The Honor able Amul R . Thapa r, United States District Judge f or the Ea stern District of * Kentucky , sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 09a0573n.06 No. 08-5579 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

CH AR L OT TE OWENS, P laintif f-App ellant,

v. WEL L MONT, I

NC., Defendan t-Appellee.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EAL FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E E AST ERN DI STRI CT OF TEN

NESSEE

O P I N I O N

Before: M OORE an d ROGERS, Circuit Judges; THAP AR, District Judge. * KA REN NELSO N MOORE, Circ uit Jud ge. Plaintiff-Appellant Char lotte Owens (“ Ow e ns ” ) a

pp e a ls fro m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f D e fe nd antAppellee Wellmont , I nc. and/or d/b/ a W ell mont Holston Valley Medica l Center (“ Wellmont ”). Ow e ns br ou g ht two a g e -d isc ri min a tio n cla ims a g a ins t We llm on t un de r t he Ag e Di sc ri min a tio n in E m p l o y m ent Act ( “ADE A”) , 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Te nnessee Human Rig hts Act (“TH RA”), Te nn. Code Ann. §§ 4-21- 101 et seq., c laiming that, beca use of Owens’ s ag e, Wellmont eliminated Owe ns’s position as a phy sical thera py technicia n (“PTT” ) as pa

rt of a r eduction-in-f

orce eff ort and re fused to re h i re Ow en s t o any other position. For the rea sons discussed below, we AF F IRM the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt w ithre sp e c t to Ow e ns ’s un lawf ul-2

discharg e cla im, RE VE RSE the di strict court’s gr ant of summary judgme nt with respec t to Owens’s failure -to-re hire c laim, and REMAND for pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s opinion. I. F ACTS AND P ROCEDURE Th e fa c ts o f t

his c a se are he a vil y

disp ut ed. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt de sc ri be d th e pe rt ine nt f

a c ts

and pa rt y a sse rt ion s a s f

oll ow s: Charlotte Owe ns (“Ow ens”) was e mploy ed b y W el l m o n t , I n c. d

/ b / a W el l m ont Holston V alley Medica l Ce nter (“Wellmont”) fr om May 1970 until her termination on J une 23, 2003 (ef

fec tive J uly

23, 2003). At the time of he r termination, Owe ns was 54 y ear s of ag e and e mploy ed as a phy sical thera

py technici an (“PTT” or “ te c hn ic ian” ) i n We llm on t’ s in patie nt p hy sic a l the ra

py de pa rtme nt. F ro m 19 96 un til her te rminati o n , Owens’ supervisor wa s J ose Vivaldi (“ Vivaldi”), the sy stem director fo r i np a tie nt r e ha

bil itatio n s e rv ic e s f

or Wel lmo nt. I n May 2 0 0 3, a budg etar

y revie w, which include d a produc tivity analy sis, was c on du c te d to de te rm ine wh e the r t he inp a tie nt d e pa

rtme nt w a s o ve rs ta ff

e d w i th P TT s. This reviewreve aled that the de partm en t wa s overstaf fed w ith technicians a

nd established a ne ed to hire more licensed phy sical th er ap y assistants (“L PTA” or

“ a ssi sta nts ” ), wh ic h w ou ld a llo w We llm on t to bil l f or mor e se rv ic e s t han it co uld wi th P TT s. Ac c or din g to Wel lmo nt, it the n de c ide d, a s a re su lt of the re vie w a

nd in order to meet budg etar

y restra ints, to reduce the number of te chnici ans in the inpatient depar

tment by eliminating one open PTT po s i t i o n and by laying of f two fu ll

- ti me e mp lo y e e s . I n o r d e r to d e te r mi n e w h ic h e mp lo y e e s w o u ld b e laid off, Vivaldi formed a

leade rship team consisting of himself, Clay ton C h ap man, an oc c up a tio na l th e ra

pis t, L ind a

Ge may e l, a spe e c h an d h e ari ngthe ra pis t, a nd Mic he lle Henr y , a p h y sical thera

pist. The lea dership team evaluate d the PTTs on five 1 job-related cr iteria set fo rt h in Wellm ont’s policy on temporar

y /permane nt force reduc tions: 1) y ear s of servic e; 2) pe rfor mance ; 3) depe ndability

/reliability ; 4) f l e x i b i l i t y; an d

5 ) j o b c r i t i c a l i t y. The tec hnicians in the i npatient department wer e given a score from 1 to 5 on eac h of these job r elated c riterion, with one be ing the lowest an d fi v e being the hig he st, e xce pt fo r y e ars of se rv ic e , w hic h w a s sc or e d f ro m 1 t o 3 . T e c hn ic ians wi th g reater senior ity rec eived highe r score s on the y ear s of service criter ion. The scor es were aver ag ed and the technicia ns ranke d from hig hest to lowest aver ag e scor e. Owens r ece ived the fifth lowe st score of th e s i x t ec h n i cians. Two of those who rec eived hig her sc ores than O wens we re ove r 50 y ear s old. The dec ision was made to e lim inate the po sit ion s o f t ho se wi th t

he low e st s c or e s, that of

Ow e ns and

a ma le technicia n, Mike Corder, who was less than 30 y ear s of ag e at the time. Ac cording3

to V iva ldi , O we ns ’ a g e wa s n e ith e r a fact or no r a c on sid e ra

tio n in the de c isi on

to eliminate Owe ns’ pos ition. Owens was infor med of Wellmont’s decision on J une 24 , 2 00 3, by

Vi va ldi and

Ma c k L ow e (“ L ow e ” ), Human Re so ur c e s Sp e c ia lis t. 2 I t w a s th e pr a c tic e of Wel lmo nt, duri ng any re du c tio n in for c e , to w or k w ith displaced employ ees to pla ce them in othe r depar tments at the hospital. W ellmont’s re du c tio n in

fo rc e po lic y , h ow e ve r, d oes no t pr ov ide any re c a ll r ig hts . A t th e tim e Cor de r w a s to ld of the de c isi on to e lim inate his po sit ion , h e wa s g ive n th e op tio n to tr ans fe r t o a

no the r p os iti on

and he a c c e pte d a

po sit ion a s a lin e n d istri bu tio n c le rk

in the environmental service s depar tment. Owens w as not offe red a transfe r on June 24; howeve r, she inquire d about the possibility of workingpart time in the inpatient d ep ar t m en t

. At t h i s p o i n t , t h e a cc o u n t s o f t h e p ar t i es ab o u twh at h ap p en edd i v er ge s i g n i f i c an t l y. W el l m o n tcl ai m s t h at L o we b ega n i m m ed i at el y , d u ri n g t h e J u n e 2 4 m ee t i n g, to place O wens in anothe r position at the hospital, calling Car ol Forr est (“F orre st”), mana g e r o f t

he ho sp ita l’ s ce ntr a l ste ri le pr oc e ssi ngde pa rtme nt whil e Ow e ns wa s st ill in his of fi c e , to inq

uir e a bo ut a po ssi ble op e nin g . F or re st ha d an op e nin g a t th e same pay g ra d e as Owens’ previous position and indicated she would like to interview Owens. Acc ording to L owe, Owens was infor med of the ope ning a

nd was supposed to meet with For

rest the next day

. Owens did not appe ar to mee t with Forre st, never contac ted For

rest and e x presse d no further interest in the position. W ellmont contends that Ow ens “likely would h ave been of

fer ed” the position, i f she ha d purs ue d it

. Owens, on the other hand, claims she asked L owe a bout part-time wor

k and wa s to ld n oth ingwa s ava ila ble . Sh e de nie s th a t L ow e e ve r t old he r a bo ut a po ssi ble o p e n i n g i nc e n t r a l s t e r i l e p r o c e s s i n g . O w e n s c l a i m s s h e m e tw i t h L o w e t w o d ays afte r her termination and a g ain asked about part-time or R eg istry work to fill in for PTTs on their day s off and vacation. L owe a g ain said there was “ nothing” for he r. 3 At Owens’ reque st, L owe ma d e an appointment for Owe ns to meet with Rhonda McGhe e (“ McGhe e”) , supervisor of patient ca

re. The pa rties agree that Owens talked with Mc Ghee about an opening in patient c are . Ow ens had pr e vio us ly wo rk e d in

patie nt c are and

wa s b e lie ve d q

ua lif ie d to perf orm the duties of the position. The job wa s offe red to Owens, she indicated she woul d t ak e t h e posi tion and a wor k schedule was pre pare d for he r, which r equire d three twelve (1 2 ) h o u r shifts per we ek rather than the five e ight ( 8) hour shifts she had previously worke d. Vivaldi was informed by L owe that Ow ens had be en hire d fo r t he op e nin g . B e lie vin g sh e “ c ou ld [n ot] p hy sic a lly pe rf or m a t [he r] b e st” on

thi s s chedule , Owens later de clined the position. This positi on would have be en at the 4 same pa y g rade as Owe ns’ prior position. 54 Once ag ai n , th e p arti e s ’ a c c o u n ts o f w h a t h a p p e n e d n e xt s h o w s u

b s ta n ti al disag ree ment. Acc ording to Wellmont , plaintiff was then offe red a Reg istry position which would have allowed Ow ens t o work twe nty (20) hour s per we ek in the inpatient depar

tment. Admittedly , this posit ion was n o t t h e same as her former position. Owens was a lso informed that the inpatient de partment wa s not hiring a ny new PTTs a

nd any new hires in the depar tment would be L PTAs. Owens, a ccor ding to Wellm ont, declined the of fer “bec ause she did not want to work with Mr. Vivaldi.” On the other

hand, . . . Owens denies that she even discussed the position or was e ver offe red the position.

_____________________________ FN 1 : As discussed i n

fra , Owens c laims that formation of the lea dership team was not authorized by

Wellmont ’s re duction in force p o l i cy and wa s part of Wellmont ’s “pr etext” for discrimination. F N2 : Al tho ug h in fo rm e d o f We llm on t’ s d e c isi on on June 24 , O wen s’ termination letter wa s dated June 23. FN3: Reg istry

employ ees a

re pa rt of the hospital’s supplementa l sta ff, use d to m e e t c us tom e r n e e ds or to r e so lve sp e c ia l e mpl oy me nt s itu a tio ns . FN4: Wellmont claims Owe ns “neve r repor ted to work.” Owens a g ree s but claims she told Wellmont she wa s declining the position. FN5: I n her r esponse to “D efe ndant’s Concise Statement of Undisputed Fa cts,” Ow ens denie s t h at t h e pay g rade would have be en the same; howeve r, she po int s to no thi ngin t

he re c or d w hic h d isp ute s th is f a c t. Owens v. W

ellmont, Inc. , No. 2:04-CV-274, 2008 WL 752640, at *1-2 (E .D. Tenn. Ma rch 19, 2008) (third alter ation added) (footnotes 1-5 in or igina l). Owens c ontends that she met with A dams on sever al occa sions to inquire about specific job postings. One such mee ting oc curr ed in ea rly September 2003 a

nd conce rned a

n in-patient phy sical thera py depar tment PTT job post ing that was posted on September 3, 2003. On September 24, 2003, Vivaldi reque sted that the posted Sept ember PTT positi on be cha ng ed to a L PTA position. Acc ording to Vivaldi, this request occ urre d5

afte r a c onversation with W ellm o n t ’s v i ce pr esident, duringwhich [Vivaldi] was reminded of the productivity analy sis .

. . . A 26 y ear old L PTA was hired by 6 Wellmont for the position as a Re g istry employ ee. . . . It was not disputed that Owens w as not qualified f or a L PTA position. I n Fe b ruary 2004, a PTT in the inpatient depar

tment resig ned her

employ ment with Wellm ont. Vivaldi posted the vaca ncy “interna lly ,” and a Reg istry employ ee who was 34 y ear s of ag e wa s place d in the open PTT position in early April 2004.

__________________________ FN6: Plaintiff objects that the content of t he conversation betwe en Vivaldi and W ellmont’s vice pr esident as he arsa y . To the extent that the reminder to Vivaldi of the produc tivity

analy sis and the nee d for more L PTAs is offe red to expl ain why V i v a l d i a s k e d

f o r t h e p o s t i n g t o b e c h an g e d , i ti s n o th e ar s ay. Owens , 2008 WL 752640, at *3. Owe n s f il e d a c o mp la in t a ll e g in g a g e d is c r im in a ti o n in v io lati o n o f th e A D EA and the THRA. The complaint included two claims, the first re g ardingWellmont ’s dischar g e of O wens a nd the sec ond reg ardingWellmont ’s ac tions post-discharg e. On Ma rch 16 , 2 0 0 7 , Wellmont filed a motion for summary

judgme nt. The dis t ri ct co u rt g rante d the motion, concluding (1) that Ow ens failed to make a prima f

acie case reg arding her termination claim and, even if Owens ha d established a prima f acie case , she poi nted t o no evidenc e in the re cord f rom which the district c ourt could infer that Wellmont ’s reduction-in-for ce rationale for Owens’s t ermination was prete x tual; and (2) that O w e n s c o u l d

n o te s t a b l i s h a p r i m a f a c i e c a s e f

o r h e r p o s t

- d i s c h ar g e c l a i m , w h i c h i s e s s e n t i a l l y a fa ilure -t o- re hir e c la im, be c a us e Ow e ns ne ve r f

or ma lly a pp lie d f or any of t h e p o s i t i on s th a t sh e c la ims

wer e denie d her. O wens timely appea led.Ow e ns ’s TH RA c la ims are su bje c t to the same sta

nd ard of pro of a s h e r A DE A c la ims , 1 Brennan v. Tractor Supply Co. , 2 37 F . App ’x 9, 15 -1 6 & n. 6 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 7) ; thus we wi ll sp e c if ic a lly a dd re ss o nly the AD EAc la ims

. 6

II. AN AL YSI S A. Summ ary Judgm ent Standard of Review “We re view de novo a

district court’s g rant of s u m mary judgme nt.” Patterson v. Hudson Area Sch. , 551 F.3d 438, 444 (6th Cir. 2009)

. Fe d. R. Civ. P. 56( c) state s that summary judgme nt is proper “ if the pl eading s, the di scover y and dis closure materials on file, and any aff idavits show that there is no ge nuine issue as to a ny materia l fac t and that the movant is entitled to judgme nt as

a ma tte r o f l aw. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 6( c ). “ Whe n we re vie w a mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, we mus t view all fac ts and inferenc es i n the light most favor able to the non- moving pa rty .” Hamilton v. Gen. E l ec. Co. , 5 5 6 F

. 3 d 4 2 8 , 4 3 3 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 9 )

. “ W e e xam i n e t h e g r an t o f s u m m ar y j u d g m e n tto deter mine whether

the evidenc e pre sents a suff icient disag ree ment to r equire submissi on to a jury or whe ther it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” DiCarlo v. Potter , 358 F.3d 408, 414 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (interna l quotation marks omitted). B. A DE A 1 T h e A DE A m ak es i t“u n l aw fu l fo r an em p l o y er . . . t o fa i l o r r ef u s e t o h i re o r t o d i s ch ar ge any individual .

. . beca

use of such i ndividual’s ag e.” 29 U .S.C. § 623(a)(1) . “An a g e-discr imination pla int if f m ay su pp or t he r c la im w ith eith e r d ir e c t e vid e nc e or ind ir e c t ( a lso c a lle d c ir c ums tanti a l) evidenc e.” B la ir v . H

e n r yFilters, Inc. , 50 5 F .3 d 5 17 , 5 23 (6 th C ir . 2 00 7) . “ Di re c t e vid e nc e is evidenc e that proves the exis tence of a fac t w ithout re quiring any infere nces,” Rowan v. Lockhe ed Martin Energy Sy

s., Inc. , 3 60 F .3 d 5 44 , 5 48 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4), wh ile c ir c ums tanti a l e vid e nc e is “evide nce r equiringinfere nces to reac h the conclusion that the defenda nt discriminated ag ainst the7

plaintiff,” Blair , 5 0 5 F. 3 d at 5 2 4

. W h en a p l a i n t i f f o ff er s o n l y ci rc u m s t an t i al ev i d en ce o f a ge discrimination, we must analy ze the claim under

the McD onnell Douglas Corp. v . Gree n , 4 11 U. S. 792 (1973), bur den-shiftingfra mework. Rowan , 360 F.3d at 547. Under this fra mework, the plaintiff mus t first submit evidenc e from which a rea sonable jury could conc lude that he or sh e e sta bli sh e d a pr ima fa c ie c a se of dis c ri min a tio n. Th e de fe nd ant m us t the n o ff e r a dmi ssi ble e vid e nc e of a le g iti mate , n on dis c ri mina tor y re a so n f or its action. I f the de fenda

nt does so, the plaintiff must i d en t i fy evidenc e fr om which a rea sonable jury

could conc lude that the prof fer ed re ason is actua lly a p re text for unlawful discr imination. Blair , 505 F.3d at 524 (internal c itations omi tted). As the district court noted, O wens a ppear s to make two s ep ar ate claims under the AD EA: (1) Wellmont unlawfully

discharg ed Owe ns beca

use of he r ag e; and ( 2) post-dischar g e, Wellmont unlawfully failed to re hire Ow ens bec ause of her a g e. Owe ns offe rs no direc t evidence to support either c laim; thus, bot h claims are subject to McD onnell Douglas ana ly sis

. 1. Unlaw fu l Discharge Ty pically , “[i] n order

to establish a prima fa cie c ase of ag e di s cr i m ination using circ umstantial evidence under the McD onnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a membe r of the pr otected c lass, that is, he is at least forty y ear s of ag e; (2) he was subjec ted to an adve rse e mploy

ment action; (3) he was qua lified for the pos i t i o n ; and (4) he was tre ated differ ently

from similarly

situated emplo y ees outside the pr otected c lass.” Mi tc he ll v . V an de rb ilt Univ. , 3 89 F .3 d 1 77 , 1 81 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) ; s e e a l so B r i g g s v. Potter , 463 F.3d 507, 514 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Howe ver, w hen the plaintiff w as dischar g ed as part o f a re d uction-in-for ce pr og ram, the fourth prongis modified and the plaintiff is require d to show “‘a dditional direct, circ umstantial, or statistical evidenc e tending to indicate that the employ er sing led out the plaintiff for discharg e for8

impermissible reasons.’ ” Asmo v. Keane, Inc. , 4 7 1 F. 3 d 5 8 8 , 5 9 3 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Barnes v. Ge nCorp Inc. , 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 ( 6th Cir. 1990)). I t is undisput ed that Owe ns was at leas t fo rt y y ear s old at the time of dischar g e, that her discharg e constitutes a

n adver se employ

ment action, and that she wa s qualified to per form her PTT position. Thus, t he only

prongin dispute in the instant appeal is the four th prong , which Owe ns contends is satisfied by

the circ umstances surr ounding the reduc tion in force. We ne ed not, howeve r, deter mine the merits of Ow ens’s a rg ument beca

use it is clea

r that Owens ha s failed to produc e any evidenc e that Wellmont’s reduction-in-f orce rat io n a le f

o r O w e ns’s dischar g e is prete x tual. See Ladd v. Grand Trunk W

. R.R., Inc

. , 552 F.3d 495, 502 (6th Cir. 2009) (dete rmining that the pane l “nee d not addre ss whether

[pl aintiff] made out her pr ima fac ie ca se, because she has fa iled to produce any

e vid e nc e that G ra

nd Tr un k’ s d e c isi on

wa s me re pr e te xt an d h a s the re fo re fa ile d to c arr y he r u lti mate burden of persua sion”). On c e a pla int if f e sta bli sh e s a pr ima fa c ie c a se of a g e dis c ri min a tio n, “ [t]he de fe nd ant m us t then offe r admissible evidenc e of a leg itimate, nondiscriminatory rea son for its action. I f the defe ndant does so, the plaintiff must identify evidenc e from which a rea sonable jury could conc lude that the proff

ere d rea son is a ctually a prete x t for unlawf ul discrimination.” Blair , 505 F.3d at 524 (interna l citation omitt ed). It is u n disputed that Wellm ont’s reduc tion-in-forc e rationale for
te rm inatin g Ow e ns is a le g iti mate , no nd isc ri min a tor y re a so n f or dis c ha rg ingOw e ns . T hu s, e ve n if Ow e ns c ou ld e sta

bli sha pr ima fa c ie c a se of dis c ri min a tio n, Ow e ns wo uld sti ll have the burd e n to show that Wellmont ’s re duction-in-for ce r ationale is pre text ual. Owe ns cannot mee t this burden. “An e mploy ee c an show prete x t by offe ring evidenc e that the e mploy er’ s proffe red r eason h adn o b as i s i nfa ct , d i d

n o tac tu al l y

m o t i v at e i t s d ec i s i o n , o r wa s n ev er u s ed i n t h e p as t t o d i s ch ar geOwens’ s assertion reg arding Wellmont ’s failure t o transfe r her fails because the undisputed 2 fac ts establish that Wellmont did offe r to tr ansfe r Owens to the W-2 Patient Care position. Owens decide d not to acce pt the transfe r, and this decision does not esta blish a claim for a g e discrimination. Ow e ns ins ist s th a t We llm on t w a s r e qu ir e d to of fe r he r a “ su bs tanti a lly

e qu iva le nt” po sit ion , b ut t his asser tion is l eg ally

incorrec t

. T h e concept of “ substantially equivalent” employ

ment applies to a plaintiff’s duty

to miti g ate his or he r dama g es with respe ct to front pay , s e e, e . g ., EEOC v. Allen Petroleum Co. of E. Tenn., I nc. , No. 94-5355, 1996 WL 325249, at *6 (6th C ir. J une 12, 1996), a nd is thu s in a

pp lic a ble a t th is s ta g e of

the pr oc e e din g s.

9 an employ ee.” Sm ith v . Ch ry sle r Co rp ., 15 5 F .3 d 7 99 , 8 05 -0 6 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 8) ; Asmo , 471 F.3d at 595. As the district court c orre ctly notes , Ow en s ’s concession reg ardingthe validity of the productivity

analy sis and the re commendation conta ined there in preve nts Owens fr om arguing that W e l l m o n t ’s re d

u ct i o n -i n -f

o rc e r at i o n al e i s n o tb as edi nfa ct o r w as n ev er u s edt o d i s ch ar ge

em p loy ees. Owens , 2 00 8 WL 75 26 40 , at *1 0; se e als o O w e n s B r . a t 4 7 ( “ T h e p la intiff is not challeng ing the fac t that an ef ficienc y study was unde rtake n by

Wellmont during the Spring of 2003 and that a r eduction in the number of the Medical C enter ’s in-patient phy sical thera py depar tment PTTs was re commended.” ). More over, O wens doe s not make any specific argument that Wel lmo nt’ s a sse rt e d r a tio na le is p re te xtua l; O we ns me re ly state s g e ne ra lly

that “Vi val di’ s matr ix evalua tion and L eade rshi p T ea m ra n k i n g p ro ce s s wa s fr au gh t wi t h co n t ra d i ct i o n s an d

i n consi stencies

and we re a pr e te xt to c ov e r u

p ag e dis c ri min a tio n. ” Ow e ns B r. a t 40 . O we ns po int s to no thi ngin the re cord to support this a ssertion, nor could we find any such evide nce. T here fore , we c onclude that Owens ha s failed to esta blish pretext, and we AF F IRM the district court’s g rant of summar y jud g me nt t o We llm on t on Ow e ns ’s te rm inatio n c la im. 2. P os t- Di sc har ge Cl aim Owens a rg ues that W ellmont discriminated ag ainst her ba sed on ag e by failing to transfe r 2

or re hir e Ow e ns a ft e r she wa s disc ha rg e d— e sse nti a lly , Ow e ns is as se rt ing a fa ilure -t o- re hir e c la im.10

I t is im portant t o note t hat Owens had no rig ht to be rehired by Wellmont

. See Record on A ppeal (“ RO A” ) at 5 5 ( W e l l m o nt T e m p o r ary /Pe rm ane nt R e du c tio ns in F or c e Pol ic y a t 3) ; see also Ridenour v. Lawson Co. , 791 F. 2 d 5 2 , 5 7 (6th Cir. 1986) (“ Where a n employ er r educe s his workforc e for economic r easons, it in curs no duty to transfe r an e mploy ee to a nother position within the

c omp any .” ); Almond v. ABB I ndus. Sys., Inc

. , 56 F. App’ x 672, 678 (6th Cir. 2003) (same ). Owe ns can still establish a prima fac ie case for a claim of failure to r ehire based on ag e discrimination if she can de monstrate that: (1) she “is a membe r of the pr otected a g e g roup”; (2) she “is qualified f or the rehire or re call position”; (3) she “ap plied for the a vailable position or ca

n establish that the employ er w as otherw ise obligated to consider h[er]”; and (4 ) “t he position went to a y oung er individual outsi de the protec ted class or that other rea sonable evidenc e exis ts f or inferr ing that [ s]he was denied a posi tion beca use of h[er] age .” W

anger v. G .A. Gray Co. , 872 F.2d 142, 145 (6th Cir. 19 89 ); Gran t v . H

ar c ou rt B ra c e Col l. P ub lis he rs , No. 98-3829, 1999 WL717982, at * 3 (6 t h Cir. Sept. 9, 1999). Ty

pically , a gene ralized expression of i ntere st in a posi tion is not enoug h to satisfy the third prongof the W

anger test. W anger , 872 F.2d at 147 (“With li mited exceptions, one cannot establish that he wa s subject to an adve rse hiringdecision unless he makes his desire f or the position known to the employ er.” ). Howe ver, “ dependingon the fa cts of the pa rticular c ase, an employ ee need not f ormally apply for a position.” Grant , 1999 WL 717982, at *4. Instead, “ [t ]he job-seeke r must make a rea sonable attempt to demonstrate to the employ er that he is interested in the job.” Id

. (c i t i n g EEOC v. Me tal Serv. Co. , 8 92 F .2 d 3 41 , 3 48 (3 d Ci r. 19 90 ); W halen v. Unit R ig, Inc. , 974 F.2d 1248, 125 1 (1 0 t h Cir. 1992), cert. de nied , 507 U.S. 973 (1993)). The circ umstances of a pa rt ic ula r c a se de te rm ine wh e the r a pla int if f’ s ac tio ns we re su ff

ic ie nt t o d e mon str a te an in te re st i n the position. Grant , 1999 WL 717982, at *4.Th e date of thi s me e tin g is d isp ute d. At or a l argume nt, Wel lmo nt c on te nd e d th a t th is 3 meeting occur

red on or afte r September 1 0 , 2 0 0 3

. As explained below, the individual Owe ns contends was hired to f

ill this position has a hire date of September 8, 2003. I f Owe n s d i d not inq uir e a bo ut t he po sit ion

un til Se pte mbe r 1 0, the n th e po sit ion wo uld no t ha ve be e n a n “ a va ila ble position” at the time that she inquired a bout the job. This argument is unconvincingfor at least two rea sons. First, none of

the af fidavits prepa

red by Wellmont employ ees state s that, at the time that Ow e ns inq

uir e d a bo ut t he Se pte mbe r 3 po sti ng , th e po sit ion wa s a lr e a dy

fi lle d. I n fa c t, A dams insists that no full-time employ ee w as eve r hired to f ill thi s position. R OA at 66 ( Adams Aff . ¶ 14). The fa ct that the PTT position was alleg edly filled at the time t hat Owens inquired about the posting would be an obvious de fense to this action, and it seems strang e that Wellmont would not produce c on c re te te sti mony

re g ard ingthat f

a c t or ra ise the iss ue in i ts br ie fi ngif Wel lmo nt’ s a sse rt ion

is acc urate

. Second, and mor e important, the portion of Owens’ s deposition te stimony cited in support of this argument is ambiguous at best reg arding whether the Adams meeting took place on or afte r S ep tember 10. See RO A 3 3 6 ( O w e n s 3 /2 /0 7 D e p . a t 9 0 )

. M o r e o v e r , o th e r p ie c e s of Owe ns’s deposition testimony

and af fidavit support an infe renc e that Owe ns met with A dams to discuss the September 3 PTT position on September 8, 2003, or ea rlier. See ROA at 418 (Ow ens 3/2/07 Dep. at 115); ROA at 448 (Owe ns Revised Aff. ¶ 45). A me eting on September 8 c ould have oc curr ed wh ile the PTT po sit ion wa s sti ll a va ila ble

. B e c a us e we mus t int e rp re t the e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t favor able to Owe ns and resolve all conf licts in Owens’s fa

vor at the summar

y -judg ment stag e, we must draw the pe rmissible infere nce that Owens met with Adams and inquired a bout the September 3 PTT posting bef

ore that positi on was filled. 11 Th e dis tr ic t c ourt fo un d that Owe ns c ou ld not e sta bli sh the thi rd pr on g of he r pr ima fa c ie c a se be c a us e “ [i ] t is und isp ute d .

. . tha t O we ns ne ve r f

or ma lly a pp lie d f or any of the po sit ion s in question” and O wens “ made no re as onable attempt to demonstrate to Wellmont that she wa s interested in a

ny of the PTT positions.” Owens , 200 8 WL 75 26 40 , at *12

. We co nc lud e that th is fi n d i n g i s n o tco rr ec t , b u to n l y wi t h re s p ec tt o t h e S ep t em b er 3 , 2 0 0 3 P T T j o b p o s t i n g. Acc ording t o Ow ens’s revised af fidavit, she we nt to see Adams about an in-patient PTT posting in ea

rly September 2003 a

nd “aske d [Adams] for the PTT job.” R OA at 4 48 (Owe ns 3 Re vis e d A ff

. ¶ 45 ); se e als o ROA at 489 (9/3/03 PTT J ob Detail). A lthough Ow ens may not have for ma ll y a p p li e d f o r th e Se p te mb e r 3 PT T p o s it io n a t th a t ti me , it s e e ms c le ar tha t, under the circ umstances, a

formal a pplication was not re quired. Ow ens did more th an m ak e a ge nera liz edAdams asse rts in her a ffidavit that the PTT position that Owens i n q u i re d about was 4 rec ateg ori z ed as a L PTA position “on or about September 26, 2003 . . . to be in line with the re c omm e nd a tio ns fr om t

he pr od uc tiv ity ana ly sis ,” and that that po sit ion “ wa s n e ve r f

ill e d b y a fu ll12 expression of interest in working for W ellmont—Owens specifically informed Ada

ms that Owens was intere sted in a position that was curr ently open. More over, the rec ord supports an infe renc e that Wellmont had off

ere d Owens positions in the past without a formal a pplication. For example, there is no indication in the record t h at Ow en s formally applied for

the W-2 Patient Care Te chnician position before it wa s offe red to he r; rathe r, she mer ely spoke to L owe a

nd McGhe e about the job. See, e .g. , ROA at 34 (Ow ens 12/20/06 Dep. at 141). Thus, under these c ircumstance s, it appear s that Owens ma de “a

rea sonable attempt to demonstrate to the employ er that [ s]he [ wa]s interested in the job.” Grant , 19 99 WL71 79 82 , at *4 ; EEOC v. Me tal Serv. Co. , 892 F.2d 341, 348 ( 3d Cir. 1990) (“ Court s h a ve g e ne ra lly

he ld t hat the fa ilure to fo rm a lly a pp ly fo r a job op e nin g wi ll n ot b ar a Ti tle VI Iplaintiff from e stablishing a pr ima fac ie claim of di scriminatory hiring , as l ong as the plaintiff made e very

rea sonable attempt to convey his interest in the job to t h e empl oy er.” ). We there fore hold that Owens ha s satisfied the third prongof the W anger te st. Fur ther, when revie wing the record in the l ight most favor able to Owens, we c onclude that O w e n s h a s s a ti s f

ie d th e o th e r thr e e p r o n g s of the W anger test . I t is un dis pu te d th a t O we ns is a

me mbe r o f t

he pr ote c te d c la ss a

nd tha t sh e is q ua lif ie d for a PTT po sit ion

. As to wh o wa s h ir e d to fill the PTT position in question, evidence in the rec ord re veals that the phy sical thera py in-patient depar tment hir ed L arr a Schwar tz (“ Schwar

tz”), a 26-y ear -old L PTA, on September 8, 2009. ROA at 493-94 (July 2004 Phy sical Therapy I n-Patient Dep’ t Roster). No ot her individual wa s hired by that depar tment in 2003. Thus, an infere nce c an be dr awn that Schwa rtz was hired to fill the PTT po sit ion a bo ut w hic h O we ns inq

uir e d. B e c a

us e Sc hw art z is not a

me mbe r o f t

he pr ote c te d c la ss, 4tim e e mpl oy e e .” RO A at 66 (A dams Af f. ¶¶ 13 -1 4)

. Ad a ms a sse rt s that Sc hw art z wa s “ hir e d a s a Reg istry employ ee” and “w orked a s a Reg istry employ ee a s a [L PTA] i n the Inpatient Depa rtment.” RO A a t 66 -6 7 (A dams Af f. ¶ 14 ). Ho we ve r, a s e xpla ine d a bo ve , wh e n dr awi ng all reas on able infere nces in fa

vor of Ow ens, on the cur

rent re cord, w e must conclude that there is a g enuine issue of mater ial fac t reg arding whether Schwar tz was hired to fill the PTT positi on in question. That PTT position was not recateg orized until September 26, 2003, y et Schwar tz was hire d on September 8, 2 0 0 3

. T h u s , a

ju r y c o u ld c o n c lu d e th a t, r e g ar d le s s o f an y o f f ic ia l t it le A d a ms a s s ig n e d to Sc h w artz , Sc hw art z wa s h ir e d to fi ll the PTT po sit ion tha t O we ns so ug ht. 13 Owens ha s satisfied the four th prong of W

anger . Acc ording ly , we hold that Owe ns has m ad e out a prima f acie ca s e fo r her f

ailure- to-rehir e cla im and we RE VE RSE the district court’s g rant of

summa ry jud g me nt o n th a t c la im. III . C ON CL USI ON For t h e re as o ns discussed above , we AF F IRM the district court’s g rant of summar y judgme nt with r eg ard to Owens’s unla wful dischar g e cla im, RE VE RSE the district court’s g rant of summary judgme nt with reg ard t o Owens’ s failure -to-re hire c laim, and REMAND for f urther proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.