[Cite as State v. Bement, 2013-Ohio-5437.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 99914 

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs. 

WILLIAM BEMENT

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-571792 

BEFORE: Boyle, P.J., E.A. Gallagher, J., and Kilbane, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 12, 2013
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 

Kenneth J. Lewis 

Kenneth J. Lewis Co., L.P.A. 

1220 West 6th Street 

Suite 502 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Daniel T. Van 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

8th Floor, Justice Center 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

 

MARY J. BOYLE, P.J.: 
{¶1} This case came to be heard upon the accelerated calendar pursuant to 

App.R. 11.1 and Loc.R. 11.1. 

{¶2} Defendant-appellant, William Bement, appeals his sentence, raising a single 

assignment of error: 

Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in sentencing the 

appellant too harshly. 

{¶3} Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm. 

Procedural History and Facts

{¶4} On February 5, 2013, Bement was sentenced in Rocky River Municipal 

Court and placed on probation for his conviction of operating a motor vehicle under the 

influence. Following the sentencing hearing, Bement returned home, began drinking, 

and posted the following threats on his Facebook page for his “friends” to read: “People 

need to stop shooting up schools and start shooting cops in courthouses”; “I’m on board. 

Load up.” Bement further threatened: “Fuck Rocky River Court. Kill your local 

judges.” 

{¶5} After one of Bement’s Facebook friends notified the police, Bement was 

subsequently indicted on two counts of retaliation, violations of R.C. 2921.05(A), felonies 

of the third degree. Bement reached a plea agreement with the state wherein he pleaded 

guilty to an amended count of attempted retaliation, a felony of the fourth degree, and the 

remaining charge was dismissed. The trial court accepted the plea and then referred the 

case for a presentence investigation report. 
{¶6} At sentencing, the trial court confirmed that Bement’s counsel and the 

prosecutor had an opportunity to review the presentence report. Bement’s counsel 

indicated that he had “no issues with the contents.” The trial judge then heard from 

Bement, who expressed remorse for his actions. Bement’s counsel further addressed the 

court, urging the court to allow Bement to return home to his family and his job given that 

he had already served 70 days in jail and learned a valuable lesson. Bement’s counsel 

further emphasized that Bement’s offense involved “words” only and not acts of violence, 

nor was he “planning on carrying anything out.” 

{¶7} The trial judge questioned Bement’s reasoning for his threats on Facebook 

when the trial judge only gave him probation. He responded that “[i]t was just the way I 

was being spoke to. It was just there was a lot of things building up. It’s not even just 

to do with the courts in general. It’s just a lot of things were getting to me.” The trial 

judge asked for clarification as to Bement’s reference to “the way they spoke to you.” 

He responded: 

She was like — you know, like normally you would be given the option of 

like a three-day hotel stay. She told me she wanted to see me in jail and 

she didn’t want to give me that option. And then they were trying to throw 

on restitution that I already had taken care of, which was like $4,000 and 

that’s why my attorney had gone back in the courtroom. 

{¶8} The trial judge further asked Bement the meaning of his threat, “I’m on 

board. Load up.” Bement indicated that “[i]t was just a figure of speech. It meant 

nothing. It was almost like song lyrics.” He further indicated that he did not want to 
shoot the cops in the courthouse and that he said that just “to be rash” — “just doing it for 

shock factor.” 

{¶9} The court also heard from the prosecutor, who discussed the effect that 

Bement’s actions have had on the Rocky River Municipal Court judge that sentenced 

him, including that the judge “has told her husband and children that they need to be more 

vigilant as a result of the defendant’s threat that day.” The prosecutor further read a 

statement from the municipal court judge, wherein she expressed her opinion that Bement 

deserves “some jail time.” After acknowledging that “the defendant cannot be kept in 

jail forever,” the judge expressed her interest in Bement “being on a very, very long and 

very, very strict probation.” 

{¶10} The trial court ultimately imposed a prison term of 17 months. The court 

further informed Bement that he was subject to three years of postrelease control with the 

following conditions: (1) no alcohol and drugs, (2) mental health counselling, (3) anger 

management, and (4) no contact with the victim, the victim’s place of employment, and 

the victim’s family. 

{¶11} From this order, Bement now appeals. 

Excessive Sentence

{¶12} In his sole assignment of error, Bement argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion in failing to follow the statutory mandates of R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, 

thereby imposing a sentence that was “too harsh.” We find his argument to lack merit. 
{¶13} We do not review felony sentences under an abuse-of-discretion standard. 

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Rather, we may 

increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence * * * or may vacate the 

sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing” if 

we determine that “the record clearly and convincingly * * * does not 

support the sentencing court’s findings under [various provisions]; [or] 

[t]hat the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

Id. 

{¶14} Contrary to Bement’s assertion, the trial court was not required to make any 

findings on the record in imposing a “near maximum” sentence. Indeed, there are no 

longer any specific findings or reasons a court must give in order to impose maximum 

sentences. State v. Calliens, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97034, 2012-Ohio-703, ¶ 28; State 

v. Rose, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-11-214, 2012-Ohio-5607, ¶ 82. Thus, we must 

determine if Bement’s sentence was otherwise contrary to law. 

{¶15} The court’s only guide in this case was the purposes and principles of felony 

sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the serious and recidivism factors set forth in 

R.C. 2929.12. R.C. 2929.11(A) provides that 

The overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public from 

future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender using the 

minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes 

without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government 

resources. 
{¶16} Under R.C. 2929.12(A), trial courts must consider a nonexhaustive list of 

factors, including the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct, the likelihood of recidivism, 

and “any other factors that are relevant to achieving those purposes and principles of 

sentencing.” 

{¶17} There is still no “mandate,” however, for the sentencing court to engage in 

any factual findings under R.C. 2929.11 or 2929.12. State v. Jones, 12th Dist. Butler No. 

CA2012-03-049, 2013-Ohio-150, ¶ 49, citing Rose, 12th Dist. Butler No. 

CA2011-11-214, 2012-Ohio-5607, ¶ 78; State v. Putnam, 11th Dist. Lake No. 

2012-L-026, 2012-Ohio-4891, ¶ 9. Instead, the “trial court still has the discretion to 

determine whether the sentence satisfies the overriding purpose of Ohio’s sentencing 

structure.” Jones at ¶ 49. Furthermore, “[w]e can presume from a silent record that the 

trial court considered the appropriate factors unless the defendant affirmatively shows 

that the court has failed to do so.” State v. Bohannon, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-130014, 

2013-Ohio-5101, ¶ 7; State v. Parsons, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-10-27, 2011-Ohio-168, ¶ 

15. 

{¶18} Based on the record before us, we find that Bement’s sentence is not clearly 

and convincingly contrary to law. Here, the trial court imposed a sentence within the 

sentencing range. Bement fails to overcome the presumption that the trial court 

considered the appropriate factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 in imposing a prison 

term. Indeed, the trial court ordered a presentence investigation report prior to 

sentencing, which indicated that Bement had been convicted of several felonies, including 
breaking and entering and drug possession offenses. The trial court further considered 

the impact of Bement’s actions on the victim and the victim’s family. And while Bement 

characterizes his stated “remorse” and inability to own a gun as strong mitigating factors 

favoring a lesser sentence, the trial court has the discretion to disagree and determine a 

sentence that satisfies the overriding purpose of Ohio’s sentencing structure. State v. 

Jackson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99059, 2013-Ohio-3136, ¶ 26 (rejecting defendant’s 

argument that the trial court ignored mitigating evidence and imposed a sentence that is 

“too harsh”). 

{¶19} As for Bement’s claim that his sentence is not proportionate with sentences 

imposed for similarly situated offenders, Bement did not raise the issue of proportionality 

at the sentencing hearing. Nor did he present evidence as to what a “proportionate 

sentence” might be. Thus, he has not preserved the issue for appeal. State v. Burt, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99097, 2013-Ohio-3525, ¶ 39. 

{¶20} Bement’s sole assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶21} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having 

been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court 

for execution of sentence. 
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

 

MARY J. BOYLE, PRESIDING JUDGE 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., and 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR