Filed 5/13/15 P. v. Hanloh CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. BLAIR CHRISTOPHER HANLOH, Defendant and Appellant. G049417 (Super. Ct. No. 10CF1450)

O P I N I O N

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. BLAIR CHRISTOPHER HANLOH, Defendant and Respondent. G049525

Appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, William R. Froeberg, Judge. Affi rmed; remanded fo r resentencing.2 Reed Webb, under appointment by th e Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant and for Defendant and Respondent. Tony Rackauckas, District Attorn ey, and Matthew Lockhart, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Adrianne S. Denau lt, Deputy Attorneys Ge neral, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
I NTRODUCTION Defendant Blair Christopher Hanloh r ecorded deeds purpor ting to quitclaim five real properties from himself to the trus tee of a company he owned. Defendant, however, had no interest in those propertie s, and was seeking to obtain them through adverse possession. He was convicted of f iling false documents, in violation of Penal Code section 115, subdivision (a). We conclu de there was more th an sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdic t, and affirm the judgment. However, the sentence imposed by the trial court was unauthorized. The
trial court sentenced defendant to serve four years in th e county jail. Penal Code section 115, subdivision (a) does not permit the felony sentence to be served in local custody. We remand the matter for resentencing.

S TATEMENT OF F ACTS AND P ROCEDURAL H ISTORY Defendant admitted at tria l that he signed and ca used to be recorded quitclaim deeds on five pieces of real propert y in Orange County, California. Defendant testified that he believed the properties we re abandoned, and recorded the quitclaim deeds as part of an attempt to adversely po ssess them. Each of the deeds contained the following language: “This conveyance is made in compliance with California Civil Code3 Section 1047 [1] for the purpose of possession . . . .” Each of the deeds purported to quitclaim to either Noel Rojas or Blair Ha nloh, as trustee of Diversified Management Trust, the interest of Blair Hanloh, an unma rried man. Defendant, however, did not have any interest in those properties to transfer. Defendant intended to adversely po ssess the properties in question. Through another person, defendant changed the locks and rented out two of the properties to innocent third parties. Defendant represen ted to the tenants, police investigators, and others that he owned or controlled the propertie s, or that the properties belonged to him. Defendant was charged in an informati on with five counts of recording a false instrument (Pen. Code, § 115, subd. (a)); a jury convicted him of all five counts.
Defendant was sentenced to a total of four years: the low term of 16 months on one count, and consecutive terms of eight months on eac h of the other four counts. Over the People’s objection, the tria l court ordered that defendant serve his term in local custody, pursuant to Pena l Code section 1170, subdivision (h). Defendant and the People each filed a timely notice of appeal.

D EFENDANT ’ S A PPEAL Defendant argues there was not sufficien t evidence to su pport the verdict against him for filing false documents. “‘In a ssessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we
review the entire record in th e light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credib le, and of solid value such that a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reas onable doubt.’ [Citation.]” ( People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1249.) We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that could re asonably be deduced from the evidence. ( People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 10 53.) We may reverse for lack of substantial evidence

1 Civil Code section 1047 provides as follows: “Any person claiming title to real property in the adverse possession of another may transfer it with the same effect as if in actual possession.”4 only if “‘upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial ev idence to support’” the conviction. ( People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) Penal Code section 115, subdivision (a) provides: “Every person who knowingly procures or offers a ny false or forged instrument to be filed, registered, or recorded in any public office within this state, which instrument, if genuine, might be filed, registered, or recorded under any law of this state or of the United States, is guilty of a felony.” The purpose of section 115 is “to prevent the recordation of spurious documents knowingly offe red for record.” ( Generes v. Justice Court (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 678, 681-682.) There was ample evidence that defenda nt prepared, execut ed, and caused to be recorded quitclaim deeds on five separate real propert ies. These quitclaim deeds purported to transfer the properties to defe ndant or to Noel Rojas, as trustee of defendant’s company. Defendant did not hold any interest in any of the properties at the time, however. Because a quitclaim deed cr eates a presumption that the title to the property is held as sh own in the instrument ( In re Marriage of Broderick (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 489, 496; see City of Manhattan Beac h v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 232, 239-242), there was substa ntial evidence that the quitc laim deeds were false.
This case is on all fours with People v. Denman (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 800. We agree with the analysis and conclusion of that case. In People v. Denman , supra , 218 Cal.App.4th at pages 804-807, the defendant recorded quitclaim deeds and homestead declarations on nine properties that he believed were abandoned in order to acquire them via adverse possession. The defe ndant placed tenants at the properties. ( Id. at pp. 805-806, 807.) Th e defendant had no claim of title to or interest in the properties ( id. at p. 807), and was convicted of 20 counts of violating Penal Code section 115 ( People v. Denman , supra , at p. 804). The appellate court rejected the defenda nt’s argument that he did not file any false documents within the meaning of Penal Code section 115 because the quitclaim5 deeds only transferred any title or interest he actually had in the properties. ( People v.
Denman , supra , 218 Cal.App.4th at pp. 807-810.) Because the defendant did not have an interest to transfer, he argued, the quitcla im deeds were not false or fraudulent. ( Id. at p. 807.) “Here, defendant filed quitclaim deeds to himself on property to which he
admitted he had no title or interest . While defendant is technically correct that he attested in the quitclaim deed that he was only transf erring whatever title or interest he possessed,
it was clear based on the evidence he had abso lutely no interest in the property. The
documents themselves were false in that they transferred an interest that he did not have
to himself and then he recorded the docum ent, clouding the title of the true property owners. Adopting defendant’s reasoning woul d be in direct contradiction with the purpose behind section 115 to pr eserve and protect the integrity of public records. Based on the purpose of the statute and the fact that section 115 has been broadly construed, the quitclaim deeds could reasonably be consid ered false documents by the jury.” ( Id. at p. 809.)
Defendant here contends that there are significant factual differences
between People v. Denman and the present case, which sh ould prevent th is court from relying on the analysis of that case. To the extent there are factual differences, they are insignificant. While the defendant in People v. Denman filed homestead declarations as well as recording quitclaim deeds, the cl oud on title was just as thick without a homestead declaration. Moreover, the defenda nt was convicted separately for each false quitclaim deed and each false homestead decl aration recorded on each property. ( People
v. Denman , supra , 218 Cal.App.4th at pp. 803-804.) Further, the claim of title pursuant to adverse possession in defendant’s quitclaim deeds does not di stinguish this case from People v. Denman . The defendant in that case was also claiming title by adverse possession ( People v. Denman , supra , 218 Cal.App.4th at pp. 804-805), a lthough the opinion does not specify wh ether the deeds in that case contained the statutory reference th at the quitclaim deeds in this case do.6 Further, the statutory citation in each of th e quitclaim deeds—Civil Code section 1047—
does not show that defendant was asserti ng a claim of adverse possession. To the contrary, the language of the statute shows de fendant was transferring title to property to which someone else was claiming adve rse possession. (See footnote 1, ante .)
Defendant’s assertion that no one woul d be misled by his quitclaim deeds
because he was out of the title chain is incorrect; if defe ndant had truly acquired the properties by adverse possession, he would have been jump ing into the chain of title. People v. Denman relied on Generes v. Justice Court , supra , 106 Cal.App.3d 678, 681, in which the defendant caused to be reco rded a grant deed transferring an easement from herself to hersel f; the easement was on land the defendant did not own. The appellate court concluded the defendan t had violated Penal Code
section 115 because the deed wa s deceptive, even thou gh the defendant ha d no interest in the easement, and, therefore, the gran t deed was technically not false. ( Generes v. Justice
Court , supra , at p. 682.) “A title searcher encoun tering the spurious document who acted upon it as genuine would of course be materially deceived.” ( Ibid. )

T HE P EOPLE ’ S A PPEAL The People also appealed from the judgment, arguing the trial court erred by permitting defendant to serve his sentence in local custody. Defendant concedes that
his sentence to serve time in local custody is unauthorized; we agree. The presumption is that all felonies will be punished by commitment to state prison: “Except in cases where a differe nt punishment is pres cribed by any law of this state, every offense de clared to be a felony is punishable by imprisonment for 16 months, or two or three years in the st ate prison unless the offense is punishable pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.” (Pen. Code , § 18, subd. (a).) If a crime is subject to Penal Code section 1170, ho wever, a defendant may be sentenced to commitment in local custody: “[A] felony puni shable pursuant to this subdivision where7 the term is not specified in the underlying offense shall be punishable by a term of imprisonment in a county jail for 16 months, or two or three years. [¶] . . . [A] felony punishable pursuant to this su bdivision shall be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for the term described in the underlying offense.” (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (h)(1) & (2).) Penal Code section 115 does not expr essly provide that a prison sentence imposed for violation of that statute may be served in a county ja il pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (h). (By co ntrast, Penal Code sec tions 114 and 115.1, subdivision (f) provide that persons convicted of violating those statutes may be punished “pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.”) In the absence of statutory authority permitting a violation of section 115 to be punished by commitment to local custody, the trial court was required to sent ence defendant to state prison.
We do not know whether the trial c ourt would select the same term of imprisonment as it did for local custody. Accordingly, we remand the matter for resentencing. In his reply brief, the district attorney agreed resentencing is appropriate.

D ISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed; the ma tter is remanded for resentencing.

FYBEL, J.

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.

MOORE, J.