* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-11085

Summary Calendar

UWE R. TAYLOR, 

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:10-CV-1158

Before DENNIS, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff Uwe Taylor appeals the determination of the Commissioner of

Social Security, denying him disability benefits. We AFFIRM.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Taylor alleges that he has a variety of problems that qualify as a disability

under 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). These include: chronic pain in his feet, legs, and back,

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

June 28, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
No. 11-11085

2

tarsal tunnel syndrom, nerve entrapment, and plantar fasciitis. His application

for disability benefits was initially denied and plaintiff requested a hearing

before an ALJ, which was held in April, 2009 at which time the plaintiff was 49

years old. The ALJ determined that the plaintiff was not disabled and not

entitled to benefits after the judge concluded that Taylor’s impairments did not

meet the severity requirements of the social security regulations. A vocational

expert also testified before the ALJ that Taylor was capable of working at

various sedentary jobs although he could not return to his prior line of work.

Taylor appealed to the district court, which referred the matter to a magistrate

judge, before ultimately adopting the opinion of the magistrate judge affirming

the ruling of the ALJ. Taylor appeals. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our standard of review of social security disability claims is exceedingly

deferential and limited to two inquiries: whether substantial evidence supports

the ALJ’s decision, and whether the ALJ applied the proper legal standards

when evaluating the evidence. See Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th

Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence is enough that a reasonable mind would support

the conclusion. Id. The evidence “must be more than a scintilla, but it need not

be a preponderance.” Leggett v. Chater, 67F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Any findings of fact by the Commissioner which are

supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Richardson v. Perales, 402

U.S. 389, 390 (1971).

DISCUSSION

The crux ofthe plaintiff’s argumentis thatthe ALJ substituted his opinion

for that of the medical personnel who have treated Taylor since the onset of his

pain. Taylor argues that the ALJ’s conclusion runs contrary to those medical

opinions and is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree with this

assertion. The record indicates that the ALJ used the medical information
No. 11-11085

3

provided by Taylor to determine the plaintiff’s residual functional capacity for

work. Under the regulations and our case law, the determination of residual

functional capacity is the sole responsibility of the ALJ. See Ripley v. Chater, 67

F.3d 552, 557 (5th Cir. 1995). What Taylor characterizes as the ALJ

substituting his opinion is actually the ALJ properly interpreting the medical

evidence to determine his capacity for work. 

We also disagree with Taylor’s assertion that the ALJ’s conclusion is not

supported by substantial evidence. As the magistrate judge explained in

extensive detail, Taylor’s medical records failto corroborate his complaints. The

records include an MRI that was “normal,” an EEG test finding that was

“normal,” neurophysiological studies that were “unremarkable,” and an MRI of

the plaintiff’s brain that was “essentially normal.” Even one of Taylor’s own

doctors remarked that “[i]t appears that the patient does not have any

anatomical reason [for] his pain.” A different doctor testified similarly at the ALJ

hearing. There was substantial evidence for the ALJ’s determination.

Finally, plaintiff asserts that the ALJ did not use the proper legal

standard for determining his disability eligibility. We disagree. Although the

ALJ did not identify the specific applicable legal standard, we agree with the

magistrate judge that the ALJ nevertheless applied the proper standard. While

it is true that the ALJ never cited to Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099, 1101 (5th

Cir. 1985), which provides the appropriate legal standard for determining the

severity of the disability, procedural perfection is not required unless it affects

the substantial rights of a party. See Mays v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th

Cir. 1988). Here, substantial evidence supports the finding of the non-severity

of Taylor’s mental problems. A comprehensive medical exam revealed no

evidence of Taylor’s alleged mental health issues or any reason why mental

problems would prevent him from engaging in gainful activity. In addition, the

medical records showed that Taylor did not take any medications for his mental
No. 11-11085

4

health complaints. He also failed to seek mental health care even after he was

twice referred for mental health treatment at his request. The claimant must

show that he is so functionally impaired by his mental impairment that he is

precluded from engaging in substantial gainful activity. See Hames v. Heckler,

707 F.2d 162, 165 (5th Cir. 1983). He fails to do so, and any error by the ALJ in

notfollowing the procedures set outinStone is harmless. As such, remand is not

required since there is no evidence in the record that Taylor’s mental health

claims are severe enough to prevent him from holding substantial gainful

employment. 

We reject Taylor’s various other claims for essentially the same reasons as

the court below.

CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the district court’s decision upholding the ruling of the ALJ

and reject Taylor’s claims.