No. 87-69

INTHE SUPREME COURTOF THE STATEOF MONTANA
1987

WILLIAM COBLE, Petitioner andAppellant,-VSDANIELMAGONE, Missoula County Sheriff,
Defendantand Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: TheDistrict Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 

### In and for the County ofMissoula, TheHonorableJack L. Green,Judgepresiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

ForAppellant:

J. Dirk Beccari, Missoula,Montana

For Respondent:

Hon. Mike Greely,Attorney General, Helena,Montana JoeR. Roberts,Asst. Atty. General,Helena Robert L. Deschamps, 111,Missoula CountyAttorney, Missoula,Montana

Submitted onBriefs: Aug. 13, 1987 Decided: November 3, 1987

Filed: 

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ClerkMr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

This appeal arises from a denial of a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County. Petitioner-Appellant, William Ray Coble

(Coble), applied for the writ of habeas corpus based on the theory he should not be extradited, pursuant to the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (5s46-30-101, et seq., MCA), to the State of Idaho on a Governor's warrant. Coble appeals this ruling. We find the District Court reached the proper conclusion in this case. Generally, a proper procedure for review would be to petition for a writ of certiorari. A denial of a writ of habeas corpus is not properly appealable to this Court. In

reHart (1978), 178Mont. 235, 583 P.2d 411. However, due to the nature of this claim, and in light of judicial economy,

wewill review the case as a petition forwrit of certiorari. The issue we must answer is whether the District Court erred indenying the writ ofhabeas corpusbecause petitioner is a juvenile and therefore not subject to the Uniform CriminalExtraditionAct. During mid-June, 1986, Coble's mother moved from Payette, Idaho to Missoula, Montana. Coble, age seventeen, stayed in Payette and allegedly stole a 1979 Mercury Monarch and destroyed some household furnishings. He later joined his mother in Missoula. On July 16, 1986, a Lawyer Magistrate of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho issued a warrant for the arrest of Coble. The warrant charged Coble with the felony offenses of Grand Theft, Idaho Code SS 18-2403(1) and 18-2407(1) and Malicious Injury to Property, Idaho Code 5 18-7001.Coble was arrested in Missoula and on July 22, 1986 appeared in District Court. He informed the court at that time that he would fight extradition. A Governor's warrant

was issued by the Governor of Montana on September 3, 1986 after a Demand for Extradition was made by the Governor of Idaho on August 6, 1986. The Governor's warrant from the state of Idaho was accompanied by an application for requisitionand awarrant for Coble's arrest. Coble filed the petition for the writ on September 18, 1986. After various extensions of time were granted, on December 9,1986 the DistrictCourt entered findingsof fact, conclusions of law and an order denying the writ. The findings of fact stated: 

### 1. the Governor of Montana had issued a warrant for Coble's arrest; 2. Coble was indeed the William Jay Coble named on the warrant; 3. the extradition documents appeared "on their face to be in order"; 

### 4. Coblewas chargedwith the crimes of Grand Theft and Malicious Injury to Property (felonies in Idaho); 5. Coble was fugitive; and 6. Coble was seventeen years old. The District Court further found as conclusions of law that Coble had been lawfully detained and all of the requirements of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act were properly complied with. Finally,the court found that Coble was not exempt from the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act on the basis that he was a juvenile. Coble contends that the District Court erred in finding that the Uniform Extradition Act applied to him because he is a juvenile. We disagree. We have previously held that a court, in its scope of inquiry of whether the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act is applicable,is limited to the following considerations: (a) whether the extradition documents on their face are in order;(b) whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state; (c) whether thepetitioner is theperson named in the request for extradition; and 

### (dl whether the petitioner is a fugitive. Michigan v. Doran (1978), 439 U.S. 282, 289, 99 S.Ct. 530, 535, 58 L.Ed.2d 521, 527; cited in Crabtree v. State (1980), 186 Mont. 340, 343, 607 P.2d 566, 567. Petition of Blackburn (Mont. 1985), 701 P.2d 715, 717, 42 St.Rep. 525, 527. From a review of the record, it is clear that the District Court took these standards into consideration. Coble admits the above-stated criteria are applicable in this

case. He also admits that the extradition documents are in order and he is theperson named in them. But Coble contends that the second requirement,that a crimebe charged, is not met because, as a juvenile, he cannot be charged with the felonious offenses of grand theft and malicious injury to property. The offenses, he contends, can be charged only against an adult in both the asylum state (Montana)and the demanding state (Idaho)

# . Therefore, Coble argues, the greatest offense he canbe chargedwith is delinquencywhich is not an extraditable crime. We do not agree with these assertions. Coble argues the case of People v. Smith (N.Y. 1981), 440 N.Y.S.2d 837, stands for the proposition that the offenses should be limited to delinquency and therefore non-extraditable. Smith, however, deals specifically with whether the juvenile can be considered a "fugitive" for extradition purposes. Further, the juveniles in Smith werecharged with 

### a juvenile status offense, not a felony as in this case. The District Court looked to the charging document, the warrant of arrest,and found that therewas a charge of grand theft and malicious destruction of property under Idaho law. These chargesare sufficient. The rule is clear: The only safe rule is to abandonentirely the standard to which the indictment must conform, judged as a criminal pleading, and consider only whether it shows satisfactorily that the fugitivehasbeen in fact, however Cinartfully] charged with crime in the state fromwhich he has fled. (Citationsomitted.) Blackburn, 701 P.2d at 718, 42St.Rep. at 528. Here, the District Court properlv determined that a crime had been charged. The warrant is specific and in compliance with the requirementsof 

### 5 46-30-211,MCA. Coble cites case law which deals with the question of whether a juvenile can be extradited under the Uniform Criminal ExtraditionAct and furthermakes the statement that the majority does not favor juvenile extradition unless a "serious" crime has been committed. We find this to be inaccurate. All the case law cited concludes that juveniles are not to be treated any differently than an adult by the asylum state: fJ1urisdictionswith extradition statutes comparable to those adopted in Utah and Wyoming have held that a juvenile fugitivemay be extradited. In Ex Parte Jetter, Tex.Cr.App., 495 S.W.2d 925

(1973), the court remanded a juvenile fugitive charged with murder to custody of the demanding state explaining that the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act

(which has been adopted by Utah [and Montana]) did not exclude minors from itsoperation. The court in Snyderv. State, 95 Idaho 643, 516 P.2d 700, 73 A.L.R.3d 695 (1973) held that a juvenile court hearing to determine whether to waive jurisdiction and allow the juvenile tobe tried as an adult was unnecessary,being beyond extradition procedural requirements. Cf. People v. Pard-o,47 I11.2d 420, 265 N.E.2d 656 (1970). Burnhamv. Hayward (Utah1983), 663P.3d 65, 67. Therefore,we find that for juvenilesand adults alike, only the standards enunciated in Doran should be considered

once the governor's warrant is issued. [Olnce the Governor 

### of the State of Montana issuedhis warrant "all questions involving the prior arrest and detention are rendered immaterial." 39 C.J.S. 

### 5 115, Habeas Corpus, p. 889. Case law also holds that even if the previous detentionwas irregular, which is not the case here, then the governor's warrant renders all such claimsmoot. (Citations omitted.) Also, in Dilworth v. Leach

(1973), 183Colo. 206, 515 P.2d 1130, the Colorado Supreme Court agreed with the above cited principle and stated: 

### "[Nleitherreason nor justice requires a change in thewell-settled principle that the process involved in the initial arrest in the asylum state becomes moot upon the issuance of the governor's warrant." 515 P.2d at 1131. Blackburn, 701 P.2d at 719, 42 St.Rep. at 529. Here, once the governor's warrant was issued, the District Court had the ability to consider only the Doran standards. It did not, as Coble alleges, have the power to look to the charging state's law and determineCoble's status

as a juvenile. As was said in Batton v. Griffin (Ga. 1978), 246 S.E.2d 667, 668, legal challenges 

### "[slhouldbe raised 

### in the demanding state rather than in the sanctuary state." See

### Snyderv. State (Idaho1973), 516 P.2d 700. In this case, we feel that Coble should raise the issue of his juvenile standing in Idaho. Coble argues that the Uniform Criminal ExtraditionAct contains no language that indicates itwas intended to apply to juveniles. Citing S 

### 1-2-101,MCA, 

### Coble asserts that the court should not insertwhat has been omitted. A review of theUniform Criminal ExtraditionAct shows that juveniles are not expressly included in the act, but it also shows that juveniles are not expressly excluded. The legislative history shows that juveniles were not intentionally omitted. Other states have applied the Act to juveniles. Ex 

### Parte Jetter (Tex. 1973), 495 

### S.W.2d 925; Burnham, supra. Respondent appropriately points out that Article IV, S 

### 2 of the United States Constitution,onwhich theUniform Criminal Extradition Act is based, provides that 

### "[a]person charged1' shall be subject to extradition. There is no limitation for juveniles. It is clear that there is to be no additional proceduralprotection for juvenilesunder theAct. We hold that the failureof the Legislature to include, or specifically exclude, juveniles is of no aid to Coble in this case. The District Court was correct in limiting its considerationto the standardsofDoran. The Attorney General of 

### the State of Montana has also recognized that juveniles are not to be exempted from application of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 41 

### A.G.Op. 24 (1985)

# . In evaluationofwhether juveniles could be properly extradited, the Attorney General appropriately concluded that the majority of 

### "[

### j]urisdictions allow extradition of juveniles 

### if they are charged with a 

### crime in the demanding state."In conclusion, Blackburn expresses the standard of review required for reversal of the District Cou.rt's determination in this case. [Tlhe Governor's warrant is prima facie evidence of all the information recited in it including identity, fugivity and that the petitioner is properly charged with a crime. In re the Matter of Hart

(1978), 176 Mont. 225, 583 P.2d 411. This Court recognized this general rule with respect towhether the accusedwas a fugitive in State ex rel. Hart 

### v. District Court (1971)

### , 157 Mont. 287, 293, 485 P.2d 698, 702, stating: 

### "

### 'The issuance of a warrant of rendition by the Governor of the asylum state raises a presumption that the accused is the fugitive wanted and it is sufficient to justify his arrest, detention and delivery to thedemanding state.

## * * * In order to rebut the presumption the accused must prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that he was not present in the demanding state at the time of the alleged offense or that he bras not the person named in the warrant 

# . . . I It Blackburn, 701 P.2d at 717, 42St.Rep. at 527-528. In this case, the Governor's warrant is "regular on its face and makes out a prima facie case authorizing extradition." Jetter, 495 S.W.2d at 925. Coble did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not present i.n Idaho at the time the alleged crimes were committed nor d-oes he dispute that he is theparty named in thewarrant. TheDistrict Court reached theproper conclusion.and the petition forwrit of certiorari isdenied. 

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-- IWe concur: 

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CMief Justice 

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