Present: All the Justices 

THE LAMAR COMPANY, LLC 

v. Record No. 131235 

CITY OF RICHMOND OPINION BY 

 JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 

 April 17, 2014 

ALAN T. SHAIA, ET AL. 

v. Record No. 131249 

CITY OF RICHMOND 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Melvin R. Hughes, Jr., Judge 

 In this appeal, we consider whether the Circuit Court of 

the City of Richmond ("circuit court") erred by holding that 

Code § 15.2-2307 is "merely enabling" legislation and granting 

the demurrer filed by the City of Richmond ("City"). 

I. Facts and Proceedings Below 

These consolidated appeals arise from the circuit court's 

judgment sustaining the City's demurrer and dismissing the 

complaints for declaratory judgment filed by Alan T. Shaia and 

Wayne T. Shaia (the "Shaias") and The Lamar Company, L.L.C. 

("Lamar"). The Shaias are the owners of real property located 

at 501 South 14th Street, on Mayo Island in Richmond, Virginia. 

Lamar leases the property from the Shaias and maintains a 

billboard on the premises which is visible from Interstate 95. 

 The City brought an enforcement action against Lamar and 

the Shaias seeking removal of the billboard, or in the 
2

alternative, requiring the billboard to be lowered to a 

conforming height. Lamar and the Shaias filed separate 

complaints for declaratory judgment against the City alleging 

that "the City may not require removal of [the billboard] if the 

City has been paid taxes for more than 15 years." In response, 

the City filed demurrers, pleas in bar, and motions for 

sanctions against all plaintiffs. The circuit court conducted 

hearings on the City's pleadings on December 14, 2012 and April 

10, 2013. Following the hearings, the circuit court held: 

This suit for declaratory relief under the 

Declaratory Judgment Act, [which] involves 

plaintiffs’ request for a declaration of 

rights and obligations of the parties under 

Va. Code § 15.2-2307[,] is premature as the 

statute is merely enabling law empowering 

local governments the means to enact 

ordinances consistent therewith. Here, 

plaintiffs’ allegations are devoid of any 

reference that the defendant has enacted any 

ordinance under the statute, in the absence 

of which the Complaint is not based on 

present but speculative facts, not ripe for 

judicial assessment and otherwise seeks an 

advisory opinion. 

In its final orders, the circuit court sustained the City's 

demurrers, denied the motions for sanctions, and held that the 

pleas in bar were rendered moot as a result of its ruling on the 

demurrers. 

 Lamar and the Shaias noted their appeals to this Court and 

we awarded an appeal on their single assignment of error: 
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The Circuit Court erred in sustaining the City's 

Demurrer by finding that the Vested Rights Statute in 

VA Code § 15.2-2307 is "merely enabling" legislation 

and that private property owners in the Commonwealth 

do not have these statutory vested rights protections 

unless a local government chooses to adopt an 

implementing ordinance thereunder. Because of this 

fundamental misinterpretation of the Statute, the 

Circuit Court dismissed the Complaint on the Basis 

that Lamar [and the Shaias] could not allege, as a 

condition precedent for a vested rights claim, that 

Richmond City Council had passed an ordinance to 

implement the 2008 Amendment. 

II. Analysis 

A. Standard of Review 

 Whether Code § 15.2-2307 is enabling legislation is a 

question of law which we review de novo. See Conyers v. Martial 

Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 

178 (2007). 

B. Is Code § 15.2-2307 Merely Enabling Legislation? 

When interpreting a statute this Court applies wellestablished rules of statutory construction. In Laws v. 

McIlroy, 283 Va. 594, 598, 724 S.E.2d 699, 702 (2012), we 

stated: "When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are 

bound by the plain meaning of that language. Furthermore, we 

must give effect to the legislature's intention as expressed by 

the language used unless a literal interpretation of the 

language would result in a manifest absurdity." (Internal 

quotation marks omitted.) 
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Dillon's Rule provides that "municipal corporations have 

only those powers that are expressly granted, those necessarily 

or fairly implied from expressly granted powers, and those that 

are essential and indispensable." Marble Techs., Inc. v. City 

of Hampton, 279 Va. 409, 417, 690 S.E.2d 84, 88 (2010)(internal 

quotation marks omitted). Enabling legislation is the 

mechanism by which the General Assembly "expressly grants" power 

to local governments. Therefore, by nature, enabling acts are 

permissive. See, e.g., Shealor v. City of Lodi, 145 P.2d 574, 

575, 577 (Cal. 1944); Huggins v. Wacaster, 266 S.W.2d 58, 60 

(Ark. 1954). In contrast, restrictive legislation limits the 

power of local governments. See Marble Techs., 279 Va. at 418-

19, 690 S.E.2d at 88-89. Applying these principles, we must 

decide whether the General Assembly intended to grant or 

restrict power when enacting Code § 15.2-2307. 

Code § 15.2-2307 provides, in relevant part, that: 

[N]otwithstanding any local ordinance to the 

contrary, if . . . the owner of the building 

or structure has paid taxes to the locality 

for such building or structure for a period 

in excess of 15 years, a zoning ordinance 

may provide that the building or structure 

is nonconforming, but shall not provide that 

such building or structure is illegal and 

shall be removed solely due to such 

nonconformity. 

The opening clause, "[n]otwithstanding any local ordinance to 

the contrary," demonstrates the General Assembly's intent to 

forbid local governments from declaring an existing building or 
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structure illegal after taxes have been paid for 15 years or 

more.* Similarly, the General Assembly signaled its intent to 

limit local authority by including this restrictive language: "a 

zoning ordinance . . . shall not provide that such building or 

structure is illegal and shall be removed solely due to such 

nonconformity." Id. Based on the plain language of the 

statute, we hold that the fourth paragraph of Code § 15.2-2307 

cannot be construed as an enabling provision. 

III. Conclusion 

The circuit court erred by holding that Code § 15.2-2307 is 

"merely enabling" legislation. We will reverse the circuit 

court's judgment and will remand this case for further 

proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 

Reversed and remanded. 

 

*

 "Notwithstanding" is defined as "despite [or] in spite of." 

Black’s Law Dictionary, 1168 (9th ed. 2009). The Court of 

Appeals of Virginia, using Webster’s Dictionary, defined 

"notwithstanding" as "without prevention or obstruction from or 

by." Green v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 567, 569-70, 507 S.E.2d 

627 (1998).