P RE CE DE NT I AL

UN I TED STATES CO UR T OF A PP EALS F O R T H E T H IR D C IR C U IT

N o. 08- 4138

J. S

. , a m i no r, t hroug h h er par ents ; T E R R Y S N Y D E R ; S TE VEN S NYD ER, A p p e llan ts

v.
BLU E M OU NTA I N SCH OO L DI STRI CT; J OY CE RO M BERG ER; J AM ES M c GO NI GLE

O n A p p ea l from the U n it ed S tat es D istri ct C o u rt f o r th e M id d le D istric t o f P e n n sy lv a n ia ( D

. C

. N o. 07- cv- 00585) D i s t r i ctJ udge: H onor abl e J ames M

. M unl ey

A r gued J une 2, 2009 A r gued En B anc J une 3, 2010

Be f o r e : M c KE E , Ch i e f

J u d g e , S L OVI T E R, S CI RI CA , RENDEL L, BARRY, AM BRO, F UENTE S , S M I TH, F I S HER, C H A G A R E S , J O R D A N , H A R D IM A N , G R E E N A W A Y , J R .,

and V A N A S K IE, C i rcui t Judg es. ( Fi l ed: J une 13, 2011)

M aryE

. K o h art A l i ces on K

. L i t t m an T ar a S. Sar os i ek D rin k e r, B id d le & R e a th 1 8 th & C h e rryS tre e ts2 O n e L o g an S q u are Phi l adel phi a, PA 19103

M aryC athe ri n e R o p er A m er i can Ci vi l L i ber t i es U ni on o f P e n n sy lv a n ia P. O

. B ox 40008 Phi l adel phi a, PA 19106

W i t ol d J

. W al cza k ( A r gued) A m er i can Ci vi l L i ber t i es U ni on 313 A t w ood St r eet Pi t t s bur gh, PA 15213 A tto rn e y s fo r Ap p e lla n ts

J onat han P. R i ba ( A r gued) S we e t , S t e v e n s , Ka t z & W i l l i a ms 331 E as tB ut l erA venue P. O

. B ox 5069 N ew B r i t ai n, PA 18901 A t t or ney f

orAppel l ees

______________________ OPI NI ON O F THE COURT

______________________

C H A G A R E S, C i r cui tJ udge, w i t h w hom M cK E E , C hi ef J udge, SL O V I T E R , A M B R O , FU E N T E S, SM I T H , H A R D I M A N , and G R E E N A W A Y , J R ., C ir c u it J u d g e s , jo in

.
J

. S. , a m i nor , by and t hr ough herpar ent s , T er r ySny derand St even Sny der , i ndi vi dual l y and on behal f of thei r daught er , appea l t he D i s t r i ctC our t ’ s gr antof s um m ar yj ud g m en t i n favorof t he B l ue M ount ai n School D i s t r i ct(“the School D i s t r i ct ”) and deni al of t hei r m ot i on fors um m ar yj udgm ent

. T hi s cas e ar os e w hen t he School D i s t r i cts us pended J

. S. fo r cr eat i ng, on a w eeke nd and on herhom e comput er , a M y Space pr ofi l e ( t he “pr ofi l e”) m aki ng fun3 o f h e r m id d le s c h o o l p rin c ip a l, Ja m e s M c G o n ig le. T h e p ro f ile cont ai ned adul t l anguage and s exual l y expl i ci t cont ent

. J

. S. and her p a re n ts s u e d th e S c h o o l D istric t u n d e r 4 2 U .S .C . § 1 9 8 3 a n d sta te l aw , al l egi ng t hatt he s us pens i on vi ol at ed J

. S. ’ s Fi r s t A m endment fre e sp ee ch ri g h ts , that the S ch o o l D istri ct’s po li cies w ere uncons t i t ut i onal l yoverbr oad and va gue, t hatt he School D i s t r i ct
v iolat ed t he Sny der s ’ Four t eenth A m endment s ubs t ant i ve due pr oces s r i ght s t o r ai s e t hei r chi l d, and t hat t he S chool D i s t r i ctact ed out s i de of i t s aut hor i t yi n puni s hi ng J

. S. forout

- of- s chool s peec h.

B eca us e J

. S. w as s us pended fr om s chool for s p ee ch tha t i ndi s put abl ycaus ed no s ubs t ant ial d is r upt i on i n s chool and t hat
cou l d n ot r easona blyhav e l ed scho ol offi ci al s t o fo recas t
s ubs t ant i al di s r upt i on in sc hool , t he School D i s t r i ct ’ s act i ons v io late d J.S .’s F irst A m e n d m e n t f re e sp e e c h rig h ts. W e w ill
ac co rdin g ly rev erse an d rem an d that asp ec t o f th e D istri ct C o u rt ’s j udgm ent

. H ow ever , w e w i l l aff i r m t he D i s t r i ctC our t ’ s j udgm ent that the S ch o o l D istri ct’s po li cies w ere n o t o v erb roa d o r vo id-fo rvag uen ess, and t hat t he S cho ol D i st ri ct did not vi olat e t he S ny ders’ F o u rt e e n th A m e n d m e n t s u b s ta n tiv e d u e p ro c e s s ri g h ts

.
I.

J

. S. w as an H onor R ol l ei ght h gr ade s t udentw ho had neve r been di s ci pl i ned i n s c h o o l u n t i l D ece m ber2006 and Februar y2007,
w hen s he w as t w i ce d isc i pl i ned fordr es s code vi ol at i ons by M c G o n ig le . O n S u n d a y , M a rc h 1 8 , 2 0 0 7 , J .S

. a n d h e r f ri e n d K .L ., a n o th e r e ig h th g ra d e stu d e n t at B lu e M o u n tain M id d le S c h o o l,
cr eat ed a fake pr ofi l e of M cG oni gl e, w hi ch t heypos t ed on M y Space, a s oci al net w or ki ng w ebs i t e. T he pr ofi l e w as cr eat ed at J .S .’s h o m e , o n a c o m p u te r b e lo n g in g to J .S .’s p a re n ts

.
T he pr ofi l e di d noti dent i fyM cG oni gl e byname, s chool , or l ocat i on, t hough i tdi d cont ai n h is offi ci al phot ogr aph fr om t he School D i s t r i ct ’ s w ebs i t e. T he prof i l e w as pr es ent ed as a s el fpor t r ay al of a bi s exual A laba m a mi ddl e s chool pr i nci pal named “M

- H oe. ” T h e pr ofi l e cont ai ned crude cont entand vul gar lan g u a g e , ran g in g f

ro m n o n se n se a n d ju v e n ile h u m o r to p ro f a n ity
a n d sh a m e f

u l p e rso n a l atta c k s a im e d a t th e p rin c ip a l an d h is4 fam i l y
. F or i nst ance, the p rofi l e l i st s M -H oe’s general i nter est s as:

“ d e t e n t i o n , b e i n g a t i g h t a s s , r i d i n g t h e f r a i n t r a i n , s p e n d i n g t i me w i t h m ychi l d ( w ho l ooks l i ke a gor i l l a) , bas ebal l , m ygol den pen, f u c k in g in m yo f

f ic e , h ittin g o n s tu d e n ts a n d th e ir p a re n ts .” A ppendi x ( “A pp. ”) 38. I n addi t i on, t he pr ofi l e s t at ed i n t he “A bout
m e” s ect i on:

H E L L O C H ILD R E N [. ] y e s. i t ’s y ou r oh so
w on derful, hairy , exp res si on l ess, sex add i ct , faga ss, p u t o n this w o rl d w ith a sm all d ick P R IN C IP A L [.] I have c om e t o m y s pace s o i can pe r ver t t he mi nds of
o th e r p ri n c ip a l’ s [ s ic ] t o b e ju s t lik e m e . I k n o w , I k n o w , y o u ’re a ll th rilled [ .] A n o th e r re a so n I c a m e to
m y s pace i s beca us e - I am keepi ng an ey e on y ou stud ents (w ho [m ] I care for s o m uch )[. ] For t ho se w h o w a n t to b e m yf

ri e n d , a n d a re n ’t in m ys c h o o l[ ,] I l ove chi l dr en, s ex ( anyki nd) , dogs , l ong w al ks on t he b each, t v, being a dick h ead, and l astbu t no t l east
m y dar l i ng w i fe w ho l ooks l i ke a man ( w ho s at i s fi es m yn e e d s ) M Y F R A IN T R A IN

. . . . Id. T ho ug h d i sturbi ng , t he record i nd i cat es t hat the p rofi l e w as so out r ageous t hatno one t ook i t s cont ent s er i ous l y
. J

. S. t es t i fi ed t hat
s he i nt ended the pr ofi l e t o b e a jok e betw een he r s el f and he r f rie n d s. A t h e r d e p o sitio n , s h e tes tifie d th a t s h e c re a ted th e p ro f ile becau se she t ho ug ht i t w as “ c o m i cal ” i nsofa r as i t w as so

“ o u tr a g e o u s .” A p p . 1 9 0

.
I ni t i al l y , t he pr ofi l e coul d be vi ew ed i n ful l byany one w ho knew t he U R L ( oraddr es s ) orw ho ot her w i s e found t he prof i l e by
s e a r c h i n g M yS p a c e f

o r a t e r m i t c o n t a i n e d

. T h e f o l l o w i n g d a y, h o w e v e r, J.S . m a d e th e p ro f ile “ p riv a te” a f

ter se v e ra l stu d e n ts appr oache d herats chool , gener al l yt o s ayt hatt hey tho ught t he pr of i l e w a s fu nn y
. A pp
. 19 4. By maki ng t he pr of i l e “ pr i va t e , ” J

. S. l i m i t ed ac ces s t o t he pr ofi l e t o peopl e w hom s he and K

. L

. i nvi t ed to b e a M y S p a c e “ f

rie n d .” J .S . a n d K .L . g ra n ted “ f rie n d ” sta tu s to
a b o u t tw e n ty-tw o S c h o o l D is tr ic t s tu d e n ts

.
T he School D i s t r i ct ’ s comput er s bl ock acc es s t o M y Space,
s o no B l ue M ount ai n s t udent w as everabl e t o vi ew t he pr ofi l e fr omI n ad di t i on, R om ber gert es t i fi ed as t o herknow l edge that 1 it w a s a ctua ll yK

. L

. an d n o t J. S

. w h o ap p rop ri ated M cG o n igle’s phot ogr aph fr om t he School D i s t r i ct ’ s w ebsit e. A pp. 305- 06. Fur t her , it w as notunt i l M ar ch 29, 2007 t hatt he School D i s t r i ct pl ace d a w ar ni n g on i t s w ebs i t e pr ohi bi t i ng t he dupl i cat i on of
5 s c h o o l

. M c G o n i g l e f

i r s t l e a r n e d a b o u t t h e p r o f i l e o n T u e s d a y, M ar ch 20, 2007, fr om a s t udentw ho w as i n hi s offi ce t o di s cus s an unr el at ed i nci dent

. M cG oni gl e as ked t hi s s t udentt o at t empt t o fi nd
o utw ho had cr eat ed t he pr ofi l e. H e al s o at t empt ed –
uns ucce s s ful l y– t o fi nd t he pr ofi l e h im self, even c ont act i ng M yS p a c e d i r e c t l y.
A t t h e e n d o f t h e s c h o o l d a y o n Tu e s d a y , t h e s t u d e nt w ho in iti a llyto ld M c G o n ig le a b o u t th e p ro f ile re p o rte d to h im th a t it had bee n cr eat ed byJ

. S. M cG oni gle a sk ed t hi s s t udentt o br i ng hi m a pri nt outof t he pr ofi l e t o s chool t he nextday , w hi ch s he di d. I ti s undi s put ed t hatt he onl ypr i nt outof t he pr ofi l e tha t w as ever b ro u g h t to sch oo l w as one b ro u g h t at M c G o n ig le’ s s p e c if ic r e q u e st.

O n W ednes day , M ar ch 21, 2007, M cG on igl e s how ed t he pr ofi l e t o Super i nt endentJ oy ce Rom ber ger an d the D i r ect orof T echnol ogy , Susa n Schnei der

- M or gan. T he t hr ee met forabout fi ft een mi nut es t o di s cus s t he pr ofi l e. M cG oni gl e al s o s how ed t he p rof il e to tw o g u idan ce co u n selo rs, M iche ll e G u ers a n d D eb ra F r a in (M c G o n ig le’ s w if e ). M c G o n ig le c o n tac ted M y S p a c e to at t empt t o d isco v er w hatcomput erhad bee n us ed t o cr eat e t he p ro f ile, b u t M y S p a c e re f

u se d to re lea se th a t in f

o rm a tio n w ith o u t a
cour tor der

. T he School D i s t r i ct poi nt s t o no evi dence t hatany one e v e r s u s p e c te d th e in f

o rm a tio n in th e p ro f

ile to b e tr u e
.
M cG oni gle ul t i m at el ydeci ded t hatt he cr eat i on of t he pr ofi l e w as a Level Four I nfr act i on undert he D i s ci pl i nar yC ode of B l u e M o u n tai n M idd le S ch o o l, Student

- Par entH andbook, A pp. 65- 66, as a fal s e accus at i on abouta s t aff m ember of t he s chool and a “copyr i gh t” vi ol at i on of t he comput erus e pol i cy , forus i ng M c G o n ig le’ s p h o to g ra p h . A t h is d e p o sitio n , h o w e v e r, M c G o n ig le admi t t ed t hat he bel i eved t he s t udent s “w er en’ t acc us i ng m e. T hey
w er e pr et endi ng t heyw er e me. ” A pp. 327. 1phot ogr aphs or ot hercont entfr om t he w ebs i t e. See A pp. 79, 180.
M cG oni gl e t es t i fi ed t hat t he ot her t i m es he i m pos ed a t en- 2 day s us pens i on w er e w hen s t udent s br ought t o s choo l a kn i fe,
r azor , al cohol , and mar i j uana. A pp. 317.
6 J

. S. w as abs entfr om s chool on W ednesda y , t he day M cG oni gl e obt ai ned a copy of t he pr ofi l e. W hen s he r etur ned, on T h u rsd a y , M a rc h 2 2 , 2 0 0 7 , M c G o n ig le s u m m o n e d J.S . an d K .L . to hi s of fi c e t o mee tw i t h hi m and G ui da nc e Couns e l orG ue r s
. J

. S. i ni t i al l ydeni ed cr eat i ng t he pr ofi l e, but t hen admi t t ed herr ol e. M cG oni gl e t ol d J

. S. and K

. L

. t hathe w as up s etand angry , and t hr eat ened t he chi l dr en and t hei r fami l i es w i t h l egal act i on. A pp. 3 3 3 -3 4 . F o llo w in g th is m e e tin g , J.S . an d K .L . rem a in e d in M cG oni gl e’ s offi ce w hi l e he c ont act ed t hei r par ent s and w ai t ed for th e m to c o m e to s c h o o l.

M cG oni gl e met w i t h J

. S. and herm ot herT er r ySny derand
s how ed M r s
. Sny der t he pr ofi l e. H e t ol d t he chi l dr en’ s par ent s t hat J

. S. and K

. L

. w oul d r ece i ve t en day s o u t

- of- s chool s us pens i on, w h ich a lso p ro h ib ited a tten d a n c e a t s c h o o l d a n c e s. M c G o n ig le al s o t hr eat ened l egal act i on. J

. S. and herm ot herbot h apol ogi zed to M c G o n ig le, a n d J.S . su b se q u e n tlyw ro te a lette r o f a p o lo g yto M cG oni gl e and hi s w i fe.

M cG oni gl e next cont act ed M y Space, pr ovi ded t he U R L for th e p ro f ile a n d re q u e ste d its re m o v a l, w h ich w a s d o n e . M c G o n ig le
a lso c o n tac ted S u p e rin ten d e n t R o m b e rg e r to in f o rm h e r o f

h is deci s i on r eg ar di ng J

. S. and K

. L

. ’ s puni s hm ent

. A l t hough R om ber gercoul d have ove rru led M cG o n igle’s de cisi o n , sh e a g reed
w i t h t he puni s hm ent

. O n Fr i day , M ar ch 23, 2007, M cG oni gl e s ent J

. S. ’ s par ent s a di s ci pl i nar y not i ce, w hi ch s t at ed t hat J

. S. had bee n s us pended f

ort en day s
. T he fol l ow i ng w eek, R om ber gerdecl i ned

2 M rs . S n y d e r’ s re q u e s t to o v e rr u le th e s u s p e n s io n
. O n the s am e d ay M cG o n igle m et w ith J. S

. an d h er m o ther, he cont act ed t he l ocal pol i ce a nd as ked aboutt he po ssibi l i t yof pr es s i ng cr i m i nal char ges ag ai ns t t he s t udent s
. T he l ocal pol i ce r efe r r ed M cG oni gl e t o t he st at e pol i ce, w ho i nfor m ed hi m t hathe
c o u ld p re ss h a ra ss m e n t ch a rg e s, b u t th a t th e c h a rg e s w o u ld lik e ly7 be dr opped. M cG oni gl e chos e nott o pr es s charges

. A n offi cer d id , how ever, com plet e a fo rm al reportand asked M cG on i gle
w h e th e r h e w a n ted th e s ta te p o lice to c a ll th e stu d e n ts a n d th e ir par e n t s t o t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n t o l e t t h e m k n o w h o w s e r i o us t he
s i t u a t i o n was
. M c Gon i g l e a s k e d t h e o f f i c e r t o d o t h i s , a n d on Fr i day , M ar ch 23, J

. S. and K

. L

. and t hei r m ot her s w er e s um m oned t o t he s t at e pol i ce s t at i on t o di s cus s t he pr ofi l e.

T he School D i s tr i c ta s s e r t e d th att he pr ofi l e di s r upt ed s chool i n t he fo ll o w i ng w ay s
. T her e w er e gene r al “rum bl i ngs ” i n t he
s chool r egar di ng t he pr ofi l e. M or e s peci f i c a l l y , on T ues day , M ar ch 2 0 , M c G o n ig le w a s ap p ro a c h e d b y tw o tea c h e rs w h o in f o rm e d h im t hats t udent s w er e di s cus s i ng t he prof i l e i n cl as s
. A pp. 322. R andy N unemacher , a M i ddl e School m at h t eac her , ex per i ence d a di s r upt i on i n hi s cl as s w hen s i x or s even s t udent s w er e t al ki ng and di s cus s i ng t he pr ofi l e; N unemacherhad t o t el l t he s t udent s t o s t op t al ki ng t hr ee t i m es , and r ai s ed hi s voi ce on the t h i r d occa s i on. A pp. 368- 73. T he exc hange l as t ed aboutfi ve ors i x m i nut es
. A pp. 371. N unemacheral s o t es t i fi ed t hathe hear d t w o s t udent s t al ki ng aboutt he pr ofi l e i n hi s cl as s on anot herday , butt heys t opped w hen he t ol d t hem t o getback t o w or k. A p p
. 3 73- 74. N unemacher admi t t ed t hatt he t al ki ng i n cl as s w as nota uni que i nci dentand t hat he had t o t el l hi s s t udent s t o s t op t al ki ng aboutvar i ous t opi cs about
once a w eek. A not hert eac her , A ngel a W er ner , t es t ifi ed t hats he
w as appr oache d by a group of ei ght h gr ade gi r l s at t he end of her Ski l l s forA dol es cent s cours e t o r epor t t he pr ofi l e. A pp. 415- 16. W er ners ai d t hi s di d no t d isrupt hercl as s beca us e t he gi r l s s poke
w ith h er d u ri n g the p o rt ion o f th e c lass w h en stu d en ts w ere p e rm itte d to w o rk in d e p e n d e n tly. A p p . 4 1 7 -1 8

.
T he School D i s t r i ctal s o al leged di s r upt i on t o C ouns el or Fr ai n’ s j ob act i vi t i es
. Fr ai n canc el ed a s m al l num berof s t udent
couns el i ng appoi nt m ent s t o s uper vi s e s tud en t t es t i ng on t he
m orni ng t hat M cG on i gle m et w i t h J

. S

. , K

. L

. , and t heir p a rents

. C ouns el orG uer s w as or i gi nal l y s chedul ed t o s uper vi s e t he s t udent t est i ng , bu tw as asked b yM cG on i gle t o si t i n on t he m eet i ng s, so Fr ai n fi l l ed i n for G uer s
. T hi s s ubs t i t ut i on l as t ed aboutt w ent y - fi ve to th irtym in u te s
. T h e re is n o e v id e n c e th a t F ra in w a s u n a b le to
re sc h e d u le th e c a n c e led stu d e n t ap p o in tm e n ts, a n d th e stu d e n ts
w ho w er e t o m eetw i t h herr emai ned i n t hei r r egul ar cl as s es
. A pp.8 352- 53.

O n M ar ch 28, 2007, J

. S. and her par ent s fi l ed this act i on agai ns tt he School D i s tr i ct , Super i nt endentR om ber ger , and Pr i nci pal M cG oni gl e. B yw ay of st i pul at i on, on J anuary7, 2008, al l cl ai m s agai ns t R om ber ger and M cG oni gl e w er e di s m i s s ed, and
o n l y t h e S c h o o l D i s t r i c t r e m a i n e d a s a d e f e n d a n t

. A f

t e r d i s c o v e r y, b o th p a rt ie s m o v e d f

o r s u m m a ry ju d g m e n t.

A ft er anal y zi ng t he above fact s , t he D i s t r i ct C o u r t gr ant ed t he S cho ol D i st ri ct ’s sum m aryj ud gm ent m oti on on al l cl ai m s, t hough sp eci fi cal l yacknow l edgi ng t hatT i nkerv. D es M oi nes Ind ep en d en t C o m m u n ity Sc h o o l D istri ct, 3 9 3 U

. S

. 5 0 3 (19 6 9 ), does notgover n t hi s cas e bec aus e no “subs t ant i al and mat er i al d isru p ti o n ” o cc u rred

. A p p
. 1 0 -12 (refu sing to relyo n T ink er); A p p . 1 7 (c o n c lu d in g th a t “a su b sta n tial d isru p tio n so a s to f a ll
u n d e r T i n k e r d i d n o to c c u r ” )

. I n s t e a d , t h e Di s t r i c t Co u r t d r e w a di s t i nct i on bet w een pol i t i cal s peec h ati s s ue i n T i nker , and “vul gar and off ens i ve” s peec h at i s s ue i n a s ubs equents chool s peec h cas e, B et hel School D i s t r i ct v. Fr as er , 478 U

. S. 675 ( 1986)

. A pp. 11- 12. T he D i s t r i ct C o ur tal s o not ed t he Supr eme C our t ’ s m os t r ece nt sch o o l sp ee ch d ec isi o n , M o rse v
. F red erick , 5 5 1 U

. S

. 3 9 3 (20 0 7 ),
w her e t he C o u rt al l ow ed a s chool di s t r i ctt o pr ohi bi t a banne r p ro m o tin g ille g a l d ru g u s e a t a s c h o o l- s p o n s o re d e v e n t.

A ppl y i ng a var i at i on of t he Fr as erand M or s e s t andar d, t he D i s t r i ctC our thel d t hat “ as vul gar , l ew d, and pot ent i al l yi l l egal
s peec h t hat had an eff

ect on campus, w e fi nd t hatt he s chool di d not
v io late th e p lain tiff ’s r ig h ts in p u n ish in g h e r f o r it ev e n th o u g h it
ar guabl ydi d notcaus e a s ubs t ant i al di s r upt i on of t he s chool

. ” A pp. 15- 16. T he C our tas s er t ed t hatt he fac t s of t hi s cas e es t abl i s hed a
connec t i on bet w een off- campus act i on and on- campus eff ect , and t hus j us t i fi ed puni s hm ent , beca us e: ( 1) t he w ebs i t e w as aboutt he
s c h o o l ’ s p r i n c i p a l ; ( 2 ) t h e i n t e n d e d a u d i e n c e w a s t h e s t u d e n t b o d y; ( 3) a pape r copy w as br oughti nt o t he s chool and t he w ebs i t e w as di s cus s ed i n s chool ; ( 4) t he pi ctur e on t he pr ofi l e w as appr opr i at ed fr om t he School D i s t r i ct ’ s w ebs i t e; ( 5) J

. S. cr eat ed t he pr ofi l e out of anger at t he pr i nci pal for di s ci pl i ni ng her for d ress c ode vi ol at i ons i n t he pas t ; ( 6) J

. S. l i ed i n s chool t o t he pr i nci pal about
c re a tin g th e p ro f

ile; (7 ) “ a lth o u g h a su b sta n tial d isru p tio n so a s to9 f a l l u n d e r Ti n k e r d i d n o t o c c u r
. . . t h e r e w a s i n fa c t s o me di s r upt i on dur i ng s chool hour s ”; and ( 8) t he pr ofi l e w as vi ew ed at least by the p ri n cipa l atsch o o l. A p p
. 1 7 (em p h asis ad d ed ).

T h e D istri ct C o u rt then rejected sev era l o ther d istri ct co u rt deci s i ons w her e t he cour t s di d not al l ow s chool s t o puni s h s peec h t hatoccurr ed off

campus, i n clud ing t he dec i s i on i n L ay s hock v. H erm it ag e S ch o o l D istri ct, 4 9 6 F

. S u p p
. 2 d 5 8 7 (W

. D

. P a. 20 0 7 ), a case subst anti al l ysi m i l ar t o t he on e befo re us, and w hich i s al so bei ng cons i der ed by t hi s C our t

. See A pp. 18- 20. I n di s t i ngui s hi ng th e se c a se s, th e D istric t C o u rt m a d e se v e ra l q u a lit a tiv e ju d g m e n ts ab o u t the s peec h i nvol ved i n eac h. See, e. g. , A pp. 18 ( as s er t i ng t hat the st at em ents i n F l ahert yv. K ey st on e O aks S cho ol D i st ri ct, 247 F. Supp. 2d 698 ( W

. D

. P a. 2003), w er e “r at heri nnocuous c o m p a re d to th e o f

f e n siv e a n d v u lg a r sta tem e n ts m a d e b yJ.S . in t he pr es entcas e”) ; A pp. 19 ( cont endi ng t hat“[t ] he s peec h in t he i ns t antcas e .
. . i s di s t i ngui s habl e” f r om t he s peec h i n K i l l i on v. Fr ankl i n R egi onal School D i s t r i ct , 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 ( W

. D

. Pa. 2001) , beca us e of, i nt eral i a, “t he l evel of vul gar it yt hatw as pr es ent ” i n t he i ns t antcas e) ; A pp. 20 ( cl ai m i ng t hat , as compar ed t o L ay s hock, “t he fa ct s of ourcas e i ncl ude a much m or e vul garand
o ff en sive p rof

il e” ).

U lt im ately , the D istri ct C o u rth eld th at alt h o u g h J. S

. ’s pr ofi l e di d notcaus e a “ s ubs t ant i al and mat er i al ” di s r upt i on under T in k e r, th e S c h o o l D istric t’s p u n ish m e n t w a s c o n stitu tio n a lly per m i s s i bl e bec aus e t he pr ofi l e w as “vul garand off ens i ve” unde r F ra se r a n d J.S .’s o f

f -c a m p u s c o n d u c t h a d a n “ e f f e c t” a t th e sc h o o l. I n a footnot e, the D i s t r i ctC our t al s o not ed t hat“the pr ot ect i ons pr ov ided u nderT i nkerdo notappl yt o s peec h t hati nvades t he ri g h ts of o thers.” A p p
. 1 6 n
. 4 (cit ing T ink er, 39 3 U

. S

. at 51 3 ).

N ex t, th e D istri ct C o u rth eld th at t h e S ch o o l D istri ct’s po l i ci es w ere not vag ue an d o verbroad. T he D i st ri c t C ou rtfi rs t
a p p ro a c h e d th e iss u e in a so m e w h a t b a c k w a r d s m a n n e r: it concl uded t hatbeca us e t he puni s hm entw as appr opr i at e undert he Fi r s tA m endment , t he pol i ci es w er e not vague a nd overbr oad eve n t hough t heycan be r ead t o appl yt o off- campus c onduct

. A pp. 21. A l t er nat i vel y , t he D i s t r i ct C our t hel d t hat t he pol i cyl anguage w as “s uffi ci ent l ynar r ow
. . . t o confi ne t he pol i cyt o s chool gr ounds and10 s chool

- r el at ed act i vi t i es
. ” I d. ( quot i ng t he H andbook, w hi ch provides t hat the “[ m ]ai ntenance o f order appli es d uri ng t ho se t i m es w hen s t udent s ar e undert he di r ect cont r ol and s uper vi s i on of
s chool di s t r i ct o ffi ci al s , ” and not i ng t hatt he comput erus e pol i cy in c o rp o ra te s th e lim ita tio n s o f th e H a n d b o o k ).

T he D i s t r i ct C our t al s o hel d t hatt he School D i s t r i ctdi d not
v io la te th e S n y d e rs’ p a re n tal rig h ts u n d e r th e F o u rte e n th A m e n d m e n t. T h e C o u rt c o n c lu d e d th a t “th e sc h o o l d id n o t er r in d i s c i p l i n i n g J

. S

. , a n d h e r a c t i o n s we r e n o t me r e l y pe r s on a l h o me ac ti v it ies[,]” an d that there fo re the S n y d ers’ p are n tal ri g h ts w ere n o t v io late d . T h e C o u rt d id n o t ad d re ss d ire c tlyth e p lain tiff s’ s tate l aw ar gum ent , butdi d not e t hat P en n sy l vani a l aw al l ow s s chool di s t r i ct s t o “puni s h s t udent s [] ‘ dur i ng s uch t i m es as t heyar e under t he sup ervi si on of the bo ard of scho ol dir ect ors and t eache rs , i ncl udi ng t he t i m e nec es s ar i l ys penti n comi ng to an d r etur ni ng fr om s c ho ol

. ’ ” A pp
. 22 ( qu ot i ng 24 Pa

. Cons

. St a t

. § 5

- 51 0)

. J

. S.
an d h er p are n ts fil ed a t im ely ap p ea l fro m the D istri ct C o u rt ’s en try o f su m m a ryju d g m e n t in f a v o r o f th e S c h o o l D istric t an d f ro m its d e c isio n to d e n yth e ir m o tio n f o r su m m a ryju d g m e n t.

II.

Th e Di s t r i c tCo u r t h a d j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e f e d e r a l c l a i ms p u rsua n t t o 2 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1 3 3 1 an d 2 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1 3 4 3 (a)(3) a n d (4),
a n d e x e rc ise d su p p lem e n tal ju risd ictio n o v e r th e sta te la w c laim
u n d e r 2 8 U. S

. C. § 1 3 6 7

. W e e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n u n d e r 2 8 U. S

. C. § 1291.

W e re v iew a D istri ct C o u rt ’s disp o sit ion o f a su m m ary j udgm entm o ti o n d e novo. Pi chl erv. U N I T E , 542 F. 3d 380, 385 ( 3d C i r
. 2008) ( ci t i ng M ar t en v. G odw i n, 499 F

. 3 d 290, 295 ( 3d C ir

. 2 0 0 7 )). In c o n d u cti n g this rev iew , w e use the s am e stan d ard as th e D istri ct C o u rt sh o u ld h av e a p p li ed

. F arrell v
. P lanters L if e sa v e rs C o ., 2 0 6 F .3 d 2 7 1 , 2 7 8 (3 d C ir. 2 0 0 0 ). “T h e c o u rt sh a ll gr ants um m ary j udgm enti f t he movants how s t hatt her e i s no genui ne di s put e as t o anym at er i al fac t and t he m o v an t is ent i t l ed to ju d g m e n t as a m a tter o f law .” F e d . R . C iv . P . 5 6 (a ) (s e tti n g f o rth th e leg a l st a n d a rd f

o rm e rlyf

o u n d in F e d . R . C iv . P . 5 6 (c )). A ll i nfer ence s m us t be vi ew ed i n t he l i ght m os t favor abl e to the11 n o n m o v in g p a rty , M a tsu sh ita E lec . In d u s. C o
. v . Z e n ith R a d io C orp. , 475 U

. S. 574, 587 ( 1986) ; Far r el l , 206 F. 3 d at278, and
w here, as w as t he case h ere, t he D i st ri ct C ou rtcon sider s cr ossm ot i ons fors um m ar yj udgm ent “ t he cour t const r ues fac t s and dr aw s i nfer ence s ‘ i n favo r of t he par t yagai ns t w hom t he mot i on undercons i der at i on i s m ade, ’ ” Pi chl er , 542 F. 3d at 386 ( quot i ng S a m u e lso n v
. L a P o rte C m ty

. S c h

. C o rp ., 5 2 6 F .3 d 1 0 4 6 , 1 0 5 1 (7 th C ir . 2 0 0 8 ))

.

“ A d i s p u t e d f

a c ti s ‘ ma t e r i a l ’ i f

i t wo u l d a f

f e c t t h e o u t c o me o f th e su itas d eterm ined b ythe s u b stan ti v e law

. ” G rayv
. Y o rk N ew sp ap ers, I n c., 9 5 7 F

. 2 d 1 0 7 0 , 1 0 7 8 (3d C ir

. 1 9 9 2 ). I m por t ant l y , t he nonmovi ng par t y cannot s at i s fy i t s r equi r ement of
e sta b lish in g a g e n u in e d isp u te o f f a c t m e re lyb yp o in tin g to
uns uppor t ed al l egat i ons found i n t he pl eadi ngs
. C el ot ex C orp. v. C at ret t , 47 7 U

. S

. 31 7, 32 2-23 ( 19 86 ). Inst ead, t he part y m ust rai se m or e t han “s om e met aphy s i cal doubt , ” M at s us hi t a, 47 5 U

. S

. at 5 8 6 , an d th e c o u rt m u st d e ter m in e th a t “a f a ir-m in d e d ju ryc o u ld
r etur n a ver di ctfort he [nonm o v ing par t y ] on t he evi dence pr es ent ed. ” A nder s on v. L i ber t yL obby , I nc. , 477 U

. S. 242, 252 ( 1986) ; s ee a l s o B our i ez v. C ar negi e M el l on U ni v. , 585 F. 3d 765, 770- 71 ( 3d C i r
. 2009)

. I t i s i m per m i s s i bl e for t he cour t t o i nt r ude upon t he dut i es of t he fa ct

- fi nderbyw ei ghi ng t he evi dence or m aki ng cr edi bi l i t ydet er m i nat ion s. Pi chl er , 542 F. 3d at386. Fi nal l y , w hen t he nonm ovi ng par t yi s t he pl ai nt i ff, he mustpr oduce
s uffi ci entevi dence to es t abl i s h everyel ement t hathe w i l l be
r equi r ed t o pr ove att r i al

. C el ot ex, 477 U

. S. at322.

III

.
A l t ho ug h the preci se i ssue befo re this C ou rt is on e of f i rs t i m pr es s i on, t he Supr eme C our t and t hi s C our t h av e anal y zed the
e x ten t to w h ich s c h o o l o f f icia ls c a n re g u late stu d e n t sp e e c h in
s ever al t hor ough opi ni ons t h at compel t he conc l us i on t hatt he S c h o o l D istric t v io late d J.S .’s F irst A m e n d m e n t f re e sp e e c h rig h ts
w hen i ts u sp en ded herfors peec h t hatcaus ed no s ubs t ant i al di s r upt i on i n s chool and t hatcoul d not r eas onabl yhave l ed s chool
o f f ic ia ls to f

o re c a s t s u b s ta n tia l d is ru p tio n in s c h o o l.

A.12 W e begi n our anal y s i s by r ecogni zi ng t he “c om pr ehens i ve au tho ri ty ” of teac h ers an d o ther pu b li c sch o o l o ff ici als. T in k er, 393 U

. S. at507. See gene r al l yV er oni a Sch. D i s t

. 4 7 J v
. A ct on, 515 U

. S. 646, 655 ( 1995) ( des cr i bi ng t he publ i c s chool s ’ p o w er o v er p u b li c sc h o o l children as b o th “c u stod ial an d tutelary ”). T h o se o ff

ici als i n v o lved in the ed u ca ti o n al pro ce ss p erf o rm “i m por t ant , del i cat e, and hi ghl y di s cr et i onar yfunct i ons
. ” W

. V a. S t at e B d. of E du c. v. B arnet t e , 3 1 9 U

. S

. 62 4, 63 7 (194 3). A s a r es ul t , fede r al cour t s gener al l yexer ci s e r es t r ai ntw hen cons i der i ng i s s ues w i t hi n t he pur vi ew of publ i c s chool offi ci al s
. See B d. of E duc. , I s l and Tre es U ni on Fr ee Sch. D i s t

. v. Pi co, 4 5 7 U

. S

. 853, 8 6 4 (1 9 8 2 ) (“ [ F ] e d e ra l co u rts s h o u ld n o t o rd in a rily‘in ter v e n e in t he re s o l u t i o n o f

c o n f l i c t s whi c h a r i s e i n t h e d a i l yo p e r a t i o n of
s chool s y s t ems. ’ ” ( quot i ng E pper s on v. A r kans as , 393 U

. S. 97, 104 ( 19 68 ) ) ) ; s e e a l s o Haz e l w oo d Sc h. D i s t

. v. K uh l mei e r , 48 4 U. S. 2 6 0 , 2 6 6 (1 9 8 8 ) (“ [ T ]h e e d u c a tio n o f th e N a tio n ’s yo u th is pr i m ar i l yt he r es pons i bi l i t y of par ent s , t eac her s , and s t at e and l ocal sch o o l of ficials, an d n o t of

fe d era l j u d g es.”).

T he au t ho ri t yof p ub l i c schoo l off i ci al s is no t bo un dles s, how ever
. T he Fi r s tA m endment unques t i onabl ypr ot ect s t he fr ee s peec h r i ght s of s t udent s i n publ i c s chool

. M or s e, 551 U

. S. at396 (“ O u r c a se s m a k e c lea r th a t stu d e n ts d o n o t ‘sh e d th e ir
cons t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s t o f r e e d o m of

s p e e c h o r e x p r e s s i o n a t t he
s chool hous e gat e. ’ ” ( quot i ng T i nker , 393 U

. S. at50 6 ))

. I ndeed, “[ t] h e v igil an t pro tecti o n o f c o n sti tuti o n al free d o m s is no w h ere m or e vi t al t han i n t he comm uni t yof A m er i can s chool s
. ” Shel t on v. T uck er, 36 4 U

. S

. 47 9, 48 7 (196 0). T he ex erci se of F i rs t A m endment r i ght s i n s chool , how ever , has t o be “appl i ed i n l i ght
o f th e sp ec ia l c h ara cterist ics o f th e sc h o o l env ir o n m en t, ” T ink er, 3 9 3 U .S

. a t 5 0 6 , an d th u s th e c o n stitu tio n a l rig h ts o f stu d e n ts in publ i c s chool s “ar e notaut om at i cal l ycoext ens i ve w i t h t he r i ght s of ad u l t s i n ot hers et t i ngs , ” Fr as er , 478 U

. S. at682. Si nce Ti nker,
cour t s have s t r uggl ed t o s t r i ke a ba l ance bet w een s afeguar di ng s t udent s ’ Fi r s tA m endment r i ght s and pr ot ect i ng t he aut hor i t yof
s chool admi ni s t r at or s t o m ai nt ai n an appr opr i at e l ear n i ng e n v ir o n m e n t.

T he Supr eme C our t es t abl i shed a ba s i c fr amew or k for
as s es s i ng s t udentfr ee s peec h cl ai m s i n T i nker , and w e w i l l as s um e,T h e a p p e llan ts a rg u e th a t th e F irst A m e n d m e n t “lim its 3
s chool offi ci al [s ’ ] abi l i t yt o s anct i on s t udent sp ee ch t o t he
s chool hous e i t s el f. ” A ppel l ant s ’ B r
. 25. W hi l e t hi s ar gum enthas
s om e appea l , w e nee d not addr es s i t t o hol d t hatt he School D i s t r i ct
v io la te d J .S .’s F ir s t A m e n d m e n t f re e s p e e c h ri g h ts

. 13 w i t hout deci di ng, t hat T i nker appl i es t o J

. S. ’ s s peec h i n t hi s cas e. 3 T he C our t i n T i nker hel d t hat “t o j us t i fypr ohi bi t i on of a pa r t i cul ar expr es s i on of opi ni on, ” s chool offi ci al s m us t demonst r at e t hat“t he f o rb id d e n c o n d u ctw ou l d m at eri al l ya n d su b sta n tiallyin ter f e re w ith t he r equi r ement s of appr opr i at e di s ci pl i ne i n the oper at i on of t he
s chool

. ” Ti nker , 393 U

. S. at509 ( emphasi s added) ( quot at i on m ark s o m it ted). T h is b u rde n ca n n o t be m et i f sc h o o l of ficials are dr i ven by“a mer e des i r e t o avoi d the d isc om for t and
u n p le a s a n tn e s s th a t a lw a y s a c c o m p a n ya n u n p o p u la r v ie w p o in t.” I d. M or eover , “Ti nkerr eq u ir es a s peci fi c and s i gni fi cantfea r of d is ru p tio n , n o t ju s t s o m e re m o te a p p re h e n s io n o f d is tu rb a n c e .” S ax e v
. S tat e C o ll

. A rea S ch

. D ist

. , 2 4 0 F .3 d 2 0 0 , 2 1 1 (3d C ir

. 2001)

. A l t hough T i nkerdeal t w i t h pol i t i cal s peec h, t he opi ni on has
neverbeen c onfi ned t o s uch s peec h. See i d. at215- 17 ( hol di ng t hat th e sc h o o l’s a n ti-h a ra ss m e n t p o licy w a s o v e rb ro a d b e c a u se it “a p p ear s t o covers ubs t ant i al l ym or e s peec h t han coul d be prohibi t ed u nd er Tinker’ s subst anti al dis rupt i on t est ”); see al so K i l l i on , 1 3 6 F. Supp. 2d at455- 58 ( hol di ng t hatt he s chool
o v e rste p p e d its c o n stitu tio n a l b o u n d s u n d e r T in k e r w h e n it
s us pended a s t udentform aki ng “l ew d” comm ent s aboutt he
s c h o o l ’ s a t h l e t i c d i r e c t o r i n a n e - ma i l t h e s t u de nt w r ot e a t h o me and ci r cul at ed t o t he non- s chool e- m ai l acc ounts o f s ever al classm ates).

A s t hi s C our thas e mph a s i z e d , w i t h t hen- J udge A l i t o w r i t i ng fort he maj or i t y , T i nker s et s t he gene r al r ul e forr egul at i ng s chool
s peec h, and t hat r ul e i s s ubj ect t o s ever al nar r ow exce pt i ons
. Saxe, 240 F. 3d at212 ( “Si nce Ti nker , t he Supr eme C our t has car ved out a number of narr ow cat egor i es of s peec h t hata s chool m ayr es t r i ct
even w i t ho ut the thr eat of sub st anti al dis rupt i on
. ” ). T he fir st
e x c e p tio n is s e t o u t in F ra se r, w h ich w e in te r p re ted to p e rm it
s chool offi ci al s to r egul at e “‘ l ew d, ’ ‘ vul gar , ’ ‘ i ndece nt , ’ and ‘plainlyo ff

en sive ’ spe ec h in sc h o o l. ” Id

. at 21 3 (qu o ti n g F rase r, 478 U

. S. at683, 685) ( emphasi s added) ; s ee a l s o Sypn iew sk i v.14 W ar r en H i l l s R eg’ l B d. of E duc. , 307 F. 3d 243, 253 ( 3d C i r
. 2002) ( quot i ng Sa x e’s n arro w interpre tat ion o f th e F rase r ex ce p ti o n ). T he
s econd e xcept i on t o T i nker is ar t i cul at ed i n H aze l w ood School D istric t v . K u h lm e ie r , w h ich a llo w s s c h o o l o f f icia ls to “ re g u late
s chool

- s pons or ed s peec h ( t hat i s , s peec h t hata r eas onabl e obs er ver w oul d vi ew as t he s chool ’ s ow n s peec h) on t he ba si s of any l egi t i m at e peda gogi cal conce r n. ” Saxe, 240 F. 3d at214.

T h e S u p re m e C o u rt re c e n tly a rticu late d a th ird e x c e p tio n to T i n k e r ’ s g e n e r a l r u l e i n M o r s e
. Al t h o u g h , p r i o r t o t h i s c a s e , we hav e no thad an o pp ortun i t yt o an al y ze t he scop e of the M orse exce pt i on, t he Supr eme Court i t s el f emphasi zed the narr ow r eac h of i t s deci s i on. I n M or s e, a s chool puni s hed a s t udentfor unfur l i ng, ata s chool

- s pons or ed eve nt , a l ar ge banne r cont ai n i ng a mess age thatcoul d r eas onabl ybe i nt erpr et ed as pr om ot i ng i l l egal dr ug us e. 551 U

. S. at396. T he C our t emphasi zed thatM or s e w as a s chool s peec h cas e, beca us e “[ t ] he eve ntoccurr ed dur i ng nor m al
s chool hour s , ” w as s anct i oned byt he s chool “as an appr oved s oci al
ev en t or class tri p , ” w as su p erv ised b yteac h ers a n d ad m inist rators fr om t he s chool , and i nvol ved per for m ance s byt he s chool band and ch ee rl ea d ers. I d

. at 40 0 -01 (qu o tat ion m ark s o m it ted). T h e C o u rt t hen hel d t hat“[t ] he ‘ s peci al ch ara ct er i s t i cs of t he s chool envi r onm ent , ’ T i nker , 393 U

. S. [] at 506 [] , and t he governm ent al i nt er es ti n s t oppi ng s t udent dr ug abus e .
. . al l ow s chool s t o r es t r i ct
s t udentexpr es s i on t hat t heyr eas onabl yr egar d as pr om ot i ng i l l egal d ru g u s e .” Id . a t 4 0 8

.
N ot ab l y , J u s t i c e Al i t o ’ s c o n c u r r e n c e i n M o r s e f u r t h er emphasi zes t he narr ow nes s of t he C our t ’ s hol di ng, str essing t hat M or s e “s t and[s ] att he fa r r eac hes of w h at t he Fi r s t A m endment per m i t s
. ” 551 U

. S. at42 5 (A li t o, J

. , concurr i ng)

. I n fac t , J us t i ce A l i t o onl yj oi ned t he C our t ’ s opi ni on “on t he under sta ndi ng t hat t he opi ni on does nothold thatt he s peci al char act er i s t i cs of t he pu bli c schoo l s necessar ilyj ust i fyany otherspeech res t ri ct i on s” than tho se reco g n ized b y the C o u rt in T ink er, F rase r, K u h lm eier, and M orse. Id. at 42 2-23. Just i ce A l i t o al so no t ed thatt he M orse decis i on “do es not endo rs e t he b road argum ent .

. . th a t th e F i rs t A m endment per m i t s publ i c s ch ool offi ci al s t o cens oranys t udent sp e e c h th a t in ter f

e re s w ith a sc h o o l’s ‘e d u c a tio n a l m iss io n .’ T h is
a r g u me n tc a n e a s i l yb e ma n i p u l a t e d i n d a n g e r o u s way s , and I15 w oul d r ej ecti tbefor e su ch abus e occ ur s
. ” I d. at423 ( ci t at i ons om i t t ed)

. M or eover , J us t i ce A l i t o engage d i n a det ai l ed di s cus s i on di s t i ngui s hi ng t he r ol e of s chool aut hor i t i es fr om t h e r ol e of p a re n ts, a n d th e sc h o o l co n tex t f ro m th e “ [ o ]u tsid e o f

sc h o o l”
c o n te x t. I d . a t 4 2 4 -2 5

.
B.

T her e i s no di s put e t hatJ

. S. ’ s s peec h di d not caus e a s ubs t ant i al di s r upt i on i n t he school

. T he School D i s t r i ct ’ s couns el
co n ce d ed this po int at oral arg u m en t and the D istri ct C o u rt expl i ci t l yfound t hat“a s ubs t ant i al di s r upt i on s o as t o fal l under T i nkerdi d notoccur
. ” A pp. at17. N onet hel es s , t he School D i s t r i ctnow ar gues t hati t w as j us t i fi ed i n puni s hi ng J

. S. un der T i nkerbeca us e of “ fac t s w hi ch m i ght r eas onabl y have l ed s chool aut hor i t i es t o for eca s t s ubs t ant i al di s r up ti o n of orm at er i al i nt er fer ence w i t h s chool act i vi t i es
. . . . ” Ti nker , 393 U

. S. at514. A l t hough t he bur den i s on s chool aut hor i t i es t o m eetT ink er’s
r equi r ement s t o ab ri dge s t udentFi r s t A m endment r i ght s , t he School D i s t r i ctneed notprov e w ith abs ol ut e ce r t ai nt yt hat
s ubs t ant i al di s r upt i on w i l l occur
. D oni ngerv. N iehoff, 527 F. 3d 41, 51 ( 2d C i r
. 2008) ( hol di ng t hatT i nkerdoes not r equi r e “a ctual di s r upt i on t o j us t i fya r es t r ai nton s t udents peec h ”); L ow er yv. E uver ar d, 497 F. 3d 584, 591- 92 ( 6t h C i r
. 2007) ( “Ti nkerdoes not req u ir e sc h o o l of

ficials t o w aitu n ti l th e h o rse h as lef t th e b arn befor e cl os i ng t he door

. . . . [I t ] does notr equi r e ce r t ai nt y , onl yt hat t he for eca s tof s ubs t anti al di s r upt i on be r eas onabl e. ”) ; L aV i ne v. B l ai ne Sch. D i s t

. , 257 F. 3d 981, 989 ( 9t h C i r
. 2001) ( “Ti nkerdoes
n o t r eq u ir e sc h o o l of

ficials t o w ait u n ti l d isru p ti o n ac tuallyo cc u rs b e f o re th e ym a ya c t.” ).

T h e f a c ts in th is c a se d o n o t su p p o rt th e c o n c lu sio n th a t a for e c a s to f

s u b s t a n t i a l d i s r u p t i o n was r e a s o n a b l e
. I n Ti n k e r , t he Supr eme C our thel d t hat“ouri ndepende ntexami nat ion o f t he
r ecor d fai l s t o y i el d evi dence t hat t he s chool aut hor i t i es had r eas on t o an t i c i p a t e t h a tt h e wea r i n g o f t h e a r mba n d s [ t o p r o t e s t t he V i et nam W ar ] w oul d s ubs t ant i al l yi nt er fer e w i t h t he w or k of t he
s chool ori m pi nge upon t he ri ght s of ot hers t udent s
. ” 393 U

. S. at 5 0 9

. G iven this ho lding , itis i m p o rt an t t o co n sid e r th e re co rd16 befor e t he Supr eme C our t i n T i nkerand compar e i t t o t he fa ct s of th is c a s e
.
T he r el evantevent s i n T i nker t ook pl ace i n D ece m ber1965, t he y eart hatover200, 000 U

. S. t r oops w er e depl oy ed t o V i et nam a s p a rt o f

O p e ra tio n R o lli n g T h u n d e r. Ju stic e B lac k d iss e n ted in T i nk er, no t i ng t hat “m em bers of thi s C ou rt , l i ke all otherci t i zens, know , w i t hout bei ng t ol d, t hat t he di s put es over t he w i s dom of t he V i et nam w arhave di s r upt ed and di vi ded t hi s count r yas few ot her i s s ues [e] verhave. ” I d. at 524 ( B l ack, J

. , di s s ent i ng)

. I n fac t , t he T i nkerm aj or i t yi t s el f not ed t he s chool aut hor i t i es ’ conce r n about th e e f f e c t o f th e p ro tes t o n f

rie n d s o f a stu d e n t w h o w a s k ill e d in V i et nam. See i d. at509 n. 3. J us t i ce Bl ack a l s o em p h asized t he fol l ow i ng por t i ons of t he r ecor d:

t he [] ar m ban d s caus ed comm ent s , w ar ni ngs byot her
s t udent s , t he poki ng of fun a tt hem, and a w ar ni ng by an ol derfootbal l p lay er thatot her , nonpr ot es t i ng stud e nt s ha d b e t t e r l e t t he m al on e
. The r e i s al so e v id e n c e th a t a te a c h e r o f m a th e m a tics h a d h is l es s on per i od pr act i cal l y‘ w r ecke d’ chi efl yby di s put es w i t h [a pr ot es t i ng student ] w ho w or e her
arm b an d fo r he r ‘de m o n str ati o n
. ’

I d. at517 ( B l ack, J

. , di s s ent ing)

. B as ed on t hes e fa ct s , J us t i ce B l ack di s agr eed w i t h t he Ti n k er m aj or i t y ’ s hol di ng t hatt he
ar m bands di d not caus e a s ubs t ant i al di s r upt i on i n s chool : “I t hi nk th e re c o rd o v e rw h e lm in g ly sh o w s tha t th e a rm b a n d s d id e x a c tly wha tt h e e l e c t e d s c h o o l o f f i c i a l s a n d p r i n c i p a l s f o r e s a w t hey
w oul d, t hati s , t ook t he s t udent s ’ m i nds off thei r cl as s w or k and di ver t ed t hem t o t hought s aboutt he hi ghl yemot i onal s ubj ectof t he V i et nam w ar. ” Id. at 51 8; s ee al so i d. at 52 4 (“O f cou rs e stud ents , l i ke ot herpeopl e, cannot concentr at e on l es s eri s s ues w hen bl ack
a rm b a n d s a re b e in g o ste n tatio u slyd isp layed in th e ir p r e se n c e to cal l a t t e n t i o n t o t h e wou n d e d a n d d e a d o f t h e war , s o me of t he
w o u n d ed an d the d ea d b eing their frien d s an d n eigh b o rs. ”).

T hi s w as t he r ecor d i n T i nker , an d y et t he maj or i t yi n t hat
cas e hel d t hat“t he r ecor d do es n otdemonst r at e anyfac t s w hi ch
m i ghtr eas onabl yhave l ed s chool aut hor i t i es t o for eca s t s ubs t ant i alIn d e e d , a lth o u g h S u p e rin ten d e n t R o m b e rg e r h a d a d u tyto 4

r epor tal l egat i ons of i nappr opr i at e s exual cont actorot her
m isco n d u ct by o ff

ici a ls in the S ch o o l D istri ct, sh e d id n o t r ep o rt M cG oni gl e, beca us e s he bel i eved the cont entof t he prof i l e w as not t r ue. A pp. 295- 307. In fa ct , R om ber gerdi d not even que s t i on M cG oni gl e as t o w het heranyof t he cont entw as t r ue. A pp. 307.
W e agree w i t h t he app el l ants ’ ar gu m ent that 24 P a. C on s. 5 St at

. § 5- 510 al s o bar r ed t he School D i s t r i ctfr om puni s hi ng J

. S. for heroff- campus s peec h. Sect i on 5- 510 l i m i t ed t he aut hor i t yof t he School D i s t r i ctt o: adopt [i ng] and enfor c[i ng] s uch r eas onabl e rul es and
r egul at i ons
. . . r egar di ng the conduct and d e p o rtm e n t o f a ll p u p ils a tten d in g th e p u b lic s c h o o ls i n t he di s t r i ct , dur i ng s uch t i m e as theyar e undert he
s u p e r v i s i o n o f t h e b o a r d o f s c h o o l d i r e c t o r s and t eache rs , i ncludi ng t he ti m e nece ssar i l yspent i n c o m in g to a n d re tu rn in g f ro m sc h o o l.

24 Pa. C ons
. St at

. § 5 -51 0 (em phas i s added)

. T he di s s entnot es t hat§ 5- 510 per m i t s a s chool di s t r i ctt o exer ci s e “s uch contr ol as i s nece s s ar yt o pr eventi nfr act i ons of di s ci p li n e and i nt er fer ence w i t h t he educ at i onal pr oces s
. ” D

. O

. F. v. L ew i s bur g A r ea Sch. D ist

. B d

. o f S ch

. D ir s. , 8 6 8 A .2 d 2 8 , 3 6 (P a. C o m m w
. C t. 2 0 0 4 ). W hi l e t hatm aybe t r ue, t he Pe n n s y l v a n i a C om m onw eal t h C our t has
17 di s r upt i on of orm at er i al i nt er fer en ce w i t h s chool act i vi t i es , ” and t hu s t hat the scho ol vi olat ed the stud ents ’ F i rs t A m end m ent r i gh t s. I d. at 514 ( emphasi s added)

. T ur ni ng t o our r ecor d, J

. S. cr eat ed t he pr ofi l e as a j oke, and s he t ook s t eps t o m ake i t “p ri v ate” so t hat
a c c e ss w a s lim ited to h e r a n d h e r f rie n d s. A lth o u g h th e p ro f ile cont ai ned M cG oni gl e’ s p ictur e fr om t he s chool ’ s w ebs i t e, t he p rofi l e di d noti dent i fyhi m byname, s chool , orl ocat i on. M o re o v e r, th e p ro f

ile, th o u g h in d isp u tab ly v u lg a r, w a s s o ju v e n ile and nons ens i cal t hatno r eas onabl e per s on coul d t ake i t s cont ent
s er i ous l y , and t he r ecor d cl ear l ydemonst r at es t hat n o o n e di d. 4 A l so, t he S cho ol D i st ri ct ’s com pu t ers block access to M y S pace, s o no B l ue M ount ai n s t udentw as everabl e to v iew t he pr ofi l e fr om s chool

. A nd, t he onl ypr i nt outof t he pr ofi l e t hatw as everbr ought

5i nt erpr et ed t hi s pr ovi s i on t o pr ohi bi t a s chool di s t r i ct fr om p u n ishing stud en ts fo r co n d u ct oc cu rri n g o u tsi d e o f sc h o o l ho u rs – even i f s uch conduc toccur s on s chool pr oper t y
. See i d. at35- 36.

A l l of t he i nt egr al event s i n t his c ase oc cur r ed out s i de t he
s chool , dur i ng non- s chool hour s
. A ccor di ngl y , § 5- 510 al s o bar r ed th e S c h o o l D is tr ic t f

ro m p u n is h in g J .S

.
M cG o n igle test ifi ed that af ter t h is l aw su itw as f

il ed , there 6

w a s a g e n e ra l d e c lin e in stu d e n t d isc ip lin e a n d th a t h e b e liev e d th is l i t i gati on i t sel f enc ou raged o t her stud ents t o m i sbehav e beca use t heyt houghtt heycoul d s i m pl yfi le a l aw s ui t t o al l evi at e any tro u b le. A p p . 3 5 0 -5 1 . M c G o n ig le’ s te stim o n yin th is re g a rd is i r r el evant t o t he i s s ues befor e t hi s C our t beca us e t hes e di s r upt i ons d id n o t ari se o u t of

the c rea ti o n o f th e p rof

il e it self, bu t r athe r, w ere t he di r ectr es ul tof t he School D i s t r i ct ’ s r es pons e t o t he pr ofi l e and th e e n su in g lit ig a tio n . T h is tes tim o n y , th e re f o re , is n o t re lev a n t to det er m i ni ng t he l evel of di s r upt i on t hatt he pr ofi l e c au sed i n t he
sc h o o l.

W e r ecogni ze that vul gar and offens i ve spee ch such a s t hat

7 empl oy ed i n t hi s cas e – eve n m ade i n j es t – coul d d am age t he
car eer s of t eac her s and admi ni s t r at or s and w e conclude onl yt hat
18 t o scho ol w as one th a t w as broug ht atM cG on i gle’ s express r eques t

. T hus , bey ond gener al r um bl i ngs , a fe w m i nut es of t al ki ng i n clas s, and som e off

i ci al s r earr ang i ng t heirschedu les t o assi st M cG oni gl e i n deal i ng w i t h t he pr ofi l e, no di s r upt i ons occurr ed. 6

In c o m p aring o u r rec o rd t o the reco rd in T ink er, th is C o u rt
ca n n o t a p p ly T ink er’s h o lding to justi fy the S ch o o l D istri ct’s act i ons i n t hi s cas e. A s t he Supr eme C our t has admoni s hed, an “undi ffe r ent i at ed fe aror appr ehens i on of di s t urbance i s not enough t o o ve r c ome the r i gh t t o fr e e do m of e xp r e s s i on
. ” Ti nk e r , 39 3 U. S. at 508. I f Ti nker ’ s bl ack a r m bands – an os t ent at i ous r emi nderof t he hi ghl y emot i onal and cont r over s i al s ubj ect of t he V i et nam w ar – co uld not “r easona blyhav e l ed scho ol a u th ori t i es t o fo recas t
s ubs t ant i al di s r upt i on of orm at er ial i nt er fer ence w i t h s chool act i vi t i es , ” i d. at514, nei t hercan J

. S. ’ s pr ofi l e, d esp it e t he unfor t unat e humi l i at i on i t caus ed forM cG oni gl e. 7th e p u n i t i ve acti on t aken byt he S cho ol D i st ri ct viol at ed the Fir st A m e n d m e n t f

re e s p e e c h ri g h ts o f

J .S

.
T o t he ext entt he di s s ents uppor t s i t s ar gum ent s r egar di ng m at er i al and s ubs t ant i al di s r upt i on bys pecul at i ng about t he pos s i bi l i t yof di s comfortbyt he r eci pi ent s of t he s peec h i n t hi s cas e, we c i t e t h e n - J u d g e Al i t o ’ s a d mo n i t i o n i n S a x e t h a t “ [ t ] h e S u p r e me C our thas hel d t i m e and t i m e agai n, bot h w i t hi n and out s i de of the schoo l con t ext, t hat the m ere fact t hat som eon e m i gh t t ake o ffen se att he cont entof t he s peec h i s nots uffi ci entj u s t i fi cat i on for pr ohi bi t i ng i t

. ” 240 F. 3d at 215; s ee al s o T i nker , 393 U

. S. at509 ( h o l d i n g s c h ool offi ci al s cannotpr ohi bi t s t udents peec h bas ed upon the d esire to a v o id “d isco m fo rtan d u n p leasa n tnes s”).
19 C our t s m us tdet er m i ne w hen an “u ndi ffe r ent i at ed fe aror app rehensi on of d i sturbanc e” t ransform s i nto a reas on able forecast that a su b stan ti al disrup ti o n o r m aterial interfe ren c e w il l occ u r. T h e S c h o o l D istric t cite s s e v e ra l ca se s w h e re c o u rt s h e ld th a t a for eca s to f

s u b s t ant i al and mat er i al di s r upt i on w as r eas onabl e. See,
e. g
. , D oni nger , 527 F. 3d at50- 51 ( hol di ng t hatpuni s hm entw as j us t i fi ed, under T i nker , w her e a s t udent ’ s der ogat or y bl og aboutt he
s chool w as “purpos el ydes i gned by[t he s t udent ] t o come ont o t he campus, ” t o “enc our age other s t o cont actt he admi ni s t r at i on, ” and
w here t he b l og con t ai ned “at best m i sl eading an d at w orstfal se i nfor m at i on” t hatt he s chool “nee d[ed] t o c o rr e c t ” ( quot at i on m ar ks and al t er at i on om i t t ed) ) ; L ow er y , 497 F

. 3 d at 596 ( hol di ng t hat puni s hm entw as j us t i fi ed, under T i nker , w her e s t udent s ci r cul at ed
a p e tit io n to f

e llo w f o o tb a ll p layers c a lli n g f o r th e o u s te r o f

th e ir f o o tb a ll co a c h , ca u sin g th e sc h o o l to h a v e to c a ll a tea m m e e tin g to
ens ur e “t eam uni t y , ” and w her e notdoi ng s o “w o ul d have be en a gr ave di s s er vi ce t o t he ot herpl ay er s on t he t eam”); L aV i ne, 257 F .3 d a t 9 8 4 , 9 8 9 -9 0 (h o ld in g th a t th e sc h o o l d istric t d id n o t v io late a st udent ’ s Fi r s tAm e n d me n t r i g h t s whe n i t e x p e l l e d h i m on an emer gencybas i s “t o pr event [] pot ent i al vi ol ence on campus” aft er h e s h o w e d a p o em en ti tl ed “L ast W o rds” to h is E n g li sh teac h er, w hi ch w as “fi l l ed w i t h i m agery of vi ol ent death and s ui ci de” a nd coul d “be i nt erpr et ed as a por t entof futur e vi ol ence , of t he sh o o ti n g o f [ ] fe ll o w stud en ts”).T h e d iss e n t co n c lu d e s th a t o u r d e c isio n c re a te s a c irc u it 8
s pl i t w i t h t he C our t of A ppeal s fort he Second Ci r cui t , pos i t i ng t hat t hatcour thas det er m i ned “thatoff- campus hos t i l e and of fens i ve stu d e n t in ter n e t sp e e c h th a t is d ire c ted a t sc h o o l o f f icia ls re su lts in
a s ubs t ant i al di s r upt i on of t he cl as s r oom envi r onm ent

. ” D i s s ent i ng O p. 22. W e di s agr ee, l ar gel ybeca us e t he di s s enthas over s t at ed our sis te r c ir c u it’s la w . E a c h c a se a p p ly in g T in k e r is d e c id e d o n its
ow n fac t s , s ee D o n i nger , 527 F. 3d at53 ( “W e dec i de onl yt hat b ase d on t he exi s t i ng r ecor d, [t he s t udent ’ s ] pos t cr eat ed a for es eea bl e r i s k of subs t ant i al di s r upt i on t o t he w or k and di s ci pl i ne o f th e sc h o o l .

. . . ”), W isniew sk i v. B d

. o f E d u c. of W ee d sp o rt C ent

. Sch. D i s t

. , 494 F. 3d 34, 40 ( 2d C i r
. 2007) ( deci di ng cas e “on t hi s r ecor d”) , s o al l “of f-campus hos t i l e and of fens i ve s t udent i nt er nets peec h” w i l l not nece s s aril y cr eat e a mat er i al and
s ubs t ant i al di s r upt i on ats chool nor w i l l i t r eas onabl yl ead s chool offi c i a l s t o f

o r e c a s t s u b s t a n t i a l d i s ru p t i o n i n s c h o o l

. Fu r t h e r , t he

20 T he School D i s t r i ctl i kens t hi s cas e t o t he above ca s es by cont endi ng t hatt he pr ofi l e w as acc us at or y and ar ous ed s us pi ci ons among t he s chool comm uni t yaboutM cG oni gl e’ s char act er beca us e of the pr ofi l e’ s r efe r ence s t o hi s engagi ng i n s exual
m isc o n d u c t. A s e x p lain e d a b o v e , h o w e v e r, th is c o n ten tio n is
s i m pl ynots uppor t ed byt he r ecor d. T he pr ofi l e w as s o out r ageous th a t n o o n e c o u ld h a v e tak e n it se rio u sly , an d n o o n e d id . T h u s, it
w a s c lea rlyn o t re a so n a b lyf o r e se e a b le th a t J.S .’s s p e e c h w o u ld
c re a te a su b sta n tial d isru p tio n o r m a ter ial in ter f e re n c e in sc h o o l, and t hi s cas e i s t her efor e d is t i ngui s habl e fr om t he s t udents peec h
a t is s u e in D o n in g e r, L o w e ry, a n d L a V in e
.
M or eover , unl i ke t he s t udent s in D oni nger , L ow er y , and L aV i ne, J

. S. di d noteven i nt end fort he s peec h t o r eac h t he s chool – in fact , she t o ok speci fi c st eps t o m ake the profi l e “pri vate” s o t hat onl y her fr i ends coul d acc es s i t

. T he fac t t hat herfri ends happen t o be B l ue M ount ai n M i ddl e School s t udent s i s not
s u rp r i s i n g , a n d d o e s n o t me a n t h a t J

. S. ’ s s p e e c h t a r g et ed t he schoo l

. F i nall y , any sugg est i on t hat, absent M cG on i gle’ s act i on s, a s u b sta n tial d isru p tio n w o u ld h a v e o c c u rre d , is d ire c tly
u n d e rm in e d b y th e re c o rd

. If a n y th in g , M c G o n ig le’ s re sp o n s e to t he pr ofi l e exa cerbat ed r at her t han cont ai ned t he di s r upt i on i n t he
sc h o o l. 8fac t s of t he ca s es ci t ed byt he di s s enti n s uppor t of i t s pr opos i t i on t hat w e have cr eat ed a c i r cui t s pl i t di ffe r cons i der abl yfr om t he fac t s pr es ent ed i n t hi s cas e. See, e. g. , D oni nger , 527 F. 3d at50- 51; W isn iew sk i, 4 9 4 F .3 d a t 3 5 (in v o lv in g a stu d e n t “s h a rin g w ith f r i e n d s v i a t h e I n t e r n e t a s m a l l d r a w i n g c r u d e l y, b u t c l e a r l y, su g g esti n g that a n am e d te a ch er sh o u ld b e sh o t and k il led” ). A ccor di ngl y , w e do not per cei ve any ci r cui t s pl i t and w i l l cont i nue t o d eci de eac h case o n it s i nd i vidual fact s.

T h e S c h o o l D istric t se ize s u p o n lan g u a g e in T in k e r th a t is 9 arg u ab lyd ict a, claim ing that itw as ju sti fied in ab ri d g in g J. S

. ’s Fi r s tA m endment r i ght s beca us e t he pr ofi l e def amed M cG oni gl e. S cho ol D i st ri ct B r. 28 -33. In T i nk er, t he C ou rt dis cussed its
conce r n w i t h “t he r i ght s of ot hers t udent s t o b e let al one. ” 393 U

. S. at 508. A s a r es ul t , t he C our t appea r ed t o i ndi cat e t hats chool offi ci al s coul d s t op conduct t hat w oul d “i m pi nge upon t he r i ght s of
o ther stud en ts .” Id. at 50 9

. L ater in the o p inion , the C o u rt
re itera ted th e p o in t, bu t re f e rre d sim p lyto “ in v a sio n o f th e rig h ts of ot her s
. ” I d. at513. A l t hough M cG oni gl e i s not a s t udent , t he S cho ol D i st ri ct cl ai m s J. S ’s spee c h is not i m m un i zed b yt he F i rs t A m endment beca us e M cG oni gl e’ s r i g h tt o be fr ee f r om defa m at i on fi t s w i t hi n t h i s l a n g u a g e i n Ti n k e r
. W e a r e n o t a war e o f a ny deci s i ons anal y zi ng w het her t hi s l anguage appl i es t o any one ot her th a n “ stu d e n ts,” b u t w e d o n o te th a t o u r ca se s h a v e e m p lo y e d b o th of t hes e cl aus es
. See, e.g. , W al ker

- Ser r ano, 325 F. 3d at416- 17; S yp n i e w s k i , 3 0 7 F

. 3 d a t 2 6 4 , 2 6 5 ; S a x e , 2 4 0 F

. 3 d a t 2 1 4 , 2 1 7

. We fu rt h er n o te t h ere is a d an g er in a cc ep ti n g the S ch o o l D istri ct’s
ar gum ent : i f t hatpor t i on of Ti nker is br oadl ycons t r ued, an a ss e rtio n o f

v irtu a llya n y“ rig h ts” c o u ld tra n sc e n d a n d e v isc e ra te t he pr ot ect i ons of t he Fi r s t A m endment

. See generall y S n y derv. Phel ps , 131 S. C t

. 1207 ( 2 0 1 1 ) (not i ng t hatt he Fi r s t A m endment im p o se s li m itatio n s o n th e a b ili tyto re c o v e r in to rt). In a n ye v e n t,
w e agr ee w i t h J

. S. t hat , as a mat t erof l aw , M cG o n igle coul d not
21 T he fa ct s s i m pl ydo nots upp o rt the concl us i on t hatt he School D i s t r i ct coul d have r eas onabl y for eca s t ed a subs t ant i al di s r upt i on of orm at er i al i nt er fer ence w i t h t he school as a r es ul t of J

. S. ’ s pr ofi l e. U nderT i nker , t her efor e, t he School D i s t r i ctvi ol at ed J

. S. ’ s Fi r s tA m endment fre e spee ch r i ght s w hen i t s us pended he r forcr eat i ng t he pr ofi l e. 9s ucce ed i n hi s cl ai m t hatt he pr ofi l e vi ol at ed hi s ri ght t o be fr ee fr om de fa mat i on
. Se e H us t l e r M a ga z i ne , I nc
. v. Fa l w e l l , 48 5 U. S. 46, 57 ( 1988) ( hol di ng t hat a l i bel cl ai m cannots ur vi ve w her e no r eas onabl e obs er ver can under s t and t he s t at ement s t o be des cr i bi ng actual fac t s or event s ) ; W echt v. PG Publ ’ g C o. , 510 A

. 2d 769, 774 ( Pa. Super C t

. 1986) ( “Even t he m os t i nat t ent i ve r eade r w oul d not
acc eptt hi s ar t i cl e as a fa ctual nar r at i ve. C ons i der i ng t he t ot al i t yof t he pr i nt ed mat er i al

. . . w e fi nd t hi s publ i cat ion inc apabl e of defa m at or ym eani ng. ”) ; s ee a l s o D avi s v. M onr oe C ount y B d. of E duc. , 526 U

. S. 629, 652 ( 1999) ( hol di ng “s i m pl e a cts of t eas i ng an d n am e-c all ing ” a re n o t acti o n ab le).

In d isp u tab ly , n e ith e r K u h lm e ier n o r M o rse g o v e rn s th is 10
cas e.
N ot abl y , i n M or s e, C hi ef J us t i ce R ober t s al s o ci t ed J us t i ce

11 B r ennan’ s concurr ence i n Fr as er , w hi ch not ed, “[i ] f r e s p o n d enthad g iv e n th e sa m e sp e e c h o u tsid e o f th e sc h o o l en v iro n m e n t, he c o u ld
n o t h a v e b e e n p e n a lize d sim p lyb e c a u se g o v e rn m e n t o f f icia ls
cons i der ed hi s l anguage t o be i nappr opr i at e. ” Fr as er , 478 U

. S. at 6 8 8 (B re n n a n , J ., c o n c u rr in g ) ( c itin g C o h e n , 4 0 3 U .S . 1 5 ).
22 C.

B ec au se T ink er d o es n o t j u sti fy the S ch o o l D istri ct’s suspensi on of J. S

. , t he o nlyw ayfor t he p un ishm ent t o p ass cons t i t ut i onal m us t er i s i f w e acce ptt he School D i s t r i ct ’ s ar gum ent
– an d the D i s t r i ctC our t ’ s hol di ng – t hatJ

. S. ’ s s peec h can be pr ohi bit ed u ndert he Fr as erexce pt i on t o T i nker

. T he School 10 D istric t ar g u e s th a t a lth o u g h J.S .’s s p e e c h o c c u rre d o f f c a m p u s, it
w as j us t i fi ed i n di s ci pl i ni ng herbeca us e i t w as “l ew d, vul gar , and offe ns i ve [a nd] had an e ffe cton the school and t he educ at i onal
m i s s i on of t h e D i s t r i ct

. ” School D i s t r i ctB r
. 7. T he School D istric t’s arg u m e n t f

a ils a t th e o u tse t b e c a u se F ra se r do e s n o t ap p ly t o off- campus s p ee ch

. Speci fi cal l yi n M or s e, C hi ef J us t i ce R ober t s , w r i t i ng fort he maj or i t y , emphasi zed that “[ h ]ad Fr as er del i ver ed t he s ame spe ech i n a publ i c fo rum o u ts i de t he s chool cont ext , i t w oul d have been pr ot ect ed. ” 551 U

. S. at 40 5 (cit i ng C ohe n v
. Ca l

. , 4 0 3 U. S. 1 5 ( 1 9 7 1 ) )

. Th e Cou r t ’ s c i t a t i o n t o t he 11 C ohen dec i s i on i s not ew or t hy

. T he S upr eme C our t i n C ohen hel d,T he School D i s t r i ct not es t hat t he cour t s i n D oni ngerand 12 B e thl ehem A rea S cho ol D i st ri ct sugg est ed t hat F ras er app l i e s to vul gar off- campus s peec h. See D oni nger , 527 F. 3d at49 ( “I ti s not clea r .
. . [w h ethe r] Fra ser a p p li es to o f f-c am p u s sp ee ch

. ”); B et hl ehem A r ea Sch. D i s t

. , 807 A

. 2 d at 8 67 ( “[W ] e ar e not
c o n v in c e d th a t re lian c e so lely o n T in k e r is a p p ro p ria te.” ). N o t o n ly
ar e t hes e ca s es notbi ndi ng on thi s C our t , but al s o bot h D oni nger an d B eth le h em A rea S ch o o l D istri ct ulti m atelyreli ed o n T ink er, no tF ras er, i n u ph oldi ng schoo l censo rsh i p. T hu s, t he co urt s’
s ug g e s t i on t hatt he Fr as ers t andar d m ayappl yt o off- campus s peec h i s di ct a. M os ti m por t ant l y , t hatdi ct a i s under m i ned di r ect l yby C hi ef Jus t i ce R ober t s ’ s s t at ement i n M or s e: “H ad Fr as erdel i ver ed th e sa m e sp e e c h in a p u b lic f o ru m o u tsid e th e sc h o o l co n tex t, i t
w oul d have be en pr otected

. ” 551 U

. S. at405 ( ci t i ng C ohen, 403 U

. S. 15)

. T he mostl ogi cal r eadi ng of C hi ef J us t i ce Rober t s ’s
s t at ement pr event s t he appl i cat i on of Fr as ert o s peec h t hatt akes pl ace off- campus, dur i ng non- s chool hour s , and t h at i s i n no w ay sp o n so re d b yth e sc h o o l.

23 in a n o n -sch o o l sett ing , that a st ate m ay n o t m ak e a “si n g le fo u rl e t t e r e x p l e t i v e a c r i m i n a l o f f e n s e
. ” 4 0 3 U

. S

. a t 2 6

. A c c o r d i n g l y, Ch i e f J u s t i c e Ro b e r t s ’ s r e l i a n c e o n t h e Co h e n d e c i s i o n r e a f f i r ms that a stu d en t’ s fre e sp ee ch ri g h ts ou tsi d e the s c h o o l con text are
c o e x ten siv e w ith th e rig h ts o f a n a d u lt.

T hus , undert he Supr eme C our t ’ s pr ece dent , t he Fr as er ex ce p ti o n to T ink er d o es n o t app ly h ere
. In o ther w o rds, F rase r’s “lew d n ess” stan d ard ca n n o t be e x tend ed to justi fy a sc h o o l’ s p u n ish m e n t o f J.S . f

o r u se o f p ro f a n e lan g u a g e o u tsid e th e sc h o o l, du ri ng no n-schoo l ho urs. 12

T he School D i s t r i ct poi nt s out t hat “a har d copyorpr i nt out
o f th e p rof

il e a ctua ll y c a m e into the sch o o l. ” S ch o o l D istri ct B r. 2 2 . H o w e v e r, th e f

a c t th a t M c G o n ig le c a u se d a c o p yo f th e p ro f ile t o be br ought t o s chool does not t r ans for m J. S

. ’s off- campus s peec h i nt o s chool s peec h. T he fl aw s of a c ont rary r ul e ca n be i l l u s t r a t e d b ye x t r a p o l a t i n g f r o m th e f

a c t s o f F r a s e r i t s e l f

. As d iscu ssed ab o v e, th e S u p rem e C o u rtem p h asize d that F rase r’s
s peec h w oul d have be en pr ot ect ed had he del i ver ed i t out s i de t heN ot e t hatthe q u est i on of w het hera s chool has t he 13 aut hor i t y t o puni s h a s t udent w ho br i ngs vul gars peec h i nt o s chool i s s epar ate fro m w het hert he s chool can puni s h t he s our ce of t hat
s peec h.
24 s chool

. Pr es um abl y , t hi s pr ot ect i on w oul d not be l i ft ed i f a s chool offi ci al orFr as er ’ s fel l ow cl as s m at e overhear d t he off

- campus sp e e c h , rec o rd e d it, a n d p layed it t o th e sc h o o l p rin c ip a l. 13 S im ilarlyh e re , the f

a c t th a t an o th e r stu d e n t p rin te d J .S .’s p ro f ile and br oughti tt o s chool att he expr es s r eques t of M cG oni gl e does nott ur n J

. S. ’ s off- campus s peec h i nt o on- campus s peec h.

U n d e r th e se c irc u m sta n c e s, to a p p lyth e F ra se r sta n d a rd to j us t i fyt he School D i s t r i ct ’ s puni s hm entof J

. S. ’ s s peec h w oul d be t o adopta rul e t hatal l ow s s chool offi ci al s t o puni s h anys peec h by
a stu d e n t th a t tak e s p la c e a n y w h e re , at a n ytim e , as lo n g a s it is aboutt he s chool ora s chool offi ci al , i s br oughtt o t he at t ent i on of
a s chool offi ci al , and i s deeme d “o ffens i ve” byt he pr evai l i ng aut hor i t y
. U nder t hi s s t andar d, t w o s t udent s can be puni s hed for
u sin g a v u lg a r re m a rk to sp e a k a b o u t th e ir tea c h e r a t a p riv a te par t y , i f anothers t udentover hear s t he r emar k, r epor t s i t t o t he sch o o l auth o ri ti es, an d the s ch o o l auth o ri ti es fin d the re m ark “off ensi ve. ” T here i s no p ri ncipl ed w ayt o d i st i ng uis h this h yp o th e tic a l f

ro m th e f a c ts o f th e in s ta n t c a s e
.
A ccor di ngl y , w e conc l ude t hatt he Fr as erdeci s i on di d not gi ve t he School D i s t r i ct t he aut hor i t y t o puni s h J

. S. for h er o ffc a m p u s s p e e c h

.
* * * * *

N ei t hert he Supr eme C our t nor t hi s C our t has everal l ow ed
sc h o o ls to p u n ish stu d e n ts f o r o f f -c a m p u s sp e e c h th a t is n o t sc h o o ls pons or ed orata s chool

- s pons or ed eve ntand t h at c aused no
s ubs t ant i al di s r upt i on ats chool

. W e fol l ow t he l ogi c and l et t erof thes e ca s es and r ever s e t he D i s t r i ctC our t ’ s gr antof s um m ary j udgm enti n favor of t he S chool D i s t r i ctand deni al of J

. S. ’ s m ot i on f o r su m m a ryju d g m e n t o n h e r f r e e sp e e c h c laim . A n o p p o site hol di ng w oul d s ign ifi ca n tl yb roa d en sch o o l dist ri cts’ au tho ri ty over stu d e n t sp e e c h a n d w o u ld v e st s c h o o l o f f icia ls w ith d a n g e ro u sly25 overbr oad cens or s hi p di s cr et i on. W e w i l l r emand t o the D is t r i ct Co u r tt o d e t e r mi n e a p p r o p r i a t e r e l i e f o n t h i s c l a i m.

I V.

W e n e x t t u r n t o t h e a r g u me n t o f J

. S. ’ s p a r e n t s t h at t he S cho ol D i st ri ct viol at ed t heirF ou rt eenth A m end m ent due p rocess rig h t to ra ise th e ir c h ild in th e m a n n e r th a t th e ysa w f it. Speci fi cal l y , t heyar gue t hat , i n di s ci pl i n ing J. S. forconductt hat
occurr ed i n herpar ent s ’ hom e dur i ng non- s chool hour s , t he School D i st ri ct i nter fered w i t h thei r par ental ri gh t s.

A s t he S upr eme C our t has not ed, “i tcannotnow be doubt ed th a t th e D u e P ro c e ss C lau se o f th e F o u rte e n th A m e n d m e n t p ro tec ts t he funda m ent al r i ght of par ent s t o m ake deci s i ons conce r ni ng t he
car e, cus t ody , and contr ol of t hei r chi l dr en. ” Troxe l v. G r anvi l l e, 530 U

. S. 57, 66 ( 2000)

. T hi s l i b erty inter es t , how ever , i s not ab so lute, A n sp ac h v
. C ityo f P h il a., 5 0 3 F

. 3 d 2 5 6 , 2 6 1 (3d C ir

. 2007) , and “ther e maybe ci r cumst ances in w hi ch s chool aut hor i t i es , i n or dert o m ai nt ai n o r derand a pr opereduca t i onal at m os pher e i n t he exer ci s e of pol i ce pow er , m ayi m pos e s t andar ds
o f c o n d u c t o n s t u d e n t s t h a t d i f f e r f r o m t h o s e a p p r o v e d b y s o me p are n ts, ” G rue n k e v
. S eip, 2 2 5 F

. 3 d 2 9 0 , 3 0 4 (3d C ir

. 2 0 0 0 ). S h o u ld the scho o l p o licie s c o n f lict w ith th e p a re n ts’ lib e rtyin ter e st, t he pol i ci es m ay onl y pr evai l i f t hey ar e “t i ed to a c o m p el l i ng in te re s t.” Id . a t 3 0 5

.
A confl i ctw i t h t he p ar ent s ’ l i ber t yi nt er es t w i l l not be l i g h t l yf o u n d , a n d , i n d e e d , o n l yo c c u r s w h e n t h e r e i s s o me

“ m a n ip u la tiv e , c o e rc iv e , o r r e s tr a in in g c o n d u c t b yth e S ta te .” A n sp a c h , 5 0 3 F .3 d a t 2 6 6 . In o th e r w o rd s, th e p a re n ts’ lib e rty i nt er es tw i l l onl ybe i m pl i cat ed i f t he s t at e’ s act i on “depr i ved t hem of t hei r r i ghtt o m ake d ec is i ons conce r ni ng t hei r chi l d, ” and not
w hen t he ac t i on m er el y“compl i cat ed t he maki ng and i m pl ement at i on of t hos e dec i s i ons
. ” C

. N

. v. R i dgew ood B d. of E duc. , 430 F. 3d 159, 184 ( 3 d C ir

. 2 005)

. O n t he ot herhand, how eve r, t he l evel of i nt er fer ence r equi r ed t o fi nd a conf l i ct betw een t he school dis t ri ct ’s po l i cyand t he p arent s’ l i bert yi nter est
m ayvar ydependi ng on t he s i gni fi canc e of t he s ubj ectati s s ue, and26 t he t hr es hol d forfi nding a conf l i ctw i l l notbe as hi gh w hen t he
s chool d i s t r i c t ’ s a c t i o n s “ s t r i k e a t t h e h e a r t o f p a r e n t a l d e c i s i o nm aki ng aut hor i t yon m at t er s of t he gr eat es t i m por t ance
. ” I d.

I n t hi s cas e, J

. S. ’ s par ent s al lege t hatt he School D i s t r i ct i nt er fer ed w i t h t hei r abi l i t yt o det er m i ne w hatout

- of- s chool behavi orw ar r ant ed di s ci pl i ne and w hat for m t hatdi s ci pl i ne t ook. T hi s , how ever , i s notan acc ur at e des cr i pt i on of t he i m pactt hatt he School D i s t r i ct ’ s act i ons had upon J

. S. ’ s paren ts’ abi l i t yt o m ake deci s i ons conce r ni ng t hei r daught er ’ s upbr i ngi ng. T he School D i s t r i ct ’ s act i ons i n no w ay for ced or pr event ed J. S. ’ s par ent s fr om r eac hi ng t hei r ow n di s ci pl i nar ydeci s i on, nor di d it s act i ons for ce h er p are n ts to ap p rov e o r d isap p rov e o f h er c o n d u ct. F u rt h er, th ere w as no t r i gger i ng of t he par ent s ’ l i ber t yi nt er es t due t o t he s ubj ect
m at t erof t h e S chool D i s t r i ct ’ s i nvol vement ; a dec i s i on i nvol vi ng a chi l d’ s us e of s oci al m edi a on t he i nt er neti s nota “m at t er [] of t he grea tes ti m por t ance
. ” C om par e C

. N

. , 430 F. 3d at184- 85 (d e ter m in in g th a t n o d u e p ro c e ss v io latio n o c c u rre d w h e n a sc h o o l,
w i t h o u tf i r s tre c e iv in g p e r m i s s i o n f r o m p a r e n t s , d i s t r i b u t e d s u r v e ys t o s t udent s t hati ncl u d ed q ues t i ons abouts exual act i vi t yand
s ubs t ance abus e) , w i t h G r uenke, 225 F. 3d at 306- 07 ( fi ndi ng a due p ro c e s s v io lat ion w h en a sc h o o l coa ch d id n o t i n fo rm a stu d en t’ s parent s of t heir dau gh t er’ s po si t i ve pregnan cy t est ). U n d e r these ci rcum st ances, w e cann ot fi nd t hat J

. S

. ’s pare n ts’ l i bert yi nter est
w as i m pl i cat ed, and w i l l aff i r m t he D i s t r i ctC our t ’s g rantof
sum m aryj ud gm e n t o n thei r Fou rt eenth A m end m ent due p rocess c l a i m.

V.

Fi nal l y , J

. S. chal l enges t he B l ue M ount ai n St udent

- Par ent Han d b o o k ( “ Han d b o o k ” ) a n d t h e Acc e p t a b l e Us e of t he C om put er s , N et w or k, I nt er net , E l ectr o n i c Commu n i c a t i o n s Sy s t em and I nfor m at i on Pol i cy( “A U P”) as uncons t i tut i onal l yoverbr oad and vague

. R el y i ng lar gel yon t he t es t i m onyof M cG oni gl e and R om ber ger , J

. S. encour ages t hi s C our t t o s t r i ke dow n t hes e School D is tr ic t p o lic ie s
.27 “ A re g u latio n is un c o n stitu tio n a l o n its f a c e o n o v e rb re a d th g rou n d s w h ere there is []‘a li k eli h o o d that the s ta tu te’s ve ry exi s t ence w i l l i nhi bi t fr ee e xpr es s i on’ by‘ i nhi bi t i ng t he s peec h of t hi r d par t i es w ho ar e not befor e t he C our t

. ’ ” Saxe, 240 F. 3d at214 ( quot i ng M ember s of C i t yC ounci l v. T axpay er s forV i ncent , 466 U .S . 7 8 9 , 7 9 9 (1 9 8 4 )). “ [ T ]h e o v e rb re a d th d o c trin e is n o t ca su a lly empl oy ed, ” Sypn iew s ki , 307 F. 3d at258 ( quot i ng L

. A

. Pol i ce D ep ’tv
. U n it ed R ep o rt ing P u b l’ g C o rp., 5 2 8 U

. S

. 3 2 , 3 9 (19 9 9 )), and befo re c oncl udi ng t hata l aw i s uncons t i t ut i onal l yoverbr oad, th e c o u rt m u st f

irst d e ter m in e th a t th e re g u latio n is n o t “s u sc e p tib le t o a r eas onabl e l i m i t i n g cons t r uct i on, ” Saxe, 240 F. 3d at215. Fur t her, a law w i l l onl ybe s t r uck dow n as overbr oad i f t he
overbr eadth i s “notonl yr eal buts ubs t ant i al i n r elati on t o t he
s t atut e’ s pl ai nl yl egi t i m at e s w eep. ” B r oadr i ck v. O k la hom a, 413 U

. S

. 60 1, 61 5 (197 3). In und ert aking t his analy si s i n the p u b lic
s chool s et t i ng, how ever , i t i s i m por t ant t o r ecogni ze t hat t he s chool di s t r i ctm ayper m i s s i bl yr egul at e a br oaderr ange of speec h t han coul d be r egul at ed for t he gene r al publ i c, gi vi ng s chool r egul at i ons a l ar gerpl ai nl yl egi t i m at e s w eep. Sypni ew s ki , 307 F

. 3d at259. D ue t o t hi s cons i der at i on and conc er ns aboutt he resp ons i bi l i t i es w ith w h ich p u b lic sch o o ls are task ed , w e h av e a d o p ted a “m o re h e sita n t ap p lica tio n ,” id . a t 2 5 9 , o f th e o v e rb re a d th d o c trin e w ith in publ i c s chool s
. A ccor di ngl y , “a s chool di s ci pl i nar y pol i cy w i l l be
s t r uck dow n as overbr oad onl y aft er cons i der at i on o f th e spec i al
n e e d s o f sc h o o l d isc ip lin e h a s b e e n b ro u g h t to b e a r to g e th e r w ith t he l aw ’ s gener al hes i t at i on t o appl yt hi s ‘ s t r ong m edi ci ne. ’ ” I d. at 260.

J

. S. ’ s ar gum entt hatt he School D i s t r i ct ’ s pol i ci es are overbr oad i n t hatt heyr eac h out

- of- s chool s peec h fai l s on fac t ual gr ounds , as t he pol i ci es ar e expl i ci t l y l i m i t ed t o i n- s chool s peec h. T he H and b o o k st at es t hatt he author i t yof t he pr i nci pal s and tea c h e rs w ith in th e D istric t is lim ited to “ th o se tim e s w h e n stu d e n ts
ar e undert he di r ectcont r ol and s u p erv isi on of s chool di s t r i ct offi ci al s
. ” A pp. 58. I n addi t i on, t he s peci fi c pol i cyon comput er u s a g e i n t h e H a n d b o o k s t a t e s t h a t “ [ s ] t u d e n t s m a y n o t c r e a t e , c o p y, r ece i ve, orus e dat a, l anguage or gr aphi cs w hi ch ar e obs cene , t hreat eni ng, abus i ve, or ot her w i s e i nappr opr i at e ats chool oron sig n o u t eq u ip m e n t at h o m e .” A p p . 6 1 . T h e A U P is s im ilarly l i m i t ed in scope, and defines “com pu t er” as28 anys chool di s t r i ct ow ned, l eas ed orl i cens ed or emp loy ee, s t udentand gues t ow ned per s onal har dw are, soft w ar e orot hert echnol ogyus ed on schoo l dis t ri ct prem i ses or at schoo l dis t ric t ev ents , orconnec t ed t o the s chool di s t r i ctnet w or k, cont ai ni ng s chool di s t r i ctpr ogr ams ors chool di s t r i ct
or s t udent dat a
. . . at t ache d or connec t ed t o, i ns t al l ed in, or o therw ise u sed in co n n ec ti o n w ith a c o m p u ter.

A pp. 40. W e nee d not gi ve t hes e r egul at ion s a l i m i t i ng cons t r uct i on, t her efor e, as t he School D i s t r i ct has al r ead y li m i t ed th e re a c h o f

its p o lic ie s
.
W hatJ

. S. chal l enges her e i s not t he pol i ci es t hemsel ves , but t h e i n t e rp r e t a t i o n o f

t h e s e p o l i c i e s t h a t a l l o ws t h e Sc h o o l Di s t r i ct t o appl yi t s r egul at i ons bey ond t he t i m es w hen she w as w i t hi n t he di r ectcont r ol and super vi s i on of t he School D i s t r i ct , orbey ond t i m es w hen s he w as u s i ng a s chool comput er
. T he
m isi n terpretati o n o f th ese p o li cies b ys peci fi c i ndi vi dual s , how ever , does not m ake the pol i ci es overbr oad. A l t hough t he H andbook and A U P can be appl i ed i n a w ay t hat vi ol at es a s tudent ’ s cons t i t ut i onal
r i ght s , as happene d i n t hi s cas e, t he r egul at i ons t hemsel ves ar e not
c o n st it u tio n a llyin f

irm o n th e b a sis o f

b e in g o v e rb ro a d . F o r th is
rea so n , w e w il l aff

ir m th e D istri ct C o u rt ’s gra n t of su m m ary ju d g m e n t o n th is is s u e
.
O urvaguene s s i nqui r yi s gr o u n d e d i n the not i ce r equi r ement of t he Four t eenth A m endment ’ s due pr oces s cl aus e. C i t yof C hi cago v. M or al es , 527 U

. S. 41, 56 ( 1999)

. A s t atut e w i l l be
cons i der ed voi d forvagu en ess i f i t does not al l ow a per s on of
o rd in a ryin tellig e n c e to d e ter m in e w h a t c o n d u c t itp ro h ib its, o r if i ta ut ho r i z e s a rbi t r a r ye nf or c e ment

. H i l l v. Col or a do , 53 0 U. S. 703, 732 ( 2000)

. T hi s s t andar d, ho w ever , i s m or e r el axed i n t he schoo l env i ronm ent: “G i ven t he schoo l ’s need t o be able t o im po se di s ci pl i nar ys anct i ons fora w i de ran g e o f unant i ci pat ed conduc t di s r upt i ve of t he educ at i onal pr oces s , t he s chool di s ci pl i nar yr ul es need notbe as det ai l ed as a cr i m i nal code w hi ch i m pos es cr i m i nal
s anct i ons
. ” Fr as er , 478 U

. S. at 686. T hi s C our t has decl ar ed t hat
s chool di s ci pl i nar yr ul es s houl d be s t r uck dow n “onl yw hen t he vaguene s s i s es peci al l y pr obl emat i c, ” Sypni ew s ki , 307 F. 3d at266,29 a n d h a s u p h e ld a sc h o o l d isc ip lin a ry p o licyth a t re q u ire d stu d e n ts t o confor m t o “‘ an i m pr eci s e but co m pr ehens i bl e nor m at i ve s t andar d, ’ ” i d. ( quot i ng C oat es v. C i t yof C i nci nnat i , 402 U

. S. 61, 6 1 4 (1 9 7 1 ))

.
A gai n , w e w il l aff

ir m the D istri ct C o u rt ’s de term ination tha t th e S c h o o l D istric t’s p o licie s w e re n o t f a c iallyu n c o n s ti tu tio n a l. T h e p o lic ies clea rl yd ef ine w h en an d w h ere they ap p ly

. F u rt h er, t he cont entof t he r egul at i ons i s noti m p erm issi bl yvague. A l t hough t he A U P pr ohi bi t s a br oad ra n g e of us es of t he School D i s t r i ct ’ s comput er s ( i ncl udi ng acc es s i ng ort r ans m i t t i ng “mat er i al l i kel yt o be off

ens i ve orobj ect i onabl e t o r eci pi ent s , ” A pp. 47) , t he
a d d it io n o f

sp e c if ic e x a m p les o f

im p e rm iss ib le u sa g e s d ra w s th is po l i cyw i t hin t he p urvi ew of S ypn i ew ski , an d a rt i culat es a compre hens i bl e nor m at i ve s t andar d. For exampl e, underthe g e n e ra l p ro h ib iti o n a g a in st o f f e n siv e m at eri al , the A U P speci fi cally pr ohi bi t s defa m at or y , s exual l y expl i ci t , di s cr i m i nat or y , and vi ol ent
m at er i al

. A pp. 47- 48. T her e ca n be no doubtt hatJ

. S. w oul d have
e x p e c t e d t o h a v e b e e n p u n i s h e d u n d e r t h e Ha n d b o o k a n d t h e AUP had s he t aken the s ame act i ons fr om a s chool comput eror w hi l e on sc h o o l g r o u n d s. In th is s e n se , the ye sta b lish a c o m p re h e n sib le
nor m at i ve s t andar d t h at i s appr opr i at e forus e i n di s ci pl i ni ng s tu d e n t m is c o n d u c t.

A s w ith the discu ssion o f ov erb rea d th abo v e, J.S

. ’s
ar gum ents eems t o r el yon s peci fi c i ndi vi dual s ’ m i s i nt erpr et at i ons o f th e p o li cies, an d n o t the inv ali d ityo f th e p o li cies the m selv es. It
w as t he ext ens i on and app l i cat i on of t hes e pol i ci es t o s peec h
u n d e rta k e n f

ro m h e r p e rso n a l c o m p u te r a t h e r p a re n ts’ h o m e to
w hi ch s he obj ect s h ere
. T hi s puni s hm ent , how ever , w as not al l ow ed byt he vague nes s of t he p o l i ci es
. I ns t ead, i t w as im p lem e n ted d e sp ite th e f a c t th a t th e s e p o licie s q u ite c lea rlyd id notext end t o t he conduc t ati ssu e. A s t he pol i ci es ar e not
u n c o nst i t uti on al l yvag ue, m uch l ess vagu e i n a m ann er that i s “es peci al l y pr obl emat i c, ” w e w i l l aff i r m t he D i s t r i ctC our t ’ s gr ant of s um m ar yj udgm enton t hi s i s s ue.30 V I.

For t he for egoi ng r eas ons , t he D i s t r i ctC our t ’ s j udgm ent
w i l l be af

fi r m ed i n par t , r ever s ed i n par t and r emanded.

### 1 J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District , No. 08

- 4138 SMITH, Circuit Judge , concurring , with whom McKEE, Chief Judge , SLOVITER, FUENTES , and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge s , join.
Because the school district suspended J.S. for speech that she engaged in at home o n a Sunday evening, I fully agree with the majority ‘s conclusion that it violated J.S.‘s First Amendment rights. I write separately to address a question that the majority opinion expressly leave s open : whether Tinker appl ies to off

- campus speech in the f irst place . I would hold that it does not , and that the First Amendment protects students engaging in off

- campus speech to the same extent it protects speech by citizens in the community at large

. As a general matter, the First Amendment strictly protec ts speech regardless of whether it is disruptive, offensive, vulgar, or insulting. See Texas v. Johnson , 491 U.S. 397, 408

– 10 , 414 (1989); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell , 485 U.S. 46 , 54

– 57 (1988 ); Cohe n v. California , 403 U.S. 15 , 25

– 26 (1971)

. I n Tinker v . Des Moines Independent Community School District , 393 U.S. 503 (1969) , the Supreme Court considered whether different rul es should govern student speech inside public school s
. Although it observed that students do not ―shed their constitutional rights t o freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,‖ the Court determined that, ―in light of the special characteristics of the school environment‖ and the need to defer to school officials‘ authority ―to prescribe and control conduct in the schools , ‖ the First Amendment‘s ordinarily strict protection of speech rights should be relaxed in the public

- school context

. Id. at 506

–08

. The Court thus

### 2 concluded that some otherwise

- protected speech can be suppressed in the school setting, but only if it ―w ould materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.‖ Id. at 5 13

. In later cases, the Court recognized exceptions to Tinker , holding that even non
- disruptive school speech can be
re stricted if it is lewd or vulgar, Bethel Sch

. Dist

. 403 v. Fraser , 478 U.S. 675 , 685 (1986), if it is school

- sponsored and th e restriction is ―reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns , ‖ Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier , 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) , or if it is reasonably viewed as promoting the use of illegal drugs, Morse v. Frederick , 551 U.S. 393 , 403 (2007).
Courts agree that Fraser , Kuhlmeier , and Morse apply solely to o n
- campus speech (I use the phrase ―on

- campus speech‖ as shorthand for speech communicated at school or, though not on school grounds, at a school

- sanctioned event , s ee Morse , 551 U.S. at 40 0

–0 1)

. Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly recognized that Fraser does not extend ―outside the school contex t, ‖ i d. at 405 (citing Cohen ) , and three justices have observed (withou t objection from the other six) that speech promoting illegal drug use , even if proscribable in a public school, would ―unquestionably‖ be protected if uttered elsewhere, id. at 434 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter and Ginsburg , JJ., dissenting )

. L ower courts, however , are divided on whether Tinker ‘s substantial

- disruption test governs students‘ off

- campus expression. Compare Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd. , 393 F.3d 608, 6 15, 6 20 (5th Cir. 2004) ( Tinker does not apply to students‘ off

- campus speech), T homas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent

. Sch. Dist. , 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 , 1053 n.18 (2d Cir. 1979) ( distinguishing Tinker in a case involving off

- campus expression ), and Klein v.

### 3 Smith , 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1441 (D. Me. 1986), with Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. o f the Weedsport Cent

. Sch. Dist. , 494 F.3d 34, 39 & n.4 (2d Cir. 2007) ( Tinker applies to off

campus speech in certain circumstances) , J. C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist. , 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 110 4 , 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (same), and Kill ion v. Franklin Reg ’ l Sch. Dist. , 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 454

– 55 (W.D. Pa. 2001). In my view, the decisions holding that Tinker does not apply to off

- campus speech h ave the better of the argument

. Tinker ‘s holding is expressly grounded in ―the special char acteristics of the school environment,‖ 393 U.S. at 506, and the need to defer to school officials‘ authority ―to prescribe and control conduct in the schools,‖ id. at 507. 1 

### The Court‘s later school

- speech cases underscored Tinker ‘s
narrow reach

. Tinker , according to the Court‘s decision in Fraser , rests on the understanding that ―the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,‖ see 478 U.S. at 682, and that students are a captive audience while at school , see id. at 684

. See also id. at 688 n.1

1 Tinker did say that the substantial

- disruption standard governs student speech ―in class or out of it.‖ 393 U.S. at 513. Read in context, though, it is clear that the phras e ―or out of it‖ does not mean ―out of school‖ but rather ―in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours.‖ Id. at 512

– 13. See also id. at 508 (―Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus , that deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk . . . .‖) (emphasis added). Had the Court intended to vest schools with the unprecedented authority to regulate stude nts‘ off

- campus speech, surely it would have done so unambiguously.

### 4 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment ) ( stating that the Court‘s school

- speech cases ―obviously do not [apply] outside of the school environment‖). Kuhlmeier , moreover, described Tinker as ―address[ing] educators‘ ability to silence a student‘s personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises. ‖ 484 U.S. at 271. Finally, in Morse , the Court took care to refute the contention that the plaintiff‘s speech, which took place at a school field trip, did not occur

― at school. ‖ 551 U.S. at 401. In concluding that the plaintiff‘s suit was governed by the Tinker line of cases , the Court stressed that the field trip ―occurred during normal school hours,‖ that it ―was sancti oned by [the principal] as an approved social event or class trip,‖ that ―[t]eachers and administrators were interspersed among the students and charged with supervising them,‖ and that the ―high school band and cheerleaders performed.‖ Id. at 400

–01

. If Tinker and the Court‘s other school

- speech precedents applied to off

campus speech, this discussion would have been unnecessary. See also id. at 406 ( ― ̳ First

. . . Amendment rights [] are different in public schools than elsewhere

. ‘ ‖) (quoting Veronia Sc h. Dist. 47J v. Acton , 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995))

. Indeed, in his Morse concurrence, Justice Alito essentially recognized that Tinker ‘s substantial

- disruption test does not apply to students‘ off

- campus expression

. See id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring) ( noting that Tinker allows schools to regulate ―in

- school student speech . . . in a way that would not be constitutional in other settings‖ )

. A ccord Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg ’l Bd. of Educ. , 307 F.3d 243, 259 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that under Tinker , a ―broader . . . area of speech can be regulated at school than outside school‖)

. The Second Circuit addressed a school‘s punishment of off

- campus speech in Thomas v. Board of Education ,

### 5 Granville Central School District , supra . There, a public high sc hool suspended students for publishing an ―underground‖ newspaper, which was ― saturated with distasteful sexual satire, including an editorial on masturbation and articles alluding to prostitution, sodomy, and castration.‖ 607 F.2d at 1045 n.3. Although the students had composed ―an occasional article‖ in the school building
a fter classes, the rest of the publication process, including printing and distribution of the newspaper , had occurred off campus after school hours. Id. at 1045. The students were suspended after a teacher confiscated a copy of the newspaper that another student had taken to school. In the ensuing § 1983 suit, the Second Circuit concluded that Tinker did not control because the newspaper was best viewed as off

campus speech

. I

d. at 1050

. The court therefore applied general First Amendment law, determined that the school‘s actions were un constitutional , and invalidated the students‘ suspensions

. Id. at 1050

– 53

. The Fifth Circuit followed suit in Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board , supra
. There, while sitting in the privacy of his own home, a high school student drew a picture of his school being attacked by missiles, helicopters, and armed assailants

. 393 F.3d at 611. The student stored the picture in his closet. The sch ool learned of the drawing when the student‘s younger brother inadvertently took it there . The school expelled the student. In the civil

- rights action that followed, the Fifth Circuit determined that the picture amounted to off

- campus speech and th us dec lined to apply Tinker , holding that it governs only ―student expression  ̳that

.

. . occur [s] on the school premises.‘‖ Id. at 615 , 619 (quoting Kuhlmeier , 484 U.S. at 271)

. Applying general First Amendment principles, the court concluded that the picture

### 6 was not a ―true threat, ‖ see Watts v. United States , 394 U.S. 705 (1969) , and th erefore was protected expression

. Id. at 61 7

– 18

. See also Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 14 , 822 F.2d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 1987) (Arnold, J.); Lee Goldman , Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach , 63 Fla. L. Rev. 395 , 430 (2011) (arguing that Tinker should not be applied to students‘ off

campus speech); Mary

- Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age , 60 Fla. L. Rev. 1 027, 1093 (2008) (―[T]he Tinker approach to student speech is ill

- suited to deal with off

- campus expression.‖). I agree with Thomas and Porter , and I believe that various post

- Tinker pronouncements of the Supreme Court support their ratio decidendi

. App lying Tinker to off

- campus speech would create a precedent with ominous implications

. Doing so would empower schools to regulate students‘ expressi ve activity no matter where it takes p lace, when it occurs, or what subject matter it involves

— so long as it
c ause s a substantial disruption at school. Tinker , for example, authorizes schools to suppress political speech

— speech ―at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect,‖ Morse , 551 U.S. at 403

—if it substantially disrupts school activities

. See 393 U.S. at 51 3

. Suppose a high school student, while at home after school hours, were to write a blog entry defending gay marriage. Suppose further that several of the student‘s classmates go t wind of the entry , t ook issue with it , and cause d a s ignificant d isturbance at school

. While the school could clearly punish the students who act ed disruptively , i f Tinker were held to apply to off

- campus speech, the school could also punish the student whose blog entry brought about the disruption

. That c annot be , nor is it, the law

.

### 7 To be sure, this case does not involve political speech

. J.S. simply published an i nsulting (and, I would say, mean

spirited) parody of her principal on Myspace. But the lack of political content is irrelevant for First Am endment purposes. There is no First Amendment exception for offensive speech
or for speech that lacks a certain quantum of social value

. Snyder v. Phelps , 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219

– 20 (2011); United States v. Stevens , 130 S. Ct. 1577 , 1586 , 1591 (2010) ; Hust ler Magazine , 485 U.S. at 55; Cohen , 403 U. S. at 25

– 26 ; FCC v. Pacifica Found

. , 438 U.S. 726, 763 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting ) (observing that the Court has consistently ―refuse[d] to embrace the notion, completely antithetical to basic First Amendment values, that the degree of protection the First Amendment affords protected speech varies with the social value ascribed to that speech by five [justices]‖). I t is worth pointing out, as well, that although speech like J.S.‘s may appear to be worthless , it does enable citizens to vent their frustrations in nonviolent way s. We ought not to discount the importance in our society of such a ―safety valve.‖ See Rodney A. Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society 13 (1992)

. Furthermore, if Tinker were applied t o off

- campus speech , there would be little reason to prevent s chool officials from regulating adult speech uttered in the community

. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth , 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (noting that adults and children generally enjoy t he same constitutional rights). Adults often say things that give rise to disruptions in public schools . Those who championed desegregation in the 1950s and 60s caused more than a minor disturbance in the southern schools. Of course, the prospect of usi ng Tinker to silence such speakers is absurd. But the absurdity stems not from applying Tinker to off

- campus

### 8 speech uttered by adults and students alike , but from the antecedent step of extending T inker beyond the public

- school setting to which it is so f

irmly moored

. See Clay Calvert, Off

Campus Speech, On

- Campus Punishment: Censorship of the Emerging Internet Underground , 7 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 243 , 280

– 81 (2001). I would hold that Tinker does not govern a student‘s off

- campus expression

. 2


### But that is only half the battle. The other half: how can one tell whe ther speech takes place on or off campus? Answering this question will not always be easy

. See Morse , 551 U.S. at 401. The answer plainly cannot turn solely on where the speaker was sitting when the speech was originally uttered. Such a standard would fail to accommodate the somewhat ―everywhere at once‖ nature of the internet. So, for example, I would have no difficulty applying Tinker t o a case where a student sent a disruptive email to school f aculty from his home computer. Regardless of its place of origin, speech intentionally directed towards a school is properly considered on

- campus speech

. O n the other hand, speech originating off campus does not mutate into on

- campus speech simpl y because it foreseeably makes its way onto campus. See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. , --- F.3d

--- ( 3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); Papandrea, supra , at 1090

– 92

. A bare foresee ability standard could be stretched too far , and would risk ensnaring any off

- cam pus expression that happened to discuss school

- related matters. See Thomas , 607 F.2d at 1053 n. 18

.

2 Assuming arguendo that Tinker did apply to students‘ out

- of

school speech, I agree with the majority that the school district has failed to satisfy the substantial

- disruption test.

### 9 In any event, this case does not require us to precisely define the boundary between on

- and off

- campus speech , since it is perfectly clear that J.S.‘s spe e ch took place off campus. J.S. created the Myspace profile at home on a Sunday evening ; she did not send the profile to any school employees ; and she had no reason to know that it would make its way onto campus . In fact, she took steps to limit dissemin ation of the p r ofile , and the Myspace website is blocked on school computer s
. If ever speech occurred
o utside of the school setting , J.S.‘s did so
. Having determined that J.S.‘ s speech took place off campus, I would apply ordinary First Amendment princi ples to determine whether it was protected. I agree with the majority that this was protected speech . The speech was not defamatory, obscene, or otherwise unprotected

. See Hustler Magazine , 485 U.S. at 57; Miller v. California , 413 U.S. 15 (1973) . J.S. ‘s suspension, then, violated the First Amendment

.

* * *
J.S. said vulgar , offensive things about her principal on Myspace. And she went beyond that. She wrote cutting,
mean
- spirited things about members of his family. If we could suppress her speech without s ilencing other , more deserving speakers , public discourse would suffer no harm

. But courts have long disclaimed the ability to draw a principled distinction between ― worthless ‖ and ― valuable ‖ speech

. W e must t olerate thoughtless speech like J.S .‘ s in order to provide adequate breathing room for valuable, robust speech

—the kind that enriches the marketplace of ideas, promotes self

- government , and contributes to self

determination

. Without condoning her disrespectful and

### 10 mean
- spirited tone, I sup port J.S.‘s right to say the things she said free from government punishment

.1

1 

### FISHER, Circuit Judge , dissenting , with whom SCIRICA , RENDELL , BARRY , JORDAN , and VANASKIE , Circuit Judges , join

. Today‟s holding severely undermines schools‟ authority to regulate students who “materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. , 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). While I agree with the majority‟s apparent adoption of the rule that off

- campus student speech can rise to the level of a substantial disruption, I disagree with the Court‟s application of that rule to the facts of this case. The majority misconstrues the facts. In doing so, it allows a student to target a school official and his family with malicious and unfounded accusations about their character in vulgar, obscen e, and personal language. I fear that our Court leaves schools defenseless to protect teachers and school officials against such attacks and powerless to discipline students for the consequences of their actions. J.S., a n eighth

- grade student at Blue Mou ntain Middle School, was upset with her principal James McGonigle for disciplining her for dress

- code violations, and she created a MySpace page in retaliation. At the URL http://www.myspace.com/kidsrockmybed, J.S. accused her principal of having sex in h is office, “hitting on students and their parents,” and being a “sex addict.” She called him a “dick head,” stated that he was “put on this world with a small dick,” and called him a “fagass.” She stated that his wife “looks like a man” and that his son “looks like a gorilla.” She stated that the principal enjoys “riding the fraintrain,”

– a reference to his wife Debra Frain, who worked at the school

### 2 as a guidance counselor

– and that “it‟s a slow ride but you‟ll get there eventually.” I respectfully di ssent from the majority‟s ruling that the Blue Mountain School District‟s ten

- day suspension of J.S. for making false accusations against McGonigle violated her First Amendment right to free speech. The majority holds that “[t]he facts in this case do not support the conclusion that a forecast of substantial disruption was reasonable.” Maj. Op. at 15 . But the majority makes light of the harmful effects of J.S.‟s speech and the serious nature of allegations of sexual misconduct. Broadcasting a personal a ttack against a school official and his family online to the school community not only causes psychological harm to the targeted individuals but also undermines the authority of the school. It was permissible for the School District to discipline J.S. bec ause substantial disrupti on was reasonably foreseeable.
I. I disagree with the majority‟s assessment that the four opinions of the Supreme Court on student speech “compel the conclusion that the School District violated J.S.‟s First Amendment free speech rights.” Maj. Op. at 1 1 . In fact, the Supreme Court has never addressed whether students have the right to make off

- campus speech that targets school officials with malicious, obscene, and vulgar accusations. In Tinker , the Court examined whether a scho ol had the authority to prevent students from wearing black arm bands on campus in protest of the Vietnam War. 393 U.S. 503

. In Bethel School District v. Fraser , the Court held that a school could suspend a student for giving an obscene and vulgar

### 3 speech on campus at a school

- sponsored event. 478 U.S. 675 , 685 (1986). The Court in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier ruled that a school could exercise editorial control over the contents of a student newspaper so long as it was “reasonably related to l egitimate pedagogical concerns.” 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). And in Morse v. Frederick , the Court determined that a school could sanction a student for unfurling a banner that promoted illegal drug use at a school

approved event. 551 U.S. 393 , 403 (2007). None of these decisions control the facts of this case nor do they compel a conclusion in favor of J.S. The Supreme Court has only briefly and ambiguously considered whether schools have the authority to regulate student off

- campus speech. See Emily Go ld Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Hostile Speech About School Officials and the Limits of School Restrictions , 19 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 591, 617

- 18 (2011). In Tinker , the Court stated that “conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any r eason

– whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior

– materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of rights of others is, of course, not immunized by constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.” 393 U.S. at 513 . But it is unclear if “in class or out of it” means to distinguish the classroom from the world beyond the schoolhouse gates, or if it simply means out of class but in the cafeteria, schoolyard, or other areas on school grounds. Again, in Kuhlmeier , the Court stated that, We have . . . recognized that the First Amendment rights of students in the public schools “are not automatically coextensive with

### 4 the rights of adults in other settings,” Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser , 478 U.S. 675, 682[] (1 986), and must be “applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.” Tinker , []393 U.S.[] at 506[.] A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its “basic educational mission,” Fraser ,[] 478 U.S.[] at 685 ,[] even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school.
484 U.S. at 266. But the Court ‟s meaning was left unclear. Either the Court meant to distinguish the school‟s authority to regulate student speech on campus from the schoo l‟s authority to regulate off

- campus speech , o r the Court was simply contrasting the school‟s authority to regulate student speech with the government‟s authority to regulate adult speech. In Morse , the Court declined the opportunity to determine whether schools have the authority to regulate off

campus speech. Even though the student created the banner at issue off campus and was off school grounds when he unfurled it, the Court held that it was a school speech case because the banner was displayed at a school

- approved event during normal school hours. Morse , 551 U.S. at 400

- 01. The Court, however, did state in dicta that schools have more limited authority to regulate obscene speech outside of the school environment when it claimed that “[h]ad Fraser d elivered the same speech in a public forum outside the school context, it would have been protected.” Id. at 404 (citing Cohen v. California , 403 U.S. 15 (1971)). But the Court did not address the issue of whether schools can

### 5 regulate off

- campus speech w hich causes substantial on

campus disruption under Tinker

. II. I believe that the rule adopted by the Supreme Court in Tinker should determine the outcome of this case. Under Tinker , we must examine whether J.S.‟s speech created a significant threat of s ubstantial disruption at the Middle School. School authorities need not wait until the disruption actually occurs if they are able to “demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led [them] to forecast substantial disruption of or material interfere nce with school activities.” Tinker , 393 U.S. at 514. If the Middle School reasonably forecasted substantial disruption, then it had the authority to regulate J.S.‟s speech. The majority seems to acknowledge just as much, but finds that “[t]he facts sim ply do not support the conclusion that the School District could have reasonably forecasted a substantial disruption of or material interference with the school as a result of J.S.‟s profile.” Maj. Op. at 2 1

. The majority reaches this conclusion by contr asting the facts of Tinker with those of our case. It notes that at the time of Tinker the United States had over 200,000 troops deployed in Vietnam and the country was divided over the issue. The majority cites the dissenting opinion of Justice Black wh o argued that the record demonstrated that the black arm bands worn by students in protest of the Vietnam War would distract students and disrupt the classroom. And yet, notes the majority, the Court in Tinker held that “„the record does not demonstrate a ny facts which might reasonably have led

### 6 school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities.‟” Maj. Op. at 15 (emphasis in original) (quoting Tinker , 593 U.S. at 514). From a comparison with the facts of this case, the majority draws the conclusion that J.S.‟s speech did not cause a substantial disruption at the Middle School nor was it reasonable to forecast a substantial disruption. The majority is correct in finding it appropriate to distinguish th e facts of Tinker , but it fails to heed several salient distinctions that compel the opposite conclusion. The speech in Tinker was political speech, was not directed at the school or at school officials, and was not vulgar, obscene, malicious, or harmful. Moreover, the majority misconstrues the facts of this case, making light of J.S.‟s accusations and underestimating its impact.
A. The speech at issue in Tinker did “not concern aggressive, disruptive action or even group demonstrations. . . . [It was] a silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance.” 393 U.S. at 508. The Court was concerned that peaceful and nonintrusive political speech was censored by the school. The Court was motivated by a fear of totalitarian ism and the need to protect freedom of expression to preserve the foundations of a democratic system. What made the school‟s prohibition so troubling was that it appeared to be a content

- based regulation of political speech. The school prohibited student s from protesting the war, whereas other students were permitted to wear political buttons. Some even wore the Iron Cross, a

### 7 symbol traditionally associated with Nazism. “Clearly, the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at least without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally permissible.” Id . at 511. A government entity regulating political speech that it did not agree with was eerily similar to that of totalitarian regimes. “In our system, state

- operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. . . . [Students] may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved.” Id

. In order to maintain a thriving d emocracy, students cannot be unreasonably encumbered in their freedom to express moral, political, and social ideals and beliefs. “„The classroom is peculiarly the “marketplace of ideas.” The Nation‟s future depends upon leaders trained through wide expo sure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth “out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than through any kind of authoritative selection.”‟” Id . at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents , 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (internal citations omitt ed)). Schools should foster an environment of learning that is vital to the functioning of a democratic system and the maturation of a civic body. Allowing for the expression of beliefs and opinions in a robust but respectful environment encourages engag ement, promotes self

- improvement, and furthers the search for truth. The Court in Tinker embraced the freedom of speech as an essential component of the educational system. “When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during th e authorized hours, he may express his opinions,

### 8 even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without „materially and substantially interefer(ing) with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school‟ and without colliding with the rights of others.” Id. at 512

- 13 ( alteration in original) (citation omitted).
B. J.S., by contrast, targeted her principal and her principal‟s family with lewd, vulgar, and offensive speech. She created a MySpace page usi ng a photograph of McGonigle that she had taken from the School District website, and she publicly disseminated numerous hurtful accusations. She accused McGonigle of sexual misconduct: “fucking in [his] office,” “hitting on students and their parents,” and being a “sex addict.” She insulted McGonigle by calling him a “dick head,” stating that he was “put on this world with a small dick,” and calling him a “fagass.” And J.S. insulted his family. She stated that his wife “looks like a man” and that his s on “looks like a gorilla.” She stated that the principal enjoys “riding the fraintrain” and that “it‟s a slow ride but you ‟ ll get there eventually.”
The School found this speech to be i n violation of school policy because J.S. made “false accusations abo ut the school principal” and violated copyright law in using McGonigle‟s picture. App. A70. This constituted a level IV infraction because it involved “making a false accusation about a school staff member,” i d

. A66, and the School imposed a ten

- day susp ension.

### 9 J.S.‟s speech is not the type of speech that the Tinker Court so vehemently protected. I agree with the majority that the facts in the record fail to demonstrate subst antial disruption at the S chool. B ut the profile‟s potential to cause disrupti on was reasonably foreseeable , and that is sufficient

. 1 

### Tinker , 393 U.S. at 514. Two forms of disruption were foreseeable. First, the MySpace page posed a reasonably foreseeable threat of interference with the educational environment. If J.S.‟s speech went unpunished, it would undermine McGonigle‟s authority and disrupt the educational process . Second, J.S.‟s speech posed a reasonably foreseeable threat of disrupting the operations of the

1 

### Today, our Court releases a separate opinion dealing with school discipline of a student who created a MySpace profile of his principal. See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist.,

-- F.3d

-- (3d Cir. 201 1 ) (en banc)

. However, I find the two cases distinguishable. Unlike the instant case, the school district in Layshock did not argue on appeal that there was, under Ti nker, a nexus between the student ‟ s speech and a substantial disruption of the school environment. Id. at Part IV.2. This nexus, under Tinker, is the basis of my dissent in this case. Th e Court in Layshock also h o ld s , under Fraser , that the student ‟ s sp eech could not be considered “on

campus” speech just because it was targeted at the Principal and other members of the school community and it was reasonably foreseeable that school district and Principal would learn about the MySpace profile. Id. at Part IV.3. Layshock ‟s holding, therefore, does not speak to the facts of this case to which I believe Tinker applies.

### 10 classroom. It was foreseeable that J.S.‟s false accusations and malicious comments would disrupt McGonigle and Frain‟s ability to perform their jobs. I handle both forms of disruption in turn. Finally, I discuss how the majority misconstrues the facts to underestimate the foreseeable impact of J.S.‟s speech.
1.
J.S .‟s speech posed a threat of substantial disruption to the educational environment . The majority fails to recognize the effects of accusations of sexual misconduct. J.S. created the profile at the URL ending in: “kidsrockmybed.” She accused McGonigle of having sex in his office, “hitting on students and their parents,” and being a “sex addict.” The profile stated that “I love children[ and] sex (any kind).”
Such accusations interfere with the educational process by undermin ing the authority of school o fficials to perform their jobs. In a case where a student referred to his assistant principal as a “dick,” the district court noted: Insubordinate speech always interrupts the educational process because it is contrary to principles of civility and respec t that are fundamental to a public school education. Failing to take action in response to such conduct would not only encourage the offending student to repeat the conduct, but also would serve to foster an attitude of disrespect towards teachers and sta ff.

### 11 Posthumus v. Bd. of Educ. of the Mona Shores Pub. Sch. , 380 F. Supp. 2d 891, 902 (W.D. Mich. 2005). J.S. did not only refer to her principal as a “dick” but launched a vulgar attack on his character and accused him of sexual misconduct. J.S. embarras sed, belittled, and possibly defamed McGonigle. If J.S. were not disciplined, it would demonstrate to the student body that this form of speech is acceptable behavior

– whether on or off camp us. Further, accusing school officials of sexual misconduct pos es a foreseeable threat of diverting school resources required to correct the misinformation and remedy confusion

. I t was reasonably foreseeable that the accusations made in the MySpace profile would be shared with parents and teachers. McGonigle‟s chara cter would come under investigation, and his fitness to occupy a position of trust with adolescent children would be questioned. It is inevitable that as more students and parents learned of the profile, the S chool would experience disruption. While Supe rintendent Joyce Romberger may have dismissed the accusations as false because she knew him, 2 

### students and parents unfamiliar with McGonigle may have had serious questions about McGonigle‟s character and actions . Parents would become concerned that their children were supervised by a man accused of having sex in his office, being a “sex addict,” and “hitting on” their children. It was reasonably foreseeable that

2 

### Romberger stated that she did not disclose any of the allegations in the profile because she believed it consisted of “lies” and “malicious comments” made by students angry at McGonigle.

### 12 school administrators would have to spend a substantial amount of time alleviating these conce rns. The Middle School acted reasonably in requesting the removal of the MySpace page, contacting J.S.‟s parents, and suspending J.S. for ten days. If such steps were not taken, it is likely that the Middle School would have suffered substantial disrupti ons because McGonigle‟s authority would have been severely undermined and school resources would have been diverted to alleviate the inevitable concerns

. 2. The majority also overlooks the substantial disruptions to the classroom environment that follow f rom personal and harmful attacks on educators and school officials. J.S.‟s speech attacked McGonigle and Fra i n in personal and vulgar terms and broadcasted it to the school community. T his kind

### 13 of harassment has tangible effects on educators. 3 

### It may cause teachers to leave the scho ol and stop teaching altogether, and those who decide to stay are oftentimes less effective. See Jina S. Yoon, Teacher Characteristics as Predictors of Teacher

- Student Relationships: Stress, Negative Affect, and Self

- Efficacy , 30 Soc. Behav. & Personality 485,

3 

### It is worth noting that these forms of online personal attacks by students occur with some degree of frequency. They are often directed at other students and have been called “cyberbullying.” In a 20 10 study, 20.8 percent of students ages 10 to 18 years old stated that they had been “cyberbullied” in their lifetime, and 7.5 percent stated that they were “cyberbullied” within the previous 30 days, where “cyberbullying” was defined as “when someone repeatedl y harasses, mistreats, or makes fun of another person online or while using cell phones or other electronic devices

. ” Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying Research Center, available at http://www.cyberbullying.us/research.php

. In a different study from 2007

– perhaps reflecting the nebulous concept of “cyberbullying”

– 7 percent of students stated that they had been victims of “self

- defined cyberbullying.” National School Board Association, Creating & Connecting: Research and Guidelines on O nline Social

– And Educational

– Networking 6 (2007); see also M.I. Ybarra & J.K. Mitchell, Online Aggressor/Targets, Aggressors and Targets: A Comparison of Associated Youth Characteristics , 45 J . Child Psychol. & Psychiatry 1308 (2004) ( 19 percent of you th were on the giving or receiving end of online aggression in the previous year ).

### 14 491 (2002) (“Not only does teacher stress affect teachers‟ general attitude toward teaching, but also it is likely to influence the quality of their relationships with students.”); Suzanne Tochterman & Fred Barnes, Sexua l Harassment in the Classroom: Teachers as Targets , 7 Reclaiming Child & Youth 21, 22 (1998) (noting that educators who are subject to sexual harassment feel: “detachment; shame; horror; uncertainty; demoralization; fear; feelings of being unappreciated, t argeted, objectified, belittled, and victimized; sadness; anger; avoidance; feeling defeated; blame; separation; and attack”) . Educators become anxious and depressed and feel unable to relate to their students. Id

. They lose their motivation to teach, a nd their students suffer as a result. “Even if the school official remains at the school, „anxious, depressed or disengaged teachers are less able to sustain the academic engagement of their students,‟ thus harming student motivation and behavior.” Waldm an, supra at 646 (quoting Benoit Galand, et al., School Violence and Teacher Professional Disengagement , 77 Brit. J. of Educ. Psychol. 465, 467 (2007)). These studies are consistent with cases involving hostile, vulgar, and obscene student speech directed at school officials. In Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weedsport Central School District , the Second Circuit note d that a teacher who was subjected to hostile student speech became distressed and had to stop teaching the student‟s class. 494 F .3d 3 4, 35

- 36 (2d Cir. 2007). Similarly, i n J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District , the teacher, suffered stress, anxiety, loss of appetite, loss of sleep, loss of weight, and a general sense of loss

### 15 of well being as a result of viewing the [hostile and offens ive student] web site. She suffered from short

- term memory loss and an inability to go out of the house and mingle with crowds. [The teacher] suffered headaches and was required to take anti

- anxiety/anti

- depressant medication. 807 A.2d 847, 852 (Pa. 2002 ). The teacher was unable to return to school, and the “web site had a demoralizing impact on the school community.” Id . In Schroeder v. Hamilton School District , a teacher was subjected to anti

- homosexual speech from students and parents and suffered a “nervous breakdown that ultimately resulted in his termination.” 282 F.3d 946, 950 (7th Ci r. 2002). I n our case, McGonigle stated that he became distressed after viewing J.S.‟s MySpace profile. He stated , “ I was very upset and very angry, hurt, and I c an‟t understand why [J.S.] did this to me and my family.” App. A333. J.S.‟s speech had a reasonably foreseeable effect on the classroom environment. In addition to causing a diminution in respect for authority and a diver sion of school resources, J.S.‟s speech posed reasonably foreseeable psychological harm to McGonigle and Fra i n that would impact their ability to perform their jobs. Being subject to such personal attacks, they may have been discouraged to interact with students and perhaps even motivat ed to leave without the institutional support of the School. Without effective punishment, McGonigle and Frain would have been less effective in fulfilling the educational mission of their positions. Furthermore, if the Middle School did not punish

### 16 J.S. , it was foreseeable that other students may have decided to personally attack McGonigle, Frain, or other members of the school. Cf. Morse , 551 U.S. at 409

- 10 (noting the “difficult” and “vitally important” role that school principals play and reasoning th at “failing to act would send a powerful message to the students” in affirming school‟s 10

- day suspension of student for speech promoting illegal drug use). The Middle School protected its employees against such a vicious and personal attack, thereby prev enting substantial disruption of the classroom environment. I believe ou r Court errs in precluding schools from protecting teachers and officials against such harassment

. 3. I question the majority‟s assessment of the facts of this
case. 4 

### Its conclusion that a substantial disruption was not

4 

### My disagreement with the majority is principally with respect to its interpretation of the facts. I am not in disagreement with the majority ‟s assumption that Tinker appl ies to off

- campus speech . We simply disagree about whether J.S.‟s speech rises to the level of a substantial disruption. By sharp contrast, the concurring opinion by Judge Smith embraces the position that Tinker does not apply to off

- campus speech. The concurring judges state that off

campus student speech should receive the same protections as adult speech “in the community at large.” Conc. Op. at 1. While certainly a defensible position, I find it unpersuasive. Student speech that targets school off icials, is publicly broadcasted to the school community, and has a reasonably foreseeable substantial disruption on the classroom

### 17 reasonably foreseeable rests on several mischaracterizations: that J.S.‟s MySpace profile should be regarded as a “joke”; that her profile should not have been taken seriously; that because J.S. did not identify McGo nigle by name, it lessened the impact of her profile; and that J.S. took steps to ensure that her profile remained private and did not reach the school. Each of these findings is flawed. First, the majority makes light of J.S.‟s post, characterizing it a s a “joke” that, while “indisputably vulgar,” was “juvenile and nonsensical.” Maj. Op. at 17 . The majority goes so far as to state that we should take J.S.‟s speech less seriously because she intended it as a “joke.” See id . This is not the test adopte d by Tinker . The intent of the

environment is regulable by schools, whether it occurs on
- or off

- campus. T he regulation of J.S.‟s speech wa s grounded in “th e special characteri stics of the school environment, ” Tinker , 393 U.S. at 506 , because i t serve d the purposes of preserving the authority and respect of school officials, averting the need to utilize school resources to correct misinformation and remedy c onfusion, and protecting school officials against the psycho logical effects of student harassment. The concurring judges advocate for an ar tificial distinction that belies the fact that off

- campus student speech can have a very real impact on the classroo m environment.

### 18 speaker is of no consequence. 5 

### What determines the permissibility of the S chool‟s response under the First Amendment is whether it was reasonable to foresee substantial disruption. Moreover, it is not our role to determine how schools should treat accusations of sexual misconduct and personal attacks on school officials. School administrators, not judges, are best positioned to assess the potential for harm in cases like this one, and we should be loath to substitute our ju dgments for theirs. See Morse , 551 U.S. at 427 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (warning against the dangers of interfering “with reasonable school efforts to maintain discipline”); cf. Fraser , 478 U.S. at 683 (“The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.”). Thus, e ven if J.S.‟s post can be treated as a juvenile joke, it does not mean that the School District had to treat it as such. For it is also eminently reasonable to treat accusations of sexual misconduct seriously. I believe our Court errs when it tells a school district how it should handle

5 

### Even if J.S.‟s intent were at issue, it is not so clear that the profile was intended to be a joke. While she at one point stated that the profile was created for comical reasons, J.S. also stated that she created the profile because she was “mad” at McGonigle for disciplining her. She claimed that McGonigle unnecessarily yelled at her for committing dress code violations. I t is therefore fair to say that J.S. created the profile in retaliation.

### 19 violations of its policy that are of as serious and grave a matter as false accusations of sex ual misconduct. 6 

### The majority also draws conclusions from the fact that Superintendent Romberger had a duty to report allegations of misconduct and did not do so in this particular case. But the fact that Superintendent Romberger chose not to report the misconduct does not mean that it should not have been reported. Moreover, other schools who face this situation may properly choose to report allegations of misconduct. Our Court does a disservice when it treats allegations of sexual misconduct lightly a nd condones school districts for not taking action. The majority claims that no one could take the contents of J.S.‟s post seriously. Id . But stating that the principal of a middle school has sex in his office and is a “sex

6 

### Similarly, even though the majority migh t have reached a different conclusion on these facts, it certainly cannot be said that the School District acted unreasonably by suspending J.S. for ten days. Cf. Morse , 551 U.S. at 398, 409

- 10 (affirming ten

- day suspension of student who displayed a bann er encouraging illegal drug use at a school event). Indeed, the reasonableness of the School District‟s response to J.S.‟s behavior further distinguishes this case from Layshock , where, in addition to being suspended for ten days, the student was (1) tran sferred to a special academic program for “students with behavior and attendance problems who are unable to function in a regular classroom,” (2) banned from all extracurricular activities, and (3) prohibited from participating in his graduation ceremony. See Layshock , Part I & n.6.

### 20 addict” who enjoys “hitting o n children and their parents” are serious allegations that cannot be taken lightly by any school official or by our Court. The majority states that the profile did not identify McGonigle by name, school, or location. Maj. O p. 2 2 . B ut this in no way lesse ns the gravity of harm. The profile identified McGonigle by posting his picture. There are no facts in the record demonstrating that anyone was at a loss as to who the profile was about. The majority claims that J.S. did not inten d for her accusations to reach the school. Maj. Op. at 17 . Even if this is true, it is an unreasonable expectation that should not carry weight in our analysis. J.S. created a profile on a social networking site using McGonigle‟s photograph, accused him of sexual misconduct, insulted his family members, and used exceptionally vulgar and obscene language. She then made the profile public and shared it with classmates. It was only a matter of time before the subject of her attack found out. And he did, two days later. The majority claims that J.S. “took specific steps to make the profile „private‟ so that only her friends could access it.” Maj. Op. at 2 0 . But there is another way to read this. After hearing from her fellow students about the buzz her profile had created, she made it “private,” but then continued to send the profile to her classmates, sharing it with twenty

- two students. J.S. evinced an expectation that she could somehow share the profile amongst members of the school without the subj ect of her vehement attack finding out. The majority embraces this unreasonable expectation.

### 21 The majority also finds that the School District was barred by state law from punishing J.S. for off

- campus speech. Maj. Op. at 17 n. 5

. Pennsylvania law states that a School District has the authority to : adopt and enforce such reasonable rules and regulations as it may deem necessary and proper, regarding the management of its school affairs . . . as well as regarding the conduct and deportment of all pupils att ending the public schools in the district, during such time as they are under the supervision of the board of school directors and teachers, including the time necessarily spent in comin g to and returning from school. 24 Pa. Const. Stat. § 5

- 510. The majo rity relies on D.O.F. v. Lewisburg Area School District Board of School Directors , 868 A.2d 28 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004), for the proposition that schools lack the authority to regulate conduct that occurs outside of school during non

- school hours. But this c ase is unrelated to the case before us. It involves a student‟s use of drugs during non

- school hours that had no effect on the school. Here, by contrast, a student directed speech about the school at members of the school and had a foreseeable impact
on the operations of the classroom. McGonigle punished J.S. “to prevent interference with the educational process,” which the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has explicitly held is authorized under § 5

- 510. See D.O.F., 868 A.2d at 36 ; see also Bethlehem Are a Sch

. Dist

. , 807 A.2d at 852 ( holding that a school district‟s punishment of a student for creating a website at home during non

- school hours was permissible ).

### 22 Accordingly, I do not believe the statute excludes school regulation of out

- of

- school conduct that threatens to materially interfere with the educational process. 7 

### B ecause the profile created a reasonably foreseeable substantial disruption of the Middle School, the School District did not exceed its statutory authority in punishing J.S.
C.
Our de cision today causes a split with the Second Circuit. In applying Tinker , the Second Circuit has held that off

- campus hostile and offensive student internet speech that is directed at school officials r esult s in a substantial disruption of the classroom en vironment. In Wisniewski , a middle school student sent messages to fifteen fellow students via an instant messenger program from his home computer during
non
- school hours. 494 F.3d at 35

- 36. The program used an icon depicting one of his teachers being s hot in the head with text below reading “Kill Mr. VanderMolen.” Id . The Second Circuit stated that “off

- campus conduct can create a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption within a school,” id. at 39 (citing Thomas v. Board of Education, 607 F.2d 1043 , 1052 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979)), and held that it was reasonably foreseeable that the depiction would come to the attention of school authorities and the teacher who was the subject of the drawing. Id . at 39

- 40. The court reasoned that:

7 

### I also believe it is improper to read § 5

- 510 as an exhaustive description of all occasions under which school officials are statutorily authorized to punish students for infractions of school policies.

### 23 The potentially threa tening content of the icon and the extensive distribution of it, which encompassed 15 recipients, including some of Aaron‟s classmates, during a three

- week circulation period, made this risk at least foreseeable to a reasonable person, if not inevitable. A nd there can be no doubt that the icon, once made known to the teacher and other school officials, would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment.
Id. The Second Circuit held that hostile and offensive off

campus s tudent speech posed a reasonably foreseeable threat of substantial disruption within the school. Id

. The Second Circuit confronted a similar scenario in Doninger v. Niehoff

, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008) ( Doninger I) and Doninger v. Niehoff , -- F.3d

-- , 201 1 WL 1532289 (2d Cir. April 25, 2011) ( Doninger II). A member of the high school student council, upset by scheduling conflicts regarding a student event, posted a message on her blog from her home computer during non

- school hours. She stated that the student event was “cancelled due to douchebags in the central office.” Doninger I, 527 F.3d at 45. She urged people to call or write a school official “to piss her off more.” Id

. The school received numerous calls and emails, some of which were from stud ents who were upset. As a result of the blog post, the school refused to allow the student to run for Junior Class Secretary. The student challenged the school‟s sanction, but the Second Circuit stated that the student‟s post, “although created off

- campu s, was purposely designed by

### 24 [the student] to come onto the campus.” Doninger I, 527 F.3d at 50. The Court reasoned that her post “foreseeably create[d] a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment.” Id . at 50. It was reasonably fores eeable that “administrators and teachers would be further diverted from their core educational responsibilities by the need to dissipate misguided anger or confusion over [the student event‟s] purported cancellation.” Id. at 51

- 52. The majority claims th at these cases are distinguishable. It argues that no one could have taken J.S.‟s accusations seriously and that “J.S. did not even intend for the speech to reach the school.” Maj. Op. at 20 . The majority misses the mark. As discussed above, J.S.‟s pos t was at least potentially psychologically harmful to McGonigle and Frain, it was vicious in its accusations of sexual misconduct, and it posed the potential to undermine McGonigle‟s authority at the Middle School and to divert School resources in temperin g the inevitable anger and confusion amongst parents and the community following a public accusation of sexual misconduct . It is of no consequence if J.S. in fact did not intend to reach the Middle School. She directed obscene and harmful speech at McGon igle and his family, disseminated it to members of the School, and made unfounded accusations. For these reason s , it was reasonably foreseeable that her speech would cause a substantial disruption of the educational process and the classroom environment

. And it is on this point that the majority parts ways with the Second Circuit.

* * *

### 25 The majority‟s approach does not offer a promising way forward. Internet use among teenagers is nearly universal. See Amanda Lenhart, et al., Pew Internet & American L ife Project: Teens and Social Media 2 (2007) (stating that 93 percent of teenagers use the internet and 61 percent use it daily). And social networking sites have become one of the main vehicles of social interaction. See Amanda Lenhart, et al., Pew Inte rnet and American Life: Teens and Mobile Phones 59 (2010) (stating that 73 percent of teenagers use a social networking site); National School Board Association, Creating & Connecting: Research and Guidelines on Online Social

– And Educational

– Networking (2007) (stating that teenagers spend an average of 9 hours per week on social networking sites). The line between “on

- campus” and “off

- campus” speech is not as clear as it once was. Today, students commonly carry cell phones with internet capabilities o nto school grounds. Approximately 66 percent of students receive a cell phone before the age of 14, and slightly less than 75 percent of high school students have cell phones. Amanda Lenhart, et al., Pew Internet and American Life: Teens and Mobile Phone s 9 (2010). Twenty

- three percent of teenagers between the ages of 12 and 17 who own cell phones use them to access social networking sites like MySpace and Facebook. Id . at 56. The majority embraces a notion that student hostile and offensive online spe ech directed at school officials will not reach the school. But with near

- constant student access to social networking sites on and off campus, when offensive and malicious speech is directed at school officials and disseminated online to the student body , it is

### 26 reasonable to anticipate an impact on the classroom environment. I fear that our Court has adopted a ru le that will prove untenable.
IV. I concur in the Court‟s decision that the School District did not violate J.S.‟s parents‟ rights under the Fo urteenth Amendment to raise their child in the manner which they saw fit as discussed in Part IV of the majority opinion, and I concur in the decision that the School District‟s policies were not unconstitutionally overbroad and vague as discussed in Part V of the majority opinion. But I respectfully dissent from the decision that the suspension of J.S. for making false and malicious accusations against her principal in the form of lewd and offensive speech violated her First Amendment rights. In student free speech cases, courts must grapple with the issue of promoting freedom of expression while maintaining a conducive learning environment. I believe the majority has unwisely tipped the balance struck by Tinker , Fraser , Kuhlmeier , and Morse , thereby jeo pardizing schools‟ ability to maintain an orderly learning environment while protecting teachers and school officials against harmful attacks.