1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

HONORABLE JOSEPH E. IRENAS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-0057 

(JEI/KMW)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

PATRAS WILLIAMS, LLC

Amy Marie Williams, Esquire

14 Countryside Lane, Suite 100

Ringwood, NJ 07456

Counsel for Plaintiff

REILLY, JANICZEK & MCDEVITT PC

Susan Valinis, Esquire

2500 McClellan Boulevard, Suite 240

Merchantville, NJ 08109

Counsel for Defendant

IRENAS, Senior District Judge:

This is a breach of contract case. Plaintiff 2000 Clements 

Bridge, LLC (“Clements Bridge”) brought suit against Defendant 

OfficeMax North America, Inc. (“OfficeMax”), claiming that 

OfficeMax had breached the terms of a commercial lease agreement 

between the parties. Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment Awarding Damages, Attorneys’ Fees

2000 CLEMENTS BRIDGE, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

OFFICEMAX NORTH AMERICA, INC.,

Defendant.
2

and Legal Expenses (Dkt. No. 103).1

 For the reasons given below, 

the Motion will be granted in part in favor of Clements Bridge. 

Summary judgment will also be granted in part in favor of 

OfficeMax.

I.

There are no material facts in dispute. As the Court has 

previously ruled on the issue of liability, see 2000 Clements 

Bridge, LLC v. Officemax North America, Inc., No. 11-0057, 2012 

WL 3600285 (D.N.J. Aug. 21, 2012), the Court will recount only 

those facts relevant to the disposition of the instant Motion. 

Plaintiff 2000 Clements Bridge, LLC owns the Deptford Landing 

Shopping Center (“Shopping Center”), which consists of retail 

space. Defendant OfficeMax North America, Inc., was a tenant of 

the Shopping Center. 

On September 13, 2007, OfficeMax entered into a lease 

(“Lease”) with the Shopping Center’s previous owner, AIG Baker 

Deptford, LLC. (SUMF2 ¶ 1) On July 16, 2010, Clements Bridge 

acquired title to the Shopping Center and took over the Lease. 

(SUMF ¶ 2) The Lease contains three articles relevant to the 

 

1 This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1332(a)(1). 2 SUMF refers to OfficeMax’s Statement of Material Undisputed Facts in Support 

of OfficeMax’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on 

Damages (Dkt. No. 107).
3

matter at hand. Article 23, which sets forth the landlord’s 

remedies, provides,

If Tenant shall be in default of any monetary 

obligation under this lease . . . , or shall be in 

default under any other provision of this 

lease . . . , then Landlord may, by giving written 

notice to Tenant, at any time thereafter during the 

continuance of such default, either (a) terminate this 

lease or (b) re-enter the Demised Premises by summary 

proceedings or otherwise, expel Tenant and remove all 

property therefrom, relet the Demised Premises at the 

best possible rent readily obtainable (making 

reasonable efforts therefor) and receive the rent 

therefrom; provided, however, Tenant shall remain 

liable for the equivalent of the amount of all rent 

reserved herein less the avails of reletting, if any, 

after deducting therefrom the reasonable cost of 

obtaining possession of the Demised Premises and the 

reasonable cost of any repairs and alterations 

(excluding tenant improvements for any replacement 

tenant or tenants thereof) necessary to prepare it for 

reletting, or (c) exercise any other remedy permitted 

at law or equity other than acceleration of 

rents. . . . Except for the legal remedy of damages 

(provided Landlord shall in all instances be required 

to mitigate damages) as set forth herein and remedies 

of Landlord expressly set forth herein, Landlord’s 

remedies shall be exclusive of other remedies.

(Id. at Ex. 1 (“Lease”), art. 23, at 27-28) Article 35 of the 

Lease also specifies, “Unless otherwise provided, upon the 

termination of this lease under any of the Articles hereof, the 

parties hereto shall be relieved of any further liability 

hereunder as to acts, omissions or defaults occurring prior to 

such termination.” (Id. art. 35, at 34) Finally, Article 40 

delineates the parties’ responsibilities with respect to 

attorneys’ fees:
4

If either party hereto be made or becomes a party to 

any litigation commenced by or against the other party 

involving the enforcement of any of the rights and 

remedies of such party, or arising on account of the 

default of the other party in the performance of such 

party’s obligations hereunder, then the prevailing 

party in any such litigation, or the party becoming 

involved in such litigation because of a claim against 

such other party, as the case may be, shall receive 

from the other party all costs and reasonable 

attorneys’ fees incurred by such party in such 

litigation.

(Id. art. 40, at 35)

Beginning in October 2010, OfficeMax stopped making monthly 

rent payments to Clements Bridge, who sent default notices to 

OfficeMax on October 12, 2010, November 5, 2010, and December 7, 

2010. (Williams Cert. ¶ 4, Exs. 2, 3, 4) In each notice, 

Clements Bridge reserved “the right to exercise any or all of 

those remedies as set forth in Article 23 of the Lease . . . , 

which may include, but shall not be limited to, the right to 

commence legal proceedings.” (Id. at Exs. 2, 3, 4) In 

addition, the November 5 letter stated that Clements Bridge had 

the right “to exercise any and all of the remedies set forth in 

Article 23 of the Lease or elsewhere, which may include, but 

shall not be limited to, the right to commence legal proceedings 

against [OfficeMax] to obtain all appropriate legal and 

equitable remedies.” (Id. at Ex. 3)

On November 23, 2010, Clements Bridge filed the Complaint 

in New Jersey State Court, alleging breach of contract, unjust 
5

enrichment, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing, and tortious interference. Clements Bridge also sought 

a declaratory judgment. (Notice of Removal Ex. A, Dkt. No. 1) 

On December 7, 2010, OfficeMax sent Clements Bridge a written 

notice that it was terminating the Lease as of February 28, 

2011. (SUMF ¶ 3) OfficeMax removed the action to this Court on 

January 6, 2011 (Dkt. No. 1) and filed an Answer and Crossclaims 

on January 20, 2011. (Dkt. No. 7) On January 22, 2011, 

OfficeMax closed its store. Clements Bridge sent a letter to 

OfficeMax on February 25, 2011 stating that it was exercising 

“the remedy specifically set forth in Section 23(b),” which 

allows Clements Bridge to re-enter the property. (Valinis Cert. 

Ex. A) Clements Bridge took possession of the store on February 

28, 2011. (SUMF ¶¶ 6-7)

Between April and December 2011, Clements Bridge negotiated 

a retail lease with DSW Shoe Warehouse, Inc. (“DSW”) to replace 

the Lease it had with OfficeMax. (Williams Cert. ¶ 9) On 

December 19, 2011, Clements Bridge sent OfficeMax a letter 

indicating that it was terminating the Lease. (SUMF ¶ 20) 

Clements Bridge entered into a lease with DSW (“DSW Lease”) that 

same day. DSW took possession of the store on January 13, 2012, 

and began paying rent on April 10, 2012. (Williams Cert. Ex. 1 

(“Damages Stipulation”), ¶ 5)
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On August 21, 2012, this Court found that OfficeMax had 

breached the Lease and granted summary judgment to Clements 

Bridge on that claim. (Dkt. Nos. 84-85) The Court denied 

summary judgment on Clements Bridge’s remaining claims and on 

all of OfficeMax’s crossclaims. (Id.) 

On November 21, 2012, Clements Bridge and OfficeMax entered 

into a Stipulation of Facts Regarding Damages (“Damages 

Stipulation”). (Damages Stipulation ¶ 4) The parties agreed to 

the amounts of all categories of damages that Clements Bridge 

seeks but disagreed on the categories of damages to which 

Clements Bridge is entitled. The five undisputed categories of 

damages are as follows:

1) Fixed Rent for the period from December 1, 2010 through 

December 19, 2011 (“Undisputed Fixed Rent Damages”) in 

the amount of $419,600.41, subject to prejudgment 

interest at a rate of 6%;

2) Common area maintenance costs (“CAM”) for the period 

from January 1, 2009 through December 19, 2011

(“Undisputed CAM Damages”) in the amount of 

$107,980.51, subject to prejudgment interest at a rate 

of 6%;

3) Taxes for the period from January 1, 2010 through 

December 19, 2011 (“Undisputed Tax Damages”) in the 

amount of $132,914.56, subject to prejudgment interest 

at a rate of 6%;

4) Premises utility charge amounts for the period of March 

1, 2011 through December 19, 2011 (“Undisputed Carrying 

Cost Damages”) in the amount of $9,553.79, subject to 

prejudgment interest at a rate of 6%; and

5) Costs and expense that Clements Bridge paid to third 

parties to repair damage to the Premises after 
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OfficeMax vacated it (“Undisputed Repair Damages”) in 

the amount of $1,006.80, subject to prejudgment 

interest at a rate of 6%.

(Id. ¶¶ 9, 11, 13, 15, 17)

In addition, there are six categories of damages on which 

the parties disagree. For three of the categories – Fixed Rent, 

CAM, and Taxes – the disputed amounts concern the period of time 

after Clements Bridge entered into the DSW Lease. The disputed 

damages are as follows:

1) Fixed Rent for the period from December 20, 2011 

through January 31, 2018 (“Disputed Fixed Rent 

Damages”) in the amount of $622,700.33, with future 

Disputed Fixed Rent Damages to be discounted to 

present value at 6%;

2) CAM amounts for the period from December 20, 2011 

through April 9, 2012 (“Disputed CAM Damages”) in the 

amount of $10,109.56;

3) Taxes for the period of December 20, 2011 through 

April 9, 2012 (“Disputed Taxes Damages”) in the amount 

of $27,560.93;

4) Premises utility charges for the period from December 

20, 2011 through January 12, 2012 (“Disputed Carrying 

Cost Damages”), the date on which DSW took possession 

of the Premises, in the amount of $876.26;

5) Commissions that Clements Bridge paid to third party 

brokers in connection with the DSW Lease (“Commission 

Damages”) in the amount of $127,088.90; and

6) A construction allowance that Clements Bridge paid to 

DSW pursuant to the DSW Lease (“Construction Allowance 

Damages”) in the amount of $600,420.00.

(Id. ¶¶ 10, 12, 14, 16, 18-19) 
8

Clements Bridge now moves for summary judgment on damages, 

attorneys’ fees, and legal expenses. (Dkt. No. 103)

II.

Summary judgment is proper if “the movant shows that there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 

(1986). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court 

must construe the facts and inferences in a light most favorable 

to the non-moving party. Pollock v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Long Lines, 

794 F.2d 860, 864 (3d Cir. 1986). 

“‘With respect to an issue on which the non-moving party 

bears the burden of proof, the burden on the moving party may be 

discharged by ‘showing’ – that is, pointing out to the district 

court – that there is an absence of evidence to support the 

nonmoving party’s case.’” Conoshenti v. Public Serv. Elec. & 

Gas, 364 F.3d 135, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Celotex, 477 

U.S. at 323). The role of the Court is not “to weigh the 

evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine 

whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “Only disputes 

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 
9

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary 

judgment.” Id. at 249.

Where the meaning of contract language is at issue, a party 

is entitled to summary judgment “only if the contract language 

is unambiguous,” such that it “is subject to only one reasonable 

interpretation.” Arnold M. Diamond, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Trailing 

Co., 180 F.3d 518, 522 (3d Cir. 1999). While “the threshold 

inquiry as to whether contract terms are ambiguous is a legal 

question,” the interpretation of an ambiguous contract term is 

left to the factfinder. Teamsters Indus. Employees Welfare Fund 

v. Rolls-Royce Motor Cars, Inc., 989 F.2d 132, 135 n.2 (3d Cir. 

1993).

III.

A.

The threshold dispute question before the Court is which 

remedy Clements Bridge elected under Article 23. OfficeMax 

argues that Clements Bridge ultimately chose to terminate the 

Lease pursuant to Article 23(a) and is therefore barred from 

recovering damages for the period from December 20, 2011,

onwards under Article 35. The Court disagrees.

First, the Court finds that the remedies listed in Article 

23 are not exclusive. Article 23 states, “Landlord may . . . 

either (a) terminate this lease or (b) re-enter the Demised 
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Premises . . . , or (c) exercise any other remedy permitted at 

law or equity . . . .” (Lease art. 23, at 27-28) Nothing in 

this language indicates that Clements Bridge could pursue only 

one of the listed remedies. Rather, Clements Bridge was 

entitled to exercise any and all remedies in Article 23, 

including termination, re-entry, and litigation. 

Second, even if the Article 23 remedies were exclusive, the 

Court finds that Clements Bridge elected to re-enter, retake, 

and relet under Article 23(b). Thus, Clements Bridge’s 

purported termination of the Lease pursuant to Article 23(a) on

December 19, 2011 was invalid. As such, Article 35, which 

limits the parties’ liability after the Lease is terminated, 

does not apply. (Id. art. 35, at 34) The Court now turns to 

the question of damages.

B.

“Judicial remedies upon breach of contract fall into three 

general categories: restitution, compensatory damages and 

performance.” Donovan v. Bachstadt, 453 A.2d 160, 165 (N.J. 

1982). The purpose of compensatory damages is to put the 

nonbreaching party in the position it would have been in absent 

the breach. Totaro, Duffy, Cannova & Company, L.L.C., 921 A.2d 

1100, 1107-08 (N.J. 2007). “What that position is depends upon 

what the parties reasonably expected.” Donovan, 453 A.2d at 
11

165. Thus, a defendant is liable only for losses that were 

foreseeable result of a breach when the contract was made. Id.

In this case, the parties’ expectations are clear: 

Clements Bridge expected that OfficeMax would pay it a certain 

amount of Fixed Rent until the Lease expired on January 31, 

2018. The parties also expected that for the duration of the 

Lease, OfficeMax would cover common area maintenance (“CAM”) 

costs, real estate taxes, and utility charges. Therefore, 

Clements Bridge is entitled to the following damages:

1) Disputed Fixed Rent Damages in the amount of 

$622,700.33,3 which is the difference between the 

amount of rent Clements Bridge now receives from DSW 

and the amount of rent it would have received from 

OfficeMax for the duration of the Lease;

2) $10,109.56 in Disputed CAM Damages for the period from 

December 20, 2011, through April 9, 2012, the date on 

which DSW began paying rent;

3) $27,560.93 in Disputed Taxes Damages for the period of 

December 20, 2011, through April 9, 2012; and

4) Disputed Carrying Cost Damages in the amount of 

$876.26, which is the amount that Clements Bridge paid 

in utility charges from December 20, 2011, the date on 

which Clements Bridge entered into the Lease with DSW, 

through January 12, 2012, the date on which DSW 

accepted possession of the Premises.

(Damages Stipulation ¶¶ 10, 12, 14, 16)

Clements Bridge also asserts that it can recover brokers’ 

commissions that it paid in connection with the DSW Lease under 

 

3 Per the parties’ Damages Stipulation, any future Disputed Fixed Rent Damages 

will be discounted to present value at 6%.
12

a compensatory damages theory. The Court agrees. The purpose 

of compensatory damages is to put the plaintiff in the position 

it would have been in but for the defendant’s breach. Totaro, 

921 A.2d at 1107-08. Here, Clements Bridge would not have had 

to pay these fees absent OfficeMax’s breach. Further, the 

commission was a foreseeable consequence of the breach, 

particularly given the Lease’s express requirement that Clements 

Bridge mitigate its damages in order to pursue remedies at law 

or equity. (Lease art. 23(c), at 28) 

However, the Court does not agree that Clements Bridge is 

entitled to the full amount of the Commission Damages. The 

Lease was to expire on January 31, 2018. By contrast, the DSW 

Lease will expire on January 31, 2022.4

 The commission that 

Clements Bridge paid covers the full term of the DSW Lease, 

which lasts four years beyond when the OfficeMax Lease would 

have expired. Allowing Clements Bridge to recover Commission 

Damages for the years beyond the expiration of the OfficeMax 

Lease would result in a windfall for Clements Bridge. 

Therefore, the Court will reduce the Commission Damages by 40% 

from $127,088.90 to $76,253.34. This reduction is proportional 

to the number of years that the DSW Lease lasts beyond the 

expiration of the OfficeMax Lease. 

 

4 For the purposes of the damages calculation, the Court assumes that DSW will 

not exercise its option to extend the DSW Lease to either fifteen or twenty 

years.
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Finally, Clements Bridge seeks damages for $600,420.00 in 

Construction Allowance damages for money it paid to DSW under 

the terms of the DSW Lease. Clements Bridge contends that these 

costs were a foreseeable consequence of OfficeMax’s breach and 

thus recoverable under a compensatory damages theory. OfficeMax 

argues that Article 23(b) bars recovery for these costs because 

it provides that OfficeMax is responsible for “the reasonable 

cost of any repairs and alterations (excluding tenant 

improvements for any replacement tenant[)].” (Id. art. 23(b), 

at 28)

In this case, the Lease bars Clements Bridge from 

recovering these costs as compensatory damages. “Under [New 

Jersey] law, when the terms of a contract are clear and 

unambiguous, there is no room for construction and the court 

must enforce those terms as written.” Watson v. City of E. 

Orange, 815 A.2d 956, 959 (N.J. 2003). Article 23(b) explicitly 

excludes tenant improvements for the replacement tenant as a 

category of damages for which Clements Bridge may recover. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Clements Bridge is not 

entitled to Construction Allowance Damages.

In sum, summary judgment will be granted in favor of 

Clements Bridge with regard to the Disputed Fixed Rent Damages, 

Disputed CAM Damages, Disputed Taxes Damages, Disputed Carrying 

Cost Damages, and Commission Damages in part. Summary judgment 
14

will be granted in favor of OfficeMax with respect to the 

Construction Allowance Damages. Clements Bridge will be awarded 

damages in the following amounts:

Undisputed Damages5 $671,056.076

Disputed Fixed Rent Damages $622,700.337

Disputed CAM Damages $10,109.56

Disputed Taxes Damages $27,560.93

Disputed Carrying Cost Damages $876.26

Commission Damages $76,253.34

Total $1,408,556.49

IV.

Clements Bridge also seeks attorneys’ fees and costs and 

divides those fees into three categories: litigation attorneys’ 

fees pursuant to Article 40, pre-litigation fees in connection 

with OfficeMax’s default, and mitigation of damages fees in 

connection with the negotiation of the DSW Lease. (Williams 

Cert. ¶ 14) OfficeMax opposes these fees for two reasons. 

First, OfficeMax argues that Article 40 does not permit Clements 

Bridge to recover attorneys’ fees for pre-litigation and lease-

 

5 See supra pp. 6-7 for a breakdown of the Undisputed Damages; see also 

Damages Stipulation ¶¶ 9, 11, 13, 15, 17. 6 This amount is subject to the assessment of prejudgment interest at a rate 

of 6%, per the Damages Stipulation. (Damages Stipulation ¶¶ 9, 11, 13, 15, 

17)

7 As agreed in the Damages Stipulation, this amount will be discounted to 

present value at 6%. (Id. ¶ 10)
15

negotiation work. Second, OfficeMax contends that the fees 

sought are unreasonable. The Court addresses these arguments in 

turn.

A.

In recognition of New Jersey’s strong public policy against 

shifting attorneys’ fees and costs, the New Jersey Supreme Court 

has adopted “the ‘American Rule,’ which prohibits recover of 

counsel fees by the prevailing party against the losing party.” 

In re Niles, 823 A.2d 1, 7 (N.J. 2003) (citing In re Estate of 

Lash, 766 A.2d 765, 771 (N.J. 2001)). “However, ‘a prevailing 

party can recover those fees if they are expressly provided for 

by statute, court rule, or contract.’” Litton Indus., Inc. v. 

IMO Indus., Inc., 982 A.2d 420, 427 (N.J. 2009) (quoting 

Packard-Bamberger & Co., Inc. v. Collier, 771 A.2d 1194, 1202 

(N.J. 2001)). “[E]ven where attorney-fee shifting is controlled 

by contractual provisions, courts will strictly construe that 

provision in light of the general policy disfavoring the award 

of attorneys’ fees.” N. Bergen Rex Transp., Inc. v. Trailer 

Leasing Co., 730 A.2d 843, 848 (N.J. 1999) (citing McGuire v. 

City of Jersey City, 593 A.2d 309, 417 (N.J. 1999)).

There is no dispute in this case that the parties 

contracted for shifting attorneys’ fees and costs to the 

prevailing party. OfficeMax instead challenges Clements 
16

Bridge’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs outside of this 

litigation. The Court agrees that Clements Bridge may not 

recover for this work.

Article 40 of the Lease provides,

If either party hereto be made or becomes a party 

to any litigation commenced by or against the other 

party involving the enforcement of any of the rights 

and remedies of such party, or arising on account of 

the default of the other party in the performance of 

such party’s obligations hereunder, then the 

prevailing party in any such litigation . . . shall 

receive from the other party all costs and reasonable 

attorneys’ fees incurred by such party in such 

litigation.

(Lease art. 40, at 35) This provision plainly limits attorneys’ 

fees and costs to those sustained as part of any litigation 

around the Lease. Fees and costs for attorney work performed in 

connection with the pre-litigation default notices and 

negotiation of the DSW Lease are therefore outside the scope of 

Article 40, especially in light of New Jersey’s directive to 

construe the language strictly.

Clements Bridge argues that it should be awarded these fees 

and costs as compensatory damages on the theory that but for 

OfficeMax’s breach, there would have been no need for Clements 

Bridge to send default notices or negotiate a new lease. While 

that may be true as a matter of fact, the argument fails as a 

basis for awarding attorneys’ fees. As noted above, New Jersey 

has a strong public policy against shifting attorneys’ fees and 
17

costs. Allowing Clements Bridge to recover fees and costs for 

work relating to OfficeMax’s default and the DSW Lease would 

controvert that policy, especially because the parties expressly 

contracted around the presumption against fee-shifting and 

limited fee-shifting to fees incurred in litigation. 

Accordingly, Clements Bridge may not recover attorneys’ fees and 

costs for any work related to OfficeMax’s default prior to the 

commencement of litigation or the negotiation of the DSW Lease.

B.

OfficeMax next argues that the fees incurred in litigation 

are unreasonable. “In determining the reasonableness of an 

attorneys’ fee award, the threshold issue ‘is whether the party 

seeking the fee prevailed in the litigation.’” Litton, 982 A.2d 

at 428 (quoting N. Bergen, 730 A.2d at 848). After making that 

determination, the Court must use the lodestar method, which 

involves multiplying the total number of hours reasonably 

expended by a reasonable hourly rate, to decide what constitutes 

a reasonable fee. Rendine v. Pantzer, 661 A.2d 1202, 1226 (N.J. 

1995); see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-37 

(1983). The Court must consider the following factors in 

determining the reasonableness of the fee:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and 

difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 

requisite to perform the legal service properly;
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(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that 

the acceptance of the particular employment will 

preclude other employment by the lawyer;

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for 

similar legal services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by 

the circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional 

relationship with the client;

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the 

lawyer or lawyers performing the services;

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 860 A.2d 435, 447 (N.J. 

2004) (citing RPC 1.5(a)).

“The computation of the lodestar mandates that the trial 

court determine the reasonableness of the hourly rate of the 

prevailing attorney in comparison to rates for similar services 

by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and 

reputation in the community.” Litton, 982 A.2d at 429 (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court must also 

determine whether the time expended to achieve the result is 

“equivalent to the time ‘competent counsel would have expended 

to achieve a comparable result.’” Furst, 860 A.2d at 447 

(quoting Rendine, 661 A.2d at 1227). The Court should exclude 

hours that are not reasonably expended, including those that are 
19

excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. Rendine, 661 

A.2d at 1226. Finally, the Court must consider the degree of 

success when deciding whether the time expended is reasonable. 

Litton, 982 A.2d at 429. The Court may reduce an award only “in 

response to specific objections made by the opposing party.” 

Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 426 F.3d 694, 

711 (3d Cir. 2005).

1. Reasonable Rate

Clements Bridge seeks an hourly rate of $405.00 per hour 

for legal services performed by partners in connection with 

litigation and an hourly rate of $150.00 per hour for work 

performed by paralegals in connection with litigation. 

(Williams Cert. ¶ 19) The party seeking fees bears the burden 

“of producing sufficient evidence of what constitutes a 

reasonable market rate for the essential character and 

complexity of the legal services rendered in order to make out a 

prima facie case.” Smith v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 107 F3d 223, 

225 (3d Cir. 1997). “This burden is normally addressed by 

affidavits prepared by other attorneys in the relevant legal 

community.” Access 4 All, Inc. v. Boardwalk Regency Corp., No. 

08-3817, 2012 WL 3627775, at *4 (D.N.J. June 28, 2012).

To support the reasonableness of its requested rate, 

Clements Bridge submits a certification from lead counsel, Amy 
20

Williams, regarding the nature of the work performed (Williams 

Cert.); a profile of the firm, Patras Williams, LLC, and its 

partners, Ms. Williams and Anna Patras (id. Ex. 9); and 

certifications from four partners from four different law firms 

who practice in the District of New Jersey stating that the 

requested rates are commensurate with the prevailing rates in 

this legal community (Bundy Cert.; Kaller Cert.; Vales Cert.; 

Argiropoulous Cert.). Clements Bridge has met its burden with 

these submissions. As OfficeMax has not opposed the 

reasonableness of the hourly rates, the Court finds the proposed 

rates to be reasonable.

2. Reasonable Hours

OfficeMax raises several objections to Clements Bridge’s 

request for fees. The Court addresses them in turn.

a.

First, OfficeMax argues that the award should be reduced to 

reflect the fact that Clements Bridge succeeded on only one of 

its claims. (Valinis Cert. ¶ 31(a)) The Court disagrees. 

Although the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Clements 

Bridge on only its breach of contract claim, the remaining 

claims for unjust enrichment, breach of the covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing, tortious interference, and a declaratory 
21

judgment were clearly pled in the alternative. Further, 

Clements Bridge’s success on its breach of contract claim 

allowed it to recover almost all of the damages that it sought. 

Cf. N. Bergen, 730 A.2d at 850 (holding that the attorneys’ fee 

award should be reduced where plaintiff recovered only fiftyeight percent of the damages it sought). Accordingly, the Court 

will not reduce the award on this basis.

b.

OfficeMax next argues that Clements Bridge cannot recover 

for time that its counsel block billed because the time entries 

are too vague. “A fee petition is required to be specific 

enough to allow the district court ‘to determine if the hours 

claimed are unreasonable for the work performed.’” Rode v. 

Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1191 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting 

Pawlak v. Greenawalt, 713 F.2d 972, 978 (3d Cir. 1983)). Courts 

in this district have repeatedly held that block billing can 

meet this requirement. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Circa 

Direct LLC, No. 11-2712, 2012 WL 6568417, at *9 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 

2012) (not yet published); Ill. Nat. Ins. Co. v. Wyndham 

Worldwide Operations, Inc., No. 09-1724, 2011 WL 2293334, at *4 

(D.N.J. June 7, 2011); United States v. NCH Corp., Nos. 98-5268, 

05-0881, 2010 WL 3703756, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2010). In 
22

this case, the entries are specific enough for the Court to 

determine whether the time expended was reasonable.

c.

OfficeMax also claims that Patras Williams spent excessive 

amounts of time drafting and reviewing pleadings. OfficeMax 

argues that it was unreasonable for counsel to bill 10.2 hours 

on its Complaint, 5.1 hours reviewing OfficeMax’s Answer and 

Counterclaims, and 35.3 hours on its moving papers for its 

motion for summary judgment on liability. (Valinis Cert.

¶ 31(c)) OfficeMax also objects to 18.2 hours of time that 

counsel spent preparing and responding to discovery requests.8

 

First, 10.2 hours is a reasonable amount of time to spend 

drafting a 17-page Complaint comprising 97 paragraphs and 

several claims. Second, 5.1 hours spent reviewing and analyzing 

OfficeMax’s Answer and Counterclaims appears reasonable in light 

of the length of Clements Bridge’s Complaint and the 

counterclaims that OfficeMax asserted. Third, the Court cannot 

say that it was unreasonable for counsel to spend 35.3 hours 

preparing Clements Bridge’s moving papers for its motion for 

summary judgment on liability given that Clements Bridge 

submitted a 34-page brief, a 17-page Rule 56.1 statement, and a 

 

8 OfficeMax has not explained why any of these hours are excessive, nor has it 

offered suggested reductions.
23

120-page certification in support of its motion. Fourth, 18.2 

hours spent on preparing and responding to discovery requests 

seems reasonable, as those hours cover “the exchange of initial 

disclosures, the production of more than 3,000 pages of 

documents between the parties, preparation of requests for 

admissions and documents, as well as interrogatories propounded 

by [Clements Bridge], and responses to requests for documents 

and interrogatories propounded by [OfficeMax].” (Williams Reply 

Cert. ¶ 15) Therefore, the Court will not reduce these hours.

d.

OfficeMax also asks the Court to exclude 8.2 hours that Ms. 

Williams billed because they are administrative tasks that could 

have been completed by a paralegal. (Valinis Cert. ¶ 31(d)) 

Specifically, OfficeMax seeks to exclude the following entries:

(1) November 22, 2010 — “Prepare Summons and Case 

Information Statement re: OMX Complaint; draft 

filing letter; facilitate filing of OMX Complaint 

w/ court; t/c w/ REDACTED” – 1.3 hours

(2) December 7, 2010 — “Coordinate service of OMX 

Complaint on OMX registered agent; finalize and 

coordinate delivery of OMX December rent default 

notice; electronic correspondence w/ C. Lents re: 

same; review and analysis of OMX lease 

termination letter” – 0.8 hours

(3) December 29, 2010 — “Electronic correspondence w/ 

REDACTED; finalize file and serve track 

assignment motion” – 1.1 hours

(4) May 4, 2011 — “T/c w/ REDACTED; finalize and 

serve discovery requests on OMX counsel; 

preliminary review and analysis of OMX discovery 
24

requests; electronic correspondence w/ REDACTED; 

t/c w/ REDACTED” – 1.3 hours

(5) June 5, 2011 — “Finalize initial draft of written 

discovery responses; t/c w/ REDACTED; prepare 

service copies and serve same on OMX counsel” –

3.7 hours

(Valinis Cert. ¶ 31(d)) 

In reply, Ms. Williams certifies that Patras Williams did 

not employ any paralegals or administrative staff with 

litigation experience during the period covered by three of the 

challenged entries (November 22, 2010, December 7, 2010, and 

December 29, 2010). (Williams Reply Cert. ¶ 10) Be that as it 

may, the Court agrees with OfficeMax that administrative tasks 

should not be billed at partner rates. See Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, 

Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 195 F. App’x 93, 101 (3d Cir. 2006) 

(reducing an award where an attorney performed administrative 

tasks). The Court will therefore reduce Ms. Williams’s billing 

rate by approximately fifty percent to $200.00 per hour for 5.2 

of these hours. As the Court agrees with Ms. Williams that some 

of the challenged hours are not administrative, the Court will 

exclude 3.0 hours from the lower rate. 

e.

OfficeMax argues that several fees and costs should be 

excluded as pre-litigation expenses, which would be barred under 

Article 40. (Valinis Cert. ¶ 31(e)) However, all of the 
25

disputed fees and costs were incurred after litigation in this 

matter had already begun. Thus, there is no basis for excluding 

these hours.

f.

OfficeMax’s next argument is that certain fees and costs 

for a reassignment of track designation in New Jersey Superior 

Court should be excluded because it was the result of counsel’s 

error. (Valinis Cert. ¶ 31(f)) In reply, Ms. Williams argues 

that Clements Bridge sought a reassignment of track designation 

because subsequent to Clements Bridge filing the Complaint, 

OfficeMax defaulted on its December rent and indicated that it 

was both terminating the Lease and planning to close the store 

immediately. (Williams Reply Cert. ¶¶ 21-26, Ex. A) Given 

these actions, Clements Bridge sought to accelerate discovery to 

facilitate the “prompt resolution” of the case. (Id. Ex. A 

¶¶ 14-15) As OfficeMax has not provided any evidence suggesting 

that the motion to change the track designation was submitted to 

correct counsel’s error rather than being submitted in response 

to the changing factual circumstances, the Court will not 

exclude these hours.
26

g.

OfficeMax also seeks to exclude time spent on Clements 

Bridge’s Motion to Strike OfficeMax’s amended counterclaims, as 

the Motion was denied. (Valinis Cert. ¶ 31(g)) But as Clements 

Bridge points out, this Court ultimately found that OfficeMax’s 

counterclaims were without merit. Further, the fact that a 

prevailing party lost a nondispositive motion does not mean that 

it is not is not entitled to fees for that motion. Therefore, 

the Court will not exclude these hours.

h.

OfficeMax next argues that 52.2 hours should be excluded or 

reduced because Ms. Williams and her partner, Ms. Patras, 

conducted excessive research for those tasks based on their 

claimed level of expertise. (Valinis Cert. ¶ 31(h)) The Court 

cannot say that it was unreasonable for Ms. Williams and Ms. 

Patras to spend 52.2 hours on research over the course of over a 

year of litigation during which time the parties engaged in 

extensive discovery and filed dispositive motions.

i.

Finally, OfficeMax contends that the request should be 

denied “for charges related to unnecessary overnight mail and 

overhead costs (i.e., bates labeling and duplication costs).” 
27

(Id. ¶ 31(i)) Once again, OfficeMax provides no explanation for 

why these costs were unnecessary. The Court is satisfied with 

Ms. Williams’s explanations for these costs (Williams Reply 

Cert. ¶¶ 40-47, Ex. B) and deems these costs reasonable. 

Accordingly, they will not be reduced.

3. Lodestar

For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that the 

lodestar calculation is as follows:

Legal Professional Reasonable 

Hourly Rate

Reasonable 

Hours 

Expended

Total Fee

Amy Williams, Esquire $405 468.3 $189,661.50

Amy Williams –

Administrative

$200 5.2 $1,040.00

Anna Patras, Esquire $405 8.2 $3,321.00

Paralegal $150 36.8 $5,520.00

These fees total $199,542.50. Clements Bridge is also entitled 

to recover costs of $5,323.00. Thus, the total award for 

attorneys’ fees and costs is $204,865.50.

V.

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff Clements Bridge’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment Awarding Damages, Attorneys’ Fees 

and Legal Expenses is granted in part. Summary judgment is 

granted in favor of OfficeMax with respect to the Commission 

Damages in part, Construction Allowance Damages, pre-litigation 
28

attorneys’ fees, and lease-negotiation attorneys’ fees. Summary 

judgment is granted in favor of Clements Bridge in all other 

respects. Clements Bridge is awarded a total of $1,613,421.99, 

with $671,056.07 subject to the assessment of prejudgment 

interest at a rate of 6%, and $622,700.33 subject to discount to 

present value at a rate of 6%. The Court will issue an 

appropriate Order. 

Date: July 23, 2013

/s/ Joseph E. Irenas ______

Joseph E. Irenas, S.U.S.D.J.