(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2016 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

KOKESH v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 16–529. Argued April 18, 2017—Decided June 5, 2017 

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) possesses authority to investigate violations of federal securities laws

and to commence enforcement actions in federal district court if its 

investigations uncover evidence of wrongdoing. Initially, the Commission’s statutory authority in enforcement actions was limited to

seeking an injunction barring future violations. Beginning in the

1970’s, federal district courts, at the request of the Commission, began ordering disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings. Although Congress has since authorized the Commission to seek monetary civil penalties, the Commission has continued to seek 

disgorgement. This Court has held that 28 U. S. C. §2462, which establishes a 5-year limitations period for “an action, suit or proceeding 

for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture,” applies

when the Commission seeks monetary civil penalties. See Gabelli v. 

SEC, 568 U. S. 442, 454.

 In 2009, the Commission brought an enforcement action, alleging 

that petitioner Charles Kokesh violated various securities laws by

concealing the misappropriation of $34.9 million from four businessdevelopment companies from 1995 to 2009. The Commission sought

monetary civil penalties, disgorgement, and an injunction barring

Kokesh from future violations. After a jury found that Kokesh’s actions violated several securities laws, the District Court determined 

that §2462’s 5-year limitations period applied to the monetary civil 

penalties. With respect to the $34.9 million disgorgement judgment, 

however, the court concluded that §2462 did not apply because disgorgement is not a “penalty” within the meaning of the statute. The 

Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that disgorgement was neither a 
 

 

2 KOKESH v. SEC 

Syllabus 

penalty nor a forfeiture. 

Held: Because SEC disgorgement operates as a penalty under §2462,

any claim for disgorgement in an SEC enforcement action must be

commenced within five years of the date the claim accrued. Pp. 5–11.

(a) The definition of “penalty” as a “punishment, whether corporal

or pecuniary, imposed and enforced by the State, for a crime or offen[s]e against its laws,” Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 667, 

gives rise to two principles. First, whether a sanction represents a 

penalty turns in part on “whether the wrong sought to be redressed is

a wrong to the public, or a wrong to the individual.” Id., at 668. Second, a pecuniary sanction operates as a penalty if it is sought “for the

purpose of punishment, and to deter others from offending in like 

manner” rather than to compensate victims. Ibid. This Court has 

applied these principles in construing the term “penalty,” holding, 

e.g., that a statute providing a compensatory remedy for a private 

wrong did not impose a “penalty,” Brady v. Daly, 175 U. S. 148, 154. 

Pp. 5–7.

(b) The application of these principles here readily demonstrates

that SEC disgorgement constitutes a penalty within the meaning of 

§2462. First, SEC disgorgement is imposed by the courts as a consequence for violating public laws, i.e., a violation committed against

the United States rather than an aggrieved individual. Second, SEC 

disgorgement is imposed for punitive purposes. Sanctions imposed

for the purpose of deterring infractions of public laws are inherently 

punitive because “deterrence [is] not [a] legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectiv[e].” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539, n. 20. Finally, SEC disgorgement is often not compensatory. Disgorged profits are paid to the district courts, which have discretion to determine 

how the money will be distributed. They may distribute the funds to 

victims, but no statute commands them to do so. When an individual 

is made to pay a noncompensatory sanction to the government as a

consequence of a legal violation, the payment operates as a penalty. 

See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U. S. 395, 402. Pp. 7–9.

(c) The Government responds that SEC disgorgement is not punitive but a remedial sanction that operates to restore the status quo. 

It is not clear, however, that disgorgement simply returns the defendant to the place he would have occupied had he not broken the 

law. It sometimes exceeds the profits gained as a result of the violation. And, as demonstrated here, SEC disgorgement may be ordered 

without consideration of a defendant’s expenses that reduced the 

amount of illegal profit. In such cases, disgorgement does not simply

restore the status quo; it leaves the defendant worse off and is therefore punitive. Although disgorgement may serve compensatory goals

in some cases, “sanctions frequently serve more than one purpose.” 
 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 

Syllabus 

Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602, 610. Because they “go beyond

compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers” as a consequence of violating public laws, Gabelli, 568 U. S., at 

451–452, disgorgement orders represent a penalty and fall within

§2462’s 5-year limitations period. Pp. 9–11. 

834 F. 3d 1158, reversed. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 16–529 

CHARLES R. KOKESH, PETITIONER v. SECURITIES
 

AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
 

[June 5, 2017]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 

A 5-year statute of limitations applies to any “action, 

suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, 

penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise.” 28 U. S. C. 

§2462. This case presents the question whether §2462

applies to claims for disgorgement imposed as a sanction

for violating a federal securities law. The Court holds that 

it does. Disgorgement in the securities-enforcement context is a “penalty” within the meaning of §2462, and so 

disgorgement actions must be commenced within five

years of the date the claim accrues. 

I 

A 

After rampant abuses in the securities industry led to

the 1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression,

Congress enacted a series of laws to ensure that “the

highest ethical standards prevail in every facet of the

securities industry.”1 SEC v. Capital Gains Research 

—————— 

1Each of these statutes—the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. §77a 

et seq.; the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §78a et seq.; the 
 

 

2 KOKESH v. SEC 

Opinion of the Court 

Bureau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 186–187 (1963) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The second in the series—the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934—established the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) to 

enforce federal securities laws. Congress granted the Commission power to prescribe “‘rules and regulations . . . as 

necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 

protection of investors.’” Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 

Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 728 (1975). In addition to 

rulemaking, Congress vested the Commission with “broad

authority to conduct investigations into possible violations

of the federal securities laws.” SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, 

Inc., 467 U. S. 735, 741 (1984). If an investigation uncovers evidence of wrongdoing, the Commission may initiate

enforcement actions in federal district court. 

Initially, the only statutory remedy available to the SEC 

in an enforcement action was an injunction barring future

violations of securities laws. See 1 T. Hazen, Law of Securities Regulation §1:37 (7th ed., rev. 2016). In the absence 

of statutory authorization for monetary remedies, the 

Commission urged courts to order disgorgement as an

exercise of their “inherent equity power to grant relief 

ancillary to an injunction.” SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur 

Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 91 (SDNY 1970), aff ’d in part and 

rev’d in part, 446 F. 2d 1301 (CA2 1971). Generally, disgorgement is a form of “[r]estitution measured by the

defendant’s wrongful gain.” Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment §51, Comment a, p. 204 

—————— 

Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U. S. C. §79 et seq.; the 

Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U. S. C. §77aaa et seq.; the Investment 

Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. §80a–1 et seq.; and the Investment 

Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. §80b–1 et seq.—serves the “fundamental purpose” of “substitut[ing] a philosophy of full disclosure for the

philosophy of caveat emptor and thus . . . achiev[ing] a high standard of 

business ethics in the securities industry.” SEC v. Capital Gains 

Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 186 (1963). 
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

(2010) (Restatement (Third)). Disgorgement requires that 

the defendant give up “those gains . . . properly attributable to the defendant’s interference with the claimant’s 

legally protected rights.” Ibid. Beginning in the 1970’s,

courts ordered disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings in order to “deprive . . . defendants of their profits in

order to remove any monetary reward for violating” securities laws and to “protect the investing public by providing an effective deterrent to future violations.” Texas 

Gulf, 312 F. Supp., at 92. 

In 1990, as part of the Securities Enforcement Remedies

and Penny Stock Reform Act, Congress authorized the

Commission to seek monetary civil penalties. 104 Stat. 

932, codified at 15 U. S. C. §77t(d). The Act left the Commission with a full panoply of enforcement tools: It may 

promulgate rules, investigate violations of those rules and 

the securities laws generally, and seek monetary penalties and injunctive relief for those violations. In the 

years since the Act, however, the Commission has continued its practice of seeking disgorgement in enforcement

proceedings.

This Court has already held that the 5-year statute of

limitations set forth in 28 U. S. C. §2462 applies when the 

Commission seeks statutory monetary penalties. See 

Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U. S. 442, 454 (2013). The question

here is whether §2462, which applies to any “action, suit 

or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty,

or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise,” also applies when 

the SEC seeks disgorgement. 

B 

Charles Kokesh owned two investment-adviser firms 

that provided investment advice to business-development 

companies. In late 2009, the Commission commenced an 

enforcement action in Federal District Court alleging that

between 1995 and 2009, Kokesh, through his firms, mis-
 

 

4 KOKESH v. SEC 

Opinion of the Court 

appropriated $34.9 million from four of those development 

companies. The Commission further alleged that, in order

to conceal the misappropriation, Kokesh caused the filing

of false and misleading SEC reports and proxy statements. 

The Commission sought civil monetary penalties, disgorgement, and an injunction barring Kokesh from violating securities laws in the future.

After a 5-day trial, a jury found that Kokesh’s actions

violated the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. 

§80a–36; the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C.

§§80b–5, 80b–6; and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,

15 U. S. C. §§78m, 78n. The District Court then turned to 

the task of imposing penalties sought by the Commission. 

As to the civil monetary penalties, the District Court

determined that §2462’s 5-year limitations period precluded any penalties for misappropriation occurring prior to

October 27, 2004—that is, five years prior to the date the 

Commission filed the complaint. App. to Pet. for Cert. 

26a. The court ordered Kokesh to pay a civil penalty of 

$2,354,593, which represented “the amount of funds that

[Kokesh] himself received during the limitations period.” 

Id., at 31a–32a. Regarding the Commission’s request for a

$34.9 million disgorgement judgment—$29.9 million of 

which resulted from violations outside the limitations 

period—the court agreed with the Commission that because disgorgement is not a “penalty” within the meaning 

of §2462, no limitations period applied. The court therefore entered a disgorgement judgment in the amount of

$34.9 million and ordered Kokesh to pay an additional 

$18.1 million in prejudgment interest. 

The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 

834 F. 3d 1158 (2016). It agreed with the District Court 

that disgorgement is not a penalty, and further found that 

disgorgement is not a forfeiture. Id., at 1164–1167. The 

court thus concluded that the statute of limitations in 

§2462 does not apply to SEC disgorgement claims. 
 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

This Court granted certiorari, 580 U. S. ___ (2017), to

resolve disagreement among the Circuits over whether 

disgorgement claims in SEC proceedings are subject to the 

5-year limitations period of §2462.2 

II 

Statutes of limitations “se[t] a fixed date when exposure

to the specified Government enforcement efforts en[d].” 

Gabelli, 568 U. S., at 448. Such limits are “‘vital to the 

welfare of society’” and rest on the principle that “‘even 

wrongdoers are entitled to assume that their sins may be

forgotten.’” Id., at 449. The statute of limitations at issue 

here—28 U. S. C. §2462—finds its roots in a law enacted

nearly two centuries ago. 568 U. S., at 445. In its current 

form, §2462 establishes a 5-year limitations period for “an

action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil 

fine, penalty, or forfeiture.” This limitations period applies here if SEC disgorgement qualifies as either a fine, 

penalty, or forfeiture. We hold that SEC disgorgement 

constitutes a penalty.3 

A 

A “penalty” is a “punishment, whether corporal or pecuniary, imposed and enforced by the State, for a crime or

offen[s]e against its laws.” Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 

657, 667 (1892). This definition gives rise to two principles. First, whether a sanction represents a penalty turns 

—————— 

2Compare SEC v. Graham, 823 F. 3d 1357, 1363 (CA11 2016) (holding that §2462 applies to SEC disgorgement claims), with Riordan v. 

SEC, 627 F. 3d 1230, 1234 (CADC 2010) (holding that §2462 does not 

apply to SEC disgorgement claims). 3Nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as an opinion on 

whether courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings or on whether courts have properly applied 

disgorgement principles in this context The sole question presented in 

this case is whether disgorgement, as applied in SEC enforcement 

actions, is subject to §2462’s limitations period. 
 

 

6 KOKESH v. SEC 

Opinion of the Court 

in part on “whether the wrong sought to be redressed is a

wrong to the public, or a wrong to the individual.” Id., at 

668. Although statutes creating private causes of action 

against wrongdoers may appear—or even be labeled— 

penal, in many cases “neither the liability imposed nor the 

remedy given is strictly penal.” Id., at 667. This is because “[p]enal laws, strictly and properly, are those imposing punishment for an offense committed against the 

State.” Ibid. Second, a pecuniary sanction operates as a

penalty only if it is sought “for the purpose of punishment,

and to deter others from offending in like manner”—as

opposed to compensating a victim for his loss. Id., at 668. 

The Court has applied these principles in construing the

term “penalty.” In Brady v. Daly, 175 U. S. 148 (1899), for 

example, a playwright sued a defendant in Federal Circuit 

Court under a statute providing that copyright infringers

“‘shall be liable for damages . . . not less than one hundred 

dollars for the first [act of infringement], and fifty dollars

for every subsequent performance, as to the court shall 

appear to be just.’” Id., at 153. The defendant argued 

that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction on the ground

that a separate statute vested district courts with exclusive jurisdiction over actions “to recover a penalty.” Id., at 

152. To determine whether the statutory damages represented a penalty, this Court noted first that the statute 

provided “for a recovery of damages for an act which violates the rights of the plaintiff, and gives the right of

action solely to him” rather than the public generally, and 

second, that “the whole recovery is given to the proprietor,

and the statute does not provide for a recovery by any 

other person.” Id., at 154, 156. By providing a compensatory remedy for a private wrong, the Court held, the statute did not impose a “penalty.” Id., at 154. 

Similarly, in construing the statutory ancestor of §2462, 

the Court utilized the same principles. In Meeker v. 

Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U. S. 412, 421–422 (1915), the 
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

Interstate Commerce Commission, a now-defunct federal 

agency charged with regulating railroads, ordered a railroad company to refund and pay damages to a shipping

company for excessive shipping rates. The railroad company argued that the action was barred by Rev. Stat.

§1047, Comp. Stat. 1913, §1712 (now 28 U. S. C. §2462), 

which imposed a 5-year limitations period upon any “‘suit 

or prosecution for a penalty or forfeiture, pecuniary or

otherwise, accruing under the laws of the United States.’” 

236 U. S., at 423. The Court rejected that argument, 

reasoning that “the words ‘penalty or forfeiture’ in [the

statute] refer to something imposed in a punitive way for 

an infraction of a public law.” Ibid. A penalty, the Court 

held, does “not include a liability imposed [solely] for the

purpose of redressing a private injury.” Ibid. Because the 

liability imposed was compensatory and paid entirely to a 

private plaintiff, it was not a “penalty” within the meaning

of the statute of limitations. Ibid.; see also Gabelli, 568 

U. S., at 451–452 (“[P]enalties” in the context of §2462 “go

beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label

defendants wrongdoers”). 

B 

Application of the foregoing principles readily demonstrates that SEC disgorgement constitutes a penalty

within the meaning of §2462.

First, SEC disgorgement is imposed by the courts as a

consequence for violating what we described in Meeker as 

public laws. The violation for which the remedy is sought

is committed against the United States rather than an

aggrieved individual—this is why, for example, a securitiesenforcement action may proceed even if victims do not 

support or are not parties to the prosecution. As the Government concedes, “[w]hen the SEC seeks disgorgement, it 

acts in the public interest, to remedy harm to the public at

large, rather than standing in the shoes of particular 
 

8 KOKESH v. SEC 

Opinion of the Court 

injured parties.” Brief for United States 22. Courts agree. 

See, e.g., SEC v. Rind, 991 F. 2d 1486, 1491 (CA9 1993) 

(“[D]isgorgement actions further the Commission’s public 

policy mission of protecting investors and safeguarding the 

integrity of the markets”); SEC v. Teo, 746 F. 3d 90, 102 

(CA3 2014) (“[T]he SEC pursues [disgorgement] ‘independent of the claims of individual investors’” in order to 

“‘promot[e] economic and social policies’”). 

Second, SEC disgorgement is imposed for punitive 

purposes. In Texas Gulf—one of the first cases requiring 

disgorgement in SEC proceedings—the court emphasized 

the need “to deprive the defendants of their profits in 

order to . . . protect the investing public by providing an 

effective deterrent to future violations.” 312 F. Supp., at 

92. In the years since, it has become clear that deterrence 

is not simply an incidental effect of disgorgement. Rather, 

courts have consistently held that “[t]he primary purpose 

of disgorgement orders is to deter violations of the securities laws by depriving violators of their ill-gotten gains.” 

SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F. 3d 170, 175 (CA2 1997); 

see also SEC v. First Jersey Securities, Inc., 101 F. 3d 

1450, 1474 (CA2 1996) (“The primary purpose of disgorgement as a remedy for violation of the securities laws

is to deprive violators of their ill-gotten gains, thereby

effectuating the deterrence objectives of those laws”); 

Rind, 991 F. 2d, at 1491 (“‘The deterrent effect of [an SEC] 

enforcement action would be greatly undermined if securities law violators were not required to disgorge illicit 

profits’”). Sanctions imposed for the purpose of deterring 

infractions of public laws are inherently punitive because 

“deterrence [is] not [a] legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectiv[e].” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539, n. 20 

(1979); see also United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U. S. 321, 

329 (1998) (“Deterrence . . . has traditionally been viewed 

as a goal of punishment”). 

Finally, in many cases, SEC disgorgement is not com-
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

pensatory. As courts and the Government have employed

the remedy, disgorged profits are paid to the district court,

and it is “within the court’s discretion to determine how 

and to whom the money will be distributed.” Fischbach 

Corp., 133 F. 3d, at 175. Courts have required disgorgement “regardless of whether the disgorged funds will be

paid to such investors as restitution.” Id., at 176; see id., 

at 175 (“Although disgorged funds may often go to compensate securities fraud victims for their losses, such

compensation is a distinctly secondary goal”). Some disgorged funds are paid to victims; other funds are dispersed 

to the United States Treasury. See, e.g., id., at 171 (affirming distribution of disgorged funds to Treasury where 

“no party before the court was entitled to the funds and 

. . . the persons who might have equitable claims were too

dispersed for feasible identification and payment”); SEC v. 

Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397, 1404–1405 (CD Cal. 1983) (ordering disgorgement and directing trustee to disperse 

funds to victims if “feasible” and to disperse any remaining money to the Treasury). Even though district courts

may distribute the funds to the victims, they have not

identified any statutory command that they do so. When 

an individual is made to pay a noncompensatory sanction

to the Government as a consequence of a legal violation,

the payment operates as a penalty. See Porter v. Warner 

Holding Co., 328 U. S. 395, 402 (1946) (distinguishing 

between restitution paid to an aggrieved party and penalties paid to the Government). 

SEC disgorgement thus bears all the hallmarks of a

penalty: It is imposed as a consequence of violating a

public law and it is intended to deter, not to compensate. 

The 5-year statute of limitations in §2462 therefore applies when the SEC seeks disgorgement. 

C 

The Government’s primary response to all of this is that 
 

 

 

10 KOKESH v. SEC 

Opinion of the Court 

SEC disgorgement is not punitive but “remedial” in that it

“lessen[s] the effects of a violation” by “‘restor[ing] the 

status quo.’” Brief for Respondent 17. As an initial matter, it is not clear that disgorgement, as courts have applied it in the SEC enforcement context, simply returns 

the defendant to the place he would have occupied had he

not broken the law. SEC disgorgement sometimes exceeds

the profits gained as a result of the violation. Thus, for 

example, “an insider trader may be ordered to disgorge not

only the unlawful gains that accrue to the wrongdoer

directly, but also the benefit that accrues to third parties

whose gains can be attributed to the wrongdoer’s conduct.” 

SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F. 3d 296, 302 (CA2 2014). Individuals who illegally provide confidential trading information have been forced to disgorge profits gained by 

individuals who received and traded based on that information—even though they never received any profits. 

Ibid; see also SEC v. Warde, 151 F. 3d 42, 49 (CA2 1998) 

(“A tippee’s gains are attributable to the tipper, regardless

whether benefit accrues to the tipper”); SEC v. Clark, 915 

F. 2d 439, 454 (CA9 1990) (“[I]t is well settled that a tipper 

can be required to disgorge his tippees’ profits”). And, as 

demonstrated by this case, SEC disgorgement sometimes 

is ordered without consideration of a defendant’s expenses

that reduced the amount of illegal profit. App. to Pet. for 

Cert. 43a; see Restatement (Third) §51, Comment h, at 

216 (“As a general rule, the defendant is entitled to a 

deduction for all marginal costs incurred in producing the 

revenues that are subject to disgorgement. Denial of an 

otherwise appropriate deduction, by making the defendant 

liable in excess of net gains, results in a punitive sanction

that the law of restitution normally attempts to avoid”). 

In such cases, disgorgement does not simply restore the 

status quo; it leaves the defendant worse off. The justification for this practice given by the court below demonstrates that disgorgement in this context is a punitive, 
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

rather than a remedial, sanction: Disgorgement, that court 

explained, is intended not only to “prevent the wrongdoer’s

unjust enrichment” but also “to deter others’ violations of 

the securities laws.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a.

True, disgorgement serves compensatory goals in some 

cases; however, we have emphasized “the fact that sanctions frequently serve more than one purpose.” Austin v. 

United States, 509 U. S. 602, 610 (1993). “‘A civil sanction 

that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving 

either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as 

we have come to understand the term.’” Id., at 621; cf. 

Bajakajian, 524 U. S., at 331, n. 6 (“[A] modern statutory 

forfeiture is a ‘fine’ for Eighth Amendment purposes if it

constitutes punishment even in part”). Because disgorgement orders “go beyond compensation, are intended to

punish, and label defendants wrongdoers” as a consequence of violating public laws, Gabelli, 568 U. S., at 451– 

452, they represent a penalty and thus fall within the 5-

year statute of limitations of §2462. 

III 

Disgorgement, as it is applied in SEC enforcement

proceedings, operates as a penalty under §2462. Accordingly, any claim for disgorgement in an SEC enforcement 

action must be commenced within five years of the date

the claim accrued. 

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 

Circuit is reversed. 

It is so ordered.