[Cite as State v. Henderson, 2017-Ohio-2678.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 16AP-870 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 16CR-2682) 

Steve L. Henderson, : (ACCELERATED CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on May 4, 2017 

 

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and 

Barbara A. Farnbacher, for appellee. Argued: Barbara A. 

Farnbacher.

On brief: David L. Rowland, for appellant. Argued: 

David L. Rowland.

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

DORRIAN, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Steve L. Henderson, appeals from an order of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas revoking his bond. For the following reasons, 

we dismiss the appeal. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} Appellant was indicted on May 18, 2016, on one count of participation in a 

criminal gang, a second-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2923.42, and nine counts of 

having a weapon under disability, a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2923.13. On 

June 21, 2016, the trial court set appellant's bond at $100,000, with additional conditions 

that appellant not possess weapons of any kind and that he stay away from his codefendant. Appellant posted bond and was released from custody. 

{¶ 3} On December 2, 2016, plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio, moved for 

reconsideration of appellant's bond, asserting that appellant failed to comply with the 
No. 16AP-870 2 

conditions imposed by the court and that it was necessary for the safety of appellant's 

victim for the court to revoke or substantially increase appellant's bond. The trial court 

conducted a hearing on the state's motion on December 6, 2016. At the hearing, the state 

presented testimony from Columbus Division of Police Officer Samuel Chappell, 

regarding social media activity purportedly conducted by appellant involving threats and 

gang activity. During the hearing, the trial court asked whether the prosecution was 

seeking revocation of appellant's bond; the prosecutor responded that the state was not 

requesting denial of bond but sought "a significant increase, in excess of $750,000." (Tr. 

at 30.) At the end of the hearing, the trial court revoked appellant's bond and ordered 

appellant to be taken into custody. 

II. Assignment of Error 

{¶ 4} Appellant appeals and assigns the following single assignment of error for 

our review: 

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 

DENYING APPELLANT BAIL AS ITS FINDINGS WERE 

NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING 

EVIDENCE; THE COURT DID NOT ISSUE FINDINGS. 

III. Discussion 

{¶ 5} R.C. 2937.222(A) provides that, on motion of the prosecuting attorney or 

sua sponte by the court, a judge shall hold a hearing to determine whether a defendant 

charged with certain offenses, including second-degree felonies, shall be denied bail. The 

statute further provides that no defendant shall be denied bail unless the judge "finds by 

clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the 

accused committed the offense described in [R.C. 2937.222(A)] with which the accused is 

charged, finds by clear and convincing evidence that the accused poses a substantial risk 

of serious physical harm to any person or to the community, and finds by clear and 

convincing evidence that no release conditions will reasonably assure the safety of that 

person and the community." R.C. 2937.222(B). We review a trial court's denial of bail 

pursuant to R.C. 2937.222 for abuse of discretion. State v. Foster, 10th Dist. No. 08AP523, 2008-Ohio-3525, ¶ 6. An abuse of discretion occurs when a court's decision is 

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 

219 (1983). 
No. 16AP-870 3 

{¶ 6} Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his bond 

because the court failed to make the necessary findings by clear and convincing evidence 

as required under R.C. 2937.222(B). The state responds that R.C. 2937.222 does not 

apply, asserting that it did not request appellant be held without bond, based on the 

prosecutor's response to the trial court's question at the hearing. The state argues the trial 

court revoked appellant's bond, pursuant to its inherent powers, rather than under the 

statute. The state further argues that, to the extent R.C. 2937.222 may be found to apply 

to the revocation of appellant's bond, the trial court did not abuse its discretion because 

the state presented evidence at the hearing to establish the findings required under the 

statute. 

{¶ 7} The trial court appeared to have believed it was revoking appellant's bond 

pursuant to R.C. 2937.222. At the hearing, the court explicitly referred to the fact that 

appellant was charged with a second-degree felony, which would permit a denial of bond 

under the statute, and to appellant's right to an immediate appeal of the order. However, 

due to subsequent developments in this case, we need not reach the question of whether 

the trial court revoked appellant's bond pursuant to R.C. 2937.222 or pursuant to its 

inherent powers. 

{¶ 8} We take notice of the fact that, after this appeal was filed, the trial court 

reinstated bail for appellant on January 19, 2017, setting his bond at $750,000. Appellant 

and the state each acknowledge this development in their briefs, but disagree as to the 

effect of the trial court's action. Appellant asserts the subsequent bond was set so high as 

to be tantamount to a denial of bail.1 The state, by contrast, argues the order setting bond 

for appellant renders the present appeal moot, and that we should dismiss the appeal on 

that basis. 

{¶ 9} An order denying bail under R.C. 2937.222 is a final, appealable order, but 

the trial court retains jurisdiction during any appeal to conduct additional proceedings in 

 

1 To the extent appellant seeks to argue on appeal that the January 19, 2017 order set appellant's bond at an 

amount so high as to be tantamount to a denial of bail, his argument is faced with two problems. First, this 

appeal was taken from the order revoking bond; therefore, the January 19, 2017 order granting the increased 

bond is not at issue before the court. Second, claims of excessive bond are generally subject to challenge 

through an action in habeas corpus, not by direct appeal. See Chari v. Vore, 91 Ohio St.3d 323, 325 (2001) 

("Habeas corpus is the proper remedy to raise the claim of excessive bail in pretrial-release cases."); In re De 

Fronzo, 49 Ohio St.2d 271, 273 (1977) ("It is well established that habeas corpus is the proper remedy to 

raise the claim of excessive bail."); Foster at ¶ 5 ("Customarily, challenges to excessive bond are reviewed 

under an abuse of discretion standard by means of an original action in habeas corpus."). 
No. 16AP-870 4 

the case or further consider the order denying bail. R.C. 2937.222(D)(1) and (2). The 

statute expressly provides that "[i]f, during the pendency of an appeal under division (D) 

of this section, the court of common pleas sets aside or terminates the order denying bail, 

the court of appeals shall dismiss the appeal." R.C. 2937.222(D)(2). 

{¶ 10} The doctrine of mootness is based on constitutional principles and the 

concept of judicial restraint. James A. Keller, Inc. v. Flaherty, 74 Ohio App.3d 788, 791 

(10th Dist.1991). Under this doctrine, the court will not rule on matters that do not 

involve an actual controversy. See Tschantz v. Ferguson, 57 Ohio St.3d 131, 133 (1991), 

quoting Miner v. Witt, 82 Ohio St. 237 (1910), syllabus (" 'It is not the duty of the court to 

answer moot questions, and when, pending proceedings in error in this court, an event 

occurs without the fault of either party, which renders it impossible for the court to grant 

any relief, it will dismiss the petition in error.' "). An issue is moot when it " 'involve[s] no 

actual genuine, live controversy, the decision of which can definitely affect existing legal 

relations.' " (Citations omitted.) Grove City v. Clark, 10th Dist. No. 01AP-1369, 2002-

Ohio-4549, ¶ 11, quoting Culver v. Warren, 84 Ohio App.3d 373, 393 (11th Dist.1948). 

{¶ 11} As a result of the trial court's January 19, 2017 order setting bond for 

appellant, this appeal must be dismissed. If the trial court revoked appellant's initial 

bond, pursuant to R.C. 2937.222, that statute would require dismissal of the appeal 

because the January 19, 2017 order effectively set aside or terminated the bond revocation 

order. See R.C. 2937.222(D)(2). Alternatively, if the trial court revoked appellant's initial 

bond pursuant to its inherent powers, the January 19, 2017 order superseded the bond 

revocation order. As a result, appellant is eligible for bail and the present appeal would be 

moot because there is no genuine controversy to be resolved by this court. See, e.g., State 

v. Saikus, 8th Dist. No. 71981 (Mar. 12, 1998) (concluding that appellant's claim of denial 

of due process because of unreasonable bond was moot because his motion for reduction 

of bond was granted). In either circumstance, this appeal must be dismissed. 

IV. Conclusion 

{¶ 12} For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss appellant's appeal. 

Appeal dismissed. 

TYACK, P.J., and LUPER SCHUSTER, J., concur.