NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

 

MARC TARABOUR, PETER RIORDAN, 

MURRAY MANKOWITZ, MIKE DIMURO, 

KEN BOSLAND, JEFF BELLUARDO, 

TONY MONG, JEFF MIRABILE, JACK 

KRAMER, ROBIN DRYLIE, KAITLYN 

JACKSON, LEANN LUGASHI, STAN 

KLEIMAN, ROBERT LEWIS, ED MEYER, 

and THE ASSOCIATION OF CURRENT 

AND RETIRED LIVINGSTON 

AUXILIARY POLICE OFFICERS, INC., 

Civ. No. 10-3213 (DRD) 

O P I N I O N

 Plaintiffs, 

v. 

TOWNSHIP OF LIVINGSTON, 

LIVINGSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, 

and POLICE CHIEF CRAIG M. 

HANDSCHUCH, 

 Defendants. 

Appearances by:

BERMAN SAUTER RECORD & JARDIM PC 

by: Thomas C. Jardim, Esq. 

222 Ridgedale Avenue 

Cedar Knolls, New Jersey 07927 

Attorney for Plaintiffs 

GENOVA, BURNS & GIANTOMASI 

by: Sandro Polledri, Esq. 

 Erica K. Rustad, Esq. 

494 Broad Street 

Newark, New Jersey 07102 

Attorneys for Defendants

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DEBEVOISE, Senior District Judge

This case concerns an investigation into possible financial improprieties and fraudulent 

solicitation by members of Livingston Township Auxiliary Police Associations. Plaintiffs, each 

auxiliary police officers, have brought this action in an effort to halt inquiries by the Livingston 

Police Department into the conduct and records of their organizations. Having had limited 

success with an application for injunctive relief, Plaintiffs now seek over $51,000 in attorney’s 

fees. 

Plaintiffs have submitted this fee application pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Plaintiffs 

argue that because they were successful in obtaining: (1) a preliminary injunction barring the 

implementation of a May 31, 2010 directive ordering Auxiliary Police Officers to disassociate 

from their organization; and (2) an order reinstating John Belluardo, Ken Bosland, Mike 

DiMuro, Robin Drylie, Tony Mong, Peter Riordan and Marc Tarabour, that they should be 

entitled to all legal fees incurred in connection with this litigation, including the costs of the 

currently pending appeal. 

Having examined these arguments, Plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 The Township of Livingston Police Department employs about 75 full-time police 

officers. (Def. PI. Br. 2) (Doc. No. 16). For many decades, the Township has also maintained a 

smaller group of auxiliary police officers to provide for additional personnel and resources in the 

case of public emergencies. Id. The officers in the Auxiliary Unit are volunteers who are trained 

to assist in functions such as traffic direction, crowd control, and patrol duty. Id. at 3. Auxiliary 

officers serve under the direction and supervision of the Chief of Police and are authorized to 

carry firearms. Id. 

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 Throughout the years, auxiliary officers have formed organizations to pursue common 

interests and objectives. In May 1952, several officers formed a not-for-profit corporation called 

the Livingston Police Associates Club (the “Club”). Id. at 4. The Club was formed for the 

purpose of creating and maintaining a shooting range at which police officers, both regular duty 

and auxiliary, could practice their firearm skills. Id. In the early 1990s, another auxiliary 

organization, the Auxiliary Police Association (the “Association”) was formed. Id. The 

Association was an unincorporated group operating pursuant to a Constitution and a series of 

Bylaws. Pursuant to this Constitution, the Association gave substantial control over its operations 

to the Chief of Police, including the right to “supervise”, “exercise control”, and “exercise veto 

powers” over the Association’s activities. Id. at 5. The Association’s principal activity was to 

raise money to pay for the uniforms and equipment of auxiliary police officers. Id. 

 On November 30, 2009, Defendant Handschuch sent a memorandum to all auxiliary 

police officers informing them that he intended to exercise more direct control over the 

Association. (Polledri Cert. Ex. 18). In particular, the memo stated that promotions within the 

auxiliary officer ranks would be made by the Chief of Police and not by the Association itself. 

Id. After receiving these instructions, on December 30, 2009, Association President Jeff Mirabile 

and two other auxiliary police officers formed a new not-for-profit corporation called the 

Livingston Auxiliary Police Association, Inc. (the “2009 Corporation”). Id. Ex. 9. 

The 2009 Corporation was neither affiliated with, nor controlled by, the Livingston 

Police Department. Indeed, the name of the 2009 Corporation appears deliberately chosen so that 

it could easily masquerade as the original Association. In fact, it appears that neither Defendant 

Handschuch nor the Township realized that a new organization had been created for several 

months. While the 2009 Association was not recognized by the Township of Livingston, it 

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nevertheless used stationary and advertisements that featured an image of the Livingston Police 

Department badge. Id. Ex. 10. Moreover it solicited funds from Livingston business owners 

through fundraising letters that purported to be sent on behalf of the Livingston Auxiliary Police. 

Id. 

 In early 2010 Plaintiff Mirabile began to take further action to resist Defendant 

Handschuch’s control. On February 22, 2010, Plaintiff Mirabile threw another auxiliary officer 

out of the Association and informed him that he was no longer welcome to use automobiles 

purchased through Association fundraising. Id. Ex. 20. That same day, Plaintiff Mirabile told 

Defendant Handschuch that the 2009 Association would not reimburse the Township for 

purchases of uniforms and patches for auxiliary officers as it had in the past. Id. Ex. 21. 

 Relations between Plaintiff Mirabile and Defendants continued to deteriorate. On or 

about March 9, 2010, the Police Department learned that Plaintiff Mirabile had allegedly 

threatened two Township employees. (Def. PI. Br. 10). This was not the first time that Plaintiff 

Mirabile had been involved in questionable behavior. In October of 2009, Plaintiff Mirabile had 

been involved in another incident with another off-duty auxiliary officer, Darin Dubrow. Id. at 8. 

On March 19, 2010, Defendant Handschuch suspended Plaintiff Mirabile pending an internal 

investigation into his conduct. (Polledri Cert. Ex. 24). 

 In the course of this investigation, Defendants learned about the newly formed 2009 

Association and its fundraising efforts. On March 26, 2010, Defendant Handschuch directed 

Plaintiff Mirabile to provide records and bank information related to the 2009 Association to the 

Police Department. Id. Ex. 28. Through counsel, Plaintiff Mirabile refused. Id. Ex. 29. By 

subsequent letter of counsel, Plaintiff Mirabile confirmed that he had retained attorneys for the 

purpose of “investigat[ing] improper behavior by... the police department.” Id. Ex. 30. On April 

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8, 2010 Defendants sent Plaintiff Mirabile a letter informing him that it was launching a second 

investigation into his behavior. Id. Ex. 32. 

 In May 31, 2010 Defendants issued a Memorandum directing all auxiliary police officers 

to either leave the 2009 Association or be removed from their positions. Id. Ex. 33. In early June, 

Defendants scheduled an interview of Plaintiff Mirabile in which he would be questioned about 

facts that had been uncovered in the internal investigation. (Def. PI. Br. 14). 

On June 14, 2010, Plaintiff Mirabile filed a complaint against the Township of 

Livingston, the Livingston Police Department, and Craig Handschuch, the Livingston Police 

Chief in New Jersey Superior Court. (Doc. No. 1). The complaint asserted claims for: arbitrary, 

capricious and bad faith actions by defendants; violations of Mirabile's constitutional rights for 

freedom of speech and for freedom of associations; violation of N.J.S.A.40A:14-147; violation 

of fundamental fairness and procedural due process; violation of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-191, et seq., 

(the New Jersey Attorney General Guidelines of Internal Affairs); and violation of the Local 

Government Ethics Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.1, et seq. Plaintiff Mirabile sought, among other 

things, to enjoin the scheduled interview and bar any other investigation into his conduct. 

On June 23, 2010, the complaint was removed to this Court. Id. 

 On July 8, 2010, Defendants sent a letter to the 2009 Corporation demanding that it cease 

and desist from using the name and badge of the Livingston Police Department in its fundraising 

materials. (Polledri Cert. Ex. 12). The letter informed the 2009 Corporation that it could be in 

violation of the New Jersey Charitable Registration and Investigation Act. N.J.S.A. 45:17A-18 

et. seq. Two days later on July 10, 2010 Plaintiffs created a new organization, called the 

“Association of Current and Retired Livingston Auxiliary Police Officers, Inc. (the “2010 

Corporation”). (Def. PI. Br. 7). 

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 On July 23rd, 2010, an amended complaint was filed naming as plaintiffs not only 

Mirabile, but also additional Livingston auxiliary police officers, and the 2010 Corporation. 

(Doc. No. 10). Plaintiffs then sought emergency injunctive relief by order to show cause, asking 

this Court to: (1) enjoin the investigations into Plaintiff Mirabile and the various auxiliary 

organizations, (2) reinstate all officers removed for failure to comply with the May 31, 2010 

memorandum, and (3) enjoin Defendants from interfering with auxiliary officer membership in 

the 2010 Corporation. (Doc. No. 11). 

 On November 29, 2010, this Court issued an Order denying, in large part, Plaintiffs’ 

requests for injunctive relief. (Doc. No. 37). In a ruling dictated from the bench, this Court held 

that the Livingston Police Department and Police Chief had the authority to investigate Plaintiffs 

and the activities of their organizations. (Doc. No. 32). However, this Court did enjoin 

Defendants from implementing the May 31, 2010 memorandum, as it constituted a 

constitutionally impermissible restriction of auxiliary police officers’ right to association. This 

Court also ordered that Defendants reinstate any auxiliary officers removed due to noncompliance with that directive. Id. 

 Based on the November 29, 2010 order, Plaintiffs now move the Court for attorney’s fees 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 

II. DISCUSSION

In a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a court “in its discretion, may allow the 

prevailing party... a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). In 

enacting the statute, Congress viewed § 1988 fees as “an integral part of the remedies necessary 

to obtain” effective compliance with § 1983. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 11 (1980) (quoting 

S. Rep. No. 94-1011 at 5 (1976)). 

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Plaintiffs contend that this fee award is “mandatory” (Pl. Reply 4) and that this Court, 

having issued a preliminary injunction, has no choice but to award Plaintiffs’ counsel their full 

fees. This is incorrect. While “a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee” 

after success on a § 1983 action, a court may not grant fees if “circumstances would render such 

an award unjust” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). Indeed, “[t]here is no doubt 

that the award of counsel fees is a matter of the court's discretion rather than an absolute right. 

Isaacs v. Temple University, 467 F. Supp. 67, 69 (E.D. Pa. 1979). Courts have repeatedly refused 

to award fees altogether where the record demonstrates inequitable conduct by the prevailing 

party or an unreasonable inflation of the bill by counsel.1

 

Moreover, interim awards of attorney’s fees are inappropriate where the only relief 

obtained is a preliminary injunction which may be subsequently overturned on the merits. See

People Against Police Violence v. City of Pittsburgh, 520 F.3d 226, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting 

that a “fee award [would be] premature [where] further proceedings on the merits of the 

injunction were clearly contemplated.”); see also Dupuy v. Samuels, 423 F.3d 714, 722 -723 (7th 

Cir. 2005) (finding that “the district court's award of attorneys' fees, even on an interim basis, 

was premature” where “[a]lthough the district court expressed the expectation that the remaining 

proceedings would not be lengthy, it also made it clear that there was still work to be done.”). 

 

1

 See, e.g., Lewis v. Kendrick, 944 F.2d 949, 956 (1st Cir. 1991) (“To turn a single 

wrongful arrest into a half year's work, and seek payment therefor, with costs, amounting to 140 

times the worth of the injury, is, to use a benign word, inexcusable. We should not tolerate, even 

by a partial award, such an imposition by counsel on the defendants, and on the court. In the 

exercise of the statutory discretion, we reverse the award of fees altogether.”); Brown v. Stackler, 

612 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1980) (“Where, as here, the claim is obviously inflated to an 

intolerable degree, the remedy is plain, and the District Court properly pursued it. If, as appellant 

argues, the Court were required to award a reasonable fee when an outrageously unreasonable 

one has been asked for, claimants would be encouraged to make unreasonable demands, 

knowing that the only unfavorable consequence of such misconduct would be reduction of their 

fee to what they should have asked for in the first place. To discourage such greed a severer 

reaction is needful, and the District Court responded appropriately in the case at bar.”). 

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Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the award of a preliminary injunction does not make a 

plaintiff a “prevailing party” for the purposes of § 1988 if the plaintiff ultimately loses on the 

merits. Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 72 (2007).2 Before attorney’s fees may issue, “respect for 

ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim.” 

Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 

532 U.S. 598, 603-604 (2001). 

 Here there has been no final judgment on the merits and the overwhelming majority of 

Plaintiffs’ claims have not yet been adjudicated. In addition, there are serious allegations that 

Plaintiffs have behaved in an unabashedly criminal fashion, obtaining donations through fraud, 

misappropriating money intended for charitable use, and conducting acts of armed harassment 

against Township employees. It would be inappropriate to award interim attorney’s fees before 

the Court has the facts at its disposal to determine whether “special circumstances” exist which 

would preclude a fee award altogether. Truesdell v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 290 F.3d 

159, 163 (3d Cir. 2002). 

 Even if an interim award were appropriate, the amounts requested by Plaintiffs’ counsel 

are clearly improper. While § 1988(b) permits attorneys who have “obtained excellent results,” 

to “recover a fully compensatory fee” for “all hours reasonably expended on the litigation,” that 

is not the case here. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. Indeed, where the prevailing party “has achieved 

only partial or limited success,” it is appropriate for the court to reduce the fee award 

 

2

 See also Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We 

recognize that there will be occasions when the plaintiff scores an early victory by securing a 

preliminary injunction, then loses on the merits as the case plays out and judgment is entered 

against him-a case of winning a battle but losing the war. The plaintiff would not be a prevailing 

party in that circumstance.”). Note that the instant case is not like Watson or People Against 

Violence, where a plaintiff was held entitled to attorney’s fees after winning a preliminary 

injunction because the application for permanent relief was subsequently mooted. Here no claims 

have been mooted and no final disposition on the merits has been made. 

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accordingly.3 Id. at 435-36. A downward reduction is warranted “even where the plaintiff's 

claims were interrelated, nonfrivolous, and raised in good faith.” Spencer v. Wal-Mart Stores, 

Inc., 469 F.3d 311, 318 (3d Cir. 2006). A court may not, however, “decrease a fee award based 

on factors not raised at all by the adverse party.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d 

Cir. 1990). 

 In their complaint Plaintiffs assert multiple claims in seven counts. In its brief, 

Defendants break the counts down into thirteen different legal claims and argue that Plaintiffs 

have won, at best, 15% of them.4 But no matter which accounting is adopted, Plaintiffs have not 

prevailed on the overwhelming majority of their claims and cannot be awarded fees for time 

spent pursuing claims upon which they have not yet prevailed. Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183 (3d Cir. 

1990) (a fee award should be reduced by the number of hours "spent litigating claims on which 

the party did not succeed"). 

Moreover, the billing records provided by Plaintiffs clearly indicate that they seek fees 

for legal work that is entirely unrelated to the injunction that was issued, including (1) work 

related to the formation and merger of the various not-for profit corporations created by 

Plaintiffs; (2) work pertaining to the appeal of the denial of injunctive relief; and (3) work related 

 

3

 Plaintiffs’ Counsel claimed at oral argument that “his understanding of the caselaw” 

required that he be paid fees for “the whole ball of wax.” This position is entirely unsupported in 

Plaintiffs’ papers and by the relevant law. 

4

 Defendants’ list includes: (1) freedom of association under the U.S. Constitution (2) 

freedom of association under the N.J. Constitution; (3) freedom of speech under the U.S. 

Constitution; (4) freedom of speech under the N.J. Constitution; (5) liberty and reputational 

interests under the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution (6) liberty and reputational interest 

under the due process clause of the N.J. Constitution; (7) procedural due process under the U.S. 

Constitution; (8) procedural due process under the N.J. Constitution; (9) New Jersey Civil Rights 

Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 et seq. (10) arbitrary, capricious and "bad faith" conduct; (11) N.J.S.A. 

40A:14-147, which establishes the limitations period and procedures for the discipline of sworn 

police officers; (12) N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181 et seq., which pertains to internal affairs guidelines; 

and (13) the Local Government Ethics Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.1 et seq. (Def. Br. 11-12). 

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to the internal affairs investigation. While Defendants have summarized the entries in Plaintiffs’ 

billing logs that are most obviously inappropriate, this Court could not make any award of fees 

before receiving a sworn certification from Plaintiffs’ counsel that none of the work for which 

fees are sought was related to the internal affairs investigation, the creation of new associations 

for the purpose of soliciting donations, the appeal of this Court’s order, or any number of other 

inappropriate activities. It is not the proper role of the Court to guess at the relevance of vague 

billing entries. 

 Since the Court has ample basis to deny the fee award as premature, it will not address 

whether this case is also, as Defendants contend, over-staffed and top-heavy for a dispute of its 

complexity. However the parties would do well to note that complexity that is added through the 

introduction of large numbers of frivolous and unsupportable claims will not ultimately justify a 

larger fee award. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Fees is DENIED. 

s/ Dickinson R. Debevoise 

DICKINSON R. DEBEVOISE, U.S.S.D.J. 

Dated: March 9th, 2011 

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