### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A pr il 17, 200 6 S es sio n

MARY ELLEN H ALL MCI NTI RE v. T IMO THY LAPLE AU MCINTI RE

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Sh elby County No. CT-003442-03 K aren R. William s, Jud ge

No. W2004-02904-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Jun e 13, 2006

Th e tr ia l c ou rt g ra nte d Mo the r’ s p e tit ion in o bje c tio n to F a the r’ s p ro po se d r e loc a tio n o f the pa rt ie s’ minor children a n d am ended pa renting plan to awa

rd custody

to Mother; order ed F ather to repa y prepa id child support to Mother; set F ather ’s child support obligation based on his curr ent income; order ed F ather

to refund sums to the childre n’s ac counts; awa rded Mother

the parties’ ti m es h are property ; and ordered Father to pay $30,000 of Mot her’ s attorney ’s fees. We aff irm in part, modify in part, re verse in part, and r emand.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed in p art; Modif ied in p art; Reve rsed in part; and Rem anded

D AVI D R. F ARMER , J
., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , S P

. J ., joined.

Marc E. Reisman, Memphis, Tennesse e an d L eslie G. Coleman, Me mphis, Tennessee , for the appellant, Timothy

L apleau McI ntire.

Geor g e L awr ence Rice, I I I , and L aura Diane Roge rs, Memphis, T ennesse e, for the appe llee, Mary Ellen Hall McIntire.

OP IN ION

This appea l follows an ac rimonious divorce and arises f rom Def endant/Appe llant Timothy L aple a u M c I nti re ’s (M r. Mc I nti re ) pr op os e d re loc a tio n w ith the pa rtie s’ c hil dr e n f

ro m Me mph is t o Nashville. Plaintiff/Appellee Ma ry Ellen McI ntire (Ms. McIntire) a nd Mr. McI ntire we re ma rried in 19 86

. Th re e c hil dr e n we re bo rn of the marria g e

. Th e pa rt ie s se pa rate d on June 1, 20 02 , a ndMs. McI ntire filed a

complaint for divorc e on June 19. Mr. McI ntire answe red a nd counter claimed on J uly 1. The fin al decr ee of

divorce was e ntere d on September 25, 2002. The trial court a war ded the divorce to Mr. McI ntire on the g rounds of irre concilable differ ence s, and incorpor ated the parties’ marital dissolution agr eeme nt (“ M DA ”) and par enting plan into the decr ee of divorce

. Under the par enting plan, Mr. McI ntire was a war ded primary residential c ustody . Ms. McI ntire’s-2-

pr e su me d c hil d s up po rt

ob lig a tio n w a s c a lc ulate d b a se d o n h e r p ro je c te d incom e a ndwa s p a id i n pr op e rt y a s a su m tot a l. Th e tr ia l c ou rt fo un d a do wn wa rdde viatio n f

ro m pr os pe c tiv e ly -d ue c hil d support was a ccor dingly

justified.

The pa rties ar e medica l doct o rs

. M s

. McI ntire, howe ver, did not complete her r esidenc y b e c a u s e t h e p ar t i e s r e l o c a t e d t o M r

. M c In t i r e ’ s p l a c e o f e m p l o ym e n ta n d d e c i d e d t o s t ar ta f a m i l y. Mr . M c I nti re a lso ha s a n MB A an d is a bo ard c e rt if ie d pa tho log ist . I n 1 99 9, Mr . M c I nti re le ft his medical position and subseque ntly attended la w school. Ms. McI ntire wa s the primary car etake r of the childre n.

I n M a y 20 02
, on e mo nt h pri or

to the pa rt ie s’ se pa

ratio n, Mr . M c I nti re be g a n w or k a s a
su mme r a sso c ia te wi th a la w f ir m in Na sh vil le. I n Febr ua ry 20 03 , M r. Mc I nti re inf

or me d M s. McI ntire of his intention to relocate wit h the parties’ children to Nashville as requir ed by Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 36- 5-108. On F ebrua ry 21, Ms. McI ntire filed a petition opposing re location and seeking to set aside or modify the final decr ee of divorce

. I n her pe tition, M s. McI ntire alleg ed that she and Mr . McI ntire had been spending substantially equal time with the children until Mr. McI ntire lim ite d h e r v isi tat ion to the pr ov isi on s o f the pa re nti ng pla n w he n s he ob je c te d to his de c isi on to reloc ate. She further alleg ed that she had e ntere d into the MDA under dur ess, and moved the court to set side or modify the final decr ee; enjoin Mr. McI ntire fr om interfering w ith her visitation and fr om r e mov ing the c hil dr e n f ro m Sh e lby

Cou nty ; a wa

rdhe r c us to dy of the c hil dr e n a ndse t- c hil d

su pp ort; a ndre fu ndhe r a mou nts a lle g e dly pr e pa id a s c hil d s up po rt

.
The trial c ourt hear d the matter over eig ht day s in May and J une, 2003. On Aug ust 21, 2003, the t rial court enter ed an order that the children shall not be relocate d to Nashville and a mended the pare nting plan to a war d primary residential custody to Ms. McI ntire. The c ourt set Mr. McIntire’s child support o b l i gati on at $1,955 per month based on an a nnual salary of $80,000; order ed Mr. McI ntire to ref

und Ms. McI ntire approx imately $275,000 in prepa id child support, less a cr edit for an undete rmined amount of c hild support pay able by Ms. McI ntire; a w a

r d e d M s

. M cI ntire time-shar e property not previously

specific ally

awa rded in the origina l decr ee. Ms. McI ntire filed a notice of appea l on September 22, 2003. This Court dism issed the appe al on April 15, 2004, for lack of a fina l judgme nt.
Following hearings in September 2004, on November 3, 2004, the trial court entere d an orde r on attorney ’s fe es, child support, and the children’ s “Va ng uard a ccounts.” The c ourt order ed Mr. McI ntire to r epay Ms. Mc I ntire $270,347 for prepa id c hild support; order ed Mr. McI ntire to return funds re moved from the c hildren’s Va ng aurd a ccounts; and order ed Mr. McI ntire to pay $30,000 of Ms. McI ntire’s a ttorney ’s fe es. The tr ial court a lso d enied Mr. McI ntire’s motion to stay pending

app e a l. Mr

. Mc I nti re fi le d a no tic e of app e a l to thi s Cou rt on No ve mbe r 9 , 2 00 4. We a ff ir m in pa rt , modify in part, re verse in part, and r emand.

Issues Presented

Mr . M c I nti re pr e se nts the fo llo wi ng iss ue s, a s w e re wo rdthe m, f or ou r r e vie w:-3-

(1) Whether the trial c ourt err ed by apply ing the wrong standard when deter mining whe ther Mr. Mc I ntire, as primary residential pa

rent, should have been pe rmitted to relocate t o Nashville, TN, with the parties’ minor children.

(2 ) Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d by fi nd ing Ms. Mc I nti re ha d pr e paid c hi ld support in the amount of $270,347 and w hether the trial court erre d in finding it had leg al authority to order reimburse ment despite t he finality of the e arlier decr ee of divorce

. (3) Whether the trial c ourt err ed by ordering Mr . M cIntire to return f unds

remove d from the c hildren’s Va ng uard a cc o u n t s wher e the issue wa s not raised in a ny

pleading s befor e the tria l cou rt , where there was no e vidence

re gar d ing the actua l a mount r emoved, and wher e the funds wer e used for a pe rf e c tly pe rm iss ibl e pu rp os e un de r the app lic able statut e s.
(4) Whether the trial c ourt err ed by awa rding timeshare property

to Ms. McI ntire subsequent to the time the fina l decr ee be came final despite the fac t that the pa rt ie s’ MD A w hic h w a s in c or po rate d in to the fi na l dec re e sp e c if ic a lly itemiz ed the marital property to be awarde d to Ms. McI ntire and awar ded the timeshare to Mr. McI n tire throug h a re siduary clause providing “Husba nd shall rec eive a ll of the rema ining a ssets.”

(5 ) Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d by or de ri ng Mr . M c I nti re to p a y $3 0, 00 0 o f M s. Mc I nti re ’s a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.

Ms. Mc I nti re ra ise s th e fo llo wi ng a dd iti on a l is su e s:
(1 ) Whe the r M r. Mc I nti re is w illful ly a ndvo lun tari ly

un de re mpl oy e d f

or c hil d

su pp ort pu rp os e s.
(2) Whether Ms. M cInt i re should have been a war ded more than $30,000 for

a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.

Stan dard of Revie w

Ou r s ta nd ardof

re vie w of a

tr ia l c ou rt

sit tin g wi tho ut a

jury is de novo upon the re cord. W rig ht v . Ci ty of K

nox v ill e , 8 9 8 S

. W

. 2 d 1 7 7
, 1 8 1 (T en n

. 1 9 9 5 ). W e r ev i ew t h e t ri al co u rt ’s fi n d i n gs of fa c t w ith a

pr e su mpt ion of

c or re c tne ss u nle ss the e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s o the rw ise . T e nn . R. App. P. 13( d). Thus, we may not r ever se the trial court’s fac tual finding s unless they are contra

ry to the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. We re view the tria l court’s c onclusions on ma tters of law de

novo , wi th no pr e su mpt ion of c or re c tne ss. Te nn

. R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Bo wde n v . W ar d , 27 S.W .3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000) . We will not overturn a trial c ourt’s d et ermination insofar as it is based on an-4-

assessment of w itness cre dibilit y ab s en t cl ea r and convincing evidenc e to the contr ary

. W ells v. Te nn e sse e Bd

. o f R e ge nts , 9 S.W .3d 779, 783 (Tenn.1999)

.
Relocation

Mr. McI ntire asse rts the trial court err ed by incorre ctly apply ing Tennesse e Code Annota ted § 36-6-108 whe n determining whether he should be permitted to reloc ate the parties’ minor children to N a sh vil le . M r. Mc I nti resu bmi ts the tr ia l c ou rt e rr on e ou sly

app lie d s ub se c tio n 10 8(c) whe n it should have a

pplied subsection 108(d), a nd that the trial court should have permitted reloca tion wh e re it w a s f

or a re a so na ble pu rp os e . T he Cod e pr ov ide s, in p e rt ine nt p art :
(c ) I f the pa

re nts are a c tua lly

sp e nd ing su bs ta nti a lly

e qu a l in te rv a ls o f t ime with the child and the r elocating pa rent see ks to move with the child, the other pa rent

ma y , w ith in thirty

(3 0) da y s o f r e c e ipt

of no tic e , f ile a peti tio n in op po sit ion to

re mov a l o f the c hil d. No pr e su mpt ion in f a vo r o f o r a g a ins t th e re qu e st t o r e loc a te wi th the chi ld sh a ll a

ri se . T he c ou rt

sh a ll d e te rm ine wh e the r o r n ot t o p e rm it

re loc a ti o n o f t h e c h i l d b a s e d u p o n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s o f t h e c h i l d

. T h e c o u r tsh a ll consider a ll releva nt fac tors including the following wher e applica ble: (1) The extent to which visi tation rig hts have be en allowe d and exerc ised; (2 ) Wh e the r the pr ima

ry re sid e nti a l pa

rent , onc e ou t of

the jurisd ic tio n, is lik e ly to c omp ly

wi th a ny ne w v isi ta tio n a

rr a ng e me nt; (3) The love, af

fec ti o n an d emotional ties exi sting be tween the pare nts and child; (4 ) T h e d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e p ar en t s t o p ro v i d e t h e c h i l d w i t h fo o d
, cl o t h i n g, medical car e, education a nd other nece ssary car e and the deg ree to which a pa rent ha s been the primary

car eg iver; (5) The importance of continuity in the child' s life and the le ng th of time the

c hil d h a s li ve d in a

sta ble , s a tis fa c tory

e nv ir on me nt; (6 ) T he sta

bil ity of the fa mil y

un it o f the pa

re nts ; (7 ) T he me nta l a ndph y sic a l he a lthof the pa re nts ; (8) The home, school and c ommunityrec ord of the c hild; (9)( A) The rea sonable pre fer ence of the c hild if twelve (12) y ear s of ag e or older; (B ) The c ourt may hear the prefer ence of a y oung er child upon reque st. The pref ere nces of older c hildren should normally be g iven g reater we ight than those of y oung er c hildren; (10) Evide nce of phy sical or e motional abuse to the child, to the other pa rent or to any other pe rson; and (11) The char acte r and be havior of a ny other pe rson who resides in or fre quents the home of a

pare nt and such pe rson' s interac tions with t he child. (d)( 1) I f t he parents are not actua lly spending substantially

equal inter vals of tim e wi th the c hil d a ndthe pa re nt spe nd ing the g re a te r am ou nt o f t ime wi th the c hil d proposes to re locate w ith the c hild, the other pare nt ma y , within thirty(30) da y s of-5-

rec eipt of the notice , file a petition i n opposition t o remova l of the child. The othe r pare nt may

not attempt to reloca te with the child unless expressly authorized to do

s o b y t h e c o u r tp u r s u a n tt o a c h a n g e o f

c u s t o d y o r

p r i m ar y c u s t o d i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y. Th e pa re nt s pe nd ing the g re a te r a mou nt o f t ime wi th the c hil d s ha ll b e pe rm itt e d to

re loc a te wi th the c hil d u nle ss the c ou rt fi nd s: (A) T he re location does not have a re asonable purpose; (B ) Th e re l o cation would pose a threa t of specif

ic and se rious harm to the child that outweig hs the threa t of harm to the c hild of a cha ng e of c ustody ; or (C ) T he pa

re nt' s mo tiv e fo r r e loc a tin g wi th the c hil d is vin dic tiv e in tha t it is intended to def

eat or deter

visitation rights of the non- custodial pare nt or the par ent spending less time with the child. (2) Spec ific and serious harm to the child includes, but is not li mited to, the fo l l o wi n g: (A) I f a pa

rent wishes to take a child with a se rious m ed i ca l p ro b l em to an

are a whe re no a dequate trea tment is readily available ; (B ) I f a pa re nt w ish e s to take a c hil d wi th sp e c if ic e du c a tio na l r e qu ir e me nts to a n a re a wi th n o a c c e pta

ble e du c a tio n f

a c ili tie s; (C) I f a pare nt w ishes to r eloca te and take up residenc e with a per son with a his tory of c hil d o r d ome sti c abu se or wh o is c ur

re ntl y abu sin g a lc oh ol o r o the r d ru g s; (D) I f the ch i l d re l i es on t he par ent not reloc ating who provides e motional support, nurturing and deve lopment such that remova l would result in severe emotional detriment to the child; (E) I f the custodial pare nt is emotionallydisturbed or de pendent suc h that the custodial pare nt is not c apable of adequately pare nting the child in the abse n ce of support sy stems curre ntly i n p l ace in this state, and such support sy stem is not available at the propose d reloc ation site; or (F ) I f t he proposed reloc ation is to a for eig n country whose public policy

does not normally

enfor ce the visitation rights of non-c ustodial parents, that doe s not have

a n a de qu a te ly

fu nc tio nin g le g a l sy ste m or tha t othe rw ise pr e se nts a su bs ta nti a l r isk of spec ific and se rious harm to the c hild.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-108(c ) & (d)( 2005). Mr. McI ntire asserts the trial court e rre d in finding tha t the pa rt ie s sp e nt s ub sta nti a lly

e qu a l tim e wi th the c hil dr e n a nd in ba sin g its ho ldi ng on a be st i nte re st analy sis under 108(c ). He asserts that the trial court should have permitted reloc ation under 108( d) wher e the pa

renting plan clea

rly provides that the c hildren would be w ith Ms. McI ntire approximately

twenty -five pe rce nt of the time.

We beg in our ana ly sis by

noting that Mr. Mc I ntire does not contend that the trial court er red in determining that reloc ation was not in the best interests of the children. He does not arg ue that the court misapplied 108(c). Rather, he asserts the trial court erre d in its factual dete rmination that the parties spen t substantiallyequal time with the childre n and that, under 108(d), the trial court should have pe rmitted relocation where it was for a rea sonable prof

essional purpose a nd not vindictive.-6-

Subsection 108(c) require s the court to enga g e in a best interest ana ly sis when determining wh e the r t o p e rm it r e loc a tio n o f the c hil dren wh e n th e pa re nts are “ a c tua lly

sp e nd ing su bs ta nti a lly equal interv al s o f time with the child[ren].” Tenn. Code Ann § 36- 6-108(c ). Howe ver, w hen the pare nts are not a ctually

spending substantially

equal a mounts of time with the children and the pa rent spending the g reater amount of time with children pr oposes to reloc ate with the c hildren, re location will be permitted unless re location does not have a reasonable purpose, poses a thre at of spec ific and serious harm to the children, or t he parent’s mot ive for reloc ating is vindictive. Tenn. Code Ann. § 3 6- 6- 10 8( d) ; Kaw atr

a v . Ka wat ra , 182 S.W .3d 800, 805 (Tenn. 2005). Although the Code does not define how co u r

ts a r e to de termine what constitutes “substantially equal time,” our

supreme c ourt has stated:

To determine the number of day s to c redit to ea ch par ent for pur poses of Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 36-6-108( c) a nd (d), the trial court should first examine the provisions of the re sidential schedule. T he trial c ourt should the n consider a dditional time eac h pare nt spent with the child that is not ref lected in the re sidential schedule. I f either pare nt violated t he terms of t he residential schedule by interfe ring with the other pa rent’s tim e wi t h t h e child, the trial court should make a ny nece ssary adjustments to ref

lect the time that the child should have be en in the ca re of the other p ar e n t

. T o a l l o c a t e a d a y t o o n e p ar e n tw h e n b o t h p ar e n t s c l a i mc r e d i tf o r t h a td a y, the tr ia l c ou rt sh ou ld e xami ne 1) the ho ur s e a c h pa re nt a c tua lly sp e nt wi th the c hil d on that day ; 2) the ac tiviti es in which e ach pa rent e ng ag ed with the child; 3) the

resour ces the pare nt expended on the child' s behalf during that time period, including the costs of a

meal or a ny

other c osts directly

rela ted to t h at p ar en t ’s care a nd

su pe rv isi on of

the c hil d; a nd4) a ny

oth e r f a c tor that the tr ia l c ou rt

de e ms r e le va nt.

Kaw atr a , 182 S.W .3d at 803-04. Althoug h the terms of a pare n t i n g p l an o r custodyorder are rele vant to the consider ation of whe ther 108(c ) or 108( d) is a pplicable, they

arenot determinative. Id. Rather, the c ourt must determine, a s a fa ctual matter , whether the p ar en t s h ave spent substantially

equal time with the childre n. See id.; Pl ac e nc ia v . P lac e nc ia
, 4 8 S. W. 3 d 732, 737 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)( L illard, J . concur ring ). As this Court previously has not ed, the de termination of wh ic h s ub se c tio n is app lic able of te n is dif fi c ult wh e n th e c ir c ums ta nc e s a ndthe div isi on of tim e have f luctuated. Pl ac e nc ia , 48 S.W .3d at 737.

I n this case, the pa

renting plan clea

rly provides Mr. McI ntire a g reater a mount of pare nting time. Howeve r, the trial c ourt found the pa rties had spe nt substantially equal time with the childre n
a ndthat:

[t ]he parties neg otiated t he P PP [parenting plan] over seve ral months and executed it on August 16, 2002. Fa ther promised Mother that she would have mor e par enting time with the children than the times provided f or in the PPP . I n fac t, this occurre d until F ather finally formally advised Mother that he had taken a job in Nashville and

wo uldbe mov ing wi th the c hil dr e n. Whe n Moth e r obj e c te d, F a the r r e du c e d h e r t ime with the children to the e x act terms of the PPP

. Father testified that he did not take-7-

domestic rela tions unti l the Fa ll of 2002 and infer s he wa s not a war e of the body of law prior to that time. The [c] ourt does not acc ept this infere nce . . . a nd his conduct ref lects that he unde rstood family law issues as he neg otiated the PPP and planne d his mov e to Na sh vil le

. As so on a s Moth e r obj e c te d to the mov e , h e re du c e d h e r t ime with the children to the minimum provided for in the PPP so as to create a situation wher e the pa

rents we re “ not actually

spending substantially

equal inter vals of time” wi th the c hil dr e n. Du ri ng the c ou rs e of thi s li tig a tio n, F a ther con ti nu ed to lim it M o th e r ’ s ti me w ith th e c h il d r e n e v e n w h e n h e w a s in M is s o u r i li ti g a ti n g his other

ca s e. Ba s ed o n h i s co n d u ct , t h e [ c] o u rt fi n d s th at Fa t h eru s ed h i s s u p er i o r k n o wl ed ge of the law to manipulate Mother so a s to secure an adva ntag e re lative to the childre n.

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

fu rthe r f ou ndthat Mr . M c I nti re ha d a c c e pte d a po sit ion wi th a law fi rm in Nashville as e arly

as Aug ust 2002, but that he “w illfullydid not tell Mot her this sig nificant fa ct for

sever al months even thoug h she kept a sking a bout his job si tuation.” The t ri al co u rt fo und Mr. McI ntire had a llowed Ms. McI ntire to believe she would have daily acc ess to the childre n and that he had “admitted that he withheld the information until l ate De cembe r.” The trial court de termined Mr. McI ntire’s behavior constit uted a “fraud upon Mother and the [c] ourt.” I ntere stingly , the trial court stated tha t “[b] oth parties failed to impre ss the [c] ourt with the ir testimony ,” but found that Mr. McI ntire “a

ppear ed to try to manipulate his answe rs” which “adde d cre dibilit y to Mother’s a rg ument that he tra pped her into ag ree ing to the PPP.”

We cannot say

the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst the finding s of the trial court in this case. Although Ms. Mc I ntire’s time with the childre n was limited to the terms of the pa renting plan at the time Ms. McI ntire filed he r petition opposing r eloca tion in Februa ry 2 0 0 3
, M s . McI ntire cle arly spent

su bs ta nti a lly

mor e tim e wi th the c hil dr e n im me diate ly pr ior to e ntry of the pa re nti ng pla n in Au g us t 20 02 , p art ic ula

rl y du ri ng the pe ri odof

Mr . M c I nti re ’s int e rn sh ip i n N a sh vil le fr om M a y to A ug us t, 2002. Fu rther, the evidenc e does not pre ponderate ag ainst the trial court’s determination that the parties had been spending substantially equal a mounts of time with the children until Mr. McI ntire limit ed Ms. McI ntire’s pa

renting time when she obje cted to his proposed r eloca tion. The trial court’s determinations in t his case rest l arg ely on the court’s assessment of w itness cre dibilit y and will not be over turned a bsent clea

r and c onvincing evidenc e to the contr ary . Acc ording ly , we a ffirm application of § 36- 6-108(c ). As noted above, Mr. McI ntire does not assert that the trial court e rre d in its best int ere st of the child ana ly sis under § 36-6- 108(c) . We affirm on this i ssue.

Pre pa id C hild Supp or t

This case ag ain hig hlights the proble matic nature of child support ag ree ments which skirt the child support g uidelines. I n the pre sent ca se, Mr. McIntire re ceive d a substantially g reater shar e of

mari ta l pr op e rt y and th e part ies a g re e d th a t th e va lue of thi s p ro pe rt y

wo uldme e t or

e xce e d M s. Mc I nti re ’s c hil d s up po rt

ob lig a tio ns un de r the g uid e lin e s b a se d o n h e r p ro je c te d in c ome . M s. McI ntire asse rts Mr. McI ntire re ceive d $275,000 in property as pre paid child support. Mr. McIntire

asserts the $275,000 in property was not prepa id child support and that, eve n if it is, the trial court is without authorityto order him to re turn it to Ms. McI ntire.-8-

Mr. McI ntire conte nd s t h e t ri al court e rre d in ordering him to refund to Ms. McI ntire $2 75 ,0 00 in p re pa id c hil d s up po rt , le ss the a mou nt o f s up po rt wh ic h M s. Mc I nti re wo uldha ve pa id from September

1, 2002, until J uly

2003, based on he r ac tual earnings f or t h at p er i o d . Mr. Mc I nti re ’s arg ume nt, a s we pe rc e ive it, is tw o- fo ld. F ir st, Mr . M c I nti re a sse rt s th a t Ms . M c I nti re did

no t pr e pa y

a ny c hil d s up po rt . Rathe r he a sse rt s the pa rt ie s ag re e d to a dow nw ard de viatio n in c hil d supp o rt t o z er o m ere ly

in rec og nition of an unequa l property division, and that the parties did not

a g r e e t h a tM s

. M c In t i r e w a s , i n e s s e n c e , p a yi n g h e r c h i l d s u p p o r tw i t h a

s h ar e o f m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y.
We find this arg ument to be di s i n gen u o u s at best. The pare nting plan pr oposed by Mr. Mc I nti re a nde nte re d b y

the tr ia l c ou rt

in S e pte mbe r 2 00 2 s ta te s:

Whe n y ou con si der the a dd iti on a l $2 75 ,0 00 .0 0 [in mari ta l pr op e rt y ] F a the r i s
re c e ivi ng

. . . M oth e r i s prep ay ing thi s c hil d s up po rt in a n a mou nt tha t a de qu a te ly

cover s what her

child support obliga tion would be during the minorityof all three (3) of the pa rties’ minor childre n.
Although the trial court’ s final orde r re cog nized this ag ree ment as j ustify ing a downwar d deviation from t h e ch i l d support g uidelines, the parties and the c ourt clea rly construed Ms. Mc I ntire to be prepay ing c hild support in the form of prope rty

. Reg ardle ss of what is stated in a de cre e of divo rc e, t h e d u t y of child support ca nnot be ba r g a i n e d a w a y , a n d a g r e e m e n t s n o t t o s e e k f u t u r e i n c r e a s e s i n s u p p o r t ar e v o i d a s a g a ins t pu bli c policy

. Berryhill v. Rhode s , 21 S.W .3d 188, 193 (Tenn. 2000) . Any deviation from the g uidelines

mus t be ju st if

ied

. I n thi s c a se , th e pa

re nti ng pla n a ndtr ia l c ou rt ’s or de r, re a d to g e the r, c le arl y de mon str a te t hat the tr ia l c ou rt de viate d f

ro m th e g uid e lin e s in se tti ng c hil d s up po rt be c a us e Ms. McI ntire had pr epaid he r child support oblig ation in the form of prope rty . Additionally , the “deviation” in the child support provision w as not a deviation in the amount of support owe d, but only in the amount prospec tively due. The amount of support was calc ulated at the g uideline amount based on Ms. McIntire’s proje cted e arning capa city of $75,000 per y ear

. I n their pare nting plan, the pa rt ie s a lso a c kn ow le dg e d th a t th e c hil d s up po rt or de r r e ma ine d mo dif

ia ble by the c ou rt

.

Mr. McI ntire additionally asserts that, assuming Ms. McI ntire di d prepay child support, the trial court did not have the authority to or der repay ment beca use such repay ment would wor kan unlawful re troac tive modification. Clearly , a child support orde r is not retroa ctively modifiable, but may be modified only

as of the d at e a petition for modification is filed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36 -5 -1 01 (a )( 5) (2 00 5) ; Ru tle dg e v . B ar re tt , 802 S.W .2d 60 4
, 6 0 6 (T enn. 1991). I n this case, howeve r, orde ring Mr. McI ntire to return amounts prepa id by Ms. McI ntire, less amounts due f or the period in w hich Mr. McI ntire had primary custody of the children, does not w ork a r et ro ac t i ve modification. Rather, the modification is pr ospective. I t r elieves Ms. McIntire of he r child support ob lig a tio n u po n c ha ng e of c us tod y . M oreo ver, as no te d, in a dd iti on to a c kn ow le dg ing that Ms

. McI ntire wa s prepay ing child support, the parties acknow ledg ed and provided for the possibilit y

of mod if ic a tio n in the pa

re nti ng pla n. Th e pa

re nti ng pla n p ro vid e s:-9-

The pa rties af firmatively acknow ledg e that C ourt approva l must be obtained befor e
c hil d s up po rt

c a n b e re du c e d o r mod if ie d, un le ss s uc h p a y me nts are a uto ma tic a lly reduc ed or te rminated unde r the terms of the Pare nting Plan.

C l ea rl y , Ms. McI ntire’s c hild support obligation was te rminated upon c hang e of c ustody of the parties’ children. We a ffirm the trial court’s determination that Ms. McI ntire pre paid child support in the amount of $275,000 and tha t this obl igation re m ai n ed modifiable unde r the terms of the pare nting plan.

Howeve r, the trial c ourt err ed in determining the da te of modifica tion and in i ts d e termination of amounts to be cr edited to Mr

. McI ntire. Child support is modifiable only as of the date a petition to m od if y is f ile d w ith the c ou rt . I n th is case, Ms . McInti re fi le d h e r p e tit ion in o pp os iti on to reloc ation and to set aside or modify the final decr ee of divorce on Fe bruary 21, 2003. I n her pe tition to set aside the final decree
, Ms. McI ntire asse rted she ha d prepa id child support based on a projec ted annual income of $60,000, but that her actua l inc ome for 2002 was $13,000. She asserted the cor rec t child support obliga tion for 2002 was $2,328.

I n its order of A ug ust 2003, the trial court o rd er ed M r. M cI ntire to ref und Ms. McI ntire pr e pa id c hil d s up po rt

of $2 75 ,0 00 , les s a cr e dit fo r the a mou nt o f c hil d s up po rt Ms. Mc I nti re wo uld ha ve be e n ob lig a te d to pa y fr om Se pte mbe r 1, 20 02
, un til July 20 03
, ba se d on he r a c tua l e arn ing s. I n it s N ov e mbe r 3 , 2 00 4, or de r, the tr ia l c ou rt se t th e re fu nda t $ 27 0, 00 0. How e ve r, re a din g Ms. McI ntire’s pe tition t o set aside the f inal decr ee of divorce as a pe tition t o modify , the amount of he r
c hil d s up po rt

ob lig a tio n w a s mo dif

ia ble on ly fr om the da te of he r pe tit ion , Fe br ua ry 21 , 200 3. Th us , Mr. M cI ntire i s entitled to a credit from the ref und amount in an amount equa l to the child support gu i d el i n e am o u n t fo r t h re e ch i l d re n b as ed o n an i n co m e of $ 7 5
, 0 0 0 fr o m Au gu s t 2 0 0 2 t h r o u gh Fe bruary 2003, and base d on an income of $13,000 from F ebrua

ry 2003 throug h J uly 2003, when Ms. McI ntire’s c hild support obligation ende d upon chang e of c ustody

. We r emand to the trial court fo r d e te rm inatio n o f the c re dit du e Mr . M c I nti re a ndfo r e ntry of a n o rd e r r e qu ir ing Mr . M c I nti re to repa y Ms. McI ntire $275,000, less the c redit, within thirty (30) da y s of entry

of the orde r.

The “V ang uar d Ac c ount

s”

I n its November 2004 or der, the trial court order ed Mr. McI ntire to r efund funds which he had take n from ac counts established for the benefit of t he parties’ children under the Uniform Gift to M ino rs Ac t ( “ the UG MA ” ). Th e or de r s ta te s:

[Mr.] TimothyMcI ntire shall immediately return the funds re moved from the children’ s respe ctive Va ng uard A ccounts. The amount returne d shall be the a mount the children would have had if the funds had never been remove d. First Te nnessee shall be the Tr

ustee of the funds, which sha ll be used for the childre n’s educ ational expenses afte r hig h school. Neither party shall be permitted to w ithdraw funds f rom the ac count without the consent of the other party

. Should the parties disag ree on the-10-

amount of use of

the funds, the trustee from F irst Tennesse e shall have final decisionmakin g a uth or ity . T he fe e s f or the Tr us te e sh a ll b e pa id f

ro m th e a c c ou nts

.

M r. M cInt i re asserts the trial court e rre d in requiring him to refund the Va ng uard f unds for four

rea sons: (1) compliance with the order is imposs ible; (2) the tria l court ruled on a n issue that was not properly

befor e the c ourt; (3) ther e wa s insufficient evide nce to support the court’s or der; (4) Mr. Mc I nti re ’s us e of

the fu nd s w a s p e rm iss ibl e un de r the app lic able statut e s.
We first dispe n s e wi th Mr. McI ntire’s a rg ument that the trial court ruled on an issue not pr op e rl y be fo re it. Al tho ug h, a s M r. McI nt ir e a sse rt s, the iss ue wa s n ot r a ise d in the ple a din g s, it clea rl y wa s t ri ed b yconsent. “ When issues not raised by the pleading s are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be trea ted in all respe cts as if they had bee n raised in the pleading s.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.02. Ms. McI ntire raised the issue at lea st as ear ly as the Nove mber 26, 2003, hearing be fore the trial court, and the tra nscript of the November hea ring indicates that the issue initiallyhad bee n addre ssed by the parties and the c ourt in Aug ust, 2003. At the Novembe r hearing, c ounsel for Mr . McI ntire stated: “N ow, the Va ng uard a ccount . . . That’s an unre s o lved iss ue I sa id I wa s g oin g to g e t, b e c a us e that’ s h e re .” Mr . M c I nti re didno t ob je c t, b ut c on c e de d to having taken f

unds from the a ccount, submitting they wer e prope rly

used under

the UGMA to pa y for the c hildren’s e ducational e x penses. Additionally
, Mr. M cI ntire agr eed that the appropriate way to resolve the issue w as with an a ccounting and, af ter much discussion, the pa rties ag ree d that Mr. McI ntire would provide an acc ounting by J anuary 6, 2004. Mr. McI ntire provided his a ccounting in May 2004, and the matter

was a g ain hea

rd in September 2004. Mr. M cI ntire’s arg ument that the trial court r

uled on an issue not prope rly befor e the c ourt is without merit.

Mr. McI ntire also asse rts there was i n s ufficie nt evidence to support the trial court’ s order

. Mr. McI ntire asse rts: “To say that the pre pondera nce of the eviden ce d oes not support the trial

co u r t’ s ru li n g is a n u n d e r s tate me n t. T h e r e w a s n o e v id e n c e p r e s e n te d b y M s

. M c I n ti r e.” Mr

. McI ntire conc edes, how ever , both here and in the trial c ourt, that h e re m o ved funds f rom the children’ s Vang uard a ccounts. The only question befor e the c ourt with respe ct to these a ccounts wa s wh et h er Mr. McI ntire re moved the funds f or appr opriate pur

poses. Mr. McIntire submits he withdre w f

u n d s f r o m th e a c c o u n ts to r e imb u r s e h im s e lf f o r a mo u n ts e xp e n d e d f

o r th e c h il d r e n ’s pr ivate sc ho ol tuit ion a ndoth e r e du c a tio na l e xpe ns e s. Ms. McI nt ir e a sse rt s th e a c c ou nts expenditures wer e pre- divorce expenditures, that the funds wer e deple ted af ter the divorc e, and that Mr. McI ntire used the f

unds to pay his attorney ’s fee s. Mr. McI ntire sug g ested that a n acc ounting was the be st way t o resolve the issue. The tra nscript of the Septe mber 2004 he aring indicates the trial court rece ived cancelled personal checks from Mr. McIntire dating from 2000, and that betwee n J uly and September

2002 Mr. McI ntire deple ted the funds. Mr. Mc I ntire simply failed to provide

an ac counting that would demonstrate pr oper use of the funds. The ref ore, the trial court’ s determination was larg ely one of c redibility

which we will not overturn absent c lear and convinc ing evidenc e to the contra

ry

. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the tria l court’s de termination that Mr. McI ntire improperly

remove d funds from the c hildren’s Va ng uard a ccounts.-11-

We a g re e wi th M r. Mc I nti re , h ow e ve r, that th e tr ial cou rt’ s o rd e r i s impo ssi ble to c omp ly with where it specifies no a mount to be refunde d. We rea d the trial court’s order as re quiring Mr. McI ntire to r eturn all amounts taken from the fund since the dec ree of divorce was e ntere d in 2002. Th e e xac t a mou nt take n, ho we ve r, is un c le ar fr om the re c or d b e fo re us . T he tr a ns c ri pt i nd ic a te s th is amount to be betwe en $102,000 and $130,000. We rema nd to the t rial court for de termination of the exact amount re moved by Mr. McI ntire fr om the Vang uard acc ounts e stablished for the childre n under the UGMA, a nd for e ntry of an or der r equiring M r. M cInt i re to refund that amount to the

acc ounts.

The Ti me- Shar e Pr op e rty

I n its Aug ust 2003 order
, the trial court a war ded time-shar e prope rty to Ms. McI ntire base d on a findi n g t h at “[d]uring the ne g otiations neither party identified the time shar e as a marital or

se pa rate a sse t. In li g ht o f a ll tha t w a s o n th e ta ble to be div ide d, the [c]o urt is no t su rp ri se d th a t th is asset wa s overlooked. Since it has now bee n identified, the [c]ourt finds that it is a marital asset and

awa rds it to Mother.” M r. M cInt ire a sserts that the time-shar e wa s contemplated by the parties during settlement neg otiations a nd was awa rded to Mr

. McI ntire throug h a “re sidual clause ” in the parties’ MDA. The MDA incorporated by the court in the 2002 decr ee pr ovides for the division of

a c on sid e ra

ble mari ta l e state a nd c on ta ins six pr ov isi on s re la tin g to the div isi on of th e par tie s’ pr op e rt y . T he sixth pr ov isi on pr ov ide s:

Husband shall re ceive all of the re maining ma rital assets; as it relates to any rea l estate other t han the J CMG Building
, which includes the parties’ marital re sidence
, Wife shall sign a ny

documents nec essary

to transfe r such r eal e state to Husband.

Additionally , e-ma il corre spondence betwee n the parties du ri n g t h e cour se of the ne g otiations includes re fer ence to the time-shareproperty

.

A m ari ta l di sso lut ion a g re e me nt i s e sse nti a lly a c on tr a c t e xecu ted by the pa rt ie s in contemplation of divorc e proc eeding s. E.g., Gray v . Estate of Gray
, 99 3 S.W. 2d 59
, 63 (T e nn . Ct

. App. 1998). A pr operty

settlement provision of an MDA is “within the cate g ory of co n t ra ct s and is to be lo o k ed upon and e nforc ed as a n ag ree ment, and is to be construe d as other c ontrac ts as respe cts its interpre tation, its meaning and ef fec t.” Id. (citations omitted). The interpre tation of a contra ct is a matter of

law. Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc ., 995 S

. W

. 2 d 8 8
, 95 (Tenn. 1999) . When interpre ting the pr ovisions of an MDA that reta in their contractual nature, we apply g ener al contra ct principles, see king to a scertain and ef fec tuate the intent of the parties at the t ime the ag ree ment was executed. Buettner v. B uettner , 183 S.W .3d 354, 358 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). We construe the va

ri o u s p ro v i sions of a contra ct tog ether , g iving e ffe ct to eac h provision and

asce rtaining the intention of the parties ba sed upon the usual, natural, and or dinary meaning of the lang uag e they

employ ed. Id.

W e a g r e e w i t h M r

. M c In t i r e t h a tt h e p ar t i e s ’ M D A p r o v i d e d f o r t h e d i v i s i o n o f

a l l p r o p e r t y, that the time-shar e prope rty was a ddresse d in co rr espondenc e betwe en the pa rties, and that Mr.-12-

Mc I nti re wa s a wa

rd e d th e pr op e rt y

thr ou g h th e “ re sid ua l c laus e .” We r e ve rs e the tr ia l c ou rt on thi s issue.

Wil lf ul a nd V olu nta ry Une mploy ment

Thetr ia l court set Mr. Mc I ntire’s c hild support obligation at the g uideline amount base d upon an undisputed annua l sa lary of $80,000 as a f irst y ear associate in a major law firm. Ms. McI ntire

asserts t he trial c ourt err ed whe re Mr . McI ntire had e arne d $450,000 in prior y ear s as a medic al doctor a nd potentially

would earn considera

bly more t h an $80,000 as a pr acticing attorney . Mr. Mc I nti re , o n th e oth e r h a nd , a sse rt s h is p ro sp e c tiv e c hil d s up po rt ob lig a tio n c a nn ot b e ba se d o n h is past income; that the pa

rties ag ree d that he would leave the prac tice of medicine to attend law school befor e they contemplated divorce ; a nd that the trial court properly based his child support oblig ation on his present income

.

Al tho ug h c ou rt s a

re inc lin e d to fi ndwi llf

ul a ndvo lun tary

un de re mpl oy me nt whe n a pa rt y with child support obligations voluntarily leave s his employ ment and chooses to acc ept a job which pr ov ide s si g nif

ic a ntl y le ss inc ome , whe the r a part y is wil lf ull y a ndvo lun tari ly

un de re mpl oy e d is a question of fa ct, and the trial court has considera ble discre tion in it s determination. W ill is v . W ill is
, 62 S.W. 3d73 5, 73 8 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 1) . I n ma kin g its de te rm inatio n, the tr ia l c ou rt mus t consider the party ’s past and present employ ment and whether the party ’s choice to acc ept a lowe r pay ing job wa s rea sonable a nd made in g ood faith. Id.

I n the curr ent case , the parties do not cite us to a finding by the trial court reg arding whether Mr. M cI ntire i s voluntarily undere mploy ed, and w e find none . Rather, the a rg uments prese nted on appea l are predic ated on the t rial court’s determination of Mr. McIntire’s income for c hild support purposes. It is undisput ed that Mr. Mc I ntire wa s terminated f rom his previous employ ment in the medical f ield; that he attende d law school during t h e course of the pa rties’ mar riag e; and that he

so ug ht a ndob ta ine d a

po sit ion wi th a

ma jor la w f ir m up on g ra duati ng fr om l a w s c ho ol. I t is undisputed that his annual income as a first-y ear associate was $80,000. We af firm setting of Mr. McI ntire’s c hild support obligation base d on his curre nt income as a prac ticing attorney

.
Atto rne y ’s Fe e s

Ms. Mc I nti re inc ur

re d a tto rney ’s fees in e xce ss o f $ 10 0, 00 0. She su bmi ts tha t $4 4, 70 0 in fe e s w e re a sso c ia te d w ith iss ue s r e g ard ing the c ha ng e of c us tod y a nd that a n a dd iti on a l $1 4, 60 0 in fee s were incurre d to revise the pare nting plan. She also contends that f ees in the a mount of $70,000

wer e assoc iated with re location m atters. The trial court awar ded Ms. McI ntire attorne y ’s fe es in the amount of $30,000.

Both pa rties assert the trial court e rre d in the awa rd of attorney ’s fe es to Ms. Mc I ntire. Mr. McI ntire asse rts the awa

rd of $30,000 was in err or where the reloc ation statutes do not provide for attorney ’s fe es and w here the award ex cee ds attorney ’s fees associated wit h the custody issues. He submits t hat Ms. McI ntire incurr ed attorne y ’s fe es in the amount of $3,600 with respe ct to the-13-

custody issues. Ms. McI ntire, on the ot her hand, submits t he trial c ourt err ed by not awar ding he r the full amount of attorney ’s fee s wher e the reloc ation matter falls within the purview of T ennesse e Code Annotated § 36-5-103( c) when it e ffe ctuates a cha ng e in custody . She alternately submits t hat if she is not entitled to attorney ’s fees for fee s incurre d with respec t to the relocation issue, the trial court e rre d by

not awar ding he r all fe es assoc iated with the custody issues, which total $59,300.

The que stion of the appropriate amount of attorney ’s fee s to be awa rded is larg ely

left to the discretion of the trial court. Aaron v. Aaron
, 909 S.W .2d 408, 411 (Tenn.1995) . Upon appe al, we g e ne ra lly wi ll n ot d istur

b th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on un le ss the e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t it

. Storey v . Storey , 8 35 S.W. 2d59 3, 59 7 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp .1 99 2) . We a ff ir m.

Hol din g

We affir m the trial court’ s judgme nt with r espec t to r eloca tion of the children a nd chang e of custody to Ms. McI ntire. We als o aff irm the trial court’s determination that Ms. McI ntire has prepa id child support in the amount of $275,000. We aff irm the trial court’s order requiring Mr. McI ntire to r epay Ms. Mc I ntire $275,000, less a cr edit for a mounts Ms. McI ntire would have been obligated to pay

during the time the children wer e in the custody of Mr. McIntire. We rema nd for a determination of t he amount of t his cre dit consistent with this opinion. We aff irm the t rial court’s order requiring Mr. McI ntire to ref und actua l sums taken from the c hild ren’ s Vang uard a ccounts, a nd

rema nd for a

specific determination of that amount. We r ever se the trial c ourt’s orde r aw arding the parties’ time-share property to Ms. McI ntire, and hold the pr operty wa s awa rded to Mr. Mc I ntire throug h the re sidual clause in the pa rties’ MDA. We a ffirm the tria l court’ s s etting of Mr. McI ntire’s c hild support oblig ation based on his cur rent income . We affirm the awa rd of attorney ’s fee s to Ms. McI ntire i n the amount of $30,000. We deny Ms. McI ntire’s re quest for attorney ’s fe es on appea l.

Th is c a us e is r e ma nd e d to the t ri a l c ou rt fo r f urthe r d e te rm inatio ns c on sis te nt w ith thi s op ini on . Co sts of

thi s app e a l are ta xed on e -h a lf to A pp e lle e Ma ry El le n H a ll M c I nti re a ndon e -h a lf t o A p p e l l a n tT i m o t h y L ap l e a u M c In t i r e a n d h i s s u r e t y, f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ DAVID R. FARMER, J UDGE