NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

 :

WILLIAM COLEMAN, :

 :

Plaintiff, :

 :

v. :

 :

MONMOUTH MEDICAL CENTER, et al., :

 :

Defendants. :

 :

Civil Action No. 10-3321 (MLC)

O P I N I O N

APPEARANCES:

WILLIAM COLEMAN, Plaintiff pro se, #18598

Monmouth County Correctional Institution, 1 Waterworks Road

Freehold, New Jersey 07728

COOPER, District Judge

Plaintiff, William Coleman, a state inmate confined at the

Monmouth County Correctional Institution in Freehold, New Jersey,

when he submitted this Complaint for filing, seeks to bring this

action in forma pauperis. Based on the affidavit of indigence,

the Court will grant the application to proceed in forma pauperis

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and order the Clerk of the Court

to file the Complaint.

The Court must now review the Complaint, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, to determine whether it should

be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 

For the reasons set forth below, the Complaint will be dismissed.

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BACKGROUND

Coleman brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 against the Monmouth Medical Center and All Jane and John

Does 0-100 (fictitious medical staff at Monmouth Medical Center). 

(Complaint, Caption and ¶ 4b). The following factual allegations

are taken from the Complaint, and are accepted for purposes of

this screening only. The Court has made no findings as to the

veracity of the allegations.

Coleman alleges that, on December 8, 2009, he was taken to

the Monmouth Medical Center by police officers after he was beaten

by them. The medical staff attempted to take a CT scan of 1

Coleman, but he was unable to hold his head still because he was

choking from blood and saliva. The police officers attempted to

keep him still by forcing his head down, and pulling his hair

from the opening of the scanner. The officers also cursed about

having to stay at the hospital. The officers then searched

Coleman’s pockets and down his pants, in front of the medical

staff, despite his cries from back pain. (Compl., ¶ 6).

Coleman alleges that the hospital and the medical staff

failed to provide proper medical care because they did not

intervene to stop the police from handling him at the hospital. 

He also claims they were part of a “vindictive” and “unethical”

 Coleman has brought a separate action against the police 1

officers and the Long Branch Police Department as to this alleged

incident of December 7 or 8, 2009. See Coleman v. Long Branch

Police Dep’t, et al., No. 10-2613 (MLC) (currently pending).

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attempt to assist the police in covering up the assault. (Id.). 

He seeks more than $5 million dollars in punitive, compensatory

and emotional damages because he suffered from mental, physical

and emotional damage from the defendants’ inaction.

STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL

The Court must review a complaint in a civil action in which

a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress

against a governmental employee or entity. The Court is required

to identify cognizable claims and sua sponte dismiss any claim

that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and

1915A. This action is subject to screening for dismissal under

both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A.

In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the

Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in a plaintiff’s

favor. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007)

(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and Haines

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)); see also United States

v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). The Court must “accept

as true all of the allegations in the complaint and all reasonable

inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch.

Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). But the Court need not

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credit a pro se plaintiff’s “bald assertions” or “legal

conclusions.” Id.

A complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis

either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

325 (1989) (interpreting the predecessor of § 1915(e)(2), the

former § 1915(d)). The standard for evaluating whether a

complaint is “frivolous” is an objective one. Deutsch v. United

States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086-87 (3d Cir. 1995).

A pro se complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a

claim if it appears “‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him

to relief.’” Haines, 404 U.S. at 521 (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); see Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93-94 (in

pro se prisoner civil action, the Court reviewed whether

complaint complied with pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)).

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), the issue

presented was whether Iqbal’s civil rights complaint adequately

alleged defendants’ personal involvement in discriminatory

decisions regarding Iqbal’s treatment during detention that, if

true, violated his constitutional rights. Id. The Court examined

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which provides that a

complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”. Citing Bell 2

 Rule 8(d)(1) provides that “[e]ach allegation must be 2

simple, concise, and direct. No technical form is required”.

4

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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), for the

proposition that “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and

conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do,’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949, the

Supreme Court identified two working principles underlying the

failure to state a claim standard:

First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to

legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do

not suffice ... . Rule 8 ... does not unlock the doors of

discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than

conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a

plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. 

Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not

permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not

“show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.

Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50 (citations omitted).

The Court further explained that

a court . . . can choose to begin by identifying pleadings

that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not

entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions

can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations. When there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise

to an entitlement to relief.

Id. at 1950.

Thus, to prevent a summary dismissal, civil complaints must

allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that a claim is

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facially plausible. This then “allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1948. Iqbal emphasizes that a

plaintiff must demonstrate that the allegations in a complaint

are plausible. Id. at 1949-50; see Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555, &

n.3; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009).

Iqbal provides the “final nail-in-the-coffin for the ‘no set

of facts’ standard” set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

45-46 (1957), that applied to federal complaints before Twombly. 3

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. A district court must now conduct the

two-part analysis set forth in Iqbal:

First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be

separated. The District Court must accept all of the

complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard

any legal conclusions. [Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50]. 

Second, a District Court must then determine whether the

facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that

the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” [Id.] In

other words, a complaint must do more than allege the

plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to

“show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips,

515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in

Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the

court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,

the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show [n]’-‘that

the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, [129 S.Ct. at

1949-50]. This “plausibility” determination will be “a

 In Conley, a district court could summarily dismiss a 3

complaint for failure to state a claim only if it appeared beyond

doubt that a plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of

a claim that would show entitlement to relief. 355 U.S. at 45-

46. Under this “no set of facts” standard, a complaint could

effectively survive so long as it contained a bare recitation of

the claim’s legal elements.

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context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

This Court is mindful, however, that the sufficiency of this

pro se pleading must be construed liberally in Coleman’s favor,

even after Iqbal.

SECTION 1983 ACTIONS

To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must

allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the

alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting

under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);

Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994).

ANALYSIS

The allegations in the Complaint may be construed as a

denial of medical care claim in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment because it appears that plaintiff was not a convicted

person at the time the incident occurred. However, as an initial

matter, this Court finds that the Complaint is subject to

dismissal because the defendants are not “state actors” subject

to liability under § 1983.

Coleman brings this action against the Monmouth Medical

Center and its medical staff. But he fails to allege any facts

to show that these defendants were acting under color of state

law. Although the Doe medical staff defendants are “persons”

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pursuant to the first element for § 1983 liability, Coleman has

not alleged sufficient facts to show that they are state actors

to bring a claim under § 1983. 

Before private persons can be considered state actors for

purposes of § 1983, the state must significantly contribute to

the constitutional deprivation, e.g., authorizing its own

officers to invoke the force of law in aid of the private

persons’ request. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel,

20 F.3d 1250, 1266 (3d Cir. 1994). A private person may fairly

be said to be a state actor “when (1) he is a state official, (2)

he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from

state officials, or (3) his conduct is, by its nature, chargeable

to the state.” Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., 184 F.3d 268,

277 (3d Cir. 1999). Here, Coleman fails to allege that the

medical staff were state officials, acted with significant aid

from state officials, or acted in a manner that could be charged

to the state. Merely invoking the bald elements of a legal claim

that the medical staff were acting in concert with the police

officers is not sufficient without factual support to state a

cognizable claim. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Accordingly,

the Complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim as

to the Doe medical staff defendants. 

The Monmouth Medical Center also is not a “person” subject to

liability under § 1983. See Grabow v. S. State Corr. Fac., 726

F.Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989). Coleman has not alleged facts

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sufficient to show that Monmouth Medical Center is a public

health care entity or that its medical staff are state employees

acting in furtherance of state objectives or authorization. The

claims against this defendant must be dismissed.

The allegations of misconduct by these defendants also fail

to rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. Coleman

does not allege any facts to show that the medical staff refused

to treat him or acted in a manner excessive in relation to any

stated purpose of security and administration, which a court may

infer was intended as punishment and retaliation. See Hubbard v.

Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 158-63 (3d Cir. 2005); Newkirk v. Sheers,

834 F.Supp. 772, 781 (E.D. Pa. 1993). Accordingly, the Complaint

fails to state a claim that Coleman was denied medical care in

violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and

therefore, the Complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a

claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

CONCLUSION

The Complaint will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1), for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted. The Court will issue an

appropriate order and judgment.

 s/ Mary L. Cooper 

MARY L. COOPER

United States District Judge

Dated: December 30, 2010

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