This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1
CENTURY BANK, A NEW MEXICO 2 BANKING CORPORATION, 3 Plaintiff-Appellee, 4

v. NO. 33,045 5 PRAXIS ARCHITECTS, INC., 6 A NEW MEXICO CORPORATION, 7 Defendant-Appellant. 8

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY 9 Sylvia LaMar, District Judge 10 Cuddy & McCarthy, LLP 11 Charlotte H. Hetherington 12 Santa Fe, NM 13 for Appellee 14 Sommer, Udall, Sutin, Hardwick & Hyatt, P.A. 15 Jack N. Hardwick 16 Santa Fe, NM 17 for Appellant 18 MEMORANDUM OPINION 192 HANISEE, Judge. 1
{1} Appellant Praxis Architects, Inc. (Praxi s) appeals from the district court’s 2 summary judgment ruling that Appellee Cen tury Bank’s (Century) mortgage lien on 3 a piece of real property had priority over Praxis’s mechanic’s lien on the property. The 4 summary judgment order was entered on September 8, 2011, and Praxis initially 5 appealed the summary judgment ruling to th is Court in 2012. We dismissed the appeal 6 for lack of a final judgment. See Century Bank v. Artyard Ltd. P’ship , No. 31,939, 7 mem. op. at 5 (N.M. Ct. App. May 22, 2012) (non-precedential). On remand, the 8 district court entered a stipulated judgment on January 23, 2013, pursuant to a 9 stipulated judgment that resolved all claims between Century and four ancillary 10 defendants, foreclosing Century’s mortgage. The district court then approved a special 11 master’s sale of the property on April 19, 2013, and entered a stipulated judgment 12 dismissing Praxis’s cross-claims against three of the ancillary defendants on June 13, 13 2013. Praxis then filed a notice of appeal as to Century only on July 12, 2013. 14 Because we determine Praxis failed to timely appeal its cl aims against Century, and 15 instead chose to postpone an appeal until af ter Century’s involvement in the case had 16 been concluded for nearly three months, we dismiss its appeal. 17 BACKGROUND 181 The six additional defendant s are not parties to this appeal, thus we include 18 discussion of them only as relevant to our resolution of this case. 19 3 {2} Century filed a complaint for money due on a promissory note to foreclose a 1 mortgage, appoint a receiver, and enfo rce commercial guaranties, naming as 2 defendants Praxis and si x additional parties. 1 The subject of the lawsuit was a piece 3 of real property located in Santa Fe, New Mexico on which Praxis filed a claim for a 4 mechanic’s lien in the office of the Cl erk of Santa Fe County. Praxis answered 5 Century’s complaint and asserted a counterclaim that sought declaratory judgment that 6 Praxis’s lien had priority over Century’s mortgage lien. 7
{3} Century filed a motion for summary judgment alleging there were no issues of 8 material fact as to the priority of Cen tury’s mortgage lien over Praxis’s lien and 9 asserting that Century’s mortgage is a first and prior lien because it was recorded 10 before any work commenced on any buildings, improvements, or structures on the 11 property. Praxis responded contending that disputed material facts existed regarding 12 whether construction activities constituting the commencement of work by Praxis 13 were performed prior to execution of Century ’s mortgage lien. Praxis asserted that its 14 lien had priority over Century’s mortgagelien because Praxis commenced work on 15 the property before Century recorded the mortgage and because Century had actual 16 knowledge of the work performed prior to the execution of the mortgage. 174 {4} On September 8, 2011, the district court granted summary judgment in favor 1 of Century and dismissed Praxis’s counterclaim. It additionally ordered Praxis to 2 cancel its lien of record. The district court then awarded Century costs and attorney 3 fees and ruled that the order granting summary judgment was a final and appealable 4 order pursuant to Rule 1-054(B)(2) NMRA (stating that when multiple parties are 5 involved, the district court may enter final judgment adjudicating all issues as to one 6 or more, but fewer than all parties). 7
{5} Praxis appealed to this Court arguing th at the district court order granting 8 summary judgment was substantively errone ous, and appealed the district court’s 9 determination that it had issu ed a final appealable order in the first place. We agreed 10 with Praxis that the orders were non-fi nal, and in a memorandum opinion summarily 11 dismissed the appeal on the grounds that neith er of the district court’s orders were 12 immediately reviewable pursuant to Rule 1-054(B)(2). See Artyard Ltd. P’ship , No. 13 31,939, mem. op. at 5. We re manded the case to district court for further proceedings. 14
{6} Following remand the district court entered a stipulated judgment on January 15 23, 2013,“settling all claims between Century ” and the four ancillary defendants. On 16 the signature line counsel for Praxis—a party to the order despite having summary 17 judgment granted against it—handwrote the not ation “by presentment, subject to the 18 appellate claims of Praxis.” A judgment of foreclosure was issued regarding the 195 property at issue and the district court approved appointment of a special master to 1 conduct a judicial sale in foreclosure. The district court specifically ruled that “[t]he 2 [p]roperty shall be conveyed free and clear of all liens and encumbrances determined 3 to be junior to or inferior to Century’s [m]ortgage on the [p]roperty[.]” Additionally, 4 the court ordered that “[a]ll proceeds from the sale (after costs of sale) shall be used 5 to satisfy . . . debts to Century[.]” Following auction of the property, the district court 6 entered an order on April 19, 2013 approving a special master’s sale of the property. 7 On June 13, 2013, the districtcourt entered a final stipul ated order dismissing Praxis’s 8 cross-claims against the remaining three ancillary defendants. The order did not 9 include Century in any substantive capacity . On July 12, 2013, Praxis filed a notice 10 of appeal against Century. Praxis again ar gues that the district court’s ruling that 11 Century’s mortgage lien had priority over Praxis’s lien was incorrect as a matter of 12 law. 13 DISCUSSION 14
{7} Before reaching the merits of this appeal we must initially determine whether 15 the January 23, 2013 stipulated judgment , or the April 19, 2013 order approving a 16 special master’s sale of the property, were final orders as to Century from which 17 Praxis must have appealedwithin thirty days. See NMSA 1978, § 39-3-2 (1966); Rule 18 12-201(A)(2) NMRA (requiring a notice of appeal to be filed within thirty days after 196 the judgment or order appealed from is filed in district court). “Determining whether 1 [an] appeal was timely involves the interpretation of court rules, which we review de 2 novo.” Grygorwicz v. Trujillo , 2009-NMSC-009, ¶ 7, 145 N.M. 650, 203 P.3d 865. 3 Praxis filed its second notice of appeal on Ju ly 12, 2013, nearly seven months after the 4 January stipulated judgment resolving Century’s remaining claims in the case, and 5 nearly three months subsequent to the or der approving the sale of the property from 6 which Century stood to benefit. Thus, if eitherof these orders werefinal orders as to 7 Century, Praxis “failed to appeal the order in a timely fashion and in the absence of 8 unusual circumstances, this [C]ourt does not have jurisdiction to consider [the] 9 appeal.” Lyman v. Kern , 2000-NMCA-013, ¶ 7, 128 N.M. 582, 995 P.2d 504. 10
{8} On appeal, Praxis claims that the only final order from which it could have 11 appealed was the June 13, 2013 stipulated order dismissing Praxis’s cross-claims 12 against the remaining defendants because this order disposed entirely of all Praxis’s 13 remaining cross-claims. However, Praxis does not challenge that order in any 14 substantive way. Instead, Praxis seeks review of the district court’s September 8, 2011 15 order granting summary judgment to Century. 16
{9} Rule 1-054(B) governs judgments upon multiple claims or involving multiple 17 parties. Subsection (B)(2) provides that “w hen multiple parties are involved, judgment 18 may be entered adjudicating all issues as toone or more, but fewer than all parties. 197 Such judgment shall be a final one unless the court, in its di scretion, expressly 1 provides otherwise and a provision to that effect is contained in the judgment.” Id. 2 “An order is final when all i ssues of law and fact have been determined and the case 3 is disposed of by the district court to the fullest extent possible.” In re Adoption of 4 Homer F ., 2009-NMCA-082, ¶ 9, 146 N.M. 845, 215 P.3d 783. 5
{10} At the outset, we observe that our re view of both the January 23 stipulated 6 judgment and the April 19 order reveal th at the district court included no language 7 indicating that the orders should be consid ered anything other than a final judgment 8 for purposes of Rule 1-054(B)(2). Furthermore, in focusing our attention to the April 9 19 order, we note that the order approved and confirmed the special master’s sale of 10 the property on which Praxis disputed priority of its lien. Previously, the court had 11 issued an order in Century’s favor on January 23, concluding that the property was to 12 be foreclosed, sold, and all proceeds were to be paid to Century in satisfaction or 13 partial satisfaction of its lien. The April 19 order was the last action of the district 14 court to which both Century and Praxis were interested parties, and this action wholly 15 disposed of the property in dispute. Whil e Praxis contends that this order could not 16 have been final as there were still cross- claims pending as to remaining defendants, 17 we note that Rule 1-054(B)(2) does not require the adjudication of all issues as to all 18 parties, but merely all issues as to one or more parties. At the time the district court 192 Because we conclude that the April 19 order was final for purposes of appeal, 18 we need not consider the finality of the January 23 stipulation judgment. 19 8 approved the sale of the property, having given notice by its January order that it had 1 intended to do exactly that, no remaining i ssues between Century and Praxis remained 2 pending as the property in dispute was soldand the deed was to be delivered to 3 Century. Thus, this order was final and Prax is failed to appeal within thirty days, 4 divesting this Court of its power of jurisdiction. See Lyman , 2000-NMCA-013, ¶ 7. 2 5
{11} In its reply brief, Praxis asks us to exercise our discretion to review this appeal 6 given Praxis’s earlier attempt to bring this appeal to this Court and the “confusion 7 caused by the [district] court’s erroneous ruling that the September 8, 2011[] order 8 granting summary judgment was a final order[.] ” Praxis contends that dismissal of the 9 appeal “would be ‘extreme’ under the unusual circumstances before the Court.” Yet 10 we observe that Praxis itself sought a conclu sion that the district court’s order was 11 non-final, and prevailed on that assignment of error to the district court. While we 12 recognize that it is unfortunate that Praxi s’s earlier appeal entailed a conclusion that 13 review of the district court’s summary j udgment order was premature, and its current 14 appeal is now determined to be untimely, we note that Praxis was acutely aware that 15 the order granting summary judgment was non-final, and would presumably become 16 final as to Century in the ordinary courseof the ensuing litigation on remand. Insofar 179 as Praxis now asks us to exercise our di scretion and review th e current appeal, our 1 Supreme Court has instructed that “[ c]ounsel should not rely on the court’s 2 munificence when filing notices of appeal.” Trujillo v. Serrano , 1994-NMSC-024, ¶ 3 19, 117 N.M. 273, 871 P.2d 369. “Only the most unusual circumstances beyond the 4 control of the parties . . . will warrant overlooking procedural defects.” Id . While 5 Praxis asserts there are “ unusual circumstances before the Court[,]” it fails to 6 articulate what it contends those circumstances to be. See Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. 7 Corp. , 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15, 137 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 1076 (“We will not review 8 unclear arguments, or guess at what his arguments might be.”). Accordingly, we 9 decline Praxis’s invitation to exercise our discretion to review this appeal. 10 CONCLUSION 11
{12} For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss Praxis’s appeal as untimely pursuant to 12 Section 39-3-2 and Rule 12-201(A)(2). 13
{13} IT IS SO ORDERED. 14

_________________________________ 15 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 16 WE CONCUR: 17

_________________________________ 18 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 1910 _________________________________ 1 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 2