NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

SIGIFREDO QUINTERO MURRIETA, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0280

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2012-146598-001

The Honorable John R. Ditsworth, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Andrew Reilly

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Mikel Steinfeld

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. MURRIETA

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Patricia A. Orozco and Judge Maurice Portley joined.

N O R R I S, Judge:

¶1 Sigifredo Murrieta appeals from his convictions and 

sentences for four counts of sexual conduct with a minor, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

(“A.R.S.”) § 13-1405 (Supp. 2014),

1 one count of kidnapping, see A.R.S. § 13-

1304 (2010), one count of sexual abuse, see A.R.S. § 13-1404 (2010), and one 

count of aggravated assault. See A.R.S. § 13-1204 (Supp. 2014). 

¶2 On appeal, Murrieta argues the superior court improperly 

relied on Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(b) to preclude evidence the victim, 

Murrieta’s daughter, had twice removed an ankle monitoring device she 

had worn in connection with a juvenile adjudication. More specifically, 

relying on State v. Machado, 226 Ariz. 281, 284, ¶ 16, 246 P.3d 632, 635 (2011)

affirming 224 Ariz. 343, 355–56, ¶¶ 29–32, 230 P.3d 1158, 1170–71 (App.

2010), Murrieta argues Rule 404(b) “was designed to protect defendants,” 

not “witnesses such as the victim,” and thus this evidence should have been 

admitted. Murrieta further argues preclusion of this evidence violated his 

right to meaningfully cross-examine the victim regarding her motive to 

fabricate the allegations against him. See generally Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 

308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974); State v. Dunlap, 125 Ariz. 104, 608 

P.2d 41 (1980). 

¶3 Because the superior court precluded the evidence over

Murrieta’s general objection,2 we review for harmless error. See State v. 

 

1Although the Arizona Legislature has amended certain 

statutes cited in this decision after the date of Murrieta’s offenses, these 

revisions are immaterial to our resolution of this appeal. Thus, we cite to 

the current version of these statutes. 

2In objecting, Murrieta did not raise Machado nor did he argue, 

as he does on appeal, that the admissibility of the evidence was solely 

governed by Arizona Rules of Evidence 401 through 403 and not 404.

Murrieta also failed to argue the preclusion of this evidence violated his 

right to a meaningful cross-examination. Under these circumstances, we 
STATE v. MURRIETA

Decision of the Court

3

Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 18, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005) (“Reviewing 

courts consider alleged trial error under the harmless error standard when 

a defendant objects at trial and thereby preserves an issue for appeal.”). 

Assuming, without deciding, the superior court should have admitted the

evidence, the error was harmless, and thus, we affirm Murrieta’s 

convictions and sentences. 

¶4 “An error is harmless if a reviewing court can determine, 

beyond a reasonable doubt, that it neither affected nor contributed to the 

verdict.” State v. Yonkman, 233 Ariz. 369, 376, ¶ 24, 312 P.3d 1135, 1142 (App. 

2013). “The inquiry is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, 

a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty 

verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” 

State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 588, 858 P.2d 1152, 1191 (1993) (quoting Sullivan 

v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081, 124 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1993)).

Here, preclusion of the evidence the victim had twice removed her ankle 

monitoring device most assuredly did not affect nor contribute to 

Murrieta’s convictions.

¶5 At trial, defense counsel asserted this evidence demonstrated 

the victim’s “motive and bias to lie.” According to Murrieta’s defense 

theory of the case, this evidence established the victim wanted to “get out 

of the house” and, thus, had motive to fabricate the allegations against him.

¶6 Other evidence, however, established, corroborated, and 

confirmed the victim wanted to escape from home. As the superior court 

recognized in explaining its ruling, “It’s very clear [the victim] was a 

runaway and that’s what we are going to hear.” And, indeed, that is 

precisely what the jury heard. At trial, the victim made no secret about her 

efforts to run away from home. The detective who investigated the case

and two of the victim’s brothers also testified the victim frequently ran 

away from home. Further, Murrieta discussed the victim’s habit of running 

away in a video recording of his interview with police the State introduced 

into evidence and played for the jury. Cf. State v. Bocharski, 218 Ariz. 476, 

486, ¶¶ 40–41, 189 P.3d 403, 413 (2008) (erroneous admission of evidence

was harmless error when other, non-tainted proof clearly supported same 

facts). If, as Murrieta argues on appeal, his “goal was to corroborate his 

claim that [the victim] was motivated to fabricate her allegations to escape 

her living situation,” the victim, the detective, and the victim’s brothers 

 

could easily find Murrieta has waived these arguments on appeal. We 

have, however, elected to address the propriety of the superior court’s 

preclusion of the evidence based on the reason it gave. See infra ¶ 6.
STATE v. MURRIETA

Decision of the Court

4

provided more than ample testimony allowing him to do just that.3 Thus, 

in closing, Murrieta’s counsel argued the victim “ran away” and “continued 

to run away” and then pointed out “[o]ne of the most common examples 

[of fabricated allegations of sexual abuse] include teenage girls who are 

trying to change their living conditions.” 

CONCLUSION

¶7 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Murrieta’s convictions

and sentences.

 

3Furthermore, Murrieta corroborated much of the victim’s 

testimony concerning his sexual contacts with her during his interview with 

police. Cf. Yonkman, 233 Ariz. at 376, ¶ 24, 312 P.3d at 1142 (preclusion of 

evidence defendant had been acquitted of similar prior offenses harmless 

error because defendant admitted to police he had touched victim, thereby 

corroborating victim’s testimony).