In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-17-00174-CR 

JOAQUIN CORONADO, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

 

On Appeal from the 154th District Court 

Lamb County, Texas 

Trial Court No. DCR-5424-16, Honorable Felix Klein, Presiding 

 

November 25, 2019 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ. 

Appellant, Joaquin Coronado, appeals his conviction for the offense of engaging 

in organized criminal activity,1 and sentence to fifty-five years’ incarceration in the Texas 

Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. By his appeal, appellant contends 

that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court submitted 

an erroneous jury charge. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.02(a)(5) (West Supp. 2019).
2

Factual and Procedural Background

In the spring of 2014, a group of individuals worked together to distribute large 

amounts of methamphetamine in Lamb County, Texas. An investigation identified 

appellant as the leader of this network. In May of 2014, appellant was arrested on an 

unrelated warrant. At the time of his arrest, appellant was in possession of a simulated 

handgun and magazine, clear plastic baggies, a digital scale, a ledger, and multiple strips 

of paper with handwritten contact information on each.

Texas Department of Public Safety Special Agent Ashburn met with appellant after 

his arrest. After receiving Miranda warnings, appellant voluntarily gave Ashburn both an 

oral and written statement. In both statements, appellant admitted to bringing a large 

quantity of “dope” and “drugs” into Lamb County during the months immediately 

preceding his arrest. In his oral statement, appellant explained that he had several 

individuals, including many of his co-defendants, who would sell the drugs for him and 

that he would even institute competitions to encourage his agents to sell more drugs. 

Appellant and his agents were so successful selling drugs that appellant stated that he 

had to return to his supplier “every day” and that he would purchase a quarter pound of 

the drugs every time he resupplied. Appellant was indicted for the offense of engaging in 

organized criminal activity.

At trial, the State offered appellant’s statements into evidence, which were 

admitted over appellant’s objections. Three co-defendants were called by the State. 

Each of the co-defendants corroborated the statements made by appellant in his written 

and oral statements, namely that appellant was the head of a methamphetamine 

distribution ring. The jury found appellant guilty of engaging in organized criminal activity 
3

by delivering a controlled substance in Penalty Group 1 in an amount of 200 grams or 

more but less than 400 grams. The jury also assessed appellant’s sentence at fifty-five 

years’ incarceration in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal 

Justice. After the trial court rendered judgment on the jury’s verdict, appellant timely filed 

his notice of appeal.

By his appeal, appellant presents two issues. By his first issue, appellant contends 

that the evidence presented at his trial is insufficient to support his conviction. By his 

second issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred by submitting a jury charge 

which authorized the jury to convict appellant of an offense outside the express language 

of Texas Penal Code section 71.02(a). We will review appellant’s second issue first.

Charge Error

By his second issue, appellant contends that the trial court submitted a jury charge 

that erroneously authorized the jury to convict him of an offense outside of the express 

language of Texas Penal Code section 71.02(a)(5). The State responds that the charge 

is not in error as it tracks with the language of section 71.02(a)(5).

In analyzing a claim of charge error, the Court should first determine whether the 

submitted charge was erroneous. Arteaga v. State, 521 S.W.3d 329, 333 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2017). If the charge was erroneous, the Court must then determine whether 

appellant suffered harm due to the error. Id. It is only when we have reached an 

assessment of harm that error preservation becomes relevant. Kirsch v. State, 357 

S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). If error was properly preserved by timely 

objection, reversal is required if it is shown that the error caused the defendant some 
4

harm. Marshall v. State, 479 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Almanza v. 

State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc)). If, on the other hand, the 

defendant did not properly object to the jury charge, as in the present case, reversal is 

only required if the error was so egregious that it denied the defendant a fair and impartial 

trial. Id. (citing Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171).

The written charge given to the jury by the trial court should distinctly set forth the 

law applicable to the case. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14 (West 2007); Vega v. 

State, 394 S.W.3d 514, 518-19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The application paragraph of the 

jury charge, not the abstract portion, authorizes a conviction. Yzaguirre v. State, 394 

S.W.3d 526, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The jury is presumed to have understood and 

followed the trial court’s charge absent evidence to the contrary. Crenshaw v. State, 378 

S.W.3d 460, 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

In the present case, appellant contends that the trial court erred by submitting a 

jury charge that authorized the jury to find appellant guilty of establishing, maintaining, or 

participating in a combination to deliver or possess with intent to deliver 200 to 400 grams 

of methamphetamine. However, the application paragraph of the trial court’s charge

tracks the language of section 71.02(a)(5). Specifically, the charge informs the jury to 

find appellant guilty if, with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination, 

“he delivered a controlled substance in Penalty Group 1 . . . .” Section 71.02(a)(5) 

provides that,

A person commits an offense if, with the intent to establish, maintain, or 

participate in a combination or in the profits of a combination or as a member 

of a criminal street gang, the person commits or conspires to commit one or 

more of the following: (5) unlawful manufacture, delivery, dispensation, or 

distribution of a controlled substance or dangerous drug, or unlawful 
5

possession of a controlled substance or dangerous drug through forgery, 

fraud, misrepresentation, or deception;

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.02(a)(5) (emphasis added). Nowhere in the jury charge is 

the jury authorized to convict appellant for engaging in organized criminal activity by

committing or conspiring to commit possession of a controlled substance with the intent 

to deliver.2 We conclude that the trial court did not err in charging the jury as it did.

Appellant correctly identifies that the indictment in this case improperly alleged that 

appellant committed the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity when he did 

“knowingly deliver or possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance in Penalty 

Group 1 . . . .” As discussed above, mere possession with intent to deliver is insufficient 

to support a charge under section 71.02(a). However, at no time did appellant file a 

motion to quash the indictment or object to the indictment. By failing to do so, appellant 

waived any objection to this defect in the indictment. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

art. 1.14(b) (West 2005) (“If the defendant does not object to a defect, error, or irregularity 

of form or substance in an indictment . . . before the date on which the trial on the merits 

commences, he waives and forfeits the right to object to the defect, error, or irregularity 

and he may not raise the objection on appeal or in any other postconviction proceeding.”).

Concluding that there is no error in the jury charge and that appellant waived any 

error in the indictment, we overrule appellant’s second issue.

2 We do note that the charge includes two lesser-included offenses that are based on possession 

of a controlled substance. However, neither of these offenses authorize the jury to convict appellant for 

engaging in organized criminal activity based on simple possession.
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Sufficiency of the Evidence

By his first issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the 

jury’s finding that appellant committed the offense of engaging in organized criminal 

activity by delivering a controlled substance in Penalty Group 1, in an amount of 200 or 

more grams but less than 400 grams.

In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); see Brooks v. State, 

323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “[O]nly that evidence which is sufficient in 

character, weight, and amount to justify a factfinder in concluding that every element of 

the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt is adequate to support a 

conviction.” Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917 (Cochran, J., concurring). We remain mindful 

that “[t]here is no higher burden of proof in any trial, criminal or civil, and there is no higher 

standard of appellate review than the standard mandated by Jackson.” Id. When 

reviewing all the evidence under the Jackson standard of review, the ultimate question is 

whether the jury’s finding of guilt was a rational finding. See id. at 906-07 n.26 (discussing 

Judge Cochran’s dissenting opinion in Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 448-50 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2006), as outlining the proper application of a single evidentiary standard of 

review). “[T]he reviewing court is required to defer to the jury's credibility and weight 

determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the 

weight to be given their testimony.” Id. at 899 (emphasis in original).
7

To prove that appellant was guilty of engaging in organized criminal activity, the 

State was required to prove that appellant, with an intent to establish, maintain, or 

participate in a combination or in the profits of a combination, committed or conspired to 

commit delivery of a controlled substance in Penalty Group 1, specifically 

methamphetamine, in an amount of 200 or more grams but less than 400 grams. TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.02(a)(5); Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2018). A combination is defined as three or more persons collaborating to carry on 

criminal activities, regardless of whether the persons know one another or whether 

membership in the combination changes over time. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.01(a) 

(West 2011). To prove that a combination existed, the State had to prove an agreement 

to act together in a continuing course of activity. Ledet v. State, 177 S.W.3d 213, 218 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d). To prove the necessary intent, the State 

must show that appellant committed the predicate offense with the specific intent to 

participate in a criminal activity with a combination of persons and to participate in the 

profits of the combination. McGee v. State, 909 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1995, 

pet. ref’d). Intent may be inferred from acts, words, and conduct of the accused as well 

as the circumstances in which appellant’s actions occurred. DeLeon v. State, 77 S.W.3d 

300, 312 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. ref’d). It is not enough for appellant just to be 

aware of the existence of the combination, he must also have known of the combination’s 

intended criminal activity. McGee, 909 S.W.2d at 518.

“A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless 

corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense 

committed . . . .” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.14 (West 2005). In reviewing the 
8

sufficiency of the evidence corroborating an accomplice witness’s testimony, we must 

exclude the testimony of the accomplice from consideration and examine the remaining 

evidence to determine whether this evidence tends to connect the defendant to the 

commission of the offense. McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) 

(en banc).

Appellant specifically challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to corroborate the 

testimony of the accomplice witnesses. The non-accomplice witness evidence need not 

be sufficient to support conviction for the charged offense; rather, it must be sufficient to 

“tend to connect” appellant to the commission of the offense. See id. Here, in appellant’s 

oral statement, he admits that he purchased as much as a quarter pound of 

methamphetamine daily which he would deliver to a combination of people in Lamb 

County during the period alleged by the State. Appellant stated that he would “pass” 

these drugs to his distributors. He described the enterprise as a “business.” Appellant 

specifically discussed delivering drugs to multiple persons, including the accomplice 

witnesses. In addition, the physical evidence found in the vehicle appellant was driving 

when he was arrested, including a simulated handgun and magazine, clear plastic 

baggies, a digital scale, a ledger, and multiple strips of paper with handwritten contact 

information on each, tends to connect appellant to the offense of delivering drugs. Since 

appellant’s issue is couched in terms of the sufficiency of the evidence to corroborate the 

testimony of the accomplice witnesses, we conclude that the non-accomplice evidence is 

more than sufficient to tend to connect appellant to the offense alleged in the jury charge.

However, even if we construe appellant’s issue as challenging the sufficiency of 

the evidence to support his conviction generally, we conclude that the evidence is 
9

sufficient. Again, to prove appellant guilty of engaging in organized criminal activity, the 

State had to prove that appellant, with an intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a 

combination or in the profits of a combination, committed or conspired to commit delivery 

of a controlled substance in Penalty Group 1, specifically methamphetamine, in an 

amount of 200 or more grams but less than 400 grams. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 71.02(a)(5). Appellant’s intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination to 

commit delivery of methamphetamine in an amount of 200 or more grams but less than 

400 grams in the spring of 2014 is established by appellant’s statement alone. Appellant 

admitted to organizing a “business” with many individuals to sell methamphetamine in 

Lamb County. For an extended period of time during the applicable period, appellant 

admitted that he would acquire a quarter pound of methamphetamine, approximately 113 

grams, every day which he would deliver to his distributors to sell. Consequently, we 

conclude that a rational jury could have found appellant guilty of each essential element

of the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity beyond a reasonable doubt. See

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912.

Finding the evidence to be sufficient to corroborate the accomplice witnesses’ 

testimony and to support appellant’s conviction, we overrule appellant’s first issue.

Conclusion

Having overruled both of appellant’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial 

court.

Judy C. Parker

 Justice

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