1

Filed 10/9/13 (reposted without change 10/9/13 to attach unmodified opn.)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO 

COUNTY,

Respondent;

CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING,

 Real Party in Interest.

C072325

(Super. Ct. No. 34-2012-

80001044)

ORDER MODIFYING 

OPINION 

[CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the Disposition of the published majority opinion filed herein on 

September 18, 2013, be modified as follows: 

1. Delete the third sentence (and its following citation) of the Disposition, which 

reads “Each party shall pay its own costs in this writ review proceeding. (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 8.493(a)(1)(B); Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (c).)” 

2. At the end of the last sentence of the Disposition, which begins “To the extent the 

trial court” and ends with “court costs incurred in the trial court.” insert the following text 

“, and in this court.” so that the Disposition now reads:
2

DISPOSITION

Having complied with the procedural requirements for issuance of a peremptory 

writ in the first instance, we are authorized to issue the peremptory writ forthwith. (See 

Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171.) Let a peremptory writ of 

mandate issue directing respondent Superior Court to vacate its judgment of October 22, 

2012, and its ruling under submission of September 13, 2012, and to enter a new 

judgment (1) that directs Public Health to produce to News Center the requested citations 

in accordance with the standards set forth in this opinion, ante, at pages 19 to 22 

(pt. III.D. of the Discussion), and (2) that grants declaratory relief to News Center to this 

same extent (on News Center‟s parallel complaint for declaratory relief). To the extent 

the trial court determines that News Center prevailed in this matter, News Center is 

entitled to recover, upon appropriate application, reasonable attorney fees and court costs 

incurred in the trial court, and in this court. (Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (d).)14

This modification represents a change in the judgment.

BY THE COURT:

 HULL , Acting P. J.

 BUTZ , J.

__________________________

14 In this writ review proceeding, we have resolved the specific issue presented 

regarding the potential conflict between the Lanterman Act‟s confidentiality provisions 

and the Long-Term Care Act‟s public accessibility provisions in the context of the PRA 

request here. Public Health also asks us, more generally, whether it is obligated to 

produce other information and documents, and whether it is immune from sanctions for 

wrongful disclosures. To the extent these two issues are not covered by our resolution 

here, we decline to address them at this point. (See Filarsky v. Superior Court (2002) 

28 Cal.4th 419, 432, 434-435 [public agency may not initiate declaratory relief action to 

determine its duties under the PRA].)
1

Filed 9/18/13 (unmodified version)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO 

COUNTY,

Respondent;

CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING,

 Real Party in Interest.

C072325

(Super. Ct. No. 34-2012-

80001044)

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; petition for extraordinary writ of mandate. 

Timothy M. Frawley, Judge. Peremptory writ issued. 

 

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie Weng-Gutierrez, Assistant 

Attorney General, Niromi W. Pfeiffer and Grant Lien, Deputy Attorneys General, 

for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Davis Wright Tremaine, Duffy Carolan and Jeff Glasser for Real Party in 

Interest.
2

This is an action under the California Public Records Act (PRA) (Gov. Code, 

§ 6250 et seq.). Pursuant to the PRA, an investigative news organization requested 

citations for patient care violations that the State Department of Public Health (Public 

Health) issued to state facilities housing mentally ill and developmentally disabled 

patients. These citations were issued under California‟s Long-Term Care, Health, Safety, 

and Security Act of 1973 (hereinafter, Long-Term Care Act) (Health & Saf. Code, § 1417 

et seq.). 

Long-Term Care Act citations are publicly accessible in certain contexts, 

including through a PRA request. However, another statutory scheme, the LantermanPetris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.) and companion statutes in the 

Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act (id., § 4500 et seq.), renders mental 

health records, and information obtained in the course of providing such services, 

confidential (id., §§ 5328, 5328.15, 4514).1 

Pursuant to the Lanterman Act, Public Health redacted from the citations it 

provided the news organization essentially all the facts concerning the nature of the 

violations. 

In this writ review proceeding (Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (c)), we harmonize the 

Long-Term Care Act‟s public accessibility provisions with the Lanterman Act‟s 

confidentiality provisions in the context of this PRA request. We conclude, among other 

things, that Public Health must not redact from the citations provided under the PRA the 

particular description of what the nature of the violation was, a description required by 

the Long-Term Care Act. Consequently, we issue a peremptory writ of mandate along 

these lines. 

 

1 We will refer to this statutory scheme—the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and the 

Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act—collectively as the Lanterman Act. 
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In May 2011, the Center for Investigative Reporting (News Center), an 

investigative news organization, requested under the PRA (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.) 

copies of citations for violations of patient care standards that Public Health issued to 

seven of the state‟s residential facilities for the mentally ill and the developmentally 

disabled (occasionally hereinafter, state facilities; these facilities are operated by the State 

Department of Developmental Services, not a party herein).2 News Center sought 

citations issued from January 1, 2002, to the present. 

Public Health responded to News Center‟s PRA request by stating that Public 

Health was required to maintain citations for only four years, and that any citations 

produced would be redacted pursuant to the confidentiality provisions set forth in the 

Lanterman Act, applying to the mentally ill and the developmentally disabled. 

Public Health produced 55 extensively redacted citations for the years 2007 to 

2011. Public Health removed essentially all factual information about the nature of the 

violation from the citations, so that they stated generically along the following lines: 

“The facility failed to keep Client 1 free from harm”; “The facility . . . failed to ensure 

clients‟ rights to be free from the harm of abuse”; “The facility . . . failed to treat clients 

with dignity and respect”; or simply, “The facility failed to: [remainder redacted].” 

News Center filed a complaint for declaratory relief and petitioned the trial court 

for a writ of mandate to obtain the PRA-requested citations in unredacted or minimally 

redacted form. News Center relied principally on the Long-Term Care Act (Health & 

Saf. Code, § 1417 et seq.), the statutory scheme under which Public Health issued the 

 

2 The term “developmental disability” includes “mental retardation, cerebral palsy, 

epilepsy, and autism” and disabling conditions “closely related to mental retardation”; the 

term does not include “handicapping conditions that are solely physical in nature.” 

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4512, subd. (a).) 
4

citations. The Long-Term Care Act provides that its citations (for found violations) are 

publicly available (id., § 1429; see id., §§ 1423, 1424), and that its writings are open to 

public inspection pursuant to the PRA, except for the names of individuals other than 

certain investigating officers (id., § 1439). 

In ruling on News Center‟s complaint and writ petition, the trial court concluded 

that (1) “[w]here mental health records are involved [(i.e., the records at issue here)], 

there is an irreconcilable conflict between the Lanterman Act‟s confidentiality provisions 

and the Long-Term Care Act‟s accessibility provisions”; (2) “[t]he statutes cannot be 

harmonized by disclosing the citation denuded of all the underlying factual information 

giving rise to the citation”; and (3) “the Legislature intended the accessibility provisions 

of the Long-Term Care Act to prevail as a special exception to the Lanterman Act‟s 

general rule of confidentiality.” Consequently, the trial court issued a writ of mandate 

(and corresponding declaratory relief) directing Public Health to produce the citations 

requested by News Center “without redaction, except as to the names of individuals other 

than investigating officers . . . .”3 

 

3 The trial court also stated that Public Health could not rely on “its internal retention 

policy” (i.e., Public Health‟s policy that it was required to maintain citations for only four 

years), and concluded that if Public Health still has responsive documents, it is obligated 

to produce them. In the context of our resolution of this case, we agree. 
5

Public Health filed a petition for extraordinary writ of mandate with us, seeking 

review of the trial court‟s decision. (Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (c).)4 We issued an 

alternative writ and stayed further proceedings.5 

 

4 In a one-paragraph passage in its writ review petition, Public Health contends the trial 

court‟s writ of mandate also overlooked the privacy protections set forth in the 

Information Practices Act of 1977 (Civ. Code, § 1798 et seq.), which prohibits state 

agencies from releasing an individual‟s personal identifying information unless 

authorized to do so—for example, name, home address, home phone number, social 

security number, or medical history or financial matters. (Civ. Code, §§ 1798.3, subd. 

(a), 1798.24.) The trial court‟s ruling and writ order redacted names, and contemplated 

redacting any personal identifying information that could be akin to “naming” someone 

(except, as the relevant statutes provide, the names of certain investigators). We intend 

our resolution of this case to similarly foreclose the release of personal identifying 

information. 

5 News Center claims that we lack jurisdiction to consider Public Health‟s writ review 

petition, because Public Health filed its petition late. (Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (c); 

People v. Superior Court (Brent) (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 675, 683 [where a statute sets 

forth a specific time limit within which a writ petition must be filed, the failure to do so 

has been held jurisdictional].) We disagree. Under the PRA review procedure, Public 

Health had 25 days from the date the court clerk served notice of the trial court‟s ruling 

(20 days plus five days for mailing) either to file with us its petition for extraordinary writ 

(seeking review), or to request a filing extension from the trial court of up to 20 more 

days. (Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (c); see Cornell University Medical College v. Superior 

Court (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 311, 314 [it is generally implied in such a statute that an 

extension must be requested before the statutory filing deadline expires].) The court 

clerk stated that it mailed the trial court‟s ruling on September 13, 2012, but the trial 

court‟s postage meter disclosed the ruling was mailed September 17, 2012. Public 

Health‟s first act regarding its writ review petition was to seek in the trial court on 

October 10, 2012, an extension of time to file the petition (and the trial court granted 

Public Health a 20-day extension). This October 10 date is 27 days from September 13, 

but only 23 days from September 17. Recognizing the import of which mailing date was 

the correct one given the 25-day deadline to act, the parties letter-briefed the trial court on 

this issue, and the trial court, as authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 1013a, 

subdivision (4), impliedly determined that the September 17 date was the correct one. 

Public Health then filed its petition for extraordinary writ of mandate (seeking review) 

with us on October 26, 2012, which is 39 days from September 17. 
6

DISCUSSION

I. Issue and Standard of Review

New Center‟s PRA request for the Public Health citations for the state facilities 

implicates three statutes: the PRA (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.); the Long-Term Care Act 

(Health & Saf. Code, § 1417 et seq.); and the Lanterman Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§§ 5000 et seq., 4500 et seq.).6 

The issue is, in the context of a PRA request for citations issued by Public Health 

to state facilities housing the mentally ill and the developmentally disabled: Can the 

public accessibility provisions for citations issued under the Long-Term Care Act be 

reconciled with the confidentiality provisions of the Lanterman Act, and, if so, how?

The PRA provides for the inspection of public records maintained by state and 

local government agencies to fulfill the “fundamental and necessary right of every person 

in this state” to have access to information concerning the conduct of the people‟s 

business. (Gov. Code, § 6250.) The PRA‟s general policy is to favor disclosure; a claim 

of nondisclosure must be found in a specific exemption enumerated in that act. (Cook v. 

Craig (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 773, 781; Gov. Code, § 6253.) The PRA exemption at issue 

here masks “[r]ecords, the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to . . . 

state law . . . [the state law here being the Lanterman Act confidentiality provisions].” 

(Gov. Code, § 6254, subd. (k).) The Long-Term Care Act, however, makes its citations 

publicly accessible via statutory provisions on posting, requesting, and the PRA. (See 

Health & Saf. Code, §§ 1423, 1424, 1429, 1439.) 

 

6 Because the statutes we discuss are found in various codes, for simplicity, we will refer 

to the statutes in discussion pursuant to their act rather than their code—for example, 

section 6254 of the PRA (i.e., the Government Code); section 1417 of the Long-Term 

Care Act (i.e., the Health and Safety Code); and section 5328 of the Lanterman Act (i.e., 

the Welfare and Institutions Code). We will, however, cite to the acts by their respective 

code attributions. 
7

As for any reconciliation between the Long-Term Care Act‟s public accessibility 

provisions and the Lanterman Act‟s confidentiality provisions, “[t]he issue presented is 

essentially one of statutory construction. When engaged in statutory construction, our 

aim is „to ascertain the intent of the enacting legislative body so that we may adopt the 

construction that best effectuates the purpose of the law.‟ [Citations.] „We first examine 

the words themselves because the statutory language is generally the most reliable 

indicator of legislative intent.‟ [Citation.] When construing the interaction of two 

potentially conflicting statutes, we strive to effectuate the purpose of each by 

harmonizing them, if possible, in a way that allows both to be given effect.” (Chavez v. 

City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 986 (Chavez).) 

We turn now to the statutory purposes and relevant language of the Long-Term 

Care Act and the Lanterman Act. 

II. The Statutory Purposes and Relevant Language of the

Long-Term Care Act and the Lanterman Act 

A. The Long-Term Care Act

The Long-Term Care Act (Health & Saf. Code, § 1417 et seq.), which applies to 

the state facilities for the mentally ill and the developmentally disabled at issue here, also 

applies to the much more populous skilled nursing facilities and convalescent hospitals in 

the state (and essentially to all long-term health care facilities in the state). (See Health & 

Saf. Code, §§ 1418, 1250.) 

The Long-Term Care Act establishes an inspection, citation, reporting, and civil 

(monetary) penalty system that is designed to create a less cumbersome, less draconian, 

and more preventative enforcement method than the system of suspending and revoking 

health facility licenses. (See Health & Saf. Code, div. 2, chs. 2, 2.4, 3; Health & Saf. 

Code, § 1417.1; California Assn. of Health Facilities v. Department of Health Services

(1997) 16 Cal.4th 284, 294-295 (California Assn.); Kizer v. County of San Mateo (1991) 
8

53 Cal.3d 139, 150 (Kizer).) This act is designed to “ensure that long-term health care 

facilities provide the highest level of care possible,” by ensuring that patient care 

standards are met. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 1422, subd. (a), 1417.1.) The Long-Term 

Care Act applies to some “of the most vulnerable segments of our population”—for 

example, “ „nursing care patients . . . who are already disabled by age and infirmity‟ ” 

and, as here, the mentally ill and the developmentally disabled. (California Assn., supra, 

19 Cal.4th at p. 295; Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 150.) As a remedial statute, the LongTerm Care Act‟s citation provisions are to be liberally construed on behalf of the class of 

persons they are designed to protect. (California Assn., supra, at p. 295; Health & Saf. 

Code, § 1424.) 

Public Health (formerly the Department of Health Services) administers and 

enforces the Long-Term Care Act. (California Assn., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 288.) The 

Long-Term Care Act contains provisions that make citations publicly available, except 

for the names of individuals other than specified investigating officers. (See Health & 

Saf. Code, §§ 1423, subd. (a)(2), 1424, 1429, 1439.) Public availability of the citations is 

accomplished primarily through prominent posting at the facility (for the more serious 

class A and class AA citations), public request, and PRA request. (Health & Saf. Code, 

§§ 1429, 1439.) In this way, the Long-Term Care Act affords the public an oversight role 

concerning long-term health care facilities. We note, however, that the media, such as 

News Center, has no greater right of access to public records pursuant to a PRA request 

than the general public. (Dixon v. Superior Court (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1271, 1279.)

The two most pertinent provisions of the Long-Term Care Act covering the nature 

of citation information available to the public are sections 1423 and 1424. (Health & Saf. 

Code, §§ 1423, 1424.) 

Health and Safety Code section 1423, subdivision (a)(2) specifies, as relevant, that 

“[e]ach citation shall be in writing and shall describe with particularity the nature of the 
9

violation, including a reference to the statutory provision, standard, rule or regulation 

alleged to have been violated, the particular place or area of the facility in which it 

occurred, as well as the amount of any proposed assessment of a civil penalty. The name 

of any patient jeopardized by the alleged violation shall not be specified in the citation in 

order to protect the privacy of the patient. . . . The citation shall fix the earliest feasible 

time for the elimination of the condition constituting the alleged violation, when 

appropriate.” 

And Health and Safety Code section 1424, subdivisions (a) and (b) add, as 

relevant:

“Citations issued pursuant to [the Long-Term Care Act] shall be classified 

according to the nature of the violation and shall indicate the classification on the face 

thereof [(i.e., class „B‟, class „A‟, and class „AA‟ [in increasing severity])].

“(a) In determining the amount of the civil penalty, all relevant facts shall be 

considered, including, but not limited to, the following:

“(1) The probability and severity of the risk that the violation presents to the 

patient‟s or resident‟s mental and physical condition.

“(2) The patient‟s or resident‟s medical condition.

“(3) The patient‟s or resident‟s mental condition and his or her history of mental 

disability or disorder.

“(4) The good faith efforts exercised by the facility to prevent the violation from 

occurring.

“(5) The licensee‟s history of compliance with regulations.
10

“(b) Relevant facts considered by [Public Health] in determining the amount of the 

civil penalty shall be documented by [Public Health] on an attachment to the citation and 

available in the public record. . . .” 

News Center made its request for the Public Health citations pursuant to section 

1439 of the Long-Term Care Act, the act‟s PRA provision. (Health & Saf. Code, 

§ 1439.) 

Section 1439 of the Long-Term Care Act states that “[a]ny writing received, 

owned, used, or retained by [Public Health] in connection with the [Long-Term Care Act] 

is a public record within the meaning of [the PRA], and, as such, is open to public 

inspection pursuant to the [PRA] provision[s] of Sections 6253, 6256, 6257, and 6258 of 

the Government Code. However, the names of any persons contained in such records, 

except the names of duly authorized officers, employees, or agents of the state 

department conducting an investigation or inspection in response to a complaint filed 

pursuant to [the Long-Term Care Act], shall not be open to public inspection and copies 

of such records provided for public inspection shall have such names deleted.” (Health & 

Saf. Code, § 1439.) Government Code section 6253, subdivision (b) of the PRA states, 

as relevant, that public records are to be made promptly available, “[e]xcept with respect 

to public records exempt from disclosure by express provisions of law . . . .” 

Government Code sections 6256 and 6257 have been repealed. (Stats. 1998, ch. 620, 

§§ 7, 10, p. 4121.) Government Code section 6258 governs the proceedings to enforce 

the right to the record.

Section 6254 of the PRA specifies the particular types of records exempt from 

PRA disclosure. The PRA disclosure exemption at issue here, as noted, is for “[r]ecords, 

the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to . . . state law, including, but 

not limited to, provisions of the Evidence Code relating to privilege.” (Gov. Code, 

§ 6254, subd. (k).)
11

That leads us to the state law here on exempting or prohibiting disclosure—

sections 5328 and 4514 of the Lanterman Act. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5328, 4514.)

B. The Lanterman Act

The Lanterman Act (see Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 4500 et seq., 5000 et seq.) is a 

comprehensive state law directed at the evaluation, supervision, protection, care and 

treatment of persons who are mentally ill, developmentally disabled or impaired by 

chronic alcoholism. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5001.)7 

The Lanterman Act states that all information and records obtained in the course 

of providing services under the Lanterman Act (and other specified mental health 

programs) shall be confidential, subject to defined statutory exceptions. (Welf. & Inst. 

Code, §§ 4514, 5328.) The legislative purpose for confidentiality is to encourage persons 

with mental or severe alcohol problems or developmental disabilities to seek, undergo 

and accept treatment, and to be candid and open in such treatment, knowing such 

treatment will remain confidential and any embarrassment, undesired publicity or stigma 

will be avoided. (In re S. W. (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 719, 721; County of Riverside v. 

Superior Court (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 478, 481 (County of Riverside); see also Tarasoff v. 

Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 440 (Tarasoff).)

Section 5328 of the Lanterman Act sets forth the following general rule of 

confidentiality applying to the mentally ill: “All information and records obtained in the 

 

7 As originally enacted, the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, including its confidentiality 

provisions, applied to both the mentally ill and the developmentally disabled. (Welf. & 

Inst. Code, § 5328, added by Stats. 1972, ch. 1058, § 2, pp. 1960-1961; Gilbert v. 

Superior Court (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 161, 168-169 (Gilbert).) For our purposes, a later 

nonsubstantive statutory division kept the mentally ill (and chronically alcoholic) in the 

Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, and placed the developmentally disabled in the parallel 

companion statutory scheme of the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act; 

the confidentiality provisions of both acts are quite similar. (See, e.g., Welf. & Inst. 

Code, §§ 4500, 4514, 5328; Gilbert, supra, at pp. 168-169.)
12

course of providing services under Division 4 (commencing with Section 4000 [mental 

health]), Division 4.1 (commencing with Section 4400 [developmental services]), 

Division 4.5 (commencing with Section 4500 [the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities 

Services Act]), Division 5 (commencing with Section 5000 [the Lanterman-Petris-Short 

Act]), Division 6 (commencing with Section 6000 [admissions and judicial 

commitments]), or Division 7 (commencing with Section 7100 [mental institutions]), to 

either voluntary or involuntary recipients of services shall be confidential. . . . 

Information and records shall be disclosed only in any of the following cases.” (Welf. & 

Inst. Code, § 5328.) Presently, section 5328 has 25 exemptions to its general rule of 

confidentiality, covering service provider communications, patient consent, insurance 

claims, research purposes, courts, law enforcement, senate and assembly rules 

committees, patient‟s attorney, coroner, licensing and investigative agency personnel, 

medical boards, and patient safety. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5328, subds. (a)-(y).) In 

addition, additional exemptions are set out in successive code sections to section 5328.8

Section 4514 of the Lanterman Act—as noted, enacted as a nonsubstantive 

amendment intended to move the confidentiality laws concerning the developmentally 

disabled from the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act to the Lanterman Developmental 

Disabilities Services Act—sets forth now the general confidentiality rule for the 

developmentally disabled, and provides as pertinent: “All information and records 

obtained in the course of providing intake, assessment, and services under Division 4.1 

(commencing with Section 4400), Division 4.5 (commencing with Section 4500),

 

8 See Welfare and Institutions Code sections 5328.01 (particular law enforcement 

investigation), 5328.02 (correctional authorities), 5328.04 (social workers/probation 

officers), 5328.05 (elder abuse), 5328.06 (protection and advocacy agency), 5328.1 

(patient‟s family), 5328.2 (Justice Department), 5328.3 (patient disappearance), 5328.4 

(crimes by or against patients), 5328.5 (elder abuse), 5328.8 (patient death), 5328.9 

(employer), and 5328.15 (authorized licensing personnel). 
13

Division 6 (commencing with Section 6000), or Division 7 (commencing with Section 

7100) to persons with developmental disabilities shall be confidential. . . . Information 

and records shall be disclosed only in any of the following cases.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§ 4514; see Gilbert, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at pp. 168-169.) Section 4514 has 

exemptions to its general confidentiality rule that parallel those for section 5328. (Welf. 

& Inst. Code, §§ 4514, subds. (a)-(v), 4514.3, 4514.5.) 

“Services” is defined broadly in the Lanterman Act, as including, but not limited 

to, “diagnosis, evaluation, treatment, personal care, day care, domiciliary care, special 

living arrangements, physical, occupational, and speech therapy, training, education, . . . 

employment, mental health services, recreation, counseling . . . , protective and other 

social and sociolegal services, information and referral services, follow-along services, 

adaptive equipment and supplies, advocacy assistance, . . . assessment, assistance in 

locating a home, child care, behavior training and behavior modification programs, 

camping, community integration services, community support, daily living skills training, 

emergency and crisis intervention, facilitating circles of support, habilitation . . . ,” and so 

on and so forth, covering essentially anything “directed toward the alleviation of a 

developmental disability [or a mental illness] or toward the social, personal, physical, or 

economic habilitation or rehabilitation of an individual with a developmental disability 

[or a mental illness] . . . .” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4512, subd. (b).) 

We now turn to the application of this statutory language. Let reconciliation 

begin, if it is possible.

III. Applying and Harmonizing the Lanterman Act’s Confidentiality Provisions 

and the Long-Term Care Act’s Public Accessibility Provisions

A. Application of the Lanterman Act

We must first consider Public Health‟s threshold argument that “[t]he Long-Term 

Care Act authorizes [PRA] requests for citations issued to long-term care facilities, 
14

subject to the exceptions set forth in the [PRA]. (Health & Saf. Code, § 1439.) The 

[PRA] does not require the disclosure of records whose disclosure is exempted or 

prohibited under . . . state law. (Gov. Code, § 6254, subd. (k).) Under the Lanterman 

Act, all information and records obtained in the course of providing services to mentally 

ill and developmentally disabled patients shall remain confidential. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 

[§§ 5328, 4514].)” “Hence, any request for [Long-Term Care Act] citations should not 

result in the production of information or documents privileged by the Lanterman Act.” 

“The [Long-Term Care Act] and the Lanterman Act are not in conflict, and Public Health 

abided by both statutes when it produced heavily redacted citations [i.e., devoid of all 

facts regarding the nature of the violation] to [News Center].” 

The problem with this argument is that it uses the Long-Term Care Act to defeat 

the Long-Term Care Act with respect to the mentally ill and the developmentally 

disabled. Public Health‟s argument uses one of the Long-Term Care Act‟s public 

accessibility provisions—PRA requests (Health & Saf. Code, § 1439)—to foreclose, 

almost completely, public accessibility to Long-Term Care Act citations issued to state 

facilities housing the mentally ill and the developmentally disabled. In making this 

argument Public Health notes that, since nearly everything that happens to a patient in 

one of the state facilities at issue happens “in the course of providing services” to that 

patient, the Lanterman Act‟s general confidentiality rule conceivably applies to nearly all 

patient-related mental health records. Through this argument, Public Health completes a 

hat trick of public oversight denial, by effectively nullifying the public accessibility of 

Long-Term Care Act citations via facility posting, public request, and PRA request; and 

Public Health does so in the context of one of the most vulnerable populations protected 

by the Long-Term Care Act. The Legislature did not exempt state facilities housing the 

mentally ill and the developmentally disabled from the Long-Term Care Act‟s public 
15

oversight protection through its public accessibility provisions. But Public Health‟s 

argument does; so we reject it.9 

As noted, “[w]hen construing the interaction of two potentially conflicting 

statutes, we strive to effectuate the purpose of each by harmonizing them, if possible, in a 

way that allows both to be given effect.” (Chavez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 986.)

On the one hand, the case for confidentiality under the Lanterman Act is indeed 

strong. 

The Lanterman Act‟s confidentiality provisions are quite broad, given the 

statutory definition of “services,” and use mandatory language—“[a]ll information and 

records obtained in the course of providing services . . . shall be confidential” and “shall 

be disclosed only in any of the following [statutorily identified] cases.” (Welf. & Inst. 

Code, §§ 5328, 4514, 4512, subd. (b); Gilbert, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 169.)

In light of this mandatory language, Gilbert concluded that the Legislature 

intended, in fact “intended precisely,” that these Lanterman Act records “be absolutely 

confidential except for the specifically listed cases set forth in the several subdivisions 

of” sections 5328 and 4514 (and in their companion statutes). (Gilbert, supra, 

193 Cal.App.3d at p. 169; Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5328, 4514.) Gilbert held, for our 

 

9 As an opposing aside to this point, News Center argues that information obtained in a 

citation investigation is not information “obtained in the course of providing services.” 

(Citing Devereaux v. Latham & Watkins (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1585-1586 [in an 

action for breach of Lanterman Act confidentiality, the court stated, “[w]here there is no 

showing by the person claiming confidentiality of records under [Welfare and Institutions 

Code] section 5328 that the records were generated in the course of receiving treatment 

under the statutory sections therein specified, disclosure is not governed by section 

5328”]; see also Tarasoff, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 443 [because the psychotherapy at issue 

there was not provided under any of the mental health programs specified in the 

Lanterman Act, that act‟s confidentiality provisions did not apply].) We agree with the 

trial court that a citation for violating patient care standards still is likely to include 

information obtained in the course of providing services to patients. 
16

purposes, that an owner/operator of a facility for the developmentally disabled, in an 

administrative license revocation proceeding, could not obtain records of three of its 

former patients for possible use in impeaching complaining witnesses or in mitigating 

any penalty. (Gilbert, at pp. 164-165, 169; see also County of Riverside, supra,

42 Cal.App.3d at pp. 480-481 [state chiropractic board, in license revocation proceeding, 

could not obtain alcoholic treatment center records involving the accused chiropractor, 

because the matter did not fall within any of the specific disclosure exceptions set forth in 

Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5328 and succeeding sections]; People v. Gardner (1984) 

151 Cal.App.3d 134, 140 [§ 5328 prohibited patient information disclosure to probation 

officer preparing probation report for court, because the section (at that time) had no such 

confidentiality exception].) 

This strict interpretation of the confidentiality provisions of sections 5328 and 

4514 of the Lanterman Act (and succeeding statutes) is further buttressed by a trio of 

amendments to that act, including a very recent one:

(1) a 1980 enactment (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5328.15, subd. (a)) and a 1982 

enactment (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4514, subd. (n)) authorizing disclosure of Lanterman 

Act confidential information and records to authorized licensing personnel of Public 

Health, as necessary to the performance of their duties to inspect, license, and investigate 

health facilities to ensure that the standards of care are being met; and setting forth 

measures to keep such information confidential in related criminal, civil, or 

administrative proceedings (Stats. 1980, ch. 695, § 1, p. 2095; Stats. 1982, ch. 1141, § 1, 

pp. 4111-4112);

(2) parallel amendments in 1985 to the two statutes listed in (1), broadening those 

sections to also include authorized legal staff and special investigators of the Department 

of Social Services, in connection with inspecting, licensing and investigating (Stats. 
17

1985, ch. 994, §§ 1, 2, pp. 3190-3194, 3198-3199; see Gilbert, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at 

p. 172); and 

(3) amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 5328.15 and 4514, 

adopted just last September (2012), that authorize protection and advocacy agencies—

i.e., private, nonprofit corporations created by statute to protect and advocate for the 

rights of the mentally ill and the developmentally disabled (and other disabled persons)—

to obtain otherwise confidential Lanterman Act information and records incorporated 

within unredacted citation reports, licensing reports, survey reports, statements of 

deficiency, and plans of correction (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5328.15, subd. (c), 4514, 

subd. (v), Stats. 2012, ch. 664, §§ 3, 1, respectively; see §§ 4514.3, 5328.06, 4900 et seq., 

4901, subd. (a)). 

The point is—if explicit statutory permission was needed for authorized licensing 

personnel, legal staff, special investigators, and protection and advocacy agencies to fully 

obtain the otherwise confidential Lanterman Act information and records—it is clear the 

Legislature intends to maintain confidentiality in the Lanterman Act context. 

Furthermore, if nearly all of this information could have been obtained through a simple 

PRA request, these statutory enactments and amendments would have been unnecessary. 

B. Application of the Long-Term Care Act

On the other hand, the case for public accessibility to Long-Term Care Act 

citations is strong as well. 

Through the Long-Term Care Act, the Legislature intended to establish an 

inspection, citation and reporting system to ensure that long-term health care facilities 

comply with patient care standards. (Health & Saf. Code, § 1417.1.) An integral part of 

this system is public oversight—a public look behind the doors of these institutions—by 

making citations for violations of patient care standards publicly available through 
18

various statutory means, including facility posting, public request, and PRA request. (Id., 

§§ 1423, 1424, 1429, 1439.) 

The Long-Term Care Act is designed to protect some of the “most vulnerable 

segments of our population.” (California Assn., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 295; Kizer, supra, 

53 Cal.3d at p. 150.) The mentally ill and the developmentally disabled in the state 

facilities comprise some of the most vulnerable of these most vulnerable—i.e., some of 

those most in need of the safeguards provided by public oversight of patient care 

standards as envisioned in the Long-Term Care Act. 

Given the strong hands played by both the Lanterman Act‟s confidentiality 

provisions and the Long-Term Care Act‟s public accessibility provisions, legislative 

intention would best be served by harmonizing them, if possible, in a way that allows 

both to be given effect. (See Chavez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 986.) 

As the trial court recognized, because the confidentiality provisions of the 

Lanterman Act apply to mental health programs, any conflict between those 

confidentiality provisions and the Long-Term Care Act‟s public accessibility provisions 

occurs in the context of mental health records (including the developmentally disabled). 

C. Common Purpose of Both Acts

The mentally ill and the developmentally disabled in state facilities comprise a 

relatively small portion of the overall population protected by the Long-Term Care Act. 

Significantly, with respect to the mentally ill and the developmentally disabled in state 

facilities, the Lanterman Act and the Long-Term Care Act apply to the same population 

and seek the same purpose—to promote and protect the health and safety of mental health 

patients. But the two acts effectuate this common purpose from opposite directions. The 

Lanterman Act effectuates this purpose by ensuring the confidentiality of mental health 

records—this encourages persons with mental problems to seek, accept and undergo 

treatment, and to be open and candid in treatment. The Long-Term Care Act effectuates 
19

this purpose, as relevant here, by making citations for violations of patient care standards 

publicly accessible, so the public can oversee what is happening in these facilities. This 

congruence of population and purpose, and this effectuation of purpose from opposite 

directions, creates a complementarity of method to effectuate the common purpose for 

this common population. In this way, these confidentiality and public accessibility 

provisions can be harmonized.10

That takes care of the theory supporting harmonization here. What does 

harmonization mean in practical terms, in terms of the statutory language at issue?

D. Giving Effect to Both the Lanterman Act and the Long-Term Care Act

We have seen that a citation issued under the Long-Term Care Act (1) must 

describe “with particularity the nature of the violation” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1423, 

subd. (a)(2)), and (2) must set forth certain “[r]elevant facts” (id., § 1424, subd. (b)), 

except for the names of the persons involved in the incident (other than specified 

investigators and inspectors) (id., § 1439). 

1. Names of involved persons.

We start, then, with the easiest harmonization concerning the Long-Term Care 

Act‟s public accessibility provisions and the Lanterman Act‟s confidentiality 

provisions—any names contained in the citations, other than those of the authorized 

inspectors and investigators specified in section 1439 of the Long-Term Care Act, must 

be deleted. (Health & Saf. Code, § 1439; Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5328, 4514.)

 

10 Moreover, this congruence of population and purpose also distinguishes the present case 

from the strict view of Lanterman Act confidentiality taken in the Gilbert line of 

decisions, where the competing legal interests did not involve such congruity. (See, e.g., 

Gilbert, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at pp. 164, 168-169 [confidential records of 

developmentally disabled patients sought by accused facility to assist its defense in 

license revocation proceeding]; County of Riverside, supra, 42 Cal.App.3d at p. 481 [in 

license revocation proceeding, chiropractic board sought confidential alcoholic treatment 

records of the accused chiropractor]; see Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5328, 4514.) 
20

2. Nature of the violation.

Turning to the description of the nature of the violation, Health and Safety Code 

section 1423, subdivision (a)(2) of the Long-Term Care Act specifies that each citation 

issued “shall be in writing and shall describe with particularity the nature of the violation, 

including a reference to the statutory provision, standard, rule or regulation alleged to 

have been violated, the particular place or area of the facility in which it occurred, as well 

as the amount of any proposed assessment of a civil penalty. . . . The citation shall fix the 

earliest feasible time for the elimination of the condition constituting the alleged 

violation, when appropriate.” 

The redacted citations provided by Public Health did properly cite and set forth 

“the statutory provision, standard, rule or regulation [found] to have been violated” 

(Health & Saf. Code, § 1423, subd. (a)(2)), “the amount of [the] assessment of a civil 

penalty” (ibid.), and “the earliest feasible time for the elimination of the condition 

constituting the alleged violation” (by specifying a deadline for compliance) (ibid.), as 

well as the “classification” of the citation (in increasing severity, Class “B,” Class “A,” 

and Class “AA” as required by Health & Saf. Code, § 1424). The citations also properly 

listed the name and address of the facility. 

The redacted citations that Public Health provided to News Center stated next to 

nothing, however, regarding the nature of the violation; all that was said along those 

lines, for example, was that the client was not kept free from harm or from abuse, or that 

the facility failed to comply with the designated regulation, or that the facility simply 

“failed to: . . .” In terms of describing the nature of the violation, the Long-Term Care 

Act‟s public accessibility provisions can be harmonized with the Lanterman Act‟s mental 

health-based confidentiality provisions, by having the citations describe with 

particularity, for example, what was the harm, what was the abuse, what was the lack of 

respect or dignity afforded, and what was the action that the facility did or failed to do. 

In addition, Public Health must also identify “the particular place or area of the facility
21

in which [the violation] occurred.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1423, subd. (a)(2), italics 

added.) 

One further point on this topic deserves mention. At oral argument, News 

Center‟s counsel agreed that if a requested citation specifies facts that identify an 

individual whose name is not to be disclosed (i.e., specifies facts that are the functional 

equivalent of naming that individual), those facts may be redacted. At this stage of the 

proceedings, we do not know if the (heavily redacted) requested citations contain any 

such facts. On remand, if there is a disclosure issue in this regard, the trial court can 

determine that issue by reviewing the challenged citation in camera. 

That covers the issue of harmonizing the disclosure of “the nature of the 

violation.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1423, subd. (a)(2).) We turn to the issue of the 

“relevant facts.” 

3. Relevant facts.

Section 1424, subdivision (b) of the Long-Term Care Act states that “[r]elevant 

facts considered by [Public Health] in determining the amount of the civil penalty shall 

be documented by [Public Health] on an attachment to the citation and available in the 

public record.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1424, subd. (b).) These relevant facts include the 

patient‟s or resident‟s mental condition, medical condition, and history of mental 

disability or disorder, and the risk the violation presents to the patient‟s or resident‟s 

mental and physical condition; as well as the facility‟s good faith efforts to prevent the 

violation, and the licensee‟s history of regulatory compliance. (Id., § 1424, subd. (a)(1)-

(5).) 

The patient‟s or resident‟s mental, physical, and medical conditions, history of 

mental disability or disorder, as well as the risk the violation presents to that mental and 

physical condition, are not disclosable in PRA-requested citations, in light of the mental 

health-based confidentiality provisions of the Lanterman Act. (Health & Saf. Code, 
22

§ 1424, subd. (a)(1)-(3); Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5328, 4514.) However, the Lanterman 

Act‟s confidentiality provisions do not foreclose public disclosure of the “good faith 

efforts exercised by the facility to prevent the violation from occurring” (Health & Saf. 

Code, § 1424, subd. (a)(4)), and “[t]he licensee‟s history of compliance with regulations” 

(id., § 1424, subd. (a)(5)); indeed, these disclosures to the public would further the LongTerm Care Act‟s public oversight component.

E. Conclusion

Public Health argues that it properly harmonized the Lanterman Act‟s 

confidentiality provisions with the Long-Term Care Act‟s public accessibility provisions 

by redacting essentially all facts in the citation concerning the nature of the violation, 

given the Lanterman Act‟s confidentiality provisions. 

As we saw at the outset of this part of the Discussion, ante (pt. III.A.), though, 

Public Health‟s position effectively writes public oversight of state facilities for the 

mentally ill and the developmentally disabled out of the Long-Term Care Act. The 

Long-Term Care Act is an integral, complementary part of the statutory protection 

afforded to patients and residents of long-term health care facilities, including the state 

facilities; indeed, the Long-Term Care Act provides the more efficient, more 

preventative, less draconian citation-based protective system to the system of suspending 

or revoking licenses. And an integral part of this integral act is the accessibility it affords 

the public to the citations issued under it. The Long-Term Care Act is a remedial statute, 

and as such, is to be liberally construed on behalf of the class of persons it is designed to 

protect; as we have seen, a most vulnerable class here. (See California Assn., supra, 

16 Cal.4th at p. 295.) 

That said, News Center argues that the Long-Term Care Act‟s public accessibility 

provisions trump the Lanterman Act‟s confidentiality provisions, and all that must be 
23

redacted from the requested citations are the names of those involved in an incident 

(except investigating and inspecting officers). 

News Center‟s position, however, effectively dismisses the strong protections of 

confidentiality afforded the mentally ill and the developmentally disabled under the 

Lanterman Act in state facilities. The Legislature has determined that these protections 

are necessary for the mentally ill to seek and accept treatment, and for that treatment to 

be effective. The Legislature, just late last year, amended the Lanterman Act‟s 

confidentiality provisions to allow protection and advocacy agencies to obtain, among 

other information, information within unredacted citation reports; this amendment 

recognized that the Legislature has long granted to mental health records a strong 

protection of confidentiality. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5328.15, subd. (c), 4514, subd. (v), 

Stats. 2012, ch. 664, §§ 3, 1, respectively.)11 We must keep in mind that what is before 

 

11 News Centers also cites to three instances where later enacted, non-Lanterman statutes 

were deemed to constitute exceptions to the Lanterman Act confidentiality provisions. 

The first instance, Albertson v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 796, involved an 

amendment to the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6000 et 

seq.), which permitted a district attorney in an SVPA proceeding to obtain otherwise 

confidential treatment information in an updated mental evaluation of the inmate. As 

Public Health notes, Albertson is distinguishable because the Legislature specifically 

considered the confidentiality provision of section 5328 of the Lanterman Act in drafting 

this SVPA amendment. (Albertson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 805-807.) The other two 

instances involve Attorney General opinions, both of which concluded that a mandated 

reporter‟s statutory duty to report child abuse supersedes the confidentiality provisions of 

the Lanterman Act, because these reporting and confidentiality laws both promote the 

safety of children and because the entire legislative scheme in the area of child 

protection, as it has developed, has been directed toward discovering more abuse cases 

and preventing serious harm by taking prompt remedial action. (65 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 

345 (1982); 58 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 824 (1975).) The Attorney General opinions did not 

encompass statutory reconciliation, but one statute trumping the other. Furthermore, we 

must note the informational context presented here: a PRA request from the public for 

Long-Term Care Act citations. 
24

us is a PRA request from the public for Long-Term Care Act citations involving state 

facilities for the mentally ill and the developmentally disabled.12 

Because we have found that the Lanterman Act and the Long-Term Care Act can 

be reconciled in the manner we have set forth in part III.D. of this Discussion, ante, we 

need not consider the parties‟ arguments as to which statute is general or specific, and 

which statute is earlier or later. (See Department of Fair Employment & Housing v. 

Mayr (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 719, 725.)13

 

12 We also note that the Long-Term Care Act has a consumer information service system, 

under which the general public may obtain the following information, among other 

information: a history of all citations and complaints for the last two full survey cycles 

pursuant to a facility profile; substantiated complaints, including the action taken and the 

date of the action; state citations assessed, including the procedural status of the citation 

and the facility‟s plan or correction; state actions, including license suspensions, 

revocations, and receiverships; and federal enforcement sanctions imposed. (Health & 

Saf. Code, §§ 1422.5, 1439.5, subd. (b).) Under this system, Public Health must “ensure 

the confidentiality of personal and identifying information of residents and employees 

and shall not disclose this information . . . .” (Id., § 1422.5, subd. (e).) The disclosure of 

this information under the Long-Term Care Act‟s consumer information service system 

is, or can be made, compatible with our interpretation of the citation information publicly 

available in the context of the state facilities at issue. 

13 We grant News Center‟s November 5, 2012 request for judicial notice of certain 

legislative history of Senate Bill No. 1377 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) chapter 664, sections 3 

and 1, which added subdivision (c) to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5328.15, and 

subdivision (v) to section 4514, respectively—concerning information available to 

protection and advocacy agencies as exemptions to the Lanterman Act‟s confidentiality 

provisions. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459.) 

 We also grant Public Health‟s October 26, 2012 request for judicial notice of certain 

legislative history of Senate Bill No. 1377, and two incidents involving unique 

circumstances akin to naming an otherwise confidential individual. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 

459.) 
25

DISPOSITION

Having complied with the procedural requirements for issuance of a peremptory 

writ in the first instance, we are authorized to issue the peremptory writ forthwith. (See 

Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171.) Let a peremptory writ of 

mandate issue directing respondent Superior Court to vacate its judgment of October 22, 

2012, and its ruling under submission of September 13, 2012, and to enter a new 

judgment (1) that directs Public Health to produce to News Center the requested citations 

in accordance with the standards set forth in this opinion, ante, at pages 19 to 22 

(pt. III.D. of the Discussion), and (2) that grants declaratory relief to News Center to this 

same extent (on News Center‟s parallel complaint for declaratory relief). Each party 

shall pay its own costs in this writ review proceeding. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.493(a)(1)(B); Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (c).) To the extent the trial court determines 

that News Center prevailed in this matter, News Center is entitled to recover, upon 

appropriate application, reasonable attorney fees and court costs incurred in the trial 

court. (Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (d).)14 (CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION)

 BUTZ , J.

I concur:

 HULL , Acting P. J.

 

14 In this writ review proceeding, we have resolved the specific issue presented regarding 

the potential conflict between the Lanterman Act‟s confidentiality provisions and the 

Long-Term Care Act‟s public accessibility provisions in the context of the PRA request 

here. Public Health also asks us, more generally, whether it is obligated to produce other 

information and documents, and whether it is immune from sanctions for wrongful 

disclosures. To the extent these two issues are not covered by our resolution here, we 

decline to address them at this point. (See Filarsky v. Superior Court (2002) 28 Cal.4th 

419, 432, 434-435 [public agency may not initiate declaratory relief action to determine 

its duties under the PRA].) 
1

I respectfully dissent. Implicitly recognizing that sections 5328 and 4514 of the 

Lanterman Act conflict with sections 1423, 1424, and 1439 of the Long-Term Care Act,1

the majority “harmonizes” these provisions by holding that the Long-Term Care Act 

controls over the Lanterman Act on the issue of “describ[ing] with particularity the nature 

of the violation” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1423, subd. (a)(2)), but the Lanterman Act 

controls over the Long-Term Care Act on the issue of setting forth other “relevant facts,” 

including the patient‟s or resident‟s “medical” and “mental” conditions, his or her 

“history of mental disability or disorder,” and “the risk that the violation presents to [his 

or her] mental and physical condition.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1424, subds. (a), (b)(1)-

(3).) Thus, under the guise of bringing harmony, the majority opinion does violence to 

two statutory enactments―carving out of the Lanterman Act an exception allowing 

public citations to include an unredacted description of the nature of the violation, and 

severing from the Long-Term Care Act the requirement that the public record contain the 

aforementioned “relevant facts.” As will be explained immediately below, I believe such 

an approach runs contrary to established rules of statutory construction. 

I

Principles of Statutory Construction

“„As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to 

determine the Legislature‟s intent so as to effectuate the law‟s purpose.‟ [Citation.] We 

begin by examining the statutory language because the words of a statute are generally 

 

1 In this dissenting opinion, the Lanterman Act refers to the combined LantermanPetris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.) and Lanterman Developmental 

Disabilities Services Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4500 et seq.). The Long-Term Care Act 

refers to the Long-Term Care, Health, Safety, and Security Act (Health & Saf. Code, 

§ 1417 et seq.).

The petitioner, Department of Public Health, is referred to as Public Health.
2

the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citations.] We give the words of the 

statute their ordinary and usual meaning and view them in their statutory context. 

[Citation.] We harmonize the various parts of the enactment by considering them in the 

context of the statutory framework as a whole. [Citations.] „If the statute‟s text evinces 

an unmistakable plain meaning, we need go no further.‟ [Citation.] „Only when the 

statute‟s language is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, 

may the court turn to extrinsic aids to assist in interpretation.‟ [Citations.]” (In re C.H.

(2011) 53 Cal.4th 94, 100-101; San Leandro Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of San 

Leandro Unified School Dist. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 822, 831.) 

“„A court must, where reasonably possible, harmonize statutes, reconcile seeming 

inconsistencies in them, and construe them to give force and effect to all of their 

provisions. [Citations.] This rule applies although one of the statutes involved deals 

generally with a subject and another relates specifically to particular aspects of the 

subject.‟” (Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 

Cal.4th 783, 805, quoting Hough v. McCarthy (1960) 54 Cal.2d 273, 279.) However, 

“[i]f conflicting statutes cannot be reconciled, later enactments supersede earlier ones 

[citation], and more specific provisions take precedence over more general ones 

[citation]. Absent a compelling reason to do otherwise, we strive to construe each statute 

in accordance with its plain language. [Citation.]” (Collection Bureau of San Jose v. 

Rumsey (2000) 24 Cal.4th 301, 310; see also People v. Moody (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 

987, 993.) 

II

Conflict Between the Lanterman Act and the Long-Term Care Act

Reading sections 5328 and 4514 of the Lanterman Act (confidentiality provisions) 

and sections 1423, 1424, and 1439 of the Long-Term Care Act (citation provisions) in 

accordance with the plain meaning of the words used therein, I conclude the two statutory 
3

enactments are in conflict and no reasonable interpretation will give force and effect to all 

of their provisions. 

First, some context. This case involves a request for citations under the Public 

Records Act. (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.) The Public Records Act “embodies a strong 

policy in favor of disclosure of public records (see Gov. Code, §§ 6250 & 6252, subds. 

(a), (b)), and any refusal to disclose public information must be based on a specific 

exception to that policy.” (Lorig v. Medical Board (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 462, 467.) 

One such exception applies to “[r]ecords, the disclosure of which is exempted or 

prohibited pursuant to federal or state law.” (Gov. Code, § 6254, subd. (k).) However, 

“[s]ince disclosure is favored, all exemptions are narrowly construed. [Citations.] The 

agency opposing disclosure bears the burden of proving that an exemption applies. 

[Citation.]” (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1301, 

1321.) 

The Lanterman Act, the majority opinion correctly observes, is a “comprehensive 

state law directed at the evaluation, supervision, protection, care and treatment of persons 

who are mentally ill, developmentally disabled or impaired by chronic alcoholism. 

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5001.)” (Maj. Opn. at p. 11.) The enactment‟s confidentiality 

provisions make all information and records obtained in the course of providing services 

under that enactment (and other specified enactments) confidential, subject to defined 

statutory exceptions. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5328, 4514; see also id., § 5328.01 et seq. 

[setting out additional exceptions to the general rule of confidentiality].) The enactment 

defines “services” broadly to cover essentially anything “directed toward the alleviation 

of a developmental disability [or a mental illness] or toward the social, personal, physical, 

or economic habilitation or rehabilitation of an individual with a developmental disability 

[or a mental illness].” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4512, subd. (b).) The majority opinion also 

correctly notes the legislative purpose for confidentiality is “to encourage persons with 
4

mental or severe alcohol problems or developmental disabilities to seek, undergo and 

accept treatment, and to be candid and open in such treatment.” (Maj. Opn. at p. 11.) 

However, the Lanterman Act as a whole must be construed to, among other things, 

“guarantee and protect public safety” and “protect mentally disordered persons and 

developmentally disabled persons from criminal acts.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5001, 

subds. (c), (g).) 

The Long-Term Care Act, the majority opinion again correctly observes, applies 

to long-term health care facilities, including the state facilities for the mentally ill and the 

developmentally disabled at issue here. (Maj. Opn. at p. 7.) The enactment “authorizes 

[Public Health] to inspect such facilities for compliance with statutes and regulations on 

patient care and to issue citations to noncomplying facilities. [Citations.] [Public Health] 

is authorized to enter any facility for inspection . . . . When [Public Health] observes a 

violation of a statute or regulation, it issues a citation to the facility. [Citation.] Citations 

are classified according to the seriousness of the violation, and a penalty range is 

prescribed for each class.” (Kizer v. County of San Mateo (1991) 53 Cal.3d 139, 142.) 

This system of inspection and citation “is to be liberally construed on behalf of the class 

of persons it is designed to protect,” e.g., nursing care patients, the mentally ill, and the 

developmentally disabled, who are some of “the most vulnerable segments of our 

population.” (California Assn. of Health Facilities v. Department of Health Services

(1997) 16 Cal.4th 284, 295.) 

Section 1423 of the Long-Term Care Act provides, in relevant part, that “[e]ach 

citation shall be in writing and shall describe with particularity the nature of the 

violation, including a reference to the statutory provision, standard, rule, or regulation 

alleged to have been violated, the particular place or area of the facility in which it 

occurred, as well as the amount of any proposed assessment of a civil penalty. The name 

of any patient jeopardized by the alleged violation shall not be specified in the citation in 
5

order to protect the privacy of the patient. However, at the time the licensee is served 

with the citation, the licensee shall also be served with a written list of each of the names 

of the patients alleged to have been jeopardized by the violation, that shall not be subject 

to disclosure as a public record. The citation shall fix the earliest feasible time for the 

elimination of the condition constituting the alleged violation, when appropriate.” 

(Health & Saf. Code, § 1423, subd. (a)(2), italics added.) 

Section 1424 of the enactment directs Public Health to consider “all relevant facts” 

in determining the amount of the civil penalty, “including, but not limited to, the 

following: [¶] (1) The probability and severity of the risk that the violation presents to 

the patient’s or resident’s mental and physical condition. [¶] (2) The patient’s or 

resident’s medical condition. [¶] (3) The patient’s or resident’s mental condition and his 

or her history of mental disability or disorder. [¶] (4) The good faith efforts exercised 

by the facility to prevent the violation from occurring. [¶] (5) The licensee‟s history of 

compliance with regulations.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1424, subd. (a), italics added.) 

This section also provides: “Relevant facts considered by [Public Health] in determining 

the amount of the civil penalty shall be documented by [Public Health] on an attachment 

to the citation and available in the public record.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1424, 

subd. (b), italics added.) 

Section 1439 of the enactment provides: “Any writing received, owned, used, or 

retained by [Public Health] in connection with the provisions of [the Long-Term Care 

Act] is a public record within the meaning of [the Public Records Act], and, as such, is 

open to public inspection pursuant to the provision of Sections 6253, 6256, 6257, and 

6258 of the Government Code. However, the names of any persons contained in such 

records, except the names of duly authorized officers, employees, or agents of the state 

department conducting an investigation or inspection in response to a complaint filed 

pursuant to [the Long-Term Care Act], shall not be open to public inspection and copies 
6

of such records provided for public inspection shall have such names deleted.” (Health & 

Saf. Code, § 1439; see also id., § 1429, subds (a), (b) [requiring posting of class “AA” 

and class “A” citations “in plain view of the patients or residents in the long-term health 

care facility, persons visiting those patients or residents, and persons who inquire about 

placement in the facility,” and requiring class “B” citations that have become final to be 

“retained by the licensee at the facility cited until the violation is corrected” and “made 

promptly available by the licensee for inspection or examination by any member of the 

public who so requests”].) 

Thus, the Long-Term Care Act makes citations (containing a description of the 

nature of the violation) and their attachments (containing the relevant facts surrounding 

the violation, including the patient‟s or resident‟s medical and mental conditions, his or 

her history of mental disability or disorder, and the risk that the violation presents to his 

or her mental and physical condition) public records under the Public Records Act. The 

Lanterman Act, however, makes confidential, and therefore not subject to disclosure 

under the Public Records Act, all information obtained in the course of providing services 

to the mentally ill and developmentally disabled under the Lanterman Act and other 

specified enactments. Accordingly, unless the Long-Term Care Act‟s requirements that 

the citation contain a description of the nature of the violation and the attachment contain 

a statement of the relevant facts surrounding the violation can be reasonably interpreted 

to not require inclusion of information obtained in the course of providing services within 

the meaning of the Lanterman Act, the two statutory enactments conflict. I see no way to 

so construe the citation provisions of the Long-Term Care Act. Nor do my colleagues in 

the majority offer such an interpretation of these provisions. Indeed, the majority opinion 

acknowledges the conflict by holding that “[t]he patient‟s or resident‟s mental, physical, 

and medical conditions, history of mental disability or disorder, as well as the risk the 

violation presents to that mental and physical condition, are not disclosable . . . in light of 
7

the mental health-based confidentiality provisions of the Lanterman Act.” (Maj. Opn. at 

p. 21.) 

Simply put, the Long-Term Care Act and the Lanterman Act conflict because the 

Long-Term Care Act requires public disclosure of information the Lanterman Act 

requires to remain confidential, and vice versa. 

III

Resolution of the Conflict

I conclude the Long-Term Care Act‟s citation provisions, in addition to making 

citations public records, also created an exception to the Lanterman Act‟s exemption 

from disclosure under the Public Records Act. 

“„It is the general rule that where the general statute standing alone would include 

the same matter as the special act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will be 

considered as an exception to the general statute whether it was passed before or after 

such general enactment.‟” (In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651, 654; see also 

Miranda v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 913, 924-925; Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 1859 [“when a general and particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount 

to the former”].) Moreover, “[i]t is well settled that a later statute may supersede, 

modify, or so affect the operation of an earlier law as to repeal the conflicting earlier law 

by implication. [Citations.]” (Orange County Air Pollution Control Dist. v. Public Util. 

Com. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 945, 954, fn. 8.) 

In Albertson v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 796 (Albertson), our Supreme 

Court held the Legislature created “an exception to [the Lanterman Act‟s] general rule of 

confidentiality of treatment records” by a subsequent and more specific statutory 

enactment amending the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA). (Id. at p. 805.) There, 

prior to the petitioner‟s release from prison, the district attorney filed a petition for 

commitment under the SVPA. The trial court found probable cause to believe the 
8

petitioner was a sexually violent predator and set the matter for trial. Nearly a year and a 

half after the petitioner‟s initial interviews and evaluations by mental health experts, the 

district attorney sought an order directing him to undergo an updated mental health 

interview and evaluation. The district attorney also sought access to the petitioner‟s 

mental health treatment files. (Id. at pp. 798-800.) The trial court granted these requests. 

(Id. at pp. 800-801.) Issuing a writ of mandate directing the trial court to deny the district 

attorney‟s requests, the Court of Appeal held, as relevant here, that the trial court‟s order 

granting access to mental health treatment files violated section 5328 of the Lanterman 

Act. (Id. at p. 801.) Our Supreme Court reversed based on “newly enacted amendments 

to the SVPA,” specifically, Welfare and Institutions Code section 6603, subdivision (c). 

(Id. at p. 803.) The court explained that this provision “sets out express authority for the 

updated evaluations” and “provides that „[t]hese updated or replacement evaluations shall 

include review of available medical and psychological records, including treatment 

records, consultation with current treating clinicians, and interviews of the person being 

evaluated . . . .‟ [Citation.] By this language, the current provision clarifies within the 

SVPA an exception to [the Lanterman Act‟s] general rule of confidentiality of treatment 

records, and allows the district attorney access to treatment record information, insofar as 

that information is contained in an updated evaluation.” (Id. at p. 805.) 

Thus, while sections 5328 and 4514 of the Lanterman Act provide that 

“[i]nformation and records shall be disclosed only in any of the following cases” (italics 

added), followed by several exceptions to the general confidentiality rule (both in 

subsequent subdivisions within sections 5328 and 4514, and also in separate sections 

immediately following section 5328), none of which applies in this case, our Supreme 

Court made clear in Albertson, supra, 25 Cal.4th 796 that exceptions to this general rule 

may be found in other statutory enactments, there, the SVPA. Similarly, the Attorney 

General‟s office has issued opinions concluding that specific reporting statutes supersede, 
9

and therefore create exceptions to the general confidentiality provisions of the Lanterman 

Act. (65 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 345 (1982) [duty to report child abuse under the Child Abuse 

Reporting Law supersedes the confidentiality provisions of the Lanterman Act]; see also 

58 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 824 (1975).) 

The same reasoning applies to the citation provisions of the Long-Term Care Act. 

These citation provisions are the more specific provisions because the Lanterman Act‟s 

confidentiality provisions, standing alone, include the citations at issue in this case, but 

also broadly cover any “[i]nformation and records obtained in the course of providing 

services” under the Lanterman Act and other specified statutory enactments. (Welf. & 

Inst. Code, § 5328.) The citation provisions, on the other hand, deal specifically with 

citations and precisely mandate the contents of these citations. As the more specific 

statutes, the Long-Term Care Act‟s citation provisions take precedence over the 

Lanterman Act‟s general confidentiality provisions.2 

 

2 I am not persuaded by Public Health‟s argument that the Lanterman Act is the 

specific statute that trumps the Long-Term Care Act because the Lanterman Act pertains 

to a subclass of mentally ill and developmentally disabled patients, while the Long-Term 

Care Act applies to all patients/residents of long-term care facilities. Public Health relies 

on two cases I find distinguishable: McDonald v. Conniff (1893) 99 Cal. 386; and In re 

Ward (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 369. The 1893 case involved an action to foreclose a lien 

of a street assessment. The Supreme Court held that an assessment statute making certain 

documents prima facie evidence of the regularity of the proceedings did not contravene 

the constitutional provision prohibiting the legislature from passing special or local laws 

“regulating the practice of courts of justice.” The court explained it is not necessary that 

a law shall affect all the people of the state or concern a procedure applicable to every 

court action to be considered a general law. (McDonald, supra, 99 Cal. at pp. 390-391.) 

Thus, there were no conflicting statutes in McDonald. 

The 1964 case involved two sentencing statutes that conflicted when applied to the 

defendant who was convicted of selling marijuana. One statute (former Health and 

Safety Code section 11531) provided that every person who sells any marijuana shall be 

punished by imprisonment in state prison from five years to life and shall not be eligible 

for parole or release until he or she has served not less than three years. Another statute 
10

Moreover, like the reporting laws at issue in the Attorney General‟s opinions, the 

Long-Term Care Act‟s citation provisions are in essence reporting statutes that are 

designed to protect the patients/residents in long-term health care facilities by requiring 

inspection and reporting of inadequate care (via issuing citations). By posting these 

citations at the facilities and making them public records (with specific names removed), 

the information is made available to the patients/residents, their families, employees, and 

the general public. This informs and protects the public and patients/residents from 

facilities that provide inadequate treatment of patients/residents who are vulnerable and 

dependent upon the facilities for good care. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 1422.5, 1422.6, 

1422.7, 1429.) Thus, treating the Long-Term Care Act‟s citation provisions as an 

exception to the Lanterman Act‟s confidentiality rule comports with the legislative 

purpose of the Lanterman Act, which must be construed to “guarantee and protect public 

 

(former Penal Code section 1202b) provided that for any person who was under the age 

of 23 years at the time of committing a felony or felonies, the court may, notwithstanding 

any other provision of law fixing or affecting the penalty for the felony or felonies, 

specify that the minimum term of imprisonment shall be six months. The Court of 

Appeal concluded former Penal Code section 1202b was the more specific provision that 

created an exception to the general sentencing rule of former Health and Safety Code 

section 11531 for persons under the age of 23 years at the time of committing the crime. 

This was because former Health and Safety Code section 11531 began with the “generic” 

phrase “„[e]very person,‟” while former Penal Code section 1202b applied only to 

persons under the age of 23 years at the time of committing the crime and used the phrase 

“„notwithstanding any other provision of law fixing or affecting the penalty for the 

offense.‟” (In re Ward, supra, 227 Cal.App.2d at pp. 374-375.) Here, unlike former 

Penal Code section 1202b, the Lanterman Act‟s confidentiality provisions were not made 

to apply notwithstanding any other provision of law. Indeed, these provisions have been 

held to be general in nature and subject to numerous exceptions, both within the 

Lanterman Act and outside of that enactment. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5328, 

subds. (a)-(y), 5328.01 et seq.; Albertson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 805.) Nor are the LongTerm Care Act‟s citation provisions phrased in generic terms. Instead, as already 

explained, they specifically mandate the content of citations. 
11

safety” and “protect mentally disordered persons and developmentally disabled persons 

from criminal acts.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5001, subds. (c), (g).) 

Additionally, the citation provisions of the Long-Term Care Act, enacted in 1973 

(Stats. 1973, ch. 1057, § 1, pp. 2088-2095), were enacted after the confidentiality 

provisions of the Lanterman Act, which were originally enacted in 1972 (Stats. 1972, 

ch. 1058, § 2, pp. 1960-1961).3 As mentioned, “[i]t is well settled that a later statute may 

supersede, modify, or so affect the operation of an earlier law as to repeal the conflicting 

earlier law by implication. [Citations.]” (Orange County Air Pollution Control Dist. v. 

Public Util. Com., supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 954, fn. 8.) Nor am I persuaded by Public 

Health‟s argument that the enactment, in 1980, of an exception to the Lanterman Act‟s 

confidentiality provisions (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5328.15; Stats. 1980, ch. 695, § 1, 

p. 2095) makes the confidentiality provisions the later-enacted statutes simply because 

this exception reiterated the general rule of confidentiality before setting forth the 

exception. 

In sum, the Long-Term Care Act makes citations and their attachments public 

records under the Public Records Act. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 1423, subd. (a), 1424, 

subd. (b), 1439.) The Lanterman Act, prohibiting disclosure of information obtained in 

the course of providing services under that enactment (and other specified enactments), 

subject to defined statutory exceptions (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5328, 4514; see also id., 

§ 5328.01 et seq.), creates an exemption from disclosure under the Public Records Act. 

 

3 While Welfare and Institutions Code section 4514 was enacted in 1982 (Stats. 

1982, ch. 1141, § 1, pp. 4108-4112), as mentioned in the majority opinion, this was part 

of a “nonsubstantive statutory division [that] kept the mentally ill (and chronically 

alcoholic) in the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, and placed the developmentally disabled in 

the parallel companion statutory scheme of the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities 

Services Act; the confidentiality provisions of both acts are quite similar.” (Maj. Opn. at 

p. 11, fn. 7.) Accordingly, the Lanterman Act‟s confidentiality provisions were originally 

enacted in 1972. 
12

However, as also mentioned, this exemption must be narrowly construed. (County of 

Santa Clara v. Superior Court, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 1321.) By specifically 

setting forth the required contents of the citations and attachments, some of which would 

be confidential under the Lanterman Act, the Legislature created “within the [Long-Term 

Care Act] an exception to [the Lanterman Act‟s] general rule of confidentiality.” 

(Albertson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 805.) This is what the trial court concluded. I would 

deny the petition for writ of mandate. 

 HOCH , J.