The Honor able John R. Gibs on, United States Circuit J udg e for the Court of Appe als for * the Eig hth Circuit, sit ting by desig nation. 1 06
- 46 67
- cv A dam owi cz v. U ni t ed St at es of Am er i ca 

### UN ITED STA TES C OUR T OF AP PE ALS F OR TH E S EC ON D C IR C U IT

_____________________ Aug ust Term, 2007 (Argued: May

9, 2008 Dec ided: J uly 9, 2008) Docke t Nos. 06-4667-c v, 07-4723-c v

_____________________ Michae l Adamowicz, Eliz abeth F rase r, individually and as Executors of

the Estate of Ma

ry Adamowicz, Dec ease d,

Pe tit ion e rs-

Ap pe lla nts , -v.- United States of Amer ica, Respondent- Appellee

.

_______________________ BEF ORE: HAL L , L I VI

NGSTON, a

nd GI BSON, Cir c uit

J ud ge s. *

_______________________ Petitioners-Appellants Micha el Adamowic z and Eliz abeth F rase r appe al from the decisions of the U nited States District Court for the Ea stern District of N ew Yor k (Wex ler, J. ) denying the ir petitions to quash four diffe rent third-pa rty summonses and enfor cingtwo other summonses issued by

the Interna l Revenue Ser vice ( “I RS”) as par

t of its ongoinginvestigation into the estate a

nd g ift tax liability

of their mother ’s estate . We conclude that appellants have not met their burde n of provingbad fa ith and improper pur pose, and the ref

ore a ffirm the de cisions of the district court. In rea chingthis conclusion, we hold that whethe r the g overnme nt’s violation of the Interna l Revenue Code or an I RS reg ulation in connection with the issuance of a summonsThese c ases ha ve bee n consolidated for

argument. Docke t No. 06-4667-c v is an appe al 1 fr om t he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of a pe tit ion to q ua shthr e e thi rd -p art

y summo ns e s is su e d to Michae l Adamowicz, Eliz abeth F rase r, and Rosly n Savings B ank and e nforc ement of two summonses issued to Adamowicz and Fr aser in their ca

pacities a s executors of Mar y Adamowicz’s estate. Docke t No. 07-4723-c v is an appe al from the district c ourt’s denia l of a petition to quash a third-par ty summons is sued to Marie Z ere . Be cause the ca ses involve the same pa rties and the sa

me under ly ing f

acts, a nd beca use they rely upon the same la

w for resolution, we c onsolidate them for de cision. 2 a ff e c ts the e nf

or c e a bil ity of that summo ns de pe nd s u po n th e tot a lity

of the c ir c ums tanc e s, including the seriousness of the infring ement, the ha rm or pre judice, if a

ny , cause d there by , and the g overnme nt’s g ood faith.

_______________________

FREDERI CK M. SEMBL ER, L aw Of fice of F rede rick M. Sembler, PL L C, New York, NY , for

Ap pe lla nts . KENNET H W. ROS ENB ERG (Eileen J. O’Connor & Nathan J. Hochman, Assistant Attorney s Gene ral, Andr ea R. Te bbets, on the brief , Ro sly nn R. Mauskopf & Be nton J . Campbell, United States Attorney s, of counsel), Tax Division, U.S. Department of Justi ce, Washing ton, DC, for Appellee
.

________________________ PER CU RI AM : Petitioners-Appellants Micha el Adamowic z and Eliz abeth F rase r appe al from the decisions of the U nited States District Court for the Ea stern District of N ew Yor k (Wex ler, J. ) denying the ir petitions to quash four diffe rent third-pa rty summonses and enfor cingtwo other summonses issued by

the Interna l Revenue Ser vice ( “I RS”) as par

t of its ongoinginvestigation int o th e e state and

g if t tax lia bil ity of the ir mot he r’ s e state . B e c a

us e we c on c lud e that a

pp e lla nts 1 have not met their

burden of

proof to show ba d faith and imprope r purpose , and bec ause w e decide that technica l violations occurringin the course of a tax investigation do not warra nt quashing a summons absent bad f aith, harm, or pr ejudice, w e af firm the dec isions of the district
c ourt .3 BACK GR OUND I. The Adamowicz, F raser , and Rosl yn Su m m onses I n J uly 2005, I RS Est ate Tax Attorney Susan L eboff

issued three third-par

ty summonses in h e r i nv e sti g a tio n o f t

he e state and

g if t tax lia bil ity of Ma ry Ad amow ic z. Pe tit ion e rs -a pp e lla nts Michae l Adamowicz and Elizabeth Fr aser are the dec edent’ s children a nd also the executors of he r e state . T he thr e e summo ns e s w e re iss ue d to Mic ha e l A damow ic z as an in div idu a l, E liza be th Fr aser as an individual, and Rosly n Savings B ank. The first two summonses reque sted that Adamowicz and F rase r appe ar on Septe mber 8, 2005 a nd produce a number

of docume nts that the I RS claimed would be re levant in deter mining whe ther the de cede nt had either direc tly , or throug h her c losely -held c ompanies, made g ratuitous transfe rs to family members be fore her death that would be subject to estate a nd g ift tax liability . The summons to Rosl y n Savings B ank reque sted its appear ance on J uly 29, 2005 and aske d it to produce a more discr ete se t of do c ume nts . Ad amow ic z an d F ra se r, in t he ir c a pa c ity a s e xec uto rs of

the e state , mo ve d to qu a sha ll three third-par

ty summonses on Aug ust 11, 2005, asserting , inter alia, that the summonses were overbr oad and w ere issued for a n improper pur

pose. The g overnme nt moved to dismi ss that p et i t i o nan d

al s o s o u gh tan o rd er

co mp el l i n g co mp l i an ce wi t ht h e s u m m o n s es , at t ac h i n g a decla ration fr om I RS Att orney L eboff to support its m otion. L eboff issued two additional summonses to Adamowicz and Fr aser in their ca

pacities a s executors of the e state, re questing that they appea r on September

8, 2005, and that they

produce a number of doc uments. Adamowicz and F rase r appe are d at the I RS on S eptember 8, 2005, but they did not provide any

documents re sponsive to the summonses and ref used to answe r qu e sti on s. Th e g ov e rnme nt f ile d a pe tit ion on Ma rc h 9 , 2 00 6 to e nf

or c e the se tw o s umm on se s.The five included the thre e third-pa rty summonses issued to Adamowicz as an 2 ind ivi du a l, F ra se r a s an in div idu a l, a nd Ros ly n Savin g s B ank , a

nd the tw o s umm on se s is su e d to Adamowicz and F rase r in their ca pacities a s executors of the e state.

4 On Se pte mbe r 7 , 2 00 6, the dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d A damow ic z’s and F ra se r’ s p e tit ion

to quash the thre e third-pa

rty summonses and order ed that all five summonses be enfor ced. Citi ng 2 Un ite d S tates v . P owe ll , 379 U.S. 48 (1964), the district cour t expl ained that the f

our cr iteria for deter mining whe ther a

summons is to be enf

orce d had bee n met. I t relied on L eboff ’s dec laration to find that (1) the summonses we re issued f or the leg itimate purpose of de termining the prope r estate a nd g ift tax liability

of Mar y Adamowicz; (2) the inf

ormation soug ht was re levant to that purpose; (3) the information soug ht was not alre ady in the possession of the g overnme nt; and (4) all administrative steps re quired by the Interna l Revenue Code ( “I RC”), 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9834, had bee n followed. Thus, it found that the g overnme nt had established a prima fa cie showing under Po we ll , a

nd that A damow ic z’s and

F ra se r’ s su

bmi ssi on s “ [did ] litt le , if

any thi ng , to counter the L eboff

Dec laration or support any claim of improper

purpose.” II. The Z e r e Sum m ons I n Jun e 20 06 , a s p art

of the same inv e sti g a tio n, L e bo ff iss ue d a thi rd -p art

y summo ns to Marie Z ere , President of Z ere Real Estate Ser vices, Inc. The summons requested that Z ere appea r on August 7, 2006, and that she produc e (1) all documents cr eate d since January 1, 1997 pe rt a ini ngto a

laws uit fi le d b y Z e re Re a l E state Se rv ic e s a g a ins t A dama g Re a lty Cor p. ; ( 2) a ll documents cr eate d since January 1, 1997 relating to the r elationship betwee n Paul Aniboli and Mary Ad amow ic z, Mi c ha e l A damow ic z, E liza be th F ra se r, and

Ad ama g Re a lty

Cor p. ; and (3 ) a ll do c ume nts c re a te d s inc e Janu ary 1, 19 97 e vid e nc inga

do nativ e int e nt b y

Ma ry Ad amow ic z to Michae l Adamowicz and Elizabeth Fr aser .Mary Adamowicz died in 2002, but the I RS requested doc uments up to 2006 in the Ze re 3 Sum mon s. 5 Adamowicz and F rase r filed a petition to quash the summons, asserting that the summons
was ove rly

broad a nd that it was serve d for the imprope r purpose of har assing and intimidating them. I n their petition, they asser ted many of the same alleg ations of improper pur pose that they had made in their petition to quash the three ear lier third-pa rty summonses. The g overnme nt moved to dismiss the petition and to order compliance with the summons, and ag ain submitted a supporting de clar ation from L eboff . I n her de clar ation, L eboff explained that Mary

Adamowicz had owne d a 52% inter est in Adamagand that Aniboli and the e x ecutor s had par ticipated in the sale of pr operty

owned by

Adamag . Her

decla ration continued: “ The doc uments sought in the Z ere summons are ne cessa ry to aid in the deter

mination for estate and g ift tax purposes [of] the
va lue of the Ad ama g pr op e rt

y and the c ha ra c te r o f t he tr ans fe r o f t

he pr op e rt

y fr om A dama g to the c omp any

c on tr oll e d b y

An ibo li a

nd de c e de nt’ s c hil dr e n; t

hat is , w he the r t

hat tr ans fe r s ho uld be construe d to be in some part a g ift from the de cede nt to her childre n.” As to postmortem
r e c o r d s r e qu e s t e d , L e b o f f e x p l a i n e d

t h a ti nh e r

e x p e r i e n c e a s ane x am i n e r , “ i ti s a l m o s ta l w ays 3
nece ssary to reviewpostmortem rec ords to arr ive at the c orre ct deter mination of the estate tax ,” beca use prope rty

at issue may

have be en tra

nsfer red shor tly afte r a de cede nt’s death. Such transfe rs, L eboff

decla red, w ould “shed lig ht on the amount and natur e of a ny g ratuitous transfe r that ma y have oc c ur

re d w he n th e de c e de nt t

ra ns fe rr e d th e se pr op e rt ie s to he r c hil dr e n in the fi rs t instance.” On September

28, 2007, the district court de nied the petition to quash the Z ere summons and orde red that it be enforc ed. The district court re lied upon L eboff ’s dec laration to find that the g overnme nt had met its burden of e stablishing that the summons should be enfor ced unde r6

Po we ll . The district cour t also stated that Adamowic z’s and Fr aser ’s submissions di d not counter the L eboff

Dec laration nor support their claim of imprope r purpose . Ad amow ic z an d F ra se r a

pp e a l f ro m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on s in bo th c a se s. DI SCU SSIO N I. Stand ard of Review We reviewthe district court’s f actua l findings f

or cle ar e rror

and its interpre tation of the I nterna l Revenue Code de novo. Mollison v. United States , 481 F.3d 119, 122 ( 2d Cir. 2007). II. Appli cable Law The Supreme Court’s decision in Un ite d S tates v . P owe ll , 3 79 U. S. 4 8 ( 19 64 ), se ts f or th the standar d by

which the I RS can obtain enfor ceme nt of a tax summons . The I RS m ust make a pr ima fa c ie sh ow ingthat: ( 1) “ the inv e sti g a tio n w ill be c on du c te d p ur su ant t o a le g iti mate purpose,” (2) “ the inquiry may be re levant to the purpose ,” (3) “the infor mation sought is not alre ady within the Comm issioner’s possession,” a nd (4) “ the administrative steps re quired by the Code have been f

ollowed.” Id. a t 57 -5 8. Th is r e qu ir e me nt i s “ de sig ne d to e ns ur e on ly the ba sic propriety of the investig ation” bec ause, “ [a] s the statutory lang uag e esta

blishes, the I RS’s investigatory

power is quite broad.” Mollison , 481 F.3d at 122 (internal quotation mar ks omi tte d) . O nc e the I RS ha s e sta bli sh e d it s p ri ma

fa c ie c a se , “ the burd e n s hif ts t o th e ta xpay e r t o disprove one of

the four Po we ll

criter ia, or to demonstrate that judicial enf orce ment would be an abuse of the cour t’s proce ss.” Id. (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d) . T he ta xpay e r b e ars a

“ he avy” burd e n in

thi s r e g ard , b e c a

us e he or sh e mus t di sp ro ve “ the a c tua l e xiste nc e of a va lid civil tax deter

mination or collection purpose by the I RS.” Id. at 122-23 (inter nal quotation marks omitted). An abuse of

the cour t’s proce ss occur s “if the summons had bee n issued for a n improper pur

pose, such a s to harass the tax pay er or to put pressure on him to settle a c ollatera l dispute, or for a

ny other purpose ref

lectingon the g ood faith of the pa rticular inve stigation.” Po we ll , 379 U.S. at 58.7

III. Pr im a F acie Show ing Und er Po we ll The district cour

t properly found that the I RS had made a pr ima fac ie showing that the
summo ns e s sh ou ld b e e nf or c e d. Al tho ug h it

re lie d s ole ly

up on L e bo ff ’s de c lara tio ns in b oth
case s, an af

fidavit from the I RS i s sufficient to esta blish the prima fac ie eleme nts under Po we ll
. See M ollison , 481 F.3d at 123 (stating that “the I RS m ade its pre liminary showing by

way of the C an al e D ec l ar at i o n , wh i ch s et s fo rt ht h e f ac t s re co u n t edab o v e” an d ci t i n g In re M

cVane , 44 F.3d 11 27 , 1 13 6 ( 2d

Cir . 1 99 5) , f

or the pr op os iti on

that an a ff

ida vit fr om a g ov e rnme nt o ff

ic ia l is sufficie nt to establish a Po we ll pr ima fa c ie sh ow ing ); Un ite d S tates v . W hite , 853 F.2d 107, 111- 12 (2d Cir. 1988) (c iting ca ses holding that the g overnme nt’s burden to e stablish the Po we ll require ments is mini mal and that it may be met by

way of a g overnme nt ag ent af fidavit, and late r concludingthat the g overnme nt had made suc h a prima f acie showing based on a

n I RS age nt’s aff idavit). Ba sed on L eboff ’s dec larations, it is clear

that: (1) the summonses we re issued f or the leg itimate purpose of de termining the tax li ability of Mar y Adamowicz’s esta

te; (2) the information soug ht may

be re levant to that purpose; ( 3) the summonses did not seek infor mation
a lr e a dy in t he g ov e rnme nt’ s p os se ssi on ; and (4 ) t he I RS f oll ow e d th e pr op e r a dmi nis tr a tiv e ste ps . IV. Burden S hif

ted To P etitioner s-Appellants Adamowicz and F rase r asse rt five diff ere nt arguments to support their contention that the summonses should be quashed: (1) the summonses are overly broad; (2) the information soug ht by the summonses is not relevant; (3) the summonses seek doc uments alrea dy in the possession of the I RS; (4) the summonses we re issued in ba d faith and f or an imprope r purpose ; and (5) the I RS failed to follow proper administrative proc edure s. The district cour t found, and we ag ree , that appellants have fa iled to meet their he avy burden to disprove one of the Po we ll c ri te ri a or to show that enfor ceme nt of the summonses would be an a buse of the c ourt’s proc ess bec ause the
summonses were issued in bad fa ith or for a n improper pur

pose. See M

ollison , 481 F.3d at 122- 23 ; Po we ll , 379 U.S. at 58.8 A. The Po we ll

Cr it e r ia Appellants’ f

irst three a

rguments attempt to disprove the Po we ll criter ia, namely , that the inquiry is releva nt to the leg itimate tax investigation purpose and that the summonses do not see k information alre ady

in the possession of the g overnme nt. Se e Po we ll , 379 U.S. at 57-58. F or the
rea sons discussed below, a ppellants have failed to disprove any of the Po we ll

criter ia. First, appe llants argue that the summonses ar e over ly broad, which makes c ompliance
unre a so na

ble and in s ome c a se s im

po ssi ble . T he y

re ly on I RC § 76 03 (a ), wh ic h r e qu ir e s th a t a tax s ummons describe the production soug ht “with rea sonable c erta inty .” Other courts have stated that “[a] summons will be deeme d unrea sonable a nd unenfor cea

ble if it is overbroa d and disproportionate to the e nd soug ht.” Un ite d S tates v . Th e od

or e , 479 F.2d 749, 754 ( 4th Cir. 1973). We have said, in the context of enforc ing I RS sum monses, that “the Gove rnment may not
e xer c ise its inv e sti g a tiv e and inq uis ito ri a l po we r w ith out li mit —th e e xami natio n is unre a so na ble
and imp e rm iss ibl e if

it i s o ve rb ro a d, out of

pr op or tio n to the e nd

so ug ht, or

if it i s so unre late d to the matter pr operly

under inquiry

as to exceed the investigatory power .” United States v. Harrington , 388 F.2d 520, 523 ( 2d Cir. 1968) (citations and inter nal quotation marks omitted). Other Circ uits have explained that: “An I RS sum mons is overbroad if it does not advise the summoned party

what is requir ed of him with sufficie nt specificity to permit him to respond adequately

to the summons.” Un ite d S tates v . M e dli n , 986 F.2d 463, 467 ( 11th Cir. 1993) (interna l quotation marks omitted). The re quirement that a summons not be overbroa d is rooted in the Four

th Amendment protec tion ag ainst unrea sonable sea rche s and seizures. See U nited States v. Judic ial W

atch, Inc

. , 3 71 F .3 d 8 24 , 8 33 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 4) (e xpla ini ngthat a summo ns is not overbroa d for F ourth Amendment purpose s “if the inquiry is within t he author ity

of the
a g e nc y , th e de mand

is n ot t oo ind e fi nit e , a

nd the inf or matio n s ou g ht i s r e a so na

bly re le va nt” (interna l quotation marks and alter ation omitted)). These case s show that claims of summonses beingoverbr oad g ener ally do not avail, except in limit ed cir cumstance s. Se e, e .g ., The od or e , 4799

F.2d at 755 (conc luding that I RS sum mons to tax prepa rer for a ll returns and w ork re cords
re latin g to h is c lie nts ov e r t hr e e y e ars , w hic h w ou ld a mou nt t o 1 ,5 00 ta x re tur

ns , w a s o ve rl y broad)
. Appellants her e have not shown that the summonses at issue prese nt any thing approa chingsuch extreme cir cumstance s, and thus there is no support for their c laim that the
summonses are ove rbroa d. The Ada mowicz and Fr aser

summonses are spe cific a bout what inf or matio n a nd re c or ds are be ingso ug ht. Al tho ug h th e y do re qu e st m any

dif fe re nt d oc ume nts g ener ated ove r long spans of time, on their f ace the re quests are not “disproportionate to the e nd soug ht.” The od

or e , 479 F.2d at 754. Moreover , they sufficie ntly

advise the summoned pa rties what is requir ed to be pr oduced a nd permit the par

ties to respond ade quately
. Se e Me dli n , 986 F .2 d at 46 7. Th e summo ns e s r e qu e st, in m any c a se s, “ a ll d oc ume nts ” c re a te d in a sp e c if ic tim e fr ame : ( 1) c on c e rn ingbu sin e ss b e tw e e n th e e xec uto rs and oth e r c omp anie s a

nd ind ivi du a ls; (2 ) c on c e rn inga g re e me nts the e xec uto rs or the de c e de nt h a d w ithba nk s a nd oth e r l e nd e rs ; (3) a ppraisals of pr operty

owned by

the dec edent or

companies in whic h she had a n interest; and (4) tra nsfer s by the dec edent to her

family or compa nies in which her

family had an inter est. The
summo ns e s a lso re qu e st d oc ume nts fr om s pe c if ic tr ans a c tio ns , n ame ly , ( 1) do c ume nts re late d to land transa ctions betwee n Say ville Development Gr oup and the Ada magCorporation; (2) documents re lated to pay

ments made by

the dec edent ( including inter est or princ ipal paid on notes related to contra cts betwe en compa nies Adama g and Say

ville); and (3) documents re lated to deposits of money

into accounts he ld by

AdamagRealty

and Ve tera

ns Hig hway

Group. Although, a dmittedly , the summonses do reque st a g reat deal of infor mation and documents, that fac t in and of itself does not re nder the m overly broad. See J

udicial W atch, Inc

. , 371 F.3d at 832 (“That the rec ords soug ht are extensive is not m ater ial so long a s the rec ords ar e re levant to the matters at issue in the a

udit.” (interna l quotation marks omitted)).10

The Rosly

n Ba nk and Z ere Summons es ar e eve n more c ircumscr ibed in their bre adth than those just discussed. I n the Rosly n Ba nk Summons , the I RS specifically reque sts: (1) bank sig natur e c ard s f

or the de c e de nt, the e xec uto rs , A dama g Cor p. , a nd oth e r n ame d e nti tie s; (2 ) c or po rate re so lut ion s f

or the same name d e nti tie s; a nd (3 ) l oa n a pp lic a tio ns , a g re e me nts , appra isals, and re lated re cords f or those entities. The summons states with par ticularity which
re c or ds are so ug ht a

nd fo r what y e ars . L ike wi se , th e Z e re Sum mon s r e qu e sts : ( 1) a ll d oc ume nts pe rt a ini ngto a

laws uit be tw e e n Z e re Re a l E state and Ad ama g Re a lty

Cor p. ; ( 2) a ll d oc ume nts
e v id e n c in g th e f

in an c ia l a n d le g a l r e lati o n s h ip b e tw e e nPa u l A n ib o li , M ar

y A d amo w ic z,
e xec uto rs , a

nd Ad ama g Re a lty

Cor p. , in c lud inga g re e me nts to s e ll r e a l pr op e rt y ; and (3 ) a ll do c ume nts e vid e nc inga

do nativ e int e nt b y

the de c e de nt t ow ard

the e xec uto rs . T he se re qu e sts
are cer tainly specific enoug h for Ma

rie Z ere to know what is beingreque sted of her
. Se e Me dli n , 986 F.2d at 467. Appellants, there fore , cannot show that these summonses are overbr oad. Ap p e ll an ts ’ s e c o n d

ar g u me n t i s th a t t

h e s u mm o n s e s s e e k

ir r e le v an t i n f

o r mati o n . We have sa id: Th e statut or

y langua g e is “ may

be re le va nt o r m a te ri a l.” Con g re ss a c te d a dv ise dly in using the ve rb “ma

y be” r ather

than “is,” since the Commiss ioner c annot be cer tain that the documents a

re r eleva nt or materia l until he sees them. This court has consistently

held that the thre shold the Commi ssioner must surmount is very low, namely , “whe ther the inspec tion sought ‘mig ht have thrown light upon’ the corr ectne ss of the taxpay er’ s returns.” Un ite d S tates v . No all , 5 8 7 F. 2 d

1 2 3 , 1 2 5 (2 d

C i r. 1 9 7 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Foster v. United States , 265 F.2d 183, 187 ( 2d Cir. 1959)). He re, the district court, re ly ing upon L eboff ’s dec larations, found that the information re quested “ may be re levant” to the le g itimate purpose adva nced by the I RS. B a se d o n a

re vie w o f t

he summo ns e s a

nd L e bo ff ’s de c laratio ns , th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fi nd ingin t his reg ard w as not clea

rly err oneous, nor wa s its decision an abuse of discretion. See E

EOC v. Quad/Graphics, Inc

. , 63 F.3d 642, 645 ( 7th Cir. 1995) (“A f inding by the district court that do c ume nts are re a so na

bly re le va nt t o a le g iti mate a g e nc y

purp os e c ann ot b e ov e rt

ur ne d a bs e nt a11

showing that the fa ctual dete rminations on which it is based ar e cle arly err oneous or that the ruling itself constitutes an abuse of discre tion.”). The Ada mowicz, Fra ser, a

nd Rosly n Ba nk Summons es all see k information re lated to the I RS’s investigation of possible g ratuitous transfe rs to family members by

the dec edent or

by one of her closely -held c ompanies. Althoug h appellants c halleng e the I RS’s request for postmortem
rec ords, L eboff

explained, and the district cour t cre dited her e x planation, that postmortem
rec ords ar e re levant to a de termination of prope r estate tax l iability . J A 342] The entities involved in the reque st are a ll corporations in which some family members owne d a sig nificant share or ar e S-cor

porations to which the de cede nt had made w eekly pay ments. We cannot say that the re quested infor

mation will not be releva

nt to the investigation. Th e Z e re Sum mon s a lso re qu e sts inf or matio n to de te rm ine the e state and g if t tax lia bil ity of the e state of Ma

ry Adamowicz. Specific ally , the information soug ht may help deter

mine the
va lue of the Ad ama g pr op e rt

y and the c ha ra c te r o f t he tr ans fe r o f t

hat pr op e rt

y fr om A dama g to Aniboli’s company

and the de cede nt’s children, f or purpose s of deter

mining whe ther that tra

nsfer should be construe d as a g ift. Appellants have prese nted no viable a rgument as to why

L eboff ’s statements re g ardingthe possible rele vance of the infor mation sought by

the Z ere Summons sh ou ld n ot h ave be e n c re dit e d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt . Appellants’ third a

rgument is that the particular documents soug ht throug h the
summo ns e s are a lr e a dy

in t he po sse ssi on

of the I RS. T he y

have of fe re d n o e vid e nc e , h ow e ve r, to support that asser

tion. Although ther e may be some re dundancy

betwee n the documents soug ht and those a lrea dy

produce d, that in itself does not require a findingthat the summonses should be quashed. See U

nited States v. Linsteadt , 724 F.2d 480, 483- 84 (5th Cir. 1984) (e x plaining that

“ [t]he ‘a lr e a dy

po sse sse d’ e xce pti on

to t he e nf or c e me nt o f I

nte rn a l Re ve nu e summo ns e s is
narr owly construed” such that eve n wher e some infor mation may

be tec hnically

in the I RS’s possession, if the bulk of the mater ials summoned is not demonstrably in the possession of the12

I RS, t he summons may

be prope rly

enfor ced ( citations omitt ed)) . Even a ssuming appe llants have proven that some documents have alre ady been pr oduced, the y

have not shown that the bulk of the inf or matio n r e qu e ste d in

the summo ns e s is a lr e a dy in t he po sse ssi on

of the I RS. B. B ad F ait h and I m pr ope r P ur pos e Appellants asse rt that the summonses wer e issued by the I RS, and specifica lly by L eboff , in bad fa ith for the improper purpose of

hara ssing a

nd intimi dating them. They descr ibe a number of disputes that they have ha d with the I RS t hroug hout the course of this audit, arguing that th os e dis pute s and

the I RS’ s c on du c t, t ake n to g e the r, e vid e nc e an im pr op e r p ur

po se . Wh ile appellants’ a lleg ations do indicate that ther e have been a number of disputes throughout the proce ss of the audit, for

the re asons that follow, the a lleg ations do not support a finding of improper pur

pose. Po we ll provides that a summons should not be enfor ced “ if the summons had bee n issued for a n improper pur

pose, such a s to harass the tax pay er or to put pressure on him to settle a collater al dispute, or for

any other purpose ref

lectingon the g ood faith of the pa rticular investigation.” Po we ll , 379 U.S. at 58. The taxpay er ha s the burden of proof to show such a

n improper pur

pose, id. , and we have c hara cter ized that burden as a “hea vy ” one, Mollison , 481 F.3d at 122-23. We have sa id: Although me re c onclusory alleg ations of wrong doing unsuppor ted by any e vid e nc e fr om whic h a

c ourt mig ht d ra w a n in fe re nc e of

a bu se are ins uf

fi c ie nt t o rebut the g overnme nt’s prima fa cie showingof a pr oper inve stigatory purpose, the taxpay er ha s met his burden if he a lleg es spec ific fa cts from whic h a cour t might inf e r a po ssi bil ity

of so me wr on g fu l c on du c t by the Go ve rnme nt. United States v. Millman , 765 F.2d 27, 29 ( 2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (interna l quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in orig inal). Appellants cite two spe cific a lleg ations that they claim provide e vidence of improper purpose: (1) the I RS’s breac h of its ag ree ment to discharg e an e state tax li en on the de cede nt’s proper ty interest in Peconic, N ew Yor k; and (2) L eboff

’s misconduct throug hout the estate tax13

audit. Although the re w ere cer tainly disputes in the course of

the tax investi g ation, the fa ct of tho se dis pute s d oe s n ot s uf fi c e to p ro ve imp ro pe r p ur po se on the pa rt of the I RS. A

pp e lla nts ’ alleg ations of bad f

aith are , moreove r, conc lusory and ar e not supported by the evidenc e proff ere d. As to the Peconic pr operty dispute, althoug h there was a g enuine disag ree ment betwee n the I RS and appellants over the re lease of the lien on the Pec onic prope rty , there is no ind ic a tio n in

the re c or d th a t th e I RS a c te d in ba d f a ithin t his matte r. Ap pe lla

nts have fa ile d to sh owho w this e ve nt i s ti e d to the summo ns e s at is su e be y on d th e fa c t th a t th e y are loo se ly

a ll pa rt of the same tax inve sti g a tio n. As to L e bo ff ’s a lle g e d mi sc on du c t, t

he pa rt s o f t he re c or d to which appe llants cite as support for their cla ims of misconduct evidenc e only a tax attorney attempting to do he r job, fac ed with taxpay ers who ha ve bee n less than forthc oming throug hout the proc ess. The c orre spondence betwee n appellants a nd L eboff reve als no bad fa ith on L eboff ’s pa rt , n or do e s it su pp or t a pp e lla nts ’ c on c lus or

y a lle g a tio ns that L e bo ff

thr e a te ne d th e m w ith ins ult ingor

de fa mator y c omm e nts . The district cour

t found that appe llants’ submissi ons did not support a claim of improper purpose. We agree that appellants have fa iled to meet their he avy burden to show that enfor ceme nt of the summonses would be an a buse of the c ourt’s proc ess on the basis that the
summonses were issued in bad fa ith or for a n improper pur

pose. See M

ollison , 481 F.3d at 122- 23 ; Po we ll , 379 U.S. at 58. As a fina l note, appellants a rgue that they

should have be en g rante d an evide ntiary hear ing a nd limit ed discove ry

on the question of whe ther the I RS i ssued the summonses in bad faith. This Court has said that a tax pay er must make a “substantial pre liminary

showing ” of improper pur

pose to war

rant a n evidentiar

y hear ing. Millman , 7 6 5 F. 2 d at 2 9 (q u o t i n g United States v. Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc. , 718 F.2d 7, 14 ( 2d Cir. 1983), aff’d , 469 U.S. 310 (1985)). The district court’s de cision to gr ant or de ny such a he aringis reviewe d for a buse of discr etion. See Tiff any Fine Arts, Inc
. , 718 F.2d at 14. Appellants did not make a substantial showingofAppellants also asse rt that the I RS m istakenly soug ht to enforc e the summonses that 4 we re iss ue d to Ad amow ic z an d F ra se r a s e xec uto rs , a nd thu s, that th e I RS ne ve r m ov e d to e nf or c e the summo ns e s is su e d to the a pp e lla nts a s in div idu a ls. Al tho ug h th e g ov e rnme nt d id mistakenly

attach the wrongsummonses to it s motion t o enfor ce the summonses, all parties we re awa re of which summonses wer e at issue. Indeed, a ppellants had attached c opies of the pr oper summo ns e s to the ir

pe tit ion to q ua sh . D e sp ite thi s te c hn ic a l e rr or by the g ov e rnme nt, a

pp e lla nts have not shown howthey wer e har med or pre

judiced by

it, and thus, it cannot rise to the leve l of a vio latio n th a t w ou ld w arr ant q ua sh ingthe summo ns e s.

14 improper pur

pose, and the district court wa s well within its di scre tion in deny ing the m a hea ring
an d l i m i t e d d i s c o v e r y. C. IRS’s F ailure to F ollow Adm inis trat ive P roce dures Appellants asse rt that the I RS failed to follow proper administrative proc edure s, citing thi s a s e vid e nc e of

ba d f a ithand a s a ba sis fo r q

ua sh ingthe summo ns e s. Spe c if ic a lly , th e y

c la im: (1) by sending a letter

to the Appea ls Office , L eboff violated I RS R evenue Procedur e 2000-43, which prohibits ex parte communications between a ppeals off icer s and other I RS employ ees; (2) by obtaining a

copy of an a ppraisal f rom another

party , the I RS i mproperly examined rec ords
re qu ir e d to be pr od

uc e d und e r a

summo ns in v iol a tio n o f I RC § 76 09 (d ); (3 ) t he I RS im

pr op e rl y used the a udit to obtain information about tax liability of other individuals; and (4) the I RS failed to notify parties involved in the summonses in violation of I RC § 7609(a). The g overnme nt 4
argue s th a t th e se a lle g e d e rr or s d o n ot w arr ant q ua sh ingthe summo ns e s at is su e be c a us e appellants we re not pre

judiced by

them in any

way . This Circuit has not previously decide d whether

violations of the sort alleg ed her e re quire quashing related summonses issued in the course of a tax investigation. Other Circuits that have addre ssed this issue have he ld that violations of the I RC or tax regulations occurr ing in the
course of a tax investigation do not necessar ily require related tax sum monses to be quashe d. Those cour

ts have looked at whether the taxpay er suf

fer ed har m or prejudice and whe ther the mistakes made by

the I RS were in g ood faith. See U nited States v. Bank of M oulton , 614 F.2d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1980) (“ The c orre ct appr oach f or dete rmining whether

to enforc e a15

summons requires the c ourt to evaluate the ser iousness of the violation under a ll the circ umstances, includingthe g overnme nt’s g ood faith and the deg ree of har m imposed by

the
un lawf ul c on du c t.” ); see also Robe rt v. United States , 364 F.3d 988, 996- 97 (8th Cir. 2004) (s et t i n g fo rt ht h at C i rc u i t ’s ru l e t h at “t h e e n fo rc eab i l i t y o f as u m m o n s t h at t h e IRS i s s u edt h ro u gh
a vio latio n o f a

law o r r ule de pe nd s u

po n a ll o f t

he c ir c ums tanc e s su

rr ound ingthe summo ns , i n c l u d i n g t h e s e r i o u s n e s s o f t h e v i o l a t i o n , t h e g o v e r

n m e n t ’ s g o o d

f a i t h , an d t h e h ar m , i f an y,
c a us e d b y the vio latio n” ). Em

plo yingsim ila

r r e a so nin g , th e F ir st a

nd Sixth C ir c uit s h ave he ld that minor notice violations are not a basis for qua shing a summons. Cook v. United States , 104 F.3d 886, 889 ( 6th Cir. 1997) (employing a harmless e rror

ty pe ana ly sis to conclude that a one
da y -l a te no tic e did

no t w arr ant q

ua sh ingthe summo ns ); Sylve stre v. United States , 978 F.2d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 1992) (per

curiam) (holding untimely notice wa s not a basis for qua shing the
summo ns wh e re Sylve str e wa s n ot h arm e d b y the late no tic e ). Court s h ave “ de c lin e [d] to e le vate form over substance a

nd [have] reject[ed] the sugg estion that ever y infring ement of a
re qu ir e me nt o f t

he I nte rn a l Re ve nu e Cod e a bs olute ly pr e c lud e s e nf

or c e me nt o f a

n I RS summons.” Bank of Moulton , 614 F.2d at 1066. We see no re ason to vary from this g ener al approa ch take n by

our sister Circuits. Thus, we a dopt the rule that whe ther the g overnme nt’s vio latio n o f t

he I RC o r a

n I RS r e g ulatio n in

c onne c tio n w iththe iss ua nc e of a summo ns a ff

e c ts the enf orce ability

of that summons depends upon the totality of the c ircumstance s, including the seriousness of the infring ement, the ha rm or pre judice, if a

ny , cause d there by , and the g overnme nt’s g ood faith. Applying our

holding to the a

ppellants’ alleg ations in this case, we conclude that
a pp e lla nts have no t sh ow n h owthe y have be e n h arm e d o r p re jud ic e d b y

the a lle g e d e rr or s. As to the first cla imed violation, appellants argue that communications between L eboff and the I RS’sI RC § 61 66 a llo ws fo r t he de fe rr a l of

e state ta x pay

me nt whe n th e e state c on sis ts l arg e ly 5 of int e re st i n c los e ly -h e ld b us ine sse s. 16 Appea ls Office in connec tion with the denial of the e state’s sec tion 6166 application violated the 5
ru le a g a ins t e x part e c omm un ic a tio ns e mbo die d in

I RS r e g ulatio ns . T he re g ulatio n, e xpla ine d in I RS Re ve nu e Pr oc e dure 20 00 -4 3, pr ov ide s th a t e x part e c omm un ic a tio ns be tw e e n a

pp e a ls office rs and other

I RS employ ees a

re pr ohibited during the appe als proce ss to ensure a n independe nt appellate r eview. E ven if ther e we re a violation here, a

ppellants fail to show any nexus between that violation and the summonses at issue. Nor have the y

made a ny showing of ho w the y have be e n h arm e d b y

that vi olatio n in

the c ours e of

thi s tax inve sti g a tio n. Th e ru le applies to protec t the appellate revie w of the de nial of the e state’s 6166 a pplication, which is the subject of a

separ ate pe nding a ction in Tax C ourt, wher e pre sumably appellants may

argue the direc t effe ct, if any , of the a lleg ed violation. The sec ond, third, and four th challeng es fa ll more square ly within the ambit of our holding. Appe llants claim that the I RS i mproperly examined rec ords under

summons and that such examination violated I RC § 7609(d), which provide s: “No examination of any rec ords require d to be produc ed under a summons as to which notice is re quired unde r subsec tion (a) may be made .” Appe llants alleg e that the I RS ex amined an a ppraisal that it obtained f

rom
ano the r p art

y and that th e a pp ra isa l in

qu e sti on wa s r e qu e ste d und e r t

he summo ns iss ue d to Rosly n Savings B ank. We nee d not rea ch the issue of whether there was a

violation here, beca use eve n if there wer e, appe llants provide no evidenc e fr om which we c ould conclude that the I RS acted in bad fa ith, nor do they alleg e any

harm or pr ejudice that resulted fr om it. Appellants also alleg e that the I RS “admitted” that it is usi ng the audit to obtain information
c on c e rn inga lle g e d li a

bil iti e s o f o the r t a xpay e rs . Ins of ar a s th is a

rgume nt g oe s to ov e rb re a dth
and imp ro pe r p ur

po se , b oth

have be e n a dd

re sse d a bo ve . We a lso po int

out he re that a

pp e lla nts h av e f a i l e d t o s h o w an y h ar

mo r p r e j u d i c e r e s u l t i n g f

r o mt h i s a l l e g e d

v i o l a t i o n . F i n a l l y,We also note that in L eboff ’s dec laration, she states that proper notice wa s serve d by 6 cer tified mail to the involved parties. Appe llants do not proffer any viable evide nce to c ounter this declaration. 17 appellants a ssert that the I RS failed to abide by notice provisions in I RC § 7609(a) bec ause the Service failed to notify

appellants a

nd all the par

ties identified in the summonses that the summonses had bee n issued. Yet ag ain, appe llants do not ex plain how, or e ven if, they have been pr ejudiced by

this alleg ed notice violation. The re is no question that they knew a bout the summonses soon enoug h to initi ate a timely petition to quash them. I f the notice provisions are intended to provide the summoned parties with ample time to protec t their interests by initiating
an ac tion to quash the summonses, see I RC § 7609(a)(1) , then surely that interest has not be en impinged upon he re. 6 We h ave c on sid e re d a

pp e lla nts ’ r e ma ini ngargume nts and fi nd the m to be wi tho ut m e ri t. CO NC LU SION F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e AF F I RM the de c isi on of the dis tr ic t c ourt .