NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

HARRY DUNLEAVY,

Plaintiff, : Hon. Dennis M. Cavanaugh

v. OPINION

EDWARD GANNON, ALAN : Civil Action 2:1 1-cv-0361(DMC)(MF)

HANDLER, JOHN TONELLI,

CANDACE MOODY, LT. JAMES

MCINNESS, JOHN PALM, ROBERT

STOBER, CHARLES CENTfNARO,

BARRY FRANK, JOHN BRESUN,

GARY LIGHTMAN, JOHN

BARBARULA, LAURIE VEIGHT,

TIMOTHY MATTESON, PETER

ROMAINE, NEW JERSEY STATE

POLICE, NEW JERSEY BAR

ASSOCIATION, OFFICE OF

ATTORNEY ETHICS, LAKELAND

BANK,

Defendants.

DENNIS M. CAVANAUGH, U.S.D.J.:

This matter comes before this Court on four motions by Defendants Barry Frank (ECF No.

38), Gary Lightman (ECF No. 43), Laurie Veith (ECF No. 44), John Breslin (ECF No. 47). for

sanctions pursuant to FED.R.CIv.P. 11. Plaintiff Harry Dunleavy (“Plaintiff’) filed various

pleadings in opposition to these motions for sanctions. (S ECF Nos. 50-1, 53-5 and 57.) Barry

Frank submitted a reply brief. (ECF No. 57.) Mr. Frank also filed a motion to enjoin Plaintiff

from filing any further motions. (ECF No. 73.) This Court filed an Order and Opinion (ECF Nos.

82-3) dismissing Plaintiffs complaint with prejudice (hereinafter, the November 1st Opinion )

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Dunleavy v. Gannon, No. 1 1-cv-361, 2011 WL 5321004 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2011). Additionally,

Plaintiff has filed a motion for reconsideration of this Court’s November 1St Opinion. (ECF No.

84.) Pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 78, granting this Court the authority to resolve the motion on the

papers, no oral argument was heard. Based on the following, this Court hereby grants

Defendants’ motions for sanctions against Harry Dunleavy in the form of reasonable costs and

attorneys fees incurred by Mr. Frank, Mr. Lightman, Mr. Thomas and Mr. Breslin in defending this

action from its inception on January 20, 201 1. Further, this Court hereby sua sponte enjoins

Plaintiff from filing any further complaints without Court approval. This Court hereby denies

Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of this Court’s November Opinion. 1

I. BAcKGRouND

Plaintiffs claims stem from the allegation that he lost personal funds that were being

wrongfully handled by the Defendants as an investment. Plaintiff alleged that Charles W. Cart

fraudulently persuaded him to invest $25,000 in what Plaintiff believed to be a “health insurance

claims company” named Skylands Administrators. (PI.’s Compi. ¶ 1). From there, Plaintiff

alleged that the same funds were incorrectly or wrongfully deposited in another account named

Skylands Benefit Consultants, LLC. jc Plaintiff claimed that the funds were then “fraudulently

and clandestinely funneled to pay debts for a strip club in Florida called the ‘Wild Coyote.” jj.

Plaintiff has filed a multitude of lawsuits arising out ofthe same facts and claims. Plaintiff

additionally instituted disciplinary action against attorneys and judicial officials involved in the

‘This Court finds Rule Ii sanctions to be the most appropriate mechanism for deterring

similar conduct, further, this case will not be reopened pursuant to Plaintiffs motion for

reconsideration. Therefore, Mr. Frank’s cross-motion to enjoin Plaintiff from filing any further

motions in this matter without leave (ECF No. 73) is hereby terminated as moot.

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suits. Plaintiff has filed almost a dozen cases in this Court and has made several unsuccessful trips

to the Third Circuit. (Breslin’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Sanctions 2, July 11, 2011, ECF No. 47.)

The first of suits involving claims bearing similarity to those asserted by Plaintiff in the instant

action was filed in this Court in 2005. at 25. In 2007, Plaintiff filed in the Superior Court of

New Jersey, Sussex County against Defendants involved in prior actions (hereinafter, Superior

Court Case”). Dunleavy v. Lakeland Bank, et al., No. SSX-L-825-07 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.

2009), disposal docketed. Plaintiff then filed Attorney Grievances against attorney Defendants in

the Office of Attorney Ethics and against the Honorable Edward Gannon, J.S.C. in the Advisory

Committee on Judicial Conduct (hereinafter, respectively “OAE” and “ACJC”). 2This Court

dismissed Plaintiffs complaint in the instant action on grounds of res judicata and the entire

controversy and Rooker-Feidman doctrines. S, November l Opinion.

On December 11, 2007, Plaintiff filed the Superior Court Case against Lakeland Bank and

others involved in the alleged investment gone wrong. S Dunleavy v. Lakeland Bank, Ct al., No.

SSX-L-825-07 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2009), disposal docketed. Judge Gannon dismissed

Plaintiffs complaint against all Defendants except Mr. Cart, and after trial found that Plaintiff had

“nO cause” for that remaining claim. (Frank Br. in Supp. Mot. for Sanctions 6, May 12, 2011, ECF

No. 38; see also Gannon eta!. Br. 1-2, Apr. 21, 2011, ECF No. 29-1.) Plaintiff did not appeal. jj

Plaintiff filed grievances, in March 2010, with the OAE and ACJC against attorney

Defendants bringing the instant motions for sanctions and Judge Gannon. (Gannon et al. Br. in

Supp. Mot. to Dismiss 1, Apr. 21, 2011, ECF No. 29-1.) Plaintiffs problems with attorneys and

the Judge involve a stated “conspiracy” to issue an unfavorable judgment in that case, P1.’ s

2Judge Gannon presided over the Superior Court Case, defined supra.

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Compl. ¶I 6, 21, 23, 25. Plaintiff contends here that the OAE Committee members failed to

investigate his claims of improper conduct. Id. at 2. In each grievance, the facts of the wrongfully

handled investment, and litigation pursued by Plaintiff as a result, underlie the substance of

Plaintiffs claims. (Lakeland Bank Br. Mem. in Supp. R.11 Sanctions 1, June 9, 2011, ECF No.

44-2).

In this Court, Plaintiff attempts to revitalize the fact pattern underlying his Superior Court

claims with new accusations against counsel and others involved in that litigation. Generally,

Plaintiff explains in his complaint how the unfavorable Superior Court judgment resulted from

case mishandling by attorney Defendants rather than lack of merit or frivolity of claims. Plaintiffs

complaint avers that his due process rights were violated by attorneys involved in that litigation,

pursuant to 42 U.S,C.A. § 1983. PL’s Compl. ¶ 3, Plaintiff charges Defendants with

“conspiracy, cover-ups, deliberate lies, sabotage, fabrications, willful and malicious concealment

of vital documents, fraudulent removal of documents from a court file, and a judge [sic.] allowing

Defendants and their attorneys to lie to the Court and ignore Court rules and the law with

impunity,” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 1.)

This Court granted motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Laurie Veith, Gary Lightman,

Barry Frank, Charles Centinaro, Edward Gannon, Alan Handler, Lt. James Macinness, Candace

Moody, John Palm, Robert Stober, JohnTonelli, John Breslin and the New Jersey State Police

(ECF Nos, 12, 26, 28, 29, 35, 41) and dismissed Plaintiffs complaint with prejudice in the

November St Opinion and Order.

1. Motions for sanctions

As Plaintiffs complaint has already been dismissed, remaining motions in this action

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include the motions for Rule 11 sanctions filed by Barry Frank, Gary Lightman, Laurie Veith,

Timothy Matteson, Peter Romaine and John Breslin. (ECF Nos. 38, 43, 44, 47.)

Defendants assert that Plaintiff made representations to the court for improper purposes

including harassment, causing unnecessary delay and needlessly increasing the cost of litigation

under Rule 11. Defendants state that Plaintiff files merely to ‘extract. . . the amount of his claim

that he was unsuccessful in pursuing against others in the New Jersey litigation” and that, in the

instant matter, Plaintiff makes frivolous arguments lacking basis in law and fact. Içj at 2.

Defendants demonstrate the legal and factual deficiency by showing, as an example, that Plaintiff’s

“conspiracy” charge on Defendants’ alleged intent “to deprive him of his constitutional rights” is

not supported by even “a single fact” that reaches the elements of conspiracy at law. (Frank Br, in

Supp. Mot. for Sanctions 2-3, 14.) In a similar manner, Defendants show the legal deficiencies in

Plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(hereinafter, ‘ADEA”).

Most significant is the allegation that Plaintiff continues to engage in the same conduct,

filing numerous similar suits, despite adverse holdings reasoned upon Plaintiffs’ failure to state a

claim for relief. Id. at 12. Plaintiff has been warned by various Courts. Dunleavy v. New

Jersey, No. 05-cv-3865, 2008 WL 199467, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 18, 2008.) Further, Defendants

Laurie Veith, Timothy Matteson and Peter Romaine sent Plaintiff a letter under the “safe harbor”

provision of Rule 11 informing him of their arguments under the Rule and their strong

recommendation that he withdraw his complaint. (Aff. of Thomas Ex. E, June 9, 2011, ECF No.

44-1.) Plaintiff did not withdraw his complaint and the same was dismissed in this Court on

November 1St, 2011. Defendants seek Court ordered sanctions against Plaintiff, pursuant to Rule

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11, in the form of all costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in the instant litigation.

(a) Barry Frank’s Motion for Sanctions

Mr. Frank began representing James Flanagan in the State Court Case on May 5, 2008 in

substitution of Gary Lightman, Mr. Flanagan’s former attorney. According to Mr. Frank’s

arguments, which are supported by the court’s findings, Plaintiff incorrectly accused Mr. Flanagan

of having an interest in the company into which Plaintiffs personal funds were funneled. (Pl.’s

Compl. ¶ 1, 22.) Mr. Frank refers to the instant action as merely “the most recent chapter in

[Plaintiffs] four-year persecution of people whom he imagines [are] responsible for his poor

investment decision, their lawyers and the judge who was assigned to adjudicate the underlying

dispute.” j 2-3. Mr. Frank further avers in his brief, that Plaintiff repeatedly presents the same

issues and is seeking to relitigate the same issues that he already had a full and fair opportunity to

litigate. (Frank Br. in Supp. Mot. for Sanctions 17-8.) Indeed, this Court dismissed Plaintiffs

complaint in the instant action on grounds of res judicata and entire controversy and Rooker

Feldman doctrines. (November 1St Opinion, ECF No. 82-3.)

Mr. Frank asserts that Plaintiffs claim under the ADEA, prohibiting workplace

discrimination, is patently frivolous and utterly inapplicable. jç at 13. Mr. Frank makes a similar

argument regarding Plaintiffs § 1983 claim. Since Mr. Frank is a private lawyer, not a state actor,

the § 1983 claim is legally unsustainable. 3 at 3. Mr. Frank’s characterization supports the

contention that, “Plaintiff is more interested in attacking his victims than he is in seeking redress

for real injuries.” j4. at 13 n.5.

3Further, Mr. Frank demonstrates that Plaintiff previously failed to obtain relief under § 1983 in the prior actions. See, Frank Br, 12 (citing Dunleavy v. State of New Jersey, 2007 WL

2793370 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2007), gfi, 251 Fed.Appx. 80 (3d Cir. 2007)).

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Mr. Frank supplies ample evidence showing that Plaintiff has been warned that conduct

similar to what is being exhibited in the instant litigation is inappropriate. Examples include

District and Circuit Court findings that Plaintiff “made bald allegations of age discrimination

without anchoring them with specific facts that tend to prove discrimination.” Dunleav v. Mount

Olive Twp., 2005 WL 1828560, at *7 (D.N.J. July 29, 2005), d, 183 Fed. Appx. 157 (3d Cir.

2006); see also Dunleavy v. Montville T., 2005 WL 1917610, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2005),

aff’d, 192 Fed. Appx, 100 (3d Cir. 2006). Dismissal of prior actions was reasoned upon such

findings.

Mr. Frank seeks sanctions in the form of all costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in defending

the instant litigation.

(b) Gary Lightman’s Motion for Sanctions

Mr. Lightman originally represented James Flanagan in the State Court Case before Mr.

Frank substituted in as counsel. (Frank Br. in Supp. Mot. for Sanctions 5.) Plaintiff sets forth no

facts or claims against Mr. Lightman that he did not allege in the Superior Court Case or in the

subsequent ethics grievance Plaintiff filed against him. (Lightman Br. in Supp. Mot. for Sanctions

2.) Plaintiff is barred from reasserting these claims by collateral estoppel, Mr. Lightman argues.

at 14. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Lightman failed to conduct discovery as Plaintiff saw fit and

that he was involved in a conspiracy with various other attorney Defendants in contravention of

PlaintifT’s due process rights. Id at 7-8. Comparatively, during the Superior Court Case, Plaintiff

41n response to both District Court decisions, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Judge

Katherine S. Hayden, who presided over Plaintiffs’ cases, which was dismissed for failure to

state a claim. Dunleavy v. Hayden, Docket No. 07-cv-3729 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2009), ECF No. 18

(order denying reconsideration).

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filed many unsuccessful motions for sanctions, contempt and recusal. He accused the parties,

attorneys and Judge Gannon of various “imaginary infractions,” including alleged discovery

defaults and related procedural decisions that resulted in unfavorable decisions. jç at 7. Plaintiff

alleges the same in the instant matter. j

Mr. Lightrnan generally alleges that Plaintiffs complaint is without support in fact or law.

(Lightman Br. in Supp. Mot. for Sanctions 10.) Moreover, Plaintiffseeks relitigation of State

Court Case claims, even though he never appealed the court’s unfavorable decision, jc Mr.

Lightman repeats Mr. Frank’s arguments, that Plaintiff cannot state a claim under the ADEA or §

1983. j Mr. Lightman seeks sanctions in the form of all costs and fees he and his law firm have

incurred in defending this litigation.

(c) Laurie Veith, Timothy Matteson and Peter Romaine’s Motion for Sanctions

Ms. Veith was Vice President of Lakeland Bank at the time of Plaintiffs filing. (Veith et

al. Mot. For Sanctions 2, June 9, 2011, ECF No. 44•)5 Mr. Matteson was and currently serves as

General Counsel at Lakeland Bank and Mr. Romaine was and currently serves as Vice President of

Lakeland Bank. j Plaintiff alleges Ms. Veith and Mr. Romaine ignored subpoenas to appear in

Court. (Pl.’s Compl. 26, 28.) Plaintiff alleges Mr. Matteson blind-sided Plaintiff by attempting to

have Mr. Lightman take Plaintiffs deposition over the telephone. icj,, at 27. Defendants aver

Plaintiffs allegations are “utterly bereft” of any grounding in fact or law and are insufficient to

support a claim for relief. Id. at 2.

5Ms. Veith currently serves as Senior Vice President at Lakeland Bank. ‘Lakeland Bank

Announces Employee Promotions,” Oct. 12, 2011, LakelandBank.com,

http://www.lakelandbank.com/Resource-Center/Press-Releases/Show-Press-Release.aspx?id49

7 (last visited Jan. 18, 2012).

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Defendants advance arguments similar to those asserted by Mr. Frank and Mr. Lightman,

showing that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim fails as a matter of law. j at 5-6. Further, they allege

Plaintiff can sustain no claim under the ADEA or § 1985 given the facts supplied. a at 7-8.

Defendants also state that Plaintiffs claims are duplicative and, as held in this Court’s November

1st Opinion, are barred by res judicata. j4,, at 8-9. Ms. Veith, Mr. Matteson and Mr. Romaine seek

sanctions in the form of all reasonable costs and counsel fees incurred in defending action

instituted by Plaintiff in this Court, from its inception.

(d) John Breslin’s Motion for Sanctions

Mr. Breslin represented McIntyre & Co., accountants employed by the company in which

Plaintiff claims to have intended to invest, Mr. Breslin contends that Plaintiffs complaint fails to

set forth any claim against him that is reasonably grounded in fact or law. (Breslin’s Mot. for

Sanctions 1, July 11, 2011, ECF No. 47-3.) Moreover, Plaintiffs complaint makes no direct legal

allegations against Mr. Breslin. (Pl.’s Compl., Jan. 20, 2011, ECF No. 1; Breslin’s Mot. for

Sanctions 1.) Mr. Breslin points to the fact that Plaintiff did not appeal any of the state court

decisions, but rather filed grievances against attorneys involved in the Case and the Judge

presiding over the same. (Breslin’s Mot. for Sanctions 1.)

Mr. Breslin aptly notes Judge Debevoise’s admonishment of Plaintiff in Dunleavv v. New

Jersey, to show that he has been warned to cease similar prior conduct:

.the [Clourt wishes to note that several of Dunleavy’ s claims appear to be

frivolous and the [Cjourt is concerned that Dunleavy has caused unnecessary expense by

laundry-listing various claims without familiarizing himself with the laws underlying the

same, and without having even attempted to exhaust the various administrative procedures

prerequisite to bringing certain of these claims.” (Breslin’s Mot, for Sanctions 2 (citing

No. 05-cv-3865, 2008 WL 199467, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 18, 2008.)))

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Plaintiff should have been well-aware of his obligations to the Court, opposing parties and their

counsel in the instant matter, Mr. Breslin contends. (Breslin Mot. for Sanctions 3.) Mr. Breslin

then goes on to describe the lengthy history of Plaintiffs inundation of Defendants with baseless

accusations and demonstrates that exact findings in judgments of a variety of courts and Judges.

at 23-6. Additionally, Mr. Breslin explains that Plaintiff cannot legally or factually sustain the

claims he has mounted against Defendants here. jç at 15-9.

Further, Mr. Breslin repeats the arguments ofthe other Defendants moving for sanctions in

the instant motions, that Plaintiffs claims are barred by res judicata and the Rooker-Feldman and

entire controversy doctrines. at 3-4. Mr. Breslin seeks monetary sanctions against Plaintiff. jçj.

at 27-8.

2. Motion for reconsideration

This Court granted Defendants motion to dismiss in the November 1St Opinion and

accompanying Order. 6 Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of that Opinion and Order on

December 9, 2011, thirty-eight days later. (ECF No. 84.) Plaintiff contends that this Court

mischaracterized Plaintiffs claim, and due to the mischaracterization, found that Plaintiff was

attempting to relitigate claims already decided. Plaintiff points to a statement in the November 1St

Opinion where this Court explains that Plaintiff “personally deposited” funds at Lakeland Bank.

See, Opinion 3, Nov. 1, 2011, ECF No. 83. Plaintiff contends that this sentence should be

6Motions to dismiss were filed by Defendants Laurie Veith (ECF No. 12), Gary Lightman

(ECF No. 26), Barry Frank (ECF No. 28), and John Breslin (ECF No. 35) on March 22, April 20,

April 21 and April 28, respectively; by Defendants Charles Centinaro, Edward Gannon, Alan

Handler, Lieutenant James Macinness, Candace Moody, John Palm, Robert Stober and John

Tonelli on April 21 (ECF No. 29); and, by The New Jersey State Police on May 17 (ECF No.

41).

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replaced with a concept: that some branch or person within or of Lakeland Bank who “to this day,”

Plaintiff “does not know,” wrongfully deposited $25,000 worth of his personal funds into an

unintended account. (Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. 1-2, Dec. 9, 2011, ECF No. 84.) Plaintiff states that

based on the mischaracterization of fact, this Court’s decision was “emotionally upsetting” and

“perhaps a clear parameter that inadequate consideration was given to Plaintiff’s claims of a

plethora of civil rights and due process violations.” j4.

ll STANDARD OF REVIEW

1. Motion for sanctions

The bottom line purpose of a sanction under Rule ii is deterrence. The Court must be

mindful of the proportionality of the sanction in that it is limited to what suffices to “deter

repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.” FED. R. Civ. P.

I i(c)(4) (2007). “The sanction may include nonmonetary directives: an order to pay a penalty into

court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment

to the movant or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses directly resulting from the

violation.” Id. Courts have uniformly sanctioned litigants who attempt to relitigate issues already

decided against, including those under the guise of constitutional arguments and 1983 claims.

Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, Employees or Officers, 855 F.2d 1080,

1090 (3d Cir. 1988) (upholding sanctions where claims were identical to other claims already

adjudicated and therefore legally frivolous); see also, Balthazar v. Atl. City Med. Ctr., 279 F.

Supp. 2d 574, 594 (D.N.J. 2003) (imposing Rule 11 sanctions where the Court concluded the

litigant was merely attempting to relitigate unsuccessful State Court claims).

Rule 11 contemplates, as well as orders directing payment to the movant of part or all of

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the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation, sanctions in

the form of nonmonetary directives. FED.R.Clv.P. 11. The Third Circuit has concluded that

District Courts may issue an injunction requiring a litigant who has repeatedly filed complaints

alleging claims that have already been fully litigated to receive Court approval before filing further

complaints. In the Matter of Packer Avenue Associates, 884 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that

District Court did not abuse its discretion by ordering appellant to receive its permission before

filing additional pleadings) (citing Chipps v. U.S.D.C. M.D.Pa., 882 F.2d 72 (3d Cir.1989); jjij:

Oliver, 682 F.2d 443 (3d Cir.1982)). Other circuits have reached the same conclusion. See Filipas

v. Lemons, 835 F.2d 1145 (6th Cir.1987); In re Martin-Tigona, 763 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.1985),

denied, 474 U.S. 1061, 106 S.Ct. 807, 88 L.Ed,2d 782 (1986); Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d 1075

(1st Cir.1980).

2. Motion for reconsideration

Motions for reconsideration in this District are governed by L. Civ. R. 7.1(1). U.S. v.

Compaction Sys. Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 339, 345 (D.N.J. 1999). A motion for reconsideration

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after the entry of the Order on the original motion by

the Judge. Local Civ. R. 7.1(I) (2012). Further, the Rule requires that a movant submit “concisely

the matter or controlling decisions which the party believes the [Judge] has overlooked.” jc. A

motion pursuant to the Rule may be granted in only three, very limited circumstances. Database

Am.. Inc. v. Bellsouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp., 825 F. Supp. 1216, 1220 (D.N.J. 1993). The first

involves establishment that an intervening change in the controlling law has occurred. J The

second involves presentation of new evidence that could not have been confronted in the prior

disposition because it was not previously available. Id. The third involves correcting a clear error

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of law or preventing manifest injustice involved in a prior order. Ici

Reconsideration is “an extraordinary remedy” that is to be granted “very sparingly.” S

NL Indus. Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing

Maldonado v. Lucca, 636 F.Supp. 621, 630 (D.N.J. 1986)). Local Rule 7.1(I) does not

contemplate a recapitulation of arguments considered by the Court before rendering its original

decision. S_ç Bermingham v. Sony Corp. of Am.. Inc., 820 F. Supp. 834, 856 (D.NJ. 1992),

affd, 37 F.3d 1485 (3d Cir. 1994). It is improper, on a motion for reconsideration, to “ask the

court to rethink what it ha[sJ already thought through - rightly or wrongly.” Oritani Say. & Loan

Ass’n v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 744 F. Supp. 1311, 1314 (D.N.J. 1990). In other words, a motion for

reconsideration is not meant to take the place of an appeal.

Hi. DISCUSSION

All four Defendants submit the same arguments to this Court regarding the

inappropriateness of Plaintiffs’ conduct in the instant action. The pleadings are repetitive and seek

relitigation of issues already decided in the State Court Case. Further, Plaintiffs allegations are

unsubstantiated by law or fact. For example, Plaintiff brings a claim under the ADEA and fails to

provide any legal or factual support for that claim. Plaintiff mentions § 1983 in his complaint, but

none of the Defendants who have moved for sanctions here are state actors. Plaintiff more

generally states that his due process rights were violated because, for instance, Defendant attorneys

failed to execute pre-trial discovery the way Plaintiff envisioned. Plaintiff did not appeal any State

Court decisions on these claims, rather he brought his strikingly similar complaint to this Court

seeking relitigation.

Defendants rebut all of Plaintiffs arguments which this Court has already dismissed on res

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judicata grounds. It is clear that Plaintiff has filed frivolous claims. Further, Plaintiff has been

warned, by State Court dismissals, that his claims fail for want of a factual and legal basis. Here,

Plaintiff fails to supplement already litigated claims with any new evidence. It is clear that

Plaintiff filed pretextually and seeks rather to merely harass Defendants and obtain judgment he

was previously denied. Plaintiff has been cautioned not only by State Court dismissals, but also by

explicit warnings of the frivolous nature of his filings. Further, this Court has already concluded

that his claims are barred because they were already litigated. Still, Plaintiff files a meritless

motion for reconsideration out of time which fails to put forth any new law or fact.

This Court has granted Plaintiff as a pro se thus far, great leniency in his pleadings and

communications with this Court and with parties to this litigation. However, given Defendants’

arguments in the instant motions, this Court finds that Plaintiff has dragged the parties through

over twelve months of frivolous litigation in this case. Additionally, having made a final decision

on this matter, this Court no longer will tolerate further filings from Plaintiff on these same claims

and must take action to deter Plaintiff from behaving in such a way in the future. Rule 11 grants

this Court wide latitude to determine sanctions so long as what is ordered is limited to what

suffices to deter repetition.

Defendants have aptly shown that they have engaged with Plaintiffs’ claims for far too

long, through State Court proceedings as well as over a year’s worth of filings in this Court.

Defendants persuasively argue that costs and fees incurred in this litigation be granted to them.

This Court agrees with Defendants, and grants the motion for sanctions in the form of reasonable

costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in the instant litigation from its inception. Further, because

Plaintiff has repeatedly filed in this Court and State Court on the same claims, which thereafter,

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were consistently dismissed on res judicata, entire controversy doctrine and collateral estoppel

grounds, this Court requires that Plaintiff seek approval from the Court before filing any future

complaints. Plaintiff is hereby enjoined from filing future complaints without said Court approval.

2. Motion for Reconsideration

Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Opinion and Order filed in this Court on November

1St, 2011. Plaintiff filed for reconsideration on December 9, 201 1, thirty-eight days from the Order

on the original motion. Rule 7.1(T) clearly states that a party has fourteen days to file a motion for

reconsideration from the date of entry of the Order on the original motion. Plaintiffs motion for

reconsideration is time barred.

For the sake of completeness, this Court will consider Plaintiffs argument for

reconsideration. Plaintiff contends that reconsideration is warranted because of an alleged

mischaracterization of the facts. However, Plaintiff merely parses language used in the Opinion in

an attempt to show that this Court somehow misunderstood Plaintiffs allegations. Plaintiffs

argument is unavailing and does not sufficiently reach the threshold required for reconsideration.

It would seem that Plaintiff attempts to convey that this Court’s alleged mischaracterization

involves correcting a clear error of law or preventing manifest injustice involved in a prior Order.

The appropriate legal conclusion on dismissal of Plaintiffs complaint remains exactly the same

whether Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration language or this Court’s language from the

November Opinion is considered. In other words, Plaintiffs recapitulation of fact does not

affect the analysis performed or conclusion reached by this Court. Plaintiffs attempt to replace a

phrase with an unsubstantiated and illogical concept only speaks further to his litigious nature and

the appropriateness of serving Rule 11 sanctions upon him in the instant Opinion. Reconsideration

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is “an extraordinary remedy” that is to be granted “very sparingly” and Plaintiff has demonstrated

no grounds on which reconsideration would be warranted here even if his motion had not been

filed outside of the fourteen day period. $ç NL Indus. Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 935 F.

Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996) (citation omitted).

1Y CoNcLusioN

Based on the following, this Court hereby grants Defendants’ motions for sanctions

against Harry Dunleavy in the form of all reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees incurred by Mr.

Barry Frank, Mr. Gary Lightman, Mr. Walter E. Thomas and Mr. John Breslin in defending this

action from its inception on January 20, 2011. Further, this Court hereby sponte enjoins

Plaintiff from filing any further complaints without Court approval. This Court denies Plaintiff’s

motion for reconsideration of this Court’s November Opinion. 7

Date: January 2012

Orig.: Clerk

cc: All Counsel of Record

Mark Falk, U.S,M.J.

7This Court finds Rule 11 sanctions to be the most appropriate mechanism for deterring

similar conduct, further, this case will not be reopened pursuant to Plaintiffs motion for

reconsideration. Therefore, Mr. Frank’s cross-motion to enjoin Plaintiff from filing any further

motions in this matter without leave (ECF No. 73) is hereby terminated as moot.

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