1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 49449

STATE OF IDAHO ,
Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v.

PATRICIA LEE KILDOW ,
Defendant

- Respondent

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Filed: December 1, 2022
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Lynn G. Norton , District Judge.
Orders granting suppression motion and motion to dismiss, reversed and case remanded

. Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen , Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for appellant

. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jason C. Pintler , Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for respondent

. Jason C. Pintler argued.

________________________________________________ BRAILSFORD, Judge The State appeals from the district court ’ s order granting Patricia Lee Kildow ’ s motion to

suppress and the court’s subsequent order dismissing the charges against Kildow . We reverse and
remand.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In May 2021, a 911 caller reported observing two blonde females in a red GMC parked at an apartment complex who were smoking methamphetamine out of a glass pip e that looked “like a light bulb

. ” During the call, t he caller reported that the GMC was leaving the apartment complex ;
t he call er was following it ; and it pulled into a superstore parking lot. In addition to a description
of the vehicle
, its occupants and their conduct , the caller also provided his identity and that of his2

companion, their contact information, and their location. Officer Rudan received th is information in dispatch notes, responded to the repo r t “immediately
, ” and located the GMC and its occupants matching the caller’s description in the superstore parking lot. 1 Officer Rudan parked his patrol
vehicle and approached the GMC. When the dri ver began to exit the GMC , Officer Rudan
instructed the driver to remain in the vehicle.
After Officer Rudan identified the driver, Kildow, and the passenger, Kildow’s daughter,
Officer Rudan requested assistance and returned to his patrol vehicle to conduct a records check on Kildow and the passenger. During this time, other officers arrived on the scene, including Officer Lloyd and Officer Albers, who is a drug

- dog handler. Officer Rudan i nstructed Officer Lloyd to remove Kildow an d the passenger from the GMC

. Officer Lloyd testified that she believed she was removing the occupants from the vehicle so Officer Albers could perform a drug

dog sniff and that Officer Lloyd approached the passe nger

- side door, asked the passenger to step out, and opened the door. Immediately upon opening the door, Officer Lloyd saw “a clear, plastic water bottle that had been modified into a bong,” which she recognized as drug paraphernalia. 2 During a subseque nt search of the GMC, the officers discovered contraband
, including methamphetamine
, in Kildow’s purse

. T he State charged Kildow with possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. At the preliminary hearing, Officers Rudan, Albers, and Lloyd test ified. Thereafter, Kildow filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search. At an evidentiary hearing, Officer Lloyd testified again. In addition to this testimony, the district court also considered the preliminary hearing transcrip t; the audio of the 911 call; f ootage from the officers’ body cameras; and the incident detail report, which included the dispatch notes from the 911 call. Following the hearing, the district court issued a written decision granting Kildow’s suppression motion. The court concluded Officer Rudan detained Kildow when Officer Rudan
asked Kildow to remain in the car. Further, the court found that the 911 caller provided : (1) a description of the GMC, its occupants, and its location, which Officer Rudan corroborated;

1 The 911 caller provided a license plate for the GMC and transposed the last two number s

. T he district court found , however, that the report was reliable despite this transposition

.

2 After Officer Lloyd opened the door and saw drug paraphernalia, Officer Albers ’ drug dog conducted a sweep around the GMC, entered the vehicle, and alerted. T he dog sniff , however, is not at issue in this case.3

(2) first

- hand observations of the occupants’ conduct with “reliable details of how [the 911 caller] could distinguish the smoking of illegal drugs from a legal su bstance by the description of ‘light bulb’ and ‘white smoke’”; and (3) the reporting parties’ “identities, co ntact information, and location.” Based on these findings, the court concluded the 911 caller’s information “had sufficient indicia of reliability to justify detention of the [GMC] and its occupants ” and provided reasonable suspicion to detain the GMC’s occupants. Despite concluding Officer Rudan lawfully detained the GMC’s occupants, t he district court concluded the officers were not justified in ordering the occupants to exit the GMC because the officers were not investigating a traffic violation; the State had not shown the occupants “posed a risk of danger that would just ify a Terry [ 3 ] frisk”; and the occupants “were only asked out of the
vehic le so that the drug

- sniffing canine could engage in a free

- air sniff of the exterior of the vehicle.” Further, the court concluded probable cause under the automobile exception did not exist to justify the officers ordering the GMC’s occupants to exit the vehicle

. Accordingly, the court
held the search of the GMC was unconstitutional and granted Kildow’s suppression motion.
The State timely appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court ’ s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
as found. State v. Atkinson , 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez

- Molina
, 127 Id aho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers , 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
III.
ANALYSIS The State argues the district court erred by granting Kildow ’ s suppression motion. Specifically, the State challenges the court ’s conclusion that “the general rule that an officer may

3 See Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 30

- 31 (1968) (creating stop

- and

- frisk exception to Fourth Amendment warrant requirement).4

order a suspect from a car during the course of a detention does not apply when the officer is investigating a non

- traffic offense.” In response, Kildow argues an officer’s authority to order a

susp ect to exit a vehicle is limited to instances in which the officer conducted a traffic stop of a moving vehicle. The United States Supreme Court first articulat ed the rule that an officer may order a lawfully detained driver to exit the vehicle in Pennsylvania v

. Mimms , 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977).
In Mimms , the offic er stopped a vehicle displaying an expired license plate. Id. at 107. Per the officer’s standard practice, he asked the driver t o exit the car despite having “no reason to suspect foul play from the particular driver at the time of the stop” and not having seen anything “unusual or suspicious about his behavior.” Id. at 109

- 10. Once the driver exited the vehicle, the officer
noti ced a large bulge under the driver’s jacket, frisked the driver, discovered a loaded handgun, and arrested him for carrying a concealed weapon without a license. Id. at 107. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the denial of the driver’s suppression m otion
, concluding the officer’s order to exit the vehicle was “an impermissible ‘ seizure ’ ” because he “could not point to ‘ objective observable facts to support a suspicion that criminal activity was afoot or that the occupants of the vehicle posed a threat to police safety. ’ ” Id. at 108. On appeal
, the United States Supreme Court disagreed. Id. at 108. In addressing the issue, the Court noted the inquiry “focus[ed] not on the intrusion resulting from the request to stop the
vehicle or from the late r ‘pat down,’ but on the incremental intrusion resulting from the request to get out of the car once the vehicle was lawfully stopped.” Id. at 109. The Court “recognized the inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an au tomobile.” Id. at 110. The Court then weighed this risk against “the driver’s personal liberty occasioned not by the initial stop of the vehicle, which was admittedly justified, but by the order to get out of the car

. ”
Id. at 111. Balancing these facto rs, the Court concluded the intrusion caused by asking the driver
to exit the vehicle was de minimis

. Id. The Court reasoned : The driver is being asked to expose to view very li ttle more of his person than is

a lready exposed. The police have already lawfully decided that the driver shall be briefly detained; the only question is whether he shall spend that period sitting in the driver’s seat of his car or standing alongside it. Not only is the insistence of th e police on the latter choice not a “ serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, ” but it hardly rises to the level of a “ petty indignity. ” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968) )

.5

The United States Supreme Court extended the Mimms rule t o apply to passengers in Maryland v. Wilson , 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997), holding that “an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending the completion of the stop.” In that case, the Court
reasoned that the risk of harm to both the police and the occupants of a stopped vehicle is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation. Id. at 414.
In State v. Irwin , 143 Idaho 102, 137 P.3d 1024 (Ct. App. 2006), t h is Court considered the
Mimms rule and concluded an officer may open a vehicle’s door before ordering its occupant s to exit without violating the Fourth Amendment

. In that case, the officers were patrolling after dark
and “saw an automobile traveling in the opposite direction wi th its headlights off and its passenger door open.” Id. at 103, 137 P.3d at 1025. After the officers activated their overhead lights and began pursuing the vehicle, its passenger exited the moving vehicle and the officers stop p ed to ensure the passenger was uninjured. Id. Later, the officers located the vehicle lawfully parked with its lights and engine off and its doors and windows closed. Id. In the vehicle, “they saw Irwin curled up on the floor behind the front seats.” Id. The officer testified that “he wanted to see [Irwin’s] hands in order to ensure officer safety
, ” “ wanted to prevent Irwin from moving the
vehicle in an effort to elude or injure the officers
, ” and wanted to ensure Irwin was not injured. Id. As a result, the officer opened the passenger door and “ordered Irwin to come out.” Id. On intermediate appeal, the d istrict court ruled the officer violate d Irwin’s civil rights when
he opened her vehicle door, and the State appealed. Id. at 104, 137 P.3d at 1026. Addressing this ruling, this Court reversed. Id. at 106, 137 P.3d at 1028. It reasoned: [A]n officer’s action of opening a car door before directing the occupant to exit is no more intrusive than a verbal command followed by the occupant’s opening the door. Eithe r way, the door will be opened and the officer will see inside. The officer’s act here did not expose to view any more of Irwin or the interio r of her vehicle than would h a ve been exposed if Irwin had opened the door herself. Id. The Court concluded that “given that the officers have clear authority to order people out of vehicles during a roadside stop, it is constitutionally irrelevant whether the officer or the occupant opens the car door to enable the occupant to exit.” Id. ; see also State v. Jay , 167 Idaho 592, 598,
473 P.3d 861 , 867 ( Ct. App. 2020) (concluding officer had reasonable suspicion of traffic violation and opening car door did not constitute unlawful search)

. In this case, t he district court distinguished Irwin when granting Kildow ’s suppression motion, concluding that “this case is not a traffic stop for any traffic violation and there was never any evidence presented that there was ever any concern about the welfare of any occupant of the6

vehicle.” The S tate argues that “this dis tinction is erroneous because the rational e for the [ Mimms ] rule is a balancing of a risk to the officer against [the] degree of intrusion”; “the risk to the officer
is not less ” because of the nature of the crime being investigated ; and “there is no legal basis for differentiating between traffic and non

- traffic offenses.” Kildow responds that “it is not the nature of the investigation that matters”; rather, “it is whether the seizure begins with an of ficer conducting a traffic stop

. ”
A ccordingly, at i ssue is whether an officer must have reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation versus reasonable suspicion of some other criminal activity before ordering the occupants of a vehicle to exit after lawfully detaining them. We hold that, if an officer has lawfully detained the occupants of a vehicle, the officer may order the occupants to exit the vehicle regardless of whether the officer detained the occupants to investigate a traffic violation or some other criminal activity. The dispositive inquiry is w hether the officer had reasonable suspicion to lawfully detain the occupants in the vehicle before ordering them to exit

. Kildow neither disputes that Officer Rudan had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to detain Kildow and the passenger nor
other wise contends the officers unlawfully detained them . Because Officer Rudan lawfully detained the GMC’s occupants in the vehicle, the officers had the authority to order both Kildow
and the passenger to exit the vehicle. Contrary to Kildow’s assertions, t he rationale in Mimms for allowing an officer to order occupants to exit a vehicle applies equally in this case. See Mimms , 434 U.S. at 110 (recognizing “inordinate risk confronting an officer”). As the United States Supreme Court noted, the focus on whether the officer’s intrusion is unconst itutional is not “on the intrus ion resulting from the request to stop the vehicle or from the later ‘pat down.’” Id. at 109. Rather , the focus is on the intrusion caused by the officer’s order for the occupants t o exit the vehicle. Id. Even if the reasonable suspicion allowing the detention does not relate to a traffic violation, the intrusion to the occupants of a lawfully detained vehicle remains the same : They have already been lawfully detained; they
will b e detained while standing versus sitting in the vehicle; and they are exposing only a little more of their person than has already been exposed. Id. at 111.
Likewise , t he risks the officers encountered while investigating the report that Kildow and her p assenger were smoking methamphetamine in the GMC are the same risks attendant to investigating the occupants of a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation. No thing distinguish es the
risks to the officer in Mimms , who was investigating an expired license pl ate, from the risks to the7

officers in this case , and there is no basis to conclude the officers in this case faced some lesser risk. Rather, t he risk remained the same that the officers could not see the occupants’ hands or that the occupants might reach for a weapon or move the vehicle in an effort to elude or injure the
officers

. That “none of the officers testified that either [Kildow] or her daughter posed a danger to the officers or others,” as Kildow notes, is not a basis to conclude the officers c ould not order the GMC’s occupants to exit. Although the officers in Irwin had spe cific safety concerns, s uch concerns are not necessary to support an officer’s authority to order the occupants of a lawfully
detained vehicle to exit. The Mimms C ourt established the rule not in the context of specific safety concerns but rather in the context of the officer following a “standard practice,” having “no reason to suspect foul play from the particular driver at the time of the stop,” and not having se en anything “unusual or suspicious about his behavior .” Id. at 109

- 10. Moreover, Officer Lloyd testified that
she removed the GMC’s occupants per “policy and procedure” and that “it’s a safety risk” to have someone in the vehicle during a drug

- dog sniff. Finally, that Officer Lloyd did not ask the passenger to exit the vehicle until later during the detention is not a basis to conclude the order
was unlawful. As Kildow concedes, “the authority to order the occupants to get out of a lawfully stopped vehi cle remains throughout the duration of the lawful seizure.” At oral argument, Kildow asserted the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez v. United States , 575 U.S. 348 (2015), precludes the application of the Mimms rule to allow an officer to order an occupant of a lawfully detained vehicle to exit absent a traffic stop

. Specifically, Kildow relie s on the Court’s statement in Rodri g uez that “ highway and officer safety are interests different in kind from the Government’ s endeavor to detect crime in general or drug trafficking in particular.” Id. at 357. The Idaho Supreme Court has previously discussed the meaning of this and related language in Rodriguez

. In State v. Pylican
, 167 Idaho 745, 753

- 54,
477 P.3d 180
, 188

- 89 (2020), the Court addressed whether an officer unconstitutionally prolonged a traffic stop by ordering the o ccupants of a vehicle to exit in order to conduct a drug

- dog sniff. In that context, the Court ruled that “ Rodriguez d oes not bar officers from ordering occupants of a lawfully stopped vehicle to exit in order to investigate possible crimes unrelated to a valid traffic stop. ” Id. at 754, 477 P.3d at 189. I n State v. Warren , 169 Idaho 588, 593, 499 P.3d 423, 428 (2021), the Court considered whether Rodriguez means that “ only stops related to motor vehicle code investigations allow for the detention of a vehicle’s passengers ” and concluded that “ n othing8

in Rodriguez states that a traffic stop which gives rise to reasonable suspicion of another crime then transforms the subsequent investigation into a non

- traffic stop with a slate of different rules.”
See also State v. Wharton , 170 Idaho 329, 335, 510 P.3d 682 , 688 (2022) ( “[T] he State’s proposed practice of checking passengers for outstanding warrants during a traffic stop, as a matter of course, is a negligibly burdensome precaution for officer safety that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid. Accordingly , when warrant checks on passengers do occur, they do not unlawfully extend a stop under Rodriguez .” )

. Although these cases do not directly address whether a traffic stop is an essential component of an officer’s authority under Mimms and its progeny to order the occupants to exit a lawfully detained vehicle , o ur ruling that a traffic stop is not required is in
accord wit h the Idaho Supreme Court’s narrow reading of the language in Rodri g uez on which
Kildow relies. Because Officer Rudan lawfully detained Kildow and the passenger, Officer Lloyd had authority to order the passenger to exit the vehicle. That Officer Lloyd actually opened the door rather than the passenger is “constitutionally irrelevant.” See Irwin , 143 Idaho at 106, 137 P.3d at
1028 (ruling whether occupant or officer opens door is constitutionally irrelevant)

. Officer Lloyd’s act expose d no more view of the GMC or its interior than the passenger would have exposed if she had opened the door. See id. (providing rationale for allowing officer to lawfully open door). Once the door was open, the drug paraphernalia was in plain view and justified the subseq uent search of
the GMC. See Baldwin v. State , 145 Idaho 148, 155, 177 P.3d 362, 369 (2008) (ruling officer must lawfully make initial intru sion to support plain view exce ption).
IV.
CONCLUSION
T he district court erred by granting Kildow’s suppression motion and dismissing the charges against her. Accordingly, w e reverse the court’s orders granting suppression and dismissing the charges and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Chief Judge LORELLO and Judge GRATTON CONCUR

.