alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Motion for Rehearing Granted, Memorandum Opinion filed February 23, 2012,

Withdrawn, Appeal Reinstated and Order filed July 19, 2012.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 11

- 01002

- CV

____________ CHRISTINE E. REULE , Appellant

V.
RLZ INVESTMENTS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Co Civil Ct at Law No 4

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1001350



### ORDER
On February 23, 2012, this court issued an opinion dismissing this appeal. Appellant filed a motion for rehearing. The motion is GRANTED

. This court’s opinion filed February 23, 2012, is WITHDRAWN , and our judgment of that date is VACATED. The appeal is ordered REINSTATED.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Frost, Brown and Christopher.
Case 2:11-cv-00525-CCC-JAD Document 52 Page 1 of 2 PageiD: 338

UNTED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

David Anderson, individually and

derivatively on behalfofBioretec Oy,

No. 11-0525 (CCC)(3AD)

Plaintiff,

y. STIPULATION OF

DISMISSAL

Pertti T&znälä, Pekka Sillanaukee, Hannu

Timnierbacka, and MedTech Rahasto Ky,

Defendants,

and

Bioretec Oy,

—Nominal Defcndant

x

IT IS REREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the parties

hereto, through their undersigned counsel, that the above-captioned action shall be, and hereby

is, dismissed with prejudice and without costs to either side.

Dated: January 18,2012

NO28563; I

Case 2:11-cv-00525-CCC-JAD Document 53 Filed 04/24/12 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 340
Case 2:iicv-OO525CCC-JAD Document 52 RIed 04123112 Page 2 of 2 PagelD: 339

LOWENSTEIN SANDLER PC

By:

Steven M./Hecht

65 Livington Avenue

Roseland, New Jersey 07068

(973) 597-2500

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IC: j

CARL D. POPLAR, P.A.

By: \J:k, Carl D. Poplar ‘

101 Kings Highway South, Bldg. Two

Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08034

(856) 216-9979

George 0. Richardson III

SJJLLWAN & WORCESTER LLP

1290 Avenue ofthe Americas, 29thFloor

New York, New York 10104

(212) 660-3000

Attorneys for Defendants and Nominal

Defendant

SO ORDERED:

ipr iLj

Hon. Claire C, Cecchi, U.S.D.J.

{N0298563; 1)-2-

Case 2:11-cv-00525-CCC-JAD Document 53 Filed 04/24/12 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 341
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 14, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 05-51137

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

PEDRO ESQUIVEL-BAUTISTA,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:05-CR-823-ALL

--------------------

Before KING, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and SMITH, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Pedro EsquivelBautista raises arguments that are foreclosed by AlmendarezTorres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), which held

that a prior conviction is a sentencing factor under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1326(b)(2) and not a separate criminal offense. The

Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
#### BROWN v. FIRE ASS’N OF PHILADELPHIA.

District Court, S. D. New York.

Sept. 16, 1940.

Goldstein & Goldstein, of New York City, for plaintiff.

Powers, Kaplan & Berger, of New York City, for defendant.

MANDELBAUM, District Judge.

The court heretofore denied the plaintiff’s motion for a bill of particulars. She now moves for reargument stating that the purpose of her motion originally was not to enable her to frame a responsive pleading, but to prepare for trial and that such procedure is permissible under Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c.

I have re-examined the entire matter and have decided to adhere to my original ruling. The words “to prepare for trial” as contained in the language of Rule 12(e) are comprehended in the words “to prepare a responsive pleading”. This construction has met with judicial approval. See Brockway Glass Co., Inc. v. Hartford Empire Co., D.C.W.D.N.Y. May 1940, 1 F.R.D. 242. Mr. Holtzoff, connected with the Department of Justice, in editing the decisions by the various federal judges throughout the country, in his work on New Federal Procedure and the Courts, 1940, at pages 35-40, expresses the view that the words “to prepare for trial” as embodied in Rule 12(e) should be deleted from the rule in order to eliminate any doubt on this point.

In addition, a word should be said with respect to the additional point raised by the plaintiff with respect to Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in support of its application for a bill of particulars. That rule states, in part, that in all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. I find, after careful examination of the defenses interposed by the defendant, that the plaintiff’s contention is without merit since the defenses dealing with fraud are fully particularized and need no further elaboration. What the plaintiff is seeking is evidence and not ultimate facts. This is not permissible under Rule 9 (b).

I have also read Judge Hulbert’s opinion in the case of Prutinsky v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 1 F.R.D. 440, decided August 14, 1940, urged by the plaintiff in support of her position, and I believe it is not in conflict with my present ruling.

The reargument is granted and upon such reargument my original decision is adhered to.
Prepared by MERRILL CORPORATION




QuickLinks
 -- Click here to rapidly navigate through this document

 
 

THIRD AMENDMENT TO THE
  NETBANK, INC.
  1996 STOCK INCENTIVE PLAN    
  



    THIS THIRD AMENDMENT is made as of this 14th day of December, 2001, by NetBank, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
State of Georgia (hereinafter called the "Company"). 


W I T N E S S E T H:  


    WHEREAS, the Company maintains the NetBank, Inc. 1996 Stock Incentive Plan (the "Plan"); 


    WHEREAS,
as a result of prior amendments to the Plan, the Company's 1997 33.125-for-one stock split and its 1999 three-for-one stock
split, a total of 3,750,000 shares of Stock are currently reserved for issuance pursuant to Stock Incentives under the Plan and a maximum of 596,250 shares are permitted for such issuance to any
eligible employee during a given fiscal year; 


    WHEREAS,
the Company desires to amend the Plan to increase the number of shares authorized for issuance thereunder; and 


    WHEREAS,
the Board of Directors of the Company has duly approved and authorized this amendment to the Plan, subject to the further approval of the Company's shareholders; 


    NOW,
THEREFORE, the Company does hereby amend the Plan as follows: 


    1.  By
deleting, effective as of the date first set forth above, the first sentence of Section 2.2 in its entirety and by substituting therefor the following: 




"Subject
to adjustment in accordance with Section 5.2, 7,500,000 shares of Stock (the "Maximum Plan Shares') are hereby reserved exclusively for issuance pursuant to Stock Incentives." 





    2.  Except
as specifically amended hereby, the Plan shall remain in full force and effect as prior to the adoption of this Third Amendment. 



    3.  Notwithstanding
the foregoing, the adoption of this Third Amendment is subject to the approval of the stockholders of the Company and in the event that the
stockholders of the Company fail to approve such adoption within twelve months of the date of the approval of the Third Amendment by the Board of Directors of the Company, the adoption of this Third
Amendment shall be null and void. 


    IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Third Amendment to be executed on the day and year first above written. 



	 	 	NETBANK, INC.
	

 	
 	

By:  /s/ D.R. Grimes
	 	 	Title:  Vice Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
	
ATTEST:	
 	

 
	

By:  /s/ Robert E. Bowers	
 	

 
	Title:  Chief Financial Officer	 	 
	

(CORPORATE SEAL)	
 	

 











QuickLinks


THIRD AMENDMENT TO THE NETBANK, INC. 1996 STOCK INCENTIVE PLAN
# AllYears_IntStub

Page &P of &N
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(Form S-3 Nos. 333-07415, 333-68935, 333-79995, 333-84819, 333-86805 and
333-92815) of BNP Residential Properties, Inc. of our report dated January 5,
2001 with respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of BNP
Residential Properties, Inc. included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the
year ended December 31, 2000.






                                                 /s/  ERNST & YOUNG LLP




Raleigh, North Carolina
March 26, 2001



                                       50
<PAGE>
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack

,

Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh

Elizabeth M. Welch,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

Jul y 14 , 2021 

# Order

Clerk July 14 , 2021

162250 (23)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

SC: 162250

v C OA: 354321

Oakland CC: 2018

- 269358

- FC

JAIME LYNN RIEGER,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the C hief Justice , the motion of defendant

- appellant to extend the time

for filing her reply is GRANTED. The reply will be accepted as timely filed if submitted

on or before August 11, 2021.
Exhibit 32.1
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
 PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the dates and for the
periods expressed in the Report.
 Date: July 30, 2009
    By:
    /s/ Robert C. KillRobert C. KillPresident and Chief Executive Officer
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.2


              CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Kathleen A. Bayless, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Komag, Incorporated;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements and other financial
information included in this report fairly present, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a - 15(e) and 15d - 15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of
directors:

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize, and report financial information; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.



DATE:  March 5, 2004                   BY: /s/  Kathleen A. Bayless
       -------------                       ------------------------
                                       Kathleen A. Bayless
                                       Vice President,
                                       Chief Financial Officer
# table121_q14.2_naics
#### Dustin John BUSSON-SOKOLIK, et al., petitioners, v. MILWAUKEE SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING.

No. 10-1398.

June 20, 2011.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied.
<PAGE>
                                                                  Exhibit 4(B)-1

                              ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT
                                       OF
                             DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION

         The undersigned corporation hereby submits these Articles of Amendment
for the purpose of amending its Articles of Incorporation:

         1. The name of the corporation is Duke Energy Corporation.

         2. The following amendment to the Articles of Incorporation of the
corporation was adopted by the holders of its Common Stock on the 26th day of
April, 2001, in the manner prescribed by law:

         The first unnumbered paragraph of Article IV of the Articles of
         Incorporation was amended to read as follows:

                  The total number of authorized shares of this Corporation is
         2,024,000,000 shares, divided into 12,500,000 shares of Preferred Stock
         of the par value of $100 each (hereafter called Preferred Stock),
         10,000,000 shares of Preferred Stock A of the par value of $25 each
         (hereafter called Preferred Stock A), 1,500,000 shares of Preference
         Stock of the par value of $100 each (hereafter called Preference
         Stock), and 2,000,000,000 shares of Common Stock without nominal or par
         value (hereafter called Common Stock).

         3. Only shares of Common Stock of the corporation were entitled to vote
with respect to the amendment. The number of such shares of the corporation
outstanding at the time of such adoption was 771,910,744; the number of votes
entitled to be cast thereon was 742,013,462; and the number of votes
indisputably represented at the meeting of shareholders was 600,316,763.

         4. The number of votes cast for such amendment was 552,160,160, and the
number of votes cast against such amendment was 44,104,667. The total number of
undisputed votes cast for the amendment was sufficient for approval of the
amendment.

         This the 2nd day of May, 2001.

                                      DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION

                                  By: /s/ Richard B. Priory
                                      ------------------------------------------
                                      Richard B. Priory
                                      Chairman of the Board, President
                                      and Chief Executive Officer
Executive Order 13510

# Waiver Under the Trade Act of 1974 With Respect to the Republic of Belarus

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including subsection 402(c)(2) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (the “Act”) (19 U.S.C. 2432(c)(2)), which continues to apply to the Republic of Belarus pursuant to subsection 402(d) of the Act (19 U.S.C. 2432(d)), and having made the report to the Congress set forth in subsection 402(c)(2), I hereby waive the application of subsections (a) and (b) of section 402 of the Act with respect to the Republic of Belarus.

[FR Doc. E9-16034

Billing code 3195-W9-P
Case 2:11-cr-00080-SDW Document 99 Filed 05/20/11 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 243
Case 2:11-cr-00080-SDW Document 99 Filed 05/20/11 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 244
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 127 (Monday, July 6, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 31984-31985]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-15751]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration

[TA-W-70,535]


NCI-Ceco Building Systems, Rocky Mount, NC; Notice of Termination 
of Investigation

    Pursuant to Section 221 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, an 
investigation was initiated on May 26, 2009, in response to a petition 
filed on behalf of workers at NCI-Ceco Building Systems, Rocky Mount, 
North Carolina.
    The petitioning group of workers is covered by an earlier petition 
(TA-W-70,518) filed on May 26, 2009, that is the subject of an ongoing 
investigation for which a determination has not yet been issued.

[[Page 31985]]

    Further investigation in this case would serve no purpose, and the 
investigation under this petition has been terminated.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 17th day of June 2009.
Linda G. Poole,
Certifying Officer, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance.
[FR Doc. E9-15751 Filed 7-2-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-FN-P
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A21D0164, A21D0165. IN THE INTEREST OF J. M., A CHILD (FATHER).

In these related applications for discretionary appeal, the father of minor child

J. M. seeks appellate review of two trial court ordersthat were entered on October 29,

2020. The trial court granted the father’s request for an extension of time to seek

appellate review of its orders, and he filed these applications on December 21, 2020.

We lack jurisdiction because the applications are untimely.

An application for discretionary appeal must be filed within 30 days of the

entry of the order or judgment to be appealed. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (d). The

requirements of OCGA § 5-6-35 are jurisdictional, and this Court cannot accept an

application for appeal not made in compliance therewith. See Boyle v. State, 190 Ga.

App. 734, 734 (380 SE2d 57) (1989). Because applications for discretionary review

are filed in the appellate court, it is the appellate court – not the trial court – that is

authorized to grant an extension of time to file a discretionary application. Gable v.

State, 290 Ga. 81, 85 (2) (a) (720 SE2d 170) (2011). 

Here, although the trial court purported to grant the father an extension of time 

January 20, 2021
to file his applications for discretionary appeal, it was not authorized to do so.

1 See

id. As no valid extension was granted, the father’s applications are untimely. Filing

deadlines are jurisdictional, and this Court is unable to accept an untimely

application. See Crosson v. Conway, 291 Ga. 220, 220 (1) (728 SE2d 617) (2012).

Accordingly, these applications are hereby DISMISSED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

1 The Supreme Court has recognized that, to avoid federal due process

violations in a parental rights termination case, a trial court may grant a parent

permission to pursue an out-of-time application for discretionary review if the

parent’s appellate due process rights were frustrated by ineffective assistance of

counsel. See In the Interest of B. R. F., 299 Ga. 294, 296-298 (788 SE2d 416) (2016).

But here, the juvenile court’s orders granting the extension do not address whether

counsel provided ineffective assistance. Withoutsuch a finding by the juvenile court,

this Court cannot consider the father’s untimely applications. See id. at 298-300.

01/20/2021
#### PENNSYLVANIA R. CO. v. LATTAVO BROTHERS, Inc. et al.

Civ. No. 26262.

United States District Court N. D. Ohio, E. D.

May 11, 1949.

James C. Davis, Geo. H. P. Lacey and Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff.

A. W. Thomas, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendant.

*206JONES, Chief Judge.

This action arises out of a collision of one of defendant Lattavo’s tractor-trailer units with one of plaintiff’s trains. Plaintiff has joined defendant Fidelity as the liability insurer of Lattavo.

Defendants have moved to strike from the complaint all reference to Fidelity and to dismiss Fidelity as a party herein for the reason that the complaint fails to state a claim against Fidelity upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff contends that Fidelity is properly joined under Rules 18 (b) and 20(a), Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.

Rule 18(a), as defendant points out, relates to joinder of claims, not of parties.

Rule 20(a) provides for the joinder of defendants “if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action.”

The plaintiff presently has no cause of action against Fidelity. The questions of law and fact to be determined in this case will relate to the collision at the crossing. Whether Fidelity will be required to pay any money to plaintiff will depend upon whether judgment is for plaintiff or defendant and, if for plaintiff, whether the contract between defendant and Fidelity required Fidelity to pay in this instance.

Since it does not appear that, if plaintiff does have a claim against Fidelity, any questions of law or fact common to its claim against defendant Lattavo would be involved, the requirements of Rule 20(a) as to joinder of defendants are not present in this case.

Some states, apparently, have statutes authorizing the joinder of the liability insurer in an action against the insured. There apparently is no such statute in Ohio.

For the reasons noted, defendants’ motion to strike and to dismiss The Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York as a party defendant will be sustained for failure to state a claim and for improper joinder.

Defendant Lattavo’s motion for a more definite statement as to the respects in which it is claimed said defendant was negligent will be overruled. The complaint alleges that defendant’s agent “negligently drove a motor tractor and trailer into collision with plaintiff’s east-bound passenger train * * (Complaint, par. 5.) The complaint appears to have been drafted in the spirit of Rule 8(a) and (e)(1) and in conformity with Form *9,*Rules of Civil Procedure. The further information which defendant seeks may be obtained by the discovery procedures but should not burden the pleadings.

Summarizing:

1. Defendants’ motion to strike is sustained.

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Fidelity as a party defendant is sustained.

3. Defendant Lattavo’s motion for a more definite statement is overruled.