[Cite as Teays Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Struckman, 2023-Ohio-244.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

PICKAWAY COUNTY

TEAYS VALLEY LOCAL SCHOOL :

DISTRICT BOARD OF

EDUCATION, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 21CA7

v. :

MICHAEL STRUCKMAN, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

Defendant-Appellant. :

________________________________________________________________

APPEARANCES:

Andrew C. Clark and Richard T. Ricketts, Pickerington, Ohio, for 

appellant.

Nelson Reid and Sue W. Yount, Columbus, Ohio, for appellee.

________________________________________________________________

CIVIL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT

DATE JOURNALIZED: 1-25-23

ABELE, J.

{¶1} This is an appeal from a Pickaway County Common Pleas 

Court summary judgment in favor of Teays Valley Local School 

District Board of Education, plaintiff below and appellee 

herein. Michael Struckman, defendant below and appellant 

herein, assigns the following errors for review:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

“THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 

REFUSING TO PERMIT APPELLANT TO PURSUE 
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DISCOVERY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CIVIL 

RULES.”

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

“THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 

STRIKING APPELLANT’S AMENDED ANSWER AND 

COUNTERCLAIMS WHICH WAS FILED WITH CONSENT 

OF OPPOSING COUNSEL PURSUANT TO CIVIL RULE 

15(A) AND SUBSEQUENTLY DENYING APPELLANT’S 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND.”

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT AS TO LIABILITY WHERE THE 

PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACT ENVISIONED THAT 

DEFENDANT WOULD BE PERMITTED TO GROW CROPS 

ON THE PROPERTY DURING THE TIME PERIOD 

RELEVANT TO THIS CASE.”

In 2004, appellant agreed to sell approximately 70 acres of 

real estate to appellee.1 One provision in the contract gave 

appellant the right to continue “Farming Activities on any part 

of the Real Estate purchased by Buyer until Buyer commences 

construction on any such portion of the Real Estate or otherwise 

must occupy said portion of the Real Estate in connection with 

its intended use thereof.” 

1 The underlying facts can be found in our previous 

decisions concerning the litigation between the parties: 

Struckman v. Bd. of Edn. of Teays Valley Loc. Sch. Dist., 2019-

Ohio-115, 128 N.E.3d 709 (4th Dist.) (Struckman II), and 

Struckman v. Bd. of Edn. of Teays Valley Loc. Sch. Dist., 4th 

Dist. Pickaway No. 16CA10, 2017-Ohio-1177 (Struckman I).
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{¶2} In July 2015, Teays Valley Local School District 

Superintendent Robin Halley sent a letter to appellant to inform 

him that appellee intended to occupy the property and 

appellant’s farming rights would terminate at the end of the 

2015 farming season. Halley’s letter stated that appellee’s 

“plans include the construction of a small facility on the site 

in conjunction with its occupancy and use of the property for 

the District’s student FFA organization and other potential 

school-related or extracurricular functions.”

{¶3} In March 2016, appellant filed a complaint against 

appellee for breach of contract, specific performance, 

declaratory and injunctive relief, and willful, wanton and 

knowing breach of contract. Appellant asserted that he agreed 

to sell his property to appellee (at a generous discount) based 

on the understanding that (1) appellee would use the property as 

a school site, and (2) appellant would have the right to 

continue to farm the property until appellee developed a school 

on the property. Appellant argued that appellee’s use of the 

property for any purpose other than a school site constitutes a 

breach of the real estate purchase contract.

{¶4} In response, appellee filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion 

to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
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relief could be granted. Appellee argued that the contract did 

not require it to build a school on the property.

{¶5} The trial court agreed with appellee that the purchase 

contract did not require appellee to build a school on the 

property and granted the motion to dismiss the complaint. The 

court found its decision regarding the contract language 

dispositive of the other arguments. Appellant appealed the 

trial court’s judgment. 

{¶6} Meanwhile, appellee filed the complaint that is the 

subject of the present appeal. Appellee’s complaint alleged 

that, based upon the purchase contract and the previous 

litigation, appellant did not have any right to continued use of 

the property. Appellee asked the court to eject appellant from 

the property and to enter a permanent injunction to enjoin him 

from entering, using, or possessing the property. Appellee also 

requested that the court award it the planted crops and to find 

that appellant engaged in a trespass.

{¶7} On July 11, 2016, appellant filed an answer and 

counterclaims. In his counterclaims, appellant asserted that 

appellee breached the purchase contract and requested specific 

performance of appellee’s obligations under the contract. 

Appellant asked the trial court to order appellee “to cease and 
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desist any attempt to take possession of the Real Estate or 

restrict in any manner [appellant]’s use of the Real Estate for 

farming purposes as provided for in the Purchase Contract.” He 

also alleged “willful, wanton and knowing intended breach” of 

contract.

{¶8} On March 27, 2017, this Court affirmed the trial 

court’s judgment that dismissed appellant’s complaint in the 

initial case (Struckman I). In doing so, we rejected 

appellant’s argument that the purchase contract’s language was 

ambiguous so as to permit appellant to introduce parol evidence 

that the parties intended that appellee would use the property 

to build a school. Instead, we concluded that the relevant 

contract language is unambiguous and did not require appellee to 

build a school on the property. The relevant contract language 

states:

The Contract shall not affect the current right 

to use the Real Estate for Farming Activities prior to 

closing. Furthermore, Seller shall be entitled to 

without charge from Buyer continue its Farming 

Activities on any part of the Real Estate purchased by 

Buyer until Buyer commences construction on any such 

portion of the Real Estate or otherwise must occupy 

said portion of the Real Estate in connection with its 

intended use thereof. 

{¶9} We did not agree with appellant that this language, or 

any other language in the contract, showed that appellee 
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promised to build a school on the property or that appellee 

agreed it would terminate appellant’s farming rights only if 

appellee started to build a new school. Rather, we concluded 

that the contract’s plain language states that appellant 

retained the right to farm the property until appellee (1) 

started construction on any portion of the property, or (2) 

“otherwise must occupy said portion of the property in 

connection with ‘its intended use thereof.’” Id. at ¶ 26. We 

determined that the language provides that appellant retained 

the right to farm the property “until a certain time when 

[appellee] sought to use the property [it] purchased.” Id. We 

interpreted the phrase “its intended use” to mean that appellee 

“could not arbitrarily occupy the property just to terminate 

[appellant]’s farming rights. Instead, [appellee] must have 

occupied the property with the intent to use it for some 

envisioned purpose.” Id.

{¶10} We additionally pointed out that the contract’s 

integration clause states that the contract “embodies the entire 

agreement between Seller and Buyer.” Id. at ¶ 25.

{¶11} Next, we recognized that the superintendent’s July 

2015 letter gave appellant notice that appellee intended to 

occupy and use the property. We observed that appellant’s 
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“entire complaint [was] based upon the assertion that 

[appellee]’s notice breached the terms of the purchase contract 

because [appellee] did not intend to use [the property] as a 

site for a new school.” Id. at ¶ 27. We therefore concluded 

that, because the contract did not require appellee to build a 

school on the property, appellant’s complaint failed to set 

forth a claim upon which relief could be granted. In sum, we 

concluded that the “purchase contract presents an insuperable 

bar to relief on [appellant]’s breach of contract claims.” Id. 

Appellant subsequently filed a notice of appeal with the Ohio 

Supreme Court.

{¶12} Appellant also filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief 

from judgment and argued that appellee’s notice to occupy the 

property was invalid for the failure to comply with the Ohio 

Sunshine Law, R.C. 121.12.2 Appellant claimed that (1) the board 

did not place the issue on the agenda of a public meeting, and 

(2) new evidence showed that the parties intended that appellee 

would use the property as a school site. On November 8, 2017, 

2 The Ohio Supreme Court has referred to this law as the 

“Open Meetings Act.” State ex rel. More Bratenahl v. Village of 

Bratenahl, 157 Ohio St.3d 309, 2019-Ohio-3233, 136 N.E.3d 447, ¶ 

8.
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appellee filed a motion to stay discovery, which the trial court 

later granted.

{¶13} On December 20, 2017, the Ohio Supreme Court declined 

to accept appellant’s appeal of our decision that affirmed the 

trial court’s decision that granted appellee’s motion to 

dismiss. 151 Ohio St.3d 1474, 2017-Ohio-9111, 87 N.E.3d 1271.

{¶14} Subsequently, the trial court denied appellant’s 

Civ.R. 60(B) motion and determined that laches barred 

appellant’s Sunshine Law allegation and the law-of-the-case 

doctrine precluded it from considering appellant’s claim 

regarding the meaning of the purchase contract. Appellant 

appealed this decision.

{¶15} On January 9, 2019, we affirmed the trial court’s 

decision to deny appellant’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion. We determined 

that although appellant did not timely file his motion as it 

related to the Sunshine Law allegation, appellant could have 

discovered the basis for the claim through a “pre-suit publicrecords request.” Id. at ¶ 24. We also concluded that the lawof-the-case doctrine prevents appellant from relitigating his 

claim that the purchase contract’s phrase, “its intend use,” is 

ambiguous so as to permit appellant to introduce parol evidence 
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to establish that the parties intended that appellee must use 

the property as a school site.

{¶16} Following our remand, the trial court’s staff attorney 

contacted the parties via email to ask how they intended to 

proceed, and the court set the matter for a status conference. 

In response to the staff attorney’s email, appellant’s counsel 

outlined a proposed case schedule as follows: 

Appellee’s deadline to file 

amended pleading

March 1, 2019

Appellant’s deadline to file 

an answer to appellee’s 

amended pleadings and/or amend 

its pleadings

March 21, 2019

Initial disclosure of 

witnesses

April 26, 2019

Supplemental disclosure of 

witnesses

August 16, 2019

Dispositive motion deadline November 15, 2019

Discovery cutoff December 31, 2019

Trial February/March 2020

{¶17} Appellee’s counsel responded:

We are fine with the proposed case schedule with 

the exception of the discovery cut-off and dispositive 

motion deadline. I would prefer that discovery close 

before the dispositive motion deadline and suggest 

that we simpl[y] flip those dates.
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{¶18} Appellant’s counsel replied that the “revision is 

fine” and set forth a “new proposed schedule” that changed the 

dates for discovery and dispositive motions.

{¶19} On March 18, 2019, the trial court issued a scheduling 

order that denied appellee’s motion for leave to amend its 2016 

complaint, ordered dispositive motions to be filed by July 8, 

2019, and set the matter for a jury trial. Notably, the 

scheduling order did not include dates for either party to amend 

the pleadings.

{¶20} On March 21, 2019, appellant filed a first amended 

answer to appellee’s complaint and first amended counterclaims. 

Appellant, however, did not ask the court for leave to file the 

complaint. Instead, appellant asserted that appellee provided 

written consent to the amendment. Appellant attached the series 

of emails between the court’s staff attorney and the parties 

that discussed a proposed case schedule and contended that in 

those emails, appellee provided written consent to appellant’s 

amended answer and counterclaims. The amended counterclaims 

contained the following claims for relief: (1) breach of 

contract; (2) rescission for material mistake; (3) breach of 

conditional gift; (4) failure of meeting of the minds; (5) 
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reformation of purchase contract; and (6) Sunshine Law 

violation.

{¶21} Appellee subsequently filed a motion to strike 

appellant’s amended answer and counterclaims. Appellee (1) 

disputed appellant’s claim that it had consented to appellant’s 

amended pleading when it agreed in an email to a proposed case 

schedule, (2) emphasized that the email discussions involved 

only a proposed schedule that set forth dates for both parties 

to amend their pleadings, and (3) noted that, after the March 

18, 2019 status conference, the trial court set its own 

schedule. The court’s scheduling order denied appellee’s 

pending motion to amend its complaint and did not include a date 

for appellant to file an amended answer and counterclaims. 

Appellee stated that the parties had discussed a proposed 

schedule only and that the court’s own case scheduling order 

took precedence.

{¶22} On April 17, 2019, the trial court determined that, 

because appellant filed his amended answer and counterclaims 

without leave of court and without appellee’s consent, the 

amended answer and counterclaims must be stricken from the 

record.
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{¶23} On April 19, 2019, appellant filed a memorandum contra 

appellee’s motion to strike and a motion for leave to file his 

amended pleading instanter and a motion for reconsideration. 

Additionally, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the 

court’s April 17, 2019 judgment striking his amended pleading 

from the record.

{¶24} On July 8, 2019, appellee requested summary judgment 

and asserted that the doctrine of res judicata prevents 

continued litigation. Appellee further argued that because the 

trial court and this Court already determined that appellant 

does not have any rights to the property, no genuine issues of 

material fact remain. Thus, appellee requested (1) a judgment 

declaring that it properly terminated appellant’s farming rights 

as of October 2015 and that appellant’s continued use of the 

property constitutes a trespass; (2) a judgment ejecting 

appellant from the property; (3) a judgment permanently 

enjoining appellant from entering, using, or otherwise 

possessing the property; and (4) compensatory damages, 

disgorgement of profits earned from the property, punitive 

damages, and attorneys’ fees and expenses.

{¶25} On July 22, 2019, appellant filed a motion to strike 

appellee’s summary judgment motion and asserted that his notice 
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of appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction. He also 

filed a motion to continue the matter after the appeal is 

resolved so that he can have additional time, under Civ.R. 

56(F), to conduct discovery. Appellant also filed a memorandum 

contra and contended that appellee did not satisfy its initial 

Civ.R. 56(C) burden and issues remain regarding whether 

appellant has a right to farm or use the property and whether 

appellee’s use of the property is legitimate. Appellant argued 

that “[n]o court has determined, or even reviewed, the issue of 

whether [appellee]’s clandestine plan to needlessly occupy the 

Property was legally sufficient under the Contract or if it was 

an impermissibly arbitrary plan concocted ‘just to terminate 

[appellant]’s farming rights.’”

{¶26} After this Court dismissed appellant’s appeal from the 

trial court’s decision that struck his amended answer and 

counterclaims, the trial court held a hearing to consider the 

outstanding matters. First, the court allowed appellant’s 

counsel to address his first amended answer and counterclaims. 

Counsel stated that in January 2019, he received a notice from 

the court that asked the parties to agree to a proposed 

scheduling order and to submit it to the court. Counsel sent an 

email to appellee’s counsel with proposed dates for filing 
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certain documents and this email included dates to submit 

amended pleadings. Appellee’s counsel responded that she would 

change the dates to complete discovery and to file dispositive 

motions. Appellant’s counsel then “agreed to that change and we 

submitted that proposed order.” Appellant’s counsel stated that 

he “interpreted [appellee’s counsel’s] consent in writing to 

that deadline of March 21st for [appellant] to file its amended 

pleadings to be written consent to the pleadings, and that was 

the basis for the filing of the motion at first.”

{¶27} Appellee’s counsel responded that she did not consent 

to appellant’s filing of an amended answer and counterclaim, but 

instead, stated that the parties “exchanged emails regarding a 

proposed case schedule, which is entirely procedural in nature.” 

She stated that “the first time [that she] saw the proposed 

amended answer and counterclaim was after it was filed,” that 

she “did not consent to the substance of it” and “did not and 

do[es] not consent to the filing of their amended answer and 

counterclaim.”

{¶28} On December 23, 2019, the trial court denied 

appellant’s motion for leave to file an amended answer and 

counterclaims. The court rejected appellant’s claim that 

appellee’s counsel consented to the filing an amended complaint 
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when counsel agreed, via email, to a case scheduling order that 

appellant’s counsel had proposed. Instead, the court stated 

that the emails concerned “scheduling negotiation * * * in 

preparation for a pre-trial conference with [the trial] Court, 

in which [the trial] Court disagreed with the proposed schedules 

and imposed its own schedule.” The court thus denied 

appellant’s motion for leave to file an amended answer and 

counterclaims. The court then gave both parties additional time 

to provide any further responses to appellee’s pending summary 

judgment motion.

{¶29} On January 10, 2020, appellant filed a supplemental 

memorandum in opposition to appellee’s summary judgment motion 

and asserted that genuine issues of material fact remained for 

resolution at trial regarding (1) whether appellee’s use of the 

property for a storage shed is arbitrary and solely to terminate 

appellant’s farming rights, (2) whether appellee’s efforts to 

terminate appellant’s farming rights violated the Ohio Sunshine 

Law, and (3) whether appellee had a legal basis to send a 2015 

termination notice “where documentation shows that [appellee] 

did not concoct its ‘intended use’ for the property until at 

least March 2016.”
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{¶30} On March 26, 2020, the trial court granted appellee 

summary judgment. The court first determined that res judicata 

barred appellant’s counterclaims. The court next considered 

whether appellee is entitled to summary judgment regarding the 

claims raised in its complaint and determined that no genuine 

issues of material fact remained regarding whether appellant 

trespassed on the property. The court noted that the previous 

decisions established that appellant did not have any right to 

the property or any right to continue farming any portion of the 

property and, thus, his continued presence on the property 

constituted a trespass. The court declared that appellant does 

not have any rights to the property and that he may not enter, 

use, or possess the property. With that, the court set the 

matter for a damages hearing.

{¶31} On April 9, 2021, the parties entered into a 

“stipulated final judgment entry.” In this entry, the parties 

agreed to divide the $34,173.14 currently held by the receiver 

as follows: (1) $20,000 to appellant; and (2) the remaining

balance to appellee. This appeal followed.

I

{¶32} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts 

that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his 
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request to conduct discovery. Appellant contends that the trial 

court’s decision prevented him from fully preparing his case for 

litigation. 

{¶33} Appellee argues that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by staying discovery until the court ruled on 

appellee’s summary judgment motion because that decision was 

perfectly rational because appellee sought summary judgment 

based upon the doctrine of res judicata. Appellee claims that 

any discovery that appellant would have pursued would not have 

helped him overcome the res-judicata bar and would have been 

completely unnecessary.

{¶34} “Appellate courts generally review a discovery dispute 

under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Torres Friedenberg v. 

Friedenberg, 161 Ohio St.3d 98, 2020-Ohio-3345, 161 N.E.3d 546, 

¶ 22. Accordingly, a decision to grant or deny a stay of 

discovery rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. 

Alford v. Arbors at Gallipolis, 2018-Ohio-4653, 123 N.E.3d 305, 

¶ 70 (4th Dist.). Moreover, a reviewing court will not overturn 

a trial court’s ruling regarding a Civ.R. 56(F)3 continuance 

3 Civ.R. 56(F) provides as follows:

Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 

opposing the motion for summary judgment that the party 
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unless the trial court abused its discretion. State ex rel. 

Denton v. Bedinghaus, 98 Ohio St.3d 298, 305, 2003-Ohio-861, 784 

N.E.2d 99, ¶ 31, citing Mauzy v. Kelly Services, Inc., 75 Ohio 

St.3d 578, 592, 664 N.E.2d 1272 (1996); Bender v. Logan, 2016-

Ohio-5317, 76 N.E.3d 336, ¶ 86 (4th Dist.); Citizens Bank of 

Logan v. Hines, 4th Dist. Athens No. 12CA5, 2013-Ohio-690, ¶ 8. 

“‘[A]buse of discretion’ [means] an ‘unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

unconscionable use of discretion, or * * * a view or action that 

no conscientious judge could honestly have taken.’” State v. 

Kirkland, 140 Ohio St.3d 73, 2014-Ohio-1966, 15 N.E.3d 818, ¶ 

67, quoting State v. Brady, 119 Ohio St.3d 375, 2008-Ohio-4493, 

894 N.E.2d 671, ¶ 23. “An abuse of discretion includes a 

situation in which a trial court did not engage in a ‘“sound 

reasoning process.”’” State v. Darmond, 135 Ohio St.3d 343, 

2013-Ohio-966, 986 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 34, quoting State v. Morris, 

132 Ohio St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, 972 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 14, 

quoting AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban 

Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 

cannot for sufficient reasons stated present by 

affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s 

opposition, the court may refuse the application for 

judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits 

to be obtained or discovery to be had or may make such 

other order as is just.
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(1990). The abuse of discretion standard is deferential and 

does not permit an appellate court to simply substitute its 

judgment for that of the trial court. Darmond at ¶ 34.

{¶35} We further observe, however, that a trial court’s 

discretion “is not without limits.” Mauzy v. Kelly Services, 

Inc., 75 Ohio St.3d 578, 592, 664 N.E.2d 1272 (1996). As the 

Mauzy court explained:

Although unusual, appellate courts will reverse a 

discovery order “when the trial court has erroneously 

denied or limited discovery.” 8 Wright, Miller & Marcus, 

Federal Practice & Procedure (2 Ed.1994) 92, Section 

2006. Thus, “[a]n appellate court will reverse the 

decision of a trial court that extinguishes a party’s 

right to discovery if the trial court’s decision is 

improvident and affects the discovering party’s 

substantial rights.” Rossman v. Rossman (1975), 47 Ohio 

App.2d 103, 110, 1 O.O.3d 206, 210, 352 N.E.2d 149, 153–

154. 

Id. A trial court ordinarily abuses its discretion by limiting 

discovery when “[t]he record discloses that further discovery 

was warranted in order to fully prepare to litigate” the 

pertinent legal issues. Id.

{¶36} On the other hand, “‘[a] trial court acts within its 

discretion when it grants a stay of discovery pending the 

resolution of a dispositive motion.’” State ex rel. Ebbing v. 

Ricketts, 133 Ohio St.3d 339, 2012-Ohio-4699, 978 N.E.2d 188, ¶ 

21, quoting Thomson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. 
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No. 09AP–782, 2010-Ohio-416, ¶ 32. Furthermore, a trial court 

does not abuse its discretion by staying discovery or by 

“overruling a Civ.R. 56(F) motion to continue when further 

discovery would prove fruitless.” Bender v. Logan, supra, at ¶ 

88, citing Fifth Third Mortgage Co. v. Rankin, 4th Dist. 

Pickaway No. 10CA45, 2011-Ohio-2757, ¶ 33; Battle v. Favreau, 

5th Dist. Morgan No. 15AP0007, 2015-Ohio-5106, ¶ 17, quoting 

Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1478 (C.A.5 1985) (“‘discovery 

should not be allowed’” until threshold issue resolved). 

Discovery ordinarily is fruitless when additional time would not 

provide any benefit. Davis v. Eachus, 4th Dist. Pike No. 

04CA725, 2004-Ohio-5720, ¶ 41. 

{¶37} In Davis, for example, we determined that when res 

judicata is a dispositive issue, then giving a party additional 

time to conduct discovery will not provide any benefit. We 

explained: 

in light of our conclusion that the non-attorney 

defendants are entitled to dismissal on res judicata 

grounds, we fail to see how the appellant could have 

suffered any prejudice arising from the trial court’s 

failure to provide the appellant with additional time to 

conduct discovery. 

Id.

{¶38} Other courts likewise have determined that when res 

judicata is a dispositive issue or when a motion raises a purely 
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legal issue, then discovery generally will be fruitless. State 

ex rel. Sawyer v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dept. of Children & Family 

Servs., 110 Ohio St.3d 343, 2006-Ohio-4574, 853 N.E.2d 657, ¶ 10 

(additional discovery not necessary to resolve summary judgment 

motion that involved “purely legal arguments”); Dehlendorf v. 

Ritchey, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-87, 2012-Ohio-5193, ¶ 23 

(court did not abuse discretion by staying discovery when 

appellant did not establish that additional discovery “could 

lead to admissible evidence related to the issue of collateral 

estoppel”).

{¶39} In the case sub judice, appellee asserted that it is 

entitled to summary judgment based upon the doctrine of res 

judicata. Appellee’s motion involved a purely legal issue –

whether the prior proceedings between the parties demonstrated 

that res judicata precluded appellant’s counterclaims and 

established appellee’s entitlement to relief. Here, additional 

discovery would not have helped appellant to illustrate that the 

doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable. The trial court, 

therefore, did not abuse its discretion by staying discovery or 

by overruling appellant’s Civ.R. 56(F) motion for additional 

time to conduct discovery.
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{¶40} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we 

overrule appellant’s first assignment of error.

II

{¶41} In his second assignment of error, appellant asserts 

that the trial court abused its discretion by striking 

appellant’s amended answer and counterclaims. Appellant first 

argues that opposing counsel consented to the amendment via 

email and that this email constitutes written consent under 

Civ.R. 15(A). Appellant claims that the question regarding a 

party’s consent to an amended pleading under Civ.R. 15(A) is a 

question of law for this Court to decide, but if this court 

determines that the email did not constitute written consent, we 

should review the trial court’s decision to deny his motion for 

leave to amend for an abuse of discretion.

{¶42} Appellant further asserts that the trial court 

prematurely entered its decision without affording appellant an 

opportunity to respond. Appellant also challenges the lack of 

analysis contained in the trial court’s decision.

{¶43} Appellee disputes appellant’s assertion that the 

question regarding a party’s written consent is a question of 

law for this Court to decide. Instead, appellee argues that 

whether a party consented to a Civ.R. 15(A) amendment is a 
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factual matter reserved for the trial court and the issue is 

subject to a manifest weight of the evidence standard.

{¶44} Appellee also asserts that appellant had an adequate 

opportunity to be heard regarding the issue of written consent. 

Appellee claims that the trial court ultimately considered all 

of appellant’s arguments.

{¶45} Appellee additionally argues that the trial court’s 

denial of appellant’s motion for leave to amend his answer and 

counterclaims did not constitute an abuse of discretion. 

Appellee contends that res judicata barred the counterclaims 

that appellant sought to amend and, as a consequence, rendered 

any amendments futile. Appellee notes that appellant’s motion 

for leave to amend relied upon the same words that this Court 

interpreted in our March 27, 2017 decision, i.e., “its intended 

use.” Appellee thus argues that appellant’s amended 

counterclaims constitute an attempt to relitigate an issue that 

this Court previously decided.

A

{¶46} Initially, we note that the “ultimate decision to 

grant leave to amend a pleading is vested in the sound 

discretion of the trial court and its decision on such matters 

will not be reversed absent a showing of an abuse of that 
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discretion.” Martin v. Wandling, 2016-Ohio-3032, 65 N.E.3d 103, 

¶ 34 (4th Dist.); Rose v. Cochran, 4th Dist. Ross No. 14CA3445, 

2014-Ohio-4979, ¶ 17. Additionally, appellate courts review “a 

trial court’s orders regarding docket and case management for an 

abuse of discretion.” King v. Divoky, 9th Dist. Summit No. CV 

29769, 2021-Ohio-1712, ¶ 26.

B

{¶47} Civ.R. 15(A) states that after the initial pleadings 

have been filed, “a party may amend its pleading only with the 

opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” 

Although Civ.R. 15(A) provides that leave of court shall be 

freely given when justice so requires, litigants do not have an 

“absolute or unlimited right to amend a complaint.” State ex 

rel. Jeffers v. Athens Cty. Commrs., 4th Dist. Athens No. 

15CA27, 2016-Ohio-8119, ¶ 64, citing Kinchen v. Mays, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 100672, 2014–Ohio–3325, ¶ 17. 

{¶48} We further note that Civ.R. 16(A) requires litigants 

to attempt to agree upon a case management schedule and for the 

court to “consider such agreements in the establishment of any 

such schedule.” Nevertheless, it is well-established that a 

trial court has “inherent authority to control its own docket 

and manage the cases before it.” Holsopple v. Holsopple, 9th 
PICKAWAY, 21CA7

25

Dist. Summit No. 29441, 2020-Ohio-1210, ¶ 18; Matrix 

Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Merriman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96280, 

2011-Ohio-4419, ¶ 8, quoting Mackey v. Steve Barry Ford, Inc., 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 58681, 1991 WL 95081, *2 (May 30, 1991); 

Rudolph v. Ohio Dept. of Human Services, 4th Dist. Meigs No. 

00CA023, 2001 WL 379112, *2 (Apr. 9, 2001); see State ex rel. 

Haley v. Davis, 145 Ohio St.3d 297, 2016-Ohio-534, 49 N.E.3d 

279, ¶ 13, citing Horman v. Veverka, 30 Ohio St.3d 41, 42–43, 

506 N.E.2d 218 (1987) (recognizing “trial court’s inherent power 

with respect to its orders and docket”).

{¶49} To that end, Civ.R. 16(B)(3)(a) allows trial courts to 

enter a scheduling order that “limit[s] the time to * * * amend

the pleadings.” Once a court enters a scheduling order, then 

the “schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the 

court’s consent.” Civ.R. 16(B)(4). Furthermore, Civ.R. 16(D) 

states that a court’s scheduling order “controls the course of 

the action unless the court modifies it.” 

{¶50} In the case at bar, appellant first contends that 

appellee gave written consent to his amended answer and 

counterclaims when appellee agreed via email to appellant’s 

proposed case schedule. Appellant asserts that whether a party 

gave written consent is a legal issue that we review on a de-
PICKAWAY, 21CA7

26

novo basis. Appellee, on the other hand, argues that whether it 

gave written consent is a factual finding subject to a manifest 

weight of the evidence standard of review. 

{¶51} In the case sub judice, regardless of which standard 

should apply, we do not believe that the trial court erred by 

determining that appellee did not consent to appellant’s amended 

answer and counterclaims. As the trial court recognized, the 

parties discussed a proposed case schedule that the court had 

yet to approve. Part of the parties’ proposed case schedule 

included a date for appellee to file an amended complaint and a 

date for appellant to file an amended answer and counterclaims. 

The trial court, however, did not adopt the parties’ proposed 

case schedule and did not allow either party to amend their 

pleadings. Instead, the trial court imposed its own case 

schedule. In view of the fact that the trial court did not 

adopt the parties’ proposed case schedule, appellee cannot be 

deemed to have consented to appellant’s amended answer and 

counterclaims. Rather, any consent that appellee may have given 

was premised upon the trial court adopting the parties’ proposed 

case schedule, which included dates for both parties to amend 

their pleadings. Once the court entered its own scheduling 

order, that order controlled the proceedings. See Civ.R. 16(D) 
PICKAWAY, 21CA7

27

(a court’s scheduling order “controls the course of the action 

unless the court modifies it”). 

{¶52} Moreover, we do not believe that the trial court 

abused its discretion by striking appellant’s amended answer and 

counterclaims or by denying appellant’s motion for leave to file 

the amended pleading. “The general policy of Civ.R. 15(A) 

favors liberal amendment of pleadings.” State ex rel. Reese v. 

Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Correction Legal Dept., ___ Ohio St.3d 

___, 2022-Ohio-2105, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 30. A trial court 

ordinarily abuses its discretion by denying a timely filed 

motion for leave to file an amended pleading when the amendment 

would allow the pleading party to “set forth a claim upon which 

relief can be granted.” Peterson v. Teodosio, 34 Ohio St.2d 

161, 175, 297 N.E.2d 113 (1973). Conversely, a trial court does 

not abuse its discretion by denying a party leave to file an 

amended pleading when amending the pleading “would be futile.” 

State ex rel. McDougald v. Greene, 161 Ohio St.3d 130, 2020-

Ohio-3686, 161 N.E.3d 575, ¶ 20, citing ISCO Indus., Inc. v. 

Great Am. Ins. Co., 2019-Ohio-4852, 148 N.E.3d 1279, ¶ 52 (1st 

Dist.); see Wilmington Steel Prods., Inc. v. Cleveland Elec. 

Illum. Co., 60 Ohio St.3d 120, 123, 573 N.E.2d 622 (1991) 

(“[W]here a plaintiff fails to make a prima facie showing of 
PICKAWAY, 21CA7

28

support for new matters sought to be pleaded, a trial court acts 

within its discretion to deny a motion to amend the pleading.”); 

Kinchen v. Mays, supra, at ¶ 17.

{¶53} In the case sub judice, we do not believe that the 

trial court abused its discretion by striking appellant’s 

amended answer and counterclaims and by denying him leave to 

file an amended pleading. Permitting appellant to file an 

amended answer and counterclaims would have been futile due to 

the res judicata bar.

It has long been the law of Ohio that “an existing 

final judgment or decree between the parties to 

litigation is conclusive as to all claims which were or 

might have been litigated in a first lawsuit.” * * * 

The doctrine of res judicata requires a plaintiff to 

present every ground for relief in the first action, or 

be forever barred from asserting it.

Natl. Amusements, Inc. v. Springdale, 53 Ohio St.3d 60, 62, 558 

N.E.2d 1178 (1990), quoting Rogers v. Whitehall, 25 Ohio St.3d 

67, 69, 494 N.E.2d 1387 (1986). 

{¶54} The res judicata doctrine applies even if the first 

lawsuit did not “explore[] all the possible theories of relief.” 

Id. Thus, res judicata extinguishes a litigant’s claim even if 

the litigant “‘is prepared in the second action (1) To present 

evidence or grounds or theories of the case not presented in the 

first action, or (2) To seek remedies or forms of relief not 
PICKAWAY, 21CA7

29

demanded in the first action.’” Grava, 73 Ohio St.3d at 383, 

quoting 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Judgments (1982) 209, 

Section 25; see Brown v. Dayton, 89 Ohio St.3d 245, 248, 730 

N.E.2d 958 (2000).

{¶55} In the case sub judice, in the first lawsuit between 

the same parties that involved the same purchase contract, a 

final judgment had been entered. This existing final judgment 

between the parties “is conclusive as to all claims which were 

or might have been litigated in a first lawsuit.” Natl. 

Amusements, 53 Ohio St.3d at 62, quoting Rogers v. Whitehall, 25 

Ohio St.3d 67, 69, 494 N.E.2d 1387 (1986). Because appellant 

did not “present every ground for relief in the first action,” 

he is “forever barred from asserting [them].” Id. 

Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

striking appellant’s amended pleading or by denying him leave to 

file the amended pleading.

{¶56} Appellant also asserts that the trial court 

prematurely ruled upon appellee’s motion to strike and deprived 

him of an opportunity to be heard. We, however, agree with 

appellee that the trial court ultimately considered all of 

appellant’s arguments. In December 2019, the trial court held a 

hearing and allowed appellant to present an argument regarding 
PICKAWAY, 21CA7

30

his amended answer and counterclaims and his claim that 

appellee’s counsel had agreed to the filing. Consequently, any 

error that may have occurred by prematurely striking appellant’s 

amended answer and counterclaims is harmless error that we must 

disregard. See Watershed Mgt., L.L.C. v. Neff, 4th Dist. 

Pickaway No. 10CA42, 2012-Ohio-1020, ¶ 67 (trial court errs by 

ruling upon motion before allowing nonmoving party adequate 

response time but error may be harmless); Entingh v. Old Man’s 

Cave Chalets, Inc., 4th Dist. No. 08CA14, 2009–Ohio–2242, ¶ 21–

22 (ruling on motion to compel before adverse party had 

opportunity to respond is harmless error when court considered 

adverse party’s argument in a subsequent motion to vacate the 

premature ruling).

{¶57} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we 

overrule appellant’s second assignment of error.

III

{¶58} In his third assignment of error, appellant asserts 

that the trial court erred by granting appellee summary 

judgment. Appellant claims that appellee failed to satisfy its 

initial Civ.R. 56 burden and that the following questions of 

fact remain: (1) whether appellee properly terminated 

appellant’s farming rights; (2) if so, whether appellee 
PICKAWAY, 21CA7

31

terminated those rights as to the entire tract or to only a 

portion of the tract; and (3) whether appellee’s termination, to 

the extent that it was legally enforceable, was effective to 

prohibit all access and all farming activities during the 2016 

crop season.

{¶59} Appellee asserts that appellant fails to consider the 

primary basis for the trial court’s summary judgment decision, 

i.e., that res judicata bars appellant’s claims. Appellee 

contends that appellant’s arguments remain focused upon the 

contract language even though the parties already have litigated 

the meaning of the contract language.

A

{¶60} Initially, we emphasize that appellate courts conduct 

a de novo review of trial court summary judgment decisions. 

E.g., State ex rel. Novak, L.L.P. v. Ambrose, 156 Ohio St.3d 

425, 2019-Ohio-1329, 128 N.E.3d 209, ¶ 8; Pelletier v. Campbell, 

153 Ohio St.3d 611, 2018-Ohio-2121, 109 N.E.3d 1210, ¶ 13; 

Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 

241 (1996). Accordingly, an appellate court need not defer to a 

trial court’s decision, but instead must independently review 

the record to determine if summary judgment is appropriate. 

Grafton, 77 Ohio St.3d at 105.
PICKAWAY, 21CA7

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Civ.R. 56(C) provides in relevant part:

* * * * Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if 

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 

written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, 

and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed 

in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to 

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or 

stipulation may be considered except as stated in this 

rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless 

it appears from the evidence or stipulation, and only 

from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds 

can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is 

adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary 

judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the 

evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the 

party’s favor.

{¶61} Therefore, pursuant to Civ.R. 56, a trial court may 

not award summary judgment unless the evidence demonstrates 

that: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be 

litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law; and (3) after viewing the evidence most strongly 

in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can come to 

but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the 

nonmoving party. E.g., State ex rel. Whittaker v. Lucas Cty. 

Prosecutor’s Office, 164 Ohio St.3d 151, 2021-Ohio-1241, 172 

N.E.3d 143, ¶ 8; Pelletier at ¶ 13; Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 

50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).
PICKAWAY, 21CA7

33

B

{¶62} In the case sub judice, the trial court granted 

appellee summary judgment based upon the doctrine of res 

judicata. “The doctrine of res judicata encompasses the two 

related concepts of claim preclusion, also known as res judicata 

or estoppel by judgment, and issue preclusion, also known as 

collateral estoppel.” O’Nesti v. DeBartolo Realty Corp., 113 

Ohio St.3d 59, 2007-Ohio-1102, 862 N.E.2d 803, ¶ 6; accord Baker 

by Thomas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232–34, 118 S.Ct. 

657, 663–64, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998), fn.5 (citations omitted) 

(the term, “res judicata,” traditionally describes both “claim 

preclusion (a valid final adjudication of a claim precludes a 

second action on that claim or any part of it); and (2) issue 

preclusion, long called ‘collateral estoppel’ (an issue of fact 

or law, actually litigated and resolved by a valid final 

judgment, binds the parties in a subsequent action, whether on 

the same or a different claim”)). 

With regard to claim preclusion, a final judgment 

or decree rendered on the merits by a court of competent 

jurisdiction is a complete bar to any subsequent action 

on the same claim between the same parties or those in 

privity with them. [Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 

379, 381, 653 N.E.2d 226 (1995)], citing Norwood v. 

McDonald, 142 Ohio St. 299, 52 N.E.2d 67 (1943), 

paragraph one of the syllabus, and Whitehead [v. Gen. 

Tel. Co., 20 Ohio St.2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969)], 

paragraph one of the syllabus. Moreover, an existing 
PICKAWAY, 21CA7

34

final judgment or decree between the parties is 

conclusive as to all claims that were or might have been 

litigated in a first lawsuit. [Grava] at 382, 653 N.E.2d 

226, citing Natl. Amusements, Inc. v. Springdale, 53 

Ohio St.3d 60, 62, 558 N.E.2d 1178 (1990). “‘The 

doctrine of res judicata requires a plaintiff to present 

every ground for relief in the first action, or be 

forever barred from asserting it.’” Id. at 382, 653 

N.E.2d 226, quoting Natl. Amusements at 62, 558 N.E.2d 

1178. 

Brooks v. Kelly, 144 Ohio St.3d 322, 2015-Ohio-2805, 43 N.E.3d 

385, ¶ 7.

{¶63} Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, “‘precludes 

the relitigation, in a second action, of an issue that has been 

actually and necessarily litigated and determined in a prior 

action.’” Warrensville Hts. City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. 

Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 152 Ohio St.3d 277, 2017-Ohio8845, 95 N.E.3d 359, ¶ 9, quoting Whitehead v. Gen. Tel. Co., 20 

Ohio St.2d 108, 112, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969); accord Lowe’s Home 

Centers, Inc. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, 154 Ohio St.3d 

463, 2018-Ohio-1974, 116 N.E.3d 79, ¶ 33; Ft. Frye Teachers 

Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 81 Ohio St.3d 392, 

395, 692 N.E.2d 140 (1998).

While the merger and bar aspects of res judicata have 

the effect of precluding the relitigation of the same 

cause of action, the collateral estoppel aspect 

precludes the relitigation, in a second action, of an 

issue that has been actually and necessarily litigated 

and determined in a prior action that was based on a 

different cause of action. “In short, under the rule of 
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35

collateral estoppel, even where the cause of action is 

different in a subsequent suit, a judgment in a prior 

suit may nevertheless affect the outcome of the second 

suit.”

Fort Frye, 81 Ohio St.3d at 395 (citation omitted), quoting 

Whitehead, 20 Ohio St.2d at 112. 

{¶64} The res judicata doctrine, therefore, “serves to 

preclude a defendant who has had his day in court from seeking a 

second on that same issue.” State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 

2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, ¶ 18, citing State ex rel. 

Willys–Overland Co. v. Clark (1925), 112 Ohio St. 263, 268, 147 

N.E. 33. The doctrine “promotes the principles of finality and 

judicial economy by preventing endless relitigation of an issue 

on which a defendant has already received a full and fair 

opportunity to be heard.” Id.

{¶65} In the case at bar, we believe that the trial court 

correctly determined that the doctrine of res judicata bars 

appellant’s counterclaims. Appellant’s counterclaims seek to 

relitigate the same claims that were, or could have been, 

litigated in the first lawsuit. In the first lawsuit, we 

determined that the contract language presented an “insuperable 

bar” to appellant’s breach of contract claims. Appellant’s 

counterclaims in the present case essentially repeat the claims 

raised in the first lawsuit. Therefore, our previous decision 
PICKAWAY, 21CA7

36

governs the outcome of appellant’s counterclaims, and appellant 

is barred from relitigating those claims.

{¶66} Moreover, res judicata bars appellant’s additional 

arguments that appellee’s termination notice violated the 

Sunshine Law and that he retained a right to continue farming a 

portion of the property. Appellant could have raised the 

Sunshine Law claim and the argument that he retained a right to 

continue farming a portion of the property in the first lawsuit, 

but did not. Therefore, res judicata precludes appellant from 

raising these additional claims.

{¶67} Appellant nevertheless argues that “in the context of 

declaratory judgments, ‘res judicata precludes only claims that 

were actually decided.’” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, quoting 

State ex rel. Trafalgar Corp. V. Miami Cty. Bd. Of Commrs., 104 

Ohio St.3d 350, 2004-Ohio-6406, 819 N.E.2d 1040, ¶ 22. However, 

even if true, we point out that in the first lawsuit appellant 

claimed that appellee breached the purchase contract in addition 

to seeking a declaratory judgment and other forms of relief. 

Our decision in the first lawsuit addressed appellant’s breach 

of contract claim and determined that our resolution of his 

breach of contract claim was dispositive of the other claims 

raised in his complaint, all of which focused upon the language 
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37

of the contract and appellee’s alleged breach of the contract. 

See Struckman I at ¶ 15 and ¶ 27 (appellant argued that trial 

court erred by dismissing complaint when he “set forth facts 

that would allow him to recover on his breach of contract 

claims” and stated that contract language presented “an 

insuperable bar to relief on [appellant]’s breach of contract 

claims”). Thus, we believe that appellant’s reliance upon 

Trafalgar is misplaced.

C

{¶68} Appellant also argues that the trial court incorrectly 

entered summary judgment in appellee’s favor regarding its 

trespass claim. “‘The elements of civil trespass are (1) an 

unauthorized intentional act and (2) entry upon land in the 

possession of another.’” Ogle v. Hocking Cty., 4th Dist. 

Hocking No. 14CA3, 2014-Ohio-5422, ¶ 39, quoting DiPasquale v. 

Costas, 186 Ohio App.3d 121, 2010–Ohio–832, 926 N.E.2d 682, ¶ 

102 (2d Dist.). Appellant contends that whether he had a 

continued right to enter the property in 2016 constitutes a 

genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment 

in appellee’s favor. In particular, appellant asserts that the 

following contract language shows that he had the right to 

continue farming the property in 2016:
PICKAWAY, 21CA7

38

Seller shall be entitled to without charge from 

Buyer continue its Farming Activities on any part of the 

Real Estate purchased by buyer until Buyer commences 

construction on any such portion of the Real Estate or 

otherwise must occupy said portion of the Real Estate in 

connection with its intended use thereof. In the event 

Buyer notifies Seller by October 1 (Buyer shall provide 

Seller with as much advance notice as is reasonably 

possible of its intent to use the Real Estate) of any 

given year that Buyer intends to use the Real Estate 

purchased by Buyer, Seller agrees that Buyer shall not 

be liable to Seller for any loss or damage incurred by 

Seller, including the cost of any damaged crops on the 

Real Estate, as a result of Buyer’s use of said Real 

Estate in the ensuing year. If Buyer fails to notify 

Seller of its intentions by October 1 of any given year 

as described above, then Buyer agrees to reimburse 

Seller for any loss or damage to Seller’s crops planted 

on the Real Estate purchased by Buyer as a result of 

Buyer’s use of said Real Estate in the ensuing year, in 

amounts mutually agreed to by both Seller and Buyer, or 

as determined by the actual loss incurred by Seller.

Appellant thus contends that res judicata does not prevent him 

from litigating this issue because none of the previous court 

decisions actually decided this specific issue.

{¶69} Assuming, arguendo, that res judicata does not bar 

appellant from litigating this issue, we do not agree with his 

argument that this contract language demonstrates that he had a 

right to continue farming the property in 2016 and that he could 

not have been trespassing on the property. 

{¶70} The interpretation of a contract is a question of law 

that appellate courts independently review. Sharonville v. Am. 

Emp. Ins. Co., 109 Ohio St.3d 186, 2006-Ohio-2180, 846 N.E.2d 
PICKAWAY, 21CA7

39

833, ¶ 6. “In all cases involving contract interpretation, we 

start with the primary interpretive rule that courts should give 

effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed in the 

language of their written agreement.” Sutton Bank v. 

Progressive Polymers, L.L.C., 161 Ohio St.3d 387, 2020-Ohio5101, 163 N.E.3d 546, ¶ 15, citing Sunoco, Inc. (R&M) v. Toledo 

Edison Co., 129 Ohio St.3d 397, 2011-Ohio-2720, 953 N.E.2d 285, 

¶ 37. Courts presume that the language used in the contract 

reflects the parties’ intent. Smith v. Erie Ins. Co., 148 Ohio 

St.3d 192, 2016-Ohio-7742, 69 N.E.3d 711, ¶ 18; Westfield Ins. 

Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 

1256, ¶ 11.

{¶71} Thus, courts must first review the plain and ordinary 

meaning of the language used in a contract “unless manifest 

absurdity results, or unless some other meaning is clearly 

evidenced from the face or overall contents of the instrument.” 

Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241, 374 

N.E.2d 146 (1978), paragraph two of the syllabus; accord Galatis 

at ¶ 11. If the language is clear and unambiguous, “a court may 

look no further than the writing itself to find the intent of 

the parties.” Galatis at ¶ 11 (citation omitted). “[A] 
PICKAWAY, 21CA7

40

contract is unambiguous if it can be given a definite legal 

meaning.” Id. (citation omitted).

{¶72} In the case sub judice, the contract language is 

unambiguous, and it does not state that appellant has the right 

to continue farming the property “in the ensuing year.” 

Instead, the contract outlines appellee’s liability, if any, to

appellant for any damages during the year after appellee 

notifies appellant of its intent to begin using the property. 

The language indicates that the parties contemplated that 

appellant might plant crops before appellee notified him of its 

intention to use the property and that they determined, in 

advance, whether appellant would be entitled to compensation for 

any loss or damage to those crops if appellee’s use of the 

property during the ensuing year damaged the crops. The 

language does not, however, give appellant a right to continue 

planting crops or otherwise to continue engaging in farming 

activities “in the ensuing year.” Rather, the language 

clarifies appellee’s obligations after it notifies appellant 

that it intends to begin using the property. It does not 

nullify the preceding language that gives appellant the right to 

continue farming the property only “until Buyer commences 

construction on any such portion of the Real Estate or otherwise 
PICKAWAY, 21CA7

41

must occupy said portion of the Real Estate in connection with 

its intended use thereof.”

{¶73} Consequently, we do not agree with appellant that the 

trial court incorrectly entered summary judgment in appellee’s 

favor regarding its trespass claim.

D

{¶74} Appellant next argues that appellee failed to support 

its summary judgment motion with proper Civ.R. 56(C) evidence.

{¶75} Appellee, however, contends that it cured any defect 

when it later authenticated the documents from the previous 

court proceedings in its reply memorandum. Appellee further 

points out that the trial court granted appellant an opportunity 

to respond to appellee’s reply memorandum. 

{¶76} After our review, we agree with appellee’s assertion. 

Moreover, appellee’s motion rested upon res judicata principles, 

which in turn, relied upon previous court proceedings subject to 

judicial notice. “Both trial courts and appellate courts can 

take judicial notice of filings readily accessible from a 

court’s website.” State v. Wright, 4th Dist. Scioto Nos. 

15CA3705 and 15CA3706, 2016–Ohio–7795, fn. 3; citing In re 

Helfrich, 5th Dist. Licking No. 13CA20, 2014–Ohio–1933, ¶ 35; 

see also State ex rel. Everhart v. McIntosh, 115 Ohio St.3d 195, 
PICKAWAY, 21CA7

42

2007–Ohio–4798, 874 N.E.2d 516, ¶ 8, 10 (court can take judicial 

notice of judicial opinions and public records accessible from 

the internet). Consequently, we do not agree with appellant 

that the trial court improperly entered summary judgment in 

appellee’s favor.

{¶77} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we 

overrule appellant’s assignment of error and affirm the trial 

court’s judgment.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
PICKAWAY, 21CA7

43

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and that 

appellee recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this 

appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this 

Court directing the Pickaway County Common Pleas Court to carry 

this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that 

mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Smith, P.J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

For the Court

BY:__________________________ 

 Peter B. Abele, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a 

final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal 

commences from the date of filing with the clerk.