[J-110-2014] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

SAYLOR, C.J., EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.

IN RE: PETITION TO SUBMIT BALLOT QUESTION TO CONCORD TOWNSHIP VOTERS

DELAWARE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS, Intervenor

APPEAL OF: COLETTE BROWN : : : : : : : : : : : No. 126 MAP 2014 Appeal from the order of Commonwealth Court at No. 1426 CD 2014 dated September 26, 2014 Affirming the order of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division, at No. 2014-06512 dated August 14, 2014.

SUBMITTED: November 21, 2014

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE STEVENS DECIDED: July 20, 2015 Collette Brown, 1 a Concord Township, Delaware County resident (“Appell ant”), appeals the Commonwealth Court’s order affirming the trial court’s dismissal of her petition to place, on the November 2014 ballot, a re ferendum question seeking to change the Township’s governmental status from second-class to fir st-class. For the following reasons, we reverse the order of the Commonwealth Cour t and remand to the trial court for further proceedings, consistent with this opinion.

The following issue of first impression has been present ed before this Court: Does 53 P.S. § 55207 restrict granting of a registered voter petition to submit to voters of the subject township, a ballot questio n for reclassification to First Class, to the first municipal or general electio n at least ninety days

1 Although the lower court opinions list Brown and Con cord First, a local citizens group, as Appellants, since Brown is a pro se litigant, she cann ot represent Concord First.[J-110-2014] - 2

after only the ascertainment of the minimum population density specified in the statute of three hundred inhabitants per square m ile, or does 53 P.S. § 55207 require submission of the ballot question to vote rs of the subject township at the first municipal or general election at least ninety days after both the ascertainment of minimum population density an d after a petition signed by five per centum of the registered voter of the township is filed with the court?

I. Background On July 28, 2014, pursuant to 53 P.S. § 55207, Appe llant filed a petition with the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, seeking to place the referendum question “Should Concord Township become a Township of the First Class?” on the November 2014 ballot. The petition contained 994 signatures ( 8.5%) out of the Township’s 11,640 registered voters and claimed that as of the 2010 censu s, the Township had a population density of around 1,258 inhabitants per square mile (“ IPSM”). As stated, both figures easily exceeded the statutory thresholds of 300 IPSM an d 5% registered voter signatures, which Appellant believed operated as conjun ctive preconditions. 2 On August 6, 2014, seven named qualified electors (“Ap pellees”) filed objections and claimed the petition was substantively and procedur ally defective under the statute, which they argued was time-limited to the first municip al or general election occurring at least ninety days after the 2010 census. That same day , the Delaware County Bureau of

2 The statute reads, in relevant part: At the first general or municipal election occurring, a t least ninety days after the ascertainment, by special enrollment or from the l ast preceding United States census, that any township of the second class has a population of at least three hundred inhabitants to the square mile, a nd after a petition signed by at least five per centum of the registered vo ters of the township has been filed in the quarter sessions court, the questi on of whether such township of the second class shall become a township of the first class shall be submitted to the voters of the township . . . . 53 P.S. § 55207.[J-110-2014] - 3

Elections (“Intervenor”) filed a petition to interven e and a request for declaratory relief, claiming that in addition to not satisfying the stat utory requirements, the petition should be dismissed because a home rule study referendum question wa s already on the ballot (which voters later approved), and that if Appellant’ s referendum question were successful, the subsequent change in Township government could violate the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas denied the petition on August 14, 2014. The trial court read 53 P.S. § 55207 to restri ct second- to first-class township referendum questions to the first municipal or general election occurring at least ninety days after the township’s population density has been fo rmally ascertained at 300 or more IPSM, 3 as long as a petition has been signed by at least 5% of the township’s registered voters. Noting that the last United States census was tallied in 2010 and presented to the Commonwealth in 2011, and that the first municipal and general elections occurring at least ninety days after respective ly took place in 2012 and 2013, the trial court concluded that the petition failed t o meet the statutory requirements. A Commonwealth Court panel affirmed in a unanimous p ublished opinion on September 26, 2014. See In re Petition to Submit B allot Question to Concord Tp. Voters, 100 A.3d 765 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2014) (hereinafter “In re Petition”). Contrary to Appellant’s argument that the “first . . . election occ urring at least ninety days after” language applies to both the population density and p etition signature filing requirements as simultaneous prerequisites, the Commonwealth Court f ound that:

3 The population density requirement may be verified from the United States census or by “special enrollment.” 53 P.S. § 55207. Special en rollment may be performed, no later than one year before the upcoming United State s census, upon petition by the owners of 25% of a second-class township’s assessed real estate . 53 P.S. § 55205. A specially appointed commissioner then determines if the township’s population density meets the statutory threshold. Id.[J-110-2014] - 4

“[F]irst election” relates only to the phrase with whi ch it is immediately juxtaposed, “ascertainment [of population] . . . from the last preceding United States census.” The phrase “first election 90 d ays after [ascertainment of population]” operates as a clear time limitation which serves the necessary purpose of ensuring that the popula tion density upon which the ballot question is based remains accurate when the matter is put to the voters. The time limitation would be entirel y eviscerated if the [appellants] could extend it by waiting several years t o file their petition with the court.

In re Petition, 100 A.3d at 767. The Commonwealth Court also noted that the original statute, enacted in 1931, did not require (or even allow for) petition signatures. Instead, the referendum question was automatically added to the next ballot occurring at le ast ninety days after the formal ascertainment of a second-class township’s population densi ty at 300 or more IPSM. 4 The Commonwealth Court accordingly found that the pe tition signature filing requirement, added to the statute in 1941, was not intended to chan ge the ninety-day time limitation, which would otherwise frustrate its purpose. 5

4 See Act of Jun. 24, 1931, P.L. 1206, § 207 (origina l statute). At the first general or municipal election occurring a t least ninety days after ascertainment, by special enrollment or from the United States census, including the United States census of [1930] and each sub sequent census, that any township of the second class has a population of at least three hundred inhabitants to the square mile, the question w hether such township of the second class shall become a township of the first cla ss shall be submitted to the voters of the township . . . .

Id.

5 See Act of Jul. 24, 1941, P.L. 502, §1 (first amende d statute). At the first general or municipal election occurring , or at a special election held, at least ninety days after the ascertainment, by special enrollment or from the last preceding United States census, that any township of the second class has a population of at least three hundred i nhabitants to the square mile, and after the filing of a petition signed by at least five per centum of the registered voters of the township has been filed in the quarter sessions court , the question whether such township of the second class (continuedJ)[J-110-2014] - 5

Appellant filed a timely petition for allowance of a ppeal, and on October 17, 2014, we granted allocatur to address the issue as stated supra . On November 17, 2014, the Concord Township Government Study Commission (“Commission ”), composed of seven named commissioners-elect (“Commissioners-Elect”) who, pur suant to the Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law, 53 P.S. § 2911 et seq ., were elected in November 2014 to form the Commission (together “Amici”), filed an am icus brief, sought intervenor status, and requested an enlargement in the briefing schedule. We denied Amici’s application to intervene and for enlargement of briefing schedul e on December 31, 2014.

II. Discussion

A. Arguments of the Parties

1. Appellant Redacting the words she believes are not in substantive d ispute, Appellant presents the text of 53 P.S. § 55207 as follows: At the first . . . election occurring, at least ninety days after the ascertainment [that the township has the minimum popul ation density], and after a petition [meeting its requirements] has been filled with the . . . court, the question . . . shall be submitted to the vote rs of the township . . . .

Appellant’s Brief at 14. Appellant maintains that t he grammatical structure of “. . . at least ninety days after

the ascertainment . . . , and after the petition . . . has been filed” indicates both requirements must be met before determining the timing of “the first general or

(Jcontinued) shall become a township of the first class shall be submit ted to the voters of the township . . . . A special election for such purpose shall be held

. . . upon petition signed by at least five per centum of the registered voters of the township.

. . . . Id. (emphasis in published statute to denote changes f rom original).[J-110-2014] - 6

municipal election occurring at least ninety days after. ” Id (emphasis in original). Appellant adds that Appellees’ interpretation “fundam entally alters the statute’s language, adding a restrictive ‘only’ and changing the ‘and afte r’ phrasing for the petition prerequisite to ‘and if.’” Id. at 15. In addition to its plain text, Appellant avers the sta tutory history of 53 P.S. § 55207 and related statutes are favorable to her position. A ppellant argues that although the original statute called for the automatic addition of the referendum question to the next eligible ballot, its 1941 revision, which added the pe tition signature filing requirement, “unambiguously tied both prerequisites to the determin ation of timing for which election the question would be submitted to voters.” Appellant ’s Brief at 16. Appellant adds that the new option of a special election, placed as a clause between the generally scheduled elections and “at least ninety days after” clauses, ind icates the legislature’s intent that the petition signatures be filed at least ninety days befor e either type of election. 6 Appellant also believes that the ninety-day period was necessary f or the county board of elections to adequately prepare the ballots and ballot instructi ons, especially in 1941. Appellant additionally cites 53 P.S. § 55208, which con trols where a second- to first-class township referendum question fails to obtain a majority vote. 7 Appellant first

6 Appellant notes that although the legislature remov ed the special election provision when it amended the statute for the last time in 194 9, it left the petition signature filing requirement in conjunction with the “ after

. . . and after

” grammatical structure. Appellant’s Brief at 18.

7 See 53 P.S. § 55208 (returns of election and effect thereof). . . . . If a majority of the votes cast at any such ele ction shall be in favor of remaining a township of the second class, no further pro ceedings shall be had for a period of two years, after which period the supervisors, by unanimous action, may, or, upon petition of ten per ce ntum of the registered voters of the township, shall, through the County Boar d of Elections, (continuedJ)[J-110-2014] - 7

notes that the statute mandates a two-year wait befor e the question may be resubmitted “in the manner hereinbefore provided,” meaning that second- to first-class referendum questions were never meant to be tethered to the first election immediately following the census. Appellant’s Brief at 19. Appellant also claims t hat prior to this case, many former second-class townships; including Pocono, Monroe Cou nty (2013), 8 Lower Macungie, Lehigh County (2007), and Whitemarsh, Mont gomery County (1956); approved and passed first-class referendums well beyond th e first ballot available ninety-plus days after the most recent census. Appellant further claims the lower courts’ holding that a strict time limitation ensures the township’s population density remains above t he statutory threshold is faulty policy reasoning. Appellant argues that while “it is p ossible that a township with [a] population density just above the minimum might late r fall below it, . . . given the unrelenting historic trend toward growing population, it is impossible . . . to justify an argument that the legislature had that overriding con cern.” Appellant’s Brief at 22. 9

(Jcontinued) resubmit the question to the electors of the township i n the manner hereinbefore provided.

Id.

8 The Pocono Township referendum was actually timely un der the opposing parties’ reading of the statute, since the full results of the 2 010 census were not accepted by the Commonwealth until August 17, 2011. See Holt v. 201 1 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 614 Pa. 364, 378, 38 A.3d 711, 719 (2012) ( noting that the Legislative Data Processing Center’s acceptance of the complete 2010 census da ta package as “usable” triggered, in that case, “the ninety-day period for f iling a preliminary redistricting plan”). 9 Appellant’s sole citation in support of this claim is the general (though easily verifiable) statement that “Pennsylvania’s population has continued to grow with every census since this statute was passed, up to and including the census of 2 010.” Appellant’s Brief at 22-23 n.6. See Census of Population and Housing, U.S

. C ENSUS B UREAU (Dec. 3, 2014), https://www.census.gov/prod/www/decennial.html.[J-110-2014] - 8

Appellant also remarks that 53 P.S. §§ 55209-55209(a) already address the scenario where a first-class township’s population density falls bel ow 300 IPSM. 10 In that case, voters may (but are not required to) revert to second -class status via a referendum question that is automatically placed on the next ballo t. 53 P.S. § 55209(a).

2. Appellees Appellees respond that outside of special enrollment (wh ich is not at issue here), 53 P.S. § 55207 requires timely utilization of the U nited States census. Appellees assert that limiting second- to first-class township referendum questions to the first election following formal population density ascertainment is th e only way to “allow the electorate, elected officials, potential candidates, and the County Board of Elections a rational and

10 53 P.S. §§ 55209-55209(a) state that: At any time, not less than one year before the time fixed for taking a decennial census of the United States, whenever the ow ners of twenty-five per centum of the assessed valuation of the real estate of any township of the first class shall present their petition to the court of quarter sessions averring that the township no longer has a population of three hundred inhabitants to the square mile, and shall give such secur ity as the court may prescribe for the payment of all costs and expenses which m ay be incurred in any procedure had upon said petition, the court shal l appoint a commissioner to perform the duties hereafter prescribed.

. . . . 53 P.S. § 55209 (ascertainment of population). At the first general or municipal election occurring a t least ninety days after the ascertainment by special enrollment or from the las t preceding United States census, that any township of the first class no lon ger has a population of at least three hundred inhabitants to t he square mile, the question whether such township of the first class shall be reestablished as a township of the second class shall be submitted to the vo ters of the township . . . . 53 P.S. § 55209(a) (submission of question to voters; re turns of election, and effect thereof).[J-110-2014] - 9

reasonable basis to consider submission of [the] question to voters until the results of the next census are ascertained.” Appellees’ Brief at 4. Appellees otherwise maintain that Appellant’s “distorte d logic” would allow, with respect to the 2010 census, for the consideration of seco nd- to first-class township referendum questions any time between 2012 and 2020 . Id. Appellees claim that within this timeframe, “[p]ossibly 3 to 4 municipal ele ction cycles could have taken place in which the majority of voters elected supervisors only to have this mandate potentially overturned,” and that “a candidate could run for super visor in a municipal election held 90 days after ascertainment, lose the election, then . . . circulate a petition for First Class the following year for the sole purpose of unseating the duly elected supervisor.” Id.

3. Intervenor Intervenor largely echoes Appellees’ arguments, emphasiz ing that the plain text, statutory history, and sound public policy support the lo wer courts’ reasoning. Intervenor also implies that Appellant’s petition lacks su fficient signatures, noting that the trial court expressed concern without directly addressing the issue.

4. Amici Amici note that Concord Township voters approved a ref erendum pursuant to the Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law, 53 P.S. § 2911 et seq., whereby Commissioners-Elect were chosen to study the possibility of home rule government and recommend accordingly. 11 Amici argue that by establishing the Commission, Townsh ip voters have exercised their right to adopt their own f orm of local government. Amici

11 If the majority of commission members were to recomme nd a home rule charter or optional plan, a referendum would be placed on the b allot, giving Township voters the final decision. Otherwise, the group would be discharge d and no change would take place.[J-110-2014] - 10

claim that if Appellant’s referendum question were ad ded to the ballot, which would purportedly be before the Commission even began its stu dy, the reason for and purpose of that study would be rendered moot. Amici otherwise incorporate Appellees’ and Intervenor’s allegations that Appellant failed to comp ly with the statutory requirements. Appellant counters that at the time Amici filed their brief, the results of the November election had not yet been certified, meaning the Commission had not validly formed and the Commissioners-Elect could not take legal a ction in its name. 53 P.S. § 2915(a). Appellant adds that even if the Commission w ere validly formed, it cannot seek relief because its purpose is limited to examining the p ossibility of home rule government. 53 P.S. § 2918. Appellant further alleges that the ballot question authorizing the Commission itself may have been unlawful, since “[a]n or dinance may not be passed . . . for the election of a government study commission . . . while proceedings are pending under any other petition . . . .” 53 P.S. § 2927(a ).

B. Standard of Review and Relevant Law Issues of statutory interpretation are pure questions of law. Accordingly, this Court’s standard of review is de novo and our scope is pl enary. Focht v. Focht, 613 Pa. 48, 52, 32 A.3d 668, 670 (2011). This Commonwealth’ s statutes shall be interpreted under the rules set forth in 1 Pa.C.S. § 1901 et seq., unless their application would result

in a construction that contravenes the intent of the G eneral Assembly. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1901. The General Assembly is presumed to not intend a result that is absurd, unreasonable, or impossible to execute. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1). The meaning of words and phrases shall be discerned thro ugh the rules of grammar and in accordance with their common and approve d usage. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903. While a statute’s plain language is generally the best i ndicator of its legislative intent, where there are issues of ambiguity, additional facto rs may be considered, including the[J-110-2014] - 11

occasion and necessity for the statute, the circumstances un der which the statute was enacted, the object to be attained, and the consequences of a particular interpretation. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c); Malt Beverages Distribs. Ass’n v. Penn sylvania Liquor Control Bd., 601 Pa. 449, 974 A.2d 1144, 1149 (2009). While a st atute’s grammar and punctuation shall not control or affect its legislative intent, “[w ]ords and phrases which may be necessary to the proper interpretation of a statute an d which do not conflict with its obvious purpose and intent, nor in any way affect its scope and operation, may be added in the construction thereof.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1923(b)-(c)

. An amended statute shall be viewed as merging into, a nd becoming one with, the original statute. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1953. In addition, t he amendment shall be construed as if it had been part of the original statute. American B rake Shoe Co. v. Dist. Lodge 9 of Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 373 Pa. 164, 173, 94 A.2d 884, 887 (1953). However, where a statute has been amended multiple times, the most recen t amendment shall be read into the statute as previously amended and not into the sta tute as originally enacted. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1954. Statutes in pari materia (related t o the same persons, things, or classes of things) shall be viewed together as one statute. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1932.

C. Analysis Appellant argues that based on the text alone, the po pulation density and petition signature filing requirements must both be fulfilled b efore the ninety-day time limitation triggers with respect to the first upcoming election. T he opposing parties maintain that the population density requirement alone starts the “a t least ninety days after” clock, with the petition signature filing requirement serving as a n additional prerequisite. Both sides cite the statutory history of 53 P.S. § 55207 and rela ted statutes, and the public policy reasoning behind those statutes, in support of their positions.[J-110-2014] - 12 1. Statutory Interpretation Since 53 P.S. § 55207 has been amended three times, it s plain text cannot be examined in isolation. Rather, it must be viewed sequ entially, in light of its past iterations. This entails a two-step process in the case a t bar. Without losing sight of the statute as a whole, the first amendment to the statute “shall be construed as merging into the original statute . . . and viewed [together] as o ne statute passed at one time.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1953. The second amendment, by extension, “ shall be read into the original statute as previously amended and not . . . as origin ally enacted.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1954. Abridged to its relevant portions, the original stat ute reads: At the first . . . election occurring at least ninety da ys after ascertainment, . . . that any township of the second class has a popula tion of at least three hundred inhabitants to the square mile, the question w hether such township of the second class shall become a township of the first cla ss shall be submitted to the voters of the township . . . . Act of Jun. 24, 1931, P.L. 1206, § 207. Its first amen dment states: At the first general or municipal election occurring , or at a special election held, at least ninety days after the ascertainment . . . th at any township of the second class has a population of at least three hu ndred inhabitants to the square mile, and after the filing of a petition signed by at least five per centum of the registered voters of the township has been filed in the quarter sessions court , the question whether such township of the second class shall become a township of the first class shall be submit ted to the voters of the township . . . .

Act of Jul. 24, 1941, P.L. 502, §1 (emphasis in publishe d statute to denote changes from original). The original statute called for automatically adding the referendum question to the first ballot occurring no fewer than ninety days after formal ascertainment of the requisite population density. The first amendment made two not able additions: the petition signature filing requirement, which carried over to th e present statute, and a special election option, which did not. Regardless, reading t he original act and its first[J-110-2014] - 13

amendment as one cohesive statute, the plain language su pports Appellant’s belief that the population density and petition signature filing requirements must both be fulfilled in order to activate the ninety-day time limitation. R emoval of the special election option does not change this conclusion. The present statute read s: At the first . . . election occurring, at least ninety days after the ascertainment, . . . that any township of the second cla ss has a population of at least three hundred inhabitants to the square mile, and after a petition signed by at least five per centum of the registered vo ters of the township has been filed . . . , the question of whether such tow nship of the second class shall become a township of the first class shall be submi tted to the voters of the township . . . .

53 P.S. § 55207.

The Commonwealth Court’s finding that “‘first election ’ relates only to the phrase with which it is immediately juxtaposed” belies the stat ute’s plain language. In re Petition, 100 A.3d at 767. Rather, the Commonwealt h Court’s interpretation transforms

“after . . . and after” into “after . . . and provided .” Even assuming arguendo that the statute is ambiguous and warrants the consideration of ot her relevant factors, there are no additional related statutes or salient public policy concerns that undercut Appellant’s argument. 53 P.S. § 55208 proves instructive. As not ed by Appellant, second- to first-class township referendum questions that fail to pass by a majority vote may be resubmitted two years later “in the manner hereinbefo re provided” in 53 P.S. § 55207. 53 P.S. § 55208. This contradicts the opposing parties’ claim that such questions may only be submitted immediately after the census or specia l enrollment. Appellant’s citation to 53 P.S. §§ 55209-55209(a), wh ich govern where a first-class township’s population density later falls below 300 IPS M, is less on-point. Those statutes state that township voters may choose, via refer endum, to revert to second-class status either upon petition between censuses or automati cally after the next census.[J-110-2014] - 14

There is nothing mutually exclusive about the language of those statutes and Appellees’ reading of 53 P.S. § 55207. See Cozzone ex rel. Co zzone v. W.C.A.B., 621 Pa. 23, 39, 73 A.3d 526, 536 (2003) (unless otherwise indicated, s tatutes in pari materia shall not be read “as if one part operates to nullify, exclude or ca ncel the other”). Finally, at least two former second-class townships; namel y Lower Macungie, Lehigh County and Whitemarsh, Montgomery County; subm itted via voter petition, and approved via referendum, a change to first-class status w ell beyond the time limit as construed by the opposing parties. 12 Furthermore, when Whitemarsh Township’s referendum petition was unsuccessfully challenged as lacking in affidavits, the Montgomery County Court of Quarter Sessions never consi dered the timeliness of its submission, which would be late according to the opposing parties. See Whitemarsh Tp. Referendum, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 271, 274-75 (Pa.Quar.Se ss. 1955) (reciting the statutory text without addressing the “at least ninety days afte r” language). 13

2. Public Policy The opposing parties’ public policy arguments are similar ly unavailing. While the

Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that a strict time limita tion is necessary to ensure the “[ascertainment of population] . . . upon which the ba llot question is based remains

12 Once again, the Pocono Township referendum was timely under the lower courts’ and opposing parties’ reading of the statute. See supra n. 9. For details regarding the Pocono and Lower Macungie referendums, see David Pier ce, Drive in Pocono Township for First Class Status Gains Momentum, P OCONO R ECORD , Jul. 28, 2013, 12:01 AM, http://www.poconorecord.com/article/20130728/News/30728 0341.

13 The plaintiff in Whitemarsh did not raise the issue o f timeliness, and it is never the responsibility of the court to develop claims on behalf of a party. See Zeigler v. Church of the Brethren Gen. Bd., 570 Pa. 2, 3, 807 A.2d 872, 872 (2002) (noting it is “improper for court to act as advocate and sua sponte raise defense on b ehalf of party”). Nonetheless, the quarter sessions court would have presumably remark ed on the absence of a claim that would otherwise prove fatal to the defendant’s p etition.[J-110-2014] - 15

accurate when the matter is put to the voters” appears se nsible in the abstract, actual census data safely dispels this concern. In re Petition, 100 A.3d at 767. In addition to Concord Township, whose population has experienced larg e, consistent gains since reaching 335.2 IPSM in 1970, seven other Delaware Co unty townships (and former townships) have surpassed 300 IPSM in more recent years. 14 The populations of Bethel and Thornbury, which respectively exceeded 300 IPSM in 1960 and 1970, have since grown by over 10% each census period. While Marple and Newtown’s populations have wavered since first reaching 300 IPSM in 1950, at their current population densities of 2,326.1 and 1,221.6 IPSM, these mature bedroom commun ities are safely past the point of reverting to their former agrarian states. Even relatively rural Chadds Ford and Edgmont, which have population densities of 418.4 and 406.8 IPSM, would have to lose over 25% of their current populations (over 1,000 peo ple) before returning to 300 IPSM. Appellees’ public policy arguments range from spare concl usory statements to extreme hypothetical scenarios. Common sense refutes Ap pellees’ notion that voters cannot consider second- to first-class referendum questions on “a rational and reasonable basis” unless they are rushed onto the ballot. Appellees’ Brief at 4. Appellees’ claim that “[p]ossibly 3 to 4 municipal electi on cycles could have taken place in which the majority of voters elected supervisors only to have this mandate potentially overturned,” implies that after an unspecified proba tionary period, elected officials gain an inalienable right to serve their local governments, ir respective of whether voters later decide that their officials, governmental organization , or both, require changing. Id. 15

14 Census of Population and Housing, U.S. C ENSUS B UREAU (Dec. 3, 2014), https://www.census.gov/prod/www/decennial.html.

15 See 53 P.S. § 55208 (returns of election and effect thereof): (continuedJ)[J-110-2014] - 16

Moreover, there is nothing barring second class township o fficials from re-running if and when their governments reorganize. 16 Finally, while a spurned candidate could theoretically circulate a first-class township petition “fo r the sole purpose of unseating the duly elected supervisor,” Appellees’ assumption that such an act would win over voters who did not elect that candidate in the first place is dubious at best. Appellees’ Brief at 4.

(Jcontinued) . . . . If a majority of the votes cast at any such ele ction shall be in favor of becoming a township of the first class, the government of the township of the first class shall be organized and become operative on the first Monday of January next succeeding such election, at which time the terms of the officers of the township of the second class shall cease and terminate.

Id.

16 See 53 P.S. §§ 55225, 55226 (officers for new townshi ps; election of commissioners in new townships): Whenever a new township of the first class shall be create d . . . , the court of quarter sessions shall appoint five commissioners, and the o ther elective officers to which the township is entitled . . . . The o fficers so appointed shall hold their offices from the first Monday of January f ollowing the election creating such township until the first Monday of January following the municipal election at which officers of the township are elected as hereinafter provided. 53 P.S. § 55225. At the first municipal election following the creation of a township as hereinbefore provided, if such township has not been divided into wards, there shall be elected five township commissioners at lar ge. Three of such commissioners shall be elected for terms of four years each , and tow [sic] for terms of two years each, from the first Monday of Ja nuary next following such election. . . . . 53 P.S. § 55226.[J-110-2014] - 17 3. Additional Arguments Appellant’s desired referendum question and Amici’s state d interests are tenuously connected. Beyond what appear to be statemen ts of educated conjecture, Amici fail to explain how inclusion of the referendum question would necessarily thwart the interests of voters or supersede the purpose of the Commission. Amici’s general citation to the series of statutes that permits voter- approved home rule charter government study commissions is unavailing, as is the case l aw in support of their vague assertion that finding in favor of Appellant would “co ntravene[] the long standing policy of the Courts to protect the rights of voters whenever possi ble as well as their right to select their local form of government.” Amici’s Brief at 5. The issue squarely before this Court is one of statutory interpretation. It is not, as Amici would like to believe, the public policy implicati ons of allowing an allegedly competing referendum question on a future ballot that would, in all likelihood, have appeared on the November 2014 ballot but for these p roceedings. For the same reasons this Court denied Amici’s petition to intervene, Amici’s claims require no further review. See Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionmen t Comm’n, 620 Pa. 373, 396, 67 A.3d 1211, 1224-25 (2013) (amicus briefs raising issues no t implicated by the parties warrant no consideration). Intervenor’s claim that Appellant’s petition lacks sufficie nt signatures is also tangential to the issue before this Court, and therefo re requires no further review. See Appeal of Municipality of Penn Hills, 591 Pa. 164, 16 9, 546 A.2d 50, 52 (1988) (stating that “the intervenor takes the litigation as he finds i t . . . and . . . must raise claims in subordination to and in recognition of the propriety of the original action . . . .”).[J-110-2014] - 18 III. Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, we hold that pursuant to 53 P.S. § 55207, secondto first-class township referendum questions shall be submi tted to voters at the first general or municipal election occurring at least ninety days after fulfilling both the population density ascertainment and petition signature filing requirements as set forth in the statute. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court and remand

to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Messrs. Justice Eakin and Baer join the opinion. Mr. Chief Justice Saylor files a dissenting opinion in wh ich Madame Justice Todd joined.