Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1511-CR-1852 | November 14, 2016 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Deborah Markisohn

Marion County Public Defender Agency

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General

Ellen H. Meilaender

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Christopher Buckhalter,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

November 14, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1511-CR-1852

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Ronnie Huerta, 

Commissioner

Trial Court Cause No.

49F19-1405-CM-27225

Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1511-CR-1852 | November 14, 2016 Page 2 of 7

Statement of the Case

[1] Christopher Buckhalter (“Buckhalter”) appeals, following a bench trial, his 

conviction for battery as a Class A misdemeanor. He argues that the trial court 

abused its discretion in admitting into evidence the victim’s show-up and incourt identifications of him. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting this evidence, we affirm.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting into 

evidence the victim’s show-up and in-court identifications of 

Buckhalter.

Facts

[3] On May 24, 2014, the night before the Indianapolis 500, Nicholas Castorena 

(“Castorena”) and his friends were camping in the Coke Lot (“the Lot”) near 

the Indianapolis Motor Speedway. While Castorena and his friends were 

walking around the Lot, they came upon a group involved in an altercation 

with another man. One of Castorena’s friends asked the group, “where’s the 

party at?” (Tr. 24). Someone from the group responded to the comment by 

hitting Castorena’s friend and knocking him to the ground. As Castorena 

attempted to intervene, he was hit in the back of the head. When he turned 

around, Castorena looked right at Buckhalter and clearly saw Buckhalter’s face
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1511-CR-1852 | November 14, 2016 Page 3 of 7

before Buckhalter hit Castorena in the face. Castorena and his friends quickly 

turned and ran.

[4] Later that evening, Castorena and his friends came upon the same group. 

Castorena was hit again but did not see who it was. Gunshots were fired, and 

one of Castorena’s friends was fatally wounded. Speedway Police Department 

Officers arrived at the scene, and Officer Matthew Pridemore (“Officer 

Pridemore”) noticed Castorena, who was covered in blood. Officer Pridemore 

asked Castorena if he had been involved in the altercation, and Castorena 

responded that he had. 

[5] While walking through the Lot with Officer Pridemore, Castorena pointed out 

the group of individuals that had been involved in the two altercations. These 

individuals were standing together and talking. They had not been detained by 

the police at that time. Officer Pridemore radioed a detective and asked the 

detective to detain these individuals. After the individuals were detained, 

Castorena identified Buckhalter as the man who had hit him in the face during 

the first altercation. 

[6] The State charged Buckhalter with Class A misdemeanor battery. At trial, over 

Buckhalter’s objection, Castorena identified Buckhalter as the person who had 

hit him in the face. However, according to Buckhalter, he was walking through 

the Lot when he was “snatched up from behind” without any warning and 

taken to the ground by a police officer who handcuffed him and took him to the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1511-CR-1852 | November 14, 2016 Page 4 of 7

show up. (Tr. 145). The trial court convicted Buckhalter as charged. 

Buckhalter appeals.

Decision

[7] Buckhalter argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence 

of the show-up and in-court identifications. The admission of evidence is 

within the discretion of the trial court. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259-60 

(Ind. 2013). We will reverse a ruling on the admission of evidence only for an 

abuse of discretion, which occurs only when the ruling is clearly against the 

logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects the party’s 

substantial rights. Id. at 260.

I. Show-up Identification

[8] Buckhalter first contends that the admission of the show-up identification into 

evidence violated his rights against unreasonable search and seizure under the 

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because the police lacked 

reasonable suspicion to detain him for the show-up identification.1 The Fourth 

Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by the government, 

and its safeguards extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that 

 

1 Buckhalter also argues that the admission of this evidence violated Article 1, Section 11 of 

the Indiana Constitution. However, we do not address state constitutional claims that are 

raised for the first time on appeal. See Mahl v. Aaron, 809 N.E.2d 953, 958 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2004) (declining to address equal protection argument under Indiana Constitution when 

argument at trial was based only on federal constitution). Here, our review of the record 

reveals that Buckhalter did not raise the state constitutional claim at trial. Accordingly, he has 

waived this allegation of error. See id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1511-CR-1852 | November 14, 2016 Page 5 of 7

fall short of traditional arrest. C.H. v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1086, 1092 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2014), trans. denied. However, a police officer may briefly detain a person 

for investigatory purposes without a warrant or probable cause if, based upon 

specific and articulable facts together with the rational inferences from those 

facts, the official intrusion is reasonably warranted and the officer has a 

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity “may be afoot.” Moultry v. State, 808 

N.E.2d 168, 170-71 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 266 

(1968)). Reasonable suspicion must be more substantial than an officer’s 

unparticularized suspicion or hunch. C. H., 15 N.E.3d at 1092. In determining 

whether reasonable suspicion exists, we must examine the totality of the 

circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer had a 

particularized and objective basis for suspecting wrong-doing. Id.

[9] Here, Buckhalter specifically argues that the “State presented absolutely no 

evidence at trial as to why Buckhalter had been detained for the show-up.” 

(Buckhalter’s Br. 21). According to Buckhalter, “[s]imply being a black male at 

the Coke Lot on the night of May 24, 2014, was not the individualized 

articulable reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that Terry requires to justify 

a seizure.” (Buckhalter’s Br. 21).

[10] However, our review of the evidence reveals that Castorena was involved in 

two altercations with the same group, which included Buckhalter, on the same 

night. Following the second altercation, while Castorena was walking through 

the Coke Lot with Officer Pridemore, Castorena noticed and pointed out 

members of that group standing together and talking. Officer Pridemore 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1511-CR-1852 | November 14, 2016 Page 6 of 7

radioed a detective and asked him to detain these individuals. In a show-up, 

Castorena identified Buckhalter as the individual who had hit him in the face. 

Castorena, who was a witness to two altercations, provided the detaining officer 

with a particularized and objective basis for suspecting wrong-doing on the part 

of the individuals that he detained for the show-up. The trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.

II. In-Court Identification

[11] Buckhalter also argues that pursuant to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, 

the unconstitutional show-up identification “tainted the subsequent in-court 

identification.” (Buckhalter’s Br. 27). However, to invoke this doctrine, a 

defendant must show that the seizure was illegal in the first place. Gyamfi v. 

State, 15 N.E.3d 1131, 1136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), reh’g denied. Because there 

was no illegal seizure in this case, there can be no fruit of the poisonous tree, 

and Buckhalter’s argument fails. 

[12] Lastly, Buckhalter argues that the trial court erred in admitting the in-court 

identification because there was no independent basis for it. The factors a court

considers in determining whether an independent basis exists include: (1) the 

amount of time that the witness was in the presence of the defendant; (2) the 

distance between the two; (3) the lighting conditions; (4) the witness’ degree of 

attention to the defendant; (5) the witness’ capacity for observation; (6) the 

witness’ opportunity to perceive particular characteristics of the defendant; (7) 

the accuracy of any prior description of the defendant by the witness; (8) the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1511-CR-1852 | November 14, 2016 Page 7 of 7

witness’ level of certainty at the pretrial identification; and (9) the length of time 

between the crime and the identification. Hyppolite v. State, 774 N.E.2d 584, 

594 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.

[13] Here, our review of the evidence leads us to agree with the State that 

“application of the above-recited factors to this case shows that Castorena had a 

sufficient independent basis to support his ability to fairly identify [Buckhalter] 

in-court.” (State’s Br. 18). Specifically, Castorena had sufficient opportunity to 

view his attacker. After being hit in the back of the head, Castorena turned and 

looked right at Buckhalter. According to Castorena, he could “clearly see who

[had] hit [him] in the face.” (Tr. 130). Because Castorena was in extremely 

close physical proximity to Buckhalter, Castorena had a high degree of 

attention fixed on him. In addition, Castorena’s identification of Buckhalter 

was certain. We find no error here, and the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by admitting the in-court identification of Buckhalter.

[14] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Riley, J, concur.