NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DELMI LOPEZ-ROMERO, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 15-72760 

Agency No. A205-254-660 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 11, 2022**

San Francisco, California

Before: WALLACE, S.R. THOMAS, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Delmi Lopez Romero, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions 

for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (Board) order dismissing her 

appeal from an immigration judge’s (IJ) decision denying her application for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAR 15 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

(CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the agency’s factual 

findings for substantial evidence. See Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 

2014). “Factual findings ‘are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would 

be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Id., quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 

We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the Board’s denial of Lopez Romero’s request 

for asylum and withholding of removal. Specifically, substantial evidence supports 

the Board’s determination that Lopez Romero “failed to carry her burden of proving 

past persecution, a reasonable likelihood of future persecution on account of a 

protected ground, or a clear probability that her life or freedom would be threatened 

on account of a protected ground if she were returned to El Salvador.” The record 

shows that Lopez Romero’s main evidence for any alleged past persecution is based 

on “six phone calls over a period of seven months by a person named Luis.” Dkt. 

No. 4 at 84. Although she alleges that the telephone calls threatened her and her 

children, they were never hurt or even approached by “Luis.” 

We agree with the IJ that these telephone calls simply do not constitute

persecution, “an extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment our 

society regards as offensive.” Ghaly v. I.N.S., 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Indeed, we have repeatedly held that “mere threats, without more, [are not] enough 

to constitute past persecution.” Lim v. I.N.S., 224 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 2000). For 
3 

similar reasons, substantial evidence also supports the Board’s determination that 

there is a lack of well-founded fear of future persecution. The record shows that 

gang members have not come looking for her or tried to contact her since the 

threatening telephone calls. Moreover, since leaving El Salvador, her children, 

mother, and brother continued to live in El Salvador and have not received any 

additional telephone calls from gang members or had any problem with those gang 

members in their daily lives. Finally, Lopez Romero failed even to provide any

direct evidence that shows Luis is part of any gang. Thus, there is substantial 

evidence that she has no well-founded fear of future persecution and that she can 

relocate in El Salvador.

1

 

For similar reasons, substantial evidence also supports the Board’s denial of 

CAT protection. There is no evidence that anyone is still looking for Lopez Romero 

at all, let alone any proof that she “personally will face torture if [she] returns.” 

Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 2020). 

The petition for review is DENIED.

1 Because the Board held that Lopez Romero failed her burden of establishing 

eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal, there is no need to address 

whether she also demonstrated membership in a cognizable particular social group 

and a nexus to an enumerated ground. Cf. Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 

1081, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013).