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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

HEIKE ALBERT, 

 Plaintiff, 

 

v. 

DRS TECHNOLOGIES, INC, DRS RSTA, 

INC., a wholly owned subsidiary of DRS 

TECNOLOGIES, INC., 

 Defendants. 

Civil Action Number:

2:10-cv-03886

OPINION

HON. WILLIAM J. MARTINI

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Heike Albert was terminated by her employer, DRS RSTA, Inc., a Delaware 

corporation with its principal place of business in Florida. Albert worked for DRS RSTA, 

Inc. in Florida. She now brings a Title VII gender discrimination claim and related causes 

of action under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD), N.J. Stat. Ann. §

10:5-1 et seq. The basis for the state causes of action is that her employer is a wholly 

owned subsidiary of a New Jersey-based entity, DRS Technologies, Inc. Albert further 

alleges that the discriminatory conduct was connected to the New Jersey entity and the 

decisions of its employees. Thus the discriminatory conduct emanated from New Jersey.

Defendants seek to dismiss the New Jersey state causes of action, and to transfer the 

motion to the Middle District of Florida. 

For the reasons elaborated below, the Court will GRANT the Defendants‟ motion, will 

DISMISS the NJLAD claims (counts 3 and 4), and will TRANSFER the action to the 

Middle District of Florida. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Motion to Dismiss. The Defendants‟ motion to dismiss is brought pursuant to the 

provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). This rule provides for the 

dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted. The moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim 

has been stated, Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005), and dismissal 

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is appropriate only if, accepting all of the facts alleged in the complaint as true, the 

plaintiff has failed to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (abrogating “no set of 

facts” language found in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The facts alleged 

must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555. This requirement “calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation 

that discovery will reveal evidence of” necessary elements of the plaintiff‟s cause of 

action. Id. Furthermore, in order to satisfy federal pleading requirements, the plaintiff 

must “provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief,” which “requires more than labels 

and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

do.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555). 

Motion to Transfer. Transfer is sought under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (“For the convenience 

of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil 

action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.”). In deciding 

whether to grant a transfer, the Court will balance both private and public factors. The list 

of non-exclusive private factors include: plaintiff‟s forum choice; the defendant‟s 

preference; where the claim arose; convenience of parties; and convenience of witnesses

– “but only to the extent that the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one of 

the fora; and the location of books and records (similarly limited to the extent that the 

files could not be produced in the alternative forum).” Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 

F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995). The list of non-exclusive public factors include: “the 

enforceability of the judgment; practical considerations that could make the trial easy, 

expeditious, or inexpensive; the relative administrative difficulty in the two fora resulting 

from court congestion; the local interest in deciding local controversies at home; the 

public policies of the fora; and the familiarity of the trial judge with the applicable state 

law in diversity cases.” Id. at 879-80. The burden rests on the movant, and Plaintiff‟s 

choice of venue should not be “lightly disturbed.” Id. at 879.

III. FACTS

The basic facts do not appear in dispute. Plaintiff was an employee of DRS RSTA, Inc. 

(RSTA), a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Florida. Albert

was employed in Florida. RSTA is a wholly owned subsidiary of DRS Technologies, Inc. 

(DRS), a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey. After 

being terminated, Albert exhausted administrative remedies, and then brought the instant 

action. In her four-count complaint she asserts two counts under Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(f) et seq., both a gender discrimination claim 

and a retaliation claim. She also asserts two counts under NJLAD, both a gender 

discrimination claim and a retaliation claim. Albert‟s position is that the discriminatory 

conduct emanated from New Jersey, from DRS, and its employees, thus giving her a 

sufficient connection to this Court (the New Jersey forum) and the New Jersey state law 

causes of action (NJLAD). 

IV. ANALYSIS

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Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff acknowledges that she worked for Defendants in Florida. 

Plts.‟ Br 1. Her position is that because she worked for a “New Jersey corporation, and 

[because] the decision to terminate her employment was made in New Jersey,” she can 

maintain this action in New Jersey and assert her NJLAD counts. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff‟s 

position is somewhat obscure. She acknowledges that RSTA was her employer. RSTA is 

not a New Jersey corporation, nor does it have its principal place of business in New 

Jersey. It appears Plaintiff is asserting that she worked for a New Jersey corporation 

because RSTA is wholly owned by DRS, an entity with a principal place of business in 

New Jersey. 

Whether Plaintiff worked for a New Jersey entity or not, and whether the alleged 

discriminatory conduct emanated from New Jersey or not, it is clear that Plaintiff 

performed her duties in Florida, and, perhaps, occasionally elsewhere, but at no time did 

she work in New Jersey. In these circumstances, the Plaintiff‟s connection to New Jersey 

is insufficient to assert an NJLAD cause of action. Norenius v. Multaler, Inc., 2008 WL 

4162878, at *7, (N.J. Super. App. Div. Sept. 11, 2008) (“We do not perceive that the 

protections afforded to „inhabitants‟ under the LAD were intended to extend to 

„inhabitants‟ of other states employed exclusively within the borders of those states.”); 

Satz v. Taipina, 2003 WL 22207205, at *16 (D.N.J. April 15, 2003) (“New Jersey courts 

have consistently applied the law of the state of employment to workplace claims, and 

have therefore only applied the NJLAD if the plaintiff worked in New Jersey.” (emphasis 

added)). It appears the NJLAD counts must be dismissed. 

Motion to Transfer. Plaintiff supports her forum choice by arguing that the burden is on 

the movant, that her forum choice should not be lightly disturbed, that the adjudication of 

NJLAD counts favor a New Jersey judge and forum, and that discovery will establish that 

the decision to terminate Albert was made in New Jersey, thereby requiring access to 

New Jersey witnesses and documents. The Court has already determined that the NJLAD 

counts should be dismissed. Plaintiff‟s claim in regard to New Jersey witnesses and 

documents is wholly speculative. It seems clear that any number of witnesses discussed 

in her complaint are Florida residents, i.e., her RSTA co-workers and supervisors. 

Plaintiff lives in Florida and her (immediate, if not only) employer is a Florida-based 

entity. The Court sees little reason to defer to Plaintiff‟s forum choice because her 

employer‟s parent corporation‟s principal place of business is in New Jersey and because 

discovery might reveal that some part of the alleged wrongful termination decision 

emanated from New Jersey. Weighing the public and private factors, the Court finds that 

transfer is in order. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons elaborated above, the Court GRANTS the Defendants‟ motion, 

DISMISSES the NJLAD claims (counts 3 and 4), and TRANSFERS the action to the 

Middle District of Florida.

s/ William J. Martini 

DATE: May 23, 2011 William J. Martini, U.S.D.J.

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