J.A21015/15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee :

:

v. :

:

PATRICK HARRISON, :

:

Appellant : No. 1533 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order May 12, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division No(s).: MC-51-CR-0036469-2013

BEFORE: ALLEN, MUNDY, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED JULY 24, 2015

Appellant, Patrick Harrison, appeals from the order denying his petition 

for writ of certiorari with the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas 

following a judgment of sentence entered in the Philadelphia Municipal Court 

after a bench trial and conviction for simple possession of a controlled 

substance.1 He challenges whether the police had reasonable suspicion or 

probable cause to seize him. We affirm.

We adopt the facts and procedural history set forth by the trial court. 

See Trial Ct. Op., 11/4/14, at 1-3.2 Appellant was tried and found guilty in 

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).

2 We acknowledge the holding of In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073 (Pa. 2013), that 

after October 30, 2013, the scope of review for a suppression issue is limited 
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the Municipal Court of Philadelphia County, which sentenced him to twelve 

months’ probation on January 23, 2014. On February 22, 2014, he filed a 

petition for writ of certiorari with the Court of Common Pleas, which denied 

same on May 12, 2014. Appellant timely appealed on May 14, 2014, and 

timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.

Appellant raises the following issues:

Did not the [municipal] court err when it denied 

[Appellant’s] motion to suppress physical evidence where 

two police officers seized him as he was walking down the 

street, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, 

and where [Appellant’s] flight and the recovery of a jar of 

PCP were the fruit of an unlawful stop?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

Appellant claims that while walking outside at 10:30 p.m., a patrol car 

with two police officers pulled up to him and asked him to approach and 

remove his hands from his pockets. He contends he responded by 

continuing to walk, at which point one officer exited the vehicle and again 

ordered him to approach and remove his hands from his pockets. Appellant 

asserts he responded by removing his hands from his pockets but then 

putting them back in. He argues he made no movement and the officers did 

 

to the record available to the suppression court. Id. at 1085, 1089 (stating 

holding applies to “all litigation commenced Commonwealth-wide after the 

filing of this decision”). Because the instant criminal complaint was filed 

prior to October 30, 2013, In re L.J. does not apply.
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not discern any suspicious objects on his person that justified his seizure. 

We discern no basis for relief.

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a 

trial court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to 

determining whether the factual findings are supported by 

the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from 

those facts are correct. Where the prosecution prevailed in 

the suppression court, we may consider only the 

Commonwealth’s evidence and so much of the evidence for 

the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the 

context of the record as a whole. Where the record 

supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are 

bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal 

conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

In re J.E., 937 A.2d 421, 425 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted). In evaluating 

the legal conclusion drawn by the suppression court, this Court may also 

consider uncontradicted testimony from the suppression hearing not 

included in the suppression court’s findings of fact. Commonwealth v. 

Mendenhall, 715 A.2d 1117, 1119 n.1 (Pa. 1998). We can also affirm on 

any basis. Commonwealth v. Clouser, 998 A.2d 656, 661 n.3 (Pa. Super. 

2010).

Initially we note that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 

has led to the development of three categories of 

interactions between citizens and the police. The first of 

these is a “mere encounter” (or request for information) 

which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but 

carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. The 

second, an “investigative detention[,]” must be supported 

by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop 

and a period of detention, but does not involve such 

coercive conditions as to constitute the functional 

equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial 

detention” must be supported by probable cause. 
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Commonwealth v. Ellis, 662 A.2d 1043, 1047 (Pa. 1995) (citations and 

footnote omitted).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the objective 

Jones/Mendenhall3standard “in determining whether the conduct of the 

police amounts to a seizure or whether there is simply a mere encounter 

between citizen and police officer.” Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 

769, 774 (Pa. 1996). 

In [Commonwealth v. Hicks, 253 A.2d 276 (Pa. 1969)], 

this Court adopted the United States Supreme Court’s 

decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 

L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), which permits a police officer to 

effect a precautionary seizure where the police have a 

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Terry, 

and by analogy Hicks, recognized that there are some 

instances in which an individual may not be arrested, but 

will still be considered to be “seized.” In Jones, this Court 

adopted an objective standard for determining what 

amount of force constitutes the initiation of a Terry stop: 

whether a reasonable person innocent of any crime, would 

have thought he was being restrained had he been in the 

defendant’s shoes. This case, which preceded the United 

States Supreme Court’s decision in . . . Mendenhall, . . . 

was a precursor to the so-called “Mendenhall” test 

posited by the United States Supreme Court: “a person 

has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances 

surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have 

believed he was not free to leave.”

The Jones/Mendenhall standard has since been 

consistently followed in Pennsylvania in determining 

whether the conduct of the police amounts to a seizure or 

 

3 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Commonwealth v. 

Jones, 378 A.2d 835 (Pa. 1977).
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whether there is simply a mere encounter between citizen 

and police officer.

Id. at 773-74 (some punctuation and citations omitted). 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court provided further guidance in applying 

this “totality of the circumstances” test:

In evaluating the circumstances, the focus is directed 

toward whether, by means of physical force or show of 

authority, the citizen-subject’s movement has in some way 

been restrained. In making this determination, courts 

must apply the totality-of-the-circumstances approach, 

with no single factor dictating the ultimate conclusion as to 

whether a seizure has occurred.

Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 890 (Pa. 2000) (footnotes and 

some citations omitted). Factors examined in this totality-of-thecircumstances approach include “all circumstances evidencing a show of 

authority or exercise of force, including the demeanor of the police officer, 

the manner of expression used by the officer in addressing the citizen, and 

the content of the interrogatories or statements.” Mendenhall, 715 A.2d at 

1119. This Court also set forth a non-exclusive list of factors:

[T]he number of officers present during the interaction; 

whether the officer informs the citizen they are suspected 

of criminal activity; the officer’s demeanor and tone of 

voice; the location and timing of the interaction; the visible 

presence of weapons on the officer; and the questions 

asked. Otherwise inoffensive contact between a member 

of the public and the police cannot, as a matter of law, 

amount to a seizure of that person.

Commonwealth v. Collins, 950 A.2d 1041, 1047 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(en banc) (citation omitted). 
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A request to talk does “not need to be justified by any level of 

suspicion.” In re D.M., 781 A.2d 1161, 1165 (Pa. 2001). A request is 

distinguishable from a demand. Commonwealth v. Au, 42 A.3d 1002, 

1007 n.3 (Pa. 2012). A seizure does not occur when police request 

identification from an individual or ask questions of that individual. Id. at 

1007 (quoting, inter alia, I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984) 

(“[P]olice questioning, by itself, is unlikely to result in a Fourth Amendment 

violation.”)). Similarly, a police demand to keep one’s hands out of one’s 

pockets is a “minor inconvenience” and “not a substantial impairment on [a 

defendant’s] liberty of movement, particularly considering the officers[’] 

legitimate concerns for their own safety.” Commonwealth v. Lyles, 54 

A.3d 76, 83 (Pa. Super. 2012). 

In sum, the question of “whether the police needed some level of 

requisite cause at the time they initially approached” the defendant is 

“governed by the type of encounter that the police initiated when they 

approached” the defendant. In re D.M., 781 A.2d at 1164 (emphases 

added). The critical inquiry is what type of encounter the police initiated at 

the time they initially approached the defendant. See id. After identifying 

the type of encounter—e.g., mere encounter, investigative detention, or 

custodial detention—this Court must then determine whether the police had 

the requisite cause for that encounter, respectively, e.g., no suspicion 

required, reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, or probable 
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cause for an arrest. See Ellis, 662 A.2d at 1047; Jones, 378 A.2d at 839 

n.4.

Instantly, Appellant’s argument did not address the flash information 

relied on by the police and their belief that Appellant matched the flash. 

See Trial Ct. Op. at 2. Under the totality of the circumstances, we assume a 

seizure occurred when the police, late at night and in a high crime area, 

initially asked Appellant to “come here,” thus issuing an official compulsion 

to stop. See Mendenhall, 715 A.2d at 1119; Ellis, 662 A.2d at 1047. The 

police reinforced the directive to approach the vehicle when one of the 

officers exited the vehicle and asked Appellant to remove his hands from his 

pockets and “come here.” See Ellis, 662 A.2d at 1047. In other words, the 

circumstances were such that a reasonable, innocent person, in Appellant’s 

shoes, would have thought he was being restrained. See Matos, 672 A.2d 

at 773-74. 

Consequently, we ascertain whether the police had the requisite 

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot after initiating the 

investigative detention. See id.; Jones, 378 A.2d at 839 n.4. In 

establishing whether there was reasonable suspicion, it is axiomatic that the 

United States and Pennsylvania constitutions “do not proscribe all searches 

and seizures . . . only ‘unreasonable’ ones.” Commonwealth v. Beaman, 

880 A.2d 578, 582 (Pa. 2005) (footnote omitted). 

The reasonableness of a seizure that is less intrusive than 

a traditional arrest depends upon a three-pronged 
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balancing test derived from Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 

99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979), in which the 

reviewing Court weighs the gravity of the public concerns 

served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure 

advances the public interest, and the severity of the 

interference with individual liberty. To be deemed 

reasonable under this standard, such a seizure must 

ordinarily be supported by reasonable suspicion, based 

upon objective facts, that the individual is involved in 

criminal activity. The existence of individual suspicion, 

however, is not an “irreducible” component of 

reasonableness in every circumstance.

Id. at 582 (emphasis added and citations and some punctuation omitted); 

accord Commonwealth v. Mistler, 912 A.2d 1265, 1271 (Pa. 2006) 

(stating that “the Fourth Amendment generally requires the presence of 

individualized suspicion to justify a seizure”). “A primary concern when 

balancing opposing interests is protecting the individual from arbitrary 

invasions resulting from the broad discretion of the officers.” Mistler, 912 

A.2d at 1271. Instantly, because of the flash and the police belief that 

Appellant matched the flash,4 we hold that under the totality of 

circumstances, the police reasonably believed Appellant was involved in 

criminal activity. See Beaman, 880 A.2d at 582 (holding reasonable 

suspicion based on objective facts). Accordingly, we discern no error by the 

 

4 We acknowledge that the flash description was for a gunpoint robbery 

committed by a black male wearing a white hoodie and a black male wearing 

a blue hoodie; Appellant is a black male who was wearing a black hoodie 

that appeared to be dark or blue at the time the police encountered him. 

N.T., 1/23/14, at 7-8, 14-15, 24, 26.
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trial court and affirm, albeit on different grounds. See In re J.E., 937 A.2d 

at 425; Clouser, 998 A.2d at 661 n.3.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/24/2015
II I I I IIII/ II IIII I II Ill l/1 

7218716041 

MC·51·CR·0036469·2013 Comm. v. Harrison, Patrick M. 

Opinion 

notice of appeal and a requested Pa.R.A.P. l 925(b) statement. 

certiorari. The petition was heard by this Court and denied. Defendant thereafter filed a 

Following the imposition of sentence, defendant filed a petition for writ of 

defendant. 

charge. Judge Brady then imposed a sentence of twelve months' probation upon 

Brady found defendant guilty of the drug offense but not guilty of the resisting arrest 

Brady denied. Defendant then proceeded to trial and at the conclusion of the trial Judge 

Prior to the commencement of trial defendant litigated a motion to suppress, which Judge 

before the Honorable Frank T. Brady of the Municipal of Philadelphia County for trial. 

following his arrest on September 18, 2013. On January 23, 2014, defendant appeared 

with knowing and intentional possession of a controlled substance and resisting arrest 

Defendant, Patrick Harrison, was charged as of the above bill and term number 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

OPINION 

;,,_,·; 

PATRICK HARRISON 

vs. NO.: MC-51-CR-0036469-2013 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

PHILADELPHIA COUNTY 

COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY 

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION 

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2 

I All references to the record refer to the testimony recorded on January 23, 2014, during the motion to 

suppress and trial. 

2 Officer McCarthy indicated that on closer inspection the sweatshirt was black but appeared to be blue 

because it was dark. (N .T. 14). 

Id. 

by getting him down onto the ground and handcuffing him with the help of other officers. 

Officer McCarthy pursued him and managed to subdue defendant, who was struggling, 

defendant's pockets at which time defendant fled northbound on 44th Street. (N.T. 8). 

inside his pockets. (N.T. 7). Officer McCarthy removed defendant's hands from 

complied with both requests but as he approached the officers, he placed his hands back 

defendant to remove his hands from his pocket and to come to him. Id. Defendant 

As defendant was walking away, Officer McCarthy exited his vehicle, told 

7).2 Defendant looked at the officers, stuck his hands in his pocket and kept walking. Id. 

he matched the flash information, the officers told defendant to approach them. (N.T. 

Street. Id. Because he was wearing what the officers believed to be a blue sweatshirt and 

observed defendant in the vicinity of 44111 and Walnut Streets walking northbound on 44th 

westerly direction. (N. T. 6- 7, 26). 1 Approximately two minutes thereafter, the officers 

black men garbed in blue and white hooded sweatshirts respectively, who had fled in a 

4211d and Walnut Streets and that the complainant had described his assailants as two 

received a radio call indicating that a gunpoint robbery had just occurred in the area of 

Brian McCarthy and his partner, Officer Gallagher, was on routine patrol when they 

On September 18, 2013, at approximately 10:30 p.m., Philadelphia Police Officer 

FACTUAL HISTORY 

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3 

In his l 925(b) statement, defendant asserts that this Court erred by denying his 

writ of certiorari. According to defendant the writ should have been granted because 

Judge Brady erred by denying his motion to suppress because police lacked sufficient 

grounds to effectuate an investigative detention of him given that he was merely walking 

down the street and did not match the description of either robbery suspect. Defendant 

further contends that because the police did not have grounds to stop him the PCP should 

have been suppressed insofar as it was discarded as a result of illegal police conduct. 

A lower court's decision on the issuance of a writ of certiorari will not be 

disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. McGinley, 563 A.2d 518 (Pa. 

Super. 1989). The standard of review for a challenge to the denial of a motion to suppress 

is that, assuming there is support in the record, the reviewing court is bound by the facts 

as found by the suppression court and may reverse the court only if the legal conclusions 

drawn from those facts are in error. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 698 A.2d 571, 572 (Pa. 

1997). "[The ]scope of review is limited to the factual findings and legal conclusions of 

the [trial] court." In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1080 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). The 

reviewing court is "limited to considering only the evidence of the prevailing party, 

and so much of the evidence of the non-prevailing party as remains uncontradicted when 

read in the context of the record as a whole." Id. 

DISCUSSION 

Before he was apprehended and he as he was fleeing defendant discarded a glass 

Jar from his right hand pocket. Id. Police retrieved the glass object after securing 

defendant. It was found to contain more than six grams of PCP. (N .T. 48). 

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4 

Our Pennsylvania courts require law enforcement officers to demonstrate 

ascending levels of suspicion to justify their interactions with citizens as those 

interactions become more intrusive. The first of these is a "mere encounter," or request 

for information, which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no 

official compulsion to stop or to respond. Commonwealth v. Pakacki, 901 A.2d 983, 987 

(Pa. 2006). The second, an "investigative detention," must be supported by a reasonable 

suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve 

such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest, Id. An 

officer may conduct a brief investigative stop of an individual where the totality of the 

circumstances leads the officer to possess reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is 

afoot. Commonwealth v. Melendez, 676 A.2d 226, 228 (Pa. 1996). 

Finally, an arrest or "custodial detention" must be supported by probable cause. 

See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 614 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Pa. 1992). The key difference 

between an investigative detention and a custodial one is that the latter involves such 

coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest, Pakacki, 901 

A.2d at 987. In determining whether an encounter with the police is custodial, the 

standard is an objective one, and must be determined with reference to the totality of the 

circumstances. Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 634 A.2d 1078, 1085-86 (Pa. 1993). 

Whenever a police officer stops a person and restricts his or her freedom to leave, 

the officer has "seized" the individual and the protections of the Fourth Amendment 

apply. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). "[A]n encounter becomes a seizure if the 

officer engages in conduct which a reasonable man would view as threatening or 

offensive even if performed by another private citizen. This would include such tactics 

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5 

3 It is noted that simply asking someone to remove his hands from his pocket does not escalate a mere 

encounter into an investigative detention. See Commonwealth v. Lyles, 54 A.3d 76 (Pa. Super. 2012), 

affirmed, 97 A.3d 298 (Pa. 2014) (noting that the minor act of asking someone to remove his hands from 

his pocket is "not a substantial impairment on ... liberty of movement, particularly considering the officers 

legitimate concerns for their own safety."). 

narcotics at the Capital Cafe. Martin, 705 A.2d at 890. The tip was relayed to Detective 

Super. 1997), police received an anonymous tip at 3:30 p.m. that Martin was selling 

to the level of an investigatory stop.3 In Commonwealth v. Matiin, 705 A.2d 887 (Pa. 

only after defendant refused to remove his hands from his pockets did the encounter rise 

few questions." Commonwealth v. Guzman, 44 A.3d 688, 694 (Pa. Super. 2012). It was 

Police officers are "entitled to approach ordinary citizens on the street and ask a 

use language a reasonable person would have concluded could not be ignored. 

with defendant. The police did not grab defendant, brandish weapons, block his way, or 

suggesting that defendant could not continue on his way during their initial interaction 

Court found nothing amiss with this conclusion because the officers did nothing 

fled after Officer McCarthy removed defendant's hands from them. (N.T. 39). This 

his hands back inside his pockets after being told to remove them from his pockets and he 

encounter and only later rose to the level of an investigative detention after defendant put 

Instantly, the suppression court found that the interaction originated as a mere 

SEIZURE§ 9.2(H) (20 ED. 1987). 

Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 890 (Pa. 2000) (quoting 3 WAYNE LEFAVE, SEARCH AND 

seizure, courts must examine the totality of the circumstances. Commonwealth v. 

. . " Bennett, 604 A.2d at 283. To determine whether an interaction rose to the level of a 

such as ... blocking the path of the suspect, and encircling the suspect by many officers .. 

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6 

Raymond Greene who knew Martin. Id. Detective Greene proceeded to the Cafe where 

he approached Martin, asked him if he could speak with him, and then asked him "to step 

outside." Id. Martin responded, "Okay," and exited the Cafe. Id. 

On appeal, the Superior Court held that in asking Martin to talk and step outside 

did not initiate an investigative detention because Detective Greene did not approach 

Martin in a threatening manner, did not coerce or intimidate him, and never told Martin 

that he was required to leave the Cafe. Id. 

Similarly, In the Interest of D.M., 781 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 2001), the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court held that no seizure had occurred in a case in which an officer received a 

call that a man was seen with a gun at a certain intersection in Philadelphia. Id., 781 A.2d 

at 1162. Police responded immediately and saw D.M., who matched the description of 

the armed man provided by the caller. Id. The officer "exited his vehicle and told [D.M.] 

to come over." Id. The Supreme Court found that the officer acted legally his iteratction 

with "did not need to be justified by any level of suspicion" because, "at the time the 

police initially approached D.M. it was unclear whether the police intended to do 

anything other than talk to him." Id. 

Instantly, as in the foregoing cases, police did nothing more than manifest an 

intention to speak to defendant. As noted above, there is no evidence that the police 

acted in a threatening, coercive, or intimidating manner, or that when they first 

encountered defendant they told him that he was required to stop. Instead, the record 

shows that defendant voluntarily stopped and began speaking with the police. It was only 

after defendant placed his hands inside his pocket that the incident escalated into an 

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Hall, 713 A.2d at 652-653. 

7 

Two Reading police officers, patrolling in their cruiser, saw 

defendant and a companion conversing in an alley near a 

cafe. The police parked their vehicle, the conversants broke 

up, and appellant approached the police car while getting 

his I.D. out of his wallet and asked "Is everything all right, 

officer?" After a brief exchange, the officer removed from 

his vehicle and noticed Hall had his hands in his pocket. He 

asked if he was armed and Hall said he was not. Hall was 

asked to take his hands out of his pocket, but only removed 

his left hand. As the officer came to him, Hall pivoted with 

his hand in his pocket. After being asked again to remove 

his hand, he did, but became confrontational and stated that 

he would not be searched. The officer replied that he would 

not search him, but only pat him down for weapons. 

investigate him. In Hall, supra, the facts were as follows: 

after being directed to remove them, defendant gave police grounds to stop and 

Thus, by having his hands in his pocket and then placing them back inside them 

not seized when an officer asked him rev'd on other grounds, 771 A.2d 1232 (Pa. 2001). 

see also Commonwealth v. Hall, 713 A.2d 650, 653 (Pa. Super. 1988) (the defendant was 

individual's conduct." Commonwealth v. Caiier, 779 A.2d 591, 594 (Pa. Super. 2001); 

into an investigative detention because the officer's reaction was necessitated by the 

out of his pocket. Such reaction by a police officer does not elevate the mere encounter 

may justifiably reach for his side arm and order the individual to stop and take his hand 

pocket, thereby creating a potential danger to the safety of a police officer, the officer 

"if during a mere encounter, an individual on his own accord, puts his hands in his 

pockets did not convert the encounter into a seizure. The Superior Cami has ruled that 

Next, the fact that the police ordered defendant to take his hands out of his 

rights were not violated when police initially interacted with defendant. 

investigative detention. Thus, the lower court did not en by finding that defendant's 

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8 

In addition, even if the initial interaction between the police and defendant herein 

did rise to the level of an investigative detention, a reversal is not required because police 

had the right to stop defendant based on the totality of circumstances existing at the time. 

While on routine patrol, the officers herein received a flash report of a gunpoint robbery. 

The flash report provided a physical and clothing description of the assailants as well as 

the direction in which they fled. Not more than two minutes later, two block west of the 

scene of the robbery, the police observed defendant, who matched the physical 

description of one of the assailants, was dressed in garb closely matching the description 

of the clothes worn by one of the suspects and had his hands in his pockets. 

Case law is clear that facts such as the instant ones justified the stop. As a general 

matter, police are permitted to conduct an investigatory stop "when relying on 

information transmitted by a valid police bulletin." In re D.M., 727 A.2d 556, 558(Pa. 

1999) ( citations omitted); See also Commonwealth v. Foglia, 979 A.2d 357 (Pa. Super. 

2009) (police had reasonable suspicion to conduct investigatory detention upon arriving 

at location, a high crime area, within 90 seconds of the radio call and found the defendant 

The Hall Court ruled that "when Hall approached with his hand thrust in his 

pocket and refused to remove it, the encounter escalated into a situation where the totality 

of circumstances involved a reasonable suspicion and justified a detention to stop and 

frisk." Hall, 713 at 653. Thus, the Hall's decision to keep his hand in his pocket after 

being asked to remove it escalated the encounter into one of reasonable suspicion. 

Here, as in Hall, defendant's decision to again place his hands raised the matter 

from a mere encounter to an investigative detention. The finding by the lower court that 

this was so was not erroneous. 

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matching the description of the radio call, and the defendant walked away from the 

approaching police cruiser and grabbed at his waist band); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 

519 A.2d 427, 430 (Pa. Super. 1986) (police officer may rely on police radio flash 

information to justify investigatory stop). 

That same factor present here as well as others, all of which justified the stop of 

defendant, including the recent radio call, the fact that the robbery was committed by 

gunpoint, and defendant's similarity to the description broadcast over police radio. 

Defendant asserts that the stop was illegal because he did not match the flash 

description because his sweat shirt was black in color and not blue. This small 

discrepancy was explained by the officer. Moreover, the law is clear that minor 

differences in clothing do not render a stop illegal. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Vinson, 

522 A.2d 1155, 1157 (Pa. Super. 1987) (stop proper although the appellant and his 

companion were shorter than the victim's description, and their jackets were different); 

Commonwealth v. Sheridan, 437 A.2d 44 (Pa. Super. 1981) (stop was proper even though 

the defendant wore a different color and type of coat from the description, and he lacked 

the described hat). 

It is important to note that a reviewing court "cannot evaluate the totality of the 

circumstances through the grudging eyes of hindsight nor in terms of library analysis, but 

as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement." Commonwealth v. 

Jackson, 907 A.2d 540, 543 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. Shelly, 703 

A.2d 499, 503 (Pa. Super. 1997)). 

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DATE 1#/N 

Based on the foregoing, the judgment of sentence should be affirmed. 

CONCLUSION 

by this Court denying defendant's petition for writ of certiorari be sustained. 

Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, it is suggested that the ruling made 

motion to suppress on that ground. 

there was no forced abandonment and the lower court did not en by denying defendant's 

Because the police acted legally in all respects in their interaction with defendant, 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 978 A.2d 1000, 1005 n. 6. (Pa. Super. 2009). 

[T]he principle of "forced abandonment" is not recognized 

under the Fourth Amendment, California v. Hodari D., 499 

U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690, (1991), 

although it is under Article 1, Section 8. Conunonwealth v. 

Matos, 43 Pa. 449, 672 A.2d 769 (1996). While 

Pennsylvania recognizes the principle of forced 

abandonment, that legal theory requires that the 

abandonment of contraband or evidence be precipitated by 

illegal police conduct. In the Interest of Evans, 717 A.2d 

542 (Pa.Super. 1998). 

motion, it is noted that 

him to abandon the PCP, and therefore the lower court erred by denying his suppression 

Finally, regarding defendant's claim that the illegal actions of the police forced 

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