IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 13-1575

Filed September 10, 2015

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

TY ANDRE PATRICK,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Eliza J. Ovrum 

(suppression hearing) and Lawrence P. McLellan (trial and sentencing), Judges. 

Ty Patrick appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and 

sentence. AFFIRMED.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Maria L. Ruhtenberg, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant Attorney 

General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Joseph D. Crisp, Assistant 

County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
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BOWER, J.

Ty Patrick appeals the adverse ruling on his motion to suppress and the

judgment and sentence entered for possession of marijuana, third offense, in 

violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2013), enhanced as a habitual 

offender pursuant to Iowa Code section 902.8. Patrick claims the stop of the car, 

in which he was a passenger, was unconstitutional and the evidence obtained 

from stop should have been suppressed. He also claims his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to object to an inadequate waiver of a jury trial for penalty 

enhancements. We find the district court properly denied Patrick’s motion to 

suppress. We decline to address Patrick’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 

claim, as the record is insufficient for us to address this issue. This issue is 

preserved for possible postconviction-relief proceedings. 

I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In May 2013, Des Moines police officers stopped a car because it had a 

cracked left rear taillight and was “showing white.” As the officer approached the 

vehicle, he noticed a cellophane wrapper containing an unknown substance near 

Patrick, who was a passenger sitting in the backseat of the vehicle. After 

speaking with the driver, the officer asked the passengers (including Patrick) for 

identification. The officer noticed Patrick attempting to conceal the cellophane 

wrapper and ordered Patrick to get out of the car. Upon searching Patrick, the 

officer found a small plastic bag of marijuana and a glass pipe. The officer 

subsequently learned Patrick was wanted for a parole violation. 
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On June 11, Patrick was charged with possession of marijuana. The 

State also filed an amended trial information alleging Patrick had two previous

convictions under Iowa Code chapter 124, which enhanced a serious 

misdemeanor to a class “D” felony. The State also alleged Patrick was a habitual 

offender, which further enhanced the penalty to an indeterminate term of 

incarceration of fifteen years with a three-year mandatory minimum sentence.

In August, Patrick filed a motion to suppress claiming the officer’s stop of 

the car violated the United States and Iowa Constitutions. After a hearing, the 

court denied the motion. 

A bench trial on the minutes was conducted in September and Patrick was 

found guilty. The court sentenced Patrick to an indeterminate term of 

incarceration not to exceed fifteen years. 

Patrick now appeals. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Constitutional challenges are reviewed de novo. State v. Kern, 831 

N.W.2d 149, 164 (Iowa 2013). We independently evaluate the totality of the 

circumstances based upon the entire record. Id. Deference is given to findings 

of fact made by the district court, but we are not bound by them. State v. Turner,

630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Suppression

Patrick claims the district court should have suppressed the evidence 

found as a result of the search of the car in which he was a passenger because 
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the stop was unconstitutional. Specifically, Patrick claims the car’s taillight was 

not cracked (the only reason given by the officer for pulling over the car) and 

therefore the evidence should be suppressed.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, 

section 8 of the Iowa Constitution prohibit unreasonable search and seizures. 

“[S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a ‘seizure’ . . . 

even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite 

brief.” Delaware v. Prous, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). Stopping a vehicle and 

detaining the occupant is not an unreasonable seizure when the officer has either 

(1) probable cause due to observation of a traffic violation or (2) reasonable 

suspicion, supported by articulable facts, a criminal act has occurred or is 

occurring. State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 201–04 (Iowa 2004). If we find the 

officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop, we will affirm the ruling of the 

district court.

Upon our de novo review of the record, we find the taillight was cracked 

thereby showing white light. While the car taillight color was obscured by the 

light from the officer’s car during the first part of the stop, the taillight crack is 

visible when the car is loaded onto the tow truck. We find the officer had 

probable cause to stop the vehicle and affirm the district court’s denial of 

Patrick’s motion to suppress. We affirm Patrick’s conviction. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Patrick claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to an 

inadequate waiver of a jury trial on the penalty enhancements, as required by
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Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.19(9). In order to prevail, Patrick must show 

his counsel (1) failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) prejudice resulted. 

Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001) (citing Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). “Only in rare cases will the trial record 

alone be sufficient to resolve the claim on direct appeal.” State v. Straw, 709 

N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2006). Ordinarily we reserve claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel raised on direct appeal for postconviction proceedings to 

allow full development of the facts surrounding counsel’s conduct. State v. Atley,

564 N.W.2d 817, 833 (Iowa 1997). As discussed below, the record is not 

sufficiently developed to present the issue in this case, and this issue is best 

suited for a possible postconviction-relief hearing. 

Since Patrick faced a possession charge that imposed an enhanced 

penalty for prior convictions and habitual offender status, the State was required 

to conduct a two-stage trial. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(9); see also State v. 

Kukowski, 704 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Iowa 2005). Once the jury found Patrick guilty 

of the possession charge, Patrick “shall have the opportunity in open court to 

affirm or deny that [he] is the person previously convicted.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 

2.19(9). If Patrick denied the previous convictions “then sentence shall be 

postponed for such time as to permit a trial before a jury on the issue of the 

offender’s identity with the person previously convicted.” Id. In State v. 

Kukowski our supreme court noted, 
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An affirmative response by the defendant under the rule, however, 

does not necessarily serve as an admission to support the 

imposition of an enhanced penalty as a multiple offender. The 

court has a duty to conduct a further inquiry, similar to the colloquy 

required under rule 2.8(2), prior to sentencing to ensure that the 

affirmation is voluntary and intelligent.

704 N.W.2d at 692; see also State v. Johnson, 770 N.W.2d 814, 825–26 (Iowa 

2009) (finding rule 2.19(9) applicable in both bench and jury trials); State v. Doty,

No. 14-0249, 2014 WL 5249761 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2014) (finding appellant 

not prejudiced by lack of rule 2.19(9) colloquy because appellant admitted to 

prior convictions in plea agreement); State v. Davenport, No. 09-1699, 2010 WL 

3503969 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 9. 2010) (finding where rule 2.19(9) colloquy was

not conducted by court for sentencing enhancements, record was inadequate to 

address prejudice prong of ineffective-assistance claim, but claim was preserved 

for future postconviction-relief proceeding). 

Patrick filed two jury trial waivers; neither addressed Patrick’s right to a 

separate trial on the enhancements or made any mention of the prior convictions. 

The district court questioned Patrick on his jury trial waiver but did specifically 

address his right to a jury trial on the enhancements. Upon our review of the 

record, it is unclear if Patrick understood the implications of the sentencing 

enhancements. Therefore, we are unable to make a finding on whether Patrick’s 

trial counsel breached an essential duty in failing to object to the court’s 

omission. 

We affirm Patrick’s conviction but preserve Patrick’s ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim for possible postconviction-relief proceedings. See 

State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 203 (Iowa 2002) (“Postconviction proceedings 
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allow an adequate record to be developed and allow the attorney charged with 

providing ineffective assistance an opportunity to respond to the defendant’s 

claims.”).

AFFIRMED.