THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Arthur L. Jayroe, Jr., in his Capacity as Chief Magistrate 

of Newberry County, Plaintiff, 

v. 

Newberry County, South Carolina and Wayne Adams, 

Defendants, 

and 

The Honorable Hugh K. Leatherman, Sr., in his capacity 

as President Pro Tempore of the South Carolina Senate, 

Intervenor. 

Appellate Case No. 2015-000373 

IN THE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 

Opinion No. 27548 

Heard June 16, 2015 – Filed July 22, 2015 

QUESTION ANSWERED "NO" 

Desa A. Ballard and Harvey M. Watson, III, both of Ballard & Watson, of 

West Columbia, for Plaintiff. 

Steve A. Matthews and Sarah P. Spruill, both of Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, 

P.A. and James E. Smith, Jr., of James E. Smith, Jr., P.A., all of Columbia, 

for Defendants. 
 

Kenneth M. Moffitt, Edward H. Bender and Elizabeth H. Brogdon, Counsel 

to the South Carolina Senate, for Intervenor, President Pro Tempore Hugh K. 

Leatherman, Sr. 

PER CURIAM: We granted plaintiff's request that we exercise our original 

jurisdiction to "determine whether [defendants] have the authority to abolish parttime magistrate positions in Newberry County." S.C. Sup. Ct. Order dated May 7, 

2015. We hold defendants do not have such authority and therefore answer the 

question "No." We also note that no Newberry County magistrate position has 

been abolished. 

FACTS 

Plaintiff, formerly the part-time Chief Magistrate of Newberry County, brought 

this action in the Court's original jurisdiction to determine whether defendants 

Newberry County and Wayne Adams, County Administrator, have the authority to 

abolish part-time magistrate positions in Newberry County. In addition, the Court 

permitted the Senate President Pro Tempore to intervene in this action. Defendants 

and the Intervenor agree with plaintiff that defendants do not have such authority, 

contending that all of defendants' actions have been done in compliance with the 

South Carolina Constitution and applicable statutes. 

Plaintiff was a part-time magistrate in Newberry County. Under the formula 

established by S.C. Code Ann. § 22-8-40(C) (2007), Newberry County is entitled 

to three magisterial positions. Under this statute, four part-time magistrates equal 

one full-time magisterial position. Section 22-8-40(E). During the four year 

period expiring April 30, 2015, Newberry's three magisterial positions were filled 

by two full-time magistrates and three part-time magistrates, one of whom was 

plaintiff. See S.C. Code Ann. § 22-1-10(A) (Supp. 2014) (last sentence of second 

paragraph). Defendant Newberry County is statutorily mandated to notify the 

senatorial delegation1

 representing Newberry County in writing of the number of 

magistrate positions available in the county, as well as other information, as the 

terms near expiration. S.C. Code Ann. § 22-1-10 (A) (third paragraph). 

1 A single senator represents all of Newberry County. 
 

Defendant Newberry County, acting through defendant Adams pursuant to a vote 

taken at a County Council meeting, wrote its senator invoking § 22-1-10(A) on 

August 21, 2014. In this August letter, the County requested its three magisterial 

positions be filled with three full-time magistrates, thus discontinuing the use of 

part-time magistrates. On June 2, 2015, the Governor appointed Magistrate Barry 

Koon as a full-time magistrate to fill the magisterial position formerly filled by 

three part-time magistrates, two of whom were petitioner and Koon. On that same 

date, the Senate confirmed the appointment. See S.C. Const. art. V, § 26.2 The 

other two magisterial positions in Newberry County were also filled by full-time 

magistrates. 

ISSUE 

Do defendants have the authority to abolish a part-time 

magistrate position in Newberry County? 

ANALYSIS 

Plaintiff argues that, in effect, § 22-1-10(A) delegates the authority to abolish parttime magistrate positions to Newberry County. He contends this statute violates 

this Court's decision in Davis v. County of Greenville, 322 S.C. 73, 470 S.E.2d 94 

(1996). In Davis, the Court held that counties cannot "abolish" a magistrate's 

position, nor may a county, consistent with the unified judicial system, abolish 

magistrate courts entirely within a given county. Davis, supra. Neither of these 

constitutionally forbidden acts has occurred here. 

Plaintiff contends this language in § 22-1-10(A) is an unconstitutional delegation 

of authority to the county government: 

2 This section provides: 

The Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the 

Senate, shall appoint a number of magistrates for each county 

as provided by law. The General Assembly shall provide for 

their terms of office and their civil and criminal jurisdiction. 

The terms of office must be uniform throughout the State. 
 

At least ninety days before the date of the commencement of 

the terms provided in the preceding paragraph and every four 

years thereafter, each county governing body must inform, in 

writing, the Senators representing that county of the number of 

full-time and part-time magistrate positions available in the 

county, the number of work hours required by each position, 

the compensation for each position, and the area of the county 

to which each position is assigned. If the county governing 

body fails to inform, in writing, the Senators representing that 

county of the information as required in this section, then the 

compensation, hours, and location of the full-time and part-time 

magistrate positions available in the county remain as 

designated for the previous four years. 

According to plaintiff, this statute delegates to the county control over the number 

of magistrate positions in violation of the constitutional rule set forth in Davis. We 

disagree. 

The number of magisterial positions in a given county is determined by the 

formula established in S.C. Code Ann. § 22-8-40(C) and (D) (2007), subject to an 

agreement pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 22-2-40(C) (Supp. 2014) or to 

"termination" pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 22-1-30(B) (Supp. 2014).3

 Here, there 

is no dispute that the number of magisterial positions in Newberry County is three, 

and that there was no agreement between Newberry County and its senator to 

increase or decrease this number as provided in § 22-2-40(C), nor was any 

magisterial position "terminated" in accordance with § 22-1-30(B). It is true that in 

their August 2014 letter, defendants asked that the county's three magisterial 

positions be filled by three full-time judges. That this letter contains merely a 

request negates plaintiff's assertion that defendants "control" the number of 

magisterial positions in Newberry County. Further, in arguing that his position 

3 Plaintiff purports to challenge the constitutionality of these statutes, but lacks 

standing since there was no agreement pursuant to § 22-2-40(C) nor was he 

terminated pursuant to § 22-1-30(B). To the extent he seeks to invoke "public 

interest standing" to challenge the statutes, he ignores both the scope of the 

question we agreed to decide, and the Court's firm policy of declining to decide a 

constitutional challenge unless necessary to a resolution of the case. E.g. S.C. 

Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Cochran, 356 S.C. 413, 589 S.E.2d 753 (2003). 
 

was abolished, plaintiff misapprehends the statutory scheme: the reallocation of 

Newberry County's three magisterial positions from a combination of full and parttime judges to three full time magistrates does not constitute a change in the 

number of magisterial positions in the county. In other words, no position has 

been "abolished." 

We accepted this matter in our original jurisdiction to answer the question whether 

defendants have the authority to abolish part-time magistrate positions in 

Newberry County. We agree with all parties that defendants have no such 

authority, and further agree with defendants and the Intervenor that no part-time or 

full-time Newberry County magisterial position has been abolished. Rather, as 

permitted by § 22-4-80(E), the part-time magisterial positions, including the one 

previously held by plaintiff, have been combined into one full-time magistrate 

position, and the Newberry County magistrates have been lawfully appointed 

pursuant to S.C. Const. art. V, § 26. While we decline plaintiff's invitation to 

expand the scope of this case to address issues of an alleged constitutional conflict 

between S.C. Const. art V, § 26 and art. V, § 4, and his related statutory claims, we 

have reviewed all of plaintiff's arguments and find nothing of merit warranting the 

exercise of our authority to add necessary parties4

 and address these additional 

arguments. 

CONCLUSION 

Defendants Newberry County and Adams do not have the authority to abolish parttime magistrate positions in Newberry County. 

QUESTION ANSWERED NO. 

PLEICONES, Acting Chief Justice, BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN, JJ., 

and Acting Justice James E. Moore, concur. 

4 For example, the Governor would be a necessary party.