United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 9, 2006

Decided March 13, 2006

Before

Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

 Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 05-3908

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ROBERT M. COTTON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Central District of Illinois

No. 99-10065-001

Michael M. Mihm, 

Judge.

O R D E R 

The district court revoked Robert Cotton’s supervised release and ordered

him to serve a prison term of 21 months after finding that he violated the conditions

of his release on multiple occasions. Cotton filed a notice of appeal, but his

appointed counsel now moves to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967), because he cannot find a nonfrivolous basis for appeal. We invited Cotton to

respond to counsel’s submission, see Cir. R. 51(b), but he has not done so. We thus

review only the potential issues identified in counsel’s facially adequate brief. 

United States v. Tabb, 125 F.3d 583, 584 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).

In 1999 Cotton pleaded guilty to possessing cocaine base with intent to

distribute, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to 96 months’ imprisonment

and an eight-year term of supervised release. His prison sentence was later

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-3908 Page 2

reduced to 72 months under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, and in

December 2004 he began serving his term of supervised release. In August 2005

the government petitioned the district court to revoke Cotton’s supervised release

based upon his (1) alleged possession and use of cocaine as evidenced by a positive

urinalysis, (2) failure to complete substance-abuse treatment, (3) admission to his

probation officer that his girlfriend was using cocaine at his residence, and

(4) violation of his home confinement by leaving his residence without reporting to

work, as he was required to do. The district court found that the government had

met its burden as to each alleged violation, revoked Cotton’s supervised release, and

ordered him reimprisoned for 21 months (plus 39 days of unserved home

confinement from a previous violation) to be followed by three more years of

supervised release. 

Counsel first considers arguing that the district court abused its discretion in

revoking Cotton’s supervised release. See United States v. Young, 41 F.3d 1184,

1186 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that revocation of supervised release is reviewed for

abuse of discretion). To revoke a term of supervised release a district court must

find by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant violated a condition of his

release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1153

(7th Cir. 2001). Here, the district court relied on a urinalysis, the discharge

summary from Cotton’s treatment center, and statements from Cotton and his

probation officer to find that a preponderance of the evidence supported that Cotton

had committed another crime (possession and use of cocaine), failed to complete a

substance-abuse treatment plan, associated with others involved in criminal

activity, and violated the rules of his home confinement. The only violation Cotton

attempted to challenge was the allegation of drug use, but he did not contest the

results of the urinalysis and merely suggested implausible explanations for why the

cocaine was present in his urine. Because a court may infer possession from

positive urine samples, Trotter, 270 F.3d at 1154, and Cotton did not dispute the

other three violations, we agree that a challenge to the revocation would be

frivolous. 

Counsel next considers arguing that Cotton’s term of imprisonment is

unreasonable in light of the advisory guidelines. But counsel has not been able to

identify anything in the record on which to base an argument that the term is

unreasonable, and because the 21-month term is within the recommended

sentencing range for his violation and criminal history category in the Revocation

Table, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a), we agree that any reasonableness challenge would be

frivolous.

The motion to withdraw is GRANTED and the appeal is DISMISSED.