United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 14-2594

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Rebecca Shirrell

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

St. Francis Medical Center; Lisa Miller

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - Cape Girardeau

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 Submitted: April 13, 2015

 Filed: July 16, 2015

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Before RILEY, Chief Judge, LOKEN and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Rebecca Shirrell, a nurse formerly employed by St. Francis MedicalCenter (St.

Francis), brought this action alleging religious discrimination and retaliation in

violation of Title VII and the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) after St. Francis

terminated her employment. Shirrell alleged discrimination based on her Jewish faith

and retaliation based on complaints she made concerning a co-worker’s derogatory
remark about the Jewish faith. The district court granted summary judgment in favor 1

of St. Francis and Lisa Miller, the co-worker who made the derogatory remark,

holding that Shirrell failed to make a prima facie showing of discrimination or

retaliation under Title VII and failed to satisfy the requirementsfor her MHRA claims

when the evidence showed St. Francis terminated Shirrell pursuant to hospital policy

for an accumulation of disciplinary points. Shirrell appeals, and we affirm. 

I.

St. Francis first hired Shirrell, who is Jewish, as a clinical nurse in 1995. 

Shirrell resigned her position in July 2000. In 2001, St. Francis re-hired Shirrell,

where she continued to work until her 2012 discharge. In 2007, Shirrell moved to

part-time status,primarilyworking weekends. Shirrell worked the weekend shift with

Miller for a number of years. In late February or early March 2012, Miller was

having a discussion about the purchase of a camper with another co-worker in

Shirrell’s presence. Miller, who is not Jewish, commented to the co-worker that she

was going to try to “Jew down” or had “Jewed down” the seller of the camper to a

lower price. Prior to this comment, Shirrell had not heard Miller or any other coworkers make derogatory remarks about the Jewish faith and did not have any issues

in her working relationship with her co-workers.

Shirrell informed her supervisor, Tammy Hahn-Brown, who served as the

Nurse Manager of Orthopedics, about Miller’s comment in a phone call the following

day. Hahn-Brown told Gerry Salter, St. Francis’s Director of Orthopedic Services,

about the incident and told Salter thatshe would speak with Miller about the incident

and communicate with the staff regarding St. Francis’s expectations ofits employees. 

On March 5, 2012, Hahn-Brown posted a copy of St. Francis’s harassment policy in

The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., United States DistrictJudge for the

1

Eastern District of Missouri. 

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the nurses’ room and sent an email to nurses and nursing assistants reminding them

to be careful with their words and actions around patients, families, and co-workers

at all times.

Roughly six weeks after Miller’s comment, Shirrell informed Hahn-Brown that

her work environment had become hostile, alleging that co-workers gave her the cold

shoulder, that Miller asked Shirrell why she had complained to Hahn-Brown, and that

Miller accused Shirrell of trying to get Miller in trouble. Shirrell admits, however,

thatshe had very little interaction with co-workers during a typical weekend shift and

that she never filed a harassment complaint or internal grievance during her

employment with St. Francis. In late March or early April 2012, Hahn-Brown

announced she was taking a different position within St. Francis, vacating her

supervisory role over Miller and Shirrell. On April 20, 2012, St. Francis promoted

Miller to assume Hahn-Brown’s vacated position. Miller worked in her new position

as Nurse Manager of Orthopedics under Hahn-Brown’s supervision until late May

2012. 

In late May or early June 2012, Miller brought two patient complaints

concerning Shirrell to Salter’s attention. Salter told Miller to investigate the

complaints. Patients or family members of patients made these complaints on May

31, 2012, and June 2, 2012, alleging that Shirrell had been rude to a patient and failed

to appear in a patient’s room when summoned. Miller reported the results of her

investigation, which labeled the complaints as unprofessional conduct, to Salter. 

Pursuant to St. Francis’s Progressive Corrective Action Policy, which is designed to

address disciplinary concerns by assessing points for various infractions and

mandating disciplinary action based on accumulation of points, Salter assessed

Shirrell a suspension, worth seven points. 

By late May 2012, Shirrell had also accumulated five unscheduled absences

within a 12-month period. The fourth and fifth absences occurred on May 24, 2012,

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and May 26-27, 2012. Pursuant to St. Francis’s Absenteeism and Tardiness Policy2

and the Corrective Action Policy, Salter gave Shirrell a written warning and assessed

her three disciplinary points. In late May or early June 2012, St. Francis also issued

two separate oral warnings to Shirrell for incidents on May 17, 2012, and May 31,

2012, described as reluctance, disinterest, and/or neglect in carrying out

responsibilities. The Corrective Action Policy valued each oral warning at one

disciplinary point. Shirrell does not dispute either warning, one issued for failure to

document waste of medication and one for neglecting to write a sedation score of a

patient. 

During a meeting held on June 6, 2012, Salter informed Shirrell that St. Francis

was terminating her employment. Before making the decision to discharge Shirrell,

Salter consulted with St. Francis’s Human Resources(HR) department both in person

and via phone to verify that HR was in agreement with Salter’s assessment of

Shirrell’s disciplinary points. The decision to discharge Shirrell occurred during a

meeting between Salter, Miller, and HR employee Teri Krietzer, with Salter making

the final decision to terminate Shirrell. At the June 6th meeting, Salter informed

Shirrell that St. Francis was terminating her employment pursuant to the Corrective

Action Policy, which mandates the discharge of an employee who accumulates 12

Shirrell argues that St. Francis incorrectly applied the Absenteeism and

2

Tardiness Policy to Shirrell, treating her as a part-time employee under the policy

when the number of hours she worked rendered the policy for part-time employees

inapplicable to her. We find this dispute immaterial because we will not second guess

St. Francis’s application of its own personnel policy. See Bone v. G4S Youth Servs.,

LLC, 686 F.3d 948, 955 (8th Cir. 2012) (explaining that courts do not “sit as superpersonnel departments reviewing the wisdom or fairness of the business judgments

made by employers, except to the extent that those judgments involve intentional

discrimination” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1252

(2013). With no evidence of intentional discrimination in the application of the

policy, we decline to pass judgment on St. Francis’s determinations regarding

Shirrell’s unscheduled absences. 

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disciplinary points in a 12-month period. The disciplinary action form Salter

prepared in connection with this meeting indicated that Shirrell had accumulated 12 3

disciplinary points in a 12-month period, including 7 disciplinary points for patient

and/or family complaints, 3 disciplinary points for 5 unscheduled absences in a 12-

month period, and 2 disciplinary points for reluctance, disinterest, and/or neglect in

carrying out her duties. The disciplinary action form also included a March 1, 2012

patient complaint and a notation that patient and family complaints had previously

been addressed with Shirrell in 2011, although these did not figure into the

assessment of the 12 points. Miller was present at the discharge meeting but did not

speak, and Shirrell makes no allegations that Miller was the final decision maker

regarding her termination. Shirrell similarly makes no allegations that Salter ever

exhibited any bias against the Jewish faith. 

On June 17, 2012, Shirrell filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Missouri Commission on

Human Rights (MCHR) alleging religious discrimination, retaliation, and

termination. The EEOC and MCHR issued Notices of Right to Sue on December 14,

2012, and January 9, 2013, respectively. Shirrell initiated this action on March 4,

2013, asserting Title VII and MHRA claims against St. Francis and MHRA claims

against Miller, alleging that her discharge was based on her religion and her

complaints about discriminatory conduct. The defendants brought a motion for

summary judgment, which the district court granted, holding that Shirrell failed to

satisfy the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework with respect to her Title 4

VII claims and failed to provide evidence to sustain her MHRA claims. This appeal

follows. 

This form bears the date June 5, 2012, and Shirrell purportedly signed the

3

form on this date. The parties do not dispute, however, that the discharge meeting

occurred on June 6, 2012. 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 4

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II.

We first consider whether the district court erred in granting summary

judgment to St. Francis and Miller on Shirrell’s MHRA claims. We review a district

court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences and

reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Hill v.

Walker, 737 F.3d 1209, 1216 (8th Cir. 2013). We will affirm the grant of summary

judgment “if the movant showsthat there is no genuine dispute asto any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

The MHRA makes it unlawful to “retaliate or discriminate in any manner

against any other person because such person has opposed any practice prohibited by 

[the MHRA].” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.070(2). Prohibited conduct under the MHRA

includes discrimination based on religion. Id. § 213.055. Shirrell asserts that the

district court erred in granting summary judgment on her retaliation claim because

disputed issues of material fact exist with respect to whether Shirrell engaged in

protected activity and whether a causal connection existed between the protected

activity and her discharge. Shirrell asserts the district court erred with respect to her

religious discrimination claim because a causal connection existed between her

religion and her discharge. With respect to the MHRA claims against Miller, Shirrell

also asserts that, because Miller was personally involved in the challenged conduct

and Shirrell’s discharge, she may be held individually liable under the MHRA.

Under the MHRA, a plaintiff alleging retaliation must meet three requirements:

(1) the plaintiff complained of an MHRA-prohibited activity, (2) the employer took

an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection exists between the

complaint and adverse action. McCrainey v. Kan. City Mo. Sch. Dist., 337 S.W.3d

746, 753 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011). In resolving this claim, we need not address each

element under the MHRA because the lack of a causal connection isfatal to Shirrell’s

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claim. The evidence shows St. Francis terminated Shirrell pursuant to hospital policy,

rather than in response to her complaints about the overheard remark. Shirrell

accrued 12 disciplinary points in a 12-month period, which mandated her discharge

pursuant to the Corrective Action Policy. Shirrell had a history of disciplinary issues,

primarily difficult relations with patients and families. The record simply does not

support her assertion thatshe had a good disciplinary history. The record reveals that

Shirrell’s interactions with patients and families had been an ongoing concern, and

Shirrell attempts to place undue significance on one satisfactory job review she

received shortly before she began amassing the 12 disciplinary points that led to her

discharge. Shirrell presents no evidence other than the timing of her discharge after

her complaints to support a causal connection. Without other evidence, the fact that

Shirrell’s discharge occurred three months after her complaint isinsufficient to prove

causation. See Medley v. Valentine Radford Commc’ns, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 315, 325

(Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a one month period between protected activity and

adverse action was insufficient to establish a causal connection in the absence of

other evidence). The district court thus did not err in granting summary judgment in

favor of the defendants on Shirrell’s MHRA retaliation claim.

With respect to Shirrell’s religious discrimination claim, the MHRA requires

a plaintiff to prove: (1) the plaintiff was discriminated against with respect to her

employment or the plaintiff was discharged, (2) the plaintiff’s religion was a

contributing factorin the discriminatory act or discharge, and (3) the plaintiffsuffered

damage as a direct result. Daugherty v. City of Md. Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 820

(Mo. 2007) (en banc). Shirrell has failed to present any evidence that would support

the conclusion that her religion was a contributing factor in her discharge. The record

isinstead filled with evidence indicating that St. Francis terminated Shirrell pursuant

to hospital policy after Shirrell accumulated 12 disciplinary points. One overheard

offensive remark and a termination three months later falls far short of the requisite

causal connection. See Brannum v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 518 F.3d 542, 548 (8th Cir.

2008) (“[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents(unless extremely

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serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of

employment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d

at 818 (explaining that courts evaluating MHRA claims should look to both Missouri

law and federal employment discrimination law that is consistent with Missouri law). 

The district court thus did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants on

Shirrell’s MHRA religious discrimination claim.

Because we conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary

judgment on Shirrell’s MHRA claims, we need not consider Shirrell’s additional

argument that the district court should have held Miller individually liable under the

MHRA for her participation in the events giving rise to Shirrell’s discharge. Even if

the MHRA could impose individual liability on Miller, Shirrell’s claims against her

fail for the above-mentioned reasons. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant

of summary judgment to St. Francis and Miller on Shirrell’s MHRA claims. 

III.

We next consider whether the district court erred in granting summary

judgment to St. Francis on Shirrell’s Title VII claims. To survive a motion for

summary judgment with a Title VII claim, a plaintiffmust show either direct evidence

of a Title VII violation or create an inference of discrimination or retaliation under

the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Fiero v. CSG Sys., Inc., 759

F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 2014). Direct evidence of discrimination requires “a specific

link between the [alleged] discriminatory animus and the challenged decision,

sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion

actually motivated the employer’s decision.” Putman v. Unity Health Sys., 348 F.3d

732, 735 (8th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In the absence of direct evidence, the McDonnell Douglasframework applies, which

requires a plaintiff to make a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. See id. 

If a plaintiff satisfies this burden, the defendant then has the burden of showing a

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legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged action. Id. If the defendant

offers such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show the defendant’s

proffered reason is a pretext. Id.

As an initial matter, Shirrell asserts that the district court erred in granting

summary judgment in favor of St. Francis because the district court evaluated the

motion under theMcDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework instead of under the

elements of each cause of action that a jury would consider during deliberation. This

argument is without merit and Shirrell acknowledges asmuch when she concedesthat

a plaintiff in an employment discrimination action must satisfy the McDonnell

Douglas framework to survive summary judgment. See Appellant’s Br. 37 n.6

(“Shirrell acknowledges at present this Court requires plaintiff to establish

McDonnell Douglas elements to survive summary judgment[.]”).

Shirrell next argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment

to St. Francis on her Title VII religious discrimination claim. Because Shirrell has

presented no direct evidence of discrimination, we evaluate her claim under the

McDonnell Douglas framework. To establish a prima facie case of religious

discrimination, a plaintiff must show: (1) she is a member of a protected class because

of her religious beliefs, (2) she met her employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) she

suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the circumstances give rise to an

inference of discrimination. See Gibson v. Am. Greetings Corp., 670 F.3d 844, 853

(8th Cir. 2012). Circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination include

treating similarly situated employees who are not members of the protected class in

a different manner. Id. at 853-54.

As with Shirrell’s MHRA claims, we need not address each element of a Title

VII religious discrimination claim because, as a matter of law, the circumstances do

not give rise to an inference of discrimination. Shirrell identifies no similarly situated

co-workers who were not part of her protected class and who were treated any

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differently than she was. She also provides no evidence that the ultimate decision

maker in her discharge was biased against her. The same evidence that is fatal to

Shirrell’s MHRA claims is similarly fatal here: St. Francis terminated Shirrell

pursuant to hospital policy after Shirrell accrued 12 disciplinary points; St. Francis

terminated Shirrell after consultation with HR; Salter wasthe ultimate decision maker

in the termination; Miller was not involved in the decision to terminate Shirrell; and

the basis for Shirrell’s discrimination claims was one overheard, offhand remark not

directed at Shirrell. See Brannum, 518 F.3d at 548 (explaining that offhand

comments and isolated incidents do not give rise to employment discrimination

claims). For these reasons and based on this evidence, the district court did not err

in granting summary judgment to St. Francis on Shirrell’s Title VII religious

discrimination claim. 

Shirrell finally argues that the district court erred in granting summary

judgment on her Title VII retaliation claim. As with her religious discrimination

claim, Shirrell has presented no direct evidence of retaliation, requiring our analysis

to proceed in accordance with the McDonnell Douglas framework. A prima facie

case of retaliation requires a plaintiff to show: (1) she engaged in protected activity,

(2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection exists

between the two. Brannum, 518 F.3d at 547. To show a causal connection, a plaintiff

must show that her protected activity was a but-for cause of her employer’s adverse

action. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013). As

previouslydiscussed, the uncontroverted evidence in the record showsthat St. Francis

terminated Shirrell pursuant to hospital policy for disciplinary reasons, rather than in

response to Shirrell’s complaints about Miller’s remark. We therefore conclude the

district court did not err in granting summary judgment to St. Francis on Shirrell’s

Title VII retaliation claim. 

Because we conclude that Shirrell fails to make a prima facie case for both her

religious discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII, we need not consider

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whether the district court erred in holding that Shirrell failed to prove pretext. We

therefore affirm the district court’s grant ofsummary judgment on Shirrell’s Title VII

claims. 

IV. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

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