FOR THE RESPONDENT		FOR THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT

							DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION 

Solomon L. Lowenstein, Jr.		Donald R. Lundberg, Executive Secretary

503 W. Wayne St. 				David B. Hughes, Staff Attorney

Fort Wayne, IN 46802			115 West Washington St., Ste. 1060

						Indianapolis, IN 46204

______________________________________________________________

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

IN THE MATTER OF			)

						)	Case No.  02S00-8906-DI-474

BRUCE R. SNYDER			)

DISCIPLINARY ACTION

March 15, 1999

Per Curiam

	By neglecting two estates he was retained to represent and by failing to take action

in civil actions he was hired to defend, the respondent, Bruce R. Snyder, violated this Court’s

ethical rules for attorneys.  The Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission charged

the respondent by a three-count verified complaint of violations of both the Code of Professional Responsibility for Attorneys at Law1 and the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law in that he engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation; he engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and he

failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing his clients.  The

respondent and the Commission have tendered for our approval a Statement of Circumstances and Conditional Agreement for Discipline in resolution of this matter. Our jurisdiction in this case is derived from the respondent’s admission to the bar of this state on

September 25, 1963.

	Under Count I of the Verified Complaint for Disciplinary Action, the parties agree that a client retained the respondent in March 1985, to defend two mortgage foreclosure actions

and to collect an outstanding promissory note.  In March 1987, the client asked the

respondent to file his case, and paid the necessary filing fee.  The respondent told his client

he would file the case, prompting his client to provide him with a filing fee.   After checking

court records in July 1987, the client learned that his case had not yet been filed.  After two

attempts to arrange meetings with respondent, the client requested the return of his file, and

the respondent complied in September 1987.

	Under Count II, the parties agree that the respondent was hired to represent an estate

in September 1987.  After completing an inventory of the estate in December 1987, the

respondent failed to respond to court orders to file the estate’s 1986 and 1987 tax returns. 

Throughout 1989, 1990, and 1991, the heirs appeared by counsel to object or offer motions

and petitions pertaining to the respondent’s administration of the estate.  In October 1991,

the heirs filed an action against the respondent, which resulted in a settlement agreement

whereby the respondent agreed to immediately release $14,000 to the heirs and pay $25,000 plus the costs of the heir’s’ lawsuit in exchange for a sixty day forbearance on pursuing the

court action.  When the respondent failed to meet his obligations under the settlement

agreement, the heirs filed a stipulation of judgment in December 1991.

	The parties agree that under Count III, the respondent was hired to assist in the

administration of an estate in May 1994.  The respondent failed to discuss with the personal

representatives a fee arrangement at the outset of the representation, but assured them that

the estate was not complicated and could be settled within five months.  The personal

representatives heard nothing further from respondent for six months.  The respondent did

file an inventory of the estate assets in September 1994, more than four months beyond the

statutory time limit.  When the respondent forwarded an Indiana Inheritance Tax Return and

a closing statement reflecting his fees to the personal representatives, they became concerned by what they considered to be an excessive fee.  One of the personal representatives met with

respondent in November 1994 to discuss the fee.  The personal representative asked for an

itemized accounting and explanation of the fee.  Five days after this meeting, the respondent

sent an unitemized invoice which the personal representative paid fearing that the respondent

would not close the estate until his fee was paid in full.  The respondent failed to collect any

of the estate’s assets on behalf of the personal representatives, and at the time of the closing

of the estate none of the estate assets had been transferred to the personal representatives or

distributed to the heirs.  Numerous attempts by the personal representatives to contact the

respondent went unanswered, and eventually the personal representatives were forced to

retain other counsel to conclude the estate.

	We find that through his repeated failure to act on his client’s behalf, his failure to

keep clients informed of the status of their claims and his failure to provide information to

help them make informed decisions, the respondent violated Ind.Professional Conduct Rule

1.32 and Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a) and 1.4(b).3  The respondent’s failure to expedite litigation and to disclose material facts to a tribunal violate Prof.Cond.R. 3.24 and 3.3(a)(2).5    His general pattern of neglect and inattention to cases entrusted to him was prejudicial to the

administration of justice in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).6   Finally, through respondent’s conduct, the parties agree that D.R. 1-102(A)(4),(5), and (6) have been violated7 as well as D.R. 6-101(A)(3)8 and 7-101(A)(2).9

	Having found misconduct, this Court must now assess the appropriateness of the

agreed upon sanction.  In so doing, this Court examines the surrounding circumstances of the

misconduct, the respondent’s state of mind, the duty that was violated through the

misconduct, any actual or potential injury to the client, the risk to the public, the duty of this

Court to preserve the integrity of the legal profession, and any mitigating or aggravating

factors.    Matter of Christoff and Holmes, 690 N.E. 2d 1135 (Ind. 1997); Matter of Darling, 685 N.E.2d 1066 (Ind. 1997); Matter of Conway, 658 N.E.2d 592 (Ind. 1995).  

	The parties agree that the appropriate sanction for the respondent’s misconduct  is a

six month suspension from the practice of law without automatic reinstatement.  They agree 

that several factors mitigate his misconduct, including the respondent’s generally good

reputation within the community in which he practices and his involvements with local

charitable organizations.  Further, he acknowledged the seriousness of his actions and

expressed regret at the impact of his misconduct on the clients who entrusted their legal

matters to him.

	The three counts set out in this matter reflect a pattern of neglect and inattention to

client interests, as well as purposeful misleading of clients about the status of their cases.  His lack of candor with his clients adds a deeper dimension of culpability to the respondent’s

otherwise neglectful actions and convinces us that a significant period of suspension is

warranted.  We therefore find we should accept the parties’ proposed resolution of this case. 

Accordingly, the respondent, Bruce R. Snyder, is hereby suspended from the practice of law

for a period of not less than six (6) months, beginning April 19, 1999.  At the conclusion of this suspension, the respondent will be eligible to petition for reinstatement under

Ind.Admission and Discipline Rule 23(4).

	The Clerk of this Court is directed to provide notice of this order in accordance with

Admis.Disc.R. 23(3)(d) and to provide the clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit, the clerk of each of the United States District Courts in this state, and

the clerk of each of the United States Bankruptcy Courts in this state with the last known

address of respondent as reflected in the records of the Clerk.

	Costs of this proceeding are assessed against respondent.