alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Program United States Railroad

Retirement Board Letter Office of Programs 

Quality Reporting Service Center Phone: (312) 751-4992 

e-mail: qrsc@rrb.gov Fax: (312) 751-7190 

Letter No. 2014-01 Date: October 9, 2013 

TO: Certification Registration, Retirement and Unemployment Contact Officials 

SUBJECT: Impact of Sequestration under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control 

Act on RUIA Benefits for Fiscal Year 2014 

Please distribute this notice to all individuals within your organization who may need the 

information in connection with their work. 

Unemployment and sickness benefits payable under the Railroad Unemployment 

Insurance Act (RUIA) for days beginning October 1, 2013 must be reduced by 7.2 

percent, as required by the sequestration order issued by the President on April 10, 2013 

in accordance with the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, as 

amended. The reduction is based on projected claims and will continue through 

September 30, 2014. Reductions for fiscal years 2015 and beyond, should they occur, 

will be calculated based on applicable law. 

Only the reduced amount of sickness or unemployment benefits paid to a claimant will be 

charged to the claimant’s base year employer’s benefit account balance and consequently 

will be used when calculating the base year employer’s experience rated RUIA 

contribution rate for any future years. The sequestered amount will not be charged to the 

claimant’s base year employer’s benefit account balance. 

Any reduced special extended unemployment benefits paid based on the American 

Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA) will be charged to the $175 million appropriation. 

These benefits will not be charged to the claimant’s base year employer’s benefit account 

balance and consequently will not be used when calculating the base year employer’s 

experience rated RUIA contribution rate for any future years. 

If you have any questions regarding the reduction or sequestration of benefits paid based 

on the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, please contact the Railroad 

Retirement Board’s Quality Reporting Service Center at (312) 751-4992.
# table184_q17.2_naics
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. 

## IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-40720 Summary Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee v. RANDALL THOMAS CLARK; GINGER LYNN EGAN; STEVE MARTIN Defendants-Appellants Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 4:04-CR-103-3 Before WIENER, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * The attorney appointed to represent Ginger Lynn Egan has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Egan has not filed a response. The record is insufficiently developed to allow consideration at this time ofany claims ofineffective assistance ofcounsel. See United Statesv. Cantwell, 470 F.3d 1087, 1091 (5th Cir. 2006). Our independent review of the record and counsel’s brief discloses no nonfrivolous issue for appeal. Accordingly, United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## F I L E D November 13, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk

### No. 05-40720

2 counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR. R. 42.2.
#### PHILADELPHIA WORKINGMEN’S SAVING LOAN & BUILDING ASS’N v. ALBERT M. GREENFIELD & CO.

Civ. No. 8990.

United States District Court E. D. Pennsylvania.

Feb. 28, 1949.

Hymen Schwartz, of Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Jerome L. Markovitz, of Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

KIRKPATRICK, Chief Judge.

Of the defendant’s motions, the only one as to which anything need be said is the motion to dismiss the action. The ground for the motion is that the issues in this case are res judicata, by reason of judgments entered in the courts of the State of Pennsylvania. The motion was supported by affidavits to which a counter-affidavit was filed.

The proceedings relied upon to support the motion have not been brought before me. If the records in these earlier actions leave any uncertainty as to what issues were involved and settled by the judgments rendered therein (a question vital to the defense of res judicata), the parol evidence offered by the affidavits for purposes of eliminating the uncertainty may be considered by this Court. 30 Am.Jur., Judgments, Sec. 285. However, in order that the Court may proceed to enter summary judgment, it must appear that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. The affidavits before me together with the pleadings present genuine issues as to the material fact of the scope and coverage of the judgments in the state courts. Consequently the defendant’s motion to dismiss must be denied.

The motion to strike, the motion for a more definite statement and the motion for disciplinary action in accordance with Rule 11 are all denied.
MARCIA M. WALDRON 

CLERK

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

21400 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE

601 MARKET STREET

PHILADELPHIA, PA 19106-1790

Website: www.ca3.uscourts.gov

September 4, 2013

TELEPHONE

215-597-2995

Mr. William T Walsh

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 

Martin Luther King, Jr. Federal Building & United States Courthouse

50 Walnut Street

PO Box 999

Newark, NJ 07102

RE: Drake v. Filko

Case Number: 12-1150

District Case Number: 2-10-cv-06110

Dear District Court Clerk, 

Enclosed herewith is the certified judgment together with copy of the opinion in the abovecaptioned case(s). The certified judgment is issued in lieu of a formal mandate and is to be 

treated in all respects as a mandate.

Counsel are advised of the issuance of the mandate by copy of this letter. The certified judgment 

or order is also enclosed showing costs taxed, if any.

Very truly yours,

Marcia M. Waldron, Clerk

By: 

Christina M. Koperna, Case Manager

267-299-4930

cc:

Case 2:10-cv-06110-WHW-MCA Document 46-1 Filed 09/04/13 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 449
Alan Gura

David D. Jensen

Adam K. Levin

Robert T. Lougy

Mary E. Wood

Case 2:10-cv-06110-WHW-MCA Document 46-1 Filed 09/04/13 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 450
Case 1:10-cr-00852-JEI Document 28 Filed 12/15/10 Page 1 of 3 PageID: 53
Case 1:10-cr-00852-JEI Document 28 Filed 12/15/10 Page 2 of 3 PageID: 54
Case 1:10-cr-00852-JEI Document 28 Filed 12/15/10 Page 3 of 3 PageID: 55
.• \ 

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--•--~--~--7~/---------------------- ----111-. _f::/11#/ 

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II 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1100 

To institute a program for the disclosure of taxpayer information for thirdparty income verification through the Internet. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

APRIL 9, 2019 

Mr. BOOKER (for himself, Mr. SCOTT of South Carolina, Ms. HASSAN, and 

Mr. YOUNG) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To institute a program for the disclosure of taxpayer information for third-party income verification through the 

Internet. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. DISCLOSURE OF TAXPAYER INFORMATION FOR 

4 THIRD-PARTY INCOME VERIFICATION. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the 

6 close of the 2-year period described in subsection (d)(1), 

7 the Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary’s delegate 

8 (hereafter referred to in this section as the ‘‘Secretary’’) 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1100 IS

1 shall implement a program to ensure that any qualified 

2 disclosure— 

3 (1) is fully automated and accomplished 

4 through the Internet; and 

5 (2) is accomplished in as close to real-time as 

6 is practicable. 

7 (b) QUALIFIED DISCLOSURE.—For purposes of this 

8 section, the term ‘‘qualified disclosure’’ means a disclosure 

9 under section 6103(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 

10 1986 of returns or return information by the Secretary 

11 to a person seeking to verify the income or creditworthi12 ness of a taxpayer who is a borrower in the process of 

13 a loan application. 

14 (c) APPLICATION OF SECURITY STANDARDS.—The 

15 Secretary shall ensure that the program described in sub16 section (a) complies with applicable security standards and 

17 guidelines. 

18 (d) USER FEE.— 

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—During the 2-year period be20 ginning on the first day of the 6th calendar month 

21 beginning after the date of the enactment of this 

22 Act, the Secretary shall assess and collect a fee for 

23 qualified disclosures (in addition to any other fee as24 sessed and collected for such disclosures) at such 

25 rates as the Secretary determines are sufficient to 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
3 

•S 1100 IS

1 cover the costs related to implementing the program 

2 described in subsection (a), including the costs of 

3 any necessary infrastructure or technology. 

4 (2) DEPOSIT OF COLLECTIONS.—Amounts re5 ceived from fees assessed and collected under para6 graph (1) shall be deposited in, and credited to, an 

7 account solely for the purpose of carrying out the 

8 activities described in subsection (a). Such amounts 

9 shall be available to carry out such activities without 

10 need of further appropriation and without fiscal year 

11 limitation. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 32



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. Section 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, each of the undersigned President and Sole Executive
Officer of the Company, certifies, that to his knowledge:

         1) Ridgefield Acquisition Corp.'s Form 10-KSB for the annual period
         ended December 31, 2005 fully complies with the requirements of Section
         13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

         2) the information contained in Ridgefield Acquisition Corp.'s Form
         10-KSB for the annual period ended December 31, 2005 fairly presents,
         in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
         operations of the Company.



Dated:   March 28, 2006



                                            /s/ Steven N. Bronson
                                            -----------------------------------
                                            Steven N. Bronson, President
Order entered November 12, 2021

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-21-00321-CR

MICHAEL FOY WALLING, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 296-83626-2017

ORDER

Before the Court is appellant’s November 8, 2021 second motion for an 

extension of time to file his brief. We GRANT the motion and ORDER 

appellant’s brief due on November 19, 2021.

/s/ DENNISE GARCIA

JUSTICE
**EXHIBIT24**

OWENS-ILLINOIS GROUP,INC.

POWER OF ATTORNEY

KNOW ALL MEN BYTHESE PRESENTS: That each individual whose signature appears below herebyconsents to and appoints James W. Baehren as his true and lawfulattorney-in-fact and agent with all power of substitution, for him and in hisname, place and stead, in any and all capacities, to sign the 2006 AnnualReport on Form 10-K of Owens-Illinois Group, Inc., a corporation organized andexisting under the laws of the State of Delaware, and any and all amendmentsthereto, and to file the same, with all exhibits thereto, and all documents inconnection therewith, with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant tothe requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, granting unto saidattorney-in-fact and agent full power and authority to do and perform each andevery act and thing requisite and necessary to be done in and about the same asfully to all intents and purposes as he might or could do in person, herebyratifying and confirming all that said attorney-in-fact and agent or hissubstitute or substitutes, may lawfully do or cause to be done by virtuethereof.

IN WITNESSWHEREOF, each of the undersigned has hereunto set his hand on the date setopposite his name.
| Signature                 | ** ** | **Title**                                                | ** ** | **Date**      |
|---------------------------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------|------------|---------------|
|                      |       |                                                     |       |          |
| /s/ Matthew G. Longthorne |       | Director                                                 |       | March 1, 2007 |
| Matthew G. Longthorne     |       |                                                     |       |          |
|                      |       |                                                     |       |          |
| /s/ Albert P.L. Stroucken |       | Chairman and Chief Executive Officer                     |       | March 1, 2007 |
| Albert P.L. Stroucken     |       | (Principal Executive Officer)                            |       |          |
|                      |       |                                                     |       |          |
| /s/ Edward C. White       |       | President (Principal Financial and Accounting  Officer); |       | March 1, 2007 |
| Edward C. White           |       | Director                                                 |       |          |
|                      |       |                                                     |       |          |
| /s/ James W. Baehren      |       | Vice President and Secretary; Director                   |       | March 1, 2007 |
| James W. Baehren          |       |                                                     |       |          |

 

----
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Pursuantto 18 U.S.C. § 1350, the undersigned officer of Shermen WSC Acquisition Corp.(the “Company”) hereby certifies that the Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Qfor the quarter ended September 30, 2008 (the “Report”) fully complieswith the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of the Company.

 

 
|                                |  /s/  Francis P. Jenkins, Jr. |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
|                                |  Name:                             | Francis P. Jenkins, Jr. |
|                                |  Title:                            | Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and |
|                                |                                    | Director (Principal Executive Officer) |
|                                |                                    |   |
| Dated:  November 14, 2008 |                                    |

 

----
Case 2:10-cv-06356-SRC -MAS Document 8 Filed 01/06/11 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 37
Case 2:10-cv-06356-SRC -MAS Document 8 Filed 01/06/11 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 38
Current Use Case #1
Please tell us about one example of how you currently use QCEW
data.

Use case title:

Area Profiles

Briefly describe the use case:
Please include a link to any publicly available data or

estimates.

A collection of labor market and economic
information about an area updated periodically to
reflect the most current available data.

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groups, economic development organization, me.

Workforce and economic development stakeholders

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@ Confidential QCEW microdata

©) Publicly available QCEW tables

Are the data or estimates produced for
this use case made available to non-BLS
agents?

g Yes

O No

O Don't know


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or estimates for this use case?

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requirements for this use case?

Please indicate the finest level of detail needed in each

category.

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© Total private
@ 2 digit Naics

© 3digit NAICS

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{_] National {_] Census tract
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ia Metropolitan statistical Oj Zip code
area (MSA)
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O City O Central business districts
O Township Oj Arbitrary areas defined by
latitude and longitude
Ownership

O All ownership types together

g Broken down by ownership type (e.g., private, non-profit)

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# Result 16
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 23-0189

IN THE MATTER OF:

C.H., C.H., AND S.H.,

Youths In Need Of Care.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Mother and Appellant’s Motion To Consolidate 

Cases, and with good cause shown, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that DA 23-0189, DA 23-0190, and 

DA 23-0191 are hereby consolidated under DA 23-0189 and captioned as above.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

August 11 2023

08/11/2023
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

November 30, 2016

d1121 

# Order

Clerk November 30, 2016

153089

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 153089

COA: 329571

Wayne CC: 10

- 001388

- FH

STEVEN KEITH BOU,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 23, 2015

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, beca use the defendant has

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
#### Gerald Harden, Respondent, v William Tynatishon, Appellant.

[856 NYS2d 134]

*605The infant plaintiff was diagnosed with lead poisoning in early 2002 when he and his family were tenants in a house owned by the defendant. The Orange County Department of Health (hereinafter the DOH) inspected the premises on June 6, 2002, and, by notice dated June 12, 2002, informed the defendant that there were “conditions conducive to lead poisoning” at the house. The plaintiff’s family members subsequently repainted the house.

The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant to recover damages as a result of his exposure to lead paint during the period from 2000 to 2004. The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the grounds that he lacked constructive notice of any dangerous lead-paint condition prior to receiving the DOH notice, and that any lead-paint condition had been remedied by the tenants before he received that notice. The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

“[A]bsent controlling legislation, a triable issue of fact is raised when a plaintiff shows that the landlord (1) retained a right of entry to the premises and assumed a duty to make repairs, (2) knew that the apartment was constructed at a time before lead-based interior paint was banned, (3) was aware that paint was peeling on the premises, (4) knew of the hazards of lead-based paint to young children and (5) knew that a young child lived in the apartment” *(Chapman v Silber,*97 NY2d 9, 15 [2001]).

On his motion for summary judgment, the defendant failed to meet his prima facie burden of establishing that he lacked constructive notice of a hazardous lead condition at the premises *(see Molina v Belasquez,*1 AD3d 489 [2003]). Moreover, the defendant failed to demonstrate the absence of triable issues of fact, since the deposition testimony of the tenants and of the defendant, submitted on the motion, presented questions of fact as to whether, inter alia, the defendant retained a right of reentry and assumed a duty to make repairs at the property, and whether he was aware of the presence of children and of the dangers of lead paint *(see Molina v Belasquez,*1 AD3d 489 [2003]; *Vidal v Rodriquez,*301 AD2d 517 [2003]).

*606In addition, the evidence presented by the defendant failed to demonstrate that he took reasonable precautionary measures to remedy the hazardous lead condition after he received actual notice thereof from the DOH, or that the plaintiff did not sustain any additional injuries after the defendant received notice of this condition *(see Griffin v Tautel,*301 AD2d 499 [2003]; *Bellony v Siegel,*288 AD2d 411 [2001]). Thus, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Lifson, J.P., Ritter, Florio and Garni, JJ., concur.