NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

:

WILLIAM F. SEVERINO, III, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-3767 (MLC)

:

Plaintiff, : O P I N I O N

:

v. :

:

DIVISION OF YOUTH & FAMILY :

SERVICES, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

 :

THE PLAINTIFF, who is pro se, applies for in-forma-pauperis

relief under 28 U.S.C. § (“Section”) 1915 (“Application”). (Dkt.

entry no. 1, Appl.) This Court, based upon the plaintiff’s

financial situation, will (1) grant the Application, and (2) deem

the Complaint to be filed. The Court may now (1) review the

Complaint, and (2) dismiss it sua sponte if it is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,

or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court will

dismiss the Complaint, as it is frivolous and fails to state a

claim on which relief may be granted.1

THE DEFENDANTS in this action (“Federal Action”) are (1) the

New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (“NJDYFS”), (2)

 The plaintiff is no stranger to pro se litigation. See, 1

e.g., Severino v. Boro.Sayreville, No. 10-5707 (D.N.J.); Severino

v. Sayreville Police Dept., No. 10-2762 (D.N.J.).

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a NJDYFS caseworker (“Caseworker”), (3) two New Jersey Superior

Court judges (“State Court Judges”), (4) a deputy attorney

general (“DAG”), (5) an attorney with the New Jersey Office of

Parental Representation (“NJOPR”), which is a unit of the New

Jersey Office of the Public Defender (“NJOPD”) (hereinafter, the

aforementioned attorney will be referred to as “NJOPR Attorney”),

(6) an attorney supervisor assigned to either the NJOPD or the

NJOPR alone (“Attorney Supervisor”), and (7) a private attorney

(“Pool Attorney”) once assigned to represent the plaintiff. (See

dkt. entry no. 1, Compl.)

THE PLAINTIFF brings the Federal Action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, alleging that the defendants conspired to violate his

constitutional rights by instituting a state proceeding (“State

Proceeding”) against him. (Id. at 1 (alleging “conspiracy,

wicked as the worst of felons could devise, has gone un-whipped

of justice”).) The Court is able to discern the following

allegations: (1) the Caseworker investigated the plaintiff for

abuse and neglect of a child (“Child”), (2) the DAG prosecuted

the plaintiff, (3) the NJOPR Attorney represented the Child’s

mother, (4) the Pool Attorney represented the plaintiff, but was

part of the conspiracy to deprive him of his parental rights, (5)

the Attorney Supervisor conspired to assist the NJOPR Attorney,

(6) the plaintiff was found in the State Proceeding to have

neglected the Child, and (7) the State Court Judges entered

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against the plaintiff (a) judgments terminating his parental

rights, and (b) restraining orders. (See generally Compl.)

THE PLAINTIFF is attempting to avoid orders in the State

Proceeding. The proper way to do so is to seek review through

the state appellate process, and then seek certiorari directly to

the United States Supreme Court. See D.C. Ct. of Apps. v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263

U.S. 413, 414-16 (1923).

THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE prohibits adjudication of an

action where the relief requested would require a federal court

to either determine whether a state court’s decision is wrong or

void that decision, and thus would prevent a state court from

enforcing its orders. See McAllister v. Allegheny Cnty. Fam.

Div., 128 Fed.Appx. 901, 902 (3d Cir. 2005). This Court cannot

directly or indirectly review, negate, void, or provide relief

that would invalidate a decision in the State Proceeding. See

Gass v. DYFS Workers, 371 Fed.Appx. 315, 315-16 (3d Cir. 2010)

(affirming judgment dismissing claim asserted against state court

judge, NJDYFS, NJDYFS officials, deputy attorneys general, and

NJOPD attorney representing plaintiff in action concerning

parental-rights-termination proceeding, as barred by RookerFeldman doctrine).

THIS COURT also must abstain from exercising jurisdiction,

pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine, when (1) a state

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court action is ongoing, (2) important state interests are

implicated, and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise

federal claims in state court. See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm.

v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982); Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971). This Federal Action is thus

barred because the State Proceeding can be viewed as being

“ongoing for purposes of Younger Abstention”, as (1) the plaintiff

“could have appealed the termination of his parental rights first

to the Appellate Division and then to the New Jersey Supreme

Court”, but “elected to forgo these appeals and instead file the

instant federal claim”, (2) the state has a substantial interest

in parental rights proceedings, and (3) the plaintiff had an

opportunity to raise constitutional claims in the State

Proceeding. See McDaniels v. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs.,

144 Fed.Appx. 213, 214-16 (3d Cir. 2005) (affirming judgment

dismissing claim of constitutional violations committed in

parental-rights-termination proceeding).

NJDYFS, as well as the Caseworker, DAG, NJOPR Attorney, and

Attorney Supervisor in their official capacities, also are not

subject to liability here. See Gass, 371 Fed.Appx. at 316

(affirming judgment dismissing claim asserted against, among

others, NJDYFS, NJDYFS officials, deputy attorneys general, and

NJOPD attorney, as plaintiff could not recover money damages

against such officials). The Court also can discern nothing in

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the Complaint showing that the aforementioned individual

defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because they

engaged in conduct that violated clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known, and thus finds that liability cannot attach to them in

their individual capacities. See id.; see also Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

THE FEDERAL ACTION also insofar as it is brought against the

State Court Judges is barred under the doctrine of immunity, as

the allegations asserted against them concern their judicial

acts. State court judges cannot be held civilly liable for

judicial acts, even when those acts are in excess of their

jurisdiction and are alleged to have been done maliciously or

corruptly. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978);

Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000).

TO THE EXTENT that the plaintiff is asserting claims against

the DAG, the NJOPR Attorney, the Attorney Supervisor, and the

Pool Attorney, his claims are also barred, as those defendants

are immune from liability here. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509

U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (concerning prosecutor); Burns v. Reed, 500

U.S. 478, 492 (1991) (same); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,

431 (1976) (same); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,

325 (1981) (concerning public defender); Santos v. New Jersey,

393 Fed.Appx. 893, 895 (3d Cir. 2010) (same).

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TO THE EXTENT that the plaintiff asserts any discernible

allegations concerning a conspiracy on the part of the defendants

to deprive him of federal rights, such allegations appear to be

based on mere speculation and thus are without merit. See Gera

v. Pennsylvania, 256 Fed.Appx. 563, 565-66 (3d Cir. 2007).

THE PLAINTIFF also seeks emergent relief. (See dkt. entry

no. 2.) The Court finds that the plaintiff is unlikely to

succeed on the merits, as the Court is dismissing the Complaint. 

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 65; see also L.Civ.R. 65.1 (stating no order to

show cause to bring a matter for a hearing will be granted except

on a clear and specific showing of good and sufficient reasons by

the party seeking relief as to why a procedure other than by

notice of motion is necessary). The application for emergent

relief will be denied.

THE COURT will dismiss the Complaint for the aforementioned

reasons. The Court will issue an appropriate order and judgment.

 s/ Mary L. Cooper 

MARY L. COOPER

United States District Judge

Dated: November 14, 2011

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