United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-40601

US Inventor Incorporated; Tinnus Enterprises, L.L.C.; 

360 Heros, Incorporated; Ramzi Maalouf; Larry Golden; 

World Source Enterprises, L.L.C.; E-Watch, 

Incorporated, 

Plaintiffs—Appellants,

versus

Katherine K. Vidal, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual 

Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office,

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 2:21-CV-47

Before King, Elrod, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 30, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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2

Plaintiff-Appellants appeal the district court’s judgment dismissing 

their suit for lack of standing. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

In 2011, Congress passed the America Invents Act (“AIA”). The AIA 

established an executive adjudicatory body called the Patent Trial and Appeal 

Board (“PTAB”) within the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”). 

35 U.S.C. § 6(a). The AIA creates a variety of avenues for patent challengers 

to contest the validity of a patent before the PTAB. Notable for this case are 

two such avenues: inter partes review (“IPR”) and post-grant review 

(“PGR”). See id. § 6(c). 

IPRs and PGRs both have two phases: an institution phase and a trial 

phase. The institution phase’s purpose is for the PTAB to determine whether 

it should institute a trial on the merits. During an IPR, the patent challenger 

must demonstrate “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner 

would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the 

petition.” Id. § 314(a). During a PGR, the patent challenger must 

demonstrate “that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims 

challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Id. § 324(a). If such showings are 

not met, the PTAB must deny institution and the proceeding ends there. Id.

§§ 314(a), 324(a). 

Even if the patent challenger does make the statutory showing, the 

PTAB may still choose not to institute a trial. This is so because, under 

Sections 314(a) and 324(a), “the agency’s decision to deny a petition is a 

matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.” Cuozzo Speed Techs., 

LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. 261, 273 (2016) (regarding IPRs); Credit Acceptance 

Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (regarding 

PGRs). That said, the PTAB’s discretion is cabined by Congress, which 

requires that “[t]he [PTO] Director shall prescribe regulations . . . setting 

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forth the standards for the showing of sufficient grounds to institute” or deny 

either an IPR or PGR trial. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(2), 326(a)(2). 

Since the AIA was passed, PTAB panels have examined when 

“discretionary denials” are appropriate and have adopted a nonexclusive list 

of factors for consideration. See Gen. Plastic Indus. Co. v. Canon Kabushiki 

Kaisha, No. IPR2016-01357, 2017 WL 3917706 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 6, 2017); 

NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc., No. IPR2018-00752, 2018 WL 

4373643 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 12, 2018); Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL 

Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, No. IPR2019-01469, 2020 WL 740292

(P.T.A.B. Feb. 13, 2020); Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., No. IPR2020-00019, 2020 

WL 2126495 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2020). The director of the PTO (the 

“Director”) has designated these decisions “precedential” in the PTAB’s 

Standard Operating Procedure, meaning that these decisions are “binding 

Board authority in subsequent matters involving similar facts and issues.” 

PTAB, Standard Operating Procedure 2 (Revision 10), at 11

(2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/SOP2%20R

10%20FINAL.pdf.

This brings us to the instant case. Plaintiff-Appellants comprise 

several individual patent holders and US Inventor Incorporated (“US 

Inventor”), an organization representing patent holder interests. As 

beneficiaries of discretionary denials (because such denials avoid potentially 

costly IPRs or PGRs), Plaintiff-Appellants desire additional “offramps” to 

avoid PTAB trials. Consequently, they brought a two-count suit seeking a 

preliminary and permanent injunction against the Director. First, they 

argued that Sections 316(a) and 326(a) mandate that the Director engage in 

notice-and-comment rulemaking and, thus, that the Director must go 

through the Administrative Procedure Act’s (“APA’s”) notice-andcomment process to issue standards for when discretionary denial is 

appropriate. Therefore, they requested that the district court compel the 

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Director to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking when issuing 

discretionary denials. Second, they asserted that the issuance of the Standard 

Operating Procedure reflected that the Director engaged in rulemaking 

without notice and comment, and thus the Standard Operating Procedure 

must be set aside as unlawful. The Plaintiff-Appellants further sought a 

preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining the Director from granting

institution in any AIA patent trial pending completion of the compelled 

rulemaking. 

The Director moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the 

plaintiffs lacked individual or organizational standing. The district court 

agreed and dismissed the complaint. The court explained that the individual 

plaintiffs could not show a legally cognizable injury because their alleged 

injury—the potential increased risk to their patents if they do not receive a 

discretionary denial during the institution stage—was not sufficiently 

concrete. Additionally, the court found no organizational standing under 

either of US Inventor’s proffered theories because it (1) could not show that 

the purported actions (or inactions) of the Director caused the organization 

to expend resources beyond its normal expenditures and (2) did not suffer an 

informational injury because it was not denied any particular information to 

which it was entitled. 

Plaintiff-Appellants timely appealed the decision to both this circuit 

and the Federal Circuit. The appeal in the Federal Circuit is being held in 

abeyance pending this court’s decision.

II.

Before proceeding to the standing analysis, we first note that there are 

two independently necessary requirements of subject matter jurisdiction. 

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and we “possess only that 

power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life 

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Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). In other words, constitutional and

statutory authorizations are both necessary requirements for us to have

subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 

Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998); Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal 

Jurisdiction 300 (8th ed. 2020).

This appeal implicates both such requirements. In disputing the 

district court’s dismissal for lack of Article III standing, parties disagree on 

whether we have the constitutional authority to decide this instant dispute as 

part of our jurisdiction over “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const.

art. III, § 2, cl. 1. And separately, parties dispute whether we have the 

statutory authority to hear this case without transferring it to the Federal 

Circuit, which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over appeals “arising 

under . . . any Act of Congress relating to patents.” 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

To exercise jurisdiction over this case, we would need to be satisfied 

that both the constitutional and statutory requirements of subject matter 

jurisdiction are met. For the reasons below, we agree with the district court 

that Plaintiff-Appellants are without Article III standing. We thus hold that 

the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to an absence of 

constitutional authorization. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 

U.S. 534, 541 (1986)(citing United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 440 (1936))

(requiring us to confirm the district court’s jurisdiction). Because such an 

absence precludes jurisdiction, even in the face of clear statutory authority, 

we do not reach the question of whether we are statutorily allowed to hear 

(or transfer) this case.

A.

Plaintiff-Appellants assert a variety of standing theories. First, they 

argue that certain plaintiffs have individual standing. This court “review[s] a 

dismissal for lack of Article III standing de novo.” Abraugh v. Altimus, 26 

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F.4th 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2022). To have Article III standing, a plaintiff must 

demonstrate that he or she “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly 

traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to 

be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 

1916, 1929 (2018) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016)).

To show an injury in fact, a plaintiff must also establish that the injury 

is “(a) concrete and particularized” and “(b) actual or imminent, not 

conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 

(1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Although a concrete 

injury may be imminent when derived from the failure of an agency to engage 

in notice-and-comment rulemaking, see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 

521–22 (2007), mere probability of a disfavored outcome does not suffice to 

create a legally cognizable injury, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 937 F.3d 

533, 538–39 (5th Cir. 2019). Instead, the injury itself must be certainly 

impending, not speculative. See Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 747–48 

(5th Cir. 2015) (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 

(2013)). 

Here, Plaintiff-Appellants allege a risk of future harm, which can be a 

legally cognizable injury if “sufficiently imminent and substantial.” 

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2210 (2021). Specifically, 

Plaintiff-Appellants are concerned with the increased risk1 of patent 

invalidation arising out of the absence of their notice and opportunity to 

comment on the Director’s relevant (i.e., related to discretionary denials) 

modifications to the Standard Operating Procedure. A patentee’s property 

rights in his or her patents are legally protected interests, and invalidation 

1 The theory Plaintiff-Appellants posit is that the risk of a patent being invalidated 

is higher in an (1) IPR or PGR versus (2) a district court proceeding. 

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would upset these interests. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo 

Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002) (stating patents are property rights).

But it is not clear that invalidation is imminent here for PlaintiffAppellants. Instead, such a purported injury is too speculative to create 

standing. For the original procedural deficiency (Plaintiff-Appellants’ lack of 

notice and opportunity to comment) to result in the stated harm (an 

increased risk of invalidation compared to a district court challenge), the 

following series of events must occur: (1) a third party must challenge one of

Plaintiff-Appellants’ patents; (2) after a challenge occurs, the challenger 

must prove that he or she is likely to succeed at blocking issuance of or 

invalidating a patent;

2

(3) the PTAB must decide whether to apply the 

current discretionary denial factors to that patent;

3

(4) the PTAB must not 

exercise its discretionary denial; and (5) the resulting IPR or PGR proceeding 

must create a significantly higher likelihood4(i.e., increased risk of harm) of 

invalidation as compared to a district court proceeding.

2 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a) (regarding IPRs), 324(a) (regarding PGRs).

3 See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. 261, 273 (2016) (regarding IPRs); 

Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (regarding 

PGRs).

4 Plaintiff-Appellants make much of the higher invalidity rate in IPR and PGR 

proceedings (84%) as opposed to that in Article III proceedings (29%). Our summary of the 

steps leading up to an IPR or PGR underscores our hesitancy in relying too closely on these 

invalidity rate statistics to support a finding of increased risk of harm. For a challenger to 

even make it to an IPR or PGR, he or she must show a likelihood of success before the 

PTAB, which must then decide not to exercise a discretionary denial. Bringing a successful 

challenge in the district court is different. A challenger in district court does not need to 

initially show a likelihood of success, and the success of such a challenge also does not 

depend on the PTAB’s discretionary denials. We note such differences only to say that 

simply comparing patent challenges in an IPR/PGR to challenges in a district court is likely 

an apples-to-oranges comparison that fails to meet the rigor we expect in a standing 

analysis.

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Non-occurrence of a single event in this series breaks the chain of 

causation between the alleged procedural failing and resulting harm. And 

none of these events is guaranteed to occur, as each event is an outcome 

dependent on the specific choices made by independent parties (e.g., a 

challenger seeking IPR choosing how to present evidence when arguing for a 

likelihood of success). Plaintiff-Appellants have some direct knowledge of 

and control over their own choices in this series of events, but they must 

necessarily speculate and make assumptions about how other independent 

parties (e.g., challengers, the PTAB) will act. 

The Supreme Court rejected standing premised on such a 

“speculative chain of possibilities” in Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414. In that case, 

the plaintiffs challenged a new Government surveillance program and alleged 

injury from the Government’s interception of plaintiffs’ communications 

with foreign contacts. See id. at 404–07. The Court held that plaintiffs lacked 

standing because connecting the injury (the interception of communications) 

with the proffered cause (the new program) involved speculating how the 

Government and Article III judges would act in a “chain of possibilities,” 

namely the complex series of events needed for the Government to actually 

surveil plaintiffs.

5 See id. at 410. Such speculation meant that the resulting 

5 Specifically, the Court outlined as insufficiently imminent the speculative fear 

that: 

(1) the Government will decide to target the communications of non-U.S. 

persons with whom they communicate; (2) in doing so, the Government 

will choose to invoke its authority under § 1881a rather than utilizing 

another method of surveillance; (3) the Article III judges who serve on the 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court will conclude that the 

Government’s proposed surveillance procedures satisfy § 1881a’s many 

safeguards and are consistent with the Fourth Amendment; (4) the 

Government will succeed in intercepting the communications of 

respondents’ contacts; and (5) respondents will be parties to the particular 

communications that the Government intercepts.

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injury to plaintiffs was not “certainly impending” to constitute an injury in 

fact despite an “objectively reasonable likelihood” of plaintiffs’ 

communications being intercepted. See id.

This case presents a similar chain of events requiring us to 

speculate—at minimum—whether a (1) third-party challenge will occur; (2) 

how the PTAB would rule on the challenged portions of the relevant patents; 

(3) how the PTAB would consider its discretionary denial factors in (4) not

exercising discretionary denial; and (5) how a district court would otherwise 

rule on the patent claims at issue. Thus, to clearly connect PlaintiffAppellants’ procedural harm to their injury, we must engage in conjecture 

about how independent third parties, i.e., the PTAB and a district court, 

would act. Clapper rejected such conjectures as speculation insufficient to 

support a redressable injury. See id. We follow the Court and hold that 

Plaintiff-Appellants’ similarly speculative theory of injury precludes their 

ability to establish individual standing.

6

Plaintiff-Appellants’ arguments to the contrary are unavailing. They 

contend their injury is like those in Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 503

(1st Cir. 1989); TransUnion, 141 S. Ct.at 2210; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 

at 522–26; and City of Dania Beach v. FAA, 485 F.3d 1181, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 

2007). But in all those cases, and unlike that of Plaintiff-Appellants’, the 

injuries were actual and imminent; they did not require speculation. See 

Sierra Club, 872 F.2d at 498–99 (planned construction of a marine dry cargo 

terminal would clear 124 acres of wildland); TransUnion, 141 S. Ct at 2209 

Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410. 

6 This lack of individual standing also defeats any claim to associational standing.

See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) (holding that an 

association’s members must “otherwise have standing to sue in their own right” to have 

associational standing).

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(misleading OFAC alerts actually placed into plaintiffs’ credit reports sent to 

third parties); Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521–22 (coastlines were already 

receding and would recede further); Dania Beach, 485 F.3d at 1185–86 (new 

regulations would route more jets into neighborhood and thusincrease noise, 

soot, and exhaust fumes).7 Given the specific, uncertain series of events 

required under Plaintiff-Appellants’ theory of harm, we find their injury 

more closely analogous to the impermissibly speculative theory of injury 

rejected in Clapper.

Plaintiff-Appellants also argue that the district court should have 

assumed a plaintiff victory on the merits when considering standing. This 

would require us to assume that the Director acted unlawfully in evading 

notice-and-comment rulemaking on discretionary denial off-ramps and that 

lawful rulemaking would provide better off-ramps for patentees to avoid IPR 

and PGR. But even if we assume this to be true, we must still make a series 

of improperly speculative assumptions. Assuming different standards for 

discretionary denials does not affect how third parties and district courts 

would act on certain patents (e.g., by challenging or invalidating them); 

furthermore, the role of the PTAB elsewhere in the chain of events, e.g., in 

considering challenged portions of the patents, would remain unaffected.

Thus, assuming Plaintiff-Appellants’ win on the merits and positing unlawful 

rulemaking cannot overcome the lack of imminency defeating PlaintiffAppellants’ individual standing claims.

8

7 Moreover, to the extent the Plaintiff-Appellants cite similarities to Lujan and 

Summers v. Earth Island Institute, they ignore that in both of those cases, the plaintiffs lacked 

standing because their injuries were too speculative. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578; Summers v. 

Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496–97 (2009).

8 Plaintiff-Appellants make two other arguments that we address briefly here. First, 

a district court case Plaintiff-Appellants cite, Apple Inc. v. Iancu, No. 20-CV-06128, 2021 

WL 5232241 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2021), is not binding on us, and, in any event, is 

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B.

Next, Plaintiff-Appellants argue that US Inventor has organizational 

standing. An organization seeking standing must meet the same standing 

requirements governing individual standing, NAACP v. City of Kyle, 626 F.3d 

233, 237 (5th Cir. 2010), and we again review this issue de novo. Abraugh, 26 

F.4th at 302. Plaintiff-Appellants present two theories of injury, and we 

address each in turn.

Plaintiff-Appellants first assert that they have organizational standing 

under a theory of resource diversion. Under this theory, an organization has 

a cognizable injury if it exerts resources to counteract effects of an unlawful 

action by the Government. See OCA-Greater Hous. v. Texas, 867 F.3d 604, 

610–12 (5th Cir. 2017). Although the injury need only be an “identifiable 

trifle,” Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Fowler, 178 F.3d 350, 358 (5th 

Cir. 1999) (citation omitted), it must nevertheless perceptibly impair the 

organization’s ability to provide its activities, City of Kyle, 626 F.3d at 238. 

Uninterrupted operations or a “redirect[ion]” of resources towards litigation 

and legal counseling are insufficient. La. ACORN Fair Hous. v. LeBlanc, 211 

F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 

Two cases primarily guide our analysis here. In OCA-Greater Houston, 

the plaintiff non-profit successfully demonstrated a redressable injury in its 

challenge to a Texas voting law imposing a restriction on interpretation 

distinguishable as involving the standing of materially different parties (namely, patent 

challengers) who already had specific suits dismissed due to certain discretionary denial 

factors allegedly applied unlawfully. Id. at *4. Second, Plaintiff-Appellants’ argument that 

an individual plaintiff, Ramzi Maalouf, has standing under a slightly different theory is also 

unavailing. The requested relief here, prospective invalidation of the factors and a 

requirement to engage in rulemaking, would not redress his injury for future patents. See 

City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–06 (1983) (plaintiff has no standing to challenge 

future injuries absent immediate, specific threat of future injury).

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assistance for English-limited voters. OCA-Greater Hous., 867 F.3d at 606–

07. The court held that OCA-Greater Houston was injured by having to 

exhaust “additional time and effort . . . explaining the Texas provisions at 

issue to limited English proficient voters [because] addressing the challenged 

provisions frustrate[d] and complicate[d] its routine community outreach 

activities.” OCA-Greater Hous., 867 F.3d at 610 (emphasis added). By 

contrast, routine lobbying behavior did not suffice to create standing in City 

of Kyle, 626 F.3d at 238–39. In City of Kyle, the plaintiffs could not show an 

injury when its prelitigation actions involved only lobbying against a set of 

challenged ordinances and engaging in a “$15,000 study on the impact of the 

revised ordinances” because these were part of the routine operations of the 

lobbying organization. See id. at 238. Reading these cases together, we must 

thus consider whether US Inventor’s proffered expenditures are more 

similar to the additional expenditures at issue in OCA-Greater Houston or the 

ordinary, routine expenditures in City of Kyle.

We begin with a summary of US Inventor’s activities and its 

purported expenditures. US Inventor engages in lobbying, and states that 

“part of its educational mission [is to] . . . provide[] information to its 

membership to help them deal with potential AIA trial reviews,” which it 

does by “educat[ing] the public by providing information about the factors 

that will lead to a grant, versus a denial, of institution of AIA trials, 

particularly on discretionary factors.” Plaintiff-Appellants suggest that US 

Inventor suffered injury by expending resources to respond to the Director’s 

issuance of the Standard Operating Procedure without notice and comment. 

They argue that US Inventor “needed to consume time and resources that 

would not otherwise be spent had there been lawful promulgation of notice 

and comment regulations” because it took additional time to educate its 

membership about AIA trial reviews and made US Inventor give advice 

against the patenting of certain inventions. 

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Against this general backdrop, Plaintiff-Appellants point to three 

particular endeavors as their expending additional resources in response to 

the Director’s flawed issuance of the Standard Operating Procedure. First, 

US Inventor “dedicated website resources and personnel time to creating a 

portal for inventors to deliver their opinions to the Director on their yearning 

for certainty in institution phase discretionary decisions, and for notice-andcomment rules.” This portal includes a pre-written series of requests that a 

user is to copy and paste on the Federal Register website to consider in the 

PTO’s Request for Comments on Discretion to Institute Trials before the 

Patent Trial and Appeal Board. Submit Comments to the USPTO, US 

Inventor, https://usinventor.org/ptabcomments (last visited Sept. 12, 

2022). Second, a US Inventor fellow issued commentary about the current 

discretionary rules. And third, US Inventor petitioned for notice-andcomment rulemaking. 

These endeavors by Plaintiff-Appellants reflect US Inventor’s routine 

operations as a lobbying and educational group. Their endeavors are 

dissimilar from the organizational resources expended in OCA-Greater 

Houston and more akin to the expenditures in City of Kyle. In OCA-Greater 

Houston, the plaintiff’s expended efforts constituted more than “routine” 

community outreach activities. OCA-Greater Hous., 867 F.3d at 610. But 

here, all of Plaintiff-Appellants’ endeavors reflect US Inventor’s routine 

operations as a lobbying and educational group. Its web portal is an 

educational and lobbying tool encouraging the PTO to adopt rules in its favor, 

as is its petition for rulemaking. Similarly, while it is true that US Inventor’s 

publications offered potentially different information from what they would 

contain had there been notice-and-comment rulemaking, this does not reflect 

a change in its routine practice of educating its members “by providing 

information about the factors that will lead to a grant, versus a denial, of 

institution of AIA trials.” Thus, like the plaintiffs in City of Kyle, PlaintiffCase: 21-40601 Document: 00516492204 Page: 13 Date Filed: 09/30/2022
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Appellants have not shown how their specified activities actually differ from 

US Inventor’s routine operations or how the Director’s alleged failure to 

promulgate rulemaking has caused US Inventor to depart from its ordinary 

activities. See City of Kyle, 626 F.3d at 238 (“Plaintiffs have not explained 

how the activities described above, which basically boil down to examining 

and communicating about developments in local zoning and subdivision 

ordinances, differ from the HBA’s routine lobbying activities.”).9 Therefore, 

US Inventor has not suffered an injury-in-fact under a resource diversion 

theory because it has not expended resources outside of its ordinary course 

of operations.

Plaintiff-Appellants next claim they have organizational standing 

based on an informational injury. An informational injury occurs if a plaintiff 

9 This is also what renders US Inventor’s situation distinct from the Avian Welfare 

Coalition’s (the “AWC”) in American Anti-Vivisection Society v. United States Department 

of Agriculture, 946 F.3d 615 (D.C. Cir. 2020). That case involved a 2002 amendment to the 

Animal Welfare Act that required the USDA to pass general standards regarding the 

“humane handling, care, treatment, and transportation of animals.” Id. at 617 (quoting 7 

U.S.C. § 2143(a)(1)). The USDA never did, and so the Avian Welfare Coalition, whose 

“mission is to protect and raise awareness about the plight of captive birds,” brought suit 

against the USDA seeking to compel rulemaking. Id. at 618-19. The AWC explained that, 

ordinarily, it would rely on the USDA’s publication of information to educate the public on 

humane treatment, but due to the USDA’s failure, the AWC was forced to develop howto guides, webinars, and informational pamphlets that “were not part of” its “normal 

annual expenditures,” which the court held was sufficient to establish an injury. Id. at 619. 

While AWC’s predicament is similar to US Inventor’s plight—both were engaged 

in the publication of information that would not have occurred had the relevant agency 

engaged in notice-and-comment rulemaking—US Inventor has not actually engaged in a 

practice outside of its ordinary scope. It educates the public “by providing information 

about the factors” considered by the PTAB, whether the Director adopts those factors with 

public comment or through ad hoc decisions. The AWC, having no guidance, instead had 

to research and create its own standards of care when it would ordinarily engage in what 

US Inventor is currently doing—that is, educating and commenting on the standards that 

have been passed. These two cases are thus distinguishable.

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fails to obtain information that must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a 

statute. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 704 F.3d 413, 

429–30 (5th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff-Appellants argue that notice-and-comment 

rulemaking is statutorily compelled information that US Inventor was 

denied. 

Courts that have faced this issue have agreed that a failure to issue 

notice-and-comment rulemaking does not create a right to information for 

the purpose of standing.10 Bensman v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F.3d 945, 958–

60 (7th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing laws that create a notice-and-comment 

rulemaking requirement from laws that create a specific right to 

information); Wilderness Soc’y, Inc. v. Rey, 622 F.3d 1251, 1259 (9th Cir. 

2010) (agreeing with the Seventh Circuit and explaining that a notice-andcomment mandate’s purpose is not to disclose information). We agree with 

their logic. As explained by the Seventh Circuit in Bensman, an informational 

injury can arise from a statute (such as FOIA or FACA) that aims to provide 

information to the public and then clearly creates a right to such information. 

Bensman, 408 F.3d at 958. When a statute serves some other purpose, such 

as increasing public participation in the decision-making process, there is no 

public right to information. Id.; see also Wilderness Soc’y, 622 F.3d at 1260 

(explaining that allowing any procedural injury that results in the plaintiff 

experiencing informational harm to create a concrete injury “would allow an 

10 Plaintiff-Appellants also refer to American Anti-Vivisection Society as a case 

involving an informational injury. However, “informational injury” refers to a narrower 

subset of injuries where the injury is the denial of information itself. By contrast, American 

Anti-Vivisection Society involved a monetary injury arising from resource expenditures due 

to a failure to pass notice-and-comment regulations. See American Anti-Vivisection Society, 

946 F.3d at 619 (“These activities, which were not part of [AWC’s] normal annual 

expenditures until the efforts became necessary due to USDA’s clear inaction, have caused 

a consequent drain on the organization’s resources.” (internal quotations and citation 

omitted)).

Case: 21-40601 Document: 00516492204 Page: 15 Date Filed: 09/30/2022
No. 21-40601

16

end run around the Supreme Court’s procedural injury doctrine and render 

its direction in Summers meaningless”). The provisions that PlaintiffAppellants allege create a right to information read only that the Director 

“shall prescribe regulations . . . setting forth the standards for the showing of 

sufficient grounds to institute a review.” 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(2), 326(a)(2). 

Assuming arguendo that this provision does create a notice-and-comment 

requirement, the purpose of the statute is to create regulations around the 

PTAB review process with public comment—it is not to create a public right 

to any particular information. Thus, the statutes do not form the basis for an 

informational injury.

In sum, Plaintiff-Appellants do not meet the requirements for Article 

III standing under any of their proffered theories. The district court thus 

correctly dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

Case: 21-40601 Document: 00516492204 Page: 16 Date Filed: 09/30/2022