NOT FOR PUBLICATION CLOSED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

____________________________________ 

:

JOHN GREEN, :

:

Plaintiff, : Civil Action No. 11-1152 (JAP)

:

v. : OPINION

:

JUDGE PAUL ENDLER, CHIEF :

JUSTICE STUART RABNER, JUDGE :

GLENN A. GRANT, JUDGE CHRISTINE : 

HEITMANN, PROSECUTOR JEREMY :

SOLOMON, PROSECUTOR ARVIN :

AITHAL, PROSECUTOR SPERO :

KALAMBAKAS :

:

Defendants. :

 ______:

PISANO, District Judge.

This is an action brought by John Green (“Green” or “Plaintiff”) against Judges Paul 

Endler and Christine Heitman of the East Brunswick Municipal Court, Chief Justice Stuart 

Rabner of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, Judge Glenn A. Grant of the Appellate Division of 

the Superior Court of New Jersey, and East Brunswick Municipal Court prosecutors Jeremy 

Solomon, Arvin Aithal and Spero Kalambakas. Presently before the Court are two Motions to 

Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6) and 8(a), one submitted 

by Judges Endler and Heitman along with the three municipal court prosecutors, and the other 

submitted by Chief Justice Rabner and Judge Grant. Plaintiff opposes the Motions. Also before 

the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend his complaint. The Court decides these matters without 

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oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons that follow, this 

case shall be dismissed with prejudice.

I. Background

This action arises from a speeding ticket issued to the Plaintiff in East Brunswick, New 

Jersey, on September 8, 2008. Plaintiff chose to represent himself at trial rather than accepting 

his fine, was found guilty of speeding, and was issued a higher fine than his original ticket, plus 

court costs. (Compl. ¶¶ 10-13, 26, 34.) Green appealed, alleging problems with discovery and 

evidence, and claiming that issuance of a higher fine after trial than at a plea bargain unlawfully 

penalized him for exercising his right to a trial. The municipal court decision was affirmed in the 

Superior Court, Law Division. (Id. at ¶ 35.) The Appellate Division reversed and remanded the 

matter, stating that the trial judge had erroneously denied certain discovery requests and 

excluded certain evidence regarding the applicable speed limit. State v. Green, 417 N.J. Super. 

190, 201-09 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2010). The court also noted Green’s claim that the 

difference in fines interfered with his constitutional right to a trial, stating that it was without 

merit. Id. at 209.

Green filed the instant action on March 7, 2011. He has sued the Defendants in both their 

individual and official capacities. Green claims that the Defendant municipal court judges and 

prosecutors violated his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. For the prosecutors, 

the claims are based on their refusal to turn over certain objects that he requested in discovery, 

and their objections to certain evidence. (Compl. ¶¶ 53-87). Green’s claims against the two 

municipal court judges are based on their denials of his discovery requests. (Id. at ¶¶ 88-119.). 

The claims against Judge Grant and Chief Justice Rabner are based on their positions as Acting 

Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts and as the administrator of the New Jersey 

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court system, respectively. Plaintiff does not allege specific misdeeds against Judge Grant and 

Chief Justice Rabner, but holds them responsible as policymakers for what he believes is an 

unconstitutional differentiation between traffic violators who pay their fine, and those who 

choose to go to trial. (Id. at ¶¶ 125-43.) Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against 

the “policies, practices and acts” complained of and the “unequal treatment of people that ask to 

appear before a judge.” (Id. at 11.) He also seeks compensatory damages of $966 for his court 

costs, and punitive damages of $40,000. (Id.)

Judge Grant and Chief Justice Rabner base their Motion to Dismiss on lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), arguing that this Court is barred from hearing 

Green’s case due to both the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the Eleventh Amendment. The 

municipal court defendants move to dismiss the case based on failure to state a claim pursuant to 

Rule 12(b)(6), because they are each entitled to absolute judicial or prosecutorial immunity. For 

the following reasons, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore this 

case must be dismissed with prejudice.

II. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is the general principle that lower federal courts lack 

subject matter jurisdiction to review state court decisions. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 

460 U.S. 462, 482-83 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); 

ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 109 S. Ct. 2037 (1989). Only the United States Supreme 

Court is vested with that authority. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482-86. Even if the plaintiff alleges 

that the state court action was unconstitutional, he may not appeal to the lower federal courts. 

Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486. “[A] party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in 

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substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based 

on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.”

Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06, (1994). 

The doctrine encompasses indirect attempts to undermine a state court decision. For 

example, plaintiffs may not pursue new federal claims with allegations that are “inextricably 

intertwined” with a state court decision. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486; Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 

288, 296 (3d Cir. 1992). A federal claim is inextricably intertwined if “the federal claim 

succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” Pennzoil 

Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring). The Third Circuit has also 

made clear that the doctrine applies to lower state court rulings that have not yet been upheld in 

the highest state court. Port Authority Police Benev. Ass'n, Inc. v. Port Authority of New York 

and New Jersey Police Dept., 973 F.2d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 1992). 

Based upon the law detailed above, this Court clearly lacks jurisdiction over Green’s 

complaint. The Court need not analyze whether or not it is “inextricably intertwined” with the 

state court decision in State v. Green, 417 N.J. Super. 190, because Green has brought nearly 

identical claims based upon the exact same events that were litigated in that case. The only 

meaningful difference between the two actions is that in state court, Green was a defendant 

appealing his own conviction of speeding, whereas in this action he has sued the municipal and 

state court officials who prosecuted and presided over the case against him. The allegations of 

discovery and evidence errors have already been addressed in State v. Green, and in fact, Green 

significantly prevailed on those issues in his state-court appeal. The matter was reversed and 

remanded. Id. at 200-06 (describing trial judge’s errors in denying certain of Green’s discovery 

requests); id. at 206-09 (discussing trial judge’s error in failing to conduct an evidentiary 

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hearing). The state court also addressed Green’s claim that he was penalized for taking his case 

to trial as follows:

When a judge exercises his discretion to sentence a defendant within a sentencing 

range, he is not limited to the fine that may have been required when a defendant 

pleads guilty. The latter amount is set without regard to the defendant's driving 

record, which is a factor, among others, that are considered by a judge in 

determining the appropriate sentence after trial within the sentencing range, which 

may be higher, lower, or equal to the fine imposed when a defendant pleads 

guilty. See N.J.S.A. 39:4-104 (fine between $ 50 and $ 200). In taking this case to 

trial, defendant accepted the risk that the judge would impose a fine that was not 

equal to what he would have paid had he pled guilty.

State v. Green, 417 N.J. Super. at 209. The proper way to address any perceived deficiencies in 

this or other rulings of the Appellate Division is to appeal to the state’s highest court. Contrary 

to Green’s assertion, this also applies to the state court’s finding that some of his claims were 

moot. Id. 

Two of the Defendants took no part in the state’s case against Green or in his appeal: 

Chief Justice Rabner and Judge Grant. This does not change the outcome of the instant Motions. 

It is true that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not preclude district courts from presiding over 

challenges to rules promulgated by state courts in non-judicial proceedings which do not “require 

review of a final state-court judgment in a particular case.” Feldman, 460 U.S. at 484-86. 

However, even though Green purports to sue Judge Grant and Chief Justice Rabner in their 

capacities as administrators rather than as judges, he has failed to challenge any specific rule or 

policy they have promulgated. He has spuriously connected them to his own case by suggesting 

that they are responsible for the unfairness permeating the entire New Jersey judiciary. Because 

Green has not alleged any specific errors committed by Justice Rabner and Judge Grant, he 

apparently believes that they can be held vicariously liable for the alleged errors committed by 

municipal court judges and prosecutors. Thus, exercising jurisdiction over Green’s claims 

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against Judge Grant and Judge Rabner would clearly “require review of a final state-court 

judgment in a particular case.” Id. at 486. The Plaintiff may not escape the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine by vaguely claiming that the entire judicial system is to blame and erroneously adding 

the administrators of that system as defendants.

Finally, the Court briefly notes that the Defendants’ arguments for dismissal based on

judicial immunity, prosecutorial immunity, or Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity likely 

have merit. However, these arguments need not be addressed where the Court is so clearly 

deprived of subject matter jurisdiction in the first instance by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, both Motions to Dismiss shall be granted, and this case 

shall be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend his 

complaint does nothing to correct the jurisdictional bar discussed above, and in fact bears little 

relation to any of the issues raised by Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. Therefore, the Motion to 

Amend is denied as futile. An appropriate Order follows.

/s/ Joel A. Pisano 

JOEL A. PISANO

United States District Judge

Dated: December 13, 2011

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