UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-5299

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

MARSHALL MONROE,

Defendant – Appellant.

11-4024

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER RONDELL ROGERS,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior 

District Judge. (1:08-cr-00043-CMH-1; 1:08-cr-00043-CMH-3)

Submitted: July 29, 2011 Decided: September 8, 2011

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
2

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Douglas A. Steinberg, Alexandria, Virginia, Paul P. Vangellow, 

Falls Church, Virginia, for Appellants. Neil H. MacBride, 

United States Attorney, Michael E. Rich, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Erin Creegan, Special Assistant United States 

Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

Marshall Monroe and Christopher Rogers were convicted 

of numerous offenses related to a series of convenience store 

robberies that occurred in October 2007. Monroe received an 

aggregate sentence of 300 months — considerably above his 

advisory Guidelines range of 63-78 months. Rogers was sentenced 

to 240 months in prison — also well above his advisory 

Guidelines range of 97-121 months. We previously vacated both 

sentences because the district court failed to make the 

individualized assessments required by Gall v. United States, 

552 U.S. 38 (2007). United States v. Monroe, 396 F. App’x 33

(4th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-5050). Monroe and Rogers now appeal 

their respective terms of imprisonment imposed at resentencing. 

We affirm. 

I

At Monroe’s resentencing, the district court rejected 

defense counsel’s request for a sentence within the advisory 

Guidelines range. The court determined that an upward variance 

was necessary. In this regard, the court stated:

The upward departure is appropriate here because of 

the circumstances of the offense. Mr. Monroe . . . 

was involved in four . . . armed robberies. Two of 

the . . . robberies resulted in an assault of the 

victim, one which he even dragged through the door of 

the store, inside the store, and assaulted. . . . 
4

[I]t is true . . . that you’re relatively young and 

the circumstances of your upbringing should be 

considered, but I don’t believe that that outweighs 

the depravity and the viciousness of these crimes and 

the number of them that were committed within such a 

short period of time. It’s necessary to impose a 

substantial sentence to protect the public and to 

deter you and others from such kind of conduct. 

The court sentenced Monroe, as it originally had, to an 

aggregate 300-month term of imprisonment.

At Rogers’ resentencing, defense counsel asked the 

court to take into consideration the fact that, since his 

incarceration, Rogers had completed his GED, a parenting class, 

and an educational program in carpentry skills, and was working 

in the prison’s carpentry department. Additionally, counsel 

asked the court to consider that Rogers did not enter any of the 

stores that were robbed but instead served as his codefendants’1

The court sentenced Rogers to 210 months in prison. 

In imposing sentence, the court stated:

driver. 

[I have considered] the nature and circumstances of 

this offense, the fact of these three robberies, [and

that] both of [Rogers’ codefendants] were using 

firearms and . . . engaging in some very reckless 

conduct which you knew about. I understand that you 

drove the car, but you knew what was going on and you 

provided the means for them to go ahead and to do 

that.

For that I find that there should be a fairly 

substantial upward departure from the guidelines to 

 1 James Tyer was the third codefendant.
5

meet the needs of punishment and deterrence, not only 

punishment for you but deterrence for others that do 

this kind of conduct.

However, you’ve come here with something the other 

codefendants didn’t, some record of some 

accomplishments. It has been some time since you were 

sentenced previously, and you’ve come here and 

demonstrated that you’ve been doing something 

constructive during that time and I believe that you 

ought to get credit for that.

II

After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), we 

review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. at 51. We 

vacated the sentences originally imposed because the district 

court committed procedural error when it failed “to adequately 

explain the chosen sentence — including an explanation for any 

deviation from the Guidelines range.” See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.

In evaluating a district court’s explanation for the 

sentence imposed, we have held that, although a district court 

must consider the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) sentencing

factors and explain the sentence, it need not explicitly refer

to § 3553(a) or discuss every factor on the record. United 

States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006). However, 

the district court “must make an individualized assessment based 

on the facts presented,” and apply the “relevant § 3553(a) 

factors to the specific circumstances of the case before it.” 
6

United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). The district 

court must also “state in open court the particular reasons 

supporting its chosen sentence” and “set forth enough to 

satisfy” us that it has “considered the parties’ arguments and 

has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal 

decisionmaking authority.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). In other words, the reasons articulated by 

the district court need not be “couched in the precise language 

of § 3553(a),” as long as the reasons “can be matched to a 

factor appropriate for consideration under that statute and 

[are] clearly tied to [the defendant’s] particular situation.” 

United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 658 (4th Cir. 2007).

Both Monroe and Rogers argue that the district court 

inadequately justified the upward variances and failed to 

mention § 3553(a) when imposing sentence. Separately, Monroe 

contends that his sentence was not supported by a sufficiently 

extensive individualized assessment. We reject these arguments.

In Monroe’s case, the court found that an upward 

variance was warranted for several reasons. First, Monroe

committed four robberies — two of which involved assaults on the 

victims — in a short period of time. The court also stated that 

Monroe’s crimes exhibited “depravity and viciousness.” These 

factors, as well as the need to protect the public and to deter 
7

further criminal behavior, outweighed the fact that Monroe was 

“relatively young” and had experienced a difficult childhood. It 

is irrelevant that the court did not specifically refer to 

§ 3553(a) because the court considered several pertinent 

§ 3553(a) factors when imposing sentence. We conclude that the 

court, contrary to Monroe’s argument, sufficiently explained the 

variance and made an adequate individualized assessment under 

Gall and Carter. 

Similarly, in Rogers’ case, the decision to impose a 

variant sentence was based on a variety of § 3553(a) factors. 

Rogers participated in three robberies by driving his 

codefendants to the various stores, and he was fully aware of 

what his codefendants were doing. The court also stated that 

the “substantial upward departure . . . [would] meet the needs 

of punishment and deterrence.” Finally, the court found that 

these factors were tempered somewhat by Rogers’ accomplishments 

in prison. We conclude that the court adequately explained its 

reasons for the variance and performed an appropriate 

individualized assessment.2

 2 The contention that the court “sentence[d] Rogers to the 

exact same sentence as his codefendants” has no merit, 

especially because Rogers was sentenced to 210 months in prison.
8

III

We accordingly affirm. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED