IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-50669

FRED FLORES,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

RALPH LOPEZ, Sheriff; SID L. HARLE, Judge; RAYMOND SABASTIAN 

DELEON, Attorney; MARGARET G. MONTEMAYOR; SYLVIA A. 

QUESADA, Court Reporter,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:14-CV-500

Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Fred Flores, Texas prisoner # 1411161, seeks leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis (IFP) in his appeal of the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action 

claiming he was wrongfully convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child 

and denied access to the courts. The district court determined alternatively 

(1) that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the claims under 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 27, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 14-50669

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§ 1983; (2) that if the claims were construed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the district 

court lacked jurisdiction because Flores failed to obtain this court’s 

authorization before filing the successive application; and (3) that the claims 

were meritless and time barred. The court denied Flores’s motion for leave to 

proceed IFP on appeal for the same reasons and certified that the appeal was 

not taken in good faith. 

By moving for leave to proceed IFP, Flores is challenging the district 

court’s certification that his appeal was not taken in good faith. See Baugh v. 

Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997); FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(5). A motion 

for leave to proceed IFP on appeal “must be directed solely to the trial court’s 

reasons for the certification decision.” Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202. 

Flores does not contest the district court’s reasons for dismissing the 

complaint and certifying that the appeal was not taken in good faith. 

Accordingly, he has abandoned any challenge to the certification decision, see 

Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 

1987), and failed to demonstrate that his “appeal involves legal points arguable 

on their merits,” Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Because he has not shown that his 

appeal involves a nonfrivolous issue, we deny his motion to proceed IFP and 

dismiss the appeal as frivolous. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 & n.24; Howard, 

707 F.2d at 220; 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. We also deny the motion for appointment of 

counsel. 

Both the district court’s dismissal of Flores’s complaint and our dismissal 

of his appeal as frivolous count as strikes for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

See Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763 (2015). We caution Flores that, 

if he accumulates three strikes, he will not be able to proceed IFP in any civil 

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action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless 

he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See § 1915(g).

MOTIONS DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION WARNING 

ISSUED.

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