No. PD-0756-15

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AT AUSTIN, TEXAS

__________________________________________________________________

CHARLES LAVOY ARRINGTON

Appellant

VS.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

Appellee

FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS CAUSE NO. 04-12-00430-CR

__________________________________________________________________

ON APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS 

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

__________________________________________________________________

APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

__________________________________________________________________

JORGE G. ARISTOTELIDIS

Tower Life Building

310 South St. Mary’s St., Suite 1830

San Antonio, Texas 78205

(210) 277-1906

jgaristo67@gmail.com

SBN: 00783557

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
ii

IDENTITY OF JUDGE, PARTIES AND COUNSEL

A complete list of the names and addresses of all interested parties is 

provided below so the members of this Honorable Court may at once determine 

whether they are disqualified to serve or should recuse themselves from 

participating in the decision in this case.

Complainant:

The State of Texas

Petitioner:

Charles Lavoy Arrington

Counsel for the Petitioner:

Mr. Jorge G. Aristotelidis

Tower Life Building

310 South St. Mary’s St., Suite 1830

San Antonio, Texas 78205

Counsel For the State:

Ms. Lauren Scott

Assistant District Attorney

Bexar County Justice Center

101 W. Nueva St.

San Antonio, Texas 78205

Trial Judge:

Honorable Sharon MacRae

Visiting Judge

187th District Court

Bexar County, Texas
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE(S)

IDENTITY OF THE JUDGE, PARTIES AND COUNSEL ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES iv

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE vi

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY vii

GROUND FOR REVIEW viii

ARGUMENT 1

PRAYER FOR RELIEF 13

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 14

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 15
iv

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS CASES:

Arrington v. State, 451 S.W.3d 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)..........................vii,1

Schutz v. State, 957 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).............................9,11

Yount v. State, 872 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)........................7,10,11

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS CASES:

Arrington v. State, 413 S.W.3d 106 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 2013)...vii,1,7,12,13

Arrington v. State, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2529 

(Ct. App. - San Antonio)(Mar. 18, 2015)(unpublished)...................vii,8,9

Fuller v. State, 224 S.W.3d 823 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.)............10

Lane v. State, 257 S.W.3d 22, 27 

(Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d)..............................10

Long v. State, No. 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 8885 

(Tex. App.--Tyler Nov. 26, 2008, no pet.) (unpublished)......................10

Moran v. State, 350 S.W.3d 240, 242-243 (Ct. App. San Antonio 2011).............9

Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001...........................9

TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE:

Tex. R. Evid. 702...........................................................................7,9

Tex. R. Evid. 608..............................................................................8

MISCELLANEOUS:

3 W. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 11.10(c) (2d ed. 1999))....................9

APPENDIX Arrington v. State, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2529 

(Tex. App. San Antonio Mar. 18, 2015)
v

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Appellant’s case presents an outrageous case of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, whereby defense counsel wholly failed to object to trial testimony from 

two State’s witnesses, one of whom gave her expert opinion about the truthfulness 

of the complainant’s criminal accusations, and the other of whom gave lay 

testimony that improperly bolstered the complainant’s credibility, such that 

defense counsel’s omissions could not be justified as reasonable trial strategy, after

a review of the cold, appellate record. Because the prohibition against opinion and 

bolstering testimony is well-settled by this Court’s jurisprudence, oral argument 

would assist this Court in determining whether it should review Petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance claim while on direct appeal, or require the Petitioner to 

expend more resources and further delay the process, by seeking relief via the postconviction, habeas process. 
vi

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On July 9th, 2012, jury selection began in the trial of Mr. Charles Lavoy 

Arrington (Petitioner), who was charged with six counts of aggravated sexual 

assault, and one count of indecency with a child by sexual contact, in the 187th

District Court of Bexar County, Texas, in San Antonio, Texas, before the

Honorable Sharon MacRae, visiting judge presiding. On July 13, 2012, Mr. 

Arrington was convicted by the jury of five counts of aggravated sexual assault of 

a child, and one count of indecency with a child by sexual contact. That same day, 

he was sentenced by the trial court to 60 years on five of the six aggravated sexual 

assault counts, and to 20 years for the indecency with a child by sexual contact 

count, with all sentences running concurrent. Because the jury was unable to reach 

a verdict on Count III, the court declared a mistrial. 
vii

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 14, 2013, the Fourth Court of Appeals of San Antonio reversed 

Mr. Arrington’s conviction, and remanded for a new trial, via published opinion. 

See Arrington v. State, 413 S.W.3d 106 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 2013).

On January 14, 2015, this Court reversed the Fourth Court of Appeals 

decision, and remanded all remaining, unresolved appellate issues for its

consideration. See Arrington v. State, 451 S.W.3d 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).

On March 18, 2015, the Fourth Court of Appeals decided all remaining and 

unresolved appellate issues, and affirmed Petitioner’s convictions. See Arrington 

v. State, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2529 (Tex. App. San Antonio Mar. 18, 2015)

(unpublished).

On May 21, 2015, the Fourth Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s motions 

for panel, and en banc rehearing. 

Petitioner’s PDR is due to be filed Wednesday, July 22nd, 2015. 
viii

GROUND FOR REVIEW

Whether the Petitioner’s allegation that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance of counsel by completely failing to object to all of the expert and lay 

testimony about the truth of H.A.’s allegations against Petitioner that was 

presented by the State in its case in chief, was so outrageous as to eliminate any 

reasonable trial strategy, and thus allow its consideration on direct appeal, without 

the need to require Petitioner to expend additional resources and further delay, via

the post-conviction, habeas process?
1

ARGUMENT

1. Posture of the Case:

At trial, the complainant (H.A.) made a number of sexual assault allegations 

against the Petitioner. There was no medical, or other evidence presented in 

support of these accusations, thus rendering the trial a “he said, she said” swearing 

match between them. See Arrington v. State, 413 S.W.3d 106, 113 (Tex. App. San 

Antonio 2013)(overruled on other grounds by Arrington v. State, 451 S.W.3d 834 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2015)). With this backdrop, in its case in chief, the state 

presented testimony from outcry witness Lisa Dawn McGinnis (McGinnis), and 

from H.A.’s mother, Virginia Lee Johnson (Jenny). The following are excerpts of 

their testimony, which is the subject of the Petitioner’s PDR:

2. Expert Opinion about H.A.’s Credibility from the State’s Outcry 

Witness:

On direct examination, the state called McGinnis, the school counselor at 

H.A.’s school, who was called as the outcry witness. McGinnis testified that she 

had two conversations with H.A. at her school. Having learned of a rumor that 

H.A. had stated that she was pregnant, she questioned H.A. about it. 3 RR 71. 

When confronted with the rumor, H.A. “said, no, it was a misunderstanding that 

she was just talking about, basically, where babies come from and her friends had

misunderstood her and at that point [McGinnis] believed her. It was a very short 

interview,” adding that H.A. “handled herself very well.” 3 RR 72. When asked 
2

what McGinnis’s “feeling” at the time of the conversation with H.A., she related 

that she believed that “it was just a rumor...[t]hat some kids were talking about 

how babies -- where babies come from.” 3 RR 73. McGinnis added that while the 

conversation warranted a phone call about it to H.A.’s mother, McGinnis “didn’t 

really feel like there was anything else to the information so [she] didn’t...make 

any other phone calls at that point,” further elaborating that it was a “judgment call 

somewhat on” her part “based on [her] experience and what [McGinnis has] seen 

with other students.” 3 RR 73-74

Two days later, McGinnis had a second conversation with H.A., and 

revisited the issues based on continuing rumors that she was pregnant, and this 

time, that H.A. was pregnant with her father’s baby. 3 RR 74-75. It was during 

this second interview that H.A. first alleged that the Petitioner had sexually 

assaulted her. 3 RR 76-78. 

McGinnis testimony was buttressed by her academic and professional 

background. She testified that at the time of H.A.’s outcry, she worked at 

Timberwood Park Elementary, and that she’d previously worked as a school

counselor for 11 years and in school administration for twenty-one years. She 

added that she had a bachelor’s in early childhood education, a Master’s in 

counseling, and a Ph.D. in counseling and supervision, and that she was a licensed

professional counselor, outside of her school counseling certification. 3 RR 70.
3

During McGinnis’s testimony, without any objections by the defense, the 

prosecutor asked McGinnis questions relating to whether H.A.’s sexual assault 

allegation was credible, specifically, McGinnis’s opinion about whether H.A. was 

telling the truth:

Prosecutor: Now, did you ask any questions -- did you do anything to check 

the veracity of her story?

McGinnis: I asked enough questions to make a decision about whether I 

needed to report or not. Based on what she said, based on her 

demeanor, based on the fact that I did not have any other 

concerns with her behavior or academically, what I knew about 

her at that point, I made enough -- got enough information to 

make a decision about making a report. I was leaving that 

school at the end of the year. This was the day before schooling 

got out so I didn't –

Prosecutor: Hold on there one second. I guess what I want to ask you is: 

You collected enough information to make a report.

McGinnis: Uh-huh.

Prosecutor: All right?

McGinnis: Yes.

Prosecutor: And clearly you made a report because you’re here today.

McGinnis: Yes.

Prosecutor: What did -- what details did you see that lent credibility to 

her story that made you know that she was telling you the 

truth?

McGinnis: I felt that she was telling me the truth based on the fact that 

she had details, for example, what movie they were watching; 
4

that her brother was playing PlayStation when it happened 

when she was nine; that she could very much put herself in the 

situation of what was going on exactly at that time.

Those were the things that made me feel like she was telling 

the truth.

Prosecutor: Okay. Now, what told you that those were the important 

factors? 

McGinnis: Based on my experience that I’ve had with other students, 

based on my educational experience. Those were the things 

that I fell back on.

Prosecutor: So you were trained to look for these signs?

McGinnis: As a counselor, yes.

Prosecutor: All right. Have you had the occasion to deal with somebody 

who made a false report?

McGinnis: Yes.

Prosecutor: Okay. Now, can you distinguish those instances, in general, to 

this one? I mean, what did she do that might have happened 

had she been given [sic] a false report?

McGinnis: Most of the time, not all the time, but most of the time when 

students give a false report they generally will seek you out. 

Haley did not seek me out. She did the seek out an adult. She 

was actually telling another student, which my experience has 

been that's a cry for help when you don’t know what else to do.

Most of the time the students who have made false reports

they’ve actually sought me out or told another adult. The first 

time I talked to her she didn’t want to tell me. She was fearful 

and that also made me feel like that this was a truthful 

report.

* * *
5

Prosecutor: And does that mean that the person has a false memory? That 

this is, you know, something that they just concocted?

McGinnis: No. It just means that, you know, like I said, with any of us, as 

time goes by, you might remember things that you didn't 

remember prior.

3RR 80-83 (emphasis by Appellant). 

3. Lay Testimony About H.A.’s Truthfulness:

The State later called Virginia Lee Johnson (Jenny), H.A.’s mother. On 

direct, the prosecutor asked Jenny whether she’d spoken to her daughter about the 

sexual assault allegations. The following colloquy ensued:

Prosecutor: And has she, I guess, changed from her initial reaction of 

talking about what happened?

Jenny: You mean -- not really, no. You mean, like personality?

Prosecutor: Yes. I mean, is she still fearful and embarrassed when she talks 

about it?

Jenny: No but we don’t really talk about it all that much but I ask her 

questions and she’s very honest with her answer and she’s 

not - she doesn’t hide the answers. She tells me the truth.

Prosecutor: Okay. So do you generally initiate the conversations with her or 

does she talk to you about what happened to her at her dad’s 

house? 

Jenny: She talks to me when we do talk about it.

Prosecutor: Now, have you ever talked with Haley about how serious what 

happened to her is?

Jenny: Yes.
6

Prosecutor: And did you -- I mean, were you surprised when this first came 

out?

Jenny: Yes.

Prosecutor: Why were you so surprised?

Jenny: Because I didn’t think this could happen.

Prosecutor: You didn't think this could happen to your daughter?

Jenny: Yes.

Prosecutor: Did you talk to Haley about the fact that police were going to 

be involved and she was going to have to –

Jenny: Yes.

Prosecutor: -- follow through with that?

Jenny: Yes.

Prosecutor: Did you talk to her about how serious this was?

Jenny: Yes.

Prosecutor: Did you ask Haley if she was telling the truth?

Jenny: Yes.

Prosecutor: And what did she say to you?

Jenny: She said yes and she started crying.

3 RR 48-50 (emphasis by Appellant).
7

4. Impeachment of H.A.’s Testimony:

H.A.’s testimony was impeached by the prosecutor. On direct examination, 

the prosecutor asked H.A., why she had “lied” to H.A.’s mother by failing to tell 

her about the Appellant’s sexual assault, to which H.A. claimed that “her friends” 

made her “do it.” See 3 RR 206-207. 

5. State’s Closing Arguments:

During her closing arguments, the prosecutor argued that the Petitioner’s 

guilt was substantiated by McGinnis’ testimony, as follows:

Ms. McGinnis has dealt with kids for 21 years. She told you that 

generally they do make delayed outcries. She told you that when a kid 

isn’t seeking out the adult to share this information that has a lot to 

do with whether or not you’d want to believe them or how you put 

things in perspective. Haley didn’t seek anybody out.

5 RR 35-36 (emphasis by Appellant). 

6. Fourth Court of Appeals’ Decision:

On original submission, the Fourth Court noted that “the State asked the 

school counselor, McGinnis, her opinion on the truthfulness of H.A.’s 

accusations,” and that “the State concedes that McGinnis answered direct questions 

on H.A.’s credibility and truthfulness.” See Arrington, 413 S.W.3d at 113. The 

Court agreed that her opinion on H.A.’s truthfulness was not admissible. Id. (citing 

Tex. R. Evid. 702; Yount v. State, 872 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)), 

and noted that defense counsel did not object to their admission at trial. Id. at 114. 
8

The Court also noted that “[t]he State also asked H.A.’s mother questions 

about H.A.’s truthfulness,” and noted that “[t]he credibility of a witness may be 

supported by evidence in the form of opinion, but the evidence may only refer to 

character for truthfulness and evidence of truthful character is admissible only after 

the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked.” Id. at 114 (citing

Tex. R. Evid. 608.)

However, after remand from this Court, the Fourth Court of Appeals 

concluded that “[t]he above questioning occurred in the context of the State asking 

McGinnis what made her believe H.A. enough to make an official report,” and “in 

the context of her following up on the second rumor.” Arrington v. State, 2015 

Tex. App. LEXIS 2529 *11-12 (Tex. App. San Antonio Mar. 18, 2015)

(unpublished). Acknowledging that “[d]uring cross-examination, defense counsel 

asked McGinnis only a few questions,” it elaborated that “[its] review of the record 

indicates defense counsel’s strategy in not objecting and conducting a limited 

cross-examination may have been for the purpose of avoiding emphasizing the 

matter before the jury...” Id. at *12.

As to Jenny’s bolstering testimony, the Court reasoned that “[t]he mother’s 

comments were brief and somewhat vague as to the content of what H.A. said that 

was ‘truthful,’” restating that its “review of the record indicates defense counsel’s 
9

strategy in not objecting may have been for the purpose of avoiding emphasizing 

the matter before the jury.” Id. at * 14.

The Court concluded that the Petitioner therefore “failed to satisfy his 

burden of proving that there was no imaginable strategy for defense counsel’s 

failure to object.” Id. 

In determining whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of 

counsel, when the record contains no evidence of counsel‘s reasons for the 

challenged conduct, the Court “‘will assume a strategic motivation if any can 

possibly be imagined,’ and will not conclude the challenged conduct constituted 

deficient performance unless the conduct was so outrageous that no competent 

attorney would have engaged in it.” See Moran v. State, 350 S.W.3d 240, 242-243 

(Ct. App. San Antonio 2011) (citing Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2001) (quoting 3 W. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 11.10(c) (2d 

ed. 1999)). See also Vasquez v. State, 830 S.W.2d 948, 950-51 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1992)(“when a cold record clearly confirms no reasonable trial counsel could have 

made [the complained of] trial decisions, to hold counsel ineffective is not 

speculation.”). 

To be admissible, expert testimony must “assist” the trier of fact. Schutz v.

State, 957 S.W.2d 52, 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (citing Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 702)

(other citations omitted). Expert testimony assists the trier of fact when the jury is
10

not qualified to “the best possible degree” to determine intelligently the particular

issue without the help of the testimony. Id. (citations omitted). But, the expert

testimony must aid -- not supplant -- the jury‘s decision. Id. Expert testimony does

not assist the jury if it constitutes “a direct opinion on the truthfulness” of a child

complainant‘s allegations. Id. (citing Yount v. State, 872 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1993)). See also Long v. State, No. 12-07-00256-CR, 2008 Tex. App.

LEXIS 8885, 2008 WL 5050099, at *4 (Tex. App.--Tyler Nov. 26, 2008, no pet.)

(noting that an expert may not testify that a witness is truthful.) (citing Yount, at 

712) and Lane v. State, 257 S.W.3d 22, 27 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, 

pet. ref’d)). On original submission, the Fourth Court noted that, indeed, “the State 

concede[d] that McGinnis answered direct questions on H.A.’s credibility and 

truthfulness.” See Arrington, 413 S.W.3d at 113. 

Likewise, efforts by Jenny to bolster the credibility of those allegations 

(Fuller v. State, 224 S.W.3d 823 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (allowing 

the State to pre-emptively “rebut,” through lay opinion testimony, attacks on its 

complaining witnesses solely on the basis of the cross-examination of that witness 

was inconsistent with the Schutz finding that the defense does not “open the door” 

for the same testimony by an expert by cross-examining H.A. herself.) (citing 

Schutz, at 72)), are also prohibited by this Court’s precedent. 
11

The Fourth Court’s focus on the “context” of the prohibited questions, 

whether McGinnis was sufficiently convinced that H.A. told the truth, to justify 

making an official report, is irrelevant. The focus is not on the context of the 

opinion about H.A.’s credibility, but on the fact that the opinion was given, not 

once, but repeatedly. As the outcry witness, McGinnis function was solely to 

report about the sexual assault allegations, not to render a carefully crafted opinion 

as to why she believed that H.A.’s allegations - the very heart of the prosecution’s 

case – were true. As to the Court’s second observation, that defense counsel’s 

failure to object and his conducting a limited cross-examination may somehow 

have been strategy aimed at avoiding emphasizing the matter before the jury, this 

completely misses the point. Failing to object to clear and deliberate calls for 

opinion testimony about the credibility of the complainant’s sexual assault 

allegations is not trial strategy, it is an abject failure to protect the jury’s province 

as the sole judge of credibility. 

It’s also difficult to accept the Fourth Court’s conclusion that, as to Jenny’s 

testimony, her “comments were brief and somewhat vague as to the content of 

what H.A. said that was ‘truthful.’” A review of the Jenny’s testimony leaves no 

doubt that the subject matter about which Jenny believed H.A. to be truthful, to the 

point of tears, were the sexual abuse allegations against the Petitioner. 
12

At the time of trial, Yount and Schutz had been well-settled precedent for 

over 18 and 14 years, respectively. Rather, the relevant inquiry is: how can defense 

counsel sit by idly while the state carefully prepares and engages in a long, roundly 

prohibited line of questioning, that repeatedly, and over the course of two 

witnesses, produces devastating opinion testimony, constitute a reasonable trial 

strategy? It doesn’t. Respectfully, the Fourth Court of Appeals has erred in failing 

to identify defense counsel’s omissions as outrageous, ineffective assistance of 

counsel.

Counsel’s ineffective assistance prejudiced the Petitioner, for the following 

reasons: 

1. H.A.’s credibility had already been compromised when none other than 

the prosecutor confronted H.A. about why she lied when she first spoke 

to McGinnis, which the Fourth Court noted in its first opinion. See 

Arrington, 413 S.W.3d at 115, 117.

2. The trial was a classic he-said, she-said swearing match, without medical 

or other evidence favoring the prosecutions case. Therefore, McGinnis 

expert, and H.A.’s lay witness validation of H.A.’s accusations, unfairly

and decidedly tipped the scales in favor of a conviction;

3. The prohibited testimony was a far cry from an unexpected blurb which 

could ostensibly be neutralized by defense counsel’s decision to not 

revisit and re-emphasize the testimony before the jury. Rather, it was a 

carefully crafted and effective question and answer colloquy between the 

prosecutor and the two witnesses. Indeed, the prosecutor took all of the 

liberties that defense counsel permitted her; 

4. The prosecutor specifically emphasized and argued McGinnis’ opinion 

about H.A. truthfulness in closing argument, and supported that opinion 
13

by also discussing McGinnis’ expertise, which in the eyes of the jury, 

fully qualified her to evaluate the truth of H.A.’s accusations;

5. The fairness of Petitioner’s trial was seriously hampered by the failure on 

the part of the trial court (and, for that matter, defense counsel) to ensure 

that a proper unanimity instruction was given in the case, which was 

conceded error by the state during the Fourth Court’s original 

consideration. See Id. at 113. While this Court ultimately determined 

that the lack of a unanimity instruction would not, on its own, have been 

sufficient to constitute Almanza error, thus reversing the Fourth Court’s 

determination, it should, when combined with counsel’s outrageous 

ineffective assistance, and the above enumerated factors, militate in favor 

of a finding that that the Petitioner’s trial was fundamentally unfair, and 

its result unreliable.

Lastly, the opportunistic role by the state in this case cannot be ignored. 

During oral argument before this Court, on original submission, the undersigned 

asked the Court to consider the State’s unclean hands in the trial process. Unlike 

unobjected to hearsay, which retains is probative properties, truth opinions about a 

complainant’s allegations are NEVER admissible. Sure, defense counsel’s 

dereliction is well established, but it did not give the prosecutor a license to elicit a 

wholly inadmissible line of questioning, in its quest, not, to do justice, but to 

secure a conviction, a point eloquently noted by Justice Chapa in a separate, 

concurring opinion. See Arrington, 413 S.W.3d at 119 (J. Chapa concurring) 

(“...the trial court failed in its obligation to submit a charge that does not allow for 

the possibility of a non-unanimous verdict...[a]nd the State failed in its primary 

duty, which is not to convict, but to do justice, by failing to assure that the 

convictions were constitutionally obtained.”). The state’s win-at-all-cost efforts in
14

opportunistically producing, introducing, and arguing inadmissible evidence to bag 

a conviction in this case was clear prosecutorial misconduct. If this Court is 

serious about maintaining the integrity of the trial process, it should grant PDR, 

reverse the Petitioner’s conviction, and admonish the State about its ethical duties 

at trial. Empty warnings in opinions that affirm convictions that are the product of 

prosecutorial misdeeds, do little to bring about true reform.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court grant his 

PDR, order the necessary briefing, reverse the judgment of the Fourth Court of 

Appeals, and remand this case for a new trial. 

Respectfully submitted,

Jorge G. Aristotelidis

Tower Life Building

310 South St. Mary’s St., Suite 1830

San Antonio, Texas 78205

(210) 277-1906

jgaristo67@gmail.com

By: /s/ Jorge G. Aristotelidis

State Bar No. 00783557
15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing “Appellant’s 

Petition for Discretionary Review,” was served upon opposing counsel, the 

Appellate Division of the Bexar County District Attorneys Office, and to Mr. 

Matthew Paul, State’s Attorney, by e-mailing a copy to the Bexar County District 

Attorneys Office at the Paul Elizondo Tower, 101 W. Nueva, Rm. 370 San 

Antonio, Texas 78205, and P.O. Box 12405, Austin, Texas, 78711, respectively, 

on this the 22nd day of July, 2015.

/s/ Jorge G. Aristotelidis
16

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

In accordance with Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1) and 9.4(i)(2(D), I hereby certify 

that this brief contains 3,153 words, which have been counted by use of the 

“Word” program with which this brief was written.

/s/ Jorge G. Aristotelidis
| | Neutral

As of: July 22, 2015 9:57 PM EDT

Arrington v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District, San Antonio

March 18, 2015, Delivered; March 18, 2015, Filed

No. 04-12-00430-CR

Reporter

2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2529

Charles ARRINGTON, Appellant v. The

STATE of Texas, Appellee

Notice: PLEASE CONSULT THE TEXAS

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

FOR CITATION OF UNPUBLISHED

OPINIONS.

Prior History: [*1] From the 187th

Judicial District Court, Bexar County,

Texas. Trial Court No. 2011CR1663.

Honorable Sharon MacRae, Judge

Presiding.

Arrington v. State, 2015 Tex. Crim. App.

LEXIS 15 (Tex. Crim. App., Jan. 14, 2015)

Disposition: AFFIRMED.

Core Terms

credibility, ineffective, unanimous, sexual,

sexual organ, asserts, jury charge,

penetration, counselor, questions, talk, pet,

counsel’s failure, outrageous, issues

Case Summary

Overview

HOLDINGS: [1]-Court’s failure to submit

a unanimity instruction did not amount to

fundamental error mandating automatic

reversal because defendant did not have a

right to a unanimous jury verdict under the

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments;

[2]-Counsel was not ineffective for not

objecting to testimony by the school

counselor under Tex. R. Evid. 702 about

the truthfulness of the alleged victim’s

sexual misconduct accusations because the

counsel’s strategy in not objecting may

have been for the purpose of avoiding

emphasizing the matter before the jury;

[3]-Counsel was not ineffective for not

objecting to testimony by the alleged

victim’s mother under Tex. R. Evid. 608

about the truthfulness of the alleged

victim’s sexual misconduct accusations

because the mother’s comments were brief

and somewhat vague and counsel’s strategy

may have been to avoid emphasizing the

matter before the jury.

Outcome

Judgment affirmed.

JORGE ARISTOTELIDIS
LexisNexis® Headnotes

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental

Rights > Criminal Process > Right to Jury

Trial

Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials >

Verdicts > Unanimity

HN1 The U.S. Supreme Court holds that

although the Sixth Amendment right to

trial by jury requires a unanimous jury

verdict in federal criminal trials, it does not

require a unanimous jury verdict in state

criminal trials. A state criminal defendant,

at least in noncapital cases, has no federal

right to the unanimous jury verdict.

Although the Sixth Amendment is

applicable to the States by virtue of the

Fourteenth Amendment, the United States

Constitution clearly does not grant a right

to the unanimous verdict.

Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Counsel >

Effective Assistance of Counsel > Tests for

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Counsel >

Effective Assistance of Counsel > Trials

Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals >

Standards of Review > General Overview

HN2 An appellate court reviews an

appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel under a well-established

standard of review. A defendant must show

(1) that counsel’s performance is deficient,

i.e., counsel’s assistance falls below an

objective standard of reasonableness; and

(2) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

a result of the proceeding will be different.

The reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in an

outcome. This two-pronged test is a

benchmark for judging whether counsel’s

conduct so undermines the proper

functioning of the adversarial process that

a trial cannot be relied on as producing a

reliable result.

Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Counsel >

Effective Assistance of Counsel > Trials

Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Counsel >

Effective Assistance of Counsel > Tests for

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals >

Procedural Matters > Records on Appeal

Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals >

Standards of Review > General Overview

HN3 Generally, a trial record will not

suffice to establish an ineffective assistance

of counsel claim. When ineffective

assistance is raised on direct appeal,

appellate counsel and a court must proceed

on the trial record not developed for an

object of litigating or preserving the claim

and thus is often incomplete or inadequate

for this purpose. Nonetheless, some claims

may be disposed of on direct appeal where

trial counsel’s ineffectiveness is so apparent

from the record. When no reasonable trial

strategy can justify the trial counsel’s

conduct, counsel’s performance falls below

an objective standard of reasonableness as

a matter of law, regardless of whether the

record adequately reflects the trial counsel’s

subjective reasons for acting as he or she

does. When the record contains no evidence

of counsel’s reasons for the challenged

conduct, an appellate court will assume a

strategic motivation if any can possibly be

Page 2 of 9

2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2529, *1

JORGE ARISTOTELIDIS
imagined, and will not conclude the

challenged conduct constitutes deficient

performance unless the conduct is so

outrageous that no competent attorney will

engaged in it.

Evidence > ... > Testimony > Expert

Witnesses > General Overview

Evidence > Admissibility > Expert

Witnesses

HN4 Expert testimony that a particular

witness is truthful is inadmissible under

Tex. R. Evid. 702.

Evidence > ... > Impeachment > Bad

Character for Truthfulness > Opinion &

Reputation

HN5 The credibility of a witness may be

supported by evidence in the form of

opinion, but the evidence may only refer to

character for truthfulness and evidence of

truthful character is admissible only after

the character of the witness for truthfulness

is attacked. Tex. R. Evid. 608.

Counsel: For APPELLANT: Jorge G.

Aristotelidis, Aristotelidis & Moore, San

Antonio, TX.

For APPELLEE: Jay Brandon, Assistant

District Attorney, San Antonio, TX.

Judges: Opinion by: Sandee Bryan Marion,

Chief Justice. Sitting: Sandee Bryan

Marion, Chief Justice, Marialyn Barnard,

Justice, Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice.

Opinion by: Sandee Bryan Marion

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AFFIRMED

This appeal is on remand from the Texas

Court of Criminal Appeals. Charles

Arrington is appealing his conviction on

five counts of aggravated sexual assault of

a child and one count of indecency with a

child by sexual contact. In an opinion

dated August 14, 2013, this court reversed

appellant’s conviction after concluding

appellant was denied a fair trial based on

the trial court’s failure to include a

unanimity instruction in the jury charge

and, thus, was egregiously harmed.1

See

Arrington v. State, 413 S.W.3d 106 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2013), re v ’d &

remanded, S.W.3d , No. PD-1448-13,

2015 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 15, 2015 WL

170110 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2013).

On the State’s appeal to the Court of

Criminal Appeals, the Court concluded

appellant was not egregiously harmed, and

remanded the cause to this court for

consideration of appellant’s remaining [*2]

issues on appeal.

On original appeal to this court, appellant

raised five issues: (1) the trial court

committed jury charge error by failing to

give a unanimity instruction as to each

separate criminal incident alleged at trial,

as charged in each separate count/offense

in the indictment; (2) the trial court’s jury

charge error egregiously harmed him; (3)

alternatively, the trial court’s jury charge

1 On appeal, the State conceded the lack of such an instruction in the jury charge was error.

Page 3 of 9

2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2529, *1

JORGE ARISTOTELIDIS
error rendered his trial fundamentally

unfair, in violation of the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of

the United States Constitution; (4) his trial

counsel rendered ineffective assistance of

counsel by failing to object to the State’s

elicitation of expert witness testimony

about the truthfulness of the complainant’s

sexual misconduct accusations; and (5) his

trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

of counsel by failing to object to the

State’s elicitation of lay witness testimony

about the truthfulness of the complainant’s

allegations. Because the State conceded

error (the first issue), and we reversed

based on our conclusion that appellant was

egregiously harmed (the second issue), our

opinion did not address appellant’s final

three arguments. After considering [*3]

these remaining issues, we affirm.

DUE PROCESS

Counts one through five and count seven

against appellant alleged that, on or about

March 26, 2010, appellant committed the

offense of aggravated sexual assault of a

child (H.A.) by intentionally and knowingly

(1) causing the penetration of the female

sexual organ of H.A. by appellant’s male

sexual organ; (2) causing the penetration

of the anus of H.A. by appellant’s male

sexual organ; (3) causing the female sexual

organ of H.A. to contact the mouth of

appellant; (4) causing the penetration of

the mouth of H.A. by appellant’s male

sexual organ; (5) causing the penetration

of the female sexual organ of H.A. by

appellant’s finger; and (7) causing the

penetration of the anus of H.A. by

appellant’s finger. Count six asserted a

charge of indecency with a child by

intentionally and knowingly engaging in

sexual conduct or contact on or about the

same date by causing H.A., who was under

seventeen years of age, to touch part of the

genitals of appellant with the intent to

arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any

person. The State presented evidence of

more than one instance of sexual contact to

support each count; however, the jury

instructions [*4] did not specifically inform

the jurors that they had to be unanimous

about which separate instance of abuse

they believed constituted the commission

of the offense for purposes of each

individual count.2

Instead, the trial court’s

instructions permitted the jurors to consider

whether appellant was guilty of each of the

seven alleged offenses, and the jurors were

provided with seven different verdict forms.

Appellant asserts the trial court’s failure to

submit a unanimity instruction as to each

individual count amounted to fundamental

trial error in violation of the Due Process

Clause to the Fourteenth Amendment to

the U.S. Constitution, which mandates

automatic reversal of his convictions. We

disagree.

HN1 ′′The [U.S. Supreme] Court has held

that although the Sixth Amendment right to

trial by jury requires a unanimous jury

verdict in federal criminal trials, it does not

2

For example, with respect to count one, which alleged that appellant’s male sexual organ penetrated H.A.’s female sexual organ,

H.A.’s testimony presented evidence of two separate criminal acts that would constitute this offense in her description of the events in

her shower and those occurring on the mattress in appellant’s girlfriend’s living room.

Page 4 of 9

2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2529, *2

JORGE ARISTOTELIDIS
require a unanimous jury verdict in state

criminal [*5] trials.′′ McDonald v. City of

Chicago, III., 561 U.S. 742, 766 n.14, 130

S. Ct. 3020, 177 L. Ed. 2d 894 (2010); see

also Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 634 n.

5, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 115 L. Ed. 2d 555

(1991) (′′[A] state criminal defendant, at

least in noncapital cases, has no federal

right to a unanimous jury verdict.′′);

Romero v. State, 396 S.W.3d 136, 147 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet.

ref’d) (recognizing that, although Sixth

Amendment is applicable to the States by

virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, ′′[t]he

United States Constitution clearly does not

grant a right to a unanimous verdict′′);

Phillips v. State, 130 S.W.3d 343, 351 n.6

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004),

aff’d, 193 S.W.3d 904 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006). Therefore, we do not believe the

trial court’s error violated appellant’s

federal due process rights or amounted to

an automatic reversal. Romero, 396 S.W.3d

at 147 (concluding appellant’s argument

lacked merit and proceeding to examine

appellant’s claimed right to unanimity of

jury verdict under only Texas law); see

also Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157,

172-74 (disapproving of cases which

suggest jury charge error requires an

′′automatic′′ reversal).

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF

COUNSEL

In two issues, appellant asserts trial counsel

was ineffective for not objecting to

testimony about the truthfulness of H.A.’s

sexual misconduct accusations.

1. Standard of Review

HN2 We review an appellant’s claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel under the

well-established standard of review. See

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

690, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674

(1984); Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808,

812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The defendant

must show (1) that counsel’s performance

was deficient, i.e., counsel’s assistance fell

below an objective standard of

reasonableness; [*6] and (2) prejudice,

i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been

different. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812. A

reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome. Id. This two-pronged test is the

benchmark for judging whether counsel’s

conduct so undermined the proper

functioning of the adversarial process that

the trial cannot be relied on as having

produced a reliable result. Id.

HN3 Generally, the trial record will not

suffice to establish an ineffective assistance

of counsel claim. Id. at 813-14. When, as

here, ineffective assistance is raised on

direct appeal, appellate counsel and the

court must proceed on a trial record not

developed for the object of litigating or

preserving the claim and thus is often

incomplete or inadequate for this purpose.

Freeman v. State, 125 S.W.3d 505, 506

(Tex. Crim. App. 2003); cf. Massaro v.

United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-05, 123

S. Ct. 1690, 155 L. Ed. 2d 714 (2003).

Nonetheless, some claims may be disposed

of on direct appeal where ′′trial counsel’s

ineffectiveness is so apparent from the

Page 5 of 9

2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2529, *4

JORGE ARISTOTELIDIS
record.′′ Massaro, 538 U.S. at 508;

Freeman, 125 S.W.3d at 507; see also

Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005); Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at

814 n.6. ′′[W]hen no reasonable trial

strategy could justify the trial counsel’s

conduct, counsel’s performance falls below

an objective standard of reasonableness as

a matter of law, regardless of whether the

record adequately [*7] reflects the trial

counsel’s subjective reasons for acting as

[he] did.′′ Andrews, 159 S.W.3d at 102.

When the record contains no evidence of

counsel’s reasons for the challenged

conduct, we ′′’will assume a strategic

motivation if any can possibly be

imagined,’ and will not conclude the

challenged conduct constituted deficient

performance unless the conduct was so

outrageous that no competent attorney

would have engaged in it.′′ Garcia v. State,

57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001);

Moran v. State, 350 S.W.3d 240, 243 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.). Here, no

motion for new trial was filed, and no

post-trial evidentiary hearing was held.

Therefore, our review is limited to the trial

record.

2. School Counselor’s Testimony

During trial, the State asked Lisa McGinnis,

the school counselor, for her opinion on

the truthfulness of H.A.’s accusations and

the State concedes McGinnis answered

direct questions on H.A.’s credibility and

truthfulness. Defense counsel did not

object. Appellant asserts McGinnis was

neither qualified nor presented as an expert

on the subject of ′′manipulation,′′ ′′fantasy,′′

or any other accepted, expert-based aspect

of credibility. Appellant also asserts

McGinnis’s testimony was not presented

as a response to the defense ′′opening the

door.′′ Appellant asserts the State portrayed

McGinnis as an ′′expert′′ at trial. HN4

Expert [*8] testimony that a particular

witness is truthful is inadmissible under

Texas Rule of Evidence 702. Yount v. State,

872 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. Crim. App.

1993).

H.A. had testified she told her friends

about the incidents that occurred over

spring break. McGinnis approached H.A.

twice about rumors, which were circulating

at her elementary school, that H.A. was

pregnant. The first time, H.A. told

McGinnis it was a joke and her friends

made her do it. The second time, H.A. told

McGinnis about the sexual abuse.

When McGinnis took the stand, the State

first questioned her about her qualifications:

Q: And so how long have you worked

as a school counselor?

A: I’ve been a school counselor for 11

years.

Q: And how long have you worked in

school administration.

A: Twenty-one years.

Q: Now, what age groups have you

worked with?

A: Mostly elementary school but the

last two years I worked with middle

schools anywhere from five to 15.

Page 6 of 9

2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2529, *6

JORGE ARISTOTELIDIS
Q: Now, what kind of education do you

have?

A: I have a [sic] early childhood

education degree, a bachelor’s. I have a

master’s in counseling and then a Ph.D.

in counseling and supervision and I’m a

licensed professional counselor outside

of my school counseling certification.

The State then asked her about H.A.’s

credibility:

Q: What did — what details did you

[*9] see that lent credibility to her

story that made you know that she was

telling you the truth?

A: I felt that she was telling me the

truth based on the fact that she had

details, for example, what movie they

were watching; that her brother was

playing PlayStation when it happened

when she was nine; that she could very

much put herself in the situation of

what was going on exactly at that time.

Those were the things that made me

feel like she was telling the truth.

Q: Okay. Now, what told you that those

were the important factors?

A: Based on my experience that I’ve

had with other students, based on my

educational experience. Those were the

things that I fell back on.

Q: So you were trained to look for these

signs?

A: As a counselor, yes.

. . .

Q: . . . I mean, what did she do that

might have happened had she been

giving a false report?

A: . . . The first time I talked to her she

didn’t want to tell me. She was fearful

and that also made me feel like that this

was a truthful report.

[Emphasis added.]

Appellant argues this amounted to an expert

opinion that H.A.’s accusation against him

was the truth. Appellant asserts trial

counsel’s failure to object cannot be

considered trial strategy, and he [*10]

relies on several cases that appear to stand

for the proposition that there are no

circumstances in which allowing a witness

to opine on the truthfulness of the

complainant in a case where there is no

physical or scientific evidence linking the

defendant to the crime and credibility of

the complainant is the primary issue, might

be considered sound trial strategy. See

Fuller v. State, 224 S.W.3d 823, 835 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (′′defense

counsel’s tactic seems to have been to

allow, without objection, the State’s

witnesses to testify to the credibility and

truthfulness of J.W.’s allegations and then,

on cross-examination, to explore the

foundation for that witness’ belief in the

credibility, believability, or truthfulness of

J.W.’s allegations′′); Sessums v. State, 129

S.W.3d 242, 248 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2004, pet. ref’d) (′′[W]e find ourselves

reviewing the activities of trial counsel in

failing to object to clearly and

unquestionably objectionable testimony of

the most outrageous and destructive type.

There is no conceivable strategy or tactic

that would justify allowing this testimony

in front of a jury.′′); Miller v. State, 757

Page 7 of 9

2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2529, *8

JORGE ARISTOTELIDIS
S.W.2d 880, 884 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988,

pet. ref’d) (′′In the present case, we can

glean no sound trial strategy in defense

counsel’s failure to object to the extensive,

inadmissible testimony concerning the only

real issue at trial—complainant’s

credibility.′′); Garcia v. State, 712 S.W.2d

249, 253 (Tex. App.—El Paso, pet. ref’ d)

[*11] (′′counsel should have made and

persisted in valid objections to all of the

testimony which permitted Detective

Calanche and Yolanda Aguilar to pass

upon the credibility of other witnesses′′).

However, after a review of the record, we

do not agree with appellant’s contention

that defense counsel’s performance was

outrageous and lacked any possible

strategic motive. McGinnis was an outcry

witness who spoke to H.A. twice. During

the first conversation, H.A. did not admit

the abuse to McGinnis; instead, H.A. told

McGinnis the pregnancy rumor was merely

a misunderstanding with her friends.

McGinnis admitted H.A. ′′was not

forthcoming in telling me anything that

was going on that was inappropriate.′′

McGinnis did not believe an official report

was necessary, although she informed

H.A.’s mother about the conversation. The

second conversation with H.A. occurred

two days later when another rumor

circulated that not only was H.A. pregnant,

but H.A. thought the baby might be

appellant’s. McGinnis called H.A. back to

her office, and this time, H.A. made her

outcry. McGinnis then made her official

report. The above questioning occurred in

the context of the State asking McGinnis

[*12] what made her believe H.A. enough

to make an official report. During

cross-examination, defense counsel asked

McGinnis only a few questions.

Our review of the record indicates defense

counsel’s strategy in not objecting and

conducting a limited cross-examination

may have been for the purpose of avoiding

emphasizing the matter before the jury.

Also, McGinnis’s testimony was in the

context of her following up on the second

rumor and her decision to make an official

report. We conclude appellant has not

satisfied his burden of proving there was

no imaginable strategy for defense

counsel’s failure to object. Therefore,

appellant has failed to rebut the strong

presumption of effective assistance, and

has not shown that counsel’s conduct was

so outrageous that no competent attorney

would engage in it or that the outcome of

the trial is unreliable due to counsel’s

errors.

3. The Mother’s Testimony

The State also asked H.A.’s mother

questions about H.A.’s truthfulness. HN5

The credibility of a witness may be

supported by evidence in the form of

opinion, but the evidence may only refer to

character for truthfulness and evidence of

truthful character is admissible only after

the character of the witness [*13] for

truthfulness has been attacked. TEX . R.

EVID. 608. Appellant argues he did not

′′open the door′′ by attacking H.A.’s

credibility, so as to allow H.A.’s mother to

provide her opinion on H.A.’s truthfulness.

Appellant points to the following portions

of H.A. ’s mother’s testimony:

Page 8 of 9

2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2529, *10

JORGE ARISTOTELIDIS
Q: And has she, I guess, changed from

her initial reaction of talking about

what happened?

A: You mean — not really, no. You

mean, like personality?

Q: Yes. I mean, is she still fearful and

embarrassed when she talks about it?

A: No but we don’t really talk about it

all that much but I ask her questions

and she’s very honest with her answer

and she’s not — she doesn’t hide the

answers. She tells me the truth.

. . .

Q: You didn’t think this could happen

to your daughter?

A: Yes.

Q: Did you talk to [H.A.] about the fact

that police were going to be involved

and she was going to have to —

A: Yes.

Q: — follow through with that?

A: Yes.

Q: Did you talk to her about how

serious this was?

A: Yes.

Q: Did you ask [H.A.] if she was telling

the truth?

A: Yes.

Q: And what did she say to you?

A: She said yes and she started crying.

[Emphasis added.] Appellant’s counsel did

not object.

On appeal, appellant asserts that because

defense counsel [*14] did not attack H.A.’s

character for truthfulness, it was improper

for the State to elicit this testimony. And,

even if H.A.’s character for truthfulness

had been attacked, the mother’s testimony

was not proper rebuttal testimony.

Therefore, defense counsel’s failure to

object constituted ineffective assistance of

counsel. We disagree.

The mother’s comments were brief and

somewhat vague as to the content of what

H.A. said that was ′′truthful.′′ Our review

of the record indicates defense counsel’s

strategy in not objecting may have been

for the purpose of avoiding emphasizing

the matter before the jury. We conclude

appellant has not satisfied his burden of

proving there was no imaginable strategy

for defense counsel’s failure to object.

Therefore, appellant has failed to rebut the

strong presumption of effective assistance,

and has not shown that counsel’s conduct

was so outrageous that no competent

attorney would engage in it or that the

outcome of the trial is unreliable due to

counsel’s errors.

CONCLUSION

We overrule appellant’s remaining issues

on appeal and affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Do not publish

Page 9 of 9

2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2529, *13

JORGE ARISTOTELIDIS
Envelope Details

https://reviewer.efiletexas.gov/EnvelopeDetails.aspx?envelopeguid=b1d15ec0-100e-11cb-18ce-19fed1f542ff[7/24/2015 10:36:36 AM]

Print this page

Case # PD-0756-15

Case Information

Location Court Of Criminal Appeals

Date Filed 07/22/2015 09:46:31 PM

Case Number PD-0756-15

Case Description

Assigned to Judge

Attorney

Firm Name Individual

Filed By Jorge Aristotelidis

Filer Type Not Applicable

Fees

Convenience Fee $0.00

Total Court Case Fees $0.00

Total Court Filing Fees $0.00

Total Court Service Fees $0.00

Total Filing & Service Fees $0.00

Total Service Tax Fees $0.00

Total Provider Service Fees $0.00

Total Provider Tax Fees $0.00

Grand Total $0.00

Payment

Account Name George W. Aristotelidis

Transaction Amount $0.00

Transaction Response

Transaction ID 10144980

Order # 006186759-0

Petition for Discretionary Review

Filing Type EFileAndServe

Filing Code Petition for Discretionary Review

Filing Description Appellant's Petition for Discretionary Review with

Appendix

Reference Number

Comments Please accept this second filing and disregard the

first one filed on 7/22/2015 at 9:39:29

Status Rejected

Fees

Court Fee $0.00

Service Fee $0.00

Rejection Information

Rejection

Reason Time Rejection Comment
Envelope Details

https://reviewer.efiletexas.gov/EnvelopeDetails.aspx?envelopeguid=b1d15ec0-100e-11cb-18ce-19fed1f542ff[7/24/2015 10:36:36 AM]

Other 07/24/2015 10:34:11

AM

This document is not allowing me to accept it. Please call me at (512)

936-1623.

Documents

Lead Document Petition for Discretionary Review - FINAL - Charles Lavoy

Arrington.pdf [Original]

Attachments Arrington v. State_ 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2529-2.pdf [Original]

eService Details

Name/Email Firm Service Type Status Served Date/Time Opened

Lauren Scott

lscott@bexar.org

Bexar County District

Attorneys Office EServe Sent Yes Not Opened