[Cite as State v. Rink, 2021-Ohio-1068.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

LUCAS COUNTY 

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-20-1049 

 

 Appellee Trial Court No. CR20021826 

v. 

Stanley Lee Rink DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: March 31, 2021 

* * * * * 

 Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and 

 Brenda J. Majdalani, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

 Autumn D. Adams, for appellant. 

* * * * * 

MAYLE, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Stanley Rink, appeals the December 18, 2019 judgment of the 

Lucas County Court of Common Pleas resentencing him following our remand in State v. 

Rink, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1130, 2019-Ohio-4379 (“Rink II”). For the following 

reasons, we affirm. 
2.

I. Background and Facts 

{¶ 2} In 1999, Rink was convicted of one count of rape and sentenced to three 

years in prison (“1999 case”). He was released in 2001 and placed on postrelease 

control. 

{¶ 3} In 2002, shortly after his release from prison, Rink was convicted of two 

counts of rape in the case underlying this appeal (“2002 case”). The trial court sentenced 

Rink to ten years in prison on each count, as well as five years in prison for violating 

postrelease control. The court ordered Rink to serve the prison terms consecutively, with 

the five-year postrelease control sanction to be served first. Rink appealed to this court, 

arguing that the trial court erred by imposing maximum sentences. We affirmed. State v. 

Rink, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-02-1307, 2003-Ohio-4097. 

{¶ 4} In 2008, the trial court issued a nunc pro tunc sentencing entry once again 

sentencing Rink to ten years on each rape count and five years on the postrelease control 

violation. The court again ordered Rink to serve the sentences consecutively, with the 

postrelease control sanction to be served first. Rink did not appeal the nunc pro tunc 

entry. 

{¶ 5} Beginning in 2014, Rink filed various motions attempting to vacate the fiveyear prison sentence for the postrelease control violation on the basis that postrelease 

control was not properly imposed in the 1999 case, rendering that part of his sentence 

void. The trial court denied all of Rink’s requests, and he appealed its final denial. 

Ultimately, we concluded that “Rink argue[d], the state concede[d], and the trial court 
3.

found that postrelease control was not properly imposed in the 1999 case and that the 

five-year postrelease control sanction [was] void.” Rink II, 6th Dist. Lucas No. 

L-19-1130, 2019-Ohio-4379, at ¶ 15. Because Rink had already completed his five-year 

sentence for the postrelease control violation, we determined that the proper remedy was 

to credit the days he served for the postrelease control violation to his 20-year sentence 

for the rape convictions. Id.

{¶ 6} On December 11, 2019, the trial court resentenced Rink in accordance with 

our decision in Rink II, vacating the five-year postrelease control sentence, reaffirming 

the aggregate 20-year sentence for Rink’s rape convictions, and crediting the time Rink 

served under the postrelease control sentence against the rape sentences. 

{¶ 7} Rink now appeals, assigning the following error: 

The Trial Court erred in not granting Appellant credit for the time he 

Served on post-release control. 

II. Law and Analysis 

{¶ 8} In his assignment of error, Rink contends that he should receive 243 days of 

jail-time credit toward his 20-year rape sentence in the 2002 case because he spent 243 

days under an improperly-imposed term of postrelease control following his release from 

prison in the 1999 case. He argues that he is entitled to this additional jail-time credit 

because “his freedom was restrained and he was subject to the supervision of the Adult 

Parole Authority for a voided period [of] post-release [sic] control * * *.” The state 

responds that Rink waived this argument by failing to raise it at the resentencing hearing. 
4.

Alternatively, the state argues that Rink is not entitled to credit for time when he was not 

physically confined. 

{¶ 9} “When reviewing sentencing errors, the Supreme Court of Ohio has 

consistently held that a failure to object waives all but plain error.” State v. Devai, 2013-

Ohio-5264, 2 N.E.3d 993, ¶ 16 (11th Dist.). Rink did not ask the trial court to give him 

additional credit against his rape sentences for the time that he was under postrelease 

control supervision, but not incarcerated, so he has waived all but plain error. 

{¶ 10} Plain error is an error that affects an appellant’s substantial rights. Crim.R. 

52(B). An error that affects substantial rights is one that “affected the outcome” of the 

proceedings. State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002). Plain error 

should be found “only in exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest 

miscarriage of justice.” State v. Hill, 92 Ohio St.3d 191, 203, 749 N.E.2d 274 (2001), 

citing State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three of the 

syllabus. 

{¶ 11} Rink’s request for credit toward his prison term for days when he was not 

confined in jail or prison, or under a similarly restrictive sanction (such as confinement in 

a community-based correctional facility), is contrary to statutory law and governing 

precedent from the Supreme Court of Ohio. That is, R.C. 2967.191(A) provides for a 

reduction of prison time for related days to confinement. It states, in relevant part, that 

“[t]he department of rehabilitation and correction shall reduce the prison term of a 

prisoner * * * by the total number of days that the prisoner was confined for any reason 
5.

arising out of the offense for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced * * *.” 

(Emphasis added.) Recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio clarified that “R.C. 

2967.191(A) is plain and unambiguous and limits a jail-time credit to specific types of 

confinement, those in which the defendant is confined in a public or private facility.” 

(Emphasis added.) State v. Reed, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4255, ¶ 19. 

{¶ 12} In Reed, the Supreme Court determined that a defendant who was 

sentenced to prison after the trial court revoked his community control was not entitled to 

jail-time credit for the days he spent on house arrest and electronic monitoring after his 

conviction because, although “confinement” is not defined by R.C. 2967.191, the statute 

contemplates confinement in a “public or private facility intended for penal 

confinement,” and does not extend to any type of confinement in a private residence. Id.

at ¶ 16. 

{¶ 13} Applying that logic to Rink’s case, we cannot agree that he is entitled to 

credit against his rape sentences for time when he was not imprisoned. Although being 

on postrelease control necessarily meant that Rink was subject to certain restrictions, see

Ohio Adm.Code 5120:1-1-12, those restrictions were not the equivalent of Rink being 

“confined in a public or private facility” that is “intended for penal confinement.” Reed

at ¶ 16. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that the time Rink was on 

postrelease control meets the second requirement in R.C. 2967.191(A)—i.e., that it 

“ar[ose] out of the offense for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced * * *.” 

Rink was on postrelease control before he was charged with and convicted of the rapes in 
6.

the 2002 case. So, logically, the term of postrelease control could not have arisen from 

the 2002 convictions.1

{¶ 14} In support of his argument, Rink cites N. Olmstead v. Cipiti, 114 Ohio 

App.3d 549, 683 N.E.2d 795 (8th Dist.1996). In that case, the appellant was convicted of 

a misdemeanor and sentenced to, among other things, the maximum sentence of 30 days 

in jail, which the court suspended on the condition that the appellant complete a term of 

probation. Id. at 550-551. However, he was held in jail pending trial for 59 days—more 

than the maximum number of days that he could legally be incarcerated for the offense of 

which he was convicted. Id. at 553. The Eighth District vacated the trial court’s 

imposition of the suspended jail sentence because the appellant had already served more 

than the statutorily-permissible number of days in jail for his conviction and “any 

sentence of incarceration imposed due to a violation of the terms of probation would be 

void.” Id. at 554. 

{¶ 15} As Rink recognizes in his brief, “[i]n Cipiti, the imposition of a jail 

sentence was void and [the appellant] received credit for the days he was incarcerated.” 

(Emphasis added.) Nonetheless, Rink contends that he should receive credit for days that 

he was not incarcerated because he was improperly subject to state control via the terms 

and conditions of postrelease control. Cipiti does not support his position. Rather, the 

 

1

 The five-year prison term for the postrelease control violation, on the other hand, did

arise from the 2002 rape convictions; the postrelease control sanction was a punishment 

that Rink received as a direct result of committing new crimes while on postrelease 

control. 
7.

Cipiti court’s determination that the appellant could not properly be sentenced to any 

further jail time hinged on the fact that he had already been confined in jail beyond the 

maximum allowable number of days, id. at 553-554, which fits squarely with the 

Supreme Court of Ohio’s recent pronouncement that an offender is entitled to jail-time 

credit for any time that was spent physically “confined in a public or private facility” that 

is “intended for penal confinement.” Reed, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4255, at ¶ 16. 

{¶ 16} In sum, we previously determined that the trial court erred in imposing 

postrelease control, which resulted in an invalid prison term. Rink II, 6th Dist. Lucas No. 

L-19-1130, 2019-Ohio-4379, at ¶ 15. However, that error was rectified at resentencing 

when the trial court gave Rink credit for the days that he was actually confined in prison 

on the void five-year prison sentence and ordered the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation 

and Correction to apply that credit to Rink’s 20-year sentence in the 2002 case. Rink is 

not entitled to any credit beyond that. Accordingly, his assignment of error is not welltaken. 

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 17} Based on the foregoing, the December 18, 2019 judgment of the Lucas 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Rink is ordered to pay the costs of this 

appeal pursuant to App.R. 24. 

Judgment affirmed. 
8.

 State v. Rink 

 C.A. No. L-20-1049 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Thomas J. Osowik, J. _______________________________ 

JUDGE 

Christine E. Mayle, J. 

 _______________________________ 

Gene A. Zmuda, P.J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE 

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of 

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported 

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: 

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.