NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOCELYN SUSAN BUNDY, an individual, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

NIRVANA LLC, a Washington Limited 

Liability Company; LIVE NATION 

MERCHANDISE, LLC, a Delaware Limited 

Liability Company; MERCH TRAFFIC 

LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability 

Company; SILVA ARTIST 

MANAGEMENT, LLC, a California Limited 

Liability Company,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 21-56305

D.C. No. 

2:21−cv−03621−DSF−MAA

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Dale Fischer, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 20, 2023

Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW and KOH, Circuit Judges, and McMAHON,

** District 

Judge.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Colleen McMahon, United States District Judge for 

the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUL 3 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Jocelyn Susan Bundy brought this copyright infringement action against 

Nirvana LLC, Live National Merchandise LLC, Merch Traffic LLC, and Silva 

Artist Management LLC (collectively, Defendants) for unlicensed use of her 

grandfather C.W. Scott-Giles’s drawing of “Upper Hell” from Dante Alighieri’s

The Divine Comedy (the “Illustration”). Bundy appeals the district court’s 

dismissal of her case for forum non conveniens, contending that the United 

Kingdom is an inadequate forum and that the remaining forum non conveniens

factors favor suit in the United States. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for abuse of 

discretion the district court’s dismissal based on forum non conveniens, see Lewis 

v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 953 F.3d 1160, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2020), and its denial of 

a motion for reconsideration, see Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 

2007). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this case for 

forum non conveniens and denying the related motion for reconsideration. In 

reviewing a dismissal for forum non conveniens, we examine: (1) the adequacy of 

the alternate forum; (2) the deference owed a plaintiff’s chosen forum; and (3) 

whether the balance of private and public interest factors favors dismissal. See 

Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 643 F.3d 1216, 1224 (9th Cir. 2011).
3 

1. The district court properly determined that the United Kingdom

provides an adequate alternative forum. “An alternative forum is deemed adequate 

if: (1) the defendant is amenable to process there; and (2) the other jurisdiction 

offers a satisfactory remedy.” Id. at 1225. Here, Defendants are amenable to 

process in the United Kingdom because they accepted, as a condition for the 

district court’s dismissal, that they must submit to personal jurisdiction in the 

United Kingdom for all of Bundy’s claims. See id. Further, the district court 

correctly concluded that Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Ainsworth [2011] UKSC 39 does not 

preclude the United Kingdom from exercising jurisdiction over Bundy’s U.S. 

copyright claims. Lucasfilm holds that the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction is 

limited over foreign property disputes only where proceedings are “principally 

concerned” with the “question of title” or “the right to possession” of a foreign 

property right. Id. [105]; see also id. [101] (describing the “very narrow” question 

on appeal). The main thrust of Lucasfilm is to expand the United Kingdom’s 

jurisdiction over copyright infringement suits, rather than restrict it. See id. 

Bundy contends that the principal issue in this case is indeed the validity of 

her U.S. copyright interest, thus precluding U.K. jurisdiction under Lucasfilm. 

However, the district court correctly concluded that the validity issue here is 

probably secondary, as the face of Bundy’s complaint suggests that she does not 

have an enforceable U.S. copyright interest. And Bundy fails to allege how U.S. 
4 

copyright law would protect the Illustration as a “foreign work.” She has not 

demonstrated that the United Kingdom was a “treaty party” to the United States

when the Illustration was published in 1949, which is required for a foreign work 

to be enforceable under U.S. law. 17 U.S.C. § 104(b)(1); see also 1 M. Nimmer & 

D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 5.07 (2022).1 Her allegations that the 

Illustration did not enter the public domain in the United States do not alter this 

statutory requirement. 

By contrast, whether the Illustration has copyright protection under U.K. law

remains a threshold legal question to be addressed by the U.K. courts. The district 

court need not have accepted as true Bundy’s legal conclusion in her complaint

that she is the sole owner of the Illustration. See Whitaker v. Tesla Motors, Inc., 

985 F.3d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 2021). And even though two witnesses have 

provided declarations disclaiming ownership of a U.K. copyright interest in the 

Illustration, Bundy has yet to present affirmative evidence proving sole ownership

or ownership at all. Given that Bundy’s evidence does not conclusively resolve the 

ownership issue, and that Defendants plan to continue to challenge Bundy’s

ownership going forward, ownership of a U.K. copyright interest in the Illustration

1

In her briefing, Bundy cites to the Berne Convention as the international treaty 

that supports U.S. copyright protection for her U.K. work. However, the United 

States did not join the Berne Convention until 1989. See 1 Nimmer on Copyright

§ 5.07; 9 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright app. 20 (collecting all 

international copyright treaties with the United States).
5 

persists as a threshold issue in this case. As a result, Lucasfilm does not bar U.K. 

jurisdiction, and the district court properly determined that the United Kingdom

serves as an adequate forum. 

2. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in concluding that 

Bundy’s forum choice is afforded “less deference” because she is a foreign 

plaintiff. Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. Pte, Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 703 (9th Cir. 

1995) (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981)). Although 

Defendants are headquartered in the United States, see Carijano, 643 F.3d at 1229,

this connection to the United States alone does not warrant increased deference. 

See Ravelo Monegro v. Rosa, 211 F.3d 509, 513–14 (9th Cir. 2000).

3. With lessened deference to Bundy’s choice of forum, the district court 

did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the public and private interest factors 

weigh in favor of dismissal. See Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1145 

(9th Cir. 2001). A number of public interest factors weigh in Defendants’ favor,

including the need to apply U.K. and German law, see Leetsch v. Freedman, 260 

F.3d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 2001), the unwarranted potential burden on U.S. courts, 

see Lueck, 236 F.3d at 1147, and the fact that a trial in the United Kingdom would 

be “speedier” than one in the Central District, Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jenson, 743 

F.2d 1325, 1337 (9th Cir. 1984). While Bundy is correct that our circuit is split on 

the appropriate way to apply the local interest factor, see Carijano, 643 F.3d at 
6 

1233 n.3, we need not decide that issue because the remaining factors either favor 

dismissal or are neutral even if the local interest factor were to weigh in Bundy’s 

favor. 

Among the private interest factors, the residence and convenience of the 

parties and witnesses, access to evidence, and enforceability of judgment also favor 

dismissal. See Lueck, 236 F.3d at 1145. Material evidence and witnesses related 

to ownership are in the United Kingdom, and ownership is a critical threshold issue 

that a U.K. court is more equipped to resolve. Moreover, it is possible for Bundy 

to enforce a U.K. judgment in the United States. See Cal. Code Civ. P. §§ 1715(a), 

1716(a)–(d), 1723; Carijano, 643 F.3d at 1231–32; Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre 

Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1213–15 (9th Cir. 2006). And to 

the extent Bundy may face difficulty collecting evidence from the United States,

see Lueck, 236 F.3d at 1145, the district court conditioned dismissal on the 

Defendants’ agreement to use the discovery procedures set forth in the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure and to voluntarily produce documents and witnesses 

under their control in the United States for use in the U.K. suit. 

“In cases concerning foreign plaintiffs, this court rarely has reversed a 

district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens.” Vivendi SA 

v. T-Mobile USA Inc., 586 F.3d 689, 694 (9th Cir. 2009). With the “highly 

deferential” standard of review in mind, id., we hold that the district court did not 
7 

abuse its discretion in dismissing this case for forum non conveniens and denying 

Bundy’s motion for reconsideration.

2

AFFIRMED.

2 Because we affirm the district court’s decision, we do not reach the question of 

whether this case should be reassigned upon remand.