Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 130 / Thursday, July 9, 2009 / Notices 32931 

1The purchase or acquisition of a failed 

depository institution in receivership refers to the 

purchase of the deposit liabilities, or both such 

liabilities and assets. 

be isolated from the rest of the 

collection system. The facility also 

states that by doing this, wells EW2, 

EW3, EW4R, EW8 and EW9R will have 

no vacuum applied and will remain off 

during the duration of the construction, 

expected to last until July 15, 2006. 

A: Yes. EPA approves County’s 

request for an alternative timeline and 

alternative operation under NSPS 

subpart WWW, for wells EW2, EW3, 

EW4R, EW8, and EW9R. 

Dated: June 8, 2009. 

Lisa Lund, 

Director, Office of Compliance. 

[FR Doc. E9–16274 Filed 7–8–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6560–50–P 

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE 

CORPORATION 

Notice of Agency Meeting 

Pursuant to the provisions of the 

‘‘Government in the Sunshine Act’’ (5 

U.S.C. 552b), notice is hereby given that 

at 11:55 a.m. on Thursday, July 2, 2009, 

the Board of Directors of the Federal 

Deposit Insurance Corporation met in 

closed session to consider a matter 

related to the Corporation’s corporate, 

supervisory, and resolution activities. 

In calling the meeting, the Board 

determined, on motion of Vice 

Chairman Martin J. Gruenberg, 

seconded by Director John E. Bowman 

(Acting Director, Office of Thrift 

Supervision), concurred in by Director 

John C. Dugan (Comptroller of the 

Currency), Director Thomas J. Curry 

(Appointive), and Chairman Sheila C. 

Bair, that Corporation business required 

its consideration of the matter which 

was to be the subject of this meeting on 

less than seven days’ notice to the 

public; that no earlier notice of the 

meeting was practicable; that the public 

interest did not require consideration of 

the matter in a meeting open to public 

observation; and that the matter could 

be considered in a closed meeting by 

authority of subsection (c)(9)(B) of the 

‘‘Government in the Sunshine Act’’ (5 

U.S.C. 552b(c)(9)(B)). 

The meeting was held in the Board 

Room of the FDIC Building located at 

550—17th Street, NW., Washington, DC. 

Dated: July 6, 2009. 

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 

Robert E. Feldman, 

Executive Secretary. 

[FR Doc. E9–16171 Filed 7–8–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P 

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE 

CORPORATION 

RIN 3064–AD47 

Proposed Statement of Policy on 

Qualifications for Failed Bank 

Acquisitions 

AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corporation (FDIC). 

ACTION: Proposed statement of policy 

with request for comment. 

SUMMARY: The FDIC is proposing to 

issue a Statement of Policy on 

Qualifications for Failed Bank 

Acquisitions (Proposed Policy 

Statement) to provide guidance to 

private capital investors interested in 

acquiring or investing in failed insured 

depository institutions regarding the 

terms and conditions for such 

investments or acquisitions. This 

Proposed Policy Statement is being 

published with a request for comment 

in order to obtain the public’s views on 

the provisions of the policy statement 

before it becomes effective. 

DATES: Comments must be received by 

the FDIC no later than August 10, 2009. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

on the Proposed Policy Statement by 

any of the following methods: 

• Agency Web Site: http:// 

www.FDIC.gov/regulations/laws/ 

federal/notices.html. Follow 

instructions for submitting comments 

on the agency Web site. 

• E-mail: Comments@FDIC.gov. 

Include RIN # 3064–AD47 on the 

subject line of the message. 

• Mail: Robert E. Feldman, Executive 

Secretary, Attention: Comments, Federal 

Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th 

Street, NW., Washington, DC 20429. 

• Hand Delivery: Comments may be 

hand delivered to the guard station at 

the rear of the 550 17th Street Building 

(located on F Street) on business days 

between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m. 

Instructions: All comments received 

will be posted generally without change 

to http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/ 

federal/propose.html, including any 

personal information provided. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Catherine Topping, Counsel, Legal 

Division, (202) 898–3975 or 

ctopping@fdic.gov, Charles A. Fulton, 

Counsel, Legal Division, (703) 562–2424 

or chfulton@fdic.gov, or Mindy West, 

Chief, Policy and Program Development, 

Division of Supervision and Consumer 

Protection, (202) 898–7221 or 

miwest@fdic.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

I. Background 

Recently, private capital investors 

have indicated interest in purchasing 

insured depository institutions in 

receivership.1 The FDIC is particularly 

concerned that owners of banks and 

thrifts, whether they are individuals, 

partnerships, limited liability 

companies, or corporations, have the 

experience, competence, and 

willingness to run the bank in a prudent 

manner, and accept the responsibility to 

support their banks when they face 

difficulties and protect them from 

insider transactions. 

Especially in light of the increased 

number of bank and thrift failures, and 

the consequent increase in interest by 

potential acquirers, the FDIC has 

evaluated the policies that apply in 

deciding whether a prospective 

acquisition is appropriate. The FDIC has 

reviewed various elements of private 

capital investment structures and 

considers that some of these investment 

structures raise potential safety and 

soundness considerations and risks to 

the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) as 

well as important issues with respect to 

their compliance with the requirements 

applied by the FDIC in its decision on 

the granting of deposit insurance. The 

concerns center on the need for fully 

adequate capital, a source of financial 

and managerial strength for the 

depository institution, and the potential 

adverse effects of extensions of credit to 

affiliates. These structuring issues are 

present with respect to any new 

proposed acquisition of a failed insured 

depository institution. 

The FDIC is seeking public input on 

this Proposed Policy Statement. This 

guidance describes the terms and 

conditions that private capital investors 

would be expected to satisfy to obtain 

eligibility for a proposed acquisition 

structure. These measures would cover 

capital support and cross guarantees; 

transactions with affiliates; secrecy 

jurisdiction investors; continuity of 

ownership requirements, and 

disclosure. 

II. Request for Public Comment 

The FDIC invites comments on all 

aspects of the Proposed Policy 

Statement, including the following 

questions: 

1. The measures contained in the 

Proposed Policy Statement will not be 

applied to individuals, partnerships, 

limited liability companies, or 

corporations, that accept the 


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32932 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 130 / Thursday, July 9, 2009 / Notices 

responsibilities under existing law to 

serve as responsible custodians of the 

public interest that is inherent in 

insured depository institutions, but will 

be applied to (a) private capital 

investors in certain companies, 

proposing to assume deposit liabilities, 

or both such liabilities and assets, from 

a failed insured depository institution in 

receivership (including all entities in 

such an ownership chain) and to (b) 

applicants for insurance in the case of 

de novo charters issued in connection 

with the resolution of failed insured 

depository institutions (hereinafter 

‘‘Investors’’). Is some other definition 

more appropriate? 

2. The Proposed Policy Statement 

indicates that so-called ‘‘silo’’ structures 

would not be considered to be eligible 

bidders for failed bank assets and 

liabilities since under these structures 

beneficial ownership cannot be 

ascertained, the responsible parties for 

making decisions are not clearly 

identified, and/or ownership and 

control are separated. Are there any 

reasons why they should be considered 

to be eligible bidders? 

3. One of the most important elements 

in the Proposed Policy Statement is the 

requirement that the acquired 

depository institution be very well 

capitalized. The text requires a Tier 1 

leverage ratio of 15 percent, that this 

ratio be maintained for a period of at 

least 3 years, and thereafter that the 

capital of the insured depository 

institution remain at a ‘‘well 

capitalized’’ level. The capital adequacy 

of depository institutions formed from 

assets and/or liabilities acquired from 

failed banks in receivership is a matter 

of crucial importance for reasons of 

safety and soundness and for protection 

of the Deposit Insurance Fund. This is 

especially important in the case of 

newly established banks that, as a 

general matter, have a weak record of 

performance in the early years of 

activity. 

In view of these considerations it has 

been suggested that a Tier 1 leverage 

ratio of 15 percent included in the text 

of the Proposed Policy Statement is 

entirely necessary and appropriate for at 

least some minimum period after the 

new depository institution acquisition. 

On the other hand, it has also been 

suggested that safety and soundness 

considerations can be satisfied with a 

lower, but a still high level, of Tier 1 

capital more in line with the level 

normally applicable to bank or thrift 

investors subject to prudential 

regulation, activities restrictions and 

that serve as a source of strength for 

their subsidiary institutions. It is also 

suggested that exceeding such normal 

capital levels could have the effect of 

making investments in the assets and 

liabilities of failed banks and thrifts 

uncompetitive and uneconomic. 

The FDIC seeks to accomplish both 

objectives in setting initial capital 

requirements for failed bank asset and 

liability acquisitions under this 

Proposed Policy Statement. Clearly, a 

high level, above normal levels, is 

necessary to deal with the unusual 

circumstances facing banking 

institutions, especially new banking 

institutions, today. The FDIC seeks the 

views of commenters on the appropriate 

level of initial capital that will satisfy 

safety and soundness concerns without 

making investments in the assets and 

liabilities of failed banks and thrifts 

uncompetitive and uneconomic. 

As noted above, the text of the 

Proposed Policy Statement requires an 

initial Tier 1 leverage ratio of 15 

percent, that this ratio be maintained for 

a period of at least 3 years, and 

thereafter that the capital of the insured 

depository institution remain at a ‘‘well 

capitalized’’ level. Should there be a 

further requirement that if capital 

declines below the required capital 

level, the institution would be treated as 

‘‘undercapitalized’’ for purposes of 

Prompt Corrective Action and the 

institution’s regulator would have 

available all the measures that would be 

available in such a situation? 

4. Should the Source of Strength 

commitment included in the Proposed 

Policy Statement be retained in the final 

policy statement? Should the 

commitment be enhanced to require 

from the shell holding company and/or 

the Investors a broader obligation than 

only a commitment to raise additional 

equity or engage in capital qualifying 

borrowing? 

5. Should the Cross Guarantee 

commitment included in the Proposed 

Policy Statement be retained in the final 

policy statement? Should the 

commitment contained in the Proposed 

Policy Statement be enhanced by 

requiring a direct obligation of the 

Investors? 

6. The Proposed Policy Statement 

limits the use of entities in an 

ownership structure that are domiciled 

in bank secrecy jurisdictions unless the 

investors are subsidiaries of companies 

that are subject to comprehensive 

consolidated supervision as recognized 

by the Federal Reserve Board. Should 

entities established in bank secrecy 

jurisdictions be considered to be eligible 

bidders even without being subject to 

comprehensive consolidated 

supervision? 

7. Under the Proposed Policy 

Statement, Investors would be 

prohibited from selling or otherwise 

transferring securities of the Investors’ 

holding company or depository 

institution for a 3 year period of time 

following the acquisition absent the 

FDIC’s prior approval. Is 3 years the 

correct period of time for limiting sales, 

or should the period be shorter or 

longer? 

8. The Proposed Policy Statement 

provides that Investors that directly or 

indirectly hold 10 percent or more of 

the equity of a bank or thrift in 

receivership would not be considered 

eligible to be a bidder to become an 

investor in the deposit liabilities, or 

both such liabilities and assets, of that 

failed depository institution. Is this 

exclusion from bidding eligibility 

appropriate on the basis of the need to 

assure fairness among all bidders and to 

avoid an incentive for the 10 percent or 

more Investor to seek to take advantage 

of the potential availability of loss 

sharing by the FDIC if the subsidiary 

bank or thrift enters into a receivership? 

9. Should the limitations in this 

Proposed Policy Statement be lifted 

after a certain number of years of 

successful operation of a bank or thrift 

holding company? If so, what would be 

the appropriate timeframe for lifting the 

conditions? What other criteria should 

apply? Should all or only some of the 

conditions be lifted? 

III. Text of Proposed Policy Statement 

The text of the Proposed Statement of 

Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank 

Acquisitions follows: 

Proposed Statement of Policy on 

Qualifications for Failed Bank 

Acquisitions 

Introduction 

Capital investments by individuals 

and limited liability companies acting 

through holding companies operating 

within a well developed prudential 

framework has long been the dominant 

form of ownership of insured depository 

institutions. From the perspective of the 

FDIC’s interest as insurer and supervisor 

of insured depository institutions, this 

framework has included, in particular, 

measures aimed at maintaining well 

capitalized bank and thrift institutions, 

support for these banks when they face 

difficulties, and protections against 

insider transactions. The ability of the 

owners to provide financial support to 

depository institutions with adequate 

capital and management expertise are 

essential safeguards. These safeguards 

are particularly appropriate for owners 

of insured depository institutions given 

the important benefits conferred on 


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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 130 / Thursday, July 9, 2009 / Notices 32933 

depository institutions by deposit 

insurance. 

Recently, private capital investors 

have indicated an interest in 

participating in acquiring the deposit 

liabilities, or both such liabilities and 

assets, of failed insured banks and 

thrifts in receivership in the current 

circumstances in which substantial 

additional capital is needed in the U.S. 

banking system. The FDIC is keenly 

aware of this need, particularly as it 

arises in the context of its function as 

the receiver of failed insured depository 

institutions charged with protecting 

insured deposits based on a 

congressionally mandated least cost to 

the insurance fund solutions for these 

institutions. The FDIC is also aware that 

new banks, regardless of their investor 

composition, pose an elevated risk to 

the deposit insurance fund since they 

generally lack a core base of business, a 

proven track record in the banking 

industry, and are vulnerable to 

significant losses in the early years of 

incorporation. 

The FDIC is of the view that private 

capital participation in the acquisition 

of the deposit liabilities, or both such 

liabilities and assets, from a failed 

depository institution in receivership 

should be consistent with the foregoing 

basic elements of insured depository 

institution ownership. The FDIC has 

reviewed various elements of private 

capital investment structures for 

consistency with these principles. Some 

acquisition arrangements, such as those 

involving complex and functionally 

opaque ownership structures, typified 

by so-called ‘‘silo’’ organizational 

arrangements, in which the beneficial 

ownership cannot be ascertained, the 

responsible parties for making decisions 

are not clearly identified, and/or 

ownership and control are separated, 

would be so substantially inconsistent 

with these principles as not to be 

considered as appropriate for approval 

for ownership of insured depository 

institutions. While these structuring 

issues are generally attributed to private 

equity ownership investments, the FDIC 

will apply the same standard of review 

to any prospective proposed acquisition 

of a failed bank or thrift to ensure parity 

and to avoid the creation of loopholes 

or regulatory arbitrage. 

Other ownership structures raise 

important policy issues that can be 

addressed so as to meet the principles 

applied by the FDIC in its decisions on 

the granting of deposit insurance. The 

FDIC is particularly concerned that 

owners of banks and thrifts, whether 

they are individuals, partnerships, 

limited liability companies, or 

corporations, accept the responsibility 

to serve as responsible custodians of the 

public interest that is inherent in 

insured depository institutions and will 

devote their efforts to assuring that 

banks or thrifts acquired with assistance 

from the deposit insurance fund do not 

return to the category of troubled 

institutions. 

In order to address the concerns 

raised mainly by ownership structures 

involving more than de minimis 

investments that typically involve a 

shell holding company owned by 

another entity or other entities that 

avoid certain of the responsibilities of 

bank and thrift ownership, the FDIC is 

establishing standards for bidder 

eligibility that would be applicable to 

(a) private capital investors in a 

company (other than a bank or thrift 

holding company that has come into 

existence or has been acquired by an 

Investor at least 3 years prior to the date 

of this policy statement), that is 

proposing to directly or indirectly 

assume deposit liabilities, or such 

liabilities and assets, from a failed 

insured depository institution in 

receivership, and to (b) applicants for 

insurance in the case of de novo 

charters issued in connection with the 

resolution of failed insured depository 

institutions (hereinafter ‘‘Investors’’). 

The standards provide for: 

(a) Capital support of the acquired 

depository institution; 

(b) agreement to a cross guarantee 

over substantially commonly owned 

depository institutions; 

(c) limits on transactions with 

affiliates; 

(d) maintenance of continuity of 

ownership as specified below; and 

(e) avoidance of secrecy law 

jurisdiction vehicles as the channel for 

their investments unless the parent 

company is subject to consolidated 

home country supervision. 

It is the intention of the FDIC to apply 

these requirements as set out below. 

Capital Commitment: Investors would 

be expected to agree to cause the 

depository institution acquiring deposit 

liabilities, or both such liabilities and 

assets, from a failed depository 

institution in receivership to be initially 

capitalized at a minimum 15 percent 

Tier 1 leverage ratio for a period of 3 

years unless the period is extended by 

the FDIC, and thereafter to maintain the 

depository institution at no lower level 

of capital adequacy than ‘‘well 

capitalized’’ during the remaining 

period of their ownership. If at any time 

the depository institution fails to meet 

this standard, the Investors would have 

to immediately facilitate restoring the 

institution to the ‘‘well capitalized’’ 

standards. Failure to maintain the 

required capital level will result in the 

institution being treated as 

‘‘undercapitalized’’ for purposes of 

Prompt Corrective Action triggering all 

of the measures that would be available 

to the institution’s regulator in such a 

situation. 

Source of Strength: Investors 

organizational structures subject to the 

measures provided for in this policy 

statement would be expected to agree to 

serve as a source of strength for their 

subsidiary depository institutions. 

Source of strength commitments under 

this paragraph are to be supported by 

the agreement of the depository 

institution holding company in which 

the Investors have invested that holds 

the stock of such depository institutions 

to sell equity or engage in capital 

qualifying borrowing. 

Cross Guarantees: Investors whose 

investments, individually or 

collectively, constitute a majority of the 

direct or indirect investments in more 

than one insured depository institution 

would be expected to pledge to the FDIC 

their proportionate interests in each 

such institution to pay for any losses to 

the deposit insurance fund resulting 

from the failure of, or assistance 

provided to, any other such institution. 

Transactions with Affiliates: All 

extensions of credit to Investors, their 

investment funds if any, any affiliates of 

either, and any portfolio companies (i.e., 

companies in which the Investors or 

affiliates invest) by an insured 

depository institution acquired or 

controlled by such Investors under this 

policy statement would be prohibited. 

For purposes of this policy statement 

the term ‘‘extension of credit’’ is defined 

in 12 CFR 223.3(o) including any 

subsequent amendments, and the term 

‘‘affiliate’’ is any company in which an 

investor owns 10 percent or more of the 

equity of that company. 

Secrecy Law Jurisdictions: Investors 

employing ownership structures 

utilizing entities that are domiciled in 

bank secrecy jurisdictions would not be 

eligible to own a direct or indirect 

interest in an insured depository 

institution unless the Investors are 

subsidiaries of companies that are 

subject to comprehensive consolidated 

supervision (‘‘CCS’’) as recognized by 

the Federal Reserve Board, and they 

execute agreements on the provision of 

information to the primary Federal 

regulator about the non-domestic 

Investors’ operations and activities; 

maintain its business books and records 

(or a duplicate) in the U.S.; consent to 

the disclosure of information that might 

be covered by confidentiality or privacy 

laws and to cooperate with the FDIC, if 

necessary, in obtaining information 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1 with NOTICES
32934 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 130 / Thursday, July 9, 2009 / Notices 

maintained by foreign government 

entities; consent to jurisdiction and 

designation of an agent for service of 

process; and consent to be bound by the 

statutes and regulations administered by 

the appropriate U.S. Federal banking 

agencies. 

Continuity of Ownership: Investors 

subject to this policy statement would 

be prohibited from selling or otherwise 

transferring securities of the Investors’ 

holding company or depository 

institution for a 3 year period of time 

following the acquisition absent the 

FDIC’s prior approval. This time period 

is consistent with the current de novo 

business plan change approval and 

other requirements in FDIC Deposit 

Insurance Orders. The FDIC does not 

expect to approve any sale to a private 

capital investor during such 3 year 

period unless the buyer agrees to be 

subject to the same conditions that are 

applicable under this policy statement 

to the selling Investor. 

Special Owner Bid Limitation: 

Investors that directly or indirectly hold 

10 percent or more of the equity of a 

bank or thrift in receivership would not 

be considered eligible to be a bidder to 

become an investor in the deposit 

liabilities, or both such liabilities and 

assets, of that failed depository 

institution. 

Disclosure: Investors subject to this 

policy statement would be expected to 

submit to the FDIC information about 

the Investors and all entities in the 

ownership chain including such 

information as the size of the capital 

fund or funds, its diversification, the 

return profile, the marketing documents, 

the management team and the business 

model. In addition, Investors and all 

entities in the ownership chain will be 

required to provide to the FDIC such 

other information as is determined to be 

necessary to assure compliance with 

this policy statement. 

Limitations: Nothing in this policy 

statement is intended to replace or 

substitute for any determination 

required by a relevant depository 

institution’s primary Federal regulator 

or a Federal bank or thrift holding 

company regulator under any applicable 

regulation or statute, including, in 

particular, bank or thrift holding 

company statutes, or with respect to 

determinations made and requirements 

that may be imposed in connection with 

the general character, fitness and 

expertise of the management being 

proposed by the Investors, the need for 

a thorough and reasonable business plan 

that addresses business lines and 

strategic initiatives and includes 

appropriate contingency planning 

elements, satisfactory corporate 

governance structure and 

representation, and any other 

supervisory matter. 

By order of the Board of Directors. 

Dated at Washington, DC, this 2nd day of 

July, 2009. 

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 

Robert E. Feldman, 

Executive Secretary. 

[FR Doc. E9–16077 Filed 7–8–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6714–01–P 

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 

Notice of Proposals to Engage in 

Permissible Nonbanking Activities or 

to Acquire Companies that are 

Engaged in Permissible Nonbanking 

Activities 

The companies listed in this notice 

have given notice under section 4 of the 

Bank Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. 

1843) (BHC Act) and Regulation Y (12 

CFR Part 225) to engage de novo, or to 

acquire or control voting securities or 

assets of a company, including the 

companies listed below, that engages 

either directly or through a subsidiary or 

other company, in a nonbanking activity 

that is listed in § 225.28 of Regulation Y 

(12 CFR 225.28) or that the Board has 

determined by Order to be closely 

related to banking and permissible for 

bank holding companies. Unless 

otherwise noted, these activities will be 

conducted throughout the United States. 

Each notice is available for inspection 

at the Federal Reserve Bank indicated. 

The notice also will be available for 

inspection at the offices of the Board of 

Governors. Interested persons may 

express their views in writing on the 

question whether the proposal complies 

with the standards of section 4 of the 

BHC Act. Additional information on all 

bank holding companies may be 

obtained from the National Information 

Center website at www.ffiec.gov/nic/. 

Unless otherwise noted, comments 

regarding the applications must be 

received at the Reserve Bank indicated 

or the offices of the Board of Governors 

not later than July 24, 2009. 

A. Federal Reserve Bank of 

Minneapolis (Jacqueline G. King, 

Community Affairs Officer) 90 

Hennepin Avenue, Minneapolis, 

Minnesota 55480–0291: 

1. Norlo Inc., Prior Lake, Minnesota, 

to engage, de novo, in lending activities, 

pursuant to section 225.28 (b)(1) of 

Regulation Y. 

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 

System, July 06, 2009. 

Robert deV. Frierson, 

Deputy Secretary of the Board. 

[FR Doc. E9–16255 Filed 7–8–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6210–01–S 

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION 

Sunshine Act; Notice of Meeting 

TIME AND DATE: July 14, 2009—10 a.m. 

PLACE: 800 North Capitol Street, NW., 

First Floor Hearing Room, Washington, 

DC. 

STATUS: A portion of the meeting will 

be in Open Session and the remainder 

of the meeting will be in Closed Session. 

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: 

Open Session 

1. FMC Agreement No. 201202: 

Oakland MTO Agreement. 

2. FMC Agreement No. 011275–027: 

Australia and New Zealand/United 

States Discussion Agreement. 

3. FMC Agreement No. 011275–028: 

Australia and New Zealand/United 

States Discussion Agreement. 

Closed Session 

1. Section 15 Order on Competition, 

Rates and Service in the U.S.-Australia/ 

New Zealand and Northbound and 

Southbound Trade. 

2. FMC Agreement No. 011741–013: 

U.S. Pacific Coast-Oceania Agreement. 

3. Order Initiating Proceeding— 

Admission to Practice Before the 

Commission. 

4. Internal Administrative Practices 

and Personnel Matters. 

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: 

Karen V. Gregory, Secretary. (202) 523– 

5725. 

Karen V. Gregory, 

Secretary. 

[FR Doc. E9–16414 Filed 7–7–09; 4:15 pm] 

BILLING CODE P 

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION 

Ocean Transportation Intermediary 

License Revocations 

The Federal Maritime Commission 

hereby gives notice that the following 

Ocean Transportation Intermediary 

licenses have been revoked pursuant to 

section 19 of the Shipping Act of 1984 

(46 U.S.C. Chapter 409) and the 

regulations of the Commission 

pertaining to the licensing of Ocean 

Transportation Intermediaries, 46 CFR 

part 515, effective on the corresponding 

date shown below: 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1 with NOTICES