alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT LARRY DONNELL GAITHER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 96-6406 J. C. SMITH; JOE L. PRATT, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, District Judge. (CA-96-132-5-BR) Submitted: October 29, 1996 Decided: January 27, 1997 Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________ Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________ COUNSEL Larry Donnell Gaither, Appellant Pro Se.

_________________________________________________________________ Unpublished opinions are not binding pr ecedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________OPINION PER CURIAM: Appellant, a North Carolina inmate, appeals the district court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1994), amended by Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). We have reviewedthe record and the district court's opinion and find no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm substantially on the reasoning of the district court. Gaither v. Smith , No. CA-96-132-5-BR (E.D.N.C. Mar. 4, 1996). To the extent that Appellant raises claims not addressed by the district court, we find his claims meritless. First, to the extent Appellant's claim of retaliation for filing a prison grievance states a First Amendment violation, his claim iswithout merit. Appellant's allegations that Appellee Smith reprimanded him and threatened him with future lock-up in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment right to file grievances are legally insufficient to meet the necessary "adverse impact" requirement. See ACLU v. Wicomico County , 999 F.2d 780, 786 n.6 (4th Cir. 1993).Second, to the extent that Appellant alleged that Appellee Pratt violated his civil rights by going along with Appellee Smith, his claim is without merit. Pratt cannot be held vicariously liable for Smith's actions because individuals ca nnot be sued under§ 1983 by virtue of respondeat superior. Wright v. Collins , 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985). Furthermore, since Pratt did not directly or in a supervisory capacity deprive Gaither of any federally protected right, Pratt cannot be held individually liable under § 1983 based on his supervisory capacity.We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
2
THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et

al.

Defendant.

60 DAY ORDER ADMINISTRATIVELY TERMINATING ACTION

It having been reported to the Court that the above—captioned action has been settled,

IT IS on this 27th day of August, 2019,

ORDERED that this action and any pending motions are hereby administratively

terminated; and it is further

ORDERED that this shall not constitute a dismissal Order under the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure; and it is further

ORDERED that within 60 days after entry of this Order (or such additional period

authorized by the Court), the parties shall file all papers necessary to dismiss this action

under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, if settlement cannot be consummated,request that the action be reopened; and it is further

ORDERED that, absent receipt from the parties of dismissal papers or a request to

reopen the action within the 60—day period, the Court shall dismiss this action, without

further notice, with prejudice and without costs.

/s/ Freda L. Wolfson

FREDA L. WOLFSON United States District Judge
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###### Department of the Treasury

###### Internal Revenue Service

# AGENCY:

Internal Revenue Service (IRS); Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division.

# ACTION:

Correction to a notice of Renewal Charter and Filing Letters.

# SUMMARY:

This document contains a correction to a notice of renewal charter and filing letters, which was filed and available for public inspection with the Office of the Federal Register on June 24, 2009 and published on June 25, 2009. The renewal charter was filed on June 16, 2009, with the Committee on Finance of the United States Senate, the Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Library of Congress.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

## Need for Correction

                    As submitted to the                     **Federal Register**                    , the renewal charter is missing as well as the previously mentioned filing letters.                

## Correction of Filing

Accordingly, the filing of the renewal charter is corrected by including the charter and the charter's filing letters.

Dated: June 24, 2009.

Steven J. Pyrek,

Designated Federal Official, Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division, Internal Revenue Service.

      ( print page 31339)          ( print page 31340)          ( print page 31341)          ( print page 31342)          ( print page 31343)          ( print page 31344)    

BILLING CODE 4830-01-P

[FR Doc. E9-15428 Filed 6-25-09; 4:15 pm]

BILLING CODE 4830-01-C
#### *In the matter of*John G. Murray, *an insolvent and imprisoned Debtor.*

NEW-YORK,

May, 1817.

A first judge o-”o0n juXuMori TMct¡onthurnithe %fief0¡n 8!’TMf tso-j1 *A'R'*Z~

APPLICATION was made to the first iudge of the court of common pleas of *Montgomery*county, by *Gardner,*an inhabitant of the county, and one of the creditors of *Murray,*who had been imprisoned more than sixty days on execution, within the county, for an assignment of his estate for the benefit of his creditors, pursuant to the act for giving relief in cases of insolvency, passed the 12th of *April,*1813. (1 *M. R. L.*460. sess. 36. ch. 98. s. 9.)

The judge, on the 20th of December, received the petition, affidavits, &c. and granted an order for the creditors to show cause, &c. before him, on the 28th of *February*last, when Gardner appeared, and produced the necessary proofs of publication, *See.*and prayed an order for the assignment, no person appearing to oppose it; but the judge refused to grant the order, stating as a reason for his refusal, that on further advice, he was of opinion that he had no cognizance of the cause, nor any authority to grant relief under the ninth section of the act,

A motion was now made for a *mandamus*to be directed to the judge, commanding him to grant the order, &c.

*Per Curiam.*

The motion must be denied. The ninth section of the act mentions only the chancellor, and justices of this court, to whom application is to be made for relief in such cases, and is silent as to the first judge of a court of common pleas. He has not, therefore, any jurisdiction as to cases arising under that section=

Motion denied,
# table73_q9.4_naics
#### Holt *against*Johnson.

NEW-YORK,

October, 1817.

Where the. plaintiff dis-The h¡sntuwn,iTMut of njítfó/üyTlah t!TM IgiUd nant and the the“iáuer '¡f pounding the horse, might Hse;him, until the day of sale ; J^evioul'tó the *liT deknSnt'*S oTMer‘of Mm ou^VtiS session, it *was tenant badft£o from the defendant to make the still the using the horse ^regMaiity and as by the provi-, sionsof the 10th . section of the *act concerning distresses,*S-c. sess 36. c. 63.(1 *R. L.*436.) the plaintiff was protected from being deemed a trespasser *ab*initio, the defendant could not treat the distress as a nullity, and. therefore, committed a trespass in taking the horae.

IN ERROR, on *Certiorari*to a justice’s court. *7*J

The defendant in error brought an action of trespass in the court below, against the plaintiff in error, for taking a horse out the harness, while in the possession of the plaintiff below, (the defendant in error.) The defendant below, having proved that the horse was his property, the plaintiff proved, that he, as of certain premises in the occupation of one *Soule,*had regularly distrained' the horse for rent arrear, while the horse was on the leased premises, and in the charge of *Soule*the ° tenant, as bailiff for the defendant; that after the horse was *1 1*seized, *Soule,*who then claimed to be his owner, agreed with the plaintiff, that instead of sending the horse to an open pound the plaintiff might take him home, and use him for his keeping, until the day of sale ; and the plaintiff did so ; and while he was so using the horse, between the time of making the distress and the day of sale, the defendant came and took away the horse, which was the trespass complained of* The "justice save iudg- ; r ¿i. 1 i 1 J b Jb ment tor the piamtm below, *x*

*Per Curiam.*

The judgment was right. The plaintiff below *430acted in good faith, under the agreement for the use of t~-ie horse made with Soule, who had him in his possession, and who claim~ ed to be the owner. There is reason to believe, from the nature of the bailment, between the defendant Holt, the true owner, and Soule, that Soule had authority, as the agent of the defendant, to make the agreement with the plaintiff for the use of the horse; and if so, the defendant has sustained no injury. But, at most, the using the horse was merely an irregularity, after a regular distress; and the 10th section of the act concerning distresses, &c. (1 ~M R. L. 436.) protects the plaintiff from being deemed a trespasser ab initio, and makes him liable only for the special injury. The defendant, therefore, had no right to consider the distress as a nullity, and in taking the horse he committed a trespass. The judgment must, therefore, be aflirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
EXHIBIT 31.1  CERTIFICATION OF PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  CERTIFICATION  I, Harley B. Kaplan, President and Chief Executive Officer, certify that:  1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of RathGibson, Inc.;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this Quarterly Report;  4. The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:  a. designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;  b. evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report, based on such evaluation;  c. disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and  5. The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):  a. all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and  b. any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.   Date:  June 11, 2007/s/ Harley B. KaplanHarley B. KaplanPresident and Chief Executive Officer
Case 3:11-cv-00597-JAP-LHG Document 16 Filed 11/18/11 Page 1 of 18 PageID: 459
Case 3:11-cv-00597-JAP-LHG Document 16 Filed 11/18/11 Page 2 of 18 PageID: 460
Case 3:11-cv-00597-JAP-LHG Document 16 Filed 11/18/11 Page 3 of 18 PageID: 461
Case 3:11-cv-00597-JAP-LHG Document 16 Filed 11/18/11 Page 4 of 18 PageID: 462
Case 3:11-cv-00597-JAP-LHG Document 16 Filed 11/18/11 Page 5 of 18 PageID: 463
Case 3:11-cv-00597-JAP-LHG Document 16 Filed 11/18/11 Page 6 of 18 PageID: 464
Case 3:11-cv-00597-JAP-LHG Document 16 Filed 11/18/11 Page 7 of 18 PageID: 465
Case 3:11-cv-00597-JAP-LHG Document 16 Filed 11/18/11 Page 8 of 18 PageID: 466
Case 3:11-cv-00597-JAP-LHG Document 16 Filed 11/18/11 Page 9 of 18 PageID: 467
Case 3:11-cv-00597-JAP-LHG Document 16 Filed 11/18/11 Page 10 of 18 PageID: 468
Case 3:11-cv-00597-JAP-LHG Document 16 Filed 11/18/11 Page 11 of 18 PageID: 469
Case 3:11-cv-00597-JAP-LHG Document 16 Filed 11/18/11 Page 12 of 18 PageID: 470
Case 3:11-cv-00597-JAP-LHG Document 16 Filed 11/18/11 Page 13 of 18 PageID: 471
Case 3:11-cv-00597-JAP-LHG Document 16 Filed 11/18/11 Page 14 of 18 PageID: 472
Case 3:11-cv-00597-JAP-LHG Document 16 Filed 11/18/11 Page 15 of 18 PageID: 473
Case 3:11-cv-00597-JAP-LHG Document 16 Filed 11/18/11 Page 16 of 18 PageID: 474
Case 3:11-cv-00597-JAP-LHG Document 16 Filed 11/18/11 Page 17 of 18 PageID: 475
Case 3:11-cv-00597-JAP-LHG Document 16 Filed 11/18/11 Page 18 of 18 PageID: 476
Exhibit 32.2

Certification Pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350)

I, Neil Salmon, certify that:

1. the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q
for the period ended September 30, 2009 (the Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

2. the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
Innophos Holdings, Inc. at the dates and for the periods indicated.

A signed original of this written statement required by
Section 906 has been provided Innophos Holdings, Inc. and will be retained by Innophos Holdings, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

The undersigned expressly disclaims any obligation to update the foregoing certification except as required by law.

Date: November 4, 2009



/S/ NEIL SALMONNeil Salmon Vice President and Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial
Officer)


The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to the
requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 1350 and is not being filed as a part of the Report.



41
#### Carolyn F. McNeill, by Her Parent and Natural Guardian, Cora McNeill, et al., Respondents, v Town of Islip, Defendant, and County of Suffolk, Appellant.

[977 NYS2d 892]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant County of Suffolk appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Martin, J.), dated July 31, 2012, which denied its motion to compel the plaintiffs to provide duly executed authorizations to secure certain medical records of the nonparty Cheryl McNeill, the sister of the plaintiff Carolyn F. McNeill.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendant County of Suffolk moved, by order to show cause, to compel the plaintiffs to provide duly executed *588authorizations to secure certain medical records of Cheryl Mc-Neill, a nonparty, who is the sister of the plaintiff Carolyn F. McNeill. Service of the order to show cause was made in compliance with the requirements imposed by the court (Whelan, J.). In opposition to the County’s motion, Cheryl McNeill asserted, in an affidavit, that the records sought were privileged. She did not, however, contend that she received inadequate notice of the County’s motion. The Supreme Court denied the motion solely on the ground that notice was deficient under CPLR 3101 (a) (4).

Cheryl McNeill waived any objection to the adequacy of notice by failing to assert that ground in opposition to the County’s motion *(see Benson Park Assoc. LLC v Herman,*93 AD3d 609, 609 [2012]; *cf. Kooper v Kooper,*74 AD3d 6, 13-14 [2010]; *Yihye v Blumenberg,*260 AD2d 371, 371-372 [1999]; *People ex rel. Golden v Golden,*57 AD2d 807, 807 [1977]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should not have sua sponte raised the issue of notice and denied the motion on the ground of inadequate notice *(cf. Dupps v Betancourt,*99 AD3d 855, 856 [2012]; *Matter of Mandala v Jablonsky,*242 AD2d 271, 272 [1997]).

Nonetheless, we affirm the order appealed from because the County was not entitled to disclosure of the records it sought. Cheryl McNeill was not a party to the action, her records were subject to the physician-patient privilege, and she expressly declined to waive that privilege *(see*CPLR 4504 [a]; *Roman v Turner Colours,*255 AD2d 571, 572 [1998]; *Muniz v Preferred Assoc.,*189 AD2d 738, 738 [1993]; *Wepy v Shen,*175 AD2d 124, 124-125 [1991]; *Baldwin v Franklin Gen. Hosp.,*151 AD2d 532, 533 [1989]; *Dalley v LaGuardia Hosp.,*130 AD2d 543, 544 [1987]; *cf. Scipio v Upsell,*1 AD3d 500, 500 [2003]).

The parties’ remaining contentions need not be addressed in light of our determination, are without merit, or are not properly before this Court. Skelos, J.P, Balkin, Leventhal and Sgroi, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Charles Arokium, Appellant.

[822 NYS2d 442]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Budd G. Goodman, J), rendered June 3, 2004, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of grand larceny in the third degree, and sentencing him to a term of 1 to 3 years, unanimously affirmed.

*459The court properly denied the *Mapp/Dunaway*branch of defendant’s suppression motion without a hearing. Defendant’s assertions of innocent conduct at the time of his arrest, and his general denial of “the allegations in the accusatory instrument” failed to either controvert the specific information that was provided by the People concerning the prior criminal activity that formed the predicate for his arrest, or to provide any other basis for suppression *(see People v Jones,*95 NY2d 721 [2001]; *People v Soto,*284 AD2d 158 [2001], *lv denied*96 NY2d 924 [2001]; *see also People v Lopez,*5 NY3d 753 [2005]; *compare People v Hightower,*85 NY2d 988 [1995]). Concur—Buckley, EJ., Tom, Marlow, Nardelli and Williams, JJ.
---

EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OFCHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICERANDCHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICERPURSUANT
TO     18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED
PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Warren Robb, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial
Officer of Pioneer Exploration Inc., (the Company), hereby certify pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

| | (i)  | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Company for
      the quarter ended May 31, 2007 (the Quarterly Report) fully complies
      with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
      Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | ---- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
| | (ii) | the information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly
      presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
      operations of the Company.                                                                             

| | By:    | /s/ Warren Robb            
| | ------ | ---------------------------
| |        |                            
| | Name:  |                            
| |        | Warren Robb                
| |        |                            
| | Title: | Chief Executive Officer and
| |        | Chief Financial Officer    
| |        |                            
| | Date:  | July 13, 2007              

---
Case 2:10-cv-06749-FSH-PS Document 11 Filed 07/22/11 Page 1 of 9 PageID: 71
Case 2:10-cv-06749-FSH-PS Document 11 Filed 07/22/11 Page 2 of 9 PageID: 72
Case 2:10-cv-06749-FSH-PS Document 11 Filed 07/22/11 Page 3 of 9 PageID: 73
Case 2:10-cv-06749-FSH-PS Document 11 Filed 07/22/11 Page 4 of 9 PageID: 74
Case 2:10-cv-06749-FSH-PS Document 11 Filed 07/22/11 Page 5 of 9 PageID: 75
Case 2:10-cv-06749-FSH-PS Document 11 Filed 07/22/11 Page 6 of 9 PageID: 76
Case 2:10-cv-06749-FSH-PS Document 11 Filed 07/22/11 Page 7 of 9 PageID: 77
Case 2:10-cv-06749-FSH-PS Document 11 Filed 07/22/11 Page 8 of 9 PageID: 78
Case 2:10-cv-06749-FSH-PS Document 11 Filed 07/22/11 Page 9 of 9 PageID: 79
Case 2:10-cv-03984-FSH -PS   Document 9    Filed 08/31/10   Page 1 of 1 PageID: 128
#### Gerald Platovsky et al., Plaintiffs, v City of New York et al., Defendants. (Matter No. 1.) In the Matter of Gerald Platt et al., Appellants, v Lawfinance Group, Inc., et al., Respondents. Vicki-Jo Platovsky, Nonparty Appellant. (Matter No. 2.)

[855 NYS2d 571]

When determining whether a particular dispute is arbitrable, a court must determine whether the dispute “falls within the *843scope of the arbitration agreement” *(Maross Constr. v Central N.Y. Regional Transp. Auth.,*66 NY2d 341, 345 [1985]), and whether the dispute “is one that may be submitted to arbitration without violation of any law or public policy” *{id.*at 346). Since the dispute over the entitlement of the respondents Robert Herbst, Esq., and Beldock Levine & Hoffman, LLP to an attorney’s fee in connection with the underlying personal injury action, falls within the scope of the broad arbitration clause contained in the contract at issue *(see Matter of Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co. v Investors Ins. Co. of Am.,*37 NY2d 91, 96 [1975]), and since no law or public policy precludes arbitration of that dispute *(see Matter of Sprinzen [Nomberg],*46 NY2d 623, 630 [1979]), the Supreme Court properly concluded that the dispute was arbitrable.

The appellants’ remaining contentions are without merit. Mastro, J.P., Covello, Eng and Belen, JJ., concur. *[See*15 Misc 3d 1125(A), 2007 NY Slip Op 50840(U).]