NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

:

DIEGO FERNANDO MEJIA, :

: Civil Action No. 11-0937(NLH)

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : OPINION

:

MR. ORTIZ, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

APPEARANCES:

Diego Fernando Mejia

F.C.I. Fort Dix

P.O. Box 2000

Fort Dix, NJ 08640

Plaintiff pro se

HILLMAN, District Judge

Plaintiff Diego Fernando Mejia, a prisoner confined at the 

Federal Correctional Institution at Fort Dix, New Jersey, seeks 

to bring this action in forma pauperis pursuant to pursuant to 

Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 

(1971), alleging violations of his constitutional rights.1 

1 This matter previously was administratively terminated based on 

Plaintiff’s submission of deficient applications for leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff has submitted a new IFP 

application which reflects that he is entitled to proceed in

 

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At this time, the Court must review the Complaint to 

determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or 

malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant 

who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in

forma pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which 

prisoner seeks redress from a governmental defendant); 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison 

conditions).

I. BACKGROUND

The following factual allegations are taken from 

Plaintiff’s Complaint and are accepted as true for purposes of 

this review.

Plaintiff alleges that he has a long history of working for 

the Federal Prison Industries, also known as “UNICOR.” 

According to Plaintiff, he and a group of other UNICOR inmate 

workers were placed on a 30-day non-work status, allegedly for 

lack of work, after which they were called to attend a meeting 

at which the UNICOR factory manager Mr. Ortiz requested that 

forma pauperis. Based on his new application and the absence of 

three qualifying dismissals within 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the 

Court will direct the Clerk of the Court to re-open this matter, 

will grant Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), and will order the Clerk of the 

Court to file the Complaint.

2

 

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they all voluntarily resign from their UNICOR jobs. Plaintiff 

contends that Mr. Ortiz planned to reduce his expenses by rehiring these same workers at a lower pay grade, with loss of 

longevity pay and vacation pay benefits. When Plaintiff and 

other workers refused to voluntarily resign, they were all 

terminated from their UNICOR employment. Plaintiff argues that 

this termination violated Bureau of Prisons policies and his due 

process rights.

Plaintiff alleges that UNICOR supervisor Mr. Dalessandro 

has previously subjected prison workers to lay-offs, replacing 

them with lower-cost workers, in this same fashion in order to 

reduce expenses.

Finally, Plaintiff states that his performance evaluations 

reflect that he has done an excellent job while employed at 

UNICOR,2 and that he was terminated because he is Hispanic.

Petitioner names as defendants UNICOR factory manager Mr. 

Ortiz, Assistant factory manager Ms. Long, UNICOR Supervisor Mr. 

Dalessandro, and other unknown UNICOR-FCI Fort Dix staff. He 

seeks restoration to his UNICOR job and back pay since his 

termination date of July 12, 2010.

2 Plaintiff states that the defendants have failed to maintain 

complete and accurate performance evaluation records, allegedly 

in violation of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5), but that 

the records that are available reflect his excellent work 

history and performance.

3

 

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II. STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL

Every complaint must comply with the pleading requirements 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 

statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the 

... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson 

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted).

While a complaint ... does not need detailed factual 

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the 

“grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires 

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 

not do ... . Factual allegations must be enough to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level 

... .

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) 

(citations omitted). That is, a complaint must assert “enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Id. at 570.

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The determination whether the 

factual allegations plausibly give rise to an entitlement to 

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relief is “‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing 

court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’” 

Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations 

omitted). Thus, a court is “not bound to accept as true a legal 

conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” and “[t]hreadbare 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678 (citations omitted). 

In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the 

Court must be mindful to accept its factual allegations as true, 

see James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 

2012), and to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff, 

see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); United States 

v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).

Where a complaint can be remedied by an amendment, a

district court may not dismiss the complaint with prejudice, but 

must permit the amendment. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 

(1992); Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d 

Cir. 2002) (dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)), cited 

in Thomaston v. Meyer, 519 F.App’x 118, 120 n.2 (3d Cir. 2013); 

Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000) (dismissal 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Urrutia v. Harrisburg 

County Police Dept., 91 F.3d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1996).

III. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents

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In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971), the Supreme Court held that 

a violation of the Fourth Amendment by a federal agent acting 

under color of his authority gives rise to a cause of action 

against that agent, individually, for damages. The Supreme 

Court has also implied damages remedies directly under the 

Eighth Amendment, see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), and 

under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s 

Due Process Clause, see Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 

IV. ANALYSIS

It is well established that an inmate has no liberty or 

property interest in a particular prison job, or any prison job. 

See James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 629-30 (3d Cir.), cert. 

denied, 493 U.S. 870 (1989); Bryan v. Werner, 516 F.2d 233, 240 

(3d Cir. 1975). While federal law does provide for 

discretionary compensation for inmates assigned to work in an 

industrial operation such as UNICOR, see 18 U.S.C. 4126(c), 

neither § 4126 nor any regulatory scheme developed under it 

creates a liberty or property interest on the part of federal 

inmates, see, e.g., Huff v. Outlaw, Civil No. 09-0520, 2010 WL 

1433466, *8 (D.S.C. March 8, 2010) (collecting cases), report 

and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 1433470 (D.S.C. April 8, 

2010). Indeed, there is no constitutional requirement that a 

prisoner receive any pay for working at a prison job. Jones v. 

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USA, Civil No. 09-0033, 2009 WL 5083401, *4 (W.D. La. Dec. 23, 

2009), appeal dismissed as frivolous, 412 F.App’x 690 (5th Cir. 

Feb. 16, 2011); Northrop v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, Civil No. 

08-0746, 2008 WL 5047792, *8-*10 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2008) 

(collecting cases). Cf. Talkowski v. Lane, Civil No. 89-6338, 

1990 WL 60706, *2 (N.D. Ill. April 20, 1990) (“By its terms the 

Thirteenth Amendment allows involuntary servitude as a 

punishment for persons convicted of a crime, like [the 

Plaintiff]. Prison officials thus may compel inmates to work --

even for no pay -- without running afoul of the Thirteenth 

Amendment.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a due 

process claim arising out of the termination of his prison 

employment and related compensation.

Nor has Plaintiff stated a claim for an equal protection 

violation in connection with the termination of his prison job. 

Although the Fifth Amendment by its own terms does not

reference equal protection, the Supreme Court has interpreted it

to include an equal protection element, Bolling v. Sharpe,

347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954), that the Supreme Court has analyzed

identically to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976). See U.S. 

v. Lopez, 650 F.3d 952, 961 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bolling

and Buckley). The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment commands that no State shall "deny to any person 

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within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," which 

is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated

should be treated alike. City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne

Living Center , 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe,

457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)); Artway v. Attorney General of New

Jersey , 81 F.3d 1235, 1267 (3d Cir. 1996).

Here, Plaintiff first states that the defendants engineered 

a mass termination of inmate workers in order to reduce costs, 

then counters that he, individually, was wrongfully terminated 

because he is Hispanic. Plaintiff cannot have it both ways. If 

all of the inmate employees who refused to voluntarily resign 

were terminated as a cost-cutting measure, Plaintiff was not 

treated differently on the grounds of his ethnicity. Not only 

has Plaintiff failed to state an equal protection claim, but his 

factual allegations belie any suggestion of discrimination. Cf.

Al-Shahin v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Civil No. 06-5261, 

2007 WL 2985553, *11 (D.N.J. Oct. 4, 2007) (dismissing 

generalized allegation of equal protection violation asserted by 

alien detainee challenging conditions of confinement), cited in

Mebuin v. U.S., Civil No. 13-0443, 2013 WL 4012449 (D.N.J. Aug. 

5, 2013) (same).

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Complaint will be 

dismissed with prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

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§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, for 

failure to state a claim. It does not appear that Plaintiff 

could cure the deficiencies of his Complaint by amendment. 

An appropriate order follows.

At Camden, New Jersey s/Noel L. Hillman 

Noel L. Hillman

United States District Judge

Dated: June 23, 2014

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