NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 21a0030n.06

No. 19-2236

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

NAKEYSHA WISDOM

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BEFORE: BOGGS, SUTTON, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges

BOGGS, Circuit Judge. Defendant Nakeysha Wisdom appeals her 70-month sentence for 

conspiracy to commit health-care fraud. Although her plea agreement contained an appeal waiver, 

Wisdom argues that the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(N) by

failing to properly explain the waiver and confirm she understood it. Because the plea agreement’s 

text is clear and the district court’s explanation was comprehensive, Wisdom’s waiver of her 

appellate rights is valid. We therefore dismiss her appeal.

We review de novo whether a defendant waived her appellate rights in a valid plea 

agreement. United States v. Murdock, 398 F.3d 491, 496 (6th Cir. 2005). If a defendant did not 

object at her plea hearing, we review for plain error her later challenge that the plea colloquy 

violated Rule 11(b)(1)(N). Ibid.

A defendant may waive any right, including the right to appeal, through a valid plea 

agreement. See United States v. Toth, 668 F.3d 374, 377–78 (6th Cir. 2012). An appeal waiver is 
No. 19-2236, United States v. Wisdom 

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enforceable if it was “knowing and voluntary.” Ibid. To ensure that a defendant knows what rights 

she is waiving, “the court must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant 

understands, . . . the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal or to 

collaterally attack the sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N).

If a defendant waives her appellate rights, she may challenge the waiver “on the grounds 

that it was not knowing and voluntary, was not taken in compliance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, or 

was the product of ineffective assistance of counsel.” United States v. Detloff, 794 F.3d 588, 592 

(6th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 354 F. App’x 250, 252 (6th Cir. 2009)). If a 

district court misstates the scope of an appellate waiver, it fails to comply with Rule 11(b)(1)(N). 

See United States v. Melvin, 557 F. App’x 390, 393–96 (6th Cir. 2013). If there is an initial correct 

statement of the waiver, a second, misstated explanation that expands the permissible bases for 

appeal may inadvertently create an exception to the written waiver. See Detloff, 794 F.3d at 593.

Here, Wisdom’s plea agreement contained an unambiguous waiver of her right to appeal 

her sentence on any grounds, unless the sentence exceeded 87 months. At her plea hearing, 

Wisdom stated that she reviewed the terms of the agreement with her attorney and voluntarily 

accepted them. The district court generally summarized the waiver and explained that Wisdom

could not appeal a sentence “contemplated” by the plea agreement, meaning at or below 87 

months. Wisdom confirmed that she understood.

Wisdom now argues that the district court failed to ensure that she understood the appeal 

waiver because it made an ambiguous statement. The court explained that, after it heard arguments 

regarding Wisdom’s proper Guidelines range, it would come to its own decision that could be 

higher than what the parties agreed upon. It explained that if “it’s a tougher sentence than [she] 
No. 19-2236, United States v. Wisdom 

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had contemplated,” she “probably do[es] have the right then to appeal the sentence calculation and 

so forth because it’s beyond what [she] contemplated . . . .”

Yet this statement is only ambiguous when read in a vacuum. Earlier in the plea colloquy, 

the district court clearly referred to the Sentencing Guidelines range in Wisdom’s plea agreement 

as her “contemplated” sentence. The court explained that she could not appeal a “sentence that is 

as contemplated here, and there’s a specific number of months, 87 months that’s identified here.” 

The court continued that Wisdom could not appeal a sentence “that is at or below [her] 

contemplated sentencing range,” to which the prosecutor confirmed “87 is the correct number

. . . .” Then the court again stated that she could not appeal a “sentence that is contemplated by 

[her] Rule 11 agreement, it’s already been noted, it’s been mentioned, and methodology has been 

identified.”

We have previously held that a district court can expand a defendant’s right to appeal 

beyond the limited circumstances allowed by the waiver in the written plea agreement if, during 

the plea colloquy, it follows an initially accurate explanation with a contradictory one. See, e.g.,

Detloff, 794 F.3d at 593. But here, Wisdom confirmed her understanding of an initial accurate 

statement, and there is nothing in the record suggesting that any subsequent statement interfered

with that understanding. At most, there was an additional ambiguously worded reiteration. 

Because the district court did not misstate Wisdom’s appellate rights or create an exception to her 

appeal waiver, she waived her right to contest her 70-month sentence on appeal.

Accordingly, we DISMISS Wisdom’s appeal.