alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

Exhibit 12.1:      Computation of Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                                 2000           1999
                                                             --------------------------
<S>                                                          <C>             <C>
Computation of Earnings:
      Pre-tax income from continuing operations                $680,703      $226,526
      Undistributed income from equity investees                 82,823        13,754
                                                             ------------    ----------

        Computed Earnings                                       597,880       212,772
                                                             ------------    ----------

Fixed Charges:
      Interest Costs:
        Expensed                                                 89,238        75,730
        Capitalized                                              30,105        16,695
      Minority interest in income of a subsidiary                16,956        16,632
      Amortization of interest rate hedges                        2,851           -
      Amortization of financing costs                             3,627         2,434
      Rental expense representative of interest factor           45,495        24,732
                                                             ------------    ----------

        Total fixed charges                                     188,272       136,223
                                                             ------------    ----------

      Earnings before income taxes and fixed charges           $756,047      $332,300
                                                             ============    ==========

      Ratio of earnings to fixed charges                           4.02          2.44
                                                             ============    ==========

</TABLE>
Case 2:10-cv-04039-ES-CLW Document 10 Filed 08/31/10 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 211
EX-10.8



 Exhibit 10.8 
 ASSIGNMENT AGREEMENT 
 This Assignment Agreement (“Assignment”), entered
into by and among Transco Pipeline Services LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (“Assignor”), and Williams WPC-I, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (“Assignee”), is effective as of January 1, 2013 (the
“Effective Date”). 
 RECITALS 
 A. WHEREAS, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, and Assignor are parties to an Administrative Services Agreement dated February 16, 2010 (the
“Agreement”). 
 B. WHEREAS, pursuant to an organizational restructuring of The Williams Companies, Inc. and its
affiliates, employees of Assignor ceased to be employees of Assignor and became employees solely of Assignee on the Effective Date. 
 Assignor
and Assignee hereto agree as follows: 
 ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION 

1. Assignment. Assignor hereby assigns to Assignee all rights, obligations, and other interests in and under the Agreement.

 2. Assumption. Assignee shall assume and be responsible for all of Assignor’s rights, obligations, and other
interests in and under the Agreement, including, but not limited to, any rights or obligations arising before the Effective Date. 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Assignment to be executed by their duly authorized representatives on February 13, 2013. 

 

									
	 ASSIGNOR:
	 		 	ASSIGNEE:
			
	 Transco Pipeline Services LLC
	 		 	 Williams WPC-I, LLC

					
	 By:
	 	 /s/ Frank J. Ferazzi
	 		 	 By:
	 	/s/ Stephanie C. Cipolla
		 	 Frank J. Ferazzi

Vice President
	 		 		 	 Stephanie C. Cipolla

President
ACCEPTED 04-15-00224-CR FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 6/9/2015 10:04:16 AM KEITH HOTTLE CLERK
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION OF CEO AND CFO PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

(Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)



In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Cal Dive International, Inc. (the Company) for the period ending September 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), Quinn J. Hébert, as Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and G. Kregg Lunsford, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Dated:   October 30, 2009







| |                                      
| | -------------------------------------
| | /s/ Quinn J. Hébert                  
| | Quinn J. Hébert                      
| | President and
Chief Executive Officer







| |                                                     
| | ----------------------------------------------------
| | /s/ G. Kregg Lunsford                               
| | G. Kregg Lunsford                                   
| | Executive Vice President
and Chief Financial Officer





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



This certification accompanies the Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
PAULJ.FISHMAN

United States Attorney 

JORDAN M. ANGER 

Assistant U.S. Attorney

970 Broad Street Room 700 

Newark, N J 07102 

Tel.973-645-2928

Fax. 973-645-3210

August 17,2012

UNITED STA TES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HON. KATHARINE S. HAYDEN

PLAINTIFF, CRIMINAL No. 11-164-01

v. SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT

ANSELMO GENOVESE,

DEFENDANT.

The Judgment in the above-captioned case having been paid in full, the Clerk of

the United States Court for the District of New Jersey is hereby authorized and requested to

satisfy and cancel said judgment of record, as to defendant, Anselmo Genovese.

PAULJ.FISHMAN

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

s/ JORDAN M. ANGER By: 

JORDAN M. ANGER

ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY

Case 2:11-cr-00164-KSH Document 36 Filed 08/29/12 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 226
Exhibit 32.1 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 In connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report On Form 10-Q of Baoshinn Corporation (the "Company") for the quarter ending March 31, 2010, I, Benny Kan, Chief Executive Officer of the Company hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that:  1. Such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending March 31, 2010, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  2. The information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending March 31, 2010, fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  Dated:  May 14, 2010 BAOSHINN CORPORATION By:  /s/ Benny Kan Benny Kan  Exhibit 32.2 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 In connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report On Form 10-Q of Baoshinn Corporation (the "Company") for the quarter ending March 31, 2010, I, Sean Webster, Chief Financial Officer of the Company hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that:  1. Such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending March 31, 2010, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  2. The information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending March 31, 2010, fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  Dated:  May 14, 2010 BAOSHINN CORPORATION By:  /s/ Sean Webster Sean Webster
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Warren Mitchell, Appellant.

[855 NYS2d 409]

No opinion. Order filed. Concur-Friedman, J.E, Gonzalez, McGuire and Moskowitz, JJ.
CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned hereby certifies that
the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2009 of
Franklin Towers Enterprises Inc. (the “Company”) fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in such Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





/s/
      Dingliang Kuang





Dingliang
Kuang


Chief
Executive Officer


Chief
Financial Officer




August
18, 2009




A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
Franklin Towers Enterprises, Inc. and will be retained by Franklin Towers
Enterprises, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.
EXHIBIT 31.01

CERTIFICATION

(Pursuant to Rule 13a-14(a))

I, Robert E. Marziano, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q of Bank of the Carolinas Corporation;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrants other
certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any
change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants
internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation
of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely
affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that
involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



|                   |  |                                      
|------------------ |  | -------------------------------------
|Date: May 14, 2007 |  | /s/ Robert E. Marziano               
|                   |  | Robert E. Marziano                   
|                   |  | President and Chief Executive Officer
[Dkt. Nos. 192, 200]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JENNIFER KASILAG, et at.,

Plaintiffs,

V.

HARTFORD INVESTMENT

FNANCIAL SERVICES, LLC,

Defendant.

JENNIFER KASILAG, et at.,

Plaintiffs,

V.

HARTFORD FUNDS MANAGEMENT

COMPANY, LLC,

Defendant.

Civil No. 1:11 -cv-O 1 O$3-RMB-KMW

Civil No. 1:14-cv-01611-RMB-KMW

JENNIFER KASILAG, et at.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

HARTFORD FUNDS MANAGEMENT

COMPANY, LLC,

Defendant.

Civil No. 1:1 5-cv-O 1 876-RMB-KMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO (1) STRIKE

PLAINTIFFS’ DEMANDS FOR A JURY TRIAL, AND (2)

DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ CROSS-MOTION TO

EMPANEL AN ADVISORY JURY

Case 1:11-cv-01083-RMB-KMW Document 202 Filed 07/28/16 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 10094
AND NOW, on this 28th day ofJuly, 2016, upon consideration of

Defendants Hartford Investment financial Services, LLC’s and Hartford Funds

Management Company, LLC’s Motion to (1) Strike Plaintiffs’ Demands for a

Jury Trial, and (2) Preclude Plaintiffs from Offering Evidence at Trial of “Lost

Investment Earnings,” the Memorandum of Law in Support thereof, and

Plaintiffs’ opposition thereto, as well as Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion to Empanel an

Advisory Jury and Defendants’ opposition thereto,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that for reasons to be set forth in an opinion

rendered upon conclusion oftrial in this matter: (1) Defendants’ Motion to Strike

Plaintiffs’ Demand for a Jury Trial is GRANTED; (2) Plaintiffs’ Motion to

Empanel an Advisory Jury is DENIED; and (3) The Court reserves on

Defendants’ Motion to Preclude Plaintiffs from Offering Evidence of “Lost

Investment Earnings” at trial because the Court intends to try the issue of liability

first. In the event the Court finds no liability by Defendants, the motion will be

moot.

Th1ion. Renee Marie Bumb,

U.S.D.J., District ofNew Jersey

Case 1:11-cv-01083-RMB-KMW Document 202 Filed 07/28/16 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 10095
Case 3:11-cv-01160-AET -DEA Document 11 Filed 07/01/11 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 82
Case 3:11-cv-01160-AET -DEA Document 11 Filed 07/01/11 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 83
#### Felipe Cardenales et al., Appellants-Respondents, v Queens-Long Island Medical Group, P.C., et al., Respondents-Appellants, and Hak Yuen, Respondent.

[854 NYS2d 440]

*586The contention of the defendants Donald Nicolardi and Liviu Schapira that the continuous treatment doctrine did not toll the statute of limitations as against them, has already been resolved against them by this Court’s prior holding *(see Cardenales v Queens-Long Is. Med. Group, P.C.,*18 AD3d 689 [2005]; *White v Murphy,*290 AD2d 704 [2002]).

We reject the argument of Nicolardi and Schapira that they established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law *587pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, rational jurors could conclude that these defendants departed from good and accepted medical practice, and that their departures were a substantial factor in causing the death of the decedent *(see Cohen v Hallmark Cards,*45 NY2d 493 [1978]; *O’Boyle v Avis Rent-A-Car Sys.,*78 AD2d 431 [1981]).

Notwithstanding the foregoing, we agree with the Supreme Court that the verdict against Nicolardi and Schapira was against the weight of the evidence. The evidence at trial so preponderated in favor of finding that neither of these defendants failed to perform complete colonoscopies to the cecum, in 1996 and again in 1997, that the jury verdict finding that they departed from good and accepted medical practice by failing to do so, could not have been reached upon any fair interpretation of the evidence *(see Nicastro v Park,*113 AD2d 129 [1985]; *Speciale v Achari,*29 AD3d 674 [2006]).

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the jury verdict in favor of the defendant Hak Yuen was not against the weight of the evidence *(see Nicastro v Park,*113 AD2d 129 [1985]).

In light of our determination, it is unnecessary to reach the parties’ remaining contentions. Lifson, J.P., Ritter, Florio and Garni, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





Solely
for the purposes of complying with 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted
pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002:





I, Kyle
Kennedy, the undersigned Chief Executive Officer of Seafarer
Exploration Corp. (the “Company”), hereby certifies,
based on my knowledge, that the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the
Company for the year ended December 31, 2017, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”):





(1) the
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.





Dated
April 2, 2018





/s/ Kyle KennedyKyle
KennedyChief
Executive Officer(Principal
Executive Officer and acting Principal Accounting
Officer)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

 

:

SHANE ROSE, :

:

Petitioner, :

:

v. :

:

ERIC H. HOLDER, et al., :

:

Respondents. :

 :

Civil No. 10-3399 (SDW)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

1. On July 2, 2010, Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his pre-removal-period detention at the Bergen County Jail in the

custody of the Department of Homeland Security, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226, since September

15, 2009.

2. On March 15, 2009, Respondents filed a Supplemental Answer indicating that on

September 1, 2010, an Immigration Judge ordered Petitioner’s removal, on January 7, 2011, the

Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the appeal, and Petitioner did not file a petition for

review in the Court of Appeals. Respondents ask this Court to dismiss the Petition as moot

because Petitioner is no longer detained under the challenged statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

3. Because an order of removal becomes “final upon the earlier of –(i) a determination by

the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in

which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals,”

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B), Petitioner’s removal became administratively final when the Board of

Immigration Appeals affirmed the removal order on January 7, 2011.

Case 2:10-cv-03399-SDW Document 11 Filed 03/18/11 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 241
4. “[W]hen an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien

from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as the ‘removal

period’).” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). Section 1231(a)(2) requires the Attorney General to detain

aliens during the removal period: “During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain

the alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). 

5. Federal statute provides that “[t]he removal period begins on the latest of the

following:

(i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively final.

(ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders

a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the court’s final order.

(iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under an

immigration process), the date the alien is released from detention

or confinement.

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). 

6. Petitioner’s removal period began on January 8, 2011. See U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i). 

7. Because Petitioner challenges his detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and, as of

January 7, 2011, Petitioner’s detention is no longer governed by § 1226, but is required by 8

U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2), Petitioner’s challenge to his detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) is moot. 

See Rodney v. Mukasey, 340 Fed. App’x 761 (3d Cir. 2009).

8. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

s/Susan D. Wigenton 

SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.

DATED: March 18, 2011

2

Case 2:10-cv-03399-SDW Document 11 Filed 03/18/11 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 242
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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-7257

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

BONITA R. DEMBY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Chief District

Judge. (CR-96-440, CA-99-314-AM)

Submitted: December 16, 1999 Decided: January 10, 2000

Before MURNAGHAN and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Bonita R. Demby, Appellant Pro Se. Randy I. Bellows, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
* Although the district court’s order is marked as “filed” on

August 12, 1999, the district court’s records show that it was

entered on the docket sheet on August 16, 1999. Pursuant to Rules

58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the

date that the order was entered on the docket sheet that we take as

the effective date of the district court’s decision. See Wilson v.

Murray, 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986).

2

PER CURIAM:

Bonita R. Demby seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying her motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 1999).

We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and

find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See United States v. Demby, Nos. CR-96-440; CA-99-

314-AM (E.D. Va. Aug. 16, 1999).* We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

DISMISSED