* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Th e case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines o f law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JUN 15 1998 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES ARTHUR COOPER, Defendant-Appellant. No. 97-4181 (D.C. No. 95-CR-169C) (D. Utah)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BALDOCK , EBEL, and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
Defendant/Appellant Charles Arthur Cooper (“Cooper” ) was convicted of being a felon in possession of a weapon, in violati on of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and of possession of an unregistered firearm, in violationof 26 U.S.C. § 5861. Cooper claims that the district court denied him of his ri ght to present a complete defense- 2 -

by refusing to allow him to present evidence relate d to his mental state. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 129 1, and we affirm. Background The facts underlying this appeal are not in dispute . Police officers in Moab, Utah responded to a call that a man had been seen brandishing a sawed-off shotgun during an altercation with a woman outside a convenience store; the woman identified the man as Cooper, and indicated t hat he was an acquaintance of hers. (See Tr. Rec. Vol. II at 20-24, 27.) Officers apprehen ded Cooper at a Moab trailer park. (See id. at 24-35.) In Cooper’s vehicle officers found a l oaded sawed-off shotgun, two loaded pistols, and an unloa ded rifle. (See id . at 43-50.) Cooper, who stipulated that he was a convicted felo n, was indicted with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in vio lation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and with one count of possession of an unregistered weapon, namely the sawed-off shotgun, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) and 26 U.S.C. § 5871. At trial, Cooper sought to present evidenc e of the effect on him of the death of his girlfriend’s step-son, Paul Plumb, who se death had been attributed by the police to a hit-and-run accident, but which Coo per believed to be an intentional homicide. The district court limited the admission of evidence of Cooper’s mental state to only that evidence tending to show that he did not know he was in possession of a firearm or that he did not know the characteristics of the firearm.- 3 -

(See Tr. Rec. Vol. II at 91-97.) The district court r efused to allow any evidence offered in support a justification defense or to sh ow that Cooper was so agitated that he did not think about being a restricted pers on. (See id. ) The district court concluded that Cooper’s motive for carrying a firearm was not relevant to the issue of his knowledge that he was in possession of a fir earm or his knowledge of the characteristics of that firearm. (See id. )
Discussion In his brief on appeal, Cooper acknowledges that § 922(g) is a general intent crime, and that the motive for the possession of a gun by a felon is irrelevant to that crime. (See Aplt. Br. at 5-6.) At trial, Cooper waived the af firmative defenses of insanity, duress, and justification. (S ee Tr. Rec. 8/18 at 87-97.) Thus, on appeal Cooper is limited to arguing that the dis trict court erred in refusing to allow him to present evidence that would tend to sh ow that his mental state precluded him from forming the requisite general intent to possess a gun. We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.
See United States v. Janusz , 135 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1998). It is clea rly established law in this circuit that in order for t he government to obtain a conviction for violation of § 922(g)(1) it need onl y prove that “(1) the defendant was convicted of a felony; (2) the defendant therea fter knowingly possessed a firearm; and (3) the possession was in or affecting interstate commerce.” United- 4 -

States v. Mains , 33 F.3d. 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 1994). Not only m ust the government prove that the defendant knew he had pos session of a gun, it must also prove that he was aware of the “‘the particular cha racteristics that made his gun a statutory firearm.’” United States v. Reed , 114 F.3d 1053, 1056-57 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Mains , 33 F.3d at 1229). However, the defendant’s motiv e for possessing a weapon is irrelevant to the crime. Se e United States v. DeSoto , 950 F.2d 626, 632 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing cases). On appeal, Cooper challenges his conviction only onthe grounds that the district court’s ruling interfered with his abilityto put on evidence tending to show that because of his disturbed mental state he did n ot have sufficient knowledge for conviction under this statute. However, in response to Cooper’s request to present evidence of his mental state, the district court in dicated that Cooper could present any evidence, including his own testimony, that was relevant to the issue of his inability to form the intent to possess a weapon an d his lack of knowledge of the characteristics of the weapon. (See Tr. Rec. Vol. II at 87-97.) Cooper called four lay witnesses, all of whom testified, inter alia, a bout the death of Paul Plumb and its effects upon Cooper’s mental state. (See id. Vol. II at 13-19; 28-34; 56-59; 65- 68.) Moreover, at the end of trial the court instr ucted the jury, inter alia, that in1 We also note that although Cooper was allowed to p ut on evidence

tending to show that his agitated mental state inte rfered with his mens rea, he did not request a jury instruction on the issue of his mental state at the time of the crime. - 5 - order to find Cooper in violation of § 922(g) the j ury had to find that he “knew he was possessing a firearm.” 1 (Supp. Vol. I Jury Instuction #10.) The district court did not abuse its discretion i n ruling that it would allow only evidence of the effect of the death of Paul Pl umb upon Cooper’s ability to know that he was in possession of a gun and his kno wledge of the characteristics of the gun as a firearm. Indeed, it appears on the record before us that the district court did nothing to limit the presentation of suchevidence, even reminding Cooper that he could testify as to the effects of t his upsetting event on his mens rea if he wished. (See Tr. Rec. Vol. II at 91-92,97.) In addition to evidence of the effect of Plumb’s de ath upon his mental state, Cooper argues on appeal that the district court’s ruling prevented him from presenting the following evidence in support of his argument that he lacked the requisite mens rea for the crime: (1) his lengthy s tay in jail just prior to the crime and (2) his suffering of extreme paranoia along with delusions that he heard the voices of dead prison inmates. (See Aplt. Br. at 6.) However, it is not evident in the record on appeal that Cooper ever made a specif ic offer detailing to the district court the content, source, and relevance of this ev idence. Thus, Cooper may not- 6 -

complain on appeal that the district court’s genera lized ruling on the type of evidence that would not be allowed prevented him fr om presenting this specific evidence at trial. See Janusz , 135 F.3d at 1323 (“‘Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unl ess a substantial right of a party is affected and . . . the substance of the ev idence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which the questions were asked.’”) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(2)). For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT

David M. Ebel Circuit Judge