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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 36147

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SHERRI HELEN CASH,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 498

Filed: June 4, 2010

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin 

Falls County. Hon. G. Richard Bevan, District Judge. 

Order denying motion to suppress, affirmed.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Stephen D. Thompson, Special 

Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Ketchum, for appellant. Stephen D. 

Thompson argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Rebekah A. Cudé, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Rebekah A. Cudé argued.

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WALTERS, Judge Pro Tem

This case involves the search of a motor vehicle by an Idaho state trooper after a traffic 

stop. Sherri Helen Cash, a passenger in the vehicle, appeals the district court’s denial of her 

motion to suppress evidence of her possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine,

discovered during the search. We affirm the order denying Cash’s suppression motion.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

A pickup truck driven by Anthony Gardner was stopped by an Idaho state trooper for

multiple equipment violations. Cash was a passenger in the pickup. On approaching and 

speaking to Gardner, the trooper noticed the smell of alcohol coming from the vehicle. The 

officer told Gardner and Cash that he could smell an odor of alcohol and asked them if there was 

any alcohol in the vehicle. The driver told the officer that there was not any alcohol in the 
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vehicle. The passenger, Cash, said that she had spilled a beer in the vehicle on a prior date. The

trooper asked Cash if she had anything to drink on that day and she replied that she had not. As 

to the odor, the driver said that he did not know anything about it. While the trooper was talking 

to them, the trooper observed an open can of beer on the floorboard at Cash’s feet. Cash 

admitted that the beer was hers and, at the trooper’s request, handed it to another officer who had 

arrived at the scene. The trooper then asked the driver, Gardner, if he knew about the open can 

of beer, and Gardner said that he did. The trooper asked Gardner if he had anything to drink. 

Gardner at first told the trooper “No,” but then changed his mind and said that he had some 

earlier in the day. The trooper had both Gardner and Cash step out of the vehicle.

The trooper had Gardner perform field sobriety tests and he passed the tests. Next, the 

trooper asked Gardner if there was any other alcohol in the vehicle. Gardner stated that there 

was not. The trooper then entered the vehicle to search for other open containers. He found only 

a sealed can of beer, but while in the vehicle observed a methamphetamine pipe in plain view in 

the top of Cash’s open purse which was still in the vehicle. After informing Cash of her 

Miranda1rights, he interviewed her about the pipe and then searched her purse, finding a tin of 

marijuana, a marijuana cigarette, a contact lens case containing methamphetamine and a syringe 

containing methamphetamine. The trooper arrested Cash and she was charged with possession 

of methamphetamine, Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1).

Cash moved to suppress the evidence found during the search, contending that the stop 

was illegally extended. After a hearing the district court denied the motion. Cash conditionally 

pled guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion. Cash filed a 

timely notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction.

II.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A motion to suppress evidence for violation of constitutional rights presents questions of

fact and law. The facts that are material to the issues raised in this appeal are not in dispute. 

Therefore, we exercise free review in determining whether constitutional standards have been 

met in light of the facts presented. State v. Holler, 136 Idaho 287, 291, 32 P.3d 679, 683 (Ct.

 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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App. 2001); State v. Evans, 134 Idaho 560, 563, 6 P.3d 416, 419 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. 

Jordan, 122 Idaho 771, 772, 839 P.2d 38, 39 (Ct. App. 1992).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits government agents 

from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures and applies to the seizures of persons 

through arrests or detentions falling short of arrest. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 

873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). When a private vehicle is stopped by the 

police, all of its occupants are “seized” and may seek suppression of evidence if the seizure did 

not comply with Fourth Amendment standards. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007); 

State v. Haworth, 106 Idaho 405, 406, 679 P.2d 1123, 1124 (1984); State v. Luna, 126 Idaho 

235, 236-37, 880 P.2d 265, 266-67 (Ct. App. 1994). However, a mere passenger in a vehicle has 

no standing to object to an illegal search of the vehicle. Id.

When the purpose of a detention is to investigate a possible traffic infraction or a crime, it 

must be based at least upon reasonable, articulable suspicion. Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 263 n.7. 

Although an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to 

effectuate the purpose of the stop, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983), a detention 

initiated for one investigative purpose may disclose suspicious circumstances that justify 

expanding the investigation to other possible crimes or infractions. State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 

913, 916, 42 P.3d 706, 709 (Ct. App. 2001). An individual may not be detained even 

momentarily beyond that necessary without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so. State v. 

Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 652, 51 P.3d 461, 466 (Ct. App. 2002). “Whether an officer had the 

requisite reasonable suspicion to detain a citizen is determined on the basis of the totality of the 

circumstances,” State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 964, 88 P.3d 780, 783 (Ct. App. 2004) 

(quoting Wilson v. Idaho Transp. Dep’t, 136 Idaho 270, 276, 32 P.3d 164, 170 (Ct. App. 2001)), 

which includes the experiences and training of the officer.

III.

ANALYSIS

Here, the trooper stopped the vehicle on probable cause of multiple traffic violations and 

Cash does not challenge the lawfulness of the initial stop or the officer’s investigation of those 

offenses. After the stop was effectuated, the trooper smelled beer, inquired as to its source, and 

Cash eventually admitted to possessing an open can of beer. Cash does not challenge the 

lawfulness of the trooper’s investigation of the source of the odor of beer. Cash also does not 
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challenge the lawfulness of the trooper’s investigation into whether Gardner was driving under 

the influence by having him perform field sobriety tests. Instead, Cash contends that the 

extension of the stop after Gardner passed the field sobriety tests, to include the trooper’s entry 

into the vehicle to search for more open containers, was “unreasonable.”

In State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 125 P.3d 536 (Ct. App. 2005), a state trooper 

observed a vehicle weave over the centerline three times. The trooper stopped the car and upon 

approaching the vehicle noticed that driver Wigginton’s eyes were bloodshot and that there was 

an “overwhelming” smell of alcohol coming from the vehicle. The passenger explained that 

someone had previously spilled a beer and that the odor was enhanced when the heater was 

running. Both Wigginton and the passenger denied drinking alcohol that night. The trooper had 

Wigginton perform field sobriety tests, which he passed. The trooper then searched the car for 

an open container of alcohol, and found ingredients and equipment commonly used in 

manufacturing methamphetamine. This Court held that under the circumstances there existed 

probable cause to search the vehicle for an open container being transported in violation of I.C. 

§ 23-505. Id. at 182-83, 125 P.3d at 538-39. The Court determined that an odor of alcohol that 

may be coming from the occupants rather than from something else within the vehicle alone is 

insufficient to justify a search of the vehicle, but the existence of additional information pointing 

to the likelihood of an open alcoholic beverage container in the vehicle gives rise to probable 

cause for a search. Wigginton, 142 Idaho at 183, 125 P.3d at 539.

Here, Cash argues that the trooper’s continued investigation into whether more than one

open container was in the vehicle constituted an unreasonable and unlawful extension of the 

detention in that “no objective, reasonable grounds testified to by the officer or in existence 

before the District Court justified the additional detention.” The record disproves this assertion. 

At the hearing, the trooper testified that although Gardner and Cash denied the existence of 

another open container in the vehicle, by that time he had already caught the two in multiple 

inconsistencies and lies concerning the existence of containers of alcoholic beverages in the 

vehicle which might explain the odor of alcohol emanating from the vehicle. The trooper further 

said that he continued his open container investigation and searched the vehicle because “in my 

experience, when there’s one [open container in a vehicle], more times than not there’s other 

multiple open containers.”
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It is clear that the existence of each open alcoholic beverage container present in a motor 

vehicle would constitute a separate violation of I.C. § 23-505. The fact that an officer has found 

one such container, which might possibly explain the odor detected in the vehicle, does not 

preclude the officer from confirming whether that container was the only one by searching for 

more containers. This is true particularly where more than one person is present in the vehicle 

who might each be charged with violating the provisions of I.C. § 23-505 relating separately to 

drivers and to passengers.

The facts known to the trooper pointed to the likelihood of additional containers of 

alcoholic beverages in the vehicle, possibly one or more belonging not just to the passenger Cash 

but also to the driver, Gardner. Cumulatively, these facts gave probable cause for the search to 

determine whether such containers existed and whether they were open or sealed. The district

court correctly held that the stop was not unreasonably extended by the trooper’s continued open 

container investigation. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

The district court’s denial of the motion to suppress and the judgment of conviction are 

affirmed.

Judge GRATTON and Judge MELANSON CONCUR.