In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 15-119C

(Bid Protest)

(Filed: July 14, 2015) 1

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A-T SOLUTIONS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

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Post-award Bid Protest; 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1491(b)(1); Transition Plan Feasibility; 

Cost Evaluation; Cost Realism Analysis; 

FAR 15.404-1; Technical Evaluation; 

Adjectival Ratings; Unequal Treatment; 

v. Best Value Determination.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant,

 and

 

CUBIC APPLICATIONS, INC.,

 Intervenor.

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J. Alex Ward, Damien C. Specht, Ethan E. Marsh, Jenner & Block LLP, 1099 New York 

Avenue, NW, Suite 900, Washington, D.C. 20001, for Plaintiff. 

Benjamin Mizer, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Steven J. Gillingham, and James Sweet, U.S. 

Department of Justice, Civil Division, Commercial Litigation Branch, P.O. Box 480, Ben 

Franklin Station, Washington, D.C. 20044, for Defendant. 

Paul F. Khoury, Wiley Rein LLP, 1776 K Street, NW, Washington, D.C., for Intervenor. 

Tracye Winfrey Howard and Nina Rustgi, Wiley Rein LLP, 1776 K Street, NW, Washington, 

D.C. 20006, Of Counsel. 

 

1 The Court issued this opinion under seal on June 29, 2015, and directed the parties to file 

proposed redactions by July 15, 2015. The Court publishes this Opinion indicating redactions by 

asterisks “[***].”
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OPINION AND ORDER

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WILLIAMS, Judge.

This post-award bid protest comes before the Court on the parties’ cross-motions for 

judgment on the Administrative Record (“AR”). Plaintiff, A-T Solutions (“A-TS”), challenges 

the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s (“DTRA”) award of a contract to the incumbent Cubic 

Applications, Inc. (“Cubic”) for the development and implementation of training programs to 

counter threats from chemical, biological, or nuclear attacks or accidents. Plaintiff challenges 

DTRA’s evaluation of Cubic’s proposed transition costs and staffing, and the assignment of 

strengths and weaknesses to Cubic’s and A-TS’ proposals. Plaintiff requests that the Court 

declare the award unlawful and permanently enjoin DTRA from performing the contract until the 

Agency reopens the procurement and makes a new award. For the reasons that follow, the Court 

denies the protest. 

Findings of Fact2

DTRA’s Issuance of Solicitation No. HDTRA1-14-R-0003 

The mission of DTRA is to “safeguard America and its allies from weapons of mass 

destruction (WMDs), specifically chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 

explosives (CBRNE) threats.” AR 152. DTRA provides the military, federal agencies, and 

foreign allies with training to reduce and counter threats from chemical, biological, and nuclear 

attacks or accidents. Id. DTRA’s Building Partnership Capacity Department (“J3BP”) 

“institutionalizes training and concepts of operations,” “promotes counter WMD awareness” and 

works to establish, test, and improve “both U.S. and foreign counter CBRNE and nuclear surety 

capabilities, policies and procedures . . . .” Id. 

On January 31, 2014, DTRA issued solicitation number HDTRA1-14-R-0003 for 

“technical, logistical, operational, training, and all associated ancillary support required to 

develop, perform, and execute the J3BP Department’s counter CBRNE Exercise, Training, 

Capability Assessment & Development mission sets.” Id. DTRA anticipated awarding one 

indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (“IDIQ”) contract and then issuing cost-plus-fixed-fee 

task orders. AR 232, 234. 

The solicitation included three Sample Task Orders to be evaluated and awarded. The 

contract had a five-year ordering period and an additional five-year option period. AR 2519. 

The anticipated award date of the IDIQ contract was no later than September 5, 2014, with 

Sample Task Orders 1 and 3 to be awarded within two business days of contract award and 

Sample Task Order 2 to be awarded by December 2014. Id. Each Sample Task Order was split 

into CLINs 0001 and 0002. CLIN 0001 was for a 60-day transition period from September 17, 

 

2 These findings of fact are derived from the AR. Additional findings of fact are in the 

Discussion. 
3

2014 to November 16, 2014. Id. CLIN 0002, which called for the performance of three Sample 

Task Orders, was to commence on November 16, 2014. Id.

Sample Task Order 1 was for the development and implementation of training programs 

to improve the consequence management capabilities of United States partner nations “during 

the early phases of a CBNR incident . . . .” AR 250. Sample Task Order 2 was for the 

development and implementation of training programs to counter the threat of international 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. AR 283. Sample Task Order 3 was for the 

development and implementation of joint training exercises to improve United States and partner 

nation responses to nuclear accidents or incidents. AR 336. In the solicitation, the statement of 

work for each Sample Task Order included transition work, stating:

During the period September 17, 2014 through November 16, 2014, the contractor 

shall provide any and all transition support required during the 60 day transition 

period that may be required. Any and all transition costs shall be proposed and 

accumulated discretely under CLIN 0001 only.

AR 251, 284, 338. 

The contract was to be awarded on a best value basis using three factors: mission 

capability, past performance, and cost. AR 236. Mission capability was more important than 

past performance, which was more important than cost. Id. Mission capability included 

Subfactor A – Management Approach and Subfactor B – Technical Approach. Id. The two 

subfactors under mission capability were of equal importance and mission capability combined 

with past performance was significantly more important than cost, although cost was to be 

“carefully considered.” Id. 

DTRA was to evaluate Subfactor A based on offerors’ “comprehensive Management 

Approach,” which defined and detailed how offerors would perform the contract requirements. 

AR 237. Subfactor B required offerors to submit a comprehensive Technical Approach that 

defined, detailed, and demonstrated offerors’ technical understanding and approach to executing 

the SOW for each Sample Task Order effort. AR 238. Each technical approach was to include 

Transition, Execution, and Staffing Plans. Id. The Staffing Plan had to correspond to the 

Execution Plan and demonstrate that the proposed personnel possessed the required skills. Id.

The solicitation included DTRA’s estimates of the staffing levels needed to perform each 

Sample Task Order, expressed as a number of Full Time Equivalents (“FTEs”). One FTE was 

the equivalent of 1,880 hours per year. Each Sample Task Order’s statement of work (“SOW”) 

expressly advised Offerors that they “[were] not required to utilize the Government provided 

FTE estimates.” See AR 251, 284, 338. The SOW further informed offerors that the estimated 

FTEs were “provided for pricing purposes only and [would] be deleted from the SOW upon Task 

Order award.” AR 251, 284, 338.

In terms of cost, DTRA would 

evaluate the realism of the proposed cost/price by assessing whether the proposed 

cost elements for each Sample [Task Order] and transition plan 1) [were] realistic 

for the work to be performed; 2) reflect[ed] a clear understanding of the 

requirements; and 3) [were] consistent with the unique methods of performance 
4

identified in the Offeror’s Technical Approach Execution Plan and priced with the 

identical quantity and labor mix of personnel identified in the Technical Approach 

Staffing Plan. 

AR 243. The Government was to evaluate each offeror’s cost proposal for “realism, 

reasonableness, and completeness.” Id. As part of its cost evaluation, DTRA would determine 

the most probable cost “by adjusting the Offeror’s proposed cost and fee, when appropriate, to 

reflect any additions or reductions in cost elements to realistic levels based on the results of the 

cost realism analysis.” Id.

Proposals

DTRA received proposals from A-TS, the incumbent Cubic, and three other offerors. ATS and Cubic proposed the following FTE levels as compared to DTRA’s estimates:

A-TS

FTE

Cubic

FTE

Agency Estimate

FTE

Sample Task Order 1 [***] [***] 36

Sample Task Order 2 [***] [***] 17.8

Sample Task Order 3 [***] [***] 29.5

AR 1697, 1779, 1835; AR 2934-35; AR 423, 284, 457. 

In its cost section, Cubic described its efforts to reduce costs, including proposing no cost 

for transition. AR 1998. For CLIN 0001, the transition CLIN, for each Sample Task Order, 

Cubic proposed zero hours and zero cost. See AR 2453. In its cost proposal, Cubic stated that 

“the efforts required during the transition period will be performed by employees assigned to our 

indirect rate pools.” AR 2009. In its Management Approach section, Cubic described its 

transition plan and identified which employees would be involved and what their roles would be. 

AR 1652-55. In its technical proposal, Cubic described how it would implement the transition 

for each Sample Task Order, including the role and tasks of management employees. AR 1686, 

1768-69, 1827-29. Furthermore, Cubic represented that its corporate structure assigned “most

incumbent transition tasks to [its] overhead organization.” AR 1687.

Proposal Evaluation and Award

The Source Selection Evaluation Board (“SSEB”) contained a three-member Mission 

Capability Evaluation Team, a two-member Past Performance Risk Assessment Group, and a 

three-member Cost Evaluation Team. AR 2524. The SSEB applied the definitions of strengths 

and weaknesses set forth in the solicitation. The SSEB evaluated not only each strength or 

weakness, but also “the benefit of the strength to the Government or the impact of the weakness 

on performance.” AR 2533. The SSEB used the following ratings, as set forth in the 

solicitation:

Significant Strength: An aspect of an Offeror’s proposal that has substantial merit 

or substantially exceeds specified performance or capability requirements in a 

way that will be advantageous to the Government during contract performance. 
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Strength: An aspect of an Offeror’s proposal that has merit or exceeds specified 

performance or capability requirements in a way that will be advantageous to the 

Government during contract performance.

Significant Weakness: A flaw in the proposal that appreciably increases the risk 

of unsuccessful contract performance. 

Weakness: A flaw in the proposal that increases the risk of unsuccessful contract 

performance. 

AR 2533. 

In assessing risk, the Government considered the degree to which an offeror’s proposed 

approach might cause “a disruption of schedule, increased costs, degradation of performance, 

need for increased Government oversight, or the likelihood of unsuccessful contract 

performance.” Id.

As required by the solicitation, the SSEB used the following adjectival ratings:

Outstanding: Proposal meets requirements and indicates an exceptional approach 

and understanding of the requirements. Strengths far outweigh any weaknesses. 

Risk of unsuccessful performance is very low.

Good: Proposal meets requirements and indicates a thorough approach and 

understanding of the requirements. Proposal contains strengths which outweigh 

any weaknesses. Risk of unsuccessful performance is low.

Acceptable: Proposal meets requirements and indicates an adequate approach and 

understanding of requirements. Strengths and weaknesses are offsetting or will 

have little or no impact on contract performance. Risk of unsuccessful 

performance is no worse than moderate. 

Marginal: Proposal does not clearly meet requirements and has not demonstrated 

an adequate approach and understanding of the requirements. The proposal has 

one or more weaknesses which are not offset by strengths. Risk of unsuccessful 

performance is high.

Unacceptable: Proposal does not meet requirements and contains one or more 

deficiencies. Proposal is not awardable. 

AR 2534. 

The parties received the following ratings for Subfactor A – Management Approach:

Rating Significant 

Strengths

Strengths Weaknesses

A-TS Good 2 2 0

Cubic Good 1 2 0

AR 2575-77, 2610-11. 
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For Subfactor B – Technical Approach, Cubic received an “outstanding” rating overall 

and the following number of strengths and weaknesses:

Cubic

Significant 

Strengths

Strengths Weaknesses

Sample Task 

Order 1

2 0 2

Sample Task 

Order 2

3 1 0

Sample Task 

Order 3

3 0 0

AR 2578-87. 

For Subfactor B – Technical Approach, A-TS also received an “outstanding” rating 

overall and the following strengths and weakness: 

A-TS

Significant 

Strengths

Strengths Weaknesses

Sample Task 

Order 1

3 3 1

Sample Task 

Order 2

1 2 3

Sample Task 

Order 3

2 3 1

AR 2612-25. For the past performance factor, both A-TS and Cubic received the highest 

“substantial confidence” rating. AR 2702. 

Cubic and A-TS submitted the following prices, as compared to the IGCE:

Sample Task 

Order 1

Sample Task 

Order 2

Sample Task 

Order 3

Total

Cubic [***] [***] [***] [***]

A-TS [***] [***] [***] [***]

Independent 

Government 

Cost Estimate

[***] [***] [***] [***]

AR 2709.
7

The Government conducted a price analysis and determined that adequate price 

competition established price reasonableness, as there were five offerors. AR 2709-10. For each 

offeror, the Government also performed a cost realism analysis to determine whether the 

proposed cost elements were realistic for the work to be performed, consistent with the offeror’s 

technical proposal, and reflected a clear understanding of the requirements. AR 2711. Although 

the Government could have determined a “most probable cost” for each proposal by “adjusting 

each offeror’s proposed cost and fee to reflect any additions or reductions in cost elements,” it 

did not make any adjustments to either Cubic’s or A-TS’ cost proposal and found that both 

proposals were realistic. AR 2712, 2726, 2738. 

The 11-member Source Selection Advisory Council (“SSAC”) created a Comparative 

Analysis Report, determined that the SSEB’s evaluation was proper, and agreed to recommend 

award to Cubic without discussions. AR 2755, 2760. The SSAC agreed that both Cubic and ATS merited a “good” rating for Subfactor A – Management Approach as both had a “thorough 

approach and understanding of the requirements,” and that both Cubic and A-TS merited an 

“outstanding” rating for Subfactor B – Technical Approach because they demonstrated an 

“exceptional approach and understanding of the requirements.” AR 2763-65. The SSAC 

unanimously concurred with all of the SSEB’s findings on price. AR 2767-69. The SSAC found 

that

[b]ased on the costs of the two essentially equally rated offers, Cubic and A-T 

Solutions, . . . the [***] higher proposed cost of A-T Solutions was not offset by 

the proposed technical benefits.

AR 2770. A-TS’ price was [***] higher than Cubic’s. AR 3372. 

On June 23, 2014, the Source Selection Authority (“SSA”) issued his Source Selection 

Decision Document. AR 2775-77. In this decision, the SSA determined that Cubic’s “proposal 

provide[d] the best overall value to satisfy the requirements of [DTRA].” Id. The SSA stated:

Utilizing the results of the evaluation conducted by the SSEB, the strengths and 

weaknesses outlined in that evaluation, and the SSAC Comparative Analysis 

Report, I have conducted an integrated assessment of the proposals using the 

criteria and order of importance established in Section M of the RFP. As 

evidenced in the evaluation results, Cubic Applications, Inc. provided the overall 

best value to meet the Government’s requirements.

In the final analysis, Cubic Applications, Inc. and A-T Solutions were determined 

to be essentially equal for Mission Capability with a Good for Management 

Approach and Outstanding for Technical Approach. Both companies also 

received a rating of Substantial Confidence regarding past performance. However, 

the Cubic proposal was approximately [***] less than A-T Solutions. The 

difference in estimated cost is not overcome by any other factors. 

AR 2776-77. The SSA thus decided to award the contract to Cubic without discussions, and 

award was made on July 23, 2014. AR 2777.
8

A-TS’ GAO Protest

On August 4, 2014, A-TS filed a protest before the Government Accountability Office 

(“GAO”). A-TS’ grounds of protest were very similar to those raised here, specifically that 

DTRA failed to appreciate the risk of Cubic’s low staffing and that it failed to properly assign 

strengths and weaknesses to the Cubic and A-TS proposals. AR 2928-29. GAO held an 

outcome prediction conference on October 31, 2014, and opined that the protest would be 

sustained for two reasons – 1) DTRA’s assignment of a weakness to A-TS for proposing 

individuals whose hours exceeded those of a Full Time Equivalent, but not to Cubic, which also 

proposed individuals in excess of a Full Time Equivalent and, 2) DTRA’s improper award of a 

strength to Cubic for purchasing non-refundable airline tickets, as this was required of all 

contractors. AR 3287. On November 3, 2014, the Agency decided to take corrective action and 

reevaluate this weakness and strength, “[r]econsider the overall evaluation of offerors based on 

any revisions to the mission capability evaluation of offerors,” “reconsider the award decision 

based upon the reevaluated strengths and weaknesses,” and “[i]ssue a new award decision.” AR 

3287-88.

DTRA’s Corrective Action

The chair of the SSEB issued a new document containing “Post-Protest Source Selection 

Evaluation Board Results” on November 13, 2014. AR 3294. The SSEB removed the strength 

that Cubic had received for Sample Task Order 2 related to the non-refundable airline tickets. 

AR 3320. For A-TS, the SSEB removed one weakness and “reworded” another weakness.3 AR 

3332. The removed weakness, for Subfactor B – Technical Approach in Sample Task Order 2, 

stated “Offeror has one individual whose hours exceed 1 FTE (352 for CLIN 1; 1880 for CLIN 

2) without explanation ([Sample Task Order] 2 – page 52).” AR 3340. A-TS’ original weakness 

was for Subfactor B – Technical Approach in Sample Task Order 3 and similarly stated:

Offeror has one individual whose hours exceed 1 FTE (352 for CLIN 1; 1880 for 

CLIN 2) without explanation ([Sample Task Order] 3 – page 59). 

AR 3345. The impact/risk of the original weakness was listed as “Government is uncertain why 

one individual is exceeding 1 FTE hours.” Id.

As part of its corrective action, DTRA did not remove this weakness and restated it as 

follows:

Offeror provided an inconsistent staffing plan for Transition. The Senior Exercise 

Planner is proposed to work 544 hours during transition (page 194 para 1.1 

Transition) however, in Exhibit 73 (page 167) the Senior Exercise Planner is not 

identified and instead the hours are divided between Program Analysts.

AR 3346. DTRA assessed the new impact/risk of this reworded weakness as follows:

[b]ecause of the inconsistency in the proposal the Government doesn’t understand 

the transition staffing and [sic] proposed transition tasks would be accomplished. 

 

3 Although DTRA characterized this weakness as having been “reworded,” Plaintiff 

disputes this and contends that DTRA actually created a new weakness. See AR 3332.
9

Id. 

On January 17, 2015, the SSA issued a new Source Selection Decision Document, noting 

that no changes were made to Cubic’s or A-TS’ Subfactor A – Management Approach, and thus 

both retained a “good” rating. AR 3369, 3373. The SSA stated that the removal of Cubic’s 

strength for non-refundable airline tickets was “insignificant and did not impact the original 

evaluation results,” and that Cubic’s Subfactor B – Technical Approach rating remained 

“outstanding.” AR 3369. The SSA also addressed the SSEB’s and SSAC’s revised statements 

of A-TS’ weaknesses. The SSA noted that the SSEB determined that the removal of one 

weakness and the “rewording” of another “were insignificant to the overall findings and did not 

impact the original evaluation results.” AR 3369-70. The SSA stated that Cubic’s and A-TS’ 

Subfactor A and B proposals were roughly equivalent. AR 3370. The SSA added a new 

assessment of the relative best value of the proposals of A-TS and Cubic, stating that he was 

particularly impressed by Cubic’s experience doing business in over 85 countries and Cubic’s 

pre-engagement strategy for each Sample Task Order. Id. 

The SSA noted that the Contracting Officer “did a verification of the proposed costs to 

ensure [there were] no changes to the evaluation during the delay associated with the protest and 

verified the original costs were complete, reasonable and realistic.” AR 3371. The SSA 

continued:

Cubic’s labor rates were higher than [A-TS’]; however Cubic offered to do the 

work with fewer hours through an efficient approach. Cubic proposed [***], 

which provided an exceptional process to support Government surge requirements 

and a thorough approach to support international logistics and an exceptionally 

through [sic] understanding of the technical requirements. [A-TS’] proposal also 

provided a large skill pool complimented by both full time and part time 

positions, and cross-functional area qualified instructors with teaching credentials, 

however the benefits to the Government did not outweigh the approximately 

[***] additional cost. As noted before, both Cubic and [A-TS] were judged 

essentially equal on the Mission Capability Factor; Subfactor A – Management 

Approach (both GOOD/PURPLE) and Mission Capability Subfactor B –

Technical Approach (both OUTSTANDING/BLUE).

In analyzing the costs, it was noted that about [***] of Cubic’s [***] in lower 

costs were attributable to reduced labor hours. The balance of the difference (in 

Cubic’s favor) were associated with the fringe, labor overhead, G&A, materials 

handling, and their fixed fee. The lower Cubic rates in fringe, labor overhead, 

G&A, materials handling, and fixed fee will benefit the Government on future 

task orders. 

The nearly [***] would be an immediate savings. However, the approximately 

[***] in savings could be extrapolated for the life of the contract. By selecting 

Cubic, the Government, in theory, would be obtaining [***] more effort than [ATS] over the five year period of performance. 

AR 3372. The SSA determined that it was in the Government’s best interest to award the 

contract to Cubic without discussions. AR 3373.
10

The GAO dismissed A-TS’ protest on November 3, 2014, due to DTRA’s decision to 

take corrective action. AR 3366. After the SSA issued his post-GAO protest Source Selection 

Decision on January 7, 2015, A-TS filed the instant protest on February 6, 2015. The 

Government voluntarily stayed award until June 30, 2015. Compl. ¶ 4 n.1. 

Discussion

Standard of Review 

The Court evaluates bid protests pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act’s standard 

of review for an agency action. Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 

2005) (citing Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324, 

1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). This Court will not disturb an agency’s procurement decision unless the 

Court finds that it was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 

accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); Adams & Assocs. v. United States, 741 F.3d 

102, 105-06 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The Court will set aside an agency’s decision as arbitrary and 

capricious if “the agency ‘entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered 

an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or [the 

decision] is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of 

agency expertise.’” Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. United States, 586 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 

2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 

Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). The Court will “uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the 

agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight 

Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974). The Court will not overturn an agency decision “even 

though it might, as an original proposition, have reached a different conclusion as to the proper 

administration and application of the procurement regulations” if the Court finds a reasonable 

basis for the agency’s action. Honeywell, Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 644, 648 (Fed. Cir. 

1989) (quoting M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). 

If this Court finds that the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously or contrary to law, the 

plaintiff must also show that it was prejudiced by this conduct to prevail. Bannum, 404 F.3d at 

1351. The plaintiff must show that there was a “substantial chance” the plaintiff would have 

received the contract award but for the Government’s errors in the procurement process. Id. at 

1358. Under Rule 52.1, the parties are limited to the AR, and the Court makes findings of fact as 

if it were conducting a trial on a paper record. See id. at 1356. Looking to the AR, the Court 

must determine whether a party has met its burden of proof based on the evidence in the record. 

Id. 

DTRA Correctly Evaluated Cubic’s Staffing

A-TS challenges DTRA’s evaluation of Cubic’s staffing in two respects – its evaluation 

of Cubic’s Technical Approach and its cost realism analysis. As to the Technical Approach, ATS asserts that “the record contains no documents” showing that DTRA “determined that Cubic 

could perform the Sample Task Orders with just [***] percent of the Government’s staffing 

estimate.” Pl. Mot. 17-18. A-TS also takes issue with the post-protest Source Selection 

Decision claiming that the SSA did not specifically acknowledge that Cubic’s proposed staffing 

was “sharply lower than the Government estimate.” Id. at 18-19. Finally, A-TS contends that 
11

DTRA’s technical evaluation was arbitrary and capricious because it did not contain a “coherent 

and reasonable explanation” of DTRA’s exercise of discretion. Id. at 19-20.

Plaintiff’s efforts to undermine the technical evaluation fail. The record contains ample 

documentation demonstrating that Cubic’s lower staffing was fully disclosed by Cubic and 

understood by the Agency. Cubic not only put the Government on notice that it planned to use 

lower staffing levels than the Agency estimate, it touted that approach as a cost savings measure. 

The solicitation did not require offerors to propose a minimum number of FTE to be responsive, 

or to explain any variation from the Agency’s estimated FTE levels. Rather, offerors were free 

to utilize their manpower as they saw fit to complete the Sample Task Orders. 

In its proposal for each Sample Task Order, Cubic detailed how it had arrived at its 

proposed staffing levels based on historical performance data, including a table of such data over 

different months in 2012 and 2013, for Sample Task Orders 1 and 3. AR 1697, 1835. Cubic not 

only explained its approach in its narrative, it depicted its staffing graphically. For each Sample 

Task Order, Cubic included a graph showing how its specified number of employees assigned to 

a given task would vary by month, representing “how the Cubic Team [would] support the [Task 

Order] execution with significantly less FTEs than the Government estimate.” Id. Cubic 

represented that it would be able to keep its core staff to a minimum, as it had done over the last 

10 years. Id. 

Cubic’s Execution Plan detailed how it would perform each Sample Task Order with the 

number of employees that it proposed. See AR 1684-1748; 1762-1817; 1824-87. For example, 

Cubic provided a Staffing Plan that listed over 60 of its and its subcontractor’s employees and 

cross-referenced their work with the requirements of the solicitation’s SOW for Sample Task 

Order 1. AR 1724-25. Similarly, Cubic’s proposal for Sample Task Orders 2 and 3 detailed the 

anticipated roles of numerous identified employees in completing the contract tasks. See AR 

1762-1817; 1824-87. 

Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, not only did Cubic highlight that it would use less 

staffing, but the SSA also clearly articulated his understanding that Cubic would expend fewer 

hours to perform. In his second Source Selection Decision Document, the SSA stated:

Cubic’s labor rates were higher than [A-TS’]; however Cubic offered to do the 

work with fewer hours through an efficient approach. Cubic proposed [***], 

which provided an exceptional process to support Government surge requirements 

and a thorough approach to support international logistics and an exceptionally 

through [sic] understanding of the technical requirements.

AR 3372. 

Nor has Plaintiff established that DTRA failed to rationally explain its award to Cubic. 

This was a best-value procurement. The SSA’s post-GAO protest Source Selection Decision set

forth elements of Cubic’s proposal that he found valuable, including Cubic’s international 

presence and Cubic’s pre-engagement strategy on Sample Task Order 1. AR 3370. He 

concluded that while A-TS’ and Cubic’s Technical Approaches were roughly equivalent in 

merit, Cubic had an exceptionally thorough understanding of the technical requirements, and an 

“efficient approach” that allowed it to do the work using fewer hours, providing the Government 
12

with a cost savings of almost [***]. AR 3372. In sum, Plaintiff’s challenges to DTRA’s 

technical evaluation of staffing and the award to Cubic are not supported by the record.

The Cost Realism Analysis Was Reasonable

Second, A-TS argues that DTRA failed to properly conduct a cost realism analysis and 

“did not adjust Cubic’s proposed costs to account for its low staffing levels.” Pl. Mot. 22. 

According to A-TS, the Agency should have adjusted Cubic’s proposed costs to reflect the 

insufficient staffing levels it proposed. Id. This, A-TS contends, would have forced the Agency 

to add additional hours to Cubic’s proposed staff levels, therefore significantly increasing 

Cubic’s costs. Id.

As cost realism determinations are within an agency’s “sound discretion and expertise,” 

the Court will not overturn a cost realism determination unless the plaintiff demonstrates the 

absence of a rational basis for the agency’s decision. CTA Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 684, 

693 (1999). It is unnecessary for an agency to demonstrate that a required cost realism analysis 

was conducted with “impeccable rigor.” OMV Med. Inc. v. United States, 219 F.3d 1337, 1334 

(Fed. Cir. 2000). In performing a cost realism analysis, an agency independently reviews and 

evaluates the elements of an offeror’s proposed cost estimate “to determine whether the 

estimated proposed cost elements are realistic for the work to be performed; reflect a clear 

understanding of the requirements; and are consistent with the unique methods of performance 

and materials described in the offeror’s technical proposal.” 48 C.F.R. § 15.404-1. Agencies are 

required to do more than merely state that a cost realism analysis was performed. Cohen Fin. 

Servs., Inc. v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 267, 286-87 (2013). 

Plaintiff’s cost realism argument is predicated on its erroneous assumption that Cubic’s 

staffing levels were too low and had to be adjusted upward with a concomitant increase to 

Cubic’s price. This construct is flatly wrong as explained above. While Cubic’s staffing levels 

were lower than A-TS’ and the Government estimate, the Agency reasonably determined that 

they were not too low, and there is no basis for the Court to impose the so-called cost realism 

adjustment Plaintiff proposes. See AR 2726, 3366. DTRA had a rational basis for concluding 

that Cubic’s staffing proposal met the requirements of the solicitation and that Cubic’s cost 

proposal was realistic. A-TS’ contention that DTRA should have adjusted Cubic’s costs is 

without merit.4

 

4 A-TS also speculates that the Agency misunderstood Cubic’s [***] in evaluating its 

lower FTEs. Pl. Mot. 19. A-TS presumes that the staffing difference between the Government’s 

FTE estimates and Cubic’s proposal was due to Cubic cutting hours for management and 

support. Pl. Reply 10. Using Sample Task Order 2 as an example, A-TS posits that because 

[***] Cubic’s proposal should have had less hours for these roles, not more, if the lower staffing 

levels in its proposal were truly due to [***]. Id. A-TS’ unproven assumptions do not provide a 

basis to substitute A-TS’ purported evaluation for that of the Agency. 
13

DTRA’s Technical Evaluation of Cubic’s Transition Plan Was Reasonable

A-TS also claims that the Agency failed to evaluate whether Cubic’s transition plan was 

technically feasible. Pl. Mot. 9. A-TS contends that Cubic’s transition plan generated 

inconsistencies that were not addressed by the Source Selection Board, making it unclear 

whether Cubic’s proposed transition plan was technically feasible. Specifically, A-TS asserts 

that, in its transition plan, Cubic assigned its incumbent employees to work on two contracts at 

the same time -- the incumbent contract and the new award -- and committed direct staff to work 

on the new contract’s transition CLINs, while claiming that transition tasks would be performed 

only by indirect staff. Id. at 11-12. 

Cubic’s technical proposal described its transition plan as follows:

Detailed transition planning is critical to a smooth transition of personnel, 

execution tasks, and material from the current contract to this new task order 

(TO). We acknowledge that this is a new contract with new contractual 

requirements and CDRLs. The program’s transition period from 17 September to 

16 November 2014 corresponds to the end of our current incumbent task order 

period of performance. 

We will continue to execute all technical tasks on the current contract through the 

transition period. Our Corporate overhead staff will complete all security, 

contractual, and HR requirements associated with the new contract prior to 16 

November. Our approach ensures no disruption to existing services and the 

smooth implementation of new services and contract options. Performing the 

majority of our work now, our approach keeps our Country Leads and currently 

assigned staff focused on supporting their assigned operations, while our 

leadership team and support staffs focus on transitioning to the new task order 

contract vehicle. This approach ensures continuity of operations and a successful 

transition. 

AR 1686. 

A-TS argues that Cubic assigned its incumbent employees to work on two contracts at 

once because, in its Management Approach, Cubic stated that the incumbent Program Managers 

were “fully vested in their respective programs” yet also described these individuals as working 

on the transition to the new contract. Pl. Mot. 11-13; AR 1654. A-TS attempts to divine an 

inconsistency where none exists. Cubic’s proposal did indicate that managers would be working 

both on the incumbent contract and on overseeing the transition. However, it is not inconsistent 

for managers to be “fully vested” in their respective programs and oversee transition – it is a 

sound business judgment to use managers with program experience to ensure a smooth 60-day 

transition.5 Much of A-TS’ complaint here can be attributed to Cubic’s status as the incumbent, 

but neither this reality nor Cubic’s proposed transition gives rise to A-TS’ suggested 

inconsistency. 

 

5 Because Cubic is not charging any costs for transition to its new contract, there is no risk 

that the Government is paying too much for this effort. 
14

A-TS also asserts that the assignment of transition tasks to direct management personnel 

was at odds with Cubic’s assertion that its corporate overhead staff would “complete all security, 

contractual, and HR requirements” associated with the new contract. Pl. Mot. 11-13; AR 1686. 

A-TS ignores that Cubic described how the transition would be managed by a specified team of 

employees and how its corporate overhead staff would complete other activities. AR 1686-89. 

Cubic represented that its corporate structure assigned “most incumbent transition tasks to [its] 

overhead organization.” AR 1687 (emphasis added). In its proposal, Cubic broke transition 

down into transition management and staffing. For Sample Task Order 1, the management 

section stated that transition would be done “under the guidance” of [***].

6

 AR 1686. [***], 

Cubic’s Program Manager, was tasked with the “overall responsibility to plan, organize, direct 

and control the transition” and would work with [***], the Deputy PM, to “manage the 

development and updating of team procedures and team training requirements.” Id. Cubic also 

identified “key participants in management transition” as the “[CBRN Preparedness Program] 

Coordinator,” the “Country Leads,” and “selected members” of a subcontractor’s “logistics 

support team.” Id. In the staffing section, Cubic proposed that incumbent staff who were 

engaged in the “planning, execution or after-action phases on the current contract” would not be 

switched to the new contract until day one of the new performance period. AR 1687. 

Here, DTRA reasonably accepted Cubic’s detailed transition plan. The solicitation did 

not break out what specific tasks had to be done for transition. Instead, it required that offerors 

provide transition plans that would:

[S]pecifically define, detail, and demonstrate all aspects of ramp-up including 

transition risks with mitigation strategies and staffing schedules, training and data 

capture for all prime and subcontracted efforts as necessary . . . [and] . . . define 

and detail how the proposed Transition Plan [would] reduce impact to current 

schedules, and detail how and when the offeror will have processes and 

procedures in place.

AR 238. Plaintiff’s attempt to unearth another inconsistency in Cubic’s transition plan based 

upon the assignment of transition tasks to direct, as opposed to overhead, employees is not 

supported by the record. There is no “technical” problem or inconsistency with Cubic’s ability 

to perform transition based upon the direct or overhead status of its employees. 

Plaintiff Did Not Establish that the Agency Misevaluated Cubic’s Transition Costs

A-TS asserts that DTRA failed to understand that Cubic’s cost proposal for transition was 

unrealistic, relying on its own comparison of Cubic’s cost proposal with Cubic’s technical 

proposal. A-TS argues that Cubic’s cost proposal was unrealistic because Cubic proposed no 

costs for transition while appearing to assign many staff members to transition in its technical 

proposal. Pl. Mot. 13-15. That Cubic proposed charging zero hours for its transition effort in its 

cost proposal does not invalidate its technical proposal. The SOW for each Sample Task Order 

required that “[a]ny and all transition costs shall be proposed and accumulated discretely” under 

CLIN 0001. AR 251, 284, 338. For CLIN 0001, in every applicable table and chart in its cost 

proposal, Cubic indicated that it was charging $0 for all transition efforts, including direct labor. 

See, e.g., AR 2047. 

 

6 The parties base their arguments on the transition plan in Sample Task Order 1.
15

Indeed, Cubic’s proposal reiterated that it would charge $0 for transition in several 

instances:

 “We have not proposed costs for transition. The required transition tasks will be 

performed by our indirect staff.” AR 1998.

 “The required transition tasks will be performed by our indirect staff, therefore 

CLIN 0001 is $0. Please refer to Paragraph 14.4 below and Volume II, Section 

1.0: Sample Tasks, pages 1-3 of each.” Id.

 “CAI, along with the subcontractors, have not priced a Transition Period. As 

described in Volume II, Section 1.0: Sample Tasks, pages 1-3 of each, the efforts 

required during the transition period will be performed by employees assigned to 

our indirect rate pools.” AR 2009. 

 $0 for transition was represented on Cubic’s charts and labor hour summaries for 

each Sample Task Order. AR 2459, 2478, 2495. 

 “In no case do we anticipate charging new employee labor to the transition 

CLIN. Administrative and training actions in preparation for performance will be 

at no cost to the Government.” AR 1687, 1829.

As Cubic represented numerous times in its proposal that there would be no cost for 

transition, the risk for a no-cost transition remained exclusively on Cubic. Cubic could not

charge for transition when it affirmatively represented multiple times in its proposal that it would 

not. Contractors are permitted to absorb costs in their proposals. Where the contractor 

undertakes such a business judgment, the Government is not required to adjust the contractor’s 

proposal to account for the absorbed costs. See In Re Science Applications, Int’l Corp., B232548, 1989 WL 240237 at *14 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 23, 1989). 

A-TS attempts to create another inconsistency by arguing that Cubic’s cost proposal 

stated that it would not charge for transition only because it would be using indirect employees, 

while its technical proposal stated that some direct employees would work on transition. This 

argument is a red herring. The language and charts in Cubic’s proposal make clear that no matter 

what type of employee would work on transition, Cubic would not charge the Government for 

this effort. A-TS might have a point if despite offering no-cost indirect employees for transition, 

Cubic’s proposal inconsistently slipped in costs for some direct employees or was unclear about 

what it was charging for transition efforts of direct employees. This is not the case here. While 

Cubic’s cost proposal did reference its use of indirect employees in discussing its no-cost 

transition, it consistently and repeatedly assured the Government that there would be no cost for 

transition. Contrary to A-TS’ suggestion, there is no basis in Cubic’s proposal to infer that there 

would or could be a cost for any direct employees’ transition efforts. The Agency did not err in 

its evaluation of Cubic’s transition cost.

The Agency Did Not Treat A-TS Unequally in the Technical Evaluation

A-TS argues that DTRA treated it unequally in the technical evaluation by failing to 

award it certain strengths and by assigning it a weakness in evaluating its Sample Task Order 3 

when taking corrective action. Pl. Mot. 24-31. In essence, Plaintiff asks the Court to reevaluate 

its proposal. In this endeavor, Plaintiff faces an uphill battle. This Court does not sit as a super 

source selection authority to second guess and re-score offerors’ proposals. Rather, it is well 

established that the Court should not substitute its judgment to assess the relative merits of 
16

competing proposals in a government procurement. AshBritt, Inc. v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 

344, 367 (2009) clarified by, amended by AshBritt, Inc. v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 654 (2009) 

(citing R & W Flammann GMBH v. United States, 339 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 

(internal citations omitted)). 

The FAR requires “integrity, fairness, and openness” in procurements and prohibits 

Government personnel involved in the acquisition from engaging in conduct that favors one 

offeror over another. See CMI Mgmt. v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 276, 300 (2014) (citing 28 

C.F.R. § 1.102(b)(3); 28 C.F.R. § 15.306(e)(1)). “The agency’s failure to follow the terms of its 

own Solicitation and selection of an offeror based upon different requirements than those 

imposed upon the only other offeror are quintessential examples of conduct which lacks a 

rational basis.” Hunt Bldg. Co. v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 243, 273 (2004). Contracting 

officers are obligated to treat all offerors equally, “evaluating proposals evenhandedly against 

common requirements and evaluation criteria.” NCL Logistics Co. v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 

596, 626 (2013) (quoting Banknote Corp. of Am., Inc. v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 377, 383 

(2003), aff'd 365 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 48 C.F.R. § 1.602-2). Indeed, “an agency action is 

arbitrary when the agency offered insufficient reasons for treating similar situations differently.” 

Id. (quoting Transactive Corp. v. United States, 91 F.3d 232, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). However, 

offerors who are not similarly situated may be treated differently. See NCL Logistics Co., 109 

Fed. Cl. at 626. 

Cubic Was Properly Given a Strength for International Logistics 

A-TS failed to demonstrate that DTRA should have considered its technical proposal on 

international logistics to be equal to Cubic’s. DTRA awarded Cubic a Management Approach 

strength for its thorough approach to international logistics, finding it was doing business in over 

85 countries, regularly using local nationals as employees in foreign countries, and negotiating 

vendor agreements in support of international operations. AR 3438. The benefits of this 

strength to the Government were a strong likelihood of cost savings, streamlining logistic 

requirements through existing relationships, and offering reliable quality. Id.

A-TS asserts that DTRA misunderstood and “implicitly re-wrote Cubic’s proposal to 

include benefits that the Agency valued but that Cubic did not actually offer” because the 

proposal did not fully list the 85 countries and did not state that Cubic planned to use these 

existing local national vendor relationships. Pl. Mot. 25. This argument is devoid of merit. 

Cubic actually tied its work in 85 countries to this solicitation requirement, while A-TS’ 

Subfactor A – Management Approach did not contain a description of how its international 

presence would help it manage the contract. In its Management Approach, under the subheading 

“1.1.6.1.1 Technical Performance Requirements [SOO 4.2 a. – h.],” Cubic represented that it was 

currently performing “all Technical Performance Requirements (TPR) as specified in SOO 

paragraph 4.2 on our current incumbent contracts.” AR 1666. Cubic then stated that it was 

providing “[a] brief overview of the processes we use to perform these requirements . . . .” Id. 

In a section within subheading 1.1.6.1.1 labeled “In-Country Logistical Support [SOO 4.2.e],” 

Cubic described the work its subcontractors would do to provide in-country logistical support 

and concluded that “[i]n addition, both Cubic and [a subcontractor] are large multinational 

companies doing business in over 85 countries with offices throughout the world. We regularly 

employ local national employees and negotiate vendor agreements in support of international 

operations.” AR 1667. 
17

A-TS also argues that its own proposal “was plainly superior in this area” because it 

“explained that its overseas reach involves work specifically relevant to this contract” in 45 

different countries, and “identified its key overseas locations and pledged those locations to 

support this contract.” Pl. Mot. 25-26. A-TS points out a variety of places in its proposal where 

it referred to its international activities in 45 different countries. Pl. Mot. 26 (citing AR 763, 800, 

875, 808, 780). However, only one mention of “45 countries” was in A-TS’ Subfactor A –

Management Approach, contained in a general description of A-TS in its identification of prime 

and subcontractors. AR 763.7In its Management Approach section on Offsite Facilities, A-TS 

listed 16 international cities that were available to support program operations. AR 780. Other 

mentions of A-TS’ international presence were contained in its Technical Approach as part of its 

description of how it would perform the Sample Task Orders. 

In sum, based on the difference in the offerors’ proposals, it was reasonable for DTRA to 

conclude that Cubic’s international experience would aid international logistics during contract 

performance and award Cubic, but not A-TS, this strength for Subfactor A – Management 

Approach. 

DTRA Properly Evaluated A-TS’ Innovation And Relevancy Toolkit

A-TS argues that DTRA improperly failed to assign it a strength for its Innovation and 

Relevancy Toolkit in its Subfactor A – Management Approach. Pl. Mot. 30. In order to merit a 

strength, the proposed item had to “exceed[] specified performance or capability requirements in 

a way that [would] be advantageous to the Government during contract performance.” AR 239. 

A-TS’ Innovations and Relevancy Toolkit was a

[***]

AR 768. A-TS described how it would “plan, coordinate and track the preparations and phased 

development/re-deployment of personnel deployed OCONUS in support of operations in highrisk, hostile areas.” Id. Neither A-TS nor Cubic received a strength or a weakness for this

technical element. 

A-TS asserts that its toolkit deserved a strength “based on the toolkit’s breadth and the 

ability of an online platform to quickly share information among the various parties.” Pl. Mot. 

30. A-TS further argues that if all offerors were required to propose a way to track personnel 

and inventories and A-TS’ toolkit merely met this requirement, then Cubic should have been 

awarded a weakness for its inferior “paper course catalogue” and “annual, serialized inventory” 

of property. Id. at 30-31 (citing AR 3070, 1660, 1667).

Here, in the context of specialized training to counter chemical, biological, or nuclear 

attacks or accidents, the Agency is in a far better position than the Court to assess how 

advantageous A-TS’ Innovation and Relevancy Toolkit would be to the Government during 

contract performance. This Court is not about to second-guess which offeror’s tracking system 

was superior for the Agency’s purposes or engage in the exercise of rescoring technical 

 

7 AR 763 was a list of “team members, business size, role, anticipated areas of Statement 

of Objectives responsibility, sample [Task Order] alignment, and value they bring to the DTRA 

BPC program.” AR 762. AR 763 listed A-TS as the prime contractor.
18

proposals. See AshBritt, Inc., 87 Fed. Cl. at 367. Rather, the Court affords deference to agency 

determinations on technical matters, in recognition of the special expertise of procurement 

officials. AM Gen., LLC v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 653, 677 (2014) (citing E.W. Bliss Co. v. 

United States, 77 F.3d 445, 449 (Fed. Cir. 1996); J.C.N. Constr., Inc. v. United States, 107 Fed. 

Cl. 503, 510 (2012); Beta Analytics Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 384, 395 (2005)). 

Technical ratings involve discretionary decisions of procurement officials that the Court will not 

second guess. E.W. Bliss Co., 77 F.3d at 449. 

The Agency Did Not Treat A-TS Unfairly In Taking Corrective Action

When examining agency corrective action, the Court considers whether the corrective 

action was “reasonable under the circumstances.” See, e.g., Sierra Nev. Corp. v. United States, 

107 Fed. Cl. 735, 750 (2012); Sheridan Corp. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 141, 151 (2010); 

ManTech Telecomms. & Info. Sys. Corp. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 57, 65 (2001). A-TS 

argues that the weakness that it received for Sample Task Order 3 after the Agency’s corrective 

action was both unreasonable and evidence of disparate treatment. Pl. Mot. 26. As a general 

matter, A-TS contends that this weakness resulted from an illegal “second scrub for weaknesses 

performed on [A-TS’] – and only [A-TS’] – proposal.” Id. at 27. Contrary to A-TS’ assertion, 

the record shows that as part of the corrective action, the Agency reconsidered all offerors’ 

proposals. As the SSEB’s post-GAO brief indicates, all offerors were afforded an opportunity to 

be reconsidered, and the Mission Capability Evaluation Team “researched issues, conducted reevaluation and made revisions to record as appropriate.” AR 3300. This is reflected in the postprotest review for Cubic’s Subfactor B – Technical Approach, where the Agency removed 

Cubic’s strength for travel costs that had been questioned by GAO. AR 3313. 

A-TS further argued that the Agency created a new weakness in taking corrective action, 

while Cubic and the Government contend that the Agency “reworded” a weakness identified in 

GAO’s outcome prediction. The original weakness assigned to A-TS’ proposal and risk as 

compared to the reworded weakness and risk are as follows:

Original Weakness and Impact/Risk Reworded Weakness and Impact/Risk

Offeror has one individual whose hours 

exceed 1 FTE (352 for CLIN 1; 1880 for 

CLIN 2) without explanation (STO 3 – page 

59)

Offeror provided an inconsistent staffing 

plan for Transition. The Senior Exercise 

Planner is proposed to work 544 hours 

during transition (page 194 para 1.1 

Transition) however, in Exhibit 73 (page 

167) the Senior Exercise Planner is not 

identified and instead the hours are divided 

between Program Analysts.

Government is uncertain why one individual 

is exceeding 1 FTE hours

Because of the inconsistency in the proposal 

the Government doesn’t understand the 

transition staffing and [sic] proposed 

transition tasks would be accomplished 
19

AR 3345-46. The original weakness questioned why a Senior Exercise Planner’s hours exceeded 

1 FTE.8 The new weakness questioned the hours of this same Senior Exercise Planner and asked 

why he was designated as working 544 hours during transition in one area of the proposal but not 

in another. Both the old and reworded weakness concern the same person and the same hours, 

and the amplified explanation of this weakness was reasonable, and not the result of a different 

standard being applied to A-TS. 

A-TS further contends that in articulating this weakness, the Agency expressed a concern 

about the hours of A-TS’ Senior Exercise Planner that had “no basis in fact,” and ignored 

Cubic’s inconsistent transition staffing. Pl. Mot. 28-29. The Court concludes that the record 

supports the Agency’s finding of an inconsistency and weakness in A-TS’ transition proposal. 

On page 194 of A-TS’ proposal, under the heading “Project Management,” “1.1 Transition” was 

described as follows:

Transition is 60 days. Team A-TS leadership will initially coordinate with 

incumbent and customer, identify and develop processes/Project management 

plan, and then staff will continue to implement. TO Pjm (352 hours) + 5 Regional 

Leads + (1760 hours) + Senior Exercise Planner (544 Hours) + Logistician (272 

Hours) = (2928 Total Hours).

AR 946. However, A-TS’ Exhibit 73 on page 167 of A-TS’ technical proposal depicted “the 

ramp-up of [Task Order] staff through the transition” but did not mention the Senior Exercise 

Planner. Instead, 272 hours each were assigned to a Senior Program Analyst and a Program 

Analyst. AR 919. The charts for A-TS’ Sample Task Order 3 transition staffing allocation and 

cost proposal did not show the hours of the two program analysts described in its Exhibit 73. AR 

947, 1198. Thus, the Agency reasonably concluded that there was an inconsistency regarding 

who would perform these 544 hours of work during transition.

A-TS also argues that it was treated unequally because it received this weakness for 

inconsistent transition staffing, while Cubic did not receive any weaknesses for the alleged 

inconsistencies in its transition plan. Pl. Reply 22-23. However, the parties are not similarly 

situated in this regard, because A-TS’ proposal had an inconsistency, but Cubic’s did not. See

NCL Logistics Co., 109 Fed. Cl. at 627 (holding that offerors who are not similarly situated may 

be treated differently). In A-TS’ proposal, an individual was listed as performing specified hours 

in one part of the proposal, but these hours were inconsistently assigned to other employees in 

another part of the proposal. In contrast, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that there was an 

inconsistency in Cubic’s proposal due to its $0 cost for transition and its use of both indirect and 

direct employees.

DTRA Reasonably Assigned A-TS’ Proposal a Weakness for On-Site Staffing

A-TS argues that DTRA irrationally awarded it a weakness for its on-site staffing. As 

part of the Subfactor B – Technical Evaluation for Sample Task Order 2, DTRA gave A-TS a 

weakness which stated “[t]he Offeror’s proposal increases the on-site presence for the On-Site 

Operational Support and FBI Program Liaison positions (Task 3.1; Task 3.2).” AR 3392. The 

 

8 The only individual having more than 1 FTE hours on page 59 of Sample Task Order 3 

was Senior Exercise Planner [***]. 
20

associated impact/risk was stated to be “Government cannot accommodate additional on-site 

presence other than what is indicated in the SOW.” Id. The related solicitation provisions 

stated:

6.1. The contractor shall provide one (1) FTE on-site for operational support to 

ICP J3BPPC office throughout the period of performance as required to assist in 

planning and execution of ICP program requirements as well as facilitate 

requirements coordination and communication with ICP partnering elements 

within DTRA; . . . . 

6.3.1. The contractor shall provide part-time, on-site support at the FBI 

International Operations Division (IOD) to plan, formulate, execute, monitor, and 

measure ICP program requirements and implementation support with the FBI as 

well as facilitate the required coordination and communication between J3BPPC 

and the FBI IOD. 

AR 292-93. 

A-TS’ proposal stated that the Task Order project manager and the Senior Program 

Analyst would support the ICP J3BPP office and that the Senior Program Analyst would serve as 

the DOD/FBI Liaison Officer. AR 890-91. When describing its staffing, A-TS stated that on-site 

operational support (Task 3.1) would be done by a Program Analyst for 2940 total hours and the 

DOD/FBI Program Liaison Support (Task 3.2) required “one FTE for two different areas,” 

consisting of “To Pjm (125 hours) + Senior Program Analyst (1870 hours) + 960 Program 

Analyst – 2955 Total Hours.” AR 896. 

It was reasonable for DTRA to award A-TS a weakness for its proposed staffing levels 

for these positions. While the solicitation specified one FTE for the ICP J3BPP on-site office 

and part-time support for the on-site FBI liaison office, A-TS proposed hours well beyond one 

FTE (1880 hours) for both roles, because ATS proposed that Task 3.1 would be done by a 

Program Analyst for 2940 hours and Task 3.2 would be shared by three individuals for 2955 

hours. A-TS’ current argument that individuals working in these roles could have been 

employed off-site or could have worked on-site when the Government requested their presence 

was not included in A-TS’ proposal. See Pl. Mot. 32-33.9 

 

9

In its reply, A-TS raises a new argument that Cubic should have received a similar 

weakness because Cubic proposed [***] as its “DTRA on-site liaison in planning and execution 

of ICP J3BPPC reqs” for 1915 hours, also more than 1880 hours. Pl. Reply 24. However, A-TS 

misinterprets Cubic’s proposal. Cubic did not propose that [***] would only spend 1915 hours as 

the on-site liaison. His full job description was:

Serve as DTRA on-site liaison in planning and execution of ICP J3BPPC reqs. 

Facilitate communication with interagency affiliates. 

Maintain ICP Dashboard schedule, administrative records, document meetings. 

Support unforeseen short-notice tasking. 
21

The Agency Reasonably Assigned A-TS a Weakness for Senior Program Analyst 

Responsibilities

A-TS argues that it should not have been assigned a weakness for Subfactor B –

Technical Approach in Sample Task Order 2 for an alleged discrepancy between its Execution 

Plan and Staffing Plan in explaining the responsibilities of the Senior Program Analyst. Pl. Mot. 

33. 

This weakness stated:

The Offeror’s Staffing Plan lists the Senior Program Analyst as solely providing 

full time on-site support at the FBI. Offeror’s Execution Plan assigns the Senior 

Program Analyst additional responsibilities not listed in the Staffing Plan. (3.2.3; 

3.2.9.1; 3.2.9.3).

AR 3392. The associated impact/risk was “Government is uncertain as to the scope of the Senior 

Program Analyst’s responsibilities.” Id.

A-TS asserts that there was no discrepancy. Pl. Mot. 33. However, as DTRA noted, the 

record shows that A-TS inconsistently described the Senior Program Analyst’s role across 

different parts of its technical proposal. A-TS’ Execution Plan at section 3.2.3 stated that “[t]he 

Senior Program Analyst [would] lead the ICP portal management throughout the life cycle of 

course content and engagement.” AR 877. The Senior Program Analyst was also described as 

an “ICP Portal stakeholder.” Id. However, in ATS’ Execution Plan section 3.2.9.1, the Senior 

Program Analyst and the TO Pjm were described as part of the on-site operational support to the 

ICP J3BPP office. AR 890. Furthermore, in Execution Plan section 3.2.9.3, the Senior Program 

Analyst was described as serving as the “DOD/FBI ICP program Liaison Officer,” ensuring that 

“all ICP events are coordinated and documents are properly staffed through both the J3BPP and 

the FBI IOD.” AR 891. As part of this role, the Senior Program Analyst would “help the FBI 

IOD plan, formulate, execute, monitor and measure the ICP program requirements as well as 

facilitate and coordinate between the DOD, DTRA, and FBI.” Id. 

A-TS’ Exhibit 68 to its proposal, which broke down job roles by hours, assigned the 

Senior Program Analyst 352 hours for transition, 10 hours for ICP curriculum development and 

revision, and 1870 for the DOD/FBI Program liaison support. AR 894. A-TS’ Staffing Plan 

referred back to this Exhibit but described the scope of the Senior Program Analyst’s work as 

Provide onsite support to the FBI International Operations Division (IOD) to plan, 

formulate, execute, monitor, and ensure ICP requirements and implementation 

support. Maintain close liaison with the FBI WMD Directorate and in country 

legal attaches. Provide curriculum review, development, and oversight. Facilitate 

and coordinate communication between J3BPPC and FBI IOD. 

AR 906. This Staffing Plan thus did not mention the Senior Program Analyst’s role in leading 

ICP portal management or his role in the on-site J3BPPC office. 

 

AR 1813.
22

The Agency’s articulation of this weakness contained an error -- the Staffing Plan did not 

list the Senior Program Analyst as “solely” providing full time on-site support to the FBI, but 

referenced Exhibit 68, which showed that the Senior Program Analyst would spend 10 hours on 

ICP curriculum development and revision. See AR 894, 906. However, despite this inaccuracy, 

the weakness correctly identified that the Execution Plan listed additional responsibilities for this 

position not included in the Staffing Plan. DTRA’s error in not acknowledging the 10 hours for 

ICP curriculum development and revision does not invalidate its identification of the differing 

responsibilities A-TS gave to the Senior Program Analyst across different areas of its proposal. 

The different Execution Plan sections described a broader scope of the role of the Senior 

Program Analyst than was evident from the Staffing Plan, which was confined to describing the 

work of the Senior Program Analyst while performing as the DOD/FBI liaison. 

In any event, A-TS was not prejudiced by its receipt of this weakness for Subfactor B –

Technical Approach Sample Task Order 2. A-TS received an “outstanding” rating for Subfactor 

B – Technical Approach, and removing this weakness could not have improved its rating. This 

weakness was not mentioned in either the pre- or post-GAO protest SSA decision and thus did 

not appear to tip the balance in favor of Cubic. See AR 2751, 3294. 

DTRA’s Best Value Decision Was Reasonable

Procurement officials have substantial discretion to determine which proposal represents 

the best value for the government. E.W. Bliss Co., 77 F.3d at 449. Here, the SSA acted well 

within his discretion to decide that while A-TS’ and Cubic’s proposals were roughly equal, 

Cubic’s proposal provided certain desired advantages, and Cubic’s [***] lower cost made 

Cubic’s proposal a better value to the Government. 

Conclusion

The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the AR and motion for injunctive 

relief. The Court GRANTS Defendant’s and Intervenor’s cross-motions for judgment on the 

AR. The Court directs the Clerk to enter judgment accordingly. 

s/Mary Ellen Coster Williams

MARY ELLEN COSTER WILLIAMS

Judge