COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Bray and 

 Senior Judge Overton*

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

KENNETH JAMES KRAMPEN 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0241-98-1 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 FEBRUARY 9, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

Edward W. Hanson, Jr., Judge 

 J. Roger Griffin, Jr. (Chris A. Christie; 

Christie & Kantor, on brief), for appellant. 

 Richard Barton Campbell, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Kenneth James Krampen (appellant) was convicted in a bench 

trial of two counts of taking indecent liberties with a child, in 

violation of Code § 18.2-370.1. He contends the evidence was 

insufficient to find that he maintained the required "custodial 

or supervisory relationship" over the child within the meaning of 

the statute. For the following reasons, we affirm the 

convictions. 

 I. 

 Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

 

 *Judge Overton participated in the hearing and decision of 

this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 

January 31, 1999 and thereafter by his designation as a senior 

judge pursuant to Code § 17.1-401, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.01:1. 
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granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible 

therefrom. See Juares v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 154, 156, 493 

S.E.2d 677, 678 (1997). So viewed, the evidence established that 

the victim, D.V., was fifteen years old at the time of the 

offenses. In early 1997, D.V. attended Foundry United Methodist 

Church in Virginia Beach with appellant, his wife, and their five 

children. D.V.'s mother or aunt would take her to the Krampen 

residence, where she would ride to church with the Krampen 

family. Appellant's wife often transported the victim to church, 

and appellant drove her home. Appellant was the only adult in 

the car during these trips. Appellant and his wife were the only 

people who had D.V.'s mother's permission to take D.V. to and 

from church. 

 On two separate occasions in April 1997, appellant drove 

D.V. home after church. On the first occasion, appellant stopped 

the car in a vacant parking lot and told the victim he had sexual 

feelings for her. He kissed her, rubbed her thigh and talked 

about having sex with her. Appellant told D.V. having sex with 

him would be "the best sex [she] ever had." He did not touch her 

breasts or vaginal area on that occasion. 

 Approximately one week after that incident, appellant again 

drove the victim home from church. En route, appellant stopped 

the car at a dead-end parking area. He placed his hand inside 

D.V.'s shirt and fondled her breasts. He also placed his mouth 

on them and fondled her vagina with his hand inside her pants. 
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 On May 5, 1997, the Department of Social Services began an 

investigation of appellant, during which he confessed to the 

allegations. At the interview, the investigator asked appellant 

"if he understood that when he took [the victim] back and forth 

to church that he assumed a custodial or guardianship role over 

her." Appellant responded, "Yes." 

 At trial, appellant stipulated to the April 1997 incidents. 

 The trial court found that appellant maintained "a custodial or 

supervisory relationship" over D.V. and convicted him of both 

offenses. 

 II. 

 Appellant's sole contention on appeal is that the evidence 

was insufficient to establish that he maintained the statutorily 

required custodial or supervisory relationship over D.V. He 

argues that his involvement with the victim "consisted only of 

assisting her in transportation from church" and the applicable 

statute requires "more than an informal part-time casual 

relationship." 

 Code § 18.2-370.1 provides: 

 Any person eighteen years of age or older who 

maintains a custodial or supervisory 

relationship over a child under the age of 

eighteen, including but not limited to the 

parent, step-parent, grandparent, 

step-grandparent, or who stands in loco 

parentis with respect to such child and is 

not legally married to such child, and who, 

with lascivious intent, knowingly and 

intentionally (i) proposes that any such 

child feel or fondle the sexual or genital 

parts of such person or that such person feel 

or handle the sexual or genital parts of the 
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child, or (ii) proposes to such child the 

performance of an act of sexual intercourse 

or any act constituting an offense under 

§ 18.2-361, or (iii) exposes his or her 

sexual or genital parts to such child, or 

(iv) proposes that any such child expose his 

or her sexual or genital parts to such 

person, or (v) proposes to the child that the 

child engage in sexual intercourse, sodomy or 

fondling of sexual or genital parts with 

another person, or (vi) sexually abuses the 

child as defined in § 18.2-67.10(6), shall be 

guilty of a Class 6 felony. 

(Emphasis added). 

 Code § 18.2-370.1 is clear and unambiguous in requiring 

proof of a "custodial" or "supervisory" relationship over the 

victim. "The requirement of custodial relationship is not merely 

a basis for enhancing punishment. . . . [Rather], the custodial 

relationship the accused maintains with respect to the victim is 

a predicate to guilt." Seibert v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 40, 

46, 467 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1996). 

 "Where a statute is unambiguous, the plain meaning is to be 

accepted without resort to the rules of statutory 

interpretation." Last v. Virginia State Bd. of Med., 14 Va. App. 

906, 910, 421 S.E.2d 201, 205 (1992). "`Courts are not permitted 

to rewrite statutes. This is a legislative function. The 

manifest intention of the legislature, clearly disclosed by its 

language, must be applied.'" Barr v. Town & Country Properties, 

Inc., 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990) (quoting 

Anderson v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 560, 566, 29 S.E.2d 838, 841 

(1944)). Accordingly, we must "'take the words as written'" in 
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Code § 18.2-370.1 and give them their plain meaning. Adkins v. 

Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 166, 169, 497 S.E.2d 896, 897 (1998) 

(quoting Birdsong Peanut Co. v. Cowling, 8 Va. App. 274, 277, 381 

S.E.2d 24, 26 (1989)). 

 The word "custody" has been defined generally as "[t]he care 

and control of a thing or person." Black's Law Dictionary 384 

(6th ed. 1990). Additionally, the Supreme Court has rejected 

limiting the definition of "custody" to legal custody. See

Lovisi v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 848, 850, 188 S.E.2d 206, 208 

(construing Code § 40.1-103, formerly Code § 40-112), cert.

denied, 407 U.S. 922 (1972). 

 In its language [the statute] is unambiguous, 

justifying no limitation of the meaning of 

"custody" to legal custody. To give it such 

a restrictive definition would eliminate, 

among others, teachers, athletic instructors 

and baby-sitters, all of whom might have 

temporary custody of children, from the 

purview of the statute. 

Id. (emphasis added). 

 Accordingly, we hold that the "custodial or supervisory 

relationship" required under Code § 18.2-370.1 is not limited to 

those situations where legal custody exists. The statute 

specifically provides that such a relationship "include[s] but 

[is] not limited to the parent, step-parent, grandparent, [or] 

step-grandparent." Code § 18.2-370.1 (emphasis added). The term 

also includes those individuals eighteen years or older who 

have a temporary, custodial relationship with a child, such as, 

"teachers, athletic instructors and baby-sitters." Lovisi, 212 
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Va. at 850, 188 S.E.2d at 208. The child in each instance has 

been entrusted to the care and control of the supervising adult. 

 The evidence established that, with the permission of the 

victim's mother, appellant willingly drove the victim home from 

church. As the only adult present during these trips, appellant 

had the responsibility for and control of the victim's safety and 

well-being while she was in his care. His contact with the 

victim was in the nature of a baby-sitter, i.e., one entrusted 

with the care of the child for a limited period of time. Indeed, 

in appellant's interview with investigators he acknowledged that 

he "assumed a custodial or guardianship role over" the victim by 

transporting her to and from church. The Commonwealth's evidence 

was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant 

maintained the requisite custodial or supervisory relationship 

over the victim when he proposed that they have sexual relations 

and when he sexually abused her. Accordingly, we affirm 

appellant's convictions. 

 Affirmed.