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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket Nos. 48891/48892

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KEAREN R. YOUNG,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: November 28, 2022

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Kootenai County. Hon. Cynthia K.C. Meyer, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction for vehicular manslaughter and aggravated driving under 

the influence of alcohol, drugs, and/or an intoxicating substance, affirmed; order of 

restitution, affirmed; and order denying Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion, affirmed. 

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Kimberly A. Coster, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Andrew V. Wake, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge

Kearen R. Young appeals from the district court’s judgment of conviction for vehicular 

manslaughter, Idaho Code § 18-4006(3)(b), and aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, 

drugs, and/or an intoxicating substance, I.C. § 18-8006, and order of restitution. Young alleges 

the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence, denying her Idaho 

Criminal Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, and failing to consider her future ability to 

pay the amount of restitution ordered. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in its 

sentencing determination, its denial of Young’s I.C.R. 35 motion, or its order of restitution, the 

judgment of conviction, the order denying Young’s I.C.R. 35 motion, and the restitution order are 

affirmed. 
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I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are uncontested on appeal. While driving under the influence of 

alcohol, Young turned left in front of an oncoming motorcycle. The motorcycle struck Young’s 

car and Albert Galli, the motorcycle driver, and his wife, Amy Galli, the motorcycle passenger, 

were seriously injured. Young left the scene. Shortly thereafter, a law enforcement officer and 

Young made contact; Young submitted to alcohol testing of her breath which registered a breath 

alcohol concentration of .272, .241, and .250. The State charged Young with two counts of 

aggravated driving under the influence, I.C. § 18-8006, and one count of leaving the scene of an 

injury accident, I.C. § 18-8007, all felonies. Approximately two months after the accident, Albert 

died at the hospital from complications related to the crash. As a result, the State charged Young 

with vehicular manslaughter, I.C. § 18-4006(3)(b), a felony, in a separate criminal case.

Pursuant to a plea agreement resolving the charges in both cases, Young pleaded guilty to 

vehicular manslaughter and one count of aggravated driving under the influence. Young agreed 

to pay restitution and child support for Albert’s minor children. The parties agreed to jointly 

recommend that Young’s aggregate sentence not exceed twenty years, and the State dismissed the 

remaining charges. The district court sentenced Young to fifteen years, with five years 

determinate, for vehicular manslaughter and a five-year determinate sentence for aggravated 

driving under the influence with the sentences to run consecutively. The district court left 

restitution open for sixty days. 

The State filed a memorandum requesting restitution for the victims’ economic losses 

pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304 (economic loss restitution) and an order for child support pursuant to 

I.C. § 18-4007(3)(d) (child support restitution). The district court held a restitution hearing. The 

district court found that Amy and GEICO1 were victims of Young’s crimes and ordered Young to 

pay Amy $21,454.00 and GEICO $14,859.36 for the economic losses incurred as a result of the 

accident. Additionally, the district court ordered Young to pay $209.00 a month for child support 

to Amy until her and Albert’s youngest child turned eighteen.

Subsequently, Young filed an I.C.R. 35 motion, requesting the district court reduce her 

determinate sentences to reflect the positive changes she made in her life, allow her to care for her 

 

1 GEICO paid $14,859.00 when the motorcycle was totaled as a result of the accident. 
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elderly parents, and begin working toward paying back the ordered restitution and child support. 

The district court found that its previously imposed sentences were reasonable and denied Young’s 

I.C.R. 35 motion. Young timely appeals.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court’s imposed sentence, denial of an I.C.R. 35 motion, and order of restitution are 

discretionary decisions. State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276, 1 P.3d 299, 304 (Ct. App. 2000); 

State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Bybee, 115 

Idaho 541, 543, 768 P.2d 804, 806 (Ct. App. 1989). When a trial court’s discretionary decision is 

reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the 

lower court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries 

of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices 

before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 

270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).

III.

ANALYSIS

Young argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence 

and denying her I.C.R. 35 motion. Young also argues the district court abused its discretion by

failing to consider her future ability to pay the amount of restitution ordered and that the totality 

of the evidence presented in the presentence materials do not support a conclusion that Young has 

a foreseeable ability to repay the restitution after release from incarceration. In response, the State 

argues the district court did not err.

A. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion 

Young asserts that in light of the mitigating factors present in this case, the district court 

abused its discretion by imposing excessive sentences. Specifically, Young argues that her

devotion to her family, church, and community; her remorse for her actions; her changes in her 

lifestyle; and her desire to work to pay restitution and child support to the victims of her crimes 

make the sentences imposed unreasonable under any view of the facts of the case. 

An appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard. Burdett, 134 

Idaho at 276, 1 P.3d at 304. Where a sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show 

that it is unreasonable and thus a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 
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825 P.2d 482, 490 (1992). A sentence may represent such an abuse of discretion if it is shown to 

be unreasonable upon the facts of the case. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 

(1982). A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it appears at the time of sentencing that 

confinement is necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve 

any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution applicable to a given case. 

State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). Where an appellant 

contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, we conduct an 

independent review of the record, having regard for the nature of the offense, the character of the 

offender, and the protection of the public interest. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 P.2d 

1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s 

entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Our role is limited 

to determining whether reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as the district court. 

State v. Biggs, 168 Idaho 112, 116, 480 P.3d 150, 154 (Ct. App. 2020).

A sentence need not serve all the sentencing goals or weigh each one equally. State v. 

Dushkin, 124 Idaho 184, 186, 857 P.2d 663, 665 (Ct. App. 1993). The primary consideration is, 

and presumptively always will be, the good order and protection of society. All other factors are, 

and must be, subservient to that end. State v. Hunnel, 125 Idaho 623, 873 P.2d 877 (1994); State 

v. Pederson, 124 Idaho 179, 857 P.2d 658 (Ct. App. 1993). 

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Young’s sentences. The 

district court acknowledged it had discretion in imposing a sentence and identified the factors that 

guide its discretion. The district court understood the statutory range of sentences available for 

Young’s crimes and the sentences imposed are within the statutory range.

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 Additionally, upon 

review of the record, the sentences imposed are not excessive given consideration of the nature of 

the offense, character of the offender, and protection of the public interest. 

While Young has expressed remorse, articulated a desire to take accountability for her 

actions, and taken some steps to make changes, these facts do not render the district court’s 

sentences excessive. Prior to the current conviction, Young had three previous convictions for 

driving under the influence. In two of those cases, Young’s blood alcohol concentration 

approached or was over .20 and she fled the scene. These convictions did not act as a deterrent to 

 

2 Vehicular manslaughter and aggravated driving under the influence each carry a statutory 

range of up to fifteen years of incarceration. I.C. § 18-4007(3)(b); I.C. § 18-8006(1)(a).
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Young because, in this case, Young again drove under the influence with testing indicating a blood

alcohol concentration of .272/.241/.250. While driving under the influence, Young turned left in 

front of an oncoming motorcycle, causing the motorcycle to crash into the side of her car and the 

Gallises were launched over Young’s vehicle and landed on the roadway. While the Gallises lay 

unconscious and/or unresponsive, Young left the scene. Young’s actions caused significant injury 

to each of the Gallises. Amy fractured her T-7 vertebrae, broke her rib, and had a mild brain injury. 

Albert broke his neck, had a brain injury, and ultimately died from complications of his injuries, 

leaving his children without a father.

Driving under the influence of alcohol poses a significant public safety concern. Given 

Young’s history of driving while under the influence of alcohol, the impact of Young’s actions 

upon the Gallises and their children, and the need to impose a sentence that both punishes Young’s 

behavior in this case and deters future similar behavior, we decline to hold that Young’s sentences

of fifteen years, with five years determinate, for vehicular manslaughter and five years determinate

for aggravated driving under the influence, are unreasonable under any view of the facts. 

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its sentencing discretion. 

B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying Young’s I.C.R. 35 

Motion

Young argues the district court abused its discretion by denying her I.C.R. 35 motion in 

light of the evidence presented at the motion hearing.

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 A motion for reduction of sentence under 

I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed to the sound discretion of the court. State v. 

Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d 23, 24 (2006); State v. Allbee, 115 Idaho 845, 846, 771 

P.2d 66, 67 (1989). In presenting an I.C.R. 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence 

is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in 

support of the motion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). In 

conducting our review of the grant or denial of an I.C.R. 35 motion, we consider the entire record 

and apply the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original sentence. State 

v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21, 22, 740 P.2d 63, 64 (Ct. App. 1987). 

 

3 The State argues that Young waived her ability to file an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion 

as part of her plea agreement. The State did not raise this claim to the district court in response to 

Young’s I.C.R. 35 motion. Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered for the first 

time on appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). Accordingly, we 

will not address this issue further. 
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 At the I.C.R. 35 motion hearing, Young testified that she believed the district court should 

reduce the determinate length of her prison sentence because, since the imposition of her sentence, 

she maintained sobriety, requested a transfer to a facility with a work center where she can be more 

productive, began an Alcoholics Anonymous self-study program, and enrolled in mindfulness and 

grief classes. Young further emphasized that she does not believe that she is a threat to the 

community, she has good family support, and she had not received any disciplinary offenses while 

incarcerated. Finally, Young testified that she wants to be able to be released from prison earlier 

so she can care for her elderly parents and work towards paying her restitution and child support 

obligations to the victims in the case.

While Young’s good behavior and sobriety during her incarceration are admirable, they 

are also expected. As such, Young’s behavior during the time she spent incarcerated does not 

establish that her sentences are excessive. At the sentencing hearing, the district court considered 

Young’s presentence investigation report which detailed the support she receives from family and 

friends. Young expressed her remorse and desire to pay restitution prior to sentencing. Thus, 

Young’s additional testimony as to these issues at the I.C.R. 35 motion hearing did not constitute 

new information that would render her sentences excessive. The district court acted within its 

discretion and consistent with legal standards when it denied Young’s I.C.R. 35 motion and, 

accordingly, did not err.

C. The District About Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Its Restitution Order 

Young argues the district court abused its discretion by ordering that she pay Amy 

$21,454.00 and GEICO $14,859.36 in restitution for the economic losses they sustained as a result 

of her criminal conduct.

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 While Young concedes these restitution amounts accurately represent 

the economic losses the victims incurred as a result of her actions, she asserts that when the district 

court ordered restitution, it “did not address [her] future ability to pay at all” and, as such, the court 

failed to reach its decision through an exercise of reason. Second, Young argues the totality of the 

evidence presented in the presentence materials do not support a conclusion that she has a 

foreseeable ability to repay the restitution after release from prison. In support of her arguments, 

Young cites State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, 462 P.3d 1125 (2020) (Garcia I). While the State 

“concedes that the district court could have been more explicit in its analysis of Young’s 

 

4 Young does not challenge the district court’s child support order on appeal. 
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foreseeable ability to pay,” it argues the court nonetheless “adequately addressed the issue and the 

record supports its (at least implicit) finding.” 

1. The district court considered Young’s future ability to pay the restitution 

ordered 

Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) authorizes a sentencing court to order a defendant to pay 

restitution for economic loss to the victim of a crime. The decision of whether to order restitution, 

and in what amount, is within the discretion of a trial court, guided by consideration of the factors 

set forth in I.C. § 19-5304(7) and by the policy favoring full compensation to crime victims who 

suffer economic loss. State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37, 43 P.3d 794, 796 (Ct. App. 2002); 

Bybee, 115 Idaho at 543, 768 P.2d at 806. Thus, we will not overturn an order of restitution unless 

an abuse of discretion is shown. Richmond, 137 Idaho at 37, 43 P.3d at 796.

Pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304, which governs economic loss restitution for crime victims: 

Unless the court determines that an order of restitution would be 

inappropriate or undesirable, it shall order a defendant found guilty of any crime 

which results in an economic loss to the victim to make restitution to the victim. 

An order of restitution shall be a separate written order in addition to any other 

sentence the court may impose, including incarceration, and may be complete, 

partial, or nominal.

I.C. § 19-5304(2). While I.C. § 19-5304 expressly authorizes a restitution award for the full 

amount of a victim’s economic loss, that authority is bounded by certain considerations. In 

determining whether to order restitution and the amount of restitution to award, a trial court:

shall consider the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of 

the offense, the financial resources, needs and earning ability of the defendant, and 

such other factors as the court deems appropriate. The immediate inability to pay 

restitution by a defendant shall not be, in and of itself, a reason to not order 

restitution.

I.C. § 19-5304(7). Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that “a [trial] court may order 

restitution based on a foreseeable ability to repay the award.” State v. Wisdom, 161 Idaho 916, 

924, 393 P.3d 576, 584 (2017). A district court’s determination that a defendant has a foreseeable 

ability to repay the award is a factual finding that will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by 

substantial evidence. Garcia I, 166 Idaho at 681-82, 462 P.3d at 1145-46. 

In Garcia I, the district court ordered Garcia to pay $162,285.27 in restitution. Id. at 682,

462 P.3d at 1146. The district court’s analysis of Garcia’s future ability to pay the restitution

consisted of one sentence: “Having considered [Garcia’s] economic circumstances, the Court 

concludes that an order of restitution is appropriate in this case.” Id. The Idaho Supreme Court 
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held the district court abused its discretion in two ways. First, the district court failed to recognize 

the outer boundaries of its discretion in failing to identify the proper standard: i.e., it did not 

recognize the difference between Garcia’s immediate inability to pay the restitution award and his

foreseeable ability to pay the restitution award. Id. Second, the district court failed to show an 

exercise of reason when it limited its analysis of Garcia’s future ability to pay to the one sentence 

set forth above. Id. Noting that a district court is not required to “divine a defendant’s future 

financial capabilities” or “limit a victim’s right to restitution to what is presently known about the 

defendant,” the Court held that pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304(7), a court must provide some analysis 

concerning a defendant’s future ability to pay a restitution award in order to reach its decision 

through an exercise of reason. Garcia I, 166 Idaho at 683, 462 P.3d at 1147. The Court held the 

district court abused its discretion in ordering the amount of restitution because it did not “address 

Garcia’s future ability to repay at all.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court remanded the case for a 

restitution order consistent with its opinion. Id. 

Following remand, the district court held another evidentiary hearing, found Garcia had 

the future ability to pay the restitution, and ordered restitution in the amount of $162,285.27. State 

v. Garcia, 170 Idaho 708, 711, 516 P.3d 578, 581 (2022) (Garcia II). Garcia appealed and the 

Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the restitution award, finding there was substantial and competent, 

albeit conflicting, evidence regarding Garcia’s future ability to pay the restitution. Id. at 707, 516 

P.3d at 585. First, the Court concluded the district court erroneously found that Garcia had made 

progress paying down the restitution amount ordered because the payments Garcia made from his 

garnished wages were not keeping up with the interest accruing on the restitution. Id. However, 

the Court went on to conclude that substantial and competent evidence supported the district 

court’s conclusion regarding Garcia’s future ability to pay restitution because the court properly 

considered the other I.C. § 19-5305(7) factors. Garcia, 170 Idaho at 707, 516 P.3d at 585. The 

Court specifically noted that the district court considered the economic losses sustained by the 

victims as a result of Garcia’s offenses; Garcia’s financial resources, needs upon release, and 

earning ability to repay the restitution amount; Garcia’s positive pre-incarceration employment 

history in the trailer manufacturing industry; his potential employment capacity in the same or 

similar industry upon release; the educational and vocational opportunities available to Garcia to 

increase his employability and earning capacity before release; and the lack of evidence that Garcia 

had any impairments, mental or physical, that would adversely impact his employability or ability 
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to perform work in the future. Id. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s restitution 

order. Id. 

Although Young relies on Garcia I to support her argument that the district court did not 

address Young’s future ability to pay the restitution, we find State v. Foeller, 168 Idaho 884, 489 

P.3d 795 (2021) more analogous to the facts of this case. In Foeller, pursuant to a plea agreement, 

Foeller pleaded guilty to two counts of grand theft and one count of tax evasion; she also agreed 

to pay restitution “if applicable per statute.” Id. at 886, 489 P.3d at 797. The State sought

restitution on behalf of the victims of Foeller’s crimes, including $535,952.87 to Travelers 

Casualty. Id. at 886, 489 P.3d at 797. Foeller did not challenge the accuracy of the amount owed 

to Travelers Casualty, but argued that she should not be ordered to pay the full amount because 

she lacked a future foreseeability to pay the restitution based on her indigency, her lack of other 

resources, her inability to work as an accountant upon her release from prison, a documented 

disability for mental health issues, and the fact that the interest accrual during her three-year 

incarceration would be “astronomical.” Id. at 887, 489 P.3d at 798. 

The district court ordered Foeller to pay the $535,952.87 restitution to Travelers Casualty. 

Id. The district court’s analysis of Foeller’s future ability to pay the restitution consisted of the 

following sentence: “[B]ecause the defendant is not going to be incarcerated forever, the defendant 

does have the ability to earn money and does have the ability to pay some of this back at some 

point.” Id. Foeller appealed. Id. 

The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s restitution award. The Court first 

noted that restitution “has been elevated to a constitutional right in the state of Idaho.” Id. at 888, 

489 P.3d at 799. The Court then distinguished Foeller from Garcia I, noting that although the 

district court’s analysis of Foeller’s future ability to pay restitution consisted of only one sentence, 

and the court did not cite to specific information in the record or the presentence materials to 

support its assertion that Foeller had the ability to earn money, “the record contain[ed] an 

abundance of facts permitting both sides to argue for and against Foeller’s ability to pay the 

restitution.” Id. at 889, 489 P.3d at 800. The Supreme Court concluded that there was substantial 

evidence supporting the district court’s finding that Foeller had the ability to repay the restitution 

upon her release, even though the finding was made without reference to specific facts. Id. at 890, 

489 P.3d at 801.
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Here, like Foeller, Young agreed, pursuant to her plea agreement, to pay restitution “if 

applicable per statute.” Also similar to Foeller, Young concedes that Amy and GEICO were 

victims under the restitution statute, their economic losses were a result of her criminal conduct, 

and the restitution amounts ordered by the district court accurately represent their economic 

losses.5 During the restitution hearing, Young’s trial counsel argued the restitution in this case 

falls into two categories: (1) economic loss restitution pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304; and (2) child 

support restitution for Albert’s children pursuant to I.C. § 18-4007. Young’s trial counsel cited to 

I.C. § 19-5304(7), listed the factors the district court should consider, and argued that his only 

objection to restitution was that Young did not have either an immediate or long-term ability to 

pay the restitution based on the length of her prison sentence. However, Young’s counsel then 

stated that “a lot” of the restitution for the victims’ economic losses would be paid by Young’s 

insurance:

Your Honor, finally, just with respect to the civil case, I want to let the court 

know that’s still ongoing. I anticipate that once the insurance companies figure out 

whether Ms. Young’s employer or Ms. Young’s auto insurance, who is going to 

pay what, a lot of this is going to be satisfied out of--at least--not the child support 

amounts, but the economic out-of-pockets. We’ll be filing, you know, a motion for 

partial satisfaction of judgment, or whatever. That hasn’t occurred yet, but it should 

occur soon.

Thus, although Young’s counsel argued that while Young did not have the immediate ability to 

repay the restitution for the victims’ economic losses, he also acknowledged Young’s insurance

would soon have the ability to pay “a lot” of the restitution and that the payment would be credited 

to Young. We see no meaningful distinction between Young herself paying restitution or Young’s 

insurance paying the restitution because, in either event, the payment is credited against Young’s 

legal obligation to pay restitution. Thus, the district court could properly consider the payment--

whether from Young or Young’s insurance--as supporting a conclusion that Young had the future 

ability to pay the restitution. 

Subsequently, in its oral decision, the district court explicitly addressed Young’s immediate 

inability to pay, finding the order:

 

5 Young challenged the inclusion of prospective expenses in the State’s restitution 

calculations for Amy as such expenses did not represent a loss Amy actually incurred. The district 

court agreed with Young’s challenge and, accordingly, its restitution award did not include the 

challenged $300 prospective expense. 
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takes into account that Ms. Young is incarcerated and doesn’t have the means to 

satisfy presently some of the debts and certainly not to satisfy them in--very quickly 

over the course of the next few years. I do recognize that she may have some 

income that she might earn while she’s in custody. I also recognize that it would 

be very low income and I don’t know how much would be available to pay any 

debts.[6]

Thus, like Foeller, but unlike Garcia I, here, the district court addressed both Young’s 

immediate and future ability to pay her “debts,” i.e., both economic loss and child support 

restitution and that Young had the future ability to earn an income, albeit a low one. Thereafter, 

the district court stated it would be awarding restitution “using the information that I got here in

the hearing today.” That information included both the information that Young would be credited 

with paying “a lot” of the economic loss restitution in the near future and the information regarding 

the child support calculation. The record also indicatesthe district court considered Young’s future 

ability to pay the economic loss restitution because the district court stated it would set out the 

amount of restitution for the victims’ economic losses and the child support “separately and put a 

little bit of detail into the calculation of the amounts so that when and if there are payments made 

from the insurance company, they can be credited if appropriate to the amounts that are setout.” 

It is true that the district court’s findings are not as extensive as those in Garcia II, but 

precedent does not require the district court to make such extensive findings in order to uphold a 

restitution order. Moreover, like in Garcia II, the district court considered the economic losses 

sustained by the victims as a result of Garcia’s offenses based on Young’s concession that Amy 

and GEICO were victims pursuant to the statute and that the amount of restitution represented their 

economic loss. Similarly, and as noted above, the district court considered Young’s financial 

resources and her earning ability to repay the restitution amount. Finally, there was evidence 

presented that Young did not have any impairments, mental or physical, that would adversely 

impact her employability or ability to perform work in the future. Although more limited than the 

findings in Garcia II, the record here does not support a conclusion that the district court did not 

 

6 While the transcript may be read that the district court’s comments were referring to the 

child support restitution award, the district court used the word “debts,” which would encompass 

both the child support restitution and the economic loss restitution. Moreover, even if this 

statement applied only to one category of the restitution award, the reasoning similarly applies to 

the economic loss restitution. Young cites no authority that the district court was required to 

provide separate reasoning for the imposition of each type of restitution, and we decline to impose 

such a requirement. 
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address Young’s future ability to pay restitution “at all.” Instead, consistent with precedent, the 

district court provided some, albeit limited, analysis concerning Young’s future ability to pay the

restitution award and, thus, reached its decision through an exercise of reason. 

In light of the facts of this case, a crime victim’s constitutional right to restitution, and the 

controlling precedent, we conclude that the district court sufficiently analyzed and addressed 

Young’s immediate inability and foreseeable future ability to pay restitution. Accordingly, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution. 

2. The district court’s finding that Young has the future ability to pay restitution 

after release from incarceration is supported by substantial and competent 

evidence 

The district court addressed Young’s immediate inability and foreseeable future ability to 

pay restitution and then ordered restitution. Like in Foeller and Garcia II, the district court’s 

finding that Young has the future ability to pay restitution for the economic losses the victims

sustained as a result of Young’s criminal conduct is supported by substantial and competent 

evidence in the record and in the presentence materials.

First, the appellate record was augmented by order of the Idaho Supreme Court to include 

a satisfaction of judgment, filed by Amy Galli, which indicated Young’s $21,454.00 restitution 

award owing to Amy had been paid. The satisfaction of judgment was filed on July 20, 2022, 

approximately eleven months after the restitution order was filed on August 31, 2021. This 

document corroborates trial counsel’s representation that a lot of the restitution would “soon” be 

paid by Young’s insurance. Second, the amount of the remaining economic loss restitution Young 

owes is the $14,859.36 owed to GEICO--a significantly lesser amount of restitution than the 

$162,285.27 at issue in Garcia or the $535,952.87 owed in Foeller. While the amount at issue 

does not negate the requirement to address a defendant’s future ability to pay, it is nonetheless a 

factor the trial court can consider. Third, the presentence materials indicate that Young has a high 

school diploma and an Associate of Arts degree, as well as linguistic and hospitality certificates. 

Young further listed her job skills and experience as a “CNA (Nurse asst.)--Airline--Industry 

Hospitality, tutoring, wholesale/Retail Sales in fashion design.” Young indicated that she was 

receiving monthly disability income from the Social Security Administration but did not specify 

for what diagnosis. Many letters were submitted in support of Young; some indicated she was 

dependable, conscientious, and hardworking, characteristics that enhance her ability to obtain and 

maintain employment upon her release from prison. One letter further indicated that Young
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“excelled” in her career and had worked both as a flight attendant and as a caregiver in the health 

care field. Nothing in the presentence materials suggest employment opportunities would not be 

available upon Young’s release from incarceration or that she would otherwise be unable to repay 

the remaining $14,859.36 of restitution. 

Thus, the district court’s finding that Young had the future ability to pay restitution is 

supported by substantial and competent evidence.7 As such, we decline to find that the district 

court’s conclusion was not reached by an exercise of discretion and, consequently, the court did 

not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution. 

IV.

CONCLUSION 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence, denying 

Young’s I.C.R. 35 motion, or ordering restitution. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction, order 

denying Young’s I.C.R. motion, and order of restitution are affirmed. 

Chief Judge LORELLO and Judge GRATTON CONCUR. 

 

7 Even if this Court concluded that after analyzing Young’s future ability to pay the 

restitution, the district court did not make an explicit finding, the district court made an implicit 

finding that Young had the foreseeable future ability to repay restitution by addressing Young’s 

ability to pay her “debts” and then imposing restitution. In the absence of an explicit finding, we 

will review the record to determine what finding is implicit in the trial court’s order. State v. 

Welker, 129 Idaho 805, 808, 932 P.2d 928, 931 (Ct. App. 1997). We defer to implicit findings of 

fact supported by substantial and competent evidence. See id. As discussed above, the record 

provides substantial and competent evidence to support the district court’s finding--either explicit 

or implicit--that Young had the foreseeable future ability to pay restitution.