NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

JOSEPH ALEXIS DELACRUZ, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 18-0175 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Coconino County

No. S0300CR201400426

The Honorable Michael R. Bluff, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Coconino County Attorney's Office, Flagstaff

By Marc Stanley

Counsel for Respondent

Joseph Alexis Delacruz, Florence

Petitioner

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the court, in 

which Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined. 

FILED 8-23-2018
STATE v. DELACRUZ

Decision of the Court

2

J O H N S E N, Judge:

¶1 Joseph Alexis Delacruz petitions this court for review of the 

dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief under Rule 32 of the 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. We have considered the petition for 

review and the response and, for the reasons stated, grant review and deny 

relief.1

¶2 Delacruz pled guilty to kidnapping, a Class 2 felony and 

domestic violence offense. Although the State and Delacruz stipulated to 

the range of a possible term of incarceration, the parties agreed to 

imposition of probation instead of prison.

¶3 The plea agreement incorrectly stated the correct sentencing

range for a non-dangerous, non-repetitive Class 2 felony. The agreement 

stated that the felony to which Delacruz would plead "carries a minimum 

prison sentence of 4 years; a mitigated sentence of 3 years; a presumptive 

sentence of 5 years; a maximum sentence of 10 years; and an aggravated 

sentence of 8.75 years." Before sentencing, the State moved to amend the 

plea agreement by replacing the incorrectly stated aggravated term of 8.75 

years with the correct 12.5 years. Defense counsel did not object, and the 

superior court granted the motion before suspending sentence and 

imposing a seven-year term of probation. At the sentencing hearing, the 

court reminded Delacruz that the plea agreement had been amended to 

state that the possible aggravated sentence was 12.5 years, not 8.75 years. 

The court asked Delacruz if he understood that if he violated his probation, 

he could be sentenced to up to 12.5 years in prison, and Delacruz replied, 

"Yes, ma'am." Delacruz did not file a timely notice of post-conviction relief 

from the entry of judgment and sentence. See Rule 32.4(a)(2)(C) ("a 

defendant must file the notice no later than 90 days after the entry of 

judgment and sentence.")

¶4 Roughly six weeks later, Delacruz's probation officer 

petitioned the court to revoke probation, alleging Delacruz violated his 

probation by failing to participate in domestic-violence treatment and using

illegal drugs. The court held a hearing at which Delacruz admitted the 

drug-use allegation. Before Delacruz admitted the violation, the court 

informed him that under his amended plea agreement, he could be 

 

1 In a separate filing, Delacruz argues the State's response to his 

petition was untimely because it was postmarked one day after the 

deadline. The relevant date is the filing date, and the response was timely 

filed on the last day.
STATE v. DELACRUZ

Decision of the Court

3

sentenced to up to 12.5 years in prison. The court asked Delacruz if he 

recalled receiving that warning from the court when it imposed probation. 

When Delacruz replied that he did not recall that admonition, the court 

offered to have a transcript prepared of that portion of the prior proceeding. 

The court then asked Delacruz whether he understood that if he admitted 

the probation violation, he could be sentenced to prison for between three 

and 12.5 years, and he replied that he understood. Upon Delacruz's 

admission to the probation violation, the court then revoked his probation

and imposed a 10-year prison sentence. The court later ordered restitution 

in the amount of $7,782.31.

¶5 Delacruz filed a Rule 32 notice, and, in an ensuing petition,

raised claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel, related to the 

incorrect sentencing range originally set forth in the plea agreement. 

Delacruz also claimed the court improperly failed to allow him the 

opportunity to withdraw from the plea agreement before amending the 

agreement to correct the possible sentencing range. The superior court 

summarily denied relief, finding Delacruz’s claims related to the entry of 

the plea and the original sentencing were precluded because he failed to 

raise them in a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Regarding claims 

related to his admission to the probation violation disposition, the court 

found Delacruz had failed to raise a colorable claim. We review the court's 

decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 

19 (2012).

¶6 On review, Delacruz asserts he "had major [ineffective 

counsel] throughout [the] court hearings." He complains his counsel "lied"

to him and asserts he was "[coerced] and missled [sic]." Delacruz also states, 

"I never wanted to agree to the situation I'm in now[,]" and he claims his 

prison sentence is unlawful. Finally, Delacruz maintains the transcripts 

indicate he did not understand the potential prison sentence that could 

result from a probation violation.

¶7 Delacruz does not substantiate his claims with citations to the 

record or legal authority. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(4)(B)(iii), (iv) 

(requiring petitions for review to contain citations to the record and legal 

authority); Canion v. Cole, 210 Ariz. 598, 600, ¶ 11 (2005) (petitioner must 

"strictly comply" with Rule 32 to be entitled to relief). More importantly, 

Delacruz does not explain how the superior court erred in denying his 

petition for post-conviction relief; he merely makes cursory assertions that 

the court erred. See State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 298 (1995) (claims not 

supported by argument or citation to the record are waived).
STATE v. DELACRUZ

Decision of the Court

4

¶8 In any event, the record reflects that Delacruz knowingly, 

intelligently and voluntarily pled guilty pursuant to the amended 

agreement before the court imposed probation. Although he argues that 

the sentencing transcript demonstrates that he did not understand the 

amended plea agreement, during the earlier proceeding at which the court 

accepted his plea, Delacruz assured the court that he understood that the 

amendment increased the possible sentencing range. Having knowingly, 

intelligently and voluntarily consented to the amended agreement, 

Delacruz cannot complain that, after he violated probation, the court 

imposed a sentence consistent with the amended agreement. Moreover, 

Delacruz also understood at the revocation hearing several weeks later that 

he faced a possible 12.5-year prison term if the court found he violated a 

condition of probation. Finally, given the court's prior finding of 

aggravating circumstances, the sentence the court ultimately imposed is 

lawful. See Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-702(D) (2018).

2

CONCLUSION

¶9 Delacruz has failed to show that the superior court abused its 

discretion by denying his petition. Accordingly, although we grant review, 

we deny relief.

 

2 Absent material revision after the date of an alleged offense, we cite 

the current version of a statute or rule.