alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-40224

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JESUS CORONA-ROJAS,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:15-CR-821-1

Before REAVLEY, OWEN, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Jesus Corona-Rojas

has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 

229 (5th Cir. 2011). Corona-Rojas has filed a response. The record is not 

sufficiently developed to allow us to make a fair evaluation of Corona-Rojas’s

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel; we therefore decline to consider the

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 19, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 16-40224 Document: 00514038146 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/19/2017
No. 16-40224

2

claims without prejudice to collateral review. See United States v. Isgar, 739 

F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir. 2014).

We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record 

reflected therein, as well as Corona-Rojas’s response. We concur with counsel’s 

assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. 

Accordingly, the motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused 

from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See

5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

 Case: 16-40224 Document: 00514038146 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/19/2017
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Case 2:11-cv-01117-DMC   Document 11   Filed 01/25/12   Page 5 of 5 PageID: 69
S05Y0108, S05Y0109.

#### IN THE MATTER OF TIMOTHY ROBERT BRENNAN (two cases).

(609 SE2d 355)

Per curiam.

These matters are before the Court on the Notices of Discipline filed by the State Bar against Respondent Timothy Robert Brennan alleging violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.16, 3.2, and 9.3 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, see Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The State Bar attempted but was unable to locate and serve Brennan personally with the notices, and so served him by publication in accordance with Bar Rule 4-203.1 (b) (3) (ii). Brennan failed to respond to the notices as required under Bar Rule 4-208.3 and, therefore, he is in default, has no right to an evidentiary hearing and is subject to discipline by this Court.

In Case No. S05Y0108, Brennan filed a lawsuit on behalf of a client but did not depose witnesses before expiration of the discovery period; told the client he had requested an extension to file a motion for summary judgment but had not; failed to respond to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment; and failed to respond to the Notice of Investigation. Based on his default, Brennan has admitted that he violated Rules 1.3, 3.2 and 9.3 in this matter.

In Case No. S05Y0109 Brennan accepted a $1,000 retainer from a client to represent him in a legal matter, but thereafter did not return the client’s calls and later falsely told the client that he had filed a lawsuit but could not locate the defendant to serve him, when he had not attempted to do either. Brennan did not tell his client that he was not in good standing with the State Bar, nor did he advise the client that he had moved his office or closed his practice, and he did not return his client’s file or the unearned portion of the retainer. Brennan did not respond to the Notice of Investigation in this case and he admits by default that he violated Rules 1.3,1.4,1.16 and 9.3.

We agree with the State Bar that Brennan’s violations of the Bar Rules warrant disbarment and find in aggravation of discipline that Brennan’s two similar cases indicate a pattern of professional deception and abandonment. Accordingly, the name of Timothy Robert Brennan hereby is removed from the rolls of attorneys authorized to *59practice law in the State of Georgia. He is reminded of his duties under Bar Rule 4-219 (c).

Decided February 21, 2005.

*William, P. Smith III, General Counsel State Bar, K. Gene Chapman, Assistant General Counsel State Bar,*for State Bar of Georgia.

*Disbarred.*

*All the Justices concur.*
S05A0157.

#### RUBIANI v. THE STATE.

(612 SE2d 798)

Decided May 9, 2005.

Jose A. Rubiani, *pro se.*

SEARS, Presiding Justice.

In November 1987, appellant pled guilty to charges of murder and robbery, and was sentenced to life in prison. In 2003, appellant filed a motion seeking to void the judgment of his conviction, in which he attacked the trial court’s acceptance of his guilty pleas and claimed: (1) that the trial court misinformed appellant about his right to appeal; (2) that the trial court failed to adequately explain the elements of the charges to which appellant pled guilty; and (3) that appellant’s guilty pleas were not intelligently entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court held that appellant’s motion was, in essence, a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.1 Because the motion was not filed during the term of court in which appellant was sentenced, the trial court dismissed it as untimely.2 Appellant then filed a direct appeal.

Appellant’s motion clearly was not timely. “It is well settled that when the term of court has expired in which a defendant was sentenced pursuant to a guilty plea, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to allow the withdrawal of the plea.”3 Once the term of court in which a defendant was sentenced has expired, the only available means for an appellant to withdraw his guilty plea is through habeas corpus proceedings.4

Appellant was sentenced on November 25, 1987, yet he did not file his motion to withdraw until January 17, 2003, after 91 terms of court had passed.5 Thus, it is obvious that appellant’s motion was untimely and was properly dismissed by the trial court.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*

*300*J. Gray Conger, District Attorney, Ryan R. Leonard, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General,*for appellee.

1

 Under our precedent, courts should examine the substance of a motion, rather than its nomenclature, to determine what sort of relief is sought therein. *Thompson v. State,*274 Ga. 818 (559 SE2d 730) (2002) (treating a motion to void judgments as a motion to withdraw guilty plea).

2

 In his motion, appellant also claimed that the indictment against him was improperly obtained. The trial court, however, concluded this claim was repetitive, as it had previously been resolved adversely to appellant in the ruling on his plea in abatement. Because nothing in either the record or appellant’s brief rebuts this conclusion, we accept it as accurate. *Ware v. State,*279 Ga. 17, 18 (608 SE2d 643) (2005).

3

*Henry v. State,*269 Ga. 851, 853 (507 SE2d 419) (1998).

4

Id.

5

 See OCGA § 15-6-3 (8) (D) (Muscogee County has six annual terms of court).
EX-10.71



 Exhibit 10.71 
 AMENDMENT No. 1 
 to 

CHANGE IN CONTROL AGREEMENT 
 THIS AGREEMENT, made this 19th day of December, 2012 by and between Leroy M. Ball, Jr. (“Executive”) and Koppers Holdings Inc. (the “Company”). 

WHEREAS, the Company and Executive entered into a Change in Control Agreement (the “CIC Agreement”) dated
September 1, 2010; and 
 WHEREAS, the Company and Executive desire to amend the CIC Agreement to clarify its
continued compliance with Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and the final regulations and other interpretive guidance issued thereunder. 
 NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein, and intending to be legally bound, the parties hereby agree as follows: 

 

	 	1.	Paragraph 2(g) of the CIC Agreement shall be amended by adding the following new subparagraph at the end thereof: 


“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, including in subsection (d), in the case of payments or benefits under this
Agreement that are or may be deferred compensation subject to Internal Revenue Code Section 409A and are subject to an effective release as set forth above, where the period for execution and non-revocation of the release spans more than one
calendar year, no such payment or benefit shall be made or provided any earlier than the beginning of the second calendar year. In no event may Executive, directly or indirectly, designate the calendar year of payment.” 

 

	 	2.	Terms defined in the CIC Agreement which are used herein shall have the same meaning assigned to them in the CIC Agreement. 


 

	 	3.	Except as expressly modified herein, all terms and conditions of the CIC Agreement shall remain unchanged and in full force and effect. 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed and delivered this Agreement as of the day and year first above written.

  

					
	THE COMPANY:	 		 	EXECUTIVE:
			
	 /s/ Steven R. Lacy
	 		 	 /s/ Leroy M. Ball, Jr.

	Signature	 		 	Signature
			
	 Steven R. Lacy
	 		 	 Leroy M. Ball, Jr.

	Name	 		 	Name
			
	 Senior Vice President, Administration,
General Counsel and Secretary
	 		 	 Vice President and Chief
Financial Officer

	Title	 		 	Title
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 500 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 500

   To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide for a 
 permanent increase in payment amounts under the Medicare Program for 
             home health services furnished in rural areas.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 29, 2003

  Mr. Stupak introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committee on Energy 
    and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
  Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide for a 
 permanent increase in payment amounts under the Medicare Program for 
             home health services furnished in rural areas.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PERMANENT INCREASE FOR HOME HEALTH SERVICES FURNISHED IN A 
              RURAL AREA.

    Section 1895(b) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395fff(b)) 
is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(7) Increase for rural areas.--In the case of home health 
        services furnished in a rural area (as defined in section 
        1886(d)(2)(D)) on or after April 1, 2003, the payment amount 
        otherwise made under this subsection for such services shall be 
        increased by 10 percent.''.
                                 <all>
```
Case 2:11-cr-00126-FSH Document 17 Filed 05/26/11 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 48
Case 2:11-cr-00126-FSH Document 17 Filed 05/26/11 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 49
Summary of 2013 Executive Compensation



 Exhibit 10.29 
 SUMMARY OF 2013 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
 The Company’s 2013 executive
compensation has been approved by the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors and the full Board of Directors. With the guidance of a compensation consultant, executive compensation was derived from third-party compensation survey data for
comparable companies and executive positions and is based upon performance targets and payments tied to a percentage of base pay. The key elements of the Company’s 2013 executive compensation are as follows: 

Bonus Incentive Compensation: 
 Annual cash incentive bonuses are intended to compensate for the achievement of Company strategic, operational and financial goals and/or individual performance objectives. Amounts payable are
discretionary and typically calculated as a percentage of the applicable executive’s base salary, with higher ranked executives typically being compensated at a higher percentage of base salary. Individual objectives are tied to the particular
area of expertise of the employee and their performance in attaining those objectives relative to external forces, internal resources utilized and overall individual effort. The Compensation Committee works with the Chief Executive Officer to
develop and approve the performance goals for each executive and the Company as a whole. The goals established by the Compensation Committee and the Board of Directors are based on the Company’s historical operating results and growth rates, as
well as expected future results, and are designed to require significant effort and operational success on the part of the executives and the Company. These bonus awards are in two levels based on the Company achieving certain specified operating
metrics, including revenue and operating profit. The applicable bonus payable will be paid following the completion of 2013. 

The following table sets forth the 2013 salary and bonus, assuming achievement of 100% of the target based on the foregoing criteria, for
each of the Company’s named executive officers (as defined in Item 402(a)(3) of Regulation S-K): 
  

									
	 Name of Executive Officer
	  	2013 Base
Salary	 	  	Cash Bonus
(Assuming
Achievement
of 100% of
Target)	 
	 Michael K. Simon
	  	$	370,000	  	  	$	370,000	  
	 James F. Kelliher
	  	$	275,000	  	  	$	148,400	  
	 Michael J. Ewing
	  	$	300,000	  	  	$	120,000	  
	 Marton B. Anka
	  	$	260,000	  	  	$	130,000	  
	 Seth L. Shaw
	  	$	215,000	  	  	$	185,000	  
	 Michael J. Donahue
	  	$	237,000	  	  	$	94,800	  
	 Andrew F. Burton
	  	$	230,000	  	  	$	92,000
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO****18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,****AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE****SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

            In connection with the Quarterly Report of Jake’s Trucking International, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), the undersigned certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of the undersigned’s knowledge, that:

            (1)        The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

            (2)        The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.			Dated:    August 3, 2007                                      By:    /s/ Michael Quesnel                                                                            Michael Quesnel, Chief Executive Officer			                                                                            (Principal Executive Officer) Chief Financial			                                                                            Officer, Chief Accounting Officer and Principal			                                                                            Financial Officer)

----
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h
Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk October 26, 2009

1019 

# Order

October 26, 2009

138508

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 138508 COA: 282691 Emmet CC: 07-002795-FH JAMES DOUGLAS HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 27, 2009 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
#### In the Matter of Tanasia Elanie E., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant.

[853 NYS2d 380]

*643As the presentment agency correctly concedes, the petition was facially insufficient as to the menacing in the third degree counts because it failed to set forth sworn nonhearsay allegations of fact sufficient to establish, if true, the physical menace element of that crime *(see*Family Ct Act § 311.2; *Matter of Michael M.,*3 NY3d 441 [2004]; *Matter of Neftali D.,*85 NY2d 631, 635 [1995]; *Matter of Jermaine G.,*38 AD3d 105 [2007]; *Matter of Akheem B.,*308 AD2d 402 [2003]; *contra Matter of Monay W.,*33 AD3d 809 [2006]; *Matter of Willie W,*32 AD3d 479 [2006]). Thus, those counts of the petition must be dismissed.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency *(Matter of David H.,*69 NY2d 792 [1987]; *Matter of Charles S.,*41 AD3d 484 [2007]), we find that it was legally sufficient to support the findings that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of robbery in the second degree *(see*Penal Law § 160.10 [1]; *Matter of Laquan H.,*29 AD3d 582, 582-583 [2006]), grand larceny in the fourth degree *(see*Penal Law § 155.30 [5]; *People v Haynes,*91 NY2d 966 [1998]), and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree *(see*Penal Law § 165.40; *Matter of Laquan H,*29 AD3d 582 [2006]). Resolution of issues of credibility is primarily a matter to be determined by the finder of fact, which saw and heard the witnesses, and its determination should be accorded great deference on appeal *(see Matter of Charles S.,*41 AD3d 484 [2007]; *Matter of Gabriel A.,*12 AD3d 666, 667 [2004]). Upon the exercise of our factual review power *(cf.*CPL 470.15 [5]), we are satisfied that the findings of fact with regard to the foregoing acts were not against the weight of the evidence. Lifson, J.P., Ritter, Florio and Garni, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Douglas Dunbar, III, Appellant.

[976 NYS2d 667]

Appeal by the defendant from two judgments of the County Court, Orange County (Berry, J.), both rendered December 7, 2011, convicting *846him of robbery in the first degree (two counts) under indictment Nos. 11-00046 and 11-00233, respectively, upon his pleas of guilty, and imposing sentence. Assigned counsel has submitted a brief in accordance with *Anders v California*(386 US 738 [1967]), in which he moves for leave to withdraw as counsel for the appellant.

Ordered that the motion of Gerald Zuckerman for leave to withdraw as counsel is granted, and he is directed to turn over all papers in his possession to the appellant’s new counsel assigned herein; and it is further,

Ordered that Michael G. Paul, Esq., 49 Maple Avenue, New City, N.Y., 10956, is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal; and it is further,

Ordered that the respondent is directed to furnish a copy of the certified transcript of the proceedings to the appellant’s new assigned counsel; and it is further,

Ordered that new counsel shall serve and file a brief on behalf of the appellant within 90 days of the date of this decision and order on motion, and the respondent shall serve and file its brief within 30 days after the brief on behalf of the appellant is served and filed. By prior decision and order on motion of this Court dated April 19, 2012, the appellant was granted leave to prosecute the appeal as a poor person, with the appeal to be heard on the original papers, including a certified transcript of the proceedings, and on the briefs of the parties, who were directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other.

The brief submitted by the appellant’s counsel pursuant to *Anders v California*(386 US 738 [1967]) is deficient because it fails to adequately analyze potential appellate issues or highlight facts in the record that might arguably support the appeal (see *People v*Singleton, 101 AD3d 909, 910 [2012]; *People v Ovalle,*99 AD3d 1023, 1024 [2012]; *Matter of Giovanni S. [Jasmin A.],*89 AD3d 252, 256 [2011]). Since the brief does not demonstrate that assigned counsel fulfilled his obligations under *Anders v California,*we must assign new counsel to represent the appellant *(see People v McNair,*110 AD3d 742, 743 [2013]; *People v Abdul,*102 AD3d 976, 976 [2013]; *People v Singleton,*101 AD3d at 910; *Matter of Giovanni S. [Jasmin A.],*89 AD3d at 258).

In any event, upon this Court’s independent review of the record, we conclude that nonfrivolous issues exist, including, but not necessarily limited to, whether the defendant validly waived his right to appeal, whether the defendant validly waived his right to seek review of the denial of that branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress identification evidence, *847and, if not, whether that branch of the omnibus motion was properly denied *(see People v Roman,*291 AD2d 461, 462 [2002]). Angiolillo, J.E, Hall, Roman and Cohen, JJ., concur.
G

IU )

FSPREVIOUSLY

POSTED AS SECURITY FOR BOND FOR THE PURPOSE OF PAYMENT OF

ATTORT’EY FEES AND COSTS

Defendant. Siring Liu CDefendant”), by and through his attorney, tames I). Tunick

(“Counsel”), moves this Honorable Court for an order directing the Clerk of the United States

District Court to release back to Defendant uvenry jive thousand dollars (S23,O00, which was

previously posted as security for bond, for the purpose of payment of attorne tees and costs, the

United States of America, through Assistant United States Attorney L. judson \Velie, expressing no

objection to this particular amendment to the conditions of bond, the Court being fully advised in

the matter and for good and sufficient cause sbown

WHEREFORE on this dayof,2012

1. IT IS ORDERED, the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of

New Jerse is hereby ordered to release twenty five thousand dollars (S25,000) back

to Siring Liu 939 Waukegan Rd. Apartment 113 Deerfield, II 60015. Defendant is

required to transfer the twenty five thousand (S25,00o to counsel within sevcntyof receipt.

i\ 71

SO ORDERED: