alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
##### 



Exhibit 31.1
 CERTIFICATION OF PRESIDENT PURSUANT TO SECURITIES
ACT RULES 13A-14 AND 15D-14 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of the Partnership;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the
periods covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included
in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)
and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made
known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which
this report is being prepared;b)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the period covered by this report
based on such evaluation; andc)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter
(the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants
internal control over financial reporting; and
 5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
function):
 a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation
of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely
affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; andb)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees
who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting.
 Date:  March 23, 2007
    /s/ Shirlene LopezShirlene LopezPresident
#### Dennis Amodio et al., Respondents, v City of New York et al., Appellants. Warrington Group, Ltd., et al., Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants, v Baron Rubber, Ltd., Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.

[822 NYS2d 530]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Faul G. Feinman, J.), entered January 31, 2006, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied defendants’ cross motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, denied third-party plaintiffs’ cross motion for summary judgment on indemnification, and granted, in part, third-party defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint, unanimously modified, on the law, summary judg*457ment granted to defendant City, the matter remanded to determine the merits of defendants’ spoliation motion, and otherwise affirmed, without costs. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant City of New York dismissing the complaint as against it.

A municipal defendant generally is not answerable in damages for the injurious consequences of official action involving the exercise of discretion or expert judgment in policy matters, and is not exclusively ministerial *(Haddock v City of New York,*75 NY2d 478, 484 [1990]; *see Mon v City of New York,*78 NY2d 309, 313 [1991]; *Tango v Tulevech,*61 NY2d 34, 40-41 [1983]). The function of selecting firefighting equipment is clearly a discretionary governmental function, and the City’s extensive review process was thus entitled to such immunity *(see McCormack v City of New York,*80 NY2d 808 [1992]).

The nonmunicipal defendants’ cross motion for spoliation sanctions as a result of plaintiffs’ alleged failure to produce the actual boots worn on the day of his injury was timely made, and the court is directed to make a determination with respect to the merits of that motion, on which we offer no opinion.

We disagree with the motion court’s finding that the nonmunicipal defendants’ cross motion for indemnification in the third-party action was untimely; however, we make no modification in this regard because these third-party plaintiffs failed to establish their entitlement to such relief.

We have considered the parties’ remaining contentions for affirmative relief and find them unavailing. Concur—Buckley, EJ., Tom, Marlow, Nardelli and Williams, JJ.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-20556 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus CHRISTOPHER LEMOSES JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. H-00-CR-891-1

-------------------- October 29, 2002 Before DeMOSS, BENAVIDES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Christopher Lemoses Johnson appeals his conviction and sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Johnson argues that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) must be reversed because it is unconstitutional to convict a defendant under that statute when the firearm’s only connection with interstate commerce was that at some point in the past it crossed state lines.No. 01-20556 -2- This court has repeatedly rejected constitutional challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) convictions, concluding that the interstate commerce element is satisfied by the possession of a firearm that was manufactured in a different state or country. See United States v. Cavazos , 288 F.3d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied , (U.S. Oct. 7, 2002) (No. 02-5348); see also United States v. Daugherty , 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied , 534 U.S. 1150 (2002). Thus, Johnson’s argument fails. The conviction is AFFIRMED. AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 10.7


                      SECOND AMENDMENT TO ESCO ELECTRONICS
               CORPORATION DIRECTORS' EXTENDED COMPENSATION PLAN

         WHEREAS, ESCO Technologies Inc. (formerly ESCO Electronics Corporation)
("Company") adopted the ESCO Electronics Corporation Director's Extended
Compensation Plan ("Plan"); and

         WHEREAS, the Company retained the right to amend the Plan; and

         WHEREAS, the Company desires to amend the Plan effective as of April 1,
2001;

         NOW, THEREFORE, effective as of April 1, 2001, the Plan is amended as
follows:

         1. The following is added at the end of Section II:

                  No director joining the Board as an outside director for the
                  first time on or after April 1, 2001 shall be eligible to
                  participate in the Plan.

         2. The first sentence of Section III is revised to read as follows:

                  The annual benefit under the Plan shall be a percentage of the
                  annual cash retainer of $20,000 being paid to directors as of
                  April 1, 2001, based upon the number of the director's
                  complete years of service at the time of retirement in
                  accordance with the following table:

         3. The following is added at the end of Paragraph 3 of Section III:

                  Notwithstanding the foregoing the director may elect, upon
                  such terms and conditions as the Human Resources and Ethics
                  Committee of the Board may determine, to receive the actuarial
                  equivalent of the entire benefit in a single lump cash sum.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the foregoing Amendment was adopted on the 10th day
of May, 2001.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Calvin Griffin, Appellant.

[852 NYS2d 797]

We have reviewed the record and agree with the defendant’s *664assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on appeal. Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is granted *(see Anders v California,*386 US 738 [1967]; *People v Paige,*54 AD2d 631 [1976]; *cf. People v Gonzalez,*47 NY2d 606 [1979]). Spolzino, J.P., Santucci, Dillon and Balkin, JJ., concur.
## F I FTH 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________ Case No. 5 D 2 3

- 3168 LT Case No. 2008

- CF

- 010573

- C

_____________________________
R AYDEL A LVAREZ , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

3.800 appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County

. Robert Segal, Judge

. Raydel Alvarez, Century, pro se

. No Appearance for Appellee

.

January 19, 2024

P ER C URIAM

. This Court previously dismissed Appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and affirm ed the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for postconviction relief in Brevard County Circuit Court Case No. 2008

- CF

- 010573

- C . Because it appears that Appellant’s postconviction filings a re abusive, repetitive, malicious, or frivolous, Appellant is cautioned that any further pro se filings in this Court, asserting claims stemming from Brevard2

County Circuit Court Case No. 2008

- CF

- 010573

- C
, may result in sanctions such as a bar on pro se fi ling in this Court and referral to prison officials for disciplinary proceedings, which may include forfeiture of gain time. See § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (202 3 ) ; State v. Spencer , 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999)

.
A PPELLANT C AUTIONED

.

M AKAR , B OATWRIGHT , and K ILBANE , JJ., concur

.
# covid_table52_c62_naics
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Stephen R. Brunner, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operating Officer and President of Constellation Energy
Partners LLC, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that to my knowledge:

(i) The accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2008 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended; and

(ii) The information contained in such report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of Constellation Energy Partners LLC.



|                                                              
|--------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Stephen R. Brunner                                        
|Stephen R. Brunner                                            
|Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operating Officer and President

Date: August 8, 2008
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-08-00310-CR

NO. 03-08-00311-CR

Travis Henry Benner, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY, 264TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NOS. 60793 & 61655, HONORABLE MARTHA J. TRUDO, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant seeks to appeal from judgments of conviction for the unauthorized use of

a motor vehicle and for aggravated robbery. In February 2007, appellant pled guilty in trial court

cause number 60793 (our cause number 03-08-00310-CR) and was placed on deferred adjudication

for five years. In April 2008, appellant pled true to the State’s motion to adjudicate in cause 60793

and guilty to the offense of aggravated robbery in trial court cause number 61655 (our cause number

03-08-00311-CR). The trial court signed a judgment adjudicating his guilt in cause 60793 and a

judgment of conviction in cause 61655. The trial court has certified that both causes are plea bargain

cases and that appellant has no right of appeal. Thus, the appeals are dismissed. See Tex. R. App.

P. 25.2(d).
2

___________________________________________

David Puryear, Justice

Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Puryear and Pemberton

Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction

Filed: July 24, 2008

Do Not Publish
ESTABLISHMENT DATA ESTABLISHMENT DATA

EARNINGS EARNINGS

NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED

B-17. Average hourly earnings, excluding overtime1 of production employees on manufacturing payrolls

Industry Feb.

2011

Mar.

2011

Jan.

2012

Feb.

2012 p

Mar.

2012 p

Manufacturing ............................................................................. $18.07 $18.01 $18.24 $18.18 $18.13

Durable goods .......................................................................... 19.23 19.14 19.31 19.25 19.17

Wood products ........................................................................ 14.36 14.25 14.20 14.12 2 ( )

Nonmetallic mineral products ............................................... 17.11 16.83 17.11 16.96 2 ( )

Primary metals ........................................................................ 18.80 18.61 19.16 18.91 2 ( )

Fabricated metal products ..................................................... 17.24 17.17 17.33 17.27 2 ( )

Machinery ................................................................................. 18.35 18.38 18.87 18.91 2 ( )

Computer and electronic products ....................................... 22.69 22.51 22.80 22.77 2 ( )

Electrical equipment and appliances ................................... 17.28 17.13 17.17 17.26 2 ( )

Transportation equipment ..................................................... 24.04 24.00 23.66 23.51 2 ( )

Furniture and related products ............................................. 14.59 14.62 14.85 14.86 2 ( )

Miscellaneous manufacturing ............................................... 16.41 16.36 16.48 16.55 2 ( )

Nondurable goods ................................................................... 16.23 16.21 16.56 16.44 16.46

Food manufacturing ............................................................... 13.87 13.85 14.20 14.22 2 ( )

Textile mills .............................................................................. 13.55 13.34 12.74 12.90 2 ( )

Textile product mills ................................................................ 11.65 11.77 11.95 11.86 2 ( )

Apparel ..................................................................................... 11.44 11.30 12.31 12.37 2 ( )

Paper and paper products ..................................................... 19.09 18.95 19.49 19.16 2 ( )

Printing and related support activities ................................. 16.87 16.82 16.77 16.62 2 ( )

Petroleum and coal products ................................................ 30.23 30.00 28.93 28.75 2 ( )

Chemicals ................................................................................ 20.17 20.38 20.78 20.49 2 ( )

Plastics and rubber products ................................................ 15.18 15.08 15.44 15.31 2 ( )

154

1 Derived by assuming that overtime hours are paid at the rate of

time and one-half.

2 Data not available.

p = preliminary.

NOTE: Data are currently projected from March 2011 benchmark

levels. When more recent benchmark data are introduced with

the release of January 2013 estimates, all unadjusted data from

April 2011 forward are subject to revision.
#### Van Sickler *against*Jacobs.

NEW-YORK,

October, 1817.

Where improperevidence has been admitted, in a justice^ court, without being excepted to at the time, it cannot afterwards be made a ground of objection, oo the return to a *certiorari.*By the act in addition to the *Met concerning judgments and*executions, sess. 38. c. 227. necessary cooking utensils, owned by. anv person being a householdeypre ex-*gpeli0^i*from ^execution and distress for rent. The party claiming an exception under this act, for lus cooking utensils, must show, affirmatively and certainly, that the cooking u-tensile taken in execution or distrained upon, were in fact necessary, and not merely that they might be useful in cooking.

IN ERROR, on *certiorari*to a justice’s court.

The plaintiff in error brought an action of trespass *da bonis asportatis,*in the court below, against the defendant, in error. The defendant justified under a warrant of distress for rent, and judgment was rendered in his favour.

The objections presented, on the return to the *certiorari,*were, 1. That the warrant of distress was proved by parol evidence only, whereas it ought to have been produced on the trial. 2. That the distress was illegal, because it appeared that among the articles distrained, there were one copper tea-kettle, one tin oven, three iron-pots, one grid-iron, and one sauce-pan.

*Per Curiam.*

The first objection cannot avail, because no exception to the parol evidence of the warrant was made at the trial. The witness who swore to the warrant, may, for any thing that appears, have had it in his pocket, ready to be produced if it had been required.(a) As to the second objection, the act of the 18th of *April,*1815, (sess. 38. c. 227. p. 231.) declares, that “ *necessary cooking utensils,*owned by any person being a householder, shall be exempted from execution and distress for rent.” In this case, it appears that the plaintiff was a householder; but it does not appear that any of the articles dis-trained were, in fact, to him, *necessary cooking utensils.*It does not appear that these were all the cooking utensils found in the plaintiff’s possession ; he may have had an abundant supply, besides these articles. In order to claim the benefit of that statute, tthe party must show affirmatively, and certainly, that the cooking utensils were, in fact, necessary. It is not sufficient, as in this case, to show merely, that the articles distrained might he useful in cooking. The judgment, therefore, ought to be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

(a)

**Vide *Cobb*v. *Curtiss,*8 *Johns. Rep.*470. *Van Slyck v. Taylor,*9 *Johns. Rep.*146, *Reed*v. *Ginet,*12 *Johns. Rep.*296.
**CERTIFICATION      PURSUANT TO**

**18      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906      OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

|   | • | the                  Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or                  15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                  and |
|--------|---------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | • | the                  information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                  respects, the financial condition and results of operations of                  the                  combined predecessors of the                  Partnership. |
|--------|---------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                                                  |                                                                                                                                                                         |                                                                |
|-------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                  |                                                                                                                                                                         |
|                                             |                                                                                                                                                                    |                                                           |
| Date:  September              7, 2007  | By:                                                                                                                                                                | /s/ JOHN              B.              WALKER    |
|                                                  | John              B. Walker                                                                                                                                                  |
|                                                  | Chief                Executive Officer of EV Management LLC, general                partner of EV Energy GP, L.P.,general                partner of EV Energy Partners, L.P. |

----
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Santo Torres, Appellant.

[855 NYS2d 409]

No opinion. Order filed. Concur—Lippman, P.J., Gonzalez, Sweeny and Catterson, JJ.