No. 3--01--0570

_________________________________________________________________

							IN THE

							APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

							THIRD DISTRICT

							A.D., 2002 

In re JERMAINE J.,				)	Appeal from the Circuit Court

	a Minor					)	of the 10th Judicial Circuit,

							)	Peoria County, Illinois

(The People of the State of		)

Illinois,						)

							)

	Petitioner-Appellee,		)	Nos. 98--JD--473 and

							)		98--JD--530

	v.						)

							)	

Jermaine J.,					)	Honorable

                                )	Chris L. Frederickson,

	Respondent-Appellant).		)	Judge, Presiding.

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		JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE DELIdelivered the Opinoion of the court:n 

_________________________________________________________________

	The minor, Jermaine J., was adjudged to be delinquent under

the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/1--1 et seq. (West 1998)) for having committed the offense of unlawful

possession of a stolen motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4--103(a)(1)

(West 1998)).  He admitted committing the offense.  In a

dispositional order, he was committed to the Department of

Corrections (DOC) for an indeterminate period not to exceed seven

years.  His motion to reconsider his commitment was denied.  In

his first appeal to this court, we reversed and remanded for his

attorney to file a Rule 604(d) certificate (188 Ill. 2d R.

604(d)).  In the Interest of J.J., No. 3--99--0021 (2000) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).  The facts that led to his commitment were discussed in his first appeal.  Only

those facts necessary for an understanding of the issues in this

appeal will be discussed here.

	On remand, the minor's attorney filed a Rule 604(d)

certificate and the minor filed a "Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea

And For Reconsideration Of Sentence."  His motion was denied.  On

appeal, the minor argues that (1) on remand, the trial court

abused its discretion by failing to order and consider an updated

social investigation report prior to ruling on his motion to

withdraw and reconsider; and (2) he is entitled to credit for the

time he spent in custody prior to the date of the dispositional

order.  We affirm the denial of his motion to withdraw and

reconsider.  We rule that he is entitled to credit for his time

spent in custody prior to the date of the dispositional order. 

We remand for the trial court to calculate the number of days'

credit to which the minor is entitled.

ANALYSIS

I. Social Investigation Report

	The minor contends that the trial court abused its

discretion by failing to order and consider an updated social

investigation report prior to ruling on his motion to withdraw

and reconsider.  According to this court's research, the issue

raised by the minor is one of first impression in Illinois.  

	We review the denial of a motion to withdraw and reconsider

in a juvenile case for abuse of discretion.  In re E.V., 298 Ill. App. 3d 951, 700 N.E.2d 175 (1998).  A written social investigation report shall be considered by the trial court prior

to the issuance of an order of commitment.  The report shall be

completed within 60 days prior to the commitment order being

issued.  705 ILCS 405/5--705(1) (West 2000).

	The minor's argument that he was entitled to a new social

investigation report is based on the differences between civil

juvenile delinquency proceedings and adult criminal proceedings. 

He contends that the trial court should have generated a new

report prior to ruling on his motion to withdraw and reconsider

because of the underlying philosophy in juvenile proceedings. 

Among other cases, he cites In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 746 N.E.2d 732 (2001), to articulate that philosophy as a spirit of

humane concern for, and the promotion of the welfare of, the

minor.

	The minor submits that the Act's philosophy is further

evidenced by its provisions for (1) a continuance during the

commitment hearing to receive reports or other evidence (705 ILCS

405/5--705(3) (West 2000)); and (2) periodic evaluations after

the minor has been committed (705 ILCS 405/5--745 (West 2000)).

	A basic rule of statutory construction, however, states that

courts are to declare and enforce the law as enacted by the

legislature.  Courts are not to annex new provisions or

substitute different ones, or read into a statute exceptions,

limitations, or conditions which depart from its plain meaning. 

Lauer v. American Family Life Insurance Co., 199 Ill. 2d 384, 769 N.E.2d 924 (2002).  The purpose of a motion to reconsider the sentence is not to conduct a new sentencing hearing, but rather

to review the appropriateness of the sentence imposed and correct

any errors.  People v. Vernon, 285 Ill. App. 3d 302, 674 N.E.2d 153 (1996).

	In this case, we will not annex a new provision into section

5--705(1) of the Act regarding the social investigation report. 

The plain language of the Act only calls for the preparation and

consideration of a written social investigation report before a

commitment hearing.  A motion to reconsider is not a new

commitment hearing requiring a new social investigation report. 

See Vernon, 285 Ill. App. 3d 302, 674 N.E.2d 153.  Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion because he failed to

order and consider a new report prior to denying the minor's

motion to withdraw and reconsider.

II. Credit for Time Served in Predisposition Custody

	The minor contends that he is entitled to credit against his

indeterminate term of commitment for the time he was in custody

prior to the trial court issuing its dispositional order.

	Jermaine J. committed the instant offense on June 27, 1998. 

At the time of the offense, he was under the guardianship of the

Department of Children and Family Services in "The Children's

Home Association of Illinois" (Children's Home) in Peoria.  The

minor was served with a copy of the juvenile petition and a

summons for this case at the Children's Home on July 22, 1998. 

He was discharged from the Children's Home on August 12, 1998. 

The court issued its dispositional order committing the minor to the DOC on September 25, 1998.  The record does not indicate the

minor's location between his discharge from the Children's Home

and the issuance of the dispositional order.

	In In re B.L.S., 325 Ill. App. 3d 96, 757 N.E.2d 637 (2001), appeal allowed, 198 Ill. 2d 591, 766 N.E.2d 239 (2002), we ruled that where the court imposes a determinate period of commitment

on a minor, the minor is entitled to credit for time served in

predisposition custody.  In B.L.S., we stated that we agreed with the holding of the Appellate Court, Fourth District, in In re E.C., 297 Ill. App. 3d 177, 696 N.E.2d 846 (1998).  In E.C., the court held that a minor is entitled to credit for time spent in

predisposition custody against an indeterminate term of

commitment.  Recently, the Fourth District reaffirmed its holding

from E.C. in In re Jesus R., 326 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 762 N.E.2d 717 (2002).

	The State argues that B.L.S. is distinguishable from the instant case because it concerned a determinate rather than an

indeterminate term of commitment.  The State urges us to follow

the Second District's holding in In re J.J.M., 299 Ill. App. 3d 327, 701 N.E.2d 1170 (1998).  The J.J.M. court ruled that a minor is not entitled to credit for time in predisposition custody

against an indeterminate term of commitment.

	We see no reason to distinguish the holding of B.L.S. from the present case because of the difference between determinate

and indeterminate terms of commitment.  In B.L.S., we agreed with the holding of E.C. in which the minor's term of commitment was indeterminate.  We also rejected the holding of J.J.M. because of, inter alia, amendments to the Act subsequent to J.J.M.  Therefore, we rule that under B.L.S., E.C., and Jesus R., the minor in this case is entitled to credit for the time he spent in

predisposition custody against his indeterminate term of

commitment.

	It is unclear from the record how many days the minor spent

in predisposition custody for the instant offense.  We remand the

matter to the circuit court for a determination of the number of

days' credit to which the minor is entitled against his term of

commitment.

CONCLUSION

	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the

Peoria County circuit court denying the minor's motion to

withdraw and reconsider.  The minor is entitled to credit for his

time spent in custody for this case prior to the date of the

dispositional order.  We remand the matter to the circuit court

to calculate the number of days' credit to which the minor is

entitled.

	Affirmed in part and remanded with directions.

		SLATER, J.,  SNAand MCDADE, P. JJ., concur.D Slater