United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3296

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* 

v. * 

* 

Maynard F. Brown, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

__________

 Appeals from the United States

 No. 05-3428 District Court for the Western

__________ District of Missouri.

United States of America *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

*

 v. *

*

David L. Deputy, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *
-2-

__________

No. 05-3456

__________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Monty Camden, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 13, 2006

Filed: August 29, 2006

___________

Before ARNOLD, JOHN R. GIBSON, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

Maynard Brown, David Deputy, and Monty Camden were among nineteen

defendants who were charged in a forty-nine count indictment that arose from the

alleged diversion of pseudoephedrine by businesses in and around Forsyth, Missouri

to individuals who used the pseudoephedrine to manufacture methamphetamine.

Deputy appeals from his conviction following a jury trial, Brown appeals from the

sentence imposed following his guilty plea, and Camden appeals from the denial of

his motion to quash and to suppress evidence that preceded his conditional guilty plea.

We affirm.
-3-

Deputy operated three related businesses from the same warehouse building in

Forsyth, Missouri. The Castle was a retail operation that primarily sold drug

paraphernalia items, and it was the focus of the two-year undercover investigation that

concluded with these indictments. D & D Distributors was an entity Deputy formed

for the purpose of obtaining a federal Drug Enforcement Administration license to

distribute, on a wholesale level, products containing pseudoephedrine, ephedrine, and

phenylpropanolamine. D & D supplied the pseudoephedrine pills that were purchased

and found at The Castle during the investigation. Between May of 2000 and August

of 2002, D & D ordered 5,142,528 pseudoephedrine pills. The third business, D-Mart,

sold pseudoephedrine pills to Deputy’s customers who wanted to purchase more than

the maximum number of pills allowed by the DEA without a record being made of the

sale.

When Deputy applied for the DEA license in 1999, the agency assigned a

diversion investigator to review the application, meet with Deputy, and inspect the

location in which the products were to be handled and stored. Deputy’s application

listed five convenience stores to which he intended to distribute the products, and he

represented to the investigator that he expected sales of these products to make up less

than ten percent of his total sales. The investigator saw no items of drug paraphernalia

during her inspection of Deputy’s building, and Deputy did not volunteer that he was

planning to sell such items along with pseudoephedrine. The agency approved the

application and issued the license.

The DEA investigator provided Deputy with copies of notices that informed

him that pseudoephedrine is used illicitly to manufacture methamphetamine and

advised him how to identify people who might be buying the product for that purpose.

She also gave him a chart that listed the maximum number of pseudoephedrine pills

that a distributor could sell in a month’s time to individuals and to retailers without

reporting the sale to the DEA. The DEA has no threshold requirement that limits how
-4-

much pseudoephedrine a distributor is permitted to sell; its requirements address only

record-keeping and reporting.

In 2002, the DEA was scheduled to return to D & D to verify that it was

meeting the legal requirements of the distributing license it held. However, the

investigator learned that D & D was the subject of an ongoing criminal investigation

and refrained from its regulatory inspection so as not to interfere. At the conclusion

of the criminal investigation, the DEA gave Deputy the opportunity to surrender his

license, and he did so.

The criminal investigation, which continued for nearly two years, was

conducted by the COMET drug task force, or the Combined Ozarks Multijurisdictional Enforcement Team. Having received information that The Castle was

selling large quantities of pseudoephedrine pills, members of the task force visited the

business on October 25, 2001. They observed that The Castle was selling a variety

of items including drug paraphernalia, plastic baggies commonly used for packaging

controlled substances, smoking pipes, scales, urine test cleansing kits, knives, and

pornography, along with pseudoephedrine. The Castle was identified as a head shop,

a business that primarily sells drug paraphernalia. However, it also sold World War

II memorabilia, including Russian army gas masks.

 The officers purchased large amounts of pseudoephedrine at The Castle

through more than a dozen undercover purchases. During these sales, Deputy often

spoke of the limit on the number of pseudoephedrine pills that he could sell to an

individual and expressed his preference for staying under the DEA reporting limit.

He would also tell customers that he would not remember them if they returned the

following day, thereby allowing the customers to purchase another month’s limit of

pills. He assured customers that the pills he sold were not wax coated and would

dissolve easily. In addition, officers conducted trash pulls of the dumpster located on

the south side of The Castle’s parking lot and retrieved large numbers of empty blister
-5-

packs of pseudoephedrine with all the pills having been removed. According to a

member of the task force, this commonly occurs to allow all the pills to be gathered

in a single container as is necessary to cook methamphetamine. The dumpster also

contained several envelopes which bore the words “pseudo pull” along with a dollar

amount and a date, and bank deposit slips for The Castle.

The officers executed a federal search warrant for The Castle on October 17,

2002. During the search they seized approximately 460,000 pseudoephedrine pills

with a note on the boxes indicating that they were waiting for a shipment back to

Lannett, the drug manufacturer. The officers also learned that Deputy ran his three

businesses out of this location: The Castle, D & D Distribution, and D-Mart. Records

relating to D & D indicated that it was distributing pseudoephedrine to locations

throughout southwest Missouri and northern Arkansas, including a laundromat and

other head shops. Larry Crow was D & D’s main salesperson.

D-Mart was located in the warehouse that housed Deputy’s other businesses,

but D-Mart had a separate entrance. Once certain customers purchased the limit of

pills at The Castle (meaning below the reporting requirement), Deputy would advise

them that they could exit the store and buy the limit again at D-Mart.

 During the search, agents found a January 16, 2002 letter from the DEA

advising Deputy that Missouri law forbids retail stores from selling more than the

equivalent of three boxes of pseudoephedrine pills to a customer. They also

discovered a May 23, 2000 agreement with Lannett, signed by Deputy, which limited

the sale of its pseudoephedrine to 144 boxes per customer per month. According to

Crow, Deputy told him he could sell up to four cases of pseudoephedrine per month

per store, with each case consisting of 144 boxes of 48 pills, but he was to put each

case on a separate invoice. Deputy told Crow he could sell one person more than four

cases so long as the person had more than one business that could make separate

purchases. Crow also testified that he prepared false invoices at Deputy’s direction
-6-

for pseudoephedrine sales to a business named Good Earth Industries, but Deputy

actually kept those pills for extra inventory.

One of the stores to which Crow sold pseudoephedrine was the Hilltop Store

located in Isabella, Missouri, and operated by Maynard Brown. Members of the drug

task force obtained a search warrant for the store and for Brown’s residence and

executed it on March 29, 2003. Brown was arrested the following day. Within days

after his arrest, Brown threatened his relative and former employee, Missy Reichert,

who was cooperating with the investigation. Six months later, Brown placed a

message on a sign outside of his store that said, "I see you, Missy. I see you, too,

Tony." Missy Reichert’s husband is named Tony. Brown also followed the off-duty

vehicle of an Ozark County deputy sheriff who had helped to obtain and execute the

search warrant of his property. When the officer stopped Brown and asked why he

was following him, Brown replied that he wanted the officer "to see what it felt like."

The investigation also revealed information that Brown distributed some of the

pseudoephedrine he purchased to Monty Camden, who in turn provided it to others

who used it to manufacture methamphetamine. Camden then brought

methamphetamine back to Brown to sell at the Hilltop Store. An Ozark County

narcotics investigator learned that heavy traffic frequented Camden’s home, which

was located on a rural road, and that Camden had recently had plumbers working to

replace some pipes that had been burned out by heavy acid. Based on this

information, the investigator attempted to visit Camden in his home to tell him that

he suspected illegal activity and to ask for consent to search the property. When he

arrived at the property, he first knocked on the door of the main house. Getting no

answer, he continued around the house to a cabin. He knocked on its door and again

got no answer. He observed an exhaust fan in a second floor window of the cabin and

a number of sheds that were secured with heavy padlocks. The investigator then

obtained and executed a search warrant for Camden’s property. The search revealed
1

These nine counts were alleged to be in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(c)(2) and

846, 18 U.S.C. § 1956, and 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).

2

The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

-7-

chemicals and precursors needed to manufacture methamphetamine along with white

powder substance and residue that field tested positive for methamphetamine.

The investigation concluded with a forty-nine count indictment that named

Deputy, Crow, Brown, Camden, and fifteen others. Two superseding indictments

were filed, both of which added another defendant and one more count. Deputy went

to trial and was found guilty on all nine of the counts on which he was charged: one

count of conspiracy to distribute or possess three kilograms or more of

pseudoephedrine knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that it would be

used to manufacture methamphetamine; two counts of distribution of pseudoephedrine

knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that it would be used to manufacture

methamphetamine; one count of possession of pseudoephedrine knowing, or having

reasonable cause to believe, that it would be used to manufacture methamphetamine;

one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering; and four counts of money

laundering.1

 Deputy was sentenced to 240 months on each count, to be served

concurrently. The jury also found some of Deputy’s real and personal property

subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 853, namely the property that contained The

Castle and cash in the amount of close to one million dollars, and the district court

ordered the forfeiture of those items.2

 Deputy appeals from the judgment, arguing:

there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; the district court erred in

failing to exclude expert testimony on the normal sales of pseudoephedrine; and the

district court abused its discretion in instructing the jury.

Brown pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute or possess three

kilograms or more of pseudoephedrine, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe
3

Id.

4

Id., adopting the report and recommendation of the Honorable James C.

England, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

-8-

that it would be used to manufacture methamphetamine, and was sentenced to 168

months’ imprisonment. He appeals from a two-level enhancement of his sentence that

the district court imposed for obstruction of justice.3

Camden entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to

manufacture and distribute methamphetamine, reserving the right to appeal the district

court’s denial of his motion to quash a search warrant and to suppress evidence found

in the search.4

 Camden was sentenced to thirty-seven months’ imprisonment. On

appeal, Camden raises only the suppression issue.

I.

Deputy argues that the district court erred in denying his motions for judgment

of acquittal because the government failed to introduce evidence sufficient for the jury

to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the possession, distribution, and drug

conspiracy counts. He asserts that he was a lawful seller of pseudoephedrine who

openly purchased the product and complied with the DEA’s reporting requirements,

that no evidence was introduced to show that methamphetamine was manufactured

from the pseudoephedrine he sold, and that he was not part of a conspiracy. We

review challenges to sufficiency of the evidence by examining the evidence in the

light most favorable to the verdict and accepting all reasonable inferences which tend

to support the jury’s verdict. United States v. Exson, 328 F.3d 456, 460 (8th Cir.

2003). We do not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. Id.
-9-

This court has recently had numerous occasions to discuss attacks on the

sufficiency of the evidence in cases involving the possession and distribution of

pseudoephedrine with the knowledge, or with reasonable cause to believe, that it will

be used to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c). For

example, in United States v. Bewig, 354 F.3d 731 (8th Cir. 2003), we determined that

a reasonable jury could have concluded that Bewig entered into a conspiracy to violate

§ 841(c) because of certain key facts. First, we noted that pseudoephedrine has

limited legal uses, and that "if you do not have a cold, a headache, or sinus problems

there are remarkably few things you can do with pseudoephedrine except make illegal

narcotics." 354 F.3d at 736. Bewig’s sales of pseudoephedrine to routine customers,

and in bulk, suggested that he was acting merely as a front to an organized drug

scheme. Second, Bewig knew that pseudoephedrine was used to make

methamphetamine. Third, Bewig’s distributor informed him that he was ordering

pseudoephedrine at a disproportionately high rate, which suggests agreement in the

illegal endeavor as a conspirator who promoted the venture with a stake in the

outcome. Fourth, Bewig sold the pseudoephedrine in amounts larger than his limit or

to the same person over the course of a day in multiples of the limit. Taken together,

these facts led us to conclude that Bewig could not "defeat his conviction by hiding

behind an unreasonable veil of ignorance." Id. at 736-37. See also United States v.

Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1165 (2006) (rejecting

the argument that defendant’s constructive possession of pseudoephedrine was

insufficient evidence of his knowledge that it would be used to manufacture

methamphetamine).

We likewise reject Deputy’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. While

we have made it clear that "section [841(c)(2)] does not punish the inadvertent sale of

a listed chemical to an illegal drug manufacturer, but instead punishes only those sales

where the seller understands, or should reasonably understand, that the chemical will

be used illegally," United States v. Sdoulam, 398 F.3d 981, 988 (8th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Bewig, 354 F.3d at 737), the evidence here strongly supports the jury’s
5

Deputy includes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on the money

laundering counts in the heading of his argument, but he never addresses those counts

in the body of his brief. There was sufficient evidence that Deputy made money by

selling pseudoephedrine and that he promoted his illegal distribution scheme with that

money, see United States v. Jenkins, 78 F.3d 1283, 1288 (8th Cir. 1996), and we reject

his challenge.

-10-

finding. Deputy knew that pseudoephedrine is used to make methamphetamine, and

investigators found large quantities of empty blister packs dumped in trash receptacles

outside The Castle. Deputy operated two retail businesses out of the same building,

thereby allowing his customers to buy twice the number of tablets during each

purchase. His distribution business, D & D, had a variety of customers that are not

traditional vendors of cold and sinus medication. Deputy advised his D & D

salesman, Crow, how to make it look like he was not exceeding the limit of sales per

customer by pretending that various businesses were unrelated, and Deputy himself

would assure customers that he would not remember them if they returned the

following day. The evidence in this case was overwhelmingly sufficient to establish

the elements of the substantive charges of distribution and possession.

This same evidence likewise causes us to reject Deputy’s challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the drug conspiracy charge.5

 The

government is not required to prove an express understanding between the

conspirators, but "need only establish a tacit understanding between the parties, and

this may be shown wholly through the circumstantial evidence of [the defendant’s]

actions." Bewig, 354 F.3d at 735. Deputy had tacit understandings with Crow about

the quantity of tablets he could sell and to whom, and with his retail customers about

the quality and quantity of the tablets he distributed. The district court did not err in

denying Deputy’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
6

Deputy argues in his brief that the witness lacked the necessary educational

background in the field of statistics, but he failed to raise that argument before the

district court. Deputy’s counsel raised the witness’s lack of academic degree in the

field of statistics in cross-examination as a challenge to the weight of his testimony,

but made no objection to its admissibility on that ground. We therefore review it for

plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Deputy has not demonstrated that the district

court committed such error in finding the witness’s educational background sufficient.

-11-

II.

Deputy asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to exclude the

testimony of an expert witness concerning the normal or expected sales of

pseudoephedrine by a traditional convenience store. Although he acknowledges that

the subject matter of the witness’s testimony was admissible under United States v.

Sdoulam, 398 F.3d 981, 988-91 (8th Cir. 2005), Deputy argues that the witness should

not have been allowed to testify because his opinions were based on insufficient facts

and data,6

 and that furthermore his testimony was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.

We review the district court’s decision to admit expert testimony for abuse of

discretion. Id. at 989.

Deputy complains that the witness had not visited any of the stores that D & D

serviced and that he had no information about their location, size, condition, and

operations. However, the witness’s testimony was based on comparing sales at these

stores to data obtained from a national economic census regarding estimated national

pseudoephedrine sales figures. The census information is precisely what we approved

in Sdoulam, and the sales figures came from invoices seized from D & D to which

Deputy posed no objection. Deputy’s assertion of unfair prejudice in the admission

of the testimony is unsupported by any argument, and he has failed to demonstrate that

the district court abused its discretion.
-12-

III.

 Deputy asserts that the district court abused its discretion by giving the jury a

permissive inference instruction that allowed the jurors to infer that Deputy had

reasonable cause to believe that the pseudoephedrine he sold would be used to

manufacture methamphetamine if the jurors found that he sold excessive amounts of

pseudoephedrine. Deputy asserts that the instruction was not warranted because the

district court had already agreed to give an instruction on knowing and deliberate

ignorance, and an additional permissive instruction was prosecutorial overkill. We

review the challenge for abuse of discretion, United States v. Phelps, 168 F.3d 1048,

1057 (8th Cir. 1999), and we will uphold the instruction if it is a correct statement of

the law and supported by the evidence. United States v. Sdoulam, 398 F.3d 981, 993

(8th Cir. 2005).

The challenged instruction is nearly identical to one we approved in Sdoulam,

except that the instruction in this case also permitted an inference of knowledge or

reasonable cause to believe if the jurors found beyond a reasonable doubt that Deputy

"sold abnormally large amounts of pseudoephedrine as a wholesaler to customers not

traditionally associated with the legitimate sale of pseudoephedrine." However,

because the addition of these words was supported by the evidence and the instruction

remains a correct statement of the law, the instruction was proper. See Arkwright

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gwinner Oil, Inc., 125 F.3d 1176, 1180 (8th Cir. 1997).

We affirm the judgment as to Deputy.

IV.

Maynard Brown appeals a single sentencing issue. Brown pleaded guilty to one

count of conspiracy to distribute three kilograms or more of pseudoephedrine,
7

The government did not agree to the enhancement as part of the plea agreement

and ostensibly took no position on it at the hearing. However, the government

attorney offered to and did conduct a direct examination of the officer who was

involved in each of the incidents upon which the district court’s finding was based.

-13-

knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that it would be used to manufacture

methamphetamine, and was sentenced to 168 months’ imprisonment. The plea

agreement included a stipulation to a base offense level of 32 with a two-level

increase for possession of a dangerous weapon, another two levels for a leadership

role, and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, with a net offense

level of 33.

The presentence investigation report recommended a two-level enhancement

under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice. The district court adopted the

recommendation following an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the evidence raised

the inference of a threat. The district court denied Brown’s objection to the

enhancement, and Brown argues that the preponderance of the evidence did not

support the court’s finding.7

 We review the district court’s factual findings for clear

error. United States v. Willey, 350 F.3d 736, 738 (8th Cir. 2003).

The Ozark County deputy sheriff who arrested Brown spoke with Missy

Reichert and her husband Tony less than one week after the arrest as part of the

ongoing investigation. The Reicherts had recently lived next to the Hilltop Store that

Brown operated and Missy had worked there. They told the deputy that since his

arrest, Brown had been looking for them where they had relocated in Arkansas and

had threatened to kill them. The day after this conversation, the same deputy was

driving in Ozark County and noticed that Brown’s vehicle was following him. He

stopped on a road that he knew was a dead end and got out of his vehicle to enter the

woods. Brown stopped briefly by the deputy’s vehicle and then continued driving
-14-

towards the dead end. The deputy returned to his vehicle, stopped Brown at the dead

end, and checked him for weapons. He asked Brown why he was following him, and

Brown replied that he wanted the deputy "to see what it felt like."

Approximately five months later, the deputy noticed a large illuminated sign

sitting next to the Hilltop Store’s driveway. The sign listed items for sale but also

read, "I see you, Missy. I see you, too, Tony." The district court’s conclusion that

Brown’s conduct constituted an implied threat to the Reicherts is not clearly

erroneous.

Brown also argues that § 3C1.1 requires that the obstructive conduct take place

when the defendant knows that an investigation of the instant offense is underway,

and that he had no such knowledge. We review de novo the application of the

guidelines to the facts. Willey, 240 F.3d at 738.

The guidelines describe obstructive behavior to include "threatening,

intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing a . . . witness . . . directly or

indirectly, or attempting to do so." U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment. n. 4(a). Brown

correctly asserts that the guideline requires obstructive conduct to have occurred

during the course of the investigation related to the offense of conviction and not at

any other time. United States v. Stolba, 357 F.3d 850, 852-53 (8th Cir. 2004). He

admits that he knew that a state investigation for possession of methamphetamine was

underway but he denies that he had any knowledge of a federal investigation. This

distinction is irrelevant under the guideline, as the state investigation involved a

closely related offense. See United States v. Adediran, 26 F.3d 61, 64-65 (8th Cir.

1994). The district court correctly interpreted the guideline.

We affirm Brown’s sentence.
-15-

V.

Camden appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to quash a search

warrant and to suppress evidence found in that search. He asserts that the affidavit

used to obtain the warrant lacked probable cause and contained knowingly made

material misrepresentations and omissions. We review the district court’s findings of

fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. The existence of probable

cause is a mixed question of fact and law which we review de novo. United States v.

Velazquez-Rivera, 366 F.3d 661, 664 (8th Cir. 2004).

The affidavit in question was prepared by Ozark County Deputy Sheriff David

Holmes, a member of the drug task force. During the course of his investigation,

Holmes obtained information from an informant that Camden was supplying

methamphetamine to Brown in return for pseudoephedrine tablets. At the time

Holmes obtained this information, Brown had recently been arrested for

manufacturing methamphetamine. The informant said that Camden drove a beer

delivery truck and made weekly stops at the Hilltop Store. After talking with the

owner of the beer distributorship, one of Camden’s neighbors, and another informant,

Holmes went to Camden’s house to speak with him. No one responded to his knocks

on the door of the house or of another cabin located on the property. While there,

Holmes noticed the windows of the cabin were blocked and an exhaust fan was

installed in a second floor window. He saw several windowless, padlocked

outbuildings and a five-gallon jug of what he identified as muriatic acid on the front

porch of the house. In his affidavit, Holmes wrote that muriatic acid is used in the

manufacture of methamphetamine although its intended use is to clean cement. He

saw no cement on Camden’s property. Based on the information in the affidavit, the

Ozark County prosecutor obtained a search warrant for Camden’s property and all of

the buildings located on it. The search revealed chemicals and precursors needed to
-16-

manufacture methamphetamine along with white powder substance and residue that

field tested positive for methamphetamine.

Camden asserts that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause because it

did not establish a nexus between what it alleged to be Camden’s drug activity and his

property. The affidavit stated that a jug of muriatic acid was located on the porch, but

during cross-examination Holmes admitted that the jug was marked as "acid" and he

believed but did not know it to be muriatic acid at the time. Camden further argues

that other details in the affidavit were unclear, confusing, and insignificant. The

magistrate judge found that the affidavit contained sufficiently reliable and detailed

information, both from informants and resulting from Holmes’s corroborating efforts,

to establish probable cause. We have reviewed the record and conclude that the

circumstances set forth in the affidavit, including the veracity and basis of knowledge

of those who supplied hearsay information, produced a fair probability that contraband

would be found on Camden’s property. See United States v. Edmiston, 46 F.3d 786,

789 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). The district

court did not err in adopting the magistrate judge’s finding of probable cause.

Camden also challenges the district court’s finding that the affidavit did not

contain deliberate or reckless misrepresentations and omissions of material facts that

would invalidate the search warrant and exclude the fruits of the search under Franks

v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). Camden lists five erroneous factual

statements: 1) the affidavit stated that the jug on the porch contained muriatic acid

when Holmes did not know the identity of its contents with certainty; 2) Holmes

implied that the gallon contained five gallons without knowing the amount in it; 3) the

affidavit did not clearly state whether plumbing had been replaced because acid had

been poured down the drain of the house or the cabin; 4) Holmes did not recite the

distance between the house and the cabin, which is two-tenths of a mile; and 5) the
-17-

affidavit stated that there was no cement visible at the house, but there was in fact

concrete.

The complaints Camden sets forth are more akin to discrepancies than to

misrepresentations or omissions. However, even assuming that any of them fall into

the latter category, there would be no Franks violation unless Camden shows that

Holmes misrepresented the information or made false statements with the intent to

make, or in reckless disregard of whether it made, the affidavit misleading. United

States v. Allen, 297 F.3d 790, 795 (8th Cir. 2002). Camden has made no effort to

make such a showing. In addition, if information had been intentionally or recklessly

misrepresented, Camden would have to prove that the affidavit would not support a

finding of probable cause without those statements. Id. The record does not support

any such conclusion.

The district court did not err in denying Camden’s motion to quash the search

warrant and to exclude evidence uncovered pursuant to execution of the warrant.

We affirm the district court as to all issues with respect to Deputy, Brown, and

Camden.

______________________________