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' ORIGINAL 

lf n tbe mlniteb $tate5 <!ourt of jf eberal <!Iaint5 

No. 17-1501C 

(Filed: October 23, 2017) 

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KERRY S. WELLS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

THE UNITED STATES, 

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Defendant. * 

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DISMISSAL ORDER 

WHEELER, Judge. 

FILED 

OCT 2 :i 2017 

U.S. COURT OF 

FEDERAL CLAIMS 

On October 12, 2017, Plaintiff Kerry S. Wells filed a handwritten prose complaint 

in this Court against his patent attorney, Charles C. McCloskey. Mr. Wells alleges that 

Mr. McCloskey stole his patent and seeks justice from this Court as a result. Pursuant to 

its inherent authority, the Court sua sponte DIMISSES Mr. Wells' complain for lack of 

subject-matter jurisdiction because he neither alleges a claim against the United States nor 

identifies any separate source of substantive law creating a right to monetary damages. 

Background 

On October 12, 2017, Mr. Wells filed a complaint in this Court, seeking justice for 

his patent attorney's failure to protect his patent. Compl. at 1. In his complaint, Mr. Wells 

names Charles C. McCloskey as the sole defendant. Id. Mr. Wells states that he hired Mr. 

McCloskey in 2009 to assist him in obtaining a patent for his invention, the "Solar Power 

Address Sign." Id. Mr. Wells then alleges that he was awarded a design patent for his 

invention on December 7, 20 I 0 and that Mr. McCloskey stole this patent from him by 

forcing him to sign a "second power of attorney." Id. 

7017 1450 DODO 1346 1888 
Mr. Wells further alleges that he filed a complaint against Mr. Mccloskey with the 

Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel on February 9, 2016 and received a letter from 

the "Legal Ethics Counsel" stating that a special representative would investigate the 

matter. Id. at 2. However, Mr. Wells claims that no such investigation took place because 

Mr. McCloskey sits on the "Ethics Counsel Committee." Id. Mr. Wells claims that he is 

precluded from following up on the matter with the U.S. Patent Examiner because he is not 

authorized or assigned to the patent; rather, he is merely listed as the patent's "inventor." 

Id. Mr. Wells now "seeks justice" from this Court as a result of Mr. McCloskey's failure 

to protect Mr. Wells' patent. Id. 

Discussion 

Subject-matter jurisdiction may be challenged at any time by the court sua sponte. 

See, e.g., Toohey v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 97, 98 (2012). When deciding whether 

there is subject-matter jurisdiction, the court "accepts as true all uncontroverted factual 

allegations in the complaint, and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." 

Estes Express Lines v. United States, 739 F.3d 689, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Although prose 

litigants are generally held to a lower standard in their pleadings, a pro se plaintiff must 

still prove subject-matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Lengen v. 

United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 317, 328 (2011). 

Under the Tucker Act, the Comi may hear any "claim against the United States 

founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an 

executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or 

for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 

149l(a)(l). The Tucker Act itself does not create a substantive cause of action. Rather, 

for a claim to be cognizable under the Tucker Act, the plaintiff must identify a "separate 

source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages." Fisher v. United States, 

402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The separate source of substantive law is considered 

money-mandating if it "can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for damages 

sustained as a result of the breach of the duties [it] impose[s]." Id. at 1173 (quoting United 

States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 217 (1983)). 

This Court only has jurisdiction to entertain claims against the United States. 28 

U.S.C. § 149l(a)(l); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588 (1941); Moore v. Public 

Defenders Office, 76 Fed. Cl. 617, 620 (2007) ("When a plaintiffs complaint names 

private parties, or local, county, or state agencies, rather than federal agencies, this court 

has no jurisdiction .... "); Pikulin v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 71, 75 (2011) ("It is well 

settled that the United States is the only proper defendant in the Court of Federal Claims."). 

Mr. Wells has not named any federal agency or the United States as a defendant; rather, he 

has named his patent attorney, Charles C. McCloskey, as the sole defendant. Thus, Mr. 

Wells' complaint fails to meet the foundational jurisdictional requirement that the United 

States be the defendant, and the only defendant. 

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Additionally, Mr. Wells fails to identify any separate source of substantive law 

creating a right to monetary damages. In his complaint, Mr. Wells merely asks the Court 

for ''.justice," without pointing to any money-mandating statute that would entitle him to 

monetary relief. As such, this Court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Wells' claim. 

Conclusion 

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES Mr. Wells' 

complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter 

judgment accordingly. No costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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THOMAS C. WHEELER 

Judge