Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 11

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V. OPINION

BOSTON SCEINTIFIC

NEUORMODULATION CORPORATION,

Defendant.

John Michael Vazguez, U.S.D.J.

This matter comes before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs

Wendy Bahnsen and Carolina Fuentes (collectively “Plaintiffs”).’ D.E. 296. Defendant Boston

Scientific Neuromodulation Corporation (“BSNC” or “Defendant”) filed a brief in opposition,

D.E. 309, to which Plaintiff replied. D.E. 336.2 The Court reviewed the submissions made in

support and in opposition ofthe motion and considered the motion without oral argument pursuant

‘Plaintiffs also moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(c). A Rule 12(c) motion does not appear appropriate here. “Under Rule 12(c),

judgnwnt will not be granted unless the movant clearly establishes that no material issue of fact

remains to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Bayer Chemicals

Corp. v. Albermale Corp., 171 Fed. Appx. 392, 397 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Jablonski v. Pan Am.

WoridAirways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290 (3d Cir. 198$) (internal citations and quotations

omitted)). Because resolving this motion required the Court to look beyond the pleadings, theCourt will resolve Plaintiffs’ motion as a motion for summary judgment.

2 In this Opinion, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (D.E. 296) will be referred to as “P1.MSJ.” Defendant’s brief in opposition (D.E. 309) will be referred to as “Def. Opp.” Plaintiffs’

reply brief (D.E. 336) will be referred to as “P1. Rep.”
Defendant BSNC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Boston Scientific Corporation.

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (“Am. Compi.”) ¶ 16; D.E. 19. During the relevant time period,

BSNC “marketed, sold, supplied and submitted claims for a range ofmedical devices and relatedequipment, including the Precision PlusTM SCS[Spinal Cord Simulation] System.” Id. As a

government supplier of medical equipment, BSNC was responsible for responding to requests to

replace external equipment. Its Billing and Collections Department was responsible for

processing the necessary documentation. Id. ¶ 27.

BSNC employed Plaintiff Bahnsen in its Valencia, California office from March 2008

through October 2009. Plaintiffs’ Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute (“PSOMF”) ¶ 1;D.E. 296-2. From March 2008 through January 2009, Ms. Bahnsen worked in BSNC’s

Customer Service Department. Am. Compl. ¶ 8. In January 2009, BSNC transferred Ms.

Bahnsen to its Billings and Collections Department to work as a Reimbursement and Claims

Management Specialist. Id.

In March 2009, Ms. Bahnsen entered into an “Agreement Concerning Employment for

U.S. Employees” (“Bahnsen Agreement”) with Boston Scientific Corporation. PSOMF ¶ 3.

Defendant has also filed a motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ claim. Similarly,

Plaintiffs and Defendant have filed Daubert motions as to the proposed expert witnesses in thiscase. Those motions are addressed in separate opinions and orders.

“The facts herein come from the evidence in the record. The Opinion cites to Plaintiffs’ Statement

of Material Facts Not In Dispute unless the parties disagree about the fact(s) or supplemental

information is necessary.

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any copies.” Defendant’s Counterclaims (“Def. CC.”) ¶ 10; D.E. $4. The agreement also has a

“Remedies for Breach” provision that states, “[a]ny breach of this Agreement is likely to cause

Boston Scientific substantial and irrevocable damage[.]” Id. ¶ 12. BSNC tenninated Ms.

Bahnsen’s employment on October 15, 2009. Id. ¶ 14.

BSNC employed Plaintiff Fuentes in its Valencia office from May 2005 through June

2010. PSOMF ¶ 2. From her hiring through March 200$, Ms. Fuentes worked as the

Administrative Assistant to BSNC’s Vice President of Health Economics and Reimbursement.

Am. Compl. ¶ 13. In February 2009. afier Ms. Fuentes returned to work from medical leave,

BSNC transferred her to its Billing and Collection Department. Defendant’s Supplemental

Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute (“DSSOMF”) ¶ 1; D.E. 309-1.

In August 2005, Ms. Fuentes entered into an “Employee Invention and Confidential

Information Agreement Policy Letter 2” (“Fuentes Agreement”) with Advanced Bionics (a

predecessor to BSNC). PSOMF ¶] 2, 4, 7. California law governs the Fuentes Agreement. Def.

Opp. at $. The agreement includes a clause requiring Ms. Fuentes “during the term of [her]employment and thereafier, [to] keep confidential and refrain from using or disclosing to others

all confidential information. . . which Employee develops or learns about during the course of

[her] employment.” Def. CC. ¶ 7. BSNC terminated Ms. Fuentes’ employment on October 15,

2009. Id. ¶ 13.

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PSOMF ¶ 7. Defendant claims Ms. Fuentes acted “to defend her work performance as an

Administrative Assistant.” DSSOMF ¶ 7(a).

Over the course of their employment in BSNC’s Billing and Collections Department,

Plaintiffs allege that they became aware of BSNC’s illegal billing practices. P1. MSJ at 2. Thisled Plaintiffs to speak with Dr. Joseph Piacentile,5 a former False Claims Act6 (“FCA”)

whistleblower and whistleblower consultant, at some time between September and October

2009. Dr. Piacentile advised Plaintiffs to obtain copies of documents that evidenced BSNC’sillegal billing practices. PSOMF ¶ 8; DSSOMF ¶ 16. Plaintiffs then consulted attorneys about

bringing a False Claims Act (“FCA”) suit against BSNC for its illegal billing practices. PSOMF¶ 10. Thereafler, Plaintiffs took “from B$NC’s offices copies of CM$-1500 forms, reports from

the Zirmed system, and medical documentation like written orders from physicians, pertaining to

claims that had already been submitted to Medicare.” PSOMF ¶ 9.

In March 2011, Plaintiffs filed a qui tam Complaint alleging that BSNC submitted false

claims to the Government in violation of the FCA, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et. seq. Def. CC. ¶ 16.

Plaintiffs then filed an Amended Complaint in September 2012. D.E. 19. Plaintiffs allege thatDefendant became aware that they had removed BSNC documents years before they filed their

Defendants indicate that Dr. Piacentile was previously convicted of health care fraud.

631 U.S.C. § 3729 etseq.

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finn of Norton Rose fuibright US LLP (“Norton Rose”)7 to investigate BSNC’s potential

regulatory exposure from Plaintiffs’ actions and suggest mitigation tactics. BSNC paid Norton

Rose $30,834 for this work. DSSOMF ¶ 19-20.

In December 2013, after Plaintiff began producing the copied documents to B$NC,

Defendant also hired a forensic investigative firm, Computer Forensic Services, Inc. (“C$F”).

Id. ¶J 23-25. BSNC asked CSF to determine what documents and information Plaintiff might

have taken from BSNC. Defendant paid CSF $37,381.25 for its services. Id. ¶J 25-26.

In January 2014, Defendant filed amended counterclaims against Plaintiffs. In its

counterclaims, Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs’ copying and sharing of BSNC documents

breached the terms of both their agreements with BSNC. Def CC. ¶ 25-34; PSOMF ¶ 3-4.

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiffs filed the aforementioned Complaint and Amended Complaint. In response,

Defendant filed motions to strike, to dismiss the Amended Complaint, and to disqualify

Plaintiffs’ counsel. D.E. 28-30. Of note, Defendant moved to strike “Confidential and Protected

Information” from the Amended Complaint, alleging that Plaintiffs’ use of BSNC’s information

violated the Health Insurance Portability and Affordability Act (“HTPPA”). D.E. 28. Judge

‘

Norton Rose is also Defendant’s litigation counsel in this matter. Plaintiffs have not raised an

issue concerning the fact that Norton Rose attorneys are potential witnesses in this case, in their

mitigation counsel role, and that Norton Rose is also litigation counsel. The Court declines to do

so sna sponte.

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counterclaims. D.E. 84. In response, Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the amended counterclaims.

D.E. 85. Judge Wigenton denied Plaintiffs’ motion. D.E. 132.

On December 22, 2014 the case was reassigned from Judge Wigenton to Judge Arleo.

D.E. 149. Then, on March 1, 2016, the case was again reassigned from Judge Arleo to theundersigned. D.E. 226. The Court thereafier granted the parties’ stipulated voluntary partial

dismissal. D.E. 293. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on January 27, 2017. D.E. 296.

Defendant filed a brief in opposition, D.E. 309, to which Plaintiffreplied. D.E. 336.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A moving party is entitled to summary judgment where “the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact in dispute is material when it “might affect the outcome of

the suit under the governing law” and is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude granting a motion for

summary judgment. Id. “In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may

not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing ofthe evidence; instead, thenonmoving party’s evidence ‘is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his

favor.” Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477

U.S. at 255)). A court’s role in deciding a motion for summary judgment is not to evaluate the

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Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). After the moving party adequately supports its

motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings and by her own

affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (internal quotation marks

omitted). To withstand a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving

party must identify specific facts and affirmative evidence that contradict the moving party.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. “tI]f the non-movant’s evidence is merely ‘colorable’ or is ‘not

significantly probative,’ the court may grant summary judgment.” Messa v. Omaha Prop. &

Cas. Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d 523, 528 (D.N.J. 2000) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50)).

Ultimately, there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact” if a party “fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.”

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. “Ifreasonable minds could differ as to the import of the

evidence,” however, summary judgirient is not appropriate. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-5 1.

III. ANALYSIS8

Defendant alleges two counterclaims: a breach of contract claim against Ms. Bahnsen,

and a breach of contract claim against Ms. Fuentes. Def. CC. ¶J 25-34. Massachusetts law

8 Defendant’s counterclaims were brought pursuant to the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction. 28

U.S.C. § 1367. The counterclaims are sufficiently related to the federal law claims set forth inPlaintiffs’ Amended Complaint that they form part ofthe same case or controversy. Dc Asenclov. Tpson foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 308 (3d Cir. 2003), as amended (Nov. 14, 2003).

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Buiwer v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. 672, 690 (2016). Similarly, in California a breach of

contract claim is comprised of the following elements: (1) a contract existed, (2) a party

performed or was excused from performing, (3) the other party breached, (4) damages resulted to

the nonbreaching party. See Oasis W Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 51 Cal. 4th $11, 821 (2011).

A. Breach of Contract & the False Claim Act’s Public Policy ExceptionHere, Plaintiffs do not dispute Defendant’s contention that they breached the terms of

their respective employment agreements when they copied and took BSNC documents. Instead,Plaintiffs argue that FCA public policy excuses any breach. Relying on this exception, Plaintiffs

argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Defendant’s counterclaims.

The FCA provides penalties for persons who knowingly submit fraudulent claims to the

Government. US. cx ret. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944

f.2d 1149, 1152 (3d Cir. 1991). Private plaintiffs may bring a qtti tam action on behalf of the

government to recover losses that the goverrnnent incurred from defendant’s knowingsubmission of fraudulent claims. Hutchins v. Witentz, Goldman & Spitzer, 253 F.3d 176, 182(3d Cir. 2001) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1)). Courts have recognized the public importance of

private persons bringing quti tam actions. See United States v. Cancer Treatment Centers ofAm.,

350 F. Supp. 2d 765, 769-70 (M.D. Ill. 2004) (“From targeting massive contractor fraud during

the Civil War to halting healthcare fraud today, the ability ofindividuals to serve as private

attorneys general and to protect the interests ofthe government has and continues to serve vital

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contract concerns); see Cancer Treatment Centers ofAm., 350 F. Supp. at 773 (finding that

plaintiff and the government were “correct” that “the confidentiality agreement cannot trump the

FCA’s strong policy of protecting whistleblowers who report fraud against the government”).

Here, both Ms. Bahnsen and Ms. Fuentes argue that public policy considerations excuse

any breach resulting from their taking BSNC documents. P1. MSJ at 12. The parties discuss two

separate occurrences of Plaintiffs removing documents. The Court will address each occurrence

separately.

1. Ms. Fuentes’ Copying of Her Work Laptop in 2008

A genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Ms. Fuentes’ copying of her work

laptop in 2008 makes her liable for breach of contract. In February 2008, Ms. fuentes copied the

contents of her work laptop onto a USB drive. P1. MSJ, Ex. F (Fuentes Dep. 55:3-56:14). Ms.

Fuentes explained that she made the copy “because when I came back from medical leave, I was

placed in a new position, and I just had a feeling that something was going to happen, and I

needed to be able to prove my work.” Id. (Fuentes Dep. 57:4-8). BSNC argues that the FCA

public policy exception is inapplicable because Ms. Fuentes acted out of concern for job

protection, not to bring a FCA claim. Def. Opp. at 3. BSNC points out that in 2008, Ms.

Fuentes had not yet started work in BSNC’s Billing and Collections Department. Id. Therefore,

BSNC argues that at the time Ms. Fuentes copied her laptop’s contents, she could not have acted

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infoi-mation to BSNC upon termination. Plaintiffs assert that the fuentes agreement only

prohibited Ms. Fuentes from using or disclosing such information. Thus, they claim Ms.

Fuentes’ actions are covered by the FCA since Ms. Fuentes later “only ‘used’ or ‘disclosed’ thatinformation in connection with pursuing a case against BSNC for violations of the FCA.” P1.

MSJ at 3.

The Court is persuaded that Defendant has raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to

whether Ms. Fuentes’ copying of the contents of her work laptop in 2008 breached her

employment agreement. Defendants correctly note that at the time she copied the information,

Plaintiff did not do so for purposes of bringing a FCA action. Ms. Fuentes was not yet assigned

to the Billing and Collections Department or aware of the alleged improper billing. Plaintiffs

are, therefore, not entitled to summary judgment as to the 2008 alleged breach by Ms. Fuentes.9

2. Ms. Bahnsen’s and Ms. Fuentes’ Copying of BSNC Documents in 2009

A genuine dispute of material fact does not exist as to the breach of contract claims

concerning Ms. Bahnsen and Ms. fuentes’ copying of BSNC documents in 2009. Indeed,

Defendant scarcely addresses the issue. Instead, Defendant focuses on Ms. Fuentes’ copying of

As to the 2008 computer documents, Defendant tries to ioop Ms. Bahnsen in as well. In

support, Defendant claims that Ms. Bahnsen later possessed the documents while working inconjunction with Ms. fuentes. However, Defendant provides no analysis to support its

argument. for example, Defendant provides no factual information that Ms. Bahnsen was awareof, much less involved in, Ms. Fuentes’ taking of documents. Thus, as to the 2008 computer

documents, there is no genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment in favor

of Ms. Bahnsen.

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developing an FCA case.” Def. Opp. at 3. Yet Defendant does not offer evidence to support its

assertion.

Plaintiffs argue that in 2009 they “removed from BSNC’s office copies of materials

needed to prove BSNC violated the False Claims Act.” P1. MSJ at 3. Further, Plaintiffs allegethat they did not remove these documents until after consulting with attorneys and a former False

Claims Act whistleblower. Id. After those consultations, Plaintiffs followed the advice given

and “only took information on claims that had already been submitted to Medicare.” Id. at 4.

Defendant does not allege facts to create a genuine dispute that documents taken in 2009 were

intended or used for any other purpose than to bring a FCA claim against BSNC. Plaintiffs are,

therefore, entitled to summary judgment as to the 2009 alleged breach pursuant to the FCA’s

public policy considerations.

B. Contract Damages: Nominal and Damages

Defendant seeks both nominal and actual damages for the contract breaches it alleges

against Plaintiffs in its counterclaims. As noted, only Defendant’s counterclaim against Ms.

Fuentes for her alleged breach based on the 2008 computer documents survives. Plaintiffs argue

that Defendant’s counterclaims “also fail as a matter of law because BSNC has not produced

evidence sufficient to prove damages.” P1. MSJ at 16. Defendant disagrees, claiming that sinceit is entitled to nominal damages, the Court need not address whether BSNC suffered actual

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damages for Ms. Fuentes’ copying of her work laptop’s contents in 2008. California law

regarding nominal damages for a breach of contract is unsettled. Some California courts have

held that “{e]ven where no actual damages can be established, a plaintiff who has established that

a contract was breached is entitled to an award of nominal damages as the breach itself is a ‘legalwrong that is fully distinct from the actual damages.” ProMex, LLC v. Hernandez, 781 F. Supp.

2d 1013, 1019 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Sweet v. Johnson, 169 Cal. App. 2d 630, 632 (1959)).

However, other California courts have held that a claim for breach of contract fails ifthe alleged

wronged party does not put forward evidence of damages. Nave/her v. Sletten, 106 Cal. App.

4th 763, 775 (2003) (holding that plaintiffs’ claims could not survive the motion to dismiss

because “[d] amages are, of course, a necessary element of the breach of contract cause of action

and proof of that element is wholly lacking”). Although the California courts have not taken a

consistent position on nominal damages, since there is authority for allowing nominal damages

for a breach of contract, the Court will allow this claim to go forward. See Cal. Civ. Code §

3360 (“When a breach of duty has caused no appreciable detriment to the party affected, he may

yet recover nominal damages.”). Plaintiffs are, therefore, not entitled to summary judgment on

Defendant’s claim of nominal damages for Ms. Fuente’s alleged breach in 2008.

2. Actual Damages

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or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that

information or witness to supply evidence on a motion.. . unless the failure was substantially

justified or is harmless.” The parties agree that the fact discovery deadline for the matter was

April 29, 2016. Def. Opp., Ex. 2 ¶ 24. Defendant did not submit evidence regarding damages

until September 2016, five months later, in conjunction with expert discovery. Id. ¶ 25.

Defendant has not provided any evidence that substantially justifies its late production.

Instead, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs were not harmed by the tardy disclosure because they

had an opportunity to depose Defendant’s corporate representative pursuant to federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 30(b)(6). Defendant asserts that its witness, Mr. O’Neil, “testified that the

company would be claiming mitigation damages relating to an internal investigation of Relators’

actions and that the Company would be offering evidence of its damages in expert discovery.”

Def. Opp. at 22, fn. 11 (emphases added). Defendant also claims that late production of its

mitigation expenses did not harm Plaintiffs since “BSNC’s corporate witness had previously

testified as to the approximate amount of such expenses.” Id.

The Court disagrees. Mr. O’Neil was BSNC’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness. As such,

Defendant designated Mr. O’Neil to be BSNC’s voice. Mr. O’Neil had to “testify about

infonTlation known or reasonably available to the organization.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). Mr.

O’Neil failed to do so. The following deposition testimony is illustrative:

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Q. How much time and how much money?

A. From -- from my conversations with counsel, and I think we’ll

provide experts to -- to talk about that , but upwards of $50,000.

Q. When was that investigation conducted?

A. I don ‘t have specflcs ofit.

Q. Was it in the year 2009?

A. I don ‘t have specifics ofit.

P1. MSJ, Ex. H. (O’Neil Dep. 66:14-67:5 (emphases added)).

First, at the time of the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, Defendant had not produced its

documents relating to its claimed damages. Second, the witness was clearly in no position to

provide substantive testimony as to Defendant’s claimed damages. further, after Plaintiff did

receive the relevant documents, it requested another deposition of the Rule 30(b)(6) witness.

Defendant refused. P1. MSJ, Ex. M. Thus, Plaintiffs were plainly harmed by their inability to

obtain critical fact discovery of Defendant’s alleged damages.

The Court also has concerns as to whether Defendant’s alleged mitigation expenses were

reasonable. A party who suffers damages from a breach of contract has a duty to reasonably

mitigate those damages. Again i’. Gavra, 236 Cal. App. 4th 91, 111(2015). The party will not

be able to recover damages for losses that were unreasonable and could have been avoided.

Valle de Oro Bank v. Gamboa, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1686, 1691 (1994). It is the breaching party’s

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tactics. DSSOMF ¶ 19. Defendant also seeks mitigation damages for money it expended to hire

CSF to determine what documents and information Plaintiffmight have taken from BSNC. Id. ¶

25. Defendant paid Norton Rose $30,834 and CSF S37,38 1.25. Id. ¶jJ 20, 26.

Defendant’s expenditures to mitigate HIPPA regi.ilatory concerns give the Court pause as

to their reasonableness. Judge Wigenton had already ruled that HIPPA concerns raised in

Defendant’s motion to dismiss were not relevant to this case. P1. MSJ at 21; D.E. 49 at 15.

further the money Defendant paid CSF also appears questionable because Defendant presents no

plausible explanation as to why it was necessary. Defendant states that “it was under no

obligation to take Relators’ word regarding their unlawful actions and had reason to doubt their

credibility in that regard.” Def. Opp. at 27, fn. 14. Yet, Defendant presents no evidence

demonstrating that it had a reasonable concern as to the accuracy and completeness of Plaintiffs’

document production.

10 Plaintiffs did not provide the Court with relevant law on this issue. Plaintiffs instead cited to

Massachusetts law as to a non-breaching party bearing the burden to prove that its mitigation

expenses were reasonable. P1. MSJ at 19. They presumably did so because the Bahnsen

Agreement is governed by Massachusetts law. Plaintiffs then cited to a Ninth Circuit case forthe same proposition, Reynolds Metals Co. v. Lampert, 316 f.2d 272, 273, on reh’g, 324 F.2d

465 (9th Cir. 1963). Plaintiff presumably did so because the Fuentes Agreement is governed by

California law. However, Reynolds Metals Co. is inapposite because it applies Oregon law.

California law provides that it is the breaching party’s burden to show that the other party’s

mitigation expenses were unreasonable. Agam, 236 Cal. App. 4th at 111.

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because they “did not have the opportunity to depose anyone with actual knowledge ofthe

alleged investigation conducted or the expenses allegedly incurred so as to test their veracity or

reasonableness.” P1. Rep. at 10 (emphasis in original). Thus, because Plaintiffs could not

evaluate the reasonableness of the Defendant’s alleged mitigation expenses during factdiscovery, Rule 37 dictates that the Court cannot do so now. The Court may not consider this

evidence in ruling on this motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. As a result, Defendant has presented

insufficient infon-nation reflecting why there is a genuine issue of material fact to preclude

summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor as to actual damages.

IV. CONLCUSION

for the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (D.E. 296) is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiffs motion is granted except that Defendant’scounterclaim for breach of contract against Ms. Fuentes relating to her copying of the contents of

her BSNC laptop in 2008. Defendant is limited to seeking nominal damages for this allegedbreach. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

Dated: December 15, 2017

John”Michael Vazquez.’.].J.

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