In the

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 21-1367 

SYLVIA LESZANCZUK, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

CARRINGTON MORTGAGE SERVICES, LLC, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 19-cv-3038 — Robert M. Dow Jr., Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED OCTOBER 29, 2021 — DECIDED DECEMBER 28, 2021 

____________________ 

Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and KANNE and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. 

KANNE, Circuit Judge. After Sylvia Leszanczuk defaulted 

on her mortgage, her mortgage servicer, Carrington Mortgage 

Services, inspected her residence and charged her a $20.00 fee 

for the inspection. Leszanczuk brought a putative class action 

against Carrington, alleging that the fee constituted a breach 

of her mortgage contract under Illinois law and violated the 

Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices 
2 No. 21-1367 

Act (“ICFA”). The district court dismissed her second 

amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state plausible claims. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

On January 29, 2010, Leszanczuk executed a mortgage

contract to secure a loan on her Illinois residential property. 

The mortgage was insured by the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). 

After Carrington acquired the mortgage and took over 

loan servicing, Leszanczuk contacted Carrington by phone in 

December 2016 to make her December mortgage payment. 

Leszanczuk’s asserts that during this conversation, Carrington told her that her account was not yet set up in their system 

and they had no way to receive a payment from her at that 

time, and then assured her that her account was in a “grace 

period” and she did not have to make payments until her account was set up. Nonetheless, at some point in early 2017 

Carrington found Leszanczuk to be in default on the mortgage by failing to make required payments. (These facts do

not affect the outcome of the case. At oral argument, 

Leszanczuk’s counsel affirmed that, for purposes of her 

claims, it does not matter what the reason for the default was.) 

Carrington then conducted a visual drive-by inspection of 

Leszanczuk’s property. Carrington charged Leszanczuk 

$20.00 for the inspection and disclosed the fee to Leszanczuk 

in her March 2017 monthly statement. According to 

Leszanczuk, Carrington knew or should have known that she 

occupied her property because (1) they had spoken on the

phone prior to the inspection about setting up the loan in 
No. 21-1367 3

Carrington’s system and (2) Carrington would mail monthly 

mortgage statements to Leszanczuk at the property’s address. 

Despite alleging that she had an earlier phone conversation 

with Carrington, Leszanczuk also alleged that Carrington 

made no attempt to contact her by phone prior to the driveby inspection. 

Leszanczuk sued Carrington, bringing claims for breach 

of the mortgage contract and for violations of the ICFA, 815 

Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/2, on behalf of putative nationwide and 

Illinois classes. In the operative second amended complaint, 

Leszanczuk alleged that Carrington breached her mortgage 

contract by charging her the $20.00 inspection fee when it 

“knew, or should have known,” that she occupied her property, in purported violation of a HUD regulation, 24 C.F.R. § 

203.377 (2021), which Leszanczuk claimed limits the fees Carrington may charge under the contract and is incorporated 

into her contract. Leszanczuk also alleged that charging the 

inspection fee was an unfair practice under the ICFA. 

The district court granted Carrington’s motion to dismiss 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and dismissed 

both of Leszanczuk’s claims with prejudice. The courtrejected 

Leszanczuk’s interpretation of her mortgage contract and 

found that the fees Carrington may charge under the contract 

are not limited by § 203.377. The court also concluded that 

charging Leszanczuk the $20.00 inspection fee was not an unfair practice because it did not offend public policy and was 

not oppressive. Noting that Leszanczuk had not cured the defects the court identified in earlier complaints and that further 

amendment would therefore be futile, the court denied

Leszanczuk leave to amend. Leszanczuk now appeals. 
4 No. 21-1367 

II. ANALYSIS

Leszanczuk maintains that she has stated claims for 

breach of contract and for violations of the ICFA. We review

de novo the district court’s grant of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss, accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true 

and drawing all reasonable inferences in Leszanczuk’s favor. 

See Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir. 2016). 

A. Breach-of-Contract Claim

Leszanczuk argues that her mortgage contract did not permit Carrington to charge her the $20.00 inspection fee. In pertinent part, the mortgage contract provides as follows: 

• Paragraph 5, titled “Occupancy, Preservation, 

Maintenance and Protection of the Property; Borrower’s Loan Application; Leaseholds,” provides: 

“Lender may inspect the Property if the Property 

is vacant or abandoned or the loan is in default. 

Lender may take reasonable action to protect and 

preserve such vacant or abandoned Property.” 

• Paragraph 7, titled “Charges to Borrower and Protection of Lender’s Rights in the Property,” provides that, if the borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in the contract, 

then “Lender may do and pay whatever is necessary to protect the value of the Property and 

Lender’s rights in the Property.” It further provides, “Any amounts disbursed by Lender under 

this paragraph shall become an additional debt of 

Borrower and be secured by this Security Instrument.” 
No. 21-1367 5

• Paragraph 8, titled “Fees,” states in its entirety: 

“Lender may collect fees and charges authorized 

by the Secretary [of HUD].” 

Leszanczuk contends that Paragraph 8 incorporates 

§ 203.377 and thereby limits the fees the lender may collect 

from the borrower to those authorized by that regulation. 

That regulation provides that the lender is responsible for 

monthly inspections of a property after the borrower has defaulted on the loan and vacated the property. 24 C.F.R. 

§ 203.377. It further provides that, once a mortgage payment 

is forty-five days late and the lender has been unable to reach 

the borrower by phone, the lender is responsible for a visual 

inspection of the property to determine whether it is vacant. 

Id. According to Leszanczuk, § 203.377 has been interpreted 

to mean that if a property is known to be occupied, no inspections are required by HUD or authorized for reimbursement. 

Therefore, she continues, because she alleged that Carrington 

knew or should have known that she was occupying her 

property, the mortgage contract, incorporating § 203.377, prohibited Carrington from charging her the inspection fee. 

Whether § 203.377 means what Leszanczuk says it means 

is discussed in further depth below as that issue relates to 

Leszanczuk’s ICFA claim. For purposes of her breach-of-contract claim, suffice to say that the mortgage contract does not 

evince an intent to incorporate § 203.377 or to prohibit inspection fees. “Under Illinois law, a document is incorporated by 

reference into the parties’ contract only if the parties intended 

its incorporation.” 188 LLC v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 300 F.3d 730, 

736 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Wilson v. Wilson, 577 N.E.2d 1323, 

1329 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)). Mere reference to “HUD regulations 

fall[s] short of the showing necessary to demonstrate that the 
6 No. 21-1367 

parties intended to incorporate the regulations, in their entirety, into their mortgage agreement.” Hayes v. M & T Mortg. 

Corp., 906 N.E.2d 638, 641 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). Leszanczuk fails 

to identify specific contractual language that shows an intent 

to completely adopt HUD regulations. Paragraph 8’s reference to “fees and charges authorized by the Secretary” does 

not demonstrate an intent to make the relevant regulations 

enforceable under the mortgage contract, let alone § 203.377, 

which does not even mention fees. See Hayes, 906 N.E.2d at 

641. 

At bottom, the plain language of the contract does not prohibit Carrington from charging inspection fees. See Gallagher 

v. Lenart, 874 N.E.2d 43, 58 (Ill. 2007) (“A court must initially 

look to the language of a contract alone, as the language, 

given its plain and ordinary meaning, is the best indication of 

the parties’ intent.”). The mortgage contract expressly allows

Carrington’s charge of the inspection fee as a “necessary” expenditure to protect the value of the property after 

Leszanczuk’s default. Paragraph 5 permits the lender to inspect the property “if ... the loan is in default,” while Paragraph 7 authorizes the lender to “pay whatever is necessary 

to protect the value of the Property” if the borrower fails to 

keep her end of the bargain and to make those expenditures 

“an additional debt of Borrower.” Leszanczuk points out that 

the contract is silent on whether the lender may collect fees 

for inspecting properties that are owner-occupied, but there 

is nothing prohibiting it from doing so, either. 

Leszanczuk does not argue that the inspection fee fails to

qualify as a “necessary” expenditure under the plain language of Paragraphs 5 and 7; rather, she contends that Paragraph 8 “defines the contours of ‘necessary’ described in 
No. 21-1367 7

Paragraph 7.” (Appellant’s Br. at 22.) But contrary to 

Leszanczuk’s contention, Paragraph 8’s permissive language 

does not operate to “explicitly” restrict the authority granted 

by Paragraphs 5 and 7. (Id. at 11.) Paragraph 8 simply states 

that the lender “may collect fees and charges authorized by 

the Secretary.” Given its plain and ordinary meaning, this language does not indicate that the lender can collect only fees 

and charges authorized by the Secretary and is barred from 

collecting unauthorized fees. Rather, it conveys that the 

lender may, but does not have to, collect additional fees that 

are permitted by the Secretary. A comparison to Paragraph 9 

makes Paragraph 8’s meaning even clearer. Section (a) of Paragraph 9 provides, “Lender may, except as limited by regulations issued by the Secretary, in the case of payment defaults, 

require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this 

Security Instrument.” As the district court correctly observed, 

Paragraph 9, unlike Paragraph 8, “explicitly limits [Carrington’s] actions by reference to HUD regulations,” and “[i]f the 

parties intended Paragraph 8 to impose similar limitations, 

they could have used similar language.” 

Leszanczuk offers several arguments in favor of her preferred interpretation, but all are unavailing. Leszanczuk cites 

a number of lower court decisions to support her argument 

that her mortgage contract should be read to incorporate 

HUD regulations. See, e.g., Mathews v. PHH Mortg. Corp., No. 

20-CV-00200-JFH-JFJ, 2020 WL 5260813, at *1 (N.D. Okla. 

Sept. 3, 2020); In re Ruiz, 501 B.R. 76 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2013). But 

these cases, analyzing different contracts mostly under other 

states’ laws, do not persuade us to conclude that this contract 

should be read to incorporate § 203.377 under Illinois law,

where the contract does not evince an intent to do so. 
8 No. 21-1367 

Leszanczuk takes issue with the district court’s reliance on 

Majchrowski v. Norwest Mortg., Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Ill. 

1998), abrogation recognized on other grounds by Cement-Lock v. 

Gas Tech. Inst., No. 05 C 0018, 2006 WL 3147700, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 

Nov. 1, 2006), and Walker v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 121 

Cal. Rptr. 2d 79 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2002), to conclude that 

Paragraphs 5 and 7 authorize the collection of inspection fees. 

She maintains that those cases addressed conventional mortgages that are not insured by the FHA and therefore “do not 

involve HUD regulations and do not contain the equivalent 

of Paragraph 8 of the Mortgage at issue here.” (Appellant’s Br. 

at 19.) But, as discussed, and as the district court explained, 

FHA-insured mortgages do not automatically incorporate 

HUD regulations and Paragraph 8 does not limit the fees that 

may be charged. Thus, these cases, interpreting contractual 

language which is substantially similar to that in Paragraphs 

5 and 7, are persuasive. They support the interpretation of 

Paragraphs 5 and 7 as authorizing the inspection fee at issue. 

Leszanczuk contends that the district court’s reading of 

the contract renders Paragraph 8 superfluous. See Land of Lincoln Goodwill Indus., Inc. v. PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 762 F.3d 

673, 679 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[W]henever possible we attempt to 

give meaning to every provision of the contract and avoid a 

construction that would render a provision superfluous.”). 

Leszanczuk explains that, if the contract were read to permit 

charges whether or not they are authorized by HUD, Paragraph 8—which, according to Leszanczuk, permits only 

charges authorized by HUD—would be rendered superfluous. Again, however, Leszanczuk’s interpretation of Paragraph 8 is incorrect. Paragraph 8 is permissive and does not 

limit the fees Carrington may charge to those authorized by 

HUD. 
No. 21-1367 9

Read properly, Paragraph 8 still serves a purpose in the 

contract because, as Carrington explains, it “authorizes an entire category of ‘additional charges’ not otherwise permitted 

by Paragraphs 5 and 7, i.e., charges that are authorized by the 

Secretary.” (Appellee’s Br. at 13.) Indeed, it is Leszanczuk’s 

interpretation that would render a contractual provision superfluous—if Paragraph 8 were read to “define[] the contours 

of” Paragraph 7 and limit the fees that may be charged thereunder (Appellant’s Br. at 22), then Paragraph 7 would serve 

no purpose. We cannot endorse such an interpretation. 

Finally, Leszanczuk urges us to apply canons of construction to reach her preferred interpretation. But, as explained, 

the contract clearly and unambiguously permits the assessment of inspection fees against the borrower. While 

Leszanczuk maintains her interpretation is “reasonable,” 

demonstrating that the mortgage is “ambiguous” (Appellant’s Br. at 24), “[a] contract is not rendered ambiguous 

merely because the parties disagree on its meaning,” Cent. Ill. 

Light Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 821 N.E.2d 206, 214 (Ill. 2004). Accordingly, because the mortgage contract is unambiguous, we 

“need not utilize canons of construction ... and should interpret the words with their popularly understood meaning.” 

City of Chicago v. Elm State Prop. LLC, 69 N.E.3d 390, 395 (Ill. 

App. Ct. 2016). 

As Carrington aptly observes, Leszanczuk appears to 

“begin[] with the legal conclusion that the HUD [r]egulation 

is incorporated and then searches for a supporting rationale.” 

(Appellee’s Br. at 25.) But the district court correctly concluded that § 203.377 is not incorporated in the contract and 

that the contract expressly permits the inspection fee at issue. 
10 No. 21-1367 

Leszanczuk has failed to state a claim for breach of her mortgage contract. 

B. ICFA Claim

Leszanczuk argues that charging her the inspection fee 

was an unfair practice, in violation of the ICFA. See Siegel v. 

Shell Oil Co., 612 F.3d 932, 934 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The elements 

of a claim under the ICFA are: (1) a deceptive or unfair act or 

practice by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intent that the 

plaintiff rely on the deceptive or unfair practice; and (3) the 

unfair or deceptive practice occurred during a course of conduct involving trade or commerce.”). To determine whether a 

practice is unfair, we consider “(1) whether the practice offends public policy; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; [and] (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers.” Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit 

Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 961 (Ill. 2002). “All three criteria do not 

need to be satisfied to support a finding of unfairness. A practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it meets one 

of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets all three.” 

Id. (quoting Cheshire Mortg. Serv., Inc. v. Montes, 612 A.2d 1130, 

1143–44 (Conn. 1992)). 

Regardless of whether the ICFA claim is duplicative of the 

breach-of-contract claim, as Carrington contends, it fails on 

the merits. Leszanczuk has failed to adequately allege that the 

inspection fee offended public policy, was oppressive, or 

caused her substantial injury. 

1. Offense to Public Policy

Leszanczuk maintains that the charge of the inspection fee 

offended public policy because it purportedly violated 

§ 203.377. A practice offends public policy if it violates a 
No. 21-1367 11

standard of conduct embodied in a statute, the common law, 

or otherwise, i.e., if “it is within at least the penumbra of some 

common-law, statutory or other established concept of unfairness.” Elder v. Coronet Ins. Co., 558 N.E.2d 1312, 1316 (Ill. App. 

Ct. 1990) (quoting FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 

233, 244–45 n.5 (1972)). 

The HUD regulation provides, in full, 

The mortgagee, upon learning that a property subject to a mortgage insured under this part is vacant 

or abandoned, shall be responsible for the inspection 

of such property at least monthly, if the loan thereon 

is in default. When a mortgage is in default and a 

payment thereon is not received within 45 days of 

the due date, and efforts to reach the mortgagor by 

telephone within that period have been unsuccessful, the mortgagee shall be responsible for a visual 

inspection of the security property to determine 

whether the property is vacant. The mortgagee shall 

take reasonable action to protect and preserve such 

security property when it is determined or should 

have been determined to be vacant or abandoned 

until its conveyance to the Secretary, if such action 

does not constitute an illegal trespass. “Reasonable 

action” includes the commencement of foreclosure 

within the time required by § 203.355(b) of this part.

24 C.F.R. § 203.377. Leszanczuk does not dispute that a lender 

may inspect a property whenever it wants; she maintains that 

the lender cannot charge fees for nonmandatory inspections, 

i.e., inspections when the property is occupied by the borrower. But the regulation itself does not mention fees. Relying 

on three nonbinding sources, Leszanczuk claims that HUD 

has interpreted § 203.377 to mean that if a property is known 
12 No. 21-1367 

to be occupied, no inspections are required or authorized for 

reimbursement by HUD or the borrower. 

First, Leszanczuk points to HUD Mortgagee Letter 81-26, 

titled “Property Inspection Fees,” interpreting mortgagees’ 

“responsibilities for property inspections and applicable rules 

for reimbursement” as set forth in 24 C.F.R. §§ 203.377 and 

203.402(g) and HUD Administration of Insured Home Mortgages Handbook (4330.1). 1981 WL 389744, at *1 (June 16, 

1981). Leszanczuk relies on the portion of the Mortgagee Letter which states that “[o]nce the property has been found to 

be occupied ... no further inspections are required by HUD 

and reimbursement would not be allowed,” id., contending 

that because Carrington knew or should have known that she 

occupied her property and did not attempt to reach her by 

phone to confirm, it therefore cannot be reimbursed for the 

property inspection. 

Leszanczuk takes this statement out of context. In relevant 

part, the Mortgagee Letter provides, 

It is HUD’s intent to permit mortgagees to be reimbursed for the cost of any mandatory inspection 

which is performed. This includes any inspection 

made after the mortgagee learns that the property is 

vacant or abandoned, or after it has been unable to 

contact the mortgagor by telephone during the initial 45-day period of a delinquency. Reimbursement 

for the latter inspection is allowed regardless of 

whether the property is found to be vacant or occupied, and regardless of whether the mortgagee’s 

representative also talks to the mortgagor about the 

delinquency during the course of the inspection. 

Once the property has been found to be occupied, 

however, no further inspections are required by 
No. 21-1367 13

HUD and reimbursement would not be allowed. 

Although mortgagees are required, as a last resort, 

to visit the property in an attempt to arrange a faceto-face interview to discuss a delinquency (24 CFR 

203.604) this is not a reimbursable expense. However where a visit to the property to arrange an interview is combined with the initial inspection to determine whether the property is vacant, reimbursement would be authorized for the initial inspection. 

Where a visit to the property is made solely for arranging an interview or conducting an interview, no 

reimbursement would be authorized.

1981 WL 389744, at *1. As the district court found, the purpose 

of the Letter is to establish that mortgagees may be reimbursed by HUD for performing mandatory inspections. The 

Letter does not discuss whether the mortgagee may demand 

reimbursement from the mortgagor for performing other inspections. There is also no indication that the mortgagee must

first verify occupancy by phone for reimbursement to be permitted. 

Second, Leszanczuk points to Chapter 9 of HUD’s Administration of Insured Home Mortgages Handbook (4330.1). Part 

9-9 describes the mortgagee’s responsibility to inspect, preserve, and protect the property in the case of default.

Leszanczuk points to Section 9-9(A)(2)(d), which provides, “If 

there is evidence that the mortgagee knew the mortgagor was 

still in occupancy ... charges [of inspection fees] are inappropriate and must not be charged to the mortgagor or included 

on a claim for insurance benefits.” As Carrington points out, 

however, this portion of Handbook 4330.1 was superseded. 

Carrington cites a June 24, 2015, Transmittal Letter for the 

FHA Single Family Housing Policy Handbook (4000.1) which 
14 No. 21-1367 

states that Handbook 4000.1 took the place of several portions—including Chapter 9—of Handbook 4330.1, effective 

March 14, 2016 (before Carrington conducted the inspection 

here). The parallel provision of Handbook 4000.1 only addresses mandatory inspections and does not mention 

whether inspection fees are prohibited when the borrower 

continues to occupy the property. See HUD Single Family 

Housing Policy Handbook (4000.1) § III(A)(2)(h)(xi)(B). 

Leszanczuk maintains that Handbook 4330.1 is still in effect 

because it “appears current on HUD’s website” (Appellant’s 

Reply Br. 23), but the Transmittal Letter indicates that partially superseded Handbooks will remain on the website for 

informational purposes. 

Finally, Leszanczuk also cites HUD Mortgagee Letter 10-

18, titled “Update of Property and Preservation (P&P) Requirements and Cost Reimbursement Procedures,” which 

merely outlines “inspection requirements and types of inspections” as set forth in § 203.377 and HUD Handbook

4330.1, but does not purport to limit fees for inspections. 2010 

WL 1976742, at *5. 

In short, these sources do not help Leszanczuk establish 

that § 203.377 embodies a policy of prohibiting fees for nonmandatory inspections, i.e., inspections when the property is 

owner-occupied. In fact, the purpose of the regulation is to 

protect the FHA’s interest in the property when the borrower 

has defaulted. According to the preamble of the final rule 

promulgating § 203.377, the regulations “set minimum standards for mortgage servicing acceptable to HUD,” while noting

that “mortgagees retain full flexibility in dealing with mortgagors.” Amendments to Mutual Mortgage Insurance Regulations, 41 Fed. Reg. 49730 (Nov. 10, 1976). The language of 
No. 21-1367 15

the regulation itself outlines the steps that servicers of FHAinsured mortgages must take to “protect and preserve” property upon learning that a loan is in default and upon determining that a property is “vacant or abandoned.” 24 C.F.R. § 

203.377. Even Leszanczuk’s cited sources concern mortgagees’ duty to perform mandatory inspections when the borrower has defaulted. The policy underlying § 203.377 is to impose obligations on mortgagees to protect the value of the 

property in the case of default, not to protect mortgagors from 

unnecessary fees. Therefore, Leszanczuk cannot show that the 

inspection fee offended public policy for purposes of her 

ICFA claim.

2. Oppressive and Substantial Injury to Consumers 

Alternatively, Leszanczuk maintains that the inspection 

fee was oppressive and substantially injured her, in violation 

of the ICFA. Because Leszanczuk has failed to show that the 

inspection fee offended public policy, she must show that the 

fee was oppressive or caused her substantial injury to an even 

greater extent. See Robinson, 775 N.E.2d at 961. Conduct is oppressive under the ICFA if it “leave[s] the consumer with little 

alternative except to submit to it.” Id. Leszanczuk has not 

plausibly alleged that she had little alternative except to pay 

the $20.00 fee. She asserts that “she was forced to pay this fee 

in order to bring the Mortgage current, thereby avoiding default, acceleration of her debt, and/or foreclosure.” (Appellant’s Br. at 27.) Contrary to this assertion, Leszanczuk was 

already in default when the fee was assessed—that is why 

Carrington conducted the drive-by inspection—and she does 

not allege that she was threatened with foreclosure because of 

her failure to pay the $20.00 fee. And, as the district court reasoned, Leszanczuk fails to explain how a fee that was 
16 No. 21-1367 

permitted by the mortgage contract can be oppressive when 

she “does not argue that she did not freely enter into the mortgage contract or that the contract is unconscionable.” 

Similarly, Leszanczuk has not shown that the inspection 

fee constituted a substantial injury. Under this inquiry, “the 

injury must: (1) be substantial; (2) not be outweighed by any 

countervailing benefits to consumers or competition that the 

practice produces; and (3) be an injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided.” Siegel, 612 F.3d at 

935. Leszanczuk maintains that Carrington’s practice of 

charging the inspection fees, “in the aggregate, causes substantial losses to the public as a whole” (Appellant’s Br. at 27–

28), but a large loss cannot on its own support a claim for unfairness, see Robinson, 775 N.E.2d at 961. And Leszanczuk reasonably could have avoided the inspection fee by contracting 

with a different mortgage servicer. See Saunders v. Mich. Ave. 

Nat’l Bank, 662 N.E.2d 602, 608 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (finding that 

$20.00 overdraft fee was not unfair because plaintiff had control over whether she would be assessed the fee and was free 

to select another bank). Moreover, even accepting that 

Leszanczuk was “stuck” with the inspection fee, “[t]hat takes 

us back to the question whether the [fee] was oppressive,” 

and we have concluded that it was not. Batson v. Live Nation 

Ent., Inc., 746 F.3d 827, 834 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Because Leszanczuk has not plausibly alleged that the 

$20.00 inspection fee offended public policy, was oppressive, 

or caused her substantial injury, the district court correctly 

concluded that she failed to state a claim under the ICFA. 
No. 21-1367 17

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we conclude that the district court 

properly dismissed Leszanczuk’s claims. We AFFIRM the district court’s decision.