Codell 

Gibson III was charged with inflicting corporal injury on a 

girlfriend (count 1; Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)),1 false 

imprisonment by violence (count 2; § 236), and misdemeanor 

contempt of court (count 3; § 166, subd. (c)(1)). He pleaded not 

guilty. The jury found defendant guilty as charged. 

Defendant was sentenced to a total of two years in state

prison, calculated as follows: the low term of two years for count 

1, a concurrent low term of 16 months for count 2, and a 

concurrent term of 364 days for count 3.2

The trial court imposed a $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4,

subd. (b)), a $90 court facilities assessment (Gov. Code § 70373), 

and a $120 court security assessment (§ 1465.8), and imposed 

and stayed a $300 parole revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.45).

3 

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. 

On appeal, he argues: (1) His conviction of false 

imprisonment by violence is not supported by substantial 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 

unless otherwise indicated. 

2 Defendant also pleaded no contest in a separate case for 

domestic battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)). He was sentenced to 364 

days to be served concurrently with the previously described twoyear term for count 1, and no additional fines or fees were 

imposed. 

3 There is a discrepancy between the minute order, which 

sets forth the amounts identified above, and the reporter’s 

transcript, which identifies the facilities assessment as $60 and 

the court security assessment as $80. The abstract of judgment 

mirrors the amounts set forth in the reporter’s transcript. 
3

evidence; and (2) Pursuant to People v. Dueñas (2019) 

30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas), defendant is entitled to a hearing 

to determine his ability to pay the court-imposed fines and 

assessments.

As pointed out by the People there is a discrepancy between 

the trial court’s July 18, 2019, minute order and the abstract of 

judgment regarding the fines and assessments imposed against 

defendant. Upon remand, we direct the clerk of the trial court to 

prepare an amended abstract of judgment to reflect the amounts 

of the fines and assessments as correctly set forth in the trial 

court’s July 18, 2019, minute order and forward the corrected 

abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

I. Prosecution evidence

A. Defendant and his girlfriend arrived at a hotel where 

they were often seen together, and the girlfriend was later found 

outside defendant’s room covered in blood

On October 12, 2018, defendant and C.C. arrived together 

at a Long Beach hotel at around 12:30 or 1:00 a.m. Defendant 

had been staying at the hotel for approximately six or seven 

months before that night. A hotel security guard, Solomon 

McCorvey (McCorvey), recognized both defendant and C.C., who 

he knew was defendant’s “girlfriend/wife/significant other.”

Although C.C. was not a registered guest at the hotel, McCorvey 

had seen C.C. several times at the hotel with defendant. 

Defendant and C.C. left the lobby to go up to defendant’s

room on the 10th floor, room 1006. C.C. returned to the lobby 

after about 10 to 20 minutes and asked for a room key, which 

McCorvey gave to her. About 10 to 15 minutes later, McCorvey 

conducted his rounds, a process in which he walks the length of 
4

every hotel floor in about 10 to 15 minutes. There were no noises 

or disturbances when he passed room 1006. 

At about 1:00 or 2:00 a.m., Kerry King (King) and Luke 

Errett (Errett), guests in the room next to room 1006, heard a 

woman “shrieking, screaming” for help. The screams lasted 

about 20 seconds, long enough for Errett to wake up, put on his 

glasses, and get to the door of his own room. When King and 

Errett entered the hallway, C.C. was lying on her back on the 

floor, not moving and covered in blood. King turned C.C. on her 

side because she feared that C.C. would choke on her own blood.

There was a significant amount of blood on the carpet and bloody 

handprints on the doorway to room 1006. Errett saw defendant

walking away from C.C. and into a staircase at the end of the 

hallway. 

Another guest on the 10th floor opened his door and stated 

that he had called 911. King asked C.C. who had done this to 

her, and C.C. identified defendant by name. Several minutes 

later, defendant, who was wearing only a shirt, came back into 

the hallway to return to room 1006. Errett asked defendant if he 

was the person C.C. had identified, and defendant confirmed that 

it was him. Errett asked defendant what had happened, and 

defendant responded, “‘She had it coming. She was trying to 

break into the room.’”

4

Defendant then entered room 1006 and went out a couple of

minutes later wearing a new set of clothes. In a “frighteningly 

calm” and “chilling” manner, defendant said something to the 

4 C.C. was about 5 feet 8 inches tall and weighed about 145 

pounds, whereas defendant was about 6 feet 1 inch tall and 

weighed about 230 or 240 pounds.
5

effect of, “‘Really, [C.C.]?’” or “‘Are you kidding me? You’re really 

going to go through with this.’” He then walked to the opposite 

end of the hallway and left through the staircase. 

Meanwhile, at the front desk, McCorvey was notified that a

guest from the 10th floor had called 911. McCorvey immediately 

went to the 10th floor hallway, saw guests helping C.C., and 

asked a guest for towels to help stop the bleeding. Paramedics 

arrived and took C.C. to the hospital. 

B. C.C. had multiple injuries to her head that were 

consistent with her hair being pulled; defendant was arrested

C.C.’s injuries included a bloody nose, hair falling out from 

being pulled on, an eye that was swollen shut, bruising on both 

eyes, petechia5 on one of her eyes, and swelling on her face. The 

back of C.C.’s neck had a scratch along the hairline, as well as 

matted blood, which were consistent with her hair being pulled. 

C.C. told the treating doctor that she had been “struck in the face 

and head with fists and feet as well as choked,” and she was 

unsure whether she had lost consciousness during the incident. 

As defendant walked away from the hotel in the parking 

lot, he was arrested by Long Beach Police Department Officer 

Brian Prebanda. Defendant had dry blood on his forearms and 

hands, which he admitted was his girlfriend’s blood. Defendant

did not have any visible injuries, but had a “light redness” on his 

leg. He also had C.C.’s cell phone. 

5 Petechia is a red dot in the eye that occurs when a blood 

vessel in the eye bursts due to lack of oxygen; it is common in 

cases of strangulation. 
6

C. Blood spatter on the door of the hotel room suggested to 

a detective that C.C. was trying to get out of the room

At around 3:30 to 4:00 a.m., Long Beach Police Department 

Detective Elizabeth Barba, who worked in the sex crimes unit,

met C.C. at the hospital. A few hours later, Detective Barba took 

C.C. back to the hotel to collect her belongings. C.C. retrieved 

her items from the closet, bathroom, and the floor, and packed 

them into her suitcase, which was already in the room along with 

defendant’s suitcase. C.C. retrieved a contact lens from the floor 

that had been knocked out, as well as her “‘emergency phone’” 

from behind the couch. 

There was blood on the bed, a picture frame on a wall 

leading towards the bathroom, the carpet, and the doorway. 

There was blood spatter on the floor that appeared to be going in 

the direction of the inside of the room towards the door, which 

was the only way to exit the room. There was blood on the 

outside of the doorway as well. The location and pattern of the 

blood droplets suggested to Detective Barba that C.C. had been 

leaning forward and trying to get out of the room. Pieces of C.C’s 

blonde hair were also “everywhere,” such as on the floor in

various areas of the room and on the bed. There was blonde hair 

on the carpet, as well as clumps of blonde hair on the comforter 

and the space between the bed and the sofa. 

Defendant called C.C. four times while she was with 

Detective Barba, but C.C., who was trembling and scared when 

she received the calls, did not answer.6

6 C.C. did not testify at trial. Although Detective Barba 

called and spoke to C.C. one time after the incident, C.C. did not 

respond to subsequent calls. According to defendant, C.C. was 

living in Kentucky at the time of the trial. 
7

II. Defense evidence

Defendant testified on his own behalf. 

Defendant and C.C. met in California around 2015 and 

began an on-and-off sexual relationship that carried on through 

October 2018. Both defendant and C.C. were married to other 

people when they began their relationship. Defendant lived 

primarily in Kentucky, but he occasionally came to California for 

work for extended periods of time. When he came to California, 

he would see C.C. once or twice a week because his job could 

require him to work 16-hour days. At some point, C.C. stayed 

with defendant off and on in Kentucky for a few months at a 

time, and she had brought some of her things with her. Although 

defendant was seeing other people besides C.C., she was his 

girlfriend in October 2018. 

Defendant had been arrested for domestic violence 

incidents involving C.C. at Long Beach hotels in both 2015 and 

2016, but he was not convicted in either case. In August 2018, a 

protective order had been issued against him in California, which 

prohibited him from contacting C.C.7 That order had been issued 

after an August 5, 2018, incident where police responded to a 

domestic violence call at the same Long Beach hotel where the 

October 12, 2018, incident occurred.8 Defendant denied hitting 

7 The criminal protective order was issued on August 30, 

2018. After sentencing in the trial at issue here, defendant

pleaded guilty to a charge of domestic battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)) 

based on the August 5, 2018, incident.

8 Long Beach Police Department Officer Keyen Foley 

testified about this incident, and the trial court took judicial 

notice of the protective order, during the prosecution’s case-inchief. 
8

C.C. and testified that he had blood on his hand because he had a 

recurring scab on his nose that bled. 

On October 12, 2018, defendant went to a night club. C.C. 

arrived at the same club and sat down at his table. Because of 

the protective order, defendant left the club so he “wouldn’t get in 

trouble.” He returned to the hotel alone and then prepared to go 

to sleep. Defendant texted C.C. not to come to the room, and he 

asked her where he should send her things. 

Sometime after he had fallen asleep, C.C. entered the room,

jumped on top of him in the bed and started hitting him.

Defendant did not know who was attacking him, so he “came up 

swinging” and threw the person into the wall. When he realized 

that the person in his room was C.C., he lifted her off the ground 

and pushed her out of the room. Scared, defendant left the 

hallway, but returned to the room to change because he was not 

fully clothed. Defendant told Errett that, “she broke into my 

hotel room, and she attacked me.” 

At the time of his arrest, defendant told Officer Prebanda 

that the blood on his forearms and hands was C.C.’s, but did not 

recall having C.C.’s phone in his possession.

III. Rebuttal evidence

The prosecution had two rebuttal witnesses. Officer 

Prebanda addressed defendant’s statements at the time of his 

arrest. When he was arrested, defendant told Officer Prebanda 

that hotel security let C.C. into the room and defendant was 

aware it was C.C. C.C. immediately jumped on top of defendant

and started hitting him. After being arrested, defendant told 

Officer Prebanda that the phone in his possession belonged to 

C.C. 
9

Officer Foley, who responded to the August 2018 incident, 

testified that defendant had no blood or injuries on his nose or 

face on August 5, 2018. 

DISCUSSION

I. Substantial evidence supports defendant’s conviction for false 

imprisonment by violence

Defendant contends that there is insufficient evidence to 

support his conviction for false imprisonment because there is no 

evidence that C.C. was restrained in the hotel room and her 

injuries alone do not permit an inference of restraint. He further 

argues that the jury could have convicted him of false 

imprisonment based on improper speculation. 

A. Standard of review and relevant law

When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting a conviction, an appellate court reviews the 

entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to 

determine whether it contains reasonable, solid, and credible 

evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the defendant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson (2015) 60 

Cal.4th 966, 988.) A reviewing court does not invade the province 

of the jury by reweighing the evidence, or by re-reconciling

competing circumstances and redrawing competing inferences 

from those circumstances; it is the jury—not the appellate 

court—that must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt. (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 

1055–1056.) “[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Jackson v. Virginia

(1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318–319.) 
10

This standard applies when the evidence is primarily 

circumstantial, and the appellate court “must accept logical 

inferences that the jury might have drawn from the 

circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 

396.)

Section 236 provides: “False imprisonment is the unlawful 

violation of the personal liberty of another.” Any exercise of 

express or implied force which compels another person to remain 

where she does not wish to remain, or to go where she does not 

wish to go, is false imprisonment. (People v. Agnew (1940) 16 

Cal.2d 655, 659–660.) The essential element of false 

imprisonment is restraint. (Id. at p. 659.) The restraint must be

of “a person’s freedom of movement” because the statutory 

language “clearly suggests it relates to the personal liberty to be

free from physical restraint.” (People v. Bamba (1997) 58 

Cal.App.4th 1113, 1121.) The restraint can be short in time and 

distance (People v. Riddle (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 222, 230), and 

the victim need not be restrained in a confined space (People v. 

Fernandez (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 710, 718 (Fernandez)).

False imprisonment is a general intent crime. (People v. 

Olivencia (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1391, 1397–1398.) The offense 

is a felony if the restraint is effected by violence, menace, fraud or 

deceit. (§ 237; People v. Dominguez (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1351, 

1356–1357.) “Violence” in this context is the use of force greater 

than that reasonably necessary to effect the restraint. (People v. 

Hendrix (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1458, 1462.)

B. Analysis

Applying these legal principles, we conclude that 

substantial evidences supports defendant’s conviction for false 

imprisonment by violence. Hotel guests heard a woman 
11

screaming for help for about 20 seconds. Both the length of the 

screaming and the fact that no witness heard a man’s voice 

suggest that the woman screaming was in a situation from which 

she wished to escape. It was entirely reasonable for the jury to 

rely on a lengthy scream to infer that C.C. was being restrained 

against her will, particularly when considered in context with the 

other circumstantial evidence.9 

Thereafter, two hotel guests found C.C. outside of room 

1006, bloody. Police officers later found clumps of C.C.’s hair on 

the bed and on the hotel room floor, and a mark on the back of 

her neck suggested that her hair had been pulled out. From this 

evidence, the jury reasonably could have inferred that defendant 

was restraining C.C. in the hotel room and using her hair to pull 

her closer to him, rather than push her away as he claimed in his 

trial testimony. 

Moreover, the fact that her hair was pulled out and found 

in multiple places in the room suggests that defendant used force 

beyond that necessary to prevent C.C. from leaving the room. 

People v. Castro (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 137, 143 (Castro) is 

instructive. In that case, the appellate court held that the 

defendant had used sufficient force to satisfy the elements of 

9 In his reply brief, defendant discounts this evidence by 

claiming that C.C. was screaming only after she left room 1006 

because there is no direct evidence that she was screaming from 

inside the room. Defendant is essentially asking us to reweigh 

the evidence, something we cannot, and will not, do. (People v. 

Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 89 (conc. & dis. opn. of CantilSakauye, C. J.; People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 882–

883.)
12

false imprisonment by violence where he had approached a young 

girl on the street, grabbed her arm, turned her around, and 

pulled her a few steps toward his car. The court noted that the 

restraint was accomplished by the time the defendant had turned 

the victim around. (Ibid.) The use of additional force by pulling 

her towards his car, even just a few steps, was sufficient to 

constitute violence because that force was greater than that 

reasonably necessary to effect the restraint.

Much like the defendant in Castro, defendant had already 

accomplished the restraint of C.C. when he pulled on her hair, 

and in pulling her hair out, he used force significantly greater 

than reasonably necessary to accomplish that restraint. Indeed, 

the instant case is stronger than Castro because the additional 

force required to pull out someone’s hair is significantly greater 

than that required to pull a young person a few steps in one 

direction. (Castro, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 143.) The fact 

that C.C. did not testify, unlike the complaining witness in 

Castro, does not change our conclusion. (Id. at p. 140.) 

In addition to the pulled-out hair evidence, there was also a 

large amount of blood, not only in the hallway and on the outside 

of the door, but inside the room as well. Inside the hotel room, 

there was blood on the bed, a picture frame, the carpet, and the 

doorway. The pattern of blood near the doorway inside the room 

suggested that C.C. had been leaning forward toward the door. 

Such blood spatter is consistent with injuries caused to

C.C. as she tried to leave the room, rather than as if she had 

fought to stay inside of the room. Detective Barba opined as 
13

much, and the jury reasonably could have believed such opinion 

based on their own review of photographs of the hotel room.10 

Urging us to reverse, defendant argues that the record 

lacks any evidence, beyond C.C.’s injuries, that defendant 

restrained or confined C.C. in the hotel room. Aside from the fact 

that he offers no legal authority for the proposition that injuries 

alone cannot permit an inference of restraint, as set forth above, 

there was ample evidence beyond C.C.’s injuries of restraint. To 

conclude otherwise, we would have to reweigh the evidence, 

something we cannot, and will not, do. (People v. Young (2005) 34 

Cal.4th 1149, 1181 [we do not reweigh the evidence or resolve 

conflicts in the evidence]; People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 

1139 [if the circumstances reasonably justify the factfinder’s 

findings, the reviewing court may not reverse the judgment 

merely because it believes that the circumstances might also 

support a contrary finding]; People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 

932–933 [same].)

Defendant further asserts that affirming the false 

imprisonment conviction here would allow a battery and other 

similar offenses to be charged as false imprisonment. We are not 

convinced.

10 In his reply brief, defendant asserts that Detective Barba 

did not offer any such opinion. Defendant is mistaken. When 

asked if there was “[a]nything significant about those droplets of 

blood in your opinion,” Detective Barba replied that it seemed 

that she was “leaning somewhat forward in an attempt to get out 

of the room, and that’s where the droplets” came from. 
14

Fernandez, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th 710 helps us reach this 

conclusion. In Fernandez, the victim was running away from the

defendant and several others. (Fernandez, supra, at pp. 712–

713.) The defendant caught up to the victim and pulled him 

down, restraining him “long enough for [the victim] to suffer over 

20 kicks.” (Id. at p. 718.) In affirming the conviction for false 

imprisonment, the court distinguished between the battery and 

the false imprisonment by pointing out that “[the defendant] and 

the others could have hit [the victim] without holding him down.” 

(Ibid.) Though the battery and false imprisonment in Fernandez

occurred at the same time, the court was able to identify two 

distinguishable offenses and uphold the conviction. (Ibid.)

Similarly, here, the injury inflicted on C.C. and the false 

imprisonment offenses also occurred at the same time, but they 

were two separate offenses. As in Fernandez, defendant could 

have hit C.C. without restraining her, but based on the evidence 

and inferences described above, a rational jury could have found 

that defendant both injured C.C. and prevented her from leaving 

his hotel room. The prosecutor told the jury as much when he 

explained, “[defendant] was brutally . . . assaulting his girlfriend, 

and when he was doing so, he was preventing her from leaving 

the room.” Thus, it does not follow that affirming defendant’s

conviction on these facts would lead to false imprisonment 

charges in all battery and related offense cases.

II. Restitution fines and assessments

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing the 

assessments and fines without first determining that he had the 

ability to pay, in violation of his federal and state constitutional 

rights. In support, he relies on Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 

1157. We have previously “conclude[d] that Dueñas was wrongly 
15

decided.” (People v. Hicks (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 320, 324 (Hicks), 

review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258946; accord, People v. 

Kingston (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 272, 279–282; People v. Kopp

(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, 96–97, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, 

S257844.) It follows that we reject defendant’s challenge to the 

assessments and fines, including his contention that he was 

denied effective assistance of counsel for failing to raise this issue 

at sentencing.

That said, as pointed out by the People, there is a 

discrepancy between the trial court’s July 18, 2019, minute order, 

which lists the facilities assessment as $90 and the court security 

assessment as $120, and the reporter’s transcript, which 

identifies the facilities assessment as $60 and the court security 

assessment as $80. The abstract of judgment mirrors the 

reporter’s transcript. 

Ordinarily, discrepancies between the reporter’s transcript 

and the clerk’s transcript “are resolved in favor of the reporter’s

transcript unless the particular circumstances dictate otherwise.” 

(In re Merrick V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235, 249; see also People 

v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385.) This general 

principle does not apply where the trial court did not orally

pronounce the correct, statutorily mandated assessments. 

(People v. Sencion (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 480, 483–484.) And, 

where harmonization of discrepancies is not possible, “‘that part 

of the record will prevail, which, because of its origin and nature 

or otherwise, is entitled to greater credence [citation].’” (People v. 

Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599.)

In this case, the minute order sets forth the correct 

amounts because defendant was convicted on three counts, and 

the statutes at issue specifically include both felony and 
16

misdemeanor convictions. (Gov. Code § 70373, subd. (a)(1) [“The 

assessment shall be imposed in the amount of thirty dollars ($30) 

for each misdemeanor or felony”]; § 1465.8, subd. (a)(1) [“[A]n 

assessment of forty dollars ($40) shall be imposed on every 

conviction for a criminal offense”]; see also People v. Castillo

(2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1415, fn. 3; People v. Roa (2009) 171 

Cal.App.4th 1175, 1181.) Accordingly, the abstract of judgment 

must be corrected to match the July 18, 2019, minute order. We

therefore direct the clerk of the trial court to (1) prepare an 

amended abstract of judgment reflecting the correct amount of 

both assessments ($90 facilities assessment and $120 court 

security assessment); and (2) forward a copy of the amended 

abstract of judgment to the California Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation. (People v. Sinclair (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 

848, 856–857.)
17

DISPOSITION

The clerk of the trial court is directed to (1) prepare an 

amended abstract of judgment reflecting a $90 facilities 

assessment and a $120 court security assessment; and 

(2) forward a copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all 

other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, Acting P. J.

ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, J.

CHAVEZ

________________________, J.

HOFFSTADT