NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0179n.06 F iled: Marc h 6, 2007 No. 06-5121 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT AUTHOR RAY TURNER, Pe tit ion e r-

Ap pe lla nt,

v. DA VI D M ILLS ; S TEP HEN DO TSON , W ar de n, Re sp on de nts -A

pp e lle es. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL F ROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C O U R T F O R

T H E M ID D LE DI STRI CT OF TEN

NESSEE O P I N I O N

BEF ORE: CO LE, SUT TON , a nd C OOK, C ir c uitJudg e s. R. G UY COLE, JR., Circuit Judge. Petitioner-Appellant Author Ray Turner appea ls the district court’s de nial of his petition for habe as cor pus relief under 28 U .S.C. § 2254. The district court c oncluded that ( i) Turne r filed his petition after expiration of the one-year statute of limitations in t he An tit e rr oris m and Ef

fe c tiv e De a th P e na lty

Ac t ( AE DPA ), c od if

ie d p ri nc ipa lly

a t 28 U. S.C. § 2 2 4 4 ( d ) ; a

n d ( ii ) T u r n e r w a s n o t e n ti tl e d

to equitable t o ll in g o f

th e s tatute o f

li mi tati o n s . We AF F IRM the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt. I. BACKG ROUND A. State- Court P roce edings In N o v e mb e r

1 9 9 5 , T u r

n e r p l e a d e d g u i l ty i nT e n n e s s e e s t a t e c o urtt o a g g r av a t e d r o b b e r y, ag g ravated kidnapping , and two counts of a g g ravated ra pe. The court imposed a t o t al effec tiveNo. 06-5121

Tur ne r v . M ill s

- 2 - se nte nc e (a ft e r a c c ounti ngfo r c on se c uti ve and c on c ur re nt s e nte nc e s) of

fo rt y y e ars . A s p art

of his plea a g ree ment, Turner

waived dir ect a

ppeal of his conviction. On April 4, 1996, Turne r filed a m o t i on for post-c onviction relief, a rguing that his trial attorney advised him to ag ree to an i m p ro p er s en t ence as par t of his plea agree ment. On J uly 2, 1997, the cour

t denied re lief. On Septembe r 23, 1998, the state c ourt of appe als aff irmed. On Mar ch 22 , 1 99 9, the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court de nie d T ur

ne r p e rm iss ion

to a pp e a l. On Janu ary 7, 20 02 , T ur

ne r f ile d a se c on d moti on for po st- c on vic tio n r e lie f i n s tate c ourt , which the court denied on J anuar y 14, 2002, noting that his f irst petition was fully

resolved on the merits and that this second pe tition was theref ore impr o p er. On April 15, 2003, the state c ourt of appea ls affirme d. On September 2, 2003, the Tenne ssee Supreme Court denied Turne r per mission to a pp e a l. B. F ederal- Court P roce edings On September 9 , 2 0 0 3 , Turner filed, pro se , a petition for wr it of habea s corpus unde r 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in t he district cour t. On Dec ember

14, 2004, the district court a ppointed counsel for Turner . On J une 23, 2005, counse l file d an am en d ed petiti on for ha beas r elief. O n September 7, 2005, the district court g rante d Turner ’s motion to suppl ement the amended pe tition wit h prison medical r ecor ds. On Novembe r 14, 2005, the district cour t gr anted the State’s motion to dismi ss the petition on statute-of- limit ations g rounds. Turner v. Dotson , No. 3:04-cv-0167 (M.D. Te nn. Nov. 14, 2005) (unpublished orde r). T h e co u rt reje cted Tur ner’ s argument that, beca use “he has depre ssion and bouts of blindness,” the limitations period should be tolled on equitable g rounds. Id. at 3.No. 06-5121

Tur ne r v . M ill s

- 3 - On November 28, 2005, the district c ourt g rante d Turner ’s reque st f or a Certificate of Appea lability

“on the issue of

equitable tolling ba sed upon [Turner’s] cited medical conditions that

wer e the only gro u n ds cited for his equitable tolling c ontention.” On De cembe r 1, 2005, Turne r

a pp e a le d to thi s Co ur

t. II. DI SCU SSIO N A. Stand ard of Review AEDPA g overns this ca se bec ause Tur ner f irst filed his habea s petition in 2003, well af ter AEDPA’s effe ctive date of April 24, 1996. Allen v. Y ukins , 366 F.3d 396, 399 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (citing Lindh v. Murphy , 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997))

. This Court revie ws de novo a dis trict court’s de cision to deny a wr it of habea s corpus. Id. (c i t i n g Go nz ale s v . E lo , 233 F.3d 348, 352 ( 6th Cir. 2000)). T h e p a r tie s c ite , w ith out e xplanatio n, c on fl ic tin g sta nd ard s o f r e vie w w ithre g ard to e qu ita ble tolling. Turner contends that “a district court’s rejec tion of equitable tolling is review ed de novo.” (T u rn er ’s Br

. 9 (c i t i n g Kin g v . B e ll , 3 78 F .3 d 5 50 , 5 53 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) ). ) T he State c on te nd s, howeve r, that this Court “revie ws a g rant or de nial of equitable tolling for a buse of discr eti on.” (S t at e’ s Br

. 7 (c i t i n g Truit t v. County of W ayne , 148 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1998)).) I n this case, Turn e r i s c or

re c t. When a district court re fuses to apply equitable tolling, this Court ’s s t an d ard of revie w depends on the circ umstances: Where the facts are undisputed or t he district cour t rules as a

matter of law that equitable tolling is unava ilable, the standard of revie w is de novo; otherwise , the standar d is a buse of discre tion. Dunlap v. United States , 250 F.3d 1001, 1007 n.2 (6th Cir. 2001) (notingthat this Court has applied vary ing sta ndards of revie w to equitable- tolling dec isions and that it had y etNo. 06-5121

Tur ne r v . M ill s

- 4 - to addre ss the standard in the ha beas c ontext ). He re, be cause t h e fa cts are undisputed, we re view de novo the district cour

t’s decision. B. Equit abl e Tol ling AEDPA i mposes a one-y ear statute of l imitations for habeas petitions that challeng e statecourt judgme nts. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)( 1). The statute of limitations begins to run fr om the latest of four c ircumstance s; the rele vant circ umstance here is “the date on which the [state-c ourt] judgment beca me final by

the conc lusion of direct re view . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (A). T he statute of lim itatio ns is toll e d, ho we ve r, fo r the “ tim e duri ng wh ic h a pro pe rl y fi le d ap pli c a tio n f or State po stconviction or other

collater al re view with re spect to the pe rtinent judg ment or claim is pe nding . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) . Turner conce des that he f

iled his habea s petition after the o ne-year statut e of lim itatio ns e xpir e d. He c on te nd s, ho we ve r, that he is e nti tle d to e qu ita ble tol lin g . B e c a

us e the applica

ble dea dlines and history of Turne r’s filing s are rele vant to the equitable- toll ing d is c u s s io n , w e f

ir s t d is c u s s th e s e e le me n ts o f h is a p p e a l a n d th e na s s e s s h is e qu it a

b le

- to ll ing

argume nt. 1. Turner

Concede s He F iled His Habe as Petition Three Y ear s L ate. Turner ’s state-c ourt conviction bec ame f inal when he pleade d g uilty on November 16, 1995, beca use he a g ree d to forfe it his di rec t-appe al rig hts. See28 U. S.C. § 2 24 4( d) (1 )( A) . Pe tit ion e rs , such as Tur

ner, whose state c onvictions were conclude d by direc t reviewbefor e AED PA’s eff ective date ( April 24, 1996), ar e af forde d a one- y ear

g rac e per iod, until April 24, 1997, in which to file a habea s petition. Gr iff

in v . R oge rs , 3 99 F .3 d 6 26 , 6 32 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5)

. Turn e r’ s Ap ri l 4, 19 96 po stconviction petition, however , tolled this one-y ear li m i t ati ons period—esse ntially stopping theNo. 06-5121

Tur ne r v . M ill s

- 5 - AEDPA clock from starting

. See 28 U. S.C. § 224 4( d) (2 ). Th e Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt ult imate ly de nie d T u r n e r p o s t
- c o nv i c t i o n

r e l i e f o n M arc h 2 7, 19 99 , a nd his po st- c on vic tio n p ro c e e din g s b e c ame final ninety

day s later, on J une 22, 1999, af ter the pe riod in which he c ould have soug ht a writ of

cer tiorari from the United States Supreme Court. See A llen , 3 6 6 F. 3 d at4 0 0 (c i t i n g Ab e la v . M

ar tin , 348 F.3d 164, 172- 73 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc) ). At this point—J une 22, 1999—the clock sta rted ticking f or the one -y ear

limit ations period, makinghis feder al habe as petition due June 22, 2000. Turn e r d id n ot f

ile his ha be a s p e tit ion , no r did he make any oth e r fi lin g s— in f e de ra l or state court—be fore this June 22, 2000 deadline. His next filing was not until J anuar y 7, 2002, when he filed a se cond petition for post-c onviction relief i n s tate cour t. After the court de nied that sec ond petition as improper, the T ennesse e Supreme Court denied re lief on that petition on September 2, 2003. I t was not until thi s point that, on September 9, 2003, Turner first filed his habe as petition,

mor e tha n thre e y e ars a ft e r the e xpir a tio n of the statut e of lim itatio ns . T ur

ne r c on c e de s th is p oint. He co n t en d s , h o we v er , t h at h e i s en t i t l edt o equ i t ab l e t o l l i n g. 2. Equitable Tolling D oes Not Apply Her e. Be cause AEDPA’s one -y ear statute of limitations i s not jurisdic t i onal, a pe titioner who mis se s th e de a dli ne may

sti ll m a int a in a

via ble ha be a s a c tio n if

the c ourt de c ide s th a t e qu ita

ble tolling is appropr iate. Allen , 3 6 6 F. 3 d at4 0 1 (c i t i n g Dunlap , 250 F.3d at 1007). The pe titioner bear s the burden of demonstrating that he or she is entitled to equitable tolling

. Id. (c i t i n g McClendon v. Sherman , 329 F.3d 490, 494 ( 6th Cir. 2003)). W e c o n s i d e r

t h e f o l l o w i n g f

a c t o r s i nd e c i d i n g w h e th e r e qu i t a b l e t o l l i n g s h o u l d

a p p l y: (1 ) the pe tit ion e r’ s la c k o f n oti c e of the fi lin g re qu ir e me nt;No. 06-5121

Tur ne r v . M ill s

- 6 - (2) the petitioner’s la ck of c onstructive knowledge of the filing re qu ir e me nt; (3 ) dil ig e nc e in p ur su ingon e ’s ri g hts ; (4) absenc e of pr ejudice to the r espondent; and ( 5 ) th e p e ti ti o n e r ’ s r e a s o n a b le n e s s in r e ma in in g ign o r an t o f the le g a l r e qu ir e me nt f

or fi lin g his c la im. Id. (c i t i n g Dunlap , 250 F.3d at 1007)

. “This list of fac tors is not nece ssarily compre hensive, and not all fac tors are rele vant in all case s.” Id. (q u o t i n g Vroman v. Brigano , 346 F.3d 598, 605 ( 6th Cir. 2003)). The first two fac tors (lac k of notice a n d l ac k o f const ructive know ledg e) involve similar considerations, so we addre ss them toge ther. Cf. id. a t 402 (d isc us sin g the se fa c tor s tog e the r) . T his Court also has emphasized that the four th fac tor (abse nce of

prejudice to the re spondent) “is to be considere d only

afte r a f actor that might justify

tolling is identified.” Id. at 4 0 1 -0 2 (q u o t i n g Vroman , 34 6 F .3 d at 60 5) . F or

thi s r e a so n, we c on sid e r t hat f a c tor la st.

a. Lack of Actual or Constructive Knowledge of Filing Requirement The State c ontends that Turne r has abandone d his c laim of inadequate notice of AEDPA’ s requir e me n ts “ b e c a

u s e h e ma

k e s n o f a c tu a l o r le g a l a r g u me n t .
. . in

s u p p o rt o f th a t p o s ition.” (State’s B r. 10.) None theless, we b el i eve T urner ’s statement that he “wa s convicted pr ior to the passag e of A EDPA and strug g led on his own beha lf wi t h o u t t h e as sistance of counsel or a

prison l ega l ai d e, ” ( T u rn er ’s Br

. 1 0 ), fa i rl y m ak es th e p o i n tth at h e l ac k edac tu al o r c o n s tru ct i v e kn o wl ed ge of AE DPA ’s re qu ir e me nts . U nd e r t his Court ’s pr e c e de nt, ho we ve r, Turn e r’ s conte nti on fa lls sh or t. Th e law w a s so me wh a t un se ttl e d a s to ho w A ED PA’ s st a tut e of lim itatio ns wo uld

a pp ly to petitioners, such a s Turner , whose c onvictions became fi nal bef ore A EDPA’s ef

fec tive date, seeNo. 06-5121

Tur ne r v . M ill s

- 7 - Allen , 366 F.3d at 402, until this Court held i n 1999 that these pe titioners had until April 24, 1997 (one y ear afte r AEDPA’s eff ective date) to file t heir habeas petitions

. Id. (c i t i n g Au sti n v . M itc he ll , 200 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 1999), overruled on othe r grounds by Cowherd v. Million , 3 80 F .3 d 9 09 (6 th Cir . 2 00 4) (e n b anc )) . B ut i t ha s a lw ay s b e e n c le ar b y AE DPA’ s te rm s th a t a

pr op e r s tate po stconviction petit ion will toll the one-y ear limit ations period for the duration of the post-conviction proce eding s. Id. (citing 2 8 U.S.C. § 2444(d)(2)) . Thus, Turner ’s initial state post-conviction pe tit ion , f ile d Apr il 4 , 1 99 6—

be fo re AE DPA ’s e ff

e c tiv e date —to lle d the statut e of lim itatio ns un til the post-conviction proce eding s beca me final on J une 22, 1999. By that time, it was c lear that the deadline for fili ng his habea s petition was one y ear later, June 22, 2000. See A llen , 366 F.3d at 402 (“The AEDPA statute plainly states that the one-year statute of limitations runs from the ‘conc lusion of dir e c t r e vie w’ and

that th e statut or

y pe ri od is toll e d dur ing the tim e wh e n a mot ion fo r s tate po st conviction re view is pending .” (c iting 28 U.S.C. § 2444(d)(1) -(2) )). B ut T ur ne r f ile d his pe tit ion ov e r thr e e y e ars late r, on Se pte mbe r 9, 200 3. “ B e c a us e of thi s [C ]ourt’s decision in Au sti n ,” which e x plai n e d h o w A E D PA a p p li e d to p e ti ti o n e r s whose c onvictions be c ame fi na l be fo re AE DPA ’s e ff e c tiv e date , “ and

AE DPA ’s c le ar p ro vis ion s r e g ard ingthe statut e of limitations, [ Turner ] cannot claim a lac k of construc tive knowledg e r e g ardingthe filing deadline.” Id. a t 40 3; c

f. G rif fin , 399 F.3d at 637 (noting that petitioner’s “ig noranc e of the filing de adline g iven the unstable and unsettled nature of AEDPA at the crucial time of the mistake was re asonable and supports her argument for toll ing” ) (emphasis added)

. Even if Turner lacke d actua l knowledg e of AE DPA ’s re le va

nt p ro vis ion s, “ ig no ranc e of the law a lon e is n ot s uf fi c ie nt t o w arr ant e qu ita

ble tolling.” Id. (q u o t i n g Ro sev . D ole , 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1991) ). In sum, the purported la ckNo. 06-5121

Tur ne r v . M ill s

- 8 - o f a ct u al o r c o n s t ru ct i v e n o t i ce h er e d o es n o tfa v o r e qu i t ab l e t o l l i n g.

b. Tur

ne r’ s La c k of D ili ge nc e in P ur

su ing Hi s R igh ts Turner contends that by filing multipl e state post-conviction petitions, he “dilige ntly pursued relief in state court.” (Turne r’s B r. 13, 14.) And he ultimately filed for habea s relief

on September 9, 2003, only

a we ek af ter his sec ond round of state post -convic tion proce eding s beca me final. The fa c ts s ho w, ho we ve r, that he wa s n ot s uf fi c ie ntl y dil ig e nt i n p ur su inghis ri g hts

. As an in iti a l matte r, Turn e r’ s se c on d p os t- c onvic tio n p e tit ion wa s im pr op e r b e c a

us e the state courts re ache d the m erits of his first petition. Turner v. Tennessee , N o. M2 00 2- 00 54 1- CCA -R 3- PC, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. L E XIS 349, at *2 (Apr . 15, 2003). B ut, even a ssuming that this second petition wer e p roper

(or that Tur

ner c onfused it with what he be lieved to be a habea s petition), Turner did not file it unti l J anuar y 7, 2002—more than a y ear and a ha lf afte r the June 22, 2000 deadline for fili ng his habea s petition. This was unreasona bly late. Cf. Kee nan v. Bagley , 400 F.3d 41 7, 42 1 (6 th Cir

. 20 05 ) (n oti ng that pe tit ion e r c ou ld h ave a “ ve ry str on g ” argume nt f

or e qu ita ble tol lin g if he re a so na

bly vie we d th e state -c ourt or de r as g ra nti nghim e xtra tim e to f ile a state po stconviction petition, which could explain why he did not file a timely

habea s petition). Turner attributes this de lay to his lack of acc ess to documents re lated to his case ; his learning disability ; and his bouts of depre ssion and migr aine he adac hes, which ha ve caused blindness lasting five to ten minutes. B ut these fa ct o rs ca n n o t excuse his lack of dilig ence . First, althoug h a letter fr om Turn e r’ s po st- c on vic tio n a tto rn e y ind ic a te s that Turn e r did no t re c e ive c e rt a in do cumen ts, including the t ra n s cr i pt of his plea petition, until Februa ry 2, 2005, Turner

provides no indication reg ardingwhen he first soug ht these docume nts—certa inly no indication he did so nea rly five y ear sNo. 06-5121

Tur ne r v . M ill s

- 9 - e arl ie r, a s th e de a dli ne fo r his ha be a s pet iti on a

pp ro a c he d. Se c on d, Turn e r doe s not expl a in h owhis

me nta l and

ph y sic a l li mit a tio ns , w hic h n o d ou bt m a de purs uin g his ri g hts mo redif fic ult , preve nted him fr om d ili g e ntl y

purs uin g tho se ri g hts a lto g e the r. Thus , th is fact or wei gh s a g a ins t e qu ita ble t o l l i n g.

c. Turner’s Reasonablene ss in Remaining Ignorant of The Legal Requireme nt for Fi lin g H is C lai m Turner contends that the fac tors discussed above—his pro se status until this appeal, the lac k of assist ance from a prison leg al aide, that his conviction became final befor e AEDPA was e nacte d, his lack of a cce ss to his pl ea tr anscr ipt and related documents, his l ear ning disa bility , his depression and re lated use of

anti-depr essant medication, and his brief pe riods of blindness from mig raine heada ches—tog ether constitute g rounds for his rea sonablene ss in rema ining unawar e of the filing de a dli ne fo r h is h a

be a s p eti ti on. F or

the re a so ns dis c us se d a

bo ve wi th r e g ard

to e a c h o f t

he se fac tors, howeve r, none e x cu s e T u rner from filing his habea s petition more than three y ear s late. They simply do not rise to the l evel of

rea sonable ig noranc e this Court has rec og nized, such as when (i) a pe titioner relies on a

court orde r indicatinghe or she still has time to file, see, e .g., Keenan , 400 F .3 d at 42 1; King , 378 F.3d at 553; or (ii) the law is u n s et t led, se e, e .g ., Gr iff in , 399 F.3d at 636; Solomon v. United States , 4 67 F .3 d 9 28 , 9 33 (6 th Cir

. 20 06 ))

. Thus , Turn e r fa ils to s ho w t hat hi s ignor ance of the filingdeadline was rea sonable, espec ially wher e he a ppare ntly rema ined unawa

re of that dea dline for thre e y ear s after it passed. d. Lac k

of Pre jud ic e to T heSta te As noted above , this Court considers the prejudice fac tor only afte r identifying a fac tor thatNo. 06-5121

Tur ne r v . M ill s

- 10 - might justify

tolling. Vroman , 346 F.3d at 605

. Be ca use none of the other f

actor s justify

tolling here , we do not conside r the prejudice factor, though we not e that “it is difficult to claim that forc ing the war den to make a

n arg ument on the merits o f [ p et i t i o ner’ s] petit ion will be prejudicial to the state’s c ause.” Gr iff

in , 399 F.3d at 637-38.

III . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt.