United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Submitted April 16, 2009

Decided April 17, 2009

Before

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No.  08‐2965

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

AMY JO KRUEGER,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of

Wisconsin.

No. 06‐CR‐120‐C

Barbara B. Crabb,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Amy Jo Krueger pleaded guilty to misuse of a Social Security number.  See 42 U.S.C.

§ 408(a)(7)(8).  She served 18 months’ imprisonment and then began a 3‐year term of

supervised release.  After she violated the terms of her release, the government petitioned to

have her release revoked.  At her revocation hearing, Krueger stipulated to four

violations—opening a checking account without her probation officer’s permission,

violating state and federal law by passing bad checks, leaving the jurisdiction without

permission, and failing to submit a truthful supervised‐release report at the end of each

month.  Based on these stipulations, the district court revoked her supervised release,

ordering her reimprisoned for 11 months.  Krueger appeals, but her appointed attorney has

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 08‐2965 Page 2

moved to withdraw because she is unable to identify a nonfrivolous basis for appeal.  See

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  We invited Krueger to comment on counselʹs

motion, see CIR. R. 51(b), but she has not responded.  Thus, we are left to review only the

two potential issues identified in counselʹs facially adequate brief.  See United States v. Schuh,

289 F.3d 968, 973‐74 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel first considers whether Krueger could challenge the district court’s decision

to revoke her supervised release.  A district court may revoke a term of supervised release if

it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant violated the terms of

release.  18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); United States v. Flagg, 481 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 2007).  Here,

Krueger stipulated to having violated several terms of her release—violations that the

district court classified as Grade C.  Once the district court had found just one Grade C

violation, it acted within its discretion to revoke supervised release.  See § 3583(e)(3);

U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(2).  

Counsel also questions whether Krueger could challenge the reasonableness of her

term of reimprisonment.  We will uphold a term of reimprisonment so long as it is not

plainly unreasonable.  See United States v. Neal, 512 F.3d 427, 438 (7th Cir. 2008).  The district

court categorized Krueger’s violations as “Grade C” which, combined with her criminal

history category of IV, yielded an advisory guideline range of 6 to 12 months’

reimprisonment.  See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a).  The court then imposed a sentence near the top of

that range given the seriousness of Kruger’s inability to go even a short time without

passing bad checks and the need to protect the community from her future criminal acts.

Because the court weighed the applicable policy statements, see U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. B, and the

factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), see United States v. Salinas, 365 F.3d 582, 588‐89 (7th Cir.

2004), we agree that any challenge to Kruger’s term of reimprisonment would be frivolous.

   Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.