IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

DENNIS VINCENT STANTON, 

Appellant/Cross-Respondent, 

vs. 

TWYLA MARIE STANTON, 

Respondent/Cross-Appellant. 

No. 80910 

FILED 

ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART AND 

REVERSING IN PART 

This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a district court order 

setting aside a divorce decree. Fifth Judicial District Court, Nye County; 

Robert W. Lane, Judge. 

Appellant filed a complaint for divorce in the Eighth Judicial 

District Court, but dismissed it after respondent was appointed legal 

counsel when the court concluded she had a diminished capacity. A month 

later, the parties filed another divorce complaint in the Eighth Judicial 

District Court, but dismissed the action after their peremptory challenge 

was denied and the matter remained assigned to the same District Court 

Judge who had appointed respondent legal counsel in the prior proceedings. 

Shortly thereafter, the parties filed yet another divorce complaint in the 

Fifth Judicial District Court. After the divorce decree in that action was 

entered, respondent relocated to Arkansas where her parents obtained a 

guardianship over her. Thereafter, the parents moved to set aside the 

divorce decree. The parties then reconciled and remarried. At the hearing 

on the motion, appellant's counsel agreed to set aside the divorce decree as 

a moot issue. The district court granted the motion to set aside the divorce 

decree and ordered that the joint petition for divorce was dismissed with 

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prejudice. The court further entered an order awarding respondent's 

temporary guardians attorney fees as sanctions against appellant for 

committing a fraud upon the court by failing to inform the district court 

about the Eighth Judicial District Court proceedings. Both parties 

appealed. 

Because appellant agreed to set aside the divorce decree at the 

hearing, he has waived any challenge he may now have to the district 

court's decision to set it aside. Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev, 49, 

52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (A point not urged in the trial court, unless it 

goes to the jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to have been waived and will 

not be considered on appeal."). Respondent has also waived any challenge 

to the district court's order to set aside the divorce decree because her 

guardians sought it on her behalf and were successful in their motion, see 

NRAP 3A(a) (explaining that only aggrieved parties may appeal a 

judgment), and even if she disagreed with her guardians or they lacked 

standing to file the motion on her behalf, she had notice of the proceedings 

and even filed her own a ffidavit in the matter but did not seek to intervene 

or oppose the motion. 

Regardless of the parties waivers, the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in granting the motion as the court held a hearing on 

the motion and the evidence in the record supports a finding of clear and 

convincing evidence of a fraud upon the court. NRCP 60(d)(3) (permitting 

a district court to "set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court"); NC-DSH, 

Inc. v. Garner, 125 Nev. 647, 658, 218 P.3d 853, 861 (2009) (explaining that 

such motions are "addressed to the sound discretion of the trial coure'). This 

court notes as well that neither appellant nor respondent sought an 

evidentiary hearing nor made any request to call witnesses or present 

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evidence outside of what was provided to the court in the pleadings. 

Therefore, we affirm the district court order in this regard. 

Nevertheless, we conclude the district court abused its 

discretion in sanctioning appellant. See Watson Rounds v. Eighth Judicial 

Dist. Court, 131 Nev. 783, 787, 358 P.3d 228, 231 (2015) ("This court reviews 

sanctions awarding attorney fees for an abuse of discretion."). NRCP 

11(c)(2) permits a party to seek sanctions against an opposing party for 

violations of NRCP 11(b), but requires such request to be made in a separate 

motion and served on the opposing party before being filed with the court, 

providing the opposing party with 21 days to cure the violation. The request 

for sanctions against appellant was not made in a separate motion, it was 

not served on him before it was filed with the district court, and he was not 

provided with an opportunity to cure the violation. Therefore, because the 

proper procedure for sanctioning a party was not followed, the district court 

abused its discretion in sanctioning appellant; and, we reverse this portion 

of the order. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED IN 

PART AND REVERSED IN PART. 

, J. 

Cadish 

A J. 

Pickering 

 j. 

Herndon 

'In light of this order, we need not reach the parties additional 

arguments. 

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cc: Hon. Robert W. Lane, District Judge 

Holley Driggs/Las Vegas 

Law Office of Christopher P. Burke 

Nye County Clerk 

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