1 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION [Dkt. Ents. 48, 49, 52] 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

CAMDEN VICINAGE 

Appearances 

Thomas J. Mellon 

86 Court Street 

Freehold, NJ 07728 

 Attorney for Plaintiff Jason Cordial 

Michael E. Riley 

Law Offices of Riley & Riley 

The Washington House 

100 High Street, Suite 302 

Mount Holly, NJ 08060 

Attorney for Defendants Atlantic City, Franco Sydnor, & 

Michelle Clark 

Patrick J. Wolf & Sharleen E. Pratt 

Zarwin, Baum, DeVito, Kaplan, Schaer & Toddy, P.C. 

1818 Market Street, 13th Floor 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

 Attorneys for Defendant John J. Mooney III 

Cristopher C. Mauro 

Camacho Mauro Mulholland, LLP 

20 Nassau Street, Suite 308 

Princeton, NJ 08542 

Attorney for Defendants Harrah’s Atlantic City Propco, LLC, 

d/b/a Harrah’s Resort Atlantic City & Kolongi Watford 

Bumb, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

JASON CORDIAL, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

ATLANTIC CITY, et al., 

 Defendants. 

Civil No. 1:11-cv-01457 

(RMB/AMD) 

OPINION 

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This action arises out of a March 29, 2009 incident in 

which Plaintiff Jason Cordial (“Plaintiff”) was forcibly removed 

from Harrah’s Hotel and Casino (“Harrah’s”) in Atlantic City and 

arrested by Atlantic City Police Officers Franco Sydnor 

(“Sydnor”) and Michelle Clark (“Clark”). Plaintiff brings claims 

against the City of Atlantic City (“Atlantic City”), Atlantic 

City Police Department Chief of Police John J. Mooney 

(“Mooney”), Officers Sydnor and Clark, Harrah’s, Security 

Officer Kolongi Watford (“Watford”) (collectively, 

“Defendants”), and numerous other named and fictitious 

individuals or entities.1

Before the Court are three motions for summary judgment 

filed by 1) Defendants Atlantic City, Sydnor, and Clark; 

2) Defendant Mooney; and 3) Defendants Harrah’s and Watford. For 

the reasons that follow, these motions for summary judgment will 

be granted in part and denied in part. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

The following facts are taken from the Rule 56.1 Statements 

submitted by Plaintiff and Defendants. Although the parties 

present similar descriptions of the events leading to this 

litigation, where their accounts differ, the Court adopts 

 

1

 The Complaint names several other Harrah’s employees: Marcus 

Corbit, Eric Crewe, Shaun Paisley, Rivera, Greg Reichenbach, 

and Cahill. (Compl. at 1.) The docket reflects no evidence that 

these individuals were served with the Complaint and none of 

them have appeared in this action. 

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Plaintiff’s version of events for purposes of deciding these 

motions.2

On March 29, 2009, Plaintiff was attending a friend’s 

bachelor party at Harrah’s. (Mooney’s Statement of Undisputed 

Material Facts (“Mooney’s SUMF”), Dkt. Ent. 49, ¶¶ 2-3; 

Plaintiff’s Response to Mooney’s Statement of Facts (“Pl.’s Res. 

Mooney”), Dkt. Ent. 54, ¶¶ 2-3.) At approximately 1:00 or 2:00 

a.m., one of Plaintiff’s friends became involved in an 

altercation with another patron while at “the Pool” Nightclub, 

and the other members of Plaintiff’s party intervened. (Mooney’s 

SUMF ¶ 8; Pl.’s Resp. Mooney ¶ 8.) Security approached and asked 

Plaintiff’s party to leave. (Mooney’s SUMF ¶ 9; Pl.’s Resp. 

Mooney ¶ 9.) Plaintiff and two of his friends then became 

involved in a second confrontation, in the Waterfront Hallway, 

with another unidentified patron, who threw some type of liquid 

at Plaintiff. (Mooney’s SUMF ¶ 10; Pl.’s Resp. Mooney ¶ 10.) 

Harrah’s security personnel Watford, Corbit, and Paisley 

responded to this second incident and began to escort 

Plaintiff’s friend, Scott Rayburg (“Rayburg”), through the 

hallway. (Harrah’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts 

(“Harrah’s SUMF”), Dkt. Ent. 52, ¶¶ 8-9; Plaintiff’s Response to 

 

2

 Where there are significant factual disputes between the 

parties, the facts should be construed in favor of the nonmoving party. See Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 

2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 956 (2004). 

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Harrah’s Statement of Facts (“Pl.’s Resp. Harrah’s”), Dkt. Ent. 

64, ¶¶ 8-9.) Plaintiff claims that he attempted to assist 

Rayburg, who suffers gait instability due to his prior back 

surgery. (Pl.’s Resp. Harrah’s ¶¶ 5-6.) Rayburg, however, lost 

his balance and fell into a female passerby, knocking her to the 

ground. (Pl.’s Resp. Harrah’s ¶ 8.) In the resulting fuss, 

Corbit, Watford, and Paisley grabbed Plaintiff in an attempt to 

physically restrain him, and took him to the ground. (Harrah’s 

SUMF ¶ 8; Pl.’s Resp. Harrah’s ¶¶ 11-13.) 

Plaintiff and Rayburg were then escorted to a holding cell 

located on Harrah’s property. (Harrah’s SUMF ¶ 9; Pl.’s Resp. 

Harrah’s ¶ 14.) Shortly thereafter, Officers Sydnor and Clark 

arrived at the holding cell. (Atlantic City’s Statement of 

Undisputed Material Facts (“AC’s SUMF”), Dkt. Ent. 48, ¶ 12; 

Plaintiff’s Response to Atlantic City’s Statement of Facts 

(“Pl.’s Resp. AC”), Dkt. Ent. 54, ¶ 12.) At that point, 

Plaintiff began using and directing foul language at the 

officers. (AC’s SUMF ¶ 13; Pl.’s Resp. AC ¶ 13.) Plaintiff 

claims that, while he was in the holding cell, Harrah’s security 

personnel and Officers Sydnor and Clark assaulted him, which 

Defendants dispute. (Pl.’s Resp. AC ¶ 16.) 

Upon Harrah’s request, Sydnor and Clark escorted Plaintiff, 

un-handcuffed, through the lobby and out the front doors, where 

they attempted to place him in a taxicab. (AC’s SUMF ¶ 14; Pl.’s 

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Resp. AC ¶ 14.) Defendants allege that Plaintiff was becoming 

increasingly agitated and verbally abusive towards the officers 

as he was escorted out of the casino. (AC’s SUMF ¶ 15.) Once 

outside, Plaintiff claims to have told the officers that he did 

not want to enter the cab and had no money to pay for the fare. 

(AC’s SUMF ¶ 16; Pl.’s Resp. AC ¶ 16.) Throughout this time 

Plaintiff continued to curse at the officers, was verbally 

abusive and combative towards them, and allegedly verbally 

threatened the officers with physical harm. (AC’s SUMF ¶ 16; 

Mooney’s SUMF ¶ 17; Pl.’s Resp. Mooney ¶ 17.) An altercation 

involving Plaintiff, Sydnor, and Clark followed, which led to 

Plaintiff being arrested and ultimately charged with terroristic 

threats, aggravated assault on a police officer, resisting 

arrest, and disorderly conduct. (Mooney’s SUMF ¶ 18; Pl.’s Resp. 

Mooney ¶ 18.)3

 Plaintiff alleges that during this altercation 

Defendants Sydnor and Clark, as well as Harrah’s security 

officers, assaulted him without justification and with excessive 

force causing him to suffer injuries. (Pl.’s Resp. Harrah’s 

¶ 1.) 

In this action, Plaintiff brings claims under § 1983 

against Sydnor and Clark, as well as John Does 1-5, for 

excessive force (Count One), failure to intervene in the 

 

3

 Plaintiff’s charges were dismissed through his participation in 

New Jersey’s Pre Trial Intervention (“PTI”) Program. (AC’s SUMF 

¶ 19; Pl.’s Resp. AC ¶ 19.) 

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unjustified assault and arrest of Plaintiff (Count Two), and 

malicious abuse of process (Count Three). Plaintiff asserts § 

1983 claims against John Does 2, and 6-10 for supervisory 

liability (Count Four), and against Atlantic City, Chief Mooney, 

and John Does 6-10 for constitutional deprivations due to 

unlawful customs, practices, or policies and inadequate training 

(Count Five). The Complaint separately asserts a claim for 

prospective injunctive relief against Atlantic City, Mooney, 

Sydnor, Clark, and John Does 1-10 (Count Six). In addition, 

Plaintiff asserts several state law claims: assault and battery 

(Count Seven) and negligent or intentional infliction of 

emotional distress (Count Eight) against Corbit, Crewe, Paisley, 

Rivera, Watford, Reichenbach, Cahill, Sydnor, Clark, and John 

Does 1-20; as well as negligent hiring, training and supervision 

(Count Nine) and agency (Count Ten) against Corbit, Crewe, 

Paisley, Rivera, Watford, Reichenbach, Cahill, John Does 11-25, 

Harrah’s, and ABC Corporations 1-10. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Summary judgment shall be granted if “the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it will “affect the 

outcome of the suit under the governing law . . . .” Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is 

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“genuine” if it could lead a “reasonable jury [to] return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. When deciding the 

existence of a genuine dispute of material fact, a court’s role 

is not to weigh the evidence; all reasonable “inferences, 

doubts, and issues of credibility should be resolved against the 

moving party.” Meyer v. Riegel Prods. Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 307 

n.2 (3d Cir. 1983). However, a mere “scintilla of evidence,” 

without more, will not give rise to a genuine dispute for trial. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Further, a court does not have to 

adopt the version of facts asserted by the nonmoving party if 

those facts are “utterly discredited by the record [so] that no 

reasonable jury” could believe them. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 

373, 380 (2007). In the face of such evidence, summary judgment 

is still appropriate “where the record . . . could not lead a 

rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party . . . .” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 

587 (1986). 

The movant “always bears the initial responsibility of 

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and 

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 

with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the 

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 

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56(c)). Then, “when a properly supported motion for summary 

judgment [has been] made, the adverse party ‘must set forth 

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 

trial.’” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(e)). The non-movant’s burden is rigorous: it “must point to 

concrete evidence in the record”; mere allegations, conclusions, 

conjecture, and speculation will not defeat summary judgment. 

Orsatte v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995); 

Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 227 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 

Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 228 

(3d Cir. 2009)) (“[S]peculation and conjecture may not defeat 

summary judgment.”). 

III. CLAIMS AGAINST FICTITIOUS PARTIES 

As an initial matter, Plaintiff has brought numerous causes of 

action against several John Does, who are purportedly employees 

of Atlantic City or Harrah’s, as well as several ABC 

Corporations that are allegedly agents, servants and/or 

employees of Harrah’s. Although “[u]se of John Doe defendants is 

permissible in certain situations until reasonable discovery 

permits the true defendants to be identified,” these parties 

must be dismissed if such discovery does not reveal their proper 

identities. See Blakeslee v. Clinton Cnty., 336 F. App’x 248, 

250 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming district court’s sua sponte 

dismissal of fictitious parties that were not identified after 

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discovery) (citing Klingler v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 738 

F. Supp. 898, 910 (E.D. Pa. 1990)); Scheetz v. Morning Call, 

Inc., 130 F.R.D. 34, 37 (E.D. Pa 1990) (dismissing Doe 

defendants after discovery yielded no identities). This may be 

done upon motion of a party or the Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 

(“On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just 

terms, add or drop a party.”). Here, Plaintiff has failed to 

amend the Complaint or otherwise identify any of these 

fictitious defendants despite the fact that discovery has now 

closed. Nor does he contest that dismissal of these unnamed 

parties is appropriate. (See Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to 

Atlantic City (“Pl.’s Br. Opp. AC”), Dkt. Ent. 54, at 1.) 

Accordingly, these parties shall be dismissed. 

IV. CLAIMS AGAINST ATLANTIC CITY, SYDNOR AND CLARK

Atlantic City and Officers Sydnor and Clark seek summary 

judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for municipal liability, 

as well as the state law claims for malicious abuse of process, 

assault and battery, and negligent or intentional infliction of 

emotional distress.4

 Plaintiff concedes that summary judgment as 

to the state claims is appropriate (see Pl.’s Br. Opp. AC at 1), 

and therefore Defendants’ motion is granted as to these claims. 

 

4

 These Defendants also moved with respect to Count Four against 

the unnamed supervisory employees, which is dismissed in 

accordance with the above. Defendants Sydnor and Clark do not 

move for summary judgment on the excessive force and failure to 

intervene claims (Counts One and Two). 

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With respect to the municipal liability claims, Defendants 

argue that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate the existence of an 

unconstitutional policy or custom, or that any such policy or 

custom proximately caused Plaintiff’s injury. Atlantic City 

further argues that Plaintiff has not produced any evidence of 

any training deficiencies or that the City had knowledge that 

officer training was inadequate. 

1. Municipal Liability 

Plaintiff seeks to hold Atlantic City liable under § 1983 

pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 

658 (1978). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Atlantic City 

maintained an unlawful custom, practice, or policy of tolerating 

its officers’ use of excessive force and failed to adequately 

train its officers. It is axiomatic that a municipal entity 

cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat 

superior solely because it employs a tortfeasor. Katzenmoyer v. 

Camden Police Dep’t, No. 08-1995, 2012 WL 6691746, at *3 (D.N.J. 

Dec. 21, 2012) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). Rather, 

municipalities may only be held liable for injuries inflicted 

pursuant to a government policy or custom. Beck v. City of 

Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996). Policy is made when 

a decisionmaker with final authority to establish municipal 

policy with respect to the action issues an official 

proclamation, policy, or edict. Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 

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F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990). A course of conduct or practice 

is considered custom when, though not authorized by law, such 

practices are “so permanent and well-settled as to virtually 

constitute law.” Id. Custom can also be established through 

evidence of knowledge and acquiescence. Groark v. Timek, No. 12-

1984, 2013 WL 6199187, at *17 (D.N.J. Nov. 27, 2013). 

To impose municipal liability pursuant to a custom, a 

plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with 

deliberate indifference to its known or obvious consequences. 

Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 398 

(1997). This can be shown if it is obvious that a custom would 

lead to constitutional violations. Berg v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 

219 F.3d 261, 277 (3d Cir. 2000). A pattern or continued 

adherence to an action that the municipality knows or should 

know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by its police 

officers can establish the requisite conscious disregard for the 

consequences of its actions such that a municipality may be held 

liable. Groark, 2013 WL 6199187, at *6 (citing Brown, 520 U.S. 

at 407). 

Plaintiff alleges that Atlantic City should be held liable 

due to its custom of acquiescing in its officers’ use of 

excessive force as demonstrated by its failure to conduct 

adequate Internal Affairs (“IA”) investigations into excessive 

force complaints against police officers. This is a recognized 

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theory of municipal liability. See Beck, 89 F.3d 966. In Beck, 

the plaintiff offered evidence that the officer in question had 

five prior complaints filed against him within five years, all 

of which alleged similar misconduct by the officer. Id. at 973. 

The plaintiff also presented annual reports showing a high rate 

of excessive force complaints throughout the police department 

and produced evidence that the internal investigation process 

was shallow and flawed. Id. at 973-74. The Third Circuit 

determined that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence 

to permit a jury to infer that the City “knew about and 

acquiesced in a custom tolerating the tacit use of excessive 

force by its police officers.” Id. at 976.

Similarly, Plaintiff here has presented sufficient evidence 

to demonstrate genuine issues of material fact regarding whether 

Atlantic City has a custom of acquiescing in the use of 

excessive force by its officers. Specifically, Plaintiff 

presented evidence that from 2005 to 2009,5

 426 excessive force 

complaints were lodged with IA, but only 4 were sustained. (Ex. 

 

5

 Plaintiff also offers statistics for 2010, showing that only 1 

of the 166 excessive force complaints was sustained. (Ex. H to 

Pl.’s Br. Opp.) While subsequent complaints or violations 

cannot be used to demonstrate knowledge of an unconstitutional 

policy at the time of plaintiff’s incident, they are relevant 

to show a continuous pattern to support a finding of custom or 

policy. See Groark 2013 WL 6199187, at *17 (citing Beck, 89 

F.3d at 972). 

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H to Pl.’s Br. Opp. AC.)6 There were seven excessive force 

complaints against Sydnor and two against Clark during the same 

period. (Ex. L to Pl.’s Br. Opp. AC.)7 The written complaints and 

subsequent IA investigation reports demonstrate that many of the 

complaints are similar in nature to the instant matter in that 

the complainants allege being grabbed by Sydnor, thrown or taken 

to the ground, and then assaulted or punched while on the 

ground.8 (Ex. M to Pl.’s Br. Opp. AC); cf. Troso v. Atlantic 

City, No. 10-1566, 2013 WL 6070028, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 15, 

2013) (granting motion in limine barring the use of IA reports 

because Plaintiff did not offer “the additional evidence needed 

to properly bolster or contextualize the [IA] Summary Reports 

and Summaries of the Use of Force Reports” and provided “no 

 

6

 The court notes that statistical evidence alone, “isolated and 

without further context,” generally “may not justify a finding 

that a municipal policy or custom authorizes or condones the 

unconstitutional acts of police officers.” Katzenmoyer, 2012 WL 

6691746, at *4 (quoting Merman v. City of Camden, 824 F. Supp. 

2d 581, 591 (D.N.J. 2010)). However, a showing that the officer 

whom a plaintiff accuses of using excessive force has been the 

subject of multiple similar complaints, as the Plaintiff here 

has done, can be sufficient. Groark 2013 WL 6199187, at *6 

(citing Katzenmoyer, 2012 WL 6691746, at *4). 

7

 See Worrall v. City of Atlantic City, No. 11-3750, 2013 WL 

4500583, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2013) (“Indeed, relevant Third 

Circuit precedent indicates multiple complaints against just 

one officer may suffice to establish a custom.”). 

8

 Plaintiff also points to a complaint made by another police 

officer against Officer Sydnor for aggravated sexual assault. 

As the circumstances surrounding that incident are dissimilar 

to the allegations here, the Court does not consider that 

complaint. 

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details regarding [the incident in question] or the incidents 

reflected in the Use of Force Reports”). None of these 

complaints, however, were sustained. (Ex. L to Pl.’s Br. Opp. 

AC.) Chief Mooney reviewed many of the investigative reports 

involving Officer Sydnor before forwarding them to the 

prosecutor’s office. (See Ex. M to Pl.’s Br. Opp. AC at RR 

IA220, 765, 1041.) In addition, Chief Mooney received annual 

Early Warning System memoranda reporting which officers received 

three or more IA complaints during a calendar year. (Ex. O. to 

Pl.’s Br. Opp. AC.) Several of these reports cited Officer 

Sydnor. (Id.)9

 As in Beck, a reasonable jury could infer from the 

narrow time period and similar allegations “that the Chief of 

Police knew, or should have known, of [Officer Sydnor’s] 

propensity for violence when making arrests.” Beck, 89 F.3d at 

973; Garcia v. City of Newark, No. 08-1725, 2011 WL 689616, at 

*4 (D.N.J. Feb. 16, 2011) (denying summary judgment for police 

department based on evidence of written civilian complaints 

against individual defendant police officers). 

 

9

 The Early Warning System reviews all IA complaints made against 

an officer, not just excessive force complaints. (Ex. O to Pl.’s 

Br. Opp. AC.) As such, Sydnor triggered the Early Warning System 

review for IA complaints that did not involve the use of 

excessive force. Also of note, while Mooney testified that, at 

some point, he thought the reports were issued quarterly (Ex. E 

(“Mooney Dep.”) to Pl.’s Br. Opp. AC at 51:24-54:10), the 

reports in the record indicate the system tracked complaints 

filed in a calendar year. (Ex. O to Pl.’s Br. Opp. AC.) 

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Additionally, Plaintiff presented evidence from which a 

reasonable jury could infer that the IA investigation process is 

designed to insulate the accused officers from penalty. Captain 

Timothy J. Friel, a former IA investigator, admitted that it is 

not “regular practice” for investigators to review an officer’s 

prior and subsequent history when evaluating civilian 

complaints, despite the Attorney General (“AG”) guidelines. (Ex. 

G (“Friel Dep.”) to Pl.’s Br. Opp. AC at 19:11-20:16); see Beck 

89 F.3d at 973 (finding issue of fact as to the sufficiency of 

investigations when complaints were “insulated from other prior 

and similar complaints and treated in a vacuum”). A review of 

the IA investigation reports supports Friel’s testimony. 

Furthermore, these reports reflect that the complainant was not 

always interviewed, officers were asked only to provide written 

statements (which appear to be copied verbatim from their police 

reports), and officer statements seem to be given much greater 

weight than civilian statements. (Ex. M to Pl.’s Br. Opp. AC.)10

From this evidence, a reasonable jury could find that the IA 

investigations were insufficient or inadequate and that Atlantic 

City exhibited deliberate indifference to the risk that its 

 

10 In the sampling of investigation reports, a complainant who 

used a phone to take pictures of the events was described as 

“idiotic” for doing so. (Ex. M to Pl.’s Br. Opp. AC at RR 

IA764-22.) Another complainant was discredited in part for 

stating he was struck in the head while the medical reports 

indicated an injury to his eye. (Id. at RR IA1040-4.) 

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officers would use excessive force in a manner similar to that 

alleged here. Merman, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 592 (finding a genuine 

issue of fact regarding the sufficiency of IA investigations 

pursuant to Beck); Monaco v. City of Camden, No. 04-2406, 2008 

WL 408423, at *14 (D.N.J. Feb. 13, 2008) (finding IA 

investigations were suspect due to reliance only on written 

statements and conclusions of “not sustained” rather than 

following up on indeterminate information). Moreover, “[t]he 

evidence presented is sufficient to establish that Atlantic City 

was the ‘moving force’ behind Plaintiff's injuries due to its 

failure to act despite prior notice.” Worrall, 2013 WL 4500583, 

at *5. 

Atlantic City’s attempts to distinguish this case from Beck 

and its progeny are unpersuasive. Atlantic City first argues 

that “Plaintiff’s involvement with law enforcement was a result 

of his intoxication and aggressive behavior” and therefore any 

purported custom cannot as a matter of law be the proximate 

cause of Plaintiff’s injury. (Atlantic City’s Brief (“AC’s 

Br.”), Dkt. Ent. 49, at 15.) This position—for which Atlantic 

City cites no authority—is without merit at this stage of the 

proceedings. Although a jury may readily find that Plaintiff’s 

conduct was the proximate cause of his injuries and not a policy 

or custom of Atlantic City, that is a question for the jury as 

discussed herein. 

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Atlantic City next argues that there is no evidence that 

any written IA policies were violated. Even if this were a 

prerequisite,11 Plaintiff has pointed to sufficient evidence from 

which a juror could infer the IA process was inadequate. For 

instance, the AG Guidelines require review of an employee’s 

complaint history each time a new complaint is made, but Captain 

Friel testified that the department was not following that 

guideline “on a regular basis.” (Friel Dep. at 20:9-16.) 

Finally, Atlantic City argues that Plaintiff’s failure to 

provide an expert report on police procedure or statistical 

analysis of IA complaints is fatal to his claims. However, while 

expert testimony can be required in some cases, the issues 

presented here are not beyond the ken of an average juror “to 

assess what a reasonable municipal policymaker would have done 

with the information in this case”. Worrall, 2013 WL 4500583, at 

*5 n.4 (citing Beck, 89 F.3d at 975-76). 

Plaintiff also asserts a failure to train claim. A 

municipality can be liable in limited circumstances for failing 

to train employees. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 

(1989). The failure to train must amount to “deliberate 

 

11 See St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 130-31 (1988) 

(discussing that a persistent custom can exist even if it is 

contrary to other regulations); see also Merman, 824 F. Supp. 

2d at 592 (evidence that IA investigation insulated officers 

from liability was enough to defeat summary judgment without 

evidence of written policy violations). 

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indifference to the rights of persons with whom those employees 

will come into contact.” Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 

1359 (2011). Deliberate indifference requires that the defendant 

was on notice that, absent additional specific training, it was 

highly predictable that the individual offices would use 

excessive force. Troso v. City of Atlantic City, No. 10-1566, 

2013 WL 1314738, at *9 (D.N.J. March 28, 2013) (internal 

quotations omitted). This can be demonstrated through a pattern 

of similar violations that would establish that the “policy of 

inaction was the functional equivalent of a decision [by the 

municipality] to violate the Constitution.” May v. Sanna, No. 

09-3253, 2012 WL 1067686, at *12 (D.N.J. March 29, 2012) 

(quoting Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1365). 

As discussed above, there is a pattern of complaints 

against Sydnor alleging similar misconduct in similar 

circumstances, as well as a high number of excessive force 

complaints against the Department as a whole. Mooney stated that 

he was in charge of all IA investigations, was in charge of 

setting IA procedures, and signed off on a number of the reports 

including many reports involving Officer Sydnor. (Mooney Dep. at 

12:17-13:19, 32:5-24, 63:10-20.) Yet, despite the number of 

excessive force complaints asserted against Sydnor, he testified 

that no one from the Police Department has spoken to him about 

the complaints, suggested additional training, or sent him for 

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re-training. (Ex. P (“Sydnor Dep.”) to Pl. Br. Opp. AC at 88:12-

89:2.) From this evidence, it is reasonable to infer that 

Atlantic City was on notice that without additional training, it 

was highly predictable that officers would continue to use 

excessive force. See Troso, 2013 WL 1314738, at *9 n.10. 

For these reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment 

on Plaintiff’s Monell claims will be denied. 

2. Prospective Relief 

In addition to seeking damages, Plaintiff also seeks 

prospective injunctive relief against Atlantic City and its 

officers. He has styled this request as a separate count of the 

Complaint. Atlantic City has moved for summary judgment on this 

separate count on grounds that it is rendered moot due to 

Plaintiff’s failure to produce sufficient evidence in support of 

his Monell claim. This argument must be rejected in light of the 

Court’s decision above. 

Although the parties did not raise this argument, Plaintiff 

must demonstrate standing for each form of relief sought. 

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l Servs. (TOC), Inc., 

528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000). Equitable remedies are unavailable 

absent a showing of irreparable harm, which cannot be met 

without a showing of a real or immediate threat that the 

plaintiff will be wronged again. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 

461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983). 

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Here, Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief are based 

entirely on past harm. He has made no showing of any likelihood 

of harm in the future. This alleged harm lacks the “high degree 

of immediacy required to constitute injury in fact and provide 

Article III standing” for prospective relief. Pa. Prison Soc. v. 

Cortes, 508 F.3d 156, 166 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Defenders of 

Wildlife v. Lujan, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)). Without a showing of 

likelihood that he himself would be harmed again by Defendants 

in the near future, Plaintiff is “no more entitled to an 

injunction that any other citizen.” Lundy v. Hochberg, 91 

F. Appx. 739, 743 (3d Cir. 2003). Accordingly, all claims for 

injunctive relief must be dismissed.12 See Blakeney v. Marsico, 

340 F. App’x 778 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming District Court’s sua 

sponte dismissal of complaint for lack of Article III standing 

for prospective injunctive relief); Pa. Prison Soc., 508 F.3d at 

169 (remanding for determination of standing for injunctive 

relief because issue was not raised below). 

V. CLAIMS AGAINST MOONEY 

Defendant Mooney also moves for summary judgment on Count 

Five, which seeks to hold Mooney liable for implementing a 

policy, practice or custom of tolerating excessive force by the 

police officers and, inter alia, implementing and/or conducting 

 

12 Additionally, the alleged injury will not go unrecompensed, as 

there is an adequate remedy at law in the form of damages. See 

Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111. 

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superficial and shallow IA processes, failing to employ 

corrective or disciplinary measures despite knowledge of officer 

misconduct, and otherwise failing to train, supervise, control 

and discipline officers. (Compl. at Count Five.) Defendant 

Mooney first argues that it is entirely unclear from the 

Complaint whether Plaintiff is asserting official or individual 

capacity claims against him. He further contends that the claims 

should be treated only as official capacity claims because they 

are based upon allegations of “policy making conduct which can 

only be described as occurring in Chief Mooney’s official 

capacity.” (Mooney’s Br., Dkt. Ent. 49, at 11). But this is not 

the correct standard. See Cincerella v. Egg Harbor Twp. Police 

Dep’t, No. 06-1183, 2009 WL 792489, at *12 n.4 (D.N.J. March 23, 

2009). It has long been recognized that State officials may be 

sued in their individual capacity for their official conduct. 

See, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). The cause of 

action as alleged is identical to the Monell claim against 

Atlantic City. (Compl. at Count Five). In fact, in response to 

Defendant’s arguments, Plaintiff states only that there is 

sufficient evidence “to visit Monell liability on Defendants 

Atlantic City and Chief of Police Mooney” and provides no 

clarification as to the nature of his claims.13 (Pl.’s Br. Opp. 

 

13 The Court also notes that Defendant Mooney failed to submit a 

reply in support of his motion for summary judgment. 

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AC at 21.) Looking to the Complaint, however, Plaintiff alleges 

that “[a]ll Defendants are named in their individual and 

official capacities.” (See Compl. at 5, ¶ 16.) As such, the 

Court will address both types of claims. 

1. Official Capacity Claims 

To the extent that Plaintiff brings suit against Defendant 

Mooney in his official capacity as the Chief of Police, summary 

judgment must be granted and the claims dismissed. In addressing 

the distinction between official capacity and individual 

capacity suits, the Supreme Court explained that “officialcapacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading 

an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” 

See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25. A suit against the Chief of Police in 

his official capacity is really a claim against the police 

department and, in turn, the municipality. A municipal 

department and the municipality itself are not deemed separate 

legal entities under the law, and therefore cannot both be named 

as parties to an action. See, e.g., Bonenburger v. Plymouth 

Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997); Adams v. City of 

Camden, No. 98-5186, 2006 WL 42236, at *7 n.4 (D.N.J. Jan. 6, 

2006) (“...police departments cannot be sued in conjunction with 

municipalities, because the police department is merely an 

administrative arm of the local municipality, and is not a 

separate judicial entity.”). For this reason, courts have held 

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that an officer sued in an official capacity cannot be a named 

party in an action asserting identical claims against the 

municipality. See, e.g., Duran v. Warner, No. 07-5994, 2013 WL 

4483518, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2013) (dismissing official 

capacity claims against Chief of Police where identical claims 

were asserted against the municipality); Owens v. City of 

Atlantic City, No. 05-3132, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47584, at *39-

40 (D.N.J. June 6, 2008) (same). 

Because Plaintiff asserts identical § 1983 claims against 

Atlantic City, summary judgment is appropriate as to any 

official-capacity claims against Defendant Mooney. 

2. Individual Capacity Claims 

It is clear that “‘[g]overnment officials may not be held 

liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates 

under a theory of respondeat superior.’” Cruz v. Cnty. of 

Bergen, No. 10-3322, 2011 WL 1211396, at *2 (D.N.J. March 29, 

2011) (citation omitted). Rather, a government official may only 

be liable for his own misconduct. Id. Thus, a supervisor may be 

liable in his individual capacity if (1) as a policymaker, he 

“with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established 

and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly 

caused [the] constitutional harm,” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. 

Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Detention Ctr., 372 F. 3d 572, 586 (3d 

Cir. 2004) (quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 

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F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989)), or (2) he “participated in 

violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate 

them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and 

acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations.” Id. (citing Baker 

v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190–91 (3d Cir. 1995)). Moreover, 

to impose liability under the knowledge and acquiescence theory, 

there must be “both (1) contemporaneous knowledge of the 

offending incident or knowledge of a prior pattern of similar 

incidents, and (2) circumstances under which the supervisor's 

assertion could be found to have communicated a message of 

approval to the offending subordinate.” Chinchello v. Fenton, 

805 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1986); Moriarty v. de LaSalle, No. 

12–3013 (RMB), 2012 WL 5199211, at *5, *6 (D.N.J. Oct. 19, 

2012). “Particularly after Iqbal, the connection between the 

supervisor’s directions and the constitutional deprivation must 

be sufficient to demonstrate a plausible nexus or affirmative 

link between the directions and the specific deprivation of 

constitutional rights at issue.” Dare v. Twp. of Hamilton, No. 

13-1636, 2013 WL 6080440, at *7 (D.N.J. Nov. 18, 2013) (quoting 

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 127 n.5 (3d Cir. 

2010)). 

Plaintiff appears to argue that Mooney should be held 

individually liable under a similar theory as Atlantic City for 

Mooney’s role as a policymaker. Defendant, on the other hand, 

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suggests that Mooney cannot be held liable as a policymaker 

because “[p]ursuant to N.J.S.A. § 40A:14-118, at all times Chief 

Mooney was directly responsible and answered to the ‘appropriate 

authority’ for the day to day operations of the police 

department and his operation thereof was made pursuant to 

policies established by the ‘appropriate authority.’” (Mooney’s 

Br. at 18.) However, Defendant Mooney testified that he oversaw 

and was responsible for IA investigations, received early 

warning reports of repeated IA complaints, and, as Chief of 

Police, had the authority to create policies addressing the 

procedures applicable to IA investigations. (Mooney Dep. at 

12:17-22, 54:21-56:16, 31:23-32:24, 63:6-20.) In addition, 

Mooney clearly had knowledge of the number of excessive force 

complaints against Officer Sydnor as he reviewed several reports 

before he forwarded them to the prosecutor’s office. (See Ex. M 

to Pl.’s Br. Opp. AC at RR IA220, 765, 1041) As discussed above, 

a juror could find the evidence sufficient to show that the IA 

investigative process was designed to shield officers from 

liability and therefore created an atmosphere in which the use 

of excessive force was tolerated, and knowledge as to the number 

of complaints could permit an inference of deliberate 

indifference. Thus, the evidence presents a question of fact as 

to whether or not Defendant Mooney can be held liable as a 

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policymaker for the police department’s purported custom of 

tacitly approving the use of excessive force. 

In addition, “[a] supervising authority may be liable under 

§ 1983 for failing to train police officers when the failure to 

train demonstrates deliberate indifference to the constitutional 

rights of those with whom the officers may come into contact.” 

Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 207 n. 7 (3d Cir.2005) (citing 

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 

L.Ed.2d 412 (1989)). A plaintiff must (1) identify failures to 

provide specific training that have a causal nexus to the 

alleged injury; and (2) demonstrate that the absence of this 

training can reasonably be said to reflect deliberate 

indifference to whether constitutional deprivations occur. 

Blacknail v. Citarella, 168 F. App’x 489, 492 (3d Cir. 2006). 

As discussed above, Mooney was ultimately responsible for 

IA investigations and personally reviewed and approved many of 

the IA reports in the record. As such, he had actual knowledge 

of the number of excessive force complaints, those against 

Sydnor in particular. The number of complaints was never 

discussed with Sydnor nor was additional training on the use of 

force suggested. From this, it is reasonable to conclude that 

Mooney knew of training deficiencies in the use of force and was 

deliberately indifferent as to whether any constitutional 

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deprivations continued to occur. Thus, summary judgment will be 

denied. 

Defendant also argues that even if Plaintiff has stated a 

claim against Defendant Mooney in his individual capacity, 

Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. “The doctrine of 

qualified immunity protects government officials from liability 

for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate 

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which 

a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 

U.S. 223 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). 

“The Supreme Court has established a two-part analysis 

that governs whether a government official is entitled 

to qualified immunity. . . . The first question in the 

Saucier analysis asks whether the official's conduct 

violated a constitutional or federal right. . . . The 

second question asks whether the right at issue was 

“clearly established.” . . . To be clearly 

established, “[t]he contours of the right must be 

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 

understand that what he is doing violates that right.” 

Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 173-74 (3d Cir. 2010) 

(citations omitted). Defendant cites several dated cases, which 

he contends “stand for the proposition that, under the context 

of police action, an official’s mere inaction in the face of 

subordinate officers [sic] unconstitutional actions clearly does 

not suffice to render the official individually liable.” 

(Mooney’s Br. at 20 (citing inter alia Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 

362 (1976)).) It is unclear to this Court how these cases would 

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support a finding of qualified immunity here. To the extent that 

Defendant wishes to proceed on such a theory, he shall submit 

supplemental briefing on this issue within thirty (30) days of 

this Opinion. 

VI. CLAIMS AGAINST HARRAH’S AND WATFORD 

Defendants Harrah’s and Watford move for summary judgment 

on claims for assault and battery (Count Seven), negligent 

infliction of emotional distress (Count Eight),14 negligent 

hiring, training, and supervision (Count Nine), and agency 

(Count Ten). Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants’ 

arguments regarding negligent infliction of emotional distress 

or negligent hiring. As such, the Court will grant summary 

judgment as unopposed as to those claims. The remaining counts 

are addressed in turn. 

1. Negligent Supervision and Training (Count Nine) 

To defeat summary judgment of a negligent supervision 

claim, a plaintiff must present evidence to support three 

 

14 Plaintiff has titled this Count “negligent/intentional 

infliction of emotional distress.” (Compl. at Count Eight.) 

Defendants, however, appear to have interpreted this as 

asserting only a negligent infliction of emotional distress 

claim, which Plaintiff does not contest. In any event, the 

record does not appear to support an intentional infliction of 

emotional distress claim. See Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 

703 (N.J. 1998) (discussing elements of an intentional 

infliction of emotional distress claim and requiring conduct to 

be “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to 

go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as 

atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community”). 

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fundamental requirements. First, the employer must have known or 

had reason to know that the employee exhibited dangerous 

characteristics. Carmichael v. Carmichael, No. 13-2409, 2014 WL 

347804, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2014) (citing Smith v. Harrah’s 

Casino Resort of Atlantic City, No. L-0827-11, 2013 WL 6508406, 

at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 13, 2013)). Second, there 

must be a reasonable foreseeability of harm to others. Brijall 

v. Harrah’s Atlantic City, 905 F. Supp. 2d 617, 620 (D.N.J. 

2012). Third, the negligent supervision must be the proximate 

cause of the alleged injury. Id. 

In addition, liability can be imposed on an employer who 

fails to properly train its employees. Tobia v. Cooper Hosp. 

Univ. Med. Ctr., 643 A.2d 1, 6 (N.J. 1994). Rooted in 

negligence, it is a separate and distinct claim from respondeat 

superior and covers acts outside the scope of employment. Hoag 

v. Brown, 935 A.2d 1218, 1230 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007). 

A plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) an employer had a duty to 

train its employees; (2) the employer failed to properly train 

its employees; and, (3) this failure was the proximate cause of 

the injury. Stoby v. Egg Harbor Twp., 754 F. Supp. 2d 716, 721 

(D.N.J. 2010). 

Here, Plaintiff has produced no evidence beyond the 

incident in question to support a theory of negligent 

supervision. That Harrah’s employees were violent on this date, 

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however is not sufficient to show that Harrah’s knew or should 

have known of any “unfitness or dangerous characteristics” prior 

to this incident. See Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 516 (N.J. 

1982). Plaintiff has provided no criminal histories, personnel 

files, employment records, or other evidence to support this 

claim. Plaintiff points only to one prior incident that involved 

only one of the Harrah’s employees named herein (Rivera), which 

led to a separate lawsuit filed by a different plaintiff. This 

one other action, which has since been sent to mediation and 

dismissed, is insufficient to show knowledge of violent 

propensities of these employees. Absent any facts in the record 

that indicate Harrah’s knew or should have known about any 

violent proclivities of the employees involved in the March 29, 

2009 incident, summary judgment must be granted on the negligent 

supervision claim. 

Similarly, with respect to the negligent training claim, 

Plaintiff has provided no evidence of training insufficiencies 

or established a causal link between the training and his 

injuries. Harrah’s has provided evidence of its training program 

which teaches the use of defensive techniques and testimony 

which supports that all officers underwent this training 

program. (Exs. E & F to Harrah’s Br.) Plaintiff points only to 

the security footage of the March 29, 2009 incident, which he 

alleges shows Harrah’s employees using excessive force contrary 

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to Harrah’s training manuals. In the absence of any additional 

evidence such as expert testimony on the inadequacy of Harrah’s 

training programs or causation, this incident cannot sustain a 

claim of negligent training. See Brijall, 905 F. Supp. 2d at 621 

(noting a lack of expert testimony and stating video 

surveillance, without more, cannot sustain claim for negligent 

training or supervision). As such, summary judgment will be 

granted. 

2. Assault and Battery Against Watford (Count Seven) 

Under New Jersey law, a person is subject to liability for 

battery if “he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive 

contact . . . or an imminent apprehension of such contact’ and a 

‘harmful’ or ‘offensive’ contact ‘directly or indirectly’ 

results.” Russo v. Ryerson, No. 01-4458, 2006 WL 477006, at *36 

(D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2006) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 

13, 18 (1965)). An assault can occur in the absence of actual 

contact if the victim is placed in imminent apprehension of 

harmful contact. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21 

(1965)). Self-defense and defense of others are affirmative 

defenses that can shield a defendant from liability if proven. 

See N.J. Model Civil Jury Charge § 3.10 (1984). 

Both parties acknowledge that Harrah’s security officers 

did in fact restrain Plaintiff and the video surveillance bears 

this out. (Ex. H to Harrah’s Br., Dkt. Ent. 52.) Harrah’s and 

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Watford argue that this contact was justified both in selfdefense and for the defense of other Harrah’s patrons because 

Plaintiff was agitated and unruly. Plaintiff maintains this 

force was unnecessary and relies heavily on the security 

surveillance footage. While the video surveillance is not as 

favorable to Plaintiff as he portrays, whether or not the 

employees were justified in restraining Plaintiff in the manner 

in which they did presents a factual issue to be resolved by the 

jury.15

Watford also argues there is insufficient evidence to show 

his involvement in the alleged assault and battery, but he is 

mentioned by name in Harrah’s Incident Report as being forced to 

restrain Plaintiff. (See, e.g., Ex. D (“Incident Report”) to 

Harrah’s Br.) Therefore, viewing the facts in a light most 

favorable to Plaintiff, there is an issue of fact as to 

Watford’s involvement. 

3. Agency Against Harrah’s (Count Ten) 

Plaintiff seeks to hold Harrah’s liable for the alleged 

assault and battery by its employees. An employer is liable 

under a theory of respondeat superior for torts committed by 

employees within the scope of their employment. New Jersey 

 

15 Furthermore, courts have recognized that a casino may exclude 

disorderly patrons from its premises. Simone v. Golden Nugget 

Hotel & Casino, 844 F.2d 1031, 1035 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting 

Uston v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370, 375 (N.J. 

1982)). 

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courts consider four factors in determining whether an 

employee’s conduct is within the scope of his employment: 

(1) whether the act is of a kind the employee is employed to 

perform; (2) whether the act occurs substantially within the 

authorized time limits; (3) whether the act is actuated, at 

least in part, by a purpose to serve the master; and (4) if 

force is intentionally used by the servant against another, 

whether the use of force is not “unexpectable” by the master. 

Davis v. Devereux Found., 37 A.3d 469, 489-90 (N.J. 2012) 

(citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1958)). Moreover, 

while intentional torts generally fall outside the scope of 

employment, courts have found employees’ acts to “be within the 

scope of their employment when their attempts to enforce their 

employer’s rules instigated violence.” Brijall, 905 F. Supp. 2d 

at 622. Thus, when an employee’s responsibilities include the 

enforcement of the employer’s rules, the conduct is generally 

attributable, in whole or in part, to the employee’s attempt to 

serve the employer. Davis, 37 A.3d at 469. 

Here, Harrah’s argues that if its security personnel 

committed an assault and battery, the employees must have been 

acting outside the scope of their employment because they were 

authorized only to use appropriate defensive techniques in 

carrying out their duties. However, even if the alleged level of 

force was strictly unauthorized by Harrah’s policies, these 

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employees were responsible for the enforcement of the employer’s 

rules and the removal of unruly patrons. Brijall, 905 F. Supp. 

2d at 623 (genuine issue of fact remained as to whether casino 

security officer was within scope of employment in committing 

battery). The employees’ attempts to perform these duties seem 

to have prompted the altercation. Id. Therefore, “the fight ‘was 

certainly related to’ [the security officers’] employment and a 

jury question is presented as to whether the act was within the 

scope of [the security officers’] employment.” Id.; Schisano v. 

Brickseal Refactory Co., 162 A.2d 904 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1960) 

(finding issue of fact as to whether a battery committed by the 

employee during a parking dispute with a customer was within the 

scope of employment where employee was responsible for keeping 

unauthorized cars out of the lot). Accordingly, Harrah’s motion 

for summary judgment on Count Ten must be denied. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons outlined above, summary judgment will be 

GRANTED as to Counts Three, Four, Six, Eight, and Nine in their 

entirety, and DENIED as to Counts Five and Ten. In addition, 

summary judgment is GRANTED as unopposed with respect to the 

Count Seven claims against Defendants Sydnor and Clark but 

DENIED with respect to the Count Seven claim against Defendant 

Watford. All fictitious parties are hereby DISMISSED. An 

appropriate order will be issued herewith. 

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Date: March 19, 2014 

s/Renée Marie Bumb 

RENÉE MARIE BUMB 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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