NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DENISE ABBOTT,

Plaintiff,

v.

VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS,

Defendant.

Civil Action No.:

11-0421 (PGS)

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.

This case comes before the Court on defendant Verizon Communications’ (“Verizon”)

motion to dismissthe complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [Docket Entry

No. 8]. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 1331,

§ 1343 (a)(3), and § 1367. For the reasons stated below, Verizon’s motion to dismiss is granted

without prejudice.

I

Plaintiff filed her complaint on January 20, 2011. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she

was employed by Verizon from January 2005 to July 2009 and that throughout her employment, she

was forced to endure systematic, harassing behavior. Plaintiff further alleges that this harassing

behavior culminated in her termination under false pretenses. According to Plaintiff, Verizon

terminated Plaintiff for sending a pornographic email that exposed Plaintiff’s supervisor’s sexual

preferences when Verizon knew or should of known that Plaintiff did not send such an email.

This alleged behavior, while arguably arising from a common nucleus of operative fact,

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involved two distinct phases. The first phase began in April 2005, when Plaintiff was transferred

from her original position as FiberOptic Splicing Technician to the position of Services Technician. 

According to Plaintiff, during her employment as Services Technician, Plaintiff was routinely

assigned poorly-stocked, unsanitary trucks and was denied a permanent truck assignment. Plaintiff

further claims that on one occasion, the vehicle to which she was assigned contained a bottle of

urine. Plaintiff suggests that these assignments were made in contravention of Verizon’s seniority

rules. Plaintiff also claims that in June 2005, after undergoing surgery for a tumor, Plaintiff was

“informed that she had been fired” for missing two days of work. Plaintiff later returned to work,

although the pleadings are unclear as to whether Plaintiff was misinformed or reinstated. According

to Plaintiff, this pattern of harassing behavior ended in February 2006 when Plaintiff was transferred

to an administrative position in Levittown, Pennsylvania.

The second phase of harassing behavior allegedly began in December 2007 when Plaintiff

was elected as Shop Steward for her Union. In her capacity as Shop Stewart, Plaintiff was actively

involved in pursuing Equal Employment OpportunityCommission (“EEOC”) grievances on behalf

of Union members and filing lawsuits with the National Labor Board. As Shop Stewart, Plaintiff

also initiated and organized a Labor Relations Stress meeting on behalf of all Verizon employees in

her department. Additionally, from February 2008 to April 2009, Plaintiff utilized her Family

Medical Leave Act (“FLMA”) intermittent disability leave. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of her

position as Shop Steward and her use of FLMA leave, Verizon subjected Plaintiff to various acts of

harassment, including workplace hostility, disparate treatment, violations of the Health Insurance

Portability and Accountability Act, increased surveillance, write-ups, suspensions, and, ultimately,

an arbitrary discharge. In conjunction with these general charges, Plaintiff provides two specific

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allegations: Plaintiff alleges that in February 2008 her job assignment was downgraded from the

Help-Desk to receiving incoming queue calls, and in November 2008 Verizon ignored her written

complaints.

In describing her alleged termination, Plaintiff provides substantiallymore detail. According

to Plaintiff: On May 27, 2009 Verizon alleged that Plaintiff sent a pornographic email exposing

Plaintiff’s supervisor’s sexual preference when Verizon knew or should have known that Plaintiff

did not send the email. That same day, Verizon suspended Plaintiff under false pretenses;

subsequent to the suspension, Plaintiff’s supervisor harassed Plaintiff via telephone while Plaintiff’s

supervisor was at work. On July 2, 2009, Plaintiff was terminated under the same false pretenses

as her suspension.

Plaintiff’s complaint includes ten causes of action, including (1) work place harassment, (2)

sex discrimination, (3) negligent retention, (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (5)

disparate treatment and retaliation, (6) infringement of the freedom of speech, (7) defamation, (8)

civil conspiracy, (9) violation of the covenant of good faith and faith dealing in the implied contract

between Plaintiff and Defendant; and (10) violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination

(“NJ LAD”). On August 12, 2011, Verizon filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint in its

entirety with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Verizon provides an

array of reasons for dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint, among them the argument that “the complaint

offers nothing beyond mere conclusory assertions . . . .” In response to this allegation, Plaintiff

provided over ten pages of factual recitations in her opposition brief. Very few of these recitations

are included in Plaintiff’s complaint. 

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II

The Court reviews this motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which

provides for dismissal of a claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Rule

8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that “a pleading that states a claim for relief must

contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; .

. . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (a)(2). To evaluate the sufficiency of claims under the pleading requirements

of Rule 8, a court is required to apply the plausibility standard articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009). Under this standard, 

a complaint will survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) only if it states “sufficient factual allegations,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Importantly,“threadbare recitals of

the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at

1949; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, the pleadings must include “factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010).

III

Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and

12(b)(6) because Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that Verizon engaged in culpable conduct. 

With regard to the first phase of Plaintiff’s allegations, Plaintiff alleges that she was routinely

assigned to unsanitary, poorly-stocked trucks and that she was denied a permanent truck assignment. 

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Plaintiff also alleges that she was “informed that she had been fired” for missing two days of work. 

These allegations are incomplete. First, Plaintiff fails to make clear which cause of action these

allegations relate to; Plaintiff includes one reference to “male counterparts,” but there is no claim

that Plaintiff was discriminated against because of her gender. Second, Plaintiff’s recitation of the 1

facts are vague: Plaintiff fails to discuss the condition of the vehicles to which her male counterparts

were assigned. Plaintiff does not allege that any employee received a permanent truck assignment. 

Plaintiff does not state whether she was actually fired or incorrectly informed that she was fired. 

Plaintiff does not identifywho notified her or her firing. Assuming Plaintiff was fired, Plaintiff does

not explain how or why she was reinstated. Third, Plaintiff fails to provide facts illustrating that the

first and second phases of Plaintiff’s allegations arise from a common nucleus of operative fact. Such

assertions fail to meet the Rule 8 standard. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.

1937, 1949 (2009).

With regard to the second phase of Verizon’s alleged conduct, key allegations are absent. 

Plaintiff states that Verizon “downgrad[ed] her job assignment from the esteemed Help-Desk

position to receiving incoming queue calls,” without identifying the parameters of this

demotion—for instance, whether there was a difference in pay or assignments. Plaintiff also states

that “Verizon violated Plaintiff’s right to protection from workplace violence, discrimination and

retaliation by ignoring written complaints from Plaintiff,” without identifying the substance of the

complaints. With regard to Plaintiff’s termination, it is unclear whether Plaintiff alleges that Verizon

1

If Plaintiff is indeed proceeding under a theory of gender discrimination, such cause of

action would likely be time-barred. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,

Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982).

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fabricated an email exchange, sent an email to frame Plaintiff, or improperly blamed Plaintiff for a

third party email. Outside of these assertions, Plaintiff’s complaint includes only general references

to workplace hostility, disparate treatment, etc., without identifying any precise conduct. Finally,

several of Plaintiff’s causes of action, in particular Plaintiff’s religious discrimination claim, are

entirely unsupported by Plaintiff’s assertions. Such threadbare recitals cannot withstand a motion

to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009);Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

Despite granting Verizon’s motion to dismiss, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend her

complaint. In Plaintiff’s opposition brief, Plaintiff provides ten pages of factual assertions that

should have been included in her original pleadings. Although Plaintiff did not move for a motion

to amend her complaint, the Court is empowered to give leave to amend “when justice so requires.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Court finds that—since it is possible that the allegations included in

Plaintiff’s opposition brief or known by Plaintiff but absent from her complaint would, if

incorporated, state a claim upon which relief may be granted—in the interests of justice, Plaintiff

should be given leave to amend.

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ORDER

This matter, having come before theCourt on Verizon’s motion to dismiss[Docket EntryNo.

8], and this Court having considered the parties’ submissions without oral argument; and for the

reasons stated above,

IT IS on this 26th of March, 2012,

ORDERED that Verizon’s motion for to dismiss is granted without prejudice; and

ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted thirty (30) days to amend her complaint so as to set forth

a viable cause of action.

s/Peter G. Sheridan 

PETER G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J. 

March 26, 2012

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