IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________________

No. 01-60068

_______________________________

ALVIN C. COPELAND,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

Respondent-Appellee,

_______________________________

No. 01-60069

_______________________________

PATTY K. COPELAND, also known as Patty K. White,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

Respondent-Appellee,

_________________________________________________

Appeals from the Decision

of the United States Tax Court

_________________________________________________

May 13, 2002

Before JONES, WIENER, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

WIENER, Circuit Judge:

Petitioners-Appellants Alvin C. Copeland and Patty K.

Copeland, also known as Patty K. White (collectively, “Taxpayers”)

appeal the Tax Court’s grant of partial summary judgment to the

Commissioner of Int e rnal Revenue (“Commissioner”) and the Tax

Court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment. We conclude

that the Tax Court properly denied the Taxpayers’ deduction under

26 U.S.C. § 165 (“I.R.C. § 165") for their initial investments in2

the partnerships, and therefore affirm that ruling. The Tax Court

erred, however, in sustaining the Commissioner’s imposition of the

increased interest rate under 26 U.S.C. § 6621(c) (“I.R .C. §

6621(c)”). Because no deduction was disallowed under 26 U.S.C. §

183 (“I.R.C. § 183"), and because the Commissioner proffered no

alternative basis for imposing the I.R.C. § 6621(c) interest rate,

the Commissioner may not impose that rate. Accordingly, we reverse

the Tax Court’s ruling on the I.R.C. § 6621(c) interest rate, and

remand for imposition of a judgment consistent with these rulings

I. Facts and Proceedings

The disputed tax items and interest charges derive from the

following transactions: In 1979, Taxpayers invested $100,000 in

Garfield Oil and Gas Associates (“Garfield”), a state-law

partnership, and in 1981 they invested $75,000 in Capricorn Company

(“Capricorn”), also a state-law partnership. Capricorn invested in

another state-law partnership, Cardinal Oil Technology Partners

(“Cardinal”), after which Garfield and Cardinal together invested

in enhanced oil recovery technology projects. From 1979 to 1982,

Garfield and Cardinal reported partnership tax items relating to

the investments in the enhanced oil recovery technology projects,

and allocated the tax items to the partners, including Taxpayers.

Taxpayers filed joint tax returns for the tax years 1979 through

1982, which returns included deductions allocated to the Taxpayers

from the Garfield and Capricorn partnerships.

In 1990, the Commi ssioner issued notices of deficiency to1 Temporary Treasury Reg. § 301.6621-2T.

2 99 T.C. 132 (1992), aff’d sub nom. Hildebrand v.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 28 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 1994),

cert. denied , 513 U.S. 1079 (1995).

3 As the Commissioner explains, the Garfield and Cardinal

limited partnerships were members of a group of limited

partnerships known as the “Elektra/Hemisphere” partnerships. The

activities and transactions of Garfield and Cardinal were

substantially identical to those of the Elektra/Hemisphere

partnerships that were the subject of Krause

.

3 Taxpayers, based on the Commissioner’s disallowance of the

partnership deductions on Taxpayers’ returns. The notice of

deficiency also imposed interest at 120% of the usual rate on the

Taxpayers’ u n derpayment of tax attributable to the disallowed

deductions, employing the Secretary’s temporary regulations 1 issued

pursuant to the then-applicable version of I.R.C. § 6621(c).

Taxpayers petitioned the Tax Court for a redeter mination of the

deficiency that year, but, aside from two flurries of activity in

which the parties entered their pleadings, stipulated issues, and

made appearances in the Tax Court, there was no further action

taken in the Tax Court until 1999.

In the interim, the Tax Court decided Krause v. Commissioner

of Internal Revenue

, 2 a case involving various enhanced oil

rec overy technology partnerships which had engaged in activities

and transactions substantially identical to those in which Garfield

and Cardinal were involved. 3 Following the Tax Court’s decision in

Krause

, Taxpayers paid the principal amount of the tax deficiency,

but were allegedly unable to afford to pay the interest that had4

accumulated by that time. When the Tax Court activities in this

case resumed in 1999, the court issued an order requiring the

parties to show cause “why a decision in this case sh ould not be

entered in accordance with the Court’s disposition of the issues in

[ Krause ].” That issue was not actually addressed at the show-cause

hearing, however. Instead, when the Tax Court learned that

Taxpayers were willing to settle the case by paying the standard

interest (not the I.R.C. § 6621(c) increased interest) on the

deficiency in a lump-sum payment, the court adjourned the hearing

with instructions to the Taxpayers to make the sett lement offer

within 12 days, and to the Comm issioner to file a status report

with the co urt regarding settlement discussions within 30 days.

The Tax Court further instructed that (1) if the parties should

fail to reach a settlement, they should file a stipulation of

facts; (2) the Commissioner should file a motion for summary

judgment within 60 days after the status report was due; and (3)

Taxpayers should file a response to the Commissioner’s motion

within one month thereafter.

The parties did not reach a settlement agreement. In

accordance wi th the Tax Court’s instructions, they filed a

stipulation of facts, which i ncluded an affirmation that the

factual findings and legal conclusions made in Krau se were

incorporated by reference, “except for the conclusion that I.R.C.

§ 6621(c) applies and [except for] any implication that the

[ Krause ] partnerships are partnerships for federal income tax4 In the Stipulation of Facts submitted by the parties

jointly, they agreed that “[a]fter resolution of the I.R.C. §§

6621 (c) and 165 issues, the only disputed issues will be (A) the

petitioner Patty K. Copeland’s entitlement to innocent spouse

relief, (B) the reclassification of interest on petitioner Alvin

C. Copeland’s 1985 returns and the effect, if any, of such

reclassification on the Joint Returns, and (C) the determination

and allocation of certain carrybacks to the Joint Returns between

petitioners for purposes of determining the amount of their

respective deficiencies.”

5 Copeland v. Commissioner , 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 2127 (2000).

5 purposes, notwithstanding that th ey lack profit objective within

the meaning of I.R.C. § 183.” In particular, the parties agreed

th at the K rause decision “control[led] the tax treatment of the

Partnership Tax Items, as well as the additions to tax asserted in

these cases.”

The Commissioner then filed a motion for partial 4 summar y

judgment, arguing that the increased rate of interest under I.R.C.

§ 6621(c) was properly applied to Taxpayers’ underpayment of tax,

and that Taxpayers were not entitled to deductions under I.R.C. §

165 for their initial cash investments in the Garfield and Cardinal

partnerships. Taxpayers filed their own motion for partial summary

judgment, directly opposing both of the Commissioner’s contentions.

In a Memorandum Opinion, 5 the Tax Court grant ed the

Commissioner’s motion and denied Taxpayers’ counter-motion,

sustaining the imposition of the I.R.C. § 6621(c) interest rate on

Taxpayers’ underpayment of tax, and disallowing the I.R.C. § 165

deduction for their initial cash investments in the partnerships.

The court entered a Decision reflecting this ruling in October6 Stanford v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 152 F.3d

450, 455 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing G.M. Trading Corp. v.

Commissioner , 121 F.3d 977, 980 (5th Cir. 1997)).

6 2000, from which Taxpayers timely appealed.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

“The Tax Court’s determinations of law —— for example,

interpretations of statutory language

——are reviewed de novo,

while its factual findings are reviewed for clear error.” 6

B. Analysis

1. I.R.C. § 165 Deduction for Initial Investment

As the Tax Court observed in its Memorandum Opinion, after the

Krause case was decided, Taxpayers “concede[d] all of the

origi nally claimed tax benefits relating to their investments in

the partnerships, and...[sought] a loss deduction only for the

amount of cash they invested in the partnerships.” In support of

this deduction, they framed their argument to the Tax Court as

follows:

Unless there is a finding of fact that

[Taxpayers’] investment in the Partnerships

lacked sufficient profit motive under IRC §

183, [Taxpayers] are entitled to their out-ofpocket investment under IRC § 165. [Taxpayers]

have conceded that if the Partnerships were

partnerships for federal income tax purposes,

then [Taxpayers] are not entitled to out-ofpocket deductions , however, [Taxpayers] argue

that the Partnerships are not partnerships for

federal income tax purposes.” [Emphasis

added.]

Although Taxpayers have not made the above concession so clear in7 26 U.S.C. § 761(a).

7

their appellate briefs and oral arguments to us, they have premised

their argument in favor of the deduction solely on the assertion

that “Garfield and Cardinal are not partnerships for federal income

tax purposes.” “If an enterprise, such as Garfield and Cardinal,

is formed without any pro fit motive,” their reasoning runs, “it

cannot be a partnership for federal income tax purposes and the

activities of the partnership cannot be imputed to the investors

for purposes of determining the applicability of 26 U.S.C. § 183 to

the investors. In such cases, a determination of profit motive

must be made at the individual investor level.” Although this

argument is certainly creative, it is without merit.

Section 761(a) defines what a “part nership” is for federal

income tax purposes:

(a) Partnership. For purposes of this

subtitle, the term “partnership” includes a

syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or

other unincorporated organiza tion through or

by means of which any business, financial

operation, or venture is carried on, and which

is not, within the meaning o f this title, a

corporation or a trust or estate. 7

In keeping with this definition, the Tax Court observed that the

Garfield and Cardinal limited partnerships

entered into transactions, formed joint

ventures, operated gas wells, and engaged in

vario us other activities. They carried on a

financial oper ation or venture. They are to

be treated as partnerships under section

761(a) even though the underlying activities

of the partnerships lacked a profit objective

under section 183

. The Garfield and Cardinal8 Copeland, 79 T.C.M. (CCH), at 2130 (emphasis added).

9 Vanderschraaf v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 74

T.C.M. (CCH) 7, 11 (1997) (emphasis in original).

8 limited partnerships each had the formal

indicia of partnership status and conducted

themselves generally as partnerships

. They

are to be treated as partnerships.

... The parties’ stipulation that activities and

transactions of the Garfield and Cardinal

limited partnerships were not entered into

with a profit objective does not affect the

status of the partnerships as partnerships for

Federal income tax purposes

. 8

We agree with the distinction presented by the Tax Court on this

issue: “[A] court decision that a partnership activity ...lacks a

profit objective. ..is not equivalent to[] a holding that the

investors intended to create an entity other than a partnership.” 9

Even though the Krause court determined that the activities engaged

in by the partnerships lacked a pro fit objective, none can

seriously contend that th ose who created these business entities

did not intend to create entities “by means of which [a] business,

financial operation, or venture [would be] carried on.” We reject

Taxpayers’ argument tha t is premised on the proposition that the

determination that the partnership activities lacked profit

objective stripped the partnerships themselves of partnership

status for federal income tax purposes. Accordingly, we affirm the

Tax Court’s determination that the Commissioner properly denied the

Taxpayers’ deductions for their initial investments in the

partnerships.10 Upon enactment in 1984, this provision was codified as

I.R.C. § 6621(d). It was amended and redesignated as I.R.C. §

6621(c) by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100

Stat. 2744, § 1511(c)(1)(A)-(C). I.R.C. § 6621(c) applies to

interest accruing after December 31, 1984, even if the

transaction was entered into before the date of its enactment.

Tax Reform Act of 1984, § 144(c), Pub. L. No. 98-369, Div. A,

July 18, 1984, 98 Stat. 494. Section 6621(c) was among several

penalty provisions replaced with a single “accuracy-related”

penalty by the 1989 Act. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-247, at 1388,

1394 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2858-59, 2864.

Despite its repeal, I.R.C. § 6621(c) still applies to tax years

prior to 1989.

9 2. I.R.C. § 6621(c) Interest

In 1984, Congress amended I.R.C. § 6621 to provide for an

increased rate of interest on substantial underpayments of tax

attributable to tax-motivated transactions. 10 As amended by the Tax

Reform Act of 1986, I.R.C. § 6621(c), which is applicable for the

tax years here in question, provided:

(c) Interest on substantial underpayments attributable to

tax motivated transactions.

(1) In general. In the case of int erest payable under

section 6601 with respect to any substantial underpayment

attributable to tax motivated transactions, the rate of

intere st established under this section shall be 120

percent of the underpayment rate established under this

section.

(2) Substantial underpayment attributable to tax

motivated transactions. For purposes of this subsection,

the term “ substantial underpayment attributable to tax

motivated transactions” means any underpayment of taxes

imposed by subtitle A for any taxable year which is

attributable to 1 or more tax motivated transactions if

the amount of the underpayment for such year so

attributable exceeds $1,000.

(3) Tax motivated transactions.

(A) In general. For purposes of this subsection, the10

term “tax motivated transaction” means

—— (i) a ny valuation overstatement (within th e

meaning of section 6659(c)),

(ii) any loss disallowed by reason of section

465(a) and any credit disallowed under

section 46(c)(8),

(iii) any straddle (as defined in section 1092(c)

without regard to subsections (d) and (e) of

section 1092),

(iv) any use of an accounting method specified

in regulations prescribed by the

Secretary as a use which may result in a

substantial distortion of income for any

period, and

(v) any sham or fraudulent transaction.

(B) Regulatory authority. The Secretary may by

regulations specify other types of transactions which

will be treated a s tax motivated for purposes of this

subsection and may by regulations provide that specified

transactions being treated as tax motivated will no

longer be so treated.... [Emphasis added.]

The Secretary exercised the authority granted in I.R.C. §

6621(c)(3)(B), and enacted Temporary Regulation § 301.6621-2T (“TTR

§ 301.6621-2T”), which provides, in relevant part:

Q-2. What is a tax motivated underpayment ?

A-2. A tax motivated under payment is the portion of a

deficiency (as defined in section 6211) of tax imposed by

subtitle A (income taxes) that is attributable to any of the

following tax motivated transactions:

(1)

... a valuation overstatement within the meaning of

section 6659(c)(1)[];

... (6) Any deduction disallowed with respect to any other

tax motivated transactions (see A-4 of this section)

.

... Q-4. Are any transactions other than those specified in A-2 of

this section and those involving the use of accounting methods

under circumstances s pecified in A-3 of this section

considered tax motivat ed transactions under A-2(6) of this

section?

A-4. Yes. D eductions disallow ed under the following

provisions are considered to be attributable to tax motivated

transactions:

(1) Any deduction disallowed for any period under

section 183, relating to an activity engaged in by11 26 C.F.R. § 301.6621-2T (emphasis added).

11 an individual or an S co rporation that is not

engaged in for profit

.... 11

T o summarize the foregoing, I.R.C. § 6621(c) authorized the

imposition of 120% of the usual interest rate on underpayments of

tax in excess of $1,000, but only if they were attributable to tax

motivated transactions as defined either in I.R.C. § 6621(c)(3)(A)

or in the regulations enacted by the Secretary pursuant to I.R.C.

§ 6621(c)(3)(B). Exercising this authority, the Secretary added

a sixth cate gory of tax motivated transactions to the five

specified by the Congress in I.R.C. § 6621(c)(3)(A) by promulgating

TTR § 301.6621-2T: “Any deduction disallowed for any period under

section 183, relating to an activity engaged in by an individual or

an S corporation that is not engaged in for profit.”

As a threshold matter, Taxpayers argue that the Commissioner

abused his discretion by imposing the tax from the date the payment

was due, instead of giving them the opportunity “to resolve this

matter without payment of interest at the penalty increased rate.”

At oral argument, they asked specifically that we reverse the Tax

Court’s decision and render judgment in their favor as to the

interest that accrued between the due date of the relevant tax

returns an d the 1990 notice of deficiency. In support of this

request, they argue th at the legislative history of I.R.C. §

6621(c) shows that the section was intended to serve as a tool for

managing the Tax Court’s docket, by providin g incentive for12 See supra note 9.

12

taxpayers to concede to the Commissioner’s assessment of tax

deficiencies without resorting to litigation. Instead of

furthering the legislative intent, Taxpayers argue, the

Commissioner’s imposition of th e I.R.C. § 6621(c) rate, of which

they learned only when they received the notice of deficiency,

amounted to a penalty. As noted above, 1 2 I.R.C. § 6621(c) expressly

applies to interest accruing after December 31, 1984, even if the

offending transaction was entered into before the date of its

enactment. According to Taxpayers, the Commissioner’s “penalizing”

imposition of I.R.C. § 6621(c) interest is therefore particularly

unfair on these facts, because their investment i n the

partnerships, which is the only transaction for which this penalty

could serve any deterrent purpose, pre-dated the enactment of

I.R.C. § 6621(c).

We are not persuaded by Taxp ayers’ arguments on this point.

If I.R.C. § 6621(c) is applicable at al l to Taxpayers’

u nderpayment, it is applicable from the due date of the tax that

they have been determined to owe. The initial language of I.R.C.

§ 6621(c) references “interest payable under section 6601.” I.R.C.

§ 6601, in turn, states:

§ 6601. Interest on underpayment, nonpayment, or

extensions of time for payment, of tax.

(a) General rule. If any amount of tax imposed by this

title (whether required to be shown on a return, or to be

paid by stamp or by some other method) is not paid on or

before the last date prescribed for payment, interest on13 26 U.S.C. § 6601(a) (emphasis added).

14 See, e.g.

, Guilzon v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

, 985 F.2d 819, 823-24 n.11 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Swearingen v.

Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. , 968 F.2d 559, 562 (5th Cir.1992))

(“Fifth Circuit law is crystal clear that when, as here, the

language of a statute is unambiguous, this Court has no need to

and will not defer to extrinsic aids or legislative history.”).

13 such amount at the underpayment rate establis hed under

section 6621 shall be paid for the period from such last

date to the date paid

. 13

The application of this provision is mechanical, and we find no

abuse of discretion by the Commissioner in calculating the interest

from the date that Taxpayers’ tax deficiency was due.

Neither are we persuaded by Taxpayers’ invocation of the

legislative intent of I.R.C. § 6621(c). In combination, I.R.C. §§

6621(c) and 6601 are unambiguous, requiring the imposition of

interest starting from “the last such date” of “the period” for

which the unpaid tax was due. As the Commissioner emphasizes, in

the absence of ambigui ty, we are not to look beyond the plain

wording of the statute or regulation to divine legislative intent. 14

The larger question presented here is the pro priety of

imposing the I.R.C. § 6621(c) interest rate on Taxpayers’

underpayment at all. In contesting the imposition of that rate,

Taxpayers argue that the Tax Court erred in failing to analyze

whether they, the Taxpayers, had a profit motive when they invested

in the subject partnerships. Our close analysis of this argument

leads us to conclude that indeed it was error, on these facts, to

impose the I.R.C. § 6621(c) interest rate at all, irrespective of15 Taxpayers also argue that it was an abuse of discretion

for the Commissioner to refuse their settlement offer of a lumpsum payment equal to the amount of interest, calculated at the

regular rate, that had accrued. As we conclude that the I.R.C. §

6621(c) interest rate should not be imposed at all, we need not

address their argument premised on the settlement offer.

14 the indiv idual partners’ profit motive, because there was no

deduction disallowed under § 183, as TTR § 301.6621-2T pellucidly

requires. We therefore reverse the Tax Court’s ruling and hold

that the I.R.C. § 6621(c) interest rate is inapplicable to

Taxpayers’ underpayment of tax. 15

To repeat, I.R.C. § 6621(c) interest may be imposed only when

there is a “substantial” underpayment of tax that is attributable

to a tax motivated transaction as defined either in I.R.C. §

6621(c)(3)(A) or in the regulations enacted by the Secretary

pursuant to I.R.C. § 6621(c)(3)(B). As any underpayment of $1,000

or more is deemed “substantial,” that element of the section is not

at issue. And, the Commissioner does not contend that any of the

definitional categories of “tax motivated transaction” listed under

I.R.C. § 6621(c)(3)(A) apply. Rather, the o nly kind of tax

motivated transaction that is proffered by the Commissioner is the

one found in TTR § 301.6621-2T, A4:

Deductions disallowed under the following provisions are

considered to be attributable to tax motivated

transactions:

(1) Any deduction disallowed for any period under

[I.R.C.] section 183

, relating to an activity

engaged in by an i ndividual or an S corporation

th at is not engaged in for profit. [Emphasis

added.]16 28 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 1994).

17 Copeland , 79 T.C.M (CCH), at 2131 (quoting Hildebrand , 28

F.3d at 1028).

15 The Commissioner maintains that b ecause the Tax Court determined

that the partnerships in which Taxpayers invested lacked a profit

motive under I.R.C. § 183, the requirements of TTR § 301.6621-2T

were met, and it was proper to impose the I.R.C. § 6621(c) interest

rate. This application of TTR § 301.6621-2T, which was adopted by

the Tax Court and blessed by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits,

impermissibly broadens the reach of this penalty.

E xamination of the plain language of TTR § 301.6621-2T

establi shes that the essential elements of the type of tax

motivated transaction defin ed by that regulation are as follows:

There must be (1) a deduction (2) that is disallowed under I.R.C.

§ 183, (3) that is related to an ac tivity engaged in by an

individual or an S corporation, and (4) that is not engaged in for

profit. Despite this clear and unambiguous regulatory mandate,

however, the Commissioner’s appellate brief asserts that,

“[p]ursuant to [the Secretary’s] statutory grant of authority, the

Treasury Regulations under I.R.C. § 6621(c) adopt the profit motive

test of § 183 as a litmus test for ‘tax motivated transactions.’”

Similarly, the Tax Court, in its Memora ndum Opinion, quoted

Hildebrand v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

, 16 as it insisted:

Section 6621(c)(1) imposes an increased rate of

interes t on “any substantial underpayment

attributable to tax motivated transactions,” which

include activities not engaged in for profit. 1718 26 U.S.C. § 183(a) (emphasis added).

16 These statements are both imprecise and flatly incorrect. The TTR

§ 301.6621-2T definition indisputably requires that a d eduction be

disallowed under I.R.C. § 183 before the increased penalty may be

imposed, not that an activity be determined to lack profit motive

under the factors of I.R.C. § 183. Being disallowed under I.R.C.

§ 183 is not congruent with being tested

—— and fou nd wanting ——

u nder the factors set forth in I.R.C. § 183. Indeed, the

Taxpayers’ deductions were not “disallowed under” I.R.C. § 183 but

were, as the Commissioner notes, purportedly found to be lacking in

profit motive under the factors set forth in the regulations that

accompany I.R.C. § 183. More importantly, even if the Commissioner

had wanted to disallow the Taxpayers’ deductions under I.R.C. § 183

for purposes of TTR § 301.6621-2T, he could not have done so!

I.R.C. § 183 states:

§ 183. Activities not engaged in for profit.

(a) General rule. In the case of an a ctivity engaged in

by an individual or an S corporation

, if such activity is

not engaged in for profit, no deduction a ttributable to

such activity shall be allowed under this chapter except

as provided in this section. 18

The pl ain language of the statute thus explicitly cabins its

applicability to activ ities engaged in by i ndividuals or S

corporations

—— and, by virtue of the traditional maxim of statutory

construction, expressio unis est exclusio alterius (the expression

of one thing is the exclu sion of others), precludes the section’s

applicability to partnerships. Yet the only parties that engaged19 Krause , 99 T.C. 132, 168 (1992).

20 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (emphasis added).

21 26 U.S.C. § 174(a) (emphasis added).

17 in an activity for other than profit were the two partnerships: No

individual and no S corporation engaged in any activity here, with

or without a profit motive.

The Commissioner nevertheless relies on the fact that the Tax

Court in Krause sustained the Commissioner’s disallowance of

deductions “under section 183.” The deduction having been

disal lowed “under section 183,” argues the Commissioner, leads

inexora bly to the conclusion that the I.R.C. § 6621(c) increased

interest rate applies. We disagree with the Commissioner’s basic

premise that these deductions were disallowed “under § 183.”

In Krause

, the Tax Court engaged in an analysis of whether the

deductions at issue met the requirements of I.R.C. §§ 162 and 174. 19

Those two I.R.C. sections provide, in relevant part:

§ 162. Trade or business expenses.

(a) In general. There shall be allowed as a deduction

all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred

duri ng the taxable year in carrying on a ny trade or

business

.... 20

and

§ 174. Research and experimental expenditures.

(a) Treatment as expe nses. (1) In general. A taxpayer

may treat research or experimental expenditures which are

paid or incurred by him during t he taxable year in

connection with his trade or business as expenses which

are not chargeable to capital account. The expenditures

so treated shall be allowed as a deduction. 21

Both statutes require that the expense be paid or incurred in22 Agro Science Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 934

F.2d 573, 576 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.183-2(a)

(1990); Mayrath v. Commissioner , 357 F.2d 209, 214 (5th Cir.

1966); Drobny v. Commissioner , 86 T.C. 1326, 1340 (1986)).

23 See, e.g.

, Tallal v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

, 778 F.2d 275, 276 (5th Cir. 1985) (“When the taxpayer is a member

of a partnership, we have interpreted 26 U.S.C. § 702(b) to

require that business purpose must be assessed at the partnership

level.”).

24 Id. (approving the use of the “criteria identified in

Treasury Regulation § 1.183-2" for guidance in determining

whether a partnership “lacked a bona fide profit objective”).

See also Krause , 99 T.C. at 168 (“The factors set out in the

Treasury regulations under section 183 generally are utilized in

determining whether the requisite profit objectives are present

18 connection with a “trade or business” before the deduction is

allowed. It is well-established that the determination whether an

undertaking qualifies as a trade or business involves an inquiry

into profit motive:

Congress allows deductions under 26 U.S.C. §

162 for expenses of carrying on activities that

constitute a taxpayer’s trade or business, [or]

under 26 U .S.C. § 174 for research and

development expenses in connection with a trade

o r business....Expenditures may only b e

deducted under sections 162 [and] 174...if the

facts and circumstances indicate that the

taxpayer made them primarily in furtherance of

a bona fide profit objective independent of tax

consequences. 22

It is equally accepted that in the partnership context, the profit

motive inquiry focuses on the partnership, not the individual

partners, 23 and that the factors in the Treasury Regul ations to

I.R.C. § 183 (for determining whether an “activity is...engaged in

for profit”) may be employed to determine the profit motive required

by sections 162 and 174 exists. 24 It bears emphasizing, however,under section 162 [and] section 174.”).

25 Krause , 99 T.C. at 175-76 (emphasis added).

26 Even the Commissioner recognizes this limitation in his

appellate brief when he states (emphasis ours): “The regulations

under § 183 list a number of factors relevant to the

determination of profit motive, and those factors have frequently

19 that the factors from I. R.C. § 183 are only t ools for determining

the requisite profit objective under I.R.C. §§ 162 and 174;

deductions for partnership expenses are n ot allowed or disallowed

directly under I.R.C. § 183 itself.

Despite this truism, however, the Tax Court in Krause

, after

employing the factors from the Regulations under I.R.C. § 183 in its

analysis of the deductions claimed under I.R.C. §§ 162 and 174,

concluded:

In summary, prese nted to us in this case

is a chain or multilayered series of

obligations, stacked or multiplied on top of

each other via the numerous partnerships to

produce debt obligations in stagge ring dollar

amounts, using a large ly undeveloped and

untested product, in a highly risky, very

speculative, and non-arm’s-length manner in an

attempt to generate significant tax deductions

for investors. The transactions did not, and

do not, constitute legitimate for-profit

business transactions.

Losses of the partnerships are disallowed

under section 183

.... 25

The Tax Court’s wording to the contrary no twithstanding, however,

the deductions were not actually disallowed under I.R.C. § 183, but

under I.R.C. §§ 162 and 174, neither of which are limited

—— as is

§ 183

—— to activities engaged in by individuals and S corporations,

to the exc lusion of partnerships. 2 6 I.R.C. § 183 provided thebeen applied by the courts in determining whether a profit motive

exists for all sorts of entities, including partnerships and

corporations, to which the limitations on deductibility of § 183

do not apply .”

27 See Hill v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 204 F.3d

1214, 1220 (9th Cir. 2000). The Hill court was, in turn, relying

on the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in Hildebrand v. Commissioner

, 28 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 1994).

28 Copeland , 79 T.C.M. (CCH), at 2131 (emphasis added).

20 Krause court with only the factors for analysis, not statutory

authority to allow or disallow deductions themselves. To say that

th e deductions are disallowed “under section 183" impermissibly

conflates the I.R.C. sections in question and thereby glosses over

this crucial distinction.

The Tax Court again endorsed this gloss, however, when it

considered the instant case. Adopting the rationale offered by the

Ninth Circuit, 27 the Tax Court stated,

[T]he Secretary has authority to define certain

transa ctions as tax motivated, t he Secretary

has defined transa ctions lacking a profit

motive under section 183 as tax motivated

, the

transactions in this case lack a profit motive

under section 183, petitioners’ activities

relatin g to these transactions are therefore

tax motivated. 28

That, of course, is not what TTR § 301.6621-2T states. Again, that

regulation designates as “tax motivated” “[a]ny deduction disallowed

f or any period u nder section 183

, relating to an activity engaged

in by an individual or an S corporation that is not engaged in for

profit”; and, again, the de ductions disallowed in K rause (which

ruling was stipulated to apply here) were disallowed under § 162 and29 See, e.g.

, Hill v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 204

F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2000); Hildebrand v. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue , 28 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 1994).

30 Hill , 204 F.3d at 1217 (quoting Pacific First Fed. Sav.

Bank v. Commissioner , 961 F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting

First Charter Financial Corp. v. United States , 669 F.2d 1342,

1345 (9th Cir. 1982))).

21 § 174

, employing only the profit objective factors in the Treasury

Regulations accompanying § 183. The Ninth Circuit’s and Tax Court’s

pr o nouncements that “transactions lacking a profit motive under

section 183" cons titute tax motivated transactions under I.R.C. §

6621(c) impermissibly broadens the reach of this punitive interest

provision. The definition of a tax motivated transaction found in

TTR § 301.6621-2T ineluctably requires that the underpayment of tax

be attributable to deduction disallowed under I.R.C. § 183, and such

a disallowance simply did not take place in the instant case

—— nor

could it have.

As the foregoing makes clear, we respectfully differ with our

fellow circuits regarding the application of I.R.C. § 6621(c) via

TTR § 301.6621-2T. 29 We are, of course, mindful of the admonition

of the Ninth Circuit that “[u]niformity among Circuits is especially

important in tax cases to ensure equal and certain administration

of the tax system.” 30 Nevertheless, the plain language of TTR §

301.6621-2T leaves us no choice, for it compels our conclusion. It

is certainly conceivable that the Secretary meant to classify as tax

motivated any deduction that was determined to lack a profit motive,

as the Commissioner and Tax Court contend. Indeed, TTR § 301.6621-31 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.

32 902 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1990).

33 Heasley , 902 F.2d at 385.

22 2T could have been drafted to do just that: apply when partnership

transactions tested for profit motive using the factors from I.R.C.

§ 183 were found to lack such a profit motive. TTR § 301.6621-2T,

however, unambiguously directs a different analysis. As the

Commissioner insisted when arguing that the rules for the startingdate of the interest rate accrual should be mechanically applied, 31

when the statutory (or regulatory) language is clear, we must look

no further.

Neither do our earlier rulings applying I.R.C. § 6621(c) compel

a different conclusion. In H easley v. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue

, 32 we considered a non-partnership case i n which the

Commissioner sought to impose the I.R.C. § 6621(c) interest rate by

means of the statutory definition relating to a valuation

ove r statement, or, alternatively, employing TTR § 301.6621-2T.

Having determined earlier in the Heasley opinion that the

underpayment of tax was not attributable to a valuatio n

overstatement, we considered the alternative basis for the increased

interest rate, TTR § 301.6621-2T , and rejected that, as well.

Accepting for the purposes of that inquiry the simplified

articulation of the test in TTR § 301.6621-2T (“The I.R.S. defines

transactions ‘not engaged in for profit’ as tax-motivated” 3 3 ), w e

advanced to the next step of the analysi s and determined that the34 Heasley , 902 F.2d at 386.

35 945 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1991).

36 66 F.3d 729 (5th Cir. 1995).

37 71 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 1996).

23 Tax Court erred in failing to con sider the individual taxpayers’

profit motive, and, further, that if the Tax Court had conducted the

proper inquiry it would have found the re quisite profit motive. 3 4

The net result, therefore, was the same as in the instant case,

albeit for slightly different reasons: disapproval of the

Commissioner’s attempt to impose the I.R.C. § 6621(c) interest rate

using TTR § 301.6621-2T.

In Heasley

, we reached that result by implicitly granting the

Commissioner’s interpretation of TTR § 301.6621-2T for the sake of

argument, yet finding that the taxpayers had a profit motive. Here,

we never reach the question whether profit motive is to be tested at

the individual or partnership level, because we begin (and end) with

an examination of that which the Heasley court assumed arguendo

——

the Commissioner’s interpretation and application of TTR § 301.6621-

2T.

Our three subsequent encounters w ith I.R.C. § 6621(c) are

like w ise distinguishable, for none of them implicates TTR §

301.6621-2T. In those three partnership cases, L ukens v.

Commissio ner of Internal Revenue

, 35 Chamberlain v. Commissioner of

Internal Revenue

, 36 and Durrett v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

, 37

the Commissioner sought to impose the inc reased interest rate by24

means of I.R.C. § 6621(c ) (3)(A)(v), the statutory category of tax

motivated transactions implicating sham or fraudulent transactions.

Sham, though, is not the category chosen by the Commissioner in the

instant case; rather, the TTR § 301.6621-2T category of disallowance

under I.R.C. § 183 is the thrust here. We note in passing that in

all three sham cases, we rested our affirmance of the imposition of

the I.R.C. § 6621(c) intere st rate at least in part on the

recognition of the Tax Court’s factual finding that the individual

Taxpayers lacked a profit motive. But again, as explained above, we

decline in the instant case even to reach the quest ion of whose

profit motive to analyze, because the requis i te disallowance of a

deduction under I.R.C. § 183 simply did not take place.

To summarize, then, TTR § 301.6621-2T defines a tax motivated

transaction, for purposes of I.R.C. § 6621(c), as “[a]ny deduction

disallowed for any period under section 183

, relating to an activity

engaged in by an individual or an S corporation that is not engaged

in for profit.” The unambiguous plain language of TTR § 301.6621-2T

thus expressly li mits its applicability to instances in which a

deduction has been disallowed under I.R.C. § 183; and that section

is itself limited in application to activities of individuals and S

corporations. The only role I.R.C. § 183 played in the instant case

was to provide analytical tools

—— the factors found in the Treasury

Regulations

—— for assessing the partnership’s profit objective, for

p urposes of sections 162 and 174. To repeat for emphasis, in

promulgating TTR § 301.6621-2T, the Secretary could have defined a25

tax motivated transaction as one for which a profit motive, as

analyzed under the fac tors of § 183, was found lacking , but the

Secretary did not. Instead, TTR § 301.6621-2T defines a tax

motivated transaction as a deduction that has been disallowed under

§ 183

, and no such disallowance has been or could have been made in

this case. It was therefore error for the Tax Court to adopt

unquestioningly the Ninth Circuit’s assumption that a finding of a

lack of profit motive using the factors of I.R.C. § 183 could,

without more, support the i m position of I.R.C. § 6621(c) interest

via TTR § 301.6621-2T. Accordingly, we reverse the Tax Court’s

ruling and hold that the I.R.C. § 6621(c) in terest rate cannot be

applied to the Taxpayers’ underpayment of tax. We therefore remand

t his action to the Tax Court for entry of an appropriate judg ment

consistent herewith.

AFFIRMED in part; and REVERSED in part and RE M ANDED for entry of

judgment.