UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

HOWARD F. YOST, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.  No. 03-1512

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Huntington.

Robert C. Chambers, District Judge.

(CA-01-921-3)

Submitted: October 3, 2003

Decided: October 24, 2003

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

J. T. Meisel, Huntington, West Virginia, for Appellant. James A.

Winn, Regional Chief Counsel, Region III, Patricia M. Smith, Deputy

Regional Chief Counsel, Teri C. Smith, Assistant Regional Counsel,

Office of the General Counsel, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Kasey Warner, United States

Attorney, Stephen M. Horn, Assistant United States Attorney,

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. 
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Howard F. Yost appeals the district court’s order accepting the

magistrate judge’s recommendation to deny Social Security disability

benefits ("DIB"), asserting (1) the ALJ erred by finding that he

retained the residual functional capacity to perform a limited range of

light work; (2) the ALJ erred in his weighing of the medical evidence;

and (3) the ALJ erred in his credibility determination. We affirm. 

We must uphold the district court’s disability determination if it is

supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Hays v.

Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Contrary to Yost’s

argument, we find that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity finding

is supported by substantial evidence. The record actually contains evidence that Yost can perform the physical demands of medium work.

Thus, the ALJ gave Yost the benefit of the doubt by finding that he

could perform only a limited range of light work. Moreover, the ALJ

imposed all of the exertional and non-exertional limitations supported

by the record. Finally, we find that Yost’s activities of daily living,

including caring for his dogs, watching television, visiting family and

friends, attending church services, driving short distances, and occasional hunting support the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination. 

Next, Yost argues that the ALJ erred in his weighing of the medical

evidence. We disagree. Yost contends that the ALJ erred by rejecting

the opinions of a case manager ("Goddard") and a physical therapist

("Brewer") with regard to his physical impairments. However, neither

Goddard nor Brewer is an acceptable medical source under the Social

Security regulations to determine whether Yost suffers a medically

determinable impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 1513(a) (2002). Moreover,

Goddard’s opinion was rendered on June 13, 1997, nearly three

months after March 31, 1997, Yost’s date last insured, and Brewer’s

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opinion was rendered on July 31, 1997, exactly four months after the

date Yost was last insured. Thus, the ALJ did not err by rejecting

these opinions in determining Yost’s disability for DIB purposes. 

With regard to his mental impairment, Yost argues that the ALJ

erred by rejecting the opinion of his treating psychiatrist, Dr. Massenburg. Again, we disagree. First, Dr. Massenburg evaluated Yost on

only one occasion. Thus, he is not Yost’s treating psychiatrist. Furthermore, his findings are contradicted by those of Yost’s treating

physician and his treating psychologist. Thus, even if Dr. Massenburg

were considered Yost’s treating psychiatrist, his opinion would not be

entitled to controlling weight. See Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514,

517 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that treating physician’s opinion is entitled to great weight if not contradicted by persuasive evidence).

Finally, Dr. Massenburg’s opinion was rendered on July 22, 1997,

nearly four months after the date Yost was last insured. Thus, it is not

relevant to a disability determination for DIB purposes.

Lastly, Yost argues that the ALJ erred by finding his subjective

allegations of pain and their impact on his ability to work not entirely

credible. This argument fails. The ALJ’s credibility finding was based

on inconsistent statements by Yost regarding his motivation to work,

as well as the lack of objective medical evidence to support his subjective allegations. In particular, Yost stated at his hearing that he

would "pick up pop cans if [he could] make a living at it," but further

stated that he was not willing to relocate for work. Moreover, the

record reveals a lack of objective medical findings to support Yost’s

subjective allegations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) (2002); see also

Mickles v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 918, 923 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that

allegations of pain, without more, are insufficient to find disability);

Parris v. Heckler, 733 F.2d 324, 327 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that

subjective evidence of pain cannot take precedence over objective

medical evidence or lack thereof). Yost’s x-rays and MRI’s were consistently normal, a physical therapist noted no correlation between

Yost’s subjective pain and his demonstrated physical ability upon

testing, and his activities of daily living, as noted previously, further

undermine such allegations. 

Yost also contends that the disability award from the West Virginia

Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board as of June 13, 1997, should

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be considered in assessing his credibility. The standards for finding

a claimant disabled under West Virginia law and under the Social

Security Act are entirely different. Thus, a state award of benefits

does not bind us in establishing proof of disability for DIB purposes.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504. We therefore find that the ALJ properly

evaluated Yost’s credibility. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying benefits.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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