NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

________________________________

:

DALMA EDWARDS, :

: Civil Action No. 10-3360 (JBS)

Petitioner, :

:

v. : O P I N I O N

 :

FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, :

et al., :

:

Respondents. :

________________________________:

APPEARANCES:

DALMA EDWARDS, Petitioner Pro Se

#54938-083

FCI Fort Dix

P.O. Box 2000

Fort Dix, New Jersey 08640

IRENE E. DOWDY, AUSA

OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY

Camden Federal Bldg. & U.S. Courthouse

401 Market Street, 4 Floor th

Camden, New Jersey 08101

Attorney for Respondents

SIMANDLE, District Judge

Petitioner Dalma Edwards (“Edwards”), a federal prisoner

currently confined at the Federal Correctional Institution at

Fort Dix, New Jersey (“FCI Fort Dix”), has submitted a petition

for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, on or 1

 Section 2241 provides in relevant part: 1

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about July 1, 2010, challenging a determination made by the

Federal Bureau of Prisons (hereinafter the “BOP”) for his

placement in a residential re-entry center at the end of his

prison term, allegedly in violation of the Second Chance Act. 

The named respondents are the BOP and Donna Zickefoose, Warden at

FCI Fort Dix (hereinafter, the “Government”). On October 22,

2010, counsel for the Government filed a response to the

petition, including the relevant administrative record of the

case (Docket entry no. 7). Edwards filed a reply or traverse on

November 4, 2010 (Docket entry no. 9).

Because it appears from a review of the submissions and

record that Edwards is not entitled to relief, the petition will

be denied.

BACKGROUND

A. The Second Chance Act

Residential Re-Entry Center (“RRC”) assignments are governed

by 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1), which was amended in 2007 by the 

Second Chance Act, Pub. L. No. 110-199, effective April 9, 2008. 

(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the

Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts

and any circuit judge within their respective

jurisdictions. 

* * *

(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a

prisoner unless-... (3) He is in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States .... 

2

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In essence, the Act extended the maximum amount of time that the

Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) may place an inmate in an RRC from 180

days to twelve months.

Regularly referred to as the “Second Chance Act,” the

amended statute provides, in pertinent part: 

(1) In General.-The Director of the Bureau of Prisons

shall, to the extent practicable, ensure that a

prisoner serving a term of imprisonment spends a

portion of the final months of that term (not to exceed

12 months), under conditions that will afford that

prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and

prepare for the reentry of that prisoner into the

community. Such conditions may include a community

correctional facility. 

(2) Home confinement authority.-The authority under

this subsection may be used to place a prisoner in home

confinement for the shorter of 10 percent of the term

of imprisonment of that prisoner or 6 months. 

... 

(4) No limitations.-Nothing in this subsection shall be

construed to limit or restrict the authority of the

Director of the Bureau of Prisons under section 3621. 

... 

(6) Issuance of regulations. The Director of the

Bureau of Prisons shall issue regulations pursuant to

this subsection not later than 90 days after the date

of the enactment of the Second Chance Act of 2007,

which shall ensure that placement in a community

correctional facility by the Bureau of Prisons is- 

(A) conducted in a manner consistent with

section 3621(b) of this title; 

(B) determined on an individual basis; and 

(C) of sufficient duration to provide the

greatest likelihood of successful

reintegration into the community. 

3

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18 U.S.C. § 3624(c). As noted in the statute, the BOP was

ordered to issue regulations not later than 90 days after the

date of the enactment of the Second Chance Act, to ensure that

placement was conducted consistently with § 3621(b) of the

statute, that the determination was individualized, and that the

duration of placement was sufficient. Section 3621(b) states:

(b) Place of imprisonment. The Bureau of Prisons

shall designate the place of the prisoner’s

imprisonment. The Bureau may designate any

available penal or correctional facility that

meets minimum standards of health and habitability

established by the Bureau, whether maintained by

the Federal Government or otherwise and whether

within or without the judicial district in which

the person was convicted, that the Bureau

determines to be appropriate and suitable,

considering- 

(1) the resources of the facility contemplated;

(2) the nature and circumstances of the offense;

(3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner;

(4) any statement by the court that imposed the

sentence- (A) concerning the purposes for which

the sentence to imprisonment was determined to be

warranted; or (B) recommending a type of penal or

correctional facility as appropriate; and 

(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the

Sentencing Commission pursuant to Section

994(a)(2) title 28 . . .

. . . Any order, recommendation, or request

by a sentencing court that a convicted person

serve a term of imprisonment in a community

corrections facility shall have no binding

effect on the authority of the Bureau under

this section to determine or change the place

of imprisonment.

On April 14, 2008, the BOP issued a “Memorandum for Chief

Executive Officers”, providing staff guidance for implementing

4

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the Second Chance Act. The memorandum indicated that the BOP’s

then-existing time frame on pre-release community confinement

placement was no longer applicable and should not be followed,

that certain adjustments were necessary to the Program Statement

7310.04, concerning review of inmates for pre-release RRC

placement, and that each inmate’s pre-release RRC decision must

be analyzed and supported under the § 3621(b) factors, cited

above. Among other guidelines, the memorandum provided:

While the Act makes inmates eligible for a maximum of

12 months pre-release RRC placements, Bureau experience

reflects inmates' pre-release RRC needs can usually be

accommodated by a placement of six months or less.

Should staff determine an inmate's pre-release RRC

placement may require greater than six months, the

Warden must obtain the Regional Director's written

concurrence before submitting the placement to the

Community Corrections Manager.

BOP Memo, April 14, 2008, as cited in Strong v. Schultz, 559 F.

Supp.2d 556, 562 (D.N.J. 2009).

Subsequently, the BOP issued the required regulations,

effective October 21, 2008, setting forth procedures for

evaluating inmates’ placement decisions to RRCs or home

detention. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 570.20-570.22. The regulations do

not include the requirement in the April 14, 2008 memo for

approval from the Regional Director for pre-release RRC placement

beyond six-months.2

 Title 28 of the Code of Federal Register, section 570.22 2

states: “Inmates will be considered for pre-release community

confinement in a manner consistent with 18 U.S.C. section

5

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B. Petitioner’s Claims and Application of the Act.

1. Background of Petitioner’s Case

Edwards was convicted in the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, on charges of theft of

government property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 642, and

money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(2)(B)(i)

and 2. On February 10, 2003, Edwards was sentenced to a term of

78 months in prison, with three years of supervised release. On

May 25, 2007, Edwards was released from prison, via good conduct

3621(b), determined on an individual basis, and of sufficient

duration to provide the greatest likelihood of successful

reintegration into the community, within the time-frames set

forth in this part.”

The time frames noted are set forth in section 570.21, which

states: 

(a) Community confinement. Inmates may be designated to

community confinement as a condition of pre-release

custody and programming during the final months of the

inmate's term of imprisonment, not to exceed twelve

months.

(b) Home detention. Inmates may be designated to home

detention as a condition of pre-release custody and

programming during the final months of the inmate's

term of imprisonment, not to exceed the shorter of ten

percent of the inmate's term of imprisonment or six

months.

(c) Exceeding time-frames. These time-frames may be

exceeded when separate statutory authority allows

greater periods of community confinement as a condition

of pre-release custody.

28 C.F.R. § 570.21

6

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time credits, to supervised release. However, on February 1,

2010, Edwards’ supervised release was revoked, and he was

sentenced to a prison term of 18 months. The Government contends

that Edwards' projected release date, assuming he receives all

good conduct time available to him, is May 21, 2011. (See

Declaration of Tara Moran (“Moran Decl.”) at Exhibits 1 and 2).

Edwards claims that his projected release date is three days

earlier, on May 19, 2011. (Petitioner’s Traverse at § K, pg. 6).

On May 21, 2010, one year before his projected release date,

Edwards’ Unit Team Case Manager, Frederick Olsen, met with

Edwards to conduct a Program Review. Before the Program Review,

Olsen reviewed Edwards’ Central File, which includes historical

information such as the inmate’s criminal history, financial

information, education, work history, and performance. At that

May 21, 2010 meeting, Edwards’ RRC placement was discussed. (See

Declaration of Frederick Olsen (“Olsen Decl.”) at ¶¶ 3, 5).

Olsen relates that his program review of Edwards revealed

that Edwards had violated supervised release, indicating “an

individual’s inability or unwillingness to follow implemented

rules and standards.” (Olsen Decl., ¶ 6). Olsen also noted that

Edwards had owned and operated two businesses before his

incarceration, and had worked as an aviation machinist in the

United States Navy. Olsen stated that while there was no promise

of employment for Edwards at the time, Edwards’ records did show

7

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that he had a work history. Olsen further stated that Edwards

had indicated that he would live with his girlfriend upon release

from prison. (Id.). Thus, based on the following

recommendation, the Unit Team determined that 90 to 120 days in

an RRC would be appropriate:

Regarding release planning, inmate Edwards stated that he

would live with his girlfriend upon release from custody. 

As of now, inmate Edwards has no promise of employment,

however Unit Team feels 90-120 RRC placement time would help

facilitate a successful transition back into the community. 

According to his Pre-Sentence Investigation report, inmate

Edwards owned and operated two different businesses and was

in the United States Navy as an aviator machinist in the

past, therefore, he has work history. During his

incarceration period, he has worked in Food Service work

detail, where he has gained skills. Inmate Edwards has not

participated in any courses during his incarceration period

at this facility. Based on his educational background, past

employment, community and family resources, assets and

employable skills, the Unit Team feels that the

recommendation for RRC is substantiated. In addition, the

Unit Team discussed methods to secure employment ... i.e.,

employment center, etc. Unit Team also encouraged inmate

Edwards to begin reaching out to prospective employers prior

to his release from custody.

(Olsen Decl., ¶ 7 and Attachment 1).

Olsen further stated that the recommendation of 90-120 days

RRC placement was made after weighing all of the statutory

criteria and with the 12 month maximum placement under the Second

Chance Act in mind. (Olsen Decl. at ¶ 9).

Edwards admittedly has not exhausted his administrative

remedies before commencing this habeas action. He does contend, 3

 The BOP Administrative Remedy Program is a multi-tier 3

process that is available to inmates confined in institutions

8

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however, that he had attempted to do so, but was denied the

appropriate administrative remedy forms, thus forcing him to file

his grievance “outside the normal mode of communication.” (Pet.

Traverse at ¶ E, pg. 4).

Finally, in reply to the Government’s answer and

administrative record, Edwards alleges that he had never

indicated that he would live with his girlfriend and submitted an

affidavit from her to that effect. He also states that the Unit

Manager was not present at the May 21, 2010 program review,

although the record does not indicate that he was. Further,

Edwards had requested a “strategic release plan”, which allegedly

has not been implemented in his case. Finally, in his initial

petition, Edwards states that he has a tumor, which allegedly

operated by the BOP for “review of an issue which relates to any

aspect of their confinement.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.10. An inmate

must initially attempt to informally resolve the issue with

institutional staff. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a). If informal

resolution fails or is waived, an inmate may submit a BP-9

Request to “the institution staff member designated to receive

such Requests (ordinarily a correctional counsel)” within 20 days

of the date on which the basis for the Request occurred, or

within any extension permitted. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.14. An

inmate who is dissatisfied with the Warden's response to his BP-9

Request may submit a BP-10 Appeal to the Regional Director of the

BOP within 20 days of the date the Warden signed the response. 

See 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). The inmate may appeal to the BOP's

General Counsel on a BP-11 form within 30 days of the day the

Regional Director signed the response. See id. Appeal to the

General Counsel is the final administrative appeal. See id. If

responses are not received by the inmate within the time allotted

for reply, “the inmate may consider the absence of a response to

be a denial at that level.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.18.

9

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requires surgical intervention that would render him unable to

work for a period of time while he recuperates. Consequently,

based on medical need, he argues that he requires more than 90-

120 days RRC placement. Edwards did not provide any medical

confirmation of recommended surgery.

2. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

As an initial matter, this Court notes that Edwards did not

fully exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this

habeas petition. Although 28 U.S.C. § 2241 contains no statutory

exhaustion requirement, a federal prisoner ordinarily may not

bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §

2241, challenging the execution of his sentence, until he has

exhausted all available administrative remedies. See, e.g.,

Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000); Arias v.

United States Parole Comm’n, 648 F.2d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 1981);

Soyka v. Alldredge, 481 F.2d 303, 306 (3d Cir. 1973). The

exhaustion doctrine promotes a number of goals:

(1) allowing the appropriate agency to develop a

factual record and apply its expertise facilitates

judicial review; (2) permitting agencies to grant the

relief requested conserves judicial resources; and (3)

providing agencies the opportunity to correct their own

errors fosters administrative autonomy.

Goldberg v. Beeler, 82 F. Supp.2d 302, 309 (D.N.J. 1999), aff’d,

248 F.3d 1130 (3d Cir. 2000). See also Moscato v. Federal Bureau

of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 761 (3d Cir. 1996). Nevertheless,

exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where

10

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exhaustion would not promote these goals. See, e.g., Gambino v.

Morris, 134 F.3d 156, 171 (3d Cir. 1998) (exhaustion not required

where petitioner demonstrates futility); Lyons v. U.S. Marshals,

840 F.2d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 1988) (exhaustion may be excused where

it “would be futile, if the actions of the agency clearly and

unambiguously violate statutory or constitutional rights, or if

the administrative procedure is clearly shown to be inadequate to

prevent irreparable harm”); Carling v. Peters, 2000 WL 1022959,

*2 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (exhaustion not required where delay would

subject petitioner to “irreparable injury”).

In Snisky v. Pugh, the petitioner did not deny his failure

to exhaust; however, the Court excused exhaustion because the

petitioner was scheduled to be released, and his claim was

clearly without merit. See 974 F. Supp. 817, 819 (M.D. Pa.

1997), rev’d on other grounds, 159 F.3d 1353 (3d Cir. 1998). The

court recognized that exhaustion could be excused where it would

be futile. See id. In Snisky, the court found that the BOP

“unequivocally” would deny the petitioner’s relief, and he would

return to the district court after the denial. Thus, the court

addressed the claims on the merits.

Likewise, in Ferrante v. Bureau of Prisons, the court found

that if the petitioner’s claim were meritorious, he would be

released to a halfway house relatively soon; therefore,

dismissing the petition for lack of exhaustion would be futile. 

11

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See 990 F. Supp. 367, 370 (D.N.J. 1998)(citing Snisky, 974 F.

Supp. at 819-20). Further, the court held that the petitioner’s

claim was clearly without merit, so that the exhaustion issue

need not be reached. See id. See also Fraley v. Bureau of

Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 1993)(stating that exhaustion

was not required because it was futile, as Regional Director

would “almost certainly” have denied request, and term of

imprisonment was completed).

Here, this Court finds that, although Edwards had an

opportunity to exhaust his administrative remedies, he failed to

do so. Nevertheless, at the time that the Unit Team made a final

recommendation for Edwards’ RRC placement, any attempt to exhaust

administrative remedies likely would have been futile because

Edwards’ release date was imminent. Moreover, it appears that

Edwards did attempt to exhaust his administrative remedies,

albeit outside the prescribed channels in the administrative

remedy process. Consequently, even if Edwards was successful in

pursuing his administrative remedies, he would have lost several

months for his extended RRC placement. Therefore, this Court

concludes that Edwards did not have adequate time to fully pursue

his administrative remedies before bringing this action. 

Finally, because this Court finds that Edwards’ claim is not

meritorious, as set forth below, his failure to exhaust becomes

moot.

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2. Claims and Defenses Asserted in this Action

Petitioner principally refers to Strong v. Schultz, 599 F.

Supp. 556 (D.N.J. 2009) for his contention that the BOP

disregarded the Second Chance Act in denying him a longer RRC

placement. (See Petition at pg. 10). He argues that

consideration of all of his circumstances and criteria for an

extended placement, the recommended 90-120 day RRC placement is

insufficient for him to secure employment and successfully reenter the community. Edwards further contends that the BOP

abused its discretion in denying him an extended RRC placement as

provided by the Second Chance Act, citing the April 14, 2008 memo

“cap” on RRC placement at six months.

The Government contends that the BOP fully complied with the

requirements of the Second Chance Act, and made a whollyindividualized evaluation and determination in Edwards’ case

pursuant to the requisite factors to be considered under 18

U.S.C. § 3621(b). 

DISCUSSION

In Strong v. Schultz, 599 F. Supp.2d 556 (D.N.J. 2009), the

petitioner, Douglas Strong’s RRC placement decision was made on

October 2, 2008. Thus, the decision was made subsequent to the

April 14, 2008 memo, but prior to the October 21, 2008 enactment

of the regulations by the BOP. In Strong, the court held that

the April 14, 2008 Memorandum issued by the BOP was inconsistent

13

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with the Second Chance Act’s amendments to § 3624(c), because it

“impermissibly constrains staff’s discretion to designate inmates

to a CCC fora duration that will provide the greatest likelihood

of successful reintegration into the community, contrary to §

3624(c)(6)(C).” Strong, 599 F. Supp.2d at 563. Thus, as to Mr.

Strong, the court held:

Accordingly, because the duration of Strong’s [RRC]

placement was determined pursuant to these

impermissible limitations, the BOP abused its

discretion in determining that Strong’s placement would

be for six months. This Court will therefore grant the

writ to Strong, and remand the matter to the BOP with

instructions to consider Strong for a longer placement

in a [RRC], in accordance with the Second Chance Act,

and without regard to the April 14, 2008, Memorandum.

Id. at 563.

In this case, however, Edwards’ placement decision was made

well after the effective date of the interim rule. Nevertheless,

Edwards suggests that his placement decision was impermissibly

constrained by the six-month presumption contained in the April

14, 2008, memorandum. Edwards provides no factual support for

this contention, nor does this Court find any support in the

record.

Courts since Strong have recognized the limited holding of

Strong. In cases, such as here, where Edwards’ RRC placement

decision was made after the BOP issued the appropriate

regulations and abandoned the directive in the Memorandum

concerning the six-month presumptive placement, courts have

consistently held that the Second Chance Act does not guarantee a

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one-year RRC placement, but “only directs the Bureau of Prisons

to consider placing an inmate in a RRC for up to the final twelve

months of his or her sentence.” Lovett v. Hogsten, 2009 WL

5851205 (6 Cir. Dec. 29, 2009)(unpubl.); see also Travers v. th

Federal Bureau of Prisons, 2009 WL 4508585 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2009)

(finding that “. . . nothing in the Second Chance Act entitles

Petitioner to a halfway house placement longer than the 120-150

days already approved. These pre-release placement decisions are

committed, by statute, to the discretion of the Director of the

Bureau of Prisons, whose exercise of discretion is to be guided

by the enumerated considerations.”); Creager v. Chapman, 2010 WL

1062610 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2010)(holding that although

Petitioner disagrees with her RRC placement date after

consideration of the § 3621(b) factors, this “does not establish

a constitutional violation, as nothing in the Second Chance Act

or § 3621(b) entitles [Petitioner] or any other prisoner to any

guaranteed placement in a residential reentry center[]” and “‘the

duration of [RRC] placement is a matter to which the [BOP]

retains discretionary authority.’” (citations and quotation

omitted)); Chaides v. Rios, 2010 WL 935610 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 15,

2010)(“In sum, the BOP has discretionary authority to transfer an

inmate to an RRC at any time, after considering the factors set

forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), and has a separate and distinct

obligation to consider an inmate for transfer to an RRC for up to

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twelve months prior to the inmate’s release date, after

considering the factors set forth in section 3621(b).” (citation

omitted)).

In distinguishing Strong, the Middle District of

Pennsylvania examined a claim by a petitioner who received a 60-

day RRC placement recommendation. See Wires v. Bledsoe, 2010 WL

427769 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2010). In the Wires case, the court

found that:

. . . since the petitioner’s unit team recommended

significantly less than six months (only 60 days) in a

RRC, there is no basis to infer that their discretion

was in any way constrained or chilled by the

requirement stated in the memoranda that RRC placement

beyond six months must be based on unusual or

extraordinary circumstances and must be approved by the

Regional Director.

The petitioner was considered for placement in a

RRC. Thus, he was not denied due process. Further,

there is no basis to infer in the instant case that the

petitioner did not receive the individualized

consideration for RRC placement required by the Second

Chance Act. That petitioner disagrees with the

recommendation for a 60-day placement is not a basis to

issue a writ of habeas corpus.

Id. at *12. The Wires court cited Torres v. Martinez, a case

also in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which was dismissed

for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. However, the

Torres court also examined the merits of the case, finding:

Torres asserts that the April 14, 2008 Bureau of

Prison Memorandum imposes a policy of categoric

pre-release placement for a time of six months or less

because placement for a period greater than six months

requires approval by a Bureau of Prisons Regional

Director. The petitioner states that denying prison

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staff the discretion to recommend a placement longer

than six months without advance written approval by a

Regional Director is inconsistent with 18 U.S.C.

3624(c), as interpreted in Strong, 599 F. Supp.2d at

561-62.

In Strong, the court found that the policies

elaborated in the April 14, 2008 Memorandum were in

violation of regulatory guideposts included in the

Second Chance Act's amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c).

It held that the “[m]emorandum impermissibly constrains

staff's discretion to designate inmates to a CCC for a

duration that will provide the greatest likelihood of

successful reintegration into the community, contrary

to § 3624(c)(6)(C).”

There is evidence that the April 14, 2008

Memorandum has been replaced with formal federal

regulations applicable to the petitioner. Interim

regulations passed on October 21, 2008 state that

“[i]nmates may be designated to community confinement

as a condition of pre-release custody and programming

during the final months of the inmate's term of

imprisonment, not to exceed twelve months.” 28 C.F.R. §

570.21(a). Moreover “[i]nmates will be considered for

pre-release community confinement in a manner

consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), determined on an

individual basis, and of sufficient duration to provide

the greatest likelihood of successful reintegration

into the community, within the time-frames set forth in

this part.” 28 C.F.R. § 570.22 (Oct. 22, 2008).

The court finds that the Bureau of Prisons did not

violate the Second Chance Act when it determined that

Petitioner Torres would be placed in pre-release

custody for six months, regardless of whether it

followed the April 18, 2008 Memorandum or the October

2008 Regulations when it reviewed the petitioner's

case. In doing so, the court declines to extend the

reasoning of Strong to the petition before us. Unlike

Strong, the petitioner has provided no reason why he

requires more than six months of pre-release placement,

other than that it would give him the greatest

likelihood of successful reintegration.

Torres v. Martinez, 2009 WL 2487093, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 12,

2009)(internal citations omitted).

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Likewise, the Eastern District of Kentucky has distinguished

Strong in Ramirez v. Hickey, 2010 WL 567997 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 12,

2010), finding that the petitioner’s reliance on Strong was

misplaced, because Mr. Strong’s RRC placement was determined in

accordance with the memorandum. In petitioner Ramirez’s case,

there was nothing presented to indicate that the RRC placement

decision was “based upon arguably discretion-limiting criteria

contained in the now defunct April 14, 2008, Memorandum. 

Consequently, the reasoning of Strong is inapplicable here ....” 

Ramirez, at *4.

In fact, cases brought before various district courts around

the country have resulted in the courts examining whether the 

§ 3621(b) factors were considered by the BOP in making the RRC

placement decision, after an individualized assessment. When the

§ 3621(b) factors are considered, the courts are satisfied that

the law was correctly applied and followed.

In the Eastern District of Arkansas, the District Court

examined BOP Program Statement 7310.04. See Lewis v. Outlaw,

2010 WL 1198179 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 23, 2010). That Program

Statement states that RRC needs can usually be met by placement

of six months or less, stating:

(1) An inmate may be referred up to 180 days, with

placement beyond 180 days highly unusual, and only

possible with extraordinary justification. In such

circumstances, the Warden shall contact the Regional

Director for approval and the Chief USPO in the

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inmate's sentencing district to determine whether the

sentencing judge objects to such placement.

Program Statement 7310.04, P. 8. The Eastern District of

Arkansas, citing the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,

noted that the “extraordinary justification” requirement was “a

legitimate standard, consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), that

the BOP may use when considering a request for extended RRC

placement.” Lewis, at *3 (citing Miller v. Whitehead, 527 F.3d

752 at 758-59 (8 Cir. 2008)). The Eastern District of Arkansas th

found that the BOP policy “is a valid exercise of the BOP’s broad

discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c).” 

Lewis, at *3.

In the case before this Court, it is clear that Edwards was

considered for RRC placement in accordance with the factors

enumerated in § 3621(b), and on an individualized basis. This is

evidenced by the administrative record provided and the Olsen

Declaration. Edwards has not provided anything, other than a

self-serving claim by his girlfriend that she would not provide

him a residence upon his release, as well as a generalized

statement, unaccompanied by medical documentation, alleging that

he has a medical condition requiring surgery, that would suggest

that the BOP did not conduct a proper determination as required

by law. Accordingly, this Court finds that the BOP’s

consideration of all of the criteria under § 3621(b) was thorough

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and individualized, and consistent with the Second Chance Act

requirements. 

Moreover, for reasons stated above, the Strong decision does

not apply to Edwards’ case, as his RRC placement decision was (1)

decided after the BOP imposed appropriate regulations; and (2)

was decided in accordance with the factors set forth in §

3621(b).

Thus, based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the BOP

complied with the Second Chance Act and Edwards has not

demonstrated that he “is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States ...” as

require for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, is hereby denied. An

appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

s/ Jerome B. Simandle 

JEROME B. SIMANDLE

United States District Judge

Dated: December 23, 2010

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