UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MATTHEW S. WOLF, on behalf of

himself and all others

similarly situated,

 Plaintiff,

v.

NISSAN MOTOR ACCEPTANCE

CORPORATION,

 Defendant.

Civil No. 10-3338 (NLH/KMW)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

Michael John DeBenedictis, Esquire

DeBenedictis & DeBenedictis L.L.C.

20 Brace Road

Suite 350

Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08034

Thomas T. Booth, Jr., Esquire

Law Offices of Thomas T. Booth, Jr., L.L.C.

129 W. Evesham Road

Voorhees, New Jersey 08043

Attorneys for Plaintiff Matthew S. Wolf

William H. Grae, Esquire

The Chartwell Law Offices, L.L.P.

75 Main Street

Suite 201

Millburn, New Jersey 07041

Attorney for Defendant Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation

HILLMAN, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Matthew

Wolf’s motion [Doc. No. 17] for reconsideration. Plaintiff seeks

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reconsideration of the Court's June 22, 2011 Opinion and Order

[Doc. Nos. 15, 16] granting Defendant Nissan Motor Acceptance

Corporation’s (hereinafter, “Nissan”) motion to stay this matter

and compel arbitration and referring this matter to arbitration. 

(Pl.’s Br. in Supp. of His Mot. for Recons. [Doc. No. 17-1]

(hereinafter, “Pl.’s Recons. Br.”), 1.) Specifically, “Plaintiff

... requests reconsideration of [the Court’s] [O]pinion ... to

the extent” that Opinion is based upon AT&T Mobility LLC v.

Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), which was submitted by Nissan

as supplemental authority in support of the motion to stay and

compel arbitration after the briefing had closed. (Pl.’s Recons.

Br. 1.) The Court has considered the parties submissions, and 1

decides this matter pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

78. 

For the reasons expressed below, Plaintiff's motion for

reconsideration is denied.

 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

In this action, Plaintiff brings a putative class action

against Nissan alleging violations of the Servicemembers Civil

1. The Court specifically considered the supplemental letter

briefs [Doc. Nos. 19, 20] submitted by Plaintiff and Nissan on

March 20, 2012 and March 23, 2012 respectively, which highlight

recent developments in the relevant case law. 

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Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 501 et seq, as well as a claim for

conversion. (Op. [Doc. No. 15] 1-3, June 22, 2011.) As

previously set forth in the Court’s June 22, 2011 Opinion,

Plaintiff, a captain in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps of the

United States Army Reserves, “entered into an agreement to lease

a 2007 Nissan Infiniti G35 Sedan for thirty-nine months” on or

around November 25, 2006. (Id. at 2.) Upon entering the lease

agreement, Plaintiff “paid $595 in ‘capitalized cost reduction’”

which was considered as “an advance toward the lease's rent.” 

(Id. at 2-3.) Similarly, Plaintiff also opted to prepay for

several other items which he could have elected to pay on a

monthly basis. (Id. at 3.) Approximately one year later,

Plaintiff was called into active military service, and as a

result, Plaintiff invoked the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act

(“SCRA”) and returned the leased vehicle to Nissan on or about

October 30, 2007. (Id.) 

As set forth in his complaint, Plaintiff contends that “the

SCRA entitles military service members, like himself, to a

prorated refund of lease payments made in advance.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that although he invoked the SCRA and provided

the proper notices, Nissan would not refund any prorated

“capitalized cost reduction” payments initially made by

Plaintiff. (Id.) Relevant here, the lease agreement between the

parties “contained an arbitration clause mandating that all

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claims are subject to arbitration.” (Id. at 2.) In June of

2010, Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action seeking to

bring a putative class action suit against Nissan for conversion

and violations of the SCRA. (Id. at 3.)

B. Nissan’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

Rather than answer Plaintiff’s complaint, on September 17,

2010, Nissan moved to stay the proceedings in this Court and to

compel Plaintiff to arbitrate his claims under the Federal

Arbitration Act, (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4, as set forth in the

arbitration clause of the parties’ lease agreement. (See

generally Def.’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Compel Arbitration and

to Stay Proceedings [Doc. No. 5-1] 1-2.) Plaintiff filed a brief

in opposition to Nissan’s motion on December 9, 2010, and

Defendant filed a reply brief in support of the motion on

December 20, 2010. 

Approximately four (4) months after the briefing on Nissan’s

motion to stay and compel arbitration was complete, the Supreme

Court of the United States issued an opinion in AT&T Mobility LLC

v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). In AT&T Mobility, the

Supreme Court considered “whether the FAA prohibits States from

conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements

on the availability of classwide arbitration procedures” and

addressed the question of whether Section 2 of the FAA preempted

a California state-law rule which classified “most

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collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as

unconscionable.” 131 S. Ct. at 1744, 1746. In ruling on these

issues, the Supreme Court reversed the determination by the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals, wherein the Ninth Circuit previously

concluded that the California state-law rule at issue was not

preempted by the FAA. Id. at 1745, 1753.

The Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility concluded that while the

saving clause of Section 2 of the FAA “preserves generally 2

applicable contract defenses” it does not “preserve state-law

rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the

2. Section 2 of the FAA provides that:

A written provision in any maritime transaction or

a contract evidencing a transaction involving

commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy

thereafter arising out of such contract or

transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or

any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to

submit to arbitration an existing controversy

arising out of such a contract, transaction, or

refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and

enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law

or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

9 U.S.C. § 2. 

 The final phrase of Section 2, referred to as a saving

clause, “permits arbitration agreements to be declared

unenforceable ‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for

the revocation of any contract.’” AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at

1746. “This saving clause permits agreements to arbitrate to be

invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as

fraud, duress, or unconscionability,’ but not by defenses that

apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the

fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.” Id. (citation

omitted). 

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FAA's objectives.” Id. at 1748. According to the Supreme Court,

“[r]equiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes

with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a

scheme inconsistent with the FAA.” Id. Thus, the Supreme Court

held that the California state-law rule at issue stood “as an

obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes

and objectives of Congress ... [and was] preempted by the FAA.” 

Id. at 1753 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Based on the April 27, 2011 opinion in AT&T Mobility, Nissan

filed a letter brief on May 11, 2011, arguing that AT&T Mobility

“wholly forecloses” Plaintiff’s argument that the class waiver in

the parties’ lease agreement is unconscionable and therefore

unenforceable under New Jersey Law. (Def.’s Letter Br. [Doc. No.

14] 1, May 11, 2011.) Nissan thus argued that “[t]o the extent

New Jersey law would find [Nissan’s] waiver unenforceable, the

FAA preempts New Jersey law[, thus] [t]he parties arbitration

agreement should be enforced, and [Nissan’s] motion to compel

arbitration should be granted.” (Id. at 3.) The docket reflects

that Plaintiff failed to respond to Nissan’s letter brief, and

thus did not object to Nissan’s arguments regarding the holding

in AT&T Mobility and the FAA preempting New Jersey state law. 

C. The June 22, 2011 Opinion and Order

By Opinion and Order dated June 22, 2011, the Court granted

Defendant’s motion to stay the proceedings before this Court and

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to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims. (See generally Op.

[Doc. No. 15], June 22, 2011; Order [Doc. No. 16], June 22,

2011.) As a threshold issue, the Court determined that, despite

the “general breadth” and “expansive” nature of the arbitration

clause, the arbitrability of the reasonableness and validity of

the arbitration clause itself was an issue to be determined by

the Court, and not the arbitrator. (Op. [Doc. No. 15] 9-11, June

22, 2011.) Accordingly, the Court proceeded to consider

Plaintiff’s central challenges to the arbitration clause. (Id.

at 11.) 

In this regard, Plaintiff made two arguments relevant to the

present motion for reconsideration. First, Plaintiff argued 3

that the arbitration clause was unconscionable based on the

“purposes and policies underscoring the SCRA[,]” which is

designed to free members of our Armed Forces from civilian

obligations to the extent that those obligations may distract or

3. Plaintiff also argued that the entire arbitration agreement

was unconscionable on the basis of a fee-shifting provision and a

provision regarding costs on appeal. (Op. [Doc. No. 15] 17, June

22, 2011.) The Court found that these provisions were

“unconscionable and unenforceable to the extent they may be

construed and applied to require [Plaintiff] to shoulder the

entire financial burden of the arbitration and, ... the appeal of

his claims.” (Id. at 18-19.) However, the Court found that the

unconscionability of these provisions did “not invalidate the

entire arbitration agreement[,]” and only the unconscionable

provisions would be stricken and severed from the remainder of

the agreement. (Id. at 19.) Plaintiff does not seek

reconsideration of this portion of the Court’s June 22, 2011

Opinion. (See, e.g., Pl.’s Recons. Br. 2, 9-10, 13-15.) 

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interfere with our service members’ military service and

objectives. (Id. at 12.) According to Plaintiff the purposes

and policies underlying the SCRA require the invalidation of a

class action waiver provision like the one in the parties’ lease

agreement. (Id.) On this issue, however, the Court concluded

that “the SCRA, by its own words and provisions, does not bar or

otherwise invalidate a class action or arbitration waiver

provision.” (Id.) The Court specifically recognized that the

SCRA was “a clearly worded statute[,]” and that it could not

“modif[y] or nullif[y] a contractual agreement mutually adopted

by private parties” in the absence of “direct authority” within

the SCRA “that precludes waivers of class-wide proceedings.” 

(Id.) The Court also noted that in light of AT&T Mobility, the

Court could not infer “the SCRA’s tacit supersession or

predominance over” the Federal Arbitration Act. (Id. at 13.)

Second, Plaintiff also argued that the arbitration clause

was unconscionable under New Jersey law relying on the New Jersey

Supreme Court’s decision in Muhammad v. Cty. Bank of Rehoboth

Beach, 912 A.2d 88 (N.J. 2006), and the Third Circuit’s decision

in Homa v. American Express Co., 558 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2009).4

(Op. [Doc. No. 15] 17, June 22, 2011). The Court considered this

3. In opposing Nissan’s original motion, Plaintiff argued that

“the Third Circuit and the New Jersey Supreme Court have clearly

established[] [that] the FAA does not preclude an examination

into whether an arbitration agreement is unconscionable under New

Jersey law.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 13.) 

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argument, but, in light of AT&T Mobility, the Court could not

“find any public interest articulated in this case, either in

connection with the SCRA or New Jersey law, [that] overr[ode] the

clear, unambiguous, and binding class action waiver included in

the parties’ arbitration agreement.” (Id. at 17.) The Court

went on to recognize that “New Jersey precedent notwithstanding,

the Court [was] bound by the controlling authority of the United

States Supreme Court.” (Id.)

II. STANDARD 

In this district, motions for reconsideration are governed

by Local Civil Rule 7.1(i), which provides in relevant part, that

"[a] motion for reconsideration shall be served and filed within

14 days after the entry of the order or judgment on the original

motion by the Judge or Magistrate Judge." L. CIV. R. 7.1(i). 

Rule 7.1(i) further provides that the party moving for

reconsideration must submit a "brief setting forth concisely the

matter or controlling decisions which the party believes the

Judge or Magistrate Judge has overlooked[.]" L. CIV. R. 7.1(i). 

A motion for reconsideration under Rule 7.1(i) is "'an extremely

limited procedural vehicle,' and requests pursuant to th[is]

rule[] are to be granted 'sparingly.'" Langan Eng'g & Envtl.

Servs., Inc. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., No. 07-2983, 2008 WL 4330048,

at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2008) (citing P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt.

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LLC v. Cendant Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 349, 353 (D.N.J. 1992)). 

The purpose of a motion for reconsideration "'is to correct

manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered

evidence.'" Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v.

Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). 

In seeking reconsideration, the moving party bears a heavy burden

and the motion can only be granted if the party "shows at least

one of the following grounds: (1) an intervening change in the

controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was

not available when the court granted the motion for summary

judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact

or to prevent manifest injustice." Id. 

However, reconsideration is not appropriate where the motion

only raises a party's disagreement with the Court's initial

decision. Florham Park Chevron, Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,

680 F. Supp. 159, 163 (D.N.J. 1988); see also Schiano v. MBNA

Corp., No. 05-CV-1771, 2006 WL 3831225, *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2006)

("Mere disagreement with the Court will not suffice to show that

the Court overlooked relevant facts or controlling law, ..., and

should be dealt with through the normal appellate process[.]")

(citations omitted); United States v. Compaction Sys. Corp., 88

F. Supp. 2d 339, 345 (D.N.J. 1999) ("Mere disagreement with a

court's decision normally should be raised through the appellate

process and is inappropriate on a motion for

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[reconsideration]."). Accordingly, "courts in this District

routinely deny motions for reconsideration that simply re-argue

the original motion." Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.,

No. 04-2355, 2009 WL 5818836, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 2009). 

III. ANALYSIS 

In the present motion, Plaintiff argues that 5

reconsideration is proper and should be granted because the Court

overlooked “matters relating to the contractual terms” as well as

“decisions relat[ing] to this Court’s ability to void a class

action waiver under federal law and state law[.]” (Pl.’s Recons.

Br. 4.) According to Plaintiff, proper consideration of these

matter and decisions reasonably would have altered the result

reached in the June 22, 2011 Opinion. (Id.) 

Plaintiff identifies two specific issues the Court should

reconsider in the present motion: (1) “[w]hether AT&T Mobility

forecloses the Application of State Law to an Arbitration

Agreement When Such Application Neither Manufactures a Result

5. Local Rule 7.1(i) requires that a brief offered in support of

a motion for reconsideration “set[] forth concisely the matter or

controlling decisions which the party believes the Judge ... has

overlooked[.]” L. Civ. R. 7.1(i) (emphasis added). Here, we are

of the view that the brief in support of Plaintiff’s motion is

anything but concise. Despite Plaintiff’s arguable failure to

comply with the requirement of Rule 7.1(i), the Court has fully

considered all of Plaintiff’s arguments, however nuanced they may

be, in denying the present motion for reconsideration. For the

sake of clarity and brevity, the Court does not set forth each

argument in this Opinion. 

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Inconsistent with the Parties’ Express Agreement nor

Fundamentally Alters the Dispute Resolution Process Against the

Wishes of the Parties[?]” and (2) Plaintiff’s contention that

“this Court has the authority to void the class action waiver in

arbitration even in the absence of express statutory authority

under the SCRA[.]” (Id. at 9, 13.) Plaintiff also asserts that

contrary to the June 22, 2011 Opinion, “the application of New

Jersey precedent to void the class action waiver is not preempted

by AT&T Mobility under the facts of this case[.]” (Id. at 2.) 

With respect to the first issue, Plaintiff argues generally

that “application of Muhammad does not stand as an obstacle to

the intent of Congress as embodied in the FAA[.]” (Id. at 9.) 

Plaintiff asserts that unlike the circumstances of AT&T Mobility,

the parties here “consented to the application of state law” and

have contractually stipulated that if the “class action waiver is

otherwise voidable under [New Jersey’s] public policy, the

parties hav[e] consented to proceed[] in court and not as an

individual arbitration[.]” (Id. at 9-10.) Plaintiff contends

that a proper and complete reading of the parties’ agreement

demonstrates that Plaintiff is simply “seeking to hold Nissan to

its contractual assent to representative litigation proceeding in

court.” (Id. at 11.) Thus, Plaintiff argues that “the parties

have an agreement that if the class action waiver is voidable

(under Muhammad) then the parties agree to proceed as a class

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action in court.” (Id.)

Plaintiff’s argument is multi-layered - asserting that (1)

the Court may properly find the class action waiver

unconscionable under New Jersey law, and thus voidable from the

lease agreement, despite the Supreme Court’s holding in AT&T

Mobility; and (2) to the extent the Court finds the class action

waiver is voidable under New Jersey law, the parties may still

proceed with class wide claims in court. However, Plaintiff’s

argument – that he maintains the right to proceed with class wide

claims for relief in the judicial forum, as opposed to the

arbitration forum - has previously been considered and rejected

by the Court. 

In opposing Nissan’s original motion to compel arbitration,

Plaintiff specifically argued that the “class action waiver ...

only applie[d] to arbitration[.]” (Pl.’s Opp’n 4; see also id. at

11 n.6 (“The class action waiver is not ‘symmetrical’; that is,

it only applies if the arbitration forum is selected, not the

judicial forum.”); id. at 12 (arguing that Nissan is “attempting 6

6. Footnote six continues: “In other words, Nissan did not draft

... [a] contract that contains a blanket class action waiver

regardless of the forum, rather under the guise of a forum

selection clause, Nissan has attempted to contractually confer

upon itself the right to reto-actively ‘defeat’ a putative class

action appropriately filed under the lease in federal court, by

selecting the arbitration forum, then denying the putative class

access to any and all of the arbitration forum’s claim

aggregation procedures that are otherwise available to the

class.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 11 n.6.) 

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to switch this putative class from the forum within which [the

lease agreement] permits class actions [i.e., the judicial forum]

to the forum within which [the lease agreement] does not permit

class actions [i.e., the arbitration forum][.]”); id. at 2

(stating that because “the lease agreement specifically provides

[that] class actions are to be venued in court, and not in

arbitration, plaintiff brought this matter in the present

forum.”)). 

The Court fully considered this argument, which attempts to

carve out a specific exemption from the arbitration provision

allowing for class actions brought in court as opposed to in

arbitration. This argument, and its slight variation as argued 7

in the present motion, are insufficient to warrant

reconsideration of the Court’s prior finding that the “class

action waiver” was “clear, unambiguous, and binding ... [as]

included in the parties’ arbitration agreement.” (Op. [Doc. No.

15] 17, June 22, 2011.) The Court previously noted the “general

7. While Plaintiff initially argued that the class action waiver

only applied to class wide proceedings brought in arbitration,

but not in court, Plaintiff later contradicted his own argument. 

At subsequent points in Plaintiff’s opposition, Plaintiff

contended that “[t]his case is about a contractual provision that

precludes all class-wide remedies for any car leased from

defendant.” (See Pl.’s Opp’n 16) (emphasis added). Plaintiff

specifically noted that in Muhammad the “central issue” was the

fact that the “class-action waiver precluded a class action

‘whether in arbitration or in court litigation.’” (Id.) (citation

omitted). Plaintiff then argued that this “is precisely what the

[class action waiver] at issue in this matter, on its face,

mandates.” (Id.) 

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breadth” of the arbitration provision, which provides that “‘any

claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise

... shall, at your or our election be resolved by neutral,

binding arbitration and not by court action[,]’” and found that

provision was “indeed expansive[.]” (Id. at 9.) 8

In this motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff merely

presents his disagreement with the Court’s determination that the

arbitration provision — and by extension its class action waiver

— are broad and expansive. Plaintiff is simply re-arguing that

the same narrow interpretation of the class action waiver he

presented in opposition to Nissan’s original motion should govern

this action. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to meet the standard

to warrant reconsideration of the Court’s June 22, 2011 Opinion

on this issue.

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff argues that despite the

Supreme Court’s holding in AT&T Mobility, the Court may, properly

apply New Jersey precedent to void the class action waiver

because Muhammad is not preempted by the FAA, this argument has 9

8. The only limitation the Court found with regard to the

expansive breadth of this arbitration provision was that the

provision “lacked sufficient specificity and clarity” to “inform

a potential consumer that even the validity of the arbitration

clause itself must be decided by the arbitrator” as opposed to

the Court. (Op. [Doc. No. 15] 9-10, June 22, 2011.)

9. Plaintiff contends that Defendant initially “[c]onced[ed] the

application of Muhammad” and “took the straightforward legal

position that New Jersey would enforce the class action

waiver[.]” (Pl.’s Recons. Br. 1 n.1.) Plaintiff argues that

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been completely foreclosed to Plaintiff by controlling precedent

from the Supreme Court and now from the Third Circuit Court of

Appeals. On remand from the Supreme Court after AT&T Mobility,

the Third Circuit in Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 655 F.3d 225 (3d

Cir. 2011), specifically determined that the FAA preempts the New

Nissan “did not raise any preemption-based arguments regarding

[the] state precedent at issue here ... under the FAA.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff is correct in noting that Nissan did not make an FAA

preemption argument in the original motion to compel arbitration,

but Plaintiff overstates the import of Nissan’s apparent failure

to assert preemption at the outset.

 At the time Nissan filed the motion to compel arbitration on

September 17, 2010, controlling precedent from the Third Circuit

held that the FAA did not preempt the New Jersey Supreme Court’s

holding in Muhammad. See Homa v. American Express Co., 558 F.3d

225, 229-30 (3d Cir. 2009). Subsequently, the Supreme Court

decided AT&T Mobility on April 27, 2011, and pursuant to that

opinion, vacated a May 2010 opinion and order entered by the

Third Circuit which relied on the holding in Homa. See Cellco

P’ship v. Litman, 131 S. Ct. 2872 (2011). 

 On remand, the Third Circuit considered anew “whether the FAA

preempts the New Jersey Supreme Court’s ruling in Muhammad.” 

Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 655 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 2011). In

August of 2011, the Third Circuit issued its opinion in Litman

holding that Homa had been abrogated by the Supreme Court’s

decision in AT&T Mobility and that Muhammad’s holding was in fact

preempted by the FAA. Id. 

 Accordingly, at the time Nissan filed the motion to compel

arbitration, Homa precluded from Nissan from arguing that the FAA

preempted Muhammad. Had Defendant asserted a preemption based

argument at the outset when Homa precluded the same, Nissan or

its counsel could reasonably have been subject to sanctions for

violating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) by asserting

legal contentions which were not warranted by existing law. See

FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). 

 Moreover, within just two weeks of the Supreme Court’s ruling

in AT&T Mobility, Defendant submitted a letter brief [Doc. No.

14] specifically asserting a preemption argument because, for the

first time, the law reasonably supported Nissan’s position. 

Plaintiff chose not to file any response or objection to Nissan’s

letter brief outlining the holding in AT&T Mobility. 

 

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Jersey Supreme Court’s ruling in Muhammad. Litman, 655 F.3d at

230. The Third Circuit explained that the holding in AT&T

Mobility is “both broad and clear: a state law that seeks to

impose class arbitration despite a contractual agreement for

individualized arbitration is inconsistent with, and therefore

preempted by, the FAA, irrespective of whether class arbitration

‘is desirable for unrelated reasons.’” Litman, 655 F.3d at 231

(citing AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1753). Thus, Plaintiff in

this action can no longer rely on Muhammad, as the Third Circuit

has clearly held the FAA preempts this New Jersey precedent. 

10 11

With respect to Plaintiff’s argument the Court has the

authority to void the class action waiver in the arbitration

10. The Third Circuit recently reaffirmed the broad holding in

Litman and concluded that under AT&T Mobility, a Pennsylvania law

similar to the New Jersey law in Muhammad was also preempted by

the FAA. Quilloin v. Tenet HealthSystem Philadelphia, Inc., ---

F.3d. ---, No. 11-1393, 2012 WL 833742, at *9 (3d Cir. Mar. 14,

2012). 

11. Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff contends that the

lease agreement stipulates that if the class action waiver is

voidable under New Jersey law, the parties may proceed with

litigation in court, Litman similarly forecloses that argument. 

The plaintiffs in Litman made virtually the same argument, which

the Third Circuit explicitly rejected. 655 F.3d at 231 n.8

(“Second, [the plaintiffs] argue that they should be allowed to

proceed to litigation because the Agreements' say that ‘if for

some reason the prohibition on class arbitrations ... is deemed

unenforceable, then the agreement to arbitrate will not apply.’ 

... As [the plaintiffs] see it, that provision was triggered by

Muhammad. However, because Muhammad is preempted by the FAA, it

is inapplicable here and cannot trigger that provision.”)

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument in this case also fails. 

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provision even in the absence of express statutory authority

under the SCRA, the Court specifically addressed this issue in

ruling on Nissan’s original motion. Plaintiff fails to submit

any authority binding on this Court that warrants reconsideration

on this issue. The Court previously noted that if “the SCRA

guarantee[d] service members the right to a class-wide proceeding

to vindicate their statutory benefits, then that [was] not ...

made apparent to the Court.” (Op. [Doc. No. 15] 14, June 22,

2011.) Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the SCRA guarantees

the right of servicemembers to enforce their rights under this

statutory scheme by virtue of a class-wide proceeding.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff's motion fails

to set "forth concisely the matter or controlling decisions

which" Plaintiff believes the Court overlooked. See L. CIV. R.

7.1(i). It is clear that the present motion for reconsideration

simply represents Plaintiff's disagreement with the Court's

initial decision and constitutes an attempt to re-argue

Plaintiff’s prior opposition arguments. Plaintiff’s disagreement

alone is insufficient to establish that the Court overlooked

relevant facts or controlling law in granting summary judgment

for Defendant. See Schiano, 2006 WL 3831225, *2 ("Mere

disagreement with the Court will not suffice to show that the

Court overlooked relevant facts or controlling law, ..., and

should be dealt with through the normal appellate process[.]")

18

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(citations omitted). Furthermore, denial of Plaintiff's motion

for reconsideration is appropriate given that the motion simply

re-argues the same contentions asserted by Plaintiff in

opposition to Nissan’s original motion to compel arbitration. 

See Altana Pharma AG, 2009 WL 5818836, at *1. In light of the

recognition in this District that a motion for reconsideration is

"an extremely limited procedural vehicle" and that such requests

should be granted "sparingly", the Court finds that Plaintiff

fails to meet the standard for reconsideration, and the motion

for reconsideration must be denied. See Langan, 2008 WL 4330048,

at *1.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration [Doc. No. 17] is denied. An order consistent

with this Opinion will be entered. 

Dated: March 29, 2012 /s/ Noel L. Hillman 

At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

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