SIXTH DIVISION March 31, 2011

No. 1-09- 2484 GAZI H. MASH AL., Ind iv., and in a R epr ese nt at ive Capaci ty on Beh al f of Al l Th ose Sim il arly Situated, Pl ai n ti f f -A pp el l an t, v. THE CITY O F C HICA GO ; T ERR Y G . HI LL

ARD , Not Indi v., but as Superi

ntenden t o f the C hicago Polic e Depa rtme nt; CA ROLINE O. SH OENB ERGER, Not Indi v., bu t asCom m i ss i one r of the Ci ty of Ch i cago D ep artm

en t of Consu mer S erv i ce s; an d B EA REY NA -HI CK

EY, Not Indi v. , but a s D i

rec tor of the Ci ty of Ch i cago D ep artm

en t of Reven ue, Defendan ts-Appellees. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) A ppe al f rom the C i rcui t Court of Coo k C oun

ty

No. 00 CH 013396

Ho no r ab le Stuart E. Pal

mer, Judge Presidin

g. JUS TI CE CAHI LL de livered t he judg ment o f the co ur t , w ith o pinion. Pr esiding J ust ice Ga rc ia and J ust ice McB ride co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion. O P I N I O N In t his app eal, we r esp ond t o a sup er visor y or der ent er ed by t he su pr eme co ur t dire ct ing us to an swe

r f our certif i ed questi ons u nde r Ill i noi s Suprem

e Court Ru

l e 308 (ef f . Feb . 26, 201 0). We f i rst set out verb ati

m the f our certif i ed questi ons c ontai

ne d i n the order:

“ A . W ha t i s a ‘dec i si on on the meri ts’ un de r [s ec ti on 2 -80 2 of

the Code of Civil Pro ced ur e ( Co de) (7 35 I LCS 5/ 2- 802 (Wes t 200 4) )] t hat wo uld p re clude t he
en try of a cl ass dece rtif i cation order. B. W he the r, i n a cl as s acti on c as e c ha

l l en gi ng de f en da nts ’ practi ceof2

issuing p ar king o r st anding vio latio ns t o t axicab d river s and ot her s by mail and wit hou t any per so nal ser vice o n t he dr iver o r p lacement of t he cit at ion o n t he off endi ng ve hicl e, a prior Judge’s rul

in g that t he def

endan ts’ ‘practice of

sendi ng a sec ond not ice o f a par king o r st anding vio latio n pr ior t o a n initial not ice being eit he rha nd de liver ed t o t he dr ive ro f t he ve hic le o raffix ed t o t he ve hic le is violative of the plain

lan guage o f the [operat iv

e] stat ute and t he ordinances’
con sti tute s a de cisi on on th e m eri ts u n der [s ec ti on

2- 80 2 of th e C ode ] s uc h

th at a subsequent Judge presidin g in the case lacks the author ity to decert if y the cl ass. C. W he the r, i n a cl as s acti on c as e c ha

l l en gi ng de f en da nts ’ practi ceof issuing p ar king o r st anding vio latio ns t o t axicab d river s and ot her s by mail and wit hou t any per so nal ser vice o n t he dr iver o r p lacement of t he cit at ion o n t he of f en di ng ve hi cl e, a pri or J udg e’ s r ul i ng tha t de ni ed the de f en da nts ’ m oti on f or partial sum mary j udgm en t on the a ppl i cation of thei r af f i rm ati ve def en ses of f ail ure to exhaust admi

ni strat iv e remedi es, res ju dicata , t he co llater al at t ack do ct rine, and the vol un tary pa y men t doc tri ne con sti tutes a d ec i si on on the meri ts u nd er [ se cti on 2- 80 2] such

th at a su b se qu en t Ju dg e p re si di n g i n th e c as e l ac ksth e a uth ori ty to decert if y the cl ass. D. W he the r, i n a cl as s acti on c as e c ha

l l en gi ng de f en da nts ’ practi ceof issuing p ar king o r st anding vio latio ns t o t axicab d river s and ot her s by mail and wit hou t any per so nal ser vice o n t he dr iver o r p lacement of t he cit at ion o n t he of f en di ng ve hi cl e, a Judge ’s rul i ng tha t gra nte d i n p art th e d ef en da nts ’ m oti on f or summ ary j udgment on the application of the statut e of li mi tat ions constitutes a1-09-2484

3

deci si on on the me

rits unde r [section 2-802] such that a sub sequent Judge pres i di ng i n the ca se l

acks the a uthori ty to dec erti f

y the c l ass .” In a nsweri ng th e f i rst que sti on we

conc l ude that f or a dec i sion to be

“on the m eri ts” un der
se cti on 2- 80 2 th er e m us t b e a com pl ete de ter m i n ati on of l i ab i l i ty on a c l ai m , b as ed on th e f ac ts dis cl osed by

the evi dence. W

e answe r the second question i

n the n egative: the grant of partial summary judg ment in favo r o f plaintiff in this cas e did no t co mplet ely det er mine the liability on a claim based o n t he fact s disclo sed in evidence . We answ er t he t hird q ues t ion in t he neg at ive: t he court did n

ot render a “ deci si on on the me rits” wh en i t denie d defen

dants’ m ot ion f or part ia l
su m mary j udg men t on th ei r af f i rm ati ve de f en se s b ec au se

the cou rt m ad e n o de term i na ti on of l i ab i l i ty . W e a ns we r th e f ourth que sti on i n th e n eg ati ve : the p arti

al su m mary j udg men t rul i ng on the statut e of l

im itations was not a deci si on on the me rits be cause i

t did not determi

ne l ia bi li ty as to the remain

in g mem bers of the class. This case ari ses from a cl

ass action lawsui

t fil ed in 2000 by pl

ain tiff Gazi Mash

al agai nst the City of Chicago ( City). Mashal wor ked as a C hicago t axi driv er and challenged the City’s pr act ice o f issuing “fly

-by” t ra ffi c cit at ions t o t axicab d river s and ot her s. “Fly-by” t ra ffi c cit at ions
ar e de scr ibed in t he plea dings a s t hos e allege dly rece ived by mail, witho ut per so nal ser vice o n t he driver or placemen

t o f the ci tat ion on the offen

din g vehi cle. The ci

rcuit cou rt ent ered a class certif i cation order i

n 20 02. In Ma rc h 20 05 , pl ai n ti f f f i l ed a m oti on f or p ar ti al su m mar y j udgm en t on th e C i ty ’s l i ab i l i ty for issuing t he cit at ions. Among o t her claims, plaint iff ar gue d t hat t he Cit y’s pr act ice violat ed t he Ill in ois Veh ic le Code (625 ILCS 5/11-208.3(b)(3), (b)(5)(i) (Wes t 2004)) and the Munici

pal Code1-09-2484

4

of Chi cago (Chi cago M uni ci pal Code §9 —100— 030(b) (am

ended F eb . 10, 200 9); §9— 100 —05 0(d ) (a men de d D ec . 7, 2 005 )). In J

ul y 200 5, th e C i ty al so f i l ed a m oti on f or su mmar y jud gme nt . T he Cit y ar gu ed t ha t pla int iffs w er e b ar r ed fr o m lit iga t ing t he ir c laims be caus e the

y f ail ed to f i rst ch al l enge th e ci

tations at the

depa rtme nt of adm i nistrati ve he ari ngs . T he Cit y als o ar gu ed t ha t t he cla ims w er e b ar r ed by res ju dicata , col l ateral estoppe l , the v

olu ntary payment do ct rine and failure t o e xhaus t administr at ive remed ies. T he co ur t fou nd t hat t he practice of i

ssui ng the “ fl y-b y” ci tations was i

ll egal under the Illi

nois Vehi cl e Code and Ch

ic ago Munici pal Code, grant ed plaintif f’s m ot ion for par tial summ

ary judgment and denied the City’s motion f or summ ary j udgme

nt. Some tim

e passed, wi

thout expl

anati on in the record. In 2006, t he Ci

ty fi led a m ot ion f or p artial sum

mary judgm ent on t he aff

irm ative defen

se of the sta tute of l i m i tations . The C i

ty con ten de d that the on

e-y ea r s tatute of l i m i tati ons i n s ec ti on 8-101 o f the Local Governm ental and Governm

ental Empl

oyees Tort Imm

uni ty Act (745 I LCS 10/ 8-1 01 (W es t 200 6)) appl i ed to ba r ce rtai n c l ai m s, a nd i n th e al tern ati ve , th e f i ve -y ea r l i m i tation peri od i n s ection 13- 205 of

the C ode (735 ILCS 5/13-2 05 (W est 200 6)) app l i ed. J

udge Rich ard Si eb el , wh o had

ha ndl ed th e ca se u

p to that poi

nt, reti red an d was repl ace d by Judg e Stuart Pa lmer
. Ju dg e P alme rfo un d t ha t t he five
- yea rst at ut e o f limit at io ns a pp lied an d h eld t ha t all cl ai ms bef ore Sept em

ber 13, 1995, were barred. Agai n consi derabl e tim e passed wi

thout expl anati on in the record. In Jan uary 2007, the Ci

ty m oved to decert if

y the cl ass, argui

ng that the case n

o longer satisf ie d the requirem

ents f or class ce

rtif ic ation. Speci fi

cally , the City contended that Judge Sieb el ’s rul

in g that t he “ fl

y-b y” practice was i

ll egal resolved the comm

on is sues i

n the case , such1-09-2484

5

t ha t cla ss ce r t ifica t io n w as no lo ng er wa rr an t ed
. Ju dg e P alme rgr an t ed t he Cit y’s mo t io n in J uly 2008. Pl ai n ti f f f i l ed a m oti on un der Il l i n oi s S up re me C our

t Ru l e 3 08 (e f f . F eb . 26 , 20 10 ) to certif y a question f

or interl ocuto ry rev

ie w: whether the court’s order granting pl ai ntif f parti al
su m mar y j udgemen

t wa s a “ de cisi on on th e m eri ts” su ch th at a su b se qu en t j udge l ac ke d a uth ori ty und er se cti on 2-8 02 of

the C ode (735 ILCS 5/2-80 2 (W est 200 4)) to dece rtif y the c l ass . Pl ai ntif f ’smotion wasden i ed. Plaint iff t hen filed a mot ion fo r a sup er visor y or der wit h t he I lli nois S upr eme Co ur t , a sking that t he f our questions above b e certif ie d. The suprem

e court enter ed a supervisory order di re cti n g th e c i rc ui t cou rt to c er ti f y th e f our qu esti on s f

or a pp ea l an d di re cti n g th i s c our t “ to accept the appeal

pursuant to I ll

in ois Suprem

e Court Rule 308 and an

swer the certif

ie d questions.” The ci

rcuit court cert if

ie d the questions on Septem ber 9, 2009. T he firs t qu es t io n is: “[ w] ha t is a ‘d ec isio n o n t he mer it s’ un de r[ se ct io n 2
- 80 2] t ha t wo uld pr eclud e t he ent ry o f a class d ece rt ifi cat ion o rd er ?” Section 2-80 2(a) o f the Code stat es: “As so on a s pr act icable aft er t he co mmencement of a n act ion br ou ght as a class a ct ion, t he
cou rt sh al l de term i ne by orde r wh ether i t may be so m ai nta i ne d a nd de scri be thos e w hom t he co ur t s finds t o be members o f the class. This o rd er may be co ndit ional and may be
am ended b ef ore a de ci sion on th

e m eri ts.” 735 ILCS 5/2-80 2(a) (W est 200 4). The parties a

gree that section 2-802 does not defi ne “ deci si on on the me

rits,” and our
re sea rc h has no t re vealed an I lli nois c ase spe cifically

defining a “de cision o n t he merit s” in t he1-09-2484

6

contex t of se cti on 2-8 02. We re view qu est ions o f sta t ut or y inter pr et at ion de novo
. People ex rel. Madigan v. Illino is C omme rce Comm ’n , 231 I ll . 2d 370, 377, 899 N.E. 2d 227 (2 008). The prim ary purpose of our re v i ew i s to gi v e e f f ec t to th e l

eg i sl atu re ’s i n ten t. Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construc tion Co. , 149 Ill . 2d 190, 194, 595 N.E .2d 561 (1992). When the l anguage of

a statut e i s uncl

ear we will examine the “r eas on a nd nec essit y for t he law, t he evils so ught t o be re medied, and t he purpose to be ach

ie ved.” In re Detention of Lieberman , 201 Ill . 2d 300, 308, 776 N.E .2d 218 (2002 ). The p ar

ti es appe ar to ag re e th at res ju dicatacase l

aw provides

guida nce i n thi s case, equa tin g “ j udgm en t on the m

eri ts” wi th “ deci sion on th e m eri ts” i n the con text of section 2-802
. The parties c ite Fraley v. Boyd , 83 Il l . Ap p. 2d 98 , 102, 22 6 N.E.2d 81 (19 67), wh

ere the court st at ed: “[a] judg ment is o n t he merit s whe n it amo unt s t o a dec ision as t o t he r esp ect ive right s and di sa bi l i ti esof the pa rti esbase d on

the ul ti matef ac ts or s tateof f ac ts d i sc l ose d by

the pleadi ng s or ev i de nc e, or both, an d on wh i ch the righ t of rec ove ry depe nds, i

rre sp ec ti ve of f orm al , techn i cal or dil atory obj ections or c onten

tions.” But, t he parties

dif fer on the appl

ic ation of the def

in ition to this

case. Rel

yi ng on our st at ement in Rosolow

ski v. Clark Refining &

Marketing , 383 Ill . App. 3d 420, 426, 890 N.E. 2d 10 11 (2 00 8) , t hat "a 'de cisio n o n t he me rit s' is so met hing diffe re nt t han a fina l jud gme nt ,” pla int iff
ur ges us t o a do pt an exp ansive d efinition o f “decisio n on t he merit s." Plaint iff ask s us t o d efine

“ de cisi on on th e m eri ts” as a dec i si on th at “ concerns t he r esp ect ive right s and liabil ities o f the par t ies base d o n t he ult imate fac t s o r st at e o f fact s disclo sed by the p leadings or evidenc e, or bot h,1-09-2484

7

and o n which t he r ight of r eco ver y depe nds, and r ega rd less o f whet her t he de cision is in t he
con tex t of aw ard i ng af f i rm ati ve rel i ef , su ch asby the gra nti ng of a m oti on to d i sm i ss or a m oti on for sum ma ry j udgme nt, or is i n the context of den

yi ng such reli ef, as b y de ny in g these m ot ions .” (Em phasi s ad ded). Where st at ut or y languag e is unc lear, we lo ok t o s imi lar laws for guid ance , e ven whe n t he l awsdo not rel

ate pre ci sel

y to the sa me su bj ect m atter. Wade v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board , 22 6 Il

l . 2d 485 , 51 1-1 2, 8 77 N .E.2 d 11 01 ( 200 7). W e agre e that “ j udg men t on t he merit s,” as d efined in res ju dicatacas e law, is analo go us t o a dec ision o n t he merit s in the class action con

text. Res judicata and cl

ass acti ons are governed b y pri nci ple s of j udic ia

l eff ic ie ncy : to ensure dupl

ic ative le gal cl ai ms can b e decided i

n a si ngle j udic ia

l proceedi ng. See Carey v. Neal, Cortina & Associates , 2 16 I ll. App. 3d 5 1, 56, 576 N. E. 2d 2 20 ( 199 1) (“[ t ]he main p ur po se o f res ju dicatais to avo id du plicat ive litigat ion bet wee n t he sa me par t ies o ver t he same matt ers” ); Process

Color Plate Co., Inc. v. Chicago Urban Transportation Distr ict , 12 5 I ll. App. 3d 885, 889, 466 N.E.2d 1033 ( 1984) (“prim ary purpose of [cl

ass acti on] is to avoid a mul tipl ic ity of lawsui ts”). A “decisi on on the me rits” an d a “j udgme

nt on the me

rits” serv e si mi la r pr oc edu ra l funct ions: aft er a “de cision o n t he merit s” a co ur t can no long er dec er t ify a class , a nd after a “judgme

nt on the me

rits” the court can no l onger hear a cl ai m. See Munson v. Rinke , 395 Ill . A pp. 3d 7 89, 794 , 91 9 N .E.2 d 43 8 (2 009 ) (th ere m us t be a f i na l j udg men t on th e m eri ts f or res judicata to apply); Rosolow ski , 38 3 I ll. A pp . 3d at 42 4 ( “abse nc e o f a d ec isio n o n t he mer it s is the second pr erequisi

te for [ class] decertifi

cation”). Based o n the sim il ar cont exts and purpo ses, we ag r ee t ha t a “ de cis io n o n t he mer it s” an d a “ju dg men t o n t he mer it s” sho uld be simila r ly1-09-2484

8

int er pr et ed . B ut , fo r t he r ea so ns be lo w, we ag re e w it h de fend ant s t hat a na rr o w d efinit io n o f a “dec ision o n t he merit s” is ca lled for : t her e must be a c omp lete det er minatio n of liabili t y on a cl ai m b ased on the f

acts dis cl osed by

the evi dence. Wh ere there are no Ill

in ois cas es addressi

ng thi s i ssue i

n the cl ass acti on context, we may l ook to fede

ral l aw f or guidan ce. Se e, e.g., Copley

Pres s, Inc. v. City

of Springfield

, 266 Ill . App. 3d 421 , 426, 63 9 N.E.2d

913 (1 994). Our certif

ic ation statute was patt erned af ter an earli

er ver sion o f Rule 23 of t he Fed er al Rules o f Civil Pr oc edu re , w hich allowe d amend ment a nd decertif ic ation af ter a “deci si on on the me

rits.” Fed. R. Ci

v. P. 23; see Rosolow

ski , 383 Ill . App. 3d a t 426 . In an ef f ort to re duc e c onf

us i on, the term “ f i na l j udg men t” w assu bs ti tuted f or “decisi on on the me

rits” i n 2003. The f

ederal advi sory com

mi tt ee expl ai ned that the chan

ge was ma de becaus e, “[f

]ollowing a

determi nation of li abi li ty *** proceedin

gs to defi ne the rem

edy ma y dem onstrate t he n

eed to amend the cl

ass def in ition or subdiv

ide the cl ass.” Fed. R. Ci

v. P. 23 advi sory com

mi tt ee's n ot es. Under thi s reasoni

ng, both a “dec is ion on the m erits” an d a “f in al judgm ent” require “a determi

nation of li abi li ty.” But, unlike

a “deci si on on the me

rits,” a “f in al judgm ent” al so requires a determ in ation of rem

edi es. See Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder , 187 Ill . 2d 34 1, 35 9, 71 8 N
. E
. 2d 19 1, 20 1 ( 19 99 ) ( a fin al ju dg men t is o ne wh er e, “ ‘if a ffir med , t he o nly thin g remai ni ng i s to pro ceed wi

th the execution of t he judg ment’ ” ( emphas is add ed) ) ( quo t ing Flores v. Dugan , 91 Ill .2d 108 , 11 2, 4 35 N .E.2 d 48 0 (1 982 )). Thi s is a uthori ty tha t a “ de ci si on o n t he mer it s” un de rse ct io n 2
- 80 2 o f t he Co de r eq uir es a fu ll de t er minat io n o f liab ilit y bu t is somethin g less than a f

in al j udgement requirin

g a deter mi

nation of remedi

es. The po licies unde rlying class c er t ifi cat ion ca ll f

or a nar ro w de fini

t ion o f a “dec ision o n t he1-09-2484

9

meri ts.” A mong othe

r requi rem en ts, to certi f

y a cl ass a pl ai ntif f m ust sh ow that “ there are qu es t io ns o f fac t o rlaw co mmo n t o t he cla ss ” t ha t “p r ed o minat e o ve ran y qu es t io ns a ffec t ing o nly individual members” and “t he class act ion is an a ppr op riat e met hod for t he fair a nd efficient adj udi cation of the c ontrove

rsy .” 735 ILCS 5/2-80 1 (W est 200 4); Smithv. Illin ois C entr al R.R. Co. , 22 3 I l l . 2d

44 1, 4 47 , 86 0 N .E. 2d

33 2 ( 20 06 ). I t wou

l d b e u n wi se to co m pe l a j udge to adhe re t o his c er t ifi

cat ion o rd er if subseq uent disco ver y est ablished a lack o f co mmonality o n any ot her f actor r equi

red to certif

y i n the f irst place. See People v. Jones , 214 Ill . 2d 187, 199, 824 N.E.2d 2 39 (20 05) (th e legi slature is pre sum ed to act rati

onal l y ). Pr ohibit ing dec er t ifi

cat ion o nly after liabil

ity has be en co mplet ely det er mined ser ves t he pu rp ose s of certif i ca ti on i n th re e w ay s. Fi rs t, j udge s w

h o h av e n ot m ade a com pl ete determi nation of li abi li ty can avoi d the judi

ci al in eff ic ie ncy in herent i n m aki ng num erous i ndi vi dual ized d eterm i na tions i n a si ngl e proce edi

ng. S ee, e.g. , Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. , 216 Ill . 2d 100, 138, 835 N.E .2d 801 (2005) (holdi ng com mon i ssues did n ot predomi

nate where court would hav e to exami

ne h undreds of thousan

ds of i ndi vi dual
vehi cles). S econ

d, ba rri ng d ecertif i cation af ter a f i na l determ i na tion of l i ab i l i ty e ns ures the c ourt does not waste reso urces in m akin g repeat ed li

abili ty determin

ations. Fin

all y, barri ng cl ass de ce r t ifica t io n o nly aft er a d et er minat io n o f liab ilit y ens ur es t he pa r t ies ca n t rus t t ha t t he cla ss will not be decertif

ie d after a right to recovery h as been establ is hed. See Rosolow

ski , 383 Ill . App. 3d at 428 (“ i t ma kesno se ns e to take the

cas e awa y f rom th e pl ai ntif f s i n the en d zone”). A narrow reading of “deci sion on the meri ts” also pro motes t he prin cipal purpo ses of cl ass action sui ts: eff ic ie ncy and econom

y of li tigation. See Portw

ood v. Ford Motor Co. , 183 Ill . 2d1-09-2484

10

459, 46 3-64, 7 01 N.E.2 d 1102(1998 ). “On t he merit s” in t he co nt ext of se ct ion 2 -8 02 mu st be read to al l ow the j udge

to decertif

y wh ere h e h as j uri sdi

cti on to und

o a prev i ous order i

f ne ces sary or whe re dec erti f

i cation does

not prej udice a

ny party wh o has bene f i tted by the p revi ous order. For the reas ons s tated ab ove, w e b el

i ev e tha t for a d ecision to be

“on the m eri ts,” the re must be a c omp lete det er minatio n of liabili t y on a c laim based o n t he fact s disclo sed by the evidenc e. This co mpo rt s wit h ou r r eas oning in Rosolow ski t ha t "a 'd ec isio n o n t he mer it s' is somethi ng diff erent from

a fi nal judgm ent.” Rosolow

ski , 383 Ill . App. 3d at 426. The second cert if

ied question i s: “Wh

ether, in a class

action case chall

engi ng defen dants’ practice of i

ssui ng parki ng or standi

ng vi olations to taxic ab dri

vers an d ot hers b y m ai l a nd wi thout
an y pe rs ona l servi ceon th

e d ri ve r or p l ac em

en t of the ci tati on on the of f en di ng ve hi cl e, a pri or Jud ge’ s ru ling tha t t he de fendant s’ ‘p ra ct ice o f sending a sec ond not ice o f a par king o r st anding vi olation pri

or t o an i ni tial notice b ei

ng ei ther hand de li

vered to t he dri

ver of the v

ehi cl e or aff ix ed to the vehicle is violative of the plain lan guage o f the [operat iv

e] stat ute and t he ordinances’
co nst itu t es a dec ision o n t he merit s und er [se ct ion 2 -8 02 o f the Co de] suc h t hat a su bseq uent Judg e pres i di

ng i n the ca se l

acks the a uthori ty to dec erti f

y the c l ass .” Here, Judge Pal

me r noted t hat whi

le Judge Si ebel ’s Decem

ber 9, 2005, mem

orandum op inion and o rd er held t hat t he "fly-by" violat ion no t ices vio late d t he I lli nois V ehicle Co de a nd Ch ica go Mu nic ipa l Co de , “[ t ] he Co ur t did no t sp ec ifica lly find t ha t su ch co nd uc t o cc ur r ed an d if
so , ho w o fte n.” Jud ge P almer t hen qu ot ed J udg e Siebe l’s or der : “[ t ]he Co ur t makes no de cl ar ati on as to th e r em

ai n i n g i ss ue s f or th e r ea son th at g en ui n e iss ue s of m ate rial f ac t ex i st a s to the num ber of ‘ fl y-b y’ tickets i ssued b

y the Ci ty duri ng the relevan

t t im e period.”1-09-2484

11

Wh i l e the “predom i na nt legal i ssue” h ad b een deci ded, J udge Pal mer m ade c l ear that there sti l l rem ai ne d “ the de term i na ti on of the hi gh l y con tes ted i ss ueof whether a

ny of the se ci tati ons , or at least which o f the se c itat ions w er e issue d in t his manner. ” T he co ur t ’s o rd er est ablished t he il le gal ity of the f ly -by ticketin g practice i

n theory, b

ut no fi ndi ng was m ade that the City

was act ually li able t o t he members of t he class and mo re re mained t o be dec ided t han t he de term i na ti on of rem edi es . Ba se d on

thi s a na l y sis, th e gran t of pa rti al su m mary j udg men t i n f av or of pl ai nti ff i n this cas e was n

ot a deci sion on the m

eri ts and di d not precl

ude dec ertif

i cati on. So
we co nc lud e t ha t a g r an t o f su mmar y jud gme nt is a de cis io n o n t he mer it s o nly wh er e it
com pletel y determ i ne s the l i ab i l i ty on a cl ai m ba sed on the f acts d i scl osed i n evi den ce. Plaint iff ’s r eliance o n Lehman v. Continental Health Care, Ltd. , 240 Ill . App. 3d 795, 608 N.E.2d 303 (1992), and Fraley , 83 Il l . Ap p. 2d 98 , 226 N .E.2d 81, i s un persuas i ve . Lehman ’s hol di ng tha t a di sm i ss al f or lac k of su bj ec t matte r j urisd

i cti on h asno res judicata effe ct is i na pposi te he re. Lehman , 2 40 I ll. App. 3d a t 802 . T he ho lding in Fraley tha t a d ef en da nt c an not
use res judicata wi

thout provi

ng th at two acti ons l

i tig ated th e sa

me cl ai m i s si m i l arl y i na pposi te. Fraley , 83 Il

l . A pp . 2d at 1 02 . Al

th oug h th e l an gu ag e a b out “ j udgm en ts o n th e m eri ts” i n b oth
ca se s c oul

d b e i nte rprete d broad

l y , th e a ppl i ca ti on of the rul esi n th e c as esthe

m se l ve s do not sup po rt plaint iff

’s po sitio n. Whe re Jud ge S iebel’s o rd er did no t det er mine the liability of t he parti es on an y clai m , we b el i ev e the correct an

swe r to the se cond

certif i ed questi on i s “ no.” The third certifi

ed question is: “W

hether, in a cl

ass action case chal

len gin g defendants’ practice of i

ssui ng parki ng or standi

ng vi olations to taxic ab dri

vers an d ot hers b y m ai l a nd wi thout
an y pe rs ona l servi ceon th

e d ri ve r or p l ac em

en t of the ci tati on on the of f en di ng ve hi cl e, a pri or1-09-2484

12

Judge ’s rul i ng tha t de ni ed the de f en da nts ’ m oti on f or pa rti al su m mary j udg men t on th e a ppl i ca ti on of their aff

irm ative defen

ses of fai lure to exhaust ad mi

ni strat iv e remedi es, res ju dicata , t he col l ate ra l atta ck doc tri n e, an d th e v ol un tar y pa y men t doctri n e c on sti tute s a de cisi on on th e m eri ts unde r [ sec t ion 2 -8 02 o f the Co de] suc h t hat a su bseq uent Jud ge p re siding in the cas e lack s t he auth ority to decertif

y the c l ass .” Plai ntif f contends that Jud ge Siebel ’s order deny in g summ ary j udgment on defendants’ aff irm ative defen ses was a de ci si on on the me rits be cause i

t “termi nate[d] the li

tigation b etween the part ies on the m

erits or d ispose[d] o f the righ ts o f the parties, either on the entire co ntro versy or a separate part thereof" an d it "set[] or fi

xe[d] the ri ghts of a party.” (Internal quot ation m

arks omi tted.) In re A.H. , 207 Ill . 2d 590, 594, 802 N.E .2d 214 (2003) (quo ting In re Cur tis B. , 203 Ill . 2d 53, 59, 784 N.E .2d 219 (2002)). T o support hi s contention, pl ai ntif f poi nts to Judge Siebel’s s t at ement t hat “the Co ur t dec lar[ es] t hat none of t hese affirmative d efense s bar s t he clai m s rai sed by [plai ntif f ].” But Jud ge S iebel’s st at ement do es no t go as far as p laintiff wou ld have it go . While t he
or der may have re moved defend ant s’ ability t o ba r p laintiff’s claim based o n cer t ain affirmative defens es, it d id no t affect defend ant s’ ability t o d efend e ach o f the claims on t he merit s. We be l i eve that the c ourt d

i d n ot en ter a “ de ci si on on the meri ts” when i t de ni ed de f en da nts ’ m oti on f or pa rti al su m mary j udg men t on th ei r af f i rm ati ve de f en se s b ec au se

the cou rt m ad e n o f i nd i ng of liab ilit y. Thi s a na l y sis c om ports wi th p ub l i c p ol i cy . If

weadopte d pl

ai nti f f ’s prop ose d a

ppl i ca ti on of the rul e, other d ef endan ts m i ght re f rai n f rom b ri ngi ng m eri torious motion s f

or sum mary1-09-2484

13

judgm ent for fe ar that any de ci si on by the judge would ba r decertif ic ation. It would not make
sens e for class acti on procedures, which are in tended to pr omote eff

ic ie ncy , to dis courage me ritorious sum

ma ry j udgme nt motions. See Kahn v. First National Bank of Chicago , 21 6 I ll. App. 3d 272, 275, 576 N.E. 2d 321 (1 991) (“summ ary j udgment proced ure is encouraged because it promotes eff

ic ie nt and econom

ic al use of the j udic ia

l s ys tem”). For these reasons, we answer the third certi fi

ed question i

n the n egative. The fourth cert if

ied question i s: “Wh

ether, in a class

action case chall

engi ng defen dants’ practice of i

ssui ng parki ng or standi

ng vi olations to taxic ab dri

vers an d ot hers b y m ai l a nd wi thout any personal service on t he driver or placement of the cit ation o n the o ff ending vehi

cle, a Judge ’s
ru ling tha t gr ant ed in pa rt t he de fendant s’ mot ion fo r su mmary judgment on t he ap plicat ion o f the statut e of l

im itations constitutes a deci si on on the me rits unde r [section 2-802 of the Code] such that a subsequen

t Judge presidi

ng i n the case la cks the authority

to decertif

y the cl ass.” Plaint iff co nt ends t hat t he pa rt ial gra nt of su mmary judgment on s t at ut e o f li mitat ions gr oun dswa s a de cisi on on th e m eri ts a n d p re cl ud ed cl as s dec er ti f i ca ti on . Pl ai n ti f f ag ai n ci tes to In re A.H. , t his time fo r t he pr op os itio n t hat “a judg ment is c ons ider ed final if i t t er minates t he litigat ion bet wee n t he pa rt ies o n t he merit s o r d ispo ses o f the right s o f the par t ies, e ither on t he
en t ir e c o nt r o ve r sy or a separate par t thereof ." (Emphasi s added.) (Internal quot ation m

arks omi tted.) In re A.H. , 207 Ill . 2d at 594 (quo ting In re Cur tis B. , 2 03 I ll. 2d a t 59) . I n at t empt ing to apply this l anguage to summ

ary j udgment on stat ute o f l im itations grou nds, plai

ntif f conf uses a

“pa rt”wi th a “ pa rty .” A l th oug h a p ar ty may h av e a n i n terest i n th e c on trover sy , a pa rty i s n ot a

“pa rt of a c ontr ove rs y .” The cou rt’ s dec i si on to d i sm i ss som e p arti esha d n o ef f ec t on1-09-2484

14

determi ni ng def endan ts’ li abi li ty to t he rem

ai ni ng m em bers of the c la ss. Because the partial summary judg ment r uling o n t he st at ut e o f li mitat ions d id no t det er mine li ability as t o t he remai ni ng m em bers of the c la ss, we ans

wer the fourth question i

n the n egative. Ha ving an sw er ed t he fo ur ce r t ified qu es t io ns, no o t he rmat t er s a r e p r o pe r ly befo r e t his court . See People v. Poll ution Cont rol Board , 129 Ill . App. 3d 958, 965, 473 N.E. 2d 452 (1984) ("[a]n appeal

[under Ill in ois Suprem

e Court Rule 308] should be l im ited to t he question certif

ie d by the tri al court"). For the f oregoi ng r eas ons, we rem

and this ca se. Certif ie d questions a

nswered; cause rem

anded.