CLD-046 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

No. 18-3098 

___________ 

IN RE: MICHAEL RINALDI, 

 Petitioner 

____________________________________ 

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 

United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 

(Related to M.D. Pa. Crim. No. 3-18-cr-00279-002) 

District Judge: Joseph F. Saporito, Jr. 

____________________________________ 

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 

November 29, 2018 

Before: CHAGARES, RESTREPO and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed: December 20, 2018) 

_________ 

OPINION*

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PER CURIAM 

 Michael Rinaldi is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. On 

August 21, 2018, a grand jury sitting in the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of Pennsylvania charged Rinaldi with conspiracy to distribute and possess with 

intent to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. At the 

 

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent. 
2 

arraignment, Rinaldi—who was represented by counsel—refused to sign the plea form 

and the Court entered a plea of not guilty on his behalf. The District Court docket report 

reflects that the case is still in its pre-trial stages. 

On September 16, 2018, Rinaldi filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in this 

Court. In the petition, Rinaldi asserts that at his arraignment, he moved to dismiss the 

charge against him on the grounds that: (1) he is not the “Michael Rinaldi” named in the 

indictment; (2) the indictment fails to allege that the criminal activity had an effect on 

interstate commerce;1

 and (3) the agent who “brought the claim” lacks standing because 

he did not suffer any actual or threatened harm. According to Rinaldi, the Magistrate 

Judge refused to rule on the motion on the ground that it could not be brought at the 

arraignment. For these reasons, Rinaldi asks us to order the District Court to dismiss the 

indictment. 

 “Mandamus provides a drastic remedy that a court should grant only in 

extraordinary circumstances in response to an act amounting to a judicial usurpation of 

power.” In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). To demonstrate that mandamus is appropriate, a petitioner 

must demonstrate that “(1) no other adequate means exist to attain the relief he desires, 

(2) [his] right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable, and (3) the writ is 

appropriate under the circumstances.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) 

 

1

 Rinaldi also filed a written pro se motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that it 

failed to charge an effect on interstate commerce. The District Court struck the motion 

from the record because Rinaldi was represented by counsel. 
3 

(per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The first prerequisite 

“emanates from the final judgment rule: mandamus must not be used as a mere substitute 

for appeal.” Gillette v. Prosper, 858 F.3d 833, 841 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Diet 

Drugs, 418 F.3d at 379) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Rinaldi has not met his burden. First, we note that nothing in the record confirms 

Rinaldi’s representation that he moved the Magistrate Judge to dismiss his indictment at 

his arraignment. For this reason alone, he has not demonstrated that his right to issuance 

of the writ “is clear and indisputable.” However, even taking Rinaldi’s allegations as 

true, he can, through counsel, re-file his motion at an appropriate time in the District 

Court, and can appeal any adverse ruling on that motion. Therefore, he has not 

demonstrated that “no other adequate means exist to attain the relief he desires.”2

Accordingly, we will deny the petition. 

 

2

 In his mandamus petition, Rinaldi also contends that, at the arraignment, the Magistrate 

Judge refused to accept a plea agreement he claims to have entered into with the 

government. Rinaldi asks us to compel the Magistrate Judge to “accept [his] guilty plea 

and determine [his] ability to pay the associated fine.” (Pet. 2-3.) Because Rinaldi has 

not provided any evidence of this alleged agreement, and we see none in the record, we 

will not issue the writ on this basis.