In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 98-1955, 98-2584

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DONALD V. CASHMAN, and

SCOTT D. FEDDERLY,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 97 CR 102--John C. Shabaz, Chief Judge.

Argued September 14, 1999--Decided June 9, 2000

 Before BAUER, ROVNER, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

 ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Donald Cashman and Scott

Fedderly pleaded guilty to conspiring to

distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21

U.S.C. sec. 846. Cashman contests the legality of

a traffic stop that culminated in the search of

his automobile and the discovery of evidence

pointing to his involvement in the conspiracy.

Fedderly contests the district court’s finding

that he possessed a firearm in the course of the

conspiracy, see U.S.S.G. sec. 2D1.1(b)(1),

asserting, inter alia, that the district court

improperly relied on information which, according

to the terms of his plea agreement, could not be

used against him. We affirm.

I.

 On August 17, 1997, Cashman was driving his

Chevy Blazer on Interstate Highway 94 through St.

Croix County, Wisconsin, when Wisconsin State

Trooper Jason Spetz pulled him over. Trooper

Spetz effectuated the stop when he noticed a

crack in the windshield of Cashman’s Blazer. In

the course of issuing a warning ticket to

Cashman, Spetz asked for and received Cashman’s

permission to search the interior of the Blazer.

Inside, the trooper discovered, among other

things, methamphetamine and a spiral index-card

notebook containing drug-related entries.
 After he was indicted, Cashman moved

unsuccessfully to suppress the evidence that

Trooper Spetz seized from his vehicle. Cashman

argued that the traffic stop that led to the

search was unlawful. However, acting on the

recommendation of the magistrate judge, the

district court concluded that the stop was

justified by the crack in the Blazer’s

windshield. Wisconsin law requires that a

vehicle’s windshield not be "excessively cracked

or damaged." See Wis. Admin. Code sec. Trans.

305.34(3) (1997). A photograph of the Blazer’s

windshield indicated that the crack was from

seven to ten inches long, extending two inches

above the left windshield wiper of the car in its

resting position. Gov. Exs. 1, 1-A; see R. 52 at

2-3; R. 56 at 2. In the court’s view, this

appeared to be an "excessive" crack, supplying

Spetz with probable cause to stop Cashman’s

vehicle. R. 52 at 2-3; R. 56 at 2. The motion to

suppress was therefore denied, and Cashman

pleaded guilty a short while later.

 An anonymous tip led the authorities to

Fedderly, a distributor of methamphetamine whom

Cashman supplied. The tipster apprised the Dunn

County, Wisconsin Sheriff’s Department by

telephone on August 12, 1997, that Fedderly, who

was wanted on several outstanding warrants, was

staying in a stolen motor home parked in rural

Menominee. After looking the home over and

confirming that it had been reported stolen,

officers performed an inventory search. Inside a

cupboard at the foot of a bed, they discovered a

loaded .22 caliber revolver along with some of

Fedderly’s clothing. Elsewhere in the home they

found a baggie containing what appeared to be

marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a wallet with a

social security card issued to Fedderly, and just

under $500 in cash. Fedderly was arrested the

following day. When asked about the gun, he

admitted that it belonged to him and (unlike the

motor home) was not stolen. R. 112 at 12, 21-22;

see also R. 100 para. 14. On August 14, the home

was searched again. That search produced, among

other things, a black nylon tote bag, a digital

scale, syringes, and baggies, as well as a gram

scale and a Tupperware container, both of which

had methamphetamine residue on them.

 Ultimately, Fedderly pleaded guilty to

conspiring along with Cashman to distribute

methamphetamine. His plea agreement contained a

provision committing him to "make a full,

complete and truthful statement regarding his

involvement in violations of federal criminal

statutes, as well as the involvement of all other

individuals known to the defendant." R. 84 sec.

2. That same provision, however, specified that
"the information provided by the defendant under

the terms of this plea agreement will not be used

against him to determine the applicable

sentencing guideline range except as otherwise

indicated in U.S.S.G. sec.1B1.8(b)." Id.; see

also R. 111 at 8-9.

 When the probation officer interviewed him prior

to sentencing, Fedderly told the officer that

Cashman had given him the motor home in which the

gun was found because Fedderly had no place to

live. According to Fedderly, Cashman said that

his friends had stolen the motor home and that

the handgun was in the home "at the time."/1

Fedderly said that he had never even taken the

gun from the home, let alone used or carried it.

The probation officer included this information

in the pre-sentence report. R. 100 para.para. 40,

50.

 The Sentencing Guidelines call for a two-level

increase in the defendant’s base offense level

when the defendant possessed a dangerous weapon

in the course of a drug-related offense, so long

as it is not "clearly improbable" that the gun

was connected to the offense. U.S.S.G. sec.

2D1.1(b)(1) & comment. (n.3). The probation

officer applied that enhancement in calculating

Fedderly’s offense level. R. 100 para. 50.

Although "[t]here is no evidence to suggest

Fedderly used or carried the gun during any drug

transaction," the officer reasoned, "since the

weapon was provided to him by his drug supplier

and was found with other indicia of drug

distribution, we cannot say it is clearly

improbable that the weapon was connected with the

offense." Id. Fedderly contested the propriety of

the enhancement, R. 112 at 18-20, but he did not

argue that consideration of his statement to the

probation officer as to the source of the gun

violated his plea agreement with the government.

 At sentencing, the district court concluded that

the two-level enhancement for possession of the

gun in the course of the methamphetamine

conspiracy was appropriate. As the court’s

remarks reveal, the fact that Cashman had given

Fedderly the gun figured prominently in the

court’s rationale.

 The Court further finds that the loaded .22

caliber handgun was found in the stolen motor

home in which the defendant was sometimes

residing. Initially defendant informed Cragin

[one of the officers who arrested him] the gun

was his and not stolen; has since informed [the]

probation officer that gun was in the motor home

when the vehicle was provided to him by Donald

Cashman. The Court notes that there is no

evidence to suggest that Fedderly used or carried
the gun during any drug transaction. However,

this weapon was provided to him by his drug

supplier and was found with other indicia of drug

distribution.

 The Court notes that the adjustment should be

applied if the weapon was present. Now the weapon

was present in a mobile home . . . which the

defendant sometimes used. It was in the vicinity,

the immediate vicinity of methamphetamine residue

and drug paraphernalia. That is[,] items which

were normally assimilated with and/or relating to

the distribution of methamphetamine. The Court

cannot find that it is clearly improbable that

the weapon was connected with the offense.

 Those are the elements. That is the

determination. The Court believes that there is

a reason for this enhancement that has been

suggested in numerous other cases and notes

relating to the enhancement for weapon

possession. It does, as indicated, reflect the

increased danger of violence when drug

traffickers possess weapons. We have a drug

trafficker. We have . . . Donald Cashman, a drug

trafficker, who provided him, [Fedderly] now

tells us in his latest version, the gun. It

certainly wasn’t given to him to hunt squirrel.

It certainly wasn’t given him as a plaything. 

 He is in a dangerous livelihood. Perhaps [he]

doesn’t as yet realize how dangerous it was, but

the fact is this was provided to him by a drug

supplier, it was found with the other evidence

and indicia of drug distribution, and the Court

believes that the weapon was connected with this

offense having previously advised that it cannot

say it is clearly improbable the weapon was

connected. It is in words of the vernacular to

protect the stash and to protect the distribution

thereof and to protect the cash surrounding it

and to protect the defendant when he was in the

mobile home in those surroundings.

R. 112 at 22-23. (emphasis ours). Again, Fedderly

raised no objection as to the propriety of taking

into consideration Fedderly’s statement to the

probation officer about the source of the gun.

 The district court sentenced Cashman to a

prison term of 180 months and Fedderly to a term

of 144 months. Cashman now appeals his

conviction, contending that the district court

should have suppressed the evidence seized from

his Blazer. Fedderly challenges his sentence,

arguing that the government failed to establish

that he possessed the revolver discovered in the

mobile home during the conspiracy to distribute

the methamphetamine, that it is clearly

improbable that the gun had any connection to the
conspiracy, and that the district court erred in

considering his statement that Cashman had given

him that gun.

II.

A.

 Cashman contends that the district court erred

in concluding that Trooper Spetz had probable

cause to effectuate the traffic stop that

culminated in the search of his Blazer. We of

course review the court’s probable cause

determination de novo, deferring to any

subsidiary findings of historical fact that are

not clearly erroneous. Ornelas v. United States,

517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996);

United States v. Richardson, 208 F.3d 626, 629

(7th Cir. 2000). The particular legal rule

pertinent to this case is straightforward: so

long as the circumstances confronting a police

officer support the reasonable belief that a

driver has committed even a minor traffic

offense, the officer has probable cause to stop

the driver. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,

116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).

 The "Standards for Vehicle Equipment" set forth

in the Wisconsin Administrative Code specify that

the windshield of an automobile "may not be

excessively cracked or damaged." Wis. Admin. Code

sec. Trans. 305.34(3). Excessive cracking or

damage is defined, inter alia, as "a crack

inside, or which extends inside, the windshield

critical area" or "cracks which extend into any

area more than 8 inches from the frame." Id. sec.

Trans. 305.34(3)(a) and (b). The "windshield

critical area" is in turn defined as "that

portion of a motor vehicle windshield normally

used by the driver for necessary observations to

the front of the vehicle[,] . . . includ[ing] the

areas normally swept by a factory installed

windshield wiper system." Id. sec. Trans.

305.05(43).

 The windshield of Cashman’s Blazer in fact was

cracked, and the parties stipulated that Trooper

Spetz "saw a cracked windshield." R. 57 at 7; see

also id. at 25. But Cashman argues that the crack

was not "excessive" as the Wisconsin

Administrative Code defines that term--in other

words, the crack neither extended more than eight

inches away from the frame of the windshield nor

extended into the area of the windshield swept by

the vehicle’s windshield wipers. 

 The focus of Cashman’s argument is, however,

misplaced. For purposes of the probable cause

analysis, we are not concerned with the precise

length or position of the crack. The propriety of
the traffic stop does not depend, in other words,

on whether Cashman was actually guilty of

committing a traffic offense by driving a vehicle

with an excessively cracked windshield. The

pertinent question instead is whether it was

reasonable for Trooper Spetz to believe that the

windshield was cracked to an impermissible

degree. United States v. Smith, 80 F.3d 215, 219

(7th Cir. 1996). 

 The photographs in the record make plain that

the crack in the Blazer’s windshield was

substantial. Gov. Exs. 1, 1-A. As the magistrate

judge noted, and as Cashman concedes, the crack

was between seven and ten inches long, and

extended above the bottom of one of the resting

windshield wipers. R. 52 at 2-3. A trooper in

Spetz’s position, then, passing or approaching

Cashman’s vehicle on the roadway, could readily

and reasonably think that the crack met the

administrative criteria for excessive cracking

and that Cashman was violating the law by

operating the Blazer in that condition. See

Smith, 80 F.3d at 219. Careful measurement after

the fact might reveal that the crack stopped just

shy of the threshold for "excessive" cracking or

damage; but the Fourth Amendment requires only a

reasonable assessment of the facts, not a

perfectly accurate one. See id. Given the evident

length of the crack and its proximity to the

portion of the windshield swept by the wipers,

Trooper Spetz had probable cause to stop

Cashman’s vehicle.

B.

 Guidelines section 2D1.1(b)(1) directs the court

to increase the defendant’s offense level by two

levels if the defendant possessed a dangerous

weapon while committing the offense, unless it is

"clearly improbable" that the weapon had anything

to do with the crime. See id. & comment. (n.3).

As Judge Shabaz recognized, the enhancement

accounts for the heightened risk of violence that

is present when drug traffickers arm themselves.

Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Cain, 155 F.3d

840, 843 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Burns,

128 F.3d 553, 555 (7th Cir. 1997). Individuals

who do no more than conspire to distribute

narcotics are nonetheless eligible for the

enhancement, so long as they possess a firearm in

the course of the conspiracy. See United States

v. McClinton, 135 F.3d 1178, 1993 (7th Cir.),

cert. denied, 524 U.S. 921, 118 S. Ct. 2308, and

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 885, 119 S. Ct. 197

(1998); United States v. Wetwattana, 94 F.3d 280,

284 (7th Cir. 1996).

 For three reasons, Fedderly argues, the district

court erred in enhancing his offense level
pursuant to section 2D1.1(b)(1). First, the

government failed to prove by a preponderance of

the evidence that he possessed the revolver

discovered in the mobile home during the course

of the methamphetamine conspiracy; and thus the

court erred in finding that he did. Second, even

if he did possess the gun, it is, contrary to the

district court’s finding, clearly improbable that

the gun was connected to the conspiracy. Finally,

because the plea agreement prohibited the use of

his statement about the source of the gun in

calculating his sentencing range, the district

court was precluded from considering that

statement in assessing the propriety of the

enhancement for possession of the weapon. That

Fedderly possessed the firearm in the course of

the conspiracy and that it was not clearly

improbable the two were connected are findings of

fact that we review for clear error. See United

States v. Berkey, 161 F.3d 1099, 1102 (7th Cir.

1998); Burns, 128 F.3d at 556; United States v.

Tyler, 125 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir. 1997). As we

have noted, Fedderly raised no objection below to

the district court’s consideration of his

statement that Cashman gave him the gun. We

therefore review that issue for plain error.

 The district court did not clearly err in

finding that Fedderly possessed a weapon while he

conspired with Cashman to distribute

methamphetamine. The superseding indictment

alleged that the conspiracy commenced in or about

June of 1997 and extended to on or about

September 22, 1997 (R. 13 at 1)--although on the

record before us we have no reason to believe

that there was any life left in the enterprise

after Cashman and Fedderly were arrested in midAugust. The stolen motor home in which the

revolver was located had been parked in Menominee

for several days in August before the local

authorities were alerted to its presence. Until

that time, Fedderly had been in possession and

control of the motor home, although the evidence

suggests that he was not necessarily staying

there. The loaded revolver was found within a

cupboard inside the home. Given the relatively

tight confines of a motor home, one could

reasonably infer that Fedderly had possessed the

weapon inside of it. Indeed, Fedderly admitted at

the time of his arrest that the weapon was his.

These circumstances lend adequate support to the

district court’s finding that Fedderly possessed

the weapon during the course of the conspiracy.

 We likewise find no error in the court’s

determination that it was not clearly improbable

that the revolver was connected with the

conspiracy. When the sheriff’s deputies searched

the home, they found, in addition to the loaded

revolver, a variety of drug paraphernalia as well
as the gram scale and Tupperware container, both

of which had methamphetamine residue on them.

They also found a black nylon tote bag. According

to the pre-sentence report, the pertinent

findings of which were not contested, four

witnesses had seen Fedderly store methamphetamine

in Tupperware containers, and one witness had

seen him carry these containers in a black nylon

tote bag. R. 100 para.para. 30-32, 34. The record

does not tell us how close these other items may

have been to the cupboard in which the gun was

found. But given the size of a motor home, they

could not have been distant. In any case,

Fedderly bore the burden of proving that it was

clearly unlikely the gun was connected to his

narcotics activity. United States v. Grimm, 170

F.3d 760, 767 (7th Cir. 1999). Although there is

no proof that Fedderly transacted his illicit

business in the motor home or that he carried the

gun with him while transacting that business, for

example, neither is there evidence suggesting

that the presence of both the gun and the drugrelated items within the motor home was

coincidental. See Berkey, 161 F.3d at 1103; see

generally Grimm, 170 F.3d at 767-68.

 Finally, although it is undisputed that the

plea agreement prohibited the district court from

considering Fedderly’s statement as to the source

of the gun, the district court’s consideration of

that statement does not rise to the level of

plain error. In order to establish plain error,

a party must not only show that the district

court erred, but that the error, left

uncorrected, would result in a miscarriage of

justice. E.g., United States v. Humphrey, 154

F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v.

Wallace, 32 F.3d 1171, 1174 (7th Cir. 1994). In

the context of sentencing, that means that the

defendant’s sentence would have been different

but for the error. United States v. Bauer, 129

F.3d 962, 964 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v.

Hicks, 129 F.3d 376, 378 (7th Cir. 1997). There

is no question here that the district court

relied significantly on Fedderly’s protected

statement--the court cited that statement no less

than three times as it overruled Fedderly’s

objection to the enhancement. Yet, even when

Fedderly’s statement is excluded from the

analysis, there is ample evidence which

establishes that he possessed the gun during the

conspiracy and which affirmatively links the gun

to his narcotics activity. This evidence we have

already noted: the gun was found in the stolen

mobile home that Fedderly possessed for several

days prior to his arrest; Fedderly acknowledged

to arresting officers that the gun belonged to

him (R. 112 at 9); and present along with the gun

in the mobile home were drug paraphernalia, a

scale bearing methamphetamine reside, a container
of the kind in which witnesses had seen Fedderly

store methamphetamine and which, like the scale,

contained methamphetamine residue, as well as a

black nylon tote bag similar to the type one

witness had seen him use to transport the

containers. Given these independent indicia that

Fedderly possessed the gun during and in

connection with the drug conspiracy, we believe

that the court still would have enhanced

Fedderly’s base offense level pursuant to section

2D1.1(b)(1) had it not considered Fedderly’s

revelation that his drug supplier gave him the

gun. Consequently, we are not convinced that the

court’s error in considering that statement was

plain in the sense that it resulted in a more

onerous sentence for Fedderly.

III.

 Finding no error in the denial of Cashman’s

motion to suppress or in the calculation of

Fedderly’s sentencing range, we AFFIRM Cashman’s

conviction and Fedderly’s sentence.

/1 To the extent Cashman’s statement to Fedderly

suggests that the gun was present in the home at

the time it was stolen, we note that the owners

of the motor home informed the authorities that

they had never owned a firearm. See R. 112 at 11.