NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MONIQUE RODWELL Civil Action No. 11-3522 (JLL)

Plaintiff,

V.

OPINION

CITY OF NEWARK, et al.

Defendant.

LINARES, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court by way of Defendants City of Newark (“Newark”),

Detective Anthony Williams (“Det. Williams”), Detective Mark Armstead (“Det. Armstead”),

and Sergeant Jerome Ramsey (“Sgt. Ramsey”) (collectively “Defendants”)’s motion for

summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The Court has considered

the submissions made in support of and in opposition to Defendants’ motion, and decides this

matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons set

forth below, Defendants’ motion is granted in part, and denied in part.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This action arises out of an incident that occurred on October 30, 2009 involving Plaintiff

Monique Rodwell (“Plaintiff’) and officers ofthe Newark Police Department. (Def. Statement

of Undisputed Material Facts (“Def. SUMF”) at ¶ 1.)

A. Plaintiffs Initial Encounter with the Newark Police Officers

I
On October 30, 2009 Plaintiff was inside the bathroom of her apartment when she heard a

loud noise. (P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶1.) After hearing the loud noise, Plaintiff went into her living

room and saw her cousin, Gerard Crawford (“Crawford”), who had discharged a gun while

inside Plaintiff’s apartment. (Def. SUMF at ¶J 1, 5.) Plaintiffthen went down the stairs where

she saw Police Officer Cruz (“Officer Cruz”). (P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶ 1.) Officer Cruz informed

Plaintiffthat someone had run into the direction of her apartment with a gun. (Id. at ¶J 1-2.)

Plaintiffthen invited Officer Cruz into her apartment; upon entering, Officer Cruz observed

Crawford in a back room, and immediately placed him under arrest. (Id. at ¶ 2.)

Thereafter, Plaintiff’s boyfriend, Robert Tyson, located the gun that Crawford brought

into the apartment and turned it over to Officer Cruz and two other police officers who had

entered the apartment. (Id.)

Det. Williams and Det. Armstead were then dispatched to Plaintiff’s residence. (Def.

SUMF at ¶ 5.) Upon arriving at the scene, Det. Williams saw a bullet hole in the floor and on a

chair, and learned that Plaintiff was the leaseholder of the apartment. (Def. SUMF at ¶ 6.) Det.

Williams then began questioning Plaintiff as to how Crawford entered her apartment; Plaintiff

responded that she did not know how Crawford entered. (P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶ 4.) During the

course of his questioning, Det. Williams determined that Plaintiff was belligerent and agitated.

(Id. at ¶ 5.) Det. Armstead, by contrast, determined that Plaintiff was cooperative and calm

during the questioning. (Id.)

Based on Det. Williams’ perception of Plaintiff’s demeanor, he ordered his patrol unit to

transport Plaintiffto the police station for questioning, as she was a potential witness to what had

occurred. (Id.) Although Plaintiff wanted to ride to the station in her boyfriend’s car, the

officers instructed her to ride with them in the back of a patrol unit wherein the back seat car

2
doors could not be opened from the inside. (Def. SUMF at ¶9; P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶J 6-7.) Det.

Williams acknowledged in his deposition that Plaintiffwas free to refuse going to the police

station, yet the record suggests that nobody informed Plaintiff of this fact. (P1. SUMF at ¶ 6;

Def. Resp. SUMF at ¶ 6; see also Hardaway Cert., Ex. B at 56.)’

B. Plaintiff’s Experience at the Police Station

Once at the police station, Det. Williams ordered two officers to take Plaintiffto the

kitchen area which was used as an interview room. (P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶9; Def. Resp. SUMF at

¶ 9.) While Plaintiff was seated alone in the room, Det. Williams entered and closed the door.

(Id.) Plaintiff was never informed that she was free to leave the station at any time in spite of the

fact that she was not a suspect. (See P1. Supp. SUMF atJ 8, 13; Def. Resp. SUMF at 13.)

While in the interview room, Det. Williams again questioned Plaintiff about how Crawford

entered her apartment and discharged his gun. Plaintiff claims that she responded that she knew

nothing about, and had no involvement in, the incident. (P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶ 10.) According to

Plaintiff, Det. Williams then stood over her, pushed her, and poked her in the head while she was

seated in a chair. (Id.) He also allegedly called her names such as “dirty bitch” and “welfare

bitch,” slapped her, and hit her head while yelling profanities at her. (id.) 2 Plaintiffthen stood

from her chair, and Det. Williams instructed her to sit down. (Id. at ¶ 11.)

Plaintiff did not comply with Det. Williams’ instruction to sit down. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Det.

Williams then allegedly hit Plaintiffso hard that she flew back while grabbing him to avoid

incident.

Det. Williams

(P1. Supp.

did not

SUMF

question any of the other witnesses present in Plaintiffs apartment at the time of the

at ¶ 8; Def. Resp. SUMF at ¶ 8.)

2 Defendants deny that Det. Williams ever hit Plaintiff or yelled any profanities at her. (See Def. Resp. SUMF at ¶

stupid.”

10, 11.) During

(Hardaway

his deposition,

Cert., Ex. B

however, Det. Williams acknowledged that he told Plaintiff that “she was acting

at 79.)

3
hitting the wall. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Det. Williams then slammed her to the floor while

yelling more profanities at her. (Id. at ¶ 11.)

As a result of her refusal to sit down and her allegedly belligerent conduct, Det. Williams

decided to place Plaintiff under arrest. (See P1. Resp. SUMF at ¶ 11; see also Hardaway Cert.

Ex. B. at 82.) Det. Williams then told Plaintiffto remove her laces, belt and jewelry, which

Plaintiff did. (Def. SUMF at ¶ 10; P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶ 11.) While attempting to place Plaintiff

under arrest, Plaintiff pulled her arm away from Det. Williams and began flailing her arms. Det.

Williams then grabbed Plaintiff by her shirt, and Plaintiff, in turn, grabbed him by his shirt. A

struggle ensued, and Det. Williams pulled Plaintiffto the floor, pushed her down by her face,

pulled her arm behind her body, and held her until she calmed own. (P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶IJ 17-

18; Def. Resp. SUMF atJ l7-18.)

While this was happening, Det. Armstead was processing Crawford in the squad area of

the police station. (P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶ 20; Def. Resp. SUMF at ¶ 20.) Det. Armstead claims to

have heard a commotion in the interview room, and loud voices from both Plaintiff and Det.

Williams. (P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶ 20; Def. Resp. SUMF at ¶ 20.) He could not, however, recall

the particulars of what Plaintiff and Det. Williams were saying to each other. (Id.)

Following the altercation between Plaintiff and Det. Williams, the latter opened the

interview room door, and Plaintiffran out and charged at Crawford. (Def. SUMF at ¶ 11; P1.

Supp. SUMF at ¶ 18; Def. Supp. SUMF at ¶ 18.) Det. Williams and Det. Armstead then

restrained Plaintiff and handcuffed her. Sgt. Ramsey, the supervisor of the major crimes unit,

subsequently entered the interview room and asked Det. Williams what was happening. (P1.

Supp. SUMF at ¶ 25; Def. Resp. SUMF at ¶ 25.) Det. Williams responded that Plaintiff “went

with

Both

him

parties

apart

agree

from

that

when

during

he

the interview, Plaintiff never threatened Det. Williams, or had any physical contact

attempted to place her under arrest. (P1. SUMF atJ 16; Def. Resp. SUMF at ¶ 16.)

4
off,” “got mad,” “tried to get at the nephew,” and was being placed under arrest. (id.) Sgt.

Ramsey then asked Plaintiff ifshe needed medical attention, and she responded that she did not.

(Id.) Plaintiff was then placed in a holding cell. (PT. Supp. SUMF at ¶ 18; Def. Resp. SUMF at ¶

18.)

Det. Williams later removed Plaintifffrom the holding cell and took her written statement

while she was seated in the interview room and handcuffed to a chair. (P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶ 27;

Def. Resp. SUMF at ¶ 27.) In her statement, Plaintiff denied having any knowledge about how

Crawford entered her apartment or the circumstances surrounding the firing of the gun. (P1.

Supp. SLTMF at ¶ 8; Def. Resp. SUMF at ¶ 8.) Sgt. Ramsey then swore Plaintiff with respect to

her statement. (P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶27 Def. Resp. SUMF at ¶ 27.) During his deposition, Sgt.

Ramsey stated that he could not remember whether he noticed any injuries on Plaintiff. (Id.)

Once Plaintiff finished giving her statement at approximately 11:55 pm, she was placed

in another holding cell where she remained until her release on the morning of October 31, 2009.

(P1. SUMF at ¶ 12; Def. Resp. SUMF at ¶ 12.)

Det. Williams ultimately charged Plaintiff with disorderly persons conduct and resisting

arrest. (Def. SUMF at ¶ 12; P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶ 19.) Det. Williams prepared an incident report

in connection with Plaintiffs arrest which was approved by Sgt. Ramsey. (P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶

24; Def. SUMF at ¶ 17.) In said incident report, Det. Williams claims to have placed Plaintiff

under arrest because she became irate, used profanity, repeatedly stood over him, and refused his

instruction to sit down and lower her voice. (P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶ 19.)

The charges against Plaintiff were later dismissed because Det. Williams failed to appear

in court on at least three separate occasions. (See Def. SUMF at ¶ 12; P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶ 19.)

“on

supervision.

the date

(P1.

of the

Supp.

October

SUMF

30, 2009 incident, Det. Williams and Det. Armstead were under Sgt. Ramsey’s direct

at 24; Def. Resp. SUMF at ¶ 24.)

5
C. Plaintiff’s Internal Affairs Grievance

Once released from the police station, Plaintiff went to the emergency room at University

Hospital where she was treated for a swollen jaw, laceration to her left ear and soreness all over

her body. (Def SUMF at ¶ 18; P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶ 23.) While at the hospital, Plaintiff decided

to file an Internal Affairs grievance against Det. Williams and met with Lt. George Alberto (“Lt.

Alberto”), who was the on-call Internal Affairs investigator. (See P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶ 23.)

Based on his preliminary investigation, Lt. Alberto determined that Plaintiff showed signs of

physical abuse because her face appeared to be swollen. (Id.; Def. Resp. SUMF at ¶ 23.)

Consequently, Lt. Alberto recommended that the matter be investigated further. (Id.)

Lt. Jevon N. Mintz (“Lt. Mintz”) subsequently conducted an Internal Affairs

investigation. (See Hardaway Cert., Ex. R.) In connection with said investigation, Det.

Armstead and Sgt. Ramsey, respectively, filed Internal Affairs administrative submissions. (See

Hardaway Cert., Exs. K, 0.)

Based on his investigation, Lt. Mintz determined that although Sgt. Ramsey was aware

that Det. Williams used physical force against Plaintiff, he did not require Det. Williams to fill

out a use of force form in violation of Newark Police General Orders #63-2. (P1. Supp. SUMF at

¶ 28; Def. Supp. SUMF at ¶28 see also Hardaway Cert. Ex. P at 10.) Further, Lt. Mintz

determined that Det. Williams failed to follow proper protocol by not submitting a use of force

report following Plaintiff’s arrest. (Hardaway Cert., Ex. P at 10.) Nevertheless, Lt. Mintz

ultimately concluded that Det. Williams’s actions with respect to his use of force were justified,

legal and proper. (Id.)

At the time ofthe incident, Lt. William Sanchez (“Lt. Sanchez”) was the Internal Affairs

Division Commander and second in command in deciding whether to accept Lt. Mintz’s

6
conclusions. (P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶ 29; Def. Resp. SUMF at ¶ 29.) With Lt. Sanchez’s

recommendation, Deputy ChiefJoseph Tutela, the Internal Affairs Bureau Commander, accepted

Lt. Mintz’s conclusions exonerating Det. Williams. (P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶J 34-3 5; Def. Resp.

SUMF at ¶J 34-3 5.)

During his deposition, Lt. Sanchez acknowledged that calling a witness “stupid” during

questioning was not in compliance with Newark Police Department policies. (See Hardaway

Cert., Ex. Q at 45-46.) Lt. Sanchez further testified that arresting a witness for refusing to sit

down, or because she was upset or cursing, would also fail to comply with Newark Police

Department policies. (Id. at 46.) Finally, Lt. Sanchez acknowledged that if a witness refused to

cooperate, she should be allowed to leave. (See, e.g., id. at 46, 64.) Lt. Sanchez, nevertheless,

recommended that Internal Affairs exonerate Det. Williams based on his review of Plaintiffs

grievance and the administrative submissions of Det. Williams, Det. Armstead, and Sgt. Ramsey,

as he agreed with the conclusion that Det. Williams used the appropriate amount of force to

arrest Plaintiff for disorderly conduct. (P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶ 30; Def. Resp. SUMF at ¶ 30.)

Notably, Lt. Sanchez’s recommendation to exonerate Det. Williams was limited to Plaintiff’s

allegation of excessive force. That is, he did not make any recommendation with respect to

whether arresting Plaintiff for disorderly conduct was proper. (Id.) 5

D.

Department’s

Prior Allegations of Excessive Force against Det. Williams and the Newark Police

System for Tracking Excessive Force Complaints

The Newark Police Department maintains a system called the IA Pro System that tracks

citizen complaints against officers. (P1. SUMF at ¶ 37; Def. Resp. SUMF at ¶ 37.) Designated

Internal Affairs officers are responsible for manually inputting citizen complaints into the IA Pro

Associates”),

According to

Det.

an expert

Williams

report prepared by Plaintiff’s liability expert, Williams Associates, LLC (“Williams

Newark Police Department knew

used excessive force upon Plaintiff; Plaintiff was in custody prior to her arrest; and the

insufficient and failed

or should have known that their mechanism for tracking civilian complaints was

to correct it. (Def. SUMF at 27.)

7
system. (Id.) If any particular officer receives three excessive force complaints within a 12-

month period, an alert is generated, and that officer is sent for mandatory retraining. (Id.) 6 The

IA Pro system, however, does not maintain excessive force complaints that predate 2005. (P1.

Supp. SUMF at ¶ 37; Def. Resp. SUMF at ¶ 37.) Because ofthis fact, Deputy Chief Tutela was

not aware of any excessive force complaints filed against Det. Williams prior to 2005 when he

decided to accept Lt. Sanchez’s recommendation to exonerate Det. Williams. (P1. Supp. SUMF

at ¶ 36; Def. Resp. SUMF at ¶ 36.)

Det. Williams’ entire disciplinary record reveals a total often excessive force complaints

and one domestic violence complaint filed against him. (P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶ 38; Def. Resp.

SUMF at ¶ 38.) Specifically, Det. Williams’ list of excessive force complaints includes one

complaint in 1997, another in 2001, two in 2002, four in 2003, one in 2006, two in 2007, and one

domestic violence complaint in 1999. (P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶ 41; Def. Resp. SUMF at ¶ 41.)

None of these complaints resulted in any disciplinary action against Det. Williams. (Id.)

During his deposition, Deputy Chief Tutela conceded that the disciplinary record he

reviewed in connection with the Internal Affairs investigation lacked important information. (P1.

Supp. SUMF at ¶ 38; Def. Resp. SUMF at ¶ 38.) He acknowledged that if he had known the

accurate number of excessive force complaints against Det. Williams, he would have possibly

instructed his investigating officer to look into these complaints further. (Id.)

On May 3, 2010, a performance evaluation monitoring system was implemented to be

used in conjunction with the IA Pro system in order to correct substandard performance and/or

inappropriate behavior before initiating a disciplinary process. (P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶ 40; Def.

Resp. SUMF at ¶ 40.) Among other things, the performance evaluation monitoring system

6 Nothing

41; Def.

in

Resp.

the record

SUMF

suggests that Det. Williams ever received retraining in the use of force. (P1. Supp. SUMF at

at 41.)

8
requires a review of annual performance evaluations by supervisory personnel. (Id.) Sgt.

Ramsey did not think he prepared an annual performance evaluation for Det. Williams in 2009.

(Id.)

E. Alleged Medical Consequences of Plaintiff’s Encounter with Newark Police

Officers on October 30, 2009

Plaintiffs psychiatric records reveal that she suffers from panic and post-traumatic stress

disorder with episodes of marked panic in which she will curl up in a ball and clutch herself. (P1.

Supp. SUMF at ¶ 41; Def. Resp. SUMF at ¶ 41.) According to Dr. Kenneth McNeil, a

psychologist who treated Plaintiff, Plaintiff has suffered “significant psychological trauma from

the alleged assault on October 30, 2009, including panic attacks, increased fearfulness and

anxiety, and increased depression.” (P1. SUMF at ¶ 42, citing Hardaway Cert. Ex. X.) Dr.

McNeil recommended that Plaintiff “continue outpatient counseling and psychiatric treatment, to

include helping her to practice a relaxation response so that she can learn to settle herself when

tense or upset without relying solely on medication for relief.” (Id.)

Plaintiffwas examined on March 13, 2013 by Dr. James R. Cowan, M.D., who opined

that the incident on October 30, 2009 traumatized Plaintiffto an extensive degree, causing her to

suffer permanent depression and fear. (Def. SUMF at ¶ 24; P1. Supp. SUMF at ¶ 43; Def. Resp.

SUMF at ¶ 43.) Further, Dr. Cowan diagnosed Plaintiff with post-traumatic stress disorder, and

recommended that Plaintiff continue “psychotherapy and tak[e] antidepressant medication until

there is significant improvement.” (Hardaway Cert., Ex. Y.)

II. PROCEUDRAL BACKGROUND

On May 15, 2012, Plaintiff filed a ten-count amended complaint against Newark, Det.

Armstead, Sgt. Ramsey, and fictitious defendants. In her amended complaint, Plaintiff fails to

specify the specific defendants against whom each count is brought. Accordingly, the Court

9
construes the amended complaint as asserting the following claims: (1) assault and battery

against Det. Williams in his individual capacities; (2) false imprisonment and false arrest against

Det. Williams, Det. Armstead, and Sgt. Ramsey in their individual capacities under New Jersey

law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) illegal seizure and use of excessive force against Det. Williams

and Det. Armstead in their individual capacities under New Jersey law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4)

breach of duty against Det. Williams, Det. Armstead, Sgt. Ramsey in their individual capacities,

and against Newark under New Jersey law; (5) municipal liability against Newark and Sgt.

Ramsey in his official capacity under New Jersey law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (6) infliction of

emotional distress against Det. Williams, Det. Armstead and Sgt. Ramsey in their individual

capacities under New Jersey law; (7) malicious prosecution against Det. Williams, Det.

Armstead and Sgt. Ramsey in their individual capacities under New Jersey law and 42 U.S.C. §

1983; (8) abuse of process against Det. Williams, Det. Armstead and Sgt. Ramsey in their

individual capacities under New Jersey law; ‘ (9) conspiracy against Det. Williams, Det.

Armstead and Sgt. Ramsey in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1986;8 and (10)

claims against fictitious defendants for violations ofthe U.S. and New Jersey Constitutions.

On May 24, 2013, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. This Court

terminated Defendants’ motion because the papers submitted in support of and in opposition to

Defendants’ motion failed to comply with the Local Civil Rules. Defendants re-filed their

motion for summary judgment on August 5, 2013.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

pursue

In her

that

opposition

claim at

brief,

this juncture

Plaintiff

and

states

will

that “[wjith respect to her abuse of process claim,. . . [shej does not wish to

48 at 14.)

submit a voluntary dismissal with respect to that claim.” (CM/ECF No.

8 Although the amended complaint asserts a claim for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C.

conspiracy is properly

§ 1986, a claim for civil

brought under 42 U.S.C.

U.S.C. § 1985. As discussed in further detail below, a claim under 42

§ 1986 is one for failure to prevent a § 1985 conspiracy.

10
“Summary judgment should be granted only ‘if the pleadings, the discovery and

disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Bender v. Twp. of

Monroe, 289 F. Appx. 526, 526-27 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). On a summary

judgment motion, the moving party must first show that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. Celotex Corp. V. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence that a genuine issue of material fact compels a trial. Id. at 324.

The non-moving party must offer specific facts that establish a genuine issue of material fact; the

non-moving party may not simply rely on unsupported assertions, bare allegations, or

speculation. See Ridgewood Bd. ofEthic. v. N.E. cx rd. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1999).

The Court must consider all facts presented and the reasonable inferences drawn from them in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Pa. Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236

(3dCir. 1995).

IV. JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1343, and

1367.

V. LEGAL DiSCUSSION

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment for the following reasons:

(1) “Plaintiffs state law claims should be dismissed because they fail to satisfy the threshold

requirement of N.J.S.A. § 59:9-2(d);” (2) “Plaintiff’s civil rights claims must be dismissed as it is

clear that a municipality may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a theory ofrespondeat

superior;” (3) “Plaintiff has not established liability against Newark under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

based on alleged deficiencies in training and supervision;” (4) “Plaintiffs claims against Det.

11
Williams, Det. Armstead, and Sgt. Ramsey should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to

establish a civil conspiracy against these officers;” (5) “All claims against Sgt. Ramsey should be

dismissed as Plaintiff cannot prove a cause of action based on inadequate training or

supervision;” 9and (6) “Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendants Det. Williams, Det. Armstead

and Sgt. Ramsey should be dismissed as these defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.”

The Court will now proceed to address the merits of Defendants’ arguments.

A. Whether Summary Judgment is Appropriate as to Plaintiff’s Claims under New

Jersey Law

Defendants argue that summary judgment should be granted as to Plaintiffs state law

claims because Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the threshold requirement ofthe New Jersey Tort

Claims Act (“NJTCA”). In relevant part, the NJTCA provides that

[nb damages shall be awarded against a public entity or public

employee for pain and suffering resulting from any injury;

provided however, that this limitation on the recovery of damages

for pain and suffering shall not apply in cases of permanent loss of

a bodily function, permanent disfigurement or dismemberment

where the medical treatment expenses are in excess of $3,600.

N.J.S.A. § 59:9-2(d)

The New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that psychological harm in the form of

post-traumatic stress disorder may constitute a permanent loss of a bodily function within the

meaning of N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d). See Collins v. Union County Jail, 150 N.J. 407, 420 (1997)

(holding that “psychological harm in the form of post-traumatic stress disorder resulting from the

rape by the corrections officer, constitutes a permanent loss of a bodily function within the

meaning of N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d)”) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hoag v. Brown, 397 N.J.

summary

The Court

judgment

deems it

as

unnecessary

to all

to address this argument because there are independent bases upon which to grant

construes the municipal

claims against Sgt. Ramsey in his individual capacity. As discussed below, this Court

Sgt. Ramsey

liability claim against Sgt. Ramsey as being brought against Newark, rather than against

in his individual capacity. See KentucAy V. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985).

12
Super. 34, 63 (App. Div. 2007) (holding that plaintiffsatisfied the NJTCA threshold where

psychological injuries resulting from physical and verbal abuse could lead reasonable jury to find

that the injuries “were permanent and equat[edj to a substantial loss of a bodily function.”).

Here, Plaintiff has put forward sufficient evidence which may lead a reasonable jury to

find that Plaintiff has sustained permanent injuries. To provide only one example, Dr. Cowan

diagnosed Plaintiff with post-traumatic stress and concluded that she suffers from “pe1ianent

depression and fear” as a result ofthe October 30, 2009 incident. (Hardaway Cert., Ex. Y)

(emphasis added).

Although Plaintiff’s psychological injuries are sufficient to meet the threshold

requirement ofthe NJTCA, Plaintiff has failed to set forth any evidence showing that her

medical expenses exceed $3,600. Accordingly, the Court must grant summary judgment as to

Plaintiff’s claims under New Jersey law. See N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d); see also Ward v. Barnes, 545

F. Supp. 2d 400, 417-418 (D.N.J. 2008) (noting that the monetary threshold of the NJTCA is

“another threshold requirement”).’° Consequently, the following claims are dismissed to the

extent they are brought under New Jersey law: false imprisonment and false arrest; illegal seizure

and use of excessive force; breach of duty; municipal liability; infliction of emotional distress;

and malicious prosecution.

B. Whether Summary Judgment is Appropriate as to Plaintiff’s Federal Claims

Having determined that summary judgment is appropriate as to Plaintiff’s claims under

New Jersey law, the Court will now proceed to address the propriety of granting summary

judgment as to Plaintiff’s federal claims.

‘°

N.J.S.A.

It bears

59:9-2(d).

mentioning

(See

that

CM/ECF

Plaintiff

No.

concedes that it is bound by the inununity accorded to public employees in

set forth in N.J.S.A. 59:3-14 applies. Accordingly,

48 at 5-7.) Notably, Plamtiff does not argue that the exception to the NJTCA

the immunity provided in N.J.S.A.

the Court presumes that Plaintiff’s state law claims are subject to

59:9-2(d).

13
1. Whether Plaintiff has Established the Essential Elements of a Malicious

Prosecution Claim under 1983 to Survive Summary Judgment

To prevail on a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983, Plaintiffmust establish the

following elements:

(1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding;

(2) the criminal proceeding ended in [P]laintiffs favor;

(3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause;

(4) the defendants acted maliciously and for a purpose other than bringing...

[P]laintiffto justice; and

(5) [P]laintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept ofseizure

as a consequence of a legal proceeding.

Kossler v Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotingEstate ofSmith v. Marasco, 318

F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)).

Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim against Det. Armstead and Sgt. Ramsey fails as a

matter of law because nothing in the record suggests that these defendants filed charges against

her. Thus, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the first element ofthe claim as to these defendants, namely,

that they “initiated a criminal proceeding.” See id. at 186.

As to Det. Williams, however, there is no argument that he charged Plaintiff with

disorderly persons conduct in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2. The parties, nevertheless, dispute

whether: (1) Det. Williams had probable cause to arrest; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in

Plaintiff’s favor; and (3) Det. Williams acted maliciously.

a. Whether Det. Williams had Probable Cause to Arrest Plaintiff

To hold as a matter oflaw that Det. Williams had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, this

Court must conclude that information within Det. Williams’ knowledge at the time ofthe arrest

was objectively sufficient to warrant the beliefthat Plaintiff had committed, or was committing,

14
a disorderly persons offense. See, e.g., Paffv. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 436 (3d Cir. 2000)

(“Probable cause to arrest exists when the information within the arresting officer’s knowledge at

the time of the arrest is sufficient to warrant a reasonable law enforcement officer to believe that

an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.”). The Court cannot so

conclude because the only individuals who truly know what occurred inside the interview room

are Plaintiff and Det. Williams.

Indeed, the facts in the record suggest that Det. Williams seized Plaintiff—who was not a

suspect of any criminal wrongdoing until she allegedly became disorderly during the course of

her interrogation at the police station—when he ordered her to travel in the back of a patrol car

and subjected her to an interrogation without giving her the option of refusing. See, e.g.,

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (“Whenever an officer restrains the freedom of a

person to walk away, he has seized that person.”). Prior to even considering arresting Plaintiff

Det. Williams also allegedly battered her when she did not answer his questions in the manner he

wanted; this alleged use of force was objectively unreasonable as it was unnecessary to achieve

any legitimate purpose. See generally Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (indicating that

use of force greater than objectively reasonable violates the Fourth Amendment).

Det. Williams then arrested Plaintiff because she was allegedly belligerent and refused to

comply with his instruction to sit down, in spite ofthe fact that Plaintiff had a right to leave the

police station at any time. Det. Williams subsequently failed to appear in court on multiple

occasions in connection with the disorderly persons conduct charge, resulting in dismissal of said

charge.

One reasonable interpretation of these facts is that Det. Williams arrested Plaintiff and

inconsistent

11t is worth

with

noting

Newark

that Lt.

Police

Sanchez

Department

testified at his deposition that arresting a witness for refusing to sit down is

policies.

15
charged her with disorderly persons conduct to justify his use offorce, and failed to appear in

court because he knew that the disorderly persons conduct charge was meritless.

Because there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether Det. Williams

had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, it would be inappropriate to grant summary judgment as to

Plaintiffs § 1983 malicious prosecution claim on the basis that Det. Williams did, in fact, have

probable cause to arrest.

b. Whether the Underlying Criminal Proceeding ended in Plaintiff’s Favor

In Kossier, the Third Circuit reaffirmed the well settled principle that “a prior criminal

case must have been disposed of in a way that indicates the innocence of the accused in order to

satisfy the favorable determination element [of a malicious prosecution claim].” 564 F.3d at

187. “A plaintiff may attempt to indicate his innocence by demonstrating that his prior criminal

proceeding terminated in one ofthe following ways:

(a) a discharge by a magistrate at a preliminary hearing, or

(b) the refusal of a grand jury to indict, or

(c) the formal abandonment of the proceedings by the public prosecutor, or

(d) the quashing of an indictment or information, or

(e) an acquittal, or

(f) a final order in favor ofthe accused by a trial or appellate court.”

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

“The purpose ofthe favorable termination requirement is to avoid ‘the possibility ofthe

claimant [sic] succeeding in the tort action after having been convicted in the underlying criminal

prosecution, in contravention of a strong judicial policy against the creation oftwo conflicting

resolutions arising out ofthe same or identical transaction.” Id. (quoting Heck v. Humphrey,

16
512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994)).

Here, there is no dispute that Det. Williams failed to appear in court on at least three

separate occasions, and that the criminal matter against Plaintiff was consequently dismissed for

lack of prosecution. The Court is mindful that dismissal of a criminal matter for lack of

prosecution is generally an insufficient basis to conclude that the matter ended favorably for

purposes of establishing the second element of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. See, e.g.,

Donahue u. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 383 (3d Cir. 2002) (“A no! pros signifies termination of

charges in favor ofthe accused ‘only when theirfinal disposition is such as to indicate the

innocence ofthe accused.”) (emphasis in original); see also ZVfakboul v. Port Auth. ofNew York

and New Jersey, No. 09-3540, 2011 WL 4594224, at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2011) (holding that

dismissal of a criminal case for lack of prosecution failed to satisfy the second element of

malicious prosecution claim because “nothing in the record. . . suggest[ed] that the charges were

dismiss because the court or the prosecutor determined [that the plaintiff] was innocent of the

crimes.”).

The Court, however, is also mindful that determining whether a criminal proceeding

ended in a manner favorable to a plaintiff bringing a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires

a “fact-intensive” inquiry that depends on the “particular circumstances” of each case. See

Williams v. New Jersey Div. ofState Police, No. 10-3478, 2012 WL 1900602, at *11 (D.N.J.

May 24, 2012) (citing Kossler, 564 F.3d at 188).

In Williams, the plaintiff was arrested and charged with five motor vehicle and four

criminal offenses. Id. at *2. As a result ofthe arresting officer’s failure to appear in court on

two separate occasions, the Newark Municipal Court dismissed the criminal charges against the

plaintiff for lack of prosecution. Id. at 3. The Williams court held that because the factual

17
context of the case was “enveloped in alleged racial profiling, harassment and excessive use of

force,” the dismissal ofthe criminal charges against the plaintiff “reflect[ed] [his] innocence to

establish the favorable termination element to his malicious prosecution claim.” Id. at *12.

Specifically, the Court reasoned that “[d]enying the viability of a malicious prosecution claim

under. . . [the] circumstances would circumvent the thrust and purpose ofthe cause of action and

provide an incentive to file false charges, but to not prosecute in toto, discover, or appear in

court.” Id.

As discussed above, the facts in the record could lead a reasonable jury to find that Det.

Williams arrested Plaintiff as a pretext to justify his unprovoked and unnecessary use of force,

and not because he had an objectively reasonable belief that Plaintiff was committing a crime.’ 2

As in Williams, “Defendants [in this case] have not put forth affirmative proof for why

the dismissal of [the disorderly persons conduct] charge[] was not a determination favorable to

[Plaintiff].” See Williams, 2012 WL 1900602, at *12. More importantly, to accept Defendants’

suggestion that a plaintiff can never satisfy the second element of a § 1983 claim whenever those

charges are dismissed for lack of prosecution would create a perverse incentive for a rogue

officer to disclaim liability for malicious prosecution under § 1983 by merely failing to appear in

court. In light ofthe specific factual context ofthis case, this Court holds that the dismissal of

Plaintiff’s criminal matter for lack of prosecution is suggestive of her innocence.

For these reasons, the Court will not grant Defendants’ motion insofar as Defendants seek

summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against Det. Williams.

However, summary judgment is granted as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim

I 2

purpose

As there

other

are

than

sufficient

to bring

facts

her

in the record to support the inference that Det. Williams arrested Plaintiff for a

is without merit.

to justice, Defendant’s conclusory argument that Det. Williams acted without malice

18
against Det. Armstead and Sgt. Ramsey.

2. Whether Plaintiff has Established the Essential Elements of a Civil Conspiracy

Claim to Survive Summary Judgment

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) provides that “[i]f two or more persons in any State or Territory

conspire.. . for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of

persons ofthe equal protection ofthe laws,. . . the party so injured or deprived may have an

action for recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or

more of the conspirators.” To survive summary judgment on her conspiracy claim, Plaintiff

must set forth sufficient facts that would allow a reasonable jury to find: “(1) a conspiracy; (2)

motivated by a racial or class based discriminatory animus designed to deprive, directly or

indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws; (3) an act in

furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to person or property or the deprivation of any

right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Kwasnikv. Leblon, No. 05-5210, 228 Fed.

Appx. 238, 244 (3d Cir. May 22, 2007) (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03

(1971)).

“The conspiracy element of § 1985(3) requires a combination oftwo or more persons

acting in concert to commit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means, the

principal element of which is an agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong against or

injury upon and an overt act that results in that damage.” Russo v. Voorhees Twp., 403 F. Supp.

2d 352, 359 (D.N.J. 2005) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence to suggest that Det.

Williams, Det. Armstead, and Sgt. Ramsey “entered into an agreement to deprive [Pjlaintiff of

her civil rights.” (CM/ECF No. 47-8 at 19.) Plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains that although

she did not “allege[j in her complaint that the officers conspired with one another based on her

19
gender, a jury could easily find that Det. Williams, Det. Armstead, and Sgt. Ramsey conspired to

deprive her of her constitutional rights based on her gender.” (CM!ECF No. 48 at 25.) The crux

of Plaintiff’s argument is premised on her assertion that a reasonable jury could find the

existence of an agreement to deprive her of her constitutional rights in light of Det. Williams and

Sgt. Ramsey’s failure to intervene during the incident between Det. Williams and Plaintiff in the

interview room.

As an initial matter, Plaintiff has admitted that her pleaded claim for civil conspiracy is

deficient on account of her failure to allege that Det. Armstead, Det. Williams, and Sgt. Ramsey

conspired to deprive her of her constitutional rights because of a discriminatory animus.

(CM/ECF No. 48 at 25.) On this basis alone, the Court would grant summary judgment as to the

civil conspiracy claim. See, e.g., Watson v. Haverford Tp. Police Dep ‘t, No. 10-6731, 2012

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73473, at *53..*54 (E.D. Pa. May 24, 2012) (granting summary judgment as to

plaintiff’s conspiracy claim, in part, because the [pjlaintiff’s Amended Complaint fail[ed] to set

forth even the semblance ofthe elements of a conspiracy under Section 1985.”).

Even if Plaintiff’s complaint were not deficient, the Court would still grant summary

judgment as to her civil conspiracy claim because she has failed to present any evidence

suggesting either that Det. Williams, Det. Armstead, and Sgt. Ramsey entered into an agreement

to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, or that Det. Armstead and Sgt. Ramsey had any

discriminatory animus towards her. Indeed, neither Det. Armstead nor Sgt. Ramsey were present

in the interview room while Det. Williams allegedly battered Plaintiff and called her names.

Evidence that Det. Armstead and Sgt. Ramsey failed to intervene, without more, does not create

a triable issue ofmaterial fact as to whether these defendants entered into an agreement with Det.

20
Williams to deprive Plaintiff of her constitutional rights on account of a class based animus. 13

Accordingly, the Court will grant summary as to Plaintiffs civil conspiracy claim.

3. Whether Summary Judgment is Appropriate as to Plaintiff’s Municipal Liability

Claim against Newark and Sgt. Ramsey

“Claims against individual officials [like Sgt. Ramsey] in their official capacity are the

equivalent of a claim against the municipality that employs him [sic].” Okocci v. Klein, 270 F.

Supp. 2d 603, 613 (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)). Thus, to the

extent that Plaintiff has asserted a municipal liability claim against Sgt. Ramsey, the Court

construes said claim as brought only against Newark. See id.

It is well settled that “a municipality may be held liable under a § 1983 action only in

limited circumstances.” Monell v. Dep ‘t ofSocial Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 688-89 (1978).

Specifically, a municipality “may not be held liable under § 1983 for the constitutional torts of

its employees by virtue ofrespondeat superior.” Hill v. Borough ofKutztown, 455 F.3d 225,

245 (3d Cir. 2006). Rather, “a municipality may be held liable for the conduct of an individual

employee or officer only when that conduct implements an official policy or practice.” Id.

(citing Moneli, 436 U.S. at 690). Thus, to prevail on a § 1983 claim against Newark, Plaintiff

“must prove the existence of a policy or custom that has resulted in a constitutional violation in

order to make. ..[Newark] liable under § 1983.” See Groman v. Township ofManalapan, 47

F.3d 628, 637 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95). Additionally, Plaintiffmust

also establish “a plausible nexus or affirmative link between. . . [Newark’s] custom [or policy]

on

It

such

bears

a claim,

mentioning

a Plaintiff

that a

must

plamtiff may have a claim for failure to intervene under 42 U.S.C. § 1986. To prevail

conspiracy. See Clark

establish that the officers who failed to intervene were aware of a § 1985 v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1295 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[Tjransgressions

depend on a preexisting violation

of* 1986, by definition,

essential element of a claim brought

of § 1985”) (citation omitted). Thus, establishing that a conspiracy existed is an

under 42 U.S.C.

573, 588 (D.N.J. 2013) (“As Fameski

§ 1986. See Farneski v. County ofHunterdon, 916 F. Supp. 2d

sustain a § 1986 claim based

has not met the threshold requirements for a § 1985 conspiracy, he cannot

on such conspiracy.”). As Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the conspiracy element of a § 1986 claim, said claim fails as a matter of law.

21
and the specific deprivation of constitutional rights at issue.” See Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d

845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Plaintiff’s municipal liability claim against Newark and Sgt. Ramsey is premised

on three theories: (1) respondeat superior, (see CM/ECF No. 25 at ¶ 29.); (2) Newark’s alleged

maintenance of “a custom of deliberate indifference” with respect to the allegedly wrongful

conduct “of [the] defendant officers,” (see CM/ECF No. 48 at 19.); and (3) Deputy Chief

Tutela’s decision to accept Lt. Sanchez’s recommendation to exonerate Det. Williams in

connection with Plaintiffs Internal Affairs grievance binds Newark for liability purposes, (see

CM/ECF No. 48 at 15-19.) The Court will address the viability of each of these theories in turn.

a. Respondeat Superior

Any theory of § 1983 municipal liability that is premised on respondeat superior fails as

a matter of law. See Kutztown, 455 F.3d at 245. Thus, the Court will grant summary judgment

as to Plaintiff’s municipal liability claim to the extent it is premised on a theory of respondeat

superior.

b. Newark’s Alleged Custom of Deliberate Indifference

To prevail on a municipal liability claim under a theory of deliberate indifference,

“[P]laintiff must ‘simply establish a municipal custom coupled with causation—i.e., that

policymakers were aware of similar unlawful conduct in the past, but failed to take precautions

against future violations, and that this failure, at least in part, led to [her] injury.” See Beck v.

City ofPittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 972 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 851).

Here, it is undisputed that ten excessive force complaints and one domestic violence

complaint were filed against Det. Williams. Det. Williams was never disciplined in connection

with any of these complaints in spite of the fact that there were multiple complaints filed against

22
him in three separate years (2002, 2003 and 2007).

Additionally, it is undisputed that the IA Pro System that was instituted in 2005 did not

interface with the prior system in place for tracking citizen complaints. Thus, there is a question

of material fact as to whether Newark had a custom of failing effectively to track unprosecuted

citizen complaints. See White v. City ofTrenton, No. 06-5177, 2011 WL 6779595, at *13

(D.N.J. Dec. 27, 2011) (holding that evidence of deficient tracking system created “a genuine

issue of material fact as to whether the City had a custom of failing to effectively track

unprosecuted complaints of excessive force.”). Indeed, the Internal Affairs investigation did not

account for any excessive force complaints against Det. Williams prior to 2005.

In light of the number of Det. Williams’ excessive force complaints prior to the October

30, 2009 incident and the shortcomings ofthe Newark Police Department’s system for tracking

citizen complaints, a reasonable jury may find that Newark and Sgt. Ramsey were aware of, but

failed to remedy, a pattern of conduct which resulted in Det. Williams using excessive force

against Plaintiff and causing her physical and psychological injuries. Accordingly, the Court

will not grant summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s municipal liability claim insofar as said claim

is premised on a theory of “deliberate indifference.” See Beck, 89 F.3d at 973-74 (holding that

prior excessive force complaints against a police officer may properly be considered by a jury to

determine whether municipality was deliberately indifferent to officer’s propensity for violence);

White, 2011 WL 6779595, at *13.

c. Deputy Chief Tutela’s Exoneration of Det. Williams

It is well settled that “a municipality may be held liable for the conduct of an individual

employee or officer only when that conduct implements an official policy or practice.” Hill v.

Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 245 (3d Cir. 2006). The circumstances under which “[am individual’s

23
conduct implements official policy or practice” include when “a final policy-maker renders that

individual’s conduct official for liability purposes by having delegated to him authority to act or

speak for the government, or by ratifying the conduct or speech after it has occurred.” Id. “In

order to ascertain if an official has final policy-making authority, and thus can bind the

municipality by his conduct, a court must determine (1) whether, as a matter ofstate law, the

official is responsible for making policy in the particular area ofmunicipal business in question

and (2) whether the official’s authority to make policy in that area isfinal and unreviewable.”

Id. at 245-46 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff argues that as the Bureau Commander of Internal Affairs, Deputy Chief Tutela

“was solely responsible for setting policy and practice within the confines of whether to

exonerate police officers accused of violating the constitutional rights of citizens.” (CM/ECF

No. 48 at 15-16.) Defendants, on the other hand, challenge the accuracy of Plaintiffs

characterization of Deputy Chief Tutela’s role within the Internal Affairs Bureau. Specifically,

Defendants point to a portion of Deputy Chief Tutela’s deposition testimony wherein Deputy

Chief Tutela claimed that if a complaint is sustained, there is a procedure in place for

disciplining the offending officer. (CM/ECF No. 50 at 4; see also Hardaway, Ex. S at 46.) Thus,

according to Defendants, Deputy Chief Tutela cannot bind Newark because any decision he

could make with respect to disciplining any officer would not be final and unreviewable. (See

id.)

Even ifthe decision to take disciplinary action were not final, the question remains

whether Deputy Chief Tutela’s decision to exonerate Det. Williams was final and unreviewable.

Based on the record before it, the Court cannot definitively determine the answer to this

question. Because there is a question ofmaterial fact as to whether Deputy Chief Tutela’s

24
decision to exonerate Det. Williams was final and unreviewable, the Court will not grant

summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s municipal liability claim to the extent this claim is

based on Deputy Chief Tutela’s decision to accept Lt. Sanchez’s recommendation to exonerate

Det. Williams.

4. Whether Defendants Det. Williams, Det. Armstead, and Sgt. Ramsey are Entitled

to Qualified Immunity

Defendants maintain that this Court should grant summary judgment as to all federal

claims against Det. Williams, Det. Armstead, and Sgt. Ramsey in their individual capacities

because these defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar

as their conduct does not violate clearly established. . . constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “The

Supreme Court has set forth a two-step objective reasonableness test to determine whether

qualified immunity should be granted.” Barton v. Curtis, 497 F.3d 331, 335 (3d Cir. 2007)

(citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-01). As a threshold matter, the Court must first determine

whether “viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the facts alleged show that

Defendant[s’J conduct violated a constitutional right.” Bezerra V. DeLorenzo, No. 07-5670,

2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63443, at *21 (D.N.J. June 23, 2010) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). If

the Court answers this inquiry in the affirmative, it must then determine whether such a right was

clearly established at the time ofthe alleged violation. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.

The qualified immunity inquiry provides “ample room for mistaken judgments by

protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”

Marcavage v. Nat’! Park Serv., 666 F.3d 856, 860 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502

U.S. 224, 229 (1991)). “Although qualified immunity is a question oflaw determined by the

25
Court, when qualified immunity depends on disputed issues of fact, those issues must be

determined by the jury.” Monteiro v. City ofElizabeth, 436 F.3d 397, 405 (3d Cir. 2006).

With this framework in mind, the Court will now address the propriety of granting

qualified immunity to Det. Williams, Det. Armstead, and Sgt. Ramsey as to the remaining claims

against them.

a. Det. Williams

Defendants argue that Det. Williams is entitled to qualified immunity because “he had

probable cause to arrest [Pjlaintiff and charge her with disorderly persons and resisting arrest

based on her actions during the interview.” (CM/ECF No. 47-8 at 24; see also CM/ECF No. 50

at 9.) Notably, however, Defendants do not argue that Det. Williams is entitled to qualified

immunity with respect to any acts preceding Plaintiffs arrest. Accordingly, the Court construes

Defendants’ qualified immunity argument vis-à-vis Det. Williams as applying only to the

remaining federal claims arising out of Det. William’s alleged acts in connection with, and

subsequent to, Plaintiffs arrest—i.e., false imprisonment and false arrest, and malicious

prosecution. 14

I. Whether Det. Williams is Entitled to Qualified Immunity as to Plaintiff’s

False Imprisonment and False Arrest Claim

Claims for false imprisonment and false arrest are properly analyzed under the Fourth

Amendment. See, e.g., James v. Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012). In relevant

part, the Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right ofthe people to be secure in their persons..

against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. To prevail on a claim

‘

claim

To the

for

extent

illegal

that

seizure

Defendants argue that Det. Williams is entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s federal

fails because

and use of force because Det. Williams had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, the argument

force against her

the facts suggest that Det. Williams ordered Plaintiff to be seized and subsequently used excessive

Plaintiff is irrelevant

prior to ever considering arresting her. Thus, whether Det. Williams had probable cause to arrest

illegal seizure and

to whether Det. Williams is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff’s federal

use of force claim.

26
for false imprisonment and false arrest under § 1983, Plaintiffmust demonstrate that she was

arrested by a state actor without probable cause. See Groman, 47 F.3d at 636 (“[W]here the

police lack probable cause to make an arrest, the arrestee has a claim under § 1983 for false

imprisonment based on a detention pursuant to that arrest.”); see also Vasquez v. City ofJersey

City, No, 03-5369, 2006 WL 1098171, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2006) (“To maintain a claim for

unlawful arrest under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that he was arrested by a state actor without

probable cause.”).

Here, Defendants offer the conclusory argument that Det. Williams is entitled to qualified

immunity because he “had probable cause to arrest... [P]laintiff and charge her with disorderly

persons and resisting arrest based on her actions during the interview.” (CM/ECF No. 47-8 at

24.) For the reasons stated above, this argument lacks merit as there are factual questions

regarding the probable cause inquiry that would be inappropriate to resolve on a motion for

summary judgment. The Court, therefore, must proceed to consider whether Plaintiff’s right not

to be detained following an arrest absent probable cause was clearly established.

To be clearly established, “the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” See Saucier, 533

U.S. at 202. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff compels this Court to

conclude that the right of an unarmed witness who was physically beaten to be free from being

arrested and detained for no reason is clearly established. See, e.g., Wooleyhan v. Cape

Henlopen Sch. Dist., No. 10-153, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53541, at *80 (D. Del. May 17, 2011)

(“The right to be free from false arrest is a clearly established right, which necessarily includes

the right to be free from false accusations in obtaining the authority to arrest.”) (citing Lippay v.

Ozristos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1502, 1504 (3d Cir. 1993)).

27
2. Whether Det. Williams is Entitled to Qualified Immunity as to Plaintiff’s

1983 Malicious

§ Prosecution Claim

Aside from arguing that Det. Williams had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, Defendants

do not offer any explanation as to why Det. Williams is entitled to qualified immunity as to

Plaintiff’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. As discussed above, whether Det. Williams had

probable cause to arrest Plaintiffraises factual questions that would be inappropriate to resolve

on a motion for summary judgment.

Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffsuggests that Det. Williams

arrested her without probable cause. Further, as a result of Det. Williams’ initiation of an

allegedly frivolous criminal proceeding against her, Plaintiff was detained in a holding cell

overnight in violation of her Fourth Amendment right. A reasonable officer would understand

that arresting Plaintiff without probable cause and initiating a frivolous criminal proceeding

against her violate a clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from malicious

prosecution. See Molina v. City ofLancaster, 159 F. Supp. 2d 813, 820 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (noting

that the “right to be free from. . . malicious prosecution [under the Fourth Amendment) is clearly

established.”) (citing Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995)).

b. Det. Armstead and Sgt. Ramsey

The only remaining claims against Det. Armstead and Sgt. Ramsey are false

imprisonment and false arrest, and illegal seizure and use of excessive force. Thus, the Court

will consider the propriety of granting these defendants qualified immunity only as to these

claims.

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff does not dispute that Det. Armstead and

Sgt. Ramsey are entitled to qualified immunity as to her false imprisonment and false arrest

claim. The extent of Det. Armstead’s involvement in the October 30, 2009 incident was to

28
restrain Plaintiff after she charged at her cousin. The Court fails to see how Det. Armstead’s

actions in any way violated any of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Although Sgt. Ramsey was Det. Williams’ supervisor, he was not present in the interview

room. He merely approved Det. Williams’ incident report, and nothing in the record suggests

that Sgt. Ramsey had any reason to believe that Det. Williams’ lacked probable cause to arrest

Defendant.

In light of these facts, this Court holds that Det. Armstead and Sgt. Ramsey are entitled to

qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for false imprisonment and false arrest because

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that these officers’ actions were either objectively

unreasonable or violated any constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court will grant summary

judgment as to Plaintiff’s false imprisonment and false arrest claim against these defendants.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted as to:

(1) all of Plaintiff’s claims under New Jersey law; (2) all of Plaintiff’s claims against Det.

Armstead and Sgt. Ramsey in their individual capacities; (3) Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim; and (4)

Plaintiff’s municipal liability claim to the extent that this claim is premised on a theory of

respondeat superior. Defendants’ motion is denied as to: (1) Plaintiff’s federal claim for false

imprisonment and false arrest against Det. Williams; (2) Plaintiff’s federal claim for illegal

seizure and use of force against Det. Williams; (3) Plaintiff’s municipal liability claim to the

extent that this claim is premised on Newark’s alleged custom of deliberate indifference and on

Deputy Chief Tutela’s decision to accept Lt. Sanchez recommendation to exonerate Det.

Williams; and (4) Plaintiff’s federal malicious prosecution claim against Det. Williams. Further,

to the extent that Defendants have moved for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s illegal seizure

29
and use of excessive force claim against Det. Williams on qualified immunity grounds, the

motion is denied. An appropriate order follows.

Dated: jofSeptember, 2013.

/_//

JOKE L. LINARES

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

30