UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. JEREMY VAUGHN PINSON, Defendant - Appellant. Nos. 23-6175 & 23-6178 (D.C. Nos. 5:06-CR-00114-R-1 & 5:07-CR-00023-R-1) (W.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before HARTZ , TYMKOVICH , and ROSSMAN , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Defendant Jeremy Vaughn, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, filed for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma and was denied relief. She 1 then unsuccessfully filed for recons ideration in that court. Sh e appeals, raising two main issues: that the district c ourt (1) “insufficiently expl ained its reasoning,” and (2)

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

1 We follow the gender attributi on used by the district court. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### August 23, 2024 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 23-6175 Document: 010111099358 Date Filed: 08/23/2024 Page: 1Page 2 “abused its discretion in denying relief prior to full briefi ng.” Aplt. Br. at 3 (capitalization omitted). Exercising jurisd iction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the district court’s denial of Defendant ’s request for comp assionate release.
I. BACKGROUND Defendant was born in 1986. She has a long history of adjudications for criminal offenses dating back to age 13. At age 17 she was convicted of embezzlement and sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment with all but three years suspended. During that incarceration Defenda nt was convicted in 2006 of threatening then-President George W. Bush. While awaiting sentencing she pleaded guilty to making false statements (about an inmate planning to kill the judge who would be sentencing her) and to mailing a threatening communication (to a juror in her trial). For those three convictions Defendant wa s sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed her jury convictions an d sentence, and this court upheld them. See United States v. Pinson , 542 F.3d 822 (10th Cir. 2008). While in prison Defendant has amassed a lengthy disciplinary record of more than 90 incidents, with
two as recent as 2023. Defendant first filed a motion under § 3582 for compassi onate release in January 2020 and was denied relief because she did not exhaust her administrative remedies with the Bureau of Prisons as required by the statute. Defendant filed a second motion for compassionate release that July, claimi ng that COVID-19 put her “at an extreme risk of death” because of her underlying health conditions of “asthma, Appellate Case: 23-6175 Document: 010111099358 Date Filed: 08/23/2024 Page: 2Page 3 obesity, hormone therapy and a history of hypertension.” Supp. R., Vol. I at 32. The district court denied the motion, finding that Defendant ’s medical records did not support her health claims, ot her than obesity. Further, th e court found her underlying convictions and extensive pr ison disciplinary record we ighed against early release and that it would be “nearly impossible to conclude that Defendant is not a danger to the safety of other people or the community.” Supp. R., Vol. I at 64. This court affirmed the district court’s denial of her § 3582 motion. See United States v. Pinson , 835 Fed. App’x 390 (10th Cir. 2020). Defendant’s third attempt at compassiona te release has fare d no better. In its denial of her third motion for compassionate re lease, the district c ourt said it need not resolve the exhaustion issue because it “may only reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A) if (1) extraordinary a nd compelling reasons warrant such a reduction, (2) such a reduction is consistent with applicab le policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission, and (3) the fact ors set forth in sec tion 3553(a) to the extent they are applicable warrant a reduc ed sentence.” R. at 107 (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Hald , 8 F.4th 932, 937–38 (10th Cir. 2021). Again, Defendant’s underlying convictions and extensive ongoing disciplinary record weighed against her, as th ey indicated that “she c ontinues to have difficulty complying with the requirement s of incarceration.” R. at 107
. The court considered “each of the § 3553(a) factors and [found] th e following to be particularly relevant: the nature and circumstances of the offense[s]; Defendant’s history and Appellate Case: 23-6175 Document: 010111099358 Date Filed: 08/23/2024 Page: 3Page 4 characteristics; the ne ed to reflect the seriousness of the offense[s], to promote respect for the laws, and to provide just punishment for the offense[s]; and the need to protect the public from furt her crimes of Defendant.” Id. The court recognized that Defendant had raised some potential mitiga ting factors but found they did not support a sentence reduction. See id. Defendant’s later motion for reconsideration was denied for substantially th e same reasons. II. DISCUSSION We review for abuse of di scretion both “a district court’s order denying relief on a § 3552(c)(1)(A) motion” and a “deci sion to reconsider a prior ruling.” United States v. Hemmelgarn , 15 F.4th 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2021) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on an incorrect conclusion of law or a cl early erroneous finding of fact.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant first complains that the dist rict court insufficiently explained its reasoning and that it must “e xplain what the judge found pe rsuasive in each 3553(a) factor.” Aplt. Br. at 6. But while § 3553 “i mposes on the [sentencing] court a duty to ‘consider’ a variety of impor tant sentencing considerati ons, . . . it nowhere imposes on the court a duty to address those factors on the record.” United States v. ChavezMeza , 854 F.3d 655, 659 (10th Cir. 2017), aff’d, 585 U.S. 109 (2018) (further internal quotation marks omitted). And a court considering a sentence reduction need not do anything more in explaining its deci sion than a court imposing a defendant’s Appellate Case: 23-6175 Document: 010111099358 Date Filed: 08/23/2024 Page: 4Page 5 original sentence. See Hald , 8 F.4th at 948. The district court stated that Defendant’s serious crimes and “her l ong record of disciplinary infractions, including a recent infraction on February 23, 2023 for threat ening bodily harm to a staff member, indicates that she continues to have diffi culty complying with the requirements of incarceration.” R., Vol I at 107. It added that it had “consid ered each of the § 3553(a) factors” and acknowledged that Defendant had “identifie d some potential mitigating factors.” Id. “At bottom, the sentencing judge need only set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own le gal decisionmaking authority.” Chavez-Meza v. United
States , 585 U.S. 109, 113 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court’s explanation for its deci sion fulfilled those requirements. Defendant also complains that the cour t abused its discretion by ruling before full briefing. This argument misstates both th e record and the relevant legal standard. “[T]he inmate bears the burden to establis h that compassionate release is warranted, and the district court is not required to investigate possibl e avenues for relief or to develop the record in support of a motion.” United States v. Avalos Banderas , 39 F.4th 1059, 1062 (8th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Defenda nt chose when to submit her third motion for compassi onate release, and then th e burden was on her to support her legal arguments with evidence. Cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 47(d) (“The moving party must serve any supporting affidavit with the motion.”). The dist rict court provided her with ample opportunities to do so. The court allowed Defendant to freely Appellate Case: 23-6175 Document: 010111099358 Date Filed: 08/23/2024 Page: 5Page 6 supplement the record up until it disposed of her motion, which she did with several pages of exhibits, declarati ons, and a news article. And the court said that it had “considered all the letter s and filings submitted by De fendant in ruling on her motion.” R., Vol. I at 104 n.2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to give Defendant additional (unrequested ) opportunities to fu lfill her burden of supporting her claims with evidence. Defendant argues that she should have b een provided an evidentiary hearing to dispute her present dangerousness. But an evidentiary hearing may be appropriate only “when any factor important to the sentencing determination is reasonably in dispute .” United States v. Piper , 839 F.3d 1261, 1270 ( 10th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis adde d). And Defendant has not proffered any evidence to put the issue in dispute. Finally, Defendant appears to challenge the district court’s decision not to appoint her counsel. But “the re is no constitutional right to counsel to aid in a defendant’s request for compassionate release.” Hemmelgarn , 15 F.4th at 1032. The decision to appoint counsel is a matter of judicial discretion. See Engberg v. Wyoming , 265 F.3d 1109, 1121–22 (10th Cir. 2001)
. And as the district court explained, it did not appoint counsel he re because “Defendant’s claim is not particularly complex factually or legally, and Defendant’s filings show that she is able to adequately present her claim.” R., Vol. I at 108
. The district court did not abuse its discretion in so concluding. Appellate Case: 23-6175 Document: 010111099358 Date Filed: 08/23/2024 Page: 6Page 7 III. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Defendant’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for compassionate release.

Entered for the Court

Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge Appellate Case: 23-6175 Document: 010111099358 Date Filed: 08/23/2024 Page: 7