Slip Op. 06 – 153 

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

SHIMA AMERICAN CORP., 

 Before: Richard W. Goldberg, 

 Plaintiff, Senior Judge 

 v. Court No. 01-00966 

UNITED STATES, 

 Defendant. 

OPINION

[Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted in part and 

denied in part. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment 

is granted.] 

Dated: October 17, 2006 

Barnes, Richardson, & Colburn (Brian Francis Walsh, Christine 

Henry Martinez, Kazumune V. Kano) for Plaintiff Shima American 

Corp. 

Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General; Barbara S. 

Williams, Attorney in Charge, International Trade Field Office, 

Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of 

Justice (James A. Curley), for Defendant United States. 

GOLDBERG, Senior Judge: In this action reviewing a denial of a 

protest under 19 U.S.C. § 1515, Plaintiff Shima American Corp. 

(“Shima”) moves the court, under USCIT Rule 56, to enter summary 

judgment in its favor, and to order the Defendant U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection (“Customs”) to reliquidate the entries at 

issue and to refund the excess duties paid by Shima. Shima 
Court No. 01 - 00966 Page 2 

bases its motion on the “deemed liquidation” provision of 19 

U.S.C. § 1504(d), as amended in 1993. Customs also moves for 

summary judgment, contending that while some of Shima’s entries 

are subject to deemed liquidation, the rest are not.1

 

The Court concludes that the merchandise that Shima 

imported between April 1, 1986 and March 31, 1987 is not deemed 

liquidated by operation of law. See 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (Supp. 

V 1984). Because Customs properly liquidated these entries on 

August 25, 2000, the Court grants Customs’ summary judgment 

motion and enters judgment in its favor. 

I. BACKGROUND

Shima imports roller chain from Japan into the United 

States. Between April 1, 1986 and March 31, 1987, Shima made 

entries of roller chain through the Port of San Francisco (“the 

 

1

 Shima made entries through the Port of Chicago (“the Chicago 

entries”) between the review period of April 1, 1996 to March 

31, 1997. See Pl.’s Mot. Mem. Supp. Summ. J. 3 (“Pl.’s Br.”); 

Def.’s Br. Partial Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Supp. Cross-Mot. 

Summ. J. 2 (“Def.’s Br.”). Customs concedes that the Chicago 

entries were not liquidated within six months after Commerce’s 

publication in the Federal Register of the final results of the 

administrative review. Def.’s Br. 4. Customs further concedes 

that these entries are deemed liquidated by operation of law in 

accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (1994). Therefore, any 

excess antidumping duties and interest assessed upon liquidation 

of these entries should be refunded to Shima with interest on 

the refund as provided by law. Id. The Court agrees, and a 

judgment order shall be entered accordingly. 
Court No. 01 - 00966 Page 3 

San Francisco entries”). These entries were the subject of an 

antidumping duty administrative review by the U.S. Department of 

Commerce (“Commerce”). Liquidation of the entries was suspended 

pending the final results of the administrative review. The 

final results were published in the Federal Register on November 

4, 1991. Commerce revised and republished the final results on 

April 13, 1992. See Roller Chain, Other than Bicycle, from 

Japan, 57 Fed. Reg. 12,800 (Dep’t of Commerce Apr. 13, 1992) 

(amended final admin. review). Subsequently, Commerce issued 

liquidation instructions on November 30, 2000, and Customs 

liquidated the entries and assessed antidumping duties on 

December 29, 2000. 

After Customs liquidated the San Francisco entries, Shima 

filed a protest under 19 U.S.C. § 1514 claiming that the entries 

should have been liquidated at the cash deposit rate because 

they were “deemed liquidated” under 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d). 

Customs denied the protest, which prompted Shima to commence 

this action pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1515. 

II. JURISDICTION

The Court has exclusive jurisdiction over “any civil action 

commenced to contest the denial of a protest, in whole or in 

part, under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930.” 28 U.S.C. § 
Court No. 01 - 00966 Page 4 

1581(a) (2000). This action is timely and jurisdiction is 

proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews protest denials de novo. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2640(a)(1) (2000) (“The Court of International Trade shall 

make its determinations upon the basis of the record made before 

the court in . . . [c]ivil actions contesting the denial of a 

protest.”); see also Rheem Metalurgica S/A v. United States, 20 

CIT 1450, 1456, 951 F. Supp. 241, 246 (1996), aff’d 160 F.3d 

1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if “the 

pleadings [and discovery materials] show that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” USCIT R. 56(c). 

In ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, if no genuine 

issue of material fact exists, the court must determine whether 

a judgment as a matter of law is appropriate for either party. 

See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. United States, 23 CIT 679, 684, 69 

F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1375 (1999), aff’d 239 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 

2001). Summary judgment is proper in this case because there are 

no genuine issues of material fact. 
Court No. 01 - 00966 Page 5 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Application of the 1993 Amendment to the San Francisco 

Entries 

This case turns on which version of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) is 

applicable to the San Francisco entries. 19 U.S.C. § 1504 

describes the circumstances under which entries will be “deemed 

liquidated” at the rate asserted by the importer at the time of 

entry. If merchandise is not liquidated within one year of 

entry, § 1504(a) provides that it will be “deemed liquidated.” 

See 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a) (2000). If liquidation is suspended, 

different time limits apply. In 1984, the statute provided as 

follows: 

 (d) Limitation – Any entry of merchandise not liquidated 

at the expiration of four years from the applicable 

date specified in subsection (a) of this section, 

shall be deemed liquidated at the rate of duty, 

value, quantity, and amount of duty asserted at the 

time of entry by the importer of record, unless 

liquidation continues to be suspended as required by 

statute or court order. When such a suspension of 

liquidation is removed, the entry shall be 

liquidated within 90 days therefrom. 

19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (Supp. V 1984). The ninety-day requirement 

in the last sentence of this section is directory, not 

mandatory. See Am. Permac, Inc. v. United States, 191 F.3d 
Court No. 01 - 00966 Page 6 

1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Canadian Fur Trappers Corp. 

v. United States, 884 F.2d 563, 566 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). As a 

result, entries that are not liquidated within ninety days of 

removal of suspension are not deemed liquidated. See id. 

According to the 1984 version of the statute, Customs had an 

“unlimited amount of time in which to liquidate entries” if 

removal of suspension occurred after the four-year time limit. 

Koyo Corp. of U.S.A. v. United States, 29 CIT __, __, 403 F. 

Supp. 2d 1305, 1308 (2005). 

Section 1504(d) was amended by the 1993 North American Free 

Trade Agreement Implementation Act. See Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 

641, 107 Stat. 2057, 2204-05 (1993). The 1993 version provides 

as follows: 

(d) Removal of Suspension – When a suspension required by 

statute or court order is removed, the Customs Service 

shall liquidate the entry within 6 months after receiving 

notice of the removal from the Department of Commerce, 

other agency, or a court with jurisdiction over the 

entry. Any entry not liquidated by the Customs Service 

within 6 months after receiving such notice shall be 

treated as having been liquidated at the rate of duty, 

value, quantity, and amount of duty asserted at the time 

of entry by the importer of record. 

19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added). The 1993 

amendment removed both the four-year time limit and ninety-day 

“directory” time limit. Instead, if liquidation of entries is 
Court No. 01 - 00966 Page 7 

suspended, Customs must liquidate those entries within six 

months after it receives notice that suspension was removed. 

Shima argues that the 1993 amendment applies in this case. 

If Shima is correct, the San Francisco entries would be deemed 

liquidated under § 1504(d) because Customs failed to liquidate 

them within six months after Commerce lifted the suspension of 

liquidation. However, the 1993 version of § 1504(d) would have 

an impermissible retroactive effect if it is applied when the 

(1) notice of the removal of suspension, (2) the running of the 

six month period, and (3) the date of liquidation by operation 

of law all have occurred prior to the effective date of the 1993 

amendment. See Am. Int’l Chem., Inc., v. United States, 29 CIT 

__, __, 387 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1265 (2005) (citing Am. Permac, 

191 F.3d 1380); accord U.S. Tsubaki, Inc. v. United States, 30 

CIT __, __, Slip Op. 06-148 at 15 (Oct. 10, 2006). 

In this case, suspension of liquidation of the San 

Francisco entries was removed on April 13, 1992, when Commerce 

published the revised final results of the administrative 

review. See Int’l Trading Co. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1268, 

1277 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This is the same day Customs received 

notice of the removal.2 See id. Additionally, the running of 

 

2

 Shima alternatively argues that Customs received notice in 2000 

when Commerce sent an e-mail concerning liquidation of the San 
Court No. 01 - 00966 Page 8 

the six-month period and the date of deemed liquidation 

(pursuant to the 1993 amendment) occurred before the effective 

date of the 1993 amendment, which was December 8, 1993. 

Therefore, the application of the 1993 version of 19 U.S.C. § 

1504(d) would have an impermissible retroactive effect in this 

case.3

 

B. Application of the 1984 Version of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) to 

the San Francisco Entries 

 The San Francisco entries were more than four years old 

when Commerce removed the suspension of liquidation by 

publishing the revised final results of the administrative 

review on April 13, 1992. As discussed in Part IV.A., according 

 

Francisco entries. This claim is without merit. Customs 

received notice of the removal of suspension when Commerce 

published the results of its final administrative review in the 

Federal Register on April 13, 1992. In American International, 

which Shima cites to support its argument, Commerce did not 

publish the results of the final administrative review in the 

Federal Register until September 10, 2001, which was after the 

date that Customs received the e-mail notice. See 29 CIT at __, 

387 F. Supp. 2d at 1262. In the case at bar, it is irrelevant 

that Commerce may have sent an e-mail to Customs regarding 

liquidation instructions because Customs had already received 

notice of removal of suspension before the enactment of the 1993 

amendment. 

3

 For a more in-depth discussion of the retroactivity analysis 

concerning the 1993 version of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d), see U.S. 

Tsubaki, Inc. v. United States, 30 CIT at __, Slip Op. 06-148 at 

8-15. The parties in Tsubaki made nearly identical arguments to 

those made in this case, and each argument is addressed in more 

detail in that opinion. 
Court No. 01 - 00966 Page 9 

to the 1984 version of § 1504(d), deemed liquidation is not 

available to entries that are more than four years old at the 

time suspension of liquidation is removed. In line with the 

Federal Circuit’s holdings in American Permac and Canadian Fur 

Trappers, the Court finds that the San Francisco entries are not 

entitled to deemed liquidation under 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) as 

amended in 1984. See Am. Permac, 191 F.3d at 1382; Canadian Fur 

Trappers, 884 F.2d at 566. 

V. CONCLUSIONS

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies in part Shima’s 

motion for summary judgment and grants Customs’ cross-motion for 

summary judgment. A judgment order will be issued in accordance 

with these conclusions. 

 /s/ Richard W. Goldberg

 Richard W. Goldberg 

 Senior Judge 

Date: October 17, 2006 

 New York, New York