UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

PHILIP E. HAHN,

Civil Action No.:

Plaintiff, 2:ll-CV—1874-JLL—MAH

V.

OPINION AND ORDER

ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

et al.,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court by way of multiple

informal applications by pro se plaintiff Philip E. Hahn

(“Plaintiff”) to amend his Complaint. (See Docket Entries

(“D.E.”) 246, 249, 251, 259, 269, 272, and 288). For the

reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s requests for leave to amend

his Complaint to add additional parties and claims are DENIED.

II. BACKGROUND

A detailed background of this matter may be found in the

December 17, 2012, Opinion of the Honorable Esther Salas,

U.S.D.J. (D.E. 187).’ In essence, “[tjhe instant matter stems

This case was transferred to the undersigned on August 13, 2013.

(CM/ECF No. 291)
from the dismissal of several state court actions, and

Plaintiff’s recalcitrant efforts to litigate against all persons

involved in those actions.” Id.

All defendants named in the original Complaint have been

dismissed. (See D.E. 125, Mar. 13, 2012 Order (granting 11

motions to dismiss); D.E. 188, Dec. 17, 2012 Order (granting 3

motions to dismiss)) . This Court has granted fourteen (14)

motions to dismiss various defendants, including law firms,

pharmaceutical companies, government entities and Supreme Court

justices.

Meanwhile, Plaintiff has filed several informal

applications to amend his Complaint to add additional parties

and claims. 2 Some of these applications violated the requirement

set out in Local Civil Rule 7.1(f) to include a proposed amended

pleading. Most recently, without first obtaining leave from the

Court, on May 3, 2013, Plaintiff filed a second Amended

2 On May 8, 2013, the Honorable Steven C. Mannion, U.S.M.J., issued an Opinion and Order denying several informal

applications made by Plaintiff to amend his complaint. (See D.E.

245) . Magistrate Judge Mannion denied Plaintiff’s applications to amend for failure to include a copy of a proposed amended

complaint, and further ordered that Plaintiff shall not file any further applications to amend his complaint without first

requesting leave from the Court by way of written letter. (Id. at 4-5) . Plaintiff subsequently disregarded Magistrate Judge Mannion’s Order, and filed submissions seeking to add additional

parties and claims. (See D.E. 249, 251, 259, 269, 272, and 288). Those proposed additional parties/claims are reflected here.

2
Complaint. 3 (See D.E. 246, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint). it

is against this backdrop that this Court addresses Plaintiff’s

most recent attempt to amend his Complaint.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Failure to Comply With L. Civ. R. 7.1

New Jersey Local Civil Rule 7.1(f) states:

(f) Motions Regarding Additional Pleadings

Upon filing a motion for leave to file an

amended complaint or answer, a complaint in

intervention or other pleading requiring

leave of Court, the moving party shall

attach to the motion a copy of the proposed

pleading or amendments and retain the

original until the Court has ruled. If

leave to file is granted, the moving party

shall file the original forthwith.

Plaintiff’s proposed second Amended Complaint does not comply with L. Civ. R. 7.1(f) because it does not name any of the

parties that Plaintiff stated he was seeking leave to add in his

informal applications. (See D.E. 132, 161, 182, 195, and 204)

Here, Plaintiff has done nothing more than copy his Amended

Complaint filed on June 28, 2011, (D.E. 16), and hand-write over

certain dates and information as an “Amended Complaint.” A

comparison of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and this proposed Amended Complaint reveals that: The captions of the two

pleadings are identical; the signature pages contain the

typewritten dates of “April 1, 2011,” and “June 30, 2011,” the

dates upon which Plaintiff filed his original and first amended

complaints, (see D.E. 1, 16), and the language of the proposed Amended Complaint is otherwise identical to the language in the

Amended Complaint, (see D.E. 246) (Plaintiff handwrote in the

date of May 1, 2013) . The only change is that Plaintiff

replaced case nuer “A 2869 O9Tl” with “A—6282—09T1” in various

places (Plaintiff appears to have crossed out the original case

nuers and replaced them by hand) . (D.E. 246 at 28, ¶91 19—21)

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Id. “The purpose of Local Rule 7.1(f) is to give the Court and

the parties a chance to evaluate the sufficiency of the proposed

pleading.” Folkman v. Roster Fin., Nos. 05-2099, 05-2242, 05-

2243, 05-2244, 05-2245, 2005 WL 2000169, at *8 n.7 (D.N.J. Aug.

15, 2005); see also U.F.C.W. Local 56 v. J.D.’s Market, 240

F.R.D. 149, 150 (D.N.J. 2007) (stating that one of the “cardinal

rules” for a party seeking leave to amend a pleading is that a

copy of the proposed amended pleading be attached to the

motion) . Failure to include a proposed amended complaint is a

basis to deny a Plaintiff’s motion to amend. See, e.g., Tucker

v. Wynne, No. 08—4390, 2009 WL 2448520, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 10,

2009)

Plaintiff did not submit a copy of a proposed amended

complaint with any of his informal applications to amend. 4 (See

D.E. 249, 251, 259, 269, 272, and 288) . That deficiency is an

independently sufficient basis to deny Plaintiff’s requests for

leave to amend. See Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 374 (3d Cir.

2000) (holding that even where the district court failed to

provide a reason for its denial of plaintiffs’ motion to amend

the complaint, the court had not abused its power in denying the

The Court notes that Plaintiff submitted a proposed second

amended complaint on May 3, 2013. (D.E. 246) . However, Plaintiff does not appear to have submitted same in conjunction with any of his applications to amend. Furthermore, Plaintiffs

May 3, 2013, filing is procedurally and substantively improper for the reasons already discussed in footnote 3.

4
motion because plaintiffs’ “failure to provide a draft Amended

Complaint would be an adequate basis on which the court could

deny the [plaintiffs’] request”)

B. Substantive Deficiencies

This Court will first consider whether the proposed

additional defendants would be properly joined under Rule 20,

(see Waterloov Gutter Prot. Sys. Co. v. Absolute Gutter Prot.,

L.L.C., 64 F. Supp. 2d 398, 407 (D.N.J. 1999)), and then proceed

to determine if Plaintiff’s proposed amendments are permissible

under Rule 15. See Hinson v. Norwest Fin. S.C., Inc., 239 F.3d

611, 618 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating, “a court determining whether

to grant a motion to amend to join additional [parties] must

consider both the general principles of amendment provided by

Rule 15(a) and also the more specific joinder provisions of Rule

20(a) .“)

In addition to Plaintiff’s failure to submit a proposed

pleading with his applications for leave to amend, his

applications fail to satisfy the substantive requirements for a

motion to amend. More specifically, Plaintiff’s most recent

attempts to add a laundry list of additional parties and

additional claims fail for two distinct reasons. First,

Plaintiff’s attempts to add certain defendants does not comport

with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a), which governs

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joinder of parties. Secondly, Plaintiff’s proposed additional

claims are futile.

1) Joinder Under Rule 20(a)

Under Rule 20(a) (2):

Persons . . . may be joined in one action as

defendants if:

(A) any right to relief is asserted against

them jointly, severally, or in the

alternative with respect to or arising out

of the same transaction, occurrence, or

series of transactions or occurrences; and

(B) any question of law or fact common to

all defendants will arise in the action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (2). Thus, Rule 20 sets forth a twopronged test for joinder of parties requiring: (1) the assertion

of a right to relief against the party to be joined, which is

predicated upon or arises out of a single transaction or

occurrence or a series of transactions and occurrences; and (2)

questions of law or fact common to all parties. N.J. Mach. Inc.

v. Alford Indus., Inc., No. 89—1879, 1991 WL 340196, at *1

(D.N.J. Oct. 7, 1991) . For joinder to be permissible, both

requirements must be fulfilled. See Mesa Computer Utils., Inc.

v. Western Union, 67 F.R.D. 634, 636 (D. Del. 1975) (holding

that franchise agreements negotiated and executed at different

times and places nonetheless satisfied the “same transaction or

occurrence” test because plaintiffs all alleged a common pattern

of fraudulent conduct by defendant) . Joinder “promote[s] trial

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convenience and expedite[s] the final determination of

disputes... .“ Snodgrass v. Ford Motor Co., No. 96-1814, 2002 WL

485688, at *2 (D.N.J. March 28, 2002) (quoting Miller v. Hygrade

Food Prods. Corp., 202 F.R.D. 142, 144 (E.D. Pa. 2001))

(citation & quotation marks omitted) . Thus, the Court has

discretion to permit joinder if joinder comports with the

“principles of fundamental fairness.” N.J. Mach., 1991 WL

340196, at *1 (citations & quotation marks omitted)

In the instant case, Plaintiff seeks to join multiple

individuals and entities as defendants. In assessing the

propriety of joining the proposed defendants, the Court will

examine each of Plaintiff’s applications for leave to amend/add

additional parties in turn below. 5

a. Plaintiff’s 05/20/13 Application (D.E. 249)

Here, Plaintiff seeks to add the following as defendants:

Feitlin Youngman Karas & Youngman LLC; Katherine Youngman;

Novalyn L. Winfield; John Walter Sywilok; and Godlesky &

Sywilok. Plaintiff’s legal argument in support of adding the

aforementioned parties is that various defendants conspired to

deprive him of his constitutional right to a jury trial.

Here, the Court discusses D.E. Nos. 249, 251, 259, 269, 272 and

288. Also, because the Court has already discussed the mootness

of the Amended Complaint Plaintiff filed under D.E. 246, it is

unnecessary for the Court to address this docket entry in this

section of the opinion. See supra, n.3.

7
According to Plaintiff, the prospective defendants “are liable

to the plaintiff because they denied him his right to trial by

jury in the matter of the value of his previously owned property

located 103 High Point, New Jersey it was for a jury to

determine the value of the property.” (D.E. 249 at 4)

While Plaintiff’s “legal argument” recites that the alleged

acts “are transactionally related to the matters being pled via

2:ll—cv—1874,” logic, reason and most of all Plaintiff’s own

averments reveal that the alleged actions by the prospective

defendants do not satisfy the Rule 20 “single transaction or

occurrence or a series of transactions and occurrences”

standard. Plaintiff has not proffered any facts that show how

these two alleged incidents are factually or temporally related

such that they would constitute the same transaction or

occurrence or a series of transactions. The current action

represents Plaintiff’s attempt to seek redress in the district

court for his failure to receive a jury trial during various

state court proceedings of a case in which he sued various

defendants as a result of him being involuntarily committed to

Bergen Regional Medical Center in 2008. The fact that the

action presently pending here in this Court seeks redress for

the alleged involuntary commitment that was the subject of

Plaintiff’s state court case does not make the two matters part

of the same transaction or occurrence for the purpose of

8
satisfying the requirements for joinder. The two cases are

legally distinct, involve completely different allegedly liable

parties and necessarily involve completely unrelated factual

predicates. Consequently, Rule 20(a) is not satisfied.

Therefore, joinder of the defendants named in Plaintiff’s

application is impermissible.

b. Plaintiff’s 6/11/13 Application (D.E. 259)

Here, Plaintiff seeks to add the following defendants: The

Oradell Animal Hospital; John and Jane Doe #1 to 100.

Plaintiff’s legal argument in support of his motion to add these

parties is that “[t]he above referenced parties are liable to

the plaintiff because they sought to go onto the premises of

another or the highways of the United States in order to

intimidate the plaintiff and/or otherwise seek to deny him his

right to trial by jury in the matters at the bar as the above

referenced are the only parties that could have overdosed the

plaintiff’s dog on radiation in an effort to intimidate him.”

(D.E. 259)

Plaintiff’s legal argument does not at all address the Rule

20(a) joinder requirements, discussed infra, as it is completely

devoid of any factual allegations from which the Court could

conclude that the alleged conduct of the prospective defendants

was transactionally related to the allegations Plaintiff made in

9
the instant action. Therefore, joinder of the proposed

defendants is not permissible.

c. Plaintiff’s 7/02/13 Application (D.E. 269)

Plaintiff seeks to add Gerhard Hahn and Dorothy Hahn as

defendants to the instant action. 6 In support of his application

to add these defendants, Plaintiff’s application states in

relevant part:

Please accept this letter in lieu of a more

formal motion to amend the above referenced

complaints to include: 1) Gerhard Hahn; and

2) Dorothy Hahn as they were part of a

conspiracy to kill the plaintiff’s dog with

insulin in May of 2013. As the killing of

the dog was intended to intimidate the

plaintiff and thereby deter him from seeking

his Constitutional rights the plaintiff

seeks relief via title 42 section 1985 and

any other applicable law.

(D.E. 269 (formatting altered)) . The Court does not perceive any

transactional relationship between the alleged conspiracy to

intimidate the Plaintiff and the alleged conduct that is the

subject of the current lawsuit. Similarly, the Court cannot

fathom how there might be any common questions of law or fact

with respect to the conduct alleged and that which is the

subject of the instant lawsuit. Plaintiff has, therefore,

failed to satisfy either prong of the Rule 20(a) test and

consequently, joinder is impermissible.

6 Insofar as the Court can ascertain, Gerhard Hahn and Dorothy Hahn are the Plaintiff’s parents.

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d. Plaintiff’s 7/25/13 Application (D.E. 272, 288)

Plaintiff seeks to add the “honorable Salas” and the

“honorable Mannion” [sic] 7 as defendants. 8 (D.E. 272, 288)

Plaintiff’s legal argument in support of this application is

that Judge Salas and Magistrate Judge Mannion “violated the

plaintiff’s 8th amendment right via issuing the erroneous letters

of dismissal of the plaintiff’s actions in order to punish the

plaintiff in an unusual manner[.]” (D.E. 272)

This allegation is essentially the same allegation made

against numerous other parties; however, this allegation against

Judge Salas and Magistrate Judge Mannion, in addition to being

entirely factually unsupported, is not transactionally related

to the instant action. Concomitantly, there are no common

questions of law or fact with respect to the instant action and

the allegations that Plaintiff now makes against Judge Salas and

Since June 29, 2011 and until recently, the Honorable Esther

Salas, U.S.D.J. presided over this matter. Since December 11, 2012 and until recently, the Honorable Steven C. Mannion, U.S.M.J. was the Magistrate Judge presiding over the pre-trial matters in this case. By Order dated August 13, 2013, this case

was reassigned for all further proceedings.

8 The Court notes that Plaintiff sought to add the Honorable

Esther Salas as a defendant earlier in this litigation. (D.E. 132) . That application was denied per Magistrate Judge Mannion’s Opinion and Order dated May 8, 2013. (D.E. 245). While Plaintiff filed the instant, redundant applications to add

Judge Salas as a defendant without first obtaining leave to do

so in violation of the Court’s May 8, 2013, Order, the Court will nevertheless address these applications in the interests of

clarity and finality.

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Magistrate Judge Mannion. As such, Plaintiff has failed to

satisfy Rule 20(a)’s requirements for joinder.

2) Futility of Plaintiff’s Proposed Additional Claims

A liberal construction of Plaintiff’s informal applications

to amend indicates that in addition to seeking to add numerous

parties, he also seeks to add four additional claims:

i. Proposed Additional Claim: “The above

referenced parties are liable to the

plaintiff because they denied him his right

to trial by jury in the matter of the value

of his previously owned property located 103

High Point, New Jersey — it was for a jury

to determine the value of the property.”

(D.E. 249 at 4)

ii. Proposed Additional Claim: “The above

referenced parties are liable to the

plaintiff because they sought to go onto the

premises of another or the highways of the

United States in order to intimidate the

plaintiff and/or otherwise seek to deny him

his right to trial by jury in the matters at

the bar as the above referenced are the only

parties that could have overdosed the

plaintiff’s dog on radiation in an effort to

intimidate him.” (D.E. 259 at 3)

iii. Proposed Additional Claim: (Gerhard Hahn and

Dorothy Hahn) “were part of a conspiracy to

kill the plaintiff’s dog with insulin in May

of 2013.” (D.E. 269)

iv. Proposed Additional Claim: CIVIL RIGHTS

COMPLAINT [sic] “..Philip E. Hahn, a United

States citizen, appearing pro se. Mr. Hahn

brings this complaint for violation of his

individual and associational rights under

the Fifth, Seventh, Eights and Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution

in violation of title 42 U.S.C. 1983, title

12
42 U.S.C. 1985 and title 42 U.S.C. 1986.”

(D.E. 288 at 3)

A. Legal Standard For Futility

A court will consider an amendment futile if it “is

frivolous or advances a claim or defense that is legally

insufficient on its face.” Harrison Beverage Co. v. Dribeck,

133 F.R.D. 462, 468 (D.N.J. 1990) (internal citations &

quotations marks omitted) . In determining whether an amendment

is “insufficient on its face,” the Court employs the same

standard that is applied to a Rule 12(b) (6) dismissal motion.

In re Burlington Coat Factory Secs. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434

(3d Cir. 1997). Under a Rule 12(b) (6) analysis, the question

before the Court is not whether the movant will ultimately

prevail, but whether the complaint sets forth “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) . Detailed

factual allegations are not necessary to survive a Rule 12(b) (6)

motion, but “a [pleader’s] obligation to provide the grounds of

his entitlement to relief requires more than labels[,] . .

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action” and demands that the “[f]actual allegations

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level

on the assumption that all the allegations in the [pleading]

13
are true (even if doubtful in fact) .“ Id. at 555 (quotation

marks omitted)

A two-part analysis determines whether this standard is

met. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)

(interpreting Ashcroft v. Iqbai, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009))

First, a court separates the factual and legal elements of a

claim. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. All well-pleaded facts set

forth in the pleading and the contents of the documents

incorporated therein must be accepted as true, but the Court may

disregard any legal conclusions. Id. at 210; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

667 (noting that a complaint is insufficient if it offers

“labels and conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action,” or “naked assertions devoid of

further factual enhancement”) (internal quotations marks &

alterations omitted)

Second, a court must determine whether a plaintiff’s

complaint articulates “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570;

accord Fowier, 578 F.3d at 211. As the Supreme Court instructed

in Iqbal, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Iqbai, 556 U.S. at 667. Although this is

not a “probability requirement,” the well-pleaded facts must do

14
more than demonstrate that the conduct is “merely consistent”

with liability so as to “permit the court to infer more than the

mere possibility of misconduct” to make a showing of entitlement

to relief. Id. at 1949—50 (internal quotation marks omitted)

This “context-specific task . . . requires the reviewing court

to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Fowler,

578 F.3d at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

B. Futility of Plaintiff’s Proposed Claims

Even under the most liberal construction of Plaintiff’s

proposed additional claims, they are legally insufficient as

pled. In addition to seeking to add numerous parties who were

in no way associated with the conduct that allegedly resulted in

Plaintiff being deprived of a right to a jury trial (the subject

of the instant action), the claims Plaintiff seeks to add are

devoid of facts from which the Court could reasonably conclude

that the putative defendants could possibly be liable to

Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s allegations are nothing more than broad,

sweeping generalized allegations against all proposed defendants

combined with recitations of legal conclusions.

Plaintiff has been afforded ample time and multiple

opportunities to properly present a motion for leave to amend

but he has repeatedly ignored or neglected to follow the

required procedural rules. In doing so Plaintiff has also

15
failed to meet the basic substantive legal requirements as

articulated herein.

IV. CONCLUSION

This matter, having come before the Court via multiple

informal applications by Plaintiff to amend his complaint; and

the Court having considered same; and for good cause shown,

IT IS ON THIS lZth day ofSq2t 2013:

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s applications to amend his

complaint are hereby DENIED with prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff shall not file any further informal

applications or motions to amend his complaint without prior

approval from the Court. Failure to abide by this Order may

result in sanctions; and it is further

ORDERED that because Plaintiff has also failed to prosecute

or effect service of the summons and complaint within 120 days

of the filing of the Complaint, (see D.E. 187 at 13 n.lO; D.E.

201), all claims against Defendants the Borough of Paramus and

the Paramus Police Department are dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall close this

matter.

nares, U.S.D.J.

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