This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-1170

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Maurice Antwan Hegwood,

Appellant.

Filed July 27, 2015

Reversed

Johnson, Judge

Olmsted County District Court

File No. 55-CR-13-1382

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Terry L. Adkins, Rochester City Attorney, Kelly M. Wagner, Assistant City Attorney, 

Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Bridget K. Sabo, Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Peter M. Routhier, Bruce Jones, Faegre Baker Daniels, LLP, Special Assistant Public 

Defenders, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Minge, 

Judge.



 

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment 

pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

JOHNSON, Judge

A police officer stopped Maurice Antwan Hegwood’s vehicle after he turned from 

a highway into the parking lot of a business that was closed for the night. The state 

charged Hegwood with driving while impaired, and Hegwood moved to suppress the 

evidence that was obtained during the stop. The district court denied the motion on the 

ground that the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity when 

he stopped Hegwood’s vehicle. We conclude that the officer did not have a reasonable,

articulable suspicion of criminal activity and, therefore, reverse.

FACTS

At approximately 2:30 a.m. on February 17, 2013, Officer Gregory Marx of the 

Rochester Police Department was patrolling the area surrounding a bar where there 

recently had been fights and assaults at closing time. Officer Marx was driving north on 

U.S. highway 63, behind a vehicle in the same lane of traffic. Officer Marx saw the 

vehicle turn left into the parking lot of a towing business. Officer Marx thought it was 

unusual for the vehicle to turn into that parking lot because he knew that the towing 

business was closed at that time of night and that the parking lot has no other access to 

other businesses or other roads.

Officer Marx followed the vehicle into the parking lot and activated his emergency 

lights while the vehicle was still moving. After the vehicle stopped, Officer Marx 

approached the driver’s side and spoke with the driver, Hegwood. Officer Marx 
3

observed indicia of intoxication. He administered several field sobriety tests and then 

arrested Hegwood for driving while impaired (DWI). 

The state charged Hegwood with DWI, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, 

subd. 1(1), (5) (2012). Hegwood moved to suppress evidence on several grounds, 

including the ground that Officer Marx’s stop of his vehicle is invalid. At an omnibus 

hearing, Officer Marx testified that he was suspicious of Hegwood’s vehicle because he 

could not think of a reason for a person to enter that parking lot at that time of night 

except to commit a property crime. He also testified that Hegwood’s vehicle may have 

turned into the parking lot to evade his squad car. The district court denied Hegwood’s 

motion, concluding that “Officer Marx had a reasonable and articulable basis to stop 

[Hegwood’s] vehicle on February 17, 2013, to wit: [Hegwood] admitted driving into a 

private parking lot at 2:36 a.m. with no other street or access point from the parking lot.”

The parties agreed to a stipulated-evidence court trial. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 

26.01, subd. 4. The district court found Hegwood guilty. The district court stayed 

imposition of sentence for two years, ordered Hegwood to serve 48 hours in jail and 28 

days on electric home monitoring, and assessed a $900 fine. Hegwood appeals.

D E C I S I O N

Hegwood argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress 

evidence. He contends that the stop of his vehicle was not justified by a reasonable,

articulable suspicion of criminal activity. 

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the “right of 

the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
4

searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. The 

Fourth Amendment also protects the right of the people to be secure in their motor 

vehicles. See State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000). A law-enforcement 

officer may, “‘consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory 

stop’” of a motor vehicle if “‘the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that 

criminal activity is afoot.’” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) 

(quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000) (citing Terry 

v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884-85 (1968))). A reasonable, articulable

suspicion exists if, “in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer [is] able to 

point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from 

those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. 

The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high, but the suspicion must be “something 

more than an unarticulated hunch,” State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 182 (Minn. 2007) 

(quotation omitted), and more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion,” 

Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d at 393 (quotation omitted). An officer “must be able to point to 

something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 182 

(quotation omitted); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. If the 

underlying facts are undisputed, this court applies a de novo standard of review to a 

district court’s conclusion that an investigatory stop is justified by a reasonable,

articulable suspicion. State v. Yang, 774 N.W.2d 539, 551 (Minn. 2009).

Hegwood contends that the investigatory stop of his vehicle is invalid because 

Officer Marx did not identify any facts that objectively would support a reasonable, 
5

articulable suspicion of criminal activity. The state’s primary argument in response is 

that the combination of Hegwood’s unusual activity and the recent incidents surrounding 

the nearby bar at closing time provided Officer Marx with a reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity. In support of its argument, the state cites State v. Uber, 604 N.W.2d 

799 (Minn. App. 1999), and Olmscheid v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 412 N.W.2d 41 

(Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Nov. 6, 1987), two cases in which this court 

concluded that a police officer’s investigatory stop was justified by a reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity, specifically, burglary or theft. Uber, 604 N.W.2d at 801-

02; Olmscheid, 412 N.W.2d at 43. In both Uber and Olmscheid, however, there recently 

had been burglaries or thefts in the immediate area. See Uber, 604 N.W.2d at 800; 

Olmscheid, 412 N.W.2d at 42. In this case, by contrast, there is no evidence in the record 

that there had been recent burglaries, thefts, or other property crimes in the area, either at 

the towing company or at any nearby property. The problems associated with the nearby 

bar were of a different type, and Officer Marx did not testify that he suspected that the 

driver of the vehicle had been at the bar or was associated with the bar in any way. Uber

and Olmscheid are also distinguishable from this case in that way.

In addition, in both Uber and Olmscheid, an officer came upon a vehicle that 

already was present in a particular location where property crimes previously had been 

reported. See Uber, 604 N.W.2d at 800 (stating that officer saw vehicle driving at 2:00 

a.m. in suburban business park where burglaries recently had been reported); Olmscheid, 

412 N.W.2d at 42 (stating that officer saw vehicle driving at 1:30 a.m. on dead-end road 

in suburban commercial area where thefts recently had been reported). Because the 
6

officer in each case did not know what the driver of the vehicle had been doing in that 

area before the officer observed the vehicle, the officer had additional reasons to be 

suspicious and, thus, a reason to investigate. See Uber, 604 N.W.2d at 800; Olmscheid, 

412 N.W.2d at 42. In this case, however, Officer Marx was following Hegwood’s 

vehicle before he saw it turn into the parking lot, and he testified that there was “nothing” 

suspicious about Hegwood’s vehicle before the turn. Officer Marx followed Hegwood’s 

vehicle into the parking lot and activated his emergency lights before Hegwood’s vehicle 

had come to a stop. Because Officer Marx was able to observe Hegwood’s vehicle at all 

relevant times, he could be assured that no criminal activity had yet occurred. Thus, 

Uber and Olmscheid also are distinguishable from this case with respect to the 

information that was available to the investigating law-enforcement officer. See Terry, 

392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880 (asking, “would the facts available to the officer at 

the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief 

that the action taken was appropriate?” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

In the absence of reasons such as those that existed in Uber and Olmscheid, 

Officer Marx’s stop of Hegwood’s vehicle could be justified only by the possibility that 

the occupants of the vehicle might have intended to engage in criminal activity, such as a 

property crime at the towing business. That was Officer Marx’s reason for the stop, but it 

was based solely on the fact that Hegwood turned from a highway into a parking lot of a 

business that was closed during night-time hours. But a driver might turn into a parking 

lot along a highway for many reasons other than criminal activity. A driver might, for 

example, do so to safely turn around before driving in the other direction or to use a 
7

smartphone. A driver also might do so for a legitimate purpose connected with the 

business. We acknowledge that “‘innocent activity might justify the suspicion of 

criminal activity.’” State v. Martinson, 581 N.W.2d 846, 852 (Minn. 1998) (quoting 

State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Minn. 1989) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 

490 U.S. 1, 9, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1586 (1989))). And we note that “sufficient probability, 

not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.” Illinois 

v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2800 (1990) (quotation omitted). But 

here, the only factors Officer Marx articulated that suggest possible criminal activity are 

the time of night, the closed business, and the lack of access to or from the lot. When 

considered in their totality, these factors do not create the requisite probability of criminal 

activity needed to convert Officer Marx’s “unarticulated hunch,” Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 

182, into a reasonable, articulable suspicion “that criminal activity may be afoot,” Terry, 

392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884.

We note that Officer Marx could have waited nearby for a relatively short period 

of time to see whether the vehicle promptly exited the parking lot or to observe the 

activities of the occupants of the vehicle. Additional observation might have provided 

him with additional information that would have corroborated his hunch, thereby 

allowing him to form a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. That was an 

important aspect of Terry. The officer in that case observed two men make more than “a 

dozen trips” past the front window of a store before the officer formed a reasonable, 

articulable suspicion that they were “casing” the store, which justified his decision to stop

them to investigate. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 6-7, 88 S. Ct. at 1871-72; see also State v. 
8

Schrupp, 625 N.W.2d 844, 847-48 (Minn. App. 2001) (reviewing facts of Terry and 

emphasizing that officer waited and watched until hunch “ripened” into reasonable 

suspicion), review denied (Minn. July 24, 2001). By stopping Hegwood’s vehicle 

immediately after it turned into the parking lot, Officer Marx took action before he had 

acquired enough information to form a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal 

activity.

Before concluding, we note that the state has alluded to an alternative basis for the 

investigatory stop, namely, that Officer Marx stopped Hegwood’s vehicle because he 

believed that the driver may have been trying to evade him. At the evidentiary hearing, 

Officer Marx mentioned this motive as a possibility, but it was not the basis for the 

district court’s decision. On appeal, the state does not develop the argument by citing 

caselaw in support of this alternative ground. We note that evasive behavior can provide 

an officer with a reasonable, articulable suspicion for an investigatory stop. See, e.g.,

Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-25, 120 S. Ct. at 676; State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843

(Minn. 1992), aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993); Johnson, 444 N.W.2d at 827. 

But Minnesota courts have identified “some types of motorist behavior that are not 

unusual and . . . standing alone will not provide justification for an investigatory stop.” 

Schrupp, 625 N.W.2d at 848. The record of the evidentiary hearing indicates that the 

manner in which Hegwood turned into the parking lot was not unusual. Officer Marx did 

not articulate any particular reason why he believed that Hegwood was trying to evade 

him, such as, for example, a particularly abrupt turn or the absence of a turn signal. See 

id. (noting that evasive conduct must be unusual to support reasonable, articulable 
9

suspicion). Thus, the absence of sufficiently unusual behavior by Hegwood when he 

turned into the parking lot would preclude a finding that the investigatory stop is justified 

by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Hegwood was trying to evade Officer Marx.

In sum, Officer Marx did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal 

activity when he stopped Hegwood’s vehicle. Therefore, the district court erred by 

denying Hegwood’s motion to suppress evidence. Our conclusion that the district court

erred in its pre-trial ruling is dispositive of the case. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, 

subd. 4(a), (c); see also State v. Yang, 814 N.W.2d 716, 718, 722-23 (Minn. App. 2012)

(reversing conviction without remand after concluding that district court erred in pre-trial 

ruling in case tried pursuant to rule 26.01, subdivision 4).

Reversed.