NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER 

NO. CAAP-22-0000054 

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS 

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I 

IN THE INTEREST OF A.O. 

APPEAL FROM THE FAMILY COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

(CASE NO. FC-S 18-0054) 

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER 

(By: Ginoza, Chief Judge, Hiraoka and Nakasone, JJ.) 

 Respondent-Appellant Father (Father) appeals from the 

January 24, 2022 Order Terminating Parental Rights (TPR Order)1

entered by the Family Court of the Third Circuit (Family Court).2 

On appeal, Father appears to raise three points of error:3 

1 The Family Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 

Law (FOFs/COLs) on October 7, 2022 after the appeal was filed. The parties 

were allowed to address the FOFs/COLs in supplemental briefing. 

2 The Honorable Jeffery W. Ng presided. 

 3 Father's "points of error" section of his abbreviated opening 

brief contains the first two points of error; however, the "argument" section 

appears to raise a third argument which we construe as a third point of 

error, in the interest of addressing cases on their merits. See Marvin v. 

Pflueger, 127 Hawai‘i 490, 496, 280 P.3d 88, 94 (2012) (noting policy of 

addressing cases on the merits, where possible, despite noncompliance with 

appellate rule). 

Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-22-0000054

16-MAR-2023

07:46 AM

Dkt. 99 SO
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(1) the Family Court lacked jurisdiction to hear PetitionerAppellee Department of Human Services's (DHS) motion to 

terminate parental rights (TPR Motion) because DHS filed the TPR 

Motion beyond the time limitation period set forth in Hawaii 

Revised Statutes (HRS) § 587A-33(i) (2018);4 (2) the Family Court 

violated HRS § 587A-33(a)(1) and (a)(2) (2018)5 because it failed 

to require DHS to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that 

Father's family was unable to provide AO with a safe family home 

under the factors set forth in HRS § 587A-7; and (3) the Family 

Court violated HRS § 587A-33(a)(3)(A) (2018)6 by failing to 

require DHS to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that 

 4 HRS § 587A-33(i) provides: "Absent compelling reasons, if the 

child has been in foster care under the department's responsibility for an 

aggregate of fifteen out of the most recent twenty-two months from the date 

of entry into foster care, the department shall file a motion to terminate 

parental rights." (Emphases added). 

5 HRS § 587A-33(a) provides, in relevant part: 

(a) At a termination of parental rights hearing, the court 

shall determine whether there exists clear and convincing 

evidence that: 

(1) A child's parent whose rights are subject to 

termination is not presently willing and able to 

provide the parent's child with a safe family home, 

even with the assistance of a service plan; [and] 

(2) It is not reasonably foreseeable that the child's 

parent whose rights are subject to termination will 

become willing and able to provide the child with a 

safe family home, even with the assistance of a 

service plan, within a reasonable period of time, 

which shall not exceed two years from the child's 

date of entry into foster care[.] 

(Emphases added). 

6 HRS § 587A-33(a)(3)(A) provides, in relevant part: 

(3) The proposed permanent plan is in the best interests of 

the child. In reaching this determination, the court shall: 

(A) Presume that it is in the best interests of 

the child to be promptly and permanently placed 

with responsible and competent substitute parents 

and family in a safe and secure home . . . . 
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AO's resource caregivers (RCGs) were responsible and competent 

substitute parents. In support of his second point of error, 

Father objects to FOFs 14, 51, 82-83, 92-94, 105, and COLs 

10-13. 

 Upon careful review of the record and the briefs 

submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to 

the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve 

Father's points of error as follows, and affirm. 

 The pertinent background is as follows. On August 15, 

2018, police took AO into protective custody due to SO's 

(Mother) incarceration and Father's whereabouts being unknown. 

DHS placed AO in the care of RCGs. AO was seven years old when 

AO entered into foster care on October 14, 2018. 

 On August 20, 2018, DHS filed a petition for temporary 

foster custody of AO (Petition) and issued a service plan with 

recommended services for Mother and Father to complete to 

resolve DHS's safety concerns. 

 Mother intermittently participated in Family Court 

proceedings and DHS's service plan, but was ultimately defaulted 

for failure to appear. Mother did not appeal from the TPR 

Order. 

 Father resided in Mexico throughout the Family Court 

proceedings. On December 6, 2019, Father, for the first time, 

appeared before the Family Court via telephone from Mexico. 

Thereafter, Father participated in Family Court proceedings from 

Mexico and sought placement of AO with his family in California. 

 Contemporaneously, Father's family expressed interest 

in becoming resource caregivers for AO. Beginning in December 

2018, DHS allowed, and Father's family participated in, "EPIC 

Ohana Conferences" regarding AO. DHS also facilitated weekly 

phone calls between AO and Father's family, in-person visits, 

and travel for AO to California to meet Father's family. 
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Throughout the Family Court proceedings, DHS explored permanent 

placement of AO with Father's family. 

 On July 7, 2020, DHS filed the TPR Motion to terminate 

Mother's and Father's parental rights due to Mother's and 

Father's inability to provide AO with a safe family home at that 

time or within a reasonable period of time. DHS submitted a 

June 16, 2020 permanent plan contemplating adoption to an 

appropriate caregiver (Permanent Plan). 

 Rather than setting a hearing on the TPR Motion, the 

Family Court ordered DHS to look into placement of AO with 

Father's family. As a result, DHS continued to facilitate 

communication between AO and Father's family, and completed an 

out-of-state home assessment for Father's family. On January 8, 

2021, the Family Court, while recognizing that it remained open 

to considering Father's family as a permanent placement option 

for AO, scheduled trial on the TPR Motion. 

 The Family Court held trial on the TPR Motion on 

August 27, October 29, and December 10, 2021, and January 14, 

2022. 

 Father attended trial via telephone from Mexico. 

During trial, Father testified, in relevant part, that he did 

not know when he would be able to return to the United States,

he was unable to complete the requirements of his service plan 

due to his location in Mexico and COVID-19, and he did not want 

AO to be placed with him in Mexico, but wanted AO to be placed 

with his family in California. 

 The Family Court granted the TPR Motion, and Father 

timely appealed. 

 (1) Father contends that the Family Court lacked 

jurisdiction to hear the TPR Motion because DHS filed the TPR 

Motion beyond the time limitation period set forth in 
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HRS § 587A-33(i). Specifically, Father argues that HRS § 587A33(i) required DHS to file a motion to terminate parental rights 

no later than fifteen months after a child's entry into foster 

care, or no later than twenty-two months after a child's entry 

into foster care if DHS provided compelling reasons showing why 

the extension was necessary. Absent such, DHS was precluded 

from seeking to terminate parental rights. Father's point of 

error lacks merit. 

 We review the Family Court's subject matter 

jurisdiction de novo. In re Doe, 96 Hawai‘i 272, 283, 30 P.3d 

878, 889 (2001) (citation omitted). We also review the Family 

Court's interpretation of a statute de novo. In re Doe, 

90 Hawai‘i 246, 250, 978 P.2d 684, 688 (1999) (citation omitted). 

 HRS § 587A-33(i) is not a jurisdictional statute. The 

Family Court's jurisdiction is set forth in HRS § 571-11(9) 

(Supp. 2021) and HRS § 587A-5. HRS § 571-11(9) provides in 

relevant part, "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, 

the court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in 

proceedings: . . . (9) For the protection of any child under 

chapter 587A[.]" HRS § 571-11(9). HRS § 587A-5 (2018) 

provides: 

Pursuant to section 571-11(9), the court shall have 

exclusive original jurisdiction: 

(1) In a child protective proceeding concerning any 

child who is or was found within the State at the 

time specified facts and circumstances occurred, are 

discovered, or are reported to the department. These 

facts and circumstances constitute the basis for the 

court's finding that the child's physical or 

psychological health or welfare is subject to 

imminent harm, has been harmed, or is subject to 

threatened harm by the acts or omissions of the 

child's family; and 

(2) In any prior child protective proceeding under 

chapter 587, the former Child Protective Act.
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Here, the Petition and TPR Motion are proceedings for the 

protection of AO under HRS § 571-11(9) and HRS § 587A-5. As 

such, the Family Court had jurisdiction over the proceedings. 

 Father's interpretation of HRS § 587A-33(i) is 

incorrect. 

When construing a statute, the starting point is the 

language of the statute itself. Courts are bound to give 

effect to all parts of a statute, and that no clause, 

sentence, or word shall be construed as superfluous, void, 

or insignificant if a construction can be legitimately 

found which will give force to and preserve all words of 

the statute. Words are given their common meaning unless 

some wording in the statute requires a different 

interpretation. 

In re Doe, 90 Hawai‘i at 250, 978 P.2d at 688 (citations, 

brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). The plain 

language of HRS § 587A-33(i): (1) indicates that the time for 

DHS to file a motion to terminate parental rights is qualified 

in its entirety by compelling reasons, and (2) contemplates the 

possibility of a child remaining in foster care for more than 

twenty-two months by narrowing the statutory time frame to the 

"most recent" twenty-two months. See HRS § 587A-33(i). As 

such, any purported untimeliness and a child's placement in 

foster care for more than twenty-two months does not, standing 

alone, preclude DHS from filing a motion to terminate parental 

rights. 

 Here, the record also reflects the Family Court set 

forth compelling reasons justifying DHS's filing of the TPR 

Motion beyond the general time frame set forth in HRS § 

587A-33(i). At the conclusion of trial on January 14, 2022, the 

Family Court found that "compelling reasons exist[ed] to delay 

the filing" of the TPR Motion because, among other things, 

Father "did not make an appearance in this case until December 

6, 2019" and that any "alleged delay" was to "specifically give 
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[Father] additional time to formally appear, be appointed a 

lawyer and potentially begin a service plan." The Family Court 

concluded that any "alleged delay of filing the Motion for 

Termination of Parental Right was done to potentially benefit 

[Father][.]" Father makes no argument contesting these 

"compelling reasons." See HRS § 587A-33(i). 

 (2) Father contends that the Family Court violated HRS 

§ 587A-33(a)(1) and (a)(2) because it failed to require DHS to 

prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father's family in 

California was unable to provide AO with a "safe family home," 

as defined under HRS § 587A-7, prior to terminating Father's 

parental rights. In support, Father objects to FOFs 14, 51, 

82-83, 92-94, 105, and COLs 10-13. Father's argument is without 

merit. 

 "Generally, the family court possesses wide discretion 

in making its decisions and those decisions will not be set 

aside unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion." In re 

Doe, 95 Hawai‘i 183, 189, 20 P.3d 616, 622 (2001) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). This court — interpreting 

HRS § 587-73 (a)(1) and (a)(2)7 — explained: 

7 HRS § 587-73 (a)(1) and (a)(2) (2009) (repealed 2010) provided: 

(a) At the permanent plan hearing, the court shall 

consider fully all relevant prior and current information 

pertaining to the safe family home guidelines, as set forth 

in section 587-25, including but not limited to the report 

or reports submitted pursuant to section 587-40, and 

determine whether there exists clear and convincing 

evidence that: 

(1) The child's legal mother, legal father, adjudicated, 

presumed, or concerned natural father as defined under 

chapter 578 are not presently willing and able to provide 

the child with a safe family home, even with the assistance 

of a service plan; 

(2) It is not reasonably foreseeable that the child's 

legal mother, legal father, adjudicated, presumed, or 

concerned natural father as defined under chapter 578 will 

become willing and able to provide the child with a safe 
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[W]hen the parent is not presently willing and able to 

provide the child(ren) with a safe family home and it is 

not reasonably foreseeable that the parent will become 

willing and able to provide the child(ren) with a safe 

family home within a reasonable period of time which shall 

not exceed two years from the date upon which the 

child(ren) were first placed under foster custody by the 

court, the fact that the parent has a relative who is 

presently willing and able to provide the child(ren) with a 

safe family home until the parent's eventual release from 

confinement is not a basis for denying a motion by DHS for 

termination of the parent's parental rights.

In re T Children, 113 Hawai‘i 492, 499, 155 P.3d 675, 682 (App. 

2007) (emphases added).8 

 More particularly, under HRS § 587A-33(a)(1) and 

(a)(2), the Family Court must determine if there is clear and 

convincing evidence that the "child's parent whose rights are 

subject to termination" is not presently willing and able to 

provide the child with a "safe family home," and that it is not 

reasonably foreseeable that such parent will become willing and 

able to provide child with a "safe family home" within a 

reasonable period of time, not to exceed two years from child's 

entry into foster care. (Emphasis added). In this regard, HRS 

§ 587A-4 defines "parent" as: 

any legal parent of a child; the birth mother, unless the 

child has been legally adopted; the adjudicated, presumed, 

or concerned birth father of the child as provided 

in section 578-2(a)(5), unless the child has been legally 

adopted; or the legal guardians or any other legal 

custodians of the child. 

family home, even with the assistance of a service plan, 

within a reasonable period of time which shall not exceed 

two years from the date upon which the child was first 

placed under foster custody by the court[.] 

8 In 2010, the Legislature repealed and replaced HRS Chapter 587 

with HRS Chapter 587A. 2010 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 135. The provisions of HRS 

§ 587-73(a)(1) and (a)(2) were re-codified as HRS § 587A-33 (a)(1) and 

(a)(3), but remained substantively intact. Thus, the analysis in In re T 

Children applies to HRS § 587A-33(a)(1) and (a)(2). 
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"Family home" is defined as "the home of the child's legal 

custodian." HRS § 587A-4. Further, "[s]afe family home 

factors" is defined as "a list of criteria that must be 

considered in determining whether a parent is able to provide a 

safe family home as set out herein in section 587A-7." Id. 

 Given the requirements under HRS § 587A-33(a)(1) and 

(a)(2), and the relevant statutory definitions, we conclude that 

Father's argument -- that his parental rights should not have 

been terminated because his family in California could provide a 

safe family home for the child -- is without merit. The Family 

Court found, and it is not contested, that Father was nonexistent in AO's life when AO was placed with DHS, in an initial 

interview AO did not know his Father's name or whereabouts, 

Father resides in Mexico, and Father testified he did not want 

AO to live with him in Mexico but wanted AO to live with 

Father's family in California. 

 Here, because Father was unable to provide AO with a 

safe family home at the time, or within a reasonably foreseeable 

period of time, Father's family's willingness and ability to 

provide AO with a safe family home was not a basis to deny the 

TPR Motion. See id. Thus, the Family Court's termination of 

Father's parental rights based upon Father's inability to 

provide AO with a safe family home, irrespective of Father's 

family's ability to provide AO with a safe family home, did not 

constitute an abuse of discretion, and we do not address whether 

Father's family met the safe family home factors.9 

9 The Family Court's TPR Order also ordered the June 16, 2020 

Permanent Plan, which DHS recognizes is for AO's adoption to an appropriate 

caregiver. In its answering brief, DHS notes that an October 25, 2021 Safe 

Family Home Report stated that DHS could continue to assess placement with 

relatives for AO, even after permanent custody is attained. Further, AO's 

GAL noted in its answering brief that Father's family is being considered as 

a placement option, and in its supplemental answering brief noted that 

appropriate placement for AO is a separate issue from terminating Father's 

parental rights which could be addressed through a placement hearing pursuant 

to HRS § 587A-31. 
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 Father's objections to various FOFs and COLs are also 

without merit. As a threshold matter, Father fails to provide a 

concise legal argument about each contested FOF and COL. See 

Rules Expediting Child Protective Appeals Rule 11(a)(4). 

Nonetheless, our review of the record shows substantial evidence 

to support FOFs 14, 51, 82-83, 92-94, and 105, and COLs 12-13; 

they are not clearly erroneous and stand on appeal. See In re 

Doe, 95 Hawai‘i at 190, 20 P.3d at 623 (requiring substantial 

evidence to support FOFs and mixed FOFs/COLs on appellate 

review) (citation omitted). COLs 10 and 1110 accurately 

summarize HRS § 587A-7 and -33(a), and thus stand on appeal. 

See id. (explaining that "COLs are reviewed on appeal de novo, 

under the right/wrong standard") (citations omitted). 

 (3) Father contends that the Family Court erred by 

failing to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that RCGs 

were responsible and competent parents. Father points to no 

legal authority, and we find none, in support of Father's 

interpretation of HRS § 587A-33(a)(3)(A). In contrast, the 

plain language of HRS § 587A-33(a)(3) requires the Family Court 

to determine whether there exists clear and convincing evidence 

10 COLs 10 and 11 provide: 

10. In determining whether the criteria as set forth in 

HRS § 587A-33 (a) have been established by clear and 

convincing evidence, the court must consider fully all 

prior and current information related to the safe family 

home factors, as set forth in HRS § 587A-7, as to each 

child in the family individually. 

11. A parent's participation in services is only one 

criterion of the safe family home factors, as stated in 

HRS § 587A-7, in determining the parent's ability to 

provide a safe family home. Not one criterion in the safe 

family home guidelines, standing alone, is dispositive of 

whether a parent can provide a safe family home. In re 

Doe, 95 Hawai‘i at 183, 20 P.3d at 616 (2001). The parent 

must be able to demonstrate the ability to provide a safe 

family home for the child(ren). Id. HRS § 587A-7(a). 
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that the proposed permanent plan is in the best interests of a 

child. See HRS § 587A-33(a)(3). Here, the Family Court 

determined that the Permanent Plan was in AO's best interest, 

and Father does not contest this determination. As such, 

Father's third point of error is without merit. 

 For the reasons discussed above, the January 24, 2022 

Order Terminating Parental Rights entered by the Family Court of 

the Third Circuit is affirmed. 

 DATED: Honolulu, Hawai‘i, March 16, 2023. 

On the briefs: 

Ted H.S. Hong, 

for Respondent-Appellant 

Father. 

Lance S. Kobashigawa, 

Julio C. Herrera, 

Deputy Attorneys General 

for Petitioner-Appellee 

Department of Human Services. 

Laura J. Knudsen, 

The Children's Law Project of 

Hawai‘i 

Guardian ad litem 

/s/ Lisa M. Ginoza 

Chief Judge 

/s/ Keith K. Hiraoka 

Associate Judge 

/s/ Karen T. Nakasone 

Associate Judge