### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A ugus t 15
, 200 7

MA RS HAL L D ONN ELL JOHN SON v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Rutherford Coun ty

No. 57470 Jam es K . Clayton, Jr., Judge

No. M2006- 02281-CCA -R3-P C - F iled Novem ber 15, 2007

The pe titioner, Marshall Donne ll J ohnson, appea ls the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief , arguing that the post-conviction cour t er re d by finding that he re ceive d eff ective a ssistance of trial c o u n s e l a n d e n te r e d h is g u il ty p le a kn o w in g ly a n d v o lu n ta r il y

. F o ll o w in g o u r r e v ie w , we aff irm the denial of the petition.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he cour t, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.

Howar d W. W ilson, Murfree sboro, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Marsha ll Donnell J ohnson.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., At tor

ne y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; Sop hia S. L e e , A ssi sta

nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Wil liam C. W hitesell, J r., District A t t o rney Gene ral; and Tr evor H . L y nch, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

F AC TS

I n October

2003, the Rutherfor d County Gra nd J ury indicted the petitioner on one count of b u r g l a r y o t h e r t h a n a h a

b i t a t i o n , a C l a s s D f

e l o n y , a n d o n e c o u n t o f t h e f t u n d e r $ 5 0 0
, a Cla ss A misdemeanor. O n Aug ust 27, 2004, the petit ioner pled g uilty to the burglar y count of the indictment in ex chang e for

a ten- y ear

sentenc e as a

Rang e I I I , persistent off ender in the Depa

rtment of Cor re c tio n, wi th t

he tr ia l c ourt

to l a te r d e te rm ine wh e the r the se nte nc e wa s to be se rv e d c on c ur re ntl y

or c on se c uti ve ly

to t he pe tit ion e r’ s Su mne r C ounty c on vic tio ns . T he jud g me nt i n th is c a se re fl e c ts the petitioner’s se ntence was orde red to be serve d consec utively to other sentenc es in Wil liamson, Davidson, and Sumner Counties, which he w as s er v i n g on parole or probation at the time of the ins tant o ff

e ns e . I t w a s ma

nd a tor y that th e se se nte nc e s w e re or dere d co ns e c uti ve , p ur su a nt t o-2-

Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 15 (b )( 6) . Purs ua nt t o the te rm s of the ple a a g re e me nt, the theft c ou n t o f the indictment wa s dismis sed. At the g uilty plea he aring , the assistant district attorney set out the following fac tual basis for the c rime:

Your H o n o r , h a d th is matt e r g o n e to tr ia l, th e St a te w o u ld h a v e off ere d evidenc e and pr esente d testimony to establish that on o r ab o u t April 15th of 2002, [the pe tit ion e r] e nte re d in to S tyle Am e ri c a , a busi ne ss in Smy rn a , ca us ingdama g e to the bac k door. When he e ntere d into St y le Amer ica, t h er e wa s a small amount of

c ha ng e

. . . . Th a t wa s lis te d a s be ing ta ke n fr om the bu sin e ss. Whil e in si de S ty le Americ a, he buste d a hole throug h Sty le Americ a’s walls into the next business over, wh ic h w a s .

. . Sa lly ’s Beaut y S alo n. I n a ny e ve nt, y our H on or , h e bu ste d a ho le throug h one wa ll, we nt into the other one . He we nt into the beauty salon and set of

f the alar m. He exited back throug h the initial hole and went out throug h the bac k.

He wa s picked up late r af ter some instanc es, I

believe oc curring in Sumner Count y , where he ma de stateme nts reg arding this as well. That wa s in October of 2002. Detec tive R i ck Ha ll with the Sm y rna Police D epar

tment interviewe d [t he
pe tit ion e r]. He g a ve a wr itt e n state me nt ve ri fy ing him sto pp ing in the park in g lot, brea king into the first business, taking some chang e, stated that there was no money in there, r ather

bills i n there
, but he did take the chang e, bust ed the hole thr oug h the wall to g o into the n ex t b u s i n ess. And that’s whe n the alar m went off, a

nd that’s when he admitted to leaving throug h the s ame hole and leaving out throug h the bac k door of Sty le Amer ica.

At the g uilty

plea he aring , the peti t i o n er s t ated that he understood the tria l court would be

ma kin g a la te r de te rm inatio n a s to wh e the r h is s e nte nc e wo uld ru n c on c ur re ntl y or c on se c uti ve ly

to his Sum ner County

sentenc es and a sked if there was any thing in particula

r t he cour t would consider in i ts d e c isi on . T he tr ia l c ourt re sp on de d:

Well, I ’d be looking for what y ou tell me more than a ny thing else. Ithink y ou know y our re cord. Y ou know what y our re cord r efle cts. Idon’t k n o w what y our

rec ord re flec ts y et. I

understand it’s e x tensive, mos t l y b u rglarie s. How y ou’ve
cooper ated with me, with the investig ation of this crime, a nd so forth would have about as much be aringon it as any thing, or lack of cooper ation, whicheve r it was. Y o u ’ r e n o tg o i n g t o b e a

b l e t o c o n v i n c e m e t h a ty o u ’ v e c h a n g e d
, a r e y o u ?

When qu e s ti o n e d

b y tr ia l c o u n s e l, th e p e ti ti o n e r a c kn o w le d g e d

th a t t r ia l c o u n s e l h ad

re vie we d the ne g oti a te d ple a a g re e me nt wit h him the pr e vio us da

y , tha t he ha d sig ne d it, an d tha t it

corr ectly stated t he agr eeme nt he had r eac hed. Tria l counsel aske d the petitioner whe ther ther e wa s any thing f urther he neede d to do on the case other than to pre pare for t h e u pcoming sentenc ing hear in g. The pe tit ion e r s a id t hat an o ff ic e r w ho ha d in te rv ie we d h im i n th e ja il h a d p ro mis e d to
te sti fy on his be ha lf a

bo ut his c oo pe ratio n wi th the po lic e

. Tr ia l c ouns e l re sp on de d that he c ou ld subpoena tha t office r to testify at the petitioner’ s sentencinghear ing.-3-

At the Novembe r 30, 2004, sentenc ing he aring , the S t ate introduced the pe titioner’s
pr e se nte nc e re po rt , w hic h r e fl e c te d a n e xten siv e his tor

y of pr ior c on vic ti o n s

. T h e f

o r ty -f ive -y e a r- old petitioner ac knowledg ed that his criminal re cord w as substantial, that he had been inc arc erated “f ive
to s ix time s, ” a nd

tha t he un de rs too d h e wo uld

have to s e rv e the te n- y e a r s e nte nc e in t he ins tant c a se

co n s ec u t i v el y t o the sentenc e for a convic tion for which he had bee n on parole at the time he committed the instant offense . The pe titioner expl ained that his c riminal rec ord included so many burg laries be cause “that wa s what [he] di d the best” and “what [he] .

. . knew how to make money .” He state d that he commit ted t he burgla ries to support his drug habit but since that time had stopped using dr u gs and intended to a bandon his forme r life of crime. H e desc ribed the various selfimprovement cla sses he ha d taken dur ing his re cent inca rce ration and introduced as a collec tive

e xhibi t se ve ra l c e rt if

ic a te s h e ha d e a rn e d u

po n c om pl eti ng druga nd a lc oh ol c la sse s, a s w e ll a s a le tte r o f r e c omm e nd a tio n f ro m th e ins tr

uc tor of a n au to me c ha

nic s cla ss in whi c h h e wa s c ur re ntl y enrolled. H e stated that he was a high sc hool gr aduate

.

Th e pe tit ion e r t e sti fi ed th at he fu lly c oo pe ra te d w iththe po lic e a nd

a ssi ste d th e m in

rec o v e r in g a n u mb e r o f s to le n it e ms b e c a u s e h e w a s ti r e d o f h is f

o r me r li f e s ty le : “ [W] h en I was

arr ested . . . I just decide d to come c lean be cause Iwas just tired. I was just tired of the dr

ug s and,
y ou know, taking from people.

. . . I just don’t want to be doing it no more .” On c ross-examination, he ac knowledg ed that his c ooperation with the authorities had led to a number of his c ases in Sumner C o u n t y b e i n g r e t i r e d
, i n c l u d i n g t h i rt y- f o u r c o u n t s o f b u r g l a r

y, s i x c o u n t s o f

a t t e m p t e d

b u r g l a r y, six teen c ounts of t heft under $500, three counts of t heft ove r $1000 but under $10,000, twe nty -eig ht counts of vanda lism under $500, and thre e counts of va ndalism over $500.

At t h e co n cl usion of the sentenc ing he aring , the trial cour t found the petitioner to be a “prof essional criminal who has knowing ly devoted much of

his lifetime to criminal acts as a major

source of livelihood.” A c c o r d ingly , the cour t ordere d that the petitioner ser ve his ten-y ear

Rutherford County sentenc e conse cutively to the effec tive twenty -y ear sentenc e he ha d rec eived f or his Sumner County convictions.

On Aug ust 8, 2005, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction re lief in which he cla imed that his guilty plea wa s unkno wi n g an d involuntary and that he r ece ived ineff ective assistance of counse l. Following the appointment of post-conviction counsel, the petitioner filed an

a me nd e d p e tit ion

in w hic h h e a lle g e d th a t tr ia l c ouns e l w a s in e ff e c tiv e fo r, a mon g oth e r t hin g s, fa ili ngto f

ull y e xpla in t

he law r e g a rd ingc on se c uti ve ve rsus con curr e nt s e nte nc ing ; f a ili ng to proper ly investigate the ca se; and fa iling to ca ll witnesses at the sentenc ing he aring

.

At the J uly

21, 2006, evidentiar

y hear ing, trial counsel, who sa id he had be en pra cticing law in Rutherford County

for e ighte en y ear s, testified that he was appointed to re prese nt the petitioner on his arra ignme nt day . He sa id that the petitioner wa s “ver y interested” in t ry i n g t o get an off er from the State that involved r unning his Rutherf

ord County

sentenc e conc urre ntly

to his S umner C o u n t y s en tence s. Acc ording to trial counsel, he e x plained to the petitioner, a nd the petitioner understood, that he w ould have to ser ve the Rutherf

ord County

sentenc e conse cutively

to the
sentenc e for

the offe nse for

which he ha d been on pa role a t the time he committed the cr imes.-4-

Trial counse l testifi ed t h at t h e S tate’s initial offe r “w as 12 y ear s at 45 perc ent, running

consec utive on the burg lary and dismiss t h e t h eft.” The pe titioner, howeve r, re jected that offer

. Trial counse l then made a counter offe r to the State:

[The petitioner] never disputed with me that he didn’t do the offense that he

was c harg ed with. His only conce rn was try ing to g et it to run concur rent with that other sente nce that he had. So I went back and talked to the Dis trict Attorney about the possibilit y

of doing that. And I believe [t he prosec utor] told me that he wouldn’ t ag ree to run it concurr ent but if [t he petitioner] wa nted to tr y to se ttle his case and at l ea s t h ave the opportunity to ask, that that day

only he would make an off

er of ten y ear s and then set it for a

hear ing a nd let the J udg e dec ide how it would run.

Trial counse l testified that he re ceive d and re viewed a packe t of discove ry fr o m t h e State. Howeve r, to the best of his re collection, he ne ver interviewe d Detec tive Rick Hall, the offic er w ho took the defe ndant’s stateme nt or spoke to any other witnesse s in t h e case. He said he re called discussing the petitioner’s “ very extensive prior rec ord” a nd its l ikely

impact on the trial c ourt’s
sentenc ing de ter m i n at i o n s : “And I distinctly reme mber telling [t he petitioner] the odds wer e not g ood based on his prior record that he was g oing to g et concurre nt sentenc ing, but under the offe r of the State, he could at lea st ask for it. And he said, well, that’s what I want to do.” Tr ial counsel said the petitioner never disputed that he had committed the crime a nd g ave him no re ason to believe that his statement shoul d be suppressed. To t he contr ary , the petitioner “ wanted it broug ht out that he did g ive s tatements and did cooper ate because he felt like that was may be his only

way to ge t the possibili ty

to have c oncurr ent sentenc ing.”

Trial counse l said he believe d that the State took the petitioner’s c ooperation wi th the authorities into consideration when offe ring him the plea ag ree ment, which provide d for him to be
sente n c e d a s a p e r s is te n t, r a th e r

th a n c a r e e r , o f

f e n d e r a n d o f f e r e d th e p o s s ib il it

y o f c o n c u r r ent sentenc es. Prior to the g uilty plea he aring , the petitioner ne ver me nt i o n ed any thing to him about subpoenaing office rs to testify on his behalf. Tr ial counsel wa s unable to say why he did not

su bp oe na De te c tiv e Ha ll t o te sti fy

a t th e se nte nc inghe a ri ng

. He po int e d out, ho we ve r, tha t th e Sta te had announc ed to the trial cour t that the petitioner had c ooperated and g iven a state ment to police. He a ls o agr eed that he thoroug hly cover ed the pe titioner’s level of c ooperation with authorities during his ex amination of the pe titioner at the sentenc ing he aring

.

Th e pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d th a t tr ia l c ouns e l sp ok e to h im o n th re e dif fe re nt o c c a sio ns fo r o nly

“ a c ou ple of se c on ds ” e a c h tim e

. Duri ng the fi rs t me e tin g , tr ia l c ouns e l in fo rm e d h im that th e Sta te had off ere d eig ht y ear s. The petitioner sa id he told trial counsel that he would acc ept the offe r if the
sentenc es we re r

un concur rently

. When trial counsel ca me bac k, he informe d the petitioner that the St a te w o u ld g iv e h im te n y e a r s if h e w o u ld a g r e e to “ g o u n d e r a Ju d g e s e n te n c ing hear ing.” The
pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d th a t he a nd tr ia l c ouns e l dis c us se d su bp oe na ing De te c tiv e Ha ll pr ior to t he da te of his g uilty plea hear ing. A ccor ding to the pe titioner, he did not learn that Detec tive Hall would not be te sti fy ingun til he wa s at the se nte nc ing he a ri ng , whe n tr ia l c ouns e l in fo rm e d h im that th e y did-5-

not need De tective Ha ll’s testimony . He sa id he would neve r h av e pled g uilty had he know n that Detec tive Hall would not testify on his behalf at sentencing

.

On cr oss-examin at i o n , t h e p et i t i o n er ac kn o wl ed ged t h at h e w as ab l e t o i n fo rm t h e c o u rt about his cooperation with authorities. He ag ree d that no one for ced him to enter h i s p l ea , that he

un de rs too d w hat he wa s d oin g , a nd that he ha d en te re d his ple a kn ow ing ly a nd vo lun tari ly . H e a lso

ac kn o wl ed ged t h at t ri al co u n s el n ev er p ro m i s ed h i m t h at h e wo u l d re ce i v e c o n cu rr en ts en t en ci n g. Th e pe tit ion e r f

ur the r t e sti fi e d th a t he ha d n ot s po ke n w ithDe te c tiv e Ha ll s inc e the da y he g a ve his statement. He said he did not know what Hall’s testimo n y wo u ld have be en at the se ntencing hear ing a nd could “only

imag ine” what he would have said. Finally , the petitioner stated that he and post-conviction counse l had ag ree d that it would be best for the petitioner if they did not subpoena Detec tive Hall as a

witness at the evide ntiary hear ing.

On September

15, 2006, the post-conviction cour t issued a n oral ruling denying the petition, which wa s subsequently enter ed as a written order on September 20, 2006. A mong othe r thing s, the post-conviction cour

t fou n d t h at t h e petitioner’s g uilty plea wa s knowing and that he c ould not

es t ab l i s h p re

j u d i ce b as ed o n co u n s el ’s fa i l u re t o s u b p o en a De t ec t i v e Ha l l t o t h e s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g. Wit h respe ct to this latter claim, the post-con v i ct i o n court noted tha t it had considere d the
p et i t i o n er ’s u n co n t es t edt es t i m o n y a b o u t h i s co o p er at i o n wi t h p o l i ce i n i t s s en t en ci n g ru l i n g. There afte r, the pe titioner filed a timely notice of a

ppeal to this court.

AN AL YSI S

I

. P o s t

- C o nv ic t io n S t a nd a r d o f R e v ie w
The post-c onviction petitioner bea rs the burde n of proving his alleg at i o n s b y clear and convincing evidenc e. See T enn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110( f) ( 2006). When an e videntiary hear ing is held in the post-conviction setting, the finding s of fa ct made by the court a re c onclusive on appe al unless the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst them. See Tidwell v. State, 922 S.W .2d 497, 500 (Tenn. 1 9 9 6 ). W h er e ap p el l at e r ev i ew i n v o l v es p u re l y fa ct u al i s s u es , t h e ap p el l at e co u rt s h o u l d n o tre we i gh or reevaluate th e e v id e n c e

. Se e H e n le y v

. St a te , 9 6 0 S. W. 2 d

5 7 2
, 5 7 8 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 7 )

. H o w e v e r,

re vie w o f a

tr ia l court ’s a

pp lic a tio n of the law to the fa c ts of the c a se is de novo , with no presumption of cor rec tness. See Ruff v. State, 978 S.W.2d 95
, 9 6 (T en n. 1998). The issue of ineffe ctive assistance of counsel, which presents mix ed questions of fa ct and law , is reviewe d de novo , with a presumption of cor

rec tness g iven only

to the post-conviction cour t's f indings of f

act. See F ields v. State, 40 S.W .3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001) ; Burns v. State, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999).

II. Inef fective Assistance of Cou nsel

Th e pe tit ion e r c on te nd s th a t tr ia l c ouns e l w a s in e ff e c tiv e fo r f

a ili ng to a de qu a te ly

inv e sti g a te his c a se . Sp e c if

ic a lly , h e c omp la ins of c ouns e l’ s fa ilure to c on du c t a ny fa c tua l inv e sti g a tio n or to subpoena D etec tive Rick Hall to testify on the petitioner’ s b eh al f at the sente ncing hear ing. T he-6-

petitioner cla ims tha t i f he had known that the off icer was not g oing to testify

at his sentencing hear ing, he would not have pled guilty but instead would have taken his cha nces at trial.

To establish a c laim of ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel, the petitioner ha s the burden to show both that trial coun s el ’s p erf ormanc e wa s deficie nt and that counse l’s defic ient perf ormanc e pr e jud ic e d th e ou tc ome of

the pr oc e e din g . Stri c kla

nd v. Was hin g ton , 4 66 U. S. 6 68
, 68 7, 10 4 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); see State v. Taylor, 968 S.W .2d 900, 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (noting that

same sta nd a rd fo r d e te rm ini ng ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l th a t is a

pp lie d in fe de ra l c a se s a lso

a pp lie s in Te nn e sse e ). Th e Str ic kla nd sta nd a rd is a tw o- pr on g te st:

F ir st, the de fe nd a nt m

us t sh owthat c ouns e l’ s p e rf or manc e was de fi c ie nt. Th is require s showing that counsel made err ors so s erious that counse l was not fu nc tio nin g a s th e “ c ouns e l” g ua ra nte e d th e de fe nd a nt b y

the Sixth A me ndme nt. Second, the de fenda

nt must show that the deficient perf ormanc e pre

judiced the defe nse. This requir es showing that counsel’s e rror s were so serious as to deprive the defe ndant of a

fair tr ial, a trial whose result is reliable.

466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct . at 2064.

The de ficient pe rfor

mance prong of the test is satisfied by showing that “counse l ’s ac t s or omissions wer e so serious as to f all below an objec tive standard of rea sonablene ss under pre vailing
pr of e ssi on a l no rm s. ” Go a d v. Stat e , 938 S.W. 2d 36 3, 36 9 (T e nn . 199 6) (c iti ng Str ic kla nd , 4 66 U. S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065; Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975) ). The pr ejudice pr ong

o f t h e t e s ti s s a t i s f

i e d b y s h o w i n g a

r e a s o n a b l e p r o b a b i l i t y, i.e. , a “pr obability

sufficie nt to undermine confide nce in the outc ome,” that “ but for counsel' s unprofe ssional err ors, t he re sult of the proce eding would have be en diffe rent.” St ri ck l an d
, 4 6 6 U. S . at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. I n the context of a
g uil ty ple a , th e pe tit ion e r mus t show a re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity that we re it n ot f

or the de fi c ie nc ie s in counsel’s r epre sentation, he would not have pled g uilty but would inste ad h ave insisted on
proce eding to trial. Hill v. L ockar t, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370 (1985); House v. State, 44 S.W .3d 508, 516 (Tenn. 2001)

.

We conclude that the rec o rd s u p p orts the post-conviction cour t’s finding that counsel provided e ffe ctive re prese ntation. Trial counsel testified that he made no g uara ntees to the pe titioner wi th r e sp e c t to the ou tc ome of the se nte nc ing he a ri ng a nd , in fa c t, s pe c if

ic a lly inf or me d h im tha t hi s

s u b s t an t i al cr i m i n al re co rd m ad e i tu n l i k el y t h at t h e t ri al co u rt wo u l d o rd er co n cu rr en ts en t en ci n g. Trial couns el ac knowledg ed that he did not subpoena Detec tive Hall to testify at the sente ncing h e a r in g , a s r e qu e s te d b y th e p e ti ti o n e r , a n d s a id th a t h e d id n o t kn o w w h y h e h a d n o t d o n e so. Ho we ve r, in h is o pin ion

De te c tiv e Ha ll’ s te sti mony wa s un ne c e ssa ry sin c e the Sta te did

no t c on te st the fa c t th a t th e pe tit io ner ha d c oo pe rate d w iththe a uth or iti e s and

the pe tit ion e r w a s a

ble to f ull y relate his cooper ation to the trial court. Tr ial counsel e x plained that he did not challeng e the

a dmi ssi bil ity

of the pe tit ion e r’ s c on fe ssi on be c a us e the pe tit ion e r n e ve r ind ic a te d to him any fa c ts that would support a mot ion to suppress. Moreove r, suppressing the confe ssion would have bee n-7-

counter productive to the pe titioner’s stated objec tion of emphasizing his full cooper ation with the police.

Ev e n if the pe ti tione r c ou ld e sta bli shthat tr ia l c ouns e l w a s d e fi c ie nt f or fa ili ng to c a ll De te c tiv e Ha ll a s a

wi tn ess at th e sent e nc inghe a ri ng , h e c a nn ot s ho w t hat he wa s p re

jud ic e d a s a result of that fa ilure. The pe titioner did not call Detec tive Hall as a witness at the evide ntiary hear ing and testified that he could only g uess as to what Detec tive Hall’s testimony would have be en. As we ha ve pre viously

stated:

When a petit ioner c ontends that trial counse l failed to discover , interview, or
prese nt witnesses in support of his de fense
, these witnesses should be pre sented by the petitioner at the evidentiar y hear ing. A s a g ener al rule, this is the only way the petitioner ca

n establish that . . . the fa ilure to have a known witness pr esent or c all the witness to the stand re s u l t ed in the denial of c ritical evide nce w hich inured to the
pr e jud ic e of the pe tit ion e r. I t is e le me nta ry that ne ith e r a tr ia l ju dg e no r a n a pp e llate

c ourt c a n spe c ulate or g ue ss o n th e qu e sti on of wh e the r f

ur the r i nv e sti g a tio n w ou ld have re ve a le d a

ma te ri a l w itn e ss o r w hat a wi tne ss' s te sti mony

mig ht h a ve be e n if introduced by

defe nse counse l.

B la c k v . St a te , 7 94 S.W. 2d 75 2, 75 7 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 90 ). I n su m, t he pe tit ion e r h a s f

a ile d to sh ow that c ouns e l wa s de fi c ie nt in his re pr e se ntatio n or that he wo uld no t have ple d g uil ty we re it

no t f or c ouns e l’ s a lle g e d d e fi c ie nc ie s. We c on c lud e , the re fo re , that the pe tit ion e r is n ot e nti tle d to
po st- c on vic tio n r e lie f o n th e ba sis of his c la im o f i ne ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l.

III. Invol untary Guilty P lea

In a n i n t e r

r e l a t e d c l a i m , t h e p e t i t i o n e r

a l s o c o n t e n d s t h a th i s g u i l t y p l e a w a s n o tkn o w i n g l y, voluntarily , or intellige ntly enter ed. He asser

ts that he enter ed his guilty plea only

beca use he bel ie v e d th a t tr ia l c o u n s e l w a s g o in g to s u b p o e n a D e te c ti v e H a ll to te s ti f y o n h is b e h alf a t the
sentenc ing he aring

.

When an a ly

zi n g a g u il ty p le a , w e lo o k to th e f e d e r a l s ta n d a r d a n n o u n c e d in B o y k in v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. C t. 1709 (1969), and the state st andar d set out in State v. Macke y , 553 S.W .2d 337 (Tenn. 1977) . State v. Pe t t u s , 986 S.W .2d 540, 542 (Tenn. 1999) . I n Boy kin, the United States Supreme Court held that ther e must be an a ffirma tive showing in the t rial court that

a g uil ty ple a wa s v olu nta ri ly a nd kn ow ing ly

g ive n b e fo re it c a n be a c c e pte d. 39 5 U. S. a t 24 2, 89 S. Ct. at 1711. Simi larly
, in Ma ckey
, our supreme court require d an af firmative showingof a voluntar y and knowledg eable g uilty plea, na mely
, that the def

endant ha s been ma de aw are of the sig nificant
conseque nces of

such a ple a. Pettus, 986 S.W .2d at 542.

A plea is not “voluntar y ” if it results from ig noranc e, misunderstanding , coer cion, inducements, or thr eats. B lankenship v. State, 858 S.W .2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993) . The trial c ourt must determine if the guilty plea is “know ing” by

questioning the defe ndant to make sure he or she-8-

fully understands the plea a

nd its consequenc es. Pettus, 986 S.W .2d at 542; Bla nkenshi p, 858 S.W .2d at 904. B eca

use the plea m u s t represent a voluntary

and intellige nt choice a

mong the alternatives available to the defe ndant, the trial court may look at a number of circ umstantial factor s in making this dete rmination. Blanke nship, 858 S.W

. 2 d at 9 0 4

. These f actor s include: (1) the defe ndant’s re lative intellige nce; (2) his f amiliarity with criminal proce eding s; (3) whe ther he was

re pr e se nte d b y

c omp e te nt c ouns e l and

ha d th e op po rt

un ity to c on fe r wit

h co un se l abo ut a lte rn a tiv e s; (4) the a dvice of counsel a nd the cour

t about the cha

rg es ag ainst him and the pena lty to be imposed;

a nd (5 ) t he de fe nd a nt’s re a so ns fo r p le a din g g uil ty , in c lud ingthe de sir e to a vo id a g re a te r p e na lty in a jury trial. I d. at 904-05.

Th e tr a ns c ri pt o f the g uil ty ple a he a ri ng re fl e c ts that th e pe tit ion e r r e sp on de d a pp ro pr ia te ly wh e n a s k e d if h e u n d e r s to o d th e v a r io u s c o n s ti tuti o n a l r ig h ts a s d e s c r ib e d b y th e tr ia l c o u rt, if he understood he w as wa iving c erta in rig hts by pleading g uilty , whether he under stood his guilty

plea, and whe ther he was e ntering his plea knowing ly and voluntarily . The pe titioner informed the tria l

c ourt th at he w a s n ot u

nd e r t he inf lue nc e of dr ug s and fu lly un de rs too d w ha

t he wa s d oin g in
enter ing the plea. He also said that he understood that the trial court would be making a later deter mination as to whether his sente nce w ould run consec utively or conc urre ntly t o h i s Sumner County convictions. The rec ord further reve als that the petitioner wa s a hig h school g raduate and had a ve ry

extensive criminal history , which evide nced his o b vious familiarity with the criminal

c ourt sy ste m and

c ri min a l c ourt

pr oc e e din g s. We, the re fo re , c on c lud e th at th e pe tit ion e r’ s g uil ty plea wa s knowing ly , intelligently and voluntarily

enter ed.

CO NC LU SION

Ba sed on our r eview, w e conc lude that the petitioner ha s failed to show e ither that trial counsel wa s ineffe ctive or tha t his guilty plea wa s unknowing and i n v o l u n tary . Acc ording ly , we aff irm the denial of his pe tition for post-conviction relief

.

___________________________________ AL AN E. GL ENN, JUDGE