Illinois Official Reports 

Supreme Court

Nelson v. Artley, 2015 IL 118058

Caption in Supreme

Court:

DeSHAW NELSON, Appellee, v. DONALD ARTLEY (Enterprise 

Leasing Company of Chicago, Appellant).

Docket No. 118058

Filed October 8, 2015

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that 

court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. 

Alexander P. White, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Appellate court judgment reversed.

Circuit court judgment affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Hugh C. Griffin, of Hall Prangle & Schoonveld, LLC, and Esther Joy 

Schwartz, of Stellato & Schwartz, Ltd., both of Chicago, and Bettina J. 

Strauss and Timothy J. Hasken, of Bryan Cave LLP, of St. Louis, 

Missouri, for appellant.

Lisa K. Lange, of Chicago, for appellee.

Richard P. Schweitzer, of Washington, D.C., and William D. Brejcha, 

of Scopelitis, Garvin, Light, Hanson & Feary, P.C., of Chicago, for 

amicus curiae Truck Renting and Leasing Association, Inc.

Leslie J. Rosen, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers 

Association.
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Justices JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Burke, 

and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION 

¶ 1 At issue in this case is the extent of a rental car company’s financial responsibility for a 

default judgment entered against a driver of one of its vehicles where, as here, the company 

chose to comply with our state’s financial responsibility laws by obtaining a certificate of 

self-insurance from the Secretary of State. Adhering to a decision by the appellate court in 

Fellhauer v. Alhorn, 361 Ill. App. 3d 792 (2005), the circuit court concluded that the rental 

car company’s liability was limited to the same minimum coverage provisions applicable to 

rental car companies electing to meeting their financial responsibility obligations through the 

purchase of an insurance policy. On review of the circuit court’s judgment, the appellate 

court in this case rejected Fellhauer, undertook its own statutory analysis and held that the 

rental car company was liable for the full amount of the default judgment. 2014 IL App (1st) 

121681. We granted the rental car company’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a)

(eff. Jan. 1, 2015). We also allowed the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association and the Truck 

Renting and Leasing Association to file friend of the court briefs. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 

20, 2010). For the reasons that follow, we now reverse the appellate court’s judgment and 

affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 Suzanne Haney rented a car from Enterprise Leasing Company of Chicago (Enterprise). 

While being driven by an individual named Donald Artley, the vehicle crossed the center line 

of the roadway and collided with an oncoming car operated by DeShaw Nelson. Nelson 

subsequently sued Artley in the circuit court of Cook County to recover damages for the 

injuries he sustained in the accident. Artley was uninsured. When he failed to file an answer 

or otherwise appear after having been served with the complaint and summons, Nelson 

sought and obtained an order of default against him. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1301 (West 2010). 

Following a prove-up hearing, the circuit court found that Nelson had sustained $600,000 in 

damages and entered judgment in that amount in his favor and against Artley. 

¶ 4 After obtaining the default judgment, Nelson brought a supplementary action against 

Enterprise pursuant to section 2-1402 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1402 

(West 2010)) and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 277 (eff. Jan. 4, 2013) to determine whether 

the company held any property from which the judgment could be satisfied. In response to a 

citation to discover assets issued by the circuit court, Enterprise denied that it was in 

possession of any property of Artley, the judgment debtor. It also raised three affirmative 

defenses to the citation or to any efforts to obtain recovery from it in connection with 

Nelson’s judgment against Artley.

¶ 5 First, Enterprise asserted that Artley was not its customer, was not listed on its rental 

agreement with Haney as an authorized user of the vehicle, and did not even have Haney’s 

permission to use the vehicle. To the contrary, Haney had reported the vehicle as stolen. 

Accordingly, Enterprise argued, it had “no obligation to extend any financial protection to 
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[Artley] under [the] Motor Vehicle Code or Illinois public policy or Illinois case law 

construing same in any amount.”

¶ 6 For its second affirmative defense, Enterprise contended in the alternative that it was 

self-insured as permitted by Illinois law and that under the appellate court’s decision in 

Fellhauer v. Alhorn, 361 Ill. App. 3d 792 (2005), its total financial responsibility for the 

liability of any authorized driver was $100,000 per occurrence, the same minimum required 

of rental car companies which elect to meet their statutory financial responsibility obligations 

through the purchase of insurance policies. Enterprise asserted that it had already paid 

$50,000 to settle another claim arising from the same accident brought by an individual 

named Antoine Ousley, and had tendered an additional $50,000 to the court to allocate 

between Nelson and a third injured party named Renardo Page. Because those sums 

exhausted the $100,000 per occurrence liability limits claimed by the company, Enterprise 

contended that it had already tendered all that it could be required to pay. 

¶ 7 Enterprise’s third and final affirmative defense pertained solely to the separate but related 

issue of liability for court costs and postjudgment interest. Enterprise argued that there was 

nothing in its rental agreement with Haney nor in the applicable Illinois statutes that would 

obligate Enterprise to pay costs or postjudgment interest in connection with the default 

judgment. Accordingly, Enterprise contended, there was no foundation to support recovery of 

either of those items. 

¶ 8 Enterprise attached various documents to its written response to the citation. These 

included the certificate of self-insurance it had obtained from the Illinois Department of 

Insurance and a copy of its rental agreement with Haney. Paragraph 7 of the rental 

agreement, entitled “Responsibility to Third Parties,” specified that Enterprise would comply 

with applicable motor vehicle financial responsibility laws as a self-insured entity and would 

not extend any responsibility to the renter, additional authorized drivers, passengers, or third 

parties except to the minimum amount set forth in the relevant financial responsibility laws. 

¶ 9 After Nelson moved unsuccessfully to strike Enterprise’s affirmative defenses, he filed a 

petition against the company for a turnover order seeking $600,000, the entire amount of his 

default judgment against Artley, plus interest and costs. Although the circuit court granted 

relief to Nelson, it ruled that it was obligated to follow the appellate court’s decision in 

Fellhauer and that under Fellhauer, Enterprise’s liability under Illinois’s financial 

responsibility laws was limited to the same minimum coverage levels required of rental car 

companies which elect to purchase insurance policies, $50,000 per person, $100,000 per 

occurrence. As previously noted, Enterprise had already paid $50,000 to settle a claim by 

Ousley arising out of the accident and tendered an additional $50,000 to be allocated between 

Nelson and Page. Because the court had previously allotted $25,000 to Page, its final order 

limited the turnover amount to Nelson to $25,000, the balance left under the $100,000 per 

occurrence limit. 

¶ 10 Nelson appealed, arguing that Fellhauer was wrongly decided and should not be 

followed. The appellate court agreed with Nelson’s position. It rejected Fellhauer’s

construction of the governing financial responsibility laws and concluded that where, as here, 

a rental car company elects to meet Illinois’s mandatory liability insurance requirements by 

obtaining a certificate of self-insurance, its financial responsibility is not limited to the same 

minimum amounts required when mandatory liability insurance requirements are met 
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through the purchase of an insurance policy. Rather, the company is obligated to pay the full 

amount of judgments entered against the drivers of its vehicles. Accordingly, the appellate 

court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded to that court with directions to 

enter a turnover order in favor of Nelson in an amount sufficient to cover the entire $600,000 

default judgment entered against Artley. 2014 IL App (1st) 121681, ¶ 37. 

¶ 11 Enterprise petitioned this court for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013). 

We granted that petition in order to resolve the conflict between Fellhauer and the appellate 

court’s decision in this case regarding the extent of a rental car company’s liability where, as 

here, the company elected to meet its statutory financial responsibility obligations by 

self-insuring. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the appellate court in this case 

erred when it rejected the construction of the law adopted in Fellhauer. The judgment of the 

appellate court is therefore reversed and the judgment of the circuit court, which adhered to 

Fellhauer, is affirmed. 

¶ 12 ANALYSIS 

¶ 13 In undertaking our review, we begin by noting that the sole basis for Enterprise’s 

financial liability in this case is the obligation imposed on it pursuant to this state’s financial 

responsibility laws by virtue of its ownership of the vehicle which collided with Nelson when 

it was being driven by Artley, who was uninsured. Enterprise itself committed no 

wrongdoing. While Enterprise initially contested its financial liability on the grounds that 

Artley had stolen the vehicle and was not an authorized driver, it has waived that defense. 

The company now concedes that under Illinois law, it must pay some portion of Nelson’s 

default judgment against Artley. The only question before us is how much of the judgment it 

must pay. Resolution of that question turns solely on the terms of the relevant financial 

responsibility statutes, which are set forth in the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/1-100 et 

seq. (West 2010)). Statutory construction presents a question of law. Our review is therefore 

de novo. McVey v. M.L.K. Enterprises, LLC, 2015 IL 118143, ¶ 11. 

¶ 14 Section 7-601(a) of the Illinois Safety and Family Financial Responsibility Law (625 

ILCS 5/7-601(a) (West 2010)) mandates liability insurance coverage for automobiles and 

other motor vehicles designed to be used on a public highway. Under the statute, no person is 

permitted to operate, register or maintain registration of such a motor vehicle unless the 

vehicle is covered by a liability insurance policy. Progressive Universal Insurance Co. of 

Illinois v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 215 Ill. 2d 121, 128 (2005). The purpose of this 

insurance requirement is to protect the public by securing payment of their damages. Id. at 

129. The law does not, however, require that the full amount of any loss be covered. Rather, 

it mandates only certain minimum levels of coverage. At the time of the events giving rise to 

this litigation, liability insurance policies were required to provide coverage of not less than 

$20,000 for the death or bodily injury of any one person, $40,000 for the death of bodily 

injury of two or more persons, and $15,000 for property damage occurring in any one motor 

vehicle accident. See 625 ILCS 5/7-203, 7-601(a) (West 2010); State Farm Mutual 

Automobile Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 226 Ill. 2d 395, 402 (2007). 

¶ 15 Special financial responsibility provisions have also been enacted for persons who 

operate motor vehicles to transport passengers for hire (see 625 ILCS 5/8-101 (West 2010)); 

persons who operate medical transport vehicles (see 625 ILCS 5/8-101.1 (West 2010)); and 
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owners of for-rent vehicles such as Enterprise (see 625 ILCS 5/9-101 (West 2010)). All are 

required to provide “proof of financial responsibility” to the Secretary of State of Illinois. 

625 ILCS 5/8-101, 8-101.1, 9-101 (West 2010). The purpose of this requirement is to provide 

members of the public with some modicum of protection against negligent drivers of these 

various types of vehicles. Fellhauer v. Alhorn, 361 Ill. App. 3d 792, 797 (2005). As with the 

minimum liability insurance required by the Illinois Safety and Family Financial 

Responsibility Law, it was not intended to provide full coverage for losses. It simply insures 

that injured persons have some coverage when otherwise there would be none. See Fogel v. 

Enterprise Leasing Co. of Chicago, 353 Ill. App. 3d 165, 176 (2004); Insurance Car Rentals, 

Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 152 Ill. App. 3d 225, 232 (1987). 

¶ 16 During the period relevant to this case, the general definition section of the Vehicle Code 

defined “[p]roof of financial responsibility” as “[p]roof of ability to respond in damages for 

any liability thereafter incurred resulting from the ownership, maintenance, use or operation 

of a motor vehicle for bodily injury to or death of any person in the amount of $20,000, and 

subject to this limit for any one person injured or killed, in the amount of $40,000 for bodily 

injury to or death of 2 or more persons in any one accident, and for damage to property in the 

amount of $15,000 resulting from any one accident.” 625 ILCS 5/1-164.5 (West 2010). The 

minimum coverage specified under the foregoing definition was thus the same as the 

minimum coverage required under section 7-601(a) of the Illinois Safety and Family 

Financial Responsibility Law (625 ILCS 5/7-601(a) (West 2010)). Higher limits, however, 

were imposed by the General Assembly with respect to persons who operate motor vehicles 

to transport passengers for hire, persons who operate medical transport vehicles, and owners 

of for-rent vehicles such as Enterprise. See 625 ILCS 5/8-103, 8-104, 8-109, 9-103, 9-105 

(West 2010). The specified categories of owners and operators were subject to these higher 

limits rather than the limits set forth in section 1-164.5’s general definition of “[p]roof of 

financial responsibility” by virtue of section 1-101 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/1-101 

(West 2010)), which stated that the general definitions of words and phrases contained in the 

Code do not apply “when the context otherwise requires and except where another definition 

set forth in another Chapter of this Code and applicable to that Chapter or a designated part 

thereof is applicable.”1

¶ 17 Under the Vehicle Code, car rental companies such as Enterprise have the option of 

satisfying the proof of financial responsibility requirement in any one of three alternate ways. 

They may file with the Secretary of State (1) a motor vehicle liability bond as provided in 

section 9-103 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/9-103 (West 2010)); (2) an insurance policy 

or other proof of insurance in a form prescribed by the Secretary as provided in section 9-105 

of the Code (625 ILCS 5/9-105 (West 2010)); or (3) a certificate of self-insurance issued by 

the Director of the Illinois Department of Insurance. 625 ILCS 5/9-102 (West 2010). 

¶ 18 If the insurance policy option is selected, the policy must insure the operator of the rented 

vehicle against liability “to a minimum amount of $50,000 because of bodily injury to, or 

death of any one person or damage to property and $100,000 because of bodily injury to or 

death of 2 or more persons in any one motor vehicle accident.” 625 ILCS 5/9-105 (West 

 

1We further note that vehicles subject to these heightened requirements have been expressly 

exempted from the normal liability insurance policy requirements set forth in section 7-601 of the 

Vehicle Code. See 625 ILCS 5/7-601(b) (West 2010). 
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2010). Similarly, if the rental car company elects to file a motor vehicle bond as proof of 

financial responsibility, the bond must cover judgments against the customer and owner of 

the vehicle and specified others for damage to property other than the rented vehicle, or for 

any injury to, or for the death of any person, including an occupant of the vehicle resulting 

from the vehicle’s operation and must be “in the penal sum of $100,000,” the same minimum 

upper limit as an insurance policy. 625 ILCS 5/9-103 (West 2010). When the insurance 

policy and bond options are chosen, the person seeking to engage in the business of renting 

out a motor vehicle must apply for and receive approval of the policy or bond from the 

Secretary of State. 625 ILCS 5/9-108 (West 2010). 

¶ 19 In the case before us today, Enterprise elected the third option for proving its financial 

responsibility. Rather than purchase an insurance policy or motor vehicle liability bond, it 

obtained a certificate of self-insurance from the Director of the Illinois Department of 

Insurance. In order to obtain that certificate, Enterprise was required to satisfy the Illinois 

Department of Insurance that it was able and will continue to be able to pay a judgment 

obtained against it as provided by section 7-502 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/7-502 

(West 2010)). 92 Ill. Adm. Code 1090.10 (1973); see Huff v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., 

Midwest, 307 Ill. App. 3d 773, 778 (1999). The judgment in this case was, of course, against 

the vehicle’s driver and not Enterprise itself. As we have previously noted, however, 

Enterprise no longer disputes that Nelson may seek redress against it to collect on the default 

judgment Nelson obtained against the driver of Enterprise’s rental vehicle. In this, 

Enterprise’s position is consistent with the position it has taken in prior litigation, and we 

assume, without deciding, that this position is correct. See Huff v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car 

Co., Midwest, 307 Ill. App. 3d 773. In the case before us today, Enterprise questions only 

how much of the default judgment it is obligated to pay. 

¶ 20 The provisions of the Vehicle Code authorizing rental car companies to prove their 

financial responsibility by obtaining certificates of self-insurance do not specify the 

magnitude of the companies’ liability exposure under the certificates. In Fellhauer v. Alhorn, 

361 Ill. App. 3d 792, 799 (2005), however, our appellate court concluded that with respect to 

the companies’ liability to injured third parties, the legislature intended no distinction 

between self-insurers and those companies that elected to meet their proof of financial 

responsibility obligations through the other methods permitted under the law. More precisely, 

the appellate court interpreted the law to mean that self-insuring rental car companies are 

subject to the same limits on liability that would apply if they elected, instead, to meet their 

proof of financial responsibility obligations through the purchase of insurance policies 

pursuant to section 9-105 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/9-105 (West 2010)). The court 

reached this conclusion based on the relevant statutory provisions governing proof of 

financial responsibility, the purposes of those provisions, and persuasive authority from other 

jurisdictions applying comparable law in similar circumstances. Fellhauer, 361 Ill. App. 3d 

at 797-99. 

¶ 21 The appellate court in the case before us acknowledged the existence of Fellhauer, but 

accorded it no deference. 2014 IL App (1st) 121681, ¶¶ 22-25. Rejecting the rationale 

advanced by the Fellhauer court as well as the authorities from other jurisdictions on which 

Fellhauer relied, it undertook its own, independent interpretation of the applicable Illinois 

statutes. Emphasizing the absence of express language limiting liability where proof of 

financial responsibility is established through a certificate of self-insurance and purporting to 
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take into account the statutory scheme as a whole, it concluded that the liability faced by 

self-insuring rental car companies was, in effect, unlimited. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. 

¶ 22 Enterprise challenges the appellate court’s analysis on several grounds. It contends that 

the court’s decision places Illinois law in direct conflict with the so-called Graves 

Amendment to the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A 

Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) (49 U.S.C. § 30106 (2006)) federal legislation which 

generally preempts all state statutory and common law to the extent such law would hold 

owners in the business of renting or leasing motor vehicles vicariously liable for the 

negligence of drivers, except when there is negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of 

the owner (see Beth Bates Holliday, Validity, Construction, and Application of Graves 

Amendment (49 U.S.C.A. § 30106) Governing Rented or Leased Motor Vehicle Safety and 

Responsibility, 29 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 223 (2008)). Enterprise further argues that the appellate 

court wrongly disregarded the terms of the rental car contract between Enterprise and Haney, 

which limited Enterprise’s financial responsibility for judgments against renters or other 

drivers of its vehicles to the “applicable state minimum financial responsibility amounts.” 

Enterprise’s primary argument, however, is that the appellate court’s judgment is premised 

on an interpretation of the governing provisions of Illinois law which contravenes basic rules 

of statutory construction. 

¶ 23 We believe that Enterprise’s challenge to the appellate court’s construction of the 

relevant statutes is meritorious and that the Fellhauer court’s interpretation of the law was 

correct. As a preliminary matter, Fellhauer has been in place for a decade. Until the appellate 

court in this case ruled as it did, no court had challenged the soundness of Fellhauer’s 

determination that rental car companies electing to meet their proof of financial responsibility 

obligations under section 9-101 by self-insuring under section 9-102(3) were subject to the 

same minimum coverage provisions applicable to rental car companies electing to meeting 

their financial responsibility obligations through the purchase of insurance policies under 

section 9-102(2). Fellhauer stood unquestioned, and the legislature allowed the relevant 

provisions of the Vehicle Code to remain in effect, as written, without change throughout this 

period. Where, as here, the legislature chooses not to amend a statute after a judicial 

construction, it will be presumed that the legislature acquiesced in the court’s statement of 

legislative intent. Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 183 Ill. 2d 30, 50 (1998).

¶ 24 We do not rely on this presumption alone. The appellate court’s construction of the 

relevant statutory provisions must be rejected for other reasons as well. When interpreting a 

statute, courts must “ ‘consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it 

addresses and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting it.’ [Citation.]” People v. 

Allen, 2015 IL 113135, ¶ 32. Although the appellate court in this case acknowledged the need 

to consider the relevant provisions of the Vehicle Code as a whole (2014 IL App (1st) 

121681, ¶ 24), it ultimately failed to recognize that the express, undisputed and overriding 

purpose of the self-insurance option, as with the two alternate options available to rental car 

companies under section 9-102 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/9-102 (West 2010)), is 

simply to establish “proof of financial responsibility.” As we discussed earlier in this 

opinion, “proof of financial responsibility,” as that term is defined and used in the Vehicle 

Code, is not proof of ability to fully satisfy judgments. Rather, it is merely proof of ability to 

provide some base level of financial coverage where otherwise there would be none. That 
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base-level coverage is therefore the standard by which the self-insurers’ liability must be

gauged. 

¶ 25 Imposing unlimited liability on those who elect to self-insure under section 9-102(3) (625 

ILCS 5/9-102(3) (West 2010)) is patently incompatible with this standard. It is the same as 

saying that anyone who chooses to meet the minimum financial responsibility requirements 

through self-insurance will be subject to maximum financial exposure. That is a deal no 

rational economic actor would be likely to take. Under the appellate court’s interpretation of 

the law, the self-insurance option would therefore be rendered meaningless. This is 

impermissible. Construing a statute in a way that renders part of it a nullity offends basic 

principles of statutory interpretation. See Madison Two Associates v. Pappas, 227 Ill. 2d 474, 

493 (2008). 

¶ 26 The appellate court’s interpretation would also have random and inconsistent 

consequences for the motoring public. Under the result reached by the appellate court, the 

ability of persons injured in accidents involving rental cars to recover from the cars’ owners 

would become a lottery. If a rental company met its proof of financial responsibility 

obligations through purchase of an insurance policy or bond, it could cap its liability at a 

maximum of $100,000. If it turned out that the company had elected to self-insure, however, 

the company’s liability exposure would be unlimited. Two otherwise identical injured parties 

could thus face substantially different recovery prospects based solely on the fortuity of 

which option the rental car company had chosen to satisfy our state’s proof of financial 

responsibility requirements. This could be a boon for a person injured in an accident which 

happened to involve a self-insured rental car. For all other injured parties, however, the 

inequity is manifest. 

¶ 27 In construing a statute, we presume that the legislature did not intend absurd, 

inconvenient, or unjust results (Alvarez v. Pappas, 229 Ill. 2d 217, 232 (2008)), and we will 

not, absent the clearest reasons, interpret a law in a way that would yield such results (Town 

of Cicero v. Green, 211 Ill. 241, 244 (1904)). We see no clear reason why the legislature 

would have wanted to subject self-insuring car rental companies to greater liability than all 

other car rental companies. Indeed, we fail to see any reason why the legislature would have 

wanted to single such companies out for special treatment. For purposes of insuring 

compliance with this state’s proof of financial responsibility standards, the distinction would 

accomplish nothing for anyone. We therefore reject it, as did the appellate court in Fellhauer.

¶ 28 In the course of its analysis, the court in Fellhauer observed that its conclusion, i.e., that 

the legislature did not intend to treat self-insurers differently than their counterparts who 

elected to be covered by traditional insurance policies and expose them to unlimited liability, 

was dictated by common sense. Fellhauer, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 798. The appellate court panel 

in this case disparaged Fellhauer’s reliance on common sense, suggesting that it was not an 

appropriate consideration or, at least, not sufficient authority to support the court’s 

conclusions regarding the meaning and operation of the relevant statutes. 2014 IL App (1st) 

121681, ¶¶ 22, 24. These comments echoed criticism by the dissenting justice in Fellhauer, 

who complained that the “court should not rewrite statutes with its own ‘common sense.’ ” 

Fellhauer, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 801 (Myerscough, J., dissenting). 

¶ 29 With due respect to the appellate court panel in this case and the dissenting justice in 

Fellhauer, we do not believe this criticism is valid. For one thing, there is nothing inherently 
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objectionable about using common sense when deciphering a statute. To the contrary, our 

court has specifically cited with approval the proposition that courts “do not set aside 

common experience and common sense when construing statutes.” (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.) Exelon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 234 Ill. 2d 266, 282 (2009). Moreover and 

more importantly, when the majority in Fellhauer referred to common sense, at no time did it 

suggest that its subjective beliefs were in any way a substitute for legal reasoning and 

authority. Rather, it used “common sense” as a shorthand for deductive reasoning based on 

the language and purposes of the law and the consequences of a contrary construction. It then 

proceeded to reference case law from other jurisdictions to further support its position, there 

being none directly on point from Illinois. Fellhauer, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 798-99. The 

conclusion it reached was properly followed by the circuit court in this case. It should have 

been followed by the appellate court as well. In light of this holding, we need not reach 

Enterprise’s additional arguments that the decision by the appellate court in this case is 

incompatible with the Grave’s Amendment and wrongly disregarded the terms of the rental 

car contract between Enterprise and Haney. 

¶ 30 CONCLUSION 

¶ 31 For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court was correct when it construed the relevant 

provisions of the Vehicle Code to mean that Enterprise’s financial responsibility was limited 

to the same minimum coverage provisions applicable to rental car companies electing to 

meet their financial responsibility obligations through the purchase of an insurance policy. 

Under that construction of the law, the amount Enterprise is obligated to pay Nelson under 

the turnover order is limited to $25,000, which it has already tendered. Contrary to the view 

taken by the appellate court, Enterprise is not liable for the entire $600,000 default judgment. 

The judgment of the appellate court is therefore reversed and the circuit court’s judgment is 

affirmed. 

¶ 32 Appellate court judgment reversed. 

¶ 33 Circuit court judgment affirmed.