NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

______________________________

STEVEN KADONSKY, :

Petitioner, :

v. :

GREG BARKOWSKI, et al., :

Respondents. :

_____________________________

Civil Action No. 11-1250 (AET)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

Steven Kadonsky, Pro Se

807236B

New Jersey State Prison

P.O. Box 861 

Trenton, NJ 08625

Michael McLaughlin

Somerset County Prosecutor’s Office

40 Bridge Street

P.O. Box 3000

Somerville, NJ 08876

Attorney for Respondents

THOMPSON, District Judge

Petitioner, Steven Kadonsky, submitted this petition for a writ 

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and Respondents 

submitted an answer to the petition (ECF No. 12), with the available 

state court record. For the following reasons, the petition will be 

denied.
2

BACKGROUND

The facts set forth by the state court in Petitioner’s direct 

appeal are as follows:

In February of 1992, as a result of an ongoing 

narcotics investigation, a search warrant was executed at 

a warehouse in Piscataway. Property and contraband were 

found at that location which are used in the indoor 

cultivation of marijuana. As a result of arrests made that 

day, detectives discovered an enormous amount of marijuana 

in a “safehouse”, operated by defendant and his employees, 

where marijuana was vacuum-packed in large plastic jars for 

re-sale. Detectives also located an overwhelming amount of 

records and documents, including numerous sets of 

fictitious identification. These records detailed the 

large amounts of marijuana, sold in cases at a price of 

$2,000 per case, the operational expenses of the indoor 

grow, as well as salaries and Christmas bonuses for its 

employees. Detectives also found bank accounts, mailbox 

drops, telephone services, trucking and real estate 

rentals, and supply store accounts set up under false names 

and fictitious corporations. Information supplied by 

co-defendants, as well as this extensive paper trial [sic], 

confirmed defendant's involvement as Leader of this 

criminal enterprise.

State v. Kadonsky, 288 N.J. Super. 41, 44 (App. Div. 1996). 

Petitioner pled guilty to New Jersey’s “drug kingpin” statute, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3. The sentencing provision of that statute required 

the trial court to sentence Petitioner to life imprisonment with a 

twenty-five year period of parole ineligibility. See Kadonsky, 288 

N.J. Super. at 43. On February 29, 1996, the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Appellate Division (“Appellate Division”) found Petitioner’s 

contentions on appeal (concerning the nature of the marijuana 

trafficking statute, the trial court’s decision not to hold a hearing 
3

on the warrantless search, and the adequacy of the factual basis at 

the plea) without merit, and affirmed. See id. The New Jersey 

Supreme Court denied certification on May 23, 1996. State v. 

Kadonsky, 144 N.J. 589 (1996)(Table).

Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) to 

correct an illegal sentence was denied by the trial court and the 

appellate courts, with the New Jersey Supreme Court denying 

certification on May 26, 1999. State v. Kadonsky, 160 N.J. 477 

(1999)(Table). A second motion for PCR, concerning counsel’s 

effectiveness, fines, and prosecutorial misconduct was denied by the 

New Jersey Courts, with the New Jersey Supreme Court denying 

certification on March 4, 2010. State v. Kadonsky, 201 N.J. 440 

(2010)(Table).

Having exhausted his state court remedies, Petitioner then filed 

this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254. In this petition, he asserts the following claims: (1) 

Petitioner was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel 

throughout every state of Petitioner’s litigation; (2) prosecutorial 

misconduct when the prosecutor “double crossed” Petitioner by not 

dismissing charges in exchange for information; (3) due process 

violation due to excessive fines; (4) unconstitutional sentencing in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment; (5) due process violation in 

warrantless search; (6) inadequate factual basis for guilty plea; and 
4

(7) conflict of interest and prosecutorial misconduct. See Petition, 

¶ 12.

DISCUSSION

A. Section 2254 Cases

“As amended by [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act of 1996] AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 sets several limits on the power 

of a federal court to grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus 

on behalf of a state prisoner.” Cullen v. Pinholster, ––– U.S. ––––, 

––––, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). Section 2254(a) permits a court 

to entertain only claims alleging that a person is in state custody 

“in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The AEDPA further limits a federal 

court's authority to grant habeas relief when a state court has 

adjudicated petitioner's federal claim on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d). If a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court 

proceedings, this Court has “no authority to issue the writ of habeas 

corpus unless the [state c]ourt's decision ‘was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 

Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,’ or ‘was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’” Parker v. 
5

Matthews, -- U.S. --, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2151 (2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)). However, when “the state court has not reached the merits 

of a claim thereafter presented to a federal habeas court, the 

deferential standards provided by AEDPA ... do not apply.” Lewis v. 

Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 100 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 

203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001)).

A court begins the analysis under § 2254(d)(1) by determining 

the relevant law clearly established by the Supreme Court. See 

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660 (2004). Clearly established 

law “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme 

Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court 

decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). A court 

must look for “the governing legal principle or principles set forth 

by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71–72 (2003). “[C]ircuit precedent 

does not constitute ‘clearly established Federal law, as determined 

by the Supreme Court,’ [and] therefore cannot form the basis for 

habeas relief under AEDPA.” Parker, 132 S. Ct. at 2155 (quoting 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).

A decision is “contrary to” a Supreme Court holding within 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), if the state court applies a rule that 

“contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] 

cases” or if it “confronts a set of facts that are materially 
6

indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a [different result.]” Williams, 529 U.S. at 

405–06. Under the “ ‘unreasonable application’ clause of § 

2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state 

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the 

Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle 

to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

However, under § 2254(d)(1), “an unreasonable application of federal 

law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” 

Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 785 (quoting Williams at 410). As the 

Supreme Court explains,

A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit 

precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded 

jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state 

court's decision.... Evaluating whether a rule application 

was unreasonable requires considering the rule's 

specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway 

courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case 

determinations. It is not an unreasonable application of 

clearly established Federal law for a state court to 

decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been 

squarely established by [the Supreme] Court.

Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted).

“This is a difficult to meet, and highly deferential standard 

for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court 

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 
7

1398 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The 

petitioner carries the burden of proof, and review under § 2254(d) 

is limited to the record that was before the state court that 

adjudicated the claim on the merits. Id.

B. Petitioner’s Habeas Claims Will Be Denied.

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Ground 1)

The Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that a 

criminal defendant “shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance 

of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The right to 

counsel is “the right to effective assistance of counsel.” McMann v. 

Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (emphasis added).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

habeas petitioner must show both that his counsel's performance fell 

below an objective standard of reasonable professional assistance and 

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

unprofessional errors, the outcome would have been different. See

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984). A “reasonable 

probability” is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 

the outcome.” Id. at 694. Counsel's errors must have been “so serious 

as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is 

reliable.” Id. at 687. “When a defendant challenges a conviction, the 

question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent 
8

the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt 

respecting guilt.” Id. at 695.

With respect to guilty pleas, “counsel is required to give a 

defendant information sufficient ‘to make a reasonably informed 

decision whether to accept a plea offer.’” Shotts v. Wetzel, 724 F.3d 

364, 376 (3d Cir. 2013)(quoting United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 

43 (3d Cir. 1992)). The Third Circuit has also noted that “’in the 

context of pleas a defendant must show the outcome of the plea process 

would have been different with competent advice.’” Id. (quoting

Lafler v. Cooper, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384, 182 L. Ed.2d 

398 (2012)). “If a defendant rejects a plea, he must show that ‘but 

for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability 

he and the trial court would have accepted the guilty plea’ and the 

resulting sentence would have been lower.” Id. (quoting Lafler, 132 

S. Ct. at 1391)(other citations omitted).

Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective due to dual 

representation of a co-defendant, for failing to challenge an 

excessive fine, for failing to move to withdraw the guilty plea, for 

failure to seek enforcement of the agreement to dismiss charges 

against him, and for failure to investigate a prosecutorial conflict 

of interest. See Petition, ¶ 12. Petitioner raised these issues in 

his second PCR motion before the state trial court.

The Appellate Division rejected the arguments for the reasons 
9

expressed in the PCR judge’s May 8, 2007 written opinion. See State 

v. Kadonsky, 2009 WL 3429572 (N.J. App. Div. Oct. 27, 2009) at *5. 

In that opinion, the PCR judge cited Strickland and found:

First, Defendant merely alleges that trial counsel 

failed to move to have Defendant withdraw the guilty plea 

after the court sentenced him to a term greater than the 

plea agreement when his attorney had the opportunity to do 

so, trial counsel improperly coached Defendant to lie and 

told him what to say during his plea allocution, trial 

counsel conspired with the court to create waivers that 

Defendant never made and did not exist, that he received 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and 

ine4ffective assistance of post-conviction relief 

counsel. These contentions made by the defendant prove to 

be nothing more than blatant accusation that are 

complete[ly] lacking in any factual or legal basis. 

Defendant provides little to no support to prove any of 

these alleged actions on the part of any of his attorneys, 

the Somerset County Prosecutor’s Office, or the bench. 

Therefore, with regard to the above noted arguments, this 

Court cannot find that Defendant’s counsel was ineffective 

under Strickland and Fritz.

***

Defendant’s newest allegations of ineffective 

assistance of counsel due to dual representation must also 

be addressed. First and foremost, this allegation could 

have, and should have been brought on direct appeal. 

Defendant has been aware of this dual representation for 

many years . . . this is the first time this allegation is 

being brought by Defendant. As such, this allegation 

should fail under R. 3:22-4.

However, even decided on the merits, this argument of 

dual representation must also fail. . . . [The state law 

case cited by Petitioner] contemplates dual representation 

between co-defendants at trial. . . . . In this case 

however, the Defendant’s case did not go to trial. In 

fact, Defendant knowingly and willfully entered into a plea 

agreement where he would plead guilty for the mutual 

benefit of himself and his co-defendants . . . . It is 

completely disingenuous for the Defendant to enter into a 

plea agreement in concert with, and for the benefit of, his 

co-defendant . . . and now allege a conflict of interest 

as a result of dual representation . . . . The defendant 
10

brings forth not a scintilla of evidence as to how this 

potential dual representation prejudiced him in the least. 

Thus here too, the Defendant’s allegations must fail.

(See Answer, Respondents’ Exhibit Pa-123). Petitioner’s 

additional allegations concerning ineffective assistance of counsel 

were also denied by the PCR judge and the Appellate Division. 

Affirming the PCR judge, the Appellate Division reasoned:

In short, defendant dredges up allegations that are 

unsupported by any competent evidence, which were not 

previously raised and are therefore barred. From our 

thorough review of the PCR record, we conclude that Judge 

Ciccone correctly applied the Strickland/Fritz standard, 

with respect to the claim of ineffective assistance of 

trial, appellate and first PCR counsels. Moreover, we agree 

with her conclusion that defendant failed to meet his 

burden of making a prima facie showing of his attorneys' 

deficiency. State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462-63, 609 

A.2d 1280 (1992). With respect to allegations of improper 

conduct by defendant's trial attorney and Bissell, 

defendant has also failed to make a showing based on 

competent evidence. Rather, he has presented self-serving, 

uncorroborated allegations.

Kadonsky, 2009 WL 3429572 at * 5.

Having carefully reviewed the record, and considering the claims 

asserted by Petitioner herein, this Court does not find that trial 

or appellate counsel was ineffective to warrant habeas relief. As 

stated many times by the PCR court and Appellate Division, Petitioner 

clearly understood the plea and consequences, providing an adequate

factual basis. A review of the record shows that Petitioner’s trial 

and appellate counsel represented him adequately at the plea and 
11

sentencing phases.

Petitioner here has not shown that the outcome of the plea would 

have been different had Petitioner received “competent advice.” 

Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384. Petitioner's challenges fail to meet 

either prong of the Strickland test, since counsel's actions were 

reasonable, and Petitioner failed to show any prejudice. The state 

courts' findings were based upon application of the correct 

Strickland standard. These findings were neither contrary to, nor 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal 

law, nor were they based upon an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented. Petitioner is not entitled 

to relief on these claims.1

2. Prosecutorial Misconduct (Ground 2)

Petitioner argues that the prosecutor reneged on the agreement 

to dismiss the charges against him in exchange for information. 

Petitioner asserts that there was an in camera agreement which was 

violated, and that the prosecutor “double-crossed” him. (Petition, 

¶ 12).

 

1 With respect to Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of 

PCR counsel, such claim must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(i), because the “ineffectiveness or incompleteness of counsel 

during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall 

not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(i).
12

The Appellate Division, on appeal of Petitioner’s second PCR 

petition, explains the unique facts surrounding Petitioner’s 

assistance in great detail:

In September 1993, on the day of trial, defendant 

entered a negotiated plea of guilty to: first-degree 

offense of being a leader or “kingpin” of a narcotics 

trafficking network, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3; two counts of 

second-degree conspiracy to possess marijuana, a 

controlled dangerous substance (CDS) with intent to 

distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and -5b(1) and N.J.S.A. 

2C:5-2; second-degree possession of marijuana with intent 

to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and 5b(10); and 

fourth-degree possession of marijuana, N.J.S.A. 

2C:35-10a(3).

There was an in camera hearing before Judge Michael 

R. Imbriani. The attorneys for defendant, his brother 

George Kadonsky and co-defendant Carolyn Czick were 

present. The then Somerset County Prosecutor, Nicholas 

Bissell, was also present and agreed that if defendant 

cooperated with law enforcement, the sentence 

recommendation would be reduced. The amount of the 

reduction would depend on the extent of defendant's 

cooperation. Specifically, defendant was to provide 

information concerning the narcotics organization of 

co-defendant Howard Weinthal, which was believed to be a 

nationwide network. Defendant agreed that he would be given 

consideration on his sentence each time the Prosecutor's 

Office obtained information sufficient to obtain a warrant 

to search for and seize large quantities of marijuana or 

make arrests of individuals involved in narcotics 

trafficking. That same day, defendant and George Kadonsky 

entered pleas of guilty before Judge Imbriani, who accepted 

the pleas, but postponed defendant's sentence for several 

months.

During a six-month period, the State made several 

seizures of large quantities of marijuana based on tips and 

information given by defendant to the Prosecutor's Office. 

Weinthal's girlfriend, Kimberly Cruson, and three 

undocumented aliens from Mexico, were charged in 

connection with one of the seizures. Linda Taylor and 

Joseph William were also arrested following an extensive 
13

investigation by the Somerset County Prosecutor into 

defendant's cooperation.

Before the sentencing hearing, Assistant Prosecutor 

Head-Melitto wrote a letter to defendant's counsel, 

outlining defendant's cooperation, which led to nine 

seizures of 3,160 pounds of marijuana, $509,945 in cash, 

and the arrest of three individuals involved in the 

transportation of the marijuana. The letter stated:

At the time of his plea on September 8, 1993[,] 

defendant agreed to the following cooperation 

for the listed sentence consideration:

Within 30 days of the plea and thereafter:

500-1,000 pounds of marijuana

No Credit

1,000 pounds of marijuana

15 years with a 5 year stipulation

500 pounds of marijuana

10 years with a 3 1/3 year stipulation

500 pounds of marijuana

10 years flat

500 pounds of marijuana

7 years flat

You will recall that the State insisted that any 

cooperation include arrests of individuals 

involved in narcotics trafficking above the 

level of mere transportation, or so-called 

“mules.”

As you can see, defendant's cooperation has not 

precisely coincided with the terms that he 

proffered and agreed to in Court. In some cases 

he has exceeded the agreement and in other areas 

he has fallen short.

At the sentencing hearing, however, the State sought 

the maximum statutory penalty. According to the 

Prosecutor's Office, it conducted investigations after 

each seizure and maintained ongoing surveillance of 
14

defendant and his associates. During the investigations, 

Taylor and Williams were interviewed. They revealed that 

the information that defendant had been providing to the 

Prosecutor's Office was false. Law enforcement officers 

concluded that defendant had actually orchestrated a 

scheme whereby marijuana was to be placed in storage by 

individuals using various disguises and fictitious 

identification. Defendant would then provide the 

Prosecutor's Office with “tips” regarding the location of 

drugs in order to receive consideration on his sentence. 

According to the Prosecutor, these false “tips” caused the 

arrest of Cruson and the three men from Mexico. No other 

arrests were made as a result of defendant's tips.

As a result of defendant's false cooperation, the 

Somerset County grand jury returned another indictment 

against defendant alleging distribution of marijuana to 

the Prosecutor's Office, as part of defendant's fraudulent 

scheme. Defendant also pleaded guilty to this charge.

On July 1, 1994, Judge Robert Guterl merged the conspiracy, 

possession and distribution convictions and sentenced 

defendant to concurrent seven-year terms. On the kingpin 

conviction, the judge imposed a statutorily mandated life 

term with a twenty-five year parole disqualifier to run 

concurrent with the other sentences. Defendant was fined 

$500,000. We affirmed on direct appeal.

Kadonsky, 2009 WL 3429572 at *1-2 (internal footnotes omitted). The 

PCR judge rejected Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim.

A review of the record reveals no misconduct; more importantly, 

by accepting the plea, Petitioner waived his rights to assert the 

issues of prosecutorial misconduct. See Washington v. Sobina, 475 

F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that a defendant's unconditional, 

knowing, and voluntary guilty plea acts as a waiver of 

non-jurisdictional defects, including the waiver of pre-trial claims 

that police illegally seized evidence); see also United States v. 
15

Shusterman, 258 Fed. App’x 403, 404 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Shusterman’s 

claims of prosecutorial misconduct at trial are also barred by his 

guilty pleas.”)(citing Washington, 475 F.3d at 162). As such, habeas 

relief is not warranted on this claim.

3. Excessive Fines and Sentence (Grounds 3 and 4)

Petitioner argues that he has a right to be free from excessive 

fines imposed at his sentencing, and that the statute under which he 

was sentenced, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 “was not intended to encompass 

marijuana trafficking of the sort at issue herein” and “violates the 

principle of proportionality.” Petition, ¶ 12. These issues have

been litigated through the state courts and found to be without merit. 

See Kadonsky, 288 N.J. Super. at 45.

A federal court's ability to review state sentences is limited 

to challenges based upon “proscribed federal grounds such as being 

cruel and unusual, racially or ethnically motivated, or enhanced by 

indigencies.” See Grecco v. O'Lone, 661 F. Supp. 408, 415 (D.N.J.

1987) (citation omitted). Thus, a challenge to a state court's 

discretion at sentencing is not reviewable in a federal habeas 

proceeding unless it violates a separate federal constitutional 

limitation. See Pringle v. Court of Common Pleas, 744 F.2d 297, 300 

(3d Cir. 1984); Yorio v. New Jersey, 2012 WL 3133948 (D.N.J. July 31, 

2012) at *3; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
16

Here, Petitioner's challenge to the state court's sentencing

fine would not be reviewable in this Court; he has presented no cogent 

argument why his sentence is unconstitutional and he is not entitled 

to relief on this ground.

As to his argument that New Jersey’s “drug kingpin” statute 

mandatory sentencing provision did not mean to encompass marijuana 

in its realm of possible drug convictions, the Appellate Division 

found that argument without merit, noting that marijuana is a 

“Schedule I” drug encompassed within the statute. See Kadonsky, 288 

N.J. Super. at 44; N.J.S.A. 24:21-5; N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3. Petitioner 

is not entitled to habeas relief.

4. Warrantless Search (Ground 5)

Petitioner argues that a warrantless search of his property was 

conducted, and that he was not afforded a hearing on his motion to 

suppress. The Appellate Division reviewed this claim on direct 

appeal and found:

A hearing on defendant's motion to suppress was not 

afforded. R. 3:5–7(c) provides that a hearing on a motion 

to suppress need be held only if material facts are 

disputed. Apart from the conclusory assertion that an 

illegal search had occurred and that the evidence seized 

should be suppressed, defendant put no facts on record to 

support his assertion. It is not disputed that defendant's 

wife, Carol Kadonsky, gave permission for their house to 

be searched. As indicated on the consent form, Mrs. 

Kadonsky was fully advised of her rights to refuse 

permission in the absence of a search warrant. 

Nevertheless, she signed the consent form. She did not 

contend there was any legal deficiency in her consent to 

the search by executing an appropriate affidavit or 
17

certification in support of her husband's motion to 

suppress. In the absence of factual allegations to support 

the claim that the search and seizure were illegal, a 

hearing was not required and the motion to suppress was 

properly denied.

Kadonsky, 288 N.J. Super. at 45-46.

Petitioner’s allegations of an illegal search are not supported 

by the record. The record indicates that Petitioner’s wife gave 

permission for the house to be searched. She signed a consent form 

advising her of her right to refuse permission for the search, and 

has not contended that there was any legal deficiency in her granting 

of consent. Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

5. Basis for Guilty Plea (Ground 6)

Petitioner argues that there was not a sufficient basis for the 

trial court to accept his guilty plea (Petition, ¶ 12). The Appellate 

Division examined this claim on direct appeal and painstakingly 

detailed the breadth of Petitioner’s factual admissions on the 

record:

When defendant entered his guilty plea pursuant to the 

plea bargain agreement, he executed the required form 

admitting that he was a leader of a narcotics trafficking 

network. Beyond that, the court elicited from defendant 

facts sufficient to form a basis for the acceptance of his 

guilty plea. Defendant now denies that he ever admitted to 

being a leader or that he occupied the role of a high-level 

position within the narcotics trafficking network in 

question.

Defendant admitted to working with David Weinstein, 

his brother George Kadonsky, a “Mr. Miller”, Deborah 

Ysagguire, and other employees of the operation.
18

He said: “I helped Dave Weinstein put together the 

operation ... [for] growing marijuana for sale.”

Defendant admitted he “cooperated with Mr. Weinstein 

in, in setting up the facility.” Defendant “helped design 

the operations ... [and d]esign the facility, design how 

everything should work with the electrical and the plumbing 

and everything.”

He admitted to renting “a facility in Hillsborough for 

the purpose of perpetuating this particular organization.”

The following colloquy also took place:

PROSECUTOR: ... Mr. Kadonsky, was Mr. Miller subordinate 

to you in status in this organization? Was he a worker in 

this particular warehouse?

MR. KADONSKY: Mr. Miller was a worker. The direct chain of 

command was all the employees were supervised and got their 

instructions from Mr. Weinstein. They would have taken 

instructions from me—okay. Yes.

THE COURT: Yes what?

MR. KADONSKY: My brother would take instructions from me. 

He would clear things with me.

....

THE COURT: And would you share in the profits if there were 

any with David Weinstein?

MR. KADONSKY: I was to share in the profits if there are 

[sic] were anything, yes.

THE COURT: Was there anyone that would share in the profits 

between you and Mr. Weinstein that you're aware of?

MR. KADONSKY: There may have been. I don't know.

THE COURT: That you're aware of?

MR. KADONSKY: No.

THE COURT: So as far as you know, the only people who shared 

in the profits were you and David Weinstein?
19

MR. KADONSKY: Yes.

Defendant was asked: “Mr. Kadonsky, would you agree 

that the group of people constituting people such as Mr. 

Miller, Miss Ysagguire, constituted a structured 

organization or system engaged in the manufacture and 

distribution of illegal drugs?” He answered, “Yes.”

Defendant was asked: “There is no question that this 

organization was engaged in the manufacture or 

distribution of marijuana?” He answered, “Yes.”

Defendant was asked: “And was the purpose of the 

growing of the marijuana to accumulate sufficient quantity 

to distribute it to others? Was that your intent?” He 

answered, “Yes.”

Significantly, the following question and answer also 

took place:

THE COURT: Let me just say to you Mr. Kadonsky, that the 

statute, that the case [State v. Alexander, 264 N.J. Super. 

102, 624 A.2d 48 (App.Div.1993), aff'd, 136 N.J. 563, 643 

A.2d 996 (1994)] says an upper echelon member is defined 

as someone who stands on an upper level of the chain of 

command of a drug trafficking network exercising command 

authority over members of that organization whose status 

is subordinate to his. An upper level is a level which is 

superior to street level distributors and to their 

immediate supervisors and suppliers. That's what the 

statute, the case says.

MR. KADONSKY: I was involved in a conspiracy with David 

Weinstein where he was in—he managed and operated the 

facility, so from that standpoint he would ask me questions 

from time to time as to the operations, so from that 

standpoint, yes.

In light of such factual admissions, defendant cannot

now argue that there was an inadequate basis for the 

acceptance of his plea and that the conspiracy with which 

he was charged was not consummated. The factual basis for 

the acceptance of the plea is amply contained in the 

excerpts from the transcripts of court proceedings set 

forth above. As for the conspiracy charge, the factual 

admissions by defendant as above noted are replete with 
20

overt acts. 

Kadonsky, 288 N.J. Super at 46-48. 

The standard for determining the validity of a guilty plea is 

“whether the plea represents a voluntary intelligent choice among the 

alternative courses open to the defendant.” North Carolina v. Alford, 

400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970); see also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 

(1969) (a guilty plea is invalid only if it is not the result of the 

defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of his/her rights or if the 

offered plea has no factual basis). “Several federal constitutional 

rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty 

is entered in a state criminal trial[,]” including the defendant's 

privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial 

by jury, and his right to confront his accusers. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 

243. The voluntariness of a plea “can be determined only by 

considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it.” Brady 

v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970). Relevant circumstances 

include the petitioner's statements during the plea colloquy:

[T]he representations of the defendant, his lawyer, and the 

prosecutor at [the plea] hearing, as well as any findings 

made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a 

formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral 

proceedings. Solemn declarations in open court carry a 

strong presumption of verity. The subsequent presentation 

of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is 

subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in 

the face of the record are wholly incredible.
21

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73–74 (1977).

In this case, the record provides a “formidable barrier” against 

Petitioner’s arguments here in his habeas petition. It is clear that 

Petitioner thoughtfully considered the trial judge’s questions and 

understood to what he was pleading guilty. Petitioner has not 

demonstrated that the state courts’ acceptance of his plea was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law, or based upon an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Petitioner is not 

entitled to relief on this claim.

6. Conflict of Interest (Ground 7)

Petitioner argues that a conflict of interest existed when the 

Somerset County Prosecutor’s Office notified defense counsel that 

they (his counsel) were implicated in the same crimes as Petitioner 

was charged. (Petition, ¶ 12). The Appellate Division explained 

the facts as follows:

Defendant alleged that his attorneys were under 

investigation by the Somerset County Prosecutor's Office, 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Internal 

Revenue Service (IRS) as co-conspirators in the illegal 

activities of defendant. Specifically, defendant alleged 

that Bissell entered into an illegal agreement with 

defendant with the help of defendant's attorneys so that 

Bissell would receive cash from defendant. The 

investigation into the Weinthal organization was merely a 

front used to facilitate cash payments to Bissell. In 

exchange for the cash payments, Bissell would dismiss the 

charges. Defendant alleged that Bissell, who committed 

suicide in November 1996, along with the FBI and the IRS, 

commenced an investigation of the law firm representing 
22

defendant.

As stated above, Judge Ciccone found that these 

allegations by defendant were uncorroborated. Other than 

defendant's own allegation, there was a reference to a 

conversation between Williams and an investigator. 

Williams was in jail while awaiting trial on unrelated 

narcotics charges. Allegedly, Williams informed the 

Somerset County Prosecutor's Office that defendant's 

attorneys “were involved in the orchestration of the 

seizures of marijuana and cash” by Bissell. Defendant also 

submitted a certification by Taylor stating her 

supposition that the Somerset County Prosecutor was 

investigating defendant's attorneys.

Defendant's attorneys denied being investigated by 

the FBI, IRS or the Somerset County Prosecutor and denied 

the alleged conspiracy to provide Bissell with cash. This 

was corroborated by investigations conducted by the 

Somerset County Prosecutor's Office, long after Bissell's 

death, as well as statements by Assistant Prosecutor 

Head-Melillo and Deputy Chief of Detectives Norman Cullen.

The judge rejected defendant's allegations, finding 

that:

[d]efendant's mere allegations and the 

affidavits of Williams and Taylor are not enough 

to establish that [d]efendant's attorneys were 

under investigation. Defendant fails to put 

forth any substantive evidence indicating that, 

indeed, there was an investigation of his 

attorneys. Moreover, the State strongly denies 

the allegations. As such, this contention must 

fail under Strickland and Fritz.

Kadonsky, 2009 WL 3429572 at *3-4 (N.J. App. Div. Oct. 27, 

2009)(internal citations and footnotes omitted). The Appellate 

Division ultimately found: “With respect to allegations of improper 

conduct by defendant's trial attorney and Bissell, defendant has also 
23

failed to make a showing based on competent evidence. Rather, he has 

presented self-serving, uncorroborated allegations.” Id. at *5.

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims regarding 

his plea have been rejected and his guilty plea deemed adequate, see 

supra, and this Court concludes that this issue is a state court 

factual finding, examined thoroughly in the state courts, which does 

not merit federal habeas relief. See Parker v. Matthews, -- U.S. --, 

132 S. Ct. 2148, 2151 (2012) (finding when a state court has 

adjudicated a petitioner's federal claim on the merits, a district 

court “has no authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus unless the 

[state court's] decision ‘was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal Law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,’ or ‘was based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceeding.’”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)). Petitioner has not pointed to any evidence suggesting that 

the state courts’ determination of facts is unreasonable.

C. Certificate of Appealability

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), unless a circuit justice or 

judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be 

taken from a final order in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A 

certificate of appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made 

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 
24

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district 

court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could 

conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement 

to proceed further.” Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003).

Here, Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right. No certificate of appealability 

shall issue.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petition is denied. No 

certificate of appealability will issue. An appropriate order 

follows.

 /s/ Anne E. Thompson 

ANNE E. THOMPSON

United States District Judge

Dated: 11/20/13