NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

 :

KENDRA BROWN, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-3127 (MLC)

 :

Plaintiff, : O P I N I O N

 :

v. :

 :

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, :

et al., :

 :

Defendants. :

 :

THE PLAINTIFF, who is pro se, applies for in-forma-pauperis

relief under 28 U.S.C. § (“Section”) 1915 (“Application”). (Dkt.

entry no. 1, Appl.) This Court, based upon the plaintiff’s

financial situation, will (1) grant the Application, and (2) deem

the Complaint to be filed. The Court may now (1) review the

Complaint, and (2) dismiss it sua sponte if it is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,

or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court will

dismiss the Complaint, as it is frivolous and fails to state a

claim on which relief may be granted.

THE PLAINTIFF brings this action (“Federal Action”) pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of her constitutional

rights in a dispute over a mortgage on her property (“Mortgaged

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Property”). (See dkt. entry no. 1, Compl.) The Court is able 1

to discern that (1) a foreclosure action concerning the Mortgaged

Property was instituted in New Jersey Superior Court (“State

Foreclosure Action”), (2) a judgment was entered therein, and (3)

the plaintiff is currently litigating under the State Foreclosure

Action by, inter alia, moving to set aside the aforementioned

judgment. (See id.) The plaintiff appears to name a bank

(“Bank”) and the counsel representing that bank (“Bank Counsel”)

as defendants.2

THE PLAINTIFF is attempting to avoid an order in the State

Foreclosure Action. The proper way to do so is to seek review

through the state appellate process, and then seek certiorari

directly to the United States Supreme Court. See D.C. Ct. of

Apps. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr.

Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-16 (1923).

THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE prohibits adjudication of an

action where the relief requested would require a federal court

to either determine whether a state court’s decision is wrong or

 The plaintiff also has brought an action to recover 1

damages for violations of her constitutional rights in a dispute

over a mortgage on a different piece of property. See Brown v.

U.S. Bank National Association, No. 11-3123 (D.N.J.).

 The Office of the Clerk of the Court, on the electronic 2

docket (1) incorrectly lists the name of the Bank, and (2) does

not list the Bank Counsel as a defendant. Those omissions are

understandable, in view of the manner in which the plaintiff

presents her claims.

2

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void that decision, and thus would prevent a state court from

enforcing its orders. See McAllister v. Allegheny Cnty. Fam.

Div., 128 Fed.Appx. 901, 902 (3d Cir. 2005). This Court cannot

directly or indirectly review, negate, void, or provide relief

that would invalidate a decision in the State Foreclosure Action. 

See Moncrief v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 275 Fed.Appx. 149,

152-53 (3d Cir. 2008) (affirming judgment dismissing claims

concerning state foreclosure action, inter alia, as barred by

Rooker-Feldman doctrine because plaintiff sought redress from

state court judgment); Ayres-Fountain v. E. Sav. Bank, 153

Fed.Appx. 91, 92 (3d Cir. 2005) (instructing district court to

dismiss complaint concerning state foreclosure action under

Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also El Ali v. Litton Loan Serv’g,

217 Fed.Appx. 115, 116 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007) (dismissing appeal from

order that dismissed claims concerning foreclosure action, inter

alia, as barred by Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Shih-Ling Chen v.

Rochford, 145 Fed.Appx. 723, 725 (3d Cir. 2005) (same).

THE FEDERAL ACTION, to the extent that the decisions in the

State Foreclosure Action may be viewed as being final, also is

barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Res judicata, or claim 3

preclusion:

 The Court may sua sponte address affirmative defenses 3

when a plaintiff proceeds under Section 1915. Ezekoye v. Ocwen

Fed. Bank, 179 Fed.Appx. 111, 114 (3d Cir. 2005).

3

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will bar a suit if (1) the judgment in the first action

is valid, final and on the merits; (2) the parties in

both actions are the same or are in privity with each

other; and (3) the claims in the second action . . .

arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the

claims in the first one.

Sibert v. Phelan, 901 F.Supp. 183, 186 (D.N.J. 1995). Thus,

under res judicata, a judgment is given “preclusive effect” by

“foreclosing litigation of matters that should have been raised

in an earlier suit”. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of

Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984). As a result, a judgment

“foreclos[es] litigation of a matter that never has been

litigated, because of a determination that it should have been

advanced in an earlier suit”. Id.

ALL OF THE COMPONENTS of res judicata may be satisfied here,

as (1) the state court in the State Foreclosure Action has issued

an order or a judgment, which is valid, see Flood v. Braaten, 727

F.2d 303, 308 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating judgment that is final and

thus res judicata in one state’s courts will be given full faith

and credit by all other United States courts), (2) the plaintiff

and the Bank are parties to the State Foreclosure Action, and the

Bank Counsel is in privity with the Bank, and (3) the claims in

the Federal Action arise from the same transactions or

occurrences as the claims that were raised, or should have been

raised, in the State Foreclosure Action. See Moncrief, 275

Fed.Appx. at 153-54 (affirming judgment dismissing claims

4

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concerning state foreclosure action, inter alia, as barred by res

judicata); Ezekoye, 179 Fed.Appx. at 113 (dismissing appeal as

frivolous — in federal action concerning state foreclosure

proceeding — from order dismissing claims that were and could

have been raised against bank and its employees, who were not all

parties to state proceeding, based on res judicata); AyresFountain, 153 Fed.Appx. at 92 (noting federal claims concerning

state foreclosure action would be barred by res judicata); see

also El Ali, 217 Fed.Appx. at 116 n.1 (dismissing appeal from

order that dismissed claims concerning state foreclosure action,

inter alia, as barred by res judicata).

THE STATE FORECLOSURE ACTION also may be viewed as ongoing,

as the plaintiff appears to be engaging in litigation therein. A

federal court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction, pursuant

to the Younger abstention doctrine, when (1) a state court action

is ongoing, (2) important state interests are implicated, and (3)

there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in state

court. See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar

Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,

43-54 (1971). This Court cannot interfere with the ongoing State

Foreclosure Action. See Gray v. Pagano, 287 Fed.Appx. 155, 157-

58 (3d Cir. 2008) (dismissing complaint filed in connection to

ongoing state foreclosure action, inter alia, as barred by

Younger abstention); see also El Ali, 217 Fed.Appx. at 116 n.1

5

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(dismissing appeal from order that dismissed claims concerning

ongoing state foreclosure action as barred by Younger abstention).

THE COURT ALSO NOTES that the Bank and the Bank Counsel do

not appear to be state actors, and thus any claims asserting

constitutional violations are frivolous. See Brookhart v. Rohr,

385 Fed.Appx. 67, 68 (3d Cir. 2010) (dismissing appeal from order

that dismissed allegations concerning constitutionally violative

conduct by private parties in state court foreclosure action

because they were not state actors); James v. Heritage Valley

Fed. Credit Union, 197 Fed.Appx. 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating

defendant credit union and its employees were not state actors

for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Awala v. Wachovia Corp., 156

Fed.Appx. 527, 528 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating bank is not state

actor merely because it operates within a regulated industry). 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not cover merely private conduct, no matter

how wrongful. St. Croix v. Etenad, 183 Fed.Appx. 230, 231 (3d

Cir. 2006).

THE COURT will dismiss the Complaint for the aforementioned

reasons. The Court will issue an appropriate order and judgment.

 s/ Mary L. Cooper 

MARY L. COOPER

United States District Judge

Dated: November 14, 2011

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