- 442 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

302 Nebraska Report

PATTERSON v. METROPOLITAN UTIL. DIST.

Cite as 302 Neb. 442

Beverly Patterson, appella

v. Metropolitan Utilit

District, appelle

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed March 8, 2019. No. S-18-158.

1. Motions to Dismiss: Pleadings: Appeal and Error. A district court’s 

grant of a motion to dismiss on the pleadings is reviewed de novo, 

accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.

2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach 

an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the 

court below.

3. Tort Claims Act: Actions: Time. If a claimant brings his or her claim 

before a claims board under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-8,227(1) (Reissue 

2014) of the State Tort Claims Act and elects to await final disposition 

instead of withdrawing the claim to file suit, a 6-month extension from 

the mailing of a denial applies regardless of whether final disposition 

was made before or after the 2-year limitation for suits.

4. Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act: Actions: Time. There are only 

two exceptions which extend the 2-year limitation for filing suit by 6 

months under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-919(1) (Reissue 2012): (1) where 

the governmental subdivision takes some action on the claim before the 

2 years have expired but at a time when less than 6 months remain for 

filing suit and (2) if the claimant withdraws the claim within the 2-year 

period but at a time when less than 6 months to file suit remain.

Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: J. 

Michael Coffey, Judge. Affirme

Daniel Wasson, of High & Younes, L.L.C., for appellant.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

04/12/2019 09:08 AM CDT
- 443 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

302 Nebraska Report

PATTERSON v. METROPOLITAN UTIL. DIST.

Cite as 302 Neb. 442

Joseph J. Kehm, of Metropolitan Utilities District of Omaha, 

for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stac

Papik, and Freudenberg, 

Funke, 

Beverly Patterson appeals the district court’s order dismissing her claim against Metropolitan Utilities District (MUD) 

with prejudice. Patterson challenges the court’s determination 

that her claim is time barred under the Political Subdivisions 

Tort Claims Act (PSTCA).1 Patterson contends that § 13-919(1) 

provides a 6-month extension to the 2-year limitation for suits 

arising under PSTCA if the claimant brings the claim before a 

political subdivision and its governing body issues a final disposition denying the claim after the 2-year period has lapsed. 

Because Patterson’s argument is contrary to long-settled precedent and is based upon a flawed premise, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On June 30, 2015, Patterson was visiting her sister in 

Omaha, Nebraska. After parking across the street from her sister’s home, Patterson stepped onto the road verge and onto a 

manhole cover. The cover slipped from underneath Patterson’s 

feet, and she fell into the manhole injuring her right ankle and 

knee. Patterson alleges this was caused by the negligence of an 

MUD worker who had previously removed the cover for meterreading purposes and who failed to properly secure the cover 

upon completion of his or her work.

On July 17, 2015, Patterson filed a notice of tort claim 

with MUD. Patterson sent a demand to MUD pursuant to this 

action in June 2016 and a revised demand in April 2017. On 

September 13, MUD denied Patterson’s claim.

Patterson filed a complaint with the district court on 

November 3, 2017. In the complaint, Patterson asserts MUD 

1 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-901 to 13-928 (Reissue 2012 & Cum. Supp. 2018).
- 444 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

302 Nebraska Report

PATTERSON v. METROPOLITAN UTIL. DIST.

Cite as 302 Neb. 442

owed Patterson a nondelegable duty to exercise due care 

in maintaining the manhole covers which MUD’s workers 

access. Patterson contends that the meter reader’s actions 

created an unreasonable risk of harm in failing to secure the 

cover. Specifically, Patterson alleges MUD was negligent in 

the following actions: (1) failure to use due care to inspect, 

discover, and cure the dangerous conditions of a loose manhole cover when MUD had actual or constructive knowledge 

of the cover’s being loose in that MUD’s employee created the 

condition; (2) failure to keep the road verge safe for pedestrians on a public walkway; (3) failure to train and instruct 

employees to regularly monitor and maintain the manhole 

covers they access to perform their duties; and (4) failure to 

warn pedestrians of the dangerous condition, or guard or cordon off the area. Due to this negligence, Patterson alleges she 

sustained injuries.

MUD filed a motion to dismiss Patterson’s complaint for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In 

its motion, MUD contends the complaint was not filed within 

the statute of limitations proscribed by PSTCA. MUD argues 

§ 13-919(1) requires that a suit be filed under PSTCA within 

2 years of the accrual of the claim unless, before the expiration of that 2-year period, the governing body which hears the 

initial claim issues its final disposition or the claimant files a 

written withdrawal of the claim before the governing body. In 

that case, MUD argues, the claimant would have 6 additional 

months in which to file suit. Here, because Patterson did not 

voluntarily withdraw her claim before MUD and because MUD 

did not issue a final disposition until after the running of the 

2-year period, MUD asserts Patterson’s claim is time barred as 

outside the statute of limitations without satisfying the conditions precedent necessary for the 6-month extension.

The district court granted MUD’s motion. The court’s order 

notes that § 13-906 allows a claimant to withdraw his or her 

claim if the governing body has not made a final disposition of 

the claim within 6 months after it is filed and that § 13-919(1) 
- 445 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

302 Nebraska Report

PATTERSON v. METROPOLITAN UTIL. DIST.

Cite as 302 Neb. 442

bars any lawsuit arising out of a tort claim unless it is begun 

within 2 years after such claim accrued. Applying these statutes 

to Patterson’s claim, the court stated its findings that “[t]here 

is no evidence nor is there an allegation that [Patterson] ever 

withdrew her claim in writing which is a condition precedent 

to filing suit. In addition, suit was filed more than two years 

after [Patterson’s] claim accrued and therefore is barred pursuant to . . . § 13-919 (1).” The court dismissed Patterson’s claim 

with prejudice.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Patterson assigns, restated, that the district court erred in 

dismissing Patterson’s claim and determining that Patterson’s 

complaint was time barred under § 13-919(1) and that Patterson 

failed to satisfy a condition precedent to filing suit when she 

did not voluntarily withdraw her claim.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] A district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss on the 

pleadings is reviewed de novo, accepting the allegations in 

the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in 

favor of the nonmoving party.2

[2] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, for 

which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the 

court below.3

ANALYSIS

Patterson’s assignments center on the question of whether 

§ 13-919(1) provides an additional 6-month period in which 

to file suit if the claimant does not withdraw his or her claim 

from the political subdivision’s governing board before the 

expiration of the 2-year limitation on commencement of a suit 

2 Salem Grain Co. v. Consolidated Grain & Barge Co., 297 Neb. 682, 900 

N.W.2d 909 (2017).

3 Id.
- 446 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

302 Nebraska Report

PATTERSON v. METROPOLITAN UTIL. DIST.

Cite as 302 Neb. 442

and the governing board thereafter issues a denial of the claim. 

Long ago, we settled the meaning of § 13-919(1). But before 

turning to that case law, we recall basic claim filing procedures 

and consequences under PSTCA.

Before filing suit under PSTCA, a claimant is required to 

first bring his or her claim before the governing body of the 

political subdivision at issue.4 The claim must be in writing and 

must set forth the time and place of the occurrence giving rise 

to the claim and other known facts pertinent to the claim.5 The 

primary purpose of notice provisions in connection with actions 

against political subdivisions is to afford municipal authorities 

prompt notice of the accident and injury in order that an investigation may be made while the occurrence is still fresh and the 

municipal authorities are in a position to intelligently consider 

the claim and to allow it if deemed just or, in the alternative, to 

adequately protect and defend the public interest.6

After the filing of a claim with the governing body, PSTCA 

prohibits filing suit unless (1) the governing body has finally 

disposed of the claim or (2) the governing body has not taken 

final action within 6 months after the claim was filed and the 

claimant thereafter gives notice to withdraw the claim in order 

to commence suit.7 The statute specifically states that “if the 

governing body does not make final disposition of a claim 

within six months after it is filed, the claimant may, by notice 

in writing, withdraw the claim from consideration of the governing body and begin suit.”8

 PSTCA does not impose a time 

limit on the governing body’s opportunity to take action on a 

claim, other than by allowing a claimant to withdraw the claim 

if not disposed of within 6 months after it was filed. With this 

4 §§ 13-905 and 13-906.

5 See § 13-905.

6 Keller v. Tavarone, 265 Neb. 236, 655 N.W.2d 899 (2003).

7 See § 13-906.

8 Id.
- 447 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

302 Nebraska Report

PATTERSON v. METROPOLITAN UTIL. DIST.

Cite as 302 Neb. 442

claim processing framework in mind, we turn to the specific 

statute at issue.

Section 13-919 outlines the timing requirements for claims 

under PSTCA and states, in relevant part:

(1) Every claim against a political subdivision permitted under [PSTCA] shall be forever barred unless within 

one year after such claim accrued the claim is made 

in writing to the governing body. Except as otherwise 

provided in this section, all suits permitted by the act 

shall be forever barred unless begun within two years 

after such claim accrued. The time to begin a suit shall 

be extended for a period of six months from the date of 

mailing of notice to the claimant by the governing body 

as to the final disposition of the claim or from the date of 

withdrawal of the claim from the governing body under 

section 13-906 if the time to begin suit would otherwise 

expire before the end of such period.

(Emphasis supplied.) Although Patterson focuses on the last 

quoted sentence, the two preceding sentences are critical to 

our analysis.

The first sentence of § 13-919(1) “forever bar[s]” a claim 

unless the written claim has been submitted to the governing 

body within 1 year after the claim accrued. Here, the claim 

accrued on June 30, 2015—the date the accident occurred. 

Patterson filed the claim with MUD on July 17, 2015. The 

claim satisfied the first sentence of § 13-919(1). With the filing 

of Patterson’s claim, the 6-month period before Patterson could 

have withdrawn her claim began to run.9

But the second sentence of § 13-919(1) is even more significant to the situation here. It “forever bar[s]” all suits under 

PSTCA unless a suit is begun within 2 years “after such claim 

accrued.”10 Here, because the claim accrued on June 30, 2015, 

the second sentence of § 13-919(1) required that Patterson file 

9 See § 13-906.

10 § 13-919(1).
- 448 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

302 Nebraska Report

PATTERSON v. METROPOLITAN UTIL. DIST.

Cite as 302 Neb. 442

suit by June 30, 2017. Because Patterson did not file her suit 

until November 3, the second sentence of § 13-919(1) barred 

her action.

Patterson, however, points to the third sentence of § 13-919(1), 

which she claims extended the time for her to commence suit 

until March 13, 2018—6 months after MUD denied her claim 

on September 13, 2017. According to Patterson, a claimant 

would have an additional 6 months after mailing of the final 

disposition even if the disposition occurs after the 2-year date 

barring all suits.

Such an interpretation of § 13-919(1) is at odds with our 

holding in Ragland v. Norris P. P. Dist.11 In that case, we 

considered the parameters of the 6-month extension under 

§ 13-919(1), formerly codified as Neb. Rev. Stat. § 23-2416 

(Reissue 1977).12 Specifically, we explained that there are only 

two exceptions to the 2-year limitation on suits and stated:

One is where the governmental subdivision takes some 

action on the claim before the 2 years has expired but at a 

time when less than 6 months remains for filing suit. The 

second occurs if the claimant withdraws his claim within 

the 2-year period but at a time when less than 6 months 

to file suit remains.13

The claimant in Ragland argued the language of § 13-919(1) 

should be construed so that failure to withdraw a claim and 

failure of the governmental subdivision to deny the claim 

within the 2-year period constitute an action which would trigger the 6-month extension.14 In contrast, we held that the language in § 13-919(1) is clear and that the inaction of the parties 

does not amount to the conditions statutorily required for the 

6-month extension.15 Again, we stated:

11 Ragland v. Norris P. P. Dist., 208 Neb. 492, 304 N.W.2d 55 (1981).

12 Id.

13 Id. at 495, 304 N.W.2d at 57.

14 Id.

15 Id.
- 449 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

302 Nebraska Report

PATTERSON v. METROPOLITAN UTIL. DIST.

Cite as 302 Neb. 442

Where the governmental subdivision does not act on 

a claim within 2 years after the claim accrued and the 

claimant does not withdraw the claim within 2 years after 

the claim accrued, all suits permitted by [PSTCA] are 

barred and the additional 6-month period granted under 

particular circumstances does not apply.16

Explicit in our opinion in Ragland is the requirement that the 

governing body act on the claims before it within the 2-year 

period in order for its action to trigger the 6-month extension.17

Three important principles underlie the Ragland court’s 

reasoning. First, as we have repeatedly proclaimed, statutory 

language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and 

an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain 

the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and 

unambiguous.18 Second, in determining the meaning of statutory language, its ordinary and grammatical construction is to 

be followed, unless an intent appears to the contrary or unless, 

by following such construction, the intended effect of the provisions would apparently be impaired.19 Finally, a court must 

attempt to give effect to all parts of a statute, and if it can be 

avoided, no word, clause, or sentence will be rejected as superfluous or meaningless.20

Patterson’s interpretation violates two of those principles. 

First, the condition specified in the third sentence (“if the time 

to begin suit would otherwise expire before the end of such 

period”) is stated in the future tense.21 But by the date MUD 

denied the claim, the 2-year period to begin suit had already 

expired. Thus, the 2-year period to begin suit did not expire at 

any time during the 6-month period following MUD’s denial. 

16 Id. at 497-98, 304 N.W.2d at 58.

17 Id.

18 Mays v. Midnite Dreams, 300 Neb. 485, 915 N.W.2d 71 (2018).

19 State v. Swindle, 300 Neb. 734, 915 N.W.2d 795 (2018).

20 Wisner v. Vandelay Investments, 300 Neb. 825, 916 N.W.2d 698 (2018).

21 § 13-919(1).
- 450 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

302 Nebraska Report

PATTERSON v. METROPOLITAN UTIL. DIST.

Cite as 302 Neb. 442

Second, and perhaps more important, Patterson’s interpretation fails to give any meaning to the word “otherwise.” Here, 

the time to begin suit had already expired; thus, it would not 

“otherwise” expire after MUD’s denial. Our ordinary rules of 

statutory interpretation dictate that the Ragland court’s interpretation of § 13-919(1) was correct and compelled by the 

statutory language. And Ragland did not prompt any legislative response, which raises the presumption that we correctly 

discerned the Legislature’s intent.22

Instead of following our precedent from Ragland, Patterson 

asks this court to adopt an alternative interpretation in line with 

a similar provision under the State Tort Claims Act (STCA).23

Before addressing the merits of her argument, we explain her 

reasoning.

Patterson focuses on the second sentence of § 81-8,227(1), 

in which STCA uses language essentially identical to the third 

sentence of § 13-919(1) under PSTCA. Section 81-8,227(1) 

states, in relevant part:

Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, 

every tort claim permitted under [STCA] shall be forever 

barred unless within two years after such claim accrued 

the claim is made in writing to the Risk Manager in the 

manner provided by such act. The time to begin suit under 

such act shall be extended for a period of six months from 

the date of mailing of notice to the claimant by the Risk 

Manager or State Claims Board as to the final disposition 

of the claim or from the date of withdrawal of the claim 

under section 81-8,213 if the time to begin suit would 

otherwise expire before the end of such period.

(Emphasis supplied.) She relies upon our interpretation of this 

language in the context of STCA and argues that we should 

import the same interpretation into PSTCA.

22 See Estate of Schluntz v. Lower Republican NRD, 300 Neb. 582, 915 

N.W.2d 427 (2018).

23 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 81-8,209 to 81-8,235 (Reissue 2014). See Komar v. 

State, 299 Neb. 301, 908 N.W.2d 610 (2018).
- 451 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

302 Nebraska Report

PATTERSON v. METROPOLITAN UTIL. DIST.

Cite as 302 Neb. 442

[3] In Collins v. State,

24 we interpreted this language and 

held that if a claimant brings his or her claim before a claims 

board under STCA and elects to await final disposition instead 

of withdrawing the claim to file suit, a 6-month extension 

from the mailing of a denial applies regardless of whether 

final disposition was made before or after the 2-year limitation 

for suits.

While similar, § 81-8,227(1) is distinguishable from 

§ 13-919(1). As we noted in Collins25 and the cases preceding 

it,26 there is a possibility under § 81-8,227(1) that a claimant could bring a claim before the claims board under STCA 

within the 2-year period but with less than 6-months before 

the running of that period. As such, there is a chance that the 

claims board could retain a claim under STCA until after the 2 

years and the claimant would be unable to withdraw the claim 

prior to the end of the 2 years to bring suit.

However, under § 13-919(1), the period to bring a claim 

before the governing board is 1 year and the period to file suit 

is 2 years after accrual of the claim. Unlike § 81-8,227, there 

is no possibility that a claim could be appropriately brought 

within the 1-year period before the governing board, the governing board could wait until after the end of the 2-year period 

to issue its final disposition, and the claimant would be unable 

to withdraw the claim prior to the end of the 2-year period. 

Accordingly, the reasoning of our interpretation of § 81-8,227 

is inapplicable to the timing requirements of § 13-919(1) and 

we decline to modify our holding in Ragland.

27

24 Collins v. State, 264 Neb. 267, 646 N.W.2d 618 (2002), disapproved on 

other grounds, Geddes v. York County, 273 Neb. 271, 729 N.W.2d 661 

(2007).

25 Id.

26 See, Hullinger v. Board of Regents, 249 Neb. 868, 546 N.W.2d 779 (1996), 

overruled, Collins, supra note 24; Coleman v. Chadron State College, 237 

Neb. 491, 466 N.W.2d 526 (1991), overruled, Collins, supra note 24. See, 

also, Komar, supra note 23.

27 Ragland, supra note 11.
- 452 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

302 Nebraska Report

PATTERSON v. METROPOLITAN UTIL. DIST.

Cite as 302 Neb. 442

In essence, Patterson argues that PSTCA and STCA must 

be read in pari materia. But PSTCA was initially created 

by one act28 of the Legislature, and STCA was created by a 

totally separate act.29 Patterson’s argument exceeds the limits 

of the in pari materia canon. Here, this canon must be applied 

only to the statutes within PSTCA. More significantly, her 

argument violates an important rule of construction applicable 

to PSTCA: Statutes that purport to waive the protection of 

sovereign immunity of the State or its subdivisions are strictly 

construed in favor of the sovereign and against the waiver.30

While her argument seems attractive at first blush, because 

a snippet of nearly identical language must be applied one 

way under PSTCA and a different way under STCA, that 

outcome is dictated by the overall language chosen by the 

Legislature in each respective act. If the Legislature believes 

that the time limitations and procedures of PSTCA and STCA 

should be identical, it can establish a uniform procedure. 

It is not this court’s function to do so in the guise of statutory interpretation.

[4] As detailed above, § 13-919(1) requires that a claimant bring a claim before the governing board of a political 

subdivision prior to filing suit and that suits be filed within 

2 years of the date the claim accrued. There are only two 

exceptions which extend the 2-year limitation for filing suit 

by 6 months under § 13-919(1): (1) where the governmental 

subdivision takes some action on the claim before the 2 years 

have expired but at a time when less than 6 months remain 

for filing suit and (2) if the claimant withdraws the claim 

within the 2-year period but at a time when less than 6 months 

to file suit remain.31 Neither ground for exception occurred 

here. The board did not deny Patterson’s claim until after the 

28 1969 Neb. Laws, ch. 138, § 20, p. 634.

29 1969 Neb. Laws, ch. 756, § 1, p. 2845.

30 Geddes, supra note 24.

31 Id.
- 453 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

302 Nebraska Report

PATTERSON v. METROPOLITAN UTIL. DIST.

Cite as 302 Neb. 442

2-year period, and Patterson did not withdraw her claim. Thus, 

the district court did not err in dismissing Patterson’s claim 

against MUD with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we conclude Patterson’s 

petition was filed outside of the timing requirements of 

§ 13-919(1). Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing Patterson’s claim.

Affirmed