LOUIS SANCHEZ v. EDSON

MANUFACTURING ET AL. (AC 38480)
Alvord, Sheldon and Mullins, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed to this court from the decision ofthe Workers’ Compensation ReviewBoard affirmingthe decision ofthe Workers’ Compensation Commissioner that the plaintiff was not entitled to certain temporary partial or total disability benefits. The plaintiff, who had undergone two prior surgeries on his left shoulder, claimed that he injured that shoulder during his employment with the defendant manufacturer, E Co., when he moved a barrel and felt a pop in the shoulder. Thereafter, an independent surgeon, S, who had been selected by E Co., examined the plaintiff and concurred with the determination by the plaintiff’s treating physician, O, that the plaintiff was suffering from a fractureandlesionsinhisleftshoulder. S, who didnothavetheplaintiff’s entire prior medical history when he examined the plaintiff, determined that the fracture and lesions were not caused in the incident in which theplaintiffmovedthebarrel, whichhe determinedcausednothingmore than a temporary strain of the plaintiff’s left shoulder. After obtaining additional prior medical records ofthe plaintiff, S affirmed that finding in a subsequent addendum to his medical report. After O examined the plaintiff and recommended that a third surgery be performed on the plaintiff’s shoulder, the commissioner ordered the plaintiff to undergo

an examination by B, a surgeon chosen by the commissioner. B determined that the fracture and lesions in the plaintiff’s left shoulder were attributed to the barrel incident. The commissioner found that S’s opinion was more persuasive than those of O and B, and concluded, inter alia, that the plaintiff had injured his left shoulder in the course of his employment for which he was entitled to receive certain temporary totaldisabilitybenefits, butthatthe fracture andlesionswere notcaused by the barrel incident. The commissioner, thus, denied the plaintiff’s claim for certain temporary partial disability benefits. Held: 1. The boardproperly determinedthatthe commissioner’s findings concerning the cause and extent of the plaintiff’s disability were supported by sufficient underlying facts and that the inferences drawn from those facts were reasonable and legally permissible:

a. The board did not err in finding that S provided a reasonable basis for his opinion, which was supported by sufficient subordinate facts as to constitute competent medical evidence on which the commissioner properly could rely in making his findings; S physically examined the plaintiff, performedaneurologicalassessmentofhim, reviewedmedical records from O and twice reviewed additional medical records that he did not have at the time he examined the plaintiff, and S’s written opinion was not so contradicted by his deposition testimony as to render it speculative or conjectural. b. The plaintiff’s claim that, because the medical examiners did not testify before the commissioner, this court should depart from the degree of deference usually afforded to the commissioner’s credibility determinations and determine the appropriate weight to afford the opinions of the medical experts was unavailing; there was no reason for this court to give less deference to the commissioner’s credibility determinations where, as here, the commissioner was not presented with only written reports ofnontestifying witnesses, and his credibility determinations and findings were clearly influenced by the plaintiff’s live testimony that he never engaged in weightlifting or other forms of physical exercise, whichwas directlycontradictedbyO’smedicalnotes and statements from the plaintiff’s former coworkers. 2. The board did not abuse its discretion in not remanding the matter to the commissioner for an articulation as to why the commissioner, in rendering his decision, disregarded the opinion ofB, the medical examiner chosen by the commissioner to examine the plaintiff; the board, guided by the state regulation (§ 31-301-3) that governs the requisitecontent ofa commissioner’s decision, determined that the commissioner’s decision complied with the standard for decisions that do not rely

on the opinion ofa medical examiner chosen by the commissioner, and this court deferred to the board’s interpretation and construction of its

own regulation. Argued February 6—officially released August 1, 2017

Procedural History Appealfromthe decisionbythe Workers’ Compensation Commissioner for the Sixth District dismissing in part the plaintiff’s claim for certain disability benefits, brought to the Workers’ Compensation Review Board, which affirmed the commissioner’s decision, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed

. Frank V. Costello, with whom, on the brief, wasAustin Berescik-Johns, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Marian Yun, for the appellees (defendants).Opinion SHELDON, J. The plaintiff, Louis Sanchez, appeals from the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Review Board (board) affirming the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner for the Sixth District (commissioner), who dismissed, in part, his claim for workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to General Statutes §§ 31-307 and 31-308 (a). On appeal, the plaintiffclaims that the board erred (1) in affirming the commissioner’s decision that the plaintiff was not entitled to temporarypartial or temporary total disability benefits from August, 2013 to July, 2014, because the commissioner’s finding as to the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s workplace injury was not supported bysufficientsubordinatefacts; and (2) innotremanding this case to the commissioner with instructions that he articulate why, in reaching his decision, he disregarded the opinion of his own medical examiner as to the nature and extent ofthe plaintiff’s injury. We affirm the decision of the board.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. In 1992, the plaintiff was hired by Celus Fasteners, a Massachusetts manufacturer, where he worked for approximately sixteen years making rivets. When Celus Fasteners went bankrupt, the plaintiff took ajob with Metz Personnel (Metz), also in Massachusetts, where he worked as a laminator. On July 23, 2008, while working for Metz, the plaintiff tripped and fell, landing on his left shoulder. Following his fall, the plaintiff began to experience sharp pains in his shoulder. Although the plaintiff was given a cortisone injectionforhisshoulderinjuryandunderwentacourse ofphysical therapy, his shoulderpain persisted for several months. Thus, in March, 2009, the plaintiff consultedwith an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Ergin,1 aboutthe advisability of undergoing surgery on his left shoulder joint. After examining the plaintiff, however, Ergin concluded that surgery on the plaintiff’s left shoulderjoint

was unnecessary. Instead, Ergin gave the plaintiff two additional cortisone injections and instructed him to seek a second opinion if he wanted to pursue surgery. In accordance with Ergin’s instructions, the plaintiff consulted with and was examined by James D. O’Holleran, an orthopedic surgeon. After reviewing a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan of the plaintiff’s shoulder, O’Holleran opined that the plaintiff was suffering from a torn rotator cuff, AC joint arthrosis, and

a superior labral tear in his left shoulder, for which he recommended that the plaintiff undergo surgery. O’Holleran performed the recommended surgery on June 5, 2009. Almost six months later, afterthe plaintiff completed another course of physical therapy, O’Holleran gave him a medical release to return to full work duties on November 18, 2009.Thereafter, the plaintiff took a new job with Charm Sciences, another Massachusetts manufacturer, for which he mixed commercial grade chemicals. While working at Charm Sciences on December 30, 2009, the plaintiff reinjured his left shoulder when lifting a forty pound box. As a result of this reinjury, the plaintiff experienced ‘‘difficulty reaching behind his shoulder as well as

. . . overhead.’’ The following week, the plaintiff was reexamined by O’Holleran, who gave him another cortisone injection, placed him on a light duty work restriction, and recommended that he undergo

an additional six weeks ofphysical therapy. On March 22, 2010, when the plaintiff was reexamined by O’Holleran after he had completed the recommended course of physical therapy, he reported that his shoulder had experienced ‘‘a dramatic improvement

. . . .’’ Accordingly, the plaintiff requested that O’Holleran give him

a release to return to full work duty and a clearance ‘‘to do some weight training and lifting.’’ O’Holleran gave the plaintiff a release to return to full work duty and instructed him to return ‘‘on an as-needed basis.’’
On June 2, 2011, the plaintiffreturned to O’Holleran, complaining of persistent pain in his left shoulder. O’Hollerangavetheplaintiffanothercortisoneinjection and instructed him to undergo additional physical therapy. These conservativetreatmentsprovedtobe unsuccessful, however, and the plaintiff remained unable to return to work throughout July, 2011. Thereafter, the plaintiff underwent another MRI scan on August 31, 2011. On September 15, 2011, when O’Holleran reviewedthe newMRI scanwiththeplaintiff, he opined that, although the plaintiff had not suffered a new tear in his left shoulder, there was ‘‘ahigh degree of [inflammation] within the tissue inside the AC joint.’’ After discussing several treatment options with O’Holleran, the plaintiff elected to undergo a second surgery for shoulder arthroscopy, lysis of adhesions, and debridement,2 which O’Holleran performed on February 28, 2012. Althoughthe second surgerywasperformedwithout complication, the plaintiffremainedunable to work for several months thereafter.
In April, 2013, the plaintiff was employed by the defendant Edson Manufacturing,3 a Connecticut manufacturer, as a mechanic and machine operator. As part ofhis duties, the plaintiffused a dolly4 to bring barrels of nails to the company’s rivet-making machines and to transport finished rivets to other locations in the factory after they were made. While working on April 15, 2013, the plaintiff prepared to move a barrel of stainless steel nails weighing approximately 100 pounds. To do so, he first positioned himself behind the dolly and barrel, then, with his right hand on the back of the dolly, reached out with his left arm and placed his left hand on the rim ofthe barrel. Then, with his left hand gripping the rim ofthe barrel, the plaintiffpulled the barrel of nails toward his chest until he felt

a sudden ‘‘pop’’ in his left shoulder. The plaintiff did not inform anyone ofhis injury at the time he sustained it, nordidherequesttimeofffromworkafterhefinished his shift that day. Rather, he continued to work for the defendant, without complaint, forthe next eleven days, until he was laid off on April 26, 2013.
Becausethelayoffwassupposedtobetemporary, the plaintiffintendedto returnto hisjob withthe defendant when it was over. On May 20, 2013, the defendant notified the plaintiff, by text message, that he could return to work. The plaintiff responded by text message that he would return to work the following Monday. The defendant’s offer later was retracted, however, due to
an unexpected delay in receiving certain materials and supplies.
Two days later, on May 22, 2013, thirty-seven days aftertheplaintiffsufferedhisworkplace injury, hewent to the emergency room of Lawrence General Hospital in Lawrence, Massachusetts, complaining ofpain in his leftshoulder. Thereafter, theplaintiffwasreferredback to O’Holleran, who examined him on May 24, 2013. Duringthat examination, theplaintiffstatedthathe had been experiencing ‘‘significant worsening pain’’ in his left shoulder since the date of his injury, which had causedhimtobeunabletosleep ortoperformoverhead activitieswithoutpain. Accordingly, O’Holleranordered anotherMRIscanoftheplaintiff’sleftshoulderandgave him documentation stating that he would be unable to return to work until he was reevaluated.
On July 9, 2013, the plaintiff filed a form 30C notice of his workers’ compensation claim.5 On July 7, 2013,

more than seventy days after the date ofhis workplace injury, the plaintiffinformedthe defendant, forthe first time, thathe had suffered ashoulderinjurywhile working onApril 15, 2013. Afterreceiving the plaintiff’s form 30C, the defendantrequested, pursuantto General Statutes § 31-294f (a),6 that an independent medical examination of the plaintiff be conducted in order to assist itin determiningwhetherto accept orcontesttheplaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim.
Prior to that examination, on June 8, 2013, the plaintiffunderwentanotherMRIscanattherequestofO’Holleran. On August 8, 2013, the plaintiff met with O’Holleran to discuss his findings. After reviewing the MRI scan, O’Holleran opined that the plaintiff had not aggravated a previous injury to his left shoulder on April 15, 2013, but, instead, hadsustainedanewinjury—

an anteriorglenoidfracture with abonyBankart lesion7 and a Hill-Sachs lesion.8 O’Holleran then noted, ‘‘I feel that his fracture fragment is in very good position and does not need surgery at this time. Given that his original injury was in April, I feel that [the] fragment has essentially healed. He still certainly has the labral tear and he certainly has pain.

. . . I have recommended acourse of physical therapy

. . . . Regarding work, he will be cleared for light duty with no lifting greater than [ten] pounds.’’ On September 11, 2013, however, O’Holleran changed that work restriction by ordering thattheplaintiffnotreturntoworkuntilhewasreevaluated. He later reaffirmed that total work restriction on October 23, 2013.
On September 25, 2013, the plaintiff was examined by Steven E. Selden, an orthopedic surgeon selected by the defendant as its independent medical examiner. During that examination, the plaintiff informed Selden that, on April 15, 2013, ‘‘he was moving a barrel [when he] felt a pop in his left shoulder

. . . [but] he did not feel any actual pain.’’ After reviewing O’Holleran’s May 24, 2013 notes and the June 8, 2013 MRI scan that O’Holleran had ordered, Selden noted that the plaintiff hadsustainedapriorshoulderinjuryin2009, in connectionwithwhichhehadundergone a‘‘ posteriorcapsular shift and distal clavicle excision.’’ (Emphasis added.) Selden concurred with O’Holleran thatthe plaintiffwas thensufferingfromaHill-SachslesionandabonyBankartlesioninhisleftshoulder. He didnotagree, however, that this injury had occurred on April 15, 2013. Rather, he opined that ‘‘[the plaintiff] may have sustained a strain ofhis left shoulder as a result ofmoving a barrel

. . . but he has a significant preexisting condition to his left shoulder for which he had two surgical procedures. It would be very helpful to have Dr. O’Holleran’s notes regarding prior treatment for the left shoulder. Certainly, the [plaintiff’s] Bankart lesion and Hill-Sachs lesion clearly preexisted April of 2013 based on the history reviewed. A course of physical therapy at this time would be appropriate.’’ Selden further opined that the plaintiff was not totally disabled but, instead, was capable of light duty work ‘‘with avoidance of lifting

more than [twenty-five] pounds and

. . . overhead reaching and lifting.’’
On December 23, 2013, O’Holleran reexamined the plaintiffafinaltime. Duringthat examination, theplaintiffmaintained that he was still experiencing persistent pain in his left shoulder, and thus he requested that a third surgery be performed. In light of the plaintiff’s repeated history of cortisone injections, use of antiinflammatories, and physical therapy, none of which had yet proved to be successful, O’Holleran recommended that a third surgery be performed on the plaintiff’s left shoulder. Thereafter, the commissioner directed the plaintiff, pursuant to § 31-294f (a), to submit to another medical examination by an independent medical examiner of the commissioner’s own choosing, Dr. Peter R. Barnett. After performing that examination on April 14, 2014, Barnett noted: ‘‘Currently, the [plaintiff] feels that his left shoulder complaints have worsened.

. . . The [plaintiff]

. . . complains ofnumbness and tingling cir-cumferentiallythroughout the entire left upper extremity, intermittently present both during the day and at night since the injury.’’ After reviewing the plaintiff’s medical records, Barnett opined: ‘‘It is my impression based oninformation currentlyavailablethat [theplaintiff’s] bony Bankart lesion and Hill-Sachs lesion [are] attributable to the alleged work-related incident

. . . onApril 15, 2013.’’ Barnettfurtheropinedthat, although the plaintiff had not yet reached maximum medical improvement, hewas capable oflimitedwork dutywith restrictions against lifting or reaching overhead, repetitive use of the left arm, and lifting more than fifteen pounds.
On July 14, 2014, the commissioner held a formal hearing on the plaintiff’s claims (1) for total incapacity benefits from June 24 to August 8, 2013; (2) for temporary partial benefits from August 9 to October 23, 2013; and (3) for total incapacity benefits from October 24, 2013 to July 14, 2014. At that hearing, the plaintifftestified and produced documentary evidence, including MRI scans, the medical records of O’Holleran, Selden and Barnett, and transcripts of O’Holleran’s and Selden’s depositions. Inresponse, the defendantproduced, inter alia, aJuly 14, 2014 addendum to Selden’s medical report, wherein Selden stated that, although he had reviewed additional medical records pertaining to the plaintiff, he still believed that the plaintiff’s April 15, 2013 injury did not cause his glenoid fracture and lesions. The defendant also submitted copies ofcertain text messages between the plaintiff and his manager, several documents regarding the plaintiff’s two prior workers’ compensation claims for injuries to his left shoulder, and several statements from the plaintiff’s former coworkers describing past conversations with theplaintiff, inwhichhe hadtoldthemthathe routinely did pushups in the morning before going to work.
On January 5, 2015, the commissioner issued a written decision, in which he found, inter alia, that (1) the plaintiff had not informed either his employer or his coworkers ofhis workplace injury, or reported that he had any difficulty performing his job duties after the injury; (2) there was ‘‘[c]onflicting testimony

. . . as to the [plaintiff’s] weightlifting activities’’ around the date ofhis injury; (3) Selden disagreed with the mechanism of injury, opining that the April 15, 2013 incident had ‘‘caused nothing more than a temporary, self-limited strain of [the plaintiff’s] left shoulder’’; and (4) as to the extent of the plaintiff’s disability caused by his April 15, 2013injuryandresultingneedforfurthermedical treatment, Selden’s opinions were more persuasive than those of O’Holleran and Barnett. On the basis of those findings, the commissioner concluded that the plaintiff had sustained a left shoulder injury in the

course of his employment, for which he was entitled to receive ‘‘temporary total benefits for the period of June 24, 2013 through August 8, 2013.’’ The commis-sioner disagreed, however, that the April 15, 2013 incident had caused either the plaintiff’s anterior glenoid fracture orhis accompanying lesions. Instead, the commissioner adopted Selden’s opinion that on April 15, 2013, the plaintiff had suffered a shoulder sprain, and thus that ‘‘any [current] restrictions or limitations on his ability to work were unrelated to the April 15, 2013 injury.’’ On those grounds, the commissioner denied the plaintiff’s claims for temporary partial benefits for the period from August 9 to October 23, 2013, and for temporary total benefits for the period from October 24, 2013 to July 14, 2014.
On February 18, 2015, the plaintiffappealed from the commissioner’s decisionto the board, claiming thatthe commissioner had ‘‘erred in finding

. . . Selden to be

more persuasive than

. . . O’Holleran and Barnett on theissuesofextentofdisabilityandmedicaltreatment.’’ In his accompanying brief, the plaintiffargued that Seldenhadformedhisopinionastocausationandextentof disability without first reviewing the plaintiff’s medical records concerning the treatment ofhis prior shoulder injury from 2009 through 2012. As a result, he argued, Selden was unaware thatthe plaintiff’s prior injury was to the posterior labrum, whereas the April 15, 2013 injury here at issue was to his anterior labrum. The plaintiff thus argued that ‘‘[b]ecause

. . . Selden did not have sufficient subordinate facts to render an opinion [to a reasonable degree ofmedical probability], the commissioner erred in relying on his testimony.’’ Last, the plaintiffclaimedthatthe commissioner did not adequately articulate why he had disregarded the opinion of Barnett, his own medical examiner, in making his findings and issuing his award in this case. On those grounds, the plaintiff requested that the board reverse the commissioner’s decision and find that the plaintiff

was entitled to benefits ‘‘from August 8, 2013, to the present and continuing until a form 36 is approved.’’
On June 26, 2015, the board held a hearing on the plaintiff’s claims. On October 6, 2015, itissued awritten decision affirming the commissioner’s decision. In so doing, the board found, inter alia, that (1) Selden had offered a reasonable basis for his medical opinions as to causation; (2) the commissioner’s findings were supported by adequate subordinate facts; (3) the commissioner correctly applied the law to the facts found; and (4) the commissioner’s written decision ‘‘complie[d] with the standard we have delineated for a decision which does not rely on the opinion ofthe commissioner’s examiner.’’ Thereafter, theplaintifffiledthepresent appeal. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. I
On appeal, the plaintiff first claims that the board erred in affirming the commissioner’s decision because the commissioner’s findings regarding the cause and extent of the plaintiff’s disability were not supportedby sufficient subordinate facts. In support of his argument, the plaintiff asserts that Selden had formed his opinion as to the cause and extent of the plaintiff’s disabilitybefore he had reviewedthe plaintiff’s medical records regarding the prior injuries to and corresponding treatments for his left shoulder. The plaintiffargues that, without first acquainting himself with the plaintiff’s entire medical history, Selden’s opinion that the plaintiff’s fracture and lesions preexisted the April 15, 2013 injury was the product of speculation and conjecture, and thus his opinion could not be stated to a reasonable degree of medical probability. Therefore, theplaintiffargues, the commissioner’s decision, which relied heavily on Selden’s opinion, was based on speculation and conjecture. In the alternative, the plaintiff argues that because none of the medical examiners in this case testified before the commissioner at the July 14, 2014 formal hearing, this court is not obligated to defer to the commissioner’s credibility determinations and, instead, should conclude that the commissioner erred by not adopting the more persuasive opinions of O’HolleranandBarnett. SeeBodev. ConnecticutMason Contractors, The Learning Corridor, 130 Conn. App. 672, 25 A.3d 687, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 942, 29 A.3d 467 (2011).
The defendant disagrees, asserting that the board deferred appropriately to the commissioner’s factual findings and credibility determinations. In support of its argument, the defendant argues that causation is a question offact and, ifpresented with conflicting medicaltestimony, the commissionerhas the sole discretion to determine whose opinions to credit and what weight to give to such opinions. Therefore, the defendant argues, the board correctly held that it could not reject the commissioner’s finding that Selden’s opinion was
more persuasive than those of O’Holleran and Barnett. The defendant further argues that the board correctly heldthat Selden offered areasonable basis forhis opinions on causation and that, unlike the medical expert in DiNuzzo v. Dan Perkins Chevrolet Geo, Inc., 294 Conn. 132, 982 A.2d 157 (2009)—a case upon which the plaintiff relies for his argument that Selden’s opinion

wastheproduct ofspeculation and conjecture—Selden physically examined the plaintiff and, on two separate occasions, reviewed additional medical information prior to submitting the July 14, 2014 addendum to his report, wherein he affirmed his original opinion that theplaintiffsufferedashouldersprainonApril 15, 2013. The defendantthus argues thatthe board did not abuse its discretion in affirming the commissioner’s decision. We agree with the defendant.
The following additional facts, as presented to the commissioner, are relevant to this claim. As discussed intheprecedingparagraphs, the commissionerwaspresented with the plaintiff’s live testimony and documentary evidence of the plaintiff’s medical history andexaminations. In his testimony, the plaintiffwas asked, and he answered, several questions as to whether he exercised orliftedweights aroundthe date ofhis injury. The plaintiff denied that he had ever engaged in weightlifting, exercising at agym, oreven exercising athome. Moreover, the plaintiff denied that he had ever asked O’Holleran to provide him with a medical release so that he could resume weightlifting. The defendant challenged this testimony by submitting statements from three of the plaintiff’s former coworkers, describing separate conversations with the plaintiff, in which he had told them that he did pushups and sit-ups every day before going to work. In one such conversation, a coworker recalled that the plaintiff had bragged about ‘‘how easy [hisjob] was because ‘he was used to doing 200 pushups and 200-300 sit-ups among other exercises every morning before work’

. . . .’’
The documentary evidence presented at the formal hearing included, inter alia, O’Holleran’s February 27, 2014 deposition. At the deposition, O’Holleran testified that he had reviewed his notes from the years 2009 to 2013, as well as MRI scans and X-rays he had ordered oftheplaintiff’s shoulder. Onthebasis ofthose records, O’Holleran opined, inter alia, that the incident on April 15, 2013, had caused the glenoid fracture, the bony Bankartlesionandthe Hill-Sachslesionintheplaintiff’s left shoulder; this injury was unrelated to the plaintiff’s prior shoulder surgeries in 2009 and 2012; the plaintiff had not yet reached maximum medical improvement following his April 15, 2013 injury; and, in light of the fact that the plaintiff had exhausted all conservative treatment options for his shoulder, surgery would be the next logical step, after which the plaintiff would need approximately nine months to fully recover. In explaining the basis for his opinions, O’Holleran stated that the plaintiff’s present fracture and lesions

were in the anterior portion of the labrum, and thus could not have been an aggravation of the plaintiff’s prior injury, which was to his posterior labrum; the plaintiff’s report of feeling a ‘‘pop’’ at the time he was injuredwas consistentwithexperiencingaglenoidfracture and a labral tear; and, although a recent MRI scan showed that the fracture had healed, it was likely that the plaintiff’s labrum was still torn, and that the tear
was causing the plaintiff’s pain. Last, O’Holleran noted the presence of bone marrow edema 9 in the plaintiff’s shoulder, which was consistent with a recent injury to his shoulder joint.
O’Holleran’s testimony, however, was not unqualified. Thus, as to the mechanism ofthe plaintiff’s injury, O’Holleran conceded: ‘‘I have zero opinion as to whether or not he truly injured his shoulder as he said he did at work.

. . . I wasn’t there

. . . . I can only go bywhatthe patienttells me inthe office.’’ Moreover, after he was asked to assume that the plaintiff hadoperatedthe dollyinaconventionalmanner, O’Holleran conceded that it would have been uncommon for such activity to cause this type of injury. O’Holleran further conceded that a glenoid fracture that causes a bony Bankart lesion and Hill-Sachs lesion is a painful injury, andthatitwas ‘‘unusual’’ fortheplaintiffto havewaited fiveweeksbeforeseekingmedicaltreatment. Regarding the current status of the plaintiff’s injury, O’Holleran agreed that the recent scans showed that the fracture had healed, but stated both that he would be unable to determine the extent of the injury until he performed

an incision on the shoulder joint, and that he lacked objective evidenceto explaintheplaintiff’s currentneurological complaints. As to the benefits of undergoing

a third surgery, O’Holleran stated: ‘‘I think, given [that] he has not improved in [ten] months, and

. . . assuming that his condition hasn’t changed, I think [that] it’s unlikely he’s going to get much better.’’ Last, when askedabouttheMarch22, 2010noteregardingtheplaintiff’s desire to return to weightlifting and exercising, O’Holleran statedthat, although he hadno independent recollection ofthe plaintiff’s exercise habits, he did not believe that the note was a mistake.
Selden’s deposition occurred on December 2, 2013. At his deposition, Selden testified that, priorto forming his opinions, he had physically examined the plaintiff, performed a neurological assessment of him, and reviewed O’Holleran’s May 24, 2013 notes as well as the June 8, 2013 MRI scan that O’Holleran had ordered. Selden further testified that, after his September 25, 2013 examination ofthe plaintiffbut before he gave his deposition, he had received and reviewed additional medical records for the plaintiff.10 When questioned as to the results of the June 8, 2013 MRI scan, Selden acknowledged that it showed a glenoid fracture as well

as a bony Bankart lesion and a Hill-Sachs lesion. He maintained, however, that this injury had not occurred

onApril 15, 2013. Selden explainedthathis opinionwas based on two factors: (1) the mechanism of injury, as describedbytheplaintiff, wasinconsistentwithcausing

a glenoid fracture; and (2) the plaintiff’s claim that he did not feel any pain when he sustained the injury was inconsistent with sustaining a glenoid fracture. As to the mechanism of injury, Selden testified that ‘‘lifting

a barrel, whether it’s manually

. . . or using

. . . some type of dolly, is inconsistent with fracturing your glenoid.

. . . It’s the wrong mechanism to cause a fracture.’’ As to the amount ofpain the plaintiff reportedly felt at the time ofhis injury, moreover, Selden testified, ‘‘I have not seen anybody with a glenoid fracture that didn’t have significant pain in their shoulder, as with anyfracturearoundtheshoulder. That’sapainfulinjury. I’ve personally not [seen] any patients with fractures such as that, and I’ve seen lots over the years, who have not had significant pain.’’
On those grounds, Selden opined, inter alia, that theplaintiff likely suffered a shoulder strain on April 15, 2013; given the plaintiff’s history of shoulder injuries,

asprainofthisnaturewouldhavehealedwithinapproximately six to eight weeks; notwithstanding such a shouldersprain, theplaintiffwouldhaveretainedalight dutywork capacity, andshouldhave reachedmaximum medical improvement within six months ofthe date of the injury; there was no discernible reason for additional surgery on the shoulder; and he did not believe thatthe plaintiff’s current complaints ofpersistentpain and numbness were connected to the April 15, 2013 work injury because the plaintiff did not complain of,

nordid Seldenobserve anyevidencethathewas experiencing, any numbness or nerve damage when he performed his neurological examination of the plaintiff.
Selden’stestimony, like O’Holleran’s, wasnotunqualified. When asked his opinion as to what had occurred when the plaintifffelt the ‘‘pop’’ in his shoulder, Selden opinedthatthe plaintiffhad eithersubluxed11 his shoulder or felt the breaking of adhesions or residual scar tissue from his prior surgery. Thereafter, Selden agreed that the subluxation of the shoulder joint can cause a glenoid fracture resulting in Bankart lesions or HillSachs lesions. He maintained, however, thatthe mechanism of injury and the amount of pain experienced

on April 15, 2013, were inconsistent with sustaining a glenoid fracture.
In addition to these deposition transcripts, the plaintiff submitted the April 14, 2014 written report of Barnett, the commissioner’s medical examiner. In that report, Barnettnotedthathe hadreviewed O’Holleran’s notesfortheperiodfrom2009to2013, aswellasseveral X-rays and MRI scans performed between 2011 and 2013. He thennotedthattheplaintiffhadstatedthat ‘‘he

was pushing with his left arm when he felt a popping sensation and mild pain.’’ (Emphasis added.) Barnett subsequently diagnosed the plaintiff as suffering from

an anterior-inferior bony Bankart lesion and a posterior -superior bony Hill-Sachs lesion, further noting the presence ofbone marrow edemaintheplaintiff’s shoulder. On the basis of those findings, Barnett opined: ‘‘It is my impression based on information currently available that [the plaintiff’s] bony Bankart lesion and Hill-Sachs lesion is attributable to the alleged workrelated incident

. . . on April 15, 2013. There is no indication that either ofthese problems was present at thetimeofhispriorsurgicalproceduresorpriorcarefor the shoulder.’’ He further noted that, ‘‘[a]t thisjuncture surgical intervention on the left shoulder would not be recommended.

. . . [I]t is recommended that the [plaintiff] undergo a neurologic assessment

. . . to determine the cause and origin of the [plaintiff’s] nonspecific neurologic complaints

. . . .’’ Last, on the day ofthe formal hearing, the defendant submitted an addendum to Selden’s report, dated July14, 2014, wherein Selden stated, ‘‘I have reviewed additional medical records provided regarding [the plaintiff].12Itremainsmyopinionthat [theplaintiff] sustained

a strain of his left shoulder as a result of moving a barrel on [April 15, 2013].

. . . It is my opinion that the incident of [April 15, 2013] caused nothing more than atemporary, self-limited strain ofhis left shoulder

. . . [and] that any limitations on his ability to work at thistime areunrelatedtotheincidentof[April 15, 2013]. (Footnote added.)
In summarizing the commissioner’s findings, the board recalled that the commissioner had ‘‘noted that the medical evidence in this claim was disputed, and there was inconsistency between the [plaintiff’s] narrative as to his exercise regimen and the reports of his treating physician.’’ Thereafter, the board held that, in light of Selden’s examination and conclusions, as confirmed by his July 14, 2014 addendum, ‘‘the opinions that [Selden] provided in this case were

. . . competent evidence that the trial commissioner could reasonably rely upon. To the extent the initial opinions rendered by [Selden] had deficiencies, we believe that they were sufficiently clarified by the addendum submitted

. . . to constitute a reliable expert opinion.’’ Thus, the board held that the commissioner’s conclusion ‘‘[was] consistent with a medical opinion he found persuasive and reliable.’’ With these additional facts in mind, we turn to the merits of the plaintiff’s claims.
A
We firstaddresstheplaintiff’s argumentthat Selden’s opinionwasnotcompetentmedicalevidencesupported by sufficient subordinate facts, and thus that the commissioner’s decision, which relied heavily on that opinion, was based on speculation and conjecture. The gravamen ofthe plaintiff’s argument is that Selden was unaware, when formulating his opinions, thatthe plaintiff’s prior injuries were to the posterior labrum— whereashis currentinjurywastotheanteriorlabrum— and that his written opinion was directly contradicted by his subsequent deposition testimony. We are unpersuaded. ‘‘[W]e first set forth our standard ofreview for workers’ compensation appeals. The commissioner is the sole trier of fact and [t]he conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.

. . . The review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts.

. . . [I]t is [obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts.

. . . On appeal, the board must determine whetherthere is any evidence13 inthe recordto support the commissioner’s findings and award.

. . . Our scope ofreview of [the] actions ofthe [board] is [simi-larly]

. . . limited.

. . . [However] [t]he decision of the [board] must be correct in law, and it must not include facts found without evidence or fail to include material facts which are admitted or undisputed.’’ (Emphasis added; footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mahoney v. Bill Mann Tree Service, Inc., 67 Conn. App. 134, 136, 787 A.2d 61 (2001).
‘‘A commissioner’s conclusion regarding causation is conclusive, provided it is supported by competent evidence and is otherwise consistent with the law.’’ (Citation omitted.) Denglerv. SpecialAttentionHealth Services, Inc., 62 Conn. App. 440, 451, 774 A.2d 992 (2001). Moreover, ‘‘[i]t matters not that the basic facts from which the [commissioner] draws this inference

are

. . . controverted.

. . . It is likewise immaterial that the facts permit the drawing ofdiverse inferences. The [commissioner] alone is charged with the duty of initially selecting the inference which seems most reasonable and [the commissioner’s] choice, if otherwise sustainable, maynotbe disturbedbyareviewingcourt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gartrell v. Dept. of Correction, 259 Conn. 29, 36, 787 A.2d 541 (2002). ‘‘[T]here must [however] be subordinate facts from which the conclusion that there is a causal connection between the employment and the injury can be drawn.

. . . [Thus, the] right of a claimant to compensation must be based [on] more than speculation and conjecture.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DiNuzzo v. DanPerkins Chevrolet GEO, Inc., supra, 294 Conn. 143. Accordingly, ‘‘[a]lthough

. . . the board is prohibited from retrying the case or substituting its inferences for those drawn by the commissioner, the board certainly [is] free to examine the record to determine whether competent evidence supported the commissioner’s findings, inferences drawn from such findings and conclusions.’’Denglerv. SpecialAttentionHealthServices, Inc., supra, 450.
In the present case, the plaintiffargues that the commissioner’s findings were not supported by competent medical evidence because, at the time he formed his opinions, Selden was unaware that the plaintiff’s prior injuries involved the plaintiff’s anterior labrum, not the posterior labrum. The plaintiff thus argues, citing DiNuzzo v. DanPerkins Chevrolet Geo, Inc., supra, 294 Conn. 132, that, without knowing the entirety of the plaintiff’s prior medical history, Selden’s opinion on causation and extent of disability amounted to mere speculation and conjecture, andthus ‘‘there were insufficient subordinate facts in the record to support the commissioner’s finding’’; id., 143; whichwaspredicated

on Selden’s expert testimony.
After carefully reviewing the record in this case, we conclude that the board did not err in determining that Selden offered a reasonable basis for his opinion, and thus that the commissioner’s decision, which relieduponthat opinion, was supportedbysufficient subordinate facts to require that it be affirmed. First, in his September 25, 2013 report, Selden specifically noted thathehadreviewedtheplaintiff’spastmedicalhistory, which revealed that, in 2009, the plaintiff had injured his shoulder and ‘‘underwent aposterior capsular shift and distal clavicle excision. He did not do well and had

a second surgery in June of 2012. He underwent lysis of adhesions.’’ (Emphasis added.) Thereafter, during his December 2, 2013 deposition, Selden agreed with the statement by the defendant’s counsel that he reviewed ‘‘a couple of additional medical records from the past which [he] did not have’’ at the time of his examination. Last, in his July 14, 2014 addendum, Selden again reported that he had reviewed additional medical records, but that his opinion remained unchanged: theApril 15, 2013 incidenthad causednothing more than a shoulder strain, and any current limitations on the plaintiff’s ability to work were unrelated to that incident. Looking at ‘‘the entire substance of the expert’s testimony’’; O’Reilly v. General Dynamics Corp., 52 Conn. App. 813, 817, 728 A.2d 527 (1999); it is apparent that Selden was aware that the plaintiff’s 2009 injury was to the posterior labrum and that, after personally examining the plaintiff, reviewing his past medicalhistory, andtwicereviewingadditionalmedical reports, his opinion remained constant.
Forthatreason, we conclude thatthe board correctly determined that Selden’s opinions were unlike those of the claimant’s medical examiner in DiNuzzo v. Dan Perkins Chevrolet Geo, Inc., supra, 294 Conn. 132. In DiNuzzo, the decedent’s spouse ‘‘submitted a claim for dependent widow’s benefits pursuant to

. . . [General Statutes] § 31-306.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 134. In support ofher claim, the claimant submitted

a medical report prepared by the decedent’s physician, in which the doctor ‘‘stated that the cause of [the decedent’s] death was heart disease, secondary to atherosclerotic heart disease

. . . brought about by the curtailment of his physical activities

. . . [and that the decedent’s prior] compensable injury and its treatment substantially contributed to his death

. . . because they severely limited his abilityto maintain his physical fitness and aerobic conditioning.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 135. Thereafter, the commissioner in DiNuzzo found ‘‘that there was a relationship between the compensable injury and the decedent’s death

. . . [and, on that basis,] concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to benefits pursuant to § 31-306.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 136.
On appeal in DiNuzzo, our Supreme Court affirmed the judgment ofthis court, which reversed the board’s affirmance ofthe commissioner’s decision. In so doing, the DiNuzzo court noted that the medical examiner, upon whose opinion the commissioner had relied, had made the following concessions of fact which under-mined his opinion: (1) the decedent had not been diagnosed with atherosclerotic heart disease; (2) the medical examiner was unaware that ‘‘the decedent had been hospitalized approximately one month before his death for certain side effects of Interferon’’; id., 145; (3) the symptoms exhibited by the decedent shortly before his death ‘‘could have been the result ofhis use of Interferon’’; id.; and (4) because he did examine the decedent’s body postmortem, ‘‘it would be impossible to know whether the heart attack could have been prevented ifthe decedent had been able to exercise more because some heart attacks are caused by congenital heart defects that are not amenable to improvement through exercise.’’ Id., 146. The court then noted that, aside from this unsupported medical opinion, ‘‘the plaintiff produced no evidence linking the decedent’s deathto aheart attack.’’ Id., 144. Accordingly, the court held that that medical opinion amounted to no more than speculation and conjecture, and thus ‘‘the causal link between his compensable injury and his alleged

manner of death simply [became] too attenuated to supportareasonableinferencethatthetwo eventswere connected.’’ Id., 148. Here, unlike the medical examiner in DiNuzzo, Selden physically examined and performed a neurological assessment ofthe plaintiff, reviewed O’Holleran’s May, 2013 medical notes, the June 8, 2013 MRI scan, which O’Holleran had ordered, and twice reviewed additional medical records concerning the plaintiff’s prior shoulder injuries. In light of these facts, the commissioner in this case had far more evidence on the record before him to substantiate Selden’s opinion as to the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injury than the medical examiner whose opinion was rejected as speculative and conjectural in DiNuzzo

. See id., 145–48. Because Seldenprovided areasonable basis forhis opinion, that opinion was competent medical evidence supported by sufficientunderlying factstojustifythe commissioner’s reliance upon it in reaching his decision in this case. Last, we arenotpersuadedbytheplaintiff’s argument that Selden’s written report was so contradicted by his deposition testimony, or that any inconsistencies betweenthe report andthe depositionwere so substantial, as to make it inappropriate for the commissioner to rely on the report in making his findings in this

case. Although the plaintiff correctly notes that Selden testified that he believed that the plaintiff may have subluxed his shoulder on April 15, 2013, and that a shoulder subluxation can result in a glenoid fracture, there are two fundamental flaws in the plaintiff’s argument. First, Selden testified that the ‘‘pop’’ in the plaintiff’s shoulder could have been either a subluxation or
atearingofpreexistingadhesionsandscartissue, either of which could have caused the plaintiff’s shoulder strainwithout causingthe glenoidfracture. Second, the plaintifffails to acknowledge that, even ifhe did subluxhis shoulder on April 15, 2013, and a subluxation can
cause aglenoidfracture, those possibilities do not compel a finding that the particular subluxation, ifany, that occurred on April 15, 2013, is what caused the glenoid fracture. Instead, both Selden and the commissioner reasonably couldhave concludedthattheplaintiff, who claimed to have routinely done 200 pushups per day, sustained a second subluxation that caused the glenoid fracture after the date of his workplace injury on April 15, 2013, but before he went to the hospital on May 22, 2013. We thus cannot find that Selden’s written opinion

was so squarely contradicted by his deposition testimony as to render his opinion speculative or conjectural.
‘‘Once the commissionermakes afactualfinding, [we are] bound by that finding if there is evidence in the record to support it.

. . . Similarly, the conclusions drawn by the commissioner from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application ofthe law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.

. . . It [is] within the commissioner’s discretion to credit all, part
or none ofthe

. . . [expert] testimony. That determinationcannotbeoverruledbytheboardunlessitcouldnot findanyevidencetosupportthe conclusion.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Reilly v. General Dynamics Corp., supra, 52 Conn. App. 818–19. In light ofthe foregoing analysis,

we agree with the board that Selden’s opinion was supportedbysufficientsubordinatefactstoconstitutecompetent medical evidence upon which the commissioner properly could rely in making his findings in this case. We thus conclude that the board correctly determined that the commissioner’s findings were supported by sufficient underlying facts to upholdthem, andthat any inferences drawn from such facts were reasonable and legally permissible. See, e.g., Blakeslee v. Platt Bros. & Co., 279 Conn. 239, 243, 902 A.2d 620 (2006).
B Notwithstanding our conclusion that the commissioner’s findings were supported by sufficient underlying facts, the plaintiff argues, in the alternative, under Bodev. ConnecticutMason Contractors, TheLearning Corridor, supra, 130 Conn. App. 672, that this court should depart from the degree of deference usually afforded to the commissioner’s credibility determinations and conclude that the commissioner erred in not adopting the opinions of O’Holleran and Barnett. This is so, the plaintiff argues, because none ofthe medical examinersgave livetestimonybeforethe commissioner at the July, 2014 formal hearing; rather, each examiner submitted awritten report concerning his own medical evaluation of the plaintiff. The plaintiff argues that, under these circumstances, the commissioner’s credibility determinations were not influenced by the livetestimony of those witnesses, and thus this court is equally capable of determining the appropriate weight toaffordthe opinionsofSelden, O’HolleranandBarnett. We disagree and conclude that the defendant’s reliance

on Bode is misplaced.
InBode, the claimant sought temporary total disability benefits for fractures to his spine and shoulder that he sustained in 2002, after falling thirty feet from scaffolding. Id., 674. Although the claimant submitted a number of medical records in support of his claim, ‘‘[n]one of the physicians opined that the [claimant]

was totally disabled or unable to work on or afterApril 26, 2005.’’ Id., 676. In addition to these reports, the claimant submitted four vocational evaluations. Although the first two evaluations, performed in October, 2003, and January, 2004, had concluded that the claimant was ‘‘ ‘presently employable,’ ’’ the last two evaluations, whichwereperformedinAugust, 2004, and July, 2008, had concluded that ‘‘due to his worsening condition the [claimant] was completely unemployable.’’ Id., 677. In January, 2009, the commissioner dismissedthe claimant’s requestfor disabilitybenefits. Id., 678. Thereafter, the board affirmed the commissioner’s finding, concluding, interalia, that‘‘the [claimant] failed to meet his burden ofproving eligibility for temporary total disability benefits because

. . . he did not introduce one medical report in which a physician opined that [he] was totally disabled

. . . . [Thus] because thisboardisnotempoweredto overturnatrier’s evidentiary determinations unless they lack foundation in the record

. . . the trial commissioner’s decision

. . . must stand.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
OnappealinBode, the claimantarguedthattheboard had improperly affirmed the commissioner’s decision because, inter alia, the commissioner ‘‘arbitrarily disregarded

. . . the uncontroverted vocational expert opinions

. . . .’’ Id., 679. This court agreed and reversed the decision ofthe board. Id. In so doing, the court in Bode acknowledged that the claimant had not introduced asingle medical report establishinghis total disability. It held, however, that ‘‘[t]he commissioner’s inquiry

. . . as to whether the plaintiffwas realistically employable should not have ended with his review

. . . of the plaintiff’s physical capabilities. Under the facts of this case, the commissioner’s decision necessarily involved his consideration of the

. . . four vocational reports’’ as part ofhis decision as to whetherthe claimant proved his entitlement to temporary total disability benefits. Id., 681–82.
After reviewing the evidence presented to the commissioner, the court in Bode noted that none of the vocational experts had testified before the commissioner and that, of the four vocational reports, only the February, 2004 report unequivocally stated that the plaintiff presently was employable. Id., 682. Further,the court in Bode noted that the November, 2003 and the July, 2008 vocational reports had been authored by the same evaluator, who had changed his opinion in his 2008reportbyfindingthatthe claimant, atthattime,

was ‘‘ ‘totally unemployable.’ ’’ Id., 684. Last, the court noted that the commissioner’s decision discussed only the vocational reports suggesting that the plaintiffwas employable, but made no finding as to the reliability of the August, 2004 or July, 2008 reports that had stated that the plaintiff was unemployable. Id., 684.
In reversing the decision of the board, the court in Bode ‘‘declined to afford deference to the commissioner’s credibility determinations when such determinations were based solely on documentary evidence, noting that ‘no testimony regarding any ofthe underlying assertions was taken. All of the facts

. . . were reflected in the medical reports from the physicians

. . . . Thus, the deference [that] we normally would give to the commissioner on issues of credibility is not warranted in the present case, because we are as able

as he was to gauge the reliability ofthose documents.’ ’’ Id., 685, quoting Pietraroia v. Northeast Utilities, 254 Conn. 60, 75, 756 A.2d 845 (2000).
In the present case, the plaintiff argues, pursuant to Bode, thatthis court should decline to give deference to the commissioner’s credibility determinations because here, asinBode, none ofthemedicalexaminerstestified before the commissioner, and thus this court is assertedly no less capable than the commissioner ofdeciding what weight to give to those reports. We disagree. Our conclusion rests on the fact that the commissioner’s credibility determinations and findings in the present
case were clearly influenced by the plaintiff’s live testimony that he never engaged in weightlifting or other forms ofphysical exercise. As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the plaintiff was questioned as to whetherhe had everliftedweights, requested amedical release from O’Holleran to resume weightlifting, or had conversations at work about doing pushups and situps every day before going to work. The plaintiffflatly denied these allegations. His testimony was directly contradicted, however, both by O’Holleran’s medical notes and by the statements of his former coworkers. In his decision, the commissioner expressly found that there was ‘‘[c]onflicting testimony

. . . between the [plaintiff] and [O’Holleran] as to the [plaintiff’s] weightlifting activities and performing pushups’’; that Selden ‘‘disagreed with the [plaintiff’s] mechanism of the injury’’; and that ‘‘the opinions and conclusions of [Selden are] more persuasive in part than those of

. . . O’HolleranandBarnettontheissuesofextentofdisability and need for further medical treatment.’’ Against this background, we conclude that here, unlike in Bode, the commissioner was presented with

‘‘ ‘[live] testimony regarding

. . . the [claimant’s]underlying assertions’ ’’; Bode v. Connecticut Mason Contractors, The Learning Corridor, supra, 130 Conn. App. 685; not just written reports from nontestifying experts, upon which to make his findings and conclusions. It is well settled that ‘‘[the] authority to find the facts entitlesthe commissionerto determinethe weight of the evidence presented and the credibility of the testimony offered by lay and expert witnesses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ryker v. Bethany, 97 Conn. App. 304, 314, 904 A.2d 1227, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 932, 909 A.2d 958 (2006). Moreover, ‘‘[e]ven if the medical evidence

. . . is not refuted, the [commissioner] can still dismiss the claim if [he] does not find the injured worker to be credible.’’ 3 A. Sevarino, Connecticut Workers’ CompensationAfterReforms (J. Passaretti, Jr., ed., 6th Ed. 2014) § 6.02.3, p. 760. Under the circumstancesofthiscase, weseenocompellingreason to give less deference to the commissioner’s findings than we usually give to such findings in similar cases.14
II
The plaintiff’s final claim is that the board erred in not remanding the case to the commissioner with instructions that the commissioner articulate why he disregarded the opinion of Barnett, the medical examinerhe chose to examine the plaintiff. In support ofthis claim,theplaintiffarguesthat, althoughacommissioner may ‘‘[choose] not to adopt the diagnosis of the physicianperforming [thecommissioner’s] examination,’’the commissioner ‘‘should articulate the reasons behind his or her decision to disregard the examiner’s report’’ because it ‘‘has long been the expectation within workers’ compensation law

. . . that the [commissioner’s] examiner’s opinion will provide strong guidance to the commissioner’s ultimate decision.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The plaintiff asserts that the commissioner’sdecisioninthiscase ‘‘summarilystatestheopinions and conclusions of [Selden]’’ without including ‘‘any explanation whatsoever for this departure,’’ and thus the board erred in not remanding this case to the commissioner for further articulation. We disagree.
The following facts are pertinent to this claim. In his decision, the commissioner found, inter alia, that (1) Selden ‘‘opined in pertinent part that the [plaintiff] may have sustained a strain to his left shoulder’’; (2) ‘‘Dr. Barnett opined, in relevant part, causally relating the present injury to the April 15, 2013 work-related incident, did not recommend surgical intervention

. . . and recommended the [plaintiff] undergo a neurologic assessment’’; andthat (3) ‘‘the opinionsandconclusions of [Selden are] more persuasive in part than those of

. . . O’Holleran and Barnett on the issues of extent of disability and need for further medical treatment.’’ On those grounds, the commissioner agreed with Selden thattheplaintiff’sApril 15, 2013injury‘‘wasself-limiting in nature

. . . any restrictions or limitations on hisability to work were unrelated to the April 15, 2013 injury

. . . [and that] no further medical treatment is required as it relates to the April 15, 2013 injury.’’
In affirming that decision, the board held, in part, thatit‘‘reviewedthefinding [and] awardand [identified]

no legal error.’’ The board further held that ‘‘the text of the finding [and] award complies with the standard

we have delineated for a decision which does not rely

on the opinion ofthe commissioner’s examiner.’’ After reviewing the contents ofthe commissioner’s decision, the board concludedthatthe reasoning forthe commissioner’s departure from Barnett’s medical opinion ‘‘is clearly ascertainable in this opinion.’’
When reviewing the decision ofthe board, ‘‘[t]he role ofthis court is to determine whether the

. . . [board’s] decisionresultsfromanincorrectapplicationofthelaw tothe subordinate facts orfromaninference illegallyor unreasonably drawn from them.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tartaglino v. Dept. of Correction, 55 Conn. App. 190, 193, 737 A.2d 993, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 929, 742 A.2d 364 (1999). ‘‘[T]he discretion [to remand the case] is a legal discretion vested in the [board],’’ andthus we reviewthat decisionto determine ‘‘whether the [board’s] failure to remand the case to the commissioner constituted an abuse ofits discretion

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Matey v. Estate of Dember, 256 Conn. 456, 489, 774 A.2d 113 (2001).
It is well settled that ‘‘when a commissioner orders

a medical examination, there is usually an expectation among the parties that said examination will provide strong guidance to the commissioner. Where acommissioner chooses not to adopt the diagnosis ofthe physician performing that examination, he or she should articulate the reasons behind his or her decision to disregard the examiner’s report.

. . . [A]lthough a commissioner should articulate the reasons behind his decision to disregard a § 31-294f examiner’s opinion, the ultimate decision is always with the commissioner

. . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gillis v. White Oak Corp., 49 Conn. App. 630, 636–37, 716 A.2d 115, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 919, 722 A.2d 806 (1998).
Inconcludingthatthe commissioner’s decision‘‘complied with the standard

. . . delineated for a decision which does not rely on the opinion ofthe commissioner’s examiner,’’ the board was necessarily guided by § 31-310-3 ofthe Regulations ofConnecticutStateAgencies,15 which governs the requisite content ofacommissioner’s decision. After interpreting the mandates of that rule, the board concluded that the commissioner’s decision in this case satisfied those requirements. It is well settledthat ‘‘[an appellate] court affords deference to the construction ofa statute applied by the administrative agency empowered by law to carry out the stat-ute’s purposes.

. . . [A]n agency’s factual and discretionarydeterminationsaretobeaccordedconsiderable weight by the courts.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bailey v. State, 65 Conn. App. 592, 602–603, 783A.2d491 (2001); seealsoBodev. ConnecticutMason Contractors, The Learning Corridor, supra, 130 Conn. App. 679 (‘‘[i]t is well established that [a]lthough not dispositive, we accord great weight to the construction given to the workers’ compensation statutes by the commissioner and [the] board’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).
In light of the foregoing case law and principles, which afford considerable deference to the board’s interpretation and construction of its own regulations; see, e.g., Bailey v. State, supra, 65 Conn. App. 602–603;

we conclude that the board did not abuse its discretion in not remanding the commissioner’s decision for further articulation.
The decision of the Workers’ Compensation Review Board is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The recordbeforethis court doesnot containanyreferenceto Dr. Ergin’s first name.
2 O’Holleran later explained that this second surgery was performed to cut away portions of residual scar tissue in the plaintiff’s shoulder, thereby reducing stiffness and increasing the range of motion in the left shoulder.

3 Peerless Insurance Company, the workers’ compensation insurer for Edson Manufacturing, is also a defendant in this case. For convenience, we refer in this opinion to Edson Manufacturing as the defendant. See Sellers

v. Sellers Garage, Inc., 155 Conn. App. 635, 636 n.1, 110 A.3d 521 (2015).

4 During the formal hearing before the commissioner, the plaintiff agreed with his counsel’s statements that the dolly he used was a ‘‘vertical piece ofmetalwith aflatbottom’’ withtwo wheels inthe back, andthat, to operate the dolly, the operator would place an item on the flat bottom, pull the item back toward the vertical piece of metal, and rest the weight of the item on the dolly’s wheels.

5 General Statutes § 31-294c (a) provides inrelevantpart: ‘‘No proceedings for compensation under the provisions of this chapter shall be maintained unless a written notice of claim for compensation is given within one year from the date of the accident

. . . which caused the personal injury

. . . . Notice of claim for compensation may be given to the employer or any commissioner and shall state, in simple language, the date and place ofthe accident and the nature of the injury resulting from the accident

. . . . An employee of the state shall send a copy of the notice to the Commissioner of Administrative Services.

. . .’’

6 General Statutes § 31-294f (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘An injured employee shall submit himself to examination by a reputable practicing physician or surgeon, at anytime while claiming orreceiving compensation, upon the reasonable request of the employer or at the direction of the commissioner. The examination shall be performed to determine the nature of the injury and the incapacity resulting from the injury. The physician or surgeonshallbeselectedbythe employerfromanapprovedlistofphysicians and surgeons prepared by the chairman of the Workers’ Compensation Commission and shall be paid by the employer.

. . . The refusal of an injured employee to submit himselfto a reasonable examination under this section shall suspend his right to compensation during such refusal.’’

7 During his deposition, O’Holleran testified that a Bankart lesion ‘‘is a tear ofthe labrum [the cartilage that surrounds the socket in the shoulder] off of the glenoid in

. . . [the] socket.’’ He further testified that a bony Bankart lesion is caused ‘‘by the shoulder sliding out of [the] joint either partially, which is a subluxation, or fully, which is a dislocation,’’ which resultsin‘‘anavulsionofthelabrumwhereittakesoffafleckofbonewithit.’’

8 Dr. Steven E. Selden testified that ‘‘[a] Hill-Sachs lesion is a depression in the humeral head that is a result of dislocations ofyour shoulder, wherethe ball and socket come apart.’’

9 O’Holleran described bone marrow edema as ‘‘fluid [in the bone] from

an injury

. . . that goes away a few months after the injury.’’ He further testified that, because edema typically subsides after six months, the presence of edema in the plaintiff’s shoulder indicated that the plaintiff’s injury

was new and unrelated either to the 2009 or 2012 surgery.
10 At the outset of Selden’s deposition, the following colloquy occurred: ‘‘Q. You physically examined [the plaintiff], correct? ‘‘A. That is correct as well. ‘‘Q. You issued a report

. . . and that’s the full report, is it not? ‘‘A. Correct. ‘‘Q. Since that time, just recently, you have been given a couple of additional medical records from the past, which you did not have, correct? ‘‘A. That is correct.’’ Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant inquired as to which additional medical records Selden had received and reviewed prior to his December 2, 2013 deposition.

11 Subluxation is the medical term for a partial dislocation of the joint, ‘‘where the shoulder goes partly out of place.’’

12 Notably, Selden’swrittenaddendum, muchlikehisdepositiontestimony, doesnotstatewithanydegree ofspecificitywhatadditionalmedicalrecords he reviewed between his December 2, 2013 deposition and his July 14, 2014 addendum to his written report. See footnote 10 of this opinion.

13 Pursuantto § 31-301-8 ofthe Regulations ofConnecticut State Agencies, the board ‘‘considers no evidence other than that certified to it by the commissioner, and then for the limited purpose of determining

. . . whether there was any evidence to support in law the conclusion reached. It cannot review the conclusions of the commissioner when these depend upon the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses.

. . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

14 Since the Bode decision, the board has held: ‘‘We do not believe Bode

. . . has limited such precedents as [O’Reilly v. General Dynamics Corp., supra, 52 Conn. App. 813] as to the trial commissioner’s prerogative to

assess and weigh medical evidence. A trial commissioner is not obligated to accept the most recent medical opinion presented to the tribunal.

. . . However, when a medical witness offers subsequent testimony which deviates from a prior opinion, a trial commissioner must acknowledge and reconcile the differing opinions and should the commissioner seek to rely

on the prior opinion, grounds for the reliance must be provided.’’ (Citation omitted.) Sullins v. UnitedParcelService, Inc., No. 5611, CRB 1-10-12, 2012 WL 979543, *3 n.2 (January 6, 2012), rev’d on other grounds, 146 Conn. App. 154, 77 A.3d 196 (2013), aff’d, 315 Conn. 543, 108 A.3d 1110 (2015).

15 Section 31-301-3 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides: ‘‘The finding of the commissioner should contain only the ultimate relevant and material facts essential to the case in hand and found by him, together with a statement of his conclusions and the claims of law made by the parties. It should not contain excerpts from evidence or merely evidential facts, nor the reasons for his conclusions. The opinions, beliefs,

reasons and argument of the commissioner should be expressed in the memorandum of decision, if any be filed, so far as they may be helpful in the decision of the case.’’