[Cite as State v. Qualls , 2020-Ohio-3753.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OTTAWA COUNTY

State of Ohio Court of Appeals Nos. OT-18-035 OT-18-040 Appellee Trial Court Nos. 18 CR 095 v. 18 CR 116 Corwin Qualls DECISION AND JUDGMENT Appellant Decided: July 17, 2020

* * * * * James J. VanEerten, Ottawa County Prosecuting Attorney, and Barbara Gallé Rivas, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appel lee. Lawrence A. Gold, for appellant.

* * * * * OSOWIK, J. {¶ 1} This is a consolidated and delayed appeal from a judgment of th e Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas, which found appellant guilty of o ne count each of corrupting another with drugs, illegal conveyance of drugs onto grounds of detention facility or institution, money laundering, complicity to money laundering, and two counts2. of complicity to commit illegal conveyance of drugs onto ground s of detention facility or institution, and sentenced him to a total prison term of 20 yea rs. For the reasons set forth below, this court affirms the judgment of the trial court. {¶ 2} This appeal originated from three separate indictments by Ottaw a County Grand Juries against appellant, Corwin M. Qualls, that resulted in three criminal cases for a total of 26 felony counts. In summary, in the course of appe llant furnishing illegal drugs to various people, two people overdosed, and one died. A ppellant also furnished illegal drugs to people in jail. Appellant also laundered mone y comprised of the proceeds from such illegal drug activity through the commissary account of an inmate. {¶ 3} A jury trial commenced for two of the cases representing 23 of the 26 pending felony charges. At the conclusion of the prosecution’s case, appellant changed his plea from not guilty to guilty to six felonies: (1) corrup ting another with drugs, a violation of R.C. 2925.02(A)(3), and a felony of the second deg ree, R.C. 2925.02(A)(C)(1)(a); (2) complicity to commit illegal conveyanc e of drugs onto grounds of detention facility or institution, a violation of R.C. 2923. 03(A) of the principal offense of R.C. 2921.36(A)(2), and a felony of the third degree, R.C. 2 923.03(F) and 2921.36(G)(2); (3) money laundering, a violation of R.C. 1315.5 5(A)(1), and a felony of the third degree, R.C. 1315.99(C); (4) complicity to money laun dering, a violation of R.C. 2923.03(A) of the principal offense of R.C. 1315.55(A)(1), and a felony of the third degree, R.C. 1315.99(C); (5) illegal conveyance of drugs onto g rounds of detention facility, a violation of R.C. 2921.36(C), and a felony of the t hird degree, R.C.3. 2921.36(G)(2); and (6) complicity to commit illegal conveyance of drugs onto grounds of detention facility, a violation of R.C. 2923.03(A) of the princ ipal offense of R.C. 2921.36(C), and a felony of the third degree, R.C. 2923.03(F) a nd 2921.36(G)(2). Two felony counts had been dismissed prior to the start of the tria l, and the remaining 18 felony counts, including the third case, were dismissed by appe llee in connection with the plea agreement. {¶ 4} The trial court accepted the plea changes, found appellant guil ty of the six offenses, and by a nunc pro tunc judgment entry journalized on October 3, 2018, sentenced appellant to a total prison term of 20 years. {¶ 5} Appellant then filed separate appeals for the two underlying cr iminal cases representing his six convictions. On January 9, 2019, this cou rt granted delayed appeals

and ordered the consolidation of case Nos. OT-18-035 and OT-18- 040. Appellant sets forth two assignments of error: I. Appellant receive ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel in violation of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteen th Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sec tion 10 of

the Ohio Constitution. II. The trial court erred to the prejudice of appellant in acc epting a guilty plea which was not made voluntarily, in violation of app ellant’s Due Process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Const itution.4. {¶ 6} A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must overcome the strong presumption that a properly licensed Ohio lawyer is competent. State v. Roberson , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-16-1131, 2017-Ohio-4339, ¶ 95. The record do es not show appellant questioned the licensure of his attorney, Mr. Whitcomb, so his competence is presumed. To overcome this presumption, appellant has the burden to show both deficient performance by his attorney below an objective standard of reas onable representation and a reasonable probability of prejudice that but for his attorney ’s errors, the court would not have accepted his plea changes, found him guilty of six felonie s, and not have imposed a 20-year sentence. Id. “Debatable trial tactics generally do not constitute a depriv ation of

effective counsel.” State v. Phillips , 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 85, 656 N.E.2d 643 (1995).

I. Deficient Performance {¶ 7} In support of his first assignment of error, appellant argues t hat his attorney was unprepared for trial. Appellant argues his attorney failed to meet regularly with him and failed to timely provide him with the prosecution’s “surpri se” discovery, namely jail videos containing incriminating admissions by appellant. Appel lant argues that, “Counsel acknowledged his shortcomings in this area with regard to providing ineffective

assistance and motioned the court to declare a mistrial on this basis.” {¶ 8} We reviewed the record, including the transcripts of the procee dings. {¶ 9} Prior to the start of the second day of trial, on September 26, 2018, appellant made a statement to the trial court out of the presence of the jury. Appellant stated he did

not believe he would receive a fair trial because he did not vi ew appellee’s exhibit No. 155. until the afternoon of September 24, the day before trial. Exh ibit No. 15 is a series of 10 video clips recorded at the Ottawa County Detention Facility, t he jail, between September 19 and 22, featuring appellant interacting with diffe rent inmates. He argued, “I felt like * * * I made incriminating statements that I feel like I can’t defend, because I got so many cases, I was talking about another case and they ju st going to, if you understand what I’m saying, I was talking about another case an d they going to just automatically say I’m talking about this case.” {¶ 10} Appellant anticipated an ineffective assistance of counsel clai m, stating, “Everything I told this man, he said I can write it on appeal. But that’s the thing; I got to get convicted to write it on appeal.” Appellant then listed th e deficiencies of his attorney: (1) his attorney has not pursued exculpatory evidence of a fell ow inmate who wrote a statement exonerating appellant; (2) his attorney did not pursu e with four-days’ notice before trial “a very important witness of mine,” who is in pris on; (3) his attorney has not pursued “more incriminating” evidence against some of appellees ’ witnesses; (4) his attorney failed to meet with him between June 26 and September 14, 2018; and (5) most importantly to him, his attorney did not do enough to prepare a defense to the “surprise” discovery containing his incriminating statements because the j ail videos containing his incriminating statements cannot be clearly heard. {¶ 11} We review the record for the circumstances for appellant’s last two items of deficient performance. There is no evidentiary support for the other allegations.6. {¶ 12} On the second day of trial appellee called as a witness Timothy Johnson, a convicted felon who grew up in the same neighborhood as appella nt. In exchange for his testimony, Mr. Johnson pled to a reduced sentence for his own 1 7 charges. Mr. Johnson was a fellow inmate to whom appellant furnished drugs while the y were both in the jail. Mr. Johnson testified he asked appellant about drugs, and appel lant said “Yeah, I have something with me.” Mr. Johnson informed appellant he wanted d rugs to sell to generate money for his commissary account to purchase more food. Withou t an explicit verbal exchange, appellant left opiates in a bathroom, and Mr. Johnson later went to the bathroom and discovered them. Mr. Johnson testified that appel lant told him he had “gifted” or “blessed” him with the drugs. {¶ 13} Mr. Johnson sold the drugs to two inmates, one of whom overdose d. During the jail administrator’s investigation of the overdose, appellant received new criminal charges, of which some are underlying charges to this appeal. Mr. Johnson testified feeling guilt or “pressure” from appellant, “That, to my understanding, that he basically helped me so I can get some food, but due to my negli gence, he end (sic) up with charges.” In response to that pressure, on September 19 a nd 20, Mr. Johnson received from appellant draft handwritten notes to copy in his own handwriting and to sign. This occurred more than once until appellant was satisfi ed with the signed note on September 20. {¶ 14} The content of the note was for Mr. Johnson to deny appellant w as involved with the overdose incident. Mr. Johnson knew the cont ent of the note was not7. true, but he felt pressure to do what appellant asked. “Because we both was (sic) in the same situation. * * * That’s why we were going back and forth w ith these notes and

stuff.” {¶ 15} Appellant and Mr. Johnson met in a common area of the jail, kno wn as the atrium, including at a doorway, to discuss the note. The jail locates videos of the atrium from different angles. On September 20, Mr. Johnson did not ha ve time to copy appellant’s latest version of the note, so he signed the note a s drafted by appellant and delivered it to him: “[W]e didn’t have enough time. It was a rush job. They was (sic) getting ready to take our dorm back up to where we was at.” {¶ 16} Appellant then submitted Mr. Johnson’s note, along with other e xoneration

notes he obtained from fellow inmates involved in the overdose investigation, to his attorney. These exoneration notes contradicted what the inmate s were telling investigators. Appellant’s attorney then immediately provided Mr. Johnson’s note, along with the others, as reciprocal discovery to appellee on Septemb er 20. {¶ 17} Appellee entered in the record that the receipt of the reciproc al discovery “precipitated us to look into the videos of how Qualls came int o possession of [Mr. Johnson’s] letter on 9-20.” According to appellee, “Had that l etter not been produced by Mr. Qualls, and Mr. Qualls not demanded it from Mr. Johnson, we wouldn’t have ever necessarily looked into these videos.” The next day, Friday, S eptember 21, appellee obtained the 10 video clips from the jail administrator, and by 6:00 p.m. that evening, appellee called appellant’s attorney to notify him of the produ ction of the videos.8. According to appellee, “Mr. Whitcomb was more than diligent in returning the call. And, in fact, Mr. Whitcomb and I actually met on a Sunday morning * * *, and the video was shown to Defense Counsel, at least significant portions of the video. The statements that

the State believed were made on that video were disclosed to Mr . Whitcomb.” {¶ 18} According to appellee, two of the video clips showed the note t ransactions between Mr. Johnson and appellant in the atrium and appellant’s incriminating statements, which were corroborated by Mr. Johnson’s testimony. Q: Okay. There [are] several tapes. One of the tapes, I woul d like you to kind of tell me what you believe this to mean. Corwin Q ualls says to you, “All I did was bless you. I ain’t going to bless you i f you give me mother f* * *ing 17 felonies.” What do you believe Corwin Qual ls meant in talking to you about blessing you? A: That, to my understanding, that he basically helped me so I can get some food, but due to my negligence, he end up with charges

. Q: So, by the word bless, he meant gifted you the drugs?

A: Yeah.

* * * Q: So he wasn’t asking you to tell about his involvement; he w as asking you to testify favorably for him, right?

A: Yes.9. Q: Did Qualls also tell you in that conversation at the door, did he also made the statement, “If they get me – you don’t understand , if they get me on the convey, they get me on everything”?

A: Yes. {¶ 19} When appellee and appellant’s attorney met on Sunday, September 23, appellee admitted in the record, “[T]he State on that day did n ot have the ability, due to the fact that it’s a Sunday, to produce the DVD’s.” The jail v ideos run on proprietary software and cannot be copied or viewed with just any viewer. The jail administrator provided copies to appellant’s attorney and appellee around mid day on Monday, September 24, and appellee filed with the clerk’s office a noti ce of supplemental discovery compliance at 2:05 p.m. Armed with the video clips a nd his notes of appellee’s impressions of the incriminating statements, appella nt’s attorney immediately went to the jail to meet with appellant. {¶ 20} According to appellant’s attorney, “It took about an hour and 2 0 minutes, I guess, to get through all of the videos and at the conclusion o f those videos, both myself and my client looked at each other and said, ‘Gee, I didn’t hea r very much, it was pretty muffled.’” They thought the jury would have the same difficult y hearing the audio. They finished about 4:15 p.m. on the eve of trial. {¶ 21} Upon review of the record we do not find appellant’s attorney’s performance was defective. There is an indication in the recor d that around 120 hours of preparation went into this trial. Appellant admits he met with his attorney after10. September 14, to prepare for trial. The chronology of events i n the record shows both appellee and appellant’s attorney worked diligently to obtain a nd review the jail videos triggered by appellant’s production of Mr. Johnson’s letter on September 20. What appellant alleges as a lack of preparation is not supported by the record. What is supported by the record is trial preparation and strategy. State v. Thompson , 141 Ohio St.3d 254, 2014-Ohio-4751, 23 N.E.3d 1096, ¶ 219. {¶ 22} We also find the jail videos were not the only evidence of appe llant’s incriminating statements. Mr. Johnson and the jail administrat or, who reviewed the videos and copied them for the parties, testified at trial as t o what appellant said. In addition, on the record outside of the presence of the jury, ap pellant said, “I know I was the one that said it, but I don’t remember saying those things. ” See State v. Sibert , 74 Ohio St.3d 342, 343, 658 N.E.2d 772 (1996). {¶ 23} A motion for a mistrial was offered by appellant’s attorney to remedy appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and th e trial court was well within its discretion to deny the motion because a fair trial was stil l possible. Carper v. Snodgrass , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-03-1065, 2003-Ohio-6975, ¶ 13. Abuse o f discretion “‘connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies th at the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.’” Blakemore v. Blakemore , 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983), quoting State v. Adams , 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980).11. {¶ 24} After appellant expressed his frustrations on the record, appel lant’s attorney addressed the court. Mr. Whitcomb: Your Honor, I would just indicate that if I understand Mr. Qualls’ statements to the Court this morning, he ’s dissatisfied with my service, and that he feels that he is inad equately prepared to proceed. And on his behalf then, I would ask for a mistrial. Court: All right. Well, I’m going to deny the mistrial in thi s matter. * * * I have * * * no doubt that Mr. Whitcomb has prepared to t he best of his ability, given the circumstances and perhaps the lateness o f the evidence that’s coming to him. And it’s hard for me, and even you, to k now how much of what Mr. Whitcomb is doing is just part of trial strate gy. * * * So, we’re going to move forward with the case. I appreciate you ma king your concerns of record and, certainly, that is noted. We’ll procee d. {¶ 25} We do not find appellant demonstrated his attorney’s performanc e was deficient below an objective standard of reasonable representat ion. We do not find the

trial court abused its discretion when it denied the motion for a mistrial. {¶ 26} Appellant’s first assignment of error is not well-taken. II. Prejudice {¶ 27} In support of his second assignment of error, appellant argues that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s ineffective assistance because he did not voluntarily offer to change six of his pleas to guilty. Appellant argues he “was es sentially forced to enter a12. plea after the State played [the jail videos] for the jury” bec ause “he was not aware of the

statements that would be attributed to him in the videos which were incriminating admissions to elements of the indicted charges.” Appellant arg ues that if his attorney had repeatedly viewed the jail videos to clearly hear the incrimina ting statements, appellant “would have entered into a plea agreement to a ten year ODRC se ntence that was offered pre-trial by the State of Ohio.” {¶ 28} Appellant specifically argues that he received ineffective assi stance of counsel during plea negotiations that caused him to reject a mo re attractive offer prior to trial then what he was offered during trial. We find the recor d shows appellant rejected two guilty plea offers before finally changing his plea. A. First Rejected Plea Offer {¶ 29} According to the record, the first plea offer rejected by appel lant was on September 19. During plea negotiations appellant is “‘entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.’” State v. Williams , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-12-1238, 2015-Ohio405, ¶ 119, quoting Lafler v. Cooper , 566 U.S. 156, 162, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012). The Ohio Supreme Court recognizes “that trial coun sel may be ineffective if they fail to communicate the terms of a plea offer to a defenda nt.” State v. McKelton , 148 Ohio St.3d 261, 2016-Ohio-5735, 70 N.E.3d 508, ¶ 302, citin g Missouri v. Frye , 566 U.S. 134, 145, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012). The Ohi o Supreme Court further recognizes that prejudice may arise under Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668,13. 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), if the attorney’s defici ent performance caused the defendant to reject a plea deal with a more favorable result. Id. , citing Lafler at 164. {¶ 30} To succeed on a claim of prejudice where a plea offer has lapse d or been rejected because of the attorney’s deficient performance, appel lant must demonstrate: (1) a reasonable probability he would have accepted the first p lea offer had he received effective assistance from his attorney; (2) a reasonable probab ility he would have entered the first plea without appellee canceling it or the trial court refusing to accept it, if they had the authority to exercise that discretion under state law; and (3) a reasonable probability that the first plea was a more favorable result by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence of less prison time than the end result of the criminal process. Frye at 147. We find that appellant fails to demonstrate the first element. {¶ 31} The record shows appellant received his Frye hearing on September 19. In exchange for appellant’s guilty pleas to two out of the 23 felo nies to be tried starting September 25, appellee offered to recommend to the trial court a total sentence of 10 years. Appellee clearly stated in the record that if appellant rejected the offer that day, the offer was withdrawn, no further offers would be made, and t he matter will proceed to trial. The trial court engaged in extensive questioning to asc ertain that appellant’s decision to reject the plea was done voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly. Court: The plea offer, do you understand today by rejecting th at, that the State of Ohio is going to withdraw any plea offers?

A: I understand.14. Court: And it is your intention today to reject any plea offer being made by the State of Ohio? A: Yes, sir. Court: Are you doing that freely and voluntarily? A: Yes, sir. Court: Are you -- with a full understanding of the possible consequences? A: Yes, sir. Court: Do you have any questions of your attorney at this time ? A: No, sir. Court: Has he adequately and fully explained all of these opti ons and possibilities to you? A: Yes, sir. Court: Any other questions? A: No, sir. {¶ 32} The next day, on September 20, by obtaining Mr. Johnson’s note, appellant triggered the sequence of events regarding the jail videos that recorded his incriminating statements. Mr. Johnson and the jail administrator were alread y on disclosed witness lists. We do not find that appellant was prejudiced on Septemb er 19 by his attorney’s alleged failure to repeatedly review the jail videos because th e jail videos did not exist until September 21. We do not find appellant demonstrates a re asonable probability he15. would have accepted the first plea offer during the Frye hearing because he very clearly rejected that offer while stating his satisfaction with his att orney’s advice. B. Seconded Rejected Plea Offer {¶ 33} According to the record, the second plea offer rejected by appe llant was on September 27, the third day of trial: 25 years in exchange for six felony guilty pleas. {¶ 34} The jail videos were played that day for the jury using the cou rtroom’s equipment. By agreement of the parties, the court reporter did not transcribe the videos into the record. Out of the presence of the jury, appellant’s attorney reiterated his objection raised on the first day of trial, that the muffled vi deos were not to be enhanced in any way to improve “the discernability of what was being sai d.” However, he argued what was played for the jury “was much clearer * * * and I, tod ay, heard something that I did not hear on Monday afternoon.” He further argued, “My clie nt feels that based on the fact that we didn’t have a discernable copy or we couldn’t hear it on the machine [in the jail] that he feels that there is somewhat of a prejudice.” Ap pellant then directly addressed the trial court and blamed his attorney for not liste ning to the videos enough times until appellant’s incriminating statements were clear, ev en though he heard the majority of those statements: “Most of them, I would say about 25 percent I didn’t see or hear that I heard today, or I wouldn’t be here.” {¶ 35} Appellee responded that appellant knew of the existence of ever y incriminating statement because “he is the one who spoke those words. * * * He is in the best position out of anybody to be on notice about what came ou t of his own mouth. We16. are not talking about months ago. We are literally talking les s than a week ago those statements were made.” We agree with the trial court, as the a uthenticity of appellant’s voice on the recording is undisputed. State v. Phillips , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-12-1111, 2013-Ohio-4525, ¶ 17. {¶ 36} After a recess to allow appellant, his attorney, and appellee t ime to discuss a second plea offer, appellant rejected it, stating, “I could n ever take 25 years.” Appellant stated that because his attorney failed to listen to the videos multiple times “for some of the incriminating statements I probably said,” he was n ow unfairly facing 25 years in prison. According to appellant, he did “nothing” to w arrant a 25-year sentence: “If he would have did (sic) his job, like you say he did, he wo uld have seen what was on the tape, made sure what was on the tape, so I could take the p lea bargain. Now that he didn’t see it and I didn’t see it, now I am forced – I am in th is predicament I am in now.”

The trial continued. {¶ 37} We do not find that appellant was prejudiced on September 27 by his attorney’s alleged failure to review the jail videos multiple t imes because the jail videos were not the sole evidence of appellant’s incriminating stateme nts. We do not find appellant demonstrates a reasonable probability he would have a ccepted the second plea offer because he very clearly rejected that offer while stating he did “nothing” to induce him to accept a 25-year sentence.17. C. Change of Pleas {¶ 38} According to the record, the third plea offer presented to appe llant was also on September 27, but after appellee rested its case. The trial court advised appellant, “Your defense hasn’t started, Mr. Qualls. So sleep on this, ta lk to Mr. Whitcomb if you need to tonight, and we will talk tomorrow again. You will hav e an opportunity to talk before we start.” Through additional negotiations that night b y his attorney with appellee, the new plea offer was 20 years in exchange for six g uilty plea felonies, where the combined potential prison sentence was 60.5 years. The nex t morning, on September 28, appellant requested to change his pleas to six fe lonies: “[W]hat induced me to take them was when we said the possibilities [for judicia l release]. This is what

induced me to take it.” {¶ 39} We review a trial court’s allowance of a change of plea for an abuse of discretion, “although such discretion should be liberally exerc ised in favor of the

accused.” Crider v. Maxwell , 174 Ohio St. 190, 191, 187 N.E.2d 875 (1963). Trial courts have discretion in determining whether to accept a chang e of plea pursuant to R.C. 2943.03 and Crim.R. 11(C)(2). State v. Jenkins , 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 222, 473 N.E.2d 264 (1984). R.C. 2943.03 does not apply in this case because the p lea change occurred after the trial began. {¶ 40} A defendant entering a plea in a criminal case must do so knowi ngly, intelligently and voluntarily, and the failure of any one “‘ren ders enforcement of the plea

unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.’”18. State v. Barker , 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 2011-Ohio-4130, 953 N.E.2d 826, ¶ 9, quot ing State v. Engle , 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). “Crim.R. 11 w as adopted in 1973 to give detailed instructions to trial courts on the proce dures to follow before accepting pleas of guilty or no contest.” Id. “Crim.R. 11(C) requires a trial judge to determine whether that criminal defendant is fully informed of his or her rights and understands the consequences of his or her guilty plea.” Id. at ¶ 10. {¶ 41} We find it significant that after the prosecution submitted its case to the jury, then appellant began to have serious concerns about being convicted for up to 60.5

years. See Jenkins at 223. Whether appellant argues that he would have accepted the first or second plea offers before finally accepting the third offer and changing his pleas to guilty, we find those are appellant’s decisions to make, and the trial court was not required to accept any of appellant’s plea decisions. Crim.R. 11(C)(2). {¶ 42} When appellant sought to change his pleas to guilty on six felo nies, the trial court engaged in a lengthy colloquy, including the following qu estions: Court: I am going to follow the recommendation [for 20 years]. Do you understand that? A: Not quite. You said: Was I promised anything? I wasn’t promised a real promise, but what induced me to take the plea b argain is basically the possibility, a possibility was part of the plea b argain, a possibility of Judicial Release. It wasn’t no promise (sic).19. Court: Right. A: There was a good possibility that if I do –

Mr. Whitcomb: -- There was off-the-record sort of discussions that we had that if he did, you know, cooperate and so forth, that t here would be a consideration given in the future, but no promises. Nobody h as made any promises. He is facing the 20 years. That is what was promise d, if you will, as what the recommendation to the Court would be. Court: Do you agree, Mr. Qualls? A: That is what induced me to take the plea bargain, sir. Court: That is fine. Good. Have you had enough time to think about your decision? I know this offer was just made this morn ing. You [had] an offer that you were contemplating last night and that offer changed significantly in your favor in the last 18 hours or so. Have y ou had enough

time to think about it? A: I am satisfied with the time. I really didn’t, but I am sa ying that I am cool with it right now. Court: Have you had enough time to ask Mr. Whitcomb questions about that? Has he answered all of your questions? A: I will say that to the best of his ability, I believe. Court: Now I am going to ask you if you are satisfied with the advice and counsel of Mr. Whitcomb and I know that you and Mr.20. Whitcomb have had some differences about how this has been trie d over the course of the last four days, but as you sit here now, are you satisfied with his representation of you in this matter? A: * * * I would be lying if I said yeah. Court: Given your circumstances today, do you think he is givi ng you good advice on the plea?

A: Yes. {¶ 43} The trial court then reviewed the plea agreement in detail with the appellant, confirmed appellant’s understanding of each plea, th e sentencing recommendation for each plea, each right he was waiving, and hi s signature to the plea agreement. Court: Did you enter into that agreement voluntarily and of yo ur own free will? A: Yes, sir. {¶ 44} We find that appellant’s guilty pleas were “not the result of c oercion, trickery, deception or intimidation and that [they were] ‘volun tarily, intelligently and knowing made with a complete understanding of the consequences. ’” (Citations omitted.) State v. Piacella , 27 Ohio St.2d 92, 93, 271 N.E.2d 852 (1971). We find appellant made his guilty pleas intelligently, despite his late r regret of rejecting the first plea offer due to his miscalculation of the quality of appellee ’s case. Id. at 94. We find appellant repeatedly confirmed he received no promise to induce him to change his pleas21. to guilty other than the recommendation to limit his prison tim e to 20 years and his belief of the potential for judicial release in the future. Id. at 95. If trial had proceeded, appellant was motivated to avoid felony convictions that totale d 60.5 years in prison. Id. at syllabus. Although appellant expressed frustration with his attorney, he ultimately agreed that under the circumstances, his attorney was giving hi m good advice on the plea changes. {¶ 45} We find that the record confirms the trial court engaged in a f ull plea colloquy with appellant in compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2). T he trial court did not abuse its discretion when it accepted appellant’s plea changes, and the trial court’s attitude was not unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. {¶ 46} Appellant’s second assignment of error is not well-taken. {¶ 47} On consideration whereof, we find that substantial justice has been done in this matter. The judgment of the Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant t o App.R. 24.

Judgment affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pur suant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.22. State v. Qualls C.A. Nos. OT-18-035 OT-18-040

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. ________________________

_______ JUDGE Thomas J. Osowik, J.

_______________________________ Gene A. Zmuda, P.J. JUDGE CONCUR.

_______________________________ JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Cour t of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing th e final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.