J-A18023-23

2023 PA Super 191

NICHOLE S. CHAPPELL 

Appellant

v.

HANNAH M. POWELL

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 253 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered February 22, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Civil Division at No(s): 

No. 2022 GN 1013

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED: September 29, 2023

Nichole S. Chappell appeals from the order, entered in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Blair County, sustaining Appellee Hannah M. Powell’s 

preliminary objections and dismissing Chappell’s complaint for failing to make 

good faith efforts to serve Powell. After careful review, we reverse and 

remand.

Chappell and Powell were involved in a motor vehicle accident on May 

10, 2020, when Powell, attempting to make a left-hand turn directly in front 

of Chappell’s approaching vehicle at an intersection, “failed to slow her vehicle 

down or otherwise ensure traffic was clear[, and then] proceed[ed] through 

and enter[ed] the intersection where she collided with” Chappell. Complaint, 

4/25/22, at ¶ 10. On April 25, 2022, Chappell filed a negligence complaint 

against Powell alleging that she sustained multiple injuries as a result of the 
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accident. On April 28, 2022,1 Chappell unsuccessfully attempted to serve 

Powell with the complaint at a residence located at 1519 Princeton Road, 

Altoona.

2 On August 22, 2022, Chappell received a letter, dated 8/15/22,

from the Postmaster indicating that there was a “good C[hange] o[f] A[ddress]

on file” for Powell. 

On August 26, 2022, the trial court entered an “Alternative Service Order,” 

stating:

AND NOW, THIS 26th DAY of August, 2022, OUR REVIEW OF 

THE DOCKET IN THE ABOVE[-]CAPTIONED MATTER INDICATES 

THAT SERVICE HAS BEEN ATTEMPTED BUT NOT MADE ON THE 

COMPLAINT. IN LIGHT OF OUR COMMITMENT TO PROMPT AND 

FAIR DISPOSITION OF CIVIL CASES, YOU WILL BE GIVEN FORTYFIVE (45) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS NOTICE TO PETITION 

THIS COURT FOR ALTERNAT[IV]E SERVICE,

[3] UNLESS YOU 

ARE ABLE TO REINSTATE THE COMPLAINT (IF NECESSARY) AND 

PERFECT SERVICE WITHIN THIS FORTY-FIVE (45) DAY TIME 

FRAME.

IF SERVICE IS NOT PERFECTED BY THIS DEADLINE OR YOU DO 

NOT PETITION THE COURT FOR ALTERNAT[IV]E SERVICE, THE 

COMPLAINT WILL BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE IN 

ACCORDANCE WITH THE POWER GIVEN TO THIS COURT UNDER 

RULE 1901 OF THE PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF JUDICIAL 

ADMINISTRATION.

____________________________________________

1 A sheriff’s county service cover sheet shows that service was attempted by 

Chappell on 4/28/22 and that the server “spoke with homeowner on the phone 

[who] stated that they just moved in [and] did not know a Hannah Powell[, 

b]ut believed the last owners moved to NM.” Blair County Sheriff’s Office 

Service Cover Sheet, 4/28/22. 

2 The statute of limitations for Chappell’s negligence cause of action expired 

on May 10, 2022. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5534(2). 

3 The 45th day fell on October 10, 2022.
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Order, 8/26/22 (emphasis in original). On August 30, 2022, Chappell sent 

the Postmaster a letter asking “what Ms. Powell’s current address is” and

included a self-addressed stamped envelope. See Letter, 8/30/22. Chappell

filed a praecipe to reinstate the complaint on September 12, 2022; the 

complaint was reinstated on that date. See Pa.R.C.P. 401(b)(1).4 On October

5, 2022, in compliance with the trial court’s August 26, 2022 order, Chappell 

filed a “Motion to Serve Powell Pursuant to Pa.R.C[.]P. 430,” seeking 

permission to alternatively serve Erie Insurance Co. (Erie),

5 Powell’s insurer, 

on behalf of Powell. See Pa.R.C.P. 430. 

On November 2, 2022, the court issued an order granting Chappell’s 

motion for alternative service, stating that “Chappell[] may serve Erie

Insurance . . . by mailing within 10 days . . . a copy of the [c]omplaint” in the 

matter. Order, 11/2/22. One day later, on November 3, 2022, Chappell 

served Erie with the complaint, on behalf of Powell. A sheriff’s return of 

service form in the record also reveals that Chappell served the complaint 

personally on Powell on November 15, 2022. See Sheriff’s Return of Service, 

12/1/22 (“11/15/2022 11:18 AM - The requested complaint in civil action 

(CICA) was served by the Sheriff of Indiana County upon Hannah Powell, 

personally, at 7919 Route 403 Hwy[.] South, Armagh, PA[,] 15290. Dep. 

____________________________________________

4 For unknown reasons, Chappell filed another praecipe to reinstate the 

complaint on October 24, 2022. The docket indicates that the complaint was 

reinstated on that date as well. 

5 Chappell listed Erie’s home office located at 100 Erie Insurance Place, Erie, 

Pennsylvania 16530, as the address to effectuate alternative service.
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Robert Mundorff, Sheriff, return of service attached to and made part of the 

within record.”).

On November 28, 2022,6 Powell filed preliminary objections seeking to 

dismiss Chappell’s complaint on the basis that Chappell failed to make a good 

faith effort to diligently and timely serve Powell with original notice. See 

Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(1). Specifically, Powell alleged that: (1) Chappell failed to 

execute proper service upon her; (2) Chappell did not effectively reinstate the 

complaint; (3) Chappell only attempted to serve her once, on April 28, 2022, 

prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations; (4) from May through 

August 2022, Chappell made no effort to reinstate the complaint or serve her; 

and (5) the statute of limitations expired during this four-month period of 

inaction. Powell’s Preliminary Objections, 11/28/22, at 1-3. Powell attached 

a copy of an envelope to her preliminary objections; the envelope is addressed 

to Erie Insurance Company,7 with a postmark of November 3, 2022, via firstclass mail. See Preliminary Objections, 11/28/22, at “Exhibit C.” Powell also 

averred in her preliminary objections that “Plaintiff mailed the Complaint on 

or about November 3, 2022.” See id. at ¶ 9.

On December 16, 2022, Chappell filed a response to Powell’s preliminary 

objections, attaching ten exhibits, to prove that she made good faith and 

____________________________________________

6 On that same date, counsel for Powell entered her appearance. See Notice 

of Appearance, 10/28/22.

7 The envelope was addressed to the address provided by Chappell in her 

motion. See supra at n.5.
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reasonable efforts in attempting to serve Powell. Specifically, Chappell argued 

that she “carried her burden to establish that a good faith effort was made to 

serve [Powell by having] the sheriff attempt service [] at [Powell’s] address 

listed in the police report just [three] days after the [c]omplaint was filed.” 

Brief in Opposition to Preliminary Objections, at 5 (emphasis in original). 

Moreover, Chappell explained that this initial service attempt was unsuccessful 

because Powell “had moved away from her only known address.” Id. 

Chappell then averred that her counsel “used other means to locate [Powell’s] 

new address, including social media searches, internet searches, public record 

searches, and contacting the Postmaster of Blair County.” Id. at 6. When 

none of these avenues proved fruitful, Chappell avers that she petitioned the 

court for alternate service in compliance with the court’s August 26, 2022 

order, and, after the court granted Chappell permission to alternatively serve 

Powell’s insurer, Chappell timely complied and served the insurer the next 

day.

8

On February 22, 2023, the trial court granted Powell’s preliminary 

objections on the issue of service of process and dismissed Chappell’s 

complaint. The trial court determined that “the actions of [Chappell] in 

____________________________________________

8 The court’s order permitting Chappell to effectuate alternative service on 

Erie states that “[s]ervice shall be deemed to have been made on the date of 

the mailings made in accordance with this [c]ourt [o]rder.” Order of Court, 

11/2/22. A copy of the envelope in which the complaint was mailed to Erie 

has a postmark of November 3, 2022. See Defendant’s Preliminary 

Objections, 11/28/22, at “Exhibit C.” Thus, Chappell’s mailing of the 

complaint to Erie “on or about November 3, 2022,” which was admitted by 

Powell in her preliminary objections, is the date that we deem service was 

made.
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attempting to perfect service of the [c]omplaint fell short of the requirement 

of good faith and due diligence.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/28/23, at 3. 

Specifically, the court found that Chappell did not make “good faith” efforts to 

serve Powell where “it was not until [after] the [c]ourt issued a case 

management [or]der that [Chappell] took serious steps to attempt to 

effectuate service.” Id. at 4.

Chappell filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. On appeal, 

Chappell raises the following issue for our consideration: 

Did the trial court err in finding [Chappell] did not make a good 

faith effort to serve the [c]omplaint on Powell when[:] (1) 

[Chappell] attempted to serve the [c]omplaint on Powell via sheriff 

service immediately after filing [the complaint]; (2) [Chappell] 

made diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the Powell after 

learning that Powell did not reside at her last known address; and 

(3) [Chappell] perfected service by mailing the [c]omplaint to 

Powell’s insurance carrier in a timely manner, pursuant to the trial 

court[’]s August 26, 2022, [a]lternate [s]ervice [o]rder?

Appellant’s Brief, at 5.9

____________________________________________

9 Following is a succinct timeline of relevant facts:

• May 10, 2020 - cause of action arises (automobile accident);

• April 25, 2022 – complaint filed;

• April 28, 2022 – unsuccessful service of complaint attempted on 

Defendant at last known address;

• May 10, 2022 – statute of limitations deadline on underlying cause of 

action;

• August 22, 2022 – Chappell receives 8/15/22 letter from Postmaster 

indicating good change of address on file for Powell;

• August 26, 2022 – trial court issues case management order directing 

Chappell to reinstate complaint and perfect service or move for 

alternative service within 45 days;

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In reviewing a trial court’s order sustaining preliminary objections for 

improper service of process

[o]ur standard of review . . . is to determine whether the trial 

court committed an error of law. When considering the 

appropriateness of a ruling on preliminary objections, the 

appellate court must apply the same standard as the trial court. 

When considering preliminary objections, all material facts set 

forth in the challenged pleadings are admitted as true, as well as 

all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. Preliminary 

objections which seek the dismissal of a cause of action should be 

sustained only in cases in which it is clear and free from doubt 

that the pleader will be unable to prove facts legally sufficient to 

establish the right to relief.

Bellan v. Penn Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 271 A.3d 506, 509 (Pa. Super. 

2022) (citation omitted).

Chappell argues that she “made numerous attempts to locate Powell

after the [c]omplaint was filed [and that] credible evidence was offered to 

show that [she] made good faith and reasonable efforts to locate Powell and 

perfect service.” Appellant’s Brief, at 10. Chappell contends that she “was 

____________________________________________

• August 30, 2022 – Chappell sends form to Postmaster asking for 

Defendant’s new address on file;

• September 12, 2022 – Chappell praecipes to reinstate complaint;

• September 12, 2022 – complaint reinstated;

• October 5, 2022 – Chappell files motion to alternatively serve Erie 

pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 430(a);

• October 24, 2022 – Chappell again praecipes to reinstate complaint;

• October 24, 2022 – complaint reinstated;

• November 2, 2022 – trial court issues alternative service order 

permitting service by mail to Erie; and

• November 3, 2022 – Chappell serves Erie by mailing complaint, via firstclass mail.
J-A18023-23

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making proactive efforts to locate and serve [Powell] before the trial court’s 

alternative service order,” id. at 21, and, “given the steps [Chappell] took to 

discover [Powell’s] new address and [Chappell’s] compliance with the trial 

court’s alternative service order, [Chappell] has satisfied her burden of 

proving that good faith efforts were made to serve the complaint.” Id. at 22.

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1007 allows a plaintiff to commence 

a civil action by filing either a praecipe for a writ of summons or a complaint. 

See Pa.R.C.P. 1007(1)-(2). A plaintiff is required to serve the defendant with 

original process within 30 days after the issuance of a writ or the filing of a 

complaint. See Pa.R.C.P. 401(a). If the plaintiff does not effectuate service 

within that time period, he or she can praecipe for reissuance of the writ or 

reinstatement of the complaint. See Pa.R.C.P. 401(b)(1). As long as the 

plaintiff files his or her writ or complaint before the expiration of the statute 

of limitations applicable to the cause of action, the original filing, as well as 

any subsequent reissuances or reinstatements, tolls the statute of limitations. 

Gussom v. Teagle, 247 A.3d 1046, 1048 (Pa. 2021).

In cases where “‘service cannot be made’ in the normal fashion,” 

Sisson v. Stanley, 109 A.3d 265, 270-71 (Pa. Super. 2015) (emphasis in 

original), “a plaintiff may move the court for a special order directing the 

manner of service pursuant to Rule 430(a).” Deer Park Lumber, Inc. v. 

Major, 559 A.2d 941, 944 (Pa. Super. 1989). Pennsylvania Rule of Civil 

Procedure 430 states, in relevant part:

Rule 430. Service Pursuant to Special Order of Court. Publication
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(a) If service cannot be made under the applicable rule 

the plaintiff may move the court for a special order 

directing the method of service. The motion shall 

be accompanied by an affidavit stating the 

nature and extent of the investigation which has 

been made to determine the whereabouts of the 

defendant and the reasons why service cannot 

be made.

Pa.R.C.P. 430(a) (emphasis added).10

Our Court first interpreted Rule 430 in Deer Park, supra, stating:

As set forth above, Rules 410 and 430 are clear on their face. 

. . . Where service cannot be made under these provisions, for 

example, where a defendant cannot be located, a plaintiff may 

move the court for a special order directing the manner of service 

pursuant to Rule 430(a). Under this approach, a plaintiff 

must provide, along with the motion, an affidavit stating 

the nature and extent of the investigation undertaken to 

locate the defendant. The purpose of this procedure is to 

provide proof that a good faith effort has been made to 

effect service under normal methods. Only after such proof 

has been offered is the court authorized to direct 

publication or another method of substitute service.

____________________________________________

10 The Note to Rule 430 lists examples of actions that constitute a “good faith” 

effort to locate a defendant:

(a) Inquiries of postal authorities[;]

(b) Inquiries of relatives, neighbors, friends, and employers of the 

defendant;

(c) Examinations of local telephone directories, courthouse records, 

voter registration records, local tax records, and motor vehicle 

records, and 

(d) A reasonable internet search.

Pa.R.C.P. 430, Note. Our courts have stated that this list is, by no means,

exhaustive. Deer Park, supra at 946.
J-A18023-23

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Id. at 944 (emphasis added). “The availability of alternative methods of 

service as provided in [R]ules[430(a)-(b)] assures that the vigilant plaintiff 

need not be consigned to an endless cycle of reissuing and attempting 

personal service.” Witherspoon v. City of Phila., 768 A.2d 1079, 1084 n.3 

(Pa. 2001).

Instantly, Chappell averred in her Rule 430 motion that, after she 

unsuccessfully attempted to serve Powell on April 28, 2022, she contacted the 

Altoona Postmaster, on August 15, 2022, who responded with “good C[hange]

o[f] A[ddress] on file, but did not provide Powell’s current address.” Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Serve Powell Pursuant to Pa.R.C[.]P. 430, 10/5/22, at 1. Chappell 

also averred that she reached out again to the Altoona Postmaster on August 

30, 2022, for information on Powell’s current address, “however, to date, 

plaintiff has not received further correspondence from the Postmaster.” Id.

at 2. Thereafter, Chappelle averred that she “conducted numerous Lexis 

Public Records searches[,] internet searches, and social media searches to 

locate Powell, to no avail.” Id. 

Additionally, Chappell’s attorney, Paul G. Mater, Jr., Esquire, attached the 

following affidavit to Chappell’s Rule 430 motion:

1. I am the attorney for Plaintiff Nichole S. Chappell, in the 

above-captioned matter.

2. This action was instituted as a result of a May 10, 2020 motor 

vehicle incident involving a vehicle operated by Hannah M. 

Powell.
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3. Service was attempted on Powell’s address listed in the Police 

Report on April 28, 2022. No service was made by Blair County 

Sheriff as the Powell was no longer living at this address.

4. A Postmaster inquiry was requested for Powell’s current 

address, however the address was not provided to plaintiff. 

5. Numerous internet and public record searches were attempted 

to locate Powell, however none of the searches revealed 

Powell’s current address.

Affidavit of Paul G. Mater, Jr., Esquire, 9/30/22. 

Instantly, Chappell technically complied with Rule 430(a) by attaching 

to her motion “an affidavit stating the nature and extent of the investigation 

which has been made to determine the whereabouts of [D]efendant and the 

reasons why service cannot be made.” Pa.R.C.P. 430(a). Cf. Deer Park,

supra at 945 (trial court’s order permitting plaintiff to serve defendants by 

publication was “clearly error,” where trial court did not inquire into plaintiff’s 

investigation to uncover whereabouts of potential defendants, plaintiff failed 

to provide any indication of types of procedures used to locate defendants; 

alternative service can only be ordered “provided the requirements of Rule 

430(a) have been met”); see also Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Colton, 217 A.3d 

382, *4 (Pa. Super. filed May 9, 2019) (unpublished memorandum decision) 

(Rule 430(a) affidavit must detail plaintiff’s good faith efforts to locate 

defendant).

11

 

____________________________________________

11 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (non-precedential decisions filed after May 1, 2019, 

may be cited for persuasive value); see also Operating Procedure 65.37 

(same).
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Moreover, as explained in Deer Park, supra, a trial court may not 

authorize alternative service under Rule 430 until there is “proof that a good 

faith effort has been made to effectuate service under normal methods.” Deer 

Park, 559 A.2d at 944. Accordingly, the trial court’s November 2, 2022 order, 

granting Chappell’s motion for alternative service, indicates that the trial court 

believed, as of that date, that Chappell had made the requisite showing of a 

good-faith effort to serve Powell pursuant to the ordinary service rules. See 

Northern Forests II, Inc. v. Keta Realty Co., 130 A.3d 19, *31 (Pa. Super. 

2015) (affidavit accompanying Rule 430 motion “must demonstrate that the 

plaintiff exhibited ‘due diligence and good faith’ in attempting to locate the 

defendants”). See also Rosenberg v. Reading Hotel Park, Inc., 258 A.3d 

521 (Pa. Super. filed June 14, 2021) (unpublished memorandum); City of 

Phila. Water Revenue Bureau v. Towands Props., Inc., 976 A.2d 1244 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). 

Despite the court’s earlier finding that Chappell had made a good-faith 

effort to serve Powell, in its February 22, 2023 opinion explaining the reasons 

for granting Powell’s preliminary objections, the trial judge stated, in relevant 

part:

Plaintiff reinstated the complaint on September 9, 2022[,] and 

filed a motion to serve Erie Insurance on October 5, 2022. Said 

motion was granted. The defendant was also personally served in 

Indiana County on November 15, 2022. There is no explanation 

offered as to how Plaintiff located Powell for [the] purpose of 

making personal service.

After the initial attempt at service, no efforts were made to 

attempt either personal service or alternative service. It was not 

until the [c]ourt intervened and issued the order on August 26, 
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2022[,] that efforts were made to serve the [c]omplaint. Had the 

[c]ourt not issued said order, this [j]urist suspects the 

[c]omplaint would have remained unserved for many more 

months. [Chappell] offers no explanation as to why these efforts 

could not have been in the nearly four months that passed 

between the initial attempt at service on April 28th and this 

[c]ourt’s order of August 26th. There is nothing in the record to 

suggest that Powell was aware of the filing of the lawsuit prior to 

service being made.

[Chappell’s] lack of due diligence in serving the [c]omplaint is 

apparent. This [c]ourt finds that [Chappell] has failed to 

produce evidence of a good-faith effort to serve Powell

with notice that the lawsuit had been filed prior to the 

expiration of the statute of limitations. Therefore, the action 

must fail. 

Trial Court Opinion, 2/22/23, at 4-5 (emphasis added).

This Court finds it confounding that the same jurist who issued the 

August 26, 2022 case management order, explicitly granting Chappell 45 days 

to either reinstate the complaint and perfect service or move for alternative 

service, would ignore the fact that Chappell did exactly what the court ordered 

her to do within the 45-day timeline—reinstate the complaint12 and petition

for alternative service. See Order, 8/26/22 (“In light of our commitment to 

prompt and fair disposition of civil cases, you will be given forty-five (45)

days from the date of this notice to petition this court for alternative 

service, unless you are able to reinstate the complaint (if necessary) and 

perfect service within this forty-five (45) day time frame.”) (emphasis in 

original (bold)) (emphasis added (italics bold)). To extend Chappell the 

____________________________________________

12 Admittedly, Chappell did not perfect service after reinstating the complaint, 

within the 45 days, but she did continue to inquire with the Postmaster to 

ascertain Defendant’s new address.
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opportunity, by order, to petition the court for alternative service (which she 

did) and then find she did not put forth a good-faith effort to serve Powell

based on her pre-motion inactivity from April 28, 2022 (date of unsuccessful 

service) to August 26, 2022 (date of case management/alternative service 

order) is disingenuous. Rather, a clear reading of Rule 430 implicitly requires 

a trial judge first make a determination of whether a petitioner has provided 

proof that he or she has made a good faith effort to effect service under the 

normal service rules before issuing an order authorizing a method of substitute 

service.

We also find it troubling that this jurist would fail to acknowledge the 

fact that Chappell effectuated alternative service on Powell’s insurer13 just one 

day after the same trial judge issued an order permitting Chappell to serve 

Erie within 10 days pursuant to Rule 430. The record evidence shows that 

Chappell served the complaint on Erie on November 3, 2022, just one day

following the court’s November 2, 2022 order14 granting her the right to 

alternatively serve Powell’s insurer. See Powell’s Preliminary Objections, 

11/28/22, at ¶ 21 (“Ultimately, Powell was not served until November 3, 

____________________________________________

13 The court’s alternative service order specifically stated that Chappell may 

serve Erie a copy of the complaint “by regular U.S. First-Class Mail, postage 

prepaid, and by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the following 

address: 100 Erie Insurance Place, Erie, Pennsylvania 16530.” Order, 

11/2/22. The envelope attached to Defendant’s preliminary objections 

evidences that Chappell complied with this directive.

14 One can hardly conceive of any change of circumstances that occurred over 

the course of a single day to warrant the grant of preliminary objections, nor 

does the record show any such circumstance(s).
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2022[,] after the [c]ourt permitted Powell be served by way of her insurer.”). 

Finally, any “suspicion” that the trial judge may have harbored regarding 

whether the complaint “would have remained unserved for many more 

months,” save for the court’s August 26, 2002 case management order, is of 

no moment for purposes of deciding the issue on appeal. See Bellan, supra 

(as reviewing court, we, like trial court, are tasked with, admitting as true, 

“all material facts set forth in the challenged pleadings, as well as all 

inferences reasonably deducible therefrom”). 

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law in 

granting Powell’s preliminary objections where: (1) on August 26, 2022, the 

court explicitly gave Chappell 45 days to either effectuate proper service on 

Powell or move for alternative service; (2) Chappell moved for alternative 

service within 45 days of the court’s August 26, 2022 order; (3) on November 

2, 2022, the court granted Chappell permission to alternatively serve Erie, 

Powell’s insurer, within 10 days; and (4) Chappell served Erie one day later, 

on November 3, 2022. Cf. Northern Forests II, supra at *31 (plaintiff failed 

to satisfy Rule 430 requisites for service of process by publication where 

plaintiff’s counsel “totally failed to describe what efforts he made to discover 

the whereabout of any [defendant] holding an interest in the Property”).

Because the trial court concluded Chappell made a good faith effort to 

effectuate service under normal methods as of November 2, 2022, see Deer 

Park, supra at 944, and Chappell fully complied with the court’s alternative 

service order, the trial court erred in granting Powell’s preliminary 
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objections.

15 See Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Johnson, 121 A.3d 1056 (Pa. 

Super. 2015) (where appellee effectuated service pursuant to “special [Rule 

430] order,” appellant not entitled to have default judgment struck based on 

claim appellee failed to prove service of original process under normal service 

rules).

Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/29/2023

____________________________________________

15 Defendant does not argue that the trial court erroneously granted 

alternative service under Rule 430(a).