NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

 

:

VICTOR GONZALEZ, :

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

GABRIEL CAMARERO, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

 :

Civil No. 11-0995 (RMB)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

VICTOR GONZALEZ, 246450, Plaintiff Pro Se

Camden County Correctional Facility

P.O. BOX 90431

Camden, NJ 08101 

BUMB, District Judge:

Plaintiff, Victor Gonzalez, a prisoner incarcerated at

Camden County Correctional Facility in New Jersey, seeks to bring

this action in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This

Court will grant Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma

pauperis and direct the Clerk to file the Complaint without

prepayment of the filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Having

reviewed Plaintiff’s allegations, as required by 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, this Court will dismiss the federal

claims raised in the Complaint and decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over claims arising under state law. 

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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff asserts violation of his constitutional rights

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Gabriel Camarero and Jose Aparicio, who

are Probation Officers in Hartford, Connecticut, Northampton

County Prison, and Northampton County Courts. Plaintiff asserts:

On 7/11/2008 I was sentenced to 1 yr

probation. On 2/5/10 I was violated against

that 1 yr probation and served 1 yr in

Northampton County Prison. This was a

violation of my Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights to due process of law which

resulted in cruel and unusual punishment for

my unlawful detainment.

My assigned Probation Officer is Gabriel

Camarero. Northampton County courts had sent

me an appointment for 8/11/2009. I wanted to

report to her that I had to leave the state

to report to my appointment. Instead of

speaking to her I was given a substitute

officer, Jose Aparicio. I was told that I

could not go to the assigned appointment in

Northampton County. Northampton County

courts then put a failure to appear warrant

against me. I was sentenced to one year

probation for a DUI charge on 7/11/2008. I

was arrested on 1/26/2010 for a separate

charge which was later dropped. On 2/5/2010

my one year probation was revoked and I was

forced to serve one year in Northampton

County Prison, even though I had completed my

year of probation. So in actuality I served

two years instead of one.

(Dkt. 1 at 4, 7.)

For relief, Plaintiff seeks “restitution for my lost time

due to my unlawful detainment. Also I am seeking lost wages

during my unlawful detainment and punitive damages and pain and

suffering.” (Dkt. 1 at 8.)

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (?PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-

134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996),

requires a District Court to screen a complaint in a civil action

in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis or a

prisoner is seeking redress against a government employee or

entity, and to sua sponte dismiss any claim if the Court

determines that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a

claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A. 

The pleading standard under Rule 8 was refined by the United

States Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544

(2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), where the

Supreme Court clarified as follows:

Two working principles underlie our decision

in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court

must accept as true all of the allegations

contained in a complaint is inapplicable to

legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice .

. . . Rule 8 marks a notable and generous

departure from the hyper-technical, codepleading regime of a prior era, but it does

not unlock the doors of discovery for a

plaintiff armed with nothing more than

conclusions. Second, only a complaint that

states a plausible claim for relief survives

a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a

complaint states a plausible claim for relief

will . . . be a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its

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judicial experience and common sense. But

where the well-pleaded facts do not permit

the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has

alleged-but it has not “show[n]”-“that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule

Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

In keeping with these principles a court

considering a motion to dismiss can choose to

begin by identifying pleadings that, because

they are no more than conclusions, are not

entitled to the assumption of truth. While

legal conclusions can provide the framework

of a complaint, they must be supported by

factual allegations. When there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should

assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement to relief.

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 -1950 (citations omitted). 

The Court is mindful that the sufficiency of this pro se

pleading must be construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff,

even after Iqbal. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Federal Claims

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code

authorizes a person such as Plaintiff to seek redress for a

violation of his federal civil rights by a person who was acting

under color of state law. Section 1983 provides in relevant

part:

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of

any State or Territory . . . subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States or other person within the

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jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured

by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable

to the party injured in an action at law,

suit in equity, or other proper proceeding

for redress. 

To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show two

elements: (1) a person deprived him or caused him to be deprived

of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States, and (2) the deprivation was done under color of state

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Adickes v. S.H.

Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d

1099, 1107 (3d Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiff’s claim for damages because he served two years

for revocation of probation when the sentence was only one year 

is barred because a favorable judgment on the claim would

necessarily imply the invalidity of his incarceration. See Heck

v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). As the Supreme Court

explained, 

We hold that, in order to recover damages for

allegedly unconstitutional . . .

imprisonment, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must

prove that the conviction or sentence has

been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state

tribunal authorized to make such

determination, or called into question by a

federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for

damages bearing that relationship to a

conviction or sentence that has not been so

invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.

Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in

a § 1983 suit, the district court must

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consider whether a judgment in favor of the

plaintiff would necessarily imply the

invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if

it would, the complaint must be dismissed

unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the

conviction or sentence has already been

invalidated.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-487.

In this Complaint, Plaintiff contends that, although his

term for violation of probation was one year, he was incarcerated

for two years in violation of his constitutional rights. Were

this Court to agree with Plaintiff that he has been imprisoned

beyond his one-year term, this decision would necessarily imply

that probation authorities or the prison incorrectly determined

his release date or failed to timely release him. Because

Plaintiff’s incarceration beyond one year has not been

invalidated by a state court or called into question by issuance

of a writ of habeas corpus, Plaintiff’s instant Complaint for

damages based on the illegality of that incarceration is barred

by Heck. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005) (“Heck

specifies that a prisoner cannot use § 1983 to obtain damages

where success would necessarily imply the unlawfulness of a (not

previously invalidated) conviction or sentence”) (emphasis in

original); Glenn v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 410

Fed. App’x 424 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that damages claim for

incarceration beyond original sentence is barred by Heck). 

Because amending the Complaint would be futile, this Court will

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dismiss the federal claims in the Complaint for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted.

B. Claims Arising Under State Law

"Supplemental jurisdiction allows federal courts to hear and

decide state-law claims along with federal-law claims when they

are so related to claims in the action within such original

jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or

controversy." Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524

U.S. 381, 387 (1998) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). Where a district court has original jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over federal claims and supplemental

jurisdiction over state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a),

the district court has discretion to decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims over

which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3);

Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, Pennsylvania, 983 F.2d

1277, 1284-1285 (3d Cir. 1993). In exercising its discretion,

?the district court should take into account generally accepted

principles of <judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the

litigants.’” Growth Horizons, Inc., 983 F.2d at 1284 (quoting

United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). Where

the federal claims are dismissed at an early stage in the

litigation, courts generally decline to exercise supplemental

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jurisdiction over state claims. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,

383 U.S. at 726; Growth Horizons, Inc., 983 F.2d at 1284-1285.

In this case, the Court is dismissing every claim over which

it had original subject matter jurisdiction at an early stage in

the litigation and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over Plaintiff's state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3).

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court grants Plaintiff’s application to file the

Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), dismisses the federal

claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

claims arising under state law. 

s/Renée Marie Bumb 

RENÉE MARIE BUMB

United States District Judge

Dated: August 19, 2011

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