No. 87-258 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1988 

FRANK WEIGAND, 

Claimant and Respondent, 

-vsANDERSON-MEYER DRILLING CO., 

Employer, 

and 

HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Defendants and Appellants. 

APPEAL FROM: Workers' Compensation Court of the State of Montana 

In and For the Area of Great Falls 

The Honorable Timothy Reardon, Judge Presiding 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

David E. Bauer; Marra, Wenz, Johnson & Hopkins, P.C. 

Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Donald R. Marble; Marble & Seidlitz, Chester, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: February 4, 1988 

Decided: June 21, 1988 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

Defendants Anderson-Meyer Drilling Company and Home 

Insurance Company appeal from the judgment of the Workers' 

Compensation Court. The Workers' Compensation Court held 

that Frank Weigand is not barred from compensation by the 

statute of limitations provision, 5 39-71-601 (1) , MCA. The 

court further held that the Weigand's present condition is 

the result of a previous compensable injury and thus the 

defendants are liable. We affirm. 

The defendants present two issues on appeal. They are: 

(1) Whether the Workers' Compensation Court erred in 

finding that Weigand satisfied the filing requirements of 5 

39-71-601 (1) , MCA; and, 

(2) Whether there was sufficient evidence to support 

the Workers' Compensation Court's conclusion that Weigand's 

present condition is the result of his February 11, 1982, 

injury. 

On February 11, 1982, Frank Weigand injured his left 

knee when he slipped on ice and hit his knee cap on the angle 

iron steps of the defendant's oil rig. It is uncontested 

that Weigand suffered an industrial accident arising out of 

and in the course of his employment with Anderson-Meyer 

Drilling Company. Anderson-Meyer was enrolled under Plan I1 

of the Worker's Compensation Act with Home Insurance Company 

being its insurer. 

Weigand immediately informed his supervisor of the 

injury but was able to finish his shift. Weigand had his 

knee examined at Trinity Hospital in Wolf Point. The examination revealed an injury to the lateral cartilage of the 

left knee requiring surgery. The operative report revealed 

that Weigand had an "extremely degenerative (shredded) left 

lateral meniscus" which was removed during surgery. 
Following a brief stay in the hospital Weigand was released 

and immediately returned to work. 

Subsequent to the accident Weigand assisted the 

defendant/employer in completing a Employers First Report, 

which was filed with Home Insurance. The attending surgeon 

also filed the attending Physician's First Report with the 

insurer as well as his bill for $839.69. Trinity Hospital in 

Wolf Point submitted a bill to the insurer for Weigand's 

surgery in the amount of $2,260.15. These bills were paid by 

the insurer along with some smaller additional charges and 

are not an issue in the case. 

Weigand's work history subsequent to his 1982 injury 

consists of oil field jobs and ranch work. While working on 

his father's ranch during the summer of 1985 Weigand began 

experiencing increasing pain in his knee. Weigand's pain was 

not due to a new injury or accident but appeared to be the 

result of everyday wear and tear on the previously injured 

knee. In August, 1985, Weigand had his knee examined by Dr. 

James Hinde. Hinde found that Weigand had a degenerative 

left knee. Hinde felt although there was some deterioration 

prior to the 1982 injury, the condition was significantly 

aggravated by the fall and resulting surgery. Hinde further 

found that the 1982 injury and the subsequent surgery are 

significant factors in the continued degeneration of 

Weigand's knee. Hinde concluded that it was his opinion that 

Weigand's degenerative knee condition would preclude him from 

engaging in any of his former occupations. 

Although the insurer had sent Weigand at least two 

letters instructing him to complete a form 54 immediately 

following the accident, he failed to do so. (Form 54 is the 

standard claim form utilized by insurers). However, Weigand 

did file a form 54 compensation claim in March, 1986. 
The defendant denied Weigandls claim for compensation 

contending that Weigand did not file a claim within one year 

as required by 39-71-601, MCA. The defendant further 

alleged that Weigandls present difficulties were not the 

result of his 1982 injury. On June 10, 1986, the Worker's 

Compensation Court held a hearing on the matter. The court 

concluded that the requirements of § 39-71-601, MCA, had been 

satisfied and that Weigand's current condition is the result 

of his injury in 1982. From this judgment the defendants 

appeal. 

The first issue that must be examined is whether the 

Workers' Compensation Court erred in finding that Weigand 

satisfied the filing requirements of S 39-71-601 (I), MCA. 

When reviewing questions of law in workers' compensation 

cases, the standard of review is whether the lower court's 

interpretation of the law is correct. Poppleton v. ~ollins, 

Inc. (Mont. 1987), 735 P.2d 286, 288, 44 St.Rep. 644, 646. 

We conclude that the Workers' Compensation Court correctly 

interpreted the law. 

In the immediate case it is uncontested that Weigand was 

injured in an industrial accident in February, 1982, and that 

he failed to file a form 54 within one year. Weigand did, 

however, assist in preparing the Employer's First Report. 

Thus, the issue before the Court is whether submission of a 

form 54 is the exclusive method of filing a claim. 

The focal point of the controversy is 5 39-71-601, MCA. 

It provides: 

Statute 

waiver. 

all clai 

- of limitation on presentment of claim -- 

(1) In case oFpersonal injury or death, 

.ms shall be forever barred unless presented 

in writing to the employer, the insurer, or the 

division, as the case may be, within 12 months from 

the date of the happening of the accident, either 

by the claimant or someone legally authorized to 

act for him in his behalf. 
In Scott v. Utility Line Contractors (Mont. 1987), 734 

P. 2d 206, 44 St.Rep. 547, this Court had an opportunity to 

construe $ 39-71-601, MCA, under very similar circumstances. 

In Scott, as in the present case, the claimant was injured in 

1982 and sought to file a compensation claim in 1986. The 

claimant in Scott also did not file the standard workers' 

compensation claim form (form 54) for his injury, nor did he 

sign the Employer's First Report. However, there was a 

completed Employer's First Report submitted to the insurer as 

well as a medical report which was also submitted to the 

insurer. This Court affirmed the decision of the Workers' 

Compensation Court finding Scott presented his claim within 

one year, thus satisfying $ 39-71-601, MCA. We held the 

Employer's First Report contained ample information to clearly inform the employer and the division of the nature and 

basis of Mr. Scott's possible claim. Scott, 734 P.2d at 208, 

44 St.Rep at 547. This Court further stated the medical 

report included indications that a claim could likely result 

from Scott's injury. Scott, supra. 

In the present case Weigand immediately told his supervisor of the accident. FJeigand assisted the employer in 

completing the Employer's First Report, which was submitted 

to the insurer within two months of the accident. The attending physician's first report was also submitted to the 

insurer well within the twelve-month period. In this case as 

in Scott, the defendant was provided with and received ample 

information to be informed of the nature and the basis of 

Weigand's possible claim. We find that the mandate of $ 

39-71-601(1), MCA, has been satisfied. 

This issue is controlled by the holding in Scott. The 

facts are nearly identical except as to the time involved. 

The earlier case of Klein v. Independent Wholesale Associated 

Grocers, et a]. (1975), 167 Mont. 341, 538 P.2d 1358, was not 
discussed in Scott, and here the employer and insurer rely on 

Klein. The deciding point, however, is that there was presented to the employer, and through the employer to the 

insurer, by the assistance of Weigand, information in writing 

which gave all the details that a further form to be filled 

out and presented by Weigand would have given. The purpose 

of S 39-71-601 is fulfilled here. We determine to follow the 

holding in Scott, and anything contained in Klein or earlier 

cases to the contrary on this set of facts is expressly 

overruled. 

The purpose of § 39-71-601, MCA, is to give the employer 

written notice of a worker's claims within twelve months of 

the injury or accident in order to allow the employer to 

investigate the claim and if necessary prepare a defense. 

Scott, supra. The facts of the present case clearly demonstrate that the objective of the statute has been achieved. 

We affirm the judgment of the Workers' Compensation Court 

finding that Weigand presented his claim within the time 

limits expressed in S 39-71-601, MCA. 

The defendants next contend the Workers' Compensation 

Court erred in finding that there was substantial credible 

evidence to support the conclusion that Weigand's current 

condition is the result of his February 11, 1982, injury. We 

disagree. 

The standard for reviewing the Workers' Compensation 

Court's findings of fact is whether the court's findings are 

supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. 

Poppleton, 735 P.2d at 288, 44 St.Rep. at 646. In the instant case, Dr. Hinde testified that although Weigand had a 

degenerative left knee prior to his 1982 injury the condition 

was aggravated by the injury. Hinde further testified that 

Weigand's 1982 injury and the subsequent surgery are significant factors in the degenerating condition of Weigand's knee. 
Our function in reviewing these decisions is only 

to determine whether substantial evidence exists to 

support the findings and conclusions and we cannot 

impose our judgment as to the weight of the 

evidence. 

Ridenour v. Equity Supply Co. (19831, 204 Mont. 473, 

483, 665 P.2d 783, 788, citing Viets v. Sweet Grass County 

(1978), 178 Mont. 337, 583 P.2d 1070. 

It is clear from the evidence in the record that substantial credible evidence exists to support the Workers' 

Compensation Court's finding that Weigand's present condition 

is the result of his injury of February 11, 1982. The judgment of the Workers' Compensation Court is affi-rmed. The 

case is remanded for a determination of benefits. 

//'-.--.--'\ 

Justice 

/' 

We concur: / 

Justices 
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson, dissenting. 

I respectfully dissent and I would reverse the judgment 

of the Workers1 Compensation Court finding that the claimant 

presented his claim for compensation within the time limits 

set forth in 5 39-71-601, MCA. 

In my view, the majority has effectively repealed 

S 39-71-601, MCA in those cases where an Employer's First 

Report has been filed, and a medical bill has been submitted 

and paid. 

Section 39-71-601 reads as follows: 

(1) In case of personal injury or death, 

all claims shall be forever barred unless 

presented in writing to the employer, the 

insurer, or the division, as the case may 

be, within 12 months from the date of the 

happening of the accident, either by the 

claimant or someone legally authorized to 

act for him in his behalf. 

(2) The division may, upon a reasonable 

showing by the claimant of lack of 

knowledge of disability, waive the time 

requirement up to an additional 24 

months. 

The Workers1 Compensation Court Judge in Finding of Fact No. 

24, found: 

The insurer, following the 1982 accident, 

sent and claimant received, at least two, 

and probably four, letters which stated 

as follows: 

"We have been advised you are claiming 

injury as the result of an accident which 

occurred on or about the above date. 

Please complete the enclosed Claim for 

Compensation in detail and return it 

immediately. 

If you were an employee of our insured on 

the date you were injured, and if your 

injury arose out of and in the course of 

your employment, you are entitled to 
certain medical and disability benefits 

as set forth by law. 

If you are disabled for more than five 

working days and lose wages, you are 

entitled to disability benefits. Even 

though you may not lose wages as a result 

of this injury, you should complete the 

enclosed form and return to this office. 

Should you have problems at a later date 

and this form has not been filed within 

one year from the date of accident, all 

future claims for disability may be 

barred. 

If you have any questions regarding the 

benefits due you, please contact this 

office or the Division of Workers' 

Compensation, Helena, Montana." 

The claimant did not respond to the insurer's request 

and failed to submit a written claim for compensation until 

March 6, 1986, more than four years after the injury. The 

insurer has thirty days from the receipt of the claim for 

compensation to accept or deny the claim. Section 

39-71-606(1), MCA, reads as follows: 

(1) Every insurer under any plan for the 

payment of workers' compensation benefits 

shall, within 30 days of receipt of a 

claim for compensation, either accept or 

deny the claim, and if denied shall 

inform the claimant and the division in 

writing of such denial. 

In this case, claimant's counsel took the position originally 

that because the insurer had not denied the March 6, 1986 

claim in writing within 30 days as required by $ 39-71-606, 

MCA, the insurer should be held to have accepted the claim 

even though the injury had occurred more than four years 

earlier. 

The majority, by dispensing with the legislated 

requirement of a written claim for compensation seems to be 
creating uncertainty in what should be a certain procedure. 

What incident now triggers the thirty day period for an 

insurer to accept or deny a claim for compensation? Is it 

the receipt of the Employer's First Report, the receipt of a 

medical bill by the insurer, or a claim for compensation 

filed many years after the injury? 

The majority states that Wiegand assisted the Employer 

in completing the Employer's First Report but that statement 

is not supported in the record and was not found by the 

court. The record shows that claimant's brother was employed 

on the same drilling rig and later drove the claimant to the 

doctor's office in Wolf Point. It appears that sufficient 

information was provided to the employer by someone that the 

First Report could be submitted but this Court has always 

required more in previous cases. 

The Workers' Compensation Court found that the 

completion of form 54 by the claimant would not have given 

the employer any more information than it already had and 

suggested that the claimant may have been confused. 

Claimant's work history indicates that he had previously 

filed a Claim for Compensation for a 1978 injury and 

subsequently had filed a Claim for Compensation for a 1983 

injury. That claim history would indicate a certain degree 

of sophistication and claimant's failure to respond in any 

manner to four solicitations of a claim for compensation 

should be construed to be a voluntary act. 

I would defer to clearly expressed legislative intent 

and construe the claim requirements of S 39-71-601, MCA, as 

written, and would reverse the judgment of the Workers' 

Compensation Court. /