J-S43036-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

RONEESE DANIA DAVIS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 13 WDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 13, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0011185-2017

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: April 29, 2021

Appellant, Roneese Dania Davis, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, following the entry 

of her negotiated guilty pleas to simple assault, harassment, criminal mischief, 

and disorderly conduct.

1

 After careful review, we vacate the judgment of 

sentence and remand for resentencing.2 

The trial court previously set forth the relevant facts of this appeal as 

follows:

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a)(1), 2709(a)(1), 3304(a)(5), and 5503(a)(4), 

respectively. 

2 On November 18, 2020, we stayed our disposition of this case pending this 

Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Lopez, 2021 PA Super 51 (filed March 

23, 2021) (en banc). Now that this Court has issued its decision in Lopez, 

we lift the stay order. 
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On March 12, 2018, [Appellant and Co-Defendant] pled 

guilty to the above referenced charges and were sentenced 

in accordance with a plea agreement to two (2) years of 

probation at the count of simple assault, followed by a 

consecutive one (1) year period of probation for disorderly 

conduct. The facts, which were stipulated to at the guilty 

plea [hearing] are as follows[.] On May 20, 2017, police 

responded to an assault in-progress on a Port Authority bus. 

The officer observed the victim in the rear of the bus with 

visible facial injuries, including blood inside and around her 

mouth and nose. The victim complained of head and facial 

pain, vision problems, and reported that her eyeglasses 

were broken during the assault. Video surveillance footage 

captured the assault and corroborated the victim and 

witness accounts that [Appellant and Co-Defendant]

physically attacked the victim by repeatedly punching her 

about the face. At sentencing, the Commonwealth 

submitted a restitution order for $5,383.88 representing the 

costs associated with some of the victim’s medical 

treatment.1 [Appellant and Co-Defendant] requested a 

restitution hearing. The hearing took place on April 13, 

2018, wherein they argued that the medical records were 

incomplete and that the Commonwealth failed to establish 

direct causation between the assault and the detached 

retina diagnosis.[3] The Court became aware during the 

hearing that the Commonwealth had received additional 

medical records, prompting a continuation of the hearing. 

When the parties reconvened before [the c]ourt on May 8, 

2018, [Appellant and Co-Defendant] reiterated their 

argument regarding lack of direct causation and also 

challenged the authority of the court to order restitution 

payable to Equian. Citing 18 P.S. § 11.103, [Appellant and 

Co-Defendant] argued that Equian, a third-party collection 

agency seeking restitution on behalf of the medical provider, 

UPMC, is not statutorily allowed to receive payment. Briefs 

were ordered on the issue of Equian’s eligibility and 

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3 At the guilty plea hearing, the Commonwealth indicated that the victim 

needed surgery for a detached retina as a result of the assault. (See N.T. 

Plea Hearing, 3/12/18, at 16). At the subsequent restitution hearing, 

Appellant’s counsel asserted she had reviewed the relevant medical records 

and “there was no diagnosis of a detached retina that was caused by the 

criminal assault.” (Restitution Hearing, 4/13/18, at 3). 
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argument took place on June 21, 2018. After argument, the 

court entered a restitution order in the amount of $5,383.88 

payable to Equian, finding that payment to a collection 

agency designated by an entity entitled to receive 

restitution, achieves the legislative purposes of the statute: 

rehabilitation and punishment. 

1 Additional restitution was ordered payable to the 

victim to replace the eyeglasses and to the Victim’s 

Compensation Fund for medical care[.] 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 11/6/18, at 2-3) (some capitalization and footnotes 

omitted). 

Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion, arguing: 1) the 

Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient evidence to support the amount of 

actual damages suffered by the victim; 2) the record did not establish a causal 

connection between the crimes and the victim’s injury; and 3) Equian was not 

entitled to restitution under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(c)(1). The court denied the 

post-sentence motion, and Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. On 

August 29, 2019, this Court vacated Appellant’s sentence and remanded the 

matter for resentencing. Citing Commonwealth v. Ramos, 197 A.3d 766 

(Pa.Super. 2018), we determined “the trial court erred as a matter of law by 

failing to determine the amount of restitution at the original time of 

sentencing[.]” Commonwealth v. Davis, No. 1048 WDA 2018, unpublished 

memorandum at 4 (Pa.Super. filed August 29, 2019). 

On November 13, 2019, the court resentenced Appellant to the same 

aggregate term of three (3) years’ probation. The court also awarded 

restitution, including $5,383.88 to Equian and $1,296.71 to the Victim’s 
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Compensation Fund. Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion on 

November 22, 2019. Again, Appellant argued that Equian was not entitled to 

restitution under Section 1106(c)(1), and the Commonwealth failed to 

establish a causal connection between the assault and the victim’s injury. On 

December 4, 2019, the court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion. 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on January 2, 2020. On January 

7, 2020, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant timely filed her Rule 

1925(b) statement on January 28, 2020. 

Appellant now raises three issues for our review: 

Was the trial court’s sentence illegal in ordering $5,383.88 

in restitution to Equian, a debt collector, under the 

restitution statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106, when Equian was not 

an entity listed under the aforementioned restitution 

statute? 

Was the trial court’s sentence illegal because the record 

supports no causal connection between the ordered 

restitution for the injury complained of, a detached retina, 

and the simple assault to which [Appellant] pleaded guilty? 

Was the trial court’s imposition of certain court costs on 

[Appellant] improper, given that the court costs were 

imposed without consideration of [Appellant’s] financial 

resources and ability to pay?

(Appellant’s Brief at 3). 

In her first issue, Appellant challenges the court’s award of restitution 

to Equian, a third-party debt collector. Appellant contends that the definition 

of “victim” in the applicable version of Section 1106 does not include corporate 
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entities like Equian.4In light of the relevant statutory language, Appellant 

insists Equian is not entitled to restitution under Section 1106. Appellant 

concludes that this Court must vacate that portion of the judgment of 

sentence. We agree. 

The relevant scope and standard of review are as follows: 

We note that [i]n the context of criminal proceedings, an 

order of restitution is not simply an award of damages, but, 

rather, a sentence. As such, [a]n appeal from an order of 

restitution based upon a claim that a restitution order is 

unsupported by the record challenges the legality, rather 

than the discretionary aspects, of sentencing. Accordingly, 

the determination as to whether the trial court imposed an 

illegal sentence is a question of law; our standard of review 

in cases dealing with questions of law is plenary. This case 

will also necessarily call upon us to engage in statutory 

construction, which similarly presents a pure question of law 

and also implicates the legality of ... sentence. Thus, our 

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is 

plenary. 

Hunt, supra at 585 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

The version of Section 1106 in effect at the time of Appellant’s offenses 

provided, in pertinent part, as follows: 

(a) General rule.—Upon conviction for any crime 

wherein ... the victim suffered personal injury directly 

resulting from the crime, the offender shall be sentenced to 

make restitution in addition to the punishment prescribed 

therefor. 

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4 Relevant to this appeal, the Pennsylvania General Assembly amended 

Section 1106 on October 24, 2018. However, Appellant’s criminal actions and 

the entry of her guilty pleas predate the statute’s amendment. Accordingly, 

we analyze the prior version of Section 1106 for Appellant’s sentencing claim. 

See Commonwealth v. Hunt, 220 A.3d 582, 585-87 (Pa.Super. 2019). 
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* * *

(c) Mandatory restitution.—

(1) The court shall order full restitution: 

(i) Regardless of the current financial resources 

of the defendant, so as to provide the victim with 

the fullest compensation for the loss. ... 

(ii) If restitution to more than one person is set 

at the same time, the court shall set priorities of 

payment. However, when establishing priorities, 

the court shall order payment in the following 

order: 

(A) The victim. 

(B) The Crime Victim’s Compensation 

Board. 

(C) Any other government agency which 

has provided reimbursement to the victim as 

a result of the defendant’s criminal conduct. 

(D) Any insurance company which has 

provided reimbursement to the victim as a 

result of the defendant’s criminal conduct. 

* * *

(h) Definitions.—As used in this section, the following 

words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them 

in this subsection: 

* * *

“Victim.” As defined in section 479.1 of the act of April 9, 

1929 (P.L. 177, No. 175), known as The Administrative 

Code of 1929. The term includes the Crime Victim’s 

Compensation Fund if compensation has been paid by the 

Crime Victim’s Compensation Fund to the victim and any 

insurance company that has compensated the victim for loss 

under an insurance contract. 
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18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(a), (c), and (h) (repealed Oct. 24, 2018, P.L. 891, No. 145, 

§ 1, effective Jan. 31, 2005) (internal footnote omitted). 

Regarding the statutory reference in the definitions section, “Section 

479.1, formerly codified at 71 P.S. § 180–9.1, since has been recodified in the 

Crime Victims Act, 18 P.S. §§ 11.101, et seq. (the ‘CVA’).” Commonwealth 

v. Veon, 637 Pa. 442, 465, 150 A.3d 435, 449 (2016). The CVA defines 

“victim” as follows: 

(1) A direct victim. 

(2) A parent or legal guardian of a child who is a direct 

victim, except when the parent or legal guardian of the child 

is the alleged offender. 

(3) A minor child who is a material witness to any of 

the following crimes and offenses under 18 Pa.C.S. (relating 

to crimes and offenses) committed or attempted against a 

member of the child’s family: 

Chapter 25 (relating to criminal homicide). 

Section 2702 (relating to aggravated assault). 

Section 3121 (relating to rape). 

(4) A family member of a homicide victim, including 

stepbrothers or stepsisters, stepchildren, stepparents or a 

fiance, one of whom is to be identified to receive 

communication as provided for in this act, except where the 

family member is the alleged offender. 

18 P.S. § 11.103. “A ‘[d]irect victim’ is defined by the same section as ‘[a]n 

individual against whom a crime has been committed or attempted and who 

as a direct result of the criminal act or attempt suffers physical or mental 
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injury, death or the loss of earnings under this act.’” Veon, supra at 465, 

150 A.3d at 449 (emphasis in original). In Veon, our Supreme Court 

scrutinized the language in Section 11.103 and determined that it applied to 

human beings only: 

Notwithstanding any legislative expansion of the definition 

of “victim,” it is clear that the plain text of Section 11.103 

still envisages “victims” as “persons” commonly understood. 

A “victim” under Section 11.103 must be “a direct victim,” 

i.e., an “individual” who has suffered injury, death, or loss 

of earnings; or a “child,” “parent,” “guardian,” or “family 

member.” Every relevant noun unequivocally describes a 

human being, not a government agency, and nowhere else 

is there a relevant definition that persuades us to broaden 

the common understanding of these words. 

Id. at 472, 150 A.3d at 454. 

In light of the holding in Veon, this Court subsequently concluded that 

the inter-related definitions of “direct victim,” “individual,” 

and “natural person” pursuant to the pre-amendment 

version of § 1106 do not include corporate entities.... Such 

a conclusion is necessitated by a plain reading of these 

statutes, and has the additional virtue of giving full weight 

to the Supreme Court’s discussion of these same provisions 

in Veon. 

Hunt, supra at 591 (internal footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). 

Instantly, the court ordered Appellant to pay restitution to Equian. 

Based upon this Court’s holding in Hunt, the definition of “victim” under the 

pre-amendment version of Section 1106 does not include a corporate entity 

such as Equian. Therefore, Appellant’s sentence is illegal, and we vacate the

judgment of sentence. See Veon, supra; Hunt, supra. Accordingly, we 
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remand for resentencing consistent with this decision.5 

Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded with instructions. 

Jurisdiction is relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/29/2021

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5 Due to our disposition, we need not address Appellant’s remaining issues. 

Nevertheless, we note this Court has already addressed the causal connection 

between the criminal conduct and the victim’s eye injury, as Co-Defendant 

raised the same claim on appeal from her judgment of sentence. See

Commonwealth v. Sweeney, 1878 WDA 2019, unpublished memorandum 

at 6-8 (Pa.Super. filed November 30, 2020). Additionally, regarding 

Appellant’s complaint that the court imposed costs without considering 

Appellant’s ability to pay, there is no “requirement that a court hold an abilityto-pay hearing before imposing court costs on the defendant at sentencing.” 

Lopez, supra at 4.