J-S89003-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.E.W.-C., A 

MINOR,

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

APPEAL OF: L.Z.W., MOTHER

No. 1842 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered May 11, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000737-2015, CP-51-DP-0001344-2012

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.A.-S.W., A 

MINOR,

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

APPEAL OF: L.Z.W., MOTHER

No. 1843 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered May 11, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000738-2015, CP-51-DP-0001343-2012

BEFORE: SHOGAN, MOULTON, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 21, 2016

____________________________________________

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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L.W. (“Mother”) appeals from the order entered on May 11, 2016, 

terminating her parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), 

(5), (8), and (b) to her son, D.A.-S.W., born in November of 2008, and her 

daughter, Z.E.W.-C., born in August of 2011 (collectively “Children”).1 We 

affirm.

The trial court set forth the factual and procedural background of this 

case as follows:

[C]hildren were born as follows: [Z.E.W.-C.], [i]n August 

[of] 2011 and [D.A.-S.W. i]n November [of] 2008.

On July 12, 2012, [the Department of Human Services 

“DHS”] received a General Protective Service (GPS) report 

alleging that [Mother] sold her food stamps instead of buying 

food for [Children]. The condition of the family home was 

deplorable. The home was infested with mice and roaches. 

Additionally, [D.A.-S.W.] and other siblings were truant from 

school. [Father] also resided in the home and smoked 

marijuana. The report was substantiated.

[Mother] did not cooperate with DHS from July 13, 2012 to 

July 20, 2012.

On August 3, 2012, [Mother] failed to appear at a Motion 

to Compel Hearing before the Honorable Jonathan Q. Irvine. 

____________________________________________

1

 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of Z.E.W.-C.’s father, 

S.T.C. (“Father”) on May 11, 2016. Father filed a separate appeal, assigned 

Superior Court Docket Number 1768 EDA 2016, relating to the termination 

of his rights to Z.E.W.-C. Father’s parental rights are addressed in his 

separate appeal. Regarding A.M., the father of D.A.-S.W., counsel for DHS 

told the court “the Department has done multiple parent locator searches. 

We don’t have a birth date for [A.M.]” N.T., 4/5/16, at 30. The record 

establishes that A.M. has never been involved in the case and has never 

performed parental duties for D.A.-S.W. Id. at 32. The instant matter 

relates only to Mother’s parental rights to Children.
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Pursuant to a hearing, Judge Irvine granted the Motion to 

Compel Cooperation.

On August 10, 2012, Judge Irvine ordered DHS to hire a 

private investigator to assist with DHS’s investigation.

On August 24, 2012, the private investigator located the 

family at a different address.

On October 31, 2012, DHS implemented In-Home 

Protective Services (IHPS) in the home.

DHS and IHPS determined that the home was 

inappropriate. The home was overcrowded and needed to be 

cleaned. Furthermore, [Children] looked unkempt. Moreover, 

DHS learned that [Children] were not up to date with their 

medical, dental and vision or their immunizations.

DHS was denied access to the family home from December 

27, 2012 thru January, 2013. The family also resided in the 

family home.

On February 7, 2013, an adjudicatory hearing was held 

before the Honorable Jonathan Q. Irvine. Judge Irvine 

adjudicated [Children] dependent and committed them to the 

care and custody of DHS. [Children] were placed in foster care.

The matter was listed on a regular basis before Judges of 

the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas-Family Court DivisionJuvenile Branch pursuant to section 6351 of the Juvenile Act, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §6351, and evaluated for the purpose of determining 

or reviewing the permanency plan of the children.

In subsequent hearings, the [domestic relations orders] 

reflect the [c]ourt’s review and disposition as a result of 

evidence presented, addressing, and primarily with, the goal of 

finalizing the permanency plan.

On April 5, 2016 and May 11, 2016, a Termination of 

Parental Rights hearing for [Mother] was held in this matter.

On May 11, 2016, the [c]ourt found by clear and 

convincing evidence that [Mother’s] parental rights [to Children] 

should be terminated pursuant to the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act. 
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Furthermore, the [c]ourt held it was in the best interest of 

[Children] that the goal be changed to adoption.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/28/16, at unnumbered 1–2. Mother filed a timely 

notice of appeal; both Mother and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 

1925.

Mother raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Did the Trial Court err in terminating [Mother’s] parental 

rights under 23 Pa.C.S. Section 2511(a)(1), 2511(a)(2), 

2511(a)(5), and 2511(a)(8)?

2. Did the Trial Court err in finding that termination of [M]other’s 

parental rights best served [Children’s] developmental, physical 

and emotional needs under 23 Pa.C.S. Section 2511(b)?

3. Did the Trial Court err in changing [Children’s] goal to 

adoption?

Mother’s Brief at vi.

In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we 

adhere to the following standard: 

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a 

petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency 

cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to 

accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 

608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings 

are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial 

court made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; In re 

R.I.S., 614 Pa. 275, 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality). As 

has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result 

merely because the reviewing court might have reached a 

different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel-Bassett v. Kia 

Motors America, Inc., 613 Pa. 371, 455, 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 

2011); Christianson v. Ely, 575 Pa. 647, 838 A.2d 630, 634 

(Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of 
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discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for 

applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these 

cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are 

not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during 

the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 

1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an 

opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and 

termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to 

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the 

record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of 

Atencio, 539 Pa. 161, 165, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).

In re I.E.P., 87 A.3d 340, 343–344 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting In re 

Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–827 (Pa. 2012)).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). We 

have explained that the “standard of clear and convincing evidence is 

defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of 

the truth of the precise facts in issue.’” Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 

1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)). Moreover, this Court may affirm the trial 

court’s decision regarding the termination of parental rights with regard to 
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any one subsection of section 2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 

(Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Order, 5/11/16. We will focus 

on sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of 

a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The 

rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b). This Court has explained that the focus in 

terminating parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but 
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under section 2511(b), the focus is on the child. In re Adoption of C.L.G., 

956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).

To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(2), the moving party 

must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following 

elements: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal; 

(2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied. In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 

1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003). The grounds for termination of parental 

rights under section 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be 

remedied, are not limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties. In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). This Court has 

stated that a parent is required to make diligent efforts toward the 

reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. Id. A 

parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness 

regarding the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected 

as untimely or disingenuous. Id. at 340.

Mother asserts that she was compliant with her Family Service Plan 

(“FSP”) objectives for over three months before DHS filed the petitions to 

terminate her parental rights. Mother’s Brief at 7. She cites the FSP goals 
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allegedly remedied and maintains that all of the conditions that led to 

Children’s placements no longer exist. Id. at 8.

Our review of the record does not support Mother’s claims. The trial 

court noted the following in explaining Mother’s noncompliance with and 

inability to meet her FSP goals:

In the instant case, Dr. Erica Williams, an expert qualified 

in the field of forensic and clinical psychology, completed a 

[Parenting Capacity Evaluation (“PCE”) for [Mother]. Dr. 

Williams concluded that [Mother] did not have the ability to 

provide permanency nor a safe environment for [Children]. 

(N.T., 4-5-16, p. 67). Dr. Williams recommended that [Mother] 

attend mental health treatment which included trauma focus 

therapy (N.T., 4-5-16, p. 72). Furthermore, Dr. Williams 

testified that it was imperative for [Mother] to address her 

specific mental issues. [Mother’s] parenting capacity would be 

nonexistent if she failed to address her mental health issues. 

(N.T., 4-5-16, p. 67-68). [Mother] did not comply with the 

recommendations of Dr. Williams. (N.T., 4-5-16, p. 78). 

Furthermore, the current DHS social worker testified that 

[Mother] did not contact her to inquire about the needs and 

welfare of [Children]. She did not inquire about [Children’s] 

schooling or therapy. (N.T., 4-5-16, p. 89). Moreover, [Mother] 

did not comply with all of her FSP goals. The testimony 

established that the original and current DHS social workers 

explained to [Mother] that in order to reunify with [Children] she 

must comply with her objectives. (N.T., 4-5-16, pgs. 39 and 78).

Trial Court Opinion, 6/28/16, at unnumbered 4.

We agree with the trial court that there is competent evidence in the 

record supporting its findings. Dr. Erica Williams, the Director of Forensic 

Services at Assessment and Treatment Alternatives, conducted a PCE of 

Mother. She described the evaluation as one to determine “the capacity of 

that parent to provide safety and permanency to the . . . children involved.” 
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N.T., 4/5/16, at 59. Dr. Williams, who was qualified as an expert, stated 

that Mother “declared that all of the information provided by DHS [was] lies, 

that there weren’t any concerns.” Id. at 63. Dr. Williams explained that 

Mother admitted that her oldest child2 was sexually abusing two of her 

daughters, but she took no measures to protect the girls. Id. at 64. Dr. 

Williams observed that Mother’s responses:

were as though she were a bystander to the events. So she was 

able to describe things that occurred but she didn’t refer to 

herself as having a role in the events. So it was as though she 

had been watching them rather than the parent who should have 

been affecting care during it.

Id. at 62.

Dr. Williams testified that Mother had symptoms of depression that 

were consistent with a mood disorder that could be “part of a depressive 

category or a larger issue.” N.T., 4/5/16, at 66. Dr. Williams opined that 

Mother did not have the ability to provide permanency and safety to 

Children. Id. at 67. The expert testified that Mother’s issues could not be 

remedied in a short period because “you’re looking at the chronicity of the 

depression, the abuse from her own history, the impact of her choices on 

[Children] and her limit to [having] no insight in her role.” Id. at 68.

____________________________________________

2

 Mother has at least five other children, three who are in her care and two 

who are in other foster placements or kinship homes; they are not involved 

in this appeal. N.T., 4/5/16, at 22, 27; N.T., 5/11/16, at 28.
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The record supports the conclusion that Mother failed to comply with 

the FSP goal to obtain the requisite mental health intervention to enable her 

to develop the capacity to parent Children. Thus, Mother has not resolved 

the conditions necessitating Children’s placement and lacks the ability to 

provide Children with the safety necessary for their well-being. We conclude 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Mother’s 

parental rights should be terminated under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). 

Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826–827.

Next, we review the termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant 

to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). Our Supreme Court has stated:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child 

have been properly interpreted to include “intangibles such as 

love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 

791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 

1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s 

“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional 

bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention” 

should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of 

permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 

791.

In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

When evaluating a parental bond “the court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 
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evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal 

citations omitted).

A parent’s abuse and neglect are likewise a relevant part of this 

analysis: 

[C]oncluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent simply 

because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only 

dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s feelings were the 

dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would be 

reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare child who, 

after being subject to neglect and abuse, is able to sift through 

the emotional wreckage and completely disavow a parent . . . 

Nor are we of the opinion that the biological connection between 

[the parent] and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when 

considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a parent, 

to establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The psychological 

aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the 

development of the child and [his or her] mental and emotional 

health than the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.

In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court may emphasize the safety 

needs of the child. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763-764 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (affirming the involuntary termination of the mother’s parental rights, 

despite the existence of some bond, where placement with the mother would 

be contrary to the child’s best interests, and any bond with the mother 

would be fairly attenuated when the child was separated from her, almost 

constantly, for four years).

In fact, our Supreme Court has observed that the mere existence of a

bond or attachment of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the 

denial of a termination petition, and that “[e]ven the most abused of 
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children will often harbor some positive emotion towards the abusive 

parent.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (quoting K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d at 535). The 

Supreme Court instructed, “[T]he continued attachment to the natural 

parents, despite serious parental rejection through abuse and neglect, and 

failure to correct parenting and behavior disorders which are harming the 

children cannot be misconstrued as bonding.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 

(citation omitted).

We have explained that a parent’s own feelings of love and affection 

for a child, alone, do not prevent termination of parental rights. Z.P., 994 

A.2d at 1121. Further, this Court has stated: “[A] parent’s basic 

constitutional right to the custody and rearing of . . . her child is converted, 

upon the failure to fulfill . . . her parental duties, to the child’s right to have 

proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent, 

healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (internal citations omitted). It is well settled that “we will not toll the 

well-being and permanency of [a child] indefinitely.” Adoption of C.L.G.,

956 A.2d at 1007 (citing In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. Super. 2008)

(noting that a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a 

parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of 

parenting.”)).

Mother’s sole argument regarding 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) is that the 

DHS social worker testified that Mother was bonded with Children therefore 
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“termination of Mother’s rights could not be in the best interest” of Children. 

Mother’s Brief at 10 (citing N.T., 4/5/16, at 48). Our review of the notes of 

testimony indicates that the DHS social worker did not testify that Mother 

was bonded with Children, at that page or any other. Rather, DHS social 

worker Tracy Woods testified that Children were safe and comfortable in the 

foster mother’s home. N.T., 4/5/16, at 44.

Stacy Ann Barrett, the current case manager for Children, testified 

that even though Mother did not visit Children from August 2015 until 

December 2015, Children suffered no irreparable or significant harm. N.T., 

4/5/16, at 80. Children never asked about Mother. Id. at 81. Children 

were only one and four years old when removed from Mother’s custody and 

placed, together, in their current foster home. Id. at 83. The foster 

mother, who provides the primary parental bond for Children, wishes to 

adopt them. Id. Foster mother provides Children with love, safety, 

stability, and support and meets Children’s educational and medical needs. 

Id. at 83–84. During cross-examination by the Child Advocate, Ms. Barrett 

stated that Z.E.W.-C. is “very attention seeking and she’s constantly close 

with the foster parent during the visit.” Id. at 89–90. Likewise, D.A.-S.W. 

receives specialized services, and the foster mother is “an active participant 

in those services.” Id. at 88.
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In concluding that Children’s primary bond is with their foster mother 

and that adoption is in Children’s best interests, the trial court stated as 

follows:

In the instant matter, [Children] reside in the same preadoptive home. [Children] share their primary parental bond 

with the foster parent. (N.T., 4-5-1[6], p. 83). The foster 

parent provides them with love, safety and support. She meets 

their medical needs also. (N.T., 4-5-16, pgs. 83 and 84). The 

foster parent is active in [D.A.-S.W.’s] specialized services. She 

has enrolled [him] in the boy scouts. Furthermore, she has 

enrolled [Children] in painting class. (N.T., 4-5-16, p. 88). 

Moreover, when [Mother] did not visit [Children] for five months, 

they did not ask for her. (N.T., 4-5-16, p. 80). Additionally, 

[Children] would not suffer permanent /irreparable harm if the 

parental rights of [Mother] were terminated. Lastly, it would be 

in the best interest of [Children] if their goal[s] were changed to 

adoption. (N.T., 4-5-16, p. 84).

In the instant case, DHS filed the petition to terminate the 

parental rights of . . . [Mother] and change the goal to adoption. 

“In those cases where reunification is not appropriate, adoption 

is viewed as providing the greatest degree of permanence” In 

re S.H., 71 A.3d 973, 978 (Pa. Super. 2013).

Trial Court Opinion, 6/28/16, at unnumbered 5–6. Accordingly, it was 

proper for the trial court to conclude that no bond exists such that Children 

would suffer harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated. This Court 

finds no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s termination of Mother’s 

parental rights to Children pursuant to section 2511(b).

Because the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record, 

and its legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of 

discretion, we affirm the trial court’s order involuntarily terminating Mother’s 
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parental rights under section 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b) and changing 

the goal to adoption.3

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/21/2016

____________________________________________

3

 Mother does not make any additional argument as to why the goal for 

Children should not have been changed to adoption beyond reasserting that 

she met her FSP goals. Mother’s Brief at 11.