Stevens, Hinds & White, P.C. 

HOPE R. STEVENS (1904-1982) 

JAVIER A. WHITE (1945-1987) 

LENNOX S. HINDS * 

Of-Counsel: 

 JULIETTE CHINAUD 

 GNOLEBA R. SERI * 

 DIDIER SEPHO◊

Also in 

* New Jersey 

◊ Paris 

 

ATTORNEYS AT LAW 

116 WEST 111TH STREET 

NEW YORK, NY 10026 

 TEL: (212) 864-4445 

FAX: (212) 222-2680 

 E-MAIL: lawfirmshw@yahoo.com

 

NEW JERSEY OFFICE 

42 VAN DOREN AVENUE 

SOMERSET, NJ 08873 

(732) 873-3096 

 PARIS OFFICE 

 27, AVENUE DE L’OPERA

 75001 PARIS 

November 12, 2010 

VIA ELECTRONIC FILING AND FAX (1-973-297-4906) 

Honorable Madeline Cox Arleo, United States Magistrate Judge 

United States District Court 

MARTIN LUTHER KING COURTHOUSE 

50 Walnut Street – Room 2060 

Newark, New Jersey 07101 

Re: Russell-Brown v. The University of Florida Board of Trustees et al., No. 10-cv04017-SDW-MCA 

Dear Judge Arleo: 

I represent Plaintiff Sherrie Russell-Brown in the above-referenced matter. I write in further 

support of my renewed request for limited, focused jurisdictional discovery (Doc. 31), and in reply 

to the Oxford Defendants’ November 11, 2010 letter in opposition (Doc. 32). 

The following are examples of several cases in the District of New Jersey, including cases 

before Your Honor and/or Judge Wigenton, where jurisdictional discovery was conducted either 

before a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was filed or before a plaintiff’s 

opposition brief was due: Oticon, Inc. v. Vivatone Hearing Sys., LLC, No. 08-5489 (FLW)(LHG) 

(Doc. 101, June 18, 2010) (terminating, without prejudice, motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction, pending resolution of jurisdictional discovery); Bachmann Software & Serv., LLC v. 

InTouch Group, Inc., No. 08-2025 (KSH)(PS) (Doc. 12, June 26, 2008) (jurisdictional discovery 

conducted before motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was filed); Celgene Corp. v. 

Abrika Pharm., Inc., No. 06-5818 (Wigenton, J.)(Arleo, Mag. J.) (Doc. 27, Feb. 9, 2007) (granting 

jurisdictional discovery and amending briefing schedule to accommodate jurisdictional discovery, 

before plaintiff’s opposition brief was due); Lipoid, LLC v. Science & Ingredients, Inc., No. 06-3740 

(JAG)(Arleo, Mag. J.) (Doc. 21, Oct. 5, 2006) (granting jurisdictional discovery before plaintiff’s 

opposition brief was due); Alkaline Corp. v. Burnett, No. 02-2246 (Thompson, C.J.) (Doc. 12, Oct. 

Case 2:10-cv-04017-SDW -MCA Document 33 Filed 11/12/10 Page 1 of 4 PageID: 558
2

9, 2002) (granting plaintiff 30 days to conduct jurisdictional discovery and staying defendant’s 

motion to dismiss). 

Consequently, Ms. Russell-Brown’s request for jurisdictional discovery is not premature and, 

since the Oxford Defendants have asked that she consent to an extension of the briefing schedule, 

until December 20, 2010, there certainly is time and an opportunity to amend the briefing schedule 

to accommodate jurisdictional discovery. In sum, the Oxford Defendants’ argument in response to 

Ms. Russell-Brown’s initial request for jurisdictional discovery, that it is the “customary practice” in 

the District of New Jersey to consider a request for jurisdictional discovery only after a motion to 

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction has been filed (Doc. 15 at 2, ¶¶ 3-4), and their argument, in 

response to Ms. Russell-Brown’s renewed request for jurisdictional discovery, that, apparently, now, 

it is the “customary rule” in the District of New Jersey to consider a request for jurisdictional 

discovery only after the motion has been briefed and submitted (Doc. 32 at 1, ¶ 2), are self-serving 

and erroneous. 

As for the Oxford Defendants’ repeated references to the “first-filed” rule and forum non 

conveniens, “[a]s two bases for dismissal . . . that, if accepted, would permit the Court to avoid 

ruling on their jurisdictional challenges,” again, as documented in my November 9 letter (Doc. 31 at 

1-2, ¶ 2, Exhibit A), Ms. Russell-Brown voluntarily dismissed her Northern District of Florida action 

in August, appealed the conditions imposed on dismissal and the Eleventh Circuit has selected Ms. 

Russell-Brown’s appeal for mediation, scheduled in December. In fact, there is no pending case in 

the Northern District of Florida, to or for which to transfer or stay, based on the “first-filed” rule. 

See, e.g., Sperry Associates Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc., Inc., No.10-29-DRD-MAS (D.N.J. 

Apr. 5, 2010) (order in which Judge Debevoise denied, as moot, the defendants’ motion to dismiss 

or stay based on the “first-filed” rule, in light of the recent remand of the “first-filed” action from 

the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin back to a Wisconsin state court). 

Similarly, because Oxford has failed to place in the record any information regarding the 

threshold issue of whether it or its seven American co-defendants would be subject to personal 

jurisdiction in English Courts (Doc. 31 at 2-3, ¶¶ 4-8), respectfully, this Court, in fact, cannot delve 

any further into its forum non conveniens analysis. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 

235, 255 n. 22, 102 S.Ct. 252 (1981) (“At the outset of any forum non conveniens inquiry, the court 

must determine whether there exists an alternative forum”); Eurofins Pharma US Holdings v. 

BioAlliance Pharma SA, No. 09-3790, 2010 WL 3960583, at *9 (3rd Cir. Oct. 12, 2010) (“Here, the 

District Court determined that France provides an adequate alternate forum for this litigation. It 

found that each of the defendants is amenable to service of process in France and that, in any event, 

none of the defendants will contest personal jurisdiction there”); Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 

(“Lacey II”), 932 F.2d 170, 177, 185 (3rd Cir. 1991) (“To be a suitable alternative forum, the foreign 

jurisdiction must have jurisdiction over all defendants”); Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co. (“Lacey I”), 

862 F.2d 38, 44, 49 (3rd Cir. 1988) (“[W]e conclude that the defendants did not submit adequate 

information of record to facilitate the forum non conveniens analysis. We also conclude that the 

district court did not hold the defendants to their burden of persuasion”); D’Elia v. Grand 

Caribbean Co., Ltd., No. 09-cv-1707 (NLH)(KMW), 2010 WL 1372027, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2010) 

(“Because Interval Servicing has failed to satisfy this threshold inquiry, [conceding that it is subject 

to the jurisdiction of Mexican courts or that it would waive any jurisdictional or other legal 

obstructions that may impede plaintiffs’ case there], the Court need not delve any further into its 

forum non conveniens analysis”); Technology Development Co., Ltd. v. Onischenko, 536 F.Supp.2d 

511, 517 (D.N.J. 2007) (“A determination of whether an adequate alternative forum exists is a 

Case 2:10-cv-04017-SDW -MCA Document 33 Filed 11/12/10 Page 2 of 4 PageID: 559
3

threshold issue on a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens”); Derensis v. Coopers & Lybrand 

Chartered Accountants, 930 F.Supp. 1003, 1007 (D.N.J. 1996) (“Defendants have satisfied the first 

requirement that all defendants are amenable to process in Canada”). 

 Notably, counsel for the Oxford Defendants, Walter Saurack, authored an article entitled, 

“PROTECTING THE STUDENT: A CRITIQUE OF THE PROCEDURAL PROTECTION AFFORDED TO 

AMERICAN AND ENGLISH STUDENTS IN UNIVERSITY DISCIPLINARY HEARING,” 21 J.C. & U.L. 785 

(1995), in which he concludes that, although English courts “have recognized that students have a 

right to notice, a right to a hearing, a right to cross-examine witnesses and a right to have an 

unbiased decisionmaker,” English courts “typically have refused to enforce these rights.” Id. at 809. 

Ms. Russell-Brown’s case is easily distinguished from Park v. Oxford Univ., 35 F.Supp.2d 

1165 (N.D.Cal. 1997). In Park, the Court found that the pro se plaintiff’s asserted contacts between 

Oxford and California did not rise to the “high level” of contact necessary, under Ninth Circuit 

jurisprudence, to establish general jurisdiction over Oxford. Id. at 1167. Mr. Park did not address 

and, therefore, the Court did not address the issue of specific jurisdiction over Oxford. Id. at 1168. 

By contrast, here, Ms. Russell-Brown is not alleging that this Court has general jurisdiction over 

Oxford. 

Finally, on the issue of jurisdictional discovery, Ms. Russell-Brown’s case is also easily 

distinguished from Eurofins. In Eurofins, the Third Circuit affirmed the District of Delaware’s 

denial of plaintiffs’ motion for jurisdictional discovery because, in their complaint, plaintiffs failed to 

allege any facts, irrespective of “reasonable particularity,” supporting personal jurisdiction over the 

defendants, under Delaware’s long-arm statute – either that the defendants had committed an “act 

or omission” in Delaware or had contracted to supply services or things in Delaware. See Eurofins, 

2010 WL 3960583, at *6-7. 

By contrast, here, in my November 9 letter (Doc. 31 at 3-6, ¶¶ 9-14), I describe for Your 

Honor, in great detail, at least, five bases for personal jurisdiction over the Oxford Defendants and 

the, approximately, 58 paragraphs of factual allegations in Ms. Russell-Brown’s First Amended 

Complaint (Doc. 20), which suggest “‘with reasonable particularity’ the possible existence of the 

requisite ‘contacts between [the Oxford Defendants] and the forum state.’” See Eurofins, 2010 WL 

3960583, at *6. 

Take, for example, the December 2, 2008 e-mail (Doc. 20 ¶ 91, Exhibit C), in which, in 

order to assist the Gainesville Defendants in bolstering their “incompetence” defense to her federal 

civil rights claims and in retaliating against her, an Oxford professor agreed to fail Ms. RussellBrown in her January 2009 examination, which was scheduled to take place in New Jersey. Since 

this is a non-diversity, federal question case, if Oxford lacks sufficient jurisdictional contacts in any

State, the federal long-arm statute, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2), applies, and the focus turns to Oxford’s 

aggregate contacts with the United States. It is undisputed that the Oxford professor was in the 

United States when he entered into the agreement with the Gainesville Defendants, to deprive Ms. 

Russell-Brown of her federal civil rights (Doc. 20 ¶ 90, Exhibit B). Certainly, paragraphs 90-92, 

Exhibits B and C to Ms. Russell-Brown’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 20) suggest “‘with 

reasonable particularity” the possible existence of the requisite contacts or connection between 

Oxford and the United States. See Eurofins, 2010 WL 3960583, at *6. 

Case 2:10-cv-04017-SDW -MCA Document 33 Filed 11/12/10 Page 3 of 4 PageID: 560
4

In conclusion, in their Motions to Dismiss (Doc. 24-1 at 10, Doc. 26-1 at 5), the Oxford 

Defendants contend that, “[i]n attempting to establish jurisdiction, ‘at no point may a plaintiff rely 

on the bare pleadings alone’ . . . Instead, a plaintiff must ‘respond with actual proofs, not mere 

allegations.’” In their Motions to Dismiss (Doc. 24-1 at 10, Doc. 26-1 at 5), the Oxford Defendants 

also contend that, “[w]hen a court assesses a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in a 

case involving multiple defendants, the contacts of each defendant with the forum state must be 

evaluated individually.” There are several non-frivolous bases for personal jurisdiction over the 

Oxford Defendants. It would be a waste of the parties’ and the Court’s resources to require Ms. 

Russell-Brown to brief her opposition papers first, when she has already identified and is requesting 

assistance with limited, focused jurisdictional discovery. Further, in any event, the Oxford 

Defendants are seeking an extension of the briefing schedule, which can be an opportunity to 

accommodate jurisdictional discovery. 

 

Thank you for your consideration. 

 

 Respectfully submitted, 

 

 /s/ Lennox S. Hinds 

LSH/sbt 

cc: Zoe Eva Jasper, Esq., Attorney for Defendants the University of Oxford and Oxford 

University Development (North America), Inc. (via CM/ECF) 

 

Bruce Rosen, Esq., Attorney for Defendants ALM Media, LLC, William L. Pollak and Karen 

Sloan (via CM/ECF)

Case 2:10-cv-04017-SDW -MCA Document 33 Filed 11/12/10 Page 4 of 4 PageID: 561