alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
S05A1204.

#### UZOMBA v. COBB COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT et al.

(619 SE2d 683)

HUNSTEIN, Presiding Justice.

Appellant Kennedy Uzomba submitted a warrant application alleging that Henry Brock-Bey punched him in the neck. Magistrate Judge Herschel Hamlen heard testimony at the application hearing from the reporting officer and an eyewitness but refused to issue a warrant, citing serious questions concerning the veracity of the accuser. Appellant thereafter filed a petition for mandamus in Cobb County Superior Court alleging that the magistrate judge abused his discretion in refusing to issue the warrant. After a hearing, the superior court dismissed the petition for writ of mandamus. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

*630Decided September 19, 2005.

Kennedy C. Uzomba, *pro se.*

*Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, DeBraé C. Kennedy, Assistant Attorney General, Deborah L. Dance,*for appellees.

1. In *Chisholm v. Cofer,*264 Ga. 512 (448 SE2d 369) (1994), we held that a magistrate judge has discretion to determine whether or not probable cause exists for the issuance of an arrest warrant and that mandamus will not lie to compel the magistrate judge to perform this discretionary act unless a gross abuse of discretion has been shown. No abuse of discretion having been shown, it was not error to dismiss the petition.

2. To the extent the case involves an original petition against the judge of the superior court, this Court is without jurisdiction. See *Brown v. Johnson,*251 Ga. 436 (306 SE2d 655) (1983).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur, except Carley, J., who concurs in Division 1 and in the judgment.*
#### DELLAMEO v. GREAT LAKES S. S. CO.

Civ. No. 25898.

United States District Court N. D. Ohio, E. D.

Jan. 21, 1949.

Harry G. Fuerst, of Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff.

Robert G. McCreary, Jr. and Leckie, McCreary, Schlitz & Hinslea, all of Cleveland, Ohio, for defendant.

JONES, Chief Judge.

This is an action under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688, for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff seaman. It is alleged that while plaintiff was working upon a scaffold suspended over the side of defendant’s ship, a rope slipped causing one end of the scaffold to drop thus precipitating him to the dock below.

Defendant has filed motions to strike paragraphs Nos. 7 and 8 of the complaint as “redundant and immaterial,” and for a more definite statement with respect to the unseaworthiness alleged in paragraph No. 11. Defendant also objects t,o certain interrogatories served by plaintiff.

1. The motion to strike paragraphs 7 and 8 of the complaint as redundant and immaterial will be sustained. Whether the plaintiff meant to denominate the challenged paragraphs “second count” or “second cause of action” is not material. The fact is, as I see it, the paragraphs mean nothing and should be and will be stricken.

2. The same may be said of paragraph 10 in the “third cause of action” or “third count”. Statement of repeating, adopting and incorporating other paragraphs means nothing.

3. Objection to Interrogatory No. 3 will be overruled since there seems to be high authority for response to such an interrogatory.

4. Objections to Interrogatories 4 and 7 will be sustained since they attempt to obtain copies of writings or other documents which only may be obtained under Rule 34, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.

5. Motion for a definite statement in respect of the allegation of unseaworthiness of the vessel and its appurtenances will be sustained. Since paragraph 11 of the complaint alleges unseaworthiness of the vessel and its appurtenances as an independent ground of recovery it would seem to be the better part of good, indeed, if *31not required, pleading to state in what respects the vessel and its appurtenances were unseaworthy or not reasonably safe or proper for the voyage.'
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#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v John Lopez, Appellant.

[822 NYS2d 658]

Kane, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Washington County (Hall, Jr., J.), rendered February 8, 2005, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of attempted promoting prison contraband in the first degree.

In satisfaction of an indictment, defendant entered an *Alford*plea of guilty to one count of attempted promoting prison contraband in the first degree in exchange for an agreed-upon sentence which was imposed by County Court. By virtue of his failure to move to withdraw his plea or vacate his conviction, defendant failed to preserve for our review his arguments that the record does not contain sufficient proof of guilt to support his *Alford*plea, his plea was involuntary and his counsel was ineffective *(see People v Tausinger,*21 AD3d 1181, 1182 [2005]; *People v Sales,*18 AD3d 962, 962, 963 [2005]). Were we to consider defendant’s claims, we would find them without merit. The record reflects that counsel procured an advantageous plea for defendant and that this experienced criminal defendant made a rational choice to avoid the strong possibility of conviction by accepting the plea agreement. While the better practice is to have the prosecutor spread on the record the evidence of defendant’s guilt, upon review of the unusual incident report and related records which were available to County Court, and noting that the court reviewed the grand jury minutes, we are satisfied that there was strong, competent evidence of defendant’s guilt *(see People v Spulka,*285 AD2d 840, 841 [2001], *lv denied*97 NY2d 643 [2001]). Consequently, there is no basis in the record to invoke this Court’s interest of justice jurisdiction to review these unpreserved claims. Accordingly, we affirm.

Cardona, RJ., Spain, Mugglin and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
#### GREEN v. McGAUGHY et al.

No. 188.

District Court, E. D. Tennessee, S. D.

Dec. 30, 1940.

*605F. Todd Meacham, of Chattanooga, Tenn., for plaintiff.

Sizer, Chambliss & Kefauver, of Chattanooga, Tenn., for defendants.

DARR, District Judge.

The motion is to strike from the complaint language used in describing the plaintiff’s injuries, as follows, “and he was otherwise injured”. Or that the plaintiff be required to specifically set out such injuries as might be covered by the clause, “and he was otherwise injured”.

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, provides that as to the relief sought it shall be a short and plain statement of the claim.

Rule 84, F.R.C.P., provides that the forms in the appendix to the Rules are to indicate the simplicity and brevity which the Rules contemplate.

In these forms on suggested complaints based upon negligence for personal injuries the expression “and was otherwise injured” appears.

From the above, it is my opinion that the complaint is sufficient in this respect.

Should the defendants need further information in this regard, it might be obtained under the provisions of the Rules by discovery in any one of the several methods provided.

The motion of the defendants is overruled. Order accordingly.
## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S O F T E X A S NO. WR-84,085-02
IN RE JERMAINE AND RE GR ANT, Relator
ON AP P LICATION FOR A WRIT OF M ANDAM US CAUSE NO. 1016934-A IN THE 230TH DIS TRICT COURT

F ROM HARRIS COUNTY
Per curiam . O R D E R Relator has filed a motion for leave to file an a pplication for a

writ of mandamus pursuant to the orig inal jurisdiction of this Court. I n it, he contends that he filed an application for a writ of habea s corpus in the 230th District Court of Har ris County , that more than 35 day s have elapse d, and that the application has not y et been forwa rded to this Court. Relator contends that the district court enter ed an or der de signating issues on July 1, 2013. Respondent, the J udg e of the 230th District Court of Har ris County , shall file a response with this Court by having the District Clerk submit the rec ord on such habea s corpus application. I n the alterna tive, Respondent may resolve the issues set out in the order desig nating issues and then have the District Clerk submit the rec ord on such application. I n either case , Respondent’s answe r shall2

be submitt ed wi t h i n 3 0 d ay s of the date of this order
. This application for leave to file a writ of mandamus will be held in abe y ance until R espondent ha s submitt ed his response
.
Filed: May

4, 2016 Do not publish
# table83_q10.3_state
Exhibit 10(j)(2) Amendment to Letter of Understanding regarding Non-Executive
Chairman of the Board position and Consulting Agreement dated February 3, 2002
between the Registrant and Leonard M. Snyder.


February 13, 2002

Mr. Leonard M. Snyder
6260 N. Desert Moon Loop
Tucson, Arizona 85750


         Re:  Amendment to Letter of Understanding Dated February 7, 2001
                 Regarding Non-Executive Chairman Position

Dear Lenny:


As discussed, as a result of the renewal of your employment agreement, the term
of the letter agreement dated February 7, 2001 regarding your prospective role
as Non-Executive Chairman ("Letter Agreement") shall be revised as follows:


1.       Length of Term. Upon the completion of your employment under the
         revised employment agreement, dated February 3, 2002, you shall
         either be reinstated as non-Executive Chairman of the Board or
         appointed Executive Chairman for the period commencing February 2, 2003
         until the June 2004 Annual Shareholders' meeting in accordance with the
         applicable terms outlined in the Letter Agreement.

Except as set forth above, all other terms of such Letter Agreement shall remain
in effect.


Sincerely Yours,

Laurie M. Shahon
Chair - Compensation Committee

Acknowledged and Agreed:

Leonard M. Snyder:  /s/ Leonard M. Snyder
                    ---------------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

 

 : 

BERNARD CAMPBELL, : 

 : 

 Plaintiff, : 

 : 

 v. : 

 : 

JAMES GIBB, et al., : 

 :

 Defendants. : 

 : 

Civil No. 10-6584 (JBS) 

 ORDER 

 

 For the reasons set forth by this Court in the Opinion 

filed herewith; 

 It is on this 20th day of December 2013, 

 ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 

No. 58), is hereby DENIED as to defendant Gibb, and GRANTED as 

to defendants Zickefoose, Turner-Foster, and Lopez; and it is 

further 

 ORDERED that defendants Zickefoose, Turner-Foster, and 

Lopez are hereby DISMISSED from this action. 

 s/ Jerome B. Simandle 

 JEROME B. SIMANDLE 

 Chief U.S. District Judge
[893 NYS2d 420]

#### Great Wall Acupuncture, P.C., as Assignee of Maria Gonzalez, Appellant, v GEICO Insurance Company, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department,

November 17, 2009

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Law Offices of Eva Gaspari, PLLC,*Brooklyn, and *Mischel & Horn, EC.,*New York City *(Scott T. Horn*of counsel), for appel*24lant. *Law Offices of Teresa M. Spina,*Woodbury *(Emilio A. Cacace*of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant had partially paid plaintiff’s claim prior to the commencement of the action. At trial, the parties stipulated to plaintiff’s prima facie case and further agreed that defendant had timely denied the unpaid portion of the claim on the ground that the charges for acupuncture treatments exceeded the maximum fees under the appropriate fee schedule. Additionally, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the claim form and the denial of claim form were admitted into evidence. After a nonjury trial on the issue of the propriety of the fees charged, the Civil Court granted judgment to defendant dismissing the complaint, and this appeal by plaintiff ensued.

A person who seeks to practice acupuncture must be either licensed (Education Law § 8214) or certified (Education Law § 8216) to do so *{see*Education Law § 8212). The training to obtain a license remains the same even if the person seeking to practice acupuncture has a license in a different profession, such as a chiropractic license *(see 8*NYCRR 52.16 [b]; *cf.*8 NYCRR 52.16 [a]). Indeed, at trial, plaintiff’s witness, who was both a licensed acupuncturist and a licensed chiropractor, so testified. Accordingly, in light of the licensure requirements, we hold, as a matter of law, that an insurer may use the workers’ compensation fee schedule for acupuncture services performed by chiropractors to determine the amount which a licensed acupuncturist is entitled to receive for such acupuncture services *(see Great Wall Acupuncture v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co.,*16 Misc 3d 23 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; *see also AVA Acupuncture, P.C. v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co.,*23 Misc 3d 140[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51017[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; *AVA Acupuncture, P.C. v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co.,*17 Misc 3d 41 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; Ops Gen Counsel NY Ins Dept No. 04-10-03 [Oct. 2004] [http://www.ins.state.ny.us/ogco2004/ rg041003.htm (accessed Nov. 25, 2009)]). Consequently, since it is undisputed that the instant defendant reimbursed *25plaintiff pursuant to the workers’ compensation fee schedule for acupuncture services rendered by a chiropractor, plaintiff is not entitled to any additional reimbursement. Accordingly, the judgment dismissing the complaint is affirmed.

Weston, J.E, Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
|                                         | 31.1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
|---------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                                         |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
|CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
|                                         |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
|I, Lisa Norman, certify that:           
|1.                                       | I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of American Home Alliance Corporation.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
|2.                                       | Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report.
|3.                                       | Based on my knowledge, the financial statements and other financial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results from operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report.                





|By:  /s/Lisa NormanLisa Norman
Chief Executive Officer & Chairman | Date:  December 10, 2012
|----------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------
**Exhibit 32****SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**     I, Thian Hoo Tan, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report of Komag, Incorporated onForm 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 1, 2006 fully complies with the requirements of Section13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Form10-K fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations ofKomag, Incorporated.       BY: /s/ Thian Hoo Tan            Thian Hoo Tan
#### Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. *v.*Texas *&*P. Ry. Co.

*(Circuit Court, E. D. Louisiana.*

March 10, 1887.)

Master and Servant—Negligence—Fellow-Servant.

That the common master is not liable to a servant for injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow-servant is a rule recognized in the Únited States courts, *(Hough*v. *Railway Co.,*100 U. S. 213,) and a brakeman of a railroad train cannot consequontlyrecover of the company for injuries caused by the negligence of the engineer.

On Exceptions to Master’s Report.

Petition of E. M. Pierpont, ex-employe, praying for compensation for persona] injuries.

*John II. Kennard,*Jr., for petitioner.

*W. W. Howe*and *S. S.*Prentiss, for receivers.

Pardee, J.

The evidence in the case shows that the petitioner, a brakeman, was injured by the negligence of the engineer, his own negligence contributing thereto, while they were both employed on the same freight train. The master’s report is practically to the same purport, but the master seems to find that the petitioner’s negligence was mitigated to slight negligence for which he was not responsible, because of his reasonable faith that the engineer would not be guilty of any negligence. The evidence shows clearly that, but for the primary negligence of the petitioner J he would not have been inj ored, although the engineer had started his train as he did without proper signal. It also seems clear in this case that the brakeman and the engineer were fellow-servants; and, as the general rule exempting the common master from liability to a servant for injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow-servant is recognized by the courts of the United States, (see *Hough*v. *Railway Co.,*100 U. S. 213,) the petitioner should not recover from the receivers in this case, unless in some way they can be shown to be in fault. A careful examination of the evidence, and of the master’s report, shows no fault of commission nor omission on the part of the receivers.

An order will be entered sustaining the exceptions to the special master’s report, and dismissing the petition of said E. M. Pierpont.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE CARLOS ZAPATA

- SUSTAITA, Petitioner,

v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent. No. 14

- 70317 Agency No. A200

- 248

- 426

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 26, 2016 **
Before: SCHROEDER, CANBY, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges. Jose Carlos Zapata

- Sustaita , a native and citizen of Mexico , petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s order of removal

. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

AUG 3 2016 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 14

- 70317

remand, Romero

- Ruiz v. Mukasey , 538 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008 ). We deny the petition for review. Zapata

- Sustaita does not contest the BIA’s conclusion that any asylum claim
would be time

- barred. S ee Corro

- Barragan v . Holder , 718 F.3d 1174, 1177 n.5 (9th Cir. 2013) (failure to contest issue in op ening brief resulted in waiver).
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Zapata

- Sustaita failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for withholding of removal because he
did not establish a nexus between the persecution he fears and a statutorily protected ground. See Parussimova v. Mukasey , 555 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir.
200 9 ); Zetino v. Holder , 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An alien’s desire to
be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground

. ”). Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that Zapata

Sustaita failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibil ity for CAT relief because he did
not establish he would more likely than not face torture at the instigation of, or with the acquiescence of

, the Mexican government. See Silaya v. Mukasey , 524 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2008).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED
.
<PAGE>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.14


Separation Agreement
--------------------

In the event of your termination for any reason other than for cause, you will
receive a separation package to include a salary continuation of up to one year
of base salary and continued medical and dental benefits only up until such time
as you become re-employed or one year, which ever comes first.

This separation agreement would survive a change in control but can not be
triggered by the change of control or any voluntary separation notice by the
employee.



Recipients of Form of Separation Agreement
------------------------------------------

1.  Glenn P. Muir
2.  David Brady
3.  Peter C. Kershaw
4.  Eric von Stetten
5.  Peter K. Soltani
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

(609) 989-2144

Fax: (609) 989-0451

 CHAMBERS OF CLARKSON S. FISHER U.S. COURTHOUSE

 DOUGLAS E. ARPERT 402 E. STATE STREET, ROOM 6000

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE TRENTON, NJ 08608

May 24, 2011

LETTER ORDER

RE: 10-CV-6775(JAP) PATRICIA J. DELEO V. MONMOUTH CO. MOSQUITO

COMMISSION

A Settlement Hearing will be held by the undersigned on May 25, 2011 at 12:00 P.M., in Trenton

- Courtroom 6W before Magistrate Judge Douglas E. Arpert. Counsel and client representatives

with full settlement authority are required to attend.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Douglas E. Arpert 

DOUGLAS E. ARPERT

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 3:10-cv-06775-JAP-DEA Document 12 Filed 05/24/11 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 95