This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE 2 ASSOCIATION, 3 Plaintiff-Appellee, 4

v. NO. A-1-CA-37328 5 STEVEN J. CHAVEZ a/k/a STEVE 6 CHAVEZ a/k/a STEVEN CHAVEZ, 7 Defendant-Appellant, 8 and 9 NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF 10 WORKFORCE SOLUTIONS BENEFIT 11 PAYMENT CONTROL SECTION; DEX ONE 12 CORPORATION; MESA RIDGE 13 APARTMENTS LLC d/b/a MESA RIDGE 14 APARTMENTS; and YELLOW BOOK 15 SALES & DISTRIBUTION COMPANY, INC., 16 Defendants. 17 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 18 Alan M. Malott, District Judge 19 Rose L. Brand & Associates, P.C. 20 Eraina M. Edwards 21 Albuquerque, NM 22 for Appellee 232 Rachel O. Woods 1 Albuquerque, NM 2 for Appellant 3 MEMORANDUM OPINION 4 VANZI, Judge. 5
{1} Defendant Steven J. Chavez appeals fro m the district court’s foreclosure 6 judgment and order for foreclosure sale. [2 RP 269] In this Court’s notice of proposed 7 disposition, we proposed to summarily affirm. Appellant filed a memorandum in 8 opposition, which we have duly consider ed. Remaining unpersuaded, we affirm. 9
{2} We initially note that in our calendar notice, we suggested that Appellant’s 10 issues (a) through (d) were unpreserved. Appellant makes no argument in his 11 memorandum in opposition regarding issues a and b, so those are deemed abandoned. 12 See State v. Johnson , 1988-NMCA-029, ¶ 8, 107 N.M . 356, 758 P.2d 306 (explaining 13 that when a case is decide d on the summary calendar, an issue is deemed abandoned 14 when a party fails to respond to the proposed disposition of that issue). 15
{3} With regard to issues (c) and (d), Appellant argues that they were preserved, 16 pointing to the record to indicate where such arguments were made. [MIO 1-2] 17 Appellant also continues to argue issue e, which was addressed in our calendar notice. 18 Thus, Appellant’s three issues are as follo ws: (c) the district court erred by finding 19 that NMSA 1978, Section 47-1-7 (1901) is not applicable to the note indorsement and 203 assignments of mortgage, as they did not involve a conveyance of real property; (d) 1 Plaintiff Fannie Mae improperly sought “e nforcement of the [m]ortgage, as the 2 [m]ortgagee by way of a transfer of the [m]ortgage which ignores” NMSA 1978, 3 Section 47-1-4 (1865); and (e) Fannie M ae improperly sought “enforcement of the 4 [m]ortgage, as the [m]ortgagee by way of a transfer of the [m]ortgage which ignores” 5 Section 47-1-7. [DS 3; CN 3-5; see also MIO 2-5] These issues are related and 6 essentially argue that the note was not properly indorsed and that MERS did not have 7 the authority to assign the mortgage and/orrecord the assignment of mortgage and/or 8 that the assignment of mortgage was ineffective absent some additional authority 9 granted and recorded. [ SeeDS 3, 6-9; MIO 2-5] 10
{4} Section 47-1-4 states that “[a]ny pers on or persons, or body politic, holding, or 11 who may hold, any right or title toreal estate in this state, be it absolute or limited, in 12 possession, remainder or reversion, may convey the same in the manner and subject 13 to the restrictions prescribed in this chapter.” Section 47-1-7 states: 14 All powers of attorney or other writings containing authority to 15 convey real estate, as agent or attorn ey of the owner of the same, or to 16 execute, as agent for another, any c onveyance of real estate, or by which 17 real estate may be affected in law, or equity, sh all be acknowledged, 18 certified, filed and recorded, as other writings conveying or affecting real 19 estate are required to be acknowledged. No such power of attorney, or 20 other writing, filed and recorded in th e manner prescribed in this section, 21 shall be considered revoked by any act of the party executing the same, 22 until the instrument of writing revoking the same, duly acknowledged 23 and certified to, shall be filed for reco rd and recorded in the office of the 244 county clerk where said power of attorney or other writing is filed and 1 recorded. 2 In our calendar notice, we suggested that Section 47-1-7 was inapplicable because it 3 applies to conveyances of real property, not negotiable instruments. [CN 4] Appellant 4 argues that this is not always true, and we agree and clarify. 5
{5} As the statute states, see High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of 6 Albuquerque , 1998-NMSC-050, ¶ 5, 126 N.M. 413, 970 P.2d 599 (stating that “the 7 plain language of a statute is the primary indicator of legislative intent” and that we 8 “give the words used in the statute their ordinary meaning unless the [L]egislature 9 indicates a different intent” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)), Section 10 47-1-7 is intended to apply to powers of attorney or other writings that contain 11 authority (a) to convey real estate, as agent or attorney of the owner of the same, (b) 12 to execute, as agent for another, or (c) by which real estate may be affected in law or 13 equity. Section 47-1-4. In the present case, we do not have any powers of attorney or 14 conveyances of real estate, but we do have “other writings that contain authority . . . 15 by which real estate may be affected in law or equity[.]” S ection 47-1-7. Thus, 16 Section 47-1-7 requires that such writing mu st be “acknowledged, certified, filed and 17 recorded, as other writings conveying or affecting real estate are required to be 18 acknowledged.” 195 {6} In the context of Appellant’s argument, this requires that the indorsements of 1 note and assignments of mortgage be acknow ledged, certified, filed, and recorded. See 2 id. [ SeeDS 3; MIO 2-5] However, a promissory note, and, indeed, the note at issue 3 in the present case [ see1 RP 9-13], does not convey or affect real estate in law or in 4 equity—rather, a note is a negotiable instrument by which one party agrees to owe 5 another party pursuant to the terms of the instrument. SeeNMSA 1978, § 55-3-104 6 (1992). As such, to the extent Appellant argue s that the district court erred in finding 7 that Section 47-1-7 is inapplicable to th e note indorsements [DS 3], we disagree and 8 affirm the district court. 9
{7} We thus turn to Appellant’s arguments that the district c ourt erred in finding 10 that Section 47-1-7 was inapplicable to th e assignments of mortgage and that Fannie 11 Mae improperly sought enforcement of the mortgage by way of a transfer of the 12 mortgage that ignores Section 47-1-7. [DS 3; MIO 2-5] As indicated above, Section 13 47-1-7 requires that the mortgage assignments must be “acknowledged, certified, filed 14 and recorded, as other writings conveying or affecting real estate are required to be 15 acknowledged.” See§ 47-1-7. According to our revi ew of the record, it appears that 16 the mortgage and each of its assignments was, indeed, acknowledge d, certified, filed, 17 and recorded. [ See1 RP 14-30, 35, 36] In his memorandum in opposition, Appellant 18 has provided no reference to the record to indicate that this is not true. Rather, he 19 simply contends that Plaintiff “cannot s how transfer of the [m]ortgage or [n]ote 206 compliant with [Section] 47-1-7 and so fails its jurisdictional prerequisite for a cause 1 of action.” [MIO 5] Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s determination that the 2 mortgage was properly assigned and/or that Section 47-1-7 did not render such 3 assignment ineffective. See Romero v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs , 2011-NMCA-066, ¶ 7, 4 150 N.M. 59, 257 P.3d 404 (“[W]e can affirm if the district court was correct for any 5 reason that was before it on the basis of the presentations of the parties.”). 6
{8} To the extent Appellant is attempting to argue that Plaintiff did not have 7 standing to pursue this action for some reason other than that it purportedly “ignore[d] 8 Section 47-1-7” [ seeDS 3; MIO 5], we decline to address the undeveloped argument. 9 See Corona v. Corona , 2014-NMCA-071, ¶ 28, 329 P.3d 701 (“This Court has no 10 duty to review an argument that is not adequately developed.”); see also Elane 11 Photography, LLC v. Willock , 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 70, 309 P.3d 53 (“We will not 12 review unclear arguments, or guess at what a party’s arguments mi ght be.” (alteration, 13 internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). 14
{9} To the extent Appellant intends to arguethat MERS did not have the authority 15 as nominee to assign the mortgage on behalf of the lender [ seeDS 7-8], this argument 16 has been addressed by this Court and our S upreme Court, and we decline to revisit it. 17 See Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Licha , 2015-NMCA-086, ¶ 17, 356 P.3d 1102, abrogated 18 on other grounds recognized byPNC Mortg. v. Romero , 2016-NMCA-064, ¶ 18, 377 19 P.3d 461; see also Bank of N.Y. v. Romero , 2014-NMSC-007, ¶ 35, 320 P.3d 1 (“As 207 a nominee for [the lender] on th e mortgage contract, MERS could assign the mortgage 1 but lacked any authority to assign the [bo rrowers’] note.” (empha sis added)). And to 2 the extent Appellant intends to argue that MERS’s assignment of the mortgage 3 somehow implicates Section 47-1-7 and imposes a requirement that MERS and the 4 lender on whose behalf MERS acted must both sign, etc., an otherwise properly 5 recorded assignment of mortgage inorder for it to be effective [ seeDS 7, 9], we note 6 that Appellant has failed to provide any authority in support of such a conclusion, and, 7 again, we decline to address the undeveloped argument. See Curry v. Great Nw. Ins. 8 Co. , 2014-NMCA-031, ¶ 28, 320 P.3d 482 (“Wh ere a party cites no authority to 9 support an argument, we may assume no such authority exists.”); Hennessy v. Duryea , 10 1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24, 124 N.M. 754, 955 P.2d 683 (“Our courts have repeatedly 11 held that, in summary calendar cases, th e burden is on the party opposing the proposed 12 disposition to clearly point out errors in fact or law.”); see also Elane Photography, 13 LLC , 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 70; Corona , 2014-NMCA-071, ¶ 28. 14
{10} Accordingly, for the reasons stated in our notice of proposed disposition and 15 herein, we affirm. 16
{11} IT IS SO ORDERED. 17

__________________________________ 18 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 198 WE CONCUR: 1

_________________________________ 2 JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge 3

_________________________________ 4 KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge 5