IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-60546

FANY JACKELINE RAMIREZ-MEJIA, also known as Fany Ramirez, also 

known as Fany Ramirez de Quinteros,

Petitioner

v.

LORETTA LYNCH, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Before WIENER, SOUTHWICK, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

LESLIE H. SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judge:

Fany Jackeline Ramirez-Mejia’s removal order was reinstated following 

her illegal reentry into the United States. The Board of Immigration Appeals

ruled she may not apply for asylum and is ineligible for withholding of removal 

or protection under the Convention Against Torture. We agree and DENY the 

petition for review.

In March 2006, Ramirez-Mejia, a native and citizen of Honduras, was 

apprehended while illegally entering the United States. She was subsequently 

removed from the country. She returned to the United States the next month.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 21, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 14-60546 Document: 00513123078 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/21/2015
No. 14-60546

2

In January 2012, Ramirez-Mejia was arrested for theft. Her removal 

order was reinstated the following day. When questioned by an immigration 

officer, she expressed a fear of returning to Honduras. In an interview with an 

asylum officer, she explained that she feared she would be killed by the same 

individuals who killed her brother. Based on this testimony, the asylum officer 

referred her case to an immigration judge (“IJ”) for a hearing. At the hearing, 

Ramirez-Mejia testified that her brother had been murdered in May 2003. She 

asserted that her family attempted to file a police report, but that the police 

told them to “leave things the way they are . . . .” She also alleged that, in 

November 2005, she began receiving anonymous notes demanding that she 

disclose information her brother had supposedly revealed to her. RamirezMejia claimed that her failure to respond led the individuals responsible for 

the murder to open fire on her father’s business while she was present in 

February 2006. The police subsequently captured one of the assailants. While 

in custody, the assailant allegedly threatened Ramirez-Mejia and questioned 

her about her brother when she went to the police station to file a report.

Ramirez-Mejia maintained that she fled Honduras in response to these 

events. She also asserted that the individuals sought extortion money from 

her father after her departure and renewed their anonymous threats when she 

returned to Honduras in March 2006 following her removal from the United 

States.

The IJ noted that Ramirez-Mejia’s testimony did not “seem plausible” 

but accepted it as credible. Nevertheless, the IJ concluded that Ramirez-Mejia 

was ineligible for withholding of removal or protection under the Convention 

Against Torture (“CAT”). The IJ noted that she had not demonstrated

persecution based on membership in a protected group and rejected her 

argument that her nuclear family constituted a protected group. The IJ also 

 Case: 14-60546 Document: 00513123078 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/21/2015
No. 14-60546

3

concluded that Ramirez-Mejia failed to show that the Honduran government 

would allow her to be tortured. In January 2013, the Board of Immigration 

Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Ramirez-Mejia’s appeal. In February, she was 

removed to Honduras.

In March, Ramirez-Mejia moved to reopen her case based on the 

discovery of previously unavailable evidence. This evidence included: (1) an 

affidavit in which the wife of her brother stated that he had been a gang 

member and was killed by a rival gang, and that she had received threatening 

notes following his murder; (2) her brother’s death certificate; (3) affidavits in 

which her parents described their extortion at the hands of the gang; (4) a 

criminal complaint from February 2006 describing the robbery of her father’s 

business and subsequent capture of one of the perpetrators (no mention of 

gunfire is made); (5) a psychological report for Ramirez-Mejia; (6) a declaration 

from an expert on Central American gangs; (7) a statement in which a witness 

to the 2006 robbery stated that the perpetrator captured by police threatened 

to kill Ramirez-Mejia; (8) articles about gang violence in Honduras; (9) 

anonymous threatening notes; and (10) a notarized statement in which 

Ramirez-Mejia asserted that the Honduran public ministry advised her to 

return to the United States after she filed a complaint about the notes.

In May, the BIA granted the motion to reopen and remanded the case so 

that an IJ could determine Ramirez-Mejia’s eligibility for withholding of 

removal and CAT protection in light of the new evidence. In June, RamirezMejia applied for parole so that she could be present for the presentation of her 

case. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) granted the request, and 

Ramirez-Mejia was paroled into the United States in December 2013.

In February 2014, Ramirez-Mejia presented her case. She testified 

about her brother’s murder, the incident at her father’s business, and the 

 Case: 14-60546 Document: 00513123078 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/21/2015
No. 14-60546

4

threats. Additionally, an expert on Central American gangs testified about 

gang violence in Honduras and the government’s inability to control their 

actions. He stated that Ramirez-Mejia would face a high risk of harm or death 

upon returning to the country. Finally, Ramirez-Mejia’s husband testified that 

when he visited her in Honduras after her most recent removal they rarely

ventured outside due to fear.

The IJ denied withholding of removal and CAT protection. The IJ 

assumed the credibility of Ramirez-Mejia and her witnesses, but held that her 

family did not constitute a protected group, and that she had not been targeted 

on the basis of her familial status. The IJ also held that Ramirez-Mejia had 

not demonstrated that she would be tortured by the gang with the 

government’s acquiescence. Finally, the IJ declined to consider RamirezMejia’s eligibility for asylum because her removal order had been reinstated. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5); 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a).

The BIA dismissed Ramirez-Mejia’s appeal. She timely filed a petition 

for review with this court.

DISCUSSION

This court has jurisdiction to review the lawfulness of a reinstatement 

order but not the underlying removal order. See Ojeda-Terrazas v. Ashcroft, 

290 F.3d 292, 295 (5th Cir. 2002). We consider the BIA’s order and any findings 

or conclusions it adopted from the IJ. Hakim v. Holder, 628 F.3d 151, 153 (5th 

Cir. 2010). We review questions of law de novo and findings of fact for 

substantial evidence. Id. Under the substantial-evidence standard, reversal 

requires the applicant to demonstrate “that the evidence is so compelling that 

no reasonable factfinder could reach a contrary conclusion.” Chen v. Gonzalez, 

470 F.3d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir. 2006).

 Case: 14-60546 Document: 00513123078 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/21/2015
No. 14-60546

5

Ramirez-Mejia claims that she is eligible for asylum, and that the BIA 

erred by ruling that she could not apply for asylum due to the reinstatement 

of her removal order. Alternatively, she claims that her parole into the country 

following the reopening of her case rendered the reinstatement statute 

inapplicable to her. She also argues that she is eligible for withholding of 

removal and CAT protection. 

I. Effects of Ramirez-Mejia’s Reinstatement Order

An alien who illegally reenters the country after removal “is not eligible 

and may not apply for any relief under this chapter” and “shall be removed 

under the prior order at any time after the reentry.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). The 

alien is not entitled to a hearing prior to reinstatement but may make a 

statement before an immigration officer. 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.8(a), (b). If the alien 

expresses a fear of persecution or torture upon return to the country of 

removal, the alien is referred to an asylum officer. § 241.8(e). The involvement 

of asylum officers is not because of eligibility for asylum but for another 

purpose, i.e., consideration for “withholding of removal only” once an asylum 

officer determines that the fear is reasonable. Id.; § 208.31(e). 

Ramirez-Mejia argues that the BIA erred by concluding that Section 

1231(a)(5) and its accompanying regulations precluded her from applying for 

asylum following the reinstatement of her removal order because asylum is not 

a form of “relief” under the statute. Thus, since she is physically present in the 

United States and none of the limiting exceptions or conditions governing 

asylum apply to her, she maintains that she must be allowed to apply for 

asylum. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a), (b)(2).

The immigration statutes do not define the word “relief.” Nevertheless, 

“its familiar meaning encompasses any ‘redress or benefit’ provided by a court.” 

 Case: 14-60546 Document: 00513123078 Page: 5 Date Filed: 07/21/2015
No. 14-60546

6

United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 909 (2009) (quoting BLACK’S LAW 

DICTIONARY 1317 (8th ed. 2004)). Asylum is a form of redress from removal 

because, if granted, it prevents the removal from going forward. Courts 

routinely refer to asylum as a form of relief from removal and frequently 

employ the phrase “asylum relief.” See, e.g., Jama v. ICE, 543 U.S. 335, 337 

(2005); Wang v. Holder, 569 F.3d 531, 540 (5th Cir. 2009); Morales-Izquierdo 

v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 491 (9th Cir. 2007). On the other hand, we agree 

with the government’s statement at oral argument that withholding of removal 

and application of the CAT are often referred to as forms of protection, not 

relief. See, e.g., Wang, 569 F.3d at 535.

Under Section 1231(a)(5), an alien whose removal order is reinstated is 

ineligible “for any relief under this chapter . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) 

(emphasis added). “Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning 

. . . .” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997). When the word is not 

qualified by restrictive language, “there is no basis in the text for limiting” the 

word or clause it modifies. Id. Thus, Section 1231(a)(5), read plainly, broadly 

denies all forms of redress from removal, including asylum. This conclusion is 

confirmed by the statute’s admonition that an alien who illegally reenters the 

country “shall be removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). Affording asylum relief to aliens whose removal orders 

are reinstated would be inconsistent with this provision. Additionally, the 

statute’s accompanying regulations, which reiterate its blanket denial of relief 

and recognize an exception for withholding of removal but not asylum, also 

support this conclusion. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.8(a), (e); see also § 208.31(e).

Ramirez-Mejia argues that this interpretation of Section 1231(a)(5) 

conflicts with Section 1158, which outlines the general requirements and 

procedures for asylum relief. According to her, Congress intended Section 

 Case: 14-60546 Document: 00513123078 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/21/2015
No. 14-60546

7

1158’s criteria and conditions to be the only limitations on asylum. We 

disagree. Section 1158 does not “create any substantive or procedural right or 

benefit,” and “[t]he Attorney General may provide by regulation for any . . . 

conditions or limitations on the consideration of an application for asylum . . . 

.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(d)(5)(B), (d)(7). The Supreme Court emphasized the 

discretionary nature of asylum relief when it stated that the Attorney General 

is not required to grant an alien asylum even when the eligibility criteria are 

met. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 441, 444-45 (1987). These 

interpretations of Section 1158 show that it was intended to be amenable to 

limitation by regulation and by the exercise of discretion.

In addition, Section 1231(a)(5) imposes a statutory limit. It was designed 

to “enlarge[] the class of illegal reentrants whose orders may be reinstated and 

limit[] the possible relief from a removal order available to them.” FernandezVargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 33 (2006). Congress has many options in 

revising statutory schemes. Adopting a clear limitation in one section without 

amending another section specifically dealing with the same subject is one 

such option. The judiciary’s role is not to question the method of an

amendment but only to interpret its effect. The clear language in Section 

1231(a)(5) suffices to bar all relief from removal, even asylum.

This analysis is consistent with existing case law. At least one circuit 

has recognized that “‘aliens subject to reinstatement of a previous removal 

order under [Section 1231(a)(5)]’ are ‘ineligible for asylum.’” See HerreraMolina v. Holder, 597 F.3d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Regulations 

Concerning the Conventions Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478, 8485 (Feb. 

19, 1999)). Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has explicitly addressed 

the issue, but both have held that aliens subject to reinstatement orders are 

ineligible for adjustments of status under Section 1231(a)(5). See Fernandez-

 Case: 14-60546 Document: 00513123078 Page: 7 Date Filed: 07/21/2015
No. 14-60546

8

Vargas, 548 U.S. at 46-47; Silva Rosa v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 403, 410 (5th Cir. 

2007). Those cases provide a useful analogy. Like Section 1158, the 

adjustment-of-status provisions do not mention reinstatement orders. See 8 

U.S.C. § 1255. Moreover, like asylum, adjustments of status are not 

specifically listed as a type of relief under Section 1231(a)(5). Nevertheless, 

the Supreme Court and this court both held that aliens were not eligible for an 

adjustment of status under Section 1231(a)(5). See Fernandez-Vargas, 548 

U.S. at 46-47; Silva Rosa, 490 F.3d at 410.

In summary, Section 1231(a)(5)’s plain language, relevant regulations, 

and analogous case law all compel the conclusion that aliens whose removal 

orders are reinstated may not apply for asylum. Accordingly, the BIA did not 

err by declining to consider Ramirez-Mejia’s eligibility for asylum relief.

II. Ramirez-Mejia’s Parole Into the United States

Ramirez-Mejia also argues that Section 1231(a)(5) is inapplicable to her 

because it only applies to aliens who reentered the United States illegally. She 

last entered the country under a grant of parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 

1182(d)(5). Thus, she argues that the government, by paroling her into the 

United States to determine whether she was eligible for “withholding of 

removal only,” displaced her prior illegal reentry and rendered her eligible for 

asylum. The argument is imaginative but errant.

The Immigration and Nationality Act gave the Attorney General

authority to exercise discretion in granting parole and to place “such conditions 

as he may prescribe” on the parolee. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Even though 

that statute remains unchanged, parole authority now resides with the DHS.1 

 

1 It seems agreed that authority over granting parole was transferred from the 

Attorney General to the DHS in 2002 as a result of the Act that created the DHS; we need 

 Case: 14-60546 Document: 00513123078 Page: 8 Date Filed: 07/21/2015
No. 14-60546

9

Additionally, parole does not create an entitlement to remain in the United 

States: “when the purposes of such parole . . . have been served the alien shall 

forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and 

thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that 

of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” Id. Regulations 

provide further requirements and procedures for parole. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.5. 

Ramirez-Mejia was granted parole for the purpose of pursuing

withholding of removal and CAT protection. Though her presence in the 

country was with the permission of the DHS, we see no basis for concluding 

that her authorized presence overrode the effect of her earlier illegal entry. 

Nothing about the grant of temporary parole to pursue relief cancels the 

relevance of her earlier illegal reentry after having been removed. She thus 

remains subject to the provisions of Section 1231(a)(5).

We also see no relevance to the fact that, under certain circumstances, a 

removal order may not be reinstated after a removed alien legally reenters the 

country. For example, after the passage of a prescribed period of time, a prior 

removal order will not prevent a removed alien from applying for or obtaining 

admission to the country. See § 1182(a)(9); In re Torres-Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. 

866, 871-72 (BIA 2006). Such circumstances are inapplicable in this case. 

Ramirez-Mejia has not been admitted to the United States following her 

removal, and her parole has no effect on her status under the law. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(d)(5)(A); Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 188 (1958).

Ramirez-Mejia’s parole did not render Section 1231(a)(5) inoperative. 

 

not trace the statutory route of the transfer here. See Matter of Castillo-Padilla, 25 I. & N.

Dec. 257, 261 & n.1 (BIA 2010). One reference to the authority of the DHS Secretary is in 6 

U.S.C. § 202(4), which provides that the Secretary is to establish and administer rules 

governing parole.

 Case: 14-60546 Document: 00513123078 Page: 9 Date Filed: 07/21/2015
No. 14-60546

10

III. Withholding of Removal

Withholding of removal is required when an alien is able to “establish

that his or her life or freedom would be threatened in the proposed country of 

removal on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 

social group, or political opinion.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). If the alien shows 

past persecution based on membership in a relevant group, the burden shifts 

to the government to show that the threat of persecution no longer exists or 

can be mitigated through relocation within the country of removal. § 

1208.16(b)(1)(i)-(ii). Otherwise, the alien must show that he will “more likely 

than not” suffer persecution.2 § 1208(b)(1)(iii), (2). Unlike forms of relief from 

removal, such as asylum, withholding of removal (as well as CAT protection) 

prevents an alien from being returned to the place of danger; it does not 

prevent removal if some other country will accept the alien. See § 1208.16(f).

The IJ concluded that Ramirez-Mejia’s family did not meet the 

“particularity” and “social visibility” requirements of a “particular social 

group.” See Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 520-21 (5th Cir. 2012). 

It also concluded that she did not establish that she was persecuted “on account 

of” her membership in her family. The BIA affirmed based on the latter 

rationale and declined to address whether Ramirez-Mejia’s family constituted 

a “particular social group.”3 We agree with that conclusion and likewise do not 

address whether her family was a particular social group.

 

2 This standard is more stringent than the “well-founded fear” standard applicable to 

asylum. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-32 (1987).

3 Contrary to Ramirez-Mejia’s contention, the BIA did not concede that her family 

constituted a particular social group. Rather, it found as follows: “However the proposed 

social group may be defined, the applicant has not established that gang members targeted 

her to punish her for or to overcome her group membership.”

 Case: 14-60546 Document: 00513123078 Page: 10 Date Filed: 07/21/2015
No. 14-60546

11

Ramirez-Mejia argues that she was persecuted, at least in part, on the 

basis of her family membership because the gang referred to and sought 

information about her brother in the anonymous notes, sought extortion money 

from her parents, and referred to her brother in the note sent to her brother’s 

wife. She also cites testimony in which her expert witness stated that a gang’s 

animosity toward an individual may come to extend to the family as a whole. 

She concludes that “[w]ithout her relationship to her brother, the gang would 

not have asked her about any hypothetical ‘information.’”

These arguments are unpersuasive. The primary purpose of the threats 

was to obtain information Ramirez-Mejia’s brother had supposedly given her. 

Ramirez-Mejia emphasizes that the gang members mentioned her and her 

brother by name when issuing the threats. Referring to individuals by name 

indicates little, and certainly does not, in and of itself, evince intent to 

persecute on the basis of membership within a family. Accordingly, this 

evidence does not undermine the IJ’s conclusion that Ramirez-Mejia’s “worth 

to the persecutors is predicated on her knowledge of some supposed secret and 

not based upon the fact of her familial relationship to her brother.”

Ramirez-Mejia maintains that “[a]ny request for information by the gang 

members was . . . inseparable from her relationship with her brother.” She 

does not explain why that is so. Logically, there is no reason to suppose that 

those who persecute to obtain information also do so out of hatred for a family, 

or vice versa. As a result, the evidence that gang members sought information 

from Ramirez-Mejia about her brother, without more, does not support her 

claim that the gang intended to persecute her on account of her family. This 

is particularly true in light of the fact that other members of her family, who 

have remained in Honduras, have not faced persecution on the basis of their 

membership in the family.

 Case: 14-60546 Document: 00513123078 Page: 11 Date Filed: 07/21/2015
No. 14-60546

12

Finally, the fact that the gang sought to extort Ramirez-Mejia’s family is 

irrelevant for purposes of the persecution analysis, because this court “do[es] 

not recognize economic extortion as a form of persecution under immigration 

law . . . .” Castillo-Enriquez v. Holder, 690 F.3d 667, 668 (5th Cir. 2012) 

(citations and quotations omitted).

Because Ramirez-Mejia has not demonstrated that no reasonable 

factfinder could conclude that she was not persecuted on account of her family 

membership, see Chen, 470 F.3d at 1134, we agree with the BIA’s conclusion 

that Ramirez-Mejia does not qualify for withholding of removal.

IV. CAT Protection

To be eligible for CAT protection, an alien must “establish that it is more 

likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed 

country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). In assessing the likelihood of 

torture, the factfinder may consider evidence of past torture, the alien’s ability 

to relocate within the country of removal to avoid torture, and human rights 

violations within the country of removal. § 1208.16(c)(3). “Torture is defined 

as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 

intentionally inflicted on a person . . . by or at the instigation of or with the 

consent or acquiescence of a public official . . . .” § 1208.18(a)(1). Willful 

blindness to torture constitutes acquiescence. Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 

F.3d 341, 354 (5th Cir. 2002).

The BIA accepted the IJ’s finding that Ramirez-Mejia would not more 

likely than not be tortured by or with the consent of the Honduran government 

if she returned to Honduras. The IJ observed that Ramirez-Mejia, her family, 

and her brother’s wife had not been tortured in the past; she did not show an 

inability to relocate to a part of Honduras where her likelihood of harm would 

 Case: 14-60546 Document: 00513123078 Page: 12 Date Filed: 07/21/2015
No. 14-60546

13

be diminished, as her brother’s wife had done; and she did not show 

acquiescence to violence by the Honduran police, who in fact arrested a gang 

member and requested that she give a statement after the robbery of her 

father’s business in 2006.

Ramirez-Mejia does not specifically contest these findings. Instead, she 

emphasizes the country reports discussing gang violence and police corruption 

in Honduras. She also reiterates her allegations that the police recommended 

against filing a report after her brother’s murder and responded with 

indifference when she disclosed the arrested gang member’s threats in 2006 

and the anonymous notes in 2013. This evidence, she claims, shows that it is 

more probable than not that she will be tortured if removed to Honduras.

Ramirez-Mejia has not demonstrated that no reasonable factfinder could 

conclude that she did not qualify for CAT protection. See Chen, 470 F.3d at 

1134. First, she has not contested the finding that she was not tortured before 

leaving Honduras or after returning following her first and second removal. 

Nor has she contested the finding that her brother’s wife and family members 

were not tortured, despite remaining in Honduras after her brother’s murder. 

Finally, the fact that her brother’s wife has not been harmed since moving to 

another part of Honduras suggests that any danger of harm could be mitigated 

through relocation. Based on this evidence, a reasonable factfinder could have 

found that Ramirez-Mejia would not more likely than not be tortured if 

removed to Honduras. Although the country reports and alleged threats 

emphasized by Ramirez-Mejia may weigh against this conclusion, they do not 

compel the opposite conclusion. See id.

Second, Ramirez-Mejia has offered little evidence that the government 

would acquiesce in gang members’ attempts to harm her. Although she alleged 

that the police told her not to report her brother’s murder and “not to get 

 Case: 14-60546 Document: 00513123078 Page: 13 Date Filed: 07/21/2015
No. 14-60546

14

involved with these people,” she did not allege that the police stated or 

otherwise indicated that they would permit harm to befall her if she did file a 

report. Additionally, she asserted that the police allowed her to be threatened 

by a gang member after the robbery of her father’s business in 2006, but she 

acknowledged that the police arrested the gang member and insisted that she 

file a report against him. Finally, she alleged that officials advised her to leave 

the country when she disclosed the anonymous notes she had received. Again, 

however, she did not allege that the officials expressed any intent to acquiesce 

in her torture if she did not leave. This evidence, as well as the country reports 

and related testimony, does not compel the conclusion that the government 

would acquiesce in Ramirez-Mejia’s torture if she returned to Honduras.

We agree with the BIA’s conclusion that Ramirez-Mejia does not qualify 

for CAT protection.

Petition DENIED.

 Case: 14-60546 Document: 00513123078 Page: 14 Date Filed: 07/21/2015