alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit
32.2




CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED


PURSUANT
TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the accompanying quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the three
months ended September 30, 2009 and filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Jeffrey P. Wood, Chief
Financial Officer of Eagle Rock Energy G&P, LLC, the general partner of
Eagle Rock Energy GP, L.P., the general partner of Eagle Rock Energy Partners,
L.P. (the “Partnership”), hereby certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




1. The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




2. The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the
Partnership.





Date:
      November 9, 2009
            /s/
      Jeffrey P. WoodJeffrey
      P. WoodSenior
      Vice President,Chief
      Financial Officer and Treasurer of Eagle RockEnergy
      G&P, LLC, General Partner of Eagle RockEnergy
      GP, L.P., General Partner of Eagle RockEnergy
      Partners, L.P.
S OF AMERICA Mag./Crim. No. 2:11-cr-00084-

SRC

v. CONSENT ORDER

JOHN B. FROHLING

THIS MA’ITER, being presented to the Court on behalf of John B. Frohling

by counsel, S. M. Chris Franzblau of Frarizblau Dratch, P.C. for leave to permit

John 13, Froblirig to vacaUon with family at Village at Berkshires, Hancock,

Massachusetts from July 24, 2012 until Sunday at 12:30 noon, July 29, 2012 and by

consent of the Go’-erninent and the U.S. Probation Office and for good cause

shown;

iT IS on this 24th day of July, 2012

ORDERED that John B. Frohling shall be permitted to go to Hancock,

Massachusetts from 2:00p.m. on July 24, 20120 until 12:30 p.m. on Sunday, July

29,2012 at which time he shall have returned to New )ersey,

Hor Judge Stanley R. Chesler

CONSENTED 0:

Assists ey

Office o U ted States Attorney

I
ACCEPTED01-15-00604-cvFIRST COURT OF APPEALSHOUSTON, TEXAS7/23/2015 4:09:01 PMCHRISTOPHER PRINECLERK
S05A1048. S05A1049.

#### WINNER v. CRISP COUNTY. 105 FLOYD ROAD, INC. v. CRISP COUNTY.

(620 SE2d 826)

Decided October 11, 2005

Reconsideration denied November 7, 2005.

*Begner & Begner, Alan I. Begner, Cory G. Begner, Katherine K. Wood, Sirkin, Piñales & Schwartz, H. Louis Sirkin,*for appellants.

*Jenkins & Olson, Peter R. Olson, Brandon L. Bowen,*for appellee.

HUNSTEIN, Presiding Justice.

In *105 Floyd Rd., Inc. v. Crisp County,*279 Ga. 345 (613 SE2d 632) (2005), this Court held that the County’s adult bookstore ordinance was unconstitutional and reversed the trial court’s order enjoining 105 Floyd Road from operating its business in violation of the ordinance. It is well established that “! “an unconstitutional statute, though having the form and name of law, is in reality no law, but is wholly void, and in legal contemplation is as inoperative as if it had never been passed.” ’ ” *Commrs. &c. of Fulton County v. Davis,*213 Ga. 792, 794 (102 SE2d 180) (1958). While the appeal from the trial court’s ruling on the ordinance was pending, the trial court held appellants, 105 Floyd Road, Inc. and its manager, in contempt for failing to abide by the injunction and they filed these appeals. “Because the injunction was invalid, appellants cannot be held in contempt for violating it.” (Footnote omitted.) *Am. Med. Sec. v. Parker,*279 Ga. 201, 204 (3) (612 SE2d 261) (2005). See also *Rockwood Intl. &c. v. Rader Cos.,*255 Ga. App. 881, 883 (2) (567 SE2d 104) (2002) (party cannot be held in contempt for violating a void order). Accordingly, we reverse the judgments holding appellants in contempt.

*Judgments reversed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-10-00232-CV

EZEQUIEL CASTILLO, INDIVIDUALLY, MARIA DE LOS ANGELES CASTILLO, 

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND FOR ASHLEY CASTILLO AND EZEQUIEL 

CASTILLO JR., AND ROSA SILVIA MARTINEZ, INDIVIDUALLY

v.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY

On Appeal from the 404th District Court

of Cameron County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 2003-01-251-G

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be AFFIRMED. The Court 

orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED. Costs of the appeal are adjudged 

against appellant.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

November 12, 2015
#### COX v. DOHERTY et al.

No. 1315.

District Court, S. D. California, Central Division.

Jan. 22, 1941.

*565Arthur F. Larrabee, of Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff.

Dudley, Brown & McCurdy and Harry W. Dudley, all of Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant.

O’CONNOR, District Judge.

The defendant has filed a motion under Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, for an order requiring plaintiff to make and provide the defendant with a bill of particulars as to certain matters in the complaint.

The motion is granted as to paragraphs eleven (11), twelve (12) and sixteen (16). Compliance with this order is required to be made by plaintiff within fifteen (15) days from the notice of this ruling. Exceptions allowed plaintiff.

The motion of defendant under Rule 12 (e) is denied as to all other demands except as hereinabove stated, without prejudice to any available procedure by defendant under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Exceptions allowed defendant.

The rule provides: “ * * * a party may move for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial.” Under this rule the defendant has a right to know upon which particular claims plaintiff will rely at the time of the trial. All of the other matters requested by. the defendant are either evidentiary or more particularly within the knowledge of the moving party. Bills of particular should not be used to defeat the purpose of the new rules which strive for simplicity. The tendency of the courts is not to amplify but to restrict the granting of bills of particulars. When a bill of particulars is allowed, it becomes a part of the pleadings. In Mumm v. Decker & Sons, 301 U.S. 168, 57 S.Ct. 675, 81 L.Ed. 983, Chief Justice Hughes approved the elimination of numerous allegations considered, prior to that decision, to be necessary in cases of patent infringement. The granting of motions for bills of particulars, without careful examination, would lose the ground gained in that decision.
### IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10

- 08

- 00339

- CV

BRYAN ISD

, Appellant

v.

LAURA BUTTERY HAYNIE

, Appellee

From the 272nd District Court

Brazos County, Texas

Trial Court No. 07

- 001674

- CV

- 272

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Bryan Independent School Distri ct filed a notice of appeal from an order

imposing discovery sanctions. The District now files a motion to dismiss the appeal

stating that it no longer wishes to pursue the appeal.

Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 42.1(a)(1).

TOM GRAY

Chief JusticeBryan ISD v. Hayni e Page 2

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Vance, and

Justice Reyna

Appeal dismissed

Opinion delivered and filed October 29, 2008

[CV06]
```
EXHIBIT 32.1
```

```
 
```

```
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
```

```
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
```

```
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
```

```
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
```

```
 
```

```
In connection with the Quarterly Report of March 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), each of the undersigned, in the capacities and on the date indicated below, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:
```

```
 
```

```
(1)           The report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
```

```
 
```

```
(2)           The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
```

```
 
```

```
 
```

```
 
```

```
Dated:  May 20, 2009                                                                        By: */s/ Michael Mcchesney*
```

```
                                                                                                               
```

```
                                                                                                                MICHAEL MCCHESNEY
```

```
                                                                                                                Chief Executive Officer
```

```
 
```
Case 2:10-cv-04017-SDW -MCA Document 19 Filed 09/15/10 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 172
Case 2:10-cv-04017-SDW -MCA Document 19 Filed 09/15/10 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 173
P u rsuan t t o 5 T H C IR . R. 47. 5, t h e courtha s det erm i n ed that t h i s opi n i on * shou l d n otbe pu bl i shed an d i s not preceden texcept u n der t h e l i m i t ed c i r c um s t anc e s s e tf

o r t h i n 5 T H C IR . R. 47. 5. 4. 

### INTHE UNI TED S TATESCOU RT OFAPPEALS

FORTHEFIFTH CIRCU IT

N o. 08- 60390 Su m m ar y Cal endar AL EX TI TO BE N I TE Z, a l s o kno w n a s Al e x Ti t o Benit e z Pi ne da P et i t i on er v. ERI C H H OLD ER, J R, U S ATTORN EY GE N ERA L Res po nde nt Pet i t i o n f

o rRev i e w o f

a n Ord e ro f

t he B o a r do f Im m ig r a tio n A p p e a ls B IAN o. A 94 366 262 B ef ore H IG G IN B O T H A M , B A R K S D A L E an d E L R O D , C i rcui tJu dg es. P E R C U R IA M: * A le xT ito B e n ite z , an a tiv e a n dcit iz e n o f E l S a lv a d o r , h a s p e tit io n e dth is c our tf orr evi ew of

t he B oar d of

I m m i gr at i on A ppeal s’( B IA ’ s) or derr ej ec t i ng, as u n t i m e ly, h is ap pea lof t h e i m m i grati onj u dg e’ s r em oval deci si on . H e argu es th a t t h e B IAe r r e d b yd e c lin in gto a c c e p t “ju r is d ic tio n b yce r tific a tio n ,” o f h is u n t i m el y ap p e a l, a s p rovi ded i n 8 C . F . R . § 1003 . 1(c) . Th e R espon den targu es t hatt hi s c our tl ac ks j uri sdi c t i on t o r evi ew t he dec i si on o f t he B IAbe c ause i tw as

United States Court of App eals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D April2, 2009 Cha rl es R. F ulb ru g e II I ClerkN o. 08- 60390

2 pur e l y di s c r e t i o nar y andt hi s c o ur t has no l e ga l s t and ar d by w hi c h t o r e vi e w t he r ul i ng. W e do n otdeci de the j u ri sdi ct i on ali ssue presented h erei n becau se even a s s u m in gth a t ju r is d ic tio n e x is ts , B e n ite z h a s n o t a d e q u a te lyb r i e fe dh is argu m en tt h at th e B IAerr ed i n f i n di n g n o ext raordi n ary ci rcum st an ces w arran t i n g an un t i m el y ap pea l . A ccor di n gl y, t h e arg u m en ti s deem ed a b a n d o n e d . S eeS o a d jed e v . A sh cr oft , 3 2 4 F .3 d8 3 0 , 8 3 3 (5 th C ir . 2 0 0 3 ); Y oh ey v . Col l i ns , 9 8 5 F .2d 2 2 2 , 2 2 4 -2 5 (5t h C ir. 1 9 9 3 ). P ET I T I ON D ENI ED .
ORIGINAL
NAME                       ISSUE DATE                PRIN              DOC #
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
MARSALA*                   12/18/98                 $205,802           9711R2
A.CRAWFORD                 12/18/98                 $ 66,667           9712R



<PAGE>



                          NY REGIONAL RAIL CORPORATION
                                 4302 FIRST AVE.
                               BROOKLYN, NY 11232
                        (718) 788-3690 FAX (718) 788-4462


                             PROMISSORY NOTE 9711R2

                                    12/18/98


         FOR THE VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned promises to pay to the order of
JOHN MARSALA the sum of TWO HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TWO DOLLARS
($205,802) United States of America Dollars.


         The Note amount shall be paid to Note Holder in a single payment TWO
HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TWO DOLLARS ($205,802), plus all accrued
interest due on or before March 31, 1999. Interest will be Ten percent (10%) per
annum.


         In addition, the maker provides to the Note holder, listed above, the
IRREVOCABLE right to convert this Note into Common Shares of NEW YORK REGIONAL
RAIL CORPORATION ("NYRR"), as said Common Shares are available under the
provisions of the non-public offering, exemption as provided in the U.S.
Securities Act of 1933 (and Regulation D thereunder) for as long, as this Note
remains open. The conversion rights granted to the Note Holder will be
calculated based on:

         (i)      on the value of the Note divided by $0.075 or
         (ii)     on the value of the note divided by the ninety percent (90%)
                  of the average closing bid price of the common shares for the
                  previous five trading days prior to the date the conversion is
                  exercised by the Note holder.

The conversion rights represented by this note are exercisable at the option of
the Note Holder in whole at any time within the period above specified.


Upon exercise of Note 9711R2 conversion to Common shares the maker grants Note
Holder an OPTION to acquire a block of 1 shares of non restricted Common Stock
for twelve ($0.12) for every share holder acquires through converting this NOTE
9711R2 into INYRR common stock. Said OPTION will be exercisable until June 30,
1999.

                  Maker warrants that Common shares provided to Note Holder on
Conversion of Note or any other Common shares will be issued to Holder as result
of provisions of this Note will be issued without restriction.

                  To receive a certificate for the Common shares when the Note
is converted, the Note will be presented and surrendered to the Corporation,
with the accompanying form of subscription duly executed. A conversion
subscription form is provided as an attachment to this Note.

In the event of default, the undersigned agrees to pay all reasonable attorney
fees and cost of collection.


New York Regional Rail

By:__________________
President
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

NADINE HEMY and NANCY CONNER, 

individually and on behalf of themselves and 

all others similarly situated, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

PERDUE FARMS INC., ABC 

CORPORATIONS 1 through 10, and JOHN 

DOES 1-10, 

Defendants. 

Civil Action No. 3:11-888 (MAS/LHG) 

Filed Electronically 

STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE 

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a), the undersigned attorneys of record in this action 

hereby stipulate and agree that all claims in this action be and hereby are dismissed with 

prejudice, without costs to any party as against another. 

It is further stipulated and agreed that this stipulation may be executed in any number of 

counterparts, all of which counterparts, taken together, shall constitute the same instrument. 

It is further stipulated and agreed that a facsimile of this executed stipulation shall be 

treated as the original for all purposes. 

DAVID M. W ACKSMAN, ESQ., LLC 

By: S/David M Wacksman 

David M. Wacksman 

777 Terrace Ave 

Suite 303 

Hasbrouck Heights, N.J. 07604 

Tel.: 201-266-0620 

Fax: 201-462-9501 

CONNELL FOLEY LLP 

By: S/Liza M Walsh 

Liza M. Walsh 

85 Livingston Ave 

Roseland, N.J. 07068 

Tel.: 973-535-0500 

Fax:973-535-9217 

Case 3:11-cv-00888-MAS-LHG Document 96 Filed 10/24/14 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 1534
TYCKO & ZA VEREEI LLP 

By: S/Jonathan Tvcko 

Jonathan K. Tycko 

2000 L. Street, N.W., Suite 808 

Washington, D.C. 20036 

Tel.: 202-973-0900 

Fax: 202-873-0950 

Email: jtycko@tzlegal.com 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs 

SO ORDERED: 

{"c... 

This 23 day ofOc--\u~ 2014. 

VENABLELLP 

By: S/Roger Colaizzi 

Roger A. Colaizzi 

575 Seventh Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20004 

Tel.: 202-344-8051 

Fax:202-344-8300 

Email: racolaizzi@venable.com 

Attorneys for Defendant Perdue Farms Inc. 

2 

Case 3:11-cv-00888-MAS-LHG Document 96 Filed 10/24/14 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 1535
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

WASTE MANAGEMENT OF NEW

JERSEY, INC.,

Plaintiff,

vs.

TEAMSTERS-EMPLOYERS LOCAL 945

PENSION FUND and TRUSTEES OF

TEAMSTERS-EMPLOYERS LOCAL 945

PENSION FUND,

Defendants.

Civil Action No.

(FSH)(PS)

lO-cv-3984

RULE 65(b) CERTIFICATION

I, Thomas J. Bender, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b),

certify as follows:

1. I am a shareholder with the law firm of Littler Mendelson, P.C.

2. At approximately 12:45 PM today I left a voice mail message

with Ronald Richman, counsel for Defendants in this action, and a message

with his secretary, to advise him that I would be filing the attached motion

package and seeking temporary restraints against Defendants.

Case 2:10-cv-03984-FSH -PS Document 21-3 Filed 09/16/10 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 363
3. Immediately thereafter, I sent Mr. Richman a copy of this

motion package by email and first class mail.

nfy(W^

Thomas J. Bender

September 16,2010

Case 2:10-cv-03984-FSH -PS Document 21-3 Filed 09/16/10 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 364
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 17, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-40685

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

HOANG VAN NGUYEN, also known as Soi, also known as Soy,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:03-CR-53-1-LED

--------------------

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Hoang Van Nguyen appeals the 240-month sentence imposed by

the district court following his guilty-plea conviction of one

count of conspiring to manufacture, distribute, or possess with

intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense Ecstasy,

methamphetamine, cocaine, cocaine base, and marijuana. Nguyen

first argues that the district court clearly erred in finding

that he was responsible for 50,000 units of Ecstasy, a

determination that affected his base offense level. He attacks

the credibility of testimony presented at his sentencing hearing,
No. 04-40685

-2-

and he argues that there is no reliable evidence to connect him

to 50,000 units of Ecstasy. In view of the testimony adduced at

his sentencing hearing, Nguyen has failed to show that the

district court clearly erred in holding him accountable for

50,000 units of Ecstasy. See United States v. Posada-Rios,

158 F.3d 832, 878 (5th Cir. 1998); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.

Nguyen also challenges the district court’s determination

that he was a manager or supervisor under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). 

Because Nguyen’s Factual Resume and the testimony adduced at his

sentencing hearing support the district court’s application of

the three-level adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b), Nguyen has

failed to show that the district court’s factual finding as to

his role in the offense was clearly erroneous. See United States

v. Parker, 133 F.3d 322, 329 (5th Cir. 1998). 

Finally, relying on Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531

(2004), Nguyen contends that the sentencing guidelines are

unconstitutional as applied to his case because he has not

admitted to being involved with 50,000 units of Ecstasy or to his

role in the offense. Nguyen acknowledges that his argument is

foreclosed by this court’s decision in United States v. Pineiro,

377 F.3d 464, 473 (5th Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed (U.S.

July 14, 2004) (No. 04-5263), but he seeks to preserve the issue

for further review. Nguyen’s Blakely argument is foreclosed. 

See Pineiro, 377 F.3d at 473. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
S05A0392.

#### COCHRAN v. THE STATE.

(609 SE2d 353)

Fletcher, Chief Justice.

After this Court overturned Antonio B. Cochran’s malice murder conviction,1 the State elected to re-sentence Cochran to life in prison for the remaining felony murder conviction. On appeal, Cochran contends that the new sentence is void because the trial court failed to conduct a hearing before issuing the new sentence.

*52Decided February 21, 2005.

*Justin J. Wyatt,*for appellant.

*Patrick H. Head, District Attorney, Andrew J. Saliba, Amy H. McChesney, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Robin J. Leigh, Assistant Attorney General,*for appellee.

In *Williams v. State,*however, this Court held that “a sentence imposed by a trial court in a non-death penalty case is not rendered void by the court’s failure to conduct a pre-sentence hearing under OCGA § 17-10-2.”2 Moreover, felony murder carries a mandatory life sentence, and as that was the only conviction at issue, the sentence imposed is required by law and Cochran suffered no harm by the failure to hold a pre-sentence hearing.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*

1

*Cochran v. State,*276 Ga. 283 (576 SE2d 867) (2003).

2

271 Ga. 686, 691 (523 SE2d 857) (1999).
EXHIBIT 32.2

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of September 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), each of the undersigned, in the capacities and on the date indicated below, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:

 

| (1) | The report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

| (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

| Dated:  November  13, 2006 | By: /s/ Tamer Muftizade |
|----------------------------|-------------------------|

 

|   | Tamer Muftizade |
|--------|-----------------|

|   | Chief Financial Officer |
|--------|-------------------------|
NOT FOR PUBLICATION (Doc. Nos. 25, 26)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

____________________________________

:

ANN MARIE TALLEY, :

:

Plaintiff, : Civil No. 11-01180 (RBK/KMW)

:

v. : ORDER

:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al. :

:

Defendants. :

____________________________________ :

THIS MATTER having come before the Court on the motion of the United States of 

America (“Defendant”) to dismiss the complaint of Ann Marie Talley (“Plaintiff”) for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and the motion 

of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“Metlife”) for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 

complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56; and the Court having considered the 

moving papers and attached documents, and the responses thereto, and for the reasons expressed 

in the Opinion issued this date;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the United States’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. 

Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff may file an amended 

complaint within 30 days of this Order.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that Metlife’s motion for summary judgment 

is GRANTED. 

Case 1:11-cv-01180-RBK-KMW Document 40 Filed 03/28/13 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 892
Dated: 3/28/2013 /s/ Robert B. Kugler 

 ROBERT B. KUGLER

United States District Judge

Case 1:11-cv-01180-RBK-KMW Document 40 Filed 03/28/13 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 893