NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CURTIS RENEE JACKSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

J. MENDEZ; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-17448 

D.C. No. 1:11-cv-00080-BAM 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Barbara McAuliffe, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 15, 2018

San Francisco, California

Before: WALLACE and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and BATTS,** District 

Judge.

Curtis Renee Jackson, who is incarcerated at the Pleasant Valley State 

Prison in Coalinga, California, appeals from a judgment following a jury verdict in 

favor of various prison officials (collectively, “Defendants”) on his 42 U.S.C. § 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Deborah A. Batts, United States District Judge for the 

Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUN 1 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 15-17448 

1983 claim. He challenges various evidentiary rulings as well as the district court’s 

rulings denying his motion for appointment of counsel and its alleged failure to sua 

sponte hold a competency hearing. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s refusal to grant a writ of habeas 

corpus ad testificandum, Wiggins v. Alameda County, 717 F.2d 466, 468 & n.1 

(9th Cir. 1983), its evidentiary rulings, Duran v. City of Maywood, 221 F.3d 1127, 

1130 (9th Cir. 2000), its refusal to appoint counsel, Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 

965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009), and its decision whether to hold a competency hearing or 

otherwise consider a claim of incompetence. Allen v. Calderon, 408 F.3d 1150, 

1153–54 (9th Cir. 2005).

1. Attendance of O’Neal. The district court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Jackson’s motion to have Michael O’Neal, another inmate, testify at trial. 

Jackson’s argument lacks merit because the district court could reasonably 

conclude that O’Neal’s testimony would not “substantially further the resolution of 

the case,” see Wiggins, 717 F.2d at 468 n.1, as O’Neal would have testified to 

actions by Defendant Mendez that were no longer at issue in Jackson’s trial. 

2. Evidence of other assaults allegedly committed by Mendez. Nor did the 

district court abuse its discretion in excluding testimony by three inmate witnesses 

regarding other assaults allegedly committed by Defendant Mendez. On the record 

before it, the district court could reasonably conclude the excluded evidence did 
3 15-17448 

not satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), as Jackson failed to articulate how the 

testimony would show Mendez’s intent or plan. In addition, the district court could 

reasonably conclude that the probative value of the excluded testimony was 

substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues 

and misleading the jury under Rule 403 given the danger that disputes over the 

inmate witnesses’ credibility and recollection would detract from the main issue. 

See Tennison v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc., 244 F.3d 684, 690 (9th Cir. 2001). 

3. Doctor’s notes. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding 

the notes taken by the doctor who examined Jackson nearly one month after the 

alleged assault occurred. Jackson did not present testimony by a document 

custodian, or otherwise provide certification, to authenticate the doctor’s notes. See

Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)(D).

4. Appointment of counsel. Absent exceptional circumstances, “a person has 

no right to counsel in civil actions.” Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970. The district court did 

not abuse its discretion in finding that Jackson was able to represent himself after 

he ably survived summary judgment, particularly given that his case did not 

involve particularly complex legal issues. See id. Although Jackson has 

documented mental health issues, his doctor stated that he was “stable and able to 

participate in” the proceedings before the district court. 
4 15-17448 

5. Competency hearing. The district court also did not abuse its discretion in 

failing to conduct sua sponte a competency hearing. “[W]hen a substantial 

question exists regarding the mental competence of a party proceeding pro se, the 

proper procedure is for the district court to conduct a hearing to determine 

competence.” Allen, 408 F.3d at 1153 (citing Krain v. Smallwood, 880 F.2d 1119, 

1121 (9th Cir. 1989)). For the same reasons that the district court’s decision not to 

appoint counsel for Jackson was not an abuse of discretion, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in failing to hold a competency hearing. This is particularly 

true where Jackson did not make a motion for a competency hearing and where 

there was already evidence in the record regarding his competence. See Roberts v. 

Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010) (“District courts have limited 

resources (especially time), and to require them to conduct further evidentiary 

hearings when there is already sufficient evidence in the record to make the 

relevant determination is needlessly wasteful.”).

AFFIRMED.