United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 23, 2014

Decided May 23, 2014

Before

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 13-3083

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SALVADOR FLORES-CAMPOS, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 12CR604-1

John F. Grady,

Judge.

O R D E R

Salvador Flores-Campos, a citizen of Mexico, pleaded guilty to unlawful

presence in the United States after removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), and was sentenced to

70 months’ imprisonment. He filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed attorney asserts

that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S.

738, 744 (1967). Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the nature of the case and

addresses the issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. Because

the analysis in the brief appears to be thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that

counsel has discussed, plus the additional issue that Flores-Campos, disagreeing with

counsel, believes has merit. See CIR. R. 51(b); United States v. Bey, --- F.3d ---, 2014 WL

1389090, at *2 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 13-3083 Page 2

Counsel begins by noting that Flores-Campos does not wish to challenge his

guilty plea. Thus counsel appropriately omits discussion about the adequacy of the plea

colloquy and the voluntariness of the plea. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349

(7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel then discusses whether Flores-Campos could raise a nonfrivolous

challenge to his prison sentence and concludes that he could not. The defendant’s

sentence is at the bottom of the guidelines range of 70 to 87 months resulting from his

Category V criminal history and total offense level of 21 (a base offense level of 8,

see U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a), plus 16 levels because his removal followed a conviction for a

crime of violence, see id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), less 3 levels for acceptance of responsibility,

see id. § 3E1.1). Counsel identifies no basis to question the correctness of this range, and

thus Flores-Campos’s within-guidelines sentence is presumed to be reasonable. See Rita

v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007); United States v. Marin-Castano, 688 F.3d 899, 905

(7th Cir. 2012). Counsel has not identified any ground to rebut this presumption, nor

have we. The district court considered Flores-Campos’s argument that the 16-level

upward adjustment for his removal after a crime of violence overstates the seriousness

of this immigration offense, but rejected that argument after taking into account

Flores-Campos’s criminal history, his family ties to the United States, the likelihood that

he will try again to enter the United States after removal, and the need for deterrence.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B).

In his Rule 51(b) response Flores-Campos proposes to contend on appeal that

district courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over crimes committed on land that the

federal government does not own. This assertion is nonsense. Federal criminal law

applies throughout the nation. See United States v. Banks-Giombetti, 245 F.3d 949, 953 (7th

Cir. 2001). Illegal reentry is a federal crime under § 1326(a), and district courts have

jurisdiction over all federal prosecutions. 18 U.S.C. § 3231; United States v. Rogers, 270

F.3d 1076, 1078 (7th Cir. 2001).

The motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.