SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

418 

CA 16-01496 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., LINDLEY, CURRAN, AND TROUTMAN, JJ. 

 

 

ALISON M. CARBONE, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JON W. BRENIZER AND MACHT, BRENIZER & 

GINGOLD, P.C., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS. 

 

BRINDISI, MURAD, BRINDISI & PEARLMAN, LLP, UTICA (EVA BRINDISI

PEARLMAN OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.

COSTELLO, COONEY & FEARON, PLLC, SYRACUSE (NICOLE MARLOW-JONES OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Oneida County (Deborah

H. Karalunas, J.), entered December 3, 2015. The order granted the

motion of defendants to dismiss the complaint. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the motion is denied

and the complaint is reinstated. 

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this legal malpractice action

alleging that defendants did not advise her properly during settlement

negotiations in the underlying matrimonial action. In her complaint,

plaintiff alleged that defendants conducted no investigation into her

ex-husband’s financial assets and instead advised her to settle the

action, assuring her that the initial settlement offer was the best

offer she would receive. She further alleged that defendants’

representation fell below the ordinary and reasonable skill and

knowledge commonly possessed by members of the legal profession and

that, but for defendants’ negligent representation, she would have

obtained a more equitable distribution of the marital assets.

We agree with plaintiff that Supreme Court erred in granting

defendants’ motion to dismiss to the extent they relied on CPLR 3211

(a) (1). A court may grant such a motion “only where the documentary

evidence utterly refutes plaintiff’s factual allegations, conclusively

establishing a defense as a matter of law” (Goshen v Mut. Life Ins.

Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326; see Vassenelli v City of Syracuse, 138

AD3d 1471, 1473). In an action alleging legal malpractice during the

course of an underlying action that resulted in a settlement, “the

focus becomes whether ‘settlement of the action was effectively

compelled by the mistakes of counsel’ ” (Chamberlain, D’Amanda,

Oppenheimer & Greenfield, LLP v Wilson, 136 AD3d 1326, 1328, lv
-2- 418 

CA 16-01496 

dismissed 28 NY3d 942). In her affidavit in opposition to the motion,

plaintiff stated that defendants advised her that an investigation

into her ex-husband’s financial assets would be a costly and lengthy

process, but did not explain that she could apply to the court for her

ex-husband to bear the costs of the investigation. As a result,

plaintiff was convinced that she could not afford to conduct an

investigation and settled the matter without knowing what she was

giving up. Thus, although the settlement agreement in the underlying

action contained a comprehensive waiver of plaintiff’s rights, we

conclude that the language of that waiver does not conclusively

establish that plaintiff was not effectively compelled to settle by

defendants’ allegedly deficient representation (see Schiller v Bender,

Burrows & Rosenthal, LLP, 116 AD3d 756, 757; see generally CPLR 3211

[a] [1]).

To the extent that defendants moved in the alternative to dismiss

the action as barred by the three-year statute of limitations for

legal malpractice actions (see CPLR 214 [6]; 3211 [a] [5]), we agree

with plaintiff that defendants are not entitled to that alternative

relief. “ ‘The continuous representation doctrine tolls the statute

of limitations . . . where there is a mutual understanding of the need

for further representation on the specific subject matter underlying

the malpractice claim’ ” (Zorn v Gilbert, 8 NY3d 933, 934; see R.

Brooks Assoc., Inc. v Harter Secrest & Emery LLP, 91 AD3d 1330, 1331). 

Regardless of when plaintiff’s claim accrued, defendants’

representation of plaintiff in the underlying action ended, at the

earliest, upon entry of the judgment of divorce in June 2014 (see

Zorn, 8 NY3d at 934; Gaslow v Phillips Nizer Benjamin Krim & Ballon,

286 AD2d 703, 706, lv dismissed 97 NY2d 700).

Entered: March 31, 2017 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court