IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

RONALD JONES, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

SANKO STEAMSHIP CO., LTD, S.K. 

SHIPPING CO., LTD, GRANDSLAM 

ENTERPRISE CORP., HARMONY 

STEVEDORING SERVICES, and 

HYUNDAE SHIP’S SUPPLY CO., 

 Defendants. 

 

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE 

Civil Action 

No. 10-6787 (JBS/KMW) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 

SIMANDLE, Chief Judge: 

 While working as a longshoreman on Camden, New Jersey's 

Pier No. 1 during cargo operations conducted by his employer, 

the Delaware River Stevedores, Inc. (hereinafter, “DRS”), on M/V 

SANKO SUMMIT (hereinafter, “SANKO”), Plaintiff Ronald Jones 

(hereinafter, “Plaintiff”) suffered serious injuries when a 

“cut” rope sling parted, and caused a pre-slung plywood bundle 

to fall on his legs. As a result of these injuries, Plaintiff 

brought claims under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ 

Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (hereinafter, the “LHWCA”) 

against an array of entities. 

On December 8, 2015, this Court granted summary judgment in 

favor of the bareboat charter/owner pro hac vice, Defendant 

Grandslam Enterprise Corp. (hereinafter, “Grandslam”), but 

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denied summary judgment in favor of the time charterer, 

Defendant SK Shipping Co., Ltd. (hereinafter, “SK” and together 

with Plaintiff, the “moving parties”)). See Jones v. Sanko 

Steamship Co., Ltd, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, No. 10-6787, 2015 WL 

8361745 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2015) (hereinafter, the “summary 

judgment decision” or the “SMJ decision”)). In the wake of the 

summary judgment decision, the Court now confronts motions for 

reconsideration by Plaintiff (relative to the entry of summary 

judgment in favor of Grandslam) and SK (relative to the denial 

of summary judgment in its favor). [See Docket Items 146 & 151] 

In connection with both motions, though, the moving parties 

simply rehash the arguments expressly considered – and 

previously rejected – in the Court’s summary judgment decision. 

Plaintiff, for instance, restates (1) his position 

concerning when the “cut” occurred (compare Pl.’s Grandslam SMJ 

Opp’n Br. at 31-33, with SMJ decision at 18-19 & n.27 and Pl.’s 

Recon. Br. at 4-7), (2) his view that the rope sling constituted 

part of the SANKO’s “equipment” (compare Pl.’s Grandslam SMJ 

Opp’n Br. at 26-30, with SMJ decision at 29-31 & n. 37-38 and 

Pl.’s Recon. Br. at 7-13), and (3) his opinion that the 

International Safety Management (hereinafter, “ISM”) Code and/or 

SANKO’s internal operating procedures somehow expanded the duty 

of care Grandslam owed to Plaintiff. (Compare Pl.’s Grandslam 

SMJ Opp’n Br. at 30-31, with SMJ decision at 33 & n. 39 and 

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Pl.’s Reconsideration Br. at 14-24.) SK, in turn, advances its 

prior arguments concerning (1) the recency of the “cut” to the 

sling, (2) the SK Port Captains’ limited role in the cargo 

operations, and (3) the impact, or lack thereof, of its 

Guidelines for Sling Management and Port Captain Manual on the 

scope of its oversight of its own stevedores. (Compare SK’s SMJ 

Br. at 35-42, with SMJ decision at 36-41 and SK’s 

Reconsideration Br. at 9-13, 21-22.) 

 In other words, the motions for reconsideration present 

little more than disagreement with this Court’s summary judgment 

decision, and for the more detailed reasons that follow, both 

will be denied. The Court finds as follows: 

1. Summary Judgment Decision. In a forty-three page 

decision dated December 8, 2015, the Court recited, at great 

length, the factual background relative to Grandslam’s and SK’s 

involvement in the plywood shipment at issue in this litigation, 

see Jones, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2015 WL 8361745, at *2-*7, the 

framework for liability under the LHWCA and general maritime 

law, see id. at *7-*9, and then the specific contours of the 

duties owed by Grandslam and SK in this instance. See id. at 

*9-*17. 

2. With respect to Grandslam, the “bareboat charterer,” 

this Court detailed the scope of its turnover duty under Scindia 

Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981) and 

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Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., S.A., 512 U.S. 92 (1994), and 

then explained that, in order to succeed against Grandslam for 

breach of the turnover duty, Plaintiff must show: 

(1) that a defect in the vessel, its equipment, or a 

latent defect in the cargo area caused the accident; 

(2) that the vessel owner/owner pro hac vice knew 

about the hazard or should have discovered it before 

turning over the vessel to the stevedore; (3) that the 

known or knowable hazard constituted one of the type 

that the stevedoring company would likely or 

ordinarily have encountered in the course of cargo 

operations; and (4) that the hazard would not have 

been obvious to or anticipated by a reasonably 

competent stevedore. 

Id. at *10 (citations and emphasis omitted). This Court 

concluded, however, that Plaintiff could not meet the first two 

elements, because the undisputed record evidence reflected that 

the hazardous condition implicated here (e.g., the “cut” rope 

sling) came aboard “the vessel after turnover, and in relation 

to an implement unconnected to the vessel, its equipment, or the 

cargo area.”1 Id. at *11 (emphasis in original). In so 

concluding, the Court rejected Plaintiff’s characterization of 

the rope slings as part of the SANKO’s equipment (as opposed to 

a component of the cargo) on an array of legal and factual 

 

1 In other words, the Court concluded that Grandslam “played no 

role” in the cargo operations (in Camden or in Tanjung Manis), 

and observed that it was “undisputed that Grandslam had no 

access to or control over the cargo ropes that came aboard the 

vessel for the first time during the loading operations of 

Malaysian stevedores.” Jones, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2015 WL 

8361745, at *11. 

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bases. See id. at *11 n.37. Even more critically, though, the 

Court reasoned that Plaintiff’s argument on the scope of 

Grandslam’s turnover duty ran directly counter to the Supreme 

Court’s interpretation of the LHWCA. See id. at *12. For all 

of these largely independent reasons, the Court determined that 

Plaintiff could not, as a matter of law, demonstrate that 

Grandslam breached its turnover duty under Scindia and its 

progeny. See id. 

3. Turning then to whether a contract, positive law, or 

custom supplanted Grandslam’s general duties under Scindia, the 

Court rejected Plaintiff’s position that the ISM Code and/or 

Grandslam’s internal operating procedures “somehow create[d] an 

expansive duty of care beyond that of Scindia and Howlett.” Id. 

at *12. In so finding, the Court followed the overwhelming 

weight of authority rejecting the notion that the ISM Code 

and/or a ship’s internal safety manuals “create[] duties running 

from vessels to longshoremen in excess of those set out in the 

LHWCA.” Id. at *13 & n.39 (citations omitted). Aside from this 

legal conclusion, the Court observed, as a factual matter, that 

Grandslam’s internal procedures did “not mention longshoremen, 

the stevedores, or cargo-oriented tools (like, rope slings), and 

[spoke] primarily (if not exclusively) in terms of the SANKO 

crews’ responsibility for the SANKO equipment used in connection 

with cargo operations (like, the crane, hatch covers, and deck 

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lights).” Id. at *13 (emphasis added). The Court therefore 

found these documents unavailing as a source of any heightened 

duty, because the rope slings did not, and do not, constitute 

equipment. See id. For all of those reasons, this Court found 

Grandslam entitled to summary judgment. 

4. With respect to SK, however, the Court confronted a 

contextually different set of circumstances, in large part, 

because the scope of SK’s turnover duty, as the “time 

charterer,” differed from that Grandslam. Id. at *13-*14. Even 

more critically, though, the Court recited the genuine record 

evidence reflecting “(1) that SK selected, owned, and supplied 

all of the pre-slings carried aboard the SANKO, including the 

“cut” rope sling at issue here; (2) that SK did not ‘carefully’ 

inspect the conditions and/or safety of the rope slings;” and 

(3) that SK, through its own conduct and internal policies, 

“actively supervised the cargo operations of its international 

and domestic stevedores.”2 Id. at *14. The Court then detailed 

certain aspects of SK’s Guidelines for Sling Managements (most 

especially, those provisions that required SK port captains to 

 

2 In addition, the Court found that the question of whether the 

“cut” sling proved open and obvious could not be resolved upon 

the competing evidence presented on summary judgment. See 

Jones, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2015 WL 8361745, at *14. SK, 

however, does not challenge this portion of the Court’s summary 

judgment decision, and so the Court need not provide any 

additional detail. (See SK’s Recon. Br. at 19 n.5.) 

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“‘carefully check,’ ‘inspect,’ and ‘supervise’” sling quality, 

condition, and use during cargo loading), as well as the SK Port 

Captains’ own testimony concerning their actual involvement in, 

and supervision over, the cargo operations at issue here. Id. 

at *14-*15 (citations omitted). Against that backdrop, this 

Court stated that it could not “conclude that SK acted 

reasonably under all of the existing circumstances as a matter 

of law, because th[e] collective evidence, examined in the light 

most [favorable] to Plaintiff, creates at least a reasonable 

inference of negligence.” Id. at *15 (emphasis in original). 

For all of those reasons, this Court found that factual disputes 

preclude the entry of summary judgment in favor of SK. 

5. SK filed its motion for reconsideration on December 

23, 2015 [see Docket Item 146], and Plaintiff’s motion for 

reconsideration followed on January 5, 2016. [See Docket Item 

151.] 

6. Standard of Review. Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) governs 

the Court’s review of the moving parties’ motions for 

reconsideration.3 In order to prevail on a motion for 

 

3 Although Plaintiff improperly filed his motion as one seeking 

relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), as discussed 

below, extant authority explains that Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) 

embodies the relevant standard, regardless of the manner in 

which Plaintiff styled his motion. See, e.g., Grossberger v. 

Saldutti, 834 F. Supp. 2d 209, 216 (D.N.J. 2011); Ivan v. Cnty. 

of Middlesex, 612 F. Supp. 2d 546, 550 (D.N.J. 2009); Vasquez v. 

Batiste, No. 14-4366, 2015 WL 6687549 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2015); 

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reconsideration, the party seeking reconsideration must, as 

relevant here, demonstrate “‘the need to correct a clear error 

of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.’”4 Andreyko v. 

Sunrise Sr. Living, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 2d 475, 478 (D.N.J. 2014) 

(citations omitted); Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 

(citation omitted) (3d Cir. 2010) (same). More specifically, 

the moving party must set forth the “‘dispositive factual 

matters or controlling decisions of law’” it believes the Court 

overlooked when rendering its initial decision. Mitchell v. 

Twp. of Willingboro Mun. Gov’t, 913 F. Supp. 2d 62, 78 (D.N.J. 

2012) (citation omitted). 

7. In that way, a party seeking reconsideration must meet 

a high burden. See United States v. Jones, 158 F.R.D. 309, 314 

(D.N.J. 1994); Maldonado v. Lucca, 636 F. Supp. 621, 629 (D.N.J. 

1986). Even more critically, though, reconsideration does not 

provide “an opportunity for a second bite at the apple,” Tishcio 

v. Bontex, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 511, 532 (D.N.J. 1998), nor a 

vehicle “to relitigate old matters.” NL Indus., Inc. v. 

 

Tuytjens v. United States, No. 13-7597, 2015 WL 5882820, at *2 

(D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2015) (same); Fabics v. City of New Brunswick, 

No. 13-6025, 2015 WL 5167153, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 3, 2015) 

(same); Nkansah v. Aviles, No. 15-2678, 2015 WL 4647988, at *2 

(D.N.J. Aug. 5, 2015) (same). 

4 A party seeking reconsideration could, in the alternative, 

identify an intervening change in law and/or the availability of 

previously unavailable evidence. See Andreyko, 993 F. Supp. 2d 

at 478 (citations omitted). The moving parties here, however, 

advance no such arguments. 

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Commercial Union Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996). 

Indeed, mere disagreement with the court’s decision – 

particularly its reasoning and distillation of the applicable 

law and facts – should be aired through the appellate process. 

See Andreyko, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 478; see also Shevline v. 

Phoenix Life Ins., No. 09-6323, 2015 WL 348552, at *1 (D.N.J. 

Jan. 23, 2015) (same). 

8. Here, the Court first addresses two introductory 

deficiencies common to both motions, before turning to the 

moving parties’ more specific (and less intertwined) challenges. 

9. The Motions are Untimely.5 As an initial matter, 

Plaintiff improperly filed his motion as one seeking 

reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) and Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 59(e). The provisions of Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 59 address orders rendering a final judgment, 

not interlocutory orders, like the summary judgment decision, 

denying summary judgment on some, but not all, of a party’s 

claims. See Pellicano v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass’n, 540 F. 

App’x. 95, 97 n.4 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (“[B]ecause 

an order dismissing fewer than all claims or parties is 

generally not a final judgment, a Rule 59(e) motion to challenge 

such an order may only be filed after the district court enters 

 

5 Indeed, Grandslam challenges Plaintiff’s motion on precisely 

that basis. (See Grandslam’s Opp’n at 1-2.) 

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the final judgment.”). Because no final judgment has been 

entered in this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 54(b), the provisions of Rule 59(e), and its 28–day 

time limit, have no application in this instance.6 See Bridges 

v. Colvin, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, No. 12-2316, 2015 WL 5737353, 

at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2015) (finding Rule 59(e) inapplicable 

to the plaintiff’s request for reconsideration, given the 

absence of a final judgment); Mitchell, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 78 

(same). Rather, Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) provides the proper 

procedural mechanism for reconsideration of this Court’s 

interlocutory summary judgment decision. 

10. Local Civil Rule 7.1(i), however, requires that a 

motion for reconsideration be served and filed within 14 days 

from entry of the Order on the original motion.7 See L. CIV. R. 

7.1(i). In this case, Plaintiff and SK filed their motions for 

 

6 This Court’s decision in Navarrete v. United States, No. 09-

3683, 2013 WL 796274 (D.N.J. Mar. 4, 2013), aff’d, 532 F. App’x 

121 (3d Cir. 2013), compels no contrary conclusion. In 

Navarrete, a party sought reconsideration of this Court’s 

decision granting summary judgment as to all claims against the 

single remaining defendant. See id. at *1. For that reason, 

this Court applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to the 

plaintiff’s reconsideration submission. See id. at *2. Here, 

by contrast, this Court’s summary judgment decision plainly left 

open Plaintiff’s claims against SK, and so no final judgment has 

been entered. 

7 Such a rule proves particularly important in this case, given 

the vintage of this action, and the over five years expended by 

the parties, free of motion practice, in pretrial factual 

discovery. 

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reconsideration 28 and 15 days, respectively, after the court 

entered its summary judgment decision. [See Docket Items 146 & 

151.] The moving parties’ failure to file their motions within 

the fourteen-day period prescribed by the Local Rule provides a 

basis, on its own, to deny their motions. See Mitchell, 913 F. 

Supp. 2d at 78 (D.N.J. 2012) (citing cases, and denying a motion 

for reconsideration as untimely). The Court will therefore deny 

the motions for reconsideration as untimely. Despite this 

issue, the Court will equally deny the motions for lack of 

merit. 

11. The Moving Parties’ Challenges to the Court’s 

Observation Concerning the Timing of the “cut”. On the merits, 

the Court first addresses the moving parties’ relatively common 

contention concerning the time at which the “cut” occurred. 

More specifically, the moving parties argue, from different 

vantages, that the Court “overlooked” Plaintiff’s factual 

position that the “cut” “either occurred in Tanjung Manis” or 

“sometime prior to the slings arrival at that port” (Pl.’s 

Recon. Br. at 4-7), and SK’s factual position that the “cut” 

must have occurred just prior to the accident. (See SK’s Recon. 

Br. at 18-20.) 

12. In the prefatory portion of its summary judgment 

decision, this Court observed the parties’ essential agreement 

“that the single ‘cut’ could have occurred at any time prior to 

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Plaintiff’s incident.” Jones, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2015 WL 

8361745, at *2. The moving parties take issue with this general 

observation, based upon their belief that certain evidence 

supports their position on the more precise timing of the “cut.” 

Nevertheless, the Court finds these challenges unavailing 

because, as generally recited in the summary judgment decision, 

Plaintiff’s own expert explained the lack of scientific evidence 

relative to the timing of the cut, and specifically stated that 

it could have occurred at any time prior to the incident. (See 

Grandslam’s Recon. Opp’n Br. at 5-6 (citation omitted).) 

13. SK, in turn, agrees that the “cut” could have occurred 

at any time, but points to the experts’ alleged agreement that 

the “cut” could only have occurred “‘recently.’” (SK’s Recon. 

Br. at 19.) Based upon that term alone, SK then claims that the 

evidence supports only the conclusion that the cut occurred 

“just prior to the Accident.” (Id. (emphasis in original).) 

SK’s position, however, fundamentally overstates the clarity of 

the “evidence” on recency (a term not defined by the experts 

that used it), and ignores the evidence that suggests that the 

“cut” could not have occurred in transit (internationally), nor 

at the time the Camden stevedores connected the sling for 

unloading (given the nature of the implements used by the DRS 

stevedores). (See, e.g., Pl.’s SK SMF at ¶¶ 87-88; see also 

Pl.’s SK Recon. Opp’n at 5-8.) Against that backdrop, the Court 

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discerns no error in its observation that the “actual source and 

timing of the cut ... remains unknown.” Jones, ___ F. Supp. 3d 

____, 2015 WL 8361745, at *6 n.27 

14. Even more importantly, though, the precise timing of 

the cut proves largely meaningless for purposes of the pending 

motions (and in relation to the summary judgment decision), 

given the evidence, discussed at length in the summary judgment 

decision, that SK exercised at least some oversight over cargo 

operations in Tanjung Manis and Camden, and in relation to the 

stevedores’ use of its own rope slings. See Jones, ___ F. Supp. 

3d ____, 2015 WL 8361745, at *14-*15. 

15. For all of these reasons, the Court finds no basis to 

reconsider its summary judgment decision on account of the 

timing of the “cut,” and therefore turns to the moving parties’ 

alternative positions. 

16. Plaintiff’s Remaining Positions on Reconsideration. In 

the remainder of his reconsideration submission, Plaintiff takes 

the position that the Court “overlooked” matters in finding the 

rope slings part of the cargo rather than part of the SANKO’s 

equipment, and, relatedly, in the Court’s interpretation of the 

ISM Code and Grandslam’s internal documents. (Pl.’s Recon. Br. 

at 7-24.) These arguments, however, present little more than 

Plaintiff’s disagreement with the Court’s prior conclusions, and 

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not a demonstration of any dispositive factual matters or 

controlling legal authorities actually overlooked by this Court. 

17. Indeed, in again claiming that the “cut” rope sling 

constituted “equipment” (and thereby heightened Grandslam’s 

duty), Plaintiff, as noted by Grandslam, simply recapitulates 

his position that Grandslam could be held to a duty that 

transcends the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the LHWCA. 

(Pl.’s Recon. Br. at 7, 11-14; see also Grandslam’s Recon. Opp’n 

at 7-13.) Based upon this view (one rejected by this Court) and 

his reading of certain non-binding decisions and regulations 

(sources considered and rejected by this Court), Plaintiff 

submits, for the second time, that the rope slings constitute 

equipment. (See generally id. at 7-14.) In that way, though, 

Plaintiff’s position rests upon his disagreement with the 

Court’s treatment of non-binding decisions, application of 

binding Supreme Court precedent, and view of Grandslam’s lack of 

involvement in the cargo operations (or in any other way 

relevant to the rope slings). Nevertheless, the Court fully and 

comprehensively considered these arguments, and finds no reason 

to revisit them now. See generally Jones, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 

2015 WL 8361745, at *10-*12. 

18. With respect to Plaintiff’s position on the ISM Code 

and Grandslam’s internal safety procedures, Plaintiff similarly 

repeats, as noted by Grandslam, its prior arguments. (See Pl.’s 

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Recon. Br. at 14-24; see also Grandslam’s Recon. Opp’n at 13-

15.) Nevertheless, in rejecting the ISM Code as a basis for 

heightened duties, this Court “join[ed] the weight of authority 

in finding,” as a matter of law, “that the ISM Code provides him 

with no relief,” and Plaintiff again proffers no controlling 

contrary authority. Jones, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2015 WL 

8361745, at *12 n.39. Similarly, in finding Plaintiff’s 

reliance upon the internal safety guides “misplaced as a basis 

to enhance the otherwise-applicable Scindia duties,” the Court 

observed that the internal safety guides exclusively govern 

equipment (and not cargo-oriented tools, like rope slings at 

issue here), and could not, as a matter of law, impose 

heightened duties upon Grandslam. Id. at *12-*13. On this 

issue too, Plaintiff, again, offers no dispositive factual 

matter or controlling legal decision to the contrary. (See 

generally Pl.’s Recon. Br. at 19-24.) For all of these reasons, 

Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration will be denied. 

19. SK’s Remaining Positions on Reconsideration. In the 

remainder of its reconsideration submission, SK advances its 

view that the Court “overlooked” factual matters related to the 

SK Port Captains’ involvement in cargo operations, and on the 

duties, if any, imparted by SK’s own internal documents. (SK’s 

Recon. Br. at 4-13.) More specifically, SK essentially takes 

the position that its activities at the loading port in Tanjung 

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Manis have no relevance to this litigation, because the “cut” 

could, allegedly, only have occurred just prior to the accident. 

(SK’s Recon. Br. at 21.) 

20. Nevertheless, this Court, as explained above, finds 

SK’s narrow view on the timing of the “cut” unconvincing. Even 

more importantly, though, SK does not dispute that its internal 

documents (most especially, its Guidelines for Sling Management) 

required that SK port captains exercise some oversight over 

cargo operations involving rope slings,8 nor that the testimony 

of its Port Captain creates at least some inference that the 

Port Captains did indeed act in at least a quasi-supervisory 

capacity at all times relevant to this litigation (and both in 

Tanjung Manis and in Camden). (See, e.g., SK’s Recon. Br. at 3, 

5, 11-12; see also Pl.’s SK Recon. Opp’n at 9-16 (recounting the 

evidence recited in the summary judgment decision on these 

issues).) This involvement includes, in SK’s own words, a 

 

8 Rather, SK takes exception to this Court’s summary judgment 

decision, because the SK port captains’ duties, as partially 

laid out in the Guidelines for Sling Management, impose 

different obligations upon the port captains at the loading and 

unloading ports. (See SK’s Recon. Br. at 10-13.) More 

specifically, at the loading port, SK port captains must 

carefully check, inspect, and confirm cling quality, quantity, 

condition, and use; while, at the unloading port, SK port 

captains must simply collect, discard, and deliver the use 

slings. (See SK’s Recon. Br. at 10-11.) SK’s challenge, 

however, rests upon the twice-rejected notion that the “cut” 

could only have occurred at the unloading port in Camden. (See 

generally id.) Thus, it provides no basis for reconsideration. 

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telephone call and meeting between SK’s US-based Port Captain Se 

Jin Joo (hereinafter, “Captain Joo”) and DRS Captain James 

Hassall, “a brief visual inspection of the general cargo 

conditions,” and various contact between Captain Joo and DRS 

Captain Hassall in the wake of Plaintiff’s accident. (SK’s 

Recon. Br. at 5, 7-9; see also Pl.’s SK Recon. Opp’n at 15-16 

(citing additional examples).) In their deposition testimony, 

SK’s Malaysian Port Captain Jeong Hyun Kim and Captain Joo, then 

reiterated, as explained in the summary judgment decision, the 

obligations imparted by SK’s Guidelines and the scope of their 

actual involvement in the circumstances (both loading and 

unloading) that spawn this litigation. See Jones, ___ F. Supp. 

3d ____, 2015 WL 8361745, at *14-*15. 

21. In other words, although SK argues that it took a 

hands-off approach to the cargo operations, the evidence, as 

discussed in the summary judgment decision, and seen in the 

light most favorable to the opposing party, fairly supports a 

different story. See id. at *14-*15. SK’s challenges to the 

weight of this evidence and/or to the credit-worthy nature of 

its Port Captains’ recollection provide issues for resolution by 

the fact finder at trial, not by this Court on summary judgment. 

(See, e.g., SK’s Recon. Br. at 6.) For all of these reasons, 

SK’s motion for reconsideration will be denied. 

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22. An accompanying Order will be entered. 

 March 2, 2016 s/ Jerome B. Simandle 

Date JEROME B. SIMANDLE 

 Chief U.S. District Judge 

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