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Filed 2/18/15 In re C.P. CA1/1 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION ONE 

In re C.P., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

C.P., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 A141279 

 (Contra Costa County 

 Super. Ct. No. J1101578) 

 C.P. is a juvenile ward who has had a number of brushes with the law and is now 

subject to probation conditions. In this appeal, he claims that a condition prohibiting him 

from changing his residence without his probation officer’s approval is unconstitutional. 

This condition was first imposed on C.P. about three years ago and then re-imposed 

several times, but he never objected to it below. We conclude that he forfeited the claim, 

and we affirm the juvenile court’s disposition order. 

I. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL

BACKGROUND

 C.P. first came to the juvenile court’s attention in late 2011, when a juvenile 

wardship petition was filed alleging he committed carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, 

subd. (a)) and second-degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)). He was 15 at 
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the time. C.P. pleaded no contest to the carjacking count, and the robbery count was 

dismissed. Following a contested disposition hearing, the juvenile court adjudged C.P. a 

ward of the court. 

 The form disposition order entered in February 2012 includes the following 

language: “STANDARD CONDITIONS OF PROBATION. . . . [Do n]ot change 

residence without prior approval of [probation officer] & notify [probation officer] of 

change of address/telephone number within 5 days.” The record contains no indication 

that an objection was made to this condition. C.P. did not appeal from the disposition 

order. 

 C.P. was placed at Children’s Home of Stockton, but within weeks of his arrival 

he left and went missing for some time. A notice of probation violation was filed 

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 7771

), and C.P. admitted the violation. He was placed at Paradise 

Oaks Youth Services on May 3, but he was soon accused of assaulting and threatening 

staff and was terminated from the program. The juvenile court sustained an allegation 

that C.P. violated the terms of his probation, and it committed him to the Youthful 

Offender Treatment Program (YOTP) for a period of up to eight years, 199 days, or until 

he turned 21. As did the previous disposition order, this order included the standard 

condition that C.P. not change his residence without his probation officer’s prior 

approval. Again, there is no indication C.P. objected to the condition. 

 C.P. remained at YOTP for nearly a year and was released to home supervision 

(monitored with an ankle bracelet) in September 2013. A notice of probation violation 

was filed less than two months later, on November 19, alleging that C.P.’s ankle 

transmitter “went into ‘strap tamper’ status,” and C.P. was brought by his mother to the 

probation department two days later to have the transmitter reconnected. On 

November 21, yet another notice of probation violation was filed alleging C.P. had been 

suspended from school, had left home without permission, and had removed his ankle 

transmitter and could not be located. C.P.’s whereabouts were unknown for two weeks, 

 

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 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise 

specified. 
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and authorities later learned C.P. had been in a car accident and fled the scene before he 

removed his ankle transmitter. At a hearing in December regarding the two November 

petitions, C.P. admitted the allegations of the November 21 petition, and the 

November 19 petition was stricken. C.P. requested a contested disposition hearing, and 

the matter was referred to the probation department for a recommendation. 

 The probation department recommended continuing C.P.’s wardship with no 

termination date and returning C.P. to YOTP. The probation department also 

recommended the “Standard Conditions of Probation” that had been included on previous 

orders, including the condition that C.P. “not change residence without prior approval of 

[probation officer] and notify [probation officer] of change of address/telephone number 

within 5 days.” 

 Following a contested disposition hearing, C.P.’s attorney asked for C.P. to be 

rereleased to the community. The juvenile court instead ordered C.P. to remain in 

juvenile hall until he could be recommitted from the waiting list to YOTP for a ninemonth commitment. The court continued C.P. as a ward with no termination date. It also 

imposed the standard terms and conditions of probation previously imposed, stating, 

without objection: “You’re not to change your residence without the prior approval of 

the probation officer.” That same term appeared on the form order entered after the 

hearing. 

II. 

DISCUSSION

 C.P.’s sole argument on appeal is that the probation condition prohibiting him 

from changing his residence without his probation officer’s approval is unconstitutionally 

overbroad. Section 730, subdivision (b) grants the juvenile court discretion to impose 

“all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice 

may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.” And 

section 727, subdivision (a)(3) provides that where, as here, a minor is declared a ward of 

the court under section 602, “the court shall order the care, custody, and control of the 

minor or nonminor to be under the supervision of the probation officer[,] who may place 
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the minor or nonminor” in various placements. But “[a] probation condition that imposes 

limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the 

purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.” (In 

re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.) Because C.P. did not object below to the 

condition, we must first consider whether he forfeited his overbreadth challenge by 

failing to object below. We conclude he did. 

 As a general rule, a defendant’s appellate challenge to a probation condition on 

reasonableness grounds is forfeited if it is not raised at the hearing where the condition is 

imposed. (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 230.) Sentencing courts have broad 

discretion to impose probation conditions regulating conduct that is not itself criminal, 

but the conditions “must be ‘reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was 

convicted or to future criminality.’ ” (Id. at pp. 233-234, quoting People v. Lent (1975) 

15 Cal.3d 481, 486.) “A timely objection allows the court to modify or delete an 

allegedly unreasonable condition or to explain why it is necessary in the particular case.” 

(Welch, at p. 235.) 

 On the other hand, an objection based on constitutional grounds (as opposed to 

reasonableness grounds), such as a defendant’s claim that a probation condition is 

unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, is not always forfeited by the failure to raise the 

objection below. (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 889.) Such a constitutional 

challenge is not forfeited when it presents a “pure question of law.” (Id. at p. 887.) “In 

common with a challenge to an unauthorized sentence that is not subject to the rule of 

forfeiture, a challenge to a term of probation on the ground of unconstitutional vagueness 

or overbreadth that is capable of correction without reference to the particular sentencing 

record developed in the trial court can be said to present a pure question of law. 

Correction on appeal of this type of facial constitutional defect in the relevant probation 

condition . . . may ensue from a reviewing court’s unwillingness to ignore ‘correctable 

legal error.’ ” (Ibid., italics added.) Our Supreme Court has stressed that “not . . . ‘all 

constitutional defects in conditions of probation may be raised for the first time on 

appeal, since there may be circumstances that do not present “pure questions of law that 
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can be resolved without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the 

trial court.” [Citation.] In those circumstances, “[t]raditional objection and waiver 

principles encourage development of the record and a proper exercise of discretion in the 

trial court.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] We also emphasize that generally, given a 

meaningful opportunity, the probationer should object to a perceived facial constitutional 

flaw at the time a probation condition initially is imposed in order to permit the trial court 

to consider, and if appropriate in the exercise of its informed judgment, to effect a 

correction.” (Id. at p. 889; see also People v. Munoz (Feb. 5, 2015, C075983) 

__ Cal.App.4th__ [“forfeiture rule applies even to constitutional challenges of probation 

conditions if the constitutional question cannot be resolved without reference to the 

particular sentencing record developed in the trial court”].) 

 In Sheena K., the minor challenged a probation condition prohibiting her from 

associating with anyone disapproved of by the probation department but without 

specifying that she needed to be aware of the disapproval. (In re Sheena K., supra, 

40 Cal.4th at pp. 878-879.) The Supreme Court concluded that the minor had not waived 

her constitutional objection by failing to raise it below. (Ibid.) The court held that the 

minor’s objection amounted to a facial challenge because the absence of a knowledge 

requirement in the condition did “not require scrutiny of individual facts and 

circumstances but instead require[d] the review of abstract and generalized legal 

concepts.” (Id. at p. 885.) Stated another way, the reviewing court could decide whether 

the challenged condition was unconstitutional in all situations, regardless of the 

underlying criminal activity or the individual minor’s circumstances. According to the 

Supreme Court, the probation condition was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to 

notify the minor in advance with whom she could not associate. (Id. at pp. 891-892.) 

 C.P. acknowledges he failed to challenge his probation condition, but he contends 

that the issue is nonetheless preserved because he is asserting a facial challenge 

presenting a pure question of law. We disagree. At least one other Court of Appeal has 

considered a similar probation condition, but its opinion does not offer much guidance on 

the forfeiture issue. (People v. Bauer (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 937.) In Bauer, Division 
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Two of this court struck down a probation condition requiring a defendant to obtain his 

probation officer’s approval of his residence. (211 Cal.App.3d at pp. 940, 945.) It is 

unclear whether the defendant objected to the condition below, but the court in any event 

evaluated whether the condition complied with the reasonableness test of People v. Lent, 

supra, 15 Cal.3d 481. (Bauer, at p. 944.) The Supreme Court has since clarified that any 

objection on reasonableness grounds (as opposed to constitutional grounds raising pure 

issues of law) is forfeited absent an objection in the trial court (People v. Welch, supra, 

5 Cal.4th at p. 230), which means that under current law the defendant in Bauer would 

have forfeited his unreasonableness claim absent an objection in the trial court.2

 We conclude that under applicable Supreme Court precedent, C.P. forfeited his 

objection. We recognize that a probation condition restricting an adult’s ability to change 

residences may run afoul of the constitutional right to travel and freedom of association. 

(People v. Bauer, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 944 [condition that probation officer 

approve defendant’s residence “all the more disturbing because it impinges on 

constitutional entitlements”].) But probation conditions imposed on juveniles “ ‘may be 

broader than those pertaining to adult offenders’ ” because “ ‘juveniles are deemed to be 

more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and because a minor’s 

constitutional rights are more circumscribed.’ ” (In re R.V. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 239, 

247; see also People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358, fn. 4 [“Conditions of 

juvenile probation may confer broader authority on the juvenile probation officer than is 

true in the case of adults [citations].”]) When the state takes jurisdiction over a minor, it 

takes legal custody of the child and “ ‘stands in the shoes of the parent.’ ” (In re R.V., at 

p. 248; In re Nathan W. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1496, 1500.) “ ‘[T]he juvenile court may 

impose probation conditions that infringe on constitutional rights if the conditions are 

tailored to meet the needs of the minor.’ ” (In re R.V., at p. 248.) 

 

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 Whether a trial court may impose a probation condition requiring an adult defendant to 

reside at a residence approved by her probation officer is currently pending before the 

Supreme Court. (People v. Schaeffer (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1, review granted Oct. 31, 

2012, S205260.) The court apparently did not grant review on the issue of possible 

forfeiture. 
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 Thus, whether C.P.’s probation condition is permissible depends on whether it is 

tailored to meet his specific needs, and this inquiry is not a pure question of law because 

it involves reviewing the underlying factual record. (Cf. In re Sheena K., supra, 

40 Cal.4th at pp. 887-889; see, e.g., In re Pedro Q. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1368, 1373 

[restriction on minor’s travel to gang territory might be proper for a minor living outside 

the gang’s territory but overbroad for a minor who lives, works, or attends school within 

that same area]; In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941-942 [upholding 

probation condition requiring minor who lived in one county not to travel to another 

county, where criminal conduct at issue occurred and his gang was located].) The record 

reveals ample and legitimate reasons for C.P.’s residence to be closely monitored since 

C.P. has had an extensive history of going missing while under the probation 

department’s supervision. Given the statutory authority and responsibility for probation 

officers to place minors in appropriate settings (§ 727, subd. (a)(3)), we cannot conclude 

as a matter of law that the residency restriction is facially impermissible here or in all 

situations. 

 This case is distinguishable from the cases upon which C.P. relies where juvenile 

courts effectively banished minors as a condition of probation because the conditions 

were far more restrictive in those cases and, in one of them, the minor objected below. 

(In re James C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1201-1202, 1205 [condition banishing 

minor, a U.S. citizen, to Mexico over his objection violated constitutional rights of 

freedom of travel, assembly, and association]; In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 

1077, 1082, 1085 [requirement that minor live in Iran for two years constituted de facto 

deportation and impermissibly violated minor’s constitutional rights].) 

 C.P. contends that the restriction grants his probation officer “too much power to 

proscribe where” he may live. (E.g., People v. Leon (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 943, 953 

[“A probation condition that in effect delegates unfettered discretion to a probation 

officer to determine its scope at the very least risks being unconstitutionally overbroad”]; 

People v. O’Neil, supra, 165 Cal.4th at pp. 1357-1358 [probation condition gave 

probation officer no limits on persons officer could prohibit defendant from associating 
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with; court must in some way define relevant class of persons].) But there is no 

allegation or evidence that his probation officer has ever unreasonably withheld 

permission for C.P. to change residences. (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 378, 

383 [where no allegation any probation officer had taken action to restrict a defendant’s 

ability to own or keep pet, it was speculative to conclude that an officer would do so 

under condition requiring probationer to notify officer of presence of any pets at 

probationer’s residence].) 

 In reaching our conclusion we are mindful that the challenged condition is 

contained on a preprinted form, and “[i]f we were to strike down the condition as facially 

overbroad, we would invite wholesale attack on the probation condition in every case, 

even for those [delinquents] as to whom it is unquestionably legitimate. Our role in this 

appeal is to review the conditions of probation for facial constitutionality, not to 

micromanage how the juvenile court structures its probation conditions.” (In re Victor L.

(2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 922, fn. omitted [rejecting argument, raised for first time on 

appeal, that proscription on possessing paging device or other portable-communication 

technology violated juvenile’s First Amendment rights].) 

 In sum, we conclude that by not objecting below, C.P. forfeited his challenge to 

the requirement that he not change his residence without his probation officer’s prior 

approval. We observe, however, that he is not without a remedy because he may seek 

modification of the condition in the juvenile court. (§§ 775, 778; In re Shaun R. (2010) 

188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1141.) 

III. 

DISPOSITION

 The disposition order is affirmed. 
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 _________________________ 

 Humes, P.J. 

We concur: 

_________________________ 

Margulies, J. 

_________________________ 

Banke, J.