Present: All the Justices 

FREDERICKSBURG CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 992259 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 

June 9, 2000 

J.W. WYNE EXCAVATING, INC. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY 

J. Peyton Farmer, Judge 

In this appeal we consider whether the trial court properly 

denied a motion to vacate a judgment that a defendant contended 

was void because the judgment had been entered without proper 

notice. 

BACKGROUND 

On January 19, 1994, Fredericksburg Construction Company, 

Inc. (Fredericksburg), filed a motion for judgment against J.W. 

Wyne Excavating, Inc. (Wyne), alleging breach of contract for 

failure to complete certain subcontracting work and seeking 

damages of $21,419.72.1 On February 28, 1994, Wyne filed a 

demurrer, grounds of defense, and a counterclaim asserting that 

Fredericksburg was indebted to Wyne for completed work under the 

subcontracts in the amount of $108,038.07. On March 22, 1994, 

 

1

In the caption of the motion for judgment, Fredericksburg 

listed its address as “P.O. Box 172, Lorton, Virginia” and in 

the text of that motion Fredericksburg listed its address as 

“7000 E. Newington Road, Lorton, Virginia.” The significance of 

these addresses will become apparent later in this opinion. 
Fredericksburg filed a response to the demurrer and its grounds 

of defense to the counterclaim alleging payment of the claimed 

debt. 

On May 19, 1994, the trial court sustained Wyne’s demurrer 

to the motion for judgment. Fredericksburg was given leave to 

file an amended motion for judgment and amended grounds of 

defense to Wyne’s counterclaim. Thereafter, Fredericksburg 

filed an amended grounds of defense, but did not file an amended 

motion for judgment. 

On September 1, 1994, the trial court, for reasons not 

reflected in the record, entered an order permitting Wyne to 

file a motion for judgment restating the claims of its original 

counterclaim and permitting Fredericksburg to respond to that 

pleading. Wyne complied by filing a motion for judgment on 

September 9, 1994. On September 27, 1994, Fredericksburg filed 

its grounds of defense and asserted a counterclaim against Wyne.2 

Thus, while still within the framework of the original 

litigation, the roles of the parties had essentially been 

reversed. 

 

2

On November 3, 1994, the trial court stayed further 

proceedings until the conclusion of a federal court proceeding 

arising out of the same acts and transactions in which Wyne was 

pursuing a claim against an indemnitor and Fredericksburg had 

sought to intervene. Wyne subsequently dismissed its federal 

claim. 

2
During these proceedings, the law firm of Arent, Fox, 

Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn (Arent Fox) represented Fredericksburg 

and the firm name was signed to the pleadings. In accordance 

with Rule 1:5, the pleadings were signed by Brian D. Sullivan, 

an associate attorney of Arent Fox. In addition, R. Steven 

Holt, a partner of this firm, was listed as counsel of record on 

several pleadings. 

On April 12, 1996, Arent Fox, by R. Steven Holt, filed a 

motion to withdraw as counsel alleging that Fredericksburg “has 

failed substantially to fulfill obligations to Arent Fox 

regarding its services.” The motion further stated that 

Fredericksburg had agreed to Arent Fox’s withdrawal from this 

case. The motion was signed “By: Brian D. Sullivan for . . . 

R.S. Holt, a partner.” The motion was served on Bill Barnes, 

Fredericksburg’s president, and on counsel for Wyne. 

On April 15, 1996, the trial court entered an order 

stating: 

 Brian D. Sullivan, counsel for Fredericksburg 

Construction Company, Inc., requested that he be 

allowed to withdraw as counsel of record. 

It is ordered that motion to withdraw as counsel 

be granted and further that Brian D. Sullivan, VSB 

#35268 be and is hereby granted leave to withdraw his 

appearance as counsel for [Fredericksburg] in the 

action. 

Bill Barnes endorsed this order as did counsel for Wyne. 

3
On January 13, 1997, Wyne filed a praecipe seeking a 

hearing on January 20, 1997, in order to set a trial date. The 

certificate of service reflects that the praecipe was served on 

Barnes by mail at “P.O. Box 172, Lorton, Virginia,” which was 

one of the addresses listed in Fredericksburg’s original motion 

for judgment. January 20, 1997 was a legal holiday and, 

accordingly, the trial court was not open on that day. Court 

records for January 21, 1997, indicate that the case was called 

on the term day docket and was passed over. No indication of an 

appearance by either party at that hearing is found in the 

record. 

On January 27, 1997, Wyne filed another praecipe for a 

hearing to set a trial date on April 21, 1997, which was again 

served on Barnes by mail at the Lorton post office box address. 

Counsel for Wyne appeared on the hearing date and a trial date 

of September 25, 1997 was set. A letter from Wyne’s counsel 

notifying Fredericksburg of the trial date was sent to Barnes at 

the Lorton post office box address and also at 7000 E. Newington 

Road, Lorton, Virginia, which was the street address given as 

its place of business in Fredericksburg’s original motion for 

judgment.3

 

3

Wyne subsequently contended that both addresses were 

utilized at the direction of the trial court. 

4
On September 25, 1997, Wyne appeared for trial. No 

appearance for Fredericksburg, either by a principal or by 

counsel, was made at trial. A final order dated October 7, 

1997, recites that Wyne “presented evidence sufficient for a 

finding by the Court that Fredericksburg Construction Company, 

Inc. was duly indebted to J.W. Wyne Excavating, Inc. in the 

amount of . . . $85,068.62.” The order further recites that 

there was no evidence presented on Fredericksburg’s 

counterclaim. Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment for 

Wyne, awarded it $85,068.62, and dismissed the counterclaim with 

prejudice. Finally, the order recites, in apparent 

contemplation of Rule 1:13, that because “[t]he Court announced 

its ruling as contained herein in open court. . . endorsement of 

this Order by the parties is not required.” 

On November 20, 1998, Fredericksburg, appearing with new 

counsel, filed a motion to vacate the October 7, 1997 judgment, 

asserting for several reasons that this judgment was void.4 In a 

supporting memorandum, Fredericksburg asserted that the April 

15, 1996 order granted only Brian D. Sullivan leave to withdraw 

and did not relieve Holt or Arent Fox of a continuing duty to 

represent Fredericksburg. Thus, Fredericksburg contended that 

 

4

Fredericksburg also sought to quash garnishments that had 

been issued on the judgment and to obtain all funds held by the 

court pursuant to those garnishments. 

5
on January 20, 1997, Joseph M. Sullivan, Frederickburg’s new 

counsel, appeared on behalf of Fredericksburg “because Mr. Holt 

was unavailable.”5

Fredericksburg further maintained that it never received 

from Wyne the subsequent notice of the new hearing date or the 

letter containing notice of the trial date. In addition, 

Fredericksburg contended that the service of these two notices 

had been defective because Arent Fox was its counsel of record 

and those notices had not been served on Arent Fox in accordance 

with the provisions of Code § 8.01-314. Fredericksburg further 

contended that, assuming it was not represented by counsel, 

service by first class mail on a principal of the corporation 

was insufficient under the provisions of Code § 8.01-299. 

Finally, Fredericksburg asserted that under the circumstances of 

this case the entry of the final order without endorsement was 

an abuse of the discretion afforded to the trial court under 

Rule 1:13. 

 

5

Fredericksburg conceded at the hearing in the trial court 

on its motion that Joseph M. Sullivan is not associated with 

Arent Fox and did not appear on its behalf. Rather, 

Fredericksburg retained him after Holt declined to resume the 

representation. Moreover, as indicated above, the record does 

not reflect an appearance by either party on January 20, 1997, a 

legal holiday, or on the day following when the case was 

actually called on the trial court’s term day docket. 

6
Wyne responded by brief asserting that the record clearly 

indicated that the trial court’s order granting the motion to 

withdraw applied to Arent Fox and to all its members and 

associates. Wyne further asserted that service by mail on a 

principal of a corporation appearing pro se was proper under 

Code § 8.01-319. Fredericksburg filed a reply brief asserting 

that Wyne’s reliance on Code § 8.01-319 was misplaced because a 

corporation could not appear pro se in a circuit court. 

On March 12, 1999, the parties appeared for a hearing on 

Frederickburg’s motion to vacate the judgment. At that hearing, 

the parties’ arguments conformed to the positions outlined 

above. Referring to the effect of the April 15, 1996 order, the 

trial court stated that “[i]t certainly was the intent of the 

Court . . . because the Court found at that time — and the Court 

finds here again today — that [Fredericksburg] was not 

represented by Arent Fox.” The trial court further found that 

Fredericksburg “had all of the notice that it was entitled to,” 

and because Fredericksburg was without counsel there was no 

requirement for any endorsement on the final order. On June 23, 

1999, the trial court entered an order denying Fredericksburg’s 

motion. We awarded Fredericksburg this appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

On appeal, the parties essentially repeat the contentions 

made before the trial court. We will address those contentions 

7
in turn. Fredericksburg first contends that “[n]o written order 

in the Record grants leave to withdraw by Mr. Holt, or Arent 

Fox.” This is so, Fredericksburg maintains, because “[w]hile 

[the] Motion filed by Arent Fox may have well intended to 

withdraw the firm and both Mr. Holt and Mr. [Brian D.] Sullivan, 

the Order entered by the Court only granted leave to withdraw to 

Brian Sullivan.”6

“It is the firmly established law of this Commonwealth that 

a trial court speaks only through its written orders.” Davis v. 

Mullins, 251 Va. 141, 148, 466 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1996). We further 

acknowledge, as has the Court of Appeals of Virginia, the 

general principle that trial courts have the authority to 

interpret their own orders. See Rusty’s Welding Service, Inc. 

v. Gibson, 29 Va. App. 119, 129, 510 S.E.2d 255, 260 (1999). 

“Furthermore, when construing a lower court’s order, a reviewing 

court should give deference to the interpretation adopted by the 

lower court.” Id. at 129, 510 S.E.2d at 260. 

 

6

In support of its argument on this issue in the trial 

court, Fredericksburg procured an affidavit from Holt in which 

he states that “[a]s [he] read[s] the Order entered on April 15, 

1996 . . . only Brian Sullivan was removed as counsel for 

[Fredericksburg].” Fredericksburg further asserted in argument 

to the trial court that Sullivan had withdrawn from the case 

because he was leaving Arent Fox and “moved to Georgia or 

Florida to practice law.” Neither of these statements is 

relevant to our interpretation of the trial court’s April 15, 

1996 order. 

8
Here in its summation, the trial court made clear that its 

April 15, 1996 order was intended to relieve Arent Fox from its 

responsibility as counsel for Fredericksburg. That 

interpretation of this order is supported by the record. There 

is no dispute, nor can there be, that the order was entered 

pursuant to the motion to permit Arent Fox to withdraw as 

counsel. The motion clearly requests that “the law firm” of 

Arent Fox be permitted to withdraw as counsel for 

Fredericksburg. It is the order granting that motion that 

admittedly is not artfully drawn. However, whatever the effect 

of the language in the final sentence of the order expressly 

permitting Brian D. Sullivan “to withdraw his appearance as 

counsel for [Fredericksburg] in the action,” the first clause of 

that sentence addresses the motion of Arent Fox to withdraw.7 

Accordingly, we will not disturb the trial court’s 

interpretation of this order on appeal. 

We turn now to Fredericksburg’s contention that even if it 

became unrepresented as a result of the April 15, 1996 order, 

the manner of service of the notice of the January 27, 1997 

 

7

Assuming that we were to accept Frederickburg’s assertion 

that Brian D. Sullivan was terminating his employment with Arent 

Fox at the time this order was entered, it would be self-evident 

that the second clause of the final sentence was added to make 

clear that Sullivan would not continue his representation of 

Fredericksburg after he left the firm. 

9
praecipe and the subsequent notice of the trial date were 

ineffective because the service was not in accord with the 

provisions of Code § 8.01-299. As previously noted, Wyne 

contends that when Fredericksburg became unrepresented following 

the entry of the April 15, 1996 order, it was thereafter subject 

to the provisions of Code § 8.01-319(A). We agree with Wyne. 

In addressing Fredericksburg’s contention with regard to 

the applicability of Code § 8.01-299 following the withdrawal of 

its counsel, the procedural posture of the case is signficant. 

Although Fredericksburg initially invoked the jurisdiction of 

the trial court by filing its motion for judgment against Wyne, 

thereafter, as we have previously noted, the roles of the 

parties became reversed. By leave of the trial court, Wyne 

filed a motion for judgment against Fredericksburg on September 

9, 1994, and Fredericksburg filed its grounds of defense and 

counterclaim on September 27, 1994. At that point the parties 

were properly before the trial court and subject to its 

jurisdiction to direct further proceedings in the matter, 

including the method by which reasonable notice was to be given 

for those proceedings where the manner of providing that notice 

is not otherwise specified by statute or rule. 

The further proceedings critical to our consideration here 

are the January 27, 1997 praecipe and the setting of the 

September 25, 1997 trial date. There is no dispute that this 

10
trial court employs the praecipe system for the orderly 

management of its docket as permitted by Rule 1:15. That rule, 

however, does not prescribe the manner in which the praecipe is 

to be served on a domestic corporation that has become 

unrepresented by counsel, as in the present case. See also Rule 

1:12. Nevertheless, we disagree with Fredericksburg’s 

contention that Code § 8.01-299 then becomes applicable and 

prescribes the manner in which notice must be given. 

Although the term “process” is deemed to include “notice,” 

Code § 8.01-285, we are of opinion that Code § 8.01-299, which 

provides for how process “may” be served on a domestic 

corporation, is not applicable in the procedural context under 

consideration here. The thrust of Code § 8.01-299 concerns the 

initial service of process on a domestic corporation rather than 

interim service of notice for subsequent hearings and other 

proceedings, such as the filing of a praecipe, after the parties 

are properly before the court. See Frey v. Jefferson 

Homebuilders, Inc., 251 Va. 375, 380, 467 S.E.2d 788, 790 

(1996)(holding Code § 8.01-299 does not provide the exclusive 

manner in which a domestic corporation may be served with 

process). 

In contrast, Code § 8.01-319(A), which governs the manner 

for giving interim notice following institution of an action in 

certain circumstances, provides, in pertinent part, that: 

11
[a] party, who appears pro se in an action, shall file 

with the clerk of the court in which the action is 

pending a written statement of his place of residence 

and mailing address, and shall inform the clerk in 

writing of any changes of residence and mailing 

address during the pendency of the action. The clerk 

and all parties to the action may rely on the last 

written statement filed as aforesaid. The court in 

which the action is pending may dispense with such 

notice for failure of the party to file the statement 

herein provided for or may require notice to be given 

in such manner as the court may determine. 

The failure of a party who is unrepresented to provide an 

address sufficient to ensure such notice may prevent a case from 

proceeding in an orderly manner. See Byrum v. Lowe & Gordon, 

Ltd., 225 Va. 362, 363-64, 302 S.E.2d 46, 47 (1983). 

Accordingly, an unrepresented litigant who wishes to be informed 

of the proceedings must either keep the court advised of where 

service may be accomplished or retain counsel upon whom service 

may be had. See Eddine v. Eddine, 12 Va. App. 760, 764, 406 

S.E.2d 914, 917 (1991). We see no reason why this rule should 

not apply to corporations as well as natural persons. We also 

agree with the Court of Appeals’ holding in Eddine that the 

application of Code § 8.01-319 is not limited to those cases 

initiated by publication. Id. at 764 n.2, 406 S.E.2d at 917 

n.2. 

At the time Fredericksburg became unrepresented, the Lorton 

street address had been listed as its place of business and the 

Lorton post office box address was also given as its mailing 

12
address in its initial pleading. Because there was no statement 

filed pursuant to Code § 8.01-319 at the time Fredericksburg 

became unrepresented or thereafter, Wyne was entitled to rely 

upon the addresses given by Fredericksburg in its pleadings as 

being accurate until such time as Fredericksburg filed such a 

statement or entered an appearance with new counsel. Cf.

Soliman v. Soliman, 12 Va. App. 234, 240, 402 S.E.2d 922, 926-27 

(1991)(holding that giving address in pleadings is sufficient to 

satisfy requirement of § 8.01-319(A)). In the absence of such a 

statement being filed, the manner of service of notice rested 

with the discretion of the trial court. The trial court found 

that the notice given to Fredericksburg was reasonable and 

adequate, and we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion 

in that determination. 

Finally, Fredericksburg contends that the trial court’s 

order awarding judgment to Wyne is void because the trial court 

abused its discretion in entering that order without endorsement 

of counsel pursuant to Rule 1:13. We disagree. 

As applicable at the time of these proceedings, Rule 1:13 

provided, in pertinent part, as follows: 

Drafts of orders and decrees shall be endorsed by 

counsel of record, or reasonable notice of the time 

and place of presenting such drafts together with 

copies thereof shall be served by delivering or 

mailing to all counsel of record who have not endorsed 

them. Compliance with this rule . . . may be modified 

or dispensed with by the court in its discretion. 

13
This rule is designed to protect parties who are without 

notice of a proceeding. State Hwy. Comm’r v. Easley, 215 Va. 

197, 201, 207 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1974). “However, the mere fact 

that an order may have been entered without endorsement of 

counsel of record does not automatically render it void. The 

last sentence of Rule 1:13 authorizes the trial court in its 

discretion to modify or dispense with the requirement of 

endorsement of counsel.” Davis, 251 Va. at 147, 666 S.E.2d at 

93. 

Here, the trial court properly found that Fredericksburg 

was not represented by counsel at the time the final order was 

entered. Moreover, the record supports the trial court’s 

finding that Fredericksburg had failed to appear for trial after 

due notice. In such circumstances, entry of a final order 

without endorsement by an unrepresented party does not 

constitute an abuse of the trial court’s discretion under Rule 

1:13. 

CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err 

in this case and will affirm the judgment of the trial court 

denying the motion to vacate the judgment and quash 

garnishments. 

Affirmed. 

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