Affirm and Opinion Filed September 12, 2022

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-21-00191-CV

THOMAS REDWINE, AS TRUSTEE OF THE MARTHA T. LATTIMORE 

LIVING TRUST, AND INTERVENOR, ST. LUKE’S EPISCOPAL 

CHURCH OF DENISON, TEXAS, Appellants

V.

STORMY LATTIMORE CANSLER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE 

OF THE 2014 MARTHA T. LATTIMORE LIVING TRUST; JOHN 

VICTOR LATTIMORE, JR.; RICHARD CANSLER; NORTHWEST 

HOLDINGS CREEKMORE, LLC; AMERICAN BANK OF TEXAS; AND 

RAYMOND JAMES FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., Appellees

On Appeal from the 397th Judicial District Court

Grayson County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CV-15-1547

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Schenck, Molberg, and Pedersen, III

Opinion by Justice Pedersen, III

Appellants Thomas Redwine, as Trustee of the Martha T. Lattimore Living 

Trust (Redwine), and St. Luke’s Episcopal Church of Denison, Texas (St. Luke’s) 

challenge two orders of the trial court signed January 11, 2021: the Order Denying 

Intervenor St. Luke’s Episcopal Church’s Request for Declaratory Relief, and the

Order Granting Defendant Stormy Cansler’s Second Amended Motion to Enforce 
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Mediated Compromise Settlement Agreement and Dismiss Case. In a single 

appellate issue, Redwine and St. Luke’s argue that the trial court denied them due 

process by deciding a breach of contract issue on submission without a summary 

judgment proceeding or trial. We affirm the trial court’s orders.

Background

This dispute originated following the death of Martha Lattimore (Lattimore) 

in August 2015, when it was learned that she had identified the same property as the 

corpus of two trusts with different beneficiaries. In May 2014, Lattimore executed 

one trust, naming Redwine trustee and naming St. Luke’s the sole residuary 

beneficiary. In August 2014, however, Lattimore executed another trust, identifying 

substantially the same corpus, but this time naming her daughter, appellee Stormy 

Lattimore Cansler (Cansler), trustee and naming Cansler and her brother, appellee 

Victor Lattimore, Jr., the residual beneficiaries.

The Mediated Settlement Agreement

The parties signed a Mediated Settlement Agreement (the MSA) in February 

2016.1 Along with conflicting trusts, Lattimore had also executed more than one 

will. In the MSA, the parties agreed on which will and which trust—as modified by 

the MSA—would be operative. The parties agreed to dismiss their will contest, a 

guardianship proceeding, and this case, which the MSA called the Trust Case. The

 

1

 The MSA is confidential and is filed under seal in this Court. We identify only the terms necessary 

to resolve the issues before us.
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MSA intended only “proceedings necessary to complete and enforce the terms and 

provisions of [the MSA]” to continue. Appellees’ counsel notified this trial court 

that the parties had settled, that the court would need to terminate the trust in the 

future, that “as a result of settlement, no motions for summary judgment would be 

filed by any parties,” and that the trustee would continue paying the bills of the trust 

as the court had directed and the parties had agreed in the MSA.

The MSA directed that before any distributions were made from Lattimore’s 

estate, the debts and obligations owed by the estate were to be paid, including “[a]ny 

and all obligations due and owing to the Internal Revenue Service by Martha

Lattimore, her Estate or her Trust.” The parties’ filings establish that, at the time of 

the settlement, all were aware of the existence of a significant federal tax lien. After 

all debts were paid, the trust would terminate, and disbursements would be made 

according to the terms of the MSA.

The MSA had enough moving parts that—while certain MSA-related 

requirements proceeded—this case sat relatively quietly for some time. In 2018, St. 

Luke’s intervened in the suit seeking an accounting from Cansler. (Suit on the May 

2014 trust had initially been brought by its trustee, Redwine.) And in 2020, there are 

signs of discovery issues in the record.

The Motions to Enforce the MSA

On April 27, 2020, St. Luke’s filed its Plea in Intervention, Motion to Compel 

Accounting and Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, or, in the Alternative, to 
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Remove Stormy Cansler as Fiduciary. Following its statement of the basis for 

intervention and the request for accounting, the motion stated:

St. Luke’s seeks enforcement of the terms of the [MSA]. Under 

paragraph 3.13 of the [MSA], the parties contemplated that the Martha 

T. Lattimore Living Trust dated August 21, 2014 would be terminated 

prior to [payment of a specific promissory note. The party at issue] has 

paid off the promissory note and the proceeds are currently under the 

complete control of [Cansler]. St. Luke’s requests the Court enter an 

order directing that [St. Luke’s agreed-upon percentage] of the trust 

funds be paid over to St. Luke’s for its control over the funds that it 

received pursuant to the [MSA]. This request is made especially in light 

of the conduct by [Cansler’s] refusal and failure to produce an 

accounting. In the alternative, St. Luke’s requests that the Court enter 

its order directing [Cansler] to turn over one-hundred percent (100%) 

of the trust funds to a fiduciary beyond the control of [Cansler].

The motion was heard on June 17, but discussion was limited to discovery matters 

already resolved and to the question of whether Cansler had provided a sufficient 

response to St. Luke’s requests for an accounting. The trial judge suggested the 

attorneys file motions if they had specific requests for dismissal or for discovery and 

then file specific responses to any motions filed.2

Cansler complied with the judge’s suggestion almost immediately, filing her 

Amended Motion to Enforce Mediated Compromise Settlement Agreement, Dismiss 

Case, and Request for Expedited Hearing. Cansler complained of appellants’ failure 

to have this case (and the will contest) dismissed as the MSA required. Cansler asked 

the court “to enforce the [MSA], and incorporate the terms of the [MSA] in the 

 

2

 We note that the hearing was held on the Zoom digital platform. In the summer of 2020, the Covid19 pandemic remained at emergency levels across the United States, including Dallas County. 
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court’s final judgment disposing of this case.” Cansler filed a Second Amended 

Motion to Enforce that specifically cited and quoted the MSA provisions on which 

she relied. This is the motion on which the trial court ruled.

St. Luke’s filed its Response to Cansler’s Amended Motion to Enforce 

Mediated Compromise Settlement Agreement, Dismiss Case, and Request for 

Expedited Hearing and St. Luke’s Request for Declaratory Relief.

 St. Luke’s argued against dismissal, relying on (1) the MSA provision calling 

for continued court oversight necessary to complete and enforce terms of the 

MSA, and (2) a letter from Cansler’s counsel outlining post-settlement steps 

that directs the Trust Case be dismissed after tax liability is resolved and the 

trust is terminated.

 St. Luke’s also requested that a constructive trust be imposed on the Estate 

funds being held by Texas Citizens Bank as an acknowledgement that St. 

Luke’s was the beneficial owner of a specific percentage of those funds 

pursuant to the MSA. 

 St. Luke’s requested “declaratory relief” based upon its expressed concern 

that the MSA provided no date certain for distribution of its percentage of 

Lattimore’s estate. The response posited that limitations would run on the 

federal tax lien on August 12, 2025. It asked the court to declare that:

in the event the IRS takes no action to levy on the assets of the 

Martha Lattimore Living Trust on or before August 12, 2025, 

then the [MSA] shall be construed as if the IRS tax lien has been 
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“fully satisfied” and St. Luke’s shall be entitled to a disbursement 

of its [ ] beneficial ownership percentage of the Martha Lattimore 

Living Trust on August 13, 2025.

The Response closed with a prayer that the trial court set for hearing Cansler’s 

Second Amended Motion to Enforce, the earlier filed St. Luke’s Motion to Enforce,

and St. Luke’s Request for Declaratory Relief.

Proceedings on the Motions to Enforce and Request for Declaratory Relief

On July 23, 2020, the trial court sent a letter to the parties stating in relevant 

part:

The Court intends to consider the [ ] pending issues in this matter by 

submission in the near to immediate future. If there is additional 

information or evidence the parties wish the Court to consider should 

be submitted immediately. However, before doing so, the Court expects 

the parties to mediate by August 31, 2020.

The parties did mediate again, but the mediation was declared an impasse.

Shortly thereafter, on August 17, counsel for appellants sent a letter to the trial 

court stating that “from St. Luke’s perspective, there are two salient questions 

concerning the [MSA] that are before the Court on the pending motions of both 

parties.” Counsel identified the first issue as “the time of performance,” which he 

explained meant “a date certain on which St. Luke’s would be disbursed its 

settlement funds.” The letter again addressed appellants’ proposal that the trial court 

declare the day after limitations would run on the federal tax lien as that date certain. 

The second issue, according to counsel’s letter, was “notice to the financial 

institution that is holding the settlement funds” concerning the fact that St. Luke’s
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was a beneficial owner of an agreed-upon percentage of the funds held. This notice 

could be provided, counsel urged, by imposition of a constructive trust upon the 

Estate’s funds. Counsel’s letter ended with this acknowledgement:

The Court has placed the parties on notice that it will take up the various 

pending motions under advisement and proposed the parties submit 

whatever additional information we wished for the Court to consider in 

making its rulings on those motions. This writing contains St. Luke’s

additional information it wishes for the Court to consider in making its 

rulings.

The letter raised no objection to the court’s considering and deciding the pending 

motion by submission.

On September 25, counsel for Cansler responded by letter to the St. Luke’s 

submission, stating that—because the parties and court could not be certain when 

the tax lien issue would be resolved—no date certain could be inserted in the MSA.

Cansler asserted that she had complied with the MSA and asked the court to enforce 

it by dismissing the case.

On January 4, 2021, the trial court notified the parties by letter that it intended 

to grant Cansler’s Second Amended Motion and to deny St. Luke’s Request for 

Declaratory Relief “at this time.” The court explained,

The Court declines to add a time requirement to the negotiated 

settlement agreement. However, if necessary, the Court will entertain 

litigation in the future after limitations run on the IRS Tax Lien, and 

[concerning] the reasonableness of any actions in fulfilling the intent of 

the settlement agreement.

Then, on January 11, the trial court signed its orders from which St. Luke’s and 

Redwine appeal. Those orders were limited in nature. In expansive motions and 
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letter-briefs, both parties requested further relief, which the trial court denied by 

omission in its two orders. The trial court made only two rulings: it refused to imply 

a date certain for distribution of funds in the MSA, and it dismissed the case.

Appellants filed a Motion to Vacate Void Orders, citing cases that address a 

party’s withdrawal of consent to a settlement agreement or revoking a settlement 

agreement, and challenging the trial court’s resolution of the pending motions by 

submission rather than by a summary judgment or trial process. The motion was 

overruled by operation of law.

This appeal followed.

Discussion

Appellants raise a single appellate issue, asserting that:

The district court abused its discretion by denying the Appellants due 

process of law afforded by the United States Constitution, Texas 

Constitution and the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure by deciding a 

breach of contract claim by submission: a decision without a summary 

judgment proceeding, bench or jury trial.

The Nature of the Trial Court’s Rulings

At the outset, we reject the underlying premise of this issue, i.e., that the trial 

court “decid[ed] a breach of contract claim.” It is undisputed that the parties entered 

into a binding agreement when they signed the MSA. But for the court to have a 

breach of contract claim before it in this case, at least one of two events must have 

occurred before the court dismissed the case: one of the parties pleaded that the 

other breached the MSA, or one of the parties revoked the MSA. 
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Our record does not contain a petition, an answer, or a counterclaim that was 

added or amended after February 1, 2016, the date of the MSA. No party placed a 

breach of MSA claim before the trial court in this case. We will not conclude that 

rhetorical challenges to another party’s performance of an agreement—or lack of 

performance—in the course of argument or other filings are sufficient to plead a 

claim for breach of contract.3 See Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Great W. Drilling, 

Ltd., 574 S.W.3d 882, 890 (Tex. 2019) (“Breach of contract requires pleading and 

proof that (1) a valid contract exists; (2) the plaintiff performed or tendered 

performance as contractually required; (3) the defendant breached the contract by 

failing to perform or tender performance as contractually required; and (4) the 

plaintiff sustained damages due to the breach.”).

Moreover, while appellants cite authorities concerning revocation of—or 

withdrawing consent to—a settlement agreement, they did neither in this case. A 

party may revoke his consent to settle a case any time before the judgment is 

rendered. Quintero v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Tex. 1983)

(emphasis added). But here, appellants state in their briefing: “To be perfectly clear, 

Appellants do not reject or disaffirm the validity of the Settlement Agreement.” And 

at the close of their briefing, appellants make clear the nature of their appellate 

 

3

 For example, appellants’ opposed dismissal of the Trust Case based on the MSA’s requirement of 

proceedings to complete and enforce its terms. This opposition led appellees to charge that appellants were

“in breach” of the MSA, which required dismissal of the Trust Case. But appellees did nothing to advance 

this accusation of breach beyond rhetorical flourish. The disagreement was resolved by interpretation of 

the MSA, not by institution of a breach of contract suit.
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argument: “Appellants still do not know when St. Luke’s will be paid the [ ] percent 

of approximately [ ] dollars that it was and is willing to accept under the settlement 

agreement.” Nothing in the record or briefing before us indicates that appellants ever 

intended to revoke the MSA and withdraw their consent to the settlement of the case

that assures them that recovery. Indeed, rather than revoking the MSA, appellants—

like appellees—filed a motion to enforce the MSA.

Appellants’ complaint lies not with the parties’ settlement of the case, but with 

the trial court’s rulings dismissing the Trust Case and denying declaratory relief. 

When appellants talk about “withdrawing consent,” that is the “consent” to which 

they refer in their briefing:

Appellees’ trial counsel and the trial court were aware, early on, that 

Appellants did not consent to dismissal of this litigation well before the 

trial court ruled on the Appellees’ motion to enforce the settlement 

agreement by dismissing the case, while ignoring Appellants’ request 

for a declaratory judgment.

Appellants disagreed with the trial court’s rulings, but the record contains no 

revocation of the MSA.

Nevertheless, appellants contend that the nature of the trial court’s January 11 

rulings required either summary judgment or trial procedures to be followed. We 

disagree because those rulings—rather than resolving a breach of contract claim—

were limited to interpreting the MSA. In fact, appellants do not directly challenge 

the substance of either of the court’s rulings; instead they challenge the procedure 

employed by the trial court, i.e., they contend that ruling on the motions by 
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submission denied them due process. We look at the substance of the rulings, 

therefore, only to determine whether they were the type of rulings properly made by 

submission.

(1) Dismissing the Trust Case

Appellees’ motion sought dismissal of the Trust Case according to the terms 

of the MSA. Paragraph 3.7 of the MSA specifically required Redwine to dismiss this 

case. Appellants opposed the dismissal, relying on paragraph 3.17 of the MSA, 

which called for the dismissal of all pending litigation “save and except for 

proceedings necessary to complete and enforce the terms and provisions of this 

[MSA] as a part of the administration of the Estate of Martha Lattimore, Deceased.” 

The trial court took both provisions into account, dismissing the case but assuring 

the parties that “if necessary, the Court will entertain litigation in the future after 

limitations run on the IRS Tax Lien, and [concerning] the reasonableness of any 

actions in fulfilling the intent of the [MSA].” Thus, the trial court stood ready “to 

complete and enforce the terms and provisions” of the MSA when the time came for 

distribution or should any party take some other unreasonable action concerning the 

MSA. In the meantime, given that the parties had settled all claims underlying the 

Trust Case, the trial court could properly grant appellees’ motion and dismiss the 

case based on its interpretation of the MSA.
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(2) Declaratory Relief Regarding Date of Distribution

Appellants’ motion acknowledged that the MSA called for distribution of its 

agreed-upon share of the Estate’s assets only after all debts and obligations of the 

Estate had been resolved. At the time they filed the motion, the one outstanding 

obligation was the IRS tax lien. Appellants briefed the trial court concerning the 

statute of limitations for such a lien. They identified August 12, 2025 as the last 

possible date the IRS could bring an enforcement action to recover on its lien, and 

they asked the court to set the following day, August 13, 2025, as the date certain 

for distribution of the Estate’s assets. The trial court could have determined that

August 13, 2025 would comply with the MSA in one circumstance, i.e., if the IRS 

did not file an enforcement action and efforts to resolve the lien before that date—

which the MSA has set in motion—were unsuccessful. However, the date would be 

in conflict with the MSA if the lien were resolved earlier (which would otherwise 

allow St. Luke’s to receive its distribution before August 13, 2025) or if the IRS 

actually did institute an enforcement action (which would again require St. Luke’s 

to wait for resolution before it could receive its distribution). If it is construing 

an agreement to avoid forfeiture, a court may imply terms that can reasonably be 

implied, but it may not rewrite the parties’ agreement. See Fischer v. CTMI, L.L.C., 

479 S.W.3d 231, 239 (Tex. 2016). In the end, the trial court could have concluded 

that St. Luke’s proposal did not offer a more appropriate time for distribution than 

the MSA did. 
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Likewise, the court could have concluded that the lack of a specific date of 

performance did not invalidate the MSA for lack of definiteness. “[T]o be 

enforceable, a contract must be sufficiently certain to enable the court to determine 

the legal obligations of the parties thereto.” Bendalin v. Delgado, 406 S.W.2d 897, 

899 (Tex. 1966). The essential terms for a settlement agreement are the amount of 

compensation and the liability to be released. Disney v. Gollan, 233 S.W.3d 591, 

595 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (citing Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454, 

460–61 (Tex. 1995)). Appellants do not contend that either of those terms of the 

MSA is indefinite. And the trial court’s January 4, 2021 letter to the parties 

establishes that the trial court understood when distributions were to be made. Thus, 

the court could decide that the MSA, without clarification, was sufficiently definite 

to determine the legal obligations of the parties, and it could deny appellants’ 

motion. See Bendalin, 406 S.W.2d at 899.

The issues decided by the trial court were matters of contract interpretation, 

which—at its heart—is a legal issue. Interpretation of an unambiguous contract is 

an issue of law for the court. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Breitenfeld, 167 S.W.3d 840, 841 

(Tex. 2005). Thus, these decisions were properly before the trial court and were 

appropriate for decision by submission.

We conclude that the trial court did not decide a breach of contract issue, 

because no such issue was before it: no party pleaded a breach of the MSA, and no 
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party revoked the MSA. Instead, the parties raised legal issues of interpretation of 

the MSA. The trial court did not err in deciding those issues by submission.

Due Process

Appellants’ single issue contends that they were denied due process when the 

trial court made its rulings by submission. “Due process at a minimum requires 

notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 

manner.” Roper v. Jolliffe, 493 S.W.3d 624, 636 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. 

denied) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). 

It is undisputed that all parties had notice of the trial court’s intention to decide 

the motions to dismiss and for declaratory relief by submission. On July 23, 2020, 

the trial court sent a letter to trial counsel stating:

The Court intends to consider the other pending issues in this matter by 

submission in the near to immediate future. If there is additional 

information or evidence the parties wish the Court to consider should 

be submitted immediately. However, before doing so, the Court expects 

the parties to mediate by August 31, 2020.

The parties did mediate again, and both parties submitted letter briefs to the trial 

court making reference to this letter. Thus, notice was acknowledged by both parties.

The trial court did not hold an in-person hearing on these motions, but 

appellants have not cited us to authority requiring such a hearing. The parties had a 

meaningful opportunity to be heard: their arguments and evidence were invited by 

the trial court, and both parties submitted letter briefs in response to the invitation. 

Nothing in the record suggests that either party had evidence that was not offered
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and considered in that process.4 And, importantly, St. Luke’s assured the trial court

in its submission that its concern about a date certain for performance “is an issue 

that requires no court hearing.” Instead, St. Luke’s wrote, “The question of time of 

performance for the disbursement simply requires the Court to review the four 

corners of the settlement agreement to see if it can glean the intent of the parties as

to when they intended the disbursement date to be.” Appellants have likewise 

assured this Court in their briefing that no hearing was necessary.

We have concluded that the issues decided by the trial court were matters of 

contract interpretation. See SAS Inst., Inc., 167 S.W.3d at 841. Thus, after the parties

were given notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the issues, the 

decisions were properly before the trial court and were appropriate for decision by 

submission. We conclude appellants were not denied due process in the court’s 

handling of these motions.

We overrule appellants’ single issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s January 11, 2021 Order Denying Intervenor St. 

Luke’s Episcopal Church’s Request for Declaratory Relief and Order Granting 

 

4

 St. Luke’s requested an evidentiary hearing after the parties had submitted their letter briefs. But it 

indicated the request was solely to make a formal offer of the same evidence it had offered by letter. The 

trial court did not require such a formal offer; nor do we under these circumstances.

We note again the fact that these events were taking place at the height of a pandemic, during which 

courts were discouraged by the Texas Supreme Court from engaging in any conduct that could pose a 

danger of infection to the court, its staff, or the litigants. 
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Defendant Stormy Cansler’s Second Amended Motion to Enforce Mediated 

Compromise Settlement Agreement and Dismiss Case. 

210191f.p05 /Bill Pedersen, III//

BILL PEDERSEN, III

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

THOMAS REDWINE, AS 

TRUSTEE OF THE MARTHA T. 

LATTIMORE LIVING TRUST, 

AND INTERVENOR, ST. LUKE’S 

EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF 

DENISON, TEXAS, Appellants

No. 05-21-00191-CV V.

STORMY LATTIMORE 

CANSLER, INDIVIDUALLY AND 

AS TRUSTEE OF THE 2014 

MARTHA T. LATTIMORE LIVING 

TRUST; JOHN VICTOR 

LATTIMORE, JR., RICHARD 

CANSLER; NORTHWEST 

HOLDINGS CREEKMORE, LLC; 

AMERICAN BANK OF TEXAS; 

AND RAYMOND JAMES 

FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.,

Appellees

On Appeal from the 397th Judicial 

District Court, Grayson County, 

Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CV-15-1547.

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Pedersen, III. Justices Schenck and 

Molberg participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s 

January 11, 2021 Order Denying Intervenor St. Luke’s Episcopal Church’s 

Request for Declaratory Relief and January 11, 2021 Order Granting Defendant 

Stormy Cansler’s Second Amended Motion to Enforce Mediated Compromise 

Settlement Agreement and Dismiss Case are AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that appellees Stormy Lattimore Cansler, Individually and 

as Trustee of the 2014 Martha T. Lattimore Living Trust; John Victor Lattimore, 
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Jr., Richard Cansler; Northwest Holdings Creekmore, LLC; American Bank of 

Texas; and Raymond James Financial Services, Inc., recover their costs of this 

appeal from appellants Thomas Redwine, as Trustee of the Martha T. Lattimore 

Living Trust, and Intervenor, St. Luke’s Episcopal Church of Denison, Texas.

Judgment entered this 12th day of September, 2022.