State of New York

Supreme Court, Appellate Division

Third Judicial Department

Decided and Entered: July 23, 2015 520286 

________________________________

In the Matter of ALLY

FINANCIAL INC.,

Appellant,

v MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

OAKES TOWING SERVICE, INC.,

Respondent,

et al.,

Respondent.

________________________________

Calendar Date: June 3, 2015

Before: Peters, P.J., McCarthy, Egan Jr. and Rose, JJ.

__________

Rudolph J. Meola, Albany, for appellant.

Meggesto, Crossett & Valerino, Syracuse (James A. Meggesto

of counsel), for Oakes Towing Service, Inc., respondent.

__________

Egan Jr., J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McNamara, J.),

entered September 8, 2014 in Albany County, which dismissed

petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to Lien Law

§ 201-a, to declare a garagekeeper's lien null and void.

On August 13, 2013, respondent Oakes Towing Service, Inc.

(hereinafter respondent)1 towed a vehicle – in which petitioner

1 Petitioner also commenced this special proceeding against

respondent Department of Motor Vehicles, which has submitted a

letter to this Court advising that it is neither filing a brief
-2- 520286 

had a perfected lien – at the request of a local police

department in Onondaga County. Shortly thereafter, respondent

mailed a notice to petitioner via certified mail advising, among

other things, that the subject vehicle had been towed and that

respondent would be charging certain fees for its storage. The

Onondaga County District Attorney's office, which had placed a

hold on the vehicle, authorized the release of the vehicle on

December 8, 2013.2

Thereafter, by order to show cause dated January 31, 2014,

petitioner commenced this special proceeding seeking to declare

respondent's lien null and void. Upon the posting of a $20,000

bond, respondent released the vehicle to petitioner on February

7, 2014. Supreme Court subsequently upheld the validity of

respondent's lien, prompting this appeal by petitioner.

Lien Law § 184 (5) sets forth the requirements that must be

met in order for an entity that has towed and stored a motor

vehicle at the direction of a law enforcement agency to assert a

lien for such storage. Specifically, the statute provides that

the entity seeking to assert the lien must "mail by certified

mail, return receipt requested, a notice . . . to every person

who has perfected a security interest in such motor vehicle or

who is listed as a lienholder upon the certificate of title . . .

within [20] days of the first day of storage. Such notice shall

include the name of the [entity] providing storage of the motor

vehicle, the amount being claimed for such storage, and [the]

address and times at which the motor vehicle may be recovered. 

The notice shall also state that the [entity] providing such

notice claims a lien on the motor vehicle and that such motor

vehicle shall be released upon full payment of all storage

charges accrued on the date the motor vehicle is released" (Lien

nor taking a position on this appeal.

2 Although the vehicle's owner sought release of the

vehicle in September 2013, petitioner did not seek release of the

vehicle until some point after November 12, 2013, at which time

it sent a letter to respondent advising of its intention to do

so.
-3- 520286 

Law § 184 [5]). As the garagekeeper's lien for storage charges

is purely statutory, it must be strictly construed (see Grant St.

Constr., Inc. v Cortland Paving Co., Inc., 55 AD3d 1106, 1107

[2008]; Philips v Catania, 155 AD2d 866, 866 [1989]). A person

who is entitled to notice of such lien may commence a special

proceeding to determine the validity thereof (see Lien Law § 201-

a).

Initially, we reject petitioner's assertion that the

subject lien was premature. The crux of petitioner's argument on

this point is that, because the local District Attorney's office

had placed a hold on the vehicle, petitioner could not have

recovered the vehicle at the point in time that the underlying

notice of lien was tendered. As the hold on the vehicle was not

lifted until December 2013, the argument continues, the notice of

lien mailed by respondent in August 2013 necessarily was

premature. Petitioner's argument, however, is belied by the

terms of Lien Law § 184 (5), which requires that the party

asserting the lien give notice thereof within 20 days of the

first day of storage – here, August 13, 2013. Simply put,

nothing in the statute conditions the required notice upon the

lienholder's present ability to recover the vehicle.

Turning to the merits, upon reviewing the notice of lien

itself, as well as the affidavit of respondent's secretary and

treasurer attesting to the time and manner in which such notice

was mailed to petitioner, we are satisfied that the requirements

of Lien Law § 184 (5) have been met. Although the notice of lien

arguably could have been drafted with greater clarity, the

essential statutory requirements – including, but not limited to,

the amount being claimed for storage of the vehicle and

respondent's contact information – are apparent on the face

thereof. As Supreme Court correctly observed, "[t]he notice

[was] clear as to when, where and how the vehicle could be

recovered." Petitioner's remaining contentions, including its

argument regarding the applicability of Lien Law § 203, have been

examined and found to be lacking in merit.

Peters, P.J., McCarthy and Rose, JJ., concur.
-4- 520286 

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger

Clerk of the Court