J-S54006-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RICARDO ALPHONSO PEOPLES 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1298 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Order June 30, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0008708-1997

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 09, 2018

Ricardo Peoples appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on one 

conviction for first-degree murder and one conviction for second-degree 

murder. He contends the consecutive sentences of twenty years to life 

constitute an abuse of the court’s sentencing discretion. In addition, his court 

appointed attorney, Travis J. Dunn, Esquire, seeks permission to withdraw as 

counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We affirm and grant 

attorney Dunn permission to withdraw.

Peoples was seventeen years old when he shot and killed Orlando Price 

and Dionda Morant in the course of robbing them. A jury convicted Peoples of 

the first-degree murder of Price and the second-degree murder of Morant. The 
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court subsequently imposed the then-mandatory sentences of life in prison 

without possibility of parole for each of the murders consecutively.

On July 9, 2012, Peoples filed his second PCRA petition, asserting his 

sentences of life without parole were unconstitutional under Miller v. 

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). Relying on Commonwealth v. 

Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2013) (holding that Miller could not provide 

relief in collateral proceedings), the PCRA court denied People’s PCRA petition.

However, in 2016, while the denial of People’s petition was on appeal to

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court of the United States 

implicitly overruled Cunningham and held that Miller provided a basis for 

relief in collateral proceedings. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 

718 (2016). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania remanded Peoples’s appeal

to this Court, and we reversed the judgment of sentence and remanded the 

case to the Court of Common Pleas for re-sentencing.

After a new sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Peoples to 

consecutive terms of imprisonment of twenty years to life in prison. Peoples

filed a post-sentence motion, seeking reconsideration of the sentence. The 

court denied reconsideration, and Peoples filed this timely appeal.

Prior to addressing the merits of Peoples’s requested appeal, we must 

examine Attorney Dunn’s request to withdraw. Attorney Dunn has 

substantially complied with the mandated procedure for withdrawing as 

counsel. See Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361 (articulating Anders requirements); 
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Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 594 (Pa. Super. 2010) (providing 

that counsel must inform client by letter of rights to proceed once counsel 

moves to withdraw and append a copy of the letter to the petition). Peoples

did not file a response. 

As counsel has met his technical obligation to withdraw, we must now 

“make a full examination of the proceedings and make an independent 

judgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.” 

Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1248 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(citation omitted). 

Counsel has identified a single issue Peoples believes entitles him to 

relief. Peoples asserts the court abused its discretion in imposing sentence. 

He concedes this argument raises a challenge to the discretionary aspects of 

his sentence. See Appellant’s Brief, at 6. “A challenge to the discretionary 

aspects of a sentence must be considered a petition for permission to appeal, 

as the right to pursue such a claim is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. 

McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “Two 

requirements must be met before we will review this challenge on its merits.”

Id. (citation omitted). 

“First, an appellant must set forth in his brief a concise statement of the 

reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary 

aspects of a sentence.” Id. (citation omitted). See also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). 

“Second, the appellant must show that there is a substantial question that the 
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sentence imposed is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Id. (citation 

omitted). That is, “the sentence violates either a specific provision of the 

sentencing scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code or a particular 

fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. 

Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 365 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted).

We examine an appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement to determine 

whether a substantial question exists. See id. “Our inquiry must focus on the 

reasons for which the appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts underlying the 

appeal, which are necessary only to decide the appeal on the merits.” Id. 

(citation and emphasis omitted). Here, Peoples has preserved his arguments 

through a post-sentence motion. 

However, his appellate brief does not contain the requisite Rule 2119(f) 

concise statement. The Commonwealth, while noting the absence of the Rule 

2119(f) statement, has explicitly exercised its right not to object to this 

violation of our Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Appellee’s Brief, at 22.

“[I]n the absence of any objection from the Commonwealth, we are 

empowered to review claims that otherwise fail to comply with Rule 2119(f).” 

Commonwealth v. Bonds, 890 A.2d 414, 418 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation 

omitted). Peoples and the Commonwealth have fully briefed this issue in this 

Court. In light of the detailed arguments presented by the parties and Attorney 

Dunn’s’s petition to withdraw, we must address Peoples’s challenges. See 

Commonwealth v. Lilley, 978 A.2d 995, 998 (Pa. Super. 2009) (stating that 
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where counsel files an Anders brief, this Court will review discretionary 

aspects of sentencing claims that were not otherwise preserved). See also 

Commonwealth v. Gould, 912 A.2d 869, 872 (Pa. Super. 2006) (exercising

review of claim in absence of Rule 2119(f) statement where its absence did 

not hamper ability to review).1 Therefore, we must determine if any of 

Peoples’s claims raise substantial questions for our review. 

First, Peoples argues the sentence imposed was “a de facto life sentence 

without parole ... in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.” Appellant’s 

Brief, at 15. As both attorney Dunn and the Commonwealth note, this Court 

has recently rejected this argument under similar circumstances. See 

Commonwealth v. Foust, 180 A.3d 416, 438 (Pa. Super. 2018) (finding 

consecutive 30 years’ to life in prison sentences do not constitute de facto life 

without parole sentences). We agree with counsel’s assessment that this claim 

is meritless.

Peoples also argues the court erred in imposing a sentence that does 

not provide him a meaningful opportunity to obtain release. He contends that 

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (holding that a juvenile, nonhomicide offender must have a meaningful opportunity to obtain release), and 

United States v. Corey Grant, 887 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc 

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1 Additionally, Appellant’s brief does not comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2111(d), which 

requires the statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) to be appended to the brief of the appellant. 
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granted, opinion vacated, 905 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that a juvenile 

offender who could not obtain parole until age 72 did not have a meaningful 

opportunity to obtain release), establish that his sentence is unconstitutional. 

Even if we were to accept Grant as controlling law in this case, it is 

clearly distinguishable. Peoples has an opportunity to obtain parole at age 58. 

Considering he has been convicted of two murders, we can find nothing 

unreasonable with that opportunity. Peoples’s second issue is meritless.

Our independent review of the record reveals no other, non-frivolous 

issues that he could raise on appeal. 

We affirm Peoples’s judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition 

to withdraw. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw as counsel granted. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/9/2018