alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 32.0**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Qof Fox Chase Bancorp, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarterlyperiod ended June 30, 2009, as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission (the “Report”), I hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that:

 

1.                        The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

 

2.                        The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the consolidated financial conditionand results of operations of the Company as of and for the period covered bythe Report.

 
|   | By:    | /s/  Thomas M. Petro                  |
|--------|--------|---------------------------------------|
|   |   | Thomas M. Petro                       |
|   |   | President and Chief Executive Officer |
|   |   | August 6, 2009                   |
|   |   |                                  |
|   | By:    | /s/  Roger S. Deacon                  |
|   |   | Roger S. Deacon                       |
|   |   | Chief Financial Officer               |
|   |   | August 6, 2009                   |

 

----
Exhibit 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the Quarterly Report of Tianyin Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report’), I, Quoqing Jiang, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the dates and for the periods indicated.








Date:  November 13, 2009





/s/  Guoqing Jiang





Guoqing Jiang


Acting Chief Accounting Officer
TDCJ Offender Details

WMI'Mi'iH

Page 1 of2

^,l04-f*2-

trlTEXAS: DEPARIPEMT Of CRIMINAL. JUSTICE New Offender Search

Offender Information Details

Return to Search list

SID Number:

TDCJ Number:

Name:

Race:

Gender:

DOB:

Maximum Sentence Date:

Current Facility:

Projected Release Date:

Parole Eligibility Date:

Offender Visitation Eligible:

04088120

01764301

ADAMS.RICKY LYNN

B

M

1963-11-16

2036-04-23

MAC STRINGFELLOW

2036-04-23

2021-04-23

YES

Information provided is updated once daily during weekdays and multiple times per day

on visitation days. Because this information is subject to change, family members and

friends are encouraged to call the unit prior to traveling for a visit.

SPECIAL INFORMATION FOR SCHEDULED RELEASE:

Scheduled Release Date:

Scheduled Release Type:

Scheduled Release Location:

Offender is not scheduled for release at this time.

Will be determined when release date is scheduled.

Will be determined when release date is scheduled.

Parole Review Information

Offense History:

Offense

Date

Offense

Sentence

Date

„ 4 ~ M Sentence (YY-MM- County Case No. DD\

T

http://offender.tdcj .texas.gov/OffenderSearch/offenderDetail.action?sid=04088120 7/27/2015
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 22-0529

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

JASSIE LAYDELL WESTERMAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for an extension and 

good cause appearing.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant is given an 

extension of time until June 5, 2024, to prepare, file, and serve the 

Appellant’s reply brief.

No further extensions will be granted.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

May 2 2024

05/02/2024

Case Number: DA 22-0529
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-6466

KENNETH WAYNE WOODFIN,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

RONALD J. ANGELONE,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Richmond. David G. Lowe, Magistrate Judge.

(CA-01-444)

Submitted: May 16, 2002 Decided: May 28, 2002

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Kenneth Wayne Woodfin, Appellant Pro Se. Richard Bain Smith,

Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
* The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a

magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1994).

2

PER CURIAM:

Kenneth Wayne Woodfin appeals the magistrate judge’s order

denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West

1994 & Supp. 2001).* We have reviewed the record and the magistrate

judge’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny

a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the

reasoning of the magistrate judge. See Woodfin v. Angelone, No.

CA-01-444 (E.D. Va. Mar. 7, 2002). We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### WILLIAMS v. NEW JERSEY-NEW YORK TRANSIT CO.

District Court, S. D. New York.

Jan. 3, 1940.

Frank Case Hayden, of New York City, for plaintiff.

Kaye, Scholer, Fierman & Hays, of New York City (Milton Kunen, of New York City, of counsel), for defendant.

HULBERT, District Judge.

This action is to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff while a passenger in a bus operated by the defendant.

Plaintiff claims she was struck on the head by a brief case which fell through the baggage rack of said bus.

Defendant applies for an order directing the plaintiff to submit to a general physical and mental examination by Dr. Laurent Feinier, a neurologist.

Plaintiff does not object to the examination but requests the court to impose two conditions.

1. That plaintiff’s attorney be furnished with a copy of the testimony given by Dr. Feinier, which was consented to by defendant’s counsel on the argument of the motion.

2. Plaintiff previously served notice of the taking of the deposition of Henry P. Goldstein, resident agent of the defendant or manager of the claims department and called for the production for examination of reports theretofore made by Dr. H. G. Rose and Dr. Harry V. Spaulding.

The defendant, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Rule 30, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, applied for an order vacating said notice, and the endorsement made upon the motion papers by the judge who heard that motion reads: “Granted as indicated.” (Presumably, orally). No order has been entered.

Counsel for the plaintiff now requests that the defendant produce for his inspection, or furnish him with a copy of the reports of Drs. Rose and Spaulding. If, as the defendant’s counsel asserts, that relief was previously denied by one of my colleagues, it is the law of the case so far as I am concerned and that condition will not be imposed.

Settle order on notice unless consented to as to form.
N OTE : This disposition is nonprecedential.


# United States Court of Appeals
**for the Federal Circuit**

______________________

ALEXANDER S. ORENSHTEYN, Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

CITRIX SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant

- Appellee.

______________________

2011

- 1308

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Florida in No. 02

- CV

- 60478, Judge

Adalberto Jordan.

______________________

JUDGMENT

______________________

J OSEPH J. Z ITO , Zito, tlp , of Washingto n, DC, argued for plaintiff

- appellant. With him on the brief was

E MERSON V. B RIGGS

, III

.

D OUGLAS J. K LINE , Goodwin Procter, LLP, of Boston, Massachusetts, argued for defendant

- appellee. With him

on the brief were W ILLIAM A. M EUNIER ; T IMOTHY J.

R OUSSEAU , of New York, New York.

______________________T HIS C AUSE having been heard and considered, it is

O RDERED and A DJUDGED :

P ER C URIAM (L OURIE

, B RYSON

, and P ROST

, Circuit Judges)

.

AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.

E NTERED BY O RDER OF THE C OURT

April 11, 2013 /s/ Jan Horbaly

Date Jan Horbaly

Clerk
#### Raymond THOMASON, Sr., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Samuel S. LEITER et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 3197-N.

United States District Court, M. D. Alabama, N. D.

April 9, 1971.

Frank W. Riggs, III, Montgomery, Ala., for plaintiffs.

Jack Crenshaw and Maultsby Waller, Crenshaw & Waller, Montgomery, Ala., for defendants.

ORDER

JOHNSON, Chief Judge.

This case is now submitted upon the motion of the defendants Leiter, Perez, Sirulnik, Muresan, Robbins and Dillinger, filed herein April 7, 1971, asking this Court to order the plaintiffs to file further answers to certain interrogatories that were propounded by the defendants to plaintiffs on March 3, 1971. The responses that the plaintiffs have made to the defendants’ interrogatories to which the motion now under consideration is directed reflect that the basis for plaintiffs’ failure to supply the information sought is new Rule 33(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The amendment to Rule 33(c), effective July 1, 1970, relates to interrogatories seeking to require a party “to engage in burdensome or expensive research into his own business records in order to give an answer.” See notes of the Advisory Committee. The Advisory Committee further suggests that this new subdivision to Rule 33 gives the party an *291option to make the records available and place the burden of research on the party seeking the information. The theory behind the amendment is to protect against abusive use of Rule 33. However, it is clear that the new amendment is not designed to impose on an interrogating party a mass of records and thereby make the ascertaining of the answers to the questions even more burdensome or expensive on the interrogating party. This seems to be the case here.

In several instances, the answers to the defendants’ interrogatories would not require the plaintiffs to engage in any burdensome or expensive research into their own business records. Indeed, several of the questions do not call for any research — only a reference to the business records of the plaintiffs. The questions the defendants have propounded, to which the motion presently under consideration refers, do not appear to this Court to be the type of questions that subdivision (e) to Rule 33 pertains. Accordingly, it is the order, judgment and decree of this Court that plaintiffs, within five days from the date of this order, file further answers to interrogatories 10, 19, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 44(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), 45, 51(a), (b), 52(a), (b), 53, 54, 58, 60, 70, 72 and 87.

The defendants also move this Court for an order to require the plaintiffs to file further answers to other interrogatories on the grounds that plaintiffs’ answers are incomplete or evasive. An examination of the questions propounded by the defendants and the plaintiffs’ answers thereto reflect that in each instance this is true. Accordingly, it is ordered that the plaintiffs, within five days from the date of this order, file further and unambiguous answers to interrogatories 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 50, 52(c) and 55.
#### COLEY v. PIERCE.

Civ. A. No. 3611.

District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia.

Dec. 13, 1939.

Nathan A. Dobbins, of Washington, D. 'C., for plaintiff.

Cobb, Howard & Hayes and George E. C. Hayes, all of Washington, D. C., for defendant.

PROCTOR, Associate Justice.

 1st. As to motion to strike defendant’s answer to plaintiff’s answer to counterclaim, the counterclaim contains certain averments upon which the claims are made that the Hollywood Tavern & Grill and premises 2718 Georgia Avenue should be adjudged to be assets of the partnership and based thereon an extension of the receivership to the business conducted as the tavern and grill is asked. The answer to this pleading contains denials and assertions of fact which raise definite issues as to said claims concerning both properties. The pleadings should go no further on the counterclaim without leave of court. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for District Courts, rule 7(a), 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c. Nevertheless, plaintiff has filed an answer to defendant’s answer to the counterclaim. In substance, this paper but reiterates the allegations of the counterclaim and then goes on to set forth evidence and arguments in support of the counterclaim. Serious objections are manifest to this method and form of pleading, which doubtless account for the rule. I do not think it should be approved in this instance. Accordingly the motion to strike will be granted.

2nd. As to the motion of plaintiff to extend the receivership to include the Hollywood Tavern & Grill, in my opinion the record upon that subject does not warrant the appointment of a receiver. Vital facts are in dispute and a long period has elapsed since the establishment of that business. Until the evidence is heard and findings made, proper conclusions of law cannot be drawn. There is indeed too much uncertainty at present to justify the drastic action of receivership. Nor do I think that, the evidence pleaded in the stricken answer would suffice to change the situation as regards a receiver. The motion to extend the receivership will be denied.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

MIDDLE DISTRICT 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

 Respondent 

 v. 

MICKEY SANTOS COLON, 

 Petitioner 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 769 MAL 2015 

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court 

ORDER 

PER CURIAM 

AND NOW, this 19th day of September, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of 

Appeal and Motion for Leave to File Amended or Supplemental Petition for Allowance of 

Appeal are DENIED. 

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.
Exhibit 3.1

 



 

 



 

 



 

 

 

 



 

 



 

 

 



 

 



 

 

 

 



 

 



 

 

 



 

 



 

 

 



 

 



 

 

 

 

 



 

 



 

 

 

 



 

 



 

 

 



 

 



 

 

 

 



 

 



 

 

 



 

 



 

 

 



 

 



 

 

 



 

 



 

 

 



 

 



 

 

 



 

 



 

 

 

 



 

 

 



 

 



 

 

 



 

 



 

 



 

 

 



 

 

 

 



 

 



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#### Sheldon *against*Soper.

NEW-YORK,

October, 1817.

At a sale umier an execution, must beCpeoim°ed deís,t0ande stid separately and Where goods are sold under an execution, without any particular designation at the time of sale, the purchaser acquires no property, *i*action of trover for the goods. . In an action oftrover, the plaintiff must show property m himself. I cannot maintain aa

IN ERROR, on *certiorari*to a justice’s court. ' • *J*

This was an action of trover, brought by the defendant in error, the plaintiff in the court below, against the plaintiff in error, for goods which he claimed by virtue of a purchase at a *355sheriff’s sale under an execution against one *Ellis.*It appeared that the deputy sheriff, when he made the levy, under that exe cution, did not see the property in question, or know that *Ellis*owned it, and that at the time of the sale he did not know that it belonged to *Ellis ;*but he put up some articles specifically, and all the other personal property, generally, intending thereby to sell the whole of the personal property of *Ellis.*The defendant below set up a claim to the property as a purchaser under a prior execution against *Ellis;*and evidence was given to show that that sale was fraudulent. It appeared that when the sale to the plaintiff below was made, *Ellis*was in possession of the articles claimed in this suit. The justice gave judgment for the plaintiff below, the defendant in error.

*Per Curiam.*

The evidence was pretty strong to show that the defendant below acquired no right to the property in question, under the sale set up by him; for, independently of the question of fraud, the sale, in that case, was general, of all the presonal property ot *Ellis ;k*but in an action of trover, it is necessary for the plaintiff to show property in himself, which was not done in this instance. The general sale under the execution would not pass the property; the sheriff did not even know the goods, or pretend to sell them specifically, and to sanction such sales would open a door to innumerable frauds. The property should be pointed out to the inspection and examination of bidders, that they may be enabled to form an estimate of its value; as was held necessary by this court in the case of *Jackson*v. *Striker, ■*(1 *Johns. Cas.*287.) Although the sale in that case was of real property, yet the same reason and policy apply to sales of chattels. It was there laid down as a.general rule, that nothing ought to pass at a public sale, but wha* was then known and promulgated : that it was a general and salutary principle-—one necessary in order to guard against fraud, and to preserve integrity and fairness at public auctions—that no property should pass at a sheriff’s sale, but what was, at the timo, ascertained and declared. (14 *Johns. Rep.*222.) The judgment must, accordingly, be reversed.

Judgment reversed.(a)

(a)

 Vide *Woods*v. *Meacll and*others, 1 *Johns. Chan. Rep.*502.
S04A1563.

#### LEWIS v. LEWIS.

(604 SE2d 485)

Thompson, Justice.

During the pendency of the parties’ divorce proceedings, a temporary order was entered granting custody of the minor children to plaintiff Gloria J. Lewis, and requiring defendant Terry M. Lewis to pay $950 per month as temporary support and maintenance for the children. Following a jury trial, a final judgment and decree of divorce was entered pursuant to which plaintiff was awarded legal custody, and defendant was required to pay permanent child support.1 In the month following the final judgment, plaintiff brought a motion for contempt against defendant claiming, inter alia, that defendant owed a total of $3,325 in past due child support under the temporary order. The trial court refused to find defendant in wilful contempt reasoning that plaintiff waived any claim she may have had to child support under the temporary order by her failure to raise that claim during the jury trial. We granted discretionary review and reverse.

In *Newton v. Newton,*238 Ga. 282 (232 SE2d 557) (1977), we held that a claim for arrearage in temporary alimony which accrued prior to rendition of the final decree may be the subject of contempt proceedings initiated subsequent to the final decree. See also *Moore v. Moore,*207 Ga. 335 (1) (61 SE2d 500) (1950) (failure to apply for contempt of an order awarding temporary alimony during the pendency of the lawsuit cannot operate to deprive a party of the remedy after final verdict). Application of a similar rule is even more compelling in a situation such as this where temporary child support is implicated. That is because of the long-standing principle that the right to receive child support belongs to the child and cannot be waived by the custodial parent. *Crosby v. Crosby,*249 Ga. 569 (292 SE2d 814) (1982); *Livsey v. Livsey,*229 Ga. 368 (191 SE2d 859) (1972). We hold, therefore, that the claim for arrearage in child support under the temporary order was not waived by plaintiffs failure to assert the claim at trial. See generally *Thompson v. Thompson,*259 Ga. 817 (388 SE2d 514) (1990) (jury’s verdict in deciding final divorce issues cannot affect the provisions of a temporary order which was still in effect). Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

*Judgment reversed and case remanded.*

*All the Justices concur.*

*571Decided October 25, 2004.

*Hirsch, Partin, Grogan & Grogan, Milton Hirsch,*for appellant.

*Cynthia Maisano,*for appellee.

1

 Although we have no transcript of the proceedings below, it appears uncontested that by the time of the divorce trial, two of the parties’ three children had attained the age of majority; therefore, the custody and support provisions of the final decree affected only one minor child.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Swift
Energy Income Partners 1986-C, LTD's balance sheet and statement of
operations contained in its Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 1995
and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                                         125,941
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   82,242
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               208,183
<PP&E>                                       9,500,301
<DEPRECIATION>                             (8,988,433)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 723,576
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           30,802
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     657,168
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   723,576
<SALES>                                        393,640
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               398,625
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  359,209<F1>
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (8,653)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (8,653)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (8,653)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>Includes lease operating expense, production taxes, and depreciation, depletion
and amortization expense.  Excludes general and administrative and interest
expense.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>