NOT FOR PUBLICATION [Docket No. 7]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

_______________________________

 :

JOSEPH NATHAN SINGLETARY, III, :

 : Civil Action No. 

Plaintiff, : 11-0392 (RMB)

 :

v. : MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 :

BURLINGTON COUNTY JAIL et al., :

 :

Defendants. :

_______________________________:

 

Bumb, District Judge:

This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff’s filing of

his amended complaint.

On July 1, 2011, the Clerk received Plaintiff’s original

complaint, see Docket Entry No. 1, his application to prosecute

this matter in forma pauperis, see Docket Entry No. 1-2, and his

motion for appointment of pro bono counsel. 

On July 14, 2011, this Court issued an order and accompanying

opinion (“July Opinion”) granting Plaintiff in forma pauperis

status, dismissing some of Plaintiff’s challenges with prejudice

and some without prejudice, and denying his application for pro

bono counsel without prejudice, as premature. See Docket Entries

Nos. 4 and 5. 

In its July Opinion, the Court explained to Plaintiff, in

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great detail, the pleading requirement as well as the relevant

substantive tests. Specifically:

a. The Court explained to Plaintiff that challenges based

solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior were not

cognizable for the purposes of a Section 1983 action and,

therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against the warden, based

solely on Plaintiff’s assertion that the warden was “in

charge” of the Burlington County Jail, were subject to

dismissal;

b. The Court also pointed out that Burlington County Jail

and its Medical Department were not entities cognizable

as “persons” for the purposes of a Section 1983 action,

see id. at 8 (citing Will v. Michigan Dept. of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 68-70 (1989), and Grabow v. Southern

State Correctional Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538-39

(D.N.J. 1989); and

c. In addition, the Court detailed, at great length, the

legal standard governing Eighth Amendment challenges. 

The Court noted in its July Opinion:

[B]eing mindful of Plaintiff's pro se status and

recognizing that Plaintiff might have inadvertently

omitted to state the facts indicative of a

plausible Eighth Amendment claim, the Court will

dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint without prejudice,

and will allow Plaintiff to file an amended

pleading elaborating on Plaintiff's claims and

specifying the dates of the relevant events.

Id. at 15-16 (footnote omitted). 

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Consequently, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims amenable to

cure by repleading without prejudice. 

In response, Plaintiff submitted his amended complaint at bar.

See Docket Entry No. 6. The allegations stated in that amended

complaint are detailed on day-by-day – and, on occasion, even on

hour-by-hour – bases and state, in relevant part, as follows: 

Plaintiff was in Bur1ngton County Jail for a parole

violation. [During his stay there,] he was involved

in an physical alteration [with another inmate] on

10—12—10. [That other inmate, apparently, suffered

such injuries that he had to be taken to the Jail’s

Medical Department immediately. In contrast,

Plaintiff’s participation in that altercation]

resulted in his finger being injured . . . . 

Plaintiff was escorted to [a solitary confinement

cell] by Sgt. Nunn and Sgt. Eddy. [After his

arrival to that cell, Plaintiff went to the Medical

Department in order to receive his regular

medications; he obtained these medications from] a

Nurse named Roxxana [and complained to Nurse

Roxxana about his injured finger; in response,

Nurse Roxxana guessed that the finger] was probably

broken [and recommended Plaintiff to execute a

“medical slip,” i.e., a request for medical

attention with regard to his injured finger]. So

Plaintiff dropped a medical slip . . . . [On the

same date, that is, on the date of his altercation,

his injury, his conversation with Nurse Roxxana and

his execution of a “medical slip,”] Plaintiff

[also] spoke with Nurse Adrianna and Nurse Susan

and [apparently, gave them additional copies of the

“medical slip” which he executed upon

recommendation of Nurse Roxxana. In addition,

still on the same date, that is, on] 10—12—10

Plaintiff [also] gave Sgt. Zoll [another copy of

the same “medical slip.” Then, on an unspecified

date, which might have been still October 12, 2010,

or a later date,] Plaintiff spoke with Lt. Laaf

[about his request to be seen by a medical

personnel about his finger] as well as [with]

Captain Lorkin . . . . [In addition, on unspecified

date, which might have been still October 12, 2010,

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or a later date,] Plaintiff went to [the Medical

Department to obtain medical care] regarding his

breathing and showed Nurse Maurice his finger. 

Nurse Maurice stated [that the swelling of the

finger] will go away . . . [and when] Plaintiff

asked to see [a] doctor, Nurse Maurice [insisted on

his diagnose that the swelling of the finger] will

go down [on its own. Four weeks after the date of

the altercation and Plaintiff’s alleged injury,

that is,] on 11—9—10[,] Plaintiff gave another

medical slip to Nurse Roxxana [that development

occurred] at 5:00 a.m. [on November 9, 2010, when

Plaintiff went to the Medical Department for some]

medication[. Apparently, on that very day, he also

encountered] Nurse Tom [whom Plaintiff asked

whether] he was scheduled [to see a] doctor [with

regard to his finger, and Nurse Tom replied] no. 

Plaintiff [then] asked [Nurse Tom] why [he was not

scheduled to see a doctor, to which Nurse Tom

replied that Plaintiff had to put a “medical slip”

and, had he done so, he] would [have] been

scheduled. Plaintiff [then] asked Officer . . .

Henry if he could put in another medical slip [and

Officer] Henry stated yes. . . . Plaintiff then

gave [that new] medical slip to Sgt. Thompson.

[Plaintiff was seen by medical personnel on that

very day, that is, November 9, 2010. During that

examination, a] doctor stated that Plaintiff took

to[o] long to be seen. [The doctor guessed] that

the finger was probably shattered [but did not take

an x-ray immediately. Therefore, on the same

date,] Plaintiff filed a grievance. . . . [In

addition, next day, that is, on November 10,

20109,] Plaintiff also put in another medical slip

regarding pain in his finger. [Moreover, on the

following day, that is,] on 11-11-10, Plaintiff

[submitted yet another] medical slip stating his

finger was in a lot of pain, and [that he] would

like an x-ray or [to] see a specialist. [Also, on

that same date, that is, on November 11, 2010,]

Plaintiff . . . gave Sgt. Zoll two [more copies of

his] medical slip, to ensure they were received by

[the M]edical [D]epartment. On the next day, that

is,] on 11—12—10[,] Plaintiff was escorted to [the

Medical Department] and was told by [a] doctor that

an x-ray would be ordered, the doctor also

[recommended Plaintiff] not to work out [his] hand.

. . . [Later on, on the same day, that is,] on

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11—12—10[, an] x-ray was taken [and Plaintiff] was

told [he] would have results by [the] end of [the]

day. [Next day, that is,] on 11—13—10[,] Plaintiff

asked Nurse Adrianna about [the results of his] xray, [and] Nurse [Adrianna opined] that, if

Plaintiff didn’t get response [then it must have

meant that his] hand was fine. Plaintiff [however]

put in another medical slip [on the very same date,

that is, on November 13, 2010,] asking to see a

specialist or to have an MRI taken. [In addition,

on that same date, he] spoke to Nurse Nicole

regarding the results of his] x—ray, [in response

to his request,] Nurse [Nicole] checked [his] file

[and found] no results. [Therefore, next day, that

is,] on 11—14—10[,] Plaintiff gave [yet another

“medical slip” to a certain] Mrs. Jones . . .

[Apparently, the results of Plaintiff’s x-ray were

received by November 15, 2010, since already] on

11—15—10[,] Plaintiff spoke to Nurse Stacy and she

stated [results of the] x-ray [were received and]

showed non displaced fracture.[1] Since finger

[was] still swollen [Plaintiff was informed that he

would] be sent out to see specialist, [and a

request for] appointment [was made the next day,

that is,] on 11—16—11 . . . . [Two days later, that

is,] on 11—18—10, Plaintiff [was seen by] Doctor

Planch Bong [who] stated [that Plaintiff’s] “Non

Displaced Fracture” x-ray show[ed] no nerve damage

. . . . [Next day, that is,] on 11-19-10, Plaintiff

[was sent to be seen by another doctor at the] Hand

Surgery and Rehabilitation Center . . . .

[Specifically,] Plaintiff was seen by Andrew B.

Sattel, M.D. who stated that if Plaintiff was

brought in sooner he would [have] been able to have

[Plaintiff’s] finger . . . taken care of [in a

better fashion. Dr. Sattel verified that

Plaintiff’s] finger [was] healing on its own. . . . 

He also stated [that,] because of the time elapsed

since the injury, the finger [which is, seemingly,

Plaintiff’s small finger, i.e., digitus minimus,

commonly known as “pinky,” could] be permanently

1

 “When a break is non-displaced, that means the bone is

broken but still remains in place.” <<http://www.healthand

nutritiontips.net/nondisplaced_fracture/nondisplaced_fracture.htm

l>>. Therefore, the bone does not lose its natural shape as a

result of such fracture. See id.

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swollen . . . . [On the same day, that is,] on

11—19—10[, apparently after returning from his

visit with Dr. Sattel,] Plaintiff gave Nurse

Roxxana another medical slip [stating that he was

dissatisfied with Dr. Sattel’s determination and

requesting] a second opinion. [The next day, that

is,] on 11—20—10[,] Plaintiff [deposited yet]

another medical slip [again] requesting to see a

different doctor. [The next day, that is,] on

11—21-10[,] Plaintiff spoke to Nurse Nicole who

[verified that] Plaintiff would be placed on

appointment sheet to see [another] doctor. [Yet, on

the next day, that is,] on 11—22—10[,] Plaintiff

put in another medical slip asking for MRI of [his]

finger. . . . [Forty-eight hours later, that is,]

on 11—24—11[,] Plaintiff [was seen by another]

doctor . . . who ordered a new x-ray. [Apparently,

that x-ray was taken and processed within the next

eight days, since] on 12—3—10[,] Plaintiff spoke

with [an unspecified] member [of the M]edical

[D]epartment . . . and was told [that his] knuckle

[was] also broken and [so Plaintiff] need[ed] to

see [a] specialist [about that new issue]. 

Plaintiff [then] put in medical slip to see

specialist and also put in slip [requesting his]

medical records. [Within forty-eight hours, that

is,] on 12—5—10, Plaintiff [was seen by a] doctor .

. . who stated [that] he wants a splint kept on

[the injured] finger. [Four days later, that is,]

on 12—9—10[, Plaintiff’s finger and, seemingly, the

knuckle area, were placed in splint. Three weeks

later, that is,] on 12—30—10[,] Plaintiff was

examined by Ronald S. Glick, M.D. who [concluded],

“Physical examination of the left fifth finger

shows fusiform swelling with tenderness to the PIP

Joint and middle phalanx. . . . The patient was

unable to make a full fist. Review of x—rays of

the left hand on 12—21—10 showed a healed oblique

fracture of the proximal half of the middle phalanx

with extension into the articular surface. On the

lateral view, there is a very subtle stepoff of the

articular itself. IMPRESSION: Healed . . . 

fracture of . . . left fifth finger.

RECOMMENDTIONS: 1. Unfortunately, there is a little

to do for this fracture formally at this time since

it has healed. . . . . [There is a] probability of

long term residual swelling and decreased motion.”

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Id. at 2-6.

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the medical treatment of the

alleged injury to his finger can be subdivided into two periods:

(a) from October 12, 2010, to November 8, 2010, inclusive (“Period

I”); and (b) from November 9, 2010, to December 30, 2010, inclusive

(“Period II”). The allegations provided in Plaintiff’s amended

complaint as to Period II indicate that he was given constant

medical attention on virtually a daily basis, sometimes a few times

a day. See Docket Entry No. 6, at 3-6. Indeed, his allegations

verify that he was seen by a member of medical personnel on the

first day of Period II, that is, the very day when he submitted his

requests for medical attention and, from that point on, he was seen

by a specialized doctor or a general doctor, or a nurse almost

every day (or every second day or, at the latest, within three-four

days), and was provided with continuous, various forms of medical

treatment. See id. While Plaintiff expresses displeasure with

such facts as the one that the processing of his x-ray was not

immediate, or that he was initially seen by nurses rather than by

doctors, or that he was seen by specialized doctors after being

seen by general practitioners, or that the doctors differed in

their conclusions as to the finesse of his medical diagnosis, not

a single statement made by Plaintiff with regard to Period II

suggests, even vaguely, deliberate indifference on the part of

Defendants. While, hypothetically, Plaintiff’s challenges raised

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with regard to his treatment administered during Period II might

provide bases for negligence-based medical malpractice claims

within the meaning of the state tort law, these challenges facially

fail to assert a wrong of constitutional magnitude, since

"deliberate indifference" is more than mere malpractice or

negligence: it is a state of mind equivalent to reckless disregard

of a known risk of harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

837-38 (1994). As this Court already explained to Plaintiff, a

prisoner's subjective dissatisfaction with his medical care cannot

indicate deliberate indifference, see Andrews v. Camden County, 95

F. Supp.2d 217, 228 (D.N.J. 2000); Peterson v. Davis, 551 F. Supp.

137, 145 (D. Md. 1982), aff'd, 729 F.2d 1453 (4th Cir. 1984), just

as "mere disagreements over medical judgment do not state Eighth

Amendment claims," White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d at 110 (3d Cir.

1990), because “[c]ourts will disavow any attempt to second-guess

the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment . .

. [which] remains a question of sound professional judgment. 

Implicit in this deference to prison medical authorities is the

assumption that such informed judgment has, in fact, been made.” 

Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d

Cir. 1979) (internal quotation and citation omitted). In other

words, even if the judgment of specialized or general doctors, or

nurses as to the proper course of Plaintiff's treatment is

ultimately shown to be wrong, such wrongfulness would establish

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only a tort of medical malpractice, not an Eighth Amendment

violation. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06; White, 897 F.2d at

110. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims based on his medical care

administered during Period II are subject to dismissal. Since

Plaintiff’s amended complaint detailed the events of Period II on

daily and, occasionally, on hourly bases, it is apparent that

Plaintiff stated all the facts known to him with regard to Period

II. Therefore, granting Plaintiff another leave to amend his

challenges as to Period II would necessarily be futile, and no such

leave will issue.2

The Court now turns to Period I, which began on October 12,

2010, and lasted for four weeks, that is, until November 8, 2010,

2

 Ordinarily, the plaintiff may be granted "leave [to

amend,] . . . when justice so requires." See Foman v. Davis, 371

U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1414 (3d

Cir. 1993). Indeed, "[t]he Federal Rules reject the approach

that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel

may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the

purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the

merits." Foman, 371 U.S. at 182-83. However, "[a]llowing leave

to amend where 'there is a stark absence of any suggestion by the

plaintiffs that they have developed any facts since the action

was commenced, which would, if true, cure the defects in the

pleadings . . . , would frustrate Congress's objective in

enacting this statute of 'provid[ing] a filter at the earliest

stage (the pleading stage) to screen out lawsuits that have no

factual basis."' Cal. Pub. Emples'. Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp.,

394 F.3d 126, 164 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). For

instance, where the plaintiff had already amended plaintiffs

complaint and yet failed to allege sufficient facts, the courts

may find that "[the previous number of] bites at the apple is

enough," and conclude that it is proper to deny leave to replead.

Salinger v. Projectavision. Inc., 972 F. Supp. 222,236 (S.D.N.Y.

1997) (citing Olkey v. Hyperion 1999 Term Trust, Inc., 98 F.3d 2

(2d Cir. 1996).

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inclusive (since, on November 9, 2010, Plaintiff submitted another

“medical slip” and was seen by a doctor on that very day, and then

continued being seen by medical personnel on virtually daily basis

during the entirety of Period II). With regard to Period I,

Plaintiff asserts that:

a. He injured his finger fighting with another inmate on the

first day of Period I. On that day, he went to the

Medical Department to obtain his regular medication and

showed his finger to Nurse Roxxana who at no point denied

him treatment; rather, Nurse Roxxana recommended

Plaintiff to submit a “medical slip” requesting medical

care, since Roxxana allegedly hypothesized that the

finger might be “broken”;

b. In response to Roxxana’s recommendation, Plaintiff

submitted, on that very first day of Period I, four

medical “medical slips”: one to Nurse Roxxana, one to

Nurse Susan, one to Nurse Adrianna and one to Sgt. Zoll;

c. On an unspecified date during Period I, Plaintiff restated his interest in having his finger examined by a

doctor to Lt. Laaf and Captain Lorkin; and

d. On an unspecified date during Period I, Plaintiff showed

his finger to Nurse Maurice (seemingly, at the time when

Nurse Maurice was dispensing a certain medication to

Plaintiff), in response to which Nurse Maurice stated

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that the “swelling would go away.” 

Docket Entry No. 6, at 2.

The allegations stated against Nurses Roxxana, Susan,

Adrianna, Lt. Laaf and Captain Lorkin fail to state a claim within

the pleading requirements articulated in Iqbal: none of Plaintiff’s

statements plausibly suggests that these Defendants were

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs: on the

contrary, they encourage Plaintiff to seek medical attention and

assist Plaintiff with his immediate needs.3 Moreover, Plaintiff’s

day-by-day (and, on occasion, hour-by-hour) account of the alleged

events at no point suggested, even remotely, that any of these

Defendants either intentionally refused medical treatment to

Plaintiff or took any action delaying his medical treatment for

non-medical reason, or took measures to delay his medical

diagnosis, or erected arbitrary or burdensome procedures barring

Plaintiff from obtaining medical care. See id. Stripped of all

niceties, Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants merely turn

3

 Plaintiff’s original complaint indicated that Nurses Stacy

and Adrianna provided Plaintiff with an ice pack in order to help

him with the swelling of his finger; this Plaintiff’s statement

is assessed as pled fact for the purposes of this Court’s instant

analysis. See Jackson v. Broad. Music, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 3960, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2006) ("the court may take

judicial notice of . . . 'admissions in pleadings . . . filed by

a party . . . that contradict the party's factual assertions in a

subsequent [stage]'") (quoting Harris v. New York State Dep't of

Health, 202 F. Supp. 2d 143, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), and citing

Munno v. Town of Orangetown, 391 F. Supp. 2d 263, 268 (S.D.N.Y.

2005)), t 

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on the fact that Plaintiff’s examination by a doctor took place

four weeks after Plaintiff’s alleged injury, but no statement in

the amended complaint (or in the original complaint) stitches this

four-week delay to any particular action by Nurses Roxxana, Susan,

Adrianna, Lt. Laaf and Captain Lorkin. Indeed, it appears equally

possible that: (a) these Defendants were negligent in conveying

Plaintiff’s requests to the person in charge of scheduling

appointments with medical personnel; or (b) each of the Nurses

passed Plaintiff’s simultaneously-filed “medical slips” to the

person in charge of that scheduling, and Lt. Laaf and Captain

Lorkin also conveyed Plaintiff’s requests for medical care, but

that sudden and simultaneous flurry of “medical slips” and requests

for medical care resulted in a confusion and presumption that one

such “medical slip” was already registered and all else were merely

duplicates.4 Since Plaintiff’s allegations against these

Defendants assert a mere long-shot possibility at a claim and fail

to enter the realm of plausibility, his challenges against these

Defendants are subject to dismissal. “[T]he plausibility standard

. . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has

acted unlawfully. [Indeed, even w]here a complaint pleads facts

that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, [the

4

 Moreover, both these possibilities are indicative merely

of negligence rather than of reckless disregard, and even that

hypothetical negligence cannot be linked to Nurses Roxxana,

Susan, Adrianna, Lt. Laaf and Captain Lorkin. 

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so-alleging complaint still] ‘stops short of [showing] plausibility

of 'entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-54 (quoting

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007)). Since

Plaintiff’s amended complaint provides careful account of all

events relevant to the actions of Nurses Roxxana, Susan, Adrianna,

Lt. Laaf and Captain Lorkin during Period I, the Court has no basis

to presume that Plaintiff might state facts indicative of these

Defendants’ reckless disregard of Plaintiff’s medical needs. Thus,

Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants are subject to

dismissal and no leave to amend his claims against these Defendants

shall issue. 

In light of the foregoing, the sole remaining claim 

articulated in Plaintiff’s amended complaint is one of Plaintiff’s

claim made against Nurse Maurice; that claim turns on Plaintiff’s

allegation that Nurse Maurice, upon seeing Plaintiff’s swollen

finger, concluded that Plaintiff was not in need of medical care

(because of Maurice’s conclusion that the “swelling would go

away”). On one hand, the statement allegedly made by Maurice reads

like a medical diagnosis, i.e., as a statement that Plaintiff’s

alleged injury was such that the only medical treatment required

was time. If so, Plaintiff’s claims against Maurice are subject to

dismissal since, even if Maurice’s diagnosis was erroneous,

Plaintiff’s allegations based on that diagnosis assert nothing but

a negligence-based medical malpractice challenge rather than a

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claim of constitutional magnitude. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. at 837-38. However, recognizing that Nurse Maurice’s

statement could have been made in a factual context indicative of

Nurse Maurice’s outright refusal to provide any form of medical

care (rather than a merely erroneous diagnosis), the Court finds it

warranted to allow Plaintiff one more opportunity to elaborate, in

detail, on the events of – as well as the exact date (if known),

the circumstances and other statements uttered in the process of –

Plaintiff’s medical visit with Nurse Maurice during which Nurse

Maurice allegedly stated that Plaintiff needed no medical treatment

and the “swelling would go away.” Therefore, a limited leave to

amend will issue as to this narrow line of Plaintiff’s challenges.5

Finally, the Court takes notice of Plaintiff’s intermittent

line of challenges asserting that the prison officials did not

sufficiently investigate his grievances or failed to reply to his

grievances (or that they replied in a fashion that Plaintiff found

unsatisfactory). To the extent these challenges seek to assert

denial of medical care, they are identical to those assessed by

this Court under the Eighth Amendment. To the extent these

challenges are striving to allege that Plaintiff’s rights were

violated by not getting a response (or by getting a response other

5

 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s other challenges against

Nurse Maurice, pertaining to Period II, are not included in the

limited leave to amend since Plaintiff was provided with constant

medical care during that Period.

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than the one Plaintiff desired), these challenges are subject to

dismissal as facially invalid. Indeed, it is well established that

"[p]risoners are not constitutionally entitled to a grievance

procedure and the state creation of such a procedure does not

create any federal constitutional rights," Wilson v. Horn, 971 F.

Supp. 943, 947 (E.D. Pa. 1997), and a failure to respond to an

inmate's grievances "does not violate his rights to due process and

is not actionable." Stringer v. Bureau of Prisons, 145 Fed. App’x

751, 753 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422,

1430 (7th Cir. 1996)). Since this line of Plaintiff’s challenges,

if intended to assert a violation of his rights either by failure

to respond to his grievances or by an insufficient response to his

grievances, is facially without merit, issuance of leave to amend

these challenges would necessarily be futile. Therefore, no leave

to amend will issue as to these claims.

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s first amended

complaint, Docket Entry No. 6, will be dismissed. All Plaintiff’s

challenges except for his allegation that Nurse Maurice found that

no medical care for Plaintiff’s alleged injury was needed because

the “swelling would go away” will be dismissed with prejudice, for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

Plaintiff’s allegations that Nurse Maurice found that no medical

care for Plaintiff’s alleged injury was needed because the

“swelling would go away” will be dismissed without prejudice, and

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Plaintiff will be granted leave to submit his second amended

complaint detailing his allegations as to this particular set of

events. Plaintiff’s renewed motion for appointment of pro bono

counsel, Docket Entry No. 7, will be dismissed without prejudice,

as premature. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum

Opinion.

s/Renée Marie Bumb 

RENÉE MARIE BUMB,

United States District Judge

Dated: March 2, 2012

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