ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 

NO. PD-0724-15

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

OF THE STATE OF TEXAS

SITTING AT AUSTIN, TEXAS

FATIMAH RAHMAN, 

Petitioner,

VS.

THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Respondent

On Petition for Discretionary Review

To the Court of Appeals Twelfth

Supreme Judicial District Cause

No. 12-14-00225-CR

PD-0724-15

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS 

Transmitted 7/17/2015 1:32:55 PM 

Accepted 7/17/2015 4:36:02 PM 

ABEL ACOSTA

CLERK

PETITION SEEKING DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

James W. Huggler

State Bar No. 00795437

100 E. Ferguson, Suite 805

Tyler, Texas 75702

Telephone: 903-593-2400

Facsimile: 903-593-3830

jhugglerlaw@sbcglobal.net

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
IDENTITY OF PARTIES

Trial Court Judge: Christi Kennedy, Presiding

114

th

Judicial District Court

Smith County, Texas

100 N. Broadway, 2

nd Floor

Tyler, Texas 75702

Appellant/Petitioner: Fatima Rahman

TDCJ# 01943470

Halbert Unit

800 Ellen Halbert Drive

Burnet, Texas 78611

Appellant’s A. M. Thompson

Trial Counsel: 2108 S. Wall

Tyler, Texas 75701

James Huggler

100 E. Ferguson, Suite 805

Tyler, Texas 75702

A. Reeve Jackson

112 E. Line, Suite 310

Tyler, Texas 75702

Appellant’s James Huggler

Appellate Counsel: 100 E. Ferguson, Suite 805

Tyler, Texas 75702

Appellee/Respondent: State of Texas

Smith County Criminal District Attorney’s Office

State’s Whitney Tharpe

Trial Counsel: Richard Crowther 

Jacob Putman 

Chris Gatewood

i

2

Smith County District Attorney’s Office

100 N. Broadway, 4

th Floor

Tyler, Texas 75702

State’s Michael West

Appellate Counsel: Aaron Rediker

Smith County District Attorney’s Office

100 N. Broadway, 4

th Floor

Tyler, Texas 75702
TABLE OF CONTENTS

DESCRIPTION PAGE

IDENTITY OF PARTIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

TABLE OF CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii 

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v 

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

GROUNDS FOR REVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

What is a Defendant’s right to due process of law in a 

revocation proceeding, or are those rights violated if a 

Motion to Revoke probation proceeds without a signature 

from a prosecutor?

What is a Defendant’s right to due course of law in a revocation 

proceeding, or are those rights violated if a Motion to Revoke 

probation proceeds without a signature from a prosecutor?

REASONS FOR GRANTING REVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

STATEMENT OF FACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

A. Reasons for Granting Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

B. Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

C. Application to these facts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

D. Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

iii
4

PRAYER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

APPENDIX A - Opinion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
v

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. ann. 1.052( c) (West 2014). . . . . . . . . . 9

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 2.04 (West 2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 15.05 4 (West 2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12 §21(b) (West 2009). . . . . . . . . . . 8

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §49.04 (West 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 4

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §49.09(b)(2) (West 2009).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 4

CASES

Bradley v. State, 564 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Brent v. State, 916 S.W.2d 34, 37 (Tex. App. – Houston [1

st Dist.]

1995, pet. ref’d).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Caddell v. State, 605 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Davenport v. State, 574 S.W.2d 73 ((Tex. Crim. App. 1978). . . . . . . . . . 7

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786, 36 L.Ed. 2d 656,

93 S. Ct. 1756 (1973). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Garner v. State, 545 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Lugaro v. State, 904 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 1995, no 

pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Rahman v. State, No. 12-14-00225-CR, Tex. App. – Tyler,

May 13, 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Passim

Schackelford v. State, 516 S.W.3d 180 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).. . . . . . . 9

Spruill v. State, 382 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. App. – Austin 1995,

no pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6

Staten v. State, 328 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. App. – Beaumont 2010, no pet.). 6

Whitson v. State, 429 S.W.3d 632 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). . . . . . . . . . . 8

RULES

TEX. R. APP. P. ANN. 9.4 (West 2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

TEX. R. APP. P. ANN. 66.3(a) (West 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

TEX. R. APP. P. ANN. 66.3(b) (West 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

TEX. R. APP. P. ANN. 66.3(e) (West 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

OTHER SOURCES

Office of Court Administration, Annual Statistical Report

for the Texas Judiciary, Fiscal Year 2014. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1

FATIMA RAHMAN,

PD-0724-15

§ IN THE COURT OF

PETITIONER §

§

VS. § CRIMINAL APPEALS

§

THE STATE OF TEXAS, §

APPELLEE § AUSTIN, TEXAS

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:

Now Comes Fatima Rahman, Petitioner and Defendant in the trial 

court, and respectfully submits this her Petition for Discretionary Review 

complaining of the ruling and opinion by the Court of Appeals for the 

Twelfth Supreme Judicial District, and would show the Court as follows:

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

In the event this Court grants this petition, Petitioner requests the 

Court to grant oral argument herein so that all matters may be clarified 

and any questions presented by the briefs of the parties may be addressed 

in a proper manner.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant was indicted in Cause Number 114-1451-10 and charged 

with the felony offense of driving while intoxicated. I CR 2

1

; see TEX. 

PENAL CODE ANN. §§49.04, 49.09(b)(2) (West 2009). A guilty plea with an 

agreement for a probated sentence was entered. I CR 7; I RR 15-16

2

. The 

State filed an Application to Revoke Community Supervision. I CR 54-56. 

Ms. Rahman entered a plea of true to each allegation and after evidence 

and argument, the court revoked her probation and sentenced her to five 

years confinement. I CR 76-77; IV RR 34-35. Notice of appeal was timely 

filed. I CR 78. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s sentence 

in an unpublished opinion, and this petition follows. The Petition is 

timely filed on or before July 25, 2015 following proper extensions granted 

by this Court.

1 References to the Clerk’s Record are designated “CR” with 

a roman numeral preceding “CR” indicating the correct volume and 

an arabic numeral following “CR” specifying the correct page in 

the record.

2 References to the Reporter’s Record are designated “RR” 

with a roman numeral preceding “RR” indicating the correct 

volume, and an arabic numeral following “RR” specifying the 

correct page.
3

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Twelfth Court of Appeals issued an opinion in number 12-14-

00225-CR on May 13, 2015. No motion for rehearing was filed. On June

12, 2015, a Motion to Extend Time to File Petition for Discretionary 

Review was filed. That Motion was granted and the time to file a petition 

for discretionary review was extended until July 13, 2015. Counsel 

inadvertently did not include the identity of the parties and was granted 

ten days to correct and refile the Petition.

GROUND FOR REVIEW

What is a Defendant’s right to due process of law in a 

revocation proceeding, or are those rights violated if a Motion 

to Revoke probation proceeds without a signature from a 

prosecutor?

What is a Defendant’s right to due course of law in a revocation 

proceeding, or are those rights violated if a Motion to Revoke 

probation proceeds without a signature from a prosecutor?

REASONS FOR GRANTING REVIEW

The decision of the Court of Appeals conflicts with another court of 

appeals decision on the same issue. TEX. R. APP. P. ANN. 66.3(a) (West
4

2014).

The decision of the Court of Appeals decided an important question 

of state or federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by the 

Court of Criminal Appeals. Tex. R. App. P. Ann. 66.3(b) (West 2014).

The decision of the Court of Appeals conflicts with an applicable 

decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals on an important question of

state law. TEX. R. APP. PROC. ANN. 66.3( c)(West 2014).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Fatima Rahman was indicted for the third degree felony offense of 

driving while intoxicated. I CR 3. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§49.04 and

49.09(b)(2)(West 2009). A plea agreement was reached and Ms. Rahman 

received a sentence of ten years probated for a period of seven years. I RR

11. A guilty plea was entered to the indictment and the two jurisdictional 

paragraphs. I RR 15-16. The court followed the plea agreement and 

sentenced Ms. Rahman accordingly. II RR 8; I CR 19-20, 21-24.

The State filed three different motions to revoke the probation. I

CR32-34, 44-46. The first motion was dismissed and the probation was
5

modified. I CR 37-38. The second motion was also dismissed. I CR 47. 

The third motion to revoke filed on July 9, 2012 included the following 

allegations: (1) that Ms. Rahman was placed on probation; (2) that she 

used or consumed marijuana; (3) that she possessed marijuana; (4) and (5) 

that she failed to submit to urinalysis testing. I CR 54-56. Another 

application to revoke containing different allegations was also filed on 

July 8, 2014. I CR 60-62. This application alleged that Ms. Rahman (1) 

was placed on probation; (2) that she operated a motor vehicle while her 

driver’s license was suspended in Tarrant County; (3) that she operated 

a motor vehicle while her license was suspended in Hood County; and (4) 

that she failed to pay supervision fees. I CR 60-62.

Ms. Rahman entered a plea of true to identity, and all substantive 

paragraphs to the July 8, 2014 application. I CR 73; IV 17-19. We know 

it was the July 8, 2014 application because the trial court read each 

allegation prior to asking a plea. IV RR 17-19. Following evidence and 

argument of counsel, the trial court found each paragraph true, revoked 

her probation and sentenced her to five years confinement. IV RR 34-35. 

Further discussion of relevant facts is included below.
6

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

A. Reasons for Granting Review

While it is clear that a defendant is not entitled to the same level of 

due process or due course of law in revocation proceedings, no court has 

ever stated that a defendant does not have any right to due process or due 

course of law. Courts have stated that there are certain minimums in 

revocation proceedings. Those include: (1) written notice of the claimed 

violations of the terms of supervision; (2) the disclosure of evidence 

against him; (3) the opportunity to be heard and present witnesses and 

evidence; (4) a neutral and detached hearing body; (5) the opportunity to

cross-examine witnesses; and (6) a written statement as to the evidence

relied on and the reasons for revoking supervision. Staten v. State, 328

S.W.3d 901, 905 (Tex. App. – Beaumont, 2010, no pet.)(internal citations 

omitted).

This Court has stated that a probationer is entitled to the

“rudiments of due process.” one of which is a written motion to revoke that 

fully informs him of the violation of a term of probation which he is

alleged to have breached. Caddell v. State, 605 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1980). Surely one of those rudiments of due process is the
7

simple requirement that a motion to revoke probation be reviewed and 

signed by a prosecutor.

In fiscal year 2014, there were 61,338 motions to revoke filed in the 

State of Texas. Office of Court Administration, Annual Statistical Report 

for the Texas Judiciary, Fiscal Year 2014, p. 54-55.

3 This Court has not 

reviewed the minimum due process requirements for revocation 

proceedings in some time. However, stating whether a prosecutor has to 

review and sign a motion to revoke should be a minimal due process

requirementis an importantissue which should be decided by this Court.

Rahman No. 12-14-00225-CR at 4.

B. Analysis

Probation revocation proceedings are not criminal trials in the

constitutional sense; rather, they are administrative in nature. Davenport

v. State, 574 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Bradley v. State, 564

S.W.2d 727, 729 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). However, a person placed on 

probation does not lose all their rights. A probationer is entitled to a

3 Accessed at

http://www.txcourts.gov/media/885306/Annual-Statistical-Report-FY

-2014.pdf on July 13, 2015.
8

written motion to revoke that fully informs her of the violation of a term

of probation which she is alleged to have breached. Garner v. State, 545

S.W.2d 178, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). A probationer is entitled to 

minimum requirements of due process which must be observed in

revocation proceedings. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 7869, 36 L. Ed.

2d 656, 93 S. Ct. 1756 (1973).

The State cannot file an application to revoke after the term of

supervision has ended. Whitson v. State, 429 S.W.3d 632 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014). A motion to revoke must give fair notice of the allegations. Spruill

v. State, 382 S.W.3d 518, 520 (Tex. App. – Austin 2012, no pet). A

defendant has the right to counsel at revocation proceedings. Lugaro v.

State, 904 S.W.2d 842, 843-44 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 1995, no pet). 

The State may amend a motion to revoke community supervision any time 

up to seven days before the date of the revocation hearing, after which 

time the motion may not be amended except for good cause shown, and in 

no event may the State amend the motion after the commencement of 

taking evidence at the hearing. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12

§21(b) (West 2009).
9

C. Application to These Facts

There are two documents contained in the record seeking revocation 

of supervision. The first was filed on July 8, 2014 and contained four 

paragraphs. I CR 60-62. The second was filed on July 9, 2014 and 

contained five paragraphs. I CR 54-56. The trial court took a plea of true 

to each paragraph contained in the July 8, 2014 application. IV RR 17-19.

There are two problems with the trial court taking proceeding on the 

July 8, 2014 application. First, the July 8, 2014 application to revoke was 

superseded by the July 9, 2014 application to revoke. The second is that 

the pleading which was used was not signed by an attorney representing 

the State of Texas. I CR 62.

If a pleading is not signed, the court shall strike it unless it is signed 

promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the attorney or the 

defendant. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.052( c) (West 2014). While 

that provision is contained in a section entitled “Signed Pleadings of 

Defendant”, it applies equally to pleadings signed by the State of Texas.

A criminal complaint must be signed and attested to by a

prosecuting attorney. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.04 (West 2013).

A defect in a complaint if undated is defective. Shackelford v. State, 516
10

S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). A complaint must also be signed.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.05 4 (West 2013); Brent v. State, 916

S.W.2d 34.37 (Tex. App. – Houston [1

st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d).

While Appellant does not claim that a motion to revoke probation is 

identical to a criminal complaint, it is certainly similar, especially in a due 

process or due course of law analysis. Mistakes can occur, but when those 

mistakes are of Constitutional magnitude, this Court should address them 

to prevent Constitutional error in the future.

E. Conclusion

A probation revocation has a lower burden of proof and lower 

minimums of due process. However, there is still a due process 

requirement and this Court should require that a motion to revoke be 

signed and reviewed by a prosecuting attorney prior to being acted upon 

by a trial court. Otherwise, as in this case, there is no indication that 

anyone except a non-attorney probation officer reviewed the facts of the 

allegations, or the language to revoke, and that offends our concept of due 

process.
1

1

CONCLUSION

Under all circumstances, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the 

trial court’s decision. This court should grant discretionary review, allow 

complete briefing, and, upon such review, reverse the Court of Appeals 

and remand the case to the Court of Appeals.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays the Court to grant discretionary 

review and, upon such review, to reverse the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals; and for such other and further relief to which he may show 

himself justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ James Huggler 

James W. Huggler

State Bar No. 00795437

100 E. Ferguson, Suite 805

Tyler, Texas 75702

Telephone: 903-593-2400

Facsimile: 903-593-3830

jhugglerlaw@sbcglobal.net

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petition 

has been forwarded to Mike West, Smith County District Attorney’s 

Office, and on the State Prosecuting Attorney through the State of Texas 

Electronic Filing System on this the 17

th day of July, 2015 at the 

addresses listed below

/s/ James Huggler 

James W. Huggler

Mike West

Smith County District Attorney’s Office

100 N. Broadway, 4

th Floor

Tyler, Texas 75702

Lisa McMinn

State Prosecuting Attorney

PO Box 12405

Austin, Texas 78711

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this Petition complies with Tex. R. App. P. 9.4, specifically 

using 14 point Century font and contains 1, 912 words as counted by 

Corel WordPerfect version x6.

/s/ James Huggler 

James W. Huggler, Jr.
1

3

NO. PD-0724-15

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

OF THE STATE OF TEXAS SITTING AT

AUSTIN, TEXAS

********************************************************* 

FATIMA RAHMAN,

Petitioner

VS.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Respondent

********************************************************* 

On Petition for Discretionary Review

To the Court of Appeals Twelfth

Supreme Judicial District Cause

No. 12-14-00225-CR

********************************************************* 

APPENDIX

*********************************************************
14

FATIMA RAHMAN, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF 

TEXAS, APPELLEE

NO. 12-14-00225-CR

COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, TWELFTH 

DISTRICT, TYLER

2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 4820

May 13, 2015, Opinion Delivered

NOTICE: PLEASE CONSULT THE 

TEXAS RULES OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE FOR CITATION OF 

UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS.

PRIOR HISTORY: [*1] Appeal from 

the 114th District Court of Smith County, 

Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. 114-1451-10). Judge 

Christi J. Kennedy.

COUNSEL: James Huggler, for

Appellant.

Aaron Rediker, for State.

JUDGES: Panel consisted of Worthen, 

C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

OPINION BY: BRIAN HOYLE

OPINION

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Fatima Rahman appeals her conviction 

for felony driving while intoxicated, for

which she was sentenced to imprisonment 

for five years. In three issues, Appellant 

argues that the trial court erred in 

imposing attorney's fees and in 

proceeding on an unsigned application to 

revoke community supervision. We 

affirm.

BACKGROUND

Appellant was charged by indictment 

with felony driving while intoxicated. She 

pleaded "guilty" to the offense. The trial 

court assessed an agreed sentence of 

imprisonment for ten years, suspended the 

sentence, and placed Appellant on 

community supervision for a term of 

seven years.

Subsequently, the State filed an 

application to revoke Appellant's 

community supervision alleging three 

violations of the terms. Appellant pleaded 

true to all three allegations. The trial court 

found the allegations to be true, revoked 

Appellant's community supervision, and 

assessed her punishment at imprisonment 

for five years.
1

5

This appeal followed. [*2]

ATTORNEY'S FEES

In her first issue, Appellant argues that 

the trial court improperly assessed 

attorney's fees when it placed her on 

community supervision.

Standard of Review and Applicable

Law

The imposition of court costs upon a 

criminal defendant is a "nonpunitive 

recoupment of the costs of judicial 

resources expended in connection with 

the trial of the case." Johnson v. State

423 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014). When the imposition of court costs 

is challenged on appeal, we review the 

assessment of costs to determine if there 

is a basis for the costs, not to determine if 

sufficient evidence to prove each cost was 

offered at trial. Id.

A trial court has the authority to assess 

attorney's fees against a criminal 

defendant who received court-appointed 

counsel. TEX.CODECRIM.PROC.ANN. art.

26.05(g) (West Supp. 2014). But once a 

criminal defendant has been determined 

to be indigent, he "is presumed to remain 

indigent for the remainder of the 

proceedings unless a material change in 

his financial circumstances occurs." TEX. 

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.04(p) 

(West Supp. 2014). Before attorney's fees 

may be imposed, the trial court must make 

a determination supported by some 

factual basis in the record that the 

defendant has the financial resources to

enable him to [*3] offset in part or in 

whole the costs of the legal services 

provided. See Johnson v. State, 405

S.W.3d 350, 354 (Tex. App.--Tyler 2013,

no pet.). If the record does not show that 

the defendant's financial circumstances 

materially changed, there is no basis for 

the imposition of attorney'sfees. See TEX. 

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.04(p); 

Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 553, 557 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Johnson, 405

S.W.3d at 354.

Analysis

Appellant argues that attorney's fees 

were improperly assessed against her 

when she was placed on community 

supervision because she was found to be 

indigent. She contends that because the 

record contains no evidence to support a 

finding that she is not indigent, the 

judgment and bill of costs should be 

modified to delete the attorney's fees. She 

further asserts that she has already paid 

the attorney's fees, and she contends the 

clerk's office should be ordered to return 

the money to her.

Appellant pleaded guilty and was 

placed on community supervision in 

November 2010. The judgment of 

conviction assesses an amount of $694.00 

in court costs. No bill of costs itemizing 

these costs appears in the record. In July

2014, after a hearing on the State's 

application to revoke, the trial court 

revoked Appellant's community 

supervision. The judgment revoking 

community supervision shows court costs 

of $0.00. A bill of costs dated July [*4]
16

30, 2014 appears in the record and lists 

court costs totaling $394.00. Attorney's 

fees are not listed among these costs. The 

record indicates that the trial court 

determined Appellant was indigent 

because it appointed counsel to represent 

her at the guilty plea hearing, at two 

revocation hearings, and in this appeal.

Nothing in the record shows that the 

court costs assessed in the judgment of 

conviction included attorney's fees. 

Therefore, the record does not support 

Appellant's argument that she was 

improperly assessed attorney's fees. 

Consequently, her challenge is more 

appropriately termed a challenge to the 

lack of a bill of costs itemizing the costs 

named in the judgment of conviction. As 

a general rule, issues related to the 

conviction of a defendant placed on 

community supervision may be raised 

only in an appeal taken when community 

supervision is originally imposed. 

Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In other words, 

such issues may not be raised in an appeal 

filed after community supervision is 

revoked. Id.

The appropriate vehicle for 

challenging the lack of a bill of costs 

itemizing the costs named in the judgment 

of conviction was in a direct appeal from 

that judgment. See Manuel, 994 S.W.2d at

661. However, that did not occur.

Therefore, [*5] we conclude that the 

issue was forfeited. Accordingly, we 

overrule Appellant's first issue.

UNSIGNED APPLICATION TO REVOKE

In her second and third issues, 

Appellant argues that the trial court erred 

by revoking her community supervision 

based on an unsigned application to 

revoke, violating her right to due process 

and due course of law under the United 

States and Texas Constitutions.

Standard of Review and Applicable

Law

We review a trial court's order 

revoking a defendant's placement on 

community supervision for an abuse of 

discretion. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d

759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The

state's burden of proof in a revocation 

proceeding is by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871,

874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).

While a defendant at a revocation 

proceeding need not be afforded the full 

range of constitutional and statutory 

protections that are available in the trial 

of a criminal case, a person on community 

supervision is entitled to certain due 

process protections. Gagnon v. Scarpelli,

411 U.S. 778, 781-82, 93 S. Ct. 1756,

1759-60, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973); 

Bradley v. State, 564 S.W.2d 727, 729-30 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Due process, in 

connection with community supervision 

revocation proceedings, entitles a 

defendant to (1) written notice of the 

claimed violations of the terms of the 

community supervision order; (2) the 

disclosure of the evidence against him; 

(3) the opportunity to be heard in person 

and to present [*6] witnesses and
1

7

documentary evidence; (4) a neutral and 

detached hearing body; (5) the 

opportunity to cross examine adverse 

witnesses, unless the hearing body 

specifically finds good cause for not 

allowing confrontation; and (6) a written 

statement by the fact finder as to the 

evidence relied on and the reasons for 

revoking community supervision. Staten 

v. State, 328 S.W.3d 901, 905 (Tex. App.--

Beaumont 2010, no pet.).

In the context of community 

supervision revocation proceedings, due 

process entitles a defendant to a written 

motion to revoke that fully informs him of 

the alleged violation of the term of 

community supervision.Caddell v. State,

605 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex. Crim. App.

1980). A trial court's authority to revoke 

community supervision is limited to the 

grounds alleged in the state's motion to 

revoke community supervision. Moore v. 

State, 11 S.W.3d 495, 499 (Tex. App.--

Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). A 

motion to revoke community supervision 

is not required to meet the particularities 

of an indictment, information, or 

complaint because the motion is held to a 

less rigorous standard. Staten, 328 S.W.3d 

at 906. The state's motion to revoke need 

only fully and clearly set forth the basis 

on which the state seeks revocation so 

that the defendant and his counsel have 

notice. Id.

Analysis

In this case, the State's application to 

revoke is signed by a community 

supervision officer, but not by a

prosecutor. No mention [*7] of the lack 

of a prosecutor's signature was made at 

the hearing on the application.

In support of her argument, Appellant 

cites only authority that a complaint must 

be signed. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 

ANN. art. 15.05(4) (West 2005); Brent v. 

State, 916 S.W.2d 34, 37 (Tex. App.--

Houston [1st] 1995, pet. ref'd). Appellant 

concedes that an application to revoke 

community supervision is not identical to 

a criminal complaint, but she argues that 

it is similar enough that we should apply 

the same analysis. We disagree. The 

motion to revoke Appellant's community 

supervision was not required to meet the 

particularities of an indictment, 

information, or complaint. See Staten,

328 S.W.3d at 906. We conclude that

Appellant's rights to due process and due 

course of law were not violated because 

of the lack of a prosecutor's signature on 

the application to revoke.

Accordingly, we overrule Appellant's 

second and third issues.

DISPOSITION

Having overruled Appellant's first, 

second, and third issues, we affirm the 

trial court's judgment.

BRIAN HOYLE

Justice

Opinion delivered May 13, 2015.

JUDGMENT

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the 

appellate record and briefs filed herein,
18

and the same being considered, it is the 

opinion of this court that there was no 

error in the judgment.

It [*8] is therefore ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED and DECREED that the 

judgment of the court below be in all

things affirmed, and that this decision be 

certified to the court below for 

observance.

Brian Hoyle, Justice.