1 Filed 2/18/15 In re C.P. CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re C.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. C.P., Defendant and Appellant. A141279
(Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J1101578)

C.P. is a juvenile ward who has had a number of brushes with the law and is now subject to probation conditions. In this appe al, he claims that a condition prohibiting him from changing his residence with out his probation officer’s a pproval is unconstitutional. This condition was first imposed on C.P. ab out three years ago and then re-imposed several times, but he never objected to it below. We conclude that he forfeited the claim, and we affirm the juvenile court’s disposition order.
I. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND C.P. first came to the juvenile court’s attention in late 20 11, when a juvenile wardship petition was filed alleging he committed carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a)) and second-degree robb ery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212. 5, subd. (c)). He was 15 at2 the time. C.P. pleaded no contest to the ca rjacking count, and the robbery count was dismissed. Following a contes ted disposition hearing, the j uvenile court adjudged C.P. a
ward of the court. The form disposition order entered in February 2012 includes the following language: “STANDARD CONDITIONS OF PR OBATION. . . . [Do n]ot change residence without prior approval of [proba tion officer] & notify [probation officer] of change of address/telephone nu mber within 5 days.” The record contains no indication that an objection was made to this condition. C.P. did not appeal from the disposition
order. C.P. was placed at Children’s Home of St ockton, but within weeks of his arrival he left and went missing for some time. A notice of probation violation was filed (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 777 1 ), and C.P. admitted the violation. He was placed at Paradise Oaks Youth Services on May 3, but he was soon accused of assaulting and threatening staff and was terminated from the program. The juvenile court sustained an allegation that C.P. violated the terms of his prob ation, and it committed him to the Youthful Offender Treatment Program (YOTP) for a peri od of up to eight year s, 199 days, or until he turned 21. As did the previous dispos ition order, this order included the standard condition that C.P. not change his reside nce without his proba tion officer’s prior approval. Again, there is no indica tion C.P. objected to the condition. C.P. remained at YOTP for nearly a y ear and was released to home supervision (monitored with an ankle brac elet) in September 2013. A notice of probation violation was filed less than two months later, on N ovember 19, alleging that C.P.’s ankle
transmitter “went into ‘strap tamper’ status,” and C.P. was brought by his mother to the probation department two days later to have the transmitter reconnected. On November 21, yet another notice of probation violation was f iled alleging C.P. had been suspended from school, had left home withou t permission, and had removed his ankle
transmitter and could no t be located. C.P.’s whereabout s were unknown for two weeks,

1 All statutory references are to the Welf are and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.3 and authorities later learned C.P. had been in a car accident and fled the scene before he
removed his ankle transmitter. At a heari ng in December regarding the two November petitions, C.P. admitted the allegations of the November 21 petition, and the November 19 petition was stricken. C.P. requ ested a contested dis position hearing, and the matter was referred to the probati on department for a recommendation. The probation department recommended continuing C.P.’s wardship with no
termination date and return ing C.P. to YOTP. The pr obation department also
recommended the “Standard Conditions of Probatio n” that had been included on previous orders, including the condition that C.P. “not change residenc e without prior approval of [probation officer] and notify [probation office r] of change of address/telephone number within 5 days.” Following a contested dispos ition hearing, C.P.’s attorn ey asked for C.P. to be rereleased to the community. The juvenile court instead ordered C.P. to remain in juvenile hall until he could be recommitted from the waiting list to YOTP for a ninemonth commitment. The court continued C.P. as a ward with no termin ation date. It also imposed the standard terms and conditions of probation previously imposed, stating, without objection: “You’re no t to change your residence w ithout the prior approval of the probation officer.” That same term a ppeared on the form order entered after the hearing.
II. D ISCUSSION C.P.’s sole argument on appeal is th at the probation condition prohibiting him from changing his residence with out his probation officer’s approval is unconstitutionally overbroad. Section 730, subdivision (b) gran ts the juvenile court discretion to impose “all reasonable conditions that it may determin e fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reform ation and rehabilitation of th e ward enhanced.” And section 727, subdivision (a)(3) provides that wh ere, as here, a minor is declared a ward of the court under section 602, “the court shall order the care, custody, and control of the minor or nonminor to be under the supervisi on of the probation officer[,] who may place4 the minor or nonminor” in various placements . But “[a] probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitu tional rights must closely ta ilor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to av oid being invalidated as uncon stitutionally overbroad.” ( In
re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.) Becaus e C.P. did not object below to the condition, we must first consider whethe r he forfeited his overbreadth challenge by failing to object below. We conclude he did. As a general rule, a defendant’s appe llate challenge to a probation condition on reasonableness grounds is forfeited if it is no t raised at the heari ng where the condition is imposed. ( People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 230.) Sentencing courts have broad discretion to impose probation conditions regula ting conduct that is not itself criminal, but the conditions “must be ‘reasonably relate d to the crime of which the defendant was
convicted or to future criminality.’ ” ( Id. at pp. 233-234, quoting People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486.) “A timel y objection allows the court to modify or delete an allegedly unreasonable condition or to explain why it is necessary in the particular case.” ( Welch , at p. 235.) On the other hand, an objection base d on constitutional grounds (as opposed to reasonableness grounds), such as a defenda nt’s claim that a probation condition is unconstitutionally vague or overb road, is not always forfeited by the failure to raise the objection below. ( In re Sheena K.
, supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 889.) Such a constitutional challenge is not forfeited when it pres ents a “pure question of law.” ( Id. at p. 887.) “In common with a challenge to an unauthorized sentence that is not subject to the rule of forfeiture, a challenge to a term of proba tion on the ground of unconstitutional vagueness or overbreadth that is capable of correction without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court can be said to present a pure question of law. Correction on appeal of this t ype of facial constitutional defect in the relevant probation condition . . . may ensue from a reviewing c ourt’s unwillingness to ignore ‘correctable legal error.’ ” ( Ibid. , italics added.) Our Supreme Court has stressed that “not . . . ‘all constitutional defects in conditions of proba tion may be raised for the first time on appeal, since there may be circumstances that do not present “pure qu estions of law that5 can be resolved without reference to the pa rticular sentencing record developed in the trial court.” [Citation.] In those circum stances, “[t]raditional objection and waiver principles encourage development of the record and a proper exercise of discretion in the trial court.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] We also emphasize that generally, given a meaningful opportunity, the pr obationer should object to a perceived facial constitutional flaw at the time a probation co ndition initially is imposed in or der to permit the trial court to consider, and if appropriate in the exerci se of its informed judgment, to effect a correction.” ( Id. at p. 889; see also People v. Munoz (Feb. 5, 2015, C075983) __ Cal.App.4th__ [“forfeiture rule applies even to constitutional challenges of probation conditions if the constitutional question cannot be resolved without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in th e trial court”].)
In Sheena K. , the minor challenged a proba tion condition prohibiting her from associating with anyone disapproved of by the probation department but without specifying that she ne eded to be aware of the disapproval. ( In re Sheena K.
, supra , 40 Cal.4th at pp. 878-879.) The Supreme Cour t concluded that the minor had not waived her constitutional objection by failing to raise it below. ( Ibid .) The court held that the minor’s objection amounted to a facial cha llenge because the abse nce of a knowledge requirement in the condition did “not re quire scrutiny of individual facts and circumstances but instead require[d] the re view of abstract and generalized legal concepts.” ( Id. at p. 885.) Stated another way, th e reviewing court could decide whether the challenged conditi on was unconstitutional in all situations, regardless of the underlying criminal activity or the individual minor’s circumstances . According to the Supreme Court, the probation condition was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to notify the minor in advance with whom she could not associate. ( Id. at pp. 891-892.) C.P. acknowledges he failed to challenge his probation condition, but he contends that the issue is nonetheless preserved be cause he is asserting a facial challenge presenting a pure question of law. We disagree . At least one other Court of Appeal has considered a similar probation condition, but its opinion does not o ffer much guidance on the forfeiture issue. ( People v. Bauer (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 937.) In Bauer , Division6 Two of this court struck down a probation co ndition requiring a defe ndant to obtain his probation officer’s approval of his residence. (211 Cal.App.3d at pp. 940, 945.) It is unclear whether the defendant objected to th e condition below, but the court in any event
evaluated whether the co ndition complied with the reasonableness test of People v. Lent
, supra , 15 Cal.3d 481. ( Bauer , at p. 944.) The Supreme Cour t has since clarified that any objection on reasonableness grounds (as oppo sed to constitutional grounds raising pure issues of law) is forfeited absent an objection in the trial court ( People v. Welch
, supra , 5 Cal.4th at p. 230), which means that under current law the defendant in Bauer would
have forfeited his unreasonableness claim absent an objection in the trial court. 2 We conclude that under applicable Su preme Court precedent, C.P. forfeited his objection. We recognize that a probation cond ition restricting an adult’s ability to change residences may run afoul of th e constitutional right to travel and freedom of association. ( People v. Bauer
, supra , 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 944 [c ondition that probation officer approve defendant’s residence “all the more disturbing because it impinges on constitutional entitlements”].) But probation conditions imposed on j uveniles “ ‘may be broader than those pertaining to adult offender s’ ” because “ ‘juveniles are deemed to be more in need of guidance and supervis ion than adults, and because a minor’s constitutional rights are more circumscribed.’ ” ( In re R.V. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 239, 247; see also People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351 , 1358, fn. 4 [“Conditions of juvenile probation may confer broader authority on the juvenile probation officer than is true in the case of adults [citations].”]) Wh en the state takes jurisdiction over a minor, it takes legal custody of the child and “ ‘s tands in the shoes of the parent.’ ” ( In re R.V., at p. 248; In re Nathan W. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1496, 1500 .) “ ‘[T]he juvenile court may impose probation conditions that infringe on constitutional rights if the conditions are
tailored to meet the ne eds of the minor.’ ” ( In re R.V. , at p. 248.)

2 Whether a trial court may impose a probation condition requiring an adult defendant to reside at a residence approved by her probat ion officer is currently pending before the Supreme Court. ( People v. Schaeffer (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1, review granted Oct. 31, 2012, S205260.) The court apparently did not grant review on the issue of possible forfeiture.7 Thus, whether C.P.’s probation condition is permissible depends on whether it is tailored to meet his specific n eeds, and this inquiry is not a pure question of law because it involves reviewing the underlying factual record. (Cf. In re Sheena K.
, supra , 40 Cal.4th at pp. 887-889; see, e.g., In re Pedro Q. (1989) 209 Cal.Ap p.3d 1368, 1373 [restriction on minor’s travel to gang territory might be proper for a minor living outside the gang’s territory but overbro ad for a minor who lives, works, or attends school within that same area]; In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941-942 [upholding probation condition requiring minor who lived in one county not to travel to another county, where criminal conduct at issue occu rred and his gang was located].) The record reveals ample and legitimate r easons for C.P.’s residence to be closely monitored since C.P. has had an extensive history of going missing while under the probation department’s supervision. Given the statutory authority and responsibility for probation officers to place minors in appropriate settings (§ 727, subd. (a)(3)), we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the residency restriction is fa cially impermissible here or in all
situations. This case is distinguishable from the ca ses upon which C.P. relies where juvenile courts effectively banished minors as a condition of probation because the conditions were far more restrictive in those cases and, in one of them, the minor objected below. ( In re James C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1 201-1202, 1205 [condition banishing minor, a U.S. citizen, to Mexico over his objection violated constitutional rights of freedom of travel, assembly, and association]; In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1082, 1085 [requirement that minor live in Iran for two years constituted de facto deportation and impermis sibly violated minor’s constitutional rights].) C.P. contends that the restriction gran ts his probation officer “too much power to proscribe where” he may live. (E.g., People v. Leon (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 943, 953 [“A probation condition that in effect dele gates unfettered discretion to a probation officer to determine its scope at the very least risks being uncons titutionally overbroad”]; People v. O’Neil
, supra , 165 Cal.4th at pp. 1357-1 358 [probation condition gave probation officer no limits on persons officer could prohibit defendant from associating8 with; court must in some way define rele vant class of persons].) But there is no allegation or evidence that his probation officer has ever unreasonably withheld permission for C.P. to change residences. ( People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 378, 383 [where no allegation any pr obation officer had taken acti on to restrict a defendant’s ability to own or keep pet, it was speculative to conclude that an officer would do so under condition requiring proba tioner to notify officer of presence of any pets at probationer’s residence].) In reaching our conclusion we are mi ndful that the challenged condition is contained on a preprinted form, and “[i]f we we re to strike down th e condition as facially overbroad, we would invite wholesale attack on the probation condition in every case, even for those [delinquen ts] as to whom it is unquestionabl y legitimate. Our role in this appeal is to review the conditions of probation for facial constitutionality, not to micromanage how the juvenile court st ructures its probation conditions.” ( In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 922, fn. omitted [re jecting argument, raised for first time on appeal, that proscription on possessing pagi ng device or other portable-communication technology violated juvenile’s First Amendment rights].) In sum, we conclude that by not objec ting below, C.P. forfeited his challenge to the requirement that he not change his resi dence without his probation officer’s prior approval. We observe, however, that he is not without a remedy because he may seek
modification of the condition in the juvenile court. (§§ 775, 778; In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1141.)
III. D ISPOSITION The disposition order is affirmed.9 _ ____________ ____________ Humes, P.J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ Margulies, J.

_____________ ____________ Banke, J.