Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1609-CR-2079 | August 30, 2017 Page 1 of 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Suzy St. John

Marion County Public Defender

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Ellen H. Meilaender

Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Heather Ryon,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

August 30, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1609-CR-2079

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Allan Reid, 

Commissioner

Trial Court Cause No.

49G10-1603-CM-10220

Brown, Judge.
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[1] Heather Ryon appeals her conviction for possession of paraphernalia as a class 

C misdemeanor. She raises one issue which we revise and restate as whether

the court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of a search. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] At 8:30 p.m. on March 15, 2016, Beech Grove Police Officer David Parker was 

conducting a routine patrol in his fully marked police car and full uniform when 

he conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle for no rear taillights. Officer Parker 

observed Ryon sitting in the rear passenger’s seat and asked her if she would be 

willing to identify herself, and she did. Officer Parker performed a check, found 

that Ryon had an active warrant, and decided to take her into custody. A 

backup officer arrived at the scene, and Ryon and the driver exited the vehicle,

leaving an elderly female in the front passenger seat who, based upon Officer 

Parker’s observation “seemed like she would be fine just to stay in the vehicle.” 

Transcript at 8. Officer Parker placed Ryon and the driver in handcuffs. 

[3] Officer Parker approached the front passenger who claimed to be the owner of 

the vehicle and asked her if she cared if he briefly checked the vehicle for any 

contraband or weapons, and she said it was fine. Officer Parker saw the purse 

that had been on Ryon’s lap sitting on the rear seat, took the purse, brought it 

back to Ryon, and asked, “this is yours correct?” Id. Ryon answered 

affirmatively. Officer Parker asked Ryon, “would you like this to go to jail with 

you,” and Ryon said, “yes.” Id. at 49. Officer Parker searched the purse and 

found a black small “velvet-like cinch bag” which contained a glass pipe Officer 

Parker believed to be used to smoke narcotics. When Ryon saw the pipe, she 
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“in kind of a startled or uh-oh type of look said, ‘oh, I didn’t even know that 

was in there, uh, that is just mine from some time ago. I don’t even use 

anymore.’” Id. at 50. Later testing indicated methamphetamine residue in the 

pipe. 

[4] On March 16, 2016, the State charged Ryon with possession of paraphernalia 

as a class C misdemeanor. On April 11, 2016, Ryon filed a motion to suppress 

her statements and any items discovered during the search. On June 13, 2016, 

the court held a hearing on the motion and the parties and the court questioned 

Officer Parker. Ryon’s counsel argued that the evidence should be suppressed 

under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, 

Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. The court took the matter under 

advisement. 

[5] On July 11, 2016, the court entered an order denying Ryon’s motion to 

suppress, and on August 15, 2016, a bench trial was held. During cross 

examination of Officer Parker, Ryon’s counsel asked him if Ryon told him that 

she wanted to take the purse with her to booking, to which he responded that 

Ryon did not explicitly state she wanted to take the purse and that “[a]t that 

time that I cuffed her she did not say ‘Officer, please get my purse.’” Id. at 27. 

After the State rested, Ryon testified that her boyfriend was driving his 

grandmother, that they retrieved quite a few items from storage, that a purse 

was on top of a “bunch of coats and stuff that was sitting beside” her, and that 

the purse Officer Parker retrieved was not her purse and came from storage. Id.

at 44. She also testified that Officer Parker retrieved the purse after she was 
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handcuffed and took it back to his car and that she did not tell him that it was 

her purse. On cross-examination, she testified that she did not give Officer 

Parker an identification card, she just verbally gave him her information, that 

she never claimed anything inside of the purse belonged to her, that she never 

wanted the purse to come with her to the jail, and that Officer Parker did not 

ask if she wanted the purse to go to the jail with her. 

[6] On rebuttal, the prosecutor asked Officer Parker what Ryon said about the 

items inside of the purse, and defense counsel objected and argued that it was 

redundant and that Officer Parker already testified to this. The court overruled 

the objection, and Officer Parker answered: “Well, I had reached into the car 

and grabbed the purse out then I asked Ms. Ryon, ‘is this your purse; would 

you like it to go to the jail with you’ as courtesy more than anything because 

that is common for a female arrestee to want her purse to go with her.” Id. at 

49. Officer Parker also testified that he showed the purse to Ryon and that “I 

said, ‘is this yours’, she said ‘yes’, then I said, ‘would you like this to go to jail 

with you’ and she said, ‘yes’.” Id. He also stated that he placed the purse on 

the hood of his car where it was in bright light, searched it, and located the 

cinch bag. 

[7] The court found Ryon guilty and sentenced her to sixty days with fifty-six days 

suspended and 365 days probation. 
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Discussion

[8] The issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence 

of the search. The admission and exclusion of evidence falls within the sound

discretion of the trial court, and we review the admission of evidence only for 

an abuse of discretion. Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1272 (Ind. 2002). An 

abuse of discretion occurs “where the decision is clearly against the logic and 

effect of the facts and circumstances.” Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind.

2001). Even if the trial court’s decision was an abuse of discretion, we will not 

reverse if the admission constituted harmless error. Fox v. State, 717 N.E.2d 

957, 966 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh’g denied, trans. denied. “[T]he ultimate 

determination of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a question of law 

that we consider de novo.” Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014). 

[9] In ruling on admissibility following the denial of a motion to suppress, the trial 

court considers the foundational evidence presented at trial. Id. If the 

foundational evidence at trial is not the same as that presented at the 

suppression hearing, the trial court must make its decision based upon trial 

evidence and may consider hearing evidence only if it does not conflict with 

trial evidence. Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 n.1 (Ind. 2014).

[10] Ryon raises arguments under: (A) the Fourth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution; and (B) Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. 

A. Fourth Amendment
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[11] Ryon argues that the search of her purse was unreasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment because it did not fall within one of the exceptions to the warrant 

requirement, and that the search was not consensual because the grandmother’s 

consent to a search of her car did not authorize Officer Parker to search Ryon’s 

purse on the backseat. She asserts that her agreement that her purse be 

transported to jail was not knowing and voluntary consent to Officer Parker’s 

rummaging through it at the scene and that her authorization limited Officer 

Parker to being a courier for her purse. She also argues that the search was not 

reasonable as a search incident to arrest because she was away from the vehicle 

and secured in handcuffs, they were not in a high crime area, no one behaved 

suspiciously, and the purse presented no concerns for safety. She contends that 

there is no evidence the search was performed according to established 

departmental inventory procedures, and that applying the inevitable discovery 

exception would swallow the rule that inventory searches must be done 

according to established departmental policy and procedures. 

[12] The State asserts that Ryon lacks standing to litigate a challenge to a search of 

the purse because she testified to facts disavowing any expectation of privacy in 

the purse. It contends that it did not waive this argument because it never had 

an opportunity to raise this argument in the trial court because Ryon had not 

disavowed her ownership of the purse at the time of the suppression hearing or 

when she renewed her suppression objection at trial. Its positon is that Officer 

Parker lawfully searched Ryon’s purse incident to her arrest, and that if a 

person is in actual possession of an item such as a purse at or immediately 
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preceding the time of her arrest, this container is part of her person for purposes 

of the search, just as her outer clothing is, and it therefore falls under United 

States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and may be searched based solely on the 

fact of the arrest, without needing any particularized concern for officer safety 

or evidence preservation. The State further asserts that the search would still be 

valid even if it was governed by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), because 

Gant’s officer-safety justification requiring the container in the vehicle to be 

within reach and accessible is still satisfied when there are other unsecured 

persons remaining in the vehicle who could reach the container and pose a 

threat to the officer. Finally, the State argues that the pipe in Ryon’s purse 

inevitably would have been discovered when she was processed at the jail. 

[13] To the extent the State asserts that Ryon does not have standing to challenge 

the search, we note that while Ryon did not testify that the purse did not belong 

to her until after the State had rested, the State set forth rebuttal testimony from 

Officer Parker, and the prosecutor made arguments, but never asserted that 

Ryon lacked standing to contest the search. Accordingly, we will examine the 

propriety of Officer Parker’s search of the purse. See Tumblin v. State, 736 

N.E.2d 317, 320-321 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the State did not 

challenge the defendant’s standing at the suppression hearing and trial and had 

waived the argument and noting that where the prosecution has failed to make 

any trial court challenge to standing, the government may not raise the issue for

the first time on appeal and that, in resolving a claim of unlawful search and 
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seizure, an appellate court should not invoke a lack of standing sua sponte) 

(citing Everroad v. State, 590 N.E.2d 567, 569 (Ind. 1992)), trans. denied.

[14] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in 

pertinent part: “[t]he right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 

violated . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. If the search is conducted without a 

warrant, the State bears the burden to show that one of the well-delineated 

exceptions to the warrant requirement applies. M.O. v. State, 63 N.E.3d 329, 

331 (Ind. 2016).

[15] We begin with a review of cases from the United States Supreme Court. In 

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482, (2014), the Court stated that “[a]s the 

text makes clear, ‘the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 

“reasonableness.”’” (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.

Ct. 1943 (2006)). The Court addressed whether the police may, without a 

warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual 

who had been arrested, and reviewed three related precedents that set forth the 

rules governing searches incident to arrest. 134 S. Ct. at 2483-2484. 

Specifically, the Court stated: 

The first, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 

L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), laid the groundwork for most of the existing 

search incident to arrest doctrine. Police officers in that case 

arrested Chimel inside his home and proceeded to search his 

entire three-bedroom house, including the attic and garage. In 
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particular rooms, they also looked through the contents of 

drawers. Id., at 753-754, 89 S. Ct. 2034.

The Court crafted the following rule for assessing the 

reasonableness of a search incident to arrest:

“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting 

officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any 

weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist 

arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety 

might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. 

In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer 

to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s 

person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. . 

. . There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of 

the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate 

control’—construing that phrase to mean the area from 

within which he might gain possession of a weapon or 

destructible evidence.” Id., at 762-763, 89 S. Ct. 2034.

The extensive warrantless search of Chimel’s home did not fit 

within this exception, because it was not needed to protect officer 

safety or to preserve evidence. Id., at 763, 768, 89 S. Ct. 2034.

Four years later, in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S. 

Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), the Court applied the Chimel

analysis in the context of a search of the arrestee’s person. A 

police officer had arrested Robinson for driving with a revoked 

license. The officer conducted a patdown search and felt an 

object that he could not identify in Robinson’s coat pocket. He 

removed the object, which turned out to be a crumpled cigarette 

package, and opened it. Inside were 14 capsules of heroin. Id., 

at 220, 223, 89 S. Ct. 2034.
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The Court of Appeals concluded that the search was 

unreasonable because Robinson was unlikely to have evidence of 

the crime of arrest on his person, and because it believed that 

extracting the cigarette package and opening it could not be 

justified as part of a protective search for weapons. This Court 

reversed, rejecting the notion that “case-by-case adjudication” 

was required to determine “whether or not there was present one 

of the reasons supporting the authority for a search of the person 

incident to a lawful arrest.” Id., at 235, 89 S. Ct. 2034. As the 

Court explained, “[t]he authority to search the person incident to 

a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm 

and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may 

later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation 

that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person 

of the suspect.” Ibid. Instead, a “custodial arrest of a suspect 

based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the 

Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search 

incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.” Ibid.

The Court thus concluded that the search of Robinson was 

reasonable even though there was no concern about the loss of 

evidence, and the arresting officer had no specific concern that 

Robinson might be armed. Id., at 236, 89 S. Ct. 2034. In doing 

so, the Court did not draw a line between a search of Robinson’s 

person and a further examination of the cigarette pack found 

during that search. It merely noted that, “[h]aving in the course 

of a lawful search come upon the crumpled package of cigarettes, 

[the officer] was entitled to inspect it.” Ibid. A few years later, 

the Court clarified that this exception was limited to “personal 

property . . . immediately associated with the person of the 

arrestee.” United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15, 97 S. Ct. 

2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (200-pound, locked footlocker could 

not be searched incident to arrest), abrogated on other grounds by 

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 

619 (1991).
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The search incident to arrest trilogy concludes with [Arizona v. 

Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009)], which analyzed 

searches of an arrestee’s vehicle. Gant, like Robinson, recognized 

that the Chimel concerns for officer safety and evidence 

preservation underlie the search incident to arrest exception. See

556 U.S., at 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710. As a result, the Court 

concluded that Chimel could authorize police to search a vehicle 

“only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching 

distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.” 

556 U.S., at 343, 129 S. Ct. 1710. Gant added, however, an 

independent exception for a warrantless search of a vehicle’s 

passenger compartment “when it is ‘reasonable to believe 

evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the 

vehicle.’” Ibid. (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 

632, 124 S. Ct. 2127, 158 L.Ed.2d 905 (2004) (Scalia, J., 

concurring in judgment)). That exception stems not from Chimel, 

the Court explained, but from “circumstances unique to the 

vehicle context.” 556 U.S., at 343, 129 S. Ct. 1710.

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2483-2484. The Court held that “[m]odern cell phones, as a 

category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search 

of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.” Id. at 2488-2489.

[16] We next review Garcia v. State, 47 N.E.3d 1196 (Ind. 2016), a recent decision in 

which the Indiana Supreme Court discussed the search incident to arrest 

exception. The Court held that the opening of a pill container during the course 

of a pat-down search incident to arrest constituted a reasonable search. Garcia, 

47 N.E.3d at 1197. The Indiana Supreme Court stated: 

We continue to be persuaded by Robinson regarding the degree of 

suspicion necessary to conduct a search incident to arrest. The 

United States Supreme Court set out a clear standard in Robinson. 
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“A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a 

reasonable intrusion . . . that intrusion being lawful, a search 

incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.” 414 

U.S. at 235, 94 S. Ct. 467. We similarly conclude that it is “the 

lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search.” Id.

Id. at 1200. 

[17] The record reveals that Officer Parker obtained permission to search the interior 

of the vehicle by the owner, and Ryon made movements related to the purse 

prior to exiting the vehicle. Officer Parker testified that Ryon’s movements 

“she made are like touching the purse or, just like my wife, her purse will be 

beside her and she will often pat it just to kind confirm that it is there or as you 

rest your hands its touching it. So, the movements that touched it.” Transcript 

at 39. He also testified that the purse had been seated “just about her lap or 

touching her leg that she’d been getting into and fumbling when I was talking 

with her.” Id. at 24. Ryon admitted the purse belonged to her and requested 

that it be transported to the jail with her. Under these circumstances, we 

conclude that the purse was immediately associated with Ryon, and the search 

was reasonable under the circumstances and did not violate Ryon’s rights under 

the Fourth Amendment.1 

 

1 Ryon cites Anderson v. State, 64 N.E.3d 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). In that case, we held that the search of the 

defendant’s jacket which was left in a car by the defendant and sole occupant of the car was unconstitutional 

because the police unlawfully entered the passenger compartment of the defendant’s car to access the jacket. 

64 N.E.3d at 906. Unlike Anderson, the owner of the vehicle consented to a search of the vehicle, Ryon 

indicated that the purse belonged to her, and she requested that the purse be transported to jail with her. 

Thus, we find Anderson distinguishable. 
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[18] Further, under the Fourth Amendment, “the inevitable discovery exception to 

the exclusionary rule permits the introduction of evidence that eventually 

would have been located had there been no error.” Shultz v. State, 742 N.E.2d 

961, 965 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (quotations and citations omitted), reh’g denied,

trans. denied. Given Ryon’s request for Officer Parker to transport her purse to 

the jail with her, we conclude that the officer inevitably would have discovered 

the glass pipe. Thus, under the Fourth Amendment, the pipe would have been 

admissible because it eventually would have been located even assuming that 

Officer Parker’s search of the purse at the scene was improper. See Nix v. 

Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).

B. Indiana Constitution 

[19] Ryon argues that the search of the purse was unreasonable under Article 1, 

Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. She contends that, even assuming her 

 

The State notes that it found two Indiana cases in which searches of purses were found improper and cites 

Bradford v. State, 401 N.E.2d 77 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980), and Johnson v. State, 413 N.E.2d 335 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1980), but argues that those cases are not instructive. In Bradford, the trooper that ultimately searched a purse 

arrived ten or fifteen minutes after Bradford left the vehicle to stand in front of it and there was no indication 

that the purse belonged to Bradford other than the fact the purse was removed from the automobile in which 

Bradford had been sitting. See Bradford, 401 N.E.2d at 78. Similarly, in Johnson, some ten or fifteen minutes 

after Johnson was placed under arrest, handcuffed, and placed in the police car, police searched a purse and 

discovered the handgun. See Johnson, 413 N.E.2d at 336. We also observe that both Bradford and Johnson

relied upon Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S. Ct. 2586 (1979). See Bradford, 401 N.E.2d at 79; Johnson, 

413 N.E.2d at 336. The Court in Sanders noted that it was not considering the constitutionality of searches of 

the luggage at issue incident to the arrest of its possessor. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 763 n.11, 99 S. Ct. at 2593 

n.11, abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991). Further, those cases did not 

involve an owner of the vehicle consenting to a search of the vehicle, the defendant indicating that the purse 

belonged to her, or the defendant’s request that the purse be transported to jail with her. Thus, we find those 

cases distinguishable. See Chambers v. State, 422 N.E.2d 1198 (Ind. 1981) (distinguishing Bradford and Johnson

and observing that those cases more nearly paralleled the case of United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S. 

Ct. 2476 (1977), in which a footlocker was seized when the defendant was arrested and one and one-half 

hours after the arrest the police opened the footlocker without either a warrant or the permission of the 

defendant).
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statement could be viewed as an intelligent relinquishment of her right to keep 

its contents private, the consent would still be invalid under Pirtle v. State, 263 

Ind. 16, 323 N.E.2d 634 (1975), because Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana 

Constitution requires a person in custody to explicitly waive the right to consult 

with counsel before giving a valid consent to a search. The State asserts that the 

search did not violate Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution and 

points to Garcia v. State, 47 N.E.3d 1196 (Ind. 2016).

[20] Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution provides: 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall 

not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable 

cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 

describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 

seized.

[21] Although its text mirrors the federal Fourth Amendment, we interpret Article 1, 

Section 11 of our Indiana Constitution separately and independently. Robinson 

v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 368 (Ind. 2014). “When a defendant raises a Section 11 

claim, the State must show the police conduct ‘was reasonable under the 

totality of the circumstances.’” Id. (quoting State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 

1200, 1205-1206 (Ind. 2008), reh’g denied). Generally, “[w]e consider three 

factors when evaluating reasonableness: ‘1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or 

knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method 

of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the 
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extent of law enforcement needs.’” Id. (quoting Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 

356, 361 (Ind. 2005)).2

[22] Applying the factors articulated in Litchfield, we first consider “the degree of 

concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred.” Litchfield, 824 

N.E.2d at 361. In analyzing this factor, the Indiana Supreme Court has 

recently held that it had “previously recognized that ‘once a lawful arrest has 

been made, authorities may conduct a “full search” of the arrestee for weapons 

or concealed evidence. No additional probable cause for the search is required, 

and the search incident to arrest may “involve a relatively extensive exploration 

of the person.”’” Garcia, 47 N.E.3d at 1200 (quoting Edwards v. State, 759 

N.E.2d 626, 629 (Ind. 2001) (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 227, 235, 94 S. Ct. 

467) (internal quotation and citation omitted)). The record reveals and Ryon 

does not dispute that she had an arrest warrant. 

[23] Regarding the degree of intrusion, we note that the elderly woman consented to 

a search of the vehicle. With respect to the purse, we note that the Indiana 

Supreme Court has stated that “society accepts as objectively reasonable that 

persons have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their purses and other closed 

 

2 We note that the inevitable discovery exception has not been adopted as a matter of Indiana constitutional 

law. Ammons v. State, 770 N.E.2d 927, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. The Indiana Supreme Court 

has held that “our state constitution mandates that the evidence found as a result of [an unconstitutional] 

search be suppressed.” Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 80 (Ind. 1995). See also Grier v. State, 868 N.E.2d 443, 

445 (Ind. 2007) (“Evidence obtained as a result of an unconstitutional search must be suppressed.”). See also 

Gyamfi v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1131, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (declining to adopt the inevitable discovery rule as 

part of Indiana constitutional law in light of the Indiana Supreme Court’s firm language in Brown), reh’g 

denied; Ammons, 770 N.E.2d at 935.
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containers that normally hold highly personal items.” Krise v. State, 746 N.E.2d 

957, 970 (Ind. 2001). Here, Officer Parker testified that he asked Ryon if the 

purse belonged to her, that she responded affirmatively, that he asked her if she 

wanted the purse to go to jail with her, and that she said yes. Officer Parker 

testified that he “gathered her purse to send it to jail with her as her personally 

[sic] property.” Transcript at 25. Given that she was already being placed 

under arrest and requested that the purse be transported to jail with her, the 

brief delay to search the purse would have had little to no additional impact on 

Ryon’s ordinary activities and we cannot say that the degree of intrusion was 

high. 

[24] With respect to the extent of law enforcement needs, Officer Parker testified 

that Ryon indicated that she wanted her purse to go to jail with her. In Garcia, 

the Indiana Supreme Court held:

When the pill container was discovered on Garcia’s person, it is 

insignificant that Officer Robinett acknowledged that the 

container could contain legal or illegal substances or that he did 

not subjectively view Garcia or the container as dangerous. 

First, we have continually reiterated that “[a] search incident to a 

valid arrest is lawful regardless of what it reveals.” Farrie [v. 

State], [255 Ind. 681, 683, 266 N.E.2d 212, 214 (1971)]. Second, 

the objective reasonableness of the search is controlling, not 

Officer Robinett’s subjective views. Even under a brief stop and 

frisk, it is well established that the reasonableness of an officer’s 

suspicion turns upon whether “the totality of the circumstances 

presented a particularized and objective basis for the officer’s belief

. . . .” State v. Keck, 4 N.E.3d 1180, 1184 (Ind. 2014) (internal 

citation and quotation omitted) (emphasis added). Under an 

objective standard, we agree that “unknown physical objects may 
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always pose risks, no matter how slight, during the tense 

atmosphere of a custodial arrest.” Riley v. California, ––– U.S. ––

––, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014). In fact, these 

risks continue to some extent into the ensuing time thereafter the 

arrest. For example, a risk may still exist while police are 

transporting an arrestee to a secure location and during booking 

of that individual at the police station. See Chambers v. State, 422 

N.E.2d 1198, 1203 (Ind. 1981) (upholding the validity of a search 

incident to arrest, regardless of the fact that the search did not 

occur at the exact time and place of the arrest, but occurred once 

the police arrived at the police station with the defendant.)

47 N.E.3d at 1203. The Court also stated: “we see no basis in the present 

circumstances why an independent warrant should be required to search an 

item already lawfully seized.” Id. The Court further stated: “When taking an 

individual into custody, officer safety is a primary concern. Small and 

seemingly innocuous items have the potential to pose a threat. We see no 

reason to delay the officer’s ability to inspect such items once they have already 

been lawfully seized.” Id. This factor weighs in favor of the State.

[25] Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the search of the 

purse was reasonable and did not violate Ryon’s rights under Article 1, Section 

11 of the Indiana Constitution. 

Conclusion

[26] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Ryon’s conviction for possession of 

paraphernalia as a class C misdemeanor.

[27] Affirmed.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.