NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

ANDREW MICHAEL YOUNG, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 17-0328

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2016-005474-001

The Honorable Carolyn K. Passamonte, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Jesse Finn Turner

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 4-12-2018
STATE v. YOUNG

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the decision of the court, in which Presiding 

Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

S W A N N, Judge:

¶1 This is an appeal under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), from Andrew Michael 

Young’s conviction for assault and the court’s imposition of probation. 

Neither Young nor his counsel identify any issues for appeal. We have 

reviewed the record for fundamental error. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 

259 (2000); Anders, 386 U.S. 738; State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30 (App. 

1999). We find none.

¶2 A grand jury indicted Young for assault of T.I., as a class 2 

misdemeanor under A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(2). Young pled not guilty, and the 

matter proceeded to a bench trial.

¶3 At trial, the state presented evidence of the following facts. 

On the evening of November 25, 2015, teenaged J.M. drove three of his 

teenaged friends — T.I., J.B., and T.W. — through an Anthem neighborhood 

on a golf cart. The group was talking and laughing but not yelling, and 

they exclaimed when J.M. made a sharp turn to take the cart to a 

neighborhood park. The cart may have gone onto the sidewalk when J.M.

made the turn, and he briefly drove on the sidewalk to avoid a street gutter. 

But he did not drive on any private property, and the group did not see any 

residents outside of the houses they passed.

¶4 At the park, J.M. drove the group in donuts on the grass. 

After only a few minutes, however, he stopped because he saw the 

headlight of an approaching dirt bike. The teenagers initially assumed that 

the driver was J.M.’s stepfather. But it was Young, the owner of a house 

near the path that the group took to the park. Young stopped his bike on 

the grass directly in front of the cart, dismounted, and began yelling and 

cursing. He accused the teenagers of having intruded on his property, 

asked where they lived, demanded to talk to their parents, and made a 

statement to the effect either that they were lucky he had not shot them or 

that he would shoot them if they returned. And when T.I. stepped off the 

back of the golf cart, Young pinned him to the ground face-first, bending 
STATE v. YOUNG

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3

T.I.’s arm behind him and placing his knee on T.I.’s back. Young released

T.I. after one of the other teenagers told him that T.I. was a minor and J.M. 

promised to show him to J.M.’s house. T.I. climbed back onto the golf cart, 

and J.M. drove the cart to his house with Young following on his bike. T.I. 

and J.B. went to J.B.’s nearby house, either getting dropped off by J.M. or 

walking from J.M.’s house.

¶5 At J.M.’s house, Young spoke briefly to J.M.’s stepfather. 

Young told the stepfather that the teenagers had been driving donuts in the 

park. He made no mention of any driving on his property, or of his physical 

contact with T.I. The stepfather told Young that he would handle the 

situation, and Young left.

¶6 Meanwhile, at J.B.’s house, J.B. told others what had 

happened to T.I., and T.I. began crying from shock and pain. Not long 

thereafter, all of the teenagers’ parents were apprised of the situation and 

they assembled with their children at J.M.’s house. The adults soon decided 

to call law enforcement, and a sheriff’s deputy promptly responded to 

J.M.’s house. The deputy spoke to each of the teenagers separately and had 

them provide individual written statements. Each recounted that Young 

had pinned T.I. to the ground. J.M., who had recognized Young from the 

neighborhood, showed law enforcement to Young’s house and made an inperson identification.

¶7 Other deputies interviewed Young and Young’s wife. 

Young’s wife reported that she had been outside the couple’s residence that 

evening and had seen the golf cart drive onto the driveway. She heard the 

occupants yell that they needed to leave before they got shot. She went 

inside the house and told Young what had happened. According to Young, 

he looked outside and saw that the golf cart was driving at the nearby park. 

Young stated that he confronted the teenagers at the park and one of them 

approached him, but he did not touch any of them.

¶8 Young moved for a judgment of acquittal under Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 20. The court denied the motion.

¶9 For his case, Young presented his and his wife’s testimony. 

Both testified consistently with what they had told law enforcement. 

Young added that he was a police officer with no disciplinary record and, 

though not on duty at the time, could have arrested T.I. He also testified 

that the take-down technique the teenagers described was not one in which 

he was trained. He finally testified that his police department was aware 

of the assault charge, but the consequences of a conviction would be up to 
STATE v. YOUNG

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his superiors and it was his understanding that a conviction would not 

negatively impact his career.

¶10 The court found Young guilty as charged, suspended the 

imposition of sentence, and imposed four months of unsupervised 

probation. Young timely filed a notice of appeal.

¶11 We find no fundamental error. Young was present and 

represented at all critical stages. He was properly afforded a bench trial. 

See Derendal v. Griffith, 209 Ariz. 416, 425, ¶ 37 (2005); A.R.S. §§ 13-

1203(A)(2), (B), -707(A)(2). And the evidence was sufficient to support his 

conviction. A person commits assault under A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(2) if he or 

she “[i]ntentionally plac[es] another person in reasonable apprehension of 

imminent physical injury.” The state presented substantial evidence that 

Young intentionally placed T.I. in reasonable apprehension of imminent 

physical injury. The teenagers all testified that Young drove directly to 

them, yelled and cursed at them, accused them of intruding on his property, 

and made a statement about shooting them. Moreover, according to the 

teenagers, Young pinned T.I. to the ground, immobilized T.I.’s arm, and 

placed his knee on T.I.’s back. The teenagers’ credibility was for the court 

to decide. State v. Hickle, 129 Ariz. 330, 331–32 (1981).

¶12 We note that the prosecutor, in closing argument, 

characterized Young’s testimony that a conviction would not harm his 

career as “just flat out . . . not the truth” and “simply not true,” because it 

“could have drastic consequences on his career, the officer integrity list, and 

things of that nature . . . and it could be devastating to his career.” Counsel 

is afforded considerable latitude in closing argument, and may draw 

reasonable inferences from the evidence, including, in some circumstances, 

the characterization of the defendant as a liar. State v. Miniefield, 110 Ariz. 

599, 602 (1974); see also United States v. Poole, 735 F.3d 269, 276–78 (5th Cir. 

2013). Here, however, the prosecutor’s criticism of Young’s testimony was 

not supported by any evidence. But even if the prosecutor’s statements 

constituted prosecutorial misconduct, they did not rise to the level of 

misconduct requiring reversal. See State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 79, ¶ 26 

(1998) (holding that reversal for prosecutorial misconduct is warranted only 

when the misconduct, viewed cumulatively, “so infected the trial with 

unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process” and 

was “so pronounced and persistent that it permeate[d] the entire 

atmosphere of the trial” (citations omitted)).

¶13 We affirm Young’s conviction. We also affirm the probation 

term, which was proper under A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(2), (B), -901(A), and 
STATE v. YOUNG

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-902(A)(6). Defense counsel’s obligations pertaining to this appeal have 

come to an end. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85 (1984). Unless, 

upon review, counsel discovers an issue appropriate for petition for review 

to the Arizona Supreme Court, counsel must only inform Young of the 

status of this appeal and his future options. Id. Young has 30 days from the 

date of this decision to file a petition for review in propria persona. See Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 31.21(b)(2)(A). Upon the court’s own motion, Young has 30 days 

from the date of this decision in which to file a motion for reconsideration.