IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

DAVID HOWARD HEDGES, No. 52877-1-II

Respondent,

v.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

TIMOTHY HEDGES, PHILIP HEDGES, and

WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF

SOCIAL AND HELTH SERVICES,

Defendants,

EVA JUDITH HEDGES,

Appellant.

SUTTON, J. — A Polish court ordered David Hedges, a Washington resident, to pay child 

support for his two adult children, who were found by a Polish court to be disabled. The Polish 

court entered its order 13 years after the Hedges’ children reached the age of majority. The Polish 

court then requested enforcement of the Polish order from the Washington State Department of 

Child Support (DCS).

An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that the Polish order was enforceable and ordered 

David1to pay child support as ordered by the Polish court. David petitioned for review, and the 

superior court reversed the ALJ’s decision, ordering that the Polish order not be registered or 

enforced by DCS.

 

1 We use the parties’ first names for clarity and mean no disrespect.

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

December 1, 2020
No. 52877-1-II

2

In this appeal, David argues that his due process rights were violated because he did not 

receive notice of or an opportunity to participate in the evidentiary proceeding in the Polish court. 

He also argues that appearing through his attorney to appeal the Polish court’s order was not 

meaningful because he was deprived of the opportunity to participate in any evidentiary 

proceeding.2

We hold that David’s due process rights were violated and enforcement of the Polish order 

is manifestly incompatible with public policy. Therefore, we affirm the superior court’s order and 

reverse the ALJ’s final order.

FACTS

I. PARTIES’ DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE

David and Eva Hedges were married and divorced twice. During their marriage, they had 

two children. The parties’ second dissolution of marriage was completed on March 27, 1998, in 

New York, with the first dissolution of marriage settlement agreement from Arizona incorporated

into the New York decree. According to the agreement, David was to pay child support to Eva

until their two children reached the age of majority. David continued to pay child support until 

the parties’ children turned 21 in 2004 and 2005, respectively. After they became adults and 

David’s child support obligation had already terminated, Eva moved with their two sons to Poland. 

 

2 David also argues that the Polish court lacked personal jurisdiction over him and lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction over the case. Because we resolve this appeal based on due process, we do not 

reach the other issues.
No. 52877-1-II

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II. 2012 POLISH CHILD SUPPORT ORDER

On March 9, 2012, the District Court for Krakow, a trial court in Poland, issued a child 

support order (Polish order) against David to pay child support in favor of the parties’ two adult 

children after finding that both children are disabled. The evidentiary hearing at which the trial 

court decided this issue was February 28, 2012; at that time, the children were 28 and 29,

respectively. David did not receive any notice of or opportunity to participate in this hearing. It 

is undisputed that the District Court for Krakow was required to serve David with notice of the 

2012 Polish hearing, and he was never served. The first time David heard of the Polish order was 

when he received an email from Eva on April 13, 2012, notifying him of it. The District Court for 

Krakow then sent David a registered letter in May of 2012 informing him of the Polish order. 

On April 25, 2012, David retained an attorney in Poland to appeal the Polish order. On 

appeal, David argued that there was a “blatant violation of civil proceedings regulations” and 

disputed that his two children were, in fact, disabled, among other issues. Administrative Record 

(AR) at 87-92; CP at 14; FF 4.13. On May 21, 2013, the Regional Court for Krakow, an appellate 

court, issued a Decree ordering David to pay child support in favor of the parties’ two adult 

children, commencing on February 28, 2012. CP at 11; FF 4.2. 

III. ENFORCEMENT OF THE POLISH ORDER, THE ALJ’S DECISION, AND THE SUPERIOR COURT’S 

REVERSAL

On March 31, 2016, DCS received a request from the child support agency in Poland to 

enforce the Polish order. DCS issued and served a Notice of Support Debt and Registration by 

certified mail on David on August 30, 2016. David timely objected and requested an 

administrative hearing. 
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At the administrative hearing before the ALJ, David argued, among other issues, that the 

Polish court failed to provide him with procedural due process. 

The ALJ issued an Order on Submission of Documents on November 22, 2017, directing

DCS to provide a copy of the service of process documents that were served by the 

Polish Court on [David] for the March 9, 2012 hearing and the May 21, 2013 

hearing and/or a record attesting that [David] had proper notice of the support order 

and an opportunity to be heard. 

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 10. In response to this order, a DCS claim officer/attorney filed a 

nonresponsive statement indicating that “[t]he [DCS] business records indicate that Mr. Hedges 

signed for the Notice of Registration on August 30, 2016.” AR at 310. Despite the ALJ’s order, 

DCS never provided any evidence to show that David received proper notice and service of the 

2012 hearing in the District Court for Krakow.

At the hearing before the ALJ, both parties presented written evidence and testimony, as 

did DCS’s attorney. The ALJ made the following relevant conclusion of law:

5.7 . . . .

The undersigned concludes that, although he did not receive notice of the 

underlying District Court for Krakow hearing and did not have an opportunity to 

participate in that hearing, that he did have the opportunity to defend himself from 

the District Court for Krakow’s judgment in Poland with legal counsel to raise his 

defense. The undersigned concludes, [David] submitted to the jurisdiction of 

Poland by retaining an attorney to represent him in his defense before the Regional 

Court for Krakow and thereby had notice and an opportunity [to] be heard.

The undersigned therefore, does not conclude that the enforcement of the Regional 

Court for Krakow’s Decree is manifestly in violation of public policy.

CP at 19-20. The ALJ ordered that the Polish order was enforceable and could be registered with 

DCS, and ordered David to pay current child support in the amount of $1,547.06 beginning August 
No. 52877-1-II

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1, 2016, and $99,287.92 for past support for the period of March 10, 2012, through July 31, 2016. 

David filed a petition for judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).

3

 

Based on the administrative record, the superior court determined that the ALJ misapplied 

the law and the Polish order could not be registered or enforced by DCS; therefore, it reversed the 

ALJ’s decision. 

Eva appeals the superior court’s order which reversed the ALJ’s decision.

ANALYSIS

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT

The APA governs our review of an agency’s final administrative decision. RCW 

34.05.570. We will reverse the ALJ’s decision if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if 

the ALJ “erroneously interpreted or applied the law.” RCW 34.05.570(3)(d), (e). We “‘give the 

agency’s interpretation of the law great weight where the statute is within the agency’s special 

expertise.’” Crosswhite v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 197 Wn. App. 539, 549, 389 P.3d 731 

(2017) (quoting Cornelius v. Dep’t of Ecology, 182 Wn.2d 574, 585, 344 P.3d 199 (2015)). 

However, “[d]eference ‘is inappropriate when the agency interpretation conflicts with the statute.’” 

Crosswhite, 197 Wn. App. at 549 (quoting Brown v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 145 Wn. App. 

177, 183, 185 P.3d 1210 (2008)). The party seeking relief bears the burden of demonstrating the 

invalidity of the agency action. Olympic Healthcare Servs. II LLC v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health 

Servs., 175 Wn. App. 174, 180, 304 P.3d 491 (2013); RCW 34.05.570(1)(a). 

 

3 Ch. 34.05 RCW.
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We review factual determinations from a final administrative decision under the substantial 

evidence standard, and the decision will be upheld “if supported by a sufficient quantity of 

evidence to persuade a fair-minded person of the order’s truth or correctness.” Crosswhite, 197 

Wn. App. at 548. Unchallenged findings are verities on appeal. Darkenwald v. Employment Sec. 

Dep’t, 183 Wn.2d 237, 244, 350 P.3d 647 (2015). We review de novo whether the findings support 

the conclusions of law. Olympic Healthcare, 175 Wn. App. at 181. 

B. UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (UIFSA)

It is undisputed that the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA)4governsthis case. 

The UIFSA applies to all actions in Washington commenced on or after July 1, 2015, that attempt 

to register child support orders. RCW 26.21A.907. When a party seeks recognition of a 

convention support order5from another tribunal, that party must register the order with DCS. 

RCW 26.21A.613. 

“Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section, a tribunal of this state shall 

recognize and enforce a registered convention support order.” RCW 26.21A.617(1). Relevant 

here, an objecting party may raise the defense that “[r]ecognition and enforcement of the order is 

manifestly incompatible with public policy, including the failure of the issuing tribunal to observe 

minimum standards of due process, which include notice and an opportunity to be heard.” RCW 

26.21A.617(2)(a).

 

4 Ch. 26.21A RCW.

5 A “convention support order” is “a support order of a tribunal of a foreign country” which is in 

forced with respect to the United States under the Hague Convention of November 23, 2007. RCW 

26.21A.601(3); RCW 26.21A.010(3), (5)(d).
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II. MINIMUM STANDARDS OF DUE PROCESS

David argues that his procedural due process rights were violated because he was not 

served with notice of the hearing by the District Court for Krakow as required, nor did he have an 

opportunity to participate in the 2012 evidentiary hearing before the Polish court. Eva argues that 

David’s procedural due process rights were not violated because he received notice and had an 

opportunity to be heard in the appeal after the child support order was issued. We hold that David’s

right to minimum due process was violated because there is no evidence in the record that he was 

served with prehearing notice or had any opportunity to participate in any evidentiary hearing that 

led to the Polish order for child support. Because David was not afforded even minimum due 

process, the District Court for Krakow proceeding and resulting order are manifestly incompatible 

with public policy.

The federal and state constitutions guarantee a right to due process. U.S. CONST. amend. 

XIV, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3. “Due process protections include . . . the right to notice and 

an opportunity to be heard and defend.” In re the Welfare of M.B., 195 Wn.2d 859, 867, 467 P.3d 

969 (2020); see also Morrison v. Dep’t of Labor & Industr., 168 Wn. App. 269, 273, 277 P.3d 675 

(2012) (“An essential principle of due process is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity 

to be heard.”). “To determine whether a particular procedure for providing notice and an 

opportunity to be heard is constitutionally adequate, we must assess the risk of erroneous 

deprivation in light of the competing interests at stake.” Fields v. Dep’t of Early Learning, 193 

Wn.2d 36, 44, 434 P.3d 999 (2019). 

RCW 4.24.820(1) (2015) states that “Washington’s courts, administrative agencies, or any 

other Washington tribunal shall not recognize, base any ruling on, or enforce any order issued 
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under foreign law, or by a foreign legal system, that is manifestly incompatible with public policy.” 

“[A]n order is presumed to be manifestly incompatible with public policy when it does not grant 

parties the same rights as the parties are granted under the Washington or United States 

Constitutions.” Brett v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 9 Wn. App. 2d 303, 311, 455 P. 3d 568 

(2019) (citing RCW 4.24.820(2)). In Washington, a non-moving party must be personally served 

with a summons in advance of the court proceeding. RCW 4.28.080; RCW 26.10.030(2).

Here, the ALJ concluded that enforcement of the Polish order was not manifestly in 

violation of public policy. The ALJ based its conclusion on its finding that the District Court for

Krakow served David by registered mail with the Polish order after it was entered, and then David 

retained an attorney in Poland to appeal the order. The ALJ erred in concluding that enforcing the 

Polish order did not manifestly violate public policy.

Despite the ALJ’s order requiring that DCS provide proof that David was properly served

before the District Court for Krakow issued its child support order, DCS failed to provide any such 

evidence. The record does not show that David was served with a prehearing notice or had the 

opportunity to participate and defend himself in the District Court for Krakow proceeding. Thus, 

contrary to RCW 26.21A.617(2)(a)’s requirement, David was not provided any notice of the 

proceedings in the Polish district court. David was not afforded minimum due process protections

under the federal and state constitutions. Serving him with the child support order after it was 

entered is not minimum due process. Although David hired an attorney to appeal the Polish order, 

participating in an appeal was not meaningful participation because he was deprived of the 

opportunity to participate in the evidentiary proceeding before the District Court for Krakow. 
No. 52877-1-II

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Because David did not receive prehearing notice and did not have an opportunity to defend 

himself in the District Court for Krakow, we hold that David did not receive minimum due process,

and thus, the Polish proceedings were manifestly incompatible with public policy. Therefore, the 

Polish order may not be registered with DCS and is not enforceable. 

CONCLUSION

We affirm the superior court’s order and reverse the ALJ’s final order.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, 

it is so ordered.

SUTTON, J.

We concur:

LEE, C.J.

CRUSER, J.