2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-19-2013

USA v. Mark Williams

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 11-3263

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Mark Williams" (2013). 2013 Decisions. Paper 546.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________

No. 11-3263

_________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

MARK WILLIAMS,

 Appellant

________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2-10-cr-00427-006)

District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III

_______

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

July 9, 2013

Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SLOVITER, and BARRY, Circuit Judges

(Filed: July 19, 2013)

______

OPINION

______
2

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.

Mark Williams appeals his conviction for attempted robbery that interferes with 

interstate commerce in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Williams 

contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove the elements of the 

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the 

conviction and judgment of sentence.

I.

In 2010, the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) began 

investigating Angel Ortiz for drug distribution and money laundering. A DEA

undercover agent (“UC”) was introduced to Ortiz as a money launderer and drug dealer 

who had recently been released from prison. Ortiz and Williams met through one of 

Williams’ fellow police officers and concocted a series of actions that, in our view, 

appear bizarre.

In May 2010, Williams met with Ortiz and the UC to discuss plans to steal heroin 

from Ortiz’s drug supplier, Miguel Santiago, using a sham traffic stop. After that plan 

succeeded, the UC introduced Ortiz to a second undercover agent (“UC2”) who 

purported to launder gambling proceeds for the mafia, but who was actually an FBI 

agent. Ortiz believed that UC2 collected gambling proceeds and delivered the funds to 

UC for him to launder. Ortiz and Williams developed a plan to conduct another sham 

stop to steal money from UC2. Under this plan, Williams would stop Ortiz, who was 

ostensibly working as a courier for UC, shortly after Ortiz received the funds to be 

laundered from UC2.
3

Williams took a Philadelphia police property receipt from his supervisor’s desk, 

gave it to Ortiz, and showed him how to fill it out complete with a fictitious property 

number. The receipt was intended to ensure that UC2 believed that the money had 

actually been seized by the police.

Before the plan was carried out, Williams was placed on restricted duty for 

reasons unrelated to this case. As a result, he was prohibited from wearing a police 

uniform, carrying a firearm, or taking any police action. Williams recruited a friend to 

participate in the robbery. The friend drove a Chevrolet Trailblazer with tinted windows 

and emergency lights and was going to pose as an undercover officer.

On July 9, 2010, Williams and his friend met Ortiz and the UC to discuss the 

robbery planned for that day. Williams was dressed in a police uniform, carried his 

personal firearm without authorization, and took a Philadelphia police van from the 39th 

Police District. Williams and his friend then went to the area where the sham traffic stop 

was to take place. At the last minute, however, the DEA and the FBI called off the 

operation.

Williams was arrested several days later. Following a jury trial, he was found 

guilty of, inter alia, attempted robbery which interferes with interstate commerce in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Williams appeals.

1

 

1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
4

II.

Williams challenges only his conviction for attempted robbery which interferes 

with interstate commerce. Williams admits that he prepared for the theft, but claims that 

he did not take “a substantial step toward the offense charged.” Appellant’s Br. at 11. 

Thus, he argues that the jury’s verdict finding him guilty of attempted robbery was based 

on insufficient evidence and should be overturned. 2

This court has held that conviction under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, 

“requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant knowingly or willfully 

committed, or attempted or conspired to commit, robbery or extortion, and (2) the 

defendant’s conduct affected interstate commerce.” United States v. Powell, 693 F.3d 

398, 401 (3d Cir. 2012). A defendant is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when (1) 

the defendant intended to violate the statute and (2) performed an act or acts amounting 

to a substantial step toward the commission of the crime. See United States v. Tykarsky, 

446 F.3d 458, 469 (3d Cir. 2006). A substantial step goes beyond “mere preparation” but 

falls short of completion of the offense. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 134 (2d 

Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

 

2 We apply a particularly deferential standard of review when deciding 

whether a jury verdict rests on legally sufficient evidence. It is not for us to 

weigh the evidence or to determine the credibility of the witnesses. Rather, 

we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government

and will sustain the verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted).
5

The evidence presented at trial conclusively demonstrated that Williams took a 

substantial step toward commission of a Hobbs Act robbery. He met with others to plan 

the sham traffic stop, recruited a friend to participate, took a police van without 

permission, wore his uniform and personal firearm, drove to the location of the planned 

stop, and expressed frustration when authorities called off the operation at the last 

minute. A rational jury could have easily concluded that this evidence constitutes 

attempted robbery. See, e.g., United States v. Del Carmen Ramirez, 823 F.2d 1, 2 (1st 

Cir. 1987) (finding substantial step toward Hobbs Act robbery where defendant surveilled 

the robbery location, stole a car, and proceeded to the robbery location shortly before the 

robbery was to take place). Thus, there is sufficient evidence to affirm the jury’s verdict.3

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

 

3 Williams relies almost exclusively on a pair of Ninth Circuit cases to argue that his 

actions were not a substantial step toward the completion of a robbery. See United States 

v. Still, 850 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Buffington, 815 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 

1987). In Still, the defendant stole a van, parked a short distance from a bank, and was 

putting on a blond wig as police apprehended him. In the van, police found a fake bomb, 

a red pouch with a demand note attached, a notebook containing draft demand notes, a 

police scanner, and the radio frequency for the local police. The defendant confessed his 

plans to rob the bank soon after his arrest. See Still, 850 F.2d at 608. Relying on 

Buffington, the Ninth Circuit held that there was no substantial step toward a bank 

robbery because the facts did not “establish either actual movement toward a bank or 

actions that are analytically similar to such movement.” Id. at 610. While Still and 

Buffington undoubtedly provide some support for Williams’ position, we nevertheless 

conclude that they take an unnecessarily restrictive view of what is required to establish a 

substantial step, and we therefore decline Williams’ invitation to adopt the Ninth 

Circuit’s approach.