N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT
UNITED STATES OF AM ER IC A,

Pla i ntiff-Appe lle e , v. C ARLOS DAVID GUTIER R EZFLORE S, De fe nda

n t-Appe l la

nt. No. 15-50407

DC No. C R 13-3138 LAB
M EM O R ANDUM *

UNITED STATES OF AM ER IC A,

Pla i ntiff-Appe lle e , v. C ARLOS DAVID GUTIER R EZFLORE S, De fe nda

n t-Appe l la

nt. No. 15-50408

DC No. C R 15-0064 LAB

Appe a ls from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Southe rn Distric t of C a lifornia Larry A. B urns, Distric t Judge , Pre siding 

# FIL ED
MAR 21 2017 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U

. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public a t ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by Ninth C irc uit R

ule 36-3.Argue d an d Subm i tte d De c e m be r 7, 2016 Pa sa de n a , C a l ifornia B e fore : R EINHAR

DT, TASHIM A, a

nd PAEZ, C irc uit Judge s. In No. 15-50408, C arlos Gutie rre z -Flore s (“ Gutie rre z ” ), a c itiz e n of M e xic o,
a ppe a ls his e nha

nc e d se nte nc e , a

nd in No. 15-50407, the

re voc a t ion of his supe rvise d re le a se im

pose d in a

n e arlie r c a se . W e have jurisdic tion unde r 28 U.S.C . § 1291, a

nd we a ffirm
. In 2002, Gutie rre z wa s c onvic te d of viola ting C a lifornia

Pe na l C ode § 288(a ), whic h prohibits lewd a n d la sc ivious a c ts with c hildre n unde r a ge fourte e n. He wa s de porte d to M e xic o in De c e m be r 2006. Afte r he wa s disc ove re d in C a lifornia se ve n y e ars late r, Gutie rre z wa s c onvic te d of be ing a re m ove d a lie n found in theUnite d State s unde r 8 U.S.C . § 1326(a ). Afte r se rving his prison te rm , he wa s de porte d a ga in, but re m a ine d subje c t to thete rm s of his supe rvise d re le a se . One of the te rm s of his supe rvise d re le a se re quire d him to re fra i n from

“ c o m m it[ting] anothe r fe de ra l, sta te or loc a l c rim e .” In 2015, Gutie rre z wa s a

rre ste d whe n

he atte m pte d to c ross the borde r a t the San Ysidro Port of Entry

using a nothe r pe rson’ s Pe rm a

n e n t R e side nt C ard. He wa s
c ha rge d with a

tte m pte d re e ntry unde r § 1326(a )

. B a se d on the sa m e c onduc t, the

2gove rnm e nt file d a pe tition to re voke his supe rvise d re le a se in the e arlie r c a se for having c o m

m itte d a nothe r fe de ra l c rim e . The distric t c ourt he ld a

n e v ide n tia

ry he aring on Gutie rre z ’ s a lle ge d supe rvise d re le a se viola

tion. A borde r patrol a ge nt, who wa s not pre se nt a t the
arre st, te stifie d from

a re p ort de sc ribing Gutie rre z ’ s atte m pte d re e ntry . Upon a finding tha

t Gutie rre z ha d c om

m itte d a fe de ra l c rim e , i.e
. , atte m

pte d re e ntry , the distric t c o urt re voke d his supe rvise d re le a se . One m onth la t e r, Gutie rre z ple d guilty to a tte m pte d re e ntry

in the ne we r c a se . The distric t c ourt the n he ld a c om bine d se n te nc ing he aring in both c a se s. In the n e we r c a s e , the c o urt e nha nc e d Gutie rre z ’ s se nte nc e ba se d on its c o nc lusion that his prior c onvic tion unde r C a lifornia Pe na l C ode § 288(a ) wa s a “ c rim e of viole nc e ,” spe c ific a lly , “ se xua l a buse of a m inor.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (2015). B e fore se nte n c ing Gutie rre z on the supe rvise d re le a se viola tion in the
e arlie r c a se , the distric t

c ourt took judic ia l notic e of his guilty ple a in the ne we r
c a se and the n re -re voke d his supe rvise d re le a se . 1. At the tim e Gutie rre z wa s se nte nc e d, the Se nte n c ing Guide line s
re c o m m e nde d a sixte e n-le ve l e nha

nc e m e nt for a

de fe nda nt c onvic te d of atte m

pte d
re e n try who ha d a

prior c onvic tion for a

ny fe lony “ c rim e of viole nc e .” U.S.S.G.

3§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (2015). 1 The Guide line s de fine d “ c rim e of viole nc e ” to inc lude

“ se xua l a buse of a m inor.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, c m t. n.1(B )(iii). At issue is whe the r the d istric t c o urt c orre c tly de te rm ine d tha

t § 288(a ) is “ se xua l a

buse of a m inor.” W e re vie wtha

t de te rm inat ion de novo. Unite d State s v . Garc ia-J

ime ne z , 807 F.3d 1079, 1083 (9th C ir. 2015). To de te rm ine whe the r a

viola tion of § 288(a

) is “ se xua l a

buse of a m inor,”
we a pply the c a te g oric a l a

pproa c h, whic h “ c o m

pa re [s] the e le m e nts of the sta tute form ing the ba sis of thede fe n da nt’ s c onvic tion with the e le m e nts of the ‘ ge ne ric ’
c rim e .” De

sc amps v . Unite d

State s , 133 S. C t. 2276, 2281 (2013). Se c tion 288(a)
c rim ina liz e s the c onduc t of “ [a ] ny pe rson who willfully

and le wdly

c o m m its a ny le wd or la sc i vious a c t . . . upon or with the body , or a

ny pa rt or m e m be r the re of, of
a c hild who is unde

r the a g e of 14 y e ars, with theinte n t of a rousing, a p p e a ling to, or gratify ing the lust, pa ssions, or se xua l de sire s of tha t pe rson or the c hild.” The que stion is whe the r those “ e le m e nts a re the sa m e a s, or na

rrowe r tha

n” the
e le m e nts of “ se xua l a

buse of a m inor” a s ge ne ric a lly unde rstood. Se e id. W e answe re d tha

t que stion in

Unite d State

s v . Me d ina-Villa , 567 F.3d 507 (9th C ir. 2009), in whic h we de te rm ine d tha t the e l e m e nts of the ge ne ric offe nse of

1 This Guide line wa s a m e nde d on Nove m

be r 1, 2016. Ne ithe r party argue s tha

t the am e n d

m e nt ha s a

ny substa ntive e ffe c t in this c a se . 4“ se xua l a

buse of a m inor” are “ whe the r the c onduc t prosc ribe d by

the sta tute is
se xua l ; whe the r the sta

tute prote c ts a

m inor; a nd whe the r the sta

tute re quire s
a buse
. ” Id. at 513. Abuse is “ ‘ phy sic a l or psy c hologic a l ha rm ’ in light of the

a ge of the vic tim

in que stion.” Id. C om

pa ring the se e le m e nts with the e le m e nts of § 288(a ), the Me dina-Villa c ourt c onc lude d tha t “ a c onvic t ion unde r C a lifornia Pe na l C ode se c t ion 288(a ) . . . c onstitute s ‘ se xua l a buse of a m inor.’ ” Id. (a) Gutie rre z argue s tha t we should not follow Me dina-Villa be c a use it
c ontra ve ne d Estrada-Espinoza v . Muk ase y , 546 F.3d 1147 (9th C ir. 2008) (e n ba nc ). W e have a lre a dy re

je c te d tha t a rgum e nt. Se e Unite d State s v . Farme r , 627 F.3d 416, 421 (9th C ir. 2010) (“ [T] he de finitions of ‘ se x u a l a buse of a m inor’ la id out in Estrada-Espinoza

and Me dina-Villa are c om ple m e nta ry , not inc onsiste nt.” ). (b) Gutie rre z ne xt c onte nds tha t Me dina-Villa ha s be e n ove rrule d by c a se s showing tha

t the sc ope of c onduc t tha t c an sa tisfy the a buse e le m e nt of the fe de ra l de finition is na

rrowe r tha

n the sc ope of c onduc t tha t is forbidde n by

§ 288(a ). To show tha t Me dina-Villa ha s be e n “ e ffe c tive ly ove rrule d” in this wa

y , Gutie rre z
m ust c i te c a se s de c ide d by

“ inte rve ning highe r a

uthority ” tha

t a re “ c le arly irre c onc i la

ble ” with Me dina-Villa ’ s unde rsta nding of a

b use . Se e Mille r v . Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th C ir. 2003) (e n ba nc ).

5Gutie rre z c onte nds tha t c a se l aw shows tha

t only an a dult c a

n pe rpe trate
a buse unde r the fe de ra l de finition, where a s a c hild c an be lia ble for viola

ting § 288(a ). In support, Gutie rre z re lie s e n tire ly

on c a se s de c ide d prior to M e dinaVilla . The argum e nt fa ils a t the outse t, be c a

u se c a se s de c ide d be fore Me dina-Villa
c ould not ha

ve ove rrule d it. Gutie rre z a lso c o n te nds tha t a de fe nda nt c an be lia

b l e unde r § 288(a ) e ve n if the v ic tim suffe re d no ha

rm , whe re a s phy sic a l or psy c hologic a l ha rm is re quire d to
m e e t the fe de ra l de finition of a b use . In support, he c ite s thre e post- Me dina-Villa
c a se s: Pe oplev . Shoc k

le y , 314 P.3d 798 (C a l. 2013); Pe oplev . Vale nti , 197 C a l. R ptr. 3d 317 (C t. App. 2016); and Pe oplev . Lope

z , 111 C a l . R

ptr. 3d 232 (C t. App. 2010). Eve n if a ll thre e c a se s ha d be e n de c ide d by a “ highe r a uthority ,” 2 the y

are not irre c onc ila

b le with Me dina-Villa be c a use the y do not show tha

t § 288(a ) ha s a broa de r unde rsta

nding of a

buse tha n doe s “ se xua l a

buse of a m inor.” Gutie rre z re a sons tha

t V ale nti and Lope

z we re § 288(a ) prose c utions in whic h the de fe nda

nts’ c onduc t wa s not e gre g i ously se xua l. S

e e Vale nti , 197 C a l. R ptr. 3d a t 333 (de fe nda

nt “ kisse d a

n d hugge d” the vic tim ); Lope z , 111 C a l. R

ptr.

2 Gutie rre z ha s c ite d no a uthority for the proposition tha t a de c ision of a C a lifornia inte rm e diate a

ppe lla te c ourt c ould be “ h ighe r” a uthority in this c onte xt. Se e Mille r , 335 F.3d a

t 892–93 (re fe rring to “ an inte rve ning Unite d State s Supre m e C ourt de c ision, or a

n inte rve ning de c ision on c ontrolling sta t e la w by a sta te c ourt of la st re sort” a s “ inte rve ning highe r a uthority ” ). 63d at 236 (de fe nda n t dire c t e d his step-da

ughte rs “ t o dre ss in lingerie or bathing suits” a nd c rawl on the floor blindfolde d). As a re sult, thevic tim s m ay not ha ve be e n psy c hologic a lly

ha rm e d be c a

u se the y m ay have be e n una

w are that the de fe nda n t wa s se x ua l ly

gratifie d by the c onduc t. 3 S e e Vale nti , 197 C a l. R

ptr. 3d a t 351 (vic tim ’ s m othe r te stifie d tha t she ha d “ not notic e d” tha t the vic tim

ha d susta ine d “ a ny e m otiona l s c a

rs” ). Gutie rre z c onte nds tha t the se two c a se s , toge the r with Shoc k

le y ’ s holding tha

t ba tte ry is not a le sse r inc lude d offe nse of § 288(a ), 314 P.3d a

t 802, show tha

t ne ithe r psy c hologic a l nor phy sic a l ha rm to a c hild is
re quire d unde r § 288(a ), a lthough it is unde r the fe de ra l de finition. W e disa gre e . The fe de ra l de finition re quire s no gre a te r showing of ha rm tha n did Vale nti , Lope

z , a nd Shoc k le y . Unde r fe de ra l la

w, “ ‘ [s] e xua l c onduc t involving younge r c hildre n is pe r seabusiv e .” Farme r , 627 F.3d a t 419 (quoting Pe lay o -Garc ia v . Holde r , 589 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th C ir. 2009)) (e m pha sis a dde d); Unite d State s v . Baron-Me dina , 187 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th C ir. 1999) (“ The use of

3 The se c a se s a

re distinguisha

ble from the North C arolina

c a s e at issue in Unite d State

s v . Baza-Martine

z , 464 F.3d 1010 (9th C ir. 2006). The re , the c hild vic t im wa s c e rtainly una

ware of the c onduc t of the de fe nda nt, who vide ota

pe d he r “ without he r knowle dge .” Id. at 1017. The Baza-Martine z c ourt re a sone d tha

t it wa s im possiblefor the vic tim

to ha ve e xpe rie n c e d psy c hologic a l ha rm until she be c am e aware of the c o n duc t . Id. Sinc e she only le arne d of what ha d

ha ppe ne d whe n she wa s no longe r a m inor, the c ourt he l d tha t the sta te c onvic tion wa s not for “ se xua l a

buse of a m i nor.” Id. 7y oung c hildre n a s obje c ts of se xua l grat ific a tion . . . c onstitute s m a ltre a tm e nt, no

m a tte r its form .” ). 4 “ ‘ [Y] ounge r c hildre n’ in this c onte x t m e ans c hildre n y ounge r tha n fourte e n.” Farme r , 627 F.3d a t 419. Unde r this pe r

serule , whe the r the de fe nda n t’ s c onduc t wa s se xua l to a le sse r or gre a te r de gre e is im m a te ria l to whe the r the c onduc t wa s ha rm ful a nd a busive . The vic tim s in V

ale nti , Lope

z , a nd Shoc k le y a l l e xpe rie nc e d a

buse within the m e aning of “ se x ua l a buse of a m inor,” be c a use the trie rs of fa c t c onc lude d tha t the de fe nda

nts use d the m

for se xua l gra t ific a tion, a

nd “ [t] h e use of y oung c hildre n a s obje c ts of se xua l grat ific a tion . . .
c onstitute s m a ltre a tm e nt, no m a tte r its form .” Baron-Me dina , 187 F.3d a t 1147. 2. Ne xt, Gutie rre z c onte nds tha t the distric t c ourt e rre d by a llowing a borde r patrol offic e r to te stify to the c onte nts of a

nothe r offic e r’ s re port without first “ we i gh[ing] the re le a se e ’ s inte re st in his c onstitutiona l ly gua rante e d right to
c onfronta tion a ga inst theGove rnm e n t’ s good c a use for de ny i ng it.” Unite d State s
v . C omito , 177 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th C ir. 1999)

. W e a gre e tha t the distric t c ourt
e rre d in not we ighing the se c onside ra tions. Se e id.

4 This is a

sound rule . Young c hildre n who a re the obje c t

of se xua l a buse m ay have no m e m ory

of it. Othe rs m ay

re m e m be r but not understa

n d the a busive nature of the c onduc t. Proving tha t suc h c hildre n e xpe rie nc e d psy c hologic a l ha

rm m ay be im

p ossiblein som e insta

nc e s. Ye t we “ re

j e c t the notion . . . tha

t C ongre ss inte n de d . . . to e xc u se an individual who pre y s upon a c hild too y oung to [re m e m be r or] unde rsta

nd the nature of his a dva

nc e s.” Se e Baron-Me dina , 187 F.3d a t 1147. 8W e c onc lude , howe v e r, tha t the e rror wa s ha

rm le ss. The he arsay

e vide nc e
wa s of no im

p o rt be c a use Gutie rre z ’ s guilty

ple a in the m ore re c e nt c a se
e sta blishe d tha

t h e viola te d his supe rvise d re le a se in the e arlie r c a se . Se e Unite d State s v . Ve rduzc o , 330 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th C ir. 2003). Although Gutie rre z
c onte nds tha

t the distric t c ourt e rre d in re o pe ning the re c ord to ta ke judic ia l notic e of his ple a , “ [a ] distric t c ourt is a fforde d wide disc re tion” to re ope n the e vide nc e . Unite d State s v . Suare z-Rosario , 237 F.3d 1164, 1167 (9th C ir. 2001). Gutierre z ha s not shown tha

t t he distric t c ourt a buse d its disc re tion.

• ! • In sum , a viola

tion of § 288(a

) is c a te goric a lly

“ se x ua l a buse of a m inor” ; the re fore , the distric t c ourt did not err in e nha nc ing Gutie rre z ’ s se n te nc e in No. 15- 50408. Ne ithe r did the distric t c ourt e rr in a dm itting a nd re ly ing on Gutierre z ’ s guilty ple a in the m ore re c e nt c a se to support its re voking his supe

rvise d re le a se in No. 15-50407. B e c a

use tha t e vide nc e re nde rs the he arsay te stim o ny of the borde r patrol offic e r, whic h goe s to the sa m e c onte ste d issue s, virtua l surplusa ge , it wa s ha rm le s s e rror to a dm it tha

t te stim ony

without c onduc ting the C omito ba la

nc ing te st. In No. 15-50407, the re voc a tion of supe rvise d re l e a se is AFFIRM E D. In No. 15-50408, the

se nte nc e is AFFIRM E D.

9United States v. Gutierrez

- Flores , 15

- 50407 Reinhardt, Circuit Judge, concurring in the result only: I concur, although I find the state of our law regarding sexual abuse of a minor to be hopelessly incoherent. The majority disposition accurately states that
we have set forth the elements of the generic federal offense as follows: “ [that] the conduct pro scribed by the statute is sexual; [that] the statute protects a minor; and [that] the statute requires abuse
. ” United States v. Medina

- Villa , 567 F.3d 507, 513 (9th Cir. 2009). In the very next sentence of Medina

- Villa , we defined “abuse” as “physical or psychological harm
. ” Id. In that same case, however, we endorsed Baron

- Medina , which recognized that “ [ e ] ven an ‘ innocuous ’ touching,

‘ innocently and warmly received, ’ violates Section 288(a) if effected with lewd intent.” United States v. Baron

- Medina , 187 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting People v. Lopez , 965 P.2d 713, 717

- 18 (Cal. 1998)). Inexplicably, w e then held that Section 288(a) was not broader than the generic federal offense
. Id. ; see also Medina

- Villa , 567 F.3d at 513. It appears t o me that under our case law, the generic offense as defined in Medina

- Villa is clearly narrower than the California statute in that the former requires “ physical or psychological harm , ” whereas the latter may be satisfied where there is no such harm but the intent is lewd or the act is simply “corrupt , improper, and contrary to good order. ” Baron

Medina , 187 F.3d at 1147. 

# FILED
MAR 21 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL SThe argument that recent changes to the California law expand its scope and as a result make Baron

- Medina and Medina

- Villa ina pplicable is based on the assumption that there has been a change in the California courts’ construction of California law. Had there been such a change, we might have had to reexamine the question whether the California statute is broader than the generi c federal offense. However, my reading of the California cases is that they did not modify California law, and that the Cal ifornia statute is now constru ed no more broadly than it was at the time we decided Baron

- Medina and Medina

- Villa , i.e. more broadly than the generic federal offense requiring “physical or psychological harm
. ” T his panel is not in a position to straighten out our law . I t has been applied consistently despite its incoherent analysis since Baron

- Medina and Medina

- Villa , and no interv ening case has changed that fact. Whatever I might do as a member of an en banc court, I am not free to refuse to apply the governing precedent in our court to the case before us . For this reason, I concur in the result only
.