NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE 

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

KARLI B., 

Appellant, 

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, A.G., B.K, 

Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-JV 14-0336 

 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. JS17212 

The Honorable Bradley H. Astrowsky, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Denise L. Carroll, Scottsdale 

Counsel for Appellant 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By JoAnn Falgout 

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
KARLI B. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Patricia K. Norris and Judge Maurice Portley joined. 

O R O Z C O, Judge: 

¶1 Karli B. (Mother) appeals from the termination of her parental 

rights to A.G. and B.K. (collectively the Children). For the following 

reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 A.G. was born in November 2011. In April of 2012, Mother 

filed an order of protection against Harvest G. (Father)1 following a 

physical altercation between the parties during which Father choked and 

hit Mother and broke her cell phone while A.G. was present. Father was 

placed on probation and ordered to complete twenty-six domestic violence 

classes. 

¶3 In June 2012, Department of Child Services (DCS) received a 

report alleging A.G. had been sexually abused. Mother left A.G. with a 

friend overnight, and her maternal grandmother picked A.G. up the 

following day. After taking A.G. to a hospital, a medical exam revealed 

A.G. had bruising and injuries to her genitalia. A.G. went into DCS care 

that month and was ultimately placed with her maternal grandparents. 

¶4 Mother reconciled with Father and had the order of 

protection quashed, claiming she needed Father’s help “getting [A.G.] 

back.” Mother acknowledged Father had not completed the terms of his 

probation, but believed he had taken enough classes to “understand fully 

what domestic violence is.” Mother admitted to participating in 

prostitution and using drugs during this time. 

¶5 The DCS assigned Mother a family preservation team that 

worked with Mother in several different residences because she did not 

have her own apartment and lived with Father, a friend, and a cousin from 

August until October 2012. The team was concerned that Mother was 

 

1 Father’s parental rights were severed, but he is not a party to this 

appeal. 
KARLI B. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

3 

unable to provide a stable home for A.G., exhibited a lack of judgment in 

determining safe and appropriate individuals to allow contact with A.G, 

was not following through with her substance abuse treatment, and was 

pregnant in an unstable environment. DCS instituted an out-of-home 

safety plan to allow Mother to make progress with family preservation 

services. A.G. was found dependent as to Mother in December 2012. 

¶6 B.K. was born in April 2013 and was taken into DCS care at 

birth. She was later placed in the care of her maternal great aunt and uncle. 

DCS informed the juvenile court that Mother failed to provide evidence of 

stable employment, provide appropriate housing, comply with DCS 

services, address her substance abuse issue, etc. B.K. was found dependent 

as to Mother in May 2013.

¶7 Mother was referred to Terros Family First for substance 

abuse treatment, but did not complete the program. She was also assigned 

a parent aide through Arizona Baptist Children’s Services and was 

scheduled to have twice-weekly visits with the Children. However, she 

missed sixteen of fifty-two scheduled visits. Mother admitted to not 

working cooperatively with her parent aide and failing to maintain fulltime employment and a stable residence. Mother obtained her own home 

in February 2014. 

¶8 DCS later referred Mother to James S. Thal, Ph.D. for a 

psychological evaluation. Dr. Thal concluded Mother demonstrated 

“narcissism, deceitfulness, poor impulse control, lack of remorse, and other 

self-defeating behaviors.” Dr. Thal further opined Mother manifested a 

significant “character disorder” that would negatively impact the Children 

and that they could not safely be returned to Mother’s care. He 

recommended severance and adoption as the best case plan for the 

Children. 

¶9 The Children’s guardian ad litem petitioned for termination 

of Mother’s parental rights, alleging the Children had been in DCS care for 

at least nine months and Mother “substantially neglected or willfully 

refused to participate in services designed to remedy the circumstances that 

have brought the [C]hildren into care.” At the time of the severance 

hearing, A.G. and B.K. had been removed from Mother’s care for just under 

two years and a little over a year, respectively. 

¶10 The juvenile court granted the severance, finding termination 

proper under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S) section 8-533.B.8(a)-(c), 

length of time in care, and that severance was in the Children’s best 
KARLI B. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

4 

interests. Mother timely appealed and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 8-235.A, 12-

120.21.A.1, and -2101.A (West 2015).2

DISCUSSION 

¶11 We review an order terminating parental rights for an abuse 

of discretion and will affirm if the ruling is supported by sufficient 

evidence. Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292, 296, ¶ 17 (App. 2013). “We 

view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the [juvenile] 

court’s ruling.” Id.

¶12 “To terminate parental rights, a juvenile court must first find 

by clear and convincing evidence. . .the existence of at least one statutory 

ground for termination pursuant to [A.R.S. § 8-533.B], and must also find 

by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child’s best 

interests.” Jennifer G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 450, 453, ¶ 12 (App. 

2005) (citations omitted). 

I. Grounds for Termination 

¶13 The juvenile court concluded severance was proper under 

A.R.S. § 8-533.B.8(a)-(c), length of time in care. Mother argues “the State 

failed to prove the essential basis for severance on all counts.” We will 

affirm its ruling if it legally correct on any ground. Wetherill v. Basham, 197 

Ariz. 198, 202, ¶ 9 (App. 2000). 

¶14 Mother argues “the evidence produced at trial proved that 

she has shown a tremendous good faith effort in attempting to reunite with 

her children.” “Because the trial court is in the best position to weigh the 

evidence, judge the credibility of the parties, observe the parties, and make 

appropriate factual findings, this court will not reweigh the evidence but 

will look only to determine if there is evidence to sustain the court’s ruling.” 

Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004)

(internal punctuation and citations omitted). 

¶15 We find termination of Mother’s parental rights to B.K. and 

A.G. was proper under A.R.S. § 8-533.B.8(b) and (c), respectively. Under 

section 8-533.B, sufficient evidence to justify termination includes: 

 

2 We cite the current version of applicable statutes when no revisions 

material to this decision have since occurred. 
KARLI B. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

5 

8. That the child is being cared for in out-of-home placement 

under the supervision of the juvenile court, the division or a 

licensed child welfare agency, that the agency responsible for 

the care of the child has made a diligent effort to provide 

appropriate reunification services and that one of the 

following circumstances exists: 

... 

(b) The child who is under three years of age has been in an 

out-of-home placement for a cumulative total period of six 

months or longer pursuant to court order and the parent has 

substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the 

circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home 

placement, including refusal to participate in reunification 

services offered by the department. 

(c) The child has been in an out-of-home placement for a 

cumulative total period of fifteen months or longer pursuant 

to court order or voluntary placement pursuant to § 8-806, the 

parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that 

cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement and there 

is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable 

of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in 

the near future. 

(Emphasis added). 

¶16 There is no dispute the Children were in an out-of-home 

placement for the requisite statutory periods. Thus, we consider whether 

sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that DCS made a 

diligent effort to provide unification services and that Mother refused to 

participate in those services. 

¶17 “In considering the grounds for termination prescribed in 

[A.R.S. § 8-533.B.8], the court shall consider the availability of reunification 

services to the parent and the participation of the parent in these services.” 

A.R.S. § 8-533.D. However, DCS is not required to “provide every 

conceivable service or to ensure that a parent participates in each service it 

offers.” Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 231, 235, ¶ 15 (App. 

2011) (internal punctuation omitted). 

¶18 DCS assigned Mother a family preservation team and 

assigned her an out-of-home safety plan to help her make progress with the 
KARLI B. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

6 

family reunification plan. She was also referred to the Terros Family First 

Program, but failed to complete treatment. Mother was also granted 

visitation with the Children, but missed sixteen of the fifty-two scheduled 

visits. Moreover, Mother did not obtain stable housing until nearly two 

years following A.G.’s placement in out-of-home care and a year after B.K.’s 

birth. The DCS caseworker testified: 

[Mother] has only recently begun to demonstrate any 

responsibility for – or acceptance of responsibility for what 

brought [the Children] into care. She still minimizes the 

domestic violence between herself and [Father] and how that 

affected [the Children]. She does not recognize how domestic 

violence in relationships around her affects her ability to 

safely and appropriately parent [the Children]. She [] 

continues to be dishonest with her service provider. She is 

not addressing her mental health issues and knowing that her 

mental health issues and her domestic violence issues were 

the main goal, she did not follow through with setting up her 

second counseling referral. 

¶19 On this record, DCS met its statutory obligation to provide 

reunification services and Mother “substantially neglected or willfully 

refused to remedy the circumstances that cause[d]” the Children to go into 

out-of-home care. See A.R.S. § 8-533.B.8. See also In re Maricopa Cnty. Juv. 

Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 352-53 (App. 1994) (finding severance 

proper when mother failed to complete DCS recommended drug treatment 

programs and failed to attend scheduled visits with her children). 

¶20 Moreover, sufficient evidence supports a substantial 

likelihood that Mother “will not be capable of exercising proper and 

effective parental care and control in the near future” with regards to A.G. 

See A.R.S. § 8-533.B.8(c). When asked if Mother could demonstrate 

“minimally adequate parenting skills in the foreseeable future,” Dr. Thal 

concluded that the prognosis was poor. He also opined that the Children 

could be at risk for neglect and abuse while in Mother’s care. 

II. The Children’s Best Interests 

¶21 Mother next argues the trial court erred by finding 

termination was in the Children’s best interest because they are bonded to 

her and “would suffer a detriment if her rights were terminated.” Factors 

to consider in a determination of a child’s best interest include whether: “1) 

an adoptive placement is immediately available; 2) the existing placement 
KARLI B. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

7 

is meeting the needs of the child; and 3) the children are adoptable.” 

Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 380, ¶ 30 (App. 2010)

(citations omitted). 

¶22 Sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding. 

The DCS caseworker testified that termination was in the Children’s best 

interest because they had “an anxious bond” with Mother and both had 

bonded with their caregivers. She also testified that the Children’s 

caregivers were meeting their “every need” and would be “appropriate 

placement[s] to adopt” them. She concluded that the Children were 

adoptable even if not adopted by their current caregivers because they are 

“very loving and can form bonds with other individuals relatively easy.” 

Thus, we affirm the juvenile court’s ruling.

CONCLUSION 

¶23 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s order 

terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children.