Filed 2/22/24 Adelman v. Adelman CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

GARRET ADELMAN et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

JEROME ADELMAN,

Defendant and Respondent.

B330918

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. Nos. 18STLC02914, 

BV033912)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Mark E. Windham, Judge. Affirmed.

Tamer Law Corp. and Steven M. Tamer for Plaintiffs and 

Appellants.

Law Offices of Raymond Hovsepian and Raymond 

Hovsepian for Defendant and Respondent.

 ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳
2

Plaintiffs Garret and Justin Adelman appeal from a trial 

court order sustaining a demurrer to the first count of their 

complaint against defendant Jerome Adelman, as Trustee of the 

Delores Adelman Separate Property Trust. We affirm the 

judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We take the relevant facts from the operative initial

complaint and attached exhibit. (Rufini v. CitiMortgage, Inc.

(2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 299, 302; Hill v. Roll Internat. Corp.

(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1300.)

Plaintiffs lived in a guest house owned by Delores Adelman

from June 2006 to November 2015.

1 They paid Delores a total of 

$84,300 in rent. Delores passed away in October 2014. 

Defendant is the trustee of her estate.

In December 2014, plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Los 

Angeles Housing and Community Investment Department 

(HCIDLA) requesting an investigation of an illegal eviction. In 

January 2015, the HCIDLA issued a letter addressed to Delores

stating the guest house was subject to the Los Angeles Rent 

Stabilization Ordinance (RSO) and explaining some of the 

ordinance’s procedures and requirements. The letter did not 

assert Delores had violated the RSO.

In January 2016, plaintiffs filed suit against Delores, her 

estate, and Jerome.

2 Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged the defendants 

violated Los Angeles Municipal Code section 151.05, 

1 For the sake of clarity we refer to some of the parties by 

first name only.

2 Only Jerome is a party to this appeal.
3

subdivision A, by collecting rent “ ‘without first paying annual 

registration fees for their rental units and obtaining a valid 

rental unit registration certificate from the HCIDLA.’ ”3 The first 

cause of action alleged plaintiffs were entitled to disgorgement of 

the $84,300 in rent they had paid during their tenancy, as well as 

$252,900 in treble damages. It further alleged these remedies 

were available under section 151.05, subdivision A.

4

Defendant demurred to the complaint, arguing in part that 

the first cause of action failed to state a claim. Citing Lyles v. 

Sangadeo-Patel (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 759 (Lyles), defendant 

argued a landlord’s failure to register does not entitle a tenant to 

disgorgement of all rent paid or treble damages under the RSO.

The court sustained the demurrer to the first cause of action 

without leave to amend. The court later granted summary 

judgment of the complaint’s remaining cause of action. This 

appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. The RSO Does Not Provide for Disgorgement of All 

Rent Paid or Treble Damages for Failure to Comply 

with Registration Requirements

“ ‘On review from an order sustaining a demurrer, “we 

examine the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges 

facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory, 

such facts being assumed true for this purpose. [Citations.]” 

3 All undesignated code references are to the Los Angeles 

Municipal Code.

4 The complaint included a second cause of action for 

violation of section 151.09, subdivision G, seeking relocation fees. 

That claim is not at issue in this appeal.
4

[Citation.]’ ” (Tucker v. Pacific Bell Mobile Services (2012) 208 

Cal.App.4th 201, 210.) “The court does not, however, assume the 

truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Aubry v.

Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

Section 151.05, subdivision A provides, in relevant part, 

that “no landlord shall demand or accept rent for a rental unit 

without first serving a copy of a valid registration or annual 

registration renewal statement on the tenant of that rental unit.” 

Under section 151.10, subdivision A, any landlord who collects 

rent “in excess of the maximum rent . . . shall be liable in a civil 

action . . . for damages of three times the amount by which” the 

rent exceeds the maximum legal rent.

Plaintiffs contend that Delores’s failure to register the 

guest house in violation of section 151.05, subdivision A, entitled 

them to the return of all rent paid. They further argue that, due 

to the failure to register, the “maximum rent” allowed under 

section 151.10, subdivision A was zero, thus they are entitled to 

three times the amount of rent they paid.

The arguments plaintiffs make here were considered and 

rejected in Lyles. In Lyles, the plaintiff alleged her landlord 

failed to serve her with a copy of a valid registration statement

pursuant to section 151.05, subdivision A. (Lyles, supra, 225

Cal.App.4th at p. 763.) As in this case, the plaintiff argued the 

landlord’s noncompliance with section 151.05, subdivision A 

prohibited the landlord from charging any rent at all. (Id. at 

p. 766.) Therefore, the plaintiff argued, the maximum rent 

allowed under section 151.10, subdivision A was zero, and she 

sought disgorgement of all rent paid and treble damages. (Ibid.) 

The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint.
5

On appeal, the Lyles court rejected the plaintiff’s

arguments. (Lyles, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 766.) The court 

explained that section 151.05, subdivision A “does not disentitle a 

landlord to rent for a period during which the landlord is not in 

compliance” with the registration statement requirements. 

(Ibid.) “Instead, it concerns the timing of a landlord’s ‘demand’ 

for or ‘acceptance’ of rent to which the landlord remains entitled.” 

(Ibid.) Section 151.11, subdivision B makes this clear as it

“permits a tenant to ‘withhold the payment of any rent otherwise 

lawfully due and owing’ if the tenant’s landlord has failed to 

comply” with the registration requirements. (Ibid.) “Once such a 

noncompliant landlord complies with . . . section 151.05, 

subdivision A., however, the tenant becomes obligated to pay the 

current rent and any back rent withheld pursuant to . . . 

section 151.11, subdivision B. Thus, the tenant is permitted to 

withhold rent to which the landlord is otherwise entitled until 

the landlord complies with . . . section 151.05, subdivision A., at 

which time the tenant must pay the landlord all accrued rent.” 

(Id. at pp. 766–767.)

The Lyles court further rejected the plaintiff’s argument for 

treble damages. The court explained that “[t]he penalty provision 

of . . . section 151.10, subdivision A. applies only when a landlord 

‘demands, accepts or retains any payment of rent in excess of the 

maximum rent . . . in violation of the provisions of this chapter.’ 

The maximum rent is that allowed by the rent control provisions 

of the [RSO].” (Lyles, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 767.) 

Although the landlord may have violated the ordinance by 

accepting the rent while in violation of the registration statement 

service requirement, that did not mean the landlord was not 

“ultimately entitled” to the rent. (Ibid.) The Lyles court further 
6

reasoned that allowing tenants to recover all rent paid based on a 

landlord’s failure to obtain and serve a registration “would be an 

absurd and unreasonable consequence.” (Id. at p. 768.)

We agree with the Lyles court’s reasoning. While 

section 151.11, subdivision B allowed plaintiffs to withhold rent 

until defendants complied with the registration requirement, 

nothing in the RSO authorizes the disgorgement remedy they 

seek.5 Further, while the failure to comply with section 151.05, 

subdivision A affected the permissible timing of defendants’ 

acceptance of rent, it did not prohibit the charging of rent 

entirely, thereby rendering the maximum rent zero. 

Section 151.10, subdivision A’s treble damages remedy does not 

apply.

Like the Lyles court, we also reject plaintiffs’ argument 

that Carter v. Cohen (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1038 (Carter) 

suggests a different result. Plaintiffs argue Carter stands for the

proposition that when a landlord violates section 151.05, 

subdivision A, “any amount [of rent] collected” exceeds the 

maximum rent allowed under the RSO. Plaintiffs misread

Carter. Carter considered only the “narrow” question of whether 

the landlord before it was subject to the RSO at all. (Id. at 

p. 1046.) Although, as here, the plaintiff in Carter sought 

5 Plaintiffs contend Lyles is inapplicable because there the 

plaintiff alleged the landlord failed to serve a registration 

statement on her, whereas here, plaintiffs allege defendants 

failed to register the property at all. We do not find this to be a 

meaningful distinction. Whether a landlord fails to procure a 

registration statement or fails to serve a copy of a valid 

registration statement on a tenant, the remedy available to a 

tenant under the RSO is the withholding of rent pursuant to 

section 151.11.
7

“disgorgement of the entire rent she had paid” and treble 

damages, the trial court determined she was not entitled to either 

remedy and she did not appeal those rulings. (Id. at p. 1042.) 

The reviewing court thus expressly stated it was not addressing 

whether the plaintiff could “recover her rent payments in their 

entirety” or treble damages, the very arguments plaintiffs raise 

in this case. (Id. at pp. 1046, 1042–1043.)

Plaintiffs rely on a footnote in Carter which mentioned the 

landlord’s argument that since the RSO defines “maximum rent” 

by reference to “legal” rent, the ordinance did not bar landlords 

from collecting rent arising from unlawful rental agreements. 

(Carter, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1051, fn. 7.) In this context, 

the court suggested that the RSO’s definition of maximum rent 

implied that when there is no legal rent the baseline maximum 

rent is $0. However, the court further indicated that the issue 

was not before it and it concluded only that the definition of 

maximum rent did not exempt the landlord from the RSO’s 

prohibition against collecting excess rent. The discussion of a 

maximum rent of $0 was therefore dicta and, as the Lyles court 

concluded, the Carter court did not reach the issues of 

disgorgement of rent or treble damages as a result of a landlord’s 

failure to comply with the RSO’s registration requirements. 

(Ibid.; Lyles, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 767–768.)

Plaintiffs propose no other interpretation of the RSO that 

would entitle them to the relief they seek in the first cause of 

action. The trial court properly sustained the demurrer.6

6 For the first time in their reply brief, plaintiffs appear to 

argue their cause of action under section 151.05, subdivision A 

was viable because the lease was void and the building 
8

II. Plaintiffs Have Not Established that the Trial Court 

Abused Its Discretion in Denying Leave to Amend

“If the court sustained the demurrer without leave to 

amend, as here, we must decide whether there is a reasonable 

possibility the plaintiff could cure the defect with an amendment. 

[Citation.] If we find that an amendment could cure the defect, 

we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion and we 

reverse; if not, no abuse of discretion has occurred.” (Schifando v.

City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.) Plaintiffs have 

the “burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility of 

amendment.” (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 

81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43 (Rakestraw).) “The assertion of an abstract 

right to amend does not satisfy this burden.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiffs have not met their burden here. In opposing the 

demurrer, plaintiffs did not explain how they could amend the 

complaint to remedy its deficiencies.7 Similarly, on appeal, 

substandard. They also contend the “reasonable value” of the use 

of the premises was less than what they paid in rent. Plaintiffs 

fail to connect these arguments to their claim that the defendants 

are liable under the RSO for failing to register the guest house. 

“Points raised in the reply brief for the first time will not be 

considered, unless good reason is shown for failure to present 

them before.” (Campos v. Anderson (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 784, 

794, fn. 3.) Plaintiffs have not shown such good cause.

7 No reporter’s transcript was included in the record on 

appeal, and thus there is no record of what occurred during the 

demurrer hearing or the trial court’s reasoning in denying leave 

to amend. This deficiency further prevents plaintiffs from 

establishing the trial court abused its discretion. (Southern 

California Gas Co. v. Flannery (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 476, 483
9

plaintiffs assert that an amendment could “cure any defects that 

the court finds.” Yet the only specific amendment plaintiffs 

propose would allege “descriptions of the repairs needed and 

what made the premises substandard.” These changes would not 

remedy the fundamental legal deficiency in plaintiffs’ complaint. 

Neither section 151.05, subdivision A nor section 151.10, 

subdivision A identifies any remedy for failure to make repairs, 

and plaintiffs have not explained how such descriptions could 

support a claim for disgorgement of all rent paid.

Plaintiffs have not offered “allegations to support the 

possibility of amendment” or “legal authority showing the 

viability of new causes of action.” (Rakestraw, supra, 81 

Cal.App.4th at p. 44.) We cannot find the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying leave to amend.

[appellant’s burden to provide adequate record; reporter’s 

transcript indispensable in many cases involving abuse of 

discretion standard of review].)
10

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Defendant to recover his costs 

on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 

REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.