Filed 11/20/13 Ruiz v. Gardens CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO

RENE RUIZ,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
CITY OF BELL GARDENS,
Defendant and Respondent. B244395
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BS132638)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superi or Court of Los Angeles County. James C. Chalfant, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Office of Michael A. Morguess a nd Michael A. Morguess for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, Richard M. Krei sler and T. Oliver Yee for Defendant and Respondent.2 Appellant Rene Ruiz (Ruiz) is a fo rmer police officer who challenges the termination of his employment with respo ndent City of Bell Ga rdens (City) after a hearing officer sustained multip le charges against him for mi sconduct and for violation of City policies. The trial court initially denied Ruiz’s petition for administrative mandamus, after finding that the evidence su pporting a charge of dishonesty had been
obtained in violation of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq.) 1 (PBRA), but upholdin g the remaining charge s, as well as the penalty of termination. Ruiz then filed a motion for recons ideration. The trial court granted that motion and entered a judgment gr anting in part and denying in part Ruiz’s petition for writ of mandate. The judgment re manded the matter to the City to amend its
decision in a manner consistent with the tria l court’s ruling that the dishonesty charge was unsupported by the eviden ce and otherwise denied the petition for writ of mandate. We affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND Ruiz was employed by the City’s po lice department (the Department) from February 2003 to August 11, 2009. His last assignment was as a detective in the Department’s Special Investigations Unit (SIU), and his responsibilities included investigating gang -related crimes. Ruiz’s prior disciplinary record included a suspension without pay in 2004 for an incident that occurred in the Bicycle Casino Club. Ruiz had covered a video camera in the casino’s security office while another offi cer used force against a handcuffed female. Ruiz not only attempted to cove r the camera, he also failed to notify a supervisor and to
document the use of force. Internal affairs investigat ion No. 08-06 (IA No. 08-06) The Department’s investigation of Ruiz was prompted by several events. In December 2007, then Chief of Police Keith Kilmer received an anonymous letter alleging that Ruiz was having an affair with a “hom egirl” who was subsequently revealed to be

1 All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated.3 Graciella Lagunas (Lagunas). Lagunas’s thr ee brothers were notorious members of the Bell Gardens Locos street gang. The author of the letter further alleged that Ruiz was disclosing information about law enforcement activities to Lagunas and to members of the Bell Gardens Locos gang. During the su mmer of 2008, Chief Kilmer learned that Ruiz had arrested Lagunas on a felony weapon s charge, but the charges had subsequently been reduced to a misdemeanor for resisting arrest. In November 2008, Chief Kilmer instructed Lieutenant Jeffery Tr avis to obtain copies of Lagun as’s arrest report and Ruiz’s testimony at Lagunas’s June 27 , 2008 preliminary hearing. On November 26, 2008, Lieu tenant Travis served Ruiz with written notice that he was being put on paid administrative leav e pending the Department’s IA No. 08-06 regarding an incident on June 27, 2008. Altho ugh the written notice given to Ruiz did not disclose the subject of the Department’s investigation, IA No . 08-06 involved an investigation into Ruiz’s re lationship with Lagunas and hi s testimony at Lagunas’s June 27, 2008 preliminary hearing. The written notice given to Ru iz advised him that certain orders governed his paid
administrative leave status. Two of thos e orders, order No. 5 and order No. 7, are relevant to this appeal. Order No. 5 states: “You are prohibited from entering any part of any City facility which is not open to the general public.” Order No. 7 states: “You are prohibited from discussing any aspect of [IA ] No. 08-06 with any employee of the [City] (subject to a singular exception applicable to any one individual that may have been designated by you as a represen tative in these proceedings).” The notice further advised Ruiz that failure to comply w ith any of the orders contained in the notice “shall in and of itself result in a disciplinable act of insubordination.” On November 26, 2008, the same day he was served with the notice of paid administrative leave, Ruiz arranged a meetin g with Detective Angel Puente and Sergeant Ruben Musquiz at a Denny’s restaurant pa rking lot. Sergeant Musquiz was Ruiz’s immediate supervisor in the SIU’s gang divisi on. Detective Puente was president of the
Bell Gardens Police Officers Association and Ruiz ’s colleague in the SIU. Before going to the Denny’s parking lot, Ruiz asked Det ective Puente if he would serve as Ruiz’s4 union representative, and Detec tive Puente agreed. While in the Denny’s parking lot,
Detective Puente contacted a law firm and obtained a verbal commitment from an attorney at that firm to repr esent Ruiz in connection with th e Department’s investigation. In the Denny’s parking lot, Ruiz asked Sergeant Musquiz and Detective Puente if they knew why he was being investigated . Lagunas’s name came up during the conversation. Ruiz specifically mentioned La gunas and said he had met with her at times when he was not on duty. On November 27, 2008, th e day after being served with the notice of paid administrative leave, Ruiz had a telephone conversation with Det ective Mark Cobian.
Detective Cobian told Ruiz about inform ation he had received from a confidential informant regarding Lagunas. According to the informant, Lagunas had recently been interviewed by two police officers named Dow and Travis. Ruiz later admitted that at the time of his telephone conversation with Dete ctive Cobian, he knew that IA No. 08-06 concerned Lagunas and that discussing her with Detective Cobian was improper. On November 28, 2008, Ru iz telephoned Officer Rigo Barrios, his former partner in the SIU’s gang unit. During their conve rsation, Ruiz menti oned Lagunas and asked
Officer Barrios whether he remembered me eting Lagunas while Ruiz was present.
Because Officer Barrios believed that La gunas had something to do with Ruiz’s investigation, he told Ruiz that he did not want to discuss her. Ruiz later admitted that at
the time of his conversation with Officer Ba rrios, he knew that IA No. 08-06 concerned Lagunas, and that his questions about Lagunas were improper. Also on November 28, 2 008, Ruiz telephoned Detectiv e Puente and asked him to accompany Ruiz to the police st ation because he wanted to obtain arrest reports and telephone records related to Lagunas. When Detective Puente said he was unable to do
so because of work commitmen ts, Ruiz arranged for Sergeant Musquiz to take him to the SIU trailer later that day. Ru iz asked Sergeant Musquiz to meet him at a nearby Denny’s. Sergeant Musquiz picked up Ruiz at the Denn y’s parking lot and drove him to the police station. Ruiz and Sergeant Musquiz arrive d at the SIU trailer, which was locked and unoccupied, at approximately 10: 00 p.m. Upon entering the tr ailer, Ruiz asked Sergeant5 Musquiz to research a particular date on th e Department’s computer. Before Sergeant Musquiz could do so, Lieutenant Travis and Chief Kilmer entere d the trailer. Lieutenant Travis asked Ruiz what he was doing there, and Ruiz responded that he was retrieving some personal items. When Li eutenant Travis asked Ruiz where his personal vehicle was parked, Ruiz responded that it was parked “up the street.” Lieutenant Travis then asked Ruiz how he had gotten to the trailer, and Ruiz said he had walked. Ruiz later admitted
he had lied to Lieutenant Travis because he wanted to protect Sergeant Musquiz. Internal affairs investigat ion No. 08-07 (IA No. 08-07) IA No. 08-07 involved an investigation into Ruiz’s inappropriate use of his Department issued email account and cellu lar telephone to transmit non-business pornographic photographs and email messages. The investigation commenced after the Department examined Ruiz’s computer accoun t and email messages when closing Ruiz’s account pending the investig ation of IA No. 08-06. The Department’s investigation revealed that between November 9, 2006 and August 8, 2007, Ruiz had used his Depart ment email account to exchange pornographic photographs and sexually explic it emails with Tommie Gonzal ez, a female citizen. The investigation also showed that between Nove mber 15, 2007 and October 18, 2008, Ruiz used his Department issued cellular telephon e to make 35 non-police related telephone calls to Gonzalez while on duty. Finally, the investigation showed that on March 1, 2008 and November 17, 2008, Ruiz used his Depart ment issued cell phone to send photographs of a female’s partially expose d breasts to his Department email account. Ruiz admitted to having committed these incidents of misconduct. Termination of Ruiz’s employment and administrative appeal The City terminated Ruiz’s employmen t effective August 13, 2009. Ruiz appealed his termination, and an administrative hearing was he ld before the assistant city manager acting as a hearing officer. At the outset of the hearing, the City ’s attorney asked that various witness interview summaries, including a summary of the Department ’s investigative interview of Detective Puente, be marked and admitted into evidence. The hearing officer asked6 Ruiz’s counsel if he had any objection, an d Ruiz’s counsel respon ded “No objection.” The hearing officer thereafter admitted the interview summaries in to evidence as the City’s exhibit 9.
Detective Puente testified at the ad ministrative hearing. During Detective Puente’s testimony, Ruiz’s counsel asked that any communication between Ruiz and
Detective Puente be excluded from the reco rd, including Ruiz’s November 28, 2008 telephone conversation with De tective Puente before enteri ng the SIU trailer. Counsel for the City pointed out that no prior objec tion had been made and that all evidence received prior to the objecti on by Ruiz’s counsel was admiss ible as evid ence on the
record. The hearing officer ruled that the communications between Detective Puente and Ruiz on November 26, 2008, in the Denny’s parking lot were not privileged because they took place in the presence of Sergeant Musquiz, a third party. The hearing officer also ruled that no privilege attached to th e November 28, 2008 conversation between Detective Puente and Ruiz about entering th e SIU trailer because Detective Puente was not Ruiz’s employee representative at that ti me. The hearing officer concluded that any employee representative relationship between Detective Puente and Ruiz terminated when Ruiz obtained representation by legal counsel. The hearing officer noted that Detective Puente was not pres ent during the Department’s investigative interviews of Ruiz, nor was he present during any mee ting between Ruiz a nd the Department’s management to discuss Ruiz’s termination. 2 At the conclusion of the hearing, the he aring officer prepared a written decision sustaining the allegations that Ruiz violated order No. 5 of IA No. 08-06 prohibiting him from entering any part of any C ity facility not open to the public. The hearing officer
found that Ruiz’s reasons for entering the SIU trailer were not credible. Ruiz’s assertion that he thought his presence in the trailer ha d been authorized by his supervisor, Sergeant Musquiz, lacked merit because he had initially asked Detective Puente, a peer and not a

2 Such a meeting is commonly called a Skelly hearing, after Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194.7 supervisor, to accompany him to the trailer. The hearing officer further found that Ruiz’s stated reason for being in th e trailer to retrieve personal belongings lack ed credibility because his first act upon entering the trailer was not to gather his personal belongings but rather to ask Sergeant Musquiz to res earch information related to Lagunas on the Department computer. The hearing officer fo und that Ruiz was dishonest when he told
Lieutenant Travis and Chief Kilmer that his reason for entering the trailer was to retrieve personal items, and that he had walked to th e SIU trailer in response to Lieutenant Travis’s question as to how Ru iz had arrived at the trailer. The hearing officer also sustained the alle gations that Ruiz violated order No. 7 of IA No. 08-06 prohibiting him from discussing an y aspect of the investigation with any City employee except his designated represen tative. The hearing officer found that Ruiz’s discussions with Sergeant Musquiz an d Detective Puente at the Denny’s parking lot on November 26, 2008, his telephone conversation with Detective Cobian on November 28, 2008, and his telephone conversation with Officer Barrios on November 28, 2008, all were in vi olation of order No. 7. With regard to IA No. 08-07, the heari ng officer found that based on Ruiz’s own
admissions at the administrativ e hearing, Ruiz had improperly used his Department email account and cellular telephone to send an d receive pornographi c photographs and

messages. The hearing officer found just cause to terminate Ruiz’s employment and further found that the City’s decisi on to terminate Ruiz was not an abuse of discretion. Mandamus proceedings Ruiz filed a petition for writ of mandate , alleging that the City’s decision to terminate his employment was not supported by the evidence and that the penalty of
termination was excessive as a matter of law. Ruiz further argued that the Department’s summary of Detective Puente’s investigative interview should be suppressed because that interview violated Ruiz’s rights under sectio n 3303, subdivision (i) of the PBRA by intruding on the confidentia lity of his communications w ith his representative and by threatening punitive action agains t Detective Puente if he did not submit to the interview.8 The trial court denied Ruiz’s request to suppress statements made by Detective Puente during the Department’s investigativ e interview. The court concluded that Detective Puente’s role as Ruiz’s repres entative did not preclude the Department from interviewing Detective Pu ente about his own actions without violating any confidentiality. The trial court further conc luded that Sergeant Musquiz’s presence during the conversations between Detective Pu ente and Ruiz at th e Denny’s parking lot on November 26, 2008, precl uded any claim of confidentiality with respect to those conversations. With regard to Ruiz’s conve rsation with Detective Puente about entering the SIU trailer on November 28, 2008, the trial court stated: “The conversation between [Detective] Puente and Ruiz concerning Ruiz’s reasons for going to the trailer--t o pick up arrest and crime reports-- is different. If confidential, it should be suppressed. But the conversation did not concern historical inform ation which would be subject to confidentiality under section 3303(i ). Rather, the conversation was prospective in nature, concerning Ruiz ’s motivation for go ing to the trailer that evening. Ruiz cannot hide ongo ing or future misconduct by using his union representative to do so. Nothing in section 3303(i) permits that, and [Detective] Puente could be interviewed on that subject.”

The trial court also noted that suppression of Detective Puente’s interview concerning Ruiz’s reasons for entering the SIU trailer w ould not affect the determination that Ruiz
violated order No. 5. The trial court found, however, that Ruiz’s statements in response to Lieutenant Travis’s questions in the SIU trailer on Nove mber 28, 2008, were taken in violation of
the PBRA and should have be en suppressed. On that ba sis, the court overturned the dishonesty charge. The court concluded, how ever, that the heari ng officer’s remaining findings supported the decision to terminat e Ruiz’s employment. The trial court accordingly denied Ruiz’s petition on May 3, 2012.
Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s May 3, 2012 decision denying the petition for writ of mandate. The trial court granted the motion for reconsideration and then granted in part an d denied in part Ruiz’s petition for writ of mandate. The court issued a peremptory wr it of mandamus remanding the matter to the9 City to amend its December 22, 2012 decision to state that the evid ence does not support the administrative charge and finding that Ruiz was dishonest to Lieutenant Travis and
Chief Kilmer inside the SIU trailer on the even ing of November 28, 2008. The trial court otherwise denied the petition for writ of mandate. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of review In a mandamus proceeding involving a fundam ental vested right, such as the right of a city employee to continued employment ( McMillen v. Civil Service Com. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 125, 129), the trial court exerci ses its independent judgment to determine whether the agency’s findings are supporte d by the weight of the evidence. ( Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Ret. Ass’n (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 32; Kazensky v. City of
Merced (1998) 65 Cal. App.4th 44, 51 ( Kazensky ).) An appellate court must sustain the trial court’s factual findings that are suppor ted by substantial evidence, resolving all conflicts in favor of the prevailing party, and giving that party the benefit of every reasonable inference in supp ort of the judgment. ( Kazensky , at p. 52.)
“Judicial review of an agency’s assessment of a penalty is limited, and the agency’s determination will not be disturbed in mandamus proceedings unless there is an arbitrary, capricious or patently abusive exerci se of discretion by the agency. [Citation.] ‘Neither a trial court nor an appellate court is free to substitute its discretion for that of an administrative agency concer ning the degree of punishment imposed. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] If reasonable minds may differ with regard to the propriety of the disciplinary action, no abuse of discretion has occurred. [Citation.] An appellate court conducts a
de novo review of the trial court’s determ ination of the penalty assessed, giving no
deference to the trial court’s de termination. [Citation.]” ( Flippin v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Civil Service Commissioners (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 272, 279.) II. The trial court properly declin ed to remand the entire matter
Ruiz contends the trial court should ha ve remanded the entire matter back to the City after the court overturn ed the dishonesty charge ba sed on Ruiz’s statements to10 Lieutenant Travis and former Chief Kilmer inside the SIU tr ailer on November 28, 2008. The circumstances do not support returnin g the matter to the City. The City’s termination notice designates termination as the appropriate discipline for each of Ruiz’s
several acts of misconduct and insubordinatio n, including multiple violations of order No. 5 in IA No. 08-06 prohib iting Ruiz from discussing the i nvestigation with any City employee, and for violation of order No. 7, prohibiting him from entering any City property not open to the public. The City thus exercised its discretion to impose the penalty of termination based not on the aggreg ate findings of violations by Ruiz, “but by segregating the findings as to the several ch arges and designating the penalty appropriate to each violation.” ( Mast v. State Board of Optometry (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 78, 92-93.) The hearing officer expressly found that each of Ruiz’s several violations of
administrative order Nos. 5 and 7 warranted termination of Ruiz’s employment, and the trial court sustained those findings. The tria l court did not err by declining to remand the matter to the City for recons ideration of the penalty. ( Ibid. ) III. Alleged PBRA violations
Ruiz contends Detective Puente’s st atements made during the Department’s investigative interviews c oncerned confidential communications between Ruiz and his union representative that were improperly receiv ed by the City in violation of section 3303, subdivision (i). 3 Ruiz further contends the C ity obtained Detective Puente’s statements in violation of section 3303, su bdivision (i) because the City threatened punitive action against Detective Puente in order to obtain privileged communications.

3 Section 3303, subdivision (i) provides : “Upon the filing of a formal written statement of charges, or whenever an interr ogation focuses on matters that are likely to result in punitive action against any public sa fety officer, that officer, at his or her request, shall have the right to be represente d by a representative of his or her choice who may be present at all times during the interro gation. The representative shall not be a person subject to the same investigation. The representative shall not be required to disclose, nor be subject to any punitive acti on for refusing to disclose, any information received from the officer under inves tigation for noncriminal matters.”11 The challenged statements are those De tective Puente made to investigating officers during interviews conducted on Dece mber 17, 2008 and February 11, 2009, and
summarized in a witness interv iew report included as an exhibit to the Department’s investigative report on Ruiz. Ruiz did no t make a timely objection to the admission of Detective Puente’s interview report in th e administrative heari ng below and arguably forfeited the right to do so in this mandamus proceeding. ( Dibble v. Gourley (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 496, 502, disapproved on another ground in MacDonald v. Gutierrez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 150, 157-159; Morgan v. Community Redevelopment Agency (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 243, 258.)
The trial court nevertheless considered Ruiz’s request to suppress Detective
Puente’s statements a nd found that Detective Puente wa s Ruiz’s union representative. The trial court concluded, however, that s ection 3303, subdivision (i) did not apply to Ruiz’s November 28, 2008 conversation with Detective Puente abou t Ruiz’s reasons for entering the SIU trailer later that day beca use the conversation concerned matters that were prospective in nature rath er than about historical facts relevant to the Department’s investigation of Ruiz. We question whether the statutory privilege accorded by section 3303, subdivision (i) can be parsed according to the subj ect matter of the communication between an officer and his or her designate d representative. We need not, however, decide this issue. Suppressi on of the challenged statements would not affect the findings that Ruiz committed multiple other incidents of misconduct that would support the penalty of termination. Ruiz’s entry into the trailer violated the order prohibiting him from entering any City facility not open to the general public, regardless of his reasons for doing so. Ruiz also co mmitted multiple violations of the order prohibiting him from discussing IA 08-06 with other City empl oyees. Any error would thus have been
harmless. IV. Substantial evidence supports the finding of insubordination
Ruiz contends he did not intentionally violate order No. 5, prohibiting him from entering any part of any City facility not open to the genera l public, when he entered the SIU trailer on November 28, 2008, because he believed he had perm ission to do so from12 Sergeant Musquiz, his supervisor. Order No . 5 contains no exception for a supervisor’s permission to enter City property not open to the general public. The order states: “You are prohibited from entering any pa rt of any City facility whic h is not open to the general public.” Ruiz read the orde r and understood its meaning. Ruiz’s actions belie his proffered justific ation for entering the trailer -- his reliance on Sergeant Musquiz’s permission in order to re trieve some personal belongings. Ruiz first sought help in gaining access to the trailer not from Sergeant Musquiz, but from Detective Puente, a colleague, and not a superv isor. Ruiz turned to Sergeant Musquiz only after Detective Puente was unavailable. After entering the trailer, Ruiz did not collect personal effects, but rather asked Se rgeant Musquiz to obtain information for him on the Department’s computer. Substantial evidence supports the trial cour t’s conclusion that Ru iz’s entry into the
trailer was a willful viol ation of order No. 5. V. Penalty Substantial evidence supports the factual findings sustained by the hearing officer that were the basis for terminating Ruiz’s employment. The penalty imposed by an administrative agency will not be disturbed in a mandamus proceeding absent a manifest abuse of discretion. ( Kazensky, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 54.) “It is only in the exceptional case, when it is shown that reasona ble minds cannot differ on the propriety of the penalty, that an abuse of disc retion is shown. [Citations.]” ( Deegan v. City of
Mountain View (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 37, 47.) No su ch showing has been made here. Sustaining Ruiz’s discharge was not an abuse of discretion, and the trial court did not err by denying the petition for writ of mandate.13 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. The C ity is awarded its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

____ ___________________, J. CHAVEZ

We concur:

________________ ______, Acting P. J. ASHMANN-GERST

________________ ______, J.* FERNS

___________________ __________________ __________________ _________________ * Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chie f Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.