No. 87-69 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1987 

WILLIAM COBLE, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

-VSDANIEL MAGONE, 

Missoula County Sheriff, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Missoula, 

The Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

J. Dirk Beccari, Missoula, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Joe R. Roberts, Asst. Atty. General, Helena 

Robert L. Deschamps, 111, Missoula County Attorney, 

Missoula, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Aug. 13, 1987 

Decided: November 3, 1987 

Filed: 

NOV 3 - 1982 

k 757,- 

I 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

This appeal arises from a denial of a writ of habeas 

corpus in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 

Missoula County. Petitioner-Appellant, William Ray Coble 

(Coble), applied for the writ of habeas corpus based on the 

theory he should not be extradited, pursuant to the Uniform 

Criminal Extradition Act (5s 46-30-101, et seq., MCA), to the 

State of Idaho on a Governor's warrant. Coble appeals this 

ruling. We find the District Court reached the proper 

conclusion in this case. 

Generally, a proper procedure for review would be to 

petition for a writ of certiorari. A denial of a writ of 

habeas corpus is not properly appealable to this Court. In 

re Hart (1978), 178 Mont. 235, 583 P.2d 411. However, due to 

the nature of this claim, and in light of judicial economy, 

we will review the case as a petition for writ of certiorari. 

The issue we must answer is whether the District Court 

erred in denying the writ of habeas corpus because petitioner 

is a juvenile and therefore not subject to the Uniform 

Criminal Extradition Act. 

During mid-June, 1986, Coble's mother moved from 

Payette, Idaho to Missoula, Montana. Coble, age seventeen, 

stayed in Payette and allegedly stole a 1979 Mercury Monarch 

and destroyed some household furnishings. He later joined 

his mother in Missoula. On July 16, 1986, a Lawyer 

Magistrate of the District Court of the Third Judicial 

District of the State of Idaho issued a warrant for the 

arrest of Coble. The warrant charged Coble with the felony 

offenses of Grand Theft, Idaho Code SS 18-2403 (1) and 

18-2407(1) and Malicious Injury to Property, Idaho Code 5 

18-7001. 
Coble was arrested in Missoula and on July 22, 1986 

appeared in District Court. He informed the court at that 

time that he would fight extradition. A Governor's warrant 

was issued by the Governor of Montana on September 3, 1986 

after a Demand for Extradition was made by the Governor of 

Idaho on August 6, 1986. The Governor's warrant from the 

state of Idaho was accompanied by an application for 

requisition and a warrant for Coble's arrest. 

Coble filed the petition for the writ on September 18, 

1986. After various extensions of time were granted, on 

December 9, 1986 the District Court entered findings of fact, 

conclusions of law and an order denying the writ. The 

findings of fact stated: 1. the Governor of Montana had 

issued a warrant for Coble's arrest; 2. Coble was indeed 

the William Jay Coble named on the warrant; 3. the 

extradition documents appeared "on their face to be in 

order"; 4. Coble was charged with the crimes of Grand Theft 

and Malicious Injury to Property (felonies in Idaho); 5. 

Coble was fugitive; and 6. Coble was seventeen years old. 

The District Court further found as conclusions of law 

that Coble had been lawfully detained and all of the 

requirements of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act were 

properly complied with. Finally, the court found that Coble 

was not exempt from the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act on 

the basis that he was a juvenile. Coble contends that the 

District Court erred in finding that the Uniform Extradition 

Act applied to him because he is a juvenile. We disagree. 

We have previously held that a court, in its scope of 

inquiry of whether the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act is 

applicable, is limited to the following considerations: 

(a) whether the extradition documents on 

their face are in order; 
(b) whether the petitioner has been 

charged with a crime in the demanding 

state; 

(c) whether the petitioner is the person 

named in the request for extradition; and 

(dl whether the petitioner is a 

fugitive. 

Michigan v. Doran (1978), 439 U.S. 282, 

289, 99 S.Ct. 530, 535, 58 L.Ed.2d 521, 

527; cited in Crabtree v. State (1980), 

186 Mont. 340, 343, 607 P.2d 566, 567. 

Petition of Blackburn (Mont. 1985), 701 P.2d 715, 717, 42 

St.Rep. 525, 527. 

From a review of the record, it is clear that the 

District Court took these standards into consideration. 

Coble admits the above-stated criteria are applicable in this 

case. He also admits that the extradition documents are in 

order and he is the person named in them. But Coble contends 

that the second requirement, that a crime be charged, is not 

met because, as a juvenile, he cannot be charged with the 

felonious offenses of grand theft and malicious injury to 

property. The offenses, he contends, can be charged only 

against an adult in both the asylum state (Montana) and the 

demanding state (Idaho) . Therefore, Coble argues, the 

greatest offense he can be charged with is delinquency which 

is not an extraditable crime. We do not agree with these 

assertions. 

Coble argues the case of People v. Smith (N.Y. 1981), 

440 N.Y.S.2d 837, stands for the proposition that the 

offenses should be limited to delinquency and therefore 

non-extraditable. Smith, however, deals specifically with 

whether the juvenile can be considered a "fugitive" for 

extradition purposes. Further, the juveniles in Smith were 
charged with a juvenile status offense, not a felony as in 

this case. 

The District Court looked to the charging document, the 

warrant of arrest, and found that there was a charge of grand 

theft and malicious destruction of property under Idaho law. 

These charges are sufficient. The rule is clear: 

The only safe rule is to abandon entirely 

the standard to which the indictment must 

conform, judged as a criminal pleading, 

and consider only whether it shows 

satisfactorily that the fugitive has been 

in fact, however Cinartfully] charged 

with crime in the state from which he has 

fled. (Citations omitted.) 

Blackburn, 701 P.2d at 718, 42 St.Rep. at 528. 

Here, the District Court properlv determined that a 

crime had been charged. The warrant is specific and in 

compliance with the requirements of 5 46-30-211, MCA. 

Coble cites case law which deals with the question of 

whether a juvenile can be extradited under the Uniform 

Criminal Extradition Act and further makes the statement that 

the majority does not favor juvenile extradition unless a 

"serious" crime has been committed. We find this to be 

inaccurate. 

All the case law cited concludes that juveniles are not 

to be treated any differently than an adult by the asylum 

state: 

fJ1urisdictions with extradition statutes 

comparable to those adopted in Utah and 

Wyoming have held that a juvenile 

fugitive may be extradited. In Ex Parte 

Jetter, Tex.Cr.App., 495 S.W.2d 925 

(1973), the court remanded a juvenile 

fugitive charged with murder to custody 

of the demanding state explaining that 

the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act 

(which has been adopted by Utah [and 

Montana]) did not exclude minors from its 
operation. The court in Snyder v. State, 

95 Idaho 643, 516 P.2d 700, 73 A.L.R.3d 

695 (1973) held that a juvenile court 

hearing to determine whether to waive 

jurisdiction and allow the juvenile to be 

tried as an adult was unnecessary, being 

beyond extradition procedural 

requirements. Cf. People v. Pard-o, 47 

I11.2d 420, 265 N.E.2d 656 (1970). 

Burnham v. Hayward (Utah 1983), 663 P.3d 65, 67. 

Therefore, we find that for juveniles and adults alike, 

only the standards enunciated in Doran should be considered 

once the governor's warrant is issued. 

[Olnce the Governor of the State of 

Montana issued his warrant "all questions 

involving the prior arrest and detention 

are rendered immaterial." 39 C.J.S. 5 

115, Habeas Corpus, p. 889. Case law 

also holds that even if the previous 

detention was irregular, which is not the 

case here, then the governor's warrant 

renders all such claims moot. (Citations 

omitted.) Also, in Dilworth v. Leach 

(1973), 183 Colo. 206, 515 P.2d 1130, the 

Colorado Supreme Court agreed with the 

above cited principle and stated: 

" [Nleither reason nor justice requires a 

change in the well-settled principle that 

the process involved in the initial 

arrest in the asylum state becomes moot 

upon the issuance of the governor's 

warrant." 515 P.2d at 1131. 

Blackburn, 701 P.2d at 719, 42 St.Rep. at 529. 

Here, once the governor's warrant was issued, the 

District Court had the ability to consider only the Doran 

standards. It did not, as Coble alleges, have the power to 

look to the charging state's law and determine Coble's status 

as a juvenile. As was said in Batton v. Griffin (Ga. 1978), 

246 S.E.2d 667, 668, legal challenges " [slhould be raised in 

the demanding state rather than in the sanctuary state." See 
Snyder v. State (Idaho 1973), 516 P.2d 700. In this case, we 

feel that Coble should raise the issue of his juvenile 

standing in Idaho. 

Coble argues that the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act 

contains no language that indicates it was intended to apply 

to juveniles. Citing S 1-2-101, MCA, Coble asserts that the 

court should not insert what has been omitted. A review of 

the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act shows that juveniles are 

not expressly included in the act, but it also shows that 

juveniles are not expressly excluded. The legislative 

history shows that juveniles were not intentionally omitted. 

Other states have applied the Act to juveniles. Ex 

Parte Jetter (Tex. 1973), 495 S.W.2d 925; Burnham, supra. 

Respondent appropriately points out that Article IV, S 2 of 

the United States Constitution, on which the Uniform Criminal 

Extradition Act is based, provides that " [a] person charged1' 

shall be subject to extradition. There is no limitation for 

juveniles. It is clear that there is to be no additional 

procedural protection for juveniles under the Act. 

We hold that the failure of the Legislature to include, 

or specifically exclude, juveniles is of no aid to Coble in 

this case. The District Court was correct in limiting its 

consideration to the standards of Doran. 

The Attorney General of the State of Montana has also 

recognized that juveniles are not to be exempted from 

application of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 41 

A.G.Op. 24 (1985) . In evaluation of whether juveniles could 

be properly extradited, the Attorney General appropriately 

concluded that the majority of " [ j] urisdictions allow 

extradition of juveniles if they are charged with a crime in 

the demanding state." 
In conclusion, Blackburn expresses the standard of 

review required for reversal of the District Cou.rt's 

determination in this case. 

[Tlhe Governor's warrant is prima facie 

evidence of all the information recited 

in it including identity, fugivity and 

that the petitioner is properly charged 

with a crime. In re the Matter of Hart 

(1978), 176 Mont. 225, 583 P.2d 411. 

This Court recognized this general rule 

with respect to whether the accused was a 

fugitive in State ex rel. Hart v. 

District Court (1971) , 157 Mont. 287, 

293, 485 P.2d 698, 702, stating: 

" ' The issuance of a warrant of rendition 

by the Governor of the asylum state 

raises a presumption that the accused is 

the fugitive wanted and it is sufficient 

to justify his arrest, detention and 

delivery to the demanding state. * * * In 

order to rebut the presumption the 

accused must prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt either that he was not present in 

the demanding state at the time of the 

alleged offense or that he bras not the 

person named in the warrant . . . I It 

Blackburn, 701 P.2d at 717, 42 St.Rep. at 527-528. 

In this case, the Governor's warrant is "regular on its 

face and makes out a prima facie case authorizing 

extradition." Jetter, 495 S.W.2d at 925. Coble did not 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not present i.n 

Idaho at the time the alleged crimes were committed nor d-oes 

he dispute that he is the party named in the warrant. 

The District Court reached the proper conclusion. and the 

petition for writ of certiorari is denied. &L -- I 
We concur: A & CMief Justice p-7-