NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

FAITH N. NELSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2020-1179

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:19-cv-00841-EDK, Judge Elaine Kaplan.

______________________

Decided: June 3, 2020

______________________

FAITH N. NELSON, Kansas City, MO, pro se. 

 ROBERT JOEL BRANMAN, Tax Division, United States 

Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by THOMAS J. CLARK, RICHARD E.

ZUCKERMAN. 

 ______________________

Before DYK, TARANTO, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

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2 NELSON v. UNITED STATES

Faith N. Nelson appeals a decision by the United 

States Court of Federal Claims (“Claims Court”) dismissing her complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

We affirm the dismissal.

BACKGROUND

This case involves 26 U.S.C. § 6402(d)(1)(A), part of a 

centralized Treasury Offset Program for debt collection. 

Ibrahim v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 333, 335 (2013). Section 6402(d)(1)(A) provides that “[u]pon receiving notice 

from any Federal agency that a named person owes a pastdue legally enforceable debt . . . to such agency, the [IRS] 

shall reduce the amount of any [tax] overpayment payable 

to such person by the amount of such debt.” 26 U.S.C. 

§ 6402(d)(1). “31 U.S.C. §§ 3711(g) and 3716(a) require[]

[the Department of the Treasury] to make such offsets 

whenever an agency refers a debt to it and to pass the withheld funds to the agency to help satisfy the debt.” Dasisa 

v. Dep’t of Treasury, 951 F. Supp. 2d 45, 46 (D.D.C. 2013). 

Agencies that refer debts to the Department of the Treasury “certify that the debts are valid, delinquent, and legally 

enforceable.” Id. (citing 31 C.F.R. § 285.5(d)(6)).

Here, the plaintiff, Ms. Nelson, signed promissory 

notes in 1982 and 1985 for student loans, each for $2,500 

with 9% interest. She allegedly defaulted on both loans. 

The first loan was purchased by the Missouri Department 

of Higher Education. This loan was assigned to the U.S. 

Department of Education (“DOE”) in 1986. The second

loan was purchased by the Higher Education Foundation 

Program and assigned to the DOE in 1993. After these respective assignments, the DOE requested payments for 

both loans through the IRS as offsets against Ms. Nelson’s 

tax refunds. 

In January 2018, Ms. Nelson filed suit in Missouri 

state court against the DOE and the Missouri Department 

of Higher Education, alleging that the defendants had 

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NELSON v. UNITED STATES 3

incorrectly offset her federal refunds.1 The case was removed to the United Stated District Court for the Western 

District of Missouri, where Ms. Nelson’s claims against the 

Missouri Department of Higher Education were dismissed 

because the action, among other reasons, was barred by the 

statute of limitations. The district court also granted the 

DOE’s motion for summary judgement, finding that Ms. 

Nelson “continue[d] to owe money to [the DOE], and that 

[the DOE’s] continued efforts to collect that debt [were] justified.” U.S. Supp. App’x (“S.A.”) 2 (first and last alteration 

in original) (quoting Nelson v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 4:18-cv00412, 2019 WL 1529383, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 26, 2019)). 

No appeal was taken from the final judgment. 

On June 5, 2019, Ms. Nelson filed a complaint against 

the DOE and the Missouri Department of Higher Education in the Claims Court, requesting that the Claims Court 

order the government to pay back her refund offset with 

interest for tax years 1988 to 2018, to stop any further offsets to her tax refunds, to clear her credit history, and to 

pay punitive damages for violation of her Fourteenth 

Amendment rights. The government moved to dismiss for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

The Claims Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over 

Ms. Nelson’s challenge to the offset of her federal tax return by the IRS because 26 U.S.C. § 6402(g) “explicitly bars 

judicial review of [such] action.” S.A. 3 (quoting Hicks v. 

United States, 130 Fed. Cl. 222, 230 (2017)). The Claims 

Court also held it lacked jurisdiction to hear Ms. Nelson’s 

1 Ms. Nelson later clarified before the U.S. District 

for the Western District of Missouri that she believed “that 

the [Missouri Department of Higher Education] is ‘IN-CAHOOTS’ with the U.S. Department of Higher Education” 

in collecting her money. U.S. Supp. App’x 35 (quoting Ms. 

Nelson’s Response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause).

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4 NELSON v. UNITED STATES

claim for illegal exaction2 against the DOE because “she 

has already unsuccessfully pursued the issue of whether 

she was in default on her educational loans in district 

court.” S.A. 3. The Claims Court determined that this 

identical issue had been actually litigated and fully resolved in district court and that issue preclusion barred

this claim. 

The Claims Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction 

under the Fourteenth Amendment to grant punitive damages or to clear credit histories because the Fourteenth 

Amendment “do[es] not mandate payment by the government.” S.A. 4 (alteration in original) (quoting LeBlanc v. 

United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed Cir. 1995)). The 

Claims Court also held it lacked jurisdiction over any 

claims against the Missouri Department of Higher Education because it was a state agency. 

DISCUSSION

The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), grants the 

Claims Court jurisdiction “[t]o render judgment upon any 

claim against the United States founded either upon the 

Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of 

an executive department, or upon any express or implied 

contract with the United States.” But as the Supreme 

Court explained, “[n]ot every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation is cognizable under 

the Tucker Act.” United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 

216 (1983). “[A] court must inquire whether the source of 

substantive law can fairly be interpreted as mandating 

2 An illegal exaction “involves money that was improperly paid, exacted, or taken from the claimant in contravention of the Constitution, a statute, or a regulation.” 

Norman v. United States, 429 F.3d 1081, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 

2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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NELSON v. UNITED STATES 5

compensation by the Federal Government for the damages 

sustained.” Id. at 218.

The Claims Court had no jurisdiction over claims 

against a state entity, namely, the Missouri Department of 

Higher Education. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 

584, 588 (1941) (holding that the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction over claims that are not against United States). 

There is also no jurisdiction over this action as against the 

actions of the IRS in offsetting Ms. Nelson’s federal refunds

based on the DOE claims. The IRS was required, under

section 6402(d)(1), to offset her refund “[u]pon receiving notice . . . that [Ms. Nelson] owes a past-due legally enforceable debt.” 26 U.S.C. § 6402(d)(1). Under section 6402(g), 

no federal court has jurisdiction “to hear any action, 

whether legal or equitable, brought to restrain or review a 

reduction authorized by subsection . . . (d).” Id. § 6402(g).

Section 6402(g) “explicitly reserves plaintiff’s ability to sue 

agency-claimants directly, but it prohibits suits against 

[the Department of the Treasury] merely for carrying out 

its statutory obligation to collect debts that agencies refer 

to it.” Dasisa, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 46.

The Claims Court also considered whether the actions 

of the DOE in requesting the offset, rather than the actions 

of the IRS in applying it, constituted an illegal exaction. 

We need not reach whether this was an available theory of 

recovery in view of the fact that the Claims Court properly 

held that this claim is barred by issue preclusion because 

of the prior district court adjudication finding that Ms. Nelson continued to owe money to the DOE. As to this claim, 

we sustain the dismissal on the merits rather than the lack 

of jurisdiction. See Bank of Guam v. United States, 578 

F.3d 1318, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

Finally, the relief sought by Ms. Nelson under her 

Fourteenth Amendment claim (apart from the illegal exaction theory) was not within the jurisdiction of the Claims 

Court because the Due Process and Equal Protection 

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6 NELSON v. UNITED STATES

Clauses generally “do not mandate payment of money by 

the government.” LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 

1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 

Because Ms. Nelson identifies no other basis for the 

Claims Court to exercise jurisdiction over her claim, the 

Claims Court’s dismissal of her complaint is

AFFIRMED

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