Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-20015

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

RAYMOND MAYES,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:07-CR-399-ALL

Before REAVLEY, DAVIS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Raymond Mayes was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to

distribute more than five grams of cocaine base, possession of a firearm in

furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm after being

convicted of a felony. Mayes appeals the district court’s denial of his pretrial

motion to suppress. He argues that the search warrant that enabled officers to

collect inculpatory evidence and effectuate his arrest was not supported by

probable cause because the warrant affidavit consisted primarily of material

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

February 9, 2010

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

Case: 09-20015 Document: 00511023331 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/09/2010
No. 09-20015

2

that the drafting officer copied from an earlier affidavit in an unrelated case. He

also argues that we should extend our supervisory powers and order suppression

as a sanction for the misconduct of the drafting officer. 

In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, this court

first determines whether the evidence at issue was obtained by law enforcement

officials acting in objectively reasonable good-faith reliance upon a search

warrant. United States v. Shugart, 117 F.3d 838, 843 (5th Cir. 1997). If the

good-faith exception applies, our inquiry ends, and the district court’s judgment

must be affirmed. United States v. Froman, 355 F.3d 882, 888 (5th Cir. 2004)

(citations omitted). However, if the exception does not apply, we must determine

whether there was a substantial basis for finding probable cause. Id. We review

findings of fact made by a district court on a motion to suppress for clear error

and the district court’s legal conclusions de novo, viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prevailing party. See United States v. Jacquinot, 258

F.3d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 2001). 

Mayes argues that the good-faith exception does not apply in this case

because the drafting officer deliberately falsified or recklessly disregarded the

truth necessary to the finding of probable cause by cutting-and-pasting from an

unrelated affidavit. Mayes is correct that the good-faith exception is not

applicable if the warrant contains a false statement that was made intentionally

or with reckless disregard for the truth. See United States v. Pope, 467 F.3d 912,

916–17 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mays, 466 F.3d 335, 343 (5th Cir. 2006).

However, while there is evidence that the affidavit in this case may have been

copied recklessly from an earlier affidavit, the record also contains credible

evidence that the facts recited in the affidavit reflect events that actually

occurred and which established probable cause. Moreover, to the extent that the

affidavit contains unverified statements that were carelessly copied from a prior

affidavit, the removal of those statements is without consequence; the remaining

evidence in the affidavit adequa1tely establishes the necessary probable cause

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No. 09-20015

3

for the issuance of a search warrant. See United States v. Cavazos, 288 F.3d 706,

710 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Alvarez, 127 F.3d 372, 374 (5th Cir. 1997)

(citing Franks v. Delaware, 483 U.S. 154 (1978)). 

Thus, Mayes has failed to establish that the district court erred in denying

his motion to suppress. He also has not shown that this case involves rare and

particularly egregious circumstances that might prompt this court to exercise its

supervisory powers and order suppression even though the warrant application,

removed of any false information, demonstrates probable cause. Cf. United

States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506–07 (1983) (suggesting that supervisory

powers should be used sparingly); see also Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct.

695, 702–04 (2009) (reviewing the type of flagrant or systemically negligent

conduct that warrants use of exclusionary rule for deterrence purposes).

Accordingly, the district court’s order is AFFIRMED.

Case: 09-20015 Document: 00511023331 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/09/2010