alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

Filed 8/12/16 P. v. Jones CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOSEPH WAYNE JONES,

Defendant and Appellant.

E064993

(Super.Ct.No. FWV1500270)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Stanford E. 

Reichert, Judge. Affirmed.

Christian C. Buckley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 4, 2015, defendant and appellant Joseph Wayne Jones (defendant) 

entered into a negotiated plea agreement. Defendant pled guilty to one count of felony 
2

identity theft under Penal Code section 530.5, subdivision (a) (count 4) and one count of 

misdemeanor possession of a forged driver’s license under Penal Code section 470b 

(count 3). Defendant also admitted a strike prior under Penal Code section 57, 

subdivisions (b) through (i). On October 5, 2015, the court sentenced defendant to 32 

months in state prison in accordance with the plea agreement. The court also awarded 

defendant 454 days of presentence custody credits.

On December 14, 2015, defendant filed his notice of appeal and requested a 

certificate of probable cause. The court granted defendant’s request.1

B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

Defendant’s offenses involved theft or attempted theft by false pretense from Kay 

Jewelers and Zales Jewelers using false identifications and personal identifying 

information on December 19, 2014.

DISCUSSION

After defendant appealed, and upon his request, this court appointed counsel to 

represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 

25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 setting forth a statement of 

the case, a summary of the facts, and potential arguable issues, and requesting this court 

to undertake a review of the entire record.

 

1 Defendant also filed a Petition for Writ of Mandate regarding the denial of a 

post-plea nonstatutory motion for the return of property. The writ was denied (case No.

E064984).

2 The parties stipulated that the police reports would provide a factual basis for 

the plea.
3

We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, but he 

has not done so. Pursuant to the mandate of People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we 

have independently reviewed the record for potential error and find no error.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MILLER

J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ

P. J.

McKINSTER

J.
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-12-00134-CV

Mark Lee Newby

v.

Dianne Marie Uhl

§

§

§

§

From the 233rd District Court

of Tarrant County (324-460819-09)

November 15, 2012

Per Curiam

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that 

the appeal should be dismissed as moot. It is ordered that the appeal is 

dismissed as moot.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

PER CURIAM
2

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-12-00134-CV

MARK LEE NEWBY APPELLANT

V.

DIANNE MARIE UHL APPELLEE

----------

FROM THE 233RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

The trial court signed an order on March 9, 2012, finding Appellant Mark 

Lee Newby in criminal and civil contempt, committing him to jail, and ordering

him to pay child support and health expense reimbursement arrearages. Newby 

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the contempt findings, and 

we struck the portion of the order holding Newby in criminal contempt and 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
3

modified the civil contempt part of the order. See In re Newby, 370 S.W.3d 463, 

470–71 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, orig. proceeding).

In this direct appeal of the March 9, 2012 order, Newby does not challenge 

the part of the order awarding arrearages to Appellee Dianne Marie Uhl. See

In re B.A.T., No. 05-10-00593-CV, 2010 WL 3991426, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

Oct. 11, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (―Although a party may not challenge a 

judgment of contempt by direct appeal, a party may appeal a final arrearage 

order provided the notice of appeal is timely filed.‖). Instead, he merely argues 

that he should be released from jail.

Uhl has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal, arguing that the appeal is 

moot because the trial court ordered Newby released from jail on October 12, 

2012. Uhl attached to the motion an ―Order of Release from Jail‖ signed by the 

trial court on October 12, 2012. Therefore, notwithstanding that a direct appeal is 

not the appropriate method to challenge a contempt judgment,

2

the trial court’s 

October 12, 2012 order mooted the issue raised in this appeal. We dismiss this 

appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f).

PER CURIAM

 

2See Cadle Co. v. Lobingier, 50 S.W.3d 662, 671 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

2001, pet denied) (stating that a contempt judgment is reviewable only via a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus (if the contemnor is confined) or a petition for 

writ of mandamus (if no confinement is involved)); see also Beeler v. Fuqua, 351 

S.W.3d 428, 433 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, pet. denied) (―We lack jurisdiction 

over a direct appeal from a contempt order, even if the contempt order is 

appealed along with a judgment that is appealable.‖).
4

PANEL: MEIER, J.; LIVINGSTON, C.J.; and GARDNER, J.

DELIVERED: November 15, 2012
Exhibit 31.4



CERTIFICATIONS





I, Richard D. Katz, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K Argos Therapeutics,
Inc.; and



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain
any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.







|                  |  |     |  |                                           
|----------------- |  | --- |  | ------------------------------------------
|Date: May 1, 2017 |  | By: |  | /s/ Richard D. Katz, M.D.                 
|                  |  |     |  | Richard D. Katz, M.D.                     
|                  |  |     |  | Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
|                  |  |     |  | (Principal Financial Officer)
EX-10.8



 Exhibit 10.8 
  





 
  
 ALLIED NEVADA GOLD CORP.

  
 (the “Corporation”)

  
 DEFERRED SHARE UNITS 

 
 NOTICE OF GRANT 

 

			
	To:	  	
	Date:	  	

  
 This notice serves as a Deferred Share Unit
Grant Letter, which is required under Section 3.03 of the Corporation’s Deferred Share Unit Plan, a copy of which has been provided to you. 
  

Pursuant to a Board Unanimous Written Consent Resolution dated [Date], each director, as part of his remuneration, is entitled to an award of Deferred
Share Units (DSUs) totaling $150,000, for the period of [Date] to [Date]. The number of DSUs to be granted is determined by dividing $150,000 by the Company’s closing share price as of the date of the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders
(AGM), which was held on [Date]. (See Section 1.01(k).) 
  

Accordingly, because the closing share price as of [Date] (i.e., the date of the last AGM) was
$[            ], you are hereby granted [            ] DSUs as of the date of this Deferred Share Unit Grant Letter. 

 
 Based on the foregoing, our records indicate the following balances of DSUs
have been granted to you pursuant to the Company’s DSU plan: 
  

					
	 	  	# of DSU’s	 
	 Opening Balance as at [Date]
	  			
	 Granted on [Date]
	  			
	 Closing Balance as at [Date]
	  			
	 Allied Nevada Gold Corp. – stock price [Date]
	  	$	 	  
	 Estimated value at [Date]
	  	$	            	  

  
 As a reminder, pursuant to
Section 3.05 of the DSU Plan, should you separate as a director, the Corporation shall issue you one previously unissued Common Share for each outstanding whole DSU held by you on your “Separation Date,” less applicable statutory source
deductions. “Fractional Deferred Share Units” shall be cancelled. 
  
 Moreover, where DSUs have been granted to you with reference to your director remuneration for a year, in the event you resign or are otherwise no longer an “Eligible Director” during such year
other than in the event of, in connection with, or related to, a “Change in Control of the Corporation,” your DSUs will only partially vest and you will only be entitled to a pro-rated “DSU Payment” in respect of such DSUs based
on the number of days such year that you are an “Eligible Director.” 
  
 Should you have any questions regarding this Notice, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
  

	
	ALLIED NEVADA GOLD CORP.
	
	  

	 [Name]

	 [Title]
#### Peter Gillen, Appellant, v Nassau Semi-Fast Softball League, Respondent, et al., Defendant.

[853 NYS2d 590]

The plaintiff was injured while playing catcher in a softball league game when he collided with a base runner from the opposing team near home plate. The defendant Nassau Semi-Fast Softball League (hereinafter the League) established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the risk of such collision with another player is inherent in the sport of softball *(see Morgan v State of New York,*90 NY2d 471 [1997]; *Rich v West Shore Little League Baseball,*209 AD2d 396 [1994]). Therefore, the plaintiff assumed that risk by participating in the softball game, and the League cannot be held liable for her injuries. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to present evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. Spolzino, J.P., Santucci, Angiolillo and Balkin, JJ., concur.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

September 27, 2019

No. 04

- 19

- 00476

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.R.R., A CHILD

From the 38th Judicial District Court, Medina County, Texas

Trial Court No. 18

- 05

- 24951

- CV Honorable Cathy Morris, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

T his is an accelerated appeal of an order terminating the appellant’s parental rights which must be disposed of by this court within 180 days of the date the notice of appeal is filed. T EX

. R. J UD

. A DMIN

. 6.2.

The reporter’s record was originally due t o be filed in this appeal on July 22, 2019. On July 19, 2019, the court reporter responsible for preparing the record notified this court that she had not received payment for the record. On July 22, 2019, this court ordered appellant to provide written proof to this court that either (1) the reporter’s fe e ha d been paid or arrangements

ha d been made to pay the reporter’s fee; or (2) appellant is entitled to appeal without paying the reporter’s fee. Our order stated that i f appellant fail ed to respond wi thin the time provided, appellant’s brief would be due within twenty days of the date of the order, and the court would consider only those issues or points raised in appellant’s brief that do not require a reporter’s

record for a decision. See T EX

. R. A P P

. P . 37.3(c).

On August 21, 2019, the attorney who was retained to represent appellant at trial filed a

motion to withdraw. The motion stated good cause existed for the withdrawal based on communication issues and appellant’s representation that she int ended to retain new counsel for the appeal. By order dated August 27, 2019, we abated this appeal to the trial court for a ruling

on the motion to withdraw.

On September 5, 2019, a supplemental clerk’s record was filed containing an order signed by an as sociate judge denying the motion to withdraw. Appellant’s attorney requested a de novo review. On September 27, 2019, a supplemental clerk’s record was filed containing the trial court’s order adopting a prior order granting a motion to withdraw filed by the same
attorney

. It is therefore ORDERED that this appeal is REINSTATED on the docket of this court. Based on the trial court’s orders, appellant is proceeding pro se or without representation by an
attorney.Appellant is ordered to provide written proof to this court within ten (10) days of the date

of this order that either (1) the reporter’s fee has been paid or arrangements have been made to pay the reporter’s fee; or (2) appellant is entitled to appeal without paying the reporter’s fee. If

appe llant fails to respond within the time provided, appellant’s brief will be due within twenty days from the date of this order, and the court will consider only those issues or points raised in appellant’s brief that do not require a reporter’s record for a decision. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P

. 37.3(c).

_________________________________ Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 27th day of September, 2019

.

___________________________________ Luz E strada

, Chief Deputy Clerk
**Exhibit 31.2**

**MedPro Safety Products, Inc.****Rule 13a-14(a) Certification****of Chief Financial Officer**

I, Marc T. Ray, Chief Financial Officer of MedPro Safety Products, Inc. (the “Company”), certify that:

1.     I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company;

2.     Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.     Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, theperiods presented in this report;

4.     The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

          (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; and

          (c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the endof the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

          (d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the caseof an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5.     The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (orpersons performing the equivalent functions):

          (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record,process, summarize and report financial information; and

          (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

|                     |                         |
|---------------------|-------------------------|
| Dated: May 20, 2009 | /s/ Marc T. Ray         |
|                | Marc T. Ray             |
|                | Chief Financial Officer |

----
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1


               CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS, ERNST & YOUNG LLP

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement
(Forms S-8 No. 33-43898 and No. 333-51549) pertaining to the Westcorp 1991 Stock
Option Plan and the Westcorp Employee Stock Ownership Plan, respectively, and in
the related prospectus' of our report dated January 22, 2001, with respect to
the consolidated financial statements of Westcorp and Subsidiaries incorporated
by reference in the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31,
2000.

                                                       /s/ ERNST & YOUNG LLP
                                                       -------------------------
                                                           ERNST & YOUNG LLP


Los Angeles, California
March 26, 2001
# table180_q16.9_size
Exhibit 31


                      CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302


                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


I, John Figliolini, certify that:


         1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Atlantis
Business Development Corporation for the year ended March 31, 2004;


         2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
annual report;


         3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report.


         4. The registrant's other certifying offering officers and I are
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures
(as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and we
have: a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this annual report is being prepared; b) evaluated
the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures as of a
date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this annual report (the
"Evaluation Date"); and c) presented in this annual report our conclusions about
the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our
evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;


         5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit
committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the
equivalent function): a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation
of internal controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to
record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the
registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and b) any
fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls; and


         6. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have indicated in
this annual report whether or not there were significant changes in internal
controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls
subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective
actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.


Date:    ______________, 2004



--------------------------
John Figliolini
President
#### American Safety Casualty Insurance Company, Respondent, v New York City School Construction Authority, Appellant.

[823 NYS2d 19]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Jane S. Solomon, J.), entered August 10, 2005, in an action by plaintiff surety against defendant public authority to recover proceeds of construction contracts paid by defendant to a contractor that should have been paid to plaintiff pursuant to plaintiff’s indemnity agreement with the contractor, awarding plaintiff $128,834.54, plus interest, costs and disbursements, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

At the hearing to assess damages, plaintiff argued that by failing to respond to its notice to admit, defendant admitted that it owed plaintiff $128,000. Defendant responded that three years earlier, before summary judgment on the issue of liability had been granted plaintiff (16 AD3d 138 [2005]), it provided answers to interrogatories showing how much it had paid the contractor, and argued that, because plaintiff never amended its notice of claim (Fublic Authorities Law § 1744), which sought damages in an amount that “equals or exceeds as currently ascertained the sum of $55,000.00,” plaintiff could recover no more than $55,000. The assessment court properly permitted plaintiff to amend the notice of claim and complaint to conform to the evidence, absent a showing of prejudice *(see Rondout Elec, v Dover Union Free School Dist.,*304 AD2d 808 [2003]). Manifestly, there was no prejudice here, as plaintiff became aware of its full damages only because defendant provided that information years earlier. Defendant’s reliance on *Varsity Tr., Inc. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y.*(5 NY3d 532 [2005]) is misplaced. There, the Court of Appeals held that Education *442Law § 3813 (1) required the plaintiff to file a new notice of claim for damages that continued to accrue after the action started as a result of a continuing breach of contract. Here, plaintiffs damages remained constant throughout; plaintiff was simply unaware of the amount. Concur—Saxe, J.P., Marlow, Nardelli, Sweeny and Catterson, JJ.