alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 31.1  CERTIFICATION OF PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  CERTIFICATION  I, Harley B. Kaplan, President and Chief Executive Officer, certify that:  1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of RathGibson, Inc.;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;  4. The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:  a. designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;  b. evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report, based on such evaluation;  c. disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and  5. The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):  a. all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and  b. any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.   Date:  September 14, 2007/s/ Harley B. KaplanHarley B. KaplanPresident and Chief Executive Officer
* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See F ED

. R. A PP

. P.

34(a)(2). 

# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 14, 2008 *

Decided May 16, 2008

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 07

‐ 2851

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

‐ Appellee

,

v.

STEVEN M. WEBER

Defendant

‐ Appellant

. Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 06

‐ CR

‐ 261

Charles N. Clevert, Jr.

Judge

.

O R D E R

Steven Weber pleaded guilty to a single count of wire fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343.

The district court sentenced him to 36 months’ imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised

release, and ordered him to pay $178,464 in restitution. The court directed Weber to pay at

least $200 per month while on supervised release but set no payment schedule for his term

of imprisonment. The court also ordered Weber to participate in the Inmate Financial

Responsibility Program. NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 07

‐ 2851 Page 2

On appeal Weber argues only that the district court committed plain error by failing

to set a restitution payment schedule for his period of incarceration. Weber filed his brief

before we decided United States v. Sawyer

, Nos. 06

‐ 1275, 06

‐ 1614 & 06

‐ 4030, 2008 WL 942653,

at *1 (7th Cir. Apr. 9, 2008). In that decision we held that if a defendant cannot pay

immediately the sentencing court should set a payment schedule to begin after the

defendant’s release from prison. Id. at 3. Payments during the term of incarceration should

be handled through the Bureau of Prisons, not the courts. Id. at *3. In his reply brief, filed

after the Sawyer decision, Weber concedes that his argument is now foreclosed by that

decision. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err by setting a payment

schedule to begin after Weber’s release from incarceration.

AFFIRMED.
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1141 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1141

 To provide predictability and certainty in the tax law, create jobs, 
                       and encourage investment.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 11, 2019

Ms. Stabenow (for herself and Mr. Burr) introduced the following bill; 
     which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To provide predictability and certainty in the tax law, create jobs, 
                       and encourage investment.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Motorsports Fairness and Permanency 
Act of 2019''.

SEC. 2. 7-YEAR APPLICABLE RECOVERY PERIOD FOR MOTORSPORTS ENTERTAINMENT 
              COMPLEX FACILITIES MADE PERMANENT.

    (a) In General.--Section 168(i)(15) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 is amended by striking subparagraph (D).
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section shall apply 
to property placed in service after December 31, 2017.
                                 <all>
```
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v David Bressard, Appellant.

[976 NYS2d 302]

Spain, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of St. Lawrence County (Richards, J.), rendered September 6, 2011, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of robbery in the second degree (two counts).

Defendant was charged in two separate indictments with various crimes resulting from his involvement in two armed robberies. In satisfaction of these and other pending charges, defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery in the second degree and agreed to waive his right to appeal. In accordance with the plea agreement, he was sentenced to concurrent terms of eight years in prison, to be followed by five years of postrelease supervision, and was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $750. Defendant now appeals.

Initially, upon reviewing the record, we find that defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal is invalid given that he was not advised that it was a right separate and distinct from the other rights that he was forfeiting by pleading guilty *(see People v Lopez,*6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; *see also People v Bradshaw,*18 NY3d 257, 264 [2011]; *People v Ladieu,*105 AD3d 1265, 1265 [2013], *lv denied*21 NY3d 1017 [2013]; *People v Veras,*103 AD3d 984, 985 [2013], *lv denied*21 NY3d 947 [2013]). Addressing defendant’s challenge to the voluntariness of his guilty plea, it is *989unpreserved because the record fails to indicate that he moved to withdraw his plea or vacate the judgment of conviction *(see People v Ladieu,*105 AD3d at 1266; *People v Leone,*105 AD3d 1249, 1250 [2013], *lv denied*21 NY3d 1017 [2013]; *People v Revette,*102 AD3d 1065, 1065-1066 [2013]). Notably, we find that the narrow exception to the preservation rule is inapplicable, inasmuch as defendant did not make any statements during the plea colloquy that cast doubt upon his guilt or called into question the voluntariness of his plea *(see People v Lopez,*71 NY2d 662, 666-667 [1988]; *People v Ladieu,*105 AD3d at 1266; *People v Leone,*105 AD3d at 1250; *People v Revette,*102 AD3d at 1066).

Defendant’s further challenge to the propriety of County Court’s award of restitution is also unpreserved given his failure to request a restitution hearing or otherwise contest the amount of the restitution awarded at sentencing *(see People v Hulett,*106 AD3d 1330, 1331 [2013]; *People v Secore,*102 AD3d 1057, 1058-1059 [2013], *lv denied*21 NY3d 1019 [2013]; *see also People v Horne,*97 NY2d 404, 410, 414, 414 n 3 [2002]). While his challenge to the severity of the sentence is properly before us, we find it to be unavailing. Considering defendant’s lengthy criminal history, the seriousness of his actions and the number of other charges satisfied by defendant’s plea, we find no extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion warranting a reduction of the sentence in the interest of justice *(see People v Leone,*105 AD3d at 1250; *People v Salmans,*49 AD3d 961, 961 [2008]; *People v McCarthy,*23 AD3d 919, 919-920 [2005]).

Rose, J.E, McCarthy and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1245

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

GERARD O’SHEA; KATHNELL O’SHEA; ALL ABOUT BEAUTY TRUST, Astrid 

N. Dilullio, Trustee (Astrid N. Dilullio dismissed from this 

matter pursuant to the Court’s Order entered 05/30/2013) 

Gerard O’Shea and Kathnell O’Shea Trustees,

Defendants – Appellants,

and

KIM J. O’SHEA; GENESIS TRUST, Gerard O’Shea and Kathnell 

O’Shea, Trustees; GAND K TRUST, Gerard O’Shea, Kathnell 

O’Shea, and Kim J. O’Shea, Trustees,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Beckley. Irene C. Berger, District 

Judge. (5:12-cv-04075)

Submitted: July 23, 2015 Decided: July 27, 2015

Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
2

Gerard O’Shea, Kathnell O’Shea, Appellants Pro Se. Marion 

Elizabeth Erickson, Robert William Metzler, Tax Division, UNITED 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

Gerard and Kathnell O’Shea and All About Beauty Trust appeal 

from the district court’s orders reducing to judgment the 

Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s tax assessments against each of 

them for unpaid tax liabilities for the 2002, 2003, and 2004 tax 

years. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. 

Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district 

court. United States v. O’Shea, No. 5:12-cv-04075 (S.D.W. Va. 

Feb. 20, 24, & 27, 2015). We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-31087

Conference Calendar

 

EDRICK JENKINS,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

BURL CAIN, Warden, Louisiana

State Penitentiary,

Respondent-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 97-CV-1062

- - - - - - - - - -

February 10, 1998

Before SMITH, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

 Edrick Jenkins, Texas prisoner # 99089, appeals the district

court's dismissal of his habeas application. This court must

examine the basis of its jurisdiction on its own motion if

necessary. Mosley v. Cozby, 813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1987). 

Rule 4(a)(1), FED. R. APP. P., requires that the notice of appeal

in a civil action be filed within 30 days of entry of the

judgment or order from which appeal is taken. However, “[i]f an

inmate confined in an institution files a notice of appeal in 
No. 97-31087

- 2 -

either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is

timely filed if it is deposited in the institution’s internal

mail system on or before the last day of filing.” FED. R. APP. P.

4(c). 

The district court entered final judgment on July 7, 1997. 

Therefore, the final day for filing a timely notice of appeal was

Wednesday, August 6, 1997. Jenkins's application for a

certificate of appealability (COA) is construed as a notice of

appeal under Stevens v. Heard, 674 F.2d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 1982). 

The COA application is dated August 13, 1997, and it was not

filed into the court record until August 20, 1997. 

The time limitation for filing a notice of appeal is

jurisdictional, and the lack of a timely notice of appeal

mandates dismissal of the appeal. Robbins v. Maggio, 750 F.2d

405, 408 (5th Cir. 1985). As Jenkins did not file a timely

notice of appeal, the appeal is DISMISSED.

APPEAL DISMISSED.
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 129 (Wednesday, July 8, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 32612]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-16108]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION


Ocean Transportation Intermediary License Applicants

    Notice is hereby given that the following applicants have filed 
with the Federal Maritime Commission an application for license as a 
Non-Vessel-Operating Common Carrier and Ocean Freight Forwarder--Ocean 
Transportation Intermediary pursuant to section 19 of the Shipping Act 
of 1984 as amended (46 U.S.C. Chapter 409 and 46 CFR part 515).
    Persons knowing of any reason why the following applicants should 
not receive a license are requested to contact the Office of 
Transportation Intermediaries, Federal Maritime Commission, Washington, 
DC 20573.

Non-Vessel-Operating Common Carrier Ocean Transportation Intermediary 
Applicants

All West Coast Shipping Inc. dba West Coast Shipping, 1065 Broadway 
Avenue, San Pablo, CA 94806. Officer: Hwi (Henry) K. Cho, Vice 
President (Qualifying Individual).
Nippon Express U.S.A., Inc., 590 Madison Ave., Ste. 2401, New York, NY 
10022-2524. Officer: Hirotaka Hara, Vice President (Qualifying 
Individual).
Worldunimax Logistics, Inc., 16901 S. Keegan Avenue, Carson, CA 90746. 
Officer: David J. Park, President (Qualifying Individual).
Logical Freight, Inc., 555 S. Isis Avenue, Inglewood, CA 90301. 
Officer: Ruben J. Gomez, President (Qualifying Individual).
Kls Logistics Group LLC, dba Key Logistics Solutions, 1563 NW. 82nd 
Avenue, Miami, FL 33126. Officer: Daniel A. Domaszewski, President 
(Qualifying Individual).
Levin & Haydak Investments, LLC, 2631 Industrial Way, Vineland, NJ 
08360. Officer: Robert J. Haydak, Jr., Managing Partner (Qualifying 
Individual).
Marine Logistics Incorporated dba Petro, Marine International, 15110 
Ripplewind Lane, Houston, TX 77068. Officer: Kathy L. Wilson, President 
(Qualifying Individual).

Non-Vessel-Operating Common Carrier and Ocean Freight Forwarder 
Transportation Intermediary Applicants

Service Shipping, Inc. dba SSI Lines, 38104 Academy Drive, Lake Villa, 
IL 60046. Officer: William J. Marston, President (Qualifying 
Individual).
H T International, 281 E. Redondo Beach Blvd., Gardena, CA 90248. 
Officer: Glenda M. Valdez, President (Qualifying Individual).
Excel Cargo Services Inc. dba CaribEx Worldwide, 4248 Piedmont Parkway, 
Greensboro, NC 27410. Officer: Joseph R. Chatt, Jr., Vice President 
(Qualifying Individual).
Randall James Boud dba Godspeed Logistics, 344 Moyer Station Road, 
Schuylkill Haven, PA 17927. Sole Proprietor.

Ocean Freight Forwarder--Ocean Transportation Intermediary Applicants

CDS Air Freight, Inc., 107 Executive Drive, Ste. A, Dulles, VA 20166. 
Officer: Joseph J. Place, President (Qualifying Individual).
Diamond Logistics, LLC, 9500 S. De Wolf Avenue, Selma, CA 93662. 
Officers: Gerome C. Blomgren, Manager (Qualifying Individual), Bruce 
Lion, Member.

    Dated: June 26, 2009.
Karen V. Gregory,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. E9-16108 Filed 7-7-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NOS. 02-14-00392-CR

 02-14-00393-CR

 02-14-00394-CR 

BROOKS L. BURTSON APPELLANT

 

 V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

------------

FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 1340778D, 1340779D, 1340780D

------------

ORDER

------------

We have considered “Appellant’s Motion To Withdraw Anders Brief and to 

Extend Deadlines to Allow Filing of An Appellant’s Brief,” which we have 

construed as a motion for rehearing, and the State’s response. See Tex. R. App. 

P. 49.2 (stating that a motion will not be granted unless a response has been 

filed or requested by the court).

It is the opinion of the court that the motion for rehearing should be and is 

hereby GRANTED. 
2

We withdraw our June 25, 2015 memorandum opinion and judgment and 

order the appeals reinstated on the court’s docket. 

We further withdraw our order allowing appellant’s counsel to withdraw 

from the appeals and reinstate him as appellant’s counsel for the duration of the 

appeals so that counsel can file a brief raising an arguable issue. 

Appellant’s brief on the merits is now due on or before Monday, August 

17, 2015. The State’s brief will be due 30 days later.

The clerk of this court is directed to transmit a copy of this order to the 

attorneys of record.

SIGNED July 16, 2015

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth

BONNIE SUDDERTH

JUSTICE

PANEL: MEIER, GABRIEL, and SUDDERTH, JJ.
10.18KESRPFirstAmendment




Exhibit 10.18




First Amendment 
to the 
Phillips 66 Key Employee Supplemental Retirement Plan 
Effective January 1, 2013


The Phillips 66 Key Employee Supplemental Retirement Plan effective May 1, 2012 (Plan) is amended effective January 1, 2013 as provided below: 


1.  A new Section X(e) is added to provide as follows:


		
	“(e)
	Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, any right or interest of a Participant under this Plan is subject to forfeiture or recoupment, in whole or in part, under applicable law, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act.  A Participant’s rights or interests under this Plan are also subject to forfeiture or recoupment in the event such Participant’s negligence or misconduct results in materially misstated financial or other data, as determined by the Human Resources & Compensation Committee and the Audit Committee of the Board.”


 


        

1
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Dale Alan GRAU, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-3560.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Feb. 5, 2013.

Filed: Feb. 28, 2013.

John P. Messina, Asst. Fed. Public Defender, Des Moines, IA, for appellánt.

John E. Beamer, Shannon L. Olson, Asst. U.S. Attys., Des Moines, IA, for ap-pellee.

Before WOLLMAN, BOWMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The district court1 found that Dale Grau had violated his supervised release following his release from imprisonment on a federal identity-theft conviction. The court thus revoked supervised release and imposed a revocation sentence consisting of imprisonment and additional supervised release. Grau appeals, arguing that the district court erred in finding that he violated his supervised release and that it imposed an unreasonable revocation sentence.

Upon careful review of the evidence presented by the government at the revocation hearing, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the government met its burden of proving that Grau had violated his supervised release, *see United States v. Sistrunk,*612 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir.2010) (standard of review). We also conclude that the revocation sentence was not substantively unreasonable, *see United States v. Growden,*663 F.3d 982, 984 (8th Cir.2011) (per curiam) (standard of review).

The judgment is affirmed. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted.

1

. The Honorable Robert W. Pratt, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.
#### Pinkham *v.*Rutan.1

*(District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.*

June 30, 1887.)

Admiralty—Libel—Evidence—Seamen’s Wages. *u*

Evidence will not be admitted to carry a seaman’s claim for wages back of the date named in the libel, unless the libel has been previously amended.

In Admiralty.

*Charles Gibbons, Jr.,*for libelant.

*H. R. Edmwnds,*for respondent.

1

Reported by O. Berkeley Taylor, Esq., of the Philadelphia bar.

Butler, J.

No question of law is raised. The libelant’s right to recover something is admitted. He was hired at $25 per month. How long he served, and how much he was paid, are the only questions of fact. In his testimony he states, at the outset, that he joined the vessel in November, 1883. He left it in January, 1886. On cross-examination, however, he says: “I joined the Billy Redabedee in April, 1883, and left her in November, 1884. I must have joined her in April, 1884. I made a mistake. I joined the Rutan, as mate, on the seventeenth day of November, 1884.” This is entirely plain. Without something more, it would be clear that the charge for services should begin with November 17,1884. After or about the time of the libel-ant’s discharge from the ship, however, the master, who is his father, gave him a statement in writing, in which the calculation starts with January 20, 1884, and is evidently based upon the idea that the libel-ant joined the ship in November, 1883, and was paid as he admits, in full to January 20th, following the commencement of his services. I think it cannot well be doubted that this statement is a mistake. It is not entitled to the same force as the libelant’s positive allegation that he joined the ship in November, 1884. If this was not what the witness intended to say, he should have corrected it when read over to him. It seems, however, to have been said in correction of his former statement, and with full understanding of what he was saying. The statement in the libel, however, on this subject, is conclusive, so long as it stands. Without an amendment in this respect, the libelant cannot be allowed to go behind the period named. That the libel so states the time the libelant is, of course, *aware;*and yet no offer to amend has been made. Commencing the calculation with this date, taking the admission of pajrrnent- in full to January 20th following, and allowing the further credit of $150, also admitted, there would be $137.50 due January 4, 1886, when the services terminated. As against this, I find the respondent entitled to an additional credit of $100, paid at the breakwater. The weight of the evidence is clearly in favor of this credit. ■ Martin testifies positively that libelant told him this sum had been paid. To this testimony the libelant has made no reply. This will leave a balance of $37.50, with interest from January 4, 1886, for which a decree will be entered.