Court of Appeals No. 04-14-00126-CR 

Trial Court Cause No. 5226 

IN THE FOURTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COURT OF APPEALS 

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 

_______________________ 

JOEL PRICE MORRIS 

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

_______________________ 

APPEALED FROM THE 216TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 

KENDALL COUNTY, TEXAS 

Honorable N. Keith Williams, Presiding 

_____________________________________________________________ 

APPELLANT’S BRIEF 

_____________________________________________________________ 

 

M. Patrick Maguire 

 State Bar No. 24002515 

 M. Patrick Maguire, P.C. 

mpmlaw@ktc.com 

 945 Barnett Street 

 Kerrville, Texas 78028 

 Telephone (830) 895-2590 

 Facsimile (830) 895-2594 

 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT, 

 JOEL PRICE MORRIS 

ACCEPTED

04-14-00126-CR

FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

1/30/2015 12:13:05 PM

KEITH HOTTLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 4th COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 1/30/2015 12:13:05 PM KEITH E. HOTTLE Clerk
1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COUNSEL 2

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 6

ISSUES PRESENTED 7

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 8

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TRAP 9.4 9

STATEMENT OF FACTS 10

ARGUMENTS & AUTHORITIES 11

ISSUE 1: The jury’s implicit finding that Appellant was not insane at the 

time of the offense is so against the great weight and preponderance of the 

evidence as to be manifestly unjust. 11

PRAYER FOR RELIEF 31

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 32
2

Court of Appeals No. 04-14-00126-CR 

Trial Court Cause No. 5226

IN THE FOURTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COURT OF APPEALS

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

_______________________

JOEL PRICE MORRIS

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

_____________________________________________________________

IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COUNSEL

_____________________________________________________________

Appellant certifies that the following is a complete list of the parties, 

attorneys, and any other person who has any interest in the outcome of 

this appeal:

Appellant: Joel Price Morris

Appellee: The State of Texas 

Attorney for Appellant: M. Patrick Maguire

M. Patrick Maguire, P.C.

945 Barnett Street

Kerrville, Texas 78028

Attorney for Appellee: Hon. E. Bruce Curry

216th Judicial District Attorney

200 Earl Garrett, Suite 202

Kerrville, Texas 78028
3

Trial Judge: Hon. N. Keith Williams

216th Judicial District Judge

700 Main Street

Kerrville, Texas 78028
4

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Aschbacher v. State, 

61 S.W.3d 532 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. ref’d) 11

Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) 27

Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) 12, 30

Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) 11, 26

Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) 12, 30

Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) 12

Morgan v. State, 869 S.W.2d 388

(Tex. App.—Tyler 1993, pet. ref’d) 30

Plough v. State, 

725 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.) 11

Ruffin v. State, 270 S.W.3d 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) 23

United States v. Lyons, 739 F.2d 994 (5

th Cir. (Tex.) 1984) 27

Van Guilder v. State, 709 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) 12, 26

28-30
5

STATUTES AND RULES

Tex. Penal Code §2.04(d) 11

Tex. Penal Code §8.01(a) 11
6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant, Joel Price Morris, is appealing his conviction for the 

offense of murder. Appellant pled not guilty by reason of insanity on 

January 8, 2014. RR 6, 11. The jury found Appellant guilty and sentenced 

him to life imprisonment. RR 8, 196. Appellant filed his notice of appeal 

with the trial court on February 8, 2014. This brief is timely filed by being 

electronically filed with the Fourth Court of Appeals on January 30, 2015. 
7

APPELLANT'S ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. The jury’s implicit finding that Appellant was not insane at the 

time of the offense is so against the great weight and 

preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust.

** For purposes of reference in the Appellant’s Brief the following will 

be the style used in referring to the record:

1. Reference to any portion of the Court Reporter’s Statement 

of Facts will be denoted as “(RR____, ____),” representing 

volume and page number, respectively.

2. The Transcript containing the District Clerk’s recorded 

documents will be denoted as “(CR___, ___).”
8

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

I. The evidence at trial clearly showed Appellant suffered from a 

severe mental illness. The evidence at trial also showed that Appellant 

believed that killing his father was the right and just thing to do as a result of 

Appellant’s delusions that Appellant’s father was evil, that Appellant was

essentially the savior of the world, and by ridding the world of his father, 

Appellant would receive great rewards. The jury’s rejection of Appellant’s 

insanity defense is so against the great weight and preponderance of the 

evidence as to be manifestly unjust.
9

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Rule 9.4(i)(3) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, 

I certify that this brief contains 5,718 words (counting all parts of the 

document and relying upon the word count feature in the software used to 

draft this brief). The body text is in 14 point font and the footnote text is in 

12 point font.

/s/ M. Patrick Maguire

M. Patrick Maguire,

Attorney for Appellant
10

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On April 3, 2011, Appellant arranged to eat lunch with his parents at 

their home in Boerne, Texas. RR 6, 39. Appellant was going to get some 

barbecue to bring over for lunch. RR 6, 40.

Appellant arrived at his parent’s home in the early afternoon on April 

3, 2011. He walked into the house with a semi-automatic pistol and sought 

out his father who was hanging curtains in a back bedroom. Appellant

walked past his mother, who was standing near the kitchen, and cornered his 

father in the bedroom. RR 6, 41-42. Appellant then shot his father in the 

torso 8 times. RR 6, 43. Appellant left the house, went back out to his car, 

loaded an additional three rounds of ammunition in the pistol’s magazine, 

went back in the house and shot his father in the head three more times. RR 

6, 45. Appellant then left the house, got in his car and drove off. Appellant 

was stopped by law enforcement officers and arrested. RR 6, 75-76.

Appellant suffered from severe schizophrenia which led to delusions 

that his father was molesting him, that his father was evil, essentially Satan, 

and that Appellant was commanded by God to kill his father. RR 8, 20. 

Appellant pled not guilty by reason of insanity. RR 6, 11. The jury rejected 

Appellant’s insanity defense, convicted him of murder, and sentenced him to 

life imprisonment. RR 8, 196.
11

ARGUMENTS & AUTHORITIES

I.

The jury’s implicit finding that Appellant was not insane at the time of the 

offense is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence 

as to be manifestly unjust.

A. Standard of Review

It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the 

conduct charged, the actor, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did 

not know that his conduct was wrong. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 8.01(a). The 

burden is on the accused to prove the defense by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Id. § 2.04(d). Although expert medical testimony may aid the 

jury in its ultimate determination, it is not conclusive on the issue. Plough v. 

State, 725 S.W.2d 494, 499 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.). 

Whether insanity exonerates one from a criminal act involves medical, 

legal, and ethical considerations. Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941, 948 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1978). To incorporate the legal and ethical elements, a 

jury should consider all of the evidence surrounding the offense. See id. at 

951. The trier of fact may consider such evidence as the Appellant’s 

demeanor before and after the offense, attempts to evade police, attempts to 

conceal incriminating evidence, expressions of regret or fear of the 

consequences of his actions, other possible motives for the offense, and 

other explanations for his behavior. Aschbacher v. State, 61 S.W.3d 532, 
12

535 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. ref’d). Only the jury can join the 

non-medical components that must also be considered in deciding the 

ultimate issue. Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 949.

While jurors may reject the opinion of experts if it does not comport 

with their ideas of sound logic, and they are not required to give conclusive 

effect to the opinion of experts, jurors may not arbitrarily disregard such 

testimony. Van Guilder v. State, 674 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio, 1984), affirmed, 709 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). 

(emphasis added). 

The Court of Criminal Appeals has determined that the courts of 

appeals are constitutionally empowered to determine whether factually 

sufficient evidence supports the elements of a defendant’s affirmative 

defense. Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clewis 

v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129-30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). In fact, the Court 

of Criminal Appeals has expressly held that the courts of appeals have 

conclusive jurisdiction over “questions of fact” concerning the proof of an 

issue on which the defendant has the burden of proof and the burden of 

persuasion. Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 153-54 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1990). The Meraz Court recognized that it had no power to disturb a 

“question of fact” determined by a court of appeals in holding that “we now 
13

join our brethren on the Texas Supreme Court and conclude that the “factual 

conclusivity clause,” within Art. V, § 6 [of the Texas Constitution], operates 

to limit our jurisdiction and confers conclusive jurisdiction on the courts of 

appeals to resolve questions of weight and preponderance of the evidence 

adequate to prove a matter that the defendant must prove. Moreover, when 

the courts of appeals are called upon to exercise their fact jurisdiction, that 

is, examine whether the appellant proved his affirmative defense or other 

fact issue where the law has designated that the defendant has the burden of 

proof by a preponderance of evidence, the correct standard of review is 

whether after considering all the evidence relevant to the issue at hand, the 

judgment is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence 

so as to be manifestly unjust.” Id. In essence, the courts of appeals are the 

“final stop” regarding whether a jury’s verdict regarding the issue of insanity 

is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be 

manifestly unjust.

B. Analysis

Evidence of Insanity

The evidence of insanity that was presented at Appellant’s trial was 

extensive. The common thread of Appellant’s mental illness, and insanity at 

the time the offense was committed, ran through all the testimony of those 
14

familiar with Appellant. Given the fact-intensive nature of the analysis that 

this Court must undertake, it is important to highlight various portions of the 

evidence that establish Appellant’s longstanding history of mental illness, 

culminating in the acts that occurred on the day of the murder. Because both 

the State’s expert and the Appellant’s expert agreed at trial that Appellant 

was suffering from a severe mental illness, and the issue was whether 

Appellant was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, 

Appellant has set out excerpts of fact-witness testimony, much of which 

comes from the State’s case-in-chief, that supports Appellant’s affirmative 

defense of insanity, including his lengthy history of mental illness, and 

frequent bizarre behavior. The following excerpts are set out both for the 

Court’s convenience and to demonstrate the overwhelming evidence of 

insanity in this case.

Claudia Morris

Claudia Morris, Appellant’s mother, was the State’s first witness. Ms. 

Morris testified that Appellant had chronic mental illness consisting of 

schizophrenia which got so severe that in 2008, Appellant was no longer 

able to work. RR 6, 38. Appellant’s paranoia in 2008 centered around the 

government and people spying on him. RR 6, 48. Appellant actually 

attacked his father at work one day and other co-workers of Appellant were 
15

very troubled by Appellant’s bizarre behavior. RR 6, 48. Appellant was 

committed to a mental hospital for several months as a result of his illness. 

RR 6, 48-49. Appellant had multiple hospitalizations thereafter. RR 6, 50. 

Ms. Morris confirmed that Appellant actually tried to poke his own eye out 

because he believed a device had been implanted to monitor him. RR 6, 50. 

Appellant was treated twice at San Antonio State Hospital for schizophrenia. 

RR 6, 51. Appellant’s schizophrenia, and the delusions brought on by the 

disease, deteriorated to the point that Ms. Morris and her husband had to 

obtain a protective order seeking protection from Appellant. RR 6, 38; RR 

6, 52. 

Roger Baker

Roger Baker, a Kendall County deputy, was called by the State. 

Deputy Baker related a story where Appellant came in to talk to him and 

said that he had a microchip in his head. RR 6, 194. Appellant complained 

that his father “medically induced” him in to trauma and sexually abused 

Appellant. RR 6, 194. 

Wade Canavan

Wade Canavan was called by the defense. Wade is Appellant’s 

cousin. RR 7, 72. Wade testified about an incident that occurred about three 

to six months prior to the killing where Appellant came to Wade’s house 
16

rambling about filing a report that Appellant was being molested by his 

father. RR 7, 75-79. Wade became frightened when Appellant said he was 

going to kill his father. RR 7, 76. Wade became so alarmed that he had his 

daughter leave the house while Wade tried to calm Appellant down. RR 7, 

77-78. Ultimately, after cooking dinner for Appellant, taking Appellant to 

the police department to air his complaints, letting Appellant stay in Wade’s 

home for the night and generally trying to get Appellant to calm down, 

Wade told Appellant to leave and not to return. RR 7, 80-85. His testimony 

further buttresses the defense claim that Appellant was suffering from 

delusions as a result of his mental illness, and further adds credence to 

Appellant’s affirmative defense of insanity. 

Jeffery Clark

Mr. Clark was a detention officer at the Kendall County Detention 

Center. (RR 7, 97). Mr. Clark testified to the difference in Appellant’s 

demeanor when he was taking his medication as opposed to when Appellant 

was not compliant with his medication. When off medications, Appellant 

would act bizarre, including making strange comments and having loud 

outbursts. RR 7, 105. Appellant would say that he was Jesus, the son of 

God. RR 7, 105. Mr. Clark testified that the longer Appellant was off his 

medication, the more bizarre his behavior became. RR 7, 105-07. His 
17

testimony generally corroborates that of others who have experience in 

dealing with Appellant.

Christopher Ortiz

Christopher Ortiz was also a detention officer at the Kendall County 

detention center. Similar to Mr. Clark’s testimony, Mr. Ortiz related 

Appellant’s behavior shortly after being brought to jail after the killing and 

also talked about Appellant’s general behavior while incarcerated. After 

being brought to the jail after the killing, Mr. Ortiz testified that Appellant 

stated that “he was relieved because he killed the only mother fucker he 

needed to kill.” RR 7, 112. This would not appear to be the statement of 

someone who felt it was wrong to kill someone. Mr. Ortiz further testified 

that Appellant began refusing his medication while in custody. RR 7, 115. 

Mr. Ortiz testified that Appellant reported that his cell was electrified, that 

he was being gassed and he couldn’t sleep. RR 7, 116. Appellant would 

also frequently shout, yell and curse at staff when off his medication. RR 7, 

116. Mr. Ortiz stated that Appellant left for a period of time to apparently 

get stabilized and that upon Appellant’s return, Appellant acted normal and 

even apologized to Mr. Ortiz for his previous behavior. RR 7, 117. Again, 

this is consistent with testimony from others familiar with Appellant who 
18

testified that Appellant was like two different people depending upon 

whether he was taking his medication. 

Phillip Lopez

Phillip Lopez was also a detention officer at the Kendall County 

detention center. RR 7, 121. Mr. Lopez related an incident where Appellant 

tried to poke his eye out while in jail. RR 7, 122. On another occasion, Mr. 

Lopez witnessed Appellant slamming his head into a metal shelf in the jail. 

RR 7, 123. Appellant believed that his father had planted a camera in his 

eye so he was attempting to poke his eye out to remove the camera. RR 7, 

124. Appellant also believed that some of the jail staff were trying to poison 

him. RR 7, 127. 

Emelio Perada

Emelio Perada is a corporal with the Kendall County Sheriff’s Office. 

RR 7, 132. Mr. Perada also related his knowledge of Appellant trying to 

gouge out his eye and hitting his head against the metal shelf. RR 7, 134-35. 

Mr. Perada also testified that Appellant told him that “you don’t need to 

worry about me Perada. I killed the son of a bitch that I had to.” RR 7, 136. 

Consistent with what others relayed about Appellant’s condition when 

Appellant was not taking his medication, Mr. Perada testified that when 
19

Appellant was not taking his medications, he would start “acting up” and 

believing that guards were trying to kill him. RR 7, 137. 

Brian Skop

One of the most important witnesses that testified concerning the issue 

of sanity was Dr. Brian Skop, a forensic psychiatrist who was called by the 

defense. RR 8, 8-9. Dr. Skop testified that the first time he met with 

Appellant, on March 11, 2012, it was pretty clear that Appellant was “quite 

psychotic.” RR 8, 14. Dr. Skop testified that Appellant suffered from 

delusions that his father was actually his stepfather, who was an evil god, 

that was implanting devices into people and blackmailing people to control 

them as part of a secret society for the Masons. RR 8, 15. Dr. Skop testified 

Appellant suffers from schizophrenia which is a “very severe mental illness 

where people suffer from hallucinations, i.e., they hear things that aren’t 

there, and delusions, which are beliefs that they have that are so real to them 

that they consider it their reality.” RR 8, 16 (emphasis added). Dr. Skop 

testified that Appellant “believed that he was going to take over as God, that 

he was Jesus Christ and that he would rule the world. . .” RR 8, 16. Dr. 

Skop believed that Appellant suffers from a “severe mental disease or 

defect.” RR 8, 19. 
20

Appellant, on the day that he murdered his father, believed he was 

getting coded material from his “true father,” who Appellant thought was the 

true God. RR 8, 20. The code that he would interpret on the day of the 

incident when he was asked to get some barbecue at Rudy’s, and Appellant 

interpreted that R stood for “Robert” (his father), the U stood for “you,” and 

then DY stood for “die.” RR 8, 20. He believed this was a code received 

from his “true father” that meant “Robert, you die.” RR 8, 20. 

Appellant also saw codes in other areas on the day in question. For 

instance, Dr. Skop testified that Appellant bought four magazines for the gun 

that he purchased because he saw it as symbolic of the fact that his father 

was born in 1944. RR 8, 21. 

When asked to rate the seriousness of Appellant’s schizophrenia on a 

scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being the worst, Dr. Skop rated Appellant at a 10. 

RR 8, 22.

Dr. Skop watched the interview with Appellant after he was arrested 

for the murder. RR 8, 23. Dr. Skop testified that his impressions of 

Appellant were consistent with what he had come to know about Appellant. 

Specifically, Appellant talked about being Jesus and that killing his father 

was right, that it was going to end the reign of terror, and that he was going 

to move into a mansion after the killing. RR 8, 24. Dr. Skop also addressed 
21

the fact that Appellant was talking about things being implanted in his body, 

which is a fairly common delusion that schizophrenics have. RR 8, 24. 

Dr. Skop reviewed the medical records from Appellant’s multiple 

psychiatric hospitalizations. RR 8, 25. Appellant had been treated for 

mental illness at North Texas State Hospital, Timberlawn Hospital, San 

Antonio State Hospital, Austin State Hospital, Metrocare, IntraCare Medical 

Center, Terrell State Hospital, Memorial Hermann Hospital, and Hill 

Country Mental Health and Mental Retardation. RR 8, 25-26. Appellant 

had been to some of these facilities on multiple occasions. These records 

reinforced Dr. Skop’s opinion regarding Appellant’s mental condition and 

his severe mental illness. RR 8, 26. Appellant wanting to kill his father is 

the reason why he was hospitalized on almost every occasion. RR 8, 27.

Dr. Skop’s opinion was that as a result of Appellant’s severe mental 

illness, Appellant did not know that what he was doing was wrong. RR 8, 

29; RR 8, 34. Appellant believed that he was Jesus Christ and that his father 

was Satan. RR 8, 29. Appellant believed that his father had been raping and 

torturing Appellant his whole life and that he needed to be killed. RR 8, 29. 

Appellant believed that by killing his father, he would bring peace on earth, 

and dislodge the evil that he believed his father was perpetrating by having 

people murdered and by implanting devices in them. RR 8, 29. Appellant 
22

thought he was doing the correct thing at that time by killing his father. RR 

8, 29-30. 

Dr. Skop drew a good distinction in pointing out that simply because 

Appellant may have known it was illegal to kill his father does not mean that 

in his mind, as a result of his severe mental illness, that he believed it was 

wrong. RR 8, 40. Even though Appellant may have known that he would 

be arrested for killing his father, he believed it was the morally right thing to 

do. RR 8, 41. 

Robert Cantu

Dr. Robert Cantu is a forensic psychiatrist who testified on behalf of 

the State. RR 8, 62. Dr. Cantu met with Appellant in December 2013. RR 

8, 68. Dr. Cantu agreed with Dr. Skop that Appellant suffered from severe 

mental illness. RR 8, 73. Dr. Cantu’s opinion that Appellant was legally 

sane at the time of the killing stemmed from evidence that he believed 

showed that Appellant knew the consequences of his conduct (i.e., that he 

would be arrested). RR 8, 90-97. 

Evidence that Appellant did not know conduct wrong

Essentially, Dr. Cantu’s testimony that Appellant appreciated that his 

conduct was “wrong” was based upon the fact that Appellant knew his 

conduct was “legally” wrong, as opposed to morally wrong. See, e.g., Ruffin 
23

v. State, 270 S.W.3d 586, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (holding that under 

Texas law, whether a defendant is insane turns on whether he knew his 

conduct was illegal). However, Dr. Cantu’s testimony is blunted by several 

facts. 

Appellant did not attempt to flee from police. He pulled over and 

peacefully surrendered. RR 8, 96. He threw the gun out of the car in plain 

view of police officers to avoid being shot. RR 8, 96. After the killing, 

Appellant said in the interview that he “was at peace with the world,” that 

“he died for everyone’s sins,” and that he would “become king of the 

world.” RR 8, 100. Appellant also stated that killing his father was right 

because it ended his “reign of terror.” RR 8, 101. These are not the 

statements of someone who believed that his conduct was legally wrong. 

These are the statements of a person who believed he was both legally and 

morally justified in killing his father. In fact, Appellant told Dr. Cantu that 

he “never thought he would be wrong.” RR 8, 106. In fact, Appellant 

apparently did not want to get shot because then he couldn’t be pardoned by 

the President. RR 8, 118. 

The Defense proved Appellant’s Insanity

Both experts agreed that Appellant suffered from a severe mental 

illness. The difference in the opinions of Dr. Skop and Dr. Cantu broke 
24

down on whether Appellant understood that his conduct was wrong. Dr. 

Skop believed that Appellant did not know his conduct was wrong, and 

when asked whether Appellant “may” have known his conduct was illegal, 

he said yes. Dr. Skop did not state that he believed that Appellant knew his 

conduct was legally wrong. 

Dr. Cantu, on the other hand, opined that Appellant’s actions basically 

“inferred” that he knew his conduct was legally wrong. However, this 

opinion piles inference upon inference. Appellant’s conduct was clearly 

“mission-oriented” in that he believed he was righteously justified and 

anointed to kill his father for a multitude of reasons, all of which were 

legally justified in his mind to protect not only himself, but the world, from 

the things that Appellant’s delusions led him to believe his father was guilty 

of. For instance, Dr. Cantu suggested that Appellant’s concealing the gun 

from his mother when he went into his father’s house was indicative of the 

fact that he knew what he was about to do was legally wrong. RR 8, 82-83. 

However, this ignores the context of why Appellant was doing what he did. 

Appellant believed this had to be done and it is clear he took precautions to 

ensure that nothing would interfere with the success of his “mission.” In 

other words, the inference is that Appellant took this action so that his 

mother would not try and stop or interfere with his plans to kill his father. 
25

Dr. Cantu makes the same inference by stating that Appellant would not 

have thrown the gun out of the car window, or would have worried about 

getting shot, if he had done nothing wrong. RR 8, 83. Again, this ignores 

the context. Part of Appellant’s “mission” was to reap the rewards that his 

delusions led him to believe he would receive as a result of his actions. 

Obviously, having a gun in one’s hand while in the presence of a police 

officer is a recipe for being shot. What Dr. Cantu ignores in his analysis is 

that if Appellant truly believed his conduct was legally wrong, why would 

he discard a murder weapon in the plain view of police officers? This 

actually flies in the face of Dr. Cantu’s analysis.

Dr. Cantu also deduced that Appellant’s response to Dr. Cantu’s 

question of why Appellant went back in the house to shoot his father a 

second time, and Appellant answered “I wanted to make sure I killed him, or 

I would go to jail” was an admission that Appellant knew that killing his 

father was legally wrong. RR 8, 83. However, Appellant’s statement was 

inferring that unless Appellant did not kill his father, he would go to jail. 

Therefore, this statement is an indication that Appellant did not believe his 

actions were legally wrong. Clearly, this is the rationale of an insane 

individual. Finally, Dr. Cantu pointed out that Appellant drove the speed 

limit on the way to his father’s house and when asked why he did this 
26

Appellant responded “[s]o that I wouldn’t get in trouble.” RR 8, 84. This 

statement does not support the contention that Appellant knew that killing 

his father was legally wrong. It supports the contention that Appellant was 

focused on not doing anything to interfere with his plans (i.e., not getting 

stopped by the police on the way to completing his “mission”). 

The issue of legal insanity is not a strictly medical opinion, rather, it 

involves legal and ethical considerations that only a jury can decide. 

Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941, 948 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). As a result, 

the issue of insanity may be determined by the total body of evidence 

presented, not just by the expert opinions. Therefore, in a case such as this, 

it is important to scrutinize the other evidence available upon which the jury 

could have rested their decision. This is the rationale for setting forth in 

Appellant’s brief, the evidence of Appellant’s history of mental illness.

A review of this evidence leads one to conclude that the jury 

arbitrarily rejected the overwhelming evidence in this case that Appellant 

was insane at the time of the offense. The law is clear that while a jury may 

accept or reject expert testimony, a jury is not free to arbitrarily reject expert 

testimony of insanity. Van Guilder v. State, 674 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio, 1984), affirmed, 709 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1985). 
27

Even after the offense, Appellant continued to relate his bizarre and 

irrational beliefs supporting why he killed his father. One of the most 

important aspects of Appellant’s videotaped confession is that he believed 

that he was justified in killing his father because of the things that he 

believed his father had done to him and was going to do to him, as well as 

the threat Appellant’s father posed to the world as a whole.

The issue of insanity is concerned with the subjective state of mind of 

the accused at the time the offense was committed, i.e., whether the accused 

appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct. United States v. Lyons, 739 

F.2d 994, 998 (5th Cir. (Tex.) 1984) (holding that the relevant inquiry when 

determining insanity is the actual subjective state of mind of the defendant). 

Furthermore, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the question 

of insanity should focus on whether a defendant understood the nature and 

quality of his action and whether it was an act he ought to do. Bigby v. 

State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). 

Appellant did not believe that what he did was wrong because he 

believed he was justified in taking action in order to vindicate himself for all 

of the evil things that his mental illness led him to believe his father had 

done to him, what his father was still doing to him and what his father was 

going to do in the future, particularly in light of the fact that he had 
28

repeatedly been turned away by the police when Appellant complained to 

them. 

To conclude that Appellant was not insane, the jury must basically 

disregard the extensive evidence of Appellant’s chronic mental illness and 

his history of bizarre acts, and it totally ignores the core fact that Appellant 

had a deep-seated belief, flowing from his mental illness, that his father was 

evil and needed to be eliminated. The belief system that Appellant held 

toward his father formed the basis that his conduct was morally and legally 

justified, or not wrong. 

Van Guilder v. State

The evidence offered at trial of Appellant’s insanity at the time of the 

offense was significant. Van Guilder v. State, 674 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio, 1984), affirmed, 709 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1985). Appellant submits that the Van Guilder opinion is persuasive 

authority applicable to Appellant’s case.

In Van Guilder, the defendant was indicted for five offenses growing 

out of one continuous transaction. Id. at 916. One indictment was for the 

offense of murder, and the other four indictments were for attempted 

murder. Id. The jury convicted Van Guilder of the first offense and found 

her not guilty by reason of insanity on the other four indictments. Id. Van 
29

Guilder argued that the jury verdict was contrary to the great weight and 

preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly wrong and unjust and that 

the verdict was contrary to the evidence as a matter of law because she had 

established the affirmative defense of insanity. Id. at 917.

Van Guilder’s evidence consisted of testimony by friends, family and 

medical experts. Her medical history established that she was raised in an 

abusive family where substance abuse, physical abuse and sexual 

molestation were routine. Id. In addition to Van Guilder’s lengthy history 

of mental illness, as related by the witnesses, four medical doctors testified 

that Van Guilder was insane at the time of the offenses. Id. at 917-18. The 

State offered no rebuttal testimony on the issue of insanity. Id. at 918.

In the Van Guilder case, this Court analyzed the evidence presented 

and held that Van Guilder established insanity as a matter of law, reversed 

the trial court’s judgment and rendered a judgment that Van Guilder was not 

guilty by reason of insanity. Id. at 920. This Court also stated in the Van 

Guilder opinion, in dicta, that “[c]onsidering all of the evidence, we further 

believe that the finding by the jury of the vital fact of sanity is so contrary to 

the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong. 

Were we to reach the great weight and preponderance of the evidence point, 
30

we would likewise sustain it, which would result in a remand for a new 

trial.” Id.

Morgan v. State

Appellant submits that his case is also analogous to Morgan v. State, 

869 S.W.2d 388, 388-89 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1993, pet. ref’d), where three 

medical experts examined the defendant within weeks of a shooting and all 

determined that he was afflicted with a severe mental disease which 

rendered him incapable of knowing his conduct was wrong. The 

defendant’s relatives testified that he was “mentally sick,” “withdrawn,” and 

“way out” at the time of the shooting. Although the State offered one 

psychologist who examined the defendant five months after the shooting and 

determined he was not legally insane at the time of the shooting, the 

appellate court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. Id. 

CONCLUSION

 The authority granted in Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2013), to disagree with the fact finder’s determination is 

appropriate when the record clearly indicates such a step is necessary to 

arrest the occurrence of a manifest injustice. 
31

The evidence of Appellant’s insanity is compelling. Appellant 

submits that this is a case where the record demonstrates that the appellate 

court must step in to prevent a manifest injustice. Accordingly, Appellant 

prays this honorable court reverse the judgment of the trial court herein and 

remand for a new trial or render a judgment of acquittal by reason of 

insanity.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant respectfully 

prays that this Honorable Court sustain the appellate contentions herein, 

reverse the judgment of conviction entered below and remand this cause for 

a new trial, or in the alternative, reverse the judgment of conviction entered 

below and render a judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity.

Respectfully submitted,

M. PATRICK MAGUIRE, P.C.

/s/ M. Patrick Maguire 

M. Patrick Maguire

State Bar No. 24002515

945 Barnett Street

Kerrville, Texas 78028

Telephone (830) 895-2590

Facsimile (830) 895-2594

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT,

JOEL PRICE MORRIS
32

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have served a true and correct copy of 

Appellant's Brief to counsel for the State, Hon. E. Bruce Curry, via hand 

delivery, and whose address is 200 Earl Garrett, Suite 202, Kerrville, Texas 

78028, on this the 30th day of January, 2015.

 /s/ M. Patrick Maguire 

M. Patrick Maguire