NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff–Appellee, 

 v. 

KENNETH W. MEDENBACH, 

Defendant–Appellant.

No. 17-30127

D.C. No. 

1:15-CR-00407-MC-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Michael J. McShane, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted on June 8, 2018

Portland, Oregon

Before: GRABER and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN,** District 

Judge.

Kenneth Medenbach was convicted of two misdemeanors, illegal occupancy 

and camping on federal lands. He was sentenced to five years’ probation with 

standard and special conditions, including Standard Condition #6, prohibiting him 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for 

the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUL 5 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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from traveling outside the District of Oregon without permission of his probation 

officer. Medenbach violated this condition. At the hearing on the violation, the 

U.S. Attorney asked for modifications to other special probation conditions, two of 

which the district judge granted. Specifically, Medenbach was directed to address 

correspondence to federal land agencies to particular agents, and he was prohibited

from entering or camping on federal lands—including agency parking lots and 

offices—without permission. Medenbach now appeals these modifications and the 

judge’s refusal to modify Standard Condition #6. He also filed a separate appeal 

from the judgment of conviction in United States v. Medenbach, No. 16-30189, 

which we affirm in a separate memorandum disposition filed today.

We review probation conditions for abuse of discretion. Malone v. United 

States, 502 F.2d 554, 557 (9th Cir. 1974). District courts have “broad discretion” to 

fashion probation conditions, United States v. Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371, 374 (9th 

Cir. 1988), provided that the conditions “involve only such deprivations of liberty 

or property as are reasonably necessary” to effect the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b). This discretion includes “wide latitude” to 

restrict even fundamental rights. United States v. Blinkinsop, 606 F.3d 1110, 

1118–19 (9th Cir. 2010).

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the standard 

condition prohibiting travel outside the district without permission. Under 18 
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U.S.C. § 3563(b)(14), the court may require that the defendant “remain within the 

jurisdiction of the court, unless granted permission to leave by the court or a 

probation officer.” The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts specifically 

recommends the inclusion of this requirement as a standard condition of probation 

and supervised release for several compelling reasons. Administrative Office of 

U.S. Courts, Overview of Probation and Supervised Release Conditions 13 (2016). 

These include allowing “the probation officer to supervise the defendant by setting 

boundaries for travel without permission and by keeping the probation officer 

informed of the defendant’s whereabouts.” Id. at 19. Probation officers are advised 

to implement this condition by conducting a risk assessment of the defendant’s 

proposed travel, thereby determining “whether the defendant is in compliance with 

conditions of supervision . . . and assess whether travel would disrupt defendant 

needs.” Id. at 21. Standard Condition #6 is entirely reasonable, and its imposition 

here was not an abuse of discretion. Moreover, Medenbach has never been denied 

permission to travel when he has asked his supervising probation officer, and the 

judge stated that he would personally review any denial of Medenbach’s travel 

requests.

2. Nor did the district court impermissibly infringe Medenbach’s First 

Amendment rights when it required that he address his petitions to specific 

individuals at the Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. Forest Service. 
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Medenbach had sent a letter to three BLM offices threatening to “raise up a well 

regulated militia” if the government did not “‘cease and desist’ all activity in Grant 

County.” This could reasonably worry employees. And he has made similar 

comments to federal officials in the past—including references to the standoffs at 

Ruby Ridge and Waco—which this Court has found intimidating. See United 

States v. Medenbach, 116 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished). It was therefore 

not an abuse of discretion to ensure that, while preserving Medenbach’s 

fundamental right to petition the government, only those officials familiar with 

Medenbach would receive his letters, so as not to cause concern among other 

federal officials.

3. Finally, we uphold the modification of the condition prohibiting

Medenbach from entering federal lands—including offices and parking lots—

managed by the BLM and other specific federal agencies without prior approval of 

the probation officer. As with its findings regarding Medenbach’s letters, the 

district court imposed a condition “reasonably related” to Medenbach’s behavior—

a decades-long history of unlawful protests of federal land-management agencies.

AFFIRMED.