N OT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATE S OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

– Appellee,

v. KENNETH W. MEDENBACH ,

Defendant

– Appellant. No. 17

- 30127

D.C. No. 1:15

- CR

- 00407

- MC

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Michael J. McShane , District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted on June 8, 2018

Portland, Oregon Before: GRABER and M. SMITH , Circuit Judges, and KORMAN, * * District Judge. Kenneth Medenbach was convicted of two misdemeanor s , il legal occupancy and camping on federal lands. He was sentenced to five years’ probation with standard and special conditions, including Standard Condition #6, prohibiting him

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

* * The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for the Eastern District o f New York, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

JUL 5 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2

from traveling outside the District of Oregon without permission of his probation officer . Medenbach violated this condition. At the hearing on the violation, the U.S. Attorney asked for modifica tions to othe r special probation conditions, two of which the district judge granted. Specifically, Medenbach was directed to address correspondence to federal land agencies to particular agents, and he was prohibited from ente ring or camping on federal la nds

— including agency parking lots and offices

— without permission

. Medenbach now appeals the se modifications and the judge’s refusal to modify Standard Condition #6

. He also filed a separate appeal from t he judgment of conviction in United States v. Medenba ch , No. 16

- 30189 , which we affirm in a separate memorandum disposition filed today

. We review probation conditions for abuse of discretion. Malone v. United
States , 502 F.2d 554, 557 (9th Cir. 1974 ). District courts have “broad discretion” to fashion prob ation conditions, United States v. Terrigno , 838 F. 2d 371, 374 (9th Cir. 1988), provided that the conditions “involve only such deprivations of liberty or property as are reasonably necessary” to effect the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a ) (2) , 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b). This discretion includes “wide latitude” to restrict even fundamental rights. United States v. Blinkinsop , 606 F.3d 1110,
1118

– 19 (9th Cir. 2010). 1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the standard condition p rohibiting travel outside the district without permission

. Under 183

U.S.C. § 3563(b)(14), the court may require that the defendant “remain within the jurisdiction of the court, unless granted permission to leave by the court or a probation officer.” The Ad ministrative Office of the U.S. Courts specifically recommends the inclusion of this requirement as a standard condition of p robation and supervised release for several compelling reasons . Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, Overview of Probation and S up ervised Release Conditions 13 (2016). These include allowing “the probation officer to supervise the defendant by setting boundaries for travel without permission and by keeping the probation officer informed of the defendant’s whereabouts.” Id. at 19

. Pro bation officers are advised to implement this condition by conducting a risk assessment of the defendant’s proposed travel, thereby determining “whether the defendant is in compliance with conditions of supervision . . . and assess whether travel would dis rupt defendant needs. ” Id. at 21. Standard Condition #6 is entirely reasonable , and its imposition here was not an abuse of discretion

. Moreover, Medenbach has never been denied permission to travel when he has asked his supervising probation officer, and th e judge stated that he would personally review any denial of Medenbach’s travel requests

. 2. Nor did the distri ct court impermissibly infringe Medenbach’s First Amendment rights when it required that he address his petition s to specific individuals at the B ureau of L and M anagement and the U.S. Forest Service

.4

Medenbach had sent a letter to three BLM offices threatening to “r aise up a well regulated militia ” if the government did not “‘cease and desist’ all activity in Grant
Count y. ” This c ould reasonably worry employees

. And he has made similar comments to federal officials in the past

— including references to the standoffs at Ruby Ridge and Waco

— which this Court has found intimidating. See United States v. Medenbach , 116 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished) . It was therefore not an abuse of discretion to ensure that, while preserving Medenbach’s fundamental right to petition the government, only those officials f amiliar with Medenbach would receive his letters , so as not to cause concern among other federal officials

. 3. Finally, we uphold the modification of the condition prohibiting Medenbach from entering federal lands

— including offices and parking lots

— managed by the BLM and other specific federal agencies without prior approv al of the probation officer. As with its findings regarding Medenbach’s letters, the district court imposed a condition “reasonably related” to Medenbach’s behavior

— a decades

- long history of unlawful protests of fe deral land

- management agencies.
AFFIRMED.