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### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT JAC KSON

M A R C U S D EA N GE LO LE E A KA M A R C U S D EA N GE LO JO N ES v.

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr iminal Cou rt f or Shelby Coun ty No. 95-11561 Jame s M. Lamme y, Judge

No. W2009-00256-C CA-R 3-PC - Filed Augu st 18, 2009

The Petitioner, Mar cus De angelo Le e, appe als the t rial court's denial of his motion to reopen his pe tit ion fo r pos t- c on vic tio n re lie f. Th e Sta te ha s file d a mo tio n r e qu e sti ng that th is C ou rt dis mis s the above -ca

ptioned appea l. This Court is without jurisdiction t o consider the appea l as a motion to reope n a petition for post-c onviction rel i ef. A dditionally, viewing the action as a n original petition for pos t-conviction relief, t he petiti on is time-barr ed. Ac cordingly, the a ction of the lowe r court is af firmed pur suant to Rule 20, Tennesse e Rules of Criminal Procedur e.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt of th e Tr ial Co ur t A ff ir me d Pur sua nt

to Rul e 20 , R ule s o f t he Co ur t o f C r im ina l A ppe als

J. C. M C L IN , J., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which J OHN E VERET T W I LL I AMS AND C AM I LLE R. M C M ULLEN , JJ. joined.

Ruchee Janar dan Patel, Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant Marc us Dea ngelo Lee

. Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr ., At torne y G e ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Mic ha e l Moor e , Solic ito r G e ne ra l; Be nja min A. Ball, Assistant Attorney Gene ral , for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION

On De ce m b er 1 1 , 1995, the Petitioner, Marc us Dea ngelo Lee , enter ed a guilty plea to the unlawful possession of a

deadly we apon, a c lass E felony. The P etitioner receive d a sentence of one year confine ment at the county wor khouse. No direct appe al of the se ntence was take n. On May 8, 2006, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of e rror cora m nobis. The lower c ourt dismissed the2

petition on August 16, 2006. This C ourt aff irmed the lower court’s dismiss al on May 31, 2007. S ee Marc us Dea ngelo Lee aka Ma rcus Jo n es v. State, No. W2006- 02031-CCA-R3-CO, 2007 WL 1575220, *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 31, 2007)

. On J une 25, 2008, the Petitioner filed a motion t o re open his petition for post-convic tion relief and “motion for be lated appe al or p o s t -conviction relief.” As basis for r elief, the Petitioner
asser ted that his g uilty

plea wa s not knowingly

or voluntarily

enter ed and t h at the evidenc e wa s insufficient to support his conviction. B y order enter ed Decembe r 2, 2008, the lower court dismissed the Petitioner’s motion to reopen. The trial court c oncluded that the Petitioner ha d failed to state a
c la im u po n w hic h a

mot io n to reope n ma

y be ba se d. Th e tr ia l c ourt fu rt he r c on c lud e d th a t, i f considere d as an or igina l petition for post-conviction re lief, the p et i t i o n i s time barre d. On Dec ember

20, 2008, the Petitioner filed a notice of appea l document in the Shelby County Crim inal Court appea ling the lower c ourt’s denia l of his motion t o reope n.
Th e Sta te ha s fi le d a mot ion to d ism iss the abo ve -c apti on e d a pp e a l. S pe c if

ic a lly , th e Sta te
c on tends th at (1) the Pe tit ion e r f a ile d to c omp ly w ith the statut ory p re re qu isi te s in se e kin g th is Court’s revie w of the de nial of a motion to reope n a petition f or post-convic tion relief a nd (2) the petition fails to state a ground upon whic h to grant a motion to reope n a post-convic tion petition.

A. Petition for Post-Conviction R elief The Petitioner’s pleading in the trial court wa s captioned “ Motion to R e-O pen Case, a nd Motion for Belated Appeal or Post-Convi ction Relief.” It appea rs t hat t he lower court treated the pleading as both a n original petition for post-conviction relief and as a mot ion to reope n. The re cord befor e this Court fails to refle ct that a prior petition for post-convic tion relief wa s filed.

The Petitioner’s c onviction was entered on Dec ember 11, 1995. No di rec t appea l was take n from this conviction and sente nce. His conviction bec ame f inal thirty day s afte r entry

of the ju d g me nt. Th e 19 95 Pos t- Con vic tio n Pr oc e du re Ac t ( Th e “ Ac t” ) g ov e rn s a ll p e tit ion s f or po stconviction re lief filed a fter May 10, 1995, and provide s for the f iling of p et itions wit hin one-ye ar statute of "the date of the final action of the highest state appellate court to w hich an appe al is taken,
or . . . the date on which the judgment be came final." T.C.A. § 40-30-102( a). Exce pt in ve ry limited circ umstances, it a lso ma ndates that "the right to file a petition . . . shall be extinguished upon the
e x p ir a ti o n o f

th e [ o n e

- y e ar ] li mi tati o n s p e r io d

. " I d

. ; s e e a ls o T

. C. A

. § 4 0

- 3 0

- 1 0 2 ( b ) (1-3)

. Under t h e P ost- Conviction P roce dure A ct, the followingexceptions to the statute of limit ations are set forth: (1) c laims based upon a ne w rule of constitutional law applicable to a petitioner' s case ; (2) claims based upon ne w scientific e vidence showing innocenc e; and (3) claims based upon se ntence s that w e re e nh anc e d b e c a

us e of a pr e vio us c on vic tio n an d the pr e vio us c on vic tio n wa s su bs e qu e ntl y found to be illega l. See T.C.A. § 40-30-102( b)(1) -(3) (2003). The Petitioner has fa iled to assert a ny of t h es e ex ce p tions for tolling the statute. He cites no newconstitutional rule, ref ers to no new scientific e vidence , and make s no claim that an e arlier conviction has be en over turned. See T.C.A. § 4 0- 30 -1 06 (g ). Add it io nal ly , this Court c on c lud e s th a t th is i s n ot a c a se in whic h du e pr oc e ss considerations require that the statute of l imitations be tolled. See Willi a ms v . St a te , 44 S.W .3d 4643

(Tenn. 2001) (holding that strict application of the statute of limitations t o case s in which a pe titioner has bee n unilatera lly

deprive d of the opportun i t y t o s eek second-tier revie w of his convictions throug h misrepre sentations of his atto rn ey m ay violate due pr ocess) . For these re asons, the trial court, c onsidering the petition as an original petiti on for post-conviction relief , proper ly conclude d that the petition is ti me-ba rre d.

I n his brief, the Petitioner c omplains that the trial court erre d by dismiss ing the petition after
a pp oin tin g c ouns e l, b ut b e fo re re vie w co uld be c omp le te d an d an a me nd e d p e tit ion fi le d b y c ouns e l. Th e re c or d r e fl e c ts that th e Pe tit ion e r f ile d a pr o s e pe tit ion

fo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f/mot ion to
reo p e n o n Ju n e 2 5 , 2 0 0 8

. T h e St a te f il e d a r e s p o n s e to th e p e ti ti o n o n Ju ly 1 6 , 2 0 0 8

. By order enter ed Oc tober 13, 2008, the l ower court a ppointed private c ounsel to repr esent the Petitioner. On Dec ember

2, 2008, the lower

court e ntere d it s o rd er d enying the petition as time-barr ed. The Petitioner had thirty

(30) day s from entry of the order appointing counsel in which to f ile an ame nded pe tit ion or no tic e that no ame ndme nt wi ll b e fi le d. Se e T. C.A . § 40 -3 0- 10 7( b) (2 ). Th e re c or d f a ils to r e fl e c t th a t th e Pe tit ion e r f ile d e ith e r a

n ame nd e d p e tit ion

or a no tic e that no a me ndme nt w ou ld be filed. The lower c ourt proper ly denied post-c onviction relief by order enter ed De cembe r 2, 2008,
mor e tha n th ir ty (3 0) da y s a ft e r t he a pp ointme nt o f c ouns e l.

B. Motion to Re-Open Pe tition for Post-Conviction R elief

The Petitioner also c aptione d h is p le a d ingas a motion to reope n a petition for post-c onviction relief

. As a motion to re-ope n, the Petitioner's appea l fails for se vera l rea s o n s

. F i rst , in seeking revie w of the tria l c ourt's denial, a petitioner sha ll file, within ten days of the lowe r court's ruling,
an application in the Court of Criminal Appeals see king permission to appeal . See T.C.A. § 40-30- 117(c) (2003) (empha sis added); Te nn. Sup. Ct . R. 28 § 10(b). The a pplication shall be accom

panied by copie s of all t he docum ents filed by both p a r t i es i n t h e trial court and the order denying the motion. T.C.A. § 40-30-217( c)( emphasis adde d); see a lso Tenn. Sup. Ct. R . 28 § 10(b). Whil e our supreme c ourt has held that a pleadingtitled as a “notice of appea l” can be treated as a n “application for pe rmission to appeal,” it “must include the date and judgme nt f rom which the petitioner see ks
re vie w, the iss ue wh ic h th e pe tit ion e r s e e ks to r a ise , a nd the re a so ns why the a

pp e llate c ourt

sh ou ld g ra nt r e vie w. ” Gr aham v. State , 90 S.W .3d 687, 691 (Tenn. 2002)

. In the pre sent ca se, this Court cannot c onstrue the notice of appe al document f iled in the trial court as an application for permission to appea l under Graham. The notice of appe al document wa s not filed within ten days of the lowe r court’s or der; the Petitioner failed to attach the documents filed by both parties in the trial c ourt; the Petitioner failed to file the order denying the motion to reope n; and the Petitioner filed the notice of appea l document in the lower court a nd not this C ourt. Moreover, t h e noti ce of appea l document fails t o clea

rly delineate the reasons why t his Court should grant review of the denial of

the motion to reope n.
In order t o obtain appellate revie w of the tria l court’s orde r, a pe titioner mu st c omp ly w ith the stat utory requir ements conta ined in section 40-30- 117(c) , Tenne ssee Code A nnotated. The failure of a pe titioner to comply with statutory requireme nts governing re view of a denia l of a
mo ti o n to r e o p e n d e p r iv e s th is Co u r t o f ju r is d ic ti o n to e n te r tain s u c h matte r. Ne ith e r the Pos t-4

Conviction P roce dure A ct nor the Rules of the Supreme Court permit thi s Court to suspend the statutory require ments. This Court is wit hout jurisdicti o n t o entertain this matter as an a ppeal of a denia l of a motion to reopen a petition for post-conviction re lief. Finally, eve n had the Petitioner proper ly invoke d this Court's jurisdiction in thi s matter, a revie w of the motion to reope n reve als that the P etitioner has failed to allege a ground upon whic h such petition may be granted. Section 40-30-117, T ennesse e Code Annota ted, se e als o Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28 § 2(c) , governs moti ons to reope n a post -convic tion petition. A motion t o reope n a prior po st- c on vic tio n p e tit ion ma y o nly be fi le d if the pe tit ion e r a lle ge s th a t: (1) a final ruling of an appellate court establishes a constit utional right that was not
re c og niz e d a s e xis tin g at the tim e of tr ia l a ndre tr os pe c tiv e app lic a tio n o f the ri gh t is require d; or (2) ne w scientific e vidence exists establishing that the petitioner is actually innoce nt of the c onvicted off

ense( s); or (3) the petitioner’s sentenc e was enhanc ed based upon a prior c onviction which has subsequently bee n found invalid. T. C.A . § 40 -3 0- 11 7( a )( 1- 3) . I f the c la im is ba se d up on a ne w c on sti tut ion a l ru le of la w, the c la im must be brought within one year of the ruling esta blishing t hat right. T.C.A. § 40-30-117( a)( 1). If the claim is based upon an invalid prior conviction, the c laim must be brought within one year of the ruling holding the prior conviction invalid. T.C.A. § 40-30-117( a)( 3). The Petitioner alleges tha t his gu ilt y p le a

wa s in vo lun tari ly e nte re d a ndthat th e e vid e nc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt to s up po rt

his conviction. Th e Pe tit ion e r’ s mo tio n to re op e n fai ls to alleg e a g ro un d und e r whic h a

po stconviction petition may

be re opened.

Whe n an o p in io n w o u ld h av e n o p r e c e d e n ti a l v a lu e , th e Co u rt o f Cr im in a l Ap p e als may
a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o r a c tio n o f t he tr ia l c ourt

by me mor and

um o pin ion

wh e n t he judg me nt i s re nd e re d o r t

he a c tio n ta

ke n in a pr oc e e din g wi tho ut a

jur y and su c h ju dg me nt o r a c tio n is no t a deter mination of g uilt, and the evidenc e does not pre ponderate ag ainst the finding of the trial judg e. See Te nn. R

. C t

. C ri m

. App. 20. We conclude that this case satisfies the criter ia of Rule 20. The judgme nt of the trial cour t is affirmed in acc ordanc e with Rule 20 , Rules of t he C ourt of Criminal Ap pe a ls.

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### J.C . M CLIN , JU DGE