NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

:

JEROME WHITE, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-722 (MLC)

:

Plaintiff, : O P I N I O N

:

v. :

:

FREEHOLD BOROUGH, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

 :

THE COURT ordering the plaintiff to show cause why the

action should not be stayed and administratively terminated (dkt.

entry no. 4, Order To Show Cause); and the plaintiff bringing

this action, inter alia, to recover damages under 42 U.S.C. §

(“Section”) 1983 related to his arrest (“Arrest”) by defendants

who are police officers (“Federal Claims”) (dkt. entry no. 1,

Compl.); and the plaintiff alleging that he was arrested in the

defendant Freehold Borough based on warrants issued by a court in

Trenton, New Jersey (“Trenton Warrants”) (id. at 3); and

THE COURT being concerned that (1) criminal charges related

to the Trenton Warrants (“Trenton Charges”) remain pending, or

(2) criminal charges were brought and remain pending against the

plaintiff due to the circumstances underlying the Arrest

(“Freehold Charges”); and it appearing — pursuant to Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) — that (1) the Court must determine

whether a Section 1983 claim, “if successful, would have the

hypothetical effect of rendering [a] criminal conviction or

Case 3:11-cv-00722-MLC-TJB Document 6 Filed 05/12/11 Page 1 of 3 PageID: 43
sentence invalid”, and (2) if a judgment for a plaintiff on such

a claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction,

then the claim is barred until the conviction is overturned,

Gibson v. Superint. of N.J. Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, 411 F.3d

427, 451-52 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations and quotations omitted); and

THE COURT thus being concerned that if the plaintiff were

successful on the Federal Claims, then an eventual underlying

state criminal conviction could be rendered invalid; and it

appearing that when a plaintiff brings a Section 1983 claim

before [being] convicted (or files any other claim

related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending

or anticipated criminal trial), it is within the power

of the district court, and in accord with common

practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal

case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007); and

THE COURT thus ordering the plaintiff to (1) clarify whether

there were any Freehold Charges issued against him, (2) clarify

whether the Trenton Charges or Freehold Charges are pending,

including any aspect thereof that is the subject of either an

appeal or a review by any municipal or state court at any level,

and (3) show cause why the action should not be stayed and

administratively terminated pending the complete disposition of

the Trenton Charges or the Freehold Charges; and the plaintiff in

response opposing a stay and advising that there are no Freehold

Charges, but admitting that one of the Trenton Charges remains

pending (dkt. entry no. 5, Pl. Br. at 1); and the Court thus

2

Case 3:11-cv-00722-MLC-TJB Document 6 Filed 05/12/11 Page 2 of 3 PageID: 44
intending to (1) grant the Order To Show Cause, and (2) stay and

administratively terminate this action pending the disposition of

the remaining charge from the Trenton Charges, including any

aspect thereof that is the subject of either an appeal or a

review by any municipal or state court at any level; and the

Court advising the plaintiff to refrain from moving to reopen the

action until the remaining charge from the Trenton Charges is

fully resolved, and that he should submit the proper documentation

in support of that potential motion, e.g., a final order disposing

of the proceedings; and

THE PLAINTIFF BEING ADVISED that an order administratively

terminating a federal action is not the equivalent of a dismissal

of a complaint with prejudice, and is issued pursuant to the

Court’s inherent power to control the docket and in the interests

of judicial economy, see Delgrosso v. Spang & Co., 903 F.2d 234,

236 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating administrative termination not final

determination, as it “permits reinstatement and contemplates the

possibility of future proceedings”, and “does not purport to end

litigation on the merits”); and for good cause appearing, the

Court will issue an appropriate order and judgment.

 s/ Mary L. Cooper 

MARY L. COOPER

United States District Judge

Dated: May 12, 2011

3

Case 3:11-cv-00722-MLC-TJB Document 6 Filed 05/12/11 Page 3 of 3 PageID: 45