COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

March 8, 2022

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2020AP1451 Cir. Ct. No. 2020GN38

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE 

PLACEMENT OF R. V.:

OUTAGAMIE COUNTY,

 PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

 V.

R. V.,

 RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Outagamie County: 

MARK J. MCGINNIS, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Nashold, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2020AP1451

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¶1 PER CURIAM. “Richard”1appeals from orders for guardianship 

and protective placement under WIS. STAT. chs. 54 and 55, respectively. Richard

argues that Outagamie County failed to present sufficient evidence to support the 

orders. We disagree and therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On March 9, 2020, Richard, then fifty-nine years old, suffered a 

stroke and was hospitalized for two days before returning home. On March 25, 

Richard was again hospitalized after he called 911 for the eleventh time to 

complain of blood pressure issues. One day later, the County petitioned for 

temporary and permanent guardianship and for protective placement. According 

to the petitions, Richard met the standards for guardianship and protective 

placement because the stroke had impaired his “ability to make safe and rational 

decisions about his safety”; he had “become notably more impulsive, verbally 

aggressive, demanding, and irrational in his thinking/behaviors”; and he required 

physical assistance that his wife, “Theresa,” could no longer safely provide in their 

home. Following a probable cause hearing, the court commissioner ordered 

temporary guardianship of Richard’s person and estate, with Theresa appointed as 

guardian, and temporary protective placement in the hospital, with transfer to a 

skilled nursing facility or similar facility upon discharge. 

¶3 On April 20 and 21, 2020, the circuit court held a final hearing on 

the petitions. The court heard testimony from Dr. Michele Andrade, the 

 

1

 In keeping with the policy expressed in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.86 (2019-20), we refer to 

the appellant and his wife by pseudonyms to protect their privacy. All references to the 

Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2020AP1451

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court-appointed examining psychiatrist; Dr. Andrew Beine, Richard’s primary 

care provider; Tanya Vickery, the County clinical therapist who investigated the 

protective placement referral; and Theresa. As we discuss in more detail below, 

these witnesses testified—consistent with their knowledge and experience—that 

Richard’s stroke had left him cognitively impaired and highly irritable and 

aggressive. The witnesses also testified about Richard’s extensive and 

pre-existing physical disabilities and medical issues, including his bipolar 

disorder. According to the testimony, Richard could not evaluate information so 

as to make informed financial or health care decisions, and he could not 

adequately assess his own health care needs or cooperate in his own care. 

¶4 These witnesses further testified to the need for protective 

placement—specifically, that Richard’s disabilities were likely to be permanent,

that he had a primary need for residential care, and that he could not safely provide 

for his own care or custody. In addition, R.V.’s guardian ad litem filed a report

and provided an oral recommendation to the court in favor of guardianship and 

protective placement. 

¶5 Richard also testified and provided his own explanations of the 

events described by the County’s witnesses. Richard testified that his aggressive 

or inappropriate behavior stemmed from isolated incidents that he would not 

repeat. He also testified that he was not so physically limited that he was unable 

to provide for his own care. During questioning from his attorney, Richard

correctly answered questions testing his mental ability. 

¶6 The circuit court determined that Richard met the criteria for 

guardianship of his person and estate and for protective placement, and it entered 

those corresponding orders. The guardianship order retains Theresa as guardian of 
No. 2020AP1451

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Richard’s person and estate. The protective placement order designates an 

unlocked unit as the least restrictive placement, and it continues Richard’s 

placement in the hospital “with the expectation of transition to a skilled nursing 

facility or like facility as soon as a facility can be secured for him and the transfer 

arranged.” Both orders require Richard to be re-evaluated within forty-five days

of the date the orders were issued to assess his recovery from the stroke. Richard 

appeals. We discuss further facts below where pertinent to our analysis.

DISCUSSION

I. Standards of Review

¶7 Richard argues that the County has not established the elements of 

guardianship and protective placement by clear and convincing evidence. See 

WIS. STAT. §§ 54.10(3)(a), 55.10(4)(d). On review, we uphold the circuit court’s 

findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we determine de novo 

whether the evidence meets the legal criteria for guardianship and protective 

placement. Walworth Cnty. v. Therese B., 2003 WI App 223, ¶21, 267 Wis. 2d

310, 671 N.W.2d 377.

II. Guardianship 

¶8 WISCONSIN STAT. § 54.10(3)(a) sets forth the circumstances under 

which a circuit court may appoint a guardian of the person and of the estate on the 

basis of incompetency.

2 There are three requirements pertinent to this appeal. 

 

2

 Where a person has “been adjudicated by a court as meeting the requirements of [WIS.

STAT. §] 54.10(3),” that person is deemed “incompetent.” WIS. STAT. § 54.01(16).
No. 2020AP1451

5

First, to obtain guardianship of the person, the petitioner must prove that “because 

of an impairment, the individual is unable effectively to receive and evaluate 

information or to make or communicate decisions to such an extent that the 

individual is unable to meet the essential requirements for his or her physical 

health and safety.” Sec. 54.10(3)(a)2. “Impairment,” as used in § 54.10(3)(a)2., is 

defined, in pertinent part, as a “serious and persistent mental illness, degenerative 

brain disorder, or other like incapacit[y].” WIS. STAT. § 54.01(14). The phrase 

“[m]eet the essential requirements for physical health or safety” means to 

“perform those actions necessary to provide the health care, food, shelter, clothes, 

personal hygiene, and other care without which serious physical injury or illness 

will likely occur.” Sec. 54.01(19).

¶9 Second, to obtain guardianship of the estate, the petitioner must 

prove that, “because of an impairment, the individual is unable effectively to 

receive and evaluate information or to make or communicate decisions related to 

management of his or her property or financial affairs,” to the extent that any of 

the following applies: “a. The individual has property that will be dissipated in 

whole or in part[;] b. The individual is unable to provide for his or her 

support[; or] c. The individual is unable to prevent financial exploitation.” WIS.

STAT. § 54.10(3)(a)3. 

¶10 Finally, the petitioner must show that “[t]he individual’s need for 

assistance in decision making or communication is unable to be met effectively 

and less restrictively through appropriate and reasonably available training, 

education, support services, health care, assistive devices, a supported 

decision-making agreement under [WIS. STAT.] ch. 52, or other means that the 

individual will accept.” WIS. STAT. § 54.10(3)(a)4. As set forth below, the 

County met its burden of establishing these requirements. 
No. 2020AP1451

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¶11 With respect to “impairment,” Dr. Andrade testified that, as a result 

of his stroke, Richard has a neurocognitive disorder, which she described as a 

degenerative brain disorder. She also testified that the stroke exacerbated 

Richard’s preexisting bipolar disorder, which she described as a major mental 

illness. Thus, the evidence supports the court’s determination that Richard has an 

impairment, and Richard does not dispute this determination on appeal. Richard 

contends, however, that the County failed to show that his impairment rendered 

him unable to protect his physical health or his finances as required by WIS. STAT.

§ 54.10(3)(a)2. and 3. He also argues that the County failed to show that less 

restrictive means were not available. See § 54.10(3)(a)4. We address these 

arguments in turn.

A. Inability to meet essential physical or financial needs

¶12 In its oral ruling, the circuit court determined that there was clear 

and convincing evidence demonstrating that Richard “lack[ed] the ability to 

make ... decisions and to communicate in a way that would allow others to take 

care of him,” making him a danger to himself. Along similar lines, the court 

determined that there was clear and convincing evidence that Richard was unable 

to effectively “receive and evaluate information” or “effectively make or 

communicate decisions relating to the management of his ... property or financial 

affairs.” The guardianship order reflects the court’s conclusion that Richard met 

the statutory criteria (set forth above) for guardianship of the person and the estate. 

¶13 The following testimony supports the circuit court’s conclusions. 

Doctor Andrade testified that Richard’s stroke had exacerbated his mental illness 

and that Richard had both cognitive and behavioral symptoms. For example, 

Richard gave “nonsensical” responses to questions, performed poorly on memory 
No. 2020AP1451

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tests, and did not remember the name of his employer before retirement. Richard 

was also irritable, aggressive, and overly emotional. 

¶14 Doctor Andrade testified that, although Richard could “communicate 

decisions,” his impairment interfered with his ability “to understand and apply 

those decisions,” meaning that he could not ultimately “meet the essential 

requirements for his physical health and safety” or “manage his property and 

financial affairs” to avoid dissipation of property. Andrade noted, for example, 

that during her examination Richard called the nurse “because he felt he had a 

pain,” but then he “forg[o]t immediately his reason for calling.” Andrade further 

explained that Richard “exhibited excessive spending habits” post-stroke: “[h]e 

has purchased seven mobility scooters recently and he only needs one,” and “[h]e 

has r[u]n up his credit card debt to where they needed to procure a loan to pay that 

off.” She testified that, without a guardianship, Richard was at risk to have his 

property dissipated and would be unable to provide for his own support.

¶15 Doctor Beine testified that Richard was re-hospitalized two weeks

after his stroke because of post-stroke behavioral changes. Beine explained that, 

in the couple of days before the hearing, Richard had not wanted to talk to him. 

Based on prior discussions, however, Beine opined that Richard “has not had 

adequate insight or demonstrate[d] the appropriate reasoning in regards to his 

health to be able to make decisions.” 

¶16 Doctor Beine discussed Richard’s cognitive and behavioral problems 

in the hospital. For example, Beine testified that Richard did not understand why 

he had been re-hospitalized and that Richard had repeatedly tried to call 911 so 

that an ambulance could take him away from the hospital. Beine testified, 

“There’s been times where the police have to come in to talk to [Richard] about 
No. 2020AP1451

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appropriate use of his phone in calling 911 from the hospital.” Richard also “has 

thrown himself out of bed.” Beine further testified that, post-stroke, Richard did 

not act appropriately toward hospital staff. For example, on one occasion, Richard

was “very aggressive” and “yelling” at staff; on another occasion, he threw a full 

can of soda at a nurse. Richard also “made multiple inappropriate” sexual or 

“bizarre” comments to the nursing staff and “tr[ied] to get nurses’ addresses.” 

¶17 Vickery, a County clinical therapist, testified about the protective 

placement study she completed on behalf of the County, as required for the

protective placement order. See WIS. STAT. § 55.11. She testified that Richard 

displayed post-stroke “behavioral challenges,” such as aggression and agitation. 

For example, Richard called Vickery names during telephone conversations, and 

he called both her and his wife names during Vickery’s in-person visit. Vickery 

opined that, based on his behavior, Richard did not have the current ability to 

make his own health care and financial decisions. For example, Richard refused 

to cooperate with the hospital nurses in “simple tasks,” like changing his 

ileostomy bag; he “has been refusing OT [occupational therapy] and PT [physical

therapy] services”; he “pushes his call light incessantly”; and he “inappropriately” 

called the police on “multiple occasions.” 

¶18 Vickery also testified that Richard had “minimal insight into his 

impairments” and “a significant lapse in his judgment and reasoning abilities.” As 

discussed further below, Vickery also described Richard as needing significant 

assistance with his activities of daily living. Vickery noted that Richard “will 

verbalize that he can do things on his own,” but “that isn’t the case when you ask 

anyone who is providing care[] for him, be it his wife or hospital staff or even 

when I met with him and was able to observe him.” Vickery testified that Richard 
No. 2020AP1451

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was on one-to-one supervision at the hospital because he would “start screaming 

and yelling” anytime he was left alone in his room.

¶19 Richard’s wife Theresa testified that in the two weeks after his 

stroke and before he was re-hospitalized, Richard called 911 eleven times because 

he believed his blood pressure was too high. Theresa explained that Richard 

called 911 because he wanted attention, even though he knew that he was not 

experiencing an emergency. She also testified that the paramedics called her a few 

times, informing her, “We can’t be coming over every time he calls 911 especially 

with this Coronavirus going on.” In addition, Theresa testified that she “was more 

or less doing everything for” Richard, who was not physically able to get out of 

his chair, walk, use the toilet, or prepare his own food. According to Theresa, 

since his stroke, Richard would “blow up” very easily, he would tell her to “shut 

up,” and they “couldn’t even have a conversation without him screaming and 

yelling at [her].” 

¶20 Richard testified and correctly answered questions testing his mental 

ability (for example, he knew who the president of the United States was, and he 

correctly counted backward by fours). Richard acknowledged that the stroke had 

made him more emotional and had “negatively impacted” him. He maintained, 

however, that he still had the ability to make his own health care and financial 

decisions. Richard’s testimony about his physical limitations was contrary to the 

other testimony, in that he described himself as mobile and able to complete 

activities of daily living without Theresa’s help. Notably, Richard offered no 

expert testimony to rebut the County’s experts, despite having obtained an 

independent examination.
No. 2020AP1451

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¶21 We conclude that this evidence is sufficient to support the circuit 

court’s determination that Richard’s impairment (i.e., his post-stroke degenerative 

brain disorder coupled with his mental illness) had left him unable to receive and 

evaluate information or make or communicate decisions, such that he could not 

effectively protect his own health, safety, finances or property. In arguing 

otherwise, Richard attacks the physician witnesses’ qualifications, experience and 

expertise. For example, he argues that the physician witnesses did not administer 

the correct tests to assess cognitive function, that they evaluated him too soon after 

the stroke, and that they ignored the possibility that his symptoms might improve.

But it was within the court’s purview to assess the evidence and judge witness 

credibility. See Mullen v. Braatz, 179 Wis. 2d 749, 756, 508 N.W.2d 446 

(Ct. App. 1993) (it is the trial court’s function to assess the weight and credibility 

of testimony). We will not second-guess the court’s determination that these 

witnesses adequately and appropriately evaluated Richard. 

¶22 Richard also argues that “any claim that [he] lacked insight into his 

illness and need for treatment is belied by his own testimony,” in which he 

acknowledged that he needed therapy and help with activities of daily living. This 

argument ignores the fact that Richard’s testimony on these points contradicted 

that of other witnesses. For example, Richard represented that he could perform a 

variety of activities of daily living, whereas Vickery and Theresa testified that, 

while at home, he relied on Theresa to perform these functions. Thus, the circuit 

court could have reasonably credited Vickery’s and Theresa’s testimony over 

Richard’s and found that Richard had limited insight about his mental and physical 

needs. In any case, the fact that Richard acknowledged his physical needs and 

limitations at the hearing does not negate the court’s conclusion that Richard 
No. 2020AP1451

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ultimately lacked the mental capacity to evaluate health care or financial 

information or act in his own best interest in these matters. 

¶23 Richard further argues that, even accepting the physician witnesses’ 

testimony, that testimony does not demonstrate that his impairment made him 

incapable of making health care and financial decisions. Richard argues that he 

may display “poor judgment” and have a “physical disability” but that these are 

not grounds for guardianship. See WIS. STAT. § 54.10(3)(b) (“Unless the proposed 

ward is unable to communicate decisions effectively in any way, the determination 

[of incompetency] may not be based on mere old age, eccentricity, poor judgment, 

physical disability, or the existence of a supported decision-making agreement.”). 

¶24 This argument ignores physician testimony that Richard’s stroke 

exacerbated his bipolar disorder and significantly impaired his cognitive 

functioning. The County showed that Richard’s impairments directly impacted his 

ability to receive and evaluate information, and the record reflects that the circuit 

court did not order guardianship solely because Richard had a physical disability. 

The court remarked that Richard needed assistance with physical tasks, but in 

determining whether he met the criteria for guardianship, the court focused on 

Richard’s decision-making abilities. Moreover, although the court did not find so 

explicitly, Richard’s physical disability is relevant to the capacity determination, 

insofar as he could not or would not acknowledge that he needed significant 

assistance with activities of daily living. We conclude that the County met its 

burden on these elements of guardianship.
No. 2020AP1451

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B. Need for assistance in decision-making or communication cannot 

be met effectively through less restrictive means that the 

individual will accept

¶25 As stated, to obtain a guardianship order, the County was required to 

show that Richard’s “need for assistance in decision[-]making or communication 

[wa]s unable to be met effectively and less restrictively through appropriate and 

reasonably available training, education, support services, health care, assistive 

devices, a supported decision-making agreement or ... other means that [Richard]

would accept.” See WIS. STAT. § 54.10(3)(a)4. 

¶26 The circuit court found that Richard had significant behavioral issues 

that made it difficult for his wife and hospital staff to work with him. The 

evidence, as summarized above, supports this finding. Moreover, Richard’s 

testimony indicated that he did not understand or appreciate how his conduct 

affected others. For example, whereas Vickery and Theresa testified that Richard 

was often angry, abusive and uncooperative, Richard denied these behaviors,

framed them as isolated incidents, or—as with repeatedly calling 911 or throwing 

a can of soda at a nurse—suggested that they were justified. Thus, the court 

reasonably concluded that Richard would not accept help or allow others to assist 

in his decision-making. 

¶27 In addition, Dr. Andrade’s report, which was entered into evidence, 

states that guardianship is the least restrictive option because “[d]ue to untreated 

mental illness [and] severe physical illnesses [Richard] requires prolonged 

therapies to see if improvement is possible.” A reasonable inference is that, given 

Richard’s current level of impairment, “available training” and “education” would 

be insufficient to enable him to receive and evaluate health care and financial 
No. 2020AP1451

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information. See WIS. STAT. § 54.10(3)(a)4. We conclude that sufficient evidence 

supports this element of guardianship.

III. Protective Placement

¶28 The circuit court may protectively place an adult who has been 

determined incompetent under WIS. STAT. § 54.10(3)(a). WIS. STAT.

§ 55.08(1)(b); see also WIS JI—CIVIL 7060 (2019). To do so, the court must make 

several findings by clear and convincing evidence relating to the individual’s 

needs, capabilities and disability. See WIS. STAT. §§ 55.08(1), 55.10(4)(d). In 

addition, protective placement must be to “the least restrictive environment and in 

the least restrictive manner consistent with the needs of the individual to be 

protected and with the resources of the county department.” WIS. STAT.

§ 55.12(3). We examine these standards below. 

A. Primary need for residential care and custody

¶29 Protective placement requires that the individual have “a primary 

need for residential care and custody.” WIS. STAT. § 55.08(1)(a). “Primary need 

for residential care and custody” means the individual “must have a primary need 

(1) to have his or her daily needs provided for in a residential setting; and (2) to 

have someone else exercising control and supervision in that residential setting for 

the purpose of protecting the person from abuse, financial exploitation, neglect, 

and self-neglect.” Jackson Cnty. DHHS v. Susan H., 2010 WI App 82, ¶16, 326 

Wis. 2d 246, 785 N.W.2d 677.

¶30 The circuit court concluded that Richard had a primary need for 

residential care and custody because he did not have the physical or mental 

capability to care for himself and because Theresa was no longer able or willing to 
No. 2020AP1451

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care for him in their home. The evidence supports this conclusion. Aside from 

Richard, all of the witnesses testified that Richard needed significant assistance 

with daily tasks (among other physical limitations, Richard could not ambulate, 

was a fall risk, was incontinent, had diabetes, and had gangrene on a finger). 

Moreover, there was testimony that Theresa was both unable and unwilling to 

continue caring for Richard in their home, that Richard had made unwise and 

unnecessary purchases, and that Richard was not acting in his best interest with 

respect to his health and health care. We conclude that this is clear and convincing 

evidence supporting the court’s determination that Richard had a primary need for 

residential care and custody.

¶31 On appeal, Richard suggests that a “primary need for residential care 

and custody” means that an individual needs “constant” or “around-the-clock”

care. But this is not the legal standard under Susan H., which simply asks 

whether the individual’s “daily needs” (whatever they may be) need to be 

“provided for within a residential setting.” Id. Richard also disputes the 

conclusion that he cannot provide for his own daily needs, but this was a question 

for the fact-finder to decide, after weighing all the evidence. The circuit court 

found that Richard needed “intense assistance” to satisfy his daily needs; this 

finding is not clearly erroneous. 

B. Substantial risk of serious harm

¶32 As pertinent here, the second criteria for protective placement is that,

because of a “degenerative brain disorder” or a “serious and persistent mental 

illness,” the individual must be “so totally incapable of providing for his or her 

own care or custody as to create a substantial risk of serious harm to himself or 

herself or others.” WIS. STAT. § 55.08(1)(c). The circuit court did not discuss this 
No. 2020AP1451

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element in the context of protective placement, but its order reflects that the 

County satisfied this standard. Moreover, as stated, in discussing guardianship, 

the court determined that Richard could not provide for his own care and that he 

posed a danger to himself without a court order. 

¶33 The evidence supports this finding. Specifically, as discussed, the 

evidence was that Richard’s degenerative brain disorder (caused by his stroke) and 

his serious and persistent mental illness (bipolar disorder exacerbated by the 

stroke) had left him incapable of directing, or cooperating in, his own care, and 

that he would face a substantial risk of serious harm if he managed his own care. 

On appeal, Richard does not engage with this standard or set forth any detailed 

argument as to why serious harm would not result without residential care. We 

conclude that there was sufficient evidence supporting the circuit court’s 

determination that residential care was necessary to avert the risk of serious harm.

C. Disability is permanent or likely to be permanent

¶34 Third, for an individual to be protectively placed, his or her 

disability must be “permanent or likely to be permanent.” WIS. STAT.

§ 55.08(1)(d). Contrary to Richard’s arguments, the record supports the circuit 

court’s determination that this standard was met.

¶35 Richard argues that his disability is neither permanent nor likely to 

be permanent because he has improved since his stroke and may continue to 

improve. Specifically, he critiques Dr. Andrade’s testimony on this point, arguing 

that her testimony is internally inconsistent and that she was not qualified to 

conclude that his disability is permanent or likely to be permanent. 
No. 2020AP1451

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¶36 We disagree that Dr. Andrade’s testimony is inconsistent. She

testified both that Richard’s disabilities and symptoms were likely to be permanent 

and that his symptoms might possibly improve—two statements that are not 

contradictory. Moreover, as previously noted, it was the circuit court’s role to 

weigh the evidence and make credibility determinations.

¶37 Richard further implies that protective placement is inappropriate or 

legally impermissible in those situations where an individual is recovering or 

improving. However, a circuit court must base its protective placement 

determination on the evidence as it exists at the time of the hearing, not on what 

might occur in the future. Moreover, Richard provides no authority for the 

assumption that any degree of recovery renders the disability impermanent; nor 

would such an assumption seem logical where the ultimate question is whether the 

disability (not any specific symptom) is permanent. Accordingly, we do not 

address this argument in depth. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 

N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (we may choose not to address issues that are 

inadequately briefed or unsupported by legal authority). 

¶38 We do note that Richard may petition to terminate the order if he 

sufficiently recovers from his stroke and that the County must annually review his 

protective placement. See WIS. STAT. §§ 55.17, 55.18. In addition, in this case, 

the circuit court ordered a review of the protective placement within forty-five 

days, thereby accounting for the possibility that Richard might improve. 

Ultimately, however, the court was in the best position to assess how the 

possibility of future improvement impacted its determination that the disability 

was likely to be permanent.
No. 2020AP1451

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D. Least restrictive placement

¶39 Finally, protective placement “shall be provided in the least 

restrictive environment and in the least restrictive manner consistent with the 

needs of the individual to be protected and with the resources of the county 

department.” See WIS. STAT. § 55.12(3). The physician witnesses and Vickery 

testified that, consistent with their assessments of Richard’s mental and physical 

needs, the least restrictive placement was to a skilled nursing facility. Thus, the 

evidence supports the circuit court’s determination that the least restrictive 

placement was to inpatient care (a nursing home). 

¶40 Richard argues that the County “failed to prove that an in-patient 

facility was the least restrictive option for” him because “the Department had 

determined that [he] was eligible to receive some in-home care.” At the hearing, 

the parties and the circuit court explored how care might be provided in the home.

There was no evidence presented, however, that the level of in-home care Richard 

needed was in fact available and affordable, with or without County resources. 

Thus, the court did not err in determining that Richard’s needs should be met in an

inpatient setting. 

¶41 For the reasons stated, we affirm the orders for guardianship and 

protective placement.

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.