J-S33008-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MAYA DANEE JOHNSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1395 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 29, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-23-CR-0003858-2017

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED DECEMBER 15, 2021

Maya Danee Johnson appeals from her June 29, 2020 judgment of 

sentence of time-served to twenty-three months of incarceration followed by 

four years of probation, which was imposed following her convictions for three 

counts of corruption of minors. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the facts as follows:

Detective Thomas J. Schreiber works for the Radnor 

Township Police Department. In 2017, his department received a 

Childline referral from Children and Youth Services of Delaware 

County. The referral concerned a teacher’s aide who had shown 

inappropriate materials to a juvenile at Presbyterian Children’s 

Village, which is a residential treatment facility for children with 

behavioral and mental health issues located in the township. 

Presbyterian Children’s Village is a several acre property. It has 

classrooms, recreation centers and cottages. The cottages are 

used as dormitories for the students. Each cottage has an aid[e]

who is responsible for the residents living in the cottage.

As part of his investigation, Detective Schreiber interviewed 

five children (girls) at the facility. [Appellant] was the aid[e] in 
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charge of the cottage the girls lived in. The girls told Detective 

Schreiber [Appellant] showed them a photo of herself in purple 

lingerie where her breast area could be plainly seen. The girls 

who saw the photo told Detective Schreiber they were taken back 

by it. The girls also reported seeing a video where [Appellant] 

flashed her buttocks area. Thereafter, Detective Schreiber applied 

for an arrest warrant for [Appellant] as well as a search warrant 

for her personal iPhone. Using the search warrant Detective 

Schreiber performed a logical extraction of [Appellant’s] iPhone 

and recovered several videos and photos which matched the 

photos and videos which were described to him by the juveniles. 

Admitted into evidence as Commonwealth Exhibit C-1 was a set 

of three photos found on [Appellant’s] iPhone which matched the 

description of the lingerie that the girls described to Detective 

Schreiber. There were also approximately five to nine close-up 

videos that showed female genitalia masturbating. These videos 

were significant for Detective Schreiber[’s] investigation because 

they also matched the description previously told him by the 

juveniles that they were shown a video of somebody [“playing 

with herself”] up close, by [Appellant]. [N.T. Non-Jury Trial, 

1/15/19, at 123. The videos were admitted into evidence as 

Commonwealth Exhibit C-3.

Three of the girls testified at trial and corroborated the

allegations testified to by Detective Schreiber. M.S. was 

[seventeen] at the time of the incident. She testified [that 

Appellant] showed her and [another girl] a picture of herself in 

lingerie with her breasts exposed. She identified Commonwealth 

Exhibit C-1 as the pictures she was shown. M.S. testified the 

pictures made her feel uncomfortable. 

S.H. was [sixteen] at the time of trial and approximately 

[fourteen] at the time of the incident. She testified [that 

Appellant] showed her and other girls a video of herself 

masturbating. She was shown the video by [Appellant] in the staff 

room at the Cottage where she resided. S.H. testified the video 

made her feel uncomfortable and “grossed out.” S.H. also 

testified [that Appellant] on one occasion exposed her buttocks to 

her while S.H. was in her bedroom and [Appellant] was in the 

upstairs hallway of the Cottage. S.H. generally felt uncomfortable 

with [Appellant] because [Appellant] was always talking about 

sex.
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M.L. was [seventeen] at the time of trial and approximately 

[fifteen] at the time of the incident. She testified [Appellant] 

showed her and four other girls a video of herself masturbating 

corroborating S.H.’s testimony. She also corroborated S.H.’s 

testimony about being “mooned” by [Appellant].

Trial Court Opinion, 9/16/20, at 1-4. 

On January 22, 2019, following a non-jury trial, Appellant was convicted 

of three counts of corruption of minors. Sentencing was deferred so that a 

pre-sentence investigation report could be prepared. On June 8, 2020, 

Appellant received an aggregate sentence of four to forty-six months of 

incarceration followed by four years of probation. Appellant filed a postsentence motion alleging multiple discretionary sentencing issues and 

requesting a new trial based on the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. 

On July 6, 2020, the trial court held a hearing, after which it granted 

Appellant’s request for reconsideration of her sentence. Appellant was 

resentenced to an aggregate sentence of time-served to twenty-three months 

of incarceration followed by four years of probation. The court denied 

Appellant’s remaining post-sentence motion claims. This timely appeal 

followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with the mandates of 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Appellant raises the following issue for our review: “Was the evidence 

insufficient to prove [Appellant] guilty of corruption of minors?” Appellant’s 

brief at 4. 
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Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her 

convictions for corruption of minors. Our standard of review when considering 

a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is

[w]hether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh 

the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by 

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be 

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and 

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record 

must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, 

is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Gause, 164 A.3d 532, 540-41 (Pa.Super. 2017) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

In order to sustain a misdemeanor conviction for corruption of minors, 

the Commonwealth must prove that: (1) the defendant was at least eighteen 

years old at the time of the offense; (2) the victim was less than eighteen 

years old at the time of the offense; and (3) that the defendant’s specific 

actions corrupted or tended to corrupt the minor’s morals. See 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 6301(a)(1)(i). The corruption of minors statute does not require proof that 

the minor’s morals were actually corrupted. See Commonwealth v. 

Mumma, 414 A.2d 1026, 1030 (Pa. 1980). Rather, a conviction will be upheld 
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where the knowing or intentional conduct of the defendant tends to have the 

effect of corrupting the morals of a minor. See Commonwealth v. Dewalt, 

752 A.2d 915, 918 (Pa.Super. 2000). 

This court has visited the question of what constitutes “corruption” of a 

minor’s morals before. In Commonwealth v. Decker, 698 A.2d 99, 101 

(Pa.Super.1997), we held that actions that tended to corrupt the morals of a 

minor were those that “would offend the common sense of the community and 

the sense of decency, propriety and morality which most people entertain.” 

See DeWalt, supra at 918. This is a deliberately “broad” statute, as we have 

explained:

[C]orruption of a minor can involve conduct towards a child in an 

unlimited number of ways. The purpose of such statutes is 

basically protective in nature. These statutes are designed to 

cover a broad range of conduct in order to safeguard the welfare 

and security of our children. Because of the diverse types of 

conduct that must be proscribed, such statutes must be drawn 

broadly. It would be impossible to enumerate every particular act 

against which our children need to be protected.

Commonwealth v. Barnette, 760 A.2d 1166, 1173 (Pa.Super. 2000).

Herein, Appellant alleges that the evidence was insufficient to prove her 

guilty of corruption of minors on four grounds that the Commonwealth failed 

to prove: 1) that Appellant was eighteen years old at the time of the conduct;

2) that Appellant’s conduct corrupted M.O.’s morals, since viewing cleavage 

was insufficient to corrupt the morals of a minor and the Commonwealth failed 

to prove what picture M.O. was shown; 3) that Appellant intentionally showed 

S.H. the video of Appellant masturbating and that “mooning” her was 
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insufficient to corrupt her morals; and 4) that Appellant corrupted M.L.’s 

morals because she testified that after being shown the video of Appellant 

masturbating “she was just quiet.” See Appellant’s brief at 9. 

The trial court, who also sat as the fact-finder at trial, disagreed and 

addressed Appellant’s arguments together:

In this case the record, as referenced above, establishes 

[Appellant] was the adult aid in charge of the cottage where the 

juveniles resided. The victims, M.S., S.H., and M.L. were under 

[eighteen] years old at the time of the incident. Clearly 

[Appellant] showing juveniles pictures of herself in lingerie barechested and showing a video where she was masturbating are 

actions that would offend the sense of decency, propriety and 

morality which most people in the community entertain. 

Additionally, it must be noted that the juvenile victims in this case 

were in a residential treatment facility for behavioral and mental 

health issues. In other words, they were more vulnerable than 

the average child. Based on this evidence and the totality of the 

circumstances taken in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, the evidence was clearly 

sufficient to sustain [Appellant’s] conviction for corruption of 

minors. All the elements of the crimes were met by the 

Commonwealth beyond a reasonable doubt.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/16/20, at 10-11. We agree with the trial court. 

First, Appellant argued that the Commonwealth failed to prove she was

at least eighteen years old at the time of the criminal conduct. See Appellant’s 

brief at 11. We disagree. It is well-settled that a defendant’s age can be 

proven solely by circumstantial evidence, including a jury’s opportunity to 

observe a defendant. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 657 A.2d 946, 947 

(Pa.Super. 1995) (finding circumstantial evidence was enough to prove 

appellant’s age where the victim identified appellant at trial, the jury observed 

appellant, and evidence was presented that appellant had a prior marriage 
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resulting in two daughters). Herein, like in Miller, the trial court was given 

ample opportunity to observe Appellant and draw his own conclusions as to 

her age. Additionally, at the time of the crimes, Appellant maintained 

employment where she supervised children up to age eighteen years of age 

at a residential treatment facility as the “adult aid.” See N.T. Non-Jury Trial, 

1/15/19, at 85; see also Trial Court Opinion, 9/16/20, at 10. Appellant also 

had several jobs prior to this one, such as a residential treatment counselor 

and paraprofessional educator with Victoria Hayes, a defense witness. Id. at 

217. Accordingly, circumstantial evidence established that Appellant was over 

the age of eighteen at the time of this conduct. 

Next, Appellant avers that the Commonwealth failed to establish that 

Appellant’s conduct corrupted M.O.’s morals. See Appellant’s brief at 11. 

M.O. testified that she was a juvenile resident of the cottage that Appellant 

was supervising when Appellant showed her and another resident a picture of 

herself in lingerie with her chest exposed. N.T. Non-Jury Trial, 1/15/19, at 

52-55, 58-59. M.O. identified photographs of Appellant in lingerie as “similar 

to what [she] remember[ed]” in that the color of the lingerie and the way 

Appellant’s face was angled were the same. Id. at 55. M.O. further explained 

that viewing the photograph “made me like uncomfortable” so a few days later 

she reported the incident to a different staff member. Id. at 56. 

First, Appellant avers that the evidence was insufficient because M.O. 

testified that she “merely felt uncomfortable as a result of seeing the picture.” 

Appellant’s brief at 11. However, to establish corruption of a minor, the 
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Commonwealth did not need to prove that M.O.’s morals were actually 

corrupted. Instead, the Commonwealth need only prove that Appellant’s 

actions tended to corrupt the morals of a minor and “would offend the common 

sense of the community and the sense of decency, propriety, and morality 

which most people entertain.” Decker, supra, at 101. The record supports 

this conclusion. 

Alternatively, Appellant alleges that the evidence was insufficient since 

M.O. testified that the photograph was similar to the one she saw but did not 

identify the photograph as the exact picture. See Appellant’s brief at 12. 

Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Shirey, 494 A.2d 420, 424 (Pa.Super. 

1985), a case where we found the evidence insufficient to uphold a corruption 

of minors conviction after the Commonwealth failed to produce any of the 

“dirty” books, magazines, or pictures that the victims testified to being shown 

at trial. We find Shirey distinguishable from the case at bar.

Unlike in Shirey, here, the Commonwealth admitted all of the lingerie 

pictures and videos from Appellant’s phone, which matched the description 

given by M.O. and the other girls. While M.O. did not explicitly identify the 

photograph as the one she saw, she did describe the lingerie and pose that 

Appellant made, which matched the pose and lingerie from the photographs 

that were admitted. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

together with all reasonable inferences, the trial court was free to find that 

one of these pictures was the one that Appellant showed to M.O. Accordingly, 
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the evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant of the corruption of minors 

charge related to M.O. and this sub-claim fails.

In her third sufficiency challenge, Appellant alleges that the 

Commonwealth failed to prove that she intentionally showed S.H. the video of 

her masturbating. See Appellant’s brief at 12. S.H. testified that she was in 

Appellant’s office with a couple of other girls when Appellant showed all of 

them pictures of her body and a video of herself masturbating. See N.T. NonJury Trial, 1/15/19, at 94, 105. While S.H. clarified that Appellant did not 

show the video directly to S.H., S.H. was in the small room with the other girls 

when Appellant was playing the video on her iPhone. Id. Based on this 

testimony, Appellant argues that Appellant did not directly show S.H. the video 

and, therefore, the conviction for corruption of minors of S.H. was insufficient. 

Appellant relies on Dewalt, supra to support her argument. We do not find 

Dewalt applicable herein.

In Dewalt, supra at 916, the evidence at trial revealed that appellant, 

while outside on her own back porch and in the company of two adults, lifted 

her shirt and performed a short striptease. During the striptease, the 

appellant accidentally removed her underwear with her jeans. Id. at 919. 

Unbeknownst to her, three minor boys looked on while standing atop a roof 

next door. Id. Appellant was convicted of corruption of minors based on what 

the minor boys witnessed. Thereafter, she appealed her corruption of minors

convictions on sufficiency grounds. On appeal, we found that the evidence 
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belied the intentional aspect of the corruption of minors charges, since the 

appellant was unaware that the minor boys were watching. Id. 

In contrast to Dewalt, herein, Appellant knew S.H. and the other girls 

were in the room and intended to show the underage female residents the 

video of her masturbating. In addition to S.H.’s testimony about the video, 

M.L. also testified. M.L. corroborated and expanded on S.H.’s testimony, 

agreeing that they were both in the office when Appellant showed them the 

video. See N.T Non-Jury Trial, 1/15/19, at 118. M.L. also explained how 

Appellant identified herself in the video before tilting her phone towards the 

girls. Id. at 118-24, 150-51. Viewing the record as a whole, Dewalt does 

not apply.

As an alternative avenue to relief, Appellant argues that “mooning” S.H., 

by exposing her butt and some of her thighs, did not offend the propriety and 

morality that most people entertain. See Appellant’s brief at 12-13. Appellant 

does not cite to any authority in support of her position that we should 

consider her various lewd acts towards one victim individually. In addition to 

showing S.H. a video of herself masturbating, S.H. also testified that Appellant 

stopped in front of her open bedroom door, pulled down her pants, and 

“mooned” S.H., exposing her butt and some of her thighs. N.T. Non-Jury 

Trial, 1/15/19, at 84-85, 90-91, 109-110. Viewing this evidence as a whole, 

the trial court did not err when it found that this evidence was sufficient to 

convict Appellant of corruption of minors related to S.H. 
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In her final allegation of error, Appellant avers that the Commonwealth 

failed to prove that Appellant corrupted M.L.’s morals because she testified 

that her reaction to Appellant’s actions was to be “quiet.” See Appellant’s 

brief at 13; see also N.T. Non-Jury Trial, 1/15/19, at 125. We disagree with 

Appellant’s characterization of M.L.’s testimony. At trial, M.L. described 

Appellant’s actions in the video as “playing with herself” or touching her vagina 

with her fingers and said that she could hear “something wet.” N.T. Non-Jury 

Trial, 1/15/19, at 123-25. M.L. explained that viewing the video and hearing 

this noise made her feel “uncomfortable.” Id. at 118. M.L. also described 

Appellant “mooning” them as “inappropriate.” Id. at 125-26.

Further, the trial court was not required to find that M.L.’s morals were 

actually corrupted before convicting Appellant of corruption of minors. 

Instead, the court needed to determine whether Appellant’s actions tended to 

corrupt the morals of M.L. and that Appellant’s actions “would offend the 

common sense of the community and the sense of decency, propriety and 

morality which most people entertain.” See DeWalt, supra at 918. The trial 

court, sitting as fact finder, was given the opportunity to assess M.L.’s 

testimony in conjunction with the video, and found that Appellant’s actions 

were of such a type. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/16/20, at 10. Viewed in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, together with all reasonable 

inferences, there was sufficient evidence for the court to convict Appellant of 

corruption of minors related to M.L. Appellant’s final claim fails. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence. 
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/15/2021