NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

HENRY V. VARGAS

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 2:1 1-cv-2833-CCC-JAD

OPINION

ROBERT MEEHAN, ET AL.

Defendants.

CECCHL, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of Defendants Robert Meehan, Jeff

Camiscoli, Officer Drelic, Kevin Amos and Robert Andrezzi (collectively, “Defendants”) to

dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint.’ (Docket Entry No, 14). Plaintiff Henry Vargas (“Plaintiff’)

opposed Defendants’ motion and filed a cross-motion for leave to amend his Complaint.

(Docket Entry No. 16). The Court’s jurisdiction in this matter is premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The Court has considered the submissions made in support of and in opposition to the instant

‘Defendants’ motion is styled as a motion for judgment on the pleadings “pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Because Rule 12(b)(6) governs motions to dismiss, the Court

construes Defendants’ application as a such. In any event, the same legal standard applies to

both a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 1 2(b)(6).

Revell Port Auth ofNe York New Jersey 598 F 3d 128, 134 (3d Cir 2010) (citing Turbe v

Govt ofthe V I ,938 F 2d 427, 428 (3d Cir 1991) (“A motion for judgment on the pleadings

based on the defense that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim is analyzed under the same

standards that apply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion”).

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motions. 2This matter is decided without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 78. Based on the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied, and

Plaintiffs motion to amend is granted.

II. BACKGROUND

On or about May 18, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court seeking redress for

alleged violations of his federal and state constitutional rights by Defendants Robert Meehan,

Jeff Camiscioli, Officer Drelic, Kevin Amos and Robert Andrezzi. All of the named defendants

are police officers in the City of Garfield, New Jersey. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he

was subjected to several instances of unlawful arrest, search and seizure, and police stops.

Plaintiff contends that these events violated his constitutional rights and demonstrate a pattern of

harassment by Defendants.

The following recitation of facts is taken from Plaintiffs Complaint. In May 2007, after

a lengthy investigation by the Passaic County Prosecutor’s office, Plaintiff was arrested on

charges of possession of marijuana in the second degree. (Compl. ¶ 7). A search warrant was

issued for Plaintiffs apartment in Elmwood Park, New Jersey and Plaintiff subsequently pled

guilty on the charges levied in connection with the May 2007 arrest. (Id. ¶J 10-11). Just prior to

his arrest, Plaintiff shared his Elmwood Park apartment with Mark Amos, son of Defendant

Kevin Amos, the chief of the Garfield police department. (Id. ¶ 6, 9). Plaintiff asserts that the

search warrant issued for the Elmwood Park apartment made no mention of Mark Amos and that

Mark Amos was never arrested for marijuana possession, despite his inclusion in a related

2 The Court considers any new arguments not presented by the parties to be waived. Scc Brenner

v. Local 514, United Bhd. Of Carpenters & Joiners, 927 F.2d 1283, 1298 (3d Cir. 1991) (“It is

well established that failure to raise an issue in the district court constitutes a waiver ofthe

argument.”).

2

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investigational report prepared by the Elmwood Park police department. (Id. ¶i 7. 10). Plaintiff

alleges that, subsequent to his May 2007 arrest, certain Garfield police officers “began a course

of harassment, intimidation and retaliation directed at Plaintiff,” (Id. ¶ 12). Plaintiff asserts that

this conduct was “directed by Defendant Amos in an effort to intimidate Plaintiff into keeping

quiet about his son P0 Mark Amos.” (4 ¶ 28).

In his Complaint, Plaintiff identifies two arrests which he claims give rise to violations of

his constitutional rights. The first arrest occurred on September 28, 2007, when Plaintiff was

arrested by Defendant Camiscoli for resisting arrest. (Id. ¶J 15-16). The second arrest took place

on June 28, 2008, when Plaintiff was arrested for aggravated assault by Defendant Meehan. (Id.

¶J 23-26). In addition, Plaintiff asserts that he was subjected to illegal traffic stops and searches

“[o]n many occasions in 2007 and 2008.” (Id. ¶ 19). Plaintiff specifically describes only one

such stop however, which took place in May 2008 by Defendant Meehan. (Id. ¶ 22). Plaintiff

further alleges that he surreptitiously recorded unnamed Garfield police officers commenting on

the incidents described in the Complaint. (Id. ¶ 29). According to Plaintiff, the recorded officers

acknowledged that Plaintiff was arrested and/or stopped based on fabricated charges because of

his affiliation with Mark Amos. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that his attorney brought the recordings

to the attention of the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office, “which failed to present the

exculpatory evidence to the Grand Jury.” (Id. ¶1 30).

Based on the foregoing incidents. Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his civil rights

arising under the federal and New Jersey constitutions. Plaintiffs Complaint asserts seven

causes of action in that regard. Count One asserts that the search of Plaintiffs vehicle and his

Plaintiffs Complaint does not further describe the Grand Jury proceedings. The Complaint

names a John Doe defendant, described as an Assistant Bergen County Prosecutor. in connection

with the failure to present evidence to the grand jury.

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arrest on September 28, 2007 violated Plaintiff’s civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count

Two asserts that Plaintiff’s arrest on June 30, 2008 likewise violated Section 1983. Count Three

alleges harassment based on traffic stops and threats, in violation of Section 1983. Counts Four,

Five and Six claim that the aforementioned conduct violates the New Jersey Constitution, giving

rise to claims under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1, et seq. Counts Seven and

Eight allege that a John Doe defendant, identified as an Assistant Bergen County Prosecutor,

failed to present the exculpatory transcripts of Plaintiff’s conversations with Defendant Meehan

to the grand jury, in violation of Section 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act. Lastly,

Count Nine alleges that Defendants conspired to deprive him of his federal and state

constitutional rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint, asserting that it was not filed

within the governing two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff opposed Defendants’ motion and

has also filed a motion for leave to amend his Complaint.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

For a complaint to survive dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

1 2(b)(6), it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to reliefthat

is plausible on its face,” Ashcroft v. Igbal, 129 5. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the

Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all

reasonable inferences in favor ofthe non-moving party. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515

F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Furthermore, ‘[a] pleading that offers labels

and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation ofthe elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor

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does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual

enhancement.” Iqi, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.

Motions to amend the pleadings are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

Rule 1 5(a)(1)(B) applies to Plaintiff’s motion to amend, given the procedural history of this

matter. Under that provision “... a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing partys

written consent or the courts leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). The decision to grant leave to amend is left within the discretion of

the district court. Toll Bros., Inc. v. Township of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 144 n. 10 (3d

Cir.2009); Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 518—521 (3d. Cir.1988)). The Third

Circuit has shown a strong liberality in allowing amendments under Rule 15 in order to ensure

that claims will be decided on the merits rather than on technicalities. Dole v. Arco Chemical

Co., 921 F.2d 484, 487 (3d Cir.1990); Bechtel v. Robinson, 886 F.2d 644, 652 (3d Cir.1989).

Thus, an amendment must be permitted in the absence of undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive,

unfair prejudice, or futility of amendment. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108

(3d Cir.2002) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962)).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Defendants contend that

Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred under the governing two-year statute of limitations. 4In support

of their motion, Defendants highlight that the incidents described in Plaintiff’s Complaint all

The parties do not dispute that a two-year statute of limitations governs Plaintiff’s claims. ($çç

P1. Br. in Support of Mot. to Amend 1).

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occurred in 2007 and 2008. As Plaintiffs Complaint was not filed until May 18, 2011,

Defendants assert that this action must be dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiff opposed Defendants’ motion and has sought leave to file an amended complaint

to clarify that this action was instituted within the two-year limitations period. In sum and

substance, Plaintiff requests leave of court to amend the pleadings to demonstrate that

Defendants’ engaged in additional alleged wrongful conduct in 2009, rendering the Complaint

timely. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to assert additional allegations regarding Defendants’

conversations with the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office, Defendants’ continued harassment of

Plaintiff, and the false presentation oftestimony to the grand jury in 2008. Plaintiff further

asserts that he cannot adequately respond to Defendants’ statute of limitations argument until he

conducts discovery. Lastly, Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ actions were part of a

“continuing violation” of Plaintiffs federal and state constitutional rights. 5

Given the liberal standard governing motions to amend, the Court exercises its discretion

to allow Plaintiffthe opportunity to file an Amended Complaint (in the form annexed to its

moving papers) which sets forth allegations of purportedly wrongful conduct occurring in 2009.

At this early stage of the litigation, where discovery is ongoing, the Court finds it appropriate to

allow Plaintiff to amend the pleadings to clarify his allegations. In so doing, the Court does not

opine as to whether Plaintiffs claims would survive a motion for summary judgment once

discovery is complete. Rather, the Court merely finds that, at this stage, Plaintiff should be

granted leave to amend his pleading.

The Court takes no position by way of this Opinion regarding the applicability of the continuing

violations doctrine.

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Because Plaintiff has been granted leave to file his Amended Complaint, Defendants’

motion to dismiss is denied without prejudice. Defendants may renew their arguments by way of

a dispositive motion once discovery is complete.

CONCLUSION

Based on the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion to amend is granted and

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied without prejudice.

An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

CLAIRE C. CECCHI, U.S.D.J.

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