1

Filed 11/5/12

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, )

)

Plaintiff and Respondent, )

) S189786

v. )

) Ct.App. 1/2 A114612

REGINALD WYATT, )

) Alameda County

Defendant and Appellant. ) Super. Ct. No. C147107

____________________________________)

While in defendant‟s care, defendant‟s young son died of shock and 

hemorrhage due to blunt force trauma. A jury convicted defendant of involuntary 

manslaughter (Pen. Code,1 § 192, subd. (b)) and assault on a child causing death 

(§ 273ab). As relevant here, the Court of Appeal reversed the section 273ab 

conviction upon finding the trial court erroneously failed to instruct the jury, sua 

sponte, on simple assault as a lesser included offense. We conclude there was no 

error. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand with 

directions to reinstate the conviction.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In May 2003, defendant Reginald Wyatt was living with Tiffany Blake and 

their infant daughter, Valerie. Defendant also had a 14-month-old son, Reginald 

Wyatt, Jr. (Reginald), from a previous relationship. On the morning of May 18, 

 

1 All further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated.
2

2003, Reginald stopped breathing while in defendant‟s care. He was rushed to the 

hospital, but could not be revived. Although the treating doctor saw no signs of 

significant injury on the body, the autopsy disclosed that Reginald died of shock 

and hemorrhage due to blunt force trauma to the chest and abdomen.

An information was filed charging defendant with one count of murder 

(§ 187, subd. (a)) and one count of assault on a child causing death (§ 273ab).2

As explained in detail, post, the evidence at trial included medical evidence 

concerning Reginald‟s injuries, defendant‟s tape-recorded statements and trial 

testimony, and testimony from Tiffany Blake and Reginald‟s mother. After the 

defense rested, the court granted a judgment of acquittal as to the murder count. 

(§ 1118.1.) The jury convicted defendant of involuntary manslaughter (§ 192, 

subd. (b)) and child assault homicide (§ 273ab).

In 2008, the Court of Appeal reversed the section 273ab conviction. 

Because the evidence did not show that defendant had “ „actual knowledge‟ he 

was „wrestling far too hard with his young son,‟ ” the court deemed the evidence 

insufficient to prove the requisite mens rea for the crime. (Wyatt I, supra, 

48 Cal.4th at p. 779.) On review of the matter, we explained that under People v. 

Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779 (Williams), “a defendant may commit an assault 

without realizing he is harming the victim, but the prosecution must prove the 

defendant was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that a 

battery would directly, naturally, and probably result from the defendant‟s 

 

2 The assault provision now appears in section 273ab, subdivision (a), 

without substantive change. (Compare Stats. 1996, ch. 460, § 2, p. 2814 with 

Stats. 2010, ch. 300, § 1.) We refer to the operative statute simply as section 

273ab. In People v. Wyatt (2010) 48 Cal.4th 776 (Wyatt I), we noted the offense 

defined by section 273ab was sometimes referred to as “child abuse homicide.” 

(Wyatt I, at p. 779.) Upon reflection, we agree with defendant that “child assault 

homicide” is a more accurate term for the offense.
3

conduct.” (Wyatt I, at p. 779.) Applying the Williams standard, we found 

substantial evidence establishing “that defendant knew he was striking his young 

son with his fist, forearm, knee, and elbow, and that he used an amount of force a 

reasonable person would realize was likely to result in great bodily injury.” (Ibid.) 

Accordingly, we reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded for 

further proceedings.

The Court of Appeal again reversed the section 273ab conviction, this time 

concluding the trial court should have instructed the jury, sua sponte, on simple 

assault as a lesser included offense.

We granted the People‟s petition for review.

DISCUSSION

The Court of Appeal relied on People v. Basuta (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 370 

for the proposition that simple assault (§ 240) is a lesser included offense of child 

assault homicide (§ 273ab). The People do not contest this holding, so we proceed 

to the inquiry at hand. Given the evidence at trial, did the trial court prejudicially 

err in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on simple assault?

The legal principles governing our analysis are settled. “In criminal cases, 

even absent a request, a trial court must instruct on the general principles of law 

relevant to the issues the evidence raises. [Citation.] „ “That obligation has been 

held to include giving instructions on lesser included offenses when the evidence 

raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were 

present [citation], but not when there is no evidence that the offense was less than 

that charged. [Citations.]” ‟ [Citation.] „[T]he existence of “any evidence, no 

matter how weak” will not justify instructions on a lesser included offense, but 

such instructions are required whenever evidence that the defendant is guilty only 

of the lesser offense is “substantial enough to merit consideration” by the jury. 

[Citations.]‟ ” (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 623; see People v. 
4

Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 813; People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 

215.) In this regard, the testimony of a single witness, including that of a 

defendant, may suffice to require lesser included offense instructions. (People v. 

Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 646.) Courts must assess sufficiency of the evidence 

without evaluating the credibility of witnesses, for that is a task reserved for the 

jury. (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162.) The failure to instruct on 

a lesser included offense in a noncapital case does not require reversal “unless an 

examination of the entire record establishes a reasonable probability that the error 

affected the outcome.” (Breverman, at p. 165; see Thomas, at p. 814.)

We begin with a summary of the prosecution‟s evidence.3 At the time of 

the crimes, Reginald was 14 months old, stood 31 inches tall, and weighed 26 

pounds. (Wyatt I, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 782, 783.) After the autopsy, defendant 

waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 and gave the 

following statements to investigators in a tape-recorded interview. On the 

morning of May 18, 2003, defendant got up and started wrestling and playing with 

Reginald, who was staying with him and his girlfriend Tiffany Blake for the 

weekend. Defendant picked Reginald up and threw him on the bed, and 

“chopped” his back with both hands. He held Reginald up and pressed the boy‟s 

stomach to his head, and then turned and flipped Reginald a distance of about four 

feet onto the bed. (Wyatt I, at p. 782.)

Defendant said that at one point, he accidentally fell on top of Reginald 

while performing a move he called “comin‟ off the top rope.” Defendant 

explained that Reginald rolled unexpectedly just as defendant was about to jump 

 

3 We draw heavily from the facts as recited in Wyatt I, supra, 48 Cal.4th at 

pages 782-784, and incorporate additional facts from the record where relevant to 

the analysis.
5

on the bed. When defendant landed, his hip came down on Reginald, along with 

most or all of defendant‟s body weight of 170 pounds. Reginald grunted as if the 

wind had been knocked out of him, but he did not cry and continued to smile and 

seemed fine. Blake later told defendant he was playing too rough with Reginald 

and could hurt him, so defendant stopped. (Wyatt I, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 782.)

After Blake left for work, defendant resumed wrestling with Reginald for 

another 20 or 30 minutes. During this period, defendant might have hit his son 

harder because Blake was not there to interfere. Defendant “body slammed” 

Reginald about four times, and used his fists to hit Reginald in the chest about 10 

or 11 times. He did an “atomic elbow” to Reginald‟s head, hit him in the upper 

chest with his forearm about three times, and then hit him on the back. In 

addition, defendant held Reginald up by his neck, squeezed him between his legs, 

and twice did a “knee drop,” in which he hit Reginald in the back with his knee. 

He also did “pretend” head butts and boxed with Reginald, and repeatedly did a 

“suplex,” which involved grabbing Reginald and flipping him over defendant‟s 

body onto the bed. Defendant said he wanted his son to be more “active” and was 

trying to “toughen him up” because a kid cannot be “soft” to grow up in Oakland. 

(Wyatt I, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 783.)

During a second tape-recorded interview that same evening, the 

investigators asked defendant what he was feeling when wrestling with Reginald. 

Defendant said he was not feeling like himself or thinking about being rough, then 

clarified he was “stuck” on play-fighting with his son: “Like I just had a one-track 

mind. I was just stuck on toughening him up, playin‟ with Reggie, beatin‟ up 

Reggie . . . that‟s all that was stuck on there.” He further stated, “[M]y mind 

musta went blank, though, for me to really . . . hit him hard enough . . . to hurt 

him, and I not notice it. I wasn‟t payin‟ attention, and I wasn‟t thinkin‟.” In 

defendant‟s words, “I was hittin‟ him pretty hard” and “I wasn‟t doin‟ nothin‟ to 
6

not hit him no harder.” As for why he did not heed Blake‟s warning about hurting 

Reginald, defendant admitted he was “[h]ard-headed” and “[s]tubborn” and 

“[d]idn‟t want a woman to be tellin‟ me how to raise my son.” Although he had 

play-wrestled with Reginald before, this was the first time he “lost control.” 

(Wyatt I, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 783.)

Prosecution witness Dr. David Levin testified his external examination 

disclosed an abrasion on Reginald‟s chin and two abrasions on the neck. There 

was a laceration of the frenulum of the upper lip and a contusion on the chest. 

During his internal examination, Dr. Levin found an internal contusion under the 

scalp at the forehead, and bleeding on the surface of the heart, on the tissue behind 

the heart, and at the hilus of the left lung. There were four lacerations to the liver, 

which caused internal bleeding of 200 milliliters of blood into the abdominal 

cavity. Dr. Levin also found hemorrhaging behind the abdominal cavity and in the 

mesentery of the small and large intestines, as well as acute fractures of the fifth 

and sixth ribs on both the right and left sides of the back of the body. He 

additionally observed mild cerebral swelling. (Wyatt I, supra, 48 Cal.4th at 

pp. 783-784.)

Dr. Levin determined that Reginald died of shock and hemorrhage due to 

blunt force trauma to the chest and abdomen. The injuries were consistent with 

multiple instances of blunt force trauma to the back, abdomen, chest, and head, 

although some of the injuries could have been caused if a person who weighed 170 

pounds jumped up and landed with his hip onto the child‟s midsection. The 

infliction of trauma would not necessarily result in external bruising, especially in 

softer areas like the abdomen. The contusion on the chest could have been caused 

by someone attempting to administer CPR, but it was highly unlikely CPR caused 

the fractured ribs in the back of the body. (Wyatt I, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 784.)
7

Dr. James Crawford testified as a pediatric expert in medical evaluations of 

child abuse. According to Dr. Crawford, Reginald‟s injuries were “at the end of 

the bell curve,” meaning they were at a level uncommon for a one-year-old child. 

The types of injuries Reginald suffered, including the four lacerations to the liver 

and the multiple sites of internal bleeding, “are seen only in the most serious 

events,” such as when children are in car crashes or hit by motor vehicles. The 

likelihood that Reginald‟s ribs were broken during CPR was “extraordinarily 

small.” Although the fractures could conceivably have been caused by blunt force 

trauma to the child‟s back, it would have to have been “something that would have 

been quite violent, quite out of the ordinary,” given how uncommon rib fractures 

are in children. Unless the child were unconscious or had a profound neurological 

condition, he would be expected to have reacted to the types of injuries shown 

here by crying and clearly demonstrating distress. Dr. Crawford found it 

unbelievable that a child with such injuries would be laughing and smiling. 

(Wyatt I, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 784.)

In Dr. Crawford‟s opinion, there had to have been “at least multiple, and 

potentially many impacts” for the identified injuries to have resulted. Although it 

was remotely possible that one extremely violent lateral compression could have 

caused all of the significant injuries, it was more likely the injuries were caused by 

more than one blow. If all the different injuries were caused by a single event, it 

would have to have been “an extraordinarily violent act.” (Wyatt I, supra, 

48 Cal.4th at p. 784.)

In his defense, defendant took the stand and denied performing any real 

wrestling moves on Reginald. He claimed he did not strike his son hard but used 

only “make-believe wrestling moves,” such as “body-slam,” “off-the-top-rope,” 

“head butt,” “suplex,” and an “atomic elbow” to the head. Defendant testified that 

at one point, he intended to jump on the bed next to Reginald to make the bed
8

shake so Reginald would laugh. When defendant jumped up and was in the air, 

Reginald rolled underneath him. Defendant ended up falling on his son, with his 

hip hitting Reginald in the back. Defendant said that, after he landed on Reginald 

by accident, it appeared his son had the wind knocked out of him. Reginald did 

not cry and assumed normal breathing after a short while. Defendant testified he 

stopped playing with Reginald and put him down on his sleeping pallet with some 

milk. Defendant drifted off to sleep at about 10:00 a.m.

When defendant awoke, Reginald was not responsive but breathing faintly. 

He hit Reginald on the back and attempted CPR on him, but Reginald did not 

respond. Defendant tried calling his stepmother and Reginald‟s mother, but 

neither one answered. He then dialed 911, but could not get through. When he 

performed CPR on Reginald again, “some green stuff” came out of Reginald‟s 

nose. Defendant panicked and picked up his young daughter and Reginald to go 

to a neighbor‟s apartment. At this point, defendant tripped and dropped both 

children, with Reginald‟s head hitting the floor. The neighbor dialed 911. 

Defendant did not initially tell police about the bed-jumping incident because he 

did not connect it with Reginald‟s condition.

Defendant then explained his incriminating statements to the investigators. 

Defendant told the investigators he was wrestling with Reginald, presuming they 

realized that he meant he was “play wrestling.” When the investigators asked how 

Reginald could have suffered such extensive injuries in a single accident, 

defendant began “second-guessing” himself and entertained the possibility that he 

did not remember the events correctly and that he hit Reginald harder than he 

believed. Defendant was grief stricken, and he felt shame and guilt about what 

had happened. Defendant‟s mind was spinning, and he “just kind of went along” 

with the investigators‟ hypothesis that he blacked out and struck Reginald too 

hard, “because they knew, you know, basically what happened.”
9

Defense pathologist Dr. Paul Herrmann testified that Reginald‟s liver and 

rib injuries could have resulted from a single sharp blow to the back, such as if a 

170-pound man had fallen on him, but he acknowledged that would be less likely 

if Reginald were on a bed instead of on the floor. Dr. Hermann also believed the 

injuries to Reginald‟s chest and heart area were likely due to CPR administration, 

and the cause of the tear to his frenulum was consistent with an endotracheal tube 

being placed in his mouth with violent force. On cross-examination, 

Dr. Herrmann testified that a child receiving severe injuries to the liver and ribs 

might scream in pain or go immediately into shock and become still. Either way, 

however, a caregiver would likely notice a difference in the child‟s behavior.

At the time of the crime, section 273ab provided in relevant part: “Any 

person who, having the care or custody of a child who is under eight years of age, 

assaults the child by means of force that to a reasonable person would be likely to 

produce great bodily injury, resulting in the child‟s death, shall be punished by 

imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years to life.” (See ante, fn. 2.) As Wyatt I

explained, the assault in this offense requires evidence that the defendant acted 

“with awareness of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that great 

bodily injury would directly, naturally, and probably result from his act.” 

(Wyatt I, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 781; see Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 788.) 

Consistent with its meaning in analogous statutory contexts, “great bodily injury” 

refers to “significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater 

than minor or moderate harm.” (CALCRIM No. 820 [listing elements of 

§ 273ab]; see People v. Maciel (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 679, 686; People v. 

Albritton (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 647, 658.) Because the defendant “need not 

know or be subjectively aware that his act is capable of causing great bodily 

injury,” the requisite mens rea may be established “even when the defendant 

honestly believes his act is not likely to result in such injury.” (Wyatt I, at p. 781.)
10

Section 240 defines the crime of simple assault as “an unlawful attempt, 

coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of 

another.” Although assault does not require a specific intent to injure the victim, 

the defendant must “actually know[] those facts sufficient to establish that his act 

by its nature will probably and directly result in physical force being applied to 

another.” (Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 788.) No actual touching is 

necessary, but the defendant must do an act likely to result in a touching, however 

slight, of another in a harmful or offensive manner. (See People v. Cox (2000) 

23 Cal.4th 665, 674.)

As indicated, the obligation to instruct on a lesser included offense does not 

arise when there is no evidence that the offense was less than that charged. 

(People v. Thomas, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 813; People v. Taylor, supra, 

48 Cal.4th at p. 623.) Thus, the question is whether substantial evidence 

supported a conclusion that defendant committed only simple assault and not child 

assault homicide. The dispute here, reduced to its essence, concerns the measure

of the force applied by defendant.

Defendant testified he jumped onto the bed to make it shake, so as to make 

Reginald laugh. Reginald unexpectedly rolled underneath defendant as he was in 

the air, and defendant landed on Reginald. Apart from that, defendant denied 

causing any harm to his son, and specifically denied striking Reginald hard or 

using real wrestling moves on him. In support of defendant‟s case, Dr. Herrmann 

offered expert testimony that the blunt force trauma causing Reginald‟s death 

could have resulted from defendant‟s falling on Reginald. The Court of Appeal 

found that the testimony of defendant and his expert, taken together, reflected 

substantial evidence of a simple assault. We are not persuaded.

When compared, the prosecution‟s evidence (see ante, at pp. 4-7) and 

defendant‟s evidence presented the jury with two scenarios on the charge of child 
11

assault homicide. The prosecution‟s evidence supported its theory that defendant 

was guilty of administering multiple blunt force blows to Reginald that caused 

massive internal trauma and resulted in his death. Conversely, defendant offered

evidence to show he was not guilty of the charged crime because Reginald died as 

a result of a single unfortunate accident when the child unforeseeably rolled or 

turned as defendant jumped on the bed. After receiving instructions on child 

assault homicide and accident, the jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty.

The Court of Appeal, however, held the jury‟s rejection of the accident 

theory did not foreclose the possibility that the jury might also have convicted 

defendant of simple assault rather than child assault homicide. In the court‟s view, 

the jury could have found, based on defendant‟s testimony he intended to jump on 

the bed next to Reginald but not on him, that defendant did not commit an act

likely to produce great bodily injury, notwithstanding the serious injuries and 

death that in fact resulted. We cannot agree.

The Court of Appeal‟s theory of simple assault is predicated on the 

assumption that defendant willfully jumped on the bed in close proximity to 

Reginald. Significantly, a jury could not convict defendant of assault under this 

theory unless it found a reasonable person would realize this act would directly, 

naturally, and probably result in physical force being applied against Reginald. 

(Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 790.) Here, the record established that 

defendant weighed 170 pounds and that Reginald, who was 14 months old, 

weighed only 26 pounds and stood 31 inches tall. According to defendant‟s 

testimony, Reginald was lying on the bed when defendant purposefully jumped up 

and onto the bed, intending to catch Reginald in the space between defendant‟s 

body and elbow (i.e., under defendant‟s armpit) upon landing. Despite 

defendant‟s claimed intent, given the obvious weight disparity between defendant 

and Reginald, Reginald‟s size and tender age, and the way in which defendant 
12

jumped up and over Reginald in order to land in such close proximity to him, no 

reasonable person would conclude that defendant‟s act would probably result in 

only minor injury to Reginald.4

Nonetheless, even if a reasonable person might believe that minor or 

moderate harm was a possible outcome, the trial court is not required to “instruct 

sua sponte on the panoply of all possible lesser included offenses.” (People v. 

Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 215, italics added.) Such instructions are required 

only when there is substantial evidence that, if the defendant is guilty at all, he is 

guilty of the lesser offense, but not the greater. (Ibid.; People v. Thomas, supra, 

53 Cal.4th at p. 813.) “ „ “ „Substantial evidence‟ in this context is „ “evidence 

from which a jury composed of reasonable [persons] could . . . conclude[]” ‟ that 

the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed.” ‟ [Citation.]” (Huggins, at 

p. 215.) Here, it would be speculative at best to construe the trial evidence in this 

case as supporting a verdict of only simple assault. (See People v. Mendoza

(2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 174.) Accordingly, the trial court had no sua sponte duty 

to instruct on that lesser offense. (See People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 519 

[court may refuse to instruct on simple assault where evidence makes clear that if

the defendant is guilty at all, he is guilty of the greater offense of assault by means 

of force likely to produce great bodily injury]; People v. McCoy (1944) 25 Cal.2d 

177, 187.)

 

4 Dr. Herrmann‟s testimony did not provide substantial evidence to the 

contrary. The defense utilized Dr. Herrmann to address the medical possibility 

that defendant‟s landing on Reginald caused the fatal injuries, and he opined it was 

equally probable that the fatal injuries could have been caused “by a single blow, 

as by multiple blows.” The doctor, however, offered no opinion that only minor 

or moderate harm would probably result from the claimed assaultive act.
13

DISPOSITION

We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter 

with directions to reinstate defendant‟s section 273ab conviction.

BAXTER, J.

WE CONCUR:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C.J.

WERDEGAR, J.

CHIN, J.

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.
1

CONCURRING OPINION BY KENNARD, J.

This case is before us the second time. To explain why I am writing 

separately, some background information may be helpful.

In the earlier decision, People v. Wyatt (2010) 48 Cal.4th 776 (Wyatt I), the 

issue involved the sufficiency of the evidence supporting defendant‟s conviction 

for assault on a child resulting in death (hereafter also referred to as child abuse 

homicide), a crime set forth in Penal Code section 273ab. That statute states: 

“Any person, having the care or custody of a child who is under eight years of age, 

who assaults the child by means of force that to a reasonable person would be 

likely to produce great bodily injury, resulting in the child‟s death, shall be

punished by imprisonment . . . for 25 years to life.” (Id., subd. (a), italics added.) 

In concluding that, contrary to the Court of Appeal‟s decision, the evidence 

against defendant met Penal Code section 273ab‟s requirements, Wyatt I relied on 

the definition of assault that a majority of this court had adopted in People v. 

Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779 (Williams). (Wyatt I, supra, at pp. 780-781.)

Williams described the mental state for assault as requiring only that the 

defendant have “actual knowledge of the facts sufficient to establish that the 

defendant‟s act by its nature will probably and directly result in injury to another” 

(Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 782), and as not requiring “a specific intent to 

cause injury” (id. at p. 790). I dissented, expressing the view that assault is a 

specific intent crime that requires proof of an intent to injure another. (Id. at 
2

p. 791 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.); see also People v. Colantuono (1994) 7 Cal.4th 

206, 225-228 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.); Wyatt I, supra, 48 Cal.4th at 

p. 786 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).) Because the Williams majority‟s view of the 

requisite mental state for assault carried the force of precedent, I concurred in 

Wyatt I in upholding defendant‟s child abuse homicide conviction and in reversing 

the Court of Appeal‟s judgment. (Wyatt I, supra, at p. 787.)

In the wake of the remand to the Court of Appeal in Wyatt I, that court 

again reversed defendant‟s conviction, this time on the ground that the trial court 

erred in not instructing the jury on its own initiative on simple assault, a lesser 

offense necessarily included in the crime of assault on a child resulting in death. 

The trial court‟s duty in this regard arises only if a reasonable jury could have 

concluded that the lesser offense was committed, but not the greater offense. (See 

maj. opn., ante, at pp. 3-4, 12.) As it did in Wyatt I, the majority here relies on the 

Williams definition of simple assault (id. at p. 10), and it then holds that the 

evidence would not have supported such a conclusion (id. at p. 11). Because, as I 

observed earlier, the Williams majority‟s definition of assault is now the law, I 

concur in today‟s majority opinion.

KENNARD, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Wyatt

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 12/9/10 – 1st Dist., Div. 2

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S189786

Date Filed: November 5, 2012

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Alameda

Judge: Jon Rolefson

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Waldemar D. Halka, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Stan Helfman, Laurence K. Sullivan, 

Violet M. Lee and Alisha M. Carlile, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Waldemar D. Halka

P.O. Box 99965

San Diego, CA 92169

(858) 273-8626

Alisha M. Carlile

Deputy Attorney General

455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

(415) 703-5896