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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2020 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

YELLEN, SECRETARY OF TREASURY v. 

CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE CHEHALIS 

RESERVATION ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

No. 20–543. Argued April 19, 2021—Decided June 25, 2021* 

Title V of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES)

Act allocates $8 billion to “Tribal governments” to compensate for unbudgeted expenditures made in response to COVID–19. 42 U. S. C. 

§801(a)(2)(B). The question in these cases is whether Alaska Native 

Corporations (ANCs) are eligible to receive any of that $8 billion. Under the CARES Act, a “Tribal government” is the “recognized governing body of an Indian tribe” as defined in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA). §§801(g)(5), (1). ISDA, in 

turn, defines an “Indian tribe” as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or 

other organized group or community, including any Alaska Native village or regional or village corporation as defined in or established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act [(ANCSA),] which 

is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided

by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians.” 25 

U. S. C. §5304(e). 

Consistent with the Department of the Interior’s longstanding view 

that ANCs are Indian tribes under ISDA, the Department of the Treasury determined that ANCs are eligible for relief under Title V of the 

CARES Act, even though ANCs are not “federally recognized tribes”

(i.e., tribes with which the United States has entered into a government-to-government relationship). A number of federally recognized 

—————— 

*Together with No. 20–544, Alaska Native Village Corp. Association 

et al. v. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation et al., also on 

certiorari to the same court. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

2 YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS 

 RESERVATION 

Syllabus 

tribes sued. The District Court entered summary judgment for the 

Treasury Department and the ANCs, but the Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit reversed. 

Held: ANCs are “Indian tribe[s]” under ISDA and thus eligible for funding under Title V of the CARES Act. Pp. 7–28. 

(a) The ANCs argue that they fall under the plain meaning of ISDA’s

definition of “Indian tribe.” Respondents ask the Court to adopt a 

term-of-art construction that equates being “recognized as eligible for

the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians” with being a “federally recognized tribe.” Pp. 7–25.

(1) Under the plain meaning of ISDA, ANCs are Indian tribes. 

ANCs are “established pursuant to” ANCSA and thereby “recognized 

as eligible” for that Act’s benefits. ANCSA, which made ANCs eligible 

to select tens of millions of acres of land and receive hundreds of millions of tax-exempt dollars, 43 U. S. C. §§1605, 1610, 1611, is a special

program provided by the United States to “Indians,” i.e., Alaska Natives. Given that ANCSA is the only statute ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition mentions by name, eligibility for ANCSA’s benefits satisfies the

definition’s final “recognized-as-eligible” clause. Pp. 7–11.

(2) Respondents ask the Court to read ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition as a term of art. But respondents fail to establish that the language of ISDA’s recognized-as-eligible clause was an accepted way of 

saying “a federally recognized tribe” in 1975, when ISDA was passed.

Nor is the mere inclusion of the word “recognized” enough to import a 

term-of-art meaning. Respondents also fail to show that the language

of the recognized-as-eligible clause later became a term of art that 

should be backdated to ISDA’s passage in 1975. Pp. 11–18.

(3) Even if ANCs did not satisfy the recognized-as-eligible clause,

they would still satisfy ISDA’s definition of an “Indian tribe.” If respondents were correct that only a federally recognized tribe can satisfy that clause, then the best way to read the “Indian tribe” definition

would be for the recognized-as-eligible clause not to apply to ANCs at

all. Otherwise, despite being prominently “includ[ed]” in the “Indian

tribe” definition, 25 U. S. C. §5304(e), all ANCs would be excluded by

a federal-recognition requirement there is no reasonable prospect they 

could ever satisfy. Pp. 18–23.

(4) Respondents’ remaining arguments that ANCs are not Indian

tribes under ISDA are unpersuasive. They first argue that the ANCs

misrepresent how meaningful a role they play under ISDA because the 

actual number of ISDA contracts held by ANCs is negligible. This 

point is largely irrelevant. No one would argue that a federally recognized tribe was not an Indian tribe under ISDA just because it had 

never entered into an ISDA contract. Respondents further argue that 
 

 

 

Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 3 

Syllabus 

treating ANCs as Indian tribes would complicate the administration 

of ISDA. But respondents point to no evidence of such administrative 

burdens in the 45 years the Executive Branch has treated ANCs as 

Indian tribes. Respondents also warn that blessing ANCs’ status under ISDA will give ANCs ammunition to press for participation in 

other statutes that incorporate ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition. This 

concern cuts both ways, as adopting respondents’ position would presumably exclude ANCs from the many other statutes incorporating 

ISDA’s definition, even those under which ANCs have long benefited. 

Pp. 23–25. 

(b) One respondent tribe further argues that the CARES Act excludes ANCs regardless of whether they are Indian tribes under ISDA, 

because ANCs do not have a “recognized governing body.” In the ISDA 

context, the term “recognized governing body” has long been understood to apply to an ANC’s board of directors, and nothing in either the

CARES Act or ISDA suggests that the term places additional limits on 

the kinds of Indian tribes eligible to benefit under the statutes. Pp.

26–27. 

976 F. 3d 15, reversed and remanded. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and BREYER, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined, and in which 

ALITO, J., joined as to Parts I, II–C, II–D, III, and IV. GORSUCH, J., filed 

a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS and KAGAN, JJ., joined. 
 

 

 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that 

corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Nos. 20–543 and 20–544 

JANET L. YELLEN, SECRETARY OF THE 

TREASURY, PETITIONER 

20–543 v. 

CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE CHEHALIS 

RESERVATION, ET AL. 

ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGE CORPORATION 

ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS 

20–544 v. 

CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE CHEHALIS 

RESERVATION, ET AL. 

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

[June 25, 2021] 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.* 

In March 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, 134 Stat. 281. Title V of the Act allocates $8 billion of monetary relief to 

“Tribal governments.” 134 Stat. 502, 42 U. S. C. 

§801(a)(2)(B). Under the CARES Act, a “Tribal government” is the “recognized governing body of an Indian tribe” 

as defined in the Indian Self-Determination and Education 

Assistance Act (ISDA). §§801(g)(5), (1). ISDA, in turn, defines an “Indian tribe” as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, 

—————— 

*JUSTICE ALITO joins Parts I, II–C, II–D, III, and IV of this opinion. 
2 YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS 

 RESERVATION 

Opinion of the Court 

or other organized group or community, including any 

Alaska Native village or regional or village corporation as

defined in or established pursuant to the Alaska Native 

Claims Settlement Act[,] which is recognized as eligible for 

the special programs and services provided by the United

States to Indians because of their status as Indians.” 25 

U. S. C. §5304(e).

The Department of the Treasury asked the Department 

of the Interior, the agency that administers ISDA, whether 

Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) meet that definition. 

Consistent with its longstanding view, the Interior Department said yes. The Treasury Department then set aside 

approximately $500 million of CARES Act funding for the 

ANCs. The question presented is whether ANCs are “Indian tribe[s]” under ISDA, and are therefore eligible to receive the CARES Act relief set aside by the Treasury Department. The Court holds that they are. 

I 

This is not the first time the Court has addressed the 

unique circumstances of Alaska and its indigenous population. See, e.g., Sturgeon v. Frost, 587 U. S. ___ (2019); Sturgeon v. Frost, 577 U. S. 424 (2016); Alaska v. Native Village 

of Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U. S. 520 (1998); 

Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 369 U. S. 45 (1962). 

The “simple truth” reflected in those prior cases is that 

“Alaska is often the exception, not the rule.” Sturgeon, 577 

U. S., at 440. To see why, one must first understand the

United States’ unique historical relationship with Alaska 

Natives. 

A 

When the United States purchased the Territory of 

Alaska from Russia in 1867, Alaska Natives lived in communities dispersed widely across Alaska’s 365 million 

acres. In the decades that followed, “[t]here was never an 
Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

attempt in Alaska to isolate Indians on reservations,” as

there had been in the lower 48 States. Metlakatla Indian 

Community, 369 U. S., at 51. As a consequence, the claims

of Alaska Natives to Alaskan land remained largely unsettled even following Alaska’s admission to the Union as our 

49th State in 1959.1 See Alaska Statehood Act, §4, 72 Stat. 

339; Sturgeon, 577 U. S., at 429. 

That changed in 1971 with the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). 85 Stat. 688, 43 U. S. C. §1601 

et seq. ANCSA officially dispensed with the idea of recreating in Alaska the system of reservations that prevailed in 

the lower 48 States. It extinguished Alaska Natives’ claims 

to land and hunting rights and revoked all but one of 

Alaska’s existing reservations. §1610. In exchange, “Congress authorized the transfer of $962.5 million in state and 

federal funds and approximately 44 million acres of Alaska 

land to state-chartered private business corporations that 

were to be formed pursuant to” ANCSA. Native Village of 

Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U. S., at 524. These corporations are called ANCs. 

Relevant here, ANCs come in two varieties: regional 

ANCs and village ANCs. To form the regional ANCs, the

Act directed the Secretary of the Interior to divide Alaska

into 12 geographic regions. §1606(a). Within each region, 

—————— 1There were some exceptions. Congress created by statute two Alaska 

Native reservations: the Annette Islands Reserve in 1891 and the 

Klukwan Reserve in 1957. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, §15, 26 Stat. 1101; 

Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. 85–271, 71 Stat. 596. Under the 1936 

Amendment to the Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 254, 49 Stat. 1250, six

further reservations were formed. See Letter from T. Sansonetti, Solicitor of the U. S. Dept. of Interior, to M. Lujan, Jr., Secretary of Interior 33

(Jan. 11, 1993). Alaska also saw the creation of certain “executive order 

reserves,” which were more limited in purpose and scope and, like all

reserves in Alaska besides the Annette Islands Reserve, were ultimately

revoked by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). See generally D. Case & D. Voluck, Alaska Natives and Americans Laws 85–112 

(3d ed. 2012). 
4 YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS 

 RESERVATION 

Opinion of the Court 

Alaska Natives were instructed to “incorporate under the

laws of Alaska a Regional Corporation to conduct business

for profit.” §1606(d). To form the village ANCs, the Act 

identified approximately 200 Alaska “Native villages,” a

term encompassing any community of 25 or more Alaska

Natives living together as of the 1970 census. §§1602(c),

1610(b), 1615(a). For each Alaska Native village, ANCSA 

ordered the “Native residents” to create an accompanying

village corporation to “hold, invest, manage and/or distribute lands, property, funds, and other rights and assets for 

and on behalf ” of the village. §§1602(j), 1607(a). ANCSA 

then directed the Secretary to prepare a roll showing the

region and, if applicable, village to which each living Alaska 

Native belonged. §1604. Enrolled Alaska Natives then received shares in their respective ANCs. §§1606(g), 1607. 

B 

In 1975, four years after ANCSA’s enactment, Congress

passed ISDA. 25 U. S. C. §5301 et seq. ISDA answered the 

call for a “new national policy” of “autonomy” and “control” 

for Native Americans and Alaska Natives. H. R. Doc. No. 

91–363, p. 3 (1970); see also Menominee Tribe of Wis. v. 

United States, 577 U. S. 250, 252 (2016) (“Congress enacted 

[ISDA] in 1975 to help Indian tribes assume responsibility 

for aid programs that benefit their members”). 

ISDA decentralized the provision of federal Indian benefits away from the Federal Government and toward Native

American and Alaska Native organizations. ISDA allows 

any “Indian tribe” to request that the Secretary of the Interior enter into a self-determination contract with a designated “tribal organization.” §5321(a)(1). Under such a contract, the tribal organization delivers federally funded

economic, infrastructure, health, or education benefits to 

the tribe’s membership.

As originally drafted, ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition did 

not mention ANCs. H. R. 6372, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., §1(a) 
Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

(1973) (defining “Indian tribe” to mean “an Indian tribe,

band, nation, or Alaska Native Community for which the 

Federal Government provides special programs and services because of its Indian identity”). Prior to passage, however, the definition was amended twice to include, first, 

Alaska Native villages and, second, ANCs. See H. R. Rep.

No. 93–1600, p. 14 (1974) (“The Subcommittee amended the

definition of ‘Indian tribe’ to include regional and village 

corporations established by [ANCSA]”). Today, ISDA defines an “Indian tribe” as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, 

or other organized group or community, including any 

Alaska Native village or regional or village corporation as

defined in or established pursuant to [ANCSA], which is 

recognized as eligible for the special programs and services

provided by the United States to Indians because of their

status as Indians.” §5304(e).2 

Despite the express inclusion of ANCs in the definition of

“Indian tribe,” a question arose in the Interior Department 

whether the “recognized-as-eligible clause” limits the definition to “federally recognized tribes” only. A federally recognized tribe is one that has entered into “a government-togovernment relationship [with] the United States.” 1 F. 

Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law §3.02[3] (N. Newton ed. 2012). This recognition can come in a number of

ways: “from treaty, statute, executive or administrative order, or from a course of dealing with the tribe as a political

entity.” W. Canby, American Indian Law in a Nutshell 4 

(7th ed. 2020). As private companies incorporated under 

state law, ANCs have never been “recognized” by the

United States in this sovereign political sense.

In 1976, the year after ISDA’s enactment, the Interior 

Department’s Assistant Solicitor for Indian Affairs issued a 

—————— 2 In 1990, Congress made “technical corrections” to ISDA. S. Rep. No.

101–226, p. 10 (1989). Relevant here, Congress inserted a comma after 

the “Indian tribe” definition’s reference to ANCSA, bringing the definition to what it is today. Act of May 24, 1990, §2(a)(1), 104 Stat. 206. 
 

6 YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS 

 RESERVATION 

Opinion of the Court 

memorandum on the status of ANCs under ISDA. App. 44–

48. In the Assistant Solicitor’s view, the express inclusion 

of ANCs within the definition of “Indian tribe” confirmed 

that ANCs are Indian tribes under ISDA, even though they

are not federally recognized tribes. In the decades since, 

the Interior Department has repeatedly reaffirmed that position. See, e.g., 60 Fed. Reg. 9250 (1995) (ANCs “ha[ve] 

been designated as ‘tribes’ for the purposes of some Federal 

laws,” including ISDA); 58 Fed. Reg. 54364 (1993) (ANCs

“are not governments, but they have been designated as 

‘tribes’ for the purposes of ” ISDA); 53 Fed. Reg. 52833

(1988) (ISDA “specifically include[s]” ANCs). 

C 

In 2020, Congress incorporated ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition into the CARES Act. 42 U. S. C. §801(g)(1). Title V 

of the Act allocates $150 billion to “States, Tribal governments, and units of local government” to compensate for unbudgeted expenditures made in response to COVID–19. 

§801(a)(1). Of that $150 billion, $8 billion is reserved for 

“Tribal governments.” §801(a)(2)(B). A “Tribal government” is the “recognized governing body of an Indian Tribe,” 

as ISDA defines the latter term. §§801(g)(5), (1).

On April 23, 2020, the Treasury Department determined 

that ANCs are eligible for CARES Act relief, and set aside

more than $500 million for them (since reduced to approximately $450 million). App. 53–54; Letter from E. Prelogar,

Acting Solicitor General, to S. Harris, Clerk of Court (May

12, 2021). Soon after the Treasury Department’s announcement, a number of federally recognized tribes (respondents)

sued, arguing that only federally recognized tribes are Indian tribes under ISDA, and thus under the CARES Act. 

Some Tribes further argued that ANCs do not have a “recognized governing body” for purposes of the CARES Act and

are ineligible to receive its funding for that reason as well.

The suits were consolidated in the District Court for the 
Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

District of Columbia, which ultimately entered summary

judgment for the Treasury Department and the ANCs. The 

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation v. 

Mnuchin, 976 F. 3d 15 (2020). In its view, the recognizedas-eligible clause is a term of art requiring any Indian tribe

to be a federally recognized tribe. Because no ANC is federally recognized, the court reasoned, no ANC qualifies for 

funding under Title V of the CARES Act. In so holding, the 

D. C. Circuit split with the Ninth Circuit, which had held 

decades prior in Cook Inlet Native Assn. v. Bowen, 810 F. 2d 

1471 (1987), that ANCs are Indian tribes for ISDA purposes, regardless of whether they have been federally recognized. Id., at 1474. 

We granted certiorari, 592 U. S. ___ (2021), to resolve the 

Circuit split and determine whether ANCs are eligible for 

the CARES Act funding set aside by the Treasury Department. 

II 

All but one of the respondent Tribes agree that ANCs are

eligible to receive the CARES Act funds in question if they 

are Indian tribes for purposes of ISDA.3 The primary question for the Court, then, is whether ANCs satisfy ISDA’s 

definition of “Indian tribe.” The ANCs ask the Court to answer that question by looking to the definition’s plain meaning. Respondents ask the Court to adopt a term-of-art construction that equates being “recognized as eligible for the 

special programs and services provided by the United

States to Indians” with being a “federally recognized tribe,” 

i.e., a tribe recognized by the United States in a sovereign

political sense. 

—————— 3The Court addresses the arguments of that one Tribe in Part III, infra. 
 

8 YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS

 RESERVATION 

Opinion of the Court 

A 

Starting with the plain meaning, an “Indian tribe” under 

ISDA is a “tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or 

community, including any Alaska Native village or regional 

or village corporation as defined in or established pursuant 

to [ANCSA], which is recognized as eligible for the special 

programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians.” 25 U. S. C. 

§5304(e). The definition’s first two clauses are straightforward enough. The first lists entities that might count as

Indian tribes under the Act (e.g., tribes, bands, nations).

The second, “the Alaska clause,” makes clear that Alaska 

Native villages and ANCs are “includ[ed].” The third, “the 

recognized-as-eligible clause,” requires more analysis. According to that clause, the listed entities must be “recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their

status as Indians.” 

ANCs, of course, are “established pursuant to” ANCSA 

within the meaning of the Alaska clause. They are thereby

“recognized as eligible” for ANCSA’s benefits. The trickier 

question is whether eligibility for the benefits of ANCSA 

counts as eligibility for “the special programs and services

provided by the United States to Indians because of their

status as Indians.” 

It does. Contrary to the dissent’s view, post, at 9–10 

(opinion of GORSUCH, J.), ANCSA is readily described as a 

special program provided by the United States to “Indians” 

(in this case, Alaska Natives). See 43 U. S. C. §1626 (describing ANCSA’s relationship to “other programs”). The 

scope of that program is substantial: ANCSA made ANCs 

eligible to select tens of millions of acres of land and receive

hundreds of millions of tax-exempt dollars. §§1605, 1610,

1611. Not just a one-time payment, ANCSA provides for 

revenue sharing among the regional ANCs to ensure Alaska

Natives across the State benefit from an ongoing equitable 
 

Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

distribution of ANC profits. §1606(i). ANCSA further entrusts ANCs to “hold, invest, manage and/or distribute 

lands, property, funds, and other rights and assets for and 

on behalf ” of Alaska Natives, who are the ANCs’ shareholders, as well as to distribute dividends to them. See 

§§1602(j), 1606(j). Moreover, ANCs and their shareholders 

are “eligible for the benefits of ” ANCSA, §1606(d), precisely 

because of their status as Indians. See §1626(e)(1) (“For all 

purposes of Federal law, a Native Corporation shall be considered to be a corporation owned and controlled by Natives”); note following §1601, p. 1136 (ANCSA is “‘Indian 

legislation enacted by Congress pursuant to its plenary authority under the Constitution of the United States to regulate Indian affairs’”).

Respondents do not deny that the benefits of ANCSA are

“a” special program or service provided by the United States 

to Indians. According to respondents, however, such benefits are not “the” special programs and services provided to

Indians (e.g., healthcare, education, and other social services provided by federal agencies like the Bureau of Indian 

Affairs and the Indian Health Service). “The” special programs and services, respondents assert, are available only 

to federally recognized tribes (or, more precisely, to members of such tribes). In respondents’ view, ANCs are thus

“includ[ed]” in the “Indian tribe” definition’s Alaska clause 

only to be excluded en masse from that definition by the

recognized-as-eligible clause.

That would certainly be an odd result. Fortunately, the 

text does not produce it. ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition 

does not specify the particular programs and services an

entity must be eligible for to satisfy the recognized-aseligible clause. Given that ANCSA is the only statute the 

“Indian tribe” definition mentions by name, the best reading of the definition is that being eligible for ANCSA’s benefits by itself satisfies the recognized-as-eligible clause. 
10 YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS

 RESERVATION 

Opinion of the Court 

Consider a similarly worded example. A doctor recommends getting a blood test every six months to “any child,

adult, or senior, including anyone over the age of 75 whose 

blood-sugar levels have tested in the prediabetic range

within the last five years, who exhibits the warning signs 

of Type 2 diabetes.” Without further context, it is unclear 

exactly which warning signs the doctor is referring to, or 

how many of those signs a child, adult, or senior must exhibit before warranting biannual testing. But it is fair to 

say that individuals over 75 with prediabetic blood-sugar 

levels within the last five years should get tested biannually, even if they exhibit no other warning signs. By expressly “including” individuals with that one warning sign, 

the doctor’s recommendation makes clear that particular

sign, by itself, is warning enough.

Just so here: Congress’ express inclusion of ANCs “established pursuant to [ANCSA]” confirms that eligibility for 

ANCSA’s benefits alone is eligibility enough to be an Indian 

tribe. ANCs thus satisfy ISDA’s Indian tribe definition, regardless of whether they and their shareholders are eligible

for federal Indian programs and services other than those 

provided in ANCSA. At any rate, the one-to-one relationship respondents posit between membership in a federally 

recognized tribe and eligibility for federal Indian benefits

more broadly does not hold in the unique circumstances of 

Alaska. See Letter from E. Prelogar, Acting Solicitor General, to S. Harris, Clerk of Court (Apr. 22, 2021) (“[T]he federal government has historically provided benefits and services to Alaska Natives who are not enrolled members of a 

federally recognized Indian tribe”); D. Case & D. Voluck,

Alaska Natives and Americans Laws 30 (3d ed. 2012) 

(“[T]he federal government has, at least since the end of the 

nineteenth century, provided a wide variety of programs 

and services to Alaska Natives solely because of their status

as Natives”). So ANCSA is not, in fact, the only federal In-
Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

dian program or service for which ANCs and their shareholders are eligible.

It should come as no surprise that Congress made ANCs

eligible to contract under ISDA. After all, Congress itself

created ANCs just four years earlier to receive the benefits

of the Alaska land settlement on behalf of all Alaska Natives. Allowing ANCs to distribute federal Indian benefits

more broadly is entirely consistent with the approach Congress charted in ANCSA. Accord, 1 American Indian Policy 

Review Comm’n, Final Report, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 495 

(Comm. Print 1977) (ANCs “might well be the form or organization best suited to sponsor certain kinds of federally

funded programs” in Alaska); 43 U. S. C. §1606(r) (“The authority of a Native Corporation to provide benefits . . . to 

promote the health, education, or welfare of . . . shareholders or family members is expressly authorized and confirmed”).

Under the plain meaning of ISDA, ANCs are Indian 

tribes, regardless of whether they are also federally recognized tribes. In so holding, the Court does not open the door

to other Indian groups that have not been federally recognized becoming Indian tribes under ISDA. Even if such 

groups qualify for certain federal benefits, that does not 

make them similarly situated to ANCs. ANCs are sui generis entities created by federal statute and granted an enormous amount of special federal benefits as part of a legislative experiment tailored to the unique circumstances of

Alaska and recreated nowhere else. Moreover, with the exception of Alaska Native villages (which are now federally 

recognized), no entities other than ANCs are expressly “includ[ed]” by name in ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition. Cf. 

Sturgeon, 577 U. S., at 440 (“All those Alaska-specific provisions reflect the simple truth that Alaska is often the exception, not the rule”). 
12 YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS 

 RESERVATION 

Opinion of the Court 

B 

Respondents urge this Court to discard the plain meaning of the “Indian tribe” definition in favor of a term-of-art

construction. In respondents’ view, the 69 words of the “Indian tribe” definition are a long way of saying just 8: An 

“Indian tribe” means a “federally recognized tribe.” If that 

is right, respondents are correct that ANCs are not Indian

tribes, because everyone agrees they are not federally recognized tribes. To prevail on this argument, however, respondents must demonstrate that the statutory context

supports reading ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition as a term

of art rather than according to its plain meaning. See Johnson v. United States, 559 U. S. 133, 139 (2010). Their efforts 

are not persuasive.

In arguing for a term-of-art construction, respondents

first rely on a series of Acts that terminated various tribes

starting in the late 1950s. Those Acts closed tribal membership rolls, specified the division of tribal assets, and revoked tribal constitutions. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 21, 1959, 

Pub. L. No. 86–322, 73 Stat. 592. Following termination,

the tribe and its members were no longer “entitled to any of

the special services performed by the United States for Indians because of their status as Indians.” §5, id., at 593. As 

respondents note, this language resembles (although does

not mirror precisely) the final words of ISDA’s recognizedas-eligible clause. If being terminated means no longer being “entitled to any of the special services performed by the 

United States for Indians because of their status as Indians,” the argument goes, then being “recognized as eligible 

for the special programs and services provided by the

United States to Indians because of their status as Indians” 

means being a federally recognized tribe.

Respondents misjudge the relevance of these termination 

statutes. Those statutes do not contain the words “recognized as eligible”; they do not even contain the word “recognized.” Furthermore, the termination statutes use their 
 

Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

ISDA-reminiscent phrasing not as a synonym for termination but to describe just one, among other, consequences of 

a tribe’s constitution being revoked. See, e.g., ibid. (“The 

constitution of the tribe . . . shall be revoked by the Secretary. Thereafter, the tribe and its members shall not be 

entitled to any of the special services performed by the 

United States for Indians because of their status as Indians, all statutes of the United States that affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall be inapplicable to 

them, and the laws of the several States shall apply to them 

in the same manner they apply to other persons or citizens

within their jurisdiction”).

Some linguistic similarity between ISDA and the termination statutes does not suggest that the language of the 

recognized-as-eligible clause was an accepted way of saying 

“a federally recognized tribe” in 1975. It instead supports a 

much more limited proposition: A federally recognized tribe 

that has not been terminated is “entitled” to “special services performed by the United States for Indians,” and

thereby satisfies ISDA’s similarly worded recognized-aseligible clause. But of course, no one disputes that being a

federally recognized tribe is one way to qualify as an Indian 

tribe under ISDA; it is just not the only way.

Nor is the mere inclusion of the word “recognized” enough

to give the recognized-as-eligible clause a term-of-art meaning. True, the word “recognized” often refers to a tribe with 

which the United States has a government-to-government

relationship (particularly when it is sandwiched between

the words “federally” and “tribe”). That does not mean, 

however, that the word “recognized” always connotes political recognition.4 

—————— 4 Indeed, “recognition” is not even the sole term used to describe tribes

with which the United States maintains a government-to-government

relationship; “acknowledgement” is often used for that same purpose.

See 1 F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law §3.02[3] (N. Newton

ed. 2012) (“Federal acknowledgement or recognition of an Indian group’s 
 

 

 

 

14 YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS 

 RESERVATION 

Opinion of the Court 

“Recognized” is too common and context dependent a

word to bear so loaded a meaning wherever it appears, even 

in laws concerning Native Americans and Alaska Natives.

Cf. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U. S. 223, 235 (2011) (declining to read “unavoidable” as a term of art in part because “‘[u]navoidable’ is hardly a rarely used word”). Certainly, “recognized” can signify political recognition; it can 

also refer to something far more pedestrian. See, e.g., 

Black’s Law Dictionary 1436 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (defining 

“recognition” as “[r]atification; confirmation; an acknowledgment that something done by another person in one’s

name had one’s authority”). The type of recognition required is a question best answered in context. See, e.g., 25 

U. S. C. §3002(a)(2)(C)(1) (providing for control over certain

cultural items “in the Indian tribe that is recognized as aboriginally occupying the area in which the objects were discovered”); §4352(3) (defining a “Native Hawaiian organization” as a nonprofit that, among other things, “is recognized

for having expertise in Native Hawaiian culture and heritage, including tourism”). In ISDA, the required recognition

is of an entity’s eligibility for federal Indian programs and 

services, not a government-to-government relationship 

with the United States.5 

—————— 

legal status as a tribe is a formal political act confirming the tribe’s 

existence as a distinct political society, and institutionalizing the 

government-to-government relationship between the tribe and the federal government”). For instance, in 1978, three years after ISDA’s enactment, the Bureau of Indian Affairs adopted “procedures for acknowledging that certain American Indian tribes exist.” 43 Fed. Reg. 39361 

(1978). To this day, applications to become a federally recognized tribe 

are made to the Office of Federal Acknowledgement, and the Interior Department still uses “recognized” and “acknowledged” somewhat interchangeably. See, e.g., 86 Fed. Reg. 7554 (2021) (“Published below is an

updated list of federally acknowledged Indian Tribes”). 5The dissent reads the congressional findings to ISDA as providing a 

textual clue that government-to-government recognition is required. See 

post, at 7 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.) (“When Congress passed ISDA, it 

sought to provide Indians ‘meaningful leadership roles’ that are ‘crucial 
 

 

Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

Respondents next rely on sources that postdate ISDA.

Ordinarily, however, this Court reads statutory language 

as a term of art only when the language was used in that 

way at the time of the statute’s adoption. See Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media, 588 U. S. ___, ___ 

(2019) (slip op., at 10) (rejecting a term-of-art reading where

the parties “mustered no evidence that the terms of ” the 

statute carried a “specialized common law meaning . . . at 

the time of their adoption”). In relying on sources postdating ISDA, respondents must show not only that the language of the recognized-as-eligible clause later became a 

term of art, but also that this term-of-art understanding

should be backdated to ISDA’s passage in 1975. They cannot make that showing.

Respondents lean most heavily on the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994 (List Act), enacted almost 20 years after ISDA. See 25 U. S. C. §§5130, 5131. 

The List Act requires the Secretary of the Interior to publish an annual list of “all Indian tribes which the Secretary 

recognizes to be eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of 

their status as Indians.” §5131(a). According to respondents, ANCs’ absence from the Secretary’s list confirms that

they are not “eligible for the special programs and services 

provided by the United States to Indians because of their 

—————— 

to the realization of self-government’ ” (citing 25 U. S. C. §5301)). As already explained, however, supra, at 10–11, allowing ANCs to contract 

under ISDA, notwithstanding their lack of political recognition, is entirely consistent with that statute’s stated objective of “establish[ing] . . . 

a meaningful Indian self-determination policy.” §5301(b). Congress also

designed ANCSA to be “in conformity with the real economic and social

needs of Natives” and to facilitate “maximum participation by Natives in 

decisions affecting their rights and property.” 43 U. S. C. §1601(b). 

ANCs are the vehicles Congress created to further that policy of self-determination. Accord, S. Conf. Rep. No. 92–581, p. 37 (1971) (“[T]he creation of Regional and Village Corporations” are part of “a policy of selfdetermination on the part of the Alaska Native people”). 
16 YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS 

 RESERVATION 

Opinion of the Court 

status as Indians,” §5304(e), and thus fail ISDA’s recognizedas-eligible clause.

Respondents’ cross-referencing argument, however, requires the Court to ignore the reason why ANCs are not on

the list. True to its full name, the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act tasks the Secretary with maintaining a

“‘list of federally recognized tribes’” only. Note following

§5130, p. 678. The List Act, moreover, lacks language like 

that in ISDA expressly “including” ANCs “established pursuant to” ANCSA. §5304(e). The obvious inference, then, 

is that ANCs are not on the Secretary’s list simply because 

they are not federally recognized.

History confirms as much. In 1979, 15 years before the 

List Act was passed, the Secretary began publishing a list

of Indian tribes “that have a government-to-government relationship with the United States.” 44 Fed. Reg. 7235. In 

1988, ANCs were added to the Secretary’s list, which had 

been retitled “Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To

Receive Services From the United States Bureau of Indian 

Affairs,” because ANCs are “specifically eligible for the 

funding and services of the [Bureau of Indian Affairs] by

statute” and “should not have to undertake to obtain Federal Acknowledgement” (i.e., federal recognition). 53 Fed. 

Reg. 52829, 52832. In 1993, the Secretary dropped ANCs

from the list, concluding that “the inclusion of ANC[s],

which lack tribal status in a political sense, called into question the status” of the other entities on the list. 58 Fed. Reg.

54365. In so doing, the Secretary reaffirmed that ANCs

“are not governments, but they have been designated as 

‘tribes’ for the purposes of some Federal laws,” including

ISDA. Id., at 54364. The List Act, passed the following

year, “confirmed the Secretary’s authority and responsibility” to maintain a list of federally recognized tribes. 60 Fed. 

Reg. 9251. Hence, ANCs remained off the list. 

To accept respondents’ argument, then, the Court would

need to cross-reference ISDA’s definition of an “Indian 
 

Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 17 

Opinion of the Court 

tribe” with the Secretary’s list, but ignore why ANCs were 

excluded from that list in the first place. The Court declines 

to take that doubtful step.

Despite asking the Court to consider post-ISDA statutes

to determine whether ANCs are “Indian tribes” under 

ISDA, moreover, respondents largely fail to address postISDA congressional actions that contradict their position.

First, consider Congress’ treatment of the Cook Inlet Region, Inc. (CIRI), the regional ANC for the ANCSA region

covering more than half the Alaskan population. See The 

Twelve Regions, ANCSA Regional Association (June 1, 

2021), https://ancsaregional.com/the-twelve-regions. In 

1994, CIRI contracted under ISDA through its designated 

healthcare provider to offer healthcare benefits to Alaska

Natives and American Indians in Anchorage and the 

Matanuska-Susitna Valley. See Cook Inlet Treaty Tribes v. 

Shalala, 166 F. 3d 986, 988 (CA9 1999). A group of Alaska

Native villages sued, arguing that the Federal Government 

should have first obtained their approval. Ibid.; see 25 

U. S. C. §5304(l) (“[I]n any case where [an ISDA contract]

benefit[s] more than one Indian tribe, the approval of each

such Indian tribe” is required). Congress mooted the dispute by passing a bill that waived ISDA’s normal tribal approval requirement for CIRI’s healthcare contracts. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies

Appropriations Act, 1998, §325(a), 111 Stat. 1597–1598. In 

so doing, Congress not only assumed CIRI was eligible to

enter into ISDA contracts (notwithstanding its lack of federal recognition), but actively cleared the way for it to do so. 

Next, consider the Native American Housing Assistance 

and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA), 25 

U. S. C. §4101 et seq., which incorporates ISDA’s “Indian 

tribe” definition, see §4103(13)(B). NAHASDA creates a 

housing block grant program for Indian tribes. §4111. The 

regional ANCs (acting through their designated housing 

authorities) are among the largest recipients of these 
 

 

18 YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS

 RESERVATION 

Opinion of the Court 

grants in Alaska, receiving tens of millions of dollars each 

year. See Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, FY 

2020 Final [Indian Housing Block Grant] Funding by [Tribally Designated Housing Entities] & Regions. For years, 

Congress has passed appropriations riders requiring that

the existing recipients of NAHASDA’s housing block grants

in Alaska (including ANCs) continue to receive those 

grants. See, e.g., Further Consolidated Appropriations Act,

2020, Pub. L. 116–94, Div. H, Tit. II, §211, 133 Stat. 3003.

Following the D. C. Circuit’s decision in this case, Congress 

awarded additional grants under NAHASDA and emphasized that, “[f]or the avoidance of doubt,” the “Indian 

tribe[s]” eligible for those grants “shall include Alaska native corporations established pursuant to” ANCSA. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. 116–260, Div. N,

Tit. V, Subtit. A, §501(k)(2)(C), 134 Stat. 2077. 

Thus, post-ISDA sources prove no more fruitful to respondents than pre-ISDA ones. Even assuming the Court

should look to events after 1975, respondents cannot 

cherry-pick statutes like the List Act without explaining

postenactment developments that undermine their interpretation. In the end, the various statutes cited do not support respondents’ efforts to exclude ANCs from ISDA by use

of a term-of-art construction.6 

C 

Even if ANCs did not satisfy the recognized-as-eligible 

clause, however, they would still satisfy ISDA’s definition

of an “Indian tribe.” If respondents were correct that only

a federally recognized tribe can satisfy that clause, then the 

best way to read the “Indian tribe” definition as a whole 

would be for the recognized-as-eligible clause not to apply 

to the entities in the Alaska clause at all (i.e., to “any Alaska 

—————— 6 In so holding, the Court does not decide whether the language of the 

recognized-as-eligible clause has been used as a term of art in other statutes subsequent to ISDA’s enactment. 
 

 

Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 19 

Opinion of the Court 

Native village or regional or village corporation,” 25 U. S. C. 

§5304(e)). On this reading, the way to tell whether a tribe, 

band, nation, or other organized group or community is an

“Indian tribe” is to ask whether it is federally recognized,

but the way to tell whether an Alaska Native village or corporation is an “Indian tribe” is to ask whether it is “defined

in or established pursuant to” ANCSA. Ibid. Otherwise, 

despite being prominently “includ[ed]” in the “Indian tribe” 

definition, ibid., all ANCs would be excluded by a federalrecognition requirement there is no reasonable prospect 

they could ever satisfy.

Respondents object (and the dissent agrees) that this construction “produces grammatical incoherence.” Brief for 

Respondents Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation 

et al. 16; post, at 4–5. They point out that a modifying 

clause at the end of a list (like the recognized-as-eligible 

clause) often applies to every item in the list. See, e.g., 

Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 

U. S. 335, 344, n. 4 (2005). The so-called series-qualifier 

canon can be a helpful interpretive tool, and it supports the 

idea that the recognized-as-eligible clause applies to every

type of entity listed in the “Indian tribe” definition, including ANCs. Given that the entities in the Alaska clause are 

the closest in proximity to the recognized-as-eligible clause,

that canon arguably applies with particular force here. 

As the Court reiterated earlier this Term, however, the 

series-qualifier canon gives way when it would yield a “contextually implausible outcome.” Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 

592 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 9); see also id., at ___ 

(ALITO, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 1) (noting 

that “[c]anons are useful tools, but it is important to keep

their limitations in mind. This may be especially true with 

respect to . . . the ‘series-qualifier’ canon”). The most grammatical reading of a sentence in a vacuum does not always

produce the best reading in context. See, e.g., Sturgeon, 577 

U. S., at 438 (“Statutory language ‘cannot be construed in a 
20 YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS

 RESERVATION 

Opinion of the Court 

vacuum. It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory 

scheme’”); cf. B. Garner, Modern English Usage 784 (4th 

ed. 2016) (noting the “increasingly common” “‘remote relative,’” i.e., the practice of separating “the relative pronoun 

(that, which, who) from its antecedent”).

Consider an example with the same syntax as the “Indian

tribe” definition. A restaurant advertises “50% off any 

meat, vegetable, or seafood dish, including ceviche, which 

is cooked.” Say a customer orders ceviche, a Peruvian specialty of raw fish marinated in citrus juice. Would she expect it to be cooked? No. Would she expect to pay full price 

for it? Again, no. Under the reading recommended by the 

series-qualifier canon, however, the ceviche was a red herring. Even though the 50%-off sale specifically named

ceviche (and no other dish), it costs full price because it is 

not cooked. That conclusion would make no sense to a reasonable customer. 

Like applying a “cooked” requirement to ceviche, applying a “federally recognized” requirement to ANCs is implausible in context. When Congress enacted ISDA in 1975, not

a single Alaska Native village or ANC had been recognized 

for a government-to-government relationship with the 

United States. On respondents’ reading, then, the entire 

Alaska clause originally had no effect. None of its entities 

qualified as Indian tribes for purposes of ISDA, even though 

the only entities expressly included in ISDA’s definition of 

an “Indian tribe” are those in the Alaska clause. 

The only explanation respondents offer for this highly

counterintuitive result is that Congress included Alaska

Native villages and corporations in the “Indian tribe” definition on the possibility they might one day become federally recognized. That is highly unlikely. First, the Alaska 

clause would be redundant on that account. See Brief for 

Respondents Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation 
Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 21 

Opinion of the Court 

et al. 31 ([T]he Alaska [clause] is . . . best read as redundant”). A federally recognized Alaska Native village or

ANC would presumably already fit into one of the preexisting ISDA categories of “tribe[s], band[s], nation[s], or 

other organized group[s] or communit[ies].” 25 U. S. C. 

§5304(e).

Second, it is quite doubtful that anyone in 1975 thought 

the United States was going to recognize ANCs as sovereign 

political entities. ANCs are for-profit companies incorporated under state law that Congress itself created just four

years prior to ISDA. They are not at all the type of entities 

normally considered for a government-to-government relationship with the United States. Accord, 25 CFR §83.4 

(1994) (“The Department will not acknowledge,” i.e., federally recognize, “[a]n association, organization, corporation,

or entity of any character formed in recent times unless the

entity has only changed form by recently incorporating or

otherwise formalizing its existing politically autonomous 

community”). Indeed, at the time ISDA was enacted, some 

doubted whether even Alaska Native villages could be federally recognized.7 

Respondents counter by pointing to certain organizations

created in Alaska in the 1930s that later became federally 

recognized tribes. One such organization, the Hydaburg

Cooperative Association (HCA), was formed under the 1936

Amendment to the Indian Reorganization Act, which authorized Alaska Natives groups “not heretofore recognized

as bands or tribes” to organize based on “a common bond of

occupation, or association, or residence.” Ch. 254, 49 Stat. 

1250 (codified at 25 U. S. C. §5119). The HCA organized

around “a common bond of occupation in the fish industry.” 

Constitution and By-Laws of the Hydaburg Cooperative As-

—————— 7That doubt was resolved in the villages’ favor in 1993. See 58 Fed. 

Reg. 54365. 
 

22 YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS 

 RESERVATION 

Opinion of the Court 

sociation, Alaska Preamble (1938). Decades later, the Interior Department acknowledged the HCA as a federally recognized tribe, even though it is of fairly recent vintage and 

organized around a bond of occupation rather than solely

around an ancestral tribal heritage. See 58 Fed. Reg.

54369. If the HCA could be federally recognized, respondents say, some might have thought ANCs could too. 

Respondents make too much of the HCA and the small 

handful of entities like it, which are not comparable to

ANCs. Unlike ANCs, the former entities were organized

under federally approved constitutions as part of a shortlived attempt to recreate in Alaska a tribal reservation system like that in the lower 48 States. ANCs, by contrast,

were incorporated under state law pursuant to legislation

that embodied the formal repudiation of that approach.

That the Interior Department deemed the HCA and a handful of other entities like it federally recognized tribes decades after ISDA’s passage does not mean it was plausible 

in 1975 to think ANCs would one day become federally recognized tribes, as well.8 

Ultimately, respondents resort to the argument that, although the idea of ANCs becoming federally recognized

tribes might be farfetched, it is not technically impossible. 

That is, Congress’ plenary power over Indian affairs could 

—————— 8Respondents also point to a 1996 bill that would have “deemed” one 

regional ANC, CIRI, “an Indian tribal entity for the purpose of federal 

programs for which Indians are eligible because of their status as Indians” and would have mandated that CIRI be “specifically include[d]” “on

any list that designates federally recognized Indian tribes.” H. R. 3662, 

104th Cong., 2d Sess., §§121(a)–(b) (1996). By its terms, the bill would

not have entered CIRI into a government-to-government relationship 

with the United States; it merely would have made CIRI eligible for all

federal Indian programs available to federally recognized tribes. In any

event, it is hard to make too much of a failed bill. See United States v. 

Craft, 535 U. S. 274, 287 (2002) (“[F]ailed legislative proposals are a particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior 

statute” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 23 

Opinion of the Court 

conceivably permit it to recognize a government-togovernment relationship between an ANC and the United

States. Perhaps, but possibility is not the same as plausibility, and both are proper concerns of statutory interpretation. Consider again the example of a restaurant advertising “50% off any meat, vegetable, or seafood dish, including 

ceviche, which is cooked.” On respondents’ logic, because

the restaurant technically could cook its ceviche, the only 

way to read the advertisement is that ceviche is full price 

unless the restaurant takes an unexpected culinary step.

That is wrong. The best reading of the advertisement is 

that ceviche is 50% off even if it is not cooked, just as the 

best reading of ISDA is that ANCs are Indian tribes even if 

they are not federally recognized. Any grammatical awkwardness involved in the recognized-as-eligible clause skipping over the Alaska clause pales in comparison to the incongruity of forever excluding all ANCs from an “Indian 

tribe” definition whose most prominent feature is that it

specifically includes them. 

D 

Respondents make a few final arguments to persuade the 

Court that ANCs are not Indian tribes under ISDA. None 

succeeds. 

Respondents argue first that the ANCs misrepresent how 

meaningful a role they play under ISDA because the actual

number of ISDA contracts held by ANCs is negligible. The 

Court does not have the record before it to determine the 

exact number and nature of ISDA contracts held by ANCs

or their designees, either historically or currently. The 

point is largely irrelevant, however. No one would argue

that a federally recognized tribe was not an Indian tribe under ISDA just because it had never entered into an ISDA 

contract. The same is true for ANCs. To the extent respondents argue that ruling for them would be of little practical consequence given the small number of ISDA contracts 
 

 

 

24 YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS 

 RESERVATION 

Opinion of the Court 

held by ANCs, quantity is not the only issue. For example, 

CIRI contracts through a designee to provide healthcare 

to thousands of Alaska Natives in Anchorage and the 

Matanuska-Susitna Valley. Brief for CIRI as Amicus Curiae 9. The loss of CIRI’s ability alone to contract under

ISDA would have significant effects on the many Alaska

Natives it currently serves.9 

Respondents further argue that treating ANCs as Indian

tribes would complicate the administration of ISDA. If an 

ISDA contract will benefit multiple Indian tribes, each such 

tribe has to agree to the contract before it can go into effect.

25 U. S. C. §5304(l). Because membership in ANCs and federally recognized tribes often overlap, respondents argue 

that ANCs will be able to veto any ISDA contract sought by 

a federally recognized tribe in Alaska. 

Without discounting the possibility of administrative

burdens, this concern is overstated. The Executive Branch 

has treated ANCs as Indian tribes for 45 years, yet respondents point to no evidence of such a problem ever having 

arisen. If such a problem does arise, moreover, the Interior 

Department may be able to craft an administrative solution. Cf. 46 Fed. Reg. 27178, 27179 (1981) (Indian Health

Service regulations establishing an “order of precedence” 

among Alaskan entities “[f]or the purposes of contracting 

—————— 9Respondents argue that CIRI’s healthcare services would survive a 

ruling in respondents’ favor, because CIRI’s ISDA contract is provided 

for “by separate statute.” Brief for Respondents Confederated Tribes of 

Chehalis Reservation et al. 52. As discussed, after CIRI entered into an 

ISDA contract to provide healthcare benefits, a group of Alaskan tribes 

sued. See Cook Inlet Treaty Tribes v. Shalala, 166 F. 3d 986, 988 (CA9 

1999). Congress then passed a bill to moot the dispute. Department of

the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, §325(a), 111

Stat. 1597–1598. It is not entirely clear whether this bill means that 

CIRI’s ISDA contract would survive a ruling that ANCs are not Indian 

tribes under ISDA. But the fact that Congress intervened to ensure that 

a regional ANC could more easily contract under ISDA is, if anything,

further indication that the Court’s ruling today is the correct one. 
 

 

 

Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 25 

Opinion of the Court 

under” ISDA and requiring authorizing resolutions from

“[v]illages, as the smallest tribal units under” ANCSA). 

Respondents also warn that blessing ANCs’ status under 

ISDA will give them ammunition to press for participation

in the many statutes besides the CARES Act that incorporate ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition. See, e.g., Indian 

Health Care Improvement Act, §4(d), 90 Stat. 1401; Native 

American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act 

of 1996, §4(12)(B), 110 Stat. 4019–4020; Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act of 2005, [Title V of the Energy Policy Act of 2005], §503(a), 119 Stat. 

764–765. 

As the Government notes, however, there may well be

statutes that incorporate ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition 

but exclude ANCs from participation in other ways. See 

Brief for Federal Petitioner 33–34 (citing, e.g., 7 U. S. C. 

§§1639o(2), 1639p(a)(1) (defining “Indian tribe” to incorporate the ISDA definition, but also requiring participants to 

exercise “‘regulatory authority over . . . territory of the Indian tribe’”)). Moreover, this concern cuts both ways. If 

respondents’ reading prevailed, ANCs would presumably be 

excluded from all other statutes incorporating ISDA’s definition, even those under which ANCs have long benefited.

That includes the Indian Tribal Energy Development and 

Self-Determination Act of 2005, under which ANCs have received millions of dollars of energy assistance. See Brief for 

Federal Petitioner 33. That also includes NAHASDA, 

which, as discussed, creates a housing block grant program

under which the regional ANCs are some of the biggest recipients in Alaska. See supra, at 17–18. Currently, over

10,000 Alaskans live in housing units built, improved, or 

managed by these regional authorities. See Brief for Association of Alaska Housing Authorities as Amicus Curiae 15. 

All told, the Court’s decision today does not “vest ANCs

with new and untold tribal powers,” as respondents fear. 
26 YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS 

 RESERVATION 

Opinion of the Court 

Brief for Respondents Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation et al. 54. It merely confirms the powers Congress

expressly afforded ANCs and that the Executive Branch 

has long understood ANCs to possess. 

III 

Almost everyone agrees that if ANCs are Indian tribes

under ISDA, they are eligible for funding under Title V of 

the CARES Act. If Congress did not want to make ANCs

eligible for CARES Act funding, its decision to incorporate 

ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition into the CARES Act would 

be inexplicable. Had Congress wished to limit CARES Act 

funding to federally recognized tribes, it could simply have 

cross-referenced the List Act instead, as it had in numerous 

statutes before.10 Instead, Congress invoked a definition 

that expressly includes ANCs (and has been understood for 

decades to include them). Today’s ruling merely gives effect 

to that decision. 

Nevertheless, the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and 

Ouray Reservation argues that the CARES Act excludes

ANCs regardless of whether they are Indian tribes under

ISDA. Recall that the CARES Act allocates money to 

“Tribal governments.” 42 U. S. C. §801(a)(2)(B). A “Tribal 

government” is “the recognized governing body of an Indian

tribe.” §801(g)(5). According to the Utes, ANCs do not have 

a “recognized governing body” because that term applies to

the governing body of a federally recognized tribe alone. 

As the Utes implicitly acknowledge, however, federal

recognition is usually discussed in relation to tribes, not 

their governing bodies. Brief for Respondent Ute Indian 

—————— 10See, e.g., Indian Arts and Crafts Amendments Act of 2010, 

§203(a)(2), 124 Stat. 2263 (“The term ‘Indian tribe’ has the meaning 

given the term in section 102 of the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe 

List Act of 1994”); Helping Expedite and Advance Responsible Tribal

Home Ownership Act of 2012, §2, 126 Stat. 1150 (same); Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998, §2, 112 Stat. 619 (same). 
 

Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 27 

Opinion of the Court 

Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation 13 (“The recognized relationship is a political relationship between the 

United States and the tribe”); see also, e.g., note following

25 U. S. C. §5130, p. 678 (“‘[T]he United States has a trust 

responsibility to recognized Indian tribes, maintains a 

government-to-government relationship with those tribes, 

and recognizes the sovereignty of those tribes’”). In addition, the CARES Act’s use of the term “recognized governing body” is borrowed from ISDA itself, which lists the “recognized governing body” of an Indian tribe as one type of

“tribal organization” empowered to contract with the government on the tribe’s behalf. §5304(l). In the ISDA context, this term has long been understood to apply to an 

ANC’s board of directors, the ANC’s governing body as a

matter of corporate law. See, e.g., App. 45 (An ANC’s “board 

of directors . . . is its ‘governing body’”); see also Black’s Law 

Dictionary, at 219 (defining “Board of Directors” as “[t]he

governing body of a private corporation”). Indeed, respondents do not dispute that the plain meaning of “recognized

governing body” covers an ANC’s board of directors.11 

Looking to the plain meaning of “recognized governing

body” makes even more sense because nothing in either the 

CARES Act or ISDA suggests that the term “recognized

governing body” places additional limits on the kinds of Indian tribes eligible to benefit under the statutes. In both 

laws, the term instead pinpoints the particular entity that 

will receive funding on behalf of an Indian tribe. See 42 

U. S. C. §801(g)(5); 25 U. S. C. §5304(l). Because ANCs are 

Indian tribes within the meaning of the CARES Act, an 

ANC’s board of directors is a “recognized governing body”

eligible to receive funding under Title V of the Act. 

—————— 11The Utes rely also on Seldovia Native Assn., Inc. v. Lujan, 904 F. 2d 

1335 (CA9 1990). Seldovia never discussed the term “recognized governing body” and concerned whether ANCs are Indian tribes for purposes of 

Circuit precedent construing the Eleventh Amendment. Id., at 1350. 
28 YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS 

 RESERVATION 

Opinion of the Court 

IV 

The Court today affirms what the Federal Government

has maintained for almost half a century: ANCs are Indian 

tribes under ISDA. For that reason, they are Indian tribes

under the CARES Act and eligible for Title V funding. The 

judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 
 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 1 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Nos. 20–543 and 20–544 

JANET L. YELLEN, SECRETARY OF THE 

TREASURY, PETITIONER 

20–543 v. 

CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE CHEHALIS 

RESERVATION, ET AL. 

ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGE CORPORATION 

ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS 

20–544 v. 

CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE CHEHALIS 

RESERVATION, ET AL. 

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

[June 25, 2021] 

JUSTICE GORSUCH, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS and 

JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting. 

The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act 

(CARES Act) directed trillions of dollars to various recipients across the Nation to help them address the COVID–19

pandemic. Our case focuses on $8 billion Congress set aside 

for “Tribal governments.” The question we must answer is 

whether Alaska’s for-profit Alaska Native Corporations

(ANCs) qualify as “Tribal governments.” If they do, they

may receive approximately $450 million of the earmarked

funds; if not, the money will go to tribes across the country.

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 

wrote a thoughtful and unanimous opinion holding that 

ANCs are not “Tribal governments.” Today, the Court dis-
2 YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS 

 RESERVATION 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

agrees, providing two competing theories for its result. Respectfully, I find neither persuasive and would affirm. 

I 

The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 

(ANCSA) sought to “settle all land claims by Alaska Natives” by “transfer[ring] $962.5 million in state and federal 

funds and approximately 44 million acres of Alaska land to 

state-chartered private business corporations” in which

Alaska Natives were given shares. Alaska v. Native Village 

of Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U. S. 520, 523–524 

(1998); 43 U. S. C. §1601 et seq. In particular, ANCSA established over 200 “Village Corporations” and 12 “Regional

Corporations.” §§1602, 1606. The Village Corporations

were created to hold and manage “lands, property, funds,

and other rights and assets for and on behalf of a Native 

village.” §1602(j). Meanwhile, shares in the Regional Corporations went to individuals across many different tribes 

and villages. §§1604, 1606(g)(1)(A). These corporations received most of the settlement funds and lands Congress provided, assets they use to “conduct business for profit.” 

§§1606(d), 1610–1613; see also Brief for Federal Petitioner 

5. Today, ANCs are involved in oil and gas, mining, military contracting, real estate, construction, communications 

and media, engineering, plastics, timber, and aerospace 

manufacturing, among other things. GAO, Report to Congressional Requesters, Regional Alaska Native Corporations: Status 40 Years After Establishment, and Future 

Considerations (GAO–13–121, Dec. 2012). “In fiscal year

2017, ANCs had a combined net revenue of $9.1 billion.” 

Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation v. Mnuchin, 

456 F. Supp. 3d 152, 157 (DC 2020).

Everyone agrees that ANCs are entitled to some CARES 

Act relief. Already, they have received benefits Congress

allocated to corporations, like the Paycheck Protection Program. See Brief for Respondent Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah 
 

Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 3 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

and Ouray Reservation 1 (Brief for Respondent Ute Tribe).

Congress also accounted for ANC shareholders, and all 

Alaskans, when it directed over $2 billion to the State. In 

fact, Alaska received more money per capita than all but 

two other States. Id., at 3; Congressional Research Service, 

General State and Local Fiscal Assistance and COVID–19: 

Background and Available Data (Feb. 8, 2021). The Alaska 

Native Villages received hundreds of millions of those dollars because everyone agrees they qualify as tribal governments for purposes of the CARES Act. See ibid. This suit 

concerns only the ANCs’ claim of entitlement to additional 

funds statutorily reserved for “Tribal governments.” 42 

U. S. C. §801(a)(2)(B). If that counterintuitive proposition

holds true, ANCs will receive approximately $450 million

that would otherwise find its way to recognized tribal governments across the country, including Alaska’s several 

hundred Native Villages. See Letter from E. Prelogar, Acting Solicitor General, to S. Harris, Clerk of Court (May 12,

2021).

In the CARES Act, Congress defined a “Tribal government” as the “recognized governing body of an Indian 

Tribe.” §801(g)(5). In turn, Congress specified in §801(g)(1) 

that the term “Indian Tribe” should carry here the same 

meaning that it bears in the Indian Self-Determination and 

Education Assistance Act of 1975 (ISDA). The relevant portion of that statute provides as follows: 

 “‘Indian tribe’ [or ‘Indian Tribe’] means any Indian

tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community, including any Alaska Native village or regional or

village corporation as defined in or established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (85

Stat. 688) [43 U. S. C. 1601 et. seq.], which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services 

provided by the United States to Indians because of

their status as Indians.” 25 U. S. C. §5304(e). 
4 YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS 

 RESERVATION 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

The question before us thus becomes whether ANCs 

count as “Indian tribes” under the longstanding terms Congress adopted in ISDA almost 50 years ago. To resolve that 

dispositive question, we must answer two subsidiary ones:

(1) Does the statute’s final clause (call it the recognition

clause) apply to the ANCs listed earlier? (2) If so, are ANCs

“recognized as eligible for the special programs and services

provided by the United States to Indians because of their

status as Indians”? In my view, the recognition clause does 

apply to ANCs along with the other listed entities. And 

ANCs are not “recognized” as tribes eligible for the special 

programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians. 

II 

A 

Start with the question whether the recognition clause 

applies to the ANCs. As the nearest referent and part of an 

integrated list of other modified terms, ANCs must be subject to its terms. Unsurprisingly, the Court of Appeals

reached this conclusion unanimously. Lawyers often debate whether a clause at the end of a series modifies the 

entire list or only the last antecedent. E.g., Lockhart v. 

United States, 577 U. S. 347, 350–352 (2016); id., at 362– 

369 (KAGAN, J., dissenting); Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 592 

U. S. ___, ___–___ (2021) (slip op., at 5–7); id., at ___–___ 

(ALITO, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 1–4). In 

ISDA, for example, some might wonder whether the recognition clause applies only to ANCs or whether it also applies

to the previously listed entities—“Indian tribe[s], band[s], 

nation[s],” etc. But it would be passing strange to suggest 

that the recognition clause applies to everything except the 

term immediately preceding it. A clause that leaps over its 

nearest referent to modify every other term would defy 

grammatical gravity and common sense alike. See, e.g., Fa-
Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 5 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

cebook, Inc., 592 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7); Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U. S. 335, 344, n. 4 

(2005).

Exempting ANCs from the recognition clause would be

curious for at least two further reasons. First, the reference 

to ANCs comes after the word “including.” No one disputes

that the recognition clause modifies “any Indian tribe, 

band, nation, or other organized group or community.” So 

if the ANCs are included within these previously listed

nouns—as the statute says they are—it’s hard to see how 

they might nonetheless evade the recognition clause. Second, in the proceedings below it was undisputed that the 

recognition clause modifies the term “Alaska Native village[s],” even as the ANCs argued that the clause does not 

modify the term “Alaska Native . . . regional or village corporation.” Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation v. 

Mnuchin, 976 F. 3d 15, 23 (CADC 2020); Brief for Federal

Petitioner 46. But to believe that, one would have to suppose the recognition clause skips over only half its nearest 

antecedent. How the clause might do that mystifies. See 

Facebook, 592 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6) (“It would be odd 

to apply the modifier . . . to only a portion of this cohesive 

preceding clause”).

At least initially, the Court accepts the obvious and concedes that the recognition clause modifies everything in the 

list that precedes it. Ante, at 8. But this leaves the Court 

in a bind. If the recognition clause applies to ANCs, then

ANCs must be “recognized” in order to receive funds. And 

“recognition” is a formal concept in Indian law: “Federal 

acknowledgement or recognition of an Indian group’s legal 

status as a tribe is a formal political act confirming the 

tribe’s existence as a distinct political society, and institutionalizing the government-to-government relationship between the tribe and the federal government.” 1 F. Cohen, 

Handbook of Federal Indian Law §3.02[3], pp. 133–134 (N.

Newton ed. 2012); see also id., §3.02[2], at 132–133. No one 
 

6 YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS 

 RESERVATION 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

contends that ANCs are recognized by the federal government in this sense. 

Admittedly, not every statutory use of the word “recognized” must carry the same meaning. See ante, at 14. But 

not only does ISDA arise in the field of Indian law where

the term “recognition” has long carried a particular meaning. The statute proceeds to refer to groups that are “recognized as eligible for the special programs and services 

provided by the United States to Indians because of their

status as Indians.” This full phrase is a mouthful, but it 

was a familiar one to Congress by the time it passed ISDA 

in 1975. In preceding decades, Congress used similar language in statute after statute granting and terminating formal federal recognition of certain tribes.1 All of which 

strongly suggests that ISDA’s recognition clause likewise 

refers to the sort of formal government-to-government

recognition that triggers eligibility for the full “panoply of 

benefits and services” the federal government provides to 

—————— 1 E.g., Act of Sept. 21, 1959, §5, 73 Stat. 593 (upon termination, the 

former Tribe and its members “shall not be entitled to any of the special

services performed by the United States for Indians because of their status as Indians”); Act of Aug. 23, 1954, §2, 68 Stat. 769 (same); Act of Aug.

18, 1958, §10(b), 72 Stat. 621 (same); Act of Sept. 5, 1962, §10, 76 Stat. 

431 (same); Act of Apr. 12, 1968, Pub. L. 90–287, §2, 82 Stat. 93 (“Nothing

in this Act shall make such tribe or its members eligible for any services

performed by the United States for Indians because of their status as 

Indians”); Menominee Restoration Act, Pub. L. 93–197, 87 Stat. 770 (An

Act “to reinstitute the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin as a federally recognized sovereign Indian tribe; and to restore to the Menominee 

Tribe of Wisconsin those Federal services furnished to American Indians 

because of their status as American Indians”). This sort of language also 

appeared in recognition statutes in the years immediately following 

ISDA. E.g., Indian Tribal Restoration Act, §4, 92 Stat. 247 (Tribes and 

their members “shall be entitled to participate in the programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as 

Indians”); Siletz Indian Tribe Restoration Act, §3(a), 91 Stat. 1415 (reinstating eligibility for “all Federal services and benefits furnished to federally recognized Indian tribes”); Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah Restoration Act, §3a, 94 Stat. 317 (same). 
Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 7 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

Indians. 1 Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 

§3.02[3], at 134.

There is more evidence too. When Congress passed 

ISDA, it sought to provide Indians “meaningful leadership 

roles” that are “crucial to the realization of selfgovernment.” 25 U. S. C. §5301. Accordingly, “tribes may 

enter into ‘self-determination contracts’ with federal agencies to take control of a variety of federally funded programs.” Menominee Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 577 U. S. 

250, 252 (2016); see also §5321. Handing over federal government programs to tribal governments in order to facilitate self-government is precisely the sort of government-togovernment activity that aligns with formal recognition. 

See also §§5384, 5385 (reflecting later amendments to 

ISDA) (instructing the Secretary to enter compacts and

funding agreements “with each Indian tribe participating

in self-governance in a manner consistent with the Federal 

Government’s trust responsibility, treaty obligations, and 

the government-to-government relationship between Indian tribes and the United States”).

The CARES Act itself offers still further clues. In the 

provision at issue before us, Congress appropriated money 

“for making payments to States, Tribal governments, and 

units of local government.” 42 U. S. C. §801(a)(1). Including tribal governments side-by-side with States and local 

governments reinforces the conclusion that Congress was 

speaking of government entities capable of having a

government-to-government relationship with the United

States. Recall, as well, that the CARES Act defines tribal 

governments as the “recognized governing body of an Indian Tribe.” §801(g)(5). ANCs, like most corporations, have 

a board of directors, 43 U. S. C. §1606(f ), and a corporate 

board may well be the governing body of an enterprise. But 

they do not govern any people or direct any government. 
 

8 YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS 

 RESERVATION 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

B 

While initially acknowledging that the recognition clause 

applies to ANCs, the Court interprets its terms differently.

Rather than understanding it as denoting a government-togovernment relationship, the Court says, we should look to 

its “plain meaning.” Ante, at 7. But even if we could somehow set aside everything we know about how the term is 

used in Indian law and the CARES Act itself, it’s far from 

clear what “plain meaning” the Court alludes to or how 

ANCs might fall within it.

First, consider the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe 

List Act of 1994 (List Act). The List Act instructs the Secretary of the Interior to keep a list of all federally recognized 

Indian tribes. It does so using language materially identical to that found in ISDA’s recognition clause: “The Secretary shall publish in the Federal Register a list of all Indian 

tribes which the Secretary recognizes to be eligible for the

special programs and services provided by the United

States to Indians because of their status as Indians.” 25 

U. S. C. §5131(a). No one before us thinks the Secretary of 

the Interior should list the ANCs as federally recognized

tribes. And given that, it is unclear how ANCs might count

as federally recognized tribes under ISDA. To be sure, the 

List Act came after ISDA. But the Court never attempts to 

explain how the plain meaning of nearly identical language 

in remarkably similar legal contexts might nevertheless 

differ. 

Second, on any account, ISDA requires an Indian tribe or 

group to be “recognized.” But what work does this term do 

on the Court’s interpretation? Without explanation, the 

Court asserts that ANCs are “‘recognized as eligible’ for 

ANCSA’s benefits” because they are “‘established pursuant 

to’ ANCSA.” Ante, at 8. But on this understanding, any 

group eligible for benefits would seem, on that basis alone,

to be “recognized” as eligible for those benefits. The Court’s 
 

Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 9 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

reading comes perilously close to rendering the term “recognized” surplusage: If ISDA really does capture any group 

merely “eligible” for federal benefits, why not just say that 

and avoid introducing a term with a particular and wellestablished meaning in federal Indian law? 

Third, even putting aside the recognition requirement,

ISDA says tribes must receive services from the United 

States “because of their status as Indians.” §5304(e). The 

Court says that ANSCA made ANCs eligible for settlement 

funds and lands because its shareholders are Alaska Natives. Ante, at 8. But is compensation provided to profitmaximizing corporations whose shareholders happen to be 

Alaska Natives (at least initially, see 43 U. S. C. 

§§1606(h)(1), 1629c) a benefit provided to Indians? And 

were ANSCA settlement funds provided to ANCs and their

shareholders because of their Indian status or simply because Congress wanted to resolve a land dispute regardless

of the claimants’ status? See §1601(b) (“[T]he settlement

should be accomplished . . . without establishing any permanent racially defined institutions, rights, privileges, or 

obligations . . . ”); but see §1626(e)(1) (“For all purposes of 

Federal law, a Native Corporation shall be considered to be 

a corporation owned and controlled by Natives . . . ”).

Again, the answers remain unclear. Ante, at 8–9. 

Finally, ISDA provides that tribes must be recognized as

eligible for “the special programs and services provided by 

the United States.” 25 U. S. C. §5304(e) (emphasis added). 

It is a small word to be sure, but “the” suggests the statute 

refers to a particular slate of programs and services—here 

the full panoply of federal Indian benefits—not just any special programs and services the government might supply.

See Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 

14) (“[G]rammar and usage establish that ‘the’ is ‘a function

word . . . indicat[ing] that a following noun or noun equivalent is definite or has been previously specified by context’” 

(quoting Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1294 
10 YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS 

 RESERVATION 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

(11th ed. 2005))). It’s undisputed too that, while ANSCA 

provided certain compensation to ANCs, Congress has

never made those entities “eligible for the full range of federal services and benefits available to [recognized] Indian

tribes.” Brief for Federal Petitioner 48. 

Rather than confront this last problem, the Court elides 

it. In its opinion “the special programs and services” becomes “federal Indian programs and services,” ante, at 10, 

14. Nor, even if one were to (re)interpret “the special programs” as “some special programs,” is it clear whether 

ANCSA qualifies. See ante, at 10. On what account is settling a dispute over land title a “program” or “service”? See 

43 U. S. C. §1626(a) (“The payments and grants authorized 

under this chapter constitute compensation for the extinguishment of claims to land, and shall not be deemed to 

substitute for any governmental programs otherwise available to the Native people of Alaska”). Beyond even that, 

ANCSA extended specific compensation to ANCs—money

and title—in exchange for settling land claims. ANCSA 

provided ANCs nothing in the way of health, education, economic, and social services of the sort that ISDA allows 

tribes to contract with the federal government to provide.

The Court’s reply creates another anomaly too. If receiving any federal money really is enough to satisfy the recognition clause, many other Indian groups might now suddenly qualify as tribes under the CARES Act, ISDA, and 

other federal statutes. A 2012 GAO study, for example,

identified approximately 400 nonfederally recognized tribes 

in the lower 48 States, of which 26 had recently received

direct funding from federal programs. GAO, Indian Issues: 

Federal Funding for Non-Federally Recognized Tribes

(GAO–12–348, Apr. 2012). This number does not include 

additional entities that may have received federal benefits 

in the form of loans, procurement contracts, tax expenditures, or amounts received by individual members. Id., at 

35. And still other groups may have federal rights secured 
 

 

Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 11 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

by treaty, which may exist even if the tribe is no longer recognized. Cf. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U. S. 

404, 412–413 (1968). How does the Court solve this problem? With an ipse dixit. See ante, at 11 (“[T]he Court does

not open the door to other Indian groups that have not been 

federally recognized becoming Indian tribes under ISDA”).

The Court’s “plain meaning” argument thus becomes transparent for what it is—a bare assertion that the recognition 

clause carries a different meaning when applied to ANCs 

than when applied to anyone else. 

III 

With its first theory facing so many problems, the Court

offers a backup. Now the Court suggests that ANCs qualify 

as tribes even if they fail to satisfy the recognition clause. 

Ante, at 18. Because ISDA’s opening list of entities specifically includes ANCs, the Court reasons, the recognition

clause must be read as inapplicable to them alone. Essentially, the Court quietly takes us full circle to the beginning

of the case—endorsing an admittedly ungrammatical reading of the statute in order to avoid what it calls the “implausible” result that ANCs might be included in ISDA’s first

clause only to be excluded by its second. Ante, at 20. 

But it is difficult to see anything “implausible” about that

result. When Congress adopted ANSCA in 1971, it “created 

over 200 new legal entities that overlapped with existing 

tribes and tribal nonprofit service organizations.” Brief for 

Professors and Historians as Amici Curiae 27. At that time, 

there was no List Act or statutory criteria for formal recognition. Instead, as the Court of Appeals ably documented,

confusion reigned about whether and which Alaskan entities ultimately might be recognized as tribes. 976 F. 3d, at 

18; see also Brief for Professors and Historians as Amici 

Curiae 28; Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 270– 

271 (1941). When Congress adopted ISDA just four years 

later, it sought to account for this uncertainty. The statute 
 

 

 

12 YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS 

 RESERVATION 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

listed three kinds of Alaskan entities: Alaska Native Villages, Village Corporations, and Regional Corporations. 

And the law did “meaningful work by extending ISDA’s definition of Indian tribes” to whichever among them “ultimately were recognized.” 976 F. 3d, at 26. It is perfectly

plausible to think Congress chose to account for uncertainty

in this way; Congress often adopts statutes whose application depends on future contingencies. E.g., Gundy v. United 

States, 588 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) (GORSUCH, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 11–12) (citing examples). 

Further aspects of Alaskan history confirm this understanding. Over time, the vast majority of Alaska Native

Villages went on to seek—and win—formal federal recognition as Indian tribes. See 86 Fed. Reg. 7557–7558 (2021); 

Brief for Respondent Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation et al. 23. (It’s this recognition which makes them 

indisputably eligible for CARES Act relief. See supra, at 2.) 

By the time it enacted ISDA, too, Congress had already authorized certain Alaska Native groups to organize based on 

“a common bond of occupation, or association, or residence.”

25 U. S. C. §5119. This standard, which did not require previous recognition as “bands or tribes,” was unique to 

Alaska. See ibid. And at least one such entity—the

Hydaburg Cooperative Association, organized around the 

fish industry—also went on to receive federal tribal recognition in the 1990s. 86 Fed. Reg. 7558; see also Brief for 

Respondent Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation 

et al. 35–36. Though short lived and not a full 

government-to-government political recognition, the Secretary of the Interior at one point even listed ANCs as “‘Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services 

From the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs,’” before 

eventually removing them. Ante, at 15–16. And in 1996, 

Congress considered a bill that would have “deemed” a particular ANC—the Cook Inlet Region, Inc.—“an Indian

tribal entity for the purpose of federal programs for which 
 

 

Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 13 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

Indians are eligible because of their status as Indians” and 

required that it be included on “any list that designates federally recognized Indian tribes.” H. R. 3662, 104th Cong., 

2d Sess., §121. Of course, the ANCs before us currently are 

not recognized as tribes. But all this history illustrates why

it is hardly implausible to suppose that a rational Congress 

in 1975 might have wished to account for the possibility

that some of the Alaskan entities listed in ISDA might go

on to win recognition.

The particular statutory structure Congress employed in

ISDA was perfectly ordinary too. Often Congress begins by 

listing a broad universe of potentially affected parties followed by limiting principles. Take this example from the 

CARES Act. Congress afforded benefits to certain “‘unit[s]

of local government,’” and defined that term to mean “a 

county, municipality, town, township, village, parish, borough, or other unit of general government below the State

level with a population that exceeds 500,000.” 42 U. S. C. 

§801(g)(2). The litigants tell us no parish in the country 

today has a population exceeding half a million. See Brief 

for Respondent Ute Tribe 31. Suppose they’re right. Is that 

any basis for throwing out the population limitation and 

suddenly including all parishes? Of course not. Once more, 

an opening list provides the full field of entities that may be 

eligible for relief and the concluding clause does the more 

precise work of winnowing it down. The clauses work in 

harmony, not at cross-purposes.2 

—————— 2To support its implausibility argument, the Court proposes a hypothetical advertisement for “ ‘50% off any meat, vegetable, or seafood dish,

including ceviche, which is cooked.’” Ante, at 20. The Court posits that 

any reasonable customer would expect a discount even on uncooked 

ceviche. It’s a colorful example, but one far afield from Indian law and 

the technical statutory definitions before us. Even taken on its own 

terms, too, the example is a bit underdone. A reasonable customer might

notice some tension in the advertisement, but there are many plausible

takeaways. Maybe the restaurant uses heat to cook its ceviche—many 

chefs “lightly poach lobster, shrimp, octopus or mussels before using 
14 YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS 

 RESERVATION 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

In defense of its implausibility argument, the Court submits any other reading would yield a redundancy. Unless 

ANCs are exempt from the recognition clause, the Court

suggests, Congress had no reason to mention them in the 

statute’s opening clause because they already “fit into one 

of the pre-existing ISDA categories,” like “‘tribe[s], band[s], 

nation[s], or other organized group[s] or communit[ies],’” 

ante, at 20–21 (quoting 25 U. S. C §5304(e)). 

But this much is hard to see too. Admittedly, illustrative

examples of more general terms are in some sense always

redundant. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 

U. S. 84, 89 (2001) (“[That] is meant simply to be illustrative, hence redundant”). But Congress often uses illustrative examples in its statutory work, and the practice is not 

entirely pointless. As this Court has explained, illustrative

examples can help orient affected parties and courts to Congress’s thinking, and often they serve to “remove any doubt”

about whether a particular listed entity is captured within

broader definitional terms. Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U. S. 214, 226 (2008); see also Federal Land Bank 

of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U. S. 95, 99–100 

(1941); A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 176–177 (2012). 

That much is certainly true here. If Congress had failed to

list ANCs in ISDA’s first clause, a dispute could have arisen 

over whether these corporate entities even qualify as “Indian . . . organized group[s] or communit[ies].” See Brief for 

Petitioners in No. 20–544, p. 5; supra, at 9 (citing 43

U. S. C. §1601(b)). 

—————— 

them in ceviche.” See Cordle, No-Cook Dishes, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 

July 17, 2013, p. L4. Maybe the restaurant meant to speak of ceviche as

“cooked” in the sense of “fish . . . ‘cooked’ by marinating it in an acidic 

dressing” like lime juice. See Bittman, Ceviche Without Fear, N. Y. 

Times, Aug. 14, 2002, p. F3. Or maybe the restaurant simply listed every

dish it makes, understanding some dishes would be excluded by the concluding “cooked” proviso. Even in the Court’s own hypothetical it is not

“implausible” to apply the modifier across the board. 
 

Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021) 15 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

Having said all this, my disagreement with the Court’s

“implausibility” argument is a relatively modest one. We 

agree that linguistic and historical context may provide 

useful interpretive guidance, and no one today seeks to suggest that judges may sanitize statutes in service of their 

own sensibilities about the rational and harmonious.3 Instead, our disagreement is simply about applying the plain 

meaning, grammar, context, and canons of construction to

the particular statutory terms before us. As I see it, an ordinary reader would understand that the recognition clause 

applies the same way to all Indian groups. And if that’s 

true, there’s just no way to read the text to include ANCs 

as “Tribal governments” for purposes of the CARES Act. 

* 

In my view, neither of the Court’s alternative theories for

reversal can do the work required of it. The recognition 

clause denotes the formal recognition between the federal 

government and a tribal government that triggers eligibility for the full panoply of special benefits given to Indian

tribes. Meanwhile, a fair reading of that clause indicates 

that it applies to ANCs. Accordingly, with respect, I would 

affirm. 

—————— 3The Court does not suggest, for example, that the reading of the statute it rejects would be “absurd.” Absurdity doctrine “does not license 

courts to improve statutes (or rules) substantively, so that their outcomes 

accord more closely” with “ ‘what we might think is the preferred result.’ ” 

Jaskolski v. Daniels, 427 F. 3d 456, 461 (CA7 2005) (Easterbrook, J. for

the court) (ellipsis omitted). At most, it may serve a linguistic function—

capturing circumstances in which a statute’s apparent meaning is so “unthinkable” that any reasonable reader would immediately (1) know that

it contains a “technical or ministerial” mistake, and (2) understand the 

correct meaning of the text. See Lexington Ins. Co. v. Precision Drilling 

Co., 830 F. 3d 1219, 1221–1223 (CA10 2016); A. Scalia & B. Garner, 

Reading Law 237–238 (2012). Anything more would threaten the separation of powers, undermine fair notice, and risk upsetting hard-earned 

legislative compromises. Ibid; see also Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 

587 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) (slip op., at 15–16).