This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO (HSD) 2 and CRYSOL HUFFMAN, 3 Petitioners-Appellees 4
v. No. A-1-CA-36998 5 NIGEL LACHEY, a/k/a 6 JOSHUA HUFFMAN, 7 Respondent-Appellant. 8 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 9 Jane C. Levy, District Judge 10 Crysol Huffman 11 Rio Rancho, NM 12 Pro Se Appellee 13 Nigel Lachey 14 Las Vegas, NV 15 Pro Se Appellant 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 VANZI, Chief Judge. 182 {1} Respondent Nigel Lachey is appealing fro m a district court order denying two 1 motions that sought to modify child support. [RP 229, 235] We issued a calendar 2 notice proposing to affirm. Respondent ha s filed a memorandum in opposition. Not 3 persuaded, we affirm the district court. 4 {2}Respondent continues to argue that the di strict court should have modified his 5 child support. New Mexico case law only allows modification of child support to be 6 retroactive to the date of the petition for modification. See Montoya v. Montoya , 1980- 7 NMSC-122, ¶ 2, 95 N.M . 189, 619 P.2d 1233 (directing that the applicable date for 8 retroactive modification is the date of the f iling of a petition, application, or pleading); 9 see also Leeder v. Leeder , 1994-NMCA-105, ¶ 26, 118 N.M. 603, 884 P.2d 494 10 (stating that “modifications of child support cannot be effective befo re the date of the 11 pleading seeking increased or decreased support”). In this case Respondent’s motions 12 were filed on October 24, 2017. [RP 211, 217] Respondent was no longer obligated 13 to pay ongoing child support, because Childhad already reached eighteen-years-old. 14 [RP 56, 60] SeeNMSA 1978, § 40-4-7(B)(3)(b) (1997). As such, we construe 15 Respondent’s motions to be directed to the arrearage. 16 {3} Parents can agree to waiv e child support arrears. Klinksiek v. Klinksiek , 2005- 17 NMCA-008, ¶¶ 4, 13, 20, 136 N.M. 693, 104 P. 3d 559. However, in this case, the 18 State has an independent intere st in the arrears, and there is no indication that it has 193 released Respondent from his obligation topay. To the extent that Respondent 1 believes that the State waived support from th e date a driver’s li cense was issued, we 2 will not bar the State from independently maintaining the child support obligation 3 under these facts. Wisznia v. Human Servs. Dep't, 1998-NMSC-011, ¶ 17, 125 N.M. 4 140, 958 P.2d 98 (stating that es toppel will not be applied against a state governmental 5 entity unless "there is a shocking degree of aggravated and overreaching conduct 6 or . . . right and justice demand it."). 7 {4} In addition, even if the State was not a party, Respondent has not indicated that 8 Petitioner Crysol Hoffman agreed to any waiver. To the extent that Respondent 9 believes that the party’s conduct over time s hould have resulted in a change in the 10 amount of his obligation, these allegations s hould have been raised in an attempt to 11 modify before the arrearage accrued. Finally, with respect to Respondent’s assertions 12 relating to a delay in receiving the hearing o fficer’s report, this Court is not a fact13 finding court, and these claims would have had to have been addressed by the district 14 court. 15 {5} For the reasons set forth above, we affirm. 16 {6} IT IS SO ORDERED. 17

______________________________ 18 LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge 194 WE CONCUR: 1

___________________________ 2 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 3

___________________________ 4 HENRY M. BOHNHOFF, Judge 5