NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

ROLANDO S. TERRELL, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ROY HENDRICKS, et al., 

Defendants. 

JOSEPH A. DICKSON, U.S.M.J. 

Civil Action No. 2:11-cv-00832 

(CCC)(JAD) 

OPINION 

This matter comes before the Court on the second application of plaintiff Rolando S. 

Terrell ("Plaintiff') for the appointment of pro bono counsel (ECF No. 47) (the "Secc pd 

Application). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78, no oral argument was hea d. 

After carefully considering the submissions, and based upon the following, Plaintiffs Secc pd 

Application is denied without prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND. 

This matter involves a pro se litigant's second application for appointment of pro be no 

counsel. This Court previously declined to appoint pro bono counsel to Plaintiff in an Opin pn 

dated June 15, 2012. (Opinion, ECF No. 35). The facts underlying Plaintiffs initial request or 

pro bono counsel are largely identical to those asserted in this renewed application. 

Plaintiff filed the instant action on February 14, 2011, alleging violations of ris 

Constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985. Additionally, Plaintiff reques ed 

"defendants tum over all reports and video surveillance from Essex County Correctio al 

Facility," as well as the "lawyer/client log sheet from September 13, 2008 until October 6, 

2010." (Appl. for Pro Bono Counsel, ECF No. 47). 
Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at New Jersey State Prison in Trenton, New Jers y, 

alleged that correctional officers in the Essex County Department of Corrections unlaw 

confined him for over 23 hours per day, and denied him "outside/outdoor recreation," "religi s 

freedom as a practicing Muslim," "access to legal materials," and access to the law library in 

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and§ 1985. (Compl., 22, ECF No. 43). Additionally, Plain ff 

alleged that correctional officers and the Warden deprived him of his civil rights by repeat ly 

transferring him in response to the numerous complaints and grievances he has filed. (Id. , 4 ). 

Plaintiff further alleged that Defendants repeatedly "engaged in arbitrary and abusive actio " 

against him. (Mh, 17). 

In his initial application for pro bono counsel, Plaintiff cited numerous reasons why e 

appointment of counsel was needed, including his incompetence to represent himself, his lack f 

access to the prison's law library, and his inability to retain counsel. (Appl. for Pro B o 

Counsel, ECF No. 17). In the Second Application, filed on May 23, 2013, Plaintiff cited o 

the difficulty of litigation as his basis for requesting the appointment of counsel. (Appl. for 

Bono Counsel, ECF No. 47). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD. 

Civil litigants possess neither a constitutional nor statutory right to appointed coun 

Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 456-57 (3d Cir. 1997). However, in some instances then 

for representation is great and district courts are granted broad discretion to request 

appointment of attorneys to represent indigent civil litigants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (d), (e)(1). 

Third Circuit has directed that district courts should first determine whether a plaintiff's cl 

"has arguable merit in fact and law." Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993), 

denied, 510 U.S. 1996 (1994). Assuming plaintiff's claims have merit, the Third Cir 

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promulgated a number of factors to be considered by district courts in the exercise of t 

discretion under § 1915(e)(1). These factors include: (1) the plaintiffs ability to present 

case; (2) the complexity of the legal issues; (3) the extent of factual discovery and the plainti s 

ability to investigate and to comply with complex discovery rules; ( 4) the extent to which e 

case may turn on credibility determinations; (5) whether expert testimony will be required; 

(6) whether the plaintiff can afford counsel on his own behalf Id. at 156. 

The Third Circuit further emphasized that the "volunteer lawyer[s'] time is extrem ly 

valuable" and for that reason, "district courts should not request counsel under § 1915[( )] 

indiscriminately." Id. at 157. Finally, the court must take note of "the significant practi al 

restraints on the district courts' ability to appoint counsel; the ever-growing number of priso er 

civil rights actions filed each year in the federal court; the lack of funding to pay appoin 

counsel; and the limited supply of competent lawyers who are willing to undertake s 

representation" without pay. Id. 

III. DISCUSSION. 

The Court denied Plaintiffs initial request for the appointment of pro bono coun 

finding that Plaintiff ''provided insufficient information to support his application." (Opini n, 

ECF No. 35). The Court found Plaintiff had, to that point, shown himself to be literate 

articulate enough to litigate his claims. (Id.). Further, the Court acknowledged that Plainti s 

access to legal materials was restricted, but found that Plaintiff did not provide informat n 

showing that his access to legal materials was uniquely limited in comparison to other pro e 

prison litigants. (IQJ. Finally, the Court found that it was unable to determine whe er 

appointment of counsel was proper because Plaintiff had not provided sufficient informat n 

regarding his financial situation. (IQJ. 

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In the Second Application, Plaintiff again requested appointment of pro bono counsel, t 

cited only the difficulties he faces litigating his claims. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that "it i a 

very hard task on my behalf for the lack of federal law I suffer from [sic]." (Appl. for Pro Bo o 

Counsel, ECF No. 47). Plaintiff provided no other information for the Court to consid r. 

Moreover, the status of this case has changed little since the Court's June 15, 2012 denial f 

Plaintiff's request for pro bono counsel. As such, it is difficult for this Court to analyze 

Tabron factors and come to a different result than was previously reached. Therefore, the Co rt 

shall deny, without prejudice, the Second Application. The Court notes, however, that Plain 

may renew his application for pro bono counsel at any time. Furthermore, the Court retains e 

discretion to appoint counsel at any point during the litigation sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S. 

1915(e). 

Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiff's request for Defendant to tum over surveill 

videos is not appropriate at this time given the pending motion to dismiss, and thus, is denied. 

IV. CONCLUSION. 

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Second Application for the appointment of pro b o 

counsel (ECF No. 47), and his request for Defendant to turn over surveillance videos, are den d 

without prejudice. 

SO ORDERED 

cc: Hon. Claire C. Cecchi, U.S.D.J. 

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