alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v John Foti, Appellant.

[821 NYS2d 767]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Roger S. Hayes, J.), rendered February 27, 2003, convicting defendant, after a nonjury trial, of assault in the second and third degrees and attempted assault in the second degree, and sentencing him to concurrent terms of one year, unanimously affirmed.

The verdict was based upon legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490 [1987]). There is no basis for disturbing the court’s credibility determinations. The evidence supported the conclusion that defendant caused physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument.

The court properly exercised its discretion in precluding testimony that was essentially psychiatric evidence *(see*CPL 250.10 [1] [c]) and that was offered as such, since defendant failed to file timely written notice *(see People v Rivers,*281 AD2d 348 [2001], *lv denied*96 NY2d 923 [2001]). In any event, were we to find that the court erred in precluding this evidence, we would find the error to be harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. For the same reason, counsel’s failure to file timely notice did not deprive defendant of effective assistance *(see People v Hobot,*84 NY2d 1021, 1024 [1995]). We have considered and rejected defendant’s remaining arguments concerning these issues. Concur—Buckley, P.J., Mazzarelli, Williams, Gonzalez and Sweeny, JJ.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO 
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Tetragenex
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending
September 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date  hereof (the Report), Neil Martucci, Chief Financial Officer
hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

| | 1. | The report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                                                              
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |    |                                                                                                                                                                                                    
| | 2. | The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for the period covered by the Report.



| | /s/
    Neil Martucci                                
| | -----------------------------------------------------
| | Neil MartucciChief Financial OfficerNovember 14, 2008



---
# table65_q9.1_state
#### Josh Segal, Individually and Derivatively on Behalf of Lighthouse Real Estate Advisors, L.L.C., Respondent, v Paul Cooper et al., Appellants.

[856 NYS2d 12]

Accepting as true the facts as alleged in the complaint, according plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determining only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory *(Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Dev. Corp.,*96 NY2d 409, 414 [2001]), we find that plaintiffs causes of action were adequately alleged. As to fraud, whether plaintiffs reliance upon defendants’ alleged misrepresentations was reasonable is a factual issue not to be resolved on a motion directed at the pleadings *(see generally Brunetti v Musallam,*11 AD3d 280 [2004]). The adequacy of the breach of contract cause of action is gleaned from the complaint as a whole *(see Dulberg v Mock,*1 NY2d 54, 56 [1956]). Plaintiffs allegations that, on behalf of the business venture he entered into with the individual defendants to market certain properties, he actively marketed the properties, and commissions were generated and paid to defendants, who ultimately diverted them, depriving him of his share of the commissions, adequately state a cause of action for unjust enrichment *(see Wiener v Lazara Freres & Co.,*241 AD2d 114, 119-121 [1998]). Moreover, contrary to defendants’ contention, that cause of action need not be dismissed *468merely because it “contradicts the underlying theory” of the breach of contract cause of action *(see Cohn v Lionel Corp.,*21 NY2d 559, 563 [1968]; *Limited v McCrory Corp.,*169 AD2d 605, 607 [1991]; CPLR 3014). As to the unjust enrichment cause of action asserted derivatively, plaintiff alleged with sufficient particularity that a majority of the controlling members of the limited liability company were interested in the challenged transactions and that therefore a demand to initiate a lawsuit would have been futile *(see Marx v Akers,*88 NY2d 189, 198 [1986]).

Plaintiff’s demand for punitive damages should have been struck since his primary claim is contract-based and there is no allegation that defendants’ conduct was directed at the public generally (see *Gihlin v Murphy,*73 NY2d 769 [1988]). Nor do the allegations indicate that defendants’ conduct in the transactions involved a high degree of moral turpitude *(see Gamiel v Curtis & Riess-Curtis, P.C.,*16 AD3d 140 [2005]).

We have reviewed defendants’ remaining arguments and find them without merit. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Saxe, Buckley and Catterson, JJ.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

CHARLES DOUGLAS NAPIER, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D17-2752 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ) Opinion filed February 20, 2019. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County; Neil A. Roddenbery, Judge. Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Matthew D. Bernstein, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, BLACK, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.
#### Bill *against*The President, Directors, and Company *of t*he *Fourth Great Western Turnpike Road.*

NEW-YORK,

October, 1817.

In an action the3 “ainil’fí's trial1,’under the pruv^that’o'ey tíTM.3 corpora" by a turnpike appeintment ir the6' governor1 cate of the in epcefcors that the mad was erected6are not ¿epce-o/theex- *° eotpomüonlU¡e*

IN ERROR, cm *certiorari*to a justice’s court,

The defendants in error, who were the plaintiffs in the court below, brought an action against the defendant below, the plaintiff in error, on a subscription, dated the 29th of March, 1814, by which the subscribers promised to pay to the plaintiffs 20 dollars, for each share of the stock annexed to their respective names, in such property as should be designated at the time of subscribing, with a proviso, that the agreement was to be void, if the road should not he completed in the year 1815. The *x.*defendant below subscribed one share, in neat stock, or grain, The defendant below having pleaded the general issue, and denied the existence of any such company, the only evidence of that fact produced on the trial, was the appointment of inspectors by the governor, (and that by proving his handwriting only,) and the certificate of *the*inspectors, that the road was completed, and that gates were erected. The whole matter was submitted to the jury, who found a verdict for the plaintiffs below, for 20 dollars.

*Per Curiam.*

The instrument subscribed by the defendant is not according to the form prescribed by the act incorporating this company. It must, therefore, be considered as a special contract, and some doubt might be raised with respect to the consideration; but it is unnecessary to notice it, for the plaintiffs did not make out what was necessary to show themselves duly and legally incorporated. It is a well-settled rule, that when a corporation sues on a contract, they must, at the trial, under the general issue, prove that they are a corporation. (8 *Johns. Rep.*378.) In the case of the *Highland Turnpike Company*v. *M'Kean,*(10 *Johns. Rep.*156.) the books and minutes of the company, legally authenticated, were deemed evidence of the proceedings of the corporation. The evidence offered on the trial was not sufficient, and the judgment must, accordingly, be reversed,

Judgment reversed.
Exhibit  4.1        Advisory  and  Consulting  Agreements


                                           Number  of  Shares
                                           ------------------

         4.1(a)     Paul  Kessler               4,000,000




                                        8
<PAGE>
<PAGE>
                                                                      Exhibit 24

                                POWER OF ATTORNEY

                            APPALACHIAN POWER COMPANY
                 Annual Report on Form lO-K for the Fiscal Year
                                      Ended
                                December 31, 1998


      The  undersigned  directors  of  APPALACHIAN  POWER  COMPANY,  a  Virginia
corporation  (the "Company"),  do hereby  constitute and appoint E. LINN DRAPER,
JR.,   ARMANDO  A.  PENA  and  HENRY  W.   FAYNE,   and  each  of  them,   their
attorneys-in-fact  and agents,  to execute for them, and in their names,  and in
any and all of their capacities,  the Annual Report of the Company on Form lO-K,
pursuant to Section 13 of the  Securities  Exchange Act of 1934,  for the fiscal
year ended December 31, 1998, and any and all  amendments  thereto,  and to file
the same, with all exhibits thereto and other documents in connection therewith,
with   the   Securities   and   Exchange   Commission,    granting   unto   said
attorneys-in-fact  and agents,  and each of them, full power and authority to do
and perform  every act and thing  required or necessary to be done,  as fully to
all intents and purposes as the undersigned might or could do in person,  hereby
ratifying and confirming all that said  attorneys-in-fact  and agents, or any of
them, may lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof.

      IN WITNESS  WHEREOF,  the undersigned have signed these presents this 24th
day of February, 1999.




  /s/ E. Linn Draper, Jr.             /s/ James J. Markowsky
E. Linn Draper, Jr.                 James J. Markowsky


  /s/ Henry W. Fayne                  /s/ Armando A. Pena
Henry W. Fayne                      Armando A. Pena


  /s/ Wm. J. Lhota                    /s/ J. H. Vipperman
Wm. J. Lhota                        J. H. Vipperman
#### United States *v.*Burgess.

*(District Court, W. D. South Carolina.*

February 1, *1888.)*

Internal Revenue—Illicit Distilling—Rev. St. U. S. § 3279.

One who erects a “shanty” in which is put- up an illicit still, does not come under Rev. St. U. S. § 3279, which provides that “every person who *works*in any distillery * i:' * on which no sign is placed and kept, * * shall be lined, ” etc.

Indictment for Working in an Illicit Distillery, in violation of Rev. St. U. S. § 3279.

*G. M. Furman,*Asst. Dist. Atty., for the United States.

*A.*Blythe, for defendant.

Simonton, J.

The evidence in this case is that the defendant erected for one Sessions a shanty in which was put up an illlieit still. There is no evidence that he ever worked in or about the distillery after the still was set up. The defendant asks that the jury be instructed 1o find a verdict of not guilty. The section of the Revised Statutes punishes “every person who works in any distillery * * * on which no sign is placed and kept.” Section 3279. Evidently this means, working in any establishment or place in which distilled liquors are made. The fact that no sign is placed and kept on the distillery is the gist of the offense. The first part of this section requires the sign to be put up by a person engaged in distilling. The work that defendant did in putting up the shanty is not the work in a distillery forbidden by this section. The jury will find a verdict of not guilty.
OFFICE OF THE AITORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

AUSTIN 

Mr. Tom L. Beauohamp, Jr. 

Secretary to the Governor 

Austin, Texas 

Dear Sir: 

of the murder of Geow%-. 

instance states whereby offer a 

and delivery of the said 

of Lamar County, 

This reward is pay- 

, return and conviction of 

that a conre the reIn such sltuatlon, the 

al to identify the person apprehended 

11 person referred to as allegedly 

orge R. Roberts. 

the file does not reflect that any conviction of the apprehended fugitive has been had, the 
. . 

Mr. Tom L. Beauchamp, Jr., Page 2 

condltlon upon which the reward is payable has not been met, 

and it becomes unnecessary to determine, at thls time, the 

questlon of apportionment between claimants. 

Yours very truly 

ATTOF+iEY GENERAL OF TEXAS . 

APPRO-ED AUG 4, 1941 

(signed) Grover Sellers 

FI%T ASSISTANT 

ATTOkNEY GEKERAL 

By (Signed) R. W.Fairchlld 

Assistant 

APPROVED OPINION COWiiITTEiX 

By BWB Chairman
#### The Dutchess Cotton Manufactory *against*Davis.

NEW YORK,

October, 1817.

The recomer or ror&.’sfcias^eii court“maygrañt *time,*as well as enlarging ’tie orto pleat

*BLOOM,*for the defendant, moved to set aside the default entered in this cause, for want of a plea.

The defendant was served with a notice of the rule to plead in this cause, which expired the 15 th of *August*last; on the 13th of *August,*he obtained an order of the recorder of the city of jY *ew-York,*enlarging the time to plead to the 10 th of *September,*which was duly served on the plaintiffs’ attorney, on the 16th of *August.*The plaintiffs’ attorney, supposing that the recorder had no authority to grant such order, in *term*time, and that it was, therefore, of no effect, entered the default of the for want of a plea, on the 18th of *August.*

*346It appeared that on a demurrer in this cause, the court gave ju¿|gment, 0n the. 15th of *August,*for the plaintiffs, with leave to the defendant to plead instanter, and take short notice of-trial for the next circuit in *Dutchess*county ;• and that a circuit had • been appointed to be held in that county on the 25th of *August.*On the 16th of *August,*the plaintiffs’ attorney served a copy of the rule for judgment on the demurrer, on the defendant’s attorney, and informed him, that not considering the order of the recorder, enlarging the time to plead, as correct, he should mot observe it, but though the time for pleading had expired, he , would acccept a plea, if delivered in four days, and the defendant would take short notice of trial, for the circuit on the 25th of *August.*Not receiving any answer to his proposal, the plaintiff’s attorney entered the default of the defendant, for want of a plea, on the 18th of *August.*On the 10th of *September,*the defendant’s attorney tendered the plea of the general issue, with motice of set-off, to the plaintiffs’ attorney, which he refused to accept. There was an affidavit of merits on the part of the defendant.

*Ruggles,*for the plaintiffs.

*Per Curiam.*

The words of the Vlllth Rule of *April*term, 3f96, seem h) import, that an *order for time to declare*or to *plead,*cannot be granted by á *judge,*in *term,*but that application must be made to the *court.*The practice, however, is otherwise, and the judges have been so long in the habit of granting these orders, in term time, as well as in vacation, at their chambers, that we must, adopt it as the settled construction of the rule. The practice, no doubt, has grown up from a sense of its convenience, and we see no good reason to alter it. The *recorder ot’ Nezo-York,*being, by statute, *ex officio,*a commissioner, vested with the same powers as a judge of this court, in regard to all acts which may be done, at chambers, or out of court, his order to enlarge the time for pleading, in this case, must be deemed equally valid. The motion to set aside the default is, therefore, granted, but without costs on either side.

Rule granteel.
MANDATE

Court of Appeals 

First District of Texas 

NO. 01-13-00198-CR

BOBBY JOE PEYRONEL, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Appeal from the 174th District Court of Harris County. (Tr. Ct. No. 1254877).

TO THE 174TH DISTRICT COURT OF HARRIS COUNTY, GREETINGS:

Before this Court, on the 21st day of August 2014, the case upon appeal to revise or 

to reverse your judgment was determined. This Court made its order in these words:

This case is an appeal from the final judgment signed by 

the trial court on February 26, 2013. After submitting the 

case on the appellate record and the arguments properly raised 

by the parties, the Court holds that there was error in that 

portion of the trial court’s judgment that states that appellant 

was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child under six 

years of age. Accordingly, the Court modifies the referenced

portion of the trial court’s judgment to reflect that appellant 

was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a person under 

14. 

The Court also holds that there was reversible error in 

that portion of the trial court’s judgment concerning 
punishment. Accordingly, the Court reverses the portion of 

the trial court’s judgment concerning punishment and 

remands the case to the trial court for a new punishment 

hearing.

The Court further holds that there was no reversible 

error in the remaining portions of the trial court’s judgment. 

Therefore, the Court affirms the trial court’s judgment as 

herein modified.

The Court orders that this decision be certified below 

for observance.

Judgment rendered August 21, 2014.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices 

Massengale and Huddle. Opinion delivered by Justice Huddle.

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court in 

this behalf and in all things to have it duly recognized, obeyed, and executed.

August 21, 2015

Date CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE

CLERK OF THE COURT
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                       2,729,998
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                7,221,713
<ALLOWANCES>                                 (300,000)
<INVENTORY>                                  7,682,471
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            17,995,455
<PP&E>                                      10,822,993
<DEPRECIATION>                             (4,210,622)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              24,726,819
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                      (4,278,564)
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     (334,046)
<OTHER-SE>                                (16,948,951)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                24,726,819
<SALES>                                     27,908,364
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            27,908,364
<CGS>                                     (14,870,453)
<TOTAL-COSTS>                             (27,602,148)
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             (805,492)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                              (99,000)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           (797,376)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (499,276)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (499,276)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (499,276)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.06)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.06)
        

</TABLE>
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of the Interior

###### Bureau of Land Management

          - [ES-956-1420-BJ; Group No. 553, Minnesota]

# AGENCY:

Bureau of Land Management, Interior

# ACTION:

Notice of filing of plats of survey; Minnesota.

# SUMMARY:

                        The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) will file the plats of survey of the lands described below in the BLM-Eastern States office in Springfield, Virginia, 30 calendar days from the date of publication in the                         **Federal Register**                        .                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Bureau of Land Management, 7450 Boston Boulevard, Springfield, Virginia 22153. Attn: Cadastral Survey.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

This survey was requested by the Bureau of Land Management, Eastern States, Division of Lands and Renewable Resources, Milwaukee Field Office.

The lands surveyed are:

## Fourth Principal Meridian, Minnesota

The plat of survey represents the survey of an island in Kabetogama Lake, designated Tract No. 37, Township 69 North, Range 20 West, of the Fourth Principal Meridian, in the State of Minnesota, and was accepted June 5, 2009.

The plat of survey represents the survey of an island in Kabetogama Lake, designated Tract No. 37, Township 69 North, Range 21 West, of the Fourth Principal Meridian, in the State of Minnesota, and was accepted June 5, 2009.

We will place copies of the plats we described in the open files. They will be available to the public as a matter of information.

If BLM receives a protest against a survey, as shown on the plat, prior to the date of the official filing, we will stay the filing pending our consideration of the protest.

We will not officially file the plats until the day after we have accepted or dismissed all protests and they have become final, including decisions on appeals.

Dated: June 23, 2009.

Dominica Van Koten,

Chief Cadastral Surveyor.

[FR Doc. E9-15662 Filed 7-1-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4310-GJ-P