20-3244-cv

Arcamone v. Kopnisky

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 

Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the

27th day of August, two thousand twenty-one.

Present: ROSEMARY S. POOLER,

REENA RAGGI,

DENNY CHIN,

Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________

RALPH FRANCIS ARCAMONE, JR., PETITIONER, 

SURETY, BENEFICIARY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. 20-3244

JACK L. KOPNISKY, (OR HIS SUCCESSORS OR 

ASSIGNS) AS PRESIDENT AND CEO OF STERLING 

NATIONAL BANK AND STERLING BANCORP. 

SUCCESSOR MONTE N. REDMAN, NOW KNOWN AS, 

STERLING NATIONAL BANK, NOW KNOWN AS, 

STERLING BANCORP, LUIS MASSIANI, (OR HIS 

SUCCESSORS OR ASSIGNS) AS CFO OF STERLING 

NATIONAL BANK AND STERLING BANCORP., 

STERLING BANCORP, (OR ITS SUCCESSORS OR 

ASSIGNS), STERLING NATIONAL BANK, (OR ITS 

SUCCESSORS OR ASSIGNS), DOVENMUEHLE 

MORTGAGE CO., MONTE N. REDMAN, (OR HIS 

SUCCESSORS OR ASSIGNS) FORMER CEO OF 

ASTORIA BANK, ASTORIA FINANCIAL GROUP, AND 

ASTORIAFEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN 

ASSOCIATION NOW DIRECTOR OF STERLING 
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NATIONAL BANK AND STERLING BANCORP, 

ASTORIA BANK, BY MERGER, NOW KNOWN AS, 

STERLING NATIONAL BANK, NOW KNOWN AS, 

STERLING BANCORP, ASTORIA FEDERAL SAVINGS 

& LOAN ASSOCIATION, BY MERGER, NOW KNOWN 

AS, STERLING NATIONAL BANK, NOW KNOWN AS, 

STERLING BANCORP, ASTORIA FINANCIAL GROUP, 

BY MERGER, NOW KNOWN AS, STERLING 

NATIONAL BANK, NOW KNOWN AS, STERLING 

BANCORP,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________________

Appearing for Appellant: Ralph Francis Arcamone, Jr., pro se, Rowayton, 

CT.

Appearing for Appellees: Christopher J. Picard, McCalla Raymer Leibert 

Pierce, LLC, Hartford, CT.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut

(Shea, J.).

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

AND DECREED that the judgment of said District Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED.

Ralph Francis Arcamone, Jr., sued entities and individuals in Connecticut state court, 

bringing claims arising from the foreclosure of his property. He sought equitable subrogation for, 

presumably, mortgage payments he made prior to his default. The defendants removed the case to 

the District of Connecticut and moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion and 

dismissed Arcamone’s complaint with prejudice, reasoning that he failed to state a cognizable

claim for equitable subrogation; that if he had set forth a cognizable claim it would be barred by 

res judicata and collateral estoppel; and that his contention that he was legally distinct from the 

defendant in the foreclosure action, and thus was entitled to equitable subrogation, was frivolous.

Arcamone appeals. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural 

history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

As an initial matter, Arcamone’s brief fails to address the district court’s reasoning for the 

dismissal of his complaint: the sufficiency of his pleadings. Instead, Arcamone reiterates his 

allegations and, as far as he addresses any prior decision, he primarily challenges the decision of 

the “previous Trial Court,” i.e., the state court. Appellant’s Br. at 35. Arguments not raised in an 

opening brief are waived. See JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mex., S.A. de C.V., 412 

F.3d 418, 428 (2d Cir. 2005). Accordingly, Arcamone waived any challenge to the district court’s 
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dismissal of his complaint. In any event, we affirm the district court’s judgment for the reasons 

below.

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and the denial 

of leave to amend as futile. Forest Park Pictures v. Universal Television Network, Inc., 683 F.3d 

424, 429 (2d Cir. 2012) (Rule 12(b)(6)); Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014) (denial 

of leave to amend as futile).

To state a claim, a party must plead sufficient facts to permit a “reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is 

inapplicable to legal conclusions [and] . . . mere conclusory statements . . . .” Id. Here, Arcamone 

asserted in part that “RALPH FRANCIS ARCAMONE in this matter, a name that is similar to the 

surety’s name, arcamone, ralph francis jr., yet [is] not the same,” and that RALPH FRANCIS 

ARCAMONE was the actual debtor, and a fictitious person. App’x at 42. As the district court 

reasoned, Arcamone’s complaint does not permit a “reasonable inference that the defendant[s are] 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As far as can be discerned, Arcamone’s 

complaint sought equitable subrogation, seeking to place himself in the position of the former 

mortgagee of his property (Astoria Federal Savings & Loan), and he argued that with his signature, 

he discharged the balance of the mortgage and thus is entitled to either repayment, or the title to 

the property. 

Equitable subrogation in Connecticut covers an “instance in which one person, not acting 

as a mere volunteer or intruder, pays a debt for which another is primarily liable, and which in 

equity and good conscience should have been discharged by the latter.” Pac. Ins. Co. v. Champion 

Steel, LLC, 323 Conn. 254, 262 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). It “benefits only those 

who have some obligation, however indirect, to pay the debt at issue. For example, it applies to 

. . . a surety who pays its obligee [(here, the defendants)] and then sues its principal [(here, 

Arcamone)] to vindicate the rights of that obligee.” Elm Haven Const. Ltd. P’ship v. Neri Constr. 

LLC, 376 F.3d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Other than his conclusory allegations, 

which the district court did not need to credit, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, Arcamone did not plead 

any facts from which the court could reasonably draw the inference that he paid a debt for which 

another was primarily liable. Moreover, his contention that he was somehow able to discharge his 

own debt via his signature, or that he was a separate legal entity based on whether his name was 

written in all capital letters or otherwise, is patently frivolous. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 

319, 325 (1989) (“[A] complaint . . . is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or 

in fact.”). Even if Arcamone paid the debt for “ARCAMONE,” the only relief to which he would 

be entitled would be to step into the shoes of the defendants and to enforce their rights as against 

“ARCAMONE.” Wasko v. Manella, 269 Conn. 527, 548 (2004) (explaining that equitable 

subrogation permits the party to “step[] into the shoes of the party it paid in order to recover the 

payments that it made, and thus to prevent the unjust enrichment of the party whose debt it paid”

(emphasis added) (citation omitted)). Further, his argument that he was foreclosed from accessing 

the “Original Jurisdiction of Equity,” Appellant’s Br. at 42, is unavailing because Connecticut 
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courts and federal courts are courts of both law and equity. U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1 (“The 

judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, [and]

the laws of the United States . . . .”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 (“There is one form of action—the civil 

action.”); Reclaimant Corp. v. Deutsch, 332 Conn. 590, 606 n.10 (2019) (“[I]n the United States, 

most jurisdictions, including Connecticut and the federal courts, have merged law and equity 

courts.” (citation omitted)). 

And, as indicated above, even accepting as true the conclusory legal assertions contained 

in the complaint, Arcamone’s essential claim—that he is a surety who has rights to the value he 

paid on behalf of a defaulted debtor (who happens to share the same name but is in fact a different

person) or that his signature on the mortgage is evidence of a discharged debt—is factually 

frivolous, “ris[ing] to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez, 

504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Accordingly, he failed to plead facts sufficient to “allow[] the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” and the 

district court properly granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state 

a claim and as frivolous. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33 (explaining that a court 

may dismiss a claim as “factually frivolous” if the pleaded facts are “clearly baseless” or “fanciful”

(citations omitted)); see Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 2011) (applying Denton to 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion).

Although “[a] pro se complaint should not be dismissed without the Court granting leave 

to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid 

claim might be stated,” Nielsen, 746 F.3d at 62 (citation omitted), granting leave to amend here 

would have been futile. Arcamone has filed numerous complaints and motions asserting the same 

claims and seeking the same relief over many years, to no avail. Further amendment would not 

cure his irrational allegations. Cf. Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir. 2013).

We have considered all of Arcamone’s remaining arguments and find them to be without 

merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court