### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Se pte m be r 2, 200 3 S es sio n JO HN EDWARD W OODS v. J IL L SUZ ANNE WOO DS Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Willi am son Coun ty No. I-2K 475 Russ Heldman, Judge

No. M2002- 01736-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Jul y 12, 2005

T h i s ap p ea l i n v o l v es t h e fi n an ci al as p ec t s o f t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f at we l v e- y ea r m arri age . E v en t h o u gh the husband filed a

petition for divorce in the Circuit Cou rt fo r W illiamson C ounty , the parties e v e n t u a l l y s t i p u l at e d t h a t t h e w i f e w a s e n t i t l e d t o d i v o r c e o n t h e g r o u n d o f t h e h u s b a n d ’ s a d u l t e r y. Following a benc h trial, the court awar ded the wife eig hty perc ent of the ne t marital estate, $1,000 per month in reha

bilitative alimonyfor thre e y ear s, $25,000 in alimony in solido, and one-ha lf of her attorney ’s fe es. The husband appea led. We have de termined that the e vidence does not support the manner in which the trial court divided the marital estate , the amount of the r ehabilitative alimony awa rd, the a limonyi n s o l i d o aw ard, or the awa rd for attorney ’s fe es. We modify the judg ment a c c o r d i n g l y. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t M odi fie d and Aff irm ed
W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM B. C A IN and P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J J ., joined.
Th oma s F . B loo m, N a sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e llant, John Ed wa rdWoo ds

. Jef fr e y L . L e vy , N a sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or theapp e lle e , Jill S uza nn e Woo ds

. OP IN ION
I.
J ohn and Ji ll W oods were m ar ried in 1988. They lived in Chattanoog a whe re Mr . Woods wa s e mpl oy e d b y

a fo odbr ok e ra g e fi rm . M s. Woo ds re turne d to c oll e g e to e arn a de g re e in ed u c a ti o n a n d th e n b e g a n te a c h in g . I n a d d it io n to th e ir r e g u la r e mp lo y me n t, th e parties supplemented their inco m e b yselling c lothing at f lea mar kets. They

obtained the c lothing fr om Irwin Ka rp, Ms. Woods’s father, w ho owned a chain of clothing store s throug hout Tennesse e. Mr. Kar p sold the clothes to the Woodses at cost, and they would keep a ll the profits for themselve s. The fir st of the parties’ three children w as born in September 1992. They

moved to the Nashville ar ea in 1994 whe n Mr. W oods’s employ er offer ed to transfe r hi m either to Knoxvil le or Nashville. With fi n an ci al h elp from Ms. Woods’s family , they purcha sed a house in Bre ntwood.M r. K arp co nt i nued t o op erat e t he st o re f o l l o wi ng t he W o o d ses ’ s ep arat i o n. H e event ual l y c l o sed t he st o re 1 i n M ay 2 00 1. M r . K ar p and M s . W oo ds l at er as s er t ed t hat par t of t he expen s es M r . K ar p i ncu r r ed t o cl ose hi s s t ore was a m a rita l d e b t. -2- Ms. Woods found employ ment as a te ache r in Fr anklin. Their se cond child wa s born in May 1995 and their third c hild in August 1997.
Th e Woo ds e s c on tin ue d to se ll c lothe s at f le a mark e ts a ft e r the y mov e d to Na sh vil le . M s. Woods eventually

tired of tea ching and of the flea marke t merchandising a nd convince d her f ather to o pe n o ne of

his c lothin g sto re s inNa sh vil le a ndto h ir e he r a s mana g e r. Th e ne w C lothin g Wor ld sto re op e ne d inthe10 0 O aks Ma ll i n 1 99 8, a ndMs. Woo ds be c a me the ma na g e r. He r f a the r p a id her $1,000 pe r we ek and a lso provided her with a g ener ous expense all o wance. The opening of C l o t h i n g W o r l d w a s j u s t o n e i n d i c a t i o n o f M r . K arp ’ s g e n e r o u s n e s s t o M s . W o o d s a n d h e r f a m i l y. He lavishe d them with g ifts and money throug hout the marria g e, and his lar g esse e nabled the pa rties to maintain a lifesty le that was be y ond their mea ns. All was notwell with the parties’ re lationship after the y moved to Nashville. Mr. Woods c a me to b e lie ve that Ms . Wo od s h a d a do min e e ri ng pe rs on a lit y a ndbe c a me inc re a sin g ly dis e nc ha nte d w ith he r de sir e to co ntr ol mos t asp e c ts of the famil y ’s lif e . A c c or din g to M r. Woo ds , he e ve ntu a lly tir e d of

arg uin g wi th M s. Woo ds a ndbe g a n a c c e din g to h e r d e ma nd s o n mo st m a tte rs . I n M a y 19 98 , Mr

. Woo ds be g a n a c la nd e sti ne e xtramari ta l a ff a ir wi th a c o- wo rk e r. He e ve ntu a lly left home a nd filed for

divorce in 1999 but later re turned for the childre n’s sake

. I n 1999, Mr. Woods beg an to be c oncerned about his job s ec u ri t y . He and Ms. Woods app ro a c he d M r. Ka

rp abo ut the po ssi bil ity

of op e nin g a

se c on d Cl oth ing Wor ld s tor e in N a sh vil le and hi ri n g him as manag er. Mr . Kar p ag ree d. Opening the sec ond store wa s a joint effort by the Woo ds e s a ndMr . K arp . M r. Woo ds fo un d s uit able sp a c e in the Riv e rg a te Ma ll a re a , a ndhe a ndMs. Woo ds sig ne d a

fi ve-y e ar l e a se . M r. Ka rp pr ov ide d mo ne y

to p re pa rethe sto rea ndpu rc ha se fi xtur e s, a ndMs. Woo ds us e d s omeof he r o wn fu nd s t o pu rchase theinv e nto ry . T he Riv e rg a te Clo thi ng Wor ld s tor e op e ne d inAp ri l 20 00 , b ut M r. Woo ds wi thdre w f ro m th e e nte rp ri se in A ug us t 2000 when he decide d to leave the marria g e for the sec ond and fina l time. 1 Mr. Wood moved into an apartment in Hende rsonville and filed a divorce complaint i n the Circuit Court for Will iamson County

. Ms. Woods was distraug ht and suspicious a bout Mr. Woods’s de pa rtur e . Sh e re ta ine d a

private inv e sti g a tor wh o unc ov e re d Mr. Woo ds ’s e xtramari ta l a ff a ir . M s. Woods confronted Mr. Woods with this information in Oc tober 2000, a nd in Dece mber 2000, she filed an answer and counter claim denying that she had eng ag ed in ina ppropriate marital conduc t and asserting that Mr. Woods had commit ted adultery and had abandone d his family

. She also soug ht pendente lite support, a s well as a r estraining order to preve nt Mr. Woods from having any contac t wi th h is g ir lf

ri e nd . T he t ri al c ou rt , s idi ng wi th M s. Woo ds , o rd e re d M r. Woo ds to p a y $2 ,0 00 in spousal support and to re frain from having int entional contact of any sort with his g irlfriend until the litigation was c oncluded.
Mr. Karp c o n ti n u e d to o p e r a te th e Ri v e r g a te Cl o th in g Wo r ld s to r e o n h is o w n a f te r the p ar t i e s s e p ar a t e d

. H e e v e n t u a l l y d e c i d e d t o c l o s e b o t h t h i s s t o r e a n d t h e s t o r e a t1 0 0 O ak s M a l l

. In May 2001, he neg otiated a r elea se o f t he Riverg ate store lease which re quired the pay ment of-3-

$2 4, 59 8. 13 to the le sso r. Mr

. Ka rp pa id $ 18 ,5 98 .1 3 to the le sso r anda g re e d to pe rm it the le sso r t o liquidate a $6,000 ce rtificate of deposit that the Woodses had provide d to secure the lease

. Th e pr oc e e din g be c a me mor e c on te nti ou s w he n M s. Woo ds fi le d a pe tit ionse e kin g to h old Mr . Wo od s inc ri min a l or c ivi l con te mpt fo r dis ob e y ing the or de r dir e c tin g him to av oidc on ta c t w ith his girlf riend. F ollowing a

leng thy hearing, the trial court g rante d Ms. Woods a divorc e base d on Mr. Woods’s stipul ation to adultery but dismi ssed her

petition to hold M r. Woods in contempt.
I n a series of orde rs sprea d out betwee n April 3, 2001 and July11, 2002 , the trial court g rante d c us tod y

of the pa rt ie s’ thr e e c hil dr e n to Ms. Woo ds , de fi ne d M r. Woo ds ’s vis itatio n rig hts , and orde red Mr. Woods to pay $1,325 in monthlychild support. I n addition, the court orde red Mr

. Woo ds to p a y

Ms. Woo ds $1 ,0 00 pe r m on th in re ha bil itativ e a lim on y fo r thr e e y e ars , a wa rd e d M s. Woods $25,0 0 0 i n alimony in solido, and ordere d Mr. Woods to pay $9,308 of Ms. Woods’s re ma ini ng a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. Th e tr ia l c ou rt a lso a wa

rd e d Ms. Woo ds e ig hty pe rc e nt of the pa rt ie s’ mari ta l e state . In th is c on te xt, th e c ou rt de te rm ine d that the po st- div or c e pay me nt Mr

. Ka rp ha d ma de to o btain the re le a se of the lea se on the Riverg ate store was a joint marital debt. According ly , the court imposed on eac h of the pa rties the oblig ation to pay Mr. Karp one-ha lf of t he amount he had paid t o the l essor of the Riverg ate store

. Mr. Woods has appea led. He takes issue with (1) the trial court’s classification of Mr. Kar p’s investment in the second c lothing store a s a marital de bt, (2) the division of the ma rital estate, ( 3) the awa rd of reha bilitative a limony , (4) the $25,000 alimony in solido awa rd, and (5) the a war d for Ms. Woods ’s attorney ’s fees. We have determined that the t rial court erre d with reg ard to e ach of the se matte rs . II.

T HE D I V I SI ON OF THE W OO D SES ’ M A R I TAL E STATE We turn first to Mr. Woods’s iss ues re g arding the cl as s i fi ca tion of marital debt and the distribution of the parties’ marital estate. He asserts that the trial court e rre d by determining that the pa rt ie s in c ur

re d a mari ta l de bt t o M r. Ka

rp wh e n h e pai d part o f the c on sid e ratio n f or the re le a se fr om the re ma ind e r o f the Riv e rg a te Clo thi ng Wor ld’ s le a se a ndby a wa rd ing a dis pr op ortio nate ly larg e shar e of the marital estate to Ms. W oods. We have de termined that the tria l court er red by classifying Mr. Kar

p’s payment to r elea se the lease as a ma rital debt and that the manner in which the trial court divided the marital estate was inequitable

. A. P rinciples f

or Dividing a Marital Estate Dividing a

marital estate nece ssarily beg ins with the classification of the parties’ property as either se parate or ma ri t al p ro p erty

. Miller v. Miller , 81 S.W .3d 771, 775 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); Anderton v. Ande rton , 9 8 8 S

. W

. 2 d 6 7 5 , 6 7 9 ( T e n n . C t

. A p p . 1 9 9 8 )

. T e n n e s s e e i s a “ d u a l p r o p e r t y” state. Sm ith v . S

mi th , 93 S.W .3d 871, 875-76 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2002). Acc ording ly , property cannot be included in the mari t al estate unle ss it fits wit hin the definition of “marital property ” in Tenn.T he di vi di ng l i ne bet ween mar i t al a nd se p arat e pr op er t y f r equen t l y becomes bl ur r ed. M ar i t al proper t y ca n 2 b e c o m e se p a ra te p ro p e rty w h e n o n e sp o u se giv e s it to the o the r sp o u se . K i n a rd v. K i n a rd , 98 6 S.W

. 2 d 22 0 , 23 2 (T enn. C t. A p p . 1 9 9 8 ); H an over v. H an over , 7 7 5 S .W .2 d 6 1 2 , 6 1 7 (T e n n . C t. A p p . 1 9 8 9 ). O n the o the r ha n d , se p a ra te p ro p e rty c a n b e c o m e m a r it a l p ro p e rty w h e n it s o w n e r c o m m ing le s it w ith m a rita l p ro p e rty a n d no lo n g e r tre a ts it a s se p a ra te p ro p e rty. Langs chmi dt v . Langs chmi dt , 8 1 S .W .3 d 7 4 1 , 7 4 7 (T e n n . 2 0 0 2 ); S m ith v . S m ith , 9 3 S .W .3 d a t 8 7 8 ; Bat s on v. Bat s on , 76 9 S.W

. 2 d 84 9 , 85 8 (T enn. C t

. A p p . 19 8 8 ). E ven i f pro p ert y i s cl earl y s ep ara te , t he i ncrease i n t he p rop ert y ’ s val ue d urin g the marri age and t he i nco m e f rom t he p rop ert y m ay b e co nsi d ered m ari t al pro p ert y i f t he no no wner s p o use cont ri b ut ed s ub st ant i al l y t o t he separat e p rop ert y ’ s p res ervat i o n and ap p reci at i o n. T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 6 -4 -1 2 1 (b )( 1 )( B ); C oh en v. Co hen , 93 7 S.W

. 2 d 82 3 , 83 2

- 3 3 (T enn. 19 9 6 ). -4- Code Ann. § 36-4- 121(b)( 1)(A) (Supp. 2002). B y the s ame token, “sepa rate property ,” as de fined in T enn . Co de Ann. § 3 6- 4- 12 1( b) (2 ), sh ou ld n ot b e inc lud e d inthe mari ta l e state

. B e c aus e 2 property classification issues are questions of fac t, Mi tts v . Mitt

s , 3 9 S. W.3 d 1 42 , 1 44 -4 5 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p. 20 00 ); Br

own v . B ro wn , 9 13 S.W. 2d16 3, 16 7 ( Te nn . Ct. App. 19 94 ), app e llate c ou rt s w ill revie w a tria l court’s c lassification dec isions usi ng the famili ar standard of revie w in Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).
After a trial court has classified the property as either marital or se parate, it should place a rea sonable va lue on eac h piece of prope rty subject to division. Edmisten v. Edm isten , No. M2001- 00081-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 21077990, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 2003) (No T enn. R. App. P

. 1 1 a pp lic a tio n f

ile d) ; Robertson v. Robe rtson , No

. M1999-02103-COA- R3-CV, 2001 WL 459100, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. Ap p . M ay 2 , 2 001) (No T enn. R. App. P. 11 application filed) . The pa rties themselves must come for war d with competent valuation evidence

. Kin ar d v . Ki na rd , 986 S.W .2d a t 23 1; W allace v. W

allace , 733 S.W .2d 102, 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). When va luation evidence is conflicting , the court may place a value on the prope rty that is within t he range of the values prese nted by

all the re levant valuation evidence

. W atte rs v . W

atte rs , 959 S.W .2d 585, 589 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 19 97 ); Brock v . Brock , 941 S.W .2d 896, 902 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). D ecisions re g arding the value of

marital prope rty

ar e q u es t ions of fac t. Kin ar d v . Ki na rd , 986 S.W .2d at 231. Acc ording ly , they

are entitled to gr eat we ight on a ppeal and will not be second-g uessed unless they are not supported by

a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e. Sm ith v . S

mi th , 93 S.W.3 d at 8 75 ; Ray v . Ray , 916 S.W .2d 469, 470 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
On c e thepa

rt ie s’ ma ri ta l pr op e rty

ha s be e n c la ssi fi e d a ndva lue d, the tria l c ou rt ’s g oa l is to divide the marital prope rty in an essentially

equitable manne r. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4- 121(a) (1); Miller v. Miller , 8 1 S. W.3 d at 77 5. A d ivi sio n o f m ari ta l pr op e rty is n ot r e nd e re d in e qu ita

ble simply beca use it is not prec isely

equal, Robertson v. Robe rtson , 76 S.W .3d 337, 341 (Tenn. 2002) , Cohen v. Cohen , 937 S.W .2d at 832, or beca use eac h party did not rec eive a shar e of e very piece of marital property

. Ma nis v . M

an is , 4 9 S. W.3 d 2 95 , 3 06 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 1) ; King v. King , 9 86 S.W .2d 21 6, 21 9 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 8) . T he fair ne ss o f the tria l c ou rt ’s app ro a c h is ine vit ably re fl e c te d in its results. Bo lin v . B oli n , 9 9 S. W.3d 1 02 , 1 07 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 2) ; W atte rs v . W

atte rs , 959 S.W .2d at 591. Dividing a marital estate is not a mecha nical proce ss but rathe r is g uided by considering the fac tors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 4-121(c ). Kin ar d v . Ki na rd , 986 S.W .2d at 230. Trial c ourts have wide latit ude in fashioning an equitable division of marital property , Fi sh e r v . F ish e r, 648 S.W .2d 24 4, 24 6 ( Te nn . 1 98 3) ; Ma nis v . M an is , 49 S.W .3d at 306, and a ppellate c ourts acc ord g reat weig ht to a trial court’s divisi on of marital pr operty

. W ilson v. Moore, 929 S.W .2d 367, 372 (Tenn. Ct. App.I t i s cu s t om ar y for l awy er s prac t i ci ng i n t he T wen t y - Fi r s t Judi ci al D i s t r i ct t o f i l e a “ s t at ement of

i s s ues , i ncome, 3 p ro p erty, an d ex p en ses” i n d i vo rce p ro ce ed i ng s.

M s . W oo ds conce ded i n papers f i l ed i n t he t r i al cour t t hat i t was M r . K ar p who “ op ene d” t he R i ver gat e s t ore. 4 T h e trial c o u rt a lso fo u n d a s fac t t h a t “[n ]e ithe r p a rty h a d a n o w n e rs h ip inte re st in the b u sin e ss.”

M r . W oods n e g o t i a t e d t h e l e a s e fo r t h e s t o r e , a n d M r . a n d M s . W o o d s p r o v i d e d t h e $ 6 , 0 0 0 c e r t i f i c a t e of 5 d e p o sit re q u ire d to se c u re the lea se . In a d d iti o n , M s. W o o d s u se d $ 2 0 ,0 0 0 o f h e r se p a ra te fu n d s to p u rc h a se the sto re ’s initial in v e n to ry.

M r . K ar p t es t i f

i ed on Ap r i l 4, 200 1 t hat he i ns t r uct ed hi s acc ount ant t o s et up a corpora t i on for h i s daug ht er 6 and so n -in-law th a t wo ul d ow n t he st o res . H e al so t est i f i ed t hat M r. W o o d s exp res sed a co ncern t o hi m ab o ut t he react i o ns t hat M r. K arp’s other chi l d ren would have when he gave t he W o o d ses t he st o res i n N ashvi l l e, but M r. K arp to ld M r. W o o d s tha t he “w o u ld b e w ill ing to tu rn it o v e r to him .” M r. K a rp c h a ra c te riz e d the tra n sa c tio n d iff e re n tly in a law su it h e fi le d a g a ins t M r. W o o d s in D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 1 . H e a sse rte d th a t M r. W o o d s “b e g a n p re ssu rin g . . . [him ] to t r ans fer owner s hi p of

t he R i ver gat e C l ot hi ng W orl d t o h i m a nd hi s t hen wi fe. ” Kar p v . Woods , N o. 01C

- 37 63 ( V er i f i ed C o m p l ai nt fo r D am ages f o r Fraud D avi d

. C i r. f

i l ed D ec. 11 , 20 0 1 ). -5- 19 96 ); Ed war ds v . E dwa rd s, 50 1 S. W.2 d 2 83 , 28 8 (T e nn . Ct. Ap p. 19 73 ). Th us , w e wi ll o rd ina ri ly defe r to the trial court’s division of the parties’ marital e state unless it is inconsistent with t he fa ctors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 4-121(c ) or is not supported by a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e. Br

own v. Brown, 91 3 S.W. 2da t 16 8; Mahaffey v . Mahaffey, 775 S.W .2d 618, 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); Hardin v. Hardin, 689 S.W .2d 152, 154 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).
B. M r . K ar p’ s P ay m e nt

to Obt ain th e Re le as e th e Cl ot hing Wo r ld Le as e Be fore we can consider whether the trial court’s division of the parties’ net marital estate was equitable, we m ust first determine w hether the evidenc e supports the trial c ourt’s conc lusion that Mr. and Ms. Woods incurred a marital debt to Mr. Ka

rp whe n he voluntarily

paid the les s o r o f t he Riv e rg a te Clo thi ng Wor ld s tor e $1 8, 59 8. 13 to obt a in a re le a se of the re ma ind e r o f the fi ve -y e ar l e a se on the store pr operty

. The trial court determined that the Woodses owed Mr. Ka rp $18,598.13 eve n though n ei t h er Ms. Woods nor Mr. Woods included the clothing store, or any of its assets or liabiliti es, on their “ statement of issues, income, property , and expenses” and the issue had not bee n 3 litigated at trial. We have determined that the evidenc e does not support the tria l court’s c onclusion that th e Wo o d s e s w e r e o b li g a te d to r e imb u r s e M r . K arp f o r th e p a y me n t h e ma d e to o b tain the rele ase of the lease for the River g ate Clothing World store.
1.
Th e Riv e rg a te Clo thi ng Wor ld sto re was essen tia lly pa rt of Mr . K arp ’s c ha in o f s tor e s. 4 Whil e Mr . a ndMs. W oo ds si gned the le a se a ndde fr a y e d s omeof the e xpe ns e s a sso c ia te d w ith opening the store, Mr. Kar p provided the f

unds for the build-out of the spac e and the n provided the 5 nece ssary operating f

unds as l ong as t he st ore was opened. All of the store’ s inventory was obtaine d from the sourc es Mr. Ka

rp used to obtain the inventory for his other stores. The best evidenc e that Mr . K arp vie we d th e Riv e rg a te sto re a s o ne of hi s st ores i s h is t e sti mon y re g ard ing his plans to

“ g ive ” bo th the Riv e rg a te sto re a ndthe 10 0 O aks sto reto t he Woo ds e s. 6-6-

Mr

. K arp c o n ti n u e d to o v e r s e e th e o p e r a ti o n o f th e Ri v e r g a te s to r e a f

te r th e Wo o d s es se pa rate d inAu g us t 20 00 a nd e ve n af te r Ms. Woo ds qu it as sto re ma na g e r in Oc tob e r 2 00 0. I n f a c t, he continued to o p er at e t he store thr oug hout the divorce proce eding and wa s still running the Riverg ate store at the time of trial. It w as only afte r the building and contents of the Riverg ate store su staine d s ig nif

ic a nt r a in d a ma g e in A pril 2 00 1 th a t Mr . K arp de c ide d to c los e bo th s tor e s a ndto leave the Nashville are a. Eventually , Mr. Kar p, appar ently

without consulting either Mr. Woods or Ms. Woods , neg otiated a re lease from the Riverg ate store lease that require d the forf eiture of the Woodses’ $6,000.00 certificate of deposit, as well as a

payment of $18,598.13 by Mr. Kar p. Ne ith e r M s. Woo ds no r Ms. Woo ds lis te d th e Riv e rg a te sto rea s a mari ta l a sse t or

lia bil ity in their pleading s or in any of their pr e-tria l or post-trial statements re g ard i n g t heir a ssets and liabiliti es. Not surprisingly , the s tore was also not mentioned in either of the parties’ proof r elating to the div isi on of

themart ia l e state

. Ho we ve r, on May 22 , 20 01 , mor e than on e mon th a ft e r the tr ia l, Ms. Woods filed a post-trial motion seeking the trial court’s approva l of the terms that Mr. K arp ha d neg otiated for the rele ase of the Riverg ate store’s lease . Ms. Woods asserted for the first time that the le a se ob lig a tio n w a s a mari ta l d ebt a ndthat th e c ou rt sh ou ld r e qu ir e Mr . Wo od s “ to b e ar s ole responsibilityfor that s u m o r t o b ear responsibilityfor a

substantial part of it.” Mr. Woods responde d that the issues involving the lea se for the Riverg ate store wer e “c ollatera l to this divorce proce eding and must be addr essed in anothe r for um.” During a hea

ring held on May 31, 2001, the parties ag ree d that the R iverg ate store lease was a marital debt and stated th at the terms of the settlement neg otiated by Mr. Kar p wer e ac cepta

ble. Howeve r, Mr. Woods questioned whethe r either he or Ms. Woods wer e obligated to repay Mr. Kar p the $18,598.13 that he c ontr i b uted to the settlement. On June 11, 2001, the trial court e ntere d an or de r a pp ro vin g the te rm s o f the re le a se of theRiv e rg a te sto re . Whil e thec ou rt fo un d th a t th e “ su ms advanc ed by

Wife’s fathe r, I

rwin Ka rp, constitute a marital debt of the pa rties,” it r eserved for f

uture determination whether e ither Mr. Woods or Ms. Woods should be require d to repay Mr. Kar p all or a ny pa rt of the se fu nd s. I n D ecem ber 20 01 , M r. Ka rp su e d M r. Woo ds in the Cir c uit Cou rt fo r D a vid so n Co un ty asserting that Mr. Woods had fr audulently induced him t o open the Ri verg ate Clothing World store a ndse e kin g $1 50 ,0 00 in c omp e ns a tory a nd$5 00 ,0 00 in p un iti ve dam age s. I n M arc h 2 00 2, Ms. Woods requested the trial court to dispose of the last re maining issue in the divor ce pr ocee ding – the dispute surrounding their liabilityto Mr. Kar p for his $18,598.13 contribution to settlement of the Riv e rg a te sto re le a se . N ot s ur prisi ngly , Ms. Wo od s in sis te d th a t Mr . Wo od s sh ou ld b e so le ly responsible for

repay ing Mr . Kar

p, while M r. W oods asserted t hat t he responsibili ty for r epaying Mr

. Karp s h o u ld f

a ll to M s . Wo o d s . O n Ju n e 1 1 , 2 0 0 2 , th e tria l c o u r t f il e d a n o r d e r d e te r mining that eac h party

was liable to Mr. Kar

p for one -half of

his $18,598.13 pay ment toward the settlement of the Riverg ate store lease

. 2. Dividing a

marital estate includes both the division of the marital assets and the a llocation o f th e marital debts. Robertson v. Robe rtson , 76 S.W .3d at 341. Acc ording ly , marital debts ar e subject to equitable a llocation, Cutsinger v. Cutsi nger , 917 S.W .2d 238, 243 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995), a ndthe sa me ru le s o f f

a ir ne ss ande qu ity wh ic h app ly to the e qu ita ble div isi on of mari ta l a sse ts a pp lyK i n a rd v. K i n a rd , 9 8 6 S .W .2 d a t 2 3 3 ; Ki ng v . Ki ng , 9 8 6 S .W .2 d a t 2 1 9

. 7

Rober t s on v . Rober t s on , 76 S. W

. 3d a t 341. 8

W. W A L T ON G ARRETT , T ENN ESS EE D I VORCE , A L I M ONY & C HI L D C US T ODY , 19 T en n . Pr ac . § 15: 14, a t 379 9 (20 0 4 ). -7- to the division of marital debts. Ha rd y v. H ardy , 429 S.E.2d 811, 813-14 (S.C. Ct . App. 1993). Martial debts a

re de bts incurre d by either or both spouses during the course of the marriag e up to the date of the final divorc e hea

ring

. Al for d v . A lfo rd , 1 2 0 S. W. 3 d 8 1 0 , 8 1 3 ( T e n n . 2 0 0 3 )

. I n th e c o n te xt of divorce proce eding s, the courts should all o ca t e the debts considering the following fac tors: (1) the debt’s pur

pose, (2) the party

who incurr ed the de bt, (3) the pa rty or parties who bene fitted from incurring the debt, and (4) the party best able to re pay

the debt. Al

for d v . A lfo rd , 120 S.W .3d at 814; Mo nd e lli v . H owa rd , 780 S.W .2d 769, 723 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
The divi sion of t he marital debt i s heavily fac t-depe ndent; there fore , there are no brig ht-line rules providing g uidance for t h e d i s t ri b u tion of marital debt. Howe ver, the prior ca ses provide se ve ra l he lpf

ul r ule s- of -thu mb. F ir st, fo r e xamp le , it is c omm on pla c e fo r d e bts to f oll ow the a sse ts they purcha sed. S ec o n d , t h e c o u rt s ar e n o w ge n er al l y i n cl i n ed t o aw ar d ec o n o m i ca l l y d i s ad v an t aged 7 spouses a small portion of the marital debt in case s where there are few marital assets. Third, when 8 a marital debt is owed to a pa rty who is r elated to one of the spouses, the debt is freque ntly assig ned to the spouse who is related to the cr editor. I n the final a naly sis, the justness of the allocation of the 9 marital debt, li k e t he division of marital prope rty , depends on the final re sults. King v. King , 986 S.W. 2da t 21 9; Thompson v. Thompson , 797 S.W .2d 599, 604 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).
3.
We need not dec ide her e whe ther the c ommercia l lease f or the Riverg ate store was a marital debt. Neither

party identified the lease as either a marital debt or a ma rital asset prior

to or during the divorce hearing, and if it was a debt, it was complete ly exti ng uished on or af

ter May 31, 2001 when the le ssor unconditionally rele ased the Woodses from their obligations under the lease . The on ly qu e sti on be fo re us is w he the r the Woo ds e s in c ur re d a mari ta l de bt to Mr. Ka

rp wh e n h e pa id the lessor $18,596.13 to obt ain the re lease of the Riverg ate store lease . We have de termined that the y didno t.
Acc ording to Al

for d v . A lfo rd , marital debts ar e debts that a rise duri n g the cour se of the marria g e . T he re fo re , p os t- div or c e debts cann ot, by de fi nit ion , b e mari ta l de bts . T he Woo ds e s’ marria g e ende d on April 3, 2001, when the trial court e ntere d its “order of divorce ” stating that the “[b] onds of matrimony

here tofore e x isting betwe en the pa rties ar e her eby

terminat e d

and dissolved.” Acc ording ly , Mr. Kar

p’s $18,598.13 payment to the lessor, pre sumably made f ollowing the May

31, 2001 hearing, could not have give n rise to a marital debt bec ause it wa s made a fter the parties ha d be e n d ivo rc e d f

or a lmo st t wo mon ths

. Ev e n if Mr . K arp ha d p aid for th e re le a se of the le a se du ri ng the Woo ds e s’ marria g e , it is do ub tf ul that he did so wi th any

e xpe c ta tio n o f b e ing re pa id. De te rm ini ng wh e the r an in tr a -f a mil y transac tion is a loan or a g ift is a question of fac t. In re M arriage of Michel , 142 S.W .3d 912, 922-8-

(Mo. Ct. App. 2004). The fac ts of t his case demonstrate that Mr. Kar p obtained the r elea se of the Riv e rg a te sto re le a se a s mu c h f or his ow n b e ne fi t a s f

or theWoo ds e s’ be ne fi t. The Woodses wer e not the only persons who stood to bene fit from the lea se of the pr emises fo r the Riv e rg a te sto re . T he le a se wa s c le arl y int e nd e d to be ne fi t th e ir

joi nt b us ine ss e nte rp ri se wi th Mr. Kar p. Acc ording ly , Mr. Karp, as the “ owner ” of the Riverg ate Clothing World store, wa s the primary benef iciary of t he lease agr eeme nt betwee n the Woodses and the lessor of Riverg ate store premises. By October 2000, both Mr

. Woods and Ms. Woods wer e no longe r involved with the store, and Mr. Ka

rp wa s operating it on his own. He c ontinued t o m ak e t h e l ease payments when they be c a me du e . As fa

r a s thi s re c or d sh ow s, Mr

. Ka rp ne ve r c a lle d up on e ith e r Mr

. W oo ds or M s. W o o d s t o m ak e t h e l ea s e p ay m en t s o r t o re i m b u r s e h i m f o ran y o f t h e p ay m en t s h e w as m ak i n g. When Mr. Kar

p decide d to close the Riverg ate store in 2001, he had a strong business and per sonal incentive to obtain the landlor d’s conse nt t o re l ea s e t h e re maining te rm of the lea se. He wound down the Riverg ate store and neg otiated the rele ase of the lease without consulting either Mr. Woods or Ms. Woo ds

. Th e c la im c on c e rn ing Mr

. Ka rp ’s pay me nt fo r the re le a se of the le a se su rf

a c e d o nly a ft e r M r. Ka

rp a ndhis daug hte r d e c ide d to try to co nv inc e the tria l c ou rt to r e qu ir e Mr . Wo od s to repay Mr. Kar p the $18,598.13 he paid to the landlord.
Two conc lusions m ay b e d rawn from Mr. Ka rp’s for bear ance from demanding that the Woo ds e s eithe r make the le a se pay me nts or re imb ur sehim

fo r the payme nts he wa s ma kin g a ndhis un ilate ra l ne g oti a tio n o f the rel ease of the le a se . F ir st, Mr . K arp ’s c on du c t c ou ld r e fl e c t hi s understanding that the l ease payments were part of the expenses of running his business rather tha n persona l obligations of his daug hter a nd estrang ed son-in-la w. Alternatively , in light of Mr. K arp’ s pa st g e ne ro sity

tow ardtheWoo ds e s, it w ou ld b e re a so na ble to co nc lud e that his p a y me nt o f the le a se and for the re lease of the lea se we re g ratuitous.
The c onduct of the parties from Aug ust 2000 to May 2001 is inconsistent with the notion that Mr. Kar p anticipated that the W oodses would reimburse him for all or pa rt of the pay ment he made to obtain the rele ase of

the lease on the Riverg ate store . Acc ordingl y , we f ind that the trial court e rr e d b y d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t t h e W o o d s e s o w e d M r . K arp $ 1 8 , 5 9 8

. 1 3 a n d t h a t t h i s o b l i g a t i o n w a s a marit al debt. Ther efor e, this transac tion should not be conside red in the c ontext of dete rmining whether the manner

in which the trial c ourt divided the marital e state wa s fair and equitable.
C. The Fair ness of

the Division of

the Mar ital Estate
We now turn to the fairness of the m anner in which the trial court divi ded the pa rties’ marital estate. Two aspects of t his property division stand out. First, the trial c ourt, without ex planation, decide d to award ea ch p arty one-ha lf of the other

party ’s I RA and 401(k) plans. Second, the tria l court a war ded Ms. Woods eighty perc ent of the pa

rties’ marital estate. We have determined, based on our eva luation of the evide nce in lig ht of the fa ctors in T enn. Code Ann. § 36-4- 121(c) and the admonition in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121( a)( 1) against considering fault whe n dividing a ma rital estate, that a more e quitable division of the marital estate is in order.T he t r i al cour t comb i ned t he amount of t he bal anc es i n a l l four of t he part i es ’ r et i r ement ac count s , deduct ed 10 $ 8 , 0 0 0 f rom t he t o t al for t he m i ni van eq ui t y , and t hen award ed each p art y one - hal f of t he rema i ni ng am o unt

. T hen t he co urt award ed t he $ 8 , 0 0 0 t o M r. W o o d s i n place of hi s o ne- hal f i nt erest i n t he H o nd a m i ni van. -9- The pa rticulars of

the manner in w hich the trial c ourt divided the parties’ marital e state ar e ill us tr a te d b y

thefo llo wi ng c ha

rt s: Marit al P roperty Wife Husb and Hou se $295 ,00 0 1⁄2 C om bined Retirem ent ac coun ts $36, 083 10 1⁄2 C om bined Retirem ent A ccoun ts 36, 083 Adjustm ent fo r Miniv an E quity 8,0 00 10 10 1999 H onda

O dy ssey Miniv an 15, 300 Che cking A ccoun t no v alue g iv en Che cking A ccoun t no v alue g iv en Apartm ent F urnishin g s stipulated Hou se F urnishin g s stipulated
Total m arital pro perty $346 ,38 3 $44, 083 M ar it al D e bt
Wife Husb and Mortg ag e $177 ,54 5 Karp Re im bursement $9, 299 Miniv an 14, 430 Karp Re im

bursement 9,2 99

Total debt $201 ,27 4 $9, 299
Net shar e of estate $145 ,10 9 $34, 784

Th e marria g e la ste d f

or tw e lve y e ars, andthe pa rt ie s’ fi na nc ia l po sit ion s w e rero ug hly compar ab l e wh en t h ey

enter ed the mar

riag e. B oth worked outside of the home throug hout the marria g e and poole d their income in a j o i nt acc ount to pay for marital expenses. They are approx imately

the same a g e and in g ood health. Ms. Woods has two bache lor’s deg ree s, and Mr. Woo ds ha s a n a sso c iate ’s de g re e . Al tho ug h M r. Woo ds ’s job wi th t he fo odbr ok e ra g e e na

ble s h im to earn more income than Ms. Woods wa s actua lly earning at the time of the divorce , Ms. Woods has a demonstrated ear

ning potential that far exceeds her inc ome at the time of the divorce . Even if she does not wor

k for he r father, she is c apable of ea rning a hig her inc ome as a teac her.
Whil e these fac tors would support an esse ntially equ al d i v i s ion of the marital e state, two other factors favor awar ding Ms. Woods a larg er sha re. F irst, the parties themse lves ag ree d during the tr ia l th a t th e fa c t th a t Ms . Wo od s u se d h e r s e pa rate fu nd s to ena

ble the m to pu rc ha se the ir ho us eT her e i s no ques t i on t hat t he f un ds M s . W oo ds us ed t o h el p t he part i es pur cha s e t hei r hous e a r e n o l onger he r 11

se p a ra te p ro p e rty b e c a u se h e r use o f the the m fo r m a rita l p u rp o se s tra n sm u te d the m into m a rita l p ro p e rty. H o w e v e r, it i s appr opr i at e t o con s i der t h e s ou r ce of t h e f u n ds i n de t er mi n i n g h ow t h e as s et pu r ch as ed by t h e f u n ds s h ou l d be di v i ded. W h i l e t h e par t i es a g r ee d t h at M s . W oods c on t r i bu t i on s s h ou l d be con s i der ed, t h ey di s ag r ee d r eg ar di n g t h e amou n t of t h es e con t r i bu t i on s . M s . W oods s t at ed t h at s h e con t r i bu t ed $55, 768, w h i l e M r . W oods v al u ed t h em at $38, 000. -10- should be rec og nized in the divis ion of the prope rty

. Second, Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-4- 121(d) 11 provides that a spouse with phy sical custody of the pa rties’ c hildren should be fa vored w ith reg ard to the family

home and the house hold effe cts.
Ac c or din g ly , w e ha ve de te rm ine d th a t th e ma nn e r i n whi c h th e tria l c ou rt div ide d th e pa

rt ie s’ mari ta l e state sh ou ld b e mod if ie d in thr e e way s. F ir st, we ha ve de te rm ine d th a t e a c h p arty sh ou ld ke e p th e ir

re sp e c tiv e re tir e me nt a c c ou nts , th e re by a vo idi ng the po ssi bil ity

of pe na lti e s f

or e arl y liquidation. S econd, we have determined that Ms. Woods should rec eived the Honda minivan and the de bt a sso c ia te d w ithit. Th ir d, we ha ve de te rm ine d tha t Ms. Wood s is e nti tle d to a ll the e qu ity in the parties’ marital home be cause she is the primary residential pa

rent a n d b ec au s e her contributions enabled the parties to purc hase the home in the first plac e. The following table re flec ts our revised distribution of the marital estate:
Marit al P roperty Wife Husb and
Hou se $295 ,00 0 Cig na 4 01k $ 4 0,9 74 Merrill Ly nch Retirem ent A ccoun t 9,0 00 Fidelity I RA 26, 191 RothI RA 4,0 00 Che cking A ccoun t no v alue g iv en Miniv an 1 5,3 00 Apartm ent F urnishin g s stipulated Che cking A ccoun t no v alue g iv en Hou se F urnishin g s stipulated Total prope rty $323 ,30 0 $ 6 7,1 65

M ar it al D e bt
Wife Husb and Mortg ag e $177 ,54 5

- 0- Miniv an 14, 430
Total debt $191 ,97 5

- 0-
Net shar e of estate $131 ,32 5 $67, 165L o ng - t erm sp o usa l sup p o rt i s i nten d ed t o p ro vid e lo ng - t erm s up p o rt t o an ec o no m i ca l l y disad va ntag ed sp o use 12

w h o is un a b le to b e re h a b ili ta te d

. B url ew v. B url ew , 4 0 S .W .3 d a t 4 7 1 ; L o ria v . L o ria , 9 5 2 S .W .2 d 8 3 6 , 8 3 8 (T e n n . C t. A pp . 199 7). I t i s not , howev er , a g uar ant ee t hat t he r eci pi ent s po us e wi l l forev er b e abl e t o enj oy a l i fes t y l e equal t o t hat o f t h e o b ligo r sp o u se . W r i gh t v. Q ui l l en , 83 S.W

. 3 d 76 8 , 77 3 (T enn. C t

. A p p . 20 0 2 ).

A lim o n y in so lid o is a sin g le lum p su m p a ym e n t o f ca sh o r p ro p e rty. Lo ria v . L o ria , 952 S. W

. 2d a t 838. 13 U n l i k e al i mon y i n f

u t u r o, i t i s c on s i der ed a f i n al j u dg men t , or di n ar i l y u n ch an g ea bl e by t h e cou r t a f t er t h e ex pi r at i on of the ti m e fo r a p p e a l. L o ria v . L o ria , 952 S. W

. 2d a t 838.

R ehab i l i t at i ve spo usal supp o rt i s i nt end ed t o enab l e an eco no m i cal l y dis ad vant aged s p o use t o acq ui re 14

a d d iti o n a l e d u c a tio n o r t ra inin g tha t w ill e n a b le the sp o u se to a c h ie v e a n d m a inta in a stan d a rd o f l ivin g c o m p a ra b le to (c o n tinu e d ...) -11- As a re su lt of ou r re vis e d div isi on of the pa rt ie s ma ri ta l pr op e rty

a nda llo c a tio n o f the mari ta l de bt, M s . W o o d s w i l l r e c e i v e s i x t y- s i x p e r c e n to f t h e n e tm ar i t a l e s t a t e , a n d M r . W o o d s w i l l r e c e i v e t h i r t yfo ur pe rc e nt.
III .

T HE A W A R D O F R EHA BI LI TATIVE A L I M ONY Mr. Woods also asserts that the trial court erre d by requiring him to pay

Ms. Woods $1,000 per month in reha

bilitative alimonyfor thre e y ear s. He a sserts that Ms. Woods’s claim for alimony is g re a tly inf la te d b y the fa c t th at th e y

liv e d b e y on d th e ir

me a ns du ri ng themarria g e a ndthat he is unable to pay Ms. Woods $1,000 per month be cause the combined amount of his child support and a lim on y pay me nts wi ll n ot e na

blehim to s up po rt

him se lf

. We ha ve de te rm ine d that Ms. Woo ds is e nti tle d to re ha

bil itativ e a lim on y . H ow e ve r, we ha ve de te rm ine d th a t Mr . Wo od s c a nn ot r e a l i s tic a lly a f f o r d t o m ak e $ 1 , 0 0 0 p e r

m o n t h a l i m o n y p a ym e n t s i n l i g h to f h i s o t h e r o b l i g a t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g l y, we r educe the amount of Mr. Woods’s alimony obligation to $500 per month.
A.
Thereare no hard and fast rules for spousal support decisions. Ma nis v . M an is , 49 S.W .3d a t 30 4; Anderton v. Ande rton , 9 88 S.W. 2da t 68 2; Cra in v . Cr ain , 925 S.W. 2d 23 2, 23 3 (T e nn . Ct

. App. 1996). Trial courts have broad discr etion to determine whether spousal support is neede d and, if so, its nature, amount, and dur ation. B ra t t o n v. Bratton , 136 S.W .3d 595, 605 (Tenn. 2004) ; Burlew v. Burlew , 4 0 S. W.3 d 4 65 , 4 70 (T e nn . 2 00 1) ; Goodman v. G oodman , 8 S.W .3d 289, 293 (T e nn . Ct. App . 199 9) . A c c or din g ly , a pp e llate c ou rt s a

reg e ne ra lly

dis inc lin e d to se c on d- g ue ss a trial court’ s spousal support decision unl ess i t is not supported by the evidenc e or is contr ary to the public policies ref

lected in the applicable statutes. Nelson v. Nelson , 1 06 S.W. 3d20 , 2 3 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p. 20 02 ); Br

own v . B ro wn , 913 S.W .2d at 169. Our role is not to fine- tune a tria l court’s spousal support awa

rd, Davidson v. D avidson , No. M2001-01830-COA- R3-CV, 2002 WL 31769205, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. De c. 11, 2002) ( No Tenn. R. A pp. P. 11 application filed), but r ather to determine wh e the r the tr ia l c ou rt

app lie d th e c or

re c t le g a l stand ard andre a c he d a de c isi on that is no t c le arl y unrea sonable. Bogan v. Bogan , 60 S.W .3d 721, 733 (Tenn. 2001)

. Tenne ssee law rec og nizes severa l separate classe s of spousal support, including long- term pe ri od ic sp ou sa l su pp ort ( a lim on y in f utu ro ), a lim on y

in s oli do , re ha

bil itativ e sp ou sa l su pp ort, 12 13 14(

. . . con t i n u ed) 14 the sta n d a rd o f l ivin g tha t ex isted d u rin g the m a rr ia g e o r t o the p o st-d ivo rc e sta n d a rd o f livin g e x p e c te d to b e a v a ilab le to th e o the r sp o u se . T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 6 -5 -1 0 1 (d )( 1 )( C ) (S u p p . 2 0 0 4 ); s ee al s o Rober t s on v. Rober t s on , 76 S. W

. 3d a t 3 4 0 -4 1 ; S m ith v . S m ith , 91 2 S.W

. 2 d 15 5 , 16 0 (T enn. C t

. A p p . 19 9 5 ).

T r an s i t i on al s pou s al s u ppor t i s pa i d for a de f i n i t e du r at i on w h en a c ou r t f i n ds t hat rehabi l i t at i on i s n ot 15

n ec es s ar y bu t t h at t h e ec on omi ca l l y di s adv an t ag ed s pou s e n ee ds a s s i s t an ce a dj u s t i n g t o t h e ec on omi c con s equ en ce s of d i vo rce. T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 6

- 5

- 1 0 1 (d)(1)(D ). -12- and tra nsitional spousal support. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(d)( 1) re flec ts a statutory pref ere nce 15 fa vo ri ng re ha

bil itativ e sp ou sa l su pp ort a ndtr ans iti on a l sp ou sa l su pp ort ov e r l on g -t e rm pe ri od ic spousal support. Bratton v. Bratton , 13 6 S.W. 3da t 60 5; Pe rryv . P e rry , 114 S.W .3d 465, 467 (Tenn. 20 03 ); Crabtree v. Crabtree , 16 S.W .3d 356, 358 (Tenn. 2000) . Howeve r, this statutory pref ere nce d o es n o ten t i re l y d i s p l ac e t h e o t h er fo rm s o f s p o u s al s u p p o rt wh en t h e fa ct s o f t h e c as e w arra n tl o n gt er m or more ope n-ende d support. Aaron v. Aaron , 9 09 S.W. 2d40 8, 41 0 ( Te nn . 1 99 5) ; I s b e ll v. Is be ll , 816 S.W .2d 735, 739 (Tenn. 1991)

. I nitial decisions reg arding the entitlement to spousal support, as we ll as the amount and duration of spousal support, hing e on the unique f acts of eac h case and re quire a car eful ba lancing of all re le v an t f

actor s, including those ide ntified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-101(d) (1)( E). Robertson v. Robe rtson , 7 6 S. W.3 d at 33 8; Dube v. Dube , 1 04 S.W. 3d86 3, 86 8 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 2) ; W ilder v. W ilder , 66 S.W .3d 892, 894 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). A mong the se fa ctors, the two that a re c on sid e re d th e mos t impo rt a nt a re the dis a dv a nta g e d sp ou se ’s ne e d a nd the ob lig or sp ou se ’s abil ity to pay

. Robertson v. Robe rtson , 76 S.W. 3da t 34 2; Bogan v. Bogan , 6 0 S. W.3 d at 73 0; Sullivan v. Sullivan , 107 S.W .3d 507, 510 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). O f these t wo fac tors, the disadvanta g ed spouse’s nee d is the threshol d consideration. Aaron v. Aaron , 9 09 S.W. 2da t 41 0; W atters v. W atte rs , 22 S.W .3d 817, 821 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
B.
The re cord supports the trial court’s c onclusion that Ms. W oods is entitled to reha bilitative spousal s u p p o rt . She was trained to be a te ache r and a ctually taug ht school early

in the marria g e. Howeve r, she lef

t the teac hing pr ofession to work f or her fathe r, and now she fa ces the prospec t of returning to school to renew her te aching cre dentials and to shar pen her skills. At the same time, she is the primary

residential pa

rent of thr ee c hildren betwe en the a g es of eig ht and twelve. G iven her obligations to support herself and he r childre n and her other pa renta l responsibiliti es , i t was not unrea sonable for

the trial court to conclude that Ms. Woods was entitled to reha bilitative support for thr e e y e ars . The diff iculty with the trial court’s reha

bilitative a limony awa

rd is its amount. The trial court order ed Mr. Woods to pay Ms. Woods $1,000 per month. This payment, coupled with Mr. Woods’s $1,325.00 per month child support obl igation, consumes almost eig hty perc ent of Mr. W oods’s net monthlyincome and w ould requi re M r. W o o ds to support himself on approxim ately $663.00 perT enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 6

- 5

- 1 0 1 (d)(1)(E )( i x) ( Sup p . 20 0 4 ). 16
-13- month. This awa

rd i s simply unrea listi c as a prac tical matter, notwithstanding the fa ct that fault may be take n in to c on sid e ratio n inse tti ng sp ou sa l su pp ort. 16
When courts ar e setting spousal support, they should take into c onsideration the outstanding obligations of both the rec ipient spouse and the pay ing spouse

. T en n . C o d e Ann. § 36- 5- 10 1( d) (1 )( E) (i ). I n th e pa st, thi s c ou rt ha s r e du c e d th e a mou nt o f s po us a l su pp or t w he n, takin g int o consideration the pay ing spouse ’s other f inancial oblig atio n s , i t has dete rmined that the pay ing spouse would have insufficient income to support himself or herse lf. See, e .g., Sullivan v. Sullivan , 10 7 S. W.3 d at 51 1; Anderton v. Ande rton , 988 S.W .2d at 683.
We h a ve re vie we d th is r e c or d inlig ht o f a ll o f M r. Woo ds ’s fi na nc ia l ob lig a tio ns , th e pa rt ie s’ respe ctive ea

rning capa cities and the f inancial r esourc es available to them, along with the ag e and mental and phy sical condition of the pa rties, and we have determined that Mr. Woods shoul d have been r equire d to pay

Ms. Woods $500 per month for three y ear s. Even with thi s ad j u s t m en t , Mr. Woo ds wi ll s til l be r e qu ir e d to su pp ort hi mse lf onapp ro xima te ly

fo rty pe rc e nt o f h is n e t mo nth ly income.
The re duction in the amount of Mr. W oods’s spousal support obligation should relate bac k to the Aug ust 13, 2001 order r equiring Mr. Woods to pay Ms. Woods $1,000 per month. In the eve nt that Mr. Woods has overpa id his spo u s al support obligation, he is entitled to recove r the overpay ment from Ms. Woods. Theref ore, on remand, the trial court should ca lculate the amount of Mr. Woods’s overpay ment of spousal support, if any , and then a war d Mr. Woods a judgme nt for this amount. I f Ms. Woods lac ks the funds to be able to pay this judgment within six ty day s after its entry , s h e should be order ed to execute a non-intere st bearing promissory note pay able to Mr. Woo ds in the a mou nt o f the ov e rp a y me nt. Th is n ote sh a ll b e sh a ll b e du e a ndpay able up on Ms. Woods’s death or re marria g e, the sa le or tra nsfer of the pa

rties’ house, or

on Aug u st 1, 2015, whicheve r eve nt occur s first. This note shall be sec ured by a lien on the pa

rties’ house.
IV. T HE A L I M ONY I N S OL I DO A W ARD
Mr . Wo od s ta

ke s is su e wi th the tria l c ou rt ’s de c isi on to a wa rdMs. Woo ds $2 5, 00 0 in a limon y in so li do . H e a sse rt s th a t th e tria l c ou rt a wa rd e d M s. Woo ds a lim on y in s oli do so le ly

to punish him for his infidelity . Ms. Woods insists that she is entitled t o t h e aw ar d beca use of the financ ial loss Mr. Woods ’s infidelity cause d her and the parties’ childre n. We h a ve a lr e a dy

po int e d o ut that T e nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 5

- 1 0 1 ( d ) ( 1 ) ( E )( ix) p e rm its the c ou rt s to con s id e r f

au lt a s o n e o f th e f

a c to r s w h e n s e tt in g s p o u s a l s u p p o r t. H o w e v e r , th is c o u rt has repe atedly

disapproved of

punitive alimony , noting the pr ece dents holding that t h e purpose of alimony is not punish t he g uiltyspouse. W ilder v. W ilder , 6 6 S. W.3 d at 8 95 ; Anderton v. Ande rton , 98 8 S. W.2 d at 68 2; Duncan v . Duncan , 686 S.W .2d 568, 571-72 (Te nn. 1984).M r . W oods di d n ot c h al l en g e t h e br ea dt h of t h i s or der

. Eve n t h ou g h i t w as i n appr opr i at el y br oad, M r . W oods 17

w a s o b liga te d to a b id e b y it

. -14- One of the m ost common purposes for awa rding alimony

in solido i s to adjust the distributi on of marital pr operty

. Burlew v. Burlew , 40 S. W.3d at 471. The trial court was plainly not using ali m o n y i n solido for that purpose in this case beca use it had alre ady

awa rded Ms. Woods approximately

eig hty perc ent of the ma

rital estate by

the time it dec ided to awa rd her an additional $25,000 in alimony

insolido. The combined ef fec t of t he manner i n which the trial court divided the mar it a l e s tatea n d it s a li mo n y ins o li d o a w ar d w o u ldh a v e b e e n to e f f e c ti v e ly a w ar d M s . Wo ods ninety -five pe rce nt of the marital e state. We ha ve alre ady conclude d in Section I I that the trial court erre d by awa rding Ms. Woods eig hty perc ent of the ma

rital estate. T he alimony

in solido awa

rd in this case only

compounded the e rr or . T he tr ia l c ou rt

of fe re d n o e xpla natio n f

or thi s a wa

rd , a nd the fa c ts andc ir c ums ta nc e s o f this c a se po int

to the lik e lih oo d th a t th e a lim on y in so li do was int e nd e d to fu rthe r p un ishMr . Wo od s. The divi sion of m arital property and award of reha bilitative alimony , as modified by this opini on, adequately

meet Ms. Woods’s needs and a ppropriate ly balanc e the fac tors in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-4-121( c) and 36-5-101( d)(1) (E). A ccor dingly , we va cate the alimony in solido award.
V. T HE A W A R D O F A TTOR N EY ’ S F EES As a fina l matter, Mr. Woods takes issue with the trial court’s decision to requir e him to pay one-ha lf of Ms. Woods’s attorney ’s fe es sti l l o wi n g at t h e time of trial. While he conc edes that a wa rd s f or a tto rn e y ’s fe e s a

redis c re tio na

ry , h e ins ist s that the a wa

rd in this c a se wa s in app ro pria te fi rs t be c aus e he ha d a lr e a dy pa id $7 ,7 50 of Ms. Woo ds ’s a tto rn e y ’s fe e s p e nd e nte lit e a ndbe c aus e a bu lk o f h e r r e ma ini ng fe e s st e mme d f ro m Ms . Wo od s’ s v ig or ou s a ndpr olo ng e d e ff orts t o e sta

bli sh that Mr

. Woo ds ha d c omm itt e d a du lte ry e ve n a ft e r he a dmi tte d it a nd fr om he r u ns uc c e ssf ul e ff orts to h a v e M r . Wo o d s h e ld in c o n te mp t f o r v io lati n g th e o r d e r d ir e c ti n g h im to ref rain fr om i n t en t i o n al l y

co n t ac t i n g h i s p ar am o u r w h i l e t h e d i v o rc e p ro ce ed i n gs we re p en d i n g. 17 Attorney ’s fe es may

be aw arde d in divorce c ases, a nd are considere d to be a form of alimony in solido. Y

ount v. Y ount , 91 S. W.3 d 7 77 , 7 83 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 2) ; W ilder v. W ilder , 66 S.W .3d at 864. These awa

rds ar e lar g ely

discretionary

with the trial court, a nd appellate courts will not interfe re unle ss the trial court ha s not ex erc ised its discretion appropriately based on the fac ts. Aaron v. Aaron , 909 S.W .2d at 411.
We have de termined that the r ecor d supports the trial court’s decision to require Mr. Woods to de fray part of Ms. Woods’s leg al expenses but that the rec ord does not support re q u i ri n g Mr. Woo ds to p a y

$9 ,3 08 .5 3. Th e re are tw o re a so ns fo r ou r d e c isi on . F ir st, Mr . Wo od s h a d a lr e a dy pa id $7 ,7 50 of Ms. Woo ds ’s le g a l expe ns e s. Se c on d, app ro xima te ly tw o- thi rd s o f the tim e bil le d b y Ms. Woods’s lawy er be tween January 26, 2001 and May

15, 2001 was related to the prosec ution of the civil and criminal contempt petitions t hat we re u l t i m ately dismiss ed. Ac cording ly , we ha ve determined that the portion of the or der r equiring Mr. Woods to pay a portion of Ms. Woods’s leg al expenses should be modified from $9,308.53 to $3,206.00.-15- VI . I n s u m m ar y , we modify

the division of the marital estate to provide for a more equal a nd equitable d i v ision of the marital prope rty and debt; we reduc e the amount of the reha bilitative alimony awa rd fr om $1,000.00 to $500.00 per month; we vacate the alim ony in solido award; and we reduce the award of attorney ’s fe es fr om $9,308.53 to $3,206.00. W e af firm all other pr ovisions in the order s and re mand the case to the t rial court for whatever further proce eding s may

be re quired. We t a x the c os ts of thi s a

pp e a l in e qu a l pr op ortio ns to Joh n E dw ardWoo ds a ndhis su re ty a ndto Jill Suz anne Woods for w hich execution, if nec essary , may issue.

___________________________________ WI LL I AM C. K OC H, JR., P. J., M. S.