Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 53A04-1410-PC-509 | July 27, 2015 Page 1 of 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

David A. Smith

McIntyre & Smith

Bedford, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Cynthia L. Ploughe

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Larry D. Blanton, Jr.,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Respondent.

July 27, 2015

Court of Appeals Cause No.

53A04-1410-PC-509

Appeal from the Monroe Circuit 

Court

Cause No. 53C05-0904-PC-980

The Honorable Mary Ellen Diekhoff

Barnes, Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] Larry Blanton appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. We affirm.

Issues

[2] Blanton raises three issues, which we restate as:

I. whether the post-conviction court properly 

denied Blanton’s freestanding claim regarding 

Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C);

II. whether Blanton received effective assistance 

of trial counsel; and

III. whether Blanton received effective assistance 

of appellate counsel.

Facts

[3] The facts, as stated in Blanton’s direct appeal, follow:

In the fall of 2001, eleven-year-old T.D. lived with his father and 

stepmother in Effingham, Illinois. His mother and stepfather, Blanton, 

lived in Bloomington, Indiana. T.D.’s mother had visitation every 

other weekend from the time he was three years old. That fall Blanton 

sexually touched T.D. on four consecutive visits to Bloomington. At 

the time of all the touchings Blanton was forty-two years old and T.D. 

was eleven.

The first incident occurred between midnight and one in the morning.

T.D. felt Blanton kneeling on his bed. Blanton told T.D. they were 

going to the dump in the morning; T.D. rolled over to go back to sleep, 

but Blanton did not leave. Instead, Blanton picked up T.D.’s right arm 

and put it on his erect penis having T.D. stroke it several times. Then, 

Blanton rubbed his penis on T.D.’s face and lips trying to insert it into 

T.D.’s mouth. T.D. pretended he was asleep, keeping his eyes closed 

and mouth shut as tight as possible, to avoid any further actions by 
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Blanton. All the while, T.D. could see his mother asleep in her 

bedroom. The next day, T.D. accompanied Blanton to the dump.

T.D. did not address the incident with Blanton, nor did he report the 

incident to his mother when she drove him back to Effingham. He did 

not tell his father or stepmother once he returned to Effingham.

Two weeks later T.D. returned to Bloomington for the weekend.

Again, Blanton’s kneeling on T.D.’s bed awakened him. He forced

T.D. to stroke his erect penis, rubbed his penis on T.D.’s face and lips, 

and unsuccessfully attempted to insert his penis into T.D.’s mouth.

T.D. rolled away from Blanton. Blanton inserted his finger into T.D.’s 

anus. T.D. silently wept due to the pain of the violation.

Two weeks later Blanton repeated his acts. This time, after forcing 

T.D. to stroke his erect penis and rubbing it on T.D.’s face and lips, he 

ejaculated on T.D.’s face. T.D. still did not report any of the incidents 

to his mother, father, or stepmother for fear of his mother and his 

safety.

The final molestation occurred two weeks later. Blanton again made 

T.D. touch his erect penis before attempting to force T.D. to perform 

oral sex on him. Prior to leaving, however, Blanton placed T.D.’s 

penis in his mouth. T.D. closed his eyes, turned his head, and hoped 

for it to end. During each of T.D.’s encounters with Blanton T.D. 

believed Blanton was intoxicated, as he could smell alcohol emanating 

from Blanton. 

After the fourth incident, the molestations stopped. T.D. did not feel 

confident for approximately a month that it would not happen again, 

but tucked himself extra tight into his sheets. Eventually T.D.’s 

relationship with Blanton became less strained when T.D. noticed 

Blanton stopped drinking.

For two years T.D. did not say anything about the incidents to 

anyone. In seventh grade T.D. had sexual education classes and his 

friends began talking about sex. It was then he began [to] realize what 

had really happened between Blanton and himself. Then, at the 

beginning of his eighth grade year, his mind began to wander. 

Whenever his mind was not occupied, he thought of the encounters 

with Blanton and his grades began to suffer. His father and 

stepmother asked repeatedly what was causing this change in his 

behavior, but still T.D. did not disclose what happened. Eventually, 
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while watching a special on Michael Jackson, T.D. began to cry and 

told his father about the abuse.

Blanton v. State, No. 53A01-0606-CR-226, slip op. at 2-4 (Ind. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 

2007).

[4] On April 26, 2004, the State charged Blanton with Class A felony attempted 

child molesting, two counts of Class A felony child molesting, and Class C 

felony child molesting. Blanton was arrested on April 27, 2004. An initial 

hearing was conducted on April 28, 2004, and the trial court scheduled a 

pretrial conference for June 25, 2004. Blanton filed a motion to continue the 

pretrial conference, and the trial court rescheduled it for July 29, 2004. At the 

pretrial conference, a trial date of March 2, 2005 was set. However, the trial 

court later vacated that date due to court congestion and reset the trial for July 

28, 2005. 

[5] On July 21, 2005, Blanton filed a motion to continue the trial because “[t]he 

State wishes to add witnesses and one at least may be an ‘expert’. Counsel 

would need additional preparation time once the witness or witnesses are 

named.” App. p. 575. The motion also stated: “The State and Defense 

consulted and agreed to request this continuance.” Id. The trial court granted

the motion for continuance and set a final pretrial conference for September 13, 

2005.

1

 At the September 13th conference, the trial court set an additional final 

 

1

In its brief, the State mistakenly characterizes the September 13, 2005 pretrial conference as a trial date, 

resulting in erroneous calculations in the context of Criminal Rule 4(C).
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pretrial conference for October 25, 2005. At the October 25th conference, the 

trial court set the trial for January 30, 2006. The parties apparently also 

discussed Blanton’s Criminal Rule 4(C) concerns at the October conference, 

although we were not provided with a transcript of that conference.2

[6] On December 6, 2005, the trial court set a hearing for January 20, 2006,

regarding Blanton’s motion for discharge. However, Blanton did not file a 

motion for discharge until January 20, 2006. The parties indicated that further 

research was needed on the Criminal Rule 4(C) issue, and the trial date was 

reset for February 21, 2006, by the agreement of the parties. On February 14, 

2006, the trial court denied Blanton’s motion for discharge, and the trial was 

held as scheduled on February 21, 2006. 

[7] The jury found Blanton guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to 

an aggregate sentence of 105 years with thirty years suspended. On direct 

appeal, Blanton’s appellate counsel raised two issues, the sufficiency of the 

evidence and the propriety of his sentence. We affirmed his convictions but 

reduced his sentence to an aggregate sentence of thirty years in the Department 

of Correction. 

[8] Blanton filed a petition for post-conviction relief in 2009, and the petition was 

later amended twice. Blanton argued that the trial court erred by denying his 

 

2 Blanton asserts that “an agreement was made to preserve Blanton’s right to seek discharge” at the October 

conference. Appellant’s Br. p. 18. However, we were provided with no record to support this assertion.
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motion for discharge, that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and 

that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. After a hearing, the 

post-conviction court denied his petition. Blanton filed a motion to correct 

error, which the post-conviction court granted in part regarding its time 

calculation for the Criminal Rule 4(C) issue. However, even with the 

correction, the post-conviction court still determined that no Criminal Rule 

4(C) violation occurred. Blanton now appeals.

Analysis

[9] Blanton argues that the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition is clearly 

erroneous. A court that hears a post-conviction claim must make findings of 

fact and conclusions of law on all issues presented in the petition. Pruitt v. State, 

903 N.E.2d 899, 905 (Ind. 2009) (citing Ind. Post-conviction Rule 1(6)). “The 

findings must be supported by facts and the conclusions must be supported by 

the law.” Id. Our review on appeal is limited to these findings and conclusions. 

Id. Because the petitioner bears the burden of proof in the post-conviction 

court, an unsuccessful petitioner appeals from a negative judgment. Id. (citing 

P-C.R. 1(5)). “A petitioner appealing from a negative judgment must show that 

the evidence as a whole ‘leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion 

opposite to that reached by the trial court.’” Id. (quoting Allen v. State, 749 

N.E.2d 1158, 1164 (Ind. 2001), cert. denied). Under this standard of review, 

“[we] will disturb a post-conviction court’s decision as being contrary to law 

only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion, 

and the post-conviction court has reached the opposite conclusion.” Id. 
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I. Freestanding Claim

[10] Blanton first argues that the post-conviction court erred by denying his claim 

that the trial court should have granted his motion for discharge under Indiana 

Criminal Rule 4(C). The Indiana Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized 

that in “post-conviction proceedings, complaints that something went awry at 

trial are generally cognizable only when they show deprivation of the right to 

effective counsel or issues demonstrably unavailable at the time of trial or direct 

appeal.” Sanders v. State, 765 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind. 2002); see also Canaan v. 

State, 683 N.E.2d 227, 235-236 n.6 (Ind. 1997) (holding that the availability of 

the fundamental error exception as an exception to the waiver rule in postconviction proceedings is generally limited to “deprivation of the Sixth 

Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, or . . . an issue 

demonstrably unavailable to the petitioner at the time of his trial and direct 

appeal”), cert. denied. Whether the trial court properly denied Blanton’s 

motion for discharge was an issue that was available at the time of his direct 

appeal. We disagree with Blanton’s unsupported assertion that Criminal Rule 

4(C) issues may be presented as freestanding claims. Consequently, this 

freestanding claim was unavailable to Blanton in his post-conviction 

proceedings.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

[11] Blanton next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective. To prevail on a claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate both that his 

or her counsel’s performance was deficient and that the petitioner was 
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prejudiced by the deficient performance. Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 102, 

106 (Ind. 2000) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 

2052, 2064 (1984)), cert. denied. A counsel’s performance is deficient if it falls 

below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional 

norms. French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 824 (Ind. 2002). To meet the 

appropriate test for prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different. Id. “A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. Failure to satisfy either prong will cause the 

claim to fail. Grinstead v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ind. 2006). Most 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims can be resolved by a prejudice inquiry 

alone. Id. 

A. Criminal Rule 4(C)

[12] Blanton argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to address 

Criminal Rule 4(C) adequately. Although Blanton’s counsel filed a motion for 

discharge pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(C), Blanton argues that his trial counsel 

was ineffective because he “apparently did not object to the trial setting or 

otherwise renew the motion for discharge at the beginning of the trial. Nor did 

he seek leave for an interlocutory appeal . . . .” Appellant’s Br. p. 30. The postconviction court rejected Blanton’s claim. 

[13] Blanton’s trial counsel filed a motion for discharge pursuant to Criminal Rule 

4(C), which provides:
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No person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a 

criminal charge for a period in aggregate embracing more than one 

year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, 

or from the date of his arrest on such charge, whichever is later; except 

where a continuance was had on his motion, or the delay was caused 

by his act, or where there was not sufficient time to try him during 

such period because of congestion of the court calendar; provided, 

however, that in the last-mentioned circumstance, the prosecuting 

attorney shall file a timely motion for continuance as under 

subdivision (A) of this rule. Provided further, that a trial court may 

take note of congestion or an emergency without the necessity of a 

motion, and upon so finding may order a continuance. Any 

continuance granted due to a congested calendar or emergency shall be 

reduced to an order, which order shall also set the case for trial within 

a reasonable time. Any defendant so held shall, on motion, be 

discharged.

[14] Criminal Rule 4(C) was enacted “to provide functionality to a criminal 

defendant’s fundamental and constitutionally protected right to a speedy trial.” 

Logan v. State, 16 N.E.3d 953, 959 (Ind. 2014). The rule “places an affirmative 

duty on the State to bring the defendant to trial, but at the same time is not 

intended to be a mechanism for providing defendants a technical means to 

escape prosecution.” Id.

[15] The State’s duty to try the defendant within one year is an affirmative duty and 

the defendant is under no obligation to remind the State of its duty. Marshall v. 

State, 759 N.E.2d 665, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). However, when a trial date is 

set beyond the one-year limit provided under Criminal Rule 4(C), the defendant 

must file a timely objection to the trial date or waive his right to a speedy trial. 

Id. Moreover, “[i]f a delay is caused by the defendant’s own motion or action, 

the one-year time limit is extended accordingly.” Cook v. State, 810 N.E.2d 

1064, 1066 (Ind. 2004).
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[16] When Blanton was arrested on April 26, 2004, the Criminal Rule 4(C) period 

was triggered. See Isaacs v. State, 673 N.E.2d 757, 762 (Ind. 1996) (holding that 

the one-year period of Criminal Rule 4(C) commences with the date of arrest or 

filing of charges, whichever is later). Consequently, the State was required to 

bring Blanton to trial by April 26, 2005, unless the time was extended by court 

congestion or a continuance or delay caused by Blanton.

[17] Blanton filed a motion to continue the June 25, 2004 pretrial conference, and it 

was rescheduled for July 29, 2004, resulting in a delay of 34 days attributable to 

Blanton. Due to court congestion, the March 2, 2005 trial date was reset for 

July 28, 2005, resulting in a delay of 148 days due to court congestion.

[18] Blanton then filed a motion to continue the July 28, 2005 trial date, and it 

ultimately was rescheduled for January 30, 2006. Blanton argues, however, 

that this delay was not attributable to him because it was caused by discovery 

violations by the State. In support of his argument, Blanton relies in part on 

Biggs v. State, 546 N.E.2d 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). In Biggs, the defendant 

filed a motion to preclude the testimony of a confidential informant who failed 

to appear for depositions or, alternatively, to delay the trial until the State 

complied with discovery requests. We held: 

To put the defendants in a position whereby they must either go to 

trial unprepared due to the State’s failure to respond to discovery 

requests or be prepared to waive their rights to a speedy trial, is to put 

the defendants in an untenable situation. Therefore, we will not charge 

the defendants with any delay that may appear to have resulted from 

the July 18, 1989, motion for a continuance.

Biggs, 546 N.E.2d at 1275.
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[19] Here, however, the only information that we were provided with regarding the 

July 21, 2005 continuance request is from Blanton’s motion to continue and the 

CCS. The motion to continue provided: “The State wishes to add witnesses 

and one at least may be an ‘expert’. Counsel would need additional 

preparation time once the witness or witnesses are named.” App. p. 575. The 

motion also stated: “The State and Defense consulted and agreed to request this 

continuance.” Id. The CCS merely includes a notation that Blanton had filed a 

motion to continue, which the trial court granted. The record provided to us 

includes no information regarding alleged “discovery violations” by the State. 

Given this record, we cannot conclude that Biggs is controlling here. Blanton 

had the burden of demonstrating his claims, but we have no evidence that 

Blanton was placed in an “untenable situation” similar to the defendant in 

Biggs. Rather, given Blanton’s motion to continue and agreement to the 

continuance, the delay caused by the motion to continue is properly attributable 

to Blanton.

[20] Blanton filed a motion for discharge on January 20, 2006. The 176 days 

between July 28, 2005 (the vacated trial date) and January 20, 2006 (filing of 

the motion for discharge) are attributable to Blanton. Consequently, at the time 

Blanton filed his motion for discharge, 358 days of delays and court congestion 

extended the one-year deadline to bring Blanton to trial. The Criminal Rule 

4(C) deadline had not expired when Blanton filed his motion for discharge. In 

fact, even if all of the days between January 20, 2006, and the February 21, 
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2006 trial counted toward the Criminal Rule 4(C) deadline, the deadline also 

had not expired when Blanton was brought to trial. 

[21] Blanton has failed to show that his trial counsel was deficient or that his trial 

counsel’s alleged deficiency prejudiced him. Even if his trial counsel had 

pursued the motion for discharge further, he would have been unsuccessful

because the Criminal Rule 4(C) deadline had not expired at the time of 

Blanton’s trial. The post-conviction court properly denied Blanton’s petition on 

this issue.

B. Failure to Investigate Witnesses

[22] Blanton also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate 

three exculpatory witnesses, Dr. Michael Kane, Tess Hazel, and Chris Blanton. 

“When deciding a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to 

investigate, we apply a great deal of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Parish 

v. State, 838 N.E.2d 495, 500 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 

[23] All three proposed witnesses testified at the post-conviction hearing. Dr. Kane 

testified that he had treated Blanton and prescribed psychiatric medications for 

him during the relevant time period, that thirty to forty percent of patients 

taking the medications reported sexual dysfunction, that the side effects would 

be heightened by alcohol consumption, and that Blanton had not reported any 

sexual dysfunction.

[24] At the trial, T.D. testified that Blanton molested him after spending evenings at 

the Eagle’s Club. Hazel testified that she was an officer of the Eagle’s Club and 
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that she had no record of Blanton attending the Eagle’s Club during November 

and December of 2001. However, as a result of a 2010 burglary, many of the 

records were inaccessible.

[25] Chris Blanton testified that Blanton is his father, that he would have been living 

in the house and present during T.D.’s visitations, and that his bedroom was 

directly below T.D.’s bedroom. Chris claimed that the floors were very thin 

and that he did not hear any unusual activity in T.D.’s room.

[26] Although Blanton claims that the three witness provided exculpatory evidence 

that rebutted key claims by T.D., we disagree. We cannot conclude that 

Blanton has established a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s 

error in failing to investigate these witnesses, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different. Dr. Kane merely testified that sexual dysfunction was a 

possibility in a minority of patients given the medications he prescribed to 

Blanton. There is no evidence that Blanton actually experienced sexual 

dysfunction as a result of the medications. Given the 2010 burglary, Hazel was 

unable to say definitively that Blanton did not enter the Eagle’s Club during the 

period in question. Moreover, even if she was able to say that Blanton was not 

present at the club during the fall of 2001, the evidence would not have 

established that Blanton did not molest T.D. Even if eleven-year-old T.D. was 

mistaken about Blanton’s location prior to the molestations, we cannot say that 

the result of the proceeding would have been different. Finally, Chris’s 

testimony merely established that he did not hear any unusual activity coming 

from T.D.’s bedroom during the time period in question. That alone does not 
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establish a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s failure to 

investigate, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Blanton 

failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel regarding failure to 

investigate witnesses.

III. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

[27] Next, Blanton argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective. Specifically, 

Blanton argues that his appellate counsel should have raised the denial of his 

Criminal Rule 4(C) motion and ineffective assistance of trial counsel regarding 

the Criminal Rule 4(C) issue on direct appeal. The post-conviction court 

denied Blanton’s petition on this issue. 

[28] Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims generally fall into three basic 

categories: (1) denial of access to an appeal; (2) waiver of issues; and (3) failure 

to present issues well. Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1195 (Ind. 2006). 

Blanton argues that his appellate counsel failed to raise certain issues on appeal, 

resulting in waiver. To show that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an 

issue on appeal thus resulting in waiver for collateral review, the defendant 

must overcome the strongest presumption of adequate assistance, and judicial 

scrutiny is highly deferential. Id. “To evaluate the performance prong when 

counsel waived issues upon appeal, we apply the following test: (1) whether the 

unraised issues are significant and obvious from the face of the record and (2) 

whether the unraised issues are ‘clearly stronger’ than the raised issues.” Id.

(quoting Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 605-06 (Ind. 2001), cert. denied). 

“If the analysis under this test demonstrates deficient performance, then we 
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examine whether, ‘the issues which . . . appellate counsel failed to raise, would 

have been clearly more likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial.’” 

Id. (quoting Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 194 (Ind. 1997), cert. denied). 

Further, we must consider the totality of an attorney’s performance to 

determine whether the client received constitutionally adequate assistance. Id.

at 1195-96. Ineffective assistance is very rarely found in cases where a 

defendant asserts that appellate counsel failed to raise an issue on direct appeal. 

Id. at 1196. One reason for this is that the decision of what issues to raise is one 

of the most important strategic decisions to be made by appellate counsel. Id.

A. Motion for Discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C)

[29] Regarding Blanton’s Criminal Rule 4(C) claim, we have found that Blanton 

was not entitled to discharge. Consequently, Blanton cannot show that he was 

prejudiced by his appellate counsel’s failure to raise the denial of his motion for 

discharge on direct appeal. Even if his appellate counsel had raised the issue on 

direct appeal, Blanton would not have been successful, and he cannot show 

prejudice from his appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

[30] Blanton argues that his appellate counsel should have raised ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal regarding the Criminal Rule 4(C)

issue and trial counsel’s failure to investigate the three additional witnesses. A 

post-conviction hearing, not a direct appeal, is normally the preferred forum to 

adjudicate an ineffectiveness claim. Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208, 1219 (Ind. 
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1998), cert. denied. “When the claim of ineffective assistance is directed at 

appellate counsel for failing fully and properly to raise and support a claim of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant faces a compound burden on 

post-conviction.” Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 261-62 (Ind. 2000), cert. 

denied. “If the claim relates to issue selection, defense counsel on postconviction must demonstrate that appellate counsel’s performance was deficient 

and that, but for the deficiency of appellate counsel, trial counsel’s performance 

would have been found deficient and prejudicial.” Id. at 262. “Thus, the 

defendant’s burden before the post-conviction court was to establish the two 

elements of ineffective assistance of counsel separately as to both trial and 

appellate counsel.” Id.

[31] We have already determined that Blanton failed to demonstrate ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel regarding both of these claims. Consequently, even if 

appellate counsel had raised ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct 

appeal, he would not have been able to demonstrate that trial counsel’s 

performance was deficient and prejudicial.

[32] Moreover, regarding investigating the three witnesses, we note that: 

[E]xpecting appellate lawyers to look outside the record for error is 

unreasonable in light of the realities of appellate practice. Direct appeal 

counsel should not be forced to become a second trial counsel. 

Appellate lawyers may have neither the skills nor the resources nor the 

time to investigate extra-record claims, much less to present them 

coherently and persuasively to the trial court.

[33] Id. at 260 (quoting Woods, 701 N.E.2d at 1216). “To prevail on a claim of 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a defendant must therefore show 
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from the information available in the trial record or otherwise known to 

appellate counsel that appellate counsel failed to present a significant and 

obvious issue and that this failure cannot be explained by any reasonable 

strategy.” Id. at 261. 

[34] Blanton has failed to demonstrate that the information regarding the three 

witnesses at issue was available in the trial record or otherwise known to his 

appellate counsel. This claim fails.

Conclusion

[35] The post-conviction court properly denied Blanton’s petition for post-conviction 

relief. We affirm.

[36] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Bailey, J., concur.