NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

 

 :

CAZZIE L. WILLIAMS, :

 :

Plaintiff, :

 :

v. :

 :

UNITED STATES DISTRICT :

COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF :

NEWARK, NEW JERSEY, et al., : 

 :

Defendants. :

 :

Civil No. 11-884 (WJM)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

CAZZIE L. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff pro se

Reg. No. # 25079-050

FCI Fort Dix

P.O. Box 2000

Fort Dix, New Jersey 08640

MARTINI, District Judge

Plaintiff, Cazzie L. Williams, a federal inmate confined at

the FCI Fort Dix in Fort Dix, New Jersey, at the time he

submitted the above-captioned Complaint for filing, seeks to

bring this action in forma pauperis. Based on his affidavit of

indigence, the Court will grant plaintiff’s application to

proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

(1998) and order the Clerk of the Court to file the Complaint.

At this time, this Court must review the Complaint, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, to determine whether the

Complaint should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for

Case 2:11-cv-00884-WJM-MF Document 2 Filed 10/07/11 Page 1 of 14 PageID: 45
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Court

concludes that the Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Cazzie L. Williams (“Williams”), brings this

civil action, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692, known as the “Fair

Debt Collection Practices Act,” challenging his “unlawful prison

debt[s].” (Complaint, Caption). He names the United States

District Court for the District of Newark, New Jersey, the

Federal Bureau of Prisons, and the United States Department of

Treasury as defendants in this matter. (Compl., Caption). The

following factual and other allegations are taken from the

Complaint, and are accepted for purposes of this screening only. 

Williams alleges that, on April 14, 2003, he appeared before

the United States District Court for the District of Newark, New

Jersey, to enter a plea of “guilty” to a four count indictment 1

“charging [no] offense” and “violating [no] laws” of the United

States. (Compl., ¶ 2). Williams further alleges that the 2

District Court “ordered Plaintiff to pay a ‘fraudulent debt’ of

156 months imprisonment for a ‘Bank Robbery’ charge (CRNo 02-842)

 The proper appellation is the United States District 1

Court for the District of New Jersey, Newark vicinage.

 The brackets in the quotes from the Complaint are part of 2

plaintiff’s stated allegations in the Complaint and are not added

by this Court.

2

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he [never] pled guilty to making his judgment VOID.” (Compl., 3

Ground Two).

Williams further contends that the District Court ordered

him “to pay a fraudulent monetary debt of $105,797.85 based on

the [unpled] Bill charging ‘Bank Robbery’ (CRNo 02-842).” 4

(Compl., Count Three and ¶ 6). Williams alleges that, on

November 21, 2003, the District Court issued a “fraudulent

‘Judgment & Commitment Order’” so as to collect the $105,797.85

restitution fee, purportedly in violation of the Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act. (Compl., Count Four and ¶ 7). 

Plaintiff also asserts that the District Court has committed the

acts of kidnapping, extortion and racketeering to collect the

“unlawful debt[s] from Plaintiff.” (Compl., Counts Five and Six,

¶¶ 8, 9). He further alleges that the District Court placed him

in “involuntary servitude” and violated the act of “peonage” to

“collect the unlawful debt[s] from Plaintiff.” (Compl., Counts

Seven and Eight, ¶¶ 10, 11).

In Counts Nine and Ten of the Complaint, at ¶¶ 12 and 13,

Williams alleges that defendants, the Federal Bureau of Prisons

and the United States Department of Treasury, have conspired with

the District Court to “extort” plaintiff “of the illegal

Restitution fee,” and “his life, liberty, and property” based on

the alleged fraudulent judgment of conviction against him.

 See fn. 2 of this Opinion, supra. 3

 See fn. 2 of this Opinion, supra. 4

3

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Williams argues that the Federal Bureau of Prisons is “holding

Plaintiff hostage to collect the unlawful prison debt[s],” and

that all three named defendants “are conspiring to extort

Plaintiff of the unlawful prison debt[s].” (Compl., Counts

Eleven and Twelve, ¶¶ 14, 15).

Williams seeks compensatory and punitive damages in excess

of $390 billion. He also demands “rescissory damages,” namely,

to have his freedom restored, his charges expunged from his

record and the FBI database, his credit history and motor vehicle

status restored and cleared, and to have his entire judgment of

conviction declared null and void. (Compl., pp. 9-11).

II. STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-

134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996),

requires a district court to review a complaint in a civil action

in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks

redress against a governmental employee or entity. The Court is

required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss

any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. This action is subject to sua sponte

screening for dismissal under both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) an 

§ 1915A.

4

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In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the

Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the

plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94

(2007)(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). See also United

States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). The Court must

“accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Morse v. Lower

Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). The Court

need not, however, credit a pro se plaintiff’s “bald assertions”

or “legal conclusions.” Id. 

A complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis

either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

325 (1989) (interpreting the predecessor of § 1915(e)(2), the

former § 1915(d)). The standard for evaluating whether a

complaint is “frivolous” is an objective one. Deutsch v. United

States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086-87 (3d Cir. 1995).

A pro se complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a

claim only if it appears “‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle

him to relief.’” Haines, 404 U.S. at 521 (quoting Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). See also Erickson, 551 U.S.

at 93-94 (In a pro se prisoner civil rights complaint, the Court

5

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reviewed whether the complaint complied with the pleading

requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)).

However, recently, the Supreme Court revised this standard

for summary dismissal of a Complaint that fails to state a claim

in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009). The issue before

the Supreme Court was whether Iqbal’s civil rights complaint

adequately alleged defendants’ personal involvement in

discriminatory decisions regarding Iqbal’s treatment during

detention at the Metropolitan Detention Center which, if true,

violated his constitutional rights. Id. The Court examined Rule

8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides

that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Citing its recent opinion in Bell 5

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), for the

proposition that “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and

conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do,’ “Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court identified two

working principles underlying the failure to state a claim

standard:

First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to

legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a

 Rule 8(d)(1) provides that “[e]ach allegation must be 5

simple, concise, and direct. No technical form is required.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d).

6

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cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do

not suffice ... . Rule 8 ... does not unlock the doors of

discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than

conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a

plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. 

Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not

permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not

“show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.

Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-1950 (citations omitted).

The Court further explained that

a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin

by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than

conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.

While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a

complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.

When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they

plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.

Thus, to prevent a summary dismissal, civil complaints must

now allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that a claim is

facially plausible. This then “allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1948. The Supreme Court’s ruling in

Iqbal emphasizes that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the

allegations of his complaint are plausible. Id. at 1949-50; see

also Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555, & n.3; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,

578 F.3d 203, 210(3d Cir. 2009).

7

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Consequently, the Third Circuit observed that Iqbal provides

the “final nail-in-the-coffin for the ‘no set of facts’ standard”

set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), that 6

applied to federal complaints before Twombly. Fowler, 578 F.3d

at 210. The Third Circuit now requires that a district court

must conduct the two-part analysis set forth in Iqbal when

presented with a motion to dismiss:

First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be

separated. The District Court must accept all of the

complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard

any legal conclusions. [Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50]. 

Second, a District Court must then determine whether the

facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that

the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” [Id.] In

other words, a complaint must do more than allege the

plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to

“show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips,

515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in

Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the

court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,

the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show [n]’-‘that

the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, [129 S.Ct. at

1949-50]. This “plausibility” determination will be “a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-211.

 This Court is mindful, however, that the sufficiency of this

pro se pleading must be construed liberally in favor of

Plaintiff, even after Iqbal. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89

 In Conley, as stated above, a district court was 6

permitted to summarily dismiss a complaint for failure to state a

claim only if “it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle

him to relief. Id., 355 U.S. at 45-46. Under this “no set of

facts” standard, a complaint could effectively survive a motion

to dismiss so long as it contained a bare recitation of the

claim’s legal elements.

8

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(2007). Moreover, a court should not dismiss a complaint with

prejudice for failure to state a claim without granting leave to

amend, unless it finds bad faith, undue delay, prejudice or

futility. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 110-

111 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 117 (3d Cir.

2000).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks to invalidate Williams’ federal

judgment of conviction by alleging a “fraudulent” judgment &

commitment order that imposed a term of imprisonment as well as a

restitution fine. Indeed, Williams alleges that his judgment of

conviction should be deemed void because he never pled guilty to

an indictable crime. Rather, he argues that he pled guilty to an

indictment “charging [no] crime” and “charging [no] jailtime.” 

He seeks not only damages but his release from prison and an

expungement of his criminal conviction.

This is not Williams’ first attempt to invalidate his

federal conviction. This Court will take judicial notice of

Williams’ prior motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set

aside, or correct sentence, filed on March 12, 2008, in Williams

v. United States of America, Civil No. 08-1242 (JAG). In

Williams’ first § 2255 motion, the Honorable Joseph A. Greenaway,

Jr. set forth the relevant factual history, as follows:

From September 1998 through September 2002, Petitioner

robbed a total of 27 banks in New Jersey, Pennsylvania,

Ohio, Maryland, and Virginia. United States v. Williams,

9

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151 F.App’x 160 (3d Cir. 2005). On November 8, 2002,

Petitioner was indicted for four counts of bank robbery in

Newark, New Jersey; Sayreville, New Jersey; Bloomfield, New

Jersey; and Paramus, New Jersey. (Docket Entry No. 7,

United States v. Williams, Crim. No. 02-842 (D.N.J. Nov. 8,

2002)[hereinafter “Indictment”].) Subsequently, on January

21, 2003, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement, agreeing

to plead guilty to the aforementioned four counts of bank

robbery, and agreeing to waive venue and plead guilty to

three additional counts of bank robbery in the Middle

District of Pennsylvania, the Western District of

Pennsylvania, and the Northern District of Ohio. (Tr. of

Plea Proceedings 5:19 - 6:5 [hereinafter “Tr.”].) On April

14, 2003, in his plea hearing before this Court, Petitioner

pled guilty to these seven counts of bank robbery. 

Petitioner also allocuted to twenty additional bank

robberies, which the Government introduced as relevant

conduct in connection with sentencing.

 

. . .

Petitioner was sentenced on November 17, 2003 to a term of

imprisonment of 156 months, Williams, 151 F. App’x at 162,

which was an upward departure from the applicable guidelines

range of 78 to 97 months due to Petitioner’s criminal

history. Petitioner appealed this judgment on April 14,

2005, arguing that this Court’s upward departure violated

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) and Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) because the sentence was

based on the judge’s findings of fact using a preponderance

of the evidence standard, rather than the standard of beyond

a reasonable doubt. Williams, 151 F. App’x at 162.

The Court of Appeals vacated this Court’s judgment and

remanded for re-sentencing. Id. at 162. On remand,

Petitioner was sentenced to 156 months in prison. (Docket

Entry No. 31, United States v. Williams, Crim. No. 02-842

(D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2006) [hereinafter “Amended Judgment”].) 

On March 2, 2006, Petitioner appealed for a second time. 

Petitioner subsequently withdrew this second appeal. (Docket

Entry No. 32, United States v. Williams, Crim. No. 02-

842 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2006) [hereinafter “Notice of Appeal re:

Amended Judgment”].)

(July 22, 2009 Opinion, Williams v. United States of America,

Civil No. 08-1242 (JAG), at Docket entry no. 8, at pp. 2-3).

10

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In his March 2008 motion under § 2255, Williams argued that

his sentence should be vacated due to ineffective assistance of

counsel during his plea hearing and sentencing. In particular,

Williams argued there, as here, that he pled guilty to a fourcount indictment with no charges attached to it. In denying

plaintiff’s § 2255 motion, Judge Greenaway found that “[t]he

record fail[ed] to support Petitioner’s claims that his counsel

was ineffective. S[pecifically, the record show[ed] that the

indictment was not amended and ‘chargeless’ at the plea hearing;

Petitioner was, in fact, presented with the relevant Grand Jury

Indictment at the plea hearing; this Court had the authority to

sentence Petitioner because he pled guilty to the charges set

forth in the indictment; and this Court’s subject matter

jurisdiction was established by Petitioner’s criminal

indictment.” (Id., at pg. 11).

Thereafter, on June 7, 2010, Williams filed a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, again

challenging the very same conviction on similar grounds that his

plea of guilty to no crime rendered his judgment of conviction

null and void. (Williams v. Zickefoose, Civil No. 10-2953

(WJM)). In an Opinion and Order entered on December 29, 2010,

this Court dismissed with prejudice Williams’ § 2241 habeas

petition for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the habeas

petition was, in fact, a prohibited second or successive § 2255

11

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motion. (December 29, 2010 Opinion, Williams v. Zickefoose,

Civil No. 10-2953 (WJM), Docket entry no. 5, pg. 7).

Williams now seeks to circumvent the above court rulings by

couching his challenge to his conviction as a civil complaint

seeking relief under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15

U.S.C. § 1692. In particular, Williams seeks monetary damages

and his immediate release from prison, as well as an expungement

of his criminal conviction.

A habeas petition is the proper mechanism for an inmate to

challenge the “fact or duration” of his confinement, see Preiser

v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498–99 (1973), including challenges

to prison disciplinary proceedings that affect the length of

confinement, such as deprivation of good time credits, Muhammad

v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004) and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S.

641 (1997). See also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005).

Habeas corpus is an appropriate mechanism, also, for a federal

prisoner to challenge the execution of his sentence. See Coady

v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485–86 (3d Cir. 2001); Barden v.

Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478–79 (3d Cir. 1990). In addition, where

a prisoner seeks a “quantum change” in the level of custody, for

example, where a prisoner claims to be entitled to probation or

bond or parole, habeas is the appropriate form of action. See,

e.g., Graham v. Broglin, 922 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1991) and cases

cited therein.

12

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The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained

that:

whenever the challenge ultimately attacks the “core of

habeas” the validity of the continued conviction or the fact

or length of the sentence challenge, however denominated and

regardless of the relief sought, must be brought by way of a

habeas corpus petition. Conversely, when the challenge is

to a condition of confinement such that a finding in

plaintiff’s favor would not alter his sentence or undo his

conviction, an action under § 1983 is appropriate.

Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002). 

Regardless of how Williams characterizes his pleading here,

there is no doubt that he is actually challenging the validity of

his conviction. However, any such challenge must be accomplished

by way of a motion under § 2255, which must be brought in the

court where he was convicted and sentenced. Here, Williams

already has filed a § 2255 motion, which was denied, and which

the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied

on February 9, 2010. The Supreme Court denied a writ of

certiorari on April 10, 2010. Consequently, this action, mischaracterized as a civil complaint under the Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act, is now a prohibited second or successive § 2255

motion. Williams cannot file a second or successive § 2255

motion unless he first obtains permission from the Third Circuit,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). 

Consequently, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this

action, and it should be dismissed accordingly. Whenever a civil

action is filed in a court that lacks jurisdiction, however, “the

13

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court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such

action ... to any other such court in which the action ... could

have been brought at the time it was filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 1631. 

Here, this Court declines to transfer this case to the Third

Circuit for leave to file a second or successive petition as

Williams has raised these very same challenges to his conviction

on direct appeal, which was denied, and in an earlier § 2255

motion, which likewise was denied. Therefore, this Complaint

will be dismissed with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction and for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Complaint will be

dismissed with prejudice, in its entirety, as against all named

defendants, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and

1915A(b)(1), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted. An appropriate order follows.

s/William J. Martini

 

WILLIAM J. MARTINI

United States District Judge

Dated:10/7/11

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