alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 32.2**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Hostopia.com Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Michael J. Mugan, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify, to my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. (1350, as adopted pursuant to (906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|   | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and |
|--------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|--------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date: November 13, 2007 | /s/ MICHAEL J. MUGAN   |
|-------------------------|----------------------------------|

|   | Michael J. Mugan |
|--------|------------------|

|   | Chief Financial Officer |
|--------|-------------------------|

 

 

 

35

----
* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions

that have no precedential value and merely decide particular

cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes

needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal

profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-20475 

Conference Calendar

__________________

MICHAEL DWYER MCCULLOUGH,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE - 

INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,

 Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. CA H-93-2709

- - - - - - - - - -

(October 18, 1995)

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Michael Dwyer McCullough filed a pro se civil rights

complaint, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice - Institutional Division alleging that he was

improperly denied good-time credits. The district court

dismissed the complaint as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 

McCullough filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment and

a Rule 60(b) motion. The district court denied the Rule 60(b)

motion because any § 1983 claim was premature under Heck v.

Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994). 
No. 95-20475

-2-

The district court should permit a pro se plaintiff to amend

a complaint if it appears that there is a potential ground for

relief, see Gallegos v. La. Code of Criminal Procedures Art. 658,

858 F.2d 1091, 1092 (5th Cir. 1988), but the district court need

not permit futile amendments. See Davis v. Louisiana State

Univ., 876 F.2d 412, 413-14 (5th Cir. 1989). McCullough's claim

is not cognizable under § 1983; the district court properly

dismissed the complaint. Heck, 114 S. Ct. at 2372.

McCullough's argument that the district court improperly

dismissed the complaint as barred by the Eleventh Amendment need

not be addressed. McCullough's claim is not cognizable under

Heck, and the judgment is affirmed on this alternative ground. 

See Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27, 30 (5th Cir. 1992),

cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1414 (1993).

McCullough did not file a notice of appeal after the

district court denied his Rule 60(b) motion; this court does not

have jurisdiction over the order denying the motion. McKethan v.

Texas Farm Bureau, 996 F.2d 734, 744 (5th Cir. 1993), cert.

denied, 114 S. Ct. 694 (1994).

We caution McCullough that any additional frivolous appeals

filed by him or on his behalf will invite the imposition of

sanctions. To avoid sanctions, McCullough is further cautioned

to review all pending appeals to ensure that they do not raise

arguments that are frivolous because they have been previously

decided by this court.

Appeal DISMISSED. Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th

Cir. 1983); 5th Cir. R. 42.2.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

IN RE: ERIC FLORES,

 Relator.

§

§

§

§

No. 08-16-00088-CR

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF

MANDAMUS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relator, Eric Flores, has filed a petition for writ of mandamus against the El Paso County 

District Clerk. Relator contends that the District Clerk has failed to transmit to the Court of 

Criminal Appeals Relator’s application for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to Article 11.07 

of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 11.07 (West 

2015). We dismiss the mandamus petition for lack of jurisdiction.

This Court does not have mandamus jurisdiction over a district clerk unless it is shown 

that issuance of the writ is necessary to enforce our jurisdiction. See TEX.GOV’T CODE ANN. § 

22.221(a), (b) (West 2004); In re Simmonds, 271 S.W.3d 874, 879 (Tex.App.--Waco 2008, orig. 

proceeding); In re Smith, 263 S.W.3d 93, 95 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, orig. 

proceeding). The District Clerk’s alleged failure to forward an Article 11.07 writ application to 

the Court of Criminal Appeals does not implicate our jurisdiction. Consequently, we dismiss the 

petition for writ of mandamus for lack of jurisdiction.

STEVEN L. HUGHES, Justice

May 18, 2016

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Hughes, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION CLOSED

Hon. Dennis M. Cavanaugh

ORDER

Civil Action No. 11 -cv-983 (DMC -JAD)

DEM’IS M. CAVANAUGH, U.S.D.J.:

This matter comes before the Court upon a Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) (ECF

No. 16) filed by Magistrate Judge Mark Falk (hereinafter, “Judge Falk”) on December 30, 201 1

recommending that this Court grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss filed on December 9, 2011 due

to Lack of Prosucution.

The parties were given notice that pursuant to Local Civil Rule 72.1, they had fourteen days

from receipt ofthe R & R to file and serve any objections. Plaintiff filed opposition on February 2,

2012 (ECF No. 18). This Court is mindful of precedent in this District permitting relaxation of

timeliness rules for pro se litigants, and has considered the objections raised by Plaintiff despite

Plaintiffs filing out oftime. Seeg, Martin v. Keitel, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29000, *1.2 (D.N.J.

Apr. 18, 2007) (JLL).

The standard ofreview guiding this Court contemplates “a de novo determination ofthose

portions [ofthe R & R] to which objection is made.” L. Civ. R. 72.1(c)(2). This Court may “accept,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

LAURETTA WILLIAMS

Plaintiffs,

v.

CAPITAL ONE BANK

Defendants.

1

Case 2:11-cv-00983-DMC-MF Document 19 Filed 07/13/12 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 134
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate

Judge.” Id. In conducting its review, the Court “may consider the record developed before the

Magistrate Judge, making [its] own determination on the basis of that record.” See also, N.J. Brain

& Spine Cntr. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins., No. 10-cv-4260, 2011 WL 4737063, at *2 (Oct. 6, 2011)

(citing State Farm Indem. v. Fomaro, 227 F.Supp.2d 229,231 (D.N.J.2002)). For the reasons stated

herein, this Court adopts Judge Falk’s R & R as the opinion of the Court.

WHEREAS Plaintiffs claims are contained in the Notice ofRemoval (ECF No. 1) filed on

February 22, 2011;

WHEREAS Judge Falk finds that Plaintiffs failure to enter an appearance in the case or do

anything else to suggests that she has abandoned the matter altogether. See Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373

(“[J]udges, confronted with litigants who flagrantly violate or ignore court orders, often have no

appropriate or efficacious recourse other than dismissal of the complaint with prejudice.”).

WHEREAS this Court, upon review ofJudge Falk’s recommendation and the record before

it, finds that Plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed;

IT IS on this /3day of July, 2012,

ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Judge Falk’s R & R is hereby adopted as the opinion

of this Court.

S/DENNIS M. CAVANAUGH

Dennis M. Cavanaugh, U.S.D.J.

Original: Clerk

cc: All Counsel of Record

Hon. Mark Falk, U.S.M.J.

File

2

Case 2:11-cv-00983-DMC-MF Document 19 Filed 07/13/12 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 135
Exhibit
      23.1








CONSENT
      OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM







We
      have
      issued our reports dated March 31 2006, accompanying the consolidated financial
      statements and schedule and management’s assessment of the effectiveness of
      internal control over financial reporting of Airspan Networks, Inc. appearing
      in
      the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2005. We hereby
      consent to the incorporation by reference of said reports in the Registration
      Statements of Airspan Networks, Inc. on Forms S-8 (File No. 333-45260, effective
      September 6, 2000 and File No. 333-45262, effective September 6, 2000, and
      File
      No. 333-62024, effective May 31, 2001, and File No. 333-115788, effective May
      24, 2004) and on Forms S-3 (File No. 333-127479, effective August 12, 2005).





/s/
      Grant
      Thornton LLP





Miami,
      Florida


March
      31,
      2006
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed January 13, 2021.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D20-39

Lower Tribunal No. 18-31604

________________

Mota Pizza Rustica Corp. and Damaros, Inc.,

Appellants,

vs.

Sterling Retail Services, Inc., et al.,

Appellees.

An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade 

County, John W. Thornton, Jr., Judge.

Ayala Law, P.A., and Eduardo A. Maura and Luis F. Quesada; GarciaMenocal Irias & Pastori LLP., and Jorge Garcia-Menocal, for appellants.

Slusher & Rosenblum, P.A., and Jonathan S. Glickman (West Palm Beach), 

for appellees.

Before LOGUE, LINDSEY and LOBREE, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS /

Ifonorabl.

Oharley Loakhsrt Stats Treasurer Austin, Tents

at e.$%lnst the VlOl%CiQll

Qf th% **auah parsolld,**  assoaiation**of per**  any other oustodlanehipsuoh as was ate Depoe%torgAat. It was Pll;hia sletwe to hart so providsdt, but far ltimlf suoh pl~evisiaa was ngt xaaderHonorable Charley Lo&hart, page #r!

to be depositeddth bim, pursuant to the laws aitad above and applioeble thereto. 

### verytruly yotms ATRXUUEYGERi%AL OFTEXAS
Case 2:11-cr-00165-KSH Document 66 Filed 09/15/11 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 267
Case 2:11-cr-00165-KSH Document 66 Filed 09/15/11 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 268
exhibit4t.htm


 


Exhibit 4(t)


 







 


February 26, 2013

















Securities and Exchange Commission


100 F. Street, N.E.


Washington, D.C. 20549








	
Subject:

	  	
General Electric Capital Corporation Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2012 – File No. 001-06461












 


Dear Sirs:


 


Neither General Electric Capital Corporation (the “Corporation”) nor any of its subsidiaries has outstanding any instrument with respect to its long-term debt, other than those filed as an exhibit to the Corporation’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2012, under which the total amount of securities authorized exceeds 10% of the total assets of the registrant and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis. In accordance with paragraph (b) (4) (iii) of Item 601 of Regulation S-K (17 CFR §229.601), the Corporation hereby agrees to furnish to the Securities and Exchange Commission, upon request, a copy of each instrument that defines the rights of holders of such long-term debt not filed or incorporated by reference as an exhibit to the Corporation’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2012.


 


 



	
Very truly yours,


GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL CORPORATION


 


 


 


	
By:

	
/s/ Kathryn A. Cassidy

	  	  
	  	
Kathryn A. Cassidy


Senior Vice President Corporate Treasury


and Global Funding Operation
Case 2:11-cr-00177-DMC Document 12 Filed 04/20/11 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 18
Case 2:11-cr-00177-DMC Document 12 Filed 04/20/11 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 19
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

VICTORIA BARGHOUT, JENNIFER

CHEISTIANSEN, BARBARA FERINGA,

.JENNIFER MUSUMECI, LAURA REILLY,

KAREN SALOMON, NATALIE CELSKE, VERA No, 2:l1-cv-1576 (DMCIJAD)

SANTANGELO, GRETCHEN LIENHOP,

MARYJEAN SAWYER and MICHELLE SIMPSON,

individually and on behalf of a class of

similarly-situated female employees, JOINT STIPULATION OF

DISMISSAL OF THE

Plaintiffs,. CLAIMS OF PLAINTIFF

KAREN SALOMON AND

OF THE CLAIMS

AGAINST DEFENDANT

SUSAN HERSTER

--against--

BAYER HEALTHCARE PHARMACEUTICALS,

BAYER HEAITHCARE CONSUMER CARE,

BAYER HEALTHCARE ANIMAL HEALTH,

BAYER IIEALTHCARE LLC, BAYER

CORPORATION, HERM CUKIER, DENISE

D’AGOSTINO, SUSAN HERSTER, SEAN

KOLB-ffUNT, DUNCAN LAMB, LESLIE NORTH,

STEFAN OELRICH, ROBERT ROSEN, TODD

WILLIAMSON, FRANK KNAPP, LAWRENCE

PLATKIN and CLEVE SCOTT.

Defendants.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 (a)(1)(A)(ii), Plaintiffs Victoria

Barghout, Jennifer Christiansen, Barbara Feringa, Jennifer Musumeci, Laura Reilly, Karen

Salomon, Natalie Ceiske, Vera Santangelo, Gretchen Lienhop, MaryJean Sawyer, and

Michelle Simpson and Defendants Bayer HealthC•are Pharmaceuticals Inc., Bayer

HealthCare Consumer Care, Bayer HealthCare Animal Health, Bayer Healthcare, LLC and

Bayer Corporation, by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby stipulate and agree to

dismiss with prejudice and without costs or fees to either party: (1) all of Plaintiff Karen

Case 2:11-cv-01576-KM-MAH Document 74 Filed 03/11/13 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 2320
Salomon’s claims in the above-captioned action; and (2) all claims against individual

defendant Susan Herster, who shall be dismissed with prejudice as a defendant from this

action. The parties further stipulate and agree to strike paragraphs 52, 53, and 304 to 354 of

the Third Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 48).

STIPULATED AND AGREED:

s/ Sarah E. Bouchard

AN ORI) HLE , LL MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP

Katherine M. mpel* (Pennsylvania Limited Liability

Matthew L. Schmid* Partnership)

Lauren E. Seffel* Michael L. Banks (admitted pro hac vice)

Katherine E. Laxnm* Sarah E. Bouchard (NJ ID# 02807-1995)

1666 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 300 Blair J. Robinson (N

Washington, DC 20009 J ID# 040712004)

Tel: 202.499.5200 W. John Lee (NJ ID# 18502007)

Fax: 202.499.5199 A. Klair Spiller (NJ ID #033032010)

1701 Market Street

Jennifer Siegel (JS-6 110) Philadelphia, PA 19103-2921

1350 Avenue ofthe Americas, 31st Floor Tel: 215.963.5387/5077/5398/5210/4935

New York, NY 10019 Fax: 215.963.5001

Tel: 646.402.5650

Fax: 646.402.5651 Attorneysfor Deftndants

Attorneysfor Plaintiffs

*Admittedpro hac vice

SO Y//( 7/

‘7-

Hon. De is Cavanaugh, U.S.D,J.

Case 2:11-cv-01576-KM-MAH Document 74 Filed 03/11/13 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 2321
S05A0765.

#### WHITLEY et al. v. SCHWALL.

(620 SE2d 827)

HINES, Justice.

Leon and Mary Whitley appeal from the superior court’s order determining that a writ of mandamus is not available to them. Finding that the court below was correct in so ruling, we affirm.1

The Whitleys are the plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action filed in Fulton County State Court against a hospital and several physicians. During a hearing, the Whitleys orally moved for Judge Craig L. Schwall, Sr. to recuse himself from presiding over the case; Judge Schwall denied the motion. The Whitleys then filed a written motion “for recusal and disqualification” of Judge Schwall. Judge Schwall denied this motion also, finding that the affidavit in support thereof was legally insufficient. See Uniform Superior Court Rule 25.3. He also granted summary judgment on the merits to all defendants.

The Whitleys next sought a writ of mandamus in the Superior Court of Fulton County seeking to compel Judge Schwall to either recuse or disqualify himself, or to assign the motion requesting that he do so to another judge. The superior court, upon motion by Judge Schwall, found that the relief requested is not available to the Whitleys, noting that they could appeal the recusal order entered by Judge Schwall without the need of mandamus relief.

> Writs of mandamus and prohibition are extraordinary remedies available in limited circumstances to compel action or inaction on the part of a public officer when there is no other adequate legal remedy. [Cits.] Extraordinary writs are not the proper remedy to seek review of a ruling made by a trial court where there is a right of judicial review of the judge’s ruling, because the availability of judicial review is an adequate legal remedy that eliminates the availability of mandamus relief. [Cits.]

*Ford Motor Co. v. Lawrence,*279 Ga. 284, 285 (612 SE2d 301) (2005). The Whitleys acknowledge that they could pursue an appeal of Judge Schwall’s order denying their motion to recuse, and they have represented to this Court that they have filed a notice of appeal from the final order in the state court case. See OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), (d). The ability to seek judicial review of Judge Schwall’s order on the motion *727to recuse was available to the Whitleys when they sought extraordinary relief, and a writ of mandamus does not lie. See *Ford Motor Co.,*supra at 287. Compare *North Fulton Med. Center v. Roach,*265 Ga. 125, 127 (453 SE2d 463) (1995).

Decided October 11, 2005.

*James W. Howard, Huff, Powell & Bailey, R. Page Powell, Jr., Hall, Booth, Smith & Slover, Timothy H. Bendin, Downey & Cleveland, Russell B. Davis,*for appellants.

*Balch & Bingham, Carylchter, Christopher S. Anulewicz, James L. Hollis,*for appellee.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*

1

 The Whitleys styled their petition for relief in superior court as a “petition for writs of mandamus, injunction, and prohibition.” However, the superior court’s order on the petition, and the Whitleys’ arguments in this Court, address only mandamus relief.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marvin Eugene BRADLEY, a/k/a Gotti, a/k/a Gene, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-7569.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Dec. 13, 2012.

Decided: Dec. 19, 2012.

Marvin Eugene Bradley, Appellant Pro Se. Alston Calhoun Badger, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Marvin Eugene Bradley appeals the district court’s order denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006) motion. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we grant Bradley’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *United States v. Bradley,*No. 2:08-cr-00691-PMD-1 (D.S.C. Aug. 28, 2012). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
**Exhibit 31.1**

**MedPro Safety Products, Inc.****Rule 13a-14(a) Certification****of Chief Executive Officer**

I, W. Craig Turner, Chief Executive Officer of MedPro Safety Products, Inc. (the “Company”), certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, theperiods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

     (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; and

     (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of theperiod covered by this report based on such evaluation.

| Dated: May 15, 2008 | /s/W. Craig Turner      |
|---------------------|-------------------------|
|                |                         |
|                | W. Craig Turner         |
|                | Chief Executive Officer |

23

----
Exhibit 12.2
 CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-14 OR 15d-14 OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
      (a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure
that material information relating to the company, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;(b)
    
    Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such
internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to
provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and
the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles;(c)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the companys disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of
the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this
report based on such evaluation; and(d)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the companys internal control
over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual
report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect,
the companys internal control over financial reporting; and
  (a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely
to adversely affect the companys ability to record, process, summarize and report
financial information; and(b)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the companys internal control over
financial reporting.
  By:
    /s/ Quincy TangName:
    Quincy TangTitle:
    Chief Financial Officer