IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 21-1738

Filed April 13, 2022

IN THE INTEREST OF Z.S., A.A., and T.A.,

Minor Children,

B.W., Mother,

Appellant,

T.A., Father,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Kimberly Ayotte Renze, 

District Associate Judge.

A mother and a father separately appeal the termination of their parental 

rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Teresa M. Pope of Branstad & Olson Law Office, Des Moines, for appellant 

mother.

Cathleen Siebrecht of Siebrecht Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant father

of A.A. and T.A.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Kayla Stratton, Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor 

children.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Chicchelly, JJ.
2

BOWER, Chief Judge.

The mother of three children—Z.S., A.A., and T.A.—and the father of A.A. 

and T.A. separately appeal the termination of their parental rights.1 The mother 

contests the grounds for termination, asserts the court should have allowed her 

additional time, termination is not in the children’s best interests, and argues the 

court erred in denying her request to place all three children in a guardianship with 

the maternal grandparents. The father asserts the court should have granted him 

additional time to seek reunification and argues termination of his rights was not 

necessary because his children are safe in their placement with the paternal 

grandparents. We affirm on both appeals.

I. Background Facts.

Brooke is the mother of all three children: T.A. born in 2012, A.A. born in 

2013, and Z.S. born in June 2020. Thomas is the father of the older two children. 

Terrell is the putative father of Z.S. Domestic violence occurred in Brooke’s 

relationships with both fathers.

On May 21, 2020, the department of human services (DHS) began 

investigating concerns Brooke and Terrell were abusing opiates while caring for 

A.A. and T.A. and that Terrell had physically assaulted Brooke in front of the 

children. Brooke initially avoided DHS but finally agreed to provide a drug screen; 

she failed to follow through with the drug screen and continued to avoid DHS.

 

1 Terrell, the putative father of Z.S., did not participate in scheduled paternity 

testing and did not participate in any services offered to the family. He does not 

appeal.
3

On May 26, Brooke completed a substance-abuse evaluation at UCS 

Healthcare in which she reported she had been abusing prescription pain pills, got 

pregnant, and realized she could not stop taking opioids. She reported using 

opiates for six months to a year, with the longest period of abstinence being only 

three days; she reported using as frequently as three times daily. A drug screen 

taken that day was negative for all substances. Brooke was diagnosed with Opioid 

Use Disorder, Severe, and was recommended to participate in extended outpatient 

treatment and Medically Assisted Treatment (MAT).

On May 29, DHS was able to speak to Brooke, after showing up at the 

house unannounced. Brooke reported she had been in treatment for a while and 

agreed to provide a drug screen that day. The record does not indicate whether 

Brooke actually did so. 

When Z.S. was born in early June, a nurse reported Terrell had been at the 

hospital with Brooke and Z.S., sleeping in her room with the baby. There was a 

no-contact order in effect between Brooke and Terrell. Brooke first denied his 

presence but later acknowledged he had been at the hospital. She denied using 

opioids during her pregnancy and claimed a sweat patch she had put on at DHS’s

request was tampered with. Z.S. tested positive for methadone at birth. 

DHS spoke with UCS to confirm Brooke’s participation in services and found 

Brooke had missed an orientation session and her next appointment after her 

evaluation. UCS session notes from June 17 indicate Brooke was informed she 

needed to meet with her counselor by June 18 or she would be out of compliance 

with the MAT program. Brooke’s treatment counselor reported to DHS Brooke 

would not be able to continue dosing—obtaining dialing methadone doses—until 
4

she met with the counselor. Brooke did not cooperate with DHS’s attempt to 

develop a safety plan, and DHS sought temporary removal.2

Brooke and the children were located at the maternal grandparents’ home. 

A law enforcement officer accompanied DHS workers to the residence. The officer 

called for backup assistance. The juvenile court describes the removal process:

Brooke and her parents . . . were not cooperative with DHS in 

executing the removal. The police body cam video demonstrates 

that Brooke and her family were extremely belligerent and highly 

agitated. The body camera footage was offered as an exhibit at the 

termination hearing and is extremely disturbing. The children were 

present and were clearly distraught by the screaming and yelling that 

was occurring. DHS remained calm throughout the process, despite 

the reactions of Brooke and her family. A police officer can be heard

saying that the family was telling the children they would be abused 

in foster care.

 

2 The June 18, 2020 affidavit submitted in support of temporary removal states:

The circumstances surrounding the need for removal are: The 

mother is involved in a violent relationship . . . . The couple have a 

no-contact order because of domestic violence related reasons but 

the couple knowingly violate that order. On or about May 21, 2020,

the DHS received allegations that the couple were abusing opiates 

while they cared for [T.A. and A.A.]. The DHS met with the mother 

on May 20, 2020, but she refused to provide a drug screen. It would 

be later learned that on May 26, 2020, the mother sought treatment 

at UCS and was prescribed methadone. On May 29, 2020, the 

mother agreed to a drug screen patch. Then, [in June], [Z.S.] was 

born positive for methadone. It’s reported that the mother’s doctor 

was unaware of the mother’s methadone treatment; and soon after, 

the mother said that her drug screen patch fell off. Records indicate 

that [Terrell] visited the mother at the hospital, although the mother 

was not forthright with that information. Since [Z.S.] was discharged 

from the hospital, the mother missed the follow up appointment with 

his pediatrician, the mother missed appointments with UCS and the

mother refuses to communicate or cooperate with the DHS regarding 

the welfare of these children. The mother and relatives will not 

coordinate a safety plan for these children and it’s reported that the 

mother may be dropped from the UCS treatment program for failure 

to meet. Also, when evaluated at UCS, the mother reported that

[she] abused prescription pain killers multiple times a day for 

approximately six months before she learned she was pregnant with 

[Z.S.]
5

A contested removal hearing was held on June 29 and July 7. The court

confirmed the removal and continued the children in foster care with custody with 

DHS. The court found issues of domestic violence and Brooke’s minimization of 

her substance abuse created risks of inadequate supervision of the children. 

Adjudication and Disposition. After an August 4 contested adjudication 

hearing, the court found T.A. reported witnessing domestic violence between 

Brooke and Terrell on a number of occasions. One time, T.A. called 911, but

Brooke got on the line and reported everything was fine. Brooke denied ever 

exposing the children to domestic violence or violating the no-contact order. The 

court found Brooke was not credible regarding her relationship with Terrell or the 

domestic violence, which placed the children at imminent risk of suffering physical 

abuse and neglect. The court also found Brooke continued to minimize her 

substance-use disorder and was not in full compliance with MAT, placing her at 

greater risk of relapse. The children were adjudicated children in need of 

assistance (CINA). The court ordered Brooke to provide drug screens at the 

request of DHS and participate fully in her MAT. Brooke and Terrell were ordered 

to participate in domestic-violence services. DHS was to assess family members 

for potential placement of the children.

On August 13, the court modified T.A. and A.A.’s placement from DHS 

foster care into the custody of their paternal grandparents.3 They have remained 

 

3 T.A. and A.A. were initially placed in the same home with Z.S. but the foster family 

expressed concerns because A.A.’s behaviors endangered their four-year-old 

child.
6

in the paternal grandparents’ care and Z.S. has remained in the care of the foster 

family.

Review. A review hearing was held on November 6. Neither father 

appeared or was participating in services. Brooke was participating in MAT but 

was not attending all required programing. The court also ruled Brooke needed to 

engage in Child-Parent Psychotherapy (CPP) with the children, sign necessary 

releases so the children could participate in services, and consistently attend her 

family interactions.

The maternal grandparents filed a motion to intervene and sought to have 

the children placed with them. The court set the motions for consideration at the 

next review hearing.

On March 22, 2021, the court issued its review order. The court noted

“Thomas believes his children should be placed with his father until he moves into 

his own place.” The court made these findings:

8. There is a little progress being made. In January 2021, 

there were positive drug screens without admission of use by 

Brooke. The mother had missed some dosing, and Brooke was not 

fully compliant with MAT expectations. Brooke has been slow to 

engage with CPP services with the children. As of March 2021, 

Brooke was not consistently attending CPP with [Z.S.] due to her lack 

of consistency in her own individual therapy. [A.A.]’s therapist

recommends that Brooke participate in a parent only session with 

her, only after she has attended two session of her own mental health 

therapy. Brooke has not engaged with Drake Early Head Start 

consistently. Brooke is attending substance abuse treatment. She 

is providing drug screens for treatment. She has not provided drug 

screens for DHS as asked. [She] lacks insight as to why she and the 

children are court involved. Brooke is not consistently engaged in 

therapy services to help gain that insight, process her feelings of 

anger and frustrations, and address the reasons that the children 

were removed. Today Brooke reports that she does not [have] a 

good rapport with her individual therapist and that she is looking into 

a new one. It is important that Brooke is able to have open and 
7

honest communication with her therapist. It is also important that 

Brooke address domestic violence with her advocate. Moving 

forward, Brooke will need to find a therapist to work with so that she 

can beg[i]n making therapeutic progress. Brooke needs to 

consistently attend her visits with the children. The children are in 

need of consistent ongoing therapy. The [guardian ad litem (GAL)]

reports that the older children are doing well in the home of the 

paternal grandparents. [Thomas] has disengaged with services 

including visitation. [Terrell] is not involved with any services.

9. Brooke is consistent in her substance abuse treatment, 

including MAT, group and individual sessions, and her drug screens 

for treatment. The court is pleased to see that engagement.

10. Brooke clearly has a lot of anger and frustration with DHS 

and with the removal of her children. There is a lack of trust between 

her and any of the professional team members attempting to work 

with her. Brooke has expressed feeling that DHS has lied to the 

court, and does not recognize any positive work on her part. Her 

focus on her anger towards DHS is a barrier to her addressing the 

areas in her life that this court believes is necessary for reunification.

Brooke and this team are encouraged to continue to work on building 

a relationship that facilitates trust and progress.

The court determined that placement with the intervenor was not in the 

children’s best interest:

12. Brooke’s mother has requested placement of all three 

children. . . . At the time of the children’s initial removal, DHS did not

recommend placement with [the maternal grandparents] due to their 

inappropriate behavior at the time that DHS was executing the 

removal. They were verbally aggressive with the worker, 

uncooperative, and told the children that children are molested in 

foster care. This is particularly concerning given that the maternal 

grandparents [are] licensed foster parents. The court agreed with 

the assessment the children should not be placed in their care, and 

confirmed that order at the Adjudication hearing and the Disposition 

hearing. Much like Brooke, [grandmother] has animosity towards 

DHS that creates difficulty in building a working relationship. [She]

reports that she has a brain injury that affects her ability to

emotionally regulate. As a result, [maternal grandmother] has been 

inappropriate with DHS and with providers. DHS reports that [she]

frequently texts about placement of the children and visitation. When 

[she] does not get the response she wants, she becomes upset and 

the children are placed in the middle of it. For example, the maternal 

grandparents were not appropriate during a [family team meeting]

and the facilitator had to direct them to stop talking. There is some 

question about whether this home will be able to maintain their foster 
8

care/adoptive license. Four Oaks is requiring additional information 

from them before a determination can be made. In addition, DHS 

has concerns regarding whether [maternal grandmother] has the 

ability to provide care for the children. Both grandparents are on 

disability. [Grandmother] reports that she is paralyzed in her arm and 

hand. She also reports suffering negative [e]ffects from a brain injury 

she suffered. The children have expressed concerns regarding their 

grandfather’s vision and ability to drive. DHS has asked for further 

medical documentation to determine whether there are any medical 

reasons that would prevent the maternal grandparents from

providing care to the children. This court has ordered supervised 

visitation with the grandparents in the past because of the 

inappropriate conversations they have had with or in front of the 

children. To the grandmother’s credit, she acknowledged and 

apologized for her behavior. However, she still lacks insight and 

understanding as to why the children were removed from her 

daughter, or why they have not been placed in her care. The court

has responsibility to engage in concurrent planning as well as to 

minimize the number of moves these children experience. They are 

in concurrent homes at this time, although the youngest is separated 

from the older two. There is not current evidence that the

grandparents will be able to be licensed to adopt these, nor that it 

would be in the children’s best interest to be placed with them at this 

time.

Permanency hearing. The court scheduled a permanency hearing, which 

was held on May 20 and July 8. The court entered its order on July 8. In denying 

Brooke’s request for a six-month extension, the court found:

Brooke has struggled to engage in services, to be open an[d] honest 

about her substance use disorder, and her mental health needs. She 

is resistive to DHS and her [Family-Centered Service (FCS)]

provider. Brooke has been expected to engage in mental health

services but testified on July 8, 2021[,] that prior to June 2021, she 

had only attended therapy a handful of times. Since June, she has 

seen her mental health provider only about [three] times. Her mental 

health provider also provides substance abuse counseling and she 

sees her once a month for substance abuse. In addition to taking 

her medication, Brooke is expected to attend multiple groups a week 

at UCS. Brooke has not consistently done so. Brooke tested positive 

for cocaine in March 2021. Brooke is unwilling to provide information 

about who she was with when using. She is also unwilling to share

information about her romantic partners. Brooke isn’t able to 

recognize why it is important for the court to know that she is around 

safe, stable individuals to help support her long term recovery. 
9

Based on the progress that has been made, coupled with Brooke’s

resistance to working with providers, the court does not find an 

extension to be appropriate.

The court noted again that neither father had engaged in services. The 

court modified the permanency goal to termination of parental rights.

Termination. The permanency review and termination-of-parental-rights 

hearing was held on August 27 and 31, September 20 and 23, and October 18. 

The record indicates Thomas attended a few hours of the August 27 hearing but 

did not return after a break. He did not participate further. Thomas had provided 

no support for his children and had ceased all communication with DHS.

In her testimony Brooke acknowledged she had missed visits and 

appointments “in the past” but testified she was currently “doing what I’m supposed 

to be doing right now.” Her individual USC counselor was providing co-occurring 

mental-health and substance-abuse sessions and she had attended six sessions

in ten weeks. The individual sessions were conducted virtually. Her group 

sessions had returned to an in-person format in June; she attended five group 

sessions in June, four group sessions in July, and two in August. She was also 

speaking with a domestic violence advocate, had suitable housing, and 

employment. Brooke asked that the children be returned to her or that she be 

given more time to work toward reunification. 

Brooke denied the children had ever witnessed the domestic violence 

between her and Terrell. She did not remember T.A. calling 911 and Brooke 

interrupting the call to state everything was fine. Brooke testified she did not think 

arguments and fights behind closed doors with her significant other were wrong; 

rather, it was “normal.” She did not believe her abuse of prescription opiates was 
10

a reason for removing the children because she “was taking care of that on my 

own.” When asked about the reports she did not take feedback from service 

providers well, Brooke stated, “I have not been any—against them or anything they 

said to me. Since I was told take the feedback without fighting about it, without 

saying anything about it, I have not went against [Sarah] Swinton or anything she’s 

stated.” Brooke then called the State’s attorney a “Dumb ass.” And when asked 

if Brooke thought there was still work for her to do about her defensiveness, she 

responded: “No. . . . I simply don’t like you.” 

Brooke continued to be angry with DHS. She stressed the affidavit 

supporting removal contained a lie—that she was going to be kicked out of MAT.

4

And she stated she believed DHS social worker Whitney Gamm was going to make

money by adopting her three children out. 

Amy Winters, Brooke’s UCS Healthcare therapist, testified “from what she’s 

shared with me, it would appear she has made progress.” Winters stated, “I don’t 

know enough about Brooke to give a professional opinion about [MAT] a program 

that I don’t run.” Winters also stated a number of times that she had only been 

working with Brooke since June. When asked about Brooke’s apparent readiness 

to change, Winters stated Brooke was in the “accent stage.” Winters could not 

remember Brooke’s relapse risk. And, when asked what Brooke’s prognosis was, 

Winters stated, “We’re making progress.”

 

4 As noted in footnote 3, the affidavit notes only that “it’s reported that the mother 

may be dropped from the UCS treatment program for failure to meet.” (Emphasis 

added.)
11

On September 20, Gamm testified and acknowledged Brooke was 

participating in recommended interactions with a domestic violence advocate, 

mental-health therapy, and substance-abuse treatment. Reports of Brooke’s 

interactions during visits were generally positive. 

Gamm, however, expressed concern because both Brooke’s UCS 

treatment and diagnoses were unclear. She did not understand how Brooke was 

progressing through MAT programming and having her expectations lowered even 

though Brooke was not compliant with program expectations. Gamm was 

concerned because Brooke was asked by DHS to get drug screens on August 14

and December 21, 2020, and on February 17, 2021, but Brooke failed to show.

5

Gamm testified that when she met with Brooke in late March or early April, she 

was not aware Brooke had tested positive for cocaine at UCS because Brooke did 

not disclose that test result. She stated that while Brooke appeared to be refraining 

from opiates, she was experimenting with a new substance and the “cocaine 

positive wasn’t found until she was ordered to re-sign a release because she had 

revoked [MAT’s] release from the department.” Consequently, in April when 

Brooke agreed to wear the sweat patch, which tested negative for all but 

methadone, DHS did not have a full picture. Then, on August 2, Brooke was again 

a no- show when DHS requested a drug screen. Gamm was questioned about 

Brooke’s stated reason for not attending the August 2 drug screen—that she would 

have been late for work. Gamm responded she was offered a ride to the testing 

and:

 

5 Brooke submitted a drug screen for MAT in March and the April 1 result indicated 

positive for cocaine. Brooke did not share this information with DHS.
12

[Brooke] had indicated that her job was rather flexible, and in 

following up—when I followed up with her manager, they had 

indicated to me that they would have allowed her to go and be late, 

that they have a number of employees in similar situations, and they 

would have allowed her to be late to work had she dropped—or done 

a drug screen.

Gamm also expressed concern because UCS’s drug screens were not completely 

random. Though drug screens did not occur every Thursday, Brooke knew she 

could be tested on Thursdays when she arrived to pick up her weekly doses. 

Gamm testified Brooke had not yet taken accountability for DHS’s 

involvement with the family and lacked insight about the effects of substance 

abuse and domestic violence on the children. Gamm testified insight and 

accountability are important: “For [a parent] to understand that the reason the

department became involved were the safety concerns and helping them fix those 

issues and be supportive to them so that we return children to never have to 

become involved or re-remove children again.”

With respect to Brooke’s request the maternal grandmother and her 

significant other be allowed to be a placement for all three children, Gamm testified 

the maternal grandmother had failed to provide requested information concerning 

the brain injury she had suffered, resulting in her inability to regulate her emotions 

as well as physical disability, both of which countermanded safe placement of the 

children in her and her significant other’s care.

DHS, the FCS provider, and the children’s GAL all recommended 

termination of parental rights. The court terminated Thomas’s rights under Iowa 

Code section 232.116(1)(b), (e), and (f) (2021). Brooke’s rights were terminated
13

under paragraphs (d) and (l) as to all three children, (f) as to A.A. and T.A., and (h) 

as to Z.S.

Brooke and Thomas appeal. Brooke contests the grounds for termination, 

asserts the court should have allowed her additional time, claims termination is not 

in the children’s best interests, and argues the court erred in denying her request 

to place all three children in a guardianship with the maternal grandparents. The 

father asserts the court should have granted him additional time to seek 

reunification and argues termination of his rights was not necessary because his 

children are safe in their placement with the paternal grandparents.

II. Scope and Standard of review.

We review the termination of parental rights de novo, giving weight to the 

juvenile court’s finding of facts. In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014). We 

give weight to the juvenile court’s findings as to witness credibility because of its 

superior position to observe the witnesses and their demeanor. See In re K.P., 

No. 13-0100, 2013 WL 1457845, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2013).

III. Discussion.

A. Three-step analysis and burden of proof: When reviewing a termination 

of parental rights, we consider the three steps outlined in Iowa Code section 

232.116: (1) whether the State’s evidence supports a ground for termination; 

(2) whether termination is in the children’s best interests; and (3) whether any 

exceptions to termination apply. In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219–20 (Iowa 2016). 

We look for clear and convincing evidence, that is, whether the State’s proof leaves

us with no “serious or substantial doubts” about the correctness of the juvenile 

court’s conclusions of law. Id. at 219 (citation omitted). 
14

It is the State’s burden to prove grounds for termination exist by clear and 

convincing evidence; “the parent resisting termination bears the burden to 

establish an exception” under Iowa Code section 232.116(3). In re A.S., 906 

N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018).

B. The mother’s appeal. 

Grounds exist. Brooke contends the State did not prove the statutory 

grounds for termination. When, as here, the court rests its decision on more than

one paragraph under section 232.116(1), we may affirm on any supported ground. 

In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010). We will address paragraphs (f) and 

(h) as both require the State to prove a child has been adjudicated CINA, been out 

of the parent’s custody for a specified statutory period, and cannot be returned to 

the parent “at the present time.”6 The mother contests only the issue of whether 

the children could safely be returned to her at the present time, meaning “at the 

time of the termination hearing.” See id.

Brooke asserts that because she has a “proven commitment” to her children

and has engaged with the provided services, she is in the same position as a 

parent whose termination was reversed in In re C.Z., 956 N.W.2d 113 (Iowa 2021). 

In C.Z., the supreme court found clear and convincing evidence was lacking that 

 

6

Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) is applicable to children (1) “four years of age or 

older” (2) who have been adjudicated CINA, (3) have been removed from the 

parent’s physical custody “for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the 

last twelve consecutive months,” and (4) cannot be returned to the parent’s 

custody “at the present time” without risk of adjudicatory harm. 

Section 232.116(1)(h) is applicable to children (1) “three years of age or 

younger” (2) who have been adjudicated CINA, (3) have been removed “for at least 

six months of the last twelve months, or for the last six consecutive months,” and 

(4) cannot be returned to the parent’s custody “at the present time” without risk of 

adjudicatory harm.
15

the child could not have been safely returned to her father’s custody, noting the 

father’s consistent engagement with services and the testimony of “key witnesses”

who recommended return of the child to the father. 956 N.W.2d at 123. The court 

wrote:

The testimony of the therapist, counselor, and Early Access social 

worker showed the father’s responsiveness to these services. The 

[court appointed special advocate] and [Family Safety, Risk, and 

Permanency (FSRP)] worker stated his visits with C.Z. were positive; 

he demonstrated an eagerness to learn how to care for his daughter 

and a concern with her well-being. The father attended most of the 

offered visits, while a few were cancelled due to C.Z. or her father 

not feeling well. Three DHS workers and the FSRP worker testified 

as to the father’s responsiveness to services. Their testimony 

demonstrated the father’s cooperation throughout the case and 

ultimately, all agreed that he was capable of caring for C.Z.

The father violated a court order, drank alcohol after his 

relapse, and provided one tampered drug screen and a positive drug 

test. However, he showed remorse, admitted his alcohol use at the 

termination hearing, and provided negative drug screens after the 

tampered drug screen. He testified he had completely abstained 

from alcohol in the past few months and he understood that he 

should not have alcohol, as it had been a proven trigger.

The father at times was less than forthcoming and showed 

poor judgment when he insulted the judge on a recorded line and 

when he delayed reporting his relapse. His relapse prompted DHS 

to seek termination. But he made amends and got back on track. 

DHS ultimately changed its position and recommended C.Z. be 

returned to her father.

Id.

There are some similarities between Brooke’s position and C.Z.’s father—

both relapsed and had bad judgment in insulting others. 

There are notable differences as well. In C.Z., the father had moved to four 

overnight visits per week, which continued for about thirty days. Id. at 116. He 

transported the child “to and from daycare, handled her medical appointments, and 

took care of her daily needs.” Id. He continued working at the workplace where 
16

he had been employed through the duration of the case. Id. In contrast, Brooke 

had not moved beyond supervised visits, had not attended the majority of her 

children’s medical and mental-health appointments, and had changed employment

during the course of the termination hearings. Brooke did not delay reporting her 

positive test for cocaine—she did not report it at all to DHS. Brooke has not shown 

a responsiveness to services or shown cooperation throughout the case. Rather, 

the testimony of Brooke’s service providers was that Brooke had become more 

consistent after the permanency hearing, i.e. after the court changed the 

permanency goal to termination of parental rights and adoption. 

On our de novo review, we concur in the juvenile court’s assessment:

Since the children’s removal, Brooke has struggled with 

attending all her offered family interactions. She had to sign a 

visitation contract with her FCS worker to address visitation 

expectations. Those expectations included confirming visits, 

participating in CPP, and following FCS recommendations regarding 

parenting. Brooke has trouble accepting parenting direction from 

FCS. She becomes escalated and agitated in her communications 

with FCS and DHS. When attentive and focused, Brooke shows 

good parenting skills. However, when distracted, she misses her 

children’s cues. Brooke provides consistent affection, but

sometimes intrusive affection.

Brooke is now seeing a therapist who provides both her 

substance abuse counseling and her mental health therapy. . . . Ms. 

Winters showed little awareness of Brooke’s prior treatment history, 

substance abuse history, and current engagement with MAT. The 

therapist was unable to provide clear goals of what was being 

addressed in therapy. Ms. Winters was not aware of the 

recommendations for accountability by Brooke’s prior therapist. Ms. 

Winters was defensive in her testimony, and the court was unable to 

gain useful information about Brooke’s progress in addressing both

her substance use and her mental health needs.

Brooke’s own testimony highlights the lack of progress she 

has made since the children’s removal. Brooke still does not 

understand why her children were removed. She cannot see how

her report to UCS regarding a daily opioid use would impact her 

ability to care for the children safely. Brooke testified that she lied 

about daily use in order to be admitted into the MAT. Even if the 
17

court found that credible, it still demonstrates significant thinking 

errors on Brooke’s part. Brooke is able to provide negative drug 

screens for her treatment provider, but those drug screens are not 

truly random. Brooke does not provide random drug screens when 

asked by DHS, even knowing that the court considers missed drug 

screens to be positive.

Brooke takes little accountability in how this case has 

progressed. 

We are also concerned with Brooke’s rejection of T.A.’s statements she 

witnessed domestic violence.

We acknowledge Brooke had begun to identify unhealthy behaviors and 

setting boundaries with others. And she has belatedly engaged with Early Head 

Start and CPP. It remains to be seen if Brooke can internalize the concepts she 

is learning. There is clear and convincing evidence the children could not be 

returned to Brooke’s custody at the time of the hearing.

Additional time is not warranted. The juvenile court denied Brooke’s request 

for additional time after the permanency hearing in July. We have set out the 

court’s reasons above. After another four months, the mother only recently 

engaged with services on a more consistent basis. Therefore, we are not confident 

the need for removal will no longer exist after an additional six months. See Iowa 

Code § 232.104(2)(b). 

Best interests. We next address Brooke’s claim that termination of her 

parental rights is not the children’s best interests. In determining a child’s best 

interests, we are required to “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the 

best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and 

to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Id.

§ 232.116(2). “[T]he legislature ‘has significantly, and not too subtly, identified a 
18

child’s safety and his or her need for a permanent home as the defining elements 

in a child’s best interests.’” In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011) (citation 

omitted). 

Two quotes from service providers sum up the children’s need for safety 

and permanency. T.A. and A.A.’s Family Support Specialist noted in a May 17, 

2021 report: “The uncertainty of not knowing their permanent placement has been 

taking a huge toll on the older children.” And in June 2021, “Given [Z.S.’s]

A[dverse] C[hildhood] E[xperiences] score, developmental stage, and his 

attachment needs it is imperative that a plan be developed to provide [Z.S.] with a 

long-term option for a safe and nurturing home.” When written, the children had 

been out of the mother’s custody for about a year. 

Only after the permanency hearing did Brooke begin to more consistently 

engage in mental-health counseling and domestic-abuse services. Her therapist’s 

notes indicate Brooke spent a great deal of time in her therapy sessions airing her 

grievances about DHS rather than addressing her own issues and needs. And, at 

the termination hearing, Brooke minimized the effects of domestic abuse on the 

children’s well-being and minimized her mental-health needs and her own 

accountability in failing to engage in services. “Time is a critical element. A parent 

cannot wait until the eve of termination, after the statutory time periods for 

reunification have expired, to begin to express an interest in parenting.” In re C.B., 

611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000).

The children have been removed from parental care since June 2020.

Despite having more than the statutory period to do so, Brooke has not

successfully addressed her substance abuse or mental health or taken 
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accountability for the removal. A.A. and T.A. are placed together with their paternal 

grandparents who are willing to adopt if rights are terminated. A.A. and T.A. have 

been doing well in this home. Z.S., too, is placed in a home willing to adopt if rights 

are terminated. Both DHS and the GAL indicated that termination was in the best

interests of these children. These children need and deserve permanency. We 

find termination of parental rights and adoption are in the children’s best interests. 

No permissive factor precludes termination. Brooke asserts the court need 

not terminate her rights because her mother is willing to be a guardian for the 

children. “[A] guardianship is not a legally preferable alternative to termination.”

A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 477 (citation omitted). Guardianships do not provide true 

permanency because, “[b]y their very nature, guardianships can be modified 

or terminated.” In re E.A., No. 20-0849, 2020 WL 4498164, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. 

Aug. 5, 2020) (citing A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 477–78). We conclude the exceptions 

to termination do not apply. We affirm the mother’s appeal.

C. The father’s appeal. Thomas asserts in his appeal, “The juvenile court

erred in terminating the Father’s parental rights and in not granting additional time 

for reunification when Iowa Code [section] 232.116(3) applied as the child was 

placed with relatives.” We first note the father did not seek additional time for 

reunification during the termination hearings. Consequently, that claim is not 

preserved for our review. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 773 (Iowa 2012) (“[T]he 

general rule that appellate arguments must first be raised in the trial court applies 

to CINA and termination of parental rights cases.”).
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The father does not contest grounds for termination exist7 but asserts, 

“There was no need to terminate his legal relationship with his children when the 

status quo could have been maintained in his own parents’ home.” We cannot 

agree.

“[O]nce the State has proven a ground for termination, the parent resisting 

termination bears the burden to establish an exception to termination.” A.S., 906 

N.W.2d at 476. The father has not carried his burden. We have already noted “a

guardianship is not a legally preferable alternative to termination.” Id. at 477 

(citation omitted). We will not keep T.A. and A.A. in limbo any longer. The paternal 

grandparents are ready and willing to adopt and provide the children with 

permanence. We affirm the termination of Thomas’s parental rights to T.A. and 

A.A.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

 

7 Because the father does not contest the grounds for termination or the bestinterests framework, we need not discuss the first two steps of the three-step 

analysis. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010).