J-S53035-14 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

RONALD JAMES BAILEY, 

 Appellant No. 380 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 30, 2014 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County 

Criminal Division at Nos.: CP-26-CR-0000622-2013; 

CP-26-CR-0001113-2013 

BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., OLSON, J., and PLATT, J.*

 

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 22, 2014 

 Appellant, Ronald James Bailey, appeals pro se from the amended 

judgment of sentence entered pursuant to his negotiated guilty plea. 

Because the trial court failed to determine if Appellant voluntarily, 

knowingly, and intelligently waived his constitutional right to counsel on 

appeal, we remand.1

____________________________________________ 

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 Appellant pleaded guilty to three counts each of possession with intent to 

deliver a controlled substance (PWID) and possession of a controlled 

substance; and one count each of possession of drug paraphernalia, driving 

under the influence-general impairment (DUI), driving under a suspended 

license-DUI related (DUS), driving an unregistered vehicle, operating a 

vehicle without required financial responsibility, disregarding traffic lane, and 

careless driving, See 35 P.S. §§ 730-113(a)(30), 780-113(a)(16), and 780-

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
J-S53035-14 

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 On September 3, 2013, Appellant pleaded guilty pursuant to a 

negotiated guilty plea. On September 24, 2013, after finding Appellant 

RRRI2

 eligible, the court sentenced Appellant to terms of not less than 

eighteen nor more than forty-eight months for PWID, not less than nine 

months nor more than two years for DUI, and not less than two months, 

seven days nor more than ninety days on the DUS conviction. (See N.T. 

Sentencing, 9/24/13, at 9-13). All sentences were to run consecutively. On 

January 30, 2014, after advice from the Department of Corrections of a 

calculation error, the court filed an amended sentence. The amended 

sentence increased the RRRI minimum sentence on the PWID count to 

twenty months, increased the DUI minimum to ten months, and increased 

the DUS sentence to two months, fifteen days. (See Amended Sentence 

Order, PWID, 1/30/14; Amended Sentence Order, DUI, 1/30/14; Amended 

Sentence Order, DUS, 1/30/14). 

 Appellant, although still represented by appointed counsel, filed an 

otherwise timely pro se notice of appeal.3

 On March 7, 2014, the court 

ordered Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) statement of errors complained of 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

113(a)(32) and 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1), 1543(b)(1.1), 1301(a), 

1786(f), 3309(1), and 3714(a), respectively. 

2 See Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive, 61 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4501-4512. 

3

 We give Appellant the benefit of the Prisoner Mailbox Rule. See 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 700 A.2d 423, 726 (Pa. 1997). 
J-S53035-14 

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on appeal. (See Order, 3/07/14); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On April 25, 

2014, a month after the deadline to file a statement of errors had expired, 

Appellant’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw on the basis that “reviewing 

his file and colloquy presented to the [c]ourt demonstrates no issues.” 

(Motion to Withdraw, 4/25/14, at 1). On May 1, 2014, the court granted 

counsel’s motion without a hearing and, on May 6, 2014, the court filed a 

Rule 1925(a) statement in lieu of opinion.4

 See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 

 Appellant presents four issues for this Court’s review: 

1. Is the [c]ommon [p]leas [c]ourt within it’s [sic] power to 

amend, change, or alter, any facet of a [negotiated] plea 

sentence, sua sponte? 

2. Is the [c]ommon [p]leas [c]ourt within it’s [sic] power to 

amend, change, or alter, any facet of a [negotiated] plea 

sentence, sua sponte after the 30 days dictated by statute, 

under Pa.C.S.[A.] § 5505, which clearly states: the courts [sic] 

jurisdiction extends for 30 days after the entry of a final order, 

beyond which time the court is divested of jurisdiction? 

3. Has [Appellant’s] [c]onstitutional [r]ight to [d]ue [p]rocess 

been violated, in a criminal proceeding, where the [c]ommon 

[p]leas [c]ourt has violated [Appellant’s] negotiated plea 

sentences by amending, changing, and/or altering the sentences 

that [Appellant] agreed to by foregoing trial, and accepting by 

entry of his guilty pleas, more than 30 days after the sentencing 

orders were entered? 

____________________________________________ 

4

 The trial court represented that it could not “issue a complete opinion in 

this matter” because Appellant did not file a Rule 1925(b) statement of 

errors complained of on appeal. (Statement in Lieu of Opinion, 5/06/14, at 

2). 
J-S53035-14 

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4. Is [Appellant] entitled to enter a plea of [n]ot [g]uilty and 

be granted a new trial in light of the numerous [f]e[d]eral and 

[s]tate [c]onstitutional [r]ights violations regarding the fact that 

[Appellant’s] current [negotiated] pleas are illegal and thus 

entered into unknowingly and unwillingly[?] 

(Appellant’s Brief, at 6-7). 

 Before we consider the merits of Appellant’s issues, we must 

determine whether Appellant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived 

his right to counsel and chose to proceed pro se with this appeal. 

It is well-settled that the right to counsel on direct appeal is a 

constitutional one. See Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 722 

(Pa.Super. 2007). However, an appellant “may, acting pursuant to the rules 

of criminal procedure, proceed on his own behalf.” Commonwealth v. 

Grazier, 713 A.2d 81, 82 (Pa. 1998) (citations omitted). “When a waiver of 

the right to counsel is sought at the post-conviction and appellate stages, an 

on-the-record determination should be made that the waiver is a knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary one.” Id. (citations omitted). 

In this case, while still represented by appointed counsel, Appellant 

filed a pro se notice of appeal. Although Appellant was not entitled to hybrid 

representation, see Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032, 1035 (Pa. 

2011), the court ordered him to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. In response, 

neither Appellant nor his counsel filed either a Rule 1925(b) statement of 
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errors or a statement of intent to file a brief pursuant to Anders/Santiago.

5

 

See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), (c)(4). 

Instead, after the deadline for filing a Rule 1925(b) statement expired, 

counsel filed a motion to withdraw from representation, which the trial court 

granted without a hearing. (See Motion to Withdraw, 4/25/14, at 1; Order, 

5/01/14). We are constrained to conclude that this was error. 

The trial court failed to determine whether Appellant knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily intended to waive counsel when he filed his pro 

se notice of appeal. See Grazier, supra at 82. Therefore, we remand this 

case for the trial court to conduct a Grazier hearing within thirty days of the 

date of this decision. See id. 

If the court finds that the Grazier standard for a knowing, voluntary 

and intelligent waiver is not met, it shall appoint new counsel to proceed on 

Appellant’s behalf. Counsel shall either file a nunc pro tunc Rule 1925(b) 

statement of errors6

 and an advocate’s brief, or petition to withdraw in 

compliance with Anders/Santiago, and their progeny. 

____________________________________________ 

5 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v. 

Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). 

6

 “If an appellant in a criminal case was ordered to file a Statement and 

failed to do so, such that the appellate court is convinced that counsel has 

been per se ineffective, the appellate court shall remand for the filing of a 

Statement nunc pro tunc.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(3). 
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 Alternatively, if the court finds that Appellant’s waiver is knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary, then it shall order Appellant to file a nunc pro tunc 

pro se Rule 1925(b) statement of errors. 

 Case remanded. Panel jurisdiction retained.