SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-1300-22 

UNITED SUPPLY COMPANY, 

DIVISION OF USCO/INC., 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

WALTER J. MCCOLLUM, 

 Defendant-Respondent, 

and 

MCCOLLUM MECHANICAL 

LLC, 

 Defendant. 

___________________________ 

Argued December 5, 2023 – Decided January 11, 2024 

Before Judges Rose and Perez Friscia. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Ocean County, Docket No. DC-009743-16.

Andrew R. Turner argued the cause for appellant. 

Joseph Albanese argued the cause for respondent.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-1300-22

PER CURIAM 

Plaintiff United Supply Company, Division of USCO/Inc., appeals from a 

December 16, 2022 Special Civil Part order discharging its judgment against 

defendant Walter J. McCollum pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:16-49.1. We affirm. 

We summarize the pertinent facts and procedural history from the limited 

record provided on appeal. Plaintiff was a supplier of equipment to businesses 

in the heating, plumbing, and air conditioning trade. In March 2008, McCollum 

personally guaranteed payment of all goods purchased from plaintiff by his 

company, defendant McCollum Mechanical LLC (collectively, defendants). 

Defendants thereafter failed to make payments and presented a dishonored 

check. Accordingly, in November 2016, plaintiff filed a three-count complaint 

against defendants demanding $13,357.08 plus interests and costs. 

In February 2017, the county clerk's office entered judgment against 

defendants for $13,785.19. A writ of execution followed, but the court officer 

was unable to locate any personal property of McCollum within Ocean County, 

where the business entity was located. 

In October 2017, the Superior Court Clerk's Office docketed the judgment 

in the amount of $13,865.32, which included accrued interest and costs. The 

parties do not dispute the docketed judgment automatically became a lien on 
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McCollum's real estate, see N.J.S.A. 2A:16-1, but whether plaintiff failed to 

execute a levy on any real property owned by McCollum in New Jersey, see R.

4:59-1(d). 

On a date not disclosed in the record, McCollum relocated to Maine.1 In 

October 2018, McCollum filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition in bankruptcy in 

the District of Maine. See 11 U.S.C. § 727. In his petition, McCollum claimed 

he had no interest in real estate.2 Plaintiff was listed as a creditor holding an 

unsecured nonpriority claim against McCollum. In February 2019, the 

bankruptcy court discharged the judgment over plaintiff's objection. 

Because the judgment remained docketed, in September 2022, McCollum 

moved in the Special Civil Part to discharge plaintiff's judgment pursuant to 

N.J.S.A. 2A:16-49.1. In opposition, plaintiff essentially argued the lien passed

through bankruptcy unaffected and, as such, was not discharged. More 

particularly, plaintiff contended that granting McCollum's motion would 

constitute an "advisory or hypothetical opinion[] . . . because no property ha[d] 

1

 In his ensuing bankruptcy petition, McCollum acknowledged he had resided 

in Maine for more than six months. 

2

 McCollum declared he purchased a single-family home in Jackson, Maine in 

2016, but the property was awarded to his ex-wife pursuant to a 2018 divorce 

decree and, as such, his interest in the property was $0. 
4 A-1300-22

been identified from which to remove the lien"; "the lien w[as] automatically 

perfected upon recording" with the clerk of court; and a levy was not a condition 

precedent for perfecting the lien. 

McCollum acknowledged a judgment lien was, in a sense, "perfected" 

when the lien was docketed, but countered that "[t]he trustee's lien is superior to

that of a judgment creditor." Because plaintiff failed to obtain an execution levy 

against any "hypothetical" real property held by McCollum prior to bankruptcy, 

McCollum argued he was entitled to relief pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:16-49.1. 

In a decision placed on the record, the motion judge ordered the judgment 

discharged primarily based on his review of the governing statute and our 

decision in Assocs. Com. Corp. v. Langston, 236 N.J. Super. 236 (App. Div. 

1989). This appeal followed. 

Reprising the same contentions raised before the motion judge, plaintiff 

urges us to reverse. Because the appeal turns on a purely legal determination, 

our review is de novo. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 

140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995); see also In re Registrant H.D., 241 N.J. 412, 418

(2020) (recognizing statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo). 

N.J.S.A. 2A:16-49.1 provides that one year or more after a bankruptcy 

discharge, a debtor may apply to a court where a judgment has been docketed 
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for an order canceling and discharging the judgment. The judgment should be 

canceled and discharged "[i]f it appears . . . [the debtor] has been discharged 

from the payment of that judgment or the debt upon which such judgment was 

recovered." Ibid. However, 

[w]here the judgment was a lien on real property owned 

by the [debtor] prior to the time he was adjudged a

bankrupt, and not subject to be discharged or released 

under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, the lien 

thereof upon said real estate shall not be affected by 

said order and may be enforced, but in all other respects 

the judgment shall be of no force or validity . . . . 

[Ibid. (emphasis added).] 

Thus, the statute consists of three pertinent parts: (1) a bankrupt debtor 

may move to discharge docketed judgments one year or more after the debt was 

discharged in bankruptcy; (2) if the debtor establishes the debt was so 

discharged, the Superior Court shall enter an order requiring the clerk to cancel 

and discharge the judgment; and (3) a pre-bankruptcy lien must be discharged, 

unless it was "not subject to be discharged or released under the provisions of 

the Bankruptcy Act." The crux of plaintiff's argument on this appeal is that 

McCollum failed to satisfy the third criterion because plaintiff's lien passed 

through bankruptcy and McCollum apparently owned no pre-petition real 
6 A-1300-22

property in New Jersey. Thus, plaintiff maintains the judgment lien was not 

"subject to be discharged or released" by the bankruptcy court. 

It is well settled that "[t]o establish a lien against a judgment debtor's real 

property, a creditor need only enter a judgment in the records of the Superior 

Court; a levy and execution on real property owned by the judgment debtor are 

not required." New Brunswick Sav. Bank v. Markouski, 123 N.J. 402, 411 

(1991). "A holder of a docketed judgment has a lien on all real property held by 

the judgment debtor in the state." Id. at 412 (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:16-1, 2A:17-

17); see also Chemical Bank v. James, 354 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 2002). 

However, a judgment lien against a debtor's real property must be "perfected 

. . . by levying against it prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition." New 

Century Fin. Servs. v. Staples, 379 N.J. Super. 489, 497 (App. Div. 2005). 

Thus, when a debtor attempts to discharge a valid and perfected judgment 

lien on real property under N.J.S.A. 2A:16-49.1, "the threshold and controlling 

issue is whether the judgment [lien] was subject to discharge or release in 

bankruptcy." Gaskill v. Citi Mortg., Inc., 428 N.J. Super. 234, 241 (App. Div. 

2012), aff'd 221 N.J. 501 (2015). The statute applies if "the debtor could have 

obtained a discharge of the lien through the bankruptcy proceedings, [but] the 

debtor need not have actually obtained a discharge of the lien." Ibid. 
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In Chemical Bank, we held abandonment of real property by a bankruptcy 

trustee, and consequent survival of liens against that property, did not alter the 

fact that a judgment lien against the property could have been discharged during 

the bankruptcy proceeding. 354 N.J. Super. at 9, 11. A judgment lien becomes 

non-dischargeable only if it is levied upon either before bankruptcy filing or 

after the bankruptcy trustee's abandonment of the property. Id. at 9, 11-12; see 

also Gaskill, 428 N.J. Super. at 243; Party Parrot, Inc. v. Birthdays & Holidays, 

Inc., 289 N.J. Super. 167, 171-72, 175 (App. Div. 1996). As we explained in 

Party Parrot: 

A lien on the real estate enforced by levy, as opposed 

to the underlying judgment or indebtedness by [the]

defendants for a deficiency, is not subject to discharge 

or complete avoidance under the provisions of the 

Bankruptcy Code. If unperfected, however, [the] 

plaintiff's lien was subject to avoidance under the Code 

and therefore may now be discharged of record. 

[Id. at 171.] 

The statute has been described as a housekeeping measure to assure that 

judgments discharged in bankruptcy do not remain of record, cloud title, or 

require payment in the future. Id. at 173. The statute's purpose is aligned with 

"the intention of the Bankruptcy Act, i.e.[,] to give the bankrupt a fresh start in 

life." Langston, 236 N.J. Super. at 240. Otherwise, "[i]f judgments that have 
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been discharged in bankruptcy are allowed to remain of record, the practical 

effect may be to require payment at sometime in the future, thereby negating the 

intended benefits of the bankruptcy proceedings." Ibid. (quoting Sponsor's 

Statement to N.J.S.A. 2A:16-49.1 (July 10, 1967)). 

In the present matter, a lien against any real property in New Jersey owned 

by McCollum was created when plaintiff's judgment was docketed in October 

2017, prior to the filing of McCollum's October 2018 petition in bankruptcy. 

See N.J.S.A. 2A:16-1; see also Markouski, 123 N.J. at 412. Plaintiff did not, 

however, perfect the lien by levying against McCollum's real property prior to 

the filing of defendant's bankruptcy petition. See New Century Fin. Servs., 379 

N.J. Super. at 497. McCollum filed his bankruptcy petition more than one year 

after the bankruptcy court discharged his debts and the discharge included the 

debt underlying plaintiff's judgment. Because plaintiff's lien was not perfected, 

it was "subject to be discharged or released" by the bankruptcy court under 

N.J.S.A. 2A:16-49.1. We therefore discern no reason to disturb the motion 

judge's order discharging plaintiff's judgment lien, which squarely addressed the 

issues raised in view of the governing law and gave effect to the Legislature's 

intent. 
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Nor are we persuaded by plaintiff's argument that the judge's decision was 

"hypothetical" or "advisory." The issue decided was whether plaintiff's 

judgment lien was dischargeable under N.J.S.A. 2A:16-49.1. Plaintiff's lien 

applied against all real property owned by McCollum within New Jersey. See 

Markouski, 123 N.J. at 412. In McCollum's bankruptcy petition, he did not 

claim any interest in real property in New Jersey. Although we recognize 

plaintiff's contention that it therefore could not levy on any real property, the 

fact remains no levy issued. Even if McCollum held any pre-bankruptcy interest 

in real property in this state, the driving force underpinning N.J.S.A. 2A:16-49.1 

is the removal of clouds on title. See Langston, 236 N.J. Super. at 241. To 

effectuate that purpose, the statute's requirements ensure dormant liens do not 

remain attached to a debtor's real property following bankruptcy. See ibid. 

To the extent not addressed, plaintiff's remaining contentions lack 

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.