NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EDMOND TALLEY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 21-55071 

D.C. No. 5:19-cv-02087-SK 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Steve Kim, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 10, 2021**

Pasadena, California

Before: M. SMITH, LEE, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

Claimant Edmond Talley appeals from the district court’s order affirming the 

Commissioner’s denial of his applications for disability insurance benefits under 

Title II and supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

DEC 15 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Act. We have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 

review the district court’s order de novo and reverse only if the Administrative Law 

Judge’s (ALJ) decision was not supported by substantial evidence or was based on 

legal error. Larson v. Saul, 967 F.3d 914, 922 (9th Cir. 2020). We affirm.

1. The ALJ permissibly relied on a vocational expert’s response to a 

hypothetical question, even though the hypothetical did not explicitly incorporate 

Talley’s six-hour standing and walking limitation. The ALJ told the vocational 

expert to consider the functional capacity for “light work as defined in appendix 2 

subpart P in the regulations” with certain other non-exertional mental limitations. 

As with “medium work,” “light work” is “a term of art in disability law with a wellestablished meaning,” Terry v. Saul, 998 F.3d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 2021), that 

includes a limitation of “standing or walking, off and on, for a total of approximately 

6 hours of an 8-hour workday,” SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *6 (Jan. 1, 1983). 

Thus, the vocational expert would have understood the ALJ’s instructions regarding 

Talley’s residual functional capacity to include this limitation. See Terry, 998 F.3d 

at 1013. 

2. Talley forfeited his challenge to the vocational expert’s testimony 

based on non-Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) data because he did not raise 

this issue at his administrative hearing. See Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1109–

10 (9th Cir. 2017). Instead, Talley raised it for the first time to the Appeals Council 
3 

by offering competing vocational evidence. Claimants represented by attorneys must 

raise “all issues and evidence” to the ALJ to avoid forfeiture. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 

F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1999). Talley’s counsel could have questioned the expert 

about the standing or walking requirements of the identified work, but did not. See 

Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1156 (2019). Accordingly, Talley forfeited this

claim on appeal. See Shaibi, 883 F.3d at 1109. 

3. Even if not forfeited, Talley’s challenge to the vocational evidence on 

which the vocational expert relied fails. First, the raw data that Talley submitted to 

the Appeals Council without any explanation or argument offers no ground to 

conclude that the vocational expert’s testimony was “so feeble[] or contradicted[]

that it would fail to clear the substantial-evidence bar.” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1155–

56. Moreover, Terry forecloses this argument. See 998 F.3d at 1013 (holding that

non-DOT data “does not necessarily establish either legal error or a lack of 

substantial evidence” where “a qualified vocational expert is presumptively familiar 

with” disability law terms and their “attendant limitations,” and the record reflects 

the expert’s “unchallenged expertise and [the expert’s] reference to the [DOT]”).

“[E]ven where the evidence of record is ‘susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation,’ we must defer to the Commissioner's interpretation of the evidence.” 

Id. (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding at 
4 

step five of the disability evaluation process. 

4. Finally, the ALJ gave “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for 

partially discounting Talley’s testimony about his limitations. Molina v. Astrue, 674 

F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded by regulation on other grounds (citation 

omitted). For example, the ALJ cited conflicts between Talley’s allegations of his 

disabling physical and mental impairments and the objective medical evidence. See 

Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008). The 

ALJ also noted that Talley reported that his mental-health symptoms improved with 

medication. See Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017). Finally, 

the ALJ noted inconsistencies between Talley’s allegations of disabling physical and 

mental symptoms and his daily activities. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112–13. 

AFFIRMED.