J-A27019-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

IN RE: ESTATE OF NICHOLAS A. 

NOTARNICOLA, A/K/A NICHOLAS A. 

NOTARNICOLA, JR., A/K/A NICHOLAS 

NOTARNICOLA, DECEASED 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

APPEAL OF: AUDREY GRAJCZAR 

 No. 2079 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order Entered August 18, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County 

Orphans' Court at No(s): 03-11-00014 

BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON & STABILE, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JANUARY 21, 2016 

 Appellant, Audrey Grajczar, appeals from the order entered on August 

18, 2014,1 dismissing her exceptions to a final accounting decree, directing 

the distribution of assets in the estate of Nicholas A. Notarnicola (“the 

Estate”), and denying Appellant’s motion for discovery as moot. Upon 

review, we quash the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

 The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history of this 

case as follows: 

On March 15, 2001, Nicholas A. Notarnicola (“Decedent”) 

executed a power of attorney that designate[d] his nephew, 

Michael Zanolli, as his agent (the “POA”). In the POA, 

Decedent generally grants Zanolli the power to “transact all 

of my business and to manage all my property and affairs 

as I might do if personally present....” The POA further 

____________________________________________ 

1

 Appellant avers this appeal lies from an order entered on November 25, 

2014. However, as discussed below, the appeal lies from the order dated 

August 18, 2014. We have changed the caption accordingly. 
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enumerate[d] several specific grants of power to Zanolli, 

which include[d] the following: 

(1) To exercise any power or take any action on my 

behalf, as fully and completely as I could do 

myself, which my Agent in my Agent’s sole 

discretion believes to be in my best interest. ... 

* * * 

(3) To draw checks against any bank account, 

brokerage account or any other account in my 

name; to make deposits or withdrawals and to 

transfer funds from one account to another; to 

open any close any accounts and to sign 

signature cards and any other documents 

required for such purpose. 

* * * 

(8) To make, do and transact all and every kind of 

business whatsoever, including the receipt, 

recovery, collection, payment, compromise, 

settlement and adjustments of all accounts, 

legacies, bequests, dividends, annuities, 

demands, debts, taxes and obligations which may 

now or hereafter be due, owing or payable by me 

or to me; 

* * * 

(15) To exercise any rights which I have with respect 

to any policies of insurance on my life of which I 

am the owner or in which I have any rights 

including, but not limited to, the following: the 

right to cancel and/or surrender the policy and to 

receive the cash value; the right to borrow all or 

part of the cash value; the right to convert the 

policy to a paid-up status; and the right to 

exercise any settlement options; 

* * * 

(16) To take charge of my person in case of illness or 

disability of any kind; to authorize my admission 

to a medical, nursing, residential or similar 

facility, and to enter into agreements for my 
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care; to consent to surgical or other medical 

procedures; and to remove and place me in such 

institutions or places as my Agent may deem 

best for my personal care, comfort, benefit and 

safety after giving consideration to any wishes I 

have previously expressed on this subject. 

(17) To make such gifts of my property to such 

persons and in such form and amounts as my 

Agent in my Agent’s sole discretion believes are 

in my best interest. 

Decedent also executed his Last Will and Testament on 

March 15, 2001. In it, Decedent directs first that his last 

funeral and healthcare expenses be paid and all of his 

property sold. The proceeds from the sale, together [with] 

all other remaining assets, are to be included in the 

residuary estate, which then is to be distributed in equal 

shares to the following six designated beneficiaries: Judith 

Lynn Vila, Gerald Zanolli, Michael Zanolli, Anthony Calabro, 

Nick Calabro, and Anthony Campobasso. Decedent 

appointed Michael Zanolli as executor. 

 

For several years in the 1960s, Decedent worked for a 

company in Apollo, Pennsylvania that utilized radioactive 

materials in its operations. Decedent was exposed to such 

materials and later developed several health problems, 

including bladder cancer. Although it is not entirely clear 

from the record, sometime prior to 2008, [Appellant] 

became acquainted with Decedent and undertook to care for 

him as a live-in companion. In 2008, [Appellant] became 

aware of the United States Department of Labor’s Energy 

Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Programs Act 

(“EEOICPA”), which provides monetary compensation to 

individuals beset with illnesses caused by certain 

enumerated workplace conditions. 

 

[Appellant] assisted Decedent in preparing and submitting 

an application for benefits, on which she was designated as 

his authorized representative. On May 8, 2008, the

Department of Labor awarded Decedent $150,000.00 in

compensation, together with healthcare benefits for his 

bladder cancer. Shortly thereafter, on September 12, 2008, 

Decedent purchased a Prudential annuity contract in the 
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amount of $150,000.00, on which Decedent listed 

[Appellant] as the primary beneficiary (the “Annuity”). 

Decedent and [Appellant] also allegedly opened a joint 

checking account, although the record contains no evidence 

of such an account. 

In early August 2009, because of her own advanced age 

and personal circumstances, [Appellant] moved out of 

Decedent’s residence, as she was no longer able to meet 

the heavy demands of providing for his daily care. 

Thereafter, Zanolli placed Decedent in a skilled nursing 

facility in Monroeville, Pennsylvania. Although 

communication was difficult, Decedent and [Appellant] 

remained in contact. On or about August 3, 2009, Zanolli, 

relying on the POA, removed [Appellant] as the primary 

beneficiary of the Annuity and substituted himself as 

primary beneficiary. Sometime prior to September 2009, 

Zanolli removed himself and substituted the Estate as the 

primary beneficiary. No application or form requesting the 

latter change is included in the record, but the financial 

statements provided by Prudential beginning in September 

2009 list the “Estate” as the primary beneficiary. Around 

the same time, Zanolli, again relying on the POA, accessed 

and negotiated the Annuity’s cash value to provide for 

Decedent’s healthcare needs, which included Decedent’s 

placement in the skilled nursing facility and, ultimately, 

hospice care. All of Zanolli’s transactions in changing the 

beneficiary of the Annuity and negotiating its cash value 

were approved by Prudential. 

Decedent died on October 6, 2010. Letters Testamentary 

were granted to Zanolli as Executor of Decedent’s will on 

January 12, 2011. Because not all of the Annuity’s cash 

value had been utilized for Decedent’[s] care, the remaining 

funds, totaling approximately $67,000.00, were transferred 

into Decedent’s residuary estate. Zanolli published notice of 

the probating of Decedent’[s] will on January 15, January 

22, and January 29, 2011, in the local Valley News Dispatch 

newspaper. On May 16, 2011, [Appellant], via her counsel, 

sent a letter to Zanolli notifying him of her claim to both the 

Annuity and the joint checking account. Despite receipt of 

the letter, and apparently due to oversight, on or about 

September 22, 2012, Zanolli sent notice to the six named 

beneficiaries of Decedent’s will, but not to [Appellant], of his 
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intent to file his First and Final Account. Zanolli then filed 

the First and Final Account, together with a proposed 

distribution schedule, on October 2, 2012. No objections or 

other challenges to the account were filed with the [c]ourt, 

which subsequently confirmed the account and entered a 

decree of distribution on November 2, 2012. The decree 

distributes the cash value of Decedent’s residuary estate, 

which includes the remaining funds from the Annuity, to the 

six beneficiaries named in Decedent’s will. 

[Appellant] filed exceptions to the [c]ourt’s decree on 

November 21, 2012, in which she again assert[ed] her 

claims to the Annuity and joint checking account. On 

November 27, 2012, the [c]ourt entered an order 

permitting the filing of exceptions and appointing Jack J. 

Steiner, Esq., as auditor. For reasons not immediately 

apparent from the record, the [c]ourt did not schedule a 

hearing on the exceptions. It also does not appear that the 

auditor conducted an audit of the First and Final Account, 

held a hearing on [Appellant’s] exceptions, or prepared an 

auditor’s report. No further action was taken on the 

exceptions until the Estate filed [a] motion to dismiss on 

April 4, 2014, approximately 16 months after [Appellant] 

filed her exceptions. [Appellant] responded to the Estate’s 

motion and filed a motion for leave to conduct discovery. 

The [c]ourt heard argument on May 27, 2014, and 

scheduled a hearing on the motion to dismiss for August 1, 

2014. Thereafter, the parties submitted additional filings 

and documents to the [c]ourt and agreed that they would 

rest on their written submissions in lieu of a hearing. 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/2014, at 2-7 (record citations omitted). 

 On August 18, 2014, the trial court entered an order and opinion 

granting the Estate’s motion to dismiss. The trial court also dismissed 

Appellant’s exceptions by operation of law and on the merits and denied 

Appellant’s discovery request as moot. The trial court directed the Clerk of 

Orphans’ Court “to enter on the docket that [Appellant’s] exceptions were 

deemed denied by operation of law as of March 21, 2013.” Trial Court 
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Order, 8/18/2014, at 1. On September 8, 2014, Appellant filed exceptions 

to the trial court’s August 18, 2014 decision. On November 25, 2014, the 

trial court entered an order denying and dismissing Appellant’s September 8, 

2014 exceptions, stating it “already [] ruled upon all of the issues raised in 

[Appellant’s] second set of exceptions, the [c]ourt also [found] that ruling on 

a second set of exceptions would be improper under the Pennsylvania Rules 

of Orphans’ Court Procedure[.]” Trial Court Order, 11/25/2014, at 1. 

“We first address, sua sponte, the timeliness of this appeal because, if 

the appeal is late, we have no jurisdiction to entertain it.” In re Estate of 

Allen, 960 A.2d 470, 471 (Pa. Super. 2008). The trial court entered an 

order on November 2, 2012 confirming the First and Final Account filed by 

the executor and directing distribution of the Decedent’s estate. Appellant 

filed timely exceptions on November 21, 2012. See Pa.O.C.R. 7.1(a) 

(setting twenty-day time limit for exceptions). The court issued no ruling on 

the exceptions. Accordingly, they were deemed denied by operation of law 

on the 121st day after their filing, specifically March 22, 2013. See

Pa.O.C.R. 7.1(f) (setting time frame for denial by operation of law). On that 

day, the 30-day appeal period set by Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) began to run. See In 

re Estate of Allen, 960 A.2d at 471; Pa.O.C.R. 7.1(f); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). 

Thus, Appellant’s notice of appeal filed on December 23, 2014 fell outside 

the 30-day appeal period. See Pa.R.A.P. 903. 

Moreover, we have previously determined, 
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‘in a decedent's estate, the confirmation of the final account 

of the personal representative represents the final order, 

subject to exceptions being filed and disposed of by the 

court.’ In re Estate of Habazin, 679 A.2d 1293, 1295 (Pa. 

Super. 1996). Rule 7.1(a) of the Pennsylvania Orphans' 

Court Rules generally provides that ‘no later than twenty 

(20) days after entry of an order, decree or adjudication, a 

party may file exceptions to any order, decree or 

adjudication which would become a final appealable 

order under Pa.R.A.P. 341(b) or Pa.R.A.P. 342 following 

disposition of the exceptions. 

In re Wilton, 921 A.2d 509, 512 (Pa. Super. 2007) (emphasis in original). 

Thus, the November 2, 2012 order confirming the First and Final 

Account became appealable on the day the court disposed of Appellant's 

exceptions, i.e., on August 18, 2014. Appellant filed her notice of appeal on 

December 23, 2014, also outside of the 30-day appeal period.2 See

Pa.R.A.P. 903. Thus, for all of the foregoing reasons, we lack jurisdiction to 

entertain Appellant’s appeal. 

 Finally, we must address the Estate’s motion to dismiss for Appellant’s 

failure to file a designation of the contents of the reproduced record 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2154, filed on March 3, 2015. The Estate sought to 

have the appeal quashed or dismissed because Appellant failed to designate 

the contents of the reproduced record timely. On April 21, 2015, this Court 

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2

 We note that Appellant’s notice of appeal states that she is appealing “the 

[o]rder originally entered ... on August 18, 2014” as well as “from the 

[c]ourt’s [o]rder of November 25, 2014 disposing of [her] exceptions to” the 

August 18, 2014 order and opinion. Notice of Appeal, 12/23/2014, at 1. 

Appellant has not offered any legal authority, and our independent review 

has not revealed any, to suggest that she could file a second set of 

exceptions to toll the 30-day appeal period. 
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issued a per curiam order denying relief without prejudice for the Estate to 

raise the issue before the current panel. The Estate has not raised this issue 

again. Regardless, because we lack jurisdiction to entertain Appellant’s 

appeal, the Estate’s motion to dismiss is moot. Thus, we reaffirm the denial 

of the Estate’s motion to dismiss for failing to designate the reproduced 

record in a timely manner. 

 Appeal quashed. Motion to dismiss denied. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 1/21/2016