United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 13, 2017*

Decided February 13, 2017

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 16-1056

ERIC C. HUDSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

RONALD SALIER,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Central District of Illinois. 

No. 13-cv-04091

Sara Darrow,

Judge.

O R D E R

Eric Hudson appeals the grant of summary judgment against him in this civilrights suit asserting that a police officer falsely arrested him based on a warrant for a

different individual. We affirm. 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

 We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and *

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not

significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(A)(2)(C).
No. 16-1056 Page 2

Hudson was in the passenger seat of a car driven by Johnny Hicks when they

were pulled over for a broken headlight by Illinois State Police Officer Ronald Salier.

Salier ran Hicks’s name through a computer in his squad car and discovered a warrant

for his arrest. Salier proceeded to arrest Hicks and secure him in the back of the squad

car. Hicks told Salier that Hudson could drive the car from the scene so that it would

not have to be towed. Salier then asked Hudson for his license, in accordance with

standard operating procedures, and ran his information through the computer. The

computer returned a warrant for an individual named Clifton Hudson—Eric’s

brother—who had failed to pay a ticket on an uninsured vehicle. According to Salier,

the computer displayed identifying information, such as Clifton’s height, weight, and

eye color, as well as a birthdate that matched Eric’s and Eric’s name as an alias. Salier

arrested Eric and radioed for backup. 

While Salier was putting Eric under arrest, Clifton and two other family

members arrived at the scene. They protested that Eric could not be the subject of the

warrant, but Salier continued with the arrest and placed Eric into another squad car that

had pulled up. Salier had Eric transported to the local jail to be fingerprinted to confirm

his identity; that way, he either could be booked on a valid, applicable warrant or

released. Eric was taken to the jail and fingerprinted, but jail officials did not realize that

he was not the subject of the warrant. He was booked and placed in a cell until a family

member bonded him out hours later.

Eric Hudson sued Salier under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting false arrest in violation

of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. After discovery had taken place, Salier

moved for summary judgment, arguing that he acted reasonably as a matter of law in

arresting Eric based on the information contained in the warrant.

The district court determined that Eric’s Fourth Amendment rights were not

violated, and granted summary judgment for Salier. The court agreed with Salier that

his decision to arrest Eric was reasonable based on his name and birthdate matching the

information on the warrant. As for Eric’s argument that Salier would have discovered

the mistaken information had he listened to the protests of family members present, the

court explained that Salier—knowing that there was a valid warrant for Clifton

Hudson’s arrest—was not required to seek out evidence that potentially would

exonerate Eric.

Eric, through counsel, appealed, and we allowed counsel to withdraw after Eric’s

opening brief was filed. Eric challenges the district court’s conclusion that Salier acted

reasonably when he mistook him for Clifton, the target of the warrant. In Eric’s view,
No. 16-1056 Page 3

his arrest was unreasonable because Salier acknowledged that there was only a “50/50”

chance he was arresting Clifton Hudson. According to Eric, Salier should have

conducted a more thorough investigation into his identity because Eric’s driver’s license

alerted Salier that he may have been arresting someone other than the target of the

warrant.

When a police officer mistakes a person for someone he seeks to arrest, the arrest

is constitutional if the officer (1) has probable cause to arrest the person sought, and (2)

reasonably believes that the arrestee is the person sought. See Hill v. California, 401

U.S. 797, 802 (1971); Catlin v. City of Wheaton, 574 F.3d 361, 365 (7th Cir. 2009).

Reasonable belief requires a “sufficient probability, not certainty” that the arrestee is the

intended target. See Hill, 401 U.S. at 804; Tibbs v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 661, 664

(7th Cir. 2006).

As the district court properly determined, Salier’s decision to arrest Eric was

reasonable. The physical similarities between Eric and the warrant’s description of

Clifton, coupled with Eric’s identification matching the alias name and birthdate from

the warrant, was enough to support the reasonableness of Eric’s arrest. See Hill, 401 U.S.

at 803–04 (holding that police officers had probable cause to arrest individual who

matched the suspect’s physical description, even though he produced identification

showing that he was not the suspect); Catlin, 574 F.3d at 365– 66 (upholding

reasonableness of an arrest of a person having a name different from target’s but similar

age, height, weight, and arrestee was driving motorcycle similar to that of target’s in

area where target was expected to be found); Tibbs, 469 F.3d at 664 (upholding

reasonableness of an arrest of a person having same name, race, and sex as target but

different middle initials and a 6-year age difference). To the extent Eric maintains that

Salier should have heeded the protests of family members and investigated his identity

further, Salier was not required to do so because he had probable cause to make the

arrest. See Baker v. McCollon, 443 U.S. 137, 145–46 (1979); Atkins v. City of Chicago, 631

F.3d 823, 828 (7th Cir. 2011). 

AFFIRMED.