### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d O n B ri ef

s N ove mb er

29, 200 7
KEE NAN R. KEEN v. TE NNESSEE DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTI ON, ET AL 

### . Appeal from the Chancery Court for Hickman County No. 06-242C Timothy L. Easter, Judge

No. M2007- 00632-COA-R 3-CV - Filed February 25, 2008

A Prison Disciplinary B oard f ound a prisoner

guilty of two disciplinary infrac tions, fined him $5.00 for e ach inf

rac tion and sentenc ed him to two thirty-day terms in punitive segre gation. The prisone r filed a pe tition for writ of ce rtiorari, alleging that there wer e irregula rities in the proce dures f

ollowed by the disciplinary boar d and that its actions wer e ar bitrary, c aprici o u s , an d char acte rize d by an abuse o f discre tion. The trial court granted the writ, and the de partment a ccor dingly sent the administrative rec ord to the court for revie w. The r espondents then f iled a motion for judgment on the re cord. Thetrial court granted the motion and dismissed the prisoner's c laim. We a ffirm the tria l court. Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancer y Court Affir med
P AT R I C I A J. C OTTRE LL , P.J., M.S., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which F R ANK G. C LE MENT , J R ., and R I C HAR D H. D I NKI NS , JJ., joined.
Kee nan R. Kee n, Petros, Tenne ssee, Pro Se. Robert E. Cooper, Jr ., Attorney Ge nera l and Reporter ; Michael E. Moore , Solicitor Genera l; Kellena Bake r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y G e ne ra l, f or theapp e lle e , T e nn e sse e De pa rt me nt o f C or

re c tio n, e t a l.
OP IN ION
I. D I S CI PL I NARY P ROCE E DI NGS
The e vents that led to this appeal be gan on Mar ch 23, 2006. On that date, a disturbance at thec ho w h a ll o f the Tu rn e y Ce nte r I nd us tria l Priso n led c or re c tio na l of

fi c e rs to d e ta in K e e na n R. Kee n for his role in the disturbance. T hey told him to pack up his property because he w as being mov e d to se gr e gatio n. Ac c or din g to thedis c ipl ina ry re po rt fi le d a ga ins t hi m, M r. Ke e n r e fu se d to re- enter the c el l

. This refusa l was dee med to be suspicious, bec ause Mr . Kee n had a history of complaining about offic ers be ing in his cell.M r. K ee n a l s o s t at es t hat af t er t hi s i nci dent he w as pl ace d i n i nv ol un t ar y adm i ni s t r at i ve s egre gat i on f or a n 1 in d e fin ite p e rio d o f tim e
.

A l t h o u g h t h e h ea d i n g o f M r. K ee n ’s p eti t i o n o n l y n am es t h e W ard en an d t h e C o m m i ssi o n er a s resp o n d en t s, 2 in th e b o d y o f h is p le a d in g h e re q u e sts th a t ea c h o f th e m e m b e rs o f th e d isc ip lin a ry b o a rd b e a sk e d to re sp o n d to h is
a lleg a tio n s o f e rr o rs in th e d isc ip lin a ry p ro c e ss. -2- Cor re c tio na l of

fi c e rs a c c or din gly pr oc e e de d wi th c auti on , a ndthe y a lle ge dly dis c ov e re d s ix raz or blades which had been remove d from their original holders. The blades wer e place d in various loc a tio ns in the c e ll, inc lud ing un de r the e dg e s o f the c e ll ta ble , un de r the inm a te ’s se a t, andbe ne a th thelow e r e dg e of

thebo tto m bu nk , p la c e s w he rec or re c tio nal of

fi c e rs no rm a lly us e the ir

ha nd s to fe e l f or c on tr aba ndor

we apo ns wh ile se arc hin g in mate c e lls . S ever al se wi ng ne e dle s w e rea lso found lodged in the mattre ss of the lower bunk. Sergeant Nicky Jordan inve stigated this incident, and pre pare d a dis ciplinary re port which stated that Mr. Ke en had intentionally created a booby tra p in order to injure the cor rec tional office rs sear ching the ce ll. Mr Keen was char ged with vi olation of state law ( criminal attempt under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12- 101) and w ith possession of a dea d l y we ap o n
. T he disciplinary he aring wa s conducte d on Marc h 29, 2006. Mr. Kee n wa s repr esente d by an inmate a dvisor. The e vidence prese nted included the te stimony of Sergeant Jor dan and photographs of the ra zor bla des and of the needle s allegedly found in Mr. K een’ s cell. Mr. Keen t estified in his own defense. He a dmitted that the r a z o r b la d e s a n d n e e d le s w e r e h is , b u t h e c laim e d th a t th e ir p la c e me n t h a d b e e n s ta g e d by the office rs so that more se rious char ges could b e lodged against him. He denied that he had any intention to inj ure anybody.
The thre e member s of the disciplinary boar d found Mr. Ke en guilty of the cha rges pr esente d, an d t h ey i m posed pena lties of thirty days of punitive segre gation and a f ine of $5.00 for

eac h inf ra c tio n. Mr . K e e n a

pp e a le d th e de c ision . T he wa rd e n a ff irme d th e Boa

rd ’s de c isi on on Ap ri l 1 12, 2006, stating that after revie w of the disciplinary report, the hearing summary and of all related documentation, he f

ound that “[p] unishment g u i d el i n es we re not e xcee ded. No violations of disciplinary proc edure s werecited or ascertained.” The gui lty finding was also aff irmed on appeal to the Commi ssioner of Corr ection, who f ound “no due pr ocess violation.”
II. C OU R T P ROCE E DI NGS On July 18, 2006, Mr. Kee n filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Chance ry Court of Hickman County, ac companied by an affidavit of indigency. H e name d the war den of the prison and theCom mis sio ne r o f C or re c tio n a s r e sp on de nts

. He a lle ge d inge ne ra l te rm s tha t th e re sp on de nts 2 had exc eede d th ei r jurisdiction and had “ acte d illegally, fraudule ntly, and in an ar bitrary and capricious manner.” He objected to the fact that the correc tional office rs who found the raz ors and thene e dle s we re no t ca lle d to tes tif y at the dis c ipl ina

ry he ari ng
. He a lso arg ue d that at th e ve ry mos t he should have been c harge d with possessing contraba nd items, and that he ha d never been c harge d with any violence against staff or inmates prior to the inc ident that gave rise to this appeal. The re sp o n d ents filed a “ Notice of No Opposition to Granting Petition for Writ of Certiorari.” The pe tition was grante d, and they pr epar ed and c ertified the rec ord of the disc iplinary-3-

proce edi n g s an d filed it with the trial court. Af ter the r ecor d was filed, the responde nts filed a Motion for Judgment on the Record. Mr. Kee n also filed a Motion for Judgment on the Recor d. The trial court gr anted the r espondents’ motion and dismissed Mr. Kee n’s claim. The prisone r then filed a motion to alter or amend the trial c ourt’s orde r, which w as denie d. This appea l followed.
III. T HE W RI T OF C E RT I ORARI
The c ommon-law writ of certiorari is the proper procedura l vehicle through which prisoner s may s eek review of decisions by prison discipli nary boa rds, par ole boar ds, and other a dminist rative tribunals. Willis v. Tenn. Dep't of Correction , 1 13 S.W .3 d 70 6, 71 2 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) ; Rh od e n v . S tat e Dep’ t of Corr ection , 984 S.W .2 d 955 , 956 (T e nn . Ct. App . 199 8)

. Ho we ve r, theiss ua nc e of thewrit is not an adjudication of anything

. Gore v. Tenn. Dep’ t of Corr ection, 132 S.W.3d 369, 375 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 20 03 ). It is simply a n o rd e r t o th e low e r t ri bu na l to fi le thec omp le te re c or d o f i ts proce edings so the trial court can determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief. Hawkins v. Tenn. Dep'

t of Corr ection , 1 27 S.W .3 d 749 , 757 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 2) ; Hall v. McLesky , 83 S.W.3d 752, 757 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
Th e gr ou nds for relie f u nd e r a writ o f c e rt ior ari arequ ite lim ite d. Re vie w i s li mit e d to wh e the r “ theinf

e ri or bo ardor tr ib un al (1) ha s e xc e e de d it s ju ri sd ic tio n, or (2 ) h a s a c te d il le ga lly arbitra rily or fra

udulently.” Mc Cal le n v . Ci ty of M e mp his , 786 S.W.2d 633, 6 3 8 (T en n. 1990); Turner v. Board of Paroles , 993 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). The re viewing court “may not (1) inquire into the intrinsic cor rec tness of the lowe r tri b u n al ’s d ec ision, (2) rew eigh the evidenc e, or (3) substitut e their judgment f or that of the lowe r tribunal.” Ar no ld v. Te nn e sse e Bo ar

d of P ar ole s, 956 S.W.3d 478, 480 (Tenn. 1997) ; Powell v. Parole Eligibilit y Re vi ew Board, 879 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). T hus, a trial court’s scop e o f re v i ew u n der the writ of certiorari does not involve a n inquiry into the intrinsi c cor rec tness o f t h e d ec i s ion rea ched by the tribunal below, but only the manner in which the dec ision was rea ched. Hall v. McLesky , 83 S.W.3d at 757 (c iting Po we ll , 879 S.W.2d at 873).
Mr. Ke en h as cla imed that the re spondents exce eded the ir jurisdiction and that they ac ted

“ ill e ga lly , fr aud ule ntl y, a nd in an arb itr ary a nd c a pric iou s man ne r. ” Ho we ve r, he do e s not a c tua lly c la im that th e dis c ipl ina

ry bo ard la c ks the jurisd ic tio n to hea r an d ad jud ic a te c ha

rg e s suc h as tho se leveled a gainst him, or t hat i t did not have the authority to impose the penalties that we re a ssessed. We f ind no basis for the c laim that the board e xcee ded its jurisdiction.
Mr. Kee n argue s on appea l that the di sciplinary board subjected him to double j eopar dy by finding him guil ty of two char ges which arose from the same incident, and that they violated his due pr oc e ss righ ts. Ho we ve r, do ub le jeo par dy pr oh ibi tio ns app ly o nly to c ri min a l pr oc e e din gs
. Livingston v. State of Tenn. Board of Paroles , No. M1999-01138-COA- R3-CV, 2001 WL 747643, a t *6 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . J uly 5, 20 01 ) ( no Te nn . R. App. P. 1 1 a pp lic a tio n f

ile d) ; Blackm on v. Cam pb e ll , N o 0 1 A

- 1

- 9 8 0 7

- CH

- 0 0 3 6 1 , 1 9 9 9 W L 8 5 5 1 8 , a t * 2 ( T e n n
. Ct

. A p p
. Fe b

. 2 3 , 1 9 9 9 ) ( no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 filed ). It h as long bee n understood that proc eedings c onducted by a prison disciplinary boar d are administrative in nature . They a re not c riminal proce eding s as t he law understands that term. Ra y v . S tat e , 57 7 S .W. 2d68 1, 68 2 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 79 ); State ex re l Tur ne r v . G or

e , 175 S.W.2d 317, 318 (Tenn. 1943)

.Thus , M r
. K ee n i s appa r ent l y ar gui ng t hat t he di s ci pl i nar y boar d vi ol at ed hi s due proc es s ri ght s by depr i vi ng 3 h im o f th e b e n e fits o f th e c o n fr o n ta tio n c la u se
. See U

. S. C O N ST . A m e n d V I.; T E NN

. C O N ST

. , A r t

. I , Sect 9. A n i nd i vi du al cha r ged w i t h a cr i m e has t he r i ght “ t o be c onf r ont ed w i t h t he w i t nes s es a gai ns t hi m , ” U

. S. C O N ST . A m e n d V I., a n d “ to m eet t he w i t nes s es f ace t o fa ce. ” T E NN

. C O N ST

. , A r t

. I , Se ct 9. H ow eve r , be ca us e of t he uni que condi t i ons of pr i s on l i f e, our c our t s ha ve dec l ar ed m any t i m es t hat pr i s oner s s ubj ec t ed t o i ns t i t ut i onal di s ci pl i nar y proc ee di ngs do not e nj oy

“ th e f u ll p a n o p ly o f rig h ts” a c c o rd e d to d e fe n d a n ts in c rim in a l t ria ls. G or e v. Te nn. D ep’ t of Cor r ec t i on , 132 S. W

. 3d at 377- 78 ( quot i ng W o lff v . M c D o n n e ll, 418 U

. S. 539, 540 ( 1 9 7 4 ). A m ong t hes e r i ght s a r e t hos e ar i s i ng f r om t he
co n fro n t ati o n clau se, w h i ch d o n o t ap p l y i n p ro ce ed i n g s l i k e t h e o n e b efo re u s. H ig g in s v . W h ite , N o. M 2004- 00412- C O A -R 3 -C V , 2 0 0 6 W L 1 7 6 3 6 4 8 , a t * 4 (T e n n . C t. A p p . Ju n e 2 7 , 2 0 0 6 ) (n o T e n n . R . A p p . P . 1 1 a p p lica tio n filed ); D a v is
v . C a m p b e ll , N o. 02A 01- 9611- CV

- 00268, 1997 W L 777079, at *3 ( Tenn. Ct

. A pp. D ec
. 18, 1997) ( no Tenn. R. A pp. P. 11 ap p l i cat i o n fi l ed ).

-4- Furthe r, e ve n inthec ri min a l c on te xt, mul tip le c ha rg e s c a n, a nd so me tim e s d o, ari se fr om a sin gleinc ide nt wi th out impli c a tin g d ou bleje op ard y c on c e rn s. W e no te that th e tw o c ha rg e s in question are actua lly separate and distinct. The char ge of posse ssion of a dea dly weapon w as base d on Mr. Kee n’s physical possession of the r azor s and nee dl es fo u nd in his cell. The cha rge of attempted assault was based on the place ment of those items in a way that was allegedly c alculate d to injure the cor

rec tional office rs who sea rche d his cell.
Mr . K e e n’ s d ue pro cess arg ume nt i s so me wh a t me a nd e ri ng , b ut i t app e ars to u s th a t heis primarily complaining that he wa s u n able to call as witnesses the c orre ctional offic ers who ha d pa c ked up th e conte nts of his c e ll andwh o h a d a lle ge dly dis c ov e re d th e bo ob y- tr app e d r a z or s. Instead, the disciplinary boar d relied on a report by the corr ectional officer who had investigated the incident of Marc h 23, 2006, but who had not ac tually witnessed that incident, or at least had not bee n pr e se nt d uring these arc h o f the priso ne r’ s c e ll. 3
In Sandin v. Connor , 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the United States Supreme Court examined the question of due pr ocess rights withi n the co n t ex t of prison disciplinary proc eedings. The Court ob se rv e d th a t a

pa rty is e nti tle d to du e pr oc e ss p ro te c tio n on ly wh e re that pa rty is thr e a te ne d w ith deprivation of a protec ted intere st in li fe, liber t y o r p ro p er ty. Since incar cer ation by its nature nece ssarily involves a re trac tion of liberty, and the circ umstances of prison life sometimes require the impositi on of additional constraints, such as disciplinary or a dminist rative se gregation, the c ourt rea soned that thereis no liberty interest in rema ining free o f such constraints, so long they do not exce ed the se ntence or i mpose an “atypical and significant hardship on the i nmate in re lation to the ordinary inc idents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. The Sa nd in court held that a punishment of 30 days se gregation was not an atypical, significant deprivation such as would trigger an inmate’ s due proc ess rights. 515 U.S. at 485-86.
In Willis v. Tenn. Dep 't o f Correction , 113 S.W.3d 706, 712 (Tenn. 2003) , the Tenne ssee Supreme Court, citing Sandin, held t hat s ince none of t he penalties imposed on the prisoners by the disciplinary boar d in that case involved deprivation of a constitutionally protected right, the prisoners’ argume nt that they wer e deprived of c onstitut ional due proc ess was w ithout merit. The pe na lti e s imp os e d up on Mr

. Ke e n in thi s c a se we re the same a s th os e imp os e d o n th e pe tit ion e rs in Sa nd in and Wi lli s . Mr. Ke en ’s due proc ess claims ar e pre cluded by the holdings in Sa nd in and Wi lli s
.-5-

The Wi lli s court did, howeve r, reve rse the trial court’s denial of the writ of ce rtiorari, holding that th e pe tit ionc on tain ed alleg a tio ns of pr oc e du ra l ir

re gu lari tie s a

pa rt fr om d ue pr oc e ss c la ims su ff ic ie nt t o s ur viv e a

Rul e 12 .0 2( 6) mot ionto d ism iss fo r f a ilu reto st ate a cla im. Th e inm a te petitioner in Wi lli s alleged, int e r a lia , a failure to follow the written proce dures of the Depa rtment of Corre ction governing disciplinary pr ocee d ings that were designed to provide f or the fair and impartial determination and resolution of di sciplinary charge s against i nmates. The court held that substantial deviations from thos e proc edure s which substantially prejudice the outcome of a hea ring can form the basis for relief under the common-law writ of ce rtiorari. Wi lli s , 113 S.W.3d at 714. Based on this holding, the Wi lli s court acc o rdi ngly ordere d the trial court to grant the petition, so the di sciplinary record could be sent up for review, and the trial court could addre ss the substance of

the petitioners’ c laims in li ght of that rec ord. In the pr esent c ase, the trial court gr anted Mr. Kee n’s petition for writ of certiorari, and it thus had the opportunity to review the re cord of the disciplinary proc eeding be fore rea ching its decision.
As we state d above, the revie wing court does not r e-w eigh the evidenc e, but must uphold the decision of the inferior tribunal if that tribunal acte d within its jurisdiction, did not act illegally or arbitra rily or fraudulently, and if there is any materia l evidenceto support its findings

. Davison v. Car r , 6 59 S.W .2 d 3 61 , 36 3 (T e nn . 1 98 3) ; Wa tts v . Ci v il S e rv ic e . B oa rd of Colu mb ia , 606 S.W.2d 274, 276-77 (Te nn. 1980). These determinations a re issues of law. Wa tts , 606 S.W.2d at 277. Our re vie w o f the tria l c ou rt 's c on c lus ion s o n matters o f l a w i s de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss. Bo wde n v. Wa rd , 2 7 S. W .3 d 9 13 , 9 16 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; Union Carbide v. Huddleston , 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993) ; Tenn. R. App P. 13(d). The disciplinary pr ocee dings below wer e governed by the Unif orm Disciplinary Proce dures of the De partment of Corr ection. Those pr ocedur es we re de signed to “provide f o r the fair and impart i al determination and resolution of all cha rges plac ed against inm ates c ommitt ed to the Tenne ssee De partment of Corr ection (TD OC).” I ndex #502.01(I I). The y include require ments for prior notice of

char ges to inmates, the assistanc e of an in m ate legal adviser, an opportunity to be hear d. The rec ord shows that Mr. Kee n was notified of the cha rges a gainst him, that he was given time to prepar e to re spond to those charg es , an d t h at an inmate lega l advisor assisted him in that proce ss. While these are familiar features of our lega l system, the Uniform Disciplinary Proc edure s differ in some significant ways f rom the proc edure s that bind our criminal courts, proc eedings whic h may re sult in t he initial loss of free dom. For example, guilt of a disciplinary infra ction does not have to be prove n beyond a r easona ble doubt, but only by a preponde ranc e o f t h e evidenc e. Inde x #502.01(VI) (E)( 9)(i)( 1). Further, the disciplinary boar d is entitled to consider any evidenc e it finds reliable , whether

or not such evide n ce wo u l d b e admi ssible in a court of la w. Inde x #502.01(VI) (E)( 9)(c )(2)

. Mr. Kee n argue s that because he w as unable to call as witnesse s the corr ectional of fice rs who pa c ke d u p th e pr op e rty in his c e ll, we sh ou ld r e ve rs e thetria l c ou rt a ndgr a nt h im the re lie f h e se e ks

. Th e Un if orm D isc ipl ina

ry Pr oc e du re s in c lud e a

pr oc e ss by wh ic h inmate s ca n fil e writt e n r e qu e sts-6-

for the a ppear anceof witnesses at disciplinary hearings. No s uch written reque sts are found in the rec ord.
Mr

. Ke e n su gg e sts that he did no t kn ow wh ic h c or re c tio na l of

fi c e rs we reinv olv e d, be c aus e their name s werenot included in Sergeant Jordan’s r eport. It is possi ble he c ould have f iled such a re qu est no ne the le ss, us ing so me oth e r f orm of de sc ri pti on to d e sig nate there le va nt i nd ivi du a ls. The Proce dures a lso allow an inmate t o reque st a continuance of a sche duled hea ring for up to seve n days, Inde x #502.01(VI) (D)( 4)(a )(1) , which might have given Mr . Kee n additional time to identify these ( o r o t h er ) wi tnesses, but no such re quest for c ontinuance is found in the r ecor d. We f ind nothin g in the rec ord to indicate that, as a matter of law, the disciplinary boar d acte d illegally or fraudulently.
Th e dis c ipl ina

ry re c or d s ho ws that Mr . K e e n a pp e are d at th e he ari ng , a ndthat heha d a c c e ss to ani n m a t e l e g a l a d v i s o r
. P h o t o g r ap h s o f t h e r a z o r b l a d e s a n d n e e d l e s w e r e i n tr o d u c e d i n to evidenc e. Mr. Ke en admitt ed that the razor s werehis, but he denied that he ever intended to harm anyone. T h e b o ard also hear d from Serge ant Jordan. A t the conclusion of the pr oof, the thre e members o f t h e d isciplinary boar d found by a pr eponder anceof the e vidence that Mr. Kee n was guilty of the char ges pre sented.
For Mr. Keen, the bottom line of this appeal is his insist encethat he is innocent of the char ges for

which he w as convic ted. He c laims that he “is known for sewing throughou t the instit ution,” that he uses the r azor blades for cutting thr ead and materia l, that corre ctional offic ers sta ge d th e pla c e me nt o f the se ite ms i n s uc h a way a s to make him se e m gu ilt y of ma lic iou s in te nt, and that they we re motivated by long-sta ndin g h o s t i l ity against him by one or more c orre ctional office rs. Howeve r, as we stated above, a court revie wing a petition f or writ of certiorari may n ot inquire into the intrinsic corr ectne ss of the decision of the tribunal be low. Robinson v. Clement , 65 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
In ste a d, wi th r e ga

rdto the su ff

ic ie nc y o f th e ev ide nc e , a re vie wi ng c ou rt

mus t si mpl y de te rm inewh e the r m a te ri al e vid e nc e wa s p re se nte d to theinf e ri or bo ardor tribu na l to su pp ort it s decision. A de cision is arbitrary and void i f i t is unsupported by any mate rial evide nce, or if the tribunal fails to follow the esse ntial require ments of the law. Wa tts v . Ci v il Se rv
. Bd . o f Co lum bia , 60 6 S. W .2 d at 27 6- 77 ; Hawkins v. Tenn. De p't of Correction , 127 S.W.3d at 757. An appellate court revie wing a trial c ourt's decision follows the same standard of revie w. Watts v. Civil S er v. B d. of Col um bia , 606 S.W.2d at 277. We ha ve ea rlier de scribed the evidenc e pre sented at the hearing, and we c onclude ther e wa s material e vidence to support the disciplinary boar d’s dec ision.
III. The judgment of the trial court is af firmed. W e remand t his case to the C hance ry C ourt of Hi c kman Co un ty f

or a ny fu rthe r p ro c e e din gs ne c e ssa ry . T a x th e c os ts on app e a l to theapp e llant, Kee nan R. Kee n.-7- ____________________________________ PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE