alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
@misc{1206986,
  author = {Bill Newhouse and Josephine Long and David Weitzel and Jason Warren and Michael Thompson and Chris Yates and Hillary Tran and Alicia Mink and Aurora Herriott and Tom Cottle},
  title = {Cybersecurity Framework Profile for Liquefied Natural Gas},
  year = {2023},
  month = {2023-06-08 04:06:00},
  publisher = {NIST Interagency/Internal Report (NISTIR), National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD},
  url = {https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=936608},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8406},
  language = {en},
}
| 1) | the      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2) | the      information in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the      financial condition and results of operations of the    Company. |
|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Dated:       November 23, 2009 |   |   | /s/      Daniel D. Correa                                                                           |   |
|-------------------------------------|--------|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                                |   |   | Daniel      D. CorreaChief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer and      Director   |   |
|                                |   |   | (Principal      Executive Officer & Principal Financial Officer)                                |   |
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : Crim. No. 10-854(FSH)

v. :

LUIS MENDEZ-RIVERA : REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

 

This matter having come before the Court by way of referral from the Hon. Faith S.

Hochberg to conduct a proceeding pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 and to issue a report and

recommendation regarding the defendant’s entry of a guilty plea; and the Court having

considered the written consent by the defendant and defense counsel to have the proceeding

before the Undersigned; and the Undersigned having conducted a proceeding pursuant to Fed. R.

Crim. P. 11; and as more fully set forth and reflected in the transcript of proceedings dated April

7, 2011, the Court makes the following report:

1. The defendant consented to the entry of a guilty plea before a United States Magistrate

Judge, subject to the defendant’s ability to file any written objections to the findings and

recommendations contained in this report and orally stated at the Rule 11 proceeding and subject

to its adoption by the United States District Judge;

2. The defendant fully understood the oath and consequences of failing to tell the truth at

the plea hearing;

3. The defendant fully understood the nature of the charges and the consequences of the

guilty plea, including the maximum penalties that the defendant faces;

4. The defendant fully understood that while the United States Sentencing Guidelines

are not binding, they will be considered;

5. The defendant fully understood the right to plead “not guilty” and to be tried by a jury,

Case 2:10-cr-00854-MCA Document 40 Filed 04/07/11 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 99
with the assistance of counsel, and that the defendant would have the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses, call witnesses and compel the production of evidence if the defendant so

chose, and to remain silent or testify, if the defendant so chose;

6. The defendant fully understood that if the guilty plea is accepted, then there would be

no trial in this case;

7. The defendant was fully competent and capable of entering an informed guilty plea;

8. The defendant’s waiver of the right to file an appeal and to file a post-conviction

challenge, and the plea were free, knowing, and voluntary; and

9. There is a factual basis to support the plea of guilty.

Based upon the foregoing, and based upon the transcript of the proceedings, it is on this

7 day of April, 2011, recommended to the United States District Judge that the defendant’s plea th

of guilty be accepted and that a judgment of guilt to Count 1 of the Indictment be entered.

Respectfully,

s/Patty Shwartz 

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE

FAILURE TO FILE WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN THE FOREGOING REPORT, WITHIN

FOURTEEN DAYS OF RECEIPT OF SAME, MAY BAR DE NOVO DETERMINATION

BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE OF AN ISSUE COVERED HEREIN AND

SHALL BAR APPELLATE REVIEW OF SUCH FACTUAL FINDINGS AS MAY BE

ACCEPTED OR ADOPTED BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Case 2:10-cr-00854-MCA Document 40 Filed 04/07/11 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 100
#### BOUCHER INVENTIONS, Limited, et al. v. SOLA ELECTRIC CO. et al.

Civil Action No. 615.

District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia.

Jan. 24, 1941.

See, also, D.C., 35 F.Supp. 504.

*632John Howard Joynt and Ward, both of Washington, plaintiffs. Herbert D. G, for

Leslie W. Fricke, of Chicago, Ill., and Nelson J. Jewett, of Washington, D. C., for defendants.

BAILEY, Justice.

Affidavits contrary to those of the defendants were submitted to the Court and filed in the records of the case, being those of Aubrey E. Noble, filed January 16, 1941; George Gordon Payne, the court reporter who wrote the transcript of the testimony, filed January 16, 1941; supplementary affidavit of George Gordon Payne filed January 23, 1941; Herbert S. Ward and John Howard Joynt, attorneys for plaintiffs, filed January 23, 1941.

The transcript of the testimony made by the reporter is in accordance with my recollection of the testimony. This was my recollection when the question of the correctness of the transcript was first made, but I have had some difficulty in understanding the proper practice under the new Rules. There is no official reporter in our Court, and it would seem that there is no “official record” in the sense that the transcript of testimony by the reporter is a “record”, and it would seem that the power of the Court so far as a statement of the evidence is concerned, is limited to settling any dispute between the parties as to what the evidence before the Court actually was.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                         664,917
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,316,255
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (199,746)
<INVENTORY>                                  1,322,153
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 8,328
<PP&E>                                       1,649,832
<DEPRECIATION>                              (1,501,174)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,260,565
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,050,956
<BONDS>                                         41,307
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  5,293,095
<COMMON>                                       316,957
<OTHER-SE>                                  (3,441,750)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 3,260,565
<SALES>                                      4,838,367
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             4,838,367
<CGS>                                        2,260,947
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,260,947
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             2,468,474
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               7,157
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                101,789
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            101,789
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   101,789
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (0.13)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.13)



</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-50845 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus LUIS RICO-URITA, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. P-98-CR-53-1

- - - - - - - - - - April 6, 1999 Before DAVIS, DUHE’, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Luis Rico-Urita appeals the sentence he received after he pleaded guilty to importing marijuana and possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. Rico argues that the district court’s determination that there was no evidence of a larger drug smuggling operation was clearly erroneous. Rico also argues that the district court misapplied U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 when it stated that Rico failed to show that he was “less culpable than anyNo. -2- other drug courier.” Rico, however, failed to meet his burden of

proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, his reduced role in the offense. United States v. Zuniga , 18 F.3d 1254, 1261 (5th Cir. 1994). AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATION



I, Larry Reid, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Cleartronic, Inc.;



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4. I am the only certifying officer responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:



(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under my supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



(b )Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under my supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;



(c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report my conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



(d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and



5. I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the Board of Directors:



(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



Date: August 20, 2018



/s/ Larry M. Reid

Larry Reid, Principal Financial Officer
Exhibit
      32.2 Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
      to
      Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.




In
      connection with the Annual Report of Calgon Carbon Corporation (the “Company”)
      on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2007 as filed with the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Leroy
      M. Ball, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
      § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to
      the best of my knowledge:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial conditions and result of operations of the Company for the periods
      presented therein.





Leroy
                M. BallChief
                Financial OfficerMarch
                17, 2008





(A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
      authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
      in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
      by Section 906, has been provided to Calgon Carbon Corporation and will be
      retained by Calgon Carbon Corporation and furnished to the Securities and
      Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.)





This
      certification accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by
      the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of
      Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
#### AMP INCORPORATED, Plaintiff, v. Akin AKSU, d.b.a. Program Data Company, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 8611.

United States District Court M. D. Pennsylvania.

Dec. 18, 1964.

Hull, Leiby & Metzer, Harrisburg, Pa., for plaintiff.

Nauman, Smith, Shissler & Hall, Harrisburg, Pa., for defendant.

FOLLMER, District Judge.

In this action plaintiff seeks to enjoin defendant, its former employee, from disclosing any confidential information or trade secrets acquired by him in the course of his employment by plaintiff; from using or imparting such confidential information; seeks to have defendant required to divulge to plaintiff information relative to any inventions made by him which come within the scope of defendant’s invention agreement; seeks to have defendant required to perform invention agreement, and to account for and pay plaintiff profits acquired by any breach of agreement.

There is before the Court the following motions filed by defendant:

> 1. !For partial dismissal.

> 2. For protective order.

Defendant contends that restrictive provision for a two year period following termination of employment is unconscionable and its enforcement contrary to public policy.

I find nothing illegal, unconscionable nor unreasonable in the two year restrictive period in this case. A. F. Holden Co. v. O’Brien et al., D.C.E.D. *602Pa., 73 USPQ 481 (1947); Pankas v. Bell, 413 Pa. 494, 198 A.2d 312 (1964).

Motion for partial dismissal is denied.

Motion for protective order is denied at this time. At the taking of depositions if questions are asked clearly above and beyond the scope of proper inquiry, defendant may refuse to answer. The matter may then be referred to the Court at which time an appropriate order may be made.
Exhibit
23.1 CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM





We
consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statements No.
333-34019, 333-01019, 333-52199, 333-133389 and 333-133391 on Form S-8 of our
reports dated March 13, 2009, relating to the financial statements (which report
expresses an unqualified opinion and includes an explanatory paragraph regarding
the Company’s adoption of new accounting standards) and financial statement
schedule of Calgon Carbon Corporation and subsidiaries, and the effectiveness of
Calgon Carbon Corporation and subsidiaries’ internal control over financial
reporting, appearing in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Calgon Carbon
Corporation and subsidiaries for the year ended December 31, 2008.




Deloitte
& Touche LLP




Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania


March 13,
2009
<Page>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements on Form S-3 (No. 333-20915) and Form S-8 (Nos. 333-20961, 333-34987,
333-66227, 333-40298, 333-100482 and 333-109534) of Abington Bancorp, Inc. of
our report dated February 26, 2004, relating to the financial statements which
appears in this Form 10-K.

/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Boston, Massachusetts
March 10, 2004
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Elder, Clemen ts and Senior Judge Annunziata

HARRY CARTER MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 0105-06-2 PER CURIAM AUGUST 15, 2006 EAGLE GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION (Harry Carter, pro se , on brief). (C. Ervin Reid; Wright, Robinson, Osthimer & Tatum, on brief), for appellees.

Harry Carter appeals a decision of the Wo rkers’ Compensation Co mmission finding that his request for review of the deputy commi ssioner’s October 5, 2005 opinion was not timely filed pursuant to Code § 65.2-705 and, therefore, th e commission lacked jurisdiction to consider the review request. We have reviewed the record and the commission’ s opinion and find that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the commission in its final opinion. See Carter v. Eagle Global Logistics , VWC File No. 206-84-33 (Dec. 2, 2005). We dispense with oral argument and summarily affirm because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials be fore the Court and argum ent would not aid the decisional process. See Code § 17.1-403; Rule 5A:27.

Affirmed.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.
#### THEISS v. OWENS-ILLINOIS GLASS CO.

No. 9227.

District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania.

Feb. 19, 1940.

Clair D. Moss, of Pittsburgh, Pa., for plaintiff.

John M. Reed, of Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendant.

SCHOONMAKER, District Judge.

On January 19, 1940, the court struck from the record in this case the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, because of noncompliance with Rule 59 (b), Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, in that the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial was not served within .ten days after the entry of judgment.

We are of the opinion that we cannot now enlarge the time of serving the motion for a new trial, for Rule 6 (b) specifically states that the court "may not enlarge the period for taking any action under Rule 59, except as stated in subdivision (c) thereof.”

We therefore deny the motion to set aside the order of court striking the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondent

v. GAVIN JOSEPH CERCO, Petitioner : : : : : : : : : : : No. 943 MAL 2014 Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER PER CURIAM AND NOW , this 17th day of June, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED
.
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Alphonso Simmons, Appellant, v M. Harrehand, Warden, Manhattan Detention Center, Respondent.

[852 NYS2d 838]

To the extent petitioner is directly challenging the delay between his arrest and arraignment as unconstitutionally excessive, that claim is moot because he has been arraigned. Moreover, he has been convicted and sentenced in the underlying criminal proceeding. To the extent petitioner is claiming that certain evidence should be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful detention or delay in arraignment, that claim is unpreserved for purposes of the present appeal, and in any event it may not be raised by way of habeas corpus *(see e.g. People ex rel. Grant v Scully,*190 AD2d 543 [1993], *appeal dismissed*92 NY2d 946 [1998]). Concur-Mazzarelli, J.P, Andrias, Williams, Buckley and Acosta, JJ.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### International Trade Commission

          - [Investigation No. 731-TA-1012 (Review)]

                    On the basis of the record [1]                                          developed in the subject five-year review, the United States International Trade Commission (Commission) determines, pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1675(c)), that revocation of the antidumping duty order on certain frozen fish fillets from Vietnam would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury to an industry in the United States within a reasonably foreseeable time.                

## Background

                    The Commission instituted this review on July 1, 2008 (73 FR 37487) and determined on October 6, 2008 that it would conduct a full review (73 FR 62318, October 20, 2008). Notice of the scheduling of the Commission's review and of a public hearing to be held in connection therewith was given by posting copies of the notice in the Office of the Secretary, U.S. International Trade Commission, Washington, DC, and by publishing the notice in the                     **Federal Register**                     on January 15, 2009 (74 FR 2616). The hearing was held in Washington, DC, on May 6, 2009, and all persons who requested the opportunity were permitted to appear in person or by counsel.                

                    The Commission transmitted its determination in this review to the Secretary of Commerce on June 26, 2009. The views of the Commission are contained in USITC Publication 4083 (June 2009), entitled                     *Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from Vietnam: Investigation No. 731-TA-1012 (Review).*

By order of the Commission.

Issued: June 26, 2009.

Marilyn R. Abbott,

Secretary to the Commission.

# Footnotes

1.                             The record is defined in sec. 207.2(f) of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure (19 CFR 207.2(f)).                    
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[FR Doc. E9-15797 Filed 7-2-09; 8:45 am]

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