alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Karen Cioe, Respondent, v Petrocelli Electric Co., Inc., et al., Respondents, and New York City Transit Authority, Appellant, et al., Defendant.

[823 NYS2d 359]

*378Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Robert D. Lippmann, J.), entered April 19, 2005, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied the motion of defendant New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) for summary judgment, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of NYCTA dismissing the complaint as against it.

The duty to keep public sidewalks and roadways, including those adjacent to bus stops, in a reasonably safe condition and to repair any defects falls upon the municipality *(Rubin v City of New York,*211 AD2d 417 [1995]). Plaintiffs injuries resulting from a fall over a raised area around the curb near the crosswalk is not the responsibility of the NYCTA, which did not operate, manage, control or maintain the roadway *(Pantazis v City of New York,*211 AD2d 427 [1995]). Moreover, given the uncontroverted evidence that the work permits obtained four months prior to the accident were voided and no work took place as a result of said permits, there is no indication that NYCTA created the condition that caused plaintiff’s alleged injuries. Accordingly, there is no basis to hold NYCTA liable. Respondents’ claimed need for discovery without some evidentiary basis suggesting that discovery may lead to relevant evidence is insufficient to avoid the grant of summary judgment *(Bailey v New York City Tr. Auth.,*270 AD2d 156 [2000]). Concur—Andrias, J.P, Marlow, Sweeny, McGuire and Malone, JJ.
----

| Description      of Compensation | To      Whom                           | Amount                                |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Annual      Cash Retainer        | Directors                              | $28,000                               |
| Additional      Compensation     | Chairman      of the Board             | $50,000                               |
| for      Other Services          | Audit      Committee Chair             | $25,000                               |
|                             | Audit      Committee Members           | $15,000                               |
|                             | Compensation      Committee Chair      | $7,500                                |
|                             | Nominating      Committee Chair        | $7,500                                |
|                             | Lead      Director                     | $25,000                               |
| Meeting      Fees (Per Meeting)  | Directors      (In Person)             | $5,000                                |
| (Not      Including Actions      | Directors      (By Telephone)          | $1,000                                |
| Taken      by Consent)           | Compensation/Nominating      Committee | $1,000                                |
|                             | Audit      Committee Meeting           | $2,000                                |
| Equity      Compensation         | All      Directors                     | $119,025      Restricted Stock Units* |
EXHIBIT 23.2





CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM








To the Board of Directors of Soligenix, Inc.





We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference of our report dated March 31, 2010, relating to the consolidated financial statements as of December 31, 2009 and for the year then ended, which appears in this Form 10-K,  and in the following documents: in the registration statements (Nos. 333-162375 and 333-167792) on Forms S-1; in the registration statements (Nos. 333-157322, 333-149239, 333-162375, and 333-167792) on Forms S-1/A;  and in the registration statement on Form S-8 of Soligenix, Inc. and subsidiaries.














/s/ Amper, Politziner & Mattia, LLP


March 29, 2011


Edison, New Jersey
Case 2:10-cv-06450-WJM Document 2 Filed 12/15/10 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 14
Exhibit
32.1








CERTIFICATION


PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Regal Life Concepts, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q/A for the period ended May 31, 2008, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, ERIC
WILDSTEIN, President, Chief Executive Officer and Director of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:




(1)
            The Report fully complies with
      the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
      of 1934; and





(2)
            The information contained in the
      Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
      and results of operations of the
Company.





Date:  September
8, 2009





/s/ Eric
Wildstein


ERIC
WILDSTEIN


President,
Chief Executive Officer


and
Director
#### Tomasz Kaminski, Respondent, v Kenji Kawamoto, Appellant.

[853 NYS2d 588]

*502Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the defendant met his prima facie burden on his motion for summary judgment by establishing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident *(see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345 [2002]; *Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]; *Malave v Basikov,*45 AD3d 539 [2007]). In support of his motion, the defendant relied on the affirmed medical report of a neurologist, who examined the plaintiff. In the medical report, the defendant’s neurologist, inter alia, noted numeric range of motion findings concerning the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiffs spine. In doing so, he compared those numeric findings to what is normal, thus establishing that the plaintiff had full range of motion in both regions of his spine. He concluded in his report that the plaintiff was not neurologically disabled. The plaintiff testified at his deposition that he missed only two weeks of work as a result of the subject accident.

In opposition to the defendant’s prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The affirmation of the plaintiffs treating physician failed to do so. Among other things, the plaintiffs physician failed to compare any of her findings on range of motion to what is normal *(see Malave v Basikov,*45 AD3d 539 [2007]). The plaintiffs affidavit did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained a serious injury within the meaning of the no-fault statute as a result of the subject accident *(see Roman v Fast Lane Car Serv., Inc.,*46 AD3d 535 [2007]; *Fisher v Williams,*289 AD2d 288, 289 [2001]).

Finally, the plaintiff failed to submit competent medical evidence that he sustained a medically-determined injury of a nonpermanent nature which prevented him, for 90 of the 180 days following the subject accident, from performing his usual and customary activities *(see Roman v Fast Lane Car Serv., Inc.,*46 AD3d 535 [2007]; *Sainte-Aime v Ho,*274 AD2d 569 [2000]).

*503Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). Prudenti, P.J., Skelos, Miller, Covello and McCarthy, JJ., concur.
#### Tallmadge *against*Stockholm and another.

A default tor win always be set aside, on payment of costs, if there is merit®daTud no trial has been foatf

THIS was an action for a *libel.*After the declaration and rule to plead had been served, the defendants obtained an order , * for enlarging the time of pleading to the 20th of *September*® ° i o *i ^asU*and no plea having been put within the time limited by *345the order, the plaintiff entered the default of the defendants, for want of a plea.

*Bloom,*for the defendants,

now moved to set aside the default, and to enlarge the time for pleading. He read an affidavit, stating the reason why no plea had yet been put in ; that the venue was laid in the county of *Dutchess,*and no trial was lost, as the next circuit in that county could not be held before *April*next.

*Swift,*contra.

*Per Curiam.*

We have, from time to time, gradually the practice, as to setting aside a default for want of a plea; we have now come to the general rule, that a default for want of a plea, though regularly entered, will be set aside, in every case, on the payment of costs, where there is an of merits, and no trial has been lost. The payment of costs is a sufficient penalty on the defendant for neglecting to plead. We grant the motion, therefore, on payment of costs.

Rule granted. (a)

(a)

*Vide Davenport*v. *Ferris,*6 *Johns. Rep.*131. *Tidd's Pr.*508.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Cheukma Kenyata SANDERS, a/k/a Kuma, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-7498.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Dec. 13, 2012.

Decided: Dec. 18, 2012.

Cheukma Kenyata Sanders, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas A. O’Malley, Office of the United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina; Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed as modified by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpubhshed opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Cheukma Kenyata Sanders appeals the district court’s order denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006) motion. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. However, we modify the district court’s opinion to note that the motion is denied because the offense level did not change, and not due to career offender status. Accordingly, we affirm on the district court reasoning as modified. *United States v. Sanders,*No. 5:07-cr-00050-RLV-CH-13 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 30, 2012). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.*
Exhibit 8.1

List of Subsidiaries



|                                              |  |                       |  |                              
|--------------------------------------------- |  | --------------------- |  | -----------------------------
|Subsidiary*                                   |  | Year of Incorporation |  | Jurisdiction of Incorporation
|Hoshin GigaMedia Center, Inc.                 |  | 1998                  |  | Taiwan                       
|GigaMedia (HK) Limited                        |  | 2004                  |  | Hong Kong                    
|GigaMedia International Holdings Limited      |  | 2004                  |  | British Virgin Islands       
|Cambridge Entertainment Software Limited      |  | 2004                  |  | British Virgin Islands       
|FunTown World Limited                         |  | 2005                  |  | British Virgin Islands       
|GigaMedia Online Entertainment Corp.          |  | 2009                  |  | Cayman Islands               
|FunTown Hong Kong Limited                     |  | 1999                  |  | Hong Kong                    
|GigaMedia Asia Pacific Limited                |  | 2006                  |  | British Virgin Islands       
|Cambridge Interactive Development Corporation |  | 1997                  |  | U.S.A.                       
|Internet Media Licensing Limited              |  | 2005                  |  | British Virgin Islands       
|GigaMedia Europe Limited S.à.r.l.             |  | 2010                  |  | Luxembourg                   



|* | Includes significant subsidiaries of GigaMedia Limited only.
|- | ------------------------------------------------------------



1
#### In the Matter of Mark A. Cody, Sr., Appellant, v Robert Dennison, as Chair of the New York State Board of Parole, Respondent.

[822 NYS2d 677]

*1142Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Sackett, J.), entered April 20, 2006 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Board of Parole denying petitioner’s request for parole release.

In 1986, petitioner was convicted of murder in the second degree and he was sentenced to 20 years to life in prison. He made his initial appearance before the Board of Parole in January 2005. The Board denied his request for parole release and ordered him held for an additional 24 months. After the determination was affirmed on administrative appeal, petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding. Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the petition and this appeal ensued.

We affirm. The record discloses that in addition to the violent nature of the crime, the Board took into account relevant statutory factors, including petitioner’s criminal history, his prison disciplinary record, program accomplishments and postrelease plans, in denying him parole release *(see*Executive Law § 259-i [1] [a]; [2] [c] [A]; *Matter of Baez v Dennison,*25 AD3d 1052 [2006], *lv denied*6 NY3d 713 [2006]). The record does not support petitioner’s assertion that the Board improperly took into consideration his decision to go to trial. In addition, while petitioner argues that the Board improperly extended his 20-year minimum period of incarceration by denying him parole, the Board was vested with the discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set this as the minimum term of petitioner’s sentence *(see Matter of Silmon v Travis,*95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000]). We have considered petitioner’s remaining contentions and find them to be unavailing. Inasmuch as there is nothing to indicate that the Board’s decision evinces “ ‘irrationality bordering on impropriety’ ” *(id., quoting Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole,*50 NY2d 69, 77 [1980]), we decline to disturb it.

Cardona, *P.J.,*Crew III, Carpinello, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Market Data Consultants, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended August 31, 2007 (the "Report"), I, Wilson Cheung, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

> 1) The Report fully complies with the requirement of Section 13(a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange
> Act of 1934; and
> 
> 
> 2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the Company's
> financial position and results of operations.

/s/Wilson Cheung



Wilson Cheung, Chief Financial Officer

October 15, 2007
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Dekania Corp. (the Company) on Form
10-Q/A for the period ended March 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Thomas H. Friedberg, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.



|                      |  |  |  |     |  |                         |  |                                                                    
|--------------------- |  |  |  | --- |  | ----------------------- |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------
|                      |  |  | 
|Date: August 23, 2007 |  |  |  | By: |  | /s/ THOMAS H. FRIEDBERG
|                      |  |  |  |     |  |                         |  | Thomas H. Friedberg Chairman, Chief Executive Officer
and President
Case 2:11-cr-00055-CCC Document 12 Filed 04/15/11 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 24
Case 2:11-cr-00055-CCC Document 12 Filed 04/15/11 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 25
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE JOHN
NUVEEN COMPANY'S FORM 10-Q AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                          27,422
<SECURITIES>                                    44,842
<RECEIVABLES>                                  123,350
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               195,614
<PP&E>                                          44,157
<DEPRECIATION>                                (29,610)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 540,965
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           45,000
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           387
<OTHER-SE>                                     345,675
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   540,965
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               352,694
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  188,689
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,994
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                161,011
<INCOME-TAX>                                    63,701
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             97,310
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    97,310
<EPS-BASIC>                                       3.04
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     2.85


</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-6769

PATRICE MUNSELLE CARTER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

FLUVANNA CORRECTIONAL CENTER FOR WOMEN;

PATRICIA HUFFMAN, Warden; FLUVANNA MEDICAL

DEPARTMENT, Health Services; FRED SCHILLING;

FAYE GARNETT; ANTHONY LYNCH, Director of

Nurses,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, Senior District

Judge. (CA-03-286-7)

Submitted: August 28, 2003 Decided: September 8, 2003

Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Patrice Munselle Carter, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Patrice Munselle Carter appeals the district court’s order

denying relief on her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint under 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (2000). We have reviewed the record and find that

this appeal is frivolous. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal on

the reasoning of the district court. See Carter v. Fluvanna Corr.

Ctr. for Women, No. CA-03-286-7 (W.D. Va. Apr. 28, 2003). We deny

the motion for appointment of appellate counsel. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
EXHIBIT 28(a)

REPORT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS TO THE MEMBERS OF WELLMAN INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets of Wellman 
International Limited and subsidiaries at 31 December 1996 and 1995, and the 
related consolidated profit and loss accounts, retained earnings, and changes 
in financial position for each of the three years in the period ended 31 
December 1996, all expressed in Irish pounds (not presented separately 
herewith).  These financial statements are the responsibility of the Company's 
directors.  Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial 
statements based on our audits.

We conducted our audits in accordance with auditing standards generally 
accepted in the United States of America.  Those standards require that we 
plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the 
financial statements are free of material misstatement.  An audit includes 
examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in 
the financial statements.  An audit also includes assessing the accounting 
principles used and significant estimates made by management, as well as 
evaluating the overall financial statement presentation.  We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our opinion.

In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above, expressed in Irish 
pounds, present fairly, in all material respects, the consolidated financial 
position of Wellman International Limited and subsidiaries at 31 December 1996 
and 1995, and the consolidated results of operations and changes in financial 
position for each of the three years in the period ended 31 December 1996 in 
conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States 
of America.


KPMG
Chartered Accountants
Registered Auditors



Dublin, Ireland

30 January 1997
EXHIBIT 32

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Annual Report of SITI-Sites.com, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the period ended March 31, 2005 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), We,
Lawrence M. Powers, Chief Executive Officer and Toni Ann Tantillo, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
result of operations of the Company.

                                                /s/   Lawrence M. Powers
                                                ------------------------
                                                Lawrence M. Powers
                                                Chief Executive Officer


                                                /s/   Toni Ann Tantillo
                                                ------------------------
                                                Toni Ann Tantillo
                                                Chief Financial Officer

June 30, 2005


                                       22