PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

In re: SAMSUNG TOP-LOAD WASHING 

MACHINE MARKETING, SALES 

PRACTICES AND PRODUCTS 

LIABILITY LITIGATION. 

------------------------------ 

JERRY WELLS, et al., 

 Plaintiffs - Appellees, 

v. 

BEST BUY CO., INC.; THE HOME 

DEPOT, INC.; LOWE'S HOME CENTER, 

LLC; SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS 

AMERICA, INC.; SAMSUNG 

ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.; LOWE'S 

COMPANIES, INC.; SAMSUNG 

ELECTRONICS COMPANY, LTD, 

 Defendants - Appellees, 

and 

SEARS HOLDING CORPORATION, 

 Defendant. 

------------------------------ 

JOHN DOUGLAS MORGAN, 

 Objector - Appellant. 

-------------------------------- 

No. 20-6097 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

May 7, 2021

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court
2 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE 

OF ALASKA; ATTORNEY GENERAL 

OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS; 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE 

OF ALABAMA; ATTORNEY GENERAL 

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO; 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE 

OF INDIANA; ATTORNEY GENERAL 

OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI; 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE 

OF NORTH DAKOTA; ATTORNEY 

GENERAL OF THE STATE OF 

OKLAHOMA; ATTORNEY GENERAL 

OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, 

 Amici Curiae. 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 5:17-ML-02792-D)

_________________________________ 

Theodore H. Frank, Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute, Center for Class Action Fairness, 

Washington, DC, for Objector – Appellant John Douglas Morgan. 

John P. Elwood, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Washington, DC (R. Stanton Jones 

and Anthony J. Franze, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Washington, DC, and 

Arthur E. Brown and Elie Salamon, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, New York, New 

York, with him on the brief), for Defendants – Appellees. 

Samuel Issacharoff, New York, New York (William B. Federman, Federman & 

Sherwood, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with him on the brief), for Plaintiffs – Appellees. 

Kate B. Sawyer, Assistant Solicitor General (Mark Brnovich, Attorney General, with her 

on the brief), Office of the Arizona Attorney General, Phoenix, Arizona, for Amici 

Curiae. 

_________________________________ 

Before PHILLIPS, MURPHY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

McHUGH, Circuit Judge. 
3 

_________________________________ 

 In 2015, consumers owning Samsung top-load washing machines experienced 

issues with the top-load door detaching mid-cycle. Litigation ensued across the country, 

with the cases consolidated into the multidistrict litigation underlying this appeal. Over 

the course of several months, and with the assistance of a mediator, class counsel and the 

defendants negotiated a Settlement Agreement that provided class members five forms of 

relief. Valuing the Settlement Agreement at between $6.55 and $11.42 million and 

finding that certain aspects of the Agreement provided the average claimant greater 

compensation than damages provable at trial, the district court, over John Douglas 

Morgan’s objection, granted final class certification and final approval to the settlement. 

Essential to Mr. Morgan’s objections is the Settlement Agreement’s inclusion of a 

“kicker” agreement and a “clear-sailing” agreement relative to the award of attorneys’ 

fees and costs. Under the “kicker” agreement, Samsung retained the difference between 

the maximum permissible attorneys’ fees and costs award of $6.55 million and the 

amount actually awarded by the district court. Mr. Morgan further argues that under the 

“clear-sailing” agreement, Samsung agreed not to contest any request by class counsel for 

attorneys’ fees and costs of up to $6.55 million. Attempting to resolve his objections, 

Mr. Morgan and Samsung sought to negotiate a side agreement providing for the possible 

distribution to the class of a portion of the difference between the $6.55 million 

maximum permissible attorneys’ fees and costs, and the actual amount awarded by the 

district court. Ratification of this side agreement, however, never occurred, with 
4 

Mr. Morgan walking away based on his purported fear that class counsel might sue him 

and his counsel if he and Samsung finalized the side agreement. 

Instead of seeking the maximum award of $6.55 million, class counsel sought an 

attorneys’ fees and costs award of just under $6.25 million. Scrutinizing the billing 

records submitted by class counsel and acknowledging the existence of the “kicker” and 

“clear-sailing” agreements in the Settlement Agreement, the district court awarded class 

counsel a reduced amount of just over $3.8 million. As a result of this reward falling well 

below the maximum permissible amount of $6.55 million, Samsung was able to retain 

money that likely would have been distributed to the class had Mr. Morgan and Samsung 

finalized the side agreement. 

On appeal, Mr. Morgan advances three arguments: (1) the district court made clear 

errors of fact regarding settlement negotiations and the side agreement; (2) the district 

court abused its discretion by granting final approval to the Settlement Agreement where 

it included both a “kicker” and a “clear-sailing” agreement; and (3) the district court 

abused its discretion by granting final class certification and allowing class counsel to 

continue in its role after class counsel placed its interests ahead of the class’s interests. 

We hold that a district court must apply heightened scrutiny before approving a 

settlement that includes both a “kicker” agreement and a “clear-sailing” agreement. But 

our review of the record gives us confidence the district court did just that. And although 

the district court made one clear error in its fact-finding process, we conclude the error 

was harmless to its ultimate decisions regarding final class certification, final approval of 
5 

the Settlement Agreement, and its award of attorneys’ fees and costs. Accordingly, we 

affirm the district court’s orders on these matters. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Initiation of Litigation 

In 2015, thirty-four models of Samsung top-load washing machines, individually 

priced between $450 and $1500, experienced weakness issues with the top-load door 

mechanism. As a result of the weakness, the top-load door on some machines would 

detach during certain spin cycles, allowing water to spew out of the machine. In an effort 

to remedy this defect, the Consumer Product Safety Commission and Samsung 

announced a voluntary recall program under which Samsung would (1) provide a free 

repair to strengthen the top-load door and a one-year warranty extension; (2) give 

consumers a rebate toward the purchase of a new washing machine of any brand if a 

consumer was no longer using the washing machine; or (3) provide consumers who 

purchased a washing machine within the thirty days preceding the recall a full refund of 

the purchase price. Unsatisfied by the compensation offered by the recall program, 

consumers around the country filed class actions against Samsung.1

 

The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”) ordered the various class 

actions filed, based on the top-load door defect, be combined into a single action and 

1

 The class actions also named several retailers as defendants, specifically Best 

Buy Co., Inc.; The Home Depot, Inc.; Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.; Lowe’s Companies, 

Inc.; Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC; and Sears Holding Corporation. For ease of 

reference, we collectively refer to defendants as “Samsung.” 
6 

assigned that action to the Honorable Timothy D. DeGiusti of the Western District of 

Oklahoma. The JPML also incorporated into the multidistrict litigation a New Jersey 

class action against Samsung based on design defects in the drain pump mechanism of 

the same washing machines experiencing top-load door defects. William B. Federman of 

Federman & Sherwood assumed the role of lead class counsel. 

B. Settlement Negotiations & Agreement 

Following consolidation into the multidistrict litigation, the parties commenced 

settlement negotiations, with Michael Ungar serving as mediator. Over the span of 

several months, the parties spent nine days negotiating a settlement, focusing the first 

eight days of mediation on the issue of compensation and not turning to the issue of 

attorneys’ fees and costs until the final day of mediation.2

 In a declaration, Mr. Ungar 

described the negotiations as “hard-fought,” “lengthy,” “exhausting,” “at times 

frustrating,” and “quite adversarial.” Samsung App., Vol. I at 229, 231. Mr. Ungar further 

2

 Describing the structure of settlement negotiations, Mr. Ungar advised the 

district court: 

The relief for class members was the focus of the vast majority of the 

mediation sessions and discussions. The provisions of the settlement 

providing for the payment of attorneys’ fees, costs, and service awards 

for the named plaintiffs were negotiated only after the substantive relief 

to class members was agreed upon. There was no discussion of 

attorneys’ fees, costs, or service awards to the named plaintiffs until all 

substantive terms of the settlement were negotiated. The substantive 

terms of the settlement were never reopened or altered once the parties’ 

discussion of attorneys’ fees, costs, and service awards began. 

Samsung App., Vol. I at 231–32. 
7 

declared the settlement terms reached by the parties were “the product of arm’s length 

negotiations by highly skilled, well-informed lawyers.” Id. at 232. 

Class counsel and Samsung signed the Settlement Agreement in May 2018. The 

Settlement Agreement provided class members owning machines with top-load door 

issues four options for relief: (1) enhanced minimum recall rebates, which would allow 

class members to receive a rebate worth up to 15.5% of the estimated purchase price of 

the washing machine;3

 (2) enhanced recall repair, wherein Samsung would send a 

technician to a class member’s home to strengthen the top-load door mechanism and also 

provide the member a rebate toward the purchase of a future Samsung appliance; (3) top 

separation relief, which would allow a member experiencing a top-load door separation 

within seven years of purchasing a washing machine to receive a full refund on the 

purchase price of the machine as well as up to $400 in expenses resulting from the topload door separation; or (4) recall repair with warranty extension, under which a class 

member could request a repair to their top-load door mechanism and receive a one-year 

extension of the warranty on the washing machine.4

 The settlement also provided relief to 

class members experiencing drain-pump failures, allowing (1) $150 to cover the cost of 

already-completed repairs or installation of a new drain pump, if failure occurred within 

3

 Given the retail price of the washing machines, the maximum rebate of 

15.5% of the purchase price permitted each consumer to recover between $69.75 and 

$232.50, depending on the specific model purchased. 

4

 This option for relief also obligated Samsung to complete the repair within 

fourteen days of the class member’s request or else give the member a $50 cashequivalent card or replace the member’s washing machine. 
8 

three years of the notice date of the settlement; and (2) up to $400 for expenses stemming 

from the failure of a drain pump. 

In addition, the Settlement Agreement established parameters regarding an award 

of attorneys’ fees and costs to class counsel. Central to this appeal, the parties agreed 

Samsung would “pay attorneys’ costs and fees in the total, all-inclusive amount of 

$6,550,000.00, subject to approval of the Court.” Morgan App. at 68. In accord with this 

language, Samsung agreed not to contest any requested award of fees and costs up to 

$6.55 million. And because the Settlement Agreement did not require Samsung to place 

any money to cover the attorneys’ fees and costs in an escrow-type account prior to the 

district court’s determination of the appropriate amount of the award, the Settlement 

Agreement permitted Samsung to retain the difference between the maximum permissible 

award of $6.55 million and the amount ultimately awarded by the district court. 

C. Side Agreement Negotiations Between Mr. Morgan & Samsung 

Mr. Morgan, represented by the Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute (“HLLI”),5

expressed an intent to object to the Settlement Agreement. Mr. Morgan contended 

settlement negotiations between class counsel and Samsung culminated in a Settlement 

Agreement allowing class counsel to self-deal at the expense of class compensation. In 

particular, Mr. Morgan challenged the agreement that Samsung would retain the 

difference between the maximum permissible attorneys’ fees and costs and the amount 

actually awarded by the district court in exchange for Samsung’s agreement not to 

5

 Mr. Morgan’s niece is the president of HLLI. 
9 

challenge any request for fees and costs by class counsel of up to $6.55 million. 

Mr. Morgan also asserted the Settlement Agreement provided class members little relief 

above what was already provided by the voluntary recall program. 

In an effort to resolve the objections, Mr. Morgan and Samsung entered into 

negotiations toward a side agreement. Mr. Morgan and Samsung reached an agreement in 

principle and drafted a term sheet. The district court ordered Mr. Morgan and Samsung to 

“disclose all details of any agreements that they have reached during the pendency of this 

litigation” and place the side agreement on the record by December 31, 2019, some 

nineteen months after class counsel and Samsung signed the Settlement Agreement. 

Neither Mr. Morgan nor Samsung fully complied with the order. Samsung did, however, 

file a response outlining the general underpinnings of the side agreement. In pertinent 

part, Samsung represented the side agreement provided: 

A. If the Court does not award the maximum amount of 

attorneys’ fees under the Settlement Agreement, some of the unawarded 

fees may be distributed to Settlement Class Members if certain 

conditions are met. Samsung and [Mr.] Morgan have agreed that 70% of 

the following amount is subject to potential distribution to Settlement 

Class Members: $6.65 million (the maximum fee award permitted under 

the Settlement Agreement) minus the total amount of attorneys’ fees, 

costs, expenses, interest, and service awards awarded by the Court in 

any forthcoming fee award, minus 70% of any amount paid by Samsung 

to New Jersey Counsel in addition to the Court’s fee award (which 

would be in settlement of New Jersey Counsels’ claim related to the 

New Jersey litigation). 

B. The distribution to Settlement Class Members pursuant to 

paragraph A, above, will be made after the final outcome of any 

appeals, including appeals as to attorneys’ fees, only if the total amount 

calculated in accordance with paragraph A, above, minus the estimated 

costs of settlement administration for this distribution and any fees 

awarded by the Court to Morgan’s counsel[,] is greater than $600,000. 
10 

If this amount is less than $600,000, no distribution shall be made and 

any unawarded attorneys’ fees shall remain with Samsung. 

Morgan App. at 194. As suggested by paragraph B, the side agreement allowed HLLI to 

seek attorneys’ fees. And, assuming approval of the side agreement, Mr. Morgan agreed 

to drop all objections to the Settlement Agreement. 

 Class counsel submitted a brief in response to Samsung’s filing regarding the side 

agreement. Class counsel argued “the side deal [was] unlikely to create any benefit for 

the class.” Id. at 199 (emphasis in original). Class counsel also repeatedly questioned the 

propriety of both the side agreement and the negotiations leading to the side agreement: 

 “The side agreement is part of a pattern of misconduct by HLLI and 

Samsung.” Id. at 200. 

 “[T]his side agreement appears to be another example of misbehavior 

by both HLLI and Samsung. The former executed an about-face on its 

view of the merits of the Settlement once it found a mechanism to get 

paid, even though class members may not receive even one dollar more 

than they would have many months ago. This is standard fare for 

HLLI.” Id. (footnote omitted (which pointed out that negotiation and 

dispute over the side agreement was delaying final approval of the 

Settlement Agreement)). 

 “Samsung, for its part, has a pattern of disregarding its representations 

and settlement commitments in this very litigation.” Id.

 “Rather than meet its obligation, Samsung worked with HLLI to craft an 

[agreement] to transfer fees from class counsel to HLLI. Under the side 

agreement, HLLI can now claim for itself any attorneys’ fees that are 

not paid to class counsel.” Id. at 201 (citation omitted). 

 “Samsung’s collaboration with HLLI—in direct violation of the 

Settlement—is not meaningfully distinguishable from conduct 

condemned previously by the District of New Jersey.” Id. 
11 

After class counsel’s response, the district court granted Mr. Morgan and 

Samsung an extension of time to place the side agreement on the record. Mr. Morgan 

walked away from negotiations. Mr. Morgan cited the threat of suit by class counsel 

against both himself and HLLI as his basis for walking away from the side 

agreement. With no side agreement in place, Mr. Morgan proceeded with his 

objections to the Settlement Agreement. 

D. Mr. Morgan’s Objections, the District Court’s Rulings, and this Appeal 

In April 2020, three months after the initial deadline set by the district court to 

place the side agreement with Samsung on the record and close to two years after 

class counsel and Samsung signed the Settlement Agreement, Mr. Morgan filed his 

objection to final approval of the Settlement Agreement. As to his argument for 

disqualifying class counsel, Mr. Morgan contended class counsel breached its duty to 

the class members by opposing the side agreement, an agreement Mr. Morgan 

asserted was certain to benefit the class without posing any risk to class member 

recovery. Mr. Morgan criticized class counsel for accusing HLLI and Samsung of 

misconduct by negotiating the side agreement. Mr. Morgan also claimed class 

counsel’s course of conduct relative to the side agreement amounted to a breach of its 

fiduciary duty to the class such that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g)(4) 

precluded class counsel from continuing in its role as lead counsel. And, Mr. Morgan 

asserted that because disqualification of class counsel was required, the district court 

must decertify the class. 
12 

The district court denied Mr. Morgan’s objections and granted final class 

certification and final approval to the Settlement Agreement. The district court found 

the following facts: (1) Mr. Morgan and Samsung never finalized the side agreement 

or presented the side agreement to the court; (2) class counsel did not threaten 

Mr. Morgan with litigation; and (3) class counsel took no position on the side 

agreement. The district court concluded nothing in class counsel’s briefing on the 

side agreement undermined the adequacy of representation, and class counsel acted 

within reason when questioning whether any potential, but indefinite, monetary 

benefit from the side agreement was outweighed by the delay to the proceedings. 

Accordingly, the district court rejected Mr. Morgan’s contention that class counsel 

had not adequately represented class interests and should be disqualified. 

Thereafter, the district court concluded compensation under the Settlement 

Agreement was fair and adequate to the class. In so holding, the district court made 

several findings of fact about the Settlement Agreement. First, the district court 

found the Settlement Agreement was negotiated at arm’s length and the parties 

“vigorously litigated” the case prior to reaching settlement terms. Id. at 243. Second, 

the district court turned to the actual compensation provided by the Settlement 

Agreement. Relying on the evidence of an expert offered by class counsel, the district 

court estimated the value of the future warranty protection offered by the Settlement 

Agreement at between $6.44 and $11.31 million.6

 And, importantly, the district court 

6

 In a footnote, Mr. Morgan suggests the district court, pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 
13 

found the enhanced minimum recall rebate option in the Settlement Agreement 

provided the average class claimant more than double the damages that could be 

established at trial, allowing for a rebate of 15.5% of the purchase price rather than 

an estimated 7%. Id. at 246 (“Class Members may also select an Enhanced Minimum 

Recall Rebate bringing their rebate payment to at least fifteen-and-a-half percent 

(15.5%) of their Washer’s estimated purchase price (exceeding the estimated seven 

percent (7%) Plaintiffs would receive given a favorable jury verdict).”). Third, while 

the district court expressed skepticism about the value of rebates offered in the 

Settlement Agreement, it concluded the rebates were not the primary form of 

compensation. 

Based on these findings, the district court granted final class certification and 

final approval to the Settlement Agreement. Two and a half weeks after granting final 

approval of the Settlement Agreement, the district court issued its ruling on the 

requested attorneys’ fees and costs. Class counsel sought $5,996,079.46 in fees and 

$242,764.47 in costs, totaling an amount about $250,000 less than the maximum 

award permitted by the Settlement Agreement. After critically analyzing the hours 

billed and the hourly rate charged for varying services, the district court held that a 

579 (1993), should have disqualified the expert. However, Mr. Morgan does not 

adequately develop his argument on this point. Accordingly, the issue of the expert’s 

qualifications and exclusion of the expert is not properly before us. See Bronson v. 

Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e routinely have declined to 

consider arguments that are . . . inadequately presented[] in an appellant’s opening 

brief.”). 
14 

base fee amount of $2,951,067.50 was reasonable and supported by the record. The 

district court next selected a lodestar multiplier of 1.3.7

 This resulted in a total 

attorneys’ fees and costs award of $3,836,387.75.8

 After calculating this amount, the 

district court crosschecked its award against the value of the Settlement Agreement to 

assess what percent of Samsung’s total liability was attributable to attorneys’ fees 

and costs to class counsel. 

On appeal, Mr. Morgan argues the district court should have disqualified class 

counsel because class counsel opposed, rather than welcomed, the side agreement—

an agreement that Mr. Morgan argues was certain to give the class more money. 

Pointing to the “kicker” and “clear-sailing” agreements, Mr. Morgan also criticizes 

class counsel for agreeing to a structure where Samsung could retain unallocated 

attorneys’ fees rather than distributing them to the class in exchange for Samsung’s 

agreement not to challenge class counsel’s fees and costs request. In Mr. Morgan’s 

view, Samsung was willing to pay a certain amount of money—compensation and 

attorneys’ fees and costs combined—to settle the litigation, but the structure of the 

fee arrangement allowed Samsung to retain some of that money. Mr. Morgan 

7

 On appeal, Mr. Morgan does not challenge the reasonableness of the billing 

hours or hourly rates for any of the services performed by class counsel. Nor does 

Mr. Morgan directly challenge the district court’s selection of a 1.3 lodestar 

multiplier. 

8

 This amount is approximately $2.7 million below the maximum permissible 

award established by the Settlement Agreement. As such, all indications suggest 

some additional money would have been disbursed to the class members had 

Mr. Morgan and Samsung finalized the side agreement and had the district court 

approved that side agreement. 
15 

contends this court should reverse the district court’s orders granting final class 

certification, granting final approval to the Settlement Agreement, and awarding class 

counsel attorneys’ fees and costs, and should further hold the district court erred by 

not disqualifying class counsel. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

We review de novo whether the district court applied the correct Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 23 standard when certifying the class.9 CGC Holding Co., LLC v. 

Broad & Cassel, 773 F.3d 1076, 1086 (10th Cir. 2014). If the district court applied 

the correct standard, “we may reverse that decision only for abuse of discretion.” Id.

at 1085 (quotation marks omitted). “The district court abuses its discretion when it 

misapplies the Rule 23 factors—either through a clearly erroneous finding of fact or 

an erroneous conclusion of law.” Id. at 1085–86. “Because class certification 

decisions are necessarily case specific, district courts possess significant latitude in 

deciding whether or not to certify a class.” Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259, 

1264 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “As long as the district court applies the 

proper Rule 23 standard, we will defer to its class certification ruling provided that 

decision falls within the bounds of rationally available choices given the facts and 

law involved in the matter at hand.” Id.

9

 Mr. Morgan does not contend the district court ignored Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 23 or applied the incorrect standard when granting final class certification. 
16 

“The district court’s approval of a class action settlement is reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion.” New England Health Care Emps. Pension Fund v. Woodruff, 

512 F.3d 1283, 1290 (10th Cir. 2008). “In reviewing a court’s determination for 

abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the determination absent a distinct showing it 

was based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or an erroneous conclusion of law or 

manifests a clear error of judgment.” Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 314 

F.3d 1180, 1187 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted). However, even where a 

district court makes a clearly erroneous factual finding, we may affirm if the error is 

harmless. 28 U.S.C. § 2111; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. 

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 Standard in Class Actions 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) governs the approval of settlement 

agreements in class actions. Under the Rule, a district court, before approving a 

settlement agreement, must find that the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and 

adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). In making this determination, a district court 

must consider whether: 

(A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately

represented the class; 

(B) the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length; 

(C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account: 

(i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal; 

(ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing 

relief to the class, including the method of processing classmember claims; 

(iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees, including 

timing of payment; and 

(iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); 

and 

(D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other. 
17 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(A)–(D) (emphasis added). This court has further noted four 

factors for evaluation by a district court: 

(1) whether the proposed settlement was fairly and honestly negotiated; 

(2) whether serious questions of law and fact exist, placing the ultimate 

outcome of the litigation in doubt; 

(3) whether the value of an immediate recovery outweighs the mere 

possibility of future relief after protracted and expensive litigation; and 

(4) the judgment of the parties that the settlement is fair and reasonable. 

In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Pracs. Litig., 872 F.3d 1094, 1116–17 (10th Cir. 

2017) (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). 

 Meanwhile, Rule 23(g) governs the appointment and maintenance of class 

counsel. Under the Rule, “a court that certifies a class must appoint class counsel.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1). Based on the Rule’s plain language, “a district court’s 

decision to certify a class must precede the appointment of class counsel.” Sheinberg 

v. Sorensen, 606 F.3d 130, 132 (3d Cir. 2010). A district court may only appoint an 

attorney to represent the class if the attorney “is adequate under Rule 23(g)(1) and 

(4).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(2). And under Rule 23(g)(4), class counsel has a duty to 

“fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(4). 

 The duty placed on class counsel by Rule 23(g)(4) continues through entry of 

final judgment. Jin v. Shanghai Original, Inc., 990 F.3d 251, 261–62 (2d Cir. 2021). 

“A district court is required to monitor class proceedings and ‘reassess its class 

rulings as the case develops.’” Id. at 261 (quoting Boucher v. Syracuse Univ., 164 

F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 1999)). Where class counsel does not persist in satisfying its 

duty under Rule 23(g)(4), a district court may decertify the class if doing so would 
18 

protect the class; but, the court may also consider other measures, such as 

disciplinary action against class counsel, to address class counsel’s breach of the 

Rule 23(g)(4) duty. Id. at 262–63; Sheinberg, 606 F.3d 134. 

C. Review of Settlements with “Kicker” and “Clear-Sailing” Agreements 

1. Legal Standard 

This case presents an issue of first impression regarding the degree of scrutiny 

a district court must apply to a settlement agreement in a class action where the terms 

governing the award of attorneys’ fees and costs contain a “kicker” and a “clearsailing” agreement. From out-of-circuit authority and the arguments presented by the 

parties, we identify four possible standards for reviewing settlement agreements 

containing both a “kicker” and a “clear-sailing” agreement: (1) a per se prohibition 

against such settlement agreements; (2) a presumption against the fairness and 

reasonableness of such settlement agreements; (3) a requirement that the district 

court apply increased or heightened scrutiny before granting final approval to such 

settlement agreements; and (4) the normal standard governing the approval of 

settlement agreements in class action litigation. We conclude the third approach—

heightened scrutiny—is appropriate because while “kicker” and “clear-sailing” 

agreements may serve a purpose in the negotiation process, the presence of both 

agreements in a settlement agreement also suggests the class members may not be 

receiving all reasonable benefits. 

A true “kicker” agreement allows “all fees not awarded [to class counsel to] 

revert to defendants rather than be added to the cy pres fund or otherwise benefit the 
19 

class.”10 In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 

2011). A “clear sailing” agreement is one where the defendant “agree[s] not to object 

to an award of attorneys’ fees” specified in a settlement agreement. Id. 

To our knowledge, no court has adopted a per se rule against inclusion of 

“kicker” and “clear-sailing” agreements in settlements. See In re Sw. Airlines 

Voucher Litig., 799 F.3d 701, 712 (7th Cir. 2015) (declining to adopt a per se rule 

and noting the Ninth Circuit has also declined to do so). This court has affirmed a 

district court’s final approval of a settlement agreement containing a “kicker” 

provision.11 Fager v. CenturyLink Comm’s, LLC, 854 F.3d 1167, 1176–77 (10th Cir. 

2016). And there is good reason for not automatically rejecting settlements with 

10 Technically speaking, the Settlement Agreement did not contain a true 

“kicker” provision because Samsung never relinquished the $6.55 million in potential 

attorneys’ fees and costs. However, the effect of the structure of the attorneys’ fees 

and costs provisions in the Settlement Agreement is the same because, after entry of 

final judgment, Samsung will permanently retain the difference between the 

permissible maximum award of $6.55 million and the actual award of just over $3.8 

million. 

11 The “kicker” provision in Fager v. CenturyLink Communications, LLC

differs from the “kicker” agreement in the Settlement Agreement as the provision in 

Fager allowed the defendant to receive a reversion of unclaimed monies from the 

class compensation fund. 854 F.3d 1167, 1176 (10th Cir. 2016). However, where the 

settlement in Fager also permitted class counsel to receive a “fixed fee independent 

of the amount recovered by the class,” see id., the general concept of a defendant 

receiving a reversion in exchange for class counsel receiving favorable terms 

regarding attorneys’ fees was also at issue in Fager. Thus, although the “kicker” 

provisions in Fager and the Settlement Agreement here are not identical, we believe 

Fager is instructive with regard to addressing the “kicker” provision in the 

Settlement Agreement and what impact the inclusion of a “kicker” agreement and an 

agreement on attorneys’ fees favorable to class counsel has on the district court’s 

duty to scrutinize a settlement agreement and the award of attorneys’ fees and costs. 
20 

“kicker” agreements. “Kicker” agreements can valuably further negotiations by 

allowing defendants to establish their maximum liability with the expectation that 

their actual liability will ultimately be less once the district court scrutinizes class 

counsel’s fees and costs request. In settlements providing fair and reasonable 

compensation to the class members, “kicker” agreements, as opposed to the 

automatic distribution of unawarded attorneys’ fees and costs to class members, can 

avoid situations where participating class members receive a windfall, well above 

their actual damages, at the expense of the defendant. Further, reversions to 

defendants are not inherently improper. Had class counsel and Samsung not reached 

an agreement regarding who would receive the difference between the maximum 

permissible attorneys’ fees and costs and the actual award, the district court could 

have nonetheless permitted Samsung to retain the difference. See Van Gemert v. 

Boeing Co., 739 F.2d 730, 736–37 (2d Cir. 1984) (affirming decision by special 

master to return unclaimed judgment funds to a defendant). Thus, if a district court 

can order a reversion to a defendant, we see no reason why we should adopt a rule 

strictly precluding parties from providing for the same result as part of a settlement. 

 As for “clear-sailing” agreements, “not every ‘clear[-]sailing’ provision 

demonstrates collusion.” Gooch v. Life Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 672 F.3d 402, 426 (6th 

Cir. 2012). This court has affirmed a district court’s approval of a settlement 

agreement containing a “clear-sailing” agreement without advancing any commentary 

critical of the provision. See In re Motor Fuel, 872 F.3d at 1119–20. And we are not 

alone. Other circuits have not only affirmed final approval of settlements containing 
21 

“clear-sailing” provisions but have affirmed final approval of settlements containing 

both a “kicker” provision and a “clear-sailing” provision. Campbell v. Facebook, 

Inc., 951 F.3d 1106, 1125–28 (9th Cir. 2020); Gascho v. Global Fitness Holdings, 

LLC, 822 F.3d 269, 290–91 (6th Cir. 2016). Further, it has long been recognized that 

“kicker” and “clear-sailing” agreements can play an important role in class action 

settlement negotiations “because the defendants want to know their total maximum 

exposure and the plaintiffs do not want to be sandbagged.” Malchman v. Davis, 761 

F.2d 893, 905 n.5 (2d Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds by Amchem Prods., 

Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619, 629 (1997). With these considerations in mind, 

we reject Mr. Morgan’s suggestion that this court adopt a per se rule prohibiting 

parties from including “kicker” and “clear-sailing” agreements in class action 

settlement agreements.12

However, the inclusion of both a “kicker” agreement and a “clear-sailing” 

agreement can be an “indic[ation] of possible implicit collusion.” In re Bluetooth 

Headset, 654 F.3d at 947. We have previously expressed concerns about attorneys’ 

fees and costs awards in cases where the settlement agreement contained a “kicker” 

provision. In Fager we suggested that where a settlement agreement contains a 

12 For similar reasons, we also reject an approach placing a presumption of 

unreasonableness on settlement agreements containing a “kicker” and a “clearsailing” agreement. Individual class actions, by nature, are unique and the terms of 

settlement agreements vary significantly between actions such that we cannot 

presume the presence of a “kicker” and a “clear-sailing” agreement in a settlement 

suggests unfairness to the interests of the class in all cases. 
22 

“kicker” provision, use of only the traditional lodestar method to calculate the fees 

award may not adequately scrutinize the requested award, and therefore a district 

court should crosscheck its award against the amount paid by the defendants to the 

class members.13 Fager, 854 F.3d at 1177. Further, we have expressed wariness about 

the potential for class counsel and defendants to reach an agreement that prioritizes 

the award of attorneys’ fees and costs at the expense of class compensation and the 

interests of class members: 

“The defendant cares only about the size of the settlement, not how it is 

divided between the attorneys’ fees and compensation for the class. 

From the selfish standpoint of class counsel and the defendant, 

therefore, the optimal settlement is one modest in overall amount but 

heavily tilted toward attorneys’ fees.” Thus, class counsel may be 

tempted “to sell out the class by agreeing with the defendant to 

recommend that the judge approve a settlement involving a meager 

recovery for the class but generous compensation for the lawyers.” 

In re Motor Fuel, 872 F.3d at 1117 (quoting Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 

720 (7th Cir. 2014)). As for “clear-sailing” provisions, they cut against the general 

adversarial nature of our legal system, potentially leaving it to the district court to 

first develop arguments against the requested fees and costs and then to rule on those 

very arguments. See In re Bluetooth Headset, 654 F.3d at 949 (collecting authorities 

raising this concern and stating “[a]lthough clear sailing provisions are not 

13 The objector in Fager did not properly preserve objections to the fees 

structure of the agreement. 854 F.3d at 1177. Thus, although we discussed concerns 

regarding the fees structure in that agreement, we did not adopt a position regarding 

how district court’s should adjust their analysis where a settlement agreement 

contains a “kicker” agreement. See id. 
23 

prohibited, they ‘by their nature deprive the court of the advantages of the adversary 

process’ in resolving fee determinations and are therefore disfavored” (brackets 

omitted) (quoting Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 525 (1st Cir. 

1991)). 

To address these concerns, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that where a 

settlement agreement contains a “kicker” and a “clear-sailing” agreement, “the 

district court ha[s] a special ‘obligation to assure itself that the fees awarded in the 

agreement were not unreasonably high’ for[,] if they were, ‘the likelihood is that the 

defendant obtained an economically beneficial concession with regard to the merits 

provisions, in the form of lower monetary payments to class members or less 

injunctive relief for the class than could otherwise have been obtained.’”14 Id. at 947 

(quoting Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2003)). The Seventh 

Circuit has arguably gone a step further and concluded the inclusion of “kicker” and 

“clear-sailing” provisions in a settlement “weigh[s] substantially against the fairness 

of a settlement and call[s] for ‘intense critical scrutiny by the district court.’” In re 

Sw. Airlines Voucher Litig., 799 F.3d at 712 (quoting Redman v. RadioShack Corp., 

768 F.3d 622, 637 (7th Cir. 2014)). 

We hold a heightened scrutiny approach draws the proper balance. Faced with 

a settlement containing a “kicker” agreement and a “clear-sailing” agreement, a 

14 In re Bluetooth Headset also involved a situation where class counsel 

received an award disproportionate to the amount of class compensation. 654 F.3d 

935, 947 (9th Cir. 2011).
24 

district court must carefully consider whether the settlement was negotiated at armslength. As part of this evaluation, the district court shall take special care to assure 

the class members receive fair and reasonable compensation based on record 

evidence of their actual damages and the likelihood of success at trial. A court should 

also consider the fees and costs award provided for by the settlement in comparison 

to the value of the settlement to the class. In re Bluetooth Headset, 654 F.3d at 947–

48. And a district court may consider the structure of the negotiation process, 

including whether the parties negotiated attorneys’ fees and costs while negotiating 

class compensation or whether negotiations on fees and costs were reserved until 

after the parties reached an agreement on class compensation. In considering the 

structure of negotiations, a district court should seek independent verification of any 

claims by the parties that attorneys’ fees and costs were negotiated subsequent to and 

apart from class compensation. See id. at 948. Additionally, a court may consider 

whether the parties relied upon a neutral mediator to aid settlement negotiations, a 

consideration that “weigh[s] in favor of a finding of non-collusiveness [but] is not on 

its own dispositive.” Id. Finally, the district court shall consider the litigation and 

settlement agreement as a whole, searching for other indicia of self-dealing by class 

counsel through negotiations with the defendant.15

15 The considerations identified in this paragraph are by no means an 

exhaustive list of factors for a district court to evaluate before approving a settlement 

agreement containing both a “kicker” and a “clear-sailing” agreement. Each class 

action is unique and the district court, being keenly familiar with the case, must 

exercise its discretion to identify and consider relevant factors when determining 
25 

2. Application 

Having set forth the standard for evaluating settlement agreements containing 

both a “kicker” and a “clear-sailing” agreement, we now review the scrutiny actually 

applied by the district court in this case. We hold the district court applied sufficient 

scrutiny and did not abuse its discretion by granting final approval of the Settlement 

Agreement. 

The district court acknowledged the attorneys’ fees and costs structure created 

by the Settlement Agreement. The district court took care to rely on expert evidence 

to determine the value of certain aspects of the settlement.16 And the district court 

found that the average class claimant received compensation in excess of damages 

provable at trial, receiving rebates worth 15.5% of the estimated price of a washing 

machine rather than approximately 7%. This conclusion, which Mr. Morgan has not 

disputed with any evidence, is critical to affirming the district court’s grant of final 

approval of the Settlement Agreement. Simply put, where class members were 

receiving compensation equivalent to or in excess of actual damages, it cannot be 

said that class counsel and defendants negotiated terms that favored attorneys’ fees 

and costs at the expense of adequate and reasonable compensation for the class. 

whether a given settlement agreement was negotiated at arms-length with class 

counsel ardently representing the interests of the class members. 

16 Although Mr. Morgan disagrees with the valuation reached by the expert 

advanced by class counsel, he does not point us to any evidence he presented to 

counter the expert’s opinion and establish a competing, lesser valuation for the 

Settlement Agreement. 
26 

Rather, additional compensation to the class members would have provided a 

windfall. Thus, while the inclusion of a “kicker” and a “clear-sailing” agreement in 

the fees and costs structure might serve as an indication of improper self-dealing, the 

structure of the negotiations and the actual compensatory terms of this Settlement 

Agreement counteract the proposition that the Agreement was the product of selfdealing by class counsel through negotiations with Samsung. And this conclusion is 

confirmed by Mr. Ungar’s declaration discussing the nature, tenor, and structure of 

the settlement negotiations. 

In summation, the record supports the conclusion that class counsel fought 

hard for the interests of the class members and obtained more than equitable 

compensation for the class. Accordingly, the district court, in this complex 

multidistrict litigation, applied sufficient scrutiny and acted well within its discretion 

to grant final approval of the Settlement Agreement. 

D. Mr. Morgan’s Request to Disqualify Class Counsel & Decertify the Class 

We next hold the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting 

Mr. Morgan’s request to disqualify class counsel and decertify the class. Our analysis 

of this issue revolves around two provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 

Rule 23(g)(4) imposes a duty on class counsel to “fairly and adequately represent the 

interests of the class.” Relatedly, before granting final approval to a settlement, a 

district court must assure itself that “class counsel ha[s] adequately represented the 

class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(A). Our previous analysis of the benefits provided to 

the class members by the Settlement Agreement favors the conclusion that the district 
27 

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Morgan’s request to disqualify class 

counsel and decertify the class. 

Mr. Morgan, however, argues class counsel also breached its fiduciary duty to 

the class by opposing the side agreement that would have permitted the class 

members to receive additional compensation. We start our analysis of this argument 

by considering three factual findings by the district court that Mr. Morgan contends 

are clearly erroneous. Concluding one of the three findings was clearly erroneous, we 

then consider whether this factual error requires vacatur and remand or if it was 

harmless to the district court’s ultimate rejection of Mr. Morgan’s request to 

disqualify class counsel and decertify the class. 

First, Mr. Morgan disputes the district court’s finding that he and Samsung had 

not finalized the side agreement and that the agreement “may (or may not) have come 

to fruition.” Morgan App. at 229. Mr. Morgan contends he and Samsung reached 

final terms on the side agreement and the deal was essentially done. The record does 

not support Mr. Morgan’s position. Although the district court provided Mr. Morgan 

two opportunities to place the side agreement on the record, Mr. Morgan never 

complied with the district court’s orders. In fact, Mr. Morgan left it to Samsung to 

disclose the general terms of the side agreement by the first deadline, of 

December 31, 2019.17 Accordingly, the district court was well within its right to 

17 Samsung’s filing does note that it “conferred” with Mr. Morgan before 

submitting its response to the district court’s order. Morgan App. at 192. 
28 

express skepticism about whether the side agreement would come to fruition, and it 

did not clearly err by finding that Mr. Morgan and Samsung had not finalized a side 

agreement. 

Second, Mr. Morgan contests the district court’s finding that “Class Counsel 

never threatened to sue Objector Morgan.” See id. Once again, we find no clear error 

in this factual finding. While class counsel alleged Mr. Morgan had engaged in 

“misconduct,” id. at 200, such an allegation is far from a threat to sue. And an e-mail 

from class counsel to Mr. Morgan indicated that class counsel had never threatened 

to sue Mr. Morgan or HLLI. While Mr. Morgan believes he was entitled to a more 

definitive and affirmative promise not to sue from class counsel, he points to nothing 

in the record contradicting class counsel’s statement that it had never threatened to 

sue Mr. Morgan or HLLI. Simply put, class counsel expressing concerns about the 

side agreement does not equate to threatening to sue Mr. Morgan and HLLI. 

This takes us to Mr. Morgan’s third challenge to the district court’s factual 

findings: that “Class Counsel took no position as to the side agreement.” Id. at 230. 

Here, we find clear error. As outlined supra at 10, class counsel rather obviously 

opposed the side agreement, describing the negotiations between HLLI and Samsung 

as “misconduct” and “misbehavior” and arguing the side agreement was unlikely to 

provide class members any benefit. Id. at 200. 

We hold, however, that this error was harmless. By virtue of Mr. Morgan not 

complying with the district court’s orders to place the side agreement on the record, 

class counsel had reason to be skeptical of whether the side agreement would actually 
29 

come to fruition or if it would otherwise delay, or further delay, final approval of the 

Settlement Agreement and distribution of settlement proceeds to the class members. 

Furthermore, where the side agreement allowed HLLI to seek attorneys’ fees and 

costs and Mr. Morgan’s niece served as president of HLLI, it was not unreasonable 

for class counsel to question Mr. Morgan’s motivations both in objecting and in 

offering to drop his objections if the side agreement came to fruition. Thus, although 

the district court erred by finding that class counsel did not oppose the side 

agreement, there were reasonable bases, in line with the interests of the class 

members, for class counsel to oppose further negotiations on the side agreement.18

And the district court recognized that class counsel had reason for concern regarding 

the side agreement delaying the proceedings. 

Ultimately, we disagree with Mr. Morgan’s contention that class counsel 

breached its fiduciary duty to the class by way of its briefing in opposition to the side 

agreement. And where the Settlement Agreement provided class members fair, 

reasonable, and adequate compensation, we see no indication class counsel otherwise 

breached its fiduciary duty to the class. Therefore, we conclude the district court did 

18 Given that nineteen months elapsed between class counsel and Samsung 

signing the Settlement Agreement and the initial December 31, 2019, deadline set by 

the district court for Mr. Morgan and Samsung to place any side agreement on the 

record, Mr. Morgan and Samsung had more than adequate time to negotiate and 

finalize any side agreement. 
30 

not abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Morgan’s request to disqualify class 

counsel.19

E. District Court’s Award of Fees and Costs 

Mr. Morgan contests the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees and costs 

based, once again, on the presence of the “kicker” and “clear-sailing” agreements in 

the Settlement Agreement. We hold the presence of “kicker” and “clear-sailing” 

agreements in a settlement do place a heightened duty on the district court relative to 

any award of attorneys’ fees and costs. And we adopt the suggestion from Fager that 

before awarding fees and costs, a district court must make findings as to the 

defendant’s total liability to the class under the settlement—i.e., the value of the 

settlement—and the estimated financial impact on the defendant based on the terms 

of the settlement and in light of then-prevailing information on the class participation 

rate. See Fager, 854 F.3d at 1176–77 (recognizing merit to measuring attorneys’ fees 

against “the amount actually paid to the class”). A district court, after carefully 

reviewing billing records and performing the traditional lodestar analysis, should 

crosscheck the fees and costs award against both the value of the settlement and the 

estimated actual cost to the defendant. Finally, where a settlement agreement 

contains a “clear-sailing” agreement, any doubts regarding hourly rates and billed 

19 Because Mr. Morgan’s arguments for not granting final class certification 

and decertifying the class hinged on disqualifying class counsel, we likewise 

conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Mr. Morgan’s 

positions on these two related issues. 
31 

hours shall be resolved against class counsel. In this sense, where class counsel 

bargains for a defendant’s agreement not to challenge a request for fees and costs, 

class counsel assumes a heightened burden for establishing the propriety of the 

records supporting its fees and costs award. 

Although the Tenth Circuit had not yet adopted this framework, the district 

court complied with it. The district court was well aware of the value of the 

settlement, the class participation rate, and the resulting actual financial impact on 

Samsung.20 The district court also scrutinized the billing records offered by class 

counsel, carefully explaining its rationale for accepting the submissions. And, after 

performing its lodestar analysis, the district court crosschecked its award against the 

value of the Settlement Agreement and the actual cost of the Settlement Agreement 

to Samsung—i.e., relief to class claimants and the value of the warranties provided 

under the Agreement. 

Notably, this process employed by the district court resulted in an award to 

class counsel well below both the maximum permissible award of $6.55 million and 

the award of about $6.25 million sought by class counsel. The final award amounted 

20 In determining the actual financial impact of the Settlement Agreement on 

Samsung, we consider both the payments Samsung made to class claimants and the 

value of the warranties provided to class members by the Settlement Agreement. 

Although the warranties may not have ultimately required payments from Samsung, 

warranties, like insurance, carry with them actuary value and provide consumers 

peace of mind. Had Samsung sold the washing machines with the now extended 

warranty provided as a result of the Settlement Agreement, the list price for the 

machines likely would have been higher. Thus, while the warranties do not presently 

require Samsung to pay any monies, they are akin to a lost profit. 
32 

to slightly more than half of the minimum value of the Settlement Agreement and 

approximately one-third of Samsung’s total minimum liability for compensation, 

service awards, costs, and attorneys’ fees under the Agreement. Working off the 

maximum estimated valuation of the settlement of $11.42 million, the awarded 

attorneys’ fees and costs amount to about one-third of the maximum settlement 

valuation and about one-quarter of Samsung’s total maximum liability for 

compensation, service awards, costs, and attorneys’ fees. For purposes of 

crosschecking a lodestar figure against the value of a settlement, these percentages 

are well within the range of reasonable and permissible fees and costs awards in class 

action litigation. See Camden I Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768, 

774–75 (11th Cir. 1991) (“The majority of common fund fee awards fall between 

20% and 30% of the fund. . . . To avoid depleting the funds available for distribution 

to the class, an upper limit of 50% of the fund may be stated as a general rule, 

although even larger percentages have been awarded.”); see also In re Motor Fuel, 

872 F.3d at 1119–20 (finding no abuse of discretion where district court approved 

settlement agreement permitting for attorneys’ fees and costs in excess of half the 

money paid by defendant). Accordingly, Mr. Morgan has provided us no grounds for 

disturbing the district court’s calculated judgment in awarding class counsel just over 

$3.8 million in fees and costs. 

III. CONCLUSION 

We hold that where a settlement agreement in a class action contains a 

“kicker” agreement and a “clear-sailing” agreement, the district court must apply 
33 

heightened scrutiny before granting final approval of the settlement agreement and 

when determining the attorneys’ fees and costs award. Here, the district court did just 

that. And while the district court did make one clear error in its factual findings, the 

error was harmless. Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court’s orders granting final 

class certification, granting final approval to the Settlement Agreement, and awarding 

class counsel attorneys’ fees and costs.