This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1127 State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs. Nicolas Martinez-Feliciano, Appellant. Filed July 5, 2016 Affirmed Schellhas, Judge Dakota County District Court File No. 19HA-CR-14-1655 Lori Swanson, Attorney Gene ral, St. Paul, Minnesota; and James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Elizabeth Swank, Assistant County Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Larkin, Pr esiding Judge; Schellh as, Judge; and Smith, John, Judge. *

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.2 U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N SCHELLHAS , Judge Appellant argues that his conviction of fi rst-degree criminal sexual conduct is not supported by sufficient evidence. We affirm. FACTS On May 9, 2014, at about 9:30 p.m., M.M. returned home after running an errand. As she approached the bedroom that she shared with her boyfriend, appellant Nicolas Martinez-Feliciano, and her nine -year-old daughter C.M., M.M. noticed that the door to the bedroom was “kind of closed.” M.M. found this to be unusual because, as she put it, “we would never close that door.” M.M. en tered the darkened room and saw movement. She turned on the light and saw C.M. lying “at the edge of the bed” covered with a blanket and Martinez-Feliciano standing “by the corner of the bed” with his pants unzipped and “somewhat down.” M.M. began hitting Martinez- Feliciano and yelling for he r son. When MartinezFeliciano fled to the bathroom, M.M. approa ched C.M., hugged her, and asked her what had happened. M.M. then no ticed that C.M.’s pants and underwear were pulled down almost to her knees. M.M. touched C.M.’s legs and asked her, “‘[D]id he touch you here?’” C.M. said, “‘[N]o, where he t ouch[ed] me was here,’ pointing her finger to in between her legs.” M.M. went into the bathroom and co nfronted Martinez-Felic iano, who responded, “‘I didn’t do anything, I didn’t do anything .’” With the assistance of her son, M.M. removed Martinez-Feliciano from their home. According to M.M., “When we got3 [Martinez-Feliciano] out of the house he knelt down and he said, ‘[P ]lease forgive me, I won’t do that again.’” M.M. and her son summoned and spoke with police, who located MartinezFeliciano at a neighbor’s home and arrested hi m. C.M. was transported by ambulance to a hospital, where Laurel Edin burgh, a pediatric nurse practitioner, spoke with M.M. and conducted a medical interview and examination of C.M. in the early morning hours of May 10, 2014. C.M. indicated to Edinbur gh that Martinez-Feliciano touched C.M.’s genitals with his penis on “many” occasions , including the previous night. C.M. also indicated to Edinburgh that Martinez-Feliciano ej aculated onto C.M.’s body on at least one occasion but that he did not ejaculate onto her body the previous night. During the medical examination, Edinburgh swabbed C.M.’s genital area; forensic testing of the swab showed the presence of male DNA of which Martinez- Feliciano could not be excluded as being a contributor. Edinburgh ultimat ely made a clinical diagnosis of child sexual abuse. Respondent State of Minnesota charge d Martinez-Feliciano with first-degree criminal sexual conduct (bare genital-to-genital sexual contac t between complainant under 13 years of age and actor more than 36 months older than complainant), second-degree criminal sexual conduct (multiple instances of sexual contact where actor has significant relationship with complainant under 16 year s of age), second-degree criminal sexual conduct (sexual contact between complainant under 13 years of age a nd actor more than 36 months older than complainant), and fifth- degree criminal sexual conduct (masturbation or lewd exhibition of genita ls in presence of minor).4 At a three-day bench trial, the state presented the testimony of C.M., M.M., Edinburgh, police officers, a nd forensic scientists. The st ate also admitted exhibits, including a video recording of Edinburgh’s medical interview of C.M. and an audio recording of Edinburgh’s medical examination of C.M. Martinez-Feliciano testified in his own defense, claiming that he entered the sh ared bedroom on the evening of May 9, 2014, to charge his phone and denying that he had sexual contact with C.M. on that night or at any other time. The district court then found Martinez-Feliciano guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, guilty of both counts of se cond-degree criminal sexual conduct, and not guilty of fifth-degree criminal se xual conduct, and it sentenced Martinez-Feliciano to 150 months’ imprisonment for firs t-degree criminal sexual conduct. This appeal follows. D E C I S I O N “[Appellate courts] use the same standard of review in benc h trials and in jury trials in evaluating the sufficien cy of the evidence.” State v. Palmer , 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011). Under that standard, “[appellat e courts] carefully ex amine the record to determine whether the facts a nd the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the [fact-finder] to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Fox , 868 N.W.2d 206, 223 (Minn. 2015), cert. denied , 136 S. Ct. 509 (2015). “[Appellate courts] view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the verdict, and assume that the fact-finder disbelieved any evidence that conflicte d with the verdict.” Id. “The verdict will not be overturned if the fact-finder, upon application of the presump tion of innocence and th e State’s burden of5 proving an offense beyond a re asonable doubt, could reasona bly have found the defendant guilty of the charged offense.” Id. Martinez-Feliciano challenges the sufficien cy of the evidence to support his conviction of first-degree criminal sexual cond uct. The elements of that crime are (1) a complainant under 13 years of age, (2) an actor more than 36 months older than the complainant, and (3) sexual contact between the actor and the complainant, defined as “the intentional touching of the comp lainant’s bare genitals . . . by the actor’s bare genitals . . . with sexual . . . intent.” Minn. Stat. §§ 609 .341, subd. 11(c), .342 , subd. 1(a) (2012). According to Martinez-Feliciano, the state’s evidence was insu fficient to prove that he had sexual contact with C.M. on May 9, 2014. But the state presented direct evidence of sexual contact: C.M.’s testimony that, on May 9, 2014, Martinez-Feliciano pulled down her pants and underwear, lay down on top of her in the shared bed, and “put [his penis] in [her vagina].” The state introduced evidence to corroborate C.M.’s testimony, including M.M.’s testimony that on May 9 she entered the shared bedroom to find C.M. lying “at the edge of the bed” with her pants and underwear halfway down her legs and Martin ez-Feliciano standing “by the corner of the bed” with his pants unzipped and “somewha t down.” C.M.’s testimony was corroborated further by evidence that a swab of C.M.’s genital area re vealed the presence of male DNA of which Martinez-Feliciano co uld not be excluded as bei ng a contributor. Moreover, C.M.’s testimony was largely consistent with her prior disclosures of sexual abuse, which were introduced into eviden ce through the testimony of M.M. and Edinburgh and through the recordings of Edinburgh’ s medical interview and exam ination of C.M. And M.M.6 testified that after she and her son rem oved Martinez-Feliciano from their home shortly after Martinez-Feliciano’s alleged sexual abus e of C.M., Martinez-Feliciano “knelt down and he said, ‘[P]leas e forgive me, I won’ t do that again.’” The district court found th e testimony of C.M. and M.M. to be credible and found that Martinez-Feliciano’s denials of sexual cont act with C.M. were not credible. The court further found that “any doubt as to whether [the male] DNA [on the swab taken from C.M.’s genital area] came fro m [Martinez-Feliciano] is so mi nute as to be unreasonable.” We accept these findings without reservation. See State v. Al-Naseer , 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (recognizing that “the trier of fact is in the best position to determine credibility and weig h the evidence”); State v. Super , 781 N.W.2d 390, 396 (Minn. App. 2010) (stating that “[t]he factfinder is the exclusive judge of witness credibility”), review denied (Minn. June 29, 2010). Against the backdrop of the district court’s underlying findings, and viewed in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, the record shows th at the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn therefrom permitted the court reasonably to find that Martinez-Feliciano, with sexual intent, intentionally touched C.M.’s bare genitals with his own bare genitals on May 9, 2014. We conclude that sufficien t evidence supports Martinez-Feliciano’s conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Affirmed.