1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

ALI RAJA, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

 Defendant.

Civ. No. 2:11-cv-01755 (WJM) 

OPINION

 

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.: 

Plaintiff Ali Raja brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review 

of a final determination by the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) 

denying his application for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits 

(“DIB”). For the reasons that follow, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED. 

I. LEGAL STANDARDS 

A. The Five-Step Sequential Analysis 

Under the authority of the Social Security Act, the Social Security Administration 

has established a five-step evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is 

entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. In the first step, the Commissioner 

determines whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since the 

onset date of the alleged disability. Id. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If not, the 

Commissioner moves to step two to determine if the claimant’s alleged impairment, or 

combination of impairments, is “severe.” Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the claimant 

has a severe impairment, the Commissioner inquires in step three as to whether the 

impairment meets or equals the criteria of any impairment found in the Listing of 

Impairments. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Part A. If so, the claimant is 

automatically eligible to receive benefits (and the analysis ends); if not, the 

Commissioner moves on to step four. Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). In the fourth step, 

the Commissioner decides whether, despite any severe impairment, the claimant retains 

the Residual Functional Capacity to perform past relevant work. Id. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f), 

416.920(e)-(f). The claimant bears the burden of proof at each of these first four steps. 

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At step five, the burden shifts to the Social Security Administration to demonstrate that 

the claimant is capable of performing other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the 

national economy in light of the claimant’s age, education, work experience and RFC. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g); see Poulos v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 91-

92 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). 

B. Standard of Review 

 For the purpose of this appeal, the court conducts a plenary review of the legal 

issues. See Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999). 

The factual findings of the ALJ are reviewed “only to determine whether the 

administrative record contains substantial evidence supporting the findings.” Sykes v. 

Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence is “less than a 

preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 

F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “It means such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. When 

substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ’s factual findings, this Court must abide by 

the ALJ’s determinations. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). 

II. BACKGROUND 

On April 23, 2007, Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and DIB. 

The filings alleged that Plaintiff had a disability with an onset date of February 5, 2007, 

due to conditions including cervical degenerative disc disease, lumbar anterolisthesis, and 

spinal stenosis. Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially on July 27, 2007, and upon 

reconsideration on February 21, 2008. On July 7, 2009, Plaintiff testified at a hearing 

before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Richard West. The ALJ held a supplemental 

hearing on January 5, 2010 to allow a vocational expert to offer testimony. On January 

20, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. The ALJ 

recognized that Plaintiff had several severe impairments, but found that Plaintiff’s 

impairments did not meet or equal the impairments found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart 

P, Appendix 1, Part A. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff had the residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work with certain limitations, such as the ability 

to sit and stand at will. 

Plaintiff filed a request for review of the ALJ’s decision, which the Appeals 

Council denied on January 20, 2011. Plaintiff now brings the instant appeal, challenging 

the ALJ’s determination that he was “not disabled” from February 5, 2007 through 

January 20, 2010.1

 

1

 After filing the instant appeal, Plaintiff filed a subsequent claim for disability benefits for a 

period beginning on January 21, 2010 (the earliest date that Plaintiff could allege, given the 

earlier decision by ALJ West). On September 19, 2011, ALJ Dennis O’Leary granted Plaintiff’s 

claim for disability benefits for the period beginning on January 21, 2010. 

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III. DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed two errors: (1) the ALJ failed to fully 

develop the record; and (2) the ALJ erred in discounting the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating 

physician. Plaintiff also raises various issues regarding exhibits. Each of these issues 

will be addressed in turn. 

A. Whether the ALJ Failed to Develop the Record 

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to fully develop the record because the ALJ did 

not elicit testimony from Plaintiff about (1) Plaintiff’s ability to sit for a total of six hours, 

and (2) Plaintiff’s ability to use his hands.2

 This argument lacks merit. 

The burden lies with the claimant to develop the record regarding his disability 

because the claimant is in a better position to provide information about his own medical 

condition. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 (1987); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1512(a) and 416.912(a). The ALJ has the duty to obtain additional evidence only if 

the evidence before the Commissioner is insufficient to determine whether a claimant is 

disabled.3

 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(3), 416.927(c)(3); see also Money v. Barnhart, 91 

Fed. Appx. 210, 216 (3d Cir. 2004). In this case, the record contained over one hundred 

pages of Plaintiff’s medical records, including hospital records and testing results; the 

opinions of the consultative examiner, the state agency reviewing physician, and 

Plaintiff’s treating physician; and the opinion of a vocational expert. These records 

provided the ALJ with ample evidence on which to make a determination that Plaintiff 

was not disabled. Further, these records extensively discuss Plaintiff’s ability to sit and 

use his hands. See, e.g., R. 27-31, 41, 44-47, 49-50, 120-21, 127, 130, 132-33, 138, 161, 

165, 185-86, 188, 191, 193, 199, 208, 213, 217, 219-20, 222, 289. As such, the ALJ had 

no obligation to obtain any additional evidence. 

B. Whether the ALJ Erred in Discounting the Opinion of Plaintiff’s 

Treating Physician 

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by discounting the opinion of Plaintiff’s 

treating physician, Dr. Mohamed Kawam, in making his RFC determination. 

Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC conclusion is unsupportable in light of 

Dr. Kawam’s opinion that: (1) Plaintiff was not able to sit for six or more hours per day, 

and that (2) Plaintiff was not able to stand and/or walk for more than two hours a day. 

The Court disagrees. 

 

2

 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to elicit testimony regarding his tolerance for standing 

and his level of pain, but this is directly contradicted by the same page of Plaintiff’s brief, which 

states that “Claimant testified that his whole body hurts,” and that “Claimant testified that he can 

stand for fifteen to twenty minutes at a time.” Pl.’s Br. at 3. 

3

 The ALJ has a duty to “assume a more active role” in developing the record if the claimant is 

unrepresented. Smith v. Harris, 644 F.2d 985, 989 (3d Cir. 1981). But in this case, Plaintiff was 

represented by counsel at both hearings. See R. 25-52. 

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An ALJ is free to choose one medical opinion over another where the ALJ 

considers all of the evidence and gives some reason for discounting the evidence he 

rejects. See Diaz v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 505-06 (3d Cir. 2009); 

Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999) (“An ALJ . . . may afford a treating 

physician’s opinion more or less weight depending upon the extent to which supporting 

explanations are provided.”). In this case, the ALJ detailed his reasons for discounting 

Dr. Kawam’s opinion. He explained that Dr. Kawam’s own notes did not support Dr. 

Kawam’s conclusion that Plaintiff was disabled:4

 his findings that Plaintiff could lift five 

pounds, could stand or walk for up to two hours a day, and could sit less than six hours 

were only slightly more conservative that the ALJ’s RFC findings. R. 17. The ALJ also 

found that Dr. Kawam’s conclusion was inconsistent with Dr. Kawam’s own range of 

motion testing. Id. Finally, the ALJ noted that Dr. Kawam’s conclusion was inconsistent 

with the other evidence in the case, which included: (1) the opinion of Dr. Marc Weber, 

the consultative examiner (R. 186-89); (2) the opinion of Dr. Joseph Udomsaph, the state 

agency reviewing physician (R. 190-97); (3) the records from St. Joseph’s Regional 

Medical Center where Plaintiff was treated after a October 2009 motor vehicle accident 

(R. 291-97); and (4) MRIs taken in December 2009 (R. 299-302). Accordingly, the ALJ 

did not err by discounting Dr. Kawam’s opinion. 

C. Issues Arising from Exhibits 

Plaintiff raises two issues with respect to the exhibits. 

First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to comply with provisions of 

the Hearing Appeals and Litigation Manual (“HALLEX”).5

 Specifically, Plaintiff argues 

that the ALJ did not attach an appropriately marked Exhibit List to his decision, in 

violation of HALLEX I-2-1-20. Pl.’s Br. at 4. This argument is meritless. The Third 

Circuit has clearly stated that “HALLEX provisions . . . lack the force of law and create 

no judicially enforceable rights.” Bordes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 235 F. App’x 853, 859 

(3d Cir. 2007). “Since the manual is not binding, allegations of noncompliance should 

not be reviewed.” Cartagena v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:10-cv-05712, 2012 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 49779, at *15 (D.N.J. Apr. 9, 2012). 

Second, Plaintiff urges the Court to consider two new medical reports attached as 

exhibits to his brief: (1) an August 11, 2011 report from Dr. Marc Ruoff, Plaintiff’s 

orthopedist; and (2) an August 1, 2011 report from Dr. Ross Nochimson, Plaintiff’s pain 

management specialist. However, it is well-established that a district court may not 

consider evidence that was not before the ALJ. Morrison v. Astrue, 355 F. App’x 599, 

602 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Evidence that was not before the ALJ cannot be used to argue that 

 

4

 Dr. Kawam’s conclusion that Plaintiff was “disabled” is entitled to no special significance, and 

is an opinion reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; Wright v. Sullivan, 900 

F.2d 675, 683 (3d Cir. 1990). 

5

 “HALLEX” is an internal manual for Social Security Office of Hearings and Appeals staff that 

conveys guiding principles, procedural guidance, and information. See HALLEX I-1-001. 

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the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence.”). As such, it would be 

inappropriate to consider these supplemental reports. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED. An 

appropriate order follows. 

 

 /s/ William J. Martini 

 WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J. 

Date: July 12, 2012

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