Case No. 12-15-00082-CR

IN THE TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

TYLER, TEXAS

DAVID MARK DAVIS II, 

Appellant,

VS.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

 Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 of Angelina County, Texas

The Honorable Joe Lee Register, Presiding Judge 

Trial Cause No. 15-0290

OPENING BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

_________________________

David Mark Davis II

Appellant, Pro Se

905 N Loop 499, Unit 525

Harlingen, TX 78550 

(936) 238-8507(T)

(936) 309-0060(F)

dmarkdavis2@gmail.com

APPELLANT REQUEST ORAL ARGUMENT

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ACCEPTED

12-15-00082-CR

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

TYLER, TEXAS

7/27/2015 12:00:00 AM

CATHY LUSK

CLERK

 FILED IN 12th COURT OF APPEALS TYLER, TEXAS 7/26/2015 8:05:14 PM CATHY S. LUSK Clerk
PARTIES

ATTORNEY’S FOR THE STATE AT PRE-TRIAL HEARING, PLEA 

HEARING AND ON APPEAL:

ED C. JONES, Angelina County Attorney

TX State Bar No. 10873300

Angelina County Attorney’s Office

P. O. Box 1845

Lufkin, Texas 75902-1845

936-639-3929

DEFENDANT - PRO SE

DAVID MARK DAVIS II

Appellant, Pro Se

905 N Loop 499, Unit 525

Harlingen, TX 78550 

(936) 238-8507

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that at the time of efiling this Brief, I served a copy of the forgoing 

Opening Brief for Appellant on the party listed below by electronic service, and 

the electronic transmission was reported as complete. My e-mail address is 

dmarkdavis2@gmail.com.

1. Mr. Ed C. Jones

Attorney for the State

ejones@angelinacounty.net

. 

______________________

David Mark Davis II

Appellant, Pro Se

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Table of Contents

Table of Authorities ........................................................................................4, 5

Jurisdiction of the Court...............................................................

Statement of the Case & Facts .........................................................6

Statement on Oral Arguments ...........................................................................7

Statement of Issues Presented on Appeal ............................................7

Issue # 1 The County Court at Law was exercising original, not 

appellate, jurisdiction.

Issue # 2

The trial court erred when it denied Davis’ motion to 

suppress after (1) Davis established that the traffic stop 

which led to the State’s case was conducted without a 

warrant, (2) Davis was detained by police and not free 

to leave and (3) the State did not present one iota of 

evidence to support reasonable suspicion for said traffic 

stop to be conducted in the first place.

Summary of Argument ..........................................................7, 8

Argument .............................................................8, 9, 10, 11, 12

Prayer for Relief ....................................................................12

Certificate of Word Count ........................................................13

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Table of Authorities

 Case Page

Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) 

.........................................................................................14, 15

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)

.........................................................................................12

Anderson v. State, No. 12-12-00041-CR (Tex. App. – Tyler Oct. 16, 2013) 

.........................................................................................14. 15

Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007)

.........................................................................................16, 17

Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)

.........................................................................................14, 15

Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948)

.........................................................................................13

Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)

.........................................................................................14

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 650 (1979)

.........................................................................................16, 17

Ford v. State,158 S.W.3d 488(Tex. Crim. App.2005) 

.........................................................................................16

Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App.1997)

.........................................................................................15

Hall v. State, 297 S.W.3d 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) 

.........................................................................................16

Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) 

.........................................................................................15

Lankford v. Idaho , 500 U.S. 110 (1991)

.........................................................................................13

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Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121, 1126(5th Cir. La.1993) 

.........................................................................................16

Mattei v. State, 455 S.W.2d 761, 765-66 (Tex.Cr.App.1970)

.........................................................................................15, 16

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) 

.........................................................................................15

Rogers v. United States, 330 F.2d 535 (5th Cir.1964) 

.........................................................................................15, 16

Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994) 

.........................................................................................16

State v. Elrod, 395 S.W.3d 869 (Tex. App. – Austin 2013, no pet.)

.........................................................................................14

State v. Johnston, 336 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) 

.........................................................................................15

State v. Melcher, 153 S.W.3d 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)

.........................................................................................14

Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) 

.........................................................................................15

United States v. Bachner 706 F.2d 1121, 1125-26 (11 Cir.1983) 

.........................................................................................16

United States v. Davis,61 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. Miss.1995) 

.........................................................................................17

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) 

.........................................................................................16, 17

United States v. Thompson, 421 F.2d 373, 377 (5th Cir.1970) 

.........................................................................................15

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) 

.........................................................................................16, 17

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Wilson v. State, 311 S.W.3d 452 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) 

.........................................................................................14, 15

Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971)

.........................................................................................13

Young v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) 

........................................................................................14

US Constitution

 

U.S. Const. amend. IV 

...................................................................9, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19

U.S. Const. amend. VI

.....................................................................8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14

State Law 

 

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 27.14(d)

.................................................................................8, 9, 11, 13

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 25.01, et seq.

.........................................................................................................................13 

Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.351 

.......................................................................................................................7, 12

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure

Tex. R. of Civ. Proc. R. 21b

............................................................................................13

Tex. R. of Civ. Proc. R. 124

............................................................................................13

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Jurisdiction of the Court

This court has jurisdiction over this case as it does others that were 

origionally tried in the County Court at Law. Jurisdiction is discussed more in 

depth in Issue #1.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE & FACTS

The State complains that on or about January 17, 2015, the Appellant was 

driving a motor vehicle on Chestnut Street in Angelina County, Texas in violation 

of Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.351. This complaint and decision to charge 

Davis came as a product of a routine traffic stop and statements and other evidence 

made during said traffic stop.

1) Appellant was issued a citation to appear in the Lufkin Municipal Court 

to answer the above referenced accusation, but no criminal complaint was made in 

the Lufkin Municipal Court during the time period the Municipal Court had 

jurisdiction. 

2) At the conclusion of the traffic stop, Davis was issued a citation, but at 

some unknown point between the charging officer issuing this citation and filing 

the citation in the Municipal Court, the citation which was created from a 

completely dignital device was materially altered with a pen by an unknown 

individual. Davis was not provided a copy of the altered citation nor was he aware 

it was altered until after he plead no contest in the Angelina County Court at Law 

No. 1.

3) As part of his initial pleadings in his trial, Davis filed a motion to 

suppress evidence claiming the traffic stop was conducted by law enforcement in 

violation of Davis’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures 

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and Davis moved all evidence obtained as a result of the stop should be 

suppressed.

4) The State made a reply brief alleging that no seizure had occurred in this 

case.

5) The trial court held a hearing on Davis’ Motion to Suppress and his 

jurisdictional challenges. All of Davis’ motions were denied.

6) The trial court also held a hearing on a third party Motion to Quash a 

subpoena for two of Davis’ material witnesses. That motion was granted.

7) Davis timely filed a written a notice of appeal.

APPELLANT REQUEST ORAL ARGUMENT

This case presents a question that Davis cannot find to have been addressed 

by any other appellate court. Does a material amendment to a citation post 

issuance deprive a defendant of his Constitutional right to notice of an allegation 

being made against him when the amended citation is never provided to the 

Defendant? Appellant argues that this failure to provide the amended citation 

takes this case out of the exception to the necessity for a criminal complaint under 

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 27.14(d). Since this is a novel issue, it would be 

benefited by oral argument. 

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Davis seeks review of the following four points of legal error:

Issue # 1

The County Court at Law was exercising original, not appellate, jurisdiction.

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Issue # 2

The trial court erred when it denied Davis’ motion to suppress after (1) Davis 

established that the traffic stop which led to the State’s case was conducted without 

a warrant, (2) Davis was detained by police and not free to leave and (3) the State 

did not present one iota of evidence to support reasonable suspicion for said traffic 

stop to be conducted in the first place.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Issue # 1 - The County Court at Law was exercising original, not appellate, 

jurisdiction.

This issue relates to the jurisdiction of this court to hear this case. An appeal 

to this Court following a trial de novo where the fine is less than $100 renders this 

Court without jurisdiction to hear the case. However, an appeal to this Court

following an original criminal trial in the County Court at Law would allow this 

Court to entertain appeals even where the fine is less than $100.

In a typical class C misdemeanor traffic case, where “written notice of an 

offense for which maximum possible punishment is by fine only or of a violation 

relating to the manner, time, and place of parking has been prepared, delivered, 

and filed with the court and a legible duplicate copy has been given to the 

defendant, the written notice serves as a complaint to which the defendant may 

plead "guilty," "not guilty," or "nolo contendere."” (Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. 

art. 27.14(d) Emphasis Added.) 

In the instant case, the all-digitally created citation that was given to Davis 

at the conclusion of the traffic stop was not a mirror copy of the same citation that 

was filed in the Municipal Court. In fact, the citation filed in the Municipal Court 

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was an amended citation which was not served on Davis until April 2, 2015, and 

only as an exhibit to the State’s response to Davis’ Motion to Dismiss. 

The trial court erred when it held that it was exercising appellate jurisdiction 

as a trial de novo since (1) no complaint was filed in the Municipal Court prior to 

the trial court obtaining jurisdiction and (2) Davis was not provided with a copy of 

the citation filed in the Municipal Court.

Issue #2 – The trial court erred when it denied Davis’ Motion to Suppress.

Davis filed a motion to suppress any evidence obtained from the warrantless 

traffic stop. During the course of two separate hearings, Davis established that law 

enforcement detained him without a warrant and that he was not free to leave the 

encounter until released by the complaining law enforcement officer. The State did 

not present any evidence to support the reasonableness of the traffic stop. 

Even in light of zero testimonal evidence being presented by the State, the 

court held that the traffic stop was reasonable. The court further rejected Davis’ 

argument that a routine traffic stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

Davis asserts that the trial court’s holding is contrary to long standing 

precedent holding that a traffic stop is a seizure. Davis further asserts that the 

precident is clear here, once a defendant establishes that a search or seizure was 

conducted without a warrant, it is up to the State to justify the stop. Both of these 

errors render the judgement of the trial court an abuse of decretion. 

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 ARGUMENT

Issue # 1 -- The County Court at Law was exercising original, not appellate, 

jurisdiction.

1. Rule of Law

General Exception to Complaint Requirement in fine only misdemeanors

where plea of guilty or no contest is made.

In a class C misdemeanor case, the “written notice of an offense for which 

maximum possible punishment is by fine only...has been prepared, delivered, and 

filed with the court and a legible duplicate copy has been given to the defendant, 

the written notice serves as a complaint to which the defendant may plead "guilty," 

"not guilty," or "nolo contendere."” (Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 27.14(d) 

Emphasis Added.)

The State failed to serve the amended citation on Davis

The citation filed by the charging officer in the Lufkin Municipal Court and 

the citation issued to Davis at the conclusion of the traffic stop were not mirror 

images of one another as required by Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 27.14(d) to 

dispense with the need for a formal complaint. In fact, Davis was not served with 

the mirror copy of the citation until April 2, 2015, and only as an exhibit to State’s 

response to Davis’ Motion to Dismiss. 

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The citation filed in the Municipal Court and the Citation given at the 

conclusion of the traffic stop were materially different.

A material fact is one which might affect the outcome of the case under 

governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

Due to the fact that Chestnut Street has a speed limit ranging from 30 miles per 

hour to 70 miles per hour, the location of where a defendant is alleged to have 

exceeded the speed limit is necessary for the Defendant to be able to prepare a 

defense. 

In the instant case, the charging officer alleges that the Defendant operated 

his motor vehicle at a speed of 55 miles per hour. If proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt that a Defendant was operating his motor vehicle at 55 miles per hour on a 

stretch of Chestnut that has a posted speed limit of 30, 35, 40, 45, or 50 miles per 

hour, the State would have proven its prima facie case. However, if the State 

alleges and proves beyond a reasonable doubt that a Defendant was operating his 

motor vehicle at 55 miles per hour on a stretch of Chestnut that has a posted speed 

limit of 55, 60, 65 or 70 miles per hour, the State would have failed to prove a 

prima facie case. 

Due to the demonstrated importance of determining where a speed related 

traffic violation was alleged to have occurred, the location would be a material fact 

under Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., Supra. 

The State’s failure to serve pleadings is a violation of Davis’ constitutional 

rights and public policy.

A criminal defendant has the right to notice of the charges against him. The 

right to notice is grounded in the Constitution. "[T]he accused shall enjoy the right 

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... to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation". (U.S. Const., Amend 

VI.) The requirement of the Sixth Amendment is binding on the states under the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee. “No principle of procedural due 

process is more clearly established than that notice of the specific charge, and a 

chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that charge, if desired, are 

among the constitutional rights of every accused in a criminal proceeding in all 

courts, state or federal.” See Cole v. Arkansas 333 U.S. 196 (1948) “Notice of 

issues to be resolved by the adversary process is a fundamental characteristic of 

fair procedure.” See Lankford v. Idaho , 500 U.S. 110 (1991). “Where a person's 

good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the 

government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.”

See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).

Here, the State failed to provide Davis a copy of the charging instrument at 

the Municipal Court stage, as such, it cannot use the unserved citation to support 

the position that the case in the County Court at Law was an appeal from the 

Municipal Court. Furthermore, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules of Civil 

Procedure, and caselaw all support the requirement that all pleadings be served. 

Due to the limited number of fine only offenses that get appealed to the Court of 

Appeals, there isn’t much caselaw to go on. However, if a plaintiff in a civil case 

can be sanctioned for failure to serve pleadings, then it would only make sense that

in criminal cases, where liberty is on the line, be shown at least the same 

requirements. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 25.01, et seq.; Tex. R. of Civ. 

Proc. R. 21b; Tex. R. of Civ. Proc. R. 124.

This case presents an important question as to whether the formal complaint 

exception under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 27.14(d) becomes insufficient 

when the only citation filed in the Municipal or Justice Court is an unserved 

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amended citation, one with a material amendment, and the State does not provide 

the amended citation to the Defendant. 

For the foregoing reasons, the County Court at Law was exercising original, 

not appellate jurisdiction over this case. As a result, this Court has jurisdiction over 

this case even in light of the fact that the fine imposed was not more than $100. 

Issue # 2 -- Trial Court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s Motion to 

Suppress

1. Rule of Law

a. Standard of Review

Overall, the Standard of Review for a trial court’s ruling on a motion to 

suppress evidence is Abuse of Discretion. Anderson v. State, No. 12-12-00041-CR 

(Tex. App. – Tyler Oct. 16, 2013); Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2010); State v. Elrod, 395 S.W.3d 869, 876 (Tex. App. – Austin 2013, no 

pet.) A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is arbitrary or unreasonable. 

Anderson citing State v. Melcher, 153 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

The trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress will be affirmed if it is 

reasonably supported by the record and is correct under any theory of law 

applicable to the case. Anderson citing Young v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854, 873 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2009).

More precisely, the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence can 

be further broken down through application of a bifurcated standard of review. 

Wilson v. State, 311 S.W.3d 452, 457-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Amador v.

State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Carmouche v. State, 10 

S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Almost total deference is given to the 

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historical facts found by the trial court, while a de novo review is conducted on the

trial court’s application of the law. Crain citing Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; 

Anderson citing Wilson, 311 S.W.3d at 458 and Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327. 

Additionally, almost total deference is afforded the trial court’s rulings on mixed 

questions of law and fact when evaluation of credibility and demeanor are 

necessary. State v. Johnston, 336 S.W.3d 649, 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); 

Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App.1997). Mixed questions of

law and fact that do not depend on credibility and demeanor, as well as purely 

legal questions are reviewed de novo. Johnston, 336 S.W.3d at 657; Guzman, 955 

S.W.2d at 89; Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 62-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Of 

note is the Supreme Court’s distinction between the standards of review applied to 

the determination of probable cause in warrant and warrantless searches based on

the Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a 

warrant, and the need for an incentive to encourage police to use the warrant 

process. Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) 

relying on Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 

911 (1996).

b. Burden of Proof

When a defendant seeks to suppress evidence on the basis of a Fourth

Amendment violation, the Court of Criminal Appeals has placed the burden of 

proof initially upon the defendant. Mattei v. State, 455 S.W.2d 761, 765-66 

(Tex.Cr.App.1970). As the movant in a motion to suppress evidence, a defendant 

must produce evidence that defeats the presumption of proper police conduct and 

therefore shifts the burden of proof to the State. Id., relying upon United States v. 

Thompson, 421 F.2d 373, 377 (5th Cir.1970) and Rogers v. United States, 330 

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F.2d 535 (5th Cir.1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916, 85 S.Ct. 265, 13 L.Ed.2d 186. 

Cf. United States v. Bachner 706 F.2d 1121, 1125-26 (11 Cir.1983). A defendant 

meets his initial burden of proof by establishing that a search or seizure occurred 

without a warrant. Mattei, supra, at 766, quoting Rogers v. United States, 330 

F.2d, at 542 (5th Cir. 1964).

c. A traffic stop in and of itself is a seizure and thus subject to the Fourth 

Amendment.

Overview of Elements of a Seizure – Free to Leave Test

A full custodial arrest is not necessary for a police encounter to be 

considered a seizure. As demonstrated infra, even brief nonconsensual police 

encounters can often amount to a seizure and thus be subject to the reasonableness 

requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The test for determining whether a person 

is ‘seized’ for Fourth Amendment purposes is known as the ‘free to leave” test. See 

Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994). If the objective reasonable person 

would feel that they were not free to leave a police encounter at any point, then he 

or she has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See United 

States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).

United States Supreme Court on traffic stops

It is well established United States Supreme Court a routine traffic stop is a 

seizure under the Fourth Amendment. (See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 

(1996) holding: “Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an 

automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, 

constitutes a "seizure" of "persons" within the meaning within the meaning of the 

Fourth Amendment.”; Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007) holding: 

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“When a police officer makes a traffic stop, the driver of the car is seized within 

the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”; Delaware v. Prouse,440 U.S. 648, 

650(1979) holding: Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute 

a "seizure" within the meaning of U.S. Const. amends. IV and XIV, even though the 

purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.”) 

United States 5th Circuit Court of Appeals on traffic stops

Federal 5th Circuit Court of Appeals also has long-standing precedent

supporting this contention. (See United States v. Davis,61 F.3d 291(5th Cir. 

Miss.1995) holding “The stopping of a vehicle and the detention of its occupants is 

a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment and therefore must be reasonable”; and 

Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121, 1126(5th Cir. La.1993), which rejected a

claim made by an off duty Louisiana state Judge Defendant in a Section 1983 

action that he had not seized a driver when he placed a flashing red light on his 

dashboard and pursued the Plaintiff’s vehicle until it pulled over to the side of the 

road. In Malina the court here held that a “seizure can occur, however, through 

physical force or a "show of authority"”.

Texas courts on traffic stops

Additionally, Texas has long-standing precedent to support this contention

that a traffic stop is a seizure. See Ford v. State,158 S.W.3d 488(Tex. Crim. 

App.2005) which overturned a conviction because the facts on the record failed to 

show that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant; and Hall v. 

State, 297 S.W.3d 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), which overturned a DWI 

conviction because the officer did not demonstrate he had probable cause to 

conduct a traffic stop of the suspect in the first place.

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2. Analysis to Facts of Case

The State claims in the amended charging instrument that on or about

January 17, 2015, Lufkin Police Officer Christopher Carroll observed Davis 

speeding in violation of the Texas Transportation Code, which is a class C 

misdemeanor. The State gained all statements and other evidence used to bring the 

charge against Davis from this traffic stop.

As relevant to the fact pattern here, a defendant proves a prima facie case of 

a Fourth Amendment violation when he establishes that law enforcement acting 

without a warrant causes the reasonable person to feel as if they were not free to 

leave a police encounter. See Mendenhall, Supra. In the instant case, the trial 

court took judicial notice that the traffic stop in question was conducted without a 

warrant. This was uncontested by the State. Even in light of this acknowledgment, 

the trial court sided with the State’s contention that a routine traffic stop was not a 

seizure. This holding is contrary to long standing precedent that has explicitly held 

that routine traffic stops are seizures under the Fourth Amendment. See Whren v. 

United States, Delaware v. Prouse, and Brendlin v. California, Supra. This is just 

Supreme Court precedent on this issue. This case presents a very common defense 

to DUI’s on appeal and Davis argues the same legal logic and principals applied by 

Texas appellate courts to DUI suppression issues. The contention that a routine 

traffic stop is a seizure is well established and has been for quite a many years. 

While Davis doesn’t argue with Mr. Jones’ contention that a police officer doesn’t 

need a warrant to conduct a traffic stop, if the justification for the stop is conducted

the State must show the Court that the officer was justified in making the stop. 

This simply did not occur here. 

The State would not have been able to prove a prima facie case of speeding 

absent the evidence Davis sought to be seized. Davis proved a prima facie case that 

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the evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. For the 

foregoing reasons, this Court must reverse and remand this case to the trial court.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Davis has proven that (1) the County Court at Law, not the Municipal Court, 

was the Court of original jurisdiction in this case, and (2) he has proven a prima 

facie case that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, thus this Court must 

reverse and remand this case to the trial court.

Respectfully Submitted,

 ______________________________

David Mark Davis II

Appellant, Pro Se

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Certificate of Word Count

Relying on the word count function in the word processing software used to 

produce this document, I certify that the number of words in this reply (excluding 

any caption, identity of parties and counsel, statement regarding oral argument, 

table of contents, index of authorities, statement of the case, statement of issues 

presented, statement of jurisdiction, statement of procedural history, signature, 

proof of service, certification, certificate of compliance, and appendix) is 2,421. 

______________________________

David Mark Davis II

Appellant, Pro Se

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