*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

____________________________________

:

:

STEPHEN SIMONI, :

:

:

Plaintiff, : Civil Action No. 10-6798 (FLW)

:

v. :

: OPINION

EDWARD DIAMOND, et al. :

:

: 

Defendants. :

____________________________________:

WOLFSON, District Judge:

Plaintiff Stephen Simoni (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Jersey Shore University 

Medical Center (“JSUMC”), Meridian Health Systems Inc., Meridian Health Inc., Meridian 

Hospital Corp., Meridian Health (collectively with JSUMC, the “Hospital”), Health 

Professionals and Allied Employees, AFT, AFL-CIO, HPAE Local 5058 (together, the “Union”) 

and several individual defendants alleging various labor and employment violations arising from 

the termination of Plaintiff’s employment with JSUMC. Presently before the Court is a motion 

by Plaintiff for reconsideration of the October 5, 2014 decision of the Hon. Joel A. Pisano, 

United States District Judge,1 denying Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment. See

Opinion and Order, ECF Nos. 80, 81. Defendants oppose the motion. For the reasons below, the 

Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that reconsideration is 

warranted and denies Plaintiff's motion.

1 This matter was recently reassigned to the undersigned upon the retirement of Judge Pisano.

 

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I. BACKGROUND

Because the facts of this case are set forth in a number of prior Opinions (see, e.g., Judge 

Pisano’s October 5, 2014 Opinion (ECF No. 80) and the Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of 

Appeals filed March 20, 2013 (ECF No. 33-2)), only a brief recitation of the relevant facts is 

necessary here.

This case arises out of Plaintiff’s employment as a nurse in the cardiac catheterization 

laboratory at JSUMC. Plaintiff began working at JSUMC in August 2010. He was terminated 

approximately two months later, prior to the expiration of a 90-day probationary period

applicable to new employees.

During the time of Plaintiff’s employment, there was in effect a collective bargaining 

agreement (“CBA”) between the Union and JSUMC that governed the conditions of employment 

for certain employees.

2

 Under the CBA, the Union could initiate a grievance on behalf of an 

employee to contest a disciplinary action or discharge. The CBA further provided that the Union 

could submit the issue to arbitration if the parties were unable to resolve the grievance. 

Following his termination, Plaintiff requested that the Union file a grievance on his

behalf. The Union’s representative did so, but the grievance was denied by the Hospital. The 

Union representative then advised Plaintiff that the Union would not be pursuing arbitration on 

Plaintiff’s behalf. This action followed. 

On April 18, 2011, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint asserting seven causes of 

action: (1) a hybrid Section 301 claim under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 

185 (“LMRA”), alleging a breach of the CBA and a breach of the duty of fair representation; (2) 

unfair labor practices in violation of Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 

28 U.S.C. § 157; (3) violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination; (4) defamation; 

2 A key dispute between the parties in this case regards the applicability of the CBA to Plaintiff. 

2

 

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(5) breach of contract; (6) violation of New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act; 

and (7) tortious interference.

In response to the Amended Complaint, the Hospital and the individual defendants 

moved to dismiss all but the third cause of action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Union moved 

to dismiss the sole claim directed to it, the Section 301 claim. On October 6, 2011, Judge Pisano 

granted the motions, dismissed Plaintiff’s federal law claims and declined to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. ECF Nos. 27, 28. Judge Pisano 

held that Plaintiff had failed to state a claim under the LMRA because Plaintiff failed to plead 

facts sufficient to show that the Union had breached its duty of fair representation. ECF No. 27 

at 6-10. Specifically, Judge Pisano found that the Amended Complaint was lacking in 

allegations showing that the Union’s conduct was arbitrary or irrational, which is a necessary 

element of a claim for a breach of the duty of fair representation. Id. at 7. Further, because 

demonstrating that the Union had breached its duty of fair representation was a necessary

predicate to Plaintiff’s Section 301 claim against the Hospital, Judge Pisano dismissed that claim 

against the Hospital as well. Turning then to Plaintiff’s NLRA claim, Judge Pisano found it was 

preempted and subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. Id. at 

11-12. With no federal claims remaining in the action, the Court declined to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

Plaintiff appealed Judge Pisano’s ruling, and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 

in a decision filed March 20, 2013 (the “March 20th decision”), affirmed in part and reversed in 

part. ECF No. 33-2. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s NLRA claim, but 

reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s Section 301 claim and remanded the matter for further 

proceedings. The Circuit Court found that the facts pled were sufficient to state a claim for 

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breach of the duty of fair representation. Id. at 9-12. With respect the claim’s requirement that 

the Union’s conduct be arbitrary or irrational, the Third Circuit pointed to allegations that the 

Union, in declining to pursue arbitration on Plaintiff’s behalf, relied on a “past practice” of 

considering probationary employees to be outside the scope of the CBA. Id. at 10. The Circuit 

Court found this sufficient to support a claim that the Union acted unreasonably because the 

CBA’s integration clause expressly states that “past practices, polices or procedures” do not form 

any part of the agreement. Id. The Circuit Court also rejected the Union’s argument that a 

“plain reading” of the CBA shows that it does not apply to probationary employees, finding that 

there existed a “plausible” interpretation of the CBA which does not exclude probationary 

employees from its coverage. Id. at 11.

The matter was remanded to District Court, and Plaintiff subsequently moved for 

summary judgment on his Section 301 claim. In support of this motion, Plaintiff relied primarily

on the Third Circuit’s March 20th decision, arguing that “[b]ecause the Third Circuit has ruled 

that [Plaintiff] was entitled to all procedural and substantive protections of the CBA” there 

remained no factual issues as to whether the Hospital breached the CBA. ECF No. 51-2 at 3. In 

his Opinion denying Plaintiff’s motion, Judge Pisano stated that Plaintiff, in basing his motion on 

the March 20th decision, misapprehended the standard applied by the Third Circuit in its analysis 

of the motion to dismiss. Judge Pisano explained that while that the Third Circuit found that 

Plaintiff’s interpretation of the CBA was “plausible” such that Plaintiff’s Section 301 claim 

could withstand a 12(b)(6) challenge, the Circuit Court’s decision, which reviewed a motion to 

dismiss, did not and could not resolve disputed factual issues. ECF No. 80 at 9. Finding that the 

Hospital had produced sufficient evidence to show that genuine issues of material fact existed 

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with respect to Plaintiff’s Section 301 claim, Judge Pisano denied Plaintiff’s motion. Plaintiff 

now moves for reconsideration of that decision.

II. ANALYSIS

Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) governs motions for reconsideration and requires the moving 

party to “set[ ] forth concisely the matter or controlling decisions which the party believes the 

Judge or Magistrate Judge has overlooked[.]” L. Civ. R. 7.1(i). The burden on the moving party 

is quite high and reconsideration is granted very sparingly. To prevail on such a motion, the 

movant must demonstrate either: “(1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the 

availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct [a] clear error of law or prevent manifest 

injustice.” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010). 

Notably, a motion seeking reconsideration may not be used by a party to “restate 

arguments that the court has already considered.” Lawrence v. Emigrant Mortg. Co., Civ. No. 

11–3569, 2012 WL 5199228, *2 (D.N.J., Oct. 18, 2012). Nor may be such a motion be used “to 

relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior 

to the entry of judgment.” NL Indus., Inc. v. Comm. Union Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 513, 516 

(D.N.J. 1996). In other words, “[a] motion for reconsideration should not provide the parties 

with an opportunity for a second bite at the apple.” Tishcio v. Bontex, Inc., 16 F.Supp.2d 511, 

532 (D.N.J.1998) (internal citation omitted). Further, where a party merely has a difference of 

opinion with the court’s decision, the issue should be raised through the normal appellate 

process; reconsideration is not the appropriate vehicle. Dubler v. Hangsterfer's Laboratories, 

Civ. No. 09–5144, 2012 WL 1332569, *2 (D.N.J., Apr. 17, 2012) (citing Bowers v. Nat’l 

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 130 F. Supp. 2d 610, 612 (D.N.J. 2001)).

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Applying the above legal standards, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration must fail. As 

an initial matter, Plaintiff’s motion essentially repeats the arguments raised in his original 

summary judgment motion. He argues, just as he did previously, that the Third Circuit “resolved 

with finality” the question of whether the protections of the CBA applied to probationary 

employees and, as such, the material facts are undisputed and entitle him to judgment as a matter 

of law. ECF No. 82 at 1. However, “[t]o support reargument, a moving party must show that 

dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of law were overlooked by the court in 

reaching its prior decision.” Assisted Living Associates of Moorestown, L.L.C., v. Moorestown 

Twp., 996 F. Supp. 409, 442 (D.N.J. 1998). Here, Plaintiff attempts to meet this requirement by 

stating at the outset of his brief that the District Court “appears to have ‘overlooked’” the Third 

Circuit’s March 20th decision. It is beyond dispute, however, that Judge Pisano did consider and 

apply the March 20th decision in ruling on Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion. Rather, 

Plaintiff disagrees with Judge Pisano’s interpretation and application of that Third Circuit 

decision. However, “[a] party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with 

the Court’s decision, and ‘recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court 

before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party’s burden.’” G–69 v. 

Degnan, 748 F. Supp. 274, 275 (D.N.J. 1990) (citation omitted). Plaintiff having failed to carry 

his burden here, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

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III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is denied. An appropriate 

Order accompanies this Opinion.

DATED: April 22, 2015

/s/ Freda L. Wolfson

FREDA L. WOLFSON, U.S.D.J.

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