IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-1565

Filed July 22, 2015

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

WADE WALTER COLE,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Bremer County, Peter B. Newell, 

District Associate Judge.

Defendant appeals from his sentence for two counts of operating while 

intoxicated and one count of child endangerment. AFFIRMED.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Joseph A. Fraioli, Assistant 

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Heather Ann Mapes, Assistant 

Attorney General, Kasey Wadding, County Attorney, and Jill Dashner, Assistant 

County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., Vaitheswaran, J., and Miller, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015).
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DANILSON, C.J.

Wade Cole appeals from his sentence for two counts of operating while 

intoxicated and one count of child endangerment. He maintains the district court 

abused its discretion by failing to provide reasons on the record for the sentence 

imposed. Because we find the sentence imposed by the district court was the 

product of giving effect to the parties’ plea agreement rather than the exercise of 

trial court discretion, any alleged failure to furnish reasons was harmless. We 

affirm. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On July 22, 2014, Cole was charged by trial information with operating a 

motor vehicle without operator’s consent and operating a motor vehicle while 

intoxicated. 

The next day, Cole was charged by trial information with child 

endangerment, assault domestic abuse causing bodily injury, and a second 

count of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. 

Cole later entered a plea agreement with the State in which he would 

plead guilty to both counts of operating while intoxicated and one count of child 

endangerment and the State would dismiss the remaining charges. Additionally, 

the agreement provided that the State would recommend one-year incarceration 

for each operating-while-intoxicated charge and two years of incarceration for the 

child-endangerment charge. Each sentence was to run consecutively for a total 

term of incarceration not to exceed four years. 

On August 29, 2014, Cole entered guilty pleas pursuant to the agreement. 

The State informed the court it was “an agreed-to disposition” and explained the 
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parties’ agreement as well as the reasons for the State’s recommendations—

including Cole’s prior criminal record. The court stated:

Mr. Cole, I’ll go ahead and follow the plea agreements in this 

matter. I’ll impose a one-year prison term on each of the charges 

of Operating While Intoxicated; two-year prison term on the Child 

Endangerment. I’ll order that all of the charges run consecutive to 

each other, so you have a total sentence of four years.

The court closed the hearing by stating, “I think these sentences are appropriate 

based on your prior criminal history and the nature of these offenses.” 

Additionally, the district court filed a written sentencing order that stated the 

imposed sentence was “for the protection of society, the rehabilitation of the 

Defendant, and the further reasons stated by the Court on the record . . . .”

Cole appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

There are three different standards when a defendant challenges his or 

her sentence on appeal. State v. Seats, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2015 WL 

3930169, at *6 (Iowa 2015). “We use the abuse of discretion standard if the 

sentence is within statutory limits.” Id. We review the court’s determination to 

accept or reject a plea agreement for an abuse of discretion. State v. Thompson, 

856 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Iowa 2014). When the district court exercises its 

discretion on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or 

unreasonable, an abuse of discretion occurs. Id. We review both the court’s 

stated reasons made at the sentencing hearing and its written sentencing order. 

See id. at 919 (“The district court can satisfy this requirement [of stating on the 

record its reasons for selecting the particular sentence] by orally stating the 

reasons on the record or placing the reasons in the written sentencing order.”). 
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III. Discussion.

Cole maintains the district court abused its discretion by failing to state 

reasons for the sentence imposed on the record. Iowa Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 2.23(3)(d) requires the court to “state on the record its reason for 

selecting the particular sentence.” However, our supreme court has not 

uniformly enforced the rule.

In State v. Snyder, 336 N.W.2d 728, 729 (Iowa 1983), the district court 

had agreed to be bound by a plea agreement and incorporated the terms of the 

agreement into its sentence. The defendant appealed the sentence and 

argued—among other things—that the court erred in failing to state its reasons 

for the sentence. Snyder, 336 N.W.2d at 729. Our supreme court held that

where the sentence of imprisonment was “not the product of the exercise of trial 

court discretion but of the process of giving effect to the parties’ agreement,” “the 

purpose of a statement of reasons for imposition of the sentence would serve no 

practical purpose.” Id. Thus, “any failure by the court to furnish reasons was 

harmless.”1 Id.

In State v. Cason, 532 N.W.2d 755, 756 (Iowa 1995), the district court was 

not bound by the parties’ plea agreement, but our supreme court found the 

rationale of Snyder was applicable. Again, the supreme court held it was “clear 

from the record that the sentencing court was merely giving effect to the parties’ 

agreement. Under these circumstances, we do not believe the district court

 

1 Of course, “the better practice is for the court to state reasons in every case, even 

those in which it has no discretion.” Snyder, 336 N.W.2d at 729.
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abused its discretion in failing to state reasons for the sentence imposed.” 

Cason, 532 N.W.2d at 757. 

Recognizing it is dispositive, Cole asks us to reconsider whether district 

courts lack discretion when dealing with nonbinding plea agreements and 

ultimately to overrule Cason. However, “[w]e are not at liberty to overturn Iowa 

Supreme Court precedent.” State v. Hastings, 466 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Iowa Ct. 

App. 1990); see also State v. Miller, 841 N.W.2d 583, 584 n.1 (Iowa 2014) 

(“Generally, it is the role of the supreme court to decide if case precedent should 

no longer be followed.”). Here, the sentence imposed by the district court was 

the product of giving effect to the parties’ plea agreement and joint sentencing 

recommendation rather than the exercise of trial discretion. Under such 

circumstances, we see no benefit in reciting reasons. Cole and the State 

received the sentence they requested. Thus, any alleged failure to furnish 

reasons for the sentence was harmless. We affirm.

AFFIRMED.