II 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1285 

To require certifications and reporting in an unclassified form related to 

the national security implications of the New START Treaty, to provide 

for arms limitations in the event of the treaty’s non-renewal, and for 

other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 2, 2019 

Mr. MARKEY (for himself, Mrs. GILLIBRAND, Ms. WARREN, Mr. LEAHY, and 

Mr. BROWN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To require certifications and reporting in an unclassified 

form related to the national security implications of the 

New START Treaty, to provide for arms limitations 

in the event of the treaty’s non-renewal, and for other 

purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Save Arms control and 

5 Verification Efforts Act of 2019’’ or ‘‘SAVE Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress makes the following findings: 


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1 (1) Every United States president since John 

2 F. Kennedy has successfully concluded at least one 

3 agreement with Russia to reduce nuclear dangers. 

4 (2) If the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces 

5 Treaty is terminated, and the New START Treaty 

6 is not extended, or a new treaty is not negotiated 

7 and ratified before 2021, there would be no legally 

8 binding, verifiable limits on the United States or 

9 Russian nuclear arsenals for the first time since 

10 1972. 

11 (3) For both the United States and the Russian 

12 Federation, the New START Treaty’s transparency 

13 and verification measures provide invaluable insight 

14 into the size, capabilities, and operations of both 

15 countries’ nuclear forces beyond that provided by 

16 more traditional intelligence collection and assess17 ment methods, helping create a mutually beneficial 

18 environment of stability and predictability. 

19 (4) Former Republican and Democratic na20 tional security leaders, including George Shultz, Wil21 liam Perry, Richard Burt, Sam Nunn, Richard 

22 Lugar, and others, have expressed support for a 

23 prompt decision to extend the New START Treaty. 

24 (5) United States military leaders continue to 

25 see value in the New START Treaty, including Gen. 


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1 John Hyten, Commander of United States Strategic 

2 Command, who told Congress in March 2018 that 

3 ‘‘bilateral, verifiable arms control agreements are es4 sential to our ability to provide an effective deter5 rent,’’ and testified before Congress in February 

6 2019 that the New START Treaty is important be7 cause it provides to the United States ‘‘a cap on 

8 [Russia’s] strategic baseline nuclear weapons, and 

9 their ballistic missiles, both submarine and ICBM, 

10 as well as their bombers’’ and ‘‘just as important it 

11 gives me insight through the verification regime to 

12 their Russia’s real capabilities’’. 

13 (6) The United States NATO allies have con14 sistently expressed support for a decision by the 

15 United States and the Russian Federation to extend 

16 New START before the scheduled expiration date in 

17 2021. 

18 (7) Russian President Vladimir Putin said in 

19 July 2018 that ‘‘I reassured President Trump that 

20 Russia stands ready to extend this treaty, to prolong 

21 it, but we have to agree on the specifics . . .’’. 

22 (8) The Department of Defense Report on the 

23 Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation 

24 submitted pursuant to section 1240 of the National 

25 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 


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1 (Public Law 112–81; 125 Stat. 1643) determined 

2 that Russia ‘‘would not be able to achieve a mili3 tarily significant advantage by any plausible expan4 sion of its strategic nuclear forces, even in a cheat5 ing or breakout scenario under the New START 

6 Treaty, primarily because of the inherent surviv7 ability of the planned United States strategic force 

8 structure, particularly the Ohio-class ballistic missile 

9 submarines, a number of which are at sea at any 

10 given time’’. 

11 (9) For as long as it must exist, the United 

12 States nuclear arsenal must be maintained and mod13 ernized in a cost-effective manner to ensure it re14 mains a safe, secure, and reliable effective nuclear 

15 force that can continue to deter nuclear attack on 

16 the United States and its allies, and so that the 

17 United States can continue to pursue further 

18 verifiable reduction in global nuclear stockpiles con19 sistent with its obligations under the Nuclear Non20 proliferation Treaty. 

21 (10) The New START Treaty created a Bilat22 eral Consultative Commission to resolve issues re23 lated to implementation of the New START Treaty, 

24 and Article II of the New START Treaty states, 

25 ‘‘When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic 


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1 offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the 

2 right to raise the question of such a strategic offen3 sive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consult4 ative Commission.’’ 

5 SEC. 3. SENSE OF THE SENATE. 

6 It is the sense of the Senate that— 

7 (1) extending the New START Treaty by a pe8 riod of five years is in the national security interest 

9 of the United States, so long as the Russian Federa10 tion continues to meet the central limits of the trea11 ty; 

12 (2) the United States should immediately seek 

13 to begin discussions with the Russian Federation on 

14 agreeing to a 5-year extension of the New START 

15 Treaty; 

16 (3) the United States should use the Bilateral 

17 Consultative Commission mechanism within the New 

18 START Treaty to address issues related to new 

19 Russian strategic nuclear weapons it believes may 

20 fall under New START treaty limits; 

21 (4) extending the New START Treaty would 

22 facilitate efforts by the United States to pursue ad23 ditional arms control efforts with the Russian Fed24 eration, including efforts to address the Russian 


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1 Federation’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons and 

2 emerging technologies such as hypersonic weapons; 

3 (5) the United States should resume more reg4 ular talks on strategic stability with Russia, as well 

5 as additional bilateral and multilateral arms control 

6 efforts worldwide to address a changing global secu7 rity environment; and 

8 (6) extending the New START Treaty would 

9 facilitate efforts by the United States to engage with 

10 the People’s Republic of China to reduce dangers as11 sociated with its nuclear arsenal, which is fundamen12 tally different than the Russian Federation’s and re13 quires a separate, focused arms control effort. 

14 SEC. 4. CERTIFICATIONS IN EVENT NEW START TREATY IS 

15 NOT EXTENDED. 

16 Not later than 90 days after the date of the enact17 ment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, if the 

18 parties to the New START Treaty have not completed the 

19 procedures outlined in the treaty and its related protocols 

20 and annexes to extend the treaty’s effective date by up 

21 to five years beyond February 5, 2021— 

22 (1) the President, the Secretary of Defense, and 

23 the Secretary of State shall separately submit to the 

24 appropriate congressional committees a justification 

25 for why New START has not been extended and a 


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1 certification that the absence of an extension of the 

2 treaty is in the national security interest of the 

3 United States; and 

4 (2) the Director of National Intelligence shall 

5 submit to the appropriate congressional commit6 tees— 

7 (A) an intelligence community-coordinated 

8 assessment of why the New START Treaty has 

9 not been extended; 

10 (B) a certification that the absence of an 

11 extension of the treaty is in the national secu12 rity interest of the United States; and 

13 (C)(i) a certification that the United 

14 States is not losing intelligence insight into the 

15 Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear pro16 gram; or 

17 (ii) a report detailing how the Director of 

18 National Intelligence and the intelligence com19 munity will account for any lost intelligence ca20 pabilities. 

21 SEC. 5. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE. 

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

23 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 

24 Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional 

25 committees a National Intelligence Estimate, consisting of 


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1 an unclassified executive summary and judgments and a 

2 more detailed, classified report on the Russian Federa3 tion’s compliance with the New START Treaty and the 

4 impact to the intelligence collection capabilities of the 

5 United States if the New START Treaty and its related 

6 information exchanges and associated inspections regimes 

7 were to lapse. The report shall include the following ele8 ments: 

9 (1) A description of the Russian Federation’s 

10 compliance with the New START Treaty. 

11 (2) An assessment of the Russian Federation’s 

12 intentions with regard to extending the New START 

13 Treaty. 

14 (3) A description of the intelligence collection 

15 benefits gained as a result of the ratification and im16 plementation of the New START Treaty. 

17 (4) An assessment of what specific capabilities 

18 the United States intelligence community would have 

19 to develop and deploy to ensure that no loss of col20 lection capability would occur in the event of the 

21 lapse of the New START Treaty. 

22 (5) A cost estimate and estimated timeline for 

23 developing these new or additional capabilities, and 

24 a description of how new intelligence gathering re25 quirements related to the Russian Federation’s nuVerDate Sep 11 2014 00:26 May 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1285.IS S1285

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1 clear forces may affect other United States intel2 ligence gathering needs. 

3 (6) An assessment of projections for Russian 

4 Federation nuclear and non-nuclear force size, struc5 ture, and composition with the New START Treaty 

6 limitations in place and without the limitations in 

7 place. 

8 (7) An assessment of Russian Federation ac9 tions, intentions, and likely responses to the United 

10 States withdrawing from, suspending its obligations 

11 under, or allowing to lapse the New START Treaty 

12 and subsequently developing platforms and weapons 

13 beyond the New START Treaty’s limitations. 

14 (b) BRIEFINGS.—The Director of National Intel15 ligence shall brief the appropriate congressional commit16 tees on the elements set forth in subsection (a) when the 

17 National Intelligence Estimate is submitted under such 

18 subsection and every 120 days thereafter. 

19 SEC. 6. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. 

20 (a) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.— 

21 (1) REPORT ON EXPECTED FORCE STRUCTURE

22 CHANGES IN EVENT OF TREATY LAPSE.—Not later 

23 than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this 

24 Act, and not later than February 5, 2021, if the 

25 New START Treaty is allowed to lapse, the SecVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:12 May 07, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1285.IS S1285

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1 retary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate 

2 congressional committees a report discussing 

3 changes to the expected force structure of the 

4 United States Armed Forces if the New START 

5 Treaty is no longer in place and estimating the ex6 pected costs necessary to make such changes. 

7 (2) REPORT ON IMPACTS TO MODERNIZATION

8 PLAN.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the 

9 enactment of this Act, and not later than February 

10 5, 2021, if the New START Treaty is allowed to 

11 lapse, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of 

12 Energy shall jointly submit to the appropriate con13 gressional committees a report on how the current 

14 program of record to replace and upgrade United 

15 States nuclear weapons delivery systems and war16 heads, which anticipates the continued existence of 

17 the New START Treaty, would be modified without 

18 the existence of the New START Treaty. The report 

19 shall include the information required to be sub20 mitted in the report required by section 1043 of the 

21 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

22 2012 (Public Law 112–81; 125 Stat. 1576) and 

23 shall include— 

24 (A) a separate 10-year cost estimate from 

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1 clear sustainment plan that does and does not 

2 anticipate the continued existence of the New 

3 START Treaty, including possible costs associ4 ated with conversion or uploading of strategic 

5 delivery vehicles and warheads; 

6 (B) a separate 10-year cost estimate from 

7 the Department of Energy to implement a nu8 clear sustainment and modernization plan that 

9 does and does not anticipate the continued ex10 istence of the New START Treaty, including 

11 uploading warheads previously withdrawn from 

12 service; 

13 (C) a description of how the absence of the 

14 New START Treaty limits would impact the 

15 schedule and cost of Department of Energy’s 

16 Stockpile Stewardship management plan; and 

17 (D) an assessment of the potential impacts 

18 on how these changes will impact the Depart19 ment of Energy’s nuclear weapons complex. 

20 (b) DEPARTMENT OF STATE.—Not later than 90 

21 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not 

22 later than February 5, 2021, if the New START Treaty 

23 is allowed to lapse, the Secretary of State shall submit 

24 to the appropriate congressional committees a report on 

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1 pacts to United States diplomatic relations if the New 

2 START Treaty lapses. The report shall include the fol3 lowing elements: 

4 (1) An assessment of the likely reactions of the 

5 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 

6 NATO member countries, United States allies, Asia, 

7 and each permanent member of the United Nations 

8 Security Council. 

9 (2) A description of the expected impacts on the 

10 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the ability of 

11 the United States to key nonproliferation objectives. 

12 (3) A description of the risks posed to the long13 term health of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 

14 in the absence of United States-Russia bilateral nu15 clear arms control agreements and dialogue. 

16 (c) PRESIDENTIAL REPORT ON STRATEGIC ARMS

17 CONTROL STRATEGY.—Not later than February 5, 2020, 

18 the President shall submit to the appropriate congres19 sional committees a report including— 

20 (1) a 5-year strategy for future strategic arms 

21 control agreements with the Russian Federation; 

22 (2) an update on the status of any current dis23 cussions that may be in progress at time of report; 

24 and 


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1 (3) a description of other United States bilat2 eral and multilateral arms control efforts globally. 

3 SEC. 7. PROHIBITION ON INCREASES IN CERTAIN WAR4 HEADS, MISSILES, AND LAUNCHERS. 

5 (a) PROHIBITION.— 

6 (1) IN GENERAL.—If either of the conditions in 

7 paragraph (2) occurs, the United States Government 

8 may not, except as provided under subsection (b), 

9 obligate or expend any funds to— 

10 (A) increase above 1,550 the number of 

11 United States warheads operationally deployed 

12 on launchers for ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy 

13 bombers; 

14 (B) increase above 700 the number of de15 ployed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 

16 (ICBMs), Submarine-Launched Ballistic Mis17 siles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers; or 

18 (C) increase above 800 the number of de19 ployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, 

20 SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers, 

21 as such terms are defined and such systems are 

22 counted in the New START Treaty. 

23 (2) CONDITIONS.—The conditions referred to in 

24 paragraph (1) are as follows: 


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1 (A) The President initiates United States 

2 withdrawal from the New START Treaty in ac3 cordance with the procedures outlined in the 

4 New START Treaty and its related protocols 

5 and annexes. 

6 (B) As of February 5, 2021, the parties to 

7 the New START Treaty have not completed the 

8 procedures outlined in the New START Treaty 

9 and its related protocols and annexes to extend 

10 the Treaty’s effective date to February 5, 2026. 

11 (C) The President takes one or more ac12 tions to suspend United States obligations out13 lined in the New START Treaty and its related 

14 protocols and annexes. 

15 (b) EXCEPTIONS.—The prohibition under subsection 

16 (a) shall not be in effect if all of the following conditions 

17 are met: 

18 (1) The President, the Secretary of State, the 

19 Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and 

20 the Director of National Intelligence jointly certify 

21 that the Russian Federation is, in a way that is mili22 tarily significant— 

23 (A) increasing above 1,550 the number of 

24 the Russian Federation’s strategic warheads 

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1 continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Sub2 marine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), 

3 and heavy bombers; 

4 (B) increasing above 700 the number of 

5 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers; 

6 or 

7 (C) increasing above 800 the number of 

8 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, 

9 SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers, 

10 as such terms are defined and such systems are 

11 counted in the New START Treaty and its related 

12 protocols and annexes. 

13 (2) The President, the Director of National In14 telligence, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 

15 Energy, and the Secretary of Defense certify that it 

16 is in the national security interest of the United 

17 States to exceed prohibition limits. 

18 (3) The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary 

19 of Energy submit to the appropriate congressional 

20 committees a report with 10-year cost projections re21 lated to increasing the number of United States nu22 clear warheads, delivery vehicles, and systems as 

23 covered by the New START Treaty and its related 

24 protocols and annexes. 


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1 (4) The Director of National Intelligence sub2 mits to the appropriate congressional committees a 

3 National Intelligence Estimate of Russian actions, 

4 intentions, and likely responses to the United States 

5 exceeding these specified caps. 

6 (5) The Secretary of State, the Secretary of 

7 Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director 

8 of National Intelligence provide briefings to the ap9 propriate congressional committees about the certifi10 cations and reports submitted under paragraphs (1) 

11 though (4). 

12 (6) There is not enacted, within 60 days after 

13 each of the conditions in paragraphs (1) through (5) 

14 having been met, a joint resolution of disapproval 

15 that continues the prohibition on funding levels 

16 under subsection (a). 

17 (c) SUNSET.—The prohibition under subsection (a) 

18 shall expire on February 5, 2026. 

19 SEC. 8. FORM OF REPORTS AND CERTIFICATIONS. 

20 If any report or certification required under this Act 

21 is submitted in classified form, an unclassified version 

22 shall also be submitted at the same time. 

23 SEC. 9. DEFINITIONS. 

24 In this Act: 


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1 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT2 TEES DEFINED.—The term ‘‘appropriate congres3 sional committees’’ means all members of— 

4 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 

5 the Committee on Armed Services, the Select 

6 Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee 

7 on Appropriations of the Senate; and 

8 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

9 Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent 

10 Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Com11 mittee on Appropriations of the House of Rep12 resentatives. 

13 (2) INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

14 TREATY.—The term ‘‘Intermediate Range Nuclear 

15 Forces Treaty’’ means the Treaty between the 

16 United States of America and the Union of Soviet 

17 Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their In18 termediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, to19 gether with the Memorandum of Understanding and 

20 Two Protocols, signed at Washington December 8, 

21 1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988. 

22 (3) NEW START TREATY.—The term ‘‘New 

23 START Treaty’’ means the Treaty between the 

24 United States of America and the Russian Federa25 tion on Measures for the Further Reduction and 


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1 Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed April 

2 8, 2010, and entered into force February 5, 2011. 

3 (4) NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY.— 

4 The term ‘‘Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty’’ means 

5 the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 

6 Weapons, signed at Washington July 1, 1968 (com7 monly known as the ‘‘NPT’’). 

Æ 


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