NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

MARGARET KORROW, on behalf of 

herself and others similarly situated, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

AARON'S INC. and JOHN DOES 1-25, 

Defendants. 

SHIPP, District Judge 

Civil Action No. 10-6317 (MAS) (LHG) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

This matter comes before the Court on three motions: (1) Defendant Aaron's, Inc.'s 

("Defendant" or "Aaron's") Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 146); (2) Plaintiff Margaret 

Korrow's ("Plaintiff' or "Ms. Korrow") Motion for Approval of Revised Class Notice, Notice 

Plan, and Schedule ("Motion for Revised Class Notice") (ECF No. 149); and (3) Defendant's 

Cross Motion to Stay Motion for Revised Class Notice (ECF-No. 151). 

Plaintiff opposed Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 147) and Defendant 

replied (ECF No. 150). 1 Defendant subsequently filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority (ECF 

No. 165), and Plaintiff responded (ECF No. 166). With regard to Plaintiffs Motion for Revised 

Class Notice, Defendant opposed on the merits and requested a stay. (ECF No. 151.) Plaintiff 

opposed Defendant's cross-motion to stay and replied in support of her Motion for Revised Class 

Notice. (ECF No. 155.) Defendant then replied in support of its cross-motion. (ECF No. 156.) 

1 The Court grants Defendant's request for permission to file a reply. (ECF No. 150.) 

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The Court has carefully considered the parties' submissions and decides the matters 

without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons set forth below, and for 

other good cause shown, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, GRANTS 

Plaintiffs Motion for Revised Class Notice, and DENIES Defendant's Motion to Stay. 

I. Background & Procedural History2 

Ms. Korrow, on behalf of herself and a putative class, brought suit against Defendant 

alleging that certain fees and charges that Defendant imposed on the class through its rent-to-own 

contracts violated the New Jersey Truth in Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act and the 

New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. (Compl. ~~ 1-5, ECF 1-1.) OnJuly31, 2013, the Court granted 

class certification under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3). (July 31, 2013 Order 

2, ECF No. 77.) The "Class" was defined as "[a]ll natural persons who entered into a rent-to-own 

contract with Defendant Aaron's, Inc. in New Jersey from March 16, 2006, through and including 

March 31, 2011." (Id.) The Court also recognized two "Sub-Classes": (1) CFA-"Prorated" 

Amount Sub-Class; and (2) CFA-"Service Plus" Fee Sub-Class, which include class members that 

paid Defendant specific types of fees. (Id.) 

Approximately one year later, on July 21, 2014, Plaintiff moved for Approval of Class 

Notice and Plan ofNotice ("Original Motion for Class Notice"). (ECF No. 101.) After the parties 

briefed the motion, the Court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. (ECF No. 136.) The 

Court granted the motion with respect to the following forms of notice: "(l) direct mail; (2) e-mail; 

(3) publication in three newspapers; (4) a press release to approximately 11,700 media points; 

2 The Court assumes familiarity with the facts, which are provided in this Court's previous opinion. 

("Mem. Op.," ECF No. 78.) Thus, the Court includes only the facts relevant to the pending 

motions. 

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(5) targeted mailing to 34 legal aid and pro bono program offices in New Jersey; and (6) a 

litigation-specific website." (Id.) In contrast, the Court denied Plaintiffs motion with respect to 

the following forms of notice: "(1) a case-specific toll-free telephone number and (2) a Google ad 

word campaign." (Id.) The Court also denied Plaintiffs proposal to link Plaintiffs brief in support 

of her motion for class certification to the proposed class notice website. (Id.) 

While Plaintiffs Original Motion for Class Notice was pending, Defendant moved for 

partial summary judgment. (ECF No. 120.) The Court granted Defendant's motion with regard 

to Count Two of Plaintiffs Complaint, but denied Defendant's motion with regard to Count One. 

(ECF No. 144.) The parties have since filed the three pending motions at issue. 

II. Motion for Reconsideration 

A. Legal Standard 

Reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 7 .1 is an extraordinary remedy that is rarely 

granted. Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'!, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 482, 507 (D.N.J. 2002). 

A motion for reconsideration may be based on one of three separate grounds: (1) an intervening 

change in controlling law; (2) new evidence not previously available; or (3) to correct a clear error 

of law or to prevent manifest injustice. See id. A motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity 

to raise new matters or arguments that could have been raised before the original decision was 

made. See Bowers v. NCAA, 130 F. Supp. 2d 610, 612-13 (D.N.J. 2001). Nor is a motion for 

reconsideration an opportunity to ask the Court to rethink what it has already thought through. See 

Interfaith Cmty. Org., 215 F. Supp. 2d at 507. "Rather, the rule permits a reconsideration only 

when 'dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of law' were presented to the court but 

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were overlooked." Id. (quoting Resorts Int'! v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, 830 F. Supp. 826, 831 

(D.N.J. 1992)). 

B. Parties' Positions 

In support of Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, Defendant argues that the Court's 

summary judgment decision inconsistently treated Counts One and Two of the Complaint. (Def.' s 

Reconsid. Moving Br. 2, ECF No. 146-1.) Specifically, Defendant asserts that the Court's 

rationale for dismissing Count Two contradicts the Court's decision to deny Defendant's motion 

to dismiss Count One. (Id.) Defendant argues that both counts contained the same material fact: 

"Plaintiff did not pay more than she was required to pay," thereby merely alleging a hypothetical 

loss. (Id. at 3-4, 9-11.) 

In response to the Court's comparison between Plaintiffs debt to Defendant and the benefit 

Plaintiff received from Defendant, Aaron's asserts that debt cannot constitute "ascertainable loss." 

(Id. at 7-10.) Further, although Defendant counterclaimed to recover Plaintiffs unpaid debt to 

Defendant, Aaron's argues that its counterclaim does not convert Plaintiffs debt from a 

hypothetical loss to an "ascertainable loss." (Id. at 10-11.) Finally, Defendant cites Truglio v. 

Planet Fitness, Inc., No. 15-7959, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98585 (D.N.J. July 28, 2016), as 

supplemental authority in further support of its position. (ECF No. 165.) 

In her opposition papers, Plaintiff sets forth the legal standards applicable to a motion for 

reconsideration, and relies on the Court's Opinion. (Pl.'s Reconsid. Opp'n Br. 2-16, ECF No. 

14 7.) Plaintiff also responds to Defendant's Notice of Supplemental Authority. (ECF No. 166.) 

C. Analysis 

Here, Defendant is merely asking this Court to rethink what it has already thought through. 

Although Defendant now frames its argument as a contradiction within the Court's decision, 

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Defendant already presented all of its substantive assertions in its underlying motion for summary 

judgment. Moreover, the Court finds that Defendant's supplemental authority is consistent with 

the Court's decision. While Truglio cites relevant law, it does not contradict this Court's finding 

that Plaintiffs debt, for which Defendant seeks recovery in its counterclaim, can constitute 

"ascertainable loss."3 Defendant has, therefore, failed to proffer any change in law, unconsidered 

evidence, or persuasive argument that the Court has committed a clear error of law that requires 

correction. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration. 

III. Plaintiff's Motion for Revised Class Notice 

A. Legal Standards 

Rule 23(c)(2)(B) governs class notice for classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3), and is 

applicable here. Rule 23(c)(2)(B) provides that: 

[f]or any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to 

class members the best notice that is practicable under the 

circumstances .... The notice must clearly and concisely state in 

plain, easily understood language: (i) the nature of the action; (ii) the 

definition of the class certified; (iii) the class claims, issues, or 

defenses; (iv) that a class member may enter an appearance through 

an attorney ifthe member so desires; (v) that the court will exclude 

from the class any member who requests exclusion; (vi) the time and 

manner for requesting exclusion; and (vii) the binding effect of a 

class judgment on members under Rule 23(c)(3). 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). The Rules Advisory Committee notes that in order to help courts 

comply with the requirements of Rule 23(c)(2)(B), the "Federal Judicial Center has created 

illustrative clear-notice forms that provide a helpful starting point for actions similar to those 

described in the forms." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) advisory committee's note to 2003 amendments. 

3 Because one of the benefits conferred by the ASP program did not equal or exceed Plaintiff's 

debt for the ASP Program, a question of fact remained as to whether the ASP Program conferred 

other benefits that would preclude a finding of "ascertainable loss." (Opinion Tr. 6:11-24, ECF 

No. 148.) 

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Here, Plaintiff drafted her proposed notice based on the Federal Judicial Center's notice forms and 

complies with the general requirements under Rule 23(c)(2)(B) and due process.

4 The Court, 

therefore, focuses on Defendant's specific objections. 

B. Parties' Positions 

Defendant argues that the Court should reject Plaintiff's proposed notice, notice plan, and 

schedule and instead requests that the Court order Plaintiff to make numerous modifications. First, 

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's proposed Revised Notice Plan conflicts with the Court's 

November 30, 2015 Order, which approved "a press release to approximately 11,700 media 

points." (ECF No. 136 (emphasis added).) Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Revised Notice Plan 

states: 

A.B. data will issue, via the nationwide news line of PR Newswire, 

a Press Release version of the Publication Notice. PR Newswire 

distributes releases to more than 11, 700 media points, including 

5,700 U.S. news outlets and 6,000 websites. 

(Pl.'s Ex.Cat 4, ECF No. 149-3 (emphasis added).) Defendant asserts that the broader distribution 

implicated in the phrase "more than" is too prejudicial. (Def.'s Notice Opp'n Br. 10-12, ECF No. 

152.) 

Plaintiff responds that the Court already approved identical language in the original 

proposed Class Notice Plan, thus precluding any conflict with the Court's Order. (PL 's Notice 

Reply Br. 14-15, ECF No. 155.) 

Defendant's second objection to Plaintiff's motion is that the long form of the class notice 

contains a hypothetical in Question 8 that is ''unnecessary and potentially confusing to class 

4 In the Court's decision on Plaintiff's Original Motion for Class Notice, the Court already 

analyzed and found that Plaintiff's proposed notice complies with the general requirements of Rule 

23(c)(2)(B) and due process. (See Mem. Op. 15-20, ECF No. 135.) 

6 

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members."5 (Def.'s Notice Opp'n Br. 12.) The hypothetical states: 

For example, in one of her contracts entered into with Aaron's 

between March 16, 2006 and March 31, 2011, Ms. Korrow paid 

$31. 78 for a "Service Plus" fee, so she is seeking three times that 

amount, or $95.34. She is also seeking $100 because the contract 

imposed this fee and a Return Check fee to be charged for "any 

reason." In total, Ms. Korrow is seeking $195.34, plus interest, for 

her claims related to that Contract. 

(Pl.'s Ex. A, at 5, ECF No. 149-3.) Defendant asserts that the explanation preceding the 

hypothetical6 is sufficient and that the hypothetical fails to account "for the amounts that Aaron's 

is seeking to recoup from Plaintiff Korrow in its Counterclaim." (Def. 's Opp'n Br. 12.) 

Plaintiff responds that Aaron's failed to object to a nearly identical hypothetical contained 

in Plaintiffs original motion for approval of class notice and notice plan. (Pl.'s Notice Reply Br. 

15 (citing Pl.'s Original Mot. Ex. A, at 5-6, ECF No. 101-3).) Plaintiff further explains that the 

particular section at issue is labeled "What is the Plaintiff asking for?" thereby rendering 

incorporation of Aaron's recoupment irrelevant. (Id. (emphasis added).) 

5 Defendant fails to explain why the hypothetical would be "potentially confusing." Specifically, 

Defendant does not provide any examples of how class members might incorrectly read the 

hypothetical. 

6 Immediately preceding the hypothetical, Question 8 reads: 

For each contract that a class member entered into with Aaron's 

from March 16, 2006 to March 31, 2011, Ms. Korrow's lawsuit and 

her motion to certify the Class are asking for the following for each 

Class Member: 

1) $100 for each contract entered into during that period; 

2) Triple the amounts the Class Member paid Aaron's for "Service 

Plus" fees under each contract entered into during that period. 

(Pl.'s Ex. A, at 5, ECF No. 149-3.) 

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Defendant's third objection alleges that Question 4 of the proposed long form of class 

notice inaccurately states: "Aaron's believes that approximately 26,000 New Jersey customers are 

members of the Class certified by the Court." (Def. 's Notice Opp'n Br. 12.) According to 

Defendant, "26,000" represents the potential class size prior to the Court's dismissal of Plaintifrs 

prorate claim. (Id.) Defendant argues that the class size would "likely" be smaller and Question 

4 should be re-written as: "Aaron's believes that up to 26,000 New Jersey customers may be 

members of the Class certified by the Court." (Id. (emphasis added).) 

Plaintiff responds that the dismissal of Plaintifr s prorate claim could not affect the class 

size because the "CFA-'Prorated' Amount Sub-Class" was only composed of persons who were 

already class members. (Pl.'s Notice Reply Br. 15-16.) In other words, the class size does not 

depend on whether persons paid a "prorated" amount to Defendant. (Id.) 

Finally, Defendant's fourth objection is that Plaintifrs proposed order 

only allows Aaron's 35 days to "produce to A.B. Data, Ltd. an Excel 

spreadsheet containing the names, addresses, and, to the extent that 

it possesses this information, the telephone numbers, e-mail 

addresses, and Social Security numbers of all persons who meet the 

definition of the certified Class." 

(Def.'s Notice Opp'n Br. 12.) Defendant instead claims "Aaron's does not have a database that 

stores this information" and requests sixty days because it "will have to manually gather the 

information and confirm its accuracy." (Id. at 12-13.) Defendant additionally argues that 

"Plaintifr s suggested requirement that a person with 'personal knowledge' of the data certify to 

its accuracy is unnecessary." (Id. at 13.) 

Plaintiff responds that Defendant possesses electronic databases that contain information 

for all class members. (Pl.'s Notice Reply Br. 16-17.) In support, Plaintiff cites an e-mail message 

from Defendant's counsel, which states: 

8 

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Aaron's, Inc. maintains a central database that stores all 

transactional records from it stores, including customer information. 

The database collects data from each store on a nightly basis. 

In order to identify individuals fitting the court's definition of the 

class and their attendant contact information, Aaron's executed 

queries against the database to identify persons or entities with 

agreements during the time period, and then queries for each 

requested field, i.e., customer number, social security number, last 

name, first name, street address 1, street address 2, city, state, zip, 

home phone, work phone, driver's license number, email, cell 

phone, date of birth, and language preference. The results of the 

queries are displayed in tabular tables, which Aaron's then copied 

and pasted into an Excel file for ease and reference. 

(Pl.'s Original Mot. Ex. E (e-mail from M. McDonald to M. Quirk (July 10, 2014)); ECF No. 149-

3.) Additionally, Plaintiff re-asserts that Defendant must certify the accuracy of the class 

information. (Pl.'s Notice Reply Br. 17.) 

C. Analysis 

First, with regard to the approximate number of media distribution points for the press 

release, the Court agrees with Plaintiff. Plaintiff submitted identical language with the phrase 

"more than" and the Court approved the press release because of its cost-effectiveness and the 

need to broadly reach class members. (Mem. Op. 19, ECF No. 135.) Moreover, Plaintiff has not 

since modified the use of PR Newswire as the vehicle for a nationwide press release. For the 

reasons set forth in the Court's November 30, 2015 Memorandum Opinion, the Court, therefore, 

clarifies and re-confirms that the Proposed Notice Plan is approved with regard to the press release. 

(Mem. Op. 18-20, ECF No. 135.) 

Second, with regard to the hypothetical in the long form class notice, the Court disagrees 

with Defendant. The Court finds that the hypothetical is plainly and clearly stated and does not 

give rise to confusion. The Court also finds that the hypothetical clarifies the relief Plaintiff is 

seeking by describing the relief sought in plain language easily understood by lay persons. Finally, 

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,, 

; "t 

the Court agrees with Plaintiff that this hypothetical need not incorporate the recoupment 

Defendant seeks from Ms. Korrow. Question 6 of the long form is separately dedicated to "How 

does Aaron's answer the lawsuit's claims?" which includes a description of Defendant's 

counterclaim. (Pl.'s Ex. A, at 4-5 (emphasis added).) The Court, therefore, finds it unnecessary 

for Question 8 to incorporate the counterclaim and approves Plaintiffs proposed notice as to 

Question 8. 

With regard to Defendant's third objection, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the Court's 

dismissal of Plaintiffs prorate claim does not diminish the class size. In the Court's order granting 

class certification, the Court defined "The Class" as: "All natural persons who entered into a rentto-own contract with Defendant Aaron's, Inc. in New Jersey from March 16, 2006, through and 

including March 31, 2011." (July 31, 2013 Order 2.) The Court then defined "CFA-'Prorated' 

Amount Sub-Class" as: "All members of the Class as defined above who paid Defendant Aaron's, 

Inc., a first monthly payment that included a 'prorated' amount." (Id.) Because the Sub-Class 

members were already part of "The Class" by entering into a rent-to-own contract with Defendant 

during the relevant period, the Court's dismissal of Plaintiffs prorate claim cannot reduce the size 

of"The Class." Accordingly, the Court approves Question 4 in Plaintiffs proposed notice. 

Finally, with regard to Defendant's fourth objection, Defendant fails to provide any 

affidavit or other evidence that it would require sixty days to produce the required class 

information. On the other hand, Plaintiff cites to an e-mail message from Defendant's counsel, 

detailing the storage of all relevant information in Defendant's databases and the specific 

procedure for gathering that information. The Court, therefore, approves Plaintiffs proposed 

notice plan with regard to the thirty-five day period for Defendant to produce the required class 

information to A.B. Data, Ltd. The Court further approves Plaintiffs proposal that Defendant 

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.. 

' ' ' 

must provide Class Counsel with a certification or affidavit from a person with personal knowledge 

attesting that the spreadsheet contains the required information along with a summary of the steps 

taken to create the spreadsheet. 7 

IV. Motion for Stay 

Defendant cross-moves to stay the Court's decision on Plaintiffs Motion for Class Notice 

pending resolution of Defendant's Motions to Certify for Interlocutory Appeal and for 

Reconsideration. As the Court has now resolved both pending motions,8 Defendant's Motion to 

Stay is moot and therefore denied. 

V. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant's Motion for Limited Reconsideration is 

DENIED; Plaintiffs Motion for Approval of Revised Class Notice and Notice Plan is GRANTED; 

and Defendant's Motion for Stay is DENIED. The Court will issue an order consistent with this 

decision. 

J.-1< 

Dated: October <!rb, 2016 

Mfi!:!tttt 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

7 Defendant's lone argument with regard to the certification is that the certification is 

''unnecessary." (Def.'s Notice Opp'n Br. 13.) Defendant provides no further explanation or 

arguments, and the Court finds Defendant's cursory position unpersuasive. 

8 The Court denied Defendant's Motion for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal of the Court's 

November 30, 2015 Order. (ECF Nos. 160, 161.) 

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