IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAROLYN BETHEA, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

v.

ISRAEL ROIZMAN, et al.,

 Defendants.

HON. JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil No. 11-254 (JBS/JS)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

Joseph Green, II, Esq.

EL-SHABAZZ & HARRIS LLC

100 South Broad Street

Suite 1525 

Philadelphia, PA 19110

-andGeoffrey V. Seay, Esq.

1315 Walnut Street, Suit 602

Philadelphia, PA 19107

Pro hac vice 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Carolyn Bethea, Gloria D. Abner,

Iona Evans, Darcell Gilmore, Margaret David, Shawn Smalls,

Twanda Smith, Shelly McCullough, Georgetta Brown, Wanda

Matis, Christina O'Casio, Maria Torres, Jaharia Figuero,

Yvette Hernandez, Gladys Antelo, A Class of African-American

Female Tenants and Prospective Homeowners at Camden

Townhouses II Broadway Street, A Class of Hispanic Female

Tenants at Camden Townhouse II Broadway Street, A Class of

Low-Income Female Tenants at Camden Townhouse II Broadway

Street.

Joseph B. Fiorenzo, Esq.

SOKOL, BEHOT & FIORENZO, ESQS.

Continental Plaza

433 Hackensack Avenue

Hackensack, NJ 07601

Attorney for the Defendants Kathy Hvasta, Camden Townhouse

Associates, II, L.P., Israel Roizman, Roizman Development,

Inc., William L. Cooney, S.H.N.I.R. Apartment Management

Corp. and Melissa Jackson-Deeble 

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Michelle Banks-Spearman, Esq.

ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE CITY OF CAMDEN

4th Floor, Room 419

P.O. Box 95120

Camden, NJ 08101

Attorney for Defendants City of Camden, New Jersey and

Edward Williams

SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

 This matter is before the Court on two motions for judgment

on the pleadings or in the alternative, for summary judgment, and

one motion for summary judgment. The first motion was filed by

Plaintiffs Carolyn Bethea, Gloria D. Abner, Iona Evans, Darcell

Gilmore, Margaret David, Shawn Smalls, Twanda Smith, Shelly

McCullough, Georgetta Brown, Wanda Matis, Christina O'Casio,

Maria Torres, Jaharia Figuero, Yvette Hernandez, Gladys Antelo

("Plaintiffs") against all Defendants. [Docket Item 123.] The

City of Camden and Edward Williams ("City Defendants") filed a

cross motion for judgment on the pleadings or alternatively,

summary judgment in response. [Docket Item 166.] Defendants

Kathy Hvasta, Camden Townhouse Associates, II, L.P., Israel

Roizman, Roizman Development, Inc., William L. Cooney, S.H.N.I.R.

Apartment Management Corp. and Melissa Jackson-Deeble ("Roizman

Defendants") filed a cross motion for summary judgment against

the Plaintiffs. [Docket Item 180.] The Plaintiffs did not file

opposition to either cross motion.

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In its Opinion and Order of June 27, 2012, the court granted

several motions to dismiss filed by the other government agency

defendants primarily on grounds of immunity, failure to comply

with state notice requirements under the New Jersey Tort Claims

Act and failure to state a claim. [Docket Items 172 and 173.] 

This reasoning applies with equal force to the City Defendants,

and as discussed further below, the City Defendants' motion for

judgment on the pleadings will be granted and Plaintiffs' claims

against them will be dismissed.

As to the Roizman Defendants, the court will grant their

motion for summary judgment. As discussed in the court's

previous opinion, the Plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a

claim against any of the defendants for violations of federal

constitutional and civil rights. Consequently, these claims will

be dismissed. In addition, there are no genuine issues of

material fact in the record before the court and the court

concludes as a matter of law that the Plaintiffs did not have a

contractual right to ownership of their rental units. 

Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate to dismiss the

remainder of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. 

II. BACKGROUND

The factual and procedural history of this case is set forth

in the court's opinion of June 27, 2012 and is incorporated

3
herein. [Docket Item 172]; Bethea v. Roizman, Civ. No. 11-254,

2012 WL 2500592 (D.N.J. June 27, 2012). 

The Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on January 18,

2011. [Docket Item 1.] The Plaintiffs have since amended their

complaint twice.

The Second Amended Complaint is brought by 16 named

Plaintiffs who are low-income African American and Hispanic women

who allege that they are present and/or former tenants at Camden

Townhouses II Broadway Street. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15-30.) 

In November 1992, the Camden Redevelopment Agency ("CRA")

sold 65 tracts of land and improvements to one of Roizman's

businesses - Camden Townhouses Associates II, L.P. - for one

hundred seventy-five thousand dollars ($175,000), and an

additional forty thousand dollars ($40,000) administrative fee. 

(Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 62.) Camden Townhouses Associates II also

entered into an agreement that these 65 tracts of land were to be

developed into 91 affordable rental housing units. (Sec. Am.

Compl. ¶ 63.) 

Contemporaneously, Roizman, through Camden Townhouses

Associates II, L.P., acquired a loan from the New Jersey Housing

Mortgage and Financing Agency ("NJHMFA") and entered into a

Financing, Deed Restriction and Regulatory Agreement with the

NJHMFA which stated:

It is understood by the parties hereto that after a term

of fifteen (15) years from the end of the Construction

4
Period it is the Owner's intent to sell the Project

rental units to Low-Income Persons. In the event of such

a sale, the Owner Hereby represents, warrants and

covenants that the Project rental units will be initially

offered for sale for the sum of One Dollar (U.S. $1.00)

to the existing Low-Income Tenants who meet the income

requirements of Low-Income Persons. 

(Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 74.) On July 15, 1994, NJHMFA and Camden

Townhouses Associates II, L.P. recorded a Deed of Easement and

Restrictive Covenant for Extended Low-Income Occupancy which

provided:

This Deed of Easement and Restrictive Covenant shall

constitute an agreement between HMFA and the Owner and is

enforceable in the courts of the State of New Jersey by

HMFA or by an individual or individuals whether

prospective, present or former occupants of the Building,

who meet the low-income eligibility standards applicable

in the Building under Section 42(g) of the Tax Code, said

individual(s) being beneficiaries of the agreement which

is expressed herein between the HMFA and the Owner.

(Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 75.)

Both agreements were recorded. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 74, 75.)

The units at the Camden Townhouses Broadway II development

were then occupied by the Plaintiffs who are low-income, African

American and Hispanic females. The Plaintiffs received Section 8

Housing Vouchers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o) which provided

the Plaintiffs with rental assistance while living at the Camden

Townhouses Broadway II development. These housing vouchers were

administered through the New Jersey Department of Community

Affairs ("DCA"). (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 48.)

As a matter of legal argument, the Plaintiffs contend that

5
as soon as they became tenants at the Camden Townhouses II

Broadway Street Housing Development, "they became either direct

parties to the contract or third-party beneficiaries to the

contract between Roizman, Roizman Developments, Inc. and its

affiliated companies and NJHMFA." (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 105-107;

123-126.)

The Plaintiffs subsequently had issues with receiving their

Section 8 Housing Vouchers and were told that they no longer met

the Section 8 guidelines for occupancy at Camden Townhouses II

Broadway. The Plaintiffs allege they were "unlawfully steered"

by the DCA Defendants and Roizman Defendants to other, less

desirable rental units. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 116, 118, 120-121,

170, 173, 179-184.) Plaintiff Bethea who remained as a resident

in the Camden Townhouses II Broadway development tendered $1 to

the Roizman Defendants but was never given title to her housing

unit. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 123m 126, 238.) Plaintiff Bethea was

later evicted for failure to pay rent. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 127-

143).

The Plaintiffs ultimately brought the instant action and the

following defendants are named in the Second Amended Complaint:

! Israel Roizman ("Roizman Defendants")

" Roizman Development, Inc.

" Camden Townhouses Associates II, L.P.

- Kathy Hvasta, Manager, Camden Townhouses

Associates, II, L.P.

- William L. Coney, Manager Camden

Townhouses Associates, II, L.P.

" S.H.N.I.R. Apartment Management Corp.

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- Melissa Jackson-Deeble, Tenants Accounts

Assistant Coordinator, S.H.N.I.R.

Apartment Management Corp.

! State of New Jersey Department of Community Affairs

("DCA Defendants")

" Charles A. Richman, Acting Commissioner

" Lori Grifa, Former Commissioner

" Susan Bass-Levin, Former Commissioner

" Joseph V. Doria, Jr., Former Commissioner

" Annetta McCormick, Field Office Supervisor

" Daniel Esochanghi, Employee

" Kia Turner, Employee

! State of New Jersey Housing and Mortgage Finance

Agency ("NJHMFA")

! City of Camden

" Edward Williams, Director of Development and

Planning

! Camden Redevelopment Agency ("CRA Defendants")

" Olivette Simpson, Director of Housing

! United States Department of Housing and Urban

Development ("Federal Defendants")

" Balu Thumar, Acting Director of Public Housing

The Plaintiffs allege that as a result of the denial of

their alleged right to purchase their low-income housing units

for one dollar ($1), the named defendants violated a multitude of

Plaintiffs' federal civil and constitutional rights and committed

a number of state law violations against them.

The Second Amended Complaint brings the following causes of

action:

Count I: Tortious Interference with Contract against All

Defendants; and

Count II: Breach of Contract against Roizman, Roizman

Development, Inc., Camden Townhouses Associates II, L.P.,

7
the DCA and the NJHMFA ; and

Count III: Unjust Enrichment against Roizman, Roizman

Development, Inc., Camden Townhouses Associates II, L.P.,

the DCA, NJHMFA and City of Camden; and

Count IV: Fraudulent and Deceptive Trade Practices

against Roizman, Roizman Development, Inc., Camden

Townhouses Associates II, L.P., the DCA, NJHMFA and City

of Camden; and

Count V: Specific Performance as to Roizman, Roizman

Development, Inc., Camden Townhouses Associates II, L.P.,

and NJHMFA; and

Count VI: Negligence against Roizman, Roizman

Development, Inc., Camden Townhouses Associates II, L.P.,

and S.H.N.I.R.; and

Count VII: Violation of N.J.S.A. 54:4-6.1, et seq.

against Roizman, Roizman Development, Inc., Camden

Townhouses Associates II, L.P., and S.H.N.I.R.; and

Count VIII: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

against All Defendants; and

Count IX: Unfair Debt Collection Practices against

Roizman, Roizman Development, Inc., Camden Townhouses

Associates II, L.P., S.H.N.I.R., Hvasta, Coney, and

Jackson-Deeble; and

Count X: Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices against

Roizman, Roizman Development, Inc., Camden Townhouses

Associates II, L.P., S.H.N.I.R., Hvasta, Coney, JacksonDeeble, McCormick, Esochanghi and NJDCA; and

Count XI: Violations of constitutional amendments, civil

rights and other federal laws against All Defendants; and

Count XII: Conspiracy under the color of state law to

violate Plaintiffs' constitutional rights, civil rights

and other rights against All Defendants; and finally

Count XIII: Bivens claim against Thumar and Jane and John

Does.

[Docket Item 73.] The Roizman Defendants and the City Defendants

8
filed answers to the Second Amended Complaint. [Docket Items 94

and 97.] The DCA Defendants, NJHMFA, CRA Defendants, Federal

Defendants and Defendants Olivette Simpson and Susan Bass-Levin

filed motions to dismiss the claims against them in the Second

Amended Complaint in their entirety.

On June 27, 2012, the court issued an opinion granting all

the motions to dismiss. The court concluded that many of these

governmental defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity and

qualified immunity. The court found the Plaintiffs failed to

state viable tort and contract claims against these government

defendants because the Plaintiffs did not allege that they had

filed the proper notice of claim as required under the New Jersey

Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 et seq., and the New Jersey

Contractual Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 59:13-5. The court also

determined that Plaintiffs' federal claims in Counts X and XI did

not meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8. Specifically, the

court was unable to make sense of the Plaintiff's conclusory

allegations which were so broad as to encompass the entire

universe of federal and state law. Since the Plaintiffs'

allegations were merely "labels and conclusions" without any

factual specificity, the court dismissed Counts XI and XII

against all the moving defendants. [Docket Item 172.]

While the motions to dismiss were pending, the court stayed

Plaintiffs' pending motion for judgment on the pleadings or in

9
the alternative, summary judgment [Docket Item 123] and the City

Defendants' cross motion [Docket Item 166.] The court dismissed

as moot Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings as to

the DCA Defendants, NJHMFA, CRA Defendants, Federal Defendants

and Defendants Olivette Simpson and Susan Bass-Levin in the

court's June 27, 2012 order granting these defendants' motions to

dismiss. [Docket Item 73.] The court also lifted the stay on

the City Defendants' motion and the Plaintiffs' motion as it

pertained to the City Defendants and the Roizman Defendants. Id.

In response to the Plaintiff's motion, the Roizman

Defendants filed their own cross motion for summary judgment. 

[Docket Item 180.] The Plaintiff has not filed a response to the

City Defendant's cross motion or the Roizman Defendant's cross

motion, and the time to do so has expired. 

III. Standard of Review

Judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c), "will only

be granted where the moving party clearly establishes there are

no material issues of fact, and that he or she is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hosp., 530

F.3d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2008). Where the movant alleges that the

complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, the court applies the same standards as under Rule

12(b)(6). Turbe v. Government of Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427,

10
428 (3d Cir. 1991); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 n.2 (3d

Cir. 2004) (applying Rule 12(b)(6) standard to Rule 12(c)

motion).

In order to give defendant fair notice, and to permit early

dismissal if the complained-of conduct does not provide adequate

grounds for the cause of action alleged, a complaint must allege,

in more than legal boilerplate, those facts about the conduct of

each defendant giving rise to liability. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and

11(b)(3). These factual allegations must present a plausible

basis for relief (i.e., something more than the mere possibility

of legal misconduct). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681

(2009). In its review of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., the Court must "accept all factual

allegations as true and construe the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff." Phillips v. County of Allegheny,

515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche

Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)). 

The assumption of truth does not apply, however, to legal

conclusions couched as factual allegations or to “[t]hreadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district

court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleading sought

11
to be dismissed. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114

F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) provides

that:

If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters

outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded

by the court, the motion must be treated as one for

summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given

a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that

is pertinent to the motion.

As a general rule, a district court considering a 12(b)(6) motion

to dismiss relies on “the complaint, attached exhibits, and

matters of public record.” Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268

(3d Cir. 2007); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d

at 1425 (deciding that the district court, in ruling on a motion

to dismiss, should not have considered information from the brief

supporting the motion to dismiss).

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of

persuasion at trial, the moving party may be entitled to summary

judgment merely by showing that there is an absence of evidence

to support an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 325 (1986).

The summary judgment standard does not change when the

parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. See

12
Appelmans v. City of Phila., 826 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1987). 

Cross-motions for summary judgment:

are no more than a claim by each side that it

alone is entitled to summary judgment, and the

making of such inherently contradictory claims

does not constitute an agreement that if one

is rejected the other is necessarily justified

or that the losing party waives judicial

consideration and determination whether

genuine issues of material fact exist.

Transportes Ferreos de Venezuela II CA v. NKK Corp., 239 F.3d

555, 560 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc.,

402 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 1968)). If review of cross-motions

for summary judgment reveals no genuine issue of material fact,

then judgment may be entered in favor of the party deserving of

judgment in light of the law and undisputed facts. See Iberia

Foods Corp. v. Romeo Jr., 150 F.3d 298, 302 (3d Cir. 1998)

(citing Ciarlante v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 143 F.3d

139, 145–46 (3d Cir. 1988)).

IV. City Defendants' Cross Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

or in the alternative, Summary Judgment

The Camden Townhouses Broadway II Development is located in

Defendant City of Camden. As alleged in the Second Amended

Complaint, Defendant Edward Williams is the Director of

Development and Planning for Defendant City of Camden. (Sec. Am.

Compl. ¶ 56.) In order to finance the Camden Townhouses II

Broadway Development, on November 5, 1992, the Roizman Defendants

13
acquired a subordinate mortgage loan in the amount of

$1,000,000.00 from Defendant City of Camden and the DCA. (Sec.

Am. Compl. ¶ 66.) The Plaintiffs allege the City Defendants

failed to properly supervise the Roizman Defendants and

consequently allowed them to discriminate in the provision of

low-income housing. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 69.) The Plaintiffs

further allege that the Roizman Defendants repaid this mortgage

by using proceeds from Section 8 Rental subsidies. (Sec. Am.

Compl. ¶ 76.) 

In 2004, the City Defendants and the CRA were in the process

of revising the City's Master Plans and designated the area where

the Camden Townhouses Broadway II Development was located as a

prime redevelopment area. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 99.) The Second

Amended Complaint alleges that City Defendants never notified the

Plaintiffs, as tenants in the Townhouse Development, of the

consequences of this redevelopment plan, known as the Cooper

Plaza Redevelopment Plan. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 100.) The

Plaintiffs also allege that the Cooper Redevelopment plan was

designed to exclude Plaintiffs from the area and violated

Plaintiffs' constitutional and civil rights. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶

103.) This exclusionary result was allegedly part of a custom,

policy or practice of the City Defendants. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶

104.) The Second Amended Complaint further alleges that the City

of Camden was the recipient of "hundreds of millions of dollars

14
in federal funds, tax credits and other monetary benefits which

were used to fund" the Camden Townhouses Broadway II development. 

(Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 59.)

The Second Amended Complaint brings the following causes of

action against the City Defendants: tortious interference with

contract (Count I); unjust enrichment (Count III); fraudulent and

deceptive trade practices (Count IV); intentional infliction of

emotional distress (Count VIII); violations of constitutional

amendments, civil rights and other federal laws (Count XI); and

conspiracy under the color of state law to violate Plaintiffs'

constitutional rights, civil rights and other rights (Count XII).

A. Parties' Arguments

The Plaintiffs' move for judgment on the pleadings and

summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims for tortious interference

(Count I), breach of contract (Count II), unjust enrichment

(Count III), violations of constitutional amendments, civil

rights and other federal laws (Count XI) and conspiracy to 1

 Specifically, the Plaintiffs now label Count XI in their 1

moving papers as a claim for "denial of due process." However,

Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint labels Count XI as

"violations of constitutional amendments, civil rights and other

federal laws" and pleads a myriad of state and federal

constitutional violations. If the Plaintiffs sought relief

solely for violating their rights to due process, then Plaintiffs

should have succinctly pled this claim in their Second Amended

Complaint. The Plaintiffs instead chose to broadly plead the

entire universe of federal and state law, which as the court

explained in its June 27, 2012 Opinion, clearly violated Rule 8. 

The court will not entertain Plaintiffs' attempt at narrowing

their ill-pled claim by labeling Count XI as "denial of due

15
violate constitutional, civil and other rights (Count XII). The

Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the

alternative, summary judgment, makes several generalized

arguments against all defendants and does not specifically

address its claims against the City Defendants. [Docket Item

123.] The Plaintiffs' arguments are repetitive of their

opposition to the prior motions to dismiss. [Docket Item 113.] 

In general, the Plaintiffs argue that the City Defendants are not

entitled to immunity, the Plaintiffs did not have to comply with

the notice requirements of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act and the

Plaintiffs have conclusively established all the necessary facts

to support their claims. The Plaintiffs rely primarily on their

allegations in the Second Amended Complaint. 

2

process." This is not a fair or even plausible reading of the

express language of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint.

 In Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts Not in Dispute, 2

Plaintiffs largely cite to the allegations in their Second

Amended Complaint. The Plaintiffs also state in their brief that

these allegations are "undisputed." This is wholly inaccurate as

the City Defendants denied the majority of Plaintiffs'

allegations in their answer [Docket Item 97] and present a

contrasting factual record in support of their motion for summary

judgment [Docket Item 166]. 

Merely citing to the pleadings is insufficient to support a

motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The movants'

statement of undisputed material facts, as required by L. Civ. R.

56.1(a), must cite to admissible evidence to support each fact

that has not previously been admitted by the proponent, and

Plaintiffs have failed to do so. However, as the court has

determined that the City Defendants are entitled to judgment on

the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), Plaintiffs'

deficient statement of facts will not affect the court's

analysis. 

16
The City Defendants make several arguments in support of

their cross motion. In particular, the City Defendants contend

that the Plaintiffs have not alleged compliance with the notice

requirements of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act and therefore, all

tort claims against the City Defendants should be dismissed. The

City Defendants also argue that the Plaintiffs fail to state a

claim for unjust enrichment because they have not alleged facts

to support that the City Defendants received or retained any

benefit from the Plaintiffs. As to the federal claims, the City

Defendants argue that Defendant Williams is entitled to qualified

immunity and the Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently plead

discrimination or any constitutional or civil rights violations.

B. Analysis

1. Tort Claims

It is clear and the parties do not dispute that the City of

Camden is a public entity and Edward Williams, as the Director of

the City of Camden's Department of Planning and Development, is a

public employee as defined by the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. 

Tort claims against public entities and public employees are

governed by the New Jersey Tort Claims Act ("NJTCA"), N.J.S.A.

59:1-1 et seq. See Velez v. City of Jersey City, 180 N.J. 284

(2004). The NJTCA requires that a notice of claim be filed with

the public entity not later than the ninetieth (90th) day after

accrual of the underlying cause of action. N.J.S.A. 59:8-8(a). 

17
Failure to file the required notice will result in the dismissal

of a plaintiff's tort claims. N.J. Stat. Ann. 59:8-3.

The NJTCA defines public entity broadly and "includes the

State, and any county, municipality, district, public authority,

public agency, and any other political subdivision or public body

in the State." N.J.S.A. 59:1-3. Accoridngly, the City of

Camden, as a municipality, is a public entity as defined by the

NJTCA and Edward Williams, as the Director of the City of Camden

Department of Planning and Development, is a public employee.

Accordingly, the notice provisions of the NJTCA apply and

failure to comply with these notice provisions requires

dismissal. In this case, the Second Amended Complaint does not

allege compliance with the NJTCA notice requirements. 

Consequently, the Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against

the City Defendants for tortious interference with contract,

fraudulent and deceptive trade practices or intentional

infliction of emotional distress. 

Therefore, the City Defendants' motion for judgment on the

pleadings will be granted as to Counts I, IV and VIII of the

Plaintiffs' complaint.

2. Unjust Enrichment

Under New Jersey law, there are two basic elements of unjust

enrichment. "A plaintiff must demonstrate both that defendant

received a benefit and that retention of that benefit without

18
payment would be unjust." MK Strategies, LLC v. Ann Taylor

Stores Corp., 567 F. Supp. 2d 729, 733 (D.N.J. 2008). 

In this case, the Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they

conferred a benefit on the City Defendants. The City Defendants

did not own or control the Camden Townhouses Broadway II

Development. Any Section 8 housing vouchers or tax credits that

the City allegedly received did not come from the Plaintiffs. 

There are no allegations that the Plaintiffs paid their rent

directly to the City; rather, the Plaintiffs allege they paid

their rent to the Roizman Defendants. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 97,

111, 137

The Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they conferred a

benefit on the City Defendants. Without alleging a plausible

factual basis for this element, the Plaintiffs' claims for unjust

enrichment against the City Defendants must be dismissed. 

Therefore, the City Defendants' motion for judgment on the

pleadings as to Count III will be granted.

3. Federal Claims

As discussed in this court's previous opinion on June 27,

2012, the Plaintiffs' complaint fails to meet the pleading

requirements of Rule 8 with regard to Counts XI and XII which

allege violations of constitutional amendments, civil rights and

other federal laws as well as conspiracy under the color of state

law. Specifically, this court held:

19
The Plaintiffs' allegations have little relationship to

the facts plead in the preliminary portion of the

Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and instead are so

broad as to encompass the entire universe of federal and

state law. This is clearly violative of Rule 8 which

requires a plaintiff to set forth a "short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (a)(2). 

Due to the generality and vagueness of Plaintiffs'

allegations in Counts XI and XII, the complaint fails to

give the defendants "fair notice of what the claim is and

the grounds upon which it rests." Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555. 

[Docket Item 172 at 58-59.]

The court finds this reasoning equally applicable to the

Plaintiffs' claims against the City Defendants. Therefore, since

Counts XI and XII fail to state a claim, the City Defendants'

motion for judgment on the pleadings will be granted.

4. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the court will grant the

City Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. [Docket

Item 166.] The Plaintiffs failed to allege compliance with the

notice provision of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act and therefore

Plaintiffs' claims for tortious interference with contract (Count

I), fraudulent and deceptive trade practices (Count IV) and

intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VIII) will be

dismissed. The Plaintiffs complaint also fails to allege a

plausible factual basis to establish that the Plaintiffs

conferred a benefit on the City Defendants. Consequently,

Plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment (Count VIII) must also be

20
dismissed for failure to state a claim. Finally, the Plaintiffs

have failed to comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 8 in

alleging their federal claims in Counts XI and XII. Therefore,

these claims will be dismissed. 

As these are the only claims against the City Defendants,

the Court will grant the City Defendants motion for judgment on

the pleadings in its entirety. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' motion

for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative for summary

judgment will be dismissed insofar as it pertains to the City

Defendants.

V. Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or in the

Alternative Summary Judgment, and Roizman Defendants' Cross

Motion for Summary Judgment

The Plaintiffs now move for judgment on the pleadings, or in

the alternative summary judgment, as to their claims for tortious

interference with contract (Count I); breach of contract (Count

II); unjust enrichment (Count III); violations of constitutional

amendments, civil rights and other federal laws (Count XI); and

conspiracy under color of state law to violate Plaintiffs'

constitutional rights (Count XII). In opposition, the Roizman

Defendants filed a cross motion for summary judgment as to all

claims. The Plaintiffs did not respond.

A. Background

1. The Parties' Statements of Material Facts

21
In response to the Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the

pleadings, or in the alternative, summary judgment, the Roizman

Defendants filed a cross motion for summary judgment. [Docket

Item 180.] The Plaintiffs did not file a reply to this cross

motion.

Pursuant to L. Civ. R. 56.1(a), the Plaintiffs filed a

Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute. Of Plaintiffs' one

hundred paragraphs of material facts, only ten of these cite to

documents in the record. The remaining facts cite only to the

allegations of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. This is

insufficient to support a summary judgment motion where the

movant is the party having the burden of proof of these facts at

trial.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)(1) and L. Civ. R. 56.1(a) require the

movant, in a motion for summary judgment, to furnish a Statement

of Material Facts Not in Dispute citing to evidence in the

record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)(1)(requiring a party to

support a factual assertion by "citing to particular parts of

materials in the record, including depositions, documents,

electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,

stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion

only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials")

and L. Civ. R. 56.1(a)(requiring movant to set forth material

facts in separately numbered paragraphs "citing to the affidavits

22
and other documents submitted in support of the motion."). 

Plaintiffs may not rely on their pleadings to support a motion

for summary judgment. Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891

F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989)(holding that a party cannot rely on

unsupported assertions, conclusory allegations or mere suspicions

to survive a summary judgment motion). Therefore the court will

disregard all of Plaintiffs' facts which are unsupported by a

citation to the record, unless the unsupported statements have

been admitted by the defendants in their response.

The Roizman Defendants filed a response to the Plaintiffs'

statement of material facts despite the Plaintiffs' general lack

of citations to the record. The Roizman Defendants also filed

their own separate Statement of Material Facts which properly

cited to affidavits and other documents in support of their

allegations as required by Rule 56. The Plaintiffs chose not to

file a reply to the Roizman Defendants' cross motion and

consequently, the Plaintiffs did not respond to the Roizman

Defendants' supplemental statement of facts. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) and L. Civ. R. 56.1(a) requires

parties to respond to a Counter Statement of Material Facts by

addressing each paragraph of the opponent's statement, indicating

agreement or disagreement and, if not agreed, stating each

material fact in dispute and citing to affidavits or other

documents in the record of the motion. L. Civ. R. 56.1(a). The

23
local rule provides that "any material fact not disputed shall be

deemed undisputed for purposes of the summary judgment motion." 

Id. Similarly, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) provides for the court

to consider any fact not properly addressed by the opposing party

as undisputed for purposes of the motion.3

Accordingly, as the Plaintiffs have failed to respond to the

Roizman Defendants' Counter-Statement of Undisputed Material

Facts and because this statement is properly supported with

citations to the record, the court will deem these facts

undisputed for purposes of this motion.

2. Facts

Israel Roizman is the President of Roizman Development Inc.,

a corporation that is in the business of the development of

affordable rental housing. Camden Townhouses Associates II, LP

("Camden Townhouses"), is a limited partnership which was formed

to engage in the development of 91 low income rental housing

units in Camden encompassing an area of 10 square blocks. 

On December 6, 1991, Israel Roizman wrote to the Director of

 The consequence of the opponent's failure to address the 3

movant's Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute has long been

clear, namely, the movant's facts, duly cited to the record of

evidence, are deemed unopposed for purposes of adjudicating the

motion. See, e.g., Montville Twp. v. Woodmont Builders, 2005

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18079 (D.N.J. Aug. 12, 2005); White v. Camden

City Bd. of Educ., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1246 n.1 (D.N.J. 2003),

aff'd, 90 Fed. App'x 437 (3d Cir. 2004); Hill v. Algor, 85 F.

Supp. 2d 391, 408 n.26 (D.N.J. 2000); Maertin v. Armstrong World

Industries, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5857 n.1 (D.N.J. 2000). 

24
Research and Development at the New Jersey Housing and Mortgage

Finance Agency (NJHMFA) regarding funding for the Camden

Townhouses development. In this letter, Israel Roizman stated

that the application for funding was:

based on a 15-year amortization at 8.5%. Our proposal

is to payoff the first mortgage within the 15 years and

at that time sell each property to each "Qualified lowincome tenant" for one dollar ($1.00).

In our transfer of deed, the qualified tenant which

will purchase the property will be required to live in

the property for a minimum of an additional 15-year

period.

(Pl.'s Ex. 5).

In response, Joel Silver from the NJHMFA replied to Roizman

and informed him that he would not be able to receive financing

until the 1992-1993 fiscal year. Mr. Silver also noted:

Regarding the Project review, we had a brief meeting last

week with Tom Roberts and Catherine Washington of the

Camden Redevelopment Authority. They confirmed that the

first Broadway Townhouses project was being well

maintained and confirmed their overall satisfaction and

admiration for what you accomplished. . . . We are all

quite excited about the opportunities for homeownership

that you have described and about the training sessions

that you hope to develop.

(Pl.'s Ex. 6.)

Camden Townhouses was officially designated as a redeveloper

with regard to these properties in 1992 and entered into a

redevelopment agreement with the Camden Redevelopment Agency

("CRA"). S.H.N.I.R. Apartment Management Corp. ("SHNIR") is the

management company for the project. Defendant Kathy Hvasta is

25
the manager and Defendant William Coney is the assistant manager

of the project. Defendant Melissa Deeble-Jackson is an employee

of SHNIR.

The Redevelopment Agreement provided that "upon the

amortization of the New Jersey Housing & Mortgage Finance

Agency's first taxable bond proceeds mortgage, the Redeveloper

shall convey all right, title and interest in these properties

conveyed pursuant hereto to the Agency [CRA] for the

consideration of $1.00 for each dwelling unit." (Roizman Cert.,

Ex. A at 7 § 9.) Consequently, the Redevelopment Agreement

states that Camden Townhouses is obligated to transfer the

Project back to the CRA after the satisfaction of the first

mortgage. Id.

On September 10, 1992, the NJHMFA wrote to Roizman to inform

him that his funding was approved. In describing the project,

the NJHMFA stated:

Camden Townhouse Associates, L.P., the Sponsor, is

seeking construction and permanent financing from the

Agency for the rehabilitation of 65 townhouse style

apartment buildings into 91 low income rental units

containing 2, 3 and 4 bedroom units. It is the Sponsor's

intent to lease the units to low income tenants for a

period of 15 years. The units would then be sold to

qualified low income persons for the sum of One Dollar

($1.00).

(Pl.'s Ex. 7.)

Having received the necessary approval for financing, Camden

Townhouses then entered into a series of mortgages to pay for the

26
development. Specifically, Camden Townhouses entered into four

mortgages including three mortgages from the NJHMFA and one

mortgage from the Department of Community Affairs, which will be

discussed in detail below.

First, Camden Townhouses borrowed the collective sum of

$6,300,000.00 from the NJHMFA and these transactions were

evidenced in three separate mortgage loans. In connection with

all three mortgages, Camden Townhouses and NJHMFA entered into a

Financing, Deed Restriction and Regulatory Agreement ("Regulatory

Agreement") which was executed in 1992 and duly recorded. This

agreement states: 

The Owner hereby represents, warrants and covenants that

at all times during the Qualified Project Period, the

Compliance Period, the Extended Use Period, if

applicable, or for a term of thirty (30) years from the

end of the Construction Period, whichever shall be

longer, 100% of the units shall be available for

occupancy to Low-Income Tenants or Low-Income Persons, as

applicable and shall be Rent-restricted until this

expiration of the Payments Contract; provided, however,

that after the expiration of the Payments Contract or any

extensions thereof, the Agency may elect to revise this

requirement if the financial feasibility of the Project

is in jeopardy, as determined by the Agency.

It is understood by the parties hereto that after a term

of fifteen (15) years from the end of the Construction

Period it is the Owner's intent to sell the Project

rental units to Low-Income Persons. In the event of such

a sale, the Owner Hereby represents, warrants and

covenants that the Project rental units will be initially

offered for sale for the sum of One Dollar (U.S. $1.00)

to the existing Low-Income Tenants who meet the income

requirements of Low-Income Persons. The Owner further

represents that any sale or resale of a Project unit

shall be affordable to purchasers who meet the income

eligibility requirements for Low-Income Persons.

27
(Roizman Cert. ¶ 12, Ex. B at 12 § 4.) On July 15, 1994, NJHMFA

and Camden Townhouses Associates also recorded a Deed of Easement

and Restrictive Covenant for Extended Low-Income Occupancy which

provided:

This Deed of Easement and Restrictive Covenant shall

constitute an agreement between the HMFA and the Owner

and is enforceable in the courts of the State of New

Jersey by HMFA or by an individual or individuals whether

prospective, present or former occupants of the Building,

who meet the low-income eligibility standards applicable

in the Building under Section 42(g) of the Tax Code, said

individual(s) being beneficiaries of the agreement which

is expressed herein between the HMFA and the Owner.

(Pls.' Ex. 1 ¶ 6.)

As to the fourth mortgage loan, on November 5, 1992, the

City of Camden agreed to provide $1,000,000.00 of its Balanced

Housing Funds to the Camden Townhouses and these funds were

provided by the Department of Community Affairs. (Pls.' Ex. 9.) 

This agreement stated: 

the Sponsor (Camden Townhouses Associates, L.P.) shall

execute a Note in the amount of $1,000,000.00 secured by

a mortgage on property . . . in favor of the Department. 

The terms and conditions of this note and mortgage shall

be subject to the review and approval of the Division of

Housing and shall include a provision that allows for the

assumption of the obligation by qualified purchases of

the units if the Borrower conveys each unit improved with

the proceeds to either a family that has been duly

qualified by the Department's Affordable Housing

Management Services or to another organization approved

by the Department ("Qualified Purchaser"); or to a non

profit housing corporation(s), that has been approved by

the Department. The conveyance shall be evidenced by a

deed containing restrictions prescribed by the Department

that insure continued affordability and/or occupancy of

the units by low and moderate income households.

28
(Pls.' Ex. 9 at ¶1.B.)

This resulted in the fourth mortgage on the development

property. The underlying mortgage note for the Balanced Housing

Funds provided that on the maturity date, the Department of

Community Affairs ("DCA") would allow the assumption of the

mortgage obligation by Qualified Purchasers of the units if the

Camden Townhouses Associates complied with certain conditions. 

The DCA Mortgage provides:

On the Maturity Dates, the Lender shall allow the

assumption of this obligation by qualified purchasers of

the units as hereinafter defined if and only if the

Borrower complies with the following terms and

conditions:

1. The Borrower shall convey for the sum of One Dollar

($1.00) each unit improved with the proceeds of this

mortgage loan to either: a family that has been duly

qualified by the Department's Affordable Housing

Management Services or another organization approved by

the Lender ("Qualified Purchaser"); or to a non profit

housing corporation(s), that has been approved by the

Department. The conveyance shall be evidenced by a deed

containing restrictions prescribed by the Department to

insure continued affordability and/or occupancy of the

units by low and moderate income households. . . .

For each unit that the Borrower meets the above stated

conditions, the Lender shall provide a partial release of

the obligations evidenced by this BHP Mortgage Note and

a partial release of the underlying BHP Mortgage.

(Roizman Cert. ¶ 16, Ex. C at 2.)

In addition to the above mortgages, Camden Townhouses

entered into an agreement in November 1992 with the City of

Camden wherein the developed property would be exempt from

taxation until the first mortgage held by the NJHMFA was paid in

29
full. Instead, Camden Townhouses would make a payment in lieu of

taxes to the City equal to 6.28% of its Annual Gross Revenue. 

(Roizman Cert. ¶ 36, Ex. H.) 

The first mortgage on the property was discharged on or

about October 1, 2009. At this point, Roizman offered the

property back to the CRA, but the CRA declined to accept title to

the properties. (Roizman Cert. ¶ 9.) Since the first mortgage

was discharged, the properties were no longer exempt from

taxation. For the fiscal year commencing July 1, 2010 and ending

June 30, 2011 and the fiscal year commencing July 1, 2011 and

ending June 30, 2012, the State did not appropriate any funds for

payment of property tax abatements to residential tenants. 

(Roizman Cert. ¶ 38, Ex. I.) In addition, Camden Townhouses did

not receive a tax reduction in 2010 or 2011. (Roizman Cert. ¶

37.)

In total, two of the mortgages held by the NJHMFA have been

satisfied and one remains. The DCA mortgage is also outstanding. 

(Roizman Cert. ¶¶ 9, 11, 31.)

The construction of the development was completed on or

about March 4, 1994 and the units in the Project were rented to

low income tenants who received project based Section 8 rental

subsidies. The 15-year period after the end of construction

ended March 4, 2009. Section 8 Housing is a form of rent subsidy

administered by the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs,

30
and the Roizman Defendants have no control or involvement in

determining the income eligibility of tenants. Instead, tenants

came to Camden Townhouses pre-certified by DCA as to eligibility. 

This income eligibility screening is performed annually by the

DCA and certified to Camden Townhouses.

The Plaintiffs, with the exception of Towanda Smith and

Christina O'Casio, are either current or former tenants of Camden

Townhouses.4

In order to reside in a rental unit of the development, the

Plaintiffs entered into Lease Agreements with Camden Townhouses. 

These lease agreements allow the Plaintiffs to occupy a

residential unit in exchange for rent. The lease agreements do

not afford the tenants any right to obtain title to their units. 

(Roizman Cert. ¶¶ 19, 20, Ex. E.) 

There are several named plaintiffs in the instant complaint. 

Plaintiffs Gloria Abner, Sharon Smalls and Shelly Mathis a/k/a

Shelly McCullough were not residents 15 years after the

completion of construction in March 2009 or after the discharge

of the first mortgage on October 1, 2009. Plaintiff Gladys

Antelo did not move into Camden Townhouses until after March

2009, more than fifteen years after the date construction was

completed. (Hvasta Cert. ¶ 8.) 

 Neither Towanda Smith or Christina Casio ever resided at 4

Camden Townhouses.

31
In 2010, Plaintiffs Wanda Matias, Margaret David and Jahaira

Figueroa moved out of the Camden Townhouses. Maria Torres

voluntarily moved out on October 4, 2011. (Hvasta ¶ 9.) 

Plaintiffs Iona Evans, Maria Campos, Georgette Brown, Yvette

Hernandez and Darcell Gilmore are current tenants.

Plaintiff Bethea resided in Camden Townhouses since

construction was completed on the project until December 2010. 

On April 8, 2010, Defendant Hvasta, as the manager of Camden

Townhouses, signed a request for tenancy approval for Bethea to

remain at her current address of 523B Broadway. This request was

on a NJDCA required form that applied to all residents who

decided to remain in their unit for a time period after July 1,

2010. (Hvasta Cert. ¶ 11.)

On or about August 10, 2010, the DCA issued a notice of

disapproval to Bethea indicating that Bethea's share of the total

housing costs exceeded 40% of her household's monthly adjusted

income and consequently, she was not eligible to stay in her

unit. This notice was sent directly to Bethea instead of Camden

Townhouses. (Hvasta Cert. ¶ 12, Ex. A.) 

Camden Townhouses did not learn that the DCA had determined

Ms. Bethea was ineligible to remain in her unit at Camden

Townhouses until September 2010. Defendant Hvasta confirmed

through the DCA that Bethea was issued a new voucher that could

be used at a 2-bedroom unit at Camden Townhouses or elsewhere. 

32
(Hvasta Cert. ¶ 13 and 14.) Camden Townhouses then offered

Bethea a 2-bedroom unit located in another development because

that was the only two bedroom unit available at the time. 

(Hvasta Cert. ¶ 4.) Bethea refused the unit and did not pay the

subsidized rent for her current unit for the months of October,

November and December 2010. (Hvasta Cert. ¶ 15 and 17.)

During this same time period, in September 2010, Bethea sent

a letter to Israel Roizman seeking title to her unit. This

letter states:

My name is Carolyn D. Bethea and I am and have been a

tenant of the Broadway Townhouses for the past 18 years. 

Within the last two years myself and others that have

been residing in the Broadway Townhouses 15 years and

over were promised to be sold there [sic] Townhomes for

$1.00.

I am sending to you this certified letter and enclosed is

$1.00 for the purchase of my home at 523 B Broadway

Camden, NJ 08104. Please forward the title and the deed

to the address stated above or schedule an appointment

with me so I can sign the necessary paperwork required to

settle this matter.

(Pls.' Ex. 11.)

In December 2010, Camden Townhouses commenced eviction

proceedings for non-payment of rent and Ms. Bethea was served

with the Complaint and notice of the scheduled hearing. (Hvasta

Cert. ¶ 18.) The Complaint indicates that the landlord did not

give the tenant an option to purchase the property and that

Bethea owed $951.00 in unpaid rent. (Pls.' Ex. 18 ¶¶ 4, 9A.) 

Plaintiff Bethea vacated voluntarily before the court date

33
for the eviction proceedings. (Hvasta Cert. ¶ 19.) The Roizman

Defendants are not engaged in a business that has a principal

purpose of the collection of debts. (Roizman Cert. ¶ 25.) 

However, in November 2011, Plaintiff Bethea received a debt

collection notice from a company named ACCB seeking to collect

$776.44 on behalf of Camden Townhouses. (Pls.' Ex. 19.) There is

no evidence in the record that Plaintiff Bethea has paid this

debt to Camden Townhouses.

Currently, none of the units in the Camden Townhouses

development have been conveyed to any tenants or any other

persons. Camden Townhouses continues to retain title to the

property which remains a low-income housing development. 

(Roizman Cert. ¶ 33.) 

However, in 2011, the Roizman Defendants entered into

negotiations with St. Joseph's Carpenters Society which indicated

an interest in pursuing the Project. A Letter of Intent between

Camden Townhouses and St. Joseph's was executed whereby St

Joseph's would conduct due diligence of the Project and then make

a decision as to whether to proceed to acquire the properties for

$91. (Roizman Cert. ¶ 28, Ex. G.) The Roizman Defendants agreed

to pay up to $50,000 to reimburse St. Joseph's for the cost of

due diligence and paid $10,000 in advance. (Roizman Cert. ¶ 29.)

The Letter of Intent, though, was conditioned upon the

elimination of this litigation. St. Joseph's explained that it

34
could not afford to be involved in a Project where they will be

obligated to incur legal fees and expenses. Consequently, the

due diligence investigation has been held in abeyance pending the

outcome of this litigation. (Roizman Cert. ¶ 30.)

B. Analysis

The Plaintiffs bring the following claims against the

Roizman Defendants: tortious interference with contract (Count

I); breach of contract (Count II); unjust enrichment (Count III);

fraudulent and deceptive trade practices (Count IV); specific

performance (Count V); negligence (Count VI); violation of

N.J.S.A. 54:4-6.1 (Count VII); intentional infliction of

emotional distress (Count VIII); unfair debt collection practices

(Count IX); fraud and deceptive business practices (Count X);

violations of constitutional amendments, civil rights and other

federal laws (Count XI); and conspiracy under color of state law

to violate Plaintiffs' constitutional rights (Count XII). 

5

The court will address each count separately below.

1. Breach of Contract (Count II)

a. Parties' Arguments

The Plaintiffs argue it is undisputed that there is a

contract between the Plaintiffs and the Roizman Defendants which

 In their moving papers, the Plaintiffs mention a claim for 5

breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. This claim is

not plead in the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and

therefore will not be addressed by the court.

35
the Roizman Defendants breached. The Plaintiffs rely on the July

15, 1994 Deed Restriction as evidence that the Plaintiffs are

parties to the November 1992 Financing, Deed Restriction and

Regulatory Agreement ("Regulatory Agreement") between the NJHMFA

and Camden Townhouses. The Plaintiffs argue that the Regulatory

Agreement clearly evinced an intent to sell the rental units to

the Plaintiffs for one dollar and consequently, Plaintiffs are

the beneficiaries of this contract. Further, Plaintiffs rely on

the subsequent Deed Restriction as evidence that they are

intended beneficiaries of the Regulatory Agreement because the

Deed Restriction expressly gives Plaintiffs, as present and

former occupants of the development, a right to enforce the

agreement in New Jersey state courts. 

In addition, the Plaintiffs argue the DCA Mortgage evinces

an intent by the Roizman Defendants to sell the rental units to

Plaintiffs for one dollar. The Plaintiffs also rely on the

letters from Israel Roizman to various agencies soliciting

funding wherein the project was described as providing

homeownership opportunities and the eventual sale of the units to

the tenants for one dollar.

It is undisputed by the parties that the Roizman Defendants

did not sell the units to the Plaintiffs in March 2009, fifteen

years after the end of the construction period. Therefore, the

Plaintiffs argue the Roizman Defendants breached the contract and

36
deprived them of their rights as parties to the contract, or

alternatively, as third party beneficiaries.

The Roizman Defendants, in opposition, argue that the

Plaintiffs are neither parties to a contract nor third party

beneficiaries. Specifically, the Roizman Defendants maintain

that there are four operative agreements at issue in this case

and none of these agreements give Plaintiffs the right to

purchase their rental unit for a dollar. 

First, the Roizman Defendants argue the Redevelopment

Agreement between the CRA and Camden Townhouses does not bestow

any rights on the Plaintiffs. Rather, this agreement requires

Camden Townhouses to transfer the property back to the CRA when

the first NJHMFA mortgage is discharged. 

Next, the Roizman Defendants argue the Regulatory Agreement

and Deed Restriction between the NJHMFA and Camden Townhouses do

not provide any rights to the Plaintiffs as parties to the

contract or third party beneficiaries. In particular, the

Plaintiffs are not named in the contract and consequently, the

Roizman Defendants maintain they cannot be considered parties to

the agreement. Moreover, the Regulatory Agreement expresses that

it was Camden Townhouses "intent" to sell the units to qualified

tenants and does not mandate a transfer of ownership. Instead,

the Regulatory Agreement, through its express language,

contemplates Camden Townhouses either selling or retaining the

37
units at the end of the construction period. At most, the

Roizman Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs are incidental third

party beneficiaries and have no enforceable rights pursuant to

the agreement between NJHMFA and Camden Townhouses. 

The Roizman Defendants also argue that the DCA Mortgage

imposes no obligation on Camden Townhouses to transfer the units

to the Plaintiffs. Rather, the express language of the DCA

Mortgage gives two options for conveyance of the property. 

First, Camden Townhouses could sell the units to the families

that have been duly qualified by the DCA or to another

organization approved by the DCA. Alternatively, Camden

Townhouses could sell the property to a non-profit organization. 

The Roizman Defendants contend that the DCA Mortgage permits

Camden Townhouses to sell the units to the Plaintiffs as long as

Plaintiffs are properly qualified; however, this mortgage does

not require such a transfer and does not provide the Plaintiffs

with enforceable contractual rights.

Finally, the Roizman Defendants maintain that the lease

agreements are the only operative contract between Camden

Townhouses and the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs have not alleged

any breach of Camden Townhouses' obligations under the lease

agreements. Importantly, the lease agreements do not provide the

Plaintiffs, as tenants, with an option to purchase their unit or

a promise to transfer ownership of the unit. Therefore, the

38
Roizman Defendants maintain that the lease agreements cannot

serve as a basis for the Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim.

To the extent Plaintiffs rely on pre-contract letters, the

Defendants contend this reliance is misplaced. These letters do

not constitute a binding contract on the parties and are not

incorporated into the final mortgage notes or regulatory

agreements. 

Accordingly, the Roizman Defendants argue that summary

judgment is appropriate to dismiss Plaintiffs' breach of contract

claim.

b. Analysis

To state a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff “must

allege (1) a contract between the parties; (2) a breach of that

contract; (3) damages flowing there from; and (4) that the party

stating the claim performed its own contractual obligations.”

Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 203 (3d Cir.2007).

Under New Jersey law, a third party may bring an action to

enforce a contract only if the third party is a "person for whose

benefit the contract is made." N.J.S.A. 2A:15-2. In order for a

third party to have standing to sue, the contracting parties must

have intended that the third party receive a benefit which could

be enforced in the courts. GE Capital Mortg. Services, Inc. v.

Privetera, 346 N.J. Super. 424, 434 (App. Div. 2002). The New

Jersey Supreme Court has explained the "contractual intent to

39
recognize a right to performance in the third person is the key.

If that intent does not exist, then the third person is only an

incidental beneficiary, having no contractual standing." 

Broadway Maintenance Corp. v. Rutgers, State University, 90 N.J.

253, 259 (1982). 

In this case, the only contract directly between the Roizman

Defendants and the Plaintiffs are the lease agreements. The

Plaintiffs do not allege that the lease agreements were breached

by the Defendants in any way. Therefore, the lease agreements

cannot serve as a basis for Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim.

In addition, the Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim is

filed against the Roizman Defendants, the DCA and the NJHMFA. 6 7

The Plaintiffs have not pled a violation of the CRA Redevelopment

Agreement, nor do the Plaintiffs rely on the CRA Redevelopment

Agreement in their moving papers. Therefore, the Plaintiffs'

breach of contract claim does not arise out of any alleged

violation of the CRA Redevelopment Agreement.

To the extent the Plaintiffs rely on pre-contractual letters

from Roizman to various lending agencies to support their breach

of contract claim, the court finds this unpersuasive. These

 The breach of contract claim against the DCA was dismissed 6

in the court's June 27, 2012 opinion. [Docket Item 172.]

 The breach of contract claim against the NJHMFA was 7

dismissed in the court's June 27, 2012 opinion. [Docket Item

172.]

40
letters are not binding contracts, were not incorporated into the

final lending agreements and cannot serve as a basis for

liability.

The issue then becomes whether the Plaintiffs are third

party beneficiaries of the remaining agreements, the DCA Mortgage

and the NJHMFA Regulatory Agreement, or alternatively, whether

Plaintiffs are merely incidental beneficiaries with no right to

sue. 

After examining the terms of the DCA Mortgage, the court

concludes that the Plaintiffs are not third party beneficiaries

and may not bring suit to enforce this contract. Importantly,

the language of the DCA Mortgage does not require Camden

Townhouses to transfer ownership of the rental units and does not

evince an intent by the contracting parties to confer a benefit

on the Plaintiffs. Specifically, the DCA Mortgage provides:

On the Maturity Dates, the Lender shall allow the

assumption of this obligation by Qualified Purchasers of

the units as hereinafter defined if and only if the

Borrower complies with the following terms and

conditions:

1. The Borrower shall convey for the sum of One Dollar

($1.00) each unit improved with the proceeds of this

mortgage loan to either: a family that has been duly

qualified by the Department's Affordable Housing

Management Services or another organization approved by

the Lender ("Qualified Purchaser"); or to a non-profit

housing corporation(s), that has been approved by the

Department. 

This language allows Camden Townhouses to sell the rental units

to a family that has been deemed a "qualified purchaser" or to a

41
non-profit housing corporation. Indeed, this language does not

require that the rental units be transferred to current tenants

in the building. Rather, the DCA Mortgage gives Camden

Townhouses discretion in deciding whether to sell the units to

families or to a non-profit, and in the case of families, whether

to sell the units to existing tenants or other qualified

purchasers.

Any benefit conferred on the Plaintiffs under the DCA

mortgage would be incidental. The contracting parties gave broad

latitude to the Camden Townhouses in conveying ownership of the

rental units and does not mandate that the Camden Townhouses sell

the units at a specified time to the existing tenants of the

development. Without a contractual intent to confer a benefit on

the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs cannot be considered intended

third party beneficiaries to the DCA Mortgage. Accordingly, the

Plaintiffs cannot base their breach of contract claim on any

alleged violation of this agreement.

The same cannot be said of the NJHMFA agreement. After

reviewing the terms of the Regulatory Agreement, it is clear the

parties intended to confer a benefit on the future low-income

tenants of the development. The subsequent Deed Restriction

gives low-income persons, such as Plaintiffs, the right to bring

suit to enforce the Regulatory Agreement in New Jersey state

court. This expressly evinces an intent by the contracting

42
parties that the Plaintiffs receive a benefit and the Plaintiffs

have the ability to enforce this promise in the courts. GE

Capital Mortg. Services, Inc. v. Privetera, 346 N.J. Super. 424,

434 (App. Div. 2002). 

Therefore, the court is persuaded that the Plaintiffs, as

low-income persons, are third party beneficiaries of the NJHMFA

Regulatory Agreement and Deed Restriction.

However, the court is not convinced that the benefit

intended to be conferred on the Plaintiffs is a mandatory

transfer of ownership of the rental units. The Regulatory

Agreement states that Camden Townhouses agreed to make the rental

units "available for occupancy to Low-Income Tenants or LowIncome Persons" and agreed that the units would be rentrestricted until the mortgage was satisfied. This promise is

enforceable "at all times during the Qualified Project Period,

the Compliance Period, the Extended Use Period, if applicable, or

for a term of thirty (30) years from the end of the Construction

Period, whichever shall be longer." (Roizman Cert. ¶ 12, Ex. B

at 12 § 4.) 

This language confers certain benefits on the Plaintiffs as

low-income persons. Specifically, the Regulatory Agreement

requires Camden Townhouses to make every rental unit in the

development available for occupancy by low-income persons and

keep the units rent-restricted. This is a substantial benefit to

43
the Plaintiffs because it ensures they will be able to occupy and

reside at the Camden Townhouses development as low-income

persons. Their rent will remain subsidized so long as they are

qualified and the project will not be converted into a for-profit

development. Instead, Camden Townhouses will remain as

affordable housing for a period of at least thirty years, which

provides stability to low-income persons who remain in the

development as tenants.

The Plaintiffs argue that the language of the following

paragraph confers a benefit on the Plaintiffs to receive a

mandatory transfer of ownership of their rental unit. The court

does not agree. The subsequent paragraph of the Regulatory

Agreement states:

It is understood by the parties hereto that after a term

of fifteen (15) years from the end of the Construction

Period it is the Owner's intent to sell the Project

rental units to Low-Income Persons. In the event of such

a sale, the Owner Hereby represents, warrants and

covenants that the Project rental units will be initially

offered for sale for the sum of One Dollar (U.S. $1.00)

to the existing Low-Income Tenants who meet the income

requirements of Low-Income Persons. The Owner further

represents that any sale or resale of a Project unit

shall be affordable to purchasers who meet the income

eligibility requirements for Low-Income Persons.

(Roizman Cert. ¶ 12, Ex. B at 12 § 4.)

This language is not mandatory and does not require Camden

Townhouses to sell the rental units to the existing low-income

tenants fifteen years after the construction period's conclusion. 

44
At most, this paragraph evinces an intent of Camden Townhouses to

make such a sale, but does not require a conveyance of ownership. 

This conclusion is supported by the language used by the

contracting parties, specifically the phrase, "in the event of

such a sale." This phrase indicates that the sale of a rental

unit is not certain. In addition, the preceding paragraph,

discussed above, indicates that the project could remain under

the ownership of Camden Townhouses for a period of thirty years. 

If the parties required Camden Townhouses to convey ownership of

the rental units to current tenants fifteen years after the

completion of construction, there would be no reason for Camden

Townhouses to warrant that the units will remain affordable and

rent-restricted for thirty years.

Further, "to be enforceable, a contract must be sufficiently

definite in its terms that the performance to be rendered by each

party can be ascertained with reasonable certainty." Friedman v.

Tappan Development Corp., 22 N.J. 523, 531 (1956). Here, there

is no express language which definitively requires Camden

Townhouses to convey ownership of the rental units to existing

tenants fifteen years after the completion of construction. 

Rather, the express language indicates that "it is the Owner's

intent" and states "in the event of such a sale." This language

is at best precatory, and is not sufficiently definite for the

court to conclude with reasonable certainty that conveyance of

45
the properties was required. 

Consequently, the Plaintiffs, as intended third party

beneficiaries, have the benefit of Camden Townhouses remaining an

affordable and rent-restricted housing development for a period

of thirty years or longer. This is the benefit the contracted

parties intended to confer and gave the parties the right to

enforce in the state courts. 

In contrast, the Plaintiffs do not have the right under this

agreement to an automatic transfer of ownership of their rental

unit for one dollar. This was contemplated by the parties as a

possible outcome, but not mandated or required by the terms of

the Regulatory Agreement, and therefore not enforceable in the

courts. 

Therefore, the Plaintiffs have standing to sue to enforce

Camden Townhouses' agreement to remain an affordable and rentrestricted housing development. However, the Plaintiffs do not

have standing to sue to force Camden Townhouses to convey

ownership of the rental units. Since there is no evidence in the

record that Camden Townhouses has breached its agreement to

remain an affordable and rent-restricted housing development,

Plaintiffs cannot sustain a breach of contract claim.

Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate and Plaintiffs'

breach of contract claim against the Roizman Defendants in Count

II will be dismissed. Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the

46
pleadings will likewise be denied. 

2. Tortious Interference with Contract (Count I)

Under New Jersey law, a complaint based on tortious

interference with prospective economic advantage must allege

three elements: (1) a protectable right - a prospective economic

or contractual relationship; (2) the interference was done

intentionally and with malice; (3) the interference caused the

loss of the prospective gain; and (4) the injury caused damage. 

Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J.

739, 751 (1989).

In this case, the Plaintiffs argue that the Roizman

Defendants tortiously interfered with their right to ownership of

the rental units. However, as discussed in subsection V.B.1.

above, the Plaintiffs did not have a protectable right to the

transfer of ownership. There is no evidence in the record that

the Roizman Defendants interfered with Camden Townhouses

remaining an affordable and rent-restricted housing development. 

Indeed, Camden Townhouses remains an affordable development to

the present day. Consequently, the Plaintiffs cannot establish

the first element of their tortious interference claim.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the

pleadings or in the alternative summary judgment on this count of

their complaint must be denied. Since the Plaintiffs have not

put forth any evidence establishing the first element of their

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tortious interference claim, the Roizman Defendants' cross motion

for summary judgment will be granted and this count will be

dismissed.

3. Specific Performance (Count V)

The Roizman Defendants move for summary judgment dismissing

Count V of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint for specific

performance. The Plaintiffs' moving papers did not address this

count of their complaint and the Plaintiffs did not oppose the

Roizman Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 

The Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that the Roizman

Defendants promised to sell the existing tenants their rental

unit fifteen years from the end of the construction period for

one dollar. The Plaintiffs seek specific performance and

conveyance of their rental unit.

Under New Jersey law, a court must consider several factors

in determining whether specific performance is an appropriate

remedy for breach of contract. Importantly, the court must

determine whether the contract is valid and whether the duties of

each party are clear. Marioni v. 94 Broadway, Inc., 374 N.J.

Super. 588, 599 (App. Div. 2005). "[T]he right to specific

performance turns not only on whether plaintiff has demonstrated

a right to legal relief but also whether the performance of the

contract represents an equitable result." Id. 

As discussed above in Subsection V.B.1., the Plaintiffs do

48
not have a contractual right to the transfer of ownership of

their rental units. Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot sustain a claim

for specific performance.

Accordingly, the Roizman Defendants' motion for summary

judgment will be granted and Count V of the Plaintiffs' Second

Amended Complaint will be dismissed.

4. Unjust Enrichment (Count III)

In order to establish a claim for unjust enrichment, "a

plaintiff must show both that defendant received a benefit and

that retention of that benefit without payment would be unjust." 

VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 135 N.J. 539, 554 (1994).

The Plaintiffs argue the Roizman Defendants accepted rent

from Plaintiffs after the Plaintiffs should have been transferred

title. The Plaintiffs also argue the Roizman Defendants accepted

subsidies, tax credits and other unspecified payments to which

they were not entitled. 

The Roizman Defendants maintain the Plaintiffs received the

full benefit of their rent payments because they occupied their

rental units without disruption and received all the benefits

they were entitled to under the Lease Agreement. The Roizman

Defendants further argue that the Section 8 rental subsidies and

tax credits cannot serve as a basis for Plaintiffs' unjust

enrichment claim because the Plaintiffs did not confer this

benefit on the Roizman Defendants. Rather, government agencies

49
provided these benefits and the Roizman Defendants were entitled

to receive them.

The court finds the Roizman Defendants' argument persuasive. 

As discussed in Subsection V.B.1. above, the Plaintiffs did not

have a contractual right to ownership of the rental units. 

Consequently, the Plaintiffs were required, as specified in the

Lease Agreement, to pay monthly rent to continue occupying their

units. There is no evidence in the record that the Plaintiffs

did not receive the full benefit of their lease agreements. 

Accordingly, the Roizman Defendants' retention of the Plaintiffs'

rent payments is not unjust.

Further, there is no evidence in the record that the Roizman

Defendants unlawfully received their Section 8 housing subsidies

or tax credits. More importantly, the Plaintiffs did not confer

these benefits on the Roizman Defendants and therefore these

benefits cannot serve as a basis for Plaintiffs' unjust

enrichment claim.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the

pleadings, or in the alternative, summary judgment, is denied. 

The Roizman Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted

and the Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim will be dismissed.

5. Fraudulent and Deceptive Trade Practices and Business

Practices (Counts IV and X)

The Plaintiffs' claims for fraudulent and deceptive trade

50
practices (Count IV) and fraud and deceptive business practices 8

(Count X) are essentially common law fraud claims. Under New

Jersey law, proof of common law fraud requires five elements: (1)

a material misrepresentation by the defendant of a presently

existing fact or past fact; (2) knowledge or belief by the

defendant of its falsity; (3) an intent that the plaintiff rely

on the statement; (4) reasonable reliance by the plaintiff; and

(5) resulting damages to the plaintiff. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Land, 186 N.J. 163, 175 (2006).

The Roizman Defendants move for summary judgment arguing the

Plaintiffs have failed to establish the essential elements

required for a fraud claim. Specifically, the Roizman Defendants

maintain that the Plaintiffs have not identified any false

representation of a material fact, knowledge of a falsity or that

the Plaintiffs relied on any misrepresentation. The Plaintiffs

 In Count IV, Plaintiffs state that they seek relief "under 8

United States Housing Act of 1937 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437 et seq.;

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982

1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988, the First, Fifth, Ninth, Thirteenth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,

other constitutional provisions, federal statutes and state

laws." (Pls.' Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 278.) The Plaintiffs' reference

to this broad panoply of federal and state law is confusing to

the court and violates Rule 8. Further, the facts underlying

this cause of action fall squarely within a common law fraud

claim, and the Plaintiffs have pled no facts in Count IV to

suggest that federal law applies in this instance. Therefore,

the court will treat Count IV as a state law claim for common law

fraud. 

51
declined to file opposition.

The court finds the Roizman Defendants' argument persuasive

and will grant summary judgment dismissing Counts IV and X. The

Plaintiffs claim that the Roizman Defendants promised to sell

Plaintiffs their rental units fifteen years after the end of the

construction period. Plaintiffs rely solely on the mortgage

documents discussed in Subsection Subsection V.B.1. to support

this allegation and present no evidence of a direct

misrepresentation by the Roizman Defendants to the Plaintiffs. 

The only document exchanged directly between the parties are the

lease agreements which do not support Plaintiffs' claims. 

Indeed, the lease agreements do not evince any intent by the

Roizman Defendants to transfer ownership of the rental units at

any time. 

In addition, the Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence

establishing detrimental reliance. Based on the record before

the court, the only party to have relied on the alleged promise

to transfer the property is Plaintiff Bethea. Plaintiff Bethea

sent $1 to Israel Roizman and requested he convey ownership of

her rental unit. Plaintiff Bethea then ceased to pay rent and

eviction proceedings were filed. Rather than respond to the

eviction proceedings, Bethea voluntarily vacated the property. 

Plaintiff Bethea cannot be said to have reasonably relied on

an alleged promise to transfer ownership of her rental unit. 

52
After sending Israel Roizman $1 and a letter requesting transfer

of the property, Bethea failed to follow up with Roizman when her

request was ignored. Plaintiff Bethea then lived rent-free for

the next three months so she cannot be said to have suffered

damages by paying rent when she was allegedly the true owner of

the property. When eviction proceedings were filed, Plaintiff

Bethea chose to voluntarily vacate her rental unit rather than

attend her court hearing to defend her property rights, if any. 

This is not evidence of detrimental reliance. Instead, this

evinces Plaintiff Bethea's intent to sit on her rights and file a

lawsuit after-the-fact. If Plaintiff Bethea truly relied on

Camden Townhouses' alleged promise to convey ownership of her

rental unit, then Bethea would not have abandoned her property

without attempting to fight the eviction proceedings and legally

establish her property rights. 

Therefore, the court finds the Plaintiffs have failed to

present facts which establish that the Roizman Defendants made a

material misrepresentation to the Plaintiffs or that the

Plaintiffs detrimentally relied on any alleged promise. 

Accordingly, the court will grant the Roizman Defendants' motion

for summary judgment and Plaintiffs' claims for fraud in Counts

IV and X will be dismissed. 

6. Negligence (Count VI)

In order to establish a claim for negligence under New

53
Jersey law, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) a duty of

care owed by defendant to plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty by

defendant; and (3) an injury to plaintiff proximately caused by

defendant's breach. Endre v. Arnold, 300 N.J. Super. 136, 142

(App. Div. 1997). 

The Roizman Defendants argue summary judgment should be

granted as to Plaintiffs' negligence claim because the Plaintiffs

have failed to establish that the Roizman Defendants breached a

duty. The Plaintiffs filed no opposition to this motion.

The court finds the Roizman Defendants' argument persuasive

and will grant summary judgment dismissing this claim. The

Plaintiffs have failed to allege that the Roizman Defendants

breached any duty owed to the Plaintiffs under the lease

agreement or as landlords. 

The Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that the Roizman

Defendants breached their "duty to act in good faith to deal

fairly with Plaintiffs." There is no evidence in the record to

support this allegation. First, there is no evidence that the

lease agreements were unfair or misleading. Further, any claims

that the Plaintiffs were promised ownership of their rental units

fifteen years after completion of construction sound in contract,

and as discussed in Subsection V.B.1., are meritless. 

Therefore, the Roizman Defendants' motion for summary

judgment will be granted and Count VI will be dismissed.

54
7. Violation of N.J.S.A. 54:4-6.1 (Count VII)

The Plaintiffs allege the Roizman Defendants violated the

Tenant's Property Rebate Act, N.J.S.A. 54:4-6.1, et seq., because

the Plaintiffs did not receive a property tax rebate while they

were tenants at the Camden Townhouses. Specifically, the

Plaintiffs maintain that the Roizman Defendants failed to post

the Rent Rebate Certification in a prominent place and failed to

pay rebates to qualified tenants. 

The Roizman Defendants move for summary judgment and argue

that they were not required to pay rebates under the Tenant's

Property Rebate Act. The Roizman Defendants maintain that the

Camden Townhouses property was subject to a tax abatement

agreement with the City from 1994 to 2009 and therefore was

excluded from the statute during this period. From 2010 through

June 30, 2012, the Roizman Defendants contend that the Camden

Townhouses property did not receive a property tax reduction. 

Consequently, the Tenant's Property Rebate Act is inapplicable

and no rebate was available for the tenants as a matter of law. 

Therefore, the Defendants argue summary judgment is appropriate

to dismiss this claim. The Plaintiffs did not oppose this

motion.

The Tenant's Property Rebate Act requires:

An owner of qualified real rental property shall provide

a property tax rebate to the tenants thereof as provided

in this act for each year in which he receives a property

tax reduction.

55
N.J.S.A. 54:4-6.4. Qualified real rental property is defined by

the statute as: 

any building or structure or complex of buildings or

structures in which five or more housing units are rented

or leased or offered for rental or lease for residential

purposes except:

. . . 

(2) buildings or structures which are subject to an

abatement agreement under which reduced or no property

taxes are paid on the improvements pursuant to statute,

notwithstanding that payments in lieu of taxes are paid in

accordance with the agreement;

N.J.S.A. 54:4-6.3(a)(2).

The record shows that the Camden Town Houses property was

subject to an abatement agreement from 1994-2009. (Roizman Cert.

¶ 38, Ex. H, Agreement for Payment in Lieu of Taxes.) The

Plaintiffs have put forth no evidence to dispute this fact. 

Therefore, under the express language of the statute, the Roizman

Defendants were exempt from providing property tax rebates to

their tenants from 1994-2009.

In addition, the record shows that Camden Townhouses did not

receive a tax reduction in 2010 or 2011. (Roizman Cert. ¶¶ 37,

38, Ex. I.) The Plaintiffs have failed to provide evidence to

dispute this fact. The Tenant's Property Rebate Act only applies

when an owner of a qualified rental property receives a property

tax reduction. Since no property tax reduction was received from

2010-2011, the Roizman Defendants were under no obligation to pay

property tax rebates to their tenants and the Tenant's Property

56
Rebate Act is inapplicable.

It is clear from the record that the Roizman Defendants were

not required under the Tenant's Property Rebate Act to provide

tax rebates to their tenants. Accordingly, the Roizman

Defendants motion for summary judgment will be granted and Count

VII of the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint will be

dismissed. 

8. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Under New Jersey law, a plaintiff must allege four elements

to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress: (1) that the defendant intended to cause emotional

distress; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3)

that the actions proximately caused emotional distress; and (4)

that the plaintiff's emotional distress was severe. Buckley v.

Trenton Saving Fund Soc., 544 A.2d 857, 863 (1988).

The Roizman Defendants argue summary judgment is appropriate

to dismiss Plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress because the Plaintiffs have presented no

evidence of extreme or outrageous conduct. The Plaintiffs failed

to respond to this motion.

The court finds the Roizman Defendants' arguments to be

correct. There is no evidence in the record to support

Plaintiffs' allegations that the Roizman Defendants engaged in

extreme and outrageous conduct with the intent to cause emotional

57
distress to the Plaintiffs. As discussed above in Subsection

V.B.1., the Plaintiffs did not have a contractual right to

ownership of their rental units. Moreover, no evidence suggests

that these Defendants acted inappropriately, let alone

outrageously, toward these Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Roizman

Defendants' failure to transfer ownership of the rental units to

the Plaintiffs cannot be considered extreme and outrageous

conduct sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction

of emotional distress.

Accordingly, the Roizman Defendants' motion for summary

judgment will be granted and Count VIII of Plaintiffs' Second

Amended Complaint will be dismissed.

9. Unfair debt collection practices (Count IX)

The Ninth Count of the Second Amended Complaint alleges that

Plaintiff Bethea was a victim of unfair debt collection practices

in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et. seq. Specifically, 9

Plaintiff Bethea maintains that the proceedings brought against

her by the Roizman Defendants to collect unpaid rent attempted to

collect a non-existent debt. 

 In their Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs state 9

they are seeking relief pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq. 

However, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 regulates consumer credit cost

disclosure and does not address unfair debt collection practices. 

In contrast, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., directly addresses debt

collection practices and is applicable to Plaintiffs'

allegations. Therefore, the court will treat Count IX as raising

a claim pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692 and analyze the record

accordingly.

58
The Roizman Defendants move for summary judgment and argue

that they are not debt collectors as defined by the statute. The

Roizman Defendants maintain that they are engaged in the business

of development, rental and management of housing and they do not

have a principal business purpose to collect debts and do not

regularly collect debts owed to another. The Roizman Defendants

rely on the certification of Israel Roizman in support of their

argument. The Plaintiffs have not filed opposition.

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) defines "debt collector" as:

any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate

commerce or the mails in any business the principal

purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who

regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or

indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or

due another.

The Roizman Defendants are not debt collectors as defined by

this statute. Specifically, these defendants are not engaged in

a business the principal purpose of which is to collect a debt. 

Consequently, the provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., do not

apply to the Roizman Defendants.

In addition, there is no evidence in the record to support

Plaintiffs' allegations that the eviction proceedings against

Plaintiff Bethea were premised on a false debt. As discussed

above in Subsection V.B.1., the Plaintiffs did not have a

contractual right to ownership of their rental units. 

Consequently, in order to remain tenants, the Plaintiffs were

obligated to pay rent in accordance with their lease agreements. 

59
It is undisputed that Plaintiff Bethea owed three months of rent

at the time of her eviction proceedings. Therefore, it cannot be

said that the eviction proceedings were premised on a false debt. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not established their claim for

unfair debt collection practices and the Roizman Defendants'

motion for summary judgment will be granted.

10. Violations of Constitutional amendments, civil

rights and other federal laws and Conspiracy under

color of state law to violate Plaintiffs'

constitutional rights (Counts XI and XII)

The Roizman Defendants move for summary judgment as to

Plaintiffs' federal claims and argue these claims are legally

insufficient. As discussed in this court's previous opinion on

June 27, 2012, the Plaintiffs' complaint fails to meet the

pleading requirements of Rule 8 with regard to Counts XI and XII

alleging violations of constitutional amendments, civil rights

and other federal laws as well as conspiracy under the color of

state law. Specifically, this court held:

The Plaintiffs' allegations have little relationship to

the facts plead in the preliminary portion of the

Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and instead are so

broad as to encompass the entire universe of federal

and state law. This is clearly violative of Rule 8

which requires a plaintiff to set forth a "short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (a)(2). 

Due to the generality and vagueness of Plaintiffs'

allegations in Counts XI and XII, the complaint fails

to give the defendants "fair notice of what the claim

is and the grounds upon which it rests." Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555. 

60
[Docket Item 172 at 58-59.]

The court finds this reasoning equally applicable to the

Plaintiffs' claims against the Roizman Defendants. The

Plaintiffs have failed to seek leave to amend their complaint in

accordance with the Court's June 27, 2012 order. Therefore,

since Counts XI and XII fail to state a claim, these counts will

be dismissed.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court will deny the

Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings, or in the

alternative, summary judgment [Docket Item 123]; the Court will

grant the City Defendants' cross motion for judgment on the

pleadings [Docket Item 166]; and the Court will grant the Roizman

Defendants' cross motion for summary judgment [Docket Item 180.]

The Plaintiffs' claims for violations of federal law and

civil conspiracy fail to state a claim against any of the

defendants. As the Plaintiffs have failed to seek leave to amend

their complaint in accordance with the court's June 27, 2012

order, these claims will be dismissed.

The Plaintiffs failed to comply with the notice requirements

of the New Jersey Tort Claim Act. Consequently, the tort claims

against the City Defendants will be dismissed. In addition, the

Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they conferred a benefit on

61
the City Defendants and therefore cannot maintain an unjust

enrichment claim against them. As these are the only remaining

claims against the City Defendants, their cross motion for

judgment on the pleadings, or in the alternative summary

judgment, will be granted.

As to the Roizman Defendants, there is no genuine issue of

material fact present in the record before the court to prevent

summary judgment. The court finds as a matter of law that the

Plaintiffs did not have a contractual right to ownership of their

rental units. Consequently, Plaintiffs' claims for breach of

contract, specific performance, tortious interference with

contractual relations and unjust enrichment fail. The Plaintiffs

have not presented evidence of a material misrepresentation and

therefore Plaintiffs' claims for fraudulent and deceptive

business and trade practices are insufficient. Neither the Tax

Rebate Act, N.J.S.A. 54:4-6.1, et seq., or debt collection

regulations, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., are applicable to the

Roizman Defendants so Counts VII and IX must be dismissed. 

Further, the Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the Roizman

Defendants breached a duty or engaged in extreme and outrageous

conduct. Therefore, Plaintiffs' claims for negligence and

intentional infliction of emotional distress are insufficient and

cannot survive summary judgment.

Since these motions result in the dismissal of the remaining

62
claims in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, the case will be

closed on the docket. The accompanying Order will be entered.

 September 27, 2012 s/ Jerome B. Simandle 

Date JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Chief U.S. District Judge

63