NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

:

NICHOLAS PAPPAS, :

: Civil Action No. 10-3327(NLH)

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : OPINION

:

LEONARD ZACAMY, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

APPEARANCES:

Andrew W. Cole, Esq.

516 South 44th Street

Philadelphia, PA 19104

Counsel for Plaintiff

Dean R. Wittman, Esq.

Zeller & Wieliczko LLP

120 Haddontowne Court

Cherry Hill, NJ 08034

Counsel for Defendants Leonard Zacamy and Haddon Township

HILLMAN, District Judge

This matter is presently before the Court pursuant to the 

submission of a Motion [89] for summary judgment by the only 

remaining Defendants, Haddon Township and Leonard Zacamy.

For the reasons stated below, the Motion will be granted in 

part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

This matter was originally opened to the Court by Plaintiff 

Nicholas Pappas’s submission of a Complaint [1] asserting 

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various civil rights claims arising out of his arrest on July 

15, 2008. Briefly, Plaintiff asserted that at the end of a 

short car pursuit by police, he lost control of the car he was 

driving and hit a van and then a bus. Plaintiff alleged that he 

could not exit the vehicle through the driver’s side door, so he 

climbed out the sun-roof of the vehicle. Plaintiff further 

asserts that as soon as he was out of the vehicle and on the 

ground, he immediately complied with the order from Officer 

Leonard Zacamy to raise his hands in the air. According to 

Plaintiff, he was standing immediately in front of the bus at 

that time. He contends that Officer Zacamy then came up behind 

him, choked him, punched him, and slammed him into the concrete, 

even though he did not resist Officer Zacamy in any way. 

Plaintiff contends that Officer Zacamy punched him in the face 

repeatedly and continued to beat him even after he was cuffed. 

Plaintiff stated that he never ran from the site or resisted 

arrest in any way.

Plaintiff asserted claims for excessive use of force in 

arrest under the Fourth Amendment, cruel and unusual punishment 

under the Eighth Amendment and for due process violations under 

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff named as 

Defendants Officer Zacamy of the Haddon Township Police 

Department, Officer George Tagmire of the Haddon Township Police 

Department, Charles Jackson of the Haddon Township Police 

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Department,1 Haddon Township,2 and Officer Robert Kraft of the 

Gloucester City Police Department. He sought all appropriate 

relief.

By Stipulation [88] of the parties, Defendants Robert 

Kraft, George Tagmire, and Charles Jackson were voluntarily 

dismissed without prejudice from this action pursuant to Rule 

41(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Discovery has concluded and the remaining defendants, Haddon 

Township and Officer Zacamy, have filed this pending Motion for 

Summary Judgment. Officer Zacamy asserts that he used an 

objectively reasonable amount of force in arresting Plaintiff 

and that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Haddon Township 

argues that Plaintiff has failed to present evidence of a policy 

or custom that would subject it to liability for Officer

Zacamy’s actions.3

1 George Tagmire and Charles Jackson were alleged to be 

Plaintiff’s supervisors.

2 The claim against Haddon Township was originally pled 

improperly as against the Haddon Township Police Department.

3 In addition, the Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claims 

under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments fail as a 

matter of law because any claim based on the amount of force 

used in connection with an arrest arises solely under the Fourth 

Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and 

seizures. Plaintiff agrees and has stated that he has no 

objection to dismissal of those claims. (Plaintiff’s Brief in 

Opposition at 20, Docket Entry No. 91.)

3

 

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In support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants 

have submitted a Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute,

(Motion, Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute, Document 

89-9), to which Plaintiff has responded, (Plaintiff’s Statement 

in Response to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, 

Document No. 91-2). Accordingly, except as specifically noted, 

the following facts are not in dispute.

On July 15, 2008, between 11:30 a.m. and noon, Plaintiff 

drove to Camden, New Jersey, where he purchased twelve bags of 

heroin. As Plaintiff then drove through Haddon Township, he had 

on his person the twelve bags of heroin and a packet of several 

syringes. While driving through Haddon Township, Plaintiff 

observed a marked police vehicle following the vehicle he was 

driving. The marked police vehicle was being driven by 

Defendant Officer Leonard Zacamy, who observed Plaintiff’s 

vehicle run a red light and almost hit another vehicle at 

approximately 2:54 p.m. Officer Zacamy then activated his 

emergency lights and began to pursue the vehicle driven by 

Plaintiff.

Initially, Plaintiff did stop his vehicle. However, as 

Officer Zacamy approached his vehicle on foot, Plaintiff sped 

away. Officer Zacamy then returned to his vehicle and chased 

Plaintiff’s vehicle again. There is some dispute as to the 

length of the chase, which may have extended for as much as two 

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miles at speeds up to 40 or 50 miles an hour. The parties are 

in agreement, though, that the vehicle chase lasted no more than 

two minutes. The chase ended when Plaintiff’s vehicle struck a 

van and then a New Jersey Transit bus. The parties are not in 

agreement as to what transpired next. They have presented 

several deposition transcripts providing different versions of 

the incident, as well as other evidence.

Plaintiff stated at deposition that he exited his vehicle 

through the T-top, as soon as it came to a stop, because he 

didn’t know what was going on. He stated that he went in front 

of the bus, a matter of five to ten feet, and that Officer 

Zacamy was already there, with his weapon drawn, telling 

Plaintiff to “freeze,” to put his hands on his head, and to wait 

for Officer Zacamy’s next command. Plaintiff stated that he 

complied with that order, but that Officer Zacamy came up behind 

him, hit him and knocked him to the ground, and began repeatedly 

punching him in the face, even after he was handcuffed. 

According to Plaintiff, he never attempted to flee the scene. 

He has stated that he had some heroin in a cigarette packet in 

his pocket and he had a wrapped pack of four empty syringes in 

his hand when he exited the vehicle. When Officer Zacamy told 

Plaintiff to “drop everything,” Plaintiff threw the pack of 

syringes on the ground in front of him. (Plaintiff’s 

Opposition, Ex. A, Plaintiff’s Deposition at 18-19, 24-36.) 

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Plaintiff further testified at his deposition that people at the 

scene were yelling at Officer Zacamy to stop hitting him. 

However, no witness statements were taken from the driver or 

passengers on the bus. (Pl. Dep. at 36.) Plaintiff was taken 

to the hospital where he was subjected to a number of tests and 

treatments totaling over $34,000 in costs, and was told that he 

had several broken bones in the right side of his face. In 

addition, his dentures were broken. He remained in the hospital 

overnight. Plaintiff testified that his whole face was still 

bruised and swollen the next day and that he had trouble eating. 

In addition, Plaintiff testified that he was to be transported 

to another facility the next day and that the transporting 

officers insisted that photographs be taken of Plaintiff before 

transporting him, as they did not want any later suggestion that 

they were responsible for his injuries. (Pl. Dep. at 37, 42-

46.) While incarcerated, Plaintiff received pain medication and 

was, for an unspecified period of time, placed on a diet of soft 

food. (Pl. Dep. at 53-55.) At his deposition, Plaintiff 

testified to continuing injuries in the form of numbness and 

disfigurement--flatness--of the right side of his face where 

eleven bones were broken, and a ringing in his ears. He stated 

that his broken jawbone did not heal properly. He also stated 

that he sought and received psychiatric treatment as a result of 

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the incident, including medication to assist him in sleeping. 

(Pl. Dep. at 55-60).

Office Zacamy, on the other hand, testified at his 

deposition that Plaintiff stayed in his car after it came to a 

stop, and that Officer Zacamy exited his vehicle, drew his 

weapon, and pointed it at Plaintiff while Plaintiff was still in 

his vehicle, telling him to show his hands, and that Plaintiff 

ignored Officer’s Zacamy’s command and climbed out of the T-top

of his vehicle. Officer Zacamy testified that Plaintiff’s face 

was bloody when he first exited his vehicle. Officer Zacamy 

further testified that Plaintiff ran away from him to a grassy 

area, where Officer Zacamy grabbed his shirt, causing Plaintiff 

to fall to the ground. 

In addition, Officer Zacamy testified that Plaintiff 

continued to resist him, fighting with him and attempting to hit 

him, and refusing to give Officer Zacamy his hands. At some 

unknown point, according to Officer Zacamy, Plaintiff discarded 

the syringes and some of the drugs on his person, but Officer 

Zacamy explained that he was worried that Plaintiff might grab 

one of the syringes and that they might be harmful to the 

officer. Officer Zacamy states that he was concerned about his 

unsecured weapon, which he had returned to its holster when he 

began to chase Plaintiff on foot, but had not snapped in.

Officer Zacamy testified that he was on Plaintiff’s back, 

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attempting to subdue him, and hitting him on the side of the 

head in an effort to subdue him. According to Officer Zacamy, 

he struck only one or two blows, at which time another officer 

assisted him in cuffing Plaintiff, and no further blows were 

delivered by any officers on the scene. (Motion, Ex. D, Dep. of 

Leonard Zacamy, at 13, 15-23, 51.) As a result of this 

incident, Officer Zacamy injured his hand, requiring surgery, 

and he missed approximately two months of work. (Dep. of Zacamy 

at 40-42.)

An Officer Douglas Zeigler, who assisted in cuffing 

Plaintiff, also gave a deposition, stating that Plaintiff ran 

about 25 yards to a grassy area before being tackled by Officer 

Zacamy. He noticed syringes in the area, but stated that 

Plaintiff was not attempting to use them as a weapon. Officer 

Zeigler testified that Plaintiff was flailing his arms and 

failing to respond to officer commands to give Officer Zacamy 

his hands. Officer Zeigler further stated that he never saw 

Officer Zacamy hit Plaintiff at all, nor did he notice any 

injuries to Plaintiff. Officer Zeigler sprained his thumb in 

the incident and missed one week of work. (Motion, Ex. E, Dep. 

of Zeigler.) 

Briefly, Officer Robert Kraft testified that he saw 

Plaintiff exit his vehicle and run in front of the bus, where 

Officer Zacamy subdued him. Officer Kraft alternatively 

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described this as a grassy area. As Officer Kraft was attending 

to the driver of the van, he did not see Plaintiff and Officer 

Zacamy again until Plaintiff was handcuffed and being lifted up. 

Thus, he was not able to testify as to what transpired during 

Plaintiff’s arrest. He did not notice that Plaintiff had any 

injuries. (Motion, Ex. F, Dep. of Kraft.)

Finally, Christian Farley, the driver of the van, testified 

at deposition regarding his recollection of the incident. (Pl. 

Response, Ex. H, Dep. of Farley.) Mr. Farley described himself 

as being kind of “in shock” as a result of the accident, but did 

state that he thought Plaintiff was in the street, in the area 

of the bus and his car, at the time he was arrested. He 

specifically noted that Plaintiff did not run up the road, he 

did not see officers chasing him, and it did not look like 

Plaintiff was resisting arrest. (Dep. of Farley at 9-12, 18-

19.) Beyond that, Mr. Farley could not provide details of the 

circumstances of the arrest, including any struggle or punching 

that may have occurred.

This Court has considered the Motion and the various 

submissions of the parties and will decide the Motion on the 

briefs, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b). 

II. JURISDICTION

This Court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this 

matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, in that the Complaint 

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alleges federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See

Max v. Republican Comm. of Lancaster County, 587 F.3d 198, 199 

n.1 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. denied 560 U.S. 925 (2010). 

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A district court shall grant summary judgment, as to any 

claim or defense, “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Thus, 

summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is satisfied 

that “‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 

law.’” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) 

(citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56).

An issue is “genuine” if it is supported by evidence such 

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonmoving 

party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

248 (1986). A fact is “material” if, under the governing 

substantive law, a dispute about the fact might affect the 

outcome of the suit. Id. “By its very terms, this standard 

provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute 

between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly 

supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that 

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there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 247-48 

(emphasis in original).

Initially, the moving party bears the burden of 

demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1), (4); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (“[A] 

party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for 

its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” 

(citation omitted)); see also Singletary v. Pa. Dept. of Corr., 

266 F.3d 186, 192 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Although the initial 

burden is on the summary judgment movant to show the absence of 

a genuine issue of material fact, ‘the burden on the moving 

party may be discharged by “showing” - that is, pointing out to 

the district court - that there is an absence of evidence to 

support the nonmoving party’s case’ when the nonmoving party 

bears the ultimate burden of proof.” (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. 

at 325)). 

Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving 

party must identify, by affidavits or otherwise, specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 

U.S. at 324. “[T]he non-moving party, to prevail, must ‘make a 

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showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every] element 

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will 

bear the burden of proof at trial.’” Cooper v. Sniezek, 418 

F.App’x 56, 58 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). 

Thus, to withstand a properly supported motion for summary 

judgment, “its opponent must do more than simply show that there 

is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 

586 (1986) (citations omitted). Instead, the non-moving party 

must “go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by 

the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 

file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine 

issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 249; Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 

1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 912 (1993) 

(“To raise a genuine issue of material fact, ... the opponent 

need not match, item for item, each piece of evidence proffered 

by the movant,” but must “exceed[] the ‘ mere scintilla’ 

threshold and ... offer[] a genuine issue of material fact.”).

“In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district 

court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any 

weighing of the evidence; instead, the nonmoving party’s 

evidence ‘is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are 

to be drawn in his favor.’” Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 

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F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). 

In making this determination, however, the court may consider 

materials in the record other than those cited by the parties. 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The Excessive Force Claim Against Officer Zacamy

As noted above, Officer Zacamy argues that he is entitled 

to summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity, contending 

that he used an objectively reasonable amount of force under the 

circumstances.

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects 

government officials ‘from liability for civil damages 

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of 

which a reasonable person would have known.’” 

“Qualified immunity gives government officials 

breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken 

judgments,” and “protects ‘all but the plainly 

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” 

“We do not require a case directly on point” before 

concluding that the law is clearly established, “but 

existing precedent must have placed the statutory or 

constitutional question beyond debate.”

Stanton v. Sims, 134 S.Ct. 3, 4-5 (2013) (citations omitted). 

The Supreme Court has established a two-part analysis to 

determine if qualified immunity is appropriate: (1) whether the 

official’s conduct violated a constitutional or federal right; 

and (2) whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at 

the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct. Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009), citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 

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U.S. 194 (2001). Courts are “permitted to exercise their sound 

discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified 

immunity analysis should be addressed first.” Id. at 236. It 

is the defendant’s burden to establish entitlement to qualified 

immunity. Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 2004).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

provides that “The right of the people to be secure in their 

persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 

not be violated.” 

“To state a claim for excessive force as an unreasonable 

seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that a 

‘seizure’ occurred and that it was unreasonable.” Brower v. 

County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989), cited in Lamont v. New 

Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 182-83 (3d Cir. 2011). See also Graham v. 

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (“all claims that law 

enforcement officers have used excessive force--deadly or not--

in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 

‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth 

Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard”).

A seizure triggering Fourth Amendment protection occurs 

when a government actor “by means of physical force or show of 

authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). Clearly, here, there 

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is no question that Plaintiff has adequately alleged that a 

seizure occurred.

To determine the reasonableness of a seizure, a court “must 

balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the 

individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance 

of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” 

United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983), quoted in

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) and Scott v. Harris, 

550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007). Proper application of this objective 

reasonableness standard “requires careful attention to the facts 

and circumstances of each particular case, including the 

severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an 

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and 

whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade 

arrest by flight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 396; quoted in

Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 

1995). Other factors to be considered include “‘the duration of 

the [officer’s] action, whether the action takes place in the 

context of effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect 

may be armed, and the number of persons with whom the police 

officers must contend at one time.’” Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 

483, 497 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). Ultimately, “the 

question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively 

reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting 

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them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.

Officer Zacamy has failed to establish any entitlement to 

qualified immunity on this record. Clearly, the evidence 

presented demonstrates that there remain significant issues in 

dispute regarding both the level of threat Plaintiff presented, 

where Plaintiff has testified that he complied with the first 

order to stop and place his hands on his head, and the level of 

force used to subdue him, which resulted in broken bones in both 

Plaintiff’s face and Officer Zacamy’s hand. When the facts are 

viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, however, a 

reasonable jury could find that Officer Zacamy’s actions were 

unreasonable in light of the circumstances. Cf., e.g., Green v. 

New Jersey State Police, 246 F.App’x 158 (3d Cir. 2007) 

(affirming the denial of summary judgment to officers who 

arrested a driver for speeding and who were alleged, after he 

was placed in the back seat of a police vehicle, to have grabbed 

the arrestee’s throat before asking him to exit the vehicle when 

he became agitated, to have hit the arrestee twice on the head 

with a flashlight, causing lacerations requiring stitches, and 

to have pulled the arrestee from the car, thrown him to the 

ground, and kicked him several times).

In addition, the law regarding the reasonable use of force 

in effecting an arrest was well-established at the time of 

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Plaintiff’s arrest. See Couden, 446 F.3d at 497; Estate of 

Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, at 149-50 (3d Cir. 2005). Thus, 

if an officer applies force in an unreasonable manner under the 

factors set forth in Graham and its progeny, he is not entitled 

to qualified immunity. See Estate of Smith, 430 F.3d at 150.

Accordingly, Officer Zacamy’s motion for summary judgment 

with respect to the excessive force claim will be denied.

B. The Claim Against Haddon Township

Plaintiff argues that Haddon Township had a custom of 

failing to review citizen complaints of excessive use of force, 

which led Officer Zacamy to believe that he could use excessive 

force without any consequences.

Local government units and supervisors are not liable under 

§ 1983 solely on a theory of respondeat superior. See Connick 

v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1358-61 (2011); City of Oklahoma 

City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 n.8 (1985); Monell v. New York 

City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 694 

(1978) (holding that municipal liability attaches only “when 

execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by 

its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be 

said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury” 

complained of); Natale v. Camden County Correctional Facility, 

318 F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003). 

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To establish municipal liability under § 1983, “a plaintiff 

must show that an official who has the power to make policy is 

responsible for either the affirmative proclamation of a policy 

or acquiescence in a well-settled custom.” Bielevicz v. 

Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990), quoted in Blanche Rd. 

Corp. v. Bensalem Twp., 57 F.3d 253, 269 n.16 (3d Cir.), cert. 

denied, 516 U.S. 915 (1995), and quoted in Woodwind Estates, 

Ltd. v. Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118, 126 (3d Cir. 2000). “A policy 

is made ‘when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to 

establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues a 

final proclamation, policy or edict.’” Natale, 318 F.3d at 584 

(citations omitted). “A custom is an act ‘that has not been 

formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker,’ but that is 

‘so widespread as to have the force of law.’” Id. (citations 

omitted). The Third Circuit has observed, “[t]here are three 

situations where acts of a government employee may be deemed to 

be the result of a policy or custom of the governmental entity 

for whom the employee works, thereby rendering the entity liable 

under § 1983:”

The first is where the appropriate officer or entity 

promulgates a generally applicable statement of policy 

and the subsequent act complained of is simply an 

implementation of that policy. The second occurs 

where no rule has been announced as policy but federal 

law has been violated by an act of the policymaker 

itself. Finally, a policy or custom may also exist 

where the policymaker has failed to act affirmatively 

at all, [though] the need to take some action to 

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control the agents of the government is so obvious, 

and the inadequacy of existing practice so likely to 

result in the violation of constitutional rights, that 

the policymaker can reasonably be said to have been 

deliberately indifferent to the need.

Natale, 318 F.3d at 584 (footnote, citations, and quotation 

marks omitted). Thus, a plaintiff must demonstrate that, 

through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the moving 

force behind the plaintiff’s injury. Monell, 436 U.S. at 689.

Here, in support of his claim against Haddon Township, 

Plaintiff relies upon “The Attorney General’s Policy on Use of 

Force,” a pamphlet distributed by Haddon Township to its 

officers, as well as the Township’s response to complaints of 

excessive force. The “Attorney General’s Policy on Use of 

Force,” (Pl. Response, Docket Entry No. 91, Ex. N) appears to 

consist of a series of printouts of bullet points, of the type 

used in a slide presentation, which detail important concepts, 

including that the use of force should never be considered 

routine and that the degree of force employed should be only 

that which is reasonably necessary, as well as the appropriate 

use of force in various situations, e.g., shooting at a moving 

vehicle, and the duty of an officer to take appropriate action 

when another officer is using excessive force. Among the slides 

is one which states that an officer who uses force consistent 

with the law and this policy will be strongly supported by the 

law enforcement community in any review of the officer’s 

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actions. The “Attorney General’s Policy on Use of Force” 

further requires the preparation of a Use of Force Report any 

time physical, mechanical, or deadly force is used. The 

pamphlet or slide presentation is neutral in tone, emphasizes 

officers’ duties and responsibilities under the law, and cannot 

reasonably be construed as suggesting to officers that the use 

of excessive force is condoned in any way.

Officer Zacamy’s own Internal Affairs file reflects that a 

single complaint of excessive force was filed against Officer 

Zacamy prior to Plaintiff’s arrest. That incident involved 

officers responding to a dispute at a laundromat and alleged 

“pushing.” The incident was investigated by a Sgt. Anuw who 

interviewed two other officers present at the time, but did not 

interview the complainant or other persons present at the 

laundromat, and concluded that the contact used in taking the 

complainant into custody was appropriate. One other claim of 

“intimidation” was made against Officer Zacamy after Plaintiff’s 

arrest, in which Officer Zacamy was assisting in a property 

removal and allegedly told a woman that she could be charged 

with theft for keeping her nephew’s laptop computer. The 

complainant later withdrew her complaint, stating that she 

realized that Officer Zacamy was only trying to resolve the 

situation. In that instance, the investigating officer did 

speak to the complainant. (Pl. Response, Ex. L.)

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Plaintiff also relies on Haddon Township’s Internal Affairs 

Summary Report Forms (Pl. Response, Ex. Q, not filed), which 

purport to show that the four reports of excessive force filed 

between 2005 and 2007 were determined to be unfounded. No other 

information regarding those complaints or the Township’s 

investigation of them is provided.

While the single allegation of “pushing” in which Officer 

Zacamy was involved prior to Plaintiff’s arrest may not have 

been investigated as thoroughly as it could have been, the use 

of force there was not alleged to have resulted in any injuries, 

and the other allegations of excessive force against Officer 

Zacamy and Haddon Township are so few and so vague, as they are 

presented here, that, even when viewed in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiff, the outcomes cannot be interpreted as 

representing a custom of condoning the excessive use of force. 

Cf. Jackson v. Hamilton Twp., Civil No. 10-3989, 2014 WL 

1217662, *3-*4 (D.N.J. March 24, 2014) (granting summary 

judgment to police department where allegations regarding 

investigations of officers’ use of force “‘do [] not depict a 

‘sterile and shallow ... investigation’ procedure.’” (citation 

omitted)). Haddon Township’s request for summary judgment as to 

the municipal liability claim will be granted. 

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Officer Zacamy’s 

request for summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment excessiveforce claim will be denied, Haddon Township’s request for 

summary judgment with respect to the municipal liability claim 

will be granted, and all other claims will be dismissed with 

prejudice. An appropriate order follows.

At Camden, New Jersey s/ Noel L. Hillman

Noel L. Hillman

United States District Judge

Dated: September 19, 2014

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