PRESENT: All the Justices 

MICHAEL W. COVEL, ET AL. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 091343 JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 

 June 10, 2010 

TOWN OF VIENNA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Stanley P. Klein, Judge 

In this appeal we consider the validity of Vienna Town 

Code (“VTC”) §§ 18-258 to –280 (the “Historic Districts 

Ordinance”) and §§ 18-280.1 to –280.13 (the “WHHD Ordinance”), 

which create the Windover Heights Historic District (the 

“WHHD”). We also consider an appeal from the denial of a 

certificate of appropriateness under the WHHD Ordinance. 

I. BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 

The circuit court decided this case after a bench trial; 

consequently, we state the facts in the light most favorable to 

the Town of Vienna, the prevailing party below. Virginia Home 

for Boys & Girls v. Phillips, 279 Va. 279, 282, 688 S.E.2d 284, 

285 (2010). 

This appeal arises from three consolidated cases involving 

six parcels of land in the WHHD. Michael Covel (“Michael”) 

owns two adjoining parcels, 130 Pleasant Street, N.W. and 346 

Windover Avenue, N.W. Jerome and Johanna Covel own two 

parcels, 224 Walnut Lane, N.W. and 222 Lovers Lane, N.W. 
Matthew and Susan Stich own 200 Walnut Lane, N.W.1 PMY 

Associates (“PMY”) owns 210 Lawyers Road, N.W. 

A. CASE NO. CH-2003-184618 

In February 2003, Michael applied to the Windover Heights 

Board of Review for a certificate of appropriateness (“COA”) to 

erect a fence on his parcels. His application stated his name, 

address, and telephone number, and the date. It incorporated a 

plat of the fence. Michael did not respond to any other 

questions on the application form, including those requesting a 

list of adjacent properties; proposed materials, colors, and 

finishes of the fence; and proposed landscaping changes, if 

any. The application omitted required dimensional plans 

showing existing and proposed buildings, structures, fences, or 

signs on the parcels and photographs of the proposed fence 

location. 

The board of review considered Michael’s COA application 

initially. At the board’s hearing, he declined to supplement 

the information provided. The board then rejected his 

application as incomplete and informed him “more information is 

need[ed] to review for the application [but] that the Board has 

no objection to the building of a fence.” 

 1

 We refer to Michael Covel, Jerome and Johanna Covel, and 

Matthew and Susan Stich collectively as “the Landowners.” 

2
Michael appealed to the town council. He again declined 

to provide additional information. Following a hearing the 

council denied his application. 

Michael then appealed to the circuit court. He challenged 

the denial of his COA application and sought a declaratory 

judgment that (a) the WHHD Ordinance was unconstitutionally 

vague, (b) the Historic Districts Ordinance was enacted in 

violation of Code § 15.2-2306, and (c) the WHHD Ordinance was 

enacted in violation of VTC § 18-261.2 The Town demurred and 

the circuit court ruled that the WHHD Ordinance was not 

unconstitutionally vague on its face. There is no transcript 

of the circuit court’s hearing in the record and Michael did 

not note any objection to the ruling on the order. No further 

proceedings relevant to this appeal were conducted prior to 

consolidation. 

B. CASE NO. CH-2003-186629 

In January 2003, before he applied for the COA, Michael 

requested that his Pleasant Street parcel be withdrawn from the 

WHHD. While Michael’s COA application was pending before the 

board of review and his request to remove his Pleasant Street 

 2

 Michael brought additional claims under the due process 

provisions of the Virginia Constitution, the due process and 

equal protection provisions of the 14th Amendment to the United 

States Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. All these claims 

were either dismissed or non-suited and are not before us in 

this appeal. 

3
parcel from the WHHD was pending before the town council, the 

Landowners simultaneously requested that the other parcels they 

owned also be removed from the WHHD. The town council denied 

all these requests. 

Thereafter the Landowners jointly filed a pleading in the 

circuit court in which they appealed from the denial of their 

requests to withdraw their parcels from the WHHD and sought 

declaratory judgment that the ordinances were invalid on the 

grounds Michael had asserted.3 No further proceedings relevant 

to this appeal were conducted prior to consolidation. 

C. CASE NO. CL-2006-7105 

In November 2005, while both Case Nos. CH-2003-184618 and 

CH-2003-186629 were pending before the circuit court, PMY 

requested that its parcel be removed from the WHHD. The town 

council denied that request, whereupon PMY appealed to the 

circuit court. Although the grounds for appeal were 

substantially identical to Case Nos. CH-2003-184618 and CH2003-186629, PMY did not seek declaratory relief challenging 

the validity of the ordinances. No proceedings relevant to 

this appeal were entered prior to consolidation. 

 3

 The claims dismissed or non-suited in Case No. CH-2003-

184618 were also either dismissed or non-suited in this case. 

4
D. THE CONSOLIDATED PROCEEDING 

In January 2008 the circuit court entered an order 

consolidating the cases with the agreement of the parties. 

That order expressly incorporated into the consolidated 

proceeding the court’s earlier ruling in Case No. CH-2003-

184618 that the WHHD Ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague 

on its face. Neither the Landowners nor PMY noted any 

objection to the ruling on the order. After a three-day bench 

trial in October 2008, the circuit court entered a final order 

dismissing all the appeals and denying the Landowners 

declaratory relief. We awarded the Landowners and PMY this 

appeal. 

II. ANALYSIS 

A. APPEALS FROM THE DENIAL OF MICHAEL’S COA 

AND THE LANDOWNERS’ AND PMY’S REQUESTS FOR 

REMOVAL OF THEIR PARCELS FROM THE WHHD 

Our review of the decision of a governing body relating to 

a historic district is limited by statute to “whether that 

decision is ‘arbitrary and constitutes an abuse of discretion,’ 

or ‘is contrary to law.’ ” Norton v. City of Danville, 268 Va. 

402, 407, 602 S.E.2d 126, 129 (2004) (quoting Code § 15.2-

2306(A)(3)). The decision of the governing body is presumed to 

be correct. Id. at 408, 602 S.E.2d at 129-30. The party 

challenging the decision has the burden of proving “it is 

clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that it 

5
bears no reasonable or substantial relation to the public 

health, safety, morals, or general welfare.” Id. at 409, 602 

S.E.2d at 130 (quotation marks omitted). 

Where presumptive reasonableness is challenged 

by probative evidence of unreasonableness, the 

challenge must be met by some evidence of 

reasonableness. If evidence of reasonableness 

is sufficient to make the question fairly 

debatable, the ordinance “must be sustained”. 

If not, the evidence of unreasonableness defeats 

the presumption of reasonableness and the 

ordinance cannot be sustained. 

Id. (quoting Board of Supervisors v. Snell Constr. Corp., 214 

Va. 655, 659, 202 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1974)). An issue is "fairly 

debatable when the evidence offered in support of the opposing 

views would lead objective and reasonable persons to reach 

different conclusions." Id. (quoting Board of Supervisors v. 

Williams, 216 Va. 49, 58, 216 S.E.2d 33, 40 (1975)). 

On appeal, neither the Landowners nor PMY point to any 

evidence in the record to rebut the presumption of validity. 

Rather, they assert that the Town’s decision to deny Michael’s 

COA application and their requests to remove their parcels from 

the WHHD are unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious solely 

because the underlying ordinances are invalid. We previously 

have held that we may not consider whether the underlying 

ordinance is invalid when considering an appeal from a 

governing board’s denial of a COA. Norton, 268 Va. at 407-08, 

602 S.E.2d at 129 (“Norton’s challenge to the underlying 

6
ordinance . . . is barred from consideration in judicial review 

of the city council's action concerning the certificate of 

appropriateness.”). The appropriate method for such challenges 

is by an action against the governing body. Id. at 408 n.4, 

602 S.E.2d at 129 n.4 (citing Board of Zoning Appeals v. 

University Square Assocs., 246 Va. 290, 295 n.2, 435 S.E.2d 

385, 388 n.2 (1993)). 

Accordingly, we find no error in the judgment of the 

circuit court approving the Town’s denial of Michael’s COA and 

the requests to remove parcels from the WHHD. We now turn to 

the Landowners’ appeal from the dismissal of their claims for 

declaratory relief.4

B. THE ENACTMENT OF THE HISTORIC DISTRICTS 

 AND WHHD ORDINANCES 

Whether an ordinance has been enacted lawfully is a 

question of law we review de novo. Marble Techs., Inc. v. City 

of Hampton, 279 Va. 409, 416 & n.9, 690 S.E.2d 84, 87 & n.9 

(2010). 

The Landowners assert that the Historic Districts 

Ordinance is invalid because it exceeds the authority delegated 

by the General Assembly, specifically because it refers only to 

an “area” rather than buildings or structures. They argue that 

the authorizing statute at the time the Town adopted the 

 4

 This disposition is complete as to PMY because it did not 

raise any claims for declaratory relief. 

7
ordinance, former Code § 15.1-503.2,5 allowed a locality to 

enact a historic district ordinance only if it set forth a 

historic landmark established by the Virginia Historic 

Landmarks Commission or some other building or structure with 

historic, architectural, or cultural significance. We 

disagree. 

“[C]ourts apply the plain meaning of a statute unless the 

terms are ambiguous or applying the plain language would lead 

to an absurd result.” Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227, 

623 S.E.2d 922, 926 (2006) (citation omitted). A statute is 

ambiguous “if the text can be understood in more than one way 

or refers to two or more things simultaneously or when the 

language is difficult to comprehend, is of doubtful import, or 

lacks clearness or definiteness.” Id. at 227 n.8, 623 S.E.2d 

at 926 n.8 (citation, internal quotation marks, and alterations 

omitted). An absurd result describes “situations in which the 

law would be internally inconsistent or otherwise incapable of 

operation.” Id. at 227 n.9, 623 S.E.2d at 926 n.9 (quotation 

marks omitted). When statutory language is unambiguous and 

does not lead to absurd results, “courts may not interpret the 

language in a way that effectively holds that the General 

 5

 This statute was amended and subsequently reenacted as 

current Code § 15.2-2306. See 1997 Acts ch. 587, 676. 

8
Assembly did not mean what it actually expressed.” Hicks v. 

Mellis, 275 Va. 213, 218, 657 S.E.2d 142, 144 (2008). 

The Landowners do not challenge the Historic Districts 

Ordinance as it first was enacted in 1975. Rather, they 

challenge the ordinance as it existed when the WHHD Ordinance 

was enacted in April 1979. At that time the authorizing 

statute provided: 

The governing body of any county or municipality 

may adopt an ordinance setting forth the 

historic landmarks within the county or 

municipality as established by the Virginia 

Historic Landmarks Commission, and any other 

buildings or structures within the county or 

municipality having an important historic, 

architectural or cultural interest, and any 

historic areas within the county or municipality 

as defined by § 15.1-430(b) of the Code of 

Virginia, amending the existing zoning ordinance 

and delineating one or more historic districts 

adjacent to such landmarks, buildings and 

structures, or encompassing such historic areas; 

provided, that such amendment of the zoning 

ordinance and the establishment of such district 

or districts shall be in accordance with the 

provisions of article 8 (§ 15.1-486 et seq.), 

chapter 11, of Title 15.1 of the Code of 

Virginia. The governing body may provide for an 

architectural review board to administer such 

ordinance. Such ordinance may include a 

provision that no building or structure, 

including signs, shall be erected, 

reconstructed, altered or restored within any 

such historic district unless the same is 

approved by the architectural review board or, 

on appeal, by the governing body of such county 

or municipality as being architecturally 

compatible with the historic landmarks, 

buildings or structures therein. 

9
Former Code § 15.1-503.2(a) (Supp. 1978). Former Code § 15.1-

430(b), referenced therein, defined “[h]istoric area” to mean 

“an area containing buildings or places in which historic 

events occurred or having special public value because of 

notable architectural or other features relating to the 

cultural or artistic heritage of the community, of such 

significance as to warrant conservation and preservation.” 

Former Code § 15.1-430(b) (Supp. 1978). 

Considered together, these sections authorized a locality 

to create a historic district even if it contained no buildings 

or structures. While former Code § 15.1-503.2(a) is 

conjunctive by allowing the governing body to adopt an 

ordinance setting forth “the historic landmarks within the 

county or municipality as established by the Virginia Historic 

Landmarks Commission, and any other buildings or structures 

within the county or municipality having an important historic, 

architectural or cultural interest, and any historic areas 

within the county or municipality as defined by § 15.1-430(b),” 

the relevant language for this case is disjunctive. It permits 

the governing body to “delineat[e] one or more historic 

districts adjacent to such landmarks, buildings and structures, 

or encompassing such historic areas.” Former Code § 15.1-

503.2(a) (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added). Former Code § 15.1-

430(b) likewise is disjunctive: a historic area may contain 

10
“buildings or places.” Code § 15.1-430(b) (Supp. 1978) 

(emphasis added). 

The differentiation in former Code § 15.1-503.2(a) between 

historic districts adjacent to landmarks, buildings, and 

structures and districts encompassing historic areas, together 

with the language in former Code § 15.1-430(b) including areas 

that do not contain buildings in the definition of historic 

areas, evidences clear intent by the General Assembly to permit 

localities to create historic districts without landmarks, 

buildings, or structures. Accordingly, the Landowners’ 

argument that the Historic Districts Ordinance is invalid 

because it does not identify existing landmarks, buildings, or 

structures fails. 

The Landowners also assert that the WHHD Ordinance is 

invalid because it was not enacted in the manner set forth by 

VTC § 18-261. That section requires the planning commission to 

prepare a detailed report prior to the creation of a historic 

district. The Town responds that the requirements of VTC § 18-

261 did not apply to the enactment of the WHHD Ordinance. We 

disagree. By its terms, VTC § 18-261 governs amendments to the 

Historic Districts Ordinance, “including the establishment of 

historic districts.” Moreover, the enacting clause of the WHHD 

Ordinance states that the Historic Districts Ordinance is 

“amended by adding Section 18-280.1.” 

11
The Town argues alternatively that the WHHD Ordinance is 

saved by Code § 15.2-1427(C). The Town contends this statute 

cures any non-constitutional defect in the enactment of an 

existing ordinance. The Landowners respond that the statute 

cannot save the WHHD Ordinance because VTC § 18-261 imposes 

specific prerequisites to the creation of a historic district. 

Therefore, they argue, the general terms of Code § 15.2-1427(C) 

must give way. The Landowners also suggest that applying Code 

§ 15.2-1427(C) to save the WHHD Ordinance would conflict with 

our decision in Gas Mart Corp. v. Board of Supervisors, 269 Va. 

334, 611 S.E.2d 340 (2005). 

Code § 15.2-1427(C) provides that “[a]ll ordinances or 

resolutions heretofore adopted by a governing body shall be 

deemed to have been validly adopted, unless some provision of 

the Constitution of Virginia or the Constitution of the United 

States has been violated in such adoption.” The statute was 

reenacted in its present form in 2000. 2000 Acts ch. 895. By 

its unambiguous terms, it bars all non-constitutional 

challenges to the adoption of ordinances existing at that time. 

Thus, regardless of how specific VTC § 18-261’s requirements 

may have been when the Town enacted the WHHD, the Landowners 

cannot challenge that enactment today. 

12
The Landowners’ reliance on Code § 15.2-2315 and Gas Mart

is unavailing. Code § 15.2-2315 does not limit the effect of 

Code § 15.2-1427(C). Code § 15.2-2315 provides that: 

Whenever the regulations made under authority of 

this article require a greater width or size of 

yards, courts or other open spaces, require a 

lower height of building or less number of 

stories, require a greater percentage of lot to 

be left unoccupied or impose other higher 

standards than are required in any other statute 

or local ordinance or regulation, the provisions 

of the regulations made under authority of this 

article shall govern. Whenever the provisions of 

any other statute or local ordinance or 

regulation require a greater width or size of 

yards, courts or other open spaces, require a 

lower height of building or a less number of 

stories, require a greater percentage of lot to 

be left unoccupied or impose other higher 

standards than are required by the regulations 

made under authority of this article, the 

provisions of such statute or local ordinance or 

regulation shall govern. 

The Landowners argue that the words “other higher 

standards” embrace the higher standards imposed by VTC § 18-261 

for the enactment of the WHHD Ordinance. However, the context 

does not support this interpretation. “When general words and 

specific words are grouped together, the general words are 

limited and qualified by the specific words and will be 

construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those 

objects identified by the specific words.” Andrews v. Ring, 

266 Va. 311, 319, 585 S.E.2d 780, 784 (2003). Each of the 

terms associated with “higher standards” refers to sizes, 

13
heights, or percentages. These terms do not include the 

prerequisites for enacting an ordinance, such as the completion 

of reports. Accordingly, Code § 15.2-2315 is not applicable. 

Similarly, Gas Mart is distinguishable. In that case we 

compared the general requirements for enacting ordinances set 

forth in Code § 15.2-1427(F) with the specific requirements for 

enacting zoning ordinances set forth in Code §§ 15.2-2204 and 

15.2-2285. We applied the familiar principle of statutory 

interpretation that “when one statute speaks to a subject 

generally and another deals with an element of that subject 

specifically, the statutes will be harmonized, if possible, and 

if they conflict, the more specific statute prevails.” 269 Va. 

at 350, 611 S.E.2d at 348. 

Unlike Gas Mart, this case does not require us to 

harmonize two conflicting statutes of equal dignity. This case 

involves Code § 15.2-1427(C), a statute curing non-compliance 

with procedural requirements in the enactment of ordinances, 

and VTC § 18-261, an ordinance setting forth such procedural 

requirements. It is well settled that when a statute and an 

ordinance conflict, the statute must prevail. Code § 1-248; 

City Council of Alexandria v. Potomac Greens Assocs. P’ship, 

245 Va. 371, 378, 429 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1993) (citing City of 

Norfolk v. Tiny House, Inc., 222 Va. 414, 421, 281 S.E.2d 836, 

840 (1981)); King v. Arlington County, 195 Va. 1084, 1090, 81 

14
S.E.2d 587, 591 (1954). Gas Mart applies when a conflict 

arises between two statutes. It does not apply when the 

conflict arises between a statute and an ordinance. 

Accordingly, there is no error in the judgment of the 

circuit court upholding the ordinances as validly enacted. 

C. THE VAGUENESS CHALLENGE TO THE WHHD ORDINANCE 

The scope of the Landowners’ argument on this issue is 

limited by the procedural posture of their appeal. While they 

argue the WHHD Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague both 

facially and as applied, the circuit court dismissed Michael’s 

facial challenge and subsequently dismissed the Landowners’ 

challenge in the consolidation order by incorporating its 

ruling on Michael’s facial challenge.6 Neither Michael 

individually nor the Landowners collectively preserved any 

objection.7 Consequently, we will not consider their facial 

challenge on appeal. Rule 5:25. 

 6

 Specifically, Michael argued that the WHHD Ordinance was 

unconstitutionally vague on its face because it “contains no 

adequate and objective standards, guidelines or other rational 

criteria for evaluating applications for certificates of 

appropriateness.” The Landowners’ challenge is identical. The 

criteria for evaluating an application for a certificate of 

appropriateness are found in VTC § 18-280.8. The circuit court 

expressly held that this section is not unconstitutionally 

vague on its face. 

7

 No objection appears on the face of the relevant orders 

and the record includes no transcript of the relevant hearings 

where oral objections may have been stated. “When the 

appellant fails to ensure that the record contains transcripts 

or a written statement of facts necessary to permit resolution 

15
The circuit court also determined that the Landowners 

lacked standing to bring an as-applied challenge to the WHHD 

Ordinance in Case No. CH-2003-186629 because the WHHD Ordinance 

sets forth standards by which the Town grants or denies COAs 

and the Landowners did not apply for COAs in that case. The 

Landowners did not assign error to that ruling so their asapplied challenge in Case No. CH-2003-186629 is waived. Rule 

5:17(c); see also Kondaurov v. Kerdasha, 271 Va. 646, 658, 629 

S.E.2d 181, 188 (2006) (“[A] legal decision . . . unchallenged 

in a subsequent appeal when the opportunity to do so existed[] 

becomes the law of the case . . . and the parties are deemed to 

have waived the right to challenge that decision at a later 

time.”) Thus, all that remains before us is Michael’s asapplied challenge in Case No. CH-2003-184618. 

Whether the WHHD Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague is 

a question of law we review de novo. Volkswagen of Am., Inc. 

v. Smit, 279 Va. 327, 335, 689 S.E.2d 679, 684 (2010). 

Our review of the ordinance begins with the 

principle that duly enacted laws are presumed to 

be constitutional. Marshall v. Northern 

Virginia Transp. Auth., 275 Va. 419, 427, 657 

S.E.2d 71, 75 (2008); In re Phillips, 265 Va. 

81, 85, 574 S.E.2d 270, 272 (2003); Yamaha Motor 

Corp., U.S.A. v. Quillian, 264 Va. 656, 665, 571 

S.E.2d 122, 126 (2002); Finn v. Virginia 

Retirement System, 259 Va. 144, 153, 524 S.E.2d 

125, 130 (2000). We are required to resolve any 

 

of appellate issues, [the issues] affected by the omission 

shall not be considered.” Rule 5:11(b). 

16
reasonable doubt concerning the 

constitutionality of a law in favor of its 

validity. In re Phillips, 265 Va. at 85-86, 574 

S.E.2d at 272; Finn, 259 Va. at 153, 524 S.E.2d 

at 130; Walton v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 422, 

427, 497 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1998). Thus, if a 

statute or ordinance can be construed reasonably 

in a manner that will render its terms definite 

and sufficient, such an interpretation is 

required. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-

300 (2001); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 

612, 618 (1954); Pedersen v. City of Richmond, 

219 Va. 1061, 1065, 254 S.E.2d 95, 98 (1979). 

Tanner v. City of Va. Beach, 277 Va. 432, 438-39, 674 S.E.2d 

848, 852 (2009). 

“The constitutional prohibition against vagueness derives 

from the requirement of fair notice embodied in the Due Process 

Clause” and ensures that a law “be sufficiently precise and 

definite to give fair warning” of what it requires. Id. at 

439, S.E.2d at 852; accord Volkswagen, 279 Va. at 337, 674 

S.E.2d at 852 (a law “may survive a vagueness challenge if the 

language . . . makes clear what [it] prohibits and what is 

required in order to comply”). Its purpose is to safeguard 

against the arbitrary and discriminatory application of the law 

when a legislative act permits a subjective interpretation by 

those charged with its enforcement. Tanner, 277 Va. at 439, 

674 S.E.2d at 852. 

The WHHD Ordinance prohibits the erection of a fence 

without a COA. VTC § 18-280.4(A)(1). An applicant for a COA 

must provide “a house location survey or dimensional drawing of 

17
the subject property showing . . . all existing buildings, 

accessory buildings, structures, fences or signs” and the 

proposed location of the fence. VTC § 18-280.7(A). Michael 

did not comply with these requirements. The ordinance also 

requires the Town to consider the materials used to construct 

the fence and the similarity of its features with the features 

of existing “buildings, accessory buildings, structures, fences 

or signs in the immediate surroundings.” VTC § 18-280.8(A)(3)-

(4). Michael refused to provide the necessary information 

about his proposed fence for the Town’s consideration.8

This is not a case where the Town considered Michael’s 

application and applied vague criteria subjectively to arrive 

at an arbitrary or discriminatory result. The Town could not 

have done so because it lacked the required information from 

Michael to make any decision based on the criteria set forth in 

VTC § 18-280.8(A). Rather, the Town made an objective decision 

that Michael’s application was incomplete. 

Consequently, we find that insofar as the WHHD Ordinance 

applied to Michael in Case No. CH-2003-184618, it required him 

to submit a complete application for the Town’s review. The 

 8

 To the extent that Michael argues the WHHD Ordinance does 

not set forth the existing buildings, structures, fences or 

signs the Town “uses as standards for comparison in making the 

determination with respect to an application for a COA,” we 

find that VTC § 18-280.8(A)(4) sufficiently sets forth the 

standard as the existing buildings, structures, fences or signs 

“in the immediate surroundings” within the WHHD. 

18
information required by the ordinance to render an application 

complete is not vague. VTC §§ 18-280.7 and 18-280.8(A) are 

“sufficiently precise and definite to give fair warning” to 

Michael of the information he was required to provide. He 

repeatedly declined to supply this information. 

Accordingly, on these facts we find no error in the 

judgment of the circuit court dismissing Michael’s as-applied 

challenge to the WHHD Ordinance. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 

judgment of the circuit court. 

Affirmed.

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