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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

Klara Pall 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Trustee for Option 

One Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-3 Asset 

Backed Certificates, Series 2006-3, 

 

Defendant. 

 

 

 Civil No. 11-2883 (AET) 

 

OPINION 

 

THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant’s Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as 

Trustee for Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-3 Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2006-3’s 

(“Wells Fargo”) Motion to Remand and Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1447 [docket #5]. Plaintiff Klara Pall opposes the motion [8]. 

The Court has decided the motion after taking into consideration the parties’ submissions 

without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b). For the reasons set 

forth below, Defendant’s Motion to Remand is GRANTED. 

 II. BACKGROUND

This matter arises from a mortgage foreclosure action filed in the Superior Court of New 

Jersey Chancery Division of Mercer County (“Superior Court”) on August 28, 2007 by Wells 

Fargo against Plaintiff regarding a residential property located in Trenton, New Jersey. In her 

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answer to the state court action on December 12, 2007, Plaintiff, among her affirmative defenses, 

alleged that Wells Fargo did not comply with the provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices 

Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692. (Def’s Mot. to Remand, Ex. B, at 9). 

On February 23, 2008, Wells Fargo filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s Answer. (Id., Ex. C). The Superior Court granted Wells Fargo’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment by Order dated March 28, 2008. (Id., Ex. D). Plaintiff filed a Motion for 

Reconsideration of the Order granting summary judgment, which was denied. (Id., Ex. E). On 

September 9, 2008, an uncontested judgment in foreclosure was entered in favor of Wells Fargo. 

(Id., at 3). On January 28, 2009, the Property was sold at a Sheriff’s sale. (Id.) Plaintiff moved 

to vacate the Sheriff’s Sale, repeating allegations that the foreclosure was invalid due to 

violations of a number of consumer protection laws, including the FDCPA. (Id., Ex. F). On June 

24, 2009, the Superior Court denied that motion, noting that it would not “entertain these 

arguments again as the Court has previously ruled on there [sic] motions.” (Id., Ex. G, at 3). 

After the Sheriff’s Sale, Plaintiff filed an Emergent Application to Stay Removal of 

Occupant, (Id., Ex. H), which the Superior Court denied on May 17, 2011, noting that Plaintiff 

had the right to pursue an appeal in this matter with the Appellate Division (Id., Ex. H). 

Subsequently on May 20, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Removal and Federal Stay of Eviction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) in this Court. [1]. 

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants have a statutory right to remove “any civil action brought in a state court of 

which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A 

defendant seeking to remove a case must file a “notice of removal . . . containing a short and 

plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and 

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orders served.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). When confronted with a motion to remand, the 

removing party has the burden of establishing the propriety of removal. See F.D.I.C. v, Wissel & 

Sons Constr. Co., Inc., 881 F. Supp, 119, 122 (D.N.J, 1995). Moreover, the removal statute is 

generally “strictly construed against removal and all doubts should be resolved in favor of 

remand.” Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 (3d Cir. 1992) (quotation and citation 

omitted). 

An action that has been removed to federal court may be remanded to state court pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) on the grounds of a defect in the removal procedure. For example, failure 

to file a notice of removal within the time period provided by the removal statutes is a sufficient 

ground on which to remand. See Wissel & Sons Constr. Co., 881 F. Supp. at 122; Mountain 

Ridge State Bank v. Investor Funding Corp., 763 F. Supp. 1282, 1288 (D.N.J. 1991). The 

defendant bears the burden of establishing removal jurisdiction and demonstrating compliance 

with all pertinent procedural requirements. See, e.g., Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 

108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Capone v. Harris Com., 694 F. Supp. 111, 112 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 

In the instant case, Plaintiff seeks to remove an action that is almost four years old to this 

Court without providing any justification for why removal is appropriate. Plaintiff has not cited any 

authority for the proposition that her ability to remove extends beyond the thirty day period specified 

by statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). Nor has Plaintiff complied with any of the procedural 

requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1446, including attaching a copy of any process, pleadings or orders 

to her Notice of Removal. While this Court is not unsympathetic to Plaintiff’s circumstances, these 

procedural deficiencies alone warrant remand to the Superior Court. The Court notes that 

Plaintiff retains the right to pursue an appeal in this matter as described in the Superior Court’s 

May 17, 2011 Order. 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

For the above reasons, and for good cause shown, the Defendant’s Motion to 

Remand is granted. An appropriate order will follow. 

 _/s/ Anne E. Thompson________

ANNE E. THOMPSON, U.S.D.J. 

Dated_October 12, 2011_____ 

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