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## of

# Jfe[ersl Clsimg

No. 17-1549C 

### November 28,2017

* * *:t * ,1.

### * * * * {. ,* * * * * * +:r :f

* 

### WILL R. NOTTAGE,



### Plaintiff,

UNITED STATES,



### Defendant.

* t :t 't * :t * * )* ,fi * * :t * i( f



### Will R. 

### Nottage, Miami, FL, P1q se.



### David

## A. Levitt, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

### civil Division, 

### united 

### states Department 

### of Justice, 

### washington, D.C., 

### for defendant. 

### with him were 

## Lisa 

## L. Donahue, Assistant Director, 

### commercial Litigation Branch, 

### Robert E. 

### Kirschman, 

### Jr., Director, 

### commercial Litigation Branch, and 

### chad A. Readler, Acting
Assistant 

### Attorney General, Civil Division.



# f,

# tr'r';-r; "1.,



# FILED

NO\/

## 2I 2017
U,S. COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS



### Motion 

### to Dismiss; In Forma 

### Pauperis; Prison 

### Litigation Reform

### Act; Takings

HORN. 

### J.



### on october 17,2017, 

### plq se plaintiff 

### will R. Nottage, 

### who is currently 

### a prisoner
at Metro 

### West Detention Center in Miami, Florida, 

### filed a hand-written complaint with this


### court inthe above-captioned 

### case.1 Plaintiff separately filed an Application to Proceed ln Forma Pauperis 

### that same day. 

## OPINION

1Since December 15,2015, plaintiff hasfiled at least six additional complaints or appeals



### on his own behalf, all of 

### which appear to be unrelated 

### to 

### plaintiffs complaint in this case'



### see Nottaqe v. 

### state, No. SC17-1580, (Fla.

### Aug. 

### 25,2017): Nottaqe 

### v.

### statg.No 3D17- 

### i-ZAalG[lDist3t-App. June 

### G,2017), Nottaqe 

### v. State, No. 

### 3D15-2827, (Fla--Dist. Ct 

### App DLc 15,2015); Nottaqev. State, 

### No.3Dl5-2651, 

### (Fla Dist Ct 

### App Nov 19,2015); 

### Nlttaq" u.

### ndar, f..jo.ZO,lZOZSOS1-CA-o1, (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 

### 3,2017); Nottaqe v. Adam, 

### No.ZOlt-OZql77-CA-01

, (Fla. Cir. 

### Ct Oct. 16,2017).



### ?01,7 1.,+50 

## [000 ],3r.th 0?40

### In his complaint, plaintiff states this court has jurisdiction over his complaint because plaintiff's claims relate to "various agencieswho [sic] arefunded through federal agencies." Plaintiffalleges thatthe
joint venture ofthe U.S.CA [sic], Justice Administration Commission, IRS, President of Senate and the House of Representatives to name a few, which has supported the State of Florida to intrude on my estate and copywriting laws that imply-in-law [sic] contracts. Estate has nothing to do with actual land, but on IP/Intellectual Property basis, because it deals with one's nob-ility, clergy and commons. Agreements created in law without notifying the actual plaintiff or defendant citizens of a municipality ofthe contracts, terms and agreements that aretransitioned.

Plaintiff defines nobility as "one's worthiness to be notified," clergy as "one's body [or] religion," and commons as "one's social status or one's right [to] participate actively in a social gathering."Althoughthe handwritingfollowingthe abovequoted portion ofplaintiff's complaint is nearly illegible, plaintiffclaimsthat "the statute [sic] thatverifythefacts ofthis truth are the following: s.733.37(2)(A), 27.52(1),(a)(5), (c), (d), (e)8, 2(0)1, 

### (f), (g) 

### &(i)3,
s. 27.5303(1)(a) 

### &(b) are a few statutes that prove this claim; which is an infringing of intellectual property done through law, and the benefit ofselling due process services." Plaintiff's citations do not correspond with anyfederal statutes.2



### Plaintiff also maintains that the government is operating an "intellect-ual scheme to municipalize the nation, orto transfer private ownership to municipal owner ship [sic]" and is attempting to "take over the ownership or management of [sic] (water, gas, electricity, stre-tcars [sic], farries [sic], etc.), inwhich annotating and copyrightingthe laws, ent tied [sic] the government to have entitlement over." It is unclear whether plaintiff believesthefederal governmentorthe governmentofthe StateofFlorida is administering the "intellectual scheme to municipalize the nation." Plaintiff's complaint seeks $3,000,000.00 in damages, and "Monetary, Non-Monetary Declaratory or injunctive Relief, and Punitive, but the most important is monetary; if you're unable to help me conce-rning the following two matters."

On October 31, 2017, defendant filed its opposition to plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. In its motion, defendantargues plaintiffhasfiled afrivolous complaint, which must be dismissed pursuantto the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915 (2012). Defendant maintains "the implication that [plaintiff] has a property interest in 'nobility, clergy, and commons,' an undefined concept, is fanciful." Moreover, defendant asserts that plaintiff's "claim that funding provided by the United States enabled the State of Florida to 'municipalize' his property and deprive him if [sic] is 'nobility, clergy, and commons' is fanciful on its face." Defendantfurther notesthat plaintifffails to identifyany

2 

### It may be that plaintiff, residing in a prison in Florida, was attempting to cite to sections 27.52, 27.5303, and 733.37 ofthe Florida Statutes.



### 2

### property the State of Florida took from plaintiff, or identify any funding provided by the federal governmentto the State of Floridawhich caused harm to plaintiff.

DISCUSSION



### The court recognizes that plaintiff is proceeding pro se, without the assistance of counsel. When determining whether a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff is sufficient to invoke review by a court, pro se plaintiffs are entitled to liberal construction of their pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (requiring that allegations contained in aprosecomplaint be held to "less stringentstandardsthan formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"), reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972); see also Ericksonv. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977); Matthewsv. United States, 750 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Diamond v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 516, 524, aff'd, 603 F. App'x 947 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 1909 (2015). "However, '"[!]here is
no duty on the part ofthe trial courtto create a claim which [the plaintiff] has not spelled out in his [or her] pleading.""' Lengen v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 317, 328 (2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Scogin v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 285, 293 (1995) (quoting Clarkv. Nat'I Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))); see also Bussie v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 89, 94, aff'd, 443 F. App'x 542 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 249, 253 (2007). "While aQIQ

### se plaintiffis held to
a less stringent standard than that of a plaintiff represented by an attorney, the pro se plaintiff, nevertheless, bears the burden of establishing the Court's jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." Riles v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 163, 165 (2010) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. at 9 and Taylorv. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir.) ("Plaintiff bears the burden ofshowing jurisdiction by a preponderance ofthe evidence."), reh'g and reh'g en bane denied (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see also Shelkofsky v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 133, 139 (2014) ("[W]hile the court may excuse ambiguities in a pro se plaintiff's complaint, the court 'does not excuse [a complaint's] failures."' (quoting Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995)); Harris v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 290, 292 (2013) ("Although plaintiff's pleadings are held to a less stringent standard, such leniency 'with respect to mere formalities does not relieve the burden to meetjurisdictional requirements."' (quoting Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. at 253)).

In order to provide access to this court to those who cannot pay the filing fees mandated by Rule 77.1(c) (2017) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims, 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915 permits a court to allow a plaintiffto file a complaint without paymentoffees orsecurity, underspecificcircumstances. Section 1915(a)(1)statesthat:

Subjectto subsection (b), any court ofthe United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense ofany suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment offees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes astatement of all assets such prisoner possesses [and] that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of



### 3the action, defense or appeal and affiant's beliefthatthe person is entitled to redress.

28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(a)(1). Therefore, thestatuteat28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(a)(1) requires aperson to submit an affidavitwith a statement ofall the applicant's assets, and thatthe affidavit state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant's belief that the person is entitled to redress. See

## kl

When enacting the in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915, Congress recognized that '"a litigantwhose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits."' Dentonv. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzkev. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)); see also McCulloughv. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 1, 3 (2006), appeal dismissed, 236 F. App'x 615 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1050 (2007). Accordingly, Congress included subsection (e) in the in forma pauperis statute, which allows courtsto dismiss lawsuits determinedto be "frivolous ormalicious," orwhen the complaintfailsto state a claim upon which reliefmay be granted. 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(e). The United States Supreme Court has found that "a court may dismiss a claim as factually frivolous only if the facts alleged are 'clearly baseless'

... a category encompassing allegations that are 'fanciful'

... 'fantastic'

... and 'delusional

...."' Dentonv. Hernandez, 504 U.S. at32-33 (internal citationsomitted);
see also McCullough v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. at 3; Schagene v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 661, 663 (1997).

Courts, however, should exercise caution in dismissing a case under section 1915(e) because a claim that the court perceives as likely to be unsuccessful is not necessarilyfrivolous. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. at33. As stated by the United States Supreme Court, "a finding offactual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level ofthe irrational orthewholly incredible, whether or notthere are judicially noticeablefacts available to contradictthem."

## kl

The standard in 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(a)(1) for in forma pauperis eligibility is "unable to pay such fees orgive securitytherefor." Determination ofwhat constitutes "unable to pay" or unable to "give security therefor," and therefore, whether to allow a plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis is left to the discretion ofthe presiding judge, based on the informationsubmitted bytheplaintifforplaintiffs. See, §.&., Rowlandv. Cal. Men'sColony, Unit II Men'sAdvisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 217-18 (1993); Roberson v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 234, 239, appeal dismissed, 556 F. App'x 966 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Fuentes v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 85, 92 (2011). This court and its predecessors were established to make available a user friendly forum in which plaintiffs can submit their legitimate claims against the sovereign, limited only by the legislative decision to waive sovereign immunity as to the types ofclaims allowed. In fact, prominently posted at the entrance to this courthouse are the words ofAbraham Lincoln: "It is as much the duty of governmentto renderpromptjusticeagainst itself, in favorofcitizens, as it istoadminister the same, between private individuals."

4Although plaintiff's apparent lack of income and financial resources may qualify plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis, as discussed below, plaintiff's complaint is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. "Subject-matter jurisdiction may be challenged at anytime bythe partiesor bythecourt sua sponte." Foldenv. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Fanning, Phillips 

### &Molnarv.West, 160 F.3d 717, 720 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). The TuckerAct, 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1491, grantsjurisdiction to this court as follows:

The United States Court of Federal Claims shall havejurisdiction to render judgmentupon any claim againstthe United Statesfounded either uponthe Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contractwiththe United States,
orfor liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.

28 U.S.C. 

### § 1491(a)(1). As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the Tucker Actwaives sovereign immunityto allowjurisdiction overclaims againstthe United States (1) founded on an express or implied contractwith the United States, (2) seeking a refund from a prior payment made to the government, or (3) based on federal constitutional, statutory, or regulatory law mandating compensation by the federal government for damages sustained. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 289-90 (2009); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983); see also Alvarado Hosp., LLC v. Price, 868 F.3d 983, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Greenlee Cnty., Ariz. v. United States, 487 F.3d 871, 875 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en bane denied (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1142 (2008); Palmerv. United States, 168 F.3d 1310, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

"Not every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation is cognizable underthe TuckerAct. The claim must be onefor moneydamages againstthe United States

...." United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216; see also United Statesv. White Mountain .Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003); Smith v. United States, 709 F.3d 1114, 1116 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 259 (2013); RadioShack Corp. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Rick's Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[P]laintiff must

... identify a substantive source of lawthat creates the right to recovery of money damages against the United States."); Golden v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 764, 768 (2014). In Ontario Power Generation, Inc. v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit identified threetypes ofmonetaryclaimsforwhichjurisdiction is lodged in the United States Court of Federal Claims. The courtwrote:

The underlying monetaryclaims are ofthreetypes

.... First, claims alleging the existence of a contract between the plaintiff and the government fall within the Tucker Act's waiver.

. . . Second, the Tucker Act's waiver encompasses claims where "the plaintiff has paid money over to the Government, directlyor in effect, and seeks return ofall or partofthatsum." Eastport S.S. [Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 599, 605-06,] 372 F.2d [1002,] 1007-08 [(1967)] (describing illegal exaction claims as claims "in which 'the Government has the citizen's money in its pocket"' (quoting Clappv. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 505, 117 F. Supp. 576, 580 (1954))

....


### 5Third, the Court of Federal Claims hasjurisdiction overthose claims where "money has not been paid but the plaintiff asserts that he is nevertheless entitled to a payment from the treasury." Eastport S.S., 372 F.2d at 1007. Claims in this third category, where no payment has been made to the government, eitherdirectly or in effect, require thatthe "particular provision oflaw relied upon grantsthe claimant, expresslyorby implication, a rightto be paid a certain sum."

## JsL.; see also [United States v. JTestan, 424 U.S. [392,] 401-02 [1976] ("Where the United States is the defendant and the plaintiff is not suing for money improperly exacted or retained, the basis of the federal claim-whether it be the Constitution, a statute, or a regulationdoes notcreate a cause ofaction for money damages unless, asthe Court of Claims has stated, that basis 'in itself

... can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained."' (quoting Eastport S.S., 372 F.2d at 1009)). This category is commonly referred to as claims brought under a "money-mandating" statute.

Ontario Power Generation, Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d 1298, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
see also Twp. ofSaddle Brookv. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 101, 106 (2012).

To prove that a statute or regulation is money-mandating, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an independent source of substantive law relied upon '"can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government."' United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. at 290 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976)); see also United Statesv. White Mountain ApacheTribe, 537 U.S. at472; United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 217; Blueport Co

.. LLC v. United States, 533 F.3d 1374, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1153 (2009). The source of law granting monetary relief must be distinctfrom the Tucker Act itself. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. at 290 (The TuckerAct does not create "substantive rights; [it is simply a] jurisdictional provision[] that operate[s] to waive sovereign immunity for claims premised on other sources of law (e.g., statutes or contracts)."). "'If the statute is not money-mandating, the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction, and the dismissal should be for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."' Jan's Helicopter Serv

.. Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Greenlee Cnty., Ariz. v. United States, 487 F.3d at 876); Fisherv. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Theabsenceofamoney-mandatingsource is "fataltothecourt'sjurisdiction under theTuckerAct."); Pricev. United States, 133 Fed. Cl. 128, 130 (2017); Peoplesv. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 553, 565-66 (2009).

When deciding a case based on a lack ofsubject matterjurisdiction or forfailure to state a claim, this court must assumethat all undisputedfacts alleged in the complaint
aretrue and mustdrawall reasonable inferences in the non-movant'sfavor. See Erickson

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 ("[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all ofthe factual allegations contained in the complaint." (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly. 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (citing Swierkiewiczv. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002)))); Fid. 

### &Guar. Ins. Underwriters. Inc. v. United States, 805



### 6F.3d 1082, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

"Determinationofjurisdictionstartswith the complaint, which mustbewell-pleaded in that it must state the necessary elements ofthe plaintiff's claim, independent of any defensethat may be interposed." Holleyv. United States, 124 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir.) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983)), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Klamath Tribe Claims Comm. v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 203, 208 (2011); Gonzalez-Mccaulley Inv. Grp., Inc. v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 710, 713 (2010). A plaintiff need onlystate in the complaint "a shortand plain statementofthe groundsforthe court'sjurisdiction," and "a shortand plain statementofthe claim showing thatthe pleader is entitled to relief." RCFC 8(a)(1), (2) (2017); Fed. 

### R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (2) (2017); see also Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57, 570 (2007)). To properly state a claim for relief, "[c]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences of fact do not suffice to support aclaim." Bradleyv. Chiron Corp., 136 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Mczeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1363 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting C. Wright and 

### A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1286(3d ed. 2004)); Briscoev. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 1981) ("[C]onclusory allegations unsupported by any factual assertions will not withstand a motionto dismiss."), aff'd, 460 U.S. 325 (1983). "Aplaintiff'sfactual allegations must'raise
a right to relief above the speculative level' and cross 'the line from conceivable to plausible."' Three S Consulting v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 510, 523 (2012) (quoting Bell All. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), aff'd, 562 F. App'x 964 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir. 2014). As stated in Ashcroftv. Igbal, "[a] pleading thatoffers 'labels and conclusions' or'a formulaic recitation ofthe elements ofacause ofactionwill notdo.' 550 U.S. at555. Nordoesacomplaintsuffice ifittenders 'naked assertion[s]'devoid of'further factual enhancement.'" Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell All. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

In the above-captioned case, plaintiff asserts that this court hasjurisdiction over his complaint because the complaint "relates to various agencies who [sic] are funded through federal agencies." Plaintiff's complaint is less than clear. Plaintiff appears to be asserting that becausethefederal government provided the State ofFloridawith funding, which Florida used to pass legislation creating "imply-in-law [sic] contracts" between its citizens and the government of Florida, it somehow created a legal relationship between plaintiff and the federal government. Plaintiff appears to allege that these "imply-in-law [sic] contracts" infringed on plaintiff's "nobility, clergy and commons." As the Supreme Court ofthe United States explained in Hatzlachh Supply Co., Inc. v. United States:

The TuckerAct itselfis only ajurisdictional statute, ofcourse, and does not createa substantive rightto moneydamages. United Statesv. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398, 96 S.Ct. 948, 953, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976). The enforceable claim in this case must arisefrom the alleged contract. Moreover, the Court of Claims' jurisdiction with respect to contracts extends only to actual contracts, either express or implied in fact; it does not reach claims on



### 7contracts implied in law. Alabama v. United States, 282 U.S. 502, 507, 51 S.Ct. 225, 226, 75 L.Ed. 492 (1931); GoodyearTire

### &RubberCo. v. United States, 276 U.S. 287, 292-293, 48 S.Ct. 306, 307, 71 L.Ed. 843 (1928); United States v. Minnesota Mutual Investment Co., 271 U.S. 212, 217, 46 S.Ct. 501, 502, 70 L.Ed. 911 (1926); Hill v. United States, 149 U.S. 593, 598, 13 S.Ct. 1011, 1013, 37 L.Ed. 862 (1893).

Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460, 465 n.5 (1980) (per curiam); see also Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. United States, 654 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Hercules Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 423 (1996)); Johns-Manville Corp.

v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 1, 18 (1987). Accordingly, the court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim that an "imply-in-law [sic]" contract existed between the federal government and plaintiff. Additionally, if plaintiff is asserting an implied-in-law contract existed between the State of Florida and plaintiff, this court lacks jurisdiction to review plaintiff's claim becausethis courtdoes not havejurisdiction to reviewalleged implied-inlawcontracts, nordoesthecourthavejurisdiction overtheactionsofstates, stateofficials, and state agencies. See Soudersv. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 497 F.3d 1303, 1307-08 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Jiron v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 190, 198 (2014); Woodson v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 640, 649 (2009).3

3 In plaintiff's response to defendant's motion to dismiss, plaintiffargues

THERE Is No RULE IN THE FRCP [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] THAT PROHIBITS PRISONERS FROM LITIGATION,ANDTHE 1srAMENDMENT, WHICH ISA CONTRACT BE1WEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE CITIZENS THEREOF; THAT GUARANTEES THEM THE RIGHT To FREEDOM OF SPEECH, OR OF THE PRESS OR THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE To PEACEABLY ASSEMBLE, AND To PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRl-EVANCES. FOR MR. DAVID LEVITTTo ASK THE HONORABLE JUDGE MARION [sic] B. HORN To DIMINISH THE OBLIGATION OFTHIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTWOULD BEASKING THEJUDGETo DISREGARD ARTICLE 1, SECT-ION 10 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WHICH STATES: THE STATES SHALL MAKE No LAWS IMPAIRING THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS. IWOULD ALSO LIKE To NOTIFYTHE HONORABLE MARION [sic] B. HORNANDALL PARTIES INVOLVEDTHAT IAM NOTA PRISONER, BECAUSE I HAVEN'T BEEN CONVl-CTED OR SENTENCED To A PRSION SENTENCE. FURHTER-MORE IAM INNOCENTOFTHE CRIMEALLEDGEDAGAINST ME, THATWASTRUMPED FROM AN EVENT, IN WHICH IWAS THEVICTIM

... OF THE INCIDENTTHAT LEDTO ME BEING A DET-AINEE.

(capitalization in original). In its opposition to plaintiff'sApplication to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Motion to Dismiss Pursuantto the Prison Litigation Reform Act, defendant doesnotassertthatplaintiff'sstatus asa prisonerordetaineeprecludeshimfrom litigating his complaint, and the court notesthat prisoners and detainees are not barred from filing lawsuits. Indeed, the in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915, permits a prisoner, which is defined as "any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquentfor, violations of criminal law,"



### 8Plaintiff has failed to prove any contractual relationship between plaintiff and the federal government existed and has not alleged that he has made any payments to the federal government. The Tucker Act does not provide jurisdiction to this court over his claims because plaintiffhasfailed todemonstratethatany particularprovision oflaw upon which he relies is money-mandating. See, g&, United Statesv. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. at 290; Ontario Power Generation, Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d at 1301. The statutes cited by plaintiffdo not impose anyobligations on the United States. Therefore, this court does not havejurisdiction over plaintiff's above discussed allegations.

Additionally, it appears that plaintiff also is trying to assert that this court has jurisdiction over his complaint because plaintiff's rights arise under the Due Process Clause ofthe Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and are being violated by "sellingdue processservices,"aphrase plaintiffdoes notdefineorexpand upon, when the federal government provided funds to the State of Florida, which Florida used to sell those "due process services." Plaintiff also attempts to cite Florida Statutes sections 27.52, 27.5303, and 733.37, all ofwhich are state not federal statutes. Section 27.52 of the Florida Statutes provides for the determination of indigent status for purposes of obtaining a public defender, and section 27.5303 is concerned with the withdrawal of a public defender presented with a conflict ofinterest; moreover, section 733.37 has been repealed. See FLA. STAT.§§ 27.52, 27.5303, and 733.37 (2017). Thefederal statute at 11 U.S.C. § 365 discusses the responsibilities of atrustee when assuming or rejecting any executory contract or unexpired lease of a debtor. The Due Process Clause ofthe Fifth Amendment, however, "does not 'mandate money damages by the Government."' Chittenden v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 251, 260 (quoting Smith v. United States, 36 F. App'x. 444, 446 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995)), aff'd, 663 F. App'x 934 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Golden v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 764, 768 (2014); Faison v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 637, 643 (2012). Nordoesthe court havejurisdictionto adjudicatedue process claims raised under the Fifth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See James v. Caldera, 159 F.3d 573, 581 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d at 1028); Hufford v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 696, 704 (2009).

The United States Court of Federal Claims does have jurisdiction over nonfrivolous takings claims asserted against the United States, see, g&, Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 494 U.S. 1, 12 (1986) (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946)), butsubject matterjurisdictiononlyexists overtakings

to litigate without paying a court's requisite filing fees. Moreover, the court also lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims that his rights under the First Amendment are being violated because the First Amendment, by itself, does not provide an independent basis forjurisdiction in this court. United Statesv. Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1065 (1984) ("We agree with the Court of Claims that the first amendment, standing alone, cannot be so interpreted to command the payment of money."); Volk v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 313, 326 (2013); Coxv. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 213, 217, appeal dismissed (Fed. Cir. 2012).

9claims when a plaintiff asserts a non-frivolous claim that falls within the court's general subject matter jurisdiction. See Filler v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 123, 127 (2014) (quoting Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2005)), aff'd, 602 F. App'x 518 (Fed. Cir. 2015). If, however, the plaintiffalso is trying to raise sometype ofa takings claim by the federal government of plaintiff's "intellectual property," plaintifffails to allege a propertakings claim underthe Fifth Amendment. In defendant's opposition to plaintiff's Application to Proceed 

### !n Forma Pauperis and Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to the Prison Litigation ReformAct, defendantarguesplaintiff'stakingsclaim is "unintelligible

on its face" and should be dismissed as frivolous. Defendant correctly notesthat plaintiff has failed to identify any property the federal government, or even the State of Florida, has taken from him, but only references his nobility, clergy, and commons. As noted above, according to defendant, plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because "the implicationthat he has a property interestin 'nobility, clergy, and commons,' an undefined concept, is fanciful."A person'sthoughts and private activities are not cognizable claims giving rise to a compensable property interest. See Riles v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 163, 165 (2010) ("Plaintiff's private thoughts and activities cannot be construed as being private propertyorintellectual propertythatwould besubjecttoa regulatorytaking, which is necessaryforthis Courtto havejurisdiction."). Moreover, takings claims againststates arise underthe Due Process Clauseofthe FourteenthAmendment. Soudersv. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 497 F.3d at 1308 (citing Chi., B. 

### &Q. 

### R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 238-39 (1897)). Because Fourteenth Amendment due process claims ortakings claims

are "againstastate governmental entityand are not 'againstthe United States,'the Court of Federal Claims does not havejurisdiction overthem." See Soudersv. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 497 F.3d at 1308 (citing LeBlancv. United States, 50 F.3d at 1028).

"Dismissal for lack ofsubject-matterjurisdiction because ofthe inadequacy ofthe federal claim is properonlywhen the claim is 'so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions ofthis Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as notto involve a federal controversy."' Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (quoting Oneida Indian Nation ofN.Y. v. Cnty. OfOneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974)); see also Fillerv. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. at 127 (citations omitted); Hicksv. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 76, 86 n.5 (2014). Plaintiffhas not identified any relationshipwith thefederal government. Moreover, plaintiff has failed to identify a single action taken bythe federal government that even remotely infringed on any property interest according to which plaintiffcan claim his rights were abridged.Therefore, because plaintiffhas notsupported anyof his allegationswith anyfactual support or basis for asserting his claims, this court finds plaintiff's complaintto befrivolouswithin the meaning of28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(e)(2) and denies plaintiff's Application to Proceed 

### !n Forma Pauperis. See,**~.** Floyd v. United States, 125 Fed. Cl. 183, 192 (2016) (finding plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis to be frivolous when plaintifffailed to provide anyfactual allegations indicating the NewYork Police Department's device for taking electronic fingerprints infringed on plaintiff's patent); Manning v. United States, 123 Fed. Cl. 679, 685 (2015) (finding plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis to be frivolous when plaintiff's taking claimswere unsupported by anyfactual foundation).

10The statute at 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(e) also permits this court to dismiss a complaint thatfailsto state aclaim upon which reliefmay be granted. The court reviews complaints in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a government entity or officer or employee of a government entity and may dismiss any portion ofthe complaint that "is frivolous, malicious, orfails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

...." 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915A(b); see Hardin v. United States, 123 Fed. Cl. 667, 672 (2015); Manning

v. United States, 123 Fed. Cl. at 684. In this case, plaintiff has offered only vague, conclusory, or incomprehensible allegations with no attendant support, which is not sufficientto state anyofplaintiff's claims. See, !Lll.,., Howellv. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 792-93 (2016). Thus, plaintiff's complaint alsofails to state aclaim upon which relief may be granted.

CONCLUSION

Forthe foregoing reasons, plaintiff's Application to Proceed 

## !!J. Forma Pauperis is DENIED, and plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSEDfor lackofsubject matterjurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Clerk's Office shall enter JUDGMENT consistent with this opinion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

# ~**,O:Jfl~** MRfAN BLANK HORN Judge

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