NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

_______________________________

 

RODNEY R. ROBERTS, :

 Civil Action No. 

Plaintiff, : 11-1198 (SDW)

 

v. : 

 

JENNIFER VELEZ et al., : O P I N I O N

 

Defendants. :

_______________________________

Wigenton, District Judge:

This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff's

submission of a civil complaint (“Complaint”) and his application

to proceed in this action in forma pauperis. Based on

Plaintiff’s affidavit of indigence, the Court will grant

Plaintiff’s applications to proceed in forma pauperis, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1998), and will order the Clerk to file

the Complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

The Complaint asserts that, starting from 2006 and until

early 2010, Plaintiff was confined at the Special Treatment Unit

at Kearney, New Jersey (“Kearney Facility”), and – during that 1

 Plaintiff is an individual involuntarily committed 1

pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (“SVPA”), N.J.S.A.

30:4-27.24, et seq. 

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period of his confinement – he was periodically evaluated by

medical professionals in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 for placement

in various therapeutic treatment modules. See Docket Entry No.

1, at 4-5. These medical professionals determined that Plaintiff

was fit to participate in some but not in all treatment modules

administered at the Kearney Facility. See id. Plaintiff, who

preferred to attend all modules administered at the Kearney

Facility, concluded that these medical determinations were

discriminating and biased. See id.

It appears that, in 2010, Plaintiff was transferred from the

Kearney Facility to another facility, and – later that year –

from that other facility to a unit within a “lock-up” facility

located in Avenel, New Jersey (“Avenel Unit”). See id. at 5-6. 

Plaintiff: (a) asserts that the Avenel Unit has been populated by

other civilly committed individuals; and (b) notes that he would

have preferred to be housed among the general prison population

of a prison facility, seemingly to avoid the stigma Plaintiff

associates with being housed among civilly committed individuals. 

See id. at 6. Plaintiff also asserts that, since some point in

2010, Plaintiff was denied all forms of therapeutic treatment on

the grounds of Plaintiff being housed at the Avenel Unit; he

maintains that the decision to deny him all forms of treatment

was made by Defendants Paolillo, Canataro and certain unspecified

members of the Avenel Unit Human Services. See id. 

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Plaintiff asserts that: (a) his treatment at the Kearney

Facility was inadequate; (b) his evaluations at the Kearney 2

Facility violated Plaintiff’s equal protection rights because

Plaintiff was allowed to participate only in some, rather than

all, modules; (c) his housing at the Avenel Unit violates his

procedural due process rights; and (d) his lack of any therapy

since 2010 also violates his rights.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A district court is required to review a complaint in a

civil action where the litigant is proceeding in forma pauperis. 

Specifically, the court is required to identify cognizable claims

and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Accordingly, because

Plaintiffs are proceeding in forma pauperis in both abovecaptioned matters, their complaints are subject to sua sponte

screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the

Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the

plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007);

 Plaintiff’s action challenging the adequacy of treatment 2

at the Kearney Facility is among consolidated cases currently

pending before Judge Dennis M. Cavanaugh. See Alves et al. v.

Ferguson et al. (“Alves”), 01-0789 (DMC) (N.J.D.). 

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see also United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). 

The Court must “accept as true all of the allegations in the

complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn

therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902,

906 (3d Cir. 1997). The Court need not, however, credit a pro se

plaintiff’s “bald assertions” or “legal conclusions.” Id. 

Moreover, recently, the Supreme Court clarified the standard

for summary dismissal in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937

(2009), stressing that Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure mandates a complaint to contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Citing its prior decision in

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), for the

proposition that “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and

conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do,’ “Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court identified two

working principles underlying the failure to state a claim

standard:

First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to

legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do

not suffice ... . Rule 8 ... does not unlock the doors of

discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than

conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a

plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. 

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Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not

permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not

“show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.

Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-1950 (citations omitted).

The Court further explained that

a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin

by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than

conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.

While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a

complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.

When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they

plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Id. at 1950; see also Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555, & n.3; Fowler v.

UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009).

Consequently, the Third Circuit observed that Iqbal provides

the “final nail-in-the-coffin for the 'no set of facts' standard”

set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), that 3

applied to federal complaints before Twombly. Fowler, 578 F.3d

at 210. The Third Circuit now requires a district court to

 In Conley, as stated above, a district court was 3

permitted to summarily dismiss a complaint for failure to state a

claim only if “it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle

him to relief. Id., 355 U.S. at 45-46. Under this “no set of

facts” standard, a complaint could effectively survive a motion

to dismiss so long as it contained a bare recitation of the

claim’s legal elements.

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conduct the two-part analysis set forth in Iqbal when presented

with a motion to dismiss, specifically:

First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be

separated. The District Court must accept all of the

complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard

any legal conclusions. [Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50]. 

Second, a District Court must then determine whether the

facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that

the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” [Id.] In

other words, a complaint must do more than allege the

plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to

“show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips,

515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in

Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the

court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,

the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show [n]’-‘that

the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, [129 S.Ct. at

1949-50]. This “plausibility” determination will be “a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-211.

III. SECTION 1983 ACTIONS

Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States or other person within

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress ... .

Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff

must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the

alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting

under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

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(1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir.

1994).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act

The New Jersey SVPA, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 et seq., provides

for the custody, care and treatment of involuntarily committed

persons who are deemed to be sexually violent predators (“SVP”).4

N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26. The New Jersey Department of Corrections

(“DOC”) operates the facilities designated for SVPs, N.J.S.A.

30:4-27.34(a); and the New Jersey Department of Human Services

(“DHS”) provides for their treatment. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.34(b). 

The SVPA was amended in 2003 to require that regulations be

promulgated jointly by the DOC and the DHS, in consultation with 

of the Attorney General, taking “into consideration the rights of

the patients as set forth in section ten of P.L. 1965, c. 59 (C.

30:4-24.2) ... [to] specifically address the differing needs and

 The SVPA defines a SVP as 4

a person who has been convicted, adjudicated delinquent

or found not guilty by reason of insanity for

commission of a sexually violent offense, or has been

charged with a sexually violent offense but found to be

incompetent to stand trial, and suffers from a mental

abnormality or personality disorder that makes the

person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if

not confined in a secure facility for control, care and

treatment.

N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26(b). 

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specific characteristics of, and treatment protocols related to,

sexually violent predators.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.34(d). 5

B. Transfers from One Facility to Another

Plaintiff asserts that his rights were violated by transfers

from the Kearney Facility to another facility, and then to the

Avenel Unit, a unit within a “lock-up” facility having a more

restrictive daily regime than that employed at the Kearney

Facility.6

In Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), the Supreme

Court of the United States examined the conditions of confinement

mandated by Kansas’ Sexually Violent Predator Act (“Kansas Act”),

a legislation substantively indistinguishable – for the purposes

of this Court’s analysis – from the SVPA. The Kansas Act called

for confinement of sexually violent predators in secure

facilities that could be, regime- and conditions-wise, analogized

 In passing the SVPA, the New Jersey Legislature made 5

specific findings regarding SVPs. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.25. The

Legislature noted that it was necessary to modify the previous

civil commitment framework and additionally separate SVPs from

other persons who have been civilly committed. Id.

 Plaintiff paraphrased this line of allegations in terms 6

of his right to stay at the Kearney Facility. However, inmates

have no due process right to choose their specific place of

confinement. See, e.g., Olim v Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245-46

(1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976). Thus,

Plaintiff’s displeasure with being housed at the Avenel Unit

rather than in the Kearney Facility (or his displeasure with

being housed among civilly committed individuals rather than

among general prison population) is not actionable. 

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to a correctional facility. See id., 521 U.S. at 363-64. The 7

Court, however, concluded that housing of civilly committed

individuals at the segregated prison-like unit was not a

violation of these individuals’ constitutional rights, since the

conditions within the unit were essentially the same as those

existing in mental hospitals for involuntarily committed persons

(and since the residents of the segregated unit were receiving

mental treatment under the language of the Kansas Act). See id.,

521 U.S. at 363, 364, 365-368. Consequently, the Court held that

involuntary confinement under the Kansas Act was not

unconstitutional with regard to civilly committed individuals

confined within prison grounds, so long as such civilly committed

individuals were: (a) segregated from the general prison

population; and (b) afforded a treatment comparable to that

provided to other civilly committed persons confined in treatment

units. Id., 521 U.S. at 368-69; see also Seling v. Young, 531

U.S. 250, 261062 (2001) (revisiting the same issue in detail upon

examination of the State of Washington’s version of the SVPA and,

in addition, holding that placement of civilly committed

individuals in a unit located within prison grounds and having

 In fact, while deciding Kansas v. Hendricks, the Supreme 7

Court was unambiguously advised that the sexually violent

predators in Kansas were to be held in a segregated unit within

an actual prison.

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prison-like administrative regime did not violate the Double

Jeopardy Clause was without merit).

In light of the Supreme Court precedent unambiguously

established in Hendricks and Seling, Plaintiff’s allegations

based on the fact of his transfer to the Avenel Unit administered

similarly to a correctional facility (or Plaintiff’s allegations

based on his housing among civilly committed individuals rather

than among prison general population) are facially without merit

and should be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. See In re Commitment of

W.Z., 173 N.J. 109 (2002) (same); accord United States v.

Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010) (addressing a federal statute

under which federal SVPs – whose prison term expired and civil

commitment begun – continued being housed within the same prison

facility where they have actually served their sentences). 

C. Treatment/Therapy at the Kearney Facility

Plaintiff also asserts that his rights were violated when he

was evaluated by medical professionals and determined fit to

participate in some, but not all, therapeutic modules

administered at the Kearney Facility; in connection with this

line of challenges, Plaintiff also maintains that the limited

benefits of the modules in which Plaintiff was fit to participate

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in did not allow Plaintiff to advance as much as Plaintiff hoped

to advance.8

1. Claims Based on 2006/2007 Events Are Time Barred

For purposes of the statute of limitations, Section 1983

claims are characterized as personal injury actions. See Wilson

v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1983). Accordingly, New Jersey's

two-year limitations period on personal injury actions, N.J.

Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2, governs Plaintiff's claims. See Montgomery

v. DeSimone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1998); Cito v.

Bridgewater Township Police Dept., 892 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir.

1989). 

Under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2, an action for an injury to

the person caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default must be

commenced within two years of accrual of the cause of action. 

See Cito, 892 F.2d at 25; accord Brown v. Foley, 810 F.2d 55, 56

(3d Cir. 1987). “[A] federal cause of action accrues when the

plaintiff discovers, or with due diligence should have

discovered, the injury that forms the basis for the claim.”

Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania v. Southeastern Pennsylvania

Transp. Authority, 539 F.3d 199, 209 (3d Cir. 2008). 

Here, the events of Plaintiff’s evaluations and

participation in therapeutic modules that took place prior to

 Plaintiff asserts that, over 6-year period of therapy, he 8

advanced only two levels. 

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February 28, 2009, are time barred, since the Complaint submitted

in this matter was executed on February 27, 2011. Granted the 9

panoply of Plaintiff’s actions commenced in this District during

the last decade (and, especially, during the last year), any

consideration associated with equitable tolling is facially

inapplicable to the Complaint at bar, since Plaintiff's prior

actions unambiguously indicates that Plaintiff could have

initiated the case at bar sooner had he wished to do so.

Therefore, all Plaintiff’s challenges based on the events

that took place prior to February 28, 2009, will be dismissed

with prejudice, as time barred.

2. Claims Duplicative of Those Litigated in Alves

The power of a federal court to prevent duplicative

litigation is intended “to foster judicial economy and

the 'comprehensive disposition of litigation,'” Curtis

v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000)

(quoting Kerotest Manufacturing Co. v. C-O-Two Fire

Equipment Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952)), and “to

protect parties from 'the vexation of concurrent

litigation over the same subject matter.'” Id.

(quoting Adam v. Jacobs, 950 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir.

1991)). 

 Since Plaintiff is a confined individual, his mailings to 9

the Court are subject to the prisoners' mailbox rule, pursuant to

which pleadings are deemed filed at the time an inmate hand his

pleading to the facility officials for mailing to the court. 

Although it is plausible that Plaintiff handed his Complaint to

Avenel Unit officials on the date later than the date affixed on

his Complaint, it is self-evident that Plaintiff could not submit

his Complaint at any prior date. Reading these facts in light

most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court presumes -- without making

a factual finding to that effect -- that Plaintiff's instant

Complaint was "filed," within the meaning of the prisoners'

mailbox rule, on the date Plaintiff executed his Complaint.

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Porter v. NationsCredit Consumer Disc. Co., 2003 Bankr. LEXIS

933, at *33 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2003).

Here, Plaintiff’s claims alleging inadequacy of the

therapeutic modules administered to him during his confinement at

the Kearney Facility are already pending, for a number of years,

before Judge Cavanaugh in Alves, 01-0789 (DMC) (N.J.D.).

Therefore, this line of claims is wholly duplicative of the

challenges currently litigated in Alves. Consequently, these

claims are subject to dismissal, as duplicative.

3. Equal Protection Claims Are Without Merit 

Plaintiff also asserts that his rights were violated during

his July 2009 medical evaluation, when Plaintiff was, allegedly,

deemed fit to participate in some, but not all, therapeutic

modules administered to the civilly committed individuals

confined at the Kearney Facility. 

The concept of equal protection, as embodied in the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see Bolling v. Sharpe, 347

U.S. 497 (1954), has been construed to implicitly include an

equal protection guaranty generally as broad as that of the

Fourteenth Amendment, applicable to the states. See United

States v. Milan, 304 F.3d 273, 281 n.6 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing

United States v. Leslie, 813 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1987)), cert.

denied, 538 U.S. 1024 (2003).

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The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

commands that no State shall “deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” which is

essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated

should be treated alike. See City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne

Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe,

457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)); Artway v. Attorney General of New

Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235, 1267 (3d Cir. 1996). Despite its sweeping

language, though, “[t]he Equal Protection Clause does not forbid

classifications. It simply keeps governmental decisionmakers

from treating differently persons who are in all relevant

respects alike.” Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).

Proof of disparate impact alone, however, is not sufficient

to succeed on an equal protection claim; a plaintiff also must

prove that the defendant intended to discriminate. See Village

of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,

429 U.S. 252, 264-66 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,

242, 244-45 (1976). Thus, discriminatory intent must be a

motivating factor in the decision, even though it need not be the

sole motivating factor. See Village of Arlington Heights, 429

U.S. at 265-66.

Once this intentional disparity in treatment is shown, a

court will proceed to determine whether the disparity can be

justified under the requisite level of scrutiny. See City of

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Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-40; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17

(1982); Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 91-92 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.

denied, 465 U.S. 1032 (1984). In testing the validity of an

official action that is alleged to deny equal protection, the

action “is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the

classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a

legitimate state interest.” City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at

439-40. The general rule gives way, however, when a statute

classifies by race, alienage or national origin since these

classifications “are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be

sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a

compelling state interest.” Id. at 440.

Here, Plaintiff does not assert that he is a member of any

suspect class or that he was discriminated as a member of that

class, i.e., at no point the Complaint alleges that the Kearny

Facility officials were discriminating a class of persons

consisting of a certain race or gender, and that Plaintiff was

discriminated among other members of the class.

Rather, Plaintiff asserts that he was “discriminated” by not

being found, after a medical evaluation, fit to take each and

every module administered by the Kearney Facility. However,

Plaintiff’s displeasure with the fact that he deemed unfit to

participate in every possible module, while some civilly

committed individuals might have been deemed fit to partake in

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all modules, fails to assert that Plaintiff was similarly

situated to these hypothetical individuals. Indeed, the

Complaint expressly states that participation in different

modules was allowed on the bases of inmates’ medical evaluations. 

The fact that Plaintiff’s psychiatric evaluation determined him

to be at a stage of mental advancement different from those of

other inmates indicates that Plaintiff was not similarly situated

to other individuals. Simply put, the Court has no mandate to

second-guess a medical determination.

Since the decision of Kearney Facility officials to assign

differently-advanced individuals to different modules was

rationally related to a legitimate state interest, their decision

to allow Plaintiff to participate in some but not all available

modules could not amount to a violation of Plaintiff’s equal

protection rights. See Lada v. Del. County Cmty. College, 2009

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91634, at *18 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2009)

(“‘Because this court can hypothesize a rational basis’ for the

challenged government action, plaintiff's equal protection claim

must be dismissed”) (quoting Mercatus Group LLC v. Lake Forest

Hospital, 528 F. Supp. 2d 797, 817 (N.D. Ill. 2007)). 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s allegations asserting discrimination

are without merit and will be dismissed with prejudice.

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D. Complete Denial of Therapeutic Treatment in Avenel 

The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o State shall

... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law.” This due process guarantee has been interpreted

to have both procedural and substantive components, with the

latter protecting fundamental rights which are so “implicit in

the concept of ordered liberty” that “neither liberty nor justice

would exist if they were sacrificed.” Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S.

319, 325 (1937). Consequently, substantive due process protects

the inmates’ fundamental rights and, in addition, guards the

inmates against government conduct which is so egregious that it

“shocks the conscience,” even if this conduct does not implicate

any specific fundamental right. See United States v. Salerno,

481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).

 The Supreme Court established that there exists a

constitutionally protected right of mentally retarded persons

confined at a state institution to minimally adequate treatment. 

See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 316, 319 and 322; see also Leamer v.

Fauver, 288 F.3d 532 (3d Cir. 2002). In Leamer, the Court of

Appeals held that, since the New Jersey’s statutory scheme for

sex offenders was predicated on the inmate’s response to

treatment, that statutory regime created a fundamental due

process liberty interest in treatment. See Leamer, 288 F.3d at

545; accord Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368-69 (inmates housed in

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prison-like conditions must be afforded a treatment comparable to

that provided to other civilly committed persons confined in

treatment units); but see Bailey v. Gardebring, 940 F.2d 1150,

1153-54 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 503 U.S. 952 (1992)

(concluding that a sexually violent predator had no due process

right to “psychiatric treatment to overcome a ‘sexual offender

condition’”); Semler v. Ludeman, 2010 WL 145275, at *26 (D. Minn.

Jan. 8, 2010) (following Bailey for the conclusion that there was

no “recognized constitutional right to effective ‘treatment’ in

the context of civilly committed sex offenders” and citing

Nicolaison v. Ludeman, 2008 WL 508549, at *8 (D. Minn. Feb. 11,

2008), the case finding that Youngberg “only recognized a right

to ‘minimally adequate’ treatment that reduces the need for

restraints [rather than a] comparable right to treatment that

facilitates release”).

This Court, being bound by the Court of Appeals’ guidance in

Leamer, finds that Plaintiff have substantive due process right

in a treatment facilitating his release prospects. 

The Fourteenth Amendment affords pretrial detainees and

civilly committed individuals, such as Plaintiff, protections

that are “at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections

afforded to a convicted prisoner.” Natale v. Camden County Corr.

Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir.2003) (quoting City of Revere

v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)).

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For the purposes of Eighth Amendment, “[i]n order to state a

cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions

sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to

serious medical need.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106

(1976). The Court of Appeals, however, clarified in Monmouth

County Correctional Institution Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326

(3d Cir. 1987), that the correctional personnel may manifest

“deliberate indifference” by denying medical care if such “denial

exposes the inmate 'to undue suffering or the threat of tangible

residual injury.” Id. at 346 (quoting Westlake v. Lucas, 537

F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir. 1976)). Moreover, in White v. Napoleon,

897 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1990), the Court of Appeals pointed out

that the officials’ acts effectively denying or delaying a

prescribed medical treatment for non-medical reasons violate the

requirements set forth by the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 110

(“‘deliberate indifference to, and defiance of, explicit medical

instructions, resulting in serious and obvious injuries’ stated a

violation of constitutional rights”) (quoting Martinez v.

Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921, 924-25 (2d Cir. 1970)); see also Lanzaro,

834 F.2d at 346 (deliberate indifference is demonstrated “[w]hen

. . . prison authorities prevent an inmate from receiving

recommended treatment for serious medical needs”); accord Inmates

of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir.

1979) (“Courts will disavow any attempt to second-guess the

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propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment . . .

[which] remains a question of sound professional judgment. 

Implicit in this deference to prison medical authorities is the

assumption that such informed judgment has, in fact, been made”)

(internal quotation and citation omitted). 

Here, Plaintiff asserts that, for three or four years (i.e.,

the period starting from some point in 2005-2006 and until late

2009 - early 2010), he was receiving a certain psychiatric

treatment at the Kearny Facility, and this treatment was

prescribed to Plaintiff by medical professionals who evaluated

him. Plaintiff also asserts that, from 2010 and on, he was

denied this prescribed treatment for non-medical reasons (i.e.,

simply because of his housing arrangement, over which Plaintiff

had no control). Being bound to presume these assertions as

true, the Court finds that Plaintiff duly alleged a violation of

his substantive due process rights under Leamer. The Court,

therefore, will proceed Plaintiff’s claim based on denial of

medical treatment at the Avenel Unit past the sua sponte

dismissal stage, and will direct Defendants to answer this

narrowly-tailored line of Plaintiffs’ challenges. See Fowler,

578 F.3d at 210-211 (detailing the plausibility standard).

VI. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s application to

proceed in this matter in forma pauperis will be granted. All

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Plaintiff’s claims based on allegations other than complete

denial of medical treatment will be dismissed, while Plaintiff’s

claims asserting complete denial of medical treatment will be

proceeded past the sua sponte dismissal stage.

An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

s/Susan D. Wigenton 

Susan D. Wigenton,

United States District Judge

Dated: July 12, 2011

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