[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-13578

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

WILLEMS CALIXTE, JR., 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 0:20-cr-60153-WPD-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13578

Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Willems Calixte, Jr. appeals his conviction and sentence for 

possession of a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). On appeal, Calixte challenges the applicability of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) 

(“ACCA”) and the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). After 

careful review of the parties’ arguments, we affirm.

I

We review de novo whether a prior state conviction qualifies as a “violent felony” under the ACCA. See United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1341 (11th Cir. 2014). However, “we review 

unpreserved sentencing objections only for plain error.” United 

States v. Corbett, 921 F.3d 1032, 1037 (11th Cir. 2019). 

The ACCA requires that any person who violates 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g) serve a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years when 

he has three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug 

offenses committed on separate occasions. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). 

In Borden v. United States, the Supreme Court concluded that a criminal offense with a mens rea of recklessness cannot qualify as a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s elements clause to enhance a 

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21-13578 Opinion of the Court 3

defendant’s sentence. 593 U.S. 420, 423–24, 429 (2021) (plurality 

opinion); id. at 446 (Thomas, J., concurring).1

In Somers v. United States, we relied on the Florida Supreme 

Court’s determination that state-law aggravated assault requires a 

mens rea of at least knowing conduct and could not be committed 

recklessly to hold that Florida aggravated assault “categorically 

qualifies” as a violent felony under the ACCA’s elements clause, 

even after Borden. 66 F.4th 890, 896 (11th Cir. 2023). And in United 

States v. Fritts, we held that a conviction under Florida’s armed-robbery statute “categorically qualifies” as a violent felony under the 

ACCA based on the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation that a 

violent act was required. 841 F.3d 937, 942–43 (11th Cir. 2016).

Under the prior precedent rule, “a prior panel’s holding is 

binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or 

undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or 

this court sitting en banc.” United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 

1352 (11th Cir. 2008). 

Here, as an initial matter, because Calixte failed to challenge 

the applicability of the ACCA before the district court, we review 

his current arguments only for plain error. Corbett, 921 F.3d at 

1037. We find no error, plain or otherwise, because Calixte’s 

1When the Supreme Court decides a case and “no single rationale explaining 

the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be 

viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 

(1977) (quotation marks omitted). 

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-13578

arguments that his aggravated assault and armed robbery convictions are not violent felonies under the ACCA are foreclosed by our 

binding precedent. Somers, 66 F.4th at 890, 896; Fritts, 841 F.3d at 

942–43. To the extent that Calixte contends that our precedent was 

overturned by Borden, we disagree; that decision did not overturn 

or undermine our previous holdings to the point of abrogation. See 

Somers, 66 F.4th at 895–96; Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352.2 

Accordingly, we affirm in this respect.

II

Under federal law, a person who has been convicted of a 

crime punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment may not 

possess a firearm or ammunition that has moved through interstate 

or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In United States v. 

Rozier, we held that § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on possession of firearms by felons was a “constitutional avenue to restrict the Second 

Amendment right of certain classes of people.” 598 F.3d 768, 771 

(11th Cir. 2010). We have since held that Rozier was not abrogated 

by New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). 

United States v. Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284, 1293 (11th Cir. 2024). Therefore, Calixte’s argument that § 922(g)(1) violates the Second 

Amendment in light of Bruen is foreclosed by our binding precedent. 

2 Because at least three of Calixte’s prior felonies were qualifying violent felonies under our binding precedent, we decline to examine whether a Florida 

armed-kidnapping conviction qualifies as a violent felony.

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Accordingly, we affirm in this respect as well.

AFFIRMED.

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