UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TIMOTHY CONNELL, :

: Civil Action No. 11-0616 (RMB)

Petitioner, :

:

v. : OPINION

:

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, :

et al., :

:

Respondents. :

APPEARANCES:

Timothy Connell Allan B. K. Urgent

SBI 624559A / 690729 Office of the U.S. Attorney

N.S.P. 970 Broad Street

P.O. Box 2300 Suite 700

Newark, NJ 07114 Newark, NJ 07102

Petitioner pro se Attorney for Respondent

BUMB, District Judge

Petitioner Timothy Connell, who was confined at the time of

filing the Petition at Camden County Correctional Facility in

Camden, New Jersey, and is now confined at Northern State Prison,

in Newark, New Jersey, has submitted a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and has paid the $5

filing fee. The second amended petition, docket entry number 5,

names the U.S. Parole Commission and Eric Taylor, Warden of

Camden County Jail, as respondents. 

Because it appears from a review of the Petition that

Petitioner is not entitled to relief, the Petition will be

dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243.

Case 1:11-cv-00616-RMB Document 16 Filed 04/30/12 Page 1 of 9 PageID: 161
I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner Connell was sentenced in this district to a term

of 25 years of imprisonment for conspiracy to obstruct justice,

obstruction of justice, aiding and abetting, and illegal use of a

fire arm to commit felonies. Petitioner was mandatorily released

from custody on May 24, 1997 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4163. Until

June 6, 2007, Petitioner was to remain supervised “as if on

parole” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4164. 

Petitioner subsequently violated the conditions of

supervision and was arrested on a warrant on August 27, 2002. A

revocation hearing was held on October 29, 2002, at which time

the U.S. Parole Commission found that Petitioner had violated

three of the four charges brought in relation to the violation of

the terms of supervision. It was ordered that Petitioner was not

to receive credit for the time spent on supervision. The

Commission revoked his mandatory release and set his parole date

to October 27, 2003 with service of 14 months. Petitioner did

not receive credit for the time spent while released on

supervision (also referred to as “street time”) after May 23,

1997. Petitioner did not appeal this decision. 

A supplemental warrant was issued on December 17, 2002 to

add another parole violation. Petitioner’s case was reopened and

a reconsideration hearing was held on July 14, 2003. Petitioner

was found to have committed the additional violation, and it was

2

Case 1:11-cv-00616-RMB Document 16 Filed 04/30/12 Page 2 of 9 PageID: 162
ordered that his parole date be set at February 27, 2005, with 30

months of incarceration. Petitioner administratively appealed

the decision, but the National Appeals Board affirmed on

September 25, 2003. Petitioner was released on parole on

February 27, 2005, with parole supervision set until February 28,

2013. 

Another warrant related to violation of the conditions of

parole was later issued on September 14, 2009, related to

Petitioner’s commission of a bank robbery. The warrant issued at

such time when Petitioner was being held in connection with the

state robbery charges at the Camden County Correctional Facility

in Camden, New Jersey. A detainer has been placed on Petitioner

and the U.S. Marshals have been instructed to assume custody of

Petitioner upon his release from state detention, however, the

warrant has not yet been executed. 

Petitioner filed his initial Petition on or about February

3, 2011, and subsequently filed an Amended Petition on or about

March 3, 2011 and a Second Amended Petition on or about March 17,

2011, citing various grounds for relief. Petitioner lists the

following three grounds in his second amended petition:

“unauthorized use of Rule 2.28(f) of the Rules and Procedures

Manual,” “unauthorized use of Rule 2.26-02 of the Rules and

Procedures Manual,” and “unauthorized use of Rule 2.48-06(b) of

the Rules and Procedures Manual.” Petitioner seeks as relief for

3

Case 1:11-cv-00616-RMB Document 16 Filed 04/30/12 Page 3 of 9 PageID: 163
this Court to: “1. Order the Parole Commission to Justify the use

of the supplement warrant after revocation. 2. Order the Parole

Commission to show cause and produce the two votes required to

reopen petitioner’s case. 3. Order the Parole Commission to

credit petitioner sixteen months off his full term date of March

7, 2013.” 

Subsequent to Respondent’s answer being filed, Petitioner

submitted a document seeking to amend the Petition to add a claim

regarding the forfeiture of street time pursuant to the Parole

Commission’s decision. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Section 2241 provides in relevant part:

(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the

Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts

and any circuit judge within their respective

jurisdictions.

...

(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a

prisoner unless-- ... (3) He is in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States ... .

A habeas corpus petition is the proper mechanism for a

prisoner to challenge the “fact or duration” of his confinement,

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973), including

challenges to prison disciplinary proceedings that affect the

length of confinement, such as deprivation of good time credits,

Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004) and Edwards v. Balisok,

4

Case 1:11-cv-00616-RMB Document 16 Filed 04/30/12 Page 4 of 9 PageID: 164
520 U.S. 641 (1997). See also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 125 S.Ct.

1242 (2005). Habeas corpus is an appropriate mechanism, also,

for a federal prisoner to challenge the execution of his

sentence. See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485-86 (3d Cir.

2001); Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478-79 (3d Cir. 1990). 

In addition, where a prisoner seeks a “quantum change” in the

level of custody, for example, where a prisoner claims to be

entitled to probation or bond or parole, habeas is the

appropriate form of action. See, e.g., Graham v. Broglin, 922

F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1991) and cases cited therein.

“Section 2241 is the only statute that confers habeas

jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner who is

challenging not the validity but the execution of his sentence.” 

Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485-86 (3d Cir. 2001) (citations

omitted). A petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241 in the district where the prisoner is confined provides a

remedy “where petitioner challenges the effects of events

‘subsequent’ to his sentence.” Gomori v. Arnold, 533 F.2d 871,

874 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 851 (1976) (finding

jurisdiction where prisoner challenged erroneous computation of

release date). See also Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310 (3d

Cir. 2007) (finding jurisdiction where prisoner challenged BOP’s

failure to give credit for time served prior to federal

sentence); Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478-79 (3d Cir. 1991)

5

Case 1:11-cv-00616-RMB Document 16 Filed 04/30/12 Page 5 of 9 PageID: 165
(finding jurisdiction where prisoner challenged BOP refusal to

decide whether to designate state prison as a place of serving

federal sentence); Soyka v. Allredge, 481 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1973)

(finding jurisdiction where petitioner alleged a claim for credit

for time served prior to federal sentencing).

Convicted and sentenced prisoners retain the protections of

the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

that the government may not deprive them of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418

U.S. 539, 556 (1974); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972);

Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971). A liberty interest

protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from either of two

sources: the Due Process Clause itself or from state or federal

law. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983); Asquith v.

Department of Corrections, 186 F.3d 407, 409 (3d Cir. 1999).

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner brings this application under 28 U.S.C. § 2241

challenging the actions of the Parole Commission with respect to

the previous revocation of his parole. In support of his request

that he receive credit for the sixteen additional months added on

to his sentence when his parole revocation case was reopened,

Petitioner claims that the Parole Commission acted

inappropriately in certain actions, namely requesting that his

case be reopened, that the case was reopened with only one vote,

6

Case 1:11-cv-00616-RMB Document 16 Filed 04/30/12 Page 6 of 9 PageID: 166
and that the parole warrant was supplemented after the initial

revocation hearing. Petitioner brings his challenge by alleging

that the Parole Commission violated their own Rules & Procedures

Manual. 

Here, it appears that Petitioner is not challenging the

execution of his sentence, but rather argues that his due process

rights were violated by the Parole Commission and their alleged

non-adherence to certain sections of their own Rules and

Procedures Manual. 

It is well-settled law that a parolee facing revocation of

parole has a constitutional liberty interest in his freedom and

that the government may not revoke parole without providing due

process. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (3d Cir.

1978). However, Petitioner here had long ago faced the

revocation that he refers to in the instant Petition. The

challenges made here are not to any current revocation

proceedings but rather to a revocation decision for which the

additional term of incarceration has already been completed. 

Since he now has a subsequent and unrelated conviction,

Petitioner now seeks to go back to challenge the reopen of the

past revocation hearing by challenging the actions of the Parole

Commission as non-compliant to their own policies. However,

Petitioner is not afforded any constitutional protections under

the Parole Commission’s rules and has not cited to any precedent

7

Case 1:11-cv-00616-RMB Document 16 Filed 04/30/12 Page 7 of 9 PageID: 167
that would entitle him to habeas corpus relief on this basis. 

This Court is not constrained to consider Petitioner’s claims as

due process violations simply because Petitioner has labeled them

as such. 

Petitioner here does not appear to be challenging any parole

detainer as it relates to the unrelated charges for which he is

currently incarcerated. Rather, Petitioner is challenging the

actions of the Parole Commission to reopen, a decision which 

occurred close to a decade ago and was previously ratified by the

National Appeals Board. 

Further, Petitioner is not currently in custody as a result

of the actions of the Parole Commission that Petitioner attempts

to challenge with this Petition. Petitioner long ago served the

sixteen months term of service which was issued to him as a

result of the Commission’s actions which Petitioner challenges

here. Petitioner has not shown any viable constitutional claims

stemming from the alleged errors made by the Parole Commission

related to the reopening of his case in 2003. Petitioner has not

shown that he in custody in violation of the Constitution. 

Accordingly, the Petition will be dismissed since Petitioner has

not shown that this Court has jurisdiction to consider his

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2241.

8

Case 1:11-cv-00616-RMB Document 16 Filed 04/30/12 Page 8 of 9 PageID: 168
IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Petition is dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction. An appropriate order follows.

s/Renée Marie Bumb 

Renée Marie Bumb

United States District Judge

Dated: April 30, 2012 

9

Case 1:11-cv-00616-RMB Document 16 Filed 04/30/12 Page 9 of 9 PageID: 169