alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1
                                                                 EXHIBIT 10.2(d)

                DESCRIPTION OF TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT OFFER LETTER
                              WITH MARK T. MCGANNON
                                       AND
                         JOHN NUVEEN & CO. INCORPORATED


In Connection with Mark T. McGannon joining John Nuveen & Co. Incorporated (the
"Company") in January 1999, the Company agreed to provide Mr. McGannon with
certain minimum levels of compensation through the year 2000 as specified in
such letter of employment. These levels included a minimum annual base salary of
$200,000 and a minimum annual cash bonus of $400,000 through the year 2000. In
addition, the Company agreed to provide Mr. McGannon with certain payments in
the event the Company terminates his employment other than for Cause (as defined
under the 1996 Equity Incentive Award Plan) or Mr. McGannon terminates his
employment based on Constructive Termination (as defined under the 1996 Equity
Incentive Award Plan), during the period of two years following his employment
date. In that event, the Company will pay to Mr. McGannon his base salary
through the date of termination, a lump sum severance payment of $350,000 and a
pro-rata share of the previous fiscal year's cash bonus based on the number of
days in the current fiscal year preceding the date of termination. The Company
also agreed in the employment letter to reimburse Mr. McGannon, in the event he
becomes entitled to payments or benefits in connection with the termination of
his employment in connection with a Change in Control (as defined under the 1996
Equity Incentive Award Plan) or otherwise that subjects Mr. McGannon to the
excise tax imposed by Section 4999 of the Internal Revenue Code, in an amount
necessary to fully offset the costs associated with such tax payment.
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1196 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1196

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 1715 Linnerud Drive in Sun Prairie, Wisconsin, as the ``Fire Captain 
                   Cory Barr Post Office Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 11, 2019

  Ms. Baldwin (for herself and Mr. Johnson) introduced the following 
 bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland 
                   Security and Governmental Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 1715 Linnerud Drive in Sun Prairie, Wisconsin, as the ``Fire Captain 
                   Cory Barr Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. FIRE CAPTAIN CORY BARR POST OFFICE BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 1715 Linnerud Drive in Sun Prairie, Wisconsin, shall be 
known and designated as the ``Fire Captain Cory Barr Post Office 
Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Fire 
Captain Cory Barr Post Office Building''.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1

<S>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>           12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                   DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                        DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                               69,288,791
<SECURITIES>                                  0
<RECEIVABLES>                                 0
<ALLOWANCES>                                  0
<INVENTORY>                                   0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                     72,864,650
<PP&E>                                        0
<DEPRECIATION>                                0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                       72,864,650
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                 2,441,274
<BONDS>                                       0
<COMMON>                                      0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                         0
<PREFERRED>                                   0
<OTHER-SE>                           70,423,376
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>         72,864,650
<SALES>                                       0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                      7,399,910
<CGS>                                         0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                      8,700,219
<LOSS-PROVISION>                              0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                      (1,300,309)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                  (1,300,309)
<DISCONTINUED>                                0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                               0
<CHANGES>                                     0
<NET-INCOME>                         (1,300,309)
<EPS-BASIC>                               (41.89)
<EPS-DILUTED>                               (41.89)


</TABLE>
Exhibit 10.25

 

AVALONBAY COMMUNITIES, INC.

Secretary’s Certificate

Amendment to
 The AvalonBay Communities, Inc.
 1994 Stock Incentive Plan
 As Amended and Restated on December 8, 2004

 

On September 19, 2007, at a duly called and held meeting of the Board of Directors of AvalonBay Communities, Inc. (the “Company”) the Board adopted the following amendment to the AvalonBay Communities, Inc. 1994 Stock Incentive Plan, as amended and restated on December 8, 2004, and further amended through December 6, 2006 (the “Plan”):

 

Paragraph 6(b)(i) of the Plan is amended to read as follows to give effect to an increase in the value of the number of shares granted to each Non-Employee Director annually (from $100,000 to $125,000):

 

“Each Non-Employee Director who is serving as a Director of the Company on the fifth business day after each annual meeting of stockholders, beginning with the 2008 Annual Meting of Stockholders, shall automatically be granted on such day a number of shares of Restricted Stock equal to $125,000 based upon the closing price of shares of the Company’s Common Stock as reported by the New York Stock Exchange on such date (such number to be rounded to the nearest whole number). Except as otherwise provided in the award agreement, such shares of Restricted Stock shall vest twenty percent (20%) on the date of issuance and twenty percent (20%) on each of the first four anniversaries of the date of issuance.”

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has signed this certificate as of September 25, 2007.

 

	
 
    	
AVALONBAY   COMMUNITIES, INC.
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
/s/   Edward M. Schulman
    
	
 
    	
Name:   Edward M. Schulman
    
	
 
    	
Title:   Secretary
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Monarch Financial Holdings, Inc. (the Company) for the period ending June 30,
2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that based on their knowledge and belief:

(1) the Report fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                                                    
|----------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Brad E. Schwartz                                
|Brad E. Schwartz,                                   
|Chief Executive Officer                             
|                                                    
|/s/ Lynette P. Harris.                              
|Lynette P. Harris                                   
|Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
|                                                    
|Date: August 9, 2010                                



41
#### Workers’ Compensation Board, Appellant, v Met-Impro Services, Inc., Defendant, and Robert San Miguel, Respondent. (Action No. 1.) Workers’ Compensation Board, Appellant, v Met-Impro Services, Inc., Defendant, and Robert San Miguel, Respondent. (Action No. 2.) Workers’ Compensation Board, Appellant, v Metro Info Services, Inc., Defendant, and Robert San Miguel, Respondent. (Action No. 3.) Workers’ Compensation Board, Appellant, v Met-Impro, Inc., Defendant, and Robert San Miguel, Respondent. (Action No. 4.) Appellant.

[855 NYS2d 150]

*530In each of these four related actions pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 26 to enforce a Worker’s Compensation award, the Supreme Court erred in granting the motion of the defendant Robert San Miguel to vacate so much of the judgment in each action as was in favor of the plaintiff, Workers’ Compensation Board, and against him. Certain officers of a corporate employer may, in some circumstances, be held personally liable for Workers’ Compensation benefits that have not *531been paid by a corporate employer *(see*Workers’ Compensation Law § 26-a [1] [a]). There is no provision in either the Workers’ Compensation Law or the CPLR that authorized the Supreme Court to vacate a judgment entered pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 26 merely because the officer of the corporate employer was not specifically mentioned in the initial determination of the Workers’ Compensation Board’s administrative law judge *(see generally Matter of Lubrano v New York State Workers’ Compensation Bd.,*83 AD2d 841 [1981]; Minkowitz, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York, Book 64, Workers’ Compensation § 26, at 107; *cf. Calzati v Kaufman Astoria Studios,*279 AD2d 443 [2001]).

Robert San Miguel is identified as the president of the subject corporate employers (hereinafter the corporations) in the caption of the judgments, and elsewhere in the record on appeal. In his submissions to the Supreme Court, San Miguel did not expressly deny that he was, or that he ever had been, the president of the corporations, much less submit any competent evidence in this regard. His vague assertions that he “was not operating the above [corporation]” and that he had “nothing to do with this matter” do not constitute a denial of his status as president of the corporations. Pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 26-a (1) (a) his potential personal liability does not depend on the extent to which he actively managed the corporations or on the extent to which he might personally have been involved in the underlying accident.

Under these circumstances, San Miguel failed to demonstrate the existence of any basis to vacate so much of the underlying judgments as was in favor of the Workers’ Compensation Board and against San Miguel. In any event, we note that San Miguel failed to set forth whether administrative relief before the Workers’ Compensation Board was available and pursued to no avail. Accordingly, there was no basis to vacate so much of the judgments as was in favor of the Workers’ Compensation Board and against San Miguel. Fisher, J.P., Lifson, Covello and McCarthy, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.01





CERTIFICATIONS OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002







I, Paul S. Lipschutz, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of WaterPure International, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2011 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of WaterPure International, Inc.





By:

/s/    PAUL S. LIPSCHUTZDate: May 20, 2011

Name:

Paul S. LipschutzTitle:

Chief Executive Officer




I, Robert F. Orr, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of WaterPure International, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2011 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of WaterPure International, Inc.







By:

/s/    ROBERT F. ORRDate: May 20, 2011

Name:

Robert F. OrrTitle:

Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit
32.2




CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED


PURSUANT
TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the accompanying quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the three
months ended March 31, 2009 and filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Jeffrey P. Wood, Chief
Financial Officer of Eagle Rock Energy G&P, LLC, the general partner of
Eagle Rock Energy GP, L.P., the general partner of Eagle Rock Energy Partners,
L.P. (the “Partnership”), hereby certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




1. The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




2. The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the
Partnership.




Date:
      May 8, 2009
            /s/
      Jeffrey P. WoodJeffrey
      P. WoodSenior
      Vice President,Chief
      Financial Officer and Treasurer of Eagle RockEnergy
      G&P, LLC, General Partner of Eagle RockEnergy
      GP, L.P., General Partner of Eagle RockEnergy
      Partners, L.P.
Case 3:11-cv-01442-AET -TJB Document 15 Filed 03/07/12 Page 1 of 11 PageID: 261
Case 3:11-cv-01442-AET -TJB Document 15 Filed 03/07/12 Page 2 of 11 PageID: 262
Case 3:11-cv-01442-AET -TJB Document 15 Filed 03/07/12 Page 3 of 11 PageID: 263
Case 3:11-cv-01442-AET -TJB Document 15 Filed 03/07/12 Page 4 of 11 PageID: 264
Case 3:11-cv-01442-AET -TJB Document 15 Filed 03/07/12 Page 5 of 11 PageID: 265
Case 3:11-cv-01442-AET -TJB Document 15 Filed 03/07/12 Page 6 of 11 PageID: 266
Case 3:11-cv-01442-AET -TJB Document 15 Filed 03/07/12 Page 7 of 11 PageID: 267
Case 3:11-cv-01442-AET -TJB Document 15 Filed 03/07/12 Page 8 of 11 PageID: 268
Case 3:11-cv-01442-AET -TJB Document 15 Filed 03/07/12 Page 9 of 11 PageID: 269
Case 3:11-cv-01442-AET -TJB Document 15 Filed 03/07/12 Page 10 of 11 PageID: 270
Case 3:11-cv-01442-AET -TJB Document 15 Filed 03/07/12 Page 11 of 11 PageID: 271
907 A.2d 1008

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. ROBERT DAVIS, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

September 8, 2006.

ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted on the issue of defendant’s sentence, and the matter is summarily remanded to the trial court for resentencing in light of the Court’s decision in *State v. Thomas,*188 *N.J.*137, 902 A.2d 1185 (2006).
Case 2:11-cr-00134-CCC Document 17 Filed 07/12/11 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 41
# table62_q9_state
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1231 Engrossed in Senate (ES)]

<DOC>
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1231

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
     To reauthorize the Bulletproof Vest Partnership Grant Program.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. BULLETPROOF VEST PARTNERSHIP GRANT PROGRAM REAUTHORIZATION.

    (a) In General.--Section 1001(a)(23) of title I of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (34 U.S.C. 10261(a)(23)) is 
amended by striking ``part Y'' and all that follows and inserting 
``part Y, $30,000,000 for fiscal year 2020, and each fiscal year 
thereafter.''.
     (b) Program Name.--Part Y of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (34 U.S.C. 10531 et seq.) is amended by 
inserting before section 2501 the following:

``SEC. 2500. PATRICK LEAHY BULLETPROOF VEST PARTNERSHIP GRANT PROGRAM.

    ``The program under this part shall be known as the `Patrick Leahy 
Bulletproof Vest Partnership Grant Program'.''.

            Passed the Senate May 14, 2019.

            Attest:

                                                             Secretary.
116th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                S. 1231

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

     To reauthorize the Bulletproof Vest Partnership Grant Program.
```
Exhibit 15.1




Consent of Independent registered public accounting firm




We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements (Form S-8 Nos. 333-127013, 333-141654, 333-155442, 333-155444 and 333-164091) pertaining to the employee stock option plan of RADVISION Ltd. of our reports dated May 11, 2011, with respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of RADVISION Ltd. and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of RADVISION Ltd. included in  this Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2010.


/s/ Kost Forer Gabbay & KasiererKost Forer Gabbay & KasiererA Member of Ernst & Young Global


Tel-Aviv, Israel


May 11, 2011
#### Campbell *v.*James.

*(Circuit Court, S. D. New York.*

July 14, 1887.)

1. Mandate on Appeal—Dismissing Bill—Amended Bill.

Where a cause was remanded to the circuit court from the supreme court, with directions to dismiss the bill of complaint, *held,*that such mandate included the whole hill upon which plaintiff's case rested, and that, a decree of this court dismissing not only the original, but also the amended, bill of complaint, did not go beyond the mandate.

2. Same—Commoting Error in Decree.

If there was any error in the decree, it could only be corrected at that term, or by proceedings for review under the rules or on appeal, not by motion at a subsequent term.

In Equity.

*Marcus 1\ Norton,*for plaintiff.

*Stephen A. Walker,*U. S. Atty., for defendant.

Wheeler, J.

This cause was remanded from the supreme court at its October term, 1881, to this court, with directions to dismiss the bill of complaint. This court, after various delays in the taxation of costs, in its October term, 1883, entered a final decree dismissing the bill and amended bill of complaint, with costs taxed, and awarded execution for the costs. The plaintiff now in this April term, 1887, moves to set aside this decree, and for further proceedings. It is said, in support of this motion, that this court went beyond the mandate to dismiss the bill, by dismissing not only the bill, but tlie a,mended bill. It is understood, however, that the bill directed to be dismissed ivas the whole bill on which the plaintiff’s case rested, including the original bill as amended, as well its the original bill as at first tiled. Nothing would bet accomplished by dismissing the original bill, and leaving the amended bill, on which the cause depended and was tried, still pending. Perhaps it would have been more proper to have made a decree dismissing the bill merely *526according to the mandate, leaving it to include the whole bill, as the mandate did. *Campbell*v. *James,*104 U. S. 356. But, however that may be, the decree which this court made -was full and final, and disposed of the whole case. If there was any error in it, the error could only be corrected at that term, or by proceedings for review under the rules, or on appeal. *Bronson*v. *Schulten,*104 U. S. 410; *Phillips*v. *Negley,*117 U. S. 665, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 901.

This court is without power to open the case now. Motion denied.
Presidential Documents

32785 

Federal Register 

Vol. 74, No. 130 

Thursday, July 9, 2009 

Title 3— 

The President 

Presidential Determination No. 2009–22 of July 1, 2009 

Presidential Determination Under Section 402 (c)(2)(A) of the 

Trade Act of 1974—Republic of Belarus 

Memorandum for the Secretary of State 

Pursuant to section 402(c)(2)(A)of the Trade Act of 1974 (Public Law 93– 

618), as amended (the ‘‘Act’’), I determine that a waiver by Executive Order 

of the application of subsections (a) and (b) of section 402 of the Act 

with respect to Belarus will substantially promote the objectives of section 

402. 

You are authorized and directed to transmit this determination to the Congress and to publish it in the Federal Register. 

THE WHITE HOUSE, 

Washington, July 1, 2009. 

[FR Doc. E9–16348 

Filed 7–8–09; 8:45 am] 

Billing code 4710–10–P 


sroberts on DSKD5P82C1PROD with RULESOB#1.EPS</GPH>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DENNIS R. ENGLAND

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Sumner County

No. 9781 Jane Wheatcraft, Judge

No. M1999-00254-SC-R11-CO - Decided May 30, 2000

FOR PUBLICATION

JUSTICE BIRCH, dissenting.

I disagree with my colleagues. In my opinion, an officer must have reasonable suspicion of

criminal activity before ordering a canine sweep during an otherwise lawful investigatory stop. 

Walter v. State, 997 S.W.2d 853, 858-63 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999). 

Here, the trial court found that the officer’s investigation should have ended upon England’s

having refused to consent to a search of his vehicle. The trial court stated, “the officer used his

(England’s) refusal as the basis on which to get the dog out of the car” to conduct a canine sweep.

It is apparent from the record, therefore, that the officer’s sole reason for ordering the canine sweep

was England’s refusal to consent. The refusal to consent to a search, however, does not constitute

reasonable suspicion. See United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1417 n.4 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 236-37 (1983));see

also United States v. Fuentes, 105 F.3d 487, 490 (9th Cir. 1997); Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485,

495 (3rd Cir. 1995); United States v. Manuel, 992 F.2d 272, 274 (10th Cir. 1993). Thus, the officer

in this case lacked the necessary reasonable suspicion to justify a canine sweep. The canine sweep

of England’s car, therefore, violated his rights under Article I, § 7 of the Tennessee Constitution.

Moreover, if the officer can use England’s refusal as consent to the intrusive sweep, then why

ask in the first place? Why not just subject every vehicle stopped for a minor equipment violation

to a canine sweep? I cannot condone such a result and therefore dissent.
#### Ætna Life Ins. Co. v. Town of Milford. Same v. Town of Belmont.

*(Circuit Court, N. D. Illinois.*

July 5, 1887.)

Blodgett, J.

The suits brought by the same complainant against the town of Milford and the town of Belmont have been submitted on demurrers, and present precisely the same questions which are presented in the case just considered; and those demurrers will therefore be sustained, and the bills dismissed for want ■of equity.