Plaintiff, Civil Action No.:

10-261 (POS)

v.

PRESSLER & PRESSLER, LLP., MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Defendant.

This case comes before the Court on defendant Pressler & Pressler, L.LP.’s (‘Pressler &

Pressler”) motion for summary judgment. [Docket Entry No. 22j. In its motion for summary

judgment, Pressler & Pressler asserts that the statute of limitations has already run on all of

Plaintiffs claims. For the reasons stated below, Pressler & Pressler’s motion is GRANTED,

Plaintiff Norris Cobin’s (“Plaintiff’) complaint concerns Pressler & Pressler’s alleged

violations ofthe Fair Debt Collection Practice Act (‘FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 etseq. while trying

to recover the outstanding debt on a credit card (the “Account”). The Account was opened inPlaintiffs name on March 5, 1997. According to Plaintiff, the Account was opened by Shannon

Bellamy before Plaintiffand Ms. Bellamy were married. Plaintifffurther states that the Account was

opened without his knowledge or consent. On March 25, 2002, Plaintiff and Ms. Bellamy were

divorced. At the divorce settlement hearing, the issue of’ Ms. Bellamy’s fraudulent accounts was

raised, but there was no finding of fraud and no listing of which accounts were allegedly fraudulent.Instead thc couit stated that Plaintiti would not he responsibic toi fr iudulcnt accounts but Plaintilt
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acquisition of the Account, NCFSI referred the Account to their collection counsel, Pressler &Pressler, On January 10, 2006, Pressler & Pressler initiated collection activity. Plaintiffstates that

he informally notified Prcssler & Pressler that the debt actually belonged to Ms. Bellamy. On or

about February 1 5, 2006, Pressler & Pressler filed a complaint to recover on the Account with the

Superior Court of Bergen County New Jersey, Special Civil Part. Service of process followed

shortly thereafter. Plaintifffailed to file an answer in the lawsuit, but Plaintiff alleges that he again

informally notified Pressler & Pressler that the Account belonged to Ms. Bellamy. On June 8, 2006,

default judgment was entered against Plaintiff. On December 11, 2008, the court signed an Order

and Execution against Earnings directed toward Plaintiffsthen-employer. On February 4,2009, the

court vacated the defaultjudgment and ordered the garnished funds returned to Plaintiff, On August

3, 2009. the complaint against Plaintiff was dismissed.

Plaintiff filed his original complaint in the instant matter on January 15.2010. alleging that

Pressler & Pressier violated the FDCPA. Specifically. Plaintiff alleged that Pressler & Pressler

obtained a default judgment against Plaintiff despite knowing that Plaintiff was not responsible for

the debt. On May 24, 2010. Plaintifffiled an amended complaint, adding the allegations that, outsideof the courtroom on February 6, 2009, a member of Pressler & Pressler (1) called Plaintiff a “low

life liar,” and (2) “told [Plaintiff] that [Plaintiff] would lose his job as a result of the wage

garnishments.” Am. Compl. L, 20-21.
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return a verdict for the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,248

(1986). Such a fact is considered material only ifthe fact may affect the outcome ofthe litigation

based on the substantive law. Id. “In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district courtmay not make credibility determinations or engage in anyweighing ofthe evidence; instead, the nonmoving party’s evidence ‘is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his

favor.” Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477

U.S. at 255).

After a party flies a motion for summary judgment along with supporting papers, the nonmoving partymust produce specific factsshowing that there is a genuine issue fortrial.Jersey Cent

Power & Light Co. v. Twp. ofLacey 772 F.2d 1103, 1109 (3d Cir.1985) (citation omitted).

“[U]nsupported allegations. . . and pleadings are insufficient to repel summaryjudgment.” Schochv. Ffrst Fid Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654,657 (3d Cir.1990) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

III

An action under the FDCPA must be brought “within one year from the date on which the

violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1962k(d). Additionally, “[w]here FDCPA claims are premised upon

allegations ofimproperpursuit ofdebt collection litigation” the statute oflimitationsruns from eitherthe date of filing of the underlying collection action or the date on which the purported debtor is

served, depending on the circuit. See SchafJhauser v. Citibank, 340 Fed. App’x 128,130-31 (3d Cir.

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attempts to avoid this result by arguing that the operative date from which to determine the statute

of limitations is August 3. 2009, when the state complaint was dismissed. However, the ThirdCircuit has already considered and rejected this argument. See Scha/ihauser, 340 Fed. App’x at 1 30-

31. Thus, all of these claims are barred by the statute of limitations,

ORDER

This matter, having come before the Court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

[Docket Entry No. 22], and this Court having considered the parties’ submissions without oral

argument; and for the reasons stated above,

IT IS on this 2nd of March, 2012,

ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; and

ORDERED that Plaintiffs complaint is DISMISSEI) WITHOUT PREJUDICE and that this

case is CLOSED.

PETER G. SHERIDAN. U.S.D.J.

March 2. 2012

Plaintiff also claims that Pressler & Pressler employee Thomas M. Brogan. Esq. called

Plaintiff a lo Ide hat and said once the see this garnishment “ou ie going to lose oui job

These statements were made during a break in the February 6, 2009 hearing at the state courthouse.

The Court finds that, as Plaintiff was within immediate proximity of the Hon. Liliana S. DeAvila

Selibi, J.S.C. and the protection ofthe court, the Plaintiff was not “abused” as that language is used

in 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(2).

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