1 Filed 3/12/15 In re Christian W. CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re CHRISTIAN W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. CHRISTIAN W., Defendant and Appellant. A141022
(Alameda County Super. Ct. No. SJ1302175602)

Christian W. appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order adjudging him a ward of the court and placing him on probation. He contends that the admission of his inculpatory statements despite the failure of the police to ad equately re-advise him of his
Miranda 1 rights violated his constitutional right agai nst self-incrimination. He also urges
that the case must be remande d because the court failed to determine whether the offense was a misdemeanor or a felony, and that several of the conditions of probation are unconstitutionally vague and over broad. As the Attorney General acknowledges, remand is required for the court to determine whether the offense was a misdemeanor or a felony. In addition, several of the probation conditi ons require modification. In all other respects, we affirm the order.

1 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE On October 16, 2013, a wa rdship petition (Welf. & Inst . Code, § 602, subd. (a)) was filed alleging that appella nt, then 16 years old, had committed felony automobile theft (Veh. Code, § 10851), fe lony possession of a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor resisting a peac e officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)). Pursuant to appellant’s admission, the auto theft was found true as a misdemeanor, and the other counts were dismissed. Appellant was released to his mother on electronic monitoring. On November 18, 2013, a subsequent wardship petition was filed alleging that appellant possessed a concealed firearm (P en. Code, § 29610). After a contested jurisdictional hearing on Decemb er 11, the allegation was found true with the level of the offense to be determined at disposition. On December 26, at disposition for both petitions, appellant was adjudged a ward of th e court and placed in his mother’s home, on electronic monitoring, under specified conditions of probation. The matter was continued for 45 days for restitution and to set the level of the offe nse on the second petition. On February 10, 2014, the court vacated the order for electronic monitoring and
otherwise continued its orders. Appellant filed a timely notice of a ppeal on February 13, 2014.
STATEMENT OF FACTS On November 14, 2013, appellant’s brothe r M.W. was arrested near their home on Foothill Boulevard for possession of marijuan a for sale. Oakland Police Officer Tim
Martin obtained and executed a search warrant for their home. Martin found a firearm inside a backpack located between two beds in the bedroom shared by appellant and M.W. The backpack also contained a piece of paper with “something to the effect of Christian’s schedule” with “dates and times pr inted below that.” There was no indicia for any other names in the backp ack. When Martin arrived to execute the warrant, a young
man who did not live there had been in the bedr oom with another of a ppellant’s brothers. One of the things Martin was looking for purs uant to the warrant was a gun he suspected might be in M.W.’s possession. At the time he searched the backpack and discovered the3 gun, Martin was not certain whether it belong ed to appellant, M.W., or one of the other
men who had been in the room. On November 15, Martin arrested a ppellant at the Cambridge Academy. Appellant already had been detained on probable cause to believe he possessed the firearm, based on the indicia in the backpack and his mother’s and brother’s statements
that the bedroom in which it was found was appellant’s. When Martin contacted him a little after 11:00 a.m., appellant was in the ba ckseat of the school police officer’s patrol car. Martin took him out of the car, searched him again and put him in the backseat of his patrol car. Martin gave appellant a Miranda admonishment, reading verbatim from a “statement form” that listed the rights and th en asked, “Do you understand each of these rights as I have explained them to you?” As Martin read his rights, appellant appeared to be paying attention and did not appear to be under the influen ce. He responded, “yes.” Martin did not ask him questio ns about the case, but explained why he was under arrest
and discussed information like name and addre ss. Martin explained that policy did not require him to read Miranda rights from the form unless he was taking a written statement, but he preferred to do so to avoi d any confusion. The form had a place for the suspect to initial, indicating he or she had been read the right s, and a place for the officer to fill in the suspect’s responses. Martin did not fill out a form in this case, and was not required to do so. Martin and appellant remained in the pa trol car for about two hours, waiting for the sergeant to come and sign the “Arrest in Field” fo rm, which was required for a juvenile felony arrest. Appellant was “conc erned about the case” but they did not “talk about it specifically, ju st that the gun was found at hi s residence.” Appellant asked repeatedly if he could go home and what was going to happen to him. Appellant knew he had been arrested for the gun that had been found in his room. Once the arrest in field form was signed, Martin transported appellant to the police station, which took about 10 or 15 minutes . After appellant was processed through intake, Martin placed him in an interview r oom at 2:10 p.m. The room was about eight feet square, with a table and three chairs; appe llant sat at the table, Martin sat directly4 across from him, and Officer Hector Jimenez sa t to Martin’s left, between appellant and the closed door. The officers were “significa ntly larger” than appellant. Appellant was
not handcuffed. Martin did not read appellant his right s a second time, but asked if appellant remembered him reading the right s in the car. Martin initia lly testified that appellant “responded in the affirmative—I don’t remember if the exact words we re yes or yeah, but he responded in the affirmative. ” On questioning by appellant ’s attorney at the hearing, the officer stated, “I don’t remember if it was yes, yeah or nod in the affirmative, but I just—I don’t remember exactly the words, but it’s something to that effect.” Defense counsel asked whether Martin recorded ap pellant’s response anywhere, and Martin replied, “I believe in the report.” The po lice report describing the interview stated, “I asked [appellant] if he remembered me read ing him his rights and him answering ‘yes’ that he understood them. [Appellant] said ‘y es.’ ” Defense counsel played a portion of the recording of the intervie w and Martin acknowledged that at the moment he asked whether appellant remembered him reading hi s rights, Martin’s radio crackled and he could not hear a verbal response from appella nt. Asked whether he could “say with certainty whether or not he responded to you,” Martin re plied, “I cannot say with certainty. That was the best of my recollecti on at the time. I did not review the tape, but I knew the whole thing had been taped and audiotaped.” Martin asked appellant about the gun, and appellant said that while walking to the bus stop after school a day or two before, he noticed the gun on the ground near some bushes and put it in his backpack , intending to turn it in to a faculty member at school
because he remember ed there had been a shooting a couple of weeks before.
DISCUSSION
I. Appellant argues that when Officer Mar tin asked if appellant remembered being
advised of his Miranda rights earlier in the day, the crackling of the officer’s radio prevented him from hearing appellant’s res ponse, and his interroga tion without further clarifying that appellant remembered the prior advisement violated Miranda. We5 “examine the uncontradicted facts to determ ine independently whet her the trial court’s conclusion of voluntariness was proper” and, if there is conflicting evidence, we accept
the version of events most favorable to the People to the extent it is supported by the record. ( In re Shawn D. (1993) 20 Cal.App. 4th 200, 207-208; People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 425 ( Williams ).) “To counteract the coercive pressure [inherent in custodial surroundings], Miranda announced that police officers mu st warn a suspect prior to questioning that he has a right to remain silent, and a right to the presence of an attorney. [Citation. ] After the warnings are given, if the suspect indicates that he wi shes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. [Citation.] Similarly, if the susp ect states that he wa nts an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an a ttorney is present. [Cita tion.] Critically, however, a suspect can waive these rights. [Citation.] To establish a valid waiver, the State must
show that the waiver was kn owing, intelligent, and voluntary under the ‘high standar[d] of proof for the waiver of cons titutional rights [set forth in] Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458.’ ” ( Maryland v. Shatzer (2010) 559 U.S. 98, 103-104.) “ ‘The prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating the validity of the defendant’s waiver by a prepond erance of the evidence.’ ( People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 751; see Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370 .) In addition, ‘[a]lthough there is a threshold pres umption against finding a waiver of Miranda rights [citation], ultimately the que stion becomes whether the Miranda waiver was [voluntary,] knowing[,] and intelligent un der the totality of the ci rcumstances surrounding the interrogation.’ ( People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4t h 636, 668.)” ( Williams
, supra , 49 Cal.4th at p. 425.) “ ‘No particular manner or form of Miranda waiver is required, and a waiver may be implied from a defendant’s words and actions. [Citations.]’ ” ( People v. Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234, 1269.) The California Supreme Cour t “has long recognized that a defendant’s decision to answer questions afte r indicating that he or she understands the
Miranda rights may support a finding of implied waiver, under the totality of the6 circumstances. ( People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 247–248, citing cases.)” ( Gonzales, at p. 1269.) “[C]ourts must use ‘special care in scru tinizing the record’ to determine whether a minor’s custodial confession is voluntary ( Haley v. Ohio (1948) 332 U.S. 596, 599).” ( People v. Lessie (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1152, 1166-1167.) The required “ ‘inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation . . . includes evaluation of the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, a nd intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of wa iving those rights.’ ” ( Lessie , at pp. 1166-1167, quoting Fare
v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707
, 725.) Here, the question is whethe r, after appellant waived his Miranda rights upon arrest at his school, Martin was required to re advise appellant and obtain a waiver before questioning appellant at the police station severa l hours later and, if so, whether he did so properly. “ ‘After a valid Miranda waiver, readvisement prior to continued custodial interrogation is unnecessary “so long as a pr oper warning has been given, and [‘the subsequent interrogation is “reasonably contemporaneous” with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver.’ [Citations.]” [Citation.] The necessity for readvisement depends upon various circumstances, in cluding the amount of time that has elapsed since the first waiver, changes in the iden tity of the interrogating officer and the location of the interrogation, any reminder of the prior advise ment, the defendant’s experience with the criminal justice system, and “[ other] indicia that the defenda nt subjectively underst[ood] and waive[d] his rights.” ’ ( People v. Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 434.)” ( People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 555 ( Duff ).) As described above, Martin testified that at the beginning of appellant’s interview, Martin asked if appellant remembered the warn ings Martin had read to him in the patrol car. Martin testified that, to the best of his recollection, appellant responded in the affirmative, although Martin could not remember whether appellant gave a verbal response or nodded affirmatively. Martin ac knowledged after listeni ng to a recording of7 this portion of the interview that he could no t hear a verbal response over the sound of his radio crackling. When defense counsel argued for exclusio n of appellant’s statement on the basis that there was no affirmative response to Ma rtin’s question whethe r appellant recalled being read his rights, the court stated, “No an swer on the tape, but he testified under oath that the minor agreed that he remembered the rights and made an affirmative act, either a comment or a nod or something, right?” Defens e counsel thought that after listening to the tape, Martin had said “he wasn’t sure.” The court asked Martin what he had said, and Martin responded, “My best recollection is th ere was some sort of affirmation, whether it was a nod or a gesture.” Noth ing could be heard on the tape , and Martin testified he was “not 100 percent positive that he said yes, ” but that since he knew the interview was taped, “I would have no reason to have a different version in my police report.” In ruling the statement admissible, the court first found that the initial Miranda
waiver remained valid becau se “even though it is three hours or a little more, it’s basically one continuous act of incarceration, if you will. The mi nor doesn’t go home or go somewhere else. He’s always in custody th e whole time. The officer is always with
him other than for a few minutes when he’s be ing booked, so it’s a continuous act, which I think makes the admonition more relevant, if that’s—maybe not relevant. It’s more in his mind because he is not doing ot her things. So the time issue, I think, is established to
be reasonable under the circumstances.” The court then found the evidence established that appellant did respond in the affirmativ e when Martin, at the police station, asked whether appellant remembered having been read his rights: “As to the other issue, which
is whether he answered or not and whether th at answer was audible, the officer recalls something positive, not negative. It seems to me that in contrast to wh at you just said, if the officer had said there was something nega tive, he would have go ne ahead and further questioned, and he didn ’t because he thought there was something positive, and it wasn’t heard on the tape. So by a preponderance of the evidence, which is the burden in this case, I’m going to allow him to testify as to the statement.”8 Appellant distinguishes his case from Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th 555, in which the court found no readvisement was necessary. In Duff , the defendant waived his rights and spoke with one officer, then asked to stop; as the offi cer was preparing to leave, the defendant asked to speak with a different officer. The second officer appeared 23 minutes later and, after small talk and a ba throom break, questioned the defendant and obtained his confession. ( Id. at pp. 554-555.) The court noted that the second questioning was “just minutes later, in the ve ry same location as before, by a detective specifically summoned by the defendant, a defe ndant the trial court found had been in prison four times before and was quite famili ar with the criminal justice system.” ( Id. at p. 555.) By contrast, appellant argues he was onl y 16 years old, the questioning occurred three hours after the initial waiver, after he had been moved from the patrol car outside his school to the police station, and he wa s not an experienced criminal who could be expected to keep the Miranda warnings in mind. Appellant emphasizes that his criminal hi story consisted of only the true finding in
the automobile theft case that was consolidated with the present case. But his arrest in
the auto theft case occu rred just a month before his arre st and interview in the present case. At the time of that arrest, appellant gave a statement to the police that was written on one of the standard police department statement forms Martin described in his testimony. Under the printed text of the Miranda admonition, next to the question, “Do you understand each of these ri ghts I have explained to you, ” the word “yes” is written and appellant’s initials appear in the space provided for them. It thus appears that although appellant did not have a lengthy criminal history, he had very recent experience receiving Miranda warnings and waiving his rights. None of the circumstances suggests any basis for questioning the voluntariness of appellant’s statement. As the trial court noted, appella nt was in continuous police custody for the three-hour time period betwee n his initial waiver and the police station
interview. While three hours is longer than the 23-minute break in Duff , courts have found considerably lo nger periods did not require readvisement of rights. ( People v.9 Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 171 [36 hours]; Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 435 [40 hours]; People v. Stallworth (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 10 79, 1089 [16 hours]; People v. Thompson (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1966, 1972 [9 hour s].) That appellant was a minor did not necessarily mean readvisement was required. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 338-339.) And while th e subsequent interv iew took place at a different location from where appellant initially received the Miranda warnings and waived his rights, he remained in Martin’s compan y continuously, except for part of the time he was being processed through intake and Martin was in the office but approximately 20 to 30 feet

away. Appellant argues that Martin, who was in a position to observe appellant’s ability to understand his rights and retain the Miranda warnings, decided he needed to readvise appellant but did not do so prop erly. This characterization is inaccurate. Martin testified that he did not readvise appella nt but rather asked if appellant remembered being read his rights. Believing he had recei ved an affirmative response, Ma rtin proceeded to interview appellant. Presumably, if Martin had not received an affirma tive response to his question, he would have readvised appellant; if this were not the case, there would have
been no reason for Martin to make the inquiry. A reminde r from the police about a prior waiver is one of the factors that may weig h against the necessity of readvisement. ( People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 504-505; People v. Mickle, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 171; People v. Stallworth
, supra , 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1089.) The record supports a conclusion that Martin sought to determine whether he needed to readvise appellant, not
that he had decided rea dvisement was required. Appellant’s reliance upon People v. Saucedo-Contreras (2012) 55 Cal.4th 203 ( Saucedo-Contreras ) is no more availing. Appellant o ffers this case as an example of
what he believes “Martin should have done when he could not hear [appellant’s] response over his crackling radio.” In Saucedo-Contreras , the defendant was admonished and
indicated he understood his Miranda rights, then was asked wh ether he was willing to waive them. After his initial response— “ ‘[i]f you can bring me a lawyer, that way I[,] I with who . . . that way I can tell you everything that I know and everything that I need to10 tell you and someone to represent me’ ” —the officer asked several questions to clarify the defendant’s wishes. ( Saucedo-Contreras, at pp. 206-207.) Saucedo-Contreras held that the initial response was sufficiently ambigu ous to justify the clarification questions, the questions were not coercive, and the furt her responses made clear that the defendant was willing to speak to the officer without an attorn ey present. ( Id. at p. 207.) Here, there is no indication appellant sa id anything to suggest he wanted an attorney. Rather, the question is whether Mar tin accurately described appellant as having responded affirmatively when asked if he recalled being read his rights. The only “ambiguity” arises from the fact that no verb al response could be heard on the tape played in court because of th e crackle of Martin’s radio. Contrary to appellant’s characterization, however, Martin never “a dmitted that he coul d not have heard a response from [appellant] over the crackling of the radio” at the time of the interview ; he testified that he could not hear a verbal response on the tape. Martin testified that he did not remember whether appellant responded verb ally or with a gesture, but that according to his “best recollection,” the response was affirmative. Appellant describes Martin as having testif ied, after listening to the tape, that he could not be certain whether he “ever got a response” from appellant. In context, it appears from the transcript that Martin was sa ying he could not be certain whether he got

a verbal response, not whether he got a response at all . After playing the tape, the following exchange occurred between defense counsel and Martin: “Q: Okay. And did you hear when y ou answered the question—when you asked the question as to whether or not he recalled you reading his rights?
“A: Yes. “Q: And at that moment your radio crackles; is that correct?
“A: Yes. “Q: Okay. And you couldn’t hear any verbal response from [appellant], correct? “A: Not over the radio crackling, no. “Q: Okay. Can you say with certaint y whether or not he responded to you?11 “A: I cannot say with certain ty. That was the best of my recollection at the time. I did not review the tape, but I knew the whol e thing had been taped and audiotaped.” Later, when the court asked Martin what he had said about appellant’s response, Martin replied, “My best recollection is ther e was some sort of affirmation, whether it was a nod or a gesture. Listening to the tape, I could not hear him, obvi ously. [¶] . . . [¶] And I’m not 100 percent positive that he sa id yes. I never reviewed the tape, but knowing that there was a tape, I would have [h ad] no reason to have a different version in my police report.” Given the references to “verbal response” in this exchange, and the fact that the police report Martin referred to described a verbal response, it appears Martin understood the inquiry to be about whethe r there was in fact a verbal response (as indicated in the report) rather than some other indication of assent. The evidence supports the juvenile court’ s determination that appellant answered affirmatively when Martin asked if he remembered being read his Miranda rights. Martin did not purport to remember the prec ise manner in which appellant responded, but he was consistent in stating his recollection th at appellant gave an affirmative response. The police report relates that appellant replied “yes” to Martin’s ques tion. The facts that Martin proceeded with a record ed interview and related appellant having said “yes” in his report support the conclusion that appellant did in fact give this response. As Martin testified, since he knew the interview was re corded, he would have had no reason to say something in his report that woul d be refuted by the recording. Appellant’s statement was properly admitted.
II. The offense alleged in the subsequent petition, possession of a concealable firearm by a minor in violation of Penal Code section 29610, is a “wobbler” punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor. (Pen . Code, § 29700, subd. (a)(3); In re Jorge P. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 628, 632, disappr oved on other grounds in People v. Infante (2014) 58 Cal.4th 688, 695). When a minor is foun d to have committed su ch an offense, the juvenile court is required to explicitly declare the offense to be a felony or a12 misdemeanor. ( In re Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199, 1204; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 702; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.780(e)(5).) If it fails to do so, remand is required. ( In re Manzy W., at p. 1204.) Here, the trial court initially deferred decision on the level of the offense to the dispositional hearing, then continued the matter, but ultimately did not make the required determination. The Attorn ey General agrees that remand is required.
III. Appellant challenges several of the cond itions of probation as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Most of the challenges are to probation conditions as stated orally by the juvenile court: that he “is not to possess, own, or handle any firearm, knife
, weapon , fireworks, explosives, or chemicals that can produce explosives ,” “is to attend
school regularly ,” “is not to be under the influence of any alcoholic beverage or illegal or intoxicating substance nor is he to possess any associated paraphernalia,” and “is not to possess any narcotics, drugs, or other controlled substances, related paraphernalia , or poisons unless prescribed by a physician.” Th e last challenge is to a condition stated only in the minute order, that he “be of good behavior .” Appellant contends that the italicized language is insufficiently precise to give him, or those charged with enforcing the conditions, fair notice of the proscribed condu ct, and that the conditions improperly fail to include a knowledge requirement. “A probation condition ‘must be sufficien tly precise for the pr obationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated,’ if it is to withstand a cha llenge on the ground of vagueness. ( People v.
Reinertson (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d [320,] 324–325 .) A probation cond ition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitu tional rights must closely ta ilor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invali dated as unconstitutionally overbroad. (See [ In re ] White, [(1979)] 97 Cal.App.3d [141,] 149–150.)” ( In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.) Appellant argues that the weapons prohib ition is vague and overbroad because the terms “knife,” “weapons” and “chemicals th at can produce explosives” could include common household items that are legal for hi m to possess, such as a table knife or13 chlorine. Noting that courts have found s eemingly innocuous items to be dangerous or deadly weapons in circumstances where the possessor intended to so use them (e.g., People v. Page (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1473 [pencil]), appellant argues that the condition is not sufficiently precise and asks for it be modified to prohibit possession of “any ‘dangerous or deadly weapons.’ ” ( In re R.P. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 562; People
v. Moore (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1186.) 2 The phrase “deadly or dangerous weapon” refers to both “items specifically designed as weapons, and other items not specifically designed as weapons that the pr obationer intended to use to inflict, or threaten to inflict, great bo dily injury or death.” ( Moore, at p. 1186.) Because it has a “plain, commonsense meaning,” it is “ ‘sufficiently precise for [the probationer] to know what is required of him.’ ” ( Ibid. , quoting In re R.P., at p. 568.) Respondent asks us to upho ld the condition as orally st ated by the juvenile court by finding that no reasonable person would in terpret it to include possession of an
innocuous items absent circumstances indica ting appellant possessed such an item with the intention of using it to inflict or threat en to inflict great bodily injury. “A probation condition should be given ‘the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader.’ ” ( People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382.) We agree that a reasonable, objective reader would not interpret the prob ation condition, as stated, to apply to
innocuous items used for their intended purpose. Yet if resp ondent’s argument is that the only reasonable interpretation of the condition is that it app lies to the enumerated items only to the extent they are da ngerous or deadly weapons, surely the better practice would be to avoid ambiguity by so stating. Due process requires that appellant know in advance what conduct will violate the conditions of his probation ( In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 913 ( Victor L. )), and there is no apparent reason not to modify the

2 The probation conditions listed in the co urt’s minute order do not precisely track the court’s statements on the record. The w eapons condition is stated in the minute order as “Do not use or possess any deadly weapon or explosive device.” “When there is a discrepancy between the minute order and the oral pronouncement of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. ( People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2.)” ( People v. Gabriel (2010) 189 Cal.App. 4th 1070, 1073.)14 condition to expressly state what respondent agrees it must mean. Modifying the probation condition to prohibit possession of any dangerous ordeadly weapon will make clear to appellant that he is not permitted to possess any item with the intention of using it to threaten or inflict great bodily injury, and will also make clear that he cannot be found to have violated probation for possession of an item that is not specifically designed to be a dangerous or deadly weap on absent such intent. Appellant further argues the probation condition cannot pass constitutional muster without a requirement that he have knowledg e of the circumstances that would constitute
a violation. In People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747, 752, the defendant posited that absent a knowledge requirement, a probation condition prohibiting possession of
firearms or ammunition could result in him bei ng found to have violat ed probation if he borrowed a car not knowing that the owner’s lawf ully obtained gun was in the trunk. The
Freitas court held that the conditi on should be modified to specify that it applied to “knowing” possession because “t he law has no legitimate interest in punishing an innocent citizen who has no knowledge of the presence of a firearm or ammunition.” ( Id

. at p. 752.) Some courts have found express knowl edge requirements unnecessary, at least where the probation condition is clearly stat ed but could be viol ated unintentionally, because a probationer cannot be found to have violated probation unless the probationer willfully violated a probation condition. ( People v. Moore, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1186-1187 [stating inadvert ent possession of weap on could not be c onsidered willful probation violation]; People v. Patel (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 956, 960-961 [announcing
intention to “construe ever y probation condition proscribin g a probationer’s presence, possession, association, or similar acti on to require the action be undertaken knowingly”].)
In Victor L. , this court took a different vi ew. The probation condition there required that the minor “ ‘not remain in any building, vehicle or in the presence of any person where dangerous or deadly weapons or firearms or ammunition exist’ ” without limiting its proscription to buildin gs or vehicles that he “ knows to contain, or people who15 he knows to possess, such weapons.” ( Victor L., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 912.) Rejecting the argument that an express knowledge requirement was not necessary
because the condition should be given a “commonsense reading” and the minor’s probation could not be revoked without evidence of a willful violation, we noted, “[w]hile the requirement of proof of willfulness may save Victor from an unconstitutional finding of guilt based on an unknowing probation vi olation, that is cold comfort to a probationer who suffers from an unfounded arre st and detention based on the whim or vengeance of an arbitrary or mean-spirited proba tion officer. [Citation. ] [¶] Due process requires more. It requires that the probationer be informed in advance whether his conduct comports with or violat es a condition of probation.” ( Id. at p. 913.) We adhere to this view. Accordingly, on remand, the juvenile court may choose to phrase this probation condition simply as a prohibition against knowing possession, ownership or handling of a ny dangerous or deadly weap on. Alternatively, the
overbreadth of the condition could be resolved by adding the qualifying language to the condition previously described, prohibitin g appellant from knowingly possessing, owning or handling “any dangerous or deadly weapon , including firearms, knives, fireworks, explosives or chemicals that can produce explosives.” Appellant’s briefs focus primarily on th e weapons condition; his challenge to the terms “good behavior,” “regularly,” and “rel ated or associated paraphernalia” used in
other conditions is not ela borated beyond cursory statem ents that these terms are imprecise and do not include a knowledge co mponent. The reference to “related or associated paraphernalia” conflates two conditi ons, one of which directs appellant “not to be under the influence of any alcoholic beverage or illegal or intoxicating substance nor is he to possess any associated paraphernalia ” while the other states he is “not to possess any narcotics, drugs, or ot her controlled substances, related paraphernalia , or poisons unless prescribed by a physician.” In both cas es, to the extent there is any ambiguity as to what paraphernalia is related to or associ ated with alcoholic beverages or intoxicating or illegally-possessed substances, appellant would be protected by addition of the16 requirement that appellant not knowingly possess such items. The conditions should be modified accordingly. The requirement that appellant “attend sc hool ‘regularly’ ” is neither vague nor overbroad, particularly when read as part of the condition as a whole: He is to “[a]ttend school regularly.” “[O]bey all school rules and regulations.” He is “not to leave the school campus during school h ours with or without permission of school officials or probation officer.” 3 The meaning of this condition is clear: Appellant must attend school according to the normal school schedule, unle ss excused for a valid reason pursuant to the school’s rules and procedures. The requirement that appellant “be of good behavior” appears only in the December 26 minute order, which states: “A ttend classes or job on time and regularly; be of good behavior and perform well.” The phrases “be of good behavior” and “perform well” do not articulate any standard for judg ing what behavior is “good” or what constitutes performing “well.” These phrases do not give appellant adequate notice of
what conduct would violate the condition and allow for “ad hoc and subjective” evaluation by those enforcing it; they are not “ ‘sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine wh ether the condition has been violated.’ ” ( In re Sheena K.
, supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) As the phrases were not employed in the conditions of probation stated orally by the court, which control in case of a discrepancy with the minutes ( People v. Gabriel, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1073), it is necessary only to strike them from the minute order.

3 We note that the phrase “with or with out permission” appears to have been an error. As recommended in the dispositional report, the condition stated, “Attend school regularly, obey school rules and regulatio ns, and not leave the school campus during school hours without permission of school offici als or the probation officer.” We assume the court did not intend to prohibit appellant from leaving school with permission of school officers or the probation officer and si mply misspoke in stating this condition. The minute order, which is silent as to th e requirement of remaining on school campus during school hours, should be corrected to accurately state the condition.17 DISPOSITION The matter is remanded to the juvenile c ourt to exercise its discretion to declare
the violation of Penal Code section 296 10 either a felony or a misdemeanor. The court shall also modify the minute or der setting forth the conditions of probation in accordance with the views expressed herein, including: 1. Specify that the w eapons prohibition applies to knowing possession, ownership or handling of dangerous or deadly weapons; 2. Specify that appellant is not to knowingly possess paraphernalia related to narcotics, drugs or other cont rolled substances, or associated with alcoholic beverages or illegal or intoxicating substances; 3. Correct the phrasing of the conditio n requiring appellant not to leave school during school hours without permission of sch ool officials or the probation officer; 4. Delete the requirements that appe llant “be of good behavior” and “perform
well.” In all other respects, the order is affirmed.18 _ ____________ ____________ Kline, P.J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ Richman, J.

_____________ ____________ Miller, J.