alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 127 (Monday, July 6, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 32012]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-15911]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION


Interest Rates

    The Small Business Administration publishes an interest rate called 
the optional ``peg'' rate (13 CFR 120.214) on a quarterly basis. This 
rate is a weighted average cost of money to the government for 
maturities similar to the average SBA direct loan. This rate may be 
used as a base rate for guaranteed fluctuating interest rate SBA loans. 
This rate will be 3.5 (3\1/2\) percent for the July-September quarter 
of FY 2009.
    Pursuant to 13 CFR 120.921(b), the maximum legal interest rate for 
any third party lender's commercial loan which funds any portion of the 
cost of a 504 project (see 13 CFR 120.801) shall be 6% over the New 
York Prime rate or, if that exceeds the maximum interest rate permitted 
by the constitution or laws of a given State, the maximum interest rate 
will be the rate permitted by the constitution or laws of the given 
State.

Richard C. Blewett,
Acting Director, Office of Financial Assistance.
[FR Doc. E9-15911 Filed 7-2-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
EXHIBIT 32.2

                                  CERTIFICATION
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
           AS ADOPTED BY SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         I, Hiram M.  Lazar,  as Chief  Financial  Officer of  Franklin  Capital
Corporation (the "COMPANY") certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted
by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

         (1) the  accompanying  Form 10-K report for the period ending  December
31,  2003 as  filed  with the  U.S.  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  (the
"REPORT") fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

         (2) the  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.



Dated:  March 30, 2004                               /s/ Hiram M. Lazar
                                                     ------------------
                                                     Hiram M. Lazar
                                                     Chief Financial Officer


A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided  to  Franklin  Capital  Corporation  and will be  retained  by Franklin
Capital  Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange  Commission or
its staff upon request.
Exhibit 99.1
                                  ------------


                  Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350,
                       As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906
                        of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of Procyon Corporation (the "Company") on
Form 10-K for the year ended June 30, 2002, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, the undersigned
President and acting Principal Executive, Financial and Accounting Officer of
the Company, do certify, to my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
          the Company.

Dated:  September 27, 2002


/s/ JOHN C. ANDERSON
--------------------
John C. Anderson
President and acting Principal Executive,
Financial and Accounting Officer
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 01-30022

Summary Calendar

 

WENDELL V. GRAY,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

JAMES M. LEBLANC, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 00-CV-1331-J

--------------------

November 21, 2001

Before DAVIS, BENAVIDES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Wendell V. Gray, Louisiana prisoner # 300228, was granted a

certificate of appealability (COA) on the issue whether the

district court erred in dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition

as barred by the one-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d). Gray argues that the limitations period should be

equitably tolled during the time that he diligently sought a copy

of the transcript of the postconviction evidentiary hearing which

was allegedly necessary to enable him to file a writ application

to the Louisiana court of appeal. Gray has not shown that the
No. 01-30022 

-2-

transcript of the postconviction evidentiary hearing was

necessary to enable him to file a writ application to the

Louisiana court of appeal. The limitations period was tolled

from the time that Gray filed his state habeas application on

October 24, 1997, to the date that the state trial court denied

the application on September 4, 1998. See § 2244(d)(2). Prior

to October 24, 1997, 203 days of the one-year limitations period

had elapsed. The limitations period was not tolled from

September 4, 1998, to March 19, 1999, during the period in which

Gray did not have a writ application to the court of appeal

pending. See Melancon v. Kaylo, 259 F.3d 401, 407 (5th Cir.

2001). Gray’s motion to correct an illegal sentence filed on

February 11, 1999, did not toll the limitations period under

§ 2244(d)(2). During this period, 195 days of the limitations

period elapsed. Because Rule 4-3 of the Louisiana Uniform Rules

of the Courts of Appeal allowed the court of appeal to consider

Gray’s untimely writ application and the court of appeal did

consider Gray’s writ application on the merits, Gray’s writ

application to the Louisiana court of appeal was properly filed. 

See id. at 405. However, as of March 19, 1999, the time in which

the limitations period was running exceeded 365 days. Therefore,

Gray’s federal habeas petition was barred by the one-year statute

of limitations. Further, Gray is not entitled to equitable

tolling because he waited approximately six months from the state

trial court’s denial of his habeas application to file a writ

application to the Louisiana court of appeal and because he

waited an additional two months from the Louisiana Supreme
No. 01-30022 

-3-

Court’s denial of his writ application to file his federal habeas

petition. See Melancon, 259 F.3d at 407-08; Coleman v. Johnson,

184 F.3d 398, 403 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1564

(2000).

AFFIRMED.
S04A1127.

#### KINARD et al. v. RYMAN FARM HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC. et al.

(598 SE2d 479)

Thompson, Justice.

Appellees Ryman Farm Homeowners’ Association, Inc. and its individual property owners brought a complaint for injunctive relief against appellants Robert Kinard, Kinard Realty, Inc., and Kinard Development, Inc. (Kinard), to prevent the development of the fourth phase of a residential subdivision known as The Ryman Farm. The trial court granted the requested relief. Finding no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in that ruling, we affirm.

The evidence showed that the development of Ryman Farm began in 1993, at which time a Declaration of Covenants, Restrictions, and Easements was filed in Whitfield County. The development was to be completed in several stages. Amendments to the declaration of covenants were filed on three occasions to extend to Phases II, III and IV of construction. The property which was to be developed as Phase IV was deeded to Kinard in 2003. The homeowners’ association believed that Kinard’s proposed development of Phase IV deviated from the declaration of covenants in certain respects. As a result, the homeowners’ association brought the present complaint seeking equitable relief, breach of the declaration of covenants, and attorney fees. The trial court granted an interlocutory injunction to maintain the status quo while the legal issues were to be litigated.

“ ‘The purpose for granting interlocutory injunctions is to preserve the status quo, as well as balance the conveniences of the parties, pending a final adjudication of the case.’ ” *Atlanta Dwellings v. Wright,*272 Ga. 231, 233 (527 SE2d 854) (2000). The trial court has broad discretion under OCGA § 9-5-8 in deciding whether to grant a request for an interlocutory injunction. *West v. Koufman,*259 Ga. 505 (384 SE2d 664) (1989).

In balancing the equities the trial court determined that the proposed development of Phase IV will diminish the value of other properties in Ryman Farm; that the homeowners’ association will suffer immediate and irreparable injury unless Kinard is temporarily enjoined from implementing his proposed plan; and that the denial of equitable relief will leave the homeowners’ association “practically remediless” should they prevail in their claim for breach of the declaration of covenants. Conversely, the court found that Kinard will *150not be oppressed by maintaining the status quo and that he will have a remedy at law should he ultimately prevail. Inasmuch as these findings are supported by the record, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

Decided June 28, 2004.

*William W. Keith III, Edward Hine, Jr.,*for appellants.

*Brinson, Askew, Berry, Seigler & Richardson, C. King Askew, MarkM. J. Webb, Waycaster, Morris &Dean, R. Leslie Waycaster, Jr.,*for appellees.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
**EXHIBIT
      32** **.1**




**CERTIFICATIONS
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
      2002**




Richard
      D. Bailey, in the capacity of the officer who performs the functions of
      Principal Executive Officer of Conihasset Capital Partners, Inc., a Delaware
      corporation (the “Registrant”), certifies that:




1.
      The
      Registrant’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2007
      (the “Form 10-Q”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




2.
      The
      information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Registrant.


/s/Richard
                D. BaileyRichard
                D. BaileyChief
                Executive Officer




Date:
      May
      15, 2007
#### COONEY v. GUILD CO.

District Court, S. D. New York.

March 26, 1940.

Frank, Weil & Strouse, of New York City, for plaintiff.

Putney, Twombly & Hall, of New York City, for defendant.

HULBERT, District Judge.

Plaintiff served notice of the taking of the deposition of the defendant corporation by its president, and vice president and secretary. During the examination of the President he was unable to answer certain questions from memory. Plaintiff then formally moved for an order directing the clerk to issue a subpoena duces tecum for the production of books and records of the defendant pursuant to Rule 45(d), Rules of Civil Procedure for District Courts, 28 U. S.C.A. following section 723c. Such orders are ordinarily endorsed, ex parte, upon the subpoena duces tecum and the party or person served may apply to vacate the subpoena'or ask for alternative relief.

The only question presented upon this motion arises from the fact that plaintiff’s assignor, formerly employed by defendant, is now engaged in a competitive business and the production of the books and records sought might result in a disclosure of information and be used to the defendant’s injury. That objection is fully met by the proposal of the plaintiff’s counsel upon the argument and the motion is granted subject to that condition. Counsel should be able to agree upon an order containing a safeguard provision which will fully protect the defendant. Otherwise, settle order o-n notice.
1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

SHARON SCHUTH

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE

Commissioner of Social Security,

 Defendant.

11-CV-00482-WJM

 

ORDER

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the 

Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1); the Court having reviewed the filings submitted by the 

Defendant; the Court noting that the Plaintiff by her letter of July 4, 2011 indicated that 

she will not be making any filings in opposition; the Court noting that in Califano v. 

Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 108 (1977), the Supreme Court held that the Social Security Act 

“clearly limits judicial review to a particularly type of agency action, a ‘final decision of 

the Secretary made after a hearing’”; the Court recognizing that Congress intended to 

avoid litigation involving stale and belated claims, Id.; the Court noting the Third 

Circuit’s holding that a decision not to consider an untimely request for review is not the 

“final decision” required before jurisdiction may be exercised, Bacon v. Sullivan, 969 

F.2d 1517, 1519 (3d Cir. 1992); the Court recognizing that the exercise of jurisdiction 

has previously been deemed inappropriate when a plaintiff seeks review of an ALJ’s 

Case 2:11-cv-00482-WJM Document 9 Filed 07/14/11 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 121
2

dismissal of a claim after receiving an untimely request for a hearing, See, e.g., Courtney 

v. Choplin, 195 F. Supp. 2d 649, 650; Whitelock v. Califano, 451 F. Supp. 541, 543

(E.D.Pa. 1978); the Court finding that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff 

did not first obtain a final decision from the Social Security Administration after a 

hearing, See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); and for good cause appearing,

IT IS on this 12th day of July 2011, hereby,

ORDERED that Defendant’s motion is GRANTED, and it is further ORDERED 

that Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED.

 /s/ William J. Martini 

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.

Case 2:11-cv-00482-WJM Document 9 Filed 07/14/11 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 122
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 September 29, 2015

a0921

Order 

Clerk

September 29, 2015

150509(23)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 150509

COA: 323479

Genesee CC: 08-023349-FH

HAROLD ARMSTEAD JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s July 28, 2015 

order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was 

entered erroneously.
July 21, 2015

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

JESSICA SHANNON, Appellant

NO. 14-14-00359-CV V.

MEMORIAL DRIVE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH U.S., Appellee

________________________________

This cause, an appeal from the judgment in favor of appellee, Memorial 

Drive Presbyterian Church U.S., signed April 21, 2014, was heard on the transcript 

of the record. We have inspected the record and conclude the trial court erred in 

dismissing appellant Jessica Shannon’s claims for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction and rendering summary judgment as to Shannon’s claims other than 

intentional infliction of emotional distress. We therefore order that the portions of 

the judgment dismissing Shannon’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

and rendering summary judgment on Shannon’s claims other than intentional 

infliction of emotional distress are REVERSED and ordered severed and 

REMANDED for proceedings in accordance with this court's opinion.

Further, we find no error in the judgment on Shannon’s claim for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress and order it AFFIRMED.

We order appellee, Memorial Drive Presbyterian Church U.S., to pay all 

costs incurred in this appeal. 

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 131 (Friday, July 10, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 33207-33208]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-16287]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration


Application(s) for Duty-Free Entry of Scientific Instruments

Pursuant to Section 6(c) of the Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Materials Importation Act of 1966 (Pub. L. 89-651, as amended by Pub. 
L. 106-36; 80 Stat. 897; 15 CFR part 301), we invite comments on the 
question of whether instruments of equivalent scientific value, for the 
purposes for which the instruments shown below are intended to be used, 
are being manufactured in the United States.

Comments must comply with 15 CFR 301.5(a)(3) and (4) of the regulations 
and be postmarked on or before July 30, 2009. Address written comments 
to Statutory Import Programs Staff, Room 3720, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Washington, D.C. 20230. Applications may be examined between 
8:30 a.m. and 5 p.m. at the U.S. Department of Commerce in Room 3720.
    Docket Number: 09-032. Applicant: National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory, 1617 Cole Blvd., Golden, Colorado 80401. Instrument: 
MicroTime 200 Single Molecule Fluorescence Lifetime Imaging System. 
Manufacturer: PicoQuant GmbH, Germany. Intended

[[Page 33208]]

Use: This instrument will be used in biomass characterization. The 
instrument will be capable of doing Fluorescence Lifetime Imaging, 
measuring Fluorescence resonance Energy Transfer and Fluorescence 
Correlation Spectroscopy for single fluorescent molecules. 
Justification for Duty-Free Entry: There are no instruments of the same 
general category being manufactured within the United States. 
Application accepted by Commissioner of Customs: June 17, 2009.
    Docket Number: 09-034. Applicant: University of Georgia, 1151 East 
Whitehall Rd., Athens, GA 30605. Instrument: Gasification Unit. 
Manufacturer: Termoquip Energia Alternativa LTDA, Brazil. Intended Use: 
This instrument will be use to turn biomass into syngas, which is 
composed of hydrogen and carbon monoxide that can be catalytically 
upgraded to liquid fuel, chemicals and energy. Justification for Duty-
Free Entry: There are no instruments of the same general category being 
manufactured within the United States. Application accepted by 
Commissioner of Customs: June 2, 2009.

    Dated: July 1, 2009.
Christopher Cassel,
Acting Director, IA Subsidies Enforcement Office.
[FR Doc. E9-16287 Filed 7-9-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-S
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONOF CHIEF EXECUTIVE**

**OFFICEROF HILAND HOLDINGS GP, LP**

**PURSUANTTO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

 

In connection with theaccompanying quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the three months ended March 31,2008 and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “Report”), I, Joseph L. Griffin, Chief Executive Officer and President ofHiland Partners GP Holdings, LLC, the general partner of Hiland Holdings GP, LP(the “Company”), hereby certify, pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

1.             The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.             The information contained in the Report fairly presents,in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations ofthe Company.

 
| Date: May 9, 2008 |   | /s/ Joseph L. Griffin                  |
|------------------------|--------|----------------------------------------|
|                   |   | Joseph L. Griffin                      |
|                   |   | Chief Executive Officer and  President |

 

----
#### In the Matter of Jose Giraldo, Respondent, v Alba Gomez, Appellant.

[852 NYS2d 842]

When reviewing a custodial parent’s request to relocate, the court’s primary focus must be on the best interests of the child *(see Matter of Tropea v Tropea,*87 NY2d 727, 739 [1996]; *Kime v Kime,*302 AD2d 564 [2003]; *Harmon v Harmon,*254 AD2d 456 [1998]). Furthermore, “ ‘[s]ince the Family Court’s . . . determination is largely dependent upon an assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and upon the character, temperament, and sincerity of the parents, its determination should not be disturbed unless it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record’ ” *(Matter of Grossman v Grossman,*5 AD3d 486, 486-487 [2004], quoting *Matter of Plaza v Plaza,*305 AD2d 607, 607 [2003]).

*646The Family Court, upon weighing the appropriate factors set forth in *Matter of Tropea v Tropea*(87 NY2d 727 [1996]), properly determined that relocation was not in the child’s best interests. Also, contrary to the mother’s contention, the Family Court considered her allegations of domestic violence in making its determination *(see*Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1]).

Under the circumstances of this case, the Family Court erred in directing the parties to engage in mediation.

The mother’s remaining contentions are without merit. Rivera, J.P., Miller, Dillon and Helen, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 23(a)

            CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statements(Form
S-8, Nos. 33-17196, 33-44822, 33-44877, 33-44876, 33-22459, 33-38491,33-54075,
33-54079, 33-54077, 333-47833, 333-28273, 333-38752, 333-62568,333-62572, and
333-117017) pertaining to various stock option, employee savings, deferred
compensation and restricted stock plans and in Registration Statements (Form
S-3, Nos. 33-36001, 333-60175, and 333-121743) pertaining to a universal shelf
registration statement and registration of preferred stock and common stock
warrants of Wellman, Inc. of our reports dated March 11, 2005, with respect to
the consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedule of
Wellman, Inc., Wellman, Inc. management's assessment of the effectiveness of
internal controls over financial reporting, and the effectiveness of internal
control over financial reporting of Wellman, Inc., included in this Annual
Report (Form 10-K) of Wellman, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2004.

/Ernst & Young LLP

Charlotte, North Carolina
March 15, 2005