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     [NOT FOR PUBLICATION - NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
                               
                United States Court of Appeals
                    For the First Circuit
                     ____________________
                               
No. 98-1092
                               
                  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                               
                          Appellee,
                               
                              v.
                               
                    YAMIL SERRANO-DELGADO,
                               
                    Defendant, Appellant.
                               
                     ____________________
                               
                               
         APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                               
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
                               
       [Hon. Salvador E. Casellas, U.S. District Judge]
                               
                     ____________________
                               
                            Before
                               
                   Torruella, Chief Judge,
Hall, Senior Circuit Judge,  
                   and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                
                      ____________________
                                   
      Bruce J. McGiverin for appellant.
      Miguel A. Pereira, Assistant U.S. Attorney, with whom
    Guillermo Gil, U.S. Attorney, Jos‚ A. Quiles-Espinosa, Senior
    Litigation Counsel, and Nelson P‚rez-Sosa and Rebecca Kellogg de
    Jes£s, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, were on brief, for appellee.  
     
    
                       ____________________
                                
                        December 1, 1998
   ____________________             
                                        LYNCH, Circuit Judge.  Yamil Serrano-Delgado contends
    that the district court erred in denying his requests to
    withdraw his guilty plea and that his counsel provided
    ineffective assistance.  We affirm his conviction.
                                I
                                        Serrano-Delgado was one of thirty-seven defendants
    indicted in connection with a violent drug conspiracy.  (For a
    further recitation of the factual background, see United Statesv. Solano-Moreta, No. 98-1091, a companion case that we also
    decide today.)  On June 25, 1996, twelve days before trial
    began, Serrano-Delgado pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute
    controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. � 841(a)(1). 
      Serrano-Delgado first communicated his desire to
    withdraw his guilty plea to the district court in late August
    1996, after the acquittal of five of his co-defendants at trial. 
    In a formal motion filed on November 8, 1996, Serrano-Delgado
    contended that he had pled guilty based on prior counsel's
    alleged advice that no one was ever acquitted in federal court,
    that he was legally innocent of the conspiracy charged, and that
    the court failed to comply with the dictates of Rule 11 when it
    accepted his guilty plea.  After an evidentiary hearing and the
    post-hearing receipt of various supporting documents, the
    district court denied Serrano-Delgado's motion on February 14,
    1997.
      Before sentencing, both Serrano-Delgado and his
    counsel filed a second set of motions to withdraw the plea,
    arguing, among other things, that Serrano-Delgado's former
    counsel advised him that in exchange for his guilty plea the
    government would guarantee that Puerto Rico authorities would
    not pursue charges against him.  After another hearing, the
    court once again denied the relief requested.
      Serrano-Delgado was sentenced to 264 months
    imprisonment in accordance with the terms of his Federal Rule of
    Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement.
                                 II     Serrano-Delgado focuses his arguments on appeal on the
    district court's denial of his withdrawal motions.  For a
    discussion of the standard by which a district court decides
    such a motion and the standard by which this court reviews the
    district court's decision, see Solano-Moreta, No. 98-1091.
      Serrano-Delgado's attempt to demonstrate that the
    district court abused its discretion in denying his motions is
    unavailing.  The district court found after a thorough
    consideration of Serrano-Delgado's contentions that the timing
    of his motion weighed against him, that the evidence of his
    imprisonment and hospitalization during some of the relevant
    time period was "not sufficient to make a successful claim of
    innocence regarding his role in the charged conspiracy," that his
    plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent despite his low
    level of formal education and evidence of learning disabilities
    and psychological problems, and that he was properly advised of
    the elements of the conspiracy charge to which he pled guilty. 
    The court also found that defendant was not misled into
    believing that the plea agreement prevented his prosecution in
    the Puerto Rico courts.
      The district court's refusal to permit the withdrawal
    of the plea here was well within its discretion.  Giving the
    deference due to the district court's findings, see Solano-
    Moreta, No. 98-1091, we agree that Serrano-Delgado's delay in
    filing his motion does not indicate a "swift change of heart,"
    United States v. Tilley, 964 F.2d 66, 72 (1st Cir. 1992)
    (internal quotation marks omitted), and that he has not
    demonstrated defects in the Rule 11 proceeding or a
    misunderstanding of the terms of the plea agreement, see United
    States v. Sanchez-Barreto, 93 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1996)
    (noting that the defendant carries the burden of persuasion), 
    cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 711 (1997).  We further agree that,
    although Serrano-Delgado has come forward with some evidence
    that suggests that he was not actively involved in the acts
    undertaken by the conspiracy during certain (but not all)
    relevant periods, the suggestion that this amounts to legal
    innocence is not powerful enough to outweigh the factors that
    cut against him.
      We also conclude that Serrano-Delgado has not shown
    that the district court, which had presided over the trial of
    eight co-defendants, erred in accepting at sentencing the plea
    agreement's stipulation that his admitted participation in the
    conspiracy made him responsible for at least 150 kilograms of
    cocaine.  See generally United States v. Marrero-Rivera, 124
    F.3d 342, 354 (1st Cir. 1997); Sanchez-Barreto, 93 F.3d at 25.
      Finally, although Serrano-Delgado claims that he was
    ineffectively assisted by counsel during one of his plea
    withdrawal hearings, we decline to address this claim on direct
    appeal.  The claim, involving the attorney who represented
    Serrano-Delgado through the district court's entry of final
    judgment, was never presented to the district court and the
    record is insufficiently developed to warrant review at this
    juncture.  See United States v. Mala, 7 F.3d 1058, 1063 (1st
    Cir. 1993) ("[T]he trial judge, by reason of his familiarity
    with the case, is usually in the best position to assess both
    the quality of the legal representation afforded to the
    defendant in the district court and the impact of any shortfall
    in that representation.").  Although on occasion we have
    reviewed an ineffective assistance claim without the benefit of
    the district court's views, this case does not fall into any
    exception to our normal rule.  See id.  Accordingly, this claim
    (along with any other claims of ineffective assistance) may, if
    Serrano-Delgado chooses, be presented on collateral review under
    28 U.S.C. � 2255.  See United States v. Tuesta-Toro, 29 F.3d
    771, 776 (1st Cir. 1994) ("Ordinarily, a collateral proceeding
    . . . is the proper forum for fact-bound ineffective assistance
    claims.").
      We have considered all of defendant's arguments
    properly presented on direct appeal and find them without merit. 
    Defendant's conviction is affirmed without prejudice to his
    right to renew his ineffective assistance claims in a collateral
    proceeding.
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