If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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### S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re GILSON/REITZ , Minor s

. May 30, 2024

No. 368485

Lenawee Circuit Court Family Division

LC No. 21

- 000090

- NA

Before: F EENEY

, P .J., and M. J. K ELLY and R ICK , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

Respondent

- mother 1 appeals as of right the trial court ’ s order terminating her parental rights to her two children, ALG and CMR, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ) (conditions that led to adjudication cont inue to exist), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to parent). We

affirm

.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In September 2021, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition requesting that the trial court take jurisdiction over ALG and CMR. The petition alleged that on August 26, 2021, Child ren ’ s Protective Services ( CPS ) received a report regarding the improper supervision and physical neglect of ALG and CMR . The report indicated that (1) the minor

children were under the car e of their maternal grandmother for an extended period of time due to

mo t her ’ s absence, (2) there was mold y food, dirty dishes, razors, trash, garbage bags, and bed bugs throughout mother’s residence, and (3) ALG and CMR suffered from untreated head lice a nd numerous bed bug bites . The petition further purported that (1) on August 27, 2021, mother left

ALG and CMR in the care of John Erskin, an individual with a history of physical abuse against an unrelated disabled child, despite DHHS notifying mother th at she was barred from allowing Erskin to care for ALG and CMR, (2) ALG ’ s elementary school counselor and principal voiced concerns regarding ALG ’ s hygiene, attendance, and overall wellbeing, and (3) mo t her allowed

ALG and CMR to interact with an individua l named James Moore, a registered sex offender

.

1 ALG ’s father is RAG, and CMR’s father is JJB. While the fathers were named a s respondent s in the child protective proceedings below

, neither participates on appeal.- 2

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Following a preliminary hearing, the trial court authorized the petition, removed the minor children

from mo t her ’ s care, and ordered her t o co mplete a case service plan (CSP)

.

In June 202 2 , the DHHS filed a supplemental petition requesting the termination of

mother ’ s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ), (g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), and (j) due to mother ’ s repeated failure to participate in or benefit from her case service plan. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that DHHS p resented clear and convincing evidence to support termination of mother ’ s parental rights under

MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ) and (j) based on her unfruitful efforts to comply with her CSP

, her unresolved mental health issues, and her inability to a cknowledge or address her role in the

children ’ s removal and trauma. The court found that DHHS failed to meet its evidentiary burden regarding MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). Nevertheless, after finding stat utory grounds for termination

under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ) and (j), t he trial court also conclude d that DHHS established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that termination of mother ’ s parental rights was in the children ’ s best interests. This appeal fol lowed.

II. STATUTORY GROUNDS

Mother first argues that the trial court clearly erred by terminati ng her parental rights under

MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ) and (j). We disagree

.

“ We review for clear error a trial court ’ s finding of whether a statutory ground for termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court ’ s special opportunit y to observe the witnesses. ” In

re Richardson , 329 Mich App 232, 251; 961 NW2d 499 (2019) (citation omitted). “ To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in

MCL 712A.19b(3) has been proved by clear and convincing evidence. ” In re Ellis , 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011).

To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one statutory basis for

termination under MCL 712A.19b(3) has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re

Sanborn , 337 Mich App 252, 272; 976 NW2d 44 (2021). In the instant case, the trial court

terminated mother ’ s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ) and (j), which authorize the termination of parental rights under the foll owing circumstances:

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the follow ing:

( i ) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no

reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child ’ s age.

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(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based o n the conduct or capacity of the child ’ s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the

parent.

T he trial court did not clearly err by finding that the record supported terminating mother ’ s parental rights under MCL 712A .19b(3)(c)( i )

. Mother ’ s mental health concerns, neglect, and improper supervision of the children led to the initial adjudication. DHHS presented extensive testimony regarding mother ’ s inadequate compliance with her CSP and her failure to benefit from services aimed at addressing parenting skills, mental health, and judgment deficiencies over a period of 15 months. Mother obtained housing, first at an apartment complex in Dundee, before later obtaining a house in Adrian. Howev er, DHHS was repeatedly unable to determine if either

residenc e was appropriate for the children because mother never allowed the caseworkers to inspect her Dundee apartment and severely delayed the inspection of her Adrian house. Additionally, a foster c are caseworker reported that there were ongoing concerns regarding certain

individuals that mother allowed into her residence, particularly because RAG, ALG ’ s father, reported that he resided there for a few weeks. W hile mother denied allowing any men to remain in her residence, a local deputy reported that Moore, a registered sex offender, entered mother ’ s Adrian home in January 2023. Moreover, mother only allowed a caseworker to assess the Adrian residence approximately a year after the initiation of th e underlying proceedings

. The caseworke r testified that the house was “ gutted and completely [un] inhabitable

, ” with no utilities

.

A June 2023 inspection of the residence revealed overgrown grass, broken glass, dilapidated lawn furniture, and garbage surr ounding the home. Mother received two civil

infractions on June 7, 2023

, one related for failing to maintain a clean and safe home, and the other for failing to remove garbage outside the home. The trial court observed that the lack of cleanliness and hygienic conditions in the home was one of the issues that lead to the initial removal of the

children

. A caseworker additionally shared that mother recently provided proof of employment

and fina ncial stability . H owever, it was noted that the agency requested the aforementioned

documents at the start of the underlying proceedings, and that mother failed to comply with the request until August 2023 , when the documentation was finally provided by m other ’ s counselor

.

Throughout the proceedings below, mother exhibit ed a lack of insight and understanding regarding the trauma her children experienced and their mental health needs, in addition to neglecting her own mental health issues. This undermined her ability to form a healthy relationship and appropriately bond with her children. Mother ’ s November 16, 2021 psychological assessment

stated that “ [ mother ] presented herself in an extremely positive light by denying many minor faults and shortcomings that most people acknowledge[,] ” essentially “ faking a good profile. ” The aforementioned psychological evaluation indicated that mo t her maintained “ high self

- denial ,”

such that the aforementioned assessment was rendered unusable. The trial court subseque ntly requested a n ew psychological evaluation to determine whether mother was benefit ing from mental health and parenting services. However, the latter psychological assessment, conducted on April 13, 2023, provided only that “ [t] he findings from this most recent evaluation align with that of previous evaluations

- that [ mother ] ‘ tends to deny and minimize common problems and weaknesses most people endorse ’ in an effort to present herself favorably[,] ” and mother revealed

“ a low self

- disclosure tendency

. ”- 4

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Mother ’ s April 13, 2023 psychological assessment further provided that she appeared to

“ become quite self

- preoccupied, inattentive, and deny and minimize problems that may impact the children. [ Mother ] will tend to ‘ see what she wants to see. ’ [ Mothe r] lacks insight into how her own behavior and choices impacted the children. ” Testimony from a caseworker indicated that during a family team meeting in July 2023, mother refused to take accountability for ALG ’ s

“ outbursts, behaviors, actions, and again, looking back and re

- reading the trauma assessment while preparing for today, [ALG] had all of these behaviors initially coming into this case. ” The trial

court expresse d concern regarding mother ’ s coping mechanisms and opined, “ there may be an

issue here where [ mother] literally is adjusting her own reality in order to avoid having to deal with the reality of her own actions. ”

The aforementioned issues were additionally evidenced by the minor children ’ s trauma assessments upon removal. Per ALG ’ s trauma assessment, conducted December 7, 2021, ALG

exhibited (1) a social engagement disorder due to “ her pattern of seeking out and interacting with unfamiliar adults, a lack of renaissance [sic] when interacting with unfamiliar adults, overfamiliar physical and verbal behavior with unfamiliar adults, and unhesitatingly accompanying unfamiliar adults[,] ” and (2) post

- traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as she “ displays an [sic] negative attitude

abou t one ’ s selves or others, disassociation leading to her traumatic experiences, unprovoked irritability and temper tantrums, hypervigilance and difficulty focusing and concentrating. ” CMR was additionally diagnosed with PTSD and attention

- deficit/hyperacti vity disorder

. T h e children ’ s behavioral issues were exacerbated following parenting time with mother due to the instability associated with delayed reunification.

As to mental health services , the record indicates that mother neglected to make sufficien t

progress as to warrant the extension of reasonable efforts toward reunification, particularly in light

of the minor children ’ s ages. See In re Sanborn , 337 Mich App at 274 (stating that even if a respondent has participated in all the services that the DHHS has offered, mere participation is not the same as overcoming the barriers justifying removal in the first place). Mother had an extensive history with CPS, with prior contacts on March 7, 2014, April 9, 2017, November 3, 2017,

October 26, 2018, Octo ber 31, 2018, November 18, 2020, November 19, 2020, March 1, 2021,

June 7, 2021, and August 6, 2021

, due to physical abuse, physical neglect, improper supervision,

and substance use

. Mother was previously offered services for substance use, improper supervision, and physical neglect, but failed to participate or benefit from the offered programs.

While reunification appeared possible at the outset of the case, the further the proceedings progressed, the more the prospect of r eunification diminished. Mother ’ s questionable insight, insensitivity, and lack of understanding confirmed that the conditions that led to the adjudication had not been rectified. Moreover, considering the evidence of the children ’ s deteriorating mental

health as a result of continued contact with mo t her , the trial court did not clearly err by finding- 5

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that the conditions that led to the adjudication were not likely to be rectified within a reasonable period of time

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III. BEST INTERESTS

Mother also argu es that the trial court clearly erred by determin ing that termination of her parental rights was in the children ’ s best interests. We disagree.

“ Even if the trial court finds that the Department has established a ground for termination by clear and convi ncing evidence, it cannot terminate the parent ’ s parental rights unless it also finds by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the children. ”
In re Gonzales/Martinez , 310 Mich App 426, 434; 871 NW2d 868 (2015). This Court reviews a

trial court ’ s best

- interest s determination for clear error. In re Sanborn , 337 Mich App at 276

. “ A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court ’ s special opportunity to observe

the witnesses. ” In re BZ , 264 Mich App 286, 296

- 297 ; 690 NW2d 505 (2004)

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“ If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child ’ s best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be

made. ” MCL 712A.19b(5). In making its determination, the trial court “ should we igh all the evidence available to it, ” and may consider

the child ’ s bond to the parent, the parent ’ s parenting ability, the child ’ s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the

parent ’ s home. Other considerati ons include the length of time the child was in care, the likelihood that the child could be returned to her parents ’ home within the foreseeable future, if at all, and compliance with the case service plan. [ In re Atchley , 341 Mich App 332, 346

- 347; 990 NW2d 685 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted).]

Moreover, “ [a] child ’ s placement with relatives is a factor that the trial court is required to

consider. ” In re Gonzales/Martinez , 310 Mich App at 434

. However, w hile placement with a

relative wei ghs against termination, it is not dispositive

, because a trial court “ may terminate parental rights in lieu of placement with relatives if it finds that termination is in the child ’ s best

interests. ” In re Olive/Metts Minors , 297 Mich App 35, 41

- 42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). In the majority of cases, it is in the child ’ s best interests to be placed with his or her siblings. Id

.

The trial court did not clearly err when it determined that termination of mother ’ s parental rights was in the children’s best inte rests

. DHHS presented detailed testimony regarding mother ’ s failure to comply with the terms of her CSP

, as well as her u nresolved mental health issues, questionable judgment, and general lack of parenting skills. M other was offered extensive

2 “ Because one statutory ground for termination was established by clear and convincing evide nce, [this Court] need not consider whether the other grounds cited by the trial court also supported the

termination decision. ” In re Foster , 285 Mich App 630, 633; 776 NW2d 415 (2009).- 6

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services

, includ ing parenting classes, individual therapy, mental health services, psychological evaluations, housing resources, and supportive visitations

. Nevertheless, she failed to make substantial progress throughout the instant case. See In re Moss , 301 Mich App 76, 89 ; 836 NW2d 182 (2013) ( “[A] t the best

- interest stage, the child ’ s interest in a normal family home is superior to any interest the parent has

. ” ). Mother advances that the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing establishes the deep bond between her and her children, and that there were minimal

concerns about her parenting skills. However, the record indicates otherwise.

During the evidentiary hearing, a caseworker testified that CMR rarely interacted with

mother d uring parenting time. Mother required assistance from parenting time staff to redirect or guide CMR. CMR repeatedly voiced that he did not want to participate in parenting time with

mother. CMR ’ s therapist additionally articulated that if mother ’ s parental rights were not

ter minated, the suspension of visitations with mother w ould be necessary to provide CMR with a sense of stability in his current placement. A recent medical report also noted that CMR “ is very extremely bonded, seems very comfortable with the foster parents, and when [CMR] came off the exam table, given he could have either have went to his mom or to the foster parents, [CMR] went to the foster parents. ” While ALG expressed that she wanted to see mother , ALG also voiced that

“ she loves living with her [pater nal] grandmother and she wants her grandmother to adopt her, and she is going to stay there. ” Each of the children ’ s placements were willing to adopt the child under their care. Each child maintained their own bedroom in their respective caregivers ’ homes, and the caregivers ensured that the children received proper medical and mental health services , and adequately participated in school . ALG and CMR continued to meet on a monthly basis despite their separate placements

, and did well living separat ely. Comparatively, mother neglected to

ensure ALG and CMR were keeping up with their homework or complying with their individualized education program s , and did not participate in behavioral meetings or meet with

ALG ’ s and CMR ’ s teachers. Moreover, a co urt order was required to ensure that mother sought necessary mental health services for ALG.

As the trial court noted during the evidentiary hearing, a child ’ s placement with a relative

is a relevant factor in termination decisions

. However, this factor is not dipositive

, given that a

trial court “ may terminate parental rights in lieu of placement with relatives if it finds that

termination is in the child ’ s best interests. ” In re Olive/Metts Minors , 297 Mich App at 43

. A

caseworker testified that both children were much more stable in their respective placements

, and made significant improvements by participating in therapy and ceasing parenting time with

mo t her . Furthermore, considering ALG ’ s numerous emotional outbursts, inpatient psychiatric hospitalizations, and negative behavioral history, it was critical for ALG to re main in a home that provided structure, predictability, and extensive care , which she did not receive while in mother’s

care

.

The trial court attributed the children ’ s progres s to their exposure to “ diligent and responsive caregivers for a significant enough period of time that they actually understand now that that is a safe place for them to relax into it. ” The trial court additionally opined :

At six and nine [ years old, ALG and CMR ] have just enjoyed stability and permanency for the last six months as I see it. Between changing placements and changing service providers and fluctuating intermittent visitations at different places, it has just been a roller coaster for them, both when they were in the care of- 7

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their mother and since they have been in foster care as a result of trying to work through that trauma and trying to find the right place for them and the right providers, and [ALG and CMR] are there, and they need that f or as long as possible as they mature through their next years.

On this record, and for all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not clearly err by finding

that termination of mother ’ s parental rights was in the children ’ s best interests

.

Affirme d.

/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney /s/ Michael J. Kelly

/s/ Michelle M. Rick