J-S14019-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JOSE JAVIER VASQUEZ

Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 96 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 30, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0007339-2016

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JOSE JAVIER VASQUEZ

Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 102 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 30, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0007340-2016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KING, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED MAY 19, 2020

Appellant, Jose Javier Vasquez, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury 

trial convictions for two counts of aggravated assault.1 We reverse Appellant’s 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a).
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convictions, vacate the judgment of sentence, and remand for a new trial.

In its opinion, the trial court accurately set forth the relevant facts of 

this case as follows:

In October of 2014, Appellant was living with [J.R.], with 

whom he had an on-and-off relationship, dating back to 

2010. [J.R.] had a two-year-old daughter...and 11-monthold twins..., none of whom were Appellant’s daughters.

On Sunday, October 12, 2014, the three girls, having spent 

the weekend at [the home of the oldest daughter’s] 

grandmother...returned to [J.R.’s] home. [J.R.] fed, bathed, 

and played with the two babies, before putting them to bed. 

They seemed fine.

At some point during the night, [J.R.] woke up to find 

Appellant had left their bed. She left the bedroom and found 

the door to the three girls’ bedroom open, which was 

unusual, since she closes it to keep [her] two-year-old...from 

wandering. [J.R.] then went into the bathroom where she 

found Appellant with a rolled up $100 bill and white powder 

on the toilet tank lid, which she believed to be heroin.

[Appellant] said he thought someone had been trying to get 

in [the house]. They went downstairs and he showed her a 

basement door with holes that he had braced. [J.R.] went 

back to bed and was awakened when the alarm went off. 

The police responded to the home a short time later. [J.R.] 

observed additional holes in the door. The police checked 

the property, then left. She checked the children and 

observed that the twins’ hair seemed to be wet, which struck 

her as unusual. When she asked Appellant if he had gone 

into the children’s room, he said he had and gave the twins 

water because they appeared thirsty.

On October 13, 2014, at around 10:00 AM, [J.R.] checked 

on the twins and saw that they were still sleeping, which 

was also unusual. Their bottles were not in their bed, but 

were downstairs by the sink, which was also unusual. When 

she tried to give them their bottle, they wouldn’t wake up. 

She attempted to wake them without success.
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[J.R.] asked Appellant to drive them to the hospital. He 

suggested splashing water on the children’s faces, but they 

did not respond to that. So [J.R.] again asked Appellant to 

take them to the hospital. As they prepared to go, the twins 

were placed in their car seats and [J.R.] observed Appellant 

blowing marijuana smoke in their faces.

When they arrived at the hospital, Appellant did not go in 

with [J.R.] and the children, but only came in later. At the 

hospital, the twins were diagnosed as under the influence of 

drugs, which diagnosis was confirmed by positive drug 

screens for opiates and marijuana. Narcan was then 

administered to both children. They remained in the 

hospital for two days.

When asked how the children might have gotten drugs, 

[J.R.] failed to disclose to medical personnel at the hospital 

and police that Appellant with whom she lived was a user of 

controlled substances. As a result, she was subsequently 

charged and entered a plea of guilty in May of 2015 to two 

counts of endangering the welfare of a child [(“EWOC”)].

(Trial Court Opinion, filed June 20, 2019, at 2-3) (internal citations omitted).

Procedurally, the Commonwealth charged Appellant at two docket 

numbers (one per each victim) with possession of a controlled substance with 

the intent to deliver, attempted murder, aggravated assault, recklessly 

endangering another person, simple assault, EWOC, and conspiracy.2 Prior to 

trial, the Commonwealth moved to preclude the introduction/mention at trial 

of a polygraph examination J.R. underwent, as well as any statements J.R. 

allegedly made prior to, during, or after the polygraph examination. On June 

25, 2018, the court heard argument on the Commonwealth’s motion. During 

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2 The Commonwealth later nolle prossed all charges except for aggravated 

assault. 
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argument, the parties acknowledged the general law of prohibiting the 

mention of a polygraph examination or introduction of the results of a 

polygraph examination at trial. Nevertheless, Appellant alleged that prior to 

the polygraph examination, J.R. admitted to the polygraph examiner that she

had given drugs to the twins. Appellant argued J.R.’s “admission” was 

admissible at trial for impeachment purposes. Appellant further agreed that 

he would not reference the polygraph examination itself or bring up the results 

of the polygraph examination (i.e., whether deception was indicated); 

Appellant sought only to admit J.R.’s “admission.” Following argument, the 

court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to preclude, stating the polygraph 

examination and J.R.’s alleged pre-examination statement were so 

“intrinsically intertwined” that it could not separate the pre-examination 

statement from the context of the polygraph. (See N.T. Pre-Trial Motion 

Hearing, 6/25/18, at 6-11).

The next day, the court revisited its ruling based on the 

Commonwealth’s concession that the entire case rested on J.R.’s testimony 

implicating Appellant. The court asked the parties if J.R.’s alleged preexamination statement could be severed from the context of the polygraph 

examination. The Commonwealth disputed that J.R. definitively made the 

alleged admission during the pre-examination and suggested it was unclear 

from the written polygraph examination report whether J.R. made the alleged 

admission in the pre-examination or during the actual polygraph. In any 
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event, the Commonwealth maintained J.R.’s alleged statement was 

inadmissible per the general law in Pennsylvania disapproving of references 

to polygraph examinations at trial. After hearing argument from the parties 

for a second time, the court affirmed its prior ruling, again stating that J.R.’s 

alleged admission was “sufficiently intertwined” with the polygraph process 

such that the statement could not be explored without discussion of the 

polygraph. (See N.T. Pre-Trial Motion Hearing, 6/26/18, at 38-52).

On June 27, 2018, Appellant proceeded to a jury trial.3 The 

Commonwealth presented only two witnesses: J.R. and Detective Kimberly 

Boston. During her testimony, J.R., inter alia, recounted the events of October 

12-13, 2014. Significantly, J.R. denied that she gave the children any drugs. 

J.R. admitted that she did not disclose to medical personnel at the hospital or 

to police that Appellant was a drug user; and J.R. pled guilty to two counts of 

EWOC in connection with that omission. (See N.T. Jury Trial, 6/27/18, at 37-

96). During Detective Boston’s testimony, the Commonwealth introduced, 

inter alia, three statements J.R. gave to police during the investigation on 

November 5, 2014, November 10, 2014, and November 21, 2014, 

respectively. While the statements were inconsistent regarding the extent to 

which J.R. implicated Appellant in the crimes, the statements remained 

____________________________________________

3 Following an appropriate colloquy, the court permitted Appellant to proceed 

pro se at trial, with the assistance of stand-by counsel. 
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consistent concerning J.R.’s denial of her role in the offenses. (See N.T. Jury 

Trial, 6/28/18, at 31-52).

Before the close of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, the court held a 

charging conference, during which Appellant specifically requested a “crimen 

falsi” jury instruction concerning J.R.’s guilty plea to EWOC. The court denied 

Appellant’s request, stating EWOC is not inherently a crime of dishonesty, 

even though the factual predicate for J.R.’s guilty pleas involved being 

dishonest. (See N.T. Jury Trial, 6/27/18, at 150-52).

Appellant testified in his own defense at trial and, inter alia, expressly 

denied any role in the offenses. Rather, Appellant maintained he looked out 

for the twins’ well-being by driving them to the hospital when J.R. noticed they 

were ill and spending the night at the hospital with them. (See N.T. Jury Trial, 

6/28/18, at 87-123). 

At the conclusion of trial, on June 29, 2018, the jury found Appellant 

guilty of two counts of aggravated assault (causes serious bodily injury). The 

court sentenced Appellant on November 30, 2018, to consecutive terms of 71⁄2 

to 15 years’ imprisonment for each offense. Appellant timely filed postsentence motions on December 10, 2018,4 which the court denied on 

December 27, 2018. On January 7, 2019, Appellant timely filed separate 

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4 The docket entries indicate that Appellant filed his post-sentence motions on 

December 11, 2018, but the timestamp confirms Appellant timely filed the 

post-sentence motions on December 10, 2018.
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notices of appeal at each docket. The court subsequently ordered Appellant 

to file concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Following the grant of an extension of time, Appellant 

timely complied. This Court has consolidated the appeals.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR AND/OR ABUSE ITS

DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE REQUEST OF

APPELLANT TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF THE HIGHLY RELEVANT 

(AND PRIOR INCONSISTENT) STATEMENT OF THE CODEFENDANT [J.R.]?

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR AND/OR ABUSE ITS

DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT THE TESTIFYING CODEFENDANT’S CONVICTION FOR ENDANGERING THE 

WELFARE OF A CHILD (“EWOC”) DID NOT CONSTITUTE 

CRIMEN FALSI WHERE, UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, 

THE EWOC CONVICTION WAS BASED UPON THE FACT THAT 

CO-DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY AND INTENTIONALLY LIED TO 

MEDICAL CARE PROVIDERS ABOUT HER INFANT 

CHILDREN’S INGESTION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES?

IS THE VERDICT OF GUILTY WITH RESPECT TO ALL 

CHARGES AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND 

SO CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE THAT IT SHOCKS ONE’S 

SENSE OF JUSTICE?

IS THE SENTENCE IMPOSED UNDULY HARSH AND

EXCESSIVE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE 

AND AS APPLIED TO APPELLANT?

(Appellant’s Brief at 8-9) (internal footnotes omitted). 

In his first issue, Appellant argues he sought to introduce at trial a 

statement J.R. gave to an investigator prior to being administered a 

polygraph examination, in which J.R. admitted that she gave drugs to the 

twins. Appellant asserts he sought to admit only the relevant pre-
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examination question and answer and conceded that no reference could be 

made to the actual polygraph examination or the results of the polygraph 

examination. Appellant emphasizes that J.R. was one of only two 

Commonwealth witnesses in this case and that the entire case rested on J.R.’s 

testimony implicating Appellant. Appellant acknowledges the general law that 

prohibits references to the results of a polygraph examination at trial. 

Appellant stresses, however, that relevant statements made during a prepolygraph interview are admissible. Appellant submits that statements made 

during a polygraph examination are also admissible—Appellant contends only 

the results of a polygraph examination are inadmissible. Appellant highlights 

the trial court’s concession in its Rule 1925(a) opinion that it erred by 

excluding J.R.’s admission, which would have impeached J.R.’s trial testimony 

denying that she gave the twins drugs. Appellant concludes the court’s ruling 

severely prejudiced his case, and this Court must vacate and remand for a 

new trial. We agree Appellant is entitled to a new trial under the facts of this 

case.

Our standard of review of a trial court’s admission or exclusion of 

evidence is well established: 

Admission of evidence is a matter within the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and will not be reversed absent 

a showing that the trial court clearly abused its discretion. 

Not merely an error in judgment, an abuse of discretion 

occurs when the law is overridden or misapplied, or the 

judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the 

result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, as shown by 

the evidence on record. 
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Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 604 Pa. 386, 403, 986 A.2d 84, 94 (2009), 

cert. denied, 562 U.S. 857, 131 S.Ct. 127, 178 L.Ed.2d 77 (2010) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). Our scope of review in cases where 

the trial court explains the basis for its evidentiary ruling is limited to an 

examination of the stated reason. Commonwealth v. Stephens, 74 A.3d 

1034, 1037 (Pa.Super. 2013). 

Historically, “[t]he rule in Pennsylvania [was] that reference to a lie 

detector test or the result thereof which raises inferences concerning the guilt 

or innocence of a defendant is inadmissible. This rule was established to 

protect the defendant in a criminal trial and it is based on this Court’s refusal 

to recognize the scientific accuracy or validity of such tests.” 

Commonwealth v. Cain, 471 Pa. 140, 155, 369 A.2d 1234, 1241-42 (1977)

(internal citations omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Hetzel, 822 A.2d 

747, 767 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 576 Pa. 710, 839 A.2d 350 (2003) 

(explaining general rule that due to well-known unreliability of polygraph

tests, our courts uniformly have been reluctant to permit any reference to 

polygraph examination at trial).

Nevertheless, this Court has stated:

The polygraph has been acknowledged by the courts of this 

Commonwealth to be a valuable tool in the investigative 

process. Its use does not per se render a confession 

involuntary. A confession is not involuntary merely 

because it was made in anticipation of, during, or 

following a polygraph examination. See 89 A.L.R.3d 

236, and cases there gathered. In Pennsylvania, an 
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inculpatory statement made during a pre-test interview was 

held admissible in Commonwealth v. Cain, 471 Pa. 140, 

1[5]6, 369 A.2d 1234, [1242] (197[7]) [(plurality)] 

(Opinion of Eagen, J., in support of affirmance). 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 463 A.2d 1113, 1115 (Pa.Super. 1983) (some 

internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 

Thus, there have been scenarios where our courts have admitted 

statements made before, during, or after a polygraph examination, without 

mention or reference to the actual results of the polygraph examination. 

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Schneider, 562 A.2d 868 (Pa.Super. 1989), 

appeal denied, 525 Pa. 598, 575 A.2d 564 (1990) (holding court properly 

denied motion to suppress confession given to police after polygraph 

examination; explaining statement given after being advised that one has 

failed lie detector test may be admitted into evidence). See also 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 591 A.2d 1095, 1104 n.15 (Pa.Super. 1991)

(en banc), appeal denied, 529 Pa. 633, 600 A.2d 953 (1991) (“Santiago I”) 

(noting trial court did not admit appellant’s second statement to police at trial 

“at least in part because the trial court labored under the false apprehension 

that such a statement was inadmissible merely because it was made during a 

polygraph examination”) (emphasis in original). Compare Commonwealth

v. Brockington, 500 Pa. 216, 220, 455 A.2d 627, 629 (1983) (holding trial 

court properly barred admission of results of polygraph examination; results 

of polygraph examination are inadmissible even where parties stipulate to 

their admission, as stipulation to admissibility cannot enhance reliability of 
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results of polygraph examination); Commonwealth v. Handfield, 34 A.3d 

187 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 617 Pa. 636, 54 A.3d 347 (2012) 

(holding court did not err in limiting cross-examination of witness concerning 

results of witness’ polygraph examination; specifically, appellant had sought 

to ask witness whether condition of witness’ plea agreement was that witness 

take and pass polygraph examination, whether witness passed or failed 

polygraph examination, and if witness failed polygraph, did witness still reap 

benefit of plea agreement); Commonwealth v. Kemp, 410 A.2d 870, 872

(Pa.Super. 1979) (reversing and remanding for new trial where 

Commonwealth introduced testimony that its witness took and passed lie 

detector test, which raised inference that test certified truth of testimony 

implicating accused; “The inference carried the weight of scientific evidence 

while in fact that evidence was unreliable”).

Instantly, the trial court addressed this issue in its Rule 1925(a) opinion 

as follows:

Here, Appellant alleges that it was error for the [c]ourt to 

preclude testimony and cross-examination as to statements 

made to a polygraph examiner by Commonwealth witness, 

[J.R.], in the course of the pre-interview, prior to the actual 

polygraph examination. Specifically, [J.R.] was asked: “Did 

you give drugs to these children?” To which she responded: 

“Yes.” 

After hearing extensive argument, the [c]ourt granted the 

Commonwealth’s motion in limine...

* * *

In this case the [c]ourt was focused on the context of the 
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statement—given in relation to a polygraph—rather than the 

statement itself. This was error. The [c]ourt could and 

should have ruled in limine that the witness could be 

impeached with her prior statement given in the context of 

questioning by a law enforcement officer, but without 

mention that the questioning was part of a polygraph 

examination. Such a solution would have honored 

Pennsylvania law that the results of polygraph 

examinations are inadmissible, but statements given in 

relation to or during such examinations are admissible.

In sum, while the multiple statements of [J.R.], including in 

connection with the polygraph examination, may have 

presented some logistical issues in presentation of [J.R.’s] 

admission, and Commonwealth rehabilitation with prior 

consistent statements, those hurdles were not 

insurmountable. Because the admission was so significant 

to the defense theory of the case, and because it could have 

been introduced without mention of a polygraph exam or 

results, it was error to exclude [J.R.’s] admission that she 

gave drugs to the children.

(Trial Court Opinion at 6-8) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 

Initially, we observe that the written polygraph examination report does

not make certain whether J.R. answered “yes” to the question “did you give 

drugs to these children” during the pre-examination interview or during the 

actual polygraph examination. The report appears to support the 

Commonwealth’s position that J.R. made the alleged admission during the 

actual polygraph examination.5 In either scenario, however, we agree with 

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5 The written polygraph examination report indicates two relevant polygraph 

questions were posed to J.R.: (1) “Did you give any of those drugs to those 

children?” J.R. responded: “Yes”; and (2) “Did you give any of those drugs to 

those children on that night?” J.R. responded: “No.” The report further states, 

“deception indicated” as to those questions, but does not specify which 
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the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) analysis that the court could have admitted J.R.’s 

“admission” without reference to the actual polygraph examination or to the 

results of the polygraph examination. See Santiago I, supra; Schneider, 

supra; Smith, supra. 

Notably, no other testimony/evidence at trial referenced an admission 

by J.R. to giving the twins drugs. While Appellant attempted to impeach J.R.’s 

testimony by highlighting J.R.’s prior inconsistent statements to police, those 

statements were inconsistent only to the extent of detail in which J.R. 

implicated Appellant in the offenses but consistently denied J.R.’s role in the 

offenses. Compare Commonwealth v. Santiago, 654 A.2d 1062, 1082 

(Pa.Super. 1994) (“Santiago II”), appeal denied, 541 Pa. 651, 664 A.2d 540 

(1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 995, 116 S.Ct. 532, 133 L.Ed.2d 437 (1995) 

(explaining statement of Commonwealth witness in pre-polygraph interview, 

that witness had not seen defendant with gun prior to victim’s murder, was 

contrary to witness’ testimony at appellant’s trial; statement, therefore, was 

relevant to enable defense to impeach testimony of key Commonwealth 

witness; nevertheless, witness’ pre-polygraph interview statement was 

____________________________________________

response was deceptive. (See Exhibit A attached to Commonwealth’s Brief).

The Commonwealth suggests J.R. was “deceptive” in her response to question 

1, in which she admitted giving the children drugs. The Commonwealth’s 

suggestion in this regard is nothing more than speculation. Even if the 

Commonwealth were correct, the results of J.R.’s polygraph examination 

would be inadmissible under prevailing law. 
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cumulative of other evidence, so prosecution’s failure to disclose witness’ prior 

inconsistent pre-polygraph statement did not constitute due process violation 

under Brady6). Although we recognize the potential logistical difficulties in 

introducing J.R.’s statement and the Commonwealth’s ability to rehabilitate 

her, we agree with the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) analysis that such “hurdles 

were not insurmountable.” Under these circumstances, the court’s evidentiary 

ruling was error and Appellant is entitled to a new trial. See Montalvo, 

supra.

In his second issue, Appellant argues he sought a ruling that J.R.’s 

convictions for EWOC constituted crimen falsi offenses, i.e., crimes involving 

dishonesty. Appellant asserts it is undisputed that J.R.’s EWOC convictions 

were based on her failure to disclose to medical personnel how her children 

were exposed to drugs. Appellant claims the facts of J.R.’s EWOC convictions 

involve dishonesty and making false statements. Appellant contends the trial 

court improperly analyzed only the statutory elements of the crime of EWOC, 

without also analyzing the underlying facts of J.R.’s convictions. Appellant 

claims the court’s ruling was particularly egregious where the 

Commonwealth’s case hinged on J.R.’s testimony implicating Appellant. 

Appellant concludes the court erred by ruling J.R.’s convictions did not 

constitute crimen falsi offenses and failing to issue the appropriate jury 

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6 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
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instruction, and this Court should vacate and remand for a new trial. We 

agree the court’s ruling was error.

Our review of this issue implicates the following legal principles:

For the purpose of attacking the credibility of any witness, 

evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime, 

whether by verdict, or by plea of guilty or nolo contendere, 

shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false 

statement. Pa.R.E. 609(a). Crimes involving dishonesty or 

false statement are commonly referred to as crimen falsi

crimes. Crimen falsi involves the element of falsehood, and 

includes everything which has a tendency to injuriously 

affect the administration of justice by the introduction of 

falsehood and fraud.

When deciding whether a particular offense is crimen falsi,

one must address both the elemental aspects of that offense 

and the conduct of the defendant which forms the basis of 

the anticipated impeachment. Accordingly, this Court 

employs a two-step procedure to determine whether a crime 

is crimen falsi. First, we examine the essential elements of 

the offense to determine if the crime is inherently crimen 

falsi—whether dishonesty or false statement are a 

necessary prerequisite to commission of the crime. Second, 

if the crime is not inherently crimen falsi, this Court then 

inspects the underlying facts that led to the conviction to 

determine if dishonesty or false statement facilitated the 

commission of the crime. The burden of proof is upon the 

party offering the conviction during cross-examination. 

Commonwealth v. Davis, 17 A.3d 390, 395 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal 

denied, 611 Pa. 678, 29 A.3d 371 (2011) (most internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).

The Crimes Code defined the offense of EWOC during the relevant 

timeframe as follows:

§ 4304. Endangering welfare of children
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(a) Offense defined.—

(1) A parent, guardian or other person supervising the 

welfare of a child under 18 years of age, or a person that 

employs or supervises such a person, commits an offense if 

[she] knowingly endangers the welfare of the child by 

violating a duty of care, protection or support.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4303(a)(1) (effective January 29, 2007 to August 27, 2017).

Instantly, we initially note that the jury heard about J.R.’s EWOC 

convictions and the factual basis for her convictions at various points 

throughout trial. Thus, it is undisputed that the court permitted evidence of 

J.R.’s EWOC convictions at trial. When Appellant specifically requested a 

“crimen falsi” jury instruction at the charging conference, however, the court 

declined Appellant’s request because the statutory elements of EWOC are not 

“inherently” crimen falsi. Indeed, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court stated: 

“Because there is no element of dishonesty or false statement set forth in the 

statute, the crime of [EWOC] is not a crimen falsi.” (Trial Court Opinion at 9).

Nevertheless, the trial court failed to conduct the second part of the twostep analysis, namely, an inspection of “the underlying facts that led to the 

conviction to determine if dishonesty or false statement facilitated the 

commission of the crime.” See Davis, supra. The record makes clear the 

factual basis for J.R.’s EWOC convictions involved dishonesty or a false 

statement to medical personnel and police concerning how the twins might 

have been exposed to drugs. Consequently, the trial court improperly ruled 

that J.R.’s EWOC convictions did not constitute crimen falsi offenses and 
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should have issued the appropriate jury instruction.7 See Commonwealth 

v. Cole, 2020 WL 400234, 2020 PA Super 12 (filed Jan. 24, 2020) (explaining 

that in Pennsylvania, witness may be impeached by prior conviction if crime 

involved dishonesty or false statement; appellant was entitled to jury 

instruction regarding relevancy of witness’ crimen falsi convictions, and how 

jury could utilize that evidence in assessing her credibility). Accordingly, we 

reverse Appellant’s convictions, vacate the judgment of sentence, and remand 

for a new trial.8

Convictions reversed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded 

for new trial. Jurisdiction is relinquished. 

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7 The Commonwealth concedes the trial court’s failure to classify J.R.’s EWOC 

convictions as crimen falsi offenses was improper (see Commonwealth’s Brief 

at 18), but insists the error was harmless because the jury heard about J.R.’s 

convictions. Because we have already decided this case warrants a new trial 

based on our disposition of issue one, we do not need to consider whether the 

trial court’s error was harmless. Instead, we offer the analysis of Appellant’s 

second issue as guidance for the trial court upon remand so that it does not 

make the same mistake for a second time. 

8 Based on our disposition, we do not need to reach Appellant’s third issue 

challenging the weight of the evidence or fourth issue challenging the 

discretionary aspects of sentencing. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/19/2020