NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

_______________________________

 :

JOSEPH NATHAN SINGLETARY, III, :

 : Civil Action No. 

Plaintiff, : 11-0392 (RMB)

 :

v. : O P I N I O N 

 :

BURLINGTON COUNTY JAIL et al., :

 :

Defendants. :

_______________________________:

 

Bumb, District Judge:

Plaintiff Joseph Nathan Singletary, III (“Plaintiff”), an

inmate confined at the Southern State Correctional Facility,

Delmont, New Jersey, seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis, 

alleging violations of his constitutional rights, pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Based on his affidavit of indigence and the absence

of three qualifying dismissals within 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the

Court will grant Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma

pauperis, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), and order the Clerk to

file the Complaint.

At this time, the Court must review the Complaint to determine

whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief.

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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff named the following entities and persons as

Defendants in this matter: Burlington County Jail, Warden Cox,

Captain Larkin, Captain Artist, Lieutenant Laaf, Lieutenant Farria,

Sergeant Zoll, Sergeant Nunn, Sergeant Eddy, Medical Department

(of, presumably, Burlington County Jail), a certain Stacy (whose

last name is unknown to Plaintiff), a certain Susan (whose last

name is unknown to Plaintiff), a certain Tom (whose last name is

unknown to Plaintiff), a certain Roxxano (whose last name is

unknown to Plaintiff), a certain Addrianna (whose last name is

unknown to Plaintiff), a certain Nicole (whose last name is unknown

to Plaintiff) and a certain Maurice (whose last name is unknown to

Plaintiff). See Docket Entries Nos. 1 and 1-3.

The Complaint states that the Warden was named as a Defendant

because he is “in charge” of Burlington County Jail, while Captains

Larkin and Artist were named as Defendants because they were,

allegedly, aware of a certain incident and Plaintiff, allegedly

gave them his “medical slips” (which, the Court presumes, were

Plaintiff’s requests to be seen by medical personnel) and his

administrative grievances. See Docket Entry No. 1, at 4. 

A page submitted jointly with the Complaint: (a) states that

one of Plaintiff’s fingers is in pain, that a certain doctor stated

that it is/was broken “in more place’s than one,” and that x-rays

of that particular finger show that the amount of “breaks” keeps

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increasing from one x-ray to another, see Docket Entry No. 1-3, at

1; and (b) clarifies that Lieutenant Laaf was named as a Defendant

because he was informed of Plaintiff’s submission of requests for

medical attention, Lieutenant Farria was named as a Defendant

because he was the person through whom Plaintiff submitted

administrative grievances, Sergeant Zoll was named as a Defendant

because he was the person through whom Plaintiff submitted his

medical slips, Sergeants Nunn and Eddy were named as Defendants

because they were aware of a certain fight and saw Plaintiff’s

finger swell but did not take Plaintiff to a medical department,

and Maurica, Stacy and Addrianna were named as Defendants because,

upon examination of Plaintiff’s swollen finger, they provided him

with an ice pack rather than calling for a doctor and/or

registering Plaintiff for a “sick-call” (which, the Court presumes,

implies either a visit by a doctor to Plaintiff’s cell or Plaintiff

being called for a doctor examination to the Jail’s medical

services department). See Docket Entry No. 1-3.

From the foregoing, the Court deduces that, on a certain

unspecified date, Plaintiff, while being housed at Burlington

County Jail, got engaged in a fight (with either other inmates or

prison officials) and, during that fight, seemingly injured his

finger. The finger apparently became swollen as a result of the

injury. Apparently, Plaintiff wishes to allege that the fight was

observed by Sergeants Nunn and Eddy, who might have seen that

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Plaintiff’s finger got swollen but who, seemingly, did not

accompany Plaintiff to the medical services department. Therefore,

Plaintiff, it seems, went to the medical department on his own and,

there, he was, apparently, seen by a certain nursing staff, who

examined his finger and, allegedly, concluded that the finger was

merely bruised, which prompted these staffers to recommend

Plaintiff to apply ice to his finger in order to reduce swelling,

while Plaintiff would have preferred to have his finger examined by

a doctor. 

In also appears that Plaintiff wishes to assert that his

finger remained either swollen or in pain, or both, and therefore 

he submitted requests to be seen by a medical professional other

than a nurse. When his requests to be seen were, allegedly,

denied, Plaintiff submitted administrative grievances. Eventually,

it seems, Plaintiff’s finger was examined by a doctor, who 

determined that the bone within the finger was fractured. X-rays

of Plaintiff’s finger were taken on a continuous basis ever since

to monitor the heeling of the fracture.1

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 In determining the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court

must be mindful to construe the facts stated in the complaint

liberally in favor of the plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551

1

 Plaintiff’s assertion that the number of fractures within

the bone of Plaintiff’s finger keeps increasing from one x-ray to

another.

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U.S. 89 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); United

States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). Indeed, it is

long established that a court should “accept as true all of the

[factual] allegations in the complaint and reasonable inferences

that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist.,

132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). However, while a court will

accept well-pled allegations as true, it will not accept bald

assertions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences, or

sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual

allegations. See id. 

Addressing the clarifications as to the litigant's pleading

requirement stated in the United States Supreme Court in Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit provided the courts in this Circuit with

detailed and careful guidance as to what kind of allegations

qualify as pleadings sufficient to pass muster under the Rule 8

standard. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,

230-34 (3d Cir. 2008). Specifically, the Court of Appeals

observed as follows:

“While a complaint . . . does not need detailed

factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation [is] to

provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief'

[by stating] more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action . . . .” Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65 . . .

Rule 8 “requires a 'showing,' rather than a blanket

assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Id. at 1965

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n.3. . . . “[T]he threshold requirement of Rule

8(a)(2) [is] that the 'plain statement [must] possess

enough heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to

relief.'” Id. at 1966. [Hence] “factual allegations

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Id. at 1965 & n.3. . . . [Indeed,

it is not] sufficient to allege mere elements of a

cause of action; instead “a complaint must allege

facts suggestive of the proscribed conduct.” Id.

Id. at 230-34 (original brackets removed). 

This pleading standard was further refined by the United

States Supreme Court in its recent decision Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009):

[In any civil action, t]he pleading standard . . .

demands more than an unadorned [“]the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me[“] accusation. [Twombly, 550

U.S.] at 555 . . . . A pleading that offers “labels

and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.” [Id.] at

555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders

“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual

enhancement.” Id. at 557. . . . A claim has facial

plausibility [only] when the plaintiff pleads factual

content . . . . Id. at 556. [Moreover,] the

plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. 

Id. [Indeed, even w]here a complaint pleads facts that

are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability,

[the so-alleging complaint still] “stops short of

[showing] plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'” 

Id. at 557 (brackets omitted). [A fortiori,] the tenet

that a court must accept as true all of the

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable

to legal conclusions [or to t]hreadbare recitals of

the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements [,i.e., by] legal conclusion[s]

couched as a factual allegation [e.g.,] the

plaintiffs' assertion of an unlawful agreement [or]

that [defendants] adopted a policy “'because of,' not

merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an

identifiable group.” . . . . [W]e do not reject these

bald allegations on the ground that they are

unrealistic or nonsensical. . . . It is the

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conclusory nature of [these] allegations, rather than

their extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles

them to the presumption of truth. . . . [Finally,] the

question [of sufficiency of] pleadings does not turn .

. . the discovery process. Twombly, 550 U.S.] at 559

. . . . [The plaintiff] is not entitled to discovery

[where the complaint alleges any of the elements]

“generally,” [i.e., as] a conclusory allegation

[since] Rule 8 does not [allow] pleading the bare

elements of [the] cause of action [and] affix[ing] the

label “general allegation” [in hope to develop facts

through discovery].

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-54.

III. NOT VIABLE CLAIMS

A. Respondeat Superior Claim

Absent consent by a state, the Eleventh Amendment bars federal

court suits for money damages against state officers in their

official capacities, see Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169

(1985), and – in addition – supervising officials cannot be held

liable for actions of their subordinates unless the litigant

asserts facts showing these supervisors’ personal involvement in

the alleged wrongs. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937; Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode,

423 U.S. 362 (1976); Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 n.14 (3d

Cir. 1993). Claims against the supervisors are subject to

dismissal to the degree they are based solely on the respondeat

superior theory. See Natale v. Camden County Corr. Facility, 318

F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003) (because respondeat superior or

vicarious liability cannot be a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, a corporation – even if it is operation under contract with

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the state – cannot be held liable for the acts of its employees and

agents under those theories). 

Here, Plaintiff asserted that the Warden is liable to him

because the Warden was “in charge” of Burlington County Jail. This

claim, unambiguously based solely on the respondeat superior

theory, is subject to dismissal with prejudice.

B. Burlington County Jail and Medical Department

Here, Plaintiff named, among Defendants in this action,

Burlington County Jail and its medical department. However, these

entities are not cognizable as “persons” subject to suit under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491

U.S. 58, 68-70 (1989) (holding that States and governmental

entities considered “arms of the State" for Eleventh Amendment

purposes are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983); Grabow v.

Southern State Correctional Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538-39

(D.N.J. 1989) (stating that New Jersey Department of Corrections

and state prison facilities not “persons” under § 1983). 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against the Jail and its medical

department will be dismissed with prejudice.

IV. TIMELINESS AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS

A. Timeliness

Here, Plaintiff did not clarify when the relevant events, such

as the alleged fight, the alleged injury to his finger and the

alleged insufficient medical treatment, took place. Plaintiff’s

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information available from the Department of Corrections website

indicates that Plaintiff was sentenced on May 13, 2005, in the

Burlington County part of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law

Division; he will become eligible for parole on October 15, 2012. 

See <<https://www6.state.nj.us/DOC_Inmate/details?x=1218351&n=0>>.

Since Plaintiff is now housed at the Southern State Correctional

Facility, but he asserts that he was housed at Burlington County

Jail from the time of his pre-trial confinement and until August

16, 2010, see Docket Entry No. 1-2, at 2, the Court cannot

determine timeliness of Plaintiff’s claims which, apparently,

accrued during his, seemingly over five-year, Burlington County

Jail confinement.

Since, as the discussion below illustrates, Plaintiff’s

Complaint is subject to dismissal without prejudice, Plaintiff will

be directed to specify, in his amended complaint, when the alleged

events took place.

A. Eighth Amendment 

Plaintiff has a protected right in being incarcerated at a

place of confinement confirming to the standards set forth by the

Eighth Amendment. The Constitution “does not mandate comfortable

prisons,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), but neither

does it permit inhumane ones, and it is now settled that “the

treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under

which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth

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Amendment.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). In its

prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments, the Eighth Amendment

. . . imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must provide humane

conditions of confinement; prison officials . . . must take

reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." 

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-527 (1984), see Helling, 509

U.S. at 31-32; Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225 (1990);

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).

The Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions which involve the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or are grossly

disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting

imprisonment. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346, 347. The cruel and unusual

punishment standard is not static, but is measured by “the evolving

standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” 

Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101

(1958)).

The Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual

punishment requires that prison officials provide inmates with

adequate medical care. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04

(1976). In order to set forth a cognizable claim for a violation

of his right to adequate medical care, an inmate must allege: (1)

a serious medical need; and (2) behavior on the part of prison

officials that constitutes deliberate indifference to that need.

See id. at 106. To satisfy the first prong of the Estelle inquiry,

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the inmate must demonstrate that his medical needs are serious.

“Because society does not expect that prisoners will have

unqualified access to health care, deliberate indifference to

medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only if

those needs are 'serious.'” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9

(1992). Serious medical needs include those that have been

diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or that are so

obvious that a lay person would recognize the necessity for

doctor's attention, and those conditions which, if untreated, would

result in lifelong handicap or permanent loss. See Monmouth County

Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347

(3d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988). The seriousness

of an inmate's medical need may also be determined by reference to

the effect of denying the particular treatment. See id. at 347. 

For example, pursuant to Estelle, if “unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain” results as a consequence of denial or delay in

the provision of adequate medical care, the medical need is of the

serious nature contemplated by the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle,

429 U.S. at 105. In addition, where denial or delay causes an

inmate to suffer a life-long handicap or permanent loss, the

medical need is considered serious. See, e.g., Archer v. Dutcher,

733 F.2d 14, 16 (pregnant inmate who miscarried stated cognizable

claim where she alleged that defendants intentionally delayed

emergency medical aid for months in order to make her suffer). 

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Hence, a medical need is serious where it “has been diagnosed by a

physician as requiring treatment or is . . . so obvious that a lay

person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s

attention.” Monmouth County Correctional Institution Inmates v.

Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.

1006 (1988).

“Deliberate indifference” exists “where [a] prison official:

(1) knows of a prisoner’s need for medical treatment but

intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical

treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner

from receiving needed or recommended medical treatment.” Rouse,

182 F.3d at 197. Furthermore, deliberately delaying necessary

medical diagnosis for a long period of time in order to avoid

providing care constitutes deliberate indifference that is

actionable. See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1993). 

Deliberate indifference is also evident where officials erect

arbitrary and burdensome procedures that result in interminable

delays that deny medical care to suffering inmates. See Monmouth

County Correctional Institution Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,

346-47 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied 486 U.S. 1006 (1998). However,

inconsistencies or differences in medical diagnoses, relatively

short delays unaccompanied by arbitrary or unduly burdensome

bureaucratic procedures, refusal to consider inmate's selfdiagnoses, to summon the medical specialist of the inmate's choice,

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or to perform tests or procedures that the inmate desires, to

explain to the inmate the reason for medical action or inaction, or

to train the inmate to perform medical procedures cannot amount to

cruel and unusual punishment. See White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103

(3d Cir. 1990) (mere disagreements over medical judgment or

treatment do not state Eighth Amendment claims); Alsina-Ortiz v.

Laboy, 400 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. 2005)(a doctor's failure to respond to

certain request for services by the inmate, in context of the

doctor's continued and regular services, did not deprive the inmate

of any meaningful treatment); Smith v. Sator, 102 Fed. Appx. 907

(6th Cir. 2004) (where a prisoner alleged that defendants did not

provide various specialized medical tests that the prisoner found

to be necessary based on his reading of medical literature, the

court held that the complaint was frivolous because refusal to

provide specialized tests amounted to nothing more than a

difference of opinion regarding the medical diagnosis and treatment

and did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation);

Lopez v. Kruegar, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6808 (E.D. Pa. June 4,

1990) (where plaintiff stated that he was receiving medication but

felt that additional medical tests should be taken, his allegations

were directed at the wisdom or quality of treatment and did not

state a claim); Coleman v. Crisp, 444 F. Supp. 31 (W.D. Okla. 1977)

(difference of opinion between plaintiff and doctors concerning

availability of treatment and medication did not establish

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violation of constitutional right or sustain claim).

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a cognizable

claim. While Plaintiff asserts that Captains Larkin and Artist

violated his rights by being aware of the fight and being the

persons to whom Plaintiff handed his medical slips and

administrative grievances, these Defendants’ capacity to observe

the fight or the act of their passing of medical slips to the

persons processing medical requests cannot render them deliberately

indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs, even if the Court is to

presume, arguendo, that a swollen finger qualifies as a serious

medical need within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. 

Indeed, at no point does Plaintiff assert that he actually

asked these Defendants for medical help (or for help with obtaining

medical attention), and that they refused him such help. 

Analogously, Lieutenants Laaf and Farria cannot be deemed

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs simply on the

grounds of being aware of the fact that Plaintiff was submitting

medical slips and administrative grievances: at no point does the

the Plaintiff assert that he actually asked these Defendants for

medical help (or for help with obtaining medical assistance), and

that they refused him such help/assistance. 

Plaintiff’s claims against Sergeants Zoll, Nunn and Eddy also

fall short of alleging a viable Eighth Amendment claim: an officer

cannot become liable for deliberate indifference to one’s medical

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need in the event the officer can just observe a sign of what might

be indicative of an inmate having a minor injury, or if the officer

can just see that an inmate is submitting, for filing or further

passage, medical slips or grievances.

Moreover, the alleged decision of Maurica, Stacy and Addrianna 

not to call a doctor but to merely offer Plaintiff ice for his

swollen finger cannot amount to a claim of constitutional

magnitude. See, e.g., Pilkey v. Lappin, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

44418, at *37 (D.N.J. June 26, 2006) (noting that there is no

constitutional right to “have a doctor at Plaintiff's disposal,”

citing McNeil v. Redman, 21 F. Supp. 2d 884 (C.D. Ill. 1998), for

the proposition that there is “no constitutional right to see a

doctor on demand; the decision whether to summon a doctor, like the

question of whether a certain diagnostic technique or form of

treatment should be prescribed, ‘is a classic example of a matter

for medical judgment,’” quoting, in turn, Estelle, 429 U.S. at

97); see also White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103 (mere disagreements

over medical judgment or treatment do not state Eighth Amendment

claims).

Finally, Plaintiff’s naming of other persons as defendants

without elaborating on these defendants’ involvement in the alleged

wrongs cannot meet the pleading requirement set forth in Iqbal.

Therefore, as drafted, Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to

dismissal. However, being mindful of Plaintiff’s pro se status and

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recognizing that Plaintiff might have inadvertently omitted to

state the facts indicative of a plausible Eighth Amendment claim,

the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice, and

will allow Plaintiff to file an amended pleading elaborating on

Plaintiff’s claims and specifying the dates of the relevant

events.2

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint will be

dismissed. Plaintiff’s claims not amenable to cure by amendment

will be dismissed with prejudice, while the remaining claims will

be dismissed with leave to amend.

An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

2

 The Court strongly encourages Plaintiff under pain of

dismissal of his Complaint with prejudice, to elaborate on the

facts of Plaintiff’s claims in detail, by stating the exact

events, when the injury occurred, what Plaintiff did upon being

injured, when and whom did he ask for help and in what exact

terms, what were the responses he received, what medical care was

eventually provided to him and when (e.g., when did the

particular examination of his finger took place, during which the

finger was x-rayed, when did the fracture was determined, when

the follow-up x-rays were taken, what treatment was offered,

etc.) In addition, taking notice of Plaintiff’s hard-tounderstand penmanship, the Court strongly encourages Plaintiff to

hand-print, rather than script, his amended pleading in order to

make the content of that amended pleading as readable as

possible.

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s/Renée Marie Bumb 

RENÉE MARIE BUMB,

United States District Judge

Dated: July 14, 2011

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