Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 41A05-1411-MI-530 | July 24, 2015 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

John Emry

Franklin, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Graham T. Youngs

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Kenneth Eugene Million,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

Sheriff of Johnson County, 

Indiana; Indiana Department of 

Correction; Indiana State Police; 

and State of Indiana,

Appellees-Respondents.

July 24, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

41A05-1411-MI-530

Appeal from the Johnson Superior 

Court; 

The Honorable K. Mark Loyd, 

Judge; 

The Honorable Richard Tandy, 

Magistrate;

41D03-1404-MI-73

May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 41A05-1411-MI-530 | July 24, 2015 Page 2 of 7

[1] Keith Eugene Million appeals the denial of his request to be released from the 

requirement that he register as a sex offender in Indiana. We reverse.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On January 1, 1989, Million pled guilty in Florida to lewd and lascivious 

conduct with a minor under the age of fourteen. On June 15, 1990, he was 

sentenced to four years and six months imprisonment. He served fourteen 

months incarcerated and was released to parole for six years.

[3] On September 14, 2004, Million moved to Indiana. On April 7, 2005, he 

registered with the Johnson County Sheriff’s Office as a sex offender. On April 

22, 2014, Million filed a “Verified Petition to Be Released From Sex Offender 

Registration Requirement,” (App. at 6), asking for relief from the burden of 

registering as a sex offender in Indiana. He filed an amended petition on May 

19, and the trial court held a hearing June 26.

[4] On August 7, 2014, the trial court denied Million’s petition. Million filed a 

motion to correct error, which the trial court denied. 

Discussion and Decision

[5] Million requested relief under Ind. Code § 11-8-8-22, which allows a sex 

offender to petition the court to remove the requirement that he register as a sex 

offender. We review the trial court’s denial for an abuse of discretion. Lucas v. 

McDonald, 954 N.E.2d 996, 998 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). An abuse of discretion 

occurs when a decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 
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circumstances supporting the petition for relief. Id. The burden is on the 

movant to demonstrate that relief is necessary and just. Id. 

[6] Million argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his petition 

for relief because the Indiana Sex Offender Registry Act (INSORA) as applied 

to him violates the ex post facto prohibition of the Indiana constitution.

1

 When 

the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, we begin with the presumption 

the statute is constitutional. Brown v. State, 868 N.E.2d 464, 467 (Ind. 2007). 

The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the heavy burden of 

rebutting that presumption. Id. All reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor 

of the statute’s constitutionality. State v. Lombardo, 738 N.E.2d 653, 655 (Ind. 

2000).

[7] The Indiana Constitution provides “[n]o ex post facto law . . . shall ever be 

passed.” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 24.2

 “The ex post facto clause forbids the Congress 

and the States to enact any law ‘which imposes a punishment for an act which 

was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional 

punishment to that then prescribed.’” Hevner v. State, 919 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind. 

 

1 Million filed a Motion to Correct Error, but he does not argue the trial court erred when it denied it. We 

review the denial of a motion to correct error for abuse of discretion, and to determine whether the court 

erred, we consider the propriety of the court’s decision on the underlying order, here the denial of his petition 

for relief. See In re Paternity of H.H., 879 N.E.2d 1175, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (review of motion to correct 

error includes review of underlying order).

2 Million does not challenge INSORA under the United States Constitution; nevertheless, our Indiana 

Supreme Court noted an ex post facto claim under the Indiana Constitution should be evaluated using “the 

same analytical framework the Supreme Court [of the United States] employed to evaluate ex post facto claims 

under the federal constitution.” Hevner, 919 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind. 2010).
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2010) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981)). “The underlying 

purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause is to give effect to the fundamental principle 

that persons have the right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise 

to criminal penalties.” Id.

[8] In 1994, Indiana enacted INSORA, codified in Indiana Code chapter 11-8-8, 

which requires certain sex offenders to register specified information with the 

State. Two parts of INSORA require Indiana residents who committed sexual 

offenses outside of Indiana to register as sex offenders in Indiana. First, in 

2001, Indiana extended INSORA to require those convicted in another 

jurisdiction of a crime “substantially similar”3 to a sex crime in Indiana to 

register in Indiana as well. Ind. Code § 5-2-12-4 (2001).4

 Second, under Ind. 

Code § 11-8-8-19(f), a person who is “required to register as a sex or violent 

offender in any jurisdiction” is required to register as a sex offender in Indiana 

for the time required by the other jurisdiction or the time required by INSORA, 

“whichever is longer.” Id. 

“Substantially Similar” Clause

[9] Million argues he should not have to register under the “substantially similar”

clause because the facts in his case are like those in Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 

371 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied. Wallace was charged with and convicted of Class 

 

3 Million does not argue the crime of which he was convicted in Florida is not “substantially similar” to a 

crime in Indiana for which one would be required to register under INSORA.

4 This section is now codified as Ind. Code §§ 11-8-8-4.5(a)(22) and 11-8-8-5(A)(22).
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C felony child molesting in Indiana in 1989. Wallace completed his sentence, 

including probation, in 1992, before INSORA went into effect. In 2001, 

Indiana amended INSORA to require certain sex offenders to register 

regardless of their conviction date. In 2003, Wallace’s ex-wife reported to 

police that he had not properly registered as a sex offender, and he was arrested 

for Class D felony failing to register as a sex offender.

[10] Wallace filed a motion to dismiss the charge against him, which was denied. 

We accepted the issue on interlocutory appeal. Our Indiana Supreme Court 

held INSORA violated ex post facto laws as applied to Wallace because he “was 

charged, convicted, and served the sentence for his crime before the statutes . . . 

were enacted.” Id. at 384. Even though Wallace was convicted of a sex offense

in Indiana, our court has extended the holding in Wallace to defendants who 

committed sex offenses in other states and then relocated to Indiana in cases 

such as Burton v. State, 977 N.E.2d 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), and State v. 

Hough, 978 N.E.2d 505 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

[11] In Burton, we held Burton, who was convicted of a sex offense in Illinois in 

1987, was not required to register as a sex offender in Indiana after he moved 

here around 2009 because “it is the date of the commission of the crime and the 

law in place at the time that is relevant to the ex post facto analysis.” 977 N.E.2d 

at 1009. In Hough, we held Hough, who had been convicted of a sex offense in 

Pennsylvania in 1993, could not be required to register as a sex offender in 

Indiana despite the fact Hough might have been required to register as a sex 

offender in Pennsylvania had he remained in that state “[b]ecause he was 
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convicted of a sex offense before Indiana enacted INSORA.” 978 N.E.2d at 

510.

[12] The same is true in the instant case: Million committed his crime in 1989, 

before Indiana enacted INSORA in 1994. Therefore, like in Burton and Hough, 

the imposition of a requirement that he register as a sex offender in Indiana 

violates our constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws.

Required to Register in Another Jurisdiction

[13] Under Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(f), an Indiana resident who is “required to register 

as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction” is required to register as a sex 

offender in Indiana for the time required by the other jurisdiction or the time 

required by INSORA, “whichever is longer.” Id. Million was not required to 

register as a sex offender in Florida. Therefore, he is not required to register as 

a sex offender in Indiana under Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(f). See Andrews v. State, 

978 N.E.2d 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (Andrews, who was convicted of multiple 

sex offenses in Massachusetts in 1984, was not required to register as a sex 

offender after moving to Indiana because he was not required to register as a 

sex offender under Massachusetts law).5

 

 

5 The State relies on our recent holding in Tyson v. State, 28 N.E.3d 1074 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), reh’g denied, 

however, Tyson is easily distinguishable. Tyson committed a sexual offense in Texas in 2002. Under Texas 

law, Tyson was required to register as a sex offender until 2014. When Tyson moved to Indiana in 2009, he 

did not register as a sex offender and was charged with Class D felony failure to register. Tyson moved to 

dismiss, and we affirmed based on the plain language of Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(f). As Million had no 

requirement to register in Florida, Tyson is inapposite.
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Conclusion

[14] The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Million’s request to be 

relieved of the burden of registering as a sex offender in Indiana. Accordingly, 

we reverse.

[15] Reversed.

Robb, J., and Mathias, J., concur.