NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

Jonathan SANTORO and Katherine 

SANTORO, 

 Plaintiffs, 

v. 

UNIQUE VACATIONS, INC., et al., 

 Defendants. 

 

 

 Civ. No. 10-3281 

 

 OPINION 

 

THOMPSON, U.S.D.J. 

This matter is before the Court upon Defendants’ Unique Vacations, Inc. (“Unique”) and 

Sandals Resorts International, Ltd. (“SRI”) (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion for 

Reconsideration. (Doc. No. 65). Plaintiffs Jonathan Santoro and Katherine Santoro 

(“Plaintiffs”) oppose Defendants’ motion and cross-move to amend the complaint. (Doc. No. 

66). The Court has decided the motions based on the written submissions of the parties and 

without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b). For the reasons stated 

below, both motions will be denied. 

BACKGROUND 

The facts of this case are more fully summarized in the Court’s Opinion of April 22, 2014 

granting Defendants partial summary judgment (the “April 22 Opinion”). (Doc. No. 51, Partial 

Summ. J. Op.). Plaintiffs are a married couple who booked a trip to the Sandals Regency La Toc 

Golf Resort & Spa in St. Lucia (“Sandals Regency La Toc”) for their honeymoon. (Doc. No. 4, 

Am. Compl., at ¶ 23; Doc. No. 51, Partial Summ. J. Op. at 1). Unique is a Delaware corporation 

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that provides marketing services for a number of hotels doing business under the trade name 

“Sandals;” SRI provides management services to those same hotels. (Doc. No. 51, Partial 

Summ. J. Op. at 2). Through a travel agent, Plaintiffs purchased an all-inclusive package from 

Unique for their stay at the Sandals Regency La Toc. (Doc. No. 4, Am. Compl., at ¶ 23). 

Included with this package was a transportation voucher, which Plaintiffs were instructed to 

present upon arrival at the Hewanorra International Airport in St. Lucia to a Sandals 

representative, who would then assist them to a vehicle that would transport them to the Sandals 

Regency La Toc. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-15). Plaintiffs followed these instructions after arriving in St. 

Lucia and were led by a Sandals representative named Karan Alexander (“Alexander”) to a taxi 

operated by Defendant Vallins Don C. Jean (“Jean”), who was not an employee of either Unique, 

Sandals, or the Sandals Regency La Toc. (Doc. No. 51, Partial Summ. J. Op. at 2). This taxi 

was either owned by Jean or Defendant Southern Taxi Association (“STA”). (Id. at 3). While 

Jean was driving Plaintiffs from the airport to the Sandals Regency La Toc, he fell asleep, which 

led to the vehicle’s running off the road and the Plaintiffs’ being injured. (Id. at 3-4). 

 Before embarking on their honeymoon, Plaintiffs had received an invoice from Unique. 

(Id. at 2-3). This invoice contained the following waiver: 

Limitation of Damages: Unique Vacation, SRI, any hotel or hotel management 

company, their affiliates, subsidiaries, directors, officers, and employees, shall not 

be liable to guest in any circumstances for: (A) any personal injuries or property 

damage arising out of or caused by any act or omission on the part of any air 

carrier or grand transportation carrier; (B) emotional distress, mental suffering, or 

psychological injury of any kind; or (C) any consequential, incidental, punitive, or 

exemplary damages. 

(Id. at 3). 

On December 13, 2013, Defendants moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ 

claims. (Doc. No. 37, Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J.). In their brief supporting this motion, Defendants 

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argued that judgment should be granted in their favor on Plaintiffs’ negligence claim because it 

was undisputed that Defendants did not own, operate, manage, or have control over STA, nor 

was Jean employed by Defendants, and thus Defendants could not have been the proximate 

cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries. (Doc. No. 37-5, Defs.’ Summ. J. Br. at 5). On December 31, 2013, 

Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment motion and made a cross-motion 

for partial summary judgment. (Doc. No. 43, Pls. Opp’n and Mot. Partial Summ. J.). In their 

brief, Plaintiffs focused not on whether Jean had the apparent authority to act as an agent of 

Defendants, as they had claimed in the 2010 Amended Complaint (Doc. 4, Am. Compl. at ¶ 13), 

but rather focused on whether Alexander was an agent of Defendants. (Doc. No. 43, Pls. Opp’n 

and Mot. Partial Summ. J. at 4-8). 

By an order and opinion issued on April 22, 2014, the Court rejected Plaintiffs’ 

negligence claim because (1) Plaintiffs had not pointed to any evidence showing that Defendants 

had any “role in the ownership, operation, or management of the vehicle in which Plaintiffs 

traveled” or that Defendants had employed or exercised any control over Jean, and (2) because 

the exculpatory clause contained in the invoice for the trip was enforceable against Plaintiffs 

under Slotnick v. Club ABC Tours, Inc., 430 N.J. Super. 59 (Law Div. 2012). (Doc. No. 51, 

Partial Summ. J. Op. at 5-6). The only claim on which the Court did not grant Defendants 

summary judgment was a claim for negligent misrepresentation. (Id. at 8-9). Trial was 

scheduled to commence on this single claim on November 17, 2014. 

The first attorney who had represented Plaintiffs before this Court was Karim Arzadi of 

the Law Offices of Karim Arzadi in Perth Amboy, New Jersey. (Doc. 40, Consent Order of 

Substitution). On December 17, 2013, attorney Donald Joworisak filed a Consent Order of 

Substitution along with a cover letter explaining to the Court that he would be representing 

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Plaintiffs going forward and that the name of the firm “The Law Offices of Karim Arzadi” was 

being changed to “Joworisak & Associates, LLC.” (Id.). Mr. Joworisak signed Plaintiffs’ 

Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and he appeared before the Court for 

Plaintiffs at oral argument on the summary judgment motion on February 19, 2014. (Doc. 43, 

Pls. Opp’n and Mot. Partial Summ. J.; Doc. No. 50). However, on November 14, 2014—the 

Friday before trial was set to begin on Monday, November 17—the Court was advised in a 

telephone conference that Vincent Glorisi of the Vincent R. Glorisi Law Offices in Old Bridge, 

New Jersey, would be representing Plaintiffs at trial. Mr. Glorisi was listed in the pretrial order 

but not as a separate law firm. He has never entered an appearance for his law firm. During the 

telephone conference call, Mr. Glorisi informed the Court for the first time that he wished to 

pursue a vicarious liability theory against Defendants, by which he would argue that Defendants 

should be held liable for the injuries caused by Jean because Jean had the apparent authority to 

act as agent of Defendants, and that therefore Defendants should be vicariously liable for his 

negligence under respondeat superior. 

 At the end of the first day of trial, after the jury had been sworn and Plaintiffs had 

presented the bulk of their case as to Defendants’ liability, Mr. Glorisi made a motion to amend 

the complaint to make his vicarious liability claim against Defendants. The next day, the Court 

indicated that it would deny Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint because there was no new 

evidence that had arisen to justify amending the complaint once trial had begun. At the end of 

the day on Wednesday, in a conference in chambers with counsel for Plaintiffs and Defendants, 

Mr. Glorisi informed the Court that Plaintiffs intended to dismiss their complaint altogether, as 

they did not feel that they had been able to convincingly prove the case for negligent 

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misrepresentation and did not wish to expend the resources to call their expert medical witnesses 

to present the case for Plaintiffs’ damages. 

On Thursday morning, the Court informed the parties both initially in chambers and on 

the record in the courtroom that it had further considered: Plaintiff’s motion to amend the 

complaint in the light of the vicarious liability theory that Mr. Glorisi had expounded; the 

evidence that Plaintiffs had offered at trial; and the claims that Plaintiffs had stated against 

Defendants in their 2010 Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 4). Taking those factors into 

consideration, the Court determined that in the interest of allowing Plaintiffs the opportunity to 

have as complete an airing of their case as justice required, that the motion to amend the 

complaint should: (1) be interpreted as a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s April 22, 2014 

Order and Opinion granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ negligence claim, as Plaintiffs’ had 

claimed Defendants were vicariously liable for Jean’s negligence in the 2010 Amended 

Complaint, and thus the Complaint did not need to be amended; and (2) that this motion should 

be granted so as to allow Plaintiffs to present this claim to a jury, as there was enough evidence 

supporting the vicarious liability theory that summary judgment should not have been granted. 

Though Defense counsel protested that the Court should not grant a motion for reconsideration 

sua sponte, the Court corrected Defense counsel and stated very clearly that it was not, in fact, 

granting a motion sua sponte but that it was responding to the motion made by Mr. Glorisi on the 

record on November 17, 2014. 

 The following day, November 19, Defendants made a motion for a mistrial (Doc. No. 

59), which the Court granted (Doc. No. 64). This case is now set to begin a new trial on 

February 3, 2015. On December 3, 2014, Defendants filed the present motion for 

reconsideration of the Court’s November 19, 2014 granting of Plaintiff’s motion for 

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reconsideration. (Doc. No. 65). On December 22, 2014, Mr. Joworisak, once again 

representing Plaintiffs,1

 filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion for reconsideration. (Doc. No. 

66). Along with this opposition, Plaintiffs also filed a motion to amend the complaint to 

substitute Ciceron Management Company, Ltd. for a fictitiously named defendant. (Id.). 

Defendants oppose this amendment. (Doc. No. 70). 

STANDARDS 

I. Motion for Reconsideration 

The Third Circuit has held that “The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is ‘to 

correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence,’” and that, 

accordingly, motions for reconsideration should be granted only where (1) there has been a 

change in controlling law; (2) there is new evidence; or (3) there is a need to correct a “clear 

error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 

2010) (quoting Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). 

II. Motion to Amend 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) governs when a pleading may be amended after the 

statute of limitations has passed. See Padilla v. Twp of Cherry Hill, 110 F. App’x 272, 276 (3d 

Cir. 2004). The statute of limitations passed long before Plaintiffs filed their motion to amend on 

December 22, 2014, as the accident giving rise to this cause of action occurred in July of 2008 

(Doc. 4, Am. Compl. at ¶ 12) and the statute of limitations for personal injuries in New Jersey is 

two years (N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.2(a)). Rule 15(c)(1)(A) allows an amendment to a complaint when 

the amendment relates back to the original pleading: 

(1) An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading 

when: 

 

1

 It is the Court’s understanding that Mr. Glorisi will represent Plaintiffs again at trial, though he 

needs to file his appearance on the record. 

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(A) the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows 

relation back. 

New Jersey’s statute of limitations for personal injuries does not discuss relating back, but under 

New Jersey’s fictitious party rule, N.J.R. 4:26-4, an amendment relates back to the original 

pleading where the plaintiff named a fictitious defendant in the original pleading and later seeks 

to amend the complaint to substitute a specific, named defendant for the fictitious defendant. To 

be able to invoke this rule, however, a plaintiff must show that she “exercised due diligence to 

ascertain defendant’s true name before and after filing the complaint.” Monaco v. City of 

Camden, 366 F.App’x 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting DeRienzo v. Harvard Indus., 357 F.3d 

348, 353 (3d Cir. 2004). 

ANALYSIS 

I. Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration 

The Court will deny Defendants’ motion for reconsideration because the Court believes 

that its decision to grant Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration on November 19, 2014 was fairly 

decided and Defendants have not shown any new evidence, any change in controlling law, or any 

clear error of law. 

As discussed above, the Court granted Mr. Glorisi’s motion for reconsideration of the 

granting of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s negligence claim because Mr. Glorisi persuaded the 

Court that there were material issues of fact which should have gone to the jury. While it would 

have been better for the apparent authority and negligence issues to have been placed firmly 

before the Court before trial began, it nonetheless became clear to the Court that Plaintiffs—Mr. 

and Mrs. Santoro—deserved to have this claim heard by the jury, and that to deny them that 

opportunity would have been a manifest injustice. Accordingly, the Court granted the motion for 

reconsideration, reinstating that claim. 

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As the Court noted in its April 22 Opinion, in order to establish vicarious liability under 

an apparent authority theory, a party must “establish that: (1) the appearance of authority has 

been created by the conduct of the alleged principal and not solely by the conduct of the putative 

agent; (2) a third party has relied on the agent’s apparent authority to act for a principal; and (3) 

the reliance was reasonable under the circumstances.” (Doc. No. 51 at 6-7) (quoting Mayflower 

Transit, LLC v. Prince, 314 F.Supp. 2d 362, 374 (D.N.J. 2004)). The doctrine of apparent 

authority exists so that a party cannot escape liability where there is no contractual relationship 

between a principal and a tortfeasor but the principal’s behavior has misled a third party into 

believing that the tortfeasor was acting under the authority of the principal as its agent or 

employee; as such, the question of whether an apparent authority relationship exists is very 

factually intensive. Mayflower Transit LLC, 314 F.Supp. 2d at 374. After Plaintiffs’ 

presentation at trial, the Court came to appreciate fully that Defendants had sold Plaintiffs an allinclusive vacation package that included a voucher for ground transportation from the airport to 

the resort, and that the marketing materials for the package and the transportation voucher could 

have led Plaintiffs to believe that the person who would drive them from the airport to the resort 

would be a Sandals employee. The Court concluded that there were material issues of fact as to 

whether the driver Jean was under the apparent authority of Defendants. See Casey v. Sanborn’s 

Inc. of Tex., 478 S.W.2d 234, 236–39 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (finding that plaintiffs had made the 

prima facie showing of liability against a Texas travel agency under the doctrine of respondeat 

superior by showing that they had been injured by the negligent conduct of a Mexican driver 

who had been contracted with by a Mexican travel service which was held out by the Texas 

travel agency as “our men in Mexico,” even though the Texas travel agency had no contractual 

relationship with the Mexican driver.) 

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Another basis for the Court’s grant of summary judgment to the Defendants on the 

negligence claim was the exculpatory clause contained in the invoice sent to Plaintiffs. While 

the Court cited Slotnick v. Club ABC Tours, Inc., 430 N.J. Super. 59 (Law Div. 2012) as having 

established the precedent in New Jersey that such clauses will generally be found enforceable, 

the Court concludes now that Slotnick is distinguishable from the present case. First, in Slotnick, 

the Defendant who was found to be protected by the exculpatory clause was Club ABC Tours, 

Inc., (“Club ABC”) which was the entity with whom the plaintiff had booked her trip to Egypt. 

Slotnick, 430 N.J. Super. at 69–70. However, the party that allegedly injured plaintiff was the 

cousin of a tour guide employed by Al Thuraya Travel & Tours (“T3”), which was hired to 

provide travel services for plaintiff and others on a Jordan add-on tour from the Egypt tour by 

STI Travel, LLC, which itself had been hired by Club ABC to act as tour operator for the Egypt 

tour. Id. at 62–64. The event at which plaintiff was injured was an optional excursion from the 

Jordan add-on tour for dinner in the T3 tour guide’s family cave. Id. at 64. Thus, there were 

many layers of privity between Club ABC and the tortfeasor. Under those circumstances, it is 

more reasonable to allow exculpatory clauses, which are generally disfavored under New Jersey 

law and are subjected to close judicial scrutiny. See Stelluti v. Casapenn Enter., LLC, 203 N.J. 

286, 303 (2010). Here, it is plausible that the driver Jean was acting under the apparent 

authority of Sandals, and that he was executing a duty that Defendants had marketed to Plaintiffs 

and for which Plaintiffs had paid a premium to Defendants. In Slotnick, by contrast, the plaintiff 

had not purchased the excursion for the dinner in the cave in Jordan from Club ABC. Slotnick, 

430 N.J. Super. at 64. Thus, the factual situation here is significantly distinguishable from the 

situation presented in Slotnick. 

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More to the point, however, the New Jersey Appellate Division has held that an 

“exculpatory agreement does not and should not insulate dangerous conduct that is more 

culpable than ordinary negligence or carelessness” (i.e., gross negligence). Stelluti v. Casapenn 

Enter., LLC, 408 N.J. Super. 435, 457 n.6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (aff’d, 203 N.J. 286 

(2010)). Here, a reasonable jury might reasonably have found that Jean was grossly negligent in 

causing the car crash. Defendants would be liable for the damages resulting from such 

negligence if the jury were also to find that Jean acted under the apparent authority of 

Defendants. Thus, the Court concludes that the Defendants’ exculpatory clause was insufficient 

as a basis for the grant of summary judgment. 

II. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend 

 To avail itself of New Jersey’s fictitious party rule, which allows a party to amend a 

complaint to add a defendant where it had named a fictitious defendant originally, the party must 

have acted with diligence before and after filing the complaint. Monaco, 366 F.App’x at 334. 

Though Plaintiffs did name “Sandals Regency La Toc Golf Resort & Spa in St. Lucia 

Management (fictitious name)” as a defendant in its complaint in 2010, there is no evidence that 

Plaintiffs acted with any diligence at all in the almost four and half years between the filing of 

the complaint and the filing of the instant motion. Apparently, nothing was done to determine 

the identity of the management company and add it as a party, even though there are several 

indications in the record that Circeron Management Company, Ltd. was the party to be named in 

the complaint. See DeRienzo v. Harvard Indus., Inc., 357 F.3d 348, 354–55 (3d Cir. 2004) 

(collecting cases where the fictitious party rule has been applied). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ 

motion will be denied. 

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CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, both Defendants’ and Plaintiffs’ motions are denied. An 

appropriate order will follow. 

 /s/ Anne E. Thompson 

 ANNE E. THOMPSON, U.S.D.J. 

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