Opinion filed July 23, 2015

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

__________

No. 11-13-00216-CR

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CARRIE MAE ABIOLA, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 372nd District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1312082D

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The jury convicted Carrie Mae Abiola of theft of property of the value of less 

than $1,500 with two prior theft convictions. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a), 

(e)(4)(D) (West Supp. 2014). The jury assessed Appellant’s punishment at 

confinement in the State Jail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice

for a term of two years, and the trial court sentenced her accordingly. Appellant 

argues that the trial court erred when it denied her motion for a directed verdict of 
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acquittal because the indictment did not contain the name of the correct “owner” of 

the property. We affirm.

The standard of review applicable to a motion for a directed verdict is the 

same standard used for a sufficiency review. Pollock v. State, 405 S.W.3d 396, 401 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.). We review the sufficiency of the evidence

under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 

Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Jones v. State, 343 

S.W.3d 550, 552 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.). Under the Jackson 

standard, we examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and 

determine whether, based on that evidence and any reasonable inferences from it, 

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 

633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 

The grand jury indicted Appellant for unlawfully acquiring or otherwise

exercising control over property of the value of less than $1,500 with the intent to 

deprive the owner, Meghan Strickland, of the property. The property included four 

packages of meat and five cases of beer. A person commits theft if that person 

“unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of property.”

PENAL § 31.03(a). Such deprivation is unlawful if “it is without the owner’s 

effective consent.” Id. § 31.03(b)(1). An “owner” is defined as one who “has title 

to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right 

to possession of the property than the actor.” Id. § 1.07(a)(35)(A). “Possession” is 

defined as “actual care, custody, control, or management.” Id. § 1.07(a)(39).

The evidence at trial showed that on January 20, 2013, around 4:00 p.m.,

Appellant and a male acquaintance entered a Tom Thumb store in Arlington. Two 

undercover loss-prevention officers, George Trevino and Randy Williams, watched 

them enter the store. Trevino and Williams were employed through a third-party 
3

contractor to prevent theft at Tom Thumb locations. The officers continued to watch

Appellant and her acquaintance as they put five cases of beer and four packages of 

various meats into their shopping cart. When the two stopped in the middle of an 

aisle to talk, Trevino went outside so that he would be ready to apprehend them if 

they tried to steal the meat and beer. Williams continued to watch Appellant and her 

friend. Appellant pushed her grocery cart toward the exit door and briefly left it next

to the exit. Appellant quickly surveyed the area to see whether she was being 

watched. Apparently comfortable that no one was watching her, she pushed the 

shopping cart out of the store without making any attempt to pay for the items.

Once Appellant was outside the store, Trevino confronted her. Trevino

identified himself as a loss-prevention officer and asked her to come back inside the 

store. After Trevino handcuffed Appellant, Trevino and Williams escorted her to a 

break room inside the store. Appellant identified herself and admitted that she had 

committed the theft in order to pay a late car payment.

Officer Vincent Orso of the Arlington Police Department arrived at the Tom 

Thumb store shortly thereafter. After he talked with Trevino and Williams,

Officer Orso placed Appellant under arrest and took her into custody.

In the indictment, the State charged Appellant with unlawfully acquiring 

property of the value of less than $1,500 from Meghan Strickland, the “owner.”

Strickland was the organized retail crime investigator for Tom Thumb in the

Dallas/Fort Worth area. At trial, Strickland testified that her undercover agents had 

filed reports with her regarding the theft. Strickland also testified that, in her 

capacity, she was actually the owner of the items that Appellant stole and that she 

had a greater right to possession of those items than Appellant. On crossexamination, Strickland admitted that she was not present when the theft occurred

and that the items that Appellant stole were in the care, custody, and control of the 

store. Appellant’s counsel moved for a directed verdict of acquittal based on the 
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lack of evidence that Strickland was the “owner” of the items Appellant stole. The 

trial court denied the motion for directed verdict.

It is well settled under Texas law that ownership may be alleged in either the

actual owner or a special owner, which is someone who has actual custody or control 

of property belonging to another person. Byrd v. State, 336 S.W.3d 242, 251–52

(Tex. Crim. App. 2011). It is “perfectly permissible” to name a corporation “as the 

owner of the property and then call any agent or employee who holds a relevant 

position in the company to testify that the corporation did not give effective consent 

for a person to steal or shoplift its property.” Id. at 252. Appellant accurately relies 

on Byrd and Dingler v. State for the proposition that, in order to avoid acquittal, the 

State must name as the “owner” one that has an ownership interest in the property 

stolen. Byrd, 336 S.W.3d at 251, 258; Dingler v. State, 705 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1984). However, that same reliance also elucidates the critical 

differences between those cases and the present case. 

For instance, in Byrd, the alleged owner of the items, which were stolen from 

a Wal-Mart, was not an employee of the store, did not testify at trial, was not 

referenced by either party at trial, and seems to have had no connection whatsoever 

to any Wal-Mart store. 336 S.W.3d at 254. As the court noted, the indictment may 

as well have alleged that “Carnac the Magnificent” owned the property in question. 

Id. The Dingler case presents a closer question but is still clearly distinguishable 

from the present case. In Dingler, a vehicle owned by a retail furniture corporation 

was burglarized, and the State alleged that the owner was a local store manager with 

no tenable connection to the vehicle. 705 S.W.2d at 146 (noting that there was “no 

evidence in the record of appeal that would establish the employment relationship

of White [the alleged owner] to the warehouse location, which is where the burglary 

occurred”). A brief selection from Dingler further differentiates it from the present 

case: 
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Other than testifying that he was an employee and a store manager for 

Louis Shanks, White did not testify what other employment functions 

he performed for the company; in particular, he was not questioned nor 

did he testify as to just what his relationship was to the burglarized 

vehicle, nor what his job with Louis Shanks entailed, nor did he 

expressly state that he had the care, custody, control, or management of 

the burglarized vehicle at the time in question. He also did not testify 

that he was the “special owner” of the burglarized vehicle.

Id. at 145. Appellant is correct to rely on Dingler for the assertion that “it is not 

enough to allege ownership in some high-ranking management person.” Id. at 146. 

However, the facts of the present case are distinguishable. 

Here, Strickland’s role and actions remedied all the deficiencies in Byrd and 

Dingler. Strickland’s testimony made clear that she was responsible for all “external 

theft,” that Trevino and Williams were her agents, that it was her responsibility to 

supervise investigations and report theft offenses to the police, and that she handled 

this case. Other courts have held that a loss-prevention officer like Trevino or 

Williams qualified as an “owner” in similar theft cases, and it would be strange and 

unnecessarily burdensome if the manager of these officers could not also qualify as 

an “owner.” See, e.g., Murillo v. State, No. 05-10-00869-CR, 2011 WL 856911, at 

*3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 14, 2011, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) 

(holding evidence was sufficient to show that loss-prevention manager was the 

“owner” of the property). As a store employee entrusted to help prevent this kind of 

theft, Strickland had a greater right to possession of the stolen items than Appellant 

and, thus, qualified as an “owner.” We hold that there was sufficient evidence for a 

rational trier of fact to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Strickland was the 

“owner” of the items Appellant stole from the store. Appellant’s sole issue on appeal

is overruled. 
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We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

JIM R. WRIGHT

CHIEF JUSTICE

July 23, 2015

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.