NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 15-1408

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YURIY S. EPSHTEYN,

Appellant

v.

CHARLES B. BURR, II, 

Senior Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Delaware County, Pa.

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-14-cv-07398)

District Judge: Honorable Legrome D. Davis

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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

June 23, 2015

Before: FUENTES, SHWARTZ and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: July 27, 2015)

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OPINION*

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PER CURIAM

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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Appellant Yuriy Epshteyn, pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”), appeals from an 

order of the District Court dismissing his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

Epshteyn sued Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas Senior Judge Charles 

Burr, II, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Epshteyn alleged that Judge Burr entered erroneous 

and fraudulent orders favoring a counterclaimant in Epshteyn’s state court case over a 

land dispute. Epshteyn requested damages and injunctive relief including setting aside

Judge Burr’s judgments and reinstating Epshteyn’s state court case. The District Court 

granted Epshteyn’s motion to proceed IFP but dismissed his complaint with prejudice 

under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Epshteyn timely appealed.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the 

District Court’s dismissal of Epshteyn’s complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Allah v. 

Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). In screening IFP complaints, a district 

court must dismiss an action if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 

or seeks monetary relief against a defendant immune to such a claim. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)–(iii). To adequately state a claim for relief, “a complaint must 

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

Under the doctrine of judicial immunity, a judge is immune from suit for monetary 

damages arising from his judicial acts. Gallas v. Supreme Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 
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(3d Cir. 2000). The only exceptions are for nonjudicial actions or those “taken in the 

complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S 9, 11–12 (1991). 

Deciding issues in Epshteyn’s case was a quintessentially judicial activity, and Ephsteyn 

does not suggest that Judge Burr clearly lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 

dispute. See id. While Epshteyn alleged that Judge Burr erred by (1) submitting the state 

case for arbitration, (2) denying Epshteyn’s request for IFP status, (3) upholding a verdict 

awarding the counterclaimant relief against Epshteyn, and then (4) holding Epshteyn in 

contempt of court when he failed to satisfy that judgment, mere error would not strip 

Judge Burr’s immunity. See Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006). 

While Epshteyn also argues that Judge Burr acted fraudulently or with bias in 

favor of the counterclaimant, even malicious or corrupt judicial actions do not deprive a 

judge of immunity. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (citing Bradley v. 

Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1872)). Moreover, Epshteyn’s claims of fraud and

bias appear to rest primarily on allegations that: (1) Judge Burr rendered decisions in the 

counterclaimant’s favor and (2) rather than drafting some of his orders himself, Judge 

Burr filled out and signed proposed orders submitted by the counterclaimant and bearing 

his lawyer’s heading. Even assuming their truth, such factual allegations do not support a 

plausible inference that Burr had a conflict of interest for which due process required his 

recusal. See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46–47 (1975).

As for Epshteyn’s challenge to the validity of Judge Burr’s orders, among federal 

courts, only the U.S. Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review and overturn state court 
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judgments. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 

544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005) (citations omitted). Therefore, neither we nor the District 

Court has jurisdiction to review and potentially vacate Judge Burr’s orders and/or

reinstate Epshteyn’s state court case.

Finally, under the circumstances of this case, the District Court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying leave to amend on the grounds of futility. See Grayson v. Mayview 

State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). 

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.