DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

FRANK J. QUARLES, III,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D18-1502

[February 19, 2020]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm 

Beach County; Samantha Schosberg Feuer, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

2012CF001830AXX.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender and Ian Seldin, Assistant Public 

Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee and Melanie Dale Surber, 

Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

DAMOORGIAN, J.

Frank J. Quarles, III (“Defendant”) appeals his conviction and sentence 

for second-degree murder with a firearm, possession of a firearm by a 

minor, and carrying a concealed firearm. Concluding that Defendant’s 

confession while in custody was not voluntary, we reverse and remand for 

a new trial. 

The then fifteen-year-old Defendant was arrested and charged with the 

first-degree murder of Michael Robertson (“the victim”) after three 

witnesses identified Defendant as the shooter. The evidence presented at 

trial established that on the day of the murder, three witnesses and the 

victim were gathered outside of the home of one of the witnesses. 

Defendant arrived at the home and confronted the victim about stealing 

his bicycle. The two began to argue, during which Defendant stated he 

had a “38” and was going to get it. Defendant took the bicycle and left. 

About 10-15 minutes later, Defendant returned with a friend and 

approached the victim and the witnesses. Defendant and the victim again 
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began to argue. At some point during the argument, Defendant pulled a 

black .38 caliber revolver from his waistband and pointed it at the victim. 

Defendant told the victim he was “not scared to pull the trigger over a 

bike,” to which the victim responded that he was not afraid of the gun. 

Defendant shot the victim in the chest and then fled on the bicycle. The 

police arrived at the scene and found the victim with a gunshot wound to 

his chest. The victim later died from the gunshot wound. 

Defendant was arrested and taken to the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s

Office, where a detective advised him of his juvenile Miranda rights. The 

detective also informed Defendant that a lawyer had been hired to 

represent him, and the lawyer did not want Defendant to speak to the 

detective. Defendant refused to make a statement, whereupon he was 

taken to a holding cell. Approximately 50 minutes later, Defendant began 

banging on the door of the holding cell saying he wanted to talk to the 

detective. The detective escorted Defendant back to the interrogation room 

and the following discussion took place:

Q: I guess it was about an hour ago that we talked, okay? 

I read your Miranda warnings to you. It was pretty 

thorough, you’re a pretty smart guy. Do you still 

understand them?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Do you still understand everything that we talked an 

hour ago about? You understand everything?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Okay. You’re reinitiating wanting to talk to me. Did I 

force you to want to talk to me?

A: No.

Q: Okay. What do you want to talk to me about?

A: What happened.

Defendant stated he accidentally shot the victim.

Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress his post-Miranda 

interrogation statements, arguing, inter alia, his wavier was involuntary. 

The court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to trial. Defendant 
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was found guilty of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder 

with a firearm, possession of a firearm by a minor, and carrying a 

concealed firearm. This appeal follows.

On appeal, Defendant argues that the court erred by: (1) denying 

Defendant’s motion to suppress his interrogation statements; (2) denying 

Defendant’s motion for mistrial because the jury was exposed to 

inadmissible evidence; (3) overruling Defendant’s objection regarding the 

deputy’s testimony; and (4) overruling Defendant’s objections to 

statements made in closing. Lastly, the cumulation of the errors denied 

Defendant a fair trial. We conclude that only the first argument merits 

discussion. Accordingly, the balance of this opinion will explain our 

holding that Defendant’s confession was not freely and voluntarily given 

and should have been suppressed.

We are guided in our decision by two cases from the Florida Supreme 

Court. In Welch v. State, the Florida Supreme Court held that “even when 

an accused has invoked the right to silence or right to counsel, if the 

accused initiates further conversation, is reminded of his rights, and 

knowingly and voluntarily waives those rights, any incriminating 

statements made during this conversation may be properly admitted.” 992 

So. 2d 206, 214 (Fla. 2008) (emphasis added) (citing Oregon v. Bradshaw,

462 U.S. 1039, 1045–46 (1983)). It explained “[w]here, as here, the 

accused had invoked his right to silence but later initiated a conversation 

with law enforcement and subsequently exercised a voluntary, knowing, 

and intelligent waiver after being advised of his rights for the second time, 

the resulting confession is admissible under Bradshaw.” Id. (emphasis 

added).

More recently, in Shelly v. State, the Florida Supreme Court reiterated 

that Welch is the correct test and it includes “a requirement that the 

accused be specifically given his or her Miranda rights after an alleged 

reinitiation.” 262 So. 3d 1, 13 (Fla. 2018). In other words, police must 

again re-read the Miranda rights before commencing further conversation. 

Here, after Defendant invoked his right to remain silent, the detective 

stopped talking to Defendant. Less than one hour later, Defendant 

changed his mind and wanted to speak with the detective. Although the 

detective did make a reasonable inquiry into whether Defendant 

remembered and understood his Miranda rights, and that his desire to 

speak with the detective was not coerced, the detective did not re-read to

Defendant his Miranda rights. Under the Supreme Court’s mandate in 

Shelly, the detective’s failure to do so rendered Defendant’s confession 

involuntary.
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In addition, it cannot be said that “there is no reasonable possibility 

that the error contributed to the conviction.” State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 

1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986). Defendant’s interrogation was a central factor to 

the State’s case. It was highlighted repeatedly in the State’s presentation 

to disprove manslaughter and repeatedly referenced in closing. The jury 

also requested to view the video of the confession again during 

deliberations. 

Having concluded that the court erred in denying Defendant’s motion 

to suppress his statements and that the error was not harmless, we 

reverse and remand for a new trial. 

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

GROSS and KLINGENSMITH, JJ. concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.