DLD-087 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 16-4048

___________

ROBERT MARQUIS RAMEY,

Appellant

v.

DONNA MELLOW, Asst. Superintendent; 

DR. RONALD PHILLIPS, Medical Director; 

N. SMITH, Health Service Administrator; 

E. ASANTE, Grievance Coordinator; 

J. DUFFY, Delaware County Sheriff; 

J. MOODY; ISSAC OKAI, Correctional Officer

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 2-15-cv-01431)

District Judge: Honorable Edward G. Smith

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

December 28, 2016

Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 10, 2017)

_________

OPINION*

_________

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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PER CURIAM

Robert Marquis Ramey appeals, pro se and in forma pauperis, the District Court’s 

final order granting judgment to the Defendants. Because no substantial question is 

presented, we will summarily affirm the judgment. 

Ramey is an inmate at SCI Benner. His present suit alleges that he sustained 

injuries when a garage gate dropped and landed on a sheriff’s van in which he was a 

passenger while leaving the George W. Hill Correctional Facility (Hill Facility). Ramey 

and eleven other passengers were evacuated and evaluated at the Hill Facility medical 

center. He described no injury at the initial evaluation, but later submitted a sick call 

request alleging back and neck pain, for which he was prescribed ibuprofen and an 

analgesic balm. Over the next seven months, he submitted two more sick call requests 

complaining of back, neck, and ankle pain, for which he was prescribed additional 

medication and recommended an exercise regime. 

Ramey then filed the present suit, which the District Court construed as alleging 

an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 

seven members of the prison staff, and a state law negligence claim against one staffer, 

based on the alleged injuries and deficient treatment he experienced. After filing his final 

amended complaint, the District Court ordered three named Defendants – a health service 

administrator, assistant superintendent, and grievance coordinator at the Hill Facility –

dismissed because Ramey failed to state claims against them. Dist. Ct. Doc. 27. Two of 

the three remaining Defendants moved for summary judgment. The District Court 
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granted the motion as to the federal claims and dismissed without prejudice the state law 

negligence claim against the one remaining Defendant. Ramey timely appealed that 

order. 

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District 

Court’s decision to dismiss for failure to state a claim and to grant summary judgment is 

plenary. Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 63-64 (3d Cir. 2008); Gallo 

v. City of Phila., 161 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 1998). Dismissal for failure to state a claim 

is proper if the pleader does not submit “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that [he is] entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Further, while viewing the facts in 

a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. Am. 

States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 1993), we will affirm the summary 

judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

The initial dismissal of three named Defendants for failure to state a claim was 

proper. First, Ramey did not allege that N. Smith, a “health service administrator,” had 

any personal involvement with respect to his injury or medical treatment, instead basing 

the claim on Smith’s failure to respond to his grievances. This is insufficient to state a 

claim and, as the record reveals no other claim Ramey could submit against Smith, denial 

of leave to amend was also proper. See Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 

2001) (holding existence of a prison grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on a 

prisoner); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Second, 
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Ramey did not allege that Donna Mellon, assistant superintendent at the Hill Facility, had 

a personal role in any of the incidents that form the basis of his § 1983 action, and Ramey

admitted during a conference that he could not assert a cognizable claim against Mellon. 

Dismissal without leave to amend was therefore proper. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 676 (2009); Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108. Finally, Ramey’s allegation that E. Asante, a

grievance coordinator who is not a member of the medical staff, was deliberately 

indifferent for failure to respond to his grievances is not an actionable claim. See Parkell 

v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 336-37 (3d Cir. 2016). In light of the foregoing, denial of 

leave to amend this claim was also within the District Court’s discretion. 

Summary judgment was also proper because Ramey has not demonstrated any 

constitutional violation. To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must 

show “a serious medical need” and “acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate 

deliberate indifference to that need.” Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 

582 (3d Cir. 2003). Deliberate indifference occurs when the defendant has knowledge of 

the need for medical care and intentionally refuses to provide it, exposing the inmate to 

“undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury.” Monmouth Cty. Corr. 

Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotations 

omitted). Mere disagreement with a prescribed treatment is not an actionable 

constitutional violation. Id.

The record’s description of Ramey’s treatment by prison staff forecloses his claim 

of deliberate indifference, so summary judgment was appropriate. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
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56(a). At his initial evaluation soon after the accident, Ramey listed no complaints;

however, when he subsequently complained of back and neck pain, he was prescribed 

ibuprofen and analgesic balm. Ramey made at least two more sick calls in the next seven 

months, which revealed no bruising or swelling and an ability to move and bend without 

much trouble. Nonetheless, Ramey received additional medication and was advised to 

follow an exercise regime. Indeed, Ramey received medical treatment each time he 

requested it, either in connection with the injuries he alleges he suffered as a result of the 

accident or otherwise. Ramey presents no facts showing that prison staff ever denied him

medical treatment when he requested it. See Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346. To the extent he 

disagrees with the prescribed treatment, such disagreement is insufficient to state an 

actionable constitutional claim. See id. Therefore, Ramey has failed to state a claim for 

violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, and summary judgment was appropriate. Cf.

Natale, 318 F.3d at 582-83.

To the extent Ramey alleges his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by a 

corrections officer negligently closing the garage gate on a van he was a passenger in, 

such a claim fails as a matter of law. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-39

(1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976) (holding mere negligence by 

prison staff is insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment violation). Having properly 

disposed of the federal claims, the District Court was well within its discretion to dismiss 

without prejudice the remaining state law negligence claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); 

Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 

judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6