UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4782

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ALISON PAIGE HILL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior 

District Judge. (5:14-cr-00079-F-4)

Submitted: October 19, 2016 Decided: November 4, 2016

Before TRAXLER, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

Elisa Cyre Salmon, SALMON LAW FIRM, LLP, Lillington, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, Acting United States 

Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Barbara D. Kocher, Assistant 

United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Alison Paige Hill pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea 

agreement, to conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, dispense, and 

produce with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of 

methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). She was sentenced within 

her advisory Guidelines range to 108 months in prison. However, 

with respect to her supervised release, the district court varied 

upward and imposed a 10-year term. On appeal, Hill challenges the 

district court’s decisions with respect to certain Guidelines in 

fashioning her sentence, the reasonableness of her Guidelines 

sentence, and the reasonableness of her 10-year variant term of 

supervised release. The Government seeks to enforce the appellate 

waiver as to all but the last claim. For the reasons that follow, 

we dismiss in part and affirm in part. 

“We review the validity of an appeal waiver de novo, and will 

enforce the waiver if it is valid and the issue appealed is within 

the scope of the waiver.” United States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d 

522, 528 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The 

validity of an appeal waiver depends on whether the defendant 

knowingly and intelligently agreed to waive the right to appeal.” 

United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 169 (4th Cir 2005). To 

determine whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent, we examine 

“the totality of the circumstances . . ., including the 

background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Id. (internal 
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quotation marks omitted). “Generally, if a district court 

questions a defendant regarding the waiver of appellate rights 

during the [plea] colloquy and the record indicates that the 

defendant understood the full significance of the waiver, the 

waiver is valid.” Copeland, 707 F.3d at 528 (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

In her plea agreement, Hill waived her right to appeal her

“conviction and whatever sentence is imposed on any ground, 

including any issues that relate to the establishment of the 

advisory Guideline range, reserving only the right to appeal from 

a sentence in excess of the applicable advisory Guideline range 

that is established at sentencing.” The language of this appeal 

waiver is clear and unambiguous, and the record reveals that Hill 

understood the full significance of the waiver. The court also 

confirmed that Hill was competent to plead guilty and was entering

her plea in the absence of threats, force, or promises outside of 

those contained in the plea agreement. Accordingly, we conclude 

that Hill’s appeal waiver is valid and enforceable as to issues 

within its scope. 

In her first two claims, Hill argues that the district court 

erred in imposing an enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 

Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2015) for possession of a firearm in 

connection with her drug offense and (2) denying her a reduction 

under USSG § 3B1.2 for her mitigating role. In her third claim, 
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she argues that her 108-month Guidelines sentence and 10-year 

variant term of supervised release are unreasonable. Hill’s 

challenges to her within-Guidelines sentence of 108 months’ 

imprisonment are clearly within the scope of, and consequently, 

barred by the appellate waiver. We therefore dismiss these claims.

Because the district court imposed an upward variance on the 

supervised release term, however, Hill’s challenge to this aspect 

of her sentence is outside the scope of the waiver. Hill argues 

that the district court did not explain why a 10-year term of 

supervised release was necessary or why the 4-to-5-year advisory 

Guidelines range was inadequate to address its concerns. Because 

Hill did not object to the term of supervised release below, this 

court reviews the record for plain error. United States v. Webb, 

738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). To establish plain error, Hill 

must show (1) that the district court erred, (2) that the error is 

clear or obvious, and (3) that the error affected her substantial 

rights, meaning that it “affected the outcome of the district court 

proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–34 (1993). 

Even when this burden is met, this court has discretion whether to 

recognize the error and may deny relief unless the district court’s 

error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 736.

A “term of supervised release . . . [is] part of the 

sentence,” United States v. Evans, 159 F.3d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 
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1998), and is therefore reviewed for reasonableness. Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). If a sentence is 

procedurally reasonable, this court reviews for “substantive 

reasonableness . . . under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”

United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). The 

sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to 

comply with the purposes” of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

(2012). 

A district court is required to consider the following factors 

when determining the length of a term of supervised release: the 

nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and 

characteristics of the defendant, deterrence, protection of the 

public, the need to provide the defendant with treatment or care, 

the applicable sentencing range, public policy, and any need for 

restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) (2012). 

Here, the district court noted the severity of 

methamphetamine addiction and expressly considered Hill’s troubled 

youth, addiction, and criminal history. The court stressed that 

Hill had a history of probation violations and that she had 

committed the instant offense while on a sentence of probation. 

The court then tailored a term of supervised release that would 

monitor future criminal activity and payments of restitution, 

noting the upward variance was warranted in light of the nature 

and circumstances of the offense, the dangers of methamphetamine 
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production, and the need to protect the community. The 10-year 

term was well within the statutory maximum supervised release term 

of life. We conclude that the supervised release variance was 

procedurally and substantively reasonable and, therefore, affirm 

this portion of Hill’s sentence. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

DISMISSED IN PART; 

AFFIRMED IN PART