1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

____________________________________ 

MICHAEL ALEXANDER : 

 : Civil Action No. 11-3348 (PGS) 

 Plaintiff, : 

 : 

 v. : 

 : 

 : 

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF : MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

TRANSPORTATION and JOHN DOES : 

1-10 : 

 : 

 Defendants : 

___________________________________ 

 Presently before the Court is a motion by Plaintiff Michael Alexander (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. 

Alexander”) (Dkt. Entry No. 46) to stay execution of (1) the Order of this Court, entered on 

September 13, 2013 (“September 13, 2013 Order”) (Dkt. Entry. No. 35), granting Defendant New 

Jersey Department of Transportation’s (“NJDOT” or “Defendant”) motion to enforce the 

settlement previously negotiated and entered into by the parties (Dkt. Entry. No. 25), as well as 

(2) the subsequent Order of this Court, entered on September 15, 2014 (“September 15, 2014 

Order”) (Dkt. Entry No. 43), denying Plaintiff’s motion to amend the September 13, 2013 Order 

(Dkt. Entry No. 36).1

 Having carefully reviewed the submissions of the parties, as well as the arguments 

proffered therein, and for the reasons that follow, and for good cause shown, Plaintiff’s motion to 

 

1 Although Plaintiff captioned his earlier motion as a motion to amend the judgment (Dkt. Entry. 

No. 36), the Court construed the motion as one seeking reconsideration of the September 13, 

2013 Order, and ruled on it accordingly. In his appeal, Plaintiff now seeks to challenge the 

Court’s September 15, 2014 Order on the ground that the Court misconstrued Plaintiff’s motion 

as one for reconsideration. 

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stay execution of this Court’s Orders of September 13, 2013 and September 15, 2014 is hereby 

DENIED with prejudice. 

DISCUSSION

 I. Legal Standard

 The Third Circuit has emphatically recognized that a “stay pending appeal . . . is an 

extraordinary remedy.” Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Secretary of the U.S. Dept. of 

Health and Human Services, Civ. No. 13-1144, 2013 WL 1277419, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 8, 2013). 

The standard governing an award, upon application, of a stay pending appeal “is essentially the 

same as that for obtaining a preliminary injunction.” Id. To demonstrate entitlement to 

preliminary injunctive relief, a party must demonstrate “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; 

(2) that it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that granting the preliminary 

relief will not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the public interest 

favors such relief.” Id. (quoting Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 

2004)). Accordingly, in ruling upon the instant motion for stay pending appeal, the Court must 

weigh the same four factors considered by courts in determining whether a grant of preliminary 

relief is warranted. 

Importantly, it bears noting that the Third Circuit has observed that “[s]uch stays are 

rarely granted, because in our Court the bar is set particularly high.” Id. Indeed, an “injunction 

shall issue only if the plaintiff produces evidence sufficient to convince the district court that all 

four factors favor preliminary relief.” Id. (quoting N.J. Hosp. Ass’n v. Waldman, 73 F.3d 509, 

512 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted)). Therefore, “[a] plaintiff’s failure to establish any element 

in its favor renders a preliminary injunction inappropriate.” Id. (quoting NutraSweet Co. v. VitMar Enter., Inc., 176 F.3d 151, 152 (3d Cir. 1999)). 

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Because the Court’s determination as to whether Plaintiff has carried his burden of 

demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits is dispositive as to the present motion, the 

Court need not conduct a lengthy analysis under the remaining prongs of the preliminary 

injunction inquiry. 

II. Analysis

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

 In order to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits with respect to the requested 

stay of the September 13, 2013 Order of this Court granting Defendant’s motion to enforce 

settlement, Plaintiff must show that, at that time, there was insufficient factual support in the 

record for the Court’s findings that (i) a valid settlement agreement had been consummated 

between the parties; (ii) Plaintiff had been apprised, and was made fully aware, that any 

settlement reached by the parties was contingent upon his resignation of his position with 

NJDOT; and (iii) that Plaintiff’s prior attorney, William Riback (“Mr. Riback”), possessed the 

necessary authority to bind the Plaintiff to the agreement negotiated by the parties during the 

settlement conference convened before the Court. In order to carry his burden with respect to the 

stay requested as to the September 15, 2014 Order of this Court denying Plaintiff’s motion to 

amend the judgment, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the Court erred in construing his motion as 

one for reconsideration, and that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. For the reasons that 

follow, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to establish a likelihood of success as to 

either of the requested stays and, accordingly, the motion must be dismissed with prejudice. 

 a. The September 13, 2013 Order Enforcing Settlement

 Although the Court has amply set forth in multiple orders and decisions the basis for its 

denials of Plaintiff’s repeated attempts at avoiding enforcement of the settlement, the Court will, 

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nonetheless, summarize its reasoning here for purposes of clarity. 

 Prior to issuing the Report and Recommendation with respect to NJDOT’s motion to 

enforce the settlement, the Honorable Lois H. Goodman, U.S.M.J., solicited and considered 

“documents containing relevant facts,” including Plaintiff’s own affidavit, as well as 

certifications from Plaintiff’s counsel and counsel for NJDOT, that bore directly on the 

controversy validity of the settlement. See Report and Recommendation at 2-5 (Dkt. Entry No. 

33). In addition, at the settlement conference convened before her, Magistrate Judge Goodman 

personally and substantially participated in the negotiations, meeting both with the parties, as 

well as separately with counsel, in order to facilitate a meeting of the minds as to the terms and 

conditions whereby the matter could be settled. Id. at 2. Moreover, in her detailed and thorough 

recitation of the events surrounding the parties’ settlement, Magistrate Judge Goodman observed 

that on several occasions throughout the day it was made clear to Plaintiff that any settlement 

agreed to by NJDOT would require an agreement by him to resign his employment. Id. at 2-3, 

11-12. Finally, that Plaintiff appeared at the settlement conference accompanied by Mr. Riback, 

who negotiated and made clear specific settlement terms on Plaintiff’s behalf, led both 

Defendant and the Court to reasonably believe that Mr. Riback possessed the necessary authority 

to settle the matter. Id. at 11. At no point thereafter did Plaintiff state or otherwise indicate to 

the Court that Mr. Riback’s authority to settle on his client’s behalf had been withdrawn. Id. 

Accordingly, on the basis of this exhaustive review and analysis, as well as her own participation 

in the settlement conference, Magistrate Judge Goodman concluded that Mr. Riback “acted with 

authority to speak on Plaintiff’s behalf” both during the settlement negotiations, and in agreeing 

to the terms of the settlement the following day during a telephone call with opposing counsel. 

Id. Therefore, the Court concluded, a valid and enforceable agreement came into existence, the 

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terms of which required Plaintiff’s resignation from his employment. 

 Thereafter, the undersigned reviewed and adopted in its entirety the Report and 

Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Goodman. In its September 13, 2013 Order, the Court 

observed that Plaintiff had filed an objection to the Report and Recommendation in the 

intervening period, reiterating the contention already addressed by Magistrate Judge Goodman, 

that Plaintiff had not been aware that the terms of the settlement agreement had been finalized, 

and that Mr. Ribeck had agreed to the same without his authorization. Having considered the 

objection, the Court concluded that “the recommendation by Magistrate Judge Goodman sets 

forth [a] compelling rationale for demonstrating that a settlement was reached; and that both 

parties had knowledge of all of the terms of the settlement including Plaintiff’s resignation from 

the Department of Transportation.” See Order Adopting Report and Recommendation (Dkt. 

Entry. No. 35) at 1. Indeed, it was largely on this basis that Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider, 

captioned as a motion to amend the judgment, was denied by this Court. See Order Denying 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Judgment (Dkt. Entry No. 43) at 1-2. 

 Accordingly, given the ample record before the Court, and for the reasons set forth 

above, the Court concludes that there was, and remains, a sufficient factual basis for the Court’s 

grant of Defendant’s motion to enforce settlement. Indeed, the Court has on three prior 

occasions had opportunity to consider the contentions proffered by Plaintiff in support of his 

multiple applications seeking to avoid enforcement of the settlement, and thrice the Court has 

arrived at the same conclusion, that is, a valid settlement was consummated between the parties, 

the terms of which included voluntary resignation of his employment by Plaintiff, and of which 

Plaintiff had been fully apprised and was aware. Therefore, in simply recapitulating his prior 

contentions regarding the validity of the settlement, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a 

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likelihood of success on the merits of challenging the Court’s September 13, 2013 Order 

enforcing settlement. 

b. The September 15, 2014 Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to 

Amend the Judgment 

Plaintiff contends that the Court erred in construing Plaintiff’s motion to amend the 

judgment as one for reconsideration, and ruling on it accordingly. Plaintiff argues that the Court’s 

error is made evident by the fact that the relief requested was an evidentiary hearing. I nother 

words, Plaintiff posits that, because the relief requested consisted of an evidentiary hearing, his 

motion to amend the judgment is somehow qualitatively, or substantively, different from a motion 

for reconsideration. It bears noting, once again, that the arguments and facts proffered in Plaintiff’s 

motion to amend the judgment are nearly identical to those previously presented to, considered, 

and determined by the Court. Indeed, the requested relief of an evidentiary hearing is the only 

feature of Plaintiff’s motion papers that seemingly distinguishes it from all previous applications 

to the Court for relief from its prior Orders concerning the underlying settlement. Based on the 

procedural history of this matter, the Court anticipates that at such hearing the same issues, 

previously resolved by the Court, would likely yet again be raised and aired by Plaintiff. Simply 

stated, Plaintiff’s request for an evidentiary hearing via a motion to amend the judgment pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) constitutes nothing more than an attempted end run 

around this Court’s prior determinations with the goal of providing Plaintiff yet another bite at the 

apple. Regardless, the Court will proceed with its analysis. 

 In order to prevail, Plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits with 

respect to his contention that he was wrongfully denied an evidentiary hearing because the Court 

erred by adjudicating the motion to amend the judgment as one for reconsideration. Plaintiff 

appears to misunderstand the relationship between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 

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New Jersey Local Civil Rule 7.1(i). As an initial matter, the Court notes that, curiously, the 

standard Plaintiff himself sets forth in his moving papers as governing the determination of a 

motion to amend the judgment is, in reality, that which is employed by courts in weighing a 

motion for reconsideration. See Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Judgment (Dkt. Entry No. 36) 

at 3-4; see also Leija v. Schmidt Mfg., Inc., 743 F. Supp. 2d 444, 456 (D.N.J. 2010) (quoting N. 

River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reins. Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)) (“a party seeking 

reconsideration ‘must rely on one of three major grounds: (1) an intervening change in 

controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence not available previously; or (3) the need to 

correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.’” (emphasis added). Indeed, in Assoc. of 

N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., Civ. No. 06-0402, 2010 WL 

2342558, at *1 (D.N.J. June 7, 2010), in considering plaintiff’s motion to amend the judgment 

pursuant to Rule 59(e), this Court observed: 

There is no express provision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for 

reconsideration of a judicial decision. The closest federal rule is . . . 59(e), 

which allows a court to “alter or amend” a judgment. In this district, 

however, L. Civ. R. 7.1(i) creates a specific procedure by which a party 

may, within 10 days of the entry of an order, ask either a District Judge or 

a Magistrate Judge to take a second look at any decision upon a showing 

that dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of law were 

overlooked by the court in reaching its prior decision. 

Accordingly, while Rule 59(e) allows for a judgment to be altered, it is Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) 

that provides the mechanism by which that relief is to be obtained. See Sabinsa Corp. v. 

Creative Compounds, LLC, Civ. No. 04-4239, 2012 WL 194123, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 23, 2012). 

Contrary to Plaintiff’s suggestion, that the relief sought by Plaintiff is an evidentiary hearing 

does not alter the result. When presented with a motion to have a prior judgment amended or 

otherwise altered, courts within this district construe, and adjudicate, such applications as 

motions for reconsideration pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(i). Therefore, any argument that 

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the Court erred in ruling on Plaintiff’s motion to amend the judgment as one for reconsideration 

is simply without merit. 

 Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court will proceed with an analysis of whether 

Plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success with respect to his contention that he is entitled 

to an evidentiary hearing. In support of his position, Plaintiff relies nearly exclusively on Henry 

v. Merrill Lynch, 169 Fed. Appx. 102 (3d Cir. 2006), in which, much as in this matter, the 

plaintiff-appellant challenged the district court’s grant of defendant-appellee’s motion to enforce 

settlement without having conducted an evidentiary hearing, arguing that, because he did not 

consent to or authorize a settlement, no valid settlement agreement had ever come into existence. 

Such reliance is misplaced, however, as the factual record, on which the Third Circuit relied in 

determining that the district court had erred in granting defendant’s motion to enforce settlement 

without prior evidentiary hearing, is readily distinguishable from that which is before the Court 

in the present matter. 

 First, plaintiff in Henry claimed that “the discussions of settlement terms occurred 

between the attorneys with the involvement of the District Judge, but without [his] participation 

or assent[.]” Here, however, Plaintiff actively participated in the settlement discussions, 

contributing substantially to the negotiation of terms whereby the matter could be resolved 

amicably. Moreover, in weighing the issue of whether plaintiff-appellant’s presence in court, 

without more, was sufficient to manifest apparent authority on the part of his attorney to bind 

him to any proposed settlement, the court attributed its inability to resolve the issue to the 

record’s ambiguity as to whether or not the attorneys’ settlement discussions took place in 

plaintiff-appellant’s presence. Once again, however, Plaintiff in the instant matter was both 

privy to, and participated in, most, if not all, settlement discussions that transpired between the 

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parties. Finally, the Third Circuit again noted the lack of clarity in the record concerning the 

extent of plaintiff-appellant’s participation in the settlement discussions in concluding that it was 

unable to determine whether defendant-appellee’s reliance on opposing counsel’s apparent 

authority to settle the matter was reasonable. Again, however, Plaintiff, here, participated 

extensively in the settlement negotiations before the Court, and the record on which the Court 

based its decision to grant Defendant’s motion to enforce settlement was substantially more 

robust, consisting of affidavits and declarations of the parties and counsel solicited by the Court, 

as well as other circumstances of which the Court was aware due to the personal and substantial 

participation of Magistrate Judge Goodman in the settlement negotiations. 

 As Henry is readily distinguishable from the instant matter on the basis of the facts 

presented in that matter, the Court finds Plaintiff’s reliance on that decision to be misplaced. The 

Court further concludes that the need for an evidentiary hearing in this case was obviated due to 

(1) the Court’s awareness of relevant circumstances concerning the settlement negotiations 

gained through its own personal and substantial involvement; (2) Plaintiff’s direct participation 

in settlement discussions both with counsel and the Court, and; (3) the Court’s development of a 

more robust record on which to base its decision through its solicitation of affidavits, 

declarations, and other relevant evidence concernsing Plaintiff’s awareness of, and consent to, 

the term of settlement requiring his resignation, as well as the authority of Plaintiff’s attorney to 

bind him to any proposed settlement that included such term. 

 Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a 

likelihood of success on the merits as to his contention that he had been wrongfully denied an 

evidentiary hearing due to the Court’s erroneous construing of his motion to amend the judgment 

as one for reconsideration. Therefore, it is the decision of this Court that Plaintiff’s motion for a 

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stay pending appeal of the Court’s September 13, 2013 and September 15, 2014 Orders shall be, 

and hereby is, DENIED with prejudice. 

ORDER

 Having carefully considered the submissions of the parties, as well as the arguments 

herein contained, and for the reasons set forth above, and for good cause shown, 

IT IS on this 10th day of November, 2014, 

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to stay execution of the Court’s September 13, 2013 

and September 15, 2014 Orders shall be, and hereby is, denied with prejudice. 

 

 s/Peter G. Sheridan 

 PETER G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J. 

 

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