Denny Chin, of the United States District Court for the Southern D istrict of New * York, sitting by

designation. The Honor able Rosemar y S. Pool er, origina lly

a member

of the pa nel, did not ** participate in consideration of this appeal. The two rema ining membe rs of the pa nel, who ar e in agree ment, have de termined the matter. See28 U.S.C. § 46(d); 2d Cir. Interna l Operating Pr oc e dure E; United States v. De simone , 140 F.3d 457 ( 2d Cir. 1998). 07-4715-cv Maharam v. Patterson U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT SUM M AR

Y O RD ER R U L I N G S B Y S U M M A R Y OR D E R D O N OT HA V E P R E C E D E N T I A L E F F E C T . C I T A T I ON T O A SUM M A R Y O R D ER FI LED O N O R AFTER JAN U A R Y 1, 20 07 , I S PER M I TTED A N D I S GO V ERN ED B Y T H IS C O U R T ’S L O C A L R U L E 3 2 .1 .1 A N D F E D E R A L R U L E O F A P P E L L A T E P R O C E D U R E 3 2 .1 . W H EN C I TI N G A S U M M A R Y O R D ER I N A D O C U M ENT FI LED W I TH TH I S C O U R T, A PA R TY M U S T C I T E E I T HE R T HE F E D E R A L A P P E N D I X OR A N E L E C T R ON I C D A T A B A S E ( W I T H T HE NO TATI O N “ S UM M ARY O RDER”) . A PARTY CI TI NG A S UM M ARY O RDER M US T S ERVE A CO PY O F IT O N A N Y P A R T Y N O T R E P R E S E N T E D B Y C O U N S E L . 1 At a stated te rm of the United States Court of A ppeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 2 Daniel Patric k Moy nihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of Ne w York, 3 on the 11 day

of Mar ch, two thousand ten. th 4 5 PRES ENT: 6 J OSEPH M. McLAUGHL I N, 7 Circuit Judge, 8 DENNYCHI N, * 9 District Judge. ** 10

____________________________________________________________ 11 12 Patsy

Mahar am

, 13 14 Plain tif f- Ap pe lla nt, 15 16 -v- (07-4715- cv) 17 18 J ames Patterson e t al

. , 19 20 Defendants-A ppellees

. 21

___________________________________________________________2 1 Appea

ringfor a ppellant: Patsy

Mahar am, pro se, N ew Yor k, N.Y. 2 3 Appea

ringfor a ppellees: Eliz abeth A. McNamar a (Christopher Robinson, on the brief

), 4 Davis Wright Tr emaine LL P, New Yor k, N.Y. 5 6 UP ON DU E C ON SID ER AT ION , I T IS H EREBYOR DE RE D , AD JU DGED , AND 7 DECREED that th e dis tr ic t c ourt jud g me nt i s AF F IRM ED

. 8 Plaintiff-Appellant Patsy Mahar am, pro se, a

ppeals fr om the September 17, 2007 9 judgme nt of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ne w York ( Wood, 10 Judge ) grantingsummary judgme nt to the defe ndants-appe llees and dismissing Ma hara m’s 11 copy

right infring ement cla im. W e assume the parties’ familiarity with the underly

ing f acts a nd 12 the proc edura l history of the c ase. 13 This Court reviews a n order grantingsummary

judgme nt de novo and f

ocuses on whe ther 14 the district court prope rly conclude d that there wer e no g enuine issues a s to any materia l fac t and 15 that the moving pa rty was e ntitled to judgment as a matter of la

w. Se eMi lle r v . W

olp off & 16 Abramson, L.L.P. , 321 F.3d 292, 300 ( 2d Cir. 2003). In deter mining whe ther ther e ar e g enuine 17 iss ue s o f m ate ri a l f a c t, t his Court is “ re qu ir e d to re so lve a ll ambi guit ie s a nd dr aw a ll p e rm iss ibl e 18 fac tual infere nces in fa vor of the pa

rty ag ainst whom summary

judgme nt is sought.” Terry v. 19 As hc ro

ft , 336 F.3d 128, 137 ( 2d Cir. 2003) (interna l quotation marks omitted). The denia l of a 20 rec usal motion is reviewed f or abuse of discre tion. United States v. Morrison , 153 F.3d 34, 48 21 (2d Cir. 1998). 22 In order

to establish a claim for

copy right infring ement, the owne r of a valid copy

right 23 must show: (1) actua l copying by the def endant; and ( 2) that the c opying a mounts to an improper 24 or unlawf

ul appropriation of the protec ted material. See J orgensen v . Epic/Sony Re cords , 351 25 F.3d 46, 51 ( 2d Cir. 2003). Actua l copying “ may be esta blished either by

direc t evidence of3 1 copying or

by indirect e vidence , including a cce ss to the copy righted work, similarities that ar e 2 probative of

copying be tween the works, and e x pert testimony .” Laureyssens v. I dea Group, 3 Inc ., 964 F.2d 131, 140 ( 2d Cir. 1992). Howe ver, “ not all copying r esults in copy right 4 infring ement, eve n if the plaintiff ha s a valid copy right,” Boisson v. Banian, Ltd. , 273 F.3d 262, 5 268 (2d Cir. 2001), and the plaintiff is require d to additionally demonstrate that “substantial 6 simil arity

to protecte d materia l exi sts between the two works,” Laureyssens , 964 F.2d at 140. A 7 defe ndant may

rebut a prima fa cie c ase of

copy right infring ement by

provingindepende nt 8 cre ation. See Procter &Gamble Co. v. Colgate PalmoliveCo. , 199 F.3d 74, 77 ( 2d Cir. 1999). 9 Af

t er h av i n g re v i ew edM ah ar am ’s co nt en t i o n s o nap p ea l an d th e r ec o rdo f p ro ce ed i n gs 10 below, we aff

irm for substantially

the re asons stated by

the district court in its thoroug h opinion. 11 Additionally , we note that Mahara m’s relianc e on Repp v . W ebber , 132 F.3d 882, 889 ( 2d Cir. 12 1997), is misplaced. Repp can be distinguished in two important respe cts. First, unlike in Repp , 13 wher e the plaintiff’ s expert testified that the plaintiff’s wor k was so “striking ly

simil ar” to the 14 defe ndant’s as to pre clude the possibility of indepe ndent cr eation, id. at 890-91, he re, Ma hara m’s 15 tw o e xpe rt s sp e c if ic a lly de c lin e d to of

fe r t he op ini on

“ that th e re sp e c tiv e wo rk s w e re so 16 strikingly

simil ar a s to preclude the possibility of indepe ndent cr eation.” Sec ond, in Repp , the 17 defe ndant submitted only his wife’s a

nd his own aff

idavit, and we c oncluded that the district 18 c ourt

wr on g ly “ a c c e pte d o nly

the ve rs ion

of int e re ste d w itn e sse s o n th e qu e sti on of se pa ra te 19 cre ation.” Id. at 891. Her e, the de fenda nts provided numerous a ffidavits, includingthose of non20 parties, suc h as the a uthor’s for

mer a g ent and se cre tary . Moreove r, the de fenda nts provided 21 ample docume ntary evidenc e—in the for

m of 11 draf

ts and numerous memos with editorial 22 no te s— c or

ro bo ratin gthe a ff

ida vit s. Th e re fo re , th e re wa s n o is su e of mate ri a l f

a c t w ithre sp e c t to 23 independe nt cre ation.4 1 We further find no abuse of

discretion in the district cour t’s denial of Ma

hara m’s rec usal 2 motion. The rec ord demonstrates that neither the district judge nor her husband had a 3 disqualifying f

inancial inter est and, whe n the judg e discove red that her son had owned a 4 potentially

disqualifying inter est duringthe pende ncy of the litigation, she properly deter mined 5 that, beca

use her son sold the stock befor e the judg e wa s awa re that he owned it, re cusal wa s not 6 war

rante d. See28 U.S.C. § 455(f). More over, ne ither the fa ct that the district cour t judge and a 7 defe ndant once lived on the same f loor of an a

partment buildingnor Maha ram’s g ener al and 8 un su

bs tanti ate d a lle g atio ns a

bo ut t he dis tr ic t ju dg e ’s so c ia l c onne c tio ns to t he de fe nd ants wo uld 9 cause a re asonable person to question the c ourt’s impartiality

. Se eUn ite d S tates v . P ite ra , 5 F.3d 10 624, 626 (2d Cir. 1993). 11 We have c onsidered a ll of Mahar am’s arguments and find them to be without merit. 12 Ac c or din g ly , th e jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

is AF F IRM ED

. 13 14 15 F OR TH E CO UR T: 16 Catherine O ’Ha g an Wolfe, Clerk 17 18