NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

PHILIP E. HAHN, : 

 : Civil Action No.: 11-1874 (ES) 

 Plaintiff, : 

 : OPINION

 : 

THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al., : 

 : 

 : 

 Defendants. : 

 : 

SALAS, District Judge

I. Introduction 

 

 Before the Court are eleven motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Also pending before the Court are four 

motions for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court 

has considered the parties’ submissions in support of and in opposition to the instant motions, 

and decides the matters without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b). 

For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted with prejudice; 

however, Defendants’ motions for the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions are denied. 

II. Jurisdiction 

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343(a)(3), 

as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

III. Background

Plaintiff has filed a litany of state court actions, the majority—if not all—of which have 

been dismissed with prejudice. Based upon those dismissals, Plaintiff now seeks relief from the 

federal courts. Plaintiff claims that the Defendants have violated his “individual and 

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associational rights under the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment [sic] to the 

United States Constitution,” and seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986. (Am. 

Compl. at 3, ¶ 1).1 While Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is essentially devoid of factual 

allegations, the crux of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint can be summarized as follows: “I have 

demanded a jury trial . . . . As a result the court does not have jurisdiction to dismiss the action. 

That is it. Game over. I get a jury trial. I will not agree to anything else.” (Docket Entry No. 58 

at 1). 

 This general allegation has led to the present action, wherein Plaintiff seeks redress from, 

among others,2 attorneys who filed—and argued—motions seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s state 

court complaints; the trial court judges who—upon reviewing the motions and hearing 

argument—dismissed Plaintiff’s complaints; the appellate division judges who affirmed the trial 

court judges’ decisions dismissing Plaintiff’s claims; and the Supreme Court justices who 

subsequently denied Plaintiff’s petitions for certification. 

IV. Legal Standards 

 A. Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the existence of a federal 

court’s subject matter jurisdiction. “When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged under Rule 

 

1

 To remedy the duplicated paragraph numbering in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, the Court will reference the 

page number and specific paragraph it is citing to. 

2

 Plaintiff also seeks relief from additional parties, some of whom he previously sued in state court. These 

additional parties include: Bergen Regional Medical Center (“BRMC”); University of Medicine and Dentistry of 

New Jersey (“UMDNJ”); Marco Zarbin, M.D. (“Dr. Zarbin”); Marianne Antoniello, M.D. (“Dr. Antoniello”); 

Abraham Berkowitz, M.D., (“Dr. Berkowitz”); Magdy Yacoub, M.D. (“Dr. Yacoub”); Bristol-Myers Squibb 

Company (“BMS”); Otsuka America Pharmaceutical, Inc. (“OAPI”); Stuart Noorily, M.D. (“Dr. Noorily”); and the 

Retina Associates of New Jersey, P.A. (“Retina Associates”). However, because Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint 

lacks a central theme tying these parties together, the Court addresses the specific allegations relating to each 

Defendant in its analysis section. 

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12(b)(1), the plaintiff must bear the burden of persuasion.” Symczyk v. Genesis HealthCare 

Corp., 656 F.3d 189, 191 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011). In considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, “the district 

court may not presume the truthfulness of plaintiff's allegations, but rather must evaluat[e] for 

itself the merits of [the] jurisdictional claims.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d 

Cir. 2005) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 

 B. Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to set forth “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that a pleader is entitled to relief.” The pleading standard 

announced by Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations; it does, however, demand 

“more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal citation omitted). In addition, the plaintiff’s short and 

plain statement of the claim must “give the defendants fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 

grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). 

 For a complaint to survive dismissal, it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim has facial plausibility when “the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Ibid. (internal citation omitted). 

 In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must accept all well-pleaded factual 

allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

non-moving party. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008). But, 

“the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is 

inapplicable to legal conclusions,” and “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or a 

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‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Furthermore, “[when] deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a 

court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached [thereto], matters of the public record, 

as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these 

documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2011). 

 “[I]f a complaint is subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a 

curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips, 515 

F.3d at 245; see also Ray v. First Nat’l Bank of Omaha, 413 F. App’x 427, 430 (3d Cir. 2011) 

(“A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without allowing the plaintiff an 

opportunity to amend his complaint unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile.”). 

Furthermore, in ruling on the present motion, the Court “must construe [Plaintiff’s] complaint 

liberally as he is proceeding pro se.” Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 32 (3d Cir. 

2011) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). 

V. Analysis3

 

3

 The Court makes three preliminary determinations. First, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to support a claim 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Although Hahn failed to specify under which part of § 1985 he seeks relief, it is clear that 

the applicable section is 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). To state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege “‘(1) a 

conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving . . . any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or 

of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; [] (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) whereby a 

person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United 

States.’” Slater v. Susquehanna Cnty., No. 11-1726, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 406, at *8 (3d Cir. Jan. 9, 2012) 

(quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1983)). “As the linchpin for 

conspiracy is agreement, . . . concerted action, without more, cannot suffice to state a conspiracy claim.” Watson v. 

Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 436 F. App’x 131, at *16 (3d Cir. 2011). Further, the “second component of the test 

requires the plaintiff to allege that the conspiracy was motivated by racial, gender, or other class-based 

discriminatory animus.” Slater, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 406, at *8 (citing Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 

135 (3d Cir. 2006)). In this case, Plaintiff neither pleads that the Defendants engaged in a conspiracy, nor does 

Plaintiff allege that the purported conspiracy was motivated by race, gender, or some other class-based 

discriminatory animus. See ibid. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 that is 

plausible on its face. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Second, because Plaintiff has failed to allege a conspiracy under 

§ 1985, he has failed to state a viable cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1986. See Koorn v. Lacey Twp., 78 F. 

App’x 199, 208 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Koorns do not have a cognizable § 1985(3) claim. Thus the Koorns’ claim 

that Township officials failed to halt a conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986 must also fail.”). Finally, 

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 A. Plaintiff’s Claimed Right to a Jury Trial Under the Seventh Amendment, 

 New Jersey Constitution, and New Jersey Rules of Court 

Plaintiff maintains that he had a legal right to a trial by jury in his state court proceedings 

as guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, Article 1 Paragraph 

9 of the New Jersey Constitution, and New Jersey Rules of Court because he has requested and 

paid for a jury trial. (See generally Am. Compl.). 

 Plaintiff’s argument is misplaced. First, it is well-settled that “the first ten Amendments 

[to the United States Constitution], including of course the Seventh, are not concerned with state 

action and deal only with Federal action.” Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, Adm’r 

of Nanos, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916) (emphasis added). In other words, “the Seventh Amendment

applies only to proceedings in courts of the United States and does not in any manner whatever 

govern or regulate trials by jury in state courts . . . .” (Ibid.) (internal citations omitted). In this 

case, Plaintiff claims that the New Jersey state court judges “did deny the plaintiff his right to a 

trial by jury as guaranteed by the [Seventh] Amendment to the United States Constitution.” 

(Am. Compl. at 25, ¶ 1). To that end, Plaintiff’s Seventh Amendment argument is misguided 

because the Seventh Amendment applies only to proceedings in courts of the United States and 

not state courts. 

 Second, this Court summarily rejects Plaintiff’s argument that he has a right to a trial by 

jury under the New Jersey Constitution and New Jersey Rules of Court. Plaintiff presented this 

exact argument during his New Jersey State Court proceedings, to which the Appellate Division 

held: 

 

Plaintiff’s contention that he has a six-year statute of limitations for the claim he seeks relief under is misplaced. 

Under New Jersey law, a personal injury claim must be brought within two years of the date of accrual. N.J.S.A. § 

2A:14-2; see Blow v. Paterson Police Dep’t, No. 11-2128, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13385, at *13 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 

2012) (“In the state of New Jersey, there is a two year statute of limitations on personal injury actions, N.J.S.A. 

2A:14-2, and thus a two-year statute of limitations on Section 1983 actions.”). 

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The gist of plaintiff’s argument on appeal, articulated in particular 

at oral argument, is that he requested and paid for a jury trial, a 

constitutional right, which trumped the firm defendants’ rights to 

make a motion to dismiss his complaint and the judicial 

defendants’ right to dismiss his case prior to an adjudication on the 

merits by a jury. Plaintiff’s position is not founded in law. As our 

Supreme Court has recognized, “in civil matters the constitutional 

right to a jury trial is not absolute. . . . Even when requested, the 

failure to present evidence warranting submission of a factual issue 

to the jury is the functional equivalent of a waiver of the right to 

have a jury decide the case.” Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 

Am., 142 N.J. 520, 537 (1995). Specifically, in the context of a 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the law is clear that 

“a court must dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint if it has failed to 

articulate a legal basis entitling the plaintiff to relief.” (citing 

cases). 

Hahn v. Frascella, No. A-0070-10T3, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS, at *4, 5 (App. Div. June 

3, 2011); see also Hahn v. Bergen Reg’l Med. Ctr., Nos. A-2869-09T1, A-6282-09T1, A-1924-

10T4, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1626, at *16, 17 (App. Div. June 23, 2011). This Court 

declines Plaintiff’s invitation to entertain this argument. To do so would be equivalent to an 

appellate review of the state courts’ decisions. 

B. The State of New Jersey 

Plaintiff claims that “the state of New Jersey den[ied] . . . his civil rights via the 

maladministration of the events of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.” (Am. Compl. at 8, ¶ 1). 

 The Court need not dwell on this issue because the law is clear: “[t]he Eleventh 

Amendment of the United States Constitution protects a state or state agency from a suit brought 

in federal court by one of its citizens regardless of the relief sought, unless Congress specifically 

abrogates the state’s immunity or the state waives its own immunity.” Thorpe v. New Jersey, 

246 F. App’x 86, 87 (3d Cir. 2010); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). Congress has 

not abrogated the state’s sovereign immunity with respect to § 1983. See ibid. (“Section 1983 

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does not abrogate states’ immunity.”). “And New Jersey has neither consented to suit nor has it 

waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Ibid. Accordingly, the State of New Jersey will be 

dismissed from this litigation. 

C. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, the Superior Court of New Jersey 

Appellate Division, the Superior Court of New Jersey—Essex, Bergen, and 

Hudson Vicinages 

 The Court next determines whether Plaintiff may seek relief from the judicial branch. 

This Court—like many other courts—finds the judicial branch to be an integral part of the State 

of New Jersey, and thus concludes that regardless of the form of relief Plaintiff seeks, Plaintiff’s 

claims against these entities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment of the United States 

Constitution. See, e.g., Dongon v. Banar, 363 F. App’x 153, at 156 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he state 

courts . . . are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because they are part of the judicial 

branch of the State of New Jersey, and therefore considered arms of the state.”); Onyiuke v. New 

Jersey Supreme Court, 435 F. Supp. 2d 394, 401 (D.N.J. 2006) (“the New Jersey Supreme Court 

is, therefore, entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Hunter v. Supreme Court of New 

Jersey, 951 F. Supp. 1161, 1177 (D.N.J. 1996), aff’d, 118 F.3d 1575 (3d Cir. 1997) (“the 

Supreme Court of New Jersey . . . enjoy[s] Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Johnson v. State 

of New Jersey, 869 F. Supp. 289, 296-98 (D.N.J. 1994) (“the New Jersey Superior Court is an 

‘arm’ of the state entitled to share in the state’s sovereign immunity. Therefore, this Court holds 

that plaintiff’s claim . . . against the New Jersey Superior Court is barred by the Eleventh 

Amendment.”); El-Hewie v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, No. 10-5153, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

53880, at *4 (D.N.J. May 19, 2011) (“The claims against the Supreme Court of New Jersey and 

the New Jersey Appellate Division are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); Haddad v. 

Flynn, No. 07-5617, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *16, 17 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2008) (“The Superior 

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Court of New Jersey and its vicinages are part of the judicial branch of the State of New Jersey, 

and are thus protected by the Eleventh Amendment.”); Kwasnik v. Leblon, No. 03-3881, 2006 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2333, at *10 (D.N.J. Jan. 23, 2006) (“The New Jersey Supreme Court, as part 

of the judicial branch of the New Jersey State government, is an integral part of the State of New 

Jersey for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment and is entitled to share in the State’s sovereign 

immunity. New Jersey has not waived its sovereign immunity with regard to suits brought in 

federal courts against its courts”); Hawkins v. Supreme Court of N.J., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

37564, at *25 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2005), aff’d, 174 F. App’x 683 (3d Cir. 2006) (“In this case, 

sovereign immunity unquestionably extends to . . . the New Jersey Supreme Court . . . , 

regardless of the type of relief requested.”).4

In light of this precedent, the Court holds that the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the 

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division, and the Superior Court of New Jersey—

Vicinages of Essex, Bergen, and Hudson—are immune from suit under the Eleventh 

Amendment. Accordingly, they will be dismissed from this litigation.5 

D. The Supreme Court Justices, Judges of the Appellate Division, and Judges of 

the Superior Court6

 

4

 There are two notable exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity: “(1) a state can consent to be sued and (2) 

Congress can abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity.” Hawkins, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37564, at *25 n.10. There 

is no indication that either exception is applicable here. 

5

 The Court notes that claims brought under §1983 do not override a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. 

Quern, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979). The Court further notes that Plaintiff’s claim that he was denied equal protection 

when only two judges, rather than three, presided over his appellate proceedings lacks merit. See Rule 2:13-2(b) 

(“Appeals shall be decided by panels of 2 judges . . . except when the presiding judge determines that an appeal 

should be decided by a panel of 3 judges.”) (emphasis added). 

6

 The Supreme Court Justices being sued by Plaintiff are the Hon. Stuart Rabner, Chief Justice; Hon. Victoria Long, 

Associate Justice; Hon. Jaynee LaVecchia, Associate Justice; Hon. Barry T. Albin, Associate Justice; Hon. John E. 

Wallace, Jr., Associate Justice; Hon. Roberto Rivera-Soto, Associate Justice; and the Hon. Helen E. Hoens, 

Associate Justice. The Appellate Division Judges that Plaintiff seeks relief from include the Hon. Joseph Lisa, 

P.J.A.D.; Hon. Steven Skillman, J.A.D.; Hon. Ronald B. Graves, J.A.D.; and the Hon. William P. Gilroy, J.A.D. 

Finally, the Superior Court Judges from whom Plaintiff seeks relief are the Hon. Paul J. Vichness, J.S.C.; Hon. 

Estella De la Cruz, J.S.C.; Hon. Mark Baber, J.S.C.; Hon. Bruno Mongiardo, J.S.C.; Hon. Carmen Alvarez, J.S.C.; 

and the Hon. Susan Reisner, J.S.C. 

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Plaintiff seeks redress from the trial court judges who dismissed his state court claims, 

the appellate judges who affirmed the trial courts’ dismissals, and the New Jersey Supreme Court 

justices who denied Plaintiff’s petitions for certification. According to Plaintiff, “the court[s] 

were not at liberty to dismiss the plaintiff’s actions . . . [s]ince the plaintiff properly demanded a 

jury.” (Docket Entry No. 57 at 3, 5). Plaintiff’s arguments are unavailing. 

 It is well established that “[a] judicial officer in the performance of his [or her] duties has 

absolute immunity from suit and will not be liable for his [or her] judicial acts.” Azubujo v. 

Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991)). “A 

judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he [or she] took was in error, was 

done maliciously, or was in excess of his [or her] authority; rather, he [or she] will be subject to 

liability only when he [or she] has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Kwasnik v. 

Leblon, 228 F. App’x 238, at *11, 12 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 

356-57 (1978)) (internal citation omitted). There are only two exceptions to the doctrine of 

judicial immunity. The first exception is where a judge engages in nonjudicial acts, i.e., actions 

not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity. Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d 

Cir. 2000). The second exception involves actions that, though judicial in nature, are taken in the 

complete absence of all jurisdiction. Ibid. 

 The Court holds that Plaintiff’s claims against the Supreme Court justices, the judges of 

the Appellate Division, and the judges of the Superior Court are barred by the doctrine of 

absolute judicial immunity. In this case, Plaintiff has not set forth any facts that would suggest 

that the judicial Defendants engaged in nonjudicial acts, nor has Plaintiff alleged facts 

demonstrating that the judges’ actions were taken in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Indeed, 

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the judicial defendants here decided pending motions, dismissed baseless claims, denied appeals, 

and denied Plaintiff’s petitions for certification. These acts were judicial in nature, and 

notwithstanding Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary, were exercised within the judges’ 

respective jurisdictions. See Kwasnik, 228 F. App’x 238 at *13 (“The Ju[dges] of the New 

Jersey Superior Court and [Justices] of the [New Jersey] Supreme Court . . . acted within their 

respective jurisdictions in denying Kwasnik’s appeal and his petition for certification.”); 

Melleady v. Blake, No. 11-1807, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144834, at *23, 49 (D.N.J. Dec. 15, 

2011) (judge was entitled to absolute judicial immunity for issuing a ruling while presiding over 

a judicial proceeding ); Gage v. Warren Twp. Comm. and Planning Bd. Members, No. 11-1501, 

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137134, at *25 (D.N.J. Nov. 29, 2011) (judge was entitled to absolute 

judicial immunity for issuing various orders in connection with matters pending before the 

court). Thus, it is without question that the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity is applicable 

here. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against the judicial Defendants are barred, and therefore 

dismissed. 

E. BRMC 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contains two allegations against BRMC. In paragraph 

32, Plaintiff alleges that BRMC became “liable via a Title 42 U.S.C. 1983 action when the 

plaintiff had his retinal detachment aggravated when the defendant’s employees . . . force[d] 

aspirin and multi vitamins on the plaintiff . . . in violation of N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.11d.” (Am. 

Compl. at 19, ¶ 32). Similarly, in Paragraph 33, Plaintiff alleges that BRMC is liable under 

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§ 1983 because its employees gave Plaintiff a CAT scan after he ingested Abilify. (Id. at 19, ¶ 

33).7

 

 The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege a viable cause of action under § 1983 for 

the following four reasons. First, the Court finds that the doctrine of res judicata bars Plaintiff’s 

claims against BRMC. “The doctrine of res judicata applies to federal civil actions brought 

under § 1983, and, in this context, we must afford ‘a state-court judgment the same preclusive 

effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was 

rendered.’” Cycle Chem., Inc. v. Jackson, No. 09-1320, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 3109, at *11 (3d 

Cir. Feb. 14, 2012) (quoting Jones v. Holvey, 29 F.3d 828, 829-30 (3d Cir. 1994)). Res judicata

bars the relitigation of “matters actually determined in an earlier action, [and] to all relevant 

matters that could have been so determined.” Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 124 

N.J. 398, 412 (N.J. 1991). “‘If, under various theories, a litigant seeks to remedy a single wrong, 

then that litigant should present all theories in the first action. Otherwise, theories not raised will 

be precluded in a later action.”’ Cycle Chem., Inc., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 3109, at *12 (quoting 

Watkins, 124 N.J. at 412). “Under New Jersey law, res judicata applies when (1) the judgment 

in the first action is valid, final and on the merits; (2) there is identity of the parties, or the parties 

in the second action are in privity with those in the first action; and (3) the claim in the later 

 

7

 BRMC contends that Plaintiff has filed no less than six state court lawsuits against BRMC—all of which have been 

dismissed with prejudice—stemming from his 2005, 2007, and 2008 involuntary commitments to BRMC. (See 

BRMC Moving Br. at 1). BRMC explains that “[t]he commitments and subsequent litigation follow a pattern; 

plaintiff, a diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic, is voluntarily admitted to BRMC after either threatening his elder 

parents . . . ; hurting himself; or making bizarre statements to the police.” (Ibid.). “Once . . . admitted, plaintiff is 

treated with . . . medication, improves dramatically, and is discharged . . . .” (Ibid.). Defendant argues that 

dismissal is warranted because Plaintiff’s “federal lawsuit is little more than a thinly veiled attempt to collaterally 

attack the various state-court rulings.” (Ibid.). 

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action grows out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim in the first action.” Ibid. 

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 

The Court concludes that each element has been satisfied. First, the judgments in the 

prior actions were valid, final, and on the merits. See, e.g., Hahn, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. 

LEXIS 1626. Second, identity of the parties exists because both Hahn and BRMC were involved 

in the prior litigations. Finally, there can be no question that Plaintiff’s federal lawsuit, i.e., the 

later action, grows out of the same occurrence that led to the Plaintiff’s earlier litigations—

Plaintiff’s commitment and subsequent treatment while at BRMC. (See Complaint, No. BER-L1852-07, attached as Exhibit B to Goffinet Cert.) (Demonstrating that Plaintiff’s claims against 

BRMC arose out of Plaintiff’s commitment and treatment at BRMC from April 15, 2005 to May 

5, 2005); (Complaint, No. HUD-L-6118-08, attached as Exhibit E to Goffinet Cert.) 

(Demonstrating that Plaintiff’s claims against BRMC arose out of his commitment and treatment 

while at BRMC on February 21, 2007); (Complaint, No. BER-L-3935-09, attached as Exhibit K 

to Goffinet Cert.) (Demonstrating that Plaintiff’s claims against BRMC arose out of his 

commitment and treatment while at BRMC from March 7, 2008 through March 18, 2008).

Plaintiff attempts to utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a pretextual basis for this Court’s 

jurisdiction. This Court is not persuaded. Plaintiff is asking this Court to relitigate and decide 

matters in contravention of firmly ingrained res judicata principles. Plaintiff has been afforded 

his day in court, during which he presented and argued his claims before a court of competent 

jurisdiction. To that end, this Court declines to relitigate matters growing out of the same 

transaction that formed the basis of Plaintiff’s earlier state court litigations. 

 Second, the law is clear: “section 1983 . . . solely supports causes of action based upon 

violations . . . of federal statutory law or constitutional rights.” Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 

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1097, 1113 (3d Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original); Bates v. Paul Kimball Hosp., 346 F. App’x 

883, 887 (3d Cir. 2009) (“In a typical § 1983 action, a court must initially determine whether the 

plaintiff has even alleged a deprivation of a right that either federal law or the Constitution 

protects.”). Thus, “[s]ection 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state 

statutes, and, . . . a state statute cannot, in and of itself, create a constitutional right.” Brown, 922 

F.2d at 1113 (internal citation omitted). Plaintiff seeks to utilize § 1983 for alleged violations of 

state statutes, namely, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.11d. (emphasis added). For that reason, Plaintiff’s 

claim must fail. 

 Third, courts do not recognize § 1983 liability on a theory of respondeat superior; rather, 

a plaintiff is required to allege that the defendant, through defendant’s own actions, violated the 

Constitution. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948; see also Jordan v. Cicchi, 428 F. App’x 195, 198 (3d 

Cir. 2011). Plaintiff’s theory of liability against BRMC is linked to alleged unlawful conduct by 

its employees. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim fails because it is predicated upon the theory of 

respondeat superior. 

 Finally, Plaintiff also has failed to state a valid claim under § 1983 because he has failed 

to allege that BRMC was acting under color of state law. Bates, 346 F. App’x 883, 887 (3d Cir. 

2009) (“To state a valid claim under § 1983 against the Medical Facilities, [plaintiff] must show 

not only that they violated his federal rights but that they did so while acting under color of state 

law.”) (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s failure to allege this necessary component of the § 1983 

analysis warrants dismissal. See ibid. (holding that “[t]he allegations in [plaintiff’s] amended 

complaint are wholly insufficient to carry his burden of demonstrating that the Medical Facilities 

acted under color of state law . . . and the District Court should have granted the Medical 

Facilities’ motion on that basis.”). 

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For the reasons articulated above, Plaintiff does not have a cognizable claim under 

§ 1983. Furthermore, because any amendment would be futile, the Court dismisses with 

prejudice Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint as it relates to BRMC. 

F. UMDNJ, Dr. Antoniello, Dr. Berkowitz, Dr. Yacoub, and Dr. Zarbin 

Plaintiff seeks relief from Defendants in connection with his June 1, 2005 cataract 

surgery. Plaintiff alleges: (1) that as a result of UMDNJ’s “maladministration . . . [he] was 

assaulted by the defendant’s (UMDNJ) employees via the performance of . . . cataract surgery on 

June 1, 2005”; (2) “plaintiff was assaulted by . . . doctor Marco Zarbin via the performance 

of . . . cataract surgery on June 1, 2005”; and (3) the Plaintiff was “recklessly assaulted” by Dr. 

Yacoub, Dr. Antoniello, and Dr. Berkowitz when he was “made to walk his bag of anesthesia to 

the operating room on June 1, 2005.” (Am. Compl. at 20, ¶¶ 38-44). In response, the 

Defendants contend that “plaintiff’s Complaint is meritless and should be dismissed with 

prejudice.” (UMDNJ Moving Br. at 2). This Court agrees. 

As a preliminary matter, it appears that Plaintiff’s basis for relief against UMDNJ is 

grounded in a theory of respondeat superior. (See Am. Compl. at 20, ¶ 38) (as a result of 

UMDNJ’s “maladministration . . . plaintiff was assaulted by the defendant’s (UMDNJ) 

employees via the performance of . . . cataract surgery on June 1, 2005.”). However, Plaintiff 

may not seek relief from UMDNJ on that basis because, as set forth above, a “defendant in a 

civil rights action must have a personal involvement in the alleged wrong; liability cannot be 

predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. 

Notwithstanding that pleading defect, Plaintiff’s claims against UMDNJ, Dr. Antoniello, 

Dr. Berkowitz, Dr. Yacoub, and Dr. Zarbin are also barred by the applicable statute of 

limitations. The law is clear: the statute of limitations for actions sounding in either personal 

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injury or medical malpractice is two years. See Mathies v. Silver, No. 11-2859, 2011 U.S. App. 

LEXIS 22676, at *10 n.3 (3d Cir. Nov. 9, 2011).8

 

In this case, Plaintiff seeks relief under § 1983 for allegations of either medical 

malpractice or personal injury stemming from events that took place on June 1, 2005. Plaintiff 

filed his original complaint in this action on April 1, 2011, i.e., almost six years after the events 

at issue occurred. Thus, Plaintiff seeks to bring an action that falls outside of the two-year 

statute of limitations. Consequently, Plaintiff’s claims arising from June 1, 2005 are time barred. 

Accordingly, all claims asserted against UMDNJ, Dr. Zarbin, Dr. Antoniello, Dr. Berkowitz, and 

Dr. Yacoub will be dismissed with prejudice. 

G. Retina Associates and Dr. Noorily 

Plaintiff claims that Retina Associates is liable under § 1983 for its “maladministration 

[of] Dr. Stuart Noorily [who] recklessly assaulted the plaintiff.” (Am. Compl. at 22, ¶ 52). 

Plaintiff also seeks relief—under § 1983—from Dr. Noorily who, according to Plaintiff, “[o]n 

April 26, 2005, . . . recklessly assaulted [him] by failing to inform [him] that his right eye would 

deteriorate in the absence of surgery.” (Id. at 22, ¶ 53). Thus, the Court must determine whether 

Plaintiff’s allegations state a claim to relief that is plausible. 

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to plead factual allegations that establish a 

plausible claim for the following reasons. First, in order to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, a plaintiff “must allege that the person who has deprived him of [a federal right] acted 

under color of state . . . law.” Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). In this case, Hahn 

never contends that Dr. Noorily and Retina Associates were acting under color of state law. 

 

8

 To the extent that Plaintiff’s theory of relief is based upon negligence, the statute of limitations also is two years. 

See Brodie v. Gloucester Twp., No. 11-1914, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12260, at *16 (D.N.J. Feb. 1, 2012) 

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Moreover, it is clear that Dr. Noorily is a private physician employed by Retina Associates, 

which is not a state entity. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fail as 

a matter of law. Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 816 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[P]urely 

private acts which are not furthered by any actual or purported state authority are not acts under 

color of state law.”). 

Finally, Plaintiff’s claims against Dr. Noorily and Retina Associates are barred by the 

relevant statute of limitations. As previously stated, actions sounding in either personal injury or 

medical malpractice are governed by two year statutes of limitations. See Mathies, 2011 U.S. 

App. LEXIS 22676, at *10 n.3. 

Here, Plaintiff seeks relief from Defendants based upon Dr. Noorily’s failure to inform 

Plaintiff that his right eye would deteriorate in the absence of surgery, which Plaintiff 

characterizes as an assault. (See Am. Compl. at 22, ¶¶ 52, 53). Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s 

characterization, the event at issue occurred on April 26, 2005. Plaintiff did not, however, file 

his original complaint with this Court until April 1, 2011. Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint was 

filed outside of the two-year statutory period, and is thus barred. Consequently, Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint, as it relates to Dr. Noorily and Retina Associates, is dismissed with 

prejudice. 

H. BMS and OAPI9

Plaintiff alleges that “[v]ia a callous and deliberate disregard for the provisions of the 

Products Liability Act of New Jersey the defendant[s], [BMS and OAPI] did release the Product 

Abilify . . . .” (Am. Compl. at 23, ¶¶ 54, 55).10

 

9

 The Court consolidates its analysis relating to Defendants BMS and OAPI based upon the allegations contained in 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, as well as Defendants’ overlapping legal arguments. 

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In light of Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court concludes that dismissal is warranted for the 

following three reasons. First, Plaintiff’s allegations are barred under the doctrine of res 

judicata. It is well-established that a claim shall be precluded under the doctrine of res judicata 

when “(1) the judgment in the first action is valid, final and on the merits; (2) there is identity of 

the parties . . . ; and (3) the claim in the later action grows out of the same transaction or 

occurrence as the claim in the first action.” Cycle Chem., Inc., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 3109, at 

*12 (internal citation omitted). 

The Court finds that each element is satisfied here. As to the first element, the Court 

finds that the state-court judgments were valid, final, and issued on the merits.11 See, e.g., Hahn, 

2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1626, at *11 (“We also agree with the court that plaintiff’s 

claims against BMS and OAP[I], were time barred. These claims were filed more than two years 

after plaintiff admittedly received package warnings that accompanied the medication in April 

2005 . . . . There was no basis for tolling[.]”).12 With regard to the second element, the prior 

litigation involved the same parties—Hahn, BMS, and OAPI. Finally, there can be no question 

that Plaintiff’s federal litigation—the subsequent suit—is based upon the same cause of action 

 10 It is unclear exactly what federal statute Plaintiff seeks relief under, and rather than specifying, Plaintiff merely 

titles this section “Civil Rights Action Via Denial Of Rights By [BMS] and [OAPI].” (See Am. Compl. at 23). It 

appears that Plaintiff seeks relief of a violation of the New Jersey Products Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1, et seq., 

which is a state statute, by way of §1983. Thus, it does not appear that “[P]laintiff has even alleged a deprivation of 

a right that either federal law or the Constitution protects.” Brown, 922 F.2d at 1113 (internal citation omitted). 

Furthermore, to the extent that Hahn seeks to utilize §1983 to remedy alleged violations of a state statute, Plaintiff’s 

utilization of § 1983 for that purpose would be contrary to well-established law. Ibid. 

11 The Court notes that “[i]t is of no moment that the earlier decision is from state court, as ‘[a] judgment that is final 

and therefore res judicata in the courts of one state ordinarily must be given full faith and credit by all other courts in 

the United States.’” Cahn v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 2d 537, 545 (D.N.J. 2003) (quoting Flood v. Braaten, 727 

F.2d 303, 308 (3d Cir. 1984)). 

12 A dismissal based upon the statute of limitations having run constitutes a final judgment on the merits for the 

purposes of res judicata. See Cahn, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 545 n.4 (holding that plaintiff’s federal claims were barred 

by the doctrine of res judicata because the earlier state-court determination, which dismissed plaintiff’s claims for 

statute of limitation purposes, was a final judgment and therefore must be given full faith and credit) (citing Atkinson 

v. Pittsgrove Twp., 193 N.J. Super 23, 26-28 (Ch. Div. 1983). 

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Hahn raised in his prior state-court litigations, i.e., the 2005 administration of Abilify and alleged 

violations of New Jersey’s Products Liability Act. (See Complaint, No. BER-L-8812-07, 

attached as Exhibit B Goffinet Cert.) (Demonstrating that Plaintiff sued BMS and OAPI for 

allegedly failing to include a warning of Abilify’s tendency to cause retinal degeneration to the 

BRMC between April 15, 2005 and June 1, 2005, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-4). Hahn’s 

attempt to disguise his prior state law claims as a civil rights action is futile and cannot withstand 

this Court’s scrutiny. Thus, BMS and OAPI have properly raised the defense of res judicata. 

Second, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to comply with the pleading requirements 

imposed by Iqbal. Specifically, Plaintiff’s assertions of alleged wrongdoing are conclusory 

statements, amounting to nothing “more than [] unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 

accusation[s].” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Consequently, these “conclusory statements, do not 

suffice.” Ibid. 

Third, neither BMS nor OAPI may be sued under § 1983 because they are private entities 

not acting under the color of state law. See Eleuteri, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 899, at *5. Plaintiff 

does not allege, nor could he, that BMS and OAPI were acting under color of state law. For that 

reason, Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to raise a plausible claim against BMS and OAPI. 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, and the allegations contained therein, relating to 

BMS and OAPI are dismissed. Further, because any amendment would be futile, Plaintiff’s 

claims are dismissed with prejudice. 

 

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I. The Law Firm Defendants13

Hahn seeks relief from the law firms and lawyers who allegedly deprived him of his right 

to a trial by jury. Thus, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff may utilize § 1983 to sue the 

law firms that allegedly “br[oke] the custom of sending competent counsel to argue on the floor 

of the Superior Court of New Jersey,” (Am. Compl. at 21, ¶¶ 48, 50), as well as the lawyers 

who—while representing their respective clients—filed motions seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s 

state-court complaints; argued those motions when requested by the court; and opposed the 

numerous appeals filed by Plaintiff. (See id. at 18, ¶¶ 28-31; at 21, ¶¶ 47-51; at 27-29 ¶¶ 10-24). 

In light of these allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for 

which he is entitled to relief for the following two reasons. First, “[a]ttorneys performing their 

traditional functions will not be considered state actors solely on the basis of their positions as 

officers of the court.” Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 277 (3d Cir. 1999) 

(emphasis added). The attorneys in this case were performing their traditional functions as 

zealous advocates—they filed motions on behalf of their respective clients and argued those 

motions before courts of competent jurisdiction. To that end, the Court will not consider these 

attorneys to be state actors. Consequently, because a violation under 1983 requires state action, 

Plaintiff’s claims against the Law Firm Defendants fail. See Groman, 47 F.3d at 638. 

Notwithstanding the Court’s first reason, the Court also holds that the Law Firm 

Defendants are immune from suit under New Jersey’s litigation privilege. New Jersey 

recognizes an “absolute litigation privilege,” Roggio v. McElroy, Deutch, Mulvaney, & 

 

13 The “Law Firm Defendants” is comprised of the following law firms and their respective lawyers: Rupprecht Hart 

& Weeks LLP, Michael Ricciarduli, Esq., and Karen Ward, Esq.; McCarter & English LLP and David R. Kott, Esq.; 

Winston & Strawn LLP and James S. Richter, Esq.; Patricia M. Wason, Esq.; Jude-Anthony Tiscornia, Esq. and 

Thomas J. Brady, Esq.; and Samuel M. Goffinet, Esq. 

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Carpenter, 415 F. App’x 432, 433 (3d Cir. 2011), which “is well-established and broadly 

applicable.” Rickenbach v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 635 F. Supp. 2d 389, 401 (D.N.J. 2009) 

(internal citation omitted). The litigation privilege “immuniz[es] from liability statements made 

during the course of judicial, administrative, or legislative proceedings.” Kersey v. Becton 

Dickinson & Co., 433 F. App’x 105, 110 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal citation and quotation marks 

omitted). “The privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial 

proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of 

litigation; and (4) that have connection or logical relation to the action.” Ibid. (internal citation 

and quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “[t]he only limitation New Jersey places upon the 

privilege is that the statements at issue have some relation to the nature of the proceedings.” 

Rabinowitz v. Wahrenberger, 406 N.J. Super. 126, 134 (App. Div. 2009). 

 In light of the preceding discussion, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by 

the New Jersey litigation privilege. First, all of the Defendants’ communications were made in 

judicial proceedings. Second, the Defendants are lawyers who are authorized by law to make 

communications on behalf of their clients. Third, the Defendants’ communications were made to 

achieve the object of litigation—namely, to have claims filed against their respective clients 

dismissed, and to have those dismissals affirmed. Finally, Defendants’ communications had a 

direct connection to the action pending before the respective courts. Therefore, because each 

element is satisfied, the Court concludes that extending the litigation privilege to these 

Defendants is warranted. 14 

 

14 Prior lawsuits involving several of these attorneys and Hahn have led to the same conclusion. See, e.g., Hahn v. 

Doyne, No. A-5991-09, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1143, at *5 (App. Div. May 5, 2011) (holding that 

counsel’s “obligation . . . was to represent their client. The actions they took on behalf of their client cannot subject 

them to liability [because] [t]he litigation privilege affords them complete immunity from plaintiff’s claims.”). 

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 Moreover, this Court notes that “[l]awyers . . . must be free to pursue the best course 

charted for their clients without the distraction of a vindictive lawsuit looming on the horizon.” 

Loigman v. Twp. Comm. of the Twp. of Middletown in the Cnty. of Monmouth, 185 N.J. 566,

587-88 (2006). This Court will “not allow the frightful specter of retributive civil actions against 

attorneys to paralyze them from exercising mundane trial duties on behalf of their clients.” Id. at 

589. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are barred, and the Court will dismiss the Law Firm 

Defendants from this litigation. 

VI. Motions for Rule 11 Sanctions

BMS, OAPI, McCarter & English LLP, David. R. Kott, Esq., Winston & Strawn LLP, 

and James S. Richter, Esq. have moved for Rule 11 sanctions against Plaintiff. (See Docket 

Entry Nos. 28, 41, 52, and 53). Specifically, Defendants seek (1) an injunction barring Plaintiff 

from filing similar complaints in this Court against them related to their representation of their 

clients without obtaining prior leave of court; and (2) any other relief the Court deems 

appropriate. (See, e.g., Docket Entry No. 41 at 4; Docket Entry No. 53 at 9). 

 Rule 11 provides, in pertinent part: 

By presenting to the court a pleading . . . an attorney or 

unrepresented party certifies that, to the best of the person’s 

knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 

reasonable under the circumstances . . . it is not being presented for 

any improper purpose . . . ; the claims . . . are warranted by 

existing law . . . ; and the factual contentions have evidentiary 

support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary 

support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or 

discovery. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)-(3). In the Third Circuit, the legal standard for evaluating the conduct 

alleged to violate Rule 11 is “reasonableness under the circumstances.” Brubaker Kitchens, Inc. 

v. Brown, 280 F. App’x 174, 184 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). Reasonableness is 

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“an objective knowledge or belief at the time of filing a challenged paper that the claim was well 

grounded in law and fact.” Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Prods. Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 289 (3d Cir. 

1991). The decision to grant a motion for sanctions falls within the discretion of the district 

judge. See Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Richards Mfg. Co., 342 F. App’x 754, 762 (3d Cir. 2009). 

 Although the Court recognizes Defendants’ frustration in litigating this matter, as well as 

the previous state court litigations, this Court is not willing, at this point in time, to impose the 

sanction requested for the following reasons. First, Plaintiff has never been told by a federal 

court that he does not have cognizable federal claims based upon the facts alleged. Thus, the 

Court finds that, under the circumstances presented here, dismissal with prejudice is the 

appropriate sanction. Second, should Plaintiff choose to file new claims against these 

Defendants, based upon the same underlying facts, those claims will be referred to this Court. 

To that end, the Court puts Plaintiff on notice that it will allow Defendants to re-file their Rule 

11 motions. Furthermore, the Court warns Plaintiff that “Courts have uniformly sanctioned 

litigants who attempt to relitigate issues already decided [], including those [re-filed] under the 

guise of constitutional arguments and 1983 claims.” Dunleavy v. Gannon, No. 11-0361, 2012 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9679, at *18 (D.N.J. Jan. 26, 2012); see also Lai v. Huilin Wei, 331 F. App’x 

143, 145 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The District Court properly ordered the Clerk not to accept any future 

filings from Lai without permission from the Court.”). 

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VII. Conclusion15

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) are granted. 

Defendants’ motions for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are 

denied. An appropriate Order shall follow. 

s/Esther Salas 

 Esther Salas, U.S.D.J.

 

 

15 The Court notes that the several Defendants have either answered or not responded to Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint and, as a result, are not subject to the rulings made in this Opinion. These Defendants include: Vasio, 

Kelly and Strollo, Robert Logan, the Estate of Dr. Cuculic, the Borough of Paramus, Paramus Police Department, 

Care Plus, and Miss Renee Garbowski. 

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