NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

________________________________

 :

JACQUAR STOKES, :

 : Civil Action No. 11-407 (JBS)

Plaintiff, :

 :

v. : O P I N I O N

 :

GARY M. LANIGAN, et al., :

 :

Defendants. :

 :

________________________________

APPEARANCES:

JACQUAR STOKES, PRO-SE PLAINTIFF

860509C/516883 

SOUTH WOODS STATE PRISON 

215 BURLINGTON ROAD SOUTH 

BRIDGETON, NJ 08302 

SIMANDLE, District Judge

Plaintiff, Jacquar Stokes, a convicted prisoner currently

confined at South Woods State Prison in Bridgeton, New Jersey,

seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis. Based on his

affidavit of indigence and the absence of three qualifying

dismissals within 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the Court will grant

Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and order the Clerk of the Court to

file the complaint. 

At this time, the Court must review the complaint, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, to determine whether it should

be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a

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claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the

complaint should be dismissed without prejudice and Plaintiff will

be granted leave to file a proposed amended complaint. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Jacquar Stokes (“Plaintiff”), brings this civil

action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Gary M. Lanigan,

Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Corrections; State

Corrections Officer (“SCO”) Sheppard, SCO John Doe and SCO Jane

Doe. The following factual allegations are taken from the

complaint, and are accepted for purposes of this screening only. 

The Court has made no findings as to the veracity of Plaintiff's

allegations.

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on July 30, 2010, he

was returning to prison from a scheduled court appearance at the

Burlington County Courthouse in a bus operated by the New Jersey

Department of Corrections ("D.O.C."). (Compl. at 10.) Due to

negligent, reckless, and high-speed driving by the Central

Transportation Unit, of which Defendants Shepard and Does are

members, he was thrown from his seat during transport and began to

experience excruciating pain in his right shoulder. (Id.) 

Plaintiff "attempted to notify the officers who operated the

vehicle that [he] had been injured but to no avail.” (Id.) At

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approximately 11:00 p.m. that night, Plaintiff returned to South

Woods State Prison and notified the nurse about his shoulder pain.

(Id. at 11.) At approximately 2:34 a.m., Plaintiff was sent to St.

Francis Medical Center in Trenton, New Jersey for x-rays. (Id.) 

X-rays revealed that his shoulder was dislocated and he was sedated

so his shoulder could be put back into place. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants are responsible for his

injuries “due to the fact that they force prisoners to board unsafe

vehicles while handcuffed and shackled...They are personally

responsible in any case that may result in a violation of the state

or local traffic laws...Each vehicle occupant shall be restrained

in an automotive safety belt. Therefore, the New Jersey Department

of Corrections were deliberately indifferent to my safety. These

vehicles (Blue Bird bus) have no safety belts and the drivers

operate them at high speeds for excessive periods of time in order

to secure overtime.” (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that the

D.O.C. is responsible “due to the fact that the occurrence was

reasonably foreseeable and a direct result of the department’s

failure to take appropriate steps that could have prevented the

situation from happening.” (Id.) 

With regard to Defendant Lanigan, Plaintiff alleges that as

the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Corrections, he is

liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior and the doctrine

of res ipsa loquitur for the following reasons: 

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1. As N.J.D.O.C. Commissioner defendant is the

overseer of all operations within and throughout

the Department of Corrections and has a duty to act

in order to prevent egregious constitutional

violations, which could and most likely would

result in ‘injury.’

2. Defendant should have been more careful in choosing

employees in order to avoid liability.

3. Defendant should have been more careful in

supervising the procedures and employees conduct in

order to avoid liability. 

4. Defendant is a benefiting [sic] recipient of his

employee’s actions. 

5. Defendant can or should have purchased liability

insurance. 

6. The defendant has the delegated authority to

control the conduct (of is employees) and should be

the ‘person’ to bear punitive and compensatory

responsibility. 

(Id. at 7.)

Plaintiff alleges that his rights under the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments have been violated. He seeks injunctive

relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, declaratory relief

and that all defendants named or soon to be named be suspended

immediately without pay or placed on alternative duty. (Id. at

13.) 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

1. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal

The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 104-134, §§

801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a

district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a

prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress against

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a governmental employee or entity. The Court is required to

identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that

is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.

This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under

both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) (B) and 1915A, because Plaintiff is a

prisoner and is proceeding as an indigent.

In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the

Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the

plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007)

(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)); see also United States v.

Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). 

The Supreme Court refined the standard for summary dismissal

of a complaint that fails to state a claim in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009). The Court examined Rule 8(a)(2) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a complaint

must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Citing

its opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),

for the proposition that “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and

conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do,’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court held that, to prevent

a summary dismissal, a civil complaint must now allege “sufficient

factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. This

then “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” See id. at 1948. 

The Supreme Court's ruling in Iqbal emphasizes that a plaintiff

must demonstrate that the allegations of his complaint are

plausible. See id. at 1949-50; see also Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555,

& n. 3; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009).

2. Section 1983 Actions

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983

provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory

... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....

Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must

allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution

or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged

deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color

of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);

Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994).

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B. Analysis 

At the outset, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff has

alleged a violation of a right secured by the Constitution. 

“The Eighth Amendment, in only three words, imposes the

constitutional limitation upon punishments: they cannot be ‘cruel

and unusual.’” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345 (1981). The

Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions which involve the unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain or are grossly disproportionate to

the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment. Id. at 347.

The cruel and unusual punishment standard is not static, but is

measured by “the evolving standards of decency that mark the

progress of a maturing society.” Id. at 346 (quoting Trop v.

Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1956)). To state a claim under the

Eighth Amendment, an inmate must satisfy an objective element and

a subjective element. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

Plaintiff’s claims focus on Defendants’ alleged failure to

provide seatbelts and failure to exercise due care in transporting

Plaintiff in a motor vehicle on the highway, which resulted in a

motor vehicle accident causing injury to Plaintiff. However, where

defendants have merely failed to exercise due care in operating a

motor vehicle, as alleged in this instance, such negligence is

insufficient to establish a violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth

Amendment. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 345-48 (1986) (citing

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986))(“...where a

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government official is merely negligent in causing the injury, no

procedure for compensation is constitutionally required”); Schwartz

v. County of Montgomery, 843 F. Supp 962 (E.D. Pa.), aff’d, 37 F.3d

1488 (3d Cir. 1994) (mere negligence insufficient to support a §

1983 action for violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments);

Morgan v. Department of Corrections, 2010 WL 4024777, at *4 (D.N.J.

October 13, 2010); Otero v. Catalogne, 2010 WL 3883444, at *8-11

(W.D.Pa. September 28, 2010)(“the alleged failure of

Defendants...to provide safety belts and properly welded steel

cages is more indicative of a lack of care or foresight, rather

than a ‘conscious disregard of a substantial risk of

harm’...[t]hus, absent any allegation showing that the driver was

consciously made aware that he was creating a substantial risk of

serious harm, yet chose to ignore the risk, a claim of deliberate

indifference cannot stand”); Dexter v. Ford Motor Co., 92 Fed.Appx.

637, 641 (10 Cir. 2004). th

Plaintiff has failed to allege a violation of a right secured

by the Constitution or laws of the United States and as such, this

Court is constrained to dismiss Plaintiff's § 1983 action in its

entirety, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).1

Since the Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged a constitutional

1

violation, Plaintiff’s claims for respondeat superior liability and failure to

train and/or supervise must also be dismissed. Romero v. Hayman, 2011 WL

1344218, at *8 (D.N.J. April 08, 2011) (plaintiff failed to state a claim for

a constitutional injury; thus he fails to state a claim for failure to train);

Wenner v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 2009 WL 1089555, at *5 (D.N.J.

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However, a district court should not dismiss a complaint with

prejudice for failure to state a claim without granting leave to

amend, unless it finds bad faith, undue delay, prejudice or

futility. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 110-111

(3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 117 (3d Cir. 2000). 

Plaintiff may be able to assert facts in an amended complaint

stating a cognizable claim under § 1983 against Defendants and

thus, this Court will grant Plaintiff thirty days to file a motion

to re-open, with a proposed amended complaint, stating a cognizable

§ 1983 claim. If Plaintiff elects to file a motion to re-open and

a proposed amended complaint, he should comply with the pleading

requirements of Iqbal as set forth in this opinion.

2. State Law Claims 

To the extent that Plaintiff is asserting any state or common

law claims in this matter, this Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 

Under § 1367(c)(3), where a district court has dismissed all claims

over which it has original jurisdiction, as this Court has done

here at this time, it may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over a related state law claim. The Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit has held that, where all federal claims are

April 21, 2009)(“[w]ith the Section 1983 claim against the treating defendants

now dismissed, there is no underlying constitutional violation capable of

supporting a claim for vicarious liability against the [supervising]

defendants”).

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dismissed before trial, “the district court must decline to decide

the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial economy,

convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative

justification for doing so.” Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123

(3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). As no such extraordinary

circumstances appear to be present here, this Court will dismiss

without prejudice any state law claims purported to be asserted by

Plaintiff.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the complaint will be

dismissed without prejudice in its entirety for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). Plaintiff will be granted leave

to file a motion to reopen and a proposed amended complaint,

stating a cognizable § 1983 claim, within 30 days. An appropriate

order follows. 

Dated: June 20, 2011

s/ Jerome B. Simandle 

JEROME B. SIMANDLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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