November 13, 2015

No. 06-15-00004-CV 

IN THE 

COURT OF APPEALS 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT TEXARKANA, TEXAS 

____________________ 

BILLIE MURPHY TREMBLE, SHARON TREMBLE DONALDSON, 

 SELIA TREMBLE SHAWKEY, WILMER FORREST TREMBLE, JR., 

 AND THE ESTATE OF WILMER FORREST TREMBLE, SR., Appellants, 

V. 

LUMINANT MINING COMPANY LLC, ENERGY FUTURE HOLDINGS 

CORPORATION, AND SUBSIDIARIES, Appellees.

On Appeal from the 4th District Court 

Rusk County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 2013-390 

BRIEF OF APPELLEES 

Jackson, Sjoberg, McCarthy & Townsend, LLP 

 David E. Jackson 

State Bar No. 10458500 

djackson@jacksonsjoberg.com

Marc O. Knisely 

State Bar No. 11614500 

mknisely@jacksonsjoberg.com

711 W. 7th Street 

Austin, Texas 78701 

(512) 472-7600 

(512) 225-5565 FAX 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES 

ACCEPTED

06-15-00004-CV

SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS

TEXARKANA, TEXAS

11/13/2015 11:37:43 AM

DEBBIE AUTREY

CLERK

 FILED IN 6th COURT OF APPEALS TEXARKANA, TEXAS 11/13/2015 11:37:43 AM DEBBIE AUTREY Clerk
- i - 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ............................................................ ii 

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... iii 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................. vi 

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT .............................................. vii 

ISSUES PRESENTED ........................................................................................... viii 

STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................... 1 

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ....................................................................... 10 

ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... 11 

 I. The Tremble Descendants lack standing to 

 bring this appeal .................................................................................. 11 

 II. Mrs. Tremble fails to assert reversible error ....................................... 13 

 III. Several entities are not proper parties 

 on appeal .............................................................................................. 21 

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER ............................................................................. 22 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 24 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE........................................................................ 24 

APPENDIX A October 8, 2014 Final Judgment (first-phase judgment) 

APPENDIX B December 16, 2014 Final Judgment (second-phase judgment) 

 
- ii - 

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Defendants/Appellants:

Billie Murphy Tremble, Sharon Tremble Donaldson, Selia Tremble Shawkey, and 

Wilmer Forrest Tremble, Jr., were Defendants in the trial court and are Appellants. 

CR 6. The foregoing Appellants also named the Estate of Wilmer Forrest Tremble, 

Sr., as an Appellant in their Notice of Appeal, CR 184, but the Estate was not a 

Defendant in the trial court. 

Counsel for Defendants/Appellants:

The Appellants who were Defendants appeared pro se in the trial court, and 

Appellants are pro se in this court. 

Plaintiff/Appellees:

Luminant Mining Company LLC was the Plaintiff in the trial court and is Appellee 

in this Court. CR 6. Appellants also named Energy Future Holdings Corporation 

and "Subsidiaries" as Appellees in their Notice of Appeal, CR 184, but neither 

Energy Future Holdings Corporation nor Subsidiaries were Plaintiffs in the trial 

court. 

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellees:

David E. Jackson 

Marc O. Knisely 

Jackson, Sjoberg, McCarthy & Townsend, LLP 

711 W. 7th Street 

Austin, Texas 78701 

(512) 472-7600 

(512) 225-5565 FAX 

djackson@jacksonsjoberg.com

mknisely@jacksonsjoberg.com

 
- iii - 

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Texas Cases 

Barstow v. State, 

742 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. App. – Austin 1987, writ denied) .................................... 6 

Bilbo Freight Lines, Inc. v. State of Texas, 

645 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. App. – Austin 1983, writ dism'd w.o.j.) ................... 13, 21 

Browning v. Prostok, 

165 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2005) .............................................................................. 15

Burbage v. Burbage, 

447 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. 2014) .............................................................................. 16 

Burkitt v. Broyles, 

340 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Civ. App. – Waco 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ....................... 17 

Cannon v. Hemphill, 

7 Tex. 184 (Tex. 1851) ....................................................................................... 17 

Champion v. Robinson, 

392 S.W.3d 118 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2012, pet. denied) ....................... 3, 19

Drake v. Chase Bank, 

No. 02-13-00340-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 12572, at *3 (Tex. 

App. – Fort Worth Nov. 20, 2014, no pet.) ........................................................ 20

Gardner v. Union Bank & Trust Co. of Fort Worth, 

176 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. – Fort Worth 1943, no writ) .......................... 19

Goldberg v. Zinn, 

No. 14-11-01091-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 6867, *18 

(Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) ................................................ 15 

Griffin v. Wolfe, 

610 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1980) ........................................................................... 3, 8 

Gunn v. Cavanaugh, 

391 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. 1965) .............................................................................. 12 
- iv - 

Heller v. Heller, 

269 S.W. 771 (1925) ............................................................................................ 6

Henson v. Estate of Bruce L. Crow, 

734 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. 1987) .............................................................................. 21 

Hershey v. Duncan, 

No. 13-01-688-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 9784, at *8 

(Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied) .................................................. 3 

Homeowners' Loan Corp. v. Cilley, 

125 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App. – Amarillo 1939, writ ref'd) ............................. 5 

In re B.L.D., 

113 S.W.3d 340 (Tex. 2003) .............................................................................. 16

In re Estate of Velvin, 

No. 06-13-00028-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 12267, *16 

(Tex. App. – Texarkana 2013, no pet.) ............................................................... 13 

In re Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, 

184 S.W.3d 718 (Tex. 2006, orig. proceeding) .......................................... 12, 21 

Lake v. Reid, 

252 S.W.2d 978 (Tex. Civ. App. – Texarkana 1952, no writ) .............................. 6 

Malone v. Malone, 

No. 06-10-00083-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 98, *10, n. 5 

(Tex. App. – Texarkana 2011, no pet.) ........................................................ 12, 16 

Marmion v. Wells, 

46 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. Civ. App. – San Antonio 1952, writ ref'd) .......... 11, 14, 16 

Martin v. Dosohs I, Ltd., 

951 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1997, no pet.) .............................. 16 

Miesch v. Anderson, 

90 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App. – Texarkana 1936, no writ) . .............................. 3 

Pain Control Institute, Inc. v. Geico General Insurance Company, 

447 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2014, no pet.) .......................................... 20 
- v - 

Peterson v. Fowler, 

11 S.W. 534 (Tex. 1889) ..................................................................................... 6 

Pfeffer v. Pfeffer, 

269 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Civ. App. – Galveston 1954, writ ref’d n.r.e.) .............. 12

Snow v. Donelson, 

242 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. App. – Waco 2007, no pet.) ........................................... 14 

Thomas v. Southwestern Settlement & Development Company, 

123 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. 1939) ............................................................................... 5 

Torrington Company v. Stutzman, 

46 S.W.3d 829 (Tex. 2000) ............................................................................... 12 

White v. Mitchell, 

60 Tex. 164 (Tex. 1883) .................................................................................... 11 

Woodhead v. Good, 

27 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App. – Eastland 1930, no writ) ................................ 15 

Rules 

TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a) ........................................................................................... 22 

Tex. R. Civ. P. 760 .................................................................................................... 3 

Tex. R. Civ. P. 761 .................................................................................................... 3 

Tex. R. Civ. P. 770 .................................................................................................... 3 

Other 

3 William V. Dorsaneo, III, Texas Litigation Guide § 43.30[3] (2015) .................. 18 
- vi - 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

Nature of the case: Plaintiff/Appellee Luminant Mining Company LLC 

("Luminant") brought this suit for partition by sale of a 

tract of about 25.326 acres of land ("the Property"). CR 

6, 8. Appellants Billie Murphy Tremble, Sharon 

Tremble Donaldson, Selia Tremble Shawkey, and 

Wilmer Forrest Tremble, Jr., were defendants in the 

trial court. CR 6. 

Trial Court: The Honorable J. Clay Gossett, Judge Presiding, in the 

4th District Court, Rusk County, Texas 

Course of Proceedings: In accordance with standard procedure in partition 

suits, the District Court rendered two final judgments. 

Luminant moved for summary judgment on the firstphase partition issues, and on October 8, 2014, the 

District Court signed the first judgment. CR 111, 190; 

see copy of judgment attached as Appendix A. On 

December 16, 2014, following a hearing, the District 

Court signed the second judgment. CR 239; see copy 

of judgment attached as Appendix B. 

Trial Court Disposition: In the first judgment, the court (i) decided that 

Appellants Sharon Tremble Donaldson, Selia Tremble 

Shawkey, and Wilmer Forrest Tremble, Jr. did not own 

any interest in the Property; (ii) determined the interests 

or shares owned by other parties, including Luminant 

and Appellant Billie Murphy Tremble; (iii) concluded 

that the Property could not be fairly and equitably 

partitioned in kind and thus should be sold; and (iv) 

appointed a receiver to conduct a sale of the Property. 

CR 190. No party appealed that judgment. In the 

second final judgment, the District Court confirmed 

and approved the sale of the Property to Luminant, 

which was the highest bidder at above market price. 

CR 239, 201-202, 206-207. 

 
- vii - 

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

 Appellants did not request oral argument, and Appellees concur that oral 

argument will not aid this Court's decisional process in this appeal from the District 

Court's second-phase partition judgment. The record is restricted to a clerk's 

record of about 250 pages, including an unappealed first-phase final judgment and 

undisputed summary judgment evidence. The legal issues are straightforward and 

readily resolvable under long-settled principles and authorities: The first-phase 

judgment is final in all respects, and it bars three of the four Appellants' attempts to 

appeal and most of the fourth Appellant's apparent appellate complaints; and, to the 

extent the fourth Appellant, Mrs. Tremble, complains about the second-phase 

judgment, she failed to preserve the complaints and the judgment is patently errorfree. Finally, submission on the briefs will spare the Court and the parties time and 

costs. 

 
- viii - 

ISSUES PRESENTED

 This appeal is from the second of two sequential final judgments in a 

partition suit in which Luminant Mining Company LLC ("Luminant"), Appellee 

here, was Plaintiff, Appellants Billie Murphy Tremble, Sharon Tremble Donaldson, 

Selia Tremble Shawkey, and Wilmer Forrest Tremble, Jr., were Defendants, and 

Luminant sought partition by sale of a 25.326-acre tract of land ("the Property"). 

CR 6, 8. In the first-phase final judgment, the District Court: (i) decided that 

Appellants Sharon Tremble Donaldson, Selia Tremble Shawkey, and Wilmer 

Forrest Tremble, Jr. did not own any interest in the Property; (ii) determined the 

interests or shares owned by Luminant, Appellant Billie Murphy Tremble, and 

other parties; (iii) concluded that the Property could not be fairly and equitably 

partitioned in kind and thus should be sold; and (iv) appointed a receiver to 

conduct a sale of the Property. CR 190; Appendix A. No party appealed that 

judgment. In the second-phase final judgment, the District Court approved the sale 

of the Property to Luminant at above market value. CR 239; Appendix B. 

 The issues in this appeal are: 

 (1) Whether Appellants Sharon Tremble Donaldson, Selia Tremble 

Shawkey, and Wilmer Forrest Tremble, Jr. lack standing to bring this appeal from 

the second-phase judgment because they own no interest in the Property, as 

determined in the unappealed first-phase final judgment; 
- ix - 

 (2) Whether Appellant Billie Murphy Tremble has failed to preserve or 

establish any reversible error in the second-phase judgment, and more specifically 

(a) Whether claimed errors are at least largely barred by the 

unappealed first-phase final judgment and are otherwise entirely barred by 

Mrs. Tremble’s failure to preserve them in the trial court; but even if further 

considered; 

(b) Whether a claim of error cannot be asserted under the Uniform 

Partition of Heirs Property Act because Texas has not enacted a version of 

that Act; and 

(c) Whether the District Court did not commit reversible error by 

confirming and approving the sale of the Property; and 

 (3) Whether the Estate of Wilmer Forrest Tremble, Sr. cannot be named 

as an Appellant and Energy Future Holdings Corporation and "Subsidiaries" cannot 

be named as Appellees because they were not parties in the trial court. 
- 1 - 

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This appeal arises from the second of two final judgments in a partition suit 

brought by Plaintiff/Appellee Luminant Mining Company LLC ("Luminant") and 

against Defendants/Appellants Billie Murphy Tremble, Sharon Tremble 

Donaldson, Selia Tremble Shawkey, and Wilmer Forrest Tremble, Jr. ("the Tremble 

Family").1

 Billie Murphy Tremble ("Mrs. Tremble") is the mother of Sharon 

Tremble Donaldson, Selia Tremble Shawkey, and Wilmer Forrest Tremble, Jr. ("the 

Tremble Descendants"). CR 137-38. The property at issue is the surface estate 

(including all coal, lignite, and other near surface minerals, but excluding the oil, 

gas, and all other liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons produced with the oil and gas) 

in a tract of land in Rusk County containing 25.326 acres ("the Property"). CR 8-9. 

For some time before 2013, Luminant and a number of people owned 

undivided interests as cotenants in the Property. Before Luminant filed the 

partition suit in November 2013, Luminant had purchased a significant majority of 

the undivided ownership interest in the Property – about 84 percent. CR 9. The 

remaining approximately 16 percent was attributable to the Tremble Family 

interest (about 1.56 percent), discussed further below, and to interests of varying 

percentages owned by nine other people. Id. 

 

1

 Title instruments and other documents in the Clerk's Record contain different spellings of 

"Tremble" – sometimes with an "e" and sometimes "Trimble." This brief adopts the spelling 

used by the Tremble Family in the District Court and in this Court. 
- 2 - 

Among the undivided interests in the Property acquired by Luminant was 

that owned by Emma Jean Tremble Smith. CR 152, 161, 178-83. Ms. Smith 

deeded her undivided interest in the Property to Luminant on December 29, 2010. 

CR 161, 179. Emma Jean Tremble Smith is the sister of Wilmer F. Tremble, Sr., 

deceased, who in turn was the husband of Mrs. Tremble and the father of the 

Tremble Descendants. CR 137-38, 151. 

Luminant filed this suit in District Court on November 26, 2013. CR 6. 

Partition of real property in Texas can be either in-kind or, under certain 

circumstances, by sale. Luminant pleaded circumstances supporting partition by 

sale and requested that relief. CR 8-11. 

When Luminant filed suit, the title information available to Luminant 

indicated that Wilmer F. Tremble, Sr., husband of Mrs. Tremble and father of the 

Tremble Descendants, previously had owned an undivided interest in the Property 

(about 1.56 percent), but that he was deceased. CR 8-9, 113-14, 137-38, 154-55, 

159-60. The available title information further indicated that Wilmer F. Tremble, 

Sr. had died intestate and that his undivided interest in the Property thus was thencurrently owned in equal shares by the Tremble Descendants, with a one-third life 

estate interest in his wife, Mrs. Tremble. Id. 

Accordingly, Luminant named as Defendants all four members of the 

Tremble Family, and credited the interest formerly owned by Wilmer F. Tremble, 
- 3 - 

Sr. to each of them, respectively, as just stated. CR 8-9. The Tremble Family 

members each filed answers in which they all claimed to own interests in the 

Property, without specifying the nature or percentage of their claimed interests, and 

in which they disputed the percentage interest owned by Luminant. CR 43-46. 

A partition proceeding is a two-step process, with two final orders or 

judgments. Griffin v. Wolfe, 610 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1980) ("A partition case, unlike 

other proceedings, has two final judgments and the first one is appealable as a final 

judgment."); Champion v. Robinson, 392 S.W.3d 118, 127 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 

2012, pet. denied). "In the first step, the trial court determines (1) the share or 

interests of each of the owners; (2) all questions of law or equity affecting the title 

to the land; and (3) whether the property is susceptible to partition or is the subject 

of a sale." Hershey v. Duncan, No. 13-01-688-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 9784, at 

*8 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied); Champion, 392 S.W.3d at 127; 

Tex. R. Civ. P. 760, 761, 770. If partition by sale is ordered, as Luminant 

requested, the second step is for the court to decide whether to confirm the sale and 

to order distribution of the sale proceeds. Miesch v. Anderson, 90 S.W.2d 314, 

316-17 (Tex. Civ. App. – Texarkana 1936, no writ). 

Luminant moved for summary judgment on the first-phase partition issues 

on July 23, 2014. CR 111-29. Luminant sought summary judgment on all of the 

first-phase partition issues, including the share or interest of each of the owners, all 
- 4 - 

questions of law or equity affecting title to the Property, and a determination that 

the Property should be partitioned by sale. Id. 

The Tremble Family filed a response to Luminant's motion for summary 

judgment on the first-phase issues on August 26, 2014. CR 133-36. The response 

raised two issues, one explicitly and the other implicitly. First, the Tremble Family 

contended that the December 2010 deed from Emma Jean Tremble Smith (sister of 

Wilmer F. Tremble, Sr.) to Luminant was fraudulent. Id. Second, the Tremble 

Family attached to their response a will by Wilmer F. Tremble, Sr. that was 

unknown to Luminant and that thus altered the status of undivided ownership 

among the members of the Tremble Family from that previously understood by 

Luminant – although the Tremble Family's response was silent about the effect of 

the will. CR 134, 142-44. 

Luminant replied as to both issues raised by the Tremble Family's summary 

judgment response. CR 150-83. First, Luminant conclusively refuted both the 

factual and legal bases for the Tremble Family's contention that the December 

2010 Smith to Luminant deed was fraudulent. The Tremble Family argued that the 

deed was fraudulent because it conveyed or purported to convey to Luminant not 

only Ms. Smith's interest in the Property, but also 100 percent of the Tremble 

Family's interest, and because the deed was "concealed from" and made "without 

knowledge or consent" of the Tremble Family. CR 133-36, 151. 
- 5 - 

The fraud claim was curious in that Luminant never contended that the deed 

from Emma Jean Tremble Smith conveyed the Tremble Family’s interest in the 

Property, in addition to Ms. Smith’s interest. Luminant’s partition petition 

acknowledged the Tremble Family’s interest, distributed among Mrs. Tremble and 

the Tremble Descendants in accordance with Luminant’s then-existing 

understanding of their respective shares, and Luminant’s motion for summary 

judgment sought judgment crediting the Tremble Family with those respective 

shares. CR 8-9, 113-14. 

Nonetheless, Luminant pointed out that, even if Emma Jean Tremble Smith 

had attempted to convey an interest in the Property beyond what she owned, the 

Tremble Family would not have been "defrauded" by the deed, because the deed 

could legally convey "such interest, and only such interest, in the land as the maker 

of the deed possesses." Thomas v. Southwestern Settlement & Development Co., 

123 S.W.2d 290, 297 (Tex. 1939); see also Homeowners' Loan Corp. v. Cilley, 125 

S.W.2d 313, 316 (Tex. Civ. App. – Amarillo 1939, writ ref'd) ("[T]he general rule 

is that one tenant in common cannot by his sole act sell or encumber more than his 

portion of the common property."). Furthermore, Ms. Smith in fact conveyed only, 

in the deed's words, "all of my undivided interest" in the Property. CR 152-54, 

178. She did not convey or purport to convey any interest in the Property greater 

than that which she owned. 
- 6 - 

The Tremble Family also was mistaken in arguing that the deed somehow 

was rendered "fraudulent," as to them or their interest, by virtue of the fact that Ms. 

Smith did not notify them about her conveyance or obtain their consent to or 

joinder in the deed. For well over a century, Texas courts have held that a cotenant 

may convey her interest in real property without the consent or knowledge of her 

cotenants. Peterson v. Fowler, 11 S.W. 534, 535 (Tex. 1889); Heller v. Heller, 269 

S.W. 771, 776 (Tex. 1925) ("As a tenant in common, Mrs. Heller had the right to 

sell off any particular part of the entire community estate, just so long as her deed 

did not injure the rights of the other children to secure their part of the estate."); 

Lake v. Reid, 252 S.W.2d 978, 982 (Tex. Civ. App. – Texarkana 1952, no writ) 

("The rule is well known that each cotenant may freely assign or convey his 

interest in the common property, 'and his assignee or vendee at once becomes the 

owner of the interest conveyed, and as such, as a matter of law, a cotenant with the 

former cotenants of his vendor, and entitled to all the rights of any cotenant, 

including the rights of possession and re-sale.'"); Barstow v. State, 742 S.W.2d 495, 

508 (Tex. App. – Austin 1987, writ denied) ("One cotenant may freely convey his 

interest in the common property as long as he does not prejudice the rights of his 

cotenants in the premises," citing Peterson v. Fowler and Lake v. Reid). CR 153-

54. 
- 7 - 

Finally, neither Luminant nor Emma Jean Tremble Smith "concealed" the 

deed. Instead, they recorded the deed in public records shortly after its execution. 

CR 154, 161, 183. 

As to the second issue raised implicitly by the Tremble Family's summary 

judgment response – the title implications of Wilmer F. Tremble, Sr.'s will – 

Luminant first learned of the will's existence when it received the response. CR 

154-55, 159-60. The will had been probated in Harrison County, but had not been 

filed in the deed records in Rusk County, where the Property is located. CR 142-

44, 159-60. Furthermore, an affidavit of heirship that had been filed in the deed 

records in Rusk County, and that Luminant had relied on, stated that Wilmer F. 

Tremble, Sr. had died intestate. CR 137, 154-55, 159-60. 

In his will, however, Wilmer F. Tremble, Sr. bequeathed all of his property, 

real and personal, to his wife, Mrs. Tremble. CR 142. The Tremble Family's 

summary judgment response therefore established that Mrs. Tremble, alone, owned 

the entire undivided interest in the Property previously owned by her husband, and 

that the Tremble Descendants did not own any interest in the Property. CR 142, 

154-55, 160-61. 

Consequently, Luminant filed a certified copy of the will in the Rusk County 

Deed Records and requested that the judgment rendered by the District Court on 

the first-phase issues conform to the title evidence provided in the Tremble 
- 8 - 

Family's summary judgment response. CR 155-56, 160-61, 165-76. The Tremble 

Family never questioned or challenged this request or the effect of Mr. Tremble, 

Sr.’s will on their title, or lack of title, to the Property. 

The District Court rendered judgment adjudicating the first-phase partition 

issues on October 8, 2014. CR 190; see copy of judgment attached to this brief as 

Appendix A. The court adjudged and decreed that the Tremble Descendants did 

not own any interest in the Property and thus were not cotenants. CR 191. In 

accordance with the evidence established by the Tremble Family's summary 

judgment response, the District Court credited Mrs. Tremble with the entire 

undivided interest previously owned by her husband, Wilmer F. Tremble, Sr. Id. 

The District Court also determined that the Property was not susceptible to 

partition in kind and should be sold, and appointed a receiver to conduct the sale. 

CR 190-92. 

As was stated above, each of the two judgments in a partition suit is a final 

judgment. Griffin, 610 S.W.2d at 466. The October 2014 judgment thus was final 

for appeal purposes when it was signed. The Tremble Family did not seek any 

post-judgment trial court relief from the October 2014 judgment, nor did they 

appeal the judgment. 

The receiver thereafter advertised the sale of the Property, solicited offers, 

and received bids, as directed by the District Court in the first judgment. CR 192, 
- 9 - 

206. Luminant was one of two bidders, and its offer was substantially higher than 

both the other offer and the fair market value established by an unchallenged and 

undisputed appraisal. CR 128-29, 201-202, 206-207. The receiver recommended 

that the District Court confirm and approve the sale of the Property to Luminant in 

accordance with Luminant's offer and contract. CR 207. 

On December 4, 2014, Luminant moved for judgment confirming the sale of 

the Property, ordering payment of the sale proceeds to the parties in accordance 

with their ownership interests in the Property determined by the first-phase 

judgment, and granting related relief finalizing the second-phase partition issues. 

CR 200-203. The Tremble Family did not respond to Luminant's motion or object 

in any way to the relief requested in the motion. 

The District Court held a hearing on Luminant’s unopposed motion for 

judgment, then rendered judgment finally disposing of all second-phase partition 

issues, including confirmation of the receiver's sale of the Property, on December 

16, 2014. CR 199, 239-41; see copy of judgment attached to this brief as 

Appendix B. The Tremble Family did not appear at the hearing in opposition to 

the motion, file any post-judgment motion, or object in any way to the judgment, 

but they filed a notice of appeal from the judgment on January 16, 2015. CR 184. 

In their notice of appeal, the Tremble Family named the Estate of Wilmer 

Forrest Tremble, Sr. as an Appellant, id.; neither the Estate nor a representative of 
- 10 - 

the Estate was a party in district court. The Tremble Family also named Energy 

Future Holdings Corporation and "Subsidiaries" as Appellees, in addition to 

Luminant, id; neither Energy Future Holdings Corporation nor any subsidiary was 

a party in district court. 

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

 The Tremble Family's arguments in this appeal are so succinct and skeletal 

that they are difficult to ascertain precisely. In accordance with Luminant's 

understanding of those arguments, and the issues they pose, Luminant responds as 

follows: 

 (1) The District Court's first-phase judgment determined that the Tremble 

Descendants – Sharon Tremble Donaldson, Selia Tremble Shawkey, and Wilmer 

Forrest Tremble, Jr. – did not own any interest in the Property. These parties did 

not appeal that judgment, and the judgment became final for all purposes. The 

Tremble Descendants therefore do not have standing to bring this appeal, which 

can properly challenge only the second-phase judgment. 

 (2) Billie Murphy Tremble does have standing to appeal. Her complaints, 

however, appear to be directed largely to the first-phase judgment and the issues 

decided by that judgment. Because that judgment became final in all respects, 

complaints about it are barred. In addition, Mrs. Tremble never preserved any 
- 11 - 

complaint about the second-phase judgment. For these and other reasons, Mrs. 

Tremble's complaints do not present any reversible error. 

 (3) The Estate of Wilmer Forrest Tremble, Sr. was not a defendant in the 

trial court, and Energy Future Holdings Corporation and "Subsidiaries" were not 

plaintiffs. The Estate therefore is not a proper appellant, and the corporation and 

its subsidiaries are not proper appellees. 

ARGUMENT

I. 

The Tremble Descendants lack standing to bring this appeal. 

 In the first-phase judgment, the District Court determined that the Tremble 

Descendants do not own any interest in the Property. CR 190-91; Appendix A. 

This determination was based on the evidence presented by the Tremble Family – 

the will of Wilmer Forrest Tremble, Sr. – which established that Mrs. Tremble 

owned all of the interest in the Property that previously had been owned by her 

husband. CR 133-34, 142. 

 No one appealed the first-phase judgment, and, because partition suits 

produce two final judgments, the earlier judgment thus became final for all 

purposes. For that reason, too, the first-phase judgment cannot be challenged in an 

appeal from the second-phase judgment, and the former judgment "must be held 

conclusive of the rights of the parties." White v. Mitchell, 60 Tex. 164, 165 (Tex. 

1883); Marmion v. Wells, 246 S.W.2d 704, 705 (Tex. Civ. App. – San Antonio 
- 12 - 

1952, writ ref'd) ("It is well settled that upon an appeal from the second or final 

decree matters determined by the first or interlocutory decree cannot be 

reviewed...."); Pfeffer v. Pfeffer, 269 S.W.2d 436, 438 (Tex. Civ. App. – Galveston 

1954, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (unappealed first-phase judgment determining interests and 

ordering sale “was conclusive against the claims of appellants to any interest in 

the” property, in appeal from second judgment approving sale); Malone v. Malone, 

No. 06-10-00083-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 98, *10, n. 5 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 

2011, no pet.). 

 As to the second-phase judgment, the Tremble Descendants essentially have 

the same status as a non-party, and, generally, a non-party cannot exercise the right 

to appeal. In re Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 184 S.W.3d 718, 723 (Tex. 

2006, orig. proceeding) ("Generally, only parties of record may appeal a trial 

court's judgment."); Gunn v. Cavanaugh, 391 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex. 1965) ("The 

general rule is that the remedy by appeal in the usual form, or by writ of error, is 

available only to parties of record...."). Furthermore, even if the Tremble 

Descendants technically remained as parties to the suit after the first-phase 

judgment became final and unappealable, they have no standing to complain about 

the second-phase judgment, which does not affect any of their rights or interests. 

Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 843 (Tex. 2000) ("Texas courts have 

long held that an appealing party may not complain of errors that do not injuriously 
- 13 - 

affect it or that merely affect the rights of others."); In re Estate of Velvin, No. 06-

13-00028-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 12267, *16 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2013, no 

pet.) ("Demond is not a party to this appeal, lacks a general justiciable interest, and 

cannot complain about errors which do not injuriously affect him," and, with 

limited exceptions, he "lacks standing to bring an appeal."). 

 Because the Tremble Descendants do not have standing to appeal, their 

appeal should be dismissed. Bilbo Freight Lines, Inc. v. State of Texas, 645 S.W.2d 

925, 927-28 (Tex. App. – Austin 1983, writ dism'd w.o.j.). 

II. 

Mrs. Tremble fails to assert reversible error.

 Mrs. Tremble's issues include: whether she was denied rights under the 

Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act ("the Uniform Act") (Issue I); whether the 

District Court erred by signing the "Final Judgment without an open hearing to 

consider the evidence" and by "omit[ting]" her "from any of the decision making 

processes" (Issues II and III); and whether there was "error in the auctioning of [the 

Property]" (Issue IV). Appellants' Brief, p. 3; for information about the Uniform 

Act, see www.uniformlaws.org (listed under “Acts” on home page). Mrs. Tremble 

next makes reference to the Uniform Act, to information about the Property that 

"was not known to" her, and to "a closed civil trial," and the latter reference 

appears to be directed at both the first-phase and second-phase judgments. Id. at p. 

4. 
- 14 - 

 Mrs. Tremble's statement of facts and argument focus exclusively on 

allegations about Ms. Smith’s deed – the same allegations that the Tremble Family 

made in their response to Luminant's motion for summary judgment on the firstphase issues. Id. at pp. 4-5. Mrs. Tremble states that Luminant filed suit claiming 

that it "has 100% ownership claim in [the Tremble Family's] undivided, inherited, 

heir property," by virtue of the deed from Emma Jean Tremble Smith to Luminant. 

Id. at p. 5. Mrs. Tremble continues, "Ms. Smith is not nor has she ever been the 

Executor of the Estate [of Wilmer Forrest Tremble, Sr.], Administrator, nor 

Trustee." Id. Finally, Mrs. Tremble argues that she and the Tremble Descendants 

"by law were not privy to pertinent information from" Luminant. Id. at p. 6. 

 For several reasons, Mrs. Tremble's complaints fall short. First, the 

complaints discussed in Mrs. Tremble’s statement of facts and argument are barred 

because they relate solely to the first-phase issues and judgment. The Tremble 

Family explicitly argued about the deed from Emma Jean Tremble Smith to 

Luminant in the first-phase proceedings, and the District Court rejected those 

arguments in its judgment. "It is well settled that upon an appeal from the second 

or final decree matters determined by the first or interlocutory decree cannot be 

reviewed...." Marmion, 246 S.W.2d at 705; Snow v. Donelson, 242 S.W.3d 570, 

572-73 (Tex. App. – Waco 2007, no pet.) (holding that the first judgment 

determining “the merits of the case” and “the rights of the parties” cannot be 
- 15 - 

revised “unless upon appeal” from that judgment, and that, "[b]ecause [Snow’s] 

complaints challenge matters decided in the first hearing from which Snow did not 

appeal, we have no jurisdiction to address them now."); Goldberg v. Zinn, No. 14-

11-01091-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 6867, *18 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 

2013, no pet.) ("To grant that relief [from the first judgment], in an appeal from 

another and different judgment, would, in effect, be to permit the first judgment to 

be collaterally attacked," quoting Woodhead v. Good, 27 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex. 

Civ. App. – Eastland 1930, no writ)); see Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 

346 (Tex. 2005) (“A collateral attack is an attempt to avoid the binding force of a 

judgment in a proceeding not instituted for the purpose of correcting, modifying, or 

vacating the judgment, but in order to obtain some specific relief which the 

judgment currently stands as a bar against.”). 

 Second, to the extent Mrs. Tremble's issues and arguments can be deemed to 

attack the second-phase judgment, those arguments were not preserved by any 

request, objection, or motion in the district court. The Supreme Court of Texas 

has described the threshold for preservation as follows: 

As a general rule, preservation requires (1) a timely objection "stating 

the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the 

trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of 

the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the 

context," and (2) a ruling. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. Stated differently, 

the test ultimately asks "whether the party made the trial court aware 

of the complaint, timely and plainly, and obtained a ruling." State 
- 16 - 

Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 241 

(Tex. 1992). 

Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249, 257 (Tex. 2014); In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 

340, 349-50 (Tex. 2003) (listing cases and explaining reasons for the requirement 

that complaints of error must be preserved in the trial court). Here, Mrs. Tremble 

did not file any response to Luminant's motion for judgment on the second-phase 

issues, did not file or make any objection or motion during the second-phase 

proceedings, and did not file any post-judgment motion. She thus waived any 

complaint about the judgment from which she has appealed. Malone, 2011 Tex. 

App. LEXIS 98, at *12-13. 

 Third, the District Court did not commit any error in rendering the secondphase judgment. As a corollary to the principle that matters decided in the first 

judgment cannot be reviewed in an appeal from the second, actions taken in the 

second-phase proceedings that merely follow the directives and decisions in the 

first judgment may not be challenged in an appeal from the second. Marmion, 246 

S.W.2d at 706 ("[I]f the judgment now appealed from merely followed that [first] 

decree, then the error, if error it be, would be in the former, and not in the latter, 

ruling."); Martin v. Dosohs I, Ltd., 951 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 

1997, no pet.) (quoting Marmion). The only remaining question in this appeal, 

therefore, is whether the first judgment's directives and decisions were not 

correctly followed in the second-phase proceedings, causing consequent error in 
- 17 - 

the second judgment. Burkitt v. Broyles, 340 S.W.2d 822, 823 (Tex. Civ. App. – 

Waco 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (the only question that could properly arise in the 

second phase would be conformity to the rules settled by the first decree, citing

Cannon v. Hemphill, 7 Tex. 184, 197 (1851)). 

 In the first-phase judgment, the District Court appointed a receiver to 

conduct a sale of the Property, CR 191, then ordered: 

It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the 

receiver shall advertise the sale of the Property, obtain offers for 

purchase of the Property, enter into a contract for the sale of the 

Property with the party making the highest offer, which contract shall 

be subject to the Court's approval, and report the proposed sale to the 

Court. 

CR 192; Appendix A. 

 Mrs. Tremble urges an issue about whether the District Court committed 

"error in the auctioning of undivided inherited heir property," Appellants' Brief, p. 

3 (Issue IV), but does not elaborate on this issue. The record, however, contains no 

evidence to support any claim of error and, to the contrary, affirmatively 

establishes that the sale of the Property was performed precisely as the District 

Court directed in the first-phase judgment and that Mrs. Tremble was awarded 

more than the fair market value of her undivided interest in the Property. 

 In her sworn Receiver's Report to Court, the receiver, Cecilia Koch, attested 

as follows: 
- 18 - 

In accordance with this Court's October 8, 2014 Judgment, I 

advertised the sale of the Property. On October 22, 2014, I listed the 

Property with the Longview and Tyler area Multiple Listing Services, 

the Century 21 website, as well as numerous other internet sites and 

The Henderson Daily News. The listings described the property, 

solicited offers to be submitted before November 22, 2014, and listed 

the price at $71,500, which is above the estimated fair market value. 

By the end of the day on November 22, 2014, I received two offers for 

purchase of the Property, true and correct copies of which are attached 

to this Report and labeled "Offer #1" and “Offer #2.” Offer #1 is the 

offer and contract for purchase of the Property by Luminant Mining 

Company LLC ("Luminant"), and is the highest and best offer. 

Luminant has offered to purchase the Property for $78,750, plus my 

fee and costs, the broker's fee, all closing costs, and the costs of court. 

Offer #2 is for a proposed purchase price of $25,326, and is 

substantially lower than Offer #1. 

I recommend that the Court approve and confirm the sale of the 

Property to Luminant in accordance with Luminant's offer and 

contract for purchase of the Property, as evidenced by Offer #1. 

CR 206-207. Luminant's offer and contract to purchase the Property for the sum of 

$78,750, plus the receiver's fee and costs and the costs of court, far exceeded the 

fair market value of the Property established by an uncontested appraisal, which 

was $68,000. CR 128-29, 201-202, 206-207. 

 The District Court properly exercised its discretion by approving and 

confirming the sale of the Property in its second-phase judgment. CR 239-241; 

Appendix B. 3 William V. Dorsaneo, III, Texas Litigation Guide § 43.30[3] (2015) 

(describing procedure for receiver's sale and stating that "[o]n appellate review of a 

court-ordered sale, inadequacy of the price is not generally a sufficient ground for 

setting the sale aside, in the absence of facts or circumstances showing fraud or 
- 19 - 

irregularity"); Gardner v. Union Bank & Trust Co. of Fort Worth, 176 S.W.2d 789, 

793 (Tex. Civ. App. – Fort Worth 1943, no writ) (the determination of whether to 

confirm a receiver's sale is a matter within the sound discretion of the court, and 

"[i]t is the settled rule in this state that a receiver's sale will not be set aside for 

inadequacy of price alone, in the absence of facts and circumstances showing fraud 

or irregularities; especially is this true unless the inadequacy is so great as to shock 

the conscience of the court"). 

 Mrs. Tremble also lists issues complaining that the District Court erred "in 

the signing of [the] Final Judgment without an open hearing to consider the 

evidence" and by "omit[ting]" her "from any of the decision making processes," 

Appellants' Brief, p. 3 (Issues II and III), but again does not elaborate on these 

issues. As with the issue just discussed, the record contains no evidence supporting 

these complaints. Luminant moved for judgment confirming the sale of the 

Property, and served the motion on Mrs. Tremble. CR 201-205. On December 3, 

2014, the District Court signed an order setting the hearing for December 16, 13 

days later, then held the hearing on that date. CR 199. The hearing was open, and 

Mrs. Tremble was not excluded from the hearing, but she did not attend and did not 

otherwise oppose or object to Luminant's motion for judgment, the Receiver's 

Report to Court, or the District Court's approval and confirmation of the sale of the 

Property. Champion v. Robinson, 392 S.W.3d 118, 122, n. 6, 127 (Tex. App. – 
- 20 - 

Texarkana 2012, pet. denied) ("The record does not support Champion's [pro se] 

claim that he received inadequate notice [of the hearing on the first-phase partition 

issues]."). 

 Finally, Mrs. Tremble asserts that she was denied rights under the Uniform 

Act. Appellants' Brief, pp. 3 (Issue I), 4. But Mrs. Tremble does not articulate 

how she allegedly was denied rights under the Uniform Act with respect to the 

receiver's actions in the second-phase proceedings or the District Court's rendition 

of the second-phase judgment. More significantly, the Texas Legislature has not 

adopted any form of the Uniform Act, nor has the Uniform Act been otherwise 

incorporated in or deemed a part of Texas law. Accordingly, Mrs. Tremble has no 

ability or authority to claim error under the Uniform Act. See Pain Control 

Institute, Inc. v. Geico General Insurance Co., 447 S.W.3d 893, 896-98 (Tex. App. 

– Dallas 2014, no pet.) (affirming summary judgment on ground that plaintiff 

alleged no recognized cause of action); Drake v. Chase Bank, No. 02-13-00340-

CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 12572, at *3 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth Nov. 20, 2014, 

no pet.) (affirming district court’s judgment on ground that plaintiff alleged claim 

not recognized under Texas law). 

 In short, the District Court's December 2014 judgment, confirming the sale 

of the property, should be affirmed. 
- 21 - 

III. 

Several entities are not proper parties on appeal. 

 The Estate of Wilmer Forrest Tremble, Sr. was not a defendant in the trial 

court, nor was a representative of the Estate. See Henson v. Estate of Bruce L. 

Crow, 734 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex. 1987) (a decedent’s estate is “not a legal entity” 

and cannot sue or be sued as such). The Tremble Family designated the Estate as 

an Appellant in their notice of appeal, CR 184, and in their filings in this Court, but 

there is no legal basis for that designation. "Generally, only parties of record may 

appeal a trial court's judgment." In re Lumbermens, 184 S.W.3d at 723. The 

doctrine of virtual representation creates an exception that allows a non-party to 

intervene on appeal in certain circumstances, but none of those circumstances exist 

here. Id. at 722-29. 

 Energy Future Holdings Corporation and "Subsidiaries" were not plaintiffs 

in the trial court, but the Tremble Family designated them as Appellees in their 

notice of appeal. CR 184. Because Energy Future Holdings Corporation and its 

subsidiaries were not parties in the trial court and there is no other legal basis for 

adding them in this appeal, they are not proper Appellees. In re Lumbermens, 184 

S.W.3d at 723-24. Since Energy Future Holdings Corporation and its subsidiaries 

are not proper Appellees, this Court has no jurisdiction over them in this case. 

 In sum, the Estate’s appeal should be dismissed for lack of standing, Bilbo, 

645 S.W.2d at 927-28, and Mrs. Tremble's appeal against Energy Future Holdings 
- 22 - 

and its subsidiaries should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. TEX. R. APP. P.

42.3(a). 

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

 The District Court carefully followed proper partition procedure. The 

District Court's first-phase judgment is conclusive of the parties' rights thereby 

determined, and the Tremble Descendants, who were found to own no interest in 

the Property, therefore lack standing to bring this appeal. In addition, Mrs. 

Tremble's complaints are barred by the first-phase judgment or are foreclosed by 

her failure to preserve them. 

 Appellee Luminant Mining Company LLC prays that this Court: dismiss 

the appeal by Sharon Tremble Donaldson, Selia Tremble Shawkey, Wilmer Forrest 

Tremble, Jr., and the Estate of Wilmer Forrest Tremble, Sr. for lack of standing; 

dismiss the appeal against Energy Future Holdings Corporation and Subsidiaries 

for lack of jurisdiction; and, with respect to the appeal by Billie Murphy Tremble, 

affirm the District Court's judgment. Appellee asks for such other and further 

relief to which it is entitled. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Jackson, Sjoberg, McCarthy & Townsend, LLP 

David E. Jackson 

State Bar No. 10458500 

djackson@jacksonsjoberg.com
- 23 - 

Marc O. Knisely 

State Bar No. 11614500 

mknisely@jacksonsjoberg.com

711 W. 7th Street 

Austin, Texas 78701 

(512) 472-7600 

(512) 225-5565 FAX 

By: /s/ David E. Jackson 

 David E. Jackson 

 State Bar No. 10458500 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES 

LUMINANT MINING COMPANY LLC 

 
- 24 - 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that a true and complete copy of the above and foregoing 

Brief of Appellees was sent via the following method, to the following parties on 

this the 13th day of November, 2015. 

Billie J. Murphy Tremble 

P. O. Box 541 

Marshall, TX 75671 

Via regular mail and 

Certified Mail, RRR 

7015 0640 0003 1869 5922 

Sharon Tremble Donaldson 

2010 Wineberry Dr. 

Katy, TX 77450 

Via regular mail and 

Certified Mail, RRR 

7015 0640 0003 1869 5946 

 

Selia Tremble Shawkey 

712 South 37th Street 

San Diego, CA 92113 

Via regular mail and 

Certified Mail, RRR 

7015 0640 0003 1869 5939 

Wilmer Forrest Tremble, Jr. 

P. O. Box 841865 

Pearland, TX 77584 

Via regular mail and 

Certified Mail, RRR 

7015 0640 0003 1869 5953 

 /s/ David E. Jackson 

 David E. Jackson 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 

As required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4 (i)(3), I certify that 

this brief contains 5267 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Rule 

9.4 (i)(1). 

 

 /s/ David E. Jackson 

 David E. Jackson