[Doc. No. 40]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. 

LARRY REDDICK

Crim. No. 09-mj-2001 (JS)

OPINION

This matter is before the Court on defendant’s “Motion to

Vacate Complex Case Designation.” Defendant’s motion asks the

court to vacate its May 4 and 6, 2010 Orders and not to exclude

from Speedy Trial Act computations the time subsequent to these

Orders. The Court received the government’s opposition and

recently held oral argument. For the reasons to be discussed,

defendant’s motion is DENIED.

Background

On January 8, 2009, a criminal complaint was issued charging

defendant with knowingly and willfully using and carrying a firearm

(9mm handgun), during and in relation to a conspiracy to distribute

and possess crack cocaine. The complaint alleges that during the

course of the offense defendant shot and murdered Brian Parker with

malice aforethought. After the complaint was issued defendant was

arrested and his initial appearance was held on January 12, 2009. 

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At his initial appearance, Michael E. Riley, Esquire was appointed

as defendant’s counsel and defendant was temporarily detained

pending his bail hearing. Defendant consented to detention on

January 16, 2009. On January 29, 2009, the Court appointed Jean D.

Barrett, Esquire, as defendant’s co-counsel pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§3005 as she is “learned in the law applicable to capital cases.” 

Defendant was advised at his initial appearance that he faced the

possibility of a death sentence but that the decision had not yet

been made whether to seek the death penalty. See January 12, 2009

Transcript (“Tr.”) at 7:13-19.

With the joint consent of the parties, five continuances were

entered excluding the time under the Speedy Trial Act pursuant to

18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(7)(A). Other continuances have been imposed 1

pursuant to statutory requirements. A summary of all continuances

is as follows:2

Docket

No.

Date Order Entered Excluded Dates Authority

11 January 16, 2009 January 16 to

April 17, 2009

Ends of Justice

18 U.S.C.

§3161(h)(8)(A)

15 April 8, 2009 April 8 to June

17, 2009

Ends of Justice

18 U.S.C.

§3161(h)(8)(A)

These continuances were entered on January 16, April 8, 1

June 16, September 16, 2009, and February 5, 2010. Mr. Reddick

signed the last Order.

Prior to amendment in 2008, the “ends of justice” 2

continuance was codified in subsection 8 rather than in the

current subsection 7. 

2

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Docket

No.

Date Order Entered Excluded Dates Authority

17 June 16, 2009 June 16 to

September 17, 2009

Ends of Justice

18 U.S.C.

§3161(h)(7)(A)

18 August 7 to

September 16, 2009

Outstanding

Motion-18 U.S.C.

§3161(h)(1)(D)

20 September 16, 2009 September 16 to

December 18, 2009

Ends of Justice

18 U.S.C.

§3161(h)(7)(A)

21 December 24, 2009

to February 5,

2010

Outstanding

Motion-18 U.S.C.

§3161(h)(1)(D)

24 February 5, 2010 February 5 to

March 9, 2010

Ends of Justice

18 U.S.C.

§3161(h)(7)(A)

25 March 19 to May 4,

2010

Outstanding

Motion-18 U.S.C.

§3161(h)(1)(D)

28/29 May 4, 2010

(amended May 6,

2010)

May 6, 2010 to

present

Complex Case18 U.S.C.

§3161(h)(7)(A)

and (B)(ii)

On May 4, 2010, the Court granted the “Motion of the United States

for Designation as a Complex Case and Continuance Pursuant to the

Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(8)(B)(ii).” The Order was 3

entered after Mr. Riley wrote the Court on April 5, 2010 [Doc. No.

27] that he “had no objection to the government’s motion declaring

the Reddick matter be a complex case.”

On or about August 25, 2010, defendant served his pro se

The Order was amended on May 6, 2010 to correct several 3

citations in the May 4 Order. For ease of reference the Court

will refer to the May 4, 2010 Order.

3

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“Motion to Dismiss the Complaint.” The Court held an in-person

status conference on October 7, 2010 and granted defendant’s request

for new counsel. The Court also advised new counsel to re-file

defendant’s motion if defendant intended to pursue the requested

relief. An Order appointing defendant’s present counsel, Rocco C.

Cipparone, Jr., was entered on October 12, 2010. Ms. Barrett’s

status as learned counsel has not changed since she was appointed

on January 29, 2009.

Defendant’s present motion does not object to any of the

continuances or Orders in the case except for the May 4, 2010 Order. 

Defendant first argues that his prior counsel, Mr. Riley, did not

have his consent to represent that he did not object to the

designation of this matter as a complex case. Defendant contends

that this invalidates the complex case Order. Second, defendant

argues this is not a complex case. Third, defendant argues the

alleged “open-ended” continuance in the May 4, 2010 Order was

unreasonable. Although defendant is not moving at this time to

dismiss the complaint, he argues that all time stemming from the

complex case Order should not be excluded from the requirements of

the Speedy Trial Act. The government argues defendant’s consent to

the complex case Order was not required, that this is a complex case

and that the May 4, 2010 Order is not unreasonable.

Discussion 

The Court will first address whether defendant’s lack of

4

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consent to the complex case Order invalidates the Order. Pursuant 4

to the Speedy Trial Act (“Act”), “[a]ny information or indictment

charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be

filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was

arrested....” 18 U.S.C. §3161(b). However, the Act provides that

certain “periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time

within which an information or an indictment must be filed, or in

computing the time within which the trial of any such offense must

commence.” 18 U.S.C. §3161(h). Included among the listed

exceptions is “[a]ny period of delay resulting from a continuance 

. . . if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his

findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action

outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a

speedy trial.” Id. at §3161(h)(7)(A). In undertaking this

balancing, the court must set forth “in the record of the case,

either orally or in writing,” the reasons in support of its

conclusion. Id. These continuances may be granted “at the request

of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the attorney

for the Government,” or by the “judge on his own motion.” Id. 

It is well settled that defense counsel has the authority to

request a Speedy Trial Act continuance without his or her client’s

consent. United States v. Stradford, No. 083256, 2010 WL 362295, 

Defendant argues, “[b]ecause the Court made the decision to 4

designate the case complex based in part on the indication of no

objection by Mr. Reddick’s counsel which was not authorized by

Mr. Reddick, the Court’s designation of the matter should be

deemed invalid.” Brief at 4 (emphasis in original).

5

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at *3 (3d Cir. Sept. 20, 2010); United States v. Nguyen, 344 Fed.

Appx. 821, 823 (3d Cir. 2009)(“[A] defendant may waive his right to

a speedy trial without explicitly stating a desire to do so”);

United States v. Tulu, 535 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500 (D.N.J.

2008)(defendant’s consent, or lack thereof, to a continuance

requested by defense counsel is not controlling for Speedy Trial Act

purposes). See also New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 115

(2000)(“[S]cheduling matters are plainly among those for which

agreement by counsel generally controls”). Indeed, this is made

clear in the Act which provides that a continuance Order may be

granted “at the request of the defendant or his counsel.” (emphasis

added). Thus, Mr. Riley plainly had the authority to consent to the

Orders entered on January 16, April 8, June 16 and September 16,

2009, and February 5, 2010. 

The Court finds that not only did defense counsel have the

authority to consent to the foregoing Orders, but he also had the

authority to consent to the government’s complex case motion.5

Although Hill, supra, did not specifically address Speedy Trial Act

The parties appear to assume that Mr. Riley represented 5

that defendant consented to the government’s complex case motion. 

However, this is not the case. Mr. Riley merely represented that

he had no objection to the motion. In the Court’s view this is a

subtle but substantive distinction. Nevertheless, since it makes

no difference to the Court’s ruling, the Court will assume that

Mr. Riley represented that defendant consented to the

government’s motion and that Mr. Reddick did not give his

consent.

6

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waivers, its reasoning is applicable here. As applied to the 6

Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”), the Supreme Court wrote,

“In allowing the court to grant ‘good-cause continuances’ when

either ‘prisoner or his counsel’ is present it [the IAD]

contemplates that scheduling questions may be left to counsel....” 

Id. at 115 (emphasis in original). The government’s complex case

motion involves a scheduling issue akin to what is involved when a

routine continuance Order is entered. As the Supreme Court wrote,

“[w]hen that subject [a delay in trial] is under consideration, only

counsel is in a position to assess the benefit or detriment of the

delay to the defendant’s case. Likewise, only counsel is in a

position to assess whether the defense would even be prepared to

proceed any earlier.” Id. at 115. Accordingly, the Court rejects 7

defendant’s argument that the complex case Order is invalid because

defendant did not consent to defense counsel’s representation that

he did not object to the Order.8

Even if the Court held that defendant’s consent was needed for

Mr. Riley to represent that he was not opposing the government’s

The decision in Hill reads, “the question of waiver under 6

the Speedy Trial Act is not before us today, and we express no

view on the subject.” 528 U.S. at 118 n.2.

The Court also notes that defendant’s learned counsel did 7

not object to the entry of the continuance Orders and the May 4,

2010 Order.

Defendant does not appear to argue that counsel may never 8

consent to a complex case motion. Instead, defendant is arguing

that Mr. Riley’s consent is invalid because he may not consent to

an open-ended continuance. For the reasons to be discussed

infra, the Court also rejects this argument.

7

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motion, this would not change the Court’s ruling. This is so

because even if the defendant objected the government’s motion still

would have been granted. 

On May 4, 2010, the Court granted the government’s motion

designating this as a complex case pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§3161(h)(7)(A) and (7)(B)(iii). Pursuant to the Act, when

determining whether an “ends of justice” continuance may be granted

the court may consider, “[w]hether the case is so unusual or so

complex, due to the number of defendants, the nature of the

prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law,

that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial

proceedings or for the trial itself” within the time limits

established by the Speedy Trial Act. After analyzing the charges

lodged against the defendant, and the fact that defendant

potentially faced the death penalty, and after being advised of the

procedures and steps the government must take before it decides

whether to pursue the death penalty, the Court ruled that the

government’s complex case motion should be granted.9

According to the government’s lawyer, the Attorney General 9

of the United States makes the final decision whether to seek the

death penalty. Before the final decision is made, the U.S.

Attorney’s Office reviews the case and makes its own

recommendation to the Capital Case Unit (“CCU”) within the

Criminal Division of the U.S. Dept. of Justice. The CCU then

makes its own independent evaluation of the case and makes

recommendations to the Attorney General who makes the final

decision regarding whether to seek the death penalty. See

generally Transcript of October 7, 2010 hearing. These

procedures are detailed in the U.S. Attorney’s Manual, Capital

Crimes, Section 9-10.000. 

8

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In arguing that the Court should not have granted the

government’s motion, defendant argues the case is not complex

because it only involves one defendant, there is no complicated

series of charges, there is no voluminous or complicated discovery

at issue, and defendant’s competence is not at issue. Brief at 7-8. 

However, defendant’s argument misses the mark. The Court did not

designate the case as complex because defendant is charged with

shooting and killing Brian Parker. Instead, the Court designated

the case as complex because of the special nature of the

government’s prosecution, i.e., that it must decide whether to seek

the death penalty. The May 4, 2010 Order makes it clear that the

death penalty component of the case is what makes the case complex

within the meaning of the Speedy Trial Act. 

10

After summarizing the procedure for deciding when to seek the

death penalty, the May 4, 2010 Order found “that the nature of the

prosecution and complexities involved in determining whether the

defendant will face the death penalty are substantial.” Order at

2-3. The Court ruled as it did because the defendant and his

learned counsel needed and requested adequate time to present their

input to the U.S. Attorney as to why it should not recommend that

the death penalty be pursued. Indeed, at the August 26, 2009

hearing the government’s lawyer stated: “We have not involved them

The government agrees as evidenced by its statement at the 10

February 5, 2010 conference: “Frankly, the facts of the case and

the trial is not likely to be all that complex . . . And the

complexity is primarily having to do with the issues of death

penalties.” Tr. at 4:18-23.

9

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[Capital Case Unit] yet, primarily because, . . . , in our joint

discussions [with Mr. Riley and Ms. Barrett], it was our agreement

that we would provide the defense as sufficient and as much time as

they would need to review the case, have discussions with Mr.

Reddick. But also, to engage other parties, like learned counsel,

like a mitigation specialist, . . . , so that they could make their

points and position known to the Capital Case Unit.” Tr. at 4:4-19. 

Defense counsel (Mr. Riley) “echoe[d]” what the government

represented. Tr. at 5:20-22. The fact that this issue is

complicated is borne out by the fact that even though learned

counsel was appointed in January, 2009, she did not present

defendant’s mitigation materials to the U.S. Attorney until October

7, 2010. 

The Court has no reason to question the government’s

representation that it was prepared to submit its death penalty

recommendation to Washington in 2009 if defendant had not insisted

it wanted to submit mitigation materials ahead of time. October 7,

2010 Tr. at 9:24-25 to 10:1-3. Although defendant’s mitigation

materials were provided on October 7, 2010, the U.S. Attorney’s

recommendation to Washington was further delayed because defense

counsel asked to meet with the U.S. Attorney before its

recommendation was made. October 21, 2010 Tr. at 3:22 to 4:2. 

That meeting was held on November 30, 2010. Time and again the

government has indicated that the decision whether to seek the death

penalty “is a very delicate matter and we didn’t want to dive into

10

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it without certainly giving the defendant [the] opportunity to be

heard.” Id. at 6:7-9. As the foregoing facts demonstrate, there

is no question that defendant’s delay in submitting his mitigation

arguments delayed the government’s decision as to whether to seek

the death penalty. This counsels against granting defendant’s 11

motion. “The Third Circuit has been unreceptive to the defendant

who plays a role in the delay of his trial and then relies on that

delay in seeking the dismissal of his indictment.” United States

v. Guitierrez, No. 06-CR-582-4, 2007 WL 4302812, at *1 (E.D. Pa.

Dec. 6, 2008)(citing United States v. Fields, 39 F.3d 439, 443 (3d

Cir. 1994)). See also United States v. Groff, No. 05-1634, 2006 WL

952226, at *3 (3d Cir. 2006)(“[T]he fact that the District Court was

attempting to accommodate the defense as well as the government is

relevant to our evaluation of the District Court’s exercise of its

discretion”).

Defendant is incorrect if he argues or implies that the Court

permanently designated the case as complex. The Court only

designated the case as complex “at least until the Attorney General

makes its final decision regarding whether or not to seek the death

penalty for defendant....” May 4, 2010 Order at 3. The Order made

it clear that after the Attorney General made its decision regarding

whether to seek the death penalty, the Court would “promptly

schedule a status conference to address all relevant Speedy Trial

Learned counsel explained that she was on trial in a 11

capital case in Pennsylvania the first half of 2010, “so I have

just gotten off this.” Id. at 10:20-22.

11

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Act issues,” including whether the complex designation should remain

in place. Id.

The Court rejects defendant’s argument that the Court’s Complex

Case Order was “inappropriate”. Brief at 8. The decision whether 12

to seek the death penalty is not straightforward. Given the

implications for defendant, it is unreasonable to expect adequate

preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself within

the time periods in the Speedy Trial Act. Accord United States v. 13

Bernacett Cosme, 127 F. Supp. 2d 271, 273 (D.P.R. 2001)(granting a

continuance “stopping the STA clock” based on the possibility the

government would seek the death penalty); United States v. Storey,

927 F. Supp. 414, 415-16 (D. Kan. 1996)(granting a continuance where

the defendant faced the death penalty because, “[g]iven the nature

of the charges against the defendant and the penalty he faces, the

case is too complex to expect adequate preparation for pretrial

proceedings within the time limits established by §3161(c)(1)”). 

See also United States v. Reavis, 48 F.3d 763, 771 (4th Cir.

1995)(affirming continuance where defendant faced the possibility

of prosecution under a seldom used federal death penalty statute).

Defendant argues, “[b]ecause Mr. Reddick is the only 12

defendant charged in a straightforward crime, and thus there are

no issues of accommodating the needs of other defense parties

with respect to obtaining counsel or trial preparation, there are

no ‘complex case’ issues, and designation of the case as a

complex case legally was inappropriate.” Id.

As discussed, absent a continuance an indictment must be 13

returned within thirty days of arrest. 18 U.S.C. §3161(b). 

Trial must be held within seventy days of the indictment. Id. at

§3161(c)(1).

12

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Defendant argues the May 4, 2010 Order is void ab initio

because it granted an “open-ended” continuance. Defendant contends,

therefore, that the Court should rule that the time originally

covered by the continuance, May 4, 2010 until the present, should

not be “excludable” for the purposes of the Speedy Trial Act. Brief

at 8. The Court disagrees. 14

Open-ended continuances are not prohibited by the Speedy Trial

Act when properly granted pursuant to §3161(h)(7) and in the

interest of justice. United States v. Lattany, 982 F.2d 866, 868

(3d Cir. 1993)(“[W]e hold that open-ended continuances to serve the

ends of justice are not prohibited if they are reasonable in

length”); United States v. Groff, supra, at *3. In United States 15

v. Rush, 738 F.2d 497, 508 (1st Cir. 1984), the court stated,

“[d]oubtless it is generally preferable to limit a continuance to

a definite period for the sake of clarity and certainty; but at the

The Court does not agree that it granted an “open-ended” 14

continuance. The Order provides that after the Attorney General

makes its final decision whether to seek the death penalty, a

conference would be promptly scheduled to address all relevant

Speedy Trial Act issues, including whether the complex case Order

should be vacated or modified. Nevertheless, for the purpose of

this discussion the Court will assume its Order was open-ended. 

Although defendant disagrees with the Court’s conclusion, 15

he apparently does not contest that the May 4, 2010 Order was

procedurally proper. The Order clearly sets forth the basis and

reasons for the Court’s finding that the interests of justice in

granting the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public

and the defendant in a speedy trial. See 18 U.S.C.

§3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, the Court continued the case “before

the Speedy Trial Act clock would have otherwise run and it also

made the requisite Speedy Trial Act statement....” Lattany, 982

F.2d at 880.

13

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same time it is inevitable that in some cases . . . a court is

forced to order an (h)(8) continuance without knowing exactly how

long the reasons supporting the continuance will remain valid.” See

also Lattany, 982 F.2d at 881 (“It is thus apparent that a need for

some open-ended continuances was foreseen by the drafters of the

district court’s Speedy Trial Act Plan”). 

This is an instance when a specific deadline was not

appropriate. The Speedy Trial Act is designed to be “flexible

enough to accommodate the practicalities of our adversary system.” 

Id. at 811 (citation omitted). The Court agrees with the government

that it would be “unconscionable” to bar defendant’s participation,

or to “ramrod” the matter through a death penalty review, without

permitting defendant adequate time to carry out a mitigation

investigation and prepare mitigation materials. Brief at 11. 

Therefore, defendant was entitled to the reasonable time he needed

to prepare his mitigation materials. It was not appropriate for the

Court to issue seriatim continuance Orders setting a 60-day deadline

that was not likely to be met. Given the gravity of the death

penalty issue to be decided, defendant was entitled to a reasonable

period of time to prepare his mitigation materials. It was not

unreasonable to extend the Speedy Trial Act deadlines while

defendant prepared his mitigation materials and while they were

being evaluated by the U.S. Attorney, the Capital Case Unit and the

Attorney General. Given the fact that the decision whether to seek

the death penalty is complex, and the fact that defendant requested

14

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input into the decision-making process, the Court’s complex case

Order was reasonable, appropriate and in the interest of justice. 

Further, the fact that the Court’s May 4, 2010 Order referred to a

specific event makes for a more compelling case to support the Order

in comparison to the Orders the Third Circuit upheld in Lattany,

supra and Groff, supra. In those cases, unlike here, the Orders

extended the Speedy Trial Act deadlines until an indeterminate time

in the future. In addition, in those cases the court relied upon

the parties to advise it when they were ready for trial. This did

not occur here. It is also noteworthy that in Lattany the Third

Circuit upheld a continuance Order that resulted in the underlying

trial taking place 551 days after indictment. 982 F.2d at 868. In

Groff, the defendant was arraigned in July 2000 and his trial did

not take place until 3 1⁄2 years later in January 2004. 

The Court does not agree with defendant that the “government 

. . . is in sole control of when the case continues.” Brief at 5

n.2. The Court also does not agree that the government had no

“temporal barriers” and could “dictate” how long the defendant

remained in pre-trial detention. Brief at 5. As the history of the

case demonstrates, the Court has closely managed the case and

scheduled hearings when requested and appropriate. If the

government unreasonably delayed its death penalty decision, the

Court could have and would have promptly addressed the issue by

amending or vacating the May 4, 2010 Order. When the Order was

entered the parties and the Court had every reason to believe that

15

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the government would act with due dispatch given the gravity of its

decision. To the extent defendant argues the Attorney General 16

should have already made its final decision, the argument has no

merit. Defendant asked for the opportunity to submit his mitigation

materials to the U.S. Attorney before that office made its

recommendation to the Capital Case Unit. Defendant then asked for

an opportunity to meet with the U.S. Attorney before its

recommendation was finalized. (The meeting was held on November 30,

2010). It is unreasonable to expect the Attorney General to make

its final decision immediately thereafter. It is of no moment that

defendant believes the decision to indict should be independent of

whether the death penalty is pursued. The government made its

position clear since the outset of the case. The Court is not 17

prepared to accept defendant’s argument that as a matter of law it

is unreasonable to wait for the death penalty decision to be made

before an indictment is returned. Assuming the parties do not

unduly procrastinate, the Court does not believe it offends the

public’s interest in a speedy trial for an indictment to be returned

In the government’s counsel past experience “[i]t took at 16

least two or three months for an answer to come back from

Washington.” October 7, 2010 Tr. at 12:13-14. Thus, it is

likely the government’s decision regarding whether to seek the

death penalty would have been made already if defendant did not

delay in submitting his mitigation materials.

The government argues the United States Attorney’s Manual 17

provides for procedures to be used for a pre-indictment death

penalty decision. The government also argues that an indictment

of a death-eligible offense must contain special findings by the

grand jury that may not be required if the Attorney General does

not authorize seeking the death penalty. Brief at 12-13.

16

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after a defendant has a full opportunity to present its death

penalty mitigation defense.

To be sure, circumstances may exist where a valid “open-ended”

Order should be stricken because it is unreasonable in length.

Lattany, 982 F.2d at 882; Groff, supra, at *3. However, this is not

that case. As discussed, the reason the government’s final death

penalty decision was not made sooner is because defendant waited

until October 7, 2010 to serve his mitigation materials. In

addition, the seven-month period between May 4, 2010 and the present

is not an inordinate amount of time. See United States v. Stewart,

179 Fed. Appx. 814 (3d Cir. 2006)(defendant was not denied his right

to due process by a delay of almost two years before he was

indicted, absent evidence that the Government deliberately delayed

the indictment for tactical advantage); Strohl v. Grace, 354 Fed.

Appx. 650 (3d Cir. 2009)(murder defendant’s constitutional right to

due process was not violated by prosecution’s decision to delay

charging him with the victim’s death until some five years after the

victim died, despite defendant’s claims that lost hospital reports

“could” have been important, and that the lost records “may” have

resulted in a different medical opinion regarding the cause of the

victim’s death). Further, in this instance the public’s interest

in a Speedy Trial was outweighed by defendant’s need and request to

submit his death penalty mitigation materials to the government.

Despite the propriety of the May 4, 2010 Order, the Order will

be modified. The Court will extend the continuance in this matter

17

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until February 15, 2011 for the same reasons set forth in the May

4, 2010 Order. If a party requests a further continuance the

request shall be made in a written application returnable before

February 15, 2011. In revising its Order, the Court heeds the Third

Circuit’s entreaty in Lattany, in which the Court stated: 

[W]e strongly urge district courts hereafter not to wait

and rely on counsel to inform them when defendants are

ready to go to trial, but instead to set deadlines. If it

later appears that circumstances require postponement of

any deadline so set, appropriate findings showing that

the interests of justice require a further continuance

can be made contemporaneously with any order extending

the time. This procedure will avoid the kind of problems

presented [here], not only under the Act but also under

defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.

982 F.2d at 883. 

Conclusion

Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, defendant’s Motion

to Vacate Complex Case Designation is DENIED. An appropriate Order

will be entered consistent with this Opinion. 

s/Joel Schneider 

JOEL SCHNEIDER

United States Magistrate Judge

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