NUMBERS 13-14-00305-CR 

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG 

 

BILLIE KNOLL, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4

of Nueces County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides and Perkes

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes

Appellant Billie Knoll appeals her conviction for misdemeanor theft. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 46 2015 R.S.). The trial court 

found appellant guilty and assessed punishment at six months’ community supervision 

and a fine of $500.00. By a single issue, appellant contends the evidence was 

insufficient to prove she had the requisite intent to deprive the store of the merchandise.
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We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Johnny Rodriguez was employed as a loss prevention officer at a Sears 

department store. While observing the conduct of store patrons, Rodriguez observed 

appellant removing clothing from hangers and placing the clothing into plastic Sears

shopping bags. According to Rodriguez, this conduct served as a “big alert signal,” 

warranting appellant’s continued observation via the store’s security cameras. In the 

course of Rodriguez’s observation, he saw appellant continue to place Sears 

merchandise into shopping bags throughout the store, remove two pairs of shoes from 

the children’s shoe department and place them under her filled shopping bags, and then 

proceed to the automotive section of the store. At the automotive section of the store, 

Rodriguez watched appellant stop at a register, speak to an attendant, and then exit the 

store with her cart full of unpaid-for merchandise. This testimony was corroborated by 

surveillance footage admitted into evidence and played during the trial.

Jacob Cotton was also employed as a loss prevention officer at the store. He

reviewed the recorded surveillance footage of appellant’s earlier conduct in the store. 

On the video, Cotton observed appellant “[grab] a stack of bags from the auto department 

underneath the register” and begin placing merchandise into those bags. Cotton testified 

that appellant made no effort to pay for the merchandise, except for the purchase of a car 

detailing kit and the auto service performed on her vehicle, which she paid for with cash 

about ten minutes after entering the store. 

Officer Ghezzi, an off-duty police officer working at the mall where the store was 
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located, was called by the Sears loss prevention office and notified of appellant’s 

behavior. Officer Ghezzi was told about a woman (appellant) “taking tags off of property 

and secreting it away” by placing it into shopping bags. He and Officer Rogers, another 

police officer, then went to the store. Officer Rogers joined Cotton and Rodriguez and 

watched appellant, whereas Officer Ghezzi remained outside in his vehicle. Officer 

Rogers subsequently notified Officer Ghezzi that appellant was leaving the store without 

having paid for the merchandise. As appellant left the store and started walking towards

her vehicle, Officer Ghezzi approached and arrested her. 

Appellant admitted during the trial that she placed the Sears merchandise into 

bags and exited the store without having paid for it. She defended herself, however, by 

stating that even though she exited the store with the unpaid-for merchandise, she did 

not leave the store with the intent to deprive Sears of the merchandise without having 

paid for it. Appellant testified that she went to Sears to have her vehicle serviced and, 

anticipating a quick service, she left her purse in her vehicle. She took only her wallet 

into the store. After leaving her car with the service technicians, she learned that the 

service was going to take about an hour. She stated that approximately ten minutes after 

arriving at the service department, she purchased a car detailing kit and unsuccessfully 

attempted to retrieve a credit card from her vehicle.

Appellant testified she then decided to shop for her children. She explained that 

the reason she removed the clothes from the hangers and placed them into the shopping 

bags was because she was sorting the items into bags for each child, and trying to prevent 

the hangers from tearing the bags. She further explained that because she left her credit 
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card in her purse, she intended to store her cart full of bagged merchandise in a certain 

“glass cubbyhole thing” located inside the interlock door between the inside and outside 

of the store. While between the two doors, she observed Officer Ghezzi “waiving like 

something was wrong.” Based on her training as a nurse, she thought he was in distress. 

Appellant testified she believed that she was responding to a perceived medical 

emergency, and did not consciously take her shopping cart into the parking lot. 

II. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

By her sole issue, appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to prove she 

had the requisite intent to commit a theft. Specifically, appellant argues that because 

she was arrested prior to physically leaving the Sears property, which includes the parking 

lot, the State did not show that she intended to commit theft. 

A. Standard of Review

“The standard for determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support 

a conviction is ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Johnson v. State, 364 S.W.3d 292, 293–94 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)) (emphasis in original); see 

Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 898–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). The 

fact-finder is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be 

given to their testimony. Anderson v. State, 322 S.W.3d 401, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd) (citing Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2008)). Reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence is within the fact-finder's exclusive 
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province. Id. (citing Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). We must 

resolve any inconsistencies in the testimony in favor of the verdict. Id. (citing Curry v. 

State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).

We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as 

defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321, 327 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1997)). Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the 

indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily 

restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for 

which the defendant was tried. Id. 

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we look at “events occurring before, 

during and after the commission of the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant 

which show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act.” Guevara v. 

State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citations omitted). Each fact need not 

point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative 

effect of all the incriminating facts are sufficient to support the conviction. Id. (citing 

Alexander v. State, 740 S.W.2d 749, 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc)). The 

evidence is sufficient if the conclusion of guilt is warranted by the combined and 

cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances. Russell v. State, 665 S.W.2d 

771, 776 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)

B. Applicable Law

A person commits theft if she unlawfully appropriates property with the intent to 
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deprive the owner of the property. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a). A person acts 

with intent when it is her conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause 

the result. Id. § 6.03(a). Deprivation is not an element of intent to deprive; therefore, 

the State need not prove actual deprivation in order to prove intent to deprive. Rowland 

v. State, 744 S.W.2d 610, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). While evidence of actual 

deprivation may be evidence of intent to deprive, other evidence may also indicate 

whether intent to deprive exists. Id. Criminal intent is necessary to establish theft. See 

Ellis v. State, 877 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd). 

C. Discussion

During the trial, the trial court heard testimony that appellant acted in a suspicious 

manner, removed clothes from hangers, removed price tags from clothes, placed

merchandise into shopping bags which she took from under a register, removed shoes 

from boxes and placed them under the filled shopping bags, and walked out of the store 

with a shopping cart full of unpaid merchandise. The court also heard testimony that 

appellant, prior to walking out of the store, spoke to a checkout attendant, who then 

proceeded to chase her as she walked out of the store. The court then heard Officer 

Ghezzi’s testimony that he intercepted appellant after she left the store with unpaid 

merchandise while she was walking toward her vehicle. Lastly, the trial court viewed the 

videotape, and considered appellant’s conflicting explanations regarding why she bagged 

the items and left the store without paying. 

The reconciliation of the conflicting testimony “is within the fact-finder’s exclusive 

province.” See Wyatt, 23 S.W.3d at 30. In weighing the credibility of the two accounts 
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and reconciling the inconsistencies in the testimony, the trial court was not obligated to 

believe appellant’s version of events. See Anderson, 322 S.W.3d at 405 (“The factfinder is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be given 

to their testimony”). We conclude that the cumulative force of the evidence is sufficient 

to lead a rational trier of fact to believe appellant possessed the requisite intent to commit 

theft. See Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 49. 

III. CONCLUSION

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. 

GREGORY T. PERKES

Justice

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the

23rd day of July, 2015.