J-S32032-17 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.K.R., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.R., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3887 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree and Order December 13, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000915-2016

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.C.R., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.R., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3889 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree and Order December 13, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000916-2016

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., STABILE, and FITZGERALD*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED JUNE 09, 2017

S.R. (“Mother”) appeals from the December 13, 2016 decrees and 

orders involuntarily terminating her parental rights to K.K.R. (born in August 

of 2011) and S.C.R. (born in October of 2012) (collectively “Children”) 

pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S32032-17

- 2 -

(b), and changing Children’s permanency goal to adoption under the 

Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351.1 We affirm. 

On March 5, 2015, Mother and Children first became known to the 

Department of Human Services of Philadelphia County (“DHS”) as a result of 

a General Protective Services (“GPS”) report alleging that Mother resided in 

an unfit house with Children, abused drugs, did not provide adequate food, 

and neglected Children. On March 20, 2015, Mother and Children moved to 

a drug and alcohol rehabilitation shelter. Mother was discharged from the 

shelter due to her non-compliance and inappropriate behavior towards 

Children. Mother and Children then moved into another shelter on April 17, 

2015. Shortly thereafter, the shelter evicted Mother after a staff member 

observed her inappropriately disciplining Children, which included spanking 

and pinching them. On April 27, 2015, Mother admitted that she hits 

Children when DHS met with her to discuss the allegations. On same day, 

DHS obtained an Order of Protective Custody (“OPC”) for Children and 

placed them with their maternal aunt, B.C. (“Maternal Aunt”).

At the shelter care hearing on April 29, 2015, the trial court lifted the 

OPC and ordered the temporary commitment to DHS to stand. The trial 

____________________________________________

1 Children have different biological fathers. The putative father of K.K.R. is 

unknown, and the putative father of S.C.R. is K.M. (“Father-2”). In separate 

decrees and orders entered on December 13, 2016, the trial court 

involuntarily terminated the parental rights of unknown father to K.K.R. and 

Father-2 to S.C.R. The unknown father of K.K.R. and Father-2 are not 

parties to the current appeal, nor did they file separate appeals.
J-S32032-17

- 3 -

court granted Mother supervised visitation and referred her to the Clinical 

Evaluation Unit (“CEU”) for a drug and alcohol screening and dual diagnosis 

assessment for mental health and substance abuse. The CEU report issued 

a progress report on May 5, 2015, revealing Mother tested positive for 

marijuana and PCP.

On May 8, 2015, the trial court adjudicated Children dependent and 

committed them to DHS. The case was transferred to the Community 

Umbrella Agency (“CUA”), which developed a Single Case Plan (“SCP”) for 

reunification with Children. Mother’s SCP objectives were: (1) to participate 

in a dual diagnosis treatment and submit to random drug screens at CEU; 

(2) to receive referral for Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”); (3) to 

engage in parent education classes; (4) to obtain appropriate housing; and 

(5) to attend supervised visitation with Children. Mother’s SCP objectives 

have remained the same throughout the duration of the case.

On October 5, 2016, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate 

Mother’s parental rights and change Children’s permanency goal to adoption. 

On December 13, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on the petitions. At 

the hearing, DHS presented the testimony of Essence Jones, the CUA case 

manager at Turning Points. Mother, represented by counsel, testified on her 

own behalf. Father-2, represented by counsel, also testified. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered decrees and orders 
J-S32032-17

- 4 -

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), 

(2), (5), (8), and (b), and changing Children’s permanency goal to adoption.

On December 30, 2016, while represented by counsel, Mother filed pro 

se notices of appeal and statements of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).2 On January 11, 2017, counsel 

for Mother, filed amended concise statements of errors complained of on 

appeal in accordance to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). This Court consolidated Mother’s 

appeals sua sponte on January 17, 2017. Mother raises the following issues.

Whether the trial court committed reversible errors when it 

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights where 

such determination was not supported by clear and 

convincing evidence under the adoption act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511 (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8)?

Whether the trial court committed reversible errors when it 

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights without 

giving primary consideration to the effect that the 

termination would have on the developmental, physical 

and emotional needs of the child as required by the 

adoption act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?

Mother’s Brief at 4.3

____________________________________________

2 We note that Mother’s pro se concise statements of errors failed to 

adequately identify in a concise manner or with specificity the issues sought 

to be pursued on appeal in accordance with Rule 1925(b)(4)(ii). As such, 

the trial court directed counsel to assist Mother with her appeals.

3

In her amended concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and 

appellate brief, Mother did not challenge the trial court’s orders changing 

Children’s permanency goal to adoption. Thus, this issue is waived. See 

Krebs v. United Refining Co., 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(holding that an appellant waives issues that are not raised in both his 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S32032-17

- 5 -

We summarize Mother’s two arguments together. Mother contends 

that the evidence makes it clear that DHS did not prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that her parental rights should be terminated pursuant 

to Section 2511(a) of the Adoption Act. Mother’s Brief at 8. Mother points 

out that she has made progress during the course of the case and has 

demonstrated a willingness to remedy the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal to perform parental duties. Id. at 11. 

Since the evidence failed to establish that her relationship with Children was 

severed, Mother argues that DHS failed to prove that termination under 

Section 2511(b) was in the best interests of Children. Id. at 13.

Our standard of review regarding orders terminating parental rights is 

as follows:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating 

parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the 

decision of the trial court is supported by competent 

evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, 

or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s 

decision, the decree must stand. Where a trial court has 

granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental 

rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge’s decision 

the same deference that we would give to a jury verdict. 

We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the 

record in order to determine whether the trial court’s 

decision is supported by competent evidence.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and the statement of 

questions involved in his brief on appeal).
J-S32032-17

- 6 -

In re S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005). In termination cases, the 

burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. 

Id. at 806. Clear and convincing evidence is defined as:

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing 

as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in 

issue.” 

In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted).

“The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and 

resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. 

Super. 2004). “[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, 

we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.” In 

re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003) (quoting In 

re: N.C., 763 A.2d 913, 917 (Pa. Super. 2000)). Additionally, this Court 

“need only agree with [the trial court’s] decision as to any one subsection in 

order to affirm the termination of parental rights.” In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 

380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). 

In this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), which provides as 

follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:
J-S32032-17

- 7 -

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of 

at least six months immediately preceding the filing of 

the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied 

by the parent.

* * *

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency for a period of at least six months, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of the 

child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not 

remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of 

time, the services or assistance reasonably available to 

the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which 

led to the removal or placement of the child within a 

reasonable period of time and termination of the 

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare 

of the child.

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from 

the date of removal or placement, the conditions which 

led to the removal or placement of the child continue to 

exist and termination of parental rights would best 

serve the needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

 (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating 

the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to 
J-S32032-17

- 8 -

the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors 

such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing 

and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the 

parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider 

any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the 

statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 

2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s 

conduct warrants termination of his . . . parental rights 

does the court engage in the second part of the analysis 

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs 

and welfare of the child under the standard of best 

interests of the child.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (internal citations 

omitted). “Parental rights may be involuntarily terminated where any one 

subsection of Section 2511(a) is satisfied, along with consideration of the 

subsection 2511(b) provisions.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. 

Super. 2010). 

Termination under Section 2511(a)(1) involves the following:

To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(1), the 

moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence 

of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to 

the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a 

settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a 

refusal or failure to perform parental duties. In addition,
J-S32032-17

- 9 -

Section 2511 does not require that the parent 

demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to 

perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights 

may be terminated pursuant to [s]ection 2511(a)(1) 

if the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose 

of relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to 

perform parental duties.

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform 

parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental rights, the court must engage in three lines 

of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her 

conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between 

parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect 

of termination of parental rights on the child 

pursuant to [s]ection 2511(b).

In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations 

omitted). Regarding the six-month period prior to filing the termination

petition:

[T]he trial court must consider the whole history of a given 

case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory 

provision. The court must examine the individual 

circumstances of each case and consider all explanations 

offered by the parent facing termination of his...parental 

rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality 

of the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary 

termination.

In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations 

omitted). 

The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section 

2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not 

limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may include 

acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re
J-S32032-17

- 10 -

A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). “Parents are required to 

make diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full 

parental responsibilities.” Id. at 340. Pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), “the 

petitioner for involuntary termination must prove (1) repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care, 

control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In Interest of Lilley, 

719 A.2d 327, 330 (Pa. Super. 1998).

“Termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(5) requires 

that: (1) the child has been removed from parental care for at least six 

months; (2) the conditions which led to removal and placement of the child 

continue to exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of the child.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1118.

“[T]o terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8), the following 

factors must be demonstrated: (1) [t]he child has been removed from 

parental care for [twelve] months or more from the date of removal; (2) the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to 

exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 

(Pa. Super. 2003).
J-S32032-17

- 11 -

Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination

will best serve the child’s needs and welfare. In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516 (Pa. 

Super. 2006). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are 

involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child.” Id. at 

520. “In this context, the court must take into account whether a bond

exists between child and parent, and whether termination would destroy an 

existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 

1121.

When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not 

required to use expert testimony. Social workers and 

caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally, 

Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 

evaluation.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

“The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines 

certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide 

for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements 

within a reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be 

considered unfit and may properly have his or her rights terminated.” In re

B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2001). Regarding the definition of 

“parental duties,” this Court has stated:

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. 

Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of 

a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and 

support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be 

met by a merely passive interest in the development of the 

child. Thus, this Court has held that the parental 
J-S32032-17

- 12 -

obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative 

performance.

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial 

obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a 

genuine effort to maintain communication and association 

with the child.

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental 

duty requires that a parent exert himself to take and 

maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively 

with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every 

problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship 

to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult 

circumstances. A parent must utilize all available 

resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must 

exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed 

in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. 

Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more 

suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental 

responsibilities while others provide the child with [the 

child’s] physical and emotional needs.

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d at 855. “[A] parent’s basic constitutional right to 

the custody and rearing of his or her child is converted, upon the failure to 

fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting 

and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe 

environment.” Id. at 856.

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Joseph 

Fernandes, we conclude Mother’s issues on appeal merit no relief. The trial 

court’s opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the 

questions presented. See Trial Ct. Op., 1/17/17 , at 3-10 (finding: Children 
J-S32032-17

- 13 -

have been removed from Mother’s custody since April 27, 2015, nineteen 

months at the time of trial due to her drug abuse and inability to 

appropriately parent Children; Mother’s compliance with her SCP goals has 

steadily declined; Mother tested positive for PCP on September 9th and 29th 

of 2016; Mother stopped attending her dual diagnosis treatment program 

and was discharged without successfully completing the program; Mother 

was referred to ARC for parenting classes, but was unsuccessfully 

discharged; Mother chose to complete parenting classes elsewhere, but 

these classes did not improve her ability to parent; Mother has never had 

appropriate housing; Mother currently lives at a shelter where Children 

cannot join her; Mother’s recent tardiness to her supervised visits with 

Children has caused some of the visits to be canceled; Mother has visited 

Children only twice in the last three months; Mother's inconsistency in 

visiting Children has caused their relationship to become unhealthy; Mother’s 

bond with Children has become very attenuated; Mother cannot provide 

Children with permanency; Maternal Aunt has provided Children with love, 

care and stability for the last nineteen months; CUA case manager credibly 

testified regarding the lack of parental relationship between Mother and 

Children in contrast to the parental bond that exists between Children and 

Maternal Aunt; termination of Mother’s parental rights would not cause 

Children irreparable harm; record demonstrates Mother’s repeated 

unwillingness to remedy the cause of her incapacity to parent, her failure to 
J-S32032-17

- 14 -

perform any parental duties, and her inability to remedy conditions that led 

to the placement of Children; evidence is clear and convincing that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights would be in best interests of Children; 

thus, court properly terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Sections 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b)). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of 

the trial court opinion.

Decrees and orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/9/2017