[Cite as State v. Jackson, 2024-Ohio-2721.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 23AP-388

(C.P.C. No. 21CR-3505)

v. :

(REGULAR CALENDAR)

Cortez J. Jackson, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on July 18, 2024

On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and

Sheryl L. Prichard, for appellee. Argued: Sheryl L. 

Prichard.

On brief: Todd W. Barstow, for appellant. Argued:

Todd W. Barstow. 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

LUPER SCHUSTER, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Cortez J. Jackson, appeals from a judgment of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas convicting him of murder and tampering with 

evidence, both with a firearm specification, and having a weapon while under disability. 

For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} By indictment filed August 26, 2021, plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio, charged 

Jackson with one count of purposeful murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), and one 

count of felony murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B); one count of domestic violence, in 

violation of R.C. 2919.25; one count of tampering with evidence, in violation of R.C. 
No. 23AP-388 2

2921.12; and one count of having weapons while under disability, in violation of R.C. 

2923.13. Both of the murder charges and the tampering with evidence charge contained 

accompanying firearm specifications. The charges arose from the August 19, 2021

homicide of Alyse Sharrae Edwards at her apartment in Columbus. Jackson entered a plea 

of not guilty. 

{¶ 3} Jackson elected to waive his right to a jury trial on the having a weapon while

under disability charge, and, prior to trial, the domestic violence charge was dismissed at 

the state’s request. Beginning April 3, 2023, the trial court conducted a jury trial on the 

remaining charges. As pertinent to this appeal, the following evidence was adduced at trial.

{¶ 4} Three individuals who were near Edwards’ apartment when she was shot

testified. Onaee Sharp, a neighbor of Edwards and Jackson, testified that, on the morning 

of August 19, 2021, she heard “either a little screaming or a loud ‘[h]elp’ and a big bump.” 

(Apr. 3, 2023 Tr. Vol. II at 139.) Her boyfriend, Terrence Thomas, told her there was “a 

dead body” at her apartment door. (Tr. Vol. II at 139.) She opened the door to find Edwards 

on the ground and Jackson in the hallway with a shocked look on his face. Sharp could see 

blood on her door from Edwards, and she looked at Jackson and asked him “what the eff 

did he do to her.” (Tr. Vol. II at 131.) Jackson gave no response, and Sharp immediately 

called 911 for help. Although Jackson initially was unresponsive to her, when the police 

arrived “he [became] irate, he started punching on the walls and everything instead of just 

answering the questions.” (Tr. Vol II at 144.) Thomas testified that he first opened the 

apartment door after hearing someone knock. When he opened it, he saw Edwards on the 

ground with blood “all over the door, all over the floor in the hallway.” (Tr. Vol. II at 157.) 

He shut the door and informed Sharp someone was in the hall, and he thought she had been 

shot. Damien O’Bryant, who was staying with a friend at a neighboring apartment, testified 

that, when he reentered the apartment building after smoking outside, he saw a severely 

injured Edwards, who looked at him and said, “[h]elp.” (Tr. Vol. II at 170.) Around the 

same time, he observed Jackson “come back into the building.” (Tr. Vol. II at 180.) 

O’Bryant immediately called the police. 

{¶ 5} Columbus Division of Police Officers Michael Church, Darryl Kerns, and 

Lucas Metz were dispatched to the scene. Officer Church testified that, when they entered 

the apartment building, they observed Edwards’ bloody body. Jackson was nearby 
No. 23AP-388 3

screaming that Edwards had been shot. Because Edwards’ head was leaning against a door,

Officer Kerns repositioned her so she was lying completely flat. They observed a gunshot 

wound to her lower abdomen and a trail of blood through the apartment. Officer Church 

asked Jackson if he knew who had shot Edwards, and he stated he did not know. Initially, 

Jackson seemed distraught about Edwards being shot, and then he became upset at the 

officers, claiming they were not doing their job or helping her. Officer Metz testified that 

he had to physically remove Jackson from the area where Edwards was and detain him

because he was “agitated * * * screaming, [and] not wanting to listen.” (Tr. Vol. II at 215.) 

Officer Metz was concerned Jackson would interfere with the officers helping Edwards. 

{¶ 6} Donald Jones, a detective in the Crime Scene Search Unit of the Columbus 

Division of Police, testified that while investigating and processing the scene they found a 

spent shell casing, also called a cartridge case, in the kitchen sink and a firearm in the water 

tank behind the toilet in the bathroom. Once the top of that tank was removed, the firearm 

was visible in the water. Keith O’Connor, another detective for the Columbus Division of 

Police, interviewed Jackson at police headquarters. Detective O’Connor testified that 

Jackson was asked whether the shooting was an accident, and he did not disclose anything 

about what happened, other than denying that he shot Edwards. 

{¶ 7} Forensic experts examined the recovered firearm, cartridge case, and the 

gunshot residue samples taken from Jackson’s hands. Caleb Worley, a forensic scientist for 

the Columbus Division of Police Crime Laboratory, testified that the cartridge case was fired 

from the firearm found at the scene. Worley further testified that, while he did not test the 

degree of force necessary to pull the trigger of this firearm, he fired this particular weapon 

and did not observe any remarkable deviation from the average force needed to pull a 

trigger. Relatedly, he noted it is “extremely difficult” for a modern firearm to fire unless the 

trigger is pulled. (Tr. Vol. III at 295.) Ted Manasian, a gunshot residue expert for the Ohio 

Bureau of Criminal Investigation, testified that the gunshot residue test kit applied to 

Jackson’s hands soon after the shooting did not reveal the presence of any gunshot residue. 

Manasian noted that gunshot residue generally does not adhere well to surfaces and easily 

can be washed off hands. 

{¶ 8} Jackson testified in his own defense as follows. He and Edwards lived 

together and had three children during their relationship. Prior to the shooting, two of the 
No. 23AP-388 4

children were in the custody of Franklin County Children Services. Edwards blamed 

Jackson and his family for those children being removed from their home. At 

approximately 5:00 a.m., August 19, 2021, and after Edwards was out partying, she

returned to their apartment, smelling like alcohol and marijuana. Edwards became angry 

at Jackson when he told her he was going to take their daughter and leave. She retrieved a 

firearm from a closet. Edwards confronted Jackson with the weapon, and they physically 

struggled. He grabbed her wrist trying to take the weapon from her, the weapon discharged 

while in her hand, and then she dropped it. Jackson picked up the firearm, took it into the 

bathroom, and dropped it into the back of the toilet. He then called the police and tried to 

apply pressure to the wound to Edwards’ abdomen. Jackson denied shooting Edwards, 

washing his hands after the shooting, or otherwise placing his hands in water. 

{¶ 9} The parties stipulated that Jackson had a prior felony conviction, namely 

aggravated assault in 2017. The parties also stipulated that the cause of Edwards’ death 

was a gunshot wound to her torso, and that DNA of both Edwards and Jackson was found 

on the firearm found at the scene. 

{¶ 10} Following deliberations, the jury found Jackson not guilty on one of the 

murder counts (purposeful murder), but guilty on the other murder count (felony murder) 

and the tampering with evidence count. The jury also reached factual findings establishing 

the firearm specifications. The trial court then found Jackson guilty of having a weapon 

while under disability. For these offenses, the trial court imposed an aggregate prison 

sentence of 18-years to life. 

{¶ 11} Jackson timely appeals. 

II. Assignment of Error

{¶ 12} Jackson assigns the following sole assignment of error for our review:

The trial court erred and deprived appellant of due process of 

law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution and Article One Section Ten of the 

Ohio Constitution by finding him guilty of murder and 

tampering with evidence, as those verdicts were not 

supported by sufficient evidence and were also against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. 
No. 23AP-388 5

III. Discussion

{¶ 13} In his sole assignment of error, Jackson alleges there was insufficient 

evidence to support his murder and tampering with evidence convictions, and that these 

convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. This assignment of error 

lacks merit.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

{¶ 14} Whether there is legally sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict is a question 

of law. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). Sufficiency is a test of adequacy. 

Id. The relevant inquiry for an appellate court is whether the evidence presented, when 

viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, would allow any rational trier of fact to 

find the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 

Mahone, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-545, 2014-Ohio-1251, ¶ 38, citing State v. Tenace, 109 Ohio 

St.3d 255, 2006-Ohio-2417, ¶ 37.

{¶ 15} Here, the jury found Jackson guilty of one count of murder and one count of 

tampering with evidence, and the trial court found Jackson guilty of one count of having a 

weapon while under disability.

1

 R.C. 2903.02(B) states that “[n]o person shall cause the 

death of another as a proximate result of the offender’s committing or attempting to 

commit an offense of violence.” This offense is known as “felony murder,” and felonious 

assault is an example of an offense of violence. Under R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), “[n]o person shall 

knowingly * * * [c]ause serious physical harm to another.” As to the offense of tampering 

with evidence, R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) states “[n]o person, knowing that an official proceeding 

or investigation is in progress, or is about to be or likely to be instituted, shall * * * [a]lter, 

destroy, conceal, or remove any * * * thing, with purpose to impair its value or availability 

as evidence in such proceeding or investigation.” 

{¶ 16} Jackson does not directly challenge the evidentiary establishment of any 

specific element of these offenses; instead, he argues Edwards’ death was the result of their 

physical struggle for control of the firearm after Edwards angrily confronted Jackson for 

suggesting their third child, like the other two, would be removed from her care. Jackson 

acknowledges his DNA was found on the firearm, but he explains this was because he 

1 Jackson’s assignment of error does not challenge his weapon while under disability conviction. 
No. 23AP-388 6

picked up the firearm and placed it in the toilet after Edwards was shot. Relatedly, he

asserts the absence of gunshot residue on his hands indicates he was not near the firearm 

when it discharged, and therefore he did not pull the trigger. When viewed in favor of the 

prosecution, however, the evidence demonstrated all the elements of murder and 

tampering with evidence.

{¶ 17} The evidence showed that Edwards was fatally shot one time in the abdomen. 

Jackson testified that, although he was physically struggling with Edwards when she was 

shot, he did not pull the trigger of the firearm in Edwards’ possession. He suggests the 

firearm may have been jostled enough to cause it to discharge the projectile, without anyone 

pulling the trigger, or Edwards herself pulled the trigger. But testimony indicated that it 

would be very unlikely for the weapon to fire unless the trigger was pulled. Immediately 

after being shot, Edwards begged for aid from others in the area, knocking on the neighbor’s 

door and saying “help” to someone entering the apartment building. This reasonably 

indicated she was trying to get away from Jackson after being shot. Although no gunshot 

residue was found on Jackson’s hands, this fact did not necessarily establish that he did not 

fire the weapon, as the evidence also demonstrated that his DNA was found on the weapon, 

gunshot residue is easily washed off, and, immediately after the shooting, Jackson placed 

the fired weapon inside the covered water tank behind the apartment’s toilet. Thus, the 

jury reasonably found that Jackson knowingly pulled the trigger and shot Edwards, killing 

her. Further, Jackson’s placement of the firearm in the water tank reasonably 

demonstrated his intent to hide the weapon used to shoot Edwards, clearly a piece of 

physical evidence that would be pertinent to an investigation of her death. In sum, the 

evidence reasonably established all the elements of felony murder and tampering with 

evidence.

{¶ 18} Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support Jackson’s convictions.

B. Manifest Weight of the Evidence

{¶ 19} “When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that 

the verdict is against the [manifest] weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a 

‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting

testimony.” Thompkins at 387, quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). 
No. 23AP-388 7

Determinations of credibility and weight of the testimony are primarily for the trier of fact. 

State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. Thus, the jury 

may take note of the inconsistencies and resolve them accordingly, “believ[ing] all, part, or 

none of a witness’s testimony.” State v. Raver, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-604, 2003-Ohio-958, 

¶ 21, citing State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67 (1964).

{¶ 20} An appellate court considering a manifest-weight challenge “may not merely 

substitute its view for that of the trier of fact, but must review the entire record, weigh the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine 

whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and 

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a 

new trial ordered.” State v. Harris, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-770, 2014-Ohio-2501, ¶ 22, citing 

Thompkins at 387. Appellate courts should reverse a conviction as being against the 

manifest weight of the evidence only in the most “ ‘exceptional case in which the evidence 

weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 

Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983).

{¶ 21} As discussed above, Jackson posits that the firearm somehow discharged 

without him pulling the trigger, after he and Edwards engaged in an altercation arising from 

her aggressive reaction to possibly losing custody of another child. He testified that when 

he confronted Edwards about another night of her carousing, she became enraged and 

retrieved the firearm, which somehow went off when he struggled with her to get control of 

it. He argues the absence of gunshot residue on his hands heavily weighed against a finding 

that he pulled the firearm’s trigger. But the absence of gunshot residue on his hands does 

not necessarily negate the inference that he pulled the trigger, as that type of residue is 

easily removed with water. Further, Jackson’s DNA was on the weapon, and he admitted 

to immediately placing the firearm in the water tank behind the toilet. Thus, while there 

was some conflicting evidence at trial, the jury was in the best position to evaluate the 

evidence and resolve any disputed facts, including the central disputed fact of whether 

Jackson pulled the firearm’s trigger, killing Edwards.

{¶ 22} For these reasons, we find Jackson’s convictions were not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶ 23} Accordingly, we overrule Jackson’s sole assignment of error.
No. 23AP-388 8

IV. Disposition

{¶ 24} Having overruled Jackson’s sole assignment of error, we affirm the judgment 

of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

Judgment affirmed.

BOGGS and EDELSTEIN, JJ., concur.