alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1

Exhibit 32.1 Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

In connection with the Annual Report of Calgon Carbon Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-K/A for the period ending December 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, John S. Stanik, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial conditions and result of operations of the Company for the periods
presented therein.



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ John S. Stanik     
|Chief Executive Officer
|                       
|April 24, 2007         



---

(A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating,
acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Calgon Carbon Corporation and will be retained by Calgon Carbon
Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.)

This certification accompanies this Report pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
# United States Court **of Appeals**  **f or the Fifth Circuit** 

**____________** No. 23

- 10972 Summary Calendar

**____________ United States of America,**  Plaintiff

— Appellee **,**

versus **Carlos Jones,** Defendant

— Appellant

**.**

**______________________________** Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:23

- CR

- 109

- 1

**______________________________** Before **Higginbotham, Jones,** and **Oldham,** Circuit Judges

**. Per Curiam**  **:** ***** Carlos Jones appeals h is guilty plea conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. He argues that the factual basis for h is plea was insufficient to demonstrate that h is conduct constituted a drug conspiracy offense. We review the forfeited

**_____________________**

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See **5th Cir**

**. R** 

**.** 47.5. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED August 14, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 23-10972 Document: 53-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/14/2024No. 23

- 10972

2 objection for plain error. See United States v. Trejo , 610 F.3d 308, 313 (5th Cir. 2010)

. According to Jones , the record did not establish h is agreement to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and even if we assumed that it did, the record did not reflect that the conspiracy involved 50 grams or more of methamphetamine or his knowledge of that quantity

. Jones also claims there was no evidence regarding the frequency of his sales or the individuals to whom he distributed methamphetamine. However, for purposes of the guilty plea, there was no requirement of any of these elements. See United States v. Jones , 969 F.3d 192, 196 (5th Cir. 2020) ; United States v. Daniels , 723 F.3d 562, 572

- 74 (5th Cir.), modified in part on reh’g , 729 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2013) ; United States v. Betancourt , 586 F.3d 303, 308

- 09 (5th Cir. 2009)

. T he entirety of the record supports a reasonable inference of an agreement among , at the very least, Jones , an unindicted coconspirator, and a supply source to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine

. See Jones , 969 F.3d at 196; United States v. Patino

- Prado , 533 F.3d 304, 309 (5th Cir. 2008 ); Trejo , 610 F.3d at 317. That evidence is bolstered by Jones’s own admission to investigators that he purchased methamphetamine and regularly distributed it. He thus fails to show error, plain or otherwise, concerning the factual basis. See Trejo , 610 F.3d at 313. The judgment of the district court is **AFFIRMED**

. Case: 23-10972 Document: 53-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/14/2024
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

DA N H JOHN TAI DANG

,

Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

,

Appellee. §

§

§

§

§ No. 08

- 2 1

- 00 172

- CR

Appeal from the

413 th Judicial District Court

of Johnson County, Texas 1

(TC# DC

- F201900089 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Da n h John Tai Dang has filed a motion to withdraw his notice of appeal and to

voluntarily dismiss this appeal. See T EX .R.A PP .P. 42.2 (governing voluntary dismissals in

criminal cases). The motion is granted. T h e appeal is dismissed.

JEFF ALLEY, Justice

December 22, 2021

Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Alley, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)

1 We hear this case on transfer from the Tenth Court of Appeals. See T EX .R.A PP .P. 41.3.
Opinion issued June 2, 2015

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

————————————

NO. 01
- 15
- 00024
- CV

——————————— COREY L. ROBERTS , Appella nt V. CELIA CLANTON ROBERT S , Appell e e
On Appeal from the County Court at Law Orange County, Texas Trial Court Ca se No. C
- 140473
- D



### MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Corey L. Roberts appeals from a default divorce judgment rendered in favor of appellee Celia Clanton Roberts. In two issues, Corey contends that (1) the trial court erred by granting default judgment because the record does not affirmatively show that he was served with citation in strict compliance with2 the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by naming Celia sole managing conservator of the co uple’s two children because Celia did not reque st such relief in her pleadings. We reverse and remand. 1
A default judgment can only be sustained on direct attack if the record affirmatively demonstrates that the defendant was served with citation in strict compliance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure

. See P rimate Constr. , Inc. v. Silver , 884 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. 1994); Paramount Credit, Inc. v. Montgomery , 420 S.W.3d 226, 231 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (“We cannot affirm a default judgment unless it is clear from the face of the record upon whom the attempted service of process was made, where, when, how, and in what capacity.”)

. Pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 107(h), a default judgment may only be obtained if the return of service has been on file with the court’s clerk for ten days. T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 107(h). The lack of strict compliance with Rule 107(h) precludes the granting of default judgment

. See Midstate Envtl. Servs., LP v.
Peterson , 435 S.W. 3d 287 , 290

– 91 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2014, no pet.)

. In this case, t he return of service filed on August 19, 2014

. indicates that Corey was served w ith citation on July 31, 2014. The trial court granted default judgment in Celia’ s favor on August 26, 2014

— seven days after the return of

1 This appeal, originally filed in the Ninth Court of Appeals, Beaumont, Texas, was transferred to the First Cou rt of Appeals, Houston, Texas. See T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN
. § 73.001 ( West 2013) (authorizing transfer of cases).3 service was filed with the clerk. Thus, the record affirmatively demonstrates that the default judgment is invalid because it was granted less than ten days after the return of service was filed wit h the clerk’s office. See i d. Because the record affirmatively shows a lack of strict compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, we sustain Corey’ s first issue. Having sustained Corey’s first issue, we need not consider his second issue

. Conclusion We r everse the default judgment and remand this case for further proceedings.

Russell Lloyd Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Huddle, and Lloyd.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF ATLANTIS PLASTICS, INC. FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31,
1995, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> DOLLAR
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                       1,255,112
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               29,779,593
<ALLOWANCES>                                 1,529,627
<INVENTORY>                                 18,543,761
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            55,093,423
<PP&E>                                     115,605,295
<DEPRECIATION>                              51,272,722
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             180,460,573
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       31,892,897
<BONDS>                                    113,293,917
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  2,000,000
<COMMON>                                       709,280
<OTHER-SE>                                  24,582,854
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               180,460,573
<SALES>                                    281,064,553
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           281,064,553
<CGS>                                      241,149,391
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              241,149,391
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            40,843,517
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                          14,303,262
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (15,231,617)
<INCOME-TAX>                                (1,673,756)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (13,557,861)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 231,405
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                254,306
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (13,072,150)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (1.83)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (1.83)
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.02


CERTIFICATION
  I, Debi B. Halbert, the Chief Financial Officer of ProFutures, Inc., the general partner of ProFutures Diversified Fund, L.P., certify that (i) the Annual Report of ProFutures Diversified Fund, L.P. on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2009 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (ii) the information contained in such Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of ProFutures Diversified Fund, L.P.
  
  PROFUTURES DIVERSIFIED FUND, L.P.
  By:  ProFutures, Inc., General Partner
  
  By:  /s/ Debi B. Halbert
  ---------------------------------
 Debi B. Halbert
 Chief Financial Officer
 April 15, 2010
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-2212

RHONDA R. BROWN,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Chief District Judge.

(CA-90-1564-JFM)

Submitted: March 21, 1996 Decided: March 29, 1996

Before NIEMEYER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Rhonda R. Brown, Appellant Pro Se. Nathan Braverman, OFFICE OF THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying relief on her complaint filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 1981 &

Supp. 1995), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1988), alleging retaliatory discharge. We have reviewed the record and the district

court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we

affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Brown v. Department

of Health and Mental Hygiene, No. CA-90-1564-JFM (D. Md. May 12,

1995). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<PAGE>   1
 
                                                                    EXHIBIT 11.1
 
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                            FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31,
                                                      -------------------------------------------
                                                         1996            1995            1994
                                                      -----------     -----------     -----------
<S>                                                   <C>             <C>             <C>
PRIMARY
Weighted average shares outstanding..................  25,910,548      25,650,705      25,448,981
Net effect of diluting stock options.................     288,989         266,313          82,201
                                                      -----------     -----------     -----------
     Total...........................................  26,199,537      25,917,018      25,531,182
                                                      ===========     ===========     ===========
Net income........................................... $31,797,349     $33,427,505     $18,819,507
                                                      ===========     ===========     ===========
Net income per share................................. $      1.21     $      1.29     $      0.74
                                                      ===========     ===========     ===========
 
FULLY DILUTED
Weighted average shares outstanding..................  25,910,548      25,650,705      25,448,981
Net effect of diluting stock options.................     358,920         311,472          82,201
                                                      -----------     -----------     -----------
     Total...........................................  26,269,468      25,962,177      25,531,182
                                                      ===========     ===========     ===========
Net income........................................... $31,797,349     $33,427,505     $18,819,507
                                                      ===========     ===========     ===========
Net income per share................................. $      1.21     $      1.29     $      0.74
                                                      ===========     ===========     ===========
</TABLE>
 
                                      F-36
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-11614

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

DAMION KENTRELL WHITE, also known as D.K., 

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:14-CR-78-2

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant White appeals from the 240-month sentence he received after 

the district court accepted his guilty plea to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(2) 

based on a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1). We DISMISS the 

appeal.

White admits that “[t]he crux of [his] objection in the district court and 

complaint now on appeal is that his conduct did not constitute a crime of 

violence . . . .” (emphasis added). White asks this court to do the very thing 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 14, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 16-11614 Document: 00514274052 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/14/2017
No. 16-11614

2

that the Supreme Court has instructed it not to do: look beyond the elements 

of the offense to the underlying facts to determine whether 

18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) is categorically a crime of violence.

In determining whether an offense is a crime of violence, this court looks 

“only to the statutory definitions—i.e., the elements—of a defendant’s offense, 

and not to the particular facts underlying the convictions.” United States v. 

Buck, 847 F.3d 267, 274 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Descamps v. United States, 

133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283 (2013)), cert. denied sub. nom. Allen v. United States, 

137 S. Ct. 2231 (2017). White’s brief is not entitled to liberal construction 

because he is represented by counsel. See Woodfox v. Cain, 609 F.3d 774, 792 

(5th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, White has not adequately briefed the only issue 

he raises. This court has recognized that failure to adequately brief an issue 

on appeal can constitute waiver of the argument. N.W. Enters., Inc. v. City of 

Houston, 352 F.3d 162, 183 n.24 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Fed. R. App. 

P. 28(a)(8)(A); United States v. Martinez, 263 F.3d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 2001); 

United States v. Thames, 214 F.3d 608, 611 n.3 (5th Cir. 2000); L & A 

Contracting Co. v. S. Concrete Servs., 17 F.3d 106, 113 (5th Cir. 1994); United 

States v. Beaumont, 972 F.2d 553, 563 (5th Cir. 1992). This court finds that 

White has waived by inadequate briefing the only issue he raises. We 

DISMISS the appeal.

 Case: 16-11614 Document: 00514274052 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/14/2017
FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 11/18/2015 7:26:56 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Dekania Corp. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for
the period ended September 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Paul Vernhes, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.



|                        |  |  |  |     |  |                  |  |                        
|----------------------- |  |  |  | --- |  | ---------------- |  | -----------------------
|Date: November 14, 2007 |  |  |  | By: |  | /s/ Paul Vernhes
|                        |  |  |  |     |  |                  |  | Paul Vernhes           
|                        |  |  |  |     |  |                  |  | Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 32.2

Section 1350 Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with
the Quarterly Report of Dollarama Group L.P. and Dollarama Group Holdings L.P. (together, the Partnership) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended August 2, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
Report), I, Robert Coallier, Chief Financial Officer of the general partner of the Company, Dollarama Group GP Inc., certify that to my knowledge:

1. the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange of 1934, as amended; and

2. the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership.

Date: September 9, 2009



/s/ Robert CoallierRobert Coallier Chief Financial Officer and Secretary
No. :

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN,TEXAS

ALPHONSO SMITH RECEIVED IN

V. C°URT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

STATE OF TEXAS JUL 15m

FROM APPEAL No.:01-14-00727

)URT No.:239 JUDICIAL I

BRAZORIA COUNTY,TEXAS

Abe!Acosta,Clerk

TRIAL COURT No.:239 JUDICIAL DISTRICT

FILED IN

FIRST MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 0URT 0F CRIMINAL APPEALS

TO FILE PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW. JjJL 2 1 20lJ

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAlA&el Acosta, Clerk

COMES NOW,ALPHONSO SMITH,PETITIONER, and files this Motion

for ^0 days in which to file a petition for Discretionary Re

view.In support of this Motion,Appellant shows the Court the fol

lowing:

1 th

The Petitioner was convicted in •the 239 District Court of

Brazoria County,Texas, of the offense of Evading Arrest with a ve

hicle in Cause No.;71088,styled State of Texas vs. Alphonso Smith.

The Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals for the first

District of Texas.The case was affirmed on July 2,2015.

II

The present deadline for filing the Petitioner for Discretio

nary Review is August 1,2015. The Petitioner has not requested

any extension prior to this request.

Ill

Petitioner's request is based upon the following facts:

Petitioner was not informed of the decision of the Court of

Appeals in affirming his case until July 7,2015. His attorney

John J. Davis has informed Petitioner that he was not appointed

to represent him on the petition for Discretionary Review.

IV

At law library,Petitioner is only allowed to (3) three case law

a day per visit on intra-loan or shepardize,in some instances

the case law can not be obtained which hinders Petitioner's research.
Petitioner has a very limited knowledge of the lav;.

WHEREFORE,Petitioner prays this Court GRANTS this Motion

and extend the deadline for filing the petition for Discretionary

Review in Case No.: 01-14-00727 to Qp<fr %l AQ1& .

Respectfully submitted:

Alphonso Smith, Pro Se

Petitioner,

Estelle Unit (T.D.C.J.-C.I.D.)

264 FM 3478

Huntsville, Texas 77320

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I,certify that a true and correct copy of the above foregoing

First Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Discretio

nary Review.has been forward by U.S. mail,postage prepaid to

attorney for State Trey D. Picard at 111 E Locust,Suite #408 A,

Angleton,Texas 77515 and to State prosecuting attorneys P.0 Box

12405,Austin,Texas 78711 on this /&t7t day of TcjCuA 2015

flUbPtwtf*

Petitioner, Pro Se
CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
 OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Atwood Minerals and Mining Corp., a
Nevada corporation, (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending February
28, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the “Report”), I, Greg Goldberg., Chief Executive Officer and Chief
Financial of the Company, certify the following pursuant to Section 18, U.S.C.
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002:
 
 1.
              The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and
 
 2.
              The
      information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.
 
  /s/
      Greg GoldbergGreg
      Goldberg
                    President
                    (Chief
      Executive Officer and
                    Chief
      Financial Officer)
                    April
      14, 2009