alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1 The HONORABLE DAVID L. PIESTER, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Nebraska, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 01-3374

___________ Sandy R. Jackson, * * Appellant, * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the v. * District of Nebraska. * University of Nebraska Board of * [UNPUBLISHED] Regents, * * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: April 5, 2002 Filed: April 8, 2002

___________ Before LOKEN, BEAM, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Sandy R. Jackson brought this action against the University of Nebraska Board of Regents (University), claiming the University terminated his Ph.D. program, harassed him, and otherwise discriminated against him based on his race, in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7. At trial, after the close of Jackson’s proof, the district court 1 entered judgment as a matter of-2- law for the University, and Jackson appeals. Having reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo, see Clark v. Runyon , 218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000), we affirm. We agree with the district court that Jackson did not prove that any of the allegedly discriminatory or harassing actions were based on his race. SeeHabib v. Nationsbank , 279 F.3d 563, 566 (8th Cir. 2001); Bradley v. Widnall , 232 F.3d 626, 632 (8th Cir. 2000); Fuller v. Rayburn , 161 F.3d 516, 518 (8th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, we affirm. A true copy. Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-20784

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

OSVALDO BIOJOS-DE LA CRUZ, also

known as Orlando Santiago Gonzalez,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-97-CR-66-1

- - - - - - - - - -

July 27, 1998

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Court-appointed counsel for Osvaldo Biojos-De La Cruz has

filed a motion to withdraw and a brief as required by Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Biojos-De La Cruz has not filed

a response. Our independent review of the brief and record

discloses no nonfrivolous issue. Accordingly, counsel is excused

from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS

DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. 
No. 

-2-
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-1087

In re: JONATHAN EUGENE BRUNSON,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (5:14-hc-02009-FL)

Submitted: April 14, 2020 Decided: April 17, 2020

Before WILKINSON, QUATTLEBAUM, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jonathan Eugene Brunson, Petitioner Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Jonathan Eugene Brunson petitions for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the district 

court has unduly delayed in ruling on his motion to reconsider. He seeks an order from 

this court directing the district court to act. The present record does not reveal undue delay 

in the district court. Accordingly, we deny the mandamus petition. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
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#### In the Matter of Tajani B., a Child Alleged to be Neglected. Suffolk County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Talisha S., Appellant. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter of Taliq B., a Child Alleged to be Neglected. Suffolk County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Talisha S., Appellant. (Proceeding No. 2.) In the Matter of Thus S., a Child Alleged to be Neglected. Suffolk County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Talisha S., Appellant. (Proceeding No. 3.)

[854 NYS2d 518]

In a child protective proceeding, the party seeking to establish neglect must show, “first, that a child’s physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired and second, that the actual or threatened harm to the child is a consequence of the failure of the parent or caretaker to exercise a minimum degree of care in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship” *(Nicholson v Scoppetta,*3 NY3d 357, 368 [2004]; *see Matter of Dimitriy R.,*39 AD3d 866 [2007]; Family Ct Act § 1012 [f]).

The petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject children were neglected by the mother *(see*Family Ct Act § 1046 [b] [i]). Here, the evidence presented at the hearing was sufficient to prove that the mother left a loaded gun on a bed accessible to her then three-year-old son and next to her then five-month-old daughter who was in a crib, thereby creating an imminent danger that their physical, mental, and emotional health would be harmed *(see Matter of Aminat O.,*20 AD3d 480, 481 [2005]).

*877Additionally, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in drawing a negative inference against the mother upon her failure to testify at the hearing *(see Matter of Karen Patricia*G., 44 AD3d 658, 660 [2007]; *Matter of Christopher*L., 19 AD3d 597, 598 [2005]).

Contrary to the mother’s contention, the Family Court did not err in failing to appoint new counsel to represent her *(see Matter of Moore v McClenos,*259 AD2d 752, 753 [1999]; *Matter of Mooney v Mooney,*243 AD2d 840, 841 [1997]). Skelos, J.P., Lifson, Santucci and Balkin, JJ, concur.
<Page>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 21.1

                      SUBSIDIARIES OF DYNEGY HOLDINGS INC.
                            AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2001

<Table>
<Caption>
                            SUBSIDIARY                                 STATE OR JURISDICTION OF INCORPORATION
-------------------------------------------------------------------  -------------------------------------------
<S>                     <C>                                          <C>
1.                      Dynegy Holdings Inc.                         Delaware
2.                      Dynegy Power Corp.                           Delaware
3.                      DMT Holdings, Inc.                           Delaware
4.                      Dynegy Midwest Generation, Inc.              Illinois
5.                      Dynegy Catlin Member, Inc.                   Delaware
6.                      Dynegy Northeast Generation, Inc.            Delaware
7.                      Dynegy Roseton, LLC                          Delaware
8.                      Dynegy Power Marketing, Inc.                 Texas
9.                      DMT Supply Holdings, LLC.                    Delaware
10.                     Dynegy Marketing & Trade                     Colorado
11.                     DMT Supply, LP                               Delaware
</Table>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Stacey Polack, Appellant.

[823 NYS2d 116]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Laura Ward, J.), rendered on or about October 8, 2002, unanimously affirmed. No opinion. Order filed. Concur—Tom, J.P, Andrias, Marlow, McGuire and Malone, JJ.
Exhibit 4.33
 ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT
 
 RECITALS
 
  AGREEMENT
  Transfer and Assignment
 Consideration and Assumption
 Further Agreement




---



##### 



Binding Agreement; Successors
 Notice
 Hoshin GigaMedia Center IncIf to the AssignorTelecopy:Attention:Hoshin GigaMedia Center IncIf to the AssigneeTelecopy:Attention:
 Severability
 Entire Agreement
 Amendment
 2




---



##### 



Waiver
 Governing Law
 Counterparts
 [Remainder of page intentionally left blank]
 3




---



##### 



Hoshin GigaMedia Center Inc.By:Name:Title:Hoshin Multimedia Center Inc.By:Name:Title:
  4




---



##### 



(CHINESE CHARACTERS)By:Name:Title:  Date:   5




---



##### 



Counterparty
    

Date of Execution
    

Term of the Contract(CHINESE CHARACTERS)
    
    July 12, 2001
    
    9 years and renewable
Case 3:11-cr-00103-AET Document 12 Filed 06/06/12 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 31
Case 3:11-cr-00103-AET Document 12 Filed 06/06/12 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 32
905 A.2d 871

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. MARKEICH JOHNSON, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

August 4, 2006.

ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted on the issue of defendant’s sentence, and the matter is summarily remanded to the trial court for resentencing in light of the Court’s decision in *State v. Pierce,*188 *N.J.*155, 902 A.2d 1195 (2006).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMAL DAMON HENDRIX,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

STATE OF NEVADA; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 16

- 16743

D.C. No. 3:15

- c v

- 00336

- RCJ

- WGC

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 11, 2017 **

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON , and HURWITZ , Circuit Judges.

Jamal Damon Hendrix, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se from the

district court’s order in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action denying Hendrix in forma

pauperis (“IFP”) status because he has three strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Washington v.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

APR 21 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 16

- 16743

Los Angeles Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t , 833 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 2016)

. We reverse

and remand.

The district court denied Hendrix ’s IFP request on the basis that he had

accrued three prior “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). T he district court

improperly counted No. 3:14

- cv

- 398

- RCJ

- VPC as a strike because the dismissal of

a mislabeled § 1983 action on the ground that it should have been brought as a

habeas petition does not count as a strike. See El

- Sha ddai v. Zamora , 833 F.3d

1036, 1047 (9th Cir 2016) ( dismissal of § 1983 action that is mislabeled as a

habeas petition does not count as a strike ); Washington , 833 F.3d at 1057 ( where a

portion of the action sounds in habeas, dismissal does not count as a strike). T he

district court improperly counted No. 3:15

- cv

- 155

- MMD

- WGC as a strike because

an i nitial dismissal of a complaint for violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8(a) , with leave to amend, does not count as a strike. See Knapp v. Hogan , 738

F.3d 1106, 11 10 (9th Cir. 2013) (“ [D] ismissals following the repeated violation of

Rule 8(a)’ s ‘short and plain statement’ requirement, following leave to amend, are

dismissals for failure to state a claim under § 1915(g). ”).

W e reverse the district court’s order revoking Hendrix’s IFP status, and

remand for further proceedings.

REVERSED and REMANDED.
Exhibit 31.2
CERTIFICATION
I, Jeffrey Park, certify that:
 1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of SXC Health Solutions Corp.;
 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit tostate a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which suchstatements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;
 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in thisreport, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cashflows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a—15(e) and 15d—15(e)) and internalcontrol over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a—15(f) and 15d—15(f)) for theregistrant and we have:
 a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;
 b) designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control overfinancial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding thereliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes inaccordance with generally accepted accounting principles;
 c) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presentedin this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as ofthe end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
 d) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected,or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting;and
 5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation ofinternal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of theregistrant’s board of directors:
 a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and
 b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
Date: May 9, 2008
By:  /s/ Jeffrey Park
Case 2:11-cr-00208-SRC Document 64 Filed 12/15/11 Page 1 of 3 PageID: 489
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NATURAL FASHIONS, INC., a California corporation,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.
BEST OF KASHMIR, AKA BOK, AKA BOK Style; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellants. No. 16

- 15825

D.C. No. 2:15

- cv

- 00033

- MCE

CMK

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 9, 2017 **

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Appellants Shah Nawaz Farash, Shanu, and Best of Kashmir appeal pro se

from the district court’s order denying their motion to set aside entry of default in

this copyright infringement action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimous ly concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

AUG 17 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 16

- 15825

We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of a motion to set

aside entry of default under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c)

. Franchise

Holding II, LLC v. Huntington Restaurants Gr p. , Inc. , 375 F.3d 922 , 925 (9th Cir.

2004). We affirm.

In their opening brief, appellants failed to challenge any of the district

cour t’s grounds for denying their motion to set aside entry of default , and therefore

appellants have waived any such challenge. See Indep. Towers of Wash. v.
Washington , 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e will not consider any claims

that were not actually argued in appellant ’ s opening brief.”); Smith v. Marsh , 194
F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A]rguments not raised by a party in its opening

brief are deemed waived.”). We therefore do not reach the merits of this case.

To the extent that Best of Kashmir is a business entity and not an assumed

name for Shah Nawaz Farash , w e dismiss Best of Kashmir’s appeal because

Farash , a non

- attorney, may not represent a business entity

. See United States v.

High Country Broad. Co. , 3 F.3d 1244, 1245 (9th Cir. 1993) (“A corporation may

appear in federal court only through licensed counsel.”); C.E. Pope Equity Trust v.

United States , 8 18 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987) ( “ Although a non

- attorney may

appear in propria persona in his own behalf, that privilege is personal to him. He

has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself.” (citations

omitted)).3 16

- 15825

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3 d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Appellants’ request for an order requiring the parties to submit fabric

samples, set forth in the opening brief, is denied.

AFFIRMED.
---

EXHIBIT 32.1

|CERTIFICATION OF                             
|---------------------------------------------
|CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER                      
|AND                                          
|CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER                      
|PURSUANT TO                                  
|18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,                      
|AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO                       
|SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Thomas Neal Roberts, Chief Executive Officer and Chief
Financial Officer of ITonis Inc., (the Company), hereby certify pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

| | (i)  | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Company
        for the quarter ended February 29, 2008 (the Quarterly Report)
        fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
        Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | ---- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
| | (ii) | the information contained in the Quarterly Report
        fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
        results of operations of the Company.                                                                                    

| | By:    | /s/
      Thomas Neal Roberts
| | ------ | -----------------------------
| | Name:  | Thomas Neal Roberts          
| |        |                              
| | Title: | Chief Executive Officer and  
| |        | Chief Financial Officer      
| |        |                              
| | Date:  | April 21, 2008               

---
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ZITO tlp

1250 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 200 (202) 466-3500

Washington, DC 20036

www.zitotlp.com

November 22, 2011

Hon. Patty Shwartz, U.S.M.J.

Frank R. Lautenberg 

United States Post Office and

Courthouse Building

Room 477

Newark, New Jersey 07101

RE: Fougera, Inc. v. GlycoBioSciences, Inc.

 Civil Action 11-01539 (KSH)(PS) 

Dear Judge Shwartz:

We are counsel for GlycoBioScience and write to confirm that lead trial counsel, Joseph

J. Zito and the President of Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff GlycoBioSciences, Mr. Kevin Drizen,

the person with full settlement authority, as well as local counsel, Mr. Stephen Knox, will

appear at the Settlement Conference scheduled for December 8th. 

Sincerely,

Joseph J. Zito

Case 2:11-cv-01539-KSH -PS Document 52 Filed 11/22/11 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 541