IV 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. RES. 827 

Affirming that all Chinese companies, private and state-owned, are under 

the effective control of the Chinese Communist Party. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 3, 2020 

Mr. MCCAUL (for himself, Ms. CHENEY, Mr. TURNER, Mr. GALLAGHER, and 

Mr. YOHO) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

RESOLUTION 

Affirming that all Chinese companies, private and stateowned, are under the effective control of the Chinese 

Communist Party. 

Whereas the United States and the United Kingdom have a 

special relationship and shared history of fighting totalitarianism and communism regardless of cost; 

Whereas the decision by the British National Security Council to allow Huawei into its fifth-generation (5G) telecommunication network is deeply concerning to the 

United States; 

Whereas banning Huawei from ‘‘sensitive parts’’ of the network, known as the core, and capping Huawei’s market 

share at 35 percent is not enough to ensure the security 

and fidelity of the United Kingdom’s 5G network; 


lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HRES 827 IH 

Whereas in order to realize the full potential of 5G, there will 

be no means to isolate one part of the network from 

other components; therefore, granting an untrusted provider access to any portion of the network inevitably risks 

opening access to the entire network, including the ability 

to take the entire network offline and deny the United 

Kingdom strategically important services; 

Whereas the United Kingdom’s Telecom Supply Chain Review requires the United Kingdom to consider, with respect to a high-risk vendor such as Huawei, the ‘‘domestic security laws in the jurisdiction where the vendor is 

based. . . .’’; 

Whereas the political economy and laws and regulations of 

the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are an affront to 

the democratic values shared by the United States and 

the United Kingdom; 

Whereas under the leadership of General Secretary Xi 

Jinping, the unelected Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 

leads everything; 

Whereas, according to the Fourth Plenum Decision Document, the CCP aims to ‘‘perfect the Party leadership over 

the National People’s Congress, government, supervision 

organs, trial organs, inspection organs, armed forces, 

people groups, companies and institutions, grass roots organizations, and social groups.’’; 

Whereas the CCP oversees the economic and technology policies of the People’s Republic of China, directs all legal 

and regulatory authorities, and exerts direct and indirect 

influence over all companies in the PRC—state-owned 

and private; 


lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
3 

•HRES 827 IH 

Whereas the CCP has codified into law its authority to interfere in and influence the operations of companies operating within and outside of the PRC and demand access 

to any data stored in or transiting through its network 

equipment; 

Whereas Article 30 of the CCP Constitution requires a CCP 

cell to be formed in any company where there are three 

of more CCP members; 

Whereas Article 15 of Regulations of the CCP on the Work 

of Grassroots Organizations in State Owned Enterprise 

requires all important operating and management issues 

to be discussed by the Party Committee, and only after 

be decided on by the board of directors or management; 

Whereas Article 19 of China’s Company Law requires every 

company to establish a CCP cell and carry out CCP activities and to provide necessary conditions for CCP cell 

activities; 

Whereas Article 26 of the Guideline on Improving Business 

Conditions for Private Enterprises calls on private businesses to support Party construction; 

Whereas, in addition to inserting itself directly into company 

operations through CCP cells and ownership stakes, the 

CCP is erecting a legal and regulatory system that in effect gives it direct influence over a company’s operations 

and access to all its personal and business information, 

thereby turning nominally private companies into resources for and tools of the CCP; 

Whereas the PRC’s National Security Law declares nearly 

any issue—from the economy to technology and information to ideology—a matter of national security and intelligence work; 


lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
4 

•HRES 827 IH 

Whereas the PRC’s Cybersecurity Law gives the CCP expansive powers over how information technology products are 

approved and where data and information are stored, including— 

(1) Articles 22 and 23 which require network products and services to adhere to mandatory national standards and obtain certain certifications, many of which require the disclosure of proprietary information, such as 

source code, and the use of indigenously innovated Chinese intellectual property; 

(2) Article 28 which mandates any network operator 

to provide technical support and assistance to public security and national security organs; and 

(3) Article 37 which sets forth broad requirements 

for data and information to be stored within the boundaries of the PRC; 

Whereas the National Intelligence Law gives Chinese intelligence agencies authority to compel private companies to 

support intelligence operations, including Article 7, which 

requires an organization or citizen to support, assist, and 

cooperate with state intelligence work, and Article 14, 

which demands that organizations provide support, assistance, and cooperation to intelligence organs; 

Whereas Article 22 of China’s Counterespionage Law states 

that when agencies are investigating espionage activities 

and collecting evidence, organizations and individuals 

must not refuse to provide it information; 

Whereas Article 18 of the Anti-Terrorism Law states that 

telecommunications business operators and internet service providers shall provide technical interfaces, decryption, and other technical support and assistance for public security organs and state security organs to prevent 


lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
5 

•HRES 827 IH 

and investigate terrorist activities in accordance with the 

law; 

Whereas Article 31 of the Encryption Law provides for government inspections of commercial encryption that, when 

used in concert with other laws and regulations, could result in full access of encrypted servers and decryption 

keys by the CCP; 

Whereas several provisions in the Ministry of Public Security 

Regulation on Internet Security Supervision and Inspection give security organs the right to conduct onsite and 

remote inspections of company networks—including technical aspects of its operations and the data and information stored on its servers—and allows authorities to copy 

any information on corporate servers; 

Whereas these and other laws, regulations, and standards 

combined with the Internet+ initiative, the social credit 

system for individuals and companies, and other industrial and sector-specific plans form the foundation for the 

PRC’s authoritarian digital governance model that it is 

aggressively exporting around the world; 

Whereas the PRC’s authoritarian model puts absolute control 

of the digital economy, including its hardware, software, 

algorithms, encryption, data, and other proprietary information, into the hands of the CCP, removing any semblance of privacy; and 

Whereas General Secretary Xi Jinping has said ‘‘high-end 

technology is the weapon of a modern country’’ and the 

CCP has clearly demonstrated its ambition to attack 

global markets with its products and services to make the 

world safe for its authoritarian model and dependent on 

its technologies: Now, therefore, be it 


lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
6 

•HRES 827 IH 

1 Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Rep2 resentatives that— 

3 (1) the Parliament of the United Kingdom of 

4 Great Britain and Northern Ireland is encouraged to 

5 reject or amend the National Security Council’s deci6 sion on telecommunications security in a manner 

7 that excludes high-risk vendors, such as Huawei, 

8 from the country’s 5G infrastructure; 

9 (2) Huawei’s track-record of illegal and corrupt 

10 behavior is endemic to their operations; 

11 (3) whether state-owned or nominally private, 

12 all Chinese companies, including Huawei, operate 

13 within a political and regulatory environment that 

14 removes their ability to act independently from or to 

15 refuse requests by the CCP; 

16 (4) this distinct state-led economy and com17 munist political system removes independent cor18 porate governance and obscures the true nature of 

19 Chinese corporate entities, harming the transparency 

20 needed to maintain the international rules-based sys21 tem; 

22 (5) fifth-generation telecommunications net23 works that incorporate products and services devel24 oped by Chinese companies face significant techno25 logical, political, ethical, and geopolitical risk; and 


lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
7 

•HRES 827 IH 

1 (6) the United States Government and its allies 

2 and partners must work expeditiously to develop and 

3 implement a concerted strategy, using all tools avail4 able, to combat what amounts to legal warfare by 

5 the Chinese government to weaponize its companies 

6 when needed. 

Æ 


lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS