NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

 

:

JOSEPH ARUANNO, :

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

STEVEN JOHNSON, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

 :

Civil No. 11-1842 (JLL)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

JOSEPH ARUANNO, #363

Special Treatment Unit- Annex

P.O. Box #CN905

Avenel, NJ 07001 

LINARES, District Judge:

Joseph Aruanno, who is civilly committed under the New Jersey Sexually Violent

Predator Act, seeks to file a Complaint against Steven Johnson, Assistant Superintendent of the

Special Treatment Unit, Director Merrill Main, and 25 John/Jane Does. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

This Court will grant Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis. This Court has

screened the Complaint for dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and, for the reasons

explained below, will dismiss the Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. See Tucker v. Arnold, 361 Fed. App’x 409 (3d Cir. 2010).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has been civilly committed as a sexually violent predator since 2004. As

explained by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,

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[i]n 1994, while in Florida, he exposed himself to two adolescent

girls as they were walking home from school and engaged in lewd

conduct in their presence. As a result of this incident, Aruanno pled

guilty to second-degree lewd conduct, and was sentenced to ten

years’ probation. Just two years later, in 1996, Aruanno sexually

molested an eight-year-old girl who had been playing on the front

steps of her house in Wildwood, New Jersey. A jury convicted

Aruanno of second-degree sexual assault, and he was sentenced to

ten years in prison, and disqualification from parole for five years. 

The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed

the conviction and sentence. The New Jersey Supreme Court

denied certification. State v. Aruanno, 793 A. 2d 716 (N.J. 2002)

(table op.).

In April 2004, while Aruanno was still serving his prison sentence,

the State of New Jersey . . . filed a petition to involuntarily commit

Aruanno pursuant to the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act

(“SVPA), N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27.24 et seq. . . . . 

At the commitment hearing, the State presented the testimony of

Dr. Vivian Shnaidman . . . . Dr. Shnaidman testified that Aruanno

was a chronic paranoid schizophrenic, but her diagnosis explicitly

ruled out diagnoses of exhibitionism and pedophilia. Nevertheless,

Dr. Shnaidman opined that Aruanno’s schizophrenia, when

combined with his previous violent conduct, created a “very high”

risk of future violence. In particular, because Aruanno refused to

take psychotropic medication to treat his schizophrenia, he would

continue to suffer from psychotic delusions which would render sex

offender treatment useless. According to Dr. Shnaidman, Aruanno

would have serious difficulty controlling his sexually predatory

behavior without undergoing treatment for his schizophrenia . . . .

Aruanno testified on his own behalf at the hearing. He denied

committing either the Florida or the New Jersey offense, and

testified that he believed the State had filed the commitment

petition in retribution for his decision to go to trial for the New

Jersey offense, rather than accepting a deal to plead guilty . . . . 

The state court found that Aruanno suffered from a mental

abnormality which created “substantial, significant, severe

difficulty controlling his sexually violent behavior,” and granted the

State’s petition for involuntary commitment. Aruanno appealed the

order, and the Appellate Division affirmed. In re Civil

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Commitment of J.A., 2007 WL 609284 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.

2007).

Aruanno v. Hayman, C.A. No. 09-3499 slip op., pp. 2-4 (3d Cir. May 27, 2010).

In 2009, the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court reversed the Law

Division’s May 3, 2007, order denying post-conviction relief on the New Jersey conviction,

vacated the conviction, and remanded the case. See State v. Aruanno, 2009 WL 1046033 (N.J. 1

Super. Ct. App. Div. April 21, 2009), certif. denied, 199 N.J. 543 (2009) (table). 

Since being detained in New Jersey, Mr. Aruanno has filed over 28 civil cases in this

Court, and 27 appeals in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 

In the Complaint presently before this Court, Plaintiff asserts the following facts:

Like a Phoenix rising from the ashes this case arises from case #

08-305 from the District Court of New Jersey to address the crimes

that were committed to obstruct justice in that case denying JA his

Constitutional Due Process rights which resulted in the failure of

that case.

During the course of that case the courts permitted the defendants

to engage in a series of retaliatory incidents such as isolating JA for

long periods of time without his legal papers, access to a law

library, etc., as well as damaged certain legal papers by soaking

them with water and throwing others out . . . .

And all of which also resulted in not being able to produce other

discovery for which the court rewarding the defendants for their

criminal action(s) by dismissing that case. 

Also, as pointed out, during this entire time the court, or more

specifically Judges Jose Linares and Claire C[]ecchi, totally

avoided the many motions and petitions submitted to the court

revealing the crimes being committed in order to obstruct justice.

(Docket Entry #1-1, pp. 1-2.)

 This Court was not able to determine through online research the outcome of the remand. 1

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (?PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat.

1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a District Court to screen a complaint in a civil

action in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis and to sua sponte dismiss any claim if

the Court determines that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), hammered the “final nail-in-the-coffin” for the

“no set of facts” standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), which was

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previously applied to determine if a federal complaint stated a claim. See Fowler v. UPMC

Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009). The pleading standard under Rule 8 was refined by the

United States Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), where the Supreme Court clarified as follows:

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First,

the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations

contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.

Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice . . . . Rule 8 marks a

notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, codepleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of

discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.

Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief

survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint

states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task

that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience

 The Conley court held that a district court was permitted to dismiss a complaint for 2

failure to state a claim only if “it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. at

45-46. 

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and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit

the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the

complaint has alleged-but it has not “show[n]”-“that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to

dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because

they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the

assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the

framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual

allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they

plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 -1950 (citations omitted). 

Since Iqbal, the Third Circuit has required district courts to conduct, with regard to Rule 8

allegations, a three-part analysis when reviewing a complaint for dismissal for failure to state a

claim:

To determine the sufficiency of a complaint under the [Iqbal]

pleading regime . . . , a court must take three steps: First, the court

must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a

claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify

allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are

not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 1950. Finally,

“where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should

assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly

give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id.

Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F. 3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (footnote omitted).

The Court is mindful that the sufficiency of this pro se pleading must be construed

liberally in favor of the plaintiff, even after Iqbal. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). 

III. DISCUSSION

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A court’s initial task is to “tak[e] note of the elements [Plaintiff] must plead” in order to

state a claim of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Iqbal, 129 S Ct. at 1947-48. Section 1983

provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable

to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show two elements: (1) a person

deprived him or caused him to be deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States, and (2) the deprivation was done under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487

U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

“Like prisoners, individuals who are involuntarily committed to a mental institution have

the right to access the courts.” Tucker v. Arnold, 361 Fed. App’x 409, 409 (3d Cir. 2010). 

Standing of civilly committed persons to pursue an access to courts claim is governed by Lewis v.

Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996). See Tucker, 361 Fed. App’x at 411. “Where prisoners assert

that defendants’ actions have inhibited their opportunity to present a past legal claim, they must

show (1) that they suffered an ‘actual injury’ - that they lost a chance to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous’ or

‘arguable’ underlying claim; and (2) that they have no other ‘remedy’ that may be awarded as

recompense’ for the lost claim other than in the present denial of access suit.” Monroe v. Beard,

536 F. 3d 198, 205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, Stover v. Beard, 129 S. Ct. 1647 (2008) (quoting

Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)). “The complaint must describe the underlying

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arguable claim well enough to show that it is ‘more than mere hope,’ and it must describe the

‘lost remedy.’” Monroe at 205-206 (quoting Christopher at 416-17). For example, in Monroe, the

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of inmates’ access to the

courts claim for failure to state a claim:

In this case, the defendants confiscated all of the plaintiffs’ . . . legal

materials, including their legal briefs, transcripts, notes of

testimony, exhibits, copies of reference books, treatises, journals,

and personal handwritten notes. In their initial pleadings, the

plaintiffs’ claim rested solely on the ground that the defendants

confiscated their legal materials, contraband and non-contraband

alike. That claim, on its face, was insufficient to state a claim under

Harbury. So too were their subsequent amendments, which alleged

that they lost the opportunity to pursue attacks of their convictions

and civil rights claims but did not specify facts demonstrating that

the claims were nonfrivolous. Nor did they maintain that they had

no other remedy to compensate them for their lost claims. Even

liberally construing their complaints as we must do for pro se

litigants, they do not sufficiently allege that they have suffered

actual injury.

Monroe, 536 F. 3d at 206 (citations and footnote omitted).

In this Complaint, Plaintiff apparently alleges that defendants Assistant Superintendent

Johnson and Director Merrill Main caused dismissal of Aruanno v. Booker, Civil No. 08-0305

(JLL) opinion (D.N.J.), aff’d, 397 Fed. App’x 756 (3d Cir. 2010). However, this Court dismissed

the excessive force claim against Booker due to Mr. Aruanno’s willful failure to comply with

discovery. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, finding that “[t]he record supports the

District Court’s finding that Aruanno’s failure to cooperate with discovery was willful.” 

Aruanno, 397 Fed. App’x at 758. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot show that he suffered actual

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injury with respect to Civil No. 08-0305 (JLL), and the Complaint will be dismissed with

prejudice. 

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court will dismiss the Complaint with prejudice. 

/s/ Jose L. Linares 

JOSE L. LINARES, U.S.D.J.

Dated: June 22, 2011

 This Court will not grant leave to amend to assert an access to courts claim involving 3

some other case, as Plaintiff is bringing a general access to courts claim in Aruanno v. Johnson,

Civil No. 11-1151 (WJM) (D.N.J. filed Mar. 1, 2011). 

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