In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-3485

STEVEN ANDERSON,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

ROGER D. COWAN, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 97 C 3352--Ruben Castillo, Judge.

Argued June 7, 2000--Decided September 15, 2000

 Before POSNER, COFFEY and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.

 RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Mr. Anderson was tried

before a jury in an Illinois trial court and

found guilty of first-degree murder, armed

robbery, and aggravated kidnaping. He was

sentenced to a life term, a 30-year term, and a

15-year term, respectively./1 He then appealed

his conviction to the Appellate Court of

Illinois; that court upheld his conviction.

Thereafter, he sought leave to appeal to the

Supreme Court of Illinois, but his petition was

denied. Mr. Anderson next filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus in the district court. The

district court denied his habeas petition but

granted a certificate of appealability on the

issue of whether Mr. Anderson’s Confrontation

Clause rights had been violated under Bruton v.

United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The district

court refused to issue a certificate with respect

to Mr. Anderson’s remaining two issues: whether

he received ineffective assistance of counsel and

whether he is entitled to a Batson hearing. For

the reasons set forth in the following opinion,

we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

I

BACKGROUND

 A confidential informant told the police that a

man named Lorne Gray was involved in the unsolved

murder of Alan Cypin. Over a year earlier,
Cypin’s body had been found in an alley. The

police then questioned Gray, and he confessed to

the murder, but also implicated Mr. Anderson. The

police then located Mr. Anderson and requested

that he appear at the police station. 

 Upon Mr. Anderson’s arrival at the police

station, the police placed him under arrest,

informed him of his Miranda rights, and then

questioned him about his involvement in Cypin’s

murder. While the police were administering a

polygraph test, Mr. Anderson confessed his role

in the crime to Officer Garrity. Mr. Anderson

then repeated the same confession to Officers

Garrity, Harrington, and Puttin. Later in the

evening, he repeated his confession to an

assistant state’s attorney, and, finally, he

confessed a fourth time during a court-reported

statement.

 The State of Illinois ("the State") prosecuted

Mr. Anderson for the murder, robbery, and

kidnaping of Cypin. Gray was tried simultaneously

on the same charges before the same court but by

a separate jury. At the trial, Officer Garrity

testified about Mr. Anderson’s confession to him.

Then, Officer Harrington testified that Mr.

Anderson had repeated the same story when he had

confessed the second time. Only these first two

confessions of Mr. Anderson were admitted into

evidence. Officer Harrington also testified about

Gray’s confession, which implicated Mr. Anderson.

II

DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254,/2 provides,

in pertinent part, that habeas relief may be

granted only if the adjudication of the claim by

the state court "resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States." 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254 (d)(1). The Supreme

Court, in Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495

(2000), clarified the meaning of this standard.

In Williams, the Court explained that a state

court decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court

precedent "if the state court arrives at a

conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court

on a question of law" or "if the state court

confronts facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court

precedent and arrives at a result opposite to

ours." Id. at 1519. The Court then stated that "a

run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the

correct legal rule from our cases to the facts of

a prisoner’s case would not fit comfortably
within sec. 2254(d)(1)’s ’contrary to’ clause."

Id. at 1520. The Court therefore focused on the

second phrase of the same subsection:

"unreasonable application" of clearly established

Supreme Court precedent. It interpreted

"unreasonable application of" as either: "if the

state court identifies the correct governing

legal rule from this Court’s cases but

unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular state prisoner’s case" or "if the

state court either unreasonably extends a legal

principle from our precedent to a new context

where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses

to extend that principle to a new context where

it should apply." Id. at 1520. 

 We review the district court’s decision to deny

habeas de novo. See Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d

620, 627 (7th Cir. 2000); Lieberman v.

Washington, 128 F.3d 1085, 1091 (7th Cir. 1997).

When the case falls under sec. 2254(d)(1)’s

"contrary to" clause, we review the state court

decision de novo to determine the legal question

of what is clearly established law as determined

by the Supreme Court and whether the state court

decision is "contrary to" that precedent. See

Schaff v. Snyder, 190 F.3d 513, 522 (7th Cir.

1999). When the case fits under the "unreasonable

application of" clause of sec. 2254(d)(1),

however, we defer to a reasonable state court

decision. See id. ("Whether the state court’s

holding involved an ’unreasonable application’ of

clearly established federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court, is a mixed question of law and

fact that we traditionally also review de novo

but with a grant of deference to any reasonable

state court decision.").

B. Confrontation Clause Violation

 Mr. Anderson argues that his Sixth Amendment

right to confront the witness against him was

violated in the trial court. The trial court

admitted into evidence Gray’s confession that

implicated Mr. Anderson; however, Gray did not

take the stand, and Mr. Anderson was unable to

cross-examine him. The Appellate Court of

Illinois held that the admission of Gray’s

confession violated Mr. Anderson’s rights under

the Confrontation Clause. It further held,

however, that overwhelming and incontrovertible

evidence of Mr. Anderson’s guilt existed. The

court found that the outcome of Mr. Anderson’s

trial was unaffected by the Confrontation Clause

violation and that the error therefore was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Before us, as

he did in the district court, Mr. Anderson argues

that the admission of Gray’s confession

constituted a violation of the Sixth Amendment as

set forth by the Supreme Court in Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).

 In Bruton, two defendants, Evans and Bruton,

were tried jointly. At their trial, the trial

court admitted the pretrial confession of Evans,

which implicated Bruton. The Supreme Court held

that Evans’ confession was not admissible against

Bruton unless Evans waived his Fifth Amendment

right not to testify so that Bruton would be

permitted to cross-examine him. See id. at 127-

28. By admitting Evans’ confession against

Bruton, the Court determined, Bruton’s Sixth

Amendment rights under the Confrontation Clause

were violated. See id. Moreover, the Court

explained, a limiting instruction was not

sufficient to cure the error. See id. at 135-37.

 The Supreme Court has explained that a violation

of the Bruton rule may be harmless error if there

is overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s

guilt. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S.

250, 253 (1969) (explaining that the case against

the defendant "was so overwhelming that we

conclude this violation of Bruton was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt"). "In some cases the

properly admitted evidence of guilt is so

overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the

codefendant’s admission is so insignificant by

comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable

doubt that the improper use of the admission was

harmless error." Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S.

427, 430 (1972); see also United States v.

Martin, 897 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir. 1990) ("A

federal constitutional error can be held harmless

only if the Court is able ’to declare a belief

that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’"

(quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24

(1967))). Moreover, the Court explained, "unless

there is a reasonable possibility that the

improperly admitted evidence contributed to the

conviction, reversal is not required." Schneble,

405 U.S. at 432.

 In Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986),

the Supreme Court set forth the factors for

determining whether a violation of the

Confrontation Clause was harmless error. See id.

at 684. The Court explained as follows:

Whether such an error is harmless in a particular

case depends upon a host of factors, all readily

accessible to reviewing courts. These factors

include the importance of the witness’ testimony

in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony

was cumulative, the presence or absence of

evidence corroborating or contradicting the

testimony of the witness on material points, the

extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted,

and, of course, the overall strength of the

prosecution’s case. 
Id.; see also United States v. Eskridge, 164 F.3d

1042, 1044 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Van Arsdall).

In Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 189-90 (1987),

the Court gave further guidance on Bruton-type

errors and, significantly, gave additional

instruction on the methodology for determining

whether such an error may be considered harmless.

Specifically, the Court held that, when a

nontestifying co-defendant’s confession is not

admissible directly against the defendant, the

Confrontation Clause bars its admission at their

joint trial even if the jury is instructed to not

consider it against the defendant and even if the

defendant’s own confession is admitted against

him. See id. at 193. The Court further explained

that "the defendant’s confession . . . may be

considered on appeal in assessing whether any

Confrontation Clause violation was harmless." Id.

at 193-94 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Cruz holds that the interlocking nature of the

confessions does not prevent a Confrontation

Clause violation; however, the interlocking

nature of the confessions may render the

violation harmless. See id. at 191.

 The district court agreed with the Appellate

Court of Illinois that the admission of Gray’s

confession violated Mr. Anderson’s rights under

the Confrontation Clause. However, the district

court relied upon Cruz to hold that the Bruton

error was harmless. Even if Gray’s confession was

excluded from the evidence, reasoned the district

court, Mr. Anderson’s confession was sufficient

to sustain his conviction because a reasonable

jury would have found Mr. Anderson guilty. The

district court concluded that the state appellate

court’s decision--that this error was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt--was not contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent.

 As the district court cogently noted, in

considering whether the admission of Gray’s

confession against Mr. Anderson was prejudicial,

we may take into consideration Mr. Anderson’s two

confessions. During those confessions, he

provided detailed accounts of the crimes. Many of

the specific details provided in Mr. Anderson’s

confessions were also present in Gray’s

confession. Following the Supreme Court in Cruz,

the corroboration between the two confessions

suggests that the admission of Gray’s confession

may be harmless error. 

 The state court concluded that the admission of

Gray’s confession in violation of Bruton was

harmless error, and it reached this conclusion by

recognizing that there was "overwhelming and

incontrovertible evidence of defendant Anderson’s
guilt." R.29, Ex.A at 12. The state court pointed

out that witness testimony and physical evidence

linked Mr. Anderson to the crime. Moreover, Mr.

Anderson twice confessed to the crime. In light

of all the evidence against Mr. Anderson, we

cannot conclude that the state court’s

determination that the admission of Gray’s

confession against Mr. Anderson was harmless

error is "contrary to or an unreasonable

application of" the clearly established Supreme

Court precedent of Bruton and its progeny./3 

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

 Mr. Anderson also submits that he was denied

effective assistance of counsel in the Appellate

Court of Illinois because counsel failed to

pursue the trial court’s denial of Mr. Anderson’s

motion to suppress his confessions. The district

court determined that Mr. Anderson procedurally

defaulted this claim.

1.

 The district court did not grant a certificate

of appealability on this claim. When a district

court does not certify an issue for appeal, the

petitioner must make "a substantial showing of

the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C.

sec. 2253(c)(2). As the Supreme Court recently

held, for a petitioner to make a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right,

the petitioner must show "that reasonable jurists

could debate whether . . . the petition should

have been resolved in a different manner or that

the issues presented were adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further." Slack v.

McDaniel, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1603-04 (2000)

(citations and quotation marks omitted). "The

petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable

jurists would find the district court’s

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable

or wrong." Id. at 1604./4 Mr. Anderson therefore

must make a substantial showing of the denial of

his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance

of counsel before we may consider the merits of

this claim. See Schaff, 190 F.3d at 528.

2.

 If a petitioner failed to raise his claim to the

state courts, and therefore failed to give the

state courts "the first opportunity to review

this claim and provide any necessary relief," he

has procedurally defaulted the claim. See

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999);

Rodriguez v. Scillia, 193 F.3d 913, 916 (7th Cir.

1999). If a petitioner procedurally defaulted on

his claim in the state court, a federal court may

not grant habeas relief unless the petitioner

"can demonstrate cause for the default and actual
prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of

federal law, or demonstrate that failure to

consider the claims will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice." Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 750 (1991); see also Thomas v.

McCaughtry, 201 F.3d 995, 999 (7th Cir. 2000);

Rodriguez, 193 F.3d at 917; Crivens v. Roth, 172

F.3d 991, 995 (7th Cir. 1999).

 The district court pointed out that Mr. Anderson

did not raise his ineffective assistance of

counsel claim in his petition for appeal to the

Supreme Court of Illinois. This failure, the

district court held, denied that court the

opportunity to decide the claim. Moreover, the

district court noted that state post-conviction

relief was no longer available for Mr. Anderson.

Therefore, the district court concluded, Mr.

Anderson procedurally defaulted on his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. To allow

him to proceed in federal court on his habeas

claim despite the procedural default, Mr.

Anderson must show, the district court stated,

cause for the default and actual prejudice due to

the default, or he must show that a failure to

consider the claim would result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. Because Mr. Anderson

failed to argue cause and prejudice, the district

court held that it could not consider the merits

of Mr. Anderson’s claim./5

 Mr. Anderson asserts that he has a

constitutional right to effective assistance of

counsel and that, in his appeal to the Appellate

Court of Illinois, his counsel was ineffective

under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984), because counsel did not raise the denial

of Mr. Anderson’s motion to suppress his

confessions./6 Mr. Anderson also claims that the

same counsel was ineffective before the Supreme

Court of Illinois when he failed to raise his own

failure to bring the suppression issue before the

Appellate Court of Illinois. This second lapse by

counsel, he claims, constituted "cause" for his

failure to raise his ineffective assistance of

counsel claim before the state courts.

 Mr. Anderson has procedurally defaulted his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. To

preserve this claim for habeas review, Mr.

Anderson needed to present it to the Supreme

Court of Illinois in his petition for

discretionary review. See Boerckel, 526 U.S. at

848. In failing to present this claim to the

Illinois courts, Mr. Anderson deprived the state

courts of the first opportunity to review it. See

id. at 844. This failure resulted in a procedural

default of his claim. See id. at 848.

 Mr. Anderson argues that, because he had
ineffective assistance of counsel in his petition

to the Supreme Court of Illinois, there is

"cause" for his failure to present his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his

petition for discretionary review to the Supreme

Court of Illinois. The Supreme Court of the

United States has held that "[a]ttorney error

that constitutes ineffective assistance of

counsel is cause." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753-54.

However, "a criminal defendant does not have a

constitutional right to counsel to pursue

discretionary state appeals," Wainwright v.

Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587 (1982), and "the right

to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal

of right, and no further." Pennsylvania v.

Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). In proceedings

in which a petitioner does not have a

constitutional right to counsel, "a petitioner

cannot claim constitutionally ineffective

assistance of counsel in such proceedings." See

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53. Mr. Anderson

therefore had no constitutional right to counsel

for his discretionary petition to the Supreme

Court of Illinois, and he could not have received

ineffective assistance of counsel for the failure

of counsel to raise his ineffective assistance of

counsel claim in his petition to the Supreme

Court of Illinois. See id. Mr. Anderson thus has

procedurally defaulted his ineffective assistance

of counsel claim, and he has not made a

substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.

D. Batson Claim 

 To make out a prima facie case of purposeful

discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.

79 (1986), Mr. Anderson needs to show that the

State struck a member of a constitutionally

protected class during jury selection and that

all the relevant circumstances raise an inference

of intentional discrimination by the State. See

United States v. Brisk, 171 F.3d 514, 523 (7th

Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 150 (1999).

Relevant circumstances include the pattern of

strikes and the prosecutor’s questions and

statements. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97; cf.

United States v. Cooke, 110 F.3d 1288, 1301 (7th

Cir. 1997) (stating that the mere fact that the

prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to

exclude two African-Americans, without more, is

insufficient to raise an inference of

discrimination); Brisk, 171 F.3d at 523 (same).

 The Appellate Court of Illinois held that Mr.

Anderson failed to make out a prima facie case of

race discrimination under Batson. The state court

said that it was unable to discern the race of

the jury or of the other excluded venire members

because Mr. Anderson failed to preserve the
record of the racial composition of the venire

pool. The prosecutor’s use of two of its

peremptory challenges to exclude African-American

women from the jury, according to the court,

failed to establish an inference of

discrimination under Batson. Thus, the state

court held that Mr. Anderson failed to establish

his prima facie case for a Batson hearing.

 The district court also held that Mr. Anderson

was not entitled to a Batson hearing because he

could not establish a prima facie case of

purposeful discrimination by the prosecutor in

the use of his peremptory challenges. Mr.

Anderson could not establish a prima facie case,

explained the district court, because to do so he

needed to do more than simply point to the fact

that the State excluded an African-American

venire person when using a peremptory challenge.

Instead, the district court stated, the defendant

must have shown that, when considering all the

relevant circumstances, such as a pattern of

strikes or the questions of the prosecutor, there

was an inference of intentional discrimination.

The district court therefore refused to hold that

Mr. Anderson was entitled to a Batson hearing.

 Mr. Anderson asserts that his request for a

Batson hearing was incorrectly denied. He argues

that he made out a prima facie case of purposeful

discrimination by the State based solely on the

prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges at

his trial. He states that he needs to show only

that he is a member of a cognizable racial group

and that the prosecutor removed venire members of

his race; the race of the jury or the other

excluded venire members, he claims, does not

indicate whether the prosecutor used the two

peremptory challenges in a discriminatory

fashion. "To establish a prima facie case of

purposeful discrimination under Batson," however,

Mr. Anderson "must do more than merely point to

the fact that the government excluded an AfricanAmerican venireperson by using a peremptory

challenge." Cooke, 110 F.3d at 1301. Instead, he

also must show that the facts and "any other

relevant circumstances" raise an inference of

discriminatory practice by the prosecutor.

Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. According to the Supreme

Court in Batson:

In deciding whether the defendant has made the

requisite showing [for a prima facie case], the

trial court should consider all relevant

circumstances. For example, a "pattern" of

strikes against black jurors included in the

particular venire might give rise to an inference

of discrimination. Similarly, the prosecutor’s

questions and statements during voir dire

examination and in exercising his challenges may
support or refute an inference of discriminatory

purpose. These examples are merely illustrative.

Id. at 96-97. Mr. Anderson does not provide any

other "relevant circumstances" to inform us

whether the prosecutor used the peremptory

challenges in a discriminatory manner, and the

Appellate Court of Illinois’ denial of a Batson

hearing is therefore not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established

Supreme Court precedent. Mr. Anderson has not

made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.

Conclusion

 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the

district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

/1 The armed robbery term was to run consecutively

with the murder sentence and the aggravated

kidnaping term was to run concurrently with the

armed robbery sentence.

/2 AEDPA applies to Mr. Anderson’s case because he

filed his federal habeas petition after the

effective date of AEDPA, April 25, 1996. See

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).

/3 Before AEDPA, federal courts assessed, on habeas

review, whether a constitutional error was

harmless by applying the rule articulated by the

Supreme Court in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619 (1993). Under that formula, the federal

habeas courts were to inquire, in the case of

trial error, whether that error "’had substantial

and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury’s verdict.’" Id. at 637 (quoting

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776

(1946)). This standard was refined by the Court

in O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995), which

held that "where the record is so evenly balanced

that a conscientious judge is in grave doubt as

to the harmlessness of the error," id. at 437,

the petitioner must prevail, see id. at 436. 

 It is unclear whether the holdings in Brecht and

O’Neal have survived the passage of AEDPA. In

Nevers v. Killigan, 169 F.3d 352 (6th Cir. 1999),

our colleagues in the Sixth Circuit held that

"the test set out by the Supreme Court in

Kotteakos and explicitly reiterated in Brecht

quite precisely captures Congress’s intent as

expressed in AEDPA and, therefore, continues to

be applicable." Id. at 371. The court reasoned

that, under Brecht, "it is the habeas

petitioner’s burden to demonstrate that the trial
error resulted in ’actual prejudice’ . . . . If

the petitioner is able to make that showing, he

will surely have demonstrated that the state

court’s finding that the error was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt--the Chapman standard--

was outside the realm of plausible credible

outcomes, and therefore resulted from an

unreasonable application of Chapman." Id. at 370

(quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637). Nevers has

been followed in the Sixth Circuit, although with

a marked lack of enthusiasm. See Maurino v.

Johnson, 210 F.3d 638, 644 (6th Cir. 2000)

(following Nevers "because there has been no

intervening Supreme Court decision invalidating

that panel’s decision"), abrogation on other

grounds recognized by Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d

940 (6th Cir. 2000). The Eighth Circuit, by

contrast, has indicated, in dicta, skepticism

about the continued vitality of Brecht. See

Whitmore v. Kenna, 213 F.3d 431, 433 (8th Cir.

2000). We need not take sides on this

disagreement. Even if we assume that Brecht

articulates a more generous standard than AEDPA,

we must conclude that, under that more generous

standard, the error was harmless. See Thomas v.

Gibson, 218 F.3d 1213, 1226 n.12 (10th Cir.

2000).

/4 See also Porter v. Gramley, 112 F.3d 1308, 1312

(7th Cir. 1997) (stating that a petitioner must

demonstrate that an issue is debatable among

jurists or that "the questions ’deserve

encouragement to proceed further’" (quoting

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4

(1983))).

/5 The district court further explained that, even

if it reached the merits, Mr. Anderson’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim would

fail. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1984), Mr. Anderson is required to show that

his counsel’s performance was so deficient that

it fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness and that he was prejudiced by this

deficient performance and that there was a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.

 According to the district court, Mr. Anderson

claims that his court-reported statement violated

Miranda and, thus, that his counsel’s failure to

object to that confession constituted

constitutionally deficient performance. As the

district court pointed out, this statement by Mr.

Anderson was not even introduced into evidence at

trial. His first two confessions, for which there

is uncontested evidence that prior to his

statements Mr. Anderson was read his Miranda

rights, were introduced at trial. The potential

Miranda violation for his fourth (as well as his
third) confession does not nullify the validity

of his first two confessions. Thus, the district

court held that Mr. Anderson’s counsel was not

acting deficiently in failing to object to the

admission of his confessions at trial.

/6 Mr. Anderson filed a motion to suppress his

confessions. The State admitted that his courtreported statement violated Miranda and agreed

not to use it at trial. He claims that he

produced enough evidence of Miranda violations

for his other confessions in his motion to

suppress that those confessions should not have

been admitted into evidence.

 The failure of his counsel to pursue the denial

of his motion to suppress his confessions,

according to Mr. Anderson, is a violation of his

Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of

counsel. Mr. Anderson contends that there is no

strategic reason for appellate counsel’s failure

to raise the denial of the motion to suppress his

statements in the state court. Failure of counsel

to raise this claim, Mr. Anderson argues,

prejudiced him because, without these

confessions, no evidence existed against him

(except for the constitutionally questionable

confession of his co-defendant).