### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Marc h 1, 200 5 MILTA D. BLA NC HAR D v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. P -28149 Joseph B. Dailey, Jud ge

No. W2004-01801-C CA-R 3-HC - F iled May 13, 2005

The petitioner, Milta D . Bla nchar d, appea ls the Shelby CountyCriminal Court’s denial of habeas c or pu s relief and cla ims that his 1992 conviction of reckle ss endang erme nt i s v o i d b ec ause the char g ing instrument did not cha rg e the offe nse of rec kless endang erme nt. We a ffirm the dismissal of the pe tition.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d.
J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL a ndJ.C. M C LIN , J J ., joined.
L orna Mc Clusky , Memphis, T ennesse e (at trial); and Wil liam D

. Massey , Memphis, Tennesse e (on appea l), for the Appellant, Milta D. B lancha rd.
Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt er; Dav id H. F ind le y , A ssi stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and Jamie Kaplan, A ssistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee. OP IN ION
The re cord r evea ls that the petitioner was c harg ed with agg ravated assault by using a pis t o l t o ca u s e the victim’s fear of imminent bodil y

injury

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-102 (2 00 3) . Pu rs ua nt t o h is 1 99 2 w ri tte n p le a a g re e me nt, the pe tit ion e r p le a de d g uil ty to r e c kle ss e nd a ng e rm e nt, a Cl ass E fel on y , an d w a s se nte nc e d to a Ra ng e I te rm of tw o y e ars in the c ou nty workhouse. In 2004, the petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief , in which he a sserted that the conviction off

ense w as not cha

rg ed in the indictment.
The ha be as c or

pu s court c onducted a

hearing on t h e s t ate’ s motion t o dismiss the petition

. Du ring the hea ring , counsel for

the petitioner a nd the state informed the cour t that the petitioner wa s awa iting sente ncing on both state and fede ral convictions. Counsel for the pe titioner acknow ledg ed that she r epre sented the pe t i t i o n er on the fede ral matter s. The petitioner ha d-2-

appar ently

long sinc e complete d serv i ce of the two-y ear sentenc e imposed in the cha lleng ed conviction. Following the hea ring , the court concluded that, as of the time of the offe nse in 1991 a ndthe re su lti ng c on vic tio n in 1 9 9 2 , r e c kl e s s e nd a ng e rm e nt w a s c on sid e re d a le sse r i nc lud e d o ff

e ns e of ag g ravated assault. B ased upon this determination, the court dismissed the petition.

The leg al issues raise d in a habe as cor pus proce eding are questions of law, and our re vie w of qu e sti on s of la w i s de novo

. Ha rt v . S tate , 21 S.W .3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000) (“[W] hether to gr ant the petition [for habeas corpus re lie f] is a qu e sti on of la w that we re vie w de no vo .” ); Sta te v . H ill , 9 54 S.W. 2d72 5, 72 7 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) (q ue sti on of la w r e vie we d o n a

pp e a l de novo ).
Ha be a s c or pu s r e lie f is a va ila

ble on ly wh e n the a g g ri e ve d p arty ’s c on vic tio n is vo id beca use the c onvicting court l acke d jurisdiction to impose the j udg ment or whe n the sentenc e has expired. Se e Arc he r v . S tate , 8 51 S.W. 2d15 7, 16 4 ( Te nn . 19 93 ). Th e pe tit ion e r in the pr e se nt c a se has appa re n t l y l ong since c ompleted his sentence pursuant to the cha lleng ed judg ment and is no lon g e r i nc arc e rate d p ur su a nt to that jud g me nt. Th us , he c la ims that hi s c on vic tio n ju dg me nt i s v oid on the g ro un d th a t th e c on vic tio n c ou rt la c ke d ju ri sd ic tio n to e nte r the jud g me nt.
A v oidc on vic tio n is on e wh ic h str ike s at the jurisd ic tio na l inte g ri ty of the tr ia l c ou rt

. Id. ; se e Sta te ex

re l. A ng lin v . Mitc he ll , 57 5 S.W. 2d 28 4, 28 7 ( Te nn . 1 97 9) ; Pa ssa re lla v . S tate , 891 S.W. 2d 61 9, 62 7 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ). “ ‘Jurisd ic tio n’ in the se ns e he re us e d, is n ot l imi te d to jurisd ic tio n of the pe rs on or of the su bje c t matt e r but a lso inc lud e s law fu l autho ri ty of the c ou rt to re nd e r the pa

rt ic ula r or de r or jud g me nt wh e re by the pe tit ion e r ha s be e n impriso ne d. ” ; An gli n , 575 S.W. 2da t 28 7; see Arc her , 8 51 S.W. 2da t 16 4; Pa ssa re lla , 891 S.W .2d at 627.

“When there is a trial on a sing le cha rg e of a felony , there is also a trial on all lesser included off

enses, ‘ as the fa cts may

be.’” State v. W

illie D. Graham , No.03C01-9707-CC-00314, s l i p o p . at1 9 (T en n . C ri m . Ap p . , M ay7 , 1 9 9 8 ) ( q u o t i n g Str ad e r v . S tate , 210 Tenn. 669, 362 S.W.2d 224, 227 (Tenn.1962) ). When an individual is acc used of a crime, how ever , the state must g ive the acc used ade quate notice of the c harg ed off ense by specifying it in the indictment. See S t a t e v. Tru sty , 919 S.W .2d 305, 309 (Tenn.1996) (citing Tenn. Const. Art. I , § 9), overruled on othe r grounds by State v. Dom iny , 6 S.W. 3d47 2, 47 7 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) . A defe nd a nt c a nn ot b e le g a lly c on vic te d o f an of

fe ns e that is no t c ha

rg e d in the ind ic tme nt or that is no t a le sse r i nc lud e d o ff

e ns e embra ced in the i ndicted charg e. Sta te v . La mp k in , 6 19 S.W. 2d52 0 ( Te nn . 1 98 1) ; Mc Le an v . S tate , 52 7 S. W.2 d 7 6 ( Te nn . 1 97 5) ; Sta te v . M or ris , 788 S.W .2d 820 (Tenn. Crim. App.1990) ).
I n the pr e se nt c a se , the pa rt ie s be low de bate d wh e the r re c kle ss e nd a ng e rm e nt w a s a lesser inc luded offe nse of a g g ravated assault in 1992. W e hold, howeve r, that an issue ne are r the threshold of a habeas corpus proce eding disposes of t he present case. Specifica lly , we hold that the petitioner is neither imprisoned nor restrained of his liberty

as a dire ct conse quence of the c halleng ed judgme nt, and there fore , he is inelig ible for ha be as c or pu s relief

. Article I , section 15 of the T ennesse e Constituti on establish e s th erig ht to seek habeas c or pu s re l i e f i n T en n es s ee , b u tt h e p ro ce d u re s go v er n i n g ha be as c or pu s pe tit ion s a

re c od if ie d in-3-

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tions 29-21-101 throug h -130. Tennessee Code Annotated sec tion 29-21-101 pr ovides that “[a]nyperson im pr iso ne d o r re str

ain e d o f li be rty , u nd e r any

pr e te ns e wh ats oever , . . . may

prosec ute a writ of habea s corpus, to inquire into the ca use of suc h imprisonment and restraint.” T en n . Code Ann. § 29-21- 101 (2003) ( emphasis adde d). “The ordinary meaning of t h e term ‘imprisoned’ is clear [; it] ref ers to ac tual phy sical conf inement or detention,” Hickm an v. State, 153 S.W .3d 16, 22 (Tenn. 2004), but the meaning of “r estraine d of liberty ” for ha be as c or

pu s purposes is less obvious.
Al tho ug h o ne ne e d n ot b e in phy sic a l c on fi ne me nt t o b e re str a ine d o f o ne ’s lib e rty for pur poses of habeas corpus , id., “whe n the restraint on a petitioner' s liberty is merely a collate ral conseque nce of

the cha lleng ed ju d gm en t, habea s corpus is not an appr opriate a venue f or see king relief ,” id. at 23. I n Hickm an , our supre me court held that a per son is not “restra ined of liberty ” for purposes of the habea s c or pu s st a tute un le ss the c ha lle ng e d ju dg me nt i tse lf imp os e s a re str a int up on the pe tit ion e r’ s f

re e do m of ac tio n o r m ov e me nt. Us e of t h e challeng ed judg ment to enhanc e the se ntence imposed on a se pa rate c on vic tio n is no t a

re str a int of

lib e rty su ff ic ie nt t o p e rm it a habea s corpus c halleng e to the orig inal conviction long afte r the sentenc e on the origina l conviction has expired.
Id. This holding in Hickm an disposes of the pre sent petitioner’s c laim to habeas corpus relief . He doe s not a lleg e that he rema ins imprisoned or is restraine d of his liberty pursuant to the challeng ed judgme nt. S ee id. at 24. B ased upon the rec ord of the he aring on the petition, the petitioner appa

rently seeks to a void the 1992 judgme nt a s a mea ns of diminishi ng his punishment liability in ong oing – but unr elated – c riminal proce eding s. This is precisely the type of c ollatera l c o n s e q u e n c eo f

th e c ha lle ng e d ju dg me nt that Hickm an deeme d unworthy of a habeas corpus r e m e d y. Acc ording ly , the dismissal of the petitioner is aff irmed.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE