NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

 

:

TIM MCGEACHY, :

:

Petitioner, :

:

v. :

:

JOHN DOE #1 WARDEN COVER, et al., :

:

Respondents. :

 :

Hon. Jose L. Linares

Civil No. 10-3342 (JLL)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

TIM MCGEACHY, #23318

Hudson County Correctional Center

35 Hackensack Avenue, C-500-East

Kearny, NJ 07032

Petitioner Pro Se

LINARES, District Judge:

Tim McGeachy, a pretrial detainee at Hudson County Correctional Center (“HCCC”),

seeks to file a Complaint seeking damages from Lawrence County Correction Center in

Pennsylvania, its warden, the Sheriff of Hudson County, New Jersey, and various Jane and John

Does. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). This Court will grant Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma

pauperis and collect the $350 filing fee by directing the Warden of HCCC to deduct installment

payments in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). This Court has screened the Complaint for

dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A and, for the reasons explained

below, will dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

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I. BACKGROUND

In the Complaint, McGeachy makes the following factual assertions:

That on the 8th day of April 2010 that defendant(s) John Doe #1

the warden of Lawrence Co. Pennsylvania Jail in New Castle PA.,

did allow plaintiff to be illegally released to defendant John Doe #2

Hudson County Sheriff’s Dept., who in turn transported plaintiff

across state lines in violation of the Uniform Criminal Extradition

Act (U.C.E.A) which violated plaintiff rights under the United

States Constitution.

(Docket Entry #1, p. 8.)

Plaintiff further claims that the Lawrence County Jail Warden violated his rights by

allowing him to be released to Hudson County officials without a governor’s warrant of

extradition. (Docket Entry #1, p. 5.) For violation of his rights, Plaintiff seeks 20 million dollars

in compensatory damages and five million dollars in punitive damages. (Id. at 9.)

Plaintiff previously filed in this Court a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging

his incarceration at the Hudson County Correctional Center. See McGeachy v. Veley, Civil No.

10-3343 (JLL) (D.N.J. filed June 30, 2010). By Opinion and Order entered August 24, 2010, this

Court summarily dismissed the Petition without prejudice to the filing of a petition pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254 after Petitioner exhausted remedies available in the courts of the State of New

Jersey. This Court will briefly outline Plaintiff’s allegations in that petition, as they fill in the

gaps of the meager allegations in this Complaint. Plaintiff alleged that on December 31, 2009,

New Castle police officers arrested him in New Castle, Pennsylvania, on a homicide warrant

issued in Hudson County, New Jersey. McGeachy allegedly elected to challenge the extradition

and, through counsel, filed a habeas petition in the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County

on March 1, 2010. See Pennsylvania v. McGeachy, Docket No. CR-0000403-09 (filed Jan. 6,

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2010) (attached to petition at docket entry #1 at pp. 11-15.). The docket in the Pennsylvania

matter, which was also attached to the petition, showed that on April 1, 2010, Judge Michael J.

Wherry ordered McGeachy released to an agent of the State of New Jersey for transportation to

New Jersey. McGeachy alleged in the petition that on April 8, 2010, Lawrence County Jail

officials released him to the custody of the Hudson County Sheriff, whose agents transported him

to the Hudson County Jail. Although the petition did not list grounds, in a narrative form

McGeachy claimed that his transfer to New Jersey authorities violated his rights under the

Extradition Act because the Governor of Pennsylvania did not sign a governor’s warrant and the

extradition papers were not proper. He sought a writ of habeas corpus determining that he was

illegally imprisoned at Hudson County Correctional Center. This Court dismissed the petition

because habeas relief based on irregularities in the extradition procedure is not available to a

petitioner once he is in the demanding state. See Harden v. Pataki, 320 F. 3d 1289, 1299 (11th

Cir. 2003). The dismissal was without prejudice to the filing of a § 2254 petition in the event

that McGeachy was convicted on the New Jersey charges and he exhausted his federal claims

before all three levels of the New Jersey courts.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), hammered the “final nail-in-the-coffin” for the

“no set of facts” standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), which was

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previously applied to determine if a federal complaint stated a claim. See Fowler v. UPMC

 The Conley court held that a district court was permitted to dismiss a complaint for 1

failure to state a claim only if “it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. at

45-46. 

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Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009). The pleading standard under Rule 8 was refined by the

United States Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), where the Supreme Court clarified as follows:

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First,

the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations

contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.

Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice . . . . Rule 8 marks a

notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, codepleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of

discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.

Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief

survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint

states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task

that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience

and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not

permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not “show[n]”-

“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to

dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because

they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the

assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the

framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual

allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a

court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they

plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 -1950 (citations omitted). 

Since Iqbal, the Third Circuit has required district courts to conduct a three-part analysis

when reviewing a complaint for dismissal for failure to state a claim:

To determine the sufficiency of a complaint under the [Iqbal]

pleading regime . . . , a court must take three steps: First, the court

must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a

claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should

identify allegations that, “because they are no more than

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conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at

1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a

court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they

plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id.

Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F. 3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (footnote omitted).

The Court is mindful that the sufficiency of this pro se pleading must be construed

liberally in favor of the plaintiff, even after Iqbal. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). 

III. DISCUSSION

A court’s initial task is to “tak[e] note of the elements [Plaintiff] must plead” in order to

state a claim of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Iqbal, 129 S Ct. at 1947-48. Section 1983

provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects,

or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show two elements: (1) a person

deprived him or caused him to be deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States, and (2) the deprivation was done under color of state law. See West v. Atkins,

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

The Extradition Clause of the Constitution provides:

A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other

Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State,

shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from

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which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having

Jurisdiction of the Crime.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. 

The Extradition Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3182, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:160-1 et seq., provides

procedures to carry out the constitutional mandate. See New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz v. Reed, 524

U.S. 151, 152 (1998); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 443 (1981). The Extradition Act provides

that, when the governor of one state demands of the governor of another state a person as a

fugitive from justice and produces an indictment or affidavit made before a magistrate which

charges the person with a crime, the executive authority of the asylum state is required to arrest

the fugitive, notify the demanding state, and confine the fugitive for a minimum of 30 days. See

18 U.S.C. § 3182. The Extradition Act, like the Uniform Criminal Extradition Law (“UCEL”),

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:160-9 et seq., requires the governor of the asylum state to honor a proper

demand from the governor of the demanding state for a fugitive who has fled the demanding

state. See 18 U.S.C. § 3182; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:160-11, 15. If the governor of the asylum

state decides that the demand is proper, then the governor must sign a warrant authorizing a

peace officer to arrest the fugitive and deliver him to an agent of the demanding state. See N.J.

STAT. ANN. § 2A:160-15, 16. The officer in the asylum state who executes the arrest warrant

may confine the fugitive in a county jail, and “the keeper of such jail must receive and safely

keep the prisoner until the officer or person having charge of him is ready to proceed on his

route.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:160-20. Under the terms of UCEL, a fugitive in the asylum state

may not be delivered to the demanding state unless he is first taken before a judge who informs

him of the demand and the crime with which he is charged, and asks him if he desires to test the

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legality of his arrest. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:160-18. Significantly, if the fugitive desires to test

the legality of his arrest, then the judge in the asylum state must fix a reasonable time within

which the fugitive may apply for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. The purpose of the writ is limited 2

to a challenge to the fugitive’s detention in the asylum state. See Barton v. Norrod, 106 F. 3d

1289, 1298 (6th Cir. 1997). “The courts of asylum States may do no more than ascertain whether

the requisites of the Extradition Act have been met . . . . [T]he Act leaves only four issues open

for consideration before the fugitive is delivered up: (a) whether the extradition documents on

their face are in order; (b) whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding

state; (c) whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition; and (d)

whether the petitioner is a fugitive.” California v. Superior Court of California, San Bernadino

County, 482 U.S. 400, 407-08 (1987) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 

Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 288-89 (1978) .

In this case, Plaintiff seeks damages because he claims that the Pennsylvania warden

released him to New Jersey authorities without a governor’s warrant in violation of the

Extradition Act. However, Plaintiff’s allegations in his habeas petition establish that he

challenged the legality of his extradition in the Pennsylvania courts in a habeas proceeding, and

 Alternatively, a person may file a complaint and affidavit in the courts of the asylum 2

state charging the fugitive with a crime or violation of parole or probation in another state. N.J.

STAT. ANN. § 2A:160-21. In that case, the UCEL requires a judge or magistrate of the asylum

state to issue an arrest warrant. Id. When the fugitive is brought before the judge, “the judge or

magistrate must, by a warrant reciting the accusation, commit him to the county jail for such a

time not exceeding 30 days and specified in the warrant, as will enable the arrest of the accused

to be made under a warrant of the governor on a requisition of the executive authority of the state

having jurisdiction of the offense, unless the accused give bail . . . or until he shall be legally

discharged.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:160-23. If the fugitive is not arrested under warrant of the

governor by the expiration of the 30 days specified in the warrant, a judge may discharge him or

recommit him for a period not to exceed 60 days. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:160-25. 

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that on April 1, 2010, Judge Michael J. Wherry of the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas

ordered McGeachy released to an agent of the State of New Jersey for transportation to New

Jersey. Moreover, “[t]o establish a § 1983 claim for monetary relief, including a showing of 3

damages, [plaintiff] will have to prove that he suffered some deprivation of liberty greater than

that which he would have suffered through extradition in full compliance with the UCEA,”

Rivera v. Algarin, 350 Fed. App’x 703, n. 10 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Knowlin v. Thompson, 207

F. 3d 9007, 909 (7th Cir. 2000)), and Plaintiff does not allege facts showing that he suffered

injury from being released from Pennsylvania and transported to New Jersey. For example,

Plaintiff does not allege that he would have been able to prevent the extradition if the proper

procedures had been followed. Because Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that defendants

violated the Extradition Act or the Extradition Clause, and he has not alleged facts showing that

he was injured, this Court will dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma

pauperis and dismisses the Complaint. 

/s/ Jose L. Linares 

JOSE L. LINARES, U.S.D.J.

Dated: June 2, 2011

 “In addition to the complaint itself, the court can review documents attached to the 3

complaint and matters of public record, and a court may take judicial notice of a prior judicial

opinion.” McTernan v. City of York, Penn., 577 F. 3d 512, 526 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

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