This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

Before 

CRISFIELD, TANG1, and GASTON, 

Appellate Military Judges

_________________________

UNITED STATES

Appellee

v.

Tammy L. TANG

Lance Corporal (E-3), U.S. Marine Corps

Appellant

No. 201800240

Decided: 12 February 2020

Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary.

Military Judge: Colonel Matthew J. Kent, USMC. Sentence adjudged 

24 May 2018 by a general court-martial convened at Marine Corps 

Base Camp Pendleton, California, consisting of a military judge sitting 

alone. Sentence approved by the convening authority: reduction to pay 

grade E-1, total forfeitures of pay and allowances, confinement for life 

without eligibility for parole, and a dishonorable discharge.2

For Appellant: Lieutenant Commander William L. Geraty, JAGC, 

USN.

For Appellee: Captain William J. Mossor, USMC.

 

1 Senior Judge Tang is unrelated to Appellant.

2 The convening authority suspended all confinement in excess of 38 years in 

accordance with a pretrial agreement.
United States v. Tang, NMCCA No. 201800240

Opinion of the Court

2

Chief Judge CRISFIELD delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 

Senior Judge TANG joined. Judge GASTON filed a separate opinion, 

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

_________________________

This opinion does not serve as binding precedent, but 

may be cited as persuasive authority under NMCCA

Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2.

_________________________

CRISFIELD, Chief Judge:

Appellant was convicted, in accordance with her pleas, of murder and 

aggravated assault in violation of Articles 118 and 128, Uniform Code of 

Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 918 and 928 (2012). 

Appellant raises one assignment of error: that her sentence to confinement for life without eligibility for parole is inappropriately severe. After 

careful consideration of the record of trial and the pleadings of the parties, we 

find no prejudicial error and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant was a 19-year-old first term Marine when she discovered she 

was pregnant. She was not married and had been dating the baby’s father, 

himself a young Marine, for only four months. She immediately considered 

terminating the pregnancy through abortion. She knew she did not want to 

be a mother and that she did not want to derail her career and life to take 

care of a child. She searched the Internet for ways she could terminate the 

fetus, and she told others she considered drinking bleach and that when the 

baby kicked her, she hit him back.3 She repeatedly referred to her baby as a 

“parasite” and resented that she could not deploy with her unit because she 

was pregnant. Nevertheless, she opted to carry the pregnancy to term 

because she feared the medical complications of abortion and because the 

baby’s father and others convinced her to have the baby. 

 

3 When she was referred for mental health treatment regarding these alarming 

comments, Appellant insisted she was only joking.
United States v. Tang, NMCCA No. 201800240

Opinion of the Court

3

Appellant moved into base housing with the baby’s father in anticipation 

of the baby’s arrival. Appellant gave birth to a healthy baby boy, D.I., on 4 

September 2016. The arrival of D.I. did nothing to change Appellant’s 

feelings toward motherhood. Although D.I.’s father encouraged her to have 

the baby, he was not interested in helping Appellant with the constant 

demands of parenting a newborn infant. Appellant also felt that D.I.’s father 

did not bear his share of the household costs. So, Appellant resented D.I. and 

her boyfriend for altering her life and draining her resources.

Due to Appellant’s earlier concerning statements about her pregnancy, a

gunnery sergeant in Appellant’s chain of command went out of her way to 

visit Appellant at home several times each week. Appellant was on maternity 

leave, so her only contact with the chain of command was through these

visits. This gunnery sergeant, herself a single mother, tried to give Appellant 

advice, which Appellant resented. Appellant’s mother saw Appellant 

handling D.I. in a rough manner and told her to be gentler. Appellant 

resented this advice too. Other women tried to help and advise Appellant, 

which also frustrated her. These unwanted intrusions only further fed 

Appellant’s resentment and loathing of D.I.

About one month after he was born, Appellant began deliberately and

forcefully slamming D.I. onto the floor of his nursery, often headfirst.4 She 

assaulted D.I. this way multiple times—as often as every other day for 

several weeks.5 Appellant continued to abuse D.I. in this manner because it 

seemed to her like he could handle the abuse. A later autopsy revealed that 

these assaults caused significant internal injuries to D.I.—specifically,

multiple fractured ribs and brain injuries that were in various stages of 

healing at the time of D.I.’s death.

On 30 October 2016, before he was two months old, Appellant was home 

alone with D.I. while the baby’s father was out getting his hair cut. Around 

 

4 At trial, Appellant entered a plea of guilty by exceptions and substitutions, 

admitting that she intentionally dropped D.I. on the floor with a means likely to 

produce death or grievous bodily harm. Evidence admitted during pre-sentencing 

indicated that Appellant told Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) she 

forcefully slammed D.I. on the floor, pushing him away from her, toward the floor, 

while she was in a seated position.

5 “I don’t know the exact number, sir, but I know that it was more than once.” 

Record at 182. Appellant had previously told NCIS special agents that she did this 

every other day for several weeks beginning when D.I. was about one month old.
United States v. Tang, NMCCA No. 201800240

Opinion of the Court

4

2:00 p.m., Appellant, after thinking about her long list of resentments,

forcefully threw D.I. headfirst onto the floor three times in rapid succession 

with the intent to kill him or inflict great bodily harm upon him. Appellant 

then picked D.I. up and apologized. She saw a golf-ball sized lump immediately appear on the side of his head. She used ice and then a warm compress 

to try to make the swelling go down. When the baby’s father returned, she did 

not tell him what she had done. Then she gave D.I. a bath. From the time 

Appellant threw D.I. until the next morning, D.I. barely ate. Around 9:00 

a.m. the next morning—about 18 hours after she threw him to the ground 

three times—Appellant took D.I. to the hospital, stating she was concerned 

that he would not eat. At the hospital she claimed she accidentally dropped 

D.I. on the floor one time, and she described how she attempted to treat him 

with ice, a warm compress, and a bath.6

D.I. was admitted, assessed, and transported by helicopter to a nearby 

civilian children’s trauma center. He was intubated; two craniotomy holes 

were drilled into his skull to relieve the pressure on his brain; and he was 

injected with strong drugs to alleviate his pain. Doctors determined that he 

was having seizures. When they touched his feet to test his reflexes, he 

recoiled in pain. Scans of D.I.’s brain revealed that half of his brain was 

entirely dead; the other half had many dead portions. Even if D.I. would have

ever regained consciousness, he would have only existed in a vegetative state, 

without any senses. Appellant and D.I’s father agreed to remove D.I. from life 

support,7 which was done on 6 November. It took 48 hours for D.I. to perish.

Appellant and D.I.’s father periodically visited D.I. in the intensive care 

unit during his eight-day stay. In the final hours of his violence-filled 57-daylong life, Appellant was indifferent to his suffering. When informed that he 

was dying she refused to hold him and told medical personnel not to wake her 

up to hold him until his heart rate was in the twenties.8 Only when D.I.’s 

heart had slowed to her prescribed rate did Appellant hold D.I. for a period of 

time, but she would not continue to hold him until he perished. A nurse held 

him, then replaced him in his crib where he ceased breathing.

 

6 She also stated he accidentally fell out of his swing once before when she had 

placed him in the swing upside down.

7 Appellant later referred to this act as “pulling the plug” on her child. Pros. Ex. 

17.

8 Record at 243-44, 250-53; Pros. Ex. 5 at 7-8.
United States v. Tang, NMCCA No. 201800240

Opinion of the Court

5

While the medical examiner took photos of D.I.’s corpse in his hospital 

room, Appellant and D.I.’s father were in the room, conversing and giggling. 

An autopsy revealed that D.I. had tremendous injuries, including multiple 

skull fractures, internal hemorrhaging, and broken ribs. After D.I.’s death, 

Appellant resumed her life. She moved back into the barracks. She knew she 

was under investigation. She maintained her claim that she accidentally 

dropped D.I. on 30 October and that he had taken one other accidental short 

fall prior to 30 October. She wanted the NCIS investigation to conclude so 

that she could move on with her life. After murdering D.I. and moving back 

into the barracks, she told her new roommate that the NCIS investigation 

was “fifty shades of bulls[***]t.”9 When asked what she meant by that, 

Appellant replied, “The world is overpopulated, and only the wealthy should 

be having kids.”10 NCIS special agents brought Appellant in for another 

interview in April, 2017, and confronted her with the autopsy results. After 

first maintaining her original story that she accidentally dropped D.I., she 

admitted that she abused D.I. She told the investigators she dropped him 

every other day for a period of several weeks in October and that on 30 

October, she threw him three times. 

Appellant negotiated a plea agreement in which the convening authority 

agreed to suspend any confinement in excess of 38 years. Pursuant to the 

agreement Appellant entered pleas of guilty and guilty by exceptions and 

substitutions to two offenses. During pre-sentencing, the Government 

presented testimony from D.I.’s treating physicians, nurses, the medical 

examiner, and other evidence. 

In extenuation and mitigation, Appellant presented testimony from two 

psychiatrists who diagnosed her with a high functioning autistic spectrum 

disorder. This condition was not diagnosed until after Appellant was already 

charged with D.I.’s murder. According to the psychiatrists, this condition

meant Appellant had difficulty regulating her emotions, controlling her 

impulses, and appreciating social nuances. Her condition contributed to her 

inability to empathize with D.I. These experts testified that the disorder did

not prevent Appellant from appreciating the nature and wrongfulness of her 

conduct. She was of normal intelligence, and she could tell right from wrong, 

although she lacked emotional maturity. They opined that Appellant would 

not be a risk to society if released from the brig; in part, because she had 

 

9 Pros. Ex. 17.

10 Id.
United States v. Tang, NMCCA No. 201800240

Opinion of the Court

6

stated that she would not have any more children. In rebuttal, the Government played a recorded brig phone conversation between Appellant and D.I.’s 

father which took place after she had murdered D.I. In the conversation, 

Appellant stated that she wanted to have another child with him. 

Additional facts necessary to resolution of the issues are contained in the 

discussion.

II. DISCUSSION

Appellant argues that her sentence to life without eligibility for parole is

inappropriately severe. We review sentence appropriateness de novo. United 

States v. Lane, 64 M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 2006). “Sentence appropriateness 

involves the judicial function of assuring that justice is done and that the 

accused gets the punishment [she] deserves.” United States v. Healy, 26 M.J. 

394, 395 (C.M.A. 1988). This requires our “individualized consideration of the 

particular accused on the basis of the nature and seriousness of the offense 

and the character of the offender.” United States v. Snelling, 14 M.J. 267, 268 

(C.M.A. 1982) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In making 

this assessment, we analyze the record as a whole. Healy, 26 M.J. at 395-97. 

Despite our significant discretion in determining sentence appropriateness, 

we may not engage in acts of clemency. United States v. Nerad, 69 M.J. 138, 

146 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

We start with the fundamental brutality and repeated nature of Appellant’s crimes. This was not a one-time loss of control in which Appellant 

snapped.11 She said D.I. barely cried and was easily soothed when she 

attended to his needs. Appellant was D.I.’s sole caretaker during most of the 

hours of his life. He was completely helpless. She repeatedly and violently 

assaulted him by slamming or dropping him on the floor of his room. During 

the providence inquiry, she stated this happened at least twice. These 

assaults actually inflicted serious injuries on D.I., which were noted during 

his autopsy. Rather than being horrified by her offenses, she thought that 

because D.I. survived her initial assaults (“sustained the damage”) she could 

continue.12 Then she murdered him by throwing him headfirst into the 

ground three times with the intent to kill him or inflict bodily harm. He died 

 

11 Such an act would still warrant severe punishment; a repeated pattern of 

deliberate violence likewise warrants appropriately severe punishment.

12 Pros. Ex. 12; Pros. Ex. 23.
United States v. Tang, NMCCA No. 201800240

Opinion of the Court

7

eight days later from the massive brain injuries resulting from Appellant’s 

actions. These major crimes call for appropriately severe punishment.

The Government presented substantial aggravating evidence related to 

Appellant’s offenses. Her actions after she inflicted the injuries that would 

cause the death of her son reflected a chilling callousness to his suffering. 

Most importantly, she waited overnight, nearly 18 hours, to seek medical 

attention for D.I. After throwing him onto the ground the third time, 

Appellant noticed a “golf ball size” swelling on the right side of his head, 

labored breathing, “carpet burn” on his face, and “a very muffled whine.”13 “I 

was horrified about what I did. I was so shocked that I was capable of doing 

something so horrific.”14 In spite of this instant realization, Appellant waited 

until the following morning to take D.I. to the hospital. Then she provided 

false information to D.I.’s doctors who sought to treat him. 

The testimony of witnesses and the evidence presented universally 

demonstrate that Appellant was shockingly indifferent to D.I.’s suffering as 

he lay dying in the hospital. She refused almost every opportunity to hold 

him and slept through most of his final hours. She stated that she was 

relieved that he died and she could go back to her normal life. As she stood 

over the baby in the hospital, she thought to herself, “My prayers and wishes 

were answered in the worst way.”15 Although generally emotionless 

throughout these events, she became visibly upset when the mother of D.I.’s 

father took her to a pizza restaurant for dinner rather than the restaurant 

she wanted to go to. She refused to participate in any “memory making”16

activities in the baby’s final hours. When the medical examiner came into the 

room to declare D.I. dead, Appellant and D.I’s father were giggling and 

cracking jokes. This behavior can be fairly considered aggravating. See 

United States v. Gogas, 58 M.J. 96, 99 (C.A.A.F. 2003). 

Appellant argues that her diagnosis of autistic spectrum disorder mitigates her offenses and renders life without eligibility for parole an inappropriately severe sentence. We believe that the disorder helps explain some of 

Appellant’s noted social awkwardness and inappropriate comments, but it 

does nothing to explain or mitigate her multiple acts of brutality toward her 

 

13 Record at 174-75.

14 Record at 169.

15 Pros. Ex. 20, p. 7.

16 Such as taking impressions of D.I.’s feet and hands.
United States v. Tang, NMCCA No. 201800240

Opinion of the Court

8

own child, her substantial delay in seeking medical attention for him, or her 

self-centered indifference to his suffering. Telling the intensive care unit 

nurse that she did not want to hold D.I. and did not want to be woken up 

until his heartbeat reached 20 beats per minute was not social awkwardness 

or failure to appreciate social nuances—it was cold heartedness.17

In short, Appellant never wanted to be a mother. She believed that D.I. 

would change her life for the worse. He cost her time, money, her ability to 

deploy, and she resented him for it. When people tried to help her, she 

pushed them away and resented the fact that they dared tell her how to be a 

mother. Because of all of her resentments, she abused D.I. and threw him to 

the ground repeatedly with the intent to kill him or inflict great bodily harm. 

When she killed him, she was relieved and sought to resume her life as it was 

before she became pregnant. Her wish had come true.

Appellant argues that her condition made it difficult for her to express 

remorse, and that she actually felt remorse for what she did. Even considering that Appellant’s mental disorder may limit her ability to communicate, 

we do not find substantial evidence that Appellant feels genuine remorse or 

any sadness at all at having taken D.I.’s life. Her lack of remorse is combined 

with a lack of understanding of the immensity of her criminal acts. While in 

pre-trial confinement pending trial for D.I.’s death, she told D.I.’s father that 

she would like to have another child with him.

Having given individualized consideration to the nature and seriousness 

of these crimes, the Appellant’s record of service, and all matters contained in 

the record of trial, including matters submitted by the Appellant in extenuation and mitigation, we conclude the sentence as approved by the convening 

authority is not inappropriately severe and is appropriate for Appellant and 

her offenses. United States v. Baier, 60 M.J. 382, 384-85 (C.A.A.F. 2005); 

Healy, 26 M.J. at 395-96; Snelling, 14 M.J. at 268. Granting sentence relief at 

this point would be to engage in clemency, which we decline to do. Healy, 26 

M.J. at 395-96.

 

17 The ICU nurse testified: “So I had asked her if she wanted to hold D.I. since his 

heart rate was slowly going down. And she said she wanted to keep sleeping. So I 

went ahead and I picked him up, because I felt like I didn’t want him to die alone 

without being held by somebody.” Record at 252.
United States v. Tang, NMCCA No. 201800240

Opinion of the Court

9

III. CONCLUSION

After careful consideration of the record and briefs of appellate counsel, 

we have determined that the approved findings and sentence are correct in 

law and fact and that no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights occurred. Arts. 59, 66, UCMJ. Accordingly, the findings and 

sentence as approved by the convening authority are AFFIRMED. 

Senior Judge TANG concurs.
United States v. Tang, NMCCA No. 201800240 

GASTON, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part)

10

GASTON, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part):

I concur in the majority’s affirmance of reduction to E-1, total forfeitures

of pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge; however, I believe a

sentence of confinement for life without the possibility of parole is inappropriately severe given the facts of this case. Our charge under Article 66 is to 

“affirm only such findings of guilty and the sentence or such part of amount 

of the sentence, as the Court finds correct in law and fact and determines, on 

the basis of the entire record, should be approved.” Article 66, Uniform Code 

of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1) (2019). This power has been 

described as “a sweeping congressional mandate to ensure a fair and just 

punishment for every accused.” United States v. Baier, 60 M.J. 382, 384 

(C.A.A.F. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The aim is to 

arrive at a sentence no more severe than that “warranted by the offense, the 

circumstances surrounding the offense, [the Accused’s] acceptance or lack of 

acceptance of responsibility for [her] offense, and [her] prior record.” United 

States v. Aurich, 31 M.J. 95, 97 n.* (C.M.A. 1990). While I share my 

colleagues’ view that Appellant’s actions were among the most egregious, 

callous acts imaginable, I nevertheless do not believe the adjudged sentence 

of confinement without the possibility of parole adequately takes into 

consideration the significant evidence in extenuation and mitigation present 

in this case, nor Appellant’s acceptance of responsibility in pleading guilty to 

the offenses.

By any reading of the record before us, Appellant’s then-undiagnosed 

Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), formerly known as Asperger’s Disorder, 

significantly impacted her coping and decision-making abilities under the 

stress and strain of taking care of an infant for the first time. As the boardcertified O-6 Head of Forensic Psychiatry Services at Naval Medical Center 

San Diego testified, the R.C.M. 706 board that he served on for Appellant 

“thought long and hard” before it was even able to conclude Appellant was 

able to appreciate the nature and quality of the wrongfulness of her conduct, 

given “her lack of social intelligence, her lack of social acumen, [and] her lack 

of emotional intelligence.”18 He described ASD as “among the greatest of 

mental defects that we work with” and testified that due to her condition 

Appellant “really was baffled by even basic emotional experiences and 

functioned along those lines, much more like a preadolescent, prepubescent 

 

18 Record at 276-77.
United States v. Tang, NMCCA No. 201800240 

GASTON, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part)

11

child with regard to emotional intelligence, emotional understanding.”19 He 

testified that Appellant’s ASD, though “mild,” was still severe enough to 

prevent her from having a “normal adult appreciation for her behavior and 

conduct” and would have barred her enlistment in the Marine Corps had it 

been properly diagnosed at that time.20

Appellant’s videotaped unsworn statement and interrogation by NCIS 

confirm the thrust of this seasoned psychiatrist’s testimony. Appellant has a 

strangely flat, overly formal affect and demeanor that do not comport with 

normal social situations. Her speech is eccentric-sounding, and she has 

always felt there is a wall between herself and other people. She expresses 

herself best through cartoon drawings. She grew up in a single-parent 

household largely devoid of emotional content or expression. She met D.I.’s 

father—her first real boyfriend—through a shared interest in video games, 

comics books, and anime, and they named D.I. after a video game character. 

That such an individual would have or at least would be perceived as having 

inappropriate emotional responses under trying or tragic circumstances is 

simply beyond question.

Predictably, this intensely socially awkward young woman soon began to 

feel overwhelmed as a pregnant, unwed, 19-year-old Marine, burdened with a 

condition that made it difficult for her to adapt to emotional changes and 

particularly ill-equipped at handling stress. The stressors of her pregnancy 

alone led her to start cutting herself. And once D.I. was born, when his crying 

could not be ameliorated through Appellant’s structured breast-feeding 

regimen, the logic of the situation broke down and she started losing control

of herself. She would throw the baby down, feel horrified about what she had 

done, then pick him back up and hold him in her arms and apologize. While 

she maintained she was not trying to kill him, she repeated these violent 

actions toward D.I., knowing what she was doing was wrong, and ultimately 

causing his death. Horrific though it is, as her R.C.M. 706 board discussed, 

this pattern of immature, childlike behavior is more illustrative of a person 

intently focused on immediate alleviation of acute emotional discomfort than 

someone giving any real consideration to the consequences.

While frustration with caring for a newborn by no means excuses Appellant’s actions, and she had a plethora of other options available to seek help 

 

19 Record at 274, 276. 

20 Record at 277, 280.
United States v. Tang, NMCCA No. 201800240 

GASTON, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part)

12

in addressing the issue, yet pursued none of them, I nevertheless find the

surrounding facts and circumstances both extenuating and mitigating. They 

reveal her actions to be not so much those of a heartless killer, but rather the 

contorted, desperate acts of young woman with a serious mental disorder 

trying to cope with stressors she found overwhelming. However tragic and 

inexcusable their result, these circumstances in my mind do not justify

awarding the maximum possible punishment, particularly for an accused 

who voluntarily accepted responsibility for her actions and pleaded guilty to 

her offenses. Generally speaking, “[a] life without parole sentence ‘means a 

denial of hope, it means that good behavior and character improvement are 

immaterial, it means that whatever might be in store for the mind and spirit 

of the convict, [s]he will remain in prison for the rest of [her] days.’ ” 

Campbell v. Ohio, 138 S. Ct. 1059, 1059-60 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., concurring

in denial of certiorari) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70 (2010)).

While one may well imagine facts and circumstances under which such a 

sentence would be appropriate, I do not believe they are present here. 

Accordingly, I would affirm only so much of the sentence of confinement 

as extends to confinement for 45 years, which I believe fulfills our “judicial 

function of assuring that justice is done and that the accused gets the 

punishment [she] deserves.” United States v. Healy, 26 M.J. 394, 395 (C.M.A. 

1988).

FOR THE COURT:

RODGER A. DREW, JR.

Clerk of Court