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September 13, 2010

VIA ELECTRONIC FILING AND FIRST CLASS MAIL

The Honorable Madeline Cox Arleo

United States Magistrate Judge

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey

Martin Luther King Courthouse

50 Walnut Street, Room 2060

Newark, NJ 07101

Re: Russell-Brown v. The University of Florida Board 

of Trustees, , et al., No. 10-cv-4017-SDW-MCA

Dear Judge Arleo:

We represent defendants the University of Oxford (“Oxford”) and Oxford

University Development, North America (“OUD”), in the above-referenced action. We write in 

response to Plaintiff’s letter, filed on September 9, 2010, in which she requests permission to file 

a motion seeking jurisdictional discovery. For the reasons explained below, we respectfully ask 

that the Court deny the request on the ground that such a motion is premature and would waste 

the resources of our clients, the other co-defendants, this Court, and Judge Wigenton, to whom 

this case has been assigned. 

This is the third lawsuit brought by Plaintiff arising primarily from her former 

service as an assistant professor at the University of Florida, Levin College of Law, and Judge 

Wigenton is the third federal judge who has been assigned to this on-again, off-again litigation. 

Each lawsuit makes essentially the same claims of discrimination against plaintiff by reason of 

race and sex, although only the third seeks to join Oxford and OUD as parties. The first suit was 

filed before Judge Paul in the Northern District of Florida and voluntarily dismissed by plaintiff. 

(See Russell-Brown v. The University of Florida Board of Trustees, et al., 1:09-cv-00023-MPAK (N.D. Fla. filed Feb. 5, 2009). The second suit was filed in the District of New Jersey before 

the Honorable Stanley R. Chesler, who transferred the case to the Northern District of Florida on 

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December 17, 2009, on the ground of improper venue. (See Russell-Brown v. The University of 

Florida Board of Trustees, et al., No. 2:09-cv-02479-SRC-MAS (filed May 22, 2009). The 

transferred case was also assigned to Judge Paul and is still pending. (See Russell-Brown v. The 

University of Florida Board of Trustees, et al., 1:09-cv-00257-MP-AK (N.D. Fla.). On August 5, 

2010, Plaintiff filed the present suit, which is now before Judge Wigenton. This time, Oxford 

and OUD are named as defendants along with various defendants associated with the University 

of Florida. The University of Florida defendants have evidently not yet been served. From the 

docket, it appears that Plaintiff has failed to disclose to this Court that this case is in significant 

respects identical to the still-pending case that Judge Chesler transferred nine months ago to the 

Northern District of Florida.

The crux of Plaintiff’s claims against Oxford is the allegation that Oxford 

participated in an international conspiracy with the University of Florida defendants to deprive 

her of her civil rights. More specifically, she alleges that Oxford, in alleged concert with the 

University of Florida, terminated her student status in England (after her unsuccessful attempts to 

satisfy the requirements for admission to a full doctoral program) because of complaints she 

allegedly made in England concerning race and sex discrimination. The basis for Plaintiff’s 

claims against OUD (a separate entity that had nothing to do with Ms. Russell-Brown) are not 

clear, as the Amended Complaint makes no allegations whatsoever regarding any actions or 

omissions by OUD. Currently, any answers or motions to dismiss by Oxford or OUD are due, 

respectively, on October 1, 2010 and October 8, 2010.

 Presumably realizing the extraordinary weakness of her claim that Oxford and 

OUD are subject to personal jurisdiction in the District of New Jersey, Plaintiff seeks discovery 

to fish for contacts between Oxford and OUD and this district. Notably, however, plaintiff fails 

to offer a single case where a court entertained a motion for jurisdictional discovery before a 

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction had been filed. Indeed, as Judge Wigenton 

has noted, the rule is precisely the opposite: “A court has discretion to allow a party to proceed 

with discovery when considering a motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction.” 

Knierim v. Siemens Corp., No. 06-4935, 2008 WL 906244, at *11 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2008) 

(emphasis added). The cases cited by Plaintiff agree. Metcalfe v. Renaissance Marine, Inc., 566 

F.3d 324, 336 n.9 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that the plaintiff requested jurisdictional discovery in its 

brief in opposition to the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction); Toys 

“R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 451 (3d Cir. 2003) (same).

There is no reason to disturb this customary practice simply because Plaintiff, 

without any explanation, “anticipates” that certain issues will arise in a jurisdictional challenge. 

(9/9/10 Letter from L. Hinds to J. Arleo at 2.) To the contrary, it makes sense for a court to 

consider a request for jurisdictional discovery only in conjunction with a motion to dismiss for 

lack of personal jurisdiction. Absent such a motion for airing the issues, a court must simply 

guess at what potential jurisdictional arguments might arise and what relevant facts might be 

asserted, and might be disputed, regarding those arguments. Plaintiff has not explained why this 

Court or Judge Wigenton should engage in such a hypothetical exercise. If, in opposition to a 

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motion to dismiss, Plaintiff can first make a colorable claim of jurisdiction and can show to this 

Court’s satisfaction that discovery will illuminate any jurisdictional issues raised in the motions 

to dismiss, she may at that point seek discovery targeted to those specific issues. Such a request 

may only be granted if Plaintiff presents factual allegations “that suggest with reasonable 

particularity” that the requisite jurisdictional contacts exist. See, e.g., Knierem, 2008 WL 

906244, at *11-12 (citation omitted).

Finally, a premature motion addressed to jurisdictional discovery risks wasting 

the resources of the parties, this Court, and Judge Wigenton. As explained above, this suit is 

almost the same as the currently pending suit in the Northern District of Florida, in which the asyet-un-served co-defendants in this action are parties. At the same time, the claims against 

Oxford are more properly heard in England, where the events in question relating to Oxford took 

place, where the relevant witnesses reside, which provides the substantive law that governs 

Plaintiff’s claims, and where Plaintiff previously initiated an administrative proceeding that 

involves many of the same issues referred to in her Amended Complaint. Thus, it is substantially 

likely that Oxford and the University of Florida defendants (when served) will move to transfer 

or dismiss the case on the ground of forum non conveniens, and Judge Wigenton may decide to 

grant defendants’ requests without ruling on any jurisdictional challenge. Indeed, she has 

followed this precise procedure at least once before. See, e.g., CLP Packaging Solutions, Inc. v. 

Sports Pouch Beverage Co., No. 07-1532, 2008 WL 2095774, at *1 & n.1 (D.N.J. May 16, 

2008). 

Tellingly, Plaintiff does not explain how, despite its irregularity and 

inefficiencies, an early motion for jurisdictional discovery would in any way advance the 

interests of the parties or of the Court. Nor does she even attempt to explain why she seeks 

discovery before serving three of the co-defendants in this lawsuit, who may have arguments of 

their own to make about where this dispute should be heard. In light of the substantial (and 

possibly purposeless) burdens that would result if Plaintiff’s request were granted, Oxford and 

OUD respectfully request that the Court direct Plaintiff to file her request for jurisdictional 

discovery, if any, only after Oxford and OUD file their likely motions to dismiss.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Zoë E. Jasper

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