alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# FILED
November 24, 1998 Cecil W. Crowson Appellate Cou rt Clerk IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

______________________________________________ AMY TYLER, Plaintiff-Appella

nt, Williamson Circuit No. 96361 Vs. C.A. No. 01A01-9711-CV-00661 LARRY MORGAN, d/b/a LARRY MORGAN CONST. COMPANY, UNITED CITIES GAS CO., ROGER P. DYE, d/b/a ROGER DYE CONST. CO., MURRAY TATUM, QUAD STATES, INC., Defendants-Ap

pellees.

____________________________ _______________________________________________ _ D I S S E N T

__________________________________________________________________________ __ CRAWFORD, J. I respectfully

dissent from the ma

jority opinion. Bear

den’s affidavit

states that he had
a conversation with the defendants’ employees right after they finished pouring the concrete at about 5:00 or 5:30 p.m. He further states that after warning the workers that they shoul d barricadethe area, he

was assured by the workers that they would put up a barricade. Although
a stretched string is not much of a bar ricade as we nor

mally think of a bar

ricade, to some pe

ople it could be considered a type of a warning barricade. Since Bearden was assured by the workers that they woul d put up a barricade, and subsequently the so-called barricade existed, there appears to be an inference that the workers placed the barricade
. In considering a moti

on for summary judg

ment, the court mus

t consider the motio

n in the same manner as a motion for directed verdict made at the close of the plaintiff’s proof; that is, the court must take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving partyallowing all reasonable inferences in favor of that party and discard all countervailing evidence. Suddath v. Park , 914 S.W.2d 910 (Tenn. App. 1995). Although the defendants categorically deny any knowledge of the string, the fact that the defendant’s employees said they were going to erect a barr icade, in my

opinion creates a genuine issue as to a mater

ial fact and pre

cludes summary jud

gment. I would reverse the order

of the trial court grant

ing summary judgmen

t and remand this case for furthe

r proceedings.2 _________________________________ W. FRANK CRAWFORD, PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2008-1418

HUMAN GENOME SCIENCES, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

IMMUNEX CORPORATION

and AMGEN INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States Court District Court for the District of Delaware in case

no. 07-CV-780, Judge Sue L. Robinson.

ON MOTION

Before MOORE, Circuit Judge.

ORDER

Human Genome Sciences, Inc. moves for a 14-day extension of time, until April

6, 2009, to file a reply brief. Immunex Corporation and Amgen Inc. oppose.

Upon consideration thereof,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

The motion for an extension of time is granted.

FOR THE COURT

/s/ Jan Horbaly

Date

cc:	Richard L. DeLucia, Esq.

Robert M. Galvin, Esq.

Jan Horbaly

Clerk FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

APR 0 2 2009

s20

JAW HORSALY

CLERK

APR 2 2009
EXHIBIT 32 .01

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of N I S
Holdings, Corp (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the
period ended September 30, 2009 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"),

I, Brian Stewart, Chief Executive Officer of the
Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my
knowledge:

        (1) The Report fully complies with the
 requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

        (2) The  information  contained in the Report
 fairly  presents,  in all material  respects,  the
 financial  condition  and result of  operations of
the Company.

    /s/ Brian Stewart
        ------------
        Brian Stewart
   Chief Executive Officer

March 16, 2010














EXHIBIT 32 .02

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of N I S
Holdings, Corp (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the
period ended September 30, 2009 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"),

I, Samantha Roberts, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my
knowledge:

        (1) The Report fully complies with the
 requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

        (2) The  information  contained in the Report
 fairly  presents,  in all material  respects,  the
 financial  condition  and result of  operations of
the Company.

      /s/ Samantha Roberts
          -------------
          Samantha Roberts
      Chief Financial Officer

March 16, 2010
Case 2:11-cr-00211-KSH Document 7 Filed 05/05/11 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 25
Case 2:11-cr-00211-KSH Document 7 Filed 05/05/11 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 26
# 2018

&P
Anthony C. Valenziano

Associate

Direct: 973.302.9696

Fax: 973.302.9947

avalenziano@shermanwells.com

210 PARK AVENUE  2ND FLOOR  FLORHAM PARK  NEW JERSEY 07932  973.302.9700

805 THIRD AVENUE  10TH FLOOR  NEW YORK  NEW YORK 10018  212.763.6464

WWW.SHERMANWELLS.COM

April 1, 2016

VIA ECF

Hon. Renee Marie Bumb, U.S.D.J.

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey

Mitchell H. Cohen Building & U.S. Courthouse

4

th & Cooper Street

Camden, NJ 08101 

Re: Kasilag v. Hartford Inv. Fin. Servs., LLC, 

Civil Action No. 11-cv-01083 (RMB)(KMW)

Kasilag v. Hartford Funds Management Company, LLC,

Civil Action No. 14-cv-01611 (RMB)(KMW)

Dear Judge Bumb:

This firm, along with its co-counsel Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy LLP, represents 

defendants Hartford Investment Financial Services, LLC and Hartford Funds Management 

Company, LLC in the above-referenced matters. Pursuant to the Court’s Order dated March 24, 

2016 [Docket Entry No. 181 and Docket Entry No. 72], enclosed please find a proposed redacted 

version of the Court’s Opinion dated March 24, 2016 [Docket Entry No. 180 and Docket Entry No. 

73] for the Court’s consideration. 

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Anthony C. Valenziano

Anthony C. Valenziano

Encl.

cc: Counsel of Record (w/encl., via ECF)

Case 1:11-cv-01083-RMB-KMW Document 183 Filed 04/01/16 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 9731
Exhibit 10.23(ii)

 

December 12, 2012

 

Dear John:

 

This letter clarifies certain terms in your offer letter from Onyx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (the “Company”) dated May 15, 2012 (the “Offer Letter”). In the Offer Letter, the Company has agreed to provide you with a “Relocation Allowance” and “Housing Assistance” to help you in relocating your family to the Bay Area. As noted in the Offer Letter, these amounts can be earned by and paid to you only so long as you are employed by the Company. For the Housing Assistance, the Company is paying you $4,500 per month (less applicable withholdings and deductions), for a gross aggregate amount of not more than $108,000. Such payments for which you are eligible will total $31,500 for 2012, $54,000 for 2013 and $22,500 for 2014, subject to your continued employment. This benefit will cease on the relocation of your family’s primary residence to the Bay Area or should you no longer be employed by the Company. For both the Housing Assistance and the Relocation Allowance, the amount paid or payable in one year will not affect the amount eligible for payment in any other year, and the right to payment is not subject to liquidation or exchange for another benefit. Nothing in this letter modifies the at will nature of your employment. This letter, together with the Offer Letter, forms the complete and exclusive statement of the subjects set forth therein and herein. This letter cannot be changed except in a writing signed by you and a duly authorized officer or director of the Company.

 

Sincerely,

 

 

	
/s/   Kaye Foster-Cheek
    	
 
    
	
Kaye   Foster-Cheek,
    	
 
    
	
Senior   Vice President, Global Human Resources
    	
 
    


 

Acceptance and Acknowledgment: I have read, understand, and accept this clarifying letter agreement.

 

	
/s/   John Osborn
    	
 
    
	
John   Osborn
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
Date:
    	
 13   December 2012
**EXHIBIT
      32.1**





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





The
      undersigned, Dingliang Kuang, the President, Chief Executive Officer, Treasurer
      and Director of Franklin Towers Enterprises, Inc. (the “Company”), certifies,
      under the standards set forth and solely for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1350,
      as
      adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to
      his
      knowledge, the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter
      ended June 30, 2008 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
      15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in that
      Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
      and
      results of operations of the Company.




Date:
                August 18, 2008




By:
            /s/
                Dingliang KuangName:
            Dingliang
                KuangTitle:
            President,
                Chief Executive Officer, Treasurer
                and Director (Principal Executive,
                Financial and Accounting Officer)





A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
      to
      the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
      and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CHAMBERS OF

JEROME B. SIMANDLE

DISTRICT JUDGE ORIGINAL FILED WITH CLERK

January 14, 2011

UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE

ONE JOHN F. GERRY PLAZA

P.O. BOX 888

CAMDEN, NJ 08101

(856) 757-5167

Andrew P. Kalick

47 George Street

Mount Ephraim, NJ 08059

Re: Kalick v. Oaklyn Borough

Civil No. 10-6229 (JBS-KMW)

Dear Mr. Kalick:

Your complaint in the above-captioned case was received by

the Clerk of Court on December 2, 2010, and your amended

compliant was received on December 21, 2010. The case was

assigned to me, and I have reviewed your application for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Before I

can determine this application to proceed in forma pauperis,

there are two questions about the affidavit you signed. The

affidavit states that you pay no monthly rent or home mortgage

payments (see answers to Question 8), yet, according to your

Amended Complaint, you reside at an address that appears to be a

private home. Please explain to the Court how your housing is

subsidized if you do not pay for it. Second, according to the

affidavit, for the past twelve months, you have had no monthly

income, cash, checking or savings accounts and have received no

gifts (see answers to Question 1) and yet, according to the

amended complaint, you traveled to the state of Florida in the

past six months “for employment purposes for a period of time”. 

See amended complaint at paragraph 11. Please explain to the

Court how you paid for this travel without any income, assets or

gifts, and what, if any, income was acquired during your time in

Florida.

Kindly furnish a response, in a letter with, if necessary, a

corrected application to proceed in forma pauperis, within 14

days of today's date, so that this matter can be considered. 

Very truly yours,

 

JEROME B. SIMANDLE

U.S. District Judge

JBS/dw

Case 1:10-cv-06229-JBS -KMW Document 3 Filed 01/14/11 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 25
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirement of Section 13(a) or 15 (d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and result of operations of the Company as of the dates and for the
periods expressed in the Report.
 Date:  August 13, 2008
    By:
    /s/ Edward J. GildeaEdward J. GildeaChief Executive Officer and President
(Principal Executive Officer)
Case 2:11-cv-01754-BRM-AME Document 133 Filed 01/22/13 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 4032
Case 3:11-cr-00144-FLW Document 65 Filed 05/03/13 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 194
#### MILLSAP et al. v. LOTZ.

No. 989.

United States District Court W. D. Missouri, S. D.

Dec. 13, 1950.

*613Mann, Mann, Walter & Powell, Springfield, Mo., and McCawley Baird, East St. Louis, 111., for plaintiff.

Harold J. Fisher, Springfield,, Mo., for defendant.

REEVES, Chief Judge.

Counsel for the defendant has filed an elaborate motion for a more definite statement and has supplemented his motion with an extensive brief or suggestions in, support thereof. The complaint has been examined in the light of the motion for a more definite statement and it appears not only that the complaint complies with Rule 8 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. but that the motion for a more definite statement calls for information and not for the clarification of doubtful or ambiguous aver-ments.

Judge Gourley of the District Court, Western District of Pennsylvania, aptly stated the present rule in Byers v. Olander, 7 F.R.D. 745, loc. cit, 746, as follows: “No need exists for the citation of authorities for the reason that the law is settled that a motion for a more definite statement * * * should not be granted where the information desired can be gained by a request for admissions, and interrogatories or depositions.”

This pronouncement of Judge Gourley is in strict accord with all of the authorities.

Counsel cites a case by the writer, Schmidt v. Going, D.C., 25 F.Supp. 412. This decision was rendered immediately after the adoption of the New Rules and all that it required was that in a proper supplemental pleading plaintiff should give to the defendant the information sought. Since that opinion the courts in other cases have pointed out that information could be obtained by interrogatories, depositions, or request for admissions.

Counsel has asked for an oral argument which is unnecessary a,s the law is too well settled to require a hearing. Accordingly, the motion for a more definite statement will be overruled.
#### BROWN et al. v. LOWDEN et al.

No. 1323.

District Court, W. D. Missouri, W. D.

Dec. 7, 1942.

Francis O’Sullivan, of Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff.

Hogsett, Trippe, Depping & Houtz, of Kansas City, Mo., for defendant Frank O. Lowden.

Joseph B. Fleming, of Chicago, 111., for defendant Railway Co.

REEVES, District Judge.

The question presented by this motion is whether the plaintiffs should be required to set out the negligent act, if any, of the defendants, which it is claimed by the plaintiffs caused the death of their son. It is stated in the complaint that a freight train operated by the defendants was derailed on Saturday, November 15, 1941 and killed *174the minor son of the plaintiffs while he was sitting as a passenger in the automobile of plaintiffs on a parking lot provided by the defendants for persons having business at defendants’ railway station.

By their motion the defendants seek to have the plaintiffs set out wherein they were negligent in causing the derailment of their freight train and the death of plaintiffs’ son. It is a clear case of res ipsa loquitur. The train was under the control and management of the defendants. In the ordinary course of things it would not have left its track if those in control had exercised proper care. The following rule has been repeatedly approved: “ ‘When the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.’ ” Atlas Powder Co. v. Benson, 3 Cir., 287 F. 797, 798; San Juan Light & Transit Co. v. Requena, 224 U.S. 89, 32 S.Ct. 399, 56 L.Ed. 680.

The plaintiffs should not be required to specify what caused defendants’'! engine and train of cars to leave the track. An inspection of the complaint indicates that the defendants should experience no trouble in preparing a responsive pleading. The motion for a more definite statement is therefore overruled.
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EXHIBIT 32.2

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Coastal Media Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-QSB for the period ending December 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jon Suk, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as
adopted pursuant to ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
          the Company.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this certification as of the
14th day of February, 2007.


/s/ Jon Suk
------------------------------
Chief Financial Officer
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-878

L.T.

vs.

R.D.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, R.D., appeals from an order of a District 

Court judge, after the first hearing after notice, extending a 

harassment prevention order issued pursuant to G. L. c. 258E, 

§ 3, for one year. We affirm.1

The sole issue raised by the defendant is his claim that 

the plaintiff "perjured herself to the court. She cannot be 

found truthful or believable." Specifically, the defendant 

alleges that the plaintiff has "Herpes 2" and lied "when she 

said she has no STD's."

At the hearing, however, the defendant stated that he could 

not pronounce the sexually transmitted disease he claims the 

plaintiff had, testifying that "[he] [couldn't] pronounce it," 

1 The plaintiff, L.T., did not file a brief in this appeal.
2

but "it's some Greek or Latin term." After ruling on the 

extension, the judge stated, addressing the plaintiff, "I hope 

you're being treated, if in fact it's true." The plaintiff 

responded, "It's not true." It is impossible to discern whether 

the plaintiff was denying having any sexually transmitted 

disease or just the unpronounceable disease the defendant 

referenced.

In any event, the defendant presents only his own word that 

the plaintiff was lying. "Our role as a reviewing court is not 

to reassess credibility determinations made by the hearing 

judge." Constance C. v. Raymond R., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 390, 397 

(2022). "We accord the credibility determinations of the judge 

who 'heard the testimony of the parties . . . [and] observed 

their demeanor' . . . the utmost deference." Yahna Y. v. 

Sylvester S., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 184, 185 (2020), quoting 

Ginsberg v. Blacker, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 139, 140 n.3 (2006). We 

are in no position to second guess the judge's credibility 

determinations on a cold transcript without seeing the witnesses
3

and how they testified. Accordingly, we cannot disturb the 

judge's order.

Order entered June 3, 2022, 

affirmed.

By the Court (Ditkoff, Hand & 

D'Angelo, JJ.2),

Clerk

Entered: May 2, 2023.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.