alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
(as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)
  (1)
    
    the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for
the period ended June 30, 2010 (the Report), filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended; and(2)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.
  /s/ Robert G. CostantiniRobert G. CostantiniExecutive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
EXHIBIT NO. 32.1
Form 10-QSB
Marketing Acquisition Corporation
File No. 0-52072

                    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                       OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 -
                      CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND FINANCIAL OFFICER

In connection  with the Quarterly  Report of Marketing  Acquisition  Corporation
(Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2007,  as filed with the
Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof  (Report),  I, Timothy P.
Halter, Chief Executive and Financial Officer of the Company,  certify, pursuant
to  18  U.S.C.  Section  1350,  adopted  as  pursuant  to  Section  906  of  the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
          the Company.


Dated: April 27, 2007                        By: /s/ Timothy P. Halter
       --------------                           --------------------------------
                                                               Timothy P. Halter
                                                     Chief Executive Officer and
                                                         Chief Financial Officer


A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided to Marketing Acquisition  Corporation and will be retained by Marketing
Acquisition  Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.
#### United States *ex rel.*Shelly *v.*St. Charles Co.

*(Circuit Court, E.*D. *Missouri.*

June 8, 1887.)

Costs—Security for, after Judgment.

Where a plaintiff has recovered judgment against a solvent defendant, and process is outstanding in the nature of an execution to collect the same, it is not proper to require the plaintiff to make a deposit to secure costs due a commissioner.

*Mandamus*Proceedings. Motion for security for costs.

*E. B. Sherzer,*for plaintiff.

*Huff & Denison,*for defendant,.

Thayer, J.,

*(orally.)*In the case of the United States, at the relation of Shelly, against the county of St. Charles, a motion has been filed by the referee or commissioner to require the plaintiff to make a deposit to secure the costs. The case in question is a *mandamus*proceeding. An alternative writ has been issued. There has been a return to the writ, a hearing of the issues raised by the return to the alternative writ, and a peremptory writ has been awat'ded for a certain sum.

In that state of the case, the commissioner to whom certain issues arising under the return to the alternative writ were referred, moves that the plaintiff be required to deposit a certain sum to secure his costs. I think the court has power to make such an order, but I do not think that it is the correct practice to make an order of that kind when a case has reached the stage that this case is in. A peremptory writ is dow outstanding which is in the nature of an execution, and it does not seem to me proper to require a plaintiff to make a deposit to secure -the costs-after he has recovered judgment, and process is outstanding, in the nature of an execution to collect the same; and especially is this true in a case where j;he defendant is shown to be amply solvent.

The judgment herein is a lien upon a large tract of land in St. Charles county, and the presumption is that the amount of the plaintiff’s debt and all costs will be recovered. Under such circumstances I think it the correct practice to require the commissioner to await proceedings under the peremptory writ, unless such proceedings are unduly delayed. The motion, therefore, to require an additional deposit, will be overruled.
# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas**
MEMORANDUM OPINION
N o. 04

- 21

- 00055

- CV
EX PARTE D.A.P. From the 81st Judicial District Court , Karnes County, Texas Trial Court No. 20

- 07

- 00125

- CVK Honorable Russell Wilson , Judge Presiding
PER CURIAM Sitting: Irene Rios , Justice Beth Watkins , Justice Liza A. Rodriguez , Justice Delivered and Filed: March 3, 2021 JOINT MOTION GRANTED, REVERSED AND RENDERED In this restri cted appeal, the Texas Department of Public S afety (“the Department”) challenges an expunction order signed by the trial court on September 15, 2020. The Department and D.A.P. have filed a joint motion asking us to reverse the expunction order in its entir ety and
to render judgment in favor of the Department. The joint motion, which is signed by each party’s counsel, states the parties have reached an agreement. We grant the motion. The trial court’s September 15, 2020 expunction order is reversed , and judg ment is rendered in favor of the Department. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 42.1(a)(2)(A) (providing an appellate court may render judgment effectuating the parties’ agreement)

. PER CURIAM
EXHIBIT
32.1





CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of California Gold Corp. (the “Company”) on
Form 10-Q for the period ended April 30, 2009as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”), I, James D. Davidson, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted
pursuant to ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)  The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)  The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this certification as of June 23,
2009.





/s/
      James D. DavidsonJames
      D. DavidsonChief
      Executive Officer andChief
      Financial Officer




A signed
original of this written statement, or other document authenticating,
acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form
within the electronic version of this written statement, has been provided to
California Gold Corp., and will be retained by California Gold Corp., and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
#### In re Brad BOOZER, Joseph Flaherty, Timothy Golnik, Ian Harding and Sridhar Iyengar, Appellants.

No. 2012-1550.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

March 11, 2013.

Ryan E. Anderson, Larson & Anderson LLC, of Dillon, CO, argued for appellant.

Jamie L. Simpson, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Scott C. Weidenfeller, Associate Solicitor.

*979MOORE, LINN, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM.

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is

Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Dale W. Brand, Appellant.

[976 NYS2d 906]

Appeal from a judgment of the Erie County Court (Thomas R Franczyk, J.), rendered December 21, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of assault in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of assault in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.05 [2]) and criminal possession of a weapon in the *1321third degree (§ 265.02 [1]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal was invalid. We reject that contention. The plea colloquy conducted by County Court adequately apprised defendant that “the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” *(People v Lopez,*6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; *see People v Graham,*77 AD3d 1439, 1439 [2010], *lv denied*15 NY3d 920 [2010]). Contrary to defendant’s contention, his “ ‘waiver [of the right to appeal] is not invalid on the ground that the court did not specifically inform [him] that his general waiver of the right to appeal encompassed the court’s suppression rulings’ ” *(Graham,*77 AD3d at 1439). Moreover, defendant’s history of mental illness did not invalidate the waiver of the right to appeal inasmuch as there was no showing that “ ‘defendant was uninformed, confused or incompetent when he’ waived his right to appeal” *(People v DeFazio,*105 AD3d 1438, 1439 [2013], *lv denied*21 NY3d 1015 [2013]). The valid waiver by defendant of the right to appeal encompasses his challenge to the suppression rulings *(see People v Kemp,*94 NY2d 831, 833 [1999]), and his challenge to the severity of the sentence *(see Lopez,*6 NY3d at 255-256; *see generally People v Hidalgo,*91 NY2d 733, 737 [1998]). Present — Scudder, EJ., Centra, Lindley, Sconiers and Valentino, JJ.
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">The People of the State of New York, Respondent, <br><br>against<br><br>Barbara Morales, Defendant-Appellant.</font></b></div><br><br><p>Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County (Rita M. Mella, J. at initial plea; Erika M. Edwards, J. at re-plea and sentencing), rendered March 7, 2013, convicting her, upon a plea of guilty, of disorderly conduct, and imposing sentence.</p><p>Per Curiam.</p><p>Judgment of conviction (Rita M. Mella, J. at initial plea; Erika M. Edwards, J. at re-plea and sentencing), rendered March 7, 2013, affirmed.</p><p>The record amply establishes that defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Defendant entered into a plea agreement that contemplated that she would initially plead guilty to petit larceny (<i>see</i> Penal Law ยง 155.25), but would ultimately have that conviction reduced to disorderly conduct (<i>see</i> Penal Law ยง 240.20), a violation, if she, inter alia, was not rearrested during the next year and paid restitution. At the plea proceeding, the court advised defendant of the rights she was waiving by pleading guilty (<i>see Boykin v Alabama</i>, 395 US 238 [1969]), including the right to a trial, the right to remain silent and the right to confront her accusers (<a href="../2015/2015_08615.htm" target="_blank"><i>see People v Conceicao</i>, 26 NY3d 375</a> [2015]).</p><p>We find unavailing defendant's present claim that the court failed to advise her of all her <i>Boykin</i> rights when she repleaded to disorderly conduct. The initial plea allocution sufficiently established defendant's understanding of her <i>Boykin</i> rights for purposes of the later plea, inasmuch as the second plea was essentially an extension of the first plea, but with the conviction reduced to a violation for defendant's benefit (<a href="../2015/2015_09621.htm" target="_blank"><i>see People v Muir</i>, 134 AD3d 641</a> [2015], <i>lv denied </i>26 NY3d 1147 [2016]; <a href="../2015/2015_25122.htm" target="_blank"><i>People v Hildinghohlson</i>, 48 Misc 3d 30</a> [2015], <i>lv denied </i>25 NY3d 1202 [2015]). "Having already waived h[er] rights, a rigorous and detailed colloquy at defendant's replea to a lesser charge, carrying with it a lesser sentence, would have been an unnecessary formalism" <i>(People v Muir</i>, 134 AD3d at 641 [internal quotation marks omitted]).</p><p>THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.</p><br>I concur I concur I concur<br>Decision Date: May 19, 2016<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_1_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Health and Human Services

###### National Institutes of Health

                    Notice is hereby given of a change in the meeting of the National Cancer Institute Special Emphasis Panel, August 5, 2009, 8 a.m. to August 6, 2009, 5 p.m., Marriott Bethesda North Hotel and Conf. Ctr., Bethesda, MD which was published in the                     **Federal Register**                     on June 26, 2009, 74FR30592.                          ( print page 32946)    

This notice is amended to change the title from “NCI-ARRA Grand Opportunities—Stem Cells” to “NCI-ARRA Grand Opportunities—Stem Cells/Cell Biology”. The meeting is closed to the public.

Dated: July 1, 2009.

Jennifer Spaeth,

Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.

[FR Doc. E9-16098 Filed 7-8-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4140-01-P
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-12271

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 2:13-cv-14453-JEM

OSCAR RODRIGUEZ, 

LIZABETH RODRIGUEZ,

 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

DETECTIVE MARK SHIREMAN,

in his individual and official capacity,

 Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(March 28, 2016)

Before WILSON, JORDAN and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Case: 15-12271 Date Filed: 03/28/2016 Page: 1 of 2 
2

Detective Mark Shireman arrested Oscar and Lizabeth Rodriguez on charges 

of dealing in stolen property, in violation of Florida Statutes § 812.019. However, 

the state attorney ultimately dropped the charges. Thereafter, the Rodriguezes filed 

a complaint in district court raising 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state malicious 

prosecution claims against Shireman. The Rodriguezes asserted that Shireman 

violated their Fourth Amendment rights and engaged in malicious prosecution

because he arrested them without probable cause. The district court granted 

summary judgment to Shireman on all of the Rodriguezes’ claims. This appeal 

followed. 

After careful consideration of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm 

substantially for reasons given by the opinion of the district court. See Rodriguez 

v. Shireman, No. 2:13-cv-14453-JEM (S.D. Fla. May 13, 2015). 

AFFIRMED.

Case: 15-12271 Date Filed: 03/28/2016 Page: 2 of 2
Exhibit 32.2


                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Regal  Rock,  Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-QSB for the period ended May  31, 2006  as  filed  with  the  Securities
and  Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned,  in
the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby certifies pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  Section  1350,  as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:

   1.    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

   2.    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
         of the Company.


Date:   January 29, 2007


/s/ Wu Chih Chun
---------------------------------------
Wu Chih Chun, Principal Financial Officer
#### UNITED STATES v. 108 BOXES OF CHEDDAR CHEESE (JEGERLEHMER, Intervener).

Civil Action No. 99.

District Court, S. D. Iowa, Davenport Division.

Nov. 30, 1942.

Maurice F. Donegan, U. S. Dist. Atty., of Davenport, Iowa, for the Government.

E. W. Mead, of Wilton Junction, Iowa, for intervening claimant.

DEWEY, District Judge.

The above entitled action ca¡’ for hearing in open court at Des Me va, on the 21st day of November, 1 '’the intervening claimant’s motion >re specific statement.

The question of whethe an order should be entered is goveri the Rules of Civil Procedure of this ■ and not by the Iowa law. While the . has some discretion as to whether such an order should be made, it' is quite generally held by the courts that such information is only to be furnished under such an order where the party cannot obtain the information ■by discovery as provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure. Such information can be so obtained and the attorney for the Government advises that upon written application by letter or otherwise to him he will be glad to furnish a detailed statement of the analysis furnished to his office by the Government, but he does not care to be bound by that analysis as conclusive in the event he is able to show other filthy substance in the article sought to be condemned.

As the claimant can obtain the information requested, insofar as the same is in the possession of the attorneys for the Government, by the procedure authorized under Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, and other rules of discovery, the motion for more specific statement should be overruled. The Clerk will therefore enter the following order:

The above entitled action having come on for hearing in open court at Des Moines, Iowa, on the 21st day of November, 1942, upon a motion by the intervening claimant for more specific statement, and the court being advised, said motion is overruled and the intervening claimant, Fred Jegerlehmer, excepts.
Case 2:10-cv-06482-SDW -MCA Document 7 Filed 03/17/11 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 59
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-1158

In re: TERRY JACKSON BENNETT,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (3:93-cr-00254-RJC-1; 3:16-cv-00520-RJC)

Submitted: March 8, 2018 Decided: March 14, 2018

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and KING and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Terry Jackson Bennett, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Terry Jackson Bennett petitions for a writ of mandamus, alleging the district court 

has unduly delayed acting on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. He seeks an order 

from this court directing the district court to act. Our review of the district court’s docket 

reveals that the district court has dismissed Bennett’s § 2255 motion. Accordingly, 

because the district court has recently decided Bennett’s case, we deny the mandamus 

petition as moot. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions 

are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid 

the decisional process. 

PETITION DENIED
ADDENDUM TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT DATED MARCH 6, 1997 BETWEEN THE REGISTRANT
AND HENRY D. JACOBS, JR.

        The  following  was  ratified  and  approved  by  the  entire  Board  of
Directors,  on recommendation of the Compensation Committee, at its meeting held
March 6, 1997 with respect to compensation and benefits for Henry D.Jacobs, Jr.,
the Company's Chairman of the Board of Directors:

        (1)  Retirement - Upon retirement, an aggregate benefit of $1,650,000 
will be paid to Mr. Jacobs in 120 equal monthly installments,  based on 50% of 
base compensation for fiscal 1996. Remaining installments will be paid to Mr. 
Jacobs' designated  beneficiary in the event of his death.

        (2)      Base Salary -Mr. Jacobs' base salary was increased to $390,000 
effective February 2, 1997, the first day of the 1997 fiscal year.

        (3)  Continuing  Base  Salary for Six Months - Mr. Jacobs' base salary 
will be continued at the $390,000 level for a six-month period  following the 
commencement of employment of a new CEO and an incentive compensation bonus will
be paid at a maximum of 30% of Mr. Jacobs' actual compensation for the
fiscal year ending January 1998 in accordance with the terms of the Company's 
Executive Bonus Plan if specified Company earnings goals are achieved.

        (4) Chairman of the Board  Compensation  - Mr. Jacobs' base salary will 
be continued at 50% of the $390,000 per annum rate for the twelve months 
following the expiration of the above six-month period.

        (5)      Medical Coverage - Medical coverage will be continued in its
present form for the duration of Mr. Jacobs employment.

<PAGE>
EXHIBIT 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,





AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the Quarterly Report of Helix Wind, Corp. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:





1.           The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.           The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.







Date: April 25, 2011
/s/ Kevin ClaudioKevin Claudio, Chief Financial Officer(Principal Accounting Officer)
Exhibit
32.1




CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the Quarterly Report of ZipGlobal Holdings, Inc. (the
“Registrant”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended December 31, 2009 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,
Michael C. Lee, Principal Executive Officer and the Principal Financial Officer
of the Registrant, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my
knowledge:




(1) the
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




(2) the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the
Registrant.




Dated:
      February 10, 2010
                  
                  /s/ MICHAEL
      C. LEEMichael
      C. LeePresident, Chief
      Executive Officer and
                    Chairman
                    (Principal
      Executive Officer)
                    (Principal
      Financial/Accounting Officer)