J-S53001-18

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.S.A., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.D.E., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 931 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree February 28, 2018

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No.: CP-51-AP-0000101-2018

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OTT, J., and PLATT*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED OCTOBER 15, 2018

M.D.E. (Mother) appeals from the decree entered February 28, 2018, in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which granted the petition 

of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) and involuntarily 

terminated her parental rights to her minor daughter, J.S.A. (Child), born April 

2016, pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b) of the Adoption Act, 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.1 After careful review, we affirm.

We take the following facts from the trial court’s May 11, 2018 opinion, 

which in turn is supported by the record. DHS became involved with the family 

in January 2017 after receiving a report alleging that Mother was incorrectly 

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1 The parental rights of T.A. (Father) were terminated on the same day by 

separate decree. He is not a party to this appeal and has not filed a separate 

appeal.
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mixing Child’s infant formula and that, as a result, Child was underweight. 

The report also alleged that Mother was diagnosed with mental health issues 

and exhibited aggressive behavior.2

In February 2017, DHS briefly made contact with Mother and Father. 

By the time contact was re-established on April 10, 2017, Child was still 

underweight, and an order for protective custody (OPC) was obtained. Child 

was placed in foster care that same day.

On April 19, 2017, the court convened a dependency hearing and 

adjudicated Child dependent. On November 22, 2017, following a 

permanency review hearing, the court found clear and convincing evidence 

established aggravated circumstances as to both Mother and Father, because

they each previously had parental rights to other children terminated.

In December 2017, Mother and Father attended a single case plan (SCP) 

meeting. Mother’s objectives were to: (1) participate in biweekly supervised 

visitation; (2) attend parenting classes; (3) participate in a parenting capacity 

evaluation; (4) attend Child’s scheduled medical appointments; (5) attend a 

housing workshop; (6) comply with the court-ordered recommendations of 

the Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU) drug and alcohol assessment. Mother did 

not go to CEU for an evaluation or random drug tests, did not complete a 

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2 The record does not provide further elaboration regarding Mother’s mental 

health issues, whether Mother received appropriate treatment for her issues, 

or what constituted “aggressive behavior.” DHS’ statement of facts indicates 

that Mother denied having mental health issues. (See DHS Exhibit A).
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parenting capacity evaluation, did not confirm her address, and did not attend 

parenting classes, housing classes, or financial counseling classes.

On February 5, 2018, DHS filed a petition seeking to involuntarily 

terminate Mother’s parental rights and change Child’s permanency goal to 

adoption. On February 28, 2018, the court held a hearing on the termination 

petition. Mother was represented by counsel and testified on her own behalf. 

Child was represented by James King, Esquire, as legal counsel and Lisa Port, 

Esquire, as guardian ad litem. DHS presented the testimony of Jessica Law, 

a social worker for NET Community Umbrella Agency (CUA), the case 

manager. 

Ms. Law testified that Mother was not compliant with any of her 

objectives and was living in a boarding house that was inappropriate for a 

child. (See N.T. Hearing, 2/28/18, at 7-11). Mother had an intake at 

Achieving Reunification Center (ARC) but her case was closed in August 2017

for non-compliance. (See id. at 9-10). Following a second referral, Mother 

attended an intake in January 2018 and attended two out of three parenting 

classes, but no housing or financial counseling. (See id. at 10-11). As of 

November 2017, Mother attended only half of the weekly supervised visits; 

after the visitation schedule was changed to biweekly, Mother attended five of 

the seven visits. (See id. at 11-12). Additionally, Ms. Law testified that Child 

is parentally bonded with her pre-adoptive foster parents, and that they take

care of her medical, emotional, and daily needs. (See id. at 12-13). Ms. Law 

believed it was in Child’s best interests for Mother’s rights to be terminated 
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and that Child would not suffer irreparable harm from the termination. (See 

id. at 14). 

Mother testified that she believes she has a bond with Child. (See id.

at 42). Further, Mother testified that she attempted to go to CEU for screening 

tests but was told to wait. (See id. at 41). Mother presented evidence that 

she was enrolled in a parenting class and had been attending classes since 

January 2018. (See id. at 27). 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted the petition pursuant 

to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b), and entered decrees 

terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. This timely appeal 

followed.3 

Mother presents the following questions for our review:

1. Did the Department of Human Services (DHS) sustain its 

burden under [23] Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(1)[,] (2) or (5) that 

Mother’s parental rights should be terminated when there was 

evidence that Mother was actively completing her permanency 

goals?

2. Was there sufficient evidence presented to establish under 23 

Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(b) that it was in the best interest of [Child] to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights?

3. Was there sufficient evidence presented to establish under [23 

Pa.C.S.A §] 2511(b) that Mother demonstrated a sincere and 

genuine desire to maintain a parent-child bond with [Child]?

(Mother’s Brief at 4).

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3 Mother filed her concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

contemporaneously with her notice of appeal on March 26, 2018. The trial 

court entered an opinion on May 11, 2018. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i)-(ii). 
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We review cases involving the termination of parental rights according 

to the following standards.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights 

cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted).

Prior to addressing the merits of Mother’s appeal, we must first 

determine whether she has preserved her issues for our review. Where an 

appellant does not preserve her issue by raising it in her concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal, that issue is waived on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement . . . are waived.”); 

Krebs v. United Refining Co. of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. 

Super. 2006). 

Here, Mother’s Rule 1925(b) statement does not include the second and 

third issues she raises in the statement of the questions involved section of 

her brief, relating to Child’s best interests and the parent-child bond. (See

Rule 1925(b) Statement, 3/26/18, at 1-2; Mother’s Brief, at 4). Accordingly, 
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Mother’s second and third issues are waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); 

Krebs, supra at 797. We now turn to the sole issue Mother has preserved.

Mother argues that the trial court erred and abused its discretion in 

terminating her parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), (2) and (5). 

(See Mother’s Brief, at 11-12). Essentially, Mother argues that DHS did not 

prove by clear and convincing evidence that her rights should be terminated, 

and that she was making progress towards her objectives. (See id.). Mother 

avers that, given the statutory requirement of fifteen months to complete her 

goals, she would have been able to care for her daughter. (See id. at 13). 

This issue merits no relief. 

Specifically, as noted above, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b). To affirm, we 

need only agree with any one of the subsections of 2511(a). See In re 

B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 

A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, we focus our analysis on subsection (a)(2), which 

states:

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 
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abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).

To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(2), the moving party 

must prove “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 

(2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes 

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” 

In Interest of Lilley, 719 A.2d 327, 330 (Pa. Super. 1998) (citation 

omitted). The grounds for termination are not limited to affirmative 

misconduct, but concern parental incapacity that cannot be remedied. See 

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010). Parents are required to 

make diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental 

duties. See id. at 1117-18.

The relevant considerations set forth in the Juvenile Act regarding 

permanency planning are as follows:

Pursuant to § 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act, when considering 

a petition for a goal change for a dependent child, the juvenile 

court is to consider, inter alia: (1) the continuing necessity for and 

appropriateness of the placement; (2) the extent of compliance 

with the family service plan; (3) the extent of progress made 

towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the 

original placement; (4) the appropriateness and feasibility of the 

current placement goal for the children; (5) a likely date by which 

the goal for the child might be achieved; (6) the child’s safety; 

and (7) whether the child has been in placement for at least fifteen 

of the last twenty-two months.
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In Interest of L.T., 158 A.3d 1266, 1276-77 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation and 

footnote omitted). With regard to the last consideration,

[i]t is beyond cavil that the fifteen-to-twenty-month period 

outlined in § 6351 is not a prerequisite to a goal change, but 

rather, an aspirational target in which to attain permanency. See

42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f.1)(9) (“If the child has been in placement for 

at least 15 of the last 22 months . . . [the court must determine] 

whether the county agency has filed or sought to join a petition to 

terminate parental rights[.]”).

Id. at 1279. 

Here, the trial court observed that:

The record demonstrated Mother’s ongoing inability to provide 

care for or control of Child due to her failure to remedy the 

conditions that brought the Child into care. Specifically, Mother 

had not completed her SCP objectives and exhibited an inability 

or refusal to attend programs necessary to complete her SCP 

objectives or to follow court orders.

(Trial Court Opinion, 5/11/18, at 4). 

The record reflects that Mother did not go to CEU for an evaluation; 

complete a parenting evaluation prior to the hearing; obtain appropriate 

housing or apprise DHS of her current address; attend housing or financial 

classes; or visit regularly with child. (See N.T. Hearing, at 7-12). While there 

was some testimony that Mother had begun visiting more regularly with Child 

and, as of February 2018, had attended two parenting classes, Mother was 

overwhelmingly non-compliant with her objectives. (See id. at 11-12). 

Accordingly, DHS proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s 

repeated and continued incapacity had caused Child to be without essential 
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parental care, control, or subsistence, and the causes of the incapacity could 

not be remedied. See Lilley, supra at 330; Z.P., supra at 1117.

Thus, we affirm the court’s decree involuntarily terminating Mother’s 

parental rights.

Decree affirmed.

President Judge Gantman joins the Memorandum.

Judge Ott concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/15/18