[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-2730

 

D. C. Docket No. 87-116-CIV-J-PHM

GLORIA J. ANDREWS, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

DONALD ROBERT WOODMAN, Individually

and as Next Friend of Scott Forrest Woodman

and as personal representative for the

Estate of Yvonne E. Woodman,

YVONNE E. WOODMAN, Deceased, SCOTT FORREST

WOODMAN, CANDRA DAWN WOODMAN, STEVEN DWIGHT

WOODMAN, Seaman Apprentice,

Plaintiffs-AppelleesCross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-Cross-ClaimantCounter-Claimant-Appellant,

Cross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendants-Cross-ClaimantsCounter-DefendantsCross-Defendants,

RUFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendant-Cross-ClaimantCounter-Defendant,
2

DUVAL GARBAGE COMPANY,

Defendant.

_____________________

No. 96-2731 _____________________ D.C. Docket No. 90-824-CIV-J-PHM

ALVIN LINDSEY SPEICHER,

GAIL P. SPEICHER,

ALVIN LINDSEY SPEICHER, JR.,

Plaintiffs-AppelleesCross-Appellants,

SKYLER R. SPEICHER,

Plaintiff,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant-CrossClaimant-CounterClaimant-AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants-CrossDefendants-CounterDefendants.
3

__________________

No. 96-2732 __________________ D.C. Docket No. 90-825-CIV-J-12(PHM)

VIRGINIA HANSEN SMITH, as personal

representative for the Estate of

Michael Stramel, deceased,

Plaintiff-AppelleeCross-Appellant,

MICHAEL STRAMEL,

Plaintiff,

TINA M. MCBETH, CHRIS HANSEN,

JILL HANSEN LESLIE, EVA E. STRAMEL,

Plaintiffs-AppelleesCross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.
4

___________________

No. 96-2733 ___________________ D.C. Docket No. 90-828-CIV-J-PHM

ROBERT C. RICHARDS,

VICKI L. RICHARDS,

MICHAEL B. HARTSFIELD, JR.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, CounterClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants, CounterDefendants,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CounterDefendant.

___________________

No. 96-2734

___________________

D.C. Docket No. 90-830-CIV-J-PHM

ROBERT S. POWELL,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Cross-Appellant,
5

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-Cross

Claimants, CrossDefendants.

_________________ No. 96-2735 _________________ D.C. Docket No. 90-831-CIV-J-PHM

CARROLL PITTMAN,

CAROLYN J. PITTMAN,

MICHAEL K. PITTMAN,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.
6

_________________

No. 96-2736 _________________ D.C. Docket No. 90-829-CIV-J-PHM

DONALD MICHAEL RENTZ,

ANNETTE RENTZ,

HELEN GOODWYNE, Deceased,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.

_________________

No. 96-2737

_________________

D.C. Docket No. 90-832-CIV-J-PHM

TRACY L. PATILLO,

CONNIE S. PATILLO,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus
7

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.

_________________

No. 96-2738 _________________ D.C. Docket No. 90-834-CIV-J-PHM

KENNETH BELL, SR., DEBORAH BELL,

ROBERT BELL, KENNETH BELL, JR.,

JIMMY BELL, JERRY BELL,

PATRICIA J. BELL, MATTHEW BELL,

MICHELLE BELL, HENRY BELL,

DOLLY BELL, deceased, JAMES RICHARD BELL,

VICTORIA MAE BELL, JAMES R. BELL, JR.,

JAMIE MICHELLE BELL,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

 Cross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, Cross-
8

Defendants.

_______________

No. 96-2739 _______________ D.C. Docket No. 90-835-CIV-J-PHM

LAWRENCE E. KERSHAW,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Cross-Appellant,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.

__________________

No. 96-2740

__________________

D.C. Docket No. 90-836-CIV-J-PHM

IDA MAE KIRK,

MICHAEL A. KIRK, Deceased,

EDMONDS WALLIS KIRK,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, Cross-
9

Claimant, CounterClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants, CounterDefendants.

__________________

No. 96-2741 ___________________ D.C. Docket No. 90-837-CIV-J-PHM

DONALD E. LEONARD, JR.,

VIRGINIA M. LEONARD,

DONALD E. LEONARD, Deceased,

WANDA LEONARD HARRISON,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.
10

___________________

No. 96-2742 ___________________ D.C. Docket No. 90-838-CIV-J-PHM

JAMES E. JOHNSON,

DOROTHY T. JOHNSON,

TERRANCE C. JOHNSON,

JIMMY E. JOHNSON,

JIMMY E. JOHNSON, JR.,

EUGENE B. JOHNSON,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.

__________________

No. 96-2743

__________________

D.C. Docket No. 90-839-CIV-J-PHM

STANLEY C. LEVEROCK, SR.,

LINDA S. LEVEROCK,

VIOLET LEVEROCK,

STANLEY LEVEROCK, JR.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus
11

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.

__________________

No. 96-2744 ___________________ D.C. Docket No. 90-841-CIV-J-PHM

DONALD RAY THREADGILL,

BARBARA A. THREADGILL,

RONNIE WAYNE THREADGILL,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.
12

________________

No. 96-2745 ________________ D.C. Docket No. 90-842-CIV-J-PHM

CLIFTON A. TODD,

JEANETTE A. TODD,

TROY A. TODD,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, CounterClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants, CounterDefendants.

___________________

No. 96-2746

___________________

D.C. Docket No. 90-844-CIV-J-PHM

NEAL THOMSEN,

JEWELL THOMSEN,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus
13

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.

_________________

No. 96-2747 __________________ D.C. Docket No. 90-843-CIV-J-PHM

ALBERT IKE NOLAN,

JEANNE NOLAN,

CAROL LYNN NOLAN,

ADRIENNE PATIENCE NOLAN,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.
14

___________________

No. 96-2748 ___________________ D.C. Docket No. 90-857-CIV-J-PHM

ROBERT D. STALEY,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Cross-Appellant,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.

___________________

No. 96-2749

___________________

D.C. Docket No. 90-846-CIV-J-PHM

CLAUDE DANIEL OGLESBY,

MARGARET OGLESBY,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant,Appellant-

 Cross-Appellee,
15

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.

_________________

No. 96-2750 _________________ D.C. Docket No. 90-848-CIV-J-PHM

BOY ELIJAH O’STEEN, JR.,

JOAN MARIE O’STEEN,

BOY ELIJAH O’STEEN, III,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.
16

__________________

No. 96-2751 __________________ D.C. Docket No. 90-851-CIV-PHM

JOSEPH D. STRANGE,

SHIRLEY A. STRANGE,

JOSEPH D. STRANGE, JR.,

LAURA A. STRANGE,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-Cross

Defendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.

__________________

No. 96-2752

__________________

D.C. Docket No. 90-852-CIV-J-PHM

JANIE L. HANSLEY,

JANIE P. HANSLEY,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus
17

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, CounterClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants, CounterDefendants.

___________________

No. 96-2753 __________________ D.C. Docket No. 90-854-CIV-J-PHM

NEIL HANSEN,

GRETCHEN HANSEN,

TRAVIS EARL THORNTON, JR.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.
18

_________________

No. 96-2754 _________________ D.C. Docket No. 90-858-CIV-J-PHM

HENRY VORPE, JR.,

JUDY VORPE,

CHRISTI D. VORPE,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.

__________________

No. 96-2755

__________________

D.C. Docket No. 90-859-CIV-J-PHM

VIVIAN E. GORE,

WILEY H. GORE,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, Cross-
19

Claimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.

___________________

No. 96-2756 ___________________ D.C. Docket No. 90-861-CIV-J-PHM

DORIS F. WALKER,

GARY W. WALKER,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.
20

_____________________

No. 96-2757 _____________________ D.C. Docket No. 90-862-CIV-J-PHM

EDDIE WILLIAMS,

LILA M. WILLIAMS,

PENNY WILLIAMS NEWMANS,

CHRISTINE MICHELLE WILLIAMS,

REBECCA LYNN WILLIAMS,

EDDIE MICHAEL WILLIAMS,

EDDIE MICHAEL WILLIAMS, JR.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.

_______________

No. 96-2758

________________

D.C. Docket No. 90-864-CIV-J-PHM

ALICE M. ANDERSON,

STEPHEN E. ANDERSON,

TERRENCE L. ANDERSON,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus
21

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.

___________________

No. 96-2759 ___________________ D.C. Docket No. 90-865-CIV-J-PHM

LEWIS D. BOWEN,

SARAH CHRISTINE FLINK BOWEN,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.

_________________

No. 96-2760

__________________
22

D.C. Docket No. 90-866-CIV-J-PHM

JOHN P. BUETTGEN,

JANICE BEUTTGEN,

DAWN BUETTGEN,

JODY BUETTGEN,

KENNETH BUETTGEN,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.

___________________

No. 96-2761

___________________

D.C. Docket No. 90-867-CIV-J-PHM

STEPHEN BRANNEN,

MISTY VELL BRANNEN,

STEPHANIE JO BRANNEN,

SHERRIE FAYE BRANNEN,

MELISSA BRANNEN MCDANIEL,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-Cross-
23

Claimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossDefendants.

________________

No. 96-2762 _________________ D.C. Docket No. 90-869-CIV-J-PHM

JOHN M. FLORES,

FLORENCE FLORES,

PATRICIA JO BELL, as personal

representative for the Estate of

Florence Flores, deceased,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.

__________________

No. 96-2763

__________________

D.C. Docket No. 90-872-CIV-J-PHM
24

ALBERT G. BELZ,

BETTY BELZ,

JOHN CLARENCE BELZ,

FREDERICK G. BELZ, I,

FREDERICK G. BELZ, II, 

SUZANNE E. BELZ,

ROBERT J. BELZ,

WILLIAM B. BELZ,

FREDERICK G. BELZ, III,

MARY M. BELZ,

JOSHUA BELZ,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, AppellantCross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants, CrossDefendants.

___________________

No. 96-2764

___________________

D.C. Docket No. 90-874-CIV-J-PHM

WAYNE K. HAZEN, 

PATRICIA CHRISTOPHER,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus

USA,

Defendant-CrossDefendant, CrossClaimant, Appellant-
25

Cross-Appellee,

WASTE CONTROL OF FLORIDA, INC.,

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.,

REFUSE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-CrossClaimants-CrossDefendants.

____________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Middle Disitrict of Florida ____________________________

(September 19, 1997)

Before DUBINA, Circuit Judge, HILL and GIBSON*, Senior Circuit

Judges.

DUBINA, Circuit Judge:

________________________

*Honorable John R. Gibson, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the

Eighth Circuit sitting by designation.

The United States appeals the district court’s award of

attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs/appellees/cross-appellants

(“plaintiffs”) pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act

(“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, on plaintiffs' claims under the

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 960(a). The government

contends the fee award was disproportionately high. Plaintiffs

cross-appeal, claiming the award was too low. We agree with the

government and remand for a redetermination of attorney's fees.
26

I. BACKGROUND

The opinion we issue today is one in a series of related

appeals which detail the facts of this case. See Woodman v. United

States, ___ F.3d ___, ___-___ (11th Cir. 1997). We summarize those

facts here, and we set forth additional procedural history relevant

to the issues in these appeals.

The United States Navy contracted with a private company,

Waste Control of Florida, Inc. (“Waste Control”), to remove

hazardous chemical waste from two Jacksonville-area naval bases in

the 1960s. For nearly two years, Waste Control dumped Navy waste

at a swampy landfill in southwest Jacksonville. Nearby residents

drew their water from wells. Toxic chemicals from the Navy waste

leached into the groundwater and polluted the wells. The residents

sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”),

28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, and CERCLA. They sued Waste Control and

two of its affiliates under CERCLA and Florida law. 

Plaintiffs sought damages under CERCLA for (1) future medical

monitoring costs, (2) statutory attorneys' fees, and (3) the

expenses of obtaining alternate water supplies. Early in the

litigation, the district court ruled that the only damages

plaintiffs could recover under CERCLA were “their expenditures for

connecting to the water line provided by the City of Jacksonville

and their expenditures for bottled water.” Woodman v. United

States, 764 F. Supp. 1467, 1470 (M.D. Fla. 1991). In a subsequent,

unpublished order, the district court ruled that plaintiffs could

not recover attorneys' fees directly under CERCLA in light of the
27

Supreme Court's decision in Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 114

S. Ct. 1960 (1994). In Key Tronic, the Court held that CERLCA

“does not provide for the award of private litigants' attorney's

fees associated with bringing a cost recovery action.” Id. at

1967. Plaintiffs do not appeal either of these district court

rulings.

Prior to trial, the government and the private contractors

took the unusual step of filing motions for summary judgment on

behalf of plaintiffs on the CERCLA claims. The district court

granted the motions and entered findings of fact no longer in

dispute, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d). The government objected

to these findings on the ground that they established elements of

the unresolved FTCA claims. The district court then vacated its

order entering summary judgment, and litigation proceeded on all

claims. 

Plaintiffs settled with the private contractors on the eve of

trial for $8.5 million. According to plaintiffs, the parties

allocated $2.5 million of that settlement for attorneys' fees.

They designated one-third of that sum, or $833,333.33, for

attorneys' fees on the CERCLA claims. A five-phase trial proceeded

on plaintiffs' claims against the United States. After the first

phase of trial, the district court found the government liable

under both the FTCA and CERCLA. Rather than litigate the CERCLA

damages, the parties stipulated to a schedule of response costs

that the United States would pay to 39 of the 171 plaintiffs. The

stipulated costs totaled $49,549.00 for obtaining alternate water
 1

Plaintiffs computed the total figure by multiplying 15,000

hours times hourly rates not exceeding the EAJA's statutory cap.

Those hourly rates are not at issue in this appeal.

28

supplies. The district court entered judgment against the United

States on the CERCLA claims and reduced the stipulated costs by the

amount of the CERCLA settlement with the private contractors.

After the set-off, only one plaintiff obtained a CERCLA award

against the government, in the amount of $700.

Plaintiffs applied to the district court pursuant to the EAJA

for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in litigating their CERCLA

claims. According to plaintiffs' fee application, their attorneys

and paralegals spent approximately 30,000 hours litigating this

case. Plaintiffs sought compensation for half of that time, plus

half of their total costs, for a total of $1,462,298.84.1

Plaintiffs argued that the CERCLA and FTCA claims overlapped so

extensively that the best way to determine which hours were

attributable to the CERCLA claims was simply to divide the total

hours in half. 

The district court made a preliminary finding that the EAJA

applied because the government's position on the CERCLA claims was

not “substantially justified.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). The court

found that the total number of hours expended and amount of

expenses incurred were reasonable. However, the court ruled that

plaintiffs were entitled under the EAJA only to one-third, not onehalf, of those hours and expenses. The court reasoned that

plaintiffs had allocated one-third of the fees and costs portion of

their settlement with the private contractors to CERCLA fees and
29

costs, and the same division should apply to their CERCLA claims

against the United States. Then, the district court reduced the

one-third by a further 78% because only 22% of the individual

plaintiffs had prevailed on their CERCLA claims. Ultimately, the

judge awarded plaintiffs $180,880 in CERCLA fees and expenses,

approximately 12% of the amount they requested. 

The government appeals, claiming that the number of hours for

which plaintiffs' attorneys sought reimbursement was so

unreasonable that the district court should have denied the fee

application outright. Alternatively, the government argues that

the award is too high. The government does not appeal the district

court's finding that its position on the CERCLA claims was not

substantially justified. Plaintiffs cross-appeal. They do not

contest the district court's decision to allocate one-third of

their hours to the CERCLA claims, but they argue that the district

court erred by reducing their award by 78%.

II. DISCUSSION

We review the district court's award of attorneys' fees and

costs under the EAJA for abuse of discretion. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552 (1988).

The EAJA permits parties who prevail against the United States

in a civil action to recover attorneys' fees and costs unless the

government's position was “substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d); see also Commissioner, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 156, 158

(1990). The EAJA specifically excludes recovery for fees and costs

expended on tort claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); Joe v.
 2

We note also that plaintiffs may not recover fees and costs

expended on their FTCA claims in light of our decision in the

related appeals that plaintiffs cannot prevail on their FTCA

claims. See Woodman v. United States, ___ F.3d ___ (11th Cir.

1997).

30

United States, 772 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1985). Thus, the EAJA

allows plaintiffs to recover fees and costs incurred in litigating

their CERCLA claims, but not their FTCA claims.2

The government's first argument is that the district court

should have rejected plaintiffs' fee application outright because

it was so outrageous. According to the government, “[t]he CERCLA

claims were not sufficiently complex, nor sufficiently contested,

to require anything close to 15,000 of attorney and paralegal

time.” Br. for Appellant at 16. The government argues that

outright denial of plaintiffs' fee application would induce

claimants to submit reasonable, carefully calculated fee demands.

Although the Eleventh Circuit has not decided the issue, the

government cites cases from several other circuits holding that

district courts do not abuse their discretion by denying in their

entirety fee applications that are grossly inflated. See, e.g.,

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Reilly, 1 F.3d 1254, 1258 (D.C.

Cir. 1993); Fair Housing Council v. Landow, 999 F.2d 92, 96-97 (4th

Cir. 1993); Brown v. Stackler, 612 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1980);

see also Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 782 n. 8 (11th Cir.

1994) (recognizing that other circuits permit outright denial but

not deciding the question).

Even if we adopted such a rule, it would not provide a basis

for vacating the district court's fee award in this case. The
31

district court expressly found that the government's unjustified

refusal to admit any of the CERCLA allegations “bordered on bad

faith” and necessitated “extensive pretrial investigation,

discovery and preparation.” R-7-904, Dist. Ct. Mem. Op. at 6-7.

The district court also found that the total hours expended by

plaintiffs' counsel were reasonable and that the government only

challenged 3,000, or 10%, of them. The government fails to show

that these findings were clearly erroneous. Therefore, there is no

evidence that plaintiffs egregiously exaggerated their fee

application. The district court did not abuse its discretion by

rejecting the government's bid for an outright denial of attorneys'

fees.

Next, the government argues that the district court abused its

discretion by failing to consider the limited success plaintiffs

achieved on their CERCLA claims. The starting point for

determining a reasonable fee award is multiplying the number of

attorney hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); Norman v. Housing

Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1302 (11th Cir. 1988).

The district court may then adjust the resulting “lodestar”

depending upon a variety of factors, the most important of which is

the degree of the plaintiff's success in the lawsuit. Hensley, 461

U.S. at 433. “[W]here the plaintiff has achieved only limited

success, the district court should award only that amount of fees

that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained.” Id. at
 3

In light of this decision, we do not reach the other

arguments advanced by the government, nor do we consider

plaintiffs' cross-appeal. 

 4

This figure dropped to $700 after the set-off for plaintiffs'

settlement with the private contractors. Although we have not

considered this issue, the Third Circuit has held that set-offs

should not be considered in determining a prevailing party's degree

of success for fee application purposes. See Gulfstream III

Assocs., Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 414, 423 (3rd

Cir. 1993) (“[T]he reduction of a plaintiff's net recovery due to

the offset of a jury verdict by prior settlements does not indicate

that plaintiff failed to prove any of its claims at trial. It may

merely reflect plaintiff's skill as a negotiator with the other

defendants . . .”). We need not resolve this issue here because

plaintiffs' CERCLA success was slight whether measured before or

after the set-off.

32

440. We agree that the district court abused its discretion by not

giving greater weight to plaintiffs' limited success.3

Plaintiffs' success on their CERCLA claims was minimal by any

measure. First, the CERCLA damages the court awarded plaintiffs

were infinitesimal compared with those they requested. Plaintiffs

sought more than $3.5 million for three types of CERCLA damages:

(1) future medical monitoring expenses, which the court valued at

$2.1 million; (2) statutory attorneys' fees, which plaintiffs

valued at $1.4 million, and (3) alternative water supply expenses.

Plaintiffs were awarded only the last category of damages--and only

$49,549.4

 This figure represents less than 1% of the amount

plaintiffs sought. Second, plaintiffs' CERCLA damages were slight

in comparison with plaintiffs' overall award. The CERCLA award

accounted for only 3% of the total award. Third, the CERCLA

victory was not successful in the sense that it vindicated an

important non-monetary principle, as may be the case with civil

rights litigation. See, e.g., Popham v. City of Kennesaw, 820 F.2d
33

1570, 1580 (11th Cir. 1987) (“The affirmation of constitutional

principles produces an undoubted public benefit that courts must

consider in awarding attorneys' fees . . .”).

Plaintiffs argue that they achieved substantial success on

their CERCLA claims. They point out that they succeeded on their

medical monitoring claims, albeit under the FTCA rather than

CERCLA. There are two problems with this argument. First, we

reversed plaintiffs' victory on medical monitoring damages under

the FTCA. See Woodman, ___ F.3d ___ (11th Cir. 1997). Second,

even if plaintiffs had succeeded on their medical monitoring claims

under the rubric of the FTCA, that success could not count for the

purpose of calculating an EAJA fee award because the EAJA does not

permit recovery of fees and costs expended on tort claims. 

The district court did consider plaintiffs' limited success in

one respect: the court reduced the amount of the fee award by 78%

because only 22% of the plaintiffs won a CERCLA award. However,

the district court did not consider that plaintiffs prevailed on

only one of their three CERCLA claims and their monetary award on

that claim was quite small. Instead, the district court awarded

plaintiffs fees and costs totaling nearly four times the amount of

their CERCLA award. Although the Supreme Court has “reject[ed] the

proposition that fee awards . . . should necessarily be

proportionate to the amount of damages a civil rights plaintiff

actually recovers,” Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986);

see also Cullens v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 29 F.3d 1489, 1493

(11th Cir. 1994) (discussing Riverside), this was not a civil
34

rights action. As noted, the best--and perhaps only--measure of

plaintiffs' success on their CERCLA claims was their monetary

damages award. 

The district court's failure to consider plaintiffs' minimal

CERCLA success was an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we vacate

the district court's award of fees and costs under the EAJA and

remand for recalculation. 

VACATED and REMANDED.