IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-30814

ROY A. WILLIAMS, also known as Roy Anthony Williams,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

DAVID F. POST; CYNTHIA T. WOODARD; CLIFFORD R. STRIDER, III; 

JON ANNE WINSTEAD; LINDA COOK; RENEE SMITH,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:17-CV-767

Before JONES, ELROD, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Roy A. Williams, Louisiana prisoner # 433256, moves for leave to proceed 

in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal. He filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 1983 and 1986 alleging that the defendants had conspired to cover up the 

falsification of portions of his trial transcript. The district court dismissed on 

various grounds, including a finding that his complaint was time barred. The 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 1, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 17-30814 Document: 00514820163 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/01/2019
No. 17-30814

2

district court denied leave to proceed IFP on appeal for failure to submit a

statement of his prison trust account.

Williams now has submitted the required records of his trust account, 

which show that he qualifies as a pauper. However, a movant for leave to 

proceed IFP on appeal also must show that he presents a nonfrivolous issue for 

appeal. See Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 586 (5th Cir. 1982); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(1)-(3). In his IFP motion, Williams asserts that he intends to raise 

various issues on appeal, including whether his complaint was time barred. 

Section 1986 sets forth a one-year limitations period. § 1986. 

Louisiana’s one-year limitations period applies to Williams’s § 1983 complaint. 

See Smith v. Reg’l Transit Auth., 827 F.3d 412, 421 (5th Cir. 2016). A cause of 

action accrues when the plaintiff knows of the existence of an injury and the 

cause of the injury. Id. The district court found that Williams was aware of 

the facts supporting his claims by December 2006, that the limitations period 

expired in December 2007, and that Williams did not file his complaint until 

June 2017. In the district court, Williams argued that he did not file his 

complaint earlier because he had not understood that the underlying facts 

raised a potential claim under § 1983. However, for a limitation period to start, 

“[a] plaintiff need not know that [he] has a legal cause of action; [he] need know 

only the facts that would ultimately support a claim.” Piotrowski v. City of 

Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001). 

We conclude that Williams has not shown a nonfrivolous issue regarding 

the dismissal of his complaint as time barred. As a result, his motion for leave 

to proceed IFP is denied. See Carson, 689 F.2d at 586. We also dismiss his

appeal as frivolous. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 & n.24 (5th Cir. 

1997); 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. 

IFP MOTION DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED.

 Case: 17-30814 Document: 00514820163 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/01/2019