In th e S u p re m e Co u rt o f Ge o rg ia

De c id e d: Ju ly 1 4 , 2 0 16

S 1 5 G1 30 3 . P ATTERS ON v . THE S TATE.

HINES , P re sid in g Ju stic e

.

Th is Co urt g ra n te d c e rtio ra ri to th e Co urt of Ap p e a ls in P a tte rso n v

. S ta te

,

3 3 2 Ga

. A p p

. 2 2 1 (7 7 0 S E2 d 6 2 ) (2 0 1 5 ), p o sin g two q u e stio n s: first, wh e th e r

th a t Co u rt e rre d in c on c lu d in g th a t th e c rim e o f s i m p le a ssa u lt a s se t fo rth in

OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ), d o e s n o t re q u ire th a t th e d e fe n d a n t h a v e th e sp e c ific

in te nt to c a

u se th e a lle g e d v ic tim o f th e a ssa u lt to su ffe r in ju ry o r th e

a p p re h e n sio n o f in

ju ry , a n d se c o n d

, if th e C o u rt of Ap pe a ls d id so e rr, wh e th e r

it fu rth e r e rre d in c o n c lu d in g th a t th e tria l c o u rt p ro pe rly re fu se d to in stru c t th e

j u r y o n th e c rim e s o f re c k le ss c o n d u c t a n d re c k le ss driv in g a s le sse r in c lu d e d

o ffe n se s o f a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt. F o r th e r e a s o n s t h a t fo llo w, we a ffirm th e

ju d g m e n t o f th e Co u rt o f Ap p e a ls.

Ric k y P a tte rso n liv e d in a mo b i le h om e with h is g irlfrie n d

, Wa n d a

Ba rtle y

. W h i l e h e r a d u lt so n , Na th a n ie l S ilv e rs, wa s p re se n t, P a tte rso n a n d

Ba rtle y a rg u e d

, a n d B a rtl e y a n d S ilv e rs u rg e d P a tte rso n to le a v e th e h o m e

.Wh e n Pa tte rso n , Ba rtle y , a n d S ilv e rs we re o u tsid e th e h o m e , P a tte rso n we n t to

h is v e h ic le

, p u t it in to g e a

r, re v v e d th e e n g in e , a n d ra p id ly d ro v e d ire c tly to wa rd

th e e n d o f t h e h o m e , n e a r S ilv e rs, wh o b e c a m e p in n e d a g a in st th e sid e o f th e

h o m e b y th e ve h i c l e ; S i l ve rs su ffe re d in te rn a l in ju rie s. Fu rth e r fa c ts c a n b e

fo u n d in th e o p in io n o f th e Co u rt o f Ap pe a ls. P atte rso n , su pra

.

Th e issu e s b e fo re th is Co u rt o n c e rtio ra ri in v o lv e P a tte rso n ’s c o n v ic tio n

o n Co u n t 4 of th e in d ic tm e n t, in wh ic h h e wa s c h a rg e d with “a g gra v a te d a ssa u lt

with a n o b

je c t,” a s th a t c rim e is se t fo rth in p re se n t OCGA § 1 6

– 5 –2 1 (b ) (2 ). 1

Th e in d ic tm e n t sp e c ific a lly a lle g e d th a t P a tte rso n

d id c o m m it a n a c t w h ic h pla c e d a n o th e r p e rso n , to wit: Na th a n i e l

La n e S ilv e rs, in re a so n a

b le a p p re h e n sio n o f im m e d ia te ly re c e iv in g

a v io le n t in

ju ry , sa id a ssa u lt h a v in g b e e n c o m m itte d with a n o b je c t wh ic h wh e n u se d offe n siv e ly a g a in st a p e rso n , is lik e ly t o a n d

a c tu a lly do e s re su lt in se rio u s b o d ily in j u r y , b y d riv in g a m o to r

1 At the time of Patterson’s indictment in F ebruary 2012, what is now OCGA § 1 6–5–21 ( b) was codified as OCGA § 16–5–21 (a). The pertinent provision reads:

A person commits the offense of ag g ravated assault when he or she assaults:

(1) W ith intent to murder, to rape, or to rob; (2) With a deadly weapon o r w ith any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively ag ainst a person, is likely to or a ctually does result in s e r i o u s bodily injury ;

. . . .

See Ga. L . 2014, p. 441.

2v e h ic le in th e d ire c tio n o f Na th a n ie l S ilv e rs, strik in g Mr. S ilv e rs

with sa id v e h ic le , a

n d p in n in g h im u p a g a in st a m o b ile h o m e with

sa id v e h ic le

.

As th is Co u rt h a s n o te d,

Ag g ra v a te d a ssa u lt h a s two e le m e n ts: (1 ) c o m m issio n o f a s im p le

a ssa u lt a s d e fin e d b y OCGA § 1 6-5 -2 0 [a ] 2 ; an d (2 ) th e p re se n c e o f

o n e o f th re e sta tu to ry a g g ra v a to rs. S e e OCGA § 1 6-5 -2 1[(b )]

. Th e
sta tu to ry a gg ra va to rs a re : (1 ) in te nt to ra p e , ro b

, o r m

u rd e r; (2 ) u se

o f a d e a d ly we a

po n or a n o ffe n siv e we a

po n lik e ly to o r a c tu a lly

re su ltin g in se rio u s bo d ily in ju ry ; 3 a n d (3 ) sh o o tin g to wa rd s p e o p le
f r o m a v e h i c l e w i t h o u t j u s t i f i c a t i o n

. S e e O C G A §
1 6 -5 -2 1 [(b )] (1 )-(3 ).

Gu y se v

. S ta te

, 2 8 6 Ga

. 5 7 4

, 57 6 (2 ) (6 9 0 S E2 d 4 0 6 ) (2 0 1 0 ). S e e a lso Brin so n

v

. S ta te

, 2 7 2 Ga

. 34 5, 3 4 7 (1 ) (5 29 SE2 d 1 2 9 ) (2 0 0 0 ) ( “ [C] e n tra l to th e o ffe nse

o f a g gr a v at e d a s sa u lt is th a t a n a ssa u lt a s d e fin e d in OCGA § 1 6

– 5

– 2 0 b e

c o m m i tte d o n th e v ic tim .” ) As su c h

, Co u n t 4 of th e in dic tm e n t c h a r g e d

P a tte rso n w i t h a sim

ple a ssa u lt u n d e r OCGA § 1 6-5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ), th a t wa s

2 OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) reads:

A person commits the offense of simple assault when he or she either:

(1) Attempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another; or (2) Commits an act which places anot h e r in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury

.

3 I t is uncontroverted that a motor vehicle may be used offensively

ag ainst a person within
the meaning of present OCGA § 16–5–21 (b). Guyse v. State

, 286 Ga. 574, 576 ( 2) (690 SE2d 406) (2010); Turner v. State , 281 Ga. 487, 489 (1) (b) (640 SE2d 25) (2007).

3a g g r a v a t e d b y th e u se of a n o bje c t

– P a tte rso n’s v e h ic le

– th a t wh e n u se d

o ffe n siv e ly a g a in st S ilv e rs, wa s l i k e l y to

, a n d a c tu a lly d id

, re su lt in se rio u s

b o d ily in ju ry

.

P a tte rso n c o n te nd s th a t a s to Co u n t 4

, h e wa s e n title d to ju ry in stru c tio n s

o n th e le sse r i n c l u d e d c rim e s o f re c k le ss c o n d u c t, a s se t fo rth in OCGA §

1 6

– 5– 6 0 (b ), 4 a n d re c k le ss d riv in g, a s se t fo rth in OCGA § 4 0

– 6– 39 0 (a ). 5 Th e

Co u rt o f Ap p e a ls c o rre c tly re c o g n iz e d th a t, a s to b o th re q u e sts, a c ru c ia l issu e

is th e c ulp a

b le m e n ta l sta te re qu ire d fo r th e c rim e c h a rg e d a n d th e c la im e d le sse r

in c lu de d o ffe nse s. S e e OCGA § 1 6 -1 -6

. 6 S e e a lso Ed wa rd s v

. Sta te

, 2 6 4 Ga

.

4 OCGA § 16–5–60 (b) reads:

A person who causes b odily harm to o r endang ers the b odily safety of another person by consciously disreg arding a substantial and unj u s t i f i a b l e r isk that his act or omission will cause harm or e ndang er the safety of the other person a nd the d isreg ard
constitutes a g ross deviation from the standard o f c are which a r e a s onable person would ex ercise in the situation is g uilty of a misdemeanor.

5 OCGA § 40–6–390 (a) reads:

Any person who drives any vehicle in reckless disreg a rd for the safety of persons or property commits the offense of reckless driving

.

6 OCGA § 16-1-6 reads:

An accused may be convicted o f a c r ime included in a crime c harg ed in the indictment or accusation. A crime is so included when:

(1) I t is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts or a less culpable mental state than is required to establish the commission of the crime charg ed; or (2) I t differs from the crime charg ed o nly in the respect that a less serious injury or

41 3 1

, 1 3 2 -1 3 3 (4 4 2 S E2 d 4 4 4 ) (1 9 9 4 ). An d

, th e Co u rt o f Ap p e a ls sta te d th a t,

a s c h a rg e d in C o u n t 4

, th e re wa s n o sp e c ific in te n t re q uire m e n t fo r th e c rim e o f

sim p le a ssa u lt.

Th e Co u rt of Ap pe a ls w a s c o r r e c t in so sta tin g

. Th is C o urt h a s o n

m u ltip le o c c a sio ns n o te d th a t th e c rim e o f sim p le a ssa u lt a s se t fo rth in OCGA

§ 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ), d o e s n o t re q u ire p ro o f o f sp e c ific in te n t. “ [T] h e S ta te n e e d

o n ly pr o v e th a t th e d e fe n d a n t in te n d e d to d o th e a c t th a t pla c e d a n o th e r in

re a so na b le a p p re h e n sio n o f im m e d ia te v io le n t in ju ry

. . . . ” Gu

y se , su p ra a t 5 7 7

(2 ). S e e a lso S to d

d a r d v

. S ta te

, 2 7 2 Ga

. 6 0 8

, 6 1 1 -6 1 2 (3 ) (5 3 3 SE2 d 3 7 9 )

(2 0 0 0 ) (“ Th e re is a n in te n t o f th e a c c u se d th a t m u st b e sh o wn , b u t it is o n ly th e

c rim in a l in te n t to c om m it th e a c ts wh ic h c a u se d th e v ic tim t o b e re a so n a b ly

a p p re h e n siv e o f re c e iv in g a v io le n t in ju ry , no t a n y u n d e rly in g in te n t o f t h e

a c c u se d in a ssa u ltin g th e v ic tim

. [Cit.] ” ). Ac c o rd J a c k so n v

. S ta te

, 2 7 6 Ga

. 4 0 8

,

4 1 2 (2 ) (fn

. 5 ) (5 77 S E2 d 5 7 0 ) (2 0 0 3 ) (o v e r r u l e d o n o th e r g ro u n d s, S ta te v

.

S p rin g e r , 2 9 7 Ga

. 3 7 6 (7 7 4 S E2 d 1 0 6 ) (2 0 1 5 )); Du n a g an v

. S ta te

, 26 9 Ga

. 5 9 0

,

5 9 4 (2 ) (5 0 2 S E2 d 7 2 6 ) (1 99 8 ); Ad sitt v

. Sta te

, 2 4 8 Ga

. 2 3 7

, 2 40 (6 ) (2 82 S E2 d

risk of injury to the same person, p r o p e r t y , or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability

suffices to establish its commission.

53 0 5 ) (1 9 8 1 ). An d

, e v id e n c e o f P a tte rso n ’s in te n t to d riv e th e v e hic le a s h e d id

is u n d isp u te d

.

No r h a v e th e se sta te m e n ts re g a rd in g in te nt u n d e r OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 )

b e e n m a de by h a

p p e n sta n c e

. R a t h e r , wh e n sq u a re ly fa c e d with a c la im th a t a

sp e c ific in te n t to c a

u se a p p re h e n sio n is re q u ire d wh e n th e d e fe n d a n t is a lle g e d

to h a v e c o m m itte d a g g ra v a te d a s sa u lt b a se d o n th e v ic tim ’s re a so n a b le

a p p re h e n sio n o f h a

rm un de r OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 )

, t h i s Co urt h a s sq u a re ly

sta te d th a t “ [ a ] ll th a t is re q u ire d is th a t th e a ssa ila n t in te n d to c om m it th e a c t

wh ic h in fa c t p la c e s a n o th e r in re a so n a b le a p pre h e n sio n o f in

ju ry , n o t a sp e c ific

in te nt to c a

u se su c h a

p pre h e n sio n

. [Cit.] ” S

m ith v

. S ta te

, 2 8 0 Ga

. 4 9 0

, 4 9 2 (1 )

(6 2 9 SE2 d 8 1 6 ) (2 0 0 6 ). An d

, th is c o n c lu s i o n re g a rd in g th e re q u ire m e n ts o f

OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ) is d e m a n d e d b y th e sim p le fa c t th a t n o re q u ire m e n t o f

a sp e c ific in te nt is se t fo rth in OCGA § 16 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ). Th e sta tu to ry la n g u a g e

is p la in a n d u n e qu iv o c a l; a p e rso n wh o c o m m its a n a c t t h a t p la c e s an o th e r in

re a so na b le a p p re h e n sio n of re c e i vin g a v io le n t in ju ry ha s c o m m itte d sim

p le

a ssa u lt u n d e r OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ). S e e O’Ne al v

. S ta te

, 2 8 8 Ga

. 2 1 9

, 2 2 0

-

2 2 1 (7 0 2 S E2 d 2 8 8 ) (2 0 1 0 ); Glo v e r v

. S ta te

, 2 72 Ga

. 6 3 9

, 64 0 (5 3 3 S E2 d 3 7 4 )

(2 0 0 0 ). An d, th is Co u rt h a s p re v io u sly a dd re sse d th e g e ne sis of OCGA § 1 6 -5

-

62 0 (a ) (2 ), o b se rv in g in Rh od e s v . S ta te , 2 57 Ga . 3 6 8

, 3 6 9 (4 ) (3 5 9 S E2 d 6 7 0 )

(1 9 8 7 ), th a t in e n a c tin g O CGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ) in 1 9 6 8

, th e Ge n e ra l Asse m b ly

e ffe c te d “ a su b sta ntia l c h a n g e

. . . in th e de fin itio n o f a g gra va te d a ssa u lt, a s

d e fin e d in th e C r i m i n a l Co d e .” In a d dre ssin g a c la im th a t th e d e fe n d a n t’s a c t

wa s th e c rim e o f p o in tin g a g u n or p isto l a t an o th e r , a n d n ot th e c rim e o f

a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt, R h o d

e s n o te d th a t be fo re th e a do ptio n o f th e Crim in a l Co d e

in 1 9 6 8

,

sim p le a ssa u lt wa s d e fin e d a s “ a n a tte m pt to c o m m it a vio le n t in

ju ry

o n a n o th e r.” Co d e An n

. § 2 6

– 13 01 (n o w OCGA § 1 6

– 5

– 2 0 (a ) (1 )). Ag g r a v a t e d a ssa u lt th e n wa s d e fin e d a s a n a ssa u lt with in te nt to

m u rd e r, ra p e , o r ro b

. Co d e An n

. § 2 6

– 1 3 0 2 (a )(1 ) (n ow OCGA §
1 6

– 5

– 21 [(b )] (1 )). Th e re wa s n o a n a lo g to O CGA § § 1 6

– 5

– 2 0 (a )(2 )

o r 2 1 [(b )] (2 ). Th u s, p o in tin g a fire a rm a t a n o th e r with o u t l eg a l ju stific a tio n a n d with o u t in te n t to m u rd e r, ra p e
, o r ro b wa s a lwa y s

a m isd e m e a no r, wh e th e r o r n o t th e v ic tim w a s a p pre he n siv e o f
b e in g in ju re d

. Th e 1 9 6 8 c o d ific a tio n in c lu d e d Co d e An n

. § §
2 6

– 1 3 01 (a )(2 ) a n d 26

– 1 3 0 2 (a )(2 ), n o w c od ifie d a s OCGA § §
1 6

– 5

– 20 (a )(2 ) a n d 2 1 [(b )]( 2 )

, a n d e sta b lish e d th a t th e u se o

f a d e a d ly we a p o n in su c h m a n n e r a s to p la c e a n oth e r in re a so n a b le

a p p re h e n sio n o

f imme d ia te v i o l e n t in

ju ry c o nstitu te s th e fe lo n

y o f

a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt

.

Id

. (Em p h a sis su p p lie d .) Th u s, Rh o de s sta n d s fo r th e pro p o sitio n th a t OCGA §

1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ) m e a ns sim p ly wh a t it sa y s; a p e rso n c om m its sim p le a ssa u lt b y

c o m m ittin g “ a n a c t wh ic h p la c e s a no th e r in re a so n a b le a pp re h e nsio n o f

7im m e d ia te ly re c e iv in g a v io le n t in ju ry .” 7

No twith sta n d in g th e se p re c e d e n ts, P a tte rso n u rg e s th a t th is Co u rt sh o u ld

n o n e th e le ss in te rp re t OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ) to in c lu d e a re q u ire m e n t th a t th e

d e f e n d a nt h a ve th e sp e c ific in te n t to c a u se th e v ic tim to b e a

p p re h e n siv e o f

re c e iv in g a v io le n t in

ju ry

. Bu t, d e sp ite th is re qu e st, OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) ( 2 )

sim p ly do e s n o t sta te th a t a d e fe n d a n t m u st in te n d to p la c e th e vic tim in

r e a s o n a b le a p pre h e n sio n o f re c e iv in g a v io le n t in ju ry

. An d

, a t th e tim e o f th e

1 9 6 8 e n a c tm e n t o f OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ), th e Ge n e ra l Asse m b ly ce r t a i n l y

k n e w ho w to p h ra se a sta tu te to in c lu d e a re q u ire m e n t th a t an a c t m u st b e m a d e

with a sp e c i f

i c i n t en t

, a s c a n b e se e n in th e re q uire m e n t o f sim u lta n e o u sly

e n a c te d OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 1 (b ) (1 ) th a t a n a gg ra v a te d a ssa u lt u n d e r th a t p ro v isio n

b e d on e “ [ w ]i t h i n t e n t to m u rd e r, ra p e , or to ro b ,” a n d w e th e re fo re c o n c lu d e

th a t th e Ge n e ra l Asse m

b ly sim p ly c h o se n o t to in c lu d e a re q u ire m e n t o f sp e c ific

7 I n Rhodes

, this Court noted that the defendant’s “own testimony (“I was showing the g un
to him so he would leave me alone.”) revealed that h is purpose in pointing the weapon was to place [ the victim] in apprehension of immediate violent injury .” Rhodes

, supra at 370 (6). However, this
observation was made immediately after reciting that the deceased victim, and those who were with
him in his car, perceived the threat posed b y the d efendant ’ s a c t i o n s ; this, tog ether with the
discussion and analy sis undertaken in the previous d ivisions of Rhodes

, makes c lear that this Court’s
notation that the d efendant intended the victim to a pprehend an injury was simply a comment about
the q uantum of evidence in the case, not the creation o f an element of the c rime bey ond that set forth in the lang uag e of current OCGA § 16–5–20 (b) (2).

8in te nt in OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ). Ha y e s v

. S ta te

, 2 9 8 Ga

. 9 8

, 10 4 (2 ) (b ) (7 7 9

S E2 d 6 0 9 ) (2 0 1 5 ); Fa ir v

. S t a t e , 2 8 4 Ga

. 1 65

, 1 6 8 (2 ) (b ) (6 6 4 S E2 d 2 2 7 )

(2 0 0 8 )

. I f l an g u a g e c h a n g in g th e re q u ire d in te n t o f th e d e fe nd a n t is to b e

in se rte d in to th e te xt o f OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ), it is fo r th e Ge n e ra l Asse m b ly

to d o it, n o t th is Co urt. 8

Th u s, th e Co u rt o f A p p e a l s wa s c o rre c t in de te rm in in g th a t, a s to Co u n t

4

,

th e S ta te wa s re q u ire d to sh o w th a t P a tte rso n in te n d e d to d riv e h is

v a n in th e d ire c tio n o f S ilv e rs, th a t S ilv e rs wa s p la c e d in re a so na b le

a p p r e h e n s io n o f in

ju ry , a n d th a t th e v a n wa s a n o b je c t th a t w h e n

u se d o ffe n siv e ly a g a in s t a p e rso n , 9 wa s lik e ly to o r a c tu a lly d id

8 Althoug h this Court’s o pini o n i n R h odes was w ritten 19 y ears after the 1968 p assag e of
what is now OCGA § 16–5–20 (a) ( 2), beg inning shortly after the enactment of OCGA § 16–5–20 (a) (2), the Court o f Appeals reg ularly decided cases also apply ing the statute as written, i.e.,without

g rafting into the crime of simple assault the a dditional e lement that the defendant must intend that
his or her act place another in reasonable apprehension of immediately r eceiving a violent injury

. See Johnson v. State

, 122 Ga. App. 5 4 2 (1) (178 SE2d 42) (1970). See also Brooks v. State

, 144 Ga. App. 97, 99 ( 3) (240 SE2d 593) ( 1 9 7 7 ) ; H i se v. State

, 127 Ga. App. 511 (194 SE2d 274) (1972).

Patterson contends in this Court that the 1968 Committee Notes to what is now OCGA § 16–5–20

sug g est a leg islative intent to include a requirement that the d efendant have a specific intent to cause the victim reasonable apprehension o f immediately r eceiving a v iolent injury

, but the Notes do not

state that there was such a leg islative intent, and the General Assembly has not, in the 46 y ears since
the Court of Appeals’s d e c ision in J ohnson

, supra, or the 29 y ears since this Court’s decision in
Rhodes

, supra, taken any opportunity to insert into the lang uag e o f OC G A § 16–5–20 (a) (2) that which Patterson wishes to be placed there.

9 W e note that the dissent raises certain hy pothetical scenarios that it contends could result
in the commission o f a g g ravated assault throug h ordinary behavior, but does so without any acknowledg ment of this element of the offense. Any consideration of the meaning of the lang uag e “when used offensively ag a inst a person” as stated in current OCGA § 16–5–21 (b) (2) is bey ond the

9re su lt in se rio u s b o d ily in ju ry

. Th e S ta te wa s n o t re q uire d to sh o w

a n in te n t to in

ju re o r th a t P a tte rso n in te n d e d to p l a c e S i lv e rs in

re a so n a b le a p p re h e n sio n o f in

ju ry

.

Pa tte rso n , su p ra a t 2 2 6 (2 ). 1 0

Ju d g m e n t a ffirm e d

. All th e Ju stic e s c o n c u r, e x c e pt Me lto n , Na h m ia s, a n d

Bla c k w e ll, JJ., wh o d isse nt.

scope of this Court’s g rant of certiorari.

1 0 Given our answer to the f irst question this Court posed on certiorari, we need not address the second question.

10S 1 5 G1 30 3 . P ATTERS ON v . THE S TATE.

B L ACKW EL L , Ju stic e , d isse ntin g.

En a c te d in 1 9 6 8

, OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ) p ro vid e s th a t a n “ a c t wh ic h

p la c e s a no th e r in re a so n a b le a p p re h e nsio n o f im m e d ia te ly re c e i v i n g a v io le n t

in ju ry ” is a sim

p le a ssa u lt. Th e sta tu te sa y s no th in g e x p re ssly a b ou t t h e in te n t

with wh ic h su c h a n a c t m

u st b e d on e , a n d so , it wa s le ft fo r th e c ou rts to d isc e rn

th e re q u isite sta te o f m in d. Wh e n re a d in c o n te x t a s a n ord in a ry re a d e r wo u ld d o ,

th e sta tu te m o st n a tu ra lly a n d re a so n a b ly is u n d e rs t o o d t o re qu ire a sp e c ific

in te nt, e ith e r t o in flic t in ju ry o r to a ro use a n a

pp re h e n sio n o f in

ju ry

. Bu t

b e g in n in g w i t h Du na g a n v

. S ta te

, 2 6 9 Ga

. 59 0 (5 0 2 S E2 d 7 2 6 ) (1 99 8 ), th is

Co u rt h a s h e ld in a n u m

b e r o f c a se s

— with o u t a n y m e a n in g fu l an a ly sis o f th e

re le v a n t sta tu to ry c o n te xt — th a t sim p le a ssa u lt b y a n a c t th a t p la c e s a no th e r in

re a so na b le a p p re h e nsio n o f im m in e n t a n d v i o le n t in ju ry re q u ire s n o sp e c ific

in te nt, o n ly a g e n e ra l in te n t to d o th e a c t th a t h a p p e n s to p ro d uc e a

pp re h e n sio n

.

In th o se c a se s, we a d o p te d a la w o f c rim in a l a ssa u lt th a t e ffe c tiv e ly a m o u n ts to

stric t lia bility

, re c o g n iz in g a

fo rm o f a ssa u lt so b ro a d th a t, b u t fo r th e g ra c e o f

p ro se c u tin g a tto rn e y s, it wo u ld m a k e fe lo ns o f m ost Ge org ia n s. To da y , we h a v eo c c a sio n to re c o n sid e r o u r p re c e d e n ts, a nd I w o u ld o v e rru le Du n a g a n a n d its

p ro g e n y

. A m a

jo rity o f th e Co u rt, h o w e v e r , h a s d e te rm in e d to sta n d b y th ose

p re c e de n ts. I re sp e c tfu lly d isse nt.

1

. Ric ky P a tte rso n a n d W a n d a B a rtle y we re in v o lv e d ro m a n tic a lly

, a n d

th e y liv e d to ge th e r in a m o b ile h o m e n e a r Da l to n

. On No v e m b e r 1

, 2 0 1 1

,

P a tte rso n re tu rn e d fro m w o rk to fin d th a t Ba rtle y h a d b e e n re m od e lin g th e h om e

with ou t him a n d d rin k in g b e e r with h e r a d u lt so n , Na th a nie l S ilv e rs. P a tte rso n

a n d Ba rtle y b e ga n to a rg u e , a n d a t so m e p o in t, P a tte rso n b e c a m e q u ite a n g ry ,

ta k in g a ro a st fro m th e ov e n a n d th ro win g it o n th e g ro u n d

, a n d sm a sh in g a g la ss

c a b in e t with a c e ll p h o n e

. Ba rtle y a sk e d P a tte rso n to le a v e , a n d e v e n tu a lly

,

P a tte rso n wa lk e d o u tsid e a n d g o t in to h is C h e v ro le t v an , wh ic h wa s p a rk e d

a b o u t 2 0 fe e t fro m th e h o m e

. P a tte rso n sta rte d th e v a n, sh ifte d in to a lo w g e a r,

re v v e d th e e n g in e , a n d a c c e le ra te d q uic k ly

, driv in g to wa rd o n e e nd o f th e

m o b ile ho m e

. Alth o u g h th e p r e c i s e s e q u e n c e o f e ve n ts is u n c le a r, S ilv e rs

ste p p e d o ff th e p o rc h a ro u n d th e sa m e tim e a n d p ro c e e d e d in to th e y a rd a d ja c e n t

to th a t sa m e e n d o f th e m o b ile h o m e , wh e re h e wa s stru c k b y th e v an

. Th e v a n

p in n e d S ilv e rs a g a in st th e m o b ile h o m e , le a vin g h im with se rio u s in ju rie s fro m

wh ic h h e re c o v e re d o n ly a fte r a h o sp ita l sta y

.

2P a tte rso n wa s in dic te d

, trie d b y a Wh itfie ld Co u n ty ju ry , a n d c o nv ic te d o f

a g g ra v a te d a ssa u l t fo r h a v in g d riv e n a m o to r ve h ic le to wa rd S ilv e rs, c a u sin g

S ilv e rs to a

p p re h e n d in

ju ry

. 1 By d e fin itio n , a n a gg ra v a te d a ssa u lt re q u ire s a

sim p le a ssa u lt a n d a sta tu to ry a g g ra va tin g c irc um sta n c e , se e G u y se v

. S ta te

, 2 8 6

Ga

. 5 7 4

, 5 7 6 (2 ) (6 9 0 S E 2 d 4 0 6 ) (2 01 0), a n d in th is in sta n c e , t h e a g g ra v a te d

a ssa u lt o f wh ic h P a tte rso n wa s c o n v ic te d wa s p re d ic a te d u p o n sim p le a ssa u lt b y

p la c in g a n o th e r in re a so n a b le a p p re h e nsio n o f an im m in e n t a n d v io le nt in ju ry ,

a s p ro vid e d in OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ). 2 At tria l, P a tte rso n d id n o t d e n y th a t h e

h a d d riv e n th e v a n c a re le ssly

, b u t th e e v id e n c e th a t h e m e a nt to h u rt S ilv e rs o r

e v e n to frig h te n h im w a s d isp u te d

. 3 P a tte rso n c o n c e d e d th a t h e m ig h t b e g u ilty

1 Patterson was convicted of disorderly c onduct as w ell. The jury also found Patterson g uilty
of two simple assaults, althoug h those assaults merg ed into the ag g ravated a ssault of w hich he was convicted. The jury

acquitted Patterson of several other crimes, including ag g ravated battery

.

2 T he ag g r a v ating circumstance was that Patterson committed the assault b y u s e o f an “object, device, or instrument which, w he n u sed offensively ag ainst a person, is likely to or actually does
result in serious bodily injury ,” former OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), namely

, a motor vehicle. See, e.g ., Guy se, 286 Ga. at 5 77 (2). See also Durrance v. State, 250 Ga. App. 185, 187 (2) (549 SE2d 406) (2001) (“Althoug h an automobile is not per se a deadly o r offensive weapon, it m a y b e come one depe n d ing on the manner and means by which the vehicle is used. The question of whether an automobile has been u sed in such a manner so as to constitute a deadly or offensive weapon is one for the jury

to resolve.” (Citations omitted)).

3 The jury would h ave been a uthoriz e d to infer an intent to injure or cause apprehension of injury simply from the fact that Patterson intentionally drove his van in the direction of Silvers. See,

e.g ., Turner v. State, 281 Ga. 487, 489 (1) (b) (640 SE2d 25) (2007). See also Smith v. State, 284
Ga. 33, 36 (3) ( 663 SE2d 155) (2008) (jury may infer that “the acts of a p erson o f sound mind and discretion are the product of that person’s will” and that “[ a] person of sound mind and discretion

3o f re c k le s s co n d u c t o r re c kle ss d riv in g , b u t u nle ss th e S ta te p ro v e d b e y o n d a

re a so na b le d o u b t th a t h e in te n d e d to in flic t a n in ju ry or c a u s e S i l v e rs to

a p p re h e n d in

ju ry , P a tte rso n u rg e d th a t h e c o u ld n ot p ro p e rly b e g u ilty o f

a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt. C o n siste n t with th a t a p p ro a c h

, P a tte rso n a sk e d th e tria l c o urt

to c ha rg e th e ju ry o n re c k le ss c o n d u c t a n d re c k le ss d riv in g a s le sse r o ffe n s e s

in c lu de d in a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt. Th e tria l c ou rt re fu se d th a t re q u e st.

Afte r h e wa s c o n v i c t e d a

n d s e n t e n c e d

, P a tte rso n a

p p e a le d

, c o nte n d in g th a t

th e tria l c o u rt e rre d wh e n it re fu se d to c h a rg e th e ju ry o n re c k le ss c o n d u c t a n d

re c k le ss d riv in g

. In Pa tte rso n v

. S ta te

, 3 32 G a

. Ap p

. 2 2 1 (7 7 0 S E 2 d 6 2 ) (2 0 1 5 ),

th e C o u rt o f A p p e a l s re

je c te d th a t c o nte n tio n a n d a ffirm e d. R e ly in g o n c a se s

fro m th e lin e th a t tra c e s b a c k to Du na g a n , th e Co u rt o f Ap p e a ls sa id th a t

a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt b y

a n a c t th a t p la c e s a n o th e r in re a so n a b le a p pre h e n sio n o f

im m in e n t a n d v i o l e n t in

ju ry re q u ire s n o in te n t to in flic t in ju ry o r c a

u se su c h

a p p re h e n s i o n , o n ly a n in te nt to d o th e a c t, wh ic h

, in th is c a se , wa s th e a c t o f

intends the natural and probable consequences of those acts”). Moreover, a n inmate testified that

Patterson had admitted in jail that he struck Silvers intentionally

, a nd there w as evidence that B artley
and Silvers orig inally had characteriz ed the incident a s “intentional.” On the other hand, there was evidence that Silvers later characteriz ed the incident as unintentional and an “accident,” that the van

was loaded with tools a

nd had worn tires, that the rear tires lost traction on the wet g r a ss as the van accelerated, that Patterson appeared to lose control of the van, and that Patterson and Silvers had a
g ood relationship.

4d riv in g

. S e e id . a t 2 2 4 -2 2 5 (2 ). Be c a u se re c kle ss c on d u c t a n d re c k le ss d riv in g

in th e c irc u m sta n c e s o f th is c a se lik e wise wo u ld re q u ire a g e n e ra l in te n t to d riv e ,

th e Co u rt o f Ap p e a ls re a so n e d , th ose o ffe n se s d id n o t in v o lv e a “ le ss c u lp a b le

m e n ta l sta te th a n th a t wh ic h wa s re q u ire d to e sta b lish th e c o m m issio n o f th e

[a g g ra va te d a ssa u lt] a s c h a rg e d .” Id

. a t 2 2 8

- 2 2 9 (2 ) (b ), (c ). Ac c ord in g ly

, th e

Co u rt o f Ap p e a ls c o n c lu d e d

, th e re wa s n o e rro r in th e re fu sa l to c h arg e th e ju ry

o n re c k l e s s c o nd uc t a nd re c k le ss d riv in g a s le sse r offe n se s in c lu d e d in th e

a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt. S e e id

. a t 2 2 9 (2 ) (b ), (c ). P a tte rso n file d a p e titio n fo r a writ

o f c e rtio ra ri, a n d we g ra n te d th e p e titio n sp e c ific a lly to re c on sid e r Du n a g a n a n d

its p ro g e n y a n d to re v isit th e qu e stio n o f th e in te n t re q u ire d fo r an a ssa ult u n d e r

OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ).

2

. Th is c a se c o n c e rn s th e m e a n in g o f OCGA § 16 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ), a n d so , o u r

a n a ly sis o ug h t to b e g in with th e fa m ilia r a n d se ttle d p rin c ip le s th a t in fo rm o u r

c o n sid e ra tio n o f sta tu to ry m e a n in g

. “ [A] s ta tu te d ra ws its m e a n in g fro m its

te x t,” Za ld iv a r v

. P ric k e tt, 2 9 7 Ga

. 5 8 9, 5 9 1 (1 ) (7 74 S E2 d 6 8 8 ) (2 01 5 ) (c ita tio n

a n d pu n c tu a tio n o m itte d ), a nd w h en w e lo o k to th e sta tu to ry te x t, “ we m u st

p re su m e th a t th e Ge n e ra l Asse m b ly m e ant wh a t it sa id a n d sa id wh a t it m e a n t.”

De a l v

. Co le m a n , 2 9 4 Ga

. 1 70

, 1 7 2 (1 ) (a ) (7 5 1 S E2 d 3 3 7 ) (2 0 13 ) (c ita tio n a n d

5p u n c tu a tio n o m itte d ). To th a t e n d

, “ we m u st re a d th e sta tu to ry te x t in its m o st

n a tu ra l a n d re a so n a

b le wa y , a s a n o rd in a ry sp e a k e r o f th e E n g lish la n g u a g e

wo u ld .” F DIC v

. L o u d e rm ilk

, 2 9 5 Ga

. 5 7 9

, 5 8 8 (2 ) (7 6 1 S E2 d 3 3 2 ) (2 0 1 4 )

(c ita tio n a n d p u n c tu a tio n o m itte d). “ Th e c o m m o n a n d c u sto m a ry u sa g e s o f th e

wo rd s a re im

p o rta nt, bu t so is th e ir c o nte x t.” Ch a n v

. E llis, 2 9 6 Ga

. 8 3 8

, 8 3 9 (1 )

(7 7 0 S E2 d 8 5 1 ) (2 0 1 5 ) (c ita tio ns o m itte d ). “ Afte r a ll, c o n te x t is a p rim a ry

d e te rm in a n t o f m e a n in g.” Ma y v

. S ta te

, 2 9 5 Ga

. 3 8 8

, 3 9 1 (7 6 1 S E2 d 3 8 ) (2 0 1 4 )

(c ita tio n a n d p un c tu a tio n o m itte d). “F o r c o n te x t

, we m a y lo o k to th e o th e r

p ro v isio ns o f th e sa m e sta tu te

, th e stru c tu re a n d h isto ry o f th e wh o le sta tu te

, a n d

th e o th e r la w — c o n stitu tio n a l, sta tu to ry , an d c o m m o n la w a lik e — th a t fo rm s

th e le g a l b a c k gro u n d o f th e sta tu to ry p ro v isio n in q u e stio n .” Tib b le s v

. Te a c h e rs

Re tire m e n t S y ste m o f Ga

., 2 9 7 Ga

. 5 5 7

, 55 8 (1 ) (7 7 5 S E2 d 5 2 7 ) (2 01 5 ) (c ita tio n

a n d p u n c tu a tio n o m itte d ). Co n sid e rin g t h e te xt a n d re le v a n t c o n te x t o f th e

sta tu t e , o u r t a sk is to d isc e rn th e wa y in wh ic h th e sta tu te m o st n a tu ra lly a n d

re a so na b ly wo u ld ha v e b e e n u n d e rsto o d a t th e tim e o f its e n a c tm e n t. S e e Wa rre n

v

. S ta te

, 2 9 4 G a

. 58 9, 5 9 0 (7 5 5 S E2 d 1 71 ) (2 0 1 4 ). With th e se p rin c ip le s in

m in d

, I tu rn n o w t o t h e t e x t a n d re le v a n t c o n te x t o f OCGA § 1 6-5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ),

6sta rtin g with th e sta te o f th e la w c o n c e rn in g c rim in a l a ssa ult a s o f 1 9 6 8 , wh e n

p a ra g ra p h (a ) (2 ) wa s e n a c te d

.

(a ) At c om m o n la w, a c rim in a l a s s a u l t wa s a n a tte m p te d b a tte ry , se e

Bru nd a g e v

. Un ite d S ta te s, 3 6 5 F2 d 6 1 6

, 6 19 (1 0 th C ir. 1 9 6 6 )

, t h a t is, “ a n

a tte m p t or o ffe r to b e a t a n o th e r, with o u t to u c h in g him .” 3 Willia m Bla c k sto n e ,

Co m m e n ta rie s o n th e La ws o f En g la n d 1 2 0 (1 st e d. 1 7 6 8 )

. 4 Se e a lso Un ite d

S ta te s v

. Be ll, 5 0 5 F 2 d 5 3 9, 5 4 0 (7 th Cir. 1 9 7 4 ) (“ A c rim in a l a ssa ult a t c o m m o n

la w wa s o rig in a lly a n a tte m p t to c om m it a b a tte ry .” ); An d e rso n v

. Cra wfo rd

, 2 6 5

F 5 0 4, 5 0 7 (8 th Cir. 1 9 2 0 ) (“ An a ssa u lt is a n a tte mp t

, w h ic h

, if c on su m m a te d

,

wo u ld re su lt in a b a tte ry .” ). Su c h a n a ssa u lt re q u ire d a sp e c ific in te n t to in flic t

in ju ry o r, pu t a no th e r wa y , “ th e de sire o r w ish to b rin g a b o u t a se rio u s b o d ily

in ju ry to th e p e rso n o f th e o th e r.” Bru n da g e , 3 6 5 F2 d a t 6 1 9

. As o n e o f th e e a rly

Am e ric an c a se s e x p la in s,

Th e d e fin itio n o f a n a ssa u lt [a t c om m o n la w] is a n o ffe r o r a tte m p t b y fo rc e to d o a c o rp o ra l in ju ry to a n o th e r; a s if o n e p e rso n strik e a t

a n o th e r with h is h a n d s , o r w i t h a stic k, an d m isse s h im ; fo r, if th e

o th e r b e stric k e n , it is a b a tte ry , wh ic h is a n o ffe n c e o f a h i gh e r

4 W hen B lackstone spoke of “an attempt o r offer to b eat a nother, without touching him,” he

was referring to the tort of assault, as it was understood at common law in Eng land. B lackstone

ex p laine d

, h o wever, that criminal a ssault was of the same nature as the tort of assault. See 4

B lackstone, Commentaries on the L aws of Eng land 216-217 (1 st ed. 1769).

7g ra d e

. Or if h e sh a k e h is fist a t a n o th e r, or p re se n t a g u n, o r o th e r

we a p o n , with in su c h d ista nc e a s th a t a h u rt m ig ht b e g iv e n ; o r d ra win g a swo rd

, a n d b ra n d ish in g it in a m e n a c in g m a n n e r

. B u t it
is e sse n tia l to c o n stitu te a n a ssa ult, th a t a n in te n t to d o so m e in ju ry

s h o u l d b e c o u p le d with th e a c t; an d th a t in te n t sh o u ld b e to d o a

c o rp o ra l h u rt to a n o th e r.

Un ite d S ta te s v

. Ha n d

, 26 F

. Ca s. 1 0 3

, 1 0 4 (C.C.D. P a

. 1 8 1 0 ) (c ita tio n o m itte d ).

In tim e , th e la w o f to rts c a m e to re c o g n iz e a no th e r v a rie ty o f a ssa u lt, o n e

th a t in v o lv e s a n a c t th a t p la c e s a no th e r in a p p re h e n sio n of a n im m in e nt in ju ry

.

As e a rly a s 1 9 3 4

, th e Re sta te m e n t (F i r s t ) of To rts a c kn o wle d g e d th is k in d o f

a s s a u lt, n otin g th a t “ [a ] n a c t o th e r th an th e m e re sp e a k in g o f wo rd s wh ic h

,

d ire c tly or in d ire c tly

, is a le g a l c a u se o f pu ttin g an o th e r in a p p re h e n sio n o f a n

im m e d ia te a n d h a rm fu l o r offe n siv e c o nta c t m a k e s th e a c to r liab le to th e o th e r

fo r th e a p p re h e n sio n so c a

u se d .” R e st a t e me n t (F irst) o f T orts § 2 1 (1 ) (1 9 3 4 ).

De a n P ro sse r re c o g n iz e d th e sa m e so rt o f a ssa u lt in h is se m in a l tre a tise o n th e

la w o f to rts, a l t h o u g h h e u n d e rsto o d th e a ssa u lt o rd in a rily to re q uire th a t th e

a p p re h e n sio n o f in

ju ry b e a re a so n a b le o ne :

An y a c t o f su c h a n a tu re a s to e x c ite a n a p p re h e n sio n o f a b a tte ry

m a y c o n stitu te a n a ssa u lt. It is an a ssa u lt to s h a k e a fist u nd e r

a n o th e r’s n o se , to a im o r strik e a t h im with a we a p o n , o r to h o ld it
in a th re a te nin g p o sitio n , t o r i se o r a d v a n c e to strik e an o th e r, to

su rro un d h im with a d isp la y o f fo rc e , to c h a s e him in a h o stile

8m a n n e r, o r to le a n o v e r a wo m a n ’s b e d a n d m a k e in d e c e n t

p ro p o sa ls, in su c h a

way a s to p u t h e r in fe a r.

S in c e th e in te re st in v o lv e d is th e m e n ta l o n e o f a p p re h e n sio n

o f c o n ta c t, it sh o u ld fo llo w t h a t t h e p l a in tiff m u st be a wa re o f th e d e fe n da n t’s a c t a t th e tim e , a n d th a t it is n ot a n a ssa u lt to a im a g u n

a t on e wh o d o e s n o t d isc o v e r it. Ap p re he n sio n is no t th e sa m e th in g

a s fe a r, a n d th e p la in tiff is n o t d e priv e d of h is a c tio n m e re ly b e c a u se h e is to o c o u ra ge o us to b e frig h te n e d o r in tim id a te d

. . . .

At th e sa m e tim e , th e c o u r t s ha v e b e e n re lu c ta nt to p ro te c t

e x tre m e ly tim id in d iv id u a ls fro m e x a gg e ra te d fe a rs o f c o nta c t, a n d

se e m to h a v e re q uire d q u ite u n ifo rm ly th a t th e a p p re h e n sio n b e o n e wh ic h w o u ld n o rm a lly b e aro use d in th e m in d o f a r e a s o n a b le

p e rso n

. P e rh a

p s if th e d e fe n d a n t h a s k n o wle d g e o f th e pla in tiff’s

p e c u lia r a n d a

b n o rm a l tim id ity

, and in te nd s to a c t u p o n it, th e re m a y b e lia b ility

, bu t a t le a st in th e a b s e nc e o f su c h k n o wle d ge , th e re is

n o a ssa u lt. Th us it is u s u a l l y h e ld th a t th e d e fe n d a n t’s a c t m u st

a m o u nt to a n offe r to u se fo rc e , an d th e re m u st b e a n a

p p a re n t

a b ility a n d o p p o rtu n ity to c a rry o u t th e th re a t im m e d ia te ly

. . . .

Willia m L. P ro ss e r , Th e La w o f To rts § 1 0 (2 n d e d

. 1 9 5 5 ) (fo o tn o te s o m itte d ).

In 1 9 6 5

, th e Re sta te m e n t (S e c o n d ) o f To rts a lso a c k no wle d g e d th a t a n a c t th a t

p la c e s an o th e r in “ im m in e n t a p p re h e n sio n ” o f “ a h a rm fu l o r o ffe nsiv e c o n ta c t”

m a y fo r m th e b a sis fo r liab ility in to rt fo r a n a ssa u lt. Re sta te m e nt (S e c o n d ) o f

To rts § 2 1 (1 ) (1 9 65 ). A t le a st b y th e la te 1 9 6 0 s, th e to rt o f a ssa u lt by p u ttin g

a n o th e r in a

p pre h e n sio n o f a n im m in e n t in ju ry a p pe a rs to h a v e b e e n g e n e ra lly

a c c e p te d. S e e Ma d d e n v

. D .C. Tra n sit S y ste m , 3 07 A2 d 7 5 6

, 7 57 (D.C. 1 9 7 3 ).

9At th a t tim e , h o we v e r, it wa s e q u a lly a c c e pte d in th e la w of to rts th a t su c h

a n a ssa u lt re qu ire s a sp e c ific in te n t, e ith e r to a c tu a lly in flic t in ju ry , o r to a ro use

a n a p pre h e n sio n o f in

ju ry

. Th e Re sta te m e n t (F irst) re c o g n iz e d th a t a ssa u lt b y a n

a c t th a t c a u se s a n o th e r to a

p p re h e n d in

ju ry n e c e ssa rily re q uire s th a t “ th e a c to r

in te nd s to in flic t a h a rm fu l o r o ffe n siv e c o n ta c t u p o n th e oth e r o r a th ird p e rso n

o r to p u t th e o th e r o r a th ird p e rso n in a p p re h e n sio n th e re of.” Re sta te m e n t (F irst)

o f To rts § 2 1 (1 ) (a ). Th e Re sta te m e n t ( S e c o n d ) lik e wise c o n d itio n e d liab ility

in to rt u p o n on e h a v in g “ a c t[e d ] in te n din g to c a use a h a rm fu l o r o ffe n siv e

c o n ta c t with th e p e rso n of th e o th e r o r a th ird p e rso n , o r a n im m in e n t

a p p re h e n sio n o f su c h a c o n ta c t.” Re sta te m e nt (S e c o n d ) o f To rts § 2 1 (1 ) (a ).

Ea c h o f th e Re sta te m e n ts re c o g n iz e d th a t, in th e a b se n c e o f s u c h a sp e c ific

in te nt, th e re w a s n o liab ility fo r a ssa ult, e v e n th ou gh “ th e a c t in v o l v e s a n

u n re a so n a

b le ris k o f c a

u sin g [a n im m in e n t a

pp re h e n sio n o f in

ju ry ] a n d

,

th e re fo re , wo u ld b e n e g lig e n t o r re c k le ss if th e risk th re a te n e d b o d ily h a rm .”

Re sta te m e n t (S e c o n d ) o f T o rts § 2 1 (2 ). Ac c o rdRe sta te m e n t (F irst) o f To rts §

2 1 (2 ). De a n P ro sse r a g re e d , e x p la in in g :

Th e re is, p ro p e rly sp e a k in g , no su c h th in g a s a n e g l i g e n t a s sa u lt.

Bu t th e in te n t n e e d no t n e c e ssa rily b e to in flic t p h y sic a l in ju ry , a n d
it is e n o ug h th a t th e re is a n in te n t to a ro u se a pp re h e nsio n

. Th u s it is

1 0a n a ssa u lt to fire a g u n n o t a im e d a t th e p la in tiff fo r th e p u rp o se o f

frig h te n in g h im

, or to p o in t it a t h im wh e n th e d e fe n d a n t k n o ws th a t it is u n lo a d e d

, a n d th e p la in tiff d o e s n o t.

P ro sse r, su p ra , a t § 1 0 (fo o tn o te s o m itte d ).

As th e n o tio n o f a

n a ssa u lt b y a n a c t th a t pla c e s a n o th e r in a p p re h e n sio n

o f im m in e n t in

ju ry g a in e d a c c e p ta n c e in th e la w o f to rts, it m a d e its wa y in to th e

c rim in a l la w. S e e U n ite d S ta te s v

. Riz z o, 4 0 9 F 2 d 4 00

, 4 0 3 (7 th Cir. 1 9 6 9 ),

d isap p ro v e d o n o th e r g ro u n ds b y S im p so n v

. Un ite d S ta te s, 4 3 5 U. S

. 6

, 1 1 (II),

n .6 (9 8 S Ct 9 0 9

, 5 5 LE2 d 7 0 ) (1 9 7 8 )

. S e e a l so Be ll, 5 0 5 F 2 d a t 5 4 0

. In 1 9 5 8

,

th e Un ite d S ta te s S u p re m e C o u rt o b se rv e d th a t a c rim in a l a ssa u lt un de r fe d e ra l

la w c o n sists o f “ p u ttin g a n o th e r in a

p p re h e n sio n o f h a rm wh e th e r o r n o t t h e

a c to r a c tu a lly in te n d s to in flic t o r is c a p a b le o f in flic tin g th a t h a rm .” La d n e r v

.

Un ite d Sta te s, 3 5 8 U. S. 1 6 9

, 1 7 7 (7 9 S Ct 2 0 9

, 3 LE2 d 1 9 9 ) ( 1 9 5 8 )

. Ev e n so ,

it wa s u n d e rsto o d th a t su c h a p p re h e n sio n h a d to be re a so n a b le fo r p urp o se s o f

c rim in a l a ssa u lt, ju st a s fo r a ssa u lt in th e la w o f to rts. S e e R iz z o , 4 09 F2 d a t 4 0 3

(“ It is u su a lly re q u ire d th a t th e a p p r e h e n s i o n o f h a rm b e a re a so n a ble o n e .”

(Cita tio n s o m itte d )). Lik e w ise

, th e c rim in a l la w a pp e a rs to h a v e a ssim ila te d th e

n o tio n th a t a n a ssa ult by pla c in g a n o th e r in a p p re h e n sio n o f a n im m in e n t in ju ry

re q u ire d a sp e c ific in te n t to a ro u se su c h a

p p re h e n sio n , if n o t a n in te n t to a c tu a lly

1 1in flic t in

ju ry

. Se e U n ite d S ta te s v. Be a sle y , 4 3 8 F 2 d 1 2 7 9

, 1 28 2 (6 th Cir. 1 9 7 1 ),

d isap p ro v e d on o th e r g ro u n d s b y S im p so n , 4 3 5 U. S

. a t 1 1 (II), n .6 (e x p la in in g

th a t ro b b e r y w a s a g g ra v a te d b y a ssa u lt w h e re “th e ro b b e r is sh own to h a v e

p o sse sse d th e in te n t to g e n e ra te a p p re h e n sio n o n th e p a rt o f h is v ic tim

, a n d

wh e re th e v i c t i m, in fa c t, is sh o wn to h a v e b e e n p la c e d in re a so n a b le

a p p re h e n sio n b y th e ro bb e r’s c o n d uc t, re g a rd le ss o f th e ro b b e r’s a b ility a c tu a lly

to in flic t h a rm ” ).

Th e g e n e ra l a c c e p ta n c e o f th e se id e a s a s a m a tte r o f c rim in a l la w wa s n o t

lim ite d to th e fe d e ra l c o u rts. In 1 96 2

, th e se p rin c ip le s we re in c orp o ra te d in to th e

Mo d e l P e n a l Co d e , wh ic h p ro v id e d t h a t o n e c o m m itte d sim p le a ssa u lt b y

“ a tte m pt[in g ] b y ph y sic a l m e n a c e to p u t ano th e r in fe a r o f i mmi n e n t se rio u s

b o d ily in ju ry .” Mo d e l P e n a l Co d e § 2 1 1 .1 (1 ) (c ). M o re o v e r, by th e la te 1 9 6 0 s,

m o st Am e ric a n ju risd ic tio n s h a d c o m e to re c o gn iz e c rim in a l a ssa u lt b y a n a c t

a ro u sin g a

p p re h e n sio n o f im m in e n t in ju ry , a s we l l a s th e tra d itio na l so rt o f

c rim in a l a ssa u lt in v o lv in g a n a tte m pt to in flic t in

ju ry

. Se e Be ll, 5 0 5 F 2 d a t 5 4 0

(c itin g c rim in a l la w tre a tise s p u b lish e d in th e 1 9 3 0 s, 1 9 4 0 s, 1 9 5 0s, a n d 1 9 6 0 s).

In th o se ju risd ic tio n s, a c r i mi n a l a s sa u lt “ c o n siste d e ith e r o f a n a c tu a l a tte m p t

to c o m m i t a b a t t e ry o r o f a n in te n tio n a l su b je c tio n o f an o th e r to re a so n a b le

1 2a

p p re h e n sio n o f re c e iv in g a b a tte ry .” Co m m e nta rie s to th e M o d e l P e n a l Co d e ,

P a rt II, § 2 1 1 .1

, c o m m e n t (1 ) (b ) (1 98 0 ). As o n e m o d e rn c o m m e n ta to r ha s

n o te d,

It is so m e tim e s sta te d th a t th is ty p e o f a ssa u lt is c o m m itte d b y a n a c t (o r by a n un la wfu l a c t) wh i c h re a so n a b ly c a u se s a n oth e r to fe a r im m e d ia te b o d ily ha rm

. Th is sta te m e n t is n o t q u ite a c c u r a t e , h o we ve r, fo r o n e c a n n o t ( i n t h o se ju risd ic tio n s wh ic h h a v e e xte n d e d
th e to rt c o n c ep t o f a s sa u lt to c rim in a l a ssa u lt) c o m m it a c rim in a l

a ssa u lt by n e glig e n tly or e v e n re c k le ssly o r ille g a lly a c tin g in su c h

a wa y (a s with a g u n o r a c a r) a s to c a u se a n oth e r p e rso n to be c o m e

a p p re he n siv e o f be in g stru c k. Th e re m u st b e a n a c tu a l in te n tio n to

c a u se a p p re h e n sio n , u n le ss th e re e xists th e m o ra lly wo rse in te n tio n
to c a u se b o d ily h a rm

.

Wa y n e R. L a F a ve , 2 S u b sta n tiv e Crim in a l La w § 1 6 .3 (b ) (2 n d e d

. 2 0 0 3 )

(fo otn o te s o m itte d ). S ee a l s o 6 A CJS Assa u lt § 8 2 (“ Ge n e ra lly

, a n in te n t to

in ju re o r to c a

use a re a so n a

b le a p p re h e n sio n o f b o d ily i n j u ry is a n e sse n tia l

e le m e n t of th e o ffe n se .” (F o o tn o te o m itte d )); 6 Am Ju r2 d Assa u lt a nd Ba tte ry §

1 7 (“ [A] ssa u lt o f th e in te n tio n a l frig h te n in g v arie ty is a sp e c ific in te n t c rim e

. It

mu s t b e p ro v e d th a t th e d e fe n d a n t in te n d e d to c re a te a n a pp re h e n sio n in th e

v ic tim b y th re a te n in g c o n d u c t.” (F o o tn o te s o m itte d )).

Th e se tre n d s p l a y e d o u t in Ge o rg ia a s we ll. In 18 33

, th e Ge n e ra l

Asse m bly e n a c te d a P e n a l Co d e th a t d e fin e d a ssa u lt a s “ a n a tte m p t to c o m m it

1 3a v io le n t in

ju ry o n th e p e rso n o f a n o th e r,” Ga

. L. 1 8 3 3

, p

. 1 5 3

, c o nsiste n t with

t h e n o tio n o f a c rim in a l a ssa u lt a t c o m m on la w in En g la n d

. F o r th e n e x t 1 3 5

y e a rs, o u r sta tu to ry la w de fin e d c rim in a l a ssa u lt e x c lu siv e ly in th o se te rm s. S e e ,

e .g ., Co d e o f 18 6 3

, § 4 2 5 6 ; Co d e o f 1 8 6 8, § 4 29 1; Co d e o f 1 8 7 3

, § 4 3 5 7 ; Co d e

o f 1 8 8 2

, § 4 35 7; P e n a l Co d e o f 1 8 9 5

, § 9 5 ; P e n a l Co de of 1 9 1 0

, § 9 5 ; Co d e o f

1 9 3 3, § 2 6 -1 4 0 1

. E v e n s o , th is Co u rt in se v e ra l c a se s e n d o rse d th e id e a th a t

c rim in a l a ssa u lt wa s n o t lim ite d to c irc um sta n c e s in wh ic h th e a c c u se d h a d a n

“ a c tu a l p re se n t a

b ility ” to in flic t in

ju ry , b u t e x te n d e d a s w e ll to c a se s in wh ic h

th e a c c u s e d h a d “ a re a so n a b ly a p p a re nt p re se n t a

b ility

, so a s to c re a te a n

a p p re h e n sio n th a t th e in

ju ry m a y b e in flic te d .” T h o m a s v

. S ta te , 9 9 Ga . 3 8

, 4 2

(2 6 S E 7 4 8) (1 8 9 6 ) (c ita tio n o m itte d ).

Alth o u g h th e se c a se s we re d e c id e d u n d e r sta tu to ry la w th a t d e fin e d

c rim in a l a ssa u lt so le ly in te rm s o f a n a tte m pte d ba tte ry , th e y a re fa r m o re

c o n siste n t with th e n o tio n o f c rim in a l a ssa u lt as a n a c t th a t p la c e s a n o th e r in

re a so n a b l e a

p p re h e n sio n of a

n im m in e n t a n d v io le n t in ju ry

. F o r in sta n c e , th is

Co u rt h e ld in Cru m

b le y v . S ta te

, 6 1 Ga

. 5 8 2

, 5 8 4 (1 8 7 8 ), th a t firin g a sh o tg u n

to wa rd th e e n g in e e r o f a pa ssin g lo c o m otiv e — a n a c t th a t p r o d u c e d a v isib le

re sp o n se fro m th e e n g in e e r — wa s a n a ssa u lt, n o twith sta n d in g th a t th e sh o tg u n

1 4wa s o n ly lo a d e d with po w d e r a n d wa s n o t, th e re fo re , a c tu a lly c a p a b le o f

in flic tin g in

j u ry fro m a d ista n c e

. Lik e wise

, in Th o m a s, th is Co u rt a ffirm e d a n

a ssa u lt c o n v ic tio n u p o n e v id e n c e th a t th e a c c u se d h a d th re a te n e d to b e a t a

wo m a n a b o u t th e h e a d , ra ise d a stic k

, a n d sta rte d to wa rd h e r, n o twith sta n d in g

th a t th e a c c u se d n e v e r go t c lo se r to th e wo m a n th an a b ou t twe n ty -fiv e ste p s. 9 9

Ga

. a t 4 0 -4 1. In Ro bin so n v

. S ta te

, 1 1 8 Ga

. 7 5 0

, 7 5 0 ( 4 5 S E 6 20 ) (1 9 0 3 ), we

a ffirm e d a c o n v ic tio n fo r a ssa u lt in a c a se in wh ic h th e a c c use d dre w b a c k h is

h a n d a s if h e w e re a

b o u t to strik e th e v ic tim with a b o ttle th a t h e w a s g ra sp in g ,

c itin g Th o m a s a n d e xp la in in g th a t i t w a s fo r th e ju ry to d e c id e wh e th e r th e

a c c u se d h a d th e “ a

pp a re n t a b i l i t y” to strik e th e v ic tim

, “h is d e m o n stra tio n

c a u sin g h e r to e n te rta in re a so n a b le fe ar o f in

ju ry to se c u re h e r sa fe ty .” Alth o u g h

we a tte m p te d to c o u c h th e se de c isio n in te rm s o f a c rim in a l a ssa u lt a t c o m m o n

la w — e x a c tly a s th e sta tu to ry la w th e n d e fin e d c rim in a l a s s a u lt

—

c o m m e n ta to rs la te r wo u ld c o m e to re c o g n iz e th e se d e c isio n s a s a j u d ic ia l

re c o g n itio n o f a d iffe re nt so rt o f c rim in a l a ssa u lt, a ssa u lt by a n a c t p la c in g

a n o th e r in re a so na

b le a p p re h e n sio n of in

ju ry

. S e e , e .g ., Co m m e n ta r i e s t o th e

Mo d e l P e n a l Co de

, su p ra , P a rt II, § 2 1 1 .1

, n .1 9 (c itin g Cru m b le y a s su p p o rt fo r

th e p ro p o sitio n th a t m o st ju risd ic tio n s h a d d e fin e d c rim in a l a ssa u lt a s “e ith e r

. . .

1 5a n a c tu a l a tte m pt to c o m m it a b a tte ry o r

. . . a n in te n tio n a l su bje c tio n o f a n o th e r

to re a so n a

b le a p p re h e n sio n o f re c e iv in g a b a tte ry ” ).

In re c o g n iz in g c rim in a l a ssa u lt a s a n a c t th a t a ro use s a n a pp re h e nsio n o f

in ju ry , w e d i d n o t d isp e n se with th e re q u ire m e n t of a sp e c ific in te n t. To th e

c o n tra ry , in Cru m

b le y , a lth o u g h we a

p p e a r to h a v e a c c e p t e d th a t th e a c c u se d

h a d n o in te n t to a c tu a lly in flic t a n in ju ry , w e p o in te d o ut th a t h e h a d e x p re sse d

a n in te nt “ to ha v e a little fu n o u t o f th e e n g i n e e r , ” p re su m a b ly b y c a u sin g th e

e n g in e e r to a

p p re h e n d in

ju ry . 6 1 Ga . a t 5 84

. In Th om a s, we c ite d a p p ro v in g ly

a C a lifo rn ia d e c isio n a

n d two En g lish c a se s fo r th e p ro p o sitio n th a t a n a p p a re n t

a b ility to in flic t in

ju ry wa s su ffic ie n t, b u t we n o te d th a t, in e a c h of th o se c a se s,

th e a c c u se d ha d a

n in te n t to in flic t in

ju ry

. S e e 9 9 Ga

. a t 4 3 (c ita tio n s o m itte d ).

An d in Do rse y v. S ta te

, 1 0 8 Ga

. 4 7 7

, 4 7 9 ( 3 4 S E 1 3 5) (1 8 9 9 ), we sta te d

e x p lic itly th a t, “ [t] o c o n stitu te a n a ssa u lt n o a c tu a l in ju ry n e e d b e sh o wn , it

b e in g on ly n e c e ssa ry to sh o w a n in te ntio n to c o m m it a n in ju ry , c o up le d with a n

a p p a re n t a b ility to d o so ,” c itin g Th o m a s. Ou r Co u rt o f Ap p e a ls lik e wise

u n d e rsto o d th e se d e c isio n s to re ta in th e re q u ire m e n t of sp e c ific in te nt. Se e , e .g .,

Ha rriso n v . S ta te , 6 0 Ga . Ap p

. 6 1 0 , 6 1 2 (1 ) (4 S E2 d 6 0 2 ) (1 9 3 9 ); Go d b o u lt v

.

S ta te

, 3 8 Ga

. Ap p. 1 3 7

, 1 3 8 (1 4 2 S E 7 0 4 ) (1 9 2 8 ); Ed wa rd s v

. S ta te

, 4 Ga

. Ap p

.

1 61 6 7

, 1 6 8-1 7 0 (1 ) (6 0 S E 1 0 3 3 ) (1 9 0 8 ). W ith th is h i s t o r i c a l c o n te x t in m in d

, I

tu rn n ow to th e e n a c tm e nt o f OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ).

(b ) A mi d co n c e rn s th a t th e e xistin g sta tu to ry la w w a s c o n trib u tin g to

“ c o n fu sio n in th e fie ld o f c rim in a l la w,” 5 th e G e n e ra l Asse m b ly c o m m issio n e d

a Crim in a l La w S tu d y Co m m itte e in 1 9 6 1 to u n d e rta k e a “ th o ro ug h stu d y o f th e

c rim in a l la ws” a n d to re c o m m e n d “a re v isio n o f th e la ws re la tiv e to c rim in a l la w

a n d pro c e d u re ,” with a n e y e to wa rd e lim in a tin g “ a m b ig u itie s a n d

in c o nsiste nc ie s.” Ga

. L. 1 9 6 1

, p

. 9 6

. Afte r se v e ra l y e a rs o f stu d y , th e S tu d y

Co m m itte e p ro p o se d a c o m pre h e n siv e re v isio n o f th e sta tu to ry la w th a t re ta in e d

“ a s m a ny [o f th e e x istin g sta tu te s] a s p o ssib le ,” b u t a lso re fle c te d th e d e c isio n s

o f th e G e o rg ia c o u rts in te rp re tin g th e e x istin g sta tu to ry la w, th e Mo d e l P e n a l

Co d e , a n d “ th e we ig h t o f th e a u th o rity in o th e r sta te s.” Ga

. Co d e An n

. b k . 1 0

,

tit. 2 6, p

. 3

, C rim in a l L a w S tu d y Co m m itte e F o re wo rd (Ha rriso n 1 9 8 8 ). 6 Ba se d

o n th e wo rk o f th e S tu d y Co m m itte e , th e Ge n e ra l Asse m b ly in 19 68 e na c te d a

c o m p re h e n siv e re v isio n o f th e c rim in a l la ws. S e e Ga . L. 1 9 68 , p . 1 2 4 9.

5 I n particular, t h e r e were concerns that much of the ex isting statutory law had become “completely obsolete

, ” that “many c riminal laws a re u nnecessarily verbose, some a re d ifficult of distinction, many are overlapping [ ,] and others are e x tremely difficult to interpret.” Ga. L

. 1961, p. 96.

6 The report and notes of the Study Committee formerly

were published in the Code.

1 7As a p a r t o f th a t re v isio n , th e Ge n e ra l Asse m b ly a d op te d th e p ro v isio n s

n o w c o difie d a t OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ), wh ic h re c o g n iz e sim ple a ssa u lts o f two

v a rie tie s. As p re se n tly c o d ifie d

, p a ra g ra p h (a ) (1 ) c a rrie s fo rwa rd th e n o tio n o f

c rim in a l a ssa u lt a s it wa s u n d e rsto o d a t c o m m o n la w a n d a s it h a d b e e n d e fin e d

in th e sta tu to ry la w of Ge o rg ia sin c e 1 83 3, p ro v id in g th at a n “ a t t e m p t[] to

c o m m it a v io le n t in

j u ry to th e p e rso n o f a n o th e r” is sim p le a ssa u lt. P a ra g ra

p h

(a ) (2 ), o n th e o th e r h a n d

, a d o p ts th e a lte rn a tiv e d e fin itio n o f c rim in a l a ssa u lt a s

a n “ a c t wh ic h p la c e s a no th e r in re a so n a b le a p p re h e n sio n o f imm e d ia te ly

re c e iv in g a v io le n t in

ju ry .” Alth o u g h th e 1 9 6 8 e n a c tm e n t m a rk s th e first e x p lic it

a c k n o wle d g m e n t in o u r sta tu to ry la w o f c rim in a l a ssa u lt b y a n a c t th a t a ro u se s

a re a so n a b le a p p re h e nsio n o f im m in e n t a nd vio le n t in ju ry , re c a ll th a t th is Co urt

a lre a d y h a d e ffe c tiv e ly re c o g n iz e d th a t so rt o f a ssa u lt b y ju dic ia l d e c isio n , e v e n

u n d e r sta tu to ry la w th a t d e fin e d a ssa u lt e x c lu siv e l y i n te rm s o f a n a tte m p t to

in flic t in ju ry

. Wh e n it p ro p o se d th is re v isio n o f th e sta tu to ry la w c o n c e rn in g

a ssa u lt, th e Crim in a l La w S tu d y Co m m itte e re p o rte d to th e Ge n e ra l Asse m b ly

th a t th e re v isio n “ is th e fo rm e r Ge o rg ia la w,” c itin g C ru m b le y a n d T h o m a s. Ga

.

Co d e An n

. b k

. 10

, Co m m itte e No te s, C h

. 2 6 -1 3

, p

. 3 5 9 (Ha rriso n 1 9 8 8 ).

1 8Mo re o v e r, th e C o m m itte e a c k n o wle d g e d th a t t h i s p ro p ose d re visio n a lso wa s

“ th e la w in a

m a jo rity o f th e A m e ric a n S ta te s.” Id

.

F o r th e pre se n t p u rp o se s, a fe w a d ditio n a l p ro v i s i o n s o f th e 1 9 6 8

e n a c tm e nt a re n o t ew o rth y

. Th e Ge n e ra l Asse m b ly fo r th e first tim e p ro v id e d

th a t a sim p le a ssa u lt “ with a de a d ly we a p on ” wa s a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt, a p ro v isio n

n o w c o d ifie d a t OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 1

. In lig h t o f th a t p ro v isio n , a n d c o n siste n t with

th e c h a rg e o f th e Crim in a l La w S tu d y Co m m itte e to a v oid in c o n siste n c ie s a n d

o v e r l a p p i n g l a w s , t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m

b l y c o n t e m

p o ra n e o u sly re p e a le d th e f o r m e r

sta tu te th a t m a d e “ sh o o tin g a t a n o th e r” a c rim e

. S e e Co d e o f 19 3 3

, § 2 6 -1 7 0 2

.

Th e 1 9 6 8 e n a c tm e n t, h o we v e r, c arrie d fo rwa rd th e p ro v isio n n o w c o d ifie d a t

OCGA § 1 6 -1 1-1 0 2

, w h ic h fo rb id s “ in te n tio n a lly a n d with o u t le g a l ju stific a tio n

p o in t[in g ] o r a im [in g ] a g u n o r p isto l a t a n o th e r, wh e th e r th e g u n o r p isto l is

lo a d e d o r u n lo a d e d .” An d fo r th e first tim e , th e Ge n e ra l A sse m b ly e n a c te d a

sta tu te c o n c e rn in g re c k le ss c o n d u c t, n ow c o d ifie d a t OCGA § 1 6

- 5

- 6 0 (b ),

wh ic h m a k e s it a m isd e m e a n o r fo r a ny p e rso n to “ c a u se [] b o d ily h a rm t o o r

e n d a n g e r[] th e b o d ily sa fe ty o f an o th e r pe rso n b y c o n sc io u sly disre g a rd in g a

su b sta n tia l a

n d u n ju stifia b le risk th a t his a c t o r o m iss i on will c a u se h a rm o r

e n d a n g e r th e sa fe ty o f th e o th e r p e rso n an d th e d isre g a rd c o nstitu te s a g ro ss

1 9d e v ia tio n fro m th e sta n d a rd o f c a re wh ic h a re a so n a b le p e rso n wo u ld e x e rc ise

in th e situ a tio n

. ” With th e se th in g s in m in d, I n o w tu rn ba c k to th e qu e stio n o f

th e in te nt re q u ire d fo r a

sim p le a ssa u lt u nd e r OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ).

(c ) To a n swe r th a t q u e stio n , o n e m u st a sc e rta in th e me a n i n g o f th e

sta tu to ry te x t, a s it wo u ld h a v e b e e n m o st n a tu ra lly a n d re a so n a bly u nd e rsto o d

a t th e m o m e n t o f i t s e n a c tm e n t in 1 9 68

. S e e Wa rre n , 2 94 Ga

. a t 5 9 0

. Th a t

m e a n in g c a n n o t b e d isc e rn e d sim p ly b y re a din g th e wo rd s o f OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0

(a ) (2 ) with c o n te m

p o ra ry e y e s a n d with ou t re g a rd to c o n t e x t

. Histo ry a n d

c o n te x t a lwa y s m a tte r, se e Ch a n , 2 9 6 Ga

. a t 8 3 9 (1 ), a n d in th is in sta n c e , h isto ry

a n d c o n te x t a re e v e ry th in g

.

Th e te x t o f OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ) sa y s n o th in g e xp lic it a b o u t t h e

re q u isite sta te o f m in d fo r a sim p l e a s s au l t b y a n a c t th a t a ro use s a re a so n a b le

a p p re h e n sio n o f im m in e n t a n d v io le n t in

ju ry

. 7 Bu t in Ge o rg ia la w, e v e ry c rim e

7 Contemporary ey es mig ht perceive an ex plicit reference to specific intent in OCGA § 16-5-
20 (a) (1), which speaks of an “attempt” to inflict a violent injury

, a nd having perceived such a reference, o ne mig ht infer that the absence of a like reference in OCGA § 1 6-5-20 (a) (2) was meant

to sig nal that an assault by a n act that arouses an apprehension of injury requires no such intent.
There are three reasons to d oubt the soundness of such a n inference. F irst, such a

n inference draws

upon the modern understanding that a criminal attempt necessarily involves a specific intent to commit the crime attempted. Recall, ho w e ver, that OCGA § 16-5-20 ( a) (1) carried forward verbatim

a p rovision that had been a part o f o ur statutory law since 1833, whereas the statutory law included

no g eneral pro v i s i o n for criminal attempts until the enactment of the 1968 revision. See OCGA §
16-4-1. The idea that OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1) can be properly understood by

reference to modern conceptions of criminal a ttempt is, therefore, hig h ly questionable. Second, recall as well that, even

2 0n e c e ssa rily m u st in v o lv e “ a jo in t o p e ra tio n o f a n a c t o r o m issio n to a c t a n d

in te ntio n o r c rim in a l ne g lig e n c e ,” OCGA § 1 6 -2 -1 (a ), a n d so , th e a bse n c e o f a n

e x p re ss p ro v isio n a

b o u t in te n t o r c rim in a l n e g l i g e n c e m e a n s on ly th a t th e

re q u isite sta te o f m in d is im p lie d

, a n d it is fo r th e c o u rts to d isc e rn th a t sta te o f

m in d

. He re , th e im

p lic a tio n se e m s c le a r e n o u g h . Th e te x t o f OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0

(a ) (2 ) p la in ly re fe rs to a fo rm o f c rim in a l a ssa u lt th a t first a p p e a re d in th e la w

o f to rts, h a d b e e n in c o rp ora te d o v e r tim e in to Am e ric a n c rim in a l la w ge n e ra lly

,

a n d h a d b e e n a c k n owle d g e d fo r m a ny y e a rs in th e d e c isio na l la w o f th is Co u rt.

By 1 9 6 8

, it wa s se ttle d in th e l a w o f t o r t s th a t th is fo rm o f a ssa u lt re q u ire d a

sp e c ific in te n t, e ith e r to in flic t in ju ry o r to a ro u se a n a

p pre he n sio n of in

ju ry

. S e e

g e n e ra lly P ro sse r, su p ra , a t § 1 0

. As th e c o nc e p t h a s b e e n in c o rp o ra te d in to

Am e ric an c rim in a l la w, it is e q u a lly se ttle d th a t it re q u ir es s u ch a n in te n t. S e e

g e n e ra lly La F a v e , su p ra , a t § 1 6 .3 (b ). An d a s it wa s re c o g n iz e d in th e d e c isio n a l

when the provision now codified at OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1) was the only way in which our statutory law defined criminal assault, this Court d ecided in Crumbley that an assault did not alway s require

a specific intent to actually inflict violent injury

, but instead could be p remised on a n intent to arouse apprehension of injury

. Crumbley is inconsistent wit h t he idea that the statutory reference to “attempt” was meant to c onvey the modern notion that an attempt a lway s requires a specific intent

to comm i t the crime attempted. F inally

, r ecall too that criminal assault by an act arousing apprehension was recog niz ed in our decisional law long before it was made a part of the statutory
law of Georg ia, and y et, our precedents never purported to d ispense with the requirement o f a specific intent. I d o not think that the refer e n c e to “attempt” in OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1) can be naturally or reasonably understood to sig n al any thing about the intent r equired for a simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2).

2 1la w o f Ge o rg ia

, it a p p e a rs to h a v e b e e n un de rsto o d to re q u ire a n in te n t to in flic t

in ju ry , se e Do rse y , 1 0 8 G a

. a t 4 7 9

, o r a t th e le a st, a n in te n t t o a r o u s e

a p p re h e n sio n

. S e e Cru m

b le y , 6 1 Ga

. a t 5 8 4

. Ge n e ra lly sp e a k in g ,

wh e re [th e l e g i s l a tu re ] b o rro ws te rm s o f a rt in wh ic h a re

a c c u m u la te d t h e l e g a l tra d itio n a n d m e a n in g o f c e n tu rie s o f

p ra c tic e , it p re su m a

b ly k n o ws an d a d o p ts th e c lu st e r o f id e a s th a t

we re a tta c h e d to e a c h b o rro we d wo rd in th e bo dy o f le a rn in g fro m

w h ic h it wa s ta k e n a n d th e m e a n in g its u se will c o nv e y to th e ju d ic ia l m in d un le ss o th e rwise in stru c te d

. In su c h c a se , a b se n c e o f

c o n tra ry d ir e c tio n m a y b e ta ke n a s sa tisfa c tio n with wid e ly a c c e p te d
d e fin itio n s, n o t a s a

d e p a rtu re fro m

th e m

.

Mo risse tte v

. Un ite d S ta te s, 3 4 2 U. S

. 2 4 6, 2 6 3 (I) (7 2 S Ct 2 4 0

, 9 6 L E 2 8 8 )

(1 9 5 2 ). Th e p ro v isio n o f OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ) re fe rs to a v a rie ty o f a ssa u lt

th a t wa s firm ly e n tre n c he d in A m e ric a n la w g e n e ra lly a n d re c o g n iz e d in th e

d e c isio n s o f th is Co u rt b y th e tim e th e sta tu te wa s e n a c te d

, a n d in th e a b se n c e

o f a n y e x p lic it p ro visio n o th e rwise

, th e sta tu te is m o st n a tu ra lly a n d re a so n a b ly

u n d e rsto o d to a d o pt th e in te n t re q u ire d u n d e r t h a t se ttle d b o d y o f p re e x istin g

la w.

T h e n o te s o f th e Crim in a l La w S tu d y Co m m itte e th a t a c c o m p anie d th e

l e g isla tio n a d o p tin g OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ) c o nfirm th a t it wa s, in fa c t

,

u n d e rsto o d in ju st th a t wa y a t th e tim e o f e n a c tm e n t. Ac c ord in g to th o se n o te s,

2 2th e p ro v isio n n o w c o d ifie d a t OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ) “ is th e fo rm e r Ge o rg ia

la w,” a n d in s u p p o rt o f th a t n o ta tio n , th e Co m m itte e c ite d Cru m

b le y a n d

Th o m a s. Eq u a lly sig n ific a n t, h a v in g u n d e rta k e n a c o m pre he n siv e stu d y o f n o t

o n ly e x istin g G e o rg ia la w , bu t a lso th e “ we ig h t o f th e a u th o rity in o th e r sta te s,”

th e Co m m itte e re p o rte d th a t th e sta tu te wa s c o n s i s t e n t w i th “ th e la w in a

m a jo rity o f th e A m e ric a n S ta te s.” With o u t a re qu ir e m e n t o f sp e c ific in te n t,

h o we v e r, th a t sim

p ly wo u ld n o t h a v e b e e n tru e

.

Oth e r p ro v isio n s o f th e 1 9 68 c o m pre he n siv e re v isio n o f th e c rim in a l la w s

a lso su p p o rt th is v ie w. Re c a ll th a t th e Ge ne ra l Asse m b ly a lso e na c te d sta tu te s

c o n c e rn in g re c k le ss c o nd uc t a n d th e in te n tio n a l p o in tin g o f a g u n a t a n o th e r a s

a p art o f th e 19 68 re v isio n

. Re c a ll a s we ll th a t th e re v isio n wa s in te n d e d

, a m o n g

o t h e r th in g s, to e lim in a te in c on siste n t a nd o v e rla p p in g la ws to th e e x te n t

p o ssib le

. If a ssa u lt un de r OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ) re q u ire d n o in te nt to in flic t

in ju ry o r a ro u se a

p p re h e n sio n, th e o v e rla

p b e twe e n th a t sta tu te a n d th e sta tu te s

c o n c e rn in g re c k le ss c o n d u c t a n d in te n tio n a lly p o in tin g a g u n a t a n o th e r wo u ld

b e su b sta n tia l, a s fu rth e r d isc u sse d la te r in th is d isse n t.

In v ie w o f th e sta tu to ry te x t a nd its re le v a n t c on te x t, OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a )

(2 ) is m o st n a tu ra lly a n d re a so n a bly un d e rsto od to re qu ire th a t a sim p le a ssa u lt

2 3b y an a c t th a t a ro use s a re a so na b le a p p re h e n sio n o f im m in e nt a n d v io le nt in ju ry

re q u ire s a n in te n t e ith e r to in flic t in ju ry o r to a ro u se a

p p re h e n sio n

. If we we re

writin g on a

c le a n sla te , I wo u ld re a d ily c o n c lu d e th a t su c h a sp e c ific in te nt is

a n e sse n tia l e le m e n t o f sim p le a ssa ult u n d e r OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) ( 2 )

. We a re

n o t, h owe v e r, writin g o n a c le a n sla te

. Ac c o rd in g ly

, I n o w tu rn to o u r p rio r

d e c isio n s to u c h in g upo n th is su b je c t.

3

. S ta rtin g with D u n a g a n , th is C o u rt ha s h e ld in se v e ra l c a se s th a t OCGA

§ 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ) re q u ire s o n ly a g e n e ra l in te n t to d o th e a c t t h a t h a p p e n s to

a ro u se a p p re h e n sio n. A p ro p e r c o n s i d e ra tio n o f th e se p re c e d e nts m u st b e g in

,

h o we v e r, with Rh od e s v

. S ta te

, 2 5 7 Ga

. 3 6 8 (3 5 9 S E2 d 6 7 0 ) (1 98 7 ), a d e c isio n

th a t p re d a te s Du n a ga n b y m o re th a n a d e c a d e

. In Rh o d e s, th e d e f e n da n t wa s

c o n v ic te d o f m a lic e m

u rd e r b y sh o o tin g , an d h e c la im e d o n a p p e a l th a t th e tria l

c o u rt sh o u ld h a v e c ha rg e d in v o lu n ta ry m a nsla u g h te r a s a le sse r in c lu d e d

o ffe n se , re a so nin g th a t h e h a d c a u se d th e d e a th o f th e v ic tim wh ile in t h e

c o m m issio n of in te n tio n a lly p o in tin g a g u n a t a n o th e r, a m isd e m e a n o r

. In

re je c tin g th is c la im o f e rro r, we e x p la in e d th a t th e e vid e nc e sh o w e d t h a t th e

d e fe n d a n t c om m itte d a gg ra v a te d a ssa u lt, n o t m e re ly th e c rim e o f po in tin g a g u n

a t a n o th e r. Ex a m in in g th e d iffe re n c e b e twe e n a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt b y a n a c t th a t

2 4p la c e s a n o th e r in re a so na b le a p p re h e n sio n o f in

ju ry a n d in te n tio n a lly po in tin g

a g u n a t a n o th e r, we sa id :

Th e a g g ra va te d a ssa u lt d e fin itio n in c lu d e s a n e le m e n t n o t c o nta in e d
in th e p o i n t in g o f a fire a rm d e fin itio n , sp e c ific a lly : a re su ltin g

re a so n a b le a p p re h e n sio n o f im m e dia te v io le n t in ju ry

. Th u s , if th e

v ic tim is no t p la c e d in re a so n a b l e a pp re h e nsio n o f im m e d ia te

v io le n t in ju ry b y th e po in tin g o f th e fire a rm , o n ly th e m isd e m e an o r

o f p o in tin g a fire a rm (a n d n o t th e fe lo n y of a gg ra v a te d a ssa u lt) h a s b e e n c o m m itte d

. (Th is wo u ld be th e c a se wh e re th e v i c t im wa s

c o m p le te ly u n a wa re th a t a fire a rm wa s p o in te d a t him

. O n th e o th e r h a n d

, if th e p o in tin g o f th e fire a rm p la c e d th e v ic tim in re a so na b le

a p p re he n sio n o f im m e d ia te v io le n t in ju ry , th e fe lo n y o f a g g ra va te d

a ssa u lt h a s o c c u rre d .)

2 5 7 Ga . a t 3 6 9 -3 7 0 (5 ).

In Du n a g a n , we qu o te d fro m th a t p a ssa g e in Rh o d e s: “ If th e p o in tin g o f

a fire arm p la c e s th e v ic tim in re a so n a b le a p p re h e n sio n o f im m e d ia te v io le n t

in ju ry , th e fe lo ny o f a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt h a s oc c u rre d.” 2 6 9 Ga

. a t 5 9 3 (2 ) (b )

(p u n c tu a tio n o m itte d ). Th e n, with o u t fu rth e r a n a ly sis, we h e ld th a t

a n a ssa u lt u n d e r [OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 )] lo o ks t o t h e v ic tim ’s

sta te o f m in d

, ra th e r th a n th e a c c u se d ’s, to e sta b lish th e e le m e n ts o f

a n a ssa u lt. Th e re is a n in te n t o f th e a c c use d th a t m ust b e sh o w n , b u t it is o n ly th e c rim in a l in te n t to c o m m it th e a c ts wh ic h c a use d th e

v ic tim to b e re a so n a

b ly a p p re h e n siv e o f re c e iv in g a v io le n t in ju ry ,

n o t a n y u n d e rly in g in te n t o f th e a c c u se d in a ssa u ltin g th e v ic tim

.

2 5Id

. a t 5 9 4 (2 ) (b ). 8 S u b se q u e n t c a se s in wh ic h th is C o u rt h e ld th a t OCGA § 1 6 -5

-

2 0 (a ) (2 ) re q uire s o n ly a g e n e ra l in te n t to d o th e a c t th a t a ro u se s a p p re h e n sio n

lik e w ise tra c e b a c k to e ith e r Du n a g a n or Rh o d e s, a n d n o n e o f th e la te r

a u th oritie s a d d s a n y th in g m e a n in g fu l to th e an a ly sis. S e e , e .g ., S to bb art v

. S ta te

,

2 7 2 G a

. 60 8

, 6 1 1 -6 1 2 (3 ) (5 3 3 S E2 d 3 7 9 ) (2 0 0 0 ) (c itin g Du n a g a n ); Ja c k so n v

.

S ta te

, 2 7 6 Ga

. 4 0 8

, 4 1 2

, n .5 (5 7 7 S E 2 d 5 7 0 ) (2 0 0 3) (c itin g D u n a g a n); F lo re s v

.

S ta t e , 2 7 7 Ga

. 7 8 0

, 7 84 (3 ) (5 9 6 S E2 d 1 1 4 ) (2 0 04 ) (c itin g Ja c k so n ); S m ith v

.

S ta te

, 2 80 Ga

. 4 9 0

, 49 1 -4 9 2 (1 ) (6 2 9 S E 2 d 8 1 6 ) (2 0 0 6 ) (c itin g lin e o f Co u rt o f

Ap p e a ls c a se s th a t wa s re fe re n c e d in Du na g a n a n d th a t le a d s b a c k to Rh o d e s);

Dry d e n v

. S ta te

, 2 8 5 G a

. 2 8 1

, 2 8 2 (6 7 6 S E2 d 17 5 ) (2 0 0 9 ) (c itin g Ja c k so n);

Gu y se , 28 6 Ga

. a t 5 7 7 (2 ) (c itin g Ja c kso n ); Wa lk e r v

. S ta te

, 2 9 3 Ga

. 7 0 9

, 7 1 2

-

7 1 3 (2 ) (b ) (7 4 9 SE2 d 6 6 3 ) (2 0 1 3 ) (c itin g Ja c k so n ); Alla be n v . S ta te

, 2 9 4 Ga

.

3 1 5

, 3 2 1 (2 ) (b ) (1 ) (7 5 1 S E2 d 8 0 2 ) (2 0 1 3 ) (c itin g Ja c k so n a n d Wa lk e r); S ta te

8 The only other authorities cited in Dunag an for these p ropositions are two decisions of our Court of Appeals, Gilbert v. State, 209 G a. App. 483 (433 SE2d 664) (1993), and Osborne v. State,
228 Ga. App. 758 (492 SE2d 732) (1997). Neither adds much to the reliance upon Rhodes. Gilbert
does not address the intent o f the accused, and it say s without any citation of supporting authority
that “[ i] t is the reasonable apprehension of harm b y t h e v i c t i m of a n assault by u se of a deadly

weapon that establishes the c rime of ag g ravated assault.” 209 Ga. App. a t 484 (1). Osborne, on the
other hand, is part of a line of cases that u ltimately leads back to Rhodes itself. See 228 Ga. App. at
759 (citing J ordan and Matthews, infra); Matthews v. State, 224 Ga. App. 407, 408 (1) (481 SE2d 235) (1997) (citing J ordan, infra); J ordan v. State, 214 Ga. App. 598, 600 (1) (448 SE2d 917) (1994) (citing W i l l i a m s , i n fra); W illiams v. State, 208 Ga. App. 1 2, 13 (430 SE2d 157) (1993) (citing Rhodes).

2 6v

. Owe n s, 2 9 6 Ga

. 2 0 5

, 2 1 0 (3 ) (a ), n

. 1 4 (7 6 6 SE2 d 6 6 ) (2 0 1 4 ) (c itin g Ja c k so n ).

In th e e n d

, th e so u n d n e s s o f th e an a ly sis in Du n a g a n a n d its pro ge n y re sts

e n tire ly u p o n th e id e a th a t Du n a g a n u nd e rsto o d Rh od e s c o rre c tly

. Up o n fu rth e r

re fle c tio n , h o we v e r, it is c le a r th a t Du n a g a n d id n ot.

Rh o de s p la in ly h o ld s th a t th e a p pre he n sio n o f th e v ic tim is a n e le m e n t th a t

d istin g u ish e s a

n a gg ra va te d a ssa u lt b y po in tin g a g u n a t a n o th e r a n d a ro u sin g

a p p re h e n sio n o f in

ju ry fro m th e c rim e o f m e re ly p o in tin g a g u n a t a no th e r, a n d

t h a t c e rta in ly is tru e e n o u g h

. Bu t R h od e s d id n o t e x plic itly sta te th a t t h i s

d istin c tio n w a s th e o n ly d istin c tio n b e twe e n th e se o ffe nse s. M o re im p o rta n t,

Rh o d e s sa id n o th in g a t a ll a b o u t th e sta te o f m in d re q u ire d fo r a n a ssa ult b y a n

a c t t h a t a ro u se s a re a so n a ble a p p re h e n sio n o f im m in e n t a n d v io le n t in ju ry

.

P e rh a p s th a t is be c a

u se Rh o d e s wa s a c a se in wh ic h th e d e fe n d a n t in disp u ta b ly

h a d a sp e c ific in te n t to a ro u se a p p re h e n sio n, a n d so , n o p a rty ra ise d a q u e stio n

a b o u t th e re q u isite in te n t. In th e p a ra g ra p h of Rh o d e s im m e dia te ly fo llo win g th e

p a ssa g e up o n wh ic h Du n a g a n re lie d , we sa id :

Rh o de s’ a c t wa s c l e a rly th e fe lo ny o f a g gra v a te d a ssa u lt. Th e
te stim o n y sh o we d th a t [th e v ic tim ]

, a s we ll a s th e th re e p a sse n ge rs in h is c a r, we re a wa re o f a n d un de rsta n d a b ly a p p re h e n siv e o f
im m e d ia te v io le n t in

ju ry

. Rh od

e s’ own te stimo ny ( “I wa s sh o win g th e g u n t o h im so h e w o u ld le a v e me a lo n e .” ) re v e a le d th a t h is

2 7p u rp o se in p o in tin g th e we a p o n wa s to p la c e [

th e v ic tim] in

a p p re h e n sio n o

f imme d ia te v io le n t in

ju ry

. T he re q u e st fo r a c h a rg e

o n m isd e m e a n o r m a n sla u g h te r p ro p e rly wa s d e nie d

.

2 5 7 Ga

. a t 3 7 0 (6 ) (e m

p h a sis su p p lie d ). Ou r sp e c ific re fe re n c e to th e in te n t o f

th e d e fe n d a n t c ou ld b e ta k e n to im p ly th a t th e Co urt in Rh od e s th o u g h t th a t su c h

a n in te n t wa s e sse n tia l to a n a ssa u lt b y a n a c t a ro u sin g re a so n a b le a pp re h e n sio n

.

Bu t in an y e v e n t, th a t re fe re n c e m a k e s pe rfe c tly c le a r th a t R h o d e s c a n n o t fa irly

b e c h a ra c te riz e d a s h o ld in g th a t su c h in te n t i s no t a n e le m e n t o f a ssa u lt u n d e r

OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ). S e e S ta te v

. W a lk e r, 2 9 5 Ga

. 8 8 8

, 8 9 3 (7 64 S E2 d 8 0 4 )

(2 0 1 4 ) (“ We h a v e re p e a te d ly c a u t i o n e d t h a t o u r d e c isio n s sta n d o n ly fo r th e

p o i n t s ra ise d b y th e p a rtie s a nd d e c id e d b y th e c ou rt. Qu e stio n s wh ic h m e re l y

lu rk in th e re c o rd , n e ith e r b ro u g h t to th e a tte n tio n of th e c o u rt n o r ru le d u p o n ,

a re n o t to b e c o n sid e re d a s h a v in g b e e n so d e c id e d a s to c o n stitu te p re c e d e n ts.”

(Cita tio n s a n d p u n c tu a tio n o m itte d)).

4

. Ev e n so , Du n a ga n a

n d its p ro g e n y a re p re c e de n ts o f th is Co urt, a n d we

o rd in a rily “ a dh e re to th e prin c ip le o f sta re d e c isis, w h ic h d ire c ts th e c o u rts to

sta n d b y th e ir p rio r d e c isio n s.” S m ith v

. S ta te

, 2 9 5 Ga

. 1 2 0

, 12 1 (7 5 7 S E2 d 8 6 5 )

(2 0 1 4 ). To b e su re , “ [t] h e a pp lic a tio n o f th e do c trin e of sta re d e c isis is e sse n tia l

to th e p e rfo rm a

n c e o f a we ll-o rd e re d sy ste m o f ju risp ru d e n c e .” Etk in d v

. S u a re z ,

2 82 7 1 Ga . 3 52 , 3 5 7 (5 ) (5 1 9 SE2 d 2 1 0) (1 9 9 9 ) (c ita tio n o m itte d). S e e a lso S ta te

v

. Ja c k so n , 2 8 7 Ga . 6 4 6 , 6 5 8 (5 ) (6 9 7 SE2 d 7 5 7 ) (2 0 1 0 ). As th e U n ite d S ta te s

S u p re m e Co u rt h a s e x p la in e d,

[v ] e ry we ig h ty c on sid e ra tio n s u n d e rlie th e p rin c ip le th a t c o u rts sh o u ld n o t lig h tly o v e rru l e p a s t d e c isio n s. Am o n g th e se a re th e d e sira b ility th a t th e la w fu rn ish a c le a r g u id e fo r t h e c o n d u c t o f
in d iv idua ls, to e n a

b le t h em to p la n th e ir a ffa irs with a ssu ra n c e

a g a in st u n to wa rd su rp rise ; th e im p o rta n c e o f fu rth e rin g fa ir a n d

e x p e d itio u s a dju d ic a tio n b y e lim in a tin g th e n e e d to re litig a te e v e ry

re le v a n t p ro po sitio n in e v e ry c a se ; a n d th e n e c e ssity o f m a in ta in in g
p u b lic fa ith in th e ju d ic ia ry a s a so u rc e o f im p e rso n a l a n d re a so n e d ju d g m e n ts.

Mo ra g n e v

. S ta te s Ma rin e Lin e s, 3 9 8 U. S

. 3 75

, 4 0 3 (IV) (9 0 S Ct 1 7 7 2

, 2 6

LE2 d 3 3 9 ) ( 1 9 7 0 ). Th a t sa id

, “ sta re d e c isis is no t a n in e x o ra b le c o m m a n d ,”

Ja c k so n , 2 8 7 G a

. a t 6 5 8 (5 ) (c ita tio n a n d p u n c tu a tio n o m itte d ), a n d “ so m e tim e s,

th e re a re c o m

p e llin g re a so n s to re e x a m in e a n e a rlie r de c isio n .” S m ith

, 2 9 5 Ga

.

a t 1 2 2

. A f

t e r a l l, “ [w] isd o m to o o fte n n e v e r c o m e s, a n d so on e o u g h t n o t to

re je c t it m e re ly b e c a

u se it c o m e s la te .” H e n sle e v

. Un io n P la n te rs Na t. Ba n k &

Tru st Co

., 3 3 5 U. S

. 5 9 5

, 60 0 (6 9 SCt 2 9 0

, 9 3 L E 2 59 ) (1 9 4 9 ) (F ra n k fu rte r, J.,

d isse ntin g ). S e e a lso Die tz v. Bo u ld in

,

_ _ _ U. S

.

_ _ _ ,

_ __ (1 3 6 SCt 1 8 8 5

, 1 9 5

LE2 d 1 6 1 ) (2 0 1 6 ) (“ All ju d g e s m a k e m ista k e s. (Ev e n u s.)” ). Wh e n w e h a v e

o c c a sio n to c o n sid e r wh e th e r a p re c e d e n t o f th is Co u rt ou g h t to b e re e x a m in e d

,

2 9we c o n sid e r a n u m b e r of fa c to rs, in c lu d i n g “ t h e a g e o f th e p re c e d e n t, th e

re lia nc e in te re sts in v o lv e d, th e wo rk a b ility o f th e p r i o r d e ci sio n , a n d m o st

im p o rta n tly

, th e so u n d n e ss o f its re a so n in g .” S ta te v

. Hu d so n , 2 9 3 Ga

. 6 5 6

, 6 6 1

(7 4 8 SE2 d 9 1 0 ) (2 0 1 3 ) (c ita tio n a n d p u n c tu a tio n o m itte d). “ W e a l s o c o n sid e r

th e e a se with wh ic h th e P e o p le a n d th e ir e le c te d re p re se n ta tiv e s m ig h t o v e rru le

o u r p re c e d e n ts, if th e y th in k th e m in c o rre c t.” Le je un e v. Mc L a

u g h lin

, 2 9 6 Ga

.

2 9 1

, 2 9 8 (2 ) (7 6 6 SE2 d 8 0 3 ) (2 0 1 4 ). “In th e e n d, w e a lwa y s m ust b a la n c e th e

im p o rta n c e o f h a v in g th e q u e stio n de c id e d a g a in st th e im

p o rta nc e o f h a v in g it

d e c id e d rig h t .” S m ith

, 2 95 Ga . a t 1 2 2 (c ita tio n o m itte d ; e m p h a sis in o rig in a l).

With th e se p rin c ip le s in m in d

, I tu rn n ow to th e q u e sti o n o f sta re d e c isis with

re sp e c t to Du n a g a n a n d its p ro g e n y

.

As fo r th e a ge o f th e p re c e de n ts, Du n a g a n wa s d e c id e d o nly 1 8 y e a rs a g o ,

a n d m o st o f its pro g e n y wa s h a n d e d d o wn in th e la st te n y e a rs. Mo re o v e r, m a n y

o f t h e se c a se s in v o lv e d m

u tu a lly e x c lu siv e v e rd ic ts, d isc u sse d th e in te nt e le m e n t

o f a ssa u lt o n ly in th a t c o n te x t, se e , e .g ., Ja c k so n , 2 7 6 Ga

. a t 4 1 2 (2 ), n .5

, a n d

a lre a d y h a v e be e n o v e rru le d b y th is Co urt with re sp e c t to th e ir h o ld in g s a b o u t

m u tu a lly e x c lu siv e v e rd ic ts. S e e S ta te v

. S prin g e r, 2 9 7 G a

. 3 7 6

, 3 8 3 (2 ) (7 7 4

S E2 d 1 0 6 ) (2 0 1 5 ) (o ve rru lin g Ja c k so n , F lo re s, Dry de n , Wa lk e r, a n d Alla b e n ).

3 0R e v i s i t i n g D u n a g a n a n d its p ro g e ny , th e re fo re , wo u ld no t d istu rb p re c e d e n ts th a t

a re firm ly e sta

b lish e d a n d we ll se ttle d in o u r ju risp ru d e n c e

. S e e , e .g ., Le je u n e ,

2 9 6 Ga

. a t 29 8 -2 9 9 (2 ) (o v e rru lin g 4 3-y e a r o ld p re c e d e n t a n d its p r o g e n y );

Ge o rg ia De pt. of Na tu ra l Re so u rc e s v

. Ce n te r fo r a S u sta in a b le Co a st, 2 9 4 Ga

.

5 9 3

, 6 0 1 (2 ) (7 5 5 S E2 d 1 8 4 ) (2 0 1 4 ) (o v e rru lin g p re c e d e n t th a t wa s “ le ss th a n

2 0 y e ars o ld ” a n d c itin g c a se s in wh ic h th e Co u rt o v e rru le d pre c e d e n ts th a t we re

2 9 a n d 9 0 y e a

rs o ld ); Hu d so n , 2 9 3 Ga

. a t 6 56 -6 5 7 (u n a n i mo u s d e c isio n

o v e rru lin g 38 -y e a r old p re c e d e n t). In a n y e v e n t, “ w ith o u t m ore , th a t w e h a v e

b e e n w r o n g f

o r m a n y y e a

rs a n d in m a n y c a se s is n o re a so n to p e rsist in th e

e rro r.” Le je u n e , 2 9 6 Ga . a t 2 9 8 -2 99 (2 ) (c ita tio n s o m itte d ).

Wh e n th e c o u rts sp e a k o f re lia n c e in te re sts in th e c o n te x t o f sta re d e c isis,

th e y re fe r to c o n tra c t in te re sts, p ro p e rty rig hts, a n d o th e r su bsta ntiv e rig h ts. S e e

Ja c k so n , 2 8 7 Ga

. a t 6 5 8 (5 ). S e e a lso Hu dso n , 2 9 3 Ga

. a t 6 6 1

. Th e p ro p e r

u n d e rsta n d in g o f a s t a

t u t e d e f i n i n g c r i m in a l a ssa ult o rd in a rily im p lic a te s n o su c h

in te re sts, a

n d th e S ta te h a s id e n tifie d no re lia n c e in te re sts in t h i s c a s e

. To th e

c o n tra ry , a t o ra l a rg u m e n t, th e S ta te c o n c e d e d th a t, if we we re to c o n c lu d e th a t

Du n a g a n a n d its p ro g e n y a re o ut o f ste p with th e m o st n at u r a l a n d re a so n a b le

u n d e rsta n d in g of OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ) a s o f th e time o f i t s e n a c tm e n t, we

3 1o u g ht to a d h e re to th a t u n d e rsta n d in g o u t o f d e fe re n c e to th e le g isla tu re ,

n o twith sta n d in g o u r p re c e d e nts.

Ab o u t th e p ra c tic a lity o f th e p re c e d e n ts, Du na g a n a n d its p ro g e n y la y

d o wn a c le a r a n d b rig h t ru le

— th e o n ly in te nt re q u ire d u n d e r OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0

(a ) (2 ) is th e in te n t to d o th e a c t th a t h a p p e n s to p la c e a n o th e r in a p p re h e n sio n

o f in ju ry — th a t c a n b e a

p p lie d in pro se c u tio n s fo r a ssa u lt with o u t m u c h

d iff i c u l t y

. Th e p re c e de n ts, h o we v e r, are u n wo rk a b le in an o th e r re sp e c t. In a

re c e n t c a se , Ju d g e C o sta o f th e F ifth Circ u it n o te d th a t, a s c on stru e d b y Du n a g a n

a n d its pro g e ny , OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 ( a ) ( 2 ) “ p ro h ib its e ve n n e g lig e n tly c a u sin g

a p p re h e n sio n o f im m in e n t v io le n t in ju r y , ” w h i c h r e n d e rs th e sta tu te a n “ o u tlie r.”

Un ite d S ta te s v

. To rre s-Ja im e , 2 0 1 6 U. S

. Ap p. LEXIS 7 2 7 1

, * 2 5 (5 th Cir. 2 0 1 6 )

(Co sta

, J., d isse n tin g ). Un d e r Du n a g a n a n d its p ro g e n y , h o w e v e r, th e sta tu te is

e v e n m o re o f a n o u tlie r th a n Ju d g e Co sta su sp e c te d

.

Ac c o rd in g to o u r p re c e d e n ts, a ll th a t is re q u ire d fo r a sim p le a ssa u lt u n d e r

OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ) is a g e n e ra l in te n t to d o th e a c t. It a p p e a rs th a t th e a c t

itse lf n e e d n o t b e o th e rwise u n la wfu l, in he re n tly wro n gfu l, o r un re a so n a b ly

d a n g e ro u s. S o lo ng a s o n e in te n d e d th e a c t, h e h a s c o m m itte d a sim p le a ssa u lt

if it h a p pe n s to pu t a

n o th e r in re a so n a

b le a p p re h e nsio n o f an i mmi n e n t a n d

3 2v io le nt in

ju ry

. T h a t is tru e wh e th e r o r no t he in te n d e d to in flic t in ju ry or a ro use

su c h a pp re h e n sio n, wh e th e r o r n o t h e k n e w t h a t in ju ry o r a p pre h e n sio n wa s

su b sta n tia lly c e rta in

, wh e th e r o r n o t h e wa s c o n sc io us o f e v e n a risk th a t su c h

in ju ry o r a p p re h e n sio n m ig ht o c c u r, an d wh e th e r o r n ot he sh o u ld h a v e k n o wn

o f su c h a risk

. It a lso is tru e wh e th e r o r n o t i n j u r y o r a p p re h e nsio n wa s

fo re se e a b le a t a ll. Ev e n if a

n e x c e e d in gly c a re fu l a n d c o n sc ie n tio u s pe rso n we re

to ta k e e v e ry re a so n a

b le p re c a u tio n to e n s u r e t h a t h is a c t wo u ld ne ith e r in ju re

a n o th e r n o r a ro u se a

p p re h e n sio n o f in

ju ry , if h e m isse d so m e th in g th ro u g h n o

fa u lt o f h is o wn , a n d if h is a c t, a s a re su l t

, h a p p e n s to p ro du c e a re a so n a b le

a p p re h e n sio n o f im m in e nt a n d v io le nt in ju ry , h e wo u l d a p p e a r to h a v e

c o m m itte d a sim

p le a ssa u lt un d e r Du n a ga n a n d its p ro g e n y . Th ose p re c e d e n ts

h o ld , a fte r a ll, th a t o nly th e in te n t to d o th e a c t m a tte rs.

Wo rse still, if a n a c t in v o lv e s th e u se o f a d e a d ly we a p o n o r a n ob

je c t th a t

is re a so n a bly lik e ly to c a

u se se rio u s in

ju ry — a fire a rm o r a m o to r v e h ic le

, fo r

i n sta n c e — th e a ssa u lt will a m o u n t to a n a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt. To illu str a t e ,

su p p o se th a t y o u a re d riv in g d o wn a n In te rsta te h ig h wa y , a n d y o u in te n tio n a lly

ste e r y ou r c a r in to a n a d

ja c e n t la n e , h a vin g c a re fu lly c he c k e d to se e th a t th e la n e

is u n o c c up ie d a n d th a t y o u m ig h t sa fe ly c h a n g e la n e s. I f y o u misse d a n o th e r

3 3v e h ic le in y o ur b lin d sp ot, a nd i f b y e n c r o a c h in g u p o n its la n e , y o u c a u se th e

d riv e r of th e o th e r v e h ic le to a p p re h e n d a n im m in e n t a n d v io le n t in ju ry , y o u

h a v e c o m m itte d a

n a s s au l t u n d e r Du n a ga n a n d its p ro g e n y , o n e th a t m a y w e ll

b e a g gra v a te d b y y o u r u se o f th e v e h ic le

. Or su p po se th a t y o u b e g in to p u ll o u t

o n to a b u sy ro a dwa y , b u t y o u sto p sh o rt a fte r re a liz in g th a t o n c o m in g tra ffic wa s

a p p ro a c h in g m o re q u ic k ly th a n y ou o rig in a lly h a d th ou g h t. T h e se so rts o f th in g s

h a v e h a p p e n e d to m o st o f u s. In m o st in sta n c e s, we re a c t q u ic k ly e n ou gh (o r th e

o th e r d riv e r d o e s) to a v o i d a n y p h y sic a l h a rm

. Bu t u n d e r Du na g a n a n d its

p ro g e n y , if su c h a c ts h a

p p e n to p u t an o th e r in re a so n a b le a p p r e h e n sio n o f a n

im m in e n t a n d v io le n t in

ju ry , we h a v e c o m

m itte d a n a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt. Un d e r

th e p re c e d e n ts o f th i s C o u r t

, m o st fa rm e rs a nd te a c h e rs, p e a c e o ffic e rs a n d

p re a c he rs, la wy e rs, a nd m e m b e rs o f th is Co u rt, a s we ll a s m an y m e m b e rs o f th e

Ge n e ra l Asse m

b ly

, w o u ld b e fe lo n s, sa v e d fro m p ro se c utio n o nly b y th e g ra c e

o f a p ro se c u tin g a tto rn e y

. 9

9 At oral arg ument, the State ag reed that a prosecution upon such hy pothetical facts would

amount to a misuse of the statute, but the State failed to ex p lain why that is so if the statute means
what Dunag an and its prog eny h old. The State say s that the cases offer no e x a mples of such misuse, althoug h Patterso n m a y well take issue with that statement. I n any event, the position of the State
boils down to an arg ument that the courts should trust the g ood nature, sound judg ment, and g race of prosecuting attorney s. I h arbor no d oubt about the integ rity of prosecuting attorney s g enerally

, but that is not how courts ordinarily construe the criminal laws. See B ag g ett v. B ullitt, 377 U. S. 360,
3 7 3 (I I I ) (84 SCt 1316, 12 L E2d 377) (1964) (“I t will not do to say that a prosecutor’s se n s e o f

3 4Th e se illu stra tio n s su g g e st, o f c o u rse , th a t Du n a g a n a n d its p ro g e n y h a v e

c o n stru e d OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ) f a r m o re e xp a n siv e ly th a n th e Ge n e ra l

Asse m bly m ig h t re a so n a

b ly b e th o u g h t to h a v e i n te n de d wh e n it e n a c te d th e

sta tu te in 1 9 6 8

. Mo re im

po rta n t, h o we v e r, th e se illu stra tio n s sh o w th e p o te n tia l

fo r th e s t a t u t e to su b sta n tia lly d isp la c e oth e r p ro v isio n s of o u r c rim in a l la w.

Re c k le ss c o n d u c t, fo r in sta nc e , re q u ire s c o n d u c t th a t e x po se s a n o th e r to a risk

o f h a rm , se e OCGA § 1 6 -5 -6 0 (b ), b u t a s th is Co u rt h a s c o n stru e d OCGA § 1 6

-

5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ), in e v e ry c a se o f re c kle ss c on d u c t in wh ic h th e p e r s o n e x p o se d to

a risk o f h a

rm p e rc e iv e s th e e x p o su re a n d a p p re h e n d s a n im m in e n t a n d v io le n t

in ju ry , th e re c k le ss c o n d u c t a m o u n ts to a n a ssa ult. T he sa m e is tru e with re sp e c t

f a i r n e s s and the Constitution would prevent a successful perjury prosecution for some of the
activities seeming ly embraced within the sweeping statutory definitions.”); U nited States v. Moon

L ake E lec. Assn., 45 F Supp2d 1070, 1084 (I I I ) (b) (D. Colo. 1999) (“W hile prosecutors necessarily enjoy much discretion, proper construction of a criminal statute cannot depend upon the g ood will of those who must enforce it.”).
The majority likewise h ints that “ordinary behavior” perhaps mig h t not pro perly form the
b a sis for an ag g ravated assault, referring to the “ element” of “ when used o ffensively ag ains t a person.” I n the first place, this putative limitation would not apply at all to simple assaults, nor would
it apply to assaults ag g ravate d b y u s e o f a “deadly weapon,” a s opposed to an “object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively ag ainst a p er s o n , i s l ikely to o r actually d oes result in
serious b odily injury

. ” Second, it is n ot clear that the so-called element to which the majority refers
is any thing more than an essential characteristic of an “ object, device, or instrument” that may form
the basis for an ag g ravated a ssault u nde r f o r m er O C GA § 16-5-21 ( a ) (2). Most important, if the

purpose for which one uses an “ object, device, or instrument” is inconsequential
— and the majority
makes clear that such an intent is entirely irrelevant
— it is d ifficult to understand how a r equirement that the “object, device, or instrument” be used “offensively ” marks any meaning f

ul limitation. I n
any event, the decision to stand by Dunag an and its p rog eny portends g reat uncertainty and perhaps more jurisprudential incoherence to come.

3 5to re c k l e s s d r i v in g, se e OCGA § 4 0 -6 -3 90 (a ), a n d it is e q u a lly tru e o f th e

re c k le ss m isu se o f a fire a rm wh ile h u ntin g

. S e e OCGA § 1 6 -1 1 -1 0 8 (a ). As fo r

th e in te ntio n a l p o in tin g o f a fire a rm a t a n o th e r, se e OCGA § 1 6 -1 1 -1 0 2 , if th e

o th e r p e r s o n p e rc e iv e s th e p oin tin g a nd a p p re h e nd s in

ju ry , th e p o in tin g is a n

a g g ra v a t e d a ssa u lt, irre sp e c tiv e o f th e in te n t, k n o wle d g e , o r n e glig e n c e o f th e

a c c u se d. Esp e c ia lly b e c a

u se th e 1 9 6 8 re v isio n wa s in te nd e d in p a rt to e lim in a te

o r m in im iz e th e o v e rlap p in g o f sta tu te s, th e su b sta n tia l p o te n tia l fo r th e

d isp la c e m e n t o f oth e r c rim in a l la ws c a lls in to su b sta n tia l d o u b t th e wo rk a b ility

o f Du n a ga n a n d its p ro g e n y

.

As fo r th e a n a ly tic a l so u n d n e ss o f th e p re c e d e n ts, I h a v e sa id e n o u g h

a lre a d y

. Th e m a

jo rity to da y a tte m

p ts to p ro p u p th e se p re c e d e n ts b y re fe re n c e

to sta tu to ry te x t, b ut its a n a ly sis is la rg e ly in d iffe re n t to re le v a n t a n d im p o rta n t

sta tu to ry c o n te xt a n d is n o t, th e re fo re , c o m p le te o r c o n v in c in g

. Du na g a n a n d its

p ro g e n y a re b a se d o n a m isapp re h e n sio n o f Rh o d e s, th e y a re in c o nsiste n t with

th e m o st n a tu ra l a n d re a so n a b le u n d e rsta n d in g o f OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ), th e y

a re o u t o f ste p with th e u n d e rsta n d in g of c rim in a l a ssa ult in Am e r i c a n l a w

g e n e ra lly

, a nd th e y m a rk G e o rg ia a s a n o utlie r. T he y a re n ot firm ly e sta b lish e d

in o u r ju risp ru d e nc e , th e y im p lic a te n o m e a n in g fu l re lia nc e in te re sts, th e y

3 6th re a te n th e su b s t an tia l d isp la c e m e nt o f o th e r p ro v isio n s o f sta tu to ry la w, a n d

th e y re c o g n iz e a sp e c ie s o f a ssa u lt th a t a p p ro a c h e s stric t liab ility a n d is rip e fo r

m isu se an d a

b u se

. If th e sta tu to ry te x t we re m o st pro p e rly u n d e rsto o d in th e wa y

th a t D u n a g a n , its p ro g e n y , a n d th e ma jo rity to d a y su g g e st, th a t w o u ld b e o n e

th in g . Bu t th e te xt is m o re n a tu ra lly a n d re a so n a b ly u n d e rsto o d o th e rwise

.

Th a t th e Ge n e ra l Asse m

b ly m ig h t re a d ily a m e n d OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 )

to p ro sp e c tiv e ly o v e rtu rn Du n a g a n an d its p ro ge n y i s t he o nly fa c to r th a t

su p p o rts c o n tin uin g a d h e re n c e to th o se p re c e d e n ts. F o r th e m o st p a rt, th is is th e

fa c to r o n wh ic h th e m a

jo rity h a n g s its d e c isio n , g o in g so fa r a s to su g ge st th a t

th e Ge n e ra l A sse m

b ly e ffe c tiv e ly h a s ra tifie d Du n a g a n b y its fa ilu re to a m e n d

th e sta t u t e a n d r e q u ire a sp e c ific in te n t e xp lic itly

. It is o n e th in g to in fe r

le g isla tiv e a c q u ie sc e n c e wh e n th e Ge n e ra l Asse m b ly h a s su b sta n tia lly c h a n g e d

a sta tu to ry p ro v isio n b u t re ta in e d l a n g u a ge th a t we p re v io u sly c o n stru e d

. Th e

in fe re nc e is m

u c h we a k e r, h o we v e r, w h e re th e Ge n e ra l Asse m bly h a s d o n e

n o th in g su b sta n tiv e with th e p ro v isio n in q u e stio n sin c e we c on stru e d it,

e sp e c ia lly wh e n o u r p re c e d e nts la c k th e so rt o f m e a n in g fu l an a ly sis th a t wo u ld

d ra w a tte n tio n to th e issu e a n d m ark it a s a d e b a ta b le on e

. S e e Ja c k so n, 2 8 7 Ga

.

3 7a t 6 5 9 (5 ), n

. 8

. Sin c e D u n a g a n , th e Ge n e ra l Asse m b ly h a s m a d e n o su b sta n tiv e

c h a n g e to OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ).

Ev e n wh e n th e re is a stro n g re a so n to in fe r le g isla tiv e a c q u ie sc e n c e , th is

Co u rt ha s fo un d c o m

p e llin g re a so n s to d e pa rt fro m p re c e d e n ts a b o u t th e

m e a n in g o f a sta tu te

. S e e , e .g ., G a rz a v

. S t a t e , 2 8 4 Ga

. 6 9 6

, 7 0 2 -7 03 (1 ) (6 7 0

S E2 d 7 3 ) (2 0 0 8 ). We h a v e a d u ty to a sc e rta in th e m e a n in g o f th e sta tu to ry la w,

a n d we m u st e n d e a v o r to d o so in a wa y th a t is c o n siste n t with th e fa m ilia r a n d

se ttle d p rin c ip le s o f sta tu to ry in te rp re ta tio n

. S om e tim e s we m a y g e t it wro n g ,

a n d y e t, if we h a v e m a d e o u r b e st e ffo rt, it m ay b e m ore a p p ro p ria te ly le ft to th e

Ge n e ra l Asse m

b ly to se t th in g s rig h t. Bu t be fo re we c a ll it a d ay a n d d e c la re o u r

ju d ic ia l wo rk a t a n e n d

, we o u g ht t o t r y a t le a st o n c e to u n d e rta ke th e so rt o f

c a re fu l te x tu a l a n a ly sis (in c lu d in g a c o n sid e ra tio n o f re le v a n t c on te x t) th a t, if

d o n e p ro p e rly

, wo u ld re ve a l th e m o st n a tu ra l a n d re a so n a b le un de rsta n d in g o f

th e sta tu e

. Co n stru in g OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ) b y m isre a d in g pa st o p i n i o n s

(lik e Rh o d e s) to d e c id e issu e s th a t th e y d o n ot d e c id e a n d lo o kin g to sta tu to ry

te x t with o u t c a

re fu l a tte n tio n to c o n te xt, d o e s n o t, in my o p in io n , d isc ha rg e o u r

d u ty

. “ W e o u g h t n o t fo llo w u n re a so n e d p re c e d e nt with o ut re a so n .” Cra y to n v

.

S ta te , 2 9 8 Ga . 7 92 , 8 03 (7 84 S E2 d 3 4 3 ) (2 0 16 ) (Bla c k we ll, J., d isse n tin g ).

3 8F o r th e se re a so n s, I w o u ld ov e rru le Du n a g a n a n d its pro g e ny to th e e x te n t

th a t th e y c o n stru e OCGA § 1 6 -5 -2 0 (a ) (2 ) to re q u ire on ly a n in te n t to d o th e a c t

th a t p la c e s a n o th e r in re a so n a b le a p p re h e n s io n o f an im m in e n t a n d v io le n t

in ju ry

. Co n siste n t with th e m o st n a t u r a l a n d re a so n a b le u nd e rsta n d in g o f th e

sta tu te

, I wo u ld h o ld th a t it in ste a d re qu ire s a sp e c ific in te nt e ith e r to in flic t

in ju ry o r to a ro u se a n a

p p re h e n sio n o f in

ju ry

. B e c a

u se a m a jo rity of th e Co urt

h a s se e n fit to sta n d b y o u r e rro n e o u s p re c e de n ts, h o we v e r, if th e o rig in a l a n d

o rd in a ry m e a

n in g o f th e sta tu te is to p re v a il, it n o w will re qu ire fu rth e r a c tio n

b y o u r Ge n e ra l Asse m

b ly . I re sp e c tfu lly d isse n t.

I a m a u th o riz e d to sta te th a t Ju stic e M e l t o n a n d Ju stic e Na h m ia s jo in in

th is d isse n t.

3 9