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No. 15-1 I 13C 

### (Filed: May 

### 23,2016)

t' * * +,* * * r(* * * * * * *.* * * * {.* * * * :t* * * * * * * * * * *

### * STEVEN R. 

### LISTWA,Plaintiff,



# Defendant. ;t * * * * * * * r. * r. :* t( {( :1.,t *(* :** **,t * :}* * :}* r. i.* *,1. * * *

### *

Steven R. 

### Listwa, Philadelphia, PA, pro se. 

### Alison S.

### Vicks, United States Department 

### of Justice, Washington, 

### DC,

### for defendant. 

### OPINION AND ORDER SWEENEY, Judge
Before the 

### court is 

### plaintiff s p1q se 

### complaint, in which he alleges that hewas 

### unlawfully discharged 

### from the 

### United States 

### Army 

### ("Army") 

### in 1966. 

### Plaintiff seeks to proceed 

### in forma pauperis 

### ("IFP") and he seeks a 

### referral to the 

### "Pro Bono/Attorney Refenal Pilot 

### Program." Defendant moves 

### to dismiss the 

### complaint pursuant

### to Rule 

### l2(b)(1) ofthe Rules 

### ofthe 

### United States Court 

### of Federal 

### Claims 

### ("RCFC"). For the reasons set

### forth below, the 

### court grants the 

### plaintiff s IFP 

### motion, denies his 

### motion for referral, and grants defendant's 

### motion to dismiss. 

## I. BACKGROTIND 

## A. Factual Background
On 

### November I

### 0, I965, 

### plaintiff completed apre-enlistment 

### medical examination 

### ior the 

### Army. Def.'s Mot., 

### Ex. 

## l at 000031


## . Plaintiff s

### vision wasfound 

### to be

### within normal 

### iimits and hewas 

### allowed to enter active 

### duty,which he

### did on January 

### 3, 1966. 

## Id. As a result 

### of the 

### examination, 

### it was noted that he had a

### history of eye 

### injury and had undergone eye 

### surgery. Id.
On January

### 7, 1996, 

### plaintiff seyesight was again examined, 

### this time atthe Eye 

### Clinic at Walson 

### Army Hospital at 

### Fort 

### Dix, New Jersey. Id. at 

### 000031-32. This examination revealed abnormalities 

### ofthe retina. 

### Id. The 

### examining physician therefore concluded that

### plaintiffwas "unfit for induction into the

### Armv" but was

### "fit for 

### retention." Id. 

### at000033. The 

### physician 

# FILED

MAY 

### 2

### 3 20ffi U.S. COURT OF 

### FEDEMLC|jIMS

THE UNITED STATES, 

# * Pro Se 

### Plaintiff; RCFC 

### l2(bXl); Tucker 

# * AcU Statute 

### of 

### Limitations; Application to 

# * Proceed 

### ln Forma Pauoeristherefore recommended that 

### plaintiff "meet a 

### Medical Evaluation Board and [be separated] 

### from

the 

### service." Id.
On January 

### 13,1966, pursuant to the dictates

### ofa medical board,

### plaintiff was placed on medical 

### hold. Id. at 

### 000031. While on medical 

### hold, 

### plaintiff developed symptoms 

### of a

### viral respiratory 

### infection. 

### Id. Plaintiff remained on medical 

### hold 

### until March 

### 29,1966. 

### Id. Notes 

### from 

### plaintiffs medical records, dated January 

### 19,1966 and February 

### 25,1966, reflect that 

### plaintiff "had 

### only minor or no

### symptoms."

# !!
On February 10, 1966, 

### plaintiff requested his own discharge 

### from the

### Army: "Request that 

### I be discharged 

### from the service UP

### AR 635-205. I have had eye

### ftouble since 1958, estimated ar 201400 and 20/200 both eyes 

### with glasses. 

### Doctor a! 

### Optometry 

### Clinic, Walson 

### Army Hospital said 

### my eyes are 

### not acceptable 

### for service 

### in the U.S.

### Army." Id. at000040-41. 

### Plaintiff was separated 

### from the service on

### April 5, 1966. Id. at 000040.


### In August 1980,

### plaintiff applied to the

### Army Board 

### for Correction of 

### Military Records 

### (.'ABCMR') to have his records changed 

### to reflect that hewas not discharged 

### voluntarily but rather as a result 

### of a permanent 

### physical

### disability. Id. at 000041 ;

### 67-69. Prior to the 

### ABCMR's making a decision on 

### plaintiff s

### August 1980 

### application, 

### plaintiff requested, on 

### May 8, 1981, that the 

### application be closed sothat he 

### could apply to the 

### Navy. Id.; seealso 

### id. at 000057, 000060.
On 

### October 14,2003, 

### plaintiff again petitioned the

### ABCMR to have 

### his medical records corrected 

### to reflect thatthe reason 

### for his dischargewas a perrnanent 

### physical

### disability. Id. at 

### 000040. The 

### ABCMR denied his 

### application on September 

### 1,2004, noting that 

### plaintiff was "discharged at his 

### own request because

### ofa medical condition 

### oflong standing" and that 

### "[t]he character

### of the discharge 

### [was] commensurate 

### with the reason 

### for the

### discharge." Id. at 000037, 000041

. 

## B. ProceduralBackground Following the 2004 dismissal 

### of his 

### claim by the

### ABCMR, 

### plaintiff began 

### filing a series 

### of federal 

### lawsuits. On October 7, 2009, 

### plaintiff filed his

### first suit 

### in this 

### court. See 

### Listwa v. 

### United States, 

### No. 

### 09-676C. On February 

### 23,2010, the undersigned granted 

### plaintiff s

### motion to

### voluntarily dismiss the 

### case. 

### Id. Before the case was dismissed, onJanuary 

### 13,2010, 

### plaintiff filed a second suit in 

### this 

### court. See 

### Listwa v. United States, 

### No. l0-27C. One 

### month later, on February 

### 23,2010, the undersigned again granted 

### plaintiff s

### motion to

### voluntarily dismiss the case. 

# !!. Plaintiffs third suit in 

### this court was

### filed shortly thereafter, on

### April 15,2010. See 

### Listwa v. United States, 

### No. 10-241C. And for a

### third time, the undersigned granted, 

### on llu1y 27

, 2010, 

### plaintiff s

### motion to

### voluntarily dismiss the case. 

### Id. Plaintiff filed his 

### fourth suit in 

### this court on January 19, 

### 2012. See 

### Listwa v. United States, 

### No. 12-40C. Later that sameyear, on 

### July 19,2012, the Honorable Lawrence J. 

### Block granted defendant's 

### motion to dismiss the case 

### for lack 

### ofjurisdiction. 

### Id. Over three years passed before 

### plaintiff filed, on

### October2,20l5, his

### fifth suit 

### in this 

### court-the instant 

### action. Five days later, 

### plaintiff filed his sixth suit in 

### this 

### court. See 

### Listwav. United States, 

### No. 15-1157C. Nine days later, on 

### October 16,2015, the Honorable Thomas C. Wheeler sua sponte dismissed 

### plaintiff s

### sixth complaint on the ground

-2-that 

### it was substantially 

### alike in all material respects to the

### fifth complaint-the instant action.

Id,


### In additiontothe

### six suits 

### filed in this court, on February 

### 9,2009, 

### plaintiff filed a

### claim in the 

### United States 

### District Court 

### for the Eastem 

### District of Perursylvania. See 

### Listwa v. 

### Dep't Veterans

### Affairs, No. 

### 09-510. One year later, on February 

### 8,2010, the Honorable Jan E. Dubois granted 

### plaintiff s

### motion to

### voluntarily dismiss the

### complaint. Id. 

### C. The 

### InstantAction 

### Plaintiffs first complaint in the case at bar was

### filed on October 

### 2,2015. ThaI same day, he

### filed a

### motion to proceed 

### in forma 

### pauperis. On October 

### 15,2015, 

### plaintifffiled a 

### motion 

### for
a 

### refenal tothe 

### "Pro Bono/Attorney Referral 

### Pilot 

### Program." On 

### October 16, 2015, the 

### court directed the 

### clerk to placethe 

### complaint and its accompanying 

### exhibits under seal becausethey contained 

### personally 

### identifing information. The court also ordered

### plaintiff to refile his 

### complaint, which he

### did on October 

### 22,2015. On October 21, 2015, 

### plaintilTmoved for a

### minitrial and 

### on Oclober 

### 22,2015, 

### plaintiff filed an amended 

### complaint, which contained 

### identical averments 

### to the

### first complaint but 

### included additional 

### exhibits. On 

### November 3,2015, the 

### court granted 

### plaintiff s

### motion towithdraw the request 

### for a

### mini-trial. On October

### 26,2015, 

### plaintiff sought leaveto present a question 

### to the court regarding the accrual date 

### of his clarms 

### for statute 

### of limitations purposes. The 

### coun did not accept the

### frling and on October 30, 201 5, the court directed the 

### clerk to retum the submission 

### to the 

### plaintiff.
On November 25, 2015, defendant moved 

### for an extension 

### oftime 

### until Januuy 7

### ,2016 to

### file its answer to the amended 

### complaint, which was granted 

### by the 

### clerk that same 

### day. On January 7

### ,2015, instead 

### of

### filing its answer, defendant moved 

### to dismiss the 

### case. 

### Plaintiff filed two responses to the 

### motion---one onJanuary 

### 19,2016 and one on January20, 

### 2016. Then, on January

## 2l and January

### 22,2016, 

### plaintifffiled notices concerning the date by 

### which defendant's answer 

### tothe 

### complaint was 

### due. On February 

### 2,2016, defendant 

### filed its 

### reply in support 

### of its 

### motion to dismiss and a response to 

### plaintiff s

### filings regarding the date the answer was due.
On February 5, 201 6, 

### plaintifffiled a 

### motion to compel the 

### production of documents. That same day, the court denied

### plaintiff s

### motion and noted that 

### it was premature given the pending 

### motion to dismiss. Three days later, 

### plaintiff filed an 

### unsolicited status 

### report. On 

### February 12,2016, the 

### court issued an order 

### directing the 

### clerk to retum three documents

### to 

### plaintiff on the ground thatthey were premature discovery requests. The court also precluded 

### plaintiff from 

### filing any 

### additional documents 

### without 

### first obtaining the 

### court's permission. 

### Finally, on 

### May 5, 2016, the court directed defendant 

### to

### clarify for the 

### court whether its 

### motion to dismiss, 

### which was

### filed January 

### 7,2016, was directed atthe 

### first complaint or whether defendant meant 

### to reference 

### plaintiffs amended 

### complaint. On 

### May 20,2016, delendant 

### filed its response 

### to the 

### court's 

### order-indicating that 

### it intended 

### to reference 

### plaintilf samended 

### complaint-and the court 

### now proceeds 

### with consideration 

### ofthe merits 

### of defendant's ripe 

### motion to dismiss.

-3-

## II. DISCUSSION 

## A, Standard of Review
The 

### plaintiffbears the burden

### ofproving, by apreponderance 

### of the evidence,that the court possesses subject matter

### jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defs. 

### of

### Wildlife, 504 

### U.S. 555,561 (1992); 

### McNutt v. Gen. 

### Motors Acceptance 

### Com., 298 

### U.S. 178, 189 

### (1936); Brandt 

### v. United States, 710 

### F.3d 1369,1373 (Fed. 

### Cir. 2013); Reynolds v.

### Army 

### &

### Air Force 

### Exch. 

### Serv.,846F.2d746, 748 (Fed. 

### Cir. I

### 988). The 

### plaintiff cannot 

### rely solely on allegations 

### in the 

### complaint, but must 

### bring forth relevant, adequate 

### proof to establish

### jurisdiction. See 

### McNutt, 298 U.S. 

### at 189. 

### A party may move 

### to dismiss a case

### for lack 

### of subject matter

### jurisdiction pursuant 

### to RCFC 

## l2(bXl). When considering such a 

### motion, the 

### court accepts astrue 

### all undisputed factual allegations made by the 

### nonmoving party, and draws 

### all reasonable inferences 

### from those facts in the 

### nonmoving party's 

### favor. Westlands Water 

### Dist. v. 

### United States, 109 Fed. 

### Cl. 177, 190 

### (2013). Whether the court has

### jurisdiction to decide the merits 

### of a case is athreshold 

### matter. SeeSteelCo.v. Citizens 

### for a Better 

### Env't, 523 

### U.S.83,94-95 (1998). "Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at

### all in any cause. 

### Jurisdiction is power 

### to declare the law, and when 

### it ceases 

### to exist, the 

### only function remaining to the 

### court is that 

### of announcing the

### fact and dismissing the 

### cause." Ex parte 

### McCardle, 74 U.S. 

### (7

### Wall.) 506, 514 

### (1868). Thus, the parties, or the 

### court sua sponte, may challenge the existence 

### ofsubject matter 

### jurisdiction atany 

### time. Arbaugh 

### v.

### Y 

### & H Com., 546 

### U.S. 500, 506 

### (2006). Ultimately, 

### if the court 

### finds that 

### it lacks subject matter

### jurisdiction, then

### it must dismiss the

### claim. Matthews 

### v. Unitcd States,72 Fed. 

### CL.274,278 (2006); see also 

### RCFC 12(hX3) 

### ("lfthe court determines atany time that 

### it lacks subject-matter

### jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the 

### action."). 

## B. Analysis 

# l. The 

### Tucker 

### Act
The

### ability of the Court 

### ofFederal Claims 

### to entertain suits against the 

### United States is 

### limited: "The United States, as sovereign, is immune 

### from suit save as

### it consents 

### to besued." 

### United States 

### v. Sherwood, 312 

### U.S. 584, 586 

### (1941). A waiver 

### of immunity "cannot be 

### implied but must be 

### unequivocally expressed." United Statesv. 

### Kine, 395 U. S. | ,4 

### (1969). The

### Tucker 

### Act, the 

### principal statute 

### goveming the

### jurisdiction 

### ofthis court, waives sovereign 

### immunity

### for claims against the 

### United States 

### not sounding 

### in tort that arefounded upon the 

### Constitution, a federal statute or 

### regulation, or an express or 

### implied contract 

### with the 

### United States. 28 U.S.C. 

### $

## l49l (2012). However, the 

### Tucker

### Act is merely 

### ajurisdictional statute and "does 

### not create any substantive 

### right enforceable against the 

### United States

### for money 

### damages." United States 

### v.

### Testan,424U.5.392,398 (1976). Instead, the substantive 

### right must appear 

### in another source 

### of law, such as a 

### "money-mandating constitutional provision, statute or 

### regulation that has been 

### violated, or an express 

### or implied contract

### with the 

### United States." Loveladies Harbor. Inc. v. 

### United States, 27 

### F.3d 1545, 1554 (Fed. 

### Cir. 1994) (en banc).
The gravamen 

### of

### plaintiff samended 

### complaint is that hewas 

### unlawfully discharged 

### from the

### Army 

### in 1966. Compl. fl

## 4. Specifically, 

### plaintiff claims that his Request 

### for Discharge, 

### DA Form 1049 was 

### forged. Id.

### tl

### 5. According to 

### plaintiff, 

### "[a]t no

### time 

### did [he]ever request a discharge 

### or sign a Request 

### for 

### Discharge." Id. 

### fl

### 9. Plaintiff further claims 

### "that

he should have received a 

### medical Discharge 

### with a Service Connected 

### Disability." Id. at 3. Because 

### plaintiff claims 

### to have been 

### unlawfully discharged 

### from the

### Army and because he also seeks

### to have the reason 

### for his discharge 

### from the 

### military changed 

### to reflect that 

### it was related 

### to a

### disability, his suit can be

### viewed either as one

### for unlawful discharge 

### or one 

### for 

### military 

### disabilitypay.r"Inthecontextofmilitarydischargecases,theapplicable'money-mandating' statute that is generally 

### invoked is the 

### Military Pay

### Act, 37 

### U.S.C. $

### 204." Maninez v. 

### United Stares,333 

### F.3d1295,1303 (Fed.

### Cir.2003). Claimsfor 

### military disability pay are also govemed 

### by a money-mandating statute, 

### found at 

### l0 U.S.C. $

## l20l (2012). See 

### Fisherv. United States, 402 

### F.3d 1167, 1174-7 5 (Fed. 

### Cir. 2005); Chambers 

### v. United States 

### , 417 F

### .3d 1218, 1223 (Fed.

### Cir.2005). Thus, under either scenario, 

### plaintiffhas identified two money-mandating statutes 

### for purposes 

### of theTucker 

### Act. Nevertheless, as discussed 

### below, the 

### court lacks subject matter

### jurisdiction over his claims.



### 2. Plaintiff s

### Claims 

### Are Barred by the Statute 

### Of 

### Limitations
Under the 

### Tucker

### Act, "[e]very claim of which the 

### United States Court 

### of Federal

### Claims has

### jurisdiction shall be baned unless the 

### petition thereon is

### filed within six years after such 

### claim 

### first accrues." 28 

### U.S.C. $

### 2501. 

### "A cause

### of action cognizable 

### in aTucker 

### Act suit accrues as soon as

### all events have occuned that are necessary 

### to enable the

### plaintiffto bring suit, i.e.,

### when 

### 'all events have occurred 

### to

### fix the 

### Govemment's alleged 

### liability, entitling the claimant 

### to demand payment and sue here 

### for his 

### money."' Martinez, 333 F.3d 

### at 1303 

### (quoting Naser Elec. Co.

### v. United States , 368 F.2d 847, 8 5

## I (1966)); seealso 

### Ingrum v. United States, 560 

### F.3d I 3 I

## I, l3 14 (Fed. 

### Cir. 2009) 

### ("A claim first accrues when 

### all the events have occurred that

### fix the alleged 

### liability of the govemment and entitle the 

### claimant to institute an

### action."). 

# If

a

### plaintiffdoes not

### file within the six-year period, he "loses 

### all rights 

### to sue

### for the loss 

### ofpay stemming 

### from the challenged 

### discharge." Maninez, 333 F.3d

### at 1304. 

### Unlawful discharge claims accrue atthe 

### time of the

### discharge. Id. at 1303; accord 

### Bowenv. United States,292 

### F.3d 1383, 1386 (Fed. 

### Cir. 2002); Real 

### v. United States,906 F.2d 

### 1557,1560 (Fed.

### Cir. 1990). Thus, 

### ifthis case is

### viewed as one 

### for 

### unlawful discharge, the 

# ' 'l-he 

### United Stares Court 

### of Federal

### Claims 

### ("Court of Federal 

### Claims") holds pleadings 

### of a p19 se

### plaintiffto less stringent standards than pleadings 

### filed by litigants represented 

### by counsel. Haines

### v. 

### Kerner,404 U.S. 519,520 

### (1972). Courts have 

### "strained 

### [their] proper 

### role 

### in adversary proceedings 

### tothe 

### limit, searching

. 

### . .

### to see 

### ifplaintiffhas a cause

### ofaction somewhere 

### displayed." Ruderer

### v. United States 

### , 412 

### F.2d 1285, 1292 

### (Ct. 

### Cl. 1969). Although
a

## gq se

### plaintiffs pleadings are held

### to a less stringent standard, such 

### leniency 

### "with respect 

### to mere

### formalities does not relieve the burden 

### to meet

### jurisdictional requirements." Minehan v. 

### United States, 75 Fed. 

### Cl. 249,253 (2007); seealso 

### Kelleyv. Sec'y. U.S. 

### Dep't of Labor, 812 

### F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed.

### Cir. 1987) 

### ("[A] court may 

### not

. . .take a 

### liberal

### view of that

### jurisdictional requirement and set a

### different rule for pgg se 

### litigants 

### only."); Bernard 

### v. United States, 59 Fed. 

### Cl.497,499 (noting that

### ple se

### plaintiffs are 

### not excused 

### from satisfying j

### urisdictional requirements), 

### aff d, 98 F.

### App'x 860 (Fed. 

### Cir. 2004). As the Court 

### of Federal 

### Claims stated 

### in Demes v. 

### United States, 52 Fed. 

### C]l.365,369 (2002), 

### "[w]hile a court should be receptive 

### to pro se 

### plaintilfs and assist them,

### justice is 

### ill-served when

### ajurist crossesthe 

### line from finder 

### of fact 

### to advocate."statute 

### of limilations on 

### plaintiffs claim began to 

### run on

### April 5, 1966. Therefore, 

### plaintiffhad

six years, or 

### until 

### April 5,1972,to seek redress in this 

### court. As a result 

### of his

### failure to do so, the court is 

### now precluded 

### from considering his 

### unlawful discharge 

### claim as 

### it is 

### untimely under the 

### Tucker

### Act's statute 

### of limitations. 

### Disability retirement pay claims accme on the date the appropriate 

### military board has either acted or declined 

### to 

### act. Chambers, 417 F.3d 

### at 1224; accord Friedman 

### v. United States, 310 F.2d 381, 389 

### (1962); Furlone 

### v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 

### 238,240-41 

### (1957). Thus,

# if this case is

### viewed as one 

### for disability retirement pay, the statute 

### of 

### limitations on 

### plaintiff s 

### claim began

### to run on September 

### l, 2004, the date the

### ABCMR denied

### plaintiff s

### petition. Therefore, 

### plaintiffhad six years, 

### or 

### until September 

### l, 2010, 

### to seek redress in

### this court. 

### Again, as a result 

### of his

### failure to

### file suit 

### for 

### disability retirement pay

### within the six-year period,
as prescribed by the 

### Tucker Act, he cannot do so now.2



### 3. Plaintiff s 

### IFP 

### Application 

### Will Be 

### Granted Finally, as noted above, 

### plaintifffiled, concurrent 

### with his 

### original complaint, an 

### applicationto proceed 

### in forma pauperis. Pursuant 

### to section 1915 

### of

### title 28, courts 

### ofthe United States are 

### permittedto

### waive

### filing fees and security under certain 

### circumstances. See 28 

### U.S.C. $ 

### l9l5(a)(1); seealso Hayes v. 

### United States, 71 Fed. 

### Cl.366,366-67 (2006) (concluding that 28 

### U.S.C. $ 1915(a)(1) applies

### to both prisoners and nonprisoners 

### alike). 

### Plaintiffs wishing to proceed 

### in forma pauperis must submit an

### affidavit that 

## (l) lists 

### all

### oftheir assets, 

### (2) declares thatthey are unableto pay the fees or 

### give the security, and 

### (3) states the nature 

### ofthe action and

### their belief thatthey are entitled to 

### redress. 28 

### U.S.C. $ 1915(a)(l). Here, 

### plaintilfhas satisfied 

### all three 

### requirements. The court therefore grants 

### plaintiffls application and waives his

### filing fee. 

# III. CONCLUSION
As se1

### forth above. Because 

### plaintilf s

### claim 

### lorwrongful discharge is barred by the statute 

### of limitations, the court 

### GRANTS defendant's 

### motion to dismiss and 

### DISMISSES 

### plaintiff's complaint for lack

### ofjurisdiction pursuant to 

### RCFC 

## l2(bXl). In addition, the court 

### GRANTS 

### plaintift's IFP 

### application and 

### DENIES 

### plaintiff s

### motion for a 

### referral. Finally, the court declines defendant's 

### invitation to determine, atthis 

### point in 

### time, whether 

### plaintiffis a vexatious 

### litigant. The 

### clerk is directed 

### to enterjudgment accordingly and shall not award costs. 

### IT IS SO 

### ORDERED.



# ' Although defendant also raises issue preclusion or 

### collateral estoppel as a bar to 

### plaintiff s

### claim, becausethe court concludes that 

### plaintiffs claim is baned by the 

### Tucker

### Act's six-year statute 

### of limitations, 

### it need 

### not address that argument.