COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, Petty and AtLee Argued at Lexington, Virginia

CHRISTOPHER LEE CROFT MEMORANDUM OPINION  BY v. Record No. 1957-14-3 JUDGE WILLIAM G. PETTY JUNE 30, 2015 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY Marcus H. Long, Jr., Judge Bruce T. Phillips (Phillips Law, PLC, on brief), for appellant. (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General; Leah A. Darron, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on brief.
Christopher Lee Croft was c onvicted of driving while hi s license was suspended, in violation of Code § 18.2-272. On appeal, Croft argue s that the trial court incorrectly interpreted the driving prohibition containe d in Code § 18.2-272 as applying beyond the initial one-year period of suspension imposed by Code § 18.2-271. We agree.
I. Because the parties are fully conversant w ith the record in this case and this memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, we recite only those facts and incidents of the proceedings as are necessary to the parties’ understa nding of the disposition of this appeal. “On appeal, ‘we review the evidence in th e light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” Becker v. Commonwealth,

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - 64 Va. App. 481, 486, 769 S.E.2d 683, 685 (2015) (quoting Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997)).
II. The question before this Court is whethe r the period of suspen sion required by Code § 18.2-271 should be interpreted as a fixed term of one year, and if so whether the one year in this case expired before Croft was charged. “Que stions of statutory inte rpretation are reviewed de novo .” Sarafin v. Commonwealth, 288 Va. 320, 325, 764 S.E.2d 71, 74 (2014). The question of whether the period of suspension expired in this case is a mixed question of law and fact which is reviewed de novo . See id. Code § 18.2-266 states, in rele vant part, that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any motor vehicle . . . while su ch person is under the in fluence of alcohol.” Code § 18.2-271(A) provides, in rele vant part, that “the judgment of conviction if for a first offense under § 18.2-266 . . . shall of itself opera te to deprive the person so convicted of the privilege to drive or operate any motor vehicle, engine or train in the Commonwealth for a period of one year from the date of such judgment.” 1 Finally, Code § 18.2-272 provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ny person w ho drives or operates any motor ve hicle, engine or train in the Commonwealth during the time for which he was deprived of the right to do so . . . by § 18.2-271. . . is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.” The Commonwealth argues that, because Croft’s license was ne ver reinstated, his suspension under Code § 18.2-271 did not expire. We disagree.

1 In addition to the suspen sion required by Code § 18.2-271, Code § 46.2-389 requires the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicl es (“DMV”) to revoke an individual’s license upon receiving a record of his c onviction for violation of Code § 18.2-266. Thus two distinct consequences flow from a conviction under Code § 18.2-266. The individual’s privilege to drive is suspended for a year pursuant to Code § 18.2-271, and his license is revoked for a year pursuant to Code § 46.2-389. Croft was convi cted of violating Code § 18.2-272, which references the period of suspension pursuant to Code § 18.2-271 only. Our analysis is therefore limited to the suspension under that section.- 3 - Our recent decision in Barden v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 700, 771 S.E.2d 699 (2015), is instructive. 2 In that case, this Court recognized that a suspension is separate and distinct from a period of suspension. Id. at 707, 771 S.E.2d at 703. This follows from the plain language of Code § 46.2-100, which provides that a suspended pr ivilege may be reinstated

“ following the period of suspension .” Id. Thus, we conclude d in Barden that although appellant’s license was s till in revoked status, he was not driving during the period of suspension or revocation because the “periods of suspensi on and revocation terminated by operation of the same statutory provisions that first author ized them.” Id. at 708, 771 S.E.2d at 703. Although we did not address Code § 18.2-271 in Barden, we hold that the same reasoning applies to the period of suspension authorized by that section. U nder Code § 18.2-271, the conviction “of itself operate[d] to deprive [Croft] of the privilege to drive or operate any motor vehicle . . . for a period of one year from the da te of such judgment.” See Code § 18.2-271. This was a suspension of Croft’s drivi ng privilege. See id. (“This suspension period shall be in addition to the suspension period provided under § 46.2-319.2.” (emphasis added)). Croft was charged with violation of Code § 18.2-272 only, which is driving “during the time for which he was deprived of the right to do so” by Code § 18.2-271. Consequently, the only time period relevant here is the period under Code § 18.2-271 that Croft was deprived of the right to drive. Under the plain language of that section, Crof t’s judgment of conviction under Code § 18.2-266 operated to deprive Croft of the privilege to drive “f or a period of one year from the date of such judgment.” Here, the date of conviction was in May 2008, meaning the one year of suspension expired in 2009. 3 After that point, regardless of Crof t’s numerous other suspensions for failing

2 This opinion was published after the parties submitted their appellate briefs.

3 The order of conviction for the May 2008 c onviction for driving wh ile intoxicated was not included in the record. According to the DMV transcript, the DMV revoked Croft’s license on June 18, 2008 for a term to expire on Ma y 15, 2009 for a conviction dated May 21, 2008.- 4 - to pay court costs, fees, and fines, he could not be charged with drivi ng during the period of his Code § 18.2-271 suspension. The Commonwealth also argues that base d on the plain language of Code § 18.2-271(D) Croft’s period of suspension did not begin to expire because Cr oft provided no evidence that he ever surrendered his license. We disagree. Code § 18.2-271(D) provides that “[n]otwith standing any other provi sion of this section, the period of license revocation or suspension shal l not begin to expire un til the person convicted has surrendered his license to the court or to the Department of Motor Vehicles.” However, the transcript of Croft’s driving record, which was admitted without objection, indicates that Croft was never issued a license. On the contrary, he was convicted twice in 20 05 of driving without a license, and subsequently convicted four add itional times in 2005 and 2006 of driving while his license was revoked or suspended. The transcript further shows th at on the day he was convicted of driving while intoxicated, Croft was also c onvicted of driving while his license was revoked or suspended. Thus, the transcript indicates th at Croft had no license to surrender when he was convicted of driving while intoxicated. “Our goal in statutory interpretation is to carry out the General Assembly’s intent ‘as expressed by the language used unless a literal interpretation of the language would result in a manifest absurdity.’” Bailey v. Spangler, ___ Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (Apr. 16, 2015) (quoting Board of Supervisors v. Windm ill Meadows, LLC, 287 Va. 170, 179-80, 752 S.E.2d 837, 842 (2014)). Under the Commonwealth’s in terpretation of Code § 18.2-271(D), an individual who was convicted of driving while intoxicated in violation of Code § 18.2-266, but who had no license to surrender, would be subj ect to a never-expiring suspension. Such an

There is no explanation in the record to acc ount for the discrepancy between the days. Nonetheless, since the subsequent charge of dr iving while suspended occu rred six years after the date of conviction, a few days’ diffe rence does not affect our analysis.- 5 - individual would never be able to acquire a valid operator’s license. The General Assembly could not have intended such a result. It would be a manifest absurdity to require Croft to surrender a license that he does not have in order for the suspension term to begin expiring. We therefore hold that where an individual c onvicted under Code § 18.2-266 has no license to surrender, the period of suspension required by Code § 18.2-271 begins on the date of conviction and ends one year later. 4 We agree that based on the record Croft’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle remains suspended. The record shows at least seventeen “indefinite” periods of suspension for unpaid fines, costs, and fees. Neve rtheless, the question before us is whether Croft was properly convicted under Code § 18.2-272. We hold that he was not. The period of suspension authorized by Code § 18.2-271 was one year from the date of conviction for driving while intoxicated. Because Croft had no license to surrender, the period of suspension began to expire on the day of conviction, May 21, 2008 and concluded a year later. His subsequent arrest six years later was therefore we ll beyond the suspension period imposed by Code § 18.2-271, and Croft cannot be convicted under Code § 18.2-272 for driving during the period of that suspension.
III. Despite Croft’s numerous other suspensions of his driving privilege, we must reverse the trial court’s conviction of Cr oft for violation of Code § 18.2-272 and dismiss the warrant. Reversed and dismissed.

4 Because the Commonwealth’s evidence shows that Croft did not have an operator’s license on the date of his convi ction, we are not called upon to analyze who has the burden of proof in showing the individual has no license.