NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DELMI LOPEZ

- ROMERO,

Petitioner,

v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 15

- 72760

Agency No. A205

- 254

- 660

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 11, 2022 * * San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE, S.R. THOMAS, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Delmi Lopez Romero , a native and citizen of El Salvador, pe titions

for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ ( Board ) order dismissing her

appeal from an immigration judge’s (IJ) decision denying h er application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAR 15 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

(CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the agency’s factual

findings for substantial evidence

. See Garcia v. Holder , 749 F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir.

2014). “Factual findings ‘are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would

be compelled t o conclude to the contrary.’” Id.
, quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the Board ’s denial of Lopez Romero’s request
for asylum and withholding of removal. Specifically, substantial evidence supports

the Board ’s determination that Lopez Romero “failed to carry her burden of proving

past persecution, a reasonable likelihood of future persecution on account of a

protected ground, or a clear probability that her life or freedom would be threatened
on account of a protected ground if she were returned to El Salvador.” The record

shows that Lopez Romero’s main evidence for any alleged past persecution is based
on “six phone calls over a period of seven months by a person named Luis.” Dkt.

No. 4 at 84. Although she alleges that the tele phone calls threatened her and her

children, they were never hurt or even approached by “ Luis

. ”
We agree with the IJ that these tele phone calls simply do not constitute

persecution
, “ an extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment our
society regards as offensive.” Ghaly v. I.N.S. , 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995)

. Indeed, we have repeatedly held that “ mere threats, without more, [are not] enough
to constitute past persecution .” Lim v. I.N.S. , 224 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 2000)

. For3

similar reasons, substantial evidence also supports the Board ’s determination that

th ere is a lack of well

- founded fear of future persecution. The record shows that

gang members have not come looking for her or tried to contact her since the
threatening telephone calls. Moreover, s ince leaving El Salvador , her children,

mother, and brother continued to live in El Salvador a nd have not received any

additional tele phone calls from gang members or had any problem with those gang

members in their daily lives

. Finally
, Lopez Romero failed even to provide any

direct evidence that shows Luis is part of any gang

. Thus, there is s ubstantial

evidence that she has no well

- founded fear of future persecution and that she can

relocate in El Salvador

. 1

For similar reasons, s ubstantial evidence also supports the Board ’s denial of

CAT protection. There is no evidence that anyone is still looking for Lopez Romero
at all, let alone any proof that she “ personally will face torture if [she] returns. ”

Mukulumbutu v. Barr , 977 F.3d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 2020)

. The petition for review is DENIED.

1 Because the Board held that Lopez Romero failed her burden of establishing eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal, ther e i s no need to address whether she also demonstrated membership in a cognizable particular social group and a nexus to an enumerated ground. Cf. Henriquez

- Rivas v. Holder , 707 F.3d 1081, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013)

.