This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-1587

In the Matter of the Expulsion of A.D. from 

United South Central Public Schools No. 2134.

Filed July 20, 2015

Reversed

Johnson, Judge

Minnesota Department of Education

Andrea L. Jepsen, Amy J. Goetz, School Law Center, LLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for 

relator A.D.)

Trevor S. Helmers, Elizabeth J. Vieira, Rupp, Anderson, Squires & Waldspurger, P.A., 

Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent United South Central Public School No. 2134)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Martha J. Casserly, Assistant Attorney General, 

St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Brenda Cassellius, commissioner of Department of 

Education)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Johnson, 

Judge .

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

JOHNSON, Judge

The United South Central School District suspended a student, A.D., after staff 

found a knife in her purse during a search of her locker. After an evidentiary hearing, the 

school board found that A.D. violated a school policy that forbids the possession of 

weapons on school property and that she engaged in conduct that endangered herself and 
2

others. Based on those two findings, the school board expelled A.D. for the remainder of 

her junior year of high school, a period of approximately six weeks. The commissioner 

of education affirmed the expulsion. On appeal, A.D. argues that her expulsion violates 

the Pupil Fair Dismissal Act. We conclude that each of the bases for A.D.’s expulsion is 

improper. The first basis is improper because the school board did not find that A.D. 

willfully violated the applicable school policy when she carried the knife to school. The 

second basis is improper because the evidentiary record does not support the school 

board’s finding that A.D. willfully engaged in conduct that endangered herself or others. 

Therefore, we reverse the expulsion.

FACTS

On the morning of Tuesday, April 15, 2014, members of the staff of United South 

Central High School, which is located in the city of Wells, conducted a random search for 

contraband. The school building was placed on lockdown status while a drug-sniffing 

dog walked past students’ lockers. Students were required to remain in their classrooms. 

A dog alerted on A.D.’s locker. School liaison officer Rick Herman performed a search

of the locker. He found a purse and, inside the purse, a three-inch-long “hunting-style 

pocketknife.” Herman did not find any drugs in A.D.’s locker; he testified that the dog 

may have alerted on A.D.’s locker because of the strong odor of perfume.

Herman secured the knife in his office and informed the school’s principal, Kelly 

Schlaak, of the results of his search. Schlaak called A.D. to her office. Schlaak asked 

A.D. whether she knew why she had been called to the principal’s office; A.D. answered, 

“you probably found my knife.” A.D. said that she had put the knife in her purse over the 
3

weekend after using it to help with chores on her boyfriend’s family’s farm. She said that 

she intended to remove it from her purse afterward but forgot to do so. She said that she 

remembered that the knife was in her purse when the lockdown was announced. She 

confirmed that she was aware that the school has a policy that does not allow her to 

possess a knife at school. 

Schlaak explained to A.D. that the school’s policy obligated her to suspend A.D. 

for up to five days. Schlaak imposed a three-day suspension because A.D. was 

cooperative and appeared to be telling the truth. Schlaak prepared a written statement 

describing the incident, which A.D. signed. Schlaak informed A.D. that the school would 

investigate further and refer the matter to the district superintendent for a determination

whether the district would commence expulsion proceedings.

On April 21, 2014, the school district served A.D. and her parents with a notice of 

proposed expulsion. Three days later, the school board held a hearing on the proposed 

expulsion. Herman, Schlaak, and superintendent Jeremy Jensen testified for the district. 

A.D. testified on her own behalf, along with her father, her part-time employer, the high 

school’s athletic director, and a former pre-school teacher. Both Schlaak and A.D.’s 

witnesses testified that A.D. was an outstanding student who participated in sports and a 

mentoring program. 

On the same day as the hearing, the school board issued written findings of fact, 

conclusions, and a recommendation that A.D. be expelled until the end of the 2013-2014 

school year, a period of approximately six weeks. A.D. appealed the school board’s 

expulsion decision to the commissioner of education pursuant to the Pupil Fair Dismissal 
4

Act (PFDA). See Minn. Stat. § 121A.49 (2014). On July 10, 2014, the commissioner 

issued an order in which she affirmed the finding that expulsion is appropriate but

concluded that the school board had failed to adequately explain its reasons for the 

duration of the expulsion. The commissioner remanded the matter to the school board 

with directions to provide additional justification for the duration of the expulsion. The 

school board reconvened on July 15, 2014, and issued a three-page letter to the 

commissioner in which it explained the factors it considered when deciding to expel A.D. 

for six weeks. On August 8, 2014, the commissioner issued a second order in which she

affirmed the six-week duration of the expulsion. A.D. appeals to this court by way of a 

writ of certiorari. 

D E C I S I O N

I. Mootness

In its responsive brief, the school district argues that A.D.’s appeal should be 

dismissed as moot. The school district contends, “The period of [A.D.]’s expulsion has 

passed and she has already returned to enrollment in the district.” In her reply brief, A.D. 

argues that her appeal should not be dismissed as moot because she may suffer collateral 

consequences as a result of her expulsion. 

“Well established in this state’s jurisprudence is the precept that the court will 

decide only actual controversies. If the court is unable to grant effectual relief, the issue 

raised is deemed to be moot resulting in dismissal of the appeal.” In re Schmidt, 443 

N.W.2d 824, 826 (Minn. 1989). An exception to the mootness doctrine exists if 

“collateral consequences attach to the judgment.” In re McCaskill, 603 N.W.2d 326, 327 
5

(Minn. 1999). Under this exception, an appeal will not be dismissed as moot if the 

appellant can identify collateral consequences arising from the judgment, and an 

appellate court will presume that collateral consequences exist if “real and substantial 

disabilities attach to a judgment.” Id. at 329 (quotation omitted).

A.D. contends that, without a decision from this court, she may suffer collateral 

consequences from the expulsion because, for example, she will be required to disclose 

the expulsion on applications to colleges and universities, and the expulsion may cause 

her to be denied acceptance. The school district contends in turn that there is no evidence 

in the record to support A.D’s argument concerning collateral consequences and that 

A.D. will have been accepted to a college or university by the time this decision is 

released. But “if real and substantial disabilities attach to a judgment, we do not require 

actual evidence of collateral consequences but presume such consequences will result.” 

Id. (quotation omitted). We presume that these collateral consequences exist because the 

possible disadvantages that A.D. could suffer if she is required to disclose her expulsion 

in undergraduate, postgraduate, or job applications are “real and substantial disabilities.”

See id.; see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575, 95 S. Ct. 729, 736 (1975) (stating that 

suspension from school “could . . . interfere with later opportunities for higher education 

and employment”); State v. Jones, 516 N.W.2d 545, 546-47 n.1 (Minn. 1994) 

(concluding, without reference to evidence in record, that appeal of criminal defendant 

was not moot in part because “having a criminal record could affect his ability to obtain 

future employment”). “A party may rebut this presumption of collateral consequences 

only by showing there is no possibility” of collateral consequences. McCaskill, 603 
6

N.W.2d at 329 (quotation omitted). The school district has not shown that there is no 

possibility that A.D. will be disadvantaged by her expulsion. Thus, A.D.’s appeal should 

not be dismissed as moot.

II. Expulsion

A.D. argues that the school board erred by expelling her in violation of the PFDA 

and that the commissioner erred by upholding the school board’s decision.

Under the PFDA, a student who has been expelled has the right to appeal the 

school board’s expulsion decision to the commissioner of education. Minn. Stat. 

§ 121A.49. The student then may seek judicial review of the commissioner’s decision in 

this court by way of a writ of certiorari. Minn. Stat. § 121A.50 (2014); Minn. Stat. 

§§ 14.63-69 (2014). This court reviews the commissioner’s decision to determine 

whether it is

(a) in violation of constitutional provisions; or

(b) in excess of the statutory authority or 

jurisdiction of the agency; or

(c) made upon unlawful procedure; or

(d) affected by other error of law; or

(e) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of 

the entire record as submitted; or

(f) arbitrary or capricious.

Minn. Stat. § 14.69. We may affirm the commissioner’s decision, remand for further 

proceedings, reverse, or modify the decision. Id. “Although in form we are reviewing 

the commissioner’s decision . . . in substance we are reviewing the school board’s 
7

decision directly.” In re Expulsion of N.Y.B., 750 N.W.2d 318, 323 (Minn. App. 2008). 

We defer to the school board’s factual findings so long as they are supported by 

substantial evidence. See In re Denial of Eller Media Co.’s Applications for Outdoor 

Advert. Device Permits, 664 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 2003); see also In re Expulsion of I.A.L, 

674 N.W.2d 741, 746 (Minn. App. 2004) (applying substantial-evidence test to school 

board’s findings). “Substantial evidence consists of: 1) such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; 2) more than a 

scintilla of evidence; 3) more than some evidence; 4) more than any evidence; and 

5) evidence considered in its entirety.” Citizens Advocating Responsible Dev. v. 

Kandiyohi Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 713 N.W.2d 817, 833 (Minn. 2006) (quotation 

omitted). “[W]e generally defer to a school board’s judgment on matters of student 

discipline” because “[j]udicial intervention in the public-school system requires 

restraint.” N.Y.B., 750 N.W.2d at 323.

The PFDA allows a school district to expel a student on any of the following 

grounds:

(a) willful violation of any reasonable school board 

regulation. Such regulation must be clear and definite to 

provide notice to pupils that they must conform their conduct 

to its requirements;

(b) willful conduct that significantly disrupts the 

rights of others to an education, or the ability of school 

personnel to perform their duties, or school sponsored 

extracurricular activities; or

(c) willful conduct that endangers the pupil or other 

pupils, or surrounding persons, including school district 

employees, or property of the school.
8

Minn. Stat. § 121A.45, subd. 2. In this case, the school board voted to expel1 A.D. 

through the end of the school year, a period of approximately six weeks, based on 

paragraphs (a) and (c) of the above-quoted statute. 

A.D.’s arguments implicate issues of the proper interpretation of the PFDA. “The 

objective of all statutory interpretation is ‘to give effect to the intention of the legislature 

in drafting the statute.’” State v. Thompson, 754 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Minn. 2008) (quoting 

State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2003)). “The principal method of 

determining the legislature’s intent is to rely on the plain meaning of the statute.” Id. To 

identify the plain meaning of a particular word used in a statute, it is appropriate to refer 

first to the common usage of the word. See Gassler v. State, 787 N.W.2d 575, 586 n.11 

(Minn. 2010). “We are to read and construe a statute as a whole and must interpret each 

section in light of the surrounding sections to avoid conflicting interpretations.” 

American Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000).

A. First Basis: Willful Violation of Regulation

A.D. first contends that the school board and the commissioner erred by 

concluding that her expulsion satisfies paragraph (a) of section 121A.45, subdivision 2. 

The school district has adopted a policy that states, “No student . . . shall possess, 

use or distribute a weapon when in a school location.” It is undisputed that A.D.’s knife 

 

1Under the PFDA, expulsion is one type of dismissal. “‘Dismissal’ means the 

denial of the current educational program to any pupil, including exclusion, expulsion, 

and suspension” but “does not include removal from class.” Minn. Stat. § 121A.41, 

subd. 2 (2014). “‘Expulsion’ means a school board action to prohibit an enrolled pupil 

from further attendance for up to 12 months from the date the pupil is expelled.” Minn. 

Stat. § 141A.41, subd. 5.
9

is considered a weapon under the policy. According to the policy, “‘Possession’ means 

having a weapon on one’s person or in an area subject to one’s control in a school 

location.” The policy also contains a safe-harbor provision, which states, “A student who 

finds a weapon on the way to school or in a school location, or a student who discovers 

that he or she accidentally has a weapon in his or her possession, and takes the weapon 

immediately to the principal’s office shall not be considered to possess a weapon.”2 

After the evidentiary hearing, the school board concluded that A.D.’s “conduct at 

school on April 15, 2014, constituted a willful violation of reasonable School Board 

regulations.” This conclusion apparently is based on findings that A.D. “admitted that 

the knife was hers and that the knife had been in her locker” and “stated she normally 

took the knife out of her purse when she went to school, but that when the lockdown was 

announced, she remembered that she had not taken it out of her purse.” The school board 

also found that A.D. “stated she was worried that the knife may be found, but did not 

report the fact that she had the knife to her teachers or the principal.” The school board’s 

conclusion also is based on the following reasoning:

[A.D.] knew, or should have known, that she could be 

expelled for bringing a knife to school. While she stated that 

she simply forgot that the knife was in her bag, she admitted 

that she immediately remembered that the knife was in her 

 

2

The safe-harbor provision of the policy was not fully and accurately restated in 

the student handbook and the student agenda book, which are the two primary means by 

which the school district communicates the policy to students. In each of those 

documents, the description of the safe-harbor provision omits the phrase, “or a student 

who discovers that he or she accidentally has a weapon in his or her possession.” Those 

documents state merely, “A student who finds a weapon on the way to school or in a 

school building [or any school location] and takes the weapon immediately to the 

principal’s office shall not be considered to possess a weapon.” 
10

bag when the notice was made about the locker searches, but 

she did not immediately report it to her teachers or the 

Principal.3 

The commissioner concluded that the school board’s decision was supported by the 

record and satisfied the statutory requirements. 

A.D. contends that the school board erred because it did not find that she 

committed a “willful violation” of the school district court’s weapons policy. The terms

“willful violation” and “willful” are not defined in the PFDA. A leading legal dictionary 

defines “willful” to mean “[v]oluntary and intentional, but not necessarily malicious.” 

Black’s Law Dictionary 1737 (9th ed. 2009). In the criminal context, this court has said:

Willful generally means a bad purpose or evil intent in 

statutes involving moral turpitude. U.S. v. Illinois Central 

Railroad, 303 U.S. 239, 58 S. Ct. 533, 82 L. Ed. 773 (1938); 

State v. Bowers, 178 Minn. 589, 228 N.W. 164 (1929). In 

misdemeanor statutes, it means a voluntary, knowing and 

intentional act, as distinguished from accidental, involuntary 

or unintentional. U.S. v. Perplies, 165 F.2d 874 (7th Cir.

1948). See, Illinois Central Railroad, 303 U.S. at 242-43, 58 

S. Ct. at 534-35.

State v. Green, 351 N.W.2d 42, 44 (Minn. App. 1984); see also State v. Cyrette, 636 

N.W.2d 343, 348 (Minn. App. 2001) (concluding that “willfully,” as used in child-neglect 

statute, means “intentional”), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2002). 

 

3

Schlaak asked A.D. if she had brought her purse to school on the prior day, and 

A.D. said that she had not done so. During the ensuing investigation, Herman reviewed 

surveillance video-recordings and saw that A.D. had brought the same purse to school on 

the day before the knife was found, and the school board found that A.D. had therefore 

also brought the knife to school the day before the lockdown. In any event, the school 

board’s finding that A.D. lied is limited to that one particular statement about the day 

before the lockdown. The school board did not find A.D. to be not credible in general 

and did not find that her misstatement concerning the prior day undermined her 

statements concerning the day in question.
11

To reiterate, the PFDA requires not just willful conduct but a “willful violation.” 

Minn. Stat. § 121A.45, subd. 2(a). The supreme court has explained the meaning of the 

term “willful violation” on only one occasion. In the context of a party’s failure to 

respond to discovery requests, the supreme court has defined “willful violation of 

discovery rules” to require “a knowing awareness of the duty imposed . . . and, in spite of 

this awareness, a deliberate, conscious, and intentional choice to disregard this duty.” 

Garrity v. Kemper Motor Sales, 280 Minn. 202, 207, 159 N.W.2d 103, 107 (1968). 

Accordingly, paragraph (a) of section 121A.45, subdivision 2, requires not just that a

student violates a school policy but also that the student is aware of the policy and makes 

a “deliberate, conscious, and intentional choice” to violate the policy. See id. 

In this case, the school board did not find that A.D. willfully violated the weapons 

policy by carrying a knife into the school building in her purse on April 15, 2014. The 

school board did not find that A.D. was aware that she was in possession of a knife when 

she entered the school building or at any time before the lockdown. The school board 

seems to have accepted as true A.D.’s testimony that she forgot about the knife when 

going to school on that day. The school board’s order does not state that A.D.’s 

testimony on that point was not credible. Thus, the findings of fact in the school board’s 

order are not sufficient to support the school board’s conclusion that A.D. willfully 

violated the school’s weapons policy by carrying the knife to school in her purse.

The school district suggests that A.D. willfully violated the school’s weapons 

policy because her conduct does not satisfy the requirements of the safe-harbor 
12

provision.

4

 The school district’s suggestion fails for two reasons. First, the record 

demonstrates that the terms of the safe-harbor provision were not “clear and definite,” as 

required by the PFDA. See Minn. Stat. § 121A.45, subd. 2(a). The school district 

maintained multiple documents that described the safe-harbor provision, and each 

document did so in a different way. The school district seeks to rely on a version that 

allows a student to avoid punishment by turning in his or her own weapon to school 

administrators. But the two versions that the school provided directly to students do not 

allow a student to avoid a violation by turning in his or her own weapon; those versions 

would allow a student to avoid a violation if the student finds and then turns in someone 

else’s weapon. A.D. testified that she was unaware of any opportunity to avoid a 

violation by making a voluntary self-disclosure. The school board did not make any 

contrary finding. The school district cannot establish that A.D. willfully violated the 

safe-harbor provision of the weapons policy without evidence and a finding that A.D.

was aware of the terms of the particular version of the safe-harbor provision that she was 

alleged to have violated. 

 

4We question whether a student commits an independent violation of the school 

district’s weapons policy if the student’s conduct does not trigger the safe-harbor 

provision. The school district’s written and oral arguments are unclear and seemingly 

inconsistent as to whether the safe-harbor provision is an independent basis for a 

violation of the policy. It appears that the safe-harbor provision is not an independent 

basis for a violation; rather, the safe-harbor provision simply allows a violation to be 

negated if a student makes a voluntary self-disclosure. Nonetheless, for purposes of a 

thorough discussion of the school district’s arguments, we assume without deciding that a 

student violates the school district’s weapons policy by not making a voluntary selfdisclosure.
13

Second, even if A.D. had been aware of the version of the safe-harbor provision 

that the school district has invoked, she was prevented from complying. All versions of 

the safe-harbor provision state that a student “shall not be considered to possess a 

weapon” if the student “takes the weapon immediately to the principal’s office.” During 

the lockdown, however, A.D. was prohibited from leaving her classroom. After the 

lockdown, she could not have complied with the safe-harbor provision because Herman 

had confiscated the knife, thereby removing it from her possession. The school district 

cannot establish that A.D. willfully violated the safe-harbor provision of the weapons 

policy by not verbally informing a member of the school’s staff of the existence of a 

weapon elsewhere in a school building because the safe-harbor provision does not allow 

a student to avoid a violation by that type of self-disclosure. 

Therefore, A.D. did not willfully violate the school district’s weapons policy by 

bringing a knife to school or by not disclosing the existence of the knife after the 

lockdown began.

B. Second Basis: Willful Conduct Endangering Self or Others

A.D. also contends that the school board and the commissioner erred by 

concluding that her expulsion satisfies paragraph (c) of section 121A.45, subdivision 2.5

 

5

The commissioner did not affirm the school board on this ground, even though 

A.D. argued to the commissioner that the school board erred by concluding that she 

engaged in willful conduct that endangered herself or others. The commissioner 

considered only whether A.D. willfully violated a school regulation and affirmed the 

school board on that basis. In her appellate brief, A.D. challenges both of the school 

board’s bases for her expulsion. She does not contend that the expulsion is not justified 

by the second basis on the ground that the commissioner did not affirm the school board 
14

After the evidentiary hearing, the school board concluded that A.D.’s “conduct at 

school on April 15, 2014, constituted . . . willful conduct that endangered [A.D.], other 

pupils, and surrounding persons.” This conclusion apparently is based on the undisputed 

fact that A.D. carried a knife into the school building inside her purse, which was stored 

inside her locker, as well as the finding that she “created a material and substantial risk of 

harm to other students and staff by possessing a knife on school property.” 

A.D. contends that the school board erred by concluding that she engaged in 

willful conduct that endangered herself or others. The term “endanger” is not defined in 

the PFDA. The plain meaning of the word “endanger” is “to bring into danger or peril of 

probable harm or loss.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 748 (3d ed. 

1961). The school district relies on Jensen’s testimony that the presence of A.D.’s knife 

in her locker endangered students and staff because “it could get into the wrong hands.”

There was no finding and no evidence that A.D. intended to remove the knife from her 

purse while at school or that any other student was aware of the presence of a knife inside 

her purse inside her locker. The mere presence of A.D.’s knife inside her purse inside her 

locker may give rise to the potential for danger, but it does not rise to the level of 

“probable harm or loss.” See id. This interpretation of the PFDA is consistent with the 

supreme court’s observation, in a juvenile delinquency prosecution for possession of a 

knife in a school, that “knives as common household utensils are clearly not inherently 

dangerous, as they can be used for a myriad of completely benign purposes.” In re 

 

on that basis. Thus, we will consider and resolve A.D.’s argument that the school board’s 

second basis for the expulsion is erroneous.
15

Welfare of C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802, 810 (Minn. 2000). The PFDA permits a school 

district to expel a student for willfully violating a reasonable policy, and the school 

district in this case had a policy that prohibits the possession of a weapon in the school. 

But the structure and language of section 121A.45, subdivision 2, indicates that 

paragraph (c) requires something more than conduct that creates the mere possibility of 

harm, which may be regulated by a policy that may be vindicated pursuant to paragraph 

(a). Thus, the evidence in the record of the school board’s evidentiary hearing does not 

support the school board’s conclusion that A.D. engaged in willful conduct that 

endangered herself or others.

In sum, we reverse the decisions of the school board and the commissioner. See 

Minn. Stat. § 14.69; In re Wang, 441 N.W.2d 488, 492-94 (Minn. 1989) (reversing and 

granting relief to relator because agency decision was affected by error of law and lacked 

substantial evidence); Beaty v. Minnesota Bd. of Teaching, 354 N.W.2d 466, 471 (Minn. 

App. 1984) (reversing and granting relief to relator because agency decision was affected 

by error of law).

Reversed.