MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 201 8 ME 119 Docket: Ken

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On	B riefs : July	19 ,	2018 Decided: August	16,	2018
Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and ALEXANDER , HJELM, and HUMPHREY , JJ.

SETH	T.	CAREY

v. BOARD	OF	OVERSEERS	OF	THE	BAR	et	al.

PER	CURIAM [¶1]	 	 Seth	 T.	 Carey	 appeals	 from	 a	 judgment	 of	 the	 Superior	 Court (Kennebec	County, Anderson,	J. )	granting	motions	 to	dismiss and	motions	 for summary	judgment .		The	court’s	order	resulted	in	judgment	for	all	defendants on	Carey’s	wide

- ranging	complaint	against	judges	and	other	court	employees, the	 Board	 of	Overseers	 of	 the	 Bar,	 the	 Maine	 Commission	 on	 Indigent	 Legal Services	(MCILS),	and	the	Lew iston	Sun	Journa l. Carey’s	complaint	was	based on	the	defendants’ actions	related	to	or participation	in	a n	attorney disciplinary proceeding	before the	Board	that	resulted	in	the	c ourt	( Brennan,	J. )	accepting an	agreed	two

- year	suspended	suspension from	the	practice	of	law with	many conditions imposed on	Carey’s	practice.2 [¶2 ]		Carey	appeals , contending	that	the	court	improperly	ruled	that	most defendants	were	protected	by	statutory	or	common	law	immuniti es , that	there

were no	disputes	of	fact	regard ing	his	claim s against	the	defendants ,	and	that the	defendants	are	entitled	to	judgment	as	a	matter	of	law .		We	affirm.
I.		CASE	HISTORY [¶3 ] In	 2016,	 the	 Board	 of	 Overseers	 of	 the	 Bar	 brought	 three disciplinary	 informations,	 M.	 Bar	 R.	 13(g) , against Seth T.	 Carey. Board	 of Overseers	 of	 the	Bar	v.	Carey ,	BAR

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- 15	 (Nov. 21,	2016 )	 ( Brennan,	J. ).		After negotiations,	 Carey	 and	 the	 Board agreed	 to	 the	 entry	 of	 a	 negotiated	 order “identifying	Attorney	Carey’s	misconduct	and	the	resulting	sanctions	imposed by	 the	 court.” Id

. at	 1. The	 agreed	 order	identified Carey’ s	misconduct	 and supporting	evidence	organized	by	the	three	discipl inary	inf ormations. Id

. [¶4 ] The	 first	disciplinary	action was	based	 on	evidence	presented by four	Maine	judges	 at	 a	 Grievance	 C ommission	 proceeding	where	 those “four jurists recounted	their	experiences,	observations,	and	concerns	about	Attorney Carey’s	lack	of	c ore	competence.” 1 Id .	at	2.		The	order	recognized	 that Carey had	been	“adamant	 that	 the	jurists [’] accounts	were	inaccurate and	 that	 they

1 Having	observed	such concerning	performance s ,	the	judges	may	have	had	an	ethical	obligation to	report Carey to	the	Board	of	Overseers	of	the	Bar. See M.	Code	Jud.	Conduct	R. 2.15(B).3 had	colluded	in	a	conspiracy	against	him.” Id .		The	order noted,	however, that Carey	 agreed	 t hat	 the	 testimony	 of the	 judges	 at	 the hearing	 before	 the Grievance	Commission	comprised “sufficient	evidence	for	this	C ourt	to	find	that he	had	demonstrated	a	lack	of	core	competence	in	the	handling	of	his	clients’ respective litigation	matters .” Id .	at	3. [¶5 ]		Based	on	tha t	information, and	apparently	by	agreement, the	court found	 that	 Carey	 had	 committed violations	 of	 Maine	 Rules	 of	 Professi onal Conduct	1.1	(incompetence), 1.3	(lack	of	reasonable	dil igence	in	representing clients), 3.3(a)(3)	 (offering	material	 evidence tha t	is	 false), 3.3(b)	 (failure	 to disc lose	 false	 evidence	 to	 a	 court), and	 8.4(d)	 (conduct	 prejudicial	 to	 the administration	of	justice)

. 2 Id

. [¶6 ] The second	 disciplinary	 action was	 based	 on	 a	 complaint	 by	 a physician	who	had	served	as	an	independent	medical	examiner	in	a	proceeding in	 which Carey represented	 a	 claimant before the	 Maine	 Workers’ Compensation	 Board. Id. The	 physician’s	 complaint	 expressed	 concern regarding	 Attor ney	 Carey’s	 conduct	 both	 in	 preparation	 for and	 during	 a

2 The	court	also	 found	violation	of Maine Rule of	Professional	Conduct 8.4(a)	(violation	of	the Rules	of	Professional	Conduct). Board	of	Overseers	of	the	Bar	v.	Carey ,	BAR

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- 15 (Nov.	21,	2016) ( Brennan,	 J. ). Because	 Rule	 8.4(a)	 makes	 violation	 of	 any	 other	 Rule	 of	 Professional	 Conduct	 a separate	violation	of	Rule	8.4(a),	the	violation	of	Rule	8.4(a) cannot	be	considered	a distinct	violation of	the	Rules	of	Professional	Conduct.4 deposition. Id .	 at	 4. A	 hearing	 officer	 of	 the	Worker s ’ Compen sation	 Board found	that Carey	had	failed	to	provide	relevant	medical	reports	to	the	physician prior	to	his	deposition	and	had	asked	the	physician	many	questions,	during	the deposition,	 relating	 to	 medical	 evidence	 that	 had	 not	 been admitted	 into evidence	in	the	proceeding. Id

. at	6. [¶7 ] The	 agreed	 order	 found	 that “ Attorney	 Carey’s	 failure	 to	 timely provide	 the	 necessary medical documents	 to [ the	 physician ]” constituted violations	of	Maine	Rules	of	Professional	Conduct 1.1	(incompetence)	and	1.3 (lack	of	reasonable	diligence	i n	representing	a	client). Id

. [¶8 ]		The	third	disciplinary	action was initiated	by	a	complaint	filed	on be half	 of	a	bank	managing Carey’s	client	 trust	accounts ( interest	 on	lawyer s
trust	accounts (IOLTA	accounts) ) pursuant	to	Maine	Bar R ule 6	and Maine Rule of	 Professional	 Conduct 1 .15. Id

. at 7. The	 complaint	 asserted	 that Carey improperly used	his	client	trust	account	to	make	payments	for	both	personal and	professional expenses	during	the	course	of	many	months. Id

. Carey	had characterized	these	pay ments	from	his	client	trust	accounts	as	“mistake s.” Id

. The	 agreed	 order found	 that	 even	 if Carey’s	 explanation was	 accurate, “Attorney	Carey	admits	that	he	failed	to	abide	by	the	rules	governing	client	trust accounts.	 	 This	 failure	is	 troubling	 because	 as	 an	 attorney	licensed	 for	more5 than	ten	years,	Attorney	Carey	knew	or	should	have	known	that	he	could	not coming le	 funds	 or	 draw	 upon his	 IOLTA	 account	 for	 personal	 and	 other nonclient	expenses.” Id .	at	7

- 8. [¶9 ]	 	 Despite	 this	 finding, the	 agreed	 order	 did	 not	 explicitl y	 find	 a violation	 of Maine Bar	 Rule 6	 or Maine Rule	 of	 Professional	 Conduct	 1.15 relating	 to	 this	disciplinary	information.		 Instead,	regarding	 this	information, the	 court	 found	 a	 violation	 of	 only Maine	 Rule	 of	 Professional	 Conduct 1.1 (incompetence). Id .	at	8. [¶1 0 ]		Proceeding	 to	address	 sanctions, the	court	noted	 that	 “Attorney Carey	has	previously	been	sanctioned	for	misconduct , some	of	which	is	similar to	the	instant	matters and	some	of	which	is	unrelated	to	those	concerns. See two	Orders	of	S uspension,	February	and	October	2009,	respectively.” Id .	at	8

. [¶1 1 ] With	 that	 background	 and	 based	 on	 the	 parties ’ agreement submitted	in	the proceeding “ as supplemented	by	the	C ourt, ” the	court	ordered Carey	suspended	 f rom	 the	practice	of	law for	 two	y ears	but	suspended	all	of that	suspension

— so	that	no	actual	suspension from	practice	was	imposed. Id

. at	9. The	suspended	suspension	was subject	 to	 twenty

- eight	conditions	 that primarily	 required	 supervision	 and	 monitoring	 of	 Carey’s	 practice, improvemen ts	 in	 his management	 of	 his	 practice,	 and	 continuing	 legal6 education	 and	 other	 courses	 to	 improve	 his	 pra ctice	 management	 and compliance	with his	professional	ethical	obligations. Id .	at	9

- 17. 3 [¶1 2 ]	 	 Less than	 two	 months	 after the entry	 of	 the November	 2016 agreed

- upon	suspended	suspension disciplinary	order, in	January	2017 ,	Carey filed in the Superior	Court a wide

- ranging complaint,	later	amended ,	against the four	 judges	 who	 had	 presented	 evidence	 in	 the	 Grievance	 Commission proceedings,	sever al	other	court	employees	who	had	worked	with	the	judges, the	 physician	 who	 had	 file d	 the	 complaint	 against Carey,	 the	 Lewiston	 Sun Journal, MCILS and its	director,	the	Board	of	Overseers	of	the	Bar,	the Board’s attorneys	 who	 had	 prosecuted	 the grievance	 co mplaint	 against	 Carey and negotiated	the	agreed	disposition	of	the	grievance	complaint,	the	Maine	District
Court , and	the Office	of	the	Clerk	of	Courts. [¶1 3 ] Car ey’s	amended	complaint	asserted numerous	causes	of	action and	allegations	against	the	defendants	including:	negligence,	abuse	of	process, invasion	 of	 privacy,	 false	 light,	 malicious	 prosecution,	 fraud	 upon	 the	 court, misrepresentation,	 conspiracy,	 tortious	 interference	 with	 prospective and actual	 economic	 advantage,	 tortious	 interference	 with	 contractual	 relations,

3 As	a	result	of	an	order	in	a	subsequent	Bar	disciplinary	proceeding, Board	of	Overseers	of	the	Bar v.	Carey ,	BAR

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- 04	(Apr.	30,	2018)	( Warren,	J .),	Carey	is	currently	subject	to	an	indefinite	suspension from	the	practice	of	law.7 violation	of	the	Maine	Unfair	Trade	Practices	Act	(MUTPA),	negligent	infliction of	emotional	distress,	intentional	infliction	 of	emotional	distress,	 violation	 of the	Racketeer Influenced	and	Corrupt	Organizations	Act	(RICO),	and	M.R.	Civ. P.	80C	appeal	of an administrative	action. [¶1 4 ] The	 court,	 the	 Board	 of	 Overseers	 of	 the	 Bar	 and	 their	 related individual	defendants , and	 the MCILS filed	motions to	dismiss	in	February	of 2017; the	Lewiston	Sun	Journal	filed	a	m otion	to	dismiss	in	May	of	2017; and the	physician	filed	a	motion	to	dismiss	in	June of 2017. [¶1 5 ] The court ( Anderson,	J. ) granted	each of	the	defendants’	motions	to dismiss	on	October	25,	2017.		Specifically,	the	court	c oncluded	that:	(1)	Carey’s tort	 claims	 against	 the	 judges	 and	 court	 employees	 were	 barred	 by	 judicial
im munity,	pursuant	 to	14	M.R.S.	§ 8111 (1)(B)	(2017);	(2) Carey’s tor t	claims against the MCIL S	director were	barred	by	discretionary	immunity,	pursuant
to	14	M.R.S. §	8111(1)(C);	(3)	Carey’s tort claims	against the	Board’s	attorneys who	 had	 prosecuted	 the	 disciplinary	 action	 against	 him	 were	 barred	 by discretionary	 functio n	 immunity	 and	 prosecutorial	 im munity,	 pursuant	 to
14 M.R.S.	 § 8 111(1)(C)

- (D);	 (4)	 Carey’s tort	 claims	 against	 another	 Board employee were	legally	insufficient	because	the	claims did	not allege anything specific	that	that	employee	had	done to	harm him;	(5) Carey’s	MUTP A	and	RICO8 claims	against	all	defendants were	barred	by sovereign	immunity;	(6)	Carey’s M.R.	Civ.	P.	80C	appeal	was	not	timely	filed,	and	even	if	it had	been timely	filed, Carey	 had	 failed	 to	 prosecute	 the	 appeal;	 (7)	 Carey’s	 claims	 against	 th e physician	were barred pursuant	to	Maine’s	Anti

- SLAPP	statute, 14	M.R.S.	§	556 (2017) ;	and	(8)	Carey’s	claims	against	the	Lewiston	Sun	Journal	were	dismissed pursuant	 to	M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 12(b)(6),	 based	 on	 his	 failure	 to	 ple ad	 all	 necessary elements	of	his cl aims. [¶1 6 ] The	 motions	 to	 dismiss	 filed	 by	 t he	 governmental	 entities	 ( the Board,	the	Maine	District	Court,	the	Office	of	Clerk	of	Courts,	and	MCILS),	“with respect	 solely	 to	 the	 state	 law	 tort	 claims , ”	 were	 converted	 to	 motions	 for summary	judgment	by	the	court.		The	governmental	entities	filed	their	motions for	summary	judgment	in	November of 2017.		Carey	did	not	file	an	opposition to	 these	 motions.	 	 The	 Superior	 Court	 granted	 the	 motions	 for	 summar y judgment	on	January	3,	2018. [¶1 7 ] Carey	filed	a notice	of	appeal	on	January	22,	2018. 4

4 On	appeal,	Carey primarily	challenges	the dismissal	of his tort	claims as	being barred	by	 the immunities	provided	by 14 M.R.S.	§	8111(1)(B)

- (D) and the	court ’s	dismissal	of	his claims	against	the Lewiston	Sun	Journ al.		This	opinion	focuses	on	tho se	two	arguments. Carey ’s arguments	presented in	his	brief	do	not	appear	to	challenge :	(1)	the	court’s	order	granting	summary	judgment	in	favor	of the	government	entities;	(2)	the	court’s	dismissal	of	Carey’s	claims	against	a	Board	employee;	(3)	the c ourt’s	dismissal	of	Carey’s	MUT P A	and	RICO	claims	based	on	sovereign	immunity;	and	(4)	the	court’s dismissal	of	Carey’s	claims	against	the	physician	pursuant	to	Maine’s	Anti

- SLAPP	statute, 14	M.R.S.9 I I.		LEGAL	ANALYSIS
A. Board	and	Judicial/MCILS’s	Motions	to	Dismiss [¶1 8 ] Carey	does	not	appear	to	challenge	the	court’s	specific	finding and conclusion that	 the absolute	 privilege	 afforded	 witnesses	 in	 judicial proceedings,	 as	 discussed	 in Dunbar	 v.	 Greenlaw , 152	 Me.	 270,	 277,
128 A.2d 218 (1956) ,	applies	to	bar	claims	against	the	defendants	arising	out of	 their	statements	made	during	Carey’s	Board	proceedings. See Mehlhorn	v. Derby ,	2006	ME	110,	¶ 11,	905 A.2d 290 (“[I] ssues	adverted	to	in	a	perfunctory manner,	 unaccompanied	 by	 some	 effort	 at	 developed	 argumentation,	 are deemed	waived.”). [¶1 9 ] When	considering	an	appeal	of	a	motion	to dismiss,	“[w]e	review the legal	 sufficiency	 of	 t he	complaint	de	novo	 and	 view the	complaint	in	 the light	most	favorable	to	the	plaintiff	to	determine	whether	it	sets	forth	elements of	 a	 cause	 of	 action	 or	 alleges	 facts	 that	 would	 entitle	 the	 plaintiff	 to	 relief pursuant	 to	 some	 legal	 theory.” Nadeau	 v.	 Frydrych ,	 2014	 ME	 154,	 ¶	 5,
108 A.3d 1254 .		This	motion	“tests	the	legal	sufficiency	of	the	complaint”	and

§ 556	(2017)

. See Bayview	Loan	Servicing ,	LLC	v.	Bartlett, 2014 ME	37,	¶	15	n. 5,	87	A.3 d 741 (stating that	a	party	waives	any	argument	that	it	fails	to	adequately	develop	in	briefing).10 “does	 not	 probe	 the	 merits	 of	 the	 underlying	 case.” Haskell	 v.	 Phinney , 460 A.2d 1354,	1359	(Me. 1983)

. B. Maine	Tort	Claims	Act [¶20 ] We	first	consider	the	application	of	the	immunity	provisions	of	the Maine	Tort	Claims	Act	as	they	apply	to	the	claims	filed	against	all	defendants except	the	Lewiston	Sun	Journal. [¶ 2 1] The	 Maine	 Tort	 Claims	 Act,	 14	 M.R.S.	 §§	 8101

- 8118,	 provides broadly that	 “[e]xcept	 as	 otherwise	 expressly	 provided	 by	 statute,	 all governmental	 entities	 shall	 be	 immune	 from	 suit	 on	 any	 and	 all	 tort	 claims seeking	recovery	of	damages.”		The	MTCA	also	extends	personal	immunity	to employees	of	governmental	entities	for	the following	actions:	(1)	undertaking or	 failing	 to	 undertake	 any	 judicial	 or	 quasi

- judicial	 act;	 (2)	 performing	 or failing	 to	perform	any	 discretionary	 function	 or	duty;	 and	 (3)	performing	 or failing	 to	 perform	 any	 prosecutorial	 function	 involving	 civil,	 cri minal,	 or administrative	enforcement. Id. § 8111(1)(B)

- (D).		“[L]iability	is	the	rule	and immunity	the	exception”	when	it	comes	to	employees	of	governmental	entities.
D ay’s	Auto	Body,	Inc.	v.	Town of	Medway ,	2016	ME	121,	¶	20,	145	A.3d	1030

. [¶22 ] Title 14	M.R.S.	§	8111(1)(E)	further	provides	that	“such	immunity does	not	exist	in	any	case	in	which	an	employee’s	actions	are	found	to	have	bee n11 in	bad	 faith.”		We	have stated	 that	 the	“bad	 faith”	language	does	not	apply	 to negate	 the	 absolute	 immunities	 of	 1 4	 M.R.S.	 §	 8111(1)(A)

- (D). Grossman	 v. Richards ,	1998 ME	9,	¶	9,	722	A.2d	371

. [¶23 ] Here,	accepting	Carey’s	factual	allegations	as	true,	Carey	alleges	no set	 of	 facts	 that could support	 the	 requisite	elements	 of any	 of	 the	claims he asserts	against	 the	defendants , who	are	governmental	employees	 or	entities

. Carey	generally	states	 that	 the	defendants	“engaged	in	repeated	malfeasance and	 prolonged	 efforts	 to	wrongfully	 destroy	 Carey’s	 professional	 career	 and reputation	 through	 fals e	 and	 embellished	 swearing,	 testimony	 and
accusations , ”	but he	never	specifically asserts	what	t hese	efforts	were .		Carey’s claims	 asserted	 against	 the	 defendants,	 even	if	 factually	 true,	are	conclusory and	 legally	 deficient , as	 he	 does	 not	 provide	 enough facts	 to	 support	 each element	of	the	causes	of	action	he	alleges. See Seacoast	Hangar	Condo.	II	Assoc. v.	 Martel, 2001	 ME	 112,	 ¶	 16,	 775	 A.2d	 1166 (stating	 that	 in	 reviewing	 a dismissal	this	Court	is	not	bound	to	accept	the	complaint’s	legal	conclusions). [¶24 ] Further,	Carey	states	that	he	“defended	against	these	outlandish, dangerously	embellished	and	even	completely	fabricated	allegations”	that	were the	basis	of	his	attorney	discipline	action	that	resulted	in	the	November	2016 order	 finding	 that	 Carey	 had	 viol ated	 provisions	 of	 the	 Maine	 Rules	 of12 Professional	 Conduct, see Board	 o f	 Overseers	 of	 the	 Bar	 v.	 Carey ,	 BAR

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- 15 (Nov. 21,	 2016)	 ( Brennan,	 J. ).	 	 Carey waived	 his	 right	 to	 trial	 on	 those allegations	and attempts	to	relitigate	the	issues	raised	during	his	b ar	discipline hearing, despite	the	fact	that	he “agreed	t o	the	entry	of	this negotiated	Order identifying	[his]	misconduct	and	the	resulting	sanctions	imposed	by	the	Court.”
I d. at	1. [¶25 ] Separate	 from	 the	insufficiency	 of	 the	complaint	 to	state	clai ms against	these	defendants,	and	c ontrary	to	Carey’s	contentions,	the	defendants’ actions	were	protected	pursuant	to	14	M.R.S.	§	8111(1)(B)

- (D).		The	Board	and Judicial/MCILS	 defendants	 are	 employees	 of	 government	 entities , and	 their actions	 related	 to	 the disciplinary	 hearing	 concerning	 Carey’s	 conduct	 as	 an attorney	 were	 discretionary	 functions,	 judicial	 functions,	 or	 prosecutorial functions within	the	meaning	of	14	M.R.S. §	8111(1)(B)

- (D).		The	court	did	not err	in	granting	the	Board	and	Judicial/MCILS	d efendants’	motions	to	dismiss. [¶26 ] In	addition	to	the	grounds	to	support	dismissal	of	the action noted by	 the	 trial	 court,	 Carey’s	 complaint	 against	 the	 judges	 and	 other	 judicial employees	arises	out	of	their	report	to	the	Board	of	action	by	Carey	that they viewed	as	unethical.		Maine	Code	of	Judicial	Conduct	Rule	2.15(B)	requires	that A	judge	having	knowledge	that	a	lawyer	has	comm itted	a	violation of	the	Maine	R ules	of	Professional	Conduct	that	raises	a	substantial13 question	 regarding	 that	 lawyer’s	 hon esty,	 trustworthiness,	 or fitness	 as	 a	 lawyer	 in	 other	 respects	 shall	 inform	 the	 Board	 of Overseers	of	the	Bar	.	.	.

. [¶27 ] We	have	held	that “ [a] ny person	has	a	qualified	privilege	to	make statements	to	law	enforcement	or	regulatory	agencies	regarding	the	conduct	of others,	where	the	person	making	the	statement	believes	in	good	faith	that	the statement	is	true	and	indicates	that	a	statutory	standard administered	by	the agency	 may	 have	 been	 violated. ” Truman	 v.	 Browne ,	 2001	 ME	 182, ¶	 15,
788 A.2d	168 ( citing Baker	v.	Charles ,	919	F. Supp.	41,	44	(D.	Me.	1996) ; Packard v.	 Central	 Maine	 Power	 Co. ,	 477	 A.2d 264,	 267

- 68	 (Me.	 1984) ;	 Restatement (Second)	of	Torts § 598	(1976)). [¶28 ] Carey	agreed	to	discipline	based	on	the	judges’	complaints	and	the physician’s	 complaint.	 	 Consequently,	 there	 can	 be	 no	 question that	 the qualified	privilege	to	report	Carey’s	misconduct	protected	t he	judges’	and	the physician’s	reports	in	this	case.
C. Lewiston	Sun	Journal’s	Motion	to	Dismiss [¶29 ]		A	party	may	move	to	dismiss	a	complaint	for	failure	to	state	a	claim upon	which	relief	can	be	granted. See M.R.	Civ.	P.	12(b)(6) .		When	considering

an appeal	 of a	 motion	 to	 dismiss,	 we	 review “the	 legal	 sufficiency	 of	 t he complaint	de	novo	and	 view the	complaint	in	 the	light	most	 favorable	 to	 the14 plaintiff	 to	 determine	 whether	 it	 sets	 forth	 elements	 of	 a	 cause	 of	 action	 or alleges	 facts	 that	 would	 entitle	 the	 plaintiff	 to	 relief	 pursuant	 to	 some	 legal theory.” Nadeau ,	2014	ME	154,	¶	5,	108	A.3d	1254

. [¶30 ]		Carey asserts various	causes	 of	action against	 the	 Lewiston	Sun Journal, 5 alleging in	 very	 general	 and	 conclusory	 terms,	 the	 actions	 of	 the Lewiston	 Sun	 Journal as	 the	 basis	 for his claims	 of	 negligence,	 invasion	 of privacy,	disclosure,	defamation,	and	false	light publicity

. [¶ 3 1]	 	 Carey fails	 to	 provide,	with	 specificity,	 the	 actual	 statements	 or actions	 of	 the	 Lewiston	 Sun	 Journal	 that	 suppor t	 his	 claims. Referencing reports	 about	 Carey’s	 then	 pending	 public	 disciplinary	 proceedings, Carey alleges that	the	“Sun	Journal	gladly	took	these lies	and	did	what	they	do

— wrote another	 libelous	 batch	 of	 stories”	 and	 that	 the	 “Sun	 Journal	 (a.k.a.	 ‘Scum Journal’)	 published	 these	 lies	 and	 embellishments	 and	 published	 them, irreparably	 damaging	 Plaintiff’s	 professional	 and	 private	 reputation.”	 	 These are	 two	of	 the	 few	specific references	 to the	Lewiston	Sun	 Journal	in	Carey’s

5 Carey	 asserted	 the	 following	 causes	 of	 action	against	 the	 Lewiston	 Sun	 Journal:	 negligence, invasion	of	privacy,	disclosure,	defamation,	false	light,	mal icious	prosecution,	fraud	upon	the	court, conspiracy,	 tortious	 interference	 with	 prospective	 and	 actual	 economic	 advantage,	 tortious interference	with	contractual	relations,	violation	of	MUTPA,	negligent	infliction	of	emotional	distress, intentional	inflic tion	of	emotional	distress,	violation	of	RICO,	M.R.	Civ.	P.	80C	appeal	of	administrative action, and decl aratory	judgment; and	he	sought punitive	damages, a restraining	order,	and	attorney fees.15 complaint,	 and	 Carey	 does	 not	 state	 what	 these	 “lies”	 and	 “embellishments”

were. [¶32 ] Newspaper	 reports	 of	 public	 court	 filings	 and	 proceedings, including	those	proceedings	t hat	result	in	imposition	of	professional	discipline , are	protected	conduct	under	the	First	Amendment. Cox	Broadcasting	Corp.	v. Cohn ,	420	U.S.	469,	495	(1975) .		In	the	face	of the First	Amendment	protection, allegations to	avoid	 that	protection	must	be	 stated	with	particular	precision. No	 such	 precise	 facts	 are	 asserted	 here. Even	 if	 Carey	 has	 presented	 an argument	 on	 appeal	 sufficient	 to	preserve	 the	issue	 for	appellate	 review,	we conclude	 that	 t he	 court	 did	 not	 err	 i n	 dismissing	 Carey’s	 claims	 against	 the Lewiston	Sun	Journal pursuant	to	M. R.	Civ.	P.	12(b)(6). The	entry	is: Judgment affirmed.16
Seth	T.	Carey,	Esq.,	L/A	Law,	Auburn,	for	appellant	Seth	T.	Carey Janet	T.	Mills,	Attorney	General , and	Susan	P.	Herman,	Dep.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office	of the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee s Office	of	the	Clerk	of	Courts	et	al. Janet	T.	Mills,	Attorney	General , and	Thomas	A.	Knowlton,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	app ellee s Maine	Board	of	Overseers	of	the Bar	et	al. Bryan	M.	Dench,	Esq.,	Stephen	B.	Wade,	Esq.,	and	Amy	Dieterich,	Esq.,	Skelton Taintor	&	Abbott,	Auburn,	for	appellee	Lewiston	Sun	Journal Hillary	J.	Bouchard,	Esq.,	Thompson	Bowie	&	Hatch	LLC,	Portland,	f or	appellee Matthew	J.	Donovan

Kennebec	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	CV

- 2017

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