Filed 3/5/24 Campana v. Saldana CA2/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

WILLIAM CAMPANA,

Plaintiff, Cross-defendant

and Respondent,

v.

CONSUELO SALDANA et al.,

Defendants, 

Cross-complainants and Appellants.

B327132

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC668542

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Christopher K. Lui, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Dennis G. Geselowitz and Dennis G. 

Geselowitz for Defendants, Cross-complainants and Appellants.

Law Offices of Steve Lopez and Steve Lopez for Plaintiff, 

Cross-defendant and Respondent.

_________________________
2

Consuelo Saldana and Mario Campana jointly purchased 

a condominium in 1987. More than two decades later, Mario 

transferred his interest in the condominium to his son, William 

Campana. Around the same time, Consuelo transferred her 

interest to her daughter, Iva Dominguez, and her daughter’s 

husband, Miguel Dominguez.1 Iva is Mario’s daughter and 

William’s half-sister. 

In 2017, William filed a complaint against Consuelo, Iva, 

and Miguel (Appellants), seeking to quiet title and partition the 

property. Appellants filed a cross-complaint against William for 

quiet title. After a bench trial, the court entered judgment for 

William and ordered the property be sold. On appeal, Appellants

argue they were entitled to a jury trial, the court ignored their 

evidence, the court entered judgment on a “sham” complaint, and 

the court erroneously ordered the property be sold. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The complaint

In July 2017, William filed a complaint against Appellants

asserting causes of action for partition of real property, 

accounting, partnership dissolution, constructive trust, common 

count, and breach of fiduciary duty. Among other forms of relief, 

William sought partition by sale, an accounting, compensatory 

and punitive damages, and dissolution of partnership.

The complaint alleged that in 1993, William’s father, 

Mario Campana, bought a condominium (the Property) with 

Consuelo Saldana “as an investment and under a verbal 

partnership agreement.” The partnership agreement allowed 

1 For the sake of clarity, we refer to the parties by their 

first names.
3

either party to call for the sale of the Property. In July 2013, 

Mario transferred his interest in the Property to William. A few 

months later, Consuelo transferred her interest to her daughter, 

Iva, and her daughter’s husband, Miguel. About three years 

later, William learned Appellants had not paid the property taxes 

or homeowners association fees. William told Appellants he 

wanted to sell the Property or have them purchase his interest, 

but they did not respond to his request.

After litigating the case for a couple of years, William 

moved for leave to file an amended complaint to clarify his 

partition cause of action, add a new cause of action for quiet title 

against Consuelo, and remove all other causes of action. As to 

the partition claim, William asserted Mario and Consuelo had 

refinanced the Property in 1993, which he mistook for the 

original purchase. In fact, they had purchased the Property 

in 1987. Because of this error, William sought to amend 

the complaint to change the purchase date from 1993 to 1987. 

Appellants opposed the motion, arguing the proposed 

amendments were barred under the sham pleading doctrine 

because they contradicted the allegations in the original 

complaint.

The court granted William leave to add a quiet title cause 

of action, but it denied the motion in all other respects. The court 

concluded the sham pleading doctrine precluded William from 

amending his allegations regarding the purchase date. The court 

noted it could not determine whether William’s mistake about 

the purchase date was reasonable because he failed to produce 

a copy of the refinance agreement. As to William’s request to 

remove causes of action, the court stated it was unnecessary 
4

because William could simply file a request for dismissal of any 

claims he no longer wished to pursue.

William filed an amended complaint that included all his 

prior claims plus a new claim for quiet title against Consuelo. 

The quiet title claim alleged Consuelo continued to claim 

an interest in the Property, despite having transferred her 

entire interest to Iva and Miguel. In relief, William sought a 

declaration that only he, Iva, and Miguel had an interest in the 

Property. After filing the amended complaint, William dismissed 

all his claims except those for partition and quiet title.

2. The cross-complaint

In April 2020, Appellants filed a cross-complaint against 

William, asserting a single cause of action for quiet title. 

Confusingly, the cross-complaint also included separate sections 

entitled “breach of contract founded upon written instrument,” 

“adverse possession,” “fraud,” and “constructive trust.” In relief, 

Appellants sought an order compelling William to transfer 

his legal title to Appellants, a judgment enjoining William 

from claiming any right to the Property, and a declaration 

that Appellants had the sole legal and equitable rights to 

the Property.

Appellants’ cross-complaint alleged that Iva is Mario and 

Consuelo’s daughter from an affair they had while Mario was 

married to another woman. In 1987—when Iva was 16 years old

—Mario agreed to help Consuelo buy the Property in lieu of 

providing past and future financial support. Mario and Consuelo 

were both named on the title to the Property. However, Consuelo 

owned the entire beneficial interest and Mario held his interest 

in trust for her. Mario agreed to transfer his interest to Consuelo 

once she paid off the mortgage. He also agreed the entire 
5

Property would eventually pass to Iva. Consuelo used the 

Property as her primary residence, and she paid off the mortgage 

in 1993. However, Mario refused to transfer title to her.

3. The trial

The parties tried their claims to the court over the course 

of six days. Iva testified her parents purchased the Property 

in 1987 for $68,000, with a $20,000 down payment. They paid off 

the original loan in 1993 and took out a second loan. Consuelo 

alone made payments on the loans.

Iva testified Mario repeatedly promised to transfer his 

interest in the Property to her and Consuelo. Despite those 

promises, he never signed a transfer deed and would come up 

with some excuse for why he could not do so. Iva eventually 

stopped believing Mario would keep his promise to transfer 

the Property to her.

According to Iva, at some point, she and Consuelo learned 

that Mario had transferred his interest in the Property to 

William. After learning of the transfer, Consuelo tried to transfer 

the entire Property to Iva and Miguel. A clerk told her that 

was not possible, so Consuelo instead deeded Iva and Miguel 

a one-half interest.

Iva testified she and Miguel were living on the Property 

with Consuelo, who was 93 years old and suffering from 

dementia. Iva said Consuelo continued to claim an ownership 

interest in the Property, despite having deeded her interest 

to Iva and Miguel nearly a decade earlier.

William testified his father transferred to him a one-half 

interest in the Property in July 2013. Mario died about three 

years later. According to William, Mario said he had entered 

into a partnership agreement to purchase the Property as an
6

investment, but he did not disclose his partner’s name. 

Over time, Mario revealed more details about the agreement, 

including that Consuelo was his partner. Mario claimed he met 

Consuelo at church, and he wanted to help her out because she 

was pregnant and had no support. Mario said the agreement 

was that Consuelo would live in the Property rent free until 

her child turned 18 years old, and then Mario would exercise 

his option to sell his share or buy out Consuelo’s share.

William testified he could not recall ever having met 

Consuelo. He met Iva once, at her wedding to Miguel in 2009. 

However, William could not recall whether his father had 

told him Iva is his half-sister. William is significantly older 

than Iva; he graduated from high school the same year she 

was born.

William explained that, after his father’s death, he learned 

Appellants were claiming an interest in the Property. He also 

discovered the property taxes had not been paid for several years. 

William explained he was claiming an ownership interest in 

the Property under the transfer deed his father signed in 2013, 

rather than under a partnership agreement. William wanted 

the Property partitioned, but he did not care whether it was 

partitioned by appraisal or by sale.

4. The judgment 

The trial court apparently issued a statement of decision 

in William’s favor. However, Appellants did not include the 

statement of decision in the record on appeal. Nor is there 

any indication in the record that Appellants filed objections 

to the statement of decision.

The court entered an interlocutory judgment for partition 

under Code of Civil Procedure section 872.720. The judgment 
7

declares William owns a one-half interest in the Property, and 

Miguel and Iva each own a one-quarter interest in the Property. 

The judgment orders the Property be sold, stating, “Under 

the circumstances, the sale of the property and division of the 

proceeds would be more equitable than division of the property; 

the Court, therefore, orders that the property be sold and the 

proceeds divided among the parties according to their respective 

interests.” The court appointed a referee to sell the Property. 

The judgment also directs the Clerk of the Court to issue a writ 

of possession under Code of Civil Procedure section 712.010 if

William applies for one.

Appellants timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

1. We deny Appellants’ motions to augment the record

Appellants filed their opening brief on appeal on 

September 28, 2023. In their brief, Appellants noted they 

intended to move to augment the record with certain documents 

that were missing from it. 

Appellants subsequently filed two motions to augment 

the record on appeal. They filed the first motion on December 6, 

2023, which was the week before oral argument. In that motion,

Appellants sought to augment the record with six documents: 

a deposition transcript, the statement of decision, three 

minute orders related to the statement of decision, and William’s

proposed statement of decision. In a declaration attached to

the motion, Appellants’ counsel stated he believed he had 

designated the documents for inclusion in the record, but he had 

since learned they had not been included. Counsel represented 

he is inexperienced in appellate work, as he normally works 

as a corporate financial officer and in-house counsel.
8

This court held oral argument on December 15, 2023. 

Nearly a week later—on December 21, 2023—Appellants 

filed a supplemental motion to augment the record. In their 

supplemental motion, Appellants sought to include in the record 

their answer to William’s complaint.

Rule 8.155 of the California Rules of Court allows an 

appellate court to augment the record “[a]t any time, on motion 

of a party or its own motion . . . .” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule

8.155(a)(1).) Our local rules state an appellant should file 

a request for augmentation “within 40 days of the filing of 

the record . . . .” (Ct. App., Second Dist., Local Rules, rule 2(b), 

Augmentation of record.) Motions filed beyond that date

“will not be granted except upon a showing of good cause 

for the delay.” (Ibid.)

The record in this case was filed on August 1, 2023, 

more than 40 days before Appellants filed their first motion

to augment. Appellants fail to show good cause for their delay. 

By their own admission, Appellants were aware the record 

was incomplete when they filed their opening brief on appeal. 

They have not provided a compelling explanation as to why 

they waited more than two months after filing their brief—and 

until the week before oral argument—to file their first motion 

to augment. Their counsel’s inexperience in appellate practice 

does not provide a sufficient explanation or excuse for the delay. 

Accordingly, we deny both motions to augment the record. 

2. Appellants were not entitled to a jury trial

Appellants argue the trial court erred in refusing to 

conduct a jury trial on the quiet title and partition claims. 

They contend that, although the claims were equitable in form, 

each raised issues for which a jury was required.
9

a. The right to a jury trial

The California Constitution states, “Trial by jury is an 

inviolate right and shall be secured to all.” (Cal. Const., art. I, 

§ 16.) Our state’s high court has explained the “right so 

guaranteed . . . is the right as it existed at common law in 1850, 

when the Constitution was first adopted, ‘and what that right is, 

is a purely historical question, a fact which is to be ascertained 

like any other social, political or legal fact.’ [Citations.]” (C & K 

Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co. (1978) 23 Cal.3d 1, 8

(C & K Engineering).)

Under this historical approach, “as a general matter the 

California Constitution affords a right to a jury trial in common 

law actions at law that were triable by a jury in 1850, but not in 

suits in equity that were not triable by a jury in 1850. [Citation.] 

In applying this test, . . . the form or title of a statutory cause 

of action is not controlling and that if the substance of the 

cause of action is one that would have been triable by a jury at 

common law, there is a right to a jury trial even if the statute’s 

designation might suggest that it is an equitable proceeding.” 

(Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc. v. Superior Court

(2020) 9 Cal.5th 279, 315.) “On the other hand, if the action is 

essentially one in equity and the relief sought ‘depends upon 

the application of equitable doctrines,’ the parties are not entitled 

to a jury trial.” (C & K Engineering, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 9.) 

“[T]he legal or equitable nature of a cause of action ordinarily 

is determined by the mode of relief to be afforded.” (Raedeke 

v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Assn. (1974) 10 Cal.3d 665, 672.)
10

b. The record does not show Appellants preserved 

the jury trial issue for appeal

William suggests the trial court properly refused to conduct 

a jury trial because Appellants failed to present the court with 

compelling legal arguments or evidence to show the claims were 

legal in nature. Although not stated explicitly, we understand 

William essentially to be making a forfeiture argument. 

“It is well-settled that the failure to raise an issue in the 

trial court typically forfeits on appeal any claim of error based 

on that issue.” (Howitson v. Evans Hotels, LLC (2022) 81 

Cal.App.5th 475, 489 (Howitson).) “ ‘An appellate court will 

not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings where an 

objection could have been, but was not, raised in the court below.’ 

[Citation.] It is unfair to the trial judge and to the adverse party 

to take advantage of an alleged error on appeal where it could 

easily have been corrected at trial. [Citations.]” (Children’s 

Hospital & Medical Center v. Bontá (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 

776–777.) 

Here, the record is extremely limited on the topic of 

Appellants’ request for a jury trial. Aside from a notice that 

Appellants had deposited jury fees, the record on the issue 

consists of two minute orders that briefly discuss the issue.

The first minute order—dated April 11, 2022—states 

William’s counsel waived a jury trial, but Appellants’ counsel 

indicated “he is not willing to waive jury at this time.” The court 

ordered Appellants’ counsel to meet and confer with his clients 

on the issue.

The second minute order—dated April 18, 2022—states 

the following: “Counsel for plaintiff/cross-defendant indicates 

that this case is an equitable claims case and there is not a 
11

legal basis for a jury trial. The Court does not find legal issue[s] 

that require a jury trial and this case should be a nonjury trial.” 

Appellants did not include in the record a reporter’s transcript 

of the hearing or a statement summarizing it. 

Although the record shows Appellants deposited jury fees 

and initially refused to waive a jury, it does not reflect that 

Appellants objected when the court subsequently ordered a 

bench trial at the April 18 hearing. Nor is there anything else 

in the record to indicate Appellants objected to the bench trial on 

the same grounds they assert on appeal. Absent such a showing, 

we may consider the issue forfeited and decline to consider 

Appellants’ arguments. (See Howitson, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 489.)

Even if Appellants had raised the objections in the trial 

court, the record suggests they later withdrew those objections. 

During his opening statement at trial, Appellants’ counsel 

remarked, “I believe a jury is not necessary in this case.” Unless 

the reporter’s transcript contains a typographical error—which 

is possible, as the transcript includes many obvious errors—

counsel’s statement suggests Appellants implicitly withdrew 

their objections and consented to the bench trial. “[I]t is well 

established that ‘. . . a party cannot without objection try his 

case before a court without a jury, lose it and then complain that 

it was not tried by jury. [Citation.]’ [Citations.] . . . [W]herein 

defendants proceeded to try the case before a judge without 

objecting to the absence of a jury, ‘Defendants cannot play 

“Heads I win. Tails you lose[.]” with the trial court.’ ” (Taylor 

v. Union Pacific Railroad Corporation (1976) 16 Cal.3d 893, 900.)
12

Although we could deny Appellants’ arguments on either 

of these bases, out of an abundance of caution, we will consider 

their arguments on the merits. 

c. Appellants were not entitled to a jury trial on 

William’s partition claim

“Under California law, the term ‘partition’ signifies ‘the 

procedure for segregating and terminating common interests 

in the same parcel of property.’ ” (14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s 

Ass’n v. VRT Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1404–1405.) 

“A co-owner of real or personal property may bring an action 

for partition. (Code Civ. Proc., § 872.210.) ‘The primary purpose 

of a partition suit is, as the terminology implies, to partition 

the property, that is, to sever the unity of possession.’ ” 

(LEG Investments v. Boxler (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 484, 493.) 

“ ‘[A]lthough the action of partition is of statutory origin in this 

state, it is nonetheless an equitable proceeding.’ ” (Cummings 

v. Dessel (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 589, 596–597.) Therefore, there 

generally is no right to a jury trial in a partition action. (See 

Meyer Koulish Co. v. Cannon (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 419, 430–431 

[“there is no right to a jury trial in civil actions that are equitable 

in nature”].)

Although Appellants seem to concede that partition actions 

are equitable in nature, they argue they were entitled to a 

jury trial on William’s partition claim because it was actually 

a partnership claim in disguise. They rely on language in 

William’s operative complaint stating Mario and Consuelo 

purchased the Property under a verbal partnership agreement, 

which allowed either partner to call for the sale of the Property.

While it is true that William’s complaint contained 

general allegations about a partnership agreement, those 
13

allegations did not form the basis for the partition claim. 

Instead, they concerned the claims for accounting, dissolution 

of partnership, constructive trust, and breach of fiduciary duty, 

which William dismissed before trial. As to the partition claim, 

the complaint alleges it arose out of William’s “undivided one-half 

interest as a tenant in common in the fee title to the Property.”

Consistent with the complaint, William and his counsel 

explicitly and repeatedly stated at trial that he was not seeking 

to sell the property under a partnership agreement. Instead, 

William sought to exercise the rights he received when Mario 

deeded him an undivided one-half interest in the Property. 

Given this record, we reject Appellants’ contention that 

William’s partition claim somehow sounded in partnership law.

We also reject Appellants’ contention that the judgment

must be premised on a partnership theory because “California 

law does not allow partition by sale against an unwilling 

co-owner in possession.” As Appellants note elsewhere in their 

appellate briefs, a forced sale is a strongly disfavored remedy

in a partition action, but it is not prohibited. (See Butte Creek 

Island Ranch v. Crim (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 360, 366 [partition 

by forced sale is “ ‘strongly disfavored’ ”].) Therefore, contrary 

to Appellants’ contentions, the fact the court ordered partition 

by sale does not prove it granted the relief under a partnership 

theory.

d. Appellants have not shown they were entitled to 

a jury trial on the quiet title claims

It is “well established that actions to quiet title, like true 

declaratory relief actions, are generally equitable in nature.” 

(Caira v. Offner (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 12, 25.) However, there 

is an exception to this rule when the quiet title action “takes on 
14

the character of an ejectment proceeding to recover possession 

of real property.” (Aguayo v. Amaro (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1102, 

1109–1110; cf. Dills v. Delira Corp. (1956) 145 Cal.App.2d 124, 

130 [“it is well settled that an action to establish title which 

does not include a prayer to obtain possession of the property 

is equitable in nature”].) The reason for this exception is that 

“ ‘courts will not permit the declaratory action to be used as 

a device to circumvent the right to a jury trial in cases where 

such right would be guaranteed if the proceeding were coercive 

rather than declaratory in nature.’ ” (State Farm Mutual Auto. 

Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal.2d 428, 432.) 

In an ejectment proceeding, the plaintiff must prove 

the defendant has wrongfully deprived him of possession of 

the property. (Montgomery v. Santa Ana & W. Ry. Co. (1894) 

104 Cal. 186, 197.) A judgment of ejection “awards possession to 

the prevailing party because he had title at the commencement 

of the action and because the losing party had no title, or had 

no such title as would authorize him to withhold possession.” 

(Zaccaria v. Bank of America National T. & S. Ass’n (1958) 

164 Cal.App.2d 715, 719.) 

Here, neither Appellants’ nor William’s quiet title claims

sought possession of the Property under an ejectment theory or 

anything comparable to an ejectment theory. Appellants were in 

sole possession of the Property at the time of trial, so there was 

no reason for them to seek to eject William or recover possession 

from him. Nor did William seek to eject Consuelo from the 

Property through his quiet title claim against her. Instead, 

as to that claim, William’s operative complaint sought only

a “judgment quieting title and declar[ing]” that William, Iva, 

and Miguel have an interest in the Property. In fact, William 
15

could not eject Consuelo from the Property given he conceded 

Iva and Miguel also had undivided interests in the Property. 

(See Verdier v. Verdier (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 348, 352 [a 

“cotenant [in common] has no right to oust a person who holds 

possession with the consent of another tenant in common”].)

Appellants argue the fact that the judgment allows William 

to obtain a writ of possession under Code of Civil Procedure 

section 712.010 (section 712.010) proves he sought possession 

of the Property through his quiet title claim. Section 712.010 

provides that, “[a]fter entry of a judgment for possession or sale 

of property, a writ of possession or sale shall be issued by the 

clerk of the court upon application of the judgment creditor . . . .” 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 712.010.) 

Consistent with the relief William requested in his 

complaint, the judgment expressly orders the sale of the 

Property, but it does not expressly grant William possession 

of it. Therefore, it seems the judgment’s reference to a writ 

of possession under section 712.010 was intended either to be a 

writ of sale or to facilitate the sale of the Property. In either case, 

the writ is a remedy for William’s partition claim, not his quiet 

title claim. For the reasons discussed above, Appellants had 

no right to a jury trial on the partition claim. Moreover, to the 

extent the judgment is ambiguous on this issue or awards relief 

beyond that requested in the complaint, Appellants could have 

raised an objection in the trial court. It appears they declined 

to do so.2 

2 Because we reject Appellants’ arguments that they were 

entitled to a jury trial, we do not consider their arguments that 

the bench trial prejudiced them.
16

3. The court did not ignore Appellants’ evidence 

supporting their defenses 

Appellants argue the trial court “ignored” evidence they 

presented in support of their affirmative defenses of laches and 

waiver. Despite this claim, Appellants fail to point to anything 

in the record showing the court excluded their evidence or 

otherwise refused to consider it. Therefore, as best we can tell, 

Appellants’ argument is their evidence was so overwhelming 

the court must have ignored it; otherwise the court would have 

ruled in their favor.

Where, as here, the parties with the burden of proof 

challenge a decision against them, the question on appeal is 

whether the evidence compels a finding in their favor as a matter 

of law. (Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, 

Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 466.) Specifically, the question 

is whether the appellant’s evidence was “ ‘(1) “uncontradicted and 

unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave 

no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to 

support a finding.” ’ ” (Ibid.) In considering this question, we 

are mindful of the most fundamental rule of appellate review: 

the judgment challenged on appeal is presumed to be correct, and 

“it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error.” 

(People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.) To 

demonstrate error, the appellant “must present meaningful 

legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations 

to facts in the record that support the claim of error.” (In re S.C. 

(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) 

Appellants have not met their burden here. As to the 

waiver issue, they fail to provide a single citation to evidence 

in the record that supports their argument. Nor do they provide 
17

meaningful analysis of how their evidence proves waiver as a 

matter of law. Instead, they simply assert they proved waiver 

through their own testimony and the testimony of one of Mario’s 

daughters, Mildred Campana. We are not required to search the 

record to ascertain whether it supports Appellants’ arguments, 

nor are we required to make Appellants’ arguments for them. 

(Inyo Citizens for Better Planning v. Inyo County Bd. of 

Supervisors (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1, 14.) Accordingly, 

Appellants have not met their burden to show error. (See 

In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.) 

Appellants’ laches argument fails for similar reasons. 

Unlike their waiver argument, Appellants provide a citation 

to the record to support their contention that the court was 

obligated to grant their laches defense. Specifically, they cite 

a total of two pages from the reporter’s transcript. On those 

pages, Mildred Campana testified she believed Mario deeded his 

interest in the Property to William so William could “help him 

get his money back, as he put it.” Mildred also testified she never 

heard Mario “mention anything more than $20,000. It was clear 

to me it wasn’t 50 percent.” Appellants do not explain how 

this testimony proved their laches defense, nor is it self-evident. 

Because Appellants fail to provide any meaningful analysis 

of the issue, they have not met their burden to show error. 

(See In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.) 

4. The trial court did not enter judgment on a 

“sham” complaint

Appellants argue the trial court erred by granting 

judgment on a “sham” complaint. Their argument seems to be 

based on the trial court’s order denying in part William’s motion 

to amend his complaint. In that order, the court ruled the 
18

sham pleading doctrine precluded William from making certain 

amendments to the complaint.3 However, the court did not hold

—as Appellants seem to suggest—the entire complaint was 

a sham. Nor do Appellants meaningfully explain how the 

court’s ruling is, in any way, inconsistent with the judgment. 

Accordingly, they have not met their burden to show error 

on this basis.

5. Appellants’ other arguments lack merit

Appellants make several arguments concerning the 

court’s order that the Property be partitioned by sale. They 

make the arguments in passing, without providing meaningful 

analysis of the issues. The arguments also lack merit. 

First, Appellants contend the court “blocked” evidence 

showing the sale of the Property would not be more equitable 

than division of the Property. However, they point to nothing in 

the record to substantiate that assertion. From our independent 

review of the record, it is apparent the court allowed Appellants

to present ample evidence on the issue.

Appellants next complain that the statement of decision 

“contains no determination by the court that partition by sale 

. . . was equitable.” Because Appellants failed to include the 

statement of decision in the appellate record, we cannot confirm 

their assertion. In any event, Appellants provide no authority 

holding a trial court must explicitly find partition by sale is 

3 “Under the sham pleading doctrine, ‘[i]f a party files 

an amended complaint and attempts to avoid the defects of 

the original complaint by either omitting facts which made the 

previous complaint defective or by adding facts inconsistent with 

those of previous pleadings, the court may take judicial notice of 

prior pleadings and may disregard any inconsistent allegations.’ ” 

(Zakk v. Diesel (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 431, 447.)
19

equitable. Even if it were required, the judgment expressly 

states, “Under the circumstances, the sale of the property and 

division of the proceeds would be more equitable than division 

of the property.” On this record, Appellants have not met their 

burden to show the trial court erred. 

Finally, Appellants contend the trial court ignored 

legal authority that precludes the sale of property over an 

objection from a “related co-owner.” However, the cases 

on which Appellants rely simply state partition by sale is a 

“strongly disfavored” remedy that is available only in limited 

circumstances. (See, e.g., Richmond v. Dofflemyer (1980) 105 

Cal.App.3d 745, 757 [“Forced sales are strongly disfavored.”]; 

Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. (1943) 

56 Cal.App.2d 645, 647 [“partition in kind is favored by the law, 

and . . . a sale will be ordered only when it is necessary to prevent 

great prejudice to the owners”].) Appellants cite no authority 

holding partition by sale is never permitted over a co-owner’s

objection. Accordingly, they have not met their burden to show 

error.
20

DISPOSITION

We affirm the judgment. William Campana shall recover 

his costs on appeal. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

LAVIN, Acting P. J.

ADAMS, J.