Filed 6/30/16 In re V.G. CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re V.G. et al., Persons Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

 H042412

 (Santa Clara County

 Super. Ct. Nos. 1-15-JD-23076,

 1-15-JD-23077)

SANTA CLARA COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND 

CHILDREN’S SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.D.,

Defendant and Appellant.

On June 1, 2015, J.F. and his half-sister, V.G., were declared dependent children 

of the court and ordered into foster care, having been found to come within the provisions 

of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (c).1 T.D., the 

children’s mother, along with Justin F., J.F’s father, appeals, seeking review of a

pre-disposition order requiring the children to be vaccinated. Justin F. contends that it 

was improper to make this order before J.F. was declared a dependent child of the court; 

mother joins in Justin F.’s argument. We find the issue to be moot and must therefore 

dismiss the appeals.

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless 

otherwise indicated.
2

Background

V.G. 2and J.F., then aged five years and nearly nine months respectively, were 

taken into protective custody by the deputy sheriffs for Santa Clara County. Mother was 

arrested for child endangerment because she had exposed the children to secondhand 

marijuana smoke and numerous safety hazards, and the children had access to marijuana, 

marijuana paraphernalia, rat feces, an open well in the backyard, and excessive trash and 

clutter throughout the home. The Department of Family and Children’s Services (DFCS)

filed a petition for each child, describing the circumstances of the children’s removal by 

the sheriffs and further alleging that mother continued to abuse methamphetamine and

marijuana despite having completed an outpatient drug program. DFCS further alleged 

that the children were repeatedly being exposed to domestic violence perpetrated by 

Justin F. The petition and subsequently amended petition cited section 300, 

subdivisions (b) and (c).

In the social worker’s jurisdiction/disposition report prepared for a February 23, 

2015 hearing, she noted that “[d]ue to personal beliefs,” mother and Justin F. “do not 

believe in having the children vaccinated.” After the hearing was continued to March 18, 

2015, the social worker submitted an addendum report in which she again noted that both 

mother and Justin F. were “not in agreement with the children in [sic] receiving any 

immunization.”

At the continued hearing DFCS recommended family reunification services for 

mother and for each child’s father. DFCS also asked the court to order that the children 

receive immunizations, consistent with their doctor’s advice. Mother and Justin F. both 

objected. Mother’s attorney explained that mother “just does not believe in 

immunization, and it’s based on the research and material that she’s read regarding the 

 

2

The alleged father of V.G. was then in prison. According to DFCS, he had a 

history of substance abuse, for which he was being treated, and domestic violence for 

which he was not taking responsibility.
3

harms of immunization.” Justin F.’s counsel explained, “Your Honor, my client practices 

the Buddhist religion, and he views that religion as a naturalist religion, so he thinks that 

immunizations are an unnatural process. It’s manmade, and he believes in leaving it to 

nature’s care, and that’s the basis of his objection.”

At that point the court ruled on DFCS’s request: “The Court has had ample time 

to consider the issue. I certainly respect the parents’ position and their objection to the 

immunization. The Court is going to order [that] the immunizations occur immediately.” 

The matter was then set for an “Early Resolution Conference” to take place on April 13, 

2015.

By the April 13 “Early Resolution” hearing, both appellants had modified their 

stance on immunizations. Justin F. was “no longer objecting to the immunizations.” 

Instead, recognizing that some immunizations had already been administered, he asked 

“that the immunizations going forward happen in a delayed or staggered manner, which 

he learned is a way that can be easier on the child so it doesn’t all have to happen at the 

same time.” Mother was “in support of that plan as well, to stagger the immunizations.” 

DFCS represented to the court that it would stagger the immunizations according to the 

doctor’s recommendation.

In preparation for the hearing on jurisdiction and disposition, the social worker 

submitted another addendum report, the third in the proceedings. In this document she 

stated that both children had received multiple vaccinations, V.G. on April 8 and J.F. on 

April 17. J.F.’s could not be staggered as appellants had requested, because the 

pediatrician had said that J.F. was “too far behind on his vaccinations to stagger them.”

On May 26, 2015, the court finally heard testimony from both parents and 

argument from counsel regarding jurisdiction and disposition, and on June 1, 2015, it 

announced its ruling. DFCS had withdrawn its allegations under section 300, 

subdivision (c); accordingly, the court addressed only subdivision (b) of the statute, as 

alleged in the first amended petition. Those allegations were sustained, and both minors 
4

were adjudged dependent children of the court. The court further found by clear and 

convincing evidence that removal from mother’s home was necessary in order to protect 

the children, and that it would be a “substantial risk of detriment” to return J.F. to Justin 

F.’s custody. Accordingly, both children were ordered into the custody of DFCS for 

placement in foster care, with reunification services to both mother and each child’s 

father.

Mother timely filed her notice of appeal from this order. Both appellants, 

however, had already filed premature notices of appeal from the March 26 immunization 

order. On June 16, 2015, on this court’s own motion, Justin F.’s notice of appeal from 

the March 26 immunization order was deemed to have been taken from the June 1 

dispositional order. In a subsequent order, we granted Justin F.’s request to file an 

amended notice of appeal. The two parents’ appeals were ordered to be considered 

together for purposes of briefing, oral argument, and disposition. 

Discussion

Justin F. challenges the March 18, 2015 order that J.F. be vaccinated over his 

objection. Mother joins in Justin F.’s argument and applies it to V.G. as well. Appellants 

anticipate the dispositive procedural obstacle to reversal by urging this court not to treat 

the issue as moot, but to consider it on the merits “because it will reoccur yet evade 

review.” Their position cannot withstand analysis.

“As a general rule, appellate courts decide only actual controversies. Thus, ‘it has 

been said that an action [that] originally was based upon a justiciable controversy cannot 

be maintained on appeal if the questions raised therein have become moot by subsequent 

acts or events.’ [Citation.]” (In re Christina A. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1158.) “An 

appeal becomes moot when, through no fault of the respondent, the occurrence of an 

event renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant the appellant effective relief.”

(In re Esperanza C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1054.) “ ‘A reversal in such a case 
5

would be without practical effect, and the appeal will therefore be dismissed.’ ” (In re 

Dani R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 402, 404.)

It is true, of course, that a technically moot case may still be resolved “ ‘if the 

question to be decided is of continuing public importance and is a question capable of 

repetition, yet evading review. [Citations.] We decide on a case-by-case basis whether 

subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter make a case moot and whether our 

decision would affect the outcome in a subsequent proceeding. [Citations.]’ ” (In re 

Anna S. (2010) 180 Cal. App. 4th 1489, 1498, quoting In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 

Cal.App.4th 1394, 1404; In re Jody R. (1990) 218 Cal. App. 3d 1615, 1622.)

Here, however, the facts demonstrate the mootness of the issue and neither 

appellant demonstrates the applicability of the exception. Justin F. admits that “the issue 

on appeal is moot because [J.F.] received vaccinations nearly a year ago on April 17, 

2015. Similarly, the issue on appeal is most likely moot as Father agreed to [J.F.’s] 

receiving vaccinations after the order was entered and prior to the vaccinations being 

given.” This concession is appropriate. We cannot overlook the facts before us by 

simply asserting, without more, that the issue is one of “public concern.” The objections 

to the immunizations were personal to each parent—mother’s based on her “research” 

and Justin F.’s based on his religion—and there is no evidence that they were “compelled 

to agree with the order despite [their] beliefs.” Because the order for immunizations was 

followed—and because both appellants withdrew their objections to the procedure—there 

is no live controversy or any effectual relief that could be granted to appellants. Nor have 

appellants convinced this court that the case poses an issue of broad and continuing 

public interest which justifies its resolution on the merits. Having presented no other 

issues directed at the proceedings leading to disposition, appellants’ challenge cannot be 

sustained.

Disposition

The appeal is dismissed.
_________________________________

ELIA, ACTING P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_______________________________

BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.

_______________________________

MIHARA, J.

In re V.G. et al.; DFCS v. T.D.

H042412