NOT RECOMMENDED F OR F ULL-TEXT PUBLICATION F ile Nam e: 11a0363n.06 No. 09-3998 UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS F OR THE S IXTH CIRCUIT

CHARL ES R. EVANS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. RI CHARD A. CORDRAY; FRANKL I N COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PL EAS, OHI O, Def endants-A

ppellees. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP PEAL FR OM T HE UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DI STRI CT OF OH I O

BEF ORE: GI L MAN and G RI FF I N, Circuit J udg es; COL L I ER, District J udg e. * GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg e. Pl ai n t iff Charles Evans appea ls the district court’s dismiss al of his claim pursuant to the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine. We re verse and re mand for f urther pr ocee dings. I

. Charles Evans was involved in a divorce proce eding in the Fr anklin County , Ohio Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. I n a separ ate state-c ourt action, he filed an abuse- ofproce ss claim ag ainst his estrang ed spouse, and she filed a counter claim asser ting that he was a “vexatious lit igator” pursua nt to Ohio Revised C ode § 2323.52. The latter court rejecte d Evans’s abuse- of-pr ocess claim; held that Evans was a vexatious litigator; and enter ed an order pursuant to

The Honora

ble Curtis L

. Colli er, Chief United States District J udg e for the Easter n District * of Tenne ssee, sitting by

desig nation.No. 09-3998

Evans v. Cordray , et al. § 2323.52, prohibiting Evans from instit uting or continuing actions in the Ohio state courts without first obtaining leave

. Subsequently , the domestic-re lations court denied two of Evans’s motions to continue in h i s d i v o rce case beca use Evans failed to seek leave in acc ordanc e with the § 2323.52 order

. Evans then filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio ag ainst Ohio Attorney Gene ral Richard Cordray and the Fr anklin County Court of Common Pleas, claiming that § 2323.52 is unc onstitut ional as applied to him and other litigants in O hio dome sticrela tions case s beca

use it alleg edly deprive s them of the fundame ntal rig ht of acc ess to the courts in violation of t he Fifth and Fourtee nth Amendments t o t h e United States Constit ution. The dist rict court gra nted t he Ohio Attorney Gene ral’s motion to dismis s, and also denied Evans’s m otion for

rec onsideration, co n cl u d i ng that the court lacke d subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine. Evans timely

appea ls. I I

. We revie w de novo a district court’s deter mination that it lacke d subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine. Carter v. Burns , 524 F.3d 796, 798 ( 6th Cir. 2008). I I I

. I n g ener al, Rooke r-Feldman prec ludes “lower fede ral courts

. . . from ex erc ising appellate jurisdiction over final state-c ourt judgme nts,” Marks v. Tennessee , 554 F.3d 619, 622 (6th Cir. 2009) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted), “[b] eca use [28 U.S.C.] § 1257, as long interpre ted,

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vests authority to revie w a state court’s judgme nt solely in [t he Supreme] Court,” Exx on Mobil Corp.

v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005). But the doctrine does not bar “a district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdi c ti o n s im ply beca use a party attempts to litigate in fede ral court

a matter previously litigated in state court.” Id. at 293. I t applies only to the “nar row g round” of “ca ses broug ht by state-c ourt losers complaining of injuries cause d b y s ta te
- c o u r t ju d g me n ts r e n d e r e d befor e the district court proce eding s commence d and inviting district court revie w and reje ction of those judg ments.” Id. at 284. We thus deter

mine whether Rooke r-Feldman bars a claim by looking to the “ source of t he injury the plaintiff alleg es in the fede ral complaint.” McCormick v. Braverm an , 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6 t h C i r. 2 006). I f the source of the plaintiff’s injury is the state-c ourt judgme nt itself, then t h e Rooke r-Feldman doctrine bars the fede ral claim. Id. “I f there is some other source of injury , such

as a t h i rd party ’s actions, then t he plainti ff asserts an independe nt claim.” Id. ; see also Lawrence

v. W elch , 531 F.3d 36 4, 368-69 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. denied 130 S. Ct. 233 (2009); Hamilton v. Herr , 540 F.3d 367, 372 (6th Cir. 2008) (stating that “what the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine primarily bars are claims that seek relief from injury ‘ca used by ’ the state court judgme nt”) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). The doctrine also “does not prohib i t fe d er al district courts from exercising jurisdiction wher e the plaintiff’s claim is mere ly a g eneral challeng e to the constitutionalit y of the state law applied in the state action, rathe r than a challeng e to the law’s application in a particula

r state case .” Carter , 524 F.3d at 798 (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted).

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I n the prese nt case , the district court conclude d that Evans’s suit was barr ed by the Rooke rFeldman doctrine. The st ar t i n g p o int of t hat court’s analy sis was Evans’s alleg ations “that ‘Ohio Re v is e d Co de Section 2323.52 is unconstitutional as applied to [hi m] and potential litigants involve d in case s of divorce ’”; that “the domestic court[,] being awa re of the Plaintiffs [si c] vexatious litigator desig nation, denied the Plaintiff [l eave ] to pro ce ed [ at a h earing on May 27, 2009]”; and that “on J une 18, 2009, leave was denied for Plaintiff to proce ed with his divorce case .” Evans v. Cordray , No. 2:09-cv-0587, 2009 WL 2628280, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug

. 25, 2009) (unpublished) (citi ng Compl., ¶¶ 1, 12). Ba sed on these alleg ations, the district court found that “[ t] he subject of Plaintiff’s complaint is not the constitutionalit y of the Ohio statute, but rathe r is the state court’s decision to d en y him leave to proce ed under that statute: a decision that implicates the merits of Plaintiff’s application for leave .” Id. Be cause the court believed that it “[ could not] revie w Plaintiff’s constitutional claims without revie wing the state court’s substantive finding s,” it held that Evans’s claim was just the sort of fede ral appea l of a state-c ourt judgme nt that the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine pr ohibits. Id. at *3. Evans arg ues that the district court’s decision is err oneous for two rea sons. First, he contends he made two claims, a spec i fi c ch al l eng e (“pur suant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this Appellant made a claim that he wa s d en i ed his fede ral rig hts by the Def endants under color of state law”) , and a g ener al one (“pur suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Plaintiff broug ht a g ener al challeng e to state law as applied to a class of litigants desig nated un d er R.C. § 2323.52 in proce eding s of divorce and domestic relations”), which the district court “improperly lump[ ed]

. . . toge ther.” Second, Eva ns

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ar gu es that even if his complaint prese nted only an as-a pplied challeng e, the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine does not apply beca use his complaint did not attack the judgme nt i t s el f, only “the constitutionalit y of the statutory proce dure of being require d to ask for leave .” Def endants, in turn, contend that we “pre viously reje cted” Evans’s g ener al-c halleng e argument in Carter , 524 F.3d at 796. And they argue that the dom est ic court’s judgme nt is implicated in this suit beca use “Mr. Evans ca n only preva il if the District Court f inds tha t the domestic court e rre d when it denied him leave to proce ed with his domestic litigation, pre cisely what Rooke r-Feldman prohibits.” We substantially ag ree with E vans. The problem with the district c ourt’s analy sis is that it deter mined the source of Evans’ s injury without ref

ere nce to his reque st for relief. See Hamilton , 5 4 0 F. 3d at 372. Our decision in Hood v. Keller , 341 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2003), provides a u s ef u l example. There , a plain t i ff was convicted of criminal trespass in state court and subsequently broug ht suit in fede ral district court ag ainst state officia ls, challeng ing the constitutionalit y of Ohio Administrative Code § 12 8-4, which require d all persons who wished to use the Ohio Statehouse g rounds to first obtain a permit to do so. Id. at 596. The district court held that the claim was barr ed by the Rooke r-Feldm a n doctrine. On appea l, we reve rsed. Noting that the plaintiff’s complaint contained “‘no demand to set aside the verdic t or the state court ruling ’” and instead “[sought] injunctive and d ec l ar atory relief prohibiting defe ndants-appe llees from using ‘pre aching and/or handing out relig ious trac ts’ as a basis for ‘enf orcing or attempting to enfor ce’ Ohio Administrative Code § 128-4,” this court conclude d that “the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine [was] inapplicable to th[ e] lawsuit.” Id. at 598.

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The Seve nth Circuit’s decision in Buck ley v

. Illinois Judic ial Inquiry Board , 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993), which we relied on in Hood , is al s o i n s t ructive. I n that case , the I llinois J udicial I nquiry Boa

rd filed ch ar ges aga i nst Robert Buc kley , an I llinois state-c ourt justice, for violating a state rule regulating the speec h o f candidates for judicial office

. Id. at 226. The I llinois Courts Commi ssion ruled that Buc kley had violated the rule in his 1990 judicial campa ign. Id. Buc kley , in response , filed suit in fed er al d istrict court seeking a decla ratory judgme nt that the state rule regulating the speec h of j udi ci al candidates was unconstitut ional. The S eventh Ci rcuit ul timately revie wed the c laim and held that the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine did not apply . I t expl ained: J ustice Buc kley ’s challenge to the constitutionalit y of [t he I llinois rule] does not entail a challeng e to the ruling by the I llinois Courts Commi ssion that he violated the rule. I t is true that if

. . . Buc kley wer e seeking not only to clea r awa y the rule so that he could run in future judicial elec tions unimpeded by it b u t al s o to obtain relief ag ainst the di scipline imposed upon h i m, he would be in eff ect appealing from the I llinois Courts Commi ssion’s judgme nt

. . . , which Rooke r-Feldman forbids him to do. But he is not asking us to expunge the disciplinary finding or do any thing else to c orre ct or re vise the Commissi on’s judg ment. He is not, in shor t, a sking for any relief of the kind an a

ppellant see ks – relief

direc ted ag ainst a judg ment. Id

. at 227. Cf. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 485-88 (1 9 8 3 ) (holding in part that a lawy er who was ref used admission to the bar could challeng e in fede ral district court the constitutionalit y of the rule that had been applied to deny him admission beca use the suit did not entail a cha lleng e to the state c ourt’s prior a pplication of the rule in his case)

. The same rea soning applies here

. Evans is not seeking relief from the state domestic court’s decisions to deny him leave to proce ed on May 27, 2009, and J une 18, 2009. I nstead, Evans reque sts “prospe ctive and perma

nent i n j u nctive relief ag ainst Richard Cordray , in his officia l capa city as

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Evans v. Cordray , et al. Attorney Gene ral for t h e S t at e of Ohio, and the Fr anklin County Court of Common Pleas, from apply ing Ohio’s vexatious l itigator statute ag ainst the Plaintiff in his divorc e case .” He also seeks “per manent inj unctive declaratory relief wher e Ohio Revised C ode 2323.52 is unconstitutional as it applies to litigants desig nated vexatious who prese ntly are , or subsequently become , involved in

case s of divorce and domestic rela tions.” Thus, the source of Evans’s inj u ry i s Oh i o ’s alleg edly unconstitutional prese nt and future enfor ceme n t o f § 2323.52’s reme dial provisions in divorce proce eding s, not the domestic court’s pr ior interlocutory decisions deny

ing him leave to proc eed. Rooke r-Feldman there fore does not apply

. Cf. Fieger v

. Ferry , 471 F.3d 637, 646 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (“To the extent that Fieg er c halleng es the c onstitut ionality of Michig an’s rec usal rules by alleg ing that ‘[t] he threa t .

. . is r eal, immediate, and continuing,’ Rooke r-Feldman does not bar his a ction” beca use “the source of [his] alleg ed injury is not the past state court judg ments; it i s the purporte d unconstitutionalit y

of Michig an’s r ecusa l rule as a pplied in future c ases.” ). Evans’s prese nt action is also not a prohibited fede ral-district- court appea l of the state-c ourt decision deter

mining that he is a “vexatious litigator.” Although the § 2323.52 order enter ed in that

case require d Evans to seek leave to litig ate or continue litigating in the Ohio courts, and is thus in

some sense a source of his injury here , Evans is not seeking relief from that judgment – he does not contest the state court’s deter mination that he is a vexatious litigator

. S ee E d w a r d s v. Ill. Bd. of Admissions to Bar , 261 F.3d 723, 729 (7th Cir. 2001) (“When the litigant is challeng ing the constitution ality of a rule that was applied to him, but is not asking to corr ect or revise the deter mination that he violated the rule, Rooker-F eldman is no obstacle to the maintenanc e of [t he]

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Evans v. Cordray , et al. suit.”) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted); cf. Hood , 341 F.3d at 598; Buck ley , 997 F.2d at 22 7

. M o re o v er, Evans’s curr ent claim that the statute is unconstitutional as applied in divorce proce eding s was not an issue in the vexatious-lit iga tor case and there fore prese nted no basis for an appea l. See g enerally Exx on Mobil , 544 U.S. at 293 (explaining that “[i] f a fede ral plaintiff prese nt[ s] some indep en d en t cl ai m, albeit one that denies a leg al conclusion that a st ate court has

rea ched in a case to which he was a party

. . . , then there is jurisdiction.”) (interna l quotation marks and citations omitted). Be cause the source of Evans’ s injury is neither the Ohio domestic c ourt’s dec ision to deny his motions to continue, nor the state court’s deter mination that he is a vexatious litigator, but rathe r the alleg ed unconstitutionalit y o f § 2 3 2 3

. 5 2 as applied in divorce proce eding s, we hold that the district court was n ot deprive d of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine. I V. For these rea sons, we reve rse th e j u d gm ent of the district court and rema nd for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

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