1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

J.G.

Plaintiff,

v.

C.M.

Defendant.

Civ. No. 11-2887 (WJM)

OPINION

C.M.

Third-Party Plaintiff,

v.

V.G., N.G., and MARY JO LYNCH,

Third-Party Defendants.

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.:

This matter comes before the Court on Third-Party Defendant (“TPD”) 

Mary Jo Lynch’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(2).

1

 Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff C.M. (“Christopher M.”)2opposes the 

motion. For the reasons set forth below, TPD Lynch’s motion is DENIED. 

 1 Although TPD expressly moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(2), which governs dismissal for lack of personal 

jurisdiction, she has confusingly characterized her motion as one for “summary judgment dismissal.” (Notice of 

Mot., ECF No. 50.) The Court wishes to make clear that this is a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss, as motions for 

summary judgment are governed by Rule 56. 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3

On May 19, 2011, Plaintiff J.G. (“Jason G.”) initiated this action against 

Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Christopher M. (hereinafter, alternatively referred 

to as “TPP”). As explained in the Court’s November 17, 2011 Letter Opinion:

[Jason G.] is a twenty-three year old male and resident of California. 

[Christopher M.] is thirty-two years old, and a resident of New Jersey. . . .

. . . .

[Jason G. alleges that] Beginning in 1995, when [Jason G.] was seven years 

old and [Christopher M.] was sixteen, [Christopher M.] began sexually 

abusing [Jason G.] These repeated instances of sexual abuse continued until 

1999. 

(Nov. 17, 2011 Letter Op. 2, ECF No. 17.) TPP Christopher M. denies that he 

sexually abused Jason G.

Christopher M.’s Third-Party Complaint

Third Party-Plaintiff Christopher M. alleges that beginning sometime around 

December 15, 2009, Third-Party Defendants V.G. (“Virginia G.”), N.G. (“Nora 

G.”), and Mary Jo Lynch4 “began making a series of false and defamatory 

 2 Based on the abundance of parties with two letter abbreviations in this action, and for the sake of readability, the 

Court has substituted those two-letter abbreviations with proper first names which reflect the gender of the party 

being referenced. The Court emphasizes that this is being done solely for the ease of the reader, and that these 

names have been arbitrarily chosen. 

3 As this is a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the Court will view the facts and 

consider the documentary submissions in the light most favorable to TPP. See One World Botanicals Ltd. v. Gulf 

Coast Nutritionals, Inc., 987 F.Supp. 317, 322 (D.N.J. 1997); see also Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 

141, 142 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1992). 4 At this juncture, the Court finds it useful to explain the relationship of these parties. As noted earlier, Jason G. and 

Christopher M. are cousins. TPD Nora G. is Jason G.’s sister, and therefore, is also Christopher M.’s cousin. TPD 

Virginia G. is the mother of Jason G. and Nora’s G., and therefore, is also Christopher M.’s aunt. TPD Mary Jo 

Lynch is a friend of Virginia G. 

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statements toward and about” his alleged sexual abuse of Jason G. (Third-Party 

Compl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 37.) More precisely – and relevant to the present motion –

TPP alleges that the TPDs called him on several occasions and made abusive 

remarks. (Id. at ¶¶ 13, 16.) TPP further claims that the TPDs also called a number 

of third-parties, including TPP’s employer, and falsely told those third-parties that 

TPP sexually abused Jason G. (Id.) TPP asserts that as a result of the TPDs’ 

knowingly false and defamatory allegations, he has incurred damage to his 

reputation, was fired from his position as Chief of Staff for a New Jersey senator, 

and has suffered physical and emotional harm . (Id. at ¶¶ 18, 48, 52.) 

Based on these allegations, on July 5, 2012, TPP filed a Third-Party 

Complaint in which he asserts the following tort claims against all three TPDs: (1) 

Defamation/Libel; (2) Civil Conspiracy; (3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional 

Distress; (4) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (5) Tortious 

Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage. 

In response, TPD Lynch filed the present Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss 

for lack of personal jurisdiction. In support of that motion, TPD Lynch notes the 

following: she is a Virginia resident; she has never been a New Jersey resident; she 

does not work in New Jersey; she does not own any property or maintain bank 

accounts in New Jersey; she does not pay taxes to New Jersey; and “her only 

involvement with this case was to place three cell phone telephone calls to [TPP] 

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from Virginia. In each call I only advised [TPP] to have no further contact with 

[Jason G.] and [Nora G.]” (Cert. of Mary Jo Lynch, ECF No. 50-5.) Based on 

these facts, TPD asserts that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over her.

II. DISCUSSION5

A. Personal Jurisdiction Generally

As an initial matter, the Court notes the following: First, that once a 

defendant raises a Rule 12(b)(2) personal jurisdiction defense, the plaintiff bears 

the burden of coming forward with a set of facts sufficient to create a prima facie

case of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mellon Bank PSFS v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 

(3d Cir. 1992). And further, that because such a defense “requires resolution of 

factual issues outside the pleadings,” a plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations must be 

supported with appropriate affidavits or documents. Time Share Vacation Club v. 

Atlantic Resorts, Ltd, 735 F.2d 61, 67 n. 9 (3d Cir. 1984).

Second, that a federal district court is permitted to exercise “personal 

jurisdiction over a nonresident of the state in which the court sits to the extent 

authorized by the law of that state.” Provident Nat’l Bank v. California Fed. Sav. 

& Loan Ass’n, 819 F.2d 434, 436 (3d Cir.1987) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e)). Thus, 

to determine if personal jurisdiction is permitted over an out-of-state defendant, a 

federal court first looks to the forum state’s long-arm statute, which in New Jersey,

 5 The Court notes that although the legal standard set forth in the Discussion section of the Opinion refers to 

“plaintiffs” and “defendants,” the standard is equally applicable to third-party plaintiffs and third-party defendants.

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permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the fullest limits of due process 

under the United States Constitution. Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 

93, 96 (3d Cir. 2004). 

And third, that to resolve the present motion, ultimately, this Court must

determine whether the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over TPD Lynch 

comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in light of 

Plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations. Id.

In that regard, the Fourteenth Amendment permits a state to exercise 

jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant only where “the defendant purposefully 

avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.” 

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (quoting Hanson v. 

Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)). Under this standard, a party may be subject to the 

in personam jurisdiction of a court through what is known as specific jurisdiction,

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meaning that a plaintiff’s claim is related to or arises out of the defendant’s

specific contacts with the forum state. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. 

v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984); Dollar Sav. Bank v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, 

746 F.2d 208, 211 (3d Cir. 1984). 

 6 The Court notes that a party may also be subject to the in personam jurisdiction of a court through what is known 

as general jurisdiction. See J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011). However, in this 

case, TPP asserts that this Court may exercise in personam jurisdiction over TPD Lynch on the basis of specific 

jurisdiction only. (TPP’s Memo. of Law in Opp. to TPD Lynch’s Mot. to Dismiss 1., ECF No. 80.) The Court’s 

analysis is appropriately limited as such.

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In this case, TPP asserts that this Court should exercise personal jurisdiction 

over TPD Lynch in this matter because TPP’s claims against her arise out of TPD 

Lynch’s specific contacts with New Jersey. However, in order for the Court to

exercise said jurisdiction, it must first be satisfied that its exercise of in personam 

jurisdiction over TPD Lynch on the basis of these specific contacts is consistent 

with the parameters of the Due Process Clause and is not otherwise unreasonable, 

as set forth in a two-part test (the “Due Process Test”): First, TPP must 

demonstrate that TPD Lynch has constitutionally sufficient “minimum contacts” 

with New Jersey. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985). 

Second, the Court must determine, in its discretion, that to exercise jurisdiction 

over TPD Lynch would otherwise comport with “traditional notions of fair play 

and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

B. Minimum Contacts

Under the Due Process Test, the Court must initially determine whether TPD 

Lynch has sufficient minimum contacts with New Jersey. The minimum contacts 

analysis, in turn, is essentially a two-part test: (1) the litigation must “arise out of 

or relate to” at least one of defendant’s contacts with the forum, see D’Jamoos v. 

Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94, 2009 WL 1332304, at *5 (3d Cir. Mar.5, 2009); 

and (2) the defendant must have “purposefully directed [its] activities” at the forum 

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state, such that the defendant could reasonably anticipate being involved in a 

litigation in that forum. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472. 

This is a fact-sensitive inquiry that turns on the “quality and nature of [the]

defendant’s activity [in relation to the forum state.]” Pennzoil Prods. Co. v. Colelli 

& Assocs., Inc., 149 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir.1998) (citation omitted). See also 

Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984) (in assessing the 

sufficiency of minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction, the court must focus on 

the “relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”). In that 

regard, telephone communications made by a defendant into the forum state may 

contribute to a finding of minimum contacts. See Grand Entm't Group, Ltd. v. Star 

Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d, 476, 482 (3d Cir. 1993); Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. 

Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 147-48 (3d Cir. 1992). 

Moreover, in tort cases, such as this one, jurisdiction may be conferred over 

non-residents based upon a single deliberate contact with New Jersey, where that 

contact resulted in the alleged injury. United States Golf Ass’n v. United States 

Amateur Golf Ass’n, 690 F.Supp. 317, 320 (D.N.J.1988) (citations omitted). And 

in the case of intentional torts, the minimum contacts requirement may be satisfied 

under the “effects test” articulated in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984). 

See IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 260 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing 

Keeton, 465 U.S. at 780) (“under Calder an intentional tort directed at the plaintiff 

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and having sufficient impact upon it in the forum may suffice to enhance otherwise 

insufficient contacts with the forum such that the ‘minimum contacts’ prong of the 

Due Process test is satisfied.”). Under the “effects test,” the minimum contacts 

prong of the Due Process Test will be satisfied if: (1) the defendant committed an 

intentional tort; (2) the plaintiff felt the brunt of the harm in the forum; and (3) the 

defendant aimed his tortious conduct at the forum, meaning “the defendant knew 

that the plaintiff would suffer the brunt of the harm caused by the tortious conduct 

in the forum, and point to specific activity indicating that the defendant expressly 

aimed its tortious conduct at the forum.” IMO, 155 F.3d at 265-66. 

i. Application

Bearing the foregoing principles in mind, the Court turns to the issue of the 

whether TPD Lynch’s actions are sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts prong 

of the Due Process Test. In this case, TPP asserts that in a series of phone calls to 

TPP, TPDs Virginia G., Nora. G. and Lynch made abusive comments about TPP 

which they knew to be untrue and which caused TPP to suffer physical and 

emotional harm. And because a number of these calls were made directly to TPP, 

these calls were undisputedly targeted at a New Jersey resident. Here, and 

although she denies further involvement, TPD Lynch admits that she is responsible 

for personally initiating three of those phone calls to TPP. Moreover, TPP alleges 

that the TPDs series of phone calls were, at the very least, a contributing cause, to 

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tangible harms which he suffered in New Jersey. As such, the Court is satisfied

that TPD Lynch’s allegedly tortious conduct was expressly aimed at New Jersey. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that TPP has met his burden of demonstrating 

facts which show that the Court should exercise personal jurisdiction over TPD 

Lynch based on her specific minimum contacts with New Jersey. See Moore v. St. 

Paul Companies, Inc., CIV. A. 94-1329, 1995 WL 11187 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 1995)

(noting first, that a defendant whose utterance injures someone in another state 

may foresee being sued there and second, that a defendant whose fraudulent 

communication by mail and telephone harms a New Jersey plaintiff is subject to 

personal jurisdiction in New Jersey, and finding that the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction was proper where, assuming the truth of plaintiff’s allegations, it was 

foreseeable to defendant that the harm from the misrepresentation he made in 

Minnesota would accrue in New Jersey, the state in which Plaintiff relied on it).

C. Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice

Having determined that TPP has demonstrated that TPD Lynch has

constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts with New Jersey, the Court must now 

consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over TPD Lynch is otherwise 

reasonable, meaning that it does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and 

substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 

477. At this stage, the burden shifts to TPD Lynch to present “a compelling case 

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that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction 

unreasonable.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477; see also Mellon Bank, 960 F.2d at

1223. To determine reasonableness, the Court considers the following factors: (1) 

the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the 

dispute; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) 

the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 

controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the several States in furthering 

substantive social policies. World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 

286, 292 (1980). Only in “rare cases [do the] minimum requirements inherent in 

the concept of ‘fair play and substantial justice’ . . . defeat the reasonableness of 

jurisdiction even [though] the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum 

activities.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano County, 

480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 462).

In this case, the TPD Lynch fails to present any argument – much less a 

compelling one – showing why the exercise of jurisdiction over her would be 

unreasonable. Moreover, the Court finds that in light of the common factual nexus 

surrounding TPP’s claims against TPD Lynch and the claims and defenses asserted 

by the numerous other parties involved in this matter, including TPDs Virginia M. 

and Nora M., requiring TPD Lynch to defend this action is New Jersey promotes 

the judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of these 

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controversies. As such, requiring TPD Lynch to defend this action in New Jersey 

does not offend traditional notions of fair play and justice. See Negron v. Oxford 

Airport Technical Services, Civ. No. 09-330, 2009 WL 1249288, at *6 (E.D. Pa. 

May 6, 2009) (“In the absence of any argument from [defendant] that the exercise 

of personal jurisdiction is unreasonable, the court finds it fair and just because[, 

among other reasons,] . . . it would be inefficient for the court, burdensome to 

plaintiffs and possibly unfair to the other defendants for plaintiffs to file separate 

actions in Pennsylvania and Minnesota for claims arising from the same 

accident.”).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, TPD Lynch’s Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss

is DENIED. An appropriate order follows.

 

 /s/William J. Martini 

 WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.

Date: April 26, 2013.

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