1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

R.M., 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

LON SAINATO, et al.,

 Defendants.

Civ. No. 2:11-cv-01676 (WJM) 

OPINION

 

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.: 

Plaintiff R.M. filed this 42 U.S.C. 1983 (“Section 1983”) action against four 

Defendants: (1) Lon Sainato; (2) the County of Morris; (3) the Office of the Morris 

County Sheriff (the “Sheriff’s Office”); and (4) Edward V. Rochford, the Morris County 

Sheriff (“Sheriff Rochford”). This matter comes before the Court on two motions to 

dismiss, one filed by the Sheriff’s Office, and the other filed by Sheriff Rochford. There 

was no oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons set forth below, the motion 

to dismiss filed by the Sheriff’s Office is GRANTED, and the motion to dismiss filed by 

Sheriff Rochford is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. FACTS 

Plaintiff was a participant in the Morris County Sheriff’s Labor Assistance 

Program (“SLAP program”), a mandatory, court-ordered program that allows approved 

candidates to serve their jail sentences by participating in supervised community service. 

Plaintiff alleges that, during his participation in the SLAP program at the Cedar Knolls 

Fire Department, he was sexually assaulted by Defendant Sainato, a Sheriff’s Office 

employee. Sainato has since pled guilty to these offenses. 

Plaintiff alleges that, prior to the sexual assault, Sainato had been the subject of a 

criminal investigation related to sexual misconduct. Plaintiff further alleges that, prior to 

the assault, Sainato was engaged in a series of sexual encounters with inmates 

participating in the SLAP program. 

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The Sheriff’s Office was the law enforcement agency that oversaw the Morris 

County SLAP program. Sheriff Rochford was the commanding officer of the Morris 

County Sheriff’s Department, and was responsible for hiring, training, and supervising 

Sheriff’s Office employees, including Sainato. Plaintiff alleges that both Defendants 

knew about the criminal investigation into Sainato’s alleged sexual misconduct, and 

knew that Sainato was engaged in sexual encounters with SLAP program inmates. 

B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 This case involves two nearly identical actions. The first action was filed against 

the same four Defendants in the District of New Jersey on February 18, 2010, and was 

assigned to the Hon. Peter G. Sheridan (the “First Action”). See Case No. 10-cv-834, 

Compl., ECF No. 1. The County of Morris, the Sheriff’s Office, and Sheriff Rochford 

moved to dismiss the complaint in the First Action. See Case No. 10-cv-834, ECF Nos. 

7, 10, 17. In an Order dated February 16, 2011, Judge Sheridan dismissed the complaint 

against the County of Morris with prejudice. Judge Sheridan dismissed the complaint 

against Sheriff Rochford and the Sheriff’s Office without prejudice and gave Plaintiff 

twenty-one (21) days to amend the complaint. 

 While the First Action was pending before Judge Sheridan, Plaintiff filed an 

identical complaint against the four Defendants in the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Morris County. Following Judge Sheridan’s order of dismissal in the First Action, 

Plaintiff amended his state court complaint to add allegations regarding Defendants’ 

failure to investigate Sainato’s criminal history and prior sexual relationships (the “First 

Amended Complaint” or the “Complaint”). On March 24, 2011, Defendants removed the 

state court action to this Court, thus initiating the current action. 

On April 28, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Stipulation of Dismissal to close the First 

Action. The Stipulation explained that Plaintiff was voluntarily dismissing the First 

Action “without prejudice to the [present action],” because Defendant Sainato was the 

“sole remaining defendant” in the First Action, and the present action was moving 

forward as to all four Defendants. Case No. 10-cv-834, ECF No. 28. Shortly thereafter, 

Plaintiff stipulated to the dismissal of the County of Morris in the present action, noting 

that Judge Sheridan had already dismissed the claims against the County of Morris with 

prejudice in a matter “involv[ing] identical questions of law and fact.” Stipulation of 

Dismissal as to County of Morris Only at 2, ECF No. 8. 

The Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Rochford now move to dismiss the present action. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, 

in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

The moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated. Hedges v. 

United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). In deciding a motion to dismiss under 

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Rule 12(b)(6), a court must take all allegations in the complaint as true and view them in 

the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); 

Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 

1998). 

Although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, “a plaintiff’s 

obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels 

and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, the factual allegations 

must be sufficient to raise a plaintiff’s right to relief above a speculative level, such that it 

is “plausible on its face.” See id. at 570; see also Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Serv., Inc., 

542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008). A claim has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 

at 1949 (2009).

III. DISCUSSION 

The Court reads the First Amended Complaint as asserting the following six 

claims: 

(1) Counts I and II: Section 1983 claims against all Defendants; 

(2) Count III: New Jersey common law claim against Sainato for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of physical injury; 

(3) Count IV: New Jersey common law claim against Sainato for negligence; and 

(4) Counts V and VI: Section 1983 claims and New Jersey common law claims 

against all other Defendants for negligent hiring, training, and supervision.1

Both the Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Rochford have moved to dismiss the claims 

against them. The Court will address each motion in turn.

A. THE SHERIFF’S OFFICE 

The Sheriff’s Office argues that Plaintiff’s claims against it are barred by res 

judicata. The Sheriff’s Office reasons that a nearly identical complaint against the 

 

1

 Counts 3 and 4 of the First Amended Complaint only contain specific allegations about 

Defendant Sainato. Although Counts 3 and 4 conclude by stating that “defendants” acted 

unlawfully and “defendants” are liable for damages, these allegations are insufficient to state a 

claim against the other defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“‘entitlement to relief’ 

requires more than labels and conclusions”). Counts 5 and 6 assert claims under the “laws of the 

State of New Jersey” and “the laws and Constitution of the United States.” First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”), ECF No. 1 Ex. 1 at 13, 17. Because the Court is required to view the 

Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court will read the Complaint as asserting 

claims under Section 1983 and New Jersey common law. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 501. 

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County of Morris was dismissed with prejudice, and the Sheriff’s Office and the County 

of Morris are essentially one entity. Thus, the dismissal of the County should apply 

equally to the Sheriff’s Office. Plaintiff argues that his claims are not barred by res 

judicata because Judge Sheridan dismissed the claims against the Sheriff’s Office 

without prejudice. Plaintiff further argues that he specifically stated in the Stipulation of 

Dismissal filed in the First Action that he was voluntarily dismissing the First Action 

“without prejudice to the [present action].” Case No. 10-cv-834, ECF No. 28. The Court 

finds that the Sherriff’s Office should be dismissed for slightly different reasons than 

those proffered by the Sheriff’s Office. 

Courts “treat [a] municipality and its police department as a single entity for 

purposes of section 1983 liability.” See Bonenberger v. Plymouth Township, 132 F.3d 

20, 25 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997). For this reason, “[p]olice departments cannot be sued 

alongside municipalities because a police department is merely an administrative arm of 

the municipality itself.” Hernandez v. Borough of Palisades Park Police Dep’t, 58 Fed. 

Appx. 909, 912 (3d Cir. 2003). When a Section 1983 action has been brought against a 

municipality and a police department, the police department must be dismissed, as “it is 

to the municipality that any liability must flow.” Millar v. Windsor Twp., No. 1:04-CV2529, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17433, at *8-9 (M.D. Pa. June 24, 2005) (granting motion 

to dismiss Police Commission because it was not a proper party to the suit); see also 

White v. City of Trenton, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43688, 15-16 (D.N.J. May 20, 2009) 

(police department was not a proper party to a 1983 action); Miller v. City of E. Orange, 

509 F. Supp. 2d 452, 459 (D.N.J. 2007) (same). The reasoning applied to police 

departments is applied with equal force to sheriff’s offices. Cap v. Rapp, No. 90-0661, 

1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1360, at *9-10 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 1991) (In the same way that a 

city police department is treated as one entity with the city, a county sheriff’s office is 

treated as one entity with the county). 

In this case, the Sheriff’s Office should be dismissed because it is not a proper 

party to the action. The Sheriff’s Office is “merely an administrative arm of the 

municipality itself.” See Hernandez, 58 Fed. Appx. at 912. The County of Morris has, 

by resolution, tasked the Sheriff’s Office with carrying out its statutory duties to maintain 

a correctional facility. Sheriff’s Office employees are technically classified as employees 

of the County, and their salaries and collective bargaining agreements must be approved 

by the County to be effective. As such, any liability under Section 1983 would flow to 

the County of Morris, not the Sheriff’s Office, and the County has already been dismissed 

with prejudice. Although the Court is sympathetic to the fact that Plaintiff voluntarily 

dismissed the Sherriff’s Office from the First Action on the assumption that he could 

pursue claims against it in the present action, the reality is that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 

claims could not have been maintained against the Sheriff’s Office in either case. 

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss filed by the Sheriff’s Office is granted, and the 

Sheriff’s Office is dismissed with prejudice. 

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B. SHERIFF ROCHFORD 

Plaintiff pled Section 1983 claims and New Jersey common law claims against 

Sheriff Rochford. The Court will first address the Section 1983 claims, followed by the 

state law claims. 

1. Section 1983 Claims 

Plaintiff asserts Section 1983 claims against Sheriff Rochford in his official and 

individual capacity for violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments. Plaintiff raises three theories of liability under the Eighth Amendment: 

(1) direct liability, (2) fault in hiring, and (3) supervisory liability/failure to train. Sheriff 

Rochford moved to dismiss all counts. For the reasons set forth below, the Court makes 

the following determinations. First, the claims pled against Sheriff Rochford in his 

official capacity are dismissed with prejudice. Second, of the claims pled against Sheriff 

Rochford in his individual capacity, the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims 

are dismissed without prejudice. Third, the Eighth Amendment supervisory 

liability/failure to train claim is dismissed without prejudice. Finally, Plaintiff’s direct 

liability claim and fault in hiring claim under the Eighth Amendment survive Sheriff 

Rochford’s motion to dismiss. Each determination will be addressed in more detail 

below. 

a. Official Capacity Claims 

 “[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a 

suit against the entity” that employs the officer. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 

(1985); see also Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 

55 (1978) (Official-capacity suits “generally represent only another way of pleading an 

action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”). Sheriff Rochford is employed 

by the County of Morris. Because Judge Sheridan already dismissed the County of 

Morris, the official capacity claims against Sheriff Rochford must also be dismissed. See 

Council v. Nash, No. 06-0007, 2007 WL 1686512, at *4 (D.N.J. Jun. 8, 2007) (dismissing 

official capacity claims against defendants because claims against the entity were being 

dismissed). 

Accordingly, the official capacity claims pled against Sheriff Rochford are 

dismissed with prejudice. 

b. Individual Capacity Claims 

Plaintiff argues that Sheriff Rochford is liable under Section 1983 for violating his 

constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. FAC 

at 7, 8. Sheriff Rochford argues that these claims should be dismissed because (1) he is 

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entitled to qualified immunity, and (2) Plaintiff failed to state a claim for supervisory 

liability. 2 Because the analysis of supervisory liability and the various constitutional 

claims are subsumed by the qualified immunity analysis, the Court will turn to the issue 

of qualified immunity. 

It is well established that government officials are immune from liability for 

damages where their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S.Ct. 

1235, 1244-45 (2012). Qualified immunity “gives government officials breathing room 

to make reasonable but mistaken judgments,” and “protects ‘all but the plainly 

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. 

2074, 2085 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). 

The Supreme Court set forth a two-part inquiry for resolving government officials’ 

qualified immunity claims: a court must decide (1) whether the facts alleged by the 

plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was 

“clearly established” at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct. Saucier v. Katz, 

533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). “[W]hether a particular complaint sufficiently alleges a 

clearly established violation of law cannot be decided in isolation from the facts 

pleaded.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1946. Accordingly, “the sufficiency of [a plaintiff's] 

pleadings is both ‘inextricably intertwined with’ and ‘directly implicated by’ the qualified 

immunity defense.” Id. at 1946-47 (citations omitted). 

i. Whether the Facts Alleged Make Out the Violation of a 

Constitutional Right 

Plaintiff asserts that Sheriff Rochford is liable for violating his constitutional 

rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court finds that 

the Complaint does not sufficiently allege violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments, but does adequately allege a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

1) Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment 

Claims 

 

2

 The Court’s understanding of Sheriff Rochford’s arguments was pieced together from multiple 

submissions made by multiple parties in multiple cases. Instead of filing a motion to dismiss 

addressing Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, Sheriff Rochford submitted a nine-page letter 

incorporating by reference his briefing for the motion to dismiss in the First Action. His briefing 

in the First Action, in turn, incorporates by reference briefs submitted by other parties to the First 

Action. His briefing in the First Action also addresses counts that were not included in the 

present Complaint (such as New Jersey Civil Rights Act claims). The Court attempted to piece 

together from these various submissions only what was applicable to the current case. 

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Plaintiff did not plead any facts or allegations supporting a claim for violations of 

the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Aside from listing these Amendments, 

the only part of the Complaint that addresses them is one conclusory phrase stating that 

Plaintiff was deprived of “life, liberty or property without due process of law.” FAC at 8. 

If there are “counts in the pleading contain[ing] boilerplate allegations mimicking the 

purported legal standards for liability,” the Court will not assume that they are true. 

Argueta v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 74 (2011); see also

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007) (“‘[E]ntitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”). 

Accordingly, the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims are dismissed without 

prejudice. 

2) Eighth Amendment Claims 

 Plaintiff adequately pled facts supporting a claim for a violation of the Eighth 

Amendment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, and also 

requires that prison officials “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the 

inmates.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). The Supreme Court 

articulated a two-part test for determining whether a prison official violated the Eighth 

Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan (“Farmer”), 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837 (1994). A plaintiff 

making such a claim must show: (1) a sufficiently serious constitutional deprivation; and 

(2) deliberate indifference by the prison official-defendant.3

 Id. There is no dispute that 

the sexual abuse suffered by Plaintiff was sufficiently serious to support an Eighth 

Amendment claim, so the key issue is whether Sheriff Rochford exhibited deliberate 

indifference to Plaintiff’s safety. 

 If read in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Complaint proffers three 

theories as to why Sheriff Rochford acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s 

safety: (1) direct liability, (2) fault in hiring, and (3) supervisory/training liability. See

Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 135 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that direct 

liability and supervisory liability are two distinct ways of making out a deliberate 

indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment); Board of County Com'rs of Bryan 

County, Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (discussing the fault in hiring theory). The 

Court will address each theory in turn. 

a) Direct Liability 

Plaintiff adequately pled facts and allegations supporting a theory of direct 

liability. In Farmer, the Supreme Court stated that an official may be held directly liable 

 

3

 This test is properly applied to employees and supervisors of inmate supervision programs, 

such as the SLAP program. See Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 135 (3d Cir. 2001) 

(using the Farmer test to evaluate the liability of employees and supervisors at a state run youth 

development and detention center). 

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for “deliberate indifference” to a plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights “if [1] he knows 

that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and [2] disregards that risk by failing 

to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. This standard 

requires actual knowledge: the official “must actually have known or been aware of the 

excessive risk to inmate safety.” Id. at 839-40. 

In this case, Plaintiff adequately pled that Sheriff Rochford had actual knowledge 

of an excessive risk to inmate safety. The Complaint alleges that Sheriff Rochford had 

“actual . . . knowledge” of the fact that Sainato was the subject of a criminal investigation 

involving allegations of sexual misconduct. FAC at 14. The Complaint also alleges that 

Sheriff Rochford had “actual . . . knowledge” that Sainato “was engaged in a series of 

sexual encounters with inmates” participating in the SLAP program. FAC at 14-15. The 

Complaint therefore adequately alleges facts supporting Plaintiff’s claim that Sheriff 

Rochford knew of a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmates. Plaintiff also 

adequately pled that Sheriff Rochford disregarded the risk. For example, the Complaint 

alleges that Sheriff Rochford “failed to take action to supervise, oversee, train, control, 

discipline, or remove” Sainato, and instead “entrusted [him] with the legal authority to 

supervise male and female inmates.” FAC at 14. 

b) Fault in Hiring 

Plaintiff adequately pled facts and allegations supporting a theory of fault in 

hiring. A plaintiff making a fault in hiring claim based on inadequate screening must 

demonstrate that “scrutiny of an applicant’s background would lead a reasonable 

policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of the decision to hire the 

applicant would be the deprivation of a third party’s federally protected right.” Brown, 

520 U.S. at 411. “[A] finding of culpability simply cannot depend on the mere 

probability that any officer inadequately screened will inflict any constitutional injury. 

Rather, it must depend on a finding that this officer was highly likely to inflict the 

particular injury suffered by the plaintiff.” Id. at 412 (emphasis in original). In other 

words, a plaintiff must show that there is a “direct causal link” between “the background 

of the particular officer hired [and] the particular constitutional violation the respondent 

suffered.” Id. at 404, 414 n.1. 

In this case, Plaintiff alleged that Sheriff Rochford was responsible for hiring 

decisions and failed to adequately screen Defendant Sainato before hiring him. See FAC 

at 4, 14. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Rochford hired Sainato “despite actual 

and/or constructive knowledge [that Sainato] was the subject of a criminal investigation 

and charge(s) involving allegations of inappropriate sexual conduct.” FAC at 14. 

Plaintiff’s allegations clearly establish a direct causal link between Sainato’s background, 

which includes criminal charges for sexual misconduct, and the particular constitutional 

violation Plaintiff suffered, i.e., sexual assault. Thus, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged facts to 

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support that Sainato “was highly likely to inflict the particular injury suffered by the 

plaintiff.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 412 (emphasis in original). 

c) Supervisory/Training Liability 

Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts and allegations to support a theory of 

supervisory/training liability. Based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in City of Canton 

v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Third Circuit developed a four-part test for liability 

under the Eighth Amendment for failure to properly supervise and train. Sample v. 

Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989). Under this regime, a plaintiff must identify 

a specific policy or practice that the supervisor failed to employ and show that: (1) the 

existing policy or practice created an unreasonable risk of the Eighth Amendment injury; 

(2) the supervisor was aware that the unreasonable risk was created; (3) the supervisor 

was indifferent to that risk; and (4) the injury resulted from the policy or practice. Id.; 

see also Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 135 (3d Cir. 2001). 

It is not clear whether this theory of supervisory liability is still available in light 

of the Supreme Court’s decision in Iqbal. The Third Circuit recently observed that 

“‘[n]umerous courts, including this one, have expressed uncertainty as to the viability and 

scope of supervisory liability after Iqbal.’” Argueta v. U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 70 (2011). The Third Circuit has “refrained from answering 

the question of whether Iqbal eliminated—or at least narrowed the scope of—supervisory 

liability because it was ultimately unnecessary to do so” in light of the cases that have 

been presented to it thus far. Id.

Like the Third Circuit in Argueta, this Court need not reach the question of the 

scope of supervising liability post-Iqbal, because the allegations in the Complaint are 

insufficient to make out a claim for supervisory liability. Consistent with Judge 

Sheridan’s findings in the First Action, this Court finds that Plaintiff failed to identify a 

policy or practice that Sheriff Rochford failed to employ. Specifically, Plaintiff failed to 

“identify in [his] pleading what exactly [the Defendant] should have done differently, 

whether with respect to specific training programs or other matters, that would have 

prevented the unconstitutional conduct.” See, e.g., Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 134 (3d 

Cir. 2001); Sample, 885 F.2d at 1118. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed without 

prejudice. 

ii. Whether the Constitutional Right Was Clearly 

Established 

Having found that the facts alleged by Plaintiff make out a violation of a 

constitutional right, the Court now turns to the second prong of the qualified immunity 

analysis: whether that right was “clearly established” at the time of the defendant's 

alleged misconduct. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. There can be no dispute that Plaintiff’s 

Eighth Amendment rights were clearly established at the time of Sainato’s misconduct. 

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As the Third Circuit explained, “the right not to be sexually abused by a state employee 

while in confinement [is] clearly established.” Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 142 n.15; see 

also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833-34; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976); 

Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 726. 

***** 

In conclusion, the Court finds that Sheriff Rochford is not entitled to qualified 

immunity. The Court further finds that Plaintiff adequately stated claims for direct 

liability and fault in hiring under the Eighth Amendment. 

2. State Law Claims 

Plaintiff asserts New Jersey state law claims against Sheriff Rochford for 

negligent hiring, training, and supervision. Sheriff Rochford argues that he is entitled to 

immunity from these state law claims under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. The New 

Jersey Tort Claims Act provides that “[a] public employee is not liable if he acts in good 

faith in the execution or enforcement of any law.” N.J.S.A. 59:3-3. The standard used to 

determine whether an employee acted in good faith under N.J.S.A. 59:3-3 is the same 

standard that is used to determine “objective reasonableness” under the qualified 

immunity analysis of Section 1983. See Lear v. Township of Piscataway, 566 A.2d 557, 

558-59 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1989). As the Court has already determined that 

Sheriff Rochford’s actions were not objectively reasonable under Section 1983, the Court 

must also find that Sheriff Rochford did not act in good faith under N.J.S.A. 59:3-3. 

Accordingly, Sheriff Rochford’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims is 

denied. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, the motion to dismiss filed by the Sheriff’s Office is 

GRANTED. The motion to dismiss filed by Sheriff Rochford is GRANTED IN PART 

AND DENIED IN PART. Specifically: (1) the claims pled against Sheriff Rochford in 

his official capacity are dismissed with prejudice; (2) the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment claims are dismissed without prejudice; and (3) the Eighth Amendment 

supervisory liability/failure to train claim is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff’s 

direct liability and fault in hiring claims under the Eighth Amendment survive Sheriff 

Rochford’s motion to dismiss, as do Plaintiff’s state law claims for negligent hiring, 

training, and supervision. An appropriate order follows. 

 

 /s/ William J. Martini 

 WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J. 

Date: May 9, 2011.

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