1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JOSEPH ARUANNO,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, 

Commissioner of Social Security,

 Defendant.

11-CV-2521

 

OPINION

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Commissioner of Social 

Security Michael J. Astrue’s (“Commissioner”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff Joseph 

Aruanno’s (“Mr. Aruanno”) Social Security benefits Complaint for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. For the reasons stated below, this Court will grant the motion 

and dismiss the Complaint.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Mr. Aruanno is a twice-convicted sex offender: in 1994, he exposed himself 

to two girls in Florida, and in 1996, he sexually molested an eight-year-old girl 

playing in front of her house in New Jersey. Aruanno v. Hayman, 384 Fed. App’x

144, 145 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 835 (U.S. 2010). In New Jersey, 

Mr. Aruanno was convicted of second-degree sexual assault and sentenced to ten 

years in prison. Id. at 145. In 2004, before Mr. Aruanno’s prison term ended, the 

State of New Jersey involuntarily committed him pursuant to the New Jersey 

Sexually Violent Predator Act (“SVPA”), N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27.24 et seq., 384 Fed. 

App’x at 145, and placed him in civil detention at a “Special Treatment Unit,”

where he currently resides. (Compl. 3, Apr. 28, 2011, ECF No. 1.)

Prior to his second conviction, on July 19, 1995, an administrative law judge

(“ALJ”) awarded Mr. Aruanno Social Security disability insurance (“SSDI”) 

benefits with an entitlement date of November 1993. (Infiesta Decl. ¶ 1, Sept. 6, 

2011, ECF No. 12-3.) The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) received notice 

that Mr. Aruanno was incarcerated as of December 23, 1996 from the Department 

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of Law Enforcement in Tallahassee, Florida. (Decl. ¶ 2., ECF No. 12-3.) The SSA 

subsequently received reports that Mr. Aruanno was incarcerated in various New 

Jersey facilities beginning April 7, 1997. (Decl. ¶ 2., ECF No. 12-3.) As a result 

of the incarceration report, the SSA suspended Mr. Aruanno’s SSDI benefits with 

an effective date of December 1996. (Decl. ¶ 3., ECF No. 12-3.) 

Throughout 2004, Mr. Aruanno contacted SSA seeking to restore the SSDI 

benefits he had received prior to his incarceration in 1996. (Compl. 5, ECF No. 1.) 

In at least five letters responding to Mr. Aruanno’s requests, SSA stated that SSDI 

and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits are not payable to individuals 

who are incarcerated or who are confined “in an institution at public expense” 

immediately upon completion of a prison sentence for a sexual criminal offense on 

the basis of a court finding that the individual is a “sexually dangerous person or 

sexual predator.” The SSA also informed Mr. Aruanno that SSI benefits are 

generally not available for any month to someone who resides in a public 

institution for the entire month. See (Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to 

Dismiss Exs. A-E, ECF No. 13.)

Several years later, on Nov. 16, 2007, Mr. Aruanno wrote to the 

Commissioner demanding restoration of his benefits. (Compl. 5, ECF No. 1.); 

(Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. F, ECF No. 13.) Mr. Aruanno 

also retained Legal Services of New Jersey in 2008 to help facilitate his claim, but 

to no avail. (Compl. 5, ECF No. 1); (Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to 

Dismiss Exs. G-H, ECF No. 13) (letters from Legal Services complaining of a lack 

of response from SSA in obtaining Mr. Aruanno’s file). Waiting several more 

years and receiving no response from the Commissioner, Mr. Aruanno filed the 

present action pro se. (Compl. 5, ECF No. 1.)

Mr. Aruanno seeks restoration of the SSDI benefits he received prior to his 

incarceration in 1996. (Compl. 6, ECF No. 1.) Mr. Aruanno claims that he is 

entitled to benefits in part, due to alleged misconduct on the part of the Special 

Treatment Unit in which he is held: 

And though the rules insinuate that hospitalized persons 

are not eligible to collect my situation varies because I 

am in a situation where the facility refuses to provide and 

care, such as soap and other personal hygienic items; 

clothes; food if I am going to eat adequate amounts of 

healthy nutritional food; legal expenses; certain medical 

expenses; etc . . . .

(Compl. 5, ECF No. 1.) 

Alternatively, Mr. Aruanno alleges he is owed approximately $50 per month

that “comes from S.S.” (Compl. 5, ECF No. 1.) Mr. Aruanno fails to cite a 

particular SSA program for the “personal needs allowance” he seeks, but he almost 

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certainly means SSI. (Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 4, ECF No. 

13.); see 42 U.S.C. § 1383(a)(2)(F)(ii)(II)(bb) (referring to “personal needs 

assistance” under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, Supplemental Security 

Income). Mr. Aruanno also states in the “Relief” section of his Complaint that he 

is seeking benefits under “SSI or SSD.” (Compl. 6, ECF No. 1.) 

Mr. Aruanno seeks an order forcing the Commissioner to resume payment of 

SSDI benefits retroactive to 2004, or alternatively, forcing the Commissioner to 

pay Mr. Aruanno a personal needs allowance of approximately $50 per month. 

(Compl. 6, ECF No. 1) (“[I] ask that S.S. be ordered to comply which would be 

Declaratory and Injuctive [sic] relief”). The Commissioner seeks dismissal of Mr. 

Aruanno’s Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Def.’s Br. in Supp. 

of Mot. to Dismiss 1, ECF No. 12-1.)

II. Legal Analysis

A. Motion to Dismiss Standard

Federal courts have an independent responsibility to consider whether they 

have subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. 

Co., 166 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 1999); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). If a federal 

court finds it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 

When a court determines whether it has subject matter jurisdiction, “the 

court may consider matters outside the pleadings such as affidavits and other 

material properly before the court.” Kelley v. Edison Twp., No. 03-4817(WHW), 

2006 WL 1084217, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2006) (citing Anjelino v. New York 

Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 87 (3d Cir. 1999)). Furthermore, “‘documents whose 

contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, 

but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.’”

Thomas v. Nova Southeastern University, Inc., No. 11–2089, 2011 WL 3205298, at 

*2 (D.N.J. July 27, 2011) (quoting Pryor v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 

548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002)). 

Finally, in the case of pro se filers, courts construe complaints liberally. 

Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 

U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972)). Similarly, “‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully 

pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 

lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 

429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). 

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B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under 42 U.S.C. § 405

Congress made § 405(g) the exclusive means of judicial challenge to SSDI

benefits decisions of the Commissioner.1

The Commissioner, through regulation, defines “final decision” in terms of 

the completion of an administrative review process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a)(5). 

To successfully complete the administrative review process, a Social Security 

benefits applicant must make timely appeals through administrative procedure

governed by 20 C.F.R. § 404.900, et seq.

42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (“No findings of fact 

or decision of the Commissioner of Social Security shall be reviewed by any 

person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided”); see Palmer 

v. Barnhart, 89 Fed. App’x 806, 809 (3d Cir. 2004) (“The Supreme Court has held 

that § 405(h) precludes federal-question jurisdiction regardless of how well a 

plaintiff characterizes his claims”) (citing Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 614 

(1984)). Subject matter jurisdiction for SSI challenges in federal court also follows 

§ 405(g). 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(1)(B)(ii)(3) (“The final determination of the 

Commissioner . . . shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) . 

. . ”). In order to challenge a decision of the Commissioner in federal court, the 

plaintiff must have obtained the Commissioner’s “final decision.” 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) (“Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security made after a hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of 

such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days . . . ”). Congress 

vests authority for determining the procedures for reaching a final decision with 

the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 766 

(1975) (“The term ‘final decision’ is not only left undefined by the Act, but its 

meaning is left to the [Commissioner] to flesh out by regulation”). 

2

 1 Mr. Arruano’s Complaint alleges that the Commissioner is unlawfully denying him SSDI and SSI benefits in 

violation of his rights under the Social Security Act, but incorrectly asserts subject matter jurisdiction under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl. 2, ECF No. 1.) As the analysis below will demonstrate, subject matter jurisdiction for 

federal court actions seeking SSDI and SSI benefits must be determined in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

However, although Mr. Aruanno asserts improper jurisdiction, a liberal construction of his Complaint in light of the 

circumstances of the filing should forgive failure to assert jurisdiction under § 405(g). The standard complaint form 

that Mr. Aruanno used to file this action gave him the option of ticking a line for “jurisdiction” next to either “42 

U.S.C. § 1983,” which the form stated was for “state prisoners,” or “Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau 

of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and 28 U.S.C. Z [sic] 1331” for “federal prisoners.” (Compl. 2, ECF No. 1.) Mr. 

Aruanno unsurprisingly selected § 1983, since he was civilly committed by New Jersey, not the United States. 

(Compl. 5, ECF No. 1.) The form does not contain a line for § 405 or Social Security-related complaints, and Mr. 

Aruanno wrote only “civilly committed persons,” on the blank line provided. (Compl. 2, ECF No. 1.) Plainly, Mr. 

Aruanno failed to assert the appropriate jurisdiction for his claims under § 405, but a liberal construction of Mr. 

Aruanno’s Complaint necessitates reading it as if jurisdiction was properly asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 405.

A final decision for purposes of § 405, 

2 The procedure begins with an “initial determination” by the SSA, generally regarding the granting, suspension, or 

reduction of benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.902 (describing administrative actions that constitute “initial determinations,” 

including denial of continuance of benefits). The applicant may challenge an initial determination by filing a timely 

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and subsequent federal subject matter jurisdiction, may only be obtained at the 

conclusion of the administrative appeals process, unless an exception applies. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.900(a)(5); see, e.g. Fitzgerald v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 232, 234 (3d Cir. 

1998). As such, an applicant’s failure to follow SSA procedures in filing timely 

appeals of SSA decisions will foreclose that applicant from obtaining jurisdiction 

for a federal district court to hear his complaint. See Bacon v. Sullivan, 969 F.2d 

1517, 1520-1521 (3d Cir. 1992) (“We join the majority view that Appeals Council 

decisions not to review untimely appeals are not ‘final decisions,’ and hence are 

not subject to judicial review”). In sum, the SSA administrative process acts as a 

federal jurisdictional bar for overly-eager plaintiffs to enter the federal court house; 

plaintiffs must exhaust the administrative remedy before seeking relief in federal 

court. 

Mr. Aruanno does not allege that the Commissioner, through the Appeals 

Council, has issued a final decision, as required for federal jurisdiction under § 

405(g), and there is nothing in the record to suggest that Mr. Aruanno challenged

SSA’s denial of benefits or the assertion that he was detained as a “sexually 

dangerous person” or “sexual predator.” Mr. Aruanno made no appeal, and 

therefore failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with the SSA. As such, the 

waiver exception to § 405(g) does not apply. 

C. Exceptions to 42 U.S.C. § 405 Jurisdiction

There are two exceptions to § 405(g) jurisdiction: first, the Commissioner 

may waive the exhaustion requirement, Salfi, 422 U.S. at 763-64; second, the court 

may find that the plaintiff has stated a collateral claim and will face irreparable 

injury if the administrative process is followed. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 

319, 330-32 & n.11 (1976) (“[T]he core principle that statutorily created finality 

requirements should, if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral 

claims to be lost and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered remains 

applicable”). Here, Mr. Aruanno does not claim that the Commissioner has waived 

the finality requirement, and the Commissioner’s brief emphatically states the 

opposite. (Def.’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 1, ECF No. 12-1.) As such, this 

Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the waiver exception to § 405(g). 

When determining whether a claim is collateral, courts focus on 

constitutional claims, see Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977); Pallotta v. 

 

appeal to the SSA for “reconsideration.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.907. If the applicant is not satisfied after reconsideration, 

he may make a timely appeal for a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.929. If the 

applicant remains unsatisfied by the ALJ’s decision, he may then make another timely appeal to an administrative 

Appeals Council. 20 C.F.R. § 404.967. Decisions of the Appeals Panel are considered “final decisions” under §

405(g), and may be appealed to the appropriate federal district court. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.

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Barnhart, 144 Fed. App’x 938, 941 (3d Cir. 2005); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 

76 (1976) (finding that constitutional issues are beyond the Commissioner’s 

competence to interpret the Social Security Act), and claims alleging improper 

SSA system-wide policies. See Bailey v. Sullivan, 885 F.2d 52, 65 (3d Cir. 1989)

(“[C]laims of systemwide misapplication or invalidity are collateral to the claims 

for individual benefits”); Liberty Alliance of the Blind v. Califano, 568 F.2d 333, 

344 (3d Cir. 1977). Also, “[a] claim is collateral if it is not essentially a claim for 

benefits.” Fitzgerald, 148 F.3d at 234 (citing Johnson v. Shalala, 2 F.3d 918, 921 

(9th Cir. 1993)). 

In Fitzgerald, the Third Circuit found no Eldridge exception where the 

plaintiff’s purported collateral claim was inseparable on the merits from her 

benefits claim, and where the plaintiff sought only benefits as relief. Id. at 235. 

For determining irreparable harm, courts consider whether the plaintiff will suffer 

severe economic harm, serious medical deterioration, or psychological stress, see 

Pallotta, 144 Fed. App’x at 941; accord Bailey, 885 F.2d at 65 (stating irreparable 

harm may occur where plaintiffs have few resources other than Social Security 

benefits and suffer from severe mental or physical conditions), but are less likely to 

find irreparable harm when plaintiff pursued his claim for years without the 

payment of benefits. Pallotta, 144 Fed. App’x at 941 (holding that a plaintiff who 

asserts a colorable due process claim but fails to assert irreparable harm is not 

entitled to an exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies). 

Here, Mr. Aruanno fails to present a collateral claim or allege irreparable 

harm. Mr. Aruanno makes no constitutional claim and alleges no overarching 

invalid SSA policy. Although Mr. Aruanno cloaks his demand for payment in the 

language of “Declaratory and Injuctive [sic] relief,” (Compl. 6, ECF No. 1), his 

suggested remedy would only require the Commissioner to pay him retroactive 

benefits.3

 3 Mr. Aruanno suggests that “injunctive and declaratory relief ... would include a more formal denial of benefits” 

from SSA, but the SSA correspondence Mr. Aruanno himself submitted as exhibits displays a clear and 

unambiguous statement of denial from the SSA. (Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 4 & Exs. A-E, ECF 

No. 13) (emphasis added). It is unclear how Mr. Aruanno could have been harmed by the alleged informality of the 

SSA letters other than through a denial of benefits. 

 As in Fitzgerald, the merits of Mr. Aruanno’s claim may not be 

separated from a claim for benefits; no collateral claim has been stated. Mr. 

Aruanno states that SSA’s denial of benefits causes him “serious irreversible 

harm,” (Compl. 6, ECF No. 1.), but urges this Court to apply any benefits found to 

be owed to him “retroactive as of 2004 when I first applied.” (Compl. 5, ECF No. 

1.) It is unclear why a present denial of benefits would harm Mr. Aruanno “in a 

way that cannot be remedied by the later payment of benefits,” Ringer, 466 U.S. at

618, when Mr. Aruanno’s sole requested remedy here is the later payment of 

benefits. Furthermore, Mr. Aruanno makes no excuse for waiting until 2011 to file 

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a claim that has its basis in a 2004 SSA decision; if Mr. Aruanno faced irreparable 

harm in 2004, one would expect from him greater urgency than filing an action 

seven years later. Any harm Mr. Aruanno faces as a result of not receiving SSDI 

or SSI benefits to which he may be entitled may be cured by later payment.

4

Even under this Court’s liberal construction, Mr. Aruanno’s Complaint fails

to state any legally cogent reason for refraining from adherence to the normal 

requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedy under § 405(g). As such, this 

Court is without subject matter jurisdiction in this action.

 

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court will dismiss the Complaint for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction.

 /s/ William J. Martini 

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.

 4 In addition to failing the substantive requirements of Eldridge, Mr. Aruanno’s claims fail to satisfy policy 

considerations underlying the exhaustion exception for § 405(g). As the Supreme Court stated in Salfi, 

“[e]xhaustion is generally required as a matter of preventing premature interference with agency processes,” adding 

that the agency should have “an opportunity to correct its own errors, to afford the parties and the courts the benefit 

of its experience and expertise.” Salfi, 422 at 765 (citations omitted). Here, if Mr. Aruanno thought he could 

demonstrate that the SSA had erroneously denied him benefits, he could have appealed through the administrative 

process. If SSA had been in error, it could have corrected itself, since Mr. Aruanno surely would have brought any 

mistake to SSA’s attention. However, Mr. Aruanno did not pursue his claim with SSA, thereby preventing the 

agency from correcting any potential errors and thwarting the policy goals of the exhaustion exception to § 405(g). 

See also Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 484-85 (1986).

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