IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

September 1, 2015 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ANTHONY WILSON and DEANGELO 

TAYLOR

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 1300998 W. Mark Ward, Judge

No. W2014-01054-CCA-R3-CD - Filed December 11, 2015

_____________________________

Both of the appellants, Anthony Wilson and Deangelo Taylor, stand convicted of first 

degree murder and attempted first degree murder. The trial court sentenced them to life 

for the first degree murder conviction and to twenty years for the attempted first degree 

murder conviction. The trial court aligned appellant Taylor‘s sentences consecutively 

and appellant Wilson‘s sentences concurrently. On appeal, appellant Taylor argues that: 

(1) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on criminal responsibility for the conduct of 

another; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support appellant‘s convictions; (3) the trial 

court erred in failing to instruct the jury on self-defense and defense of others; (4) the trial 

court erred in failing to declare a mistrial after the State told the jury that appellant was in 

jail; (5) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a close-up autopsy photograph of 

the victim‘s face; (6) the trial court erred in admitting Chris Williams‘ statement as 

substantive evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(26); (7) there was 

cumulative error that requires reversal; and (8) the trial court erred in aligning appellant‘s 

sentences consecutively. Appellant Wilson argues that the trial court erred in failing to 

grant his Motion for Acquittal because the proof at trial was inconsistent and insufficient 

and also erred in admitting into evidence Jarquez McKinley‘s police statement as 

substantive evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(26). Following our 

thorough review of the arguments, record, and the applicable law, we affirm the 

judgments of the trial court but remand for correction of appellant Taylor‘s attempted 

murder judgment. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed; 

Remanded
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ROGER A. PAGE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JOHN EVERETT 

WILLIAMS and TIMOTHY L. EASTER,JJ., joined.

Dewun R. Settle, Memphis, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Anthony Wilson.

Lance R. Chism (on appeal), and Lauren M. Fuchs and Anna Lee Benson (at trial), 

Memphis, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Deangelo Taylor.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; David H. Findley, Senior Counsel;

Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Colin A. Campbell and Tracye N. Jones, 

Assistant District Attorneys General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

 

This case concerns a large street fight that erupted in Memphis, Tennessee. The 

altercation began because Ronisha1believed that Stefanie had stolen a camera from 

someone‘s home. Multiple members of each girl‘s family became involved in the 

argument, which escalated to a physical altercation on McMillan Street on October 20, 

2010. Initially, the fight only involved the women of each family; however, male 

members of the families and males who were observing the fight soon joined the fray. 

Lyle King and Julian Williams joined the altercation on behalf of Stefanie‘s family 

members, and appellants and codefendant Alfred Robinson sided with Ronisha‘s family. 

The physical altercation ultimately led to a shootout, causing the death of the victim, Lyle 

King,2and the injury of Julian Williams and appellant Taylor. As a result of the 

shooting, appellant Taylor, appellant Wilson, and Alfred Robinson were indicted for the 

first degree murder of the victim, attempted first degree murder of Mr. Williams, and 

employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Appellants‘ trial 

began on February 4, 2014. The jury convicted appellants Taylor and Wilson as charged 

and found co-defendant Robinson not guilty on all counts. 

 

1 Because several parties and witnesses share the same last name, for clarity, we will refer to 

everyone with the last names ―King,‖ ―Johnson,‖ and ―Carter‖ by their full name or by their first name 

only. It is also the policy of this court to protect the identity of minors; as such, we will refer to any 

known minors by their first names. In doing so, we mean no disrespect. Also, throughout the duration of 

this opinion, we will endeavor to use individuals‘ formal names, rather than their nicknames, when it is 

clear from the testimony and context which person is referenced. Many of the individuals‘ full names are 

revealed in subsequent or prior testimony. Due to the frequency of this occurrence throughout the facts, 

we will not indicate each instance that a witness uses a nickname rather than a formal name.

2 Although both Lyle King and Julian Williams were victims in this case, for ease of reference, 

we will refer to the deceased victim, Lyle King, as ―the victim,‖ and we will refer to Julian Williams by 

his full name or ―Mr. Williams.‖ 
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I. Facts

Trichuna Butler, the victim‘s sister, testified that on October 20, 2010, she, 

Montoya Trezevant, Lucilla (her younger sister who was fifteen at the time), the victim, 

and Julian Williams (a friend of the victim) went to McMillan Street in Memphis, 

Tennessee, after Ms. Trezevant received a telephone call from Cheryl, Ms. Butler‘s 

cousin, informing them that several females had ―tried to jump her.‖ After the group 

arrived, Ms. Butler saw her cousin, Makala, who was thirteen or fourteen at the time, 

standing in the street. She also saw Mary Johnson, whose three children were also 

present, arrive at the scene. Vanita King, Ms. Butler‘s aunt, pulled up behind Ms. Butler 

to tell the group that she had already picked up Cheryl and Stefanie, who were with 

Vanita. Ms. Butler did not recognize the other individuals present at the scene. 

Everyone exited their vehicles and a fight ensued between several women after a 

female hit Cheryl. Ms. Butler explained that initially, Mr. Williams and the victim were 

―standing back‖ from the fight and that the victim tried to stop the fight. However, after 

the victim saw one of Mary Johnson‘s sons, Jarquez McKinley, hit Lucilla, the victim‘s 

sister, the victim joined the fight, fighting with the other males present. Ms. Butler 

explained that she then noticed an influx of males at the scene and that she joined her 

brother in fighting the males. Ms. Butler approximated that there were more than twenty 

people involved at that point. Ms. Butler then heard multiple gunshots, and everyone fled 

the scene. Ms. Butler explained that she ran inside someone‘s house. Ms. Butler heard 

three different guns firing, stating that the weapons sounded different; however, she did 

not see who was firing the weapons. After Ms. Butler was inside the house to which she 

ran for shelter, she looked outside and saw a car drive away and her brother lying on the 

ground with Mr. McKinley ―stomping him.‖ Mr. McKinley picked up a large garbage 

can and threw the garbage can on top of the victim. Mr. McKinley‘s brother, Brandon, 

pulled Mr. McKinley away from the victim. Ms. Butler and several other people at the 

scene attempted to help the victim, and Ms. Butler saw that the victim was bleeding. Ms. 

Butler asserted that neither the victim nor anyone who arrived at the scene with her had a 

gun. Ms. Butler did not know what caused the fight. 

During cross-examination, Ms. Butler explained that Vanita was Cheryl‘s mother. 

Ms. Butler also stated that Cheryl was on speaker phone when she asked Ms. Trezevant 

to pick her up and that all five people who went to the scene had heard Cheryl say that a 

group of girls had tried to ―jump her.‖ Ms. Butler stated that the five of them rode to the 

scene in Ms. Trezevant‘s gold Lexus. Although confronted with her police statement in 

which she said Cheryl and Stefanie were standing outside when Ms. Butler arrived, Ms. 

Butler asserted that only Eisha King and her daughter Makala were outside when the 

group arrived. Ms. Butler and Ms. Trezevant exited the car and spoke to Makala, and 

Vanita pulled in nearby. Cheryl got out of the car to speak with Ms. Butler, Ms. 

Trezevant, and Makala. Ms. Butler explained that Mary Johnson arrived in a red truck 
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with ―a lot‖ of females inside. Ms. Butler testified that it was one of the females with 

Mary who began the fight. Ms. Butler explained that the victim‘s attempt to break up the 

fight consisted of his trying to separate Ms. Butler and her aunt from the fight. Ms. 

Butler stated that Mr. McKinley‘s hitting Lucilla and the victim‘s attempting to pull her 

away were the first times that men entered the fight. However, afterward, men began 

joining the fight from ―everywhere.‖ Ms. Butler said that during the fight, she saw Mr. 

Williams beside her and that she then began hearing the gunshots. Ms. Butler explained 

that after the shooting, she was only in the house for two or three minutes before she went 

back outside. Ms. Butler stated that Mr. McKinley‘s brother pulled Mr. McKinley off of 

the victim and that Mary told her son to leave the victim alone. Ms. Butler explained that 

she did not know most of the people involved because she did not live in that 

neighborhood. Ms. Butler explained that she was nineteen at the time of the shooting.

Ms. Butler agreed that she did not tell the police that she heard three different guns fire. 

Joycelyn Key, a resident of McMillan Street, testified that she witnessed the fight 

and resulting shootout on October 20, 2010. Ms. Key was located three to five houses 

from the incident. She explained that ―children‖ from the neighborhood were involved in 

a verbal argument and that a physical altercation between both women and men ensued. 

Ms. Key explained that when the fighting began, she hid behind her car and that she was 

still hiding there when she heard multiple gunshots. Ms. Key asserted that she heard so 

many gunshots that she believed she would see ―a lot‖ of deceased people when it was 

over. Ms. Key stated that she never saw the victim with a gun but that she saw two other 

shooters. Ms. Key elaborated that one shooter was wearing a black shirt and holding a 

black gun and that he was standing on the left side of the street. Ms. Key described the 

other shooter as wearing a silver shirt and holding a silver gun, standing on the right side 

of the street. Both individuals shot into the crowd in the street, and the victim‘s injuries 

resulted. Ms. Key explained that after the victim fell to the ground, the shooter with the 

silver gun shot the victim approximately three times. Ms. Key testified that after the 

shooting, the man with the silver gun walked down the street toward her. She did not see 

where the shooter with the black gun went. Ms. Key explained that she later identified 

the shooter with the black gun from a photographic array. In court, Ms. Key identified 

appellant Taylor as the shooter with the black gun and denied seeing co-defendant 

Robinson during the fight. Ms. Key explained that she did not know the shooter with the 

silver gun but asserted that she had previously identified that individual.

During cross-examination, Ms. Key explained that she saw the fight taking place 

as she drove to her home. She had just stopped at her home and exited her car when the 

gunfire began, which caused her to hide behind her car. She explained that she then 

looked around the side of her car to see what was occurring. Ms. Key agreed that the 

scene was ―[p]andemonium.‖ She testified that she did not see who initially started 

shooting during the fight. Ms. Key stated that the shooter with the silver gun appeared to 

be in shock when he was walking down the street with another man after the shooting. 
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She described that shooter as being short, black, and dark-complected. She described the 

man with whom he was walking as being short with a ―funny eye.‖ Ms. Key asserted that 

the two men seemed to be friends and that the shooter‘s friend told the shooter to give 

him the gun. Ms. Key described the man with the black gun as taller, black, and lightcomplected. 

During redirect examination, Ms. Key asserted that she had identified the shooter 

in the silver shirt in ―A3‖ of the photographic spread; however, there was no indication 

on the document that an identification had been made. During recross-examination, Ms. 

Key claimed that the police officers told her to circle the person whom she identified in 

spread C but that they did not tell her to circle her choice in spread A. 

Memphis Police Department (―MPD‖) Detective Robert Wilkie explained that 

―A3‖ of Ms. Key‘s photographic spread was not circled because Detective Wilkie knew 

that the person in the A3 photograph was incarcerated when this crime occurred. 

Therefore, instead of having Ms. Key circle the photograph, he noted on the bottom of 

the page that a positive identification had not been made. During cross-examination, 

Detective Wilkie elaborated that when Ms. Key chose the A3 photograph, she stated that 

the person ― ̳kind of looked like‘‖ the other shooter. She did not make a definitive 

identification. 

Cheryl testified that she was seventeen at the time of trial and that she was thirteen 

at the time of the October 2010 incident. Cheryl explained that the victim was her cousin 

and that she knew ―Woo,‖ whom she identified as appellant Taylor,

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and ―Tiny,‖ whom

she identified as codefendant Robinson, at the time of the incident. Cheryl denied 

knowing appellant Wilson, also known as ―Ant.‖ Cheryl testified that on October 20, 

2010, she was staying with her cousin, Eisha, who lived on McMillan Street. Cheryl and 

Stefanie had gone to visit friends elsewhere when they received a call from Eisha, telling 

them that Ronisha was looking for Stefanie. After returning to McMillan Street, Ronisha 

and Ronisha‘s cousin Ashley were standing outside of Eisha‘s home claiming that they 

intended to fight Stefanie. Ronisha and Ashley were soon joined by approximately eight 

other women. Cheryl attempted to contact her mother to ask for someone to pick her up, 

but when her attempts were unsuccessful, she called her sister Montoya Trezevant. 

However, Cheryl‘s mother arrived before Ms. Trezevant, and Ms. Trezevant was arriving 

as Cheryl, her mother, and Stefanie were leaving. In response, Cheryl‘s mother turned 

around to inform Ms. Trezevant that Cheryl was with her. Before the group could leave, 

another car blocked their vehicles, and Cheryl and Ashley began fighting in the street, 

 

3 While Cheryl only indicated that ―Woo‖ was the appellant ―in the black vest,‖ the State more 

specifically asked Cheryl about the other two defendants and her knowledge of each. Therefore, it is 

clear from the context of the questioning, that Cheryl was referring to appellant Taylor in her 

identification of ―Woo.‖ 
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which caused the other people present to begin fighting. Cheryl estimated that when the 

fight initially began, there were over twenty people present. Cheryl explained that the 

fight had been underway for about five minutes when she heard the first gunshots. 

Cheryl and Eisha ducked behind a bush. Cheryl then looked toward the gunshots and 

saw appellant Taylor standing over the victim shooting as the victim lay on the ground. 

Cheryl asserted that neither the victim nor Mr. Williams had a weapon during the fight. 

Cheryl could not remember how many shots were fired, and she did not see anyone else 

fire a weapon. Cheryl stated that after the shooting, appellant Taylor walked down the 

street, entered a truck, and left the scene. Cheryl testified that she did not see 

codefendant Robinson that day. After appellant Taylor fled the scene, Cheryl saw 

Jarquez McKinley, also known as ―Jock,‖ hit the victim with a trash can and stomp on the 

victim with his foot. Cheryl did not see Mr. McKinley with a gun. 

During cross-examination, Cheryl elaborated that after her mother turned around 

to inform her sister that Cheryl and Stefanie were with her, Cheryl exited the car to tell 

Mary Johnson what was occurring. Vanita (Cheryl‘s mother) and Juanita Carter

(Ashley‘s mother) also engaged in a verbal argument. While Cheryl was talking to the 

other people present, Ashley hit her, which prompted everyone to exit their vehicles and 

begin fighting. Cheryl explained that the victim and Mr. Williams exited their vehicle

when Mary was fighting Lucilla (the victim‘s sister). Cheryl agreed that Mr. McKinley 

entered the fight after the victim attempted to intervene in the fight between Lucilla and 

Mary (Mr. McKinley‘s mother). Cheryl stated that the victim and Mr. McKinley then 

began to fight one another. Cheryl asserted that she saw appellant Taylor holding a silver 

and black gun. Cheryl also stated that there was something covering appellant Taylor‘s 

face when she saw him and that it was possibly a hat that was obscuring his face. Cheryl 

explained that appellant Taylor removed the obstruction as he fled the scene of the 

shooting so that she saw his face clearly. Cheryl did not see anyone except appellant 

Taylor with a weapon on the day of the shooting.

Stefanie testified that she was twenty years old at the time of trial, which would 

have made her a minor at the time of the shooting. Stefanie stated that in October 2010, 

she knew all three of the men on trial. On October 20, 2010, Stefanie, Eisha, Makala, 

and Cheryl were all on McMillan Street when an argument began with Ronisha because 

Stefanie was accused of taking a camera from someone‘s home. Stefanie explained that 

she stayed inside of the house until her stepmother, Vanita, arrived. Vanita, Cheryl, and 

Stefanie attempted to leave; however, when Ms. Trezevant (Stefanie‘s sister) arrived, 

Vanita returned to inform Ms. Trezevant that Cheryl and Stefanie were with her. Upon 

returning, the women exited the car, and Ashley hit Cheryl. A fight among multiple 

individuals ensued. Stefanie recalled that the victim attempted to break up a fight in 

which his sister Lucilla was involved. Stefanie testified that she was trying to help her 

sister, who was eight months pregnant, fight one of the combatants when she heard 

approximately five gunshots. Stefanie explained that she and her sister got down and that 
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when she looked up, she saw appellant Taylor shooting the victim, who was lying on the 

ground. Stefanie did not see anyone else shooting or holding a gun. 

During cross-examination, Stefanie stated that Ms. Trezevant, Lucilla, the victim, 

Mr. Williams, and Shanna all arrived at the scene together. Stefanie explained that as her 

family was attempting to leave the area, Mary Johnson, the mother of the girls who 

wanted to fight Stefanie, arrived and pulled in front of Vanita‘s vehicle, blocking the road 

in front of them. Mary exited the vehicle and wanted to speak to Stefanie. The fight 

ensued after Ashley hit Cheryl. Stefanie agreed that in her statement to police, she said 

that the victim was standing when she looked up after the shots were fired and that the 

victim was standing in the area in which appellant Taylor was shooting, not that appellant 

Taylor aimed at the victim. Stefanie denied that people ―scattered‖ when the shooting 

began.

Jarquez McKinley testified he knew all three of the men on trial from seeing them 

in his neighborhood. However, Mr. McKinley could not remember the events of October 

20, 2010, and could not remember giving the police a statement regarding the incident. 

Mr. McKinley blamed his lapse of memory on his alcoholism. He also asserted that the 

initials and signatures on his police statement and his advice to witness a photographic 

lineup form were not made by him. Mr. McKinley was also unable to remember writing 

on or signing any photographic identifications. 

The court conducted a jury-out hearing to determine if Detective Robert Wilkie 

could testify regarding Mr. McKinley‘s prior police statement. Detective Wilkie testified 

that prior to taking Mr. McKinley‘s statement, Mr. McKinley told him that he had 

consumed alcohol that evening. However, Detective Wilkie asserted that Mr. McKinley 

appeared to understand what was occurring and did not appear to be intoxicated. 

Initially, Mr. McKinley told Detective Wilkie varying versions of the shooting, but after 

being confronted with information from other witnesses, Mr. McKinley finally stated that 

he had fought with the victim and that appellant Wilson had shot the victim. Detective

Wilkie stated that Mr. McKinley either initialed or signed his advice of rights form, his 

police statement, his advice to witness form, and his photographic identifications of 

appellants Taylor and Wilson. Detective Wilkie agreed that he could not testify as to the 

veracity of Mr. McKinley‘s statement. 

Following the jury-out hearing, the trial court allowed Detective Wilkie to testify 

similarly before the jury and allowed into evidence a redacted version of Mr. McKinley‘s 

police statement, the two photographic identifications of appellants Taylor and Wilson, 

and the advice to witness form. In the redacted version of Mr. McKinley‘s statement, 

Mr. McKinley explained that he was at a liquor store when someone informed him that 

his mother was involved in a fight on McMillan Street. When Mr. McKinley arrived at 

the scene, he saw a man who had been shot running into a house. Someone told Mr. 
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McKinley that the victim had hit Mr. McKinley‘s mother, so Mr. McKinley attacked the 

victim. During the fight, Mr. McKinley heard gunshots, and the victim fell to the ground. 

Mr. McKinley asserted that appellant Wilson walked up to the victim and shot the victim 

five or six times. Mr. McKinley then fled the scene. In Mr. McKinley‘s photographic 

identifications, he stated that appellant Wilson shot the victim and that appellant Taylor 

was also shot at the scene.

Chris Williams testified that in October 2010, she lived near McMillan Street. She 

explained that she had heard of the three men on trial but that she did not know them 

personally. On October 20, 2010, Ms. Williams was standing on the corner of McMillan 

Street and a cross street when she saw a large group of people fighting in the street. Ms. 

Williams then heard gunshots from more than one gun, although she could not determine 

how many guns were fired. Initially, Ms. Williams asserted that she did not remember 

seeing the shooters. However, after being confronted with her police statement in which 

she told law enforcement that appellant Taylor was responsible for the victim‘s death, 

Ms. Williams testified that she remembered seeing appellant Taylor shoot the victim. 

Ms. Williams also recalled shots being fired toward another male as he ran away. Ms. 

Williams stated that she was unsure if the information in her statement to police was 

correct because she was intoxicated by drugs and alcohol when she witnessed the 

shooting. Ms. Williams further asserted that she had ―totally blocked [the shooting] out‖ 

and therefore did not remember what occurred. The State entered as evidence Ms. 

Williams‘ identification of appellant Taylor on which Ms. Williams wrote, ―This is Woo

[appellant Taylor], number 2. I seen [sic] him fighting and shooting the guy.‖ Although 

Ms. Williams did not remember making the statement, she agreed that she would not 

have lied when she told police that ― ̳Ant [appellant Wilson] was shooting at the boy 

running.‘‖

During cross-examination, Ms. Williams testified that when she was using illegal 

drugs, she used marijuana, ―X pills,‖ and cocaine. Ms. Williams denied abusing alcohol. 

She agreed that her memories from the shooting were suspect due to her illegal drug use 

and that she was second-guessing her memories and assertions from that time. Ms. 

Williams also asserted that due to her drug use, there were gaps of time that she was 

unable to recall. She said there were some things in her statement she knew were false. 

Ms. Williams stated that she was sure that she saw appellant Taylor at the fight but that 

she was unsure of what she saw him doing during and after the fight. Ms. Williams 

explained that when the shooting began, she hid behind her car and that her primary 

concern was her safety. Ms. Williams stated that co-defendant Robinson was not the 

same ―Tiny‖ whom she saw at the crime scene.

In a jury-out hearing, MPD Lieutenant Anthony Mullins testified that on October 

20, 2010, Ms. Williams called the police department and stated that she had witnessed the 

shooting. About two hours after the shooting, Lieutenant Mullins met Ms. Williams, 
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picked her up, and took her to the police station to give a statement. Lieutenant Mullins 

described Ms. Williams as seeming ―a little scared and nervous‖ but otherwise 

unimpaired. Lieutenant Mullins did not smell the residual odor of used narcotics. Ms. 

Williams was responsive and able to relay information to Lieutenant Mullins. Lieutenant 

Mullins stated that Ms. Williams reviewed, initialed, and signed her statement. 

Following the jury-out hearing, the trial court allowed Lieutenant Mullins to 

testify similarly before the jury and allowed into evidence a redacted version of Ms. 

Williams‘ police statement. In Ms. Williams‘ statement, she stated that ―Woo‖ (appellant 

Taylor) was responsible for the victim‘s death and that she saw two other shooters, one of 

whom she identified as ―Tiny.‖ She explained that prior to the shooting, appellant Taylor 

started complaining about being hit too hard during the fight with the victim and that 

appellant Taylor walked to his white Impala and retrieved his gun. She stated that 

appellant Taylor shot the victim four times while the victim was lying on the ground. 

Ms. Williams stated appellant Taylor and ―Tiny‖ then shot from ―opposite directions‖ at 

a second male who was with the victim. Ms. Williams then heard appellant Taylor say, 

― ̳I‘m hit.‘‖ During cross-examination, Lieutenant Mullins stated that he had no specific 

memory of asking Ms. Williams if she was intoxicated when she provided her statement 

and conceded that powder cocaine and ecstasy do not have a strong odor. Lieutenant 

Mullins explained that he showed Ms. Williams a photographic array that included codefendant Robinson and that Ms. Williams said that she knew co-defendant Robinson as 

―Tiny‖ but that he was not the same person she saw at the shooting. Ms. Williams then 

identified appellant Wilson as the second shooter. 

MPD Officer Paris Glass testified that she went to McMillan Street in response to 

a report of a shooting. When she arrived at the scene, Officer Glass saw a group of fifty 

to sixty people, and several males were fighting. When Officer Glass stopped near the 

fight, many people began to flee the area, and Officer Glass saw a male who had been 

shot lying in the street. The victim was responsive to Officer Glass but was unable to 

verbally communicate with her. Once other officers arrived, Officer Glass went into a 

nearby home based on information that there was another male gunshot victim inside. 

She found Julian Williams inside the house suffering from a gunshot wound to the leg. 

Officer Glass did not hear any gunshots while she was at the scene. During crossexamination, Officer Glass testified that after she arrived and a number of people fled 

from the area, there were approximately thirty people left at the crime scene. Officer 

Glass also agreed that when she talked to Mr. Williams, he was uncooperative and that he 

was unsure who had shot him. 

Dr. Marco Ross, the Deputy Chief Medical Examiner for Shelby County, testified 

that he was a forensic pathologist and that he performed the autopsy on the deceased 

victim on October 21, 2010. Dr. Ross stated that the victim suffered nine gunshot 

wounds. One bullet entered the victim‘s left lower back and went through the left hip 
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bone, the left internal iliac artery, the tissue near the colon, and the bladder. The bullet 

came to rest in the victim‘s inner left thigh. A second bullet entered the victim‘s right 

buttock and exited the right buttock. A third bullet entered and exited from the left 

buttock. Dr. Ross speculated that the third bullet wound might be a reentry and exit of 

the second bullet. A fourth bullet entered the right buttock, exited and reentered the 

perineum, and lodged in the victim‘s outer left thigh. A fifth bullet entered and exited the 

victim‘s right thigh. A sixth bullet entered the victim‘s inner right knee and traveled up 

the victim‘s thigh to lodge in tissue in front of the victim‘s right hip. A seventh bullet 

entered the right forearm and exited the right wrist. An eighth bullet entered and lodged 

in the victim‘s right elbow, which Dr. Ross said was consistent with someone trying to 

cover their face. A ninth bullet entered the victim‘s left forearm. The victim also 

suffered numerous other abrasions. 

Dr. Ross collected several bullets and bullet fragments that remained in the 

victim‘s body. Toxicology testing revealed that the victim had used marijuana prior to 

the shooting. Dr. Ross opined that based on the amount of marijuana byproducts found 

in the victim‘s system, the victim‘s level of impairment depended on how frequently the 

victim had used marijuana in the past. Dr. Ross said that if the victim had been a first 

time or infrequent user, the victim may have been impaired; however, if the victim was a 

habitual user, the victim may not have been impaired. Dr. Ross explained that due to the 

damage to the victim‘s iliac artery, approximately one liter of blood was found in the 

victim‘s abdomen, which could have led to the onset of shock. Dr. Ross said that the 

victim died as a result of the multiple gunshot wounds.

During cross-examination, Dr. Ross explained that the iliac artery was 

approximately the size of a pinkie or ring finger. He agreed that the victim was not shot 

in the head or upper torso where the likelihood of death was much higher than injuries to 

the extremities. Dr. Ross testified that the location of the shooter and the bullet 

trajectories depended on how the victim was positioned when the shots entered his body. 

Dr. Ross agreed that if the seventh bullet wound had been sustained while the victim‘s 

arm covered his face or chest, the victim would most likely have had a corresponding 

wound matching the exit wound for that injury and that it was possible that the eighth and 

ninth bullet wounds were sustained while the victim held a gun up. He also agreed that

when each bullet wound was considered independently, the bullet striking the iliac artery 

was the most lethal but that some of the other wounds would have required immediate 

treatment to be survivable. However, Dr. Ross clarified that it was the combined effect 

of the multiple gunshot wounds that lead to the victim‘s death. Dr. Ross explained that it 

was the victim‘s extensive bleeding that caused him to go into cardiac arrest, which 

ultimately killed him. 

Pier testified that he was eighteen at the time of trial and that he was fourteen in 

October 2010. He admitted that he had a prior juvenile conviction for aggravated 
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robbery. Pier testified that when questioned about the events of October 20, 2010, he told 

officers that he had been playing basketball when he saw a group of females begin 

fighting. However, Pier asserted that he left the scene before the shooting and that he did 

not know who was responsible for the death of the victim. He explained that he was on a 

different street with a friend, Jonathan Ford, when the shooting occurred. Pier asserted 

that he did not remember telling law enforcement that co-defendant Robinson and 

―Rambo‖ had guns so that they could rob someone at the scene of the fight and that he 

did not remember the events that he recounted in his statement. Throughout his 

testimony, Pier alternatively agreed that co-defendant Robinson, ―Rambo,‖ and appellant 

Taylor were at the scene of the fight, denied that they were present, and then asserted that 

he could not remember. When presented with his statement to police, Pier agreed that the 

initials on the first page and the signature on the last page belonged to him but asserted 

that the initials on the second page were not his. When presented with photographic 

arrays, Pier stated that he could not remember identifying anyone or signing the 

documents but then agreed that the signatures were his own. 

During cross-examination, Pier agreed that he knew appellant Taylor from the 

neighborhood and that he saw appellant Taylor at the scene of the fight. However, Pier 

asserted that appellant Taylor was only watching and that he did not see appellant Taylor 

with a gun. Pier agreed that there were a lot of people watching the women fight. He did 

not recall seeing appellant Wilson or co-defendant Robinson at the scene of the fight. 

Pier did not remember telling the police that the only reason he was talking to them was 

because co-defendant Robinson had been in an altercation with Pier‘s cousin. Pier 

asserted that he saw co-defendant Robinson at the fight but that he did not see codefendant Robinson with a gun. 

In a jury-out hearing, Detective Robert Wilkie testified that he interviewed Pier on 

October 21, 2010. Detective Wilkie explained that Pier volunteered the information 

about the shooting and that he was cooperative during the interview. Detective Wilkie 

saw Pier initial and sign his police statement and advice to witness form. Detective 

Wilkie testified that Pier identified three people in photographic arrays and that Pier 

initialed and signed the identifications. Detective Wilkie conceded that Pier told him that 

the only reason he was speaking to the detective was because co-defendant Robinson and 

Pier‘s cousin had gotten into an altercation about one week before the interview. 

Following the jury-out hearing, the trial court allowed Detective Wilkie to testify 

similarly before the jury and allowed into evidence Pier‘s witness statement, the advice to 

witness form, and three photographic arrays, two of which identified co-defendant 

Robinson and appellant Taylor. In his statement, Pier explained that he and another male 

were playing basketball when a group of females walked by discussing a forthcoming 

fight. Pier and his friend went to watch the fight and saw multiple other people arrive at 

the scene. Pier then heard ―Tiny‖ say that one of the males at the scene had money and 
-12-

that ―they‖ should rob the other man. Pier explained that ―Rambo started pulling on his 

pants where his gun usually [was], and then Tiny pulled out a .38 revolver from his 

pants.‖ Pier heard ―Tiny‖ say, ― ̳You know how we get down, no fighting. Strictly 

shooting.‘‖ Pier and his friend then left the scene. Shortly thereafter, they heard 

gunshots. Pier asserted that he only saw ―Tiny‖ and ―Rambo‖ with guns. Pier also told 

Detective Wilkie that he saw ―Rambo, Tiny, Woo, Ant, Marquis, Pig, Dman[,] . . . 

Whitey[,] and Nunu‖ at the scene of the fight. During cross-examination, Detective 

Wilkie agreed that Pier never saw appellant Taylor with a gun and that he only saw 

appellant Taylor watching the fight. Detective Wilkie also conceded that the prior 

altercation between Pier‘s cousin and co-defendant Robinson was a motive for Pier to lie 

about co-defendant Robinson‘s involvement in the shooting.

Julian Williams testified he had two prior felony convictions ― a drug-related 

offense and a robbery. He stated that in October 2010, he was friends with the victim but 

that he did not know appellants Taylor or Wilson. Mr. Williams explained that on 

October 20, 2010, he, the victim, and Ms. Trezevant drove to McMillan Street in a Lexus

in response to a telephone call. Mr. Williams asserted that no one in his group had a 

weapon. When Mr. Williams arrived, he observed a group of forty to fifty people of 

various ages and both genders arguing. He did not know any of the people on the 

opposing side of the argument. A physical altercation ensued, and Mr. Williams saw the 

victim intercede in a fight involving Lucilla. Mr. Williams attempted to help the victim 

fight the other males involved and became embroiled in the altercation as well. During 

the fight, the victim‘s glasses broke, disrupting the victim‘s vision. Mr. Williams stated 

that he grabbed the victim and attempted to flee the area. However, males exited a car 

and began shooting multiple times. After the shooting began, Mr. Williams ran until he 

collapsed on someone‘s porch. He did not know that he had suffered multiple gunshot 

wounds until the homeowners allowed him inside and began caring for his injuries. Mr. 

Williams was shot once in the arm and twice in the legs. Mr. Williams also identified

appellant Wilson4and co-defendant Robinson as two of the shooters. 

During cross-examination, Mr. Williams agreed that initially the victim tried to 

remove Lucilla from the fight but that in the attempt, the victim became involved in the 

fight himself. Mr. Williams explained that two or three male shooters exited a lightcolored car. He agreed that he did not recognize appellant Taylor as one of the shooters. 

Mr. Williams conceded that he did not know how many guns were used during the 

shooting and that he was afraid after the shooting began. Mr. Williams remembered the 

police being at the scene after the shooting, but he did not remember talking to the police 

 

4 While the transcript is unclear which appellant Mr. Williams identified, later testimony revealed 

that Mr. Williams initially made an in-court identification of appellant Taylor but then later stated that he 

was mistaken and identified appellant Wilson in-court. A review of the photographic arrays in the 

technical record, which were also introduced at trial, reveals that Mr. Williams identified appellant 

Wilson. 
-13-

about the shooting because he was ―in shock‖ and ―panicking.‖ Mr. Williams asserted 

that he saw the shooters‘ faces before they opened fire and that he saw a silver gun 

pointed at him. Mr. Williams conceded that he had not seen co-defendant Robinson‘s 

face as clearly as he had seen appellant Wilson‘s face during the shooting; therefore, he 

was not as certain about that identification. During redirect examination, Mr. Williams 

explained that co-defendant Robinson was the individual who had hit him in the face 

during that fight and that after hitting him, co-defendant Robinson ran to the men in the 

car, which was when the shooting began. Mr. Williams explained that he saw codefendant Robinson run back to the car, which was the only reason he was able to see the

shooters before the gunfire began. 

MPD Officer John Stone testified that in October 2010, he was a crime scene 

investigator and that he responded to the shooting on McMillan Street. He explained that 

both he and another crime scene investigator divided the responsibilities at the crime 

scene and that he was charged with doing all relevant sketches and measurements. 

Among the items sketched were nine millimeter Luger casings and .40 caliber casings. 

Numerous pictures of the crime scene and the home where Mr. Williams was found were 

also entered as exhibits. 

Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (―TBI‖) Special Agent Cervinia Braswell 

testified that she was assigned as a forensic scientist in the Firearms Identification Unit. 

In the course of her duties, Special Agent Braswell examined multiple bullets and 

cartridges. Based on her analysis of nine millimeter cartridges, .40 caliber cartridges and 

bullets, and .38/.357 bullets found at the scene and in the victim, Special Agent Braswell 

concluded that three weapons were used to kill the victim but that there were four to five 

weapons used during the incident. Special Agent Braswell conceded that she did not 

know if the nine millimeter cartridges were actually fired during the October 2010 

incident or if they were present from a prior incident. Following this testimony, the State 

rested its case-in-chief.

Appellant Taylor‘s first witness was Brittney, who was eighteen at the time of trial 

but was sixteen on October 20, 2010. Brittney explained that on October 20, 2010, she 

received a telephone call from her younger sister Ashley, who told her that Stefanie and 

Cheryl had ―pull[ed] up on them‖ due to a prior altercation regarding a stolen camera. In 

response to the telephone call, Brittney went to McMillan Street with two other females 

― Jasmine and Dominique. After arriving, Jasmine exited their car to speak to Ashley 

and Ronisha. In response, Stefanie and Cheryl ran into a house because they believed 

that Ashley, Ronisha, and Jasmine were going to begin a fight. Cheryl also called her 

cousin, Lucilla, to inform her of the potential for violence. Dominique and Jasmine soon 

left the area, leaving Brittney, Ronisha, and Ashley on McMillan Street. Approximately 

twenty minutes later, Mary Johnson arrived in her Hummer with Juanicia and Juanita to 

speak with Eisha, the homeowner of the house in which Stefanie and Cheryl were 
-14-

located. After Mary and Eisha had spoken and as everyone was beginning to leave, 

Brittney saw a Lexus, an Impala, and a Mitsubishi stop near Eisha‘s home. Inside the 

vehicles, Brittney saw the victim, Lucilla, Shanna, Ms. Trezevant, an unknown male, 

Vanita, and Keosha (Stefanie‘s sister). When Vanita exited her car, she was angry and 

refused to speak with Mary, and Keosha‘s car was blocking Mary‘s departure. An 

argument then ensued between Juanita, Vanita, Cheryl, and Ashley. Ashley hit Cheryl, 

which caused a fight to begin between multiple parties. Brittney then picked up a baby, 

who was in her care, and watched the fight. 

During the fight, Brittney saw Ms. Trezevant holding a silver tire iron. Brittney 

estimated that the fight continued for approximately five minutes before any males joined 

the fray. The victim entered the fight and hit Juanita in the back of the head when he 

thought that Juanita was attacking Lucilla (his sister). Brittney asserted that the victim 

then went to other fights, grabbed both Juanicia and Holly by their hair, and punched 

them both in the face. Thereafter, other males joined the fight. Brittney heard Vanita 

yell, ― ̳Pop the trunk.‘‖ Brittney believed that shooting was about to begin, so she took 

the children present behind her mother‘s truck on a hill. Brittney asserted that she saw 

the victim with a black gun. Brittney heard one gunshot and heard appellant Taylor say, 

― ̳D***, I‘m shot.‘‖ Brittney heard another shot, which hit the tire of a vehicle near her. 

Brittney saw the other male who had arrived with the victim run into a nearby duplex and 

saw the children inside the house fighting with the male. Brittney then observed the 

victim ―turned sideways‖ scooting from the street toward her. She asserted that the 

victim was not wearing a shirt or pants, that his boxers were askew, and that he was only 

wearing one sock. She then saw someone in a cream-colored shirt shoot the victim, and 

she took the children and ran. Brittney asserted that appellant Taylor was not the shooter 

she saw and that she did not see appellant Taylor after hearing him say that he had been 

shot. Brittney stated that she was approximately six feet from the victim when he was 

shot.

During cross-examination, Brittney asserted that she never saw co-defendant 

Robinson. Brittney estimated that there were approximately thirty people at the scene of 

the fight. Brittney conceded that she was hiding behind her mother‘s vehicle from the 

time the shooting began until after the shooting was over and that she was unable to see 

what occurred during that time. Brittney asserted that in October 2010, she only knew of 

appellant Taylor and co-defendant Robinson but did not know them personally. She 

stated that she did not know appellant Wilson but that she knew appellant Wilson‘s 

girlfriend. She explained that she had seen the victim several times but that they had 

never spoken. Brittney conceded that she was unable to identify the victim‘s shooter 

during her interview after the shooting. She asserted that she did not tell law enforcement 

that the victim had a gun because she was never asked. She stated that she did not see 

anyone besides the victim with a gun because her view was obstructed due to her hiding 

behind her mother‘s vehicle.
-15-

During re-direct examination, Brittney testified that after the first gunshot, she saw 

appellant Taylor holding a gun but that prior to that, she had only seen the victim holding 

a gun. Brittney also said she saw the gun that shot the victim. Brittney said that when 

she saw the victim scooting on the ground, the victim may have already been shot but 

that she did not see any blood. Brittney asserted that she was one hundred percent sure 

that appellant Taylor did not shoot the victim. She said that the victim‘s shooter ―had 

facial hair, [was] bright-skinned, [and wore a] cream shirt.‖ She said that the shooter also 

had ―small dreds‖ that were close to his head and that he had a silver gun. During recross examination, Brittney conceded that she had never given that description to law 

enforcement and that in court was the first time she had ever given anyone that 

description of the shooter.

Appellant Taylor called Juanita Carter as his second witness. Juanita explained 

that on October 20, 2010, when she was about to leave from work, she received a 

telephone call that her daughter, Ashley, was on McMillan Street because Ashley and 

Juanicia Johnson had gotten into an altercation with Stefanie. Juanita explained that she, 

Mary Johnson, and Juanicia Newsom went to McMillan Street in a burgundy Hummer. 

When she arrived, she and Mary began talking to Felicia (who had called her about the 

altercation) and Eisha. During the conversation, Juanita saw a black Impala pass them, 

drive to a nearby gas station, and then return with two other cars ― a gold, four-door car 

and a white, ―creamish‖ car ― that blocked her vehicle‘s exit. Juanita asserted that 

Vanita drove the black car and that there were two males and three females in the gold 

car. Juanita explained that Mary Johnson exited the vehicle to talk to the people in the 

cars; however, the opposing group did not want to talk. Juanita asserted that one of the 

young girls had a small hammer that had a silver metal head and a wooden handle. 

Juanita stated that Mary pleaded with the victim to leave but that Vanita was agitated and 

yelling, ― ̳We didn‘t come over here to talk,‘‖ which Juanita believed meant that Vanita 

wanted to fight. The fight broke out when Ashley hit Cheryl, which caused the other 

women to participate in the fight. During the fight, Juanita felt an unknown male pulling 

her and saw Holly Blueitt grab the male from behind. When that occurred, the male 

turned and hit Ms. Blueitt, and a fight ensued. Juanita also saw the victim fighting with 

Juanicia and saw appellant Taylor pull the victim from Juanicia. During the fight, Juanita

heard a gunshot, and everyone began to run from the area. Juanita also heard appellant 

Taylor say, ― ̳Oh,‘‖ and she began yelling that appellant Taylor had been shot. Juanita

saw appellant Taylor run away, and then she fled the area, eventually reentering her 

Hummer, which had a flat tire, and drove to a nearby street. Juanita asserted that she 

never saw anyone with a gun; she merely heard the shots. Juanita stated that she heard 

more than five gunshots during the incident. Juanita stated that she never saw appellant 

Taylor possess a gun or shoot anyone.

Appellant Taylor‘s next witness was Ashley Carter. Ashley testified that she was 

with Ronisha Johnson on McMillan Street when Ronisha and Stefanie became involved 
-16-

in an argument over a stolen camera. Due to the argument, several other people arrived 

at the scene, including Cheryl‘s mother (Vanita), Ashley‘s mother (Juanita), and Ashley‘s 

aunt (Mary). The adult women were talking about the situation when a vehicle pulled in 

behind Mary‘s vehicle. The physical altercation began when Vanita and Juanita got into 

an argument in which Cheryl tried to intervene. During the fight, Ashley saw men enter 

the fight and saw Stefanie and Ronisha fighting. Ashley explained that she was fighting 

with Cheryl and Lucilla when she heard the first gunshot, which caused her to run from 

the scene. Ashley asserted that she did not see who fired the shot because a Hummer was 

blocking her view. During re-direct examination, Ashley asserted that during the fight, 

she saw the victim and another male fighting with Ms. Blueitt and Mary and that the 

males were pulling the women‘s hair and hitting the women. 

During recross-examination, Ashley agreed that the victim and his friend were not 

the only males involved in the fight. Ashley also agreed that her cousin, Holly Blueitt, 

had a child with a family member of appellant Taylor and that Ms. Blueitt had a child 

with a family member of co-defendant Robinson.

Appellant Taylor‘s next witness was Dierrdre Taylor. Mr. Taylor testified that he 

is appellant Taylor‘s brother and that he was with appellant Taylor on October 20, 2010, 

walking in their neighborhood when they saw Mary Johnson‘s vehicle parked in the 

middle of McMillan Street. Inside the vehicle were Mary and Juanita Carter. As the two 

men were walking up McMillan Street, Mr. Taylor saw a black Impala, a ―brown 

goldish‖ Taurus, and a white Mitsubishi pass them. He saw the cars drive to a gas 

station, turn around, and then return to surround Mary‘s vehicle. Mr. Taylor saw the 

women exit their cars and saw Vanita act in an aggressive manner toward the other 

women. Mr. Taylor explained that there were essentially two groups of people facing 

each other in the street. Cheryl indicated that Vanita should fight with Juanita. However, 

Ashley intervened and began the physical altercation by attacking Cheryl. Mr. Taylor 

stated that all the women then began to fight. Mr. Taylor estimated that the combination 

of fighters and observers totaled approximately seventy-five people at the scene. Mr. 

Taylor explained that he, appellant Taylor, the victim, and Julian Williams5 watched the 

fight from Eisha‘s porch. During the fight, Mr. Taylor saw the victim jump from the 

porch and grab ―Nene‖ Newsome by her hair to stop Ms. Newsome from hitting another 

female. The victim then hit Ms. Newsome in the face twice. Mr. Taylor explained that 

after seeing this, his brother intervened in the victim‘s and Ms. Newsome‘s fight, which 

caused the victim to begin fighting with appellant Taylor. Mr. Taylor explained that he 

entered the fight when he saw Mr. Williams begin fighting appellant Taylor also. Mr. 

Taylor saw other males join the fight. Mr. Taylor asserted that he and appellant Taylor 

 

5 While Mr. Taylor only referred to Mr. Williams as a ―bright-skinned‖ male with the 

victim during direct examination, it is clear from cross-examination that he was referring to Mr. 

Williams.
-17-

only entered the fight to stop the victim from hitting Ms. Newsome. During the fight, 

Mr. Taylor heard a gunshot and heard his brother say, ―ʻOh, they shot me. They shot me, 

bro.‘‖ Mr. Taylor then looked up and saw the victim holding a black and silver gun. The 

two brothers ran from the scene after appellant Taylor was shot, but they got separated. 

As he was running, Mr. Taylor heard multiple gunshots and hid behind a house until the 

gunshots stopped. Mr. Taylor explained that he knew the additional gunshots were fired 

from multiple weapons because the sounds of the gunshots were different. He stated that 

after the gunshots stopped, he returned to the scene to look for his brother. Mr. Taylor 

then saw the victim lying sideways on a curb wounded. Mr. Taylor saw the victim‘s 

family members and Mary Johnson attempting to help the victim before he left the scene. 

Mr. Taylor agreed that he never actually saw anyone shoot a gun and that he never saw 

his brother with a gun at the scene of the shooting.

During cross-examination, Mr. Taylor agreed that he was called ―Rambo.‖ He 

also agreed that at the time of the shooting, he knew both appellant Wilson and Jarquez 

McKinley. Co-defendant Robinson is Mr. Taylor‘s cousin. Mr. Taylor stated that after 

he began running following the initial gunshot during the fight, he had not run far when 

he heard the next series of gunshots. However, his view was obstructed by the house 

behind which he was hiding, and he did not see who was shooting or observe the victim‘s 

movements immediately after the shooting. Mr. Taylor agreed that in the three years 

between the shooting and the trial, he had never told law enforcement or the district 

attorney‘s office his version of events. 

During re-direct examination, Mr. Taylor agreed that law enforcement had never 

contacted him regarding the shooting. He asserted that appellant Taylor intervened in 

Ms. Newsome‘s and the victim‘s fight to protect Ms. Newsome but that appellant Taylor 

never retaliated against the victim after appellant Taylor was shot at the scene. Mr. 

Taylor stated that at the time of the shooting, appellant Taylor had long hair. 

Mary Johnson testified that on October 20, 2010, she received a telephone call in 

the morning from Vanita, telling her that no one was going to ―f*** with Steffi.‖ When 

Mary tried to calm the conversation, Vanita ended the call. Later that day, as Mary was 

leaving work, she received another telephone call informing her that her daughters 

Jasmine Johnson and Chastity Johnson were located on McMillan Street and were about 

to get into a fight with another female. When Mary arrived, her two daughters had 

already left, and Mary apologized to Eisha (the homeowner) for the trouble that her 

daughters had caused. As Mary was about to leave, a black Impala, a tan car, and a white 

car stopped near Mary‘s vehicle, blocking her in. Inside Mary‘s vehicle sat Juanita 

Carter and Juanicia Newsom. Vanita was inside one of the cars, and Mary tried to 

explain that the issue had been resolved. However, Vanita was hostile in response, 

indicating that she wanted to fight. When Ashley and Ronisha walked up, the two girls 

entered Mary‘s vehicle. Mary attempted to talk to the victim and Lucilla because she 
-18-

knew them through her children. Mary explained that she hugged both Lucilla and the 

victim and that when she hugged the victim, she felt ―something hard . . . like a gun.‖ 

Mary explained that Juanita Carter became angry because their exit was blocked, and 

Juanita exited the car. Mary stated that everyone started ―talking smart.‖ Mary asserted 

that Lucilla began the fight by hitting Juanita and that, thereafter, everyone began 

fighting. Mary estimated that twenty to twenty-five people were involved in the fight.

Mary explained that during the fight, she was trying to protect Keosha, who was seven or 

eight months pregnant at the time. Mary also tried to stop her daughter Ronisha from 

fighting with Stefanie. Mary saw a female on the opposing side walking around with a 

pipe in her hand. Mary heard a series of ―pow‖ sounds and turned to see the victim 

holding a gun by his side while appellant Taylor and another male hit him. Mary stated 

that everyone continued to fight and that Lucilla asked her to help the victim. 

When Mary got to the victim, the victim was on his side sliding up on the curb. 

Mary said the victim eventually ―looked like he was dead‖ and that he was not moving or 

talking. Mary explained that the victim was not wearing a shirt and that his jeans were 

―at the bottom of his knees.‖ Mary said that her son Brandon walked up and said, ― ̳I 

told you, I told you, bro, not to come over here. I told you don‘t get in there involved in 

this girl fight. Now look, bro.‘‖ After her son moved away, Mary heard appellant Taylor 

say that he had been shot also and saw appellant Taylor run away. Vanita then 

approached the victim and retrieved two guns that were lying by the victim ― a silver 

gun with a black handle and another silver gun. Vanita, Cheryl, and ―Dman‖ then left the 

scene. While Mary was with the victim, her son Jarquez attempted to hit the victim with 

a green garbage can and kicked the victim. Mary explained that Jarquez was extremely 

intoxicated and that he believed the victim was attempting to hurt her. Mary did not see

appellant Taylor with a gun and did not see anyone actually fire a gun. She only heard 

the gunfire. 

During cross-examination, Mary explained that she arrived at the scene of the 

shooting in her burgundy Hummer but that Juanita Carter was driving the vehicle. Mary 

could not remember if she told law enforcement that Vanita retrieved two guns from near 

the victim after the shooting or if she told police that she felt a gun when she hugged the 

victim. Mary conceded that she did not tell law enforcement that the victim had a gun in 

his hand during the fight. When presented with her police statement, Mary conceded that 

the prior three assertions were not included in her statement and that it did not include 

information about Vanita wanting to fight or about Jarquez hitting the victim. During redirect examination, Mary asserted that she told the officer who took her statement 

information that he did not include in the printed draft of her statement.

Co-defendant Robinson‘s first witness was MPD Lieutenant James Max. 

Lieutenant Max testified that he was the case coordinator for the October 20, 2010 

shooting. Lieutenant Max provided the respective dates in which each of the co-
-19-

defendants was charged regarding the shooting: appellant Taylor, October 22, 2010; 

appellant Wilson, October 28, 2010; and co-defendant Robinson, March or April 2013. 

During cross-examination, Lieutenant Max agreed that he talked to many people 

during the course of his investigation. Lieutenant Max explained that on the night of the 

shooting, he spoke to Tony Moss, a male found near the scene of the shooting with a .40 

caliber pistol. However, Mr. Moss was released without charges because there was no 

further evidence that he was involved in the shooting. Lieutenant Max agreed that he did 

not have the gunshot residue kit taken from the victim tested and explained that gunshot 

residue tests are rarely conclusive. Lieutenant Max agreed that Tony Moss, Trichuna 

Butler, Julian Williams, and Brittney did not identify appellant Taylor as the shooter. 

Lieutenant Max stated that Brittney never told him that the victim had a gun prior to the 

shooting. Lieutenant Max agreed that he waited to charge co-defendant Robinson until 

after the victim‘s autopsy and firearms testing were complete so that he could see if the 

information matched Julian Williams‘ and Pier‘s assertions that co-defendant Robinson

was involved in the shooting. 

Co-defendant Robinson‘s next witness was Jason Powell, a private investigator 

hired on behalf of co-defendant Robinson. Mr. Powell explained that during the course 

of his investigation, he spoke with Julian Williams. Mr. Williams told Mr. Powell that he 

never saw the shooters due to the speed at which events occurred and that he did not 

recognize co-defendant Robinson. 

Following this testimony, the jury convicted appellants Taylor and Wilson as 

charged and found co-defendant Robinson not guilty on all counts. Due to an error in the 

jury instructions and due to the jury‘s not following a jury instruction, the trial court 

dismissed all the counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous 

felony. Therefore, appellants Taylor and Wilson stand convicted of the first degree 

murder of the victim and the attempted first degree murder of Julian Williams. The trial 

court sentenced appellant Taylor to life for his first degree murder conviction and to 

twenty years for his attempted first degree murder conviction, to be served consecutively, 

for a total effective sentence of life plus twenty years. The trial court sentenced appellant 

Wilson to life for his first degree murder conviction and to twenty years for his attempted 

first degree murder conviction, to be served concurrently, for a total effective sentence of 

life. Appellants Taylor and Wilson now challenge their convictions.

II. Analysis

On appeal, appellant Taylor argues that: (1) the trial court erred in instructing the 

jury on criminal responsibility for the conduct of another; (2) the evidence was 

insufficient to support appellant‘s convictions; (3) the trial court erred in failing to 

instruct the jury on self-defense and defense of others; (4) the trial court erred in failing to 
-20-

declare a mistrial after the State told the jury that appellant was in jail; (5) the trial court 

erred in admitting into evidence a close-up autopsy photograph of the victim‘s face; (6) 

the trial court erred in admitting Chris Williams‘ statement as substantive evidence 

pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(26); (7) there was cumulative error that 

requires reversal; and (8) the trial court erred in aligning appellant‘s sentences 

consecutively. Appellant Wilson argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his 

Motion for Acquittal because the proof at trial was inconsistent and insufficient and also 

erred in admitting into evidence Jarquez McKinley‘s police statement as substantive 

evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(26). 

A. Criminal Responsibility Jury Instruction

Appellant Taylor argues that criminal responsibility was not fairly raised by the 

evidence; therefore, the trial court erred in instructing the jury in that regard. ―It is wellsettled that a defendant has a constitutional right to a complete and correct charge of the 

law, so that each issue of fact raised by the evidence will be submitted to the jury on 

proper instructions.‖ State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 390 (Tenn. 2011) (citations 

omitted). It is the duty of the trial judge to properly instruct the jury as to the law 

governing the issues fairly raised by the evidence introduced at trial and the nature of the 

proceedings. Id. (quoting State v. Teel, 793 S.W.2d 236, 249 (Tenn. 1990)). On appeal, 

this court must determine if a given instruction is prejudicially erroneous, which occurs 

when the instruction ―fails to fairly submit the legal issues or if it misleads the jury as to 

the applicable law.‖ State v. Vann, 976 S.W.2d 93, 101 (Tenn. 1998) (citations omitted). 

The propriety of a given instruction is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de 

novo with no presumption of correctness. State v. Smiley, 38 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tenn. 

2001). 

―A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is 

committed by the person‘s own conduct, by the conduct of another for which the person 

is criminally responsible, or by both.‖ Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-401(a). Further, a 

person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another, if 

―[a]cting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, or to benefit in 

the proceeds or results of the offense, the person solicits, directs, aids, or attempts to aid 

another person to commit the offense[.]‖ Id. § 39-11-402(2). While not a separate crime, 

criminal responsibility is a theory by which the State may alternatively establish guilt 

based on the conduct of another. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 386 (citing State v. Lemacks, 

996 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tenn. 1999)). No specific act or deed needs to be demonstrated by 

the State, and furthermore, the presence and companionship of an accused with the 

offender before and after the offense are circumstances from which participation in the 

crime may be inferred. State v. Ball, 973 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). 

However, to be convicted, ―the evidence must establish that the defendant in some way 
-21-

knowingly and voluntarily shared in the criminal intent of the crime and promoted its 

commission.‖ Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 386 (citing State v. Maxey, 898 S.W.2d 756, 757 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)); State v. Foster, 755 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

1988)).

The trial court properly instructed the jury as to criminal responsibility in this case. 

The proof showed that the victim was shot nine times by three separate weapons. The 

victim sustained all of the injuries within a very short time period. Furthermore, Cheryl, 

Stefanie, Chris Williams, and Joycelyn Key all identified appellant Taylor as one of the 

shooters. While appellant Taylor challenges these witnesses‘ credibility, it is the 

province of the jury to resolve issues of credibility and determine the value of the 

evidence presented; as such, we will not reevaluate issues of credibility. State v. Bland, 

958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). Appellant Wilson was also identified as one of the 

shooters, and Julian Williams saw appellant Wilson with co-defendant Robinson 

immediately prior to appellant Wilson opening fire. Based on all of this information, a 

theory of criminal responsibility was fairly raised by the proof presented at trial, and the 

trial court did not err in instructing the jury about criminal responsibility. 

Even if we were to find that the trial court erred in giving the criminal 

responsibility instruction, the error was harmless because there was sufficient evidence 

that appellant Taylor was himself one of the gunmen, as established by the eye witnesses 

identifying appellant Taylor as a shooter, by the nine gunshot wounds suffered by the 

victim, and the three gunshots suffered by Mr. Williams. Therefore, any harm caused by 

giving the instruction was nullified and harmless. See State v. Rickey Dickerson, No. 

W2008-00301-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1219105, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2009) 

(citing Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b)). Appellant is not entitled to relief as to this issue.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Both appellant Taylor and appellant Wilson challenge the sufficiency of evidence 

supporting their convictions. Appellant Taylor argues that the State‘s witnesses were not 

credible and that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation. Appellant Wilson 

argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his Motion for Acquittal because the 

proof at trial was inconsistent and the witnesses were not credible.

A motion for judgment of acquittal raises a question of law, i.e., the legal 

sufficiency of the evidence, for determination by the trial court. State v. Adams, 916 

S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (citing State v. Hall, 656 S.W.2d 60, 61 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1983)). Thus, on appeal, this court applies the same standard of review both 

to the trial court‘s denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal and to the sufficiency of 

the convicting evidence underlying the jury‘s verdict. State v. Carroll, 36 S.W.3d 854, 

869 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (citing Ball, 973 S.W.2d at 292). 
-22-

The standard for appellate review of a claim challenging the sufficiency of the 

State‘s evidence is ―whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (citing 

Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972)); see Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); State v. 

Davis, 354 S.W.3d 718, 729 (Tenn. 2011). To obtain relief on a claim of insufficient 

evidence, appellant must demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

319. This standard of review is identical whether the conviction is predicated on direct or 

circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both. State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 

379 (Tenn. 2011); State v. Brown, 551 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn. 1977).

On appellate review, ― ̳we afford the prosecution the strongest legitimate view of 

the evidence as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn 

therefrom.‘‖ Davis, 354 S.W.3d at 729 (quoting State v. Majors, 318 S.W.3d 850, 857 

(Tenn. 2010)); State v. Williams, 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983); State v. Cabbage, 

571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). In a jury trial, questions involving the credibility of 

witnesses and the weight and value to be given the evidence, as well as all factual 

disputes raised by the evidence, are resolved by the jury as trier of fact. State v. Bland, 

958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Pruett, 788 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990). 

This court presumes that the jury has afforded the State all reasonable inferences from the 

evidence and resolved all conflicts in the testimony in favor of the State; as such, we will 

not substitute our own inferences drawn from the evidence for those drawn by the jury, 

nor will we re-weigh or re-evaluate the evidence. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379; 

Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d at 835; see State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984). 

Because a jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence that appellant enjoyed 

at trial and replaces it with one of guilt at the appellate level, the burden of proof shifts 

from the State to the convicted appellant, who must demonstrate to this court that the 

evidence is insufficient to support the jury‘s findings. Davis, 354 S.W.3d at 729 (citing 

State v. Sisk, 343 S.W.3d 60, 65 (Tenn. 2011)). 

The jury convicted appellants of premeditated murder and attempted premeditated 

murder. Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-202(a) defines this category of first 

degree murder as ―[a] premeditated and intentional killing of another.‖ 

―[P]remeditation‖ is an act done after the exercise of reflection and 

judgment. ―Premeditation‖ means that the intent to kill must have been 

formed prior to the act itself. It is not necessary that the purpose to kill preexist in the mind of the accused for any definite period of time. The mental 

state of the accused at the time the accused allegedly decided to kill must be 

carefully considered in order to determine whether the accused was 
-23-

sufficiently free from excitement and passion as to be capable of 

premeditation. 

Id. at § 39-13-202(d). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine 

whether the State established the element of premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt. 

See State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 599 (Tenn. 

1999). The presence of premeditation is a question of fact for the jury, and the jury may 

infer premeditation from the circumstances surrounding the killing. State v. Young, 196 

S.W.3d 85, 108 (Tenn. 2006); see State v. Suttles, 30 S.W.3d 252, 261 (Tenn. 2000); 

State v. Pike, 978 S.W.2d 904, 914 (Tenn. 1998). 

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence at trial showed that 

appellants fired weapons during a large street fight, killing one person and wounding 

another. Cheryl, Stefanie, Chris Williams, and Joycelyn Key all identified appellant 

Taylor as one of the shooters. Jarquez McKinley, Chris Williams, and Julian Williams

identified appellant Wilson as one of the shooters. While appellants challenge these 

witnesses‘ credibility, it is the province of the jury to resolve issues of credibility and 

determine the value of the evidence presented; as such, we will not reevaluate issues of 

credibility. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659. In addition to these eye witnesses claiming that

appellants were active shooters at the scene, Ms. Key asserted that she saw two males 

shooting simultaneously into the crowd of people fighting. Ms. Williams explained that 

immediately prior to the shooting, she heard appellant Taylor complaining about the 

victim‘s hitting him too hard and that appellant Taylor then went and retrieved a gun 

from a car. In her statement to police, Ms. Williams stated that there were three shooters 

at the scene and that she saw appellant Taylor shoot the victim. She also saw appellant 

Taylor and another shooter fire at another male as the male ran from the scene. On her 

photographic identification of appellant Wilson, Ms. Williams wrote, ―Ant shot at the 

boy running.‖ The victim suffered nine gunshot wounds from three separate weapons, 

which resulted in his death. Julian Williams suffered three gunshot wounds. Dr. Ross 

clarified that it was the combined effect of the multiple gunshot wounds that lead to the 

victim‘s death. Dr. Ross explained that it was the victim‘s extensive bleeding that caused 

him to go into cardiac arrest, which ultimately killed him. Based on this evidence, a 

reasonable jury could have found that appellants were responsible for the death of the 

victim and for the injuries suffered by Mr. Williams. 

Regarding appellant Taylor‘s assertions that the shootings were not premeditated, 

a defendant‘s ―state of mind is crucial to the establishment of the elements of the 

offense;‖ thus, the State may prove premeditation by circumstantial evidence. State v. 

Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 541 (Tenn. 1992). Several factors support the existence of 

premeditation including: ―the use of a deadly weapon upon an unarmed victim; the 

particular cruelty of the killing; declarations by the defendant of an intent to kill; 

evidence of procurement of a weapon; preparations before the killing for concealment of 
-24-

the crime, and calmness immediately after the killing.‖ Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 660 (citing 

Brown, 836 S.W.2d at 541-42; State v. West, 844 S.W.2d 144, 148 (Tenn. 1992)). 

However, these factors are not exhaustive and other information establishing ―a motive 

for the killing and the nature of the killing are also factors from which the jury may infer 

premeditation.‖ State v. Adams, 405 S.W.3d 641, 663 (Tenn. 2013) (citing State v. 

Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 898 (Tenn. 1998)). ―Specifically, evidence of repeated blows is 

a relevant factor in determining premeditation, although this evidence alone would not be 

sufficient to establish premeditation.‖ Id. (citing Sims, 45 S.W.3d at 8).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence at trial was sufficient 

to prove premeditation. Both Ms. Butler and Cheryl stated that the victim and Julian 

Williams were unarmed during the fight. Ms. Williams heard appellant Taylor complain 

about the victim‘s hitting him too hard and, subsequently, saw appellant Taylor retrieve a 

gun from a car. Mr. Williams saw appellant Wilson exit a car with a weapon and open 

fire. Furthermore, both victims suffered multiple gunshots. Therefore, there were 

multiple factors ― the use of a deadly weapon upon an unarmed victim; evidence of 

procurement of a weapon; motive to kill; and multiple gunshot injuries ― that supported 

a finding of premeditation. 

Finally, we note that appellant Wilson makes a sub-argument that his Sixth 

Amendment rights were violated by the use of Mr. McKinley‘s and Ms. Williams‘ 

identifications. In support of this argument, appellant cites two cases that address the 

violation of a defendant‘s Sixth Amendment rights when denied the right of counsel 

during a corporeal line-up or identification. However, appellant Wilson does not argue 

that he was denied his right of counsel but, rather, argues that the identifications were 

unreliable due to Ms. Williams‘ and Mr. McKinley‘s substance abuse. Therefore, we 

conclude that appellant‘s argument as presented is meritless and inapposite to the issue at 

hand. 

Based on the above analysis, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prosecution, a rational jury could have found the essential elements of first degree 

murder and attempted first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellants are

without relief as to this issue.

C. Self-Defense and Defense of Others Jury Instruction

Appellant Taylor argues that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury about 

self-defense and defense of others. The State responds that appellant has waived this 

argument by withdrawing his request for the defense of others instruction at trial and that, 

alternatively, there was no proof justifying a self-defense instruction.
-25-

―It is well-settled that a defendant has a constitutional right to a complete and 

correct charge of the law, so that each issue of fact raised by the evidence will be 

submitted to the jury on proper instructions.‖ Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 390 (citations 

omitted). It is the duty of the trial judge to properly instruct the jury as to the law 

governing the issues fairly raised by the evidence introduced at trial and the nature of the 

proceedings. Id. (quoting Teel, 793 S.W.2d at 249). On appeal, this court must 

determine if a given instruction is prejudicially erroneous, which occurs when the 

instruction ―fails to fairly submit the legal issues or if it misleads the jury as to the 

applicable law.‖ Vann, 976 S.W.2d at 101 (citations omitted). The propriety of a given 

instruction is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo with no 

presumption of correctness. Smiley, 38 S.W.3d at 524. 

At trial, appellant Taylor requested that the trial court instruct the jury regarding 

defense of others. The other two defendants did not request the instruction. During the 

discussion about the instruction, the trial court stated that defense of others incorporated 

the requirements for self-defense, that self-defense requires that the defendant be acting 

legally at the time self-defense was used, and that appellant Taylor was unlawfully in 

possession of a handgun at the time of the shooting. After further discussion, appellant 

Taylor withdrew his request for the instruction before the trial court could rule on 

whether the instruction would be included. However, appellant now reasserts that the 

trial court should have instructed the jury on self-defense or defense of others. This court 

addressed a similar situation in State v. Schiefelbein when a defendant affirmatively 

agreed with the trial court‘s decision regarding a jury instruction. 230 S.W.3d 88, 117 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 2007). This court stated: 

On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court‘s instruction was error. 

We decline the defendant‘s request for relief on this basis because he 

created his own predicament both by failing to object at the appropriate 

time and by inviting the court to do the very thing of which he now 

complains. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a). This court is loath to place a trial 

court in error when the party complaining on appeal failed to take 

corrective action with respect to any error which allegedly occurred below, 

and we are particularly loath to do so where the complaining party 

affirmatively acquiesced in the trial court‘s action. See id. (nothing in rule 

requires ―relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed 

to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the 

harmful effect of an error‖). This issue is waived.

Schiefelbein, 230 S.W.3d at 117. While we note that normally an erroneous jury 

instruction can be raised for the first time in the motion for new trial, we agree with the 

logic and reasoning employed in Schiefelbein. Therefore, we find that by actively 
-26-

withdrawing his motion for a defense of others instruction following a discussion about 

self-defense and defense of others, appellant Taylor has waived this issue on appeal. 

 

D. Mistrial – Appellant in Jail

Appellant Taylor argues that the trial court should have declared a mistrial after 

the State, when asking a witness a question, said that the defendants were in jail. 

Declaring a mistrial serves to repair the damage done to the judicial process when an 

occurrence at trial renders an impartial verdict impossible. State v. Williams, 929 S.W.2d 

385, 388 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). A trial court may declare a mistrial if it appears that 

some matter has occurred that would prevent the jury from reaching an impartial verdict. 

Arnold v. State, 563 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977). A trial court should only 

declare a mistrial in criminal cases in which a manifest necessity requires such action. 

State v. Millbrooks, 819 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). A mistrial is 

appropriate ―when a trial cannot continue or a miscarriage of justice would result if it 

did.‖ State v. McPherson, 882 S.W.2d 365, 370 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). 

This court will review the trial court‘s decision to grant or deny a mistrial for 

abuse of discretion. See State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 147 (Tenn. 1998) (citing State v. 

Adkins, 786 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tenn. 1990)). In reviewing the trial court‘s decision 

granting or denying a mistrial for abuse of discretion, this court considers three factors: 

(1) whether the State elicited the testimony; (2) whether the trial court gave the jury a 

curative instruction; and (3) the relative strength or weakness of the State‘s proof. State 

v. Welcome, 280 S.W.3d 215, 222 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007) (citing State v. Lawrence 

Taylor, No. W2002-00183-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 402276, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

Feb. 14, 2003)). The party requesting the mistrial bears the burden of establishing the 

necessity for it. Williams, 929 S.W.2d at 388. 

Appellant specifically challenges the following colloquy during the State‘s crossexamination of Brittney:

Q: All right. So, in your words what you told us today is Lyle King drew 

down first; is that right?

A: Yes.

Q: All right. And so here these three men are locked up for shooting Lyle 

King, right?

A: Yeah.
-27-

Q: They‘re on trial on trial for murder one, for shooting Lyle King and by 

your words, we‘ve got three innocent men in jail who were just defending 

themselves and you‘ve got this great information that Lyle King drew down 

first?

[Trial counsel objected and moved for a mistrial based on the prosecutor‘s 

statements that the defendants were in jail.]

. . . . 

[Trial court]: Yeah. I‘m not going to agree on a mistrial. I think they can 

still get a fair trial without that even with -- if the jury knows that, but I‘ll 

give a curative instruction if you want it or I cannot. 

[Trial counsel]: What difference does it make now?

[Trial court]: That‘s a two-edged sword. I don‘t -- I‘ll leave the strategic 

decision to y‘all.

. . . .

[Prosecutor to witness]: [Brittney], I‘m going to rephrase my question. So, 

you‘ve got this great information. These three men are charged with this 

crime and you just keep it to yourself; is that right?

A: Yeah.

Considering the three factors utilized in a mistrial analysis, we conclude that the 

first factor weighs in favor of appellant Taylor because the State was responsible for the 

inappropriate reference to appellant‘s incarceration. However, the second and third 

factors support the trial court‘s decision. The trial court offered to provide a curative 

instruction, but trial counsel did not want the instruction. While it was a legitimate trial 

strategy to prevent bringing appellant‘s incarceration to the jury‘s attention yet again, 

appellant is not then later entitled to relief for the failure of the trial court to offer a 

curative instruction. See McPherson, 882 S.W.2d at 371; see also Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a) 

(―Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party 

responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to 

prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.‖). Also, as discussed supra subsection 

B, there were numerous eye witnesses that identified appellant Taylor as one of the 

shooters at the scene and both of the victims suffered multiple gunshot wounds. 

Therefore, the State had a plethora of incriminating evidence against appellant Taylor. 
-28-

Finally, we note that while the State erred by mentioning appellant Taylor‘s 

incarceration, all three defendants were on trial for first degree murder, attempted first 

degree murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; 

therefore, given the severity of appellant‘s offenses, logic dictates that the jury ―must 

know a person on trial is either on bail or in confinement during the course of a trial.‖ 

State v. Baker, 751 S.W.2d 154, 164 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). Furthermore, ―[t]his court 

has held that a prosecutor‘s brief reference regarding a defendant‘s incarceration  ̳hardly 

compares to a defendant‘s appearing in shackles before the jury.‘‖ State v. Paul Edward 

Corso, Jr., No. M2010-00782-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 2848270, at *20 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. July 19, 2011) (citation omitted). Therefore, we conclude that petitioner was not 

prejudiced to the extent required to rise to the level of manifest necessity. The trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant‘s motion for a mistrial, and appellant

Taylor is not entitled to relief.

E. Autopsy Photograph 

Appellant Taylor argues the trial court erred in admitting an autopsy photograph of 

the left side of the victim‘s face. Tennessee Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403 govern 

the admissibility of the photograph in this case. See State v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d 947, 

949-51 (Tenn. 1978). First, a witness with knowledge of the facts must verify and 

authenticate a photograph before it can be admitted into evidence. Id. at 949; Tenn. R. 

Evid. 901. Next, a trial court must determine whether the photograph is relevant. Id.; see 

Tenn. R. Evid. 401. Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Tenn. R. Evid. 402. If the 

evidence has ―any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to 

the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without 

the evidence,‖ it is relevant. Tenn. R. Evid. 401. Once it determines that a photograph is 

relevant, the trial court must then determine whether the probative value of the 

photograph is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Tenn. R.

Evid. 403; Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 950-51. ―Unfair prejudice‖ is ― ̳[a]n undue tendency to 

suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional 

one.‘‖ Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 951 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403, Adv. Comm. Note). 

Furthermore, 

A trial court should consider: the accuracy and clarity of the picture and its 

value as evidence; whether the picture depicts the body as it was found; the 

adequacy of testimonial evidence in relating the facts to the jury; and the 

need for the evidence to establish a prima facie case of guilt or to rebut the 

defendant‘s contentions. 

State v. Leach, 148 S.W.3d 42, app. 63 (Tenn. 2004) (citing Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 951). 
-29-

The decision whether to admit the photograph rests within the trial court‘s sound 

discretion, and we will not reverse the trial court‘s determination absent a clear showing 

of an abuse of that discretion. Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 949; see also State v. Dubose, 953 

S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Stinnett, 958 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn. 1997); State 

v. Dickerson, 885 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). Tennessee courts follow a 

policy of liberality in the admission of photographs in both civil and criminal cases. See 

Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 949. 

―Graphic, gruesome, or even horrifying photographs of crime victims may be 

admitted into evidence if they are relevant to some issues at trial and probative value is 

not outweighed by their prejudicial effect.‖ State v. Brock, 327 S.W.3d 645, 694 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 2009) (citing Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 949-51); see State v. Curtis Scott Harper,

No. E2014-01077-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 6736747, at *14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 3, 

2015) (citations omitted). Autopsy photographs must never be used ―solely to inflame 

the jury and prejudice them against the defendant‖ and must be relevant to prove some 

material aspect of the case. Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 951 (citing Milam v. Commonwealth, 

275 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1955)). However, ― ̳if they are not relevant to prove some part of 

the prosecution‘s case, they may not be admitted solely to inflame the jury and prejudice 

them against the defendant.‘‖ Brock, 327 S.W.3d at 694 (quoting Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 

951). ―Photographs of a corpse are admissible in murder prosecutions if they are relevant 

to the issues at trial, notwithstanding their gruesome and horrifying character, and 

photographs are not necessarily rendered inadmissible because they are cumulative of 

other evidence or because descriptive words could be used.‖ State v. Derek Williamson, 

No. M2010-01067-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 3557827, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 12, 

2011) (citing Collins v. State, 506 S.W.2d 179, 185 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973)).

At trial, the State entered into evidence, without objection, a picture of the victim 

when he was still alive. The State then sought to enter into evidence an autopsy 

photograph of the left side of the victim‘s face. Trial counsel objected to the admission 

of the autopsy photograph and offered to stipulate that the victim was deceased. In 

overruling trial counsel‘s objection, the trial court noted that more gruesome photographs 

would be admitted through the medical examiner and stated, ―[Y]ou‘re telling me now 

the same pictures or worse are going to come in later, then I don‘t see any real harm, you 

know. I‘m going to overrule the objection.‖ 

Our court addressed a substantially similar situation in State v. Terrell Loverson, 

stating: 

In a murder trial, the State must prove that a victim was killed. In this case, 

the State introduced, without objection, a photograph of the victim while he 

was alive. . . . The photograph of the victim taken during the autopsy, 

admitted through Dr. Ross, permitted the jury to determine whether the 
-30-

victim about whom Rainey (and others) testified was the person who, in 

fact, had been killed. Therefore, we agree with the trial court that the 

photograph was relevant as corroborative proof of the victim‘s identity. See

Tenn. R. Evid. 401 (defining relevant evidence as ―evidence having any 

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 

without the evidence‖).

Moreover, the probative value of the photograph was not ―substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.‖ Tenn. R. Evid. 403. While 

the photograph depicts the victim as deceased, the photograph is in no way 

gruesome, nor does it show the victim‘s body ―to be in an altered condition 

due to the autopsy.‖ State v. Young, 196 S.W.3d 85, app. 129-30 (Tenn.

2006). . . . 

No. W2011-02055-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 5509776, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 

2012). We agree with the logic employed in Terrell Loverson. The picture of the 

victim‘s face was relevant to prove the identity of the deceased victim, and the victim‘s 

sister identified the victim in the autopsy photograph. Furthermore, we note that the 

autopsy photograph of the victim‘s face did not show any of the victim‘s injuries and was 

not particularly gruesome. The victim‘s face in the photograph was also unaltered due to 

the autopsy. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting the photograph into evidence. Appellant Taylor is not entitled to relief.

F. Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(26)

Both appellant Taylor and appellant Wilson challenge the trial court‘s application 

of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(26). Appellant Taylor argues that Chris Williams‘ 

police statement was erroneously admitted into evidence, and appellant Wilson 

challenges the admission of Jarquez McKinley‘s police statement. The State responds 

that both statements were properly admitted into evidence. 

At trial, both witnesses claimed a lack of memory regarding the incident due to 

alcohol or substance abuse at the time of the shooting. Due to their memory loss, the 

State sought admission of both witnesses‘ police statements given shortly after the 

shooting. Tennessee Rules of Evidence 613(b) and 803(26) govern the admission of the 

statements. 

Rule 613(b) addresses the use of a witness‘s prior inconsistent statement. It states: 

Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not 

admissible unless and until the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain 
-31-

or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to 

interrogate the witness thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. 

This provision does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined 

in Rule 803(1.2).

The purpose of Rule 613(b) is to allow the introduction of otherwise inadmissible 

extrinsic evidence for the purpose of impeachment. State v. Martin, 964 S.W.2d 564, 567 

(Tenn. 1998) (citing State v. Reece, 637 S.W.2d 858, 861 (Tenn.1982)). This court has 

stated that extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement is appropriate if the witness 

―denies or does not recall making the statement‖ or if the witness ―equivocates about 

making it.‖ State v. Ackerman, 397 S.W.3d 617, 638 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012); State v. 

Kendricks, 947 S.W.2d 875, 882 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). Normally, ―prior inconsistent 

statements offered to impeach a witness are to be considered only on the issue of 

credibility, and not as substantive evidence of the truth of the matter asserted in such 

statements.‖ Reece, 637 S.W.2d at 861. 

However, Rule 803(26) governs the admissibility of a prior inconsistent as 

substantive evidence, stating: 

A statement otherwise admissible under Rule 613(b) [is not excluded by the 

hearsay rule] if all of the following conditions are satisfied:

(A) The declarant must testify at the trial or hearing and be subject to crossexamination concerning the statement.

(B) The statement must be an audio or video recorded statement, a written 

statement signed by the witness, or a statement given under oath.

(C) The judge must conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury to 

determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the prior statement was 

made under circumstances indicating trustworthiness.

 

The Advisory Commission Comments clarify that ―only prior inconsistent statements, 

and not consistent statements, are within the ambit of this rule.‖ See Tenn. R. Evid. 

803(26), Adv. Comm‘n Cmts.; see also State v. Robert Allen Zaloba, No. M2011-00855-

CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 6690027, at *20-22 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 26, 2012) 

(explaining that Tennessee Rule of Evidence 106, the ―rule of completeness,‖ is 

inapplicable to statements admitted pursuant to Rule 803(26)). 

Our supreme court has recently espoused the standard of review for hearsay 

statements:
-32-

The standard of review for rulings on hearsay evidence has multiple layers. 

Initially, the trial court must determine whether the statement is hearsay. If 

the statement is hearsay, then the trial court must then determine whether 

the hearsay statement fits within one of the exceptions. To answer these 

questions, the trial court may need to receive evidence and hear testimony. 

When the trial court makes factual findings and credibility determinations 

in the course of ruling on an evidentiary motion, these factual and 

credibility findings are binding on a reviewing court unless the evidence in 

the record preponderates against them. Once the trial court has made its 

factual findings, the next questions—whether the facts prove that the 

statement (1) was hearsay and (2) fits under one the exceptions to the 

hearsay rule—are questions of law subject to de novo review. 

Kendrick v. State, 454 S.W.3d 450, 479 (Tenn. 2015) (citations omitted). 

1. Ms. Williams‘ Statement

Appellant Taylor challenges the admission of Chris Williams‘ police statement. 

Specifically, he argues that her statement was not made under circumstances indicating 

trustworthiness due to her admitted substance abuse and that parts of her redacted 

statement, as entered into evidence, were not actually inconsistent with her testimony. 

First, we will address appellant‘s concerns regarding the trustworthiness of Ms. 

Williams‘ statement. During her testimony, Ms. Williams asserted that she was unsure if 

the information in her statement to police was correct because she was intoxicated when 

she witnessed the shooting. Ms. Williams further asserted that she had ―totally blocked 

[the shooting] out‖ and therefore did not remember what occurred. 

In a jury-out hearing, Lieutenant Mullins testified that on October 20, 2010, Ms. 

Williams called the police department and stated that she had witnessed the shooting. 

About two hours after the shooting, Lieutenant Mullins met Ms. Williams, picked her up, 

and took her to the police station to give a statement. Lieutenant Mullins described Ms. 

Williams as seeming ―a little scared and nervous‖ but otherwise unimpaired. Lieutenant 

Mullins did not smell the residual odor of used narcotics. Ms. Williams was responsive 

and able to relay information to Lieutenant Mullins. Lieutenant Mullins stated that Ms. 

Williams reviewed, initialed, and signed her statement. 

Rule 803(26)(C) requires that in a jury-out hearing, the trial court must make a 

determination regarding whether the witness‘s statement was made under circumstances 

indicating trustworthiness. In doing so, the trial court found that Ms. Williams was 

―feigning her lack of memory.‖ The trial court stated: 
-33-

I don‘t know the reason. I do know that this particular witness was 

afraid -- whether it was founded or not was afraid. I don‘t know why she 

changed her testimony, but I just -- I don‘t find her credible. 

Her presentation from the stand. She was all over the place. She 

said different things so many times, I don‘t think that she would recognize 

the truth if it hit her in the rear end. 

It‘s an instinct call. I just don‘t -- I think she‘s feigning it all. So, I 

don‘t find her testimony that she was so high on drugs that she didn‘t know 

what she was saying to be credible. This -- I think it‘s incredible that she 

cannot remember a thing about it, but then say that some things are not true. 

I mean, she‘s just all over the place. 

. . . .

I think that the statement was given under circumstances that it was 

trustworthy, and I think all of this is good fodder for the jury to decide, but 

I‘m going to send it all to the jury[,] and I‘ll give the 803(26) instruction 

with regard to this prior statement. 

As a finding of credibility, we will not revisit the trial court‘s decision that Ms. 

Williams‘ trial testimony was not credible, thereby implicitly crediting Lieutenant 

Mullins‘ testimony. See Kendrick, 454 S.W.3d at 479 (citations omitted). Lieutenant 

Mullins explained that while Ms. Williams seemed nervous and afraid, she did not appear 

to be impaired. He asserted that Ms. Williams was responsive and able to relay pertinent 

information. Therefore, based on the trial court‘s credibility finding and the testimony 

offered by Lieutenant Mullins, we conclude that Ms. Williams‘ statement was offered 

under circumstances of trustworthiness. 

Appellant also argues that two parts of Ms. Williams‘ police statement should 

have been redacted because they were not inconsistent with her testimony at trial. We 

will address each segment of the statement in turn. The first challenged segment, as 

written, is as follows: 

Q: Do you know who is responsible for Lyle King‘s death?

A: Yes. I know him by the nickname ―Woo[.‖] 

During her testimony, Ms. Williams agreed that she told police that appellant Taylor was 

responsible for the victim‘s death. However, later in her testimony, after she was shown 

her police statement, Ms. Williams‘s unedited testimony was, ―I don‘t remember nothing, 
-34-

that basically what happened until I read this. I totally blocked it out.‖ She further 

testified that her police statement did not refresh her memory about what she told the 

police in October 2010. 

While it is true that ― ̳[e]xtrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement remains 

inadmissible when a witness unequivocally admits to having made the prior statement,‘‖

if the witness later equivocates, extrinsic evidence of the prior statement becomes 

admissible. Ackerman, 397 S.W.3d at 638 (citation omitted). Although Ms. Williams 

initially agreed that she told the police that appellant Taylor was responsible for the 

victim‘s death, she later equivocated, saying that she did not remember what she told law 

enforcement and that she had blocked out the entire event. Therefore, her testimony at 

trial was inconsistent with her prior police statement. The trial court did not err by

refusing to redact this segment of Ms. William‘s police statement. 

The second challenged statement, as written, states:

Q: Can you describe to me, in your own words, what happened before, 

during, and after the shooting?

A: I saw some ladies fighting in the middle of the street on McMillan. As I 

was driving up, a commotion started and then I saw people jumping on the 

guy. As they were jumping on them he hit the ground. ―Woo‖ started 

complaining about getting hit hard and went to the car, his white Impala, 

and got his gun. He stood over him and shot him. 

Appellant argues that this statement should not have been admitted because at trial, Ms. 

Williams was never asked if she saw appellant Taylor retrieve a gun from his car. 

However, she was impeached with her statement in this regard during the State‘s re-direct 

examination. Rule 613(b) mandates that ―[e]xtrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent 

statement by a witness is not admissible unless and until the witness is afforded an 

opportunity to explain or deny the same.‖ However, appellant Taylor failed to make an 

objection on this basis at trial. Now, on appeal, he requests plain error review. 

The accepted test for plain error review requires that:

(a) the record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court; 

(b) a clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached; 

(c) a substantial right of the accused must have been adversely affected; 

(d) the accused did not waive the issue for tactical reasons; and 

(e) consideration of the error is ―necessary to do substantial justice.‖
-35-

State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 282 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 

626, 641-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)). To rise to the level of ―plain error,‖ an error 

― ̳must [have been] of such a great magnitude that it probably changed the outcome of the 

trial.‘‖ Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 642 (quoting United States v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 937 

(7th Cir. 1988)). All five factors must be established by the record before a court will 

find plain error. Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 282. Complete consideration of all the factors is 

not necessary when clearly at least one of the factors cannot be established by the record. 

We apply a de novo standard of review to determine if the five plain error factors have 

been satisfied. State v. Cooper, 321 S.W.3d 501, 506 (Tenn. 2010).

After reviewing the record, we conclude that appellant has failed to satisfy factors 

(b), (c), and (e). As stated above, Ms. Williams clearly asserted that she did not 

remember the shooting and that she had ―totally blocked it out.‖ She further testified that 

her police statement did not refresh her memory about what she told the police in October 

2010. The State then tried to refresh Ms. Williams‘ memory regarding the challenged 

statement,6and Ms. Williams said, ―I don‘t remember this.‖ Therefore, she had already 

thoroughly repudiated her police statement to law enforcement before she was impeached 

with her statement regarding appellant Taylor‘s retrieving a weapon from a car. This 

court has stated that extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement is appropriate if 

the witness ―denies or does not recall making the statement.‖ Kendricks, 947 S.W.2d at 

882. Appellant Taylor has failed to show that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was 

breached. 

Appellant Taylor has also failed to show that a substantial right was adversely 

affected or that consideration of the error is ―necessary to do substantial justice.‖ As 

stated in supra subsection B, there were numerous eye witnesses that identified appellant 

Taylor as one of the shooters at the scene and both of the victims suffered multiple 

gunshot wounds. While some of the defense witnesses attempted to exonerate appellant 

Taylor, the jury obviously credited the testimony of the State‘s witnesses. Given this 

weight of information against appellant Taylor at trial, the admission of the challenged 

statement did not adversely affect appellant Taylor‘s rights, and it is not necessary to 

provide relief to do substantial justice. Appellant Taylor is not entitled to relief on this 

issue.

2. Mr. McKinley‘s Statement

Appellant Wilson challenges the admission of Jarquez McKinley‘s police 

statement into evidence. Specifically, appellant Wilson argues that Mr. McKinley‘s trial 

 

6

The State specifically asked Ms. Williams to look at the last question on page 2 of her 

police statement, which we note is the segment of the police statement that appellant Taylor now 

challenges. 
-36-

testimony was not inconsistent with his prior statement and that the statement was not 

made under circumstances indicating trustworthiness. Finally, appellant Wilson argues 

that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated by the admission of Mr. McKinley‘s 

police statement. The State responds that Mr. McKinley‘s police statement was properly 

admitted as substantive evidence. We will address each argument in turn. 

First, appellant Wilson argues that Mr. McKinley‘s trial testimony was not 

inconsistent with his police statement. At trial, Mr. McKinley could not remember the 

events of October 20, 2010, and could not remember giving the police a statement 

regarding the incident. Mr. McKinley blamed his lapse of memory on his alcoholism. 

Mr. McKinley also asserted that the initials and signatures on his police statement and his 

advice to witness a photographic lineup form were not made by him. Mr. McKinley was 

also unable to remember writing on or signing any photographic identifications. In 

response, Detective Wilkie testified that during his police interview, Mr. McKinley 

appeared to understand what was occurring and did not appear to be intoxicated. 

Initially, Mr. McKinley told Detective Wilkie varying versions of the shooting, but after 

being confronted with information from other witnesses, Mr. McKinley finally stated that 

he had fought with the victim and that appellant Wilson had shot the victim. Detective

Wilkie stated that Mr. McKinley either initialed or signed his advice of rights form, his 

police statement, his advice to witness form, and his photographic identifications of 

appellants Taylor and Wilson. The trial court overruled defense counsel‘s objection to 

the admission of Mr. McKinley‘s statement and later stated, ―I didn‘t say it previously 

with regard to the prior witness, this Jarquez fellow, but I thought he was lying through 

his teeth, also feigning his lack of memory.‖

This court has stated that extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement is 

appropriate if the witness ―denies or does not recall making the statement.‖ Kendricks, 

947 S.W.2d at 882. Therefore, when Mr. McKinley asserted that he could not remember 

making the police statement, it was appropriate for the State to impeach him with his 

prior statement. 

Regarding whether the statement was made under circumstances indicating 

trustworthiness pursuant to Rule 803(26)(C), appellant Wilson argues that Mr. McKinley 

was intoxicated when he observed the shooting and possibly when he gave his police 

statement. The trial court conducted the required jury-out hearing and determined that

the statement was offered under circumstances indicating trustworthiness. The trial court 

explained that Mr. McKinley came to the police, gave a statement, and signed it. The trial 

court also later opined that Mr. McKinley was ―lying through his teeth‖ and was feigning 

his memory loss. As a finding of credibility, we will not revisit the trial court‘s decision 

that Mr. McKinley‘s trial testimony was not credible, thereby implicitly crediting 

Detective Wilkie‘s testimony. See Kendrick, 454 S.W.3d at 479 (citations omitted). 

Detective Wilkie testified that during his police interview, Mr. McKinley appeared to 
-37-

understand what was occurring and did not appear to be intoxicated. Detective Wilkie 

also stated that Mr. McKinley either initialed or signed his advice of rights form, his 

police statement, his advice to witness form, and his photographic identifications of 

appellants Taylor and Wilson. Therefore, based on the trial court‘s credibility finding 

and the testimony offered by Detective Wilkie, we conclude that Mr. McKinley‘s

statement was offered under circumstances of trustworthiness. 

Finally, appellant Wilson argues that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated 

by the admission of Mr. McKinley‘s police statement and that Tennessee Rule of 

Evidence 803(26) is fundamentally unfair. However, appellant Wilson has failed to cite 

any case law supporting his argument. Appellate briefs shall contain ―the contentions of 

the appellant with respect to the issues presented, . . . including the reasons why the 

contentions require appellate relief, with citations to the authorities and appropriate 

references to the record . . . relied on . . . .‖ Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7) (emphasis added); 

see Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b) (―Issues which are not supported by argument, citation 

to authorities, or appropriate references to the record will be treated as waived in this 

court.‖); see also Berry v. State, 366 S.W.3d 160, 169 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011). 

Furthermore, because Mr. McKinley was present at trial, testified before the jury, and 

was subject to cross-examination, the admission of his statements did not rise to the level 

of a constitutional violation. See State v. Davis, 466 S.W.3d 49, 68-69 (Tenn. 2015); 

State v. Brandon Ackerman, No. M2010-01979-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 2870568, at *17 

(Tenn. Crim. App. July 13, 2012)). Appellant is not entitled to relief on this issue. 

G. Cumulative Error

Appellant Taylor argues that he is entitled to a new trial due to cumulative errors

throughout his trial. However, he has failed to prove that any errors were committed at 

trial. Therefore, we conclude that he is not entitled to a new trial on this basis.

H. Consecutive Sentencing

Appellant Taylor contests the consecutive alignment of his sentences. The State 

responds that consecutive sentencing was appropriate in this case. 

In determining an appropriate sentence, a trial court must consider the following 

factors: (1) the evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) the 

presentence report; (3) the principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing 

alternatives; (4) the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5) 

evidence and information offered by the parties on mitigating and enhancement factors; 

(6) any statistical information provided by the administrative office of the courts as to 

sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee; (7) any statement the defendant 

makes on his own behalf as to sentencing; and (8) the potential for rehabilitation. Tenn. 
-38-

Code Ann. §§ 40-35-103(5), -113, -114, -210(b). In addition, ―[t]he sentence imposed 

should be the least severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which the 

sentence is imposed.‖ Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(4). 

When an accused challenges the length and manner of service of a sentence, this 

court reviews the trial court‘s sentencing determination under an abuse of discretion 

standard accompanied by a presumption of reasonableness. State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 

682, 707 (Tenn. 2012). Prior to 2013, on appellate review of sentence alignment issues, 

courts employed the abuse of discretion standard of review. See State v. Hastings, 25 

S.W.3d 178, 181 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). Our supreme court has since extended the 

standard of review enunciated in State v. Bise, abuse of discretion with a presumption of 

reasonableness, to consecutive sentencing determinations. State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 

851, 860 (Tenn. 2013); Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 707 (modifying standard of review of withinrange sentences to abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness); see also 

State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 278-79 (Tenn. 2012) (applying abuse of discretion with 

a presumption of reasonableness to review of alternative sentencing determinations by 

the trial court). Thus, the presumption of reasonableness gives ―deference to the trial 

court‘s exercise of its discretionary authority to impose consecutive sentences if it has 

provided reasons on the record establishing at least one of the seven grounds listed in 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b) . . . .‖ Pollard, 432 S.W.3d at 861.

The procedure used by the trial courts in deciding sentence alignment is governed 

by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115, which lists the factors that are relevant 

to a trial court‘s sentencing decision. Imposition of consecutive sentences must be ―justly 

deserved in relation to the seriousness of the offense.‖ Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(1). 

The length of the resulting consecutive sentence must be ―no greater than that deserved 

for the offense committed.‖ Id. § 40-35-103(2). The court may order consecutive 

sentences if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more of the following 

seven statutory criteria exists: 

(1) The defendant is a professional criminal who has knowingly devoted 

the defendant‘s life to criminal acts as a major source of livelihood;

(2) The defendant is an offender whose record of criminal activity is 

extensive;

(3) The defendant is a dangerous mentally abnormal person so declared 

by a competent psychiatrist who concludes as a result of an 

investigation prior to sentencing that the defendant‘s criminal 

conduct has been characterized by a pattern of repetitive or 

compulsive behavior with heedless indifference to consequences;
-39-

(4) The defendant is a dangerous offender whose behavior indicates 

little or no regard for human life and no hesitation about committing 

a crime in which the risk to human life is high;

(5) The defendant is convicted of two (2) or more statutory offenses 

involving sexual abuse of a minor with consideration of the 

aggravating circumstances arising from the relationship between the 

defendant and victim or victims, the time span of defendant‘s 

undetected sexual activity, the nature and scope of the sexual acts 

and the extent of the residual, physical and mental damage to the 

victim or victims;

(6) The defendant is sentenced for an offense committed while on 

probation; or

(7) The defendant is sentenced for criminal contempt.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b). 

The Pollard court reiterated that ―[a]ny one of these grounds is a sufficient basis 

for the imposition of consecutive sentences.‖ Pollard, 432 S.W.3d at 862 (citing State v. 

Dickson, 413 S.W.3d 735, 748 (Tenn. 2013)). ―So long as a trial court properly 

articulates reasons for ordering consecutive sentences, thereby providing a basis for 

meaningful appellate review, the sentences will be presumed reasonable and, absent an 

abuse of discretion, upheld on appeal.‖ Id. If, as in this case, the trial court relies on 

subsection (4) of the statute governing consecutive sentencing, the court must make 

additional findings pursuant to State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995). Under

Wilkerson, before imposing consecutive sentences based upon the defendant‘s status as a 

dangerous offender, the trial court ―must conclude that the evidence has established that 

the aggregate sentence is  ̳reasonably related to the severity of the offenses‘ and 

 ̳necessary in order to protect the public from further criminal acts.‘‖ Pollard, 432 

S.W.3d at 863 (quoting Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d at 938). If the trial court properly follows 

the Wilkerson procedure, the standard of review enunciated above will govern the trial 

court‘s determination. 

Of the seven statutory factors, the trial court in this case found that the ―dangerous 

offender‖ factor applied to appellant‘s sentences. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(4). 

Appellant Taylor does not contest his sentence based on trial court error in failing to 

make the requisite Wilkerson findings. Rather, he concedes that the trial court correctly 

followed the procedure but argues that the court nonetheless erred in its findings. 

Because the trial court complied with Wilkerson in reaching its conclusion, we attach a 

presumption of reasonableness to its determination and review for abuse of discretion. 
-40-

―Generally,  ̳[a] trial court abuses its discretion when it applies incorrect legal standards, 

reaches an illogical conclusion, bases its ruling on a clearly erroneous assessment of the 

proof, or applies reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.‘‖ State v. 

Farrer, 355 S.W.3d 582, 586 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting State v. Phelps, 329 

S.W.3d 436, 443 (Tenn. 2010)).

At the sentencing hearing, the State introduced appellant Taylor‘s presentence 

report as an exhibit, and the parties agreed that appellant Taylor should be sentenced as a 

Range I, standard offender. The State advised the trial court that appellant Taylor was 

also in custody on other matters, having been accused of committing aggravated robbery 

on January 13, 2010, and committing another murder on November 25, 2009. Neither 

party presented witnesses, but appellant Taylor expressed his desire to allocute. In 

addressing the court, appellant maintained his innocence of shooting, harming, or killing 

anyone. Following the arguments of counsel, the trial court fixed appellant Taylor‘s 

sentence for attempted first degree murder at the middle of the range, twenty years.7 The 

trial court then ordered consecutive alignment of the twenty-year sentence to appellant

Taylor‘s life sentence for first degree murder. In so ordering, the trial court stated:

I do find the defendant‘s a dangerous offender whose behavior 

indicates little or no regard for human life, and no hesitation about 

committing a crime to which the risk to human life is high. 

I also found the circumstances surrounding the commission of these 

offenses are aggravated. Basically while I understand there was a fight, 

they basically unloaded their weapons in one of these guys and tried to 

shoot multiple times at another in the needless overly aggressive fashion. 

So I do think it was exaggerated.

I think confinement for an extended period of time is necessary to 

protect society from this defendant‘s unwillingness to lead a productive life 

and the defendant‘s resort to criminal active in furtherance of this antisocietal lifestyle. 

And I also think that the aggregate length of the sentences 

reasonably relate[s] to the offense[s] for which the defendant stands 

convicted. 

 

7

 Appellant Taylor does not contest his mid-range sentence of twenty years or the trial court‘s 

application of enhancing or mitigating factors. Therefore, we will omit a discussion thereof in this 

analysis. 
-41-

Appellant Taylor contends that the trial court erred in its findings in this regard 

because consecutive sentencing is not necessary to protect the public. In support of this 

contention, appellant Taylor contends that: (1) due to his age, he will be seventy years old 

before he is parole-eligible on his first degree murder sentence; therefore, it was 

unnecessary to add a consecutive twenty-year sentence to the life sentence; (2) appellant 

Taylor was acting in the heat of the moment and with the intent to protect others from the 

victims; and (3) his adult criminal record does not suggest that he is a threat to the public. 

He also asserts that consecutive sentencing does not reasonably relate to the severity of 

the crimes in this case, citing again his alleged ―state of passion produced by adequate 

provocation.‖ Finally, he makes the general argument this sentence alignment violates 

the principle of sentencing that the length of a sentence must be ―justly deserved in 

relation to the seriousness of the offense‖ and ―no greater than that deserved for the 

offense committed.‖

Appellant Taylor‘s argument that his advanced age at parole-eligibility somehow 

precludes application of the principles of consecutive sentencing is unavailing. There is 

no support in statutory or case law for this proposition. Rather, this court has upheld 

lengthy sentences that place defendants‘ release eligibility far past the age of ordinary 

longevity. See, e.g., State v. James L. Dowell, III & Rivera L. Peoples, No. M2012-

00520-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 1804191, at *23 (Tenn. Crim. App. April 30, 2013) 

(affirming effective 100-year sentence for multiple counts of especially aggravated 

kidnapping and aggravated robbery); State v. Mauricio Morales, No. M2010-01236-

CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 3731691, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2012) (upholding a 

100-year effective sentence for rape of a child (and other offenses) that required 100% 

release eligibility). Appellant Taylor‘s argument that he was acting in the heat of passion 

and under adequate provocation must also fail; he stands convicted of first degree murder 

and attempted first degree murder, not voluntary manslaughter. While appellant Taylor‘s 

conviction record as an adult is unimpressive, the State set forth that appellant Taylor also 

stands accused of two other crimes of violence, which belies his contention that his 

record of criminal behavior is minimal. 

At trial, Cheryl, Stefanie, Chris Williams, and Joycelyn Key all identified 

appellant Taylor as one of the shooters. Ms. Williams explained that immediately prior 

to the shooting, she heard appellant Taylor complaining about the victim‘s hitting him too 

hard and that appellant Taylor then went and retrieved a gun from a car. In her statement 

to police, Ms. Williams stated that there were three shooters at the scene and that she saw 

appellant Taylor shoot the victim. She also saw appellant Taylor and another shooter fire 

at another male as the male ran from the scene. The victim suffered nine gunshot wounds 

from three separate weapons, which resulted in his death. Julian Williams suffered three 

gunshot wounds. Dr. Ross clarified that it was the combined effect of the multiple 

gunshot wounds that lead to the victim‘s death. These facts, accredited by the jury‘s 

verdict, support the trial court‘s conclusion ―that the aggregate length of the sentences 
-42-

reasonably relate[s] to the offense[s] for which [appellant] stands convicted.‖ The trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in ordering consecutive sentence alignment. 

I. Correction of Judgment

We note that on appellant Taylor‘s judgment for attempted murder, the trial court 

failed to mark the box ―Guilty,‖ but it did mark the box ―Jury Verdict.‖ Upon review of 

the record, it is clear that the jury found appellant Taylor guilty of the alleged offense and 

that the failure to mark guilty on the judgment was merely a clerical error. As such, we 

remand this case to the trial court for correction of the judgment. 

 

CONCLUSION

Based on the parties‘ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the 

judgments of the trial court and remand for correction of appellant Taylor‘s attempted 

murder judgment.

_________________________________

ROGER A. PAGE, JUDGE