### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE N ove m be r 13, 200 8 S es sio n
SAMEH AK LADYOUS, ET AL 

### . v. GT ECH CORPORATI ON, ET AL 

### .

Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 06C-402, Barbara Haynes

No. M2008- 00665-COA-R 3-CV - F iled March 31, 2009

This is an appe al from the g ranting of a summar y judgme nt to Gtech Corporation and Specialized Communi cations Compani es , I nc., re lating to the installation of a satellite antenna

on the roof of A& S Market located in Davidson County , Tenne ssee. The market burned and the owners broug ht suit alleg ing that the neg lige nt installation of the satellite antenna ca u s ed t h e fi re. The trial court g rante d summary

judgme nt on the g round the ne g lige nce alleg ed by the marke t ow ners was not the leg al ca use of the f

ire. We re verse

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Reve rsed

D ONAL D P. H A R R IS , S R .J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., J. and R I C HAR D H. D I NK I NS , J ., joined.

G. Kl ine Pr e sto n, Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the a pp e lla nts , Same h A kla dy ou s a

nd As hr a f R ou fa il.
Willi a m B

. Ja k e s , I I I , an d H u g h C. G r a c e y , I I I , N a s h v il le , T e n n e s s e e , f o r th e a p p e ll e e, Gtec h Corporation. Tom Corts, Nashville, Tenne ssee, for the appellee , Specialized Communi cations Companies, Inc.
OP IN ION
This case involves a claim for damag es caused by a fire which occur red on June 1, 2005, at the A & S Market located at 660 Old Hickor y Boule vard in Davidson County , Tenne ssee. I n J une 2004, a sate llite dish for the Tenne ssee lottery was installed on the roof of the mar ket by Specialized Communi cations C o m panies, Inc. (SCC). The sate llite sy stem was owne d by Gtech Corpor ation (Gtec h). The f

ire wa s ignited when t he metal roof of the ma rket be came elec trified ca using a n arc at the point wher e the g round wire leading from the satellite rec eiver touched the me tal roof. The
arc ig nit e d th e fi re that de str oy e d th e mark e t. The facts relating to the cause of the fire are g ener ally not in disput e. In November 2004, the
owner s of the mar

ket, Sameh Akladyous and Ashra f Roufail, hired Shoke G ahtes, who they knewA vol un t ar y non- s ui t was t ake n as t o t he T enn es s ee E ducat i on Lot t er y C orporat i on on M ay 23, 200 6, an d t hat 1

c o rp o ra tio n is no t a p a rty to this a p p e a l.

B o t h pa rt i es f

i l ed “b are b o nes” m o t i o ns f o r summ ary jud gm ent

. W hi l e t here i s a ref erence t o a M em o randum 2

o f L a w b e ing fi le d b y b o th S C C a n d G te c h , t h e se m e m o ra n d a w e re no t i n c lud e d in the re c o rd o n a p p e a l.
-2- thr ou g h th e ir

c hurc h, to ins ta ll a se ri e s of pa rk ing lot lig hts a lon g the fr on t of the ro of of the mark e t. These lig hts were power ed by using a n elec trical service line that ran to a sign located in front of the marke t. The l ine was rer outed t hroug h a flex ible metal conduit t hat was strungalong the roof. It ran to the newly

installed lights and ultimately was c onnecte d to the sign that it had initi ally power ed. When the insulation wore off a “hot” elec trical wire leadinginto the sign, the sig n beca me elec trified and alongwith it the flex ible metal conduit that had been installed with the parkinglot lights. The flexibl e metal c onduit touched the sig n and wa s laying on the m et al ro of of the store . The meta l
ro of , it se lf , b e c a me e le c tr if

ie d. Th e sate lli te dis h, loc a te d o n th e me ta l r oo f, wa s in sta lle d d ir e c tly on the roof. A n uninsulated g round wire attache d to the s atellite had be en route d beneath the metal frame of the satellite dish so that it c ame into contact with the metal r oof. The e lectrific ation of the
me ta l r oo f c a

us e d th e g ro un d w ir e to a

rc a t th e po int

wh e re it c a me int o c on ta c t w iththe ro of . T his
arc ingwa s th e so ur c e of

the fi re that de str oy e d th e mark e t.
Suit was broug ht by Mr. Aklady ous and Mr. Roufail ag ainst SCC , Gtech, and the Tenne ssee Education L ottery

Corporation for damag es sustained a s a re sult of t h e fi re

. The c omplaint, as

1 amende d, alleg es the sate llite dish w a s n o t i n s talled on “non- petroleum ba sed roof pads” a s descr ibed in corre spondence to them from the Te nnessee Education L ottery Corporation, dated J une 11, 2004. The fa ilure to install the satellite dish in accor dance with the manner descr ibed and the f

ailure to take other saf ety prec autions such as using insulated g rounding wire w as, ac cordingto the complaint, a violation of the standard of ca re ow ed by

SCC and Gtec h to the owner s of the mar ket and wa s the pr oximate or

le g a l c a us e of the dama g e s su sta ine d b y the m.
SCC and Gtec h filed m otions for summ ary judgme nt on the g round that the e lectrific ation of the me ta l r oo f w a s th e so le le g a l c a us e of the fi re and

no t any ne g lig e nc e of

the se defe nd a nts

. Their posit ion appea

rs t o have been based upon the premise that elec trification of the m etal roof was cause d by violations of t he National Electric Code in connec tion with the i nstallation of t he par king lot lights. The trial c ourt g rante d the motions for summary judgme nt filed by

SCC and Gtec h on 2 the g round that the “ alleg ed neg lige nt actions on the par t of Def endants wer e not the leg al ca use of any damag es to the P laintiffs.” The plainti ffs, Mr. Aklady ous and Mr. Roufa il, have appe aled f rom that ju dg me nt.

I I . STANDARD OF REVI EW

Sum mary jud g me nt i s a

pp ro pr ia te on ly

wh e n th e ple a din g s, de po sit ion s, ans wer s to interrog atories, and admissions on file, tog ether with the aff

idavits, if any , demonstrate that there a re no g enuine issues of material fa ct and the moving party is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law

. Te nn . R. Civ . P. 56 .0 4; P e nle y v. Ho nd a Mo tor Co. , 3 1 S. W.3 d 181 , 183 (T e nn . 200 0) ; By rd v. Ha ll, 847 S. W. 2 d 2 0 8 , 2 1 0 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 3 )

. Si n c e o u r in qu ir y inv o lv e s p u r e ly a qu e s ti o n of law, no-3-

pr e su mpt ion

of c or re c tne ss atta c he s to the low e r c ourt ' s ju dg me nt, and our tas k is c on fi ne d to revie wing the re cord to deter mine whether the requirements of Rule 56 of the Te nnessee Rules of Civil Procedur e have been me t. Penley , 31 S.W .3d at 183; S t ap l es v
. C BL & Assocs., Inc., 15 S.W

. 3 d 8 3 , 8 8 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 0 ) ; Se a v e r s v
. M e th o d is t M e d

. Ctr

. , 9 S. W. 3 d 8 6 , 9 0

- 9 1 ( T e n n . 1999). Courts should "g rant a summary judgme nt only when both the f

acts a nd the infer ence s to be draw n from the f acts pe rmit a rea sonable pe rson t o rea ch only one conclusion." S taples, 15 S.W.3d at 89; Ba in v. Wells , 936 S.W .2d 618 , 6 2 2 (T en n . 1997). In revie wing the re cord to de termine whe ther
su mmary jud g me nt r e qu ir e me nts have be e n me t, w e mus t vi e w a ll the e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t favor able to the non- moving party

. Penley , 31 S.W .3d at 183; Ey ring v. For

t Sanders Parkw est Med. Ctr., 991 S.W .2d 230, 236 (Tenn. 1999) ; By rd, 847 S.W.2d at 210-11. Summary judgme nt proce eding s are clea rly not de signe d to se rve as a substitute for the trial of g enuine a

nd materia l fac tual matters. By rd, 847 S.W.2d at 210; see also Bloc ker v. Reg ional Med. Ctr, 722 S.W .2d 660, 663 (Tenn. 1987)

. The trial c ourt should overrule the motion where a g enuine dispute ex i s t s as t o an y materia l fac t. By rd, 847 S.W.2d at 211. A fact is mater ial if it must be decide d in order to r esolve the substantive c laim or defe nse at whic h the motion is di rec ted. I d.

III

. A N A LY S IS

I t should be noted at t he outs et t hat t his case w as dec ided by the trial cour

t and brief ed bef ore this Court prior to Tennessee S u p reme Court’s decision in Hanna n v. Alltel Publi shing Co. 270 S.W .3d 1 (Tenn. 2008) . I n Hanna n, the Court clar ified the law related to the g ranting of motions for
su mma ry jud g me nt b y

ho ldi nga pa rt y is e nti tle d to su mma

ry jud g me nt o nly

wh e n th e mov ingpa

rt y has neg ated a

n essential element of

the nonmoving pa

rty ’s claim or ha s shown that the nonmoving pa rt y c ann ot e sta

bli shan e sse nti a l e le me nt o f t he c la im at tr ia l. I d. a t 6- 7. A p art y is n ot e nti tle d to summary judge ment by

mere ly demonstrating that the nonmoving p ar ty ’s evidenc e is insufficient to establish an essential e lement of the nonmoving party ’s claim. I d.
Wit h that standard in mind, we r eview the rec ord in the case befor e us. As our cour ts have fre quently

said, a ne g lige nce a ction require s evidenc e provingthe following elements: (1) a duty of
car e owe d by

the def endant to the plaintiff; ( 2) def endant' s brea ch of that duty ; (3 ) injury ; (4)
causation in fact; and (5) proxi mate or leg al cause

. Naife h v. Valley For g e L ife Ins. Co., 204 S.W .3d 758, 771(Tenn. 2006); Staples v. CBL & A ssocs., I nc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 89 (Tenn. 2000). The element of le g a l c a us a tio n r e qu ir e s th a t th e de fe nd ant' s c on du c t mu st h a ve be e n a “ su bs tanti a l f

a c tor ” in bring ing a

bout the harm be ing c omplained of, that ther e is no statute or policy that relieve s the defe ndant from liability , and that the harm g iving rise to the action wa s rea sonably fore seea ble by
a p e r s o no f o r d i n ar y i n t e l l i g e n c e an d

p r u d e n c e

. N a i f

e h , 2 0 4 S

. W

. 3 d a t 7 7 1 ; M c C l e n ah anv
. C o o l e y, 806 S.W .2d 767, 775 (Tenn. 1991)

. I t is not disputed that the m anner of i nstallation of t he sate llite sy stem was a c ause in fa ct of the fire for whic h a cla im is m ade. The t rial cour t found the alleg ed neg lige nce of SCC and Gtec h was not the leg al ca

use of the f

ire, but fai l ed t o s t at e a b as is for this finding. Thus, the trial court
may have fo un d th a t th ere was no genuin e iss ue a s to wh e the r t he a lle g e d n e g lig e nc e wa s a-4-

“ su bs tanti a l f a c tor ” in br ing ing a

bo ut t he ha rm or that e le c tr if

ic a tio n o f t

he ro of wa s n ot r e a so na

bly fore seea ble. The holding in Hannan pr ohibits t he trial c ourt from g ranting a summary judgme nt on the ba sis the proof was ins uf fi c ie nt t o e sta

bli shon e of

the se e le me nts . I f t

he de fe nd ants fa ile d to neg ate these elements or establish that the pl aintiffs could not prove them at t rial, t hen the trial court must have found that ther e wa s some policy that relieve d the def

endants of liability

. The de position of Thoma s Eaton was filed with the court. Mr. Eaton is a licensed e lectric al eng ineer who was e mploy ed by

Messrs. Aklady ous and Roufail to investig ate the f ire. He testified that the point of ig nition of the fire was wher e the g round wire from the satellite antenna touched the metal roof a

nd arc ed whe n the roof be came elec trified. Ac cording to Mr. Eaton, had the g round wire b ee n b o n d ed to the metal roof a t the point where it came into contac t, the arc and, thus, the fire , would not ha

ve occur red. Whil e he testified that it would not have bee n prac tical to bond the g round wire to the roof, he also testified that g ener ally an ele ctricia

n does not want a

n uninsulated g rounding conductor t o touch any

thing to which it is not bonded. Ac cordingto Mr. Eaton, running the g rounding wire f

rom the g rounding clamp on the a ntenna unde rneath t h e fr am e s u pporting the
ante nn a wh e re it came int o c on ta c t w iththe me ta l r oo f n ot o nly vio la te d th is p hil os op hy

bu t w a s in violation of the National Electric Code. The Code require s the g round wire to go f rom the g rounding clamp to the ser

vice mast by

the most direct route

. Mr. Eaton testified that the circ uit which power ed the lig hts on the roof a nd the sig n was not continuously

g rounded f

rom the roof

are a bac k to the elec trical ser v i ce pa nel for the store. The
a bs e nc e of c on tin uo us g ro un din g wa s a

vio la tio n o f t

he Natio na l E le c tr ic Cod e and the fi re wo uld not have oc curr ed had there been continuous g rounding

. Mr. Eaton also stated that the circ uit was equipped with a 30 a

mp circuit bre aker . I n his opinion, the breaker was too big for the circ uit and should have be en a 15 or 20 amp circ uit breake r. He suspected, how ever , that a properl y siz ed circ uit breake r would not have tripped under the circ umstances. The arc ing at the point where the g round wire came into contact with the metal r oof would proba bly have c reated enoug h resistanc e t o p re v en tt h e c i rc u i tfr o m o v er l o ad i n g.
Mr. Eaton testified that there w ere o ther wa y s the roof c ould have be come e lectrifie d than the manner

in which it did. Accor ding to Mr. E aton t he roof may also have become elec trified by lightning , by

welding it u s i n g an ar c we lder or by someone using a powe r tool on the roof a nd
scra ping the cord to the power tool on the metal edg e of the roof. He did not te s t i fy as t o t he fr e qu e nc y of su c h o c c ur

re nc e s.
Con sid e ri ngthe fo re g oin g e vid e nc e in t he light mos t fa

vo ra ble to t he pla int if

fs , a s w e mus t, we are of the op ini on

that G te c h a

nd SCC f a ile d to ne g a te the e le me nt o f l e g a l c a us e or to e sta bli sh that the plaintiffs could not prove leg al ca use. In our view, the re is a g enuine disput e as to whether the method of installation of the sate llite antenna wa s a substantial fac tor in bring ing a bout the fire that destroy ed the plaintiffs’ marke t and as to whether elec trification of the roof by some method was
rea sonably

fore seea ble.-5-

We n e xt co ns ide r w he the r t he re is so me po lic y that re lie ve s the de fe nd ants of lia bil ity in t his
c a s e

. L i a b i l i t y i s n o tn e c e s s ar i l y i mp o s e d f o r e v e r y a c t i na c h a i no f c a u s a t i o nt h a tl e a d s t o i n

j u r y. This court has sa id, “leg al ca use connote s a policy

decision by

the judiciary

to deny liability for otherwise a ctionable c onduct. I t require s the courts to establish the boundary of l eg al liability , using mixe d c on sid e ratio ns of log ic , c omm on se ns e , jus tic e , po lic y , and pr e c e de nt. ” Was te Ma na g e me nt, In c

. , 1 5 S

. W

. 3 d

a t4 3 1 ( i n t e r

n a l c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) ; S e e a l s o M u l l i n s v
. S e a b o ar d C o a s t l i n e R a i l w a y, 517 S.W .2d 198, 201 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974). O ne of the rules of l aw t h at wil l relieve a neg lige nt actor from liability

is the doctrine of

interveningand super seding cause

. Th a t doc tr ine , whi c h s ur

viv e d th e Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court ' s a do pti on of c omp arativ e fa

ult , pr ov ide s th a t a

ne g lig e nt a c tor

wi ll b e re lie ve d f

ro m li a bil ity wh e n a ne w an d ind e pe nd e nt c a us e intervene s to pr oduce a result that could not have be en for esee n. The c ustomary explanation of the doctrine is that an inde pendent, inter vening cause brea

ks the chai n o f leg al ca

usation betwee n the orig inal actor ' s conduct a nd the eve ntual inj u ry

. M cC l ung v. Delta Squar e L td. Partnership, 937 S.W .2d 891, 905 (Tenn. 1996) ; Hay nes v. Hamilton C ounty , 883 S.W .2d 6 0 6 , 612 (Tenn. 1994) ; Waste Manag ement, Inc., 15 S.W.3d 425 at 432. The doctrine applies only when the inter

vening act (1) wa s sufficient by

itself to cause the injury , (2) wa s not rea sonably fore seea ble to the neg lige nt actor , and (3) was not a nor mal response to the neg lige nt actor' s conduct. I d..
The trial c ourt may

have determined the neg lige nt installation of t he parking lot lights on the roof of the plaintiffs' marke t by

Shoke Gahtes was an intervening act. Whether Shoke Ga htes' work amounted to an inter

vening act is, in our view, de pendent upon whe ther e lectrific ation of the roof from some sourc e wa s rea sonably fore s ee ab l e. W e have alre ady deter mined that to be a disputed mat e r ia l f

a c t in th is c a s e

. Ce rta in ly , th e r e w e r e o th e r c a u s e s o f th is f

ir e

. I f , h o w e v er, it wa s rea sonably

fore seea ble that the r o o f could become e lectrifie d from some sourc e, the a lleg ed neg lige nce of

Gtech a nd SCC may

have be en a c ontributing fa ctor to be compare d with the fault of oth e rs . We , th e re fo re , r e ve rs e the tr ia l c ourt ’s g ra nti ngof a su mma ry jud g me nt.

I V. CONCL USI ON The judg ment of the tr ial court is re verse d and this matter is rema nded for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nio n. The c osts of this appeal shall be ta x ed to Gtec h Corporation and Spec ialized Com munications Companies, I nc.

___________________________________ DONAL D P. HARRI S, SENI OR J UDGE