J-E01003-19

2019 PA Super 270

DANIEL MOHN, CHAD WALLACE AND 

IRENE SILVEUS

v.

BUCKS COUNTY REPUBLICAN 

COMMITTEE

APPEAL OF: DANIEL MOHN

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2694 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Dated December 14, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s): 

2016-03560

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., GANTMAN, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., 

DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and 

McLAUGHLIN, J.

OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 03, 2019

Daniel Mohn appeals from the order granting summary judgment in 

favor of the Bucks County Republican Committee (“the BCRC”), and denying 

his cross-motion for summary judgment on his claims for declaratory and 

injunctive relief based on alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Election Code. 

Mr. Mohn directed his appeal to the Commonwealth Court, which has 

jurisdiction over Election Code violations pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 762(a)(4)(i)(c). However, the Commonwealth Court sua sponte transferred 

the appeal to this Court based on Gordon v. Philadelphia County 

Democratic Exec. Committee, 80 A.3d 464 (Pa. Super. 2013), wherein a 

three-Judge panel of this Court determined that it had jurisdiction over an 
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appeal involving an alleged Election Code violation. We granted en banc

review to determine whether the Commonwealth Court has exclusive 

jurisdiction over appeals involving alleged Election Code violations such that

Gordon should be overruled. After careful consideration, we conclude that 

Gordon was incorrectly decided, and should be overruled. We additionally 

conclude that the issues raised by Mr. Mohn’s appeal fall within the exclusive 

jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court. Accordingly, we transfer the instant 

appeal back to the Commonwealth Court to decide its merits. 

We briefly summarize the relevant factual and procedural history 

underlying the appeal as follows. Mr. Mohn was elected as a Republican 

committeeperson in Yardley Borough, Bucks County, in 2014 and again in 

2016. After the 2016 election, the Bucks County Republican Party filed ethics 

complaints with the BCRC regarding Mr. Mohn’s actions during the election, 

including campaigning against Republican-endorsed candidates and failing to 

fulfill his responsibility to cover the polls on the day of the primary election. 

Following a hearing, the BCRC Executive Committee disqualified Mr. Mohn 

from his position based on his violations of the Rules of the Republican Party 

of Bucks County (“the Local Party Rules”). 

Thereafter, Mr. Mohn, along with two co-plaintiffs who have since 

discontinued their claims, filed a complaint against the BCRC in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Bucks County, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Mr. 

Mohn alleged that the BCRC improperly removed him from his position as 
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elected committeeperson for his voting precinct. Specifically, he claimed that

the actions of the BCRC violated the Pennsylvania Election Code, namely 25 

P.S. § 2837,

1 by disqualifying him as a committeeperson for reasons that did 

not constitute grounds for disqualification under the Local Party Rules. The 

parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 

On December 18, 2017,2the trial court denied Mr. Mohn’s motion for 

summary judgment, and granted the BCRC’s motion for summary judgment 

on the basis that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the internal 

operations of a political party pursuant to section 2842 of the Election Code.

3

 

See Trial Court Opinion, 3/13/18, at 5 (“This is a purely intra-party disciplinary 

matter that the [United States] Constitution has reserved to the [BCRC] to 

address free from government intervention.”). 

____________________________________________

1 Section 2837 provides, in relevant part, “There may be in each county a 

county committee for each political party within such county, the members of 

which shall be elected at the spring primary, or appointed, as the rules of the 

respective parties within the county may provide. The county committee of 

each party may make such rules for the government of the party in the county, 

not inconsistent with law or with the State rules of the party, as it may deem 

expedient, and may also revoke, alter or renew in any manner not inconsistent 

with law or with such State rules, any present or future county rules of such 

party.” 25 P.S. § 2837.

2 The trial court signed its order on December 14, 2017; however, the order 

was not entered on the docket until December 18, 2017. 

3 Section 2842 provides, in relevant part, that “[w]hen acting in the capacity 

of a political committee, such duly elected or appointed members shall be 

subject to the control, direction and supervision of the political committee of 

which they are members.” 25 P.S. § 2842.
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As indicated above, Mr. Mohn appealed the trial court’s rulings to the 

Commonwealth Court. However, the Commonwealth Court, relying on 

Gordon, supra, sua sponte transferred the appeal to this Court. Mr. Mohn 

now seeks appellate review to determine (1) whether the trial court had 

jurisdiction to determine if the BCRC violated the Election Code by 

disqualifying him as a committeeperson under the Local Party Rules; and (2) 

whether the BCRC was authorized by the Election Code to disqualify him for 

alleged violations of the Ethics Code of the Local Party Rules, and misconduct 

on the day of the primary election.

We certified this appeal for en banc consideration to decide the following 

two questions:

1. Whether exclusive jurisdiction over this appeal lies in the

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania pursuant to 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 762?

2. Whether this Court’s prior, three–Judge Panel decision on 

the issue in Gordon . . . should be overruled?

See En Banc Certification Order, 2/5/19. As we explain below, the answer to 

both questions is yes.

The issues for our review concern the scope of this Court’s appellate

jurisdiction. Chapter Seven of the Judicial Code sets forth the “legislatively 

ordained division of labor” between appellate courts in Pennsylvania. Valley 

Forge Indus., Inc. v. Armand Constr., Inc., 374 A.2d 1312, 1316 (Pa. 

Super. 1977); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 701 et seq. Pursuant to section 742

of the Judicial Code, this Court’s jurisdiction is limited, and does not extend to 
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appeals which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of our Supreme Court or 

the Commonwealth Court: 

The Superior Court shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction of 

all appeals from final orders of the courts of common pleas, 

regardless of the nature of the controversy or the amount 

involved, except such classes of appeals as are by any 

provision of this chapter within the exclusive jurisdiction of

the Supreme Court or the Commonwealth Court.

Id. (emphasis added).

Notably, the General Assembly consciously removed a group of cases 

from this Court’s appellate jurisdiction and committed them to a court of 

specialized appellate jurisdiction. See Newman v. Thorn, 518 A.2d 1231, 

1235 (Pa. Super. 1986). In this regard, section 762(a) of the Judicial Code 

enumerates seven specific categories of appeal from the courts of common 

pleas over which the Commonwealth Court has exclusive jurisdiction. In this 

case, we are concerned with only one of those categories. Pursuant to section

762(a) of the Judicial Code, 

(a) General rule.—Except as provided in subsection (b), 

[which is inapplicable herein] the Commonwealth Court 

shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final 

orders of the courts of common pleas in the following 

cases:

. . . .

(4) Local government civil and criminal matters.

(i) All actions or proceedings arising under any 

municipality, institution district, public school, planning 

or zoning code or under which a municipality or other 

political subdivision or municipality authority may be 

formed or incorporated or where is drawn in 
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question the application, interpretation or 

enforcement of any:

. . . .

(C) statute relating to elections, campaign 

financing or other election procedures.

42 Pa.C.S.A § 762(a)(4)(i)(C) (emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to our 

statutory scheme, appeals from final orders of the courts of common pleas 

involving the application, interpretation or enforcement of any statute relating 

to elections or election procedures fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 

Commonwealth Court. See In re Gen. Election for Dist. Justice, 670 A.2d 

629, 631 n.1 (Pa. 1996) (“Although [the Pennsylvania Supreme] Court had 

previously entertained appeals from the courts of common pleas in election 

matters . . . jurisdiction over such appeals was given to the Commonwealth 

Court when that court was created in 1970.”); see also Dayhoff v. Weaver, 

808 A.2d 1002, 1006 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (“Section 762(a)(4)(i)(C) of the 

Judicial Code provides expressly that the Commonwealth Court shall have

exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the trial courts in cases involving 

elections or election procedures.” (emphasis in original)); In re Nomination

in re Warren, 692 A.2d 1178, 1181 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (“[P]ursuant to 42 

Pa.C.S.[A.] § 762(a)(4)(i)(C), this Court has exclusive jurisdiction of election

procedures.”).

Given that the Commonwealth Court transferred Mr. Mohn’s appeal, 

which involves election matters, to this Court pursuant to Gordon, an 

understanding of that case is essential to our analysis. In Gordon, a 2-1 
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Panel Majority of this Court asserted jurisdiction over an appeal factually 

similar to the one at bar.4 There, the Fortieth Ward (40B) Democratic 

Executive Committee removed Gordon from her elected position as a member 

of the Ward Committee using Rule VIII,5 as promulgated by the Democratic 

Party of the City and County of Philadelphia. Gordon and co-plaintiff, 

Johnson,

6

filed a lawsuit against the Philadelphia County Democratic Executive 

Committee, the Ward Committee, and related parties. They claimed that 

defendants violated section 2842 of the Election Code by using Rule VIII to 

remove Gordon from her elected position. The complaint sought Gordon’s 

reinstatement to her elected office (Count I), and declaratory and injunctive 

relief to prevent future similar actions by defendants (Count II). 

While the lawsuit was pending, the Ward Committee reinstated Gordon 

to her position. Thereafter, counsel for co-plaintiffs filed a partial 

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4 Judge Bowes dissented and, as we explain in detail below, concluded in her

Dissenting Opinion that the Superior Court should have transferred the 

Gordon case to the Commonwealth Court. See Gordon, 80 A.3d at 475-76 

(Bowes, J., dissenting).

5 Rule VIII, Article 1, Section E (empowering the Ward Committee to remove 

a member and declare a vacancy in the membership “if, in the opinion of the 

entire Ward Committee, a member is unfaithful to the Democratic party and 

the best interested [sic] of the party.”).

6 The complaint was initially filed as a class action, with Johnson, who voted 

for Gordon, acting as the purported class representative of the majority of 

voters who had elected Gordon as a committeeperson. However, Johnson 

later moved to withdraw the petition for class certification.
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discontinuance as to Gordon, and a motion to intervene on behalf of the 

Philadelphia Democratic Progressive Caucus (“the PDCP”). While the motion 

to intervene was pending, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. 

The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants on the basis that 

Johnson lacked standing to litigate the action. The trial court subsequently 

dismissed the PDPC’s motion to intervene as moot. Johnson and the PDCP 

appealed those orders to this Court.

On appeal, the Gordon Majority first addressed the question of 

Johnson’s standing. It ruled that her claim at Count I as to Gordon’s removal 

was moot. 80 A.3d at 473. The Majority additionally ruled that Johnson’s 

claim at Count II as to prospective use of the Rule was not ripe. Id. As such, 

the Gordon Majority affirmed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for 

defendants. Applying the same rationale, the Majority affirmed the trial 

court’s order denying the PDPC’s motion to intervene. Id. (concluding the

issues were moot and unripe).

7

After affirming the trial court’s rulings, the Gordon Majority addressed 

“[a]s a final matter” the question of whether the Superior Court had 

jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Id. The Majority acknowledged that, 

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7 The Gordon Majority also addressed the appellants’ argument that, “even if 

the claims as to Gordon’s removal are moot, this Court should nonetheless 

consider its merits because it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.” 80 

A.3d at 473. The Majority agreed that the issues raised by appellants were of 

public importance, but was unpersuaded that the issues were likely to avoid 

review if repeated. Id. 
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pursuant to section 742 of the Judicial Code, this Court’s appellate jurisdiction 

does not extend to “such classes of appeals as are . . . within the exclusive 

jurisdiction of . . . the Commonwealth Court.” Id. at 474. The Majority further

acknowledged that pursuant to section 762(a)(4)(i)(C) of the Judicial Code, 

“the Commonwealth Court ‘has jurisdiction to hear appeals involving issues 

arising from the election process.’” Gordon, 80 A.3d at 474. 

Nevertheless, the Gordon Majority concluded that it had jurisdiction 

over the appeal because “we were not required to apply, interpret, or enforce 

the Election Code in reaching our holding.” Id. at 474.8 The Majority further 

concluded that, even if it was “incorrect[,] and [the] interpretation of the 

Election Code was sufficiently at issue to invoke the Commonwealth Court’s 

jurisdiction,” it acted within its discretion under [Pa.R.A.P. 7419] in choosing, 

in the interests of judicial economy, to consider the appeal.” Id.; see also 

____________________________________________

8 The Gordon Majority acknowledged that, pursuant to section 722(2) of the 

Judicial Code, our Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals in matters 

challenging a candidate’s right to hold public office. Gordon, 80 A.3d at 474. 

However, the Majority correctly reasoned that such jurisdiction was not 

implicated because “the issues involved did not involve the right to hold public 

office within the meaning of [section] 722(2), as the challenge was to a 

discharge from office rather than preconditions to the holding of office.” Id.; 

see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 722(2). 

9 Rule 741 provides, in relevant part, as follows: “The failure of an appellee to 

file an objection to the jurisdiction of an appellate court on or prior to the last 

day under these rules for the filing of the record shall, unless the appellate 

court shall otherwise order, operate to perfect the appellate jurisdiction of 

such appellate court, notwithstanding any provision of law vesting jurisdiction 

of such appeal in another appellate court.” Pa.R.A.P. 741(a).
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id. at 474-75 (“Appellees did not object to this Court’s jurisdiction, and judicial 

economy was served by our deciding the case after it was filed, briefed, and 

argued before us.”).

Judge Bowes dissented on the basis that section 762(a)(4)(i)(C) of the 

Judicial Code confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Commonwealth Court to 

hear appeals involving elections matters and the Election Code. She 

explained:

[A]ll cases, since the Commonwealth Court was created, 

that involve elections[,] emanate from the Commonwealth Court 

or our Supreme Court on appeal from the Commonwealth Court.

The present matter involves an election and election procedures[,]

and should be decided by the Commonwealth Court.

. . . .

When we decide whether to retain an appeal:

we must balance the interests of the parties and 

matters of judicial economy against other factors such 

as: (1) whether the case has already been 

transferred; (2) whether our retention will disrupt the 

legislatively ordained division of labor between the 

intermediate appellate courts; and (3) whether there 

is a possibility of establishing two conflicting lines of 

authority on a particular subject. Moreover, each 

transfer should be decided on a case-by-case basis.

[Trumbull Corp. v. Boss Construction Inc., 747 A.2d 395, 399 

(Pa. Super. 2000).]

In my opinion, consideration of these factors compels that 

we transfer this case to the Commonwealth Court. . . . [O]ur 

retention of it would upset the [L]egislature’s decision to vest 

exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the Commonwealth Court over 

litigation involving elections. Further, this Court has no body of 

case law concerning election cases and the questions of either 

standing or mootness in that context. This Court simply has no 
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experience with election contests and the majority has risked 

rendering a decision that may conflict with the body of law existing 

in the Commonwealth Court as to the issues it addresses. I 

consider it inappropriate for this Court to decide a case involving 

an internal rule of the Party and whether it conflicts with the 

Election Code. I would transfer this appeal to the Court with the 

experience and skill-set to handle the matter expertly. 

Id. at 475-76 (Bowes, J. dissenting) (some citations omitted).

Reconsidering Gordon, this Court, en banc, now concludes that the 

Majority Opinion in Gordon was incorrectly decided. First, the panel should 

have determined, at the outset, whether the appeal fell within the jurisdiction 

of the Superior Court. See e.g., Pennsylvanians Against Gambling

Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 877 A.2d 383, 392 (Pa. 2005)

(“Prior to considering the merits of the legal issues before us, we must address

. . . threshold matters. First, we will determine our jurisdiction to entertain 

this challenge . . ..”). The Gordon Majority improperly deferred its

jurisdictional determination until after it had affirmed the trial court’s entry 

of summary judgment and denial of intervention. This was error. The Majority 

should have determined its jurisdiction over the appeal as a threshold matter. 

See id. 

Moreover, the Majority compounded that error by using its substantive 

rulings to justify its acceptance of jurisdiction over the appeal. Importantly, 

Johnson claimed that the local Democratic party Rule violated section 2842 of

the Election Code. Rather than considering, initially, whether the electionrelated claims brought the appeal within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth 
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Court, the Gordon Majority eliminated the basis for that jurisdiction by 

deciding the merits on procedural grounds. 80 A.3d at 474 (reasoning that it 

could accept appellate jurisdiction because “we were not required to apply, 

interpret, or enforce the Election Code in reaching our holding”). In doing so, 

the Gordon Majority usurped the General Assembly’s prerogative not to vest 

appellate jurisdiction over election matters in the Superior Court by 

sidestepping the express provisions of section 762(a)(4)(i)(C) of the Judicial 

Code. Because the Legislature vested the Commonwealth Court with

exclusive appellate jurisdiction over election matters, it was that Court’s 

prerogative and duty to decide the substantive questions of standing, 

mootness and ripeness presented in Gordon – not ours.

Finally, the Gordon Majority should not have invoked Rule 741 to assert 

jurisdiction over the appeal on the basis that “[a]ppellees did not object to 

this Court’s jurisdiction, and judicial economy was served by our deciding the 

case after it was filed, briefed, and argued before us.” 80 A.3d at 474-75. 

Ordinarily, Rule 741 allows this Court to accept jurisdiction of an appeal that

belongs in another appellate court when the parties do not object. See

Commonwealth v. Smith, 722 A.2d 167, 169 (Pa. Super. 1998). However,

even where no party objects to this Court’s exercise of appellate jurisdiction,

as was the case in Gordon, we still have discretion under rule 741 to transfer

the matter to the Commonwealth Court. See e.g. Fengfish v. Dallmyer,

642 A.2d 1117, 1120 n.2 (Pa. Super. 1994); Pa.R.A.P.741(a) (providing that
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jurisdiction is not perfected if “the appellate court shall otherwise order.”).

Indeed, we should transfer the appeal where the interests of the parties and 

matters of judicial economy are outweighed by other factors, such as whether 

our retention will disrupt the legislatively ordained division of labor between 

the intermediate appellate courts; or whether there is a possibility of 

establishing two conflicting lines of authority on a particular subject. See 

Trumbull Corp., 474 A.2d at 399.

Given the Commonwealth Court’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction over

claims involving election matters, we conclude that “judicial economy” was an

insufficient basis for the Gordon Majority to accept jurisdiction over the

election-related appeal. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 858 A.2d 627, 

630-31 (Pa. Super. 2004) (“the concepts of ‘institutional comity’ and ‘systemwide efficiency’ should not be relied upon as reasons for this Court’s exercise

of appellate jurisdiction.”). As Judge Bowes warned, “[t]his Court simply has 

no experience with election contests and the majority has risked rendering a 

decision that may conflict with the body of law existing in the Commonwealth 

Court as to the issues it addresses.” Gordon, 80 A.3d at 476 (Bowes, J.,

dissenting). Moreover, by asserting jurisdiction over the appeal, the Gordon

Majority risked establishing two conflicting lines of authority on the Election 

Code, which is within the purview and expertise of the Commonwealth Court. 

Thus, to the extent that Gordon stands for the proposition that this Court can
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entertain appeals involving matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the

Commonwealth Court, it is specifically overruled.

We now hold that, in deciding whether this Court has appellate 

jurisdiction, we must consider all of the potential issues underlying the parties’ 

theories of the case. If any potential substantive issue (or participation of a 

particular party) invokes the Commonwealth Court’s jurisdiction, transfer is

appropriate, and we must transfer prior to reaching the merits of the appeal. 

Otherwise, we invade the Commonwealth Court’s exclusive jurisdiction to 

decide those substantive issues and to develop its own, consistent line of 

precedents. 

Turning to the case before us, Mr. Mohn seeks appellate review to

address the following two issues:

1. Did the trial court have jurisdiction to address Mohn’s request 

for a declaration that the [BCRC] violated the Pennsylvania 

Election Code by disqualifying Mohn from his duly elected 

position as a Republican Committeeperson for alleged 

misconduct that did not constitute a basis for disqualification 

under the [L]ocal [P]arty [R]ules?

2. Is Mohn entitled to summary judgment where: (i) the [BCRC] 

did not have authority to disqualify Mohn as a publically elected 

committeeman serving his Republican constituents, for alleged 

violations of [L]ocal [P]arty Ethics Rules, and (ii) allegations of 

misconduct on the day of the primary election immediately 

preceding the term from which he was disqualified cannot 

constitute a basis for disqualification.

Appellant’s Brief at 5. 

Mr. Mohn’s issues on appeal require a determination of the scope of the 

trial court’s jurisdiction under the Election Code to address the application, 
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interpretation, and enforcement of the Local Party Rules, and whether such 

jurisdiction is affected by our Supreme Court’s holding in Bentman v. 

Seventh Ward Democratic Executive Committee, 218 A.2d 261 (Pa. 

1966), a case involving election matters that was decided before the 

Commonwealth Court was created and vested with exclusive jurisdiction over 

appeals involving election matters. 

Mr. Mohn’s issues on appeal also require a determination of whether, in 

disqualifying Mr. Mohn from his position, the BCRC violated the Local Party 

Rules, which the BCRC is required to follow under section 2837 of the Election 

Code, and whether those Rules are inconsistent with the by-laws of the 

Republican Party of Pennsylvania, in violation of section 2837. Additionally, 

the appeal requires a determination as to whether the BCRC had the right to 

direct and discipline Mr. Mohn pursuant to section 2842 of the Election Code. 

These issues involve election matters that “draw[] in question the application, 

interpretation or enforcement of . . . statute[s] relating to elections, . . . or 

other election procedures.” 42 Pa.C.S.A § 762(a)(4)(i)(C). Consequently, the 

subject matter of this appeal directly implicates the Election Code and the 

Commonwealth Court’s precedents applying the Code’s provisions. 

As the Legislature has designated the Commonwealth Court as the 

exclusive forum for election-related appeals, we must defer the instant matter 

to its expertise. 
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Appeal transferred to the Commonwealth Court. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

President Judge Panella, President Judge Emeritus Bender, President 

Judge Emeritus Gantman, and Judges Lazarus, Dubow, Murray and 

McLaughlin join this Opinion.

Judge Nichols concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/3/19