2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

5-3-2011

David Williams v. Carl Danberg

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 11-1230

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Recommended Citation

"David Williams v. Carl Danberg" (2011). 2011 Decisions. Paper 1305.

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CLD-158 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 11-1230

___________

DAVID M. WILLIAMS,

Appellant

v.

CARL DANBERG, Commissioner of Corrections; TERRY ZINK, Esquire, Appeals 

Division; JTVCC RECORDS

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware

(D.C. Civil No. 1-10-cv-00765)

District Judge: Honorable Gregory M. Sleet

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

April 7, 2011

Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: May 3, 2011)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

David Williams appeals the dismissal of his complaint and the denial of his 

motion for counsel. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and will affirm the 

judgment of the District Court.
2

Williams, a pro se plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis, filed the instant 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 complaint on September 4, 2010, alleging that the defendants were holding 

him in extended confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. He argued that the status sheet for his incarceration lists an incorrect case 

number, reflecting charges that were later consolidated or dismissed, and that this clerical 

error should result in the termination of the state sentence he is otherwise serving.

Williams had previously pursued a similar claim in Delaware state court, and the 

Delaware Supreme Court summarized his situation as follows:

―[O]n April 1998, a grand jury returned three separate indictments against 

Williams. Williams failed to appear for his arraignment and was arrested in 

July 1998 on new criminal charges. The grand jury returned a fourth 

indictment against Williams. In October 1998, the State obtained a 

superseding indictment, which incorporated three of the indictments into 

the fourth. Case ID 9803018202 was designated as the lead case. Four 

counts of the superseding indictment were later severed and redesignated as 

Case ID 9803018202B. Williams ultimately was convicted of those four 

charges in August 1999. He was sentenced as a habitual offender. . . . In 

July 2010, Williams filed a motion for correction of an illegal sentence 

under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a) on the ground that his status 

sheet maintained by the Department of Correction incorrectly lists him as 

being convicted under the indictment in Case ID 9803018210, which was 

dismissed by the State upon the issuance of the superseding indictment.‖

Williams v. State, 7 A.3d 486, 2010 Del. LEXIS 571, at *1–2 (Del. 2010) (table). The 

court denied Williams’s motion, holding that the sentence he was serving was statutorily 

authorized and legal, and was unaffected by the Department of Correction’s clerical error. 

Id. at *2. 

The District Court recognized that Williams’s complaint was a mere recasting of 

his earlier attempt to shorten his sentence; pursuant to its screening responsibilities under 
3

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1), it dismissed the complaint and denied 

Williams’s request for counsel. See Williams v. Danberg, No. 10-765, 2011 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 538, at *12–13 (D. Del. Jan. 3, 2011). 

Our review of the District Court’s exercise of its screening authority is plenary, 

and we must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable 

inferences drawn therefrom. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000); 

Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). Under Third Circuit LAR 

27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, we may summarily affirm if no substantial question is presented by 

the appeal, and may do so on any ground supported by the record. United States v. 

Baptiste, 223 F.3d 188, 190 n.3 (3d Cir. 2000); Tourscher, 184 F.3d at 240. Denial of a 

motion for counsel is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155

n.4 (3d Cir. 1993).

It is clear that Williams’s suit is not viable in its present state. Under the rule 

established by Heck v. Humphrey, a ―claim for damages bearing [a] relationship to a 

conviction or sentence that has not been . . . invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.‖ 

512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994); see also Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 2005). As 

the sentence has not been invalidated—indeed, as observed above, his sentence has 

recently been upheld—he cannot pursue monetary relief under § 1983. To the extent that 

Williams seeks the equitable remedy of release from confinement,1―when a state 

 

1

In his complaint, Williams asked the District Court to ―issue injunctive relief, 

compensatory, for mistake of facts, negligence, also change in plea.‖ Compl. 4, ECF No. 

2. However, he earlier specified that he ―request[ed] this Honorable Court to have [the 

prison] release Petitioner.‖ Compl. 3. 
4

prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the 

relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier 

release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.‖ 

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (emphasis added). Hence, Williams is 

required to pursue his claim under habeas corpus and not under § 1983.2

We are also in full accord with the District Court that amendment of the complaint 

would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 113 (3d Cir. 2002). 

Williams would not be able to surmount the issues we identified above, let alone the 

various other deficiencies identified by the District Court. It therefore follows that the 

District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint counsel. 

Having identified no substantial issue in this appeal, we will affirm the judgment 

of the District Court for the foregoing reasons.

 

2 Williams claims that he ―filed a section 2254 habeas corpus . . . [but] can’t get the 

proper document to send to [the] 3rd Circuit Court to file a successive habeas petition,‖ 

and he argues that he must be allowed to proceed under § 1983 when ―federal habeas is 

not available.‖ Pl.’s Mem. ¶ 5, ECF No. 7 (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998)). 

But Williams has, on multiple occasions, applied to this Court for leave to file a second 

or successive habeas petition. See C.A. Nos. 10-3632, 08-2259. Given these prior 

filings, we find it difficult to credit Williams’s protestations of inability.