alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
##### 



Exhibit 31.2
 
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Network Communications, Inc.;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with
respect to the period covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods
presented in this report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)
and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 (a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused
such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,
to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;(c)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and(d)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants
most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case
of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting;
and
 5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants
auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):
 (a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and(b)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting.
 NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS, INC.October 20, 2006
    /s/  Gerard P. ParkerGerard P. ParkerSenior Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>


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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                             MAR-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                  MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                             14,663
<SECURITIES>                                      622,182
<RECEIVABLES>                                     221,875
<ALLOWANCES>                                            0
<INVENTORY>                                       437,003
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                1,340,605
<PP&E>                                          1,242,823
<DEPRECIATION>                                    118,889
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  5,436,635
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           1,989,745
<BONDS>                                                 0
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<PREFERRED>                                           245
<COMMON>                                            2,929
<OTHER-SE>                                      1,307,280
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    5,436,635
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                        0
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               (133,339)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (1,988,407)
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<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (1,988,407)
<DISCONTINUED>                                  1,547,659
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       (0.24)
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</TABLE>
#### The Continental.1 Continental Ins. Co. *v.*The Continental.

*(District Court, E. D. New York.*

May 27, 1887.)

Collision—Steam-Boat and Tow—Night—Attempt to Overtake and Pass.

The steam-boat C., in attempting to pass on the port side of a tow which she had overtaken, at night, in the channel between Blackwell’s and Long Island, ran into a canal-boat on that side of the tow. The tug had previously, by whistles, assented to the steam-boat’s passing her. *Hetd,*that as it was the steam-boat’s duty to have kept out of the way, and as the evidence indicated that the canal-boat had a proper light, and that the tug did not crowd over to the Blackwell’s island shore, the steam-boat was in fault for the collision.

In Admiralty.

*Carpenter & Mosher,*for libelant.

*Alfred C. Chapin,*for claimant.

1

Reported by Edward G. Benedict, Esq., of the New York bar.

Benedict, J.

This action is to recover of the steam-boat Continental the damages caused by a collision between that vessel and the canal-boat *167Sarah C. Brown, while being towed alongside the tug Dentz, and while passing Blackwell’s island on the night of July 12, 1883. The night was clear, and the tide was flood. The tug and tow were ahead of the Continental, as the latter came up to Blackwell’s island and on a course to pass between the island and the Long Island shore. While passing the tow on the port side, the canal-boat on the port side of the tow was struck by the Continental. Being the following vessel, and at the time passing the tow ahead, the burden is on the Continental to show that the collision was not caused by fault on her part.

The defense is set up in the answer that the failure of the canal-boat to display a light left the pilot of the Continental in ignorance of the presence of a canal-boat on the port side of the tug, and so caused the collision. The weight of the evidence is that the canal-boat had a light, and the testimony of the captain, pilot, and quartermaster of the Continental is that the collision was not caused by the absence of a light on the canal-boat. The answer also mentions a failure to port on the part of the tow, and giving an assenting reply to the signal of the Continental, as acts of negligence on the part of the tow. These defenses are also disproved by the witnesses from the Continental.

The defense contended for on the trial is a different and new defense, not alluded to in the answer, namely, that the tug crowded over to Blackwell’s island, and thereby caused the collision. Considering the statement of the answer, this defense does not demand much attention. It is not credible that the tug, after receiving and replying to the signal of the Continental, indicating an intention *on*the part of the Continental to pass the tow on the port side, would then, without reason, bear to port. Plainly, no such action on the part of the tug was thought of when the answer was made, and the testimony to that effect given at the trial fails to satisfy me that such was the fact.

The decree must bo for the libelant, with a reference to ascertain the amount.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

339 

KA 10-01196 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., PERADOTTO, CARNI, LINDLEY, AND VALENTINO, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GERALD R. KROUTH, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

 

TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (DAVID R. JUERGENS OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

GERALD R. KROUTH, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE.

SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (NICOLE M. FANTIGROSSI OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (David

D. Egan, J.), rendered February 19, 2010. The judgment convicted

defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of sexual abuse in the first

degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his

plea of guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.65

[3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is

unenforceable and that Supreme Court erred in denying his motion to

suppress identification testimony from the child victim. We conclude

that the waiver of the right to appeal is enforceable and that it

therefore precludes defendant from challenging the court’s suppression

ruling. “A waiver of the right to appeal is effective only so long as

the record demonstrates that it was made knowingly, intelligently and

voluntarily” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256). Here, the court

“engage[d] the defendant in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the

waiver of the right to appeal was a knowing and voluntary choice”

(People v James, 71 AD3d 1465, 1465 [internal quotation marks

omitted]; cf. People v Adger, 83 AD3d 1590, 1591, lv denied 17 NY3d

857), and informed him that the waiver was a condition of the plea

agreement (cf. People v Williams, 49 AD3d 1281, 1282, lv denied 10

NY3d 940). The record also establishes that defendant “indicated that

he had spoken with defense counsel and understood that he was waiving

his right to appeal as a condition of the plea” (People v Dunham, 83

AD3d 1423, 1424, lv denied 17 NY3d 794). Finally, the court made

clear to defendant that the right to appeal was separate and distinct

from the rights automatically forfeited upon plea (see Lopez, 6 NY3d
-2- 339 

KA 10-01196 

at 256; see also People v Bradshaw, 18 NY3d 257, 264). 

We note in any event that the court properly denied defendant’s

suppression motion pursuant to People v Gee (286 AD2d 62, 72-73, affd

99 NY2d 158, rearg denied 99 NY2d 652). 

Entered: March 28, 2014 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
On Criminal No, 11-037

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v, STEPHEN PIRRONE, Defendant (Inmate No. 670776)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS: Your petitioner shows that

1. STEPHEN PIRRONE (Inmate No. 670776) is now confined at South Woods State

Pz.isor 215 Burliaton Road South Bridgetor New Jersey

2 Said individual .nll be required at P Q Pistnct Court, Newark, New Jers!Y

before the Honorable William H Walls on !sSY March 13 2012 at 930 a m for a Sentencing Hearing in the above-captioned cae, in which he is a aefendarit

and a Writ of Habeas Corpus should be issued for that

DATED: March 5, 2012

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; The United States of America to

WARDEN OF SOUTH WOODS STATE PRISON

SAflO YU U Z :e fl;V.’e the bJ’ ot r’’.:::n’ •h . a (b.’

whatever name called or charged) now co4fined in South W’ods State Prison, 215

Barlngtc.n Road South, Sridget.on, New Jersey before the Unitd Jtttes District

Court betore the Honorable William H Walls at the U.S. D ot trt Court, Ne’,%rk,

Nea Jnv on Tuet;1ay , March 13 20 12 at 9 : 20 3 . m . mme ii U I uu m cowp t Oti

•J the p. ocee :Lnq . dtl andant w_. 11 be eturcv’d + .a 12 p ace ‘I rent incment in

afe and secure conduct.

WITNESS the Honorable William H. Walls

United States District Judge at Newark, New Jersey

DATED: tL7 Lot?

Per:

‘11 12 . LS

Clark o the U.S District Court

for the District of New Jersey

D6puty erk’

ORDER FOR WRIT: Let

DATED: Nd 7, 2012

4ONATs3AN W Ror tAN KOW

Assistant United States Ittorney

(Petit.oner-- (9 3) 645-2884

HONORABLE WILLIAM H. WALLS

United States District Judge

Case 2:11-cr-00037-WHW Document 20 Filed 03/07/12 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 58
Case 2:11-cv-00623-KSH -PS Document 8 Filed 08/29/11 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 36
Case 2:11-cv-00623-KSH -PS Document 8 Filed 08/29/11 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 37
**Exhibit 23.1**

**Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**

We consent to the incorporation byreference in Registration Statement Nos. 333-34019, 333-01019, 333-52199,333-133389 and 333-133391 on Form S-8 of our reports dated April 24, 2007relating to the financial statements of Calgon Carbon Corporation andsubsidiaries (which expresses an unqualified opinion and includes an explanatoryparagraph regarding the Company’s adoption of two new accountingstandards), the financial statement schedule and management’s report on theeffectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting appearing in theAnnual Report on Form 10-K of Calgon Carbon Corporation for the year endedDecember 31, 2006.

| Deloitte   & Touche LLP |
|-----------------------------|
| Pittsburgh,   Pennsylvania  |
| April 24,   2007            |
|                        |
|                             |
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

September 24, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 134425 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 134425 

 COA: 274881 

Branch CC: 01-117457-FC 

DUSTIN JAMES MILLER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 30, 2007 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has 

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). 

d0917 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

September 24, 2007 

 Clerk
EXHIBIT 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the quarterly report of Viscorp, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), each of the undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



1.

the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2.

the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.





Dated:  June 28, 2007



/s/ Charles Driscoll



Name: Charles Driscoll

Title:  Chief Executive Officer





Dated:  June 28, 2007



/s/ Charles Driscoll

Name: Charles Driscoll

Title:  Chief Financial Officer
**EXHIBIT 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, Corrado De Gasperis, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Symmetry Holdings Inc.; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the condensed consolidated financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have: 

 

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared; 

 

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

 

c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s registered public accounting firm and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

 

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Date: May 7, 2007 

 

 

| */s/ Corrado De Gasperis*                                                                                         |   |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|  

*Corrado De Gasperis*

 

*Chief Executive Officer*

 

*(Principal Executive Officer)*

  |
[Doc. No. 86] 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

DANIEL DONNELLY,

Plaintiff,

v.

DANIEL GUERRIERO, et al.,

 Defendants.

Civil No. 10-3240 (RMB/JS)

O R D E R

This matter is before the Court on “Plaintiff’s Motion for

Leave to File Fourth Amended Complaint as to Attorney Defendants

Only” [Doc. No. 86]; and the Court having held an in-person status

conference with the parties on May 18, 2011; and all parties

present at the conference indicating that they do not object to

plaintiff’s motion; and the Court finding that good cause exists to

grant plaintiff’s motion,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this 19th day of May, 2011, that

plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended Complaint as to

Attorney Defendants Only is GRANTED; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff shall file and serve the

Fourth Amended Complaint attached to his motion by no later than

May 27, 2011; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that responses to plaintiff’s Fourth

Amended Complaint shall be filed by June 30, 2011; and

Case 1:10-cv-03240-JHR -JS Document 93 Filed 05/19/11 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 1274
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order is entered without

prejudice to the defendants’ right to assert all applicable

defenses to plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint.

s/Joel Schneider 

JOEL SCHNEIDER

United States Magistrate Judge

2

Case 1:10-cv-03240-JHR -JS Document 93 Filed 05/19/11 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 1275
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nicolas ANDRADE-ALCOCER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-1866.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 28, 2013.

Decided Jan. 30, 2013.

Michelle P. Brady, Office of the United States Attorney, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Richard Kammen, Kammen, Maryan & Moudy, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant-Appellant.

Nicolas Andrade-Alcocer, Oxford, WI, pro se.

Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge and JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge.

ORDER

Nicolas Andrade-Alcocer pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphet-amines. 21 U.S.C. §§ 846,841(a)(1). In his plea agreement, he waived “his right to appeal his conviction and any sentence imposed on any ground, including the right to appeal conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3724.” At sentencing the district court calculated a guidelines range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment — based on a total offense level of 29 and a criminal-history category of I — and sentenced him to 262 months.

Andrade-Alcocer filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed counsel believes that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw. *See Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Andrade-Alcocer has told his attorney that he does not want to withdraw his guilty plea. *See United States v. Konczak,*683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir.2012); *United States v. Knox,*287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir.2002). Andrade-Alcocer has filed a response, *see*Cir. R. 51(b), insisting that the district court miscalculated his guideline range and his sentence is therefore excessive. We limit our review to the issues raised in counsel’s facially adequate brief and An-drade-Alcocer’s response. *See United States v. Schuh,*289 F.3d 968, 973-74 (7th Cir.2002).

But Andrade-Alcocer’s response ignores his attorney’s concerns regarding the appeal waiver. Aside from limited exceptions that Andrade-Alcocer does not invoke, we cannot consider the issues raised in the response if they are issues that fall within the scope of his appeal waiver. *See United States v. Bownes,*405 F.3d 634, 636 (7th Cir.2005) (noting that appeal waivers do not prohibit sentencing challenges “based on constitutionally impermissible criteria, such as race ... or a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum sentence for the defendant’s crime”). The terms of the appeal waiver expressly forbid a challenge to the reasonableness of the sentence. Nor could Andrade-Alcocer now challenge the waiver by contesting the vol-untariness of the plea agreement; he has already told his counsel that he does not wish to challenge the plea. *See United States v. Sakellarion,*649 F.3d 634, 639 *530(7th Cir.2011) (noting that appellate waiver stands or falls with plea agreement as a whole). In any event, a challenge founded on voluntariness would be frivolous: An-drade-Alcocer entered into the agreement after a plea colloquy that substantially complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. *See Konczak,*683 F.3d at 349.

Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.
Exhibit 32.1

 

Certification

 

Pursuant to Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code, the undersigned hereby certifies that:

(1) I have reviewed the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Inland's Monthly Income Fund, L.P. (the "Report") to which this statement is an Exhibit;

(2) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(3) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Inland's Monthly Income Fund, L.P.