NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

__________________________ 

JOANN SPIGNER, 

Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, SECRETARY OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

__________________________ 

2012-7019 

__________________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in case no. 10-0759, Judge Mary J. 

Schoelen. 

__________________________ 

Decided: March 9, 2012 

__________________________ 

JOANN SPIGNER, of Dallas, Texas, pro se. 

NICHOLAS JABBOUR, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department 

of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. 

With him on the brief were TONY WEST, Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, and Martin 

F. Hockey, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief was 
2 SPIGNER v. DVA

MICHAEL J. TIMINSKI, Deputy Assistant General Counsel, 

United States Department of Veterans Affairs, of Washington, DC. 

__________________________ 

Before RADER, Chief Judge, BRYSON and LINN, Circuit 

Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Joann Spigner (“Spigner”) appeals from a final decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans 

Claims (“Veterans Court”), affirming a decision of the 

Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”), which denied her 

claim for entitlement to dependency and indemnity compensation (“DIC”) benefits pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1151. 

Spigner v. Shinseki, No. 10-0759 (Vet. App. June 14, 

2011). Because Spigner appeals only factual determinations and the application of law to the facts of her case, 

this court lacks authority to review the issues presented 

and dismisses her appeal. 

BACKGROUND

Spigner’s now-deceased husband (“Mr. Spigner”) 

served on active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1951 

to 1954. In February 1987, Mr. Spigner was admitted to a 

Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) medical center for 

treatment of Korsakoff’s syndrome. While an inpatient at 

the VA medical center, on May 4, 1987, Mr. Spigner 

slipped and fell on a wet floor. Mr. Spigner complained 

about, and was treated for, an injury to his left elbow as a 

result of this fall. A few days later, on May 7, 1987, Mr. 

Spigner was released from the VA medical center. 

In December 1993, Mr. Spigner died in his home. The 

death certificate indicated that the immediate cause of his 

death was ischemic heart disease and that the underlying 

cause was arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease. Cerebral vascular disease was also listed as another “significant condition” contributing to his death, but not the 
 SPIGNER v. DVA 3

underlying cause. Similarly, the autopsy report stated 

that his death was “the result of sudden cardiac arrest 

because the vessels that supply the heart muscle itself 

with blood had been narrowed and reduced.” At the time 

of his death, Mr. Spigner was receiving non-serviceconnected disability benefits. 

In 2005, Spigner filed an application seeking DIC 

benefits pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1151. The VA regional 

office requested a medical opinion as to whether Mr. 

Spigner’s fall at the VA medical center in 1987 contributed to his death in 1993. The VA doctor concluded that 

the two events were unrelated and noted that it was 

unlikely that any documented injury from the 1987 fall 

contributed in any way to Mr. Spigner’s death from heart 

disease in 1993. Accordingly, the regional office denied 

Spigner’s claim for DIC benefits. In February 2010, the 

Board affirmed the decision of the regional office. Spigner 

appealed the Board’s decision to the Veterans Court, 

which on June 14, 2011, affirmed the Board’s decision. 

Spigner appeals. 

DISCUSSION

This court’s authority to review decisions of the Veterans Court is limited. In appeals from the Veterans 

Court not presenting a constitutional question, this court 

“may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to 

the facts of a particular case.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). 

See, e.g., Johnson v. Derwinski, 949 F.2d 394, 395 (Fed. 

Cir. 1991). Spigner raises three primary arguments on 

appeal; each is addressed in turn. 

First, Spigner argues that the Veterans Court improperly applied § 1151 to the facts of her case. Specifically, Spigner disagrees with the factual basis for the 

decision of the Veteran’s Court that Mr. Spigner’s fall in 

1987 did not contribute to his death in 1993. The application of § 1151 to the facts of Spigner’s case does not raise 
4 SPIGNER v. DVA

an issue within this court’s authority to review. 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7292(d)(2). 

Second, Spigner argues that the Veterans Court applied § 1151 to the facts of her case in a manner inconsistent with Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994). This 

argument is inapposite. Gardner dealt only with whether 

§ 1151 required a showing that the VA was at fault, id. at 

116, an issue that was not the basis of the Veterans 

Court’s decision here. Here, the question of fault for the 

fall was not at issue. The only issue was whether Mr. 

Spigner’s death was caused by his injury at the VA facility. The Veterans Court found that sufficient evidence 

supported the Board’s conclusion that his elbow injury in 

1987 did not cause his death from ischemic heart disease 

in 1993. Moreover, § 1151 has been amended substantially in response to the decision in Gardner. See Bartlett 

v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 328, 330 n.2 (2011) (“The legislative history is clear that the change [in section 1151] was 

generated to overturn the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 

in Brown v. Gardner.”). 

Finally, Spigner also challenges some of the factual 

findings of the Veterans Court as unconstitutional because the Veterans Court “gave more weight” to the 

Board’s findings than to Spigner’s evidence. This argument does not raise a constitutional question and is 

essentially a challenge to the Veterans Court’s weighing 

of the evidence, a factual matter entirely outside the scope 

of this court’s review authority. Maxson v. Gober, 230 

F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Helfer v. West, 

174 F.3d 1332, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[C]haracterization 

of [a] question as constitutional in nature does not confer 

upon us jurisdiction that we otherwise lack.”). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Spigner’s appeal is dismissed. 

DISMISSED 
 SPIGNER v. DVA 5

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.