alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
---

Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERPURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Hassan Hans Badreddine, President and Chief Executive
Officer of Bioshaft Water Technology, Inc. (the Company), hereby certify
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

| | (a) | the Quarterly report on Form 10-Q of the Company, for the
      first quarter ended October 31, 2010, and to which this certification is
      attached as Exhibit 32.1 (the Report) fully complies with the
      requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
      1934, as amended; and
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
| | (b) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents,
      in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
      operations of the Company.                                                                                                                                                         



|By:    | /s/ Hassan Hans
      Badreddine                        
|------ | --------------------------------------------------------
|Name:  | Hassan Hans Badreddine                                  
|Title: | President and Chief Executive
      Officer and Director
|       | (Principal Executive Officer)                           
|Date:  | December 15, 2010                                       

A signed original of this written statement required by
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the
Registrant and will be retained by the Registrant and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

This certification accompanies the Form 10-Q to which it
relates, is not deemed filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is
not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Registrant under the
Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (whether made
before or after the date of the Form 10-Q), irrespective of any general
incorporation language contained in such filing.

---
906 A.2d 437

#### IN THE MATTER OF JILL R. EPSTEIN, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.

September 20, 2006.

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its decision in DRB 06-106, concluding on the record certified to the Board pursuant to *Rule*1:20 — 4(f) (default by respondent), that JILL R. EPSTEIN of NEW YORK, NEW YORK, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 2000, should be censured for violating *RPC*1.3 (lack of diligence), *RPC*1.4(a) (failure to communicate with client), *RPC*1.15(b) (failure to promptly deliver funds to client), *RPC*1.15(d) (failure to comply with R. 1:21-6; record-keeping deficiencies), and *RPC*8.1(b) (failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities), and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that JILL R. EPSTEIN is hereby censured; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in *Rule*1:20-17.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report of Mattmar Minerals, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending February 28, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"Report"), I, Kirk M. Warshaw, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and                  
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

Dated: March 27, 2009

/s/ Kirk M. Warshaw-----------------------------------Kirk M. WarshawChief Financial Officer

A signed original of this certification has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



---
#### Inga Natradeze et al., Respondents, v Elena Rubin, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

[822 NYS2d 541]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Alison Y. Tuitt, J.), entered January 11, 2005, which denied defendant Rubin’s motion to vacate her default, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted.

The default order entered was a nullity inasmuch as plaintiffs’ default motion papers failed to include either a verified complaint or an affidavit prepared by one having personal knowledge of the facts at issue *(see DeLeon v Sonin & Genis,*303 AD2d 291, 292 [2003]). Although Rubin did not appear on plaintiffs motion seeking a default, and for the first time on appeal she challenges the adequacy of plaintiffs motion papers seeking a default, the issue can be reached as it is one that can be decided as a matter of law from the face of the record *(see Chateau D’ If Corp. v City of New York,*219 AD2d 205, 209 [1996], *lv denied*88 NY2d 811 [1996]). Given our conclusion that the challenged order was a “nullity,” Rubin’s remaining arguments need not be reached. Concur—Saxe, J.P, Friedman, Williams, Catterson and Malone, JJ.
Exhibit 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the quarterly report of Mattmar Minerals, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending February 28, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Kirk M. Warshaw, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





Dated: April 5, 2011





/s/ Kirk M. WarshawKirk M. WarshawChief Financial Officer(Principal Financial Officer)





A signed original of this certification has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
905 A.2d 876

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. BATISTA RODRIGUEZ, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

August 8, 2006.

ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted on the issue of defendant’s sentence, and the matter is summarily remanded to the trial court for resentencing in light of the Court’s decision in *State v. Pierce,*188 *N.J.*155, 902 A.2d 1195 (2006).
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20

- 6425

DANIEL L. ALLEN , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. R. DAVID MITCHELL; TIMOTHY J. MCKOY; KEVIN A. BARNES; LARRY M. DUNSTON; SHELTON E. ROGERS; JUANITA R. JAMES; MARANDA C. MIMS; COLBERT L. RESPASS , Defendants

- Appellees,
and FRANK L. PERRY; ROBERT D. FOUNTAIN; TERRY J. LEMON; JERRY L. CRAWFORD; CHRISTOPHER B. RICH; GEORGE T. SOLOMON,
Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Raleigh

. Louise W. Flanagan , District Judge. ( 5:16

- ct

- 03113

- FL )

Submitted : March 22, 2021 Decided: March 29, 2021

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and KEENAN and THACKER , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.2 Daniel L. Allen, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.3 PER CURIAM:

Da niel L. Allen appeals the district court’s order and judgment granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing Allen’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint. The court’s order granting summary judgment may be affirmed on any ground appearing in the record, “including theories not relie d upon or rejected by the district
court.” Scott v. United States , 328 F.3d 132, 137 (4th Cir. 2003). We conclud e that Allen’s claims are barred by North Carolina’s three

- year statute of limitations. See Wallace v.

Kato , 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (noting length of statute of limitations in § 1983 action determined by state law); Brooks v. City of Winston

- Salem , 85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1996) ( applying North Carolina’s three

- year statute of limitations for § 1983 action).
Allen’s claims accrued at the latest on May 20, 2010, the date of his second disciplinary hearing. Allen filed his complaint at the earliest on May 7, 2016, the date Allen si gned his original complaint , clearly three years beyond the accrual date for statute of limitation

purposes. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order and judgment

. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequ ately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

NICHOLAS ST. CLAIRE THOMPSON, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D19-429

)

STATE OF FLORIDA, )

)

Appellee. )

________________________________ )

Opinion filed November 1, 2019.

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 

9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for 

Pinellas County; Philip J. Federico, 

Judge.

Nicholas St. Claire Thompson, pro se. 

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

VILLANTI, SALARIO, and SMITH, JJ., Concur.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TOMMY C. COVINGTON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) CASE NO. 1:11-cv-0026-MEF

)

ZIMMER HOLDINGS, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

O R D E R

Upon consideration of the defendant's Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to

File and Serve Responsive Pleading (Doc. #7) filed on February 2, 2011, it is hereby

ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED to and including March 10, 2011.

DONE this the 3 day of February, 2011.

rd

/s/ Mark E. Fuller

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:11-cv-01723-SDW-MCA Document 10 Filed 02/03/11 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 44 Case 1:11-cv-00026-MEF -SRW Document 10 Filed 02/03/11 Page 1 of 1
#### Newark Machine Co. *v.*Gaar and others.1

*(Circuit Court, D. Indiana.*

November *18, 1886.)*

*1.*Patents for. Inventions—Clover-Hullers—Seed-Cleaners.

On the same record and evidence as in *Wewa/i'k Machine Co.*v. *3a/rgett,*28 Fed. Rep. 567, the decision in that case followed.

2. Same—Construction of Claims—Infringement.

If the patentability of the devices claimed in letters patent No. 822,465, of July 21, 1885, to Miller, for recleaner for grain-separators, be conceded, the claims must, in view of the prior art, be construed strictly; and, not being found in defendants’ machine, *held,*there was no infringement.

In Chancery.

*Wells W. Leggett, M.*D. *Leggett, Wm. & Lew Wallace,*for plaintiff.

*Wood & Boyd,*for defendants.

1

Edited by Charles C. Linthioum, Esq., of the Chicago bar.

Woods, J.

The questions presented here, excepting one, are the same which .were recently considered and decided, and as I think correctly decided, in the case of *Newark Machine Co.*v. *Hargett,*28 Fed. Rep. 567. The record and evidence in the two cases, it is conceded, are the same; but it is insisted that these defendants are shown to have infringed the device covered by patent No. 322,465, issued July 21, 1885, to Miller. The claims of that patent are two, and read as follows:

> “(1) A reeleaning attachment for grain-separators, consisting, essentially, of a hopper, a screen for receiving the grain from the hopper, an elevator having a chamber at its lower end, and its upper end arranged to deliver the grain to the hopper, and an inclined conductor having one end connected directly with the chamber of the elevator, and its upper end formed into a mouth, arranged under the discharge mouth of the screen to convey the tailings to the chamber of the elevator, substantially as set forth.

> “(2) The combination, with a separator, of a reeleaning device, consisting, essentially, of a screen, an elevator for elevating the tailings to the screen, and a spout arranged directly between the screen and elevator for receiving the tailings from the screen, and discharging them into the elevator frame ' or casing.”

, If the patentability of the device described in each claim be conceded, it is clear, in the light of the earlier art, that these claims must be construed strictly,—and, so construed, were not infringed by the defendants, whose reeleaning attachments have not had “a spout arranged directly between the screen and elevator,” nor “an inclined conductor having one end connected directly with the chamber of the elevator.” Besides, the evidence shows, as I view it, that these devices or claims had been anticipated by the Shively recleaner.

Bill dismissed for want of equity.
Case 3:11-cr-00173-AET Document 9 Filed 04/07/11 Page 1 of 8 PageID: 30
Case 3:11-cr-00173-AET Document 9 Filed 04/07/11 Page 2 of 8 PageID: 31
Case 3:11-cr-00173-AET Document 9 Filed 04/07/11 Page 3 of 8 PageID: 32
Case 3:11-cr-00173-AET Document 9 Filed 04/07/11 Page 4 of 8 PageID: 33
Case 3:11-cr-00173-AET Document 9 Filed 04/07/11 Page 5 of 8 PageID: 34
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Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Be th Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

March 3, 2015

s0223 

# Order

Clerk March 3, 2015

149421

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 149421

COA: 321078

Wayne CC: 11

- 009139

- FC

DERRICK BERNARD WESTBROOK,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 6, 2014 order of

the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to

meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
FILED

November 24, 1998

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

 ______________________________________________

AMY TYLER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Williamson Circuit No. 96361

Vs. C.A. No. 01A01-9711-CV-00661

LARRY MORGAN, d/b/a LARRY

MORGAN CONST. COMPANY,

UNITED CITIES GAS CO., 

ROGER P. DYE, d/b/a ROGER DYE

CONST. CO., MURRAY TATUM,

QUAD STATES, INC., 

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________________________________________________________________

D I S S E N T

____________________________________________________________________________

CRAWFORD, J.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. Bearden’s affidavit states that he had

a conversation with the defendants’ employees right after they finished pouring the concrete at

about 5:00 or 5:30 p.m. He further states that after warning the workers that they should

barricade the area, he was assured by the workers that they would put up a barricade. Although

a stretched string is not much of a barricade as we normally think of a barricade, to some people

it could be considered a type of a warning barricade. Since Bearden was assured by the workers

that they would put up a barricade, and subsequently the so-called barricade existed, there

appears to be an inference that the workers placed the barricade.

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider the motion in

the same manner as a motion for directed verdict made at the close of the plaintiff’s proof; that

is, the court must take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving

party allowing all reasonable inferences in favor of that party and discard all countervailing

evidence. Suddath v. Park, 914 S.W.2d 910 (Tenn. App. 1995).

Although the defendants categorically deny any knowledge of the string, the fact that the

defendant’s employees said they were going to erect a barricade, in my opinion creates a genuine

issue as to a material fact and precludes summary judgment.

I would reverse the order of the trial court granting summary judgment and remand this

case for further proceedings.
2

_________________________________

W. FRANK CRAWFORD, 

PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5048 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5048

To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide for coverage 
under the Medicare Program of annual screening pap smear and screening 
                             pelvic exams.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 9, 2004

Mr. Green of Texas introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee 
 on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
  Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide for coverage 
under the Medicare Program of annual screening pap smear and screening 
                             pelvic exams.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Providing Annual Pap Tests to Save 
Women's Lives Act of 2004''.

SEC. 2. COVERAGE OF ANNUAL SCREENING PAP SMEAR AND PELVIC EXAMS.

    (a) In General.--
            (1) Annual screening pap smear.--Section 1861(nn)(1) of the 
        Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395x(nn)(1)) is amended by 
        striking ``, if the individual involved'' and all that follows 
        before the period and inserting ``if the woman involved has not 
        had such a test during the preceding year''.
            (2) Annual screening pelvic exam.--Section 1861(nn)(2) of 
        the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395x(nn)(2)) is amended by 
        striking ``during the preceding 2 years, or during the 
        preceding year in the case of a woman described in paragraph 
        (3),'' and inserting ``during the preceding year,''.
            (3) Conforming amendment.--Section 1861(nn) of the Social 
        Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395x(nn)) is amended by striking 
        paragraph (3).
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) apply to 
items and services furnished on or after January 1, 2005.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Market Data Consultants, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended May 31, 2007 (the "Report"), I, Wilson Cheung, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

> 1) The Report fully complies with the requirement of Section 13(a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange
> Act of 1934; and
> 
> 
> 2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the Company's
> financial position and results of operations.

/s/Wilson Cheung



Wilson Cheung, Chief Financial Officer

July 18, 2007
#### Carmine Bicchetti, Respondent, v County of Nassau, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

[854 NYS2d 401]

An employee of the defendant County of Nassau was operating a vehicle engaged in snow removal operations on a highway. Therefore, his performance of that activity is subject to the standard of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b), which requires due regard for the safety of others and sets a recklessness standard in determining the liability to others arising from the performance of the work. In order for the plaintiff to recover damages for injuries caused by the operation of a vehicle subject to the provisions of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b), the plaintiff “must show that the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow and has done so with conscious indifference to the outcome” *(Riley v County of Broome,*95 NY2d 455, 466 [2000] [citation and internal quotation marks omitted]; *see Levine v GBE Contr. Corp.,*2 AD3d 596 [2003]; *Farese v Town of Carmel,*296 AD2d 436 [2002]).

The County failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as matter of law by “tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact” *(Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.,*68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). The record presents triable issues of fact as to the County employee’s conduct in the course of plowing snow, thereby precluding summary judgment *(see O’Keeffe v State of New York,*40 AD3d 607 [2007]). Skelos, J.P., Angiolillo, Leventhal and Belen, JJ., concur.
Unassociated Document











Exhibit 10.64


 


January 1, 2013


 


New York Aircam Corp.


340 Crossways Park  Drive


Woodbury, NY  11771







Re:  Extension of Management Agreement







Gentlemen:







Reference is made hereby to that certain Aircraft Management Agreement (the “Agreement”) entered into as of July 9, 2010 by and among CSC Transport, Inc. (“CSC”), New York Aircam Corp. (“NY Aircam)”, Charles F. Dolan (“CFD”) and Patrick F. Dolan (“PFD”).







CSC, DFO, CFD and PFD hereby agree that the Agreement shall hereby continue in an effect on a month-to-month basis until such time as terminated by either party on ten days notice or the aircraft which is the subject of the Agreement is sold to a third party.   Except as amended hereby, the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect in accordance with its terms.







Please indicate your acceptance of the foregoing by executing this letter in the space provided below.  Thank you for your assistance in this matter.


 



	  	Sincerely,	 
	  	  	  	 
	  	CSC TRANSPORT, INC.
	  	  	  	 
	  	
By:

	/s/ James Nuzzo	 
	  	
Name:

	
James Nuzzo

	 
	  	
Title:

	
EVP, Business Planning







 




	
AGREED AND ACCEPTED:

	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	
NEW YORK AIRCAM CORP.

	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	
By:

	/s/ Renzo R. Mori	 	 	
 

	 
	
Name: Renzo R. Mori

	 	 	 	 
	
Title: VP

	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	
CHARLES F. DOLAN

	 	 	
PATRICK F. DOLAN

	 
	/s/ Charles F. Dolan	 	 	 /s/ Patrick F. Dolan