IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
N O. 2017-BA-00250-SCT MICHAEL W. CROSBY

v. THE MISSISSIPPI BAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/21/2016 TRIAL JUDGE: HONORABLE JACQUELINE MASK TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: JAMES RUSSELL CLARK MICHAEL W . CROSBY (PRO SE) COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: COMPLAINT TRIBUNAL ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MICHAEL W . CROSBY (PRO SE) ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: JAMES RUSSELL CLARK ADAM BRADLEY KILGORE NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - BAR MATTERS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 06/21/2018 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

EN BANC. RANDOLPH, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. M i c h a e l W

. Crosby appeals the Com plaint T ribunal’s opinion and f inal j u d g me n t f inding h im in violation of R ules 1.3, 1.16, 8.1(b), and 8.4(a) and (d) of t he Mississippi Rules of Prof essional Conduct, and issuing a public r eprim a nd, b ased o n his f ailure to f ile an appeal brief on his client’s behalf , and f or his f ailure to respond to the client’s bar com plaint. The
Court f inds that the Mississippi Bar p r o v e d b y c l ear a n d convincing evidence that Crosby violated each Rule. Further, the Court f inds t h a t t h e t r ibunal’s opinion is accurate and contains all m aterial f

acts. The Com

plaint Tribunal’s o pinion and f inal judgm e nt is af

f irm ed.FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Michael C rosby was retained by Travis C ardell Brown to represent him in a crim inal trial arising f

rom the shooting of three University of Southern Mississippi f ootball play ers. Brown was convicted, and C rosby f iled a notice of a

p peal on August 3 1 , 2 0 1 2. The trial transcript was f

iled on April 3, 2013, 1 and the appeal brief was t o b e f i led by July 16, 2013. ¶3. Crosby requested a dditional tim e t o f ile the a ppeal brief on July 16, 2013; August 21, 2013; Septem

ber 1 0 , 2013; Septem

ber 16, 2013; and Septem b er 2 3, 2013. The f

irst request f or a n e xtension of tim e cited Crosby ’s caseload and t he volum inous record in Brown’s case as the basis f

or needing additional tim e. The second and third requests f or an extension of tim e c i ted Crosby ’s caseload. Crosby testif ied t hat, at the tim e h e f

iled his third request f

or

an extension of tim e, a dispute had arisen with Brown regarding the trial’s v e nue, and whether Crosby could include t h i s i ssue in the appeal brief

. Crosby did not m ove f or a change of venue f

rom Forrest County f

or Brown’s trial. Crosb y t e s t i f i e d t hat this was a strategic decision he m ade based on his y ears of experience questioning potential jurors in voir dire

. ¶4. Af ter Brown was convicted, Brown told Crosby that h e s h o u l d h a v e m o v ed f or a change of venue. Crosby t estif ied that this venue dispute created a conf lict with Brown, in

1 C ro sb y raised th e len g th o f tim e it to o k th e co u rt rep o r ter to f ile th e trial tran scrip t in h is M o tio n to A lter o r A m en d th e C o m p lain t T rib u n al’s j u d g m en t, b u t h e d o es n o t ex p l ain h o w t h e d elay af

f ected th e f

i li n g o f th e ap p eal b rief

. H e o n ly req u ested th at th is f act b e in clu d ed in o rd er to “f

u lly ref l ect” th e d elay

in f ilin g th e ap p e al b rief

. 2which C rosby would have had to include an inef f ective-assistance-of

-cou n s e l claim in the appeal brief r e g a r d i n g his own representation of Brown a t trial. C rosby t estif ied that the

venue issue prevented Crosby f rom being able t o f

ile the brief

, although the appeal brief was “really close” to com

pletion at the tim e the third request f or additional tim e was f

iled. ¶5. Crosby ’s f

ourth request f

or an e x t e n s ion of tim e was f iled on Septem

ber 16, citing
Cr o s b y ’ s c a s e l o ad, and t hat the brief was not y et com plete. Crosby ’s last request f or an extension of tim e, f

iled on Septem

ber 23, cited his own health issues. Crosby t estif ied that he could have f

i led a com pleted appeal brief at this tim e, and that he had Brown’s perm ission

to do so. However, Crosby testif i ed that Brown had changed his m ind regarding the venue issue on num erous occasions, which ultim ately prevented Crosby f

rom f iling the brief

. ¶6. On October 4, this Court issued a Show Cause Notice, as Brown’s appeal brief still had not b een f

i led. C rosby was given f

ourteen day s to f

ile the appeal brief

. Crosby testif

ied that he had obtained Brown’s p erm ission to f ile the appeal brief

. On October 18 at 4:55 p.m ., Crosby electronically f

i led a Notice of Com

p liance with Show Cause Notice and Notice of Mailing. 2 Crosby testif

ied that he phy sically p laced the appeal brief in t he m ail. Af ter the brief w as placed in the m ail, Crosby was inf orm e d t hat Brown was getting another attorney
to r epresent him

. Crosby retrieved the brief f rom the m ail, but did not inf o rm the Court that

2 C ro sb y w a s q u estio n ed as to w h y h e electro n ically f iled ev ery m o tio n an d th e N o tice o f C o m p lian ce w ith S h o w C au s e N o t ice an d th e N o tice o f M a i l i n g , b u t c h o se to m ail th e b rief

. C ro sb y co n ced ed in h i s testim o n y th at, i n o rd e r to c o m p l y w ith t h i s C o u rt’s S h o w C a u s e N o tice, th e b rief

n eed ed to b e electro n ically f iled b y m id n i g h t o n O cto b er 1 8

. 3Brown had obt a ined a d if f erent attorney , or that the Notice of Mailing was i ncorrect. 3
C r o s b y t o o k no action on B rown’s case f or another six day s, and Brown’s appeal was dism issed f

or f ailure to f ile an appeal brief

on October 24, 2013. ¶7. Af ter the appeal was d i sm issed, C rosby testif ied that he of

f ered to f ile a petition f

or post- c onviction relief ( PCR) f or Brown t o pursue an out-of -tim e appeal, and Brown gave Cro s b y c o nsent to do so. In a letter d ated August 26, 2014, Crosby m ailed the PCR and af f idavit to Brown f

or h i s signature. Brown told Crosby that he di d not receive the docum ents, and Crosby sent it two m ore tim es: once on October 10, 2014, and again on Novem ber 6, 2014. On Decem

ber 3, 2014, Brown sent Crosby a l etter s tating that, although he f elt Crosby was an “excellent attorney ,” Brown no longer w anted Crosby to represent h im

or to f ile the PCR. Crosby n ever f i l e d a n y thing with the Court to show that he no longer represented Brown. B rown later attem pted t o have his appeal reinstated throug h a n o t h e r attorney , but the Court of Appeals issued an order deny ing B rown’s m otion on February 10,
2015.

3 A t trial, th e B ar r aised th e issu e o f C ro sb y su b m ittin g th e N o tice o f M a ilin g o f th e b rief w ith o u t actu ally m ailin g th e b rief

. T h e B ar also q u estio n ed C ro sb y reg ard in g w h y h e h ad f ailed to seek rem e d ial m easu res b y in f o rm i n g t h e C o u r

t t h a t th e b rief h ad n o t b een m ailed

. H o w ev e r, th e B a r d id n o t ch arg e C ro s b y w ith a v i o latio n o f an y R u le b ased o n th is f ailu re, an d th e C o m

p lain t T rib u n al d i d n o t ad d ress it. T h eref o re, th e C o u rt d e clin es to ad d ress it. 4¶8. Crosby testif ied that, at the end of June 2015, a r epresentative of the Mississippi Bar
f orwarded him a

letter that Brown had written to the Bar’s Consum er Assistance Program

. Brown’s letter stated the f ollowing: My nam e is Travis Brown [ and] I w as supposedly repre s e n t e d b y Michael Crosby o ut o f Gul f

p o r t MS. W e went to trial [ and] lost so Mr. Crosby was supposed to f

ile an appeal, but I los t m y direct appeal because Mr. Crosby never f iled t he brief whi c h i s clearly inaf f ective [ sic] assistance of c ouncel [ s i c]. I can n ever get in touch with him [ and] his of f ice is alway s giving me the run around. [ I’m ] not doubting that Mr. Crosby is a good a t torney but I f eel like he has a lot going on in his lif e personally [ t hat’s] af

f ecting his work as an a ttorney , so t his is why I am f iling the com

plaint with the M ississippi Ba r [ and] ask that this m atter be looked into. Further m ore [ sic] I have hired new counsel [ and] no longer wish f or Mr. Crosby

to be m y attorney

. The Mississippi Bar representative inf orm ed Crosby that a bar com plaint f orm would be sent to Brown along with instructions f or its f iling. On July 1 0, 2 015, Brown f iled an inf

orm al b a r c o m plaint a gainst Crosby f

o r f ailing to f

ile his appeal brief

. Brown’s com

pl a i n t contained the f

ollowing allegation: “Michael Crosby has been i n a ffe c t i v e [s i c ] a s m y counsel.
W e went to trial [ and] l ost [ and] he never f iled an appeal brief

on m y half [ sic]. Theref

ore

m y appeal was dism issed.” ¶9. The B ar f

orwarded Brown’s com

plaint t o Crosby o n July 10, 2015, and dem anded that his r esponse be f

iled on or bef

ore J uly 27, 2015. Crosby a cknowledged that he had received the bar com

plaint and requested additional tim e to respond i n an e m ail to the Bar, which was granted with an extension to August 4. However, Crosby did not f ile a response to Brown’s bar com plaint. On A ugust 25, 2015, the Bar s ent Crosby a s econd dem and letter requesting

5that he respond to Brown’s c om plaint by Septem

ber 1, 2 015. C r o sby d id n ot subm it a response by

the date dem anded. ¶10. On Decem

b er 4, 2015, Crosby em ailed Jam es Clark, Deputy General Counsel f or the Mississippi Bar, and inf

orm ed Clark t hat he needed additional tim e to respond to Brown’s

com plaint due to his current caseload. However, Crosby ’s testim ony did not r ef lect that his caseload prevented him f rom subm i t t i n g a r esponse. Instead, Crosby testif i ed that he deliberately chose n ot t o s u b m i t a response to Brown’s bar com plaint because h e believed his r esponse would have included a personal issue that occurred in 2009 that he did not want shared with Brown. Further, C rosby t estif ied that he b elieved that he was not required under the Rules of Prof

e ssional Conduct to subm i t a response and instead believed that he would be given an opportunity to participate in an inves t i gation into the conduct that gave rise to the bar com

p laint. Crosby

never f iled a response to Brown’s bar com p laint. 4 ¶11. The Bar f

i led its f orm al com

plaint against Crosby o n D ecem ber 21, 2015, based on (1) Crosby ’s f

ailure t o f ile an appeal brief on Brown’s behalf , and (2) C rosby ’s f

ailure or ref usal to respond to the Bar com plaint f iled b y B r o w n . The Bar alleged t hat C rosby had violated the f

o llowing Mississippi Rules of Prof essional Conduct: Rule 1.2(a), which p r ovides that a l a w y e r s h all abide by a client’s decisions concerning the o bjectives of representation a nd shall consult with the client as to the m eans by

which they

are to be pursued;

4 A n em ail d ated S ep t em

b er 4 , 2 0 1 5 , w as in clu d ed in th e reco rd o n ap p eal ref lectin g th at C ro sb y h ad su b m itted a resp o n se to a sep arate b ar co m p lain t f iled b y a d i f

f eren t clien t. T h is resp o n se w as n o t to B r o w n ’ s b ar co m p l ain t. 6Rule 1.3, which provides t hat a lawy er s hall a ct with r easonable diligence and

prom ptness in representing a client; Rule 1.4(a), which provides t ha t a l a w y e r s hall k eep a client reasonably i n f o r me d a bout the status of a m atter a nd p rom ptly com ply w ith reasonab l e requests f or inf orm ation; Rule 1.16 (d), w hich provides that upon term ination of representat i on, a lawy er shall take reasonable steps to protect a client’s interests; Rule 8.1(b), which provides t hat a l a w y e r shall not f ail to disclose a f

act necessary t o correct a m isapprehension known by the person t o have arisen in the m atter, or k

nowingly f

ail to respond to a lawf

u l dem and f

o r inf orm ation by a disciplinary authority ; and Rules 8.4(a) and (d), which pro v i d e that i t is prof e ssional m isconduct f

or a law y e r to v iolate or attem pt to violate the rules of prof essional conduct or engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the adm inistration of justice. ¶12. Af ter m ore than t wenty day s elapsed with n o answer o r pleading f rom Crosby , the Bar
f iled an a pplication f

or the Clerk of Court t o enter def ault pursuant to Rule 5 5 ( a ) o f the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The C lerk entered def ault against C rosby the next day

. The Bar then f

iled a m otion f

or def ault judgm ent, alleging that Crosby h ad been personally served with process on January 4 , 2016, and never f iled an answer, m otion, o r any other pleading. ¶13. On February 29, 2016, Crosby f iled a m otion to set a s ide the Clerk’s entry of def ault. Crosby produced an a f

f idavit f rom the police o f

f i c e r w h o w as responsible f or service of
process, who stated that he did n ot personally s ee, m e et, s peak to, or serve Crosby

. Crosby also f iled a m otion t o m odif

y o n e deadline in the scheduling order. On April 22, 2016, the
Com plaint Tribunal g ranted Crosby ’s m otion to set aside the clerk ’ s e n t r y of def ault, and
7denied the Bar’s m otion f or d ef ault judgm ent. T he Com

plaint Tribunal also denied Crosby ’s

m otion to m odif

y the scheduling order as m oot. ¶14. On April 29, 2016, Crosby answere d t h e Bar’s f orm al C om

plaint, relating the f

acts

as they are discussed above. Trial was held on October 14, 2016, and Crosby was the only witness who testif

ied. The Com

plaint Tribunal issued its O pinion a n d F i n a l Judgm ent on Novem ber 14, 2016, f

i nding t hat Crosby had violated Rules 1 .3, 1.16, 8.1(b), 8.4(a), and 8.4(d) based on h is f

ailure to f

ile an a ppeal brief on Brown’s behalf , and his f

a i l u r e to respond to Brown’s b ar com plaint. The tribunal then analy zed the nine f

actors outlined in Liebling v

. Mississippi Bar , 929 So. 2d 911, 918-20 (Miss. 2006), in order to determ ine the appropriate level o f discipline. The tribunal f ound t hat the appropriate disciplinary sanction should be a public reprim and. ¶15. Crosby f

i led a m otion to alter or am end t he judgm e nt , o r a l t e r n atively , a m otion to

correct a clear error of l aw to p revent m anif est injustice, o r a l ternatively , a m otion f or a new trial or f or judgm ent notwithstanding the verdict. Crosby raised the f ollowing issues: (1) the length o f tim e it took the court reporter to f ile t he trial transcript; (2) B rown’s ability to seek

an o ut-of -tim e appeal; (3) t he venue dispute with Brown; and (4) the personal reasons f or not responding to the b ar c o mp l a int. The Com plaint Tribunal denied Crosby ’s m otion, and Crosby appealed.
S TATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ¶16. The f

ive issues raised by

Crosby on appeal are restated verbatim et literatim :

8Issue I.

If an appeal is dism issed due to the f ailure of the attorney to f

ile the appellate brief , does such f

ailure alway s constitute a violation of Rule 1

. 3 M RPC (i.e. f ailure of a lawy er to act with r easonable diligence in representing a client, or does Rule 2-4 of the MRAP and Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-39- 5(i) set f orth reasons why the a t torney ’s f ailure t o f ile the appeal b rief m ay constitute good cause.)[ ? ]
Issue II.
Does Mr. Crosby ’s actions constitute w ithdrawal f r o m r epresentation of a client when he allowed t he a ppeal to be dism issed, and f urther, did said actions constitute a violation o f Rule 1.16 MRPC w hich requires a lawy er to withdraw only when it can be accom

plished without harm to the client[ ? ]
Issue III.
Does Mr. Crosby ’s f

ailure to f ile written responses to the dem and f or the sam e, constitute a violation of Rule 8.1(b) MRPC under the unique circum stances of this case[ ? ]
Issue IV. Did Mr. Crosby violate Rule 8.4 MRPC which provides that it i s m isconduct to violate any rule of prof essional c onduct and engage in conduct that is detrim ental to the adm inistration of justice[ ? ]
Issue V. Should the opinion and judgm ent of the bar, which is to be read publicly , state all the m aterial and relevant f acts which im

pacts [ sic] M r. Crosby , and should m isstated f

acts be corrected to ref

l ect the truth[ ? ] ¶17. The f

irst f our issues can b e restated s im ply a s w hether t he M ississippi Bar proved by clear and convincing evidence t hat C r o s b y h a d violated each of the f our rules. The f

inal

9issue raised on a ppeal is restated as whether the Com plaint Tribunal’s opinion and f inal judgm ent om i t ted m aterial f acts or contains m i sleading statem ents. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶18. The appropriate standard of review in Bar discipline m atters is as f ollows:
On appeal, this Court shall review the ent i re record and the f indings and conclusions o f the Tribunal, and s hall render such orders as the Court m ay f ind appropriate. W hen reviewing di sciplinary m atters[ ,] t his Court reviews the evidence de novo , on a case-by -case b asis, si t t i n g a s triers o f f act, and no substantial evidence or m anif est error rule shields the Tribunal f rom scrutiny

. Rogers v. Mississippi Bar , 731 So. 2d 1 158, 1163-64 (Miss. 1 9 9 9 ) ( q u oting Asher v. Mississippi Bar , 661 So. 2d 722, 727 (Miss. 1995)) (internal quotations om itted). W hile this
Court a pplies a de novo standard o f review when considering evidence, “def erence is given

to the Tribunal’s f

indings ‘due to its exclusive opportunity to observe the d e me anor and attitude of

the witnesses, including the attorney , which is vital i n weighing the evidence.’”
Id. at 1164. The Missi s s i p p i B a r must “prove by clear and convincing e vidence that the respondent’s actions constitute p r of ess i o n a l m i sconduct.” Id. (quoting Mississippi Bar v. Pels , 708 So. 2d 1372, 1374 (Miss. 1998)).
DISCUSSION ¶19. Other than citing the f our Rules of Prof

essional C o n d u c t that Crosby was f ound to have violated, Crosby ’s brief contains two citations of authority

. The f irst citation ref

ers to
R u l es 2 through 4 of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate P rocedure, and the seco n d c i t e s Mississippi Co d e S e ction 9 9 -39-5(i), which provides t hat any p erson sentenced by a

1 0Mississippi court m ay f i le a m otion f

or an out-of

-tim e appeal. See M iss. Code Ann. § 99-39- 5(i) (Rev. 2015). Crosby cites not a single case in his brief nor any o ther relevant authority

to support his argum ents on appeal. The Bar asserts in i ts b rief that Crosby ’s a ppeal should be dism i ssed. ¶20. R u l e 2 8(a)(7) of t he Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure p ro v i d e s t h a t a n appellant’s b rief “shall contain the contentions o f the a ppellant

. . . and the reasons f or those contentions, with citations t o the authorities, statutes, and parts of the r ecord relied on.” This
Court has held t hat a n appellant’s f ailure to do so constitutes abandonm ent o f the issue and

m akes the issue p rocedurally barred f or appel l a t e review. Matter o f Estate of Sm ith v. Boolos , 204 So. 3d 291, 313 ( Miss. 2016) (quoting McNeil v . Hester , 753 So. 2d 1057, 1075 (Miss. 2000)). Accordingly , the Court m ay dism iss Crosby ’s appeal on this basis alone, because his brief c ontain s virtually no citations to the record, and the two citations of authority that he cites do not support his argum ents. ¶21. Notwithstan d i n g , t h i s C o u r t h a s e x a m i n e d w h e t

h er the Mississippi B ar proved by clear and convincing evidence that a n attorney violated the Rules of Prof essional Conduct based

on the a ttorney ’s f

actual argum ents a lone. See, e.g., Shah v. The Mississippi Bar , 962 So. 2d 514, 522 (Miss. 2007) (citing only the standard of review in discussion of whether the Bar proved by clear and convincing evidence that an attorney violated t he Rules of Prof essional Conduct.). This Court h as “exclusive jurisdiction of m atters pertaining to attorney d iscipline and reinstatem ent, and this Court is the ultim ate judge of m atter[ s] arising under the Rules

1 1of Discipline f or the Mississippi Bar.” Asher , 661 So. 2d at 727. And while the Court “m ay delegate the f

act-f inding process to others, s uch as t he M ississippi Bar, i ts tribunals, or courts in other jurisdictions, the f inal decision on w hether particular conduct constitutes a violation of our rules of prof

essional conduct and of discipline rests with this Court.” Mississippi Bar

v. Labovitz , 226 So. 3d 92, 95 (Miss. 2016). Crosby cites the Rules o f P rof essional Conduct that he was f

ound t o have violated an d a sserts several f actual reasons to support his
argum ents. Theref

ore, the Court m ay c onsider the argum ents p resented by Crosby o n appeal.
I. Rule 1.3 ¶22. The C ourt begins with an exam ina t i o n o f t he r ecord to determ ine w hether, by clear and convincing e vidence, Crosby v iolated Rule 1.3. R ule 1 .3 provides that “[ a] lawy er shall

act with reasonable diligence a nd prom pt n e s s in representing a client.” The Com plaint Tribunal f

ound that Crosby ’s f

ailure to f

ile an appeal brief constituted a v i o l a t i o n of this Rule. Crosby a rgues that Mississippi Rules of A ppellate Proc e d u r e 2 through 4, and Missi s s i p p i C o d e Section 99-39-5(i), provide an excuse, or establish “good cause” f or his violation of Rule 1.3. ¶23. Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 provides the penalties f o r noncom

pliance with the rules, e.g ., dism issals and other sanctions, and when the rules m ay be suspended in

a particular case. This Rule does not support Crosby ’s argum ent that he d id not v iolate Rule
1.3. Mis sissippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 p rovides how appeals m ay be taken, including the f

iling a nd n otice of appeal, i nter alia

. This Rule does n o t s u p p o r t C rosby ’s

1 2argum ent. F inally , Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 provides t he procedure f or when an appeal m ay

be taken. A gain, this Rule does not provide any support f or Crosby ’s
argum ent that he did not violate Ru le 1.3 by f ailing to f

ile an appeal b rief

. Likewise, Mississippi Code Section 99-39-5(i) is irrelevant to this a p peal, as t h i s statute deals exclusively

with post-conviction relief

. ¶24. Crosby does not dispute that he f ailed t o f ile an appeal brief f

o r B r own. Crosby f

iled the Notice of Appeal on B rown’s behalf , requested num erous e xtensions of tim e to subm it the b rief , never term inated his representation of Brown e ven af ter Brown inf

orm ed him that he was seeking another attorney , and n ever f iled the appeal brief

. Crosby ’s only a rgum ent related to his f

a ilure to f ile the brief is that Brown insisted that the venue issue be included, which Crosby f

elt was not appropriate to include. As such, the Mississippi Bar p r o v ed by clear a nd convincing evidence that Crosby violated R ule 1.3 b ased on Crosby ’s f ailure to f ile Brown’s appeal brief

. II. Rule 1.16 ¶25. Rule 1.16 requires a l awy er to withdraw f rom representation of a client only when the

sam e can be accom

plished without harm to the c lient. T he Com plaint Tribunal f

ound that Crosby e f f ectively withdrew f

rom representing Brown on a p peal when h e allowed the appeal

to be dism issed, w hich caused harm to Brown a n d constituted a violation of this Rule. Crosby c om

bined his argum ent regarding Rule 1.3 with Rule 1.16 in his brief ; theref ore, he

asserts the sam e argum ents under M ississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure 2 t hrough 4, and

1 3Mississippi Cod e S e c t i o n 99-39-5(i), which are neither applicable nor supportive of Crosby ’s

argum ent. Further, Crosby argues that, because he of f ered to f ile a petition f

or PCR f or an out-of -tim e appeal f

o r Brown, he did not withdraw or harm Brown. ¶26. Crosby ’s m e re of

f er t o f i l e a PCR f

o r Brown does not excuse his f ailure to f ile an appeal brief f

or Brown. There is no gu a r a n tee that Brown would h ave been entitled t o an out-of -tim e appeal under t he PC R s t a t u t e . Further, B rown’s second attorney attem pted to reinstate Brown’s appeal, and i t was denied. Crosby ’s a l lowing B rown’s direct appeal to be dism issed am ounted t o a withdrawal by Crosby and certainly c aused harm to Brown. The Bar proved by

clear and convincing evidence that Crosby violated Rule 1.16.
III. Rule 8.1 ¶27. Rule 8.1(b) provides t hat a lawy er in c o nnection with a disciplinary m atter shall not knowingly f

ail to respond to a lawf

ul d em and f

or inf orm ation f

rom a disciplinary authority , other than inf

orm ation otherwise p rotected by Rule 1.6, i.e ., conf idential i nf

orm ation related

to the r epresentation of client. The Com plaint Tribunal f

o und t hat Crosby v iolated this Rule because he had knowledge of the Bar com plaint and the need t o respond (he requested additional tim e t o respond and acknowledged at trial that he had received t he dem ands), but
f ailed to respond. ¶28. C r osby argues that Rule 8.1 does not require a response to be in w r i t i n g . C r o s b y
argues that, because he spoke with an attorn e y f r om the Bar, and because he a greed to participate in t he Bar’s investigation, he com plied with Rule 8.1. Crosby f urther argues that

1 4he did not intend to violate Rule 8.1. Crosby does not c i t e a ny authority t o support his

argum ents. Although Rule 8.1 does not specif ically s tate that a r esponse m ust be i n writing, the Mississippi B ar inf

orm ed Crosby

that his response to Brown’s bar com plaint was to be
in writing. On the day the Bar f o rwarded Brown’s com

plaint t o Crosby , a letter was included that stated Crosby was required to attach a certif icate of service showing th a t a f ull and

com plete copy of the response had been s erved upon Brown, o r it would not be accepted f or f iling. Further, Crosby acknowled g e d t hat his response had to be in writing in em ail correspondence with the Bar. Crosby ’s argum ent that he d id not intend t o violate Rule 8.1 also is without m erit. Again, Crosby acknowledged that hi s r e s p o n s e was to be in writing but he f ailed to subm i t a response. Thu s , h e “ k n owingly ” f ailed t o respond to a lawf ul dem and f or inf orm ation f

rom the B ar. The Bar proved b y clear a nd c onvincing evidence that Crosby violated Rule 8.1 by

f ailing or ref

using to respond to Brown’s bar com plaint.
IV. Rule 8.4 ¶29. Although Crosby r aises Rule 8.4 (a) and (d) i n his statem e n t of the issues, Crosby does

not present any a rgum ent in his brief regarding the Tribunal’s f i nding that he violated Rules 8.4 (a) and (d). Thus, the Court will not address them

. V. WHETHER T HE COMPLAINT T RIBUNAL’ S OPINION AND JUDGMENT OMITTED MATERIAL FACTS OR C ONTAINS MISLEADING STATEMENTS. ¶30. Crosby argues that the Com plaint Tribunal’s opinion and f i na l j u d g me n t om its or

m isstates “m any m aterial and relevant f acts” that he alleges will im pact his ability to practice.

1 5First, C rosby a r g u e s t h a t the opinion om its the f act that B rown’s case could have been reinstated f

or good cause by either m otion or p etition, and instead s tates that Brown received

“ the worst possible outcom e.” T his is not a m aterial f act t hat m

ust be inc l u d e d i n t h e tribunal’s opinion and f

inal j udgm ent. W hether or not Brown’s appeal could be reinstated is irrelevant as to Crosby ’s f ailure to f ile an appeal brief

on Brown’s behalf

. ¶31. Second, Crosby a lleges that the opinion does not m ention t hat Brown ref used to allow Crosby to reopen Brown’s case by f iling a P CR. A gain, whether or n o t B rown’s appeal could be revived has no relevance to Crosby ’ s f ailure to f i le the appeal brief

. ¶32. Crosby next alleges t hat the opinion does not state any thing about “ the l o n g delay which caused com m

unication and cooperation i s s u e s with [ Brown].” Crosby does not explain what delay he is ref erring t o. The Court i s unable to discern w hether this is a relevant

or m aterial f

act, because Crosby

does not expand on this issue any f urther. ¶33. Further, Crosby

alleges that the opinion does not state the total n um b er of day s that Crosby requested in his m otions f or extensions of tim e to f ile Brown’s appeal brief

, which he states totaled only sixty day s, af ter “thirteen m onths of delay .” Although Crosby does not explain what t h i r t e e n-m onth delay to which he is ref erring, he alleges in his statem ent of
f acts that t he c ourt reporter took thirteen m onths to f i le the trial transcript. 5 Presum ably , this is the thirteen-m onth “delay ” to which Crosby r ef ers. In a ny event, the am o unt of tim e that

5 T h e record dem onstrates t hat it did not take the court reporter thirteen m onths to f ile the trial t ranscript. The jury reached its verdict in Brown’s trial on June 28, 2012, and the record reveals that the trial transcript was f iled on April 3, 2013. 1 6Crosby r equested in h is m otions f or extensions of tim e i s i mma t e r i al, a nd the opinion and
f inal judgm ent contains nothing m isleading about Crosby ’s f ive r equests f

o r an extension of tim e. ¶34. Last, Crosby alleges t h a t t h e o p i n ion does not m ention the work that Crosby did in preparing Brown’s m o t ion f or judgm ent notwithstanding the verdict a nd Brown’s m otion f or

a n ew trial. The substantive w ork that Crosby d id bef ore, during, and af

ter t rial were not challenged b y the Mississippi Bar and theref ore are entirely irrelevant to Crosby ’s f ailure to f ile the appeal brief

, w hich is the only issue that g ave rise to Brown’s bar com p laint. This issue is without m erit.
CONCLUSION ¶35. The M ississippi Bar proved by clear a n d convincing evidence that M ichael W

. Crosby violated R

ules 1.3, 1.16, 8.1, 8 .4(a), and 8.4(d). F urther, the Com plaint Tribunal’s opinion and f inal judgm e nt included all m a terial f acts, and did not contain any m isleading s tatem ents. The tribunal’s opinion and f inal judgm ent are af

f irm e d. ¶36. AFFIRMED. WALLER, C.J., KITCHENS, P.J., K ING, COLEMAN, MAX WELL, BEAM, CHAMBERLIN AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR.

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