[Cite as State v. Johnson , 2021-Ohio-4447.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY State of Ohio/City of Toledo Court of Appeals Nos. L-20-1032 L-20-1033 Appellee Trial Court Nos. CRB-17-01948 v. TRD-17-0 3192

Jamar Johnson DECISION AND JUDGMENT Appellant Decided: December 17, 2021

* * * * * David Toska, City of Toledo Prosecuting Attorney, and Jimmie Jones, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. Laurel A. Kendall, for appellant.

* * * * * MAYLE, J. {¶ 1} In these consolidated appeals, appellant, Jamar Johnson, appeal s the January 3, 2020 judgment of the Toledo Municipal Court sentenci ng him for probation 1 violations in two misdemeanor cases. For the following reasons , we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part.

1 Prior to a statutory amendment in 2003, “probation” referred t o a suspended jail sentence in a misdemeanor case. State v. Mack , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-11-1065, 2012- Ohio-2960, ¶ 1, fn. 1. Since then, “probation” has ceased to e xist, and a suspended jail term has become one of the community control sanctions availabl e to a trial court to punish a misdemeanor offender. Id. , citing R.C. 2929.25. However, because the parties2. I. Background and Facts

A. Cases before the court {¶ 2} Initially, we must address which cases, exactly, Johnson is app ealing. In his original notice of appeal, filed on February 3, 2020, Johnson i ncluded trial court case Nos. CRB-17-01948 (“case 1948”) and TRD-17-03192 (“case 3192”). More than seven months later, on August 10, 2020, Johnson filed an amended noti ce of appeal that included four additional trial court case numbers, i.e., case N os. TRD-15-34408 (the “2015 case”), CRB-16-13843, CRB-16-17186, and TRD-16-30245. {¶ 3} According to the amended notice of appeal, the additional cases “were part of” an earlier appeal that we dismissed in November 2019 becaus e the trial court had not filed a final, appealable order. See State v. Johnson , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1120 (Nov. 27, 2019). In the entry dismissing the 2019 appeal, we s aid that Johnson “can file a notice [of] appeal once the trial court enters a final, appea lable order.” Id. The cases that were the subject of appellate case No. L-19-1120 were case s 1948 and 3192; the four

additional case numbers that Johnson included in his amended no tice of appeal were not

at issue in case No. L-19-1120. {¶ 4} After the trial court filed its revised sentencing entry, Johns on filed his original notice of appeal in this case, properly and timely app ealing the trial court’s

decisions in cases 1948 and 3192.

and the trial court use the term “probation”—exclusively—to ref er to Johnson’s sanctions, we will use the terms “probation” and “community con trol” interchangeably for ease of discussion.3. {¶ 5} Under App.R. 3(F)(1), [a] party may amend a notice of appeal without leave if the tim e to appeal from the order that was the subject of the initial notice of ap peal has not yet lapsed under App.R. 4. Thereafter, the court of appeals within its discretion and upon such terms as are just may allow the amendment of a no tice of appeal, so long as the amendment does not seek to appeal from a trial court order beyond the time requirements of App.R. 4 . (Emphasis added.) Subject to exceptions not relevant here, App.R. 4 gives a party 30 days from the date of the trial court’s judgment to appeal the decision. A criminal defendant can seek to appeal outside of the 30-day time limit if he files with the appellate court a motion for leave to file a delayed appeal, and the appellate court grants the motio n. App.R. 5(A), (F). A party’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives an a ppellate court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal. State v. Taft , 6th Dist. Huron No. H-18-003, 2019-Ohio-1565, ¶ 58, citing State ex rel. Pendell v. Adams Cty. Bd. of Elections , 40 Ohio St.3d 58, 60, 531 N.E.2d 713 (1988). {¶ 6} Here, Johnson did not seek leave to amend his notice of appeal, nor did we grant him leave. Because we can find no evidence that Johnson filed timely appeals of any of the additional cases or appropriately sought and was gra nted leave to file delayed appeals in the criminal cases, we lack jurisdiction to entertai n appeals of any of the

additional cases. “And we cannot allow amendment of a notice o f appeal where jurisdiction is lacking in the first instance.” State v. Conn , 2021-Ohio-2727, 175 N.E.3d4. 943 (4th Dist.), ¶ 14, citing Cleveland v. Wagner , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81730, 2003- Ohio-1358, ¶ 4. {¶ 7} Accordingly, we find that the only cases properly before us are trial court case Nos. CRB-17-01948 and TRD-17-03192, and we will confine ou r discussion and analysis to those cases.

B. Case Nos. CRB-17-01948 and TRD-17-03192 {¶ 8} In case 1948, Johnson was charged by complaint on February 12, 2017, with failure to disclose personal information in violation of R.C. 2 921.29(A), a fourth-degree misdemeanor. According to the complaint, During routine patrol the defendant did approach these Officers [sic] patrol vehicle that was sitting at the corner of Oak and Earl and ask while recording on his cell phone why these Officers were sitting on “his property”. The defendant became argumentative and these Office rs asked the defendants [sic] name multiple times in which the defendant stated he didn’t have to give his name to these Officers. The defendant never did state his name to these Officers, these Officers found his stat e I.D inside of his pants pocket. This did happen in the City of Toledo. This incident took place on February 9, 2017. {¶ 9} In case 3192, Johnson was cited by uniform traffic ticket on Fe bruary 9, 2017, for driving under suspension in violation of R.C. 4510.11 (A), a first-degree misdemeanor, and prohibited open container in violation of R.C. 4301.62(B), a minor

misdemeanor.5. {¶ 10} On June 20, 2017, Johnson was in court after being arrested on a bench warrant for failing to appear at a pretrial. Johnson was repre senting himself in several criminal and traffic cases that were pending before the trial c ourt. The city offered to allow Johnson to plead no contest to the failure to disclose ch arge in case 1948 and a resisting arrest charge in another case in exchange for dismiss ing approximately five other pending charges, including both charges in case 3192. Jo hnson declined the offer because he did not want to plead to the resisting arrest charge

. {¶ 11} But, during the trial judge’s discussions with Johnson at that hearing, Johnson indicated that he wanted to plead no contest to several of the pending charges. The trial court accepted Johnson’s no-contest plea to the failu re to disclose charge in case 1948 and found him guilty. The court said on the record that i t was sentencing Johnson to “30 days suspended; six months inactive probation; court cos ts with a stay on costs for two months to August 23.” The trial court did not prepare or s ign a typewritten judgment entry of sentence, but the handwritten journal entry from June 20 says “30 days susp / 6 mo inactive [sic].” The journal entry is also stamped with the word “PROBATION.” {¶ 12} The court also accepted Johnson’s no-contest plea to the drivin g-undersuspension charge in case 3192 and found him guilty. The court said on the record that it was sentencing Johnson to “court costs; 180 days suspended; six months inactive [probation] on the condition of no new charges.” The trial cou rt did not prepare or sign a typewritten judgment entry of sentence, but the handwritten jou rnal entry from June 20 says “180 days susp / 6 mo inactive [sic].” The journal entry is also stamped with the word “PROBATION.” The court dismissed the open-container charg e.6. {¶ 13} On July 28, 2017, the trial court’s probation department filed a “Probation Report” alleging that Johnson had violated his probation in cas e 1948, case 3192, and the 2015 case because he was charged with new offenses. In case 19 48, the probation department alleged two violations: one based on a new offense that Johnson committed on April 16, 2017, and was convicted of on June 1, 2017, and on e based on a new offense that Johnson allegedly committed on June 30, 2017, that was pen ding. In case 3192, the probation department alleged a violation based only on the June 30 offense. {¶ 14} On August 25, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on the viola tions. Although the court found that Johnson had violated his probatio n in the 2015 case, it specifically determined that Johnson did not violate his probat ion in cases 1948 and 3192. The court stated, “there was no conviction subsequent to those probations. There are pending charges, but at any rate, I’m going to indicate no prob ation at this time, and because there is no conviction, probation to continue on those cases.” In other words, the court found that (1) Johnson had not violated his probation bas ed on the April 16 charge because Johnson was convicted on June 1, 2017—which was 20 days before he was placed on probation, and (2) Johnson had not violated his proba tion based on the June 30 charge because there was “no conviction” and the case was still pending. The court’s handwritten journal entries from August 25, 2017 confirm that i t found “No PV,” and the dockets show that there was “[n]o probation violation found” in either case 1948 or case

3192. {¶ 15} On that same date, the trial court also set a “sentence review” for September 15, 2017, in “the case I just sentenced on * * *”—i.e ., the 2015 case.7. {¶ 16} The next entries on the dockets for cases 1948 and 3192 indicat e that the September 15, 2017 hearing—i.e., the “sentence review” for the 2015 case—was reset for a probation violation hearing on October 31, 2017. But, neithe r file contains a second “probation report” or other notice of probation violation, and the record does not contain a transcript of what, if anything, transpired on September 15. {¶ 17} Johnson failed to appear for the October 31, 2017 hearing, and the trial court issued a warrant for his arrest. He was arrested in Augu st 2018, and scheduled for a probation violation hearing on September 12, 2018. Again, the record does not contain any additional “probation reports” or notices of probation viol ation. {¶ 18} On September 12, 2018, Johnson appeared for a probation violati on hearing in cases 1948 and 3192, as well as a plea and sentencin g hearing in three additional cases—trial court case Nos. CRB-17-08262, CRB-17-118 59, and TRD-17- 18511 (the “2017 cases”). The alleged probation violations aro se from Johnson’s

convictions in the 2017 cases. {¶ 19} Johnson’s attorney argued that the trial court could not find t hat Johnson had violated his probation because, at the August 25, 2017 hear ing, the trial court specifically found that Johnson had not violated his probation in cases 1948 and 3192 and the city had not filed any subsequent notices of probation viol ations. Counsel also argued that Johnson’s term of probation had expired. {¶ 20} The trial court found that “[t]here is a violation filed * * * for a probation violation date of October 31, 2017. And that was based on the new charges from September 22, 2017, I guess, just that charge.” The court also found that, although8. Johnson’s stated term of probation was scheduled to end in Dece mber 2017, he had “been consistently bench warrant” since the date of the violation, so the court still had jurisdiction to dispose of the violation filed before Johnson’s term of probation expired. {¶ 21} After finding that his convictions in the 2017 cases violated h is probation in case 1948 and case 3192, the trial court sentenced Johnson f or the probation violations. In case 1948, the court said that Johnson “had 30 days hanging over [his] head on that case[, but had] served 14 of those so there will be 16 days con secutive on that case.” In case 3192, the court said that Johnson had “served 14 days on t hat one also, and I am ordering 166 days to be served consecutive on that case.” {¶ 22} The trial court next began sentencing Johnson on his new convic tions from that day—i.e., the convictions in the 2017 cases. After the co urt imposed its sentence for case No. TRD-17-18511, Johnson asked to speak. His soliloquy t ouched on prior court hearings, his history with the trial judge, a case in which he believed that he was oversentenced, issues that he had with the electronic-monitoring de partment while he was hospitalized, the amount of bond the trial court set in one of the cases he had just pleaded to, and the victim of one of his crimes using a fake Social Sec urity number. Johnson also mention several times that he was “scared for [his] life” and “ didn’t even want to go forward with this”—“this” presumably being the plea hearing. H e also asked the trial judge to recuse himself, which the judge denied as “an unreason able request * * *.” {¶ 23} After the court sentenced Johnson on the 2017 cases, Johnson as ked how he went “about withdrawing [his] plea * * *.” The court summar ily denied his request. {¶ 24} Johnson now appeals, raising five assignments of error:9. I. The trial court abused its discretion when it refused to al low appellant to withdraw his plea without a hearing, and the court had the authority to set aside the judgment of conviction and permit ap pellant to withdraw his plea, pursuant to Crim. R. 32.1. II. The trial court committed plain error when it found a prob ation

violation had occurred in case CRB-17-01948 and TRD 17-03192 fo r an alleged new conviction in case CRB 17-11859, when the PV was al leged to have occurred on September 15, 2017, and the new offense was al leged to have occurred on September 22, 2017. III. The court abused its discretion when it set appellant’s ap peal bond in case [] TRD 17-03192 at $100,000 based on an allegation that appellant “escaped” from CCNO on medical furlough, when documen tation

from CCNO indicates that he was released for medical treatment.

IV. The trial court abused its discretion when it incarcerated appellant for three days for a probation violation which had no t occurred, and after the court had ostensibly corrected the record to refl ect an unclassified misdemeanor in the underlying case (TRD 15-34408). V. The trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed app ellant’s case for resisting arrest (CRB-16-13843), knowing that appellan t wanted a jury trial in that matter, and then misrepresented the sequence of events in

the case docket. II. Law and Analysis10. A. The issues raised in Johnson’s fourth and fifth assignment s of error are not properly before the court. {¶ 25} We first address Johnson’s fourth and fifth assignments of erro r. His fourth assignment of error relates to the trial court’s handling of a probation violation in the 2015 case, and his fifth assignment of error relates to the dis missal of case No. CRB-16- 13843. As discussed above, neither of those cases was properly appealed, so we do not have jurisdiction to consider the arguments that Johnson raises in these assignments of error. Therefore, we find that Johnson’s fourth and fifth assi gnments of error are not

well-taken. B. Johnson did not move to withdraw his pleas in c ases 1948 and 3192. {¶ 26} In his first assignment of error, Johnson argues that the trial court erred by denying his oral motion to withdraw his pleas without holding a hearing. However, reading the transcript of the September 12, 2018 hearing makes clear that Johnson’s request to withdraw his pleas related to the no-contest pleas h e entered that day in the

2017 cases— not the pleas he entered 14 months earlier in cases 1948 and 3192. 2 Accordingly, we find that Johnson’s first assignment of error i s not well-taken. C. Johnson did not receive notice of the conduct that allegedl y violated his community control. {¶ 27} In his second assignment of error, Johnson argues that the tria l court committed plain error by finding that he had violated his proba tion in cases 1948 and

2 Incidentally, we note that Johnson raised the issue of withdra wing his pleas in the 2017 cases in an earlier appeal. State v. Johnson , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-18-1214, 2019-Ohio4613 (“ Johnson I ”). We determined that the trial court did not abuse its discr etion by summarily denying Johnson’s motion. Id. at ¶ 17-23.11. 3192 because the court said at the September 12, 2018 hearing t hat Johnson had “committed a probation violation * * * due to an alleged convic tion in case CRB 17- 11859 [sic] on September 15, 2017[.] However, there was no con viction on September 15, 2017 in that case (or any other).” The city responds that the warrant for Johnson’s arrest tolled his period of probation, and “his plea and findin g of guilt allowed for the Trial Court to find a probation violation.” {¶ 28} We review a trial court’s findings regarding a misdemeanor comm unity

control violation for an abuse of discretion. State v. Crosby , 6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-19- 1160 and L-19-1186, 2020-Ohio-3306, ¶ 23, citing State v. Ohly , 166 Ohio App.3d 808, 2006-Ohio-2353, 853 N.E.2d 675, ¶ 19 (6th Dist.); and State v. Pavlich , 6th Dist. Erie No. E-10-011, 2011-Ohio-802, ¶ 24. Abuse of discretion means t hat the trial court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State ex rel. Askew v. Goldhart , 75 Ohio St.3d 608, 610, 665 N.E.2d 200 (1996). {¶ 29} Although proceedings to revoke community control are not equiva lent to— and need not have the same level of formality as—a criminal tri al, an offender facing revocation is entitled to certain due process protections. State v. Stollings , 2d Dist. Greene No. 2000-CA-86, 2001 WL 501981, *2 (May 11, 2001); Pavlich at ¶ 25, citing State v. Ryan , 3d Dist. Union No. 14-06-55, 2007-Ohio-4743, ¶ 8; and Gagnon v. Scarpelli , 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). At a minimum, the offender must be provided with: (a) written notice of the claimed violations; (b) disclosure o f evidence against the [offender]; (c) the opportunity to be heard in pers on and to12. present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to co nfront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; (e) a neutral and detached hea ring body; and (f) a written statement by the fact finders as to the evide nce relied on

and reasons for revocation.

Pavlich at ¶ 25, citing State v. McKeithen, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-08-29, 2009-Ohio-84, ¶ 22; State v. Miller , 42 Ohio St.2d 102, 104, 326 N.E.2d 259 (1975); and Morrissey v.

Brewer , 408 U.S. 471, 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). {¶ 30} Here, Johnson argues that the trial court’s finding of a probat ion violation was based solely on its erroneous factual determination that, a s of September 15, 2017, Johnson had committed a probation violation, despite the fact t hat Johnson did not commit the offense that formed the basis of the probation viola tion—the charge in case No. CRB-17-11859—until September 22, 2017. {¶ 31} It appears that Johnson’s argument stems from two statements th at the trial court made at the September 12 hearing. First, the court said that “I did make a finding on August 25 that there was no probation violation because he w as not convicted, case was pending, probation to continue. He was then convicted and on September 15th that was set for probation violation hearing on October 31st before the end of his term of probation * * *.” The “finding on August 25” refers to the tri al court’s August 25, 2017 finding that Johnson had not violated his probation in cases 19 48 and 3192 based on the July 2017 probation report because (1) he was convicted of one of the offenses listed on that report before his probation in cases 1948 and 3192 began, and (2) the charge in the other case, case No. CRB-17-08262, was still pending as of Augu st 25, 2017.13. {¶ 32} Second, shortly after making that statement, the trial court st ated that “[t]here is a violation filed * * * for a probation violation d ate of October 31, 2017. And that was based on the new charges from September 22, 2017, I gu ess, just that charge.” Based on our review of the transcript as a whole, it appears th at the “probation violation * * * based on the new charges from September 22, 2017 * * *” ref erred to the charges in case No. CRB-17-11859, which were filed September 22, 2017— not the charge in case No. CRB-17-08262, which was pending as of August 25, 2017. {¶ 33} We recognize that the trial court’s statements about the variou s probation violations were confusing, but we disagree with Johnson’s chara cterization of the court’s error. Rather than finding a probation violation based on a no tice filed a week before Johnson committed a crime, as Johnson contends, it seems that t he court merely misstated the source of the probation violation by conflating t wo of the multiple cases before it that day. {¶ 34} But, we nonetheless agree with Johnson that the trial court abu sed its discretion on September 12, 2018, when found that Johnson had c ommitted probation violations in case 1948 and case 3192 for one simple reason: Johnson did not have notice that he was at risk of having his probation revoked in c ases 1948 and 3192 at any time after August 25, 2017. As Johnson’s counsel argued during the September 12 hearing, there are two alleged violations that occurred. The first viol ation * * * occurred before [Johnson] was placed on probation * * *. The o ther charge that is alleged is the menacing charge [in case No. CRB-17-0826 2] that he14. just pled to. There was a probation violation filed, there was a hearing held, he was found not to be in violation because he hadn’t been convicted

. * * * A subsequent violation for the new charges was never filed

. Therefore, I don’t think there is any probation violation. (Em phasis added.) We agree. {¶ 35} At the probation violation hearing on August 25, 2017, the tria l court specifically determined that Johnson did not commit probation v iolations in cases 1948 and 3192 based on the charge filed in case No. CRB-17-08262. T he court said, “[f]or the record, on Case Number CRB-17-01948 and TRD-17-03192 there was no conviction subsequent to those probations. There are pending charges, but at any rate, I’m going to indicate no probation at this time, and because there is no con viction, probation to continue on those cases.” The court’s handwritten journal entr ies clearly state that it found “No PV,” and the dockets show that there was “[n]o probat ion violation found” in either case 1948 or case 3192. Moreover, at the conclusion of the August 25, 2017 hearing, the court indicated that it wished to schedule a “sent ence review” for September 15, 2017, in “ the case I just sentenced on * * *”—i.e., the 2015 case. (Emphasis added.) The trial court did not indicate that it would be scheduling an y further hearings relating to

case 1948 or case 3192. {¶ 36} In our view, this conclusively resolved the alleged probation v iolations listed in the July 2017 probation report in Johnson’s favor. S o, for the court to find Johnson in violation of the terms of his probation in September 2018, Johnson must have received an additional notice that was filed at some point after August 25, 2017. He did15. not. {¶ 37} Notably, the trial court appears to have been under the misimpr ession that an additional notice had been filed. That is, at the September 2018 hearing, the trial court stated that “[t]here is a violation filed * * * for a probation violation date of October 31, 2017. And that was based on the new charges from September 22, 2017 * * *.” This, however, was incorrect. Neither the file for case 1948, nor th e file for case 3192 contains a probation report or other written notice of a probation viola tion that occurred on October 31, 2017—or any indication of probation violations after the trial court found “[n]o probation violation” on August 25, 2017. In reality, the notice for October 31, 2017, was no more than a scheduling notice that contained no su bstantive information relating to any alleged probation violations. {¶ 38} At the August 25, 2017 hearing, after finding that Johnson had not violated his probation in cases 1948 and 3192, the trial court stated th at “on the case I just sentenced on [i.e., the 2015 case] there will be a sentence rev iew on * * *” September 15, 2017. The record does not contain a transcript from September 15, 2017, so we are unable to discern what might have happened in court that day—as suming a hearing occurred at all. However, the court made handwritten notations on each journal on September 15, 2017, that state, in pertinent part, “set PV hear ing / 10-31-17 / CTN Prob.,” and each file contains a notice from the clerk’s office that states “Please be

advised that the above referenced case has been set for PROBATI ON VIOLATION HEARING. You are ordered to appear in person on Tuesday, Octob er 31, 2017 * * *.” The docket entries for the notices sent by the clerk each state “[c]ase reset” and “[c]ase16. continued.” None of this provides any information that could h ave put Johnson on “notice of the claimed [probation] violations * * *”—especially because the trial court already found that there were no probation violations at the August 2017 hearing.

Pavlich at ¶ 25. In other words, these were, at best, notices of sche duling changes; they

were not notices of conduct that constituted violations of the terms of Johnson’s probation. {¶ 39} Accordingly, because Johnson’s due process rights were violated by this lack of notice, we agree with Johnson that the trial court erre d in finding that he violated his probation in cases 1948 and 3192. Johnson’s second assignm ent of error is welltaken. D. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting Joh nson’s appeal bond. {¶ 40} Finally, in his third assignment of error, Johnson argues that the trial court erred by setting his appeal bond in case 3192 at $100,000 based on the court’s finding that Johnson had “escaped” from jail following a medical furlou gh because, although the furlough order required him to “‘contact his attorney and repor t to his supervising probation officer or the court’” following treatment, “[n]otabl y, it did not require [Johnson] to return to [the jail] that same day[.]” {¶ 41} The city responds that the trial court acted within its discret ion in setting the appeal bond based on Johnson’s criminal history and the fac t that Johnson “was discharged from his medical care, on October 9, 2018 at 6:33 pm .[, but] did not appear to the Trial Court on October 10, 2018, his next contact with the Trial Court was April 14, 2019, some six months later [sic].”17. {¶ 42} Johnson was granted bond pending appeal and only objects to the amount of bond as excessive. Because there is no right to bail on app eal, we review the trial

court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Coleman v. McGettrick , 2 Ohio St.2d 177, 179, 207 N.E.2d 552 (1965). {¶ 43} Before trial, an accused is entitled to reasonable bail as prov ided by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9, of the Ohio Constitution, with certain exceptions. See State ex rel. Baker v. Troutman, 50 Ohio St.3d 270, 272, 553 N.E.2d 1053 (1990). “Prior to conviction, an acc used is afforded the benefit of the presumption of innocence, the burden being upon the state to prove his guilt.” Coleman at 180. After conviction, the presumption for bail no longer e xists. Id. {¶ 44} R.C. 2949.02(A) permits bail pending appeal, and provides: If a person is convicted of any bailable offense, including, bu t not limited to, a violation of an ordinance of a municipal corporat ion, in a municipal or county court or in a court of common pleas and if the person gives to the trial judge or magistrate a written notice of the person’s intention to file or apply for leave to file an appeal to the c ourt of appeals, the trial judge or magistrate may suspend, subject to division (A)(2)(b) of section 2953.09 of the Revised Code, execution of the sentence or judgment imposed for any fixed time that will give the person t ime either to prepare and file, or to apply for leave to file, the appeal. I n all bailable cases, except as provided in division (B) of this section, the trial judge or magistrate may release the person on bail in accordance with Cr iminal Rule18. 46, and the bail shall at least be conditioned that the person will appeal without delay and abide by the judgment and sentence of the cou rt. {¶ 45} In support of this assignment of error, Johnson argues only tha t trial court abused its discretion by interpreting his failure to report to the court or his probation officer the day after he was discharged from receiving emergenc y medical care—which he lawfully left the jail to obtain—as an “escape.” This focus on “escape,” however, ignores the many factors considered in bail determinations. “[ I]n determining the types, amounts, and conditions of bail,” the trial court must consider factors such as the nature of the offense, the weight of the evidence against the defendan t, the defendant’s record of convictions, and the defendant’s record of appearances or fligh t to avoid prosecution. Crim.R. 46(C). {¶ 46} In this case, the record shows that Johnson is a flight risk, h as failed to appear for numerous court dates, and has an extensive criminal record. Furthermore, Johnson had no right to an appellate bond, but the trial court’ s decision to grant an appellate bond was within its discretion. Based on the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting Johnson’s appeal bond a t $100,000, considering (among other factors) his failure to report as ordered after a medical furlough. Accordingly, Johnson’s third assignment of error is not well-ta ken.

III. Conclusion {¶ 47} For the foregoing reasons, the January 3, 2020 judgment of the Toledo Municipal Court is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part. T he trial court’s determination that Johnson violated his probation in case Nos. CRB-17-01948 a nd TRD-17-03192 is19. vacated. The remaining portions of the court’s sentencing entr y are affirmed. The parties are ordered to divide the costs of this appeal equally pursuant to App.R. 24. Judgment affirmed, in part and reversed, in part.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pu rsuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Christine E. Mayle, J. ________________________

____ JUDGE Gene A. Zmuda, P.J.

____________________________ Myron C. Duhart, J. JUDGE CONCUR.

____________________________ JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Cour t of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing th e final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.