Affirmed and Opinion filed July 16, 2015.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-14-00511-CR

CATHY BROCKHAUS PARADOSKI, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3

Fort Bend County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 10-CCR-152210

OPINION

In this appeal appellant Cathy Paradoski challenges her conviction for 

driving while intoxicated (DWI). The record contains evidence that appellant 

ingested two types of prescription medication. Though appellant concedes she was 

operating a motor vehicle without the normal use of her faculties, she asserts she 

suffered a transient ischemic attack (TIA), causing her to lose control of her 

faculties while driving. On appeal, we address the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting her conviction as well as claimed errors in the trial court’s admission of 
2

evidence. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A witness called 911 after he saw appellant driving erratically. Shortly 

thereafter, appellant rear-ended another vehicle. Witnesses reported that appellant 

slurred her speech and was slow to respond to questions. Appellant could not 

adequately explain where she was or what happened. Appellant concedes that her 

mental and physical faculties were impaired. Department of Public Safety

Corporal Chad Olive took appellant to a hospital. There, appellant consented to a 

blood draw. An analysis of appellant’s blood showed the presence of 

hydrocodone, carisoprodol, and meprobamate (a metabolite of carisoprodol). 

Appellant was charged by information with the misdemeanor offense of driving 

while intoxicated. Appellant pleaded “not guilty.” A jury convicted appellant of 

the offense and the trial court sentenced her to 180 days’ confinement and ordered 

eighteen months of community supervision.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In the first issue, appellant asserts the evidence is legally insufficient to 

support her conviction for driving while intoxicated. In evaluating a challenge to 

the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction, we view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 

103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The issue on appeal is not whether we, as a 

court, believe the State’s evidence or believe that appellant’s evidence outweighs 

the State’s evidence. Wicker v. State, 667 S.W.2d 137, 143 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1984). The verdict may not be overturned unless it is irrational or unsupported by 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Tex. 
3

Crim. App. 1991). The trier of fact “is the sole judge of the credibility of the 

witnesses and of the strength of the evidence.” Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267, 

271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The trier of fact may choose to believe or disbelieve 

any portion of the witnesses’ testimony. Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1986). When faced with conflicting evidence, we presume the 

trier of fact resolved conflicts in favor of the prevailing party. Turro v. State, 867 

S.W.2d 43, 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Therefore, if any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, 

we must affirm. McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if a person is 

intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. Tex. Penal Code 

Ann. 49.04(a) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). As is relevant in this case, a 

person is “intoxicated” if she does not have the normal use of her mental and 

physical faculties by reason of the introduction of a controlled substance into the 

body. Id. at 49.01(2)(A) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). Penal Code 

section 49.04, entitled “Driving While Intoxicated,” requires the State to prove that 

a defendant lost her faculties by reason of the introduction of a substance into her

body, but it does not require the State to prove what substance caused the loss of 

the normal use of mental or physical faculties. Gray v. State, 152 S.W.3d 125, 132 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2004). A conviction for the offense of driving while intoxicated 

may be supported solely by circumstantial evidence. Kuciemba v. State, 310 

S.W.3d 460, 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 

The record contains evidence that appellant did not have the normal use of 

her faculties while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. Appellant asserts 

that the evidence is insufficient to prove the cause of the loss of faculties was by 

reason of the introduction of a controlled substance into her body. Appellant 
4

asserts there is no evidence she introduced any substance into her body. She 

claims there is no evidence that any of the prescription drugs found in her blood 

caused her to lose control of her mental and physical faculties. Appellant 

presented evidence at trial that her impairment was caused by a transient ischemic 

attack.

The record contains the following evidence:

• Appellant left her friend’s house between 11:30 p.m. and 11:45 p.m. 

Her friend’s husband testified that appellant was “fine” when 

appellant left. He did not see appellant take any pills.

• Appellant was swerving in and out of lanes, driving her vehicle in an 

unsafe manner. A witness called 911 to report the erratic driving. 

Shortly thereafter, appellant crashed into another vehicle.

• Officer Raymond Hastedt responded to the accident and determined 

appellant was impaired.

• Corporal Olive took over the scene from Officer Hastedt. Corporal 

Olive determined appellant was intoxicated. He testified to his belief 

that appellant was intoxicated by a narcotic because he did not see any 

evidence appellant was intoxicated by alcohol. 

• Video of appellant taken from Corporal Olive’s vehicle was admitted 

into evidence. 

• Corporal Olive testified that he was at the scene for about an hour 

before taking appellant to the hospital and that he usually spends an

average of thirty minutes at the hospital. On the night he arrested 

appellant it took him between one and two hours to “do everything.”

• Corporal Olive transported appellant to the hospital. Appellant’s 

medical records contain notations that say “Lortab,” and “Multiple pill 

bottles.” Lortab is a generic hydrocodone. The clinical impression in 

the medical record is “substance abuse.” 

• Upon appellant’s arrival at the hospital, appellant had a shaky gait and 

was slurring her speech, but she was “alert and oriented.”

• The nurse who saw appellant at the hospital testified that she believed 

appellant was intoxicated by reason of drugs and/or alcohol and that 
5

appellant’s behavior was consistent with someone taking hydrocodone

and carisoprodol. The nurse opined appellant’s behavior was 

particularly consistent with the side-effects of carisoprodol.

• The nurse testified that she did not believe another medical condition 

was the cause of appellant’s intoxication. 

• The nurse stated that she had worked with patients who suffered from 

a stroke and they are not generally alert and oriented.

• The nurse testified that if there is any suspicion of a stroke, an 

immediate CAT scan is taken. She explained that usually if a patient 

is suffering from a stroke there is a “neurological deficit.” 

Appellant’s behavior was “[n]ot at all” consistent with her having a 

stroke. No CAT scan was ordered.

• The nurse testified that she comes into contact with patients 

experiencing TIAs. According to the nurse, while appellant was in 

the hospital she was oriented and able to answer questions, but still 

had slurred speech. The nurse opined that an individual suffering 

from a TIA could not answer “orienting questions.” The nurse stated 

she had never seen a TIA patient with partial symptoms. 

• Appellant consented to a blood draw at the hospital. The blood draw 

showed appellant’s blood contained .02 milligrams of hydrocodone 

per liter of blood, greater than 15 milligrams per liter of blood of 

carisoprodol, and greater than 40 milligrams per liter of blood of 

meprobamate, which is a metabolite of carisoprodol. 

• Hydrocone is a narcotic painkiller. The side-effects of this drug 

include slurred speech and slowed motor skills. 

• Carisopodol is a muscle relaxant. Carisoprodol’s side-effects include

slurred speech, drowsiness, dizziness, and depressed motor skills. 

• The State’s toxicologist testified that an individual with the levels of 

hydrocodone and carisoprodol present in appellant’s system could

lose mental and physical faculties. The State’s toxicologist could not 

discern from the lab results alone whether appellant suffered the loss 

of her mental and physical faculties and therefore the State’s 

toxicologist could not render an opinion on that subject.

• Appellant presented an expert toxicologist who testified that the 

amount of hydrocodone and carisoprodol in appellant’s blood could 

cause an individual to become impaired. He explained that both of 
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these drugs have “similar side effects,” and when the drugs are taken 

together, those effects “will be additive.” According to appellant’s 

expert, when someone starts taking these drugs, “you would expect 

they would have some significant side-effects that would occur, 

meaning drowsiness, sleepiness, and perhaps the loss of mental and 

physical faculties during that time, but as time progresses both of 

those side effects parallel in their diminishing in the side effects that 

are producing that effect.” 

• Appellant’s expert toxicologist testified that a person could take both 

drugs and have the normal use of mental and physical faculties “with 

chronic therapy.”

• Appellant’s expert toxicologist characterized the concentrations in 

appellant’s blood as “high therapeutic, consistent with long-term care, 

but not consistent with an overdose.” Appellant’s expert testified that 

although these drugs “were more than the minimum amount to 

produce an effect, they were not in the toxic range.” Appellant’s 

expert toxicologist testified that he assumed the dosage was “okay”

because the doctor continued to prescribe the medication and the 

doctor would not have continued to do so if the medication caused 

appellant to be impaired. 

• Records from a pharmacy showed appellant filled the prescriptions for 

hydrocodone and carisoprodol inconsistently. The date of the offense 

was April 10, 2010. The records revealed appellant received thirty 

350 mg tablets of carisoprodol on December 23, 2009, thirty 350mg 

tablets on December 29, 2009, twelve 350 mg tablets on January 18, 

2010, twelve 350 mg tablets on January 22, 2010, twelve 350 mg 

tablets on March 16, 2010, twelve 350 mg tablets on March 24, 2010, 

and twelve 350mg tablets on September 15, 2010. With respect to 

hydrocodone, appellant received fifteen pills on December 23, 2009, 

five pills on December 28, 2009, fifteen pills on December 29, 2009. 

The record reveals that the dosage of hydrocodone increased in 

January 2010. Appellant received ten pills of the higher dosage 

January 18, 2010, ten pills of the higher dosage March 16, 2010, five 

pills of the higher dosage March 23, 2010, and five pills of the higher 

dosage September 16, 2010.

• After appellant’s accident in April 2010, appellant did not fill a 

prescription for hydrocodone or carisoprodol until September 2010.

• Neither appellant’s doctor nor the emergency-room doctor testified at 
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trial.

• Appellant’s expert toxicologist testified that when an individual 

ingests hydrocodone and carisoprodol, there are four phases of drug 

metabolism: absorption, distribution, metabolism, and excretion. As 

the liver breaks down carisoprodol, it creates a second drug, 

meprobomate. Hydrocodone is broken down into a nonactive 

substance. According to the expert, the drugs reach a peak 

concentration and then are eliminated by the metabolism. As the liver 

breaks carisoprodol into carisoprodol and meprobomate, the two 

drugs are eliminated in parallel. The carisoprodol has a half-life of 

about ninety minutes, and it takes five times that amount of time to 

eliminate the drug. The half-life of meprobomate is ten to fifteen 

hours, and it takes about five times that length for the meprobomate to 

be eliminated. The half-life for hydrocodone is ten hours, so it takes 

about five times that to eliminate hydrocodone. The expert explained 

that the level of hydrocodone in a person’s system changes slowly. 

• Appellant also presented an expert neurologist who testified that 

appellant suffered a TIA and the TIA caused her to be impaired.

Appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to prove that she introduced a 

substance into her body causing her impairment. Appellant notes her friend’s 

husband testified that appellant was fine when she got into her car and he never 

saw her take any pills. But, the State’s toxicologist testified these medications 

were present in appellant’s blood. Appellant also introduced records indicating 

that she had a prescription for the medications and filled that prescription. Thus, 

the jury had sufficient evidence to conclude appellant ingested the prescription 

medications. See Kiffe v. State, 361 S.W.3d 104, 108–09 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (holding that the jury has the responsibility of resolving 

conflicts in the testimony).

Appellant also asserts that there is no evidence proving she lost her faculties

by reason of the prescription drugs in her system. The State’s toxicologist 

provided evidence of the levels of prescription medication in appellant’s system. 

The State’s toxicologist testified that the amounts of medication in appellant’s 
8

system could cause one to lose mental and physical faculties. Appellant’s expert 

toxicologist agreed. The record thus contains evidence that appellant had an 

amount of prescription medications in her blood that could cause one to lose 

control of her mental and physical faculties. See Paschall v. State, 285 S.W.3d 

166, 177 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d). 

Though appellant’s expert opined that appellant had developed a tolerance to 

the drugs based on chronic therapy, his conclusion was based on a belief that 

appellant’s doctor would not have continued prescribing the medication if it was 

causing appellant problems. Appellant’s pharmacy records showed that she 

refilled her prescriptions inconsistently; she did not fill her prescriptions for a 

number of months after the accident. The jury reasonably could have concluded 

that appellant’s irregularity in filling the prescriptions prevented appellant from 

developing the tolerance her expert toxicologist discussed. 

Regardless of the jury’s conclusion regarding appellant’s prescription 

history, the jury had evidence from the State’s expert toxicologist and appellant’s 

expert toxicologist that appellant had prescription medication in her system in a 

quantity that could cause her to lose her mental and physical faculties. The video 

taken of appellant the night of the incident showed she had lost control of her 

mental and physical faculties. And, appellant conceded that she had. Additionally, 

the nurse who evaluated appellant testified that appellant was impaired by reason 

of drugs and/or alcohol. The record contains sufficient evidence to support the 

jury’s finding that appellant was intoxicated by reason of the prescription 

medications in her body. See Kiffe, 361 S.W.3d at 108–09 (holding testimony that

the levels of prescription in the defendant’s system were high enough to cause 

intoxication sufficient to show the defendant was intoxicated by reason of the 

prescription drugs); Harkins v. State, 268 S.W.3d 740, 751 (Tex. App.—Fort 
9

Worth 2008, pet. ref’d) (holding evidence sufficient to convict defendant of DWI 

when State presented evidence defendant had taken the drug Soma and two 

witnesses who testified Soma can cause impairment); Hooker v. State, 932 S.W.2d 

712, 715 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1996, no pet.) (holding evidence defendant 

consumed prescription drugs, was intoxicated, and that the drugs could cause 

intoxicating effects sufficient for DWI conviction).

Appellant argues that she suffered from a TIA and that the TIA (not the 

controlled substances in her system) caused her symptoms. But, the evidence 

appellant suffered from a TIA does not render the evidence that she was impaired 

by reason of prescription medications insufficient. 

First, the jury was entitled to disbelieve appellant’s witnesses and instead to 

credit the nurse’s testimony that appellant was not suffering from a TIA. See 

Crouse v. State, 441 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.) (holding 

that although appellant presented an alternative explanation for impairment, factfinder’s role is to resolve conflicts and fact-finder was free to accept or reject 

evidence presented by either side); Davy v. State, 67 S.W.3d 382, 396 (Tex. 

App.—Waco 2001, no pet.) (holding that jury could disbelieve testimony that 

defendant’s poor performance on field sobriety tests was based on lackof sleep and 

“bad leg” rather than medications). 

Second, the jury reasonably could have concluded appellant did not suffer 

from a TIA. The neurologist and the nurse testified that victims of TIAs recover 

rapidly, in contrast to individuals intoxicated by hydrocodone and carisoprodol, 

who recover gradually. Appellant’s expert concluded appellant suffered a TIA 

because he concluded she recovered rapidly. The neurologist testified that based 

on the video from Corporal Olive’s patrol car, appellant recovered rapidly. The 

neurologist explained that appellant was impaired in the first video of appellant’s 
10

ride to the hospital, and that she began recovering as she got closer to the hospital 

and had recovered by the time Corporal Olive took appellant to jail. But the nurse, 

who saw appellant in between the taking of the two videos, concluded that 

appellant did not recover rapidly and had partial symptoms, inconsistent with a 

TIA. The jury viewed the videos and also heard testimony from the nurse. Based 

on this evidence, the jury could have concluded appellant did not suffer from a 

TIA. See Harkins, 268 S.W.3d at 750 (holding jury was entitled to disbelieve 

evidence that appellant’s impairment was caused by preexisting physical 

impairment or sleep apnea and instead find that a drug, Soma, caused the 

impairment).

Third, even if the jury believed appellant suffered from a TIA, the jury 

reasonably could have concluded that appellant was impaired both by a TIA and 

the levels of prescription medication in her system. Appellant did not present any 

evidence that the presence of a TIA somehow negated any side-effects from the 

prescription medications. In fact, appellant’s expert neurologist conceded that if 

one were on the drugs carisoprodol and hydrocone and also had a TIA, the TIA 

would not eliminate the effect of those drugs. Accordingly, the evidence presented 

that appellant suffered a TIA did not negate the State’s evidence that appellant was 

impaired by reason of the prescription medications in her system. See Kiffe, 361 

S.W.3d at 108–09; Harkins, 268 S.W.3d at 750. 

The State presented sufficient evidence to prove that appellant was impaired 

by reason of prescription medications. Thus, the evidence is sufficient to support 

the jury’s verdict. See Landers v. State, 110 S.W.3d 617, 620 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d); Kiffe, 361 S.W.3d at 108–09; Harkins, 268 

S.W.3d at 750. Appellant’s first issue is overruled.
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B. Law Enforcement Officer’s Testimony

In appellant’s second issue, appellant asserts that the trial court abused its 

discretion by admitting into evidence testimony from Corporal Olive that 

appellant’s faculties were impaired by narcotics because Corporal Olive was not 

qualified to provide that opinion. See Smithhart v. State, 503 S.W.2d 283, 285 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1973). Corporal Olive testified as a lay witness. Presuming for 

the sake of argument that his testimony that appellant was impaired by narcotics

was inadmissible evidence from a lay witness, an appellate court may not reverse a 

conviction without determining whether the evidence is harmful.

The erroneous admission of Corporal Olive’s opinion testimony would be

non-constitutional error. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Delane v. State, 369 S.W.3d 

412, 423 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d). Non-constitutional 

error that does not affect the appellant’s substantial rights must be disregarded. 

Delane, 369 S.W.3d at 423. A substantial right is affected when an error has a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Id.

A criminal conviction should not be overturned for non-constitutional error if the 

appellate court, upon examining the record as a whole, has fair assurance that the 

error did not influence the jury, or had but slight effect. Id.

In assessing the likelihood that the jury’s decision was adversely affected by 

the presumed error, we consider everything in the record, including any testimony 

or physical evidence admitted for the jury’s consideration, the character of the 

alleged error, and how it might be considered in connection with other evidence in 

the case. Id. Corporal Olive testified that after he stopped appellant he “knew 

something was wrong with her.” Corporal Olive stated in a conclusory fashion 

that appellant was intoxicated by narcotics because he did not detect the presence 

of alcohol. When questioned about the possibility of a medical explanation for 
12

appellant’s behavior, Corporal Olive discounted the possibility, recounting how, on 

another occasion, he had been able to discern that a diabetic driver was

experiencing hypoglycemia and was not intoxicated because the diabetic had 

“battleship, death eyes.” 

Corporal Olive conceded that when he arrived at the scene of appellant’s 

accident the cause of appellant’s behavior was a “mystery.” Corporal Olive 

admitted that he is neither a certified drug recognition expert nor a doctor; he did 

not have medical training, and would not know if appellant was experiencing a 

TIA. He also testified that he was not educated on the effects of any particular 

drug on an individual and did not know, and could not guess, what was in 

appellant’s system. Corporal Olive specifically testified that he was not stating any 

specific drug caused appellant to be intoxicated.

Appellant cites Delane v. State for the proposition that the evidence was 

inadmissible and harmful. See 369 S.W.3d 412, 423–24. In Delane, an 

unqualified police officer testified that the defendant seemed intoxicated and had 

“something else on board” other than alcohol. Id. at 422. The police officer 

provided detailed testimony regarding the medications and their effects. Id. In 

Delane, unlike in this case, it appears that no other witness testified regarding the 

prescription medications and their effects. See id. at 423–24. Moreover, unlike the 

testimony from the police officer in Delane, Corporal Olive’s testimony was 

largely conclusory. Although Corporal Olive testified that he thought appellant 

was intoxicated by narcotics, he acknowledged that his testimony had several 

limitations, including his inability to evaluate whether or not appellant was 

suffering from a TIA as appellant claimed at trial. While Corporal Olive provided 

the jury with an example of a time that he was able to determine a diabetic was 

impaired due to a medical condition and the diabetic’s “battleship, death eyes,” this 
13

testimony did not explain how he would be able to discern whether appellant was 

impaired as a result of a medical problem.

Considering the record as a whole, the evidence showed that appellant had 

prescription medications in her blood and that those medications could cause 

intoxicating effects. Appellant argued that, even though the medications could 

cause intoxicating effects, they did not have an intoxicating effect on her and her 

impairment stemmed from a TIA. Corporal Olive specifically admitted that he was 

in no position to evaluate appellant’s argument, but the jury heard from several 

individuals in the medical field who provided lengthy testimony about the different 

potential causes of appellant’s impairment. In particular, the jury heard from the 

nurse who concluded appellant was impaired by alcohol and/or drugs and not by a 

medical condition. See Riley v. State, 988 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (holding erroneous admission of testimony from 

unqualified police officer harmless where another expert provided similar 

testimony); Jones v. State, 111 S.W.3d 600, 604–05 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. 

ref’d). 

Appellant notes that the State argued during its closing statement that 

Corporal Olive was with appellant on the night of the accident and believed she 

was intoxicated by reason of narcotics, but the medical experts had access to a 

video recording of Corporal Olive’s interaction with appellant and used that video 

to evaluate her demeanor. Thus, there was no reason for the jury to believe 

Corporal Olive’s testimony over the various experts. Because Corporal Olive’s 

testimony was conclusory and he acknowledged his lack of training as a drugrecognition expert and admitted he could not determine whether appellant suffered 

a TIA, and because the jury heard testimony from several medical experts on this 

subject, we conclude that, at most, Corporal Olive’s testimony had only a slight 
14

effect on the jury’s verdict. See Smith v. State, 65 S.W.3d 332, 345 (Tex. App.—

Waco 2001, no pet.). Therefore, the testimony did not affect appellant’s 

substantial rights. See Hawes v. State, 125 S.W.3d 535, 542 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Any error in admitting Corporal Olive’s testimony is 

harmless. Accordingly, appellant’s second issue is overruled.

C. Testimony from the State’s Toxicologist

In her third issue, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 

permitting the State’s toxicologist to testify that prescription medications were 

present in appellant’s system, over appellant’s objection. In particular, appellant 

asserts that the evidence was irrelevant because the State did not present testimony 

allowing the jury to determine the effect of the medication on appellant’s mental 

and physical faculties. Appellant argues that the trial court’s ruling violates the 

Court of Criminal Appeals’ holding in Layton v. State because the State did not 

present extrapolation evidence of the amount of medication in appellant’s blood 

while she was driving and because the toxicologist could not testify about the 

effects of the medications found in appellant’s blood. See 280 S.W.3d 235, 241–

242 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). In Layton, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined 

an officer’s testimony that a defendant admitted taking the drugs Xanax and 

Valium was irrelevant because the record contained no evidence that those drugs 

affected the defendant’s level of intoxication. See id. The Layton court held that 

“a lay juror is not in a position to determine whether Xanax and Valium, taken 

more than 12 hours before arrest, would have any effect on appellant’s 

intoxication.” Id.

Evidence of a controlled substance in a defendant’s blood is relevant, 

however, when the State presents testimony from which a lay juror reasonably 

could determine that the drug affected the defendant’s intoxication. See Bekendam 
15

v. State, 441 S.W.3d 295, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). In Bekendam, the Court of 

Criminal Appeals determined that expert testimony related to the amount of drug 

detected in the blood, the half-life1 of the drug, how the drug was metabolized, and 

the drug’s effect on the central nervous system was sufficient evidence to allow a 

lay juror to determine that the presence of a drug affected the defendant’s 

intoxication. See id. 

The record contains evidence of the amount of the drugs detected in 

appellant’s blood, the half-life of the drugs, how the drugs were metabolized, and 

the drugs’ effect on the central nervous system, as well as testimony that appellant 

was intoxicated by drugs and/or alcohol. The nurse testified that appellant was 

intoxicated by drugs and/or alcohol and appellant’s behavior was consistent with 

that of one under the effects of hydrocodone and carisoprodol. See Tex. R. Evid. 

104(b) (“When the relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact exists, proof 

must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist. The 

court may admit the proposed evidence on the condition that the proof be 

introduced later.”). The nurse testified appellant’s behavior was particularly 

consistent with side-effects of carisoprodol, and carisoprodol “pretty much has the 

same [e]ffect on everybody that [she has] seen in her practice.” 

The toxicologist testified about the specific levels of the medications found 

in appellant’s system and the general effects of the medications on the central 

nervous system. She explained that the side-effects of carisoprodol and 

meprobomate include drowsiness, dizziness, lack of coordination and tiredness. 

According to the toxicologist, side-effects of hydrocodone include drowsiness and 

dizziness. The toxicologist also testified that an individual could experience a loss 

 1 The half-life of a drug is the time it takes for the amount of the drug in the body to be 

reduced by fifty percent. See Steven E. Pegalis, American Law of Medical Malpractice § 17.3 

(3d 2005). 
16

of mental and physical faculties if one had the same levels of medication in one’s 

system as were present in appellant’s system. The State’s toxicologist also 

testified that the general half-life for carisoprodol is 100 minutes and the half-life 

for meprobomate is anywhere from six hours to seventeen hours. The toxicologist 

explained that the effects of the medications on individuals varied and that every 

individual has a different metabolism. As recited above, appellant’s expert gave 

detailed testimony regarding the half-lives of the carisoprodol, meprobomate, and 

hydrocodone and provided detailed analysis of how those drugs were metabolized. 

Appellant’s expert also conceded that an individual could be impaired by the 

amount of medication present in appellant’s system. 

The jury had expert testimony related to the amount of the drug detected in 

the blood, the half-life of the drug, how the drug was metabolized, and the drug’s 

effect on the central nervous system. See Bekendam, 441 S.W.3d at 302. 

Accordingly, the jury had sufficient evidence to conclude that the medications 

affected appellant’s level of intoxication, and the evidence was relevant. See id. 

The trial court did not err in admitting the State’s toxicologist’s testimony into 

evidence. See id. Appellant’s third issue is overruled.
17

III. CONCLUSION

The evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s DWI conviction. If the trial 

court erred in admitting Corporal Olive’s testimony that appellant was impaired by 

reason of narcotics, that error was harmless. The trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by admitting the State’s toxicologist’s testimony into evidence because 

the evidence was relevant. 

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

/s/ Kem Thompson Frost

Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Jamison and Busby.

Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).