IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

TROY D. BARTLEY v. BRENDA JONES, WARDEN

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lauderdale County

No. 6767 Joe H. Walker, III, Judge

No. W2014-01464-CCA-R3-HC - Filed March 31, 2015

The Petitioner, Troy D. Bartley, appeals the Circuit Court for Lauderdale County’s denial of

his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this

court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of

Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

Pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JOHN EVERETT

WILLIAMS and ROGER A. PAGE, JJ., joined.

Troy D. Bartley, Henning, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; and Rachel E. Willis, Senior Counsel,

for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On January 25, 2011, the Petitioner pleaded guilty to multiple offenses in four

separate indictments in Sullivan County. In case number S57,639, the Petitioner pleaded

guilty to two counts of aggravated assault, which were merged by the trial court, and received

a three-year sentence. In case number S58,333, the Petitioner pleaded guilty to delivery of

cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school zone and possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine

with the intent to sell or deliver within 1,000 feet of a school zone. The possession

conviction was merged with the delivery conviction, and the Petitioner was sentenced to

eight years. In case number S58,374, the Petitioner pleaded guilty to attempted first degree
murder, retaliation for past actions, and two counts of aggravated assault. The aggravated

assault convictions were merged with the retaliation conviction, and the Petitioner received

concurrentsentences of fifteen years and four years, respectively. The trial court ordered that

the effective sentences for each case be served consecutively for a total effective sentence

of twenty-six years.

The Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief, arguing that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel and that he entered involuntarily and unknowing guilty

pleas. The post-conviction court denied relief, and this court affirmed the post-conviction

court’s judgment on appeal. See Troy Douglas Bartley v. State, No. E2012-01881-CCA-R3-

PC, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 830, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 2013).

On July 2, 2014, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. He

contended that his four-year sentence for retaliation for past actions is illegal because it

exceeds the maximum punishment for a Class E felony with a Range I release eligibility. On

July 8, 2014, the trial court entered an order dismissing the petition.

A prisoner is guaranteed the right to habeas corpus relief under Article I, section 15

of the Tennessee Constitution. See also Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101, et seq. However, the

grounds upon which a writ of habeas corpus may be issued are very narrow. Taylor v. State,

995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999). “Habeas corpus relief is available in Tennessee only when

‘it appears upon the face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which the

judgment is rendered’ that a convicting court was without jurisdiction or authority to

sentence a defendant, or that a defendant’s sentence of imprisonment or other restraint has

expired.” Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993). “[T]he purpose of a habeas

corpus petition is to contest void and not merely voidable judgments.” Id. at 163. A void

judgment “is one in which the judgment is facially invalid because the court lacked

jurisdiction or authority to render the judgment or because the defendant’s sentence has

expired.” Taylor, 995 S.W.2d at 83. In contrast,

a voidable judgment is facially valid and requires the introduction of proof

beyond the face of the record or judgment to establish its invalidity. Thus, in

all cases where a petitioner must introduce proof beyond the record to establish

the invalidity of his conviction, then that conviction by definition is merely

voidable, and a Tennessee court cannot issue the writ of habeas corpus under

such circumstances.

Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 24 (Tenn. 2004) (internal citation and quotation marks

omitted); see also Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tenn. 2007). Moreover, it is the

petitioner’s burden to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the judgment

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is void or that the confinement is illegal. Wyatt v. State, 24 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Tenn. 2000).

If the habeas corpus court determines from the petitioner’s filings that no cognizable

claim has been stated and that the petitioner is not entitled to relief, the petition for writ of

habeas corpus may be summarily dismissed. See Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 20. Further, the

habeas corpus court may summarily dismiss the petition without the appointment of a lawyer

and without an evidentiary hearing if there is nothing on the face of the judgment to indicate

that the convictions are void. Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1994).

The Petitioner contends that his four-year sentence for retaliation for past actions is

outside the range of punishment for a Class E felony with a Range I release eligibility and

is, therefore, illegal. He appears to also assert that the illegality of the sentence for his

conviction for retaliation for past actions renders the judgments on all of his convictions

void. “[A] knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives any irregularity as to offender

classification or release eligibility.” Hicks v. State, 945 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tenn. 1997). The

determination of whether a plea bargained sentence is legal is controlled by the overall

punishment range for the offense. Hoover v. State, 215 S.W.3d 776, 781 (Tenn. 2006). As

the Tennessee Supreme Court explained in Hoover, “a plea-bargained sentence is legal so

long as it does not exceed the maximum punishment authorized for the plea offense.” Id.

The record reflects that the Petitioner’s four-year sentence did not exceed the maximum

punishment permitted for a conviction for retaliation of past actions, a Class E felony which

carries a range of one to six years. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-16-501, 40-35-111(b)(5).

When the Petitioner pleaded guilty, he waived any irregularity concerning his offender

classification or release eligibility. Therefore, we conclude that the Petitioner’s sentence is

not illegal and that there is nothing on the face of the record to otherwise indicate that the

judgments are void.

When an opinion would have no precedential value, the Court of Criminal Appeals

may affirm the judgment or action of the trial court by memorandum opinion when the

judgment is rendered or the action taken in a proceeding without a jury and such judgment

or action is not a determination of guilt, and the evidence does not preponderate against the

finding of the trial judge. See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 20. We conclude that this case

satisfies the criteria of Rule 20. Accordingly, it is ordered that the State’s motion is granted.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court

of Criminal Appeals.

_________________________________

CAMILLE R. McMULLEN, JUDGE

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