PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

MARK HARTMANN, a minor, by his

parents and next friends, Roxanna

Hartmann and Joseph Hartmann;

ROXANNA HARTMANN; JOSEPH

HARTMANN,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

LOUDOUN COUNTY BOARD OF

EDUCATION,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

EDGAR B. HATRICK; NED

No. 96-2809

WATERHOUSE,

Defendants.

VIRGINIA SCHOOL BOARDS

ASSOCIATION; TIDEWATER DOWN

SYNDROME ASSOCIATION; THE

ASSOCIATION FOR PERSONS WITH

SEVERE HANDICAPS, VIRGINIA

CHAPTER; THE ARC OF VIRGINIA;

SPINA BIFIDA ASSOCIATION OF

TIDEWATER; TIDEWATER ASSOCIATION

FOR HEARING IMPAIRED CHILDREN;

ENDEPENDENCE CENTER,

INCORPORATED;
THE VIRGINIA FOUNDATION FOR THE

EXCEPTIONAL CHILD AND ADOLESCENT;

GRAFTON SCHOOL, INCORPORATED;

PARENTS AND CHILDREN COPING

TOGETHER, INCORPORATED; NORTHERN

VIRGINIA CHAPTER OF THE AUTISM

SOCIETY OF AMERICA; CENTRAL

VIRGINIA CHAPTER OF THE AUTISM

SOCIETY OF AMERICA; PENINSULA

CHAPTER OF THE AUTISM SOCIETY OF

AMERICA; AUTISM TRAINING AND

FAMILY SUPPORT PROGRAM;

ATTENTION DEFICIT DISORDER

ASSOCIATION OF VIRGINIA; PENINSULA

ATTENTION DEFICIT DISORDER

ASSOCIATION;THE VIRGINIA INSTITUTE

OF AUTISM, INCORPORATED;

COMMONWEALTH COALITION FOR

COMMUNITY; LOUDOUN ASSOCIATION

FOR RETARDED CITIZENS; UNITED

STATESOF AMERICA,

Amici Curiae.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge.

(CA-95-1686-A)

Argued: May 9, 1997

Decided: July 8, 1997

Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, LUTTIG, Circuit Judge, and

COPENHAVER, United States District Judge

for the Southern District of West Virginia,

sitting by designation.

_________________________________________________________________

2
Reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss by published

opinion. Chief Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge

Luttig and Judge Copenhaver joined.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Kathleen Shepherd Mehfoud, HAZEL & THOMAS,

P.C., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Gerard Sale Rugel, Herndon, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: James J. Wheaton, Charles

B. Lustig, WILLCOX & SAVAGE, P.C., Norfolk, Virginia, for

Amici Curiae Tidewater Down Syndrome Association, et al. John F.

Cafferky, Kathryn Y. Aspegren, HUNTON & WILLIAMS, McLean,

Virginia, for Amicus Curiae Virginia School Boards Association.

Isabelle Katz Pinzler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Mark L.

Gross,

Michelle M. Aronowitz, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Judith A. Winston, General Counsel,

Francisco Lopez, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Washington,

D.C., for Amicus Curiae United States.

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

WILKINSON, Chief Judge:

Roxanna and Joseph Hartmann brought suit on behalf of their disabled son Mark against the Loudoun County Board of Education

under the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20

U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. The Hartmanns alleged that the Board had

failed to ensure that Mark was educated with non-handicapped children "to the maximum extent appropriate" as required by the IDEA's

mainstreaming provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B). The district court

agreed, rejecting the findings of both the local hearing officer

and the

state review officer. The Board appeals, contending that the

court's

decision is contrary to the law and the evidence in the record. We

agree. As Supreme Court precedent makes clear, the IDEA does not

grant federal courts a license to substitute their own notions of

sound

educational policy for those of local school authorities, or to

disregard

the findings developed in state administrative proceedings. Upon

3
careful review of the record, however, we are forced to conclude

that

this is precisely what has occurred in this case. Accordingly, we

reverse and remand with directions to dismiss.

I.

Mark Hartmann is an eleven-year-old autistic child. Autism is a

developmental disorder characterized by significant deficiencies in

communication skills, social interaction, and motor control. Mark

is

unable to speak and suffers severe problems with fine motor coordination. Mark's writing ability is extremely limited; he does not

write

by hand and can consistently type only a few words such as "is" and

"at" by himself on a keyboard device known as a Canon communicator. The parties agree that Mark's greatest need is to develop

communication skills.

Mark spent his pre-school years in various programs for disabled

children. In kindergarten, he spent half his time in a

self-contained

program for autistic children and half in a regular education

classroom at Butterfield Elementary in Lombard, Illinois. Upon entering

first grade, Mark received speech and occupational therapy one-onone, but was otherwise included in the regular classroom at Butterfield full-time with an aide to assist him.

After Mark's first-grade year, the Hartmanns moved to Loudoun

County, Virginia, where they enrolled Mark at Ashburn Elementary

for the 1993-1994 school year. Based on Mark's individualized education program (IEP) from Illinois, the school placed Mark in a

regular education classroom. To facilitate Mark's inclusion, Loudoun

officials carefully selected his teacher, hired a full-time aide to

assist

him, and put him in a smaller class with more independent children.

Mark's teacher, Diane Johnson, read extensively about autism, and

both Johnson and Mark's aide, Suz Leitner, received training in

facilitated communication, a special communication technique used with

autistic children. Mark received five hours per week of speech and

language therapy with a qualified specialist, Carolyn Clement.

Halfway through the year, Virginia McCullough, a special education

teacher, was assigned to provide Mark with three hours of

instruction

a week and to advise Mark's teacher and aide.

4
Mary Kearney, the Loudoun County Director of Special Education,

personally worked with Mark's IEP team, which consisted of Johnson, Leitner, Clement, and Laurie McDonald, the principal of Ashburn. Kearney provided in-service training for the Ashburn staff on

autism and inclusion of disabled children in the regular classroom.

Johnson, Leitner, Clement, and McDonald also attended a seminar on

inclusion held by the Virginia Council for Administrators of

Special

Education. Mark's IEP team also received assistance from educational consultants Jamie Ruppmann and Gail Mayfield, and Johnson

conferred with additional specialists whose names were provided to

her by the Hartmanns and the school. Mark's curriculum was continually modified to ensure that it was properly adapted to his needs

and

abilities.

Frank Johnson, supervisor of the county's program for autistic

children, formally joined the IEP team in January, but provided

assistance

throughout the year in managing Mark's behavior. Mark engaged in

daily episodes of loud screeching and other disruptive conduct such

as hitting, pinching, kicking, biting, and removing his clothing.

These

outbursts not only required Diane Johnson and Leitner to calm Mark

and redirect him, but also consumed the additional time necessary

to

get the rest of the children back on task after the distraction.

Despite these efforts, by the end of the year Mark's IEP team concluded that he was making no academic progress in the regular

classroom. In Mark's May 1994 IEP, the team therefore proposed to place

Mark in a class specifically structured for autistic children at

Leesburg Elementary. Leesburg is a regular elementary school which

houses the autism class in order to facilitate interaction between

the

autistic children and students who are not handicapped. The

Leesburg

class would have included five autistic students working with a

special education teacher and at least one full-time aide. Under the

May

IEP, Mark would have received only academic instruction and speech

in the self-contained classroom, while joining a regular class for

art,

music, physical education, library, and recess. The Leesburg

program

also would have permitted Mark to increase the portion of his

instruction received in a regular education setting as he demonstrated an

improved ability to handle it.
The Hartmanns refused to approve the IEP, claiming that it failed

to comply with the mainstreaming provision of the IDEA, which

5
states that "to the maximum extent appropriate," disabled children

should be educated with children who are not handicapped. 20 U.S.C.

§ 1412(5)(B). The county initiated due process proceedings, see 20

U.S.C. § 1415(b), and on December 14, 1994, the local hearing officer upheld the May 1994 IEP. She found that Mark's behavior was

disruptive and that despite the "enthusiastic" efforts of the

county, he

had obtained no academic benefit from the regular education classroom. On May 3, 1995, the state review officer affirmed the

decision,

adopting both the hearing officer's findings and her legal

analysis.

The Hartmanns then challenged the hearing officer's decision in

federal court.

While the administrative process continued, Mark entered third

grade in the regular education classroom at Ashburn. In December of

that year, the Hartmanns withdrew Mark from Ashburn. Mark and his

mother moved to Montgomery County, Virginia, to permit the Hartmanns to enroll Mark in public school there. Mark was placed in the

regular third-grade classroom for the remainder of that year as

well

as the next.1

The district court reversed the hearing officer's decision. The

court

rejected the administrative findings and concluded that Mark could

receive significant educational benefit in a regular classroom and

that

"the Board simply did not take enough appropriate steps to try to

include Mark in a regular class." The court made little of the

testimony of Mark's Loudoun County instructors, and instead relied heavily on its reading of Mark's experience in Illinois and Montgomery

County. While the hearing officer had addressed Mark's conduct in

detail, the court stated that "[g]iven the strong presumption for

inclusion under the IDEA, disruptive behavior should not be a

significant

factor in determining the appropriate educational placement for a

disabled child." Loudoun County now appeals.

_________________________________________________________________

1 Loudoun County contends that the Hartmanns do not present a valid

case or controversy because Mark is currently in an educational

placement which the Hartmanns find appropriate. Under the unusual

circumstances of this case, this conclusion is not correct. There is no

question

that the Hartmanns would re-enroll Mark in Loudoun County if their

suit
is successful. Specifically, the Hartmanns' expressed intent to

return

Mark to school there is corroborated by the fact that Mark's father

and

sister continue to occupy the family's home in Loudoun County.

6
II.

The IDEA embodies important principles governing the relationship between local school authorities and a reviewing district

court.

Although section 1415(e)(2) provides district courts with authority

to

grant "appropriate" relief based on a preponderance of the

evidence,

20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2), that section "is by no means an invitation

to

the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational

policy

for those of the school authorities which they review." Board of

Education of Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley , 458 U.S.

176, 206 (1982). Absent some statutory infraction, the task of

education belongs to the educators who have been charged by society with

that critical task. Likewise, federal courts must accord "due

weight"

to state administrative proceedings. Id. Administrative findings in

an

IDEA case "are entitled to be considered prima facie correct," and

"the district court, if it is not going to follow them, is required

to

explain why it does not." Doyle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 953

F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1991).

These principles reflect the IDEA's recognition that federal courts

cannot run local schools. Local educators deserve latitude in

determining the individualized education program most appropriate for a

disabled child. The IDEA does not deprive these educators of the

right to apply their professional judgment. Rather it establishes

a

"basic floor of opportunity" for every handicapped child. Rowley,

458

U.S. at 201. States must provide specialized instruction and

related

services "sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the

handicapped child," id. at 200, but the Act does not require "the

furnishing

of every special service necessary to maximize each handicapped

child's potential," id. at 199.

In this same vein, the IDEA's mainstreaming provision establishes

a presumption, not an inflexible federal mandate. Under its terms,

disabled children are to be educated with children who are not handicapped only "to the maximum extent appropriate." 20 U.S.C.

§ 1412(5)(B). Section 1412(5)(B) explicitly states that
mainstreaming

is not appropriate "when the nature or severity of the disability

is such

that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary

aids

and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily." 20 U.S.C.

§ 1412(5)(B); see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181 n.4.

7
III.

The district court's ruling strayed generally from the aforementioned principles. It diverged in particular from our decision in

DeVries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1989).

In

DeVries, we held that mainstreaming is not required where (1) the

disabled child would not receive an educational benefit from mainstreaming into a regular class; (2) any marginal benefit from mainstreaming would be significantly outweighed by benefits which could

feasibly be obtained only in a separate instructional setting; or,

(3) the

disabled child is a disruptive force in a regular classroom

setting. Id.

at 879. Although the district court failed to mention DeVries, its

opinion suggests that none of these three categories describes Mark's

situation. The district court found that Mark could receive substantial

educational benefit in a regular classroom, that his disruptive

behavior

was not sufficient to justify a more segregated instructional

setting,

and that the Leesburg program would not have been an appropriate

placement. After careful examination of the record, however, we are

forced to conclude that the district court's decision fails to

account for

the administrative findings and is not supported by the evidence

based

on a correct application of the law. In effect, the court simply

substituted its own judgment regarding Mark's proper educational program

for that of local school officials.

A.

In finding that Mark could receive an educational benefit in a

regular classroom, the district court disregarded both the hearing

officer's

finding and the overwhelming evidence that Mark made no academic

progress in the regular second grade classroom at Ashburn. Mark's

teacher testified, for example, that he was unable to retain

skills:

"once we thought he mastered [a math skill] and we left it alone

and

went onto another concept, if we went back to review, it seemed

that

he had forgotten." She confessed, "I felt like he lost a year in my

classroom." Other Loudoun County personnel testified to the same

effect. His speech therapist, for instance, stated that "[t]he only

gain

that I saw him make was in the one to one setting." The supervisor
for the county's program for autistic students likewise concluded,

"I

think there has been no progress academically in the inclusive settings;" "I think we're wasting his time." The hearing officer

accord8
ingly found that "Mark made no measurable academic progress

attributable to his placement in the regular classroom."

Mark's situation is similar to the one we faced in DeVries, 882

F.2d 876. In upholding Fairfax County's decision not to place

Michael DeVries in Annandale High School, the court observed not

only that Michael would derive virtually no academic benefit from

the

regular classroom, but also that his work would be at a much lower

level than his classmates and that he would in effect "simply be

monitoring classes." Id. at 879. Here the hearing officer made an

identical

finding, concluding that Mark "did not participate in the regular

curriculum, but was provided his own curriculum." Mark's special education teacher in Loudoun County explained, "Mark needs a

completely different program . . . . His skills have to be taught

in a

different way, in a different sequence, and even a different group

of

skills . . . from what his typical functioning peers are learning."

The district court acknowledged the testimony of Mark's second

grade teacher regarding his lack of progress, but asserted that the

hearing officer's conclusions were erroneous because the officer

failed to give due weight to the testimony of Cathy Thornton,

Mark's

private tutor during second grade, and to Mark's first grade

experience in Illinois. To the contrary, the administrative decisions

took

careful note of both. The hearing officer fully credited Thornton's

testimony, finding that Mark made progress with both her and his

speech

therapist. The officer went further, however, and observed that

both

the tutoring and speech instruction occurred in a one-to-one

setting

outside of the regular class. In light of Mark's failure to

progress in

the regular classroom, the officer drew the only reasonable

inference

from this evidence, namely that separate instruction was precisely

what Mark needed to make educational progress. As to Mark's experience in Illinois, the state review officer explained that the

Illinois

assessment of Mark's capabilities was flawed:

[I]t became clear during the course of the second grade that

Mark's academic skills were not as advanced as the Illinois

school system thought. Mark cannot read and cannot add,
yet the Illinois teachers thought he was reading at first

grade

level and progressing in the first grade math workbook....

Mark apparently did not make the academic progress in first

9
grade the records forwarded to Loudoun County from Illinois indicated....

While the district court opinion references the hearing officer's

decision, its failure to address the administrative findings noted

above

simply does not reflect the teachings of Rowley and Doyle that

state

proceedings must command considerable deference in federal courts.

The district court also relied heavily on Mark's subsequent performance in the Montgomery County schools during fourth grade. While

Montgomery County personnel did make some conclusory statements

asserting that Mark made progress, the evidence is inconclusive at

best. The district court pointed to math skills Mark demonstrated

at

the end of fourth grade, for example, but Mark was pulled out of

the

regular class for math instruction, just as Loudoun County had

recommended. Any progress he made in math therefore simply supports the

conclusion that separate, one-on-one instruction is appropriate for

Mark. Mark also continued to receive speech therapy one-on-one, and

his special education teacher in Montgomery County admitted that

the

county had no reliable method for assessing Mark's reading ability.

Finally, the district court pointed to perceived improvement in

Mark's social skills due to interaction with his non-disabled

peers.

Any such benefits, however, cannot outweigh his failure to progress

academically in the regular classroom. The mainstreaming provision

represents recognition of the value of having disabled children

interact with non-handicapped students. The fact that the provision only

creates a presumption, however, reflects a congressional judgment

that receipt of such social benefits is ultimately a goal

subordinate to

the requirement that disabled children receive educational benefit.

Here the evidence clearly supports the judgment of the local education officials and the administrative hearing officers that Mark's

educational progress required significant instruction outside of the

regular

classroom setting.

B.

The district court attributed Mark's lack of progress in Loudoun

County to the county's alleged failure to make reasonable efforts

to

accommodate him in the regular classroom. We interpret this as a
rul10
ing that the county failed to provide the supplementary aids and

services contemplated by the IDEA's mainstreaming provision. 20

U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B).

The district court's conclusion is remarkable in light of the

extensive measures taken on Mark's behalf. The hearing officer found

that

Loudoun personnel were "enthusiastic" about including Mark at Ashburn, a description fully supported by the record. The Ashburn

principal deliberately reduced the size of Mark's class and ensured that

it

was composed of students who were more independent and had

higher level skills. Mark's teacher was selected because of her

excellent teaching abilities, and the county hired a full-time,

one-on-one

aide for Mark. Mark received a full hour of speech and language

instruction daily. Frank Johnson, the supervisor of the county's

program for autistic children, provided assistance in behavior management throughout the year. Halfway through the year, the school's

efforts increased when Virginia McCullough began providing special

education services directly to Mark as well as advising Mark's

teacher

and aide. Inclusion specialists Gail Mayfield and Jamie Ruppmann

consulted with the school during the fall, and Mark's teacher

sought

advice from other experts whose names were provided to her by the

school or the Hartmanns. The teacher testified that she met

constantly

with Mark's aide, his speech therapist, the IEP team, and others to

work on Mark's program -- daily at the beginning of the year and at

least twice a week throughout.

The district court nonetheless found the county's efforts insufficient. The court relied primarily on its conclusion that the

Loudoun

educators involved with Mark had inadequate training and experience

to work with an autistic child.2 The court found the credentials of

two

_________________________________________________________________

2 The court also concluded that Loudoun County's commitment to

mainstreaming Mark lapsed at mid-year. Such a conclusion again does

not take proper account of the administrative record as required by

Rowley and Doyle. The hearing officer pointed out, for example,

that the

county actually added services for Mark in the second half of the

year,

when McCullough began providing special education instruction to

Mark. Moreover, the hearing officer noted that the IEP prepared by
Mark's team in March -- three months after the county allegedly

gave

up on mainstreaming him -- called for retaining him in the regular

classroom.

11
groups to be lacking. Neither the special education professionals

nor

the regular education instructors were deemed properly qualified.

The

conclusion that Mark had inadequately trained personnel developing

and implementing his program, however, is irreconcilable with

either

the law or the record.

As to special education personnel, the district court concedes that

the individuals working with Mark during the first half of the

year,

Mary Kearney and Jamie Ruppmann, were fully competent to assist

him. Kearney led Mark's IEP team, while Ruppmann provided consultation services. In addition to serving as the county Director

of

Special Education, Kearney had participated in the Virginia Systems

Change Project, a two-year state program on mainstreaming which

involved selected schools from across the state. Ruppmann is an

experienced, highly qualified consultant.

During the second half of the year, Frank Johnson led the IEP

team, and Virginia McCullough provided Mark with special education services. The district court rejected their qualifications,

asserting,

for example, that Johnson's credentials were clearly inadequate

because they were inferior to those of Kearney and Ruppmann. However, in addition to serving as the supervisor of Loudoun County's

program for autistic children, Johnson had a special education

masters

degree, did graduate work with an autistic child, worked directly

with

approximately ten autistic children as a teacher, and had attended

special education courses and seminars relating to autism throughout

his

professional career. Both McCullough`s early childhood degree program and her work in Loudoun County focused specifically on integrating children with disabilities into the regular classroom.

To dismiss Johnson's and McCullough's qualifications is to adopt

exactly the sort of potential-maximizing standard rejected by the

Supreme Court in Rowley. We think the Court's admonition that the

IDEA does not require "the furnishing of every special service

necessary to maximize each handicapped child's potential," Rowley, 458

U.S. at 199, encompasses the notion that the IDEA likewise does not

require special education service providers to have every

conceivable

credential relevant to every child's disability. Not all school

systems

will have the resources to hire top-notch consultants, nor will

every
school have the good fortune to have personnel who were involved

12
in a major state program related to the needs of every disabled

child.

We note that in Virginia, there is no certification for autism.

Furthermore, at the time of the trial, Loudoun County had eleven autistic

children in a total school population of approximately 20,000 students. In this light, Johnson's experience teaching ten autistic

children

was substantial. Johnson and McCullough were clearly qualified to

work with Mark as special educators, even accepting the district

court's assertion that Ruppmann and Kearney had better credentials.

The suggestion that the regular education instructors, Mark's

teacher and aide, were not adequately qualified also does not

survive

close scrutiny. Diane Johnson was an experienced professional properly certified under state law, and Virginia law does not require

teaching assistants to be certified. Furthermore, Johnson and Leitner

both

obtained special training to work with Mark. Both received

in-service

instruction and attended an outside seminar on inclusion of

disabled

children in the regular classroom. They also were trained in

facilitated

communication, a special communication method used with Mark in

Illinois.

To demand more than this from regular education personnel would

essentially require them to become special education teachers

trained

in the full panoply of disabilities that their students might have.

Virginia law does not require this, nor does the IDEA. First, such a

requirement would fall afoul of Rowley's admonition that the IDEA

does not guarantee the ideal educational opportunity for every disabled child. Furthermore, when the IDEA was passed,"Congress'

intention was not that the Act displace the primacy of States in

the

field of education, but that States receive funds to assist them in

extending their educational systems to the handicapped." Rowley, 458

U.S. at 208. The IDEA "expressly incorporates State educational

standards." Schimmel v. Spillane, 819 F.2d 477, 484 (4th Cir. 1987). We

can think of few steps that would do more to usurp state

educational

standards and policy than to have federal courts re-write state

teaching certification requirements in the guise of applying the IDEA.

In sum, we conclude that Loudoun County's efforts on behalf of
Mark were sufficient to satisfy the IDEA's mainstreaming directive.

13
C.

The district court also gave little or no weight to the disruptive

effects of Mark's behavior in the classroom, stating that "[g]iven

the

strong presumption for inclusion under the IDEA, disruptive

behavior

should not be a significant factor in determining the appropriate

educational placement for a disabled child." This statement simply

ignores DeVries, where we specifically held that mainstreaming is

inappropriate when "the handicapped child is a disruptive force in

the

non-segregated setting." 882 F.2d at 879 (quoting Roncker v.

Walter,

700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983)). In this case, disruptive

behavior

was clearly an issue. The hearing officer summarized:

[Mark's] misbehaviors include continual vocalization, especially whining, screeching and crying when unhappy or

frustrated, hitting, pinching, kicking, biting, sucking the

leg

of a chair, rolling on the floor, and removing his shoes and

clothing. Mark is a big strong child who cannot be easily

restrained when he engages in injurious behaviors such as

hitting, kicking, pinching and biting. His continual vocalizations are distracting and make it difficult for other children

to stay on task. When Jamie Ruppmann observed Mark in

his classroom, she observed two instances of significant disruption, in which he threw himself on the floor. She noted

that in each instance it took about five to eight minutes to

get Mark settled down. His loud screeching outbursts, which

occur daily, take the attention of the teacher and the aide to

redirect him; these outbursts also take the other children off

task and they then have to be redirected. Mark hits and

pinches others several times a day.

While the hearing officer did not find Mark's disruptive behavior

by

itself to be dispositive, the attention she gave to Mark's conduct

was

entirely appropriate, indeed required, under DeVries.

D.

The district court also found that Leesburg would not have been an

appropriate placement. This conclusion generally derived from the

same analysis that led to the court's determination that Mark

should

14
remain in the regular classroom. To the contrary, we hold that the

proposed Leesburg placement was carefully tailored to ensure that he

was mainstreamed "to the maximum extent appropriate." 20 U.S.C.

§ 1412(5)(B). Leesburg was a regular elementary school. Responding

to Mark's lack of academic progress in the regular classroom, the

May IEP would have placed Mark in the self-contained class for his

academic subjects, while including him with his non-disabled peers

for all other school activities such as art, music, and physical

education. To promote the success of this partial mainstreaming, the

hearing officer required the school to have an aide or teacher

accompany

Mark whenever he was in the regular classroom environment and to

place Mark with the same regular education class for all his nonacademic activities.

IV.

This is not a case which either the local educational authorities

or

the reviewing administrative officers took lightly. We have

sketched

in great detail the efforts that Loudoun County made to provide

Mark

Hartmann with a suitable education. Furthermore, the administrative

review process could not have been more thorough. The hearing officer heard testimony from eighteen witnesses over a two month period

and made detailed factual findings regarding all aspects of Mark's

educational experience. The officer's analysis carefully

incorporated

those findings and specifically addressed the evidence the

Hartmanns

presented in support of their position. The district court,

however, set

all this extensive effort and review at nought. The court failed to

mention, let alone discuss, critical administrative findings

inconsistent

with its conclusions. While making much of the credentials and

credibility of witnesses endorsing full inclusion, the court gave little

or no

attention to the testimony of Loudoun professionals. In some

instances the court, without listening to local educators,

discounted

their views despite the fact that the hearing officer had found

them

credible. One Loudoun official was dismissed outright as "a philosophical opponent of inclusion" for daring to state that he saw no

evidence that Mark had progressed in the regular classroom.
The IDEA encourages mainstreaming, but only to the extent that

it does not prevent a child from receiving educational benefit. The

evidence in this case demonstrates that Mark Hartmann was not mak15
ing academic progress in a regular education classroom despite the

provision of adequate supplementary aids and services. Loudoun

County properly proposed to place Mark in a partially mainstreamed

program which would have addressed the academic deficiencies of

his full inclusion program while permitting him to interact with

nonhandicapped students to the greatest extent possible. This

professional

judgment by local educators was deserving of respect. The approval

of this educational approach by the local and state administrative

officers likewise deserved a deference from the district court which it

failed to receive. In rejecting reasonable pedagogical choices and

disregarding well-supported administrative findings, the district

court

assumed an educational mantle which the IDEA did not confer.

Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed, and the case remanded

with directions to dismiss it.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

16