COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Alston, Chafin and Senior Judge Haley 

CIARA M. VARGAS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0530-18-4 PER CURIAM 

 NOVEMBER 13, 2018 

ARLINGTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT 

 OF HUMAN SERVICES 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 

William T. Newman, Jr., Judge 

 (Isabel Kaldenbach, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting 

on brief. 

 (Jason L. McCandless, Assistant County Attorney; G. Rex Flynn, 

Guardian ad litem for the minor child, on brief), for appellee. 

Appellee and Guardian ad litem submitting on brief. 

 The Arlington County Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (the JDR court) 

entered orders terminating Ciara Vargas’ (mother) parental rights to her child and approving the 

goal of adoption. Mother appealed the JDR court’s orders to the circuit court, which dismissed her 

appeals for her failure to appear at the circuit court hearing. This appeal followed. Mother argues 

that the circuit court erred because “[i]t considered the matter without proper service to all 

parties.” Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that the circuit court did 

not err. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the circuit court. 

BACKGROUND 

“On appeal, ‘we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party below, in this case the Department.’” Farrell v. Warren Cty. 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 

UNPUBLISHED 
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Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 59 Va. App. 375, 386, 719 S.E.2d 329, 334 (2012) (quoting Jenkins v. 

Winchester Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 12 Va. App. 1178, 1180, 409 S.E.2d 16, 18 (1991)). 

 Mother is the biological mother to the child, who was born in September 2013 and is the 

subject of this appeal. In December 2015, mother and the child were residents of California, but 

visiting Virginia. On December 16, 2015, the police arrested mother for prostitution. The police 

also observed marijuana and smelled marijuana in the hotel room where mother and the child were 

staying. The police requested the Department’s assistance because the child was with mother at the 

time of her arrest and there were no other appropriate caregivers. The child came into the 

Department’s care on that day. 

 The Department provided numerous services to mother while the child was in foster care. 

After a social worker from the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) found 

mother’s home in California to be appropriate, the Department arranged for a trial home visit. Since 

that time, mother moved several times, without notifying the Department of her moves or seeking 

approval of the homes for the child. While the child was living with mother in California, mother’s 

probation officer reported that mother had completed substance abuse counseling, but then relapsed 

with positive drug screens on March 4, April 12, May 16, and June 19, 2017. 

 After receiving information from mother’s probation officer that mother had moved again 

and the child was living elsewhere with family, the Department sought an emergency hearing with 

the JDR court. On July 7, 2017, the JDR court issued a preliminary protective order, which 

compelled mother to surrender the child to the appropriate authorities. On July 10, 2017, mother 

surrendered the child, and on July 11, 2017, the Department travelled to California to bring the child 

back to Virginia. 

 The Department subsequently sought a change in the foster care goal to adoption, and the 

JDR court scheduled a hearing for September 14, 2017. Mother’s counsel was present at the 
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hearing, but mother was not present, despite having been served with notice of the hearing date by 

certified mail, return receipt requested. The JDR court entered an order approving the goal of 

adoption on September 18, 2017. Mother appealed the JDR court’s ruling. On September 28, 2017, 

the circuit court clerk’s office sent a letter to all of the parties, including mother and her attorney, 

that the case was set for docket call on October 16, 2017. On that date, the circuit court entered an 

order setting the matter for trial on March 6, 2018 at 10:00 a.m. Mother’s counsel endorsed the 

order. 

 On October 11, 2017, the Department filed a petition to terminate mother’s parental rights, 

and the JDR court scheduled a hearing for December 13, 2017. Mother’s counsel was present at the 

hearing, but mother was not present, despite having been served with notice of the hearing date by 

certified mail, return receipt requested. The JDR court entered an order terminating mother’s 

parental rights on December 13, 2017. Mother appealed the JDR court’s ruling. On December 18, 

2017, the circuit court clerk’s office sent a letter to all of the parties, including mother and her 

attorney, that the case was set for docket call on January 8, 2018. On December 29, 2017, the 

parties, including mother’s attorney, filed a “Praecipe Setting Date for Trial,” which stated that the 

parties agreed for the case to be heard on March 6, 2018 at 10:00 a.m. On January 8, 2018, the 

circuit court entered a consent order, endorsed by counsel, stating that the case was scheduled for a 

hearing on March 6, 2018 at 10:00 a.m. 

 At approximately 11:00 a.m. on March 6, 2018, the circuit court called the case, and mother 

was not present. The Department made a motion to dismiss mother’s appeal pursuant to Code 

§ 16.1-106.1(D), which states: 

If a party who has appealed a judgment or order of a district court 

fails to appear in circuit court either at the time for setting the 

appeal for trial or on the trial date, the circuit court may, upon the 

motion of any party, enter an order treating the appeal as 

withdrawn and disposing of the case in accordance with this 

section. If no party appears for trial, the court may deem the
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appeal to be withdrawn without a motion and enter an order 

disposing of the case in accordance with this section. 

The Department argued that mother had actual notice of the hearing. Mother’s counsel was present 

at the hearing and admits that it was mother’s appeal; however, counsel questioned whether 

sufficient notice of the hearing was provided to her client. 

 The Department presented evidence from the social worker who testified that she had 

spoken to mother on the telephone “[t]his past Friday.” The social worker continued, “And during 

that conversation I asked if she was aware of the upcoming court hearing for today’s date, and she 

had said that she was informed of the hearing by her attorney and that she was making arrangements 

– trying to make arrangements to come to the hearing.” The social worker said that mother never 

told her that she was not going to be able to come to the hearing. The social worker further testified 

that she was certain that she was speaking with mother because mother has “a very distinctive 

voice.” 

 After hearing the arguments, the circuit court agreed with the Department that mother had 

actual notice of the hearing. Since mother was not present at the hearing, her appeals were 

considered withdrawn. The circuit court entered an order dismissing the appeals and remanding the 

case to the JDR court on March 28, 2018. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS 

 Mother argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing her appeals. She contends that her 

due process rights were violated and that “the Department was unable to demonstrate that [she] had 

been served with notice of the date of the appeal.” Mother acknowledges that the Department 

presented evidence from the social worker that mother was aware of the court date. However, she 

contends that the social worker’s testimony was not sufficient to prove service. We disagree. 

 The circuit court found that mother had actual notice of the hearing. “We give ‘great 

deference’ to the trial court’s factual findings and view the facts in the light most favorable to the 
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prevailing party below.” Andrews v. Creacey, 56 Va. App. 606, 619, 696 S.E.2d 218, 224 (2010) 

(quoting Blackson v. Blackson, 40 Va. App. 507, 517, 579 S.E.2d 704, 709 (2003)). “On appeal, 

we will not reverse findings of fact ‘unless plainly wrong.’” Budnick v. Budnick, 42 Va. App. 823, 

834, 595 S.E.2d 50, 55 (2004) (quoting Gilman v. Gilman, 32 Va. App. 104, 115, 526 S.E.2d 763, 

768-69 (2000)). 

 The circuit court explained that it did not “take this lightly” when it granted the 

Department’s motion to dismiss mother’s appeals; however, it held that there was sufficient 

evidence to support the Department’s motion. The circuit court found credible the social worker’s 

testimony that “she was certain that the voice she was speaking to as of this past Friday was, in fact, 

Ms. Vargas and that Ms. Vargas told her that she was aware of the hearing, had been in touch with 

her counsel about the hearing, and said that she intended to be” at the hearing. “It is well 

established that the trier of fact ascertains a witness’ credibility, determines the weight to be 

given to their testimony, and has discretion to accept or reject any of the witness’ testimony.” 

Layman v. Layman, 62 Va. App. 134, 137, 742 S.E.2d 890, 891 (2013) (quoting Street v. Street, 

25 Va. App. 380, 387, 488 S.E.2d 665, 668 (1997) (en banc)). 

 Therefore, contrary to mother’s arguments, the circuit court did not err in dismissing 

mother’s appeals pursuant to Code 16.1-106.1(D) because the evidence supported the circuit 

court’s factual findings that mother had actual notice of the hearing and she was not present at 

the hearing. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s ruling is affirmed. 

Affirmed.