UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

 .

:

ALLIED OLD ENGLISH, INC., : Civil Action No. 11-1239 (ES)(CLW)

:

Plaintiff, : OPINION

1

:

v. :

:

UWAJIMAYA, INC., et al., : 

:

Defendants. :

 :

WALDOR, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court is the motion of defendants Nishimoto Trading Co. (“Nishimoto”), 

SLU, Inc. (“SLU”), FSI, Inc. (“FSI”), Akira Moriguchi, and defendant and counterclaim plaintiff 

Uwajimaya, Inc. (“Uwajimaya”) (collectively, “Defendants”) to transfer this action to the 

Western District of Washington. (Docket Entry No. 61, the “Motion”). Plaintiff Allied Old 

English, Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “Allied”) opposed the Motion. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78, no 

oral argument was heard. For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED. 

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s complaint, amended complaint, and 

moving papers, and are accepted as true for purposes of the instant Motion. 

This case arises out of a 2005 transaction between Plaintiff and Uwajimaya subsidiary 

Sun Luck, Inc. (Docket Entry No. 1, Complaint (“Compl.”) at ¶ 10). Specifically, a substantial 

 

1 A motion to transfer venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is a non-dispositive pretrial matter. Prinir (HADAS 

1987) Ltd. v. ConAgra Food Packaged Foods Co., Inc., No. 08-914, 2008 WL 5169118, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2008). 

“This is true ‘because it can only result in the transfer of a case to another federal district, not in a decision on the 

merits or even a determination of federal jurisdiction.’” Berg v. Aetna Freight Lines, No. 07-1393, 2008 WL 

2779294, at *1 n.1 (W.D.Pa. July 15, 2008) (collecting cases) (citing Adams v. Key Tronic Corp., No. 94 Civ. 

A0535, 1997 WL 1864, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 1997)). Accord Siemens Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Open Advantage M.R.I. 

II L.P., No. 07-1229, 2008 WL 564707, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 29, 2008). 

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portion of Plaintiff’s business is its line of Asian food products sold under the brand names and 

trademarks SUN LUCK and NIKO NIKO. (Id. at ¶ 9). In 2005, Plaintiff acquired the SUN 

LUCK brand and line of business from Sun Luck, Inc. (Id. at ¶ 10). The transaction was

governed by an Asset Purchase Agreement (“APA”). The APA was executed on July 11, 2005. 

(Id.). Under the APA, Plaintiff acquired all tangible and intangible assets associated with the 

SUN LUCK brand and line of business, “including, but not limited to . . . registered and 

unregistered trademarks, trade names, trade dress, artwork, labels, and all of Sun Luck, Inc.’s 

knowhow, formulas, recipes, processes, agreements, and other intellectual property, websites and 

domain names” that had been used by Sun Luck, Inc. in connection with the SUN LUCK line of 

business. (Id. at ¶ 11).

Additionally, at the time of the agreement, Sun Luck, Inc. was in the process of phasing 

out products sold under the ROYAL BLOSSOM trademark. (Id. at ¶ 14). The APA granted 

Plaintiff express permission to use the ROYAL BLOSSOM mark in connection with the sale of 

products which had not yet been switched over to the SUN LUCK brand. (Id.). The APA also 

incorporated a Non-Compete Agreement between Plaintiff and Uwajimaya, and a Trademark 

License Agreement between Plaintiff and Uwajimaya pertaining to the NIKO NIKO trademark. 

(Id. at ¶ 15). Plaintiff contends that it has continuously manufactured and sold products under 

the SUN LUCK and NIKO NIKO marks since it acquired the SUN LUCK brand and obtained an 

exclusive license for certain NIKO NIKO products. (Id. at ¶ 19). 

Plaintiff filed the instant action in March 2011 after coming across information that

indicated that Uwajimaya, via its wholesale distribution division Seasia Wholesale Co. 

(“Seasia”), was selling products in several Washington grocery stores that appeared to infringe

Allied contract, trademark, and trade dress rights. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an amended 

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complaint, adding as Defendants Uwajimaya’s 100% owned subsidiaries and Seattle-based 

affiliates SLU and FSI, Akira Moriguchi, an executive of Uwajimaya, and Nishimoto, a 

nationwide Asian food manufacturing and distribution business that is headquartered in 

California, and which has a branch in Seattle that does business as Seasia. (Docket Entry No. 30, 

Amended Complaint (“Amended Compl.”)). Plaintiff contends that it sought to amend its 

original complaint, in part, after learning that Nishimoto – not Uwajimaya – owns Seasia. 

On April 20, 2012, Defendants filed a joint motion to transfer, arguing that this Court 

should transfer this case to the Western District of Washington pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 

(Docket Entry No. 61). On May 7, 2012, Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition (Docket Entry No. 

64, “Pl.’s Opp. Br.”) and, on May 14, 2012, Defendants filed a reply brief. (Docket Entry No. 

66, “Defs.’ Reply Br.”). The Motion was formally referred to the Undersigned on July 27, 2012. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In federal court, transfer of venue is primarily governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Section 

1404(a) permits a district court to transfer a case to any other district where venue is proper, such 

as here, “for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1404(a). The purpose of section 1404(a) “is to prevent the waste of ‘time, energy and money’ 

and to ‘protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and 

expenses . . . .’’’ Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Honeywell, Inc., 817 F.Supp. 473, 479 (D.N.J. 1993) 

(quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964)). 

The plaintiff’s choice of forum should not be lightly disturbed. See Jumara v. State Farm 

Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the party seeking transfer bears the 

burden of establishing that the proposed transferee forum is a proper forum and that a balancing 

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of the proper interests weighs in favor of transferring the case there. Id.; Hoffer v. 

Infospace.com, Inc., 102 F.Supp.2d 556, 572 (D.N.J. 2000).

The decision of whether to transfer a case is committed to the trial court’s sound 

discretion. Cadapult Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Tektronix, Inc., 98 F.Supp.2d 560, 564 (D.N.J. 2000). 

A reviewing court must first determine whether the action could have been properly brought in 

the transferee district. Id. at 570. See Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir.

1970). Specifically, the movant must demonstrate “the proprietary of venue in the transferee 

district and jurisdiction over all of the defendants.” LG Elecs., Inc., v. First Intern. Comp., Inc.,

138 F.Supp.2d 574, 586 (D.N.J. 2001). 

After the Court determines that jurisdiction and venue would be proper in the transferee 

district, the Court must consider whether certain private and public factors favor transfer. See

Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879-80. Private interests include: (1) plaintiff’s forum preference; (2) 

defendant’s forum preference; (3) whether the claim arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the 

parties as indicated by their relative physical and financial condition; (5) the convenience of the 

witnesses to the extent that they may be unavailable for trial in one of the fora, and (6) the 

location of sources such as books and records to the extent that the records could not be 

produced in the alternative forum. Id.; Days Inns Worldwide, Inc., v. Ram Lodging, LLC, No. 

09-2275, 2010 WL 1540926, at *3 (D.N.J. April 14, 2010). 

The public interests to consider include: (1) the enforceability of the judgment; (2) 

practical considerations that could make the trial easy, expeditious, or inexpensive; (3) the 

relative administrative difficulty in the two fora resulting from court congestion; (4) the local 

interest in deciding local disputes at home; (5) the public policies of the fora; and (6) the 

familiarity of the trial judge with the applicable state law in diversity cases. Id.; Ram Lodging, 

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2010 WL 1540926, at *3. These factors are not exhaustive. Instead, “a transfer analysis under 

Section 1404 is a flexible and individualized analysis which must be made on the unique facts 

presented in each case.” Lawrence v. Xerox Corp., 56 F.Supp.2d 442, 450 (D.N.J. 1999). 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction and Venue of the Transferee District

As a threshold matter, this Court must determine if the Western District of Washington is 

a “district in which this action might have been brought” pursuant to § 1404(a). A district is one 

in which an action “might have been brought” if that district has: (1) subject matter jurisdiction 

over the claims; (2) personal jurisdiction over the parties; and (3) is a proper venue. See Shutte, 

431 F.2d at 24; Yang v. Odom, 409 F.Supp.2d 599, 604 (D.N.J. 2006). The Third Circuit made 

clear in Shutte that the relevant considerations in this regard are jurisdiction and venue:

[A] transfer is authorized by [§ 1404(a)] only if the plaintiff had an 

‘unqualified right’ to bring the action in the transferee forum at the time of 

the commencement of the action; i.e., venue must have been proper in the 

transferee district and the transferee court must have had the power to 

command jurisdiction over all of the defendants.

Shutte, 431 F.2d at 24.

The Court finds that the Western District of Washington is a district where this action 

might have been brought because (1) it has subject matter jurisdiction under the Lanham Act, 15 

U.S.C. § 1125, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338; (2) personal jurisdiction over Defendants 

Uwajimaya, SLU, FSI, Akira Moriguchi, and Nishimoto is appropriate in the Western District of 

Washington because each defendant either resides there or actively conducts business within the 

state; and (3) venue is proper because, as set forth above, the alleged conduct giving rise to 

Plaintiff’s claims occurred primarily within the Western District of Washington pursuant to 28 

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U.S.C. § 1391. As such, there is no dispute that Plaintiff could have brought this suit in the 

Western District of Washington. 

B. Private Interest Factors

As to the first factor, Plaintiff’s expressed choice of forum is New Jersey. Generally, a 

plaintiff’s choice of forum is given great weight in an analysis under Section 1404(a). Shutte, 

431 F.2d at 25 (“It is black letter law that a plaintiff’s choice of a proper forum is a paramount 

consideration in any determination of a transfer request . . . .”). However, the plaintiff’s choice 

of forum is only one factor for the court to consider. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 

22, 31 (1988). Less deference is given to the plaintiff’s choice, for example, when “the case has 

little connection with the chosen forum.” Newcomb v. Daniels, Saltz, Mongeluzzi & Barrett, 

Ltd., 847 F.Supp. 1244, 1246 (D.N.J. 1994). See also Frato v. Swing Staging, Inc., No. 10-5198, 

2011 WL 3625064, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2011) (explaining that courts in this District “often 

give less weight to a plaintiff’s forum choice when the dispute at the heart of a lawsuit occurred 

almost entirely in another state.”) (citing Santi v. Nat. Bus. Records Mgmt., LLC, 722 F.Supp.2d 

602, 607 (D.N.J. 2010)). 

Plaintiff’s preference would ordinarily weigh against transfer to the Western District of 

Washington. Here, however, several independent reasons exist to afford less deference to 

Plaintiff’s choice. First, as will be discussed at length below, nearly all of the essential operative 

facts occurred in Washington, not in New Jersey. “[W]hen the central facts of a lawsuit occur 

outside the chosen forum, plaintiff’s choice of forum is accorded less weight.” NCR Credit 

Corp. v. Ye Seekers Horizon, Inc., 17 F.Supp.2d 317, 321 (D.N.J. 1998); Melone v. Boeing Co., 

No. 07-1192, 2008 WL 877974 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2008). Second, in assessing the validity of 

Plaintiff’s trademark infringement, unfair competition, and contract claims, the Court is 

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instructed to look to the location where the allegedly culpable conduct occurred. Frato, 2011 

WL 3625064, at *3. Again, said conduct occurred in Washington. As such, Allied is not entitled 

to the same deferential considerations afforded plaintiffs that bring suit in their home state.

Next, the Court must consider whether Plaintiff’s claims arose elsewhere and 

Defendants’ forum preference. Where the claims arose turns on which forum contains the center 

of gravity of the dispute, events, and transactions. See Park Inn Intern., L.L.C. v. Mody Enters.,

Inc., 105 F.Supp.2d 370, 377-78 (D.N.J. 2000). “The center of gravity analysis is a fact sensitive 

inquiry that seeks to identify the forum in which the operative facts giving rise to the litigation 

occurred.” Travelodge Hotels, Inc. v. Perry Developers, Inc., No.11-1464, 2011 WL 5869602, at 

*5 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2011). The “locus of the alleged culpable conduct” determines the place 

where the claim arose. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529, 108 S.Ct. 1945, 100 

L.Ed.2d 517 (1988).

The parties dispute the center of gravity of the instant dispute. Defendants argue that the 

allegedly culpable conduct occurred primarily in Washington. Specifically, the stores Allied 

identified as locations where allegedly infringing sales took place are primarily in Washington. 

(Defs.’ Reply Br. at 6-7). Next, Allied’s claims arising under the APA arose in Washington as 

the agreement was primarily negotiated and executed in Washington, performance by the 

Uwajimaya defendants occurred in Seattle, and the alleged breach occurred in the Seattle area. 

(Motion at 8-9). Lastly, Defendants argue that most of the Defendants presently do no business 

in New Jersey. (Motion at 7). Defendants concede that Nishimoto regularly conducts business 

in New Jersey. However, Defendants state that Allied’s claims are wholly unrelated to any of 

Nishimoto’s New Jersey-based business. Instead, Allied’s Amended Complaint focuses on 

Seasia, the Seattle branch of Nishimoto. That entity, as well as Uwajimaya, has made sales in 

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New Jersey totaling only a few thousand dollars while the vast majority of its sales – totaling 

millions of dollars – are in Washington. (Id.). 

Plaintiff disagrees with Defendants’ characterization of both the facts underlying this 

case as well as the key issues that are in dispute. (Pl.’s Opp. Br. at 12). Plaintiff acknowledges 

that specific conduct giving rise to its trade dress, trademark, and contract claims occurred in 

Washington. However, Plaintiff argues that its ability to prevail on any and all of its claims will 

center upon a determination of the rights Allied acquired under the APA – an agreement

negotiated on behalf of Allied almost entirely through communications to or from individuals 

located in New Jersey. (Id. at 13). To that end, the majority of potential meaningful witnesses 

regarding contract interpretation issues are located in New Jersey. (Id. at 13-14). 

The Court believes Allied’s framing of the issues in this case is off-base. Plaintiff 

maintains that this Court’s analysis will hinge on the rights Allied acquired under the APA and 

related agreements. Plaintiff, however, misconstrues the nature of the “center of gravity” 

analysis. Specifically, Allied fails to ascribe proper weight to the location where the operative 

facts which form the basis of its claims occurred. Here, Allied’s claims focus on sales of 

allegedly infringing products that took place primarily in the state of Washington. Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint and discovery requests implicitly acknowledge this reality. The Amended 

Complaint references sales to two Seattle-based markets. Additionally, Allied identified nine 

Washington or West Coast businesses involved in the sale of allegedly infringing products in its 

responses to Defendants’ first set of interrogatories. (Defs.’ Reply Br. at 8-9). As such, Plaintiff 

cannot genuinely dispute Washington’s overwhelming ties to the instant litigation. 

Numerous courts in this District have found contentions like those of Allied to be 

insufficient to overcome the “center of gravity” determination. See, e.g., Perry Developers, Inc., 

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2011 WL 5869602, at *6 (holding that plaintiff’s “list of contacts with New Jersey . . . fails to 

give proper focus to the situs of the crucial facts giving rise to the litigation.”); Ram Lodging, 

2010 WL 1540926, at *6 (finding transfer appropriate to forum where defendant’s breach 

occurred as opposed to situs where services were provided to defendants, plaintiff executed the 

license agreement, performance under the agreement was contemplated and undertaken, and 

plaintiff contends it realized financial damages); Days Inn Worldwide, Inc. v. Inv. Prop. of 

Brooklyn Center, LLC, No. 08-390, 2009 WL 3153277, at *4 (finding that plaintiff’s claims 

centered around alleged acts in the transferee district notwithstanding plaintiff’s assertion that it 

approved, executed, and mailed the operative agreement from New Jersey). This overwhelming 

precedent further counsels in favor of transfer. 

Furthermore, the Court is instructed to focus, primarily, on where the allegedly culpable 

conduct occurred when determining where Plaintiff’s trademark infringement, unfair 

competition, and breach of contract claims arose. With respect to Allied’s trademark 

infringement and unfair competition claims, the controlling factor is where the allegedly 

infringing sales took place. As the court explained in Elite Sports Enters., Inc. v. Lococo, “As to 

claims of trademark infringement and unfair competition, the cause of action occurs ‘where the 

‘passing off’ occurs, i.e., where the deceived customer buys defendant’s product in the belief that 

he or she is buying plaintiff’s product.’” No. 07-4947, 2008 WL 4192045, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 

2008) (internal citation omitted). Here, it is undisputed that Defendants operate their business 

primarily in Washington. Additionally, as noted above, the majority of locations of allegedly 

infringing conduct Allied has identified are all in Washington or on the West Coast. Thus, the 

potential “passing off” occurred there, not in New Jersey.2 See also LG Elecs., Inc., 138 

 

2

Plaintiff argues that Lococo is distinguishable from the instant matter because, unlike here, the parties engaged in 

no prior negotiations or agreements. (Pl.’s Opp. Br. at 14). Instead, “the defendants started selling products that the 

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F.Supp.2d at 590 (transfer appropriate where 47% of allegedly infringing sales were in 

California in comparison with 0.2% of sales in New Jersey). Next, in an action sounding in 

contract, the factors determining where the claim arose include where the contract was 

negotiated or executed, where the contract was to be performed, and where the alleged breach 

occurred. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Estate of Bleich, No. 08-668, 2008 WL 4852683, at 

*5 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2008) (internal citation omitted). Although the parties negotiated the APA in 

both New Jersey and Washington, the contracts were to be performed in the Seattle area and

most of the disputed sales were in Washington. This further favors transfer. 

Fourth, the convenience of the parties in this case constitutes a relatively neutral 

consideration. Generally, “[D]istrict courts should focus on the relative physical and financial 

condition of the parties” when determining which forum is more convenient. See Santi, 722 

F.Supp.2d at 608. Here, all Defendants are located in Washington, making it most convenient 

for those parties to litigate in Washington. Plaintiff is the only party in the case located in New 

Jersey but argues that because two of the four Defendant Seattle corporations are subsidiaries of 

Uwajimaya, and are managed by the same individuals from the same office, the location of the 

corporations does not accurately tip in favor of the Defendants. (Pl.’s Opp. Br. at 15). Plaintiff, 

a small company with a single office building, further contends that transfer would require all of 

its executives to travel cross-country thus disrupting their business operations. (Pl.’s Opp. Br. at 

16). The Court finds that all parties would be required to engage in similar cross-country travel. 

Accordingly, the parties are in a relatively similar situation. This factor does not thus weigh in 

favor of either party. 

 

plaintiff believed infringed its trademarks and the plaintiff brought suit.” (Id.) Plaintiff misreads the Lococo

decision. First, each defendant was party to a franchise agreement with plaintiff to operate stores in California. 

Lococo, 2008 WL 4192045, at *1. Second, Judge Cooper did not rely on the parties’ prior agreements, or the 

relative time they spent negotiating and executing the deal, in determining where the claims arose as a matter of 

trademark law. Accordingly, Defendants’ reliance on Lococo was not misplaced. 

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Fifth, “[i]n assessing the private interests of the parties, the convenience of potential 

witnesses must also be balanced.” See Santi, 722 F.Supp.2d at 608 (citing In re Consolidated 

Parlodel Litig., 22 F.Supp.2d 320, 323 (D.N.J. 1998)). Allied has identified twenty (20)

witnesses it may call to support is claims or defenses in its initial disclosures. Twelve of these 

individuals are located in Washington. (Docket Entry No. 61, Ex. 5, Declaration of Austin RiceStitt in Support of Defendants’ Joint Motion to Transfer Venue). Of the twenty witnesses 

identified, only three are located in New Jersey. (Id. at ¶ 4). Accordingly, the majority of 

individuals with information or knowledge that would substantiate or refute Plaintiff’s claims 

either live or are otherwise located primarily in Washington. See ESP Shibuya Enters., Inc. v. 

Fortune Fashions Indus., No. 08-3992, 2009 WL 1392594, at *3 (D.N.J. May 15, 2009) (finding 

transfer appropriate because witnesses with knowledge of the design, development, and 

manufacture of the allegedly infringing product were located in transferee district).3

Lastly, the private factor regarding the location of the relevant documents is a neutral 

factor that does not clearly weigh in favor of either forum. To that end, neither party has 

suggested that the transportation, if necessary, of the relevant documents to either forum would 

be unduly burdensome or expensive. See Fasano v. Coast Cutlery Co., No. 11-3977, 2012 WL 

1715233, at * 5 (D.N.J. May 15, 2012). However, on balance, the private interests in this matter 

would be served by transfer. 

C. Public Interest Factors

The relevant public interests also weigh in favor of transferring this case to the Western 

District of Washington. First, Washington has a strong local interest in this lawsuit because the 

 

3

Plaintiff further argues that four of the six potentially meaningful witnesses regarding contract formation and 

interpretation issues are located in New Jersey. (Pl.’s Opp. Br. at 13-14). This does not change the Court’s analysis. 

As noted above, courts must focus on the locus of the alleged culpable conduct. This Court has already established 

that the Western District of Washington contains the “center of gravity” of the dispute. 

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allegedly culpable conduct – both the infringing sales and Defendants’ breach of the APA – took 

place largely in Washington. Shibuya, 2009 WL 1392594, at *4 (finding transferee district more 

appropriate venue because bulk of infringing sales took place in that forum).4 Additionally, as 

this action concerns the conduct of corporations located primarily in Washington, it has a 

compelling interest in regulating said businesses. Frato, 2011 WL 3625064, at *6 (granting 

transfer where “action call[ed] into question the actions of corporations [located in the transferee 

district] . . . .”). 

In so holding, the Court acknowledges that both New Jersey and Washington have an 

interest in adjudicating this action as it implicates the legal interests of its citizens. Our District 

certainly has an interest in protecting the contractual rights of New Jersey residents. See, e.g., 

Apollo Tech. Corp. v. CentrOsphere Indus. Corp., 805 F.Supp. 1157, 1186-87 (D.N.J. 2008); 

Perry Developers, Inc., 2011 WL 5869602, at *7 (noting state interest in seeing that contractual 

obligations are faithfully carried out). However, as discussed, the breach of the APA, trademark 

infringement, and unfair competition claims at issue in this action arose in and have a 

significantly closer connection to the Western District of Washington than to this District. When 

both states have an interest in protecting its citizens, courts in this District have found the 

balance to tip in favor of the State that was found to be the center of gravity of the actions giving 

rise to the litigation. Id. (citation omitted). We therefore conclude that Washington has a 

stronger interest in adjudicating the present action. 

 

4 Allied argues that it is unfair to deduce that the bulk of infringing sales occurred in the transferee district because 

discovery has been limited and further discovery may reveal that infringing sales took place in locations outside of 

Washington. (Pl.’s Opp. Br. at 22). To that end, there have been a limited number of reported allegedly infringing 

Internet sales. (Id.). Moreover, Uwajimaya has asserted a counterclaim and an amended counterclaim against 

Allied for similar types of infringing conduct. Accordingly, it is more than likely that the products in issue are sold 

in more than one state. (Id.). At this juncture, Defendants have certified to the Court that Uwajimaya has already 

disclosed its limited number of online sales. Furthermore, Nishimoto does not sell its NIKO NIKO rice on or to the 

websites Allied has identified. (Defs.’ Reply Br. at 6) (internal citations omitted). The Court agrees that Defendants 

cannot ignore Uwajimaya’s counterclaim. However, weighing all relevant considerations, transfer is still warranted. 

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Next, there is no evidence that either court poses administrative difficulties or serious 

practical considerations. Both courts can competently address the merits of the parties’ 

respective arguments and apply the relevant laws appropriately. Santi, 722 F.Supp.2d at 608-09.

Nevertheless, as previously stated, the operative facts giving rise to the litigation occurred 

primarily in Washington. Furthermore, the majority of parties and witnesses pertaining to this 

matter are located within the state of Washington. It will thus likely be less expensive and more 

efficient for the case to proceed in the transferee district. Brooklyn Center, LLC, 2009 WL 

3153277, at *4. To that end, Allied essentially concedes that docket congestion favors transfer to 

Washington. (Pl.’s Opp. Br. at 25). See Ram Lodging, 2010 WL 1540926, at *7 (granting 

transfer where defendants established “more congestion exists for judges in this District than in 

[transferee district].”). Finally, despite Allied’s contentions otherwise, this case is in its early 

stages. Although some discovery has been exchanged, the parties have not taken any depositions 

nor has the Court ruled on any dispositive motions. The discovery obtained thus far will be 

equally applicable in the transferee district in any event. Frato, 2011 WL 3625064, at *7 (“The 

discovery that the parties have conducted thus far will apply with the same force whether the 

parties proceed in New Jersey or New York, and the differences in costs associated with taking 

discovery in either jurisdiction are negligible.”).

In sum, in light of the fact that Washington has been determined to be the center of 

gravity of the instant litigation, and no other public interest factors weigh in favor of this District 

retaining this case, the Jumara public factors weigh in favor of transferring this case to the 

Western District of Washington. 5 

 

5

Plaintiff additionally contends that Defendants’ Motion is not timely because Uwajimaya litigated this case in this 

District for over a year without asserting a preference for litigating this action in Washington. (Pl.’s Opp. Br. at 12). 

See Orb Factory Ltd. v. Design Science Toys, Ltd., 6 F.Supp.2d 203, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding transfer 

improper when defendant had “defended th[e] action for over a year without complaint of inconvenience.”). Orb 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Transfer is GRANTED. An 

appropriate Order shall follow. 

s/Cathy L. Waldor x 

Cathy L. Waldor, U.S.M.J.

 

Factory is distinguishable. Here, Plaintiff first filed its Amended Complaint in November 2011. (Docket Entry No. 

30). Nishimoto, one of the Defendants added to this litigation, filed its answer in January 2012. (Docket Entry No. 

44). Defendants filed this joint Motion approximately three months after Nishimoto filed its answer. The Court 

finds this gap in time reasonable. Moreover, the fact discovery deadline is January 12, 2013. (Docket Entry No. 

53). Accordingly, transfer will not likely disrupt the court or parties’ ability to complete discovery in a timely 

manner. 

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