alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 995 Engrossed in House (EH)]

<DOC>
H. Res. 995

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                          June 8, 2020.
    Resolved, That the following named Member be, and is hereby, ranked as 
follows on the following standing committee of the House of Representatives:
    Committee on Oversight and Reform: Mr. Mfume (to rank immediately after Mr. 
Khanna).
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 15** 

**- 7320** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,

Plaintiff

- Appellee
,

v.

RAYMOND EDWARD CHESTNUT, a/k/a Snoop, a/k/a Ray
,

Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Florence

. R. Bryan Harwell , District Judge. ( 4:05

- cr

- 01044

- RBH

- 1 )

Submitted : December 15, 2015 Decided: December 18, 2015

Before GREGOR Y and FLOYD, Circuit Judges , and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge

.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Raymond Edward Chestnut , Appellant Pro Se. Arthur Bradley Parham, Assistant U nited S tates Attorney , Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:

Raymond Edward Chestnut appeals the district court ’ s order

denying relief on his motion for reduction in sentence pursuant

to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c )(2 ) (2012). We have reviewed the record

and find no reversibl e error. Accordingly, we affirm

. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAROLYN BETHEA, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

v.

ISRAEL ROIZMAN, et al.,

 Defendants.

HON. JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil No. 11-254 (JBS/JS)

ORDER

This matter having come before the Court upon the

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket Item 123], the

City Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket Item

166] and the Roizman Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary

Judgment [Docket Item 180]; the Court having considered the

submissions of the parties; for the reasons explained in the

Opinion of today’s date; and for good cause shown;

IT IS this 27th day of September, 2012 hereby

ORDERED that the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment

[Docket Item 123] is DENIED; and it is 

ORDERED that the City Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary

Judgment [Docket Item 166] is GRANTED; and it is

ORDERED that the Roizman Defendants' Cross Motion for

Summary Judgment [Docket Item 180] is GRANTED; and it is further

Case 1:11-cv-00254-JBS-JS Document 185 Filed 09/27/12 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 3406
ORDERED that the clerk shall cause this case to be closed

upon the docket.

s/ Jerome B. Simandle 

JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Chief U.S. District Judge

Case 1:11-cv-00254-JBS-JS Document 185 Filed 09/27/12 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 3407
_________________________________________ 

 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

January 5, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

129564-67 (75)(76) 

129569-72 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

JOEANN BATES, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 SC: 129564-67 

v 

DR. SIDNEY GILBERT,

Defendant-Appellee, 

and 

 COA: 252022, 252047, 

252792, and 252793

 Wayne CC: 03-308969-NH 

D&R OPTICAL CORPORATION, 

d/b/a HEALTH CENTER OPTICAL,

Defendant-Appellant. 

___________________________________ 

JOEANN BATES, 

Plaintiff-Appellee/

Cross-Appellant, 

 SC: 129569-72 

v 

DR. SIDNEY GILBERT,

Defendant-Appellant/ 

Cross-Appellee,

and 

 COA: 252022, 252047, 

252792, and 252793

 Wayne CC: 03-308969-NH 

D&R OPTICAL CORPORATION, 

d/b/a HEALTH CENTER OPTICAL,

Defendant-Appellee/ 

Cross-Appellee. 

____________________________________ 

 On order of the Chief Justice, motions by defendants-appelant for extension 

of the time for filing their supplemental briefs are considered and they are GRANTED. 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

January 5, 2007 

 Clerk
Case 1:11-cv-01083-RMB-KMW Document 165 Filed 07/21/15 Page 1 of 5 PageID: 7597
Case 1:11-cv-01083-RMB-KMW Document 165 Filed 07/21/15 Page 2 of 5 PageID: 7598
Case 1:11-cv-01083-RMB-KMW Document 165 Filed 07/21/15 Page 3 of 5 PageID: 7599
Case 1:11-cv-01083-RMB-KMW Document 165 Filed 07/21/15 Page 4 of 5 PageID: 7600
Case 1:11-cv-01083-RMB-KMW Document 165 Filed 07/21/15 Page 5 of 5 PageID: 7601
Exhibit
      23




Consent
      of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm




The
      Board
      of Directors


Medialink
      Worldwide Incorporated:




We
      consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements (Nos.
      333-27207 and 333-126213) on Form S-8 and in the registration statements (Nos.
      333-120956) on Form S-3 of Medialink Worldwide Incorporated of our report dated
      March 31, 2008, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of Medialink
      Worldwide Incorporated as of December 31, 2007 and 2006, and the related
      consolidated statements of operations, stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for
      the years then ended, and the related consolidated financial statement schedule,
      which report appears in the December 31, 2007 annual report on Form 10-K of
      Medialink Worldwide Incorporated.






(Signed)
      KPMG LLP


New
      York,
      New York


March
      31,
      2008
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-08-00073-CV

The Gaylord Skinner Trust, Gaylord Skinner and Ricki Don Skinner, Appellants

v.

Nathan Minchey and Gretchen E. Minchey, Appellees

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 353RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. D-1-GN-04-003574, HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

On February 1, 2008, appellants The Gaylord Skinner Trust, Gaylord Skinner and

Ricki Don Skinner filed their notice of appeal and a motion to extend time to file their notice of

appeal. On February 8, 2008, appellees Nathan Minchey and Gretchen E. Minchey filed a motion

to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. The Mincheys contend that the Skinners failed to file their notice

of appeal and their motion for extension of time within the time prescribed under rule 26 of the rules

of appellate procedure. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.

If any party timely files a motion for new trial, the notice of appeal must be filed

within 90 days after the trial court’s judgment is signed. Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a)(1). The appellate

court may extend the time to file the notice of appeal if, within 15 days after the deadline for filing

the notice of appeal, the party files in the trial court the notice of appeal and files in the appellate

court a motion to extend time complying with Rule 10.5(b). Tex. R. App. P. 26.3.
The Skinners have also filed a motion to extend time to file the clerk’s record. In light of 1

our dismissal of this appeal, we dismiss this motion as moot.

2

The district court’sjudgment was signed on October 15, 2007. The Skinners timely

filed a motion for new trial on November 14, 2007. Therefore, the Skinners’ notice of appeal was

due on January 14, 2008. See Tex. R. App. P. 4.1(a), 26.1(a)(1). The Skinners’ motion to extend

time to file their notice of appeal was due on January 29, 2008. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.3.

“[O]nce the period for granting a motion for extension of time under Rule [26.3]

has passed, a party can no longer invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction.” Verburgt v. Dorner,

959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997). The Skinners did not file their notice of appeal and motion for

extension of time until after January 29, 2008. Therefore, they failed to invoke our jurisdiction.

Accordingly, we overrule the Skinners’ motion for extension of time, grant the Mincheys’ motion

to dismiss, and dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a).

1

____________________________________

Bob Pemberton, Justice

Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Pemberton and Waldrop

Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction

Filed: March 4, 2008
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

Braurman v. United Collection

Order of Dismissal

Civil 11-599 (SRC)

---------------------------------------------

It having been reported to the Court that the above-captioned action has been

settled, and that the request for an order of dismissal is not based on a desire to adjourn or

delay the proceedings herein;

IT IS on this OF April, 2011 6TH 

ORDERED THAT:

(1) This action is hereby DISMISSED without cost and without prejudice to the

right, upon motion and good cause shown, within 60 days, to reopen this action if the settlement

is not consummated; and

(2) If any party shall move to set aside this Order of Dismissal as provided in the

first paragraph or pursuant to the provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), in deciding such motion the

Court retains jurisdiction of the matter to the extent necessary to enforce the terms and conditions

of any settlement entered into between the parties.

 s/Stanley R. Chesler, U. S. D. J.

Case 2:11-cv-00599-SRC -MAS Document 12 Filed 04/06/11 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 65
Lucas A. Markowitz 

929.476.0038 (Direct Dial) 

212.545.1656 (Facsimile) 

973.886.3080 (Cell) 

Lucas.Markowitz@offitkurman.com 

August 30, 2021 

VIA ECF 

Honorable Kevin McNulty 

U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey 

Lautenberg U.S. Post Office & Courthouse Federal Square 

Newark, New Jersey 07101

Re: Thompson v. Homebridge Financial Services, Inc. et al. 

Case No. 2:11-cv-01494-KH-MAH 

Dear Justice McNulty, 

We represent Defendants in this case. I write to request a brief extension on the Parties’ 

time to file the Motion for Preliminary Approval of the Settlement. The prior deadline for the 

Parties’ submission is today August 30, 2021. ECF No. 285. 

The attorney from my firm who was handling the case recently went out on maternity leave 

and I joined the firm only about two weeks ago. That said, the Parties are jointly working on the 

motion papers and expect to be able to file them within three weeks at the latest. As a result, with 

consent of Plaintiffs’ attorney, the Parties request an extension of the deadline to file the Motion 

for Preliminary Approval from August 30, 2021 until September 20, 2021. 

Best regards, 

Lucas A. Markowitz 

LM/ 

4814-0349-3113, v. 1

Case 2:11-cv-01494-KM-MAH Document 287 Filed 08/30/21 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 3576
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

                       Consent of Independent Accountants



We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements listed below of Jason Incorporated of our report dated January 31,
1997 appearing on page 26 of the 1996 Annual Report to Shareholders which is
incorporated in this Annual Report on Form 10-K.  We also consent to the
incorporation by reference of our report on the Financial Statement Schedule,
which appears on page 22 of this Form 10-K.

     1.   Registration Statement on Form S-8 (Registration No. 33-18791)

     2.   Registration Statement on Form S-8 (Registration No. 33-30688)

     3.   Registration Statement on Form S-3 (Registration No. 33-31473)




\s\ Price Waterhouse LLP
------------------------
PRICE WATERHOUSE LLP
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
March 21, 1997
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 23-0340

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

v. 

SHAWN THOMAS ANDERSEN,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including November 4, 2024, within which to prepare, 

file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

September 24 2024

09/24/2024

Case Number: DA 23-0340
Motion Granted; Order filed January 14 , 2014.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 13

- 00104

- CR

____________ YANTSEY GONZALES , Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 178th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1303536



### ORDER

Appellant filed a motion requesting supplementation of the record with the original of State's exhibit 20, a scene video and State's exhibit 56, a CD.The clerk of the 178th District Cour t is directed to deliver to the Clerk of this

court the original of State's exhibit 20, a scene video and State's exhibit 56, a CD,
on or before February 5 , 2014. The Clerk of this court is directed to receive, maintain, and keep safe this original exhibit ; to deliver it to the justices of this court for their inspection; and, upon completion of inspection, to return the original of State's exhibit 20, a scene video and State's exhibit 56, a CD, to the clerk of the
178th District Court.

PER CURIAM
Presidential Documents

Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 13 / Thursday, January 22, 2009 / Presidential Documents 4101 

Memorandum of January 16, 2009 

Designation of Officers to Act as President of the Overseas 

Private Investment Corporation 

Memorandum for the President of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation 

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the 

laws of the United States of America, including the Federal Vacancies Reform 

Act of 1998, 5 U.S.C. 3345 et seq., it is hereby ordered that: 

Section 1. Order of Succession. Subject to the provisions of section 2 of 

this memorandum, the following officials of the Overseas Private Investment 

Corporation, in the order listed, shall act as and perform the functions 

and duties of the office of the President of the Overseas Private Investment 

Corporation (POPIC), during any period in which the POPIC has died, resigned, or otherwise become unable to perform the functions and duties 

of the office of POPIC, until such time as the POPIC is able to perform 

the functions and duties of that office: 

(a) Executive Vice President; 

(b) Vice President and General Counsel; 

(c) Vice President and Chief Financial Officer; 

(d) Deputy General Counsel; and 

(e) Director of Operations. 

Sec. 2. Exceptions. 

(a) No individual who is serving in an office listed in section 1 in an 

acting capacity, by virtue of so serving, shall act as POPIC pursuant to 

this memorandum. 

(b) No individual listed in section 1 shall act as POPIC unless that individual 

is otherwise eligible to so serve under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act 

of 1998. 

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of this memorandum, the President retains 

discretion, to the extent permitted by law, to depart from this memorandum 

in designating an acting POPIC. 

Sec. 3. This memorandum is intended to improve the internal management 

of the executive branch and is not intended to, and does not, create any 

right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity 

by any party against the United States, it agencies, instrumentalities, or 

entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. 


rmajette on PRODPC74 with NOTICES6
4102 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 13 / Thursday, January 22, 2009 / Presidential Documents 

Sec. 4. You are authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in 

the Federal Register. 

THE WHITE HOUSE, 

Washington, January 16, 2009 

[FR Doc. E9–1541 

Filed 1–21–09; 11:15 am] 

Billing code 3210–01–M 


rmajette on PRODPC74 with NOTICES6GWBOLD.EPS</GPH>
Case 3:11-cv-00890-MLC-LHG Document 60 Filed 12/12/12 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 376
Case 3:11-cv-00890-MLC-LHG Document 60 Filed 12/12/12 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 377
Exhibit 10.25(ii)

 

	
 
    	

    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
Nalco   Company
    
	
May 2, 2011
    	
1601   West Diehl Road
    
	
 
    	
Naperville, IL   60563-1198
    
	
 
    	
www.nalco.com
    


 

Mr. Steve Taylor

 

Dear Steve:

 

We have made an administrative modification to your January 1, 2011 Severance Agreement that will expand the length of time you will be eligible for benefits coverage. Your current agreement states that you will receive three months of medical and dental benefits continuation. However, as an officer of the Company, your eligibility has been extended to eighteen months of benefits continuation. The modified statement, which overrides section (d) on page 3 of your January 1, 2011 Severance Agreement, is shown below:

 

(d)                                 Except as otherwise indicated herein, Executive shall receive any other benefits he is otherwise eligible for under other plans or programs of the Company in accordance with their terms. Executive shall have the right to continue medical and/or dental benefits for a period of eighteen months following the Termination Date at the active employee rate.

 

Please retain this information for future reference. A copy will also be placed in your Human Resources file. Please let me know if you have questions or would like additional information.

 

Sincerely,

 

 

	
/s/   Laurie Marsh
    	
 
    	
/s/   Stephen Landsman
    
	
Laurie   Marsh
    	
 
    	
Stephen   Landsman
    
	
Vice   President, Human Resources
    	
 
    	
Vice   President, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary
Case 3:11-cv-01160-AET-DEA Document 40 Filed 05/09/13 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 1224
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4.

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-30218 Summary Calendar

ANGELA DAWN DOWLING Plaintiff v. GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION Defendant - Third Party Plaintiff - Appellee
v. KELLOGG BROWN & ROOT INC Third Party Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

(02-CV-637) Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D May 19, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 08-30218

2 Third-party defendant /appellant Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. (“KBR”) has filed an unopposed motion for a determination regarding appellatejurisdiction prior to the issuance of a briefing schedule. We grant the motion and conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction over this case. KBR filed the instant motion out of an abundance of caution because the order appealed from does not contain a specific dollar amount. Instead, the district court, upon granting summary judgment in favor of Georgia-Pacific Corporation (“GP”), ordered KBR to (1) indemnify GP for the full amount of the settlement proceeds pai d to the plaintiff on the underlying claim; and (2) reimburse GP for all attorney’s fees and costs incurred in this matter. We havejurisdiction over appeals from all “final decisions” of the district courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “A judgment is final when it terminates litigation on the merits and leaves the court with nothing to do except execute the judgment.” Z ink v. United States, 929 F.2d 1015, 1020 (5th Cir. 1991). However, ajudgment is not final until both liability and damages are determined. D eloach v. Delchamps, 897 F.2d 815, 826 (5th Cir. 1990). “Although there is no statute or rule that specifies the essential elements ofa final judgment and the Supreme Court has held that no form ofwords and no peculiar formal act is necessary to evince the rendition of a judgment, a final judgment for money must, at least, determine, or specify the means for determining, the amount of thejudgment.” Zink, 929 F.2d at 1020 (internal citations omitted). Here, the district court specifically ordered KBR to indemnify GP for the full amount of the settlement proceeds paid to the plaintiff on the underlying claim. The parties agree that the amount is readily available through court documents. With respect to the issue of attorney’s fees and costs, the Supreme Court has made clear that “a decision on the merits is a ‘final decision’ for purposes of § 1291 whether or not there remains for adjudication a request forNo. 08-30218

3 attorney’s fees attributable to the case.” B udinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co. , 486 U.S. 196, 202-03 (1988). Thus, we have appellate jurisdiction over this case.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v.

EARL SCOTT CHESNUT,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-30368

D.C. No. 3:10-cr-00259-BR

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 27, 2016** 

Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Earl Scott Chesnut appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges

the sentence of 12 months and one day imposed upon the revocation of supervised

release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Chesnut contends that the district court violated his right to due process by

FILED

OCT 03 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
basing the sentence on inaccurate information regarding one of his prior

convictions. We review for plain error, United States v. Vanderwerfhorst, 576

F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 2009), and find none. The government concedes that it

erroneously referred to one of Chesnut’s prior convictions as being for assault and

menacing when it was, in fact, just for menacing. However, the record reflects the

district court did not rely on this misstatement in imposing Chesnut’s sentence. 

Rather, the record demonstrates that the district court properly based the sentence

on Chesnut’s history of domestic violence and breach of the court’s trust. See 18

U.S.C. § 3583(e); United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Accordingly, there was no due process violation. See United States v. Christensen,

732 F.3d 1094, 1106 (9th Cir. 3013) (to establish a due process violation,

defendant must show that the challenged information “was demonstrably made the

basis for the sentence imposed”).

Chesnut’s unopposed motion to supplement the record is granted.

AFFIRMED.

2 15-30368