In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-18-00237-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 158th District Court

Denton County, Texas

Trial Court No. 14-09721-431

Before Pittman, J.; Sudderth, C.J.; and Kerr, J.

Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

IN THE INTEREST OF H.B., A CHILD
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Z.B. (Father) appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating his

parent-child relationship with his daughter H.B. After a jury trial, the jury found that 

termination of the relationship was in H.B.’s best interest and that Father:

• knowingly placed or knowingly allowed . . . [H.B.] to remain in 

conditions or surroundings which endangered [her] physical or 

emotional well-being . . . [;]

• engaged in conduct or knowingly placed [H.B.] with persons who 

engaged in conduct which endangered [her] physical or emotional 

well-being . . . [; and]

• failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that 

specifically established the actions necessary for [him] to obtain 

[H.B.’s] return . . . , [when she had] been in the temporary 

managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and 

Protective Services [TDFPS] for not less than nine months as a 

result of [her] removal from [Father] for abuse or neglect.

See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (2) (West Supp. 2018). The 

trial court approved the findings and incorporated them into the order terminating 

Father’s parental rights.

Father’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief stating that 

after thoroughly reviewing the record, he believes that any appeal by Father would be 

frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); 

see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) 

(holding that Anders procedures apply in parental termination cases). Father’s

appellate counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional 
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evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds of 

error to be advanced on appeal. See In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2009, pet. denied). Although given the opportunity, Father did not file a 

response to the Anders brief. TDFPS, Appellee, also filed no responsive brief.

As the reviewing appellate court, we must conduct an independent evaluation 

of the record to decide whether Father’s appellate counsel correctly determined that 

the appeal is frivolous. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1991); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.). Having 

carefully reviewed the record and the Anders brief, we agree with Father’s appellate 

counsel that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. See K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d at 619. 

We find nothing in the record that arguably might support the appeal. See D.D., 

279 S.W.3d at 850. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Father’s appellate counsel requests that we refer this matter back to the trial 

court “at the appropriate time” to consider “a request . . . to withdraw from further 

representation.” As his appellate counsel recognizes, Father must have counsel until 

his appeals are exhausted: “[A]ppointed counsel’s obligations can be satisfied by filing 

a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” In re P.M., 

520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016); see In re C.J., 501 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2016, pets. denied). We therefore deny appellate counsel’s request. See

P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27.
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Per Curiam

Delivered: December 20, 2018