[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-12887

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JAMES LEON DANIEL,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-00376-TWT-RGV-2

____________________

USCA11 Case: 23-12887 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 06/06/2024 Page: 1 of 10
2 Opinion of the Court 23-12887

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

James Daniel appeals his convictions for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and aiding and abetting the use of a firearm 

during a crime of violence. He argues that the district court plainly 

erred in accepting his guilty pleas because the court did not establish that he understood the charges against him or that the pleas 

were supported by independent factual bases. Because the district 

court complied with Rule 11, we affirm Daniel’s convictions. But

we remand in part for the limited purpose of correcting a typographical error in the judgment.

I.

James Daniel and four codefendants were charged with 

three counts of Hobbs Act crimes and two counts of brandishing a 

firearm during a crime of violence. The superseding indictment alleged facts about one successful bank robbery in April 2019 and one 

attempted bank robbery in August 2019. The superseding indictment explains that Daniel told an employee of Brink’s (a cash-handling company) that he wanted to rob one of their armored trucks

or couriers. Danielsolicited Brink’s route information from the employee, which he then provided to his other coconspirators. 

During the April robbery, Daniel and his codefendants

robbed a Brink’s truck while one codefendant pointed a rifle at the 

employee and disarmed him. In August, Daniel and his 

USCA11 Case: 23-12887 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 06/06/2024 Page: 2 of 10
23-12887 Opinion of the Court 3

codefendants traveled to a different bank. When the Brink’s truck 

arrived at the ATM, three of the codefendants approached the employee, with one brandishing a firearm. After the employee successfully fled, the three codefendants drove to a nearby location 

where Daniel was waiting. The group then tried to escape, but 

Daniel was caught following a police chase.

Daniel pleaded guilty to two of the charged crimes—conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1951, and aiding and abetting the brandishing of a firearm during 

a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Despite 

signing the written agreement—in which he stated he was pleading 

because he was factually guilty, that he understood he was giving 

up his trial rights, and that he understood the statutory maximums—he seemed to feign ignorance at both his change-of-plea 

and sentencing hearings. In an attempt to minimize his involvement, Daniel repeatedly stated that he wasn’t sure how he could 

be guilty of the crimes if he was not present at the scene and never 

personally possessed a firearm. After the government and the court 

explained the legal concepts of conspiracy and possession, he admitted guilt and conceded that he provided the route information 

to his codefendants. At no time did Daniel object to the plea agreement or the presentence investigation report. The district court 

sentenced him to 171-months’ imprisonment. 

This appeal followed.

USCA11 Case: 23-12887 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 06/06/2024 Page: 3 of 10
4 Opinion of the Court 23-12887

II.

On appeal, Daniel argues that the district court plainly erred 

in accepting his guilty pleas because there was no showing that he 

understood the nature of the charges, and there were insufficient 

factual bases supporting the pleas. 

Because it is the district judge that “observes the defendant’s 

demeanor, life experience, and intelligence,” we review a district 

court’s factual findings—including whether the defendant understood the nature of the charges against him and that a sufficient 

factual basis supports the plea—only for clear error. United States v. 

Presendieu, 880 F.3d 1228, 1241 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Additionally, when the alleged Rule 11 violation 

was not objected to below, we review for plain error. United States

v. Monroe, 353 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003). 

For us to reverse under plain-error review, a defendant must 

show that there is (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects 

his substantial rights. Id. It is “the defendant [who] bears the burden 

of persuasion with respect to prejudice or the effect on substantial 

rights.” Id. at 1352. To establish prejudice when challenging a guilty 

plea, a defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability 

that he would have not pled guilty” if the error had not occurred. 

United States v. Coats, 8 F.4th 1228, 1237–38 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the defendant meets that burden,

“we may exercise our discretion to notice a forfeited error” if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 

USCA11 Case: 23-12887 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 06/06/2024 Page: 4 of 10
23-12887 Opinion of the Court 5

proceedings.” Monroe, 353 F.3d at 1349 (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Before accepting a guilty plea, a district court must inform

the defendant of his rights, including the nature of the charges 

against him. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G). In determining that a 

defendant’s guilty plea is knowing and voluntary, the district court 

must conduct a plea colloquy to ensure that the three core concerns of Rule 11 are met: (1) the guilty plea is free from coercion; 

(2) the defendant understands the nature of the charges; and (3) the 

defendant knows and understands the consequences of his guilty 

plea. Presendieu, 880 F.3d at 1238. And when considering those core 

concerns, we presume that a defendant’s statements made during 

his plea colloquy are true. See United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 

187 (11th Cir. 1994). 

When the defendant fails to object to his plea before the district court, the court’s failure to strictly comply with Rule 11 does

not necessarily implicate a core concern of the Rule, nor does it 

require reversal if no prejudice is shown. Monroe, 353 F.3d at 1356. 

Even if the district court does not explicitly cover an item in Rule 

11, we will not remand so long as the court adequately addressed

the core concerns. See id. at 1355–56 & n.12.

A district court must also ensure that a plea is supported by 

a sufficient factual basis. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). There need not

be uncontroverted evidence of guilt—a factual basis is sufficient if 

a court could reasonably find the defendant guilty. United States v. 

Rodriguez, 751 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2014). And the factual basis 

USCA11 Case: 23-12887 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 06/06/2024 Page: 5 of 10
6 Opinion of the Court 23-12887

need not come solely from the defendant’s admissions—rather, the 

court can consider several sources, including a factually precise indictment that shows how the defendant’s conduct “was within in 

the ambit of that defined as criminal.” United States v. Montoya-Camacho, 644 F.2d 480, 485–86 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981)

(quotation marks omitted).

Because Daniel challenges both his Hobbs Act conviction 

and his firearm conviction, we will separately consider whether the 

district court properly accepted those pleas.

A.

To convict a defendant of Hobbs Act robbery, the government must prove that there was a robbery and an effect on interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Hobbs Act robbery can be 

committed by conspiracy. Id. Robbery is defined as “the unlawful 

taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the 

presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to 

his person or property,” among other things. § 1951(b)(1). 

The district court did not clearly or plainly err in accepting 

Daniel’s guilty plea for conspiring to commit Hobbs Act robbery. 

See Presendieu, 880 F.3d at 1240; Monroe, 353 F.3d at 1349. In signing 

his plea agreement, Daniel stated that he had read the indictment, 

discussed it with his attorney, and that he understood its terms and 

the rights he was waiving. At the change-of-plea hearing, the government explained that the conspiracy charge required it to prove 

that Daniel “and at least one other person agreed to accomplish an 

USCA11 Case: 23-12887 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 06/06/2024 Page: 6 of 10
23-12887 Opinion of the Court 7

unlawful plan” to rob Brink’s trucks. Daniel stated during his plea 

colloquy that he understood that he was charged with conspiracy 

to commit Hobbs Act robbery and that he was guilty of that crime. 

And we strongly presume Daniel’s statement of understanding to 

be true. See Medlock, 12 F.3d at 187. Daniel also stated at sentencing 

that he understood why he was guilty of conspiracy. He therefore 

cannot show that the district court’s finding that he understood the 

charge against him was clearly erroneous. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11(b)(1)(G); Presendieu, 880 F.3d at 1240. 

As to the sufficiency of the factual basis, the government 

stated that Daniel had sent text messages to a coconspirator about 

the Brink’s truck route, that he had told other members that he had 

an inside man at Brink’s, and that Brink’s engaged in interstate 

commerce. Daniel told the district court that he had given the 

route information and he knew that the coconspirator planned to 

commit robbery. The indictment’s factual allegations stated that 

Daniel and his “crew” made plans to rob the Brink’s trucks and that 

he actively participated in the conspiracy. See Montoya-Camacho, 

644 F.2d at 485–86. There was therefore a sufficient factual basis to 

find that Daniel had conspired to commit a robbery that affected 

interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).

Accordingly, we affirm Daniel’s conviction for conspiring to 

commit Hobbs Act robbery.

USCA11 Case: 23-12887 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 06/06/2024 Page: 7 of 10
8 Opinion of the Court 23-12887

B.

We will next consider Daniel’s challenges to his section 924(c) conviction for aiding and abetting the use of a firearm 

in the commission of a violent crime.

“To prevail under a theory of aiding and abetting, the government must prove: (1) the substantive offense was committed by 

someone; (2) the defendant committed an act which contributed 

to and furthered the offense; and (3) the defendant intended to aid 

in its commission.” United States v. Margarita Garcia, 906 F.3d 1255, 

1280 (11th Cir. 2018); see 18 U.S.C. § 2.

The district court did not plainly err in accepting Daniel’s 

section 924(c) guilty plea. See Monroe, 353 F.3d at 1349. In signing 

his plea agreement, Daniel stated that he had read the indictment, 

discussed it with his attorney, and that he understood its terms and 

the rights he was waiving. At the change-of-plea hearing, the government explained to Daniel that, to prove a section 924(c) violation, it had to show that, in relation to the April 2019 robbery, he 

had aided and abetted the carrying of a firearm during the violent 

crime, with knowledge that another participant would use or carry 

a firearm. Daniel explicitly stated during his plea colloquy that he

understood that “whether [he] was at the scene of the crime or 

not,” he was being charged with aiding and abetting the charge. See 

Medlock, 12 F.3d at 187.

As to the sufficiency of the factual basis, the government 

stated that it could prove that Daniel had been involved in the robbery of armed Brink’s trucks, which would necessarily involve the 

USCA11 Case: 23-12887 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 06/06/2024 Page: 8 of 10
23-12887 Opinion of the Court 9

use of firearms. It also stated that the other conspirators had 

pleaded guilty to the section 924(c) charge, showing the use of a 

firearm in the robberies. The indictment stated that Daniel was 

with a coconspirator who pointed a gun at a Brink’s employee, and 

that Daniel disarmed the employee, committing an act which contributed to the offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 2; Montoya-Camacho, 644 

F.2d at 485–86. Daniel cannot show that the district court’s findings 

that he understood the charge against him and that there was a sufficient factual basis for his guilty plea were clearly erroneous. See

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b); Presendieu, 880 F.3d at 1240.

Accordingly, we affirm Daniel’s conviction for aiding and 

abetting the use of a firearm during the commission of a violent 

crime.

III.

Although we affirm Daniel’s convictions, there is a clerical 

error in his judgment. We may sua sponteraise typographical errors 

and remand with instructions to correct them. United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 822 (11th Cir. 2006). And it is a fundamental error 

for a district court to enter judgment against a defendant who has 

not been found guilty of the crime recited in the judgment. Id. The 

judgment states that Daniel was convicted on Count 1 under 

18 U.S.C. § 951, but that statute regulates the behavior of agents of 

foreign governments. See 18 U.S.C. § 951. The Hobbs Act, which 

Daniel was actually convicted under, is 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Therefore, we remand to the district court with instructions to amend 

the judgment to correct the clerical error. 

USCA11 Case: 23-12887 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 06/06/2024 Page: 9 of 10
10 Opinion of the Court 23-12887

IV.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED IN PART.

USCA11 Case: 23-12887 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 06/06/2024 Page: 10 of 10