COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Annunziata and Senior Judge Duff 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

MICHAEL JOSEPH ABOLZADEH 

v. Record No. 2518-94-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY JUDGE CHARLES H. DUFF 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA JUNE 11, 1996 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 

Richard B. Potter, Judge 

 Ralph E. Kipp (Laurie E. Forbes; Lawson, Kipp 

& Forbes, on briefs), for appellant. 

 John K. Byrum, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General; Robert B. Condon, Assistant Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Appellant, Michael Joseph Abolzadeh, was convicted of grand 

larceny. 

 He argues that (1) the trial court erred in giving a grand 

larceny instruction, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to 

support the conviction. We disagree and affirm. On the night of 

January 18, 1994, the victim visited the apartment of a friend. 

Shortly after his arrival, Cornell Evans and appellant entered 

the apartment. The victim testified that Evans and appellant 

"started hitting [him]." Appellant took the victim's bracelet, a 

watch, a chain from around the victim's neck and two earrings 

from the victim's ears. Evans removed three rings from the 

victim's fingers. The perpetrators also stole the victim's 

 

 * Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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wallet, which contained either $166 or $165. 

 From the view we take of the case, the dispositive question 

is whether the evidence was sufficient to frame a jury issue as 

to the value of the property taken. We hold that it was 

sufficient. 

 The record showed that $165 cash was taken from the victim. 

 Also taken were the following items of personal property: 

 • 1 Gucci link chain with a cross 

 • 1 Polo ring 

 • 1 Bracelet 

 • 2 Other rings 

 • 1 Watch 

 • 2 Earrings 

 As to value, the victim testified that he paid sixty-five 

dollars for the bracelet two years before the robbery and that he 

paid $250 for one of the rings, but did not remember when. The 

watch was in the same condition at trial as when it was taken. 

The bracelet, which was apparently broken during the robbery, was 

described as being in better condition when taken. 

 In light of the evidence showing that $165 was taken in the 

offense, the narrow issue presented is whether the owner's 

testimony of the price paid for the jewelry, combined with the 

evidence of their condition at the time of the offense, was 

sufficient to support a jury finding that the jewelry had a value 

of thirty-five dollars. 

 "It is generally recognized that the opinion 

testimony of the owner of property, because 

of his relationship as owner, is competent 

and admissible on the question of the value 

of such property, regardless of his knowledge 

of property values. It is not necessary to 
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show that he was acquainted with the market 

value of such property or that he is an 

expert on values. He is deemed qualified by 

reason of his relationship as owner to give 

estimates of the value of what he owns. The 

weight of such testimony is, of course, 

affected by his knowledge of the value." 

Hayes v. Glenn, 197 Va. 746, 750, 91 S.E.2d 433, 436 (1956) 

(citation omitted). See also Walls v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 480, 

482, 450 S.E.2d 363, 364 (1994). 

 Value, like any other fact in a case, may be proved by 

circumstantial evidence. "[D]irect proof of a fact is not 

essential if circumstantial evidence proves the same fact and at 

the same time excludes every reasonable hypothesis to the 

contrary." Veney v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 805, 806, 188 S.E.2d 

80, 81 (1972). In this case we hold that it does. The jury 

believed the testimony of the victim concerning the amount of 

cash taken and the value of the stolen jewelry. "The weight 

which should be given to evidence and whether the testimony of a 

witness is credible are questions which the fact finder must 

decide." Bridgeman v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 523, 528, 351 

S.E.2d 598, 601 (1986). The victim's testimony was competent and 

was not inherently incredible. 

 Nor do we find this case to be controlled by Dunn v. 

Commonwealth, 222 Va. 704, 284 S.E.2d 792 (1981). Dunn does not 

establish a bright line or inflexible rule requiring evidence of 

depreciation for every type of property. We hold that the 

owner's evidence of the purchase price of the ring and bracelet 
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combined with the evidence of the condition of the property at 

the time of the taking was sufficient to allow the jury to decide 

the issue. 

 Having concluded that the evidence was sufficient to frame a 

jury issue on valuation, we find no error in the trial court's 

decision to grant Instruction F that defined grand larceny. It 

was offered by the defendant who, nonetheless, objected to the 

valuation question being submitted to the jury. 

 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.