SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3028-16T2

MASTERS AT KNOB HILL

CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SEAN M. LALLJEE,

Defendant-Respondent.

________________________________________

Submitted February 27, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Carroll and DeAlmeida.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. 

F-001113-16.

Ansell Grimm & Aaron, PC, attorneys for 

appellant (Breanne M. DeRaps and David J. 

Byrne, on the brief).

The Boyer Law Firm, attorneys for respondent 

(Michele T. Boyer, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Masters at Knob Hill Condominium Association, Inc. 

("the Association") appeals from an order of the Chancery Division 

awarding it attorney's fees and costs in this foreclosure action. 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

June 6, 2018
2 A-3028-16T2

Plaintiff argues that the court erred when it determined the amount 

of attorney's fees awarded. We reverse and remand for a new 

determination of the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded to 

plaintiff.

I.

Plaintiff is a residential condominium association 

responsible for the management of the common elements of a 

condominium complex in Manalapan. Defendant Sean M. Lalljee owns 

a residential unit at the complex. Defendant concedes that he did 

not fulfill his responsibility under the governing documents of 

the Association to pay common expense assessments on his unit. 

Pursuant to the New Jersey Condominium Act, N.J.S.A. 46:8B-1 to -

38, the unpaid assessments constitute liens on defendant's unit 

in favor of the Association.

Plaintiff recorded liens against Lalljee's unit with the 

Clerk of Monmouth County for unpaid common expense assessments on 

the following dates and in the following amounts: (1) March 29, 

2009, $5,258.95; (2) November 14, 2011, $3,571.04; and (3) May 1, 

2013, $5,759.47. The liens, totaling $14,589.46, secured amounts 

including assessments, late charges, and other fees through the 

end of 2013.
3 A-3028-16T2

In 2014, a bankruptcy petition filed by defendant was 

discharged. Some, but not all, of the debts memorialized in the

liens were discharged.

On January 13, 2016, the Association filed a complaint in the 

Chancery Division to foreclose on the portion of the liens not 

discharged in the bankruptcy. Defendant filed an Answer on or 

about March 9, 2016.

Attempts to settle the matter were unsuccessful. Plaintiff 

contends defendant rebuffed settlement offers, and attempts by the 

Association's Board President to resolve the matter without 

incurring significant attorney's fees. Defendant, on the other 

hand, contends that he was willing to pay the assessments that 

were in arrears, but plaintiff was unable to provide a precise 

payoff amount. The record contains several communications from 

plaintiff setting the payoff amount at divergent amounts.

Plaintiff filed three motions prior to trial. The first, to 

strike defendant's defenses and suppress his answer without 

prejudice pursuant to Rule 4:23-5, was denied when defendant 

provided discovery responses before the return date of the motion. 

The second, for partial summary judgment, was denied because a 

certification supporting the motion was not forwarded to the court. 

Plaintiff's third motion, for reconsideration of its motion for 
4 A-3028-16T2

partial summary judgment, was returnable on the day after trial. 

As a result, the motion was not heard by the trial court.

On September 15, 2016, the parties and counsel appeared for 

trial. They resolved the matter that day. Defendant agreed to 

acknowledge and pay the amount of the open assessments secured by 

the liens and recognize the Association's right to an award of 

reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in collecting the 

assessments. The total amount of common expense assessments 

recovered by plaintiff was $1,715.67, with interest.

On October 12, 2016, the Association, pursuant to Rule 4:42-

9, submitted its attorney's fee affidavit seeking $31,627.50 in 

attorney's fees, and $1,618.96 in costs. The attorney's fees 

sought were charged by two firms. Stark & Stark, P.C. ("Stark") 

represented the Association through March 2015, resulting in 

attorney's fees of $5,274.50, and costs of $677.87. Among other 

things, Stark prepared and recorded liens, engaged in settlementrelated actions, including communicating with defendant, and 

drafting proposed payment agreements. 

The Association retained Ansell, Grimm & Aaron P.C. 

("Ansell") in March 2015. Ansell represented the Association from 

the preparation and filing of the foreclosure complaint through 

entry of final judgment. Ansell's representation of the 

Association resulted in attorney's fees of $26,353, and costs of 
5 A-3028-16T2

$941.09. Some of the attorney's fees charged by Ansell were for 

set amounts for identified tasks, as agreed upon by the Association 

and Ansell. The remaining fees were based on an hourly rate.

On November 4, 2016, the trial court awarded all of the costs 

sought, $1,618.96, but only $11,274.50 in attorney's fees.

On February 27, 2017, the court entered a final judgment of 

foreclosure memorializing plaintiff's entitlement to $1,715.67 in 

common expense assessments, with interest, and $12,893.46 in 

attorney's fees and costs.

This appeal followed.

II.

Although New Jersey generally disfavors the shifting of 

attorney's fees, a prevailing party may recover attorney's fees 

if expressly provided by statute, court rule, or contract. 

Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 440 (2001) 

(citing North Bergen Rex Transp., Inc. v. Trailer Leasing Co., 158 

N.J. 561, 564 (1999) and Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 

94 N.J. 473, 504 (1983)). Rule 4:42-9(a)(8) permits the award of

attorney's fees "[i]n all cases where attorney's fees are permitted 

by statute."

The Condominium Act authorizes the award of attorney's fees 

as follows:
6 A-3028-16T2

[t]he association shall have a lien on each 

unit for any unpaid assessment duly made by 

the association for a share of common expenses 

. . . together with interest thereon and, if 

authorized by the master deed or bylaws, late 

fees, fines and reasonable attorney's fees.

[N.J.S.A. 46:8B-21(a).]

Defendant does not dispute that plaintiff, having prevailed 

in its foreclosure action with respect to delinquent common expense 

assessments on his unit, is entitled by statute and the governing 

documents of the Association to reasonable attorney's fees. The 

only issue before us is the quantum of the attorney's fees awarded.

In calculating the amount of reasonable attorney's fees, "an 

affidavit of services addressing the factors enumerated by RPC

1.5(a)" is required. R. 4:42-9(b); Township of W. Orange v. 769 

Assocs., LLC, 198 N.J. 529, 542 (2009). RPC 1.5(a) sets forth the 

factors to be considered when determining an attorney's fee award. 

The rule provides:

(a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The 

factors to be considered in determining the 

reasonableness of a fee include the following:

(1) The time and labor required, the novelty 

and difficulty of the questions involved, and 

the skill requisite to perform the legal 

service properly;

(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the 

client, that the acceptance of the particular 

employment will preclude other employment by 

the lawyer;
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(3) the fee customarily charged in the 

locality for similar legal services;

(4) the amount involved and the results 

obtained;

(5) the time limitations imposed by the 

client or by the circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional 

relationship with the client;

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability 

of the lawyer or lawyers performing the 

services;

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

[RPC 1.5.]

Courts determine the "lodestar," defined as the "number of 

hours reasonably expended" by the attorney, "multiplied by a 

reasonable hourly rate." Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 

200 N.J. 372, 386 (2009) (citing Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 

182 N.J. 1, 21 (2004)). "The court must not include excessive and 

unnecessary hours spent on the case in calculating the lodestar." 

Furst, 182 N.J. at 22 (citing Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 

335-36 (1995)). We afford trial courts "considerable latitude in 

resolving fee applications . . . ." Grow Co. v. Chokshi, 424 N.J. 

Super. 357, 367 (App. Div. 2012). Such "'determinations by trial 

courts will be disturbed only on the rarest of occasions, and then 

only because of a clear abuse of discretion.'" Packard-Bamberger, 

167 N.J. at 444 (quoting Rendine, 141 N.J. at 317).
8 A-3028-16T2

Here, the trial court reviewed each of the factors set forth 

in RPC 1.5. The court found both the fixed fees charged by Ansell, 

and the hourly rates charged by both firms to be reasonable. The 

court determined, however, that the proportionality of the amount 

of attorney's fees sought to the amount of the assessments 

recovered from defendant warranted a reduction in the fees awarded. 

The court explained its rationale: "I've considered all the . . . 

RPCs, and . . . you comply with that, but it kind of shocks the 

[conscience] when I'm asked to – to give a fee of [fifteen] times 

the amount" recovered. This is the only factor on which the trial 

court relied in reducing the attorney's fee award.

To calculate the fee, the trial court allowed the entire 

amount sought for services provided by Stark, $5,274.50. With 

respect to the $26,353 in attorney's fees sought for services 

provided by Ansell, however, the court allowed only $6,000. This 

amount was determined not by eliminating excessive or unwarranted 

hours from Ansell's affidavit. In fact, the court made no finding 

that any particular action taken by the Ansell firm was 

unreasonable or unwarranted. Instead, the trial court appears to 

have selected a dollar figure it determined to be reasonable 

without explaining how it reached that figure.

We rejected this approach to determining attorney's fees in 

The Glen Section I Condo. Assoc. v. June, 344 N.J. Super. 371 
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(App. Div. 2001). In that case, the trial court, acting without 

an affidavit of services, held that

I do [not] know of anyone that would pay $7000 

in attorney's fees to collect a judgment on 

slightly over $2,800. It is not reasonable. 

I can only, therefore, and will only award 

counsel fees reasonably related to what should 

have been done in this case. That fee that 

I'm allowing is the sum of $1000, which I 

believe adequately compensates counse[l].

[Id. at 382.]

Finding that this reasoning "clearly contravene[s] the purpose of" 

Rule 4:42-9, we remanded the matter "for a determination of 

reasonable attorney's fees based upon the proper submission of an 

affidavit of services." Ibid.

Although a court may consider the damages recovered by a 

prevailing party when determining an attorney's fee award, a 

reduction in attorney's fees may not be justified merely by 

comparing the amount of damages recovered to the amount of 

attorney's fees sought. Our Supreme Court requires a more nuanced 

analysis. As explained in Rendine,

if the specific circumstances incidental to a 

counsel-fee application demonstrate that the 

hours expended, taking into account the 

damages prospectively recoverable, the 

interests to be vindicated, and the underlying 

statutory objectives, exceed those that 

competent counsel reasonably would have 

expended to achieve a comparable result, a 

trial court may exercise its discretion to 
10 A-3028-16T2

exclude excessive hours from the loadstar 

calculation.

Similarly, a trial court should reduce the 

loadstar fee if the level of success achieved 

in the litigation is limited as compared to 

the relief sought. "If . . . a plaintiff has 

achieved only partial or limited success, the 

product of hours reasonably expended on the 

litigation as a whole times a reasonable 

hourly rate may be an excessive amount. This 

will be true even where the plaintiff's claims 

were interrelated, nonfrivolous, and raised in 

good faith."

[141 N.J. at 336 (quoting Hensley v. 

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983)).]

With respect to the first circumstance addressed in Rendine, 

the trial court must consider the hours expended, the damages 

reasonably recoverable, the interests to be vindicated, and the 

underlying statutory objectives. The trial court did not examine 

these factors. We note the legislative intent when enacting 

N.J.S.A. 46:8B-21(a), a factor overlooked by the trial court. The 

Chancery Division describe the statute as follows:

[t]he legislative scheme for collection of 

assessments for maintenance charges against 

individual unit owners is a recognition that 

such charges are the financial life-blood of 

the Association. They are conceptually akin 

to the right of a municipality to levy and 

collect real estate taxes. The legislature 

clearly did not intend that the necessary 

income stream be reduced by the payment of 

"reasonable attorneys fees" incurred in the 

process of collection of the charges.
11 A-3028-16T2

[Park Place E. Condo. Ass'n v. Hovbilt, Inc., 

279 N.J. Super. 319, 323-24 (Ch. Div. 1994).]

Any attorney's fees not paid by defendant will be borne by the 

other owners of units at the Association's condominium complex.

In addition, to the extent that attorney's fee awards are 

reduced in actions to collect common expense assessments, the 

statutory incentive for unit owners to pay assessments in a timely 

fashion is weakened. These considerations must be weighed by the 

trial court, along with the likelihood that common expense 

assessments might often be relatively small when compared to the

cost of employing counsel to collect them. Reductions in 

attorney's fees awards based on the small amount of assessments 

collected may have the unintended, and negative consequence of 

encouraging the accumulation of large amounts of delinquent 

assessments prior to an Association's initiation of legal action.

In addition, as the Court noted in Rendine, "a trial court 

may exercise its discretion to exclude excessive hours from the 

loadstar calculation" where appropriate. 141 N.J. at 336. Here, 

the trial court did not excise hours from the attorney's fee 

application, but simply reduced the Ansell attorney's fee award 

to a round number the court found reasonable.

We also agree with plaintiff that it was an abuse of the 

trial court's discretion to, without explanation, award the entire 
12 A-3028-16T2

amount of attorney's fees incurred for services by the Stark firm, 

but to reduce the fees incurred for services by Ansell. The court 

must "evaluate carefully and critically the aggregate hours" 

expended by each firm and eliminate those that "are excessive, 

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." Rendine, 141 N.J. at 335.

With respect to plaintiff's level of success achieved, the 

appropriate analysis is to compare the relief sought by plaintiff 

to the relief obtained. The Association initiated its foreclosure 

action to obtain a final judgment of foreclosure with a set amount 

due from defendant if he wished to avoid foreclosure. Plaintiff 

was completely successful in obtaining that relief. A comparison 

of the amount of attorney's fees incurred to the amount of damages 

awarded, standing alone, to determine the level of a prevailing 

party's success has been rejected by our Supreme Court. 

Szczepanski v. Newcomb Med. Ctr., 141 N.J. 346, 366 (1995) ("We 

decline to construe New Jersey's fee-shifting statutes to require 

proportionality between damages recovered and counsel-fee awards 

even if the litigation . . . vindicates no rights other than those 

of the plaintiff.").

Reversed and remanded for a determination consistent with 

this opinion of reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded to 

plaintiff.