J-A11008-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

ANITA LUI

v.

STANLEY J. ZUKOS JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1233 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Dated June 26, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County 

Civil Division at No(s): 2018-5451

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED: MAY 27, 2020

Stanley J. Zukos, Jr., appeals from the order entered June 26, 2019, in 

the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, granting summary judgment in 

favor of Anna Lui in an underlying possession/ejectment action. On appeal, 

Zukos contends the trial court erred in dismissing his motion to enforce 

settlement at the time when the pleadings were completed because the matter 

was ripe for a determination. See Appellant’s Brief, at 3. Based on the 

following, we affirm.

The trial court set forth the facts and procedural history as follows:

[Lui]’s complaint filed on May 18, 2018 alleges an action for 

possession/ejectment and an action for past due rent/unjust 

detention. The complaint further alleges that [Lui] purchased a 

residence with the address 6 Wheatfield Lane, Mountain Top, 

Pennsylvania at the Luzerne County Sheriff Sale on February 28, 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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2018. The deed is recorded in the Luzerne County Deed Book 

3018, Page 38219. [Zukos] was the owner of the property prior 

to sheriff sale and occupies the property. [Zukos] refused to

vacate the premises. The complaint further alleged that [Zukos] 

did not pay money or adequate consideration for his occupation 

of the premises from February 28, 2018 to the present.

Procedurally, judgment for possession was found in favor of 

[Lui] on May 2, 2018 and a monetary award in the amount of one 

thousand six hundred sixty-eight dollars and fifteen cents 

($1668.15) was awarded to [Lui] before the magistrate court. On 

May 11, 2018, [Zukos] appealed the judgment in the Luzerne 

County Court of Common Pleas. Upon filing the appeal, [Zukos] 

on May 11, 2018 began paying one thousand five hundred 

seventy-nine dollars ($1579.00) into escrow. On June 13, 2018, 

[Lui] filed a praecipe to strike the supersedeas effect from 

[Zukos’s] appeal. On June 17, 2018, an answer and new matter 

to the complaint was filed by [Zukos].[1] On June 25, 2018, 

[Zukos] filed a motion to reinstate supersedeas and to stay 

removal from property.

On June 25, 2018, the Honorable Fred A. Pierantoni, III, 

Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Court, granted [Zukos’s] 

motion to reinstate supersedeas permitting [Zukos] to remain in 

the property provided that [he] pay one thousand five hundred 

seventy-nine dollars ($1579.00) into escrow each month until 

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1

In his answer, in pertinent part, Zukos averred that he offered, through 

counsel, to make a payment on a monthly basis of the rental amount, but Lui 

refused to accept, and that he placed funds in an escrow account, which was 

identified by the magisterial district judge as the amount being in arrears for 

rent. See Answer and New Matter, 6/17/2018, at ¶¶ 7-9, 19. In his new 

matter, he pled the affirmative defenses of consent, justification, accord and 

satisfaction, illegality, estoppel, and failure of consideration. See id., ¶¶ 19-

24. Notably, Zukos did not assert a counterclaim for breach of contract against 

Lui, and the new matter does not allege a breach of contract claim.

On June 25, 2018, Lui filed an answer to Zukos’s new matter, alleging 

she was a bona fide purchaser of the property at issue and holds clean title to 

the premises. See Plaintiff’s Answer to Defendant’s New Matter, 6/25/2018, 

at ¶¶ 25-26. While Lui admitted she rejected his offer to lease the property, 

she asserted that no contract was established nor was any agreement 

reached. See id., at ¶ 28.
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final disposition of the matter. The court further stayed the 

eviction proceedings.

On June 26, 2018, [Zukos] filed a motion to enforce 

settlement agreement and brief in support of same. [In his 

motion, Zukos alleged: (1) that on March 16, 2018, he was 

provided with notice that Lui wanted to discuss the home with 

him; (2) two days later, Zukos and his counsel contacted Lui and 

he confirmed he would purchase the legal title back from the 

home; (3) Lui confirmed she would sell it back if Zukos paid the 

full amount due, which is what she paid ($130,000.00) plus all 

expenses incurred and all expenses that would be due to reconvey 

title; (4) Zukos agreed to the same and the parties confirmed that 

he would arrange for financing; and (5) Lui refused to honor the 

contract and settlement and filed the instant action. See Motion 

to Enforce Settlement Agreement, 6/26/2018, at ¶¶ 6-12. Zukos 

argued oral settlement agreements are enforceable in 

Pennsylvania, and he was prepared to make payment to Lui. See 

id., at 18-24.] After a response and brief was filed,[2] on July 23, 

2018, Judge Pierantoni dismissed [Zukos’s] motion to enforce 

settlement agreement without prejudice to underlying claim.[3]

The court further denied [Lui]’s claim for legal fees.

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2

In her response, Lui admitted she briefly considered reselling the home to 

Zukos, but alleged she decided not to do so because the parties never agreed 

upon a price, and consequently, no contract was formed. Additionally, she 

argued the statute of frauds renders oral contracts for the sale of land 

unenforceable where specific performance is sought. See Plaintiff’s Answer to 

Defendant’s Motion to Enforce Settlement, 7/5/2018, at ¶¶ 8-23

3 The miscellaneous judge held a hearing that day to address the motion, 

particularly on the issue of jurisdiction to proceed in the matter. Zukos alleged 

that the only remedy to enforce the settlement agreement was before the 

judge, and this was a collateral issue to the underlying claims. Lui argued that 

the underlying action was an arbitration level eviction case, the requested 

value of relief that Zukos sought exceeded arbitrational limits, and that he 

should be required to file a separate action for breach of contract. The court’s 

finding focused on Zukos’s request in light of the fact that a jury trial had been 

demanded, and that he was seeking to have a contract enforced with a sale 

of real estate involved over $100,000.00. See N.T., 7/23/2018, at 2-9.
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On June 26, 2018, the case was certified for a Luzerne 

County arbitration panel pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1301, et seq. On 

August 8, 2018, Wen Hui Zie4 was added to the action as a plaintiff 

after [Lui] petitioned the court to join an additional plaintiff.

On November 1, 2018, a Luzerne County arbitration panel 

found in favor of the plaintiffs ordering [Zukos] to pay three 

thousand one hundred fifty-eight dollars ($3158.00) for unpaid 

rent and ordering that [Zukos] vacate the premises within sixty 

(60) days of the date of the order and continue to pay $1579 per 

month for rent until [Zukos] vacates the premises. The arbitration 

panel further awarded [Zukos] to pay the court costs. On 

November 30, 2018, [Zukos] appealed the arbitration award.

On January 3, 2019, the court held a status/scheduling 

hearing wherein dates were assigned for discovery, dispositive 

motions and a jury trial was scheduled for September 12, 2019. 

On February 20, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary 

judgment and brief in support of same.5 After a response was filed

by [Zukos],[

6] oral argument was held on the motion for summary 

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4 Based on Zukos’s February 7, 2019, deposition testimony, it appears that 

Zie is Lui’s husband. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 

2/20/2019, Exhibit C (Deposition Transcript of Stanley J. Zukos), at 16.

Collectively, we treat Lui and Zie as “the Plaintiffs.” It merits mention Zie is 

not a party to this appeal.

5

In their motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiffs argued Zukos did not 

possess any valid defenses to an ejectment or eviction action, and the statute 

of frauds rendered any notion of an oral agreement between the parties as 

unenforceable. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 2/20/2019, at 

13-22.

6

In his response, Zukos averred Lui had orally agreed to transfer the deed to 

him, and she subsequently refused to transfer the property. He states:

The nature of that agreement is clearly in a factual dispute. 

[Zukos] was to remain in the premises and pay monthly rent of 

which he had paid, until such time as [he] reimbursed [Lui] for 

costs incurred and the purchase price, as a settlement of litigation 

to evict him. Once paid, [Lui] would re-convey [Zukos’s] property 

back to him. The only issue was [Lui] gathering all costs incurred 
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judgment on March 29, 2019. On June 26, 2019, the motion for 

summary judgment was granted awarding possession to the 

plaintiffs.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/19/2019, at 4-6 (italics in original; some capitalization 

removed). This appeal followed.

Preliminarily, we note that on August 23, 2019, Zukos filed a concise 

statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925, 

raising issues that concerned the dismissal of his motion to enforce the 

settlement agreement and the court’s granting of the motion for summary 

judgment. On September 23rd, this Court dismissed his appeal for failure to 

comply with Pa.R.A.P. 3517. Zukos then filed a motion to reinstate the appeal, 

which was granted on October 7, 2019. 

In preparation to draft its opinion, the trial court could not find a request 

for transcript or a filed transcript. The court then issued an order, indicating 

Zukos failed to file a motion for transcripts and ordered that he comply with 

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and providing it back to [Zukos]. In all respects, the agreement 

was confirmed. 

Defendant’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 3/25/2019, 

at ¶ 15. 

He further claimed the agreement was for the settlement of litigation, and not 

for the sale of real property, and consequently, the statute of frauds was not 

applicable. See id., at ¶ 15. In the alternative, Zukos alleged that if the statute 

of frauds applied, the present action constituted an exception because he was 

in actual, open, notorious, and continuous possession of the property. See

Defendant’s Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 

at ¶ 11.
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the appellate rules. Zukos filed a request, but limited it to the July 23, 2018 

argument regarding his motion to enforce settlement. On October 21, 2019, 

the assigned court reporter sent an email to Zukos’s counsel indicating that 

he was awaiting a deposit for the requested transcript. Additionally, the court 

later received correspondence from Lui’s counsel directed to counsel for Zukos 

requesting that the transcript for the motion for summary judgment be 

included in the reproduced record. 

The court reporter notified the court that Zukos did not request the 

transcript of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. At that time 

when the court drafted its opinion, it still had not received any transcripts to 

include in its review. To this date, Zukos has not filed a motion for transcripts 

as required by Pa.R.A.P. 1911(a).

[T]he Rules of Appellate Procedure require an appellant to order 

and pay for any transcript necessary to permit resolution of the 

issues raised on appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 1911(a).... When the appellant 

... fails to conform to the requirements of Rule 1911, any claims 

that cannot be resolved in the absence of the necessary transcript 

or transcripts must be deemed waived for the purpose of appellate 

review. It is not proper for either the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

or the Superior Court to order transcripts nor is it the responsibility 

of the appellate courts to obtain the necessary transcripts.

Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 7 (Pa. Super. 2006) (some internal 

citations omitted). See also Pa.R.A.P. 1911(d) (“If the appellant fails to take 

the action required by these rules and the Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial 

Administration for the preparation of the transcript, the appellate court may 
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take such action as it deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the 

appeal.”). 

On appeal, Zukos contends the trial court committed an error of law by 

refusing to hold a full evidentiary hearing on his motion to enforce settlement 

based on a lack of jurisdiction. See Appellant’s Brief, at 8. He insists the 

matter never should have proceeded beyond the motion proceedings as there 

was a factual dispute regarding the existence of a settlement. Id., at 7-9. 

Furthermore, he claims:

It is understood that [the trial court], in [its] opinion, claims that 

because the proceedings for the motion to enforce settlement 

were dismissed “without prejudice”, Zukos had a right and 

opportunity to refile the same, which he did not do. Unfortunately, 

the nature of Judge Pierantoni’s dismissal related to “jurisdiction” 

because it was an alleged landlord/tenant matter entitled to 

arbitration only, put Zukos in a position that he would not have 

the right to a hearing at any time during this litigation. In fact, Lui 

actually argued that if Zukos felt that there was a breach of a 

settlement agreement, he should have filed it [under] a new 

breach of contract action.

Id., at 10 (reproduced record omitted; some capitalization removed). Lastly, 

Zukos asserts he will not intentionally defend Lui’s argument concerning the 

statute of frauds due to the fact that the court failed to hold a full evidentiary 

hearing on his motion. Id., at 13. Zukos’s argument fails for several reasons.

First, because Zukos’s challenge concerns whether the court held a full 

hearing on his motion to enforce settlement and its corresponding findings 

made at the hearing, we find adequate appellate review is not possible without 

the July 23, 2019 hearing transcript. Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1911(a), Zukos 
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was required to pay for any transcript necessary to permit the resolution of 

the issues he raises on appeal. As indicated above, Zukos was on notice by 

both the trial court and the court reporter that he had not paid for the 

transcript to be transcribed and that the transcript was never filed. His failure 

to adhere to the requirements of Rule 1911 results in the waiver of this issue 

for the purpose of appellate review. See Preston, 904 A.2d at 7.

In any event, Zukos’s underlying defense argument, central to this 

litigation, is unavailing. Not only does Zukos attempt to distract this Court 

with an emphasis on his motion to enforce settlement and lack of a full 

hearing, he also characterizes the agreement at issue as a settlement of 

litigation rather than a property contract.

We are unpersuaded. We note that in his motion, and subsequent 

pleadings, Zukos maintained that in March of 2018, the parties entered into a 

verbal agreement as to the property in dispute, and therefore, he is in rightful 

possession of the home. Lui denied the existence of an oral contract. 

Accordingly, the agreement is subject to the Statute of Frauds despite the fact 

that it also allegedly is a settlement agreement. See Firetree, Ltd. V. Dept. 

of Gen. Svcs., 978 A.2d 1067, 1074 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).7

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7 While opinions of the Commonwealth Court are not binding on this Court, we 

may accept them for their persuasive value. See Petow v. Warehime, 996 

A.2d 1083, 1089 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2010). In this instance, we find the reasoning 

in Firetree persuasive and an accurate application of Pennsylvania law.
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Our standard of review regarding motions for summary judgment are 

well-settled:

We view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of 

material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Only 

where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is 

clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 

of law will summary judgment be entered. Our scope of review of 

a trial court's order granting or denying summary judgment is 

plenary, and our standard of review is clear: the trial court’s order 

will be reversed only where it is established that the court 

committed an error of law or abused its discretion.

QBE Ins. Corp. v. M & S Landis Corp., 915 A.2d 1222, 1225 (Pa. Super. 

2007).

Because the matter before us concerns a property agreement, we are 

guided by the following:

The [S]tatute of [F]rauds[8] directs that agreements for the sale 

of real estate shall not be enforced unless they are in writing and 

signed by the seller. The purpose of the statute is to prevent 

perjury and fraudulent claims. The Statute of Frauds does not void 

those oral contracts relating to land which fail to comply with the 

Statute’s formal requirements. It is to be used as a shield and not 

as a sword, as it was designed to prevent frauds, not to encourage 

them. Therefore, even though an oral contract for the sale of real 

estate may not be specifically enforced, it may form the basis for 

an action to recover damages.

Empire Props., Inc. v. Equireal, Inc., 674 A.2d 297, 302 (Pa. Super. 1996) 

(internal citation, quotations, and footnote omitted). “[The Statute of Frauds] 

is not a mere rule of evidence, but a declaration of public policy. In the absence 

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8 See 33 P.S. § 1.
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of equities sufficient of themselves to take the case out of the statute, it 

operates as a limitation upon judicial authority to afford a remedy unless 

renounced or waived by the party entitled to claim its protection.” Kurland v. 

Stolker, 533 A.2d 1370, 1372 (Pa. 1987) (citation omitted).

However, there is an exception to the general rule regarding oral 

contracts for the sale of real property. In Kurland, the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court explained that in order to satisfy the exception, a party seeking to 

enforce the oral agreement must establish the following:

The terms of the contract must be shown by full, complete, and 

satisfactory proof. The evidence must define the boundaries and 

indicate the quantity of the land. It must fix the amount of the 

consideration. It must establish the fact that possession was taken 

in pursuance of the contract, and, at or immediately after the time 

it was made, the fact that the change of possession was notorious, 

and the fact that it has been exclusive, continuous and 

maintained. And it must show performance or part performance 

by the vendee which could not be compensated in damages, and 

such as would make rescission inequitable and unjust.

...

The “indubitable proof” a claimant is required to proffer is 

evidence that should not only be found credible, but of such 

weight and directness as to make out the facts alleged beyond a 

doubt. As the alleged contract is not between parent and child, it 

may be proven by the acts and declarations of the parties, either 

together or separately. The acts and declarations relied upon, 

must not, however, be of an equivocal character; they must have 

such clearness and directness as will leave no doubt as to their 

meaning and purpose.

Kurland, 533 A.2d at 1373 (citations omitted).

Here, the trial court found the following:
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[Zukos’s] deposition transcript does not support the existence of 

an oral contract supporting an exception to the Statute of Frauds 

requirements. When [Zukos] was asked what facts he believes 

justify his remaining on the property, [Zukos] replied

A. I have been a resident there for more than 32 years. I 

basically had communication, as did [counsel for Zukos], 

with Wells Fargo, and they did not follow through on calls 

that both I and [counsel] made to them concerning the 

regaining of the property by me.

Q. Just so it’s clear for the record, it pertains to the eviction 

and ejection action that [Lui] has filed. Is your bases (sic) 

for challenging that that the Wells Fargo did not act 

properly, am I correct in saying that?

A. Yes.

Q. You have no other factors to justify why you should 

remain in the property besides that

A. Correct.

[Zukos] testified that he witnessed a telephone conversation 

between his attorney and [Lui], to which he was not a party:

A. The purchase price of the house, the. (sic) what she was 

willing to do, and all related costs that had occurred in her 

purchasing the house, as well as any financial costs that 

would be incurred of me retaking the house.

Q. Okay. Did you sign any documents pertaining to the sale 

of this house between you and Miss L[ui]?

A. There were no documents signed.

[Zukos] further testified:

Q. Have you ever entered into a lease agreement with Ms. 

L[ui] is my question.

A. No.
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Q. Have you ever entered into a lease agreement with Mr. 

Zie?

A. No. I’ve never spoken to the man.

Although [Zukos] avers that the parties reached an 

agreement with regard to settling the litigation which included that 

[Zukos] would re-acquire title to the property on March 18, 2018, 

the testimony of record as addressed above reflects that if there 

was an agreement, it appears to be a phone conversation between 

[Zukos’s] counsel and [Lui]. Importantly, a follow up letter from 

[Zukos’s] counsel to [Lui] summarizing the alleged telephone 

conversation or agreement does not exist. [Zukos’s] only 

knowledge as to the alleged agreement is the phone conversation 

he overheard where the agreement was formulated.

[Zukos] argues that in accordance with the Kurland case, 

the fact that [Zukos’s] possession has been exclusive, continuous 

and maintained in that he has been paying rent to the 

Prothonotary’s Office makes it an exception to the Statute of 

Frauds. The Supreme Court opined in Kurland, that the “demand 

for specific performance was bold. To execute a parol contract 

against an express statute is the exercise of a large power; to 

execute it without competent proof of its existence, without the 

established test of its past execution, is a wild stretch of authority, 

which no court of law or equity ought to make.” Id. at 1376. 

Summary judgment was properly granted in the case at bar as a 

right for execution of the alleged oral agreement was “simply too 

weak” for the Court’s consideration. Kurland, [s]upra.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/19/2019, at 11-13 (record citations omitted).

We agree with the court’s well-reasoned analysis. We cannot review 

Zukos’s self-serving allegations and infer that the terms of the contract at 

issue were “shown by full, complete, and satisfactory proof.” Kurland, 533 

A.2d at 1373.

Moreover, other than asserting that his possession has been exclusive, 

continuous and maintained, his argument did not address all the factors 
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identified in Kurland as necessary to establishing a transfer of real property 

by oral agreement. Of most importance, Zukos’s argument did not show 

performance or part performance which could not be compensated in 

damages. See id. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Lui, the 

nonmoving party, there is no evidence demonstrating an actual, finalized

agreement between Lui and himself, let alone evidence of “such clearness and 

directness” that would “leave no doubt” that there was a purported oral 

agreement between the parties that should be taken out of the Statute of 

Frauds. Id. Accordingly, the underlying argument is without merit, and the 

trial court did not err in granting Lui’s motion for summary judgment.

In a related matter, on April 9, 2020, Zukos filed an emergency petition 

to extend deadline to remove personal property from real estate based on the 

COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Zukos had previously sought relief with the trial 

court, which denied his petition on March 31, 2020.9In light of our disposition 

and the trial court’s order, we deny Zukos’s request for relief.

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9

In its order, the court indicated that Zukos was evicted from the residence 

and Lui took possession on February 18, 2020. Zukos was then given 30 days, 

or until March 19, 2020 to remove his personal belongings pursuant to Section 

250.505(a) of the Pennsylvania Landlord Tenant Act. However, as of the date 

of the order, Zukos had not secured a residence nor did he rent a storage unit 

for his belongings. The court noted that the matter identified in the emergency 

petition did not involve an eviction action.
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Order granting summary judgment affirmed. Appellant’s Emergency 

Petition to Extend Deadline to Remove Personal Property from Real Estate 

denied.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/27/2020