alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S O F T E X A S
N O . A P - 7 6 , 7 8 4

E X P A R T E B R A D L E Y D A L E M O G F O R D , A p p l i c a n t

O N A P P L I C A T I O N F O R A W R I T O F H A B E A S C O R P U S C A U S E N O . 2 1 5 8 I N T H E 1 1 2 D I S T R I C T C O U R T T H F R O M S U T T O N C O U N T Y

P e r c u r i a m . O P I N I O N Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Crim i n al P ro ce dure, the cler k of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for writ of habea s corpus. Ex parte Y oung , 418 S.W .2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant wa s convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and sentenc ed to thirty -three y ear s’ imprisonment. He did not appea l his conviction. Applicant contends that his plea was involuntary beca use c o u n sel wrong fully assure d him that he would be r elea sed fr om prison in one y ear to a y ear -and- a-ha lf with g ood behavior

. This case was rema

nded twice and the trial court co n d ucted a live hear ing. Ba sed on this2

Court’s independe nt revie w of the entire rec ord, it is appar ent that Applicant’s plea was involuntary

. Applicant is entitled to relief

. Ex parte Moussazadeh , ___ S.W .3d ___, Nos. AP -7 6 , 4 3 9 and AP74,185, 2012 Tex. Crim. App. L EXI S 356 (Tex. Crim. App. F eb. 15, 2012); Ex parte M oody , 991 S.W .2d 856, 857-858 (Te x . Crim. App. 1999). Relief is g rante d. The judgme nt in Caus e No

. 2 1 58 in the 112 J udicial District Court of t h Sutton County is set aside, and Applicant is rema nded to the custody of the sheriff of Sutton County to answe r the char g es as set out in the indictment. The tr i al co u rt shall issue any nece ssary bench

war rant within 10 day s after

the mandate of this Court issues. Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Dep a r tm e n t o f Cr im in a l Ju s tic e–Corre ctional I nstitut ions Division and Pardons and Paroles Division.

Deliver ed: May

2, 2012 Do Not Publish
#### RAKER v. UNITED STATES.

No. 1953-A.

District Court, W. D. New York.

Aug. 1, 1940.

For former opinion, see 23 F.Supp. 757.

Edmund Clynes, of Rochester, N. Y., for plaintiff.

George L. Grobe, U. S. Atty., of Buffalo, N. Y., and Goodman A. Sarachan, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Rochester, N. Y., for defendant.

KNIGHT, District Judge.

The petition herein was heretofore dismissed by this court upon the ground that it appeared that the claim had been filed after the final statutory date for such filing, and that the petitioner had not brought himself within the exemptions provided by Section 445, Title 38 U.S.C.A. Subsequently, by consent a re-hearing was granted. An affidavit was submitted by the petitioner purporting to show that in the opinion of a physician the petitioner was insane at the time when the limitation statute otherwise would have run. Such affidavit, in substance, states that prior to July 3, 1931, petitioner was demented; that he suffered from a dementia resulting from lethargic encephalitis, had delusions or hallucinations, lack of judgment as well as lack of muscular and mental co-ordination ; that the disease and encephalitis lethargic has been classified by psychiatrists as insanity of the brain, and that petitioner was suffering from the same ailment on June 26, 1936.

The government has submitted opposing affidavits of four physicians who have either examined the veteran or examined his record and state that petitioner was not and was not shown by the records to have been insane prior to July 3, 1931.

While the affidavit aforesaid submitted by petitioner is vague in describing the effect of the alleged disease, it seems to me that, coupling it with the allegations of the complaint, there is a prima facie showing of insanity, thus bringing petitioner within the exceptions to which the limitation period applies.

The affidavits submitted on behalf of the government have not been taken into consideration, because of the effect of the presumption aforesaid.

The original motion herein was made prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c. Under Rule 8 (c) the procedure is by way of an affirmative defense, rather than by motion as here. In the instant case the motion should be decided under the procedure prevailing prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 86.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the petition is denied, and the order of dismissal heretofore granted directed to be vacated and set aside.
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential. 

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2008-7111 PATRICIA L. AMBERMAN,

Claimant-Appellant,

v. ERIC K. SHINSEKI, Secretary of Veterans Affairs Respondent-Appellee. Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in 06-1160, Judge William A. Moorman. ON MOTION Before PROST, Circuit Judge. ORDER Patricia L. Amberman moves without opposition for a 33-day extension of time, until February 17, 2009, to file her brief. Upon consideration thereof, IT IS ORDERED THAT: The motion is granted. No further extensions should be anticipated. FOR THE COURT 

## FEB 

# 2 2009 Date

cc: Kenneth M. Carpenter, Esq. L. Misha Preheim, Esq. s20 /s/ Jan Horbaly Jan Horbaly Clerk FILED U.S. COURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT FEB 0 2 2009
CLERK
================================================================================
                                  Exhibit 32.2
                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In  connection  with the  Quarterly  Report  of  Arbutus  Resources,  Inc.  (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending April 30, 2006 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  I, Karen
Law,  Chief  Financial  Officer of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
ss.1350,  as adopted pursuant to ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
(3) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934; and (4) The  information  contained in the
Report fairly presents,  in all material respects,  the financial  condition and
result of
              operations of the Company.
IN WITNESS  WHEREOF,  the undersigned has executed this  certification as of the
August 11, 2006.

/s/  Karen Law
------------------------------
Chief Financial Officer
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER ON M OTION FOR R EHEARING

Ca se number: 01

- 1 3

- 00 103

- C R

Style: O.D. Van Duren, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee

Type of motion: Motion for rehearing

Part y filing motion: Appell ant

It is ordered that the motion for rehearing is denied

.

Judge’s signature: / s/ Jane Bland

Acting for the Court

Before: Justices Higley and Bland

. Justice Sharp was a member of the original

panel but his term of office expired in the interim. The two remaining justices

ruled on this motion. See Tex. R. App. P. 49.3(b).

Date: January 13 , 2015

.
ex10-b_22



 



EXHIBIT 10(B)(22)



Amendment Twenty-Four to Marketing Agreement



This document is Amendment Twenty-Four to the Marketing Agreement, made and
entered into effective June 1, 1993, and amended by Amendment One to Marketing
Agreement dated September 16, 1993; Amendment Two to Marketing Agreement dated
June 4, 1998; Amendment Three to Marketing Agreement dated September 25, 1998;
Amendment Four to Marketing Agreement dated October 19, 1998; and Amendment
Five to Marketing Agreement dated December 15, 1998; Amendment Six to Marketing
Agreement dated March 25, 1999, Amendment Seven to Marketing Agreement dated
May 10, 1999, Amendment Eight to Marketing Agreement dated June 24, 1999,
Amendment Nine to Marketing Agreement dated August 5, 1999, Amendment Ten to
Marketing Agreement dated October 1, 1999, Amendment Eleven to Marketing
Agreement dated January 31, 2000, Amendment Twelve to Marketing Agreement dated
March 1, 2000, Amendment Thirteen to Marketing Agreement dated April 19, 2000,
Amendment Fourteen to Marketing Agreement dated July 31, 2000, Amendment
Fifteen to Marketing Agreement dated September 25, 2000, Amendment Sixteen to
Marketing Agreement dated October 31, 2000, Amendment Seventeen dated November
29, 2000, Amendment Eighteen to Marketing Agreement dated January 24, 2001,
Amendment Nineteen to Marketing Agreement dated March 14, 2001, Amendment
Twenty to Marketing Agreement dated May 4, 2001, Amendment Twenty-One to
Marketing Agreement dated June 28, 2001, Amendment Twenty-Two to Marketing
Agreement dated September 4, 2001, and Amendment Twenty-Three to Marketing
Agreement dated October 11, 2001 (the “Agreement”), by and between American
National Insurance Company (“American National”) a Texas corporation, and
Legacy Marketing Group (“LMG”), a California corporation.


In consideration of mutual covenants contained herein, the parties agree as
follows:


1.      Section 3.1 of the Agreement is hereby deleted in its entirety and the
following new Section 3.1 shall be substituted therefore:



		
	 	“3.1 Subject to termination as hereinafter provided, this Agreement shall
remain in force and effect until the close of business on February 28,
2002, the term of this Agreement. This Agreement may be renewed by mutual
agreement for successive terms of one (1) year unless terminated by either
party by prior written notice to the other at least one hundred eighty
(180) days prior to the end of the initial term or the renewal term.”



Except as specifically amended hereby, all terms and provisions of the
Marketing Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.


IN WITNESS HEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement.




	 	 	 
	LEGACY MARKETING GROUP	 	
AMERICAN NATIONAL INSURANCE

COMPANY
	 
	By: /s/ Don Dady	 	
By: /s/ Kelly M. Collier
	 
	Title:  Vice President	 	
Title:  Vice President
	 
	Witness: /s/ Stephanie Molteni	 	
Witness: /s/ Jynx Yucra
	 
	Date: November 30, 2001	 	
Date: November 26, 2001
July 2 7 , 2017



### JUDGMENT 

## The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

SHAUN ADRIAN JACKSON , Appellant

NO. 14

- 16

- 00817

- CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

________________________________ This cause was heard on the transcript of the record of the court below. Having considered the record, this Court holds that the re was no error in the judgment. The Court orders the judgment AFFIRMED

. We further order this decision certified below for observance.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAVID T. LASHGARI and MARJE H.

LASHGARI,

 Plaintiffs - Appellants,

 v.

WILLIAM J. BRATTON, LAPD, Chief;

et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees,

 and

JOHN ERDERT; et al.,

 Defendants.

No. 09-56289

D.C. No. 2:04-cv-03322-SJO-OP

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 14, 2010** 

Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

FILED

JAN 07 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 09-56289

David T. Lashgari and Marje H. Lashgari appeal pro se from the district

court’s orders dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to prosecute and

denying their motion for reconsideration. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We review for abuse of discretion. United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Spectrum

Worldwide, Inc., 555 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 2009) (reconsideration); Pagtalunan

v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 640-41 (9th Cir. 2002) (failure to prosecute). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the action for

failure to prosecute after it warned the Lashgaris that noncompliance with its order

to file an amended complaint could result in dismissal and it granted an extension

of time to comply, and the Lashgaris failed to amend their complaint for

approximately six months after the deadline for doing so. See Pagtalunan, 291

F.3d at 642-43 (discussing factors that district courts must consider before

dismissing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b))

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for

reconsideration because the Lashgaris failed to provide a sufficient basis for

reconsideration. See United Nat’l Ins. Co., 555 F.3d at 780 (listing bases for

reconsideration).
3 09-56289

Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal under Rule 41(b), we do not

consider the Lashgaris’ challenges to the district court’s interlocutory orders. See

Al-Torki v. Kaempen, 78 F.3d 1381, 1386 (9th Cir. 1996).

The Lashgaris’ remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.
#### MICHELS v. RIPLEY.

District Court, S. D. New York.

Feb. 8, 1939.

See, also, 26 F.Supp. 959.

Edwin M. Slote, of New York City, for plaintiff.

Phillips, Mahoney & Fielding, of New York City (William E. Goldman, of New York City, of counsel), for defendant.

HULBERT, District Judge.

This motion is for an order appointing a special master before whom the oral examination of the defendant shall be had pursuant to notice to take his deposition under Rule 26, Rules of Civil Procedure for District Courts, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, instead of the notary public therein designated who, since the service of such notice, has become affiliated with the attorney for the plaintiff, and, in fact, appeared as counsel on the argument hereof; and”, further to limit the scope of said examination.

The just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action is the declared purpose of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Rule 1.)

Unless limited by Rule 30(b) or (d) the defendant may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved. (Rule 26(b).

While it was stated on the argument that plaintiff’s attorney had estimated the proposed examination would require 8 or 9 days, the court will not assume, in the absence of proof, that the examination is sought in bad faith or will be conducted with any intention to annoy, embarrass or oppress the defendant. The motion is *333therefore denied without prejudice. The order to be entered shall be settled on two ■days’ notice and shall direct the defendant to appear for examination upon a day to be agreed upon between counsel at 10 ■o’clock A. M., such examination to continue from day to day until completed, at the time and place and before a qualified person to be designated by the court. Let the order contain the requisite blank spaces for such particulars to be filled in when presented for settlement and signature. A competent stenographer must be provided by the plaintiff and the deposition when ■completed, signed and sworn to by the defendant, unless that be waived in writing, shall be forthwith filed with the Clerk of •this Court. At any time during the examination, upon the demand of either party, the taking of the deposition may be suspended to permit an application to the court pursuant to Rule 30.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Selwyn Walker, Appellant.

[851 NYS2d 881]

The defendant’s challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is unpreserved for appellate review *(see*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Gray,*86 NY2d 10, 19-21, [1995] *People v Jordan,*44 AD3d 875 [2007], *Iv denied*9 NY3d 1035 [2008]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt of criminal sexual act in the first degree and unlawful imprisonment in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon the exercise of our factual review power *(see*CPL 470.15 [5]), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Romero,*7 NY3d 633 [2006]; *see also People v Danielson,*9 NY3d 342 [2007]).

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, he was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel, since the record as a whole demonstrates that he received meaningful representation *(see People v Benevento,*91 NY2d 708 [1998]; *People v Baldi,*54 NY2d 137 [1981]; *People v Wells,*1 AD3d 621 [2003]). Spolzino, J.P., Angiolillo, Balkin and Leventhal, JJ., concur.
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dF
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Dekania Corp. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for
the period ended September 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Thomas H. Friedberg, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.



|                        |  |  |  |     |  |                         |  |                                                
|----------------------- |  |  |  | --- |  | ----------------------- |  | -----------------------------------------------
|Date: November 14, 2007 |  |  |  | By: |  | /s/ Thomas H. Friedberg
|                        |  |  |  |     |  |                         |  | Thomas H. Friedberg                            
|                        |  |  |  |     |  |                         |  | Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and President
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

:

SALIM COFI, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-87 (MLC)

:

Plaintiff, : O P I N I O N

:

v. :

:

BRICK TOWNSHIP, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

 :

THE PLAINTIFF bringing this action, inter alia, to recover

damages under 42 U.S.C. § (“Section”) 1983 related to his arrest

by defendants who are police officers (“Federal Claims”) (dkt.

entry no. 1, Compl.); and the plaintiff alleging that the

criminal charges brought against him due to the circumstances

underlying the arrest are pending (id. at 4-5); and

IT APPEARING — pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1994) — that (1) the Court must determine whether a Section 1983

claim, “if successful, would have the hypothetical effect of

rendering [a] criminal conviction or sentence invalid”, and (2)

if a judgment for a plaintiff on such a claim would necessarily

imply the invalidity of a conviction, then the claim is barred

until the conviction is overturned, Gibson v. Superint. of N.J.

Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, 411 F.3d 427, 451-52 (3d Cir. 2005)

(citations and quotations omitted); and

THE COURT thus being concerned that if the plaintiff were

successful on the Federal Claims, then an eventual underlying

Case 3:11-cv-00087-MLC-LHG Document 3 Filed 01/10/11 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 15
state criminal conviction could be rendered invalid; and it

appearing that when a plaintiff brings a Section 1983 claim

before [being] convicted (or files any other claim

related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending

or anticipated criminal trial), it is within the power

of the district court, and in accord with common

practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal

case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007); and

THE COURT thus intending to stay and administratively

terminate this action pending the disposition of the related

criminal matter, including any aspect thereof that is the subject

of either an appeal or a review by any municipal or state court

at any level; and

THE PLAINTIFF BEING ADVISED that an order administratively

terminating a federal action is not the equivalent of a dismissal

of a complaint with prejudice, and is issued pursuant to the

Court’s inherent power to control the docket and in the interests

of judicial economy, see Delgrosso v. Spang & Co., 903 F.2d 234,

236 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating administrative termination not final

determination, as it “permits reinstatement and contemplates the

possibility of future proceedings”, and “does not purport to end

litigation on the merits”); and for good cause appearing, the

Court will issue an appropriate order.

 s/ Mary L. Cooper 

MARY L. COOPER

United States District Judge

Dated: January 10, 2011

2

Case 3:11-cv-00087-MLC-LHG Document 3 Filed 01/10/11 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 16