### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE June 29, 200 6 S es sio n THE RESSA J OANNE BO OKE R v. RICARDO B AYTONI A

BOO KER, J R. Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Montgom ery C ounty No. MC- CH-CV- DI-03-414 Laurence M. Mc Millan, Chan cellor

No. M2005- 01455-COA-R 3-CV - F iled on O ctober 26, 2006

T his is a divorce c ase. The trial court g rante d There ssa J oanne B ooker ( “Wife”) a divorc e fr om Ricardo B aytonia Booke r, J r. (“Husband” ), di vided t he parties’ property , and decre ed an awa rd of a l i m o n y in solido a n d a l i m o n y i n f u t u ro . Hus band appe als, asserting that the division of marital p r o p e r ty w a s n o t e q u i t ab l e
. H e a l s o c h a l l e n g e s t h e p r o p r i e t y o f e a c h o f t h e a l i m o n y

a w ar d s
. We m o d i f y t h e tr i a l c o u r t ’ s a w ar d o f a l i m o n y in f

utu ro so as t o m ak e i t an aw ard of reha bilitative alimony . As modified, the trial c ourt’s judg ment is affirme d.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Aff irm ed as Modif

ied; Case Re m anded

C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY and S HAR ON G. LEE , J J ., joined.
Thomas F. B loom, Nashville, Tennesse e, for the appe llant, Ricardo B aytonia Booke r, Jr.
Sharon T. Masse y , Clarksville, Tennesse e, for the appe llee, The ressa

J oanne B ooker

OP IN ION-2- I.
In i t s j u d g m e n to f

d i v o r c e , t h e tr i a l c o u r tm a d e t h e f o l l o w i n g d i v i s i o n o f

m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y: Awar ded to Property Value Wife Husband
Marital Home $ 96,200 $76,200 $20,000 Thrift Sav. Ac c. 8,000 8,000 1999 L exus 17,000 17,000 Van 1,000 1,000 Motorcy cle 8,000 8,000 Coin collection 375 375 1989 Toy ota value unk. value unk. Dining rm. hutch value unk. value unk. Gra ndfathe r cloc k value unk. value unk.

153,575 84,200 46,375 $130,575 $84,200 $46,375
The total value of all of the inter es t s i n t h e m arital residence is actually $119,200 rathe r than the $96,200 ref

lected in the a

bove sche dule. The $23,000 differ ence was awa rded to Wife as a limony in solido r a t h e r t h a n a s a d i v i s i o n o f p r o p e r t y . T h e tr i a l c o u r t a l s o h e l d t h a t e a c h o f t h e p a rt ie s is entitled to one-ha lf of the other ’s retirement benefits. There is no proof a s to the prese nt-day value of either retire ment plan.
The stateme nt of the evide nce r efle cts that the parties, prior to t h e h earing below, divided items of persona l pr operty not r efle cted in the above sc hedule. The skimpyrec ord bef ore us doe s not show the values of

these other

items of persona l property

. The trial c ourt’s judg ment provides that Husba nd will pay Wife $500 per month as a limony in f utu ro . II.
Hu sb a ndapp e a ls a ndraise s th e fo llo wi ng iss ue s: 1. Does the evidence preponde rate ag ainst the trial court’s awa rd of a l i m o n y in solido a n d i t s a w ar do f a l i m o n y in f

utu ro . 2. Does the e vidence preponde rate ag ainst the trial court’s division o f t h e m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y.-3- III

. A.
Ou r r e vie w o f the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t is de novo u p o n t h e re co rd o f t h e p ro ce ed i n gs be lo w , a c c o mp a n ie d b y a p r e s u mp ti o n o f c o rr e c tn e s s , a p r e s u mp ti o n w e mu s t h o n o r u n le ss the pr e po nd eran c e of

the e vid e nc e is a g a ins t th os e fi nd ing s. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Union C arbide Corp. v. Huddleston , 854 S.W .2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). Ther e is no presumption of cor rec tness as to the trial court’ s conclusions of law. Cam pbell v. F lorida Steel Corp. , 919 S.W .2d 26, 35 (Tenn. 1996).
B.
A trial c o u rt h as broad discretion in fa shioning a division of marital property

. Fish er v. Fish er , 6 48 S.W. 2d24 4, 24 6 ( Te nn . 1 98 3) ; Bar nhill v . Ba rnhi ll , 826 S.W .2d 443, 449-50 (Te nn. C t

. Ap p . 1991). It has the same br oad discre tion with respect to an a war d of alimony

. Aaron v. Aaron , 909 S.W. 2d40 8, 41 0 ( Te nn . 1 99 5) ; Anderton v. Anderton , 9 88 S.W. 2d67 5, 68 2 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1998).
I n e va luatin g wh e the r a

tr ia l c ou rt

ha s a bu se d it s d isc re tio n, we are bo un d b y the princ ipl e that the trial court “will be upheld so long as re asonab l e m i n d s can disa g ree as to proprie ty of the decision made .” Eldridge v. Eldridge , 4 2 S

. W

. 3 d 8 2 , 8 5 (T en n
. 2 0 0 1 ) ( q u o t i n g Sta te v . Sc ott , 33 S

. W

. 3 d 746, 752 (Tenn. 2000) and Sta te v . G ill ila nd , 2 2 S. W. 3 d 2 6 6 , 2 7 3 ( T e n n
. 2 0 0 0 ) )

. A trial court a buses its discretion when it “a pplie[s] an i n co rr ect lega l standard, or rea che[s] a decision which is ag ainst logic or re asoning that cause [s] an injustice to th e party complaining .” State v. Shirley , 6 S.W. 3d24 3, 24 7 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) (c itatio n o mit te d) . A n a pp e llate cou rt cannot s ub sti tut e i t s j u d gm en t fo r that of the trial court. Myint v. Alls tate Ins. C o. , 9 7 0 S. W. 2 d 9 2 0 , 9 2 7 ( T e nn. 1998).
I V. Husband’s primary

contention with respe ct to the trial court’s alimony decr ees is that W ife failed to de monstrate any need f or either type of a limony . He a

rg ues that the parties’ re spective f i n a n c i a l a n d o t h e r

c i r c u m s t a n c e s ar e v i r t u a l l y t h e s a m e
. A s t o t h e a w ar d o f a l i m o n y in f

utu ro , Husband asserts that Wife is not economically disadvantag ed and doe s not need to be r ehabilitated. Hu sb a nda lso c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s a limon y decr ees we re de sig ne d to pu nis h h im f or his conduct during the marria g e. There are no hard and fast rules g overning spousal support decisions. Anderton , 988 S.W .2d at 682. G e n e r a ll y , tria l c o u r ts “ h a v e th e p r e r o g a ti v e to d e te r mi n e th e ty p e o f s p o u s a l s u p p o r t tha t be st f its the c ir c ums ta nc e s o f the c a se a ndma y a wa rdse ve ra l di ff

e re nt t ype s o f su pp ort in the sa me case when the fac ts w arr ant it.” Id. Tenne ssee law provides four differ ent types of a limonythat may be appr opriate in c ombination or alone: “r ehabilitative alimony , alimony in futuro, also known a s-4-

periodic a limony , transitional alimony , or alimony in solido, also known as l u m p sum alimony .” T.C.A. § 36-5-121( d)(1) (2005).
Dec isions reg arding spousal support require a car eful balanc ing of the statutory fac tors and depend upon the unique fac ts of eac h case

. Anderton , 9 88 S.W. 2da t 68 3. T. C.A . § 36 -5 -1 21 (i ) s e ts fo rth a lis t of re le va nt f

a c tor s f or a tr ia l c ou rt

to c on sid er in det e rm ini ng wh e the r a lim on y is app ro pria te , a ndif

so , th e natur e , a mou nt, le ng th o f t e rm , a ndma nn e r o f p a y me nt: (1) The relative earning c apac ity , obligations, needs, and f inancial re so ur c e s o f e a c h p art y , in c lud ing inc ome fro m pe ns ion , p ro fi t sh ari ng or re tir e me nt p la ns a nda ll o the r s ou rc e s; (2) The relative education and training of ea ch party , the ability and opportunity

of ea ch party

to secure such education and tra ining, a nd the ne c e ssi ty

of a pa rt y to s e c ur e fu rthe r e du c a tio n a ndtr a ini ng to imp ro ve su c h p art y ’s e arn ing s c apa c ity to a re a so na ble le ve l; (3) The duration of the ma rriag e; ( 4 ) T h e a g e a n d m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n o f e a c h p ar t y; (5) The phy sical conditi on of each party , including, but not limit ed to, phy sical disability

or inca pacity due to a chronic debilitating disea se; (6) The extent to which it would be unde s i ra b l e for a party to seek employ ment outside the home, beca use such party

will be custodian of a minor c hild of the marriag e; (7 ) T he se pa

rate a sse ts o f e a c h part y , bothre a l a ndpe rs on a l, t a ng ibl e and intang ible; (8) The provisions made with reg ard to t h e m ar i tal property , as define d in § 36-4-121; (9) T h e s tan d ar d o f li v in g o f th e p ar ti e s e s ta b li s h e d d u r ing the marria g e; (10) The extent to whi ch ea ch party has made such tang ible and intang ible contributions to the marria g e as monetary and homemake r c on tr ibu tio ns , a ndta ng ibl e a ndint a ng ibl e c on tr ibu tio ns by a pa rt y to t h e e d u c a t i o n , tr a i n i n g o r

i n c r e a s e d e ar n i n g p o w e r

o f t h e o t h e r p ar t y;H u sb a n d a lso re c e ive d a lo c a tio n a llo w a n c e o f se v e ra l tho u sa n d d o llar s fo r t h e W a sh ing to n , D .C . ar e a . W e 1 agr ee wi t h H us band t hat t hi s amo un t s houl d n ot be i ncl uded i n a ca l cul at i on of hi s over al l i ncome becau s e t he al l owance e n d e d in J u ly, 2 0 0 5

. -5-

(1 1) Th e r e l a t i v e f

a u l to f t h e p ar t i e s , i n c a s e s w h e r e t h e c o u r t , i n i ts discretion, dee ms it appropriate to do so; and ( 1 2 ) S u c h o t h e r f

a c t o r s , i n c l u d i n g t h e t a x c o n s e q u e n c e s t o e a c h p ar t y, a s a re ne c e ssa

ry to c on sid e r the e qu iti e s b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s. The “ rea l need of

the [disadvantag ed] spouse seeking the support is the single most im portant fa ctor ... [and nex t] the cou rt s m o s t o ften c onsider the a bilityof the oblig or spouse to provide support.” Aaron , 909 S.W .2d at 410 (c itation omit ted).
In t h i s c a s e , t h e tri a l c o u r td e t e r m i n e d t h a td e c r e e s o f a l i m o n y in solido a n d a l i m o n y in f utu ro wer e appr opriate. Spec ifically , the t rial court set aside to Wife $23,000 of the va lue of the ma rital r e s i d e n c e a s a l i m o n y in solido. It a l s o a w ar d e d h e r $ 5 0 0 p e r m o n t h a s a l i m o n y in f utu ro . The trial court’s judg ment states that the following fac tors support such an a war d: “the dur ation of the marria g e , th e e du c a tio n of the pa rt ie s, the e arn ing c apa

bil iti e s of the pa

rt ie s, the a g e of

the pa rt ie s, phy sical and me ntal health, the contribution to the assets, and the r elative f ault of the pa

rties.” The state me nt of the e vid e nc e re fl e c ts the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on fr om the be nc h in sli g htl y mor e de ta il:
I find that [Husband] has a highe r earning capa city than [W ife], Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 121(i)(1) ; that he has g reater e d u ca tion and training than s he does, § 36-5-121( i)(2); that the m arriag e is of long duration, § 36-5- 121(i)(3); t h at both parties made tang ible and intang ible contributions to the marria g e, § 36-5-121( i)(10); a nd that [Husband’s] fault was g reater than [Wife’s], § 36-5-121(i)(11)

. The re cord r evea ls that the parties we re ma rried on O ctober

16 , 1 9 7 9

. At t h e ti me of the divorce hearing, H usband wa s 47 and Wife was 45. The couple have two children, both of w hom have rea ched the ag e of majority

. Wife testified that she wa s primarily responsible for

raising the children throug hout the marria g e. She had a 20-y ear work history

with the United States Corps of En g ine e rs . H e r s a lary

wa s $ 41 ,0 00 pe r y e ar. She ha s a n a sso c ia te ’s degree, and is p re se ntl y pu rs uin g a

ba c he lor ’s de g re e . Wife te sti fi e d th a t sh e su ff e rs fr om s ome ph y sic a l a ndme nta l he a lth iss ue s.
Hu sb a ndha s a

ba c he lor ’s de g re e a nda

ma ste r’ s d e g re e in Pub lic Ma na g e me nt. At the tim e of the he aring below, he w as ea rning $45,239 per y ear

at the Depa

rtment of De fense in Washington, D. C. I n a dd iti on , h e wa s r e c e ivi ng a dis abil ity pay ment of

$1 ,1 47 pe r m on th a s a

re su lt o f h is 1 mil ita ry se rv ic e . H e nc e , H us ba nd ’s tot a l a nn ua l g ro ss i nc ome wa s $ 59 ,0 03 . Hus ba nda dmi tte d to having one extramari t al af fa i r, and a divorce was g rante d to Wi fe on the basis of Husband’ s inappropriate marital c onduct. Howe ver, H usband testified that Wife contributed to the demise of the ir ma rria g e by c omp la ini ng c on sta ntl y

a nde xhibi tin g vio le nt b e ha vio r o n s e ve ra l oc c a sio ns
.I t be ars noti ng t hat W i fe al so cl ai m ed m o nt hl y exp enses fo r her c h ild re n , w h o , a s p revi o usl y noted, have 2

re a c h e d the a g e o f m a

jo rity. W ife is n o t en tit le d to re c o v e r c h ild su p p o rt fo r a d u lt c h ild re n
. B r yan v. L each , 85 S. W

. 3d 1 3 6 , 15 1 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. 20 0 1 ). -6- Ad dr e ssi ng the iss ue of

ne e d f or sp ousal su pp ort , Wif

e su bmi tte d a n in c ome a nde xpe ns e s t at em en tre fl ec t i n g t h e f

o l l o wi n g m o n t h l y

ex p en s es as s o ci at ed wi t h h ers t an d ar d o f l i v i n g: 2
Home Ta x es & I ns. $ 112.56 Utiliti es 265.00 Car oper ation 296.00 I nsuranc e 173.95 New a uto 400.00 Household re pairs 200.00 Other 550.00
Total $1,997.51
Wife testified that her house and automobile both nee ded re pairs. He r statement of income and expense includes an a llowance for these expenses. Wife’s take- home pay is $2,372.33 per month. Her house is paid for and she has no de bt. We disag ree with Husband’s contention that Wife is not economica lly disadvantag ed vis-avis him. Husband’s g ross income is appr ox imately $18,000 per y ear more than Wife’ s annual sala ry of $41,000. Under the circumstances of this case , we ag ree with the t rial court’s implicit finding of Wife’s ec onomic disadvantag e. Th e re is a statut ory

bia s in fa vo r o f r e ha

bil itativ e a lim on y . T .C. A. § 3 6- 5- 12 1( d) (2 ); se e als o Crabtree v. Crabtree , 1 6 S. W. 3 d 3 5 6 , 3 5 8 ( T e n n
. 2 0 0 0 )

. A c c o r d in g to th e s tatu to r y d e f in it io n , “ [t ]o be re habilitated means to a chieve , with rea sonable e ffort, an ea rning capa city

that wil l p er m it the e con om ica ll y

dis a dv a nta g e d s po us e ’s sta nd a rdof liv ing a ft e r the div or c e to b e re a so na bly compar able to the standa

rd of living enjoy ed during the marria g e, or to the post-divorce standa rd of living expected to be available to the other spouse, considering the re levant statutory fac tors and the equities betwe en the pa

rties.” T.C.A. §§ 36- 5-121(d) (2), ( e)( 1).
Wif e ’s state me nt o f i nc ome a nde xpe ns e s show s tha t Wife ’s c ur re nt inc ome is suf

fi c ie nt t o meet her g ener al obligations. However , the re cord a s a whole mil itates in favor of a finding of nee d over a nd above Wife’ s g ener al expenses. Wife testified that she is pursuing a bac helor’s de g ree on a part-time basis and has se cu re d a s ch o o l loan. Her statement of e x penses doe s not refle ct any school expenses. By

the same toke n, it does not pr ovide for the establishment of a f und to cover

the repay ment of her

loan. We hold that the rec ord preponderates in favor of a fac tual finding that Wife has a ne ed for

spousal support. Howeve r, we disag ree with the trial court’s i m plicit finding that Wif e c a nn ot be re ha

bil itate d. We be lie ve sh e c a n be

. Wif e state d that sh e a nti c ipate s th a t sh e wi ll-7-

complete he r additional educ ation in five y ear s. Certainly , this additional education ca n be expected t o en h an ce h erca p ac i t y

t o ea rn m o re i n co m e t h an s h e i s cu rr en t l y ea rn i n g. Considering the two most critical fa ctors in making an award of alimony , the “real ne ed” of the spouse and the ability of the obligor spouse to pay , as well as the re maining sta tutory fac tors set forth in T.C.A. § 36-5-121( i), this Court holds that an award of reha bilitative alimonyof $500 per month for 60 months is appropriate. T his period coincide s with W ife’s f ive-y ear edu ca t i o n plan. T h e e v i d e n c e p r e p o n d e r a t e s a g a i n s tt h e tr i a l c o u r t ’ s d e c i s i o n t o a w ar d W i f e a l i m o n y in f

utu ro of $500 per month. The r ecor d simply does not support an awa rd of a limony“on a long -term ba sis or until death or re marria g e.” See T.C.A. § 36-5-121( d)(3)

. The evidence does not preponde rate ag ainst the trial court’s decision to awa rd Wife $23,000 a l i m o n y in solido in the form of a portion of her interest in the value of the marital re sidence . When thi s a wa rdis m e a su re d a g a ins t th e fa c tor s se t fo rth in T .C. A. § 3 6- 5- 12 1( i) , w e c a nn ot s a y that th is awa rd wa s an abuse of the trial c ourt’s broa d discretion.
We find no evidenc e that the tria l court’s de cre es re g arding alimony wer e im pr op e rly pr omp te d b y

Hu sb a nd ’s mis c on du c t. U nd e r T .C. A. § 3 6- 5- 12 1( i) , th e “ re la tiv e fa ult of the pa rt ie s” is something a trial court is authorized to consider in the alimony

question. The tria l co urt in the ins t an t ca se found that “ [Husband’s] fault was g reater than [Wife’s].” The evide nce doe s not preponde rate ag ainst this finding. Ther e is no evidenc e sugg esting that either of the alimony

decr ees was punitive in nature

. V.
H u s b a n d c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s d i v i s i o n o f m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y

i s n o te q u i t ab l e
. In addition, Husband maintains that the trial c ourt improperly relied upon his misconduct in dividing t h e m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y. T.C.A. § 36-4-121( a)( 1) (2005) direc ts the trial court to “e quitably divide ... the marital property betwee n the par

ties ... in proportions a s the court deems just.” As explained by this Court in Batson v. Batson , 769 S.W .2d 849, 859 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988),

a n e qu itable prop e rt y

div isi on is n ot n e c e ssa

ri ly a n e qu a l on e . It is not achieve d by

a mechanica l application of the statutory fac tors, but rathe r by considering and weighing the most releva nt fac tors in light of the unique f

acts of the case
. T

. C

. A

. 3 6

- 4

- 1 2 1 ( c ) s e t s f o r t h t h e f a c t o r s t o b e c o n s i d e r e d i n d i v i d i n g m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y: (1) The duration of the ma rriag e;-8- (2 ) T h e a g e , p h y s i c a l a n d m e n t a l h e a l t h , v o c a t i o n a l s k i lls , employ ability , earning c apac ity , estate, f inancial liabilities and fi na nc ia l ne e ds of

e a c h o f the pa

rt ie s; (3) The tang ible or intangi b le contribution by one (1) party

to the e d u c a t i o n , tr a i n i n g o r

i n c r e a s e d e ar n i n g p o w e r

o f t h e o t h e r p ar t y; (4) The relative ability

of ea ch party

for f uture acquisitions of

capital assets and inc ome; (5) The contribution of ea ch party to the acquisition, prese rvation, ap p r e c i a t i o n , d e p r e c i a t i o n o r d i s s i p a t i o n o f

t h e m ar i t a l o r

s e p ara te property , i n cl u d i ng the contribution of a pa rty to the marria g e as ho me make r, wa g e e arn e r o r p are nt, wi th the c on tr ibu tio n o f a party as homemake r or wa g e ea rner to be g iven the same weig ht if eac h party has fulfilled its role; ( 6 ) T h e v a l u e o f

t h e s e p ar a t e p r o p e r t y o f

e a c h p ar t y; (7) The estate of

eac h party

at the time of the ma

rriag e; (8) The economic c ircumstance s of ea ch party at t he ti me t he division of prope rty

is to become e ffe ctive; (9) The tax consequence s to eac h party , costs associate d with the re a so na bly fore se e able sa le of

the a sse t, andoth e r r e a so na bly fo re se e able e xpe ns e s a sso c ia te d w ith the a sse t; (10) The amount of social security benef its available to eac h spouse; and (11) Such other fac tors as ar e nec essary to consider the e quities be tw e e n th e pa

rt ie s.
Fault of a party

is not to be considere d in dividing marital prope rty . T.C.A. § 36-4-121( a)( 1).
As demonstrate d above, the trial court divi ded that portion of t he marital estate, upon w hich the parties could not ag ree , such that Wife rec eived assets valued at $84,200 and Husband re ceive d assets value d at $46,375. Wife also rec eived sever al assets to w hich there was no value a ssigne d in the statement of evidenc e or the final judgme nt, and the parties divided other undesc ribed pe rsonal property prior to the hea

ring without specifying the value of same. I n addition, the trial court state d that eac h spouse was e ntitled to half of the other spouse’s retirement. The rec ord re veals that Wife wi ll r e c e ive $4 41 pe r m on th a s h e r h a lf of Hu sb a nd ’s re tir e me nt, wh ic h d id n ot i nc lud e his mon thl y-9-

disab il it y p a y me n t at th a t ti me
. H u s b a n d w il l r e c e iv e h is h a lf o f Wi f e ’ s r e ti r e me n t when she become s elig ible to rec eive it. Neither the statement of the e vidence nor the fina l judgment pr ovides any explanation for the trial c ourt’s dec ision wi t h reg ard to dividing the martial prope rty betwee n the pa rt ie s. This Co u r t is s o me w h a t h in d e r e d in it s ab il it y to d e c id e w h e th e r th e o v e r a ll e f f e c t of the division of the parties’ ma rital property

is equitable bec ause w e do not know the value of the other a sse ts d ivi de d b e tw e e n th e m. Wi th that sa id, we c a nn ot sa y that th e e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t t h e o v e r a l l d i v i s i o n o f t h e m ar i t a l e s t a t e
. W e n o t e , h o w e v e r , t h a tt h e p r o o f d i s c u s s e d i n S e c t i o n IV of thi s brie f, wh ic h a lso tou c he s up on the re le va nt f a c tor s st a te d in T. C.A . § 36 -4 -1 21 (c ), wa rr a nts a division that favors W ife more heavily

. There fore , we affirm the tria l court’s judg ment with reg ard t o t h e d i v i s i o n o f

m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y.
F ina lly , a dd re ssi ng Hu sb a nd ’s c on te nti on that the tr ia l c ou rt imp ro pe rl y

c on sid e re d h is misconduct in making a division, it does not a ppear in the rec ord that the trial c ourt’s dec ision was b a s e d u p o n a

c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f

t h e f a u l to f e i t h e r p ar t y. V I.
The trial court’s awa

rd of alimony is modified so as to pr ovide that Husband will pay Wife re h ab il it a ti v e a li mo n y o f $ 5 0 0 p e r mo n th f o r 6 0 mo n th s f

r o m a n d a f

te r th e d a te o f entryof the judgme nt of divorce . The judg ment is aff irmed i n all other re spects. This ca se is rema nded to the trial court f

or enf orce ment of its judgment, a s modified, and for the co l l ec t ion of costs assesse d be low , a ll p ur su a nt t o a

pp lic able la w. Cos ts o n a pp e a l are ta xedha lf

to th e app ell ee, The re ssa J oanne B ooker a nd half to the a ppellant, Ricardo B aytonia Booke r, Jr.

_______________________________ CHARL ES D. SUSANO, J R., J UDGE