NOT FOR PUBLICATION

1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MARIA L. SOSA, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 

 v. 

CLIENT SERVICES, INC., 

 Defendant. 

: 

: 

: 

: OPINION

: 

: Civ. No. 11-03021 (WHW) 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

Walls, Senior District Judge 

The plaintiff Maria L. Sosa sues the defendant Client Services, Inc. alleging that the 

initial debt collection letter the company sent her violated the statutory notice and other 

requirements of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq (“FDCPA”). 

Client Services filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6), to which Sosa has not responded. Because the complaint as drafted is 

insufficient to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face, the defendant’s motion to 

dismiss is granted and the plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed without prejudice. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

On May 20, 2011, Maria L. Sosa filed the current action against defendant Client 

Services, Inc. in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Special Civil Part, Bergen County. Pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. 1441(b), Client Services removed the action to this Court on May 25, 201l. Subject 

Case 2:11-cv-03021-WHW-MCA Document 4 Filed 11/16/11 Page 1 of 9 PageID: 40
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

2 

matter jurisdiction is appropriate here under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the action arises under a 

federal statute, namely the FDCPA. 

Sosa alleges that Client Services, acting as a debt collector, failed to comply with the 

requirements of the FDCPA in its initial communications to her. According to the complaint, 

Client Services first contacted Sosa by letter on or around July 26, 2010 seeking to collect an 

alleged debt originally owed to Macys GE Mid Prime. Compl. ¶¶ 6–9. Although the complaint 

does not attach or quote any portion of the challenged letter, Sosa alleges that Client Services’ 

letter was deceptive and violated the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) because it (1) failed 

to indicate that Client Services had been assigned or purchased the alleged debt, (2) did not 

include the required wording to notify Sosa of her right to dispute the alleged debt, (3) enticed 

her to concede that she owed the full debt rather than allowing her to dispute the amount of the 

debt, and (4) misled her into believing that full payment was the only available course of action. 

Compl. ¶¶ 10–13. Sosa also alleges that Client Services violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a) by 

contacting her directly when Client Services knew or should have known that she had retained 

counsel. Compl. ¶ 14. 

 On June 15, 2011, the defendant Client Services filed a motion to dismiss for failure to 

state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Although Client Services’ motion to dismiss focuses 

on what it describes as the “sole basis for her complaint” that “the defendant failed to advise 

whether it was assigned or purchased the debt,” the Court will consider this as a motion to 

dismiss the complaint as a whole based on Client Services’ further argument that Sosa “does not 

aver any other violations of the FDCPA.” Mot. to Dismiss 1. As of the date of this order, the 

plaintiff has not filed any opposition or otherwise responded to the motion to dismiss. Under L. 

Case 2:11-cv-03021-WHW-MCA Document 4 Filed 11/16/11 Page 2 of 9 PageID: 41
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

3 

Civ. R. 7.1(d)(2), any opposition to the motion to dismiss was due no later than July 5, 2011. 

This motion is decided without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, 

construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under 

any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Broadcom Corp. 

v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 306 (3d Cir. 2007). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the 

complaint need only include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” At the same time, the complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when 

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. As a result, the complaint must contain more 

than “bare-bones allegations” or “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.” 

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 

1949). 

Despite the plaintiff’s failure to respond to the motion to dismiss, the Court will address 

the merits of this motion to dismiss and consider whether the complaint here was sufficient to 

state a valid cause of action. See Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991). 

DISCUSSION

Congress enacted the FDCPA to eliminate abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection 

practices, in part by ensuring that debt collectors provide consumers with timely and adequate 

Case 2:11-cv-03021-WHW-MCA Document 4 Filed 11/16/11 Page 3 of 9 PageID: 42
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

4 

notice of their legal rights. Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2000); 

Campuzano-Burgos v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 550 F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 2008). In particular, 15 

U.S.C. § 1692g(a) requires that the debt collector provide written notice of the following to the 

debtor within five days of its initial communication: 

(1) the amount of the debt; 

(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; 

(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the 

notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be 

assumed to be valid by the debt collector; 

(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within 

the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt 

collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the 

consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the 

consumer by the debt collector; and 

(5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the thirty-day 

period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of 

the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. 

To fulfill the statutory notice requirements of this section, the debt collector must not only state 

the debtor’s rights but must also do so in an effective manner. Granzino v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 

107, 111 (3d Cir. 1991). The court must assess the effectiveness of these statements from the 

perspective of the “least sophisticated debtor.” Wilson, 225 F.3d at 354 (quoting Granzino, 950 

F.2d at 111). The FDCPA also provides that this statutory notice, like other communications, 

must be directed to the consumer’s attorney “if the debt collector knows the consumer is 

represented by an attorney with respect to such debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a). 

I. Client Services’ Alleged Failure to Disclose the Relationship to the Debt 

The focus of Sosa’s complaint is that Client Services’ initial letter “does not explain how 

the defendant acquired this debt, or if they own it at all.” Compl. at 4. Sosa alleges that if Client 

Services does own the debt to be collected, then the complaint fails to provide sufficient 

information regarding how it acquired the debt. Id. In particular, the complaint claims that the 

written notice “does not reference at all how Client Services received this account” from the 

Case 2:11-cv-03021-WHW-MCA Document 4 Filed 11/16/11 Page 4 of 9 PageID: 43
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

5 

original creditor, arguing that Client Services “must show or at least state is [sic] has been 

assigned or purchased this alleged debt.” Id. ¶ 10. As a result, Sosa asserts that the letter “was 

written to completely deceive the consumer as to who owned the debt at this time.” Id. at 4. 

Sosa’s complaint first alleges that these deficiencies in Client Services’ initial letter 

violate the statutory notice requirements. Under the text of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a), a debt collector 

is not specifically required to state in the written notice how the debt collector received the 

account that it is attempting to collect. Instead, the debt collector must simply identify the name 

of the creditor to whom the debt is currently owed. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). The debt collector 

must also state that the consumer has the right to make a written request within the thirty-day 

period for the debt collector to provide the consumer with the name and address of the original 

creditor, if different from the current creditor. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5). Both of these must be 

communicated effectively so that the least sophisticated debtor would know who the debt is 

currently owed to and understand that he or she has a right to request the name of the original 

creditor. See Wilson, 225 F.3d at 354. 

In order to prevail on this statutory notice claim, Sosa would need to demonstrate that the 

challenged letter failed to effectively communicate or misled her as to the identity of the current 

creditor and her right to request the name of the original creditor. The only factual basis for this 

claim alleged in the complaint is that Client Services did not explain how it received the account 

and whether it had purchased or been assigned the debt from Macy’s GE Mid Prime. Compl. ¶¶ 

8–10. The complaint does not cite any language in the letter or otherwise provide any factual 

basis for its allegations that Client Services misled her as to the identity of the current creditor. 

Nor does the complaint include any allegation that the letter did not notify Sosa that she had a 

right to submit a written request to obtain the name of the original creditor. 

Case 2:11-cv-03021-WHW-MCA Document 4 Filed 11/16/11 Page 5 of 9 PageID: 44
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

6 

While nothing alleged in the complaint would necessarily prevent Sosa from ultimately 

recovering on her claim, the facts pleaded alone are not sufficient alone to allow this Court to 

draw a reasonable inference that the written notice letter violated the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 

1692g(a). Since the FDCPA does not require the debt collector to explain how it received the 

account and whether it had purchased or assigned the debt, this alone cannot be a basis for a 

violation. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5) makes clear that the identity of the original creditor need not 

be communicated in the initial written notice. Requiring the defendant to explain in the initial 

letter how the current creditor acquired the debt from the unnamed original creditor would be 

inconsistent with this provision. This district has been reluctant to find statutory notice 

misleading or insufficient solely because it does not include additional information not 

specifically required under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). See Guevara v. Client Servs., Inc., No. 11-cv3736, 2011 WL 5082251, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 26, 2011) (dismissing claim that initial notice letter 

was misleading based only on allegations that it did not include the account number and an 

explanation of debt collector’s relationship to the debt). Any remaining allegations supporting 

Sosa’s claim that Client Services failed to effectively identify the current creditor amount to little 

more than threadbare legal conclusions. To state a valid claim, Sosa will need to provide more 

specific allegations as to why the letter did not effectively communicate the true identity of the 

current creditor or why the least sophisticated debtor would otherwise be misled by the 

challenged letter. 

Sosa also cites the prohibition on flat-rating under 15 U.S.C. § 1692j to support her 

argument that Client Services had an obligation to state its relationship to the debt in the initial 

letter. This provision prohibits any party from designing, compiling, or furnishing any form for 

use in debt collection “knowing that such form would be used to create the false belief in a 

Case 2:11-cv-03021-WHW-MCA Document 4 Filed 11/16/11 Page 6 of 9 PageID: 45
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

7 

consumer that a person other than the creditor of such consumer is participating in the collection 

of or in an attempt to collect a debt such consumer allegedly owes such creditor, when in fact 

such person is not so participating.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692j(a). This section is inapposite because it 

applies only to parties who prepare misleading debt collection letters that give the false 

impression that a person other than the creditor is participating in debt collection. Here, there is 

no allegation that the collection letter references any party other than Client Services. Because 

Sosa specifically alleges that Client Services is a debt collector under the FDCPA who is 

participating in the debt collection and sent the initial contact letter itself, the complaint cannot 

state a claim against Client Services under 15 U.S.C. § 1692j. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 6–7. See Muralles v. 

Client Servs., Inc., No. 11-cv-3738, 2011 WL 3882264, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2011) (dismissing 

claim where complaint alleged only a possibility that one of the parties referenced in an initial 

contact letter was not participating in the debt collection). 

II. Other Alleged Violations of FDCPA Sections 1692c and 1692g 

The remaining allegations amount to little more than a recital of possible violations of the 

FDCPA without any additional factual detail or elaboration. As the Supreme Court has 

explained, “[a]lthough for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual 

allegations in the complaint as true, we ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion 

couched as a factual allegation.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (quoting Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). As a result, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 

1949. The Supreme Court has stressed that even though “legal conclusions can provide the 

framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 1950. 

Case 2:11-cv-03021-WHW-MCA Document 4 Filed 11/16/11 Page 7 of 9 PageID: 46
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

8 

Sosa fails to adequately plead her claim that Client Services violated 15 U.S.C. § 

1692c(a) by contacting only her when Client Services knew or should have known that she had 

retained counsel. Compl. ¶ 14. The complaint does not allege that Sosa’s counsel sent a client 

representation letter to any party. Nor does the complaint allege any other fact to support the 

allegations that Client Services had either actual or constructive knowledge that Sosa was 

represented by counsel. Id. at 4. To survive a motion to dismiss, Sosa must raise at least some 

factual basis for her claim that Client Services knew or should have known that she was 

represented by counsel. See Ventura v. Collectcorp Corp., No. 11-4576, 2011 WL 4625365, at 

*2–3 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2011) (dismissing claim for failure to plausibly allege that debt collector 

should have known that consumer was represented by counsel where complaint alleged only that 

original creditor had been sent a client representation letter). 

The complaint also makes additional summary allegations that the letter was misleading 

regarding her rights and did not effectively communicate certain information required by 15 

U.S.C. § 1692g(a). In particular, the complaint concludes without elaboration that the letter 

enticed Sosa to concede that she owed the full debt, misled her into believing that full payment 

was the only available course of action, and failed to include what it characterizes only as the 

“required wording” regarding her right to dispute the amount of the debt within 30 days. Compl. 

¶¶ 10–13. While these legal conclusions if true would state a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a), 

the bare-bones allegations in the complaint again amount to little more than a recitation of the 

elements of a potential cause of action. Id. ¶¶ 11–13. See Granzino, 950 F.2d at 111–12; Wilson, 

225 F.3d at 354–55. To ultimately survive a motion to dismiss, Sosa will need to provide more 

specific factual allegations regarding the contents of the letter and why the written notice was 

Case 2:11-cv-03021-WHW-MCA Document 4 Filed 11/16/11 Page 8 of 9 PageID: 47
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

9 

misleading and deficient. This Court finds that the complaint as written without any further 

elaboration is insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief on its face. 

CONCLUSION 

Because the complaint as drafted does not allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action 

under the FDCPA, the defendant Client Services’ motion to dismiss is granted. The Court will 

dismiss the plaintiff Maria L. Sosa’s complaint without prejudice and afford the plaintiff an 

opportunity to file an amended complaint to address these deficiencies. 

November 16, 2011 

/s/ William H. Walls 

United States Senior District Judge 

Case 2:11-cv-03021-WHW-MCA Document 4 Filed 11/16/11 Page 9 of 9 PageID: 48