NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO I.M.

No. 1 CA-JV 23-0094 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JS21282

The Honorable Amanda S. Chua, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender, Phoenix

By Jamie R. Heller

Counsel for Appellant

Law Office of Ed Johnson, PLLC, Phoenix

By Edward D. Johnson 

Counsel for Appellee

FILED 9-14-2023
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO I.M.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Anni Hill Foster delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

F O S T E R, Judge:

¶1 M.M. (“Father”) appeals the superior court’s order 

terminating his parental rights to I.M. (“Child”) in a private severance 

matter. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father and R.L. (“Mother”) were married in March 2011. 

Mother was pregnant at the time. After marrying, Mother and Father lived 

together in maternal grandmother’s home. But before Child was born in 

September 2011, Father moved out; Mother cared for Child with little 

support from Father. In 2012, Mother and Child again went to live with 

Father at another relative’s home. For about a month, Father cared for Child 

while Mother worked, but Father never provided adequate support,

including diapers or formula. After about a month, Mother and Child left.

Later that year, Mother obtained an order of protection against Father, 

which he never learned of before it expired.

¶3 After Mother moved out, Father’s time with Child involved 

only a few hours on sporadic weekends and occasionally when Child 

would visit paternal grandmother. Father’s financial support consisted of 

$50 or $100 at random intervals, but even this ceased by 2015, around the 

time that Mother and Father divorced. Father never provided school 

clothing or supplies and rarely provided gifts or cards during holidays,

though he did give Child a tea set for Christmas in 2016.

¶4 In 2015, after entry of a default divorce decree, Mother 

obtained sole legal custody of Child; Father was awarded no parenting 

time. Father never sought to gain legal decision-making or parenting time

regarding Child, and since the default dissolution of marriage he has made 

no attempts to exercise his parental rights. Father last saw Child in person 

in 2018, before he was incarcerated for a felony conviction later that year. 

Father’s conviction resulted in a lengthy sentence; his current release is

scheduled for 2030. Before the severance proceedings began, but during 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO I.M.

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3

Father’s incarceration, he sent only one text message, in May 2022, to 

Mother requesting to see Child.

¶5 Mother met F.L. (“Stepfather”) in 2013 and married him in 

2017. Since 2013, Stepfather has been the consistent father figure in Child’s 

life. He has participated in Child’s school activities, taken Child to doctor 

and dentist appointments, and has taken an interest in Child’s hobbies. 

Stepfather has also financially provided for Child. Child identifies 

Stepfather as her dad and wants him to adopt her. Stepfather is willing to 

adopt Child.

¶6 With this background, in June 2022, Mother petitioned to 

terminate Father’s rights to Child on the grounds of abandonment and 

felony conviction. Father responded, asserting that he was making efforts 

to maintain his relationship with Child. After two days of trial, on April 7, 

2023, the juvenile court ordered termination of Father’s parental rights, 

finding among other things that “Father made minimal efforts to maintain 

a relationship with the Child” since his incarceration, and “failed to 

undertake any of the myriad of responsibilities associated with parenting.”

Father timely appealed on April 17.

¶7 This Court has jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A) and 

12-120.21(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 To terminate parental rights, a court must find a statutory 

ground for termination exists by clear and convincing evidence and that 

termination serves the child’s best interests by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288, ¶ 42 (2005). “[T]he juvenile 

court is in the best position to weigh evidence and assess witness 

credibility,” so this Court will uphold the juvenile court’s termination order 

unless clearly erroneous and accept its findings of fact if supported by 

reasonable evidence and inferences. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 

3, ¶ 9 (2016). This Court views the juvenile court’s facts in the “light most 

favorable to affirming the” juvenile court’s order. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249-50, ¶ 20 (2000). This Court reviews termination 

orders for abuse of discretion. Jeffrey P. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 212, 

213, ¶ 5 (App. 2016).

I. THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 

FINDING ABANDONMENT AS GROUNDS FOR 

TERMINATING FATHER’S RIGHTS TO CHILD.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO I.M.

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¶9 Father first contends the juvenile court erred in terminating 

his rights on the ground of abandonment, claiming no evidentiary support 

for the court’s findings, and that the court ignored Mother’s inconsistent 

testimony and acts that restricted Father’s contact with Child. 

¶10 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if “the 

parent has abandoned the child.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1). “‘Abandonment’ 

means the failure of a parent to provide reasonable support and to maintain 

regular contact with the child, including providing normal supervision” but 

also covers when “a parent has made only minimal efforts to support and 

communicate with the child.” A.R.S. § 8-531(1) (emphasis added). “Failure 

to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child without just cause 

for a period of six months constitutes prima facie evidence of abandonment.” 

Id. This test is objective, measuring “whether a parent has provided 

reasonable support, maintained reasonable contact, made more than 

minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child, and 

maintained a normal parental relationship.” Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249-50, 

¶ 18.

¶11 Father argues the court abused its discretion in finding the 

statutory requirements for abandonment had been met. First, Father attacks 

the court’s findings that “Father made no efforts to maintain a connection 

with the Child” after incarceration, “Father failed to demonstrate any effort 

to have contact with the Child while incarcerated,” and that “Child’s last 

contact with a member of Father’s family was in 11/2021.” Father supports 

his position with one text message he sent Mother in May 2022, asking to 

see Child and his testimony that he sent Child, through paternal 

grandmother, cards for every birthday and holiday while maintaining 

phone and video interactions facilitated by paternal grandmother. He also 

points to Mother’s action of taking away Child’s phone after paternal 

grandmother sent text messages during the termination litigation as 

evidence of Mother’s interreference with his efforts.

¶12 Although this Court agrees with Father that he made some 

efforts to contact Child, those efforts, viewed in the light most favorable to 

Father, were minimal and do not overcome the otherwise overwhelming 

evidence of abandonment. The superior court did not err by concluding 

that Father’s efforts to maintain a relationship with Child after Father began 

serving his prison sentence have been minimal and that he has abandoned 

Child. 

¶13 Second, Father argues that the court abused its discretion by 

minimizing Mother’s inconsistent testimony and disregarding Mother’s 
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actions limiting Father’s contact with Child. “The juvenile court is in the 

best position to assess witness credibility,” including inconsistent 

testimony, so this Court “will not reweigh evidence or consider the 

credibility of witnesses on appeal.” In re James P., 214 Ariz. 420, 425, ¶ 24 

(App. 2007). Moreover, the court considered Mother’s actions, including 

that “Mother did not disclose her mailing address to father when she 

moved” and that Mother had obtained an order of protection against 

Father. The court weighed these actions against Father’s inaction: although 

he had access to communicate with Child through maternal grandmother,

he made no efforts to contact Child during the year that the order of 

protection was in place and Father made minimal efforts to contact Child 

through available channels thereafter. The superior court did not abuse its 

discretion by concluding that “Mother’s actions do not rise to the level of 

interference required to establish a defense to abandonment.”

II. BECAUSE THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 

DISCRETION REGARDING ABANDONMENT, FATHER’S 

FELONY CONVICTION ARGUMENT IS MOOT.

¶14 Next, Father contends the court abused its discretion by 

terminating his rights on the grounds of his criminal conviction. This issue 

is moot given this Court’s holding that the superior court did not err by 

finding abandonment. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, 

¶ 3 (App. 2002) (“If clear and convincing evidence supports any one of the 

statutory grounds on which the juvenile court ordered severance, we need 

not address claims pertaining to the other grounds.”)

III. THE JUVENILE COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED CHILD’S 

BEST INTERESTS.

¶15 Lastly, Father contends the juvenile court failed to consider 

the totality of the circumstances when looking at Child’s best interests. In 

such determinations, “protect[ing] a child’s interest in stability and 

security” is the court’s foremost concern. Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 15

(quoting Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 286, ¶ 34 (2005)) (alteration in 

original). The court may base its finding on either harm caused by denying 

termination or benefit gained from termination, including “the child’s 

prospective adoption.” Id. at 4-5, ¶ 16. Father essentially reiterates his 

arguments presented above.

¶16 Here, the juvenile court noted its consideration of “Father’s 

efforts toward reunification,” and that “Child knew her father back in 

2018.” But the court also found that Child “barely knows her Father now”
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and Child calls Stepfather “Dad.” The evidence discussed above reflects 

Father’s minimal efforts to support or maintain contact with Child for most 

of Child’s life, including during his current incarceration. The superior 

court appropriately considered the possibility that Child may be adopted 

by Stepfather, who has supported Child since 2017 and is willing to adopt 

her. The superior court did not abuse its discretion by finding that 

terminating Father’s parental rights was in Child’s best interests.

CONCLUSION

¶17 For the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms.