*NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

____________________________________

:

THOMAS GAGE, :

: Civil Action No. 11-1501 (FLW)

Plaintiff, :

: OPINION

v. :

:

:

WARREN TOWNSHIP :

COMMITTEE and PLANNING :

BOARD MEMBERS, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

 :

WOLFSON, District Judge: 

This action arises out of Warren Township Planning Board’s (the “Board”) approval of an

amended preliminary major subdivision and the final subdivision of a development project by

defendant Sleepy Hollow of Warren, LLC (“Sleepy Hollow”). Initially, pro se Plaintiff Thomas

Gage (“Plaintiff”), in late 2008, filed a state court complaint in Somerset County (“Somerset

Action”), essentially alleging that the Board inappropriately approved the Sleepy Hollow

development. The state court judge dismissed Plaintiff’s action. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed

another state court action in Somerset County and that court transferred the case to Morris

County (“Morris Action”). In that second action, Plaintiff challenged certain issues already

litigated in the Somerset Action. As a result, the Morris Action was dismissed primarily

pursuant to the doctrines of res judicata and claim preclusion. Unsuccessful in state court,

Plaintiff brought the present suit in this Court. All defendants in this action, the Board, Warren

Township Committee, State of New Jersey Judiciary Offices, Marianne Cammarota, Prout &

Case 3:11-cv-01501-FLW-TJB Document 38 Filed 11/29/11 Page 1 of 16 PageID: 773
Cammarota, LLP, Sleepy Hollow, Dorothy D’Angelo and Kevin Page (collectively,

“Defendants”), move separately to dismiss the Complaint on various grounds, including the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine and other preclusion doctrines. For the reasons that follow,

Defendants’ motions are GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND

For the purposes of these motions, the Court takes the facts as alleged in the Complaint as

true and recounts only the relevant facts. Plaintiff has owned a parcel of land in Warren, New

Jersey since 1997. Compl., ¶16. Plaintiff alleges that prior to his purchase of the property, the

Board had approved, albeit improperly, the extension of a road through Plaintiff’s property. Id.

at ¶ 54. Nevertheless, Plaintiff, expecting the road to be built, attempted to subdivide his

property into three separate parcels; however, that request was denied. Id. at ¶ 17. 

Subsequently, in 2004, a neighboring property owner, Sleepy Hollow, made a request for

the subdivision of its property to build twenty single-family residences. Id. at ¶¶ 48-52. The

request was preliminarily granted by the Board in September 2005. Plaintiff alleges that the site

plan approval was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶¶ 52-54.

Because Plaintiff is a neighboring property owner, he claims that as a result of the land

development, his property suffered a loss of value. Id. at ¶ 54. In that connection, Plaintiff first

filed the Somerset Action in lieu of prerogative writ in New Jersey Superior Court in November

2005. That matter was dismissed on August 23, 2006. In his decision, the state court judge

specifically found that the Board’s preliminarily approval of the site plan was not arbitrary,

capricious, unreasonable, and an abuse of discretion.

Thereafter, Somerset County declined to allow a secondary access road contemplated by

2

Case 3:11-cv-01501-FLW-TJB Document 38 Filed 11/29/11 Page 2 of 16 PageID: 774
the first site plan to moderate traffic congestion. See Compl., Exh H, Appellate Court’s decision

dated October 18, 2010, p. 3. Consequently, Sleepy Hollow devised an alternative plan and

submitted that amended plan to the Board for approval. Id. In September 2008, the Board also

approved the amended plan. Id. On September 9, 2008, Plaintiff filed the Morris Action lawsuit

against Sleepy Hollow and the Board. In that second state court action, Plaintiff again challenged

the Board’s initial approval of Sleepy Hollow’s preliminary site plan, in addition to the Board’s

subsequent approval of the amended plan. Plaintiff also claimed, inter alia, that the Board failed

to make the necessary factual findings to grant the subdivision approval and variances. See

Brennan Cert., Exh. B, State Court Opinion dated June 1, 2009. With respect to claims relating to

the Board’s first approval, the Honorable Fred H. Kumpf, J.S.C., found that those claims are

precluded by the doctrines of res judicata, claim preclusion and entire controversy. Id. at p. 17. 

With respect to claims related to the Board’s approval of the amended plan, Judge Kumpf held

that the Board’s approval was not arbitrary or capricious. As a result, the case was dismissed on

June 1, 2009. Plaintiff appealed that decision and the decision was subsequently upheld by the

appellate court. See Appellate Court’s decision dated October 18, 2010. 

Unsatisfied with the state courts’ decisions, Plaintiff brought claims based upon similar

facts in this Court in 2010; however, on June 11, 2010, this Court dismissed that complaint sua

sponte for failing to comply with pleading standards under Fed R. Civ. P. 8(a). On November

26, 2010, the Court’s dismissal without prejudice was upheld by the Third Circuit. On March 16,

2011, Plaintiff filed this Complaint against various defendants for violating his constitutional

rights as a result of the approvals of Sleep Hollow’s site plans. Pending before the Court are five

motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims. The majority of Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s

3

Case 3:11-cv-01501-FLW-TJB Document 38 Filed 11/29/11 Page 3 of 16 PageID: 775
claims based upon the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and other preclusion doctrines, and defendants

Judge Kumpf and State of New Jersey Judiciary Offices (“Judiciary Defendants”) move to

dismiss based upon immunity grounds. The Court notes that it appears that the Judiciary

Defendants are the only new defendants in this Complaint who were not named as defendants in

Plaintiff’s previous state court actions. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

When reviewing a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, courts "accept all factual

allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and

determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled

to relief." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and

quotations omitted). In Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the

Supreme Court clarified the 12(b)(6) standard. Specifically, the Court "retired" the language

contained in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), that "a complaint should not be

dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Twombly, 550 U.S. at

561 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46). Instead, the factual allegations set forth in a complaint

"must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555. As the Third Circuit has stated, "[t]he Supreme Court's Twombly formulation of the

pleading standard can be summed up thus: ‘stating ... a claim requires a complaint with enough

factual matter (taken as true) to suggest' the required element. This ‘does not impose a

probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a

4

Case 3:11-cv-01501-FLW-TJB Document 38 Filed 11/29/11 Page 4 of 16 PageID: 776
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary element." Phillips,

515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 555 U.S. at 555).

In affirming that Twombly standards apply to all motions to dismiss, the Supreme Court

recently explained the principles. First, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129

S.Ct. 1937, 1948-49 (2009). Second, "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief

survives a motion to dismiss." Id. Therefore, "a court considering a motion to dismiss can

choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not

entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 1949. Ultimately, "a complaint must do more than

allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its

facts." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). Moreover, in deciding a

motion to dismiss, the court may consider the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to

the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of plaintiff’s claim. 

Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2004).

The Third Circuit recently reiterated that "judging the sufficiency of a pleading is a

context-dependent exercise" and "[s]ome claims require more factual explication than others to

state a plausible claim for relief." West Penn Allegheny Health System, Inc. v. UPMC, No. 09-

4468, 2010 WL 4840093, at *8 (3d Cir. Nov. 29, 2010). This means that, "[f]or example, it

generally takes fewer factual allegations to state a claim for simple battery than to state a claim

for antitrust conspiracy." Id. That said, the Rule 8 pleading standard is to be applied "with the

same level of rigor in all civil actions." Id. at *7 (quoting Ashcroft, 129 S.Ct. at 1953).

II. Legal Concepts 

5

Case 3:11-cv-01501-FLW-TJB Document 38 Filed 11/29/11 Page 5 of 16 PageID: 777
Because the Court finds that the majority of Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrines

of Rooker-Feldman, res judicata and/or entire controversy, the Court will delineate those

concepts below.

A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack subject matter

jurisdiction to review and reverse state court judgments. In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 573, 580 (3rd

Cir. 2005). “[A] claim is barred by Rooker-Feldman under two circumstances; first, if the

federal claim was actually litigated in state court prior to the filing of the federal action or,

second, if the federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state adjudication, meaning that

federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong.” Id. “[A]

federal claim is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue adjudicated by a state court when (1) the

federal court must determine that the state court judgment was erroneously entered in order to

grant the requested relief, or (2) the federal court must take an action that would negate the state

court's judgment.” In re Madera, 586 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Walker v. Horn, 385

F.3d 321, 330 (3d Cir. 2004)). Where, on the other hand, the federal plaintiff presents “some

independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached,” the

doctrine does not apply. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292

(2005) quoted in Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547-48 (3d Cir.

2006)). In such an instance, jurisdiction is confirmed and the court should then consider

“whether the defendant prevails under principles of preclusion.” Exxon Mobile, 544 U.S. at 292

quoted in Turner, 449 F.3d at 548.

In addition, Rooker-Feldman applies only to “state court losers . . . complaining of

6

Case 3:11-cv-01501-FLW-TJB Document 38 Filed 11/29/11 Page 6 of 16 PageID: 778
injuries caused by [a] state-court judgment[ ] rendered before the district court proceedings

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of [that] judgment.” Gary v.

Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284)

(emphasis added). If no judgment had been reached in the state court action at the time the

federal complaint was filed, there can be no “loser.” Whether a judgment has been rendered in a

1

state foreclosure action is a question of state law. See Randall v. Bank One, 358 B.R. 145, 159

n.9 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 2006) (in reaching its Rooker-Feldman determination, applying Pennsylvania

law to determine nature of foreclosure judgment). In addition, it is the date of the complaint that

determines, for Rooker-Feldman purposes, whether a judgment had been rendered. See Gary,

517 F.3d at 201. 

B. Res Judicata

Res judicata is an affirmative defense. Such a defense is grounds for a motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “Res judicata encompasses two

preclusion concepts - issue preclusion, which forecloses litigation of a litigated and decided

matter (often referred to as direct or collateral estoppel), and claim preclusion, which disallows

litigation of a matter that has never been litigated but which should have been presented in an

earlier suit.” Bierley v. Dombrowski, 309 Fed. Appx. 594, 596-97 (3d Cir. 2009).

Collateral estoppel prevents parties or their privies from re-litigating an issue if a court

possessing personal and subject matter jurisdiction has already delivered a valid, final judgment

Hence, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “divests a federal district court of jurisdiction if the

plaintiff's claim was either (1) actually litigated in state court or (2) if the claim is inextricably

intertwined with the prior state court ruling.” Lui v. Commission, Adult Entertainment, De, 369

F.3d 319, 328 n.12 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411,

419 (3d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added)). 

7

Case 3:11-cv-01501-FLW-TJB Document 38 Filed 11/29/11 Page 7 of 16 PageID: 779
on the merits. Witkowski v. Welch, 173 F.3d 192, 198-99 (3d Cir. 1999). The doctrine applies if

four requirements are met: “1) the issue sought to be precluded [is] the same as that involved in

the prior action; 2) that issue [was] actually litigated; 3) it [was] determined by a final and valid

judgment; and 4) the determination [was] essential to the prior judgment." In re G-I Holdings

Inc., No. 02-3082, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16317, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2003)(citations omitted).

The purpose of the collateral estoppel doctrine is to promote judicial consistency, encourage

reliance on court decisions, and protect defendants from being forced to repeatedly relitigate the

same issues in multiple lawsuits. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, is a broader doctrine than collateral estoppel. It applies

not only to claims brought in a previous lawsuit, but also to claims which could have been

brought in that suit. The doctrine attaches if there has been (1) a final judgment on the merits in a

previous lawsuit involving (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent action based

on the same cause of action. Mullarkey v. Tamboer, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008)(citations

omitted). Under New Jersey law, "[a] dismissal with prejudice 'constitutes an adjudication on the

merits as fully and completely as if the order had been entered after a trial.'" Feinsod v. Noon,

261 N.J. Super. 82, 84 (App. Div. 1992) (citations omitted). Indeed, if a res judicata "bar is not

apparent on the face of the complaint, then it may not afford the basis for a dismissal of the

complaint under Rule 12(b)(6)." Rycoline Prods. v. C & W Unlimited, 109 F.3d 883, 886 (3d

Cir. 1997).

C. Entire Controversy Doctrine

The entire controversy doctrine is New Jersey's own, distinctive application of res

judicata principles. It "embodies the principle that the adjudication of a legal controversy should

8

Case 3:11-cv-01501-FLW-TJB Document 38 Filed 11/29/11 Page 8 of 16 PageID: 780
occur in one litigation in only one court; accordingly, all parties involved in a litigation should at

the very least present in that proceeding all of their claims and defenses that are related to the

underlying controversy." Kozyra v. Allen, 973 F.2d 1110, 1111 (3d Cir. 1992)(citations omitted).

The doctrine is meant to encourage a final, comprehensive adjudication of a legal controversy,

provide fairness to all involved parties (including prospective parties), and preserve judicial

resources by avoiding fragmented litigation. Mystic Isle Dev. Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad, 142

N.J. 310, 322 (1995). "It is the factual circumstances giving rise to the controversy itself, rather

than a commonality of claims, issues or parties, that triggers the requirement of joinder to create

a cohesive and complete litigation." Id. at 323. "While the wellspring of res judicata or collateral

estoppel is the notion of finality of a court's adjudication, the entire controversy doctrine is

designed to prevent the fragmentation of litigation and applies even when the first case

adjudicates an issue different from the second." Fioriglio v. City of Atlantic City, 963 F. Supp.

415, 420 (D.N.J. 1997). New Jersey Courts apply the entire controversy doctrine as a bar to a

subsequent suit when there is some duplication of proof involved. "For instance...forcing the two

claims to be brought at the same time 'would have resulted in a more comprehensive

determination of the underlying legal controversy.'" Fields v. Thompson Printing Co., 363 F.3d

259, 266 (3d Cir. 2004)(citations and quotations omitted). The Full Faith and Credit Act, 28

U.S.C. § 1738, obliges federal courts to apply New Jersey's Entire Controversy Doctrine when

hearing federal causes of action. Rycoline Prods., 109 F.3d at 887; Dowdell v. University of

Med. & Dentistry, 94 F. Supp. 2d 527, 535 (D.N.J. 2000). 

There are, however, exceptions to the doctrine's application. "The doctrine does not apply

to bar component claims that are unknown, unarisen, or unaccrued at the time of the original

9

Case 3:11-cv-01501-FLW-TJB Document 38 Filed 11/29/11 Page 9 of 16 PageID: 781
action." Mystic Isle Dev. Corp., 142 N.J. at 323. The Third Circuit has also held that "the entire

controversy doctrine does not preclude the initiation of a second action before the first action has

been concluded." Rycoline, 109 F.3d at 890. The entire controversy doctrine is codified in New

Jersey Court Rule 4:30A.

III. Analysis2

In the instant Complaint, Plaintiff asserts seven counts against Defendants. In Count I,

Plaintiff alleges that because of the negligent actions of the Board and Township Committee

members, Plaintiff suffered various emotional damages, “such as loss of control over [Plaintiff’s]

lives, marriage distress, depression, and insecurity of [Plaintiff’s] future.” Compl., ¶ 82. 

Plaintiff requests “monetary restitution for the inflicted ‘Torts’ in the amount of

$10,000,000.00.” Id. at ¶ 83. With respect to the allegations contained in Count I, Plaintiff

continues to make the same series of allegations against defendants Warren Township

Committee and Warren Township Planning Board that were made previously in state court. 

Indeed, this cause of action was actually litigated in the two prior state court actions wherein

Plaintiff’s claims relating to the Board’s approvals of the Sleepy Hollow development site plans,

both preliminary and final, were dismissed with prejudice, and Plaintiff’s appeal of the Morris

Action was denied by the appellate court. These litigations resulted in a finding that the Board

and the Township Committee did not engage in any unlawful conduct and that their approvals of

the Sleepy Hollow site plans were not arbitrary or capricious. Clearly, Count I is barred by the

doctrine of res judicata. In addition, to the extent that Plaintiff is bringing a new claim against

It is critical to note that while Plaintiff has filed opposition papers to Defendants’

motions, Plaintiff does not respond substantively to the legal arguments relating to the preclusion

doctrines, i.e., res judicata, collateral estoppel and entire controversy.

10

Case 3:11-cv-01501-FLW-TJB Document 38 Filed 11/29/11 Page 10 of 16 PageID: 782
the Board and Township Committee by way of his new theory of damages, his claim is precluded

by the entire controversy doctrine - this type of relief should have been raised in the previous

state court actions.

In Count II, Plaintiff requests the Court to void the decisions rendered by New Jersey

Superior Court Judge Fred H. Kumpf because Judge Kumpf has denied Plaintiff his

constitutional “‘rights’ of Amendment XIV and Amendment VII and has been in violation of

Article VI, Paragraph-3, Title 18 U.S.C. § 4, Title 18 U.S.C. § 1505, Title 18 U.S.C. § 1510 and

TREASON.” Id. at ¶ 85 (underline deleted). Similarly, in Count III, Plaintiff requests the Court

to void the state Appellate Court’s decision. Id. at ¶ 87. To the extent these Counts raise new

claims against the Judiciary Defendants unrelated to the state court actions, the Court will

address those claims infra. However, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to invalidate the state court

judgments in this Count, that relief is expressly barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See

Gary, 517 F.3d at 201.

In Count IV, Plaintiff requests “a compensation of $2,000.000.00 for [defendants]

Marianne Cammarota[‘s] and Prout & Cammarota, L.L.P.’s contribution to the criminal actions

that have inflicted on the Plaintiff . . . .” Id. at ¶ 90. Plaintiff alleges that Cammarota, as the

Board’s court reporter, altered and/or manipulated the testimony of certain witnesses during the

Board’s hearings concerning the development application of Sleepy Hollow. Indeed, this

specific claim was already litigated in Plaintiff’s Morris Action before Judge Kumpf wherein

Judge Kumpf found that Plaintiff’s allegations of alteration of certain transcripts relating to the

Board’s approval were without merit. Following Judge Kumpf’s dismissal, Plaintiff filed a new

complaint in Morris County Superior Court on June 17, 2009, again alleging that defendants

11

Case 3:11-cv-01501-FLW-TJB Document 38 Filed 11/29/11 Page 11 of 16 PageID: 783
Cammarota and Prout & Cammarota altered certain transcripts. That case was dismissed by

another state court judge on the ground of claim preclusion. See Brennan Cert., Exh D, State

Court Order dated August 28, 2009. Clearly, Count IV has been litigated and re-litigated by

Plaintiff in state court, and therefore, this claim is barred by the res judicata doctrine.

In Count V, Plaintiff requests that because of the unlawful conduct of the Board, “all the

approvals rendered by the Warren Township authorities to the Defendants, Sleepy Hollow of

Warren, LLC and its owner Mrs. Dorothy D’Angelo, to be regarded as nullities or voided.” Id. at

¶ 93. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Sleepy Hollow and Mrs. D’Angelo engaged in some

unspecified corruption. In this Count, Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $10 million. 

Again, as the Court has found, any claims of unlawful conduct of the Board relating to the

approvals of the Sleepy Hollow site plans have been dismissed as a result of two state court

litigations and an appeal. To the extent that Plaintiff asks the Court to invalidate the Board’s

approvals of the Sleepy Hollow site plans, such relief is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

To the extent that Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages against Sleepy Hollow and Mrs.

D’Angelo for ceratin unspecified corruption, that claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 

It appears that the allegedly unlawful conduct of Sleepy Hollow and Mrs. D’Angelo to which

Plaintiff refers in his Complaint has already been litigated. Indeed, in the Appellate Division’s

opinion, the court affirmed the trial court’s rejection of issues Plaintiff raised relating to Sleepy

Hollow: (1) two of the Board members and Sleepy Hollow’s engineering expert have

disqualifying conflicts of interest; (2) Sleepy Hollow failed to give adequate notice of its

amended plan to neighboring property owners; and (3) the estate of a now-deceased Sleepy

Hollow Partner failed to disclose a ten percent ownership interest in the project. It appears that

12

Case 3:11-cv-01501-FLW-TJB Document 38 Filed 11/29/11 Page 12 of 16 PageID: 784
Plaintiff is raising the identical issues in this Complaint, to those which have already been

litigated. See Compl., ¶ 48-66. Plaintiff has not identified any other issues in this Complaint that

would give rise to any new claims against Sleepy Hollow and/or Mrs. D’Angelo that have not

been previously adjudicated. Accordingly, Count V is precluded by the doctrines of res judicata

and collateral estoppel. 

In Count VI, Plaintiff alleges that defendant Kevin Page, “who is the engineer that served

. . . the Sleepy Hollow [development], in this case, acted negligently by misconduct against his

own state license requirements.” Id. at ¶ 68. Plaintiff further alleges that Mr. Page’s “negligent

actions contributed to the criminal action inflicted on the Plaintiff and his family.” Id. at ¶ 96. 

While it is not clear from Plaintiff’s allegations the “negligent conduct” to which he refers, it

appears in his earlier state court proceedings, Plaintiff alleged that Mr. Page lied in his deposition

relating to his testimony regarding Sleepy Hollow’s site plans. Again, these issues relating to the

actions of Mr. Page have been disposed of by the state court judgments, wherein various judges

found that the issues regarding Mr. Page’s conduct were without merit. See State Court Opinion

dated June 1, 2009, pp. 6. 17. Therefore, this claim is precluded by collateral estoppel. 

Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to bring additional claims against Mr. Page

based upon a new theory of liability, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that theory in this

Complaint, and further, it is precluded by the entire controversy doctrine - Plaintiff had the

opportunity to raise those claims in the already-closed state court litigations. 

Finally, in Count VII, pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 1361, Plaintiff requests the Court to

compel the United States Attorney General to take action against defendants in this case for

various corrupt conduct. Id. at ¶¶ 99-103. First, Plaintiff fails to set forth any basis for the

13

Case 3:11-cv-01501-FLW-TJB Document 38 Filed 11/29/11 Page 13 of 16 PageID: 785
Attorney General of the United States to investigate his claims or to “render justice.” Second,

because Plaintiff’s claims are being dismissed in their entirety for the reasons stated herein and

because Plaintiff has had ample judicial resources dedicated to reviewing his claims, Count VII is

also dismissed. 

As a final note, during the pendency of these motions, Plaintiff filed an “Amendment

Motion Requests with Stay; for a Federal Investigation and an Immediate Order to be Executed

against the Defts' action in this matter.” See Docket No. 23. That motion is denied because only

the Executive branch of the government has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide

whether to prosecute a case. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); In re Sealed Case,

838 F.2d 476, 488 (D.D.C. 1988). This Court, as the judicial arm of the government, has no

power or authority to issue the order to investigate that Plaintiff seeks in his motion. 

IV. Judiciary Defendants

With respect to the claims asserted against the Judiciary Defendants in Count II, Plaintiff

clarified his claim in his opposition as follows: 

[T]he Plaintiff is not seeking to overturn any [of] the state court judgments or

to appeal an ongoing state court proceeding. The Plaintiff’s claim is a new

action in Federal District Court . . . against the State Judiciary Officers’

misconduct that has violated the Contract Clause of the Constitution and the

Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 14 Amendment in the

th

Plaintiff’s case. 

Plaintiff’s Opp., p. 30. In that regard, although Plaintiff has couched his Complaint against the

“State of New Jersey Judiciary Offices,” his claims appear to be against the judges who issued

their various orders. However, the Court concludes that those claims are dismissed because the

Judiciary Defendants are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. 

14

Case 3:11-cv-01501-FLW-TJB Document 38 Filed 11/29/11 Page 14 of 16 PageID: 786
As a general rule, “judges are immune from liability for damages for acts committed

within their judicial jurisdiction.” Murawski v. Baldwin, 209 Fed. Appx. 99, 100 (3d Cir. 2006)

(citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)). In that regard, “[j]udicial immunity is an

immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S.

9, 11 (1991). In addition, the immunity applies as a complete shield to all suits regardless of the

claims alleged, see Imble v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), and immunity is available even if a

judge acts erroneously, corruptly or in excess of his jurisdiction. Id. at 9-10. There are two

recognized exceptions to this immunity from money damages: (1) where the judge acts in a nonjudicial capacity; and (2) where the judge acts in complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireless,

502 U.S. at 11-12.

Here, it is clear that Plaintiff alleges that his injuries were caused by the Judiciary

Defendants issuing orders in their role as judges for the State of New Jersey, and that the

exceptions to this type of immunity do not apply in this case. As such, the Judiciary Defendants

are entitled to judicial immunity, see, e.g., Murawski, 209 Fed. Appx. at 100, and all claims

against them are dismissed. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court grants all Defendants’ motions to dismiss in

their entirety. 

15

Case 3:11-cv-01501-FLW-TJB Document 38 Filed 11/29/11 Page 15 of 16 PageID: 787
DATED: November 29, 2011 /s/ Freda L. Wolfson 

Freda L. Wolfson, U.S.D.J. 

16

Case 3:11-cv-01501-FLW-TJB Document 38 Filed 11/29/11 Page 16 of 16 PageID: 788