[Cite as State v. Norris, 2024-Ohio-2964.]

COURT OF APPEALS

MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO JUDGES:

Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.

 Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.

Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.

-vsCase No. CT2024-0001

CORY NORRIS

 Defendant-Appellant O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Appeal from the Muskingum County Court 

of Common Pleas, Case No. CR2023-

0303

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: August 2, 2024

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant

RON WELCH, ESQ. CHRIS BRIGDON

Prosecuting Attorney 8138 Somerset Road

Muskingum County, Ohio Thornville, Ohio 43076

JOSEPH A. PALMER

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney

27 North Fifth Street

Zanesville, Ohio 43701
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0001 2

Hoffman, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Cory A. Norris appeals the judgment entered by the 

Muskingum County Common Pleas Court convicting him following his pleas of guilty to 

domestic violence (R.C. 2919.25(A)) and attempted disrupting public services (R.C. 

2923.02, 2909.04(A)(1)), and sentencing him to an aggregate term of incarceration of 

thirty months. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶2} On March 5, 2023, the victim and her friend were at a bar in Muskingum 

County, Ohio. The victim and Appellant previously lived together, and shared two 

children. Appellant arrived at the bar, and was upset to find the victim there. He asked 

to see her outside the bar, where they discussed her moving out of the house. Appellant 

and the victim then went back inside the bar.

{¶3} When the victim and her friend left the bar later, Appellant came up from 

behind the victim and knocked her to the ground. The victim attempted to call 911, but 

Appellant tried to prevent her from doing so. After the victim and Appellant were 

physically separated, the victim called 911.

{¶4} Appellant was indicted by the Muskingum County Grand Jury with robbery, 

domestic violence as a felony of the fourth degree based on a prior conviction, bribery, 

attempted tampering with evidence, and attempted disrupting public services. The State 

dismissed the charges of robbery, bribery, and attempted tampering with evidence, and 

Appellant pled guilty to the charges of domestic violence and attempted disrupting public 

services. The trial court sentenced Appellant to eighteen months incarceration for 

domestic violence and twelve months incarceration for attempted disrupting public 

services, to be served consecutively for an aggregate term of incarceration of thirty 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0001 3

months. It is from the December 1, 2023 judgment of the trial court Appellant prosecutes 

his appeal, assigning as error:

I. SHOULD THIS COURT REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT’S 

DECISION TO IMPOSE A MAXIMUM SENTENCE FOR COUNT 2, 

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (F4) AND A MAXIMUM SENTENCE ON COUNT 

5 ATTEMPTED DISRUPTING PUBLIC SERVICES (F5), AND A TOTAL 

SENTENCE OF 30 MONTHS; BECAUSE, THE SENTENCE WAS IN 

CONTRAVENTION OF THE SENTENCING STATUTES R.C. §2929.11 

AND R.C. §2929.12?

II. SHOULD THIS COURT REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT’S 

DECISION TO IMPOSE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES BETWEEN 

COUNTS 2 AND 5; BECAUSE, THE DECISION WAS IN 

CONTRAVENTION OF R.C. §2929.14(C)(4)?

I.

{¶5} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court’s imposition 

of the maximum sentence on each count was in violation of the principles set forth in R.C. 

2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. He argues the victim suffered only minor injuries and the 

incident was limited in scope.

{¶6} We review felony sentences using the standard of review set forth in R.C. 

2953.08. State v. Roberts, 2020-Ohio-6722, ¶13 (5th Dist.), citing State v. Marcum, 2016-

Ohio-1002. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides we may either increase, reduce, modify, or 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0001 4

vacate a sentence and remand for sentencing where we clearly and convincingly find 

either the record does not support the sentencing court's findings under R.C. 2929.13(B) 

or (D), 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(l), or the sentence is otherwise contrary to 

law. Id., citing State v. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177.

{¶7} When sentencing a defendant, the trial court must consider the purposes 

and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and 

recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12. State v. Hodges, 2013-Ohio-5025, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.).

{¶8} “The overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public from 

future crime by the offender and others, to punish the offender, and to promote the 

effective rehabilitation of the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court 

determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state 

or local government resources.” R.C. 2929.11(A). To achieve these purposes, the 

sentencing court shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the 

offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution 

to the victim of the offense, the public, or both. Id. Further, the sentence imposed shall be 

“commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and 

its impact on the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes by 

similar offenders.” R.C. 2929.11(B).

{¶9} R.C. 2929.12 lists general factors which must be considered by the trial 

court in determining the sentence to be imposed for a felony, and gives detailed criteria 

which do not control the court's discretion, but which must be considered for or against 

severity or leniency in a particular case. The trial court retains discretion to determine the 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0001 5

most effective way to comply with the purpose and principles of sentencing as set forth in 

R.C. 2929.11. R.C. 2929.12.

{¶10} Nothing in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) permits this Court to independently weigh 

the evidence in the record and substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court to 

determine a sentence which best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 

2929.12. State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 42. Instead, we may only determine if the 

sentence is contrary to law.

{¶11} A sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial 

court “considers the principles and purposes of R.C. 2929.11, as well as the factors listed 

in R.C. 2929.12, properly imposes post release control, and sentences the defendant 

within the permissible statutory range.” State v. Pettorini, 2021-Ohio-1512, ¶¶ 14-16 (5th 

Dist.). 

{¶12} The trial court stated in its judgment entry it considered the principles and 

purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and the balance of seriousness and 

recidivism factors pursuant to R.C. 2929.12. The sentence is within the statutory range. 

Pursuant to Jones, supra, this Court is not permitted to independently weigh the evidence 

in the record and substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court to determine a 

sentence which best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. We find 

the sentences imposed on Appellant are not contrary to law.

{¶13} The first assignment of error is overruled.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0001 6

II.

{¶14} In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court failed to 

make the required statutory findings to impose consecutive sentences, and the imposition 

of consecutive sentences is contrary to the record.

{¶15} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides:

(4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions 

of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison 

terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is 

necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender 

and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness 

of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, 

and if the court also finds any of the following:

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses 

while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction 

imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised 

Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.

(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of 

one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of 

the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single 

prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses 

of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0001 7

(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that 

consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime 

by the offender.

{¶16} The trial court must make the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings at the sentencing 

hearing and incorporate its findings into its sentencing entry, but it has no obligation to 

state reasons to support its findings, nor must it recite certain talismanic words or phrases 

in order to be considered to have complied. State v. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, syllabus.

{¶17} The trial court made the following findings in its judgment entry:

Pursuant to ORC §2929.14(C)(4), the Court further found that the 

imposition of consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public 

from future crime or to punish the Defendant, and that consecutive 

sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of Defendant’s 

conduct, and to the danger the Defendant poses to the public.

The Defendant’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that 

consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime 

by the offender.

{¶18} Judgment Entry, December 1, 2023. 

{¶19} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated:
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0001 8

Court does find consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the 

public and punish this offender, and consecutive sentences are not 

disproportionate to the seriousness of the conduct and the danger posed to 

the public.

Additionally, history of criminal conduct demonstrates that 

consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future 

crime.

{¶20} Sent. Tr. 10.

{¶21} Appellant argues the trial court failed to find pursuant to R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4)(b) the harm caused by the offenses was so severe or unusual that a single 

prison term would not adequately reflect the seriousness of his conduct. However, the 

trial court is only required to find one of the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a) 

through (c). Because the trial court found pursuant to subsection (c) Appellant’s history 

of criminal conduct demonstrates consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the 

public from future crime, the trial court was not required to make any findings pursuant to 

subsection (b). We find the trial court made the required statutory findings.

{¶22} In deciding whether to impose consecutive sentencing, the trial court is to 

consider the aggregate term of incarceration which will result from consecutive 

sentencing. State v. Gwynne, 2022-Ohio-4607, ¶¶14-15. In Gwynne, the Ohio Supreme 

Court clarified the standard of review this Court is to use on review of consecutive 

sentences:
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0001 9

It is important to understand that the standards referenced above 

have very specific meanings and fall into one of two categories—either a 

standard of review or an evidentiary standard of proof. “Abuse of discretion,” 

“clearly erroneous,” and “substantial evidence” are traditional forms of 

appellate-court deference that are applied to a trial court's decisions. They 

are standards of review that are applied by a reviewing court to certain 

decisions that are made by a fact-finder. They are, in essence, screens 

through which reviewing courts must view the original fact-finder's decision. 

In contrast, “preponderance,” “clear and convincing,” and “beyond a 

reasonable doubt” are evidentiary standards of proof. These standards 

apply to a fact-finder's consideration of the evidence. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)’s 

requirement that appellate courts apply the clear-and-convincing standard 

on review indicates that the legislature did not intend for appellate courts to 

defer to a trial court's findings but to act as a second fact-finder in reviewing 

the trial court's order of consecutive sentences.

In this role as a finder of fact, the appellate court essentially functions 

in the same way as the trial court when imposing consecutive sentences in 

the first instance. There are three key differences, however. The first 

difference, which is discerned from the language of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), is 

that the appellate court is constrained to considering only the findings in 

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) that the trial court has actually made. In other words, a 

reviewing court cannot determine for itself which of the three permissible 

findings within R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c) might apply to satisfy the third 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0001 10

required finding for imposing consecutive sentences, as the trial court is 

permitted to do. The second difference involves the standard of proof. 

Whereas the trial court's standard of proof under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) is a 

preponderance of the evidence—i.e., that when considered as a whole, the 

evidence demonstrates that the proposition of fact represented by the 

finding is more likely true, or more probable, than not—an appellate court 

applies a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof. And the third 

difference is the inversion of the ultimate question before the court. 

Whereas the trial court is tasked with determining whether the proposition 

of fact represented by each finding is more likely—or more probably—true 

than not, an appellate court's task is to determine whether it has a firm belief 

or conviction that the proposition of fact represented by each finding is not 

true on consideration of the evidence in the record.

Thus, when viewed in its proper context, the deference that a trial 

court's consecutive-sentence findings receive comes from the language of 

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), which imposes a higher evidentiary standard to reverse 

or modify consecutive sentences. It does not stem from any statutory 

requirement that the appellate court defer to the trial court's findings when 

considering whether reversal or modification is appropriate under R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2).

{¶23} Id. at ¶¶20-22.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0001 11

{¶24} The trial court noted at the November 29, 2023, sentencing hearing 

Appellant last was released from prison in late 2020 or early 2021. The trial court set 

forth Appellant’s past criminal history from the bench as follows:

THE COURT: Well, I’ll note, there’s a 2018 tampering with evidence. 

You received 12 months. That was consecutive to 18 months for having a 

weapon while under disability, carrying concealed weapon, improper 

handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle. And the offense occurred while 

you were on PRC. However, you didn’t plead guilty until I think PRC was 

over. You weren’t sentenced to PRC time.

March of 2014, trafficking in drugs, a felony of the fourth degree. 

Twelve-month prison sentence.

2000, failure to comply with an order, a felony of the fourth degree. 

Placed on probation for three years. Failed to report on probation. PR – or 

community control was revoked. Fourteen-month prison was imposed on 

that case. Those were all Muskingum County.

Ross County, 2007, there was an F2 escape. 2006, in Ross County, 

possession of cocaine, a felony of the second degree, tampering with 

evidence, felony of the third degree. Five years in prison on that case.

July of ’03, trafficking in cocaine. Eleven-month prison sentence.

March of 2002, possession of cocaine. Eight-month prison 

sentence.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0001 12

Pickaway County, October of ’05, possession of cocaine, eight 

months.

Criminal trespass, 2018, 2016, and 1998. Domestic violence, prior 

convictions, 2018, 2016, 1998. Aggravated menacing, menacing, assault, 

fleeing and eluding, possession of marijuana, drug abuse, disorderly 

conduct, underage consumption, driving under suspension, and leaving the 

scene of an accident.

{¶25} Sent. Tr. 8-9.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2024-0001 13

{¶26} We find the record detailing Appellant’s extensive criminal history supports 

the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences in the instant case. The second 

assignment of error is overruled.

{¶27} The judgment of the Muskingum County Common Pleas Court is affirmed. 

By: Hoffman, J.

Gwin, P.J. and

Baldwin, J. concur