alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-6079

ELLIOTT LEWIS FIELDS, JR.,

 Petitioner – Appellant,

v.

GENE JOHNSON, Director Virginia Department of Corrections, 

et al.,

 Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, 

District Judge. (1:10-cv-00839-LMB-IDD)

Submitted: March 15, 2012 Decided: March 20, 2012

Before DUNCAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Elliott Lewis Fields, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Elliott Lewis Fields, Jr., seeks to appeal the 

district court’s order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion 

for reconsideration of the district court’s order denying relief 

on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. The order is not 

appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2006); 

Reid v. Angelone, 369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 2004). 

A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies 

relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is 

debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). 

When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural 

ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable 

claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. 

at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude 

that Fields has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we 

deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 
3

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
NO. 0r-15-00334-CR

STATE OF TEXAS S rN TrrE

$

vs. s FrRST couRT

s

I\AJMA PARKER S OF APPEALS

MOTION TO E,XTEND TIME TO FILE APPE,LLANT'S BRIEF

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF SAID COURT:

Now comes Najma Parker, Appellant in the above styled and numbered

cause, and moves this Court to grant an extension of time to file appellant's brief,

pursuant to Rule 38.6 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and for good

cause shows the following:

1. This case is on appeal from the 300th Judicial District Court of

Brazoria County, Texas.

2. The case below was styled the STATE, OF TEXAS vs. Najma Parker,

and numbered73269.

3. Appellant was convicted of Theft With Two Or More Previous

Convictions.

4. Appellant was assessed a sentence of TDCJ-State Jail for a period of 2

years on 03/20/2015.

5. Notice of appeal was given on04ll0l20l5.

ACCEPTED

01-15-00334-CR

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

7/27/2015 12:41:33 PM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

 FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 7/27/2015 12:41:33 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
6. The clerk's record was filed on 0612512015; the reporter's record

filed on 0511812015.

7 . The appellate brief is presently due on 07127 12015.

8. Appellant requests an extension of time of 30 days from the present

date, i.e.07/27/2015.

9. No extension to file the brief has been received in this cause.

10. Defendant is currently ncarcerated.

1 1. Appellant relies on the following facts as good cause for the requested

extension:

Appellant's Counselhad several criminal trial cases to prepare for

during this time period.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant prays that this

Court grarfi this Motion To Extend Time to File Appellant's Brief,, and for such

other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,

FRANK J FRALEY

2616 South Loop West

Suite 503

Houston, TX77054

Tel:713.668.4496

Fax:713.668.4497
Frank J. Fraley

State Bar No. 07350350

fr aley fr ank@hotmail. c om

Attorney for Najma Parker

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on July 27, 2015, a true and correct copy of the above

and foregoing document was served on the District Attorney's Office, Brazoria

County, Jeri Yenne, by fax to 979.864.1525.
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1238 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1238

 To provide requirements for Executive agency spending at the end of a 
                  fiscal year, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 30, 2019

   Ms. Ernst introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To provide requirements for Executive agency spending at the end of a 
                  fiscal year, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``End-of-Year Fiscal Responsibility 
Act''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Covered period.--The term ``covered period'' means the 
        2-month period immediately preceding the end of a fiscal year.
            (2) Discretionary appropriations.--The term ``discretionary 
        appropriations'' has the meaning given the term in section 
        250(c) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act 
        of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 900(c)).
            (3) Executive agency.--The term ``Executive agency'' has 
        the meaning given the term in section 105 of title 5, United 
        States Code.

SEC. 3. REQUIREMENTS FOR EXECUTIVE AGENCY SPENDING AT THE END OF A 
              FISCAL YEAR.

    (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (c), the amount 
of discretionary appropriations obligated by an Executive agency during 
each month of a covered period may not exceed the average monthly 
amount of discretionary appropriations obligated by the Executive 
agency during the 10-month period immediately preceding the covered 
period.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the end of each fiscal 
year, each Executive agency shall submit to Congress and post on a 
publicly available website an itemized list of discretionary 
appropriations obligated by the Executive agency during the covered 
period immediately preceding the date on which the report is submitted.
    (c) Exception.--This section shall not apply with respect to any 
discretionary appropriations obligated by an Executive agency for 
national security-related activities.
                                 <all>
```
# Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas September 16, 2021 No. 04-20-00311-CV Margaret Fay GUIDRY , Appellant

v. Edward James GUIDRY , Jr.,

Appellee From the 452nd District Court, Menard County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2018-05589 James L. Rex, Judge Presiding 

### O R D E R Retained counsel for appellee, Shain V.H. Chapman, has filed a motion to withdraw which complies with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.5. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 6.5(a), (b). Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED. It is ORDERED that the appellee’s brief is due to be filed in this court within thirty (30) days from the date of this order. If appellee fails to file a brief, or a motion for extension of time in compliance with T EX . R. A PP . P. 10.5(b)(1), this appeal will be set at issue without the benefit of an appellee’s brief.

_________________________________ Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 16th day of September, 2021.

___________________________________ MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court
## Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

Cory Don Crosby, Appellant

No. 06

- 17

- 00179

- CR v.
The State of Texas, Appellee Appeal from the 52nd District Court of Coryell County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 16

- 23730 ). Memorandum Opinion delivered by Ju stice Moseley, Chief Justice Morriss and Justice Burgess participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court

below

. We affirm the judgment of the trial court

. W e note that the appellant, Cory Don Crosby, has adequately indicated his inability to pay costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED MARCH 23, 2018 B Y ORDER OF THE COURT JOSH R. MORRISS, III CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST: Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
. i 

Honorable Neal Birmingham Opinion No. 

Crlmlnal District Attorney. 

Cass County Re: Whether -.. - 

c-433 

burning of crosses ._ ..- Llnaen, *rexas In a resldentlal area is 

in violation of the Texas 

Dear Mr. Birmingham: Penal Code. 

In a recent opinion request of this office you asked 

whether or not there Is a provision In the Texas Penal Code 

which specifically prohibits the burning of crosses In resldentlal areas. We have been unable to find such a specific 

statute. 

It Is poaslble, however, that a person, ,&ring the 

commission of the act of burning a cross In a resddentlal 

area, may violate the provisions of various Articles In 

Vernon's Penal Code. For example, dependent upon the facts, 

such act could be In vlolatlon of on& or more of Articles 

474, 454a, 1321, 1321b and 1303. 

The possible vlolatlons are not confined to the 

above set out statutes, of course, but the above are mentioned simply to Indicate that the act of burning a cross 

In a resldentlal.area may, depending upon the facts surroundlng'the occurrence, be In vlolatlozi of one or more 

Articles of Vernon's Penal Code. 

SUMMARY 

There is no provision In the Texas Penal 

Code which specifically prohibits the burning 

of cross68 in a residential area. 

Yours very truly, 

WAGGONER CARR 

Attorney General of Texas 

Assistant Attbrney &mral' 

-2050- 
Honorable Neal Birmingham, page 2 (C-433) 

SC/lh/br 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

W. V. Geppert, Chairman 

John Banks 

Al10 B. Crow, Jr. 

Bob Flowers 

Sam L. Kelley 

,iPPROVED FOR THE ATTOP8EY GENERAL 

By: Stanton Stone 

-2051-
O'BRIEN, BELLAND & BUSHINSKY, LLC 

1526 Berlin Road

Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08003

(856) 795-2181

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

By: Mark E. Belland, Esquire 

Donna Lee Vitale, Esquire 

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF 

PAINTERS AND ALLIED TRADES 

DISTRICT COUNCIL 711 HEALTH 

& WELFARE, VACATION, and 

FINISHING TRADES INSTITUTE

FUNDS and HARRY J. 

HARCHETTS,

Plaintiffs,

 

v.

VILLAGE GLASS, INC.

 Defendants.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW 

JERSEY

Civil Action No.: 11cv01023 JLL CCC

REQUEST TO ENTER DEFAULT

TO: Clerk, United States District Court

Martin Luther King Bldg. & U.S. Courthouse

50 Walnut Street, Room 4015

Newark, NJ 07101

PLEASE enter default against Defendant, Village Glass, Inc., for failure to 

appear, plead or otherwise defend as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, as appears from the Affidavit of Donna Lee Vitale, Esquire attached 

hereto.

Case 2:11-cv-01023-ES -CLW Document 11 Filed 01/24/12 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 151
Respectfully submitted.

O’BRIEN, BELLAND & BUSHINSKY, LLC

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

S/Donna Lee Vitale

_____________________________________

Donna Lee Vitale, Esquire

Dated: January 24, 2012

Case 2:11-cv-01023-ES -CLW Document 11 Filed 01/24/12 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 152
Exhibit 31.2

Certification of Principal Financial Officer

I, Russell L. ("Rusty") Tackett, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Maverick Bancorporation, Inc.;
2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;
4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) [Intentionally Omitted] for the registrant and we have:
5. designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;
6. [Intentionally Omitted];
7. evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
8. disclosed in this quarterly report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;
9. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):
10. all significant deficiencies and material weakness in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and
11. any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

Date: November 16, 2006

/S/ Russell Tackett
Russell L. ("Rusty") Tackett
Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
**OFFICE OF**  **THE AITORNEY**  **GENERAL OF**  **TEXAS AUSTIN** 

Mr. Tom L. Beauohamp, Jr. Secretary to the Governor Austin, Texas Dear Sir:

of themurder of Geow%-. instance states wherebyoffer a and delivery of the said

of Lamar County, This reward is pay- ,return and conviction of

that a conre the reIn such sltuatlon, the al to identify the person apprehended 11 person referred to as allegedly orge R. Roberts. the file does not reflect that any conviction of the apprehended fugitivehas been had, the. .
Mr. Tom L. Beauchamp, Jr., Page 2

condltlon upon which the reward ispayable has notbeen met, and itbecomes unnecessary to determine, at thls time, the questlon of apportionmentbetween claimants. Yours very truly ATTOF+iEYGENERAL OF TEXAS .

APPRO-ED AUG 4, 1941 (signed)Grover Sellers FI%T ASSISTANT ATTOkNEY GEKERAL By (Signed)R. W.Fairchlld Assistant

APPROVED OPINION COWiiITTEiX By BWB Chairman
907 A.2d 1007

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. ENOCH BRIMAGE, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

September 8, 2006.

ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted on the issue of defendant’s sentence, and the matter is summarily remanded to the trial court for resentencing in light of the Court’s decision in *State v. Thomas,*188 *N.J.*137, 902 A.2d 1185 (2006).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DERRICK MENTER : CRIMINAL ACTION

:

v. :

:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : NO. 11-159-1

ORDER

AND NOW, this 12th day of March, 2013, it is hereby

ORDERED that the motion of defendant Derrick Menter "requesting a

complete copy of government witness Robert Sacks trial testimony"

(Doc. #57) is DENIED.

____________________

Defendant was found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to

commit murder of the Chief Judge of the United States District

Court for the District of New Jersey in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1117. He was sentenced to life imprisonment on December 9,

2011. No direct appeal was taken. On December 7, 2012, he filed

a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside or correct

his sentence (Menter v. U.S., Civ. No. 12-7526). The court

denied his motion on January 30, 2013 and declined to issue a

certificate of appealability.

Defendant now contends that witness Robert Sacks was

offered an undisclosed agreement by the government in exchange

for his testimony and that defendant has newly discovered

Case 1:11-cr-00159-HB Document 58 Filed 03/12/13 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 350
evidence that Sacks provided false testimony. Menter does not

give any specifics to support his assertions.

Menter is plowing old ground. These issues were raised

in his § 2255 motion and were found to be totally without merit.

Accordingly, his motion for a transcript is being

denied on the ground that his request is frivolous. See 28

U.S.C. § 753(f).

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Harvey Bartle III 

J.

-2-

Case 1:11-cr-00159-HB Document 58 Filed 03/12/13 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 351
Exhibit 10.39

 

Executive Park West IV

4714 Gettysburg Road

Mechanicsburg, PA 17055

 

First Addendum to Lease Agreement

 

This First Addendum is made as of the 1st day of November, 2012 by and between Old Gettysburg Associates IV LP a Pennsylvania limited partnership (“Landlord”), and Select Medical Corporation a Delaware corporation (“Tenant”).

 

BACKGROUND:

 

A.            Landlord and Tenant are parties to that certain Office Lease Agreement dated August 25, 2006 pursuant to which Landlord leased to Tenant, and Tenant leased from Landlord, approximately 47,864 rentable square feet of space known as 4714 Gettysburg Rd., Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania.  All capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Lease.

 

B.            Landlord and Tenant now desire to amend the Lease as hereinafter set forth.

 

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and promises contained herein, and intending to be legally bound hereby, Landlord and Tenant agree as follows:

 

Effective March 1, 2013 the following terms contained in the Basic Lease shall be amended as follows:

 

1.              On March 1, 2013 rent shall increase by 2% to $28.08 and remain fixed until February 28, 2018.

 

2.              Beginning March 1, 2018 rent shall increase by 2%.  Thereafter, rent shall increase annually on March 1st by 2%

 











 

All other terms and conditions contained in the Lease and not amended hereby remain in full force and effect.

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Landlord and Tenant have caused this First Addendum to be duly executed.

 

 

	
 
    	
Landlord: Old   Gettysburg Associates IV, LP
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
By:
    	
/s/ John M. Ortenzio
    
	
 
    	
Select Realty Investments I, LLC as General Partner
    
	
 
    	
John M. Ortenzio, Manager
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
Date:
    	
November 1, 2012
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
Tenant: Select Medical Corporation
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
By:
    	
/s/ Michael E. Tarvin
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
Michael E. Tarvin
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
(Print name)
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
Title:
    	
Executive Vice President, General Counsel & Secretary
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
Date:
    	
November 1, 2012
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSEPH E. RUBINO,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

ACME BUILDING MAINTENANCE; et

al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 10-16223

D.C. No. 5:08-cv-00696-JW

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

James Ware, Chief Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 19, 2011** 

Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges. 

Joseph E. Rubino appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment

in his employment action alleging race discrimination in violation of Title VII. We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Leong v. Potter,

FILED

JAN 06 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 10-16223

347 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Rubino’s race

discrimination claim because Rubino failed to raise a genuine dispute of material

fact as to whether ACME Building Maintenance treated similarly situated

individuals outside his protected class more favorably. See id. at 1124.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rubino’s discovery

motions. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that

“[b]road discretion is vested in the trial court to permit or deny discovery” (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Rubino’s remaining contentions, including those regarding judicial bias, are

unpersuasive.

We do not consider Rubino’s contentions raised for the first time on appeal. 

See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).

AFFIRMED.
ex10-21.htm



EXHIBIT 10.21




 


EXHIBIT A


 


AMENDMENT NUMBER 8


TO THE


URS FEDERAL TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC. EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT PLAN


(2007 Restatement)







The URS Federal Technical Services, Inc. Employees Retirement Plan, as restated effective January 1, 2007, is hereby amended, effective May 1, 2012, by the addition of a new Section 4.3 as follows.  The following sections of Article IV are renumbered accordingly.


 


4.3           In-Service Withdrawal after Attainment of Age 62


 



	
  

	
(a)

	
Not withstanding any provision in Section 3.3(b) to the contrary, a Participant may elect at any time after attainment of age 62 to begin receiving his or her vested Retirement Income while still in the employ of the Company.  The Participant shall begin receiving benefits on the first day of the calendar month after the Plan Administrator receives his written application to receive benefits.  In-Service Withdrawals provided under this Section 4.3 shall be subject to the following restrictions:







 



	
  

	
(i)

	
The Participant must have a reduced work schedule, which provides for the completion of less than 40 Hours of Service with the Employer in any month.







 



	
  

	
(ii)

	
If the Participant actually completes more than 40 Hours of Service in any month, that month shall be treated as a month of suspension service under Section 3.3, and the Participant’s Retirement Income shall be suspended for that month.







 



	
  

	
(b)

	
The Participant shall continue to earn Credited Service as provided above in Section 3.2(b) for a Participant who does not normally work the regular full-time work week for his Employer.







 



	
  

	
(c)

	
The Participant shall continue to accrue benefits at the rate provided above in Section 4.1(b) until the Participant’s retirement, subject to the exclusions set forth in Sections 4.1(c) and (d).







 







 


[Remainder of Page Intentionally Left Blank]


 




  





i











  






 



	
  

	
(d)

	
The Participant’s Retirement Income that otherwise would have commenced on his Normal Retirement Date shall be calculated in the same manner as the early Retirement Income calculated pursuant to Sections 4.2(b)(i) and (ii), above.







 




	 	
URS Federal Technical Services, Inc.

	 
	 	 	 	 
	
Dated:  _____________________, 2012

	
By: 

	 	 
	 	Title:	 	 
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 





 


 


ii