alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Emerita E. WOOD, Claimant-Appellant, v. Eric K. SHINSEKI, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 2012-7181.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

March 5, 2013.

*976Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Emérita E. Wood responds to the court’s order requiring her to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed as untimely.

The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims entered judgment in this case on March 28, 2012. The court received Wood’s notice of appeal on August 28, 2012, 158 days after the date of the judgment.

Any appeal from the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims must be received within 60 days of the date of entry of judgment. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2107(b); Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1). The statutory deadline for taking an appeal to this court is jurisdictional and mandatory. *See Bowles v. Russell,*551 U.S. 205, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007); *see also Henderson v. Shinseki,*— U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 1204-05, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011) (noting Congress’s intent to impose the same jurisdictional restrictions on an appeal from the Veterans Court to the Federal Circuit as on an appeal from a district court to a court of appeals).

Ms. Wood states that her filing was late due to the fact that she resides in a rural area of town, making mail delivery difficult. She also appears to contend that her lack of education and counsel contributed to her inability to know when the appeal needed to be filed. The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that there are no exceptions to the rule that an untimely appeal to this court must be dismissed. *Bowles,*551 U.S. at 213-14, 127 S.Ct. 2360; *see also International Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp.,*515 F.3d 1353, 1357-58 (Fed.Cir.2008) (“In *Bowles,*the Supreme Court emphasized the jurisdictional nature of notices of appeal and held that the jurisdictional rules lack equitable exceptions.”). Because this appeal was not received within the statutory period, we must dismiss.

Accordingly,

It Is Ordered That:

(1) The appeal is dismissed.

(2) Each side shall bear its own costs.
Exhibit 10.1

 

COMBIMATRIX CORPORATION

 

AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO
 COMMON STOCK PURCHASE WARRANTS

 

THIS AMENDMENT SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL WARRANT CERTIFICATES

 

THIS AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO COMMON STOCK PURCHASE WARRANTS (this “Amendment”) is made as of the last date set forth below by and between CombiMatrix Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), and the undersigned holder (the “Holder”) of those certain Common Stock Purchase Warrants described below (the “Warrants”).  The Warrants are two of a series of warrants to purchase shares of the Company’s Common Stock that were issued pursuant to that certain Securities Purchase Agreement dated September 28, 2012 by and among the Company, the Holder and certain other investors (the “Purchase Agreement”).

 

WHEREAS, the Company desires to amend the Warrants issued pursuant to the Purchase Agreement to provide that each such Warrant is immediately exercisable as of February 22, 2013.

 

NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties to this Amendment hereby agree as follows:  that the Warrants are hereby amended such that each and every reference to the term “Initial Exercise Date” set forth therein shall mean February 22, 2013.  All other terms, conditions and provisions of the Warrants shall remain in full force and effect without any modification whatsoever.

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company and Holder have executed this Amendment No. 1 to Common Stock Purchase Warrants as of the last date set forth below.

 

	
 
    	
COMBIMATRIX   CORPORATION
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
By:
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
Name:
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
Title:
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
Date:
    	
 
    


 

	
 
    	
HOLDER:
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
WARRANT NO.:
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
WARRANT NO.:
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
(Signature of Holder)
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
(Name of Signatory — if Holder is an entity)
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
(Title of Signatory — if Holder is an entity)
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
(Date of Signature)
EXHIBIT 23.1

                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registrations (Forms S-8
Nos. 333-63855 and 333-34197) pertaining to the Atlantis Plastics, Inc. 1998
Stock Option Plan and the Atlantis Plastics, Inc. 1997 Stock Options Plan of
Atlantis Plastics, Inc. of our report dated February 4, 2000, with respect to
the consolidated financial statements and schedule of Atlantis Plastics, Inc.
included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 1999.


Atlanta, Georgia
March 24, 2000
#### Geraldine J. NIKRASCH, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Respondent.

No. 2013-3007.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

March 4, 2013.

Before NEWMAN, LOURIE and REYNA, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

The court considers whether Geraldine J. Nikrasch’s petition for review should be dismissed.

This petition stems from an initial decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”). Subsequently, Nikrasch filed a petition for review of that decision with both the Board and this court. Because Nikrasch may not simultaneously proceed in both fora, we directed her by order of October 11, 2012, to inform this court within 21 days that she had dismissed her petition at the Board or her petition would be dismissed. Because Ni-krasch has not done so, we dismiss. Ni-krasch may appeal after the full Board disposes of her pending petition.

Accordingly,

It Is Ordered That:

(1) The petition for review is dismissed.

(2) Each side shall bear its own costs.
**EXHIBIT 31.1**

I, Robert E.Driscoll, certify that:

1.                I have reviewedthis Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2007, of MirantNorth America, LLC;

2.                Based on myknowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.                Based on myknowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;

4.                The registrant’sother certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a.                  Designed suchdisclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

b.                 Evaluated theeffectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

c.                  Disclosed inthis report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter thathas materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

5.                The registrant’sother certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’sauditors and the registrant’s board of managers (or persons performing theequivalent functions):

a.                  All significantdeficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and

b.                 Any fraud,whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

Date: August 13,2007
| By:      | /s/ ROBERT E.  DRISCOLL                                                |     |
|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| * * | Robert E. Driscoll                                                     | * * |
| * * | *President and Chief Executive Officer  (Principal Executive Officer)* | * * |

 

----
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION OF CEO AND CFO PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

(Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)



In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Cal Dive International, Inc. (the Company) for the period ending March 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), Quinn J. Hébert, as Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and G. Kregg Lunsford, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Dated:   May 2, 2008







| |                                      
| | -------------------------------------
| | /s/ Quinn J. Hébert                  
| | Quinn J. Hébert                      
| | President and
Chief Executive Officer







| |                                                     
| | ----------------------------------------------------
| | /s/ G. Kregg Lunsford                               
| | G. Kregg Lunsford                                   
| | Executive Vice President
and Chief Financial Officer





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



This certification accompanies the Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
Case 3:11-cv-00862-MAS-TJB   Document 52   Filed 07/06/23   Page 1 of 4 PageID: 846

Case 3:11-cv-00862-MAS-TJB   Document 52   Filed 07/06/23   Page 2 of 4 PageID: 847

Case 3:11-cv-00862-MAS-TJB   Document 52   Filed 07/06/23   Page 3 of 4 PageID: 848

Case 3:11-cv-00862-MAS-TJB   Document 52   Filed 07/06/23   Page 4 of 4 PageID: 849
S05A0304.

#### WHITMER v. CONWAY.

(610 SE2d 61)

HINES, Justice.

This is an appeal by inmate Michael Wesley Whitmer from the dismissal of his pre-trial petition for writ of habeas corpus. See OCGA § 9-14-22; *Smith v. Nichols,*270 Ga. 550, 551 (1) (512 SE2d 279) (1999). For the reasons which follow, we affirm.

Whitmer allegedly escaped from a work detail in Gwinnett County on April 4, 2003, while serving a felony sentence imposed in Chatham County, and committed multiple offenses of burglary in Dacula, Gwinnett County. On September 25,2003, a Gwinnett County grand jury indicted Whitmer for the crime of escape and two counts of burglary, and he was arraigned on these pending charges on February 4,2004. Whitmer filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that he was being detained illegally. Whitmer claimed that his detention was illegal because certain documentation and personal property allegedly establishing his innocence had not been provided to him and/or was destroyed in violation of rules by the Georgia Department of Corrections; the Georgia Department of Corrections improperly sent a “Special Notification” to Sheriff Butch Conway’s office referencing a communication from Conway’s office that Whitmer has a “pending sentence to be served”; he has not *100received any type of preliminary hearing; the indictment was improperly obtained; and counsel was not timely appointed. On April 20, 2004, the habeas court found that Whitmer was being lawfully detained and that the grounds raised in the petition were not proper grounds for habeas relief. Consequently, the habeas court granted respondent Conway’s motion to dismiss.

Decided March 7, 2005.

Michael W. Whitmer, *pro se.*

*Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, James M. Cavin, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General,*for appellee.

Whitmer now asserts numerous other grounds for relief,* but they are unavailing. First, Whitmer’s complaints, many of which appear to be raised for the first time on appeal, do not address his alleged illegal detention or the substantive findings by the habeas court. *See Barnes v. State,*269 Ga. 345, 357 (26) (496 SE2d 674) (1998) (In general, grounds to be considered on appeal are limited to those raised below.). What is more, there is simply no evidence to support the present claims. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas court is affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*

*

 Such grounds include, inter alia, the habeas court’s refusal to grant Whitmer a continuance due to Whitmer’s alleged illness and lack of preparation; the habeas court’s alleged violations of Canons of the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct; the habeas court’s permitting a conflict of interest in the assistant district attorney’s representation of Conway; false statements by the assistant district attorney in the motion to dismiss; and “denial of meaningful access to Courts and legal materials.”
Exhibit
      32.2


Form
      10-KSB/A


Cardiff
      International, Inc.


File
      No.
      000-49709











CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE


SARBANES-OXLEY
      ACT OF 2002





The
      certification set forth below is being submitted in connection with the Cardiff
      International, Inc.(the “Company”) Annual Report on Form 10-KSB/A for the fiscal
      year ended December 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
      Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”) for the purpose of complying with
      Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
      “Exchange Act”) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States
      Code.





I,
      Gary
      R. Teel, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify that:





1.  the
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Exchange Act; and





2.  the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of Cardiff International,
      Inc.








Dated:
                June 23, 2006
            By:
                /s/ Gary R. TeelChief
                Financial Officer
#### Jamie Marrone, Appellant, v Leonard S. Klein, D.D.S., et al., Respondents.

[823 NYS2d 371]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Sallie Manzanet, J.), entered December 27, 2005, which, in an action for dental malpractice, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and order, same court and Justice, entered April 14, 2006, which, insofar as appealable, denied plaintiff’s motion to renew, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The record establishes that the complained-of negligent treatment of teeth numbered 8, 9, 14 and 19, consisting of root canal and crown work performed over a seven-year period, was not for a single condition or complaint, but for rather isolated and discrete procedures. Accordingly, the continuous treatment doctrine does not apply to the treatment of these teeth *(see Juba v Bachman,*255 AD2d 492, 493 [1998], *lv denied*93 NY2d 809 [1999]; *Iazzetta v Vicenzi,*200 AD2d 209, 212 [1994], *lv dismissed*85 NY2d 857 [1995]). Nor are plaintiff’s claims with respect to these teeth saved by his allegation that defendants, up to and including his last visit within the statute of limitations, negligently failed to diagnose and treat his periodontal disease and bone loss *(see Iazzetta*at 212, citing, inter alia, *Nykorchuck v Henriques,*78 NY2d 255, 259 [1991] [essential to application of continuous treatment doctrine is that there has been a course of treatment established with respect to condition that gives rise to the lawsuit]; *Trebach v Brown,*250 AD2d 449 [1998]; *Chesrow v Galiani,*234 AD2d 9, 11 [1996]). The record also establishes that defendants never treated tooth number 10, and, although the alleged negligent crown work on tooth number 3 was performed within the limitations period, the claim, which was first raised in a so-called “supplemental” bill of particulars served without leave of the court after the note of issue had been filed, was properly rejected by the motion court as improperly raising a new injury (CPLR 3043 [b]; *see Gaisor v Gregory Madison Ave., LLC,*13 AD3d 58, 59-60 [2004]).

The motion to renew, in which plaintiff submitted an expert affirmation opining that plaintiffs treatments over the seven years that he was defendants’ patient “cannot be viewed as isolated incidents” and were in large part necessitated by *547defendants’ negligent failure to treat plaintiffs gum disease and bone loss, was properly rejected for lack of any excuse why such affirmation was not submitted on the original motion *(see Matter of Creole Enters, v Giuliani,*240 AD2d 279 [1997], *lv dismissed*90 NY2d 802 [1997]; *Shine v Roosevelt Hosp.,*26 AD3d 204 [2006]). Concur—Mazzarelli, J.E, Saxe, Marlow, Sullivan and Williams, JJ.
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ORDER - 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

ADOLFO GUTIERREZ-VILLAFANA,

Defendant.

 No. CR-10-051-FVS 

 ORDER GRANTING MOTION

TO CONTINUE

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s Motion to Continue Pretrial ( Ct. Rec. 24) is

GRANTED.

2. The August 5, 2010 pretrial conference and the August 16,

2010 trial date are STRICKEN.

3. A pretrial conference is scheduled for August 17, 2010 at

8:30 a.m. in Spokane, Washington.

4. Trial is continued to August 23, 2010 at 9:00 a.m in Spokane,

Washington.

5. The period from July 29, 2010 to August 23, 2010 is excluded

for purposes of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act. Additional

time is needed to adequately prepare for trial and the Court finds the

ends of justice served by this continuance outweigh the best interest

of the public and defendant in a speedy trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7).

IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is hereby

Case 2:10-cv-03900-KSH-PS Document 29 Filed 07/30/10 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 380
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ORDER - 2

directed to enter this order and furnish copies to counsel.

DATED this 31st day of July, 2010.

 s/ Fred Van Sickle 

Fred Van Sickle

Senior United States District Judge

Case 2:10-cv-03900-KSH-PS Document 29 Filed 07/30/10 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 381
EXHIBIT
32.1


OFFICERS’
CERTIFICATIONS


Certification
of Chief Executive Officer







Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, the undersigned officer of Douglas Emmett, Inc. (the “Company”), hereby
certifies, to such officer’s knowledge, that:




(i)
            the
      accompanying quarterly report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period
      ended June 30, 2009 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of
      Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange
      Act of 1934, as amended; and




(ii)
            the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.







Date:  August
      6, 2009
            By:
            /s/
      JORDAN L. KAPLANJordan
      L. KaplanPresident
      and Chief Executive Officer







A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.




The
foregoing certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, and is not being filed for purposes of Section 18
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be
incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or
after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such
filing.