STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
 

In re: C.S. FILED 

November 22, 2017 

No. 17-0578 (Kanawha County 16-JA-580) EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

OF WEST VIRGINIA 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Petitioner Mother K.F., by counsel Jason S. Lord, appeals the Circuit Court of Kanawha 

County’s June 7, 2017, order terminating her parental rights to C.S.1 The West Virginia 

Department of Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”), by counsel S.L. Evans, filed a response 

in support of the circuit court’s order. The guardian ad litem (“guardian”), Matthew Smith, filed 

a response on behalf of the child also in support of the circuit court’s order. On appeal, petitioner 

argues that the circuit court erred in failing to grant her request for a post-adjudicatory 

improvement period.2 

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these 

reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

In October of 2016, the DHHR filed an abuse and neglect petition against petitioner 

alleging that she was arrested for and charged with driving while under the influence, child 

endangerment, driving with a suspended license, and possession of a controlled substance. 

According to the petition, petitioner was the driver of the vehicle and the child was a passenger. 

The petition alleged that petitioner admitted to the police officer who executed the traffic stop 

that she had “smoked weed” and snorted hydrocodone pills prior to operating the vehicle. She 

was also in possession of approximately thirty different pills and failed the field sobriety testing. 

1

Consistent with our long-standing practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use initials 

where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re K.H., 235 W.Va. 

254, 773 S.E.2d 20 (2015); Melinda H. v. William R. II, 230 W.Va. 731, 742 S.E.2d 419 (2013); 

State v. Brandon B., 218 W.Va. 324, 624 S.E.2d 761 (2005); State v. Edward Charles L., 183 

W.Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990). 

2

Petitioner did not assert any assignment of error regarding termination. As such, we will 

not address the circuit court’s termination of petitioner’s parental rights in this memorandum 

decision. 

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The circuit court held a preliminary hearing and, following the presentation of evidence, 

found that there was no reasonable alternative to removal of the child from petitioner’s home and 

that imminent danger existed to the child’s physical well-being. The child was placed in the 

DHHR’s custody. 

In December of 2016, the circuit court held an adjudicatory hearing wherein petitioner 

stipulated that her drug abuse impaired her ability to adequately parent the child. The circuit 

court accepted petitioner’s stipulation and adjudicated her as an abusing parent. Petitioner moved 

the circuit court for a post-adjudicatory improvement period and the circuit court held the motion 

in abeyance based upon petitioner’s “lack of acknowledgment of the facts and circumstances 

which led to the filing of the petition, and her unwillingness to admit the gravity of the 

situation.” Following an April 15, 2017, improvement period review hearing, the circuit court 

terminated petitioner’s improvement period “granted in this matter” based on her failure to 

comply with the terms and conditions of her improvement period.3 

In June of 2017, the circuit court held a dispositional hearing wherein a DHHR worker 

testified that petitioner failed to fully participate in random drug screening and tested positive for 

illegal drugs on multiple occasions. The worker also testified that petitioner had been 

incarcerated and that the DHHR was unable to make contact with her for extended periods of 

time. The worker further testified that petitioner failed to participate in services, failed to 

maintain contact with the DHHR, and was believed to be homeless. During the hearing, 

petitioner testified that she had been sober for ninety days as a result of her incarceration and 

“hoped to start services again.” The guardian clarified for the record that petitioner was not 

granted an improvement period in this matter, but received services and visitation with the child. 

Based on the evidence presented, the circuit court found no reasonable likelihood that petitioner 

could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future and that 

termination of petitioner’s parental rights was consistent with the best interests of the child. 

Ultimately, the circuit court terminated petitioner’s parental rights to the child in its June 7, 2017, 

4 order.

The Court has previously established the following standard of review in cases such as 

this: 

“Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to de 

novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the 

facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the 

evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether 

such child is abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a 

3

It appears from the record that petitioner’s motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement 

period was never actually granted, despite the circuit court’s order regarding its review of the 

improvement period. 

4

Both parents’ parental rights to the child were terminated below. According to the 

guardian, the child was placed in a foster home and the permanency plan is adoption into that 

home. 

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reviewing court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, 

although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire 

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed. However, a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply 

because it would have decided the case differently, and it must affirm a finding if 

the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record 

viewed in its entirety.” Syl. Pt. 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W.Va. 223, 

470 S.E.2d 177 (1996). 

Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W.Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). Upon our review, the Court finds 

no error in the circuit court’s findings below. 

Petitioner’s only argument on appeal is that she should have been granted a postadjudicatory improvement period because “the evidence in this case supported the granting of an 

improvement period to [petitioner] in order to re-unify her with her child.” In order to obtain a 

post-adjudicatory improvement period, West Virginia Code § 49-4-610(2)(B) requires that the 

parent “demonstrate[s], by clear and convincing evidence, that [the parent] is likely to fully 

participate in an improvement period . . . .” Further, we have often noted that the decision to 

grant or deny an improvement period rests in the sound discretion of the circuit court. See In re: 

M.M., 236 W.Va. 108, 115, 778 S.E.2d 338, 345 (2015) (holding that “West Virginia law allows 

the circuit court discretion in deciding whether to grant a parent an improvement period”); Syl. 

Pt. 6, in part, In re Katie S., 198 W.Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996) (holding that “[i]t is within the 

court’s discretion to grant an improvement period within the applicable statutory requirements”). 

Here, petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she was likely to 

substantially comply with the terms and conditions of a post-adjudicatory improvement period 

because the circuit court was presented with evidence that petitioner failed to fully participate in 

random drug screening, tested positive for illegal drugs, failed to maintain contact with the 

DHHR for extended periods of time, failed to participate in services, and was homeless. 

Therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying petitioner’s motion for a post-adjudicatory 

improvement period. 

For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its 

June 7, 2017, order is hereby affirmed. 

Affirmed. 

ISSUED: November 22, 2017 

CONCURRED IN BY: 

Chief Justice Allen H. Loughry II 

Justice Robin Jean Davis 

Justice Margaret L. Workman 

Justice Menis E. Ketchum 

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker 

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