2015 UT App 43

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### T H E 

### U TA H 

### C O U RT O F 

### A P P E A L S

K I A L YN F AD E L H OD G S O N , K RI S T I N L OUI S E F AD E L, D OUGL A S K E L LY F AD E L, AND K AR A F AD E L B UR

N E TT , Plainti ffs and Appellants,

v. F AR MI N G T O N C I T

Y , E RI C M I L L E R

, AND F AR

MI N G T O N C I T

Y B OAR D O F A P P E AL S

, Defendants and Appellees.

Per CuriamDeci si on No. 20141125-CA Filed February 26, 2015

Second Di stric t Co urt, F armi ngto n Department The Honorable Thomas L. Kay No. 120701027

Georg e K. F adel, Att or ney for Appellants Jody K. Bur nett and Ro bert C. K eller, At tor neys

for Appellees

Before J UD G E S G RE G OR Y K. O R M E, J. F RE D E RI C V OR O S J R ., and J O H N A. P E ARC E

.

PER CURIAM :

¶1 This i s the second appeal by members of the Fadel fami ly (the Fadels) aris i ng from F a r mingto n Ci ty’ s (the Ci ty) deter minati on that the Fadels’ barn (the Barn), whi ch i s used only

as a si gn, violated a numb er of prov i si ons of the Uni form Code for the Abatement of Dangerous Buil d ing s (the UCADB), availab le at https://law.resource.or g/pub/us /code/ibr/i cc.u cadb.1997.p df, and that a n abatement acti on was required. See generally Hodgson v. Farmin gton City, 2014 UT App 188, 334 P.3d 484. The di stric t court agr eed wi th the City. We affi rm.Hodgson v. Farmington Ci ty

¶2 In the fi rst appeal, the Fadels arg ued that the Barn i s a si gn

a nd not a bui lding subject to the UCADB. See id. ¶ 8 (ci tin g t he Uni fo r m Code for the Abatement of Dangerous Bui ldings § 302 (1997) (prov i ding that “any bui lding or structure” that exhib i ts “any or all of the condi tions or defects” des cribed by the UCADB “shall be deemed to be a dangero us bui lding”)). The Fadels arg ued that i n R oc k Manor Trust v. State Road Commissi on , 550 P.2d 205 (Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court “co nc l usi vely deter mined that the Barn i s a si gn a nd t ha t it s holdi ng makes the i ssu e of whether the Barn i s a si gn or a structure res judi cata.” Hodgson , 2014 UT App 188, ¶ 9. We rej ected that ar gument, statin g that the supreme court “deter mined o nly that the F a d e ls’ no nconforming

use of the Barn as a si gn was not ext i ngui shed by the fi re and

co nt inu e d to be permi tte d pursuant to the Outdoo r Adver tis i ng Act’s gr andfather claus e.” Id. We stated that the Fadels di d not p resent any arg ument “explain i ng why the Barn could no t be clas si fi ed as both a structure a nd a si gn.” Id. Accordingly, we rej ected the asserti on that the Barn was not sub ject to the UCADB. Id.

¶3 In their fi rst appeal, the Fadels also challen ge d the Notice and Or der i ssu ed by t he Far mingto n Ci ty Board of Appeals, clai ming that i t was i nsu ffi ci ent becau se i t gav e them only the options to repair the Barn or demoli sh i t and di d not give them the thi rd option under the UCADB, i .e., to vacat e a nd secu re the build ing again st entry “‘[i ]f the bui lding does not consti tute an i mmedi ate dang e r t o t he li fe, li mb, proper ty, or safety of the publi c.’” See id. ¶ 10 (alterat i on in or i gin al) (emphas i s o mi tte d) (quoti ng the Uni form Code for the A ba t e ment of Dangerous Bui ldings § 403). We conclu ded that the Fadels “ha[d] fai led to explain how the potent i al remed y o f vacating and secu ring the Barn was even a viab le option under the ci rcums tances, let alone a

necess ary o ne , ” and we held that the Notice and Or der was suffi ci ent. Id. We also rej ected a challeng e to the adequacy of the Board’ s factual findings reg ardin g the dangero us condi tions of the Barn. Id. ¶¶ 11–12. Afte r d eter mining that the findings were

a d e q uate, we conclu ded that the Fadels fai led to sati sfy t he ir

20141125-CA 2 2015 UT App 43Hodgson v. Farmington Ci ty

burden to demonstrate that t he findings were not supp or ted by sub stanti al evidenc e i n the recor d. Id. ¶ 13. Consi dering the Fadels’ final arg ument that the Board’ s deci si on di d not adequately describe “the requirements to be compli ed wi th,” we conclu ded
t hat “the Board i mpli ci tly i ndi cated i ts i ntent that the Fa d e l s comply wi th the remedies outlin ed i n the Notice [and Or der].” Id. ¶ 14. We declined to di sturb the dec i si on of the Board, prev i ously affi rmed by the dis tr i ct court.

¶4 After their fi rst appeal, the Fadels fai led to comply wi th the Notice and Or der and stated that they wo uld not do so absent a further court or der. The Ci ty fi led a Mot i on to Allow Demoli tion of

a Da ng ero us St ructure. On Nove mber 24, 2014, the di stric t cour t enter ed i ts Or der on Far mingto n Ci ty’ s Mot i on to Allow Demoli tion of a Dangerous St ructure (the Demoli tion Or der), and the Fadels fi led thi s second appeal. Despi te h a vin g p ro secu ted their fi rst appeal thro ugh the di stric t co urt and thi s court, the Fadels clai m that the Demoli tion Or der i s “the only final appealable or der

or judgment that i s appealable as a matte r of right” and further clai m that the appeal rais es new i ssu es not prev i ously consi dered. We di sagree wi th both asserti ons. The Fin al S umm ary Judgment and Or der of Di smi ssal appealed by the Fadels i n their fi rst appeal

was a final appealable or der. The Demo l ition Or der enforced compli ance wi th the Notice and Or der after the Fade l s’

uns ucc essf

ul fi rst appeal. Thi s second appeal i s there fore li mi ted to

a rev i ew of the Demoli tion Order

.
¶5 The Ci ty moves for sum mary di sposi tion, arg uing that thi s appeal seeks to r earg ue i ssu es determin ed i n t he fi rst appeal. The Fadels again arg ue that the Rock Manor Trust ca se “ co nfi rms that the si gn i s a nonconforming use whi ch survives gov ernmental i nterfer ence” and tha t t he Ci ty cannot take acti on under the UCADB to require that i t be repaired or remov ed. We rej ected thi s arg ument in the fi rst appeal. Hodgson v. Farmin gton C ity, 2014 UT A p p 188, ¶ 9, 334 P.3d 484. At the hearin g on the motion t o demoli sh the Barn, the di stric t court clari fi ed that i ssu es reg ardin g the Fadel s’ alleged right to relo cate or replace the si gn were not

20141125-CA 3 2015 UT App 43Hodgson v. Farmington Ci ty

be fore the di stric t court and were separate from i ssu es relat e d t o whether the Bar n could b e demoli shed as an uns afe structure.

¶6 The Fadels next arg ue that the “pro ce e ding to demoli sh a si gn structure requires sub stanti al due process.” In the fi rst appeal,

we rej ected arg uments challen gin g the due process afforded to the Fadels i n the admini strat i ve and d ist ric t court proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 5–6. Furt hermo r e , t he Fadels were afforded due process t hr ough the proceeding that resulted i n the Notice and O r d e r speci fi cally requiring re p a ir o r demoli tion of the Barn wi thin speci fi ed tim e frames and an appeal to the Board that inclu ded a hearin g where the Fadels had an oppor tun it y to call and cross exami ne wi tnesses. The Fadels then obtained judi ci al re v i ew by both the di stric t court and thi s co ur t

. After the fi rst appeal, the di stric t court held a n a d d itional hearin g on the Ci ty’ s motion to allow demoli tion of t he Barn. The arg ument that the Fadels were not affor ded sub stanti al due process lac ks merit.

¶7 In thi s appeal, the Fadels again arg ue that the di stric t court

err ed i n e ntering an o rder allowing demoli tion o f t he Barn rat her than allowing them to vacate and secu re the Barn, whi ch they use only as a si gn. In our earlier deci si on, we consi dered ”whether the condi tion of the Barn makes i t so dangero us that v a cat i ng and

secu ring i t i s an i nadequate remedy.” Id. ¶ 9. We conclu ded that the Fadels had fai led to explain how v a ca t ing and secu ring the Barn

was “a viab le option.” Id. In addi tion, we rej ected an arg ument that there wa s insu ffi ci ent evidenc e to supp or t the deter minati on that the Barn was an un safe s tr ucture. Id. ¶ 10.

¶8 The Fadels’ arg ument i n thi s second appeal that there were genui ne i ssu es of material fact relat ed to t he dangero us c ondi tion of the Barn i s tied to a mi sch aracter i zation of the proceedings on the motion to demoli sh as a sum mary judgment proceeding rat her than an enforcement proceeding. The d i s tr i c t c ou rt ’s onl y s u m m ary judgment was affi rmed i n our 2014 deci si on i n the Fad e l s’ fi rst appeal. Fin ally, the Fadels arg ue that the Nove mber 24, 2014 Or der fai led to sati sfy rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules o f Civi l Procedure by

20141125-CA 4 2015 UT App 43Hodgson v. Farmington Ci ty

fai ling to i nclu de findings of fact. Any factual i ssu es reg ardin g the Ci ty’ s right to proceed to abate t he dangero us condi tion of the bui lding were resolv ed i n the or i gin al proceedings that culm i nated wi th our deci si on in the fi rst appeal. In addi tion, the Fadels fai led
to object to the form of the or der. The pr o ce e d i ngs o n t he motion to d e mo li sh were li mi ted to a deter minati on of whether an or der

was n ecess ary to complete the pro ceedings.

¶9 The Fadels cannot rear gue in thi s appeal i ssu es that were deter mined i n Hodgson v. F ar m i ngton City, 2014 UT App 188, 334 P.3d 484. We conclu de that the di stric t court di d not err i n enter i ng the Or der on Far mingto n Ci ty’ s Motion to Allow Demoli tion o f a Dangerous St ructure. Accordingly, we affi rm.

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