alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
2015 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-27-2015

USA v. Anna Mudrova

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015

This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Anna Mudrova" (2015). 2015 Decisions. Paper 799.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/799
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

__________

No. 14-3580

__________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ANNA MUDROVA,

 Appellant

__________

ORDER AMENDING OPINION

__________

The opinion and judgment filed July 23, 2015 shall be amended to reflect the 

correct District Judge, the Honorable Juan R. Sanchez.

For the Court,

Marcia M. Waldron, Clerk

Dated: July 27, 2015

CJG/cc: Thomas D. Kenny, Esq.

Mary Beth Leahy, Esq.
1

SEDGWICK LLP

125 Broad Street, 39th Floor

New York, New York 10004-2400

Telephone: (212) 422-0202

Facsimile: (212) 422-0925

Attorneys for Defendants

Hartford Life and Accident

Insurance Company i/s/h/a

Hartford Financial Services Group, 

The Hartford Benefit Management 

Services and GDB Claims and 

Services Operations

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT COURT OF NEW JERSEY

----------------------------------------------------------------x

JAMES WRIGHT,

Plaintiff,

-againstHARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, 

THE HARTFORD BENEFIT MANAGEMENT 

SERVICES; GDB CLAIMS AND SERVICES 

OPERATIONS; ABC 1-10 (that being the names of 

the corporate entities, companies, partnership or 

individuals intended), 

Defendants.

Civil No.: 2:11-cv-00602 

Hon. Stanley R. Chesler, U.S.D.J.

Hon. Michael A. Shipp, U.S.M.J.

PROOF OF MAILING

----------------------------------------------------------------x

1. I, Daniel M. Meier, am an associate with the law firm of Sedgwick LLP, attorneys for 

DEFENDANT HARTFORD LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY i/s/h/a HARTFORD 

FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, THE HARTFORD BENEFIT MANAGEMENT SERVICES and 

GDB CLAIMS AND SERVICES OPERATIONS.

Case 2:11-cv-00602-SRC -MAS Document 11 Filed 05/06/11 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 42
2

2. I hereby certify that I mailed a sealed envelope with postage pre-paid, via regular mail

addressed to:

Kevin T. Kutyla, Esq.

83 Spring Street

Newton, NJ 07860

(973) 940-8970

Attorney for Plaintiff

3. This envelope contained copies of defendant’s NOTICE OF MOTION FOR PRO HAC 

VICE ADMISSION OF MICHAEL BERNSTEIN, THE DECLARATION OF MICHAEL 

BERNSTEIN, THE DECLARATION OF DANIEL M. MEIER, and THE PROPOSED ORDER

which were filed with the court via ECF.

I certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true. I am aware that if any of the 

foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.

Dated: May 6, 2011

s/ Daniel M. Meier

Daniel M. Meier, Esq. (DM- 041942006)

Case 2:11-cv-00602-SRC -MAS Document 11 Filed 05/06/11 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 43
EXHIBIT 31.2  CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  CERTIFICATION  I, Barry C. Nuss, Chief Financial Officer, certify that:  1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of RathGibson, Inc.;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;  4. The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:  a. designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;  b. evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report, based on such evaluation;  c. disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and  5. The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):  a. all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and  b. any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.   Date:  December 14, 2006/s/ Barry C. NussBarry C. NussChief Financial Officer
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

IN RE: ESTATE OF RALPH F. TITO, 

DECEASED

PETITION OF: CAROL J. GALINAC

:

:

:

:

:

No. 510 WAL 2016

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of April, 2017, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Stephen R. Brunner, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operating Officer and President of Constellation Energy
Partners LLC, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that to my knowledge:

(i) The accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2008 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended; and

(ii) The information contained in such report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of Constellation Energy Partners LLC.



|                                                              
|--------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Stephen R. Brunner                                        
|Stephen R. Brunner                                            
|Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operating Officer and President

Date: May 9, 2008
**Exhibit 10.20**AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTAmendment (A)     John Brandt (“Executive”) and Stratex Networks, Inc., formerly DMC Stratex Networks, Inc. (the“Company”), are parties to an Employment Agreement of April 1, 2006 (the “Agreement”). Executiveand the Company now wish to amend the Agreement, and thus they agree as set forth below.     1.      The following is added to Paragraph 5(c)(ii) of the Agreement: “provided, however, that ifyou are 60 years of age or older on the date of your termination without cause, and if you havebeen employed by the Company for not less than three years as of the date of your terminationwithout cause, the Company will pay the premiums necessary to continue your Company group healthinsurance coverage under COBRA (or to provide you with comparable health insurance coverage) untilyou reach the age of 65 or until you are eligible to participate in another employer’s group healthinsurance plan, whichever comes first;”.     2.      In Paragraph 5(e) of the Agreement, the phase “(ii to a maximum of 18 months, unless youare 60 years of age or older on the date of your termination/resignation and you have been employedby the Company for not less than three years as of the date of your termination/resignation, inwhich case the last clause of subparagraph 5(c)(ii) shall apply)” shall be inserted following thephrase “subparagraph 5(c)(i),”.     3.     In Paragraph 11 of the Agreement, the last sentence (“Provided, however . . .”) is herebydeleted and replaced with the following sentence: “Any arbitration conducted under this Paragraphwill be pursuant to the American Arbitration Association’s (“AAA”) National Rules for theResolution of Employment Disputes, a copy of which can be found on the AAA’s website atwww.adr.org.”     Except as modified by this Amendment, the Agreement will remain in full force and effect.        Dated:  April 19, 2006 /s/ John Brandt   John Brandt           Dated: April 19,2006 Stratex Networks, Inc.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Orient Paper, Inc. (the Company) on
Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2009, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Winston C. Yen,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section
1350 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

| |     |                                                                                                                                                         
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | (1) | The Report
  fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
  Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                               
| |     |                                                                                                                                                         
| | (2) | The
  information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
  respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to
the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

The
foregoing certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350 and is not being filed for purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be
incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before
or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in
such filing.

|                        |     |                                               
|----------------------- | --- | ----------------------------------------------
|Date: November 13, 2009 | By: | /s/ Winston
  C. Yen                          
|                        |     |                                               
|                        |     | Winston C.
  Yen                              
|                        |     | Chief
  Financial Officer                     
|                        |     | (principal
  financial and accounting officer)

20

---
# Table 2200. hispanic
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 14

- 00022

- CR

Jeremiah Brigham Young

v. The State of Texas

On Appeal from the 2nd 25th District Court of Lavaca County , Texas

Trial Cause No. 13

- 06

- 9449

JUDGMENT THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered t his cause on appeal, concludes the appeal should be dismissed. The Court orders the appeal
DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion

. We further order this decision certified below for observance. February 27, 2014
#### TEXAS & P. RY. CO. v. ELGIN, J. & E. RY. CO.

No. 970.

District Court, N. D. Illinois, E. D.

Jan. 5, 1940.

Campbell, Clark & Miller, of Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

Knapp, Allen & Cushing, of Chicago, Ill., for defendant.

HOLLY, District Judge.

On the motion of the defendant to dismiss for want of indispensable parties.

This is an action in the nature of an action at law in which plaintiff seeks to recover a money judgment. Equitable relief is not sought. If plaintiff is entitled to recover against defendant it makes no difference, in an action at law, that another may be liable over to defendant. A mo*137tion to dismiss for want of such parties does not lie. The new rules provide that defendant may bring other parties, but not that the suit shall be dismissed for lack of such parties.

The motion to dismiss will be denied.

On motion of defendant for a bill of particulars.

I am of the opinion that defendant, before answering, should be given the particulars requested in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of defendant’s motion. The particulars requested in paragraph 5 have already been furnished plaintiff, apparently, and the particulars requested in paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 are either matters of which defendant is already informed, or are included in requests in prior paragraphs,- or do not seem to me to be necessary to enable the defendant to answer the complaint.

An order accordingly will be entered.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03

- 23

- 00340

- CV

In re Jose P. Garza, District Attorney, Travis County, Texas

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM TRAVIS COUNTY

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The petition for writ of mandamus is de nie d , and the motion to ex pedite is

dismissed as moot

. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a).

_______________________ ___________________ Darlene Byrne

, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and S mith

Filed: August 31, 2023
1 The Honorable Scott O. Wright, United St ates District Judge for the Western District of Missouri. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 07-1283

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Western District of Missouri. Clarence Stevens, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: January 4, 2008 Filed: January 22, 2008

___________ Before BYE, RILEY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Clarence Stevens (Stevens) appeals th e 60-month’s imprisonment the district court 1 imposed after this court re manded for resentencing. SeeUnited States v. Wintermute , 443 F.3d 993 (8th Cir. 2006). Steven s argues (1) the government should not have been allowed to present evidence at the resentencing hearing, and (2) his sentence violates the Sixth Amendment, because the sentencing enhancements he received were based on facts not found by a jury or admitted by him.-2- We conclude (1) the law-of-the-case doctrine required the district court to follow this court’s mandate to allow the government to present evidence at resentencing, giving all parties a full rese ntencing hearing; and (2) Stevens has not shown that the law of the cas e should not apply here. SeeUnited States v. Huber , 462 F.3d 945, 953 (8th Cir. 2006) (declaring the law of the case requires a trial court to follow the decision of the appellate court w ith respect to all issues addressed by the opinion); United States v. Bartsh , 69 F.3d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 1995) (explaining the law of the case prevents relitigation of settled issues and requires c ourts to adhere to decisions made in earlier pro ceedings to ensure uniformity , protect expectations, and promote judicial economy); United States v. Callaway , 972 F.2d 904, 905 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (stating the law of th e case should be followed unless a party “introduces substantially different evid ence, or [the] prior decision is clearly erroneous and works manifest injustice”).

We further conclude Stevens’s senten ce does not violate the Sixth Amendment because there is no indication the district court viewed the Guid elines as mandatory. SeeUnited States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220, 233-37, 245, 258-59 (2005) (concluding the Sixth Amendment problem resulting from the mandatory nature of the Guidelines is remedied by making the Guidelines advisory); United States v. Salter , 418 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 2005) (ruling, after Booker , the district court may enhance a sentence based on judge-found facts if the court views the Guidelines as advisory).
Steven argues in his brief the “increase in the offense level in the case at bar skews the ‘reasonableness’ analysis.” We further review the sentence for reasonableness, finding no abuse of discretion by the districtcourt, and conclude the sentence is not unreasonable. See Gall v. United States , __ U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596-97; Rita v. United States , __ U.S. __ 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007); and Booker , 543 U.S. at 261.

We affirm.

______________________________
**Exhibit 32.2**

**CERTIFICATIONOF CHIEF FINANCIAL**

**OFFICEROF GENERAL PARTNER OF HILAND HOLDINGS GP, LP**

**PURSUANTTO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

In connection withthe accompanying quarterly report on Form 10-Q for three months endedSeptember 30, 2006 and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on thedate hereof (the “Report”), I, Ken Maples, Chief Financial Officer and VicePresident - Finance and Secretary of Hiland Partners GP Holdings, LLC, thegeneral partner of Hiland Holdings GP, LP (the “Company”), hereby certify,pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.               TheReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.               Theinformation contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| Date: November 13, 2006 |   | /s/ Ken Maples                                    |   |
|-------------------------|--------|---------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                    |   | Ken Maples                                        |
|                    |   | Chief Financial Officer, Vice President - Finance |
|                    |   | and Secretary                                     |

 

1

----
, DOB: 

SBI#:150812C, is now confined to Southwoods State Prison.

2.MARCKESE STEWART, DOB: ‘ SBI#: 150812C will be required at the United States Court House in Newark. New Jersey before the Hon. Stanley R. Chesler, U.S. District Judge, on Monday, May 9. 201 t, at 11:00 am, for a Plea Hearing, in the above-captioned case. A Writ of Habeas Corpus should be issued for that purpose.

DATED: May 2, 2011

Newark, NJ Melissa Ja po, Assistant U.S. Attorney Petitioner

ORDER

Let the Writ Issue.

DATED: 6i5 /9e

H . Stanley R. Chesler, U.S.D.J.

WRIT Qj HABEAS CORPUS

The United States of America to Warden of Southwoods State Prison

WE COMMAND YOU that you have the body of

MARCKESE STEWART. L.. 1 SBI#:160812C

now confined at the Southwoods State Prison, brought before the United States District

Court, before the Hon. Stanley R, Chester, U.S. District Judge, on Monday, May 9. 2011,

at 11:00 am, for a Plea Hearing.

WITNESS the Hon. Stanley R. Chesler

United States District Judge

Newark, New Jersey.

DATED:5 )i• U WILLIAM T. WALSH Clerk of the U.S. District Court

for the District of New JerseyPerh t

Deputy Clerk
#### Steel Los III, LP, et al., Appellants, v Power Authority of State of New York, Respondent.

[823 NYS2d 490]

In an action, inter alia, to enjoin the defendant from condemning certain real property owned by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs appeal, by permission, from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Phelan, J.), entered April 13, 2005, which, in effect, denied preliminary injunctive relief on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for a determination on the merits, and further proceedings in accordance herewith.

Generally, before a condemnor may acquire property, it must first obtain a determination, made pursuant to EDPL 204, that the proposed condemnation has an appropriate public purpose and, to that end, it must give notice and hold a public hearing *(see*EDPL 201, 202, 203). Where that procedure is followed, the condemnee is allowed only 30 days within which to commence a proceeding in the Appellate Division for review of the condemnor’s determination *(see Matter of City of New York [Third Water Tunnel, Shaft 30B],*6 NY3d 763 [2006]). Where, however, a condemnor proceeds under one of the exemptions provided in *991EDPL 206, and therefore claims that it is not required to comply with the foregoing notice, hearing, and determination requirements, a condemnee may, unless otherwise provided by statute, challenge the applicability of the claimed exemption in the Supreme Court because original jurisdiction to review a claimed exemption is not specifically conferred by statute upon the Appellate Division *(see*EDPL 204, 206, 207; *Matter of City of New York [Third Water Tunnel, Shaft 30B], supra; see also*L 1982, ch 356, § 6 [amending EDPL 207 (C) (3)]), and the EDPL is otherwise silent on the issue of jurisdiction for such judicial review. In such instances, the general rule applies that “a person aggrieved by an administrative agency’s determination must challenge that decision by initiating a timely article 78 proceeding in the Supreme Court” *(Matter of City of New York [Third Water Tunnel, Shaft 30B], supra; see also*CPLR 7801). Thus, the Supreme Court erred in finding that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the plaintiffs’ claims.

Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for further proceedings, including, as appropriate, conversion of this action into a special proceeding *(see*CPLR 103 [c]).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit. Florio, J.P, Adams, Luciano and Fisher, JJ., concur.
#### JAN PRODUCTS CO. v. MILLS BROS.

Civ. 37-526.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

Jan. 27, 1949.

Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, of New York City (David Sher and Howard M. Squadron, both of New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff.

Gallop, Climenko, Gould & Lynton, of New York City (George Trosk, of New York City, of counsel), for defendants.

CONGER, District Judge.

Motion by plaintiff (1) for leave to amend the complaint by adding a fourth cause of action; and (2) for summary judgment on the same.

(1) This is granted upon consent

*27(2) Preliminarily it may be noted that this motion is premature (See Rule 56 (a), Federal Rules Civil Procedure, 28 U. S.C.A.), but the defendant makes- no issue of it, so it will be considered on the merits.

However, it is clear that this is not a case for summary judgment. The fact of the agreement itself is in dispute, and such an issue cannot be decided on controversial affidavits. Moreover, it cannot be presumed that defendant’s attorney had authority to enter into a binding compromise. See Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 2 Cir., 1946, 153 F.2d 757, 164 A.L.R. 387; Countryman v. Breen, 4th Dept. 1934, 241 App. Div. 392, 271 N.Y.S. 744, affirmed 268 N.Y. 643, 198 N.E. 536.

Where there are issues of fact, summary judgment cannot be granted where the slightest doubt remains. Arnstein v. Porter, 2 Cir., 154 F.2d 464. Measuring the affidavits submitted by defendant by the above rule I can only conclude that summary judgment is not indicated here.

Motion for summary judgment denied.

Settle order.