IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

 DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

AMERICAN PLATINUM PROPERTY 

AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,

Appellant,

v. Case No. 5D21-1299

LT Case No. 2017-31681-CICI

DAVID SWANK,

Appellee.

________________________________/

Decision filed August 19, 2022

Appeal from the Circuit Court 

for Volusia County,

Leah R. Case, Judge.

Andrew A. Labbe, of Groelle & 

Salmon, P.A., Maitland, for 

Appellant. 

Nicholas A. Shannin and Carol B. 

Shannin, of Shannin Law Firm, P.A., 

Orlando, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

LAMBERT, C.J., and HARRIS, J., concur.

TRAVER, J., concurs specially, with opinion. 
2

 Case No. 5D21-1299

 LT Case No. 2017-31681-CICI

TRAVER, J., concurring specially.

I concur in the disposition of this case, but I write separately to explain 

why I think we reached the correct conclusion despite the behavior of trial 

counsel for Appellee, David Swank.1 We were asked to consider whether 

the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for leave to amend a 

motion for trial de novo filed by Appellant, American Platinum Property and 

Casualty Insurance Company (“American”). American’s trial counsel

2

contended he made a simple scrivener’s error. Swank’s trial counsel 

accused him of making serious misrepresentations to the trial court and 

insisted Swank prevailed as a matter of law. Although every trial lawyer’s

actions and inactions in this matter leave much to be desired, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying American’s motion. Therefore, I agree 

we must affirm. 

This dispute involves insurance coverage. Swank initially sued

American and two other parties, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance 

1 Swank had two trial counsel, neither of whom represented him on 

appeal. 

2 American’s trial counsel also represented it through appellate 

briefing, but he is no longer associated with the firm of record. 
3

Company (“Universal Property”) and Universal Risk Advisors, Inc. 

(“Universal Risk”), alleging that he had suffered a covered loss on his home. 

American’s trial counsel also represented the other two defendants. On 

Universal Property’s behalf, he initially filed an answer and affirmative 

defenses. Thereafter, counsel moved to dismiss Swank’s lawsuit against 

both Universal Property and Universal Risk, attaching a copy of the operative 

insurance contract and highlighting that neither was the entity that insured 

Swank. 

Presumably hard-pressed to argue that Universal Property or 

Universal Risk had any liability in this context, Swank’s trial counsel asked 

American’s trial counsel if he would agree not to oppose the filing of an 

amended complaint that solely named American. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 

1.190(a). American’s trial counsel agreed, subject to Swank’s trial counsel’s 

agreement to drop Universal Property and Universal Risk from the case. 

Swank’s trial counsel cordially memorialized this understanding in writing, 

and Swank filed his amended complaint against American without 

opposition. Swank never sought relief of any kind from the parties his trial 

counsel had agreed to drop, and he did not mention them in his amended 

pleading. Critically, though, Swank’s trial counsel never dropped Universal 

Property or Universal Risk from the lawsuit by following the appropriate rule 
4

of civil procedure. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.250(b) (stating that parties may be 

dropped through the procedure outlined in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 

1.420(a)(1)). If American ever pursued Swank’s failure to honor counsel’s 

agreement, our record does not reflect it. 

The trial court later referred the matter to non-binding arbitration. See

§ 44.103, Fla. Stat. (2020); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.820. American and Swank were 

the only parties who participated. Ultimately, the arbitrator determined that 

American owed Swank $220,899.07, plus interest, costs, and reasonable 

attorney’s fees to be set by the trial court. The arbitrator did not mention 

Universal Property or Universal Risk in his award; indeed, throughout the 

award, he referred to American as the only “Defendant.”

If a party to a non-binding arbitration award does not timely file a motion 

for trial de novo, the decision becomes binding. See § 44.103(5); Fla. R. 

Civ. P. 1.820(h). In a multi-party case, each party who wants a new trial 

must file an individual motion seeking this relief. See Quaregna v. Strategic 

Performance Fund II, Inc., 943 So. 2d 265, 267 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

American’s counsel timely filed this motion. Unfortunately, he sought trial de 

novo only for Universal Property. Swank’s trial counsel did not inform 

American’s trial counsel that he had filed the motion on Universal Property’s 

behalf. Rather, they waited for the operative deadline to pass and then filed 
5

a motion to enforce the arbitration judgment, emphasizing that American had 

not sought a trial de novo. 

American’s trial counsel immediately filed a motion to strike Swank’s 

motion to enforce, as well as the motion to amend Universal Property’s initial 

demand for trial de novo that is the subject of this appeal. He insisted that 

American had committed a simple scrivener’s error and that it, and not 

Universal Property, meant to file the motion. In support, he attached what 

he claimed was a copy of the motion he had filed. Again, unfortunately, this 

was not true. Instead, it was an unfiled motion that had been edited to name 

American as the moving party. 

The trial court set the matter for hearing; and in the interim, the parties 

both took action. First, Swank submitted his response in opposition to the 

relief American sought. In it, Swank’s trial counsel did not acknowledge that 

they had failed to uphold their agreement to drop Universal Property from 

the lawsuit. Instead, they insisted that Universal Property was still a party. 

Further, they accused American’s trial counsel of lying to the trial court and 

fabricating a document. In the second filing, American’s trial counsel 

submitted two affidavits explaining that his associate had mistakenly filed the 

initial motion and that his legal assistant had erred in attaching the wrong 
6

document to his motion for leave to amend. Neither affidavit was signed. 

American did not request an evidentiary hearing.

The trial court conducted a hearing, at which it took no evidence. 

Swank’s trial counsel again declined to volunteer that they had failed to honor 

their agreement to drop Universal Property. Instead, they doubled down on 

their legal and factual reasons why the trial court should enforce the 

arbitration award. They also highlighted American’s failure to adduce any 

evidence whatsoever to support its contention that it had committed a simple 

clerical error. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(a). In response—and for a third time, 

unfortunately—American’s trial counsel claimed that he did not know how to 

file signed affidavits electronically.3 He also never mentioned that Swank’s 

trial counsel had reneged on their promise to drop Universal Property as a 

party. 

The trial court denied American’s motion. It did not embrace Swank’s 

theory that American’s trial counsel had acted deceptively, but it concluded 

American’s trial counsel had offered no evidence to support his contentions 

that his associate and legal assistant had made excusable mistakes. 

American subsequently submitted signed and notarized versions of the 

3 Eight days had passed since the trial court set the hearing.
7

previously filed affidavits to no avail; the trial court entered final judgment in 

Swank’s favor. 

We review the trial court’s denial of American’s motion for leave to 

amend its motion for trial de novo for an abuse of discretion. See Yun 

Enters., Ltd. v. Graziani, 840 So. 2d 420, 422 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). American 

makes two arguments for reversal. Both lack merit, but for different reasons. 

First, American contends that by failing to include Universal Property 

in his amended complaint, Swank dropped Universal Property from the 

lawsuit. When a plaintiff removes a defendant from a pleading via 

amendment, the trial court loses personal jurisdiction over the removed 

party. See, e.g., Lincoln Mews Condo. v. Harris, 276 So. 3d 344, 348 (Fla. 

3d DCA 2019); Sas v. Postman, 687 So. 2d 54, 55 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (citing 

Martin v. Consol. City of Jacksonville, 490 So. 2d 138, 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 

1986)). Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot regain personal jurisdiction until the 

removed party is served or waives its ability to challenge this issue. Lincoln 

Mews, 276 So. 3d at 348; Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b) (stating that challenges to 

personal jurisdiction are deemed waived unless raised specifically and with 

particularity in responsive motion or pleading).4 This is not what happened 

4 American’s reliance on Shannon v. McBride, 105 So. 2d 16, 18 (Fla. 

2d DCA 1958), is misplaced because it predates the adoption of rule 1.250. 

See In re Fla. Rules of Civ. Proc., 211 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1968), amended,
8

here. Swank took no action against Universal Property. Instead, Universal 

Property sought affirmative relief by demanding a trial de novo. I agree with 

American that it makes no sense why Universal Property—a non-party to the 

insurance contract under which Swank sought relief—would challenge an 

arbitration award against American. But I can envision situations where a 

removed party, such as an excess proceeds carrier, might challenge a nonbinding arbitration in which it did not participate. Accordingly, American’s 

first argument fails; it needed Swank’s counsel to honor their promise to drop 

Universal Property from the case by complying with rule 1.250(b).

Second, American generally claims that it is unfair that Swank should 

benefit from his trial counsel’s failure to keep their word. Viewed charitably, 

he appears to lodge a plea for equitable estoppel. The elements of equitable 

estoppel are: “(1) a representation as to a material fact that is contrary to a 

later-asserted position, (2) reliance on that representation, and (3) a change 

in position detrimental to the party claiming estoppel, caused by the 

representation and reliance thereon.” State v. Harris, 881 So. 2d 1079, 1084 

(Fla. 2004). Certainly, it would appear that American has a colorable basis 

to raise this doctrine. But American failed to raise it below. See Archer v. 

Winner v. Westwood, 237 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1970) (adopting rule 1.250 and 

incorporating reference to rule 1.420). 
9

State, 613 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla. 1993) (holding that to preserve issue for 

appeal, issue “must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal 

argument or ground to be argued on appeal must be part of that 

presentation” (quoting Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1985))). 

Further, a party asserting equitable estoppel must prove its elements by clear 

and convincing evidence. See Lovejoy v. Poole, 230 So. 3d 164, 166 (Fla. 

5th DCA 2017). Here, American adduced no evidence to support this 

argument. 

For these reasons, I vote to affirm. But Swank’s trial counsel should 

take no pride in this disposition or my explanation for joining it. Lawyers have 

a duty of candor to the court. They should also keep their promises to one 

another.