GULF OIL LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,

Plaintiff,

v.

PIONEER ENTERPRISES, INC.,

DEEPAK VERMA, RAJNI SETHI,

DHARMINDER SETHI, and FINE

ENTERPRISES, INC.,

Defendants.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

HONORABLE JOSEPH E. IRENAS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-1610

(JEI/AMD)

ORDER GRANTING THE MOTION TO

VACATE THE ENTRY OF DEFAULT AS

TO DEFENDANTS FINE

ENTERPRISES, INC., RAJNI

SETHI, AND DHARMINDER SETHI

(Docket # 27); AND DISMISSING

AS MOOT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

DEFAULT JUDGMENT (Docket # 21)

APPEARANCES:

ARCHER & GREINER

By: Debra Rosen, Esq.

One Centennial Square

Hadddonfield, New Jersey 08033

Counsel for Plaintiff

ECKERT SEAMANS CHERIN & MELLOTT, LLC

By: Robert L. Sanzo, Esq.

Two Liberty Place

50 South 16 Street, 22 Floor th nd

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102

Counsel for Defendants Pioneer Enterprises, Inc. and

Deepak Verma

HOFFMAN DIMUZIO

By: Dante B. Parenti, Esq.

1739-1753 Delsea Drive

P.O. Box 285

Franklinville, New Jersey 08322

Counsel for Defendants Fine Enterprises, Inc., Rajni

Sethi, and Dharminder Sethi

IRENAS, Senior District Judge:

This matter having appeared before the Court upon

Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment against

Case 1:11-cv-01610-JEI -AMD Document 28 Filed 11/09/11 Page 1 of 5 PageID: 528
Defendants Fine Enterprises, Inc., Rajni Sethi, and Dharminder

Sethi (Docket # 21) and those Defendants’ Cross Motion to Set

Aside or Vacate the Clerk’s Entry of Default (Docket # 27), the

Court having considered the moving briefs , and it appearing 1

that:

(1) This is primarily a Lanham Act trademark infringement /

breach of contract suit arising out of the termination of

Defendant Pioneer’s Distributor Agreement with Plaintiff Gulf Oil

Limited Partnership. 

(2) The Complaint alleges that Pioneer operated seven gas

stations as Gulf Oil gas stations, pursuant to the Distributor

Agreement. Plaintiff asserts that, as a result of various

breaches of the Distributor Agreement, it terminated the

Agreement, effective March 18, 2011. According to Plaintiff,

after the termination, Pioneer continued to operate its stations

as Gulf-branded stations.

(3) The Complaint asserts violations of the Lanham Act, an

unfair competition claim under New Jersey law, and breach of

contract claims, among others. Plaintiff also seeks to recover

 As the docket correctly reflects, only two briefs have 1

been filed: Plaintiff’s brief in support of its Motion, and the

Moving Defendants’ brief in support of their Motion. The Moving

Defendants’ brief can be interpreted as an implicit opposition to

the Plaintiff’s Motion. Plaintiff, however, has not filed any

response to the Motion to Vacate the Entry of Default-- whether

styled as an opposition to Defendants’ Motion or a reply in

further support of its own Motion. Such a submission was due, at

the latest, on October 24, 2011.

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on the guarantees it alleges Defendants executed in connection

with Pioneer’s agreement to purchase Gulf Oil petroleum products.

(4) On July 1, 2011, upon Plaintiff’s application, and a

finding that none of the Defendants had answered or otherwise

responded to the Complaint, the Clerk of Court entered default

against all Defendants pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).

(5) Presently, Plaintiff only seeks default judgment as to

the claim on the guarantees allegedly executed by Fine

Enterprises, and the Sethis (Count VII of the Complaint) even

though the other six counts of the Complaint also name Fine

Enterprises and the Sethis as Defendants.2

(6) Sometime after default was entered, the Moving

Defendants retained counsel for the first time. On September 16,

2011, Mr. Parenti formally entered his appearance in this case on

behalf of Moving Defendants. Two weeks later, the Moving

Defendants filed the instant Motion to Set Aside or Vacate the

Entry of Default. As noted previously, Plaintiff has filed no

opposition to the Motion.

(7) Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) provides, in relevant part,

“[t]he court may set aside an entry of default for good cause.” 

In exercising its discretion to set aside the entry of default,

 This Court previously granted the Motion of Defendants 2

Pioneer and Verma to vacate the entry of default against them. 

That motion was pending at the time Plaintiff filed the instant

Motion.

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the Court considers “(1) whether setting aside the default would

prejudice the plaintiff;” “(2) whether defendant has asserted a

meritorious defense;” and (3) “defendant’s culpability.” Farnese

v. Bagnasco, 687 F.2d 761, 764 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Feliciano

v. Reliant Tooling Co., Ltd., 691 F.2d 653, 656 (3d Cir. 1982)

(applying the “Farnese factors” and observing, “[l]ess

substantial grounds may be adequate for setting aside a default

than would be required for opening a judgment.”). “Any doubt

should be resolved in favor of setting aside the [entry of

default] so that cases may be decided on their merits.”

Feliciano, 691 F.2d at 656.3

(8) Plaintiff has not asserted that it will be prejudiced

if default is vacated; nor has it asserted that the Moving

Defendants were culpable in their delay in answering or otherwise

responding to the Complaint. The Court concludes that Plaintiff

will not be prejudiced, and there is no evidence from which the

Court might conclude that the Moving Defendants acted culpably.

(9) The Court also concludes that the Moving Defendants

have presented “at least one meritorious defense.” Farnese, 687

F.2d at 764; Feliciano, 691 F.2d at 657 (requiring the

presentation of at least one “prima facie . . . valid defense”). 

The Moving Defendants assert that Deepak Verma repaid the

 See generally Wright, Miller, Kane & Marcus, 10A Fed. 3

Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2696 (3d Ed.) (“Rule 55(c) motions [to set

aside an entry of default] are frequently granted.”).

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indebtedness that they allegedly guaranteed.

 (10) After considering the Farnese factors, the Court

concludes that the Moving Defendants have established good cause

for setting aside the entry of default.

Accordingly,

IT IS on this 9th day of November, 2011,

ORDERED THAT: 

(1) The Motion of Defendants Fine Enterprises, Inc., Rajni

Sethi and Dharminder Sethi to set aside the entry of

default (Docket # 27) is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk of

Court is hereby directed to VACATE the default entered

against Defendants Fine Enterprises, Inc., Rajni Sethi

and Dharminder Sethi. 

(2) The Moving Defendants shall answer or otherwise respond

to the Complaint within 20 days of the date of this

Order.

(3) Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment

(Docket # 21) is hereby DISMISSED AS MOOT.

 s/ Joseph E. Irenas 

JOSEPH E. IRENAS, S.U.S.D.J. 

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