IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-0955 

Filed July 22, 2015

KORVETTA GLASPER,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Joel A. 

Dalrymple, Judge.

Korvetta Glasper appeals the district court’s denial of her application for 

postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.

Darrell G. Meyer, Marshalltown, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kyle P. Hanson, Assistant Attorney 

General, Linda Fangman, County Attorney, and Kimberly A. Griffith, Assistant 

County Attorney, for appellee State.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Doyle, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, J.

Korvetta Glasper pled guilty to assault with intent to inflict serious injury 

and domestic abuse assault. On direct appeal, this court preserved two 

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims for postconviction relief. See State v. 

Glasper, 2014 WL 667715, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App., Feb. 19, 2014). 

Glasper subsequently filed a postconviction-relief application raising

several ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The district court denied the 

claims following an evidentiary hearing. 

On appeal, Glasper contends her plea attorney was ineffective (1) “in his 

handling of [her] motion in arrest of judgment” and (2) “relative to handling [her] 

‘self-defense’ claim.” To prevail, she must show counsel breached an essential 

duty and prejudice resulted. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 

Prejudice, in the guilty plea context, requires a showing that but for counsel’s 

breach, an applicant would not have pled guilty and would have elected to stand 

trial. State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 644 (Iowa 2009).

Glasper cannot make this prejudice showing. See Anfinson v. State, 758 

N.W.2d 496, 499 (Iowa 2008) (stating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

fails if either element is lacking). Glasper stated she wished to plead guilty in 

hopes of being sentenced to an inpatient treatment facility rather than prison. 

When the judge explained he was not bound by the plea agreement and could 

impose the maximum possible penalty, Glasper said she still wished to plead 

guilty. And when the judge reiterated he was “making no promises” concerning 

the sentence, Glasper stated she understood and would proceed with the guilty 

plea. 
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At one point, when Glasper equivocated in admitting an element of the 

crime, the court advised her, “Well, I won’t accept your plea of guilty if you’re 

claiming that you’re innocent of this offense.” Glasper responded, “No, I accept. 

I accept. I’m sorry. I accept it. I accept it.” Later, the court stated, “If you don’t 

believe that you’re guilty of these offenses, we can proceed with the trial.” Again, 

Glasper affirmed her desire to plead guilty. When the court advised Glasper her 

attorney was ready to proceed to trial if she wished, Glasper responded, “No.”

Glasper pled guilty to both crimes. The district court accepted the pleas. 

Glasper’s attorney proceeded to discuss the merits of a justification defense he 

had raised. He recounted his conversation with Glasper about the weakness of a 

self-defense instruction, given Glasper’s inability to show she lacked an 

alternative course of action. Glasper did not contradict these representations. 

Glasper only voiced an objection after the district court stated sentencing 

would not take place immediately. Upset that she would have to “sit[]” in jail 

pending sentencing, she stated, “I want to take my plea back right now on the 

record.” The district court explained she would get credit for time served. The 

court asked the prosecutor and defense attorney whether they wished to make a 

further record. Both declined, and the hearing was adjourned. 

Defense counsel did not sit on his hands following the adjournment. He 

filed a motion in arrest of judgment, seeking withdrawal of the plea based on 

Glasper’s dissatisfaction with his representation. After considering the motion, 

the district court stated, “You’re a competent attorney, and, quite frankly, I find 

that Ms. Glasper’s request and dissatisfaction with you is simply based upon her 

desire to avoid responsibility in these cases and delay matters. So the 
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application to withdraw is denied.” The district court clearly was unpersuaded by 

Glasper’s motives for filing the motion. 

We conclude there is no reasonable probability the outcome would have 

changed had counsel done anything differently with respect to the motion in 

arrest of judgment or the justification defense. 

We affirm the district court’s denial of the postconviction-relief application.

AFFIRMED. 

Doyle, J., concurs; Danilson, C.J., concurs specially.
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DANILSON, C.J. (concurring specially)

I concur in the result as I agree there was no prejudice. I concur specially 

to further address the prejudice prong in the analysis of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Glasper contends that if counsel had been zealous in his 

representation concerning the motion in arrest of judgment, “there is a 

reasonable probability that the trial court would have found the guilty plea too 

problematic to instill confidence in the conviction.” Such a generalized claim 

does not reflect how the failure of counsel to be zealous in his representation 

constitutes prejudice. 

Glasper has not alleged trial counsel had a conflict of interest such that 

prejudice is presumed. See State v. Vaughan, 859 N.W.2d 492, 500 (Iowa 2015) 

(citing Mickens v Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172–74 (2002) for the holding that 

“automatic reversal is required under the Sixth Amendment only when the trial 

court refuses to inquire into a conflict of interest over defendant’s or counsel’s 

objection”). Moreover, although the trial court should have been aware of a 

conflict in this case where the motion in arrest of judgment alleges ineffective 

assistance of counsel and the same counsel argues the motion, no objection was 

raised by the defendant. 

“The test of any guilty plea procedure is whether it establishes on the 

record that the guilty plea has been voluntarily and intelligently entered and that it 

has a factual basis.” Brainard v. State, 222 N.W.2d 711, 723 (Iowa 1974). Some 

reluctance on the part of a recalcitrant defendant or statements contrary to guilt 

may not be sufficient to establish the plea was not intelligently or voluntarily 
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entered. Here, assuming the issue is not moot,1even if Glasper had the benefit 

of more zealous representation regarding her motion in arrest of judgment, the 

outcome would have not changed. The plea was voluntarily and intelligently 

entered, and there was no prejudice.

 

1 Glasper was sentenced on January 11, 2013, and was imprisoned for a two-year term.