Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed December 1 , 2020.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 20

- 00449

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF M.J., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 12th Dist r ict Court Grimes County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 34836

- CCL

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

T he trial court terminat ed a mother ’ s parental rights to M.J. on several predicate grounds , including endangering conduct and endang ering conditions or surroundings, as we l l as because the mother has a mental or emotional illness or

men tal def

icie ncy ren dering her unable to care for her child

. The court also found that termination was in the child ’ s best interest. On a ppeal, the mother challenge s the legal and f

actual suf f iciency of all predic ate grounds, but she does not contest the c ourt ’ s be st interest finding. Because w e conclude that legal ly and factually sufficie nt evidence support s the district court ’ s finding of endangering conduct, we affirm the ju d gment

.2 Backg ro u nd
A. Pretrial Proceedings
1. The initial referral and investi gation
M.J. , a baby boy, was born on June 4 , 2019. Shortly after M.J. ’s birth, the Department of Family and Prot ecti ve Services ( the “ Department ” ) received a referral, which alleged that a pp e llant, M.J. ’s mother ( “Mother ”) , tested positive for phencyclidi ne ( “ PCP ” ) , tetrahydrocannabinol ( “ THC ” ) , and am phetamines based

on a drug screen performed si x days before M.J. ’ s birth

. The referral stated that Mother admitted to hospital staf f that she h a d used dru g s w hi le pregnant

. A ccording to a urinaly sis taken a t M.J. ’ s bi rth, he did not have drugs in his system , although a later meconium test showed that M. J. t ested positive for marijuana

. M .J. was admitted to the neo natal intensive care unit fol l o wing his birth.

T he Department ’s investig ator, Emma Clark, vis it ed M.J. and Mother in the hospital

. A nurse told Clar k that the hospit al placed Mother under a twenty

- fou r
hour watch due to her erra tic behavior, incl udi ng an attempt to pull the umb ilical

c ord cla m p from M. J. contrary to instructions from medical pe rson nel . The n urse also told Clark t hat Mot her spent a week in a p sychiatric care facility prior to being admitted to the hospital to give birth

. Mother admitted to Clark “ continual drug use, ” i ncluding th e us e of methamphetamine s to self

- treat , Mother sai d, the pain of her preg nancy. During Cla rk ’ s interview, Mother seemed erra tic, could not answer questions clearly, and
was not conce rned about how drugs could a ffect M.J

. When Clark a sked a

bout Mot her ’ s p la

ns to care for M.J. after discharge, Mother sta ted that sh e did not have any pla ns. Clark asked Mother if she had any relatives or friends wil ling to care for M.J., and Mother name d a friend but w as3

unable to provide a ny other in formatio n regarding the friend. Mother also stated that M.J. ’s mat ernal grandmother possibl y could care for M.J. Ac cording to Mother, the maternal grandmother had custody of two of Mother ’s three other children. Des pite sev eral attempts, Cla r k was un able to con t act the maternal grandmother before the hospital notified Clark th at Mother and M.J. were ready to be discharged. Cl ark eventual ly made contact with the ma ternal g randmother, who initially stated that she would be willing to care for M.J. but then later c han ged her mind.
2. Mother ’

s history with the Department
Mother had severa l interactions with t he Department prior to M.J. ’ s birth and t h e events of this c a se . These includ ed : (1) an investigation for p hysical a buse by Mother against her eldes t child, a daughter , resulting in a “ Reason to Believe ” determination by t he Departme nt ; (2) an investigation for neglectful sup ervision by Mother r eg a rding her first

- bo rn , during which the Department learned that Mother
teste d positive for ma rijuana at a pre

- natal doctor ’s appointment and that Mother had a menta l healt h history of anxiet y , mood disorder, and schizo

- affective disorde r ; and (3) an inv es tigation for neglectful supervision by M other reg arding her daughter and her second

- born son , resulting in find ings that Mother and the newborn son tes ted positive for marijuana

. As referenc e d above, the maternal grandmother took cu stody of M ot her ’ s two sons prior to M.J. ’ s birth

. T he Department was notified that M o ther eng aged in other troubling behavior during her p r egnancy with M. J

. Approxim ately three and one half months befor e M.J. ’s bi r

th , the Departme nt received a referral alleging th at Mothe r tested positive for THC , PCP , and amphetamines and t hat Mother initially denied knowing that she was pregnant when she i n g ested the se drugs but later acknowledged that she knew she was pregnant

. T he Department closed with4

referral withou t inv es tigation. Approximate ly one month before M .J. ’s birth, the D epartment received a referral , alle ging that Mother was at a hospital and believed she was in labor. Mother tested positive for THC , PCP , metham p hetamines, and amphetamines. Mot her stated to ho spital staff tha t “ she want [ed] to cut the baby
out. ” Mental Health and Mental Retardation ( “ MHMR ” ) was called for an evaluation , and the D e partment closed the referral without investigation

. A p proximatel y on e week before M.J. ’s birth, t he Department re c ei ved two s eparate referrals. The first referral stated that l aw enfor cement responded to a call regarding Mother having a “psych o tic episode ” in a fast

- food restaurant, during which she appeare d to be “co m ing off methamphetamines ” and talki ng to peopl e

w ho were not there. The second referral alleged that Mother had test ed positive for THC , PCP , and amphetamines and admitted to usi n g meth amphetamine the day
pr ior. The Depar

tment closed both ref

errals with o ut inves tigation.
3. The removal
Clark stated in a n affidavit that she believed th ere was an immediate and
cont inuin g danger to the physical health or safety of the child , due to Mother ’s habitual use of PCP , TH C , and a mphetamin es

. Specifical ly, Mother ’ s admission of methamphetamine use wh il e pregnant with M.J., the f act that Mother had previousl y given birth to a child who tested positive for drugs, and Mother ’s

s ignificant ment a l h ealth issues and erratic behavio r all demonstrated an unwilli ng ness or i n ability on Mother ’ s part to become a safe caregiv er for M.J

. T h re e days after M.J. ’ s birth, the Depa rtment sou ght and received an e mergency

o rder naming the Depart ment temporary s ole managing co nservator of M.J. and there after p laced M.J. in a foster hom e , where M.J. stayed through termination tria l. The D ep artment also sought an order terminat ing Mother ’ s parental rights to5

M. J. and appointing the Departme nt sol e managing co nser v ator , n ecessit ating a bench trial on the mer its

. B. Trial
The Depar

tmen t ’ s first witness was Clark . Clark testified t o the abo ve
described facts prompting the Department ’ s initial referral and investigation , begin ning with the r eport tha t a child , M. J. , had been “ born d ru g exposed. ” Near the time of the birth, Moth er tested p o sitive for a variety of drug s

. Clark interviewed Moth er at the hospital , and she admitted “ to countless times before over the y ears of abusing Metha mphetamines as w ell a s througho u t her pregnanc y. ” During Clark ’ s interview, Mother received a p hone call. Mother told the cal ler “ to bring some sweets with her a nd that they c ould exchange it in the parking lot if they had to. ” Clark suspec ted that Moth er was referring to d rugs.
Me m bers of the h o spital staff told Clark that Mother attempted to r emove a cla m p from M.J. ’ s umbilical cord despite contra ry ins tructions

. Cl ark also learned that Mother was admitte d to a psychiatric hospi tal prior to giving birth

. Clark fou nd Mother to be errati c and incoherent

. When asked of her plans with M.J. after discharge, M other “ didn ’ t have any plans. ” Clark testified that Mother “ di dn ’ t have clothes or a car seat or any necessities with her whenever she gave bi rth either.

. . . Sh e didn ’ t have s t able housing at the ti me. ”
C lark was a

war e that Mother already h ad three ch i ldren removed from her

ca re

. Clark s po ke to the children ’ s maternal grandmother, who had custody of Mother ’ s two s on s . The mater nal grand mother expre sse d an unwil lingness to

ser v e as a pla ceme nt for M.J. and stated her belief that M.J. “ would be better i n foster care. ”6

The D epartment pla ce d M. J. in a foster home , where he “ was thriving, ” and offered Mother visitations with her son. Clark recounted two vi sitations that caused her con cern. Duri ng the first, Mother initially interacted well wit h M. J., but , after being in the restroom for a l ong time, started exhibiting different behavior

. Clark decided to do an instant drug test, an d Mother tested posit ive for metha mphetamine

. C l a rk cut a s econ d vis itation short , after Mother exhibited

nervous tics, “ pus h ed an imaginary man out of the roo m [ ,] . . . and started cussing at pe ople. ” Adrianna Ruiz, a n MHMR casewor ker , t estified reg arding Mother ’ s mental health

. Ruiz s t ated th at Moth e r had been “ in and out of ” MHMR ’ s sy stem for the preceding eight years. Ac c ording to Ruiz, Mother was di agno s ed with a schizophrenia disorder several years ago

. A month pri or to giving birth to M .J., Mother was di agno sed with “ other spe ci fied psychosis, ” as well as “ coc a ine u s e disorder ” and “ meth use disorder

. ” Rui z stated th a t Mot he r “ does have a lot of crisis episodes and she does seem to have a lot of in

- pa tient hospita lizations which usually when you do ha ve those it ’ s because you ’ re unstable, you k now. You could be a harm to yourself or others. ”

M

. J. ’s mater

nal grandmo t her c on firmed tha t Mother was diagnosed with schizophrenia approx imately ei ght y ears before M .J. ’s birth. The maternal grandmot her also stated t hat Mother d oes not get “ as much a s she needs to ” in terms of psychiatric care and that, while Moth er has been presc ri bed medication, she does not al wa ys take it . The maternal grandmother ac knowledged Mo ther ’s history of drug use

. When a sked if she had concerns abou t Mothe r ’s ability to c are for a baby given the drug use, the maternal grandmo ther resp onded, “ [Mo t her]

ca n ’ t do it. ” Speaking of Mother ’ s two son s, t he maternal grandmo ther testified7

that s he has never thought M other w ould be able to care for them and that Moth er does not hav e the ability to take care of herself on a dai ly basis. 1
Grimes C ounty Sheri f

f ’s Department Sergeant Jim Adkins t estified to Mother ’s criminal history. Acco rdi ng to the department ’s record s, Mother was arrested twenty

- seven times since 2010 , including sev e n times in the year preceding trial. The charges included c ri mi nal t respas s , c riminal m ischief, indec ent exposure, possession of controlled substa nce , and assault

. During the
year before trial, Mother had spent 1 76 days in county jail

. Ki mberly Ka wuki , a caseworker with the Department (alt er natively referred to durin g trial as “ CPS ” ) , testif ied regarding a family se rvi ce plan th at was d evelope d for Mother approximately three mo nths after M.J. ’s birth. Acc ordin g to Kawuk i, t he p lan require d Mother: t o m a int ain a safe and stable home enviro nment ; t o allow CPS to do un announced h o me visits and noti fy CPS of address ch anges ; t o conta ct the CPS ca seworker at least twice monthly and notify CPS of any contact ch anges so that CPS cou ld contact Mo ther; to complete a dr ug and alcohol assessmen t and fol low the recommendations ; to s ub mit to rand om drug tests by CP S ; an d to undergo a psychological a nd/or psychia tric evaluation and follow the reco mmendations

. Kaw uki visited Mother once while Mother was in

co unty jail and s p oke to Mother three times

. I n those con v ersations Kawuki explai ned to M o th er the service plan requirements

. However, Ka wu ki also testified that she did not believe she was able to obt ain Mother ’ s signature on the
p lan and was “ not 100 per cent ” sure that Mo t her was provided a co py of the p l an.

1 The maternal grandmother al so e xplained th at Mother ’ s eldest chi ld lives with the child ’ s au n t and that, while Mother retain s he r parent al rights to the child, the au nt d oes not allow Mother to know wher e th e chi ld lives.8

T o Kaw uki ’ s knowledge, Mother di d not p erform any of the services i ncluded with i n the p la

n. 2

Kawu ki testified that : Mother d id not offer financ ial support for M.J. during the pendency of this case ; Mother did not r egu larly visit or maintain contact w ith M.J.; Mother d emonstrate d an i n abil ity to provide t he child with a s afe enviro nme nt ; M.J. had been in the managing conservatorship of the Departm ent for no less than six months during the pendency of this case ; and M oth er failed to complete a court

- ord ered substan ce abuse treatme nt pro g ram. Kawu ki believe d that Mother en d angered the c hild duri ng pregnancy by using drugs, th at Mother suffers from a mental or emotional illness or mental deficiency , an d that Mother ’s i l lne ss or me ntal deficiency makes her unable to provide for the p hysic a l ,
em otional, and men tal needs of M.J. and will con tinue to rende r Mother unable to provide for the child ’ s need s u ntil M.J. ’ s eighteenth birthday.
Kawuki explained that M.J. was p l ace d with distant relatives , wh o were providing for all of his n eeds. Kaw u ki adv oc ated in favor of the court ter minating Mother ’s parental rights and in favor of M.J

. ’ s kinship care giver s adopting him

. Kawu ki did not have any concerns abo ut th e placemen t ’ s ability to continue to care for M.J. regardless whet her ad option occu rr e d

. Another witne ss , the CASA voluntee r , testi fied similarly that M. J. was thriving in his pla cement and had bonded with his foster parents. O ne of M.J

. ’ s foster pare nt s testif i ed that he was doing w ell in their care and t hat they wish ed to adopt M.J. if Mother ’ s parental rights were terminat ed. The foster parents had recently adopted a nother chi ld, a

2 An other wit ne s s, a volunteer with Court Appointed Spe cial A dvoc ates ( “ CASA ” ) , testi fied similarl y that M other said that s h e w as not interested in completing any thing on the service plan , that she was in terested in going to some pa renti ng c lasse s, but she had no interes t in anything else on the p lan.9

son, and M.J. had b onded with his foster si bling : “ they are v er y l oving and i t ’ s
-- it ’ s a great re lationship. ”
At the conclusion of the t ria l, the c our t found clear and convincin g evidence tha t Mother : knowingly placed or knowingly allowed M.J. to remain in conditions and surroundings that endangered the chil d ; en gaged in c o nduct or knowingly pla ced the child with persons who engaged in conduct and endang ered hi s physical

or emotional wel l

- bei ng ; constructively abandoned M.J., who had be en in the temporary managing conservatorship of the Department for more th an si x months ;

a nd did not comply with the provisions of the court

- ordered se rvi ce plan

. S ee Tex. Fam. C ode § 161.00 1 (b) ( 1) ( D), (E) , (N), ( O). The trial court also found that Mothe r has a mental illness or mental deficiency that renders her unable to pro vide for the ph y sical, emotional, and mental needs of the child and such illn ess would
cont inue at lea st until M.J. wa s eighteen yea rs old

. See id. § 161.003. The court further fou nd that termination of Mother ’s rights was in M.J. ’s best interest and tha t the Departmen t should be appointed t emporary managing conservator

. See id. § 161.00 1 (b) ( 2). B a sed on these findings, the court s igned a fi nal order terminating Mother ’ s par ental rights to M.J.
Mother app eals, c hallen g ing the leg al and factual sufficien cy of the evide n ce to supp ort each of the predicate findings. She does not ch al l enge the t rial co urt ’ s finding that termination is i n M.J. ’ s best interest. Because we con clude the termination order is supported under at least one predi cate ground in sect ion 1 61.001, we need not address the t rial court ’ s fi nding that termination was also

warran ted und er section 161 .003.10 Analysis
A. Standards o f Review In a proceeding to terminate the parent

- child relationship under Texas Family Code section 161.001, the p etitioner must esta blis h by clear and convincing evidence one or more acts or omiss ions enumer ated un der subsection (1) of section 161.001(b) and that termination is in the best interest of the child under subsection (2). Tex. Fam. Code § 1 61.001; In re N .G

. , 577 S.W. 3d 230, 232 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam) ; In re J.L

. , 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). Inv olu ntary te rmination of parental rights is a serious matter implicating fundamental constituti onal r ights. Holick v. Smith , 685 S.W.2d 18, 2 0 (Tex. 1985); In re D.R.A. , 374 S.W.3d 5 28, 531 (T ex. App.

—

Hous ton [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). Altho ugh pare ntal ri ghts are of constitutional mag nitude, they are not absolute. In re A.C. , 560 S.W.3d 624, 6 29 (Te x. 2018); In re C.H. , 89 S.W .3d 17, 26 (T ex. 2002)

. Due to the severity a nd perman e ncy of te rmin ating the parental relat ionship, Texas requires clear an d co nvi ncing ev idence to support such an order. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001; In re J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d 256, 265

- 6 6 (Tex . 2002). “Clear and convinc ing evidence” m eans “the measu re or deg ree of pro of t hat will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm bel ief or conv iction as to the truth of the allegat ions sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code § 101.007; In re J. F.C. , 96 S.W.3d at 264. Thi s heightened bu rden of proof r esults in a “c orres pond ingly searching standard of appellate review.” In re A. C. , 560 S.W.3d at 630; see also In re C.M.C. , 273 S. W.3d 862, 873 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.). In reviewing legal sufficiency of the evi dence i n a parental te rmination case,

we must consider all evidence i n the light most favorable to th e fi n di ng t o de termine whether a reasonable fact fin der could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. In re J.O.A. , 283 S.W.3d 336, 34 4 (Tex.11

2009). We assum e that the fac t finder resolved disput ed facts in favor of its finding if a r easo nabl e fact finder could do so, and we dis regard all evidence that a reasonable fa ct finder could have disbelieved. Id. ; In re G.M.G. , 4 44 S.W.3 d 46, 5 2 (Tex. App.

—

Ho uston [14 th Dist.] 2014 , no pet.). However, th is does not mean that we must di sreg a rd all evi dence that does not support the findi ng. In re D.R.A. , 374 S.W.3d at 531. Becau se of the heightened standard, we also must be mind ful of a ny un di sputed evidence contrary to the fi ndin g and consider that evid ence in our analysis. Id.
In re view i ng the fac tual sufficiency of the evidence unde r the clear

- and

convincing standard, we consi der and weigh disputed evidence contrary to the fi nding ag ainst a ll the evidence favoring the findi ng. In re A.C. , 560 S.W.3d at 631; In re J.O.A. , 283 S.W.3d at 3 45

. “ If, in light of the entire record, the di sputed evidence that a reasonable fact find er could not have credited in favor of the finding i s so sig nific an t that a fact f inder cou ld not rea sona

bly have formed a firm b elief or conviction, then the ev iden c e is f actu ally insufficient.” In re J.O.A. , 28 3 S.W.3d at 345. We give due deference to th e fact finder ’ s findings , and we cannot substitute our own judg me nt for that of the fact finder. I n re H.R.M. , 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006).
B. Law App licable to End angermen t as a Predicate Ground
In her fir st is sue, Mother argues the evidence i s legally and factually insufficient to support termination under a ll section 161.00 1(b) (1 ) pre dicate grounds

. To affirm a t erminatio n judgment on appeal, a court need upho ld only

one termination ground

— in addition to upholding a challenged best intere st finding

— even if the trial court based the termination on more than one ground. In re N.G

. , 577 S.W.3d at 232 ; In re L.M

. , 57 2 S.W.3d 823 , 832 (Te x. App.

— H ouston [ 14th D ist. ] 2 0 1 9, no pet. )

. Further, due to the significant collateral12

c onsequences of te rminating parent al rights under section 161.001(b)(1)(D) or ( E), 3 “[a]llo wing section 161.001 (b)(1)(D) or (E) fi n dings to go unr eviewed o n appeal when the parent has presen ted the issue t o the court thus violates the parent ’ s due process a nd due course of law rights.” In re N.G. , 577 S.W.3d at 237

. Thus, when as here a parent challenges predicat e termination g roun d s under either subsectio n 161.001(b)(1 )(D) or (E), o r both of t ho s e subsec tions, we must address and detail our an alysis under on e of those subse ctions. See id. We will address the trial court ’ s findi ng of endangerment under subsectio n ( E )

. Terminat ion o f parental righ ts is war ranted if the fact finder fi nds by clea r

a nd convi ncing evidence, in addition to the best

- i nterest findin g, that the pare nt has “engaged in conduct or knowingly pl aced the child with persons who engaged in condu ct which endang ers t he physical or emotional well

- being of the child.” Tex. Fa m. C od e § 161.0 01(b)(1)(E). “To endanger” means to expose a child to loss or injury o r to jeopardize a child ’ s emotional or phys ical health. See In re M.C. , 917 S.W.2d 268, 26 9 (Tex. 1996). A f i nding of endang erment un der subsection ( E ) requires evidenc e th at t he enda ngerment was the result of the parent ’ s conduct , includ ing acts, omissi ons, or failures to act. In re S.R. , 452 S .W.3d 351, 361 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2 014, pet. denie d). Termination und er subsec tion ( E )
must be based on mo re than a s in gl e act o r omission; the statute requires a voluntary, delib erat e, and conscious course of conduct by the parent. Id. A c ourt properly may consider actions and inactions occurring both bef o re and after a

3 Section 161. 001( b)(1)(M) pr ovides that parental rig hts ma y be te rminated if c lear and
con vinc ing evidence support s that the pare nt “had his or her parent

- c hild relationship terminated with respect to another child based on a finding that the parent ’ s condu ct was in vi olat ion of Para graph (D) or (E) or subs tantia lly equ ivalent pro vi sions of the law of another state.” Te x. Fam . Code § 161.001(b)(1)(M). Thus, when parental rights have b e en t erminated fo r endang erment under e ither section 16 1.001(b)(1)(D) or (E), that gr o und becomes a basis to terminate that parent ’ s righ ts to other c hildren.13

child ’ s b irth to establ ish a course o f condu ct. I n re A.L. H. , 515 S.W.3d 60, 91 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2 017, pet. denied ).
Evide nce of crim inal conduct, convictions, imprisonment, and their ef fects on a parent ’ s life and ability t o parent, may es tablish an endangering course of conduct. I

n re S. R

. , 45 2 S.W.3d at 360

- 61 ; In re V.V. , 349 S.W.3d 548, 554 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1s t Dist.] 2010, pet. de nied)

. Routinely subjecting children to the probabilit y that th ey w ill be left alo ne because their parent is in jail endangers chil dren ’ s ph ys ical an d emo t io nal well

- being. See In re L.M

. , 572 S.W.3d at 834 & n.4

. Impris onment alone is not an en dangering cour se of conduct but is a fact properly considered o n the e nd ange rment issue. Tex. Dep ’ t of Human Servs. v. B oyd , 727 S.W.2d 531, 533

- 34 ( Tex. 1987)

. As well, a parent ’ s condu ct that sub jec ts a chi ld to a life of unc ertainty and instab ility endangers the child ’ s physical and emot ional well

- being

. In re F.E.N. , 542 S.W.3d 752, 764 (Tex. App.

— Houston [ 14t h D ist.] 2018, no pet. ); In re A.L.H. , 515 S.W.3d at 92.
D rug abuse is merely one for m of crimin al conduct that m ay jeopardi ze a child ’ s physical or em otional he alth and thus con stitute endangering conduct. For example, a mother ’ s d rug abuse during pregnanc y is particularly e ndangering to a n unbo rn chil d ’ s physical well

- being. See, e .g. , In re A.R.G. , No . 14

- 18

- 00952

- CV, 2019 WL 1716262, at *8 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 18, 2019 , no pet. ) (mem. op.) ( mother ’ s use of illegal drug during pregnancy was evi dence of endangerin g conduct becaus e it e xposed the child to po ssible injury or hea lth risks ) ; In re J.E. , No. 14

- 16

- 00850

- CV, 2017 WL 12740 81, at *5 (Tex. App

. — Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 4, 2017 , pet. denied ) (mem. op.) ( “ A mother ’ s use of drugs during pregnancy may amount to conduct t hat endange rs th e physical and emotional well

- being of the c hild

. ” )

.14

Mor eover, a par ent ’ s d rug abuse after a child is born may be an endangering

cou rse of conduct under s ubsection (E) because it can negatively impact the use r ’ s abilit y to parent in mult iple way s, not only by expo sing the child to the possibility tha t the paren t may be imprisoned but also because drugs can physically impair a mother ’ s or father ’ s ca pacity to par ent

. See Walker v. Tex. Dep ’ t of Family & Protective Servs

. , 312 S.W.3 d 6 08, 617 (Tex. A pp.

— Houston [ 1st D ist.] 2009, pet. denied) ; see a lso In re J .J.W

. , N o. 14

- 18

- 00985

- CV, 2019 WL 1827591 , at *6 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist. ] Apr

. 25, 2019, pet. deni ed) (mem. op

. ) ( “Drug abuse and its effect on the a bility to pare nt c an present an endange ring course of

co nduct.” )

. C. Application
There is much eviden ce establishing Mother ’ s repeated and admitted drug ab use

. M o ther has been diagnosed with “ coc a ine u s e disorder ” and “ meth use disorder

. ” T he Department present ed unco ntrov e rted e vidence tha t , c onsistent with these di agnoses, Mo ther us ed d rugs such as PC P , THC, amph etamines, and

me thamphetamine during her pregnancy with M. J

. D rug abuse during pre gna ncy i s an enda ngering cour se of conduct , s e e In re A.R.G. , 2019 WL 1716262, at *8 ; In

re J.E. , 2017 WL 12740 81, at *5 , which in fact harmed M.J

. be cause he te sted positive for an illegal subs tance at birth

. Clark testifi ed that Mother did not seem concerned about the potential effect of drugs on M.J.
Mother ’ s drug a

b u se cont inu ed afte r M.J. ’ s bi rth. She tested posi tive for meth amphetamine at leas t once duri ng a scheduled visit ation with M.J

. after his removal from her ca re

. Acco rding to the record , a fact finder reasonably could have inf

erred from Clark ’ s testimony t hat Mother a ct ual ly in gested meth amphetamine s during her vis it with M.J. Mot her knows that she has been di agno s ed with a schiz ophrenia disorder , and the maternal grandmot her said15

Mother “ does not al ways take her m edication

. ” W itnesses described instanc es when Moth er has atte mpted t o speak to, or physically interact with, peop le w ho d o not e xist

. A mental ly ill person with a hi story of inadequately self

- medicat ing and who abuse s drugs in the presen ce of a chil d je op ardizes the child ’ s physical and
emot io nal well

- b eing. See In re J. M.R, Jr. , No. 14

- 17

- 00219

- CV, 2017 WL 3567919, a t *7 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 17, 2017 , pet. denied ) (mem. op.) ( “ The evidence of Mother ’ s drug use, untreated mental illness, and criminal activity amply supports t he trial cou rt ’ s un challenged f inding of endangerment under subsection E. ” ) ; In re A. S. , No. 1 2

- 16

- 00104

- CV, 2016 WL 5827941, at *6 (Tex. App.

— Tyler Sept. 30, 2016 , no pet. ) (mem. op.) (evidence of

m other ’ s mental health issues, extensive Department histor y, inappropr iate me ntal health behavior, criminal history, and illegal drug abu se s up port ed fi nding of endangerment under subsecti o n (E))

. F i nally, Mother ’ s d rug use coup led with other proven criminal convictions and incarcerations subjected M.J. to a pr obability of being left alone b ecause Mot h er i s in jail, also en dangering the c hild ’ s physical and emotional well

- being. Betwee n the date the Department inter ven ed in this case and the date of judg ment

— just under a full year

— Mother was in carcerated for ap proximately half of that time

. T he clear and convincing evidence o f Mother ’ s c rimi nal conduct and subsequent jail time, and the collective negative effect on her ability to parent M.J., establishes an e n dan gering course of condu ct. See In re A.A.C. , No. 14

- 19

- 00560

- CV, 201 9 WL 6913327 , at *7 (Te x. App.

— Houst on [14th Dist.] Dec. 19, 201 9 , no pet. ) (mem. op.).
The fact finder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that i ts endangerment finding under subsection (E) was true. In re J.O.A. , 283 S.W.3 d at 344 ; se e also In re C.A.L. H. , No. 14

- 16

- 00899

- CV, 2017 WL 830495, at *5 (T ex.16

App.

— Housto n [14th Dist.] Feb. 28, 2017 , pet. denied ) (mem. op.) ( “ Given the undisputed eviden ce of Mother ’ s persistent use of illegal dru gs during pr egnancy and afterwards, and then ag ain dur ing t he pend ency of this suit when her parental rights were at s take, the t rial court had sufficient support for its finding that Mother engaged in a course o f conduct that endangered the Child ’ s physic al and emoti onal well

- being under [ s u

bs ection ( E)]. ” )

. A majority o f this court sitting en banc recently held that “ a parent ’ s dr ug use alone, without proof of any caus al connection to endangering their children ’ s welfare, ” is n ot enough to justi fy terminating a parent

- child relationship. In re L.C.L. , 599 S .W.3d 79 , 86 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2020 , pet. f ile d ) ( en banc). L. C.L. does not suggest that reversal is warranted here because we are not relying on Mother ’ s drug use alone to aff irm the trial court ’ s endangerment finding , a nd because t he reco rd contains a mple evidence of (1) Mot her ’ s dr ug use during h er p regna ncy wi th M.J., which caused M.J. to te st positively for an illegal substance at birth , 4 and (2) Mother ’ s numerous criminal convic tions and incarcera tions resulting fro m both drug

- r elated and non

- drug

- related offenses

. In L.C.L

. , the court ’ s en ba nc m ajority not ed th e absence of evidence of criminal charges related to the p ar ent ’ s drug use or “ proof of threat of incarceration due to alleged drug use. ” Id. at 84

- 85. Here, both ex i st

. Mother ’ s dr ug us e before and after pregnancy , combined with her substantial cr imin al history , lea ds us to

con clude that sufficient evidence supports the court ’ s finding un der subsection (E).
Considered i n the light most favorable to the trial co ur t ’ s finding, the

ev id en ce is legally suff ici ent to support the tri al court ’ s de term ination tha t termination of Mot her ’ s parental rights to M.J. was justified under Fami ly Code

4 In L.C.L ., there was no evidence that the par ent ’ s drug use in that case occurred while the par ent w as pregna nt.17

section 161.001(b)(1)(E). Furthe r , in view of the entire record, we conclude th e disputed e vidence i s not so significant as to prevent the trial court from fo rmin g a firm be lief or conviction t hat termination was w arranted unde r section 161.001(b) (1) (E). Accordingly, we conclude the evid en ce is legally and factually sufficient to su pport the su bsectio n ( E ) finding.

H aving concluded the evidence is legally and fact ually suffi cient to support the trial court ’ s findin g under subse ction ( E ) , we need n ot review the sufficiency of the evidence to s upport the subsections ( D ) , (N), or ( O ) fi ndings. See In re A. V. , 113 S.W .3 d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003).
Mother does not cha llen ge the tria l court ’ s finding that termination was in M.J. ’ s best interest , so we ne ed not address that finding

. See id. ; In re J.N.G

. , No. 14

- 15

- 00389

- CV, 2015 W L 5 634366, at *8 (Tex . App.

— Housto n [14th Dist.] Sept. 24, 2015 , no pet. ) (mem. o p.)

. We overr ule Mo ther ’ s first issue. 5
Conclusi on
We affirm the trial court ’ s judgment.

/s/ Kevin Jewe ll Justice
Panel c onsi sts of Jus ti ces Ch ri stopher, Je w el l , and Zimmerer

.

5 B ec au se of our di spositi on o f Mother ’ s f irst issue , we need not rea ch her seco nd issue, in which she contends that the evidence i s legally and factua lly insufficient to establish the elements of Family Cod e section 161 .003, an inde pe ndent bas is fo r t ermi nat i on. See Tex. F am. Code § 161.003(a)(1

- 5) ; C.W. v. Tex

. Dep ’ t of Fam

. & Pro tective Servs. , No. 03

- 17

- 00890

- CV, 2018 WL 2709208, at *9 & n.4 (Tex. App.

— Austin June 6, 2018 , no pet. ) (mem . op) (declin ing to review sufficiency of evid ence supp ortin g t ermina ti on u nder se ctio n 161. 003 , bec ause ot her pred icate ground sup port ed trial co urt ’ s ruling ) (citing In re A.V. , 113 S.W.3d at 362 )

.