UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

 

 :

JEREMY RAMOS, : 

:

Plaintiff, : Civil Action No. 

: 11-cv-259 (NLH)(KMW)

 v. :

: OPINION

COMMISSIONER GEORGE W. :

HAYMAN, et. al., : 

:

Defendants. :

 :

APPEARANCES:

Jeremy Ramos

608379-C/539143

South Woods State Prison

215 Burlington Road South

Bridgeton, N.J. 08302

Pro Se

Daniel Michael Vannella, Esq.

New Jersey Division of Law

Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex

25 Market Street

P.O. Box 112

Trenton, N.J. 08625

Attorney for Defendants George W. Hayman and Karen Balicki

HILLMAN, District Judge

Plaintiff, Jeremy Ramos, an inmate incarcerated within the

New Jersey Department of Corrections (“NJDOC”), has brought suit

against George W. Hayman, the former NJDOC commissioner, and

Karen Balicki, an administrator at the South Woods State Prison

(collectively, “Defendants”), alleging, inter alia, violations of

his federal constitutional rights, as well as state law claims. 

Defendants move for summary judgment and to dismiss Plaintiff’s

claims.

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For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment will be granted on Plaintiff’s federal claims. 

Additionally, the Court, sua sponte, will decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law

claims.

I. JURISDICTION

Plaintiff brought this matter before the Superior Court of

New Jersey. Defendants removed this action to the United States

District Court for the District of New Jersey. The Court has

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal claims under 28 U.S.C. §

1331, and may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any related

state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a prisoner who had been incarcerated within the

NJDOC’s Central Reception and Assignment Facility (“CRAF”) from

December 15, 2009 until February 4, 2010. Plaintiff was

subsequently moved to another NJDOC facility, the South Woods

State Prison (“SWSP”) in Bridgeton, New Jersey. 

Plaintiff alleges that George W. Hayman, as NJDOC

commissioner, generated and mishandled a “Security Threat Group

Member (GANG AFFILIATE)” list that caused Plaintiff to be

perceived as a member of a gang. (Complaint at 2). Plaintiff’s

inclusion on this list subjected him to threats and assaults by

gang members and prison staff. Hayman also did not properly

supervise or train his NJDOC employees, says Plaintiff, thereby

allowing gang violence to plague the prison and Plaintiff to

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suffer harm.

Further, Plaintiff claims that Karen Balicki, an SWSP

administrator, “allowed custody staff to execute a personal brand

of street justice” within SWSP against him merely because Balicki

misidentified Plaintiff as a gang member. (Compl. at 6). 

In October 2010, Plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court

of New Jersey, Law Division, Cumberland County. Defendants then

removed the action to this Court. Plaintiff sets forth federal

and state constitutional claims, as well as state tort claims. 

In February 2011, Defendants moved for both summary judgment

against and dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims. As part of their

motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not exhaust his

administrative remedies in prison.1

Defendants represent that NJDOC correctional facilities

employ an administrative grievance process, the Inmate Remedy

System, through which inmates may complain or grieve of problems

or concerns they may have. The process is outlined in the NJDOC

Inmate Handbook, given to all inmates.

During his incarceration at CRAF, from December 15, 2009

until February 4, 2010, Plaintiff did not file any inmate remedy

forms to invoke the administrative process. While incarcerated

at SWSP, however, Plaintiff filed one inmate remedy form, on

February 13, 2010. In that remedy form, Plaintiff raised an

Defendants’ counsel certifies that Plaintiff was properly 1

served the motion at his mailing address. Plaintiff,

nevertheless, has not responded to Defendants’ motion.

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issue with his classification. Eleven days after submission,

according to Linda Linen, a SWSP Program Development Specialist,

Plaintiff received a staff response “from a representative of the

Special Investigations Division (‘SID’) of the NJDOC, directing

him to write to Investigator W. Robbins at the NJDOC Central

Office in Trenton, New Jersey with this request.” (Def. Mot.,

Linen Decl., ¶ 18; see also id., Exh. E). Plaintiff did not

write to Investigator Robbins, or any other SID employees at the

Trenton office. Additionally, Plaintiff failed to appeal any

decision made regarding the original inmate remedy form that he

filed.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standards of Review

Defendants’ motion asks for both summary judgment against

Plaintiff’s claims and dismissal of any of Plaintiff’s remaining

claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.

First, summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is

satisfied that “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330

(1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

An issue is “genuine” if it is supported by evidence such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonmoving

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party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). A fact is “material” if, under the governing

substantive law, a dispute about the fact might affect the

outcome of the suit. Id. In considering a motion for summary

judgment, a district court may not make credibility

determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence;

instead, the nonmoving party’s evidence “is to be believed and

all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Marino

v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).

Initially, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323. Once the moving party has met this burden, the

nonmoving party must identify, by affidavits or otherwise,

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 

Id. Thus, to withstand a properly supported motion for summary

judgment, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts and

affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by the moving

party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57. A party opposing summary

judgment must do more than just rest upon mere allegations,

general denials, or vague statements. Saldana v. Kmart Corp.,

260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001).

Moreover, when considering a motion to dismiss a complaint

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court

must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true

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and view them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005). It is well

settled that a pleading is sufficient if it contains “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

A district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks

“‘not whether a [claimant] will ultimately prevail but whether

the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the

claim.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8

(2007) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhoades, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974));

see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (“Our

decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all

civil actions[.]’” (citation omitted)). Under the Twombly/Iqbal

standard, the Third Circuit has instructed a two-part analysis. 

First, a claim’s factual and legal elements should be separated;

a “district court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded

facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions.” Fowler

v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950). 

Second, a district court “must then determine whether the

facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the

[claimant] has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Id. at 211

(quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950); see also Phillips v. County

of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme

Court’s Twombly formulation of the pleading standard can be

summed up thus: ‘stating . . . a claim requires a complaint with

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enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest’ the required

element. This ‘does not impose a probability requirement at the

pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to

raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence of’ the necessary element.” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 556)). The movant bears the burden of showing that no claim

has been presented. Hedges v. U.S., 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir.

2005).

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants contend that summary judgment must be entered

against Plaintiff’s claims because he has failed to follow the

requisite administrative procedures for prisoners incarcerated

within the NJDOC. The failure to exhaust administrative remedies

as specified in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), Defendants argue, mandates

dismissal.

“Under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act [or, “PLRA”], a

prisoner must exhaust available administrative remedies before

bringing suit concerning prison conditions.” Daniels v.

Rosenberger, 386 F. App’x 27, 29 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a)). “Whether an administrative remedy is available to

the prisoner is a matter of law,” with the relevant inquiry being

whether the remedy was “‘capable of use; at hand.’” Id. (quoting

Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 2002)). “Proper

exhaustion of administrative remedies requires filing a timely or

otherwise procedurally non-defective grievance.” Id. 

Furthermore, “[t]he prisoner must carry the grievance through any

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available appeals process before the remedies will be deemed

exhausted." Griffin v. Samuels, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28841, at

**5-6 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2008) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). 

“[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate

suits about prison life, whether they involve general

circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege

excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S.

516, 532 (2002). Exhaustion of remedies is mandatory. 

Concepcion v. Morton, 306 F.3d 1347, 1352 (3d Cir. 2002). 

Failure to exhaust such remedies directs dismissal of the

prisoner’s claim. Id. at 1355. “The burden of proving

exhaustion of administrative remedies is on the [defendant-prison

officials].” Cerome v. Moshannon Valley Corr. Center, 2010 U.S.

App. LEXIS 24938, at *10 (3d Cir. Dec. 7, 2010).

At the time of Defendants’ alleged misconduct, Plaintiff was

an inmate incarcerated within an NJDOC facility, first at CRAF,

and later at SWSP, which is where he filed an inmate remedy form

and remains incarcerated to this day. Thus, Plaintiff was and is

subject to any policies and procedures that were and are in place

for NJDOC facilities.

Defendants contend that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement

applies to the grievance procedure set forth in the NJDOC Inmate

Handbook provided to all inmates. To support their claim,

Defendants cite to Concepcion v. Morton, 306 F.3d at 1348-51, in

which the Third Circuit held that an administrative grievance

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procedure outlined in an NJDOJ inmate handbook constituted an

administrative remedy within the scope of 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). 

Upon review of the Inmate Handbook furnished by Defendants here,

it appears that, in light of Concepcion’s holding, the

administrative procedure available to Plaintiff constitutes an

administrative remedy within the scope of 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). 

The Inmate Handbook at issue explains to inmates that they may

utilize a two-step grievance process that includes both (1) an

opportunity for the inmate to make a routine request or request

an interview to voice any grievances, and (2) an opportunity to 2

administratively appeal the resulting decision or finding. (Def.

Mot., Linen Decl., Exh. B; Def. Mot., Howells Decl., Exh. A). 

The Inmate Handbook explicitly states: “You are required to use

the Inmate Remedy System before applying to the courts for

relief[.]” (Def. Mot., Linen Decl., Exh. B, at 53; Def. Mot.,

Howells Decl., Exh. A, at 53).

With respect to the initial requests, the Inmate Handbook 2

describes the two options as follows:

a. “Routine Inmate Request” that is used to

request and obtain information and to

present issues, concerns or complaints in

writing to the correctional facility

staff, and

b. “Interview Request” that is used to

request an in-person interview in order

to present issues, concerns or complaints

in writing to the correctional facility

staff[.]

(Def. Mot., Linen Decl., Exh. B, at 54; Def. Mot., Howells Decl.,

Exh. A, at 54).

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Here, Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust all available

administrative remedies, pursuant to the Inmate Handbook and

NJDOC procedure. As Defendants accurately point out, Plaintiff

demonstrated both his knowledge of the administrative remedy

process and his ability to use it. Although he did not file an

inmate remedy form while he was housed at CRAF, he did file the

form once he was transferred to SWSP. Eleven days after his

submission, Plaintiff received an initial response, in which an

NJDOC official working for the Special Investigations Division

requested that Plaintiff write to Investigator W. Robbins at the

NJDOC Central Office in Trenton, New Jersey to proceed with his

grievance. Not only did Plaintiff not contact Investigator

Robbins, he also did not appeal the initial response to his

original inmate remedy form to the prison administrator. 

Therefore, Plaintiff failed to complete the two-step process with

his inmate remedy form. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218,

227-230 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that an inmate must complete all

steps in the administrative process before seeking judicial

relief in court); see also N.J.A.C. 10A:1-4.4(d) (“The

comprehensive Inmate Remedy System to include a ‘Routine Inmate

Request’ and/or ‘Interview Request,’ and an ‘Administrative

Appeal’ must be utilized and fully exhausted prior to an inmate

filing any legal action regarding information requests, issues,

concerns, complaints, or problems.”). By failing to complete the

process, Plaintiff did not exhaust all administrative remedies

available to him. Plaintiff, it seems, proffers no argument to

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the contrary.

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff did not exhaust

his administrative remedies, as he was required to do. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

C. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims

Apart from his federal constitutional claims, Plaintiff also

appears to raise constitutional and tort claims under New Jersey

law. To the extent Plaintiff’s only remaining causes of action

are state law claims, the Court, sua sponte, declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over those claims at this time.

“A district court may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over a claim if ‘the district court has dismissed

all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.’” Oras v.

City of Jersey City, 328 F. App’x 772, 775 (3d Cir. 2009)

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). To this point, “‘where the

claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction is

dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to decide

the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial

economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an

affirmative justification for doing so.’” Id. (quoting Hedges v.

Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000)).

In this case, Plaintiff’s federal claims will be dismissed

for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Consequently, at

this time no federal causes of action are currently pending

before this Court. The only remaining claims in this matter

involve New Jersey state law. Moreover, the Court finds that

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considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness do

not affirmatively justify the exercise of supplemental

jurisdiction under the circumstances of this matter. The case is

still in the early stages of litigation, with the complaint

having been filed in October 2010 and the suit having been

removed to this Court in January 2011. Plaintiff will not be

prejudiced by the Court’s refusal to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction because he still may attempt to pursue his state law

claims in a timely manner in New Jersey state court –-

Plaintiff’s chosen forum where he originally filed his suit. 

Also, in the event that he exhausts his administrative remedies

and properly re-files before this Court, Plaintiff may reassert

his state law claims in addition to his federal claims.

Accordingly, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims at this time. 

Those claims will therefore be dismissed, without prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment will be granted. Further, the Court, at this time, will

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

remaining state law claims. An Order consistent with this

Opinion will be entered.

DATE: July 27, 2011 /s/ NOEL L. HILLMAN 

At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

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