alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Alicia Altreche et al., Respondents, v Gilmar Masonry Corp. et al., Appellants.

[853 NYS2d 371]

The defendants met their prima facie burden of establishing that the plaintiff Alicia Altreche (hereinafter the plaintiff) did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident *(see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345, 350-351 [2002]; *Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). In opposition, the plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff sustained a serious injury under the permanent loss and permanent consequential and/or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) to her cervical and/or lumbar spines as a result of the subject accident. The opinion of the plaintiffs treating physician was based both on his contemporaneous and his most recent examinations of the plaintiff, as well as upon his review of, inter alia, the plaintiffs cervical and lumbar magnetic resonance imaging reports, which showed, among other things, disc bulges at C2 through C5 and a disc herniation at L5-S1. He opined that the plaintiffs spinal injuries and range of motion limitations observed were permanent, and were causally related to the subject accident *(see Morales v Theagene,*46 AD3d 775 [2007]; *Nigro v Kovac,*45 AD3d 547, 548 [2007]; *Green v Nara Car & Limo, Inc.,*42 AD3d 430, 431 [2007]). Contrary to the defendants’ contention on appeal, the plaintiffs adequately explained the gap in the plaintiffs treatment *(see Gibson v Tordoya,*44 AD3d 1000, 1001 [2007]; *Black v Robinson,*305 AD2d 438, 439-440 [2003]). Spolzino, J.P., Santucci, Dillon and Balkin, JJ., concur.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

AMY SMETANICK-BROWN,

Appellant,

v.

CYNTHIA BROWN,

Appellee.

No. 4D2022-3300

[December 7, 2023]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Thomas J. Coleman, Judge; L.T. Case No. FMCE20-

010266.

Terrence P. O’Connor of Morgan, Carratt & O’Connor, P.A., Fort 

Lauderdale, for appellant.

Craig J. Trocino, Coral Gables, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

MAY, LEVINE and ARTAU, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
##### 



Exhibit 32.2 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Atlantis Plastics,
Inc (the Company) for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2003 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I,
Paul G. Saari, Senior Vice President, Finance and Chief Financial Officer of
the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to §
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (3)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78m(a) or 78o(d)); and(4)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company. PAUL G. SAARISenior Vice President, Finance and Chief Financial OfficerMarch 26, 2004
 -57-
**THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS**

**Post Office Box 12248**

**Austin, Texas 78711**

**(512) 463-1312**

June 29, 2007

Mr. Percy L. Isgitt

Isgitt & Associates, P.C.

800 Sawyer Street

Houston, TX 77007

Mr. John Porter Mabry

Dunnam & Dunnam

P. O. Box 8418

4125 West Waco Drive

Waco, TX 76714-8418

RE:Case Number:  06-0913

Court of Appeals Number:  10-05-00089-CV

Trial Court Number:  26,300-A

Style:PATRICIA WILZ, GUARDIAN OF JON PATRICK FLOURNOY, AN INCAPACITATED PERSON

v.

KENNETH W. AND JUNE FLOURNOY

Dear Counsel:

Today the Supreme Court of Texas delivered the enclosed per curiam opinion and judgment in the above-referenced cause.  Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals’ judgment and renders judgment.  

Sincerely,

Blake A. Hawthorne, Clerk

by Claudia Jenks, Chief Deputy Clerk

Enclosures

**Case No. 06-0913Page 1**
1 The Honorable Ronald E. Longstaff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 05-3076

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Southern District of Iowa. Alfredo Silva, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: July 24, 2006 Filed: July 27, 2006

___________ Before SMITH, MAGILL, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Alfredo Silva appeals the se ntence the district court 1 imposed upon his guilty plea to reentering the United States illegally after having been deported following a conviction for an aggravated felony, in viol ation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). His counsel has moved to withdr aw and has filed a brief under Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967).-2- Counsel argues the sentence is unreasonable because of several mitigating factors which call for a sentence below th e 41-month prison sentence imposed by the district court. We disagree. First, the di strict court discussed Silva’s criminal history and the need to provide adequate deterrence. Both of these factors are listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) as relevant sentencing considerations, and they support the reasonableness of the distri ct court’s sentence. See United States v. Long Soldier , 431 F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 2005) (re levant inquiry is whether district court considered § 3553(a) factors and whether appellate c ourt’s review of those factors leads to conclusion that they support reasonableness of sentencing decision).
Second, the sentence was within the undis puted advisory Guidelines range, and Silva has not rebutted the presumption of reasonableness. See United States v. Lincoln , 413 F.3d 716, 717-18 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , 126 S. Ct. 840 (2005); United States v. Tobacco , 428 F.3d 1148, 1151 (8th Cir. 2005). Silva argues that he should be granted leniency based on the disadvantages he may su ffer in prison as an illegal alien, and based on sentenci ng disparities for illegal-reentry cases within different judicial districts. He did not raise these ma tters to the district court at sentencing, and in any event, they do not makehis sentence unreasonable. SeeUnited States v. Sebastian , 436 F.3d 913, 915-16 (8th Cir. 2006) (s entencing disparity resulting from fact that “fast-track” progr ams were available for those convicted of immigration offenses in certain judicial districts, but not to defendant, did not render his sentence unreasonable); cf. United States v. Cardosa-Rodriguez , 241 F.3d 613, 613-614 (8th Cir. 2001) (deportable aliens’ ineligibility for Bureau of Prisons benefits does not provide basis for downward departure in illegal-reentry cases).
Having reviewed the reco rd under Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988), we conclude there are no nonfrivolous issues. Acco rdingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment, and we grant counsel leave to withdraw.

______________________________
----

----

| (1)   | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2)   | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                               |   |   |                                                                 |   |
|------------------------------------|--------|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Date:  November 15, 2010 |   |   | /s/ JEFFREY R. SMITH                                                 |   |
|                               |   |   | Jeffrey R. Smith, President                                          |   |
|                               |   |   | (Chief Executive Officer and Principal Financial  Officer) |   |
Exhibit 32.1




CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the quarterly report of Gold Bag, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending November 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on January 19, 2011 (the “Report”), I, Grant R. White, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





-1
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





-2
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





/s/ Grant R. WhiteGrant R. WhiteChief Executive Officer and Chief Financial OfficerJanuary 19, 2011





A signed original of this certification has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION (Doc. No. 26) 

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

CAMDEN VICINAGE

___________________________________ 

 : 

AMERICAN SEATING COMPANY, : 

 : 

 Plaintiff, : 

 : Civil No. 11-53 (RBK/AMD) 

 v. : 

 : ORDER 

ARCHER PLASTICS INC., : 

d/b/a Archer Seating Clearinghouse and : 

Archer Seating, : 

 Defendant. : 

___________________________________ : 

THIS MATTER having come before the Court on the motion of American Seating 

Company (“Plaintiff”) for summary judgment on its claims against Archer Plastics, Inc. 

(“Defendant”), and the Court having considered the moving papers and responses thereto, and 

for the reasons expressed in the accompanying Opinion issued this date; 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability 

is GRANTED. 

Date: 7/18/2012 /s/ Robert B. Kugler 

 ROBERT B. KUGLER 

 United States District Judge 

Case 1:11-cv-00053-RBK-AMD Document 36 Filed 07/18/12 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 323
EXHIBIT
32.1





CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of California Gold Corp. (the “Company”) on
Form 10-Q for the period ended April 30, 2010,as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”), I, James D. Davidson, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted
pursuant to ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)  The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)  The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this certification as of June 14,
2010.





/s/
      James D. DavidsonJames
      D. DavidsonChief
      Executive Officer andChief
      Financial Officer





A signed
original of this written statement, or other document authenticating,
acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form
within the electronic version of this written statement, has been provided to
California Gold Corp., and will be retained by California Gold Corp., and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h Marilyn Kell y Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathawa y Mary Beth Kell y Brian K. Zahra,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk June 28, 2011

y0620 

# Order

June 28, 2011

142587

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 142587 COA: 294402 Kent CC: 09-002813-FH TROY ANTHONY WOODS, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the applicati on for leave to appeal the December 28, 2010 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Case 3:11-cv-00247-MLC-LHG Document 146-1 Filed 06/06/13 Page 1 of 22 PageID: 1882
Case 3:11-cv-00247-MLC-LHG Document 146-1 Filed 06/06/13 Page 2 of 22 PageID: 1883
Case 3:11-cv-00247-MLC-LHG Document 146-1 Filed 06/06/13 Page 3 of 22 PageID: 1884
Case 3:11-cv-00247-MLC-LHG Document 146-1 Filed 06/06/13 Page 4 of 22 PageID: 1885
Case 3:11-cv-00247-MLC-LHG Document 146-1 Filed 06/06/13 Page 5 of 22 PageID: 1886
Case 3:11-cv-00247-MLC-LHG Document 146-1 Filed 06/06/13 Page 6 of 22 PageID: 1887
Case 3:11-cv-00247-MLC-LHG Document 146-1 Filed 06/06/13 Page 7 of 22 PageID: 1888
Case 3:11-cv-00247-MLC-LHG Document 146-1 Filed 06/06/13 Page 8 of 22 PageID: 1889
Case 3:11-cv-00247-MLC-LHG Document 146-1 Filed 06/06/13 Page 9 of 22 PageID: 1890
Case 3:11-cv-00247-MLC-LHG Document 146-1 Filed 06/06/13 Page 10 of 22 PageID: 1891
Case 3:11-cv-00247-MLC-LHG Document 146-1 Filed 06/06/13 Page 11 of 22 PageID: 1892
Case 3:11-cv-00247-MLC-LHG Document 146-1 Filed 06/06/13 Page 12 of 22 PageID: 1893
Case 3:11-cv-00247-MLC-LHG Document 146-1 Filed 06/06/13 Page 13 of 22 PageID: 1894
Case 3:11-cv-00247-MLC-LHG Document 146-1 Filed 06/06/13 Page 14 of 22 PageID: 1895
Case 3:11-cv-00247-MLC-LHG Document 146-1 Filed 06/06/13 Page 15 of 22 PageID: 1896
Case 3:11-cv-00247-MLC-LHG Document 146-1 Filed 06/06/13 Page 16 of 22 PageID: 1897
Case 3:11-cv-00247-MLC-LHG Document 146-1 Filed 06/06/13 Page 17 of 22 PageID: 1898
Case 3:11-cv-00247-MLC-LHG Document 146-1 Filed 06/06/13 Page 18 of 22 PageID: 1899
Case 3:11-cv-00247-MLC-LHG Document 146-1 Filed 06/06/13 Page 19 of 22 PageID: 1900
Case 3:11-cv-00247-MLC-LHG Document 146-1 Filed 06/06/13 Page 20 of 22 PageID: 1901
Case 3:11-cv-00247-MLC-LHG Document 146-1 Filed 06/06/13 Page 21 of 22 PageID: 1902
Case 3:11-cv-00247-MLC-LHG Document 146-1 Filed 06/06/13 Page 22 of 22 PageID: 1903
#### BATEMAN et al. v. STANDARD BRANDS, Inc. (MIDWEST REFRIGERATION, Inc., Third Party Defendant).

No. 4575.

United States District Court, W. D. Missouri, W. D.

Oct. 18, 1949.

See also, D.C., 7 F.R.D. 455.

John W. Hudson, Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff.

Johnson, Davis, Thomson, Van Dyke & Fairchild, Albert Thomson, Kansas City, Mo., for defendant.

Sprinkle & Knowles, Kansas City, Mo., for third party defendant.

REEVES, Chief Judge.

The above motion is filed pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (c) Rule 37, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. It appears that the plaintiffs had made request of the defendant or his counsel to make certain admissions, as provided by Rule 36, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the defendant declined to make such admissions but did not contest the issue. The admission requested was the extent of the loss sustained by plaintiffs in the destruction of its building by fire.

In the trial of the case the plaintiffs experienced no trouble in establishing the extent of their loss. One witness supplied the proof, and, as stated, the defendant did not contest that issue. The issues contested by the defendant were on other grounds and not on the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff. The time and expense of the plaintiff in making the proof was trivial. The last part of the paragraph cited provides that nothing should be allowed if “admissions sought were of no substantial importance.” The court so finds, and accordingly the application for an order to pay expenses will be denied.
#### TUCKER v. A & P FOOD STORES (two cases).

Civ. Nos. 26447, 26448.

United States District Court N. D. Ohio, E. D.

Oct. 25, 1949.

*608J. Frank Azzarello, A. Alan Meltzer, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff.

Kent H. Meyers, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendant.

JONES, Chief Judge.

These are actions based on defendant’s negligence in selling meat which was contaminated with trichinae parasites. In one action plaintiff is the wife who became infected with trichinosis and who sues for injuries caused thereby, and in the other action the plaintiff is the husband who sues for damages for the loss of his wife’s services. Both complaints are essentially the same.

Defendant has filed motions to strike paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of page 2 of both complaints on the grounds that the paragraphs are redundant, immaterial, impertinent and scandalous. Since the pleadings and the motions are the same, they will be treated herein as one.

A motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(f), 28 U.S.C.A. will not ordinarily be granted unless the allegations of the complaint have no possible relationship to the controversy or are clearly prejudicial. Any doubts are to be resolved in favor of the pleading. Friend v. French Paper Co., D.C., 1 F.R.D. 531; Moore v. C. A. Olsen Manufacturing Co., D.C., 7 F.R.D. 269; Steckel v. Beeghly, D. C., 8 F.R.D. 116.

In a negligence action plaintiff is required to show that he has a legal right which has been violated by defendant’s negligence and which violation has caused plaintiff’s injury. Paragraph 3, 4 and 5 on page 2 of the complaint are allegations relating to causation and negligence. They are, therefore, relevant to the issues and are properly pleaded. They seem not unduly redundant. Paragraph 6 is an allegation of due care on plaintiff’s part. While it is not necessary to plead due care, it would not seem that such an allegation is prejudicial to defendant in any way. There is no paragraph 7 on page 2 so it is impossible to consider defendant’s objection to it.

Paragraph 1 of page 2 would seem to be unnecessary. There is one essential fact alleged in it, but that fact is alleged elsewhere also. The remainder of the allegations would not constitute admissible evidence at trial, and therefore have no place in the complaint. This paragraph will be stricken from the pleadings.

The motions will be overruled as to paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 and sustained as to paragraph 1.
EX-10.23



 Exhibit 10.23 

Amendment to 
 Stock Option Agreements 
 under the 

SunCoke Energy, Inc. 
 Long-Term Performance Enhancement Plan 
 This Amendment to the Stock Option
Agreements under the Long-Term Performance Enhancement Plan (the “Plan”) is applicable to all Stock Option Awards made under the Plan that are outstanding as of July 18, 2012. 

Section 1.5 of each Agreement is hereby amended in its entirety to read as follows: 

 

	 	“1.5.	Termination of Employment. 

  

	 	(a)	Termination of Employment—In General. Upon termination of the Participant’s employment with SunCoke and its Affiliates for any reason other than
(i) a termination of employment due to Retirement; (ii) a Qualifying Termination or termination of employment due to death or permanent disability; or (iii) a termination of employment for Just Cause, the unvested portion of the Stock
Option shall terminate immediately and the vested portion of the Stock Option shall remain exercisable in accordance with Section 1.3 of this Agreement. 


 

	 	(b)	Termination of Employment Due to Retirement. Upon termination of the Participant’s employment with SunCoke and its Affiliates due to Retirement
(as defined in Section 1.3 of this Agreement), (i) if the Retirement occurs prior to December 31 of the calendar year in which the Stock Option was granted, the then unvested Stock Option shall terminate immediately; and (ii) if
the Retirement occurs on or after December 31 of the calendar year in which the Stock Option was granted, the unvested portion of the Stock Option shall continue to vest in accordance with the vesting schedule set forth in Section 1.1(e)
of this Agreement; provided that if the Participant subsequently dies prior to the end of the vesting period, the unvested portion of the Stock Option shall immediately vest and become exercisable, and in either case the vested portion of the Stock
Option, including the portion that vests pursuant to this Section 1.5, shall remain exercisable as described in Section 1.3 of this Agreement. 

  

	 	(c)	Qualifying Termination of Employment or Termination of Employment Due to Death or Permanent Disability. In the event of the Participant’s Qualifying
Termination or termination of employment due to death or permanent disability, the unvested portion of the Stock Option shall immediately vest and become exercisable and the vested portion of the Stock Option, including the portion that vests
pursuant to this Section 1.5, shall remain exercisable for the period set forth in Section 1.3 of this Agreement. 









	 	(d)	Termination of Employment for Just Cause. Upon termination of the Participant’s employment with SunCoke and its Affiliates for Just Cause, the vested
and unvested portion of the Stock Option shall be canceled immediately. 

 All other provisions of the Stock
Option Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Amendment is
executed by the Company this 18TH day of July, 2012,
effective as of July 18, 2012. 
  

			
	SUNCOKE ENERGY, INC.
		
	By:	 	/s/ Gary P. Yeaw
	Its:	 	Vice President, Human Resources
#### COWAN et al. v. TIPTON et al.

Civ. A. No. 104.

District Court, E. D. Tennessee, S. D.

March 21, 1941.

R.' R. Kramer and Charles E. McNabb, both of Knoxville, Tenn., for plaintiffs.

Joel H. Anderson, of Knoxville, Tenn., for defendants.

DARR, District Judge.

The questions for determination are presented by separate motions of several of the parties in interest seeking to have stricken and dismissed an answer and cross-complaint filed by Mary Lee Moore. The motions are all of substantially the same tenor and will be all disposed of by this decision.

From the record it appears that Mary Lee Moore is not one of the original parties and that she seeks to become an intervening party by simply filing an answer and a cross-complaint.

N'o order of the court has been had or sought to make her an intervening party.

Under Rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, there are very plain provisions as to the conditions under which a person may become an intervening party and very plain provisions as to the procedure necessary to obtain the permission to become such party.

In all cases there must be a motion to intervene and notice for a hearing on the motion given to all parties affected. The motion shall state the grounds upon which the intervention is claimed and must be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which the intervention is sought. The court must act on such motion and an order go down reciting the court’s action. In re Finger Lakes Land Co., Inc., D.C., 29 F.Supp. 50. Moore’s Federal Practice Under the New Rules, Vol. 2, pp. 2367-2369, Ibid. Pocket Supplement, Vol. 2, 43.

It is plain that a person cannot become an intervening party on his own motion. This is true whether his right to become such party is conditional or unconditional. It is for the court to determine this question after reviewing the facts as reflected in the motion and in the pleadings accompanying the motion.

Mary Lee Moore has not complied with the Rule in any respect and her answer and cross-complaint has no place in the record.

All the motions made in this respect are sustained and the answer and cross-complaint of Mary Lee Moore are stricken.