MARIE MEDINA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CUMBERLAND COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

 

HONORABLE JOSEPH E. IRENAS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-905 (JEI/JS)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

FOLKMAN LAW OFFICES, P.C.

By: Lisa R. Marone, Esq.

1415 Route 70 East, Suite 407

Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08034

Counsel for Plaintiff

LONG MARMERO & ASSOCIATES, LLP 

By: Douglas M. Long, Esq.

44 Euclid Street

Woodbury, New Jersey 08096

Counsel for Cumberland County Department of Corrections

KAVANAGH, KAVANAGH & DILAZZERO, LLC

By: Brendan J. Kavanagh, Esq.

219 N. High Street, Suite A

P.O. Box 728

Millville, New Jersey 08332

Counsel for Cumberland County

JASINSKI, P.C.

By: John C. Hegarty, Esq.

Bayport One

8025 Black Horse Pike

Suite 470

West Atlantic City, New Jersey 08232

Counsel for Cumberland County Sheriff’s Department

IRENAS, Senior District Judge:

Plaintiff Marie Medina initiated this action against

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Cumberland County (the “County”), Cumberland County Department of

Corrections (“DOC”), Cumberland County Sheriff’s Department

(“Sheriff’s Department”) and Sergey Udalovas. The Complaint

alleges civil rights violations under federal and state law and

various common law claims arising out of alleged sexual assaults

that took place at the Cumberland County Jail (the “Jail”) between

May and July 2009. Pending before the Court are Motions to 1

Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) by DOC and the

Sheriff’s Department. 

2

I.

Plaintiff visited the Jail between May 2009 and July 2009 for

the purpose of visiting her boyfriend. (Compl. ¶ 9.) During that

time, Plaintiff alleges that she was sexually assaulted by Sergey

Udalovas. (Id. ¶ 10.) According to Plaintiff, Udalovas, while

 The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 1

U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1367.

 In addition, the County, which answered the Complaint on 2

March 2, 2011, filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) on March 17, 2011. Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the

pleadings are closed--but early enough not to delay trial--a

party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(c). 

Here, the pleadings are not closed, as the County is the

only one of the four Defendants to have filed an answer. In

fact, at the time the County filed its Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings, Defendant Udalovas had not yet been served with the

Complaint. (See 11-cv-905, Dkt. Nos. 20, 23.) Because the

County’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is premature, the

Motion will be denied without prejudice, allowing the County to

refile once the pleading stage of this litigation has concluded. 

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wearing a correction officer’s uniform and with all of his weapons

on his person, forcibly took her into a small room, locked the door

and forced her to engage in sexual acts with him. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13,

18.) 

Udalovas allegedly made threats against Plaintiff, her

children and her inmate-boyfriend to intimidate, harass and coerce

Plaintiff into the sexual acts. (Id. ¶¶ 14-17, 20.) Plaintiff

alleges that the sexual assault took place at the Jail while others

looked on and did nothing. (Id. ¶ 25.) According to Plaintiff, 3

Udalovas had a reputation as a “sex fiend” in the workplace. 

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants knew or should have known

that Udalovas posed a danger to female visitors and they failed to

protect Plaintiff from this danger. (Id. ¶¶ 26-28.)

As a result of Plaintiff’s cooperation with the prosecutor’s

office, Udalovas was arrested and charged with official misconduct

and aggravated sexual assault. (Id. ¶ 22.)

On February 17, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this

Court alleging civil rights violations under state and federal law

and various common law claims. On March 7, 2011, DOC moved to 4

 While the Complaint alleges generally that Plaintiff was 3

sexually assaulted by Udalovas “[d]uring the months of May 2009

through July 2009" (Compl. ¶ 10), the specific facts alleged

appear to detail one particular instance of sexual assault. (See

id. ¶¶ 11-25.) 

 The Complaint also assert a punitive damages claim 4

against all Defendants. However, Plaintiff concedes that

punitive damages are available only as to Defendant Udalovas and

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dismiss the federal claims. On March 25, 2011, the Sheriff’s

Department filed a motion to dismiss the federal claims. 

II.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a court

may dismiss a complaint “for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must allege facts that raise a right to relief above the

speculative level. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

While a court must accept as true all allegations in the

plaintiff’s complaint, and view them in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff, Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231

(3d Cir. 2008), a court is not required to accept sweeping legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations, unwarranted

inferences, or unsupported conclusions. Morse v. Lower Merion Sch.

Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). The complaint must state

sufficient facts to show that the legal allegations are not simply

possible, but plausible. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234. “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

voluntarily dismisses her punitive damages claims against the

County, the DOC and the Sheriff’s Department. (See Pl’s Opp. to

Sheriff’s Motion to Dismiss at 15.) 

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When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court

considers “only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached

to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form

the basis of a claim.” Lum v. Bank of America, 361 F.3d 217, 221

n.3 (3d Cir. 2004). A document that forms the basis of a claim is

one that is “integral to or explicitly relied upon in the

complaint.” Id. (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec.

Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997)).

III.

Count One of Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts federal civil

rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and § 1983 against

all Defendants. DOC and the Sheriff’s Department move to dismiss 5

Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, while the

Sheriff’s Department also moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims

pursuant to § 1983. 

The law is well settled that § 1983 claims may only be brought

against “persons.” See, e.g., Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State 6

 Although the Complaint does not specify the provision of 5

§ 1985 under which Plaintiff seeks redress, Plaintiff makes clear

in her Oppositions to the Motions to Dismiss that her claim is

under § 1985(3), which prohibits “two or more persons” from

conspiring “for the purpose of depriving, either directly or

indirectly, any person or class or persons of the equal

protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities

under the laws . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 

 Section 1983 provides: 6

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of

any State or Territory or the District of

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Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Although local government units and

municipalities are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983 and §

1985, sheriff’s departments and corrections departments are not 7

separate legal entities from the County, and therefore cannot be

independently sued for violations of § 1983 and § 1985. See 8

McLaughlin v. Cnty. of Gloucester, 2008 WL 700125, *2 (D.N.J. March

12, 2008)(dismissing § 1983 claim against sheriff’s department

because it is a branch of the county); Ramalho v. Montgomery Cnty.

Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States or other

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in

an action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress....

42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

 The term “persons” in § 1983 has the same meaning under § 7

1985. See Davis v. Norris, 198 F.3d 249 (8th Cir. 1999)

(affirming lower court’s dismissal of claims because State of

Missouri and its agencies are not “persons” under either § 1983

or § 1985); New Jersey Sand Hill Band of Lenape & Cherokee

Indians v. Corzine, 2010 WL 2674565, at *6 (D.N.J. June 30,

2010)(concluding that persons under § 1983 and § 1985 have the

same meaning); DiBartolo v. City of Philadelphia, 2000 WL 217746,

at *5 (E.D. Pa. 2000)(finding that “persons” has same meaning

under both § 1983 and § 1985). 

 The Court notes that while neither DOC nor the Sheriff’s 8

Department have made this argument, Plaintiff “submits that

either the DOC is a person because it is separate and distinct

from the County, and Plaintiff’s claims are viable; or the DOC is

merely a sub-agent of the County with the County being liable for

its conduct, in which case Plaintiff would voluntarily dismiss

her § 1983 claims against the DOC.” (Pl’s Br. in Opp. to DOC’s

Motion to Dismiss at 17.) 

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Corr. Facility, 2007 WL 1810700, at *1 (D.N.J. June 21,

2007)(dismissing claims against Montgomery County Correctional

Facility because not a person amenable to suit under § 1983);

Crooks v. Passaic Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t/Jail, 2007 WL 923330, at *2

(D.N.J. March 26, 2007)(dismissing § 1983 claim against sheriff’s

department/jail because not a proper defendant under the statute);

Open Inns, Ltd. v. Chester Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 24 F.Supp. 2d 410,

417 n.13 (E.D. Pa. 1998)(dismissing § 1983 claims against sheriff’s

department because it is a sub-unit of county); Grabow v. Southern

State Corr. Facility, 726 F.Supp 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989)(finding

that New Jersey Department of Corrections is an arm of the state,

which is not a person under § 1983); see also Bonenberger v.

Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (municipalities

and police departments are treated as a single entity under §

1983).9

As noted supra, Plaintiff has named the County, DOC, and the

Sheriff’s Department as defendants in the instant action and has

 Other circuits have also held that county corrections 9

departments and sheriff’s departments are not separate legal

entities amenable to suit under § 1983. See, e.g., Aston v.

Cunningham, 2000 WL 796086, *4 n.3 (10th Cir. June 21,

2000)(finding that dismissal of § 1983 claims against county jail

was proper because “a detention facility is not a person or

legally created entity capable of being sued”); Preval v. Reno,

2000 WL 20591, at *1 (4th Cir. January 13, 2000)(affirming

dismissal of claims against regional jail because not a person

amenable to suit under § 1983); Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210,

1214 (11th Cir. 1992)(upholding dismissal of § 1983 against

sheriff’s department because not a legal entity subject to suit

or liability under § 1983). 

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asserted all federal and state law claims against each of them. 

However, because the Sheriff’s Department and DOC are sub-units of

the County, they cannot be sued as separate individual entities

under § 1983 or § 1985. For the same reason, Plaintiff cannot

maintain state common law or state civil rights claims against the

DOC or the Sheriff’s Department separately from the County. See

Jordan v. Cicchi, 2009 WL 1704330, at *5 (D.N.J. June 18,

2009)(dismissing all claims against county correction center

because not a suable entity separate from the county); Harris ex

rel. Litz v. Lehigh Cnty. Office of Children & Youth Servs., 418

F.Supp. 2d 643, 645 n.1 (dismissing county office of children and

youth services as a defendant because not a legal entity separate

from the county). 

Accordingly, all of Plaintiff’s claims against the Sheriff’s

Department and DOC are dismissed with prejudice. 

IV.

For the reasons stated above, DOC’s and the Sheriff’s

Department’s Motions to Dismiss will be granted. Defendant

Cumberland County’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings will be

denied without prejudice. An appropriate Order accompanies this

Opinion. 

Dated: May 3, 2011

 s/Joseph E. Irenas 

JOSEPH E. IRENAS, S.U.S.D.J.

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