### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE June 4, 200 8 S es sio n
COLO NIAL PI PELI NE COMPANY

v. JO HN G. MORG AN ET AL 

### . App e al b y P e r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Appe als Chancery Court

for Davidson County No. 05-748-IVRichard H. Dink ins, Ch ancellor

No. M2006- 00591-SC-R11- CV - F iled Septem ber 9, 2008

Colonial P ipeline C ompany filed suit for dec laratory judgme nt, challeng ing the constitutionalit y of sp e c if ie d p or tio ns of th e st ate tax co de and se e kin gan in

jun c tio n a s to the e nf

or c e me nt o f t

ho se pr ov isi on s. Th e Cha

nc e ry Court dis mis se d th e act ion , h old ingtha t th e c omp any

ha d f a ile d to exhaust its administrative remedies. The Court of Appeals re verse d and re manded. We grante d an
a pp lic atio n f

or pe rm iss ion

to a pp e a l and , after con sid e ratio n o f t he iss ue s, ho ld t

hat ( 1) a pa rt y making a constitutional c halleng e to the fac ial validity of a statute nee d not exhaust i ts administrative
reme dies, and t h at (2 ) t he doctr ine of sover eig n immunity does not bar a

suit for dec laratory judgme nt askingstate off

icer s to be enjoined from enfor cing such a statute so long as the ac tion does
no t se e k mo ne y

dama g e s. We, the re fo re , a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he Court of Ap pe a ls. Tenn. R. App . P . 11 Appeal by Per m ission ; Judgme nt of th e Courtof Ap peals Aff irm ed
G AR Y R. W ADE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , C.J ., J A N I CE M. H OL DER , C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , J J ., and F RAN K F. D R OW OT A , I I I , Sp.J ., joined.

Ron L . Q uig le y , D avis , M atth e ws & Qu ig le y , P. C., and Ste ph e n H. Pr ic e , St ite s & Ha rb iso n, PL L C, f o r th e a p p e l l e e , C o l o n i a l P i p e l i n e C o mp any.
Robert E. Cooper, J r., Attorney Gene ral & Reporter ; Mic hael E. Moor e, Solicitor Gene ral; and Ma ry Ellen Knac k, Senior Counsel, for the a ppellant, State of Te nnessee
. OP IN ION

F acts and P roce dural Hi story
On Fe bruar

y 22, 2005, Colonial P i p eline Company (“Plaintiff” ), a public utility that owns and oper ates a pipeline transpor tation sy stem throug hout thirteen states includingTenne ssee, f iled-2-

suit for dec laratory

judgme nt, cont endingthat any tax assessment in ex cess of 40% as to its rea l pr op e rt y and 30 % a s to its pe rs on a l pr op e rt y vio la te s p ro vis ion s o f t

he state and

fe de ra l c on sti tut ion s. The de fendan t s i n t h i s action ar e John Morga n, the Comptroller of the Tr easur y for the State of Tenne ssee; the State B oard of Equalization; Governor Phil Bre desen in his ca pacity as a member a

nd Chairm an o f t

he State B oa

rd of Eq ua lizatio n; S e c re tary

of State Rile y

Da rn e ll i n h is c a

pa c ity a s a me mbe r a nd Vi c e -C ha ir

man o f t he State B oa

rd of Eq ua lizatio n; Da le Sims , St ate Tr e a sure r, in h is
ca p acity as a me mber of the State Boa rd of Equa liz ation; L oren Chumley , the Commiss ioner of Revenue in her c apac ity

as a me mber of the State Boa rd of Equa liz ation; Doyle Arp, the Assessor of Proper ty of the State of T ennesse e, in his capac ity as a me mber of the State Boa rd of Equa liz ation; and J.M. Bailey , a member of the State B oard of

Equalization (the “De fenda nts”).

In order to place this litigation in proper context, backg round information, both factual a nd leg al, is in order. The Plaintiff is an interstate c ommon carr ier a nd transporte r of r efine d petroleum
c omm od iti e s, su c h a s h e atin goil , d ie se l f ue l, k e ro se ne , j et fuel, and g a so lin e , whic h s up pli e s it s pr od uc ts t o a va

ri e ty of de sti natio ns wi thi n a thi rt e e n state are a of se rv ic e e xten din gfr om T e xas t o New Jersey . I ts sy stem has eleve n orig ination points and delivers to eig hty -five loc ations alongthe pipeline. In order to install its pipelines, the Plaintiff has ac quired e aseme nts from landowne rs and insta lle d s te e l- c oate d p ipe s, ty pic a lly loc ate d th ir

ty or mor e inc he s und e r t

he surf a c e of the so il. A N R P ip e li n e Co

. v
. T e nn
. B d

. o f E qu a li zati o n , N o
. M 2 0 0 1 -01098

- CO A

- R1 2

- CV , 2 0 0 2 WL 31840689 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2002). The term “pipelines” includes, amongother thing s, pipes
and fi tti ng s, c atho dic pr ote c tio n e qu ipm e nt, val ve ope ra tin gme c ha

nis ms, and

by pa ss a sse mbl ie s. I d.
Our state g ov e rnme nt, of c ours e , is e mpo we re d b y the Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ion to t a x all re a l, persona l, or mix ed prope rty , including that o wn ed an d operated by companies like the Plaintiff. Te nn . Co ns t. a

rt . I I , § 28

. Our c on sti tut ion div ide s pr op e rt y int o thr e e c la sse s: re a l pr op e rt y , ta ng ibl e persona l property , and intang ible persona l property . I d. Real prope rty is further divided into four
su bc la ssi fi c atio ns , whic h a

re a sse sse d at di ff

e re nt r ate s: (a) Public Utili ty

Property , to be assesse d at fifty -five ( 55%) pe rce nt of its value; (b ) I nd us tr ia l and

Comme rc ia l Pr op e rt

y , to be a sse sse d at fo rt

y (4 0% ) pe rc e nt of

its value; (c) Residential Property , to be assesse d at twenty -five ( 25%) pe rce nt of its v alue, provided that re sidential proper ty containingtwo (2) or

more re ntal units is hereby define d as industrial and c ommercia l property ; and (d) F arm Proper

ty , to be assesse d at twenty -five ( 25%) pe rce nt of its value.

I d. Ta ng ibl e pe rs on a l pr op e rt

y ha s thre e su

bc la ssi fi c atio ns , whic h a

re a lso a sse sse d at di ff

e re nt r ate s: (a) Public Utili ty

Property , to be assesse d at fifty -five ( 55%) pe rce nt of its value;O S A P u se s the u n it m e tho d o f a p p ra isa l fo r p u b lic u til iti e s. It a p p ra ise s a ll o p e ra ting p ro p e rty a s a sing le un it, 1 whi ch p rod uces one uni t val ue. T hi s uni t va l ue i s ap p o rt i o ned to t he st at e o f T enness ee acco rding t o t he ap p o rt i o nm ent f o rmula deri ved f

rom t he f act o rs l i st ed i n T enness ee C o d e A nno t at ed s ect i o n 67

- 5

- 1 3 2 2

. T he p ub l i c ut i l i t y ass ess m ent p e rc e n ta g e is a p p lied to T e n n e sse e ’s sh a re o f t h e un it v a lue . A fter tha t, O S A P a llo c a te s T e n n e sse e ’s sh a re o f t h e un it val ue f rom a pa rt i cul ar com p any am o ng t he res p ect i ve co unt y and m uni ci p al i t y gove rnme n ts w h e re t hat co m p any o p era t es. T en n. C o d e A nn
. § 6 7

- 5

- 1 3 2 3 (2 0 0 7 ). T he d i st ribu t i o n is m ad e in p r o p o r tio n to t he co m p an y’ s gro ss i nv es t ment i n t hos e c ount i es
. Fi nal l y , t he count i es and muni ci pal i t i es i s s ue ad val orem t ax bi l l s , wh i ch ar e c al cul at ed f rom m ul t i p l y i ng t he l o cal m i l l age rat es by t he p o rt i o n o f o p erat i ng p rop ert y a l l o cat ed to t he co unt y or m uni ci p al i t y
. T he agg r ega t e of

t hes e bi l l s r epre s ent s t he ut i l i t y ’ s proper t y t ax l i abi l i t y i n t he St at e of T enn es s ee. -3- (b ) I nd us tr ia l and

Comme rc ia l Pr op e rt

y , to be a sse sse d at thi rt

y (3 0% ) pe rc e nt o f i ts value; and (c ) Al l ot he r T ang ibl e Pe rs on a l Pr op e rt y , to be a sse sse d at f

ive (5 %) pe rc e nt o f i ts value; provide d, howeve r, that the L eg islature shall ex empt Seven Thousand F ive Hund re d ($ 7, 50 0) Do lla

rs wo rt h of su c h Ta

ng ibl e Pe rs on a l Pr op e rt

y wh ich s hall
cove r p er s o nal household g oods and fur nishings, we aringappar el and other such tang ible proper

ty in the hands of a

taxpay er.
I d. The task of

classifying intang ible persona l property has bee n expressly

deleg ated to the Gene ral As se mbl y . I d. Our c on sti tut ion re qu ir e s b oth

that the ratio of a sse ssm e nt to v a lue of pr op e rt y sh ou ld be “e qual and unifor

m throug hout the State,” and that “the value a nd definition of prope rty

in eac h class or subc lass to be asce rtained in suc h manner as the L eg islature shall direct.” I d. Fur ther, e very taxi ngauthority

must “apply

the same tax rate to all property within its jurisdiction.” I d.

L oc a l g ov e rnme nts e va luat e and a sse ss m os t c omm e rc ia l and re sid e nti a l pr op e rt

y in Tenne ssee. See Tenn. Const. ar t. I I , § 29 (“The Gene ral Asse mbly shall have pow er to a

uthorize the
sever al counties a

nd incorpora

ted towns in this State, to impose taxes for County and Corporation purposes re spectively , in such manner as shall be pr escr ibed by

law; and a ll property

shall be taxed
a c c or ding to its va lue , u po n th e pr inc ipl e s e sta

bli sh e d in

re g ard to S tate taxati on .” ). Ce rt a in
su bc ate g or ie s o f p ro pe rt

y , h ow e ve r, are a sse sse d by a c e ntr a lize d s tate a g e nc y

–th e Of fi c e of State Assessed Prope rties (“ OSAP”). Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-1301 ( 2006 & Supp. 2007). Tax payers may challeng e OSAP’s assessments by filing a n appea l wi t h t he Te nnessee State Boa rd of Equalization (the “B oard” or “B oard of Equalization”), the final a dminist rative a uthority for the assessment of a ll centra lly -asse ssed utiliti es. Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-132 8 (2006). B eca use the Plaintiff is a public utili ty , OSAP assesses the va lue of its proper ties.

Until 19 97 , O SAP a sse sse d th e op e ra tin gpr op e rt

y of a ll t a xab le pu

bli c uti lit ie s at th e same va lue (5 5% ). F oll ow ingthe se ttl e me nt o f a laws uit br ou g ht b y

se ve ra l a ir lin e s and

ra ilr oa ds to equalize taxes of locally -asse ssed prope r ty a n d c e ntra ll y- a s s e s s e d

p r o p e r ty , th e B oard of

Equalization direc ted OSAP to reduce t he asse ssment value of pe rsonal prope rty owned by

centr ally -asse ssed taxpay ers. This orderwas filed on Septe mber 30, 1997. Shortly afte r this chang e in the tax law, 1 the Pla int if

f s ou ght t o c la ssi fy

its “ op e ratin gpip e lin e ” a s p e rs on a l pr op e rt y and , the re by , r e du c e its-4-

tax l iability

pursuant to the September 30 order . OSAP, however , rec ommended to the Bo ard of Equ al i z at i on that pipelines should be classifie d as re al prope rty . The B oard c onsolidated the Plaintiff’s application for reli ef wi th two simi lar c ases. Af ter a n administrative law judg e agree d
w i thO S A P ’ s r e c o m m e n d at i o n , th e B o ar d d e c l i n e d t o r e c l a s s i f

y th e p i p e l i n e a s p e r s o n a l p r o p e rty. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 4-5- 322(b)( 1)(B )(iii); Tenn. R. App. P 12(h). On dire ct appe al, howeve r, our Court of Appe als revers ed, conc luding that the statutory definitions and common law r ules applicable to the trade fix tures wa rra nted c l as s i fi cation as pe rsonal prope rty . ANR Pipeline Co., 2002 WL31840689 at *2-4 (c iting Te nn. Code Ann. § 67-5- 501(9), ( 12)). This Court denied the application for

permission to a

ppeal. In conseque nce, the Plaintiffs were entitled to a lower assessed
va lue fo r t a x pur

po se s.
On May 18 , 20 04 , the Ge ne ra l As se mbl y , by the e na c tme nt of c ha pte r 71 9 of the 20 04 Pub lic Acts, ame nded Te nnessee Code Annotated sect i o n 6 7 -5-501, modifying the definition of re al proper ty to include [m ]ains, pipes, pipelines and tanks permitted or authorized to be built, laid or place d in, up on , o r u

nd e r a ny pu bli c or pr ivate stre e t or

pla c e fo r c on du c tin gste am, h e at, water , oil, electric ity

or any proper

ty , substance or product capa ble of tra nsportation
or conv ey an ce t here in or that is protecte d there by , excluding propa ne tanks for residential use and ab ove ground storag e tanks that c an be move d without disassembly

and ar e not af

fix ed to the land[.]

Te nn . Co de Ann. § 6 7- 5- 50 1( 9) (B )( iii ). Th e pa ssa g e of c ha pte r 71 9 re qu ir e d, on a

pr os pe c tiv e ba sis , that the Plaintiff’s pipeline be subje cted to the higher r eal pr operty assessment.
The Plaintiff cha lleng ed the propriety of the hig her a ssessment by filing a n exception. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 67- 5-1327(b) -(c ) (2005) . On September 7, 2004, Tom Fleming , Assistant to the Com ptr oll e r f or As se ssm e nts , s e nt t

he Pla int if

fs a le tte r, wh ic h s tate d a s f

oll ow s:
The e x ception filed on behalf of [ Colonial] raised issues reg ardingequalization and classification. In acc ordanc e with the statement rea d at the hear ing on Au gu s t 1 8, 2004, eq u al i zation is a func tion of the State Boa rd of Equa liz ation. The issue of classification is a matter of pe nding litig ation. Any further reque st for equa liz ation must be filed wit h t h e S tate B oard of Equali zation (I

N WRI TI NG NO LATER THAN SEPTEMB ER 27, 2004) to the
att e n ti o no f

[K e ls ie Jo n e s , E xe c u ti v e Se c r e ta r y ].

L ater , Flemingfiled an a ffidavit, admitting that the refer ence to “pendinglitigation” wa s a mistake and c o n f ir mi n g th at th e Pl a inti f

f w a s n o t a c tu a ll y p arty to li ti g ati o n me n ti o n e d in th e le tt e r
. The Plaintiff fil e d

ana p p e a l w it hth e B o ar d

o f E qu a li zati o n

an d a s tatu s c o n f

e r e n c e w a s s e t. T he
c on fe re nc e wa s th e n c ontin ue d “ to a c c omm od ate Col on ia l’ s d e sir e to e xplor e re so lut ion of its
a s s e s s me n t c la s s if

ic ati o nis s u e s b e f

o r e th e T e nn e s s e e T a x St u dy Co mm is s io nan d

th e T e nnesseeO n Feb ruary 24 , 20 0 5 , t he P l ai nt i f f al so sued t he B o ard o f E q ual i zat i o n and i t s ind ivid ual m em b ers 2 (“D efen d an t s”) in t he F ed era l D i st rict C o urt f o r t he M i d d l e D i st rict o f T en ne ssee , co nten d i ng t ha t t he D efen d an t s’ classif i ca t i o n o f

it s o p era t i ng p ro p erty vio l ated the E q ua l P ro t ec t i o n C l au se, C o m m erc e C l au se, and S up rem ac y C l au se o f t h e Un i t e d S t a t e s Co n s t i t u t i o n , a s w e l l a s t h e Te n n e s s e e C o n s t i t u t i o n
. C o l o n i a l P i p e l i n e C o
. v
. M o r g a n , 2 3 1 F

. R

. D. 5 1 8 (M .D . T e n n . 2 0 0 5 ). T h e P la intiff so u g h t d e c la ra to ry a n d in ju n c tive r e lief. T h e fe d e ra l co u rt d id no t re a c h the m e rits of t he cons t i t ut i onal cl ai ms, howev er , and di s mi s s ed t he act i on pur s uan t t o t he T ax I nj un ct i on A ct

. T he cour t f ound t hat f ede r al r ev i ew w as i n appr opr i at e bec au s e Col on i al h ad “ a pl ai n , s pee dy , a n d e f f i ci en t r eme dy ” b ef

o re t he B oar d of E q u a liza tio n a n d the T e n n e sse e sta te c o u rts. 2 8 U .S .C

. § 1 3 4 1 (“T h e d istric t c o u rts sha ll n o t e n jo in, su sp e n d o r re stra in the a sse ssm e n t, le v y o r c o llec tio n o f a n y ta x u n d e r S ta te la w w h e re a p la in, sp e e d y a n d e ff ic ie n t re m e d y m a y b e ha d in t he cour t s of

s uch S t at e. ”)

. T he C our t of Ap peal s f

or t he Si xt h Ci r cui t af

f i r med t he di s t r i ct cour t ’ s di s mi s s al

. Co l oni al P i p el i ne C o
. v. M o rgan, 47 4 F.3d 21 1 (6t h C i r. 20 0 7 ).
-5- Gene ral Asse mbly

befor e the he aringor pre hear ing confe renc e on [t he] a ppeal r esumed.” No furthe r action has be en take n; technica lly , the appe al was pe nding a t the time this l awsuit was f iled.
The Plaintiff so ug ht injunctive and dec laratory relief in the Davidson County Chance ry Court. The provisions at issue include subc lassifications (a ) and (b) of article I I , section 28 of the

2 Tenne ssee Constitution and Tennessee Code Annotated se ctions 67-5-501(8) (G), - 502(b), - 1302(a)

. The De fenda

nts filed a motion to dism iss pursuant to Tenne s s ee Ru l e of Civil Procedure 12.02, arguing f

irst that the Chance ry

Court did not have jurisdiction beca use the Plaintiff had f

ailed to exha u s t i t s administrative reme dies with the Boa rd of Equa liz ation and, sec ond, beca use the Dec laratory

J udg ment Act does not a uthorize suits ag ainst state offic ials. The Chanc ellor g rante d the Def endants’ motion to dismiss, holding only that the Plaintiff failed to exhaust its admini strative
reme dies with the Boa

rd as provided by Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 67-5-1301 e t seq. The issue of whe ther the D ecla ratory J udg ment Act author ized a suit a g ainst the State offic ers wa s not addre ssed.
On direc t appeal , o u r C ourt of Appe als treated the Chanc ellor’s ruling , which included a
re fe re nc e to “ the e nti re re c or d, ” a s a su mm ary ju dg me nt. Te nn . R. Civ . P. 56 ; T e nn . R. Civ . P. 12.02 (“I f, on a mot ion asser ting the defe nse num bere d (6) to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be grante d, matters outs ide t he pleading are prese nted to and not excluded by the
c ourt , the mot ion sh a ll be tr e ate d as one fo r summa ry jud g me nt an d disp os e d of as pr ov ide d in Ru le 56.”). After considering the m erits of the claim, the C ourt of Appeals conclude d that neither of the tw o g r o un d s r e li e d

u p o nb y th e D e f e n d an ts w o u ld

p r e c lu d e th e d e c la

r ato r y ju d g ment ac ti o n
. We g rante d the Defenda

nts’ application for permission to appea l pursuant to Rule 11 of the Te nnessee Rules of Appellate Procedur e.
Ana lys is
The De fenda

nts contend that the Court of Appe als err ed by (1) holdingthat the Chance ry Court had juri s d i ct i o n to hear the constitutional challeng e without Colonial first submi tting the claim to the B oard of Equalization a nd (2) holding that decla

ratory judgme nt is a

n available reme dy ag ainst state office rs in tax case s. The issues require us to interpret seve ral statutes, includingthe Dec laratory

J udg ement Ac t. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14- 1 0 1 t o -1 1 3 (2000 & Supp. 2007).-6-

Be cause decla

ratory re l i ef is being sought ag ainst a state a dminist rative boa rd and state office rs actingin their officia l c apac ity , we must c onstrue our Act ag ainst the backdr op of administrative law , jus tic ia bil ity pr inc ipl e s, so ve re ig n immun ity , a nd se pa ra tio n o f p ow e rs
. Stand ard of Review
For issues involving questions of l aw, our standard of revie w is de novo with no presumption of cor rec tness. Perrin v. Ga

ylord Entm’t Co., 120 S. W

. 3 d 8 2 3 , 826 (Tenn. 2003) ; Ganzevoort v. Russell, 949 S .W.2d 293, 296 (T enn. 1997). The standar d of re view for issues of fa ct is de novo upon the rec ord acc ompanied by a presumption of corr ectne ss of the trial court’s f indings, unless the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e is othe rwise. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225( e)( 2) (2005). I ssues of constitutional int erpr etation ar e a que stions of law, which we revie w de novo without any presumption of cor

rec tness g iven to the leg al conc lusions of the courts below. State v. Bur ns, 205 S.W .3d 412, 414 (Tenn. 2006) (citingS. Const ructors, Inc. v. L oudon County Bd. of Educ., 58 S.W .3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001) ). When dealingwith statutory interpre tation, well-def

ined pre cepts a

pply . Our c hief c oncer

n is to carr y out leg islative intent without broadeningor re stricting the statute beyond its int ended scope. H oug hton v. Arama rk Educ. Re s., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn. 2002). In construing le g isl ativ e e na c tme nts , w e pr e sume that e ve ry wo rd in a statut e ha s mea

nin gand purp os e and

sh ou ld b e g i v e nf u l l e f f e c ti f th e o b v i o u s i n t e n t i o n o f th e G e n e r a l A s s e mb l y i s n o tv i o l at e d b y s o d o i n g
. In re C.K.G., 173 S.W .3d 714, 722 (Tenn. 2005). When a statute is clea r, we apply

the plain meaning without complicating the task. Eastman Chem. Co. v. J ohnson, 151 S.W .3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004)

. Our oblig ation is simpl y

to enforc e the wr itten l an gu age. A bels ex rel. Hunt v. Genie I ndus. Inc., 202 S.W .3d 99, 102 (Tenn. 2006) . When a statute is ambiguous, howeve r, we may re fer ence the broade r statutory

sche m e, the hist ory

of the leg islation, or other sourc es. Parks v. Te nn. Mun. L e a gue Ris k M g mt. Poo l, 974 S.W. 2d 67 7, 67 9 (T e nn . 199 8)

. We pr e sume the Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y was a war e of its prior e nactments at the time it passed the l eg islation. Owens v. State, 908 S.W .2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995)

. I. Exhau stion of Adm inis trat ive Rem edies
A. The Dec larator y Judgme nt Act A dec laratory

judgme nt action is a re lative novelty in the law. Snow v. Pear

man, 436 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Tenn. 1968) (obser ving that “the d ec l ar at o ry judgme nt proce dure doe s not come to the jurisprudenc e of Tenne ssee from antiquity ”). The common law did not allow a suit in either law or
e qu i ty a b s e n tana c tu a l an d

p r e s e n ti n

j ur y
. C l e i nv
. K a

p l an , 4 0 S

. E

. 2 d 1 3 3 , 1 3 7 ( G a
. 1 9 4 6 )

. In
rec ent ce nturies, howeve r, dec laratory judgme nt actions have g ained popularity as a pr oactive me ans of preventing injury to the l eg al i ntere sts and rights of a li tiga nt. One commentator has observed that the de c larator

y jud g me nt ac tio n re c ognize s that “[c ]our ts sho uld op e ra te a s p re ve nti ve c lin ic s a s w e ll as hospitals for the injure d.” He nry R. Gibson, Gibson’s Suits in Cha ncer y , § 545 (6th ed. 1982). This evolution in the law has bee n achie ved lar g ely b y s t at utory

enac tment. In the 1850’s, the Eng lish Declar atory

J udg ment Act wa s passed. 15 & 16 Vict. Chap. 86. In 1922, the Confer enceA t f i rs t , A m eri can co urt s ap p roac hed d ecl arat o ry jud gm ent s wi t h skep t i ci sm. See Li b ert y W areho use Co

. v. 3 G ranni s, 27 3 U

. S. 7 0 , 76 (19 2 7 ) ( ho l d i ng t hat a f ed eral dis t ri ct co urt had no juri sdi ct i o n t o ent ert ai n a de cl arat o ry j udgment ac t i on un der K ent uck y l aw) ; Anway v. G r and Rapi ds R y
. Co

. , 179 N

. W

. 350 , 361 (M i ch. 1 92 0) ( f i ndi ng t hat an earl y de cl arat o ry judgm ent act was voi d b ecause i t w as no n- judici al in charact er). H o wever, t hi s C o urt uphe l d t he
con s t i t u t i on al i t y of T en n es s ee ’ s D ec l ar at or y Ju dg men t Act s h or t l y af t er i t wa s pas s ed. M i l l er v
. M i l l er , 261 S. W

. 965 (T enn. 19 2 3 ); s ee al so Just i ci ab i l i t y o f S ui t s f o r D ecl arat o ry Jud gm ent s

– Fed eral R ul e, 11 T enn. L. R ev. 29 4 (19 3 3 ). In a c a se inv o lvin g fac ts sim ilar to th e c a se a t b a r, the U n ited S ta te s S u p re m e C o u rt a lso a ff irm e d the c o n stitutio n a lit y of ou r Act

. N as h v i l l e, C. & S. L. R y
. v. W al l ac e, 288 U

. S. 249 ( 1933)

. T h e Cour t n ot ed t h at t h e “ Cons t i t u t i on doe s n ot
r eq uire t ha t t he cas e or cont r over s y s houl d be pres ent ed by t r adi t i onal f orms of procedur e, i nv oki ng onl y t r adi t i onal
r eme di es
. ” I d. a t 264.

T en n es s ee a l l ows f

or a d d i t i o nal rel i ef

ba s ed u pon a de cl ar at or y j u dg men t

. T en n
. Code An n
. § 29- 14- 111 4 (2 0 0 7 ).
-7- of Commissi oners on Unif orm State laws dra fted the first Unifor m Decla ratory J udg ment Act. One 3 y ear later, the Tenne ssee Ge nera l Assembl y adopted this leg islation. Act of Fe b. 9, 1923, ch. 29, 1923 Tenn. Pub. Ac ts 105 (now codified at Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-14-101 to -113 ( 2000 & Supp. 20 07 ))

. Th e state d purp os e wa s to “ se ttl e and to a ff or d re lie f f

ro m un c e rt a int

y and ins e c ur ity

wi th respe ct to rig hts, status and other leg al re lations.” I d. at § 12.

“ De c larator

y jud g me nts ” are so name d b e c a us e the y pr oc la im the ri g hts of

the lit ig ants wi tho ut o rd e ri nge xec uti on or perf orm ance
. 26 C.J.S. De c lara tor y Judg me nts § 1 (2 00 1) . T he ir 4 purpose is to settle important questions of law be fore the controve rsy has re ache d a more critical stag e. 26 C.J .S. Declar atory J udg ments § 3 (2001). The chief function is on e of construc tion. Hi nc hma n v . Ci ty Wat e r C o. , 1 67 S.W. 2d

98 6, 99 2 (Ten n. 19 43 ) ( qu oti ngNe ws um v . Inte rs tate Realty Co., 278 S.W . 56, 56-57 (Te nn. 1925)). Whil e finding s of fa ct ar e per mitted in a declar atory judgme nt action, “the se ttlement of disputed fac ts at issue betwee n the par ties will ordinarily

be rele g ated to the pr oper jurisdictional for ums otherwise provide d.” I d.

In its present for

m, t h e Tennessee Dec laratory J udg ment Act g rants cour ts of rec ord the power to declar e rights, status, and other leg al re lations. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14- 102 (2000). The Act also convey s the power to c onstrue or deter mine the validity of any written instrument, statute, ordinanc e, contr act, o r fr an ch ise, provided that the c ase is within the cour t’s jurisdiction. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14- 103 (2000). Of particula r r elevance to this ca se, the Ac t provides that “[a]ny person . . . whose rig hts, status, or other leg al re lat i o n s ar e af fe ct ed by a statute . . . may

have d et er m ined any question of construction or validity arising under the

. . . statute

. . . and obtain a decla ration of r ights, status or other leg al re lations thereunde r.” I d. Dec laratory judgme nt statutes are reme dial in nature a

nd should be construe d broadly in or der to acc omplish t heir purpose . Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 29- 14 -1 13 (2 00 0) ; Shel by County B d. of Comm’ rs v. She lby County Qu art e rl y Court , 392 S.W .2d 935, 941 (Tenn. 1965)

. A lt h o u g h a p la inti f

f in a d e c la

r ato r y ju d g me n t a c ti o n n e e d n o t s h o w a p r e s e n t in jury , an actua l “ca se” or

“contr oversy” is still required. Cardina l Chem. Co. v. Morton I nt’l, 508 U.S. 83, 95 (1993) ( st at i n g that “a pa rty seekinga dec laratory

judgme nt has the burde n of establishingthe exis tence of an a ctual ca se or c ontroversy”). A bona f ide disag ree ment must ex ist; t hat is, some rea l“ ‘ Ri pen es s a n d e x h au s t i on a r e compl eme n t ar y doc t r i n es w h i ch a r e des i g n ed t o pr ev en t u n necess ar y or 5
unt i m el y judi ci al i nt erf erence i n t he ad m i ni st rat i ve p roce ss
. ’ ” T i co r T i t l e Ins

. C o
. v. F T C , 8 1 4 F

. 2 d 7 3 1 , 7 3 5 (D

. C

. C i r. 1 9 8 7 ) ( q uo t i ng E

. G el l ho rn & B o y er, A d m i ni st rat i ve Law and P roce ss 31 6

- 1 9 (19 8 1 ) ( herei naf t er “ G el l ho rn & B o y er”))

. W hil e these d o ctri ne s are si m i l ar, t he y i nv o l ve d i f f ere nt req uirem en t s and are d esigne d t o ac hiev e d i f f ere nt p urp o ses. I n a n a t t empt t o di s t i n g u i s h t h es e doct r i n es , t h e Cour t of Appea l s f

or t h e D i s t r i ct of

Col u mbi a n ot ed:

T he exhaust i o n d o ct ri ne em p hasi zes t he p o si t i o n of t he p art y s eeki ng revi ew; i n ess ence, i t asks whe t her he may be at t emp t i ng t o s hor t ci r cui t t he adm i ni s t r at i ve proces s or whe t her he has b een re a so n a b ly d ili g e n t i n p ro te c ting his o w n in te re sts. R ip e n e ss, b y c o n tra st, is c o n c e rn e d p rim a rily w ith t he i nst i t ut i o nal rel at i o nshi p s b et ween co urt s and agenci es, and t he co m p et ence o f t he co urt s t o res o l ve d i sp utes wit ho ut f

urthe r ad m i nist rati ve refi ne m en t o f t he i ssue s.

T i co r T i t l e, 81 4 F.2d at 73 5 (quo t i ng G el l ho rn & B o y er). In short , exhaust i o n f o cuses on t he act i o ns o f t he p art y s eeki ng reli ef, an d ri p en ess f

o cu ses o n sep ara t i o n o f p o w ers. -8- interest must be in dispute. Goetz v. Smi th, 278 S.W . 417, 418 (Tenn. 1925) . Courts stil l may not rende r advisory

opinions based on hy

pothetical fa cts. Third Nat’l Ba nk v. Carver , 218 S.W .2d 66, 69 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948). The justiciabilit y doctrines of

standing , ripene ss, mootness, and political question continue as viable de fense s. See, e.g ., Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296 (1998) (f inding a dec laratory

judgme nt action was not ripe ); Cardinal Chem., 508 U.S. at 83 (findinga dec laratory jud g men t act io n wa s mo ot) . M or e ov e r, in d isp ute s invo lvi nga state a g e nc y , o ne mus t g e ne ra lly exhaust the available a dminist rative r emedies be fore filing a suit for dec laratory re l i ef. See 5 Abing ton Ctr. Assocs. L td. P’ship v. Baltimore County , 694 A.2d 165, 170 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997); s ee also Tenn. Code Ann. § 4- 5-225 (2005 & Supp. 2007). Subject to some exceptions, a decla ratory judgme nt action should not be considere d wher e spec ial statutory proce eding s provide an ade quate r emedy . Katzenbac h v. McClung, 379 U .S. 294, 296 (1964). This includes administrative re medies pre scribed unde r the U n i form Administrative Proce dures Ac t (“UA PA”) and other rele vant sec tions of the Tenne ssee Code.

B. E xha ust ion of A dm inis tr at ive Re m e die s D oc tr ine The e x haustion doctrine ha s been r ecogniz ed at common l aw a s an exercise of judicial prudenc e. J ustice Brande is ref err ed to it as “the long settled rule of judicial administration that no
one is e ntitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the pr escr ibed administrative
reme dy has bee n exhausted.” My ers v. Be thlehem Shipbuil ding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938)

. When a claim is first cognizable by an administrative a g ency , there fore , the courts will not int erf ere

“ until the a dmi nis tr ativ e pr oc e ss h a s r un its c ours e .” Un ite d State s v. W. Pa c
. R.R

. Co. , 35 2 U .S. 59, 63 (1956). B oth courts and leg islatures have rec og nized that the e x haustion doctrine pr omotes judicial eff

iciency and prote ct s administrative authority in at least three way s. First, sometimes “[j] udicial interve ntion may not be nec essar

y beca use the a g ency

can c orre ct any

initial errors at subsequent stag es of the pr ocess[, and] the ag ency ’s position on important i ssues of fact and law may not be fully

cry stalliz ed or a dopted in f inal form.” Ticor Title, 814 F.2d at 735 (quoting G ellhorn & B oy er) . Secondly , exhaustion allows the ag ency to d e v e lo p a more complete a dminist rative r ecor d upon which the c ourt ca

n make its revie w. Efc o Tool Co. v. Com m’ r, 8 1 T

. C . 976, 981 (1983). Finally , c a s e s th a

t c o n c e r n s u b je ct matter w ithin the purview of a dministrative a g encie s often involve “spec ialized fact-f

inding, inter

pretation of disputed technica l subject matter, a nd resolvingdisputes-9-

conce rningthe meaningof the a g ency ’s re gulations.” West v. Ber g land, 611 F.2d 710, 715 (8th Cir. 19 79 ) ( c itatio ns omi tte d)

. Re qu ir ing that adm ini str ativ e re me die s be e xha us te d o ft e n le ave s c ourt s be tte r e qu ipp e d to re so lve dif fi c ult le g a l is su e s b y

a llo wi ngan a g e nc y

to “ ‘p e rf or m f un c tio ns wi thi n its special compete nce.’ ” I d. (quotingParisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972)).
Whil e the doc trine ar ose as a discretionar

y rule in courts of equity , today many exhaustion require ments are mandated by leg islation. See Smit h v. United States, 199 F.2d 377, 381 ( 1st Cir. 1952). When a statute pr ovides specif ic administrati v e procedure s, “one c laiming to have been injured must first comply with the provisions of the administrative statute.” State v. Yoakum, 297 S.W .2d 635, 641 (Tenn. 1956) (cit i n g State ex rel. J ones v. City of Na shville, 279 S.W .2d 267 (Tenn. 1955) ). The me re f act that a n ag ency probably will de ny relief is not a sufficie nt excuse for fa ilure to e xha

us t ava ila ble re me die s. I d. Exha

us tio n o f a dmi nis tr ativ e re me die s is no t an a bs olute prer equisite for r elief, how ever , unless a statute “ ‘by its plain words’” require s exhaustion. Thom as v. State Bd. of

Equalization, 940 S .W.2d 563, 566 (Tenn. 1997) (quotin g R ee v es v. Olsen, 691 S

. W

. 2 d 5 2 7 , 5 3 0 (T en n
. 1 9 8 5 ))

. T hu s , a s t atu t e d o es n o tre qu i re ex h au s t i o nwh enth e l an gu age providingfor a

n appea l to an ad m i nistrative ag ency is worded pe rmissively . I d. Absent any statut or y mand ate , whe the r t o d ism iss a c a se fo r fa ilure to e xha us t a dmi nis tr ativ e re me die s w ou ld be a matter of “ ‘sound judicial discretion.’” Reeve s, 691 S.W .2d at 530 (quotingCerro Me tal Prod. v. Marsha ll, 620 F.2d 964, 970 (3d Cir. 1980))

. C. Title 67 The De fenda

nts assert that under

the fa cts of thi s case , the porti on of the Te nnessee Code that perta ins to the tax classification of utili ties and ca rrier s require s exhaus tion through the Boa rd. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 67-5- 1301 to -1334 (2006 & Supp. 2007). Upon i ts review of the statute, the Court of Appe als found no such re quirement. In makingthis determination, the Court of Appe als place d pa rt ic ula r e mph a sis on

the langua g e in s e c tio n 6 7- 5- 13 28 , whic h outl ine s the po we r of the B oa rd to revie w assessments made by OSAP. Relying on our opi nion in Thomas, the Court of Appe als found that se c tio n 6 7- 5- 13 28 pr ov ide d a n a dmi nis tr ativ e re me dy , b ut t hat th e pla in w or ds of

the statut e did not require the Plaintiff to exhaust t hat re medy throug h the B oard. We disag ree with that rationale. The languag e in the prec eding section of the statute provides
a s f oll ow s: (b) W i t h i n t en (10) day s from the fir st Monday in August, any

owner , or user , the state or any c ounty , mu

nic ipa lity , o r i nc or

po ra te d to wn may a pp e ar a nd fi le exceptions to such assessment, toge ther with such evidenc e as the owner , user, state , county , municipality

or i ncorpor ated town may desire to submit as to the value of the proper ty ass essed, and at the expiration of the ten ( 10) day s, the comptroller of the trea sury shall conve n e a

n informal hea

ringand examine such a dditional evidence and
e xce pti on s as may have be e n fil e d, and a c t the re on , e ith e r c ha ng ingor a ff ir min gits valuation. All persons or e ntities authorized to file an exception under this sec tion but failingto file an e x ception within the time permitted shall be de emed to have
wa ive d a ny ob je c tio n to the a sse ssm e nts

.-10-

(c ) O n o r b e fo re the fi rs t Mo nd ay in Se pte mbe r, the c omp tr oll e r of the tr e a sury sh a ll file with the board of equaliz ation the assessments made by the comptroller, tog ether wi th suc h re c or ds a s may be de e me d ne c e ssa ry
. Th e c omp tr oll e r o f t

he tr e a sury

sh a ll send notice to a

ny person or

entity filing a n exception to the ac t ion taken on the exception, and per sons or entities aff ecte d by the comptroller of the tre asury ’s ac tion
on the exceptions ma

y file further exceptions w ith the state boar d of equa liz ation, for revie w pursuant to § 67-5- 1328. All perso n s o r en t i ties authorized to file an exception under this section but failing to do so on or bef ore twe nty

(20) da y s from the first Mo nday

in September shall be de emed to have waived a ny objection they
may oth e rw ise have ra ise d w ithre g ard to t he a sse ssm e nts

. Te nn . Co de Ann. § 6 7- 5- 13 27 (2 00 6) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . I n o ur vie w, the pla in w or ds of

thi s st atut e dir e c t th at a ll t a xpay e rs wh o, wi thi n th e de signate d ti me pe ri od , f a il t o f ile an e xce pti on

to t he ir
no tic e of a sse ssm e nt wa ive a ll ob je c tio ns to the ir a sse ssm e nts

. Se c tio n 67 -5 -1 32 7 c le arl y se ts f or th mandatory , not permissive, administrative proc edure s. The fa ilure t o ex h austthe administrative
reme dies outlined in the statute eff ectively waives the rig ht to protest OSAP’s assessment, whether
su it b e br ou g ht i n a

n a dmi nis tr ativ e or

jud ic ia l f or um.
Neve rtheless, the Court of A ppeals c orre ctly

conclude d that our t ax code does not prec lude altog ether the Plaintiff’s s uit for declar atory judgme nt. The controversy in this case is not whethe r the Pla int if

f’ s p ro pe rt

y wa s in c or

re c tly a sse sse d in

any g ive n ye ar, but whe the r t he a pp lic a ble provisions violate consti tutional principles. The P laintiff s oug ht decla ratory and inj unctive re lief, not money

damag es or a tax re fund. Whil e the Plaintiff did appea l its 2004 assessment to the B oard, the appe al is still pending

. Moreove r, t he subj ect matter of i ts suit for a decla ratory judgme nt was of a dif fe re nt n atur e . Wh ile the Def end ant s c or

re c tly a sse rt that taxpay e rs mus t e xha us t administrative re medies to appe al a f inal decision of the B oard, se ction 67-5-1327 is no t a bar rier to a constitutional challeng e to the fa cial validity of the statute.
The De fenda

nts’ relianc e on our opinion in Northwe st Airlines v. Tenne ssee State B oard of Equalization, 861 S .W.2d 232 (Tenn. 1993), is misplaced. I n t h at case , we a

nswere d a ce rtified question from the United States Cour t o f Ap p eals for the Six th Circuit, holding that “the pr oper pr oc e dure to c ha lle ng e the a sse ssm e nt o f ce ntr a lly a sse sse d co mme rc ia l air c arr ie r pr op e rt y taxes i s to pay them under pr otest and to file a pe tition for reviewwith the Middle Division of the Court of Appea ls.” I d. at 236 (e mphasis added) (citingTenn. Code Ann. § 67- 5-1329(b) ; § 4-5-322(b) (1))

. We based our holdingon Tenne ssee Code Annotated sec tion 67-5-13 2 9 (b ), whi ch states, “ I f any railroa d or public utility has bee n or is here afte r ag g rieve d at the asse ssment so fix ed and c ertified by the boar d, such ra ilroad or public utility shall be re quired to pay

the taxes due and owing the state, counties and municipa lities, upon the full va lue of the a ssessment, under pr otest” bef ore c halleng ing the assessment in court. Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-1329( b) (e mphasis added) . We also relied upon
a se c tio n o f the Un if

or m Ad min istrativ e Pr oc e dure s Ac t th at de a ls w itha pp e a ls o f a g e nc y

de c isi on s. Nw

. Ai rl i n es, 861 S .W.2d at 236. This case is diffe rent. The Plaintiff does not seek a judicial revie w of a

n administrative dec ision. S ee H inchman, 1 6 7 S

. W

. 2d at 992. The que stion is one of constitutionalit y
.T hi s i ss ue was not ad d res sed by t he C o urt o f A p p eal s. T he D ef end ant s ci t e t he U A P A pro ced ure f o r ob t ai ni ng 6 a d ecl arat o ry ord er and asser t t hat C o l o ni al has f ai l ed t o pe t i t i o n t he B o ard “or any other s t at e agency f o r a declar at o ry order as t o t he s t at ut e’ s va l i di t y , a condi t i on p r ece dent t o mai nt ai ni ng an y s t at e c our t ac t i on f or decl ar at ory r el i ef

un der t he U A P A

. ” ( ci t i ng T enn
. C od e A nn
. § 4- 5- 22 5(b) )

. T he D ef endan t s al s o ar gu e t hat Co l oni al di d not f ol l ow t he proper “p ro c e d u re s fo r o b ta inin g re v ie w o f i ts c o n stitutio n a l i ssu e s.”
-11- In the same ve in, section 4-5-322 of the UAPA does not a

pply . Tennessee’s Uniform A dm i n i s tr at i v e P r o c e d

ur e s A c tc o n t e m p l a t e s tw o m e th o d s o f c h a l l e n g i n gth e a c t s o f

ana g e n c y, setting f orth diffe rent proc edure s for see king de clar atory relief and for ap p ealinga fina l administrat ive dec ision. Com pare Tenn. Code Ann. § 4- 5-225, with Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322 (2 00 5 & Sup p. 20 07 ). Whe the r the Pla int if f ha s sat isf

ie d the pr oc e dura l r e qu ir e me nts of the UA PA fo r b ri ng inga

dir e c t a c tio n f

or de c larator

y jud g me nt m e ri ts f

ur the r a na ly sis

. D. Unif ormAdm inis trat ive P roce dures Act 6 Th e U A P Aa

p p l i e s i nth i s i n s t an c e b e c a u s e th e B o ar d

o f E qu a l i z at i o nf

a l l s un d e r

its definition of “a g ency .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 4-5- 102(2) ( “‘A g ency ’ mea n s ea ch s t ate board, commission, commit tee, de partment, off icer , or any

other unit of state g overnme nt authorized or require d by

any statute or constitutional provision to make rules or to de termine c ontested ca ses.”)

. Be fore consideringthe UAPA’s e x haustion require ments, we first observe that the Act wa s intended to be construe d in acc ord with common law principles. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-103( a) ( stating that the Act should not be c onstrued “in derog ation of the common law”)

. Fur ther, the UAPA is reme dial leg islation and, as such, sh o u l d be libera lly construed, “ and any

doubt as to the exist ence or the extent of a power

confe rre d shall be re solved in favor of the e x istence of

the power .” I d. The proc edura l posture of this case require s us to review the portion of the UAPA dea ling with declar atory

judgme nts and dec laratory order s. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-223 to -225 (2005 & Sup p. 20 07 ). Se c tio n 4 -5 -2 25 dir e c tly a dd re sse s th e sit

uatio ns in whic h th e Da

vids on County Chance ry Cour t h as jurisdiction to render a dec laratory

judgme nt reg ardingstatutes within the p r i m ar y j ur i s d i c t i o no f

any s t at e a g e n c y: (a ) T he le g a l va lid ity

or a pp lic a bil ity of a statut e , r ule or ord er of an a g e nc y to specifie d circ umstances may be determined i n a sui t for a de clar atory judgme nt in the chanc ery court of D avi d s o nC o un ty , un l es s o th erwi s e s p ec i fi ca l l y p ro v i d ed by

statute, if the court finds that the s tatute, rule or order , or its threate ned application, interfer es with or impairs, or t hreatens to interfe re with or i mpair, t he lega l rig hts or privileg es of the c omp la ina

nt. Th e a g e nc y

sh a ll b e ma de a

pa rt y to t he su it. (b) A d ec l aratory

judgme nt shall not be rende red c oncer ning the validity

or applicability

of a statute, r

ule or orde r unless the c ompla inant has petitioned the ag ency for a decla

ratory order and the a g ency

has re fused to issue a de clar atory order

. (c ) I n pa ssi ng on the le g a l va lid ity of a ru le or or de r, the c ourt sh a ll d e c lare the ru le or orde r invalid only

if it f inds that it violates constitutional provisions, ex cee ds the statutory authority

of the a g ency , was a dopted without compliance w ith the-12-

rulemakingproce dures pr ovided for in this cha pter or othe rwise violates state or fede ral law

. Te nn . Co de Ann

. § 4-5-2 25 (e mph a sis a dd e d) . In n o unc e rt a in t e rm s, thi s st atut e re qu ir e s a prospec tive plaintiff t o m ake a re quest for a decla ratory order with an ag ency

befor e bring ing a

n action for a dec laratory

judgme nt in the Chancer y Court. See Watson v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 970 S.W. 2d 49 4 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 1 99 8). A decl ara tor y or de r i ssu e d b y

an a dmi nis tr ativ e tr ibu

na l is roug hly analog ous to a declaratory judgme nt issued by a cour t. The UAPA sets for

th the proce dures that a par ty should take to petition an ag ency for a decla ratory order : (a) Any aff ecte d person may

petition an ag ency

for a decla ratory order as to the validity or applica

bility of a statute, r

ule or order within the primar y jurisdiction of the a g e nc y . T he a g e nc y

sh a ll: (1) Convene a conte sted ca se hea ringpursuant to t he provisions of this chapte r and issue a d ec l aratory

order , which shall be subjec t to review in the c hance ry court of Da v i d s o n County , unless otherwise spe cifica lly provided by

statute, in the manner provided for

the re view of de cisions in contested ca ses; or (2) Ref use t o i s s u e a de clar atory order , in which eve nt the person pe titioni ngthe
a g e nc y fo r a de c larator

y or de r may a

pp ly fo r a de c lara tor y jud g me nt a s p ro vid e d in § 4-5-225. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4- 5-223 (e mphasis added) . The De fenda nts p o i n t o u t t hat the Plaintiff neve r petitioned the Boa

rd for a dec laratory

order , and, ther efor e, fa iled to exhaust i ts remedies unde r the UAPA.

In L .L . Be an, Inc. v. B rac ey , 817 S.W .2d 292 (Tenn. 1991), a taxpay er sought a dec laratory judgme nt and injunctive re lief under Tenne ssee’ s Dec laratory J udg ment Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Court held that the Chance ry Court la cked jurisdiction on severa l gr ounds, one of whic h was failure to comply with se ction 4-5-225 (for merly section 4-5-224)

. I d. at 293. The r uling c oncluded that th e Cha

nc e ry Court wa s “ wi tho ut j ur isd ic tio n to c on si der the c on sti tut ion a lity of a statut e pursuant to [Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-225], when the issue has not f irst been pr esente d to an administrative ag ency pursuant to [ Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction] 4-5-223.” I d. at 298. The opinion prohibited the Ch an ce ry C o urt from issuinga dec laratory judgme nt reg ardingthe
c on sti tut ion a lity

of “ a statut e de a lin gwi th s tate tax re ve nu e if su c h ex erci se of

jur isd ic tio n w ou ld . . . be in conflict with and under mine the exclusive jurisdiction for deter mining liability

for taxes that is bestowed by” Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 67 -1 -1 8 0 4

. I d. In L .L . Be an, this Court relied upon a

Court of Appea ls decision that state ag encie s have “ the authority t o co n sider the
c on sti tut ion a lity

of a statut e .” I d. (c iti ng Cr awf or d v. Co ns ol. Re t. S y s. , 7 32 S.W. 2d 29 3 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1987)).W e a l so no t ed t ha t t his l i m i t ati o n o n a d m in i st rati ve ag en cies is rec o gn i ze d i n m an y othe r jurisd i cti o ns. 7 R i cha r dson, 913 S. W

. 2d 45 2- 53 ( ci t i ng D ownen v. W ar ner , 48 1 F. 2d 64 2, 64 3 ( 9t h C i r
. 19 73 ) ( r es ol vi ng cl ai m b as ed
on c on s t i t u t i on al r i g h t i s i n appr opr i at e f o r a n a dmi n i s t r at i v e boar d) ; Al l eg h an y Cor p. v
. Pomer oy , 698 F. Su pp. 809, 8 1 3 -1 4 ( D .N .D . 1 9 9 0 ), re v ’d o n o the r g ro u n d s, 8 9 8 F .2 d 1 3 1 4 (8 th C ir. 1 9 9 0 ) (a g e n c y w itho u t p o w e r to a d ju d ic a te
co nst i t ut i o nal i s s u es ) ; K ey H av en v
. B d. of T r u s t ee s of

t h e I n t er n al I mpr ’ mt

. T r u s t Fu n d, 427 So. 2d 153 ( Fl a. 1982) (f o rum f o r consi d erat i o n of co nst i t ut i o nal que st i o n was i n co urt upo n judi ci al revi ew); M o b i l O i l C o rp. v. C i t y of R o cky R i ver, 30 9 N

. E

. 2 d 90 0 (O hi o 1 9 7 4 ) (co nst i t ut i o nal i t y o f z o ni ng o rdinance is m at t er f o r t he co urt ); D o w Jo nes & C o
. v. St at e e x r el

. O kl a. T ax C om m’ n, 78 7 P. 2d 84 3 (O kl a. 199 0) ( com mi s s i oner proper l y r ef us ed t o add r es s cons t i t ut i onal i ss ues) ; B el co P et roleum C o rp. v. Stat e B d

. o f E q ual i zat i o n, 5 8 7 P

. 2 d 2 0 4 , 2 0 8 (W y o
. 1 9 7 8 ) (agency d o es not de t erm i ne f aci al co nst i t ut i o nal i t y of st at ut e o r const i t ut i o nal i t y of i t s ap p l i cat i o n); 73 C

. J. S. P ub l i c A d m ini st rat i ve Law and P ro c e d u re § 6 5 a t 5 3 6 ; 1 A m . Ju r.2 d A d m inistra tive L a w § 1 8 5 a t 9 8 9 -9 0 ).

In ge n e ra l, the “leg islativ e p o w e r” is t h e a u tho rity to m a k e , o rd e r, a n d re p e a l l a w ; the “e x e c u tive p o w e r” is 8
t he aut ho ri t y t o ad m i ni st er and enf o rce l a w ; a n d th e “judici al po wer” i s t he aut ho ri t y t o i nt erpret and ap p l y l aw. T he T enness ee co nst i t ut i o nal p rovis i o n p rohibi t s an encro achm ent by any of t he d ep art m ent s up o n t he p o wers, f unct i o ns and p rerogat i ves of

t he o the rs
. R ic h a rd son v. Y o ung, 12 5 S.W

. 66 4 (19 1 0 ). T he b ranches of gove rnme nt , how ever, are g u id e d b y the d o c trine o f ch e c k s a n d b a la n c e s; the d o c trine o f se p a ra tio n o f p o w e rs is no t ab so lute . A n d e rs o n C o u n ty Q uart erl y C o urt v. Jud ges of 28 t h Jud i ci al C i rcui t , 57 9 S.W

. 2 d 87 5 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. 19 7 8 ).

-13- L ater , howeve r, we rec onsidered the basis for the opinion in L .L . Be an. In Richardson v. Boa rd of De ntistry , 913 S.W .2d 446 (Tenn. 1995) , this Court observed that the fa cial constitutionalit y

of a statu te may

not be deter

mined by an administrative tribuna l due to “the fundame ntal constitutional principle of sepa ration of powe rs.” I d. at 453 (citing State ex rel. Town of S. Carthag e v. B arr ett, 840 S.W .2d 895, 897 (Tenn. 1992)). In Richardson, we rec og nized that 7 “it has bee n the sole oblig ation of t h e judiciar y to interpret the la

w and de termine the constitutionalit y

of ac tions take n by the other two branc hes of g overnme nt.” I d. at 453 (c iting Te nn. Small S ch. S y s. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 148 (Tenn. 1993) ). The T ennesse e Constituti on prohibits one branc h from enc roac hing on the power s or functions of the other two branc hes. I d. 8 (citingTenn. Const. art. I I , § 2; State v. Br acke tt, 869 S.W .2d 936, 939 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) ). We did not expressly overr ule L .L

. Be an, but in discussing whether a dminist rative a g encie s have the power to consider c onstitut ional challeng es to statutes, we a cknowledg ed that both the L .L . Be an and Crawf ord ca ses had “ spa

wn e d c o n f u s io n o n th e a pplicable Te nnessee rule.” Richardson, 913 S.W.2d at 453.
Ad

min istrativ e tr ibu

na ls d o n ot l a c k th e a

uth or ity to d e c ide e ve ry

c on sti tut ion a l issu e . I t is
e sse nti a l, h ow e ve r, to d ist inguis h b e tw e e n th e va ri ou s ty pe s of co ns tit

uti on a l issu e s th at ma

y ari se in the administrative context. I n Richardson, we develope d three broad categ ories of c onstitut ional disputes: (1) cha lleng ing the fac ial constitutionalit y of a statute a

uthorizi ngan ag ency

to act or rule, (2) c halleng ing the ag ency ’s application of a statute or rule a s unconstitutional, or (3) cha lleng ing th e c o n s t i tu t i o n a l i ty

o f th e p r o c e d

ur e u s e d b y ana g e n c y
. I d

. at4 5 4

- 5 5

. A dm i n i s tr at i v e tr ibuna ls have the power

to decide c onstitut ional issues fallinginto the second a n d third cate g ories, but the first categ ory

falls exclusively

within the ambit of the judicial branc h. I d. The sepa ration of powe rs clause rese rves f

or the judiciar

y constitutional challeng es to the fac ial validity of a statute. I d. (citing Hoover Motor Ex p. Co., Inc. v. R.R. & Pub. Util. Comm ’n, 261 S.W.2d 233, 238 (T enn. 1953); Pharr v. Na shville, C., & St. L . Ry ., 208 S.W .2d 1013, 1017 (Tenn. 1948) ).-14-

Si n c e Ri c h ar d s o n , w e h av e c o n s is te n tl y h e ld th at a dmi n is tr ati v e p r o c e e d in g s are not the proper forum for cer

tain narr ow constitutional c laims. Helms v. Tenn. De p’t of Safe ty , 987 S.W .2d 5 4 5 , 5 4 6 n.1 (Tenn. 1999) . For example, in Ci ty

of Memphis v. Shelby County Election Commis sio n, 14 6 S. W.3 d 5 31 (T e nn . 2 00 4) , th e Shel by Co un ty El e c tio n Co mmi ssi on

re fu se d to place a re fer endum orde r on the e lection ballot beca use the c ommissi on deter

mined tha t t h e p roposed ordinanc e would be unc onstitut ional. I d. at 533. This Court ruled that the election commission had exceede d i ts authority

under the separ ation of powe rs clause of our c onstitut ion beca use it had “usurpe d the power

of the judiciar

y to determine the substantiv e constitutionality of duly enac ted laws.” I d. at 538. Off

icials within the executive or leg islative branc h were p ro h i bited from deter mining the substantive constitut ionality of dul y enac ted, pre sumptively valid ordinanc es. I d.
We ha ve y et to a ddress how the separ ation of power s clause would aff ect t h e r equirement to p e tit ion

fo r a de c larator

y or de r u nd e r s e c tio n 4 -5 -2 25

. In Ri c ha rd so n, the pla int if

f h a d a c tua lly petitioned the ag ency

for a decla ratory order befor e suing for a

decla ratory judgme nt in the Chancer

y Court , a nd , u po n th e a dv ic e of an a dmi nis tr ativ e law jud g e , the B oa rd of De nti str y ha d h e ld t

hat it was without jurisdiction to hear c o n s t i t u t i onal cha lleng es to the statute. I d. at 450-51. He re, the Pla int if f d id not peti tio n th e B oa rd fo r a de c larator

y or de r b e fo re su ingfo r d e c larator y jud g me nt. The que stion, therefor e, bec omes whethe r one must first petition an ag ency for a dec laratory order befor e see king a

summary j u d gm en t to determine the fac ial validity of a statute. Sec tion 4-5-223 specific ally

allows an a g g rieve d party to petition for a dec laratory order challeng ing the “validity

or applicability

of a statute, r

ule or orde r within the primary jurisdiction of the ag ency .”
Th e de fi nit ion s found in t he statut e a

pp lic a ble to t he B oa rd of Eq ua lizatio n p e rt a in d ir e c tly to the classification and assessment of pr operty

. T h e ena bling leg islation provides that the Boa rd “has jurisdiction over

the v al u ati on, classification and assessment of a ll properties in the state.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 67- 5-1501(a ) (2005). Fur ther, the Boa

rd has the duty

to “re ceive , hear , consider and ac t upon complaints and appe als.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 67-5- 1501(b) ( 2006 & Supp. 2007). Despite the br eadth of

the jurisdictional provisions found in the statute, an a g ency does not have the authority

to deter mine the facial validi ty of a statute under the constitutional requirement of se pa ratio n of pow e rs
. Te nn . Cons t. ar t. I I , § 2 ( “ No pe rs on

or pe rs on s b e lon g ingto o ne of the se [thr e e ] de pa

rtme nts sh a ll e xer c ise any of the po we rs pr operl y belo ng ingto e ith e r o f t he oth e rs , except in the case s here in directe d or per mitted.”); Richardson, 91 3 S

. W

. 2 d at 452-53. The provision in the UAPA that an ag ency may issue a dec laratory

order reg ardin g the “va lidity

or applicability

of a statute” is, theref

ore, in partial conflict with our rulingin Richardson. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-223( a) ( emphasis added). Whil e an a g ency rulingon the “a

pplicability ” is permissible, th e s ep ar at i o no f p o we rs cl au s e i n o ur co n s t i tu t i o ntru mp s an y p ro v i s i o ni nth e U AP A p erm i t t i n g a deter mination as to the “validity ” of a statute. Richardson, 913 S.W .2d at 455 (“To vest an ag ency with the authority

to determine the constitutionalit y of the legislation empoweringthe ag ency to act would violate the doctrine of the separ ation of powe rs.”) . In conseque nce, a ny provision requiring
a dmi nis tr ativ e re vie w p ri or to a dir e c t cha lle ng e to the fa c ia l val idi ty of a statut e vio late s o ur state constitution. S ee T enn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225( b); see a lso St ate v. Yoa kum, 297 S.W .2d 635, 642 (Tenn. 1956) (“The law will not require these [plaintiffs] t o exhaust an administrative reme dy whenT hi s ca s e wa s not co nt r ol l ed by t he ex hau s t i on requi r ement f ound i n t he f

eder al Ad mi ni s t r at i ve P r ocedur es 9 A ct. It d ea l t wit h p ris o ne rs seek i ng d am ag es a ga i nst f ed er a l o f

f i ce rs f o r vio l ati o ns o f

t he i r co nsti t uti o na l ri gh t s. M c Ca r t h y h a s s i n c e be e n ov e r r u l e d o n t h i s po i n t du e t o a c h a n g e i n t h e s t a t u t e g ov e r n i n g s u i t s by pr i s on e r s
. 42 U. S. C. § 19 9 7 e; B o o t h v. C hurner, 53 2 U

. S. 73 1 , 74 1 (20 0 1 ).

T he co urt i n M cC a rth y ba sed i t s ho l d i ng on t hi s excep t i o n. See i d

. at 15 5 (s t at i ng “ t he uncert ai nt y of t he 10

a d m inistra tive a g e n c y’s a u tho rity to a w a rd re lief c o u n se ls a g a ins t re q u iring e x h a u stio n ” ); se e a lso id . at 1 5 6 (R e h n q u ist, J. , c on cu r r i n g ) ( ag r ee i n g wi t h t h e maj or i t y ’ s out come be ca u s e t h e admi n i s t r at i v e “ r eme dy f u r n i s h es n o e f

f ec t i v e r eme dy
a t all” ).
-15- to do so under the a

verme nts of the fa cts here in would be a use less thing.” ). “‘The importance of
corr ectly resolvingconstitutional iss ues sug g ests that constitutional iss ues should rar ely be fore closed by

proce dural tec hnicalities.’” I n re A doption of Fe male Child, 42 S.W .3d 26, 32 (Tenn. 2001) (quotingRichardson, 913 S.W.2d at 457). Our rulingin R i ch ar d son is consistent with the ex haustion of administrative re medies do c tr ine , whic h h a s r e c ognize d exce pti on s bas e d on “e qu ita ble c on sid e ratio ns of fa ir

ne ss t o li tig ants and instituti onal compete nce.” Ronald A. Cass , C o l in S. Diver, & J ack M. B eer mann, Administrative L aw 320 ( 5th ed. 2006). I n McCarthy

v. Madig an, 503 U.S. 140 (1992), the United 9 State s Supr e me Court

outli ne d thre e br oa d e xce pti on s to the no n- statut or y e xha us tio n r e qu ir e me nt: (1 ) whe n th e a dmi nis tr ativ e re me dy wo uld c a us e un du e pr e

jud ic e to s ub se qu e nt a sse rt ion of a c la im in c ourt ; ( 2) wh e n th e a dmi nis tr ativ e re me dy wo uld be in adeq uat e “ ‘b e c a

us e of so me do ub t a s to whether the agency

was e mpowere d to gr ant ef fec tive relief

’”; a nd (3) whe n the administrative ag ency has bee n shown to be biased or has prede termined the issue. I d. at 146-49 (quotingGibson
v. B e rr y hil l, 4 11 U. S. 5 64 , 5 75 n. 14 (1 97 3) ). Th e se c on d e xce pti on ha s the mos t r e le va nc e in t his
c a s e b e c a u s e th e s e p ar at i o n o f p o w e r s d o c tr i n e r e n d e r s th e B o ar d o f E qu a l i z at i o n p o w e r l e ss t o adjudicate the P l aintiff’s c onstitut ional claims. Elaborating on this exception in McCarthy , the 10 Supreme Court obse rved that “an ag ency , as a preliminary matter, may be unable to consider whe ther to gr ant re lief bec ause i t l ac k s institutional competenc e to re solve the par ticular ty pe of issue prese nted, such a s the constitutionality of a statute.” I d. at 147-48 (emphasis added) (citingMoore
v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 497, n.5 (1977); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 76 (1976)). The Court fu rt he r n ote d th at e ve n if

the a g e nc y c ou ld a dju dic ate the matte r, it m ig ht “ la c k a uth or ity to g rant the ty

pe of r elief r equeste d.” I d. at 148 (c iting McN eese v. Bd. of Educ. for Cmty . Unit Sch. Dist., 187, 373 U.S. 668, 675 (1963)). We ag ree with the asse ssment by our hig hest court. Our

rulingtoday

is meant to achie ve harmo ny b e tw e e nth e U A PA , th e e xh a u s ti o no f r e me d ie s d o c tr in e , an d

th e s e p ar ati o no f

power s clause . In view of the respe ctive role s of administrative ag encie s and cour ts within t he sepa

ration of powe rs fra

mework, w e hold that sec tion 4-5-225 d o es n o t p reclude the Chanc ery Court from consideringa constitutional challeng e to the fa cial validity of a statute e ven whe n the ag ency has not considere d a dec laratory

order

. That said, we must now decide wh et h er t he Plaintiff’s cla ims fall within thi s narr ow exception to section 4-5-225(b)

. The pray er for relief i n the complaint filed c ontains a mix ture of-16-

constitutional challeng es; to a ce rtain extent, both facial va lidity and statutory ap p l i ca t i o n are at issue. Questions of whether the application of a st atute viol ates constitut ional principles should be submitt ed to the ag ency throug h a petition for a decla ratory order befor e any

action is brought in the Chance ry Court. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225( b). Questions of constitutional validity need not be

. Richardson, 913 S.W.2d at 454-55.

In it s c omp la int , th e P la int if f a sk e d th e Cha

nc e ry Court to “ [d]e c lare that th e ame ndme nts to [ Tenn. Code Ann.] § 67-5-501( 9) embodied in C h apter 719 are unconstitutional and unenfor cea

ble.” The Plaintiff further asked f or injunctive relief to pr event the enfor ceme nt of the disputed statutory provisions a nd rea ffirm the 2002 decision of the Court of Appea ls. These pra y ers for r elief qua lify

as fa ci al at t ac k s b eca

use they focus on the la

nguag e and e ffe ct of the statutes the mse lve s. Th e Pla int if

f a lso a sk e d th at th e c ourt pr e ve nt en fo rc e me nt of the dis pute d s tatut e s “ to the e xtent [ the y ] imp os e a sse ssm e nt rate s upo n Co lon ia l’ [s]” re a l and pe rs on a l op e ra

tin gpr op e rt

y in excess of 40% and 30% , respe ctively

. Whil e this may require the Chance ry Court to consider how the statutes have been spe cifica lly applied to the Plaintiff, the ultimate re solution of these issues de pe nd s p re do min ate ly

up on wh e the r t he un de rl ying statut e s c omp ly wi th c on sti tut ion a l ma nd ate s. Vi e we d a s a

wh ole , thi s su it is be st c ha ra c te ri zed a s a

fa c ia l atta c k c ha lle ng ingthe va lid ity of c e rt a in statutes and s t at e constitutional provisions. Thus, we deter mine that beca

use the Plaintiff’s complaint predomina

te ly r a is e d is s u e s o f s ta tu to r y v a li d it y , th e Chanc ery

Court improperly

dismiss ed this complaint for failure to exhaust admini strative re medies. We rema nd this suitto the Chance ry Court for conside ration on the mer its.

II. Allegations of

Bias an d Pr ejudgm ent by the Board
Th e Pla int if

f a lso a sse rt s that it sho uld be e xcu se d f

ro m a ll e xha

us tio n r e qu ir e me nts be c a

us e the B oa rd c ann ot pr ov ide fa ir

and imp art ia l r e vie w, the re by vio la tin gthe Pla int if

f’ s r ig ht t o pr oc e dura l du e pr oc e ss. Se e Withro w v
. L arki n, 42 1 U.S. 35 , 4 6- 47 (1 97 5) (s tatin gdu e pr oc e ss re qu ir e s a fa ir tr ia l in fr ont of a fa ir tr ibu na l in a dmi nis tr ativ e a dju dic atio n)

. Th e Pla int if f m ake s a two-fold ar gument: (1) the B oard ha s prejudg ed the issue by taking an officia l a dverse position, and (2) ther e is insufficient se paration between the Boa rd and othe r bra

nches of g overnme nt.
In support of its claim that the B oard ha s prejudg ed the issue, the Plaintiff relies he avily upon Northwe st Airlines v. Tennesse e S tate B oard of Equalization, 11 F.3d 70, 73 (6th Cir. 1992). In that
case , the S ix th Circuit of the United States Court of A ppeals he ld that the Tax I njunction Act did not ba r a su it f or inj un c tiv e re lie f a g a ins t th e B oa rd of Eq ua lizatio n in the fe de ra l dis tr ic t c ourt be c a us e there was no “plain, speedy , and eff icient reme dy” in the state cour t; the Six th Circuit ex plained that the B oa rd wa s invo lve d in

pe nd inglit ig atio n in wh ic h it ha d a sse rt e d a po sit ion dir e c tly a dv e rs e to No rt hw e st A ir lin e s’ s c la im. I d. at 72 . B e c a us e of the se “ pe c uli ar” fa c ts, the c ourt pe rm itt e d the c a se to proce ed in the fe d er al d istrict court as a “ra re e x ception” to the g ener al rule unde r the Tax Injunction Act. I d. at 73.
The Tax Injunction A ct restra ins f eder al courts only and has no application to the jurisdiction of the Da vidson County

Chance ry Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (“The district courts shall not enjoin,Ref l ec t i n g on t h e r ol e of

a dmi n i s t r at i v e ag en ci es wi t h i n a s epa r at i on of powe r s f r ame wor k , J u s t i ce J ac k s on 11

co m m ent ed t hat agenci es “ have b eco m e a veri t ab l e f o urt h branch o f

t he G o vernm ent , whi ch has deranged our t h r e e - b r a n c h l e g a l t h e o r i e s m u c h a s t h e c o n c e p t o f a f o u r t h d i m e n s i o n u n s e t t l e s o u r t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l t h i n k i n g
. ” F TC
v
. Rube r oi d Co. , 343 U

. S. 470, 487 ( 1952) ( Ja ck s on , J

. , di s s en t i n g )

. H e f u r t h er n ot ed:

A d m i ni st rat i ve agencies have b een call ed qua si

- l egi sl at i ve, qua si

- executi ve o r q uasi

- judici al , a s t he
o ccasi o n requi red, i n ord er t o val i d at e t hei r f unct i o ns wi t hi n the sep arat i o n- o f

- p o wers schem e o f

t he (c o n tinu e d ...) -17- su sp e nd or re str a in t he a sse ssm e nt, le vy

or c oll e c tio n of any tax und e r State law
. . . . ” ) ( e mph a sis
a d d e d )

. F o r

th is r e a s o n , th e r

u li n gin N o rthw e st A ir li n e s w o u ld a p p ly o n ly b y an a lo g y
. We acknow ledg e, howe ver, that one of the e x cept i o n s t o the exhaustion of administrative reme dies doctrine is “whe n the admini strative body is shown to be biased or has otherwise pr edete rmined the iss ue be fo re it. ” Mc Cart

hy , 5 03 U. S. at 14 8- 49

. Mo re ov e r, in e xtre me c a se s o f a dmi nis tr ativ e bia s, the ri g h t t o p r o c e d

ur a l d u e p r o c e s s m i g h t b e a

b r i d g e d

. W i th r o w , 4 2 1 U

. S

. at 4 6

- 4 7

. Th e se circ umstances a

re not, howe ver, a

nalog ous to those in Northwest Airlines. Here, the re is no evidenc e that the B oard of Equalization has taken a position contra ry to the Plainti ff i n pending l i t i gat i o n
. Nw

. Ai rl i n es , 1 1 F. 3 d at7 2

. T h e ANRP i p el i n e C o
. ca s e h as b ee n co n cl u d ed

. T h e r u l i n g, of cour se, predated the passag e of the amendment f ound at Tenne ssee Code Annotated sec tion 67-5- 501(9)( B) (iii), which is the ce ntral issue in this lit iga tion. The Plaintiff also points out that certa in em p l o y ee s of the B oard ma y have lobbied the Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y

to p a ss t he ame ndme nt. Te nn . Code Ann. § 6 7- 5- 50 1( 9) (B )( iii ). In r e je c tin gthi s same a rgument, fede ral District J u d ge R o b er t L . Echols observe d that “an a g ency ’s support of a public position on a policy issue does not disqualify the a gen cy o n t h e ground of bias f rom later actingin its adjudicative role.” Colonial P ipeline Co., 231 F.R.D. at 531. We believe that the r uling
c omp or ts w ithsta nd ard s o f r e vie w–“ [a ]d

m i n i s t r a t i v e d e c i s i o n - m a

k e r s are pr e sume d to c arr

y out th e ir duties with honesty

and integrity .” Jones v. Gree ne, 946 S.W.2d 817, 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996);
se e a lso W it hr ow , 4 21 U. S. at 47 (s tatin gthat th e re is a “ pr e sumpt ion

of ho ne sty and int e g ri ty in tho se se rv inga s adj ud ic ator s” ). Th at one or mor e me mbe rs of the B oa rd ha s adv oc ate d a cha

ng e in the law d oe s n ot w arr ant a n e xce pti on

to t he e xha us tio n r e qu ir e me nt.
The Plaintiff also contends that beca use the B oard of

Equalization is notinsulated from the executive an d l egis lative bra nches, it is inhere ntly

biased. That the Boa

rd includes high-ra

nking
me mbe rs of

the e xec uti ve br anc h is ins uf fi c ie nt, ho we ve r, to o ve rc ome the pr e sumpt ion of ho ne sty and int e g ri ty in the a dmi nis tr ativ e a dju dic ator

. Withro w, 42 1 U.S. at 47 . T he Un ite d St ate s Su pr e me Court has observe d that “‘the mere union of t he ex ecutive power and the j udicial power

. . . cannot be said to violate due proce ss of law.’” Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972) (q u o t i ng Tume y v. Oh io, 273 U.S

. 51 0, 53 4 (1 92 7) ). F ur the r, we have he ld t

hat “ the me re fa c t th at bo th investigative and adjudicative functions have been gr anted to an adminis trative body

. . . does not of itself cr eate an unconstitutional risk of bias in an ad m i n i s t ra t ive adjudication.” Cooper v. Wil liamson County

Bd. of Educ., 803 S.W.2d 200, 2 0 2 -0 3 (Tenn. 1990) . By its very nature , the Boa rd of Equa liz ation, like other administrative ag encie s, may perf orm some functions that might fall within the ambit of all three branc hes of g overnme nt. Whil e ther e ar e limi t at i o n s to an 11(

. . . con t i n u ed) 11 C ons t i t ut i on. T he mere r et r eat t o t he qual i f y i ng “ quas i ” i s i mp l i ci t wi t h c onf es s i on t hat al l r ecogn i zed cl as s i f i ca t i on s h av e br ok en dow n , a n d “ qu as i ” i s a s moot h cov er wh i ch we dr aw ov er ou r c on f u s i on as w e mi g h t u s e a cou n t er pan e t o c on ce al a di s or der ed bed.

I d.

A noted scho l ar of c o n stitut i o nal l aw and f ed eral co urt s has general i zed t he d i vergi ng vi ews of s o verei gn 12 i mm un i t y by s ay i ng , “ D ef ender s of s over ei gn i mm un i t y s ay t hat t he do ct r i ne properl y p ut s t r us t i n g over nment s
. Cri t i cs ar g u e t h at s u ch t r u s t h as n o r ol e i n c on s t i t u t i on al j u r i s pr u den ce ; g ov er n men t a t t i mes w i l l v i ol at e t h e l aw a n d mu s t be hel d acco unt ab l e. ” E rwi n C hem eri nsky , Fed eral Juri sdi ct i o n, § 7

. 2 , at 40 9 (5t h ed

. 20 0 7 ).
-18- ag ency ’s ability to e x erc ise the power s of other branc hes, see Richardson, 913 S.W .2d at 4 5 2, nothing in our c ase l aw p rohibits an ag ency from simultaneously

takingon quasi-executive a nd quasi-judicial role s, absent s p ec i fi c alleg ations of bias or pr ejudg ment. To the contra ry , we rec og nize that some overlap with the e x ecutive br anch ma y be nec essar

y to maintain an eff

icient and
re sp on siv e bure a

uc ra c y . T hu s, the argume nt o f i nh e re nt b ia s is wi tho ut m e ri t.
III. Declar atory Judgm ent Against State Off icer s
An imp or tant i ssu e is wh e the r a de c larator y jud g me nt may be iss ue d a g a ins t in div idu a l st ate office rs. Relying on its holding in Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S .W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995), the Court of Ap pe a ls h e ld t

hat th e De c lara

tor y Judg me nt A c t a

uth or ize s su its a g a ins t st ate of fi c e rs , so long as the goal is not “to reach the state, i ts trea sury , funds or proper ty .” I d. at 256. The Plaintiff also relies upon that ruling. The Def endants c laim, however , that three opinions from this C ourt are in conflict with Campbell: L .L . Be an, 817 S.W .2d at 297-98; N. Telec om I nc. v. Taylor, 781 S.W .2d 837, 839-40 (Te nn. 1989); and Hill v. Be eler , 286 S.W .2d 868, 871 (T en n
. 1 9 5 6 ). Under the particula r fa cts in eac h of those ca ses, we he ld that suits ag ainst state office rs should be dismissed beca use of sovereign immunit y and the lac k of subject matter jurisdiction. L .L . Be an, 817 S.W.2d at 298-99.
The doc trine of sove reign immunit y is “‘a pr inciple of the co m m o n l aw a s old as the law itself, that the king is not bound by any statute, if he be not e x pressly named to be so bound.’” Auto. Sales Co. v. J ohnson, 122 S.W .2d 453, 455 (T en n
. 1938) (quotingState v. Kinne, 41 N.H. 238 (1860))

. In Eng land, s ome s tate officer s wer e ins ulated from suit on the basis that they wer e ac ting
o nb eh al f o f

th e K i n g. S ee L o u i s L

. J af fe , S u i t s Aga i n s tGo v ern m en t s an d Of fi ce rs : S o v er ei gn Immunity , 77 Har

v. L . Rev. 1, 9 (1963). “ The King ’s immunity rested pr imarily

on the structure of the fe ud a l sy ste m and se c on da ri ly on a fi c tio n that the Ki ng c ou ld do no wr on g .” Ne va da v. Ha ll, 44 0 U .S. 41 0, 41 5 ( 19 79 ) ( c iti ng1 B la c ks tone, Comme nta ri e s * 24 6) . T od ay , A me ri c an c ourt s g ener ally reje ct the ar chai c l ega l fi ction that the sovere ign c an do no wr ong
. Seminole Tribe v. 12 Florida , 517 U.S. 44, 103 n.2 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting ) (citing L ang ford v. United States, 101 U. S

. 3 4 1 , 3 4 2 -3 4 3 (1 8 8 0 ))

. J u s t i ce Ho l m es at t emp t edt o ex p l ai n m o d ernco n ce p t i o n s o f s o v er ei gn immunit y with the logic al conclusion that “ther e can be no leg al rig ht as ag ainst the authority that makes the la

w on which the r ight de pends.” Kawa nanakoa v. Poly

blank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).W i t h r ega r d t o El eve nt h A mendm ent s over ei gn i mm un i t y , one com ment at or s ug ges t s t hat many of t he f eder al 13

ca s es de al i n g w i t h s ov er ei g n i mmun i t y , i n t er g ov er n men t al t ax i mmun i t y , an d r eg u l at or y i mmun i t y c an be e x pl ai n ed “ by at t ent i on t o s epar at i on o f p ower s i s s ues i mp l i ci t i n t hes e que s t i ons of f eder al i s m. ” La ur enc e H

. T r i be, I nt er gover nment al I mmun i t i es i n Li t i g at i on , T ax at i on , a n d Reg u l at i on : Se par at i on of Power s I s s u es i n Cont r ov er s i es About Fe der al i s m, 89 H ar v. L. Rev. 6 82 , 7 13 (197 6); s ee al s o H ar ol d J. K r ent , Reconcept ual i zi ng Sover ei gn I mm un i t y , 45 V ander bi l t L. Rev 1 5 2 9 , (1 9 9 2 ) (sta ting tha t so v e re ign im m u n ity “d e riv e s n o t fro m the infa lli b ili ty o f the sta te b u t fro m a d e sire to m a inta in a p rop er balance am o ng the b ranches o f the f ed eral go vernm ent , a nd fr o m a p rop er co m m i t m ent t o m ajo ri t ari an rul e”). T h e E le v e n th A m e n d m e n t p rin c ip a ll y a d d re sse s se p a ra tio n o f p o w e rs c o n c e rn s b e tw e e n the fed e ra l an d sta te gover nment s
. I n a si mi l ar f as hi on, t he s over ei gn i mm un i t y doct r i ne emb od i ed i n t he T enn es s ee C ons t i t ut i on addres s es se p a ra tio n o f p o w e rs issu e s a m o n g the thr e e b ra n c h e s o f go v e rn m e n t i n T e n n e sse e
.

T h e S u p re m e C o u rt h a s re c o g n iz e d a sim ilar re stra int o n the p o w e r o f t h e fed e ra l c o u rts to re n d e r j u d g m e n ts 14
ag ai n s t t h e s t at es
. T h e U n i t ed St at es Cons t i t u t i on pr ov i des , “ T h e Ju di ci al pow er of t h e U n i t ed St at es s h al l n ot be
co nst rued t o ext end t o any s ui t i n l aw o r eq ui t y , co m m enced or p rosecut ed agai nst one of t he U ni t ed Stat es by C i t i zens o f an o t he r S t ate, o r b y C i t i ze ns o r S ub je cts o f a ny F o reign S t ate.” U .S. C o nst. A m en d . 1 1 . C o ng ress i nten d ed this f i rst
ame n dmen t t o t h e U S Con s t i t u t i on s i n ce t h e B i l l of Ri g h t s t o ov er r u l e t h e ca s e of Chi s ho l m v. G eo rgi a, 2 U

. S. 419 (17 9 3 ), whi ch al l o wed a So ut h C aroli na ci t i zen t o recove r on a war de b t f o r s up p l y i ng m at eri al s t o G eo rgi a d uri ng t he R evol ut i onar y W ar
. T he pl ai n l ang uag e of t he E l eve nt h A mendm ent , read nar r owl y , see ms t o re s t r i ct onl y t he po wer o f t h e fed e ra l d istric t co u rts to he a r a c tio n s b ro u g h t ag a ins t state go v e rn m e n ts b y c iti z e n s o f a n o the r state in d ive rs ity act i ons
. See A t as cader o St at e H osp. v. Sca nlo n, 4 7 3 U .S. 234 , 289

- 90 ( 19 85 ) ( B r enn an, J. , di s s ent i ng )

. T he U ni t ed S ta te s S u p re m e C o u rt, ho w e v e r, h a d inte rp re te d this a m e n d m e n t l ib e ra lly to fi n d a c o n stitutio n a l re q u ire m e n t o f state
s over ei gn i mm un i t y i n f eder al cour t s
. See, e. g. , H ans v. Loui s i ana , 13 4 U

. S. 1, 14 ( 18 90 )

. Som ewh at cr y pt i cal l y , Ju s t i ce K enned y has rem arked t hat soverei gn i m m uni t y i s d eri ved no t f rom t he E l event h A m end m ent , “ b ut f rom t he st ruct ure o f t h e o rig ina l C o n stitutio n it se lf. ” A ld e n v . M a ine , 5 2 7 U .S . 7 0 6 , 7 2 8 (1 9 9 9 ). T h e so v e re ign im m u n ity w e d isc u ss in t h i s c as e di f

f er s f r om t h at f

ou n d i n t h e U n i t ed St at es Cons t i t u t i on , wh i ch i s pr i n ci pal l y a r es t r ai n t u pon t h e j u r i s di ct i on of t he f ede ral c o urt s
. W e f

i nd he l pf ul an al ogi es , howev er , i n muc h of t he r eas oni ng t hat t he f eder al cour t s ha ve us ed
w h e n d e a ling w ith the p ra c tica l effe c ts o f so v e re ign im m u n ity. -19- L og ic aside, the policy

behind sovere ign immunity has bee n most convincing ly justified by pr inc ipl e s o f s e pa

ratio n o f p ow e rs
. 13
This Court h as co n s istently interpre ted our state c onstitut ion as upholding the doctrine of
so ve re ig n immun ity . T he la st s e nte nc e of art ic le I , se c tio n 17 state s, “ Sui ts m ay be br ou g ht a g a ins t the State in such manne r and in such courts as t he L eg islature may by law dire ct.” The tra ditional

14 construction of the clause is that suits cannot be broug ht ag ainst the State unless expli citly authorized by statute. See, e .g ., N. B ritish & Mer cantile Co. v. Craig , 62 S.W

. 155, 157 (Tenn. 1900) ; State v. B ank of Te nn ., 62 Te nn . (3 B a xt.) 39 5, 40 3 (18 74 ). Th e Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y ha s ta ke n a c omp ara ble po sit ion by statin g : “N o co ur

t in the state sh a ll h ave any

po we r, jur isd ic tio n, or

a uth or ity to e nte rt a in any suit ag ainst the state, or a g ainst any office r of the state ac ting by authority o f t h e s t at e, with a view to re ach the state, its treasur y , funds, or prope rty

. . . .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 20-13- 102 (1994).
This conce pt of sovere ign immunity g ener ally extends to st ate a g encie s and state of fice rs actingin the ir officia l c apac ity

. 81A Am. J ur. States § 533 (2004). I n Stockton v. Morris & Pierc e, 110 S.W .2d 480 (Tenn. 1937) , howeve r, we held that the doctrine of sover eig n immunity does notLi ke t he d o ct ri ne i t sel f , t he l i t i gat i o n t act i c o f nam i ng a s t at e o f

f i cer i n a sui t as a m eans of ci rcum vent i ng 15

s ov e r e i g n i mmu n i t y h a s i t s r oo t s i n En g l i s h c om mo n l a w
. Ev e n t h ou g h t h e Ki n g c ou l d n ot be su ed, t her e we r e s om e i n s t an ce s w h er e “ ot h er of f i ci al s c ou l d be s u ed t o r eme dy t h e wr on g s don e by the go vernme n t

. ” Che mer i n s k y a t 432 (ci t i ng Jo hn V

. O rt h, T he Jud i ci al P o wer of t he U ni t ed Stat es: T he E l event h A m end m ent i n A m eri can H i st o ry 41 (19 8 7 ))

.

O ne f ed eral dis t ri ct co urt has ref erred t o E x p art e Y o ung as “‘ o ne o f t he t hree mo st i m p o rt ant de ci si o ns t he 16 Su pr eme Cour t of

t h e U n i t ed St at es h as e v er h an ded down

. ’ ” Al l i ed Ar t i s t s Pi ct u r es Cor p. v
. Rhode s , 473 F. Su pp. 560, 5 6 4 (E .D

. O hio 1 9 7 9 ) (q uo t i ng 1 7 W right & M i l l er, F ed era l P rac t i ce & P ro ce d ure § 4 2 3 1 , p
. 3 5 2 (1 9 7 8 )). It ha s also bee n c al l ed “ on e of

t h e cor n er s t on es of ou r l eg al s y s t em. ” I d. ( ci t i n g G r ea t W

. U n i t ed Cor p. v
. K i dwe l l , 577 F. 2d 1256, 1 2 6 5 (5t h C i r. 19 7 8 ))

. -20- bar suits ag ainst state offic ers to pre vent them from e nforc ing a n alleg edly

unconstitutional statute. 15 Stockton involved a suit in replevin inst i tuted by tobacc o deale rs ag ainst the State Depa rtment of Financ e to r ecove r tobacc o products that wer e seized pursuant to an unc onstitut ional statute. I d. at 48 1. Th e de fe nd ants fi le d a mot ion to d ism iss , all eging that th e tr ia l c ourt la c ke d ju ri sd ic tio n in actions ag ainst the State. I d. In reje cting this a rgument, we held that “‘[a] suit aga inst state office rs attackingthe const itutionalit y of a statute of

the State is not a suit ag ainst the State.’” I d. at 483 (quoting43 A.L .R. 408). Our re asoningpara lleled that of the United S t at es Supreme Court’s seminal dec ision of Ex parte Young , 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Essentially , an off icer actingpursuant 16 to an unconstitutional statute does not act under t he authority of t he state; thus, the off icer does not
e njo y the immun ity

that w ou ld n or

ma lly be g ra nte d p ur su ant t o o ff

ic ia l a uth or ity . In o the r w or ds , the offic er loses immunity when a ctingbeyond the scope of t he power of the State, and the powe r of the State is limited by the s tate and fede ral c onstitut ions. The issue is not whether the State has waived sove reign immunit y for this specif

ic classification of sui t; sovere ign immuni ty simply does not attach.
The e x ception we laid out in Stockton perta ins only to suits preve nting the enforc ement of
a n un c o n s t i tu t i o n a l s t atu t e
. I t w o u l d n o t a l l o w f o r m o n e y d am a g e s t o b e aw ar d e d a g a ins t st a te office rs bec ause suc h a suit would “r ea ch the state, its trea sury , funds, or prope rty .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 2 0- 13 -1 02 ; se e a lso Ed e lma n v. J or da n, 41 5 U.S. 65 1, 66 5 ( 19 74 ) ( ho ldi ngthat su its a g a ins t sta t e o ff i cer s for money

damag es ca

nnot be re ndere d in fede ral c ourt bec ause f unds to satisfy monetary awa rds “inevitably

come f rom the g ener al re venues of the state” ).
Most of the ca ses re lied up on by the Def endants in this case involve suits for money damag es, and, the ref

ore, a re not c ontrolling. F or instance , the plaintiff in Hill was a w i dow who sued in the B oard of Claims for money damag es ag ainst the State of Te nnessee for the de ath of he r hu sb and . H ill , 2 86 S.W. 2d at 87 0. Whe n th e B oa

rd of Cla ims fo und it lac ked jur isd ic tio n, Hi ll soug ht a dec laratory

judgme nt in the Chancer y Court. I d. We aff

irmed the c hance llor’s dismissal of the a ction beca

use the B oard of

Claims “had no authority or jurisdiction to hear the claimant’s petition.” I d. at 334-35. Simi larly , in Norther n Telec om, the plaintiff soug ht a tax refund fr om the Commi ssioner of Reve nue bec ause of an allege d overpa y ment. N. Telecom, 781 S.W .2d at 838-39. In both Hill and Northern T elec om, the Plaintiff sought to disguise a suit for money damag es by

an a c t i o nf o r d e c l ar at o r

y j u d g m e n t

– u s i n gth e A c ta s a

T r o j a n h o r s e “ t o r e a c hth e s t at e , i t s tr e a s ur y, fu nd s, or pr op e rt y .” Te nn . Co de Ann. § 2 0- 13 -1 02 . D e sp ite the br oa d lan gua g e in t he se op ini on s,T h i s c as e does n ot de al w i t h w ai ver o f s ov er ei g n i mmun i t y by s t at u t e, bu t e v en w h en t h e i s s u e i s on e of 17 wai ver , s ubj ect mat t er j ur i s di ct i on an d s over ei gn i mm un i t y pres ent es s ent i al l y t he s ame i s s ue. An en abl i ng s t at ut e t hat grant s a co urt s ub ject m at t er j uri sdi ct i o n to hear cl ai m s agai nst a s t at e wi l l l i kewis e co nst i t ut e an exp l i ci t l egi sl at i ve w a ive r o f so v e re ign im m u n ity.
-21- they should not be interpre ted to prec lude suit s for de clar atory judgme nt ag ainst enfor ceme nt of unconstitutional statutes by state off icer s. Stockton, 110 S .W.2d at 483.
The De fenda

nts’ relianc e on our r

uling in L .L . Be an is more on point. In that case , this Court upheld the dismissal of a suit for de clar atory judgme nt where the plaintiff ar gued that a pa rticular t a x s t atu t e w a s un c o n s t i tu t i o n a l

. L. L. B e an , 8 1 7 S

. W

. 2 d at2 2 6

. T h e p r o c e d

ur a l p o s tur e i nL. L. Be an is almost identical to the ca se at ba r. In support of the holding , this Court cited both Hill and Norther n Telec om and ruled that the Dec laratory J ud gm en t Ac t does not g rant subjec t matter jurisdi ct i o n fo r a c ourt to issue a dec laratory judgme nt ag ainst the Commis sioner of Reve nue. Fur ther, this Court made the f ollowing obse rvation:

No rt h ern T el ec o m an d

Hi l l v
. Be el er

ar e n o tb as eds o l el y

o nth e d o ct ri n e o f s o v er ei gn immunit y . The result in both case s also has as a sufficie nt ba sis for dec ision the lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Even to the extent that they do rely on the doctrine of
so ve re ig n immun ity , the ir ho ldi ng s are no t ma de ina pp lic a ble in c a se s inv olv ingstate re ve nu e by

the de vic e of

de signatin gde fe nd ant s as in divid ua ls r athe r t

ha n a s st ate of fi c ia ls.

I d. at 298 (c it i n g Au t o
. S ales Co., 122 S.W.2d at 453). The L .L . Be an opinion sug g ests that Colonial’s suit is ba

rre d for two rea sons–sovereign immunit y and lac k of subject matter jurisdiction. In light o f o u r conflicting opinion in Stockton, we must choose one holdingover the other. F or sever al re asons, we be lieve that Stockton offe rs the better alternative. First, the distinction drawn in L .L . Be an, betwe en s o v er ei gn immunit y and subjec t matter jurisdiction, was not pa

rticularly helpful under

the fa cts of that ca se or in either Norther n Telec om or Hill. Whi le these a

re two diff

ere nt leg al conc epts, sover eign immunity and subjec t matter jur is d i c t i o no f

t e n e mb o dy th e s am e i n qu i r

y i nc a s e s i n v o l v i n gd e c l ar at o r y j u d g m e n t s a g a ins t e nf or c e me nt o f a

n u nc on sti tut ion a l st atut e
. Th is is b e c a us e so ve re ig n immun ity

e nc omp a sse s b oth 17 the principle of

immunit y

from suit and the princ iple of immunit y from liability

. 81A Am. J ur. 2d States § 534 (2004). In acc ordanc e with the first principle, “[s ]overeig n immunit y is jurisdictional immun ity fr om s uit . T he c on sti tut ion a lly gua ra nte e d p ri nc ipl e of s tat e im munity a c ts a s a jurisdictional bar to an a ction ag ainst the state by prec luding a court fr om exercising subje ct-matter jurisdiction.” I d. The doc trine of sove reign immunit y was the only

rea s o n t h at t he cour

ts lacked subject matter jur isdiction in Hil l and Northern Telecom. When state officers lose this im munity by
e nf or c ingan unc on sti tut ion a l st atut e , th e De c larator y Judg me nt A c t grants ju risd ic tio n in a su it aga i n s tth em as i n d i v i d

u al s
. S t o c k t o n , 1 1 0 S

. W

. 2 d at4 8 2 -8 3

. Ab s en tth e s h i el d o f s o v er ei gn immunit y , a suit ag ainst a state of fice r is no differ ent than a suit ag ainst any other pe rson for the purposes of subje ct matter jurisdiction.Pr of es s or Cha r l es Al an W r i g h t r ef er r ed t o t h i s a ppr oac h a s “ i n di s pens ab l e t o t h e es t abl i s h men t of 18

co nst i t ut i o nal gove rnme nt and t he rul e o f l aw.” C harl es Alan W ri ght , Law of Fe d eral C o urt s 2 9 2 (4t h ed

. 19 8 3 ).

A s J a m e s M a d iso n w ro te , 19
(c o n tinu e d ...)
-22- N e x t , th e L. L. B e ano p i n i o nd i d n o ta p p l y , d i s t i n gu i s h , o r

e x p l i c i t l y

o v e r r u l e S t o c kt o n
. In Stockton, we af

firm ed a j u dg ment ag ainst the Commis sioner of F inance and Tax ation. Stockton, 110 S.W .2d at 485-86. Confronte d with these conf licting holding s, it appear s that our rulingtoday is not only compliant with a well-e stablished rule of sovere ign immuni ty as recognized by the fe dera l courts, Ex pa

rte Young , 209 U.S. at 159-60, but is also consistent with the majority view in other jurisdictions which rec og nize traditional sovereign immunity . See, e.g ., J ackson v. Millst one, 801 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Md. 2002) (“Where a st atute or r egulation is invalid, sovereig n immunit y does not prec lude a de clar atory

judgme nt action or suit for a n injunctio n aga i n s t t he g overnme ntal officia l who is re s p o n s i b l e for enfor cingthe statute or r egulation.”); City of B elmont v. Miss. S tate Tax Comm’n, 860 So. 2d 289, 296 (Mis s. 2003) (quotingState v. Hinds County Bd. of Sup’rs, 635 So. 2d 83 9, 84 2 ( Mis s. 19 94 ) ( “ Mis si ss ip pi l aw s up po rt s th e pr op os iti on that no so ve re ig n immun ity
e xists wh e n th e re lie f s ou g ht i s a de c lara tion that a pa rt ic ula r s tatut e or

a c tio n o f t

he State is unconstitutional.”); Northwa ll v. St ate, 637 N.W.2d 890, 896 (Ne b. 2002) (statingthat “ a d e clar atory j u d gment action attac king the constitutionalit y of a statute or

seekingrelief

from an inva lid act or an abuse of authority

by an off icer o r age n t i s not a suit ag ainst the state and is ther efor e not prohibited by

principles gover

ning sovereign immunit y”); Te x . Natura l Res. Conservation Comm’n
v. I T- Da vy , 7 4 S .W. 3d

84 9, 85 5 ( Te x. 20 02 ) ( “ Pr ivate pa rt ie s ma y se e k d e c lara

tor y re lie f a g a ins t sta t e o fficials who alleg edly act without leg al or statutory authority .”); B erlowitz v. Roach, 30 N.W.2d 256, 257 (Wis. 1947) (stating t hese are but actions “ag ainst the enforcing office r to preve nt him from doing that which it is claimed he ha s no leg al rig ht to do”).
Th e ru lin gin S toc kto n is ba se d u po n th e c on c e pt t

hat an o ff ic e r a c tin gpurs ua

nt t o a statut e that is un c on sti tut ion a l and vo id d oe s n ot a c t a s a

n a g e nt o f t

he State . Any

su c h a c tio n is ult

ra vires –that is, beyond the authority g rante d by

the State. As Jus tice Peckha m wrote:
The a ct to be enf

orce d is alleg ed to be unc onstitut ional; and if i t be so, t he use of the
name of the Sta

te to e nf or c e an un c on sti tut ion a l a c t to the inj ur y of c omp la ina

nts is
a pr oc e e din gwi tho ut t

he a uth or ity of , a nd on e wh ic h d oe s not a ff

e c t, t he State in i ts so ve re ig n o r g ov e rnme nta l c a pa c ity

. I t is sim

ply an il le g a l a c t up on

the pa rt of a state off i ci al i n at t empting, by

the use of the name of

the State, to enfor ce a

leg islative
enac tment which is void beca use unconstitutional.

Ex parte Young , 209 U.S. at 159. We ag ree with the assessment made by our hig hest court more 18 than a centur

y ag o. Fur

ther, the a

pproac h in Stockton is most consistent with our separation of power s doctrine in that itpreve nts sovereign immunit y from devitalizing a

judicial tool necessa

ry to e nsure that the executive and leg islative branc hes act within the constra ints of the state and f eder al constitution. Tenn. Const. art. I I , § 2; see a lso Campbell, 926 S.W .2d at 266.

19(

. . . con t i n u ed) 19 N o po l i t i cal t rut h i s cert ai nl y of great er i nt ri nsi c val ue, or i s st am p ed w ith t he aut ho ri t y of m o re e n light ened pa t rons of l i b ert y , t han t hat whi ch t he o b ject i o n i s f o und ed

. T he accum ul at i o n of all p o wers, l egi sl at i ve, executi ve, and judici ary , i n t he same hand s, whether o f one , a f ew, o r many, and
w h e the r h e re d itar y, se lfap p o inte d , o r e le c tive , m a y ju stly b e p ro n o u n c e d the ve ry d e finiti o n o f t yra n n y.

T he Fe d eral i st N o 48 (Jam es M ad i son).
-23- W h i l e in C amp b el l v
. S un d qu i s t , th e C o urt o f Ap p ea l s an al y z ed th e do ct ri n e of

s o v er ei gn immun ity un de r t he De c larator

y Judg me nt A c t in

a sli g htl y dif fe re nt w ay , th e re su lt i s c on sis te nt w ith our rulingtoday . In Campbell, our intermediate cour t rea s o n ed t h at b eca

use the De clar atory Judg me nt A c t “ sh ou ld b e lib e ra lly c on str ue d in fa vo r o f t he pe rs on se e kin gre lie f in a

pr op e r c a se to t he e nd that r ig hts and

int e re sts be e xpe dit iou sly de te rm ine d;” the Ac t w a s “ an e na bli ngstatut e to allow a prope r plaintiff to maintain a sui t ag ainst the S tate challeng ing the constitutionalit y of a state statute.” I d. at 256-57. Stated differ ently , the reme dial nature of the Act qualifie d as a w aiver
o f s o v e r e i g n i m m u n i ty
. T h e f l aw i nth atre as o n i n g, h o we v er , i s th atth e w ai v er o f s o v er ei gn immunit y must be expli cit, not implicit. See Auto. Sales Co., 122 S.W .2d at 456 (quoti ngMay rhofe r v. Bd. of Educ., 26 P. 646, 647 (Cal. 1891) ( “One cannot sue the state, unless e x pressly authorized by statute, and this principle is embodied in our c onstitut ion. Gener al statutes creating new r emedies for individuals have never been he ld to authorize such suits.”)). The Dec laratory J udg ment Act does
n o tc o n t a i nane x p l i c i tw a i v e r o f s o v e r e i g ni m mun i ty. Unlike the majority

in Campbell, we do not hold that the Decla ratory J udg ment Act wa ives
sovere ign immunity . Instead, we hold that sovereign immunit y simply does n o t apply

to a decla ratory judgme nt action cha lleng ing the constitutionalit y of a statute a g ainst state off icer s. See S t o c kt o n , 1 1 0 S

. W

. 2 d

at4 8 3

. B e c a

u s e s o v e r e i g ni m mun i ty d o e s n o ta p p l y, a w a i v e r i s unn e c e s s ar

y. Fur ther, subjec t matter jurisdiction is not a bar. Be cause this case is a de clar atory judgme nt action
a g a ins t st ate of

fi c e rs c ha lle ng ing the ir a

uth or ity to imp os e laws vio lativ e of the c on sti tut ion

in t he ir individual capac ity , as opposed to off icial ca pacity , the Def

endant s fa ll under the de finition of “per son” in our De clar atory J udg ment Act. Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-14-101 (providingthat a “pe rson” is “any person, p a

r tn e r s h ip , jo in

t s to c k c ompany , unincorpora

ted association, or society , or municipal or other c orporation of any char acte r whatsoever” ). Thus, th e General Asse mbly has authorized subject matter jur isdiction over these individu al state off icer s, to the ext ent that their a ctions are g ro un de d in

an unc on sti tut ion a l st atut e . T his g ra nt o f s ub je c t mat ter ju risd ic tio n is fo un d in Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 2 9- 14 -1 03 , whic h p ro vid e s th at “[a ]ny pe rs on
. . . who se ri g hts , status, or other leg al re lations are a ffe cted by a statute . . . may

have de termi n ed an y q u es tion of construction or va lidity

arisingunder the . . . statute . . . and obtain a decla ration of rig hts, status or other leg al re lations thereunde r.”

I t is our view, there fore , that the Declaratory J udg ment Act gra nts subject m atter jurisdiction to the Davidson County Chance ry Court to addre ss the constitutional iss ues. As stated, the Plaintiff does not seek mone y

damag es or a

ref u n d of paid taxes; the relief soug ht is a decla

ration of
un c on sti tut ion ali ty

. Th us, th e Cha nc e ry Court may iss ue de c larator

y and inj un c tiv e re lie f a g a ins t the Def endants in the ir individual c apac ity , so long as the court’s judgme nt is tailored to pre vent the-24-

implementation of unconstitutional legislation and does not “re ach the state, its treasur y , funds, or proper ty .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 20-13- 102.
Conclusion When challeng ing the fac ial validity of a statute on constitutional g rounds, a plaintiff nee d
no t e xha us t a dmi nis tr at i ve re me die s und e r t he Un if or m A dmi nis tr ativ e Pr oc e dure s A c t pr ior to a su it for de clar atory

judgme nt. Furthe r, sover eig n immunit y does not bar a

declara tory

judgme nt or inj un c tiv e re lie f a g a ins t state of fi c e rs to p re ve nt t

he e nf or c e me nt o f a

n unc on sti tut ion a l st atut e , s o long a s the plaintiff does not seek monetary damag es. For these re asons, we a ffirm the judg ment of the Co urt of Ap pe a ls a

nd re mand thi s c a se to t

he Cha nc e ry Court fo r p ro c e e din g s c on sis te nt w ith thi s o pin ion . Co sts are a sse sse d to the De fe nd ants

.

___________________________________ GA RYR. WA DE , JUST I CE