1

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

: 

BRYAN M. SANTINI, :

:

Plaintiff, : Civil Action No. 11-639 (JAP)

:

v. : OPINION

:

COLONEL JOSEPH R. FUENTES, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

This is a § 1983 case by Plaintiff Bryan M. Santini (“Plaintiff”) against Defendants 

Colonel Joseph R. Fuentes, Trooper J.L. Fuhrmann, Trooper R.H. Sickles, and the State of New 

Jersey (collectively “Defendants”). Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment [docket # 41]. The Court decides this case without oral argument. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 78. For the reasons outlined below, Defendants’ Motion is granted with respect to the 

federal claims, and this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining 

state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

I. BACKGROUND

On February 3, 2009, two women — Tiffany Drake and Crystal Knighton — had a 

physical altercation at Plaintiff’s family’s dairy farm in Harmony Township, New Jersey, and 

911 was called [docket # 41, Declaration of Vincent J. Rizzo, Jr., Ex. A, Compl. ¶¶23-26; docket 

# 50, Declaration of Jeffrey M. Patti, Ex. D, Plaintiff’s Deposition, 55:2-4]. Because there were 

reportedly fifteen people involved in the incident, several law enforcement officers responded, 

Case 3:11-cv-00639-JAP-LHG Document 59 Filed 09/18/13 Page 1 of 11 PageID: 645
2

including officers from Greenwich and Lopatcong Townships as well as Troopers Fuhrmann and 

Sickles from the New Jersey State Police [docket # 41, Declaration of Vincent J. Rizzo, Jr., Ex. 

A, ¶ 27; Ex. C, Report of Patrolman Louis Laford; Ex. D, Grand Jury Testimony of Trooper 

Fuhrmann, 12:19-23; 13:5-6]. Plaintiff’s family farm, the location of the dispute, is in the State 

Police’s jurisdiction. Id. at Ex. D, 14:2-4. 

By the time Troopers Fuhrmann and Sickles arrived at the farm, the scene was calm. [Id.

at Ex. C; docket # 50, Declaration of Jeffrey M. Patti, Ex. I, Trooper Fuhrmann’s Deposition, Ex. 

44:12-15]. The officers from Greenwich and Lopatcong Townships, who were at the scene 

before the Troopers, told them that Plaintiff “may have witnessed” the altercation “or may have 

videotaped the incident with his cell phone” [docket # 41, Declaration of Vincent J. Rizzo, Jr., 

Ex. D, Grand Jury Testimony, 15:10-20]. The Troopers also spoke to one of the women who 

engaged in the physical altercation, Tiffany Drake. Id. at Ex. C. Although Ms. Drake stated that 

she “unequivocally did not say that [Plaintiff] recorded video/pictures of the altercation with his 

cellular telephone to the Trooper,” Grand Jury testimony revealed that Ms. Drake stated that 

Plaintiff “possibly videotaped the incident on his cell phone.” [Id. at Ex. D., 21:1-6; docket # 50, 

Declaration of Jeffrey M. Patti, Ex. A, Tiffany Drake’s Affidavit, ¶ 5]. 

As a result, Trooper Fuhrmann spoke with Plaintiff [docket # 41, Declaration of Vincent 

J. Rizzo, Jr., Ex. C.; Ex. D, 20:4-7]. Plaintiff was wearing a baggy sweatshirt and sweatpants at 

the time. Id. at Ex. D, 21:5-17. Trooper Fuhrmann asked Plaintiff if he videotaped the 

altercation, and at that point, Plaintiff shoved his hands in his pockets and avoided eye contact 

with the Trooper. Id. at Ex. D, 21:17-22:1. Based on his training, Trooper Fuhrmann thought 

that Plaintiff’s response indicated that Plaintiff was deciding whether to run away, conceal 

something, or get involved in an altercation with the Trooper. Id. at Ex. D, 22:5-10. The 

Case 3:11-cv-00639-JAP-LHG Document 59 Filed 09/18/13 Page 2 of 11 PageID: 646
3

Trooper asked Plaintiff “repeatedly” to take his hands out of his pockets because Trooper 

Fuhrmann could see “some type of hard object in there” and was worried about everyone’s 

safety. Id. at Ex. D, 22:11-23; see also Ex. C. Plaintiff took his hands out of his pocket and put 

them right back into his sweatshirt pocket. Id. at Ex. D, 22:24-25. Again, he took his hands out 

of his pockets for a “couple of seconds” and then put them into his pants pocket. Id. at Ex. D, 

23:1-3. Plaintiff admits that he had his hands in his pockets and Trooper Fuhrmann kept asking 

him to remove them. Id. at Ex. E, Deposition of Bryan Santini, 62:1-64:24. At this point, 

Trooper Fuhrmann went over to Plaintiff to try and “retrieve his hands from his pockets” because 

he learned in law enforcement training that “hands are what’s going to . . . cause you harm” since 

a weapon cannot hurt a person if it is on the floor and not in someone’s hands. Id. at Ex. D, 

23:7-19. Plaintiff told the Trooper that he was going to return to work and began walking away. 

Id. at Ex. E, 64:20-24; see also Ex. C. According to the Trooper, Plaintiff took his right hand out 

of his pocket and touched Trooper Fuhrmann with an open hand on the shoulder to prevent the 

Trooper from gaining control of his hands. Id. at Ex. D, 23:21-24:1. According to Plaintiff,

however, Trooper Fuhrmann grabbed Plaintiff’s arm as Plaintiff walked away [docket # 50, 

Declaration of Jeffrey M. Patti, Ex. D, Deposition of Plaintiff, 65:1-13]. Plaintiff and Trooper 

Fuhrmann engaged in a “grasping match” as the Trooper tried to obtain control of Plaintiff’s 

hands since he did not know if Plaintiff was concealing anything [docket # 41, Declaration of 

Vincent J. Rizzo, Jr., Ex. D, 24:2-7]. Plaintiff and the Trooper struggled, fell to the ground, and 

other officers attempted to assist Trooper Fuhrmann. Id. at Ex. D, 24:8-25:4; see also Ex. C. 

The other officers “repeatedly” told Plaintiff to stop resisting. Id. at Ex. C; Ex. D, 25:15-16; Ex. 

E, 67:21-68:2. Ms. Drake, who witnessed Plaintiff’s confrontation with the Trooper, however,

stated that Plaintiff did not resist but “just laid there like a dead fish” [docket # 50, Declaration of 

Case 3:11-cv-00639-JAP-LHG Document 59 Filed 09/18/13 Page 3 of 11 PageID: 647
4

Jeffrey M. Patti, Tiffany Drake’s Affidavit, ¶ 11]. During this struggle, Trooper Fuhrmann and 

Detective Michael Patricia used pepper spray on Plaintiff, and Trooper Sickles and Patrolman 

LaFord from Lopatcong Township used their police batons on Plaintiff [docket # 41, Declaration 

of Vincent J. Rizzo, Jr., Ex. C; Ex. D, 39:4-6, 70:13-17; Ex. G, Complaint Report, Greenwich 

Township Police]. Subsequently, Plaintiff was arrested and charged with aggravated assault on a 

law enforcement officer pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1. Id. at Ex. C; Ex. I, Arrest Record. 

Three days after the incident, on February 6, 2009, Plaintiff went to see Dr. James T. 

Finegan, Jr., an opthomalogist, because Plaintiff complained of some unresolved pain due to the 

Troopers using pepper spray on him. Id. at Ex. L, letter from Dr. Finegan to Dr. Durrani. Dr. 

Finegan did not see any “sign[s] of bruising, trauma or any other disturbance to the face or the 

head on exam.” Id. Dr. Finegan opined that “[t]here was no sign of trauma or residual damages 

from the mace to his eyes or his face.” Id. Plaintiff also saw his family doctor, Dr. Durrani, to 

“see if anything was wrong with” him. Id. at Ex. E, 80:1-11. Dr. Durrani sent Plaintiff for an 

Open MRI. Id. at Ex. E, 80:12-15. Plaintiff had the Open MRI on February 9, 2009, and the 

results of the test revealed “[n]o facial fractures.” Id. at Ex. N, Findings of the CT Scan. On that 

day, Plaintiff also had an X-ray of the chest and ribs, which revealed no fractures. Id. at Ex. O, 

Findings of Xray of Chest and Ribs. Plaintiff “has not served a medical expert report attributing 

any alleged injury suffered by [P]laintiff to these [D]efendants.” Defendants Statement of 

Undisputed Material Facts, #68. 

On May 13, 2009, the case was presented to the Warren County Grand Jury [docket # 

41, Declaration of Vincent J. Rizzo, Jr., Ex. D, Grand Jury Transcript]. That day, the Grand 

Jurors returned a True Bill against Plaintiff, indicting him for aggravated assault pursuant to 

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(5)(a). Id. at Ex. J, Grand Jury True Bill. 

Case 3:11-cv-00639-JAP-LHG Document 59 Filed 09/18/13 Page 4 of 11 PageID: 648
5

In August 2009, two days before a scheduled pre-trial conference, the State brought two 

new charges in addition to the aggravated assault charge: obstruction of justice and resisting 

arrest. Id. at Ex. B, Transcript of Plea, 3:16-24; docket # 50, Declaration of Jeffrey M. Patti, Ex. 

J, Plaintiff’s Affidavit, ¶ 6. On August 12, 2009, Plaintiff pled guilty to resisting arrest; the 

aggravated assault and obstruction charges were dismissed as part of the plea. Id. at Ex. B, 4:14-

18. Plaintiff described what happened on February 3, 2009 and admitted that he resisted arrest. 

Id. at Ex. B, 8:8-9:12. 

On February 3, 2011, Plaintiff filed this Complaint against Defendants and Greenwich 

Township, Patrolman Dennis Cahill, Chief of the Greenwich Township Police Richard Guzzo, 

Lopatcong Township, Chief of Lopatcong Township Police Scott Marinelli, Detective Michael 

Patricia, and Sergeant David Voll. Id. at Ex. A, Compl. Plaintiff alleged: (1) federal 

constitutional violations, including 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, 

and Fourteenth Amendment; (2) a violation of N.J.S.A. 10:6-2; (3) New Jersey constitutional 

violations, including N.J.S.A. 10:6-2; (4) false imprisonment/false arrest/malicious prosecution; 

(5) civil conspiracy; and (6) a violation of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 et 

seq. Ex. A, Compl. On September 12, 2011, this Court signed a stipulation of dismissal, 

dismissing Defendants Greenwich Township, Sergeant David Voll, Patrolman Dennis Cahill, 

Chief Richard Guzzo, Lopatcong Township, Detective Michael Patricia, and Chief Scott 

Marinelli, with prejudice [docket # 15]. 

The remaining Defendants filed the Motion for Summary Judgment currently at issue on 

January 11, 2013 [docket # 41]. In that Motion, Defendants’ argued judgment as a matter of law 

on Count One – the federal constitutional claims – should be granted because: (1) the claims 

against the State and the Troopers in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh 

Case 3:11-cv-00639-JAP-LHG Document 59 Filed 09/18/13 Page 5 of 11 PageID: 649
6

Amendment; (2) neither the State nor the Troopers are persons under § 1983; (3) § 1983 

precludes recovery based on the theory of respondeat superior and supervisory liability; and (4) 

the Troopers are entitled to qualified immunity on all § 1983 claims. Additionally, Defendants’

assert that summary judgment is proper as to Count Two - the violation of the New Jersey Civil 

Rights Act – because neither the State nor the Troopers are “persons” under N.J.S.A. 10:6-2. 

Defendants’ further contend that summary judgment should be granted on Count Three – New 

Jersey constitutional violations – because the Troopers are entitled to qualified immunity for all 

state or common law claims. Furthermore, Defendants’ argue that they are entitled to summary 

judgment on Count Four – claims for malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment 

– because Plaintiff is unable to satisfy the elements of those claims. Defendants’ also assert that 

summary judgment should be granted on Count Five – civil conspiracy – because Plaintiff failed 

to provide facts necessary to sustain a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim. Lastly, Defendants’ argue that 

summary judgment should be granted on Count Six – a violation of the New Jersey Tort Claims 

Act - because Plaintiff cannot sustain his burden of proof on the components of negligence. 

Plaintiff responded to some, but not all, of these arguments in his opposition brief and argued 

that genuine issues of material fact exist which would preclude summary judgment.1

II. ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must establish “that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact 

 

1 The Court will consider the parts of Defendants’ motion that Plaintiff failed to address as unopposed. See Pridgen 

v. RAB Commc’ns, Inc., 2011 WL 5920932, *___ (D.N.J. Nov. 28, 2011) (stating that Plaintiff’s failure to respond 

to an argument allows the Court to “review this aspect of defendant’s motion as unopposed”). 

Case 3:11-cv-00639-JAP-LHG Document 59 Filed 09/18/13 Page 6 of 11 PageID: 650
7

exists, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and

extend all reasonable inferences to that party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Stephens v. Kerrigan, 122 F.3d 171, 176–77 (3d Cir. 1997). The 

Court is not required to “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter” but instead 

need only determine whether a genuine issue necessitates a trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). A material fact raises a “genuine” issue “if the evidence is such 

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248.

On a summary judgment motion, the moving party bears the initial burden of 

demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 323 (1986). If the moving party makes this showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving 

party to present evidence that a genuine fact issue compels a trial. Id. at 324. The nonmoving 

party must then offer admissible evidence that establishes a genuine issue of material fact, id., 

not just “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 

U.S. at 586. 

B. Federal Claims 

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges violations of: Plaintiff’s civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

1983; the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments; malicious prosecution, false arrest, and 

false imprisonment; and civil conspiracy. There are no genuine disputes of material fact 

regarding these federal claims. Defendants are entitled to judgment on Plaintiff’s federal claims 

because: (1) they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (2) the Defendants are not a “person”

under § 1983 nor § 1985; (3) Plaintiff’s underlying criminal proceeding did not terminate 

favorably and Defendants had probable cause sufficient to defeat Plaintiff’s claims for malicious 

Case 3:11-cv-00639-JAP-LHG Document 59 Filed 09/18/13 Page 7 of 11 PageID: 651
8

prosecution, false arrest and false imprisonment; (4) § 1983 precludes recovery based solely on 

respondeat superior and supervisory liability; and (5) the Troopers are entitled to qualified 

immunity. As such, summary judgment should be granted on Plaintiff’s federal claims.

First, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims against 

Defendants in their official capacities. The Eleventh Amendment provides “[t]he Judicial power 

of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 

prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 

Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. “The Eleventh Amendment protects 

states and their agencies and departments from suit in federal court . . . .” Ortega v. New Jersey, 

2012 WL 4742806, *-- (D.N.J. Oct. 3, 2012). “Similarly, absent consent by a state, the Eleventh 

Amendment bars federal court suits for money damages against state officers in their official 

capacities.” Id. “Section 1983 does not override a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Id. 

Thus, all federal claims against the State, the State Police, and Troopers Fuhrmann and Sickles in 

their official capacities are improper, and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law 

on federal constitutional claims involving these parties in their official capacities. See Lassoff v. 

New Jersey, 414 F. Supp. 2d 483, 489 (D.N.J. 2006).

In addition, the Defendants are entitled to judgment because they are not “persons” as 

required by § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989). While 

Troopers Fuhrmann and Sickles are literally “persons,” officials acting in their official capacity, 

where the governmental entity is not itself suable, are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983. Id.

at 71. Plaintiff’s opposition reveals that the claims for malicious prosecution, false arrest, and 

false imprisonment are also brought pursuant to § 1983. See Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 56, at 1 and 24. 

Case 3:11-cv-00639-JAP-LHG Document 59 Filed 09/18/13 Page 8 of 11 PageID: 652
9

Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to judgment on the claims for malicious prosecution, false 

arrest, and false imprisonment, for this same reason.

2

 

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Colonel Fuentes are premised upon the theory of 

respondeat superior. Plaintiff has failed to show the existence of any policy or custom that

caused the Troopers to violate his civil rights. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of the City of 

New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). Plaintiff’s general allegation of laissez-fair training 

practices by supervisors is not sufficient for § 1983 liability, as this factual contention merely 

resuscitates the principle of respondeat superior. Id. at 691. Accordingly, the State, the State 

Police, Troopers Fuhrmann and Sickles in their official capacities, and Colonel Fuentes, are 

entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.3

Count V of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a cause of action for civil conspiracy based upon 

false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, and this Court assumes that such 

cause of action is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.4 § 1985(3) provides that

If two or more persons . . . conspire . . . for the purpose of 

depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of 

persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges 

and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or 

hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from 

giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the 

equal protection of the laws; . . . in any case of conspiracy set forth 

 

2 The Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution because 

Plaintiff failed to show that the underlying criminal proceeding terminated in his favor. See Johnson v. Knorr, 477 

F.3d 75 (3d Cir. 2007). Instead, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to resisting arrest, which is not a favorable termination nor 

sufficient to prove his innocence in order to maintain a claim for malicious prosecution. See DiFronzo v. Chiovero, 

406 Fed. Appx. 605 (3d Cir. 2011). Defendants are further entitled to judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for malicious 

prosecution, false arrest and false imprisonment because the Grand Jury’s indictment constitutes prima facie

evidence of probable cause. Camiolo v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 334, F.3d 345, 363 (3d Cir. 2003). 

3

It should be noted that, in finding Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were not violated, Troopers Fuhrmann and 

Sickles are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. See Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 206 (3d 

Cir. 2007). However, the Court need not analyze this issue because for the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ are 

already entitled to judgment on Plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims.

4 Defendants’ moving papers presume that Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

1985, and Plaintiff fails to oppose this contention. 

Case 3:11-cv-00639-JAP-LHG Document 59 Filed 09/18/13 Page 9 of 11 PageID: 653
10

in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause 

to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, 

whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of 

having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the 

United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action

for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or 

deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.

Plaintiff has failed to set forth any facts to support the claim that Defendants’ conspired to enter 

Plaintiff’s premises for the purpose of depriving Plaintiff of his civil rights. Plaintiff’s own 

Complaint states that the Troopers entered the premises for the purpose of responding to a 

physical altercation between two females, not for the purpose of depriving Plaintiff of his civil 

rights. [docket # 41, Declaration of Vincent J. Rizzo, Jr., Ex. A, Compl. ¶¶26-27]. Further, 

similar to the analysis set forth above, the State, the State Police, Troopers Fuhrmann and Sickles 

in their official capacity, and Colonel Fuentes in his official capacity, are not “persons” for 

purposes of § 1985. See Dorsett v. New Jersey State Police, 2007 WL 556890, *-- (D.N.J. Feb. 

15, 2007). Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1985 

claims.5

C. State Law Claims 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) states that “The district courts may decline to exercise 

[supplemental] jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if – [ ] the district court has 

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction[.]” Given that this Court has granted 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all federal claims, the only remaining causes of 

action in Plaintiff’s Complaint are: (1) claims under the New Jersey state constitution; (2) 

N.J.S.A. 10:6-2; (3) false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution under state law; 

 

5 To the extent that Count V of Plaintiff’s Complaint for civil conspiracy arises out of state law, see section C. of 

this Opinion. 

Case 3:11-cv-00639-JAP-LHG Document 59 Filed 09/18/13 Page 10 of 11 PageID: 654
11

and (4) the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 et seq. Accordingly, this Court 

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), as those claims which the Court had original jurisdiction 

over have been dismissed with prejudice. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is hereby 

GRANTED, with prejudice, on Plaintiff’s federal claims. This Court declines to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1367(c)(3). An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion. 

Case 3:11-cv-00639-JAP-LHG Document 59 Filed 09/18/13 Page 11 of 11 PageID: 655