[C.A. No. 11-1315, Docs. No. 138, 142]

 [C.A. No. 11-5827, Doc. No. 25]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

IN RE: CAMDEN POLICE CASES

Master Docket No. 11-1315

(RBK/JS)

CITY OF CAMDEN

 Plaintiff,

v.

STATE NATIONAL 

INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.,

 Defendants.

Civ. No. 11-5827 (RBK/JS)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on movants’ motions to

intervene in the insurance coverage declaratory judgment action the

City of Camden (“Camden”) filed against its insurer. For the

1

reasons to be discussed, movants’ motions are DENIED.2

Background

This litigation concerns the consolidated “Camden Police

Cases.” Starting in 2009 approximately 68 plaintiffs filed 3

The insurer defendants are State National Insurance 1

Company, Star Insurance Company and Meadowbrook Insurance Group

(collectively referred to as “State National”). 

Camden does not oppose these motions. 2

Thus far the cases have only been consolidated for the 3

purposes of discovery and case management. C.A. No. 11-1315,

Case 1:11-cv-01315-RBK-JS Document 192 Filed 09/24/12 Page 1 of 12 PageID: 2231
separate complaints against Camden and individual police officers

alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for the violation of their

civil rights. The common thread in the cases is plaintiffs’

contention, inter alia, that the police officer defendants

falsified their police reports, planted evidence and testified

falsely under oath. Plaintiffs allege Camden and its police

department acted deliberately indifferent to their rights and

facilitated and tolerated the illegal acts of its police officers. 

Four former police officers have either been convicted or pled

guilty to related criminal charges. Most if not all of the 68

plaintiffs were released from jail as a result of the police

officers’ criminal conduct. One defendant was recently sentenced

to ten (10) years in prison. The three other defendants are

awaiting sentencing.

After the individual cases were filed Camden filed its

complaint against State National. (C.A. No. 11-5837). The case 4

was removed to federal court on October 6, 2011. Camden is seeking

a declaratory judgment that State National owes it a defense and/or

indemnification for the claims in the Camden Police Cases. State

National has denied coverage.

Doc. No. 4. Camden’s coverage action has been designated as a

Camden Police Case. Thus, all discovery, pleadings and motion

practice in the 68 individual cases and Camden’s coverage action

will be shared by all interested parties and counsel.

State National’s policies run from October 5, 2004 to July 4

l1, 2010.

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The present motion is before the Court on certain plaintiffs’

request to intervene in Camden’s coverage action. State National 5

opposes the motion. Movants argue they have an important interest

in the coverage case because its outcome will determine the extent

of the City’s available insurance coverage. (Brief of Whitley and

Graham (“Brief”), Doc. No. 34 at 2-3). They argue the coverage

lawsuit “may determine what funds are available to pay whatever

judgments [against Camden] are eventually entered, and practically

speaking, what funds are potentially available should the parties

be able to forge a settlement prior to trial.” Id. In opposition 6

The motion was originally filed by plaintiffs James 5

Anderson, David Bryant, Obie Carmichael, Henry Chavez and Marcus

Collins, “individually, and in a representative capacity for

similarly situated plaintiffs.” See C.A. No. 11-5827, Doc. No.

25. At oral argument it became apparent that the moving parties’

motion and advocacy was woefully deficient. Since the moving

parties were acting in a representative capacity for a group of

approximately 68 plaintiffs, the Court agreed with the

plaintiffs’ group that the interests of justice demanded they be

given another opportunity to brief the relevant issues. The

supplemental brief was filed by counsel representing plaintiffs

Whitley and Graham. The Court has considered their brief [C.A.

No. 11-5827, Doc. No. 34] and State National’s response [C.A. No.

11-5827, Doc. No. 35]. The Court exercises its discretion not to

conduct any additional oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L. R.

Civ. P. 78.1.

At the root of movants’ motion is their desire to adopt a 6

coverage position they believe is more favorable to them than the

policy interpretation set forth by Camden. Thus, if intervention

is permitted it would create the anomalous situation where

movants, strangers to Camden’s insurance policy, would be urging

the Court to adopt their coverage argument rather than that of

Camden, the insured. It would also result in a situation where

State National would have to defend against different coverage

arguments on the same issue.

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State National argues, inter alia, movants do not satisfy the

criteria under Rule 24 to intervene as of right and permissive

intervention should be denied. It argues intervention as of right

should be denied because the movants’ economic or contingent

interest in its policies does not support intervention under Rule

24(a)(2). State National also argues movants are “strangers” to

its insurance contract and the movants’ interests are adequately

protected by Camden. State National argues permissive intervention

should be denied based on controlling Third Circuit case law, there

are no common issues of law or fact, and intervention will delay

the proceedings and prejudice the parties.

Discussion

Intervention is a method of joinder, and is governed by

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. Movants seek intervention as 7

of right pursuant to Rule 24(a) and permissive intervention

pursuant to Rule 24(b). A party may intervene as of right if a

federal statute gives him or her an unconditional right to

intervene. Rule 24(a)(1). Aside from the Federal Declaratory

Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, which does not give movants a right

to intervene here, movants do not cite any applicable statute

A federal court sitting in diversity must apply federal 7

procedural law. Gasperini v. Cntr. for Humanities, Inc., 518

U.S. 415, 427 (1996); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Treesdale, Inc.

(“Treesdale”), 419 F.3d 216, 228 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the

Erie Doctrine does not require the application of state

procedural law to determine a motion to intervene). 

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giving them a right to intervene. (See Movants’ Brief at 1-2, 8

C.A. No. 11-5827, Doc. No. 25). Alternatively, a Court must grant

intervention as of right when a prospective intervenor

demonstrates: 

1) a timely application for leave to intervene, 2) a

sufficient interest in the underlying litigation, 3) a threat

that the interest will be impaired or affected by the

disposition of the underlying action, and 4) that the existing

parties to the action do not adequately represent the

prospective intervenor’s interests.

Treesdale, 419 F.3d at 220 (citation omitted); see also Fed. R.

Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Although a party seeking intervention must meet

all four requirements, “a very strong showing that one of the

requirements is met may result in a lesser showing of another

requirement.” Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 596 n. 6 (3d. Cir.

1987); Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. Virgin Islands Port Auth., 224

F.R.D. 372, 375 n.4 (D.V.I. 2004).

Movants’ are foreclosed from intervention as of right by the

Third Circuit’s controlling decision in Treesdale, supra. Accord

State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Vanaman, Civ. No. 10-1565(JHR),

2012 WL 959421 (D.N.J. March 20, 2012); Guardian Life Ins. Co. of

America v. Estate of Joseph A. Cerniglia, Civ. No. 10-5597(WHW),

2011 WL 1253955 (D.N.J. March 28, 2011). In Treesdale, the

plaintiffs sued a manufacturer, PMP, for injuries allegedly

sustained in connection with exposure to asbestos-containing

For the same reason, the Court does not consider whether 8

movants may intervene pursuant to a conditional statutory right. 

See Rule 24(b)(1)(A).

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products. In a separate action, the manufacturer’s insurer,

Liberty Mutual, sought a declaratory judgment against PMP, arguing

it had no further duty to indemnify PMP. The plaintiffs in the

asbestos action sought to intervene in PMP’s declaratory judgment

action, claiming the court’s decision could affect their ultimate

right to recovery. Affirming the district court’s denial of the

motion to intervene, the Third Circuit concluded that the

plaintiffs’ interest in the disputed insurance policies was

insufficient to circumvent the general rule that “a mere economic

interest in the outcome of litigation is insufficient to support a

motion to intervene.” Id. at 220-21 (quoting Mountain Top Condo.

Ass’n. v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder, Inc. (“Mountain Top”), 72

F.3d 361, 366 (3d Cir. 1995)). Like this case, the asbestos

plaintiffs argued the potential recovery for their injuries could

be impacted or eliminated because of the ruling in the related

coverage case. Nevertheless, the Court denied intervention.

Summarizing its ruling, the Third Circuit stated: 

Appellants here have no property interest in the Liberty

Mutual UEL policies nor do they have any other legally

protectable interest in the policies. Rather, they have

the kind of economic interest in the insurance proceeds

that we have held does not support intervention as a

matter of right. 

419 F.3d at 222. See also Mountain Top, 72 F.3d at 366 (observing

that denial of motion to intervene would be appropriate if

appellants’ only interest were to ensure the availability of funds

to pay for a possible judgment in their favor). Accordingly, the

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Court finds that movants do not demonstrate a sufficient interest

in the underlying litigation to assert a right to intervene. 

Movants argue they satisfy Rule 24(a) because they “are

persons who have an interest in the interpretation of the insurance

contracts between [Camden] and its insurers.” (Movants’ Brief at

3). Movants further argue they satisfy Rule 24(a)(2) because “the

rights and remedies they assert in their underlying claims will be

affected by any determination made by the Court in the instant

matter.” Id. However, the Third Circuit rejected these 9

arguments. See 419 F.3d at 224.

Movants cite to Mountain Top, supra, to support their argument

that their economic interest in the outcome of Camden’s coverage

case gives them a sufficient interest to warrant intervention as of

right. Movants’ argument is unavailing because Mountain Top is

plainly distinguishable from this case. As noted in Treesdale, 

although Mountain Top held that a plaintiff may intervene in a

coverage action between an insured and its insurer, this only

occurs if the action involves a specific fund created for the

benefit of the plaintiff. 419 F.3d at 221-23. No such fund was

created for the movants in this instance. Similar to Treesdale,

Movants reassert this argument in their supplemental brief. 9

See Supplementary Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion at 2-3,

C.A. No. 5827, Doc. No. 152 (“Movants’ Supp. Brief”) (“This suit

may determine what funds are available to pay whatever judgment

are eventually entered, and practically speaking, what funds are

potentially available should the parties be able to forge a

settlement prior to trial.”).

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movants “cite no controlling authority to support their argument

that plaintiffs who have asserted tort claims against the insured

can intervene as of right in an insurance coverage declaratory

action between the insured and its insurer.” Id. at 223.

Even if the Court were to find that a contingent financial

interest in the outcome of Camden’s declaratory judgment action

constituted a sufficient interest in the underlying litigation to

satisfy Rule 24(a), intervention as of right would still be denied

because movants cannot demonstrate that Camden is not adequately

representing its interests. “The most important factor in

determining adequacy of representation is how the interest of the

absentee compares with the interest of the present parties. If the

interest of the absentee is not represented at all, or if all

existing parties are adverse to him, then he is not adequately

represented.” Gen. Star Indem. Co., 224 F.R.D. at 376 (quoting

Mountain Top Condo. Assoc., 72 F.3d at 368). Movants concede they

and Camden share a “similarity of interests in seeking a

declaration that the insurers must indemnify.” (Movants’ Brief at

3). However, they argue that Camden’s coverage strategy in the

declaratory judgment action may be adverse to their position in the

underlying litigation. (Movants’ Supp. Brief at 5). While the

city’s ultimate interests in the Camden Police Cases may be

“directly and materially adverse to those of the proposed

Interveners (sic)” (Movants’ Brief at 3), those conflicting

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interests are not at play in the coverage action movants seek to

join. See Gen. Star Indem. Co., 224 F.R.D. at 377 (noting

“identical” interests where proposed intervenors and insured both

sought to ensure coverage for intervenors’ claimed losses). Camden

and plaintiffs share the same interest in maximizing Camden’s

available insurance coverage. Thus, since movants’ interests in

Camden’s coverage action are adequately protected, movants may not

intervene as of right.

In the absence of a showing of adverse interests in Camden’s

declaratory judgment action, movants must make “a concrete showing

of circumstances in the particular case that make the

representation inadequate.” Id. (citation omitted). Although the

Third Circuit recognizes the right to intervene where an insured is

insolvent and cannot defend a declaratory judgment action

adequately, which is not applicable here, the ability of an insured

to hire counsel and to participate actively in a declaratory

judgment action is sufficient evidence of its ability to adequately

represent the interests of a proposed intervenor. Treesdale, 419

F.3d at 226. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Camden’s

ability to hire counsel and to participate actively in its

declaratory judgment action is sufficient to demonstrate adequate

representation of movants’ interests. Intervention as of right

pursuant Rule 24(a)(2) is, therefore, denied.

In addition to seeking intervention as of right, movants seek

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permissive intervention. See Rule 24(b). In relevant part, Rule

24(b) permits a party to intervene by demonstrating 1) a timely

application for intervention, and 2) that the party’s claim or

defense shares a common question of law or fact with the underlying

action. See Rule 24(b)(1)(B). “Whether to allow a party to

permissively intervene is left to the sound discretion of the

Court.” Worthington v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC, Civ. No. 11-

2793(ES)(CLW), 2011 WL 6303999, at *8 (D.N.J. Dec. 15, 2011)

(citation omitted). “The purpose of permissive intervention is to

avoid a multiplicity of suits by settling related controversies in

a single action.” Wolf by Wolf v. Procter & Gamble, Co., 555 F.

Supp. 613, 627-28 (D.N.J. 1982). When reviewing a request for

permissive intervention, the court must also consider whether

permissive intervention would “unduly delay or prejudice the

adjudication of the rights of the original parties.” Pansy v.

Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 779 n.6 (3d Cir. 1994)

(quoting Rule 24(b)(3)). 

Movants’ permissive intervention request is also foreclosed by

Treesdale. In Treesdale the Third Circuit held that a contingent

financial interest in the outcome of an indemnification action is

insufficient to demonstrate a common question of law or fact

supporting permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). See 419 F.3d

at 227-28. Movants argue Treesdale is distinguishable. They argue

their claims share a common question of law or fact with Camden’s

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declaratory judgment complaint, e.g., whether the alleged incidents

at issue represent one incident or multiple occurrences. (Movants’

Supp. Brief at 7). Movants’ argument is misguided. Treesdale

makes it clear that Camden’s coverage action has nothing to do with

whether Camden violated the movant’s constitutional rights. Id. at

227-28. “Where a proposed intervenor has only a contingent 10

financial interest in a declaratory judgment action to establish

insurance coverage, he/she cannot accurately claim that there are

common questions of law or fact between the coverage dispute and

actions to determine liability for injuries [the insured] may have

caused. Id. at 228.11

In sum, the Court concludes that movants may not intervene in

defendants’ declaratory judgment action pursuant to Rule 24. 

Movants’ interest in maximizing Camden’s insurance coverage does

not create a sufficient interest to support intervention as of

right. Also, since Camden and the movants share the same interest

In fact, the Third Circuit wrote, “this argument warrants 10

little discussion or analysis. The declaratory judgment action

turns on the interpretation of the contracts of insurance.... It

has nothing to do with whether PMP caused asbestos-related bodily

injuries....” Id.

The Court also denies permissive intervention because of 11

the unnecessary complexity it will interject into Camden’s

coverage action. The presence of non-Camden parties will likely

result in further management problems in an already complex case. 

This includes, but is not limited to, the fact that if the

movants intervene State National may have to defend against

inconsistent coverage arguments. This is unnecessary since

Camden and the movants share the same interest in maximizing

Camden’s coverage.

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in maximizing Camden’s insurance coverage, movant’s interests are

adequately protected. Movants’ contingent financial interest in

Camden’s insurance policies is also insufficient to create a common

question of law or fact supporting permissive intervention. 

Furthermore, while permissive intervention would do little to

expedite plaintiffs’ consolidated cases, it would significantly

complicate Camden’s declaratory judgment action and would result in

undue confusion and prejudice. 

Conclusion

According, for all the foregoing reasons,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this 24th day of September, 2012, that

movants’ Motions to Intervene [C.A. 11-1315, Docs. No. 138, 142;

C.A. No. 11-5827, Doc. No. 25] are DENIED.12

s/Joel Schneider 

 JOEL SCHNEIDER

United States Magistrate Judge

Movants’ motion also requested that the Camden County 12

Prosecutor’s Office be jointed as a “discovery defendant.” The

request is denied as N.J.R. 4:11-1 is not applicable to cases

pending in federal court.

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