### In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ No. 17

- 1080
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v.

D AVID L. B RADFORD , Defendant

- Appellant

.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois

. No. 15

- CR

- 30001

— David R. Herndon , Judge

.

____________________
A RGUED O CTOBER 31, 2017

— D ECIDED S EPTEMBER 19, 2018

____________________

Before W OOD , Chief Judge , and E ASTERBROOK and S YKES , Circuit Judges

. S YKES , Circuit Judge

. A jury convicted David Bradford o f conspiracy to d istribute controlled substances and related drug and firearms offenses

. His appeal raises three claims of

error

. First, he c ontests the denial of his motion to suppress evidence recovered in a search of his home pursuant to a
warrant

. His chief complaint is that the warrant application2 No. 17

- 1080

relied on statements from a confidential informant but omitted information damaging to the in formant’s credibility. Second, he c hallenges the denial of his pretrial motion to exclud e evidence that he used the firearms seized in the search or directed others to use them

. Last, Bradford claims that t he government failed to prove a crack

- cocaine conspiracy

. We reject these arguments and affirm. I. Background A grand jury returned a seven

- count indictment against Bradford stemming from his drug

- distribution o peration in East St. Louis, Illinois. A jury convicted him o n six of the

seven charges : conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) , 846; transfer of a firearm to a felon, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) ; two counts of distribution of cocaine base, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) , (b)(1 )( B ), (b)(1)(C); possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, see id

. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D); and possession of a firearm as a felon, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (The jury acquitted on the remaining charge of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug

- trafficking crime

. See id. § 924(c).) We limit our account of the facts to
t he bac kground necessary to understand the issues raise d on appeal.
Federal law enforcement opened an investigation o f Bradford after he participated in a suspicious firearm purchase with h is girlfriend Delenthegia Beard

- Hawkins and their friend Danielle Smith

. ( The latter’s first name might be misleading ; Smith is a man. ) In late February 2014 , t he trio
went to an Illinois gun store where Bradford and Smith

exa mined t wo

. 5 0

- caliber Desert Eagle semiautomatic pistols

. But it was Hawkins who ended up purchasing one. TheNo. 17

- 1080 3

gun cost about $1,500 , and because Hawkins did not have enough cash, Bradford pitched in a couple hundred dollars. Bradford also purchased a laser sight for a nother type of firea rm. T he clerk offered to ship the firearm to a gun store in Missouri where Hawkins l ived so she could pick it up there

. T he Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF” ) received information about the transaction and launc hed an investigation. Agents learned that both Bradford and Smith were convicted felons, so it was illegal for them to possess a f irearm

. See § 922(g)(1).
On March 4 ATF agents surveilled Hawkins as she pick ed up the Desert Eagle at a Missouri gun store and dro ve it to Bradford’s home in East St. Louis, Illinois. When she arrived, Smith was on the front porch. Hawkins handed him the firearm , and when the two started walking toward the front door , agents arrested them. Bradford approached from around the c orner , and he too was arrested

. Hawkins told the agents that she had three firearms in her home

— two handguns and an AK

- 47 rifle

— and that she would sometimes bring them to Bradford’s house and leave them there

. She also admitted to being a regular marijuan a
user , making it illegal for her to possess a firearm

. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). Though she denied purchasing the Desert Eagle for Bradford, she reported that he kept a 9mm pistol under his pillow and that she had seen two other firearms and ammunition a t his house in th e days leading up to her arrest.
All three were detained in the St. Clair County Jail on a 48

- hour hold . B ased on Hawkins ’s information , on March 64 No. 17

- 1080

ATF agents obtain ed a warrant to se arch her home and Bradford’s

. In Bradford’s bedroom they recovered indicia of ownership of a Draco pistol (a box, an owner’s manual, and

a serial

- number tag ) , as well as empty magazines, gun holsters, a gun lock, and miscellaneous firearm parts . They did not find any firearms or the laser sight Brad ford purchased at the Illinois gun store. At Hawkins’ s home agents found a handgun , ammunition, and magazines, but they did not locate the second handgun or the AK

- 47 she said she kept there. The 48

- hour hold expired that evening, and Bradford, Hawkins, an d Smith were released. A few days later , Hawkins surrendered a Draco pistol to the ATF . A s expected , the pistol matched the serial number on the tag recovered from Bradford’s bedroom.
Around this time the ATF obtained additional information from confidential informants that Bradford was selling crack cocaine

. Smith was one of those informants; he beg a n cooperating with the ATF a fter his arrest. Agents used Smith to conduct two controlled crack

- cocaine buys from Bradford , record ing both transactions

. Smith called Bradford’s cell phone and asked to purchase crack . O n April 18 the two met at Bradford’s house , and Smith purchased 23.8 grams of crack for $1,400. Several days later Smith called Bradford and a sked for more . On April 29 th e two me t again at Bradford’s house , and Smith paid $2,250 for 33.8 grams of crack

. A few weeks after the controlled buys, Smith observed marijuana and various firearms in Bradford’s home

. Spe cifically, Smith reported to Special Agent Adam Ulery that on May 29 he observed an SKS rifle in Bradford’s bedro om closet, a Smith & Wesson .40

- caliber pistol and an XDNo. 17

- 1080 5

.40

- caliber pistol on Bra dford’s bed, as well as a Tommy

- gun rifle under Bradford’s mattress. Smith also reported t hat Bradford sometimes kept firea rms in his white Cadillac

. Ulery had observed a white Cadillac parked in fr ont of Bradford’s residence; it was registered in Brad ford’s name.
Smith c ontinu ed his cooperat ion , telling agents on June 8 that he observed Bradfor d carrying a Springfield XD .40

- caliber pistol and saw marijuana packaged for sale at Bradford’s house. He also reported that Bradford told him he had pistol

- whipped a person named D

- Bow in retaliation for
st ealing marijuana from him . Later that same day, Smith witnessed a firearms transfer at Bradford’s residence; he reported that Bradford hand ed a bag cont aining several firearms to another person inside the home

. Finally, Smith told the agents that earlier on June 8 he saw a n SKS rifle and a Smith & Wesson .40

- caliber pistol in Bradford’s bedroom. On June 9 Agent Ulery applied for another warran t to search Bradford’s home

. H e swore to the facts we’ve just recited and noted his experience investigating the use of firearms i n drug

- trafficking crimes. He explained that a confidential informant had supplied information about Bradford’s drug dealing and the firearms he kept in his home , and also that the informant had participated in two recorded crack buys from Bradford

. He described these facts in some detail, and he also stated that the informant “ha[d] proven reli able in this and in other criminal investigations over the last three months. ” Though he mentioned Smith ’s role in the illegal firearm purchase that prompted t he March 6 warrant , h e d id not i dent ify Smith as the informant

. A magistrate judge issued the warrant that same day. The search of Bradford’s home yielded three rifles, a digital scale,6 No. 17

- 1080

and two sandwich b ag gie s each containing about o ne ounce of marijuana. As we’ve noted, Bradfor d was indicted on charges of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and six related drug

- distribution and firearms c rimes. He moved in limine to suppress the evidence recovered in the March 6 and June 9 searches of his home . Th e motion was denied in all respects; only the second search remains at issue. As relevant here Bradford a rgued that t he June 9 warrant w as invalid because the agent’s application omitted negative information relevant to Smith’s credibility.
A t the suppres sion hearing , Agent Ulery testified that b y the t ime of the June 9 warrant application , Smith had served as an informant in two other investigations involving controlled buys and those transactions had confirmed his reliability

. He told the court that Smi th had advised the ATF that he had two prior felony convictions

— one for p ossession of a controlled substance and the other for armed robbery

— but h e actually had three: p ossession of a controlled substance, residential burglary, and p ossession of a firearm by a felon

. Finally , Ulery testified that S mith was on probation when he began cooperating and that the ATF had paid him for his services

. None of t his information

— Smith’s record, his probation status, and the fact that he was a paid informant

— was included in Ulery’s warrant application. Ruling on the motion, t he district judge acknowledged that Ulery had omitted important information about Smith’s credibility from the warrant application. But t he judge reasoned that Smith’s statement s were otherwise detailed, timely, and adequately corroborated, and that the applica-No. 17

- 1080 7

tion contained sufficient add itional information to support probable cause for the search

. Bradford also moved in limine to exclude any evidence that he had used the seized firearms in ot h er crimes or directed others to use them. The motion was cursory and entirely generic . I t did not specify the evidence at which it was directed or explain why the evidence was inadmissibleother than a bare assertion that it was irrelevant and prejudicial

. In a written response , t he government explained that it would seek to introduce evidence of four violent acts ( or threats of violence ) as direct evidence of the charged offenses

. First , t he government sought to introduce evidence that Bradford ordered a shooting in retaliation for a threat against one of his subordinates in the drug

- distribution conspiracy. Raphael Harris , Bradford’s cousin, sold marijuana for him at a housing complex in the area

. T he boyfriend of a woman who lived in that complex had threatened Harris , so Bradford loaned him a Mossberg rifle to “shoot up” the woman’s apartment. Harris did as Bradford directed and shot up the apartment

. N o one was injured.
The second se t of events involved Bradford’s repeated threat s and violence against a teenager nicknamed D

- Bow , who had st olen marijuana from him

. In re taliation for the theft, Bradford and Harris wen t to D

- Bow’s house and violently banged on the security bars on his bedro om window. Next , Bradford spotted D

- Bow on a bike and chased him down with his truck

. When D

- Bow jumped off the bike and fled on foot , Bradford ran over the b ike. Bradford later

c onfronted D

- Bow directly and pistol

- whipped him

.8 No. 17

- 1080

The third incident centered on Bradford ’s plan to rob one of his crack suppliers because t he two had a falling

- out

. Bradford solicited Smith and his brother to steal her car wher e she kept both drugs and cash . They didn’t go through with it. In the fourth and final episode, an associate of Bradford’s nicknamed Boo Man arrang ed for Bradford to purchase firearms at som eone’s house. When Bradford, Boo Man , and two other s entered the house , they were held up at gunpoint and robbed. Bradf ord later instructed Boo Man to shoot up the house and loaned him a firearm for that purpose. Boo Man didn’t follow through

. In a written order, t he judge summarily ruled that “ th e anticipated evidence outlined by the government” w as “relevant evidence directly related t o the charges ” because , as the government asserted , “it demonstrates how Bradford allegedly conducted his [drug] ‘business.’” The judge also ruled, again summarily , that the evidence was not “unduly prejudicial.” But t he judge ’s concluding line was cryptic:

“ [T] o the extent that Bradford’s motion goes to r elevant evidence directly related to the charges ... , it is DENIED. However , to the extent that the evidence goes to conduct that is not relevant to the charges ... , it is GRANTED.”
The c harges were tried to a jury over five days . The government ’s case included , among other evidence , testimony from Hawkins, Smith, Raphael Harris, and Jeremy Harris (Raphael’s brother, who also sold drugs for Bradford). The government also p resented evidence of the four violent incidents we’ve just discussed with out objection from Bradford. The jury found him guilty on six counts: conspiracy, two of the three firearms crimes, and all three drug

-No. 17

- 1080 9

distribution counts ( two involving cocaine base and one involving marijuana)

. The judge sentenced him to 35 years in prison and this appeal followed

. II. Discussion
A

. The Search Warrant
Bradford challenges the denial of his motion to suppress the fruits of the June 9 search

. He maintains that the omission of information damaging to Smith’s credibility was f atal
to the warrant application because it depriv ed the magistrate judge of information vital to the determination of probable

cause. “Probable cause is a practical, nontechnical inquiry that asks whether there is a fair probability, given the totality of the circumstances, that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” United States v. Orozco , 576 F.3d 745, 748 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). W e give “great deference” to th e probable

- cause determination of the magistrate who issued the warrant

. United States v. Glover , 755 F.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Gates , 462 U.S. at 236) ; see also United States v. McIntire , 516 F.3d 576, 578 (7th Cir. 2008).
When a warrant application is based on information from an informant , our cases have identified five f actors that are particularly relevant to the warrant’s facial validity : “ the level of detail, the extent of firsthand observation, the degree of corroboration, the time between the events reported and the warrant applicatio n, and w hether the informant appeared or testified before the magistrate.” Glover , 755 F.3d at 816. A lthough the sufficiency of a warrant application is a highly fact

- specific determination, we have said that “infor-10 No. 17

- 1080

mation about the informant’s credibility or potential bias is crucial.” Id. Omi tting this information depriv es the magistrate of important data in the probable

- cause calculus. The omission is not necessarily fatal, however. “[E]ven where some credibility information is omitted, a strong showing on the primary f actors can salvage the warrant. ” Id

. at 818; see also United States v. M usgraves , 831 F.3d 454, 460 (7th Cir. 2016)

. Agent Ulery ’s warrant application left out adverse information bearing on Smith’s credibility: his three f elony convictions, one of which he failed to disclose to law enforcement ; his probation status; and the payments he received for his services as an informant. A nd Smith did not

a ppear before the magistrate for questioning

. Still, we’re satisfied that the J une 9 warrant was facially valid. S mith’s information was fresh, firsthand, quite detail ed , and corroborated , all of which supports the magistrate’s finding of probable cause. A few examples suffice to show that Smith’s information

was both sufficiently detailed and adequately corroborat ed. His description s of the firearms Bradford kept in his home

w ere quite specific as to gun type , and he also identified their precise location within the home. Hawkins provided corroboration; the information agents had gathered from her confirmed that Bradford kept multiple firearms in his home. And the Draco pistol she turned ove r to the ATF matched the serial

- number tag recovered in the earlier search of Bradford’s home. Smith also reported that Bradford sometimes kept his firearms in his white Cadillac , and the ATF confirmed that Bradford owned one. Finally, the warrant application chronicled the controlled buys, which confirmedNo. 17

- 1080 11

Smith’s reports that Bradford was dealing crack and marijuana from his home.
Bradford insis ts that the information from sources other than Smith was too stale to support a finding of probable cause. The most recent controlled buy took place around six weeks before the warrant was issued, and Hawkins had described the firearms in Bradford’s home three months earlier

. It’s true that “‘[s]taleness’ is highly relevant to the legality of a search for a perishable or consumable object” like crack cocaine or marijuana. United States v. Seiver , 692 F.3d 774, 777 (7th Cir. 2012). But “depending on the cir cumstances, evidence of the sighting of a gun (or related items) does not automatically grow stale as time passes.” United States v. Hicks , 650 F.3d 1058, 1068 (7th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases). And m ore recent information supporting probable cause can fr eshen information that might otherwise be stale. See United States v. Prideaux

- Wentz , 543 F.3d 954, 958 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Newsom , 40 2 F.3d 780, 783 (7th Cir. 2005)

. Smith’s last report to the agents did just that. On June 8,
t he day before t he warrant issued , he observed firearms and drugs packaged for distribution in Bradford’s residence. This information, like his earlier reports, was firsthand and specific. In particular, he identified the firearms Bradford possessed by type and location in the residence. Smith hangs his hat on United States v. Glover , but tha t case is distinguishable

. There, as here, the affidavit in support of the warrant omitted facts damaging to the informant’ s credibility. Glover , 755 F.3d at 815. But that is where t he similarity ends. In Glover the information from the informant was only minimally corroborated and provided little detai l

.12 No. 17

- 1080

Id. at 817. Giv en the weak showing o n the primary factors relevant to probable cause , the omission of adverse credibility information was fatal to the warrant application. Id. at 818. I n contrast, Smith’s information was quite detailed and more robustly corroborat ed. And his information stood alongside ample additional evidence from the ATF’s investigation . Considering the warrant application as a whole , the omission of facts bearing negatively on Smith’s credibil ity was not fatal to the magistrate ’s probable

- cause finding

. B

. Other

- Acts Evidence Under Rule s 404(b) and 403
Bradford also challenges the admission of evidence of the four violent incidents we’ve described above

. He argues that th is evidence should have been excluded as impermissible character evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence or alt ernatively under Rule 403 because the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweigh ed its probative value

. The parties first debate whether we should consider th is issue at all, as well as the appropriate standard of review

. Th e government argues that the judge’s ruling on Bradford’s motion in limine simply postponed t h e decision on admissibility until trial , so Bradford either forfeited or str ategically waived the issue by not reasserting his objection at trial

. Accordingly, the government asks us to review for pla in

e r ror or decline to review the issue altogether. See United States v. Ridley , 826 F.3d 437, 442 , 443 n.1 (7th Cir. 2016). Bradford urges us to review for abuse of discretion, insisting that he preserved his objection by ra ising it in a motion in limine.No. 17

- 1080 13

The R ules of Evidence provide that “ [o] nce the court rules definitively on the record

— either before or at trial

— aparty need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.” F ED

. R. E VID

. 103(b). A “definitive ruling” is one that “definitively settle[s] the issue of admissibility.” United States v. Gajo , 290 F.3d 922, 927 (7th Cir. 2002). But Rule 103 also s tates that objections to the admission of evidence must be made with specificity

. S ee F ED

. R. E VID

. 103(a)(1) (B) ; see also United States v. Gulley , 722 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that a generalized motion in limine is insufficient to preserve a Rule 404(b) objection for review)

. Bradford ’s motion in limine did not satisfy Rule 103(a)’s specificity requirement . It did not identify the specific evidence he feared would be admitted or explain why it was inadm issible

. On appeal he relies on Rules 404(b) and 403, but his motion in limine mentioned neither rule. T he government ’s response listed the four incidents we’ve described above and characterized these episodes as direct evidence of the charged crimes insofar as they showed how Bradford ran his drug business. Based on these submissions, it’s n o wonder t h e judge ’s ruling was equivocal. The order appears to simultaneously accept the government’s argument and punt the whole issue over to trial

. It conclude s : “ [T] o the extent that Bradford’s motion goes to relevant evidence directly related to the charges

... , it is DENIED. However, to the extent that the evidence goes to conduct that is not relevant to the charges

... , it is GRANTED .” That ’s not a definitive ruling . So Bradford had to lodge a timely and specific objection at trial14 No. 17

- 1080

to preserve the issue for appeal

. He did not do so. H is arguments under Rules 404(b) and 403 are entirely new

. That means our review is constrained by the plain

- error standard, which is a difficult hurdle for a challenger to clear. Reversal is unwarranted unless Bradford can establish a

“ clea r or obvious ” error that affected his substantial rights. United States v. Swan , 486 F.3d 260, 264 (7th Cir. 2007). Even then, we will not “exercise our discretion to correct the error unless it seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Id

. (internal quotation marks omitted). Bradford has not carried this burden

. Rul e 404(b) bars the admission of “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act ... to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” F ED

. R. E VID

. 404(b) (1)

. The g overnment contends t hat the testimony regarding the four violent episodes was dir ect evidence of the charged drug conspiracy and firearms crimes, taking it outside the ambit of Rule 404(b)

. See United States v. Gorman , 613 F.3d 711, 717 (7th Cir. 2010).
E vidence that “tend[s] to prove the elements of the offense ” does not violate Rule 404(b). United States v. Vargas , 689 F.3d 867, 874 (7th Cir. 2012) ; Gorman , 613 F.3d at 717

. More to the point here, “evidence directly pertaining to the defendant’s role in a charged conspiracy” falls outside the scope of Rule 404(b). United States v. Adams , 628 F.3d 407, 414 (7th Cir. 2010). To win a conviction on the conspiracy count , the government had to prove that Bradford “knowingly and intentionally” joined an agreement to distribute drugs. United States v. Pulgar , 789 F.3d 807, 813 (7th Cir. 2015). To convict him of possessing a firearm in further ance of thatNo. 17

- 1080 15

conspiracy , the government had to prove that the firearms listed in the indictment did indeed “further , advance , move forward, promo te or facilitate the drug

- trafficking crime

... by providing the dealer, his stash, or his territory with protection.” United States v. Eller , 670 F.3d 762, 765 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). As we’ve explained , t he government introduced testimony that Bradford loaned a Mossberg rifle to Raphael Harris , one of his distributors, with instruct ion s that he shoot up the apartment of a woman whose boyfriend had threatened him

. T he Mossberg is listed in the indictment among the firearms that Bradford po ssessed in furtherance of the drug

distribution conspiracy . It’s also listed in the felon

- in

possession count . So the testimony about Bradford’s transfer of this particular firearm was properly before the jury on these co unts. It was also properly before the jury as direct evidence of the charged conspiracy

— though not b ecause it demonstrates how Bradford conducted his drug business , as the government ( primarily ) argues. The notion that other

crimes evidence is always admis sible to prove how the defendant ran his criminal enterprise is unsound. A narrower justification for introducing this evidence is that a drug

- distribution conspiracy requires more than a
mere buyer

- seller relationship; it requires evidence of a shared stake in the i llegal venture

— for example, the “provision of tools to advance the distribution

. ” Pulgar , 789 F.3d at 813

. Evidence that Bradford gave Harris the Mossberg rifle
to use in a show of force to preserve aut hority in his assigned drug ter ritory is just this sort of direct evidence of a conspiracy.16 No. 17

- 1080

A similar r ationale might also cover Bradford’s retaliation against D

- Bow for stealing marijuana from him

. Here again, evidence that Bradford and Harris used intimidation and violence t o protec t t h e ir drug

- trafficking enterprise from perceive d threats tend s to prove that they participated in a conspiracy. See United States v. Love , 706 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding sufficient evidence of a drug

- distributionconspiracy in part because the defendant and his coconspirators beat up an individual who the defendant suspected of robbing his crack house); United States v. James , 5 40 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing the fact that t he defendant “protected the [drug ring’s] terr itory through violence” as evidence of the defendant’s participation in a drug

- distribution conspiracy ).

T he third episode is a closer call. B radford had a falling

out with one of his suppliers and solicit ed Smith to steal her car, knowing that she store d drugs and cash in it. Perhaps it could be inferred that Bradford would distribute the stolen drugs or that h e plot ted against his supplier to intimid ate a would

- be rival in order to protect his own drug trade. See
, e.g. , United States v. Stephenson , 53 F.3d 836, 844

– 45 (7th Cir. 1995) ( involving evidence of the defendant s ’ attempt to steal drugs with plans to distribute the stolen product ); United States v. Nieto , 721 F.3d 357, 367

– 68 (5th Cir . 2013) ( involving evidence that the defendant robbed rival drug dealers to maintain a monopoly over the drug trade). The government’s brief touches on these purposes to justify its introduction of this evidence , but the argument is not developed. In the fourth and final incident, Bradford gave a firearm to a coconspirator nicknamed Boo Man and told him to shoot u p a house where the two had been robbed as theyNo. 17

- 1080 17

were purchasing firearms

. This episode is co mparable to the retaliation against D

- Bow, though only loosely so. Our point in tracing these plausible alternative justificati ons relates to the plain

- error standard of review. I t’s far from “clear or obvious ” that admitting this evidence violat ed Rule 40 4(b) . And even if it was error, Bradford has not demonstrated that admitting this evidence violated h is substantial rights and seriously undermined the fairness and integrity of his trial

. As a fallback, Bradford argues that the evidence should have been kept out under Rule 403’s balancing test , which permits exclusion of “relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice.” This argument requires only brief comment

. Bradford insists that the probative va lue of this evidence was diminished because he did not “actively dispute” that he possessed firearms . The premise of this argument is correct: an important consideration in Rule 403 balancing is the extent to which the defendant actually contests the fact that the evidence tends to prove. United States v. Gomez , 763 F.3d 845, 857 (7th Cir. 2014). “[I]f a defendant offers to concede orstipulate to the fact for which the evidence is offered, additional evidence may have little probative value.” Id. But Bradf ord never offered to stipulate that he possessed the firearms listed in the indictment

. As a m ore general matter , because Rule 403 i s a balancing test, it’s hard to show plain

error . W e see no such error here.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence of a Crack Conspiracy Finally, Bradford insists that the evidence was insufficient to prove a conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine . This argu-18 No. 17

- 1080

ment requires little comment. It should be clear fr om our description of the trial evidence that the government proved Bradf ord’s participation in an ongoing cra ck

- distribution conspiracy, not just two isolated crack

- cocaine transactions. And e ven if Bradford is right that the evidence was insufficient to prove an agreement to distribute crack, the conspiracy conviction would s till stand. Bradford was charged with conspiracy to distribute both crack cocaine and marijuana . H e does not argue that the evidence was in sufficient to prove his participation in a marijuana

- distribution conspiracy.
A FFIRMED

.